Rome and the Seleukid East: Selected Papers from Seleukid Study Day V, Brussels, 21-23 August 2015 (Collection Latomus) (English and French Edition) [Bilingual ed.] 9042939273, 9789042939271

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COLLECTION LATOMUS VOLUME 360

Altay Coşkun and David Engels (eds.) – ROME AND THE SELEUKID EAST

360

Rome and the Seleukid East Selected Papers from Seleukid Study Day V, Brussels, 21–23 August 2015 Altay Coşkun and David Engels (eds.)

Bruxelles, 2019

Seleukos I (312–281) was the strongest among the Successors of Alexander the Great, and his territory extended as far as Thrace in the West and Pakistan in the East for over a century. His kingdom reached a new pinnacle under Antiochos III (223–187), who combined military vigour with political skill, but also bears responsibility for its harsh defeat at the hands of the Romans, the ascending superpower in the Mediterranean. This failure did not yet trigger the dynasty’s collapse albeit. It was resilient and re-established itself as the leading power in the Near East under Antiochos IV (175–164), who was able to maintain friendship with Rome. Gradually, however, Seleukid rule was reduced to Syria or parts thereof by 129. The book tries to redress the balance of Seleukid weaknesses and strengths. Case studies either focus on power, politics and ideology of the Seleukid centre, or on continuity and change in 2nd-century Anatolia, Judaea and Babylon, before trying to integrate into a broader picture the factors that led to Seleukid disintegration.

SOCIÉTÉ D’ÉTUDES LATINES DE BRUXELLES – LATOMUS 2019

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COLLECTION LATOMUS

VOL. 360

ROME AND THE SELEUKID EAST

LATOMUS www.latomus.be

La Revue Latomus, ainsi que la Collection Latomus, sont publiées par la « Société d’études latines de Bruxelles – Latomus », A.S.B.L. La Revue paraît quatre fois par an. Elle forme annuellement un tome de 1000 à 1200 pages. Chaque article est signé et l’auteur en est seul responsable. Tout ouvrage intéressant les études latines adressé à la Revue fera l’objet d’un compte rendu dans la mesure du possible, mais aucune réplique ne pourra être insérée. Président honoraire de la Société : Carl Deroux. Conseil d’Administration de la Société : Pol Defosse (secrétaire), Marc Dominicy, Emmanuel Dupraz (président), Alain Martin (trésorier), Ghislaine Viré. Membres de la Société : La liste complète des membres effectifs et adhérents figure sur le site internet : www.latomus.be/membres. Comité de rédaction de la Revue et de la Collection : Pol Defosse, Marc Dominicy, Emmanuel Dupraz, Alain Martin, Ghislaine Viré, avec la collaboration de Anthony Álvarez Melero, Altay Coşkun, Jacques Elfassi, Philip Hardie, Alex McAuley, Dennis Pausch, Benoît Sans, Liana Tronci, Hélène Vial. Présentation des manuscrits pour la Revue et pour la Collection : Les auteurs sont priés d’envoyer une version électronique de leurs articles ou monographies au Prof. Emmanuel Dupraz et de leurs notes de lecture ou comptes rendus au Prof. Marc Dominicy . Nous les invitons à se conformer aux recommandations énoncées dans un document accessible sur le site internet, à partir de la rubrique « Infos & contacts » : www.latomus.be/infos-contact. Les articles, monographies et notes de lecture seront soumis à une expertise selon le principe de l’évaluation par les pairs (« peer review »). Contact postal : Les ouvrages pour compte rendu doivent être envoyés à : Prof. Marc Dominicy, Latomus, c/o Éditions Peeters, Kolonel Begaultlaan 61, B-3012 Leuven, Belgique. — Pour toute autre question relative à la Revue ou à la Collection, prière de s’adresser par voie électronique à : . Abonnements et commandes : Éditions Peeters, Bondgenotenlaan 153, B-3000 Leuven, Belgique  ; site internet : www.peeters-leuven.be. — Pour l’achat des tomes I-LI de la Revue : Schmidt Periodicals GmbH, Dettendorf, D-83075 Bad Feilnbach, Allemagne  ; site internet : www.periodicals.com. — La série complète de la Revue (à l’exception des dernières années) est accessible à partir du site internet de JSTOR : www.jstor.org/journal/lato. Droits de reproduction, de traduction et d’adaptation réservés pour tous pays. © Société d’études latines de Bruxelles – Latomus, 2019

COLLECTION LATOMUS VOLUME 360

Altay COŞKUN and David ENGELS (eds.)

Rome and the Seleukid East Selected Papers from Seleukid Study Day V, Brussels, 21–23 August 2015

SOCIÉTÉ D’ÉTUDES LATINES DE BRUXELLES — LATOMUS 2019

ISBN 978-90-429-3927-1 eISBN 978-90-429-3928-8 D/2019/0602/27 Droits de traduction, de reproduction et d’adaptation réservés pour tous pays. Toute reproduction d’un extrait quelconque, par quelque procédé que ce soit et notamment par photocopie ou microfilm, de même que la diffusion sur Internet ou tout autre réseau semblable sont strictement interdites.

Table of Contents

Preface and Acknowledgements Altay Coúkun and David Engels

9

Introduction Altay Coúkun and David Engels

11

I.

The Seleukid Empire under Antiochos III

1.

Which Seleukid King Was the First to Establish Friendship with the Romans? Reflections on a Fabricated Letter (Suet., Claud. 25.3), amicitia with Antiochos III (200–193 BC) and the Lack thereof with Ilion Altay Coúkun

27

Poets and Politics: Antiochos the Great, Hegesianax and the War with Rome Marijn S. Visscher

61

Echoes of the Persian Wars in the European Phase of the RomanSyrian War (with an Emphasis on Plut., Cat. Mai. 12–14) Eran Almagor

87

Where are the Wives? Royal Women in Seleukid Cult Documents Kyle Erickson

135

2.

3.

4.

II.

After Apameia: Seleukid Recovery and Disintegration in the Shadow of Rome

5.

The Seleukid Elephant Corps after Apameia Nicholas Victor Sekunda

159

6

6.

7.

8.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Antiochos IV and Rome: The Festival at Daphne (Syria), the Treaty of Apameia and the Revival of Seleukid Expansionism in the West Rolf Strootman

173

Reading Backwards: Antiochos IV and his Relationship with Rome Benjamin Scolnic

217

With Enemies Like This Who Needs Friends? Roman Intervention in the Hellenistic East and the Preservation of the Seleukid Patrimony Richard Wenghofer

255

III.

Asia Minor in the Transition from Seleukid to Roman Hegemony

9.

L’influence séleucide sur les dynasties anatoliennes après le traité d’Apamée Germain Payen

279

L’ombre lointaine de Rome : La Cappadoce à la suite de la paix d’Apamée Alex McAuley

309

Unlike any Other? The Attalid Kingdom after Apameia Christoph Michels

333

10.

11.

IV.

The Fading Power of the Seleukids, Roman Diplomacy, and Judaea’s Way to Independence

12.

Triangular Epistolary Diplomacy with Rome from Judas Maccabee to Aristobulos I Altay Coúkun

355

The Seleukids, Rome and the Jews (134–76 BC) Edward Dąbrowa

389

13.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

7

V.

Long-Term Perspectives on Babylonia

14.

Mais où sont donc passés les soldats babyloniens ? La place des contingents « indigènes » dans l’armée séleucide David Engels

403

Generals and Cities in Late-Seleukid and Early-Parthian Babylonia Gillian Ramsey

435

Epilogue. Rome, the Seleukid East and the Disintegration of the Largest of the Successor Kingdoms in the 2nd Century BC Altay Coúkun

457

Index nominum

481

Index locorum

489

15.

Preface and Acknowledgements Altay COùKUN and David ENGELS

It was exactly ten years ago, at the conference ‘Seleukid Dissolution’ (Exeter, July 2008), that we began exploring the potential of collaborative research in the field of Hellenistic imperial history. As we shall set out in more detail in the Introduction, a joined conference panel on Antiochos I soon followed suit (Waterloo, December 2010), paving the way for a numbered series of Seleukid Study Days. Our shared interest in the intersection of the Seleukid and Roman Empires bore its first fruits in the form of several articles on Seleukid kings which D.E. contributed to A.C.’s database Amici Populi Romani (http:// www.altaycoskun.com/apr) as of summer 2008. The present volume manifests a more substantial result of our cooperation. It includes revised and extended versions of 14 (of the 22) papers given at the workshop ‘Rome and the Seleukid East’ (Seleukid Study Day V), hosted at the Université libre de Bruxelles, 21–23 August 2015. We have added three chapters to enhance the value of this book as a reference work for Seleukid-Roman relations: a study on the beginning of Seleukid-Roman friendship under Antiochos III (by A.C.), an investigation of the effective or perceived influence of the Seleukids in the areas after they had been lost during the war with Rome, 192–188 BC (by Germain Payen), and a discussion of the disintegration of the Seleukid Empire that tries to balance the impact of Roman Imperialism, Seleukid dynastic rivalries and independence movements in the eastern territories (by A.C.). Seeing this volume coming together, we would like to express our gratitude to all who have lent us their support. First of all, we feel deeply indebted for all of the inspiration and support that our project ‘Rome and the Seleukid East’ has been enjoying over the past years. We would therefore like to thank the many young and established colleagues who have been enriching the interdisciplinary Seleukid network, especially those who gave presentations and contributed to the vivid discussions in Brussels, but most of all those who submitted their written papers and patiently went through the editorial stages with us. Among them, we name first Kyle Erickson and Gillian Ramsey, not least in appreciation for the long-term effect of their Seleukid Dissolution conference. In their continued concern for the subsequent Seleukid Study Days, they have been joined by Alex McAuley and Richard Wenghofer. We are as thankful to them

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and the other repeating contributors (Eran Almagor, Rolf Strootman) as we are to those who joined our caucus for the first time in Brussels (Edward Dąbrowa, Christoph Michels, Benjamin Scolnic, Nicholas Sekunda, Marijn Visscher). Special thanks go to Babett Edelmann-Singer (Regensburg / Munich), Ryan Johnson (Oxford), Germain Payen (Waterloo), Jess Russell (Waterloo) and – most of all – Henrikus Van Wijlik (Peking): they could not attend the workshop, but have been generous with their time in supporting the editorial process. We can release no book manuscript from our desks without cordial thanks to our wives, Dorothea and Rachel, who shouldered many of our duties, to allow us to concentrate on pursuing and finalizing this project. It requires not only inspiration and sweat for the Arts to blossom, but also a great deal of material resources. We thankfully acknowledge the generosity of the Société d’études latines de Bruxelles ‘Latomus’ (together with its new director, Emmanuel Dupraz, for the inclusion of the present volume in the Collection Latomus), the Université libre de Bruxelles, the University of Waterloo as well as the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. July 2018

Altay Coskun Waterloo, ON

David Engels Brussels / PoznaĔ

Introduction Altay COùKUN and David ENGELS

1. The Rise and Fall of an Empire The Seleukid Kingdom (312–64 BC) emerged from the Diadoch Wars as the largest of the successors to the Empire of Alexander the Great (†323). A series of conquests allowed its founder Seleukos I Nikator (312–281) to dominate most of the north-eastern Mediterranean basin, Mesopotamia and parts of Central Asia (temporarily at least) as far as the Indus River. While repeatedly attacked by the Antigonids, Ptolemies and Anatolian middle powers, and while occasionally disrupted by insurrections in Baktria and Parthia, Seleukid rulers were able to reassert their supremacy throughout the 3rd century. With one or two exceptions, it was only in times of inner-dynastic strife that they had to worry about Syria, Mesopotamia and Media, the core regions of their realm. On balance, usurpations happened rarely, did not last long, and failed without exception, at least prior to 162. Antiochos III (223–187) even had a realistic chance of reuniting nearly all the territories that Alexander had formerly brought under his sway. Through the 190s, the prestige of the victorious king was second to none: the northern and eastern territories had returned into vassal status in the course of his glorious anabasis; Ptolemaic Egypt was curtailed and bound into an uneven alliance; the kingdoms, leagues and cities of Asia Minor were either his loyal allies or afraid of imminent subjection; and the strongest force in the Greek Motherland, the Aitolian League, was keen on accepting his overlordship. True enough, with the dust of the Hannibalic and the First Macedonian Wars settling, the Romans were gradually becoming visible on the western horizon. Having crushed the naval empire of the Carthaginians, they had established themselves as the new hegemon of the western Mediterranean. Through waging war on King Philip V of Macedon, they had demonstrated themselves as a force to be reckoned with. Along with military prowess came diplomatic skill and energy, the effects of which were manifesting themselves in a growing network of alliances. These included, amongst others, the Achaian League and the Pergamene Kingdom, lest to forget a long-standing friendship with the Ptolemies. Even before the victory of Kynoskephalai in 197, the Romans showed self-confidence by demanding the – hitherto unstoppable – Antiochos to stay out of Egypt. While they did not prevent him from annexing Koile Syria or expelling Ptolemaic garrisons from Asia Minor, their intervention

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nevertheless seems to have been the ultimate reason for Antiochos to hold back from occupying the land of the Nile. Admittedly, around the year 200, the king would not have conceived the idea that his strength might be inferior to Rome; but he was aware of the potential risk that Roman Italy might join the Ptolemies in an effective alliance, and that such an opposition stood a good chance of being reinforced by Pergamon and other players of central and southern Greece. He avoided that risk, and opted for negotiations. The outcome was the conclusion of formal amicitia, the last of its kind that the Romans offered unrequested.1 The Seleukids and Ptolemies also joined in friendship, which was sealed through the betrothal of his daughter Kleopatra and the child king Ptolemy V. The reconciliation of the former enemies did not stand in the way of good Roman-Seleukid relations, on the contrary, everyone seemed to be satisfied, and fears of a major conflict were dispersed. Antiochos had rightly understood that the Romans would not go to war for Koile Syria and Anatolian territories, for whose annexation he could even present some reasonable claims. With those territories changing hands, however, the effective balance of power was gradually changing. Time was playing into the hands of the Seleukid King. Friendship with Rome cooled down as of 196, when Antiochos fortified Lysimacheia on the Thracian Chersonesos. With this act, he was demonstrating that he had set his mind on more of Europe.2 Seizing what seemed to him a splendid occasion, Antiochos accepted the invitation of the Aitolians and set over the Aegean in 192. Although he only brought small military forces with him, probably lest to provoke the Romans beyond the point of no return, his move changed the fate of his prospering kingdom, and also of the Eastern Mediterranean at large. Irrespective of the military strength and political brilliance he had shown so far, he clearly underestimated the Romans’ willingness to bring back their armies, which they had withdrawn in 194 as a sign of good-will to the Greek world. He likewise overestimated his popularity among the Greeks, who were more than hesitant to support him. The battles at Thermophylai (191) and Magnesia (190) once more demonstrated that he had miscalculated the speed, vigor and determination of the Romans. The victors dictated harsh conditions for the truce, and even worsened them somewhat for the Peace of Apameia (188). Antiochos accepted, and this revealed to everyone that he believed the Romans could crush his

1 The first friendship relation between the Romans and a Seleukid King should be dated to those negotiations in 200/198, see COùKUN (Friendship with Rome) in this volume. 2 Modern scholars have frequently evoked the ‘Cold War’ for those transitional years; esp. BADIAN (1959), cf. BURTON (2011). But historical comparisons have their limitations: one should not forget that the official friendship between Antiochos and Rome held until 193, if not beyond; and while the ancient crisis escalated in 192, it did not come to a major confrontation in the 20th-century.

INTRODUCTION

13

kingdom, if only they wanted to – a prudent decision, though a dangerous message which probably triggered the autonomist hopes of his subjects, vassals and neighbours. According to the set terms, Antiochos ceded the territories north and west of the Taurus range in south-eastern Asia Minor, handed over most of his fleet as well as his war elephants – the emblem of Seleukid power since the Battle of Ipsos (301)3 –, offered hostages, including one of his sons, and agreed to pay huge indemnities, part of them on the spot, and more to come in 12 yearly instalments, adding up to over 15,000 talents.4 The loss of territory and prestige was damaging, as were the required payments and other limitations. All of them surely had negative effects. Modern scholarship has repeatedly pointed to Apameia as the most crippling event that not only weakened the kingdom, but destroyed it in the long run.5 How painful the loss of tax income and royal lands from wealthy Asia Minor was, remains controversial. The fact that Antiochos III and his successor Seleukos IV are said to have been killed while or after pillaging temple treasures has reinforced the impression of financial despair,6 especially since 2 Maccabees draws an explicit connection between the stripping of the Judaeans and the need to pay off the required indemnities.7 Others have pointed to the inner-dynastic strife as a result of holding back the legitimate successor Demetrios in Rome. Yet others claim that the damage to Antiochos’ reputation of invincibility encouraged the vassals in the eastern territories to seek independence.8 All of this may well be true to a certain degree, but, since Seleukid kingship endured for more than a century after Apameia and even seems to have recovered to a surprising extent under the rule of Antiochos IV, something must be missing in this picture.

3

See KOSMIN (2014b); COùKUN (2012c) and SEKUNDA in this volume. The terms of Apameia have most recently been re-examined by PAYEN (2016); cf. ELVIDGE (2017), and see SEKUNDA, SCOLNIC, WENGHOFER and COùKUN (Epilogue) in this volume. 5 Cf. e.g. BOUCHÉ-LECLERCQ (1913/1914), p. 220–222: ‘Jamais souverain n’avait été plus cruellement humilié qu’Antiochos […]. En somme, Antiochos devait recommencer, avec moins de forces […], la tournée qui lui avait valu le surnom de Grand, s’il voulait prévenir l’écroulement de total de l’édifice élevé par Séleucos Nicator.’ 6 Antiochos III: DIOD. SIC. 28.3; 29.15; JUST. 32.2.1–2. Seleukos IV: APP., Syr. 45. Also see TAYLOR (2013), p. 152–158. 7 2Macc 8.11 explains the pillaging of the Seleukid governour Nikanor under Antiochos IV with the debts to Rome; generally on the greed of Seleukos IV (contrasting though with 3.2) and Antiochos IV (contrasting with 4.37f., cf. 3.7–4.25; 5.21; 9.2; also 1Macc 1.16–24. There are good reasons for caution, see the discussion by COùKUN (Epilogue, section 3, with further references). 8 E.g., CAPDETREY (2007), p. 439. 4

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2. The Study of the Seleukid Empire I: From Seleukid Dissolution to the Series of Seleukid Study Days Nearly a decade ago, the conference Seleukid Dissolution. The Sinking of the Anchor (Exeter 2008) had been organized to shed new light on the factors that weakened or even crippled the kingdom. In the course of the conference, however, it became clear that not only weakness and decline should find more pertinent descriptions and cogent analyses; but, first of all, the strengths of Seleukid rule need to be understood better, in order to allow for a fairer assessment of Seleukid imperial history.9 Scholars of Classical Studies traditionally focus on the empire’s western territories, especially the Greek cities of Asia Minor with their rich epigraphic evidence and the Levant with its wealth of coinage, besides the unique literary sources that exist for Judaea under the Maccabees. This concentration created a certain imbalance in the modern perception, as it led to the view that the kingdom was weak and declining ever since the death of its founder Seleukos Nikator. Such perspectives were further reinforced through the negative bias of the literary sources: their authors were often hostile to the Seleukids, or simply more impressed by the successful Romans.10 The Exeter conference emphasized the advantage of adopting a broad geographic approach that duly considers the Mesopotamian and Iranian parts of the Empire. This had previously been claimed most forcefully by S. SherwinWhite and A. Kuhrt (1993), in the wake of which a number of substantial studies on the eastern satrapies appeared, especially on Persia, Baktria, Parthia and Babylonia.11 Some more narrowly themed studies can be added that combine

9

See the introduction of the proceedings, ERICKSON / RAMSEY (2011), p. 13–18. Major accounts with stronger coverage of the west and the understanding that the kingdom was doomed to inevitable failure due to the moral shortcomings of the epigones or because of the lack of cohesion: e.g., BEVAN (1902); BOUCHÉ-LECLERCQ (1913/14); WOLSKI (1999); GRAINGER (2014). Preponderance on the western areas: e.g., WILL (1979/1982); GRAINGER (1990a); DĄBROWA (2011); FEYEL / GRASLIN-THOMÉ (2014). Such a preference is less surprising for studies focussing on diplomacy and inscriptions, e.g., ORTH (1977); MA (1999), or concentrating on the conflicts with the Ptolemies, e.g., GRAINGER (2010), or Rome, e.g., SCHMITT (1964); GRAINGER (2002); DREYER (2007); also see BURTON (2011); GRAINGER (2015b). The distortion in our literary sources have been studied, e.g., by PRIMO (2009); J. ENGELS (2011); CECCARELLI (2011). 11 Persia: LERNER (1999); ROUGEMONT (2012); ENGELS (2013); PLISCHKE (2014); ENGELS (2017a); STROOTMAN / VERSLUIS (2017). Baktria: POSCH (1995); HOLT (1999); LERNER (1999); COLORU (2009); WENGHOFER / HOULE (2016); WENGHOFER (ca. 2018). Parthia: WIESEHÖFER (1998); DĄBROWA (2014). Babylonia: FINKEL / VAN DER SPEK (2004/2006); KOSMIN (2014a); ERICKSON (2011); ERICKSON / RAMSEY (2011); MONERIE (2014); PIRNGRUBER (2017). Also see ENGELS (2017b) for an overview over recent publications. 10

INTRODUCTION

15

East and West,12 if not try an assessment of the Empire as a whole.13 The Exeter conference reinforced this trend: D. Ogden exemplified the creativity visible in the foundational myths;14 contrasting the factual side of the ‘Elephant Victory’ of Antiochos I, A. Coúkun showed that the Seleukids effectively lost control over parts of Asia Minor, but that they had, at the same time, the ability to contain losses and even integrate former enemies such as the Galatians into their own networks;15 K. Erickson and P. Kosmin exemplified how closely interwoven Seleukid ideology and Babylonian cultic traditions were;16 D. Engels argued for a paradigm change showing that the process away from a centralized administration to a more feudalized network controlled by a ‘King of Kings’ had started under the Achaimenids and continued, after some delays, under the Seleukids and later also under the Parthians; but even so, the change towards more indirect rule should not be confused with growing weakness.17 On the negative side, the notion of dissolution was emphasized by G. Ramsey by pointing to the ‘competitive political culture prevailing among top officials at the royal court’.18 On balance, however, it became apparent that not Seleukid decline, but rather the diverse foundations of Seleukid strength and resilience deserve better exploration, and that an interdisciplinary cooperation was the best way to achieve this. Three of the Exeter participants agreed on a more systematic cooperation at a Hellenistic conference at Waterloo (2010). Besides the organization of various conference panels, so far six numbered Seleukid Study Days followed suit which tried to foster collaborative agendas. Locations alternated between Europe and Canada (Exeter 2011, Waterloo 2011, Bordeaux 2012, Montreal 2013, Brussels 2015, North Bay, Ontario 2017). The declared intention is to include all suband neighbouring disciplines of Classical Studies, such as Philology, Epigraphy, Numismatics and Archaeology. It is especially beneficial to that enterprise that ever more participants command languages of the ancient Near and Middle East, such as Babylonian, Persian, Aramaic and Hebrew, besides Greek and Latin. Seleukid Study Day I (2011) showed a particular interest in King Antiochos I (294/281–261): his personal roots and close involvement with the Iranian satrapies, his utilization of Apolline cults to establish links with local traditions, and the discrepancy between his poor achievements against the Galatians on the

12

E.g., HELD (2002); KOSMIN (2014b); STROOTMAN (2014) and STROOTMAN (2017). BRODERSEN (1999); MEHL (1999); CAPDETREY (2007). 14 OGDEN (2011); cf. OGDEN (2017); also ERICKSON (2013) and ERICKSON (2014). 15 COùKUN (2011); cf. (2012c). 16 ERICKSON (2011); KOSMIN (2014a) (published outside the conference volume). 17 ENGELS (2011); cf. ENGELS (2013); STROOTMAN (2013); ENGELS (2014a); ENGELS (2014b); ENGELS (2017a); ENGELS (2018). 18 RAMSEY (2011); quotation from ERICKSON / RAMSEY (2011), p. 15. 13

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one hand, and his propagandistic exploitation of the alleged victory on the other.19 Seleukid Study Days II (2011) and III (2012) were dedicated to open questions on the development of the Seleukid Kingdom in the 3rd century.20 Examined were inner-dynastic rivalries21 and the emergence of new kingdoms in Asia Minor and the Iranian territories. Most importantly, it was argued that upheavals in Baktria and Parthia were only temporary, and that Seleukid suzerainty was quickly re-established, albeit under a different form. Once again, not weakness and fragmentation, but strength and resilience of the ruling house was underlined.22 Seleukid Study Day II also exemplified the need to study more systematically the female counterparts of the kings, and to investigate the functions they had both for the construction of royalty and the development of feudalistic structures. Accordingly, the creation of the role of queen and the paramount phenomenon of inter-dynastic marriage were chosen as topics for Seleukid Study Day IV (2013). This workshop became the forum not only for comparing substantial studies on prosopography and genealogy, but also for analyzing propagandistic and literary constructs of the ‘good’ and ‘evil queen’ respectively.23 After having paid much attention to the establishment and repeated defence of the Empire through the 3rd century, the Seleukid Study Group moved its focus to the 2nd century for the fifth gathering (Brussels 2015), whose proceedings are here presented. The impact that the various diplomatic and military encounters with Rome had was investigated from multiple perspectives (see next section). One of the conclusions was that not only the creative construction of Seleukid royal ideology deserves attention, but also the subtle ways of its reception and modification as well as its outspoken rejection by subjects, vassals and rivals need to come under systematic scrutiny. This is the theme that Seleukid Study Day VI (North Bay ON 2017) has most recently been dedicated to.24

19 Studies on Antiochos I: ERICKSON (2011); COùKUN (2012c); ENGELS (2013); (2017b). Report: COùKUN (2011b). 20 Reports: COùKUN (2012a), (2012b). Proceedings of Seleukid Study Day III: ERICKSON (ca. 2018) is currently at the proof stage. 21 E.g., COùKUN (ca. 2018a); D’AGOSTINI (ca. 2018); ERICKSON (ca. 2018b); MCAULEY (ca. 2018); HOLTON (ca. 2018). Now also see CHRUBASIK (2016). 22 E.g., ENGELS (2017a); STROOTMAN (2017b); WENGHOFER (2017); also COùKUN (ca. 2017a). 23 Reports: COùKUN (2012a); COùKUN / MCAULEY (2013). Proceedings: COùKUN / MCAULEY (2016). 24 Seleukid Study Day VI: Reception, Response, and Resistance: Reactions to Seleukid Claims to Territorial Hegemony. URL: http://www.altaycoskun.com/ssd06.

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3. Rome and the Seleukid East Seleukid Study Day V was convened on the assumption that the observations made at the previous workshops remain relevant for the later period as well, despite the comet-like rise of Roman hegemony all over the Mediterranean coast line: the importance of the eastern territories as a source of military recruits, taxes and prestige for the SeleukidsWKHFRQVWDQWDZDUHQHVVRIWKHQHHGWRDGDSW DQGUHFRQVWUXFWWKHLPDJHRIWKHUR\DOSHUVRQDH DQGWKHFRPSOH[LQWHUPDUULDJH strategies, which then, however, triggered dynastic conflicts to a degree unexperienced before. Although the Romans forcefully demonstrated their dominance at Magnesia and Apameia (190/188), the Seleukids continued to be a power to be taken into account.25 Seleukos IV managed to stabilize the kingdom after the death of Antiochos III, and Antiochos IV was still considered the most powerful king of his time, and this irrespective of his humiliation by Pompilius Laenas at Eleusis near Alexandria (168).26 Despite the turmoil at the beginning and the end of Demetrios I’s rule (162–150), he was, for the most part, capable of firmly controlling the Empire. Only when Ptolemy VI Philometor gave his support to the usurper Alexander I Balas (150), sealing this alliance with the hand of his daughter Kleopatra II, the infighting became dramatic. The incessant dynastic wars triggered the loss of Persia, Media and Mesopotamia to the Parthians by 142. The disaster was exacerbated by the capture of Demetrios II in 138. And yet, the success of Antiochos VII Sidetes, first against Diodotos Tryphon, second against the Judaeans, and third even against the Parthians, at least initially, demonstrated for the last time the unique potential of resilience inherent in this dynasty – regardless of the fact that his campaign ended in total failure in 129. With this, the loss of the territories east of the Euphrates was permanent, and the spiral of disintegration accelerated.27 But even so, Seleukid scions continued to claim, and fight for, their royal inheritance until Pompey deposed the last wouldbe king of this family with Antiochos XIII. Even so, this late sequence of petty kings shows that the dynasty managed until its very end to win the support of parts of the former Empire’s subjects. This process of disintegration may truly be dubbed ‘dying hard’.28 In addition, we should not forget the many neighbouring or successive dynasties who not only continued aspects of Seleukid ideology, but even boasted Seleukid blood in their veins: there was barely a Hellenistic king as far north as the Bosporan Kingdom, as far south as 25

See esp. PAYEN in this volume. Seleukos IV: MILETA (2014); ELVIDGE (2017). Antiochos IV: MITTAG (2006); FEYEL / GRASLIN-THOMÉ (2014). And see PAYEN, SEKUNDA, STROOTMAN and SCOLNIC in this volume. 27 EHLING (2008); GRAINGER (2015b); also WENGHOFER in this volume. 28 HOOVER (2007); EHLING (2008); DUMITRU (2012) and (2016). 26

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Egypt and as far east as Baktria who was not a descendent of Antiochos III.29 Hence, Roman military prowess and the damaging conditions of Apameia cannot be the decisive factors for the gradual decline of the erstwhile most powerful ‘Successor’ Kingdom. Other causes need to be taken into consideration as well. Most of all, Roman diplomacy in the East needs to be studied closely, particularly the quite flexible and at times perilous ‘friendship’ relations of the Romans.30 They not only involved the Seleukids into the inner logic of their diplomatic network, but also other communities in the eastern Mediterranean world that gradually gained freedom from Seleukid control sometime after Apameia, such as Kommagene, the Phoinikian cities and Judaea. The latter is of the highest interest, given the unique insights into the triangular diplomacy with Seleukids and Romans that the First and Second Book of Maccabees and Flavius Josephus’ Jewish Antiquities provide.31 Those losses notwithstanding, the most deleterious turned out to be the secession of the Parthians, who gradually absorbed the Iranian satrapies before invading Mesopotamia. A question that has not yet found a commonly accepted answer though is whether Parthian success was the reason for Seleukid decline or the other way round. At least, recent research has suggested that the Seleukids’ growing retreat from the ‘Upper Satrapies’ was not the result of a barely contained popular UHVHQWPHQW DJDLQVW +HOOHQLVWLF RSSUHVVLRQ WR WKH contrary, the Seleukids seem to have been able to command the loyalty not only of the Baktrians,32 but also the Persian Frataraka dynasts33 for much longer than initially presumed. Another group of negative factors were inner-dynastic rivalries that resulted partly from polygamy and partly from intermarriage with other ruling houses, most dangerously with the Ptolemies of Egypt, who had their share in absorbing the resources of the Seleukid Empire. Incestuous marriages and blood spilled by kin fuelled the disdain for the descendants of Seleukos among ancient historiographers and modern scholars alike. Those misdeeds seemed to justify moralizing concepts such as ‘debauchery’ or ‘degeneration’, which were viewed as typical for the oriental ‘race’ then and until recently. But a better understanding of nuptial practices at Hellenistic courts and of the often-distorted representation of powerful queens, as discussed

29 MCAULEY (2011); COùKUN / MCAULEY (2016) and Seleukid Study Day VI (above, n. 25). 30 BADIAN (1958); BRAUND (1984); GRUEN (1984); COùKUN (2005), (APR), (2008), (2015), (2017b); BURTON (2011). 31 Recent treatments of the Maccabean dynasty: DĄBROWA (2010); REGEV (2010); GRAINGER (2012); ECKHARDT (2013). For a particular focus on the relations with Rome: SEEMAN (2013) and (only with much caution) ZOLLSCHAN (2017); also DĄBROWA and COùKUN (Triangular Diplomacy) in this volume. 32 WENGHOFER / HOULE (2016); WENGHOFER (2017). 33 See now PLISCHKE (2014) and ENGELS (2017a).

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at Seleukid Study Day IV, should caution us against overly rash conclusions.34 In sum, it is timely to reconsider – in a collective and pluri-disciplinary effort – the complex factors that brought about Seleukid decline in the 2nd century. The present volume pursues the following questions: what defined the strength of Seleukid rule before the defeat at Magnesia?35 How were the Seleukids and their soldiers perceived by their contemporaries, and how did the Seleukid kings integrate different population groups into the army which enabled them to resist for such a long time against the Ptolemies and Parthians alike?36 How damaging were the peace conditions of Apameia meant to be, which immediate effects did they have, and to what degree were the successors of Antiochos III bound to the stipulations of the treaty?37 How destructive was Roman diplomacy after Apameia, what were its mechanisms, and what were its aims?38 How influential were the rulers of Asia Minor (esp. the Attalids and Ariarathids) and Ptolemaic kingdoms in the further course of Seleukid dissolution?39 How long did the vassal kings and satraps show loyalty, and when did the (well documented, but perhaps overestimated) Judaeans elapse the grip of the Seleukids?40 And finally: was the series of dynastic infighting more a symptom or a cause of the existential crisis?41 While following up on these questions, it turns out once more that a shift of perspective is needed: away from focusing on decline towards accounting for the persistent appeal of the dynasty, its capability of gathering resources and remaining active in eastern Mediterranean politics and warfare for generations after Apameia.

Bibliography BÉRENGER, A. / PERRIN-SAMINADAYAR, É. (eds.) (2009), Les entrées royales et impériales: histoire, représentation et diffusion d’une cérémonie publique, de l’Orient ancien à Byzance, de l’archéologie à l’histoire, Paris. BEVAN, E.R. (1902), The House of Seleucus, 2 vols, London (repr. Chicago 1985). BOIY, T. (2007), Between High and Low. A Chronology of the Early Hellenistic Period, Frankfurt a.M. BOUCHÉ-LECLERCQ, A. (1913/1914), Histoire des Séleucides, Paris. 34 OGDEN (1999); WHITEHORNE (2001); COùKUN / MCAULEY (2016); WENGHOFER in this volume. Also see STROOTMAN (2014). 35 See VISSCHER, ALMAGOR, ERICKSON and ENGELS in this volume. 36 See ENGELS and STROOTMAN in this volume. Also see HOULE (2015). 37 See above, n. 4. 38 See above, n. 5–7. 39 Attalids: MICHELS in this volume. Ariarathids: MCAULEY in this volume. Ptolemies: see above, n. 34, also WENGHOFER in this volume. 40 Babylonia: RAMSEY in this volume. Judaea: see above, n. 31. 41 See CHRUBASIK (2016) as well as WENGHOFER and SCOLNIC in this volume.

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BRIANT, P. (2003), Darius dans l’ombre d’Alexandre, Paris. BRODERSEN, K. (ed.) (1999/2000), Zwischen West und Ost. Studien zur Geschichte des Seleukidenreichs, Hamburg. BURTON, P.J. (2011), Friendship and Empire: Roman Diplomacy and Imperialism in the Middle Republic (353–146 BC), Cambridge. CAPDETREY, L. (2007), Le pouvoir séleucide: territoire, administration, et finances, Rennes. CHRUBASIK, B. (2013), The Attalids and the Seleucid Kings, 281–175 BC, in P. THONEMANN (ed.), Attalid Asia Minor: Money, International Relations, and the State, Oxford, p. 83– 119. – (2016), Kings and Usurpers in the Seleukid Empire: The Men Who Would Be King, Oxford. COLORU, O. (2009), Da Alessandro a Menandro: Il Regno Greco di Battriana, Pisa. COùKUN, A. (APR), Amici Populi Romani (APR). Prosopography of the Foreign Friends of Rome. Trier 2007–2008; Waterloo 2010ff. URL: http://www.altaycoskun.com/apr/. – (2011a), Galatians and Seleukids, in ERICKSON / RAMSEY (2011), p. 85–106. – (2011b), Report on the first ‘Seleucid Study Day’, in H-Soz-Kult, 27.10.2011. – (2012a), Report on the ‘Seleucid Study Day II’, in H-Soz-Kult, 9.1.2012 . – (2012b), Report on the ‘Seleucid Study Day III’, in H-Soz-Kult, 22.10.2012. – (2012c), Deconstructing a Myth of Seleucid History: the So-Called ‘Elephant Victory’ over the Galatians Revisited, in Phoenix 66.1–2, p. 57–73. – / MCAULEY, A. (2013), Report on ‘Seleucid Study Day IV’, in H-Soz-Kult, 1.5.2013. – (2015), Die Tetrarchie als hellenistisch-römisches Herrschaftsinstrument, in E. BALTRUSCH / J. WILKER (eds.), Amici – Socii – Clientes, Berlin, p. 161–197. – / ENGELS, D. (2015), Report on the ‘Seleucid Study Day V’, in H-Soz-Kult, 16.12.2015. – / MCAULEY, A. (eds.) (2016), Seleukid Royal Women. Creation, Representation and Distortion of Hellenistic Queenship in the Seleukid Empire, Stuttgart. – (2016a), Laodike I, Berenike Phernophoros, Dynastic Murders, and the Outbreak of the Third Syrian War (253–246 BC), in COùKUN / MCAULEY (2016), p. 107–134. – (2016b), Ptolemaioi as Commanders in 3rd-Century Asia Minor and Some Glimpses on Ephesos and Mylasa during the Second and Third Syrian Wars, in B. TAKMER et al. (eds.), Vir doctus anatolicus. Studies in Memory of Sencer Sahin, Istanbul, 257–279. – (2018), The War of Brothers, the Third Syrian War, and the Battle of Ankyra (246–241 BC): a Re-Appraisal, forthcoming in ERICKSON (2018). – (2017), Amicitia, fides und Imperium der Römer aus konstruktivistischer Perspektive. Überlegungen zu Paul Burton’s Friendship and Empire (2011), in Latomus 76.4, p. 910–924. D’AGOSTINI, M. (2018), Achaios the Younger and the Basileia of Anatolia: Observations on the Historiographical Tradition, forthcoming in ERICKSON (2018). DĄBROWA, E. (ed.) (2010), The Hasmoneans and their State, Kraków (= Electrum 16). – (ed.) (2011), New Studies on the Seleucids, Kraków (= Electrum 18). DREYER, B. (2007), Die römische Nobilitätsherrschaft und Antiochos III. (205 bis 188 v.Chr.), Hennef. DUMITRU, A.G. (2012), La fin des Séleucides (129–64 av. J.C.): Structures d’autorité centrale et autonomies locales, unpubl. PhD, Paris / Bucure‫܈‬ti.

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– (2016), Kleopatra Selene – A Look at the Moon and Her Bright Side, in COùKUN / MCAULEY (2016), p. 253–272. ECKHARDT, B. (2013), Ethnos und Herrschaft. Politische Figurationen judäischer Identität von Antiochos III. bis Herodes I, Berlin. EHLING, K. (2008), Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der späten Seleukiden (164–63 v.Chr.). Vom Tode des Antiochos IV. bis zur Einrichtung der Provinz Syria unter Pompeius, Stuttgart. ELVIDGE, M. (2017), Seleukos IV Philopator, MA Thesis, Waterloo ON. URL: https://uwspace.uwaterloo.ca/handle/10012/11840. ENGELS, D. (2011), Middle Eastern ‘Feudalism’ and Seleucid Dissolution, in ERICKSON / RAMSAY (2011), p. 19–36. – (2013), A New Frataraka Chronology, in Latomus 72, p. 29–80. – (2014a), Antiochos III. der Große und sein Reich. Überlegungen zur ‘Feudalisierung’ der seleukidischen Peripherie, in F. HOFFMANN / K.S. SCHMIDT (eds.), Orient und Okzident in hellenistischer Zeit, Vaterstetten, p. 31–75. – (2014b), Überlegungen zur Funktion der Titel ‘Großkönig’ und ‘König der Könige’ vom 3. zum 1. Jh. v.Chr., in V. COJOCARU et al. (eds.), Interconnectivity in the Mediterranean and Pontic World during the Hellenistic and the Roman Periods, Cluj-Napoca, p. 333–362. – (2017a), Benefactors, Kings, Rulers. Studies on the Seleukid Empire between East and West, Leuven. – (2017b), Neue Studien zum hellenistischen Osten – ein Forschungsüberblick, in Latomus 76.2, p. 481–496. – (2018), Iranian Identity and Seleucid Allegiance – Frataraka and Early Arsacid Coinage, forthcoming in ERICKSON (2018). ERICKSON, K. (2011), Apollo-Nabû: the Babylonian Policy of Antiochus I, in ERICKSON /RAMSEY (2011), p. 51–66. – / RAMSEY, G. (eds.) (2011), Seleucid Dissolution, Wiesbaden. – (2013), Seleucus I, Zeus and Alexander, in L. MITCHELL / C. MELVILLE (eds.), Every Inch a King: Comparative Studies in Kings and Kingship in the Ancient and Medieval Worlds, Leiden, p. 109–127. – (2014), Zeus to Apollo and back again: Shifts in Seleucid Policy and Iconography, in S. KRMNICEK / N. BAYLOR (eds.), Art in the Round, Tübingen, p. 97–108. – (ed.) (2018), War within the Family – the First Century of Seleukid Rule. Proceedings of Seleukid Study Day III, Bordeaux Sept. 2012, Swansea, forthcoming. – (2018), Antiochos Soter and the Third Syrian War, forthcoming in ERICKSON (2018). FEYEL, Ch. / GRASLIN-THOMÉ, L. (eds.) (2014), Le projet politique d’Antiochos IV, Nancy. FINKEL, I. / VAN DER SPEK, R.J. (2004–2017), Babylonian Chronicles of the Hellenistic Period (BCHP). Preliminary online edition (2004–2017) at Livius.org. (17 Apr. 2017). GRAINGER, J.D. (1990), Seleukos Nikator, London / New York. – (2002), The Roman War of Antiochos the Great, Leiden. – (2010), The Syrian Wars, Leiden. – (2012), Wars of the Maccabees: the Jewish Struggle for Freedom, 167–37 BC, Barnsley. – (2013), Rome, Parthia, & India: The Violent Emergence of a New World Order, Barnsley. – (2014), The Rise of the Seleukid Empire (323–223 BC), Barnsley.

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– (2015a), The Seleukid Empire of Antiochus III (223–187 BC), Barnsley. – (2015b), The Fall of the Seleukid Empire (187–75 BC), Barnsley. – (2017), Great Power Diplomacy in the Hellenistic World, London. GRUEN, E.S. (1984), The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome, 2 vols., Berkeley CA. HAUBEN, H. / MEEUS, A. (eds.) (2014), The Age of the Successors and the Creation of the Hellenistic Kingdoms (323–276 B.C.), Leuven. HELD, W. (2002), Residenzstädte der Seleukiden, in JDAI 117, p. 217–249. HENGEL, M. (1988), Judentum und Hellenismus, 3rd ed., Tübingen. HOLT, F. (1999), Thundering Zeus. The Making of Hellenistic Bactria, London. HOLTON, J.R. (2018), The Ideology of Seleukid Joint Kingship: The Case of Seleukos, Son of Antiochos I, forthcoming in ERICKSON (2018). HOULE, D.J. (2015), Ethnic Constructions in the Seleucid Military. MA Thesis, Waterloo ON. URL: https://uwspace.uwaterloo.ca/handle/10012/9582. HONIGMAN, S. (2014), Tales of High Priests and Taxes: The Books of the Maccabees and the Judean Rebellion against Antiochus IV, Berkeley CA. – (forthcoming), Diverging Memories, Not Resistance Literature: The Maccabean Crisis in the Animal Apocalypse and 1 and 2 Maccabees, forthcoming in P. KOSMIN / I. MOYER (eds.), The Maccabean Moment. Resistances to Hellenistic Empires. HOOVER, O.D. (2007), A Revised Chronology for the Late Seleucids at Antioch, in Historia 56, p. 281–301. HOUGHTON, A. / LORBER, C. (2008), Seleucid Coins: A Comprehensive Catalogue, New York, Part I, 2002; Part II (with O. Hoover). KOSMIN, P.J. (2014a), Seeing Double in Seleucid Babylonia: Rereading the Borsippa Cylinder, in A. MORENO / R. THOMAS (eds.), Patterns of the Past. Epitedeumata in the Greek Tradition, Oxford, p. 173–198. KOSMIN, P.J. (2014b), The Land of the Elephant Kings: Space, Territory, and Ideology in the Seleucid Empire, Cambridge MA. LANDUCCI, F. (2005), La tradizione su Seleuco in Diodoro XVIII–XX, in C. BEARZOT / F. LANDUCCI (eds.), Diodoro e l’altra Grecia, Milano, p. 155–181. LERNER, J. (1999), The Impact of Seleucid Decline on the Eastern Iranian Plateau, Stuttgart. MA, J. (1999), Antiochos III and the Cities of Western Asia Minor, Oxford. MASON, S. (2016), A History of the Jewish War, A.D. 66–74, New York. MCAULEY, A. (2011ff.), The Genealogy of the Seleucids: Seleucid Marriage, Succession, and Descent Revisited. Montreal. URL: http://www.seleucid-genealogy.com. – (2018), The House of Achaios: The Missing Piece of the Anatolian Puzzle, forthcoming in ERICKSON (2018). MITTAG, P.F. (2006), Antiochos IV. Epiphanes. Eine politische Biographie, Berlin. MONERIE, J. (2014), D’Alexandre à Zoilos: dictionnaire prosopographique des porteurs de nom grec dans les sources cunéiformes, Stuttgart. MUCCIOLI, F. (2013), Gli epiteti ufficiali dei re ellenistici, Stuttgart. OGDEN, D. (1999), Polygamy, Prostitutes and Death. The Hellenistic Dynasties, London. – (2011), Seleucid Dynastic Foundation Myths: Antioch and Seleuceia-in-Pieria, in ERICKSON / RAMSEY (2011), p. 140–160.

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OGDEN, D. (2017), The Legend of Seleucus: Kingship, Narrative and Mythmaking in the Ancient World, Cambridge / New York. ORTH, W. (1977), Königlicher Machtanspruch und städtische Freiheit, München. PAYEN, G. (2016), Les conséquences géopolitiques du traité d’Apamée en Asie Mineure, Université Laval / Université Paris-Sorbonne (PhD). PIRNGRUBER, R. (2017), The Economy of Late Achaemenid and Seleucid Babylonia, Cambridge. PLISCHKE, S. (2014), Die Seleukiden und Iran, Wiesbaden. PRIMO, A. (2009), La storiografia sui Seleucidi da Megastene a Eusebio di Cesarea, Pisa. RAMSEY, G. (2011), Seleucid Administration: Effectiveness and Dysfunction, in ERICKSON / RAMSEY (2011), p. 37–50. RAMSEY, G. (2016), The Diplomacy of Seleukid Women, in COùKUN / MCAULEY (2016), p. 87–104. REGEV, E. (2010), The Hasmoneans: Ideology, Archaeology, Identity, Göttingen. ROUGEMONT, G. (2012), Inscriptions grecques d’Iran et d’Asie centrale, London. SCHMITT, H.H. (1964), Untersuchungen zur Geschichte Antiochos des Großen und seiner Zeit, Wiesbaden. SCOLNIC, B. (2007), Thy Brother’s Blood: The Maccabees and the Morality of Kinship, Lanham. SCOLNIC, B. (2010), Judaism Defined: Mattathias and the Destiny of His People, Lanham. SEEMAN, Chr. (2013), Rome and Judea in Transition, New York. SEKUNDA, N.V. (2012), Macedonian Armies after Alexander: 323–168 BC, Oxford. SHERWIN-WHITE, S. / KUHRT, A. (1993), From Samarkand to Sardis, London. STROOTMAN, R. (2013), Babylonian, Macedonian, King of the World: The Antiochos Cylinder from Borsippa and Seleukid Imperial Integration, in E. STAVRIANOPOULOU (ed.), Shifting Social Imaginaries in the Hellenistic Period: Narrations, Practices, and Images, Leiden, p. 67–97. – (2014), After the Achaemenids: Courts and Elites in the Hellenistic Empires, c. 330–64 BCE, Edinburgh. – (2018), The Coming of the Parthians: Crisis and Resilience in the Reign of Seleukos II, forthcoming in ERICKSON (2018). STROOTMAN, R. / VERSLUYS, M.J. (eds.) (2017), Persianism in Antiquity, Stuttgart. TAYLOR, M.J. (2013), Antiochus the Great, Barnsley. VIRGILIO, B. (2003), Lancia, Diadema e porpora. Il re e la regalità ellenistica, 2nd ed., Pisa. WENGHOFER, R. / HOULE, D.J. (2016), Seleucid Blood in Bactrian and Indo-Greek Genealogy, in COùKUN / MCAULEY (2016), p. 191–207. – (2018), Rethinking the Relationship between Hellenistic Baktria and the Seleukid Empire, forthcoming in ERICKSON (2018). WHITEHORNE, J.E.G. (2001), Cleopatras, London / New York. WIESEHÖFER, J. (ed.) (1998), The Arsacid Empire: Sources and Documentation, Stuttgart. WILL, E. (1979 / 1982), Histoire politique du monde hellénistique, 2 vols., 2nd ed., Nancy. WOLSKI, J. (1999), The Seleucids: The Decline and Fall of Their Empire, Kraków.

I. The Seleukid Empire under Antiochos III

Which Seleukid King Was the First to Establish Friendship with the Romans? Reflections on a Fabricated Letter (Suet., Claud. 25.3), amicitia with Antiochos III (200–193 BC) and the Lack thereof with Ilion* Altay COùKUN Abstract Suetonius, Claud. 25.3 has preserved the summary of an obscure Roman letter to Seleucus Rex, offering him amicitia et societas in return for exempting the citizens of Ilion, their own ‘relatives’, from taxation. While previous generations of scholars had been inclined to reject this letter as a forgery, more recently, its authenticity has been claimed, and the king been identified with Seleukos II, Seuleukos III or Antiochos III. But neither Seleukos II nor III seems to have exerted effective control over Ilion to qualify. And Antiochos III became an amicus populi Romani probably in 200 BC. Rome was then, however, concerned about the Ptolemaic and the Attalid Kingdoms. Moreover, Antiochos gained the loyalty of Ilion in 198 BC. When the Romans began to advocate the freedom of some Greek cities in 196 BC, the sources repeatedly specify Lampsakos and Smyrna, which defied the king, never Ilion. The later annalistic tradition presents a polished version of the relation between Rome and Ilion: the city figures among the allies in the peace treaty of Phoinike in 205 BC; its citizens went over to Rome in the war with Antiochos, as soon as the first Roman commander C. Livius Salinator set foot on the Ilian coast in 190 BC; Salinator and soon after him L. Scipio chose to sacrifice to Ilian Athena; and Ilion is rewarded at Apameia with immunity and territorial gains. But this tradition is belied by the telling silence of Polybios and Strabon. The latter, in fact, specifies Caesar as the authority that granted tax exemption and a territorial extension. The second half of the 1st century BC thus emerges as the most likely time both for the upgrade of the proIlion annalistic tradition and the fabrication of the Suetonian letter.

1. Introduction: Seleukid-Roman Relations and a Letter from the JulioClaudian Period The beginning of friendly relations between the Seleukid court and the Roman Republic is still awaiting a satisfactory reconstruction. It is well-known that the diplomatic contact became intensive on the verge from the 3rd to the 2nd century BC, when Antiochos III Megas prevailed over Ptolemy V Epiphanes in the Fifth * For critical feedback on previous drafts, I would like to thank David Engels, Germain Payen, Jess Russell, Lothar Willms and Andreas Zack. All remaining shortcomings are of course my own.

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Syrian War (202/201–194/193 BC). He occupied Koile Syria (201/198 BC) and successfully campaigned along the Karian (ca. 202 BC), Kilikian (198 BC) and then Aegean coastline of Asia Minor (197 BC). In 196 BC, he began rebuilding Lysimacheia on the Thracian Chersonesos as the first Seleukid royal residence in Europe. His relentless progress inspired awe and respect in many of his contemporaries, but likewise triggered repeated interventions of the Romans. At some point of their negotiations, it seems, he concluded friendship with them.1 There is only one – isolated – source that points to a much earlier opportunity for establishing amicitia between the two major powers of the Mediterranean World. In his Diuus Claudius, the biographer Suetonius writes: He (Claudius) waived for good the taxes for the citizens of Ilion, as if they were the origin of the Roman tribe, after an old Greek letter by the Senate and Roman people had been recited; this promised King Seleukos friendship and alliance finally under the conditions that he would release their relatives the citizens of Ilion from every burden.2

There is no reason to doubt that such a document was produced in the mid-1st century AD, to the effect that the Ilienses were exempted from taxation.3 This is also confirmed by Tacitus, according to whom prince Nero held a speech in their support while still at a tender age.4

1 For general surveys of Antiochos’ campaigns and diplomacy after his return from his anabasis in 205/204 BC, see, e.g., BADIAN (1959); SCHMITT (1964); WILL (1982); GRUEN (1984); MEHL (1990); MA (1999); DREYER (2007); ECKSTEIN (2008); GRAINGER (2002) and (2015a); ENGELS (2012). For a discussion of his friendship diplomacy with Rome, see below. For the ideological representation of Antiochos’ westward campaigns, also see Visscher and Almagor in this volume. 2 SUET., Claud. 25.3 (adapted from the transl. by K.R. BRADLEY, Loeb): Iliensibus quasi Romanae gentis auctoribus tributa in perpetuum remisit recitata uetere epistula Graeca senatus populique R. Seleuco regi amicitiam et societatem ita demum pollicentis, si consanguineos suos Ilienses ab omni onere immunes praestitisset. 3 This is not the place to discuss the nuances between direct and indirect taxation and their relation to formal autonomy or effective independence; see BERNHARDT (1971), p. 209 n. 71 for the case of Ilion under Claudius; and cf. more generally BERNHARDT (1998) and (1999) as well as ENGELS (2017), p. 433–435. 4 TAC., Ann. 12.58: Vtque studiis honestis [et] eloquentiae gloria enitesceret, causa Iliensium suscepta Romanum Troia demissum et Iuliae stirpis auctorem Aeneam aliaque haud procul fabulis uetera facunde executus perpetrat, ut Ilienses omni publico munere soluerentur. (adapted from the transl. by J. JACKSON, Loeb: Desirous to shine by his liberal accomplishments and by a character for eloquence, he took up the cause of Ilion, enlarged with grace on the Trojan descent of the Roman nation; on Aeneas, the progenitor of the Julian line; on other traditions not too far removed from fable; and secured the release of the community from all public obligations.) Cf. SUET., Nero 7.2: Apud eundem consulem pro Bononiensibus Latine, pro Rhodiis atque Iliensibus Graece uerba fecit. The exact date is uncertain: see ERSKINE (2001), p. 172 n. 41; BATTISTONI (2010), p. 86 n. 27. For more context, see JONES (2001), p. 180f. and ELWYN (1993), p.

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2. ‘King Seleukos’, Ilion and Rome It is more problematic to accept that the Romans might ever have addressed such a request to a Seleukid king, specifically to Seleukos II Kallinikos, who is regarded most widely as the recipient of the letter. As far as I see, Bernhard Niese was the first to question the authenticity of the document in the 19th century, charging the Romans with fabricating it for ideological purposes.5 The most detailed criticism has been unfolded by Maurice Holleaux.6 He emphasizes that evidence for any renewal of amicitia with the successors of Seleukos II is lacking: only the ambassadors of Antiochos III are said to have aimed for concluding a treaty of friendship and alliance in 193 BC. Holleaux rejects all friendship terminology applied to the king’s earlier interactions with the Romans as ‘des relations d’amicale courtoisie, qualifiées par abus d’amicitia’. Otherwise, the ‘langage si sévère’ used by the Roman ambassadors in their negotiations at Lysimacheia appears to him incompatible with a preexisting friendship. Moreover, he shows that it is unlikely that Ilion began to be protected by Rome as of 237 BC, since the Lampsakenoi, when looking for support from Rome in 197 BC, took the detour to Massalia, rather than trusting the value of their syngeneia with reference to Ilion. Next, Rome intervened only for Alexandria Troas, Lampsakos and Smyrna,7 but Antiochos found even that demand outrageous, given that he was neither interfering in Italy; how much more strongly would Seleukos II have reacted to a much weaker Rome in 237 BC? Following the authority of Niese or Holleaux, generations of scholars have either endorsed their verdict or passed over Suetonius’ testimony in silence altogether when discussing early Roman-Seleukid relations.8 A minor nuance 280, who also refers to TAC. Ann. 4.55.4: the Ilienses drew on their shared ancestry with Rome in a mission to the Senate in AD 26. 5 NIESE (1899), p. 153 n. 4 and p. 281 (quoted after MAGIE 1950, vol. 2, p. 943); cf. TÄUBLER (1913), p. 203; FERRARY (1988), p. 25 n. 81. 6 HOLLEAUX (1921), p. 46–58, esp. 49f. (on friendship diplomacy in 193 BC); 50f. (quotation on friendship terminology used for 197 BC); p. 51–53 (on negotiations in Lysimacheia: wording of POLYB. 18.50.5–9 too severe; and DIOD. SIC. 28.15.2 incompatible with the intention to renew friendship; cf. LIV. 34.57.7–9, on which see below, section 3); p. 53–57 (on relations with Ilion and Lampsakos, on which also see p. 47 and see my discussion below, including the next note); p. 56f. (comparison with the situation in 237 BC). Also see below, esp. ns. 6, 24f., 44f. on Holleaux. 7 For Lampsakos, see esp. Syll.3 591 = I.Lampsakos 4 = AUSTIN2 197 = CANALI DE ROSSI (1997), p. 194–198, no. 237 e). For Lampsakos and Smyrna (also: TAC., Ann. 4.56.1), see the references to Polybios, Diodoros, Livy and Appian as below, and cf. MA (1999), p. 95–97. The case of Alexandria is more problematic, see the appendix below. 8 E.g., BEVAN (1902); BOUCHÉ-LECLERCQ (1913/14); WALBANK (1979), p. 182; MA (1999); JONES (2001); ENGELS (2017). Cf. BERNHARDT (1998), p. 91f., who does not even

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was added only by David Magie, who put the blame for forging the letter not on the Romans, but on the Ilienses.9 But the pendulum swung back a few decades ago, not least because some of Holleaux’ assumptions on diplomatic friendship were regarded as outdated.10 Some of the most distinguished Hellenistic and Roman Historians of our times are now willing to accept the above-quoted letter as a reliable document. A recurring argument in favour of the Suetonian tradition is the well-known example of the friendship with Ptolemy II Philadelphos that the Romans embarked on in 273 BC.11 It is widely believed that Seleucus Rex can only be Seleukos II Kallinikos: Seleukos I Soter barely ruled in western Asia Minor, since he was killed only a few months after his victory at Koroupedion in 281 BC; Seleukos III Keraunos died in 225 BC before reconquering the Aegean parts of Asia Minor, and when Seleukos IV Eupator succeeded his father in 187 BC, Asia Minor had largely been forfeited in the Peace of Apameia.12 The identification with Kallinikos has not remained uncontested. Andrew Erskine, for instance, observes that he barely had an opportunity to deal with address the topic when discussing the rivalry between Ilion and Skepsis; ERRINGTON (2008), p. 209, who seems to be avoiding deliberately any commitment regarding the beginning of Roman-Seleukid friendship. 9 MAGIE 1950, vol. 2, p. 943. 10 HOLLEAUX (1921), p. 47 n. 1 and p. 49f. insists on a formal foedus for societas et amicitia, – the main argument of GRUEN (1984), vol. 1, p. 65 n. 57 for rejecting Holleaux’s argument; RIZZO (1974), p. 84f.; 87. The current discussion is, however, much more complex than any of them foresaw: see, e.g., on the one hand, the contributions by ZACK, esp. (2015a) and (2017), and, on the other hand, by COùKUN, esp. (2008) and (2018), all with further references. 11 Besides the next n., also see PFEIFFER / THIJS (2007), § 2 for Philadelphos and Rome (with references). 12 See, e.g., SCHMITT (1964), p. 291, emphasizing the old age of the Roman version of the Trojan descent; GRUEN (1984), vol. 1, p. 64f. and 612, calling the rejection of the letter as a falsification ‘understandable but unnecessary’: the Romans did not invest anything, and were happy to grant informal friendship, as in the case of Ptolemy II Philadelphos. For a defense of the authenticity, also see RIZZO (1974), p. 83–88, esp. p. 86f. (depicting a vague historical context between the Third Syrian War and War of Brothers, avoiding years, sources and most scholarship); BRISCOE (1981), p. 343f.; BATTISTONI (2010), p. 86f.: ‘Sarebbe davvero ironico se proprio il più “antiquario” degli imperatori fosse stato ingannato con un falso. Al contrario questo contatto con Ilio costituisce un precedente importante per giustificare l’inclusione della polis nella pace di Fenice (205 a.C.)’; DMITRIEV (2011), p. 105; 128f. Cf. BURTON (2011), p. 107; ZOLLSCHAN (2017), p. 171. Undecided remain ELWYN (1993), p. 280–283; DREYER (2007), p. 283 n. 221 (only a passing reference); ECKSTEIN (2008), p. 31: ‘It is also possible that sometime in the 240s or 230s Seleukos II initiated an informal amicitia with Rome; but the historicity of this interchange has been challenged as well, and in any case it clearly had no international repercussions.’ Also see his qualification of Rome’s request in n. 6: ‘an impossibly arrogant Roman response’. For the exclusion of some Seleukoi, also see the discussion of ERSKINE (2001), p. 173.

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Rome: he came to power in 246 BC, but lost control of Asia Minor around 240 BC, not as late as about 237 BC, as previous generations of historians had believed; at the same time, the Romans were absorbed by the First Punic War until 241 BC.13 In fact, the chronological problem is even more pressing, if my new chronology for the War of Brothers is accepted. As I have recently suggested (in a different context), Kallinikos’ control of Anatolia collapsed long before 240 BC: within days after the death of his father Antiochos II Theos in ca. July 246 BC, Ptolemaios Andromachos, the admiral of Ptolemy III Euergetes in the Aegean, stretched out his hands for Ephesos; by August of the same year, Laodike I, Kallinikos’ mother, had been killed in her resistance to Ptolemaic encroachment; when Kallinikos finally arrived in Ionia in September, his brother Antiochos Hierax and his uncle Alexander had already changed sides, they took possession of Sardeis and Magnesia-on-the-Sipylos. About the same time, Mithradates II of Pontos invaded central Phrygia, another fleet from Egypt captured Kilikia in storm, and Euergetes landed in Seleukis. The famous Battle of Ankyra, which Seleukos II barely survived, can now be dated firmly to September or October 246 BC (with Porphyry), rather than around 240 BC (with Justin). The king escaped to his eastern satrapies, whence he returned to Syria in 244 BC after his ‘Beautiful Victory’ won at the Euphrates. There were, admittedly, a few Anatolian powers that changed sides to him in 244 BC, most prominently Olympichos in Karia, the city of Smyrna and the aforementioned king of Pontos, but their success against the combined forces of Andromachos and Hierax was limited. In about 242 BC, Kallinikos made a concession to his brother, offering him Asia Minor (except for Kilikia) in return for betraying Euergetes. There is no hint in our sources that he ever regained the control of Ionia or Aeolia during his lifetime.14 Accordingly, there is not even a theoretical chance that Seleukos II Kallinikos might have negotiated with Rome over Ilion.15 13 Thus ERSKINE (2001), p. 172–176, 173: ‘Even before his defeat de facto control of Ilion and Asia Minor as a whole was in the hands of his brother Antiochos.’ Cf. Grainger (2002), p. 11: ‘In the 240s Rome was fully occupied in the First Punic War, and Ilion was not endangered.’ Also see below on their conclusions. 14 The main source is PORPHYR., FGrHist 260 F 32.8, which is to be preferred over JUST. 27.1–3. Also see APP., Syr. 65.346 (cf. PORPHYR. / HIERON., FGrHist 260 F 43); P.Gourob = FGrHist 160 = AUSTIN2 266; I.Kildara = SEG 42, 1992, no. 994 AUSTIN2 267 (with the new interpretation that the dynastic ideology expressed here reflects the aggressive take-over of Seleukid possessions by Ptolemy III Euergetes, not the protection of his sister’s or nephew’s interests). For the chronology of 253–246 BC, see COùKUN (2016a); for 246–225 BC, see COùKUN (2018b); for local events in Western Asia Minor, 246–241 BC, also see COùKUN (2016b). The relevance of this new chronology for SUET., Claud. 25.3 has been expressed for the first time in COùKUN (2015), p. 731. 15 That he had not done so explains why the Romans did not at least intercede diplomatically for their socius et amicus, request