European Solidarity in Action and the Future of Europe: Views from the Capitals 3030865363, 9783030865368

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The Future of Europe

Michael Kaeding Johannes Pollak Paul Schmidt Editors

European Solidarity in Action and the Future of Europe Views from the Capitals

The Future of Europe Series Editors Michael Kaeding , Institut für Politikwissenschaft, Universität Duisburg-Essen, Duisburg, Nordrhein-Westfalen, Germany Senem Aydin-Düzgit, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Sabanci University, Istanbul, Turkey Johannes Pollak, Webster Vienna Private University, Wien, Wien, Austria

The “Future of Europe” series consists of monographs and edited volumes analyzing topical European issues from the perspective of each EU Member State and neighboring countries, helping to understand the different aspects of the future of the European project. It aims at combining two goals: high quality research-based and/or informed contributions stimulating pan-European national and European, academic and non-academic discussions around the “Future of Europe”, involving preferably leading academic scholars and practitioners. The series provides an authoritative library on the Future of the European Union ranging, amongst others, from general conceptual texts to assessments of countries, regions, key institutions and actors, policies and policy processes. Books in the series represent up-to-date sought-after sources of information and analysis reflecting the most up-to-date research and assessments of aspects related to the Future of Europe. Particular attention is paid to accessibility and clear presentation for a wide audience of students, practitioners and interested general readers.

More information about this series at https://link.springer.com/bookseries/16774

Michael Kaeding • Johannes Pollak • Paul Schmidt Editors

European Solidarity in Action and the Future of Europe Views from the Capitals

Editors Johannes Pollak Michael Kaeding Webster Vienna Private University Institut für Politikwissenschaft Wien, Wien, Austria University of Duisburg-Essen Duisburg, Nordrhein-Westfalen, Germany Paul Schmidt Austrian Society for European Politics Wien, Wien, Austria

ISSN 2731-3379 ISSN 2731-3387 (electronic) The Future of Europe ISBN 978-3-030-86536-8 ISBN 978-3-030-86537-5 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86537-5 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022, corrected publication 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Foreword

The year 2020 will go down in the history books. Not because the number trips so readily off the tongue, but because decades from now people will still remember that in 2020 the world changed out of all recognition. Everywhere there are clear signs that this prediction will be proven correct. Yes, but for all the wrong reasons, many will rightly say: the pandemic has plunged the world into a disastrous health and economic crisis. Europe has faced and overcome many crises in the past, but the coronavirus pandemic is affecting the daily lives of many millions of people to an unprecedented degree. That is true, but there will also be positive reasons to remember 2020 for a long time. Granted, Europe learnt that it could become massively vulnerable from one day to the next. But Europe has also shown its strengths. Those strengths did not emerge overnight, but gradually they became more and more clearly visible and their impact more and more clearly felt. Of course, the European Union must also accept criticism, take decisions more transparently, welcome an assessment of its mistakes and not shy away from democratic scrutiny. There is a debate to be had about how Europe is combating the pandemic, but not about whether it should be doing so. Because a pandemic that knows no borders cannot be defeated solely by means of national measures. If you don’t believe it, try this thought experiment: let’s suppose the pandemic had struck a few decades earlier; in the worst-case scenario that it had hit us like the Spanish flu hit our forefathers at the beginning of the twentieth century, and what is more in the immediate aftermath of a catastrophic world war. Let’s suppose that the EU was at best still a noble idea. Initially, things would have gone much worse as they in fact did: every country in Europe tried to face it alone and muddle through as best it could. Imagine there had been no other way. The occasional disputes over vaccines have offered a grim reminder that until a few decades ago conflicts such as these might still have been settled by force of arms. In 2020, happily, the ‘every country for itself’ phase didn’t last long. Borders were closed again overnight, and the first reaction of every country was to try to deal with the crisis alone. But more and more countries quickly realised that there could v

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be only one truly effective response: cooperation and solidarity, or in other words mutual support to contain the spread of the virus, for example by offering beds for intensive-care patients and providing protective and respiratory equipment, and joint efforts to develop, produce and procure vaccines and medicines. Ultimately, agreement was reached on joint action plans to cushion the severe economic and social upheaval the coronavirus has caused. Without a common Europe, there would be no Next Generation EU recovery programme. Without the EU, there would be no EUR 1800 billion to be invested over the next few years in the reconstruction and transformation of the European economy in keeping with the objectives of the Green Deal: climate protection, digitalisation, health protection and social cohesion. Without the EU and billions of euros in funding for pharmaceutical companies, effective and safe vaccines against COVID-19 could never have been developed in record time. Without the EU, it would have been unthinkable that not even 2 years after the outbreak of the pandemic vaccination against the coronavirus will be available for every European who wants it. Without the EU, there would be no consensus on the need to take a long, hard look at what happened in 2020: to describe, analyse and state the bald facts, with no ifs or buts. This is essential if we are to learn from the many less appealing episodes, which have marred our efforts to address the crisis. Solidarity means different things to different people; it is not perceived and lived in the same way everywhere. This book does much to analyse the practical implications of this diversity of viewpoints, to highlight the need to first explain our ideas to one another, so that we can understand one another better and learn from one another. This book will also help us address the shortcomings that still plague Europe: it provides a platform for a pan-European debate. Europe needs this marketplace of opinions, a forum in which ideas can be discussed and, yes, criticisms voiced: a source of inspiration and energy. This book thus also represents a significant step towards the creation of a proper European public space. All too often, our first instinct is to approach European issues from a narrowly national perspective and therefore in an often limited public sphere. It’s almost as if we put blinkers on. Issues which relate to a borderless Europe call for a borderless public debate. COVID-19 was not the only upheaval we had to come to terms with in 2020. At the last minute, a deal setting out the formal arrangements for the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union spared us a ‘hard Brexit’. We will be dealing with the practical repercussions of Brexit for a long time to come. More importantly, they should also prompt us to look beyond specific events and identify broader trends: the fact that nationalist rhetoric is sometimes more popular than calls to work together across borders; the fact that attempts to explain social and economic disadvantages convince intellectually, but not emotionally; and the fact that in the short term national self-interest still trumps European solidarity.

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Despite some false starts, the response to the coronavirus crisis has shown us that it doesn’t have to be like that. And that, even in the face of an unprecedented challenge, in the end a belief in the power of solidarity won through. It may be a coincidence, or it may be a sign, that Europe was shaken to its very foundations in 2020, a year in which we had set ourselves the task of reflecting together on the future of Europe—intensively, in a series of events planned down to the last detail. The Citizens’ Dialogues were supposed to have begun in May 2020. The start is now planned for the first half of 2021—coronavirus permitting. In deference to the pandemic, the dialogues will take place mainly online for the time being. This book can and will help us get more out of that process. Because the basis for any genuine step forward is an honest and unsparing appraisal of the status quo. Transparency and openness to criticism are the necessary and only stable foundations for any successful transformation. The aim of our joint efforts must and will be to make the EU, that is to say ourselves, more efficient, more transparent and more effective. Brussels, Belgium February 2021

Othmar Karas Katarina Barley

The European Commission’s support for the production of this publication does not constitute an endorsement of the contents, which reflect the views only of the authors, and the Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained herein.

Why This Book?

The spread of COVID-19 has turned the world upside down. The pandemic has put enormous stress on us human beings and the global economy and revealed the limits of politics in its current forms. The impact on the European Union (EU), its member states and neighbouring countries poses the biggest challenge since the Union’s inception. It is the latest stress test for Europe’s solidarity after being pummelled by the euro zone debt turmoil, the migration challenge of 2015–2016, a changing geopolitical environment and Brexit. Suddenly, to paraphrase R. Koselleck, our past experiences no longer allow us to extrapolate the future. Whether or not the EU can bounce back and what shape the recovery will take depends on what actions the member states are willing to take, individually and collectively. It is no exaggeration to say that current items on the European agenda are unprecedented in terms of their nature and magnitude: coordinating measures to contain the outbreak; mitigating the social and economic consequences of the lockdown; managing medical supplies; and research for and joint procurement of a vaccine. When the global pandemic first broke out, member states seemed to act in a decidedly un-European spirit. Free movement of goods and people, along with traditional supply routes for medical equipment, was blocked by the temporary closure of borders. Medical goods were procured on a ‘first come, first served’ basis. As the pandemic’s first wave reached its peak in March/April 2020, there was general surprise over developments, especially the striking lack of European solidarity. Though, European leaders and institutions had learned their lessons from previous crises over recent years and hence were able to act quickly. Having recognised the initial impact caused by the outbreak and subsequent lockdown on their already stuttering economies, they put in place a series of financial emergency programmes in the spring of 2020 amounting to more than EUR 3500 billion along with national programmes and initiatives for the coming years—a sum which the European Central Bank (ECB) decided to increase by another EUR 500 billion to a total of EUR 4000 billion by the end of December 2020. xi

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But first things first. On 18 March 2020, the ECB started the money shower by adopting its EUR 750 billion Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP) to lower borrowing costs and increase lending in the euro area. This was in addition to the EUR 120 billion decided on 12th March. These two measures combined to form 7.3% of the euro area GDP. On 4 May 2020, the European Commission registered EUR 7.4 billion in pledges from donors worldwide during the Coronavirus Global Response pledging event. On 4 June 2020, the ECB Governing Council decided to increase the EUR 750 billion envelope for the PEPP by EUR 600 billion to total EUR 1350 billion. In addition to these central measures, the euro area finance ministers (Eurogroup) put in place a threefold safety net credit line on 15 May 2020 (for workers, businesses and governments) amounting to a package worth EUR 540 billion. As a comprehensive economic policy response to the COVID-19 crisis, this is part of a concerted European response which includes the European Commission’s safety net for workers, its SURE instrument (Support to mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency), granting 16 member states (Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechia, Greece, Hungary, Spain, Croatia, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia) temporary financial support of up to an overall EUR 100 billion in the form of EU loans; the European Investment Bank (EIB) with its safety net for businesses, offering liquidity support to help hard-hit small and medium-sized enterprises with an emergency support package of up to EUR 200 billion; and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) with its lending capacity for sovereigns providing pandemic crisis support with credit lines amounting up to EUR 240 billion. On 21 July 2020, European Council members agreed on the future Multiannual Financial Framework 2021–2027 (MFF) amounting to EUR 1074.3 billion. In addition, there is a specific recovery effort under ‘Next Generation EU’ (NGEU), through which the European Commission can borrow funds on the capital markets for the Union of up to EUR 750 billion, which can be distributed to member states in the form of grants (EUR 360 billion) and loans (EUR 390 billion). End of December, the European Council members agreed to finalise the adoption of the MFF Regulation, at the level of the Council, and during the December plenary session, the European Parliament adopted the EU’s general budget for the year 2021—the first annual budget of the MFF 2021–2027.

Eyes Wide Shut—Solidarity Under Stress For EU citizens, though, the financial assistance seems to have gone almost unnoticed. Rather, they place more emphasis on overburdened health systems, closed borders, export/import stops of medical equipment and an overall disappointment about how the pandemic has been handled by the EU and its member states so far.

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It seems that many European politicians so far have missed the point that such a pandemic also raises eminently strategic questions. Who helps and how? Who determines the essential level of trust in the EU for the foreseeable future? Europe may have made available enormous amounts of financial help to mitigate the consequences of the pandemic. Nevertheless, it has so far ruefully failed to address the strategic questions jointly and hence left gaps, eagerly filled by Russia and China, but also Turkey. After more than 70 years of European integration it turns out, once again, that solidarity is a concept well-spoken of, but rather rarely acted upon. The sovereign debt crisis and the migration crisis have provided us with first glimpses into the abyss of solidarity’s absence. The immediate future years will give us a tremendously important answer to the question of whether the Union is just a fair-weather construction or if there is more to it. This anthology, consisting of 41 chapters, takes us on an eye-opening journey across Europe through varying national perspectives on lived and perceived solidarity. In many respects, it is quite a sobering travel—a trip that opens our eyes to the narrow, limited and diverse national definitions of solidarity. Along the way, we will come across reports from countries where solidarity within the EU seems to have found a rather safe and secure place in politics as well as policies: in Ireland and Estonia, citizens see the EU as a central political frame of reference. Solidarity is not a topic for discussion since it has become widely accepted and a matter of course. Yet, member states also show solidarity out of self-interest. Dublin has been showered with solidarity because of Brexit, having managed to upload critical Irish border issues to EU level, but remains averse when it comes to tax issues and joining the Schengen area. At the opposite end of the spectrum, we find Italy, hard hit by the last decade’s ‘polycrisis’ and now taken down even further by the pandemic, hence seriously questioning the value of EU membership. If, during the biggest challenge of the Union’s history, trust in Russia is reported to be higher than in the EU, something is manifestly wrong. Rightly or wrongly, Rome has a feeling of abandonment and was quick to criticise that it is a case of solidarity only in words and not in deeds. There is European help on the horizon, but implementation takes time and the EU has still not mastered the art of engaging with its people. If small economies depending on open borders are suddenly waking up to closed borders, where is the social capital built amongst political leaders after decades of cooperation? Somewhere between the extremes, we find countries such as Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal, Slovakia, Denmark, Germany and Romania, who all show a rather pragmatic approach to solidarity. In addition, we have member states such as France, Sweden, Austria, Greece and Spain who for a number of different reasons are sceptical about the value of solidarity. Interestingly, this group is an assemblage of those who have the impression that they are and will always be paying for the others’ inefficiencies and those who have been at the receiving end of solidarity mixed with often perceived humiliating attitudes from other member states. However, the role of countries inextricably bound to the EU by either hoping for membership or being in limbo for decades (Turkey) is not to be neglected in this

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context. The role of EU support and solidarity in developing a democratic civil society in its neighbourhood is continually emphasised. One cannot but wonder if membership will one day have a sobering effect on the EU’s ‘civilising effect’. For most of the 41 country reports in our book, solidarity seems to be understood primarily in economic terms. Many countries see themselves rather on the receiving side of solidarity, as if it were a one-way street, without considering any form of reciprocity. This is the view, for instance, not only of countries in the Western Balkans, and Bulgaria and Romania, but also Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic. Some still regard their countries as victims of history and still expect financial compensation. Against this background, solidarity can even create negative notions and is contested as a moralising rhetoric. Cyprus and Malta, for instance, see EU solidarity as an obligation. In this regard, migration has widely been regarded as an example of solidarity failure, representing a perceived low point for the Mediterranean region. By contrast, Germany has seen a U-turn in financial solidarity. It has become clear to many that the country recovers only if others also recover, lessons learned amongst others from Germany’s re-unification, including unification tax. Luxemburg acknowledges EU ambitions, but points out the lack of means available to actually meet expectations. The absence of regional solidarity between countries of the Western Balkans is also striking, while by contrast the ‘Baltic bubble’ produced very positive results, demonstrating greater cooperation amongst certain countries during the first phase of the pandemic. The Benelux countries, on the other hand, also report failure in looking for regional strategies during the pandemic’s early stage. Croatia cites a particular problem that is also manifested in other countries, namely a ‘brain drain’ of medical staff, a challenge which is critical during a health crisis. The concept of flexible or frugal solidarity, a way of opting out of close cooperation, is favoured by Denmark, for instance. France, for its part, follows a rather maximalist approach to solidarity. For Paris, the EU is obviously more than just the single market and has very much to do with social convergence as well as European value-based cooperation, rather than tax competition. However, there are also blind spots in the country’s pro-solidarity credo. It is often perceived as a messianic approach of teaching others a moral discourse that hides its own actions in failing to honour European rules in fiscal policy, common foreign and security policies or a joint migration approach.

Strengthen European Solidarity in Action Our journey shows that many EU citizens are dissatisfied with solidarity in action, as demonstrated within and between EU member states as well as other countries in the immediate neighbourhood. Nevertheless, there is diversity to report, in that Europe still covers more than four time zones with high Summer temperatures in the Mediterranean and arctic temperatures in Scandinavia; speaks 24 different languages; pays with nine currencies; and uses three common alphabets. Moreover,

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the Union combines national populations which range between 475,000 and 83 million, per capita GDP from EUR 7000 to EUR 93000, features a variety of different religions, as well as national and regional cultures. All in all, not surprisingly this poses a challenge for mutual understanding and cooperation across the continent. However, there is generally strong support amongst citizens (ranging from 50% to more than 80%), for the EU to be granted more competences for dealing with crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic, given that existing national and regional solutions seem to be falling short. This is particularly significant in Portugal, Luxembourg, Cyprus, Malta, Estonia, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Romania, Spain, Bulgaria, Poland and France. At the same time, Finland, Sweden, the Netherlands, Austria, Croatia and Czechia, for instance, are more sceptical and emphasise the importance of differentiation and cooperation along with subsidiarity. These differences within the EU and across Europe must be understood and respected, but nevertheless common European solutions to problems with a global dimension, such as pandemics, need to be worked on. More broadly, this calls for special attention in maintaining and improving solidarity across Europe. Solidarity follows interdependence across Europe. Between January 2002 and January 2020 alone, exports of goods for EU-27 member states to other member states increased from EUR 120.8 billion to EUR 256.3 billion. In 2019, the value of export trade in goods within the EU ranged from EUR 698.8 billion for Germany to EUR 1.3 billion for Cyprus. There were nine member states whose exports of goods to partners in the EU were over EUR 100 billion in 2019, accounting for 80.8% of intra-EU exports’ total value. In five member states (Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria and Poland), the value of goods exported to partners in the EU-27 increased more than 10% annually between 2002 and 2019. In nine member states (Czechia, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Estonia, Greece, Croatia, Hungary and the Netherlands) average annual growth was between 5 and 10%. Interdependence is growing and thus solidarity should follow, not only economically, but also politically, culturally and historically. Solidarity is a European value and motive for action. The EU is a union of people and nation-states. Hence, interdependence between human beings and states creates a moral duty for supporting each other at all times, not just in response to a pandemic, when solidarity translates into mutual assistance and help. As a cornerstone of the European integration process, solidarity is about understanding each other, being aware about differences and interdependencies and taking joint responsibility for a common future in a Union of 27 member states. Practised European solidarity is a shared contribution to the future of the continent. Only together it is possible to fight pandemics and find the right medicine, strengthen the Euro zone, solve the migration challenge, secure Europe’s role in the world and make a valuable contribution to global environmental challenges. Consequently, demonstrable solidarity lived by the whole European community is our potential way of gaining back sovereignty. Solidarity inspires the Union’s institutions. We have seen that EU governance involves a form of reciprocity and hence fundamental equality, a core principle within the functioning of the EU and its institutions. It is on such egalitarian grounds

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that EU member states are equal in their deserving the same rights as EU institutions. The Union caters well for smaller member states with an operating degressive proportionality in the European Parliament, an EU founded as a communité de droit based on the principle of legality, an existing club spirit within the European Council and Council of Ministers with voting rights based on the principle of double legitimacy: states and people. Brexit shows that it was a fundamental mistake of British Brexiters to imagine that they could infect the European Union with their own radical and principled rejection of European solidarity. As Brendan Donnelly graphically states in this volume, ‘The United Kingdom has received from the EU over the past 4 years a painful lesson in the effectiveness of solidarity, having been comprehensively out-negotiated by a united and well-coordinated European Union, demonstrating its institutional effectiveness.’ European solidarity requires a European identity in addition to our national, regional and local identities. How well a political entity is performing depends on how much it can count on solidarity amongst its citizens and amongst its territorial components. Accordingly, we need to strengthen a common European identity, the sense of belonging to one European society, without which there can be no solidarity. The Union is not a cash machine, but a club of countries and people sharing common values. European solidarity, which cannot be taken for granted, needs to be backed by the European public. In 2001, Jürgen Habermas wrote, ‘[. . .] a European public sphere in the sense of an area of communication in which the members of a political community debate common affairs has not yet been created.’ Twenty years later a European public sphere has not come into being either through a European mass medium or through the Europeanisation of national public spheres. Europe still operates in national media bubbles. European solidarity needs a transnational communication space. The European public deserves being referred to in this way only if the discourse is organised according to European values and rules. Johannes Hillje has been demanding for years that Europe must develop its own digital infrastructure. Ultimately, we need to talk about solidarity in practice; otherwise instances of European solidarity go unnoticed. Let’s be clear: By going it alone, Europe would now be much weaker. Only through European cooperation we were able to mobilise funds for vaccine development—a key factor in the fight against the virus. Together, we were able to leverage our bargaining power with companies to secure enough vaccine doses. Through a fair distribution system based on solidarity within the EU, all countries are supplied with quantities of vaccines in the coming months in proportion to their population, not according to their economic weight. By going it alone, no member state would have been able to secure more and earlier doses of vaccine at the negotiated prices. After all our volume talks about the successes and problems of solidarity in action. It talks to an audience beyond an academic niche interested in European politics. It is another guidebook in our Views from the Capitals series through a tremendously dynamic, interesting and challenging political landscape of Europe. As a guidebook, it favours lexical purpose as much as comprehensive comparative

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reading. Students and teachers may find a myriad of questions to explore more deeply in seminar papers and theses. Practitioners will benefit from the short overview being presented and for all of us who are interested readers it demonstrates the breathtaking diversity that unites this continent. We would like to extend our special thanks to Pol Vila Sarriá, Project Officer at TEPSA, for the editorial processing and his tireless efforts in making this project happen. December 2020

Michael Kaeding Johannes Pollak Paul Schmidt

Contents

Part I

Member States

Austria First? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Katrin Auel and Paul Schmidt

3

Belgium: Struggling with Solidarity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Steven Van Hecke, Britt Vande Walle, Geert Bouckaert, and Valérie Pattyn

7

Bulgaria: Free-Riding on EU Solidarity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Hristo Panchugov and Ivan Nachev

11

Croatia: Solidarity Lost in Translation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Hrvoje Butković

15

Cyprus’ Quest for EU Solidarity: Juxtaposing Community Values with National Interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Giorgos Kentas

19

Flexible Solidarity and the Limits of Altruism in Czechia . . . . . . . . . . . . Petr Kratochvíl and Zdeněk Sychra

25

Danish Frugal Solidarity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Catharina Sorensen

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Estonia: Symbols of Solidarity or Traps of Interdependence? . . . . . . . . . Viljar Veebel

33

Finland: Cherry-Picking on Solidarity? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Juha Jokela

37

France: Solidarity for Others . . . and for Itself! . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Christian Lequesne and Olivier Rozenberg

41

Germany: ‘Together for Europe’s Recovery’?—‘Wir schaffen das!’ . . . . Katrin Böttger, Funda Tekin, and Friederike Augustin

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Contested European Solidarity in Times of Migration Crisis: The Greek Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Eugenia Kopsidi European Solidarity? A View from a Renitent Hungary . . . . . . . . . . . . . Andrea Éltetö, András Inotai, and Norbert Szijártó Ireland: Dublin Benefits from and Contributes to European Solidarity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Brigid Laffan Italy: The Straw That Breaks the Camel’s Back? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Eleonora Poli and Nicoletta Pirozzi

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Latvia’s Peripheralised Solidarity: Rise and Fall of the ‘Baltic Bubble’ during the COVID-19 Pandemic in 2020 . . . . . . . . . . . . Aleksandra Palkova and Karlis Bukovskis

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Perceptions of European Solidarity in Lithuania—plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ramūnas Vilpišauskas

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Liberty, Fraternity, Recovery—The Luxembourg Perspective . . . . . . . . Guido Lessing

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Solidarity as the Small State Mantra for Malta’s EU Membership . . . . . Mark Harwood

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Poland: From the Solidarity Movement to Non-reciprocal European Solidarity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Zdzisław Mach Gone with the Pandemic?—Portugal and EU Solidarity . . . . . . . . . . . . . Alice Cunha Romania Relies on the EU’s Solidarity Budget to Overcome the Pandemic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Alexandru Damian and Bianca Toma

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The Extent of Solidarity—(Mis)interpretation in Slovakia . . . . . . . . . . . Lucia Mokrá and Andrea Figulová

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Slovenia: Solidarity Sounds Right, But Can We See It? . . . . . . . . . . . . . Maja Bučar and Boštjan Udovič

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Spain’s View of European Solidarity: A Pro-EU Attitude and a Self-Perception of Weakness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 Ignacio Molina Sweden: COVID-19 Messing Up the Concept of Solidarity . . . . . . . . . . . 109 Gunilla Herolf

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The Netherlands: Solidarity and Responsibility Are Two Sides of the Same Coin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 Jaap de Zwaan Part II

EU neighbours

Is the EU Albania’s Indispensable Ally Through Thick and Thin? . . . . . 119 Alfonc Rakaj and Leonie Rakaj-Vrugtman Can the Coronavirus Defeat Ethno-Politics? Paradoxes of Solidarity and Politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123 Vedran Džihić Georgia’s Pandemic Response: Promoting European Integration Through the Lens of Solidarity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127 Elene Panchulidze European Solidarity out of Self-Interest: Iceland and Crisis Management in the EU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131 Baldur Thorhallsson Friends in Need Are Friends Indeed: How Kosovo Failed to Show Solidarity During COVID-19 Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135 Donika Emini Liechtenstein: Solidarity, Yes, but on my Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139 Christian Frommelt Montenegro: Enlargement Solidarity, Hoping for the Best . . . . . . . . . . . 143 Danijela Jaćimović and Nikola Milović EU Solidarity in Action: The Curious Case of North Macedonia—Welcomed Amidst Quarantine! . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147 Irena Rajchinovska Pandeva and Sasho Georgievski European Solidarity in a Time of Crisis: A Norwegian Perspective . . . . . 151 Ulf Sverdrup and Pernille Rieker Serbia: Shared Loyalties Amidst the Pandemic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157 Marko Savkovic Switzerland: Solidarity Taken Hostage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161 Frank Schimmelfennig Solidarity Clashes with Geopolitics in EU-Turkey Relations . . . . . . . . . . 165 Senem Aydın-Düzgit and Özgehan Şenyuva United Kingdom: Brexit Meets European Solidarity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169 Brendan Donnelly

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Contents

EU-Ukraine: Towards a New Quality of Solidarity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173 Mykhailo Pashkov Correction to: Belgium: Struggling with Solidarity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Steven Van Hecke, Britt Vande Walle, Geert Bouckaert, and Valérie Pattyn

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About the Editors

Michael Kaeding is Jean Monnet Professor for European Integration and European Union Politics at the Institute of Political Science of the University of DuisburgEssen. He is visiting fellow at the European Institute of Public Administration (EIPA) in Maastricht as well as a flying faculty member at the College of Europe (CoE), Bruges, and the Turkish-German University (TAU) in Istanbul. Michael is a Fulbright alumnus and was Carl Schurz Professor during the academic year 2019–2020 at the University of Madison-Wisconsin. His research covers books and articles on non-voters at European Parliament elections, the micromanagement of European institutions and implementation of EU-legislation, norms and values across Europe, along with forms of classic and alternative EU decision-making. Between 2016 and 2019, he was chairman of the Trans European Policy Studies Association (TEPSA). The Institute of Political Science at the University Duisburg-Essen is the largest educational and research institution for political science in the federal state of North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) and enjoys high standing within the German political science community. Johannes Pollak is Professor of Political Science and rector of Webster Vienna Private University. He previously headed the Department of Political Science at the Institute for Advanced Studies in Vienna. He is also Chairperson of the Board at the Institute of European Politics in Berlin. Former positions include a Leverhulme Fellowship at the University of Reading, a Senior Visiting Fellowship at the LSE and Jean Monnet Fellowship at the EUI in Florence. His research aims to bridge the gap between political theory and European integration together with European energy policy. His latest books deal with the theoretical challenges to political representation as well as the role and function of EU Agencies in times of crises. Webster University is an American university founded in 1915. The Vienna Campus, Webster Vienna Private University, opened in 1981 and is accredited both in the USA and in Austria.

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Paul Schmidt is Secretary General of the Austrian Society for European Politics, which promotes analysis and dialogue on European affairs. He has previously worked at the Oesterreichische Nationalbank, both in Vienna and at their Representative Office in Brussels at the Permanent Representation of Austria to the European Union. Paul currently dedicates his time to discussing and advancing European integration, with a special focus on the future of Europe and EU public opinion. His comments and op-eds are regularly published in Austrian as well as international media. The Austrian Society for European Politics (Österreichische Gesellschaft für Europapolitik) was founded in 1991 and aims to promote and support communication and analysis of European affairs in Austria. With its headquarters in Vienna, the Society is a non-governmental and non-partisan platform mainly constituted by the Austrian Social Partners and the Oesterreichische Nationalbank. The Society is also a member of TEPSA.

Part I

Member States

Austria First? Katrin Auel and Paul Schmidt

With the COVID-19 crisis of 2020, questions of European solidarity are once more focussing public attention in Austria. This topic is certainly not new within the country’s political debate. Viewed from a rather national perspective and with emotions sometimes running high, EU solidarity has always been a widely discussed issue even before Austria joined the Union in 1995. During the post-World War II decades, Austrians saw themselves as citizens of an independent, neutral country in Europe, more or less unaffected by global shocks and upheavals. With the European Union accession-process being initiated in the late 1980s, many saw this position at risk. Using the slogan ‘Gemeinsam statt einsam’ (‘Better together than alone’) for the EU accession campaign, Austria’s federal government tried to dispel such worries and placed European solidarity at the centre of its agenda, a successful move which led to a two-thirds majority in favour of EU membership during the 1994 referendum. Yet, a stagnating economy in the initial months following accession, coupled with Austria’s position as a net contributor to the EU budget, soon raised doubts as to whether the country would actually benefit from EU membership or whether European solidarity was in reality just a ‘one-way street’. Once the historical vote had been won, supporters simply stopped talking about the EU, leaving citizens’ remaining questions and concerns unanswered. In the general elections a few months later, the right wing Austrian Freedom Party, strong critics of the EU, gained more than 20% of the votes, unprecedented in its history. Furthermore, in 2000 it formed a government in coalition with the Austrian People’s Party. The subsequent bilateral measures of 14 EU member states

K. Auel Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, Austria e-mail: [email protected] P. Schmidt (*) Austrian Society for European Politics, Vienna, Austria e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), European Solidarity in Action and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86537-5_1

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fuelled disappointment as they were perceived by many not only as a visible sign that solidarity was absent, but also as illegitimate and disproportionate meddling in internal democratic affairs that had a profoundly negative impact on Austrian public opinion. As an export-oriented country, Austria has clearly benefited from EU accession, the single market and Eastern enlargement. Trade within the EU accounts for over 70% of Austria’s exports, with Germany and Italy being the most important export partners. Yet the economic rationale remains rather abstract with benefits not always tangible for everyone. Whenever the pros and cons of Austrian membership are debated, Austria’s position as a net contributor seems to be the elephant in the room. In turn, there is no consensus on the question of added value for Austria, especially in emotional terms. There is limited awareness that: the country participates in every EU decision taken; young Austrians benefit from EU programmes such as the Erasmus+; substantial parts of EU budget payments flow back into Austria as regional subsidies; or that the alpine country receives contributions from research or solidarity funds. Austria’s financial contributions are often presented as a generous transfer of money to economically weak and reform-reluctant countries, turning a blind eye to the fact that Austrian business benefits from strengthening neighbouring economies, whether through the EU structural funds or specific financial aid. As a result, the concept of European solidarity is rather one-sided and sometimes misunderstood. Still, in a recent survey by the Austrian Society for EU Politics, almost half of the population supported the mobilisation of financial aid for COVID-19 affected EU countries. A similar perspective determines the government’s position regarding the migration and refugee challenge. Indeed, Austria ranks among the most affected countries, registering almost 100,000 positive first instance decisions on asylum applications from 2015 to 2019 according to Eurostat. This represents about 1% of the population, which puts Austria in third place within the EU, behind Sweden (1.4%) and Germany (1.2%). Immigration had been on the public agenda since the mid-1980s and most Austrians initially supported the reception of refugees. However, political discourse and public opinion changed quickly, with arrivals from mainly Muslim countries fuelling worries over Austrian identity and values. As in many other member states, such worries translated into politics and strengthened right-wing populist parties and views. With the second People’s Party and Freedom Party coalition taking office at the end of 2017, the dominant views emerged that: Austria had shown sufficient solidarity; it would not accept further refugees; and the country did not support the UN global compact for migration. Instead it argued for helping the countries of origin. Indeed, for the government ‘the obligation of solidarity’ meant ending a dispute over the quota system for distributing refugees into the Union and focussing on ‘flexible solidarity’ as well as joint action to prevent refugees from crossing the EU’s external borders. Here, given the different integration challenges faced by EU member states, the Austrian official rhetoric is close to that of the Visegrád countries. Moreover, as the government’s reaction to the refugee situation in Greece illustrates, it has not significantly changed its course, despite participation from the Green Party

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in government since January 2020. Adopting this defensive position is a preferred ‘wait and see’ approach rather than proactively contributing to a new European migration and asylum policy. With the COVID-19 pandemic spreading throughout the EU, Austrian solidarity discourse has reached a new level. As in many other cases, Austria relied on national measures and unilateral border closures, but was ready to provide medical and other support to countries in need. Regarding the negotiations on the coronavirus aid package ‘Next Generation EU’, and the extraordinary multiannual EU budget, Austria reinforced its stance and formed part of the so-called frugal four. During earlier negotiations on the new, post-Brexit, multiannual EU budget, Vienna had already demonstratively ‘put its foot on the brake’ by signalling that larger contributions by the net payers were not acceptable. On pandemic-related aid to the most affected countries, Austria insisted on the provision of loans rather than grants and categorically opposed any form of ‘debt union’ for the future. Accusations regarding a lack of solidarity were rejected arguing that net contributors were ‘generous per se, because they pay more than they take out’. At the same time, Austria’s government expected adherence to the ‘he who pays the piper, calls the tune’ principle and demanded a say over how its contribution is spent. Viewing developments through national lenses rather than looking at the bigger economic picture, it was regularly underlined that the current difficult situation is, at least partly, that the countries themselves are to blame, because they did not prudently save during the ‘good economic times’. However, while the mix between loans and grants was adapted, ultimately a consensus was reached on the overall amount of a recovery fund worth EUR 750 billion. The return question ‘Who has solidarity with us?’ increasingly serves as a rhetorical tool in the Austrian political blame game. Reducing the question of solidarity to a purely financial debate, though, may prove tricky and harmful. A tough stance on the European stage may well help to curb other populist forces at home, but to be credible, the government’s frequent affirmation of their pro-European position has to go hand in hand with its actions. If not, a common European perspective is lost, new scapegoats are created and EU scepticism may thrive. The COVID-19 crisis has demonstrated a need for joint European action. Globally, Europe must reduce external dependencies, but also position itself more confidently in competition with players such as China and the USA. The added value of European solidarity and our neighbours’ destiny directly determining our own well-being, needs to be better understood and its challenges continually discussed. Less polarising European debates and a more constructive role of EU member states would help to raise public awareness that many of the problems we face cannot be solved alone.

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Katrin Auel is Head of the Research Group ‘European Governance, Public Finance and Labour Markets. She joined the Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS) in 2012. After completing her studies at the University of Konstanz, she held positions at the University of Halle-Wittenberg, the University of Hagen, the University of Oxford and Viadrina European University. She has also held visiting posts at Waseda University, Tokyo, the University of Halle-Wittenberg, Stanford University (Oxford campus), Science Po Grenoble and as an associate researcher at Sciences Po, Paris. Her research focuses on Europeanisation, multilevel governance and legislative studies, with a specific interest in the role of national parliaments in the EU. The Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS) is an independent research institute covering the areas of Economics, Political Science and Sociology and a member of the Trans European Policy Studies Association (TEPSA). Paul Schmidt is Secretary General of the Austrian Society for European Politics, which promotes analysis and dialogue on European affairs. He has previously worked at the Oesterreichische Nationalbank, both in Vienna and at their Representative Office in Brussels at the Permanent Representation of Austria to the European Union. Paul currently dedicates his time to discussing and advancing European integration, with a special focus on the future of Europe and EU public opinion. His comments and op-eds are regularly published in Austrian as well as international media. The Austrian Society for European Politics (Österreichische Gesellschaft für Europapolitik) was founded in 1991 and aims to promote and support communication and analysis of European affairs in Austria. With its headquarters in Vienna, the Society is a non-governmental and non-partisan platform mainly constituted by the Austrian Social Partners and the Oesterreichische Nationalbank. The Society is also a member of TEPSA.

Belgium: Struggling with Solidarity Steven Van Hecke, Britt Vande Walle, Geert Bouckaert, and Valérie Pattyn

As Belgium is still perceived as a traditional pro-integration EU member state, European solidarity is expected to be part of the country’s DNA. During the COVID-19 pandemic, though, the country has not displayed particularly strong solidarity, not even towards its neighbouring countries. Neither has it demonstrated positive political leadership. Hosting most EU institutions, benefiting from the single market as an open economy and having a long track record in supporting deeper integration, Belgium has been a staunch ally of the Union, not just for its own interest but also from a more voluntarist point of view. For a much longer time than in many other member states, policy-makers have benefited from the so-called permissive consensus in which a pro-EU attitude among elites contrasted with relatively little interest from the wider public. Recently, this has changed with Belgians being less in favour of EU integration. According to the latest Eurobarometer data (2019), for instance, 49% of Belgians have trust in the EU, compared to 53% 1 year before and 43% on average. Over the last decade, political parties, mainly but not exclusively from extremes of the political spectrum, have started to criticise the ongoing integration process, a strategy that clearly helped their electoral success.

The original version of this chapter was revised. Author name was corrected in this chapter. The correction to this chapter can be found at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86537-5_42

S. Van Hecke (*) · B. Vande Walle · G. Bouckaert KU Leuven, Leuven, Belgium e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected] V. Pattyn Leiden University, Leiden, the Netherlands e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022, corrected publication 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), European Solidarity in Action and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86537-5_2

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Solidarity within the EU has for a long time not been considered to be an issue, but has attracted increasing controversy in light of ongoing internal state reform. It has become a central question as to how much solidarity is needed to keep Belgium together. Or put differently, to what degree are Belgian citizens willing to show (and pay for) solidarity with other parts of the country (intra-country solidarity), particularly in terms of social welfare and social security. This is seen as a system of interpersonal (financial) solidarity that is often criticised, but still broadly supported by the general public. Financial solidarity with the EU overall is very strong. It is generally accepted that a country must pay for membership of the EU, but that ultimately this should be regarded more as an investment with a high return. Hence, only rarely has the country’s EU budget contribution become the subject of discussion and then usually by the Flemish nationalists and extreme right. However, an increasingly sensitive issue of late concerns how the revenues are ultimately spent within Belgium, another challenge to intra-country solidarity. Flemish nationalists often complain that too much EU money is spent in the country’s southern region of Wallonia, especially with regard to structural funds and new instruments such as the Just Transition Fund (created to facilitate the implementation of the European Green Deal). Generally speaking, Belgium does not consider itself to be a net payer. Although its contribution to the EU budget is higher than the country receives from different funds, one has to take into account that a considerable amount is invested in and around Brussels, due to the presence of many EU institutions. In 2018, for instance, Belgium paid EUR 3.84 billion (0.84% of GDP) to the EU budget, but EUR 8.51 billion (1.86% of GDP) was spent. Probably the most popular form of solidarity comes in the form of longstanding cross-border relationships. Given the country’s geographical location and political history as well as its strong ties with neighbouring regions and cities, this comes as no surprise. Financial assistance to facilitate cross-border cooperation (Interreg programmes) is certainly welcomed by policy-makers. Yet more important is the political belief shared by many that problems can be tackled seriously only if all countries involved work together. The Benelux grouping, whose economic agenda was overtaken by the EU, has found a new ‘raison d’existence’. Cross-border cooperation has developed not only in soft policy areas such as culture and tourism, but also in hard policy areas such as home affairs. Outside of the Benelux heading, though, relations with for instance the Netherlands are not particularly self-evident. Most controversial is the issue of migration. As a country of arrival and transmigration (particularly to the UK) with rising figures in the last decade, particularly since 2015, the attitude of Belgian policy-makers as well as the wider public is ambiguous, if not polarised. On the one hand, there is support for those in need when it is organised in a humane and fair way. Belgium wants to do its share, proven by the relatively high number of accepted refugees, especially minors, as well as many spontaneous and organised initiatives by individuals, NGOs and local governments. On the other hand, there is a strong tendency to think that Belgium has already done enough and is not responsible for solving the rest of the world’s problems. Both sides favour more European solidarity ‘in action’, for instance in having common

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European rules and guidelines for relocating refugees somewhere close to the EU’s external borders. Surprisingly, as hinted above, a call for more European solidarity has largely been absent with regard to COVID-19. The federal government merely paid lip service to European integration at a time of crisis. Left-wing opposition parties called for more action and leadership but in reality not much happened. As with most member states, the initial reaction was to opt for self-interest, with no compensatory words or deeds in regard to European solidarity, not even with neighbouring countries. Although at the peak of this crisis half of the Intensive Care Units beds remained empty, not a single patient was transferred to Belgium, unlike the situation in Germany, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and France. This first wave ‘coronationalism’ was even more surprising, given the existing record of cross-border health cooperation. However, a large support and relief effort did emerge when the EU leadership was finally able to agree on its overall coronavirus response during the European Summit of 17-21 July 2020. Among the mainstream political parties and media, it was seen as a breakthrough, especially in terms of the EU’s financial management with the creation of so-called Corona-bonds and the possible introduction of EU taxes. More integration in terms of health care (and sanitary crisis management) was not on the table and nor is it clear whether or not this would have received much support. Overall, Belgium has remained silent. Due to the strong (and adversarial) position of the Netherlands in providing southern EU member states with financial assistance to fight the pandemic, ‘political solidarity’ within the Benelux grouping existed only on paper, in sharp contrast to previous cooperation. At least in the public sphere, typically comparisons with the Netherlands in responding to COVID-19 are often made, but this does not seem to lead to more convergence. As a small member state, Belgium applauds everything that is done at European level which it cannot do on its own, such as making hard deals about a coronavirus vaccine with global pharmaceutical companies. Outspoken positions in support of European solidarity have been absent, although the tone might change soon. The new federal government’s ambition is to regain its position as ‘a strong voice in Europe and the world’ by, among other things, becoming an example of ‘effective solidarity’.

Some Recommendations The Belgian government should release public statements making its position explicit whenever proposals with regard to European solidarity are made, for instance with regard to asylum and migration. A plan for cross-border patient transfers in times of health crises should be decided and good bilateral cooperation practices should be applied in different policy areas.

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Steven Van Hecke is Associate Professor in Comparative and EU Politics at the Public Governance Institute of the KU Leuven. His research focuses on Europarties, EU institutions and European integration history. KU Leuven is a research university based in Leuven that ranks among the best 50 universities worldwide. It has been identified as Europe’s most innovative university for 4 years in a row by Reuters. Britt Vande Walle is PhD Researcher at the KU Leuven Public Governance Institute, funded by a FWO fellowship ‘Fundamental Research’. Britt conducts research on Belgian and comparative politics. She focuses on political parties, political party think tanks and Belgian political crises. KU Leuven is a research university, ranked among the best 50 universities worldwide. It has been identified as Europe’s most innovative university for 5 years in a row by Reuters. Geert Bouckaert is Professor at the KU Leuven Public Governance Institute and has published on performance management, public sector reform as well as financial cycles. KU Leuven is a research university, ranked among the 50 best universities worldwide. It has been identified as Europe’s most innovative university for 5 years in a row by Reuters. Valérie Pattyn is Assistant Professor at the Institute of Public Administration of Leiden University, with partial affiliation to KU Leuven Public Governance Institute. Her current research programme focuses on topics such as comparative policy analysis, evidence-informed policy making, policy design, policy evaluation and policy capacity The Institute of Public Administration is one of the Netherlands’ largest and oldest institutes of academic research and teaching in the field of public administration. It combines a solid international academic reputation with a central positioning among the international, national, regional and local governance institutions of The Hague.

Bulgaria: Free-Riding on EU Solidarity Hristo Panchugov and Ivan Nachev

Jurgen Habermas claims in an essay (2008) that there are three crises in Europe concerning: legitimacy, solidarity and leadership. All result from a lack of functional civic participation. He later outlines an ongoing ‘gulf at the European level between the citizens’ opinion and will formation [. . .] and the policies actually adopted to solve the pressing problems’ (2013), leaving ideas and conceptions about the EU’s future ‘diffuse’ among the general population. These conclusions come in the aftermath of several external and internal crises affecting the Union. The financial and economic crises from 2008, the migration crises from 2015, along with Brexit and COVID-19 have not only impacted the concepts of burden sharing and solidarity, but also brought increasing attention to a range of ineffective policies covering immigration, asylum, Commmon Foreign Security Policy (CFSP), unemployment and so on. Both principles have remained somewhat distant to some of the member states and had only a limited impact on the already rather weakly institutionalised aspects of EU solidarity in Bulgarian discourse and governmental strategy. Solidarity is both a value displayed in interpersonal relations and an institutionalised principle of cooperation among states. To understand the underlying issues connected with an alleged ‘lack of solidarity’ in Bulgaria, we examine comparative data provided by the European Value Survey (EVS) in 2007 and 2017, outlining the underlying tendencies visible in some of the major tests that institutionalised and interpersonal solidarity faced after 2008. Since the signing of its association agreement, Bulgaria has been a net recipient of funds in the EU, with ‘conditionality’ having left little space for public debate on issues related to common EU identity. The overall consensus in Bulgaria saw this accession process as a means to an end, namely ‘democratisation’ and ‘liberalisation’. There has been little need for discussion about European values, paths of integration and the EU’s future. The process was perceived as highly

H. Panchugov (*) · I. Nachev New Bulgarian University, Sofia, Bulgaria © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), European Solidarity in Action and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86537-5_3

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technical and complex, thus to a large extent not calling for public conversation or approval. It also shifted the focus of national politics away from domestic policymaking in favour of the bigger goal. As Krasen Stanchev notes, the only narrative present in the wake of Bulgaria’s membership was the idea that Bulgarian citizens would benefit from EU funds. Accordingly, an interesting paradox has emerged. On the one hand, Bulgarians still hold stronger levels of trust in EU institutions than in Bulgarian state institutions. But on the other hand, the overall sense of identity and solidarity is much more related to the Bulgarian state, culture and language. Furthermore, as Petia Kabakchieva notes, the 2008 EVS (European Values Survey) results show that there are extremely low levels of trust in institutions but even more importantly that there are no horizontal links and social solidarity among Bulgarian citizens. Indeed, there are clear signs of distrust towards others and a very strong atomisation of Bulgarian society, which brings into question the existence of a political community, with 82% of respondents sharing the belief that you should be very careful when trusting ‘others’. Around 32.9% are ‘not very concerned’ or ‘not concerned at all’ about the living conditions of Europeans. This clearly results not only from a lack of identification with common European projects, but also and mostly an understanding that European states are much more developed. Hence, at this stage Bulgaria needs help in catching up, rather than seeing the EU’s future as a common and mutual effort. These attitudes have manifested themselves in the challenges of recent years. Public discourse around the debt crises that hit Greece and Romania in 2008, carried a tone of condemnation (our stability versus their instability), rather than raising the issue of common instruments to tackle debt and economic problems. Similarly, attitudes concerning the idea of solidarity in regard to refugees focussed on keeping refugees out, rather than discussing ways of sharing the accommodation burden for those already in. A relatively visible change appeared in the shape of the COVID-19 pandemic. Bulgaria has committed to providing personal protective gear to Austria and dedicated EUR 100,000 toward research into a coronavirus vaccine. It also initiated the restructuring of all appropriate industrial facilities to the production of protective gear and declared a readiness to distribute to EU member states. The Prime Minister proposed an EU ‘medical shield’ as a common protocol to regulate the reopening of public services and events, as well as cross-border trade and travel. However, these have simply instrumental value while focusing on the financial aid for mitigating the economic and social effects of the crisis. National discourse has certainly been dominated by discussion about proposed common EU financial instruments and funds dedicated to Bulgaria. As an overall conclusion, Bulgaria has done little in terms of EU solidarity where it matters. Although universal supporters of all EU attempts to create institutionalised solidarity, this is largely due to a lack of interest outside the topic of EU funds, thus is usually a ‘trade-off’. The absence of a ‘European discourse’ in the national public sphere makes developing a coherent and purposeful position on any EU integration related matters a difficult process. Further moves in that direction

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come up against the highly complicated and technical policy-making process at EU level and hence public and institutional attention is usually not stirred in any way.

What Can Be Done? The remedy to the above situation is twofold: overcoming the existing attitudes, while building an active civil and political society; and strengthening the institutional capacity of national administrations. European institutions will have to undertake a direct and proactive approach in engaging the Bulgarian people on issues concerning EU solidarity. The passive approach to communication which depends on national governments does more to emphasise differences rather than placing the focus on unity amongst member states. Targeted and context specific communication strategies will have to address these issues. ‘One size fits all’ narratives are ineffective and will continue to create a gap between EU and domestic policy agendas. Increasing the transparency of EU decision-making procedures and creating a package, clarifying national positions on solidarity related issues will also help with focusing on the ‘end goal’ instead of differences. A proactive interaction with national administrations in terms of a solidarity related agenda, issues and communication will also be extremely beneficial. Bulgarians’ trust in the EU is largely coloured by expectations that EU institutions will keep Bulgarian institutions in check. This resource is extremely underused and under-appreciated as an instrument to stir the narrative in Bulgaria. Hristo Panchugov is Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science at the New Bulgarian University. He is a graduate of the Central European University (Hungary). The New Bulgarian University was established in 1991 with a resolution of the Bulgarian Parliament. Its mission is to be an autonomous liberal education institution dedicated to the advancement of university education by offering accessible and affordable opportunities for interdisciplinary and specialised education as well as high quality research. The University is also a member of TEPSA. Ivan Nachev is a Bulgarian political scientist and an expert on political integration of the European Union. His interests are in the fields of political theory and practice, European values, European integration theories, strategies and political practices. He is a member of the Bulgarian Association for Political Sciences, the Institute for Public Policies and Partnership, the European Community Studies Association (ECSA) and Team Europe at the European Commission. The New Bulgarian University was established in 1991 with a resolution of the Bulgarian Parliament. Its mission is to be an autonomous liberal education institution dedicated to the advancement of university education by offering accessible and affordable opportunities for interdisciplinary and specialised education as well as high quality research. The University is also a member of TEPSA.

Croatia: Solidarity Lost in Translation Hrvoje Butković

Economic Benefits of EU Membership In 2019, Croatia’s contribution to the European Union (EU) budget was around EUR 0.5 billion. Whilst this sounds like a large sum, it is less than payments made by certain members with smaller populations. Due to their stronger economies, contributions from countries such as Slovakia and Ireland, roughly the same size as Croatia, are much larger. Since its 2013 EU accession, the country’s position, always on the net receiving end of EU budget funds, has become stronger with growing professionalism in its administration, civil society organisations and businesses. Roughly 80% of all public investments in Croatia have been co-financed from EU funds. The largest contracted project so far is an ongoing construction of the Pelješac Bridge. It will unite two parts of Croatia which are currently physically separated by the sea access corridor that belongs to Bosnia and Herzegovina. The overall net worth of the project is some EUR 400 million. Other important infrastructure projects primarily concern reconstruction of ports, airports, sections of the railroad network as well as water supply and waste disposal systems. The economic benefits of EU membership are by no means limited to Structural Funds. Integration of the Croatian economy into EU value chains in the pre-pandemic period resulted in the annual economic growth of some 3%, which was above the Union’s average. Moreover, since 2013 exports represent a growing proportion of Croatian GDP and now exceed imports, reversing the trade situation prior to EU accession. All of this in the 2014–2019 period influenced reduction of the debt to GDP ratio from 84.7 to 73.2% as well as an increase of the employment rate from 59.2 to 66.7%. Last but not least, in recent years Croatia has witnessed a genuine annual wage growth of some 2%.

H. Butković (*) Institute for Development and International Relations, Zagreb, Croatia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), European Solidarity in Action and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86537-5_4

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However, due to the coronavirus crisis Croatia is expecting an economic contraction of around 10%. This is partly due to a sizeable reliance on tourism, which contributes almost 20% to the country’s GDP. It is further expected that due to pandemic the debt to GDP ratio will increase to 90%. In such difficult circumstances, additional EU support in the form of grants and loans from the EU Recovery Fund is of key importance. In addition to EUR 12.3 billion from 2021 to 2027 MFF, in the years to come Croatia will have access to an additional EUR 9.4 billion from the Recovery Fund. 75% of those funds are reserved for grants and only 25% for loans. Hopefully the synergetic effects of this increased funding will trigger greater economic growth as we move forward.

From Not Enough Jobs to Too Few Workers Despite all its benefits, EU membership has also produced some negative economic side effects. Opening up the European labour market to Croatian citizens led to a mass emigration by many, a significant section of the labour force. Official data indicates that in 2013–2018 the country lost 200,000 skilled people. Moreover, recent research of statistical sources across the EU shows that the number of Croatian emigrants could be even higher at around 60%. The outflow of people has to some extent been compensated for by almost 100,000 immigrants that have settled in Croatia since 2013. In recent years from 2017, the share of immigrants from Western Balkan countries is on the decline so that nowadays some 15% originate from non-European countries. Of particular concern is many larger towns’ (county centres) struggle with persistent population decline, due to the combined effects of emigration and low fertility rates. The emigrant population structure leaves little hope of their eventual return. They comprise mostly young people in the most productive ages of their lives, with many of them being well educated. Hardest hit is the medical sector where so many workers have left that the system is already experiencing operational problems. The pattern of Croatia’s (pre-pandemic) economy that was growing and the people that are leaving represents a paradox to which no adequate answer has yet been found. Somewhere in the gap created by this paradox, the national debate about solidarity in the EU has been lost. The starting point for all discussions about the EU is always about Croatia being at the receiving end of its solidarity. Any discussions about Croatia being a provider of solidarity within the EU are practically non-existent. The only exception is solidarity shown towards the Western Balkan countries through the promotion of further EU enlargement. However, it could be argued that even here the motives are economic and political rather than grounded in values and altruism.

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What Could Be Done? Some Recommendations It is difficult to expect a more balanced national debate about solidarity in the EU before Croatia achieves an even greater degree of economic convergence with other member states and before it reverses its troubling trend of population decline. The former could be obtained through more strategic channelling of EU assistance towards sectors of key importance for the Croatian economy. To date, the government avoided making such strategic choices, treating all sectors as equally important. This is particularly important now that most infrastructure projects are finished and dangers of excessive dependence on tourism are being revealed. The latter could partly be resolved through immigration which has been made much easier since EU accession. However, for the most part it depends on creating better socio-economic conditions for the young professionals to remain in Croatia. Here an important segment is a demographic policy that was sadly neglected until very recently. Croatia should learn from the best practices of other member states which successfully resolved their demographic problems and financial considerations must be addressed as reasons for not having children. Last but not least taxation of the peoeple who stay childless should also be considered. Hrvoje Butković works as a Senior Research Associate in the Department for European Integration at the Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO) in Zagreb, Croatia. He defended his PhD at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb. His primary research interests include democracy in the EU and European industrial relations. IRMO is a public, non-profit, scientific research organisation located in Zagreb, with its main work organised through four departments. IRMO provides strategic support to decision makers and ensures the dissemination of its research results. IRMO is also a member of TEPSA.

Cyprus’ Quest for EU Solidarity: Juxtaposing Community Values with National Interest Giorgos Kentas

EU solidarity is a founding principle for advancing a sense of community in Europe, with the quest for its attainment being amplified during times of crisis. The COVID19 pandemic is continuing to test the Union’s solidarity to its very limits and there is certainly some degree of resentment created by the EU’s failure to deliver. But how is such solidarity created and how are its different manifestations distributed across the member states? Cyprus appears concerned with the effectiveness of this elusive quality, yet Nicosia may need to consider the extent to which its demand for solidarity matches with the solidarity it displays to others.

EU Solidarity Perceived in Cyprus Escalation of tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean forced Cyprus to appeal for assistance from the EU. In May 2019, President Anastasiades urged the European Council to demonstrate its solidarity through actions rather than words. It was not the first time that Cyprus had called upon the EU for support and indeed the country’s reasons for wanting to become a member state in the first place were very much based on a particular conception of European solidarity. During the 1990s and 2000s, the concept of EU solidarity related to efforts for a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus Problem. Cyprus is de facto divided as a result of a 1974 Turkish military invasion, in the aftermath of a snap coup organised by the Greek junta. The Republic of Cyprus joined the Union in 2004, but EU law is suspended in those areas where the Government of Cyprus does not exercise

G. Kentas (*) Cyprus Center for European and International Affairs, Nicosia, Cyprus e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), European Solidarity in Action and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86537-5_5

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effective control. For more than 15 years now, the EU has continued to be involved in the Cyprus Problem. Under the current political, social and economic conditions in Cyprus, EU solidarity is mostly discussed in the context of Turkey’s Eastern Mediterranean activities. A number of EU officials have expressed solidarity towards Cyprus. When EU Council President Charles Michel visited in September 2020, he stated that EU solidarity to Cyprus must be ‘shown by deeds and not only words.’ At the same time, during her State of the Union Address, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen confirmed that Cyprus ‘can always count on Europe’s full solidarity on protecting their legitimate sovereignty rights.’ High Representative/Vice-President (HR/VP) Josep Borrell also made similar statements. Still, media reports show that people in Cyprus expect more action in containing Turkey, not just condemnation of its activities. Cyprus, both in regard to state and society, conceives of EU solidarity as an obligation. Hence, the EU must not only be more vocal in expressing its support for Cyprus’ concerns and interests, but also take action in their defence. Some local analysts, though, suggest that incompatible national interests constitute stumbling blocks for true Union solidarity. Cyprus mostly hears strong verbal statements, which are accompanied by weak actions. At EU level there is criticism suggesting that Cyprus appears to be a net receiver of solidarity, while contributing little to its production.

Foreign Affairs With effect from the early 2010s, new geopolitical developments in the Eastern Mediterranean guaranteed the EU’s full attention. The focus is on maritime zones and sovereign rights in the Mediterranean. Turkey’s illegal activities in Cypriot waters have redefined the context of EU solidarity in terms of supportive statements for its rights and some restrictive measures against Ankara. Turkey’s defiance of EU decisions, as well as an escalation of its illegal activities sparked a debate on the extension of restrictive measures. After the Gymnich meeting in August 2020, HR/VP Borrell announced a political consensus ‘to speed up [. . .] work in order to add individuals suggested by Cyprus to the list of the existing regime for illegal drillings in the Eastern Mediterranean’. The subsequent Foreign Affairs Council in September revealed different approaches. Disagreement centred on the impact of further restrictive measures on Greco-Turkish dialogue. Nicosia suggested that defiance of the Gymnich consensus by some EU member states would lead to deadlock with regard to sanctions against Belarus. Ultimately, Cyprus accepted the adoption of sanctions on Belarus, while further measures on Turkey will be revisited in December 2020.

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Taming the Pandemic In an April 2020 interview, the new permanent secretary of Cyprus’ Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Ambassador Korniliou, said that the EU had miscalculated this crisis and failed to provide effective support for its members in need. That sentiment was shared across other EU countries, with two public opinion monitoring reports—for the European Parliament and by the European Council on Foreign Relations, both published in June 2020—showing that citizens in some member states had turned sceptical about the EU’s capabilities. However, both reports indicate that public opinion is equally doubtful with regard to confidence in national governments. Evidence reveals different perspectives across the Union with regard to EU and national responses to the pandemic. Efforts to suppress the upward epidemiological curve caused a spiral of potentially devastating economic consequences. Cyprus’ government was successful in controlling the pandemic and offering some help to other countries in terms of medical supplies. However, difficult economic problems were soon to emerge. In September 2020, the Ministry of Finance announced growth at 11.9%, compared with an EU average of 13.9% and Eurozone average of 14.7%. The recession reached 5.5% and unemployment climbed to 7.1%, whilst Public debt is now at 120%. To a large extent, Cyprus has been able to deal with the economic consequences from its own resources. In April 2020, the Minister of Finance said that he would not expect much from the EU. However, Cyprus would be resorting to other EU instruments for taming the economic impact by borrowing EUR 479 million (2.4% of GDP) through the SURE instrument (Support to mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency). The country will also receive EUR 700 million (3.5% of GDP) from the EIB and use the EUR 2.7 billion EU recovery funds. As yet, it is not known whether or not Cyprus will avoid an adjustment programme in 2021. The 2013 ECB/Commission/IMF rescue package caused some traumas, but nevertheless led to a positive outcome by restructuring public financial management.

Tackling Immigration Cyprus has the second highest per capita rate of immigration across the EU according to figures from 2017 (Eurostat). In 2019, 13,259 migrants sought asylum in Cyprus, with the overall immigration rate representing 3.8% of Cyprus’ population, compared with 1% in Greece. The Minister of Interior said in April 2020, that the number of migrants in Cyprus is much higher than the country could reasonably hope to welcome. In March 2020, the President of Cyprus announced that Turkey was intentionally channelling migrants to Cyprus and Greece, which constitutes a serious challenge to the entire EU.

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Cyprus is receiving significant EU support totalling some EUR 120 million over a 7 year period (to 2022) for financing migration programmes, which are co-funded by the Union at 90% (up from 75% in previous years). In addition to annual EU support of around EUR 10 million, the annual national budget for migration management provides EUR 29 million. In March 2020, the Ministry of Finance issued a statement contending that ‘the financial strengths of the country and its society have been exhausted by massive and unexpected arrival of migrants’. The Finance Minister called upon the EU to help Cyprus in containing more arrivals.

Contributing to EU Solidarity When former EU Council President Donald Tusk visited Cyprus in October 2019, he stated that EU solidarity is ‘for all its members, big and small’. Moreover, large and small EU states must contribute to supporting community principles and interests. Cyprus needs the EU to express and demonstrate its solidarity by taking action to defend community principles violated by Turkey’s activities in the Eastern Mediterranean. Nicosia also demands EU solidarity in tackling challenges emanating from the pandemic and massive flows of unregulated migrants, although it is appreciated that such actions cannot be taken unless EU member states agree. Hence, the country needs to work harder in advancing EU values. This entails strategic planning and a comprehensive approach to EU affairs. Cyprus’ MFA recently established a new Directorate for coordinating EU policy across ministries and public sectors, an initiative which is encountering resistance from the bureaucracy of some ministries. More must be done for advancing EU values at the national level. Nicosia must also work harder to advance EU interests in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East and Northern Africa. Regional cooperation among neighbouring countries in the form of bilateral, trilateral and multilateral forums must be embedded in an EU framework. Why not invite the EU to be a partner in the region’s emerging geopolitics along with European states who are willing to advance peaceful partnerships, stability and security? Greece, France and Italy have expressed interest and/or joined a number of initiatives in the sectors of energy and maritime security. There is room for EU institutions and other EU states to join them. Giorgos Kentas is Associate Professor in International Politics and Governance at the Department of Politics and Governance at the University of Nicosia. He is Director of a Master Programme in Public Administration. His research focuses on strategic management, politics and governance at national and European levels. He follows EU developments and studies their implications for member states and world politics. He has recently published papers on Brexit and its implications for Cyprus and strategic planning in the public sector of Cyprus.

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The University of Nicosia is the largest private university in Cyprus. It offers more than 100 conventional and distance learning online programmes at Bachelor, Master and Doctorate levels. It hosts more than 11,500 students from all over the world and is also a member of TEPSA.

Flexible Solidarity and the Limits of Altruism in Czechia Petr Kratochvíl and Zdeněk Sychra

Solidarity as a Negative Notion Solidarity is amongst those peculiar political notions that have taken on different meanings in the context of Czech politics. Together with the ‘rule of law’ or ‘EU values’, for example, it has come to be seen as part of the moralising rhetoric used by ‘old’ elites in the European Union (EU). In this interpretation, which has become dominant in Czech political discourse, solidarity ceased to be a symbolic practice expressing the EU’s political unity and was turned into a tool of division. ‘Paternalistic’ and ‘contemptuous’ towards differences are the common predicates that are related to solidarity. To put it simply, solidarity has become a predominantly negative notion. Historically this interpretation competed with the more positive pro-integrationist understanding that dominated before EU accession and shortly thereafter. However, the selective employment of solidarity by the older EU member states as well as widespread dissatisfaction related to persistent socio-economic disparities between the EU’s richer and poorer parts posed a serious challenge to the original optimistic reading of the word. For some on the left, the turning point was the Greek debt crisis, but for Czech political elites at large, the migration crisis constituted the watershed.

P. Kratochvíl (*) · Z. Sychra Institute of International Relations, Prague, Czechia e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), European Solidarity in Action and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86537-5_6

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Migration Crisis as the Watershed While the European Commission was trying to find a legal and institutional formula for the distribution of refugees during the crisis, the underlying political discourse turned decidedly moral(istic). The acceptance of refugees was not seen primarily as a political decision, but as moral responsibility. Solidarity played a central role in this argument, both externally (solidarity with the suffering people fleeing war) and internally (solidarity with the countries with the highest numbers of incoming refugees). This clashed head-on with the dominant narrative in Czechia (but also in the other Visegrád Four countries), according to which Czechia is a country that has suffered historical injustice (Kundera’s famous tragedy of Central Europe), but nevertheless remained staunchly European in mind and spirit throughout its captivity, perhaps even more so than Western European countries. Hence, the return to Europe marked a return to Czechia’s sovereign nationhood with the freedom to decide its own fate. Demanding that the country should adopt ‘European values’ and accept refugees violates both these principles and becomes deeply offensive for many. Even accepting a few Syrian child refugees became a matter of bitter political dispute in the country. Unsurprisingly, an intuitive suspicion towards refugee distribution was immediately capitalised upon by the country’s Eurosceptics. But refugee-related Euroscepticism gained wider traction across the entire societal spectrum. As a result, solidarity had to be interpreted differently, for instance as the (rather limited) willingness to help refugees as far as possible (that is in their countries of origin) or to strengthen the EU’s external borders. This re-interpretation became officially known as flexible solidarity ( flexibilní solidarita or dobrovolná solidarita, that is voluntary solidarity) which soon turned into a political mantra for the entire Visegrád Group.

‘Solidarity Has Its Limits’ This understanding of solidarity then pertains to most policy areas. Assistance to Greece during the Eurozone crisis was interpreted not as solidarity, but as a threat to the economically healthier EU countries, such as Czechia. During the 2020 Spring outbreak of COVID-19, the EU’s role was belittled, with accusations by both the President and the Prime Minister of the Union being entirely incapable of effective action. As the pandemic’s second wave emerged, attention moved away from the EU and only national measures were discussed, with solidarity entirely side-lined. EU-related measures such as a coordinated approach, which may increase accessibility for a new vaccine, was also absent from Czech debate. In a similar vein, EU funds used during the pandemic were publicly labelled as ‘our money’, in spite of the country’s position as a net recipient. Furthermore, in regard to the post COVID-19

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recovery programme (Next Generation EU), for example, Prime Minister Babiš stressed that ‘solidarity has its limits’, criticising the EU’s willingness to become what is referred to as a ‘debt union’. Ultimately, the Prime Minister agreed to adoption of the programme, albeit reluctantly despite the original Commission proposal having been amended to take into account some of his criticism. The new financial sources thus will be used, but their connection to solidarity or their EU origin are not mentioned. Solidarity thus serves a peculiar function in Czechia. Putting aside the pandemic, the term is seldom used and solidarity becomes the fall-back option only in those situations when the country itself needs it, which is rather rare, or when the country’s leadership is indifferent towards a particular matter. Support for Czechia following threatening statements from China’s foreign minister regarding the Czech Senate President’s visit to Taiwan in 2020 is a good example of the former. Interestingly, support for this visit in other EU member states (such as France and Germany) was not actively sought by the Czech government, which opposed the trip. A perfect example of the latter is Czechia’s reaction towards protests against the rigged elections in Belarus. Unlike the Polish PM, Andrej Babiš refused to meet with the opposition leader and instead argued that an EU-wide position had to be found first. This move, though, should not be seen as reliance on EU solidarity, but rather a counterbalancing move against the Polish interventionist approach.

Denied Solidarity For some time now, Czechia has not been in need of extraordinary support from the EU. Unlike the situations in Greece or Italy, mass migration is a non-issue; unlike the Baltic countries’ circumstances, Russia is not seen as an imminent threat; unlike positions being faced by countries in the EU’s southern wing, EU-funded economic recovery is not seen as essential. Coupled with the persistent narrative of Czech exceptionalism (which again resurfaced during the first wave of the coronavirus crisis—premature boasting by the Prime Minister that Czechia was ‘best in COVID’), this attitude leads to a conviction that Czechs do not need solidarity from others (while ignoring the plentiful benefits of EU membership) and hence others do not have any right to expect it from the Czechs. In EU budget terms, the expected transition of Czechia from net receiver to net contributor over the next 4 years or so will most likely further strengthen this attitude. One wonders whether the Czech government of PM Babiš will ever grasp what solidarity means or whether utilitarian calculations will always prevail in regard to the EU. The current strategy of protecting the country from what is seen as lecturing from abroad seems to be the only issue that matters for his government. Amongst rising tensions and a backlash against multilateralism, this position is both shortsighted and dangerous. However, an omnipresent renationalisation of politics also renders this position extremely popular. In a play-off with ‘complex’ against ‘simple and popular’, the latter always wins.

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Petr Kratochvíl is a Senior Researcher at the Institute of International Relations (IIR) in Prague and a Member of the TEPSA Board. He has written dozens of monographs, book chapters and journal articles. His research interests cover theories of international relations, European studies and the religion-politics nexus. Zdeněk Sychra is an Associate Professor at the University of West Bohemia and Associate Researcher at the Institute of International Relations (IIR), Prague. His academic interests include: European Union politics; Economic and Monetary Union; and political governance in the EU.

Danish Frugal Solidarity Catharina Sorensen

It Starts with Old Ventilators . . . Had it not been for the health situation’s severity, one might have forgiven the Italian authorities for thinking that their 1 April 2020 request to Denmark for help with the COVID-19 emergency had been mistakenly accepted by the Danes as an April Fools prank. The 15 or so ventilators that were prepared in response to the plea turned out to be old models unsuited for patients with lung-infections. The Italians understandably said no grazie and the ventilators were duly returned to the hospital basements where they had been found. Early in April, Denmark also donated EUR 1 million to the Italian Red Cross, but somehow that was not the story that lingered. With talks turning to EU solidarity in the aftermath of a spring and summer overshadowed by COVID-19, Denmark was regularly accused of ‘un-solidarity’. Take, for instance, the case of a tracker created by pan-European think tank, the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), to monitor acts of solidarity among the EU member states since the upsurge of the crisis in March 2020. In its August 2020 update, Denmark was found at the very bottom of the list with five solidarity acts, only just above much smaller Malta noting four such acts.

Add Frugality Then there is frugality, sometimes seen as an antonym to solidarity. Together with Austria, the Netherlands and Sweden, Denmark was part of the so-called ‘frugal four alliance’ in negotiations on the new EU framework budget and COVID-19 recovery C. Sorensen (*) Think Tank EUROPA, Copenhagen, Denmark e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), European Solidarity in Action and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86537-5_7

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fund, ‘Next Generation EU’. Prime minister Mette Frederiksen (Social Democrats) often voiced her opposition to giving out recovery funding in the form of direct grants and even called the idea of a larger EU budget ‘completely ga-ga’.

Add Opt-Outs The ga-ga remark resonates against a backdrop of long-standing Danish reservations to taking part fully in EU integration. Since 1992, Denmark has had opt-outs from some of the fastest-growing policy areas of the Union: the Euro, defence, as well as justice and home affairs (JHA). The last includes migration policy, where it implies that Denmark does not take part in the EU’s difficult negotiations on solidarity with the southern European countries that have been overburdened by the refugee crisis of 2015. Both right and left-wing political parties in Denmark have demonstrated little goodwill towards the idea of mandatory EU relocation schemes. That was made painstakingly clear during the run-up to a referendum on changing the JHA opt-out to an opt-in arrangement during 2015. While those against played on public fears of EU controlled mass migration, those in favour, which included all mainstream parties in the Folketing (Danish Parliament), promised that Denmark would never opt-in to the EU’s migration policy. It is widely believed that, despite these promises, one of the key explanations as to why 53% voted no at the referendum was widespread public concern that Denmark could end up taking part in shared solidarity on migration.

EU-Solidarity Is Not Necessarily a Plus-Word in Denmark Relief from being at arm’s length from others’ problems is even more tangible with respect to the euro, where there is a sense that struggling economies in Southern Europe reap what they have sown after years of poor public finances. Support for keeping the Danish crown has grown even stronger in line with the euro-related rescue operations that were initiated after the financial crisis. A survey of nine EU member states, including Germany and France, carried out by YouGov for the ECFR and Think Tank EUROPA in late April 2020 shows that the Danes are among those Europeans who are least willing to share the financial burden of a crisis such as the COVID-19 pandemic. Only 24% of people in Denmark are willing to share the burden. Except for neighbouring Sweden at 30%, replies in the remaining seven countries are much more supportive of financial solidarity, ranging from 43% in Germany to 70% in Portugal. Moreover, there is a parallel to recent years’ harsh debate in Denmark over EU workers’ access to social benefits. Both sides of the political spectrum in Denmark call for more restrictive measures, such as the indexation of child support, or even a

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‘social opt-out’. Against this backdrop, is it fair to conclude that there is a lack of EU solidarity in Denmark?

Danes Are Also Dedicated Europeans It should not come as a surprise that the Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jeppe Kofod (Social Democrats), had not been informed about the inappropriateness of the ventilators when he offered them to Italy. The case met with disgrace in the Folketing and Kofod, well aware of the embarrassment, convened a task force to ensure better coordination among Danish authorities in the future. As to the ECFR tracker, it does not purport to be a complete or even a balanced measure of solidarity. Whereas, for instance, it includes declarations of support, such as a speech, alongside concrete measures, such as donating EUR 1 million, at the same time it excludes repatriation help. Had this been included, Denmark would not have been rock-bottom of the table, as active efforts were also made to board 100 of stranded EU citizens onto Danish planes. Bearing in mind that Denmark figures among the world’s largest donors of development aid per capita, we need to take a closer look at whether it is the EU in ‘EU solidarity’ that sets Denmark apart.

The EU in EU Solidarity According to the ECFR/EUROPA survey, when thinking about recovery from the pandemic, only 25% of Danes expected support to come mostly from the EU. This figure was 46% in Poland and 59% in Portugal. This question is a useful proxy for Europeans’ expectations about EU solidarity—and these do not appear to be very high in Denmark. This suggests that to many Danes it may not come as a surprise, let alone a disappointment, that Denmark does not perform better on the ECFR solidarity tracker. EU solidarity, indeed, is likely to be perceived as something that Denmark is sometimes asked to show to others, not something that Denmark is likely to request, or let alone receive from others. Between its launch in 2002 and 2018, Denmark has never activated the EU alarm bell, the European Civil Protection Mechanism. As such, calls for more EU solidarity are likely to be seen as one-way requests for help from the well-off to the less well-off member states. Alternatively, such calls could be considered as something that could even risk a diluting of Danish standards. The ongoing debate about a minimum wage in Europe is rejected fiercely in Denmark, not because there is a lack of solidarity with underpaid workers elsewhere in the Union, but because of concerns that it will undercut the Danish social model that is known for its low level of legislation. A long history of Danish Euroscepticism, expressed through several EU-referenda, suggests that it is not commonplace to think of the EU as a political

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project in Denmark. Whilst membership of the Union is very highly supported— recent Eurobarometer polls (2020) suggests that a record two thirds of Danes think of membership as a ‘good thing’—this support hinges to a large extent on the internal market. Thus, as citizens of a small country, Danes are well aware of the economic interdependencies among Europeans. Yet, despite more than four decades in the EU club, it has not become a reflex to think of the internal market as being an extension of Denmark. Given the unprecedented severity of this current crisis, COVID-19 may prove to be a turning point. But in order to boost public support for EU solidarity in Denmark, Danish politicians will need to ‘mind the EU gap’ in their story about the single market’s huge importance to Denmark’s open and exportreliant economy. Sometimes helping another member state may be the best way to help one’s own country. Catharina Sorensen is Deputy Director at Think Tank EUROPA, where she contributes to its strategic development as well as being in charge of directing and developing its research-based activities. Catharina holds a PhD in political science from the University of Copenhagen (2007) and specialises in euroscepticism studies. Prior to joining the think tank, she worked for the EU’s European External Action Service, the European Commission, the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Danish Institute for International Studies. Think Tank EUROPA is an independent Copenhagen-based organisation, working to ensure that European affairs become more visible in national policy debates. Through evidence-based inquiry, EUROPA aims to substantiate and improve the foundation on which EU-related policy decisions are being made, irrespective of political ideology.

Estonia: Symbols of Solidarity or Traps of Interdependence? Viljar Veebel

Disappointment in EU Solidarity In 2020 the coronavirus pandemic revealed weaknesses in the interdependence between European Union (EU) countries. From the outset, many member states prioritised their national interests without considering sufficiently the implications of their actions at EU level. For example, Poland closed its border with Germany for foreigners to limit the virus’ spread. However, this caused serious difficulties for Estonians and Latvians travelling back home from Western Europe. People felt trapped and confused after Poland had set out quite absurd demands, for example that cars should be left in Poland while people are transported back to their home countries by buses. This made many Estonians wonder what had happened to European solidarity and why agreements between countries were suddenly no longer being respected. People’s disappointment was reflected in their assessment of how the EU had managed to cope with the crisis. A survey conducted in Estonia during May 2020 by Faktum and Ariko revealed that people living in Estonia generally do not appreciate what the EU did in helping its member states to cope with the pandemic. Only one third of survey respondents agreed that the EU had reacted well. Disaffection with the EU was particularly high among the country’s Russian-speaking minority, half of whom disagreed that the EU had responded well to the pandemic. Furthermore, most survey respondents were critical of indecisiveness demonstrated during the pandemic’s first phase, which they consider had made the Union appear weak.

V. Veebel (*) Estonian Foreign Policy Institute, Tallinn, Estonia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), European Solidarity in Action and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86537-5_8

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Baltic Solidarity Bubble However, challenges posed by the virus outbreak have also demonstrated the strength of cooperation and unity amongst the Baltic states. Whereas the three neighbours’ inability to cooperate has become legendary, this last experience proved otherwise. While other countries closed their borders, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania served as an example of mutual trust to other EU members in quickly opening their internal borders and allowing free movement of citizens within the three countries. This initiative came to be called the ‘Baltic bubble’. Furthermore, following the COVID-19 outbreak, political leaders from Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have many times stressed the importance of close cooperation between the Baltic countries, Poland and the nearest European countries in fighting the pandemic. They have also emphasised the need to cooperate in other areas, such as strengthening the EU Single Market, developing digital economies, ensuring strong collective defence in the region and so on. Last but not least, Estonia organised several special ferry trips to Germany to bring back people who were unable to reach Estonia and Latvia due to virus-related travel restrictions and to ensure the free movement of goods between the Baltic countries and Western Europe. In this respect, the challenges posed by the COVID-19 crisis actually made the Baltic countries even more united.

The EU Back on Track Again The EU institutions have recently made some efforts to support its member states in coping with COVID-19 related issues. For example, an agreement was reached on a multiannual financial framework for the EU and its economic relaunch plan (Next Generation EU), which was enthusiastically welcomed by Estonian government members. As further examples of Union-wide cooperation, the EU not only initiated a joint medical procurement programme that made it possible for Estonia to order about 400 doses of the antiviral drug Remdesivir to be ready for the second wave of COVID-19, but also set up a joint project with a value of EUR 500,000 to support vulnerable groups in Russia who were particularly affected by the pandemic. Although both Estonian people and local companies were less enthusiastic than Estonian politicians about the multiannual financial framework and some other EU-wide initiatives because practical actions were taken much more slowly than was needed or expected, it is obvious today that both the EU and its member states are in a much more advanced state of preparation.

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Challenges Are Not Over However, challenges posed by the virus’ spread are clearly not yet over for the Baltic countries. On the one hand, following the second wave’s outbreak in Autumn 2020, the Baltic solidarity bubble burst when Latvia announced that due to the high and increasing rates of coronavirus infections in Estonia and Lithuania, a 2 weeks selfisolation requirement will be reintroduced to the residents of those countries. Thus, one of the main regional challenges now is to restore the Baltic bubble as soon as possible. This is important for many reasons, including economic interests and psychological effects. On the other hand, even if from a medical perspective the EU and its member states seem to be better prepared for the pandemic’s second wave, clearly a question mark still hangs over the European economy’s recovery. The economic interdependence of European countries could potentially have a negative effect on the Baltic states’ economic recovery. Indeed, at the time of writing European countries are somewhat cautious in easing COVID-19 related restrictions, which implies that despite extensive EU-wide support it will take some time for international trade to recover. As predicted in the Bank of Estonia’s economic forecast from June 2020, two thirds of the country’s economic decline in 2020 is associated with a weak external environment. Thus, Estonia’s overall economic recovery very much depends on recovery in the local exporting sector. Recent significant drops in Estonian export volumes are related to tight restrictions in export destination markets or in the partner countries of those destination markets. In more detail, as argued by Kaspar Oja, an economist from the Estonian central bank, although restrictions related to the virus’ spread were already significantly eased in Estonia during the Summer of 2020, the potential for local exporting companies is still limited, as tight restrictions are still being applied in export destination markets or in the partner countries of these destination markets. By way of illustration, whilst Sweden has not imposed tight virus-related restrictions, nevertheless if economic activity slows down in the export destination markets of Swedish companies, this does affect both Sweden and the countries exporting to Sweden. As the Estonians see it, Germany seems to be the key to success. Local policy-makers call Germany ‘the engine of Europe’ and stress its importance in ‘making certain that Europe is able to recover from the coronavirus crisis successfully, whatever it takes. The German role was even more visible during their 2020 presidency. Still, the EU is not just about Germany, but about 27 member states. It is and will be a Union. Hence, every single EU member state should share the responsibility and carefully consider the consequences of its actions to help the European economy recover quickly from this crisis.

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Viljar Veebel is a researcher at the Department of Political and Strategic Studies of the Baltic Defence College and a National Researcher for the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR). He has worked as an Academic Advisor for the Estonian government in the European Future Convention and as a researcher for OSCE, SIDA, Estonian Foreign Policy Institute and the Eurasia Group. His key research interests include: European security and defence initiatives; use of economic sanctions as a foreign policy tool; along with EU-Russia relations and related sanctions. In the current volume, he represents the Estonian Foreign Policy Institute. The Estonian Foreign Policy Institute (EVI) is an independent, non-profit foundation that focuses it research on: regional security; European Union integration and enlargement; and developments in Russia. EVI is also a member of TEPSA.

Finland: Cherry-Picking on Solidarity? Juha Jokela

Current debate on EU solidarity in Finland displays two seemingly conflicting trends. Amidst a deteriorating European security policy landscape, Finland has highlighted EU’s role as a security community for its members, including its mutual assistance obligation spelled out in Article 42(7) of the Lisbon Treaty. Conversely, Helsinki has underlined EU member states’ national responsibility for their own finances and economy before and after the Euro Crisis. The country has experienced some notable difficulties in adapting its position to the context of economic challenges caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Heated political debate on EU’s economic recovery and the level of solidarity presents a challenge for the Finnish foreign and security policy leadership, which has stressed the need for clarifying and substantiating the meaning of Article 42(7). Finland should critically reassess its approach to EU solidarity and the limits of its own cherished self-reliance amidst not only regional, but also global challenges and transformations.

EU Solidarity in the Field of Security Finland’s EU membership since 1995 is often seen as having provided the country with a possibility to overcome security policy challenges related to its geostrategic location in the Union’s most north-eastern corner, where it shares a border with Russia which extends over 1300 kilometres. Even if Finland has opted for a policy of military non-alignment, it has nevertheless fully aligned with the EU both economically and politically.

J. Jokela (*) Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Helsinki, Finland e-mail: Juha.Jokela@fiia.fi © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), European Solidarity in Action and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86537-5_9

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Interestingly, Finland’s decision to join the single currency in 1999 was also argued to come with security policy benefits. Having the same currency as Germany and France would make Finland an integral part of the EU, which could not be left alone at times of major security policy crisis. Helsinki has also emerged as a strong supporter in strengthening EU’s global role and efficacy in terms of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. After the Ukraine crisis shook the foundations of European security and spilled over to the Baltic Sea Region in the form of heightened military tensions, Finland has also aimed to make the most out of its EU membership benefits in terms of hard security. While not having sought formal membership, Finland has nevertheless deepened its cooperation with NATO as well as with Sweden and the US. Furthermore, it has joined key European defence initiatives such as the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force, France’s European Intervention Initiative and Germany’s Framework Nation Concept. Yet for Finland only the EU membership comes with a treaty-based solidarity obligation in the field of defence. Consequently, the country has highlighted the need for clarifying and substantiating the EU’s mutual assistance clause in providing shelter against a military attack. For its own part, Finland introduced a major change to its legislation in 2017, which now allows for provision and receipt of military assistance under Article 42(7). However, Helsinki has also noted that while EU member states have been interested in deepening the EU’s defence cooperation in general, discussion on mutual assistance does not seem to have received any significant attention in many other EU capitals—most likely because of a divergence in security interests and the fact that 23 out of 27 EU members are also NATO members and hence covered by its Article 5. Moreover, Finnish discussion also highlights the need to retain a credible territorial defence system based on conscription and mobilisation of the whole society in major crises under the doctrine of comprehensive national defence.

National Responsibility in Economy These solidarity underpinnings within Finland’s approach towards the EU as a security community, have not been fully reflected in other key EU policy fields. Despite its full economic alignment with the EU, consecutive Finnish governments have highlighted the national responsibility rather than EU solidarity regarding economic policy in general and fiscal policy in particular. During the Euro Crisis, Finland did not shy away from voicing its objections to how this was managed. For instance, Helsinki signed off the second Greek rescue loan package only after its demand for collateral was accommodated. Finland also became a strong supporter of consolidating rules governing the euro area economies. In addition, it opposed moves towards joint EU debt issuance and highlighted strict

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conditionality for EU emergency funding, most notably in the European Stability Mechanism’s set up. Amidst French President Emmanuel Macron’s demands for a major overhaul of the Economic and Monetary Union, Finland joined the so-called New Hanseatic League of northern EU members in opposing these proposals. Furthermore, it welcomed Germany’s lukewarm responses towards any major reforms in this regard. While these positions were partly shaped by the continuing support for an openly populist and Eurosceptic (‘True’) Finns Party, they also resonated more broadly among the major pro-European parties. The traditional major parties of the centreleft and centre-right have all expressed reservations towards deepening joint responsibility with the EMU in the form of Eurobonds or sizable fiscal capacity, such as a Eurozone budget governed by the Eurogroup and/or the Commission. They have, though, accepted increased responsibilities within the Euro-system regarding the European Central Bank and national central banks of 19 Eurozone members. Against this background, EU economic recovery decisions related to the COVID19 pandemic have proven politically difficult for Helsinki. Solidarity in the form of EU debt issuance channelled to the member states via loans with lower level of conditionality, not to mention grants, seem to run counter to Finland’s EU solidarity approach in economic terms.

National Responsibility as a Form of Solidarity? Given Finland’s record support for EU membership (74% in 2019) and the euro (81% in 2020), according to recent Eurobarometers, as well as the country’s somewhat distinct and notable EU security aspirations, results from the recent YouGov poll from August 2020 are striking in suggesting that among 13 EU members surveyed, Finns were the least inclined to help others in economic crisis situations. Whilst this outcome certainly speaks for a degree of national egoism and suggests that a significant level of internal economic solidarity exists with regard to a strong welfare state, it does not necessarily translate into extensive EU solidarity. However, it can also be considered in part to result from a particular understanding of solidarity drawing from Finland’s historical experiences. These often stress the self-reliance of this peripheral northern state at times of crises, including major wars and severe economic recessions. If this holds true, living up to the national responsibilities also enshrined in EU law could be seen as an expression of solidarity and a preferred pathway towards a stronger EU as a community which includes the field of security.

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Reassess and Explain Finnish Approach to Solidarity Given the interdependencies among EU member states coupled with how well the Single Market and EMU function, Finland should critically reassess its approach to solidarity in the EU. Several severe EU crises over the past decade suggest that the current level of economic and political integration requires a sufficient degree of joint crisis absorption and responsibility. Moreover, a broadly shared priority within the Finnish political landscape to work towards a stronger EU in the field of security and defence is in danger of being seen as cherry-picking, if the calls for solidarity by other member states in other key EU policy fields are dismissed. Yet, Finland should also seek to clarify its own views concerning solidarity in the EU, in particular regarding EMU reforms and the EU’s response to economic downturn related to the COVID-19 pandemic. Given the increasingly competitive and turbulent external milieu, EU member states have a great responsibility in adapting to ongoing global and regional transformations as well as their related risks, so as to build up national and EU resilience. Living up to the responsibilities stipulated in EU law and arrived at jointly in the EU decision-making tables can be seen as a form of EU solidarity and a pathway to enhancing trust among the member states in strengthening joint tools which can respond to future challenges and crises. Juha Jokela is Director of the EU research programme at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA). He is also a board member of TEPSA. His research interests include the political implications of Brexit, differentiated integration in the EU’s external relations and the Europeanisation of foreign policy. The FIIA is a research institute whose mission is to produce high-quality, topical information on international relations and the EU. FIIA is part of TEPSA.

France: Solidarity for Others . . . and for Itself! Christian Lequesne and Olivier Rozenberg

Solidaire, We Stand French political elites have traditionally supported a pro-solidarity credo in European debates. Yet, this remarkably coherent position has important and significant blind spots. ‘I would like to stress the idea of solidarity, because while we have talked at length over the past ten years about responsibility in Europe, we have neglected the solidarity between us’. By making this statement in a speech at La Sorbonne in September 2017, President Macron wanted to point out the limits of a European Union based only on economic competition. He mentioned Jacques Delors’s view that the single market is meant to ‘create competition that stimulates, cooperation that strengthens and solidarity that unites’. For Macron, the very nature of European integration implies finding a balance between what has been called negative and positive integration. Behind the view that solidarity is essential, he meant primarily that the rules accepted between member states should be respected, alluding to those which deal with limiting the budgetary deficit, for which France has performed poorly since the EMU’s introduction. However, Macron also made two ambitious proposals in regard to enhancing solidarity between member states and reducing unregulated competition. Firstly, regarding corporate tax he proposed to harmonise both its base and its rate, given an understanding that compliance with the allocated tax bracket would determine access to the European Cohesion Fund. Secondly, he also advocated a ‘true social convergence’ mentioning the establishment of a minimal wage adapted to the economic reality of each member state and the harmonisation of social contributions. To that end, he imagined an original system regarding posted workers

C. Lequesne · O. Rozenberg (*) Sciences Po, Paris, France e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), European Solidarity in Action and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86537-5_10

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according to which employers should pay a higher rate of social contribution that would supplement a fund in favour of the less wealthy countries to support their convergence. President Macron was elected in 2017 with a pro-EU credo against a radical right candidate critical of the EMU and, whilst he announced his keenness to adopt a maximalist agenda on European solidarity, this discourse is not particularly new. Since the seventies, consecutive French Presidents have adopted the same kinds of views. Between the socialist Mitterrand (1981–1995) and the right-wing Sarkozy (2002–2007), for instance, there were certainly differences in style and emphasis on some specific issues, but the core of this discourse remained remarkable constant: European integration is not just about liberalising the markets, but should also be based on solidarity between Members—solidarity meaning protective and harmonising rules together with redistributive efforts, for example through the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the regional policy. It would be too simple to analyse this credo merely in terms of budgetary benefits for France. Of course, Paris has benefitted much from the CAP and cohesion funds, especially in former industrial regions of the North and East. But the Presidents’ views have remained similar since 2004, when the financial gains from participating in these policies became less obvious. There is arguably something more than utilitarianism in the call for solidarity, such as the view that Europe, as a civilisation, must be based on a form of social solidarity—a supposedly distinctive feature in comparison with its US version. ‘Solidarity within society’ is in a way converted to the European debate by the notion of ‘solidarity between member states’. The shared reluctance vis-à-vis economic liberalism among French elites makes it difficult to support European integration on the sole basis of economic growth brought about by the single market. More recently, the success of populist forces as well as Brexit have been seen as incentives to reaffirm views on European solidarity. For Macron, or Hollande before him, a ‘selfish Europe’ could lead in the short term to victory for ‘selfish populist leaders’. Popular classes should feel that they benefit in real terms from European solidarity so as to turn away from radical parties.

Blind Spots in the French Pro-Solidarity Credo Arguably, France’s pro-solidarity credo is based on a messianic tradition of teaching others. By denouncing EU countries which are selfish in not wanting to play the game of solidarity (Poland then the Netherlands), French leaders forget sometimes that there are no ‘good pupils’ and ‘bad pupils’ among EU member states, but just states with different interests. The COVID-19 pandemic, especially following the lack of support for Italy in early Spring 2020, made obvious that concrete acts of solidarity do not automatically follow speeches. The moral discourse on solidarity is sometimes deeply at odds with the implementation of EU public policies in France. On migration and refugees, France’

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contribution to the absorption of flows is not insignificant, but is by far inferior to the efforts made by Germany or, in per capita terms, Sweden and the Netherlands. On the macroeconomic rules of EMU membership, not once since 1993 has France respected the 60% of GDP maximum threshold against national debt, as called for by the Treaty of Maastricht. By contrast, some Northern and even Eastern EU member states have made considerable efforts to reduce their public debt so as to conform with this requirement. If we take the Commission’s annual general report on the implementation of EU policies, France is certainly not the best in regard to respecting EU law. On foreign and security issues, France also has a culture of quick decisions which sometimes conflict with the need to consult other member states. It goes together with the idea that if France does not take action, neither will the others, as was the case in Georgia during 2008 and Mali during 2013. For the other EU member states, these practices introduce some limits to what France can say about solidarity. Again, an explanation has to be found in the country’s history: in terms of French public opinion, solidarity has mainly to do with budgetary redistribution, whereas for other member states it concerns respect for regulatory compliance. Another limit to the French pro-solidarity credo is the EU’s geographical conception. As a founding member, France has always been reluctant to enlarge the Union overmuch. In particular, France accepted the 2004 and 2007 enlargements because moral pressure resulting from the communist legacy was difficult to oppose. But there has never been any strong conviction among French elites and society that enlargement is a positive step for the EU. This view prevails with the current debate on enlargement to the Western Balkans. Regarding this project, France is not the only EU member state to display reluctance. The same holds true for Austria, Germany and the Netherlands, with little enthusiasm evident in public opinion regarding further enlargement. However, the difference in France is that not only populist politicians, but also those in the mainstream do not hesitate to express their reluctance publicly, with no concern for politically-correct discourse. For them, European solidarity is limited to the EU club members only. A major challenge probably lies in connecting ‘solidarity from below’—a variety of transnational networks and especially cities twinning which constitutes a source of social cohesion—and ‘solidarity from above’ expressed in regular presidential discourse containing supposedly major initiatives. For observers, the disconnection between the two is striking and invites all possible forms of exchange that would contribute to embedding French proposals about European solidarity into already existing live practices.

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Christian Lequesne is Professor of Political Science at the Centre for International Research of Sciences Po. He obtained a PhD and Habilitation at Sciences Po Paris, specialising in European studies and diplomacy. He is co-founder and co-chief editor of the European Review of International Studies. Sciences Po is the leading French research university in Political Science, International Relations and Sociology. Olivier Rozenberg is Associate Professor in Political Science at the Centre for European Studies and Comparative Politics of Sciences Po. He specialises in the study of European integration and legislatures, having edited several books on those issues and the role of national parliaments in European integration. Sciences Po is the leading French research university in Political Science, International Relations and Sociology. The Centre for European Studies and Comparative Politics is a research centre which was founded at Sciences Po in 2005. It aims to fulfil three main missions: develop research on European questions at Sciences Po; facilitate Sciences Po’s insertion in European research networks; and foster European debate on the future of Europe. The Institute is also a member of TEPSA.

Germany: ‘Together for Europe’s Recovery’?—‘Wir schaffen das!’ Katrin Böttger, Funda Tekin, and Friederike Augustin

The term ‘solidarity’ is omnipresent in German social and political discourse for historical reasons and is determined by a belief that common challenges can move people closer together in a society. For instance, the so-called ‘solidarity tax’, an additional fee originally introduced to cover the immense costs of Germany’s reunification, has reminded German citizens over the last 30 years that every taxpayer is contributing to the social cohesion of a long divided country. In general terms, ‘solidarity’ builds on everyday social conventions and expresses a combination of collective efforts for a common interest, an emotional connection as well as the principle of reciprocity. However, this understanding has been increasingly questioned and undermined in German society over recent years. Since the migration of refugees to Europe peaked in 2015 and Angela Merkel’s early slogan ‘Wir schaffen das!’ (‘We can do it’), this issue of reciprocity in particular has given rise to sharp dividing trends in German society. On the one hand, a significant section of the population has identified with an altruistic aspect of solidarity, promoting a Willkommenskultur (‘welcome culture’). On the other hand, a smaller albeit growing number has developed an Ablehnungskultur (‘rejection culture’). This is based on the negative or even hostile reaction to Germany becoming a major destination for refugees and migrants. It prompted the re-emergence of a strong right-wing populist party and even right-wing extremist groups and opinions. This has certainly increased tensions in Germany’s social climate during the last few years. More recently, the COVID-19 pandemic revealed yet another change in the perception of solidarity and collective efforts. Public life in Germany is generally shaped by an active civil society which adds to state and government functions in many ways, such as: integrating refugees; providing neighbourhood help; running K. Böttger · F. Tekin (*) · F. Augustin Institut fuer Europaeische Politik, Berlin, Germany e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), European Solidarity in Action and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86537-5_11

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food banks; or organising cultural, sporting and other social events. However, following the COVID-19 outbreak the government took on a stronger role by adopting strict contact restrictions and protective measures, thereby limiting the activities of many civil society organisations, which then found themselves in a somewhat passive position, waiting for ‘normality’ to return. ‘Obeying laws’ and practising ‘social distancing’ as a concrete interpersonal act of solidarity is, therefore, a novelty from the perspective of a critical and empowered civil society, but was widely accepted as a temporary necessity. At the same time, it has caused considerable resistance and protests by a small, but vociferous and visible minority, which made not wearing face masks a symbol of their political and social beliefs and alleged individual freedom. Since April 2020, demonstrations against the government’s ‘anti-corona measures’ have grown into large-scale protests. The largest so far took place in Berlin on 29 August 2020 with around 38,000 participants. The fact that so many supporters of conspiracy theories as well as members of right-wing and Neo-Nazi groups organise such protests for promoting their own causes represents a significant cause for concern, since they are also hard Eurosceptics. The German government meanwhile put together the largest assistance package in the history of the Federal Republic of Germany, allocating EUR 353.3 billion for recovery from the pandemic, exceeding contributions in France, Italy or Spain. These funds are aimed at fighting the pandemic itself through: the purchase of protective equipment; support for hospitals and resident doctors; as well as development of a vaccine and additional treatments. Moreover, private households are supported by a reduction in value added tax until the end of 2020, along with easier access and increases in allowances for low-income families. The government has also provided vast support for businesses and their employees, including a short-time working allowance, immediate assistance programme for small businesses, selfemployed individuals and freelancers, together with support for the art and cultural sector. Beyond its economic efforts, the government has also undertaken a historically unprecedented retrieval campaign for German travellers and expatriates from all parts of the world with chartered planes and regular travel transfers. In the period from March 2020 to April 2020, more than 240,000 citizens were brought back to Germany. This ‘corona airlift’ was also used to bring seasonal workers to Germany, mainly from Romania and Bulgaria, to secure the harvest particularly of asparagus and strawberries following the closure of internal EU borders. The working and living conditions of these seasonal workers as well as other primarily East European foreign workers in the German meat industry in time provoked heated discussion. Furthermore, heavy media and political criticism resulted, once it became known that the lack of health protection and poor working conditions in general had led to high rates of COVID-19 infection transmission among these groups. In regard to the EU, Germany has had a special responsibility in facing the pandemic due to holding the Council of the EU’s rotating presidency in the second half of 2020. On the one hand, it has to facilitate solidarity and social peace domestically, whilst on the other hand it has to take responsibility for the EU in promoting cooperation and a search for European solutions. Against the COVID-19

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crisis backdrop, Germany opted for ‘Together for Europe’s recovery’ as its presidency slogan in 2020. Yet, the very first steps that Germany took in fighting the outbreak during March 2020 were focused primarily on national crisis management, including export restrictions on protective clothing and equipment, as well as closing borders, which provoked criticism from the European Commission. Only later, did Germany start to provide assistance to other EU member states that were worst affected by COVID-19, including aid deliveries and supplies of protective masks, as well as taking patients from neighbouring countries and Italy. In terms of economic solidarity at EU level, this crisis also revitalised the ‘FrancoGerman tandem’. In contrast to promoting austerity during the Global Financial Crisis that started in 2008, Germany drastically changed its policy and sided with Italy and Spain, two member states that demanded more financial support from the EU. Before opening negotiations for the ‘Next Generation EU’ programme, an emergency tool to extend the multiannual financial framework 2021–2027, Germany and France had together promoted a proportion of two-thirds in grants and guarantees and one-third in loans for the total of EUR 750 billion. The reason for this is twofold: internally, the German government is more stable than it was a year ago and Merkel could push for more solidarity; externally it has become conventional wisdom that Germany can recover economically only if the EU as a whole recovers. While Germany has demonstrated a strong commitment to economic support both at EU and national levels, humanitarian solidarity falls short in the current crisis. There is strong public awareness that tens of thousands of refugees inside and outside camps on the Greek islands—whose living conditions had already been deteriorating—are now even more at risk because of the virus outbreak. Nevertheless, despite pledges from several municipalities to take in refugees after the devastating fire experienced by refugees in the Moria camp, Germany was initially unwilling to do so before an agreement on a common European asylum policy was found. All in all, as the biggest EU member state, it can ultimately be said that Germany has showed up as one of the leading countries in solidarity measures. The slogan ‘Together for Europe’s recovery’, though, is not only an act of altruism, but also a pragmatic measure for securing and protecting the German economy and social cohesion. Moreover, with a view to the federal elections next year, this is also a moment to re-establish political stability in the country. Katrin Böttger is a Director at the Institut fuer Europaeische Politik (IEP). Her research focuses mainly on European Neighbourhood Policies, EU Enlargement Policies, EU-Central Asia relations and Euroscepticism. Since its founding in 1959, IEP has been a non-profit organisation dedicated to the study of European integration. It is one of the leading foreign and European policy research centres in Germany, serving as a forum for exchange between academia, politics, administration and political education. IEP’s mission is to apply scholarly research to issues of European politics and integration, propose ways forward and promote the practical implementation of its research findings. IEP is also a member of TEPSA.

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Funda Tekin is a Director of the Institut fuer Europaeische PolitikInstitut fuer Europaeische Politik (IEP) in Berlin and an External Senior Research Fellow at the Centre of Turkey and European Union Studies (CETEUS), the University of Cologne. She is also a member of the TEPSA Board. Her key research focuses are: EU-Turkey relations; differentiated integration of the European Union; Freedom, Security and Justice Studies; as well as Euroscepticism. Since its founding in 1959, IEP has been a non-profit organisation dedicated to the study of European integration. It is one of the leading foreign and European policy research centres in Germany, serving as a forum for exchange between academia, politics, administration and political education. IEP’s mission is to apply scholarly research to issues of European politics and integration, propose ways forward and promote the practical implementation of its research findings. IEP is also a member of TEPSA. Friederike Augustin is a project assistant at the Institut fuer Europaeische Politik (IEP). Her research focuses mainly on the Eastern Partnership, EU-Russia relations together with civil society and social movements in Russia as well as Central and Eastern Europe. Since its founding in 1959, IEP has been a non-profit organisation dedicated to the study of European integration. It is one of the leading foreign and European policy research centres in Germany, serving as a forum for exchange between academia, politics, administration and political education. IEP’s mission is to apply scholarly research to issues of European politics and integration, propose ways forward and promote the practical implementation of its research findings. IEP is a member of TEPSA.

Contested European Solidarity in Times of Migration Crisis: The Greek Case Eugenia Kopsidi

Solidarity in Theory and in the Practice of the EU Solidarity has been at the centre of European integration since the Schuman Declaration era. The Lisbon Treaty refers to solidarity not only as one of the prevailing common values shared by member states, but also as a fundamental objective to be promoted by the Union amongst all the people therein. The Charter of Fundamental Rights devotes a whole title to the development of this principle, while Article 80 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union stipulates that the principles of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility between member states shall govern the policies of the Union and their implementation. This appeal to solidarity was questioned throughout the EU during the ‘refugee crisis’, characterised as the worst displacement crisis since World War II. In 2015 and 2016, the large inflows of refugees and migrants crossing the Mediterranean to Europe’s borders, led to emotionally charged public declarations of solidarity by various European institutions and governments along with a significant part of civil society. However, as inflows persisted and increased, European voices that had initially encouraged and promoted solidarity were superseded by a strong political will to safeguard the borders at all costs, leading eventually to the closure of the Western Balkan route in March 2016. Hence, solidarity across Europe was palpably deprioritised in favour of security and safety, providing many governments with the opportunity for questionable rhetoric and subsequent extreme unilateral measures, including closing their borders. Since 2015, the major burden of controlling and managing migration flows has fallen to Greece and Italy. According to the problematic Dublin Regulation, an asylum seeker’s first country of entrance to the EU is where an asylum application

E. Kopsidi (*) Greek Centre of European Studies and Research, Athens, Greece e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), European Solidarity in Action and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86537-5_12

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will be examined. Consequently, by dint of being geographically situated at the EU’s south-eastern external border, Greece has been rendered the entrance point for most asylum seekers. Especially after the aforementioned closure of the Western Balkan route, the Greek islands of Lesbos, Samos and Chios in the north-eastern Aegean Sea have become the main points of entry for migrants and refugees seeking shelter. Following the first massive inflow in 2015, the administration of migration flows has been regulated by the EU-Turkey Statement of 18 March 2016, which was rapidly ‘upgraded’ to an Agreement, thus evolving into a legally binding text. The Agreement, which was accepted with mixed emotions by the Greek public, revealed that the migration crisis primarily concerned Greece rather than Europe, given that inflowing migrants and refugees were to be confined to the Aegean Sea Greek islands, from where asylum seekers would be returned to Turkey should their application be rejected by the Greek authorities. Although for procedural and political reasons returns to Turkey have been limited to date, the main goal of preventing and halting access to the EU ‘mainland’ has been achieved. It is, consequently, evident that the EU’s current migration policy consists of externalising European borders, thus creating a new model which reinforces the belief that the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) has in practical terms collapsed.

Collapse of the Common European Asylum System The CEAS aims at providing common minimum standards for the treatment of all asylum applications across the EU, as required by the 1951 Geneva Convention. To that end, its main pillars include increased solidarity and a sense of responsibility, both among EU member states as well as between the EU and third countries. Nevertheless, despite strong references to the solidarity principle in the Union’s most essential texts, systemic shortcomings of the CEAS, combined with EU unwillingness to cope collectively and integrally with the massive migration flows, have been dramatically confirmed. The Dublin Regulation mechanism implicitly imposed a disproportionate burden on Greek authorities, namely the major share of asylum applications. Ironically, in 2011 the European Court of Human Rights issued a decision on the M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece case, through which it held that Greece did not constitute a ‘safe third country’ where asylum seekers can be returned pursuant to the Dublin Regulation, because of the inhuman detention and living conditions they are facing. In other words, the non-refoulement principle was applied with reference to Greece. In addition, the absence of a solid migration policy in most EU member states, including Greece, is aggravated by there being no way to enter those countries legally. Facing fines and deportation due to the lack of legal residence status, the only course eventually available to migrants to ensure at least temporary abode in a country is to apply for asylum. The lack of political will to resolve this predicament has led to an abuse of the asylum system by migrants, especially since 2015.

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The refugee crisis has also been a typical example of how the European legal system is adapting in a way that may allow underlying political motives to prevail. Under double pressure from both the European Commission and member states, the Greek government has imposed a geographical limitation of movement to new migrant arriving on the Aegean islands, while Turkey arbitrarily accepts returns solely from the islands and not from the mainland. As a result, the EU-Turkey Agreement has trapped thousands of people on the Greek islands, under deplorable conditions, while their asylum applications await examination according to a questionable accelerated procedure, whose ultimate objective is to distinguish those who must be quickly sent back to Turkey. Besides, the fact that Turkey exposes immigrants to inhuman and degrading treatment while continuing to return asylum seekers to Syria in violation of international law, does not seem to cause serious concerns for the European Community. This is on the basis of the 2017 Greek Council of State’s ruling that Turkey constitutes ‘a safe third country’ offering equivalent protection to that of the 1951 Geneva Convention. Overall, it is evident that in reality ‘European solidarity’ has been almost exclusively expressed in financial terms, instead of political or even humanitarian. In order to face the migration crisis, Greece received more than EUR 2 billion within the 2015–2019 period, while Turkey was accorded EUR 6 billion. In other words, the EU seems to be prepared to pay too high a price, both in financial and political terms, with the sole purpose of keeping migrants away from its ‘mainland’. Meanwhile, domestically the ‘migration issue’ has been a top priority for both the previous leftwing government and the current conservative government since 2015, but as yet remains an unsolved problem, despite the different management approaches each has adopted. In other words, the provision of significant EU financial support to Greece does not provide a satisfactory solution for the tens of thousands of asylum seekers who are rapidly becoming illegal migrants and whose residence on Greek territory has led to intense and sometimes violent reactions by local populations.

Towards a Concrete Application of the Solidarity Principle It can justifiably be claimed that the last signs of European solidarity trace back to September 2015. This was when the Union activated an exceptional and temporary relocation programme together with a resettlement mechanism, through which 160,000 and 20,000 people, respectively, would leave Greece and Italy within a period of 3 years to relocate within other EU member states. However, even before being carried out this much-discussed relocation scheme was condemned to fail, as it covered individuals from specific countries and the acceptance of applications for relocation was decided according to criteria set forth by the member states themselves. Accordingly, an effective response to the current critical conditions calls for more EU involvement in managing migration, while member states should be prevented

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from devising their own substantive and diverging policies. Hence, the new Pact on Migration and Asylum, placing the fair sharing of responsibility and solidarity as one of its central pillars, establishes a system of ‘flexible contributions’ for member states, ranging from voluntary support to a mandatory proof of solidarity. Nevertheless, aiming mainly at enabling the southern European countries to manage the massive inflows effectively, the new Pact seems to focus once again on return policies instead of relocation or integration mechanisms. The recent destruction of Europe’s largest refugee camp in the Greek island of Lesbos by a fire that broke out in September 2020 finally led to the first practical steps towards a fairer sharing of responsibilities, as some member states announced that they would be receiving asylum seekers from the destroyed camp. This relatively new phenomenon of massive migration is an additional crisis that Europe has to face during the challenging times of recovering from recession, which apart from significantly affecting the economies of its member states, has tested the viability of the rule of law. The current COVID-19 pandemic is now bringing forth a new challenge regarding the protection of human rights. This demands the upholding of Europe’s founding values of human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality as well as solidarity for its fellow member states. Eugenia Kopsidi graduated from the Law School of the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, Greece (2010) and obtained a Master II in Public Law from Aix Marseille University, France (2010–2011). She holds a PhD in Constitutional Law (Aix Marseille University) and she is currently a Postdoctoral Research Assistant at the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki working on ‘The constitutional protection of migrants facing deportation’. She is Resident Lecturer at the European Law and Governance School (ELGS) and has also taught at Aix Marseille University, University of Paris-Et Créteil (Paris XII) as well as the Democritus University of Thrace. She is also a specialised Public Law attorney and a member of the Greek National Registry for legal aid to asylum seekers. The Greek Centre of European Studies & Research (EKEME) was founded in 1980 by a group of academics, legal practitioners, economists and social scientists. From 21 March 2014, EKEME has been officially constituted as a specialised department of the European Public Law Organisation (EPLO) under the academic responsibility of its Academic Director and the Curatorium. The Centre brings together the research experience and analytical capacity of a wide range of disciplines, especially: economics, law, political science, sociology and international relations. EKEME is also a member of TEPSA.

European Solidarity? A View from a Renitent Hungary Andrea Éltetö, András Inotai, and Norbert Szijártó

Hungary is the only member state where anti-EU rhetoric is permanently generated by the government, according to which Western civilization is jeopardised by multiculturalism, globalism, liberalism and immigration. All of these issues are said to undermine nation-states, traditions and family values. Hence, the government’s position is that the future of Europe has to be built on proud and strong, sovereign nation-states which have to pull back competences from Brussels. However, at the same time, according to public opinion polls (Standard Eurobarometer), the EU enjoys above average popularity in Hungarian society. In addition, all four Hungarian opposition parties are represented in the European Parliament (with 8 seats altogether out of 21 Hungarian MEPs) and not only call for solidarity with the EU, but also see the European Union future as being shaped by stronger, more federal integration.

Limited External and Internal Solidarity Several EU initiatives have been regularly considered by the Hungarian government from a narrow and short-term ‘national’ view. Official reaction to the COVID-19 pandemic is no exception. Hungary gave some limited health-related support to certain countries, mainly those with sizeable Hungarian ethnic minorities, or non-EU countries for political advantages. Similarly, internal solidarity remained limited (unemployment benefit, wage subsidies, support to companies) if compared with A. Éltetö (*) · N. Szijártó Institute of World Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Budapest, Hungary A. Inotai Hungary, Budapest e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), European Solidarity in Action and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86537-5_13

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most other EU member countries. In accordance with the intent of the Fidesz government, the National Bank of Hungary (HNB) introduced several measures responding to the coronavirus economic crisis to provide liquidity (overall HUF 3600 billion, approximately EUR 10 billion) for the corporate sector (from SMEs to large companies). Whilst investigative journalists often point to opacity in the HNB’s lending activities, the Hungarian people in general terms ignore these measures and their consequences. From the outset, Hungary’s government refused any kind of cooperation with the EU concerning a common migration and refugee policy. It not only closed the border by building a fence, but initiated anti-migration propaganda which was unfortunately successful, labelling each potential migrant as a threat to personal safety, family, public security, jobs, national traditions and values. In addition, the government proudly declared that Hungary was the only EU member country defending European values and Christianity, albeit with measures also against refugees who happened to be Christian. Regarding the EU Recovery Fund and the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 2021–2027, the government’s basic position is that no EU money should be linked to any political, legal or other conditionality, otherwise Hungary would veto. Before the July 2020 European summit meeting convened to discuss both funds, the Hungarian two-third majority Parliament passed a resolution obliging the Prime Minister to veto any EU initiative with conditions. The long-lasting mass protests in Belarus following the presidential election on 9 August 2020 forced the EU to condemn police brutality and emphasise the importance of the rule of law, democracy and, potentially, new and clean elections. Practically all EU countries openly protested against the Lukashenko regime and expressed their solidarity with the demonstrators, except for Hungary. Not unexpectedly, the government did not comment on this situation at all, but at least there was an announcement stating that the country would join the Polish initiative for new elections and freedom for prisoners in Belarus. However, the Hungarian media remained silent about the hardPolish position, since it is in striking contradiction with the official and continually friendly bilateral ties between Orbán and Lukashenko. On 1 September 2020, without any consultation either with competent institutions of the EU or any neighbouring or close-neighbouring Schengen country, Hungary closed all of its borders both to foreigners and to Hungarian citizens (except, interestingly, for sports and some business travel). The official justification centred on the pandemic’s imminent second wave, hence presenting the measure as necessary to avoid the threat of a virus coming from abroad, where it originated. In reality, at that moment 95% of the virus was already identified as originating within Hungary. No wonder, an EU-wide protest followed. As usual for this ‘peacock dancing’ government, the decision was immediately watered down by guaranteeing free travel to Hungary for citizens from the Visegrád countries, supposedly based on ‘traditional cooperation’ among the V4 group throughout the pandemic, which is certainly not true as there was absolutely no cross-country coordination in healthcare. It is even more telling for the lack of any meaningful V4 countries cooperation that in October 2020 Slovakia, the Czech Republic and

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ultimately also Poland introduced serious restrictions in contrast to Hungary. Despite the dramatically aggravated pandemic situation in all V4 countries, officially Hungary kept open its borders to V4 citizens, while all other Visegrád countries closed their borders. As a natural consequence of declaring the West (EU) as being in decline, the current government has established highest-level contacts with autocratic regimes in the East, from Russia and Turkey over the Central Asian ‘Turk Republics’ all the way to China. Permission given to the Russian Foreign Trade Bank to establish its intra-EU headquarters in Budapest (with diplomatic immunity for its employees), the intra-EU headquarters of the ‘Turk Council’ or the special contracts with Chinese companies (also partly under investigation in the EU) may not only represent direct or indirect threats and uncertainty for European integration, but can also serve to undermine important EU-level endeavours through Hungary as a EU member state. At the end of September 2020, Hungary’s Prime Minister welcomed the President of Kyrgyzstan, opened up a EUR 50 million credit line and doubled the Hungarian university fellowship to Kirgiz students from 75 to 150, all in the name of defending ‘Christian values’. It is more than ironic that 4 days later, as a result of massive protests following falsified election results, the Kirgiz president had to resign.

Some Remarks on the ‘Future of Europe’ In recent years, the Hungarian Prime Minister has on a number of occasions stressed how important it is to maintain Hungary’s outstanding cooperation within the V4 group. It was also highlighted that in a declining European Union, the growth centre for integration will shift from Western to Central Europe, with a clear Polish leadership fully supported by Hungary. In reality, the aggregate GDP of the V4 group constitutes only about 7% of the EU-27 and the region is also structurally dependent on the EU’s core countries, particularly Germany. Shares of exports to the EU in total are 82, 84, 80, and 85% for Hungary, Czechia, Poland and Slovakia respectively. However, Orbán tries to find old/new allies challenging the Brussels bureaucracy and restructuring the EU’s architecture towards fewer common policies and more ‘independent’ national manoeuvring room. Similar efforts can be identified in Orbán’s regular bilateral meetings with the Western Balkan countries. Officially, Hungary remains a key supporter of the EU’s Western Balkan enlargement and considers this to be a factor in weakening intra-EU cohesion and delaying or even blocking the ongoing deepening process in selected areas of integration. Finally, it is necessary to mention the role of the ‘V4 News Agency’, a communications agency formally located in London, but yet covering the entire Central and Eastern European area. The agency’s main task is to communicate one-sided (mainly negative) EU-related information in the region, whilst simultaneously emphasising the success of Central Eastern European cooperation. In fact, the agency was founded and is financed by a government-based Hungarian media consortium and

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the V4 codename has absolutely nothing to do with media cooperation among the Visegrád countries. Moreover, the other three Visegrád countries have all already protested against their being associated with this dubious undertaking.

Recommendations Accession to funds envisaged in the next MFF (2021–2027) must include clear conditionality criteria, as a consequence of which fundamental European Union values have to be complied with and monitored. This is a precondition for the EU’s global and European credibility. Funding has at least partly to be suspended if a member country deliberately undermines the EU’s internal cohesion and represents an obvious anti-EU position. It is difficult to understand—and convince European taxpayers—why the EU has been regularly financing anti-EU activities and communication programs. The use of EU money must be permanently and effectively monitored. This investigation has to include not only outright corruption and fraud, but also efficient use of the money. In this context, a cross-EU ‘efficiency analysis’ has to be carried out, investigating how individual countries/companies have used EU funds in the 2014–2020 MFF period. Allocation of EU funds must be linked to the ‘Next Generation’ priorities and to the overall requirement of fostering the EU’s sustainable competitiveness and its evolving global role and position. As a precondition for strengthening both internal cohesion and the EU’s external presence, the number of policy areas with national veto rights has to be essentially limited. Andrea Éltető is a senior research fellow, leading research into European integration at the Institute of World Economics of the Centre for Economic and Regional Studies (IWE). She has coordinated and participated in several international research projects, writing more than 150 publications in journals, working papers and books. She regularly reviews articles in domestic as well as international journals and has also been the receiver of awards from the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. The IWE is an independent fully-fledged research institute dedicated to the analysis of policyoriented topics based on in-depth theoretical and methodological background. Its priority research areas include global economic developments, current and future challenges for the European Union, including the evaluation of accession processes, international relations, the role of foreign direct investments and regional economic integration. IWE is also a member of TEPSA. András Inotai is Professor Emeritus and former Director General of the Institute of World Economics (IWE) (1991–2011). He taught in Peru (1972–1973), the College of Europe Bruges and Warsaw (1993–2017), Columbia University (2002) and in various other International Institutions, focussing on: global economic issues; European integration; as well as economic transition in Central and Eastern Europe. He is a Member of the Academic Council of the College of Europe, Scientific Board Member of the Bertelsmann Foundation as well as being the author of several

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books and hundreds of professional articles mainly in English, German, Spanish and Hungarian. He holds various international and Hungarian awards. The IWE is an independent fully-fledged research institute, dedicated to the analysis of policyoriented topics based on in-depth theoretical and methodological backgrounds. Its priority research areas include global economic developments, current and future challenges of the European Union, including the evaluation of accession processes, international relations, the role of foreign direct investments and regional economic integration. IWE is also a member of TEPSA. Norbert Szijártó, is a Junior Research Fellow at the Institute of World Economics (IWE). His research interests include European integration, Economic and Monetary Union, euro introduction and Central and Eastern Europe. He has written dozens of professional articles covering various topics to do with European integration. The IWE is an independent fully-fledged research institute dedicated to the analysis of policyoriented topics based on in-depth theoretical and methodological backgrounds. Its priority research areas include global economic developments, current and future challenges of the European Union including the evaluation of accession processes, international relations, the role of foreign direct investments and regional economic integration. IWE is also a member of TEPSA.

Ireland: Dublin Benefits from and Contributes to European Solidarity Brigid Laffan

During the decade of crises, the question of solidarity has been raised time and time again in political discourse, scholarly analysis, stakeholder forums and the media. Solidarity is a central concept in political theory and essential to political order, but it is contested. Solidarity with whom, for what and to what extent are core questions of politics. As the EU matured as a polity, it was inevitable that the question of solidarity would receive greater prominence in the politics of integration. In this chapter, I analyse two issues that have brought the question of solidarity sharply into focus in Ireland, namely Brexit and the COVID-19 pandemic.

Brexit From the time that Prime Minister Cameron launched the idea of an ‘in-out’ referendum in the UK, there was concern in Dublin about the likely consequences of a UK exit for the island of Ireland. The challenges were economic and existential in relation to the border between Ireland and Northern Ireland. The border in Ireland would be the only EU-UK land border following Brexit and it was the most intractable border to have to address because of its turbulent history. When the referendum’s outcome was announced, the Irish Government went into overdrive to ensure that the dangers of Brexit for Ireland’s stability would be addressed in the negotiations between the UK and the EU. Essentially Ireland uploaded the Irish border to EU level and what had been an issue that directly affected one member state, then became a collective EU issue.

B. Laffan (*) European University Institute, Florence, Italy e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), European Solidarity in Action and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86537-5_14

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Ireland presented a compelling case to EU institutions and its 26 partner governments about the salience of this border on the island of Ireland. The EU collectively responded by demonstrating their solidarity with Ireland. When the negotiating guidelines for the first phase of EU-UK negotiations were published in April 2017, Ireland together with citizens and financial contributions were listed as the issues that had to be resolved and completed in the withdrawal phase or the ‘divorce settlement’ (EU Negotiating Guidelines, April 2017). EU solidarity with Ireland on this existential issue was evident throughout the negotiations. Speaking in Dublin in September 2020, Michel Barnier, EU Chief Negotiator, concluded that ‘Together, we have carried forward the close relationship between Ireland and the rest of the EU, based on solidarity and respect’ (Barnier, 2020). On a previous occasion, speaking in February 2019 the then Irish Taoiseach Leo Varadkar warned that ‘Despite many attempts to bilateralise issues or to divide the 27 [the EU members besides Britain] the solidarity has been strong and resolute and those who think it will break at the last moment are in for a nasty surprise,’ and then concluded by saying that ‘Ireland’s concerns have become the European Union’s concerns’ (Varadkar 2019). There were three primary reasons for EU solidarity with Ireland. Firstly, the Irish case about the stability of the island of Ireland and the threats to the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) were compelling and chimed with the EU’s self-understanding as a peace project. Secondly, it was an opportunity to highlight that EU membership mattered, that the EU would protect one of its own and would use its collective weight in that endeavour. This came as a surprise to the UK. London felt that EU solidarity would falter at some stage and they failed to understand the loss of influence involved in exiting. Thirdly, the EU needed assurances about the integrity of the single market and the four freedoms so that Northern Ireland would not become a backdoor into the European market.

COVID-19 As the global pandemic took hold throughout Europe, particularly affecting Italy in the first instance, European solidarity was severely tested. Early in March, Italy triggered the Union Civil Protection Mechanism, the EU coordination mechanism for member state mutual support in the event of natural or manmade disasters. Unusually no member state responded with assistance, confronted as they were with the impending pandemic and unsure about the extent of their own resources and health systems. This deeply affected perceptions in Italy about the lack of European solidarity. Under pressure from the enormity of public finance demands in responding to COVID-19, the Italian government called for the creation of Corona-bonds, a form of mutualised debt to combat the pandemic and aid recovery. Mutualised bonds were and remained a contested and highly politicised issue in the EU, with Germany amongst others consistently opposing them during the Eurozone crisis, which meant that Italy was facing a difficult challenge in translating

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its demand for solidarity into policy instruments. Ireland experienced being a programme country between November 2010 and December 2013 and went into the programme with the intention of ensuring that Ireland would return to the markets within the lifetime of one programme. Although a programme country during the Eurozone crisis, Ireland did not align itself with the Mediterranean countries. Moreover, with the UK’s impending exit from the Union, Ireland had begun to align itself with what became known as ‘the Hanse group’, led by the Netherlands. It would thus be reasonable to assume that in the negotiations on COVID-19 recovery instruments Ireland would be part of the so-called ‘frugals’, which included the Netherlands. In fact, Ireland was one of nine states to sign a letter to the European Council supporting Corona-bonds in March. The letter talked of financial solidarity especially within the Eurozone. This was a distinctive break with Ireland’s cautious approach in the past and was driven by Irish Taoiseach, Leo Varakdar and Finance Minister, Paschal Donoghue. The two senior Irish politicians felt that the threat of COVID-19 was such that a joint European response was necessary. There were two reasons for the shift. Firstly, the Irish Prime Minister was a medical doctor and had an in-depth understanding of the pandemic’s nature and the challenges it posed. Secondly, Ireland had been a programme country and did not want to appear unwilling to help the hardest hit countries during the coronavirus crisis. Perhaps there was a third reason and that was the forthcoming bid by Paschal Donoghue, Finance Minister, to run for President of the Eurogroup. That bid was not in the public domain when Ireland supported Corona-bonds. Although Corona-bonds did not materialise, Germany moved its position when agreeing for the need for a large recovery fund in response to the pandemic. At the four-day European Council meeting in July 2020, Ireland was aligned with the ‘Franco-German motor’ and the Mediterranean states, in the process of becoming an even larger net contributor to the EU budget. Given Ireland’s long history as a recipient of EU budgetary solidarity, the political management of the transition from net recipient to net contibutor must be carefully managed so that net budgetary balances do not become politicised as they have in other countries. The EU is central to Ireland’s state identity and management of deep interdependence. That said, Ireland is not a maximalist when it comes to the EU’s future development and is pragmatic rather than federalist. The Irish state elites understand the EU’s salience to Ireland and will support centralisation when the case is compelling, but not for the sake of federalising the Union. Taxation and security are two major policy areas where Ireland is challenged. On security, Ireland joined PESCO, but will remain outside the Schengen area because of the common travel area with the UK. This is driven by the need to maintain an open border on the island of Ireland and the level of contact between the two islands. On taxation, Ireland opposes the Financial Transaction Tax and remains committed to a low rate of corporation tax. As the taxing of big tech becomes more and more politicised, this is an area that will test Ireland’s relations with its EU partners.

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Brigid Laffan is Director and Professor at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, at the European University Institute. Brigid is recipient of numerous awards: in 2005 she was elected Member of the Royal Irish Academy and in 2010 received the Ordre nationale du Mérite from the President of the French Republic. Her scholarship has been recognised by the THESEUS Award for Outstanding Research on European Integration in 2012 and the Lifetime Achievement Award for contribution to the development of European Studies in 2014 by the UK Association for Contemporary European Studies (UACES). The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies is an inter-disciplinary research centre at the heart of the European University Institute (EUI) in Florence. It was established in 1992 to complement the four disciplinary departments that make up the EUI with the vocation of being involved in both basic and policy research, collaborating with other centres of excellence in Europe, providing opportunities for young scholars and promoting dialogue with the world of practice. The Robert Schuman Centre is also a member of TEPSA.

Italy: The Straw That Breaks the Camel’s Back? Eleonora Poli and Nicoletta Pirozzi

The COVID-19 crisis might have been the proverbial straw that broke the camel’s back. It certainly helped fan the idea, shared by 71% of Italians, that the EU abandons Italy in times of crisis—as happened during the migration crisis—and that European solidarity is of value only in times of prosperity. By May 2020, according to a survey conducted by Instituto Affari Internazionali together with the University of Siena, 73% of Italian citizens were convinced that the pandemic had demonstrated a complete failure of the European Union itself. However, as this chapter highlights, Italy has in practical terms been receiving more solidarity from the EU than it is providing. From this perspective, a diffused perception that the EU is ineffective and unsupportive, which was already widespread before the crisis, is certainly hard but not impossible to change. To date, someone would argue that such a negative perception about the EU clashes with reality. According to the ECFR Solidarity Tracker, Italy has been the country benefiting most from wider European solidarity actions, as for example: the transfer of Italian COVID-19 patients to German hospitals by Germany in March 2020; Czech Republic’s donation of protective suits; and Poland’s supply of extra doctors. Further assistance has included: the Commission allowing maximum flexibility on budgetary rules; the Support to mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency (SURE) instrument mitigating unemployment risks; and the ECB agreeing to a temporary increase in Italian bond purchases. Moreover, the Next Generation EU package finalised by member states in July 2020 will grant Italy the largest share of resources among member countries, which will entail transfers to Italy of approximately EUR 81.4 billion in grants and a loan of EUR 127.4 billion. Activating other measures such as the credit line provided by the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) with minimum conditionality to help Eurozone members cover

E. Poli (*) · N. Pirozzi Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome, Italy e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), European Solidarity in Action and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86537-5_15

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healthcare costs related to COVID-19 is still the subject of a heated political battle within the government. The Democratic Party is in favour, but the Five Star Movement is against. Among opposition parties, Lega and Fratelli d’Italia are against, whilst Forza Italia is in favour. However, EU solidarity came as a second response and in the case of some member states was often based on words rather than real actions. From 50 actions identified by the ECFR Solidarity Tracker as demonstrating solidarity towards Italy, 15 are based only on declarations. Moreover, following the health crisis’ outbreak, the initial reaction of European institutions appeared far from being supportive and not one single member state responded to the Union Civil Protection Mechanism triggered by Italy. The unilateral closure of borders put in place by Austria, Poland, Slovakia, Czechia, Denmark, Cyprus, Latvia and Lithuania, to name a few, and the limitations of political and economic cooperation with a temporary ban to sell medical equipment to Italy by France and Germany were coupled with ECB President Christine Lagarde’s comment on the Italian spread, caused Italian bond yields to spike. The dispute on the Eurobond issue was not of help either as it merely deepened conflict along the line of a north-south divide on the need and nature of common economic measures. In the first months of the crisis, Italy felt abandoned by the EU on two counts. Not only was solidarity concerning the COVID-19 crisis absent, but also in regard to the migration crisis there was no clear sign of any help from EU member countries. From January 2020 to September 2020, of the 20,057 migrants who arrived in Italy, only 170 were relocated to other EU member countries, with France and Germany among the most supportive countries, accepting around 80 migrants each. By contrast, Italians witnessed rapid responses by China and Russia, which were pushed both by the press and the national political discourse. China was among the first countries answering the Italian call for help. The Chinese government as well as private foundations such as Alibaba, Xiaomi and Huawei donated medical supplies to Italy. Similarly, Russia sent medical equipment and specialists to the worst-hit Italian regions. Although in the long run the European actions mentioned above had a wider and more effective scope, EU and member states’ ability to communicate their solidarity plans was certainly well beaten by Chinese and Russia propaganda. Since the outbreak of the pandemic in Italy, 66% of the Chinese Embassy’s posts on several media channels were promoting solidarity between the two countries, while, according to the Russia Embassy, Russian assistance was a free response to the Italian international request for help. As a result, in April 2020, 52% (42% more since 2019) and 32% (13% more since 2019) of Italians saw China and Russia respectively as allies, while Germany and France were regarded as enemies by 45% and 38% of Italian citizens, respectively. Yet, since March 2020 the different actions put in place by the EU, most notably the Next Generation EU package, have certainly contributed in changing these negative Italian perceptions. By June 2020, 63% of Italians still considered the European action in response to the virus as ineffective whilst 58% believed that the performance of European institutions has worsened. However, European Institutions have gained some trust among Italians, with 69% of citizens having a positive

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opinion of the ‘Next Generation EU’ plan. This certainly indicates that when it comes to developing a long-term strategy for the future of the country, Italy looks towards the EU. However, the risk is that the EU might be perceived as needed only for its benefits. Italy has been hard hit by the COVID-19 crisis, with more than 50% of Italians suffering severe economic consequences. Yet, much more could be done for building a stronger commitment to the European common value of solidarity. Italian solidarity towards other EU countries has seldom formed part of public debate and never less so than is the case at present. To promote a climate of trust and solidarity at EU level, three main priorities can be identified for Italy: to inform, to deliver and to engage. Firstly, the Italian government and national institutions should promote correct information on what the EU has done to help the country, making Italians aware of the facts, eradicating speculation and propaganda. At the same time, it is important to ensure that EU institutions make Italians feel that they form a valuable part of the European family through public messages, campaigns and regular visits by EU representatives. Yet, there is another challenge in terms of communication that will need to be carefully monitored and countered by Italian and European institutions. This issue concerns strategic communication to counter disinformation, which is spreading from many sides and ultimately endangering our democracies. Secondly, after the crucial initiatives agreed by EU institutions to help member states recover from the economic and social consequences of the pandemic and particularly after the historic adoption of the ‘Next Generation EU’ package, national institutions need to deliver by turning expectations into reality. This means identifying strategic investments and sustainable reforms in Italy’s Recovery and Resilience plan, addressing the structural weaknesses of the country in terms of the digitalisation gap, excessive bureaucracy, lack of critical infrastructures, the northsouth divide. This would make Italian citizens feel that the EU really can change their lives. Finally, but not least, there is a need to reinforce the European identity of Italian people by actively engaging with them in constructing the Europe of the future. This could be achieved by transforming the already blurred ‘Conference on the Future of Europe’ into a real constituent phase, which would involve citizens in a frank discussion of what the EU should do and how this could be achieved. Ultimately some substance should be given to the idea of solidarity and hope for an ever-closer Union. Eleonora Poli is a Associate Fellow at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), where she worked on democracy, institutions and economic governance in the EU and in the Western Balkans. Eleonora holds a PhD in International Political Economy from City University, London. She has worked as consultant for a number of prominent international organisations and public institutions and is author of ‘Antitrust Institutions and Policies in the Globalising Economy’ as well as several book chapters, opinion pieces, articles and analysis on the EU’s political trends and economic policies. IAI is a private, independent non-profit think tank, founded in 1965 on the initiative of Altiero Spinelli, to promote awareness of international politics and contribute to the advancement of European integration as well as multilateral cooperation. IAI is also a member of TEPSA.

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Nicoletta Pirozzi is Head of Programme on European Union and Institutional Relations Manager at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) and Associate at the European Governance and Politics Programme of the European University Institute (EUI) in Florence. She works mainly on: EU governance; policy and institutional developments in CFSP/CSDP; civilian crisis management; EU relations with the United Nations; and the African Union. She is Scientific Coordinator of the Horizon 2020 project EU IDEA—Integration and Differentiation for Effectiveness and Accountability. She is author and editor of a number of publications, an active member of various research associations and institutions as well as being a TEPSA board member. IAI is a private, independent non-profit think tank, founded in 1965 on the initiative of Altiero Spinelli, to promote awareness of international politics and contribute to the advancement of European integration as well as multilateral cooperation. IAI is also a member of TEPSA.

Latvia’s Peripheralised Solidarity: Rise and Fall of the ‘Baltic Bubble’ during the COVID-19 Pandemic in 2020 Aleksandra Palkova and Karlis Bukovskis

Since the first COVID-19 cases were detected, European Union member states have faced challenges not only in responding to the virus and preventing its spread, but also in communicating and helping each other. The issue of solidarity has assumed greater proportions and is being discussed almost ad nauseam, but COVID-19 remains and will continue to be the European Union’s biggest challenge for the immediate future, with mutual support among the member states being essential. It is worth looking at Latvian experience and logic to understand why the country’s solidarity during the COVID-19 crisis in 2020 was peripheral, with help almost exclusively localised in the Baltic region. This chapter will analyse four main defining elements: the self-perception of the Baltic States; the geographical proximity; economic factors and preservation of the single market; and the lack of national resources. When considering the Baltic States one must not overlook the countries’ selfperception with the cultural and historical ties that exist between them. The region’s modern history is all to do with: unifying societies; moments of acquiring and losing independence; wartime suffering; Soviet-era experiences with deportations and ‘russification’; as well as reacquisition of sovereignty and eventual entering into the Euro-Atlantic institutions. Culturally and linguistically a very diverse Baltic society still builds its identity on common links. Similarly, the rest of the world tends to perceive the three states as a single entity, largely due to their geographical positioning and very similar foreign, economic and domestic policies over the last 30 years. This all supports a suspicion that Latvian national decision-makers considered the eventual creation of the ‘Baltic Bubble’ from a position of the region’s similarities, along with domestic and external marketing possibilities.

A. Palkova · K. Bukovskis (*) Latvian Institute of International Affairs, Riga, Latvia e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), European Solidarity in Action and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86537-5_16

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Geographical proximity naturally plays a significant role in ‘peripheralised solidarity’, with Latvia regarding its neighbours as countries such as Lithuania, Estonia, Finland, Sweden, Belarus and Russia. Concerning the European Union, border conditions are either those being applied by the Schengen Area or arrangements put in place by other member states. By contrast, Belarus and Russia have ‘hard’ borders, not just because of the pandemic, but in any event for Latvian national military security reasons. While both Belarus and Russia initially denied the existence and threat of the COVID-19 virus, Latvia’s domestic reaction was swift. An effort to support the healthcare system and domestic population against this new threat by imposing requirements for self-isolation was determined and unexpectedly efficiently organised. Latvia certainly did not follow the Swedish approach and hence at an early stage put Sweden on the restricted country list. Moreover, one could see a historic rerouting of passenger ferry traffic away from Stockholm and toward re-establishment of the connection between Riga and Helsinki. This was achieved not only as a demonstration of support for the Estonian ferry company Tallink, but also due to rigorous testing and restrictions followed by low number of COVID-19 cases both in Latvia and Finland. Hence, the creation of a de-facto larger ‘Baltic Bubble’ resulted in Summer 2020. Apart from the Baltic States’ image and geographical position, the economic factors and preservation of the single market play essential roles. Latvia’s most important trading partners are Estonia and Lithuania. As of January 2020, the country’s exports to Lithuania accounted for 16.2% of the total and for Estonia 11.5%. Imports, by contrast, reached 18.5% of the total from Lithuania, with 9% from Estonia. When countries cooperate in this way, a part of the EU single market system is protected. In other words, ensuring mutual solidarity between Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia makes a contribution to maintaining the single market overall. The element of a common struggle is also becoming relevant, as all three countries have been able to deal with COVID-19 faster and more effectively than many other EU countries by helping each other, thus setting an example and ensuring that all four EU fundamental freedoms continue to work. Moreover, creation of the ‘Baltic Bubble’ was intended to facilitate intra-Baltic tourism, which otherwise always suffers due to Latvians and their neighbours opting for warmer and more exotic destinations further away. It is clear that this Latvian-Estonian-Lithuanian mutual solidarity has been a cultural, geographical and economic calculation. Furthermore, it also takes in an objective motive, given the countries’ mutual lack of resources. As with the other two Baltic States, Latvia has limited financial and material reserves. According to the European Commission, Latvia’s expenditure on healthcare is at 6% of GDP, which is below the EU’s 9.8% average. Similarly, the state also registers 25% below average in terms of its medical services coverage. Hence, this boils down to solidarity being provided in a tailored manner to countries in a similar economic position. Faced with the need to demonstrate and provide solidarity with EU countries, Latvia provided assistance with medical equipment to Italy and Spain, besides sending 60,000 medical masks to Lithuania. Moreover, from Latvia’s 11 solidarity programmes in 2020, 7 involved Estonia or Lithuania. Meanwhile,

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Latvia has been regularly participating in EU level procurement of medical equipment (RescEU) and was among the final core countries shaping the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021–2027 as well as the introduction of ‘Next Generation EU’. Finally, this lack of resources also demonstrated how pooling in the name of true solidarity takes place among the Baltic states, considering for example the cooperation of national companies airBaltic and Tallink, which worked together to bring Latvian, Lithuanian and Estonian nationals back to their respective countries. An unprecedented repatriation programme brought back several thousand nationals from all around the world in just a few weeks. It can be concluded that Latvia thought through and implemented a clearly ‘peripheralised solidary’ during the COVID-19 pandemic in the first half of 2020. Shortage of resources in combination with the geographical location at the EU’s periphery and economic preservation have been the main arguments in shaping Latvia’s solidarity to date. Creation of the ‘Baltic Bubble’ on 15 May 2020 was not only a result of local determination to keep infection numbers under control by strict self-isolation policies, but also an opportunity to support the economy and give additional international visibility by branding the Baltics. The presidents of Latvia and Estonia even boldly called the Baltics a ‘small Schengen’ and ‘a success story in overcoming the COVID-19 crisis’ respectively. Regrettably, the ‘Baltic Bubble’ died on 12 September due to both Estonia and Lithuania recording significantly higher numbers of virus cases than Latvia and increasingly negative sentiments regarding each country’s approach to testing and prevention measures. The bursting of this ‘bubble’ also put solidarity on hold as for the moment collaboration would not be appropriate. Latvia having recorded the highest numbers of COVID-19 cases among the three countries in October 2020 limited the possibility of reintroducing the ‘Baltic Bubble’, because—as an old Baltic joke goes—the only thing that Estonia and Lithuania have in common is Latvia. Aleksandra Palkova is junior researcher at the Latvian Institute of International Affairs (LIIA) where she analyses problems within the European Union, provides support in research, publications, organising international conferences and project management. She received her social sciences Bachelor’s degree in political science in 2020 at Riga Stradins University. Scientific and academic interests include the European Union’s political and institutional processes, Japanese foreign policy and politics in Central Asia. The LIIA is the oldest Latvian think tank that specialises in foreign and security policy analysis. This independent research institute conducts research, develops publications and organises public lectures as well as conferences related to global affairs along with Latvia’s international role and policies. The LIIA is also a member of TEPSA. Karlis Bukovskis is Deputy Director at the Latvian Institute of International Affairs (LIIA) and the author of numerous articles as well as the scientific editor of several books. Bukovskis is also an Assistant Professor at Riga Stradins University. His main fields of interest are global political economy and the international financial system as well as the European Union. The LIIA is the oldest Latvian think tank that specialises in foreign and security policy analysis. This independent research institute conducts research, develops publications and organises public lectures as well as conferences related to global affairs along with Latvia’s international role and policies. The LIIA is also a member of TEPSA.

Perceptions of European Solidarity in Lithuania—plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose? Ramūnas Vilpišauskas

Money and . . . Traditionally the perception of solidarity among the EU members in Lithuania has been linked with money. More specifically, the use of EU funding, particularly in terms of cohesion for Lithuania’s economic catching up with the rest of the EU, has been a dominant theme in debates on Lithuania’s interests during EU budget negotiations since its accession in 2004. Interestingly, this focus has not changed much during negotiations on the EU Recovery and Resilience Fund and the next Multiannual Financial Framework for 2021–2027. Amidst all the talk of digitalisation and green economy, the President of Lithuania continued to stress the need to maintain sufficient cohesion funding, taking due account of the most recent economic trends in determining the overall distribution of EU funds aimed at economic recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic. Trying to ensure that new crisis management measures do not reduce the cohesion funding as well as insisting on faster convergence of direct payments to farmers in ‘old’ and ‘new’ member states were among the most important national concerns which were also stressed following conclusion of the July 2020 European Council meeting.

. . . Geopolitics Solidarity amongst EU member states in the face of external threats from the East and the need to support democratisation processes in the Eastern neighbourhood have been other traditional priorities within Lithuania’s European policies. NATO is R. Vilpišauskas (*) Institute of International Relations and Political Science, Vilnius university, Vilnius, Lithuania e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), European Solidarity in Action and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86537-5_17

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certainly considered to be the most important security provider, with all parliamentary parties agreeing on the need to allocate national funding amounting to at least 2% of the country’s GDP. However, Lithuania’s EU membership has also traditionally been regarded not only through the prism of economic convergence and prosperity, but also as contributing to the country’s security. For example, introduction of the Euro was motivated partly by geopolitics in Lithuania, as it was in Estonia and Latvia. Geopolitics also explains strong consensus among both political elites and the general population regarding support for democratisation, along with economic and other reforms in Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova and Belarus. In general terms, Lithuania has always focused its developmental assistance and technical support in those Eastern Partnership countries which in recent years have undertaken political as well as economic reforms and signed association agreements with the EU, by acting inside the Union’s institutions as advocates of closer relations. Following the pandemic’s outbreak, Lithuania recommended financial support for Eastern partners to help them manage this crisis. Among the country’s concrete bilateral initiatives were support for health care workers in Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia and other Eastern partnership countries by providing them with personal protective equipment to deal with the virus. Whilst focussing on support for Eastern neighbours, Lithuania also sent medical supplies and personal protective equipment to Italy, Spain and Croatia, pledging to contribute funds towards research for a coronavirus vaccine at the EU’s donor conference. However, it should be noted that these were symbolic measures aimed at expressing solidarity rather than substantial financial support. In late Summer of 2020, domestic debates on managing the COVID-19 pandemic were overshadowed by political and popular initiatives aimed at expressing support for the people of Belarus who took to the streets after rigged presidential elections on 9 August 2020. Once again, the Lithuanian president has been among the most vocal of all heads of state from the EU 27 in calling for EU wide sanctions on officials in Belarus suspected of election fraud and violence against peaceful protesters as well as providing economic, humanitarian and other types of support for people in Belarus. These measures, including a facilitated visa regime and the provision of political asylum were both national and coordinated with other neighbouring EU member states (Poland, Latvia, Estonia) after it proved too difficult to achieve consensus among EU 27 on an appropriate response to actions being perpetrated by the ruling regime in Belarus. However, despite initial disappointment that one EU member state, namely Cyprus, was able for a considerable time to block the decision on EU wide sanctions targeted at officials in Belarus, there is little political support in Lithuania for abolishing EU veto rights in regard to foreign policy.

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United in Free Movement In terms of EU-wide management of the COVID-19 pandemic, restoration of free cross-border movement seemed to be the dominant focus of Lithuania’s policies. In mid-March 2020, after many EU member states unilaterally introduced border control measures, causing Lithuanian tourists and trucks to be stranded on the German-Polish border, the country’s policy makers initiated bilateral talks with their counterparts from Poland and urged the European Commission to reinforce coordination of national responses to COVID-19 in such a way as to respect principles covering the free movement of goods and people. Also joint calls with other Baltic States, occasionally involving Baltic-Nordic or Baltic-German ministers of foreign affairs, were issued covering the need for EU coordination to ensure humanitarian corridors for people returning home and international movement of goods. As part of their exit from the national quarantine in May 2020, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia attracted outsiders’ attention by their decision to create a ‘Baltic travel bubble’ for free cross-border movement of people to facilitate tourism and economic recovery, an arrangement which functioned throughout the Summer of 2020. The focus on restoring free movement of goods and people reflects both the significant importance of the large EU common market for Lithuania’s small and open market, which is particularly interdependent with closest EU neighbours (Latvia, Poland, Germany) and the benefits of free movement of people which for a number of years have consistently been indicated as being among the most important benefits of the country’s EU membership in Eurobarometer surveys.

Persistence of National Narrative Lithuanian national narratives on solidarity inside the EU have remained surprisingly stable since its accession in 2004, despite several severe crises which affected the country’s economy and political debates. The main features which characterise these narratives are the focus on economic convergence inside the EU and active advocacy supporting reforms in Eastern neighbours together with promoting their closer relations with the EU. Moreover, being geographically close to third countries such as Russia tinges most EU related debates with geopolitical undertones. The COVID-19 crisis has not significantly altered these trends. Rather, the unilateral measures of EU 27 member states in closing their borders showed the importance of an efficiently functioning EU common market for countries such as Lithuania. The national narrative’s key features on solidary are hardly surprising, as shown in this chapter. They reflect economic development needs in Lithuania and perceived geopolitical threats from the East. Although the population largely understands and supports assistance provided to Eastern partnership countries, as witnessed by civic initiatives provided to support reforms in Ukraine and Belarus, there is less

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enthusiasm about solidarity towards richer EU member states or other regions of the world. Accordingly, it seems desirable to make the public more aware of the need for cooperative solutions in dealing with cross-border threats, which are not only military, but also include for example the spread of viruses. Most importantly, respect, transparency and due consideration by state institutions on how best to use Lithuania’s or other EU members’ taxpayers’ money in Lithuania is important for popular support of official expressions in demonstrating solidarity with other nations. This becomes particularly important with the fast increase in state borrowing and forthcoming funds from the EU Recovery and Resilience Fund. Ramūnas Vilpišauskas is Professor at the Institute of International Relations and Political Science (IIRPS), in Vilnius University. From 2009 to 2019 he was Director of the Institute. In 2004–2009, he worked as Chief Economic Policy Advisor to the President of Lithuania, Valdas Adamkus. His main research interests include the political economy of European integration, policy analysis of public sector reforms and international political economy. The IIRPS at Vilnius University is one of the most prominent social sciences institutions in Eastern Europe and the Baltic region. The Institute is an academic institution specialising in social and political sciences. IIRPS is also a member of TEPSA.

Liberty, Fraternity, Recovery—The Luxembourg Perspective Guido Lessing

Luxembourg’s official European standpoint on solidarity during the last months of the coronavirus pandemic can be subsumed under the modified tripartite motto of the French Revolution: Liberty, fraternity, recovery—the egalitarian facet being replaced by the hope of a rapid return to economic prosperity. Of course, all three facets contain aspects of solidarity in terms of receiving and giving. When the virus first struck in February 2020 with the first news from overcrowded Italian hospitals popping up on our smartphones, the illusion prevailed among some of our fellow Europeans that this would be a brief and contained event. The then new Luxembourgish Minister of Economy, Franz Fayot, recalled later in an interview that during his first Council meeting at the end of February, COVID-19 was just one point on the agenda and by far not the most important. On 4 March 2020, barely a week later during a business trip to Italy, his fellow Budget Minister Pierre Gramegna declared, ‘In the current situation, the European Union must act together and show solidarity. It is necessary to take common, strong and decisive actions to protect our economies and to counteract the economic downturn caused by the COVID-19 virus’.

Keep the Borders Open In Luxembourg, the national lockdown came into force on 16 March 2020. Schools were closed, construction sites suspended and employees from the dominating service sector were confined to home-office working. For the Luxembourgish economy, strongly interwoven with the Greater Region, where cross-border

G. Lessing (*) Luxembourg Centre for Contemporary and Digital History, Esch-sur-Alzette, Luxembourg e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), European Solidarity in Action and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86537-5_18

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commuters make up 46% of the workforce, this lockdown automatically took on a European dimension, especially since neighbouring Belgium, Germany and France had resorted to similar means of crisis management. The freedom of movement, key to European integration, has been under threat ever since. The perspective of closed inner-European borders became a real cause for concern. ‘Closing the borders is killing my country’, the Luxembourgish Prime Minister Xavier Bettel warned his European colleagues during a video conference of the European Council in mid-March. That was the right moment to call for solidarity from his neighbours in regard to liberty or freedom of movement, especially as 70% of the hospital staff are cross-border workers, mostly from Belgium and France. For a short period, the fear prevailed that France might want nationals back to work in hospitals at home, the more so as COVID-19 cases skyrocketed in the bordering Grand-Est region. The Luxembourgish government quickly made hotel rooms available for interested commuters to prevent disruptions, in particular within the health sector. Six weeks later the Luxembourgish Minister was able to report on very friendly relations with neighbouring countries, referring to the transfer of French COVID-19 patients to Luxembourg hospitals as a gesture of solidarity in times of need. By contrast, the Luxembourg government criticised the German federal authorities for having decided unilaterally on border closures, except for people with ‘valid reasons’ to travel. Ironically, on the Schengen Agreement’s 25th anniversary, free movement seemed to be at the discretion of German border guards. As a result, local and regional authorities, including those from the Greater Region, were struggling in their efforts to have the restrictions lifted. Meanwhile, reports of real or perceived refusals at the border, in shops and German hospitals generated outrage throughout social media. Many considered the temporary and conditional closure of borders as an attack on rights to freedom and cross-border solidarity. Nonetheless, bilateral tax agreements with France, Belgium and Germany were extended with regard to teleworking by way of combating the virus’ spread. The same applied to continued social security affiliations for commuters. In that context, recent tensions over demands for Luxembourgish tax solidarity towards underfunded municipalities in the Greater Region receded into the background. At the beginning of the year, Prime Minister Xavier Bettel had dismissed such demands from Trier and Metz by saying, ‘We are not here to finance the garlands for your Christmas markets’.

Share the Burden As for the second element of the tripartite motto, fraternity, it must be considered as the guiding principle of Luxembourgish migration policy. Jean Asselborn, the long serving Luxembourg Minister for Foreign and European Affairs, has repeatedly appealed to his European colleagues to show some empathy for refugees, often put into makeshift camps under very difficult conditions. Mindful of the Moria refugee camp fire disaster on the Greek island of Lesbos at the beginning of September 2020, Asselborn expressed with anger, ‘There is no reason to let minors rot on the rubbish

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dumps of the islands in Greece’. With the same verve, he criticised the lack of solidarity in the reception of refugees, noting that it is always the same six or seven countries that take on this task. In addition to Germany and Luxembourg, he expressly mentioned France, Ireland, Portugal, Finland and Switzerland. By contrast, he has blamed Hungary, Poland and Austria for being the biggest obstructors of a solidarity-based refugee policy. Committed to a reform of the European asylum system, the Minister has repeatedly called for solidarity with the south of Europe. In that sense, he is supported by others across the whole political spectrum, with the sole exception of the ADR Eurosceptic party, which represents roughly 10% of the Luxembourgish electorate, based on the results of elections to the EP in 2019. From a Luxembourgish perspective, eternal quarrels about the redistribution of refugees and the attendant lack of solidarity threatens to destroy the Union as a whole.

Generous Funding for Recovery We come now to the subject of economic recovery. There is no doubt, that the European economies and even more so the euro area countries are so closely interwoven that economic recovery can be achieved only in a pan-European context. In that sense, the common decision on a EUR 750 billion recovery plan is not merely a gesture of solidarity towards member states hit hardest by the coronavirus pandemic. The plan is also a significant move towards a level of burden-sharing and fiscal transfers, firmly opposed by more ‘frugal’ member states during the financial crisis in 2008. That Luxembourg would endorse the plan was not a surprise. In the name of solidarity, it had already been an advocate of Eurobonds. In recent debates about the multiannual financial framework 2021–2027, the Luxembourgish Prime Minister insisted, ‘We must give ourselves the means according to our ambitions’. From a Luxembourg perspective, experiences from the coronavirus crisis so far suggest a number of recommendations for the future of Europe, valid also in crisisfree times. Avoid going it alone at national level—it destroys trust. Consultations create trust and a feeling of solidarity. In a region with strong human and economic interdependencies, many problems can be solved at regional level. Bodies and instances of cooperation in the cross-border region must be strengthened, something which produces real benefit for citizens. For instance, health systems must cooperate across borders. As a final word in this chapter, acts of solidarity must also be mentioned! Images of Russian health personnel and Chinese doctors at the height of the crisis in northern Italy went viral, whereas instances of European solidarity went unnoticed. Whilst geopolitical motives were also no doubt involved here, nevertheless Europe has much to learn from the rapid reactions given by these authoritarian systems.

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Guido Lessing is a Research Assistant at the Luxembourg Centre for Contemporary and Digital History (C2DH) (University of Luxembourg). He has many years’ experience of teaching history and civics at secondary school level and has also co-authored various history and civics textbooks. After working for the Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches Européennes Robert Schuman (CERE) in Luxembourg, he joined the C2DH in September 2017. His main field of interest is European integration history. C2DH is the University of Luxembourg’s third interdisciplinary research centre, focusing on high-quality research, analysis and public dissemination in the field of contemporary Luxembourgish and European history. It promotes an interdisciplinary approach with a particular focus on new digital methods and tools for historical research and teaching. The Centre is also a member of TEPSA.

Solidarity as the Small State Mantra for Malta’s EU Membership Mark Harwood

The Attractiveness of Solidarity for a Small State As COVID-19 measures were eased across Malta in May 2020 with the island having had low infection rates and predicted by the European Commission to be the member state economy which would be least impacted by the pandemic, it was Maltese not EU flags which fluttered from balconies across the islands as the free, national health care system became the focus of national pride. As the Government announced a broad and generous recovery programme, facilitated by several years of budgetary surplus, it stated clearly that the plan was unrelated to the EU COVID-19 recovery fund (Next Generation EU). Moreover, people were reluctant to reopen the airport to Europe and beyond. It seemed, if only for a brief period, that the island, the smallest and most densely populated EU member state, was happy to tick along on its own, but any such hubris was bound to be short lived. As a small Mediterranean state, with no natural resources, bordering North Africa and dependent on tourism and access to foreign markets, Malta has always been keenly aware of its neighbours and the need to cultivate relations with foreign powers. The country has never had the luxury of ignoring its small state vulnerability and EU membership was a way of addressing this. As with any small state, the weaker side in an asymmetric relationship, Malta has often sought shelter with others as when it petitioned the British for protection in 1802. However, it was after independence (1964) that it increasingly sought solidarity (as with Libyan and Italian assistance when closure of foreign military bases loomed in 1979) and indeed promoted solidarity (demanding inclusion of the Mediterranean chapter in the Helsinki Final Act). Solidarity sat well with a country that embraced neutrality in the 1980s, but had limited capacity to protect its

M. Harwood (*) Institute for European Studies, University of Malta, Msida, Malta e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), European Solidarity in Action and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86537-5_19

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territorial integrity. While EU membership was not coaxed in terms of solidarity, nevertheless this concept has infiltrated to the core of Malta-EU relations, even into policy areas such as defence where Malta’s neutrality still limits cooperation; When Malta joined Denmark and the UK in 2018 in opting out of PESCO, the then Prime Minister stated that Malta felt it was still protected from crisis and conflict through the solidarity (Art. 222 TFEU) and mutual assistance clauses (Art. 42(7) TEU).

Migration as the Main Failure of EU Solidarity While size may make a state dependent on cultivating friendships, solidarity implies mutual support and hence Malta has been keen to show its European credentials and capacity. This was evident when the country played a central role in the evacuation of EU and foreign nationals during the Libyan civil war of 2011 and when Malta alone took its full quota of designated migrants under the relocation agreement following the 2015 migration crisis. As noted by former Commissioner Avramopoulos, Malta is regarded to have shown the ‘most solidarity’ on migration in the Mediterranean. That said, and not surprisingly, it is in this area of marked willingness to give solidarity that Malta has experienced the single largest actual and perceived failure of being shown reciprocity. Malta began receiving irregular migrants from 2002 with ‘boat arrivals’ peaking in 2008 and 2013, although even in a ‘normal’ year Malta ranks in the top 5 for firsttime-asylum-applicants per head of population in the EU. With a search and rescue area stretching from Tunisia to Greece (a legacy of the country’s period as a British naval base) and disputes about migrants rescued at sea undermining the close relationship between Malta and Italy, the country has long petitioned the EU for greater efforts in migration, whether bolstering Frontex, reforming the Dublin Regulation, burden sharing or greater cooperation with Libya. Furthermore, while the Union agreed the 2018 Mediterranean Solidarity Mechanism, which saw the majority of migrants landing in Malta being relocated elsewhere, the reality remains that during the 2005 to 2015 period 80% of relocated migrants were taken by the USA, with the remainder being spread amongst EU countries. The result is widespread Maltese unhappiness with the EU’s response, which has not been mitigated by EU solidarity efforts. More seriously, it sours bilateral relations and the enthusiasm for more solidarity; in 2020 Malta withdrew from IRINI, the EU’s naval mission to enforce the UN arms embargo on Libya, with the Maltese Foreign Minister likening the lack of support for Malta in this area to the Athenian invasion of Melos, ‘the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must’. While migration represents a low-point in perceived solidarity, Malta remains overwhelmingly in favour of the Union with membership accompanied by visible prosperity with major infrastructural works conspicuously linked to EU funds and foreign travel facilitated by consular agreements; in 2019, the Eurobarometer survey saw the Maltese first with 91% perceiving membership as beneficial for the country.

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At the same time, Malta sees itself operating as a bridge for the EU with North Africa while pushing European ‘common’ values, especially civil rights for the LGBTQI community. That said, solidarity à la carte is a trap for any member state and Malta’s principal EU objective remains its opposition to tax harmonisation. This has resulted in it being a cautious voice in the Council on debt related crises, where Malta has warned against unsustainable levels of debt as a precursor to tax reforms. In reacting to the multiannual financial framework 2021–2027 and the Next Generation EU, Malta’s Finance Minister said ‘this is good fruit but like the prickly pear, it should be handled with care’. Solidarity has its limits.

The Persistent Problem of Solidarity à la carte While member states will always be tempted by solidarity à la carte, the reality remains that for small states, and given that ultimately all EU states are small in one or other asymmetric relationship, solidarity is a generic insurance policy underscored by small state realism that deliverables may be limited. From Malta’s experience, it can be said that there is a gap between perceived and actual solidarity. Hence, more must be done either to manage realistic expectations or validate deliverables, the latter not having been helped by solidarity underscored by intergovernmental or extra-treaty dynamics. Where solidarity is coordinated within the EU’s institutional structure is central to its ability to deliver. Linked to this, a Europe of variable speeds is not conducive to solidarity as different levels of membership may result in different levels of solidarity. Emphasising commonalities seems to be the best way for political and popular engagement with common EU interests. Even for countries such as Malta, which opposes a federal Europe, there is a need to engage with citizens on proposals for EU reforms, for instance by instituting European referendums, which foster this sense of commonality. Ultimately, as this chapter has briefly explained, whilst Malta has striven to be at the core of integrating EU member states, solidarity is best serviced if the Union and all its members perceive themselves as part of an overarching whole. Mark Harwood is Director and Senior Lecturer at the Institute for European Studies, University of Malta. Having previously worked for the European Commission as well as the Maltese Government, his area of research is the impact of EU membership on Malta. The Institute was founded in 1991 as a teaching and research institute within the University of Malta. Offering a full range of degree programmes up to PhD level, the Institute has over 850 alumni. The Institute is also a member of TEPSA.

Poland: From the Solidarity Movement to Non-reciprocal European Solidarity Zdzisław Mach

For Poland solidarity is an important concept with many positive historical associations. However, in the international, specifically European, context Poles tend to see themselves as a deserving beneficiary of solidarity coming from others, while they are less inclined to offer solidarity in return. The main reason for that is, on the one hand, the historically rooted concept of Poland being a victim of foreign oppression and on the other hand a very weak sense of European common identity based on shared values.

The Legacy of Solidarity Whilst Poles are justifiably proud of the Solidarity movement in the 1980s, they are struggling for its recognition world-wide as having been the main factor responsible for communism’s collapse in Europe. Pride is associated with Poland’s heroic past, which symbolises the greatness of the Polish nation among Europeans. In recent years, though, with politics increasingly dominated by right-wing nationalist parties, the notion of solidarity has taken on a different meaning. The ruling Law and Justice party not only constructed an ideological division between liberalism and solidarity, themselves identifying with the latter, but also made solidarity a synonym for social justice. Today in the Sejm (the Polish Parliament) a party called Solidarna Polska represents the most radical faction within the right-wing coalition. The Solidarność trade union, officially successor of the 1980s movement, has transformed itself into a populist organisation, strongly connected with and supportive of the present nationalist Polish government and playing an active role in the political game between

Z. Mach (*) Institute of European Studies, Jagiellonian University, Kraków, Poland e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), European Solidarity in Action and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86537-5_20

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liberals and populists. However, the concept of solidarity still resonates positively throughout the Polish political spectrum. Rafał Trzaskowski, a liberal candidate who lost the recent presidential election, is organising a new political movement for which he proposes the title ‘Nowa (New) Solidarność’.

Why Poland Expects to Receive Solidarity in the EU The present Polish government often calls for national solidarity in advocating its social policies, frequently of a populist character, presenting them as a project of transforming the country into a just and fair state. This is supposedly aimed at taking care of disadvantaged citizens, who did not benefit economically from the postcommunist transition, and thus creating a national system of social justice. Of a very different nature is Poland’s call for solidarity in the European Union. Here the main line of argument is to do with a deserving country, which was betrayed by its allies, forced into the Soviet zone and thereby isolated from the European world of freedom and prosperity. Hence, in the name of European solidarity and as compensation for past misfortunes Poland expects to be given a large share of EU money. Solidarity is also called upon when Poland feels threatened by Russian expansion. Accordingly, in the name of solidarity with those countries which are threatened by Russian imperialism, Poland calls for Europe to support the people of Ukraine and Belarus. An entirely different perspective is of course demonstrated when Poland is expected to be the giver of solidarity. The present Polish nationalist and Eurosceptic government considers the EU as a platform for competition and struggles among member states and certainly does not believe in or support the deepening of European integration. The EU works for Poland only as a provider of funds and occasionally together with NATO as a guarantor of Polish security against Russia. Listening to comments on the future of Europe issued by members of the Polish ruling elite, one receives the clear impression that Poland would prefer the EU to revert to nothing more than the Common Market. Any attempts by EU institutions to intervene if Poland and Hungary disregard European treaties and values are seen in Warsaw as illegitimate interference and violation of national sovereignty. Ethnic, culture-based nationalism of the Polish right-wing ruling elite not only causes reluctance to accept any form of supranational integration, but also interprets a nation as being a closed, homogenous community, threatened by any form of cultural ‘otherness’. Hence, any idea of the EU as a community of values, providing a common European identity is hard if not impossible to accept. Cultural nationalism and rejection of an EU identity based on values help to understand why Poland refused to participate in the Union’s project for relocation of refugees. In broad terms the country refused to accept immigrants from Syria on the grounds that they were Muslim and thus would not assimilate to Polish society. This rejection implied a lack of solidarity in two senses: humanitarian solidarity with the refugees; and European solidarity with other EU members. The Polish position was

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such that problems with refugees should be dealt with by member states individually and no common EU policy in this matter should be accepted. The Polish government frequently suggests that the only sensible way to help refugees is to offer them assistance ‘at home’ in their countries of origin, before they actually become refugees. The EU should concentrate more on protecting its external borders and this is certainly a policy in which Poland would be prepared to participate.

Europe after COVID-19—Solidarity Without Integration The COVID-19 crisis provides another example of the Polish government’s attitude towards the idea of European solidarity. At the outset of the crisis, Poland sharply criticised EU institutions accusing them of inactivity, showing neither intention nor ability to help member states affected by the epidemic. When a proposal was launched to collect money worldwide to create the vaccine, Poland offered just EUR 750,000, a tiny amount compared to what other, smaller and poorer countries donated towards the expected EUR 1 billion. President Macron promoted this initiative, arguing that the vaccine should be available to everybody in the name of solidarity. For the Polish national authorities, this is fine as long as the richer countries pay for it. But when the Commission and then the Council debated the massive fund to rebuild the EU economy after COVID-19, this was seen in Warsaw as a natural, positive and fully understandable initiative, from which Poland would hope to benefit more than other countries, even if it had been less affected by the virus. This was yet another example of the known approach: solidarity with Poland but not from Poland. Here again, it is clear that for the current Polish government Europe is not seen as a community to which Poland belongs in anything but an economic sense. When the COVID-19 crisis broke out, the Polish government’s first reaction was to close its borders. Such values as mobility, relations with people in other parts of Europe, the sense of one European community were not even mentioned in this context.

Conclusions—Poland in the EU of Tomorrow European solidarity is understood by the current Polish government as one-way support. There is no concept of reciprocity with solidarity, an understanding which is widespread among the Polish population and rooted in the view of their country as a poor victim of oppression. Solidarity is to compensate for this. It is also understood primarily in economic terms—a transfer from the rich to the poor—and to some extent also as a way to provide security to the weaker states. But there is very little sense of belonging to one European society, very little common European identity, hence such notions as joint responsibility and interdependence do not function in

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Poland’s public debate on Europe. Viewing the EU predominantly as a cash machine makes the formation of a common identity based on shared values very difficult. Nevertheless, such an identity seems to be a necessary condition for creating some sense of European solidarity in Poland, especially among the new generation of young Poles. To achieve this an educational effort in Poland is needed, moving away from a concept of the nation as a closed, ethnic community towards one of an open, civic, pluralistic society. EU institutions must stick firmly to the view of Europe as a community of shared values, which must be a key condition for membership. Mechanisms of control must be maintained and strengthened, especially regarding the rule of law in member states. Accordingly, it is important to introduce effective mechanisms which link the distribution of EU funds to the observance of these rules and values. Zdzisław Mach is Professor of Sociology, Social Anthropology and European Studies at the Jagiellonian University in Kraków, Poland. He founded the Institute for European Studies at the Jagiellonian University and UNESCO Chair for Education about the Holocaust, as well as being one of the main authors of the European Studies curriculum in Poland. His research interests cover issues such as: nationalism; minorities and ethnicity; the development of European citizenship; migration; cultural construction of identities; collective memory and cultural heritage; as well as developing the idea of Europe. The Institute for European Studies is part of the Faculty of International and Political Studies at Jagiellonian University—the oldest and leading university in Poland. The Institute is famous for its interdisciplinary approach that combines the perspectives of anthropology, economy, cultural studies, political sciences, history, law, and sociology.

Gone with the Pandemic?—Portugal and EU Solidarity Alice Cunha

European Union solidarity in Portuguese terms goes back to the 1974 Carnation Revolution, with a package of economic emergency aid, the renegotiation of some clauses of the 1972 commercial agreement and even pre-accession assistance. Throughout its 35 years of membership, Portugal’s posture has above all been to be European, thus joining all major EU projects and remaining committed to this community of shared values, responsibility, solidarity and prosperity. 2020 has been a unique year full of urgent challenges. Unlike major breakthroughs in the history of the EU, which have usually taken around a decade to be accomplished, the COVID-19 pandemic has questioned the ability of EU institutions to act immediately, together and in a spirit of solidarity towards those states that are most in need. Concrete examples were: the buying of medical and personal protective equipment; the funding of research projects to develop a vaccine; and taking measures to avoid a deep economic and social crisis by backing furlough schemes to keep workforces employed. Those are major concerns in Portugal and the answers to them act as a sort of barometer in measuring EU solidarity in practice. During and after the March–April lockdown, Prime-minister António Costa, several Cabinet members and leaders of the opposition parties pinpointed the need for Europe to unite around solidarity. That was unanimous. The national agenda to fight this pandemic crisis included concerns about keeping jobs and restarting the economy, since initial forecasts estimated a GDP contraction of almost 10%. Portugal was hit particularly hard because of its reliance on tourism, which represents a significant share of the country’s economy. With Portugal facing its greatest challenge since the colonial war (1961–1974), being included post-lockdown on the ‘black list’ of mandatory quarantine by some EU Members (Belgium, Finland and Hungary) and the United Kingdom (no longer a Member, but an important tourist

A. Cunha (*) Instituto Português de Relações Internacionais, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Lisboa, Portugal e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), European Solidarity in Action and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86537-5_21

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source for Portugal) presented a negative perception of real European solidarity. How could a country that had taken so many preventive measures and had been presented as a model-case end up being disdained by its European partners? By contrast, Portugal welcomed the Commission’s EUR 750 billion Recovery Fund proposal and EUR 1074 billion Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) for the 2021–2027 agreement. For that outcome, Prime-Minister Costa invested time and effort in visiting the principal figure of the so-called ‘frugal four’ countries, the Netherlands, but also Hungary. This ultimately resulted in much criticism because of his statement that the rule of law should not be a condition for the concession of European funds. However, this does not represent Portuguese opinion on the matter. During these negotiations, the Portuguese official narrative changed from advocating for the funds to be approved at any cost—their delay threatening the very existence of the Union—to depicting it as a ‘money bazooka’—referring to the unprecedented amount of money. Moreover, considered as decisive contributions by the EU, and ultimately an expression of solidarity, were: the activation of the general escape clause within the Stability and Growth Pact, the Temporary Framework for State Aid measures to support the economy in the current COVID-19 outbreak; and the ECB’s Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme on asset purchase of private and public sector securities. To be fair, there is no pre and post COVID-19 difference in the perception of European solidarity in Portugal, as it remains largely dependent on the granting of EU funding. The combined package of Next Generation EU plus MFF will make available EUR 45 billion for the country over the next 7 years, which represents an increase of 37% compared with its current MFF share. Internally, the debate is now centred on whether or not the country will use the funds—the ‘easy money’, as some called it—effectively, in what sort of programmes and with what key aims. Hence, as long as the money keeps coming, the EU remains supportive (solidaire), causing little (if any) discussion on this topic among Portuguese citizens. Yet, as the pandemic’s first wave peaked, many did wonder where the EU was and how it was possible for the Italians and the Spanish to be left abandoned. It seemed as if there was only a technocratic Europe rather than a project driven by political and solidarity objectives between the peoples of Europe. Moreover, the apparent success in securing the country’s major external source of funding—critical for Portugal’s social and economic development over the years— has yet to overshadow the 2010–2014 financial crisis and ensuing bailout of the Troika. This marked the lowest solidarity level displayed towards Portugal by the EU, which at the time was perceived as a source of austerity measures and social sacrifices. In 2011 only 39% of the Portuguese people considered that EU membership was a good thing against 82% 20 years before; but recently, in 2019, the EU was perceived to have a positive image (59%). Nevertheless, as solidarity generates more solidarity, Portugal has also been a provider by participating in EU joint efforts to face the pandemic and its costs, including the country’s EUR 10 million contribution to the Coronavirus Global Response, launched by the European Commission.

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In a different context, the Portuguese government granted citizenship rights to all 130,000 migrants and asylum seekers who had residency applications underway, so to ensure that immigrant citizens had access to health and social security, in times of pandemic crisis. During the same period, Portugal accepted 500 children from Greek refugee camps and has taken part in the EU refugees’ resettlement process, by welcoming almost 2000 refugees, still less than half it has agreed to receive. Over time, the country has also joined EU peace and humanitarian missions. During the Central and Eastern countries’ accession negotiations, Portugal always supported that round of enlargement despite the costs to be paid, such as delocalisation of some industrial factories and partition of European funds. This was seen as a form of solidarity with emerging democratic states which were poorly developed economically, as had been the case with Portugal back in the 1970s and 1980s. To sum up, Portugal has long benefited from EU financial solidarity by means of structural and investment funds and has always been a net recipient from the EU’s budget. In this regard, mainstream political power has acknowledged membership benefits, but has also stressed the country’s contribution towards building a Europe which is stronger and more united (towards the world), more committed to common values as well as more economically and socially cohesive. Portugal cannot continue to act chiefly as if the EU is someone else’s responsibility, headed by a Franco-German leadership, and needs to become more involved in European politics. Ideally, it would present a European framework of action designed to create an EU health policy—in line with Ursula von der Leyen’s State of the Union speech in September 2020 and the recent EU4Health Programme— moving public health towards becoming an EU competence and not a shared one between the EU and member states. Realistically, the country may contribute to propositions under the same topic, in addition to other proposals for the further development of a social Europe. These will feature: employment and quality jobs; adequate and sustainable social protection; equal opportunities; and poverty reduction. All will be in line with the Sustainable Development Goals, the European Green Deal and the Digital Agenda for Europe. Under its fourth EU Council’s presidency (January–June 2021) Portugal will certainly highlight the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights and host the EU Social Summit in May, thus aiming to give a political impulse to that goal and, ultimately, contribute to more EU solidarity. Acknowledgement This work was supported by Instituto Português de Relações Internacionais— Universidade NOVA de Lisboa (UIDB/04627/2020).

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Alice Cunha is Research Fellow at the Portuguese Institute of International Relations. She is the author of several publications, with special research interests in European Integration and EU funding. The Portuguese Institute of International Relations (IPRI) is a research unit of NOVA University, Lisbon, dedicated to advanced studies in Political Science, International Relations and European Integration. IPRI is also a member of TEPSA.

Romania Relies on the EU’s Solidarity Budget to Overcome the Pandemic Alexandru Damian and Bianca Toma

Romania is one of the most Euro-supportive nations, albeit a little less so of late, with trust in the EU ranging between 51% (Eurobarometer 2017) and 43% (Eurobarometer 2020) against an EU average of 35%. However, the COVID-19 pandemic has reaffirmed how important the EU is at times when enhanced cooperation and solidarity are needed. Some have experienced European solidarity directly. Thousands of employees left without jobs overnight benefited from technical unemployment, a scheme promoted by the Romanian Government, but, following Brussels’ green light, with support also being given by way of funds from the current multiannual financial framework. Emergency help was provided to fight the coronavirus, with medical teams and medical supplies being provided to Romania, while dozens of patients were transferred to other EU countries as Romanian hospitals were overwhelmed. Romania has also provided support to other EU and non EU countries to tackle the rising number of COVID-19 cases, especially to Republic of Moldova. Solidarity, in this sense, has worked both ways. For others, EU solidarity has fallen short. Thousands of Romanians, employees in other member states—mainly Spain, Italy and Germany—many of them seasonal workers, with families highly dependent on their income, have been stuck on the road between EU countries as border after border was closed. Solidarity has not been sufficient even to allow their transit through some countries. Only lengthy bilateral and European Commission negotiations have led to the introduction of special transport corridors to facilitate their journeys back home. These direct experiences have certainly shaped Romanians’ perception of the pandemic. Fortunately, Romania’s health system, one of the most vulnerable and underfinanced in the EU, did not experience any large pressure early in the COVID-19 pandemic, unlike the situation in Italy or Spain, especially due to timely restrictions

A. Damian (*) · B. Toma Romanian Center for European Policies, Bucharest, Romania e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), European Solidarity in Action and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86537-5_22

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imposed by the government. Faced with an exodus of young and ambitious doctors to other European countries, largely through the lack of minimum facilities, underfunded and looted from within, the Romanian public health system was far more unprepared than those in many other EU countries. Unfortunately, from the start of October 2020 the number of cases rose rapidly, with Romania quickly becoming one of the most affected EU countries. The public authorities are once again ill prepared to face a crisis and consequently the health sector is overwhelmed with the number of cases. Romania was registering over 10,000 cases per day in early November, although its capacity to test for COVID-19 did not improve significantly, with the health system being so unprepared to deal with the pandemic. As a consequence, the mortality rate is one of the highest across Europe. The fear of being hospitalised in a public hospital is, for many citizens, just as bad as the virus infection itself. However, the dedication of some healthcare professionals has managed to save the healthcare system’s face to a large extent during the crisis, even though the structural problems are still pending and critical. A stronger European Health Union with enhanced cross-border coordination would represent a key takeaway from the current crisis and an area where the Romanian national Government should ask for more cooperation and become more involved in order to influence EU stakeholders in taking faster steps in this direction.

Unfair Competition on Essential Medical Supplies At the outset of the COVID-19 crisis, Romania also faced serious bottlenecks in supplying essential equipment both for medical staff and the general population. Those responsible for managing the crisis complained about unfair competition between EU member states in what they called ‘a jungle’ of negotiations with medical and protection equipment manufacturers. An order placed by Romania for several ventilators needed in emergency intensive care units was cancelled shortly before delivery, following the manufacturer’s preference in honouring a larger order for another member state. Despite this, EU solidarity was demonstrated when teams of Romanian doctors and nurses gave a helping hand in Italy (a team of 15 doctors and nurses) and especially in the Republic of Moldova (a team of 42 medical staff) during the pandemic’s first wave. Romania donated numerous medical supplies to Chisinau. Romanian officials were also pleased to announce that Brussels has entrusted them with the management of a so-called strategic reserve of medical equipment for the entire EU.

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Citizens’ Perceptions During the Pandemic Romanians have had mixed feelings about the COVID-19 pandemic, with support for measures taken by national authorities falling sharply in recent months. It is also a consequence of disinformation campaigns promoted by pro-Russian outlets or populist movements that protests denouncing restrictions were organised at national and EU levels. Numerous rallies were organized to denounce the restrictions, without the Romanian government being able to adequately respond to these protests and their messages as the public campaign felt short of reaching its objectives. However, regardless of their perception and the side they joined, a large majority of Romanians have acknowledged the negative effects of this pandemic, with restrictions in free movement and the economic impact being considered as the most serious and damaging. Citizens in Romania have been targeted by numerous anti-EU campaigns promoted mostly from external peers, but also by some controversial figures from within, including politicians or prominent public figures. While this thankfully has fallen short of eroding Romanians’ trust in the EU, it has nevertheless managed to sow doubt in the minds of many about the measures being taken by national authorities. In general terms, two types of messages were promoted: firstly an attempt to project the image of a Union that had forgotten its main characteristic, namely solidarity, and its inability to cope with the pandemic; and secondly antivaccine and corona-sceptic messages were widely promoted in the country. This has led to mistrust regarding Romanian public authorities, with more than 50% of Romanians believing that the authorities hide information about the pandemic, according to the latest surveys by the Romanian Institute for Evaluation and Strategy (IRES). However, on the long run, if the Romanian authorities fail to respond to these threats, confidence in the measures adopted by the authorities will diminish, while populist movements, such as the far right party Alliance for the Union of Romanians, the main promoter of populist messages, will consolidate its gains.

More Solidarity . . . Is on the Way An important test of European solidarity is represented by the post-pandemic recovery package put forward by Brussels. In Romania’s case, the result of current negotiations for funds from the EU budget covering the next 7 years, be it recovery funds, cohesion funds or loans, will make the difference between a country that is modernising or one that throws European money into a blender of bureaucracy without providing any added value projects. We know that Romania’s allocation will be an extremely significant amount, more than double (EUR 79.9 billion) compared with present benefits during the 2014–2020 framework (EUR 36.4 billion) and hopefully the government will not fail in exploiting the impact of such an injection of funds. The injection of funds must be coupled with important reforms assumed by

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Romania, such is the case with the ones included in the national recovery and resilience plan, in order to truly make a difference. The key challenge for Romanian officials in the forthcoming years is how to maximise the benefits of EU funds, while convincing Brussels that its one-size-fits all policy is no longer working. Indeed, it is questionable whether it has ever worked. Financial instruments, grants or loans should be flexible for realistic top priority projects put forward and negotiated with member states and aligned to EU objectives during the next decade. Romania has yet to access and benefit from them fully. EU solidarity, already questioned by citizens who are experiencing economic and societal insecurity or facing uneven wealth distribution, will for many remain an illusory concept if it cannot be seen to produce some material improvements in living standards across the board. The Romanian Government must prepare effectively all the necessary tools to use this solidarity financial package properly. At the same time, the Government in Bucharest will need to find allies among member states in convincing Brussels to reduce its bureaucracy and accept flexible rules together with funding for essential projects in Romania. Alexandru Damian is a Researcher at the Romanian Centre for European Policies (CRPE). He has more than 7 years experience in projects targeting good governance, transparency and EU affairs in Romania, Republic of Moldova and the Western Balkans. He is a graduate of Political Science and has an MA in European Union Studies from the Free University of Brussels. CRPE is one of the leading Romanian think-tanks specialising in EU affairs, with more than 10 years’ experience in implementing European and regional projects. The Centre’s mission is to promote Romania as an influential leader in the development of EU agendas and policies. Another key objective is to advance the Europeanisation processes in Romania and promote European citizenship by providing expertise in various fields and initiating or participating in public debates. Bianca Toma is Programme Director of the Romanian Centre for European Policies (CRPE), coordinating projects related to good governance, justice and European Union (EU) affairs. She has covered Brussels politics as EU affairs correspondent for the mainstream Romanian media. CRPE is one of the leading Romanian think-tanks specialising in EU affairs, with more than 10 years’ experience in implementing European and regional projects. The Centre’s mission is to promote Romania as an influential leader in the development of EU agendas and policies. Another key objective is to advance the Europeanisation processes in Romania and promote European citizenship by providing expertise in various fields and initiating or participating in public debates.

The Extent of Solidarity—(Mis)interpretation in Slovakia Lucia Mokrá and Andrea Figulová

Solidarity on the European and Slovak Political Agenda Solidarity is considered as one of the EU’s common values and as such has been a feature of the European project from the outset. Economic solidarity was especially evident in the 1990s, when the European Communities created the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, supporting Central and Eastern European countries in their transitions to market economies. The same values were discernible during accession to the Union, in assessing fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria and taking account of applicant countries’ starting positions. Slovakia was among those countries whose application process was delayed. Nonetheless, member states showed strong support for its pursuit of EU membership and expressed solidarity with the new political elite together with attempts to transform the political system, despite doubts about the sustainability of democracy, largely because of the authoritative ambitions of Prime Minister (and leader of ‘Ordinary People’) Igor Matovič. The European value of solidarity has been backstage during political discussions and different perceptions have sometimes led to its use as a political tool. The misinterpretation given by some political elites, including those in Slovakia, has prompted accelerated action among European leaders who wish to see solidarity included among the common values, with a more precise definition in the EU legal order. Formally ‘codifying’ solidarity in the Lisbon Treaty would not only help ensure its enforcement, but also clear up any confusion over its meaning and thus prevent misinterpretation. For the sake of clarity, solidarity in the form applied during enlargement, along with development aid as well as humanitarian assistance, should be exactly what is granted to all members and partner countries. Solidarity is

L. Mokrá (*) · A. Figulová Institute of European Studies and International Relations, Comenius University, Bratislava, Slovakia e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected]; andrea.fi[email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), European Solidarity in Action and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86537-5_23

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part of the EU’s identity and there is no leeway for different interpretations by any EU member state or other associated actors. However, we should consider the path dependency and history of some member states which may help explain ‘specific’ variations in behaviour. Certain ‘democratic backsliding’ in these countries is evident over time resulting in non-compliance with the EU’s common values and hence the EU is involved in constant enforcement.

Slovak Perspective on Solidarity Slovakia has to implement solidarity and is learning how to do this through practical experience. The current pandemic is fostering citizens’ willingness and general ability to help in supporting each other. Obvious examples of solidarity at national level include: applause of thanks; sewing masks on a voluntary basis; shopping for elderly people; or reading fairy tales online by famous people. Although these actions demonstrate solidarity in its fundamental sense, it is not always explicitly visible in Slovak foreign policy, part of which is the European agenda. However, there are several examples of national leaders ‘somehow forgetting’ about solidarity at European level, such as rejection by Council decision of the migrant relocation scheme. Similarly, solidarity was lacking in responses to the Commission’s draft proposal on the Greek financial settlement. Slovakia was the last Eurozone country to approve the EFSF Enlargement Agreement in October 2011 after approval became linked to the holding of early elections. That led to Slovakia earning a reputation for interpreting solidarity differently when acting as provider rather than beneficiary. The current EU leaders, with strong support from the Slovak foreign ministry, implement this solidarity principle in various activities, such as support for ongoing enlargement in the Western Balkans together with democratic transition and free elections in Belarus.

Solidarity Across Borders Solidarity should be the leading principle when reviewing the EU’s functioning and launching any necessary system changes to address key trends, such as digital transformation, migration, green deals and population ageing. This aims at strengthening the Union’s cohesion, economic convergence and competitiveness, ultimately achieving higher living standards. Slovakia’s official approach is that solidarity should be interpreted from a member state perspective, whilst also applying externally across EU borders, in economic support from the common budget, as has happened on many occasions in EU integration history. As the Slovak State Secretary for foreign affairs put it, ‘it is necessary to show solidarity within the EU, but also beyond, towards our partners in Africa, the Western Balkans and the Eastern Partnership countries. The entire EU is based on the principle of solidarity, and the

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Slovak Republic wants to be part of the system of aid and solidarity’. This official declaration explicitly calls for a European understanding and for Slovakia’s role in that, despite its previous negative position on the EU’s proposed solution to the Greek financial situation or rejection of the migrant relocation scheme. Polls conducted for the European Parliament in late April 2020 show that more than 61% of Slovaks think that the EU should be granted more competences for handling crises, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, so as to be more demonstrably exercising its solidarity.

‘De Facto Solidarity’ or a Common EU Value? The Post-Lisbon Perspective Although the understanding and implementation of solidarity varies in some member states, including Slovakia, the global pandemic has brought about a shift away from de facto solidarity. A more practical form is evident in common efforts to support the development of treatments and a vaccine against COVID-19. The cooperation of member states in fighting the pandemic should also be visible in other areas, such as: the coordination of a borders’ regime; finance redistribution; and support of measures concerning economic and social issues in specific regions. To protect the EU’s fragile nature, political support for real solidarity in actions rather than speeches should be admired. It should involve its incorporation in official documents and strategies. The future of solidarity between EU member states hence lies in the hands of political elites and citizens alike. Improper implementation will lead to consequences similar to those arising from the violation of other EU values. Most significantly, under the new Multiannual Financial Framework, access to decision-making and finances will be restricted following any violation of human rights, rule of law or democracy. Lucia Mokrá is Associate Professor of International and European law at Comenius University in Bratislava, Faculty of Social and Economic Sciences. She is also a visiting professor at other universities in Europe and chairperson of the TEPSA board. Her research interests include: human rights; external relations; institutional settings; as well as enforcement in international and European law. The Faculty of Social and Economic Sciences is an integral part of Comenius University in Bratislava. Academics and researchers provide expertise in different fields of social science for national decision-makers, running research and popularisation projects in Slovakia and abroad. The faculty’s foreign professors, students from abroad and European research projects give it a truly international feel. In the last decade it has earned a reputation as one of the best social science faculties in Slovakia. The Institute is also a member of TEPSA. Andrea Figulová is Assistant Professor at the Institute of European Studies and International Relations, Comenius University in Bratislava. She studied political science and law and holds a PhD in European studies and policies. Her research interests are political institutionalism and

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Slovak politics. She has also worked in the Slovak parliament, with experience there informing her current teaching. The Faculty of Social and Economic Sciences is an integral part of Comenius University in Bratislava. Academics and researchers provide expertise in different fields of social science for national decision-makers, running research and popularisation projects in Slovakia and abroad. The faculty’s foreign professors, students from abroad and European research projects give it a truly international feel. In the last decade it has earned a reputation as one of the best social science faculties in Slovakia. The Institute is also a member of TEPSA.

Slovenia: Solidarity Sounds Right, But Can We See It? Maja Bučar and Boštjan Udovič

When listening to political debates about the EU, solidarity is always placed high on the agenda. But paraphrasing the words of the Slovenian Prime Minister Janez Janša, in the final analysis when a problem or crisis emerges, member states are often on their own with little or no solidarity forthcoming from elsewhere. At best, a country can hope for some support from its immediate neighbours. Recent history corroborates this view. During the EU migration crisis in 2015, despite Slovenia being a Schengen country, this was not sufficient to keep its borders open. Similarly, in Austria as a result of the COVID-19 crisis several border crossings were closed and others tightly controlled. This created difficulties, especially for daily migrant workers: approximately 14,000 people commute on a daily or weekly basis from Slovenia to Austria. Later in the year seasonal border crossing was also problematic for tourists returning home from their Summer holidays. Protecting only one’s own interests is understandable, but at the same time that does not place EU solidarity in very high regard. One might even say that in general Slovenians share their Prime Minister’s view, in having rather low expectations as far as solidarity within the EU is concerned. As a small, relatively new member state, there is a general feeling amongst people that they have been let down by the EU on a number of occasions (migration crisis, Arbitration Award, the issue of trademark protection with Teran wine, etc.) and even though the support for membership is still high (62%), a belief that we can expect a helping hand from other member states does not exist. Part of the reason for such poor public perception of EU solidarity lies with the media: many instances of true solidarity within the EU are not attractive enough in news terms. We heard a lot about Germany banning the export of protective equipment, but a lot less about Germans offering hospital facilities to treat

M. Bučar (*) · B. Udovič Centre of International Relations, University of Ljubljana, Ljubljana, Slovenia e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), European Solidarity in Action and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86537-5_24

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COVID-19 patients from France. Moreover, European Council reporting about the MFF and Recovery Fund focused on the thrifty member states, who apparently have no feeling of solidarity with those in the South, even though their economic growth was enabled by the large markets of these very same countries. Less attention was given to the question of prolonged postponement of necessary reforms in some of the Southern countries or the reported misuse of funds in the past.

A One-Way Solidarity? We often witness only one dimension of solidarity. When Slovenia is in the position of calling for joint action or feels it is entitled to EU support (as with the Arbitration Award decision determining the border line between Slovenia and Croatia), even if this would mean that the EC would need to side with one member state against another, the feeling remains that the EU let us down and hence it would appear that the often cited ‘rule of law’ is applied only in some cases. By contrast, when solidarity was called for in sharing the burden of accepting migrants, this was not a Slovenian problem and neither the public nor the more right-wing political parties supported relocation quotas. During the COVID-19 pandemic, solidarity has again been demonstrated by some neighbouring countries and others of similar status, such as the Czech Republic and Poland, being the first to help Slovenia with masks and other medical equipment. At the same time, Germany stopped convoys of medical equipment for Slovenia, saying that its own legislation prohibits such exports. Looking at the issue of consular assistance, the situation was no different. Slovenian citizens were helped to return home, mostly free or with only minimal charge by Polish, Czech, Austrian or Croatian companies/institutions. Lufthansa, on the other hand, as the ‘German carrier’, adopted a far more business-oriented approach with little solidarity being displayed. By contrast, Slovenia demonstrated keenness in applying the solidarity principle when repatriating citizens from other countries along with our own and implemented this free of charge. Events during the first phase of the epidemic, there was a public impression about two versions of solidarity: that of ‘old’ EU members versus that of ‘new’ EU members. The examples cited above created a belief that solidarity primarily exists only with similar nations; in the case of Slovenia these nations would be the newer EU member states from Central and Eastern Europe.

Different Rights with Regard to Citizenship Let us mention one particular issue, related to the EU solidarity, namely the crossborder movement of workers. As mentioned earlier, a number of Slovenian citizens in the border areas are daily commuters to Austria, some because of above-average

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unemployment in the north-East of Slovenia and some in pursuit of higher earnings. With the Kurz Government, Austria started to fulfil the promise of the Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) to its electorate in indexing the child benefits of employees in accordance with their countries of origin. Since a perception in the EU prevailed that this was contrary to EU law, Slovenian authorities reacted promptly by asking the European Commission to block Austria’s intentions or even present the case to the Court of Justice. When this was put before the public, a group of cross-border workers from the neighbouring region requested that the Government stop their activities since ‘Austria is generously giving them jobs and some child benefits, no matter what amount’. The Government argued that the Austrian approach constituted a serious breach of EU law and that Slovenia would continue with its activities both in Brussels and bilaterally. During this process the cross-border workers stopped communicating with the Slovenian Government, partly in fear of losing their jobs. However, after 2 years of pressure from Slovenia (and other CEE countries), in May 2020, the EC started a process against Austria at the CJEU.

Make Solidarity Principle Better Known As Slovenia is a recipient member state, the availability of EU structural funds is highly welcomed. Yet, as often happens, over the years these transfers have become ‘normal’ and are no longer seen as an expression of EU solidarity. The fact that some countries are net payers into the EU budget, so that some others, such as Slovenia, may receive extra financial support for their regional development, is not emphasised enough to the general public. The functioning of the EU and its institutions is often viewed as too complex and too bureaucratic. Many of the benefits deriving from membership receive insufficient publicity and thus there is little or no awareness amongst many EU and Slovenian citizens. The importance of solidarity both at EU level and among member states needs to be better communicated. The main problem, clearly visible in Slovenia, is that some gestures or instruments of solidarity have become self-evident, rather than being announced as such. The open borders, making possible cross-border work, social transfers, MFF sources, cohesion and agricultural policy as well as many other EU instruments and those of its member states are treated as something that ‘we are entitled to’. Nobody really asks what the nature of those instruments is and how the EU would work without the principle of solidarity. Thus, in order to increase general perceptions about solidarity, a better and more persistent public relations strategy is required. Much more has to be invested in raising awareness about the schemes and actions that are being undertaken throughout Europe to help regions, cities or individual citizens. For example, Slovenia was hit by sleet and snow in 2014, which affected more than 45% of Slovenian forests and caused damage estimated at more than EUR 400 million. Slovenia received EU relief of EUR 14 million. Up to the present day, little has been published on this topic

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and neither has there been any public disclosures on how the EU funds were spent. Again, as in so many instances, we see that when it comes to criticism, both the Government(s) and the media are quick to attack Brussels, but when there are examples of clear benefits of solidarity and membership, these are treated as taken for granted with only limited or no ownership assigned to EU integration. With insufficient promotion of basic EU values, such as solidarity, in the long run defending the benefits of membership becomes increasingly difficult and may backfire, as happened in the United Kingdom. Accordingly, it is the task of domestic Governments as well as EU institutions to act in a timely way by spreading the message in clear and simple terms. Maja Bučar is Professor in the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Ljubljana and ex-Head of the Centre of International Relations (CIR). Her main field of teaching and research is in international political economy, development studies, European Union development/research and development policies. She has been involved in a number of international and national projects, related to these topics. CIR conducts interdisciplinary research in the fields of international relations, international economics and international business, politics of international law, diplomacy, human rights, international organisations and European integration. The Centre is a long-standing and active member of TEPSA as well as several other international networks. Boštjan Udovič is an Associate Professor at the Faculty of Social Sciences in the University of Ljubljana and a Researcher at the Centre of International Relations (CIR). His main fields of interest are diplomacy and the role of the political system. He is a member of various national and international advisory bodies. CIR conducts interdisciplinary research in the fields of: international relations; international economics and business; politics of international law; diplomacy; human rights; international organisations; and European integration. CIR is a long-standing and active member of TEPSA as well as several other international networks.

Spain’s View of European Solidarity: A Pro-EU Attitude and a Self-Perception of Weakness Ignacio Molina

Spain is a country prone to exploiting the idea of solidarity in European debates, which is not to imply that it is always an exemplary member state in this regard. This chapter explores three factors that explain the Spanish approach to this dimension within the integration process: the high political prestige solidarity enjoys at home; the strong Europeanism of both elites and public opinion, who are willing to advance towards an ever-closer union; along with the widespread national self-perception of economic, geographical and even political weakness. Spain generally tends to show and deliver solidarity in its EU policy, but it also has significant shortcomings.

Spaniards and Solidarity Depending on how solidarity is defined and measured, we can conclude that this is a basic guiding concept for Spanish politics or alternatively a rhetorical idea that does not need to be fully implemented through actual policies. We can reach the first conclusion if we listen to general ideological debates or analyse opinion polls, with solidarity very often mentioned as a cornerstone of public action. Indeed, the theoretical prestige of this concept in Spanish political culture is undeniable. This also translates into citizens’ values, as reflected in a sincere feeling of pain for the suffering of others and spontaneous manifestations of daily solidarity. However, the country’s comparative performance regarding the application of these broad narratives and attitudes is far less gratifying. For example, on a domestic level, the Spanish welfare State is neither particularly ambitious nor efficient in the prevention of societal exclusion. This becomes evident

I. Molina (*) Elcano Royal Institute, Madrid, Spain e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), European Solidarity in Action and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86537-5_25

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through not only the modest reduction in inequality after taxes and transfers, but also the existence of very significant objective inequalities (a Gini coefficient of 33.2 and a poverty rate of 14.6 according to 2019 Eurostat figures). Furthermore, there is no deep tradition of altruism or volunteering in the private sphere, beyond strictly family, friends or neighbourhood relationships. As for foreign policy, the Government’s External Action Strategy for the period 2020–2024 makes several references to the term. This is summarised, for example, by stating firstly that the ‘Spanish agenda is not guided by a limited national interest but responds to a global and solidarity-focused philosophy’ or secondly that its approach to international relations and regional integration ‘is constructive and follows a spirit of solidarity, defending a reinforced multilateralism’. However, a significant gap between discourse and reality can also be identified: official development assistance expenditure in 2019 accounted for only 0.21% of GDP, making it the 12th largest EU donor country in relative terms, which is a fairly mediocre position regarding international cooperation.

It Is Easier for a Pro-European Country to Support EU Solidarity If we now look specifically at EU solidarity, Spain stands out because of its strong political support for this idea. One of the most important variables explaining this attitude is the pro-European stance of both its political forces and public opinion, which tend to indicate that in terms of political objectives the integration process is not a mere internal market, but a genuine European political community. If one believes that there is ultimately a ‘demos’ in its own right, then it is easier to accept that the weakest members should be able to demand and receive assistance from the strongest. Moreover, intense debate on the Spanish ‘demos’ itself, in the context of a contested nationhood, helps to foster a Europeanist consensus, as a political identification shared by almost everyone, from the trade unions representing the working class to the conservative political forces throughout the country, whether in the rural areas or in the cities and whether in Madrid, Catalonia, the Basque Country or Andalusia. One way to measure Spain’s positive attitude towards EU solidarity is the fact that it has always wholeheartedly accepted the great supranational principles which protect the Union against free-riding. In contrast to all the other large states at some point of their membership (France, Germany, Italy, Poland and the UK), Spain has never been a problematic country during ratification of the Treaties, or when interpreting the main principles of EU law by its Constitutional Court. Admittedly, this does not extend to compliance with EU secondary legislation, where it is one of the worst performers, albeit the cause of most infringements is largely institutional (strong departmentalisation or the complex quasi-federal structure of the Spanish state) and hence unrelated to selfish considerations.

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Spain is also one of the 10 most active EU countries in the mechanisms of variable geometry and enhanced cooperation, which entail solidarity and the fight against insensitivity shown by some members to others. These include economic matters (from the outset, Spain requested participation in the euro and the financial transaction tax), justice and interior affairs (European Public Prosecutor and Prüm Convention) and the deployment of troops in all EU and NATO military missions in Europe (even in operation scenarios far removed from Spanish national security concerns).

If You Think You Are Weak, Calling for More EU Solidarity Is No Surprise The third factor that explains Spanish attitudes towards European solidarity (apart from the general importance that most Spaniards attach to solidarity and their pro-EU sentiments) is the perception that the country is weak in various domains. Thus, the expectation of being a beneficiary of Brussels solidarity—and that of the other 26 member states—is greater than the perception of being obliged to be a provider of help. Some of these weaknesses are objective, since Spain can be considered a peripheral member state both economically and geographically: distant from the inner core of the continent; isolated in energy terms because its French neighbours are reluctant to facilitate electricity interconnection; and close to potential instability from North Africa). Spain is poorer and less technologically advanced than the EU average; it remains a debtor country in the Eurozone and suffers from chronic high unemployment, now increased because of the pandemic. This approach, which is clearly favourable to solidarity, also connects with the positive experience of having been the most significant net recipient of EU regional policy measures since the mid-1980s until very recently. Along with Spain’s difficulties in independently generating growth and jobs or controlling its borders, there is also a subjective and to some extent exaggerated perception of political weakness. Ultimately, it is the fourth most powerful EU member state and has enjoyed, at least until 2015, solid domestic stability. However, its long international isolation for much of the twentieth century, its low level of public opinion trust in its national political regime and its profound territorial tensions make Spain a structurally fragile country that views the EU as a primary source of stability, legitimacy and solidarity. Very good examples of this permanent approach of considering European solidarity as the solution to domestic fragilities were the successful and visionary Spanish initiatives during the 1990s to introduce EU citizenship, setting up the Cohesion fund and harmonising extradition rules across member states. Similarly, receiving the support of EU institutions and the 27 national governments, who reaffirmed their commitment to the Spanish constitutional order, has been vital in handling the Catalan crisis. Finally, and just to mention the most recent proposals,

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Spain has requested the adoption of an integral management for EU external borders, combining ‘solidarity and responsibility’ in strengthening Europe’s social pillar, including an EU unemployment benefit scheme, and launching a massive coronavirus recovery plan financed through perpetual EU debt (partially adopted in the so-called ‘Next Generation’ fund).

Spain Is Not Always a Dedicated and Cooperative Member State Spain is indeed more of a beneficiary than a provider of EU solidarity, but it has also shown its good will towards others, as mentioned above, with its commitment to an ambitious integration process and its membership obligations. There are many examples of genuine altruism in Spain’s relationship with its EU partners, such as the cooperation of Spanish firefighters in the extinguishing of forest fires in Portugal. Furthermore, because of its national features, Spain is also a member state that contributes much more than it receives in areas such as health coverage of EU citizens (medical treatment for millions of tourists) or consular protection (since it has the fourth most extensive network of diplomatic missions abroad among EU countries). However, other recent displays of solidarity can be considered inconsistent. In the field of migration, for example, Spain complains of strong migratory pressure and often calls for the support of others in managing uncontrolled flows. By contrast, Madrid was reluctant to accept asylum seekers from heavily overburdened countries such as Germany during the refugee crisis and did not help Italy when it was overwhelmed by illegal immigrants. In other cases, there are attitudes that follow a transactional approach. Thus, association with the so-called ‘Friends of Cohesion’ (basically Central and Eastern member states) would not so much demonstrate Europeanism, despite Spain now being a net budget contributor, but rather a search for allies to maintain spending on agriculture. Likewise, close support for Ireland in the course of Brexit negotiations can be construed as an exchange for receiving similar treatment on the Gibraltar issue. Of course, Spain’s participation in the bailout programmes for Greece during the euro crisis’ worst phase implied an expectation of receiving future financial solidarity from the ECB and all other member states.

Recommendations Polls conducted during the pandemic show that Spanish public opinion strongly supports a common public health policy and a greater financial burden-sharing to deal with the terrible economic consequences of COVID-19. Along with the citizens

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of other ‘peripheral’ countries, Spaniards have also been known for their strong criticism of Northern ‘frugality’. The Southern member states are right in rebalancing the intellectual and political equilibrium within the Union when they dare to compete in the battle of EU narratives, denouncing the Netherlands and other wealthy countries (such as Sweden for its unilateral decision to opt out of the euro, or Ireland and the Netherlands for having become virtual corporate tax havens), who disregard the huge contribution of membership to their prosperity without paying the related costs through solidarity. However, Spain must take its duties more seriously, including efforts to comply with all EU secondary law, increase competitiveness and provide macroeconomic stability in exchange for financial support. Furthermore, European solidarity cannot be understood merely as something that Spain is likely to receive from other richer member states, but rather the natural result of participating in an integration process that requires giving assistance to others when necessary. To accept that the country often behaves in different areas in a tactical and short-term way lacking a European attitude is also a lesson to be learnt. Preserving national interests in the long run means defending a strong general EU interest through strong central authority demonstrated by the Union’s common institutions and a permanent dialogue with all member states, combing demands with empathy. Ignacio Molina is Senior Analyst at the Elcano Royal Institute and a Lecturer at the Department of Politics and International Relations at the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the same university. He is the author of many publications, including books, chapters in comparative volumes, articles in academic journals and policy papers. He has served as an external expert or consultant to several institutions. His areas of interest and expertise include the foreign and EU policy of Spain, and Europeanisation of Spain’s politics and government. The Elcano Royal Institute is a Spanish think tank for international studies. It is based in Madrid and was created in 2001 as a private foundation. The goal is to foster the creation and exchange of ideas in a plural and independent environment, with a stable and multidisciplinary team of analysts and a wide-ranging network of associated experts. The Elcano Institute takes its name from the Basque navigator who completed the first world circumnavigation five centuries ago.

Sweden: COVID-19 Messing Up the Concept of Solidarity Gunilla Herolf

Swedes generally perceive their country to be a loyal member of the EU. When asked, they are likely to mention facts such as Sweden being one of the largest per capita net payers to the EU and a major accepter of asylum seekers over the years, particularly in 2015. However, COVID-19 has not prompted much Swedish medical assistance, due to the country’s own difficult situation. In terms of financial support, its wariness against federalism affected and will probably continue to influence the Swedish view on collective debt. The same goes for its beliefs about the necessity of strict controls in public financing and rule-of-law as a precondition for receiving EU grants. That said, Sweden has recently launched ‘Trade for Health’ (against trade barriers for health material) and several big economic support packages against COVID-19 and hunger in low-income countries.

Financial Solidarity Sweden is very critical towards the agricultural and structural funds still covering a substantial part of the EU budget. Giving much of the agricultural support to big farmers in western Europe is seen as particularly wasteful. As stated by Swedish ministers, the new important EU tasks such as migration and border control could easily fit into an even lower budget if the CAP was reformed. Not being a member of the Eurogroup, Sweden has mainly been outside the activities connected with economic rescue operations. It did, though, offer loans to Ireland and Latvia (not taken up by the latter). Sweden is also a party to the

G. Herolf (*) Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Stockholm, Sweden e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), European Solidarity in Action and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86537-5_26

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Eurogroup’s Fiscal Compact treaty, even though as a non-euro state it is not bound by the rules. Sympathising with the Fiscal Compact’s purpose of having strict regulations for handling public finances, Sweden wants to be part of the discussions in this forum. The country has been a net contributor to the EU budget since it entered the Union in 1995. It is also one of the largest net contributors per capita (even after the rebate), which is seen as appropriate since Sweden is a rich country. The proposals for a new budget, according to which the Swedish contribution would increase by more than 30%, were, though, seen as unacceptable by the government and all political parties except the Liberals. In negotiations for the EU budget and relief to EU members hardest hit by COVID-19, Sweden formed part of the ‘frugal four’ (along with Austria, Denmark and the Netherlands), which were criticised for lacking solidarity because of their preference for loans rather than grants. Swedish ministers argued that money would be more effectively used in this way. Another argument was that it would be unwise to burden coming generations with huge collective debt, considering that future crises will need support as well. Sweden is also wary about a possible development towards federalism by giving the EU taxing authority. EU matters have rarely attracted much attention in Sweden, which on the whole is still true today. However, regarding the relief package, apart from the Liberals some people including representatives from trade unions and industry have argued that Sweden should have agreed to the original relief proposal. Their view was that Sweden should show more solidarity in times of crisis and that this was the wrong moment to stick to principles. Being generous would also have been smarter since Sweden, a highly export-dependent country, is relying on the recovery of EU countries, which account for 59% of Swedish exports.

Other Types of Solidarity The migration crisis in 2015 had an enormous impact on Swedish society. Sweden accepted around 163,000 asylum seekers during the year, which per capita was far above any other EU member state. As the situation became increasingly difficult during the Autumn, measures for reducing the influx of migrants had to be sought. There followed an expectation that more countries would then step in and take a larger share of the burden. Whilst the rules for acceptance are now more restrictive, only a few countries in the EU received more asylum seekers per capita during 2019, when Sweden accepted close to its 5000 quota (resettlement) of refugees, ranking fourth after the US, Canada and the UK. Sweden strongly supports the Commission’s efforts to introduce a common asylum and migration system, in which all countries must assume a fair share of the burden. The country has traditionally been open to workers from other countries and for a number of years actively recruited workers from southern Europe. Ireland, the UK and Sweden were the only countries that initially had none or only minor hurdles for

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workers from the new EU members joining in 2004. While the public supported this, a trade union argued against work without collective agreement, ensuring minimum salary and insurance. The union lost in the CJEU (the Laval case). Being geographically close to Russia and perceiving its policies to be aggressive, Sweden sees a united EU policy towards Russia to be of crucial importance. A common China policy is important as well and accordingly Sweden fully supports the EEAS’s efforts to negotiate a new China-EU strategic agenda.

Altruistic or Self-Interested Solidarity Due to the reasons mentioned above, while Sweden sees itself as a loyal EU member, it can also be seen as giving more willingly to the third world than to the EU. Frugality in EU budget issues is not seen as contrary to solidarity, whereas generosity in development aid (1% annually) holds a high priority. Even as a net contributor, Sweden sees many benefits being derived from its EU membership. Participation in the internal market and EU support of various kinds provides economic benefits. The benefits of cooperation are also regarded as extremely important and very much favoured rather than acting alone in areas such as security, fighting climate change, terrorism and so on. For Sweden it is imperative that the EU is not just regarded as a cash machine, but an organisation for countries sharing certain values. The UK, seen to share those values and a former like-minded EU member is sadly missed, but Brexit has led to increased support for the EU. Seeking to enforce rule-of-law conditions for disbursements was one of the major aims in the negotiations.

Recommendations Sweden should take initiatives to strengthen the system of twinning between cities in order to involve more citizens, arranging for them to meet. It is vital to connect cities in countries that are not like-minded. Furthermore, the country should take initiatives to increase the Erasmus programme so that even more students will be able to form strong links with their host countries and fellow students. Lastly, Sweden should engage in finding new potential threats against which common planning and preparations in advance is essential.

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Gunilla Herolf is a Senior Associate Research Fellow at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs (SIIA/UI) and Member of the Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences (Vice President 2010–2014), having previously been Senior Researcher at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). The SIIA/UI is an independent institute for research, analysis and information, founded in 1938 as well as being a member of TEPSA.

The Netherlands: Solidarity and Responsibility Are Two Sides of the Same Coin Jaap de Zwaan

Solidarity as a Principle Solidarity is a fundamental principle of EU cooperation, referred to in one of the first provisions of the Treaty on the European Union. Article 2 states that, ‘The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the member states in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail’. This principle reflects an understanding that once members of the same community encounter exceptional difficulties, they can make an appeal to other members for assistance. Today it is you, tomorrow it may be me, is the idea. Thus, an element of reciprocity is at stake. In that same sense, solidarity presupposes that in normal times when no urgent situations present themselves, member states respect and implement mutually agreed decisions in a correct and timely manner. Hence, the reference here is to responsibility. This counterpart of solidarity, as it were, is important to bear in mind when trying to understand the Dutch position taken in recent EU negotiations.

The COVID-19 Crisis At the outset of the COVID-19 recovery negotiations in March 2020 the Netherlands’ Minister of Finance was criticised for being reluctant to support the provision of urgent assistance to Spain and Italy, member states that had suffered most during J. de Zwaan (*) Trans European Policy Studies Associations, Brussels, Belgium © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), European Solidarity in Action and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86537-5_27

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the pandemic’s initial stages. The Netherlands did not demonstrate enough solidarity, it was said. In light of the way the Dutch position was presented at the time, this criticism was certainly justified. In terms of content, though, a nuance should be recognised here, because the Dutch reluctance was motivated by a perceived structural negligence, on the part of some member states, in the application of the budget discipline and semester arrangements agreed upon in the Euro-cooperation framework over the years. Furthermore, a lack of economic reforms was hinted at, for instance of the labour market and pension systems. Had those obligations been respected and the reforms accomplished, then the member states concerned would not have suffered as much damage as they were now experiencing. At least, that was the reasoning. Then again, this argumentation could be said to have been out of place. The coronavirus pandemic was an external phenomenon and certainly nobody in Europe could be blamed for its creation. It had already produced dramatic and tragic circumstances for many, but Spain and Italy had been hit particularly hard in terms of casualties and economic damage. Urgent help had therefore to be delivered immediately. Yet, this principle of responsibility must be accepted as valid in ‘ordinary’ times. You cannot ask for help to restore damage that you basically caused yourself through negligence.

The Multiannual Financial Framework and the Rule of Law EU negotiations on the Next Generation EU Recovery Fund and Multiannual Financial Framework 2021–2027 were thankfully concluded quite quickly by the European Council in July 2020. That said, during these negotiations the Netherlands was pointed at as one of the ‘frugal four’ (or ‘frugal five’), the group of member states barely prepared to provide an adequate financial basis for future EU policy making. Aside from this negative connotation, ‘frugal’ sounds a bit odd in the context of pure business-like negotiations, with the Dutch government aiming to agree on a modest, but realistic multiannual budget. Moreover, the government was and still is a strong supporter of an appropriate rule of law mechanism to prevent the undermining of fundamental EU principles and values, in the process of EU policy making and expenditure. Accordingly, the Dutch delegation’s objectives were not extreme. In that respect, accusations directed at the Dutch delegation of being a ‘frugal’ partner, were rather exaggerated.

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Other Cases: Finances and Migration The COVID-19 crisis was not the first occasion that solidarity was invoked by member states. The reference here of course is to the, earlier, Eurozone Financial Crisis and the migration crisis. Although not solved, regarding the financial crisis helpful arrangements for the member states in question have been elaborated over the course of time. By contrast, exceptional problems resulting from migration are dragging on. This is particularly worrying in refugee camps on a number of Greek islands. Indeed, it is not acceptable that thousands of migrants are being kept for months and years on these islands, because EU member states are not able to provide adequate infrastructures and swift procedures to deal with their applications for international protection. It can justifiably be said to be shameful in a community sharing the same principles and values, including solidarity and burden sharing. Undertaking adequate collective action has become more urgent since the Moria refugee camp’s destruction by fire on the Greek island of Lesbos in September 2020. Hence, the Commission proposals of 23 September 2020 regarding the ‘New Pact on Migration and Asylum’ represent a real test of whether or not the capitals are prepared to resolve these problems once and for all. Certainly, as with other member states the Netherlands has doubts about the solidity and feasibility of the Commission’s proposed package. Yet, the proposals are attractive because of their pragmatic and flexible characteristics. Thus, given other member states’ willingness and solidarity in finding adequate solutions for topics such as relocation and the return of those with no right to stay in the EU, the Netherlands will most likely support this package.

The Future of EU Cooperation: The Handling of Inequalities Whilst these crises have no doubt emphasised the EU’s North-South divide, i.e. the contrast between economically stronger and weaker member states, an even more structural problem begs attention regarding the future of EU cooperation. This relates to the continuing economic inequalities existing between member states in the West and a number of relatively new member states in the East. When considering this division, it can be seen that there are particularly huge differences when comparing living standards, the costs of living and the level of prosperity. Hence, in order to overcome these inequalities, once more solidarity is asked to find proper solutions. After the example of the modalities of the EU Recovery Fund, plans and projects could be elaborated and financial resources made available. The final objective must be to secure a ‘level playing field’ where all member states can participate on an equal basis. To achieve such an outcome is a matter of mutual interest. It may be that ‘poorer’ member states will profit most from common support programmes and/or

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investments. However, the ‘richer’ member states and their businesses also have much to gain here. This is so, because by investing in the economy of other member states, the effects will be mutually beneficial, for instance in terms of profit. As an example, the development of new economic activities could lead to the creation of additional employment opportunities. Thus, ultimately it is a ‘win-win’ situation. Although probably not a first priority when analysing the Dutch position vis-à-vis the future of EU cooperation, remedying inequalities reflects basically the Netherlands’ fundamental interests as well. The country is an example of a member state profiting extensively from the opportunities offered by the internal market cooperation. For example, according to recent EU statistics, intra-EU trade accounts for around 75% of Dutch exports. Moreover, the country’s businesses are traditionally amongst the group of main investors in new Eastern European member states.

Concluding Remarks Solidarity is a value that underpins processes of reciprocal cooperation. As was mentioned earlier in the chapter, today it maybe you who needs help, tomorrow it can be me. Solidarity certainly plays a role in all sectors where the EU is active. Beside issues to do with health (the COVID-19 pandemic), the Euro and financial cooperation, or migration, examples include: energy; climate change; internal and external security; foreign policy; and defence. The Netherlands is certainly a supporter of practising solidarity, but at the same time it does expect its partners to implement decisions properly in related policy domains agreed upon in the Brussels’ framework. To that extent, solidarity and responsibility are ‘two sides of the same coin’. Finally, with regard to the EU’s future agenda we should strive for more global economic equality within the Union. To achieve such an objective, a particular concept of solidarity (and burden sharing) will be required. That though will be worth the effort, since more equality will result in a more efficient internal market. In that sense more equality will not only serve the Dutch interests, but also contribute to the continuity of overall EU cooperation and, in a wider context, to more political stability on the European continent. Jaap de Zwaan is emeritus Professor of European Union Law at Erasmus University Rotterdam, former Director of the Netherlands Institute of International Relations, Clingendael, and former TEPSA Secretary General. The Trans European Policy Studies Association (TEPSA) is the first trans-European research network in the field of European studies. It consists of leading research institutes in the field of European affairs throughout Europe, with an office in Brussels. TEPSA is an international non-profit association under Belgian law (AISBL) and was established in 1974. Today TEPSA consists of 43 member institutes and associate members located in 36 European countries.

Part II

EU neighbours

Is the EU Albania’s Indispensable Ally Through Thick and Thin? Alfonc Rakaj and Leonie Rakaj-Vrugtman

EU—Albania Solidarity Tirana’s strong relationship with the European Union (EU) is deeply rooted. Not only is the Union Albania’s principal investor, donor and trading partner, but its impact is visible in every sphere of the country’s social, cultural, economic and political life. Illustrating this impact created over the past three decades are the countless plaques with EU flags that can be found scattered throughout the country, from the mountains in the North to the Ionian beaches in the South. These signs serve to remind locals and passers-by about the extensive infrastructure works financed by the EU to assist Albania’s transformation and development. Following the fall of communism, the EU provided as much as 88% of Albania’s foreign aid. Now that the country is an official candidate for EU membership, the bloc has once again increased its financial contributions: between 2007 and 2020 the country has received EUR 1.25 billion in pre-accession funds. Annually, more than EUR 100 million in EU funds is dedicated to improve key sectors including Albania’s infrastructure, food safety, justice system, agriculture, education and the environment. At the end of 2019, when parts of Albania were hit by a devastating earthquake, the EU displayed extraordinary solidarity. Its immediate response with assistance in financial, human and technical support provided a lifeline as people were being pulled from the rubble and damage was being assessed. In February 2020, the EU organised an international donors conference in Brussels, where EUR 1.15 billion were pledged to help with the recovery. Member states, the European Investment Bank and other EU institutions alone accounted for EUR 400 million of that sum.

A. Rakaj · L. Rakaj-Vrugtman (*) Institute for Democracy and Mediation, Tirana, Albania e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), European Solidarity in Action and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86537-5_28

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Although this solidarity has been sustained during the COVID-19 pandemic, the EU’s initial exclusion of non-member states such as Albania from travel and from export authorisation for personal protective equipment (PPE) contributed negatively to the blocs perception in the country. For Albania, it meant that life-saving medical equipment could not be purchased from its main trading partners in the EU. In response, criticism ensued with accusations that the Union of turning its back on the Western Balkan countries. With no ‘plan B’ in its geostrategic orientation and little assistance from third parties, this was a moment of sour realisation for Albania, namely that solutions to the country’s problems and fulfillment of its needs are ever more difficult to materialize in the absence of EU help. Slowly but surely, the EU’s financial and material assistance came in to help Albania mitigate immediate risks and the pandemic’s subsequent effects. An initial EUR 4 million were contracted to supply medical equipment, followed by an additional package of EUR 46.7 million to support social and economic recovery. In September 2020, the EU provided a macro-financial assistance package worth EUR 180 million. In addition, the country was eventually exempted from PPE authorisation upon finalisation of procedures to enrol in the so-called green corridor, which facilitates the uninterrupted supply of cross-border goods. Whilst solidarity in the relationship between Albania and the EU is overwhelmingly skewed toward Brussels, Albania has not shied away from reciprocating. Albania maintains full alignment with all EU foreign policy decisions and declarations. In addition, it has launched the first fully-fledged joint operation with Frontex to manage EU migrants transiting through the southern route, and adopted norms and undertaken painstaking, and unprecedented reforms such as the EU and US sponsored and lead justice reform. Although not a manifestation of EU solidarity, the country’s assistance to Italy with the provision of 30 doctors and nurses for a one-month period at the peak of the COVID-19 crisis demonstrates the country’s committment to its allies. Nonetheless, Albania could still do more to assume further ownership of local issues, bolster its governing capacities at all levels and foster sustainable solutions that help bring it closer to the EU in values, standards, and membership. In addition, Tirana must not be satisfied with its current level of solidarity with the EU. The country must aim to align itself closer with the Union’s values and practices by making a genuine commitment to the rule of law, democratisation, human rights and basic freedoms.

Rough Patches Ahead? Although irreplaceable in both its value and impact, the EU’s consistency in delivery has created two unintended side-effects that serve as warning signs of a rough patch ahead, if not addressed in due course. The first relates to Brussel’s unwavering solidarity over time, which has fomented a public perception that the EU will always be there to lend a hand in difficult times. While reflective of the deep

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interconnectivity (but not interdependence), it also reflects an overreliance on external help. It is imperative for the Albanian authorities to step up to the tasks ahead and assume a larger share of the burden through effective local ownership. The second unintended effect is an expectation that Albania deserves all the help it receives for its constructive regional role and reliability. Albeit critical, EU assistance cannot and must not be taken for granted as being given solely on the merits of this relationship. The inability of Albanian institutions to take responsibility to improve welfare, taken on bold but needed reforms, and consolidate democratic governance, could weigh heavily on relations with both the Union and individual member states as factures impeding such reforms will increasingly be seen as kindled by Brussels despite their poor track record. Some of these warning signs are already evident, as criticism towards Brussels by anti-government factions gains prominence. One such critique alleges that the European Commission’s progress reports tacitly exonerate the government from corruption, state capture, mismanagement, authoritarian tendencies and alleged ties to organised crime. They denounce the EU’s reluctance to challenge the government’s record as an indication that the Union prioritises Albania’s stability over its democratisation process. Another critique relates to the Union’s approach towards Albania’s integration progress. Its proponents argue that the EU applies stricter standards to Tirana than it does to other candidate countries when it comes to criteria fulfilment. Notably, arguments of this nature gained significance in 2018 and 2019, as the European Council on three occasions postponed its decision to open negotiation talks with Albania and North Macedonia. Although this criticism evaporated in March 2020 when Albania was given the green light to open negotiations conditionally, it served as a reminder that credibility and partnerships are very much work in progress that need systemic cultivation on both sides. This means that both parties must remain vigilant that unfulfilled, or even prolonged promises, could have a negative impact on the other’s credibility. For Albania, this means that the fulfilment of criteria must be fully undertaken to avoid politicisation of important reforms that are essential for the country’s development and democratisation. Ultimately, Tirana must understand that EU criteria are closely aligned with the country’s aspirations. As such, Albania’s decision-makers must work harder, not just to satisfy Brussels, but to deliver the tangible results that local constituencies demand. Alfonc Rakaj is a Tirana-based project manager and research consultant for leading Albanian think tanks and international non-governmental organisations. His work focuses on good governance, democratisation, EU integration and Albania’s foreign policy. Alfonc holds a BA in Political Science and a BA in International Relations from Oregon State University as well as an MA in International Affairs from King’s College London. Leonie Rakaj-Vrugtman is a researcher and project coordinator at the Institute for Democracy and Mediation (IDM) in Tirana. As such she is involved in research projects covering: institutional accountability; EU accession; as well as preventing and countering violent extremism. Before

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joining IDM, she worked at IISS and the Dickson Poon School of Law in London. Leonie holds an MA in International Relations from King’s College London and two Bachelor’s degrees in Communication Sciences and Journalism from Amsterdam. IDM is an independent think tank established in Tirana in 1999, working on good governance, security sector reform, civil society development and EU integration.

Can the Coronavirus Defeat Ethno-Politics? Paradoxes of Solidarity and Politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina Vedran Džihić

In the Balkans most jokes are told about Bosnians by Bosnians and so it has been with COVID-19. A current joke says that coronavirus has no chance in Bosnia as the politicians will first divide it into three ethnic coronaviruses, then give everything to weaken it and finally make it so weak that it presents no danger whatsoever. Obviously, the virus does not care about ethnicity and of course it has no ability to alter the usual political routines. Nevertheless, it can change the way politicians cooperate and more importantly how citizens interact in times of crises. A crisis can help to prioritise solidarity over division and competition. This is precisely what happened in 2014 when a major and totally unexpected crisis hit Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) together with Serbia and Croatia in the shape of floods. The city of Doboj was the largest of all the urban centres in Bosnia to be flooded in 2014. This crisis demonstrated a complete lack of preparedness by authorities. Hence, it was only when volunteer rescue units such as a rafting club from Bihać, situated in the other non-Serb entity in Bosnia, Federation of BiH, engaged in providing assistance that was effective in preventing complete breakdown. Volunteers acted autonomously, helping wherever they saw that assistance was needed, Bosniaks helping Serbs and vice versa. During the floods people started acting together to help others, not just their neighbours or family, but also people from different parts of the country most of whom they were meeting for the first time. For a while there was a sense that the floods united people and flushed away nationalist politicians. In 2014 we were provided with proof that a sense of solidarity still exists in post-war Bosnia and social capital is still intact in being able to transcend ethnic boundaries. Looking more closely at the current COVID-19 pandemic, the main question is whether or not the virus can defeat ethno-politics? The first coronavirus case can be

V. Džihić (*) Austrian Institute for International Affairs, Vienna, Austria e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), European Solidarity in Action and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86537-5_29

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traced to a truck driver arriving in Bosnia at the beginning of March having travelled from Italy. The first phase saw Bosnian authorities introducing strict measures including social distancing, closing of kindergartens, schools and universities as well as introducing very strict curfews and banning all outdoor activities for everyone under the age of 18 and over 65. In the Summer of 2020, the country experienced a sharp resurgence of infections before the curve began to flatten again as Autumn approached. Yet, throughout 2020 the numbers remained quite high and the epidemiological situation unfavourable. In Bosnia and Herzegovina with its complicated and decentralised government structure it is largely up to the governments of both entities, Federation of BiH and Republika Srpska respectively, to organise support for mitigating the economic and social consequences of COVID-19 and seek recovery of the already weak economy. However, bearing in mind Bosnia’s highly decentralised system of governance along with lingering ethnic and political animosity as well as institutional neglect, we can assume that negative effects from COVID-19 will once again brutally expose the weaknesses of our system. Whatever economic and social support the various layers of government in Bosnia will be able to give in the future, it will not be able to cope alone with negative economic and social consequences from the crisis. The EU will play a crucial role. The EU has been the key source of help for Bosnia during the pandemic throughout 2020, albeit its initial response was rather disorganised. The visible lack of solidarity among EU countries in the first weeks of their response to the COVID-19 crisis together with the closing of borders and an initial ban on exports of medical supplies to countries in the region and Bosnia itself, contributed to an impression of abandonment among the population. But the EU’s operation recovered and managed to provide most of the help that has reached the Western Balkans so far during the pandemic. The EU’s response followed the so-called ‘Team Europe’ approach to saving lives by providing quick and targeted support to our partners in facing this pandemic. Indeed, the Western Balkans was one of the first regions to experience implementation of a ‘Team Europe’ package. The Commission rather quickly mobilised over EUR 700 million of EU-support. At the ‘virtual’ Western Balkans summit in Zagreb on 6 May 2020, the EU was able to announce a comprehensive package for further emergency aid together with the economic and social consolidation of countries in the region. Overall, the EU promised a total of EUR 3.3 billion in financial aid, from which EUR 411 million are being dedicated to Bosnia. Yet, the EU’s credibility is being permanently tested, in that political elites have not changed their confrontational and hostile style of political communication. Neither have they intensified their efforts in terms of fulfilling EU criteria for enlargement, leaving Bosnia in 2020 with almost no progress in terms of integration. This inability to change the negative dynamics of ethnopolitics in Bosnia is certainly leaving the impression that despite the EU’s commitment to positive political changes, delivery is proving difficult if not impossible to achieve. The apparently endless membership talks with no end-point in sight combined with general enlargement fatigue in the EU continue to erode its credibility among the population.

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Ultimately, the crucial question is what shape European solidarity in general will take and how the Western Balkans with countries such as Bosnia will be included in any common vision of a future Europe. Without broader solidarity within the EU, there will be no internal cohesion and hence disaffection will rise and damage the European project’s credibility even further. In the European semi-periphery, where Bosnia certainly belongs, this lack of cohesion and solidarity in the EU will doubtless contribute to a further decline of democracy and an increase in populist nationalism. Only democratic and European solidarity has the capability of putting nationalist and populist energies on hold, directing the Western Balkans with Bosnia and Herzegovina firmly back onto the European track. To merge European forms of solidarity with those that are present in Bosnia among local initiatives, grassroots citizens organisations and many individuals will be the ultimate task for moving the whole region forward. It has certainly been evident during the COVID-19 pandemic that citizens networks, volunteers and many individuals have stepped in to provide help and assistance that the state was unable to provide. People have been leaving food in front of buildings for those who cannot afford it without paying attention to the receiver’s ethnicity. Young volunteers from the region have been delivering food to the elderly, medical students volunteered in hospitals and prominent Bosnian sportsmen have made huge donations. Artists and musicians have also found new niches, helping across borders with art and music to make everyday life a little more varied. The action ‘Applause at 8:00 pm’ after the strong earthquake in Zagreb on 22 March 2020 was particularly effective. On this memorable evening, people in Sarajevo sent a gesture of support and reconciliation that was stronger and more visible than anything that had been brought together on a political level for many years. A new sense of solidarity, similar to that emerging during the 2014 floods, was again being experienced in Bosnia and the wider region. How strong these initially visible forms of national and supra-regional solidarity will continue in the period after the coronavirus crisis is difficult to assess. Nevertheless, they point to the existing solidarity potential in the region, which has not been used enough so far. In the midst of one of the darkest phases in European history and one of the most severe crises since the wars of the 1990s, these common forms of solidarity could nevertheless prove to be the foundation for a radical new beginning in Bosnia and the whole region. It will need to challenge the dominant ‘ethnopolitical’ logic of the Dayton-based political structure and its inherent logic of violence and ‘Othering’. It will also need to embrace European assistance fully along with those trans-European initiatives that are able to provide support and place Bosnia into European debates on a common European future. While ethnicity and exclusive identities nurtured by dominant political parties prevail during ‘normal’ times, the solidarity able to transcend those artificial boundaries prevails in difficult times of crisis. This points at the paramount challenge within Bosnian society of trying to resolve the structural problems of a deeply fragmented and decentralised country. Political practice and narratives deeply polluted by ethnopolitics are major hindrances in trying to realise the still existing common sense of Bosnian togetherness and solidarity. Mobilising the forces of solidarity and togetherness so as to translate their power and energy into the political

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realm would be the ultimate way out of this prolonged crisis in Bosnia since Dayton and towards a new European ‘togetherness’ with Bosnia as a firmly anchored component. Vedran Džihić is Senior Researcher at the Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP), Co-Director of the Centre for Advanced Studies, South East Europe and Senior Lecturer at the Institute for Political Sciences, University of Vienna. He is a non-resident Fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations (SAIS), John Hopkins University, Washington D.C. Dzihic is the author of 4 monographs and editor/co-editor of 15 edited volumes/books. He is also the author of numerous book chapters and scholarly articles. OIIP is a Think Tank founded in 1979 and committed to fundamental research in the field of international politics. It is Austria’s leading institute on international politics at the juncture between academic and policy-oriented research.

Georgia’s Pandemic Response: Promoting European Integration Through the Lens of Solidarity Elene Panchulidze

Georgia’s largely successful response to the COVID-19 pandemic has attracted much attention. The government’s swift reaction in promptly suspending public transport, educational institutions and non-essential businesses was followed by the introduction of a state of emergency and nightly curfews. Such immediate measures reinforced with recommendations from scientists resulted in a relatively low number of confirmed cases and fatalities. As a country heavily dependent on foreign assistance and with an ill-equipped health care system, Georgia’s preparedness to handle the health and socio-economic dimensions of this crisis was far from guaranteed. The pandemic was a true test case for Georgia’s national crisis resistance. As various countries and regions imposed a lockdown, economic and trade relations were halted. Internally this resulted in multiple forms of solidarity, contributing to Georgia’s effective measures against the pandemic. Besides commendable national resilience, Georgia expressed a readiness to provide medical and technical support to neighbouring Armenia, signalling that the country positions itself not only as a receiver but also as a contributor to pan-European solidarity in times of crisis. If further promoted, such enhanced cross-regional solidarity actions could encourage stronger cooperation among Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries, as is currently evident in regional responses to events in Belarus. This adds vitality to value-based European cooperation. Georgia’s socio-economic conditions determined the internal and external dimensions of solidarity. In the pandemic’s early stages, the European Union (EU) allocated over EUR 183 million for Georgia as part of the European Commission’s ‘Emergency Support Package’ for the EaP countries. This emergency assistance package was targeted to mitigate the pandemic’s socio-economic

E. Panchulidze (*) PMC Research Center, Tbilisi, Georgia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), European Solidarity in Action and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86537-5_30

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consequences. EU assistance included funds for strengthening the country’s health system through the purchase of medical equipment, as well as small grants for civil society organisations under the ‘Rapid Response Mechanism’. Furthermore, the Commission provided EUR 150 million in macro-financial assistance programmes to Georgia aimed at improving governance, incentivising sector reforms, strengthening public finance management and implementing labour market policies. The EU has played a significant role in the country’s pandemic management support and has promised further support during the post-crisis recovery period. Numerous forms of solidarity actions were witnessed in Georgia. Rapidly adapting to the changed context, civic activists and grassroots movements launched large crowdfunding campaigns and provided humanitarian support to the elderly, people with disabilities, children, single mothers and women experiencing violence in the lockdown. As with elsewhere in the world, Georgian citizens gathered on their balconies to applaud healthcare professionals. The emerging grassroots solidarity demonstrated a high level of altruism towards the most vulnerable members of society. Besides ad-hoc solidarity actions among citizens, a number of Georgian companies displayed a high level of social responsibility by providing generous donations to the specially created fund ‘StopCovFund’, amounting to around GEL 36 million (Georgian lari). The fund is targeted to mitigate the virus’ negative consequences and provide support to government-led crisis management activities. Surprisingly, another form of solidarity—political solidarity—has also been noticeable. Although Georgian politics have become increasingly polarised, in the early stages of the virus’ outbreak opposition parties supported Government measures and voted in favour of declaring a state of emergency aimed at containing the pandemic. Georgian healthcare officials and government representatives offered both medical and logistical support to Armenia as it experienced a more severe outbreak of the pandemic. Furthermore, the Georgian government expressed its readiness to treat coronavirus patients from the conflict-affected regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, providing medical equipment, medicines and hygiene items to these regions with the help of international channels. By helping people in these regions that have tilted towards Russia in recent years, Georgian actions implied that solidarity in times of crisis should not be subject to politics. In regard to foreign policy, the pandemic context has strengthened the case for Georgia’s strategic partnership with the West as well as its European integration process. While the EU has played an important role in providing support to Georgia in its fight against the pandemic, the Russian Federation failed to play any role in the country or the wider EaP region and depended heavily on the dissemination of disinformation narratives in specific areas of strategic interest. In the post-crisis recovery period, both the Georgian government and civil society actors will need to keep further nourishing solidarity. As Georgia has relatively limited financial and economic capacity, people-to-people solidarity could create a significant added value to government crisis response efforts. Moreover, in such a

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way Georgia could promote the kind of values supposedly central to the European project. Georgia was able to provide more tangible examples of solidarity in the wider region and when necessary contribute to pan-European solidarity efforts, demonstrating that the country is not only the receiver of solidarity, but also a responsible provider. In this vein, enhanced cross-region cooperation within the EaP countries could also positively contribute to their European integration process. Coordination of post-pandemic recovery strategies within the EaP format could be a viable starting point which, in addition to the manifestation of regional solidarity action, could give an important stimulus to the fading Eastern Partnership format. However, if it is to play this role, Georgia needs to overcome its deeply divided internal political struggles that in recent years have polarised its population, thus weakening the country’s international influence and leverage. The country has performed well during the pandemic, in terms of both formal institutional and societal responses. Yet, the underlying political pathologies that preceded the pandemic have not gone away and will still need to be addressed in the recovery period. The incipient spirit of solidarity could help such progress, but much more political commitment is still needed. Elene Panchulidze is Academic Assistant at the College of Europe in Bruges, Department of EU International Relations and Diplomacy Studies. She is also an Affiliated Researcher at PMC Research Centre. Her main research interests include European Integration, Eastern Partnership, democracy promotion, development and cooperation and peace mediation. Founded in 2010, the PMC Research Centre undertakes studies in the fields of economics, politics, energy, good governance and social security. By combining global and local expertise, the Centre elaborates research-based policy options focused on economic development, accountable and transparent democratic governance. Through international cooperation, research and advocacy activities, PMC brings together representatives of academia, CSOs, government and industry. The Centre is also a member of TEPSA.

European Solidarity out of Self-Interest: Iceland and Crisis Management in the EU Baldur Thorhallsson

Decisions regarding the closure and reopening of Iceland’s borders tested the country’s solidarity with its fellow member states of the Schengen Area during the COVID-19 pandemic in the first half of 2020. Moreover, the EU’s solidarity with Iceland, an EU associate country through its membership of the European Economic Area (EEA), was further strained through the EU’s decision to ban exports of certain personal protective equipment (PPE) used in the work of healthcare professionals to destinations outside the EU, including Iceland.

Open or Closed Borders at the Height of the Pandemic? Closure of Borders During the pandemic’s initial stages, the Icelandic government’s priority was to keep its borders open in order to protect its pivotal tourist industry and the country’s position as an important hub for transatlantic flights (over 40% of tourists in Iceland come from the EEA and around 30% from the United States). Iceland’s struggle to keep its borders open started with the decision made by President Trump to ban all travel from the Schengen area to the USA, which took effect on 13 March 2020. The Icelandic government raised strong protests about this closure of US borders and publicly linked it with its decision to cancel a bilateral defence exercise between Iceland and the United States, which had been due to take place in April. On 16 March 2020, the European Commission proposed a temporary ban on all non-essential travel to the EU/Schengen countries. Iceland’s Ministers of Justice and Foreign Affairs immediately raised their opposition to this proposal at a meeting B. Thorhallsson (*) Institute of International Affairs, Reykjavík, Iceland e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), European Solidarity in Action and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86537-5_31

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with the EU ambassador in Reykjavik and claimed that in their opinion the decision was not based on any health or scientific foundations. Nevertheless, the following day EU/Schengen leaders agreed that closure of the external borders would be hastily implemented by member states.

Exports Ban On 19 March 2020 an Icelandic company informed the government that it was prohibited from importing face masks and other personal protective equipment (PPE) from EU member states, following a decision by the EU to ban exports of certain PPE to destinations outside the Union. The Icelandic government in cooperation with the other EEA EFTA states sent a clear message to the EU that this ban was not in line with the EEA Agreement. The Icelandic Prime Minister, Katrín Jakobsdóttir, took an unusual step by requesting an immediate telephone meeting with the President of the European Commission, Ursula Von der Leyen, to discuss specifically the export ban and travel restrictions. This was the first meeting between the two leaders. Following their discussions and other measures taken by the EFTA states, the EU agreed to lift the export ban to the EFTA states. The following day, Iceland announced to the EU that it would participate in the EU/Schengen travel ban and introduced new regulations prohibiting foreigners who were neither EEA nor EFTA nationals from entering the country.

Following the EU On 24 April 2020, regulation on a mandatory 14-day quarantine for all those travelling to Iceland took effect and remained in place until mid-June. Meanwhile, on a number of occasions the EU/Schengen area extended the closure of its external borders until 1 July. It is evident from the chronology of these events that decisions taken by the Icelandic government directly followed those of the EU. However, Icelandic ministers made statements on future actions which would contradict the consensus reached by EU/Schengen member states. They were clear in their wishes firstly to keep open and later re-open Iceland’s borders, including the country’s external Schengen borders. They also claimed that Iceland did not have any contractual obligations under the Schengen cooperation to continue in its participation with EU decisions on the region’s outer border closure. These statements did not go down well with the EU and hence the Icelandic government decided to postpone any action and accordingly delayed the opening of its Schengen external borders until 1 July. In general, opinion polls in Iceland indicate a substantial support for the government’s handling of the COVID-19 crisis, including decisions regarding the borders.

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Recommendations Firstly, Iceland needs to use all available means to take an active part in the decisionmaking processes within the Schengen scheme in order to protect its interests and be part of consensus making within the European Commission and the Council. Iceland and the other three EFTA members of Schengen have a seat in the Justice and Home Affairs formation of the Council of the EU and thus access to the decision-shaping process. However, they do not participate in any voting; hence, independent decisions are taken on each occasion in regard to the approval of additions to the Acquis. Iceland’s closer engagement in the Schengen decision-making processes will ultimately strengthen European solidarity and make it less likely that Iceland will drop out of Schengen consensus building and the Agreement itself. Accordingly, the EU and Iceland would both benefit from Iceland’s enhanced participation in decisionmaking within Schengen. Secondly, Iceland has to increase its access to the EU’s decision-making processes, especially regarding the internal market, in order to strengthen European solidarity. Compared with full member states, Iceland’s status as a member state of the EEA does not grant it equal access to the Union’s decision-making. Hence, Iceland is faced with decisions made by the EU, such as the decision to ban exports of PPE, without any possibility of making any contribution to the discussion. Moreover, the structure of the EEA Agreement leaves little room for manoeuvre and could be described as a one sided ‘take it or leave it (the EEA)’ position. The EU and Iceland would gain mutual benefit from Iceland’s greater involvement in EU’s decision-making regarding EEA matters. Thirdly, Icelanders need to feel that they belong in the European project and that they benefit from its decisions. When it came to the final decisions on whether or not to follow the Schengen regulations on external border controls, the Icelandic government always regarded it as important to avoid becoming the only Schengen state open to external traffic. If that situation were to arise, there would be a risk of Iceland being excluded from the next political decision to extend the closure of the Schengen’s external borders and the Schengen Area would then be closed for flights from Iceland. Icelanders would literally be stuck between the EU/Schengen and the United States, unable to travel in either direction. Iceland’s decisions to follow EU regulations on external border controls were marked by a view of European cooperation as an important mechanism not only in fighting against the pandemic, but also protecting self-interests. The Europhiles in Iceland need to make sure that a greater number of Icelanders feel part of the European project in order to strengthen European solidarity. In conclusion, the Icelandic government needs to issue a study on the implications of Iceland’s status as a member state of the EEA and Schengen during crisis situations. Iceland needs to find a way to increase its chances of influencing events within the EU and thus strengthen European solidarity during critical times. Iceland’s partial access to EU decision-making within the EEA had led to crisis management based on ad hoc arrangements. For instance, the country has secured an

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agreement on purchasing vaccines against COVID-19 through Sweden, which is authorised to export vaccines to EEA countries on the basis of EU agreements. Hence, Iceland will receive vaccines as a result of agreements between the EU and pharmaceutical manufacturers. Iceland is a member of the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), but does not have access to discussions on health issues or any other matters in the Council of the EU. A small country such as Iceland needs to be aware of the possibility that in a crisis situation most states and regional blocks will primarily look inwards to protect their own domestic interests. Our cases support previous findings regarding decisive decisions made by the EU during crisis situations (responses to the 2008 Global Financial Crisis and the 1996 Creutzfeldt-Jakob ‘mad cow’ disease) which had considerable implications for Iceland. Iceland needs to structure its relations with the EU in such a way that its interests are taken into account in the Union’s crisis response mechanisms and not solved on an ad hoc basis, thereby strengthening European solidarity. Baldur Thorhallsson is Professor of Political Science as well as Programme and Research Director at the Centre for Small State Studies, the University of Iceland. His research focuses primarily on small state studies, European integration and Iceland’s foreign policy. The Institute of International Affairs (IIA) is a research, teaching and service institute in the field of international relations and European integration at the University of Iceland. IIA is also a member of TEPSA.

Friends in Need Are Friends Indeed: How Kosovo Failed to Show Solidarity During COVID-19 Crisis Donika Emini

Friends in need are friends indeed. This saying has never been more pertinent than it is today in times of the global multi-dimensional crisis caused by the COVID-19 virus. During the pandemic’s early stages, it was widely believed that under such circumstances national interests would prevail. While this was certainly the case with Western Balkan countries, the European Union as an external actor has also played a leading role in establishing the ‘Green Corridor’, linking the region with EU member states, thus facilitating the movement of goods and medical products. Furthermore, the EU in Kosovo alone has been prompt in providing an emergency response and recovery funds, with special focus on the country’s economic revitalisation. Unfortunately, this domino effect of solidarity failed to be replicated among the Western Balkan countries. Being on the receiving end of direct benefits from the EU, the six Western Balkan countries not only showed limited solidarity with their neighbouring countries, but also did not hesitate to use the crisis in tightening their authoritarian grip further on freedoms and democratic norms, bringing about a greater tangling up in state capture. This has been the case with Kosovo—a country with one pandemic and two ineffective governments. When the first COVID-19 cases were confirmed in March 2020, this marked a fundamental turning point in the way that Kosovo’s society functions. The impact of the pandemic has been multifaceted and destructive for Kosovo, one of the least developed countries in the Western Balkans heavily reliant on international aid. The primary and most detrimental impact of COVID-19 in Kosovo is linked to the health crisis brought about mainly by the country’s primitive medical system which has traditionally been prone to corruption scandals. Moreover, the circumstances created by the pandemic have further amplified other existing problems, such as: longlasting economic crisis; worryingly high levels of unemployment; political and institutional chaos; and an education system ranked among the weakest in the world.

D. Emini (*) Civikos Platform, Pristina, Kosovo © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), European Solidarity in Action and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86537-5_32

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In times of a global health crisis, citizens’ well-being should be of paramount importance, but in the case of Kosovo the commitment of its Government and other institutions in protecting the population is debatable. Kosovo marks one of the few cases in which the COVID-19 crisis was used to overthrow a government, which had been in power for only 50 days. It is among the weakest countries in the Balkan region, finding itself in the midst not only of the most challenging security threat to the entire world, but also severe domestic uncertainty. Aside from failing to show solidarity on a regional level and beyond, the country has even failed to show care and solidarity toward its own citizens. Despite a severe increase in the number of infections, the long overdue antiCOVID law has only just been adopted in the Assembly, almost 6 months after the virus outbreak. Meanwhile, as the fragile government is still struggling to pass the law on economic recovery, businesses and Kosovo citizens are being pushed to the edge of despair in the middle of the biggest economic crisis the country has yet experienced. The lack of internal political consensus has halted the process of adopting many international agreements from which Kosovo could derive a great deal of benefit in times of crisis. These actions can easily have a detrimental impact on an already collapsing service-based economy, which has been widely hit by the government’s lockdown measures. Circumstances created by the pandemic have been used as the perfect excuse for a government freeze on internal democratic reforms, thus further amplifying already existing problems related to the rule of law being eroded. Externally, these events have reversed the progress made to date in the country’s overall democratic transformation within the framework of EU enlargement. Kosovo’s internal functioning has been seriously challenged, clearly reflecting the tendency for democratic backsliding and further strengthening the hybrid status quo in which the country has been stuck for many years on its way to democracy. Aid provided by the EU on both levels—the health crisis management and dedicated funds for economic recovery— has been perceived by the current political elite as money flowing from a free cash machine without there being the slightest effort to remain dedicated to democratisation and internal reforms in return. However, the COVID-19 pandemic has not least turned Kosovo into a geopolitical arena between China and the EU—which has been the case in Serbia, for instance. Kosovo provides a solid example of how the West has been ‘teamed up’, leaving little or no room for other external actors to extend their influence in the country. Aid provided by the EU far surpasses any assistance from other foreign actors, including emergency funds provided by the USA. The geopolitical aspect of this pandemic has generally not been an issue of concern in Kosovo. However, the political fragility and tendency to conclude the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia under the auspices of the White House—concluded with the Washington Summit on Kosovo following talks in Serbia and Brussels—with the EU struggling to restore its role as facilitator in the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia, have brought unprecedented political turmoil as the pandemic continues to rage. Debates on internal polarisation and the transatlantic fissure over the final deal for Kosovo and Serbia have created deep divisions within the country’s society. This debate focused on the

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importance of having the USA brokering a deal between Kosovo and Serbia, perceived as a party willing and able to deliver on the dialogue more than the EU—which has been leading the process for almost a decade without tangible results. This has kept the EU and some member states under pressure, fearing a potential land-swap deal between Kosovo and Serbia being facilitated by the USA, an arrangement which would have a detrimental impact on the entire region. As for the other external actors, contrary to other countries in the region Kosovo is less attractive for Russia and China due to their reluctance to recognise its status as a country. While China has been providing COVID-19 aid on a wide scale in the region, this did not include Kosovo. By contrast, Turkey, as an actor of longstanding presence in Kosovo, provided aid through structured influence in the economy, albeit to a far lesser extent than the EU, thus posing no risk for geopolitical tectonic shifts due to the pandemic in Kosovo. At regional level, Kosovo has not managed any proactive navigating around neighbouring countries. Beside the ‘Green Corridor’ facilitated by the EU and other solid regional initiatives, on a bilateral level there was a general lack of will to show solidarity toward countries in the region. This is best reflected in the freedom of movement and hesitation to have more effective cross-border cooperation, open borders which would pave the way to controlled but active freedom of movement. If there is a lesson to be learned from the COVID-19 pandemic, in the case of Kosovo it has exposed the lack of competency within the political elite to mitigate damages caused by the crisis. The country has not managed to reciprocate the solidarity received from many directions. Moreover, a failure to show solidarity even towards its own citizens in times of health crisis is clearly indicative of a government that is tailored to serve the elite in constantly striving to utilise any tool in further extending political power. The country’s failure to continue the domino effect of solidarity from the EU, promoting values and multilateralism is a key indicator that Kosovo and other regional countries have not been genuinely engaged in the EU integration process and hence lack a clear understanding of these values. Donika Emini is a PhD candidate in Politics and International Relations at the University of Westminster, London. She is leading the CiviKos Platform, a secretariat gathering 260 CSOs in Kosovo. She holds a Master’s degree in Public Policy, specialising in Public and Non-Profit Management as well as International Relations. She previously worked at the Kosovar Centre for Security Studies and was also a Research Fellow at the EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) Paris Office HQ. Other experience includes work at Transparency International in Berlin, the Balkan Policy Institute (IPOL) and General Consulate of the Republic of Kosovo in New York. CiviKos Platform is a voluntary union of civil society organisations, committed to the development of a favourable environment for cooperation between Civil Society and Public Authorities.

Liechtenstein: Solidarity, Yes, but on my Terms Christian Frommelt

Reliability, commitment and solidarity—with these words the Liechtenstein Government described its foreign policy in the Spring of 2016. Only a few months later, the Agreement on the Financial Mechanism of the European Economic Area (EEA) 2014–2021 was submitted to the Liechtenstein Parliament for approval. This financial mechanism—also known as EEA Grants—serves to reduce economic and social disparities within the EEA and can thus be cited as an example of European solidarity among the respective States. However, in the subsequent report on the Agreement and corresponding parliamentary debate, this idea of solidarity played only a minor role. Instead, the government praised itself for its success in negotiations: the expenditure foreseen for the new period was much smaller than that initially requested by the European Union. Compared with the previous financial period, the increase in expenditure was also less than the increase in EU cohesion expenditure for the same period. Finally, the government proudly announced that the increase in expenditure was even lower than the cumulative inflation rate, which meant that the increase was in fact no longer an increase at all.

Elements of Solidarity in the EEA The EEA links three members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA)— Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway—with the EU member states to form a dynamic and homogeneous economic area, thus giving the three EEA EFTA States access to the EU’s internal market. From Liechtenstein’s perspective, the EEA Grants are often referred to as a kind of ‘entry fee into the internal market’. Indeed, the EEA C. Frommelt (*) Liechtenstein Institute, Bendern, Liechtenstein e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), European Solidarity in Action and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86537-5_33

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financial mechanism has always been a request from the EU and not a gesture of goodwill from the EEA EFTA States. By contrast, the Norway Grants were initiated by the country on its own account, but are now managed together with the EEA Grants. EEA Grants have two goals: to contribute to a more equal Europe, both socially and economically; and to strengthen relations linking Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway with the 15 EU beneficiary countries,—defined as those whose gross national income (GNI) per capita is less than 90% of the EU average. The need and purpose for an EEA financial mechanism are undisputed in Liechtenstein, amongst politicians and the general public alike. According to a recent survey, though, perceptions of the EU and the EEA differ greatly regarding money paid to other European states. With reference to EEA membership, only 24% of Liechtenstein citizens agree with the statement that Liechtenstein has to pay too much money to other European states, while 72% believe that in the event of EU membership the country would transfer too much money to other EU states. This diffuse fear of the EU cohesion policy is a key driver of Euroscepticism in Liechtenstein. Solidarity in the EEA is not just limited to the EEA financial mechanism. One example of this can be seen with the EEA EFTA States’ participation in EU programmes. This is becoming increasingly selective, though, and Liechtenstein is no exception. The Liechtenstein Government openly admits that participation in EU programmes should take place only where the bulk of money paid into an EU programme flows back to Liechtenstein. In 2019, Liechtenstein participated in only three of the 18 EEA-relevant EU programmes. For instance, it did not participate in the EU Civil Protection Mechanism or the European Solidarity Corps, both of which can be seen as mechanisms supporting solidarity among the EEA States.

Types of Solidarity In the European context, Liechtenstein’s solidarity is primarily determined by selfinterest. Contributions made under the EEA financial mechanism are aimed at opening up new markets and increasing Liechtenstein’s reputation. However, looking beyond Europe the idea of solidarity seems to have a much broader basis in Liechtenstein’s foreign policy. For example, Liechtenstein regularly and generously participates in international fundraising campaigns and is also involved in various programmes on the relocation of refugees. Likewise, a recent survey in connection with the COVID-19 pandemic showed that 44% of citizens were of the opinion that Liechtenstein should financially support developing countries in coping with the economic consequences of the coronavirus crisis, while only 27% supported this argument with regard to other EEA States. In addition, Liechtenstein’s Parliament has already expressed its support for an increase in the budget for multilateral development cooperation due to the pandemic. By contrast, any increase in Liechtenstein’s contribution to the EEA financial mechanism or other forms of European solidarity have not yet been raised at political level.

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Ambivalent Relationship with Europe Liechtenstein’s European policy is driven by its interest in economic cooperation. Accordingly, it is not surprising that solidarity considerations play a subordinate role. That being the case, their main purpose is to improve economic cooperation. In its latest report on Liechtenstein foreign policy, the government states that it will continue to pursue an ‘independent European policy tailored to its needs’. However, referring to common values such as ‘freedom, democracy and the rule of law’, the report emphasises the importance of a ‘politically and economically strong Europe’, stating that Liechtenstein’s relationship with the EU is measured ‘not only by the advantages of the single market, but also by the responsibility that Liechtenstein assumes for the common challenges’. This commitment to common values is strongly reminiscent of Liechtenstein’s initial European policy objectives, which were determined much more by the desire ‘to be part of Europe’ than economic interests. Hence, at least historically one can certainly speak of a European identity in Liechtenstein as a solid basis for European solidarity. Liechtenstein’s economy has suffered greatly from the coronavirus crisis. Nevertheless, the government is expecting to declare an income surplus for 2020. Against this background, it is only logical that the EU will request a substantial increase in contributions for the EEA financial mechanism’s new financial period. It is to be hoped that the EEA EFTA States will be less hesitant this time and will meet the EU’s demands. Considering its small size and very restrictive immigration policy, financial contributions are the only means of satisfying Liechtenstein’s solidarity policy. Whether such a sign of solidarity is based on strategic interests or a European identity is then of secondary importance. Christian Frommelt has been Director of the Liechtenstein Institute in Bendern, Liechtenstein, since 2018 and a research fellow in Political Science at the Institute since 2010. He holds a PhD from the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) in Zurich and a Master’s degree from the University of Innsbruck. His research focuses on the European Economic Area (EEA) and integration policies of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) member states. He was previously Director for Brexit Studies at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Justice and Culture of Liechtenstein from 2017 to 2018. The Liechtenstein Institute was founded in 1986 as a research institute for scientific research in the fields of history, politics, law and economy relating to Liechtenstein, organised as a non-profit association and state-subsidised. It is also a full member of TEPSA.

Montenegro: Enlargement Solidarity, Hoping for the Best . . . Danijela Jaćimović and Nikola Milović

Montenegro is an integral part of Europe’s landscape in social, economic, security and political terms. Whilst the European integration process started in 2012, the accession process has been very slow to date, not least because enlargement disappeared from the EU radar, after Croatia’s accession in 2013. A new enlargement strategy has emerged in 2020, putting emphasis on both political criteria and strict conditionality. It provides time for the EU to be stronger and more solid ‘before it can be bigger’, while also giving space for the Western Balkans to push for the necessary reforms. At the same time, the world continues to face unprecedented uncertainty due to COVID-19. Montenegro is facing a sharp GDP decline in 2020, with the World Bank estimating a 12% drop in GDP, based on September projections. It is becoming clear that we are living in extraordinary times and that it will take years to rebuild as well as recover from economic devastation, restoring both jobs and growth. At the same time, the newly elected Montenegrin government has to ensure the further democratisation of society, more extensive implementation of the rule of law and combat corruption along with organised crime. However, Montenegro is quite different from other Central and Eastern European countries, where geopolitics have consistently played an important role in convergence, something which was confirmed by the Zagreb Declaration. During the integration process, there have been powerful push and pull push factors of almost equal strength for each step forward, that have made the process of enlargement very protracted. Russia has had and continues to have traditionally strong historical, cultural and religious ties with the region. Furthermore, the presence of China has become increasingly visible through their investment in infrastructure: transport, energy and industrial production, as well as the so-called ‘Balkan Silk Road’, especially in the years following the financial crisis. Moreover, the international

D. Jaćimović (*) · N. Milović Faculty of Economics, University of Montenegro, Podgorica, Montenegro e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), European Solidarity in Action and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86537-5_34

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system is changing. It is becoming increasingly evident that China is establishing a new balance of power in the world. Indeed its role may be very dominant in the postcoronavirus era, particularly in a Balkan context, as the only country that will achieve 1.2% GDP growth in 2020, based on the latest World Bank projections. The region where Montenegro is situated has been an arena where geopolitical forces have been at play, most notably resulting from the interests of China, Russia and Turkey, over the last 10 years. Moreover, the Western Balkans have become a playground for this competition between geopolitical forces, during the pandemic. The first countries that offered medical equipment and advice were Russia, China, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates in March of 2020. By contrast, the EU response was delayed until May but nevertheless provided a significant sum of EUR 3.3 billion in COVID-19 emergency relief for the region. It has polarised the debate amongst the general public about both the reliability and sincerity of this partnership with both non-EU and EU/NATO countries. Hence, it will be interesting to see how these influences are balanced out over the forthcoming period. The first test was the August 2020 parliamentary elections. The EU as a credible actor on the regional and global stages, should effectively and visibly demonstrate its ability to act, in reaffirming its solidarity with neighbouring states, including actions in overcoming the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. But solidarity is not a ‘one-way street’. Montenegro should also demonstrate its solidarity through faster and more sustained implementation of European values, so as to fulfil the political criteria associated with accession to the Union. Thus, an intricate puzzle is faced by EU policymakers. What is the best recipe for this region, especially in times of COVID-19 and the new world thereafter? It will certainly require a great deal of careful bargaining. This centres on the delicate balance between pushing the Western Balkan countries to do the maximum in moving along their individual reform paths (by applying strict and fair conditionality), whilst not pushing them too far, so that they give up on reforms, considering that accession will never happen and thus being forced to look for other options. The August election results were a clear reflection of these recent developments in Montenegro, where both right wing and populist parties won a majority, promoting the fight for the rule of law and combating corruption as key priorities.

What Can Be Done? Some Recommendations One key element is the need to find joint solutions in the future, creating a ‘two-way street’ of solidarity based on reliability and sincerity. This would represent a strategic response from Montenegro regarding the political criteria to the strategic change in accession policy implemented by the EU. COVID-19 will have lasting and serious consequences across most if not all aspects of work and life in Montenegro. As a small economy, the country relies heavily on foreign capital and it is to be expected that the inflow of FDI will be significantly lower in the coming period. The EU needs to be the most important

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actor in providing the necessary resources to mitigate this reduction in investment. One of the tools for this is offered through the new Economic Investment Package for the Western Balkans (valued at EUR 9 billion) which is tied to the further democratisation of society, implementing the rule of law together with combating corruption and organised crime. Danijela Jaćimović is Full Professor at the Faculty of Economics, University of Montenegro. Her fields of interest include International Economics and European Integration. The University of Montenegro is a public higher education institution and as such is the oldest in Montenegro. The Faculty of Economics as one of the most important educational and research institutions in the country, is also a member of TEPSA. Nikola Milović is an Associate Professor and Dean of the Faculty of Economics at the University of Montenegro. His interests are in European Economics and Competition Policy. The University of Montenegro is a public higher education institution and as such the oldest in Montenegro. The Faculty of Economics is one of the most important educational and research institutions in the country and is also a member of TEPSA.

EU Solidarity in Action: The Curious Case of North Macedonia—Welcomed Amidst Quarantine! Irena Rajchinovska Pandeva and Sasho Georgievski

The year 2020 proved to be exceedingly noteworthy for North Macedonia, not just because of the domestic political crisis and the assorted and indistinct internal management of the pandemic, but primarily due to its NATO membership being endorsed and its EU path being cleared. From Autumn 2019 until Spring 2020, the public, political and media discourse in North Macedonia was flooded by nationalistic, populistic and even Eurosceptic messages, largely to do with the EU decision in October 2019 not to open negotiations with North Macedonia. This was awaited following a difficult adoption of the Prespa agreement, which resulted in an agreement between Greece and North Macedonia, resolving a long-standing dispute over the name of the latter (openly backed by the EU). North Macedonia had been expecting to receive news of its NATO membership months before the COVID-19 outbreak since Spain—the last member state to ratify this protocol—was facing prolonged political crisis and issues in regard to the constitution of its new government. Spain proved its solidarity in action by organising the first ever tele-voting conference of the state Senate amidst quarantine conditions in order to ratify the protocol for North Macedonia’s membership of NATO on 17 March 2020. The strategic decision to pursue this membership proved valid especially in times of crisis since North Macedonia (as with other Western Balkan countries) began using NATO’s Next-Generation Incident Command System to coordinate its response to the COVID-19 crisis and provide its citizens with real-time information and guidance. Once North Macedonia had become a full NATO member on 27 March 2020, coordinated assistance on behalf of alliance members was seen to be decisive not just as a political gesture of support, but also in assisting North Macedonia in facing challenges resulting from the pandemic. I. Rajchinovska Pandeva (*) · S. Georgievski Faculty of Law Iustinianus Primus, Ss. Cyril and Methodius University, Skopje, North Macedonia e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), European Solidarity in Action and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86537-5_35

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The EU opened its door to North Macedonia (and Albania) amidst this pandemic. The decision to launch accession talks with both countries was reached via a video conference meeting of the European Council held on 24 March 2020. The green light was long overdue, especially with regard to North Macedonia, and heralded by EU officials as proof of the EU’s ability to make strategic decisions even in times of crisis. However, whilst the decision did not include a specific date for the start of accession talks, it did feature a novel enlargement methodology and was coupled with a Commission plan for the Western Balkan region on investment, socioeconomic integration and the rule of law. Strangely enough, the quarantine was extremely productive for North Macedonia’s foreign policy. Amidst the global lockdown, after waiting in the wings for decades, the country was finally welcomed onto the main stage. Yet, this decision was not welcomed and emphasised as much as it would had it been made earlier, since much of the public, political and media discourse was engaged with COVID-19 crisis management and the ultimate truth about not being able to handle the outbreak without external support. Assistance to North Macedonia from the EU and its member states comprised funds allocated to fight the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic successfully, medical and sanitation equipment, the offer to accept COVID-19 patients and so on. The EU’s response was rolled out in April 2020. North Macedonia, as one of the countries most struck by the pandemic, received access to financial support to ease the burden caused by response policies. Its access to the EU Solidarity Fund was approved with up to EUR 160 million via a macro-financial assistance package, while the European Investment Bank pledged a EUR 1.7 billion package of assistance to the region. Additionally, EU bilateral assistance included EUR 66 million from IPA 2014–2020 to cover urgent health needs as well as economic and social recovery, along with access to EUR 455 million provided regionally as an economic reactivation package. The COVID-19 assistance also marked the continuation of previous assistance and support, with an overall snapshot showing that the EU is the largest provider of financial assistance to North Macedonia. In spite of all this assistance, the collective and general perception was that the EU’s response was not enough and too late to make a difference. This display was weighed down still further by past complexities in North Macedonia’s path towards European Union membership, including endless membership talks and enlargement fatigue. Whilst EU solidarity was visible, it was nevertheless tainted by the initial response towards the region and North Macedonia which included the closing of state borders, the blocking of medical purchases and the shaping of its crisis recovery package to exclude non-member states. The EU was not alone in providing assistance and support since solidarity towards North Macedonia came also from beyond the EU, being demonstrated by individual member states (such as Czech Republic, Germany, France, Holland, Slovenia, Bulgaria), NATO allies (Turkey, Norway, USA) and other countries that were willing to extend assistance (China, Switzerland and Japan).

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Cooperation was key to arranging the safe return of foreign nationals from North Macedonia to the US and EU countries, but also to Macedonian nationals. The issue of closed borders because of COVID-19 and the country’s poor health management was reminiscent of the geopolitical and cultural space that North Macedonia belongs to the Balkan region which amidst the COVID-19 crisis was treated again as a secluded pocket of insecurity in Europe.

Lessons Learned & Challenges Ahead Management of this health crisis domestically has proved that the political establishment needs to alter its national narrative, since one of the leading problems is to do with citizens’ trust in state institutions. It has been steadily eroding over the past three decades, blunted by overwhelming doubt in the legal system, inequality and human rights abuses, levelled by high level and all-encompassing corruption, topped by irresponsible party elites that aimed to instate a system of patronage in the very core of government and policy making. The COVID-19 crisis proved that much more needs to be done in relation to the building of democracy and democratic institutions, rule of law and respect of human rights. EU and NATO accession are of paramount importance for North Macedonia because of the fundamental requirements within this process related to the county’s improvement in this regard. The pandemic demonstrated that domestically the public was evidently in need of more educational assistance along with medical help in order to contain the outbreak and graduate to a new normality in every sense possible. Education, raising awareness and building on individual responsibility are all key to the progress of Macedonian society even despite the pandemic and this is where its partners along with allies need to be more engaged and invested. On the external front and in North Macedonia-EU relations, the crisis has illustrated that interdependence is key to progress and achieving common goals. EU solidarity must evolve and encompass its longstanding partners, current aspirants for membership and future allies. The EU must recognise the need to extend the level of support needed by countries such as North Macedonia, make use of its soft power in order to balance the incentives and obligations for candidate countries and mend the initial perception of scarce and overdue EU solidarity. Finally, the COVID-19 crisis has set the stage for making everyone aware that both gain and pain should be shared jointly, in partnership.

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Irena Rajchinovska Pandeva is an Associate Professor in political science at the Iustinianus Primus Law Faculty at the Ss. Cyril and Methodius University in Skopje. She is also Vice-Dean for science and international cooperation of the Faculty and TEPSA board member. The Iustinianus Primus Law Faculty - Skopje is the oldest institution of higher education in the country offering legal studies programmes and is part of the Ss. Cyril and Methodius University in Skopje which is the first public University in North Macedonia. The Faculty houses five different types of studies at both undergraduate and postgraduate levels: law; political science (in English and Macedonian); journalism and public relations. These subjects form the focus of research projects at the university with the addition of European Union affairs. The Faculty is also a member of TEPSA. Sasho Georgievski is Full Time Professor at and Dean of the Iustinianus Primus Law Faculty, Ss. Cyril and Methodius University in Skopje. He is also a Jean Monnet Chair. The Iustinianus Primus Law Faculty - Skopje is the oldest institution of higher education in the country offering legal studies programmes and is part of the Ss. Cyril and Methodius University in Skopje which is the first public University in North Macedonia. The Faculty houses five different types of studies at both undergraduate and postgraduate levels: law; political science (in English and Macedonian); journalism and public relations. These subjects form the focus of research projects at the university with the addition of European Union affairs. The Faculty is also a member of TEPSA.

European Solidarity in a Time of Crisis: A Norwegian Perspective Ulf Sverdrup and Pernille Rieker

Norway has always been an integral part of European cooperation and solidarity. A famous advertising poster related to the Marshall Plan proclaimed, ‘All our colours to the mast’. The poster portrayed Europe as a ship navigating rough seas on a course away from a dark and threatening sky. The ship’s sails are coloured with the flags of European countries and the Norwegian flag is flying amidships on the port side. The message is clear: Europe can thrive if its forces join together. Today, the issue of European solidarity and cooperation is once again on top of the European political agenda. This is largely to do with the COVID-19 crisis together with the ensuing economic and political turbulence, but also reflects the issue of migration. The rescue package agreed by EU countries in 2020 is unique regarding both size and structure. As a non-member, Norway is not formally a part of this package. However, as a closely associated non-member through the EEA agreement and several additional agreements, the country is not only integrated and affected by European dynamics, but also contributes in various ways to European cooperation. A fundamental question relates to the rigging of Europe’s sails this time around. How and to what extent does European solidarity reach beyond the borders of the EU? Will the EU act in solidarity with European non-members and should non-members act in solidarity with EU members? Moreover, what would count as an act of solidarity or a fair expression of solidarity by members and non-members?

U. Sverdrup · P. Rieker (*) Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Oslo, Norway e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), European Solidarity in Action and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86537-5_36

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Solidarity in Times of Crisis As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, COVID-19 is the latest stress test for Europe’s solidarity. It is a stress test for European cooperation and the internal market, unfolding in a critical period for global affairs and at a time of increasing nationalism and populism. The main response in Norway has been to rally around national institutions and national capacity in acting and responding to the crisis. During the pandemic, borders were initially closed with decisions on travel and health recommendations, although informed by European data and general policies, primarily being made by Norwegian institutions and only limited references to EU or European cooperation. However, in the early stages of the crisis the Norwegian government cooperated closely with many EU countries in repatriation of citizens. To the frustration of some EU members, Norway’s government has also in some instances pursued stricter border control than other countries. However, some consideration is currently being given to adoption of the Union’s travel advice, based on regions rather than states. The country was at first also negatively affected by export bans on medical equipment that were introduced by the EU, initially treating Norway as a regular third country. But exceptions were soon made for the EEA countries, which were deemed to be close partners, more insiders than outsiders. Similarly, Norway and Iceland as well as Switzerland have been given the opportunity to buy into future vaccine programmes. For Norway this means that it will be offered the opportunity to buy 1% of the entire EU quota through Sweden, which can buy 2%. Sweden will also administer the actual resale to Norway. Norway on its side has also actively shown solidarity with the EU. For instance, during the first phase of the crisis, it sent a team of health workers to assist in Northern Italy. This was done through the Union’s Civil Protection Mechanism, which Norway has opted into as an associated non-member. Beyond that, through CEPI (Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations), Norway has also made significant financial contributions to vaccine development and resource mobilisation regarding global public goods. There is no systematic data on how Norwegians have perceived European cooperation in the crisis, but based on media reporting, most seem to think that the national government’s capacity to deal with this crisis has been by far the most important factor, there being little or no coverage in the press citing joint European initiatives or calls for more European crisis response coordination.

Solidarity Through the EEA Funding Scheme While these acts of solidarity in relation to medical equipment and health coordination should not be underestimated, the question of solidarity is also to a large extent dependent on money and financial redistribution, particularly in light of the

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European rescue and restructuring package. Norway is formally not a part of this package; hence, it is neither covered in any way and nor has it been asked to make a contribution. That said, Norway still benefits indirectly to the extent that the package adds to European political and economic stability. Similarly, it can be said that Norway also benefits because economic stimulus in the EU will support the European economy overall. This could possibly spin off into a slight increase in demand for Norwegian goods and services. Additionally, as a major investor in Europe through the Norwegian Government Pension Fund, Norway will also have direct financial gains from any upswing and stimulus in the financial markets. The bigger question is, therefore, whether or not the EU might ask non-members such as Norway to contribute more financially to European solidarity. This has been the case before, for instance during the EU’s enlargement to Eastern and Central Europe in 2004. This big-bang enlargement was an historic event that required solidarity and economic redistribution within the EU, but it also had huge implications for EU-Norway relations. Enlargement of the EU implied a parallel enlargement of the EEA, as all new EU members also automatically enter the EEA. Hence, the EU negotiated with Norway and other EEA EFTA countries on how they could best contribute to solidarity and promote social cohesion in Europe. Norwegian politicians were in for a shock. They entered into negotiations with a desire to be compensated for terminating the free trade agreements concerning fish that Norway had with many of the East and Central European countries. In addition, the Norwegian government offered to increase its financial contributions by around EUR 10 million. However, the EU requested a much more significant contribution from Norway. The outcome was that the Norwegian financial contribution, through the EEA and Norway financial grants mechanisms, increased to around EUR 200 million annually. The issue of solidarity thereby transformed Norway’s cooperation with the EU from primarily being a regulatory cooperation relating to the internal market, to additionally having a significant redistributive component. Since there is no fixed key or formula for calculating the contribution made by EEA countries, and these negotiations are asymmetric, where the EU is powerful while the EEA EFTA countries are small, the negotiations have often been difficult. The EU has repeatedly demonstrated that it is a strong and unified actor when negotiating with outsiders. When the Norwegian negotiators and politicians have tried to find some support for their positions among their Nordic neighbours, they have been told that they prefer to support the EU’s demands. A new round of negotiations on the EEA financial grants schemes is expected to begin in 2021. The proximity in time between these negotiations and the EU’s restructuring package along with the new EU budget deal, makes it appear rather plausible that the issue of Norway’s contributions to European solidarity will be a possible, but also contentious topic in the years to come.

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European Solidarity—A Political Crisis or a Wake Up Call? So far, there has been broad political support for the EEA agreement in Norway. This includes the EEA financial mechanism, which has been regarded as a condition for the agreement’s survival. However, as Brexit negotiations have also demonstrated, it is a delicate act to balance solidarity, benefits, responsibilities and obligations between insiders and outsiders. Moreover, support in Norway for European integration and the EEA cannot be taken for granted. So far, EEA Agreements have considerable support, but it remains a fragile political compromise, with opponents in various political camps. In Norway, as in many EU countries, aspects of European integration and regulations are contested. For instance, there have been concerns related to the free movement of people, seen as a challenge to the Norwegian labour market. The centre-periphery dimension in Norwegian politics seems to be gaining in importance and this has also been linked to EU affairs. Thus it is to be expected that any new demands from the EU for a significant increase in financial contributions, combined with a changing political landscape in Norway, may trigger significant changes in attitudes and support for the current agreements. It is of course difficult to predict how the next Europe debate will develop in Norway. A survey published at the end of 2019 showed that a majority of Norwegians were rather critical towards full membership (60% preferred no membership), but the survey also found that a clear majority was in favour of the current agreements (61%). The COVID-19 crisis and changes in the geopolitical landscape we have witnessed since then might have affected sentiments and outlooks. To some it has become increasingly evident that Norway has mutual interests with the EU on a range of issues and it is also dependent on cooperation with Europeans for access to medical equipment and even vaccines. But for others the crisis has demonstrated a lack of European coordination through the challenges of open borders as well as the need to strengthen national governance and resilience. As was mentioned earlier in the chapter, there is no systematic data enabling us to determine the effects of COVID-19 as such, but it seems rather clear that it has at least not led to radical changes or repositioning of opinions.

Recommendations The term solidarity refers to a unity of a kind that produces or is based on a community of interests, objectives and standards. Given the increased emphasis on European solidarity, two key question arise: Firstly, Europe and the EU will have to reflect more on the limits or boundaries of solidarity. With that in mind, is it right to say that increased European solidarity relates to issues that are internal to EU member states, or is it that European solidarity also reaches beyond the Union and beyond the borders of membership? Moreover, if

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the EU expects non-members to demonstrate solidarity, what is the appropriate balance between contributions, rights and obligations? Secondly, as Martin Sandbu recently argued in the Financial Times, for the Norwegian side it is fair to assume that sooner or later a new debate concerning EU membership will come to Norway and this debate will be won by those who are best prepared. Given the importance of European solidarity, it might very well be that this new debate will be quite distinct from previous talks in Norway regarding EU membership (1972 and 1994), which centred primarily on market issues and the benefits of membership. This time debate could well be centred more on issues such as European sovereignty in global affairs, the green economy and energy transitions. European solidarity is likely to trigger both rethinking and political realignment. Ulf Sverdrup is Director of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI). He holds a doctoral degree in Political Science from the University of Oslo. He has been a professor at the Norwegian Business School BI, and a research professor at ARENA, Centre for European Studies, at the University of Oslo. He has published extensively on various topics in international politics, with a particular emphasis on European politics, European integration and Norwegian foreign policy. NUPI is a leading centre for research on international issues in areas of particular relevance to Norwegian foreign policy. As such, the Institute communicates research-based insights to the Norwegian public as well as wider international audiences, being committed to excellence, relevance and credibility. NUPI has three main pillars of research and expertise: war and peace; economy and development; together with diplomacy and global governance. NUPI is also a member of TEPSA. Pernille Rieker is Research Professor at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) and part-time Full Professor at the Inland University College (INN). She is part of NUPI’s research group on security and defence as well as being responsible for the Institute’s Centre for European Studies (NCE). Her research interests are the EU together with European foreign and security policy, with a special focus on France and the Nordic countries. NUPI is a leading centre for research on international issues in areas of particular relevance to Norwegian foreign policy. As such, the Institute communicates research-based insights to the Norwegian public as well as wider international audiences, being committed to excellence, relevance and credibility. NUPI has three main pillars of research and expertise: war and peace; economy and development; together with diplomacy and global governance. NUPI is also a member of TEPSA.

Serbia: Shared Loyalties Amidst the Pandemic Marko Savkovic

A key question that the Serbian research community has been asking for a long time is when will the country start turning towards ‘the West’, given its geopolitical positioning together with the Serbian public’s prevalent interests, ties and aspirations. This question gained salience following Russia’s occupation and annexation of the Crimea in March 2014. As a candidate for membership, Serbia is expected to align its foreign, security and defence policy decisions with those of the European Union (EU). However, unlike others in the ‘Western Balkan 6’, Belgrade aligns itself with roughly half of the EU’s conclusions and declarations, but opts to abstain whenever these are critical of Russia and China, its principal allies in what decision makers perceive as ‘defence of territorial integrity’. In reality this amounts to contesting Kosovo’s unilaterally declared independence and consequent affirmation of statehood. Meanwhile, once again over what Belgrade perceives as the unresolved issue of Kosovo, Serbia seems to be realigning itself with the US under President Trump’s administration rather than the EU. Inviting and eventually accepting an enlarged role in the wider dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina, Washington’s rediscovered appetite for brokering a deal between two parties in conflict resulted in an ‘agreement on economic normalisation’, which inter alia resembles a Trump administration wish list. In a surprising twist that no one saw coming, Israel was promised that both Kosovo and Serbia would move their embassies to Jerusalem, in direct contradiction to the EU’s positions. In return, Israel announced its intention to recognise Kosovo. Here, as the sun sets on Trump’s presidency, Belgrade took a critical gamble that the path to US favours would pass through Israel. This would come at the cost of alienating a major part of the Arab world (where many do not recognise

M. Savkovic (*) Belgrade Fund for Political Excellence, Belgrade, Serbia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), European Solidarity in Action and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86537-5_37

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Kosovo), China (5G along with installations and cooperation with untrusted vendors) and Russia (diversification of energy supplies). How does all this sit alongside the one issue that marked 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic and ensuing responses by different countries and their health systems? With the disease spreading, decision makers found themselves facing an altogether different problem: how to explain Serbia’s relationship with China to the West. In fact, a policy of continuity began in earnest with former President Tadic in 2009, the so-called ‘steel friendship’, as it is referred to by those promoting it. One of the conscious decisions made by his successor Aleksandar Vucic was to broaden and deepen cooperation. It took some time for Brussels to notice. First to herald this change in perception were think-tanks and researchers asking for interviews. Resulting articles written combined factual reports of Chinese endeavours with concern where these might take the country. When in July 2018 Commissioner Johannes Hahn labelled Chinese preferential loans or actual investments in South East Europe the ‘potential Trojan horse’, many were caught by surprise. Faced with the EU’s decision to halt all exports of medical and protective equipment temporarily, in what will be remembered as one of the most defining speeches of President Vucic’s career, he called European solidarity ‘a fairy-tale’ and formally thanked ‘brother Xi (Jin Ping)’ for his help. Belgrade could have asked the EU for an exception on humanitarian grounds and emergency exports would have been granted. Yet it took the EU a whole month until this policy was enacted, which severely damaged its prestige in the Western Balkans. Vucic’s statement circled the globe. It was, after all, a time when the entire world was faced with an unprecedented threat, with the West, or at least Westward-leaning part, questioning China’s initial response and sincerity as the pandemic spread. China did engage in ‘mask diplomacy’, which helped a number of countries to ‘flatten the curve’ of the pandemic’s spread. However, it seems that the damage in Serbia’s relations with the EU and the West at large was already done. Whatever little trust remains, will be constantly re-evaluated in what might signal a shift, first hinted by High Representative Borrell in speaking of Brussels as being naive’. As if to confirm that times are changing, Beijing has effectively abandoned the all-benevolent ‘globalisation is good’ narrative and opted for a more assertive posture, particularly in its immediate surroundings. While China’s responsibility in this pandemic needs to be taken into account, it did provide help to Belgrade when asked, providing thousands of tons of personal protection equipment (PPE) and assistance in setting up laboratories that enabled Serbia’s health system to process and test up to 10,000 people per day. Chinese experts were active in a number of ways: passing on their experience; proposing to have patients with milder symptoms brought to temporary COVID-19 hospitals instead of isolating in their homes (which initially caused a spike in infections); and advising which hospitals were suitable for treating patients and which were not. Statements made by the Serbian leadership were met with suspicion by the EU. The President of Serbia made an attempt at damage control. A meeting was organised with member state ambassadors, an ‘op-ed’ was published in the ‘US News and World Report’ in which he stated that ‘Serbia is committed to the West’

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and finally billboards sponsored by Ekspres (government-leaning weekly) appeared across Belgrade, on which Serbia thanked Europe—and Norway. This, we assume, was a counterbalance to the earlier Informer’s (government-leaning tabloid) billboard dedicated to ‘brother Xi’. Vučić did succeed in one thing. He managed to provoke a response from both the EU and its most prominent members. Brussels financed flights that brought Chinese PPE and other equipment to Belgrade. It donated test kits and disinfection chambers. Most importantly, it allowed Serbia to redirect funds from the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) to combat the disease. Once the numbers were brought under control, Serbia’s citizens were once again granted permission to travel to the EU, if only for a couple of weeks until infection numbers surged again. The battle over image, which was on the verge of being lost, ended up being a tie. The EU’s ability to act as a unifying actor was from the outset hampered by the decision-making of individual member states, who wished to keep a free hand in imposing or withdrawing restrictions. These actions are impacting in various ways: making life difficult for returning students and workers; as well as confusing and often dissuading business travellers. With some postponement already, this might in the short run affect certain major investments planned in the region. Yet citizens have accepted this ‘new reality’, seeing COVID-19 as the ultimate vis maior. Instead of spending their Summer holidays in the EU, many followed the advice to ‘stay at home’ and become more familiar with their respective countries. In April, Richard Haass wrote how the pandemic will not bring new trends, but accelerate those that already exist. The same can be said for Serbia’s strategic orientation, as it started drifting away from the EU some time ago. In a surprising turn of events, it now seems open to the possibility of becoming the principal US ally in the region. How that will ultimately play out is very difficult to predict. For a long time, the key ingredient in the EU’s approach was the policy of conditionality. Democratic regimes in Belgrade were pressured to fulfil their promises in normalising relations with neighbours, dealing with the past and most importantly delivering those indicted for war crimes and genocide. Return of such a policy is one of the current leadership’s greatest fears. In practice, this would mean no new opening of accession chapters until full normalisation of relations is achieved with Kosovo. Alternatively, this could result from a harmonisation of foreign policy with the EU. Specific requirements would be defined in terms of the rule of law and separation of powers; access to European funds would be suspended for all but civil society (and higher education). Leading this ‘new policy’ would be a group of member states, possibly emboldened by Biden’s recent presidential election victory. But such a shift would be based on several assumptions: the end of the pandemic and a comprehensive plan for the European economy to emerge from the expected crisis; consensus between France and Germany over how to continue the enlargement policy, as two leading members of the EU; and sincerity when it comes to enlargement policy. It is not without risk for pro-democratic forces either, as hybrid regimes show no signs of weakening and may always turn into full-fledged autocracies, or worse. Lastly, both the EU and leading members states ask, who is our partner? This is a question that opposition forces in Serbia also need to answer.

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Marko Savkovic is Programme Director at the Belgrade Fund for Political Excellence (BFPE). Previously, Marko worked for 7 years as a researcher in the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP), specialising in the fields of defence reform, civil-military relations and Euro Atlantic integration. He holds a PhD from the Belgrade Faculty of Political Science, with his work and thoughts having been published extensively in academic journals as well as various magazines and portals. He regularly writes for Novi magazine weekly and European Western Balkans portals. Marko is a member of the working groups dedicated to Chapter 31 (Foreign, Security and Defence Policy) and Chapter 35 (Other issues: Kosovo) of Serbia’s European integration process, within the National Convention on the EU. The BFPE is a non-governmental, non-partisan and non-profit organisation founded in Serbia in 2003. For the last decade, it has been providing education as well as training to Serbian political and civil society leaders active in various sectors and engaged in reform processes.

Switzerland: Solidarity Taken Hostage Frank Schimmelfennig

How much solidarity does Switzerland owe to the European Union? If solidarity is what you owe needy members of your own community, the answer seems simple. Switzerland is not an EU member state and hence not part of its political community. Even though it is one of the wealthiest European countries, it is therefore not obliged to pay for the EU or its members. This principled position—which does not preclude voluntary humanitarian or development aid—is widely shared in Swiss public debate and constitutes the Swiss government’s basic negotiating stance. If only it were that simple. The EU surrounds Switzerland. One sixth (or 1.43 million) of its residents are EU citizens; another 300,000 commute to Switzerland from neighbouring countries. Pre-Brexit, 60% of Swiss trade in goods and more than half of its trade in services was with the EU. Three quarters of foreign direct investment comes from the EU; more than half of Swiss FDI goes to the EU. Clearly, Switzerland is an integral part of the EU’s transactional community. Moreover, both sides share institutions that facilitate and govern these transactions. More than 120 bilateral agreements create a dense legal network and include far-reaching market access and the free movement of people. Finally, Switzerland benefits massively from the EU. In a general sense, the EU provides Switzerland with peace and stability in its neighbourhood. Specifically, a 2019 Bertelsmann study showed that Switzerland gains most from the EU internal market, more than any member state, recording annual income gains of EUR 2900 per person (compared with EUR 840 for the average EU citizen). Its de facto participation in the EU’s transnational community and the massive benefits it derives have made Switzerland’s principled position hard to sustain. In many areas, Swiss contributions to EU policies are little contested, such as payments into the research budget and the increasing contributions that Switzerland as a

F. Schimmelfennig (*) ETH Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), European Solidarity in Action and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86537-5_38

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Schengen member makes to Frontex. But these are membership fees, not acts of solidarity and Swiss researchers have received funding in excess of Swiss contributions. However, the EU also expects a Swiss contribution to the overall social cohesion of the EU. This contribution is a recurring point of contention. Initially, the EU had demanded a mandatory Swiss contribution as part of the second package of bilateral agreements in 2004. It dropped this demand in order to facilitate domestic ratification of the package and in return for a Swiss government promise that it would unilaterally offer support for the new member states. In March 2006, the Swiss parliament passed a law committing CHF 1 billion, dubbed the ‘cohesion billion’, over a period of 10 years. The Swiss People’s Party denounced this contribution as a ‘tribute payment’ to the EU and demanded a referendum, which it lost (47–53%). According to the current Swiss Foreign Ministry website, ‘Switzerland’s contribution is an investment in Europe’s security, stability and prosperity and is thus in Switzerland’s national interest’. It is important to note that the Swiss contribution is not part of the EU budget—in that it differs from EEA EFTA countries’ contributions—but allocated autonomously by the Swiss government to projects proposed by new member states. Moreover, it is well below the level that member states contribute. For instance, in broad terms Austria pays in a single year what Switzerland has paid over 10 years for EU cohesion. Finally, the Swiss government has used the prolongation of its contribution as a bargaining chip in other ongoing negotiations with the EU. The Swiss Parliament approved a second contribution in December 2019, which would support southern European countries heavily burdened by migration in addition to the Eastern European member states. Yet it blocked the release of these funds until the EU resumes recognising the Swiss stock exchange’s equivalence. This ceased in reaction to Switzerland’s refusal to sign and ratify the Institutional Framework Agreement (IFA), which would introduce, inter alia, the dynamic adoption of EU market laws. In September 2021, the Swiss parliament unblocked the funds again to improve relations after the Swiss government had unilaterally withdrawn from the IFA. During the COVID-19 pandemic’s early months, Switzerland experienced the ups and downs of European solidarity, similarly to EU member states. Initially, it faced unilateral border closures and blocked deliveries of protective gear from its EU neighbours. Later, the European Commission exempted Switzerland from export restrictions for medical equipment and prolonged the recognition of equivalence for Swiss medical products (that might otherwise have suffered the same fate as the stock exchange). The EU and Switzerland also cooperated with repatriation flights for stranded citizens. Without health workers from its EU neighbours, the Swiss health system would cease to function properly. In return, Switzerland accepted intensive care patients from overburdened hospitals in Alsace. Then again, the EU Commission initially refused to include Switzerland in its efforts to establish interoperability between the national COVID-19 warning apps, citing the absence of an agreement on health policy that would require ratification of the Institutional Framework Agreement.

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Switzerland and the EU need to stop taking European solidarity hostage, exploiting it as a bargaining resource in their institutional and regulatory conflicts. Swiss non-membership must not serve as an excuse for refusing solidarity commensurate with the de facto transactional and institutional community as well as the mutual benefits of the EU and Switzerland. This includes a permanent and increased Swiss contribution to member states in need and non-discriminatory Swiss participation in the European fight against pandemics and other transnational health risks. Frank Schimmelfennig is Professor of European Politics at the Centre for Comparative and International Studies, ETH Zurich, Switzerland. He heads the Academic Advisory Board of the Institut für Europäische Politik, Berlin and is also a member of the TEPSA board. His key interest is European integration theory with a current focus on differentiated integration and the crisis of European integration. His most recent book is ‘Ever Looser Union? Differentiated European Integration’ (Oxford University Press 2020, with Thomas Winzen). The Centre for Comparative and International Studies (CIS) is a joint research centre of political scientists at the ETH Zurich and the University of Zurich, offering a joint Master’s programme (MACIS). CIS is also a TEPSA member.

Solidarity Clashes with Geopolitics in EU-Turkey Relations Senem Aydın-Düzgit and Özgehan Şenyuva

COVID-19 hit Turkey and the EU (European Union) at a time when bilateral relations were already strained. Early in March, the two sides were engaged in a bitter conflict regarding migration, among other issues. The dominant perception in the country was that the EU was showing little solidarity with Turkey in managing irregular migration. As the COVID-19 crisis deepened, with both the humanitarian and the economic repercussions taking their toll, bilateral conflicts briefly gave way to acts of solidarity between the two sides. This was facilitated by Turkish medical assistance to various EU, Western Balkan and Eastern neighbourhood countries. Nonetheless, this period of solidarity and goodwill was short lived, as the EU quickly took steps in consolidating internal solidarity. Geopolitical conflicts in the Eastern Mediterranean soon defined the relationship’s agenda. The crisis of TurkishEU relations seemed slowly to translate into a crisis of solidarity, almost leading to a form of schadenfreude in which Turkish authorities utilised the ongoing pandemic as evidence of poor governance and an exclusionary approach by the European states.

Initial Turkish Response: We Are Ok, They Are Not EU member states, and in particular Italy, were among those who were worst affected by the pandemic in its early stages. As the death toll in countries such as Italy started to rise, with no substantial assistance from other EU member states in S. Aydın-Düzgit (*) Sabanci University, Istanbul, Turkey e-mail: [email protected] Ö. Şenyuva Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), European Solidarity in Action and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86537-5_39

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sight and images of the tragedy unfolding in public view, the dominant narrative in Turkish government and pro-government discourse was one of Europe disintegrating. COVID-19 was largely perceived as yet another crisis similar to those before—Eurozone, Brexit and migration—in terms of its impact on further triggering dissolution of the EU by exposing the Union’s lack of internal solidarity. COVID-19 arrived in Turkey relatively late and due to factors related to the country’s demography and the structure of its health system, led to a lower death toll compared to those member states that were most severely affected in the EU. This, coupled with the early image of disarray and collapse in parts of the EU was heavily used in the pandemic’s early weeks by Turkish policy makers for the positive representation of Turkey’s national health system and governance to make strategic advances in both domestic and international political discourse.

Solidarity Measures: Turkey’s ‘Corona Diplomacy’ So far, Turkey has mostly been referred to as a donor country rather than an aid recipient during the COVID-19 crisis. Turkish assistance mainly took the form of providing masks, protective suits, COVID-19 test kits and other protective equipment to over 50 countries around the world, including EU states such as Italy, Spain, Hungary and Bulgaria as well as Western Balkan countries such as Serbia, Kosovo, Bosnia Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Albania and Montenegro. Medical assistance, mainly in the form of surgical masks and other protective clothing, were also supplied to the UK. In the Western Balkans, Turkey sent 16 million tonnes of medical aid to Serbia and over 100,000 items of medical equipment to North Macedonia. Over 50,000 protective masks and other forms of medical supplies were sent to Albania, Bosnia Herzegovina, Kosovo and Montenegro. In the case of Bulgaria, Turkey provided direct financial assistance of EUR 210,000. More than 80,000 pieces of sanitation equipment were sent to Hungary alone, along with eight tons of material to be used in mask production. Turkish assistance also covered the wider Eastern neighbourhood, with more than 20,000 items of medical equipment provided to Moldova and around 150,000 parcels of medical supplies delivered to Ukraine. These various forms of assistance delivered in the coronavirus outbreak’s early phases were largely strategically driven. The fact that a rigorous public diplomacy campaign both inside and outside of Turkey was carried out by the Turkish government under the banner of ‘aid diplomacy’ attests to this claim. As such, acts of solidarity towards other European states were used not only to bolster the government’s claim of good governance at home, but also strengthen its international presence, particularly in relation to Europe, in other regions such as the Middle East and North Africa. Turkey’s ‘corona diplomacy’, as it was frequently called, also served as an opportunity for the government to normalise its relations with European states in part and ease the country’s increasing international isolation in its wider neighbourhood and beyond. Regarding the Western Balkans and wider Eastern

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neighbourhood, it was also an opportunity to extend its ‘soft power’, for which it had already been employing a wide set of instruments in the pre-coronavirus era. These measures which were aimed at contributing to Turkey’s image and power, had the reverse impact domestically. While the media continually covered stories about aid packages being shipped to other countries, social media and opposition reports were critical of Turkey’s shortcomings and failings. For instance, while the country was sending masks abroad, domestically there was a crisis with the state banning local sales of masks and attempting centralised distribution, which ultimately failed. The images of Turkey sending aid to other countries were also at odds with the central fundraising campaign to help citizens in need, promoted directly by top level officials asking for citizens’ solidarity. Solidarity is deeply rooted at an individual level in Turkey, both in terms of attitudes and practices. Thus, the solidarity campaigns launched at local levels by the municipalities were extremely popular. The issue of solidarity in Turkey was at two levels: local and regional levels of solidarity initiated and owned by citizens; and transnational level solidarity led by the government. There was no evidence of citizens’ transnational solidarity. With the exception of European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) loans to certain Turkish private banks, European assistance to mitigate the socio-economic and medical repercussions of COVID-19 in Turkey has so far been largely absent. The EU’s macro-financial assistance packages did not initially include the country. Nonetheless, the European Commission did redirect EUR 8.75 million in pre-accession funding for the prevention and treatment of COVID19 cases, announcing that Turkey would be included in the 2021–2027 Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance.

Recommendations While the Turkish government has highlighted on various occasions that the coronavirus outbreak has brought Turkey and the EU closer together, given more time this has proved not to be the case. Once the initial furore with COVID-19 subsided, conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean quickly returned to centre stage in EU-Turkey relations, with Turkey standing on opposite and conflictual grounds primarily with Greece, France and Cyprus. Geopolitical rivalries also reflect on public opinion, with anti-European/Western public rhetoric rising in Turkey and anti-Turkey discourse flourishing in the EU. While enhancing solidarity across Europe and with Turkey is extremely difficult under these circumstances, there are still certain steps that can be taken to prevent a total breakdown in relations and strengthen the sense of solidarity across citizens on both sides. Joint local and civil society initiatives linking the Union and Turkey should be encouraged and funded. In the specific case of pandemic management, successful local measures and best practices should be shared and assistance fostered. The earthquake diplomacy between Turkey and Greece in 1999 offers important lessons in this respect. At citizen level, the sense of solidarity is strong and vibrant. With necessary steps to establish people to people

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and community to community linkages, solidarity within European citizenry including Turkey can be strengthened, from local to transnational levels. Senem Aydın-Düzgit is Professor of International Relations at the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at Sabancı University, Istanbul. She is also a Senior Scholar and Research and Academic Affairs Coordinator at the Istanbul Policy Centre (IPC). Founded in 2001, the IPC is a global policy research institution that specialises in key social and political issues, ranging from democratisation to climate change, transatlantic relations to conflict resolution and mediation. The IPC offers policymakers, academics and young researchers a unique platform where sound academic research in social sciences shapes hands-on policy work. IPC is also an associate member of TEPSA. Özgehan Şenyuva is an Associate Professor of European Studies at Middle East Technical University, Ankara and is an affiliated Researcher and Board Member at the Centre for European Studies-METU. The Centre for European Studies of the Middle East Technical University in Ankara, Turkey was founded in 1997. It aims to contribute to comparative research on Europe and European integration through an interdisciplinary team of researchers. With the teaching and research strengths of four academic departments at METU (International Relations, Political Science and Public Administration, Economics and Business Administration), it offers two different Master of Science programmes in European Studies and European Integration. CES-METU became a Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence in 2007. METU is also a member of TEPSA.

United Kingdom: Brexit Meets European Solidarity Brendan Donnelly

A recurrent Leave campaign claim during the 2016 EU referendum was that it would be easy for the United Kingdom, once it had decided to leave the EU, to agree an advantageous future economic relationship between the UK and the EU with the larger countries of the Union, notably Germany and France. Events since 2016 have shown how misconceived this prediction was. But the misconception was illuminating not only for its misjudgement of the European Union, but also the solidarity between its members. It had always been a source of irritation to some in the United Kingdom that within the European Union their country needed to negotiate on a basis of equality with smaller countries such as Luxembourg and Ireland. This was seen as an affront to national pride, whereas negotiations with France or Germany would not have been resented. In the period before and just after the 2016 referendum, this resentment became transformed in the mind of many Brexiters into the fantasy that it would be possible inter-governmentally to negotiate the terms of Brexit with two or three of the largest members in the EU, entirely cutting out the European institutions. This delusion was premised on the erroneous assumption that other large European countries also felt resentful of their smaller fellow member states and were looking for an opportunity to emancipate themselves from the tyrannical grip of the European Commission. It is true that sometimes France, Germany and other larger member states become impatient with the Commission and smaller member states. But this impatience has only ever been of the most superficial and transient kind. It was a fundamental mistake of British Brexiters to imagine that they could infect the European Union with their own radical and principled rejection of European solidarity. Even Poland and Hungary, on whom the British government built at one stage considerable hopes

B. Donnelly (*) The Federal Trust, London, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), European Solidarity in Action and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86537-5_40

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as potential allies, were unwilling to do more than give occasional rhetorical support. Particularly at the Salzburg summit in 2018 Theresa May found herself embarrassingly without the expected backing from Viktor Orban.

What Did the British Want from Brexit? At the beginning of Brexit negotiations many continental observers were puzzled by the apparently erratic nature of British diplomacy, which seemed incapable of formulating any coherent set of demands or aspirations for the negotiations. Some commentators even assumed that this vagueness must hide a sophisticated diplomatic strategy, which in due course would be unveiled by the British government. This assumption was flattering, but incorrect. A number of factors prevented the British government initially (and since) from formulating a robust strategy for its negotiations with the EU. The referendum had been won on the basis of certain unrealistic and contradictory promises, which could never have been transposed into negotiating reality. If there was a narrow majority for Brexit in 2016, there was no majority for any particular form of Brexit. Some supporters wanted it to usher in an era of radical deregulation in the UK; some wanted to continue trading with the EU by an EEA-like arrangement; others wanted to reverse European migration into the UK; yet others simply wanted to spend more money on the National Health Service, as they had been promised during the referendum campaign. It would have required an extraordinarily adroit British government to distil such preferences into a consistent and achievable negotiating package.

Long Live the Commission! Even the most diehard Brexiters in London now recognise that European solidarity has proved over the past years strikingly more effective than the British attempts at division. But there is still a reluctance to recognise in London that the reviled and hated European institutions have played a central role in cementing and co-ordinating the negotiating effectiveness of the EU. A favourite myth, beloved of British Eurosceptics, is that of the arrogant, unrepresentative European Commission, endlessly attempting to impose its centralising will on the member states. Barnier’s behaviour in the negotiations has belied this absurd caricature in every particular. He has been zealous in consulting the member states and ensured that he is their faithful representative. Regular hopes surfacing in the British press that Barnier might be replaced or demoted have always been contradicted by reality. Barnier has given a master class in the fundamental role of the Commission as organiser and facilitator of the collective will of the member states. By signing the European Treaties, member states express their general desire to participate in the

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process of European integrative solidarity. Barnier has since 2016 reminded us that the European institutions are the best, probably the only vehicle through which concrete realisation can be given to that general desire. Central to the Brexit proposition was a belief that the United Kingdom could improve its position in the world, including its relationships with its European neighbours, by leaving the EU. The growing realisation that the reverse is the case has been traumatic for the political class of the UK. Before 2016, British Eurosceptics were inclined to speak dismissively of what they saw as the inflated claims of the European Union to internal solidarity; nor was such criticism always wrong in the areas of the euro, migration and the European budget. But the United Kingdom has received from the EU over the past 4 years a painful lesson in the effectiveness of solidarity, having been comprehensively out-negotiated by a united and well-coordinated European Union, demonstrating its institutional effectiveness. After Brexit, the British state will need to improve its own levels of internal cohesion and solidarity if it is not to avoid the division and even destruction it had predicted for the European Union. Brendan Donnelly is Director of the Federal Trust, a pro-European think tank in London. He is a former Member of the European Parliament (1994–1999). He was educated at Oxford and later worked in the Foreign Office, the European Parliament and the European Commission. He is the author of ‘On the Edge: Britain and Europe’ (jointly with Hugh Dykes; 2012) and has written numerous articles on the European Union (EU), Britain’s place in the EU and federalism. The Federal Trust is a think tank that studies interactions between regional, national, European and global levels of government. Founded in 1945 on the initiative of Sir William Beveridge, it has long made a powerful contribution to the study of federalism and federal systems. The Federal Trust is also a member of TEPSA.

EU-Ukraine: Towards a New Quality of Solidarity Mykhailo Pashkov

The COVID-19 pandemic has triggered economic turbulence, state egoism and lockdown anarchy. Against this background, confrontation between the West and Russia has intensified. The Russian Federation’s new Constitution consolidated Putin’s anti-Western authoritarian regime until 2036. In addition, a Belarusian ‘black hole’ of instability has emerged on the European map. The high-profile poisoning of Russian opposition politician Alexei Navalny and many other issues present new challenges. All this suggests that the new version of EU policy leads one to thinking about a new quality of solidarity with neighbours that are moving along the European integration path, including Ukraine.

The Solidary Look from the Eastern Partnership ‘Reservation’ European integration and solidarity with the European Union (EU) are key components within the course of foreign policy, the public narrative along with the worldview of Ukraine’s leading political forces and the general public alike. However, in reality the partnership practice is rather differentiated. Since the introduction of visa-free travel and conclusion of the Association Agreement, the Kyiv-Brussels relations has lacked common strategic goals. Even the 23rd EUUkraine summit of 12 October 2021 offered no new strategic ideas. Ukraine is literally fighting for its European choice, but it has to look for solidarity from its Eastern Partnership ‘reservation’, considering how the group of Balkan states, is

M. Pashkov (*) Razumkov Centre, Kyiv, Ukraine e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), European Solidarity in Action and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86537-5_41

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heading towards EU membership. The strategic uncertainty is an obvious problem of the Kyiv-Brussels relations. A look to the future focuses exclusively on implementation of the already outdated Agreement that was concluded in the ‘pre-war’ period of 2011. Any updates are merely points of discussion. At the same time, the first part of the Agreement’s basic formula ‘Political Association and Economic Integration’ is poorly understood both in Kyiv and in Brussels. Perhaps it is about Ukraine’s regular agreement to Europe’s political statements? Since 2005, according to Government reports, the Ukraine has supported the EU position about 6000 times. Regrettably, economic integration is also asymmetric. Whilst Ukraine makes up just over 1% of the EU’s trade balance, by contrast the EU accounts for almost 42% of Ukraine’s trade. Moreover, there are very few goods with high added value in Ukrainian exports, thus its negative trade balance in 2019 amounted to more than USD 4 billion. Shared values, partnership and solidarity are worth something only if they have common strategic goals, a strong economic basis and reliable protection. These are components of a new quality of solidarity. Without effective security, European integration achievements are brought to naught.

Solidarity in the Security Sector Ukraine’s contribution to European solidarity and security is its resistance to Russian expansion. This contribution (without fanfare!) is measured by more than 13,000 dead and 33,000, wounded, 1.5 million refugees, and 43.7 thousand square kilometres of occupied territory. This is exactly why Europe’s solidarity, the unity of EU members’ positions and the policy of sanctions against the aggressor are vital for Ukraine. Back on 1 September 2014, the EU leaders adopted European Council conclusions on Ukraine, strongly condemning the ‘illegal annexation of Crimea . . . and acts of aggression by the Russian armed forces on the territory of Ukraine’. The EU’s solidarity with Ukraine can be reduced to four areas: non-recognition of Crimea’s annexation and condemnation of the Russian intervention in Donbas; imposition of sanctions against Russia; initiation of the negotiation process (Minsk-Normandy formats); provision of economic assistance to Ukraine. In particular, during May 2020, the European Commission disbursed the last tranche under the fourth macro-financial assistance programme, which since 2014 has amounted to EUR 3.8 billion assistance to Ukraine. Currently, the EU is the largest financial assistance donor to Ukraine (about USD 16 billion). Two remarks should be made in this regard. Firstly, solidarity and economic assistance have certain limits and tend to shrink over time. These limits are driven by internal processes in the EU, the pandemic and fear of the Kremlin’s nuclear blackmail. Secondly, it is clear that the war cannot be an ‘old excuse’ for weakness, errors and miscalculations of the Ukrainian government on the path to European

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integration. All this forces the parties to seek a new quality of partnership and solidarity. However, it is obvious that Ukraine’s European integration along with solidarity of the EU member states is the best way to resist Russian expansion and distance itself from the aggressor economically, mentally, socially and culturally.

Several Joint Steps The Ukraine has to initiate and, together with its European partners, force Russia to accept new approaches to resolving the Donbas conflict. These include: formalisation of the agreement for a long-term ceasefire in Donbas by international institutions (OSCE, UNSC, UNGA); revision and updating of the Minsk Agreements; return to the plan on deployment of a UN military-civilian peacekeeping mission across all occupied territories; establishment of a specialised international prisoner exchange group. Of similar importance is the partners’ common position and solidarity with Ukraine regarding the liberation of Crimea from Russian occupation, along with increased attention to Crimean issues in global discourse after Crimen Platform Forum. Eastern Partnership ideology as a ‘multi-speed’ project needs to be updated, including introduction of the EU+3 enhanced dialogue formats with Kyiv, Chisinau and Tbilisi, as well as a formal definition of the EU membership prospects for these three countries. The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement has to be modernised radically. Apart from removing barriers to trade, liberalising quotas and adapting to new EU legislation, it should be more about the new dimension of solidarity and partnership, a joint movement towards the ‘Four Freedoms’. Ensuring the effective operation of Ukraine’s anti-corruption bodies is another condition for moving forward. The Second Section of the Agreement on Foreign Policy and Security needs to be more specific (with relevant annexes and action plans). The declarative framework novels should include relevant content for clear understanding of political association and security partnership. It is essential to accumulate efforts in combating the pandemic, strengthen partnerships in healthcare and pharmacology, intensify cooperation within the COVAX initiative (Vaccine Global Access Facility) and coordinate plans to rebuild the region in the post-pandemic period. Sectoral integration should focus on breakthrough areas. Negotiations and an ensuing conclusion of the ACAA Agreement (‘an industrial visa-free regime’) will strongly stimulate the revival of industries. Another step is to introduce ‘a customs visa-free regime’ (mutual recognition of authorised economic operators), which implies the integration of Ukrainian customs into the EU system. The roadmap for Ukraine’s entry into the EU digital market should be the next joint action. Hence, current realities and challenges prioritise

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strategic prospects along with a new quality of solidarity and partnership in the economic, political and security sectors. Clear-cut prospects of Ukraine’s accession to the EU could definitely activate domestic reforms. Mykhailo Pashkov is Co-Director of the Foreign Relations and International Security Programmes at the Razumkov Centre in Ukraine. He has a doctorate in Philosophy and is the author of more than 100 publications. The Razumkov Centre is a non-governmental think tank founded in 1994, uniting experts in the fields of: economy, energy, law, political sciences, international relations, military security, land relations, sociology, history and philosophy. The Centre is also a member of TEPSA.

Correction to: Belgium: Struggling with Solidarity Steven Van Hecke, Britt Vande Walle, Geert Bouckaert, and Valérie Pattyn

Correction to: Chapter 2 in: M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), European Solidarity in Action and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86537-5_2 The book was inadvertently published with an incorrect family name for one of the author in this chapter as Walle, B.V where it should have been Vande Walle, B. This has now been corrected in the book.

The updated online version of this chapter can be found at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86537-5_2 © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), European Solidarity in Action and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86537-5_42

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