Resistance and Revolution in China [Reprint 2020 ed.] 9780520318922

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RESISTANCE AND R E V O L U T I O N IN CHINA THE COMMUNISTS A N D T H E SECOND U N I T E D

FRONT

This volume is sponsored by the CENTER FOR CHINESE STUDIES University of California, Berkeley

TETSUYA KATAOKA

Resistance and Revolution in China T H E COMMUNISTS AND T H E SECOND UNITED FRONT

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS BERKELEY • LOS ANGELES • LONDON

University of California Press Berkeley and Los Angeles, California University of California Press, Ltd. London, England Copyright © 1974 by The Regents of the University of California ISBN: 0-520- 02553-9 Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 73-84386 Printed in the United States of America

T O M Y PARENTS

CONTENTS

I. I N T R O D U C T I O N II. T W O T H E O R I E S OF R E V O L U T I O N III. F R O M T H E L U K O U C H I A O I N C I D E N T T O T H E SIXTH PLENUM The Sixth Plenum, 79

1 12 48

IV. T H E I N I T I A L EXPANSION IN N O R T H CHINA Troop Movements and Base Construction, 84 Spontaneous Mobilization within the Tradition, 101 The CCP's Land Program: 1937-1941, 116 The Structure of a Communist Base, 136

84

V. E M E R G E N C E OF T H E NEW U N I T E D F R O N T The Rally of Internal Opposition against Mao, 156 "Far Eastern Munich", 163 The December Incident, 174

143

VI. CONSOLIDATION OF T H E NEW U N I T E D F R O N T "On New Democracy", 183 The Latest Development, 189 The Shift in Local Balance of Power, 200 The Last Debate between Mao and Wang Ming, 207 The Battle of One Hundred Regiments, 214 The New Fourth Army Incident, 220

183

VII. NEW DEMOCRACY IN T H E COMMUNIST BASES The 'Left' Deviation, 230 The Three-Thirds System, 240 Bourgeois Democracy or New Democracy? 246 New Democracy and the Chinese Revolution, 260

229

VIII. T H E GUN AND T H E PEASANTS "Darkness before Dawn", 267 The Last "Orthodox" Rural Self-Defense, 287 "Peculiar Revolutionary Character of the Peasants", 295

264

I X . CONCLUSION INDEX

303 313

MAPS

1. T h e Frozen Battleline: T h e China Expeditionary Forces in late 1939 2. Co-habitation of the Communists and the Japanese: An Overview of the Communist Bases during the War 3- T h e 8th Route Army's Movements, SeptemberNovember, 1937 4- Confused Battlefront in North China 5- T h e Chin-Ch'a-Chi (Shansi-Chahar-Hopei) Border Region, circa 1944 6. T h e Chin-Chi-Lu-Yii (Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan) Border Region, circa 1944 T 7- h e Shantung District, circa 1944 8. T h e Chin-Sui (Shansi-Suiyiian) Border Region, circa 1944 9- T h e Shen-Kan-Ning (Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia) Border Region, circa 1944 10. T h e Central China Bases, circa 1944

5° 5i 62 88

96 102 110 120 146 184

TABLES

1. Government Levy in Hoshun, Shansi, 1939: Hsien Rational Burden Extra Rich Households 2. Government Levy in Hoshun, Shansi, 1939: Hsien Rational Burden Rich Households in the village of Sanch'i viii

129 130

TABLES

3. Government Levy in Hoshun, Shansi, 1939: Village Rational Burden Households in the Village of Sanch'i 4. Relief Administered by the Village of Sanch'i in Hoshun, Shansi, 1939 5. Income and Relief Outlay of the Village of Sanch'i in Hoshun, Shansi, 1939 6. Organization of a Communist Base 7. Statistics of Defecting (Bandit) Troops 8. Class Distribution of Officials in the T'aihang District after May 1942 9. Sale and Purchase of Land in "Consolidated" Villages in the Chin-Ch'a-Chi Border Region (1937-1943) 10. Rent and Interest Reduction and Social Mobility in the T'aihang District 11. Distribution of Land in Anle Hsiang, Laian, Kiangsu 12. Japanese Penetration of Hsien Governments in the Occupied Area 13. Attrition Rate of Communist Units in 1939

ix

131 131 132 138 202 246 254 255 257 269 282

It is better to be impetuous than cautious, because fortune is a woman, and it is necessary, if one wishes to hold her down, to beat her and fight with her. And we see that she allows herself to be taken over more by these men than by those who make cold advances; and then, because they are less cautious, more reckless and with greater audacity command her. MACHIAVELLI, II Principe, Ch. xxv

PREFACE

As a freshly minted assistant professor on a college campus, I was part of the agonizing American experience of the late 1960s and early 1970s. The great nation seemed to destroy itself over the war in a far-off place. The spectacle shook me especially because, as an immigrant, I was tied to this country only by my love for the ideals of America. As America seemed to lose sight of these ideals, I felt left out on a limb. Then I recalled similar, though much more profound, transformations that visited Japan as a consequence of her involvement in China. As the debate around me ultimately revolved around the Communist revolution there, I decided to do my part, not as an advocate of political action, but as someone who could rise above the politics of Cold War or reaction to it because of his vantage point. In the sense that my reward in writing this book was in the activity of investigation itself, I have already been amply rewarded by the company of people who have helped me in the task. I must acknowledge my thanks to the following persons and organizations. James P. Harrison of Hunter College and Lowell Dittmer of the State University of New York at Buffalo have read my manuscript and given me helpful comments. My association with Jim Harrison at the Columbia Seminar has been fruitful because he was writing his latest book on the history of the Chinese revolution almost simultaneously. A special thanks is due to Professor Chalmers Johnson who encouraged me in my pursuits while I was a guest of the Center for Chinese Studies at Berkeley. I was also fortunate in having the company of Messrs. John S. Service and C. P. Ch'en. Their advice and assistance was invaluable. Mr. Ch'en Shen-wen of the Bureau of Investigation in Taiwan was good enough to accommodate the jarring presence in his office of a curious foreign xi

xii

PREFACE

scholar. Mr. W u Ch'eng-ts'ai of the Institute of International Relations and Mr. Shingyochi Gikei, the then first secretary of the Japanese Embassy, also rendered valuable assistance while I was in Taiwan. In Tokyo I spent most of my time as a guest of the Center for Chinese Studies at Toyobunko. Professor Ichiko Chuzo and his staff have helped me familiarize myself with Japanese materials on the China war. I am particularly grateful to Major General Morimatsu Toshio of the War History Office, Defense Board, for spending many hours with me in discussing his experiences in China and letting me read the m a n u s c r i p t of his Pacification

War

in North

China.

The

War

History Office has been kind enough to give me permission to reproduce maps 1 and 4 from its publications. My indebtedness to Professor Philip Kuhn must be evident to a careful reader; I had to lean heavily on his conceptualization of China's tradition in the rural areas in order to solve an intractable problem which I had encountered in my work. My association with Professor T a n g Tsou of the University of Chicago goes back to the days when I was beginning my study of China there. It is difficult to express my gratitude toward him. I can perhaps suggest a close parallel between my feelings toward him and Lu Hsiin's toward "Professor Fujino," whom L u met while in Sendai, Japan, as a foreign student, and about whom he has written a moving short story. T o my American wife I owe a debt of different kind. When the world around me seemed to retreat into "know-nothing" selfishness, she stood by me and encouraged me to bring my self-appointed task to a conclusion. Last, to the Joint Committee on Contemporary China of the Social Science Research Council and the American Council of Learned Societies goes the credit for funding my research in 1968 and 1970. It goes without saying that I am solely responsible for whatever is said in this book. A few words are in order here to explain why I chose not to offer a bibliography. During the two years I spent abroad in various libraries and archives, I have examined a large number of documents produced by the Chinese Communist Party, army, government, and mass organizations—many more than I have footnoted in direct support of this book. These are raw primary materials left by the Communists in the course of the revolution and war; a good number of them are written in longhand or mimeographed. They are usually brief; most are articlelength; and directives seldom run more than a few pages. T o be truly meaningful, they have to be listed item by item, rather than by collections into which their captors have arbitrarily placed them. Such a cataloguing work calls for time and resources which I do not have;

PREFACE

xiii

hence, I decided to let my book stand simply on its footnotes. Very thorough catalogues are available from the holdings of Stanford University and Toyobunko. For the documents in the archive of the Bureau of Investigation,* readers are referred to the following bibliographies, the best in existence: T o k u d a Noriyuki, "Yenan jiki ni okeru Chukyo shuppan zasshi mokuroku" [A bibliography of magazines published by the Chinese Communist Party during the Yenan period], Ajiya kenkyu, Vol. XIII, No. 3, pp. 59-89. , "Chukyd toshi kankei shiryo mokuroku" [A bibliography of materials on the history of the Chinese Communist Party], Kindai Chugoku kenkyu senta ihd, July, 1967, pp. 9-20; October, 1967, pp. 8-24. * In the footnotes, BI stands for the Bureau of Investigation, Ministry of Justice in Taiwan.

I INTRODUCTION This book is addressed to the question, How did the Chinese Communist revolution succeed? It covers a rather long span of time, roughly from 1934 to 1943, because during this time the winning strategy was formulated, applied, and the final victory was nearly assured. It seeks to answer several questions which are directly subsumed under the principal question. The scope of the book is broad, in spite of an unfortunate lack of important data and monographic studies, because of my belief in the need for an overview of the revolution which restores a proper perspective to the event. There is of course a need to simply know more. But researches that pertain to a part of the whole are no substitute for a speculation about the whole itself. The need for such an undertaking seems greater than ever today because of the subtle but pervasive influence which China exerts on those who study her. The problem of perspective is doubly complicated in the case of China, for we are dealing with a revolution, and a rather unique one at that. As a revolution it set one half of the nation against the other. Inevitably, the victor and the loser offer totally different views of the struggle. This disparity should create no more difficulty for scholars than that in other revolutions. But the Chinese revolution took place in an intimate interaction with international conflict among the powers. The link between the war and the revolution was so close that the revolution itself can be regarded as unique on that account. Without the international conflict that engulfed China, as I shall maintain, the revolution could not have taken place. Hence, those who took part in the former took part in the latter as well. Among the international actors, accordingly, one can name Britain, Germany, Japan, the Soviet 1

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Union, and the United States as having had direct involvement in the revolution. For these nations to have distinct perspectives of their own on the revolution is understandable. But in the case of the United States in particular, its continued involvement in the civil war to this date created the need to choose between two accounts of the revolution, the victor's and the loser's. Answers to the question, How was China lost, were bound up with answers to the question, Who should rule China? We need not of course take seriously those who answer the former by first answering the latter. Still, the compulsion to see the past events within the framework of current politics and intellectual trend is strong. Thus today we repudiate the question, How was China lost, on the assumption that it was not America's to win or lose in the first place. In so doing, we assume that the revolution in China was moved solely by forces which were internal to itself and that there was no room for external forces to influence the course.* There is one other source of political distortion in the study of the Chinese revolution. Hitherto we have been unaware of it, but it accounts by and large for the uncritical acceptance of the Chinese Communist Party's official history. I hope to show that the CCP's official version of the revolution was the result of a very intense internal struggle concerning different revolutionary strategies. What has been taken in the past for a more or less frank assessment of how the revolution was won from the victor's standpoint has been in fact a justification for one faction in the CCP. 1 A multitude of participants and perspectives, however, can impede as well as facilitate our study. Out of the clash of opinions held by the victors and the losers—including those within the CCP itself—we may be able to arrive at a more balanced account of the revolution on our own. There is thus a need to re-examine the opinions, long since dis* Barbara Tuchman's celebrated book ends with this remark: "In the end China went her own way as if the Americans had never come." Stilwell and American Experience in China, 1911-1945 (New York: T h e Macmillan Co., 1970), p. 531. She does not ask whether the very extensive American involvement in China, which she documented, was well directed, or whether China went the way she did partly because the Americans were there. 1 It is easier to realize that the CCP's official history cannot be taken at face value than to know that it is also a weapon in internal power struggle. In writing Red Star Over China (London: Victor Bollancz Ltd., 1937), Edgar Snow was consciously trying to introduce the little known Communist movement to the world outside. But he did not know that he was also used by Mao's faction against its opponents both in China and Moscow. See how Heinz Shippe, who disagreed with Snow, was rebuked by Mao, in Snow, Random Notes on Red China, 1936-1945 (Cambridge, Mass.: East Asian Research Center, Harvard University, 1971), pp. 2028. Shippe, also unaware, was supporting the Comintern's line.

INTRODUCTION

S

carded, held by the losers. Above all, there is a need for a comprehensive framework for our analysis which is not marred by partisan or international differences. Such a framework should transcend the conventional political divisions that existed in China at the time without losing sight of their contours. In this study the revolution in China will be viewed as a conflict between its cities and the countryside. Let us first review the major issues raised by the Maoist Party history and by some of the existing Western works. In the Party's history, the period between 1937 and 1945 is called the period of "the war of resistance against J a p a n " and is distinguished from the revolutionary civil wars which preceded and followed it. There is agreement among all concerned that the CCP's resurgence as a power had to do with Japanese imperialism and the war of resistance in which the C C P took part. Both contemporaneously and after the fact, the C C P has been reluctant to stress the revolutionary aspect of this war for itself. Only the Kuomintang side makes the charge that the Communists were engaged in an attempt to overthrow the government while China was under foreign invasion. T h e gist of the CCP's own view is that its strenuous and unstinting efforts in the resistance induced the Chinese nation to switch its allegiance to itself. Yet Mao Tse-tung states that there was an anti-feudal aspect to the CCP's war efforts in addition to the anti-imperialist aspect. 2 T h e focal point of my inquiry is, Whether and to what extent was the war of resistance also a revolutionary war? T h a t is, what was the relationship between the anti-imperialist, nationalistic aspect of the war and the anti-feudal, revolutionary, class character of the war? All the important questions that can be raised about the war revolve around this issue. It was Mao's idea that the war of resistance was a "peasant war," 3 and that it was fought by "encircling the cities from the countryside." 4 He did not make clear whether he was referring to China's war efforts as a whole or to those of the C C P alone. There is, however, a universal agreement that the Chinese Communist movement was a peasant movement. T h e pioneering work which established this notion and linked it with the person of Mao was Benjamin Schwartz's. T h e Maoist strategy, according to him, contained the following components: (1) the existence of a strong peasant mass base; (2) the existence of a strong Leninist party; (3) the existence of a strong R e d 2 Selected Works (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1967), II, 3 1 3 . 3 Ibid., p. 287. 4 This notion, clearly a corollary of the "peasant w a r " thesis, was stated in Lin Piao, "Long Live the Victory of People's War," in A. Doak Barnett, ed., China After Mao (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 241.

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Army; (4) the control of a strategically located territorial base; and (5) the self-sufficiency of the base.® While speaking primarily of the civil war period, Professor Schwartz states that "the shift to the New Democracy line [during the war with Japan] involved no change in the basic Maoist strategy. . . . " 6 The notion that the "Maoist strategy" went through no major alteration from the civil war period to the resistance period originated in the official history of the CCP as rewritten after 1945. According to it, the CCP in Kiangsi was beset by two mistaken leaders, both " 'Left' opportunist" in character, who, from time to time, prevented the Party from acting on the correct rural strategy advocated by Mao. T h e Communists' inability to withstand the Kuomintang's encirclement campaign in 1934 is attributed to the errors of the anti-Maoists." 7 That defeat, we are told, was the price the Communists had to pay to awaken to the wisdom of Mao's line; and from the Tsunyi Conference of 1935—where Mao displaced his opponents in power—to Japan's defeat in 1945, the Party was victorious because of the rural line. Yet, can it be really said that the CCP had remained indifferent to what Schwartz defined as "Maoism" prior to the Tsunyi Conference? If not, that is, if the CCP was fully practicing the rural revolutionary line after 1928, what does its defeat in 1934 imply for Mao (or "Maoism")? In fact, did not the CCP radically alter its policy shortly after the Tsunyi Conference rather than continue to adhere to the policy of "peasant war"? It is common knowledge that in 1937 the CCP had publicly promised to discard its policies of the civil war period in favor of the united front with the Kuomintang against Japanese imperialism. The importance of Chalmers Johnson's controversial work, now fully a decade old, lies in its recognition that the Chinese Communist movement was defeated in Kiangsi in 1934 and that this defeat had something to do with its shift in orientation in 1936 and 1937. Therefore, Johnson sought to explain the subsequent rise of Communist power in terms of factors which were absent in Kiangsi.8 But in arguing that the 6 Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958), pp. 189-190. 6 Ibid., p. 200. Richard C. Thornton has successfully challenged Schwartz with respect to the origin of "Maoism" but agrees with him that the CCP's line of the Sixth Congress remained valid during the war against Japan and the civil war that followed it. The Comintern and the Chinese Communists, 1928-1931 (Seattle: Universiy of Washington Press, 1969), p. 30. 7 Resolution on Some Questions in the History of Our Party, Selected Works (New York: International Publishers Company, 1965) (hereinafter cited as SW), IV, 177-186. $ Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power, The Emergence of Revolutionary China, 1937-1945 (Stanford University Press, 1962). T h e importance of this comparative method can hardly be overstressed. My book amounts to another exercise in this method.

INTRODUCTION

5

war had galvanized the peasants into patriotic resistance, he, too, confined his attention to the rural areas. Thus the united front between the Communists and the Kuomintang is virtually ignored. This trend continues to date.9 One can go on enumerating the instances of ambiguity and ambivalence—toward the resistance and the revolution—in the CCP's own account and in Western works which reflect it. It is apparent that clarity in the relationship between the resistance and the revolution is the key to understanding the CCP's victory. T h e paradigm of Chinese revolution must therefore include both the forces of anti-imperialist nationalism and of domestic class warfare. My paradigm is an elaboration of Mao Tse-tung's favorite and apt characterization of China as a "semi-feudal" and "semi-colonial" country. This is an adaptation of a similar idea from Sun Yat-sen. Mao used the appellation "semi-colonial" to distinguish China from India, which he felt was entirely "colonial" under direct British rule. T h e terms "semi-colonial" and "semi-feudal"—or literally "half-colonial" and "half-feudal"—therefore have clear geographical denotation. A "halfcolonial" and "half-feudal" country meant one in which one part was under colonial rule and the other under feudal rule. Neither Sun nor Mao spelled out what the obverse sides of the two parts were. But Mao's use of the concepts suggests plainly that the "colonial" half of China was modern in the bourgeois-democratic sense, while the "feudal" half was entirely "non-colonial," that is, independent of direct foreign rule. "After the Opium War of 1840 China gradually changed into a semi-colonial and semi-feudal society," states Mao. 10 He means that as the treaty ports were opened up, colonization and modernization proceeded simultaneously there. T h e distinction between two halves of China, therefore, is identical with the boundary that separated China's cities from the countryside. T h e proposed paradigm charts the entire universe within which the Chinese revolution took place. It consists of several pairs of polarized categories which characterize the division between the cities and the countryside. T h e categories on each side are interrelated among themselves.

9 It is commonplace to regard the New Fourth Army Incident of 1941 as virtually the end of the second united front. See Richard C. Thornton, China, the Struggle for Power, 1917-1972 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973), pp. 115, 124. T h e only exception to this trend has been Lyman P. Van Slyke, Enemies and Friends: The United Front in Chinese Communist History (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967). 10 Selected Works, II, 309.

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T H E CITIES

T H E COUNTRYSIDE

"science a n d d e m o c r a c y " ; B o l s h e v i k

the tradition of " m i l i t a r i z a t i o n " *

" i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m " ; t h e cities of t h e world the n a t i o n a l bourgeoisie; t h e petty bourgeoisie (students a n d intellec-

the peasants; the landlords; recruits of r u r a l self-defense

tuals); warlords; the w o r k e r s m o d e r n (commerce, industry, o p e n

' f e u d a l " (agrarian, cellular)

n e t w o r k of c o m m u n i c a t i o n ) colonial (anti-imperialist)

i n d e p e n d e n t of colonialism

p o l i t i c a l consciousness

absence of nationalism, d o m i n a n c e of

(persistence of tradition) (nationalism)

sub-political relationships (kinship, secret societies)

the K u o m i n t a n g the C h i n e s e C o m m u n i s t P a r t y

T h e paradigm is intended to bridge a hiatus which exists in our understanding of the Chinese revolution. T h e hiatus is in the conceptualization of the revolution as consisting of two distinct stages, urban and rural. T h e term revolution is generally used rather inclusively to refer to political and social changes that have taken place in China since at least as early as the Republican Revolution of 1911 and up to contemporary times. This usage is common to the Kuomintang, the CCP, Chinese and Western scholars. T h e revolution thus covers a period of sixty years, a very long span of time. During the first thirty years or so, the social and political ferment was confined almost exclusively to China's treaty ports and other urban areas. T h e major protagonists were inhabitants of the cities. They included the traditional elites, their modern successors, the returned students, and the national bourgeoisie. Beside living in the cities, they were all literate. By virtue of their education, they took it upon themselves to act as natural leaders. A galaxy of figures of all political hues and ideologies vied with each other to effect changes in modern China. T h e founders of the Communist movement were all of urban extraction. During those first years of the revolution, the rural areas were virtually untouched by such ferment. T h e countryside was inert and immobile. Those who try to see modern ferment in the countryside during or prior to this period can do so only in areas contiguous to the cities. 11 Yet, * I am indebted to Professor Philip A. Kuhn for this manner of defining the tradition in the rural areas. See Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China: Militarization and Social Structure, 1796-1864 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970). 11 Frederick Wakeman, Jr., Strangers at the Gate: Social Disorder in South China, 1839-1861 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966).

INTRODUCTION

7

according to a well-established view, the revolution shifted its arena between the 1930s and the early 1940s. The revolution is thought to have turned away from the cities to the rural areas after the split between the Kuomintang and the CCP in 1927. Then the cities are thought to have become an arena of counter-revolution.12 Hence, they are ignored in most accounts of the Yenan period of the revolution. This is a misconception of the nature of the "National Revolution" of which Sun Yat-sen was the symbol. The force which animated it was nationalism; it was truly revolutionary against imperialism. The Kuomintang began to grow when it had successfully harnessed this force to its fortune. Insofar as a political movement could succeed in China's urban areas, it had to take this factor into account. The May Fourth Movement and the early Communist movement were no exceptions. Only secondarily did the leaders and the constituency of urban nationalism concern themselves with economic and social conditions of the rural areas. And the urban middle class, with strong blood ties to rural elites, placed a limit on the method of rural reform; violent insurrection was abhorred. The split of 1927 did not remove the impulse of "National Revolution" from the Kuomintang. The coup was as much an expression of Chinese nationalism directed at Russian imperialism as it was an expression of the vested interests of the landlord class. The coup had an unfortunate effect in forcing the Communists to launch radical social reform in opposition to the Kuomintang. The latter was in turn compelled to give priority to destruction of Communist insurrection, i.e., to national unification. The schism superimposed an ideological division on the objective division between the town and the country, and the cities continued to lead and dominate the rural areas. The cities were linked with what Lin Piao called the "cities of the world," the source of inspiration for the May Fourth Movement. They grew in population; acquired a larger body of the middle class (the national bourgeoisie), educated population (the petty bourgeoisie), and the working class; enjoyed an ever-expanding network of communication; and thrived on commerce and industry. These conditions conduced to a change in the political 12 What kind of society China was in the 1930s and 1940s is an important question for this study, though I do not deal with it directly. It seems true enough that the Kuomintang went into a reaction after the experience of the first united front with the Communists. Still, it seems doubtful that it was a fascist dictatorship as Barrington Moore, for instance, maintains in Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967), pp. 187-201. T h e reorganized Kuomintang always professed to be a dictatorship during the stage of tutelage. Mao's own view is that China was an "Asiatic" society and the Kuomintang a traditional dictatorship. See pp. 180-182, 187-188 below.

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complexion of the cities. T h e potential for spontaneous mobilization grew. T h e common denominator of political movement remained nationalism. As Japanese imperialism emerged as the foremost enemy after the Mukden Incident, patriotic outbursts once again became the avocation of students and intellectuals; these outbursts were linked with economic interests of the national bourgeoisie against foreign competition. But the cities supported the Kuomintang's suppression of violent insurrections in the rural areas. T h e Kuomintang government presided over this constituency and continued to grow so long as it met the mandate of nationalism. T h e backbone of its support were the financial elites and the middle class in the lower Yangtze valley and the officer corps graduated from the Whampoa Military Academy. A t some point, the Nanking government shed the tradition of warlordism and became a modern government, a species distinct from all the other regional power centers. One may regard the currency reform of 1935 as the turning point. This reform freed the Kuomintang government from heavy reliance on grain tax and from the need to farm out tax source to its army. It grew modern in other respects as well. In spite of its profession of "tutelage," a synonym for one-party dictatorship, it was very much influenced by public opinion in the cities. More than any other regional power in China, it was bound to the vocal and articulate population that could bestow or withhold the Mandate of Heaven.* As Chalmers Johnson correctly points out, the Communist movement in the Kiangsi period had little to do with nationalism. Its success stemmed almost entirely from factors which related to the "feudal" aspect of the hinterland and the presence of foreign imperialism. T h e political and sociological foundation of "Red political power" in the hinterland was explained by Mao in this way: There are special reasons for this unusual phenomenon. It can exist and develop only under certain conditions. First, it . . . can only occur in China which is economically backward, and which is semi-colonial and under indirect imperialist rule. For this unusual phenomenon can occur only in conjunction with another unusual phenomenon, namely war within the White regime . . . supported by imperialism from abroad. . . , 13 It appears that the Communist movement could have continued growing indefinitely by drawing on the forces generated exclusively in the * T h e Confucian doctrine that the emperor ruled with the sanction of heaven. When there was popular discontent with an emperor, he was thought to have forfeited his mandate, thereby opening the way for his own overthrow. 13 Selected Works, I, 65.

INTRODUCTION

9

rural areas—so long as there was a power vacuum created by "incessant wars" among warlords aligned with foreign powers. T h e steady rise of the Kuomintang in the Decade of Nanking (19271937) could only mean the eventual doom of regionalism. However, both warlord regimes and colonial powers reacted in defense of status quo. Japan was particularly sensitive to the menacing implications of radical nationalism to its interests in southern Manchuria. In 1931 it pre-empted Manchuria rather than see it reintegrated into Republican China. Nanking's problem was compounded when its domestic rivals began to invoke anti-Japanese slogans to justify their separate existence. In 1932 the CCP, too, joined these regional groups with a formal declaration of war on Japan. But as long as it harassed the government's rear in every international crisis, the Kuomintang's policy of national unification as a precondition for resistance remained credible. Little did the Chinese Communists know then that Nanking's pressure against them would be deflected once again by Japanese intervention on an unprecedented scale shortly thereafter. In the meantime, the Kuomintang refused to allow anything to get in the way of suppressing the Communist rebellion. After considerable difficulty, it finally succeeded in delivering a near-fatal blow on the revolutionary movement. T h e cities were more powerful than the countryside. T h e Kuomintang's military victory indicated that, for the rural revolution to grow, the forces generated in the cities had to be politically neutralized. Any arrangement to attain this end had to draw on the nationalistic impulse that animated the cities. T h e CCP had learned the critical weakness of its exclusively rural orientation, and once again it turned toward the cities. This is the meaning of the second united front. Neither the defeat of the Communist movement in Kiangsi, nor its success during the war against Japan, therefore, can be adequately explained unless the cities—exogenous to the peasant revolution—are included in the paradigm. My main thesis is, briefly, that the Communist victory in the "war of national liberation" followed from the fortuitous circumstances which made it possible to combine the war of resistance with a full scale revolution. T h e CCP's own power rested on mobilized peasantry. T h e mobilization was impossible unless it was preceded by a thoroughgoing land revolution. In order to neutralize the Kuomintang against peasant revolution, a protracted international conflict which subjected China to a foreign occupation was necessary. Japan's invasion enabled the Communist forces to move in behind the enemy lines. This was the most important strategic decision. It effectively ended the perennial threat of the Kuomintang's encirclement and suppression. T h e Com-

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munists' partisan (or revolutionary) interest in expanding their armed forces became indistinguishable from national interest in the resistance. By championing the cause of resistance, the C C P sought to marshal the patriotic public opinion of the cities to keep the Kuomintang in the war; this, in turn, granted immunity to the revolutionary expansion of Communist power. T o maintain, as I do, that the second united front was of paramount importance for the success of the revolution necessarily implies a high estimate of the bearing of foreign intervention on the outcome. T h e criterion for judging the impact of foreign intervention on Chinese events should not be the subjective intent of the powers—such as Japan's design to subjugate the Kuomintang or American desire to support it. Foreign intervention should be judged objectively in the light of the question: did it help or hinder the maintenance and preservation of the second united front? When looked at this way, both the United States and Japan must be said to have played important positive roles in the revolution. T h e rivalry or "contradiction" between these and other powers constituted the outer framework of the revolution in China. By discarding the paradigm of the Chinese revolution which views the rural areas in isolation, we are compelled to take new stock of the presuppositions that underlie that paradigm. One of these concerns the source of Communist power. T h e prevailing view is that it is based on "self-reliance," that is, created entirely in the rural areas. This view results from the fallacy of ignoring the function of the second united front in protecting the revolution during the stage of its infancy and growth. It is connected with the assumption that the CCP's activities during the resistance did not include revolution-making. By removing these misconceptions, it is possible to arrive at a correct assessment of the nature and strength of China's peasantry and the sources of Communist power. This is the secondary goal of my book. As the Chinese revolution in the 1937-1945 period consisted of a combination of anti-imperialist and anti-feudal struggles, so my account of it falls into two rather distinct parts. One deals with the Communist leadership's efforts to adapt itself to the war between China and Japan. T h e other deals with the peasant revolution in rural areas which fell to the CCP's control. T h e book draws on internal documents issued by the CCP in order to look at the revolution from the standpoint of the revolutionaries. In a movement which was Caesaro-Papist in nature, the internal policy debate was bound up with the question of the political power of various contenders. T h e Party's history as we have it now—the

INTRODUCTION

11

source of so much confusion—was an instrument of internal struggle. T o understand the substantive policy questions involved, we must understand the power interest of the contenders. But this book is not a history of the internal politics of the CCP. I will deal with that subject only insofar as it is indispensable for an understanding of the revolution in China.

II TWO THEORIES OF R E V O L U T I O N

In the summer of 1932, during the Fourth Encirclement Campaign, the Kuomintang forces dealt a serious blow to the O-Yii-Wan (HupehHonan-Anhwei) Soviet. T h e Fourth Front Army of the Chinese Red Army, which defended this soviet, embarked on what was really the first "Long March." Then in October of 1934, during the Fifth Campaign, the Central Soviet District in southern Kiangsi was overrun. T h e Central Committee of the CCP, the government, the Red Army, their personnel and dependents fled, with the Kuomintang forces on their heels. This was only the beginning of the worst disaster in the history of the Chinese Communist movement. T h e Red political power which controlled some 300 hsien (counties) at one time in Kiangsi, Hupeh, Honan, Hunan, Anhwei, and Fukien was almost wholly wiped out. 1 T h e revolutionary movement appeared to be on the verge of extinction. T h e defeat split the Chinese Communist leadership both in China and Moscow and gave rise to serious internal disputes. T h e disputes concerned the causes behind the fall of the Kiangsi Soviet and a general reorientation in the Party's policy to extricate itself from the critical strait. T h e dispute extended well into the early phase of the war of resistance against Japan. Out of it evolved the CCP's new strategies which directly contributed to the final victory of the revolution: abandonment of the civil war with the Kuomintang government and the formation of the "Anti-Japanese National United Front." Hitherto, we have tended to neglect the gravity of the CCP's defeat, 1 Hatano Ken'ichi, Gendai Shina no seiji to jinbutsu in contemporary China] (Tokyo: Kaizosha, 1937), p. 306.

12

[Politics and personalities

TWO

THEORIES

OF

REVOLUTION

the defects of the soviet movement, and the drastic nature of the CCP's about-face. T h e Long March, for instance, is still thought of primarily as an heroic epic. 2 But the fact that the heroic nature of the Long March resulted from the harsh circumstances imposed on the CCP by its enemy is overlooked. Above all, we have ignored the fact that the partisan interest of one faction in the CCP was bound up with the fiction that the soviet movement and the Long March could not be faulted. 3 In this chapter I will delineate the substance of the strategic dispute in the C C P between 1935 and 1936 that led to the adoption of the new policy. My primary purpose is to show that the end product— the united front line—was an uneasy juxtaposition of two distinct policy lines which clashed with each other. Let us begin by touching briefly on the O-Yu-Wan Soviet and the Red Fourth Front Army, as the fortunes of this group foreshadowed those of the Central Soviet. T h e Fourth Encirclement Campaign was directed mainly at the O-Yu-Wan Soviet. According to Chang Kuot'ao, Chiang Kai-shek marshaled a force of 500,000 men, of which 300,000 were used directly for assault.4 According to the Kuomintang's estimate, the Red Army forces in the O-Yii-Wan area north of the Yangtze River numbered 8o,ooo.5 T h e campaign began in the spring of 1932 soon after the Shanghai Incident. By the summer, Hsu Hsiangch'ien's forces were dislodged from the central base and fled westward across the Peiping-Hankow railway in search of a new, as yet unknown, base. Some tactical mistakes were made on the Communist side.6 But the sheer superiority of the Kuomintang forces in number and fire power created a situation which was irreversible. Thus the Central Committee's O-Yii-Wan Sub-bureau had discussed a plan to evacuate the base prior to the attack. 7 Of the several doubts which haunted Chang Kuo-t'ao and other leaders of the Fourth Front Army on the run, two are worthy of note. 2 Several books have been published on the Long March both in and out of China. T h e y all follow this interpretation. See, for instance, Dick Wilson, Long March (New York: Weybright and Talley, 1971). 3 See, for instance, Mao's speech at Wayaopao in northern Shensi in December, 1935, where he said, " T h e Long March . . . has proclaimed to the world that . . . Chiang Kai-shek and his like, are impotent. It has proclaimed their utter failure to encircle, pursue, obstruct and intercept us. . . ." Selected Works, I, 160. * " W o ti hui-i" [My recollections], Ming Pao, No. 43, July, 1969, p. 93. 6 Military History Bureau, the Ministry of National Defense, Chiao-fei chan-shih [A History of Military Actions Against T h e Communist Rebellion During 19301945] (Taipei: Lien-ho ch'u-pan-she, 1967), p. 538. 6 " W o ti hui-i," Ming Pao, No. 43, July, 1969, pp. 93-94. 7 Ibid., p . 92.

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One was the conditional nature of the peasant mass support for the Red Army. Support depended on the absolute control of an area by the Red Army. When a superior Kuomintang force entered a base, compelling the Red Army forces to take evasive action, the peasants were left behind to shift for themselves. A t this point, they began to waver and local resistance to Communist programs increased. Upon reaching northern Szechuan with a considerably weakened force, the Fourth Front Army decided to adopt a program designed to appease potential local opposition. The Fourth Front Army's Program Upon Entering Szechuan was an ad hoc adaptation to current local exigencies.8 But it suspended forcible confiscation of the property of the landlords, which amounted to an open challenge to the Party's "sovietization" policy. As Chang Kuo-t'ao put it, "At present it was not the agrarian revolution that had enhanced the forces of the Red Army, but the momentary victories that the Red Army had achieved [which] encouraged a small number of peasants to rise and distribute the land." 9 T h e other doubt stemmed from the difficulties which confronted the Fourth Front Army. T h e prospect of finding a stable base from which a revolution could be launched appeared very bleak. Chang Kuo-t'ao seems to have felt then that there was a deeper cause for the weakness of the revolution than merely military questions. What then sustained the Red Army's growth up until 1932, and what caused its demise after that? T h e Communist regulars were tactically superior to the Kuomintang's provincial units and were on a par with or even surpassed the central forces under certain conditions. Tactical leadership of the Red Army's command in mobile warfare was usually superior. T h e Red Army's hiking ability gave it unsurpassed mobility in difficult terrain where it usually chose to fight. In or around its own bases, the Red Army monopolized intelligence; it knew the movements of the enemy forces while keeping them in the dark as to its own whereabouts. It almost always fought on its own terms by amassing an overwhelmingly superior force against an individual column of the converging enemy forces at a decisive point. T h e Red Army could not be defeated by conventional means. T o apply unconventional means, the Kuomintang had to marshal an extraordinary number of troops for a prolonged period. T h e other major condition for the growth of the Red Army was strategic. T h i s stemmed from the basic structural weakness of the Chi8 Ibid., No. 45, September, >969, p. 75; ibid., N o . 46, October, 1969, p. 97. »Ibid., No. 46, October, ig6g, p. 99.

TWO THEORIES

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15

nese polity. Chiang Kai-shek's war against the Communists was part of a larger attempt to establish centralized and unified government by shedding the tradition of warlordism. In his campaigns against the Red Army, he had to draw on regional forces of questionable loyalty. In fact, he frequently pitted such regional units against the Red Army in the hope that one or the other or both would be decimated. T h e contradiction among the motley Kuomintang forces was usually exploited by the Red Army to breach the encirclement, e.g., during the Fukien Rebellion. T h e CCP's strategy to establish a regional regime by "winning victory of the revolution first in one or several provinces" presupposed the "semi-feudal" political structure of China. This presupposition was also shared by the Japanese Army's leadership. Japan's aggression into China since 1931 was based on the judgment that it could exploit warlordism to carve out the Chinese territory. Every major Japanese aggression since the Mukden Incident forced the Kuomintang government to break its anti-Communist encirclement. In short, the diversionary effect of exogenous factors had maintained a situation which enabled the Red Army to exercise its tactical superiority to the hilt.* T h e strategic situation of China could not be changed overnight. But the Kuomintang government made major tactical innovations for the Fifth Campaign. German advisers led by von Seeckt were credited with a part in it. Instead of trying to confront the Red Army in conventional mobile warfare, the Kuomintang forces adopted the tactic of depriving the Red Army of its soviet base by gradual advance. Innumerable blockhouses were built around the soviet area. 10 They were interconnected with newly constructed roads. A tight economic blockade was imposed. A small advance at a time was made toward the center, and the area taken was defended by a new blockhouse. Without adequate fire power, the Red Army was nearly powerless against the blockhouses. Chiang Kai-shek carried out the Fifth Campaign with determination. H e marshaled a force of 400,000 men, assisted by aircraft and modern artillery. 11 After the split caused in the Kuomintang forces by the Fukien Rebellion had been patched up in late 1933, the Campaign came to a climax. * T h e CCP's ability to mobilize the peasant masses has remained constant from 1928 to the present. What remains to be known is whether the Red Army's preponderance was the precondition of peasant mobilization, as Chang Kuo-t' ao suggests. 10 Estimated to be 3,000 by Hatano, in Gendai Shina, p. 302. 11 This is the number used directly for assault, according to Snow, Red Star Over China, p. 184. Hollington K. T o n g states that 300,000 were used, in Chiang Kai-shek, Soldier and Statesman (London: Hurst and Blackett, 1938), II, 528.

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The CCP's leadership shared the view that this fight was a decisive one. The Fifth Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee met in January. Mao charged later that the "third 'Left' line of Wang Ming" dominated the Plenum and that incorrect tactics of trying to defend every inch of the soviet base in positional warfare were adopted. 12 The Internationalists led by Ch'in Pang-hsien had the controlling voice, and Mao's dissenting opinion was brushed aside. In late April, Kuangch'ang and Chunmenling fell to the Kuomintang forces, and the approach to Juichin, the soviet capital, was opened. By this time victory for the Kuomintang forces was in sight. The CCP leadership must have debated where to go and what to do. Such a discussion might have been under way since the summer of 1932, when the Fourth Front Army was forced to evacuate the O-Yii-Wan Soviet during the Fourth Campaign. When the Fifth Campaign started, some people in P'eng Te-huai's 3rd Army Corps are said to have asked, "When will there be an end to all this?" 1 3 On July 15, 1934, the Central Committee and the Central Soviet Government issued a joint "Declaration on the March of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army to the North to Resist Japan." 1 4 This was the signal to evacuate the Central Soviet area. It was also likely that internal recrimination had begun as to the cause of the imminent defeat. I presume that Mao took the lead in criticizing the Internationalist leadership for not acting on his tactical advice. In self-defense the Internationalists seemed to have developed a line of argument which amounted to rationalization of the existing policy. One rather precious specimen is available in a speech made by Wang Ming in Moscow on November 23, 1934, 15 just as the Kuomintang forces overran the Central Soviet area. He was working in the Comintern as a Chinese delegate. He was thus in close touch with the Party Center in China and presumably privy to the debate that was developing there. His opinion must also be regarded as representative of the Comintern's view at the time. In this speech Wang Ming clearly identified himself with the incum12 SW, IV, 185. There is some doubt as to how powerless Mao was in the Party's leadership at this time. Dieter Heinzig thinks he was "neither negligible nor dominant," in "The Otto Braun Memoirs and Mao's Rise to Power," The China Quarterly, April-June, 1971, p. 284. But there is little doubt that he was not in command of the Fourth and the Fifth Campaigns. 13 Jerome Ch'en, "Resolutions of the Tsunyi Conference," ibid., October-December, 1969, p. 25. 14 Takeuchi Minora, ed., Mao Tse-tung-chi [Mao Tse-tung collection] (Tokyo: Hokubösha, 1971), IV, 363-367. 15 Hsin t'iao-chien yü hsin ts'e-lüeh [New conditions and new tactics] (Moscow: The Soviet Foreign Workers' Publishing House, 1935) (BI).

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bent leadership by attempting to explain away the debacle in Kiangsi. He spent a great deal of effort recounting the overwhelming military superiority of the Kuomintang forces used in the "Sixth Encirclement and Suppression"—this was the Comintern's numeration for the "Fifth Encirclement" after the Fukien Incident; the entirely new tactics used by von Seeckt; and the use of heavy aerial and artillery bombardment. 16 "Because of this," he said, "it was impossible not to have difficulty in quickly destroying the enemy main force, so that it was impossible not to withdraw from certain soviet areas . . . ." 17 A t no point did he engage in a wholesale attack on the strategic aspect of the existing policy. Mistakes were committed but they were tactical. "Does the Red Army have the possibility to win victory over these new policies of the enemy?" he asked himself, and answered affirmatively. 18 He was insistent that the soviet movement enjoyed the enthusiastic support of the people, 19 and he emphasized that the area lost to the Kuomintang was compensated for by the newly-opened soviets in the hands of the Red Fourth, Second, Sixth, and Seventh Corps. 20 A t the same time Wang Ming revealed another element of his position. Without questioning the Party's line as such, he placed the blame for the "mistakes" in Kiangsi mainly on the incorrect handling of the Fukien Incident both by the CCP and the rebels themselves. He was very critical of some elements in the CCP who refused to aid the 19th Route Army on the grounds that "the Red Army should not receive Chiang Kai-shek's blows in place of the 19th Route Army because at that time the igth Route Army was the object on which Chiang Kaishek was concentrating all of his power . . . ." 21 Wang Ming professed to believe, on the contrary, that "if a very large revolutionary struggle broke out in the great rear of Chiang Kai-shek's army . . . the plan to encircle the Central Soviet area could have quickly and completely gone bankrupt." 22 Wang Ming was implying that had a major urban revolt—of the kind represented by the Fukien Rebellion—been properly exploited, Kuomintang pressure could have been diverted. This was consistent with Wang Ming's position which Mao labeled as the "third 'Left' line." It represented his efforts to focus the CCP's activities on the cities within the rural-oriented line of the Party at the time. Wang Ming was to make an abrupt about-face shortly, as will be shown later, but his urban orientation remained unchanged. T h e Party Center and the First Front Army rested briefly in a small town in Kweichow Province in January, 1935, and conducted their 16 Ibid., pp. 14-16, 112-113. 17 Ibid., p. 18. 18 Ibid., p. 19.

Ibid; pp. 43, 87. 20 Ibid., pp. 84-85.

19

21 Ibid; p. 64. 22 Ibid., p. 20.

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own review of the fall of the Kiangsi Soviet. T h e Resolutions of the Tsunyi Conference—made famous because of Mao's rise to power on this occasion—agreed with Wang Ming's review in part but disagreed with it in another. T h e beginning of the internal dispute concerning the second united front can be traced back to these Resolutions. Whether issues between Mao and Wang Ming were joined on this occasion was not certain. T h a t depended on whether or not the Party Center maintained communication with the Comintern in Moscow. Chang Kuo-t'ao shows that the Fourth Front Army and the First Front Army maintained constant radio contact with each other. Thus the Tsunyi Resolutions were transmitted to northern Szechuan almost immediately from Kweichow. 23 From the Tsunyi Conference onward, Mao seems to have monopolized all radio communication with the outside world and kept his opponents in the dark. In particular, he had an interest in censoring the messages from the Comintern since he was beginning to take a line in opposition to it. But radio or other contact between the Party Center and Moscow was not impossible.24 T h e central thesis of the Tsunyi Resolutions was that the fall of the Kiangsi Soviet was the fault solely of the Internationalist leadership which commanded the Fifth Campaign. Its major import was to defend the soviet movement, the Red Army, and by extension the peasant mass movement on which they were based, as fundamentally correct. T h e rural strategy of the Sixth Congress was correct and the soviets could have continued to grow but for the purely tactical error of some individuals, according to this view. T h e Resolutions thus agreed with Wang Ming's November, 1934, review of the Fifth Campaign in not faulting the Party's line of the Sixth Congress. T h e Resolutions suggested, in passing, the views of Mao's opponents in China. Ch'in Pang-hsien, an Internationalist and the General-Secretary of the Party until he was replaced at the Tsunyi Conference, was said to have "come to the opportunist conclusion that to defeat the Fifth 'Encirclement and Suppression' was an objective impossibility." 25 On the contrary, the Resolutions maintained, "the Party of the Central Soviets, in particular . . . has achieved unprecedented successes in mobilizing the broad masses of workers and peasants to take part in the revolutionary war. T h e Red Army Expansion Movement aroused 23 " W o ti hui-i," Ming Pao, N o . 48, December, 1969, p. 85. 24 By July, 1935, there appeared an oblique reference to the dispute in the C C P Center in a Soviet press. Charles B. McLane, Soviet Policy and the Chinese Communists, 1931-1946 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), pp. 53-54. See also pp. 21-23, below. 25 Mao Tse-tung-chi, IV, 379.

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great enthusiasm among the masses . . . ." But, continued the Resolutions, Ch'in Pang-hsien "underestimated" these "favorable conditions for crushing the Fifth 'Encirclement and Suppression.' " He concluded that "we were unable to crush the 'Encirclement and Suppression' by our own efforts." 26 T h e Resolutions took serious issue with this view and opposed it head on. It must be pointed out that our work still suffers from serious defects. T h e Party's leadership in the daily struggle of the broad masses of workers and peasants against the imperialists and Kuomintang had not made any noticeable progress . . . .

T h e s e defects undoubtedly affected operations against the

Fifth 'Encirclement and Suppression' and they became the important cause of our inability to smash the 'Encirclement and Suppression.' B u t their existence must not be misunderstood as the essential

cause for our failure to

smash the Fifth 'Encirclement and Suppression.' Comrade X X

[i.e.,

Ch'in

Pang-hsien] has exaggerated the defects in these areas of our work and refused to see or admit the misjudgment on the part of the military leadership and in their basic strategy and tactics . . . .

Since our military leadership

could not adopt correct strategy and tactics, we were unable to score decisive victory in war in spite of the bravery and skill of the R e d Army, the exemplary work in the rear, and the support of the broad masses. T h i s was precisely the essential

cause for our inability to defeat the Fifth 'Encirclement and Sup-

pression' in the Central Soviet. 2 7

It followed from this point of view that "the Central Soviet could have been preserved, the Fifth 'Encirclement and Suppression' could have been broken." It appears that the Internationalist leadership at Tsunyi had an interest in blaming the defeat on the objective circumstances, while Mao, the opposition, had an interest in fixing the blame on the subjective error of those in power. T h e Internationalists had shifted from blaming the tactical error in the handling of the Fukien Rebellion (as in Wang Ming's Moscow speech) to blaming the objective circumstance. I infer that the C C P leadership at Tsunyi faced two broad alternatives in its post mortem. One was to fault the tactical, subjective judgment of some individuals and uphold the Party's line. T h e other was to exonerate the incumbent leaders by blaming the objective circumstances. T h e latter necessarily implied that the validity of the Party's strategies was open to question. But Ch'in Pang-hsien, who took the position, somehow stopped short of pushing this logic to its conclusion. I must note some peculiar features of the realignment of power that 26 Ibid., p. 380.

27

Ibid. Emphasis original.

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took place at Tsunyi. By the standard established in the C C P by then, the disaster in Kiangsi was bound to be followed by a full scale review and stock-taking. Such a review would have taken a very critical look at the role of the incumbent leaders regardless of actual culpability. T h e y would have been retired from command. A t the same time, the existing line of the Party should have come under criticism. T h e incumbent leadership and the existing Party line were in a particularly vulnerable position as the fall of the Kiangsi Soviet almost coincided with the great turn in the Comintern's line. T h e C C P could have held its Seventh Congress almost simultaneously with the Comintern's Seventh Congress, as was the custom up to then. But nothing of the sort happened. T h e T s u n y i Resolutions defended the line of the Sixth Congress, and the CCP's Seventh Congress did not convene until 1945. Error in tactical leadership was fixed mainly on a certain " H u a Fu," who was in reality a Comintern agent named Otto Braun. 2 8 C h o u Enlai, w h o commanded the Fourth Campaign without much success, retired as the General Political Commissar of the R e d Army. 2 9 Ch'in Pang-hsien was replaced in the post of the General-Secretary of the Politburo by C h a n g Wen-t'ien, another Internationalist. Both C h o u En-lai and Ch'in Pang-hsien continued in important leadership positions in the Party. T h e limited nature of the realignment at T s u n y i has been hitherto explained by the continued power of the Internationalists in the Party and the slim majority Mao could muster on his side at the time. It is my inference, however, that M a o was interested in carefully circumscribing the scope of his criticism against the "third 'Left' line" of W a n g Ming. His primary goal was to preserve intact the legitimacy of the rural strategy of the Sixth Congress. T h e T s u n y i Conference as a "military coup d'état" 30 accomplished this. A t the same time, Mao's account w i t h W a n g M i n g was not entirely settled. T h e next events in the development of the intra-Party dispute were the Party conferences in M o u k u n g and Maoerhkai in western Szechuan. Here the First Front Army and the Fourth Front A r m y met in June, 1935. M a o Tse-tung and Chang Kuo-t'ao clashed with each other on several issues. I will limit my discussion to two of them. C h a n g Kuot'ao's predicament was similar to that of the Internationalists. H e had failed to defend the O-Yii-Wan Soviet; and subsequently, he had abandoned the land confiscation policy on his own initiative. In defending 28Chi-hsi Hu, "Hua Fu, the F i f t h Encirclement Campaign and the Tsunyi Conference," The China Quarterly, July-September, 1970, p. 40. 29 Ch'en, "Tsunyi Conference," p. 2. 30 Hu, "Fifth Encirclement," p. 44.

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himself against Mao, it was natural for him to question the validity of the "sovietization" policy itself. When he saw the miserable condition of the First Front Army—reduced to 10,000 troops or one-tenth of the original size—he came to the conclusion that the soviet movement and the Long March had failed. 3 1 Mao chose to differ and blamed Chang Kuo-t'ao, instead, for breach of Party discipline. They also differed on the question of where to go. At Moukung, Chang Kuo-t'ao was told of a radio instruction from the Comintern to the Party Center in Juichin in the summer of 1934. According to this instruction, the R e d Army was to move closer to the border of Outer Mongolia in case of extreme necessity. 32 According to Wang Ming's Moscow speech of November, 1934, the C C P had decided to move westward because of the presence of Kuomintang forces in north and central China. 3 3 If Mao was in touch with the Comintern in Moukung, lie let Chang Kuo-t'ao believe otherwise. He simply proposed moving into northern parts of Shensi and Kansu. 34 Probably influenced by the last Comintern instruction, Chang Kuo-t'ao proposed to build a base where they were (i.e., Szechuan-Kansu border with Sikang as the rear) or to move into Sinkiang. Mao felt that Chang Kuo-t'ao's proposals would take the C C P too far away from the center of China. 3 5 T h e crucial question here was, What induced Mao to insist that the C C P move into the barren loess region of Shensi? One must remember that the Long March was justified by the "Manifesto to Go U p North to Resist J a p a n " issued in Mao's name in July, 1934. Did he have some specific scheme in mind? Or was this just another anti-Japanese statement which had been added to the CCP's appeals since 1932? I simply do not know. But war with J a p a n was shortly to become a vital precondition of Mao's vision of revolution. It has hitherto been assumed that the Maoerhkai Conference issued the so-called "August First Declaration." 36 This appeal was very significant because it addressed itself broadly to the intermediate groups 31 " W o ti hui-i," Ming Pao, No. 49, January, 1970, p. 82. See also his open letter on the occasion of his defection from the CCP, in T h e Commission for Compiling Documents on the 50th Anniversary of Kuomintang, ed., Kung-fei huo-kuo shih-liao hui-pien [Collection of historical documents on the ruination of the nation by the Communist bandits] (hereinafter cited as Kung-fei huo-kuo) (Taipei: Central Committee of the Kuomintang, 1961), III, 63. 32 " W o ti hui-i," Ming Pao, No. 50, February, 1970, p. 85. 33 Hsin t, iao-chien yu hsin ts'e-liieh, p. 119. 34 " W o ti hui-i," Ming Pao, No. 50, February, 1970, p. 85. 35 Ibid., p. 87. 36 Wei k'ang-Jih chiu-kuo kao ch'iXan-t'i t'ung-pao shu [Letter to the whole nation for resistance against Japan and national salvation], Kuo-Kung ho-tso k'angJih wen-hsien [Documents of Kuomintang-CCP cooperation] (hereinafter cited as Kuo-Kung ho-tso) (Hankow: T'ien-ma shu-tien, 1938) (BI), pp. 1 - 7 .

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by overcoming the sectarianism which marked the CCP's policy in the civil war period. It has been suspected that the appeal was coordinated with the Comintern's Seventh Congress which had been in session since July 25. Indeed, the content of the August First Declaration shared many points with the major speech delivered by Wang Ming at the Congress on August 7.37 Both proposed the formation of a "national defense government" based on a ten-point "common program"; an "anti-Japanese united army" which was to enlist the "Kuomintang army"; and an offer of ceasefire toward any force which was willing to join the "united army." Especially noteworthy was the exact identity of the "common program" proposed in Moscow and China as it varied in content from time to time. There were, however, visible differences between the two: while Wang Ming proposed a "national united front," the term is missing from the Declaration, which moreover left no doubt that Chiang Kai-shek was still the CCP's enemy. T h e Comintern's shift to the popular front line did not take place overnight; it was preceded by at least several months of debate. According to Wang Ming, W h e n the Comintern's Seventh Congress was under preparation, and the basic tactical guideline of the Congress was being debated . . . the Chinese Communist Party carried out a thorough and careful study of tactical problems concerning the anti-imperialist united front under the guidance of the Center . . .

.3«

Wang Ming states that the August First Declaration was the result of that study. T h e suspicion that he was the author of the Declaration is strengthened by the fact that Chang Kuo-t'ao recalls neither the united front nor the Declaration being discussed at Maoerhkai. 39 Did Wang Ming then secure the Party Center's consent before the fact, as he implies, or did he issue the Declaration in the name of the Central Committee on his own initiative as a member of the Comintern's Presidium? Chang Kuo-t'ao takes the latter view. 40 If Mao did know of the Declaration at the time, he had an interest in keeping Chang Kuo-t'ao ignorant of it for fear that the latter's opposition to the 37 T h e speech indicates that a t least a p a r t of it was written on July 16. Wang Ming hsiian-chi [Selected Works of Wang Ming] (Tokyo: Kyuko shoin, 1970), I, 2338 H a t a n o Ken'ichi, Chugoku kyosanto 1936-nen shi [History of the Chinese Communist Party, 1936] (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1937), pp. 94-95. 39 " W o ti hui-i," Ming Pao, No. 51, March, 1970, p. 82. 40 Ibid. U p o n W a n g Ming's return to China in late 1937, M a o is reported to have acknowledged W a n g Ming's authorship of the August First Declaration in a welcome speech. W a r r e n Kuo, " T h e Conflict between Chen Shao-yu and Mao Tsetung," Issues and Studies, November, ig68, pp. 35-36.

TWO THEORIES

OF

REVOLUTION

23

soviet program might be strengthened. It is impossible to settle these questions with finality. Again, much depends on whether or not Moscow and the Party Center were in touch with each other. T h e r e was at least a one-way communication, however. T h e C C P had dispatched two agents, P'an Han-nien and H u Yii-chih, to Moscow from Maoerhkai. 4 1 W h a t amounted to a counter-thesis to the Tsunyi Resolutions was articulated in W a n g Ming's August 7 speech at the Comintern Congress (July 25-August 20). He pushed to the conclusion the logic implied in Ch'in Pang-hsien's rationalization for the defeat in Kiangsi, and he used it as a premise to call for a drastic reorientation of the Chinese Communist movement. T h e r e was clearly an element of "opportunism" in W a n g Ming's shift. Echoing Mao's view, L i n Piao stated in 1965 that W a n g Ming, the practitioner of the "third 'Left' line," became a "capitulationist" or an advocate of the "second W a n g M i n g line" of "right opportunism." 42 A t the same time, there was a consistent underlying dimension in W a n g Ming's position throughout the Kiangsi and the resistance periods. His tactical change was derivative of that underlying dimension. T h e Comintern's shift to the new policy—the popular front with bourgeois democracies in opposition to fascism and reaction—had the Soviet Union's interest primarily in view. T h e shift came within half a year of the debacle in Kiangsi—a most inopportune moment for Mao, w h o had committed himself to the defense of the existing Party line. W a n g Ming, w h o had succeeded Li Li-san as Mao's opponent in 1931, took the rostrum to deliver a major speech dealing with the Far East. His speech was formally deferential toward Mao, listing him at the top of the hierarchy of Chinese Communist leaders. 43 Still, W a n g M i n g obviously had the backing of the Comintern to criticize "some comrades" in the C C P for their part in the major blunder committed in Kiangsi. W a n g Ming, articulate and verbose, fully rose to the occasion. A lengthy section of the speech, dealing specifically with China, began with a criticism of "a very greatly mistaken viewpoint" of "some people" who think that the "question of anti-imperialist national united front has no longer any meaning" because of the severity of class struggle. W a n g M i n g averred, on the contrary, that the united 41 W a n g Chien-min, Chungkuo Kung-ch'an-tang shih-kao [A d r a f t history of the Chinese Communist Party] (Taipei, 1965), III, 45-46. 42 Lin Piao, "Long Live the Victory," p. 210. 43 See the laudatory reference to Mao Tse-tung in the speech in Wang Ming hsuan-chi, I, 25.

24

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front "determines e v e r y t h i n g . " 4 4 H e suggested the premise for the radical reorientation he was d e m a n d i n g : When the national crisis is deepening day by day, there is no way of saving the nation except by a total mobilization of our great people . . . . At the same time, for the Communist Party's part, there is no means whatever to mobilize the entire Chinese people . . . except this policy of national united front . . . 4 5 T o be sure, W a n g M i n g admitted, the C C P h a d been already "practicing anti-Japanese united front policy." Georgi D i m i t r o v also took cognizance of this alleged fact. 4 6 T h e reference m i g h t have been to the A u g u s t First Declaration. B u t W a n g M i n g insisted that " r i g h t u p to n o w the C C P has failed to be truly thorough and to avoid committing mistakes in i m p l e m e n t i n g this policy." 4 7 " T h e first a m o n g the causes of these mistakes," he declared, "is that many of our comrades in the past as at the present have not comprehended the new conditions and the new environment w h i c h have emerged in recent years in C h i n a . " 48 L i v i n g in total isolation in the hinterland, he suggested, the Chinese Communists were insensitive to the stirring of public sentiment in the cities. I n this speech, W a n g M i n g did not m e n t i o n the K u o m i n t a n g as a friend to be enlisted in the united front. H o w e v e r , his several references to the K u o m i n t a n g and " t h e K u o m i n t a n g army" were moderate and solicitous, and he maintained that Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary tradition was one to w h i c h the Communists were heir. 4 9 A t the same time, he tried to distinguish his position f r o m that of C h ' e n Tu-hsiu. Ch'en's mistake, according to W a n g , was in " j u x t a p o s i n g the tactics of national united front w i t h the task of class struggle" and a b a n d o n i n g the class interests of the workers a n d peasants. T h e disaster of 1927, he stressed, was " b y n o means the fault of the tactics of anti-imperialist united front themselves." 50 W a n g M i n g was evidently anticipating an attack f r o m the left against himself, and he sought to turn the tables on his potential critics. "Some people think," he said, " t h a t the C C P ' s participation in the anti-imperialist united front w i l l only w e a k e n the leadership of the proletariat and the struggle for soviet political power. T h i s is completely inaccurate." 5 1 H e m a i n t a i n e d that only the proletarian leadership over the united front could ensure the success of agrarian revolution. I n so doing, he implied that his policy was intended to bring about a new alignment in the C C P by shifting away from its excessive reliance on the peasants. 44 Ibid., p . 7. 45 Ibid., p . 9-10.

46 Ibid., p . 63. 47 Ibid., p . 11.

48 Ibid., 4» Ibid.,

p. 13 p . 53.

50 Ibid., p. 47. 51 Ibid., p . 45.

TWO

THEORIES

OF

REVOLUTION

25

Wang Ming gave less restrained criticisms of the rural revolution in an essay written in November of 1935 for an internal audience. He lashed out at the impotence of the R e d Army: F r o m the standpoint of actual military strength, w e are still unable to win victory over J a p a n e s e imperialism and its lackeys. F r o m the standpoint of political trends, a very great part of the people have not yet escaped the influence

of other political power . . . .

T h e y have not yet defended the So-

viets. 6 2

Violent confiscation and class struggle promoted by the C C P invited greater and greater reaction. T h e Chinese soviets came to rely more and more on the Red Army alone to carry on the revolution. T h e revolution became synonymous with armed struggle. 53 It did not advance beyond the line of the R e d Army's occupation, while it tended to alienate the inhabitants of the cities who were more concerned with foreign menace. Wang Ming clearly shared the orthodox Marxist bias against the peasantry. As Mao put it later, he underestimated the "peculiar revolutionary character of the peasants." 54 T o Wang, China's peasant masses fell far behind the inhabitants of the cities in their political awareness. Such a consciousness was at best aroused only through the process of the land confiscation struggle. Would they also rise up for purely political purposes, such as defending China against the Japanese? Wang Ming did not deny, of course, that the peasants were an important component of the Chinese revolution. Nevertheless, a land revolutionary movement can never by itself directly solve the

task

of

an

anti-imperialist

revolutionary movement. . . . Experiences

prove that an anti-imperialist revolutionary movement has much

broader

motive force than a land revolutionary m o v e m e n t . 5 5

Should not the C C P try more directly and deliberately to harness the political power swelling up spontaneously in the cities? T o Wang Ming, simply reacting to the revolts in Chahar and Fukien was not good enough. 56 Wang Ming also had an instrumental view of the rural soviets which subsisted by exploiting the "semi-feudal" character of China: 52 ibid., p. 81. 63 According to Mao, both Li Li-san and Wang Ming slanderously characterized Mao's approach as the "rule of the gun," SW, IV, 195. 55 &4Ibid., p. 192. Wang Ming hsiian-chi, I, 76. 66 Hsin t'iao-chien yii hsin ts'e-lueh, p. 21. He states, "the great armed struggles which broke out among the enemy . . . were by no means all decided by our will."

26

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T h i s e n v i r o n m e n t e n a b l e d the r e v o l u t i o n to o b t a i n a m p l e o p p o r t u n i t y a n d time to train a n d a c c u m u l a t e its o w n forces. . . .

I n addition, this environ-

m e n t e n a b l e d the r e v o l u t i o n to o b t a i n a greater possibility to a v o i d an a r m e d clash . . . w h i c h arises p r e m a t u r e l y , f o r w h i c h w e are u n p r e p a r e d , a n d w h i c h is d i s a d v a n t a g e o u s to the r e v o l u t i o n . 5 7

The soviets that grew up in the interstices of the White political power by exploiting the "unevenness" of China's revolution were thus a mere preparation, a refuge from a superior enemy, and a means to some final act which was to take place beyond the borders of the rural soviets themselves. Biding of time in the hinterland was indeed a "protracted struggle." But the final act, a consummation of the revolution, was not. Wang Ming had to make this point with some trepidation, for it was only in 1931 that he had taken Li Li-san to task for making precisely the same point.58 At the time of the Fifth Plenum in 1934, furthermore, Wang Ming was instrumental in pronouncing that a "direct revolutionary situation" existed, which led to the do-or-die battle in defense of Kiangsi.69 Still, he made it clear that a successful revolution must draw on a sudden political tension created by larger domestic or international events. Such tension would do away with the "unevenness" of the revolution. I surmise that Mao's ingenuity in rising to power in the wake of the defeat in Kiangsi infuriated Wang Ming. Likewise, Wang Ming's ingenuity in exploiting the same event for his own purpose must have chagrined Mao. Wang Ming's interest was to restore China's revolution to the cities on the wave of anti-Japanese political consciousness. An element of opportunism or "politics" was present on both sides. But we must also see the substantive merits of both cases. As things stood in the summer of 1935, Mao's case from Tsunyi—the peasant revolution can go on provided that it enjoys his leadership—did not carry much weight. At the time, he was nearing northern Shensi, the destination of the grueling march, with a force of a mere 4,000.®° Restoring the CCP to the cities presupposed cooperation with the Kuomintang. "Cooperation" with regional powers such as the Fukien People's Government would not do. Such a "cooperation" or "united 57

Wang Ming hsüan-chi, I, 79. 68 A t the T h i r d Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee, which carried out partial criticism of L i Li-san, W a n g Ming charged that L i Li-san was ignorant of the distinction between the terms "high tide" and "objective revolutionary situation." Hsiao Tso-liang, Power Relations within the Chinese Communist Movement, ipjo1934 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1961), I, 68-69; ibid., II, 5 1 7 - 5 1 9 . 69 Ibid., I, 2 6 1 . 60 H e took, the First and the T h i r d A r m y Corps from Maoerhkai. " W o ti hui-i," Ming Pao, N o . 53, May, 1970, p. 87.

TWO THEORIES

OF

REVOLUTION

37

front from below" was a euphemism for inciting mutiny. T h e urban line of Wang Ming of necessity shifted to united front line, which in turn pointed to the Kuomintang government as the logical partner. In 1936 Wang Ming disclosed that the August First Declaration proposed a ceasefire and anti-Japanese agreements to Chiang Kai-shek.61 According to Chiang Kai-shek, Ch'en Li-fu reported to him that "through a friend's introduction Chou En-lai had approached Tseng Yang-fu, a Government representative in Hong Kong" in the autumn and winter of 1935 in order to arrange a ceasefire.62 Chou is reported to have attached no condition. I conclude that the Comintern had instructed the Party Center to make the proposal. From this point on, available evidence points to deepening factional differences in the Party. Contradictory orders and proclamations were issued by the CCP in the fall before it unified itself outwardly along the anti-Chiang line at Wayaopao. On October 11, the leaders of the Northeastern Anti-Japanese United Army, which was semi-independent of the C C P at the time, issued a circular telegram proposing a ceasefire and joint resistance to Japan. T h e large number of addressees included Lin Sen, Chiang Kai-shek, and Mao Tse-tung. 63 T h e Central Committee issued a declaration on November 13, according to Ho Kan-chih, demanding a policy of simultaneous "resistance to Japan and opposition to Chiang." 64 I have no access to this document, but it seems to be identical in substance to the August First Declaration. Yet again on November 28, the CCP issued an "Anti-Japanese national salvation proclamation." There are two versions of this document. One was signed by Mao and Chu T e and was in line with the August 1 and the November 13 declarations. 65 T h e other, collected contemporaneously by Hatano Ken'ichi, paralleled the October n telegram from the Manchurian leaders.66 It, too, began with a large list of addressees, starting with the authors of the October 11 telegram and various warlords. About midway through the list, as if he were an equal among the rest, was " T h e supreme commander of Nanking, Chiang Chungcheng." T h e declaration was signed by several leaders of the Red Army. Chu T e was at the top, listing himself as the supreme commander of the Red Army and the chairman of the Military Commission. Chou En-lai came next as the vice-chairman of the Military Commission. Mao's name was conspicuous by its absence. T h e simultaneous exis61 Wang Ming hsiian-chi, I, 134, 139. 62 Soviet Russia in China (New York: F a r r a r Strauss a n d C u d a h y , 1957), p . 72. 63 Chugoku kyosanto 1936-nen shi, p p . 386-389. 64 A History of the Modern Chinese Revolution (Peking: Foreign L a n g u a g e s Press, i960), p . 288. 66 Chugoku kyosanto 1936-nen shi, pp .181-184. 65 Mao Tse-tung-chi, V, 9-11.

28

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tence of contradictory declarations suggests that, since the Maoerhkai conference, some leaders of the CCP supported, while Mao objected to, the idea of proposing a ceasefire to the Kuomintang. In order to understand Mao's position, it is necessary to assess his interest as a background factor. By the end of 1935, the Communist forces that gathered in the Shensi-Kansu Soviet after the Long March numbered 15,000.67 T h e new home of the Party Center had already been subjected to two encirclement campaigns by the time the Red Army had arrived. Nanking had an upper hand. It was intent on delivering the final blow. Wang Ming's proposal stemmed from the judgment that the Red Army was too weak to continue the civil war. But precisely because it was so decimated, the Kuomintang could not be expected to grant a ceasefire, let alone cooperation. Mao's objection might have been that a ceasefire proposal under the circumstances would only encourage Nanking in its belief that the CCP was desperately weak and suing for peace. T h e Kuomintang did in fact come to regard the origin of the united front in this manner. Chiang Kaishek's reply to the August First Declaration, the Northern Bureau bitterly complained later, was a stepped-up suppression campaign. 68 When that happened, I presume, Mao's position was strengthened while Chou En-lai suffered a temporary setback. T h e idea of the united front with Chiang Kai-shek must have appeared to Mao to border on fantasy. Nevertheless, if Moscow was serious about bringing the two Chinese parties together again, it could very well have been contemplating an offer of considerable concessions to Nanking. T h e first united front was engineered by the Comintern on the basis of such a compromise. Mao's efforts since 1927 in building the Red Army and peasant soviets had been to pick up the pieces when that compromise led to a disaster and to safeguard the interest of the revolution against its recurrence. His own power in the C C P rested on the Red Army and the soviets.69 But if the C C P refused to abandon its independence in these respects, could the central government be expected to co-exist with it in peace? Between 1935 and 1936, Mao was in all likelihood apprehensive of Moscow's good faith. T h e Comintern's call for a popular front signaled a new turn in Moscow's external relations. T h e Russian national interest was increasingly taking priority over its revolutionary programs represented by the Comintern. In East Asia, Stalin was acutely inter67 Stuart Schram, Mao Tse-tung (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1966), p. 176. 68 Chügoku kyösantö 1936-nen shi, p. 219. 69 For an excellent exposition of this point and its partisan implications, see Thornton, Comintern, pp. 103-120.

TWO THEORIES

OF REVOLUTION

29

ested in maintaining neutrality with Japan in order to avoid a twofront conflict with it and Germany. He proposed a neutrality pact to Japan in 1931 and 1932, though Tokyo remained unresponsive until 1940.70 His fears were not unfounded. In October, 1935, the German government proposed an anti-Soviet defense alliance to Tokyo. In November of the following year, this was to culminate in the AntiComintern Pact. In order to secure the Soviet Union's Far Eastern borders with Manchuria, Stalin wished to strengthen and embolden the Chinese government in its running conflict with Japan. By creating a tension in the rear of the Kuantung Army facing north, this would divert Japan's pressure from the Soviet Union itself. Stalin judged correctly that only the Kuomintang government could put up a meaningful resistance to Japan. T h e Soviet government took initiatives to improve its relations with Nanking as early as 1931. 71 Faced with this solicitous diplomacy, Nanking could prevail on Moscow to curtail the revolutionary activities of the Comintern's arm in China. In the fall of 1936, a secret negotiation was started between the two governments to explore the possibilities of an anti-Japanese alliance. Although the result was a rather innocuous nonaggression pact, it included clauses by which Moscow promised to aid Nanking but not to aid the CCP. 7 2 Mao's fear that Moscow and Nanking might arrive at mutual accommodation at the expense of the C C P was probably exacerbated by the fact that Wang Ming was handling united front questions for the Comintern. Wang Ming's utterances indicated that he was critical of the lopsidedly rural orientation of the CCP leadership. Mao probably had good reason to suspect that Wang Ming was using the recent turn of events to his advantage in order to assert his control over the CCP. Wang Ming had taken credit for himself at the Congress by announcing the cessation of the policy of confiscating the property of the rich peasants.73 T h e CCP fell in line four months later. 74 Wang Ming still upheld the policy of confiscating the landlords' property at this stage.75 Nevertheless, he was in a position to benefit from a curtailment of the Maoist machine in the countryside in the name of the united front with the Kuomintang. 70 W a r History Office, T h e Defense Board, Daitoa senso kokan senshi [Publicly recorded history of the Greater East Asian War], Vol. VIII: Daihonei rikugunbu [The Imperial Army General Staff] (hereinafter cited as Imperial Army General Staff) (Tokyo: Asagumo shinbunsha, 1967), No. 1, pp. 338, 347. 71 Soviet Russia in China, p. 69. 72 Lyman Van Slyke, p. 65. 73 Wang Ming hsiian-chi, I, 97-98. 74 See the order of the Standing Committee of the Chinese Soviet in Mao Tsetung-chi, V, 13-14. 75 Wang Ming hsiian-chi, I, 91.

30

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Mao's policies on united front questions from the very outset to the end of the war in 1945 were consistent with those of the civil war days in one respect: under no circumstances should the interests of the Red Army and the territorial bases—whatever they were called under different circumstances—be abridged and his control over them curtailed. He would not agree to the united front with the Kuomintang until he found a specific scheme which made the independence of the C C P compatible with it. In December, 1935, a Politburo conference was held in Wayaopao. Its Resolution can be regarded for the most part as Mao's answer to Wang Ming. This was an important document as it was one of the more comprehensive statements of Mao's over-all strategy in the war against Japan. 76 Many of the wartime policies of the CCP, later elaborated into specific programs, could be seen in an inchoate form. As a document which was intended to set Mao off from Wang Ming, it also foreshadowed some of Mao's later indictments of Wang Ming. 77 It would be an error to characterize the Wayaopao Resolution as representing any leaning to the right. T h e idea of "united front" appeared for the first time. It was the Party's policy from then on. A t the same time, the Resolution reaffirmed the militant revolutionary line of the Party, not for a distant future but parallel with the united front. T h e Resolution was marked distinctly by the sense that China was on the eve of an upheaval. Japan's relentless advances had been generating and damming up an enormous reaction in China. T h e reaction "grew automatically" or spontaneously. It was the political task of the Party to act on it for its own revolutionary end. T h e current political situation has already caused o n e f u n d a m e n t a l c h a n g e a n d m a r k e d off a n e w era in the history of the C h i n e s e r e v o l u t i o n ; it manifests itself in the transformation of C h i n a by the J a p a n e s e imperialism i n t o a colony, i n the p r e p a r a t i o n a n d entry of the C h i n e s e r e v o l u t i o n into a great r e v o l u t i o n of n a t i o n w i d e character, a n d in the fact that the w o r l d is o n the eve of r e v o l u t i o n a n d w a r . 7 8

If Wang Ming's lectures from Moscow were full of circumlocutions, a kind of double talk which insured the social engineers against mistakes in judgment, so was this Resolution. Thus, while affirming the coming of a precipitous and nationwide (i.e., "even") "revolutionary high tide," it also warned against the possibility that the revolution might be "protracted" and "uneven." Mao appeared to be conceding Wang Ming's point without giving up his own. 76 Mao Tse-tung-chi, V, 19-40. 77 See the warning against "closed doorism" which turns Marxism and Stalinism into "dead dogma," ibid., p. 36. 78 Ibid., p. 19.

TWO

THEORIES

OF REVOLUTION

gl

As for the enemy of the revolution, the Resolution disagreed with W a n g Ming that it was primarily Japanese imperialism. " T h e main enemy of the moment is the Japanese imperialism and the ringleader of the traitors, Chiang Kai-shek," it stated. 79 T h e n it went on, The Party should call upon all the people who oppose Japan to struggle in protecting their bases. It should call upon these people to oppose the traitors in their attempt to harass the rear of the war against Japan and . . . obstruct the path of the Red Army's march. To join together the civil war in China with national war is the basic principle of the Party in guiding the revolutionary war.80 T h e last sentence may be regarded as the keynote of this Resolution. Here was the germ of the idea elaborated later that neither the war against the Kuomintang nor against J a p a n could be waged separately from, and independently of, the other. Hence, the R e d Army and the soviets were to brook no opposition to their growth. T h e Party affirmed that "the workers and peasants were still the basic motive force of the Chinese r e v o l u t i o n . " 8 1 B u t the point of the Resolution was to enable growth of the revolution within the framework of the united front against Japan, that is, by exploiting Japan's menace. " T h e relationship between each class, each political party, and each armed force in the Chinese political life has changed anew and is presently changing." 8 2 T h e new united front would include all those who were opposed to both J a p a n and Chiang Kai-shek. For this purpose, the Party made two concessions to those who were to the right of itself. T h e Soviet Workers' and Peasants' Republic was henceforth renamed the Soviet People's Republic. 8 3 In addition to the workers and peasants—the "basic motive force" of the revolution— the new republic was to include the vast masses of petty bourgeoisie and revolutionary intellectuals as "reliable allies." 8 4 T h e Resolution announced a change in the Party's policy toward the rich peasants in line with W a n g Ming's proposal. 8 5 T r e a t m e n t of the landlord class was not specifically dealt with, as though continuation of the standing policy toward it was a matter of course. A section of the national bourgeoisie was definitely in the united front. So were the warlords loosely aligned with Chiang Kaishek and the officers and men of the W h i t e army. T h e Party re79 Ibid., p. 24.

80 Ibid., p. 34. Emphasis added.

81 Ibid., p. 25.

82 Ibid., p. 24.

83 Ibid., p. 29.

84 Ibid., p. 25.

85 Ibid., p. 30. Henceforward their land was not to be confiscated regardless of whether they tilled it themselves or rented it out. W h e n a village carried out an equal distribution of land, the rich peasants were entitled to the same grade of land as the poor and the middle peasants, though an additional order of the Soviet Government prohibited the participation of the rich peasants in the R e d Army and

in elections, ibid., p. 14.

RESISTANCE

32

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REVOLUTION

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affirmed its offer of truce on condition that they unite with the R e d Array in the struggle against both Japan and Chiang Kai-shek. T h e united front, according to the Resolution, was hence a united front "from below and from above." 86 A l l this, in the Party's jargon, sounded rather bland. Underneath, a heated debate was going on in downright practical terms. W h e n M a o asserted at Wayaopao that simultaneous war and revolution were his goal, he was in effect saying that under certain circumstances the C C P could force the Kuomintang government into a war against its will. T h e n the C C P could carry on the revolution with impunity. T h a t is to say, the C C P could start a local war with the Japanese A r m y and force the rest of the nation into a total war, thus creating a " u n i t y " of sorts. W a n g M i n g was in agreement with Mao that a total war was one thing that was needed. But he seems to have insisted that, unless the C C P curtailed its revolutionary policy, the Kuomintang government would be determined more than ever to adhere to its policy of "unification first." He felt that the Kuomintang's participation was a precondition for a total war. T h u s , the issue was whether a war was necessary to create a "unity" (Mao) or whether a unity was a precondition for waging a total war (Wang Ming). M a o hinted at his formula for combining the revolution and resistance in his interview with Edgar Snow in July, 1936. Mao affirmed that the national united front was the condition for defeating Japan. T h e n questions and answers followed: Question: W o u l d the R e d Army agree not to move its troops into or against any areas occupied by Kuomintang armies, except with the consent or at the order of the supreme war council? Answer: Yes. Certainly we will not move our troops into any areas occupied by and-Japanese armies—nor have we done so for some time past. T h e R e d Army would not utilize any war-time situation in an opportunistic way. 8 7

M a o was thus promising that the R e d Army would not move into an area unless it was occupied by the Japanese Army. T h e Japanese A r m y would stand between the R e d Army and the Kuomintang forces. Later events would show that Mao made this promise in good faith so far as the geographical area of the R e d Army's occupation was concerned. Mao went on: Besides the regular Chinese troops we should create, direct, and politically and militarily equip great numbers of partisan and guerrilla

detachments

among the peasantry. W h a t has been accomplished by the anti-Japanese vol86 Ibid,., p. 24.

87 Red Star Over

China,

p. 103.

TWO

THEORIES

OF

REVOLUTION

33

unteer units of this type in Manchuria is only a very minor demonstration of the latent power of resistance that can be mobilized from the revolutionary peasantry of all China . . . ,88 T h e volunteer units in Manchuria had been coming under the C C P ' s direction since 1933. T o build such units on an immense scale and operate them behind the advancing Japanese forces—this was how the revolution and resistance were to be combined. Judging from the CCP's activities in 1936, one can discern two alternatives that Mao had in mind for initiating war. First, the Communist forces could take the initiative and provoke the Japanese forces in north China or Inner Mongolia. Second, the C C P could enlist disgruntled warlord forces in a regional united front to initiate war. In the spring the C C P started working on both plans. One failed, the other nearly succeeded.* A careful reading of Mao's definition of the "united front from below and above" at Wayaopao suggests that the regional forces only loosely affiliated with Nanking were the upper ceiling among his allies. Mao had in mind such regional power holders at Y e n Hsi-shan, Chang Hstieh-liang, Y a n g Hu-ch'eng, L i Tsung-jen, and Sung Cheyiian. As soon as the CCP's Center settled in northern Shensi, it started acting directly on all of their forces except perhaps L i Tsungjen's. I will touch briefly on the C C P ' s dealings with Yen Hsi-shan in Chapter IV. T h e Northeastern Army of C h a n g Hsiieh-liang, which had been dislodged from Manchuria by the Japanese and used by Nanking against the Communists in northern Shensi, was the first object of the R e d Army's attempt at "distintegration" (wa-chieh). T h e effort began typically with an appeal in January to the "officers and men" of the Northeastern Army. 8 9 In March a division of this force was surrounded, disarmed, and released unharmed by the R e d A r m y after being given agitation-propagada on the need to unite against Japan and Chiang Kai-shek. 90 After this an effective ceasefire * T h e Annals of diplomacy are full of examples in which a lesser partner in an alliance drags its major ally into an armed conflict, usually restorationist in aim, against the latter's will. Since the time of the Eisenhower administration, Washington has lived in fear that the governments of South Korea or T a i w a n may start a war of reunification. T h e Arab-Israeli conflict is another instance of such a threat. Note the parallel between the Palestinian guerrilla organizations, the Arab states, and Israel on the one hand and the C C P , the Kuomintang government, and Japan on the other. 88 Ibid., p. 105. 89 Ho Kan-chih, p. 300. 90 Hsi-an shih-pien chen-hsiang ti chui-shu [A recollection of the truth about the Sian Incident] (no date, no publisher listed) (BI). C h a n g Kuo-t'ao states that a regiment led by W a n g I was won over in January, in " W o ti hui-i," Ming Pao, No. 53, May, 1970, p. 89.

34

RESISTANCE

AND R E V O L U T I O N

IN

CHINA

was maintained between the two sides, apparently with the tacit approval of Chang Hsiieh-liang. Yang Hu-ch'eng was also in touch with the CCP by May. 91 In June, Ch'en Chi-t'ang, Pai Ch'ung-hsi, and Li Tsung-jen, the leaders of Kwangtung and Kwangsi cliques, hard pressed by the "centralization" policy of the Nanking government, revolted in the name of resistance to Japan. The CCP's resolution of June 13 noted that "the Southwestern War is not a pure warlord war but has some significance as a national revolution." 92 The Northern Bureau of the CCP was acting more directly on the forces under Sung Che-yuan, a follower of Feng Yii-hsiang, who had been named to head the Hopei-Chahar Political Commission to handle the tense and delicate liaison between Nanking and the Tientsin Garrison Army of Japan. Japanese military police noted with apprehension that Liu Shao-ch'i and the student groups led by him were frequenting some of Sung's forces garrisoned near Peiping. 93 By July 16, Feng Chih-an's division stationed in Fengt'ai near Lukouchiao (the Marco Polo Bridge) had its first confrontation with the Japanese forces.94 This division was in the immediate vicinity of Lukouchiao on July 7, 1937, when the fatal incident took place. Japanese observers had noted by then that Sung Che-yuan had lost control of his forces which were fired up with strong anti-Japanese senments.95 He was going the way of Chang Hsiieh-liang. Whether Moscow was informed of the details of the CCP's plans cannot be known. But Wang Ming was apparently concerned. Writing in early 1936, he said "the main weakness [of anti-imperialist united front] is that the bulk of the Kuomintang army is yet to be drawn into this all-people struggle and is to date still under the influence of the Kuomintang and the Nanking government . . . There is friction in the Kuomintang, but the friction has not led to a split in the Kuomintang." 96 He was pointing out that the intermediate groups in the Kuomintang army could not be won over except from the top down, i.e., with Chiang Kai-shek's support. By July of 1936, Wang Ming had articulated the terms of cooperation. T o reassure the skeptics on the left that the united front he was 91 Snow, Random Notes, p. 4. This was arranged with Wang Ming's knowledge, but he did not follow through with it. 92 Chugoku kyosanto 1936-nen shi, p. 236. 83 Teradaira Tadasuke, Nihon no higeki: Rokokyo jiken [Japan's tragedy: the Lukouchiao Incident] (Tokyo: Yomiuri shinbunsha, 1970), pp. 40-41, 46-47. 94 War History Office, The Defense Board, Daitoa senso kokan senshi, Vol. XVIII: Hokushi no chiansen [Pacification war in north China] (hereinafter cited as Pacification War) (Tokyo: Asagumo shinbunsha, 1968), No. 1, p. 9. 96 95 Nihon no higeki, pp. 353-355. Chugoku kyosanto 1936-nen shi, p. 139.

TWO

THEORIES

OF

35

REVOLUTION

proposing was "absolutely not a repetition of C h ' e n Tu-hsiu's opportunist mistake," he drew the f o l l o w i n g distinction for the second united front: " T h e C C P , the K u o m i n t a n g and other organizations to take p a r t in the anti-Japanese national united front w i l l all retain the plenary power to preserve their o w n ideology, their o w n political program, and their o w n organization." 97 T h u s W a n g Ming's idea of the " n a t i o n a l defense g o v e r n m e n t " was as follows: What should we do with those governments which exist in China at present? For example, the Chinese Soviet Government, the Nanking Central Government, and those governments which are nominally local governments but in fact disobey the central political power. T h e Chinese Communists' answer to this problem is: In order to turn the governments already formed into a truly all-China and truly defensible government, political power in the nation must be concentrated in the hands of one central government. We must eliminate the phenomena of disunity in Chinese politics and administration . . . . But suppose someone asks . . . are the Chinese Communists going to maintain the struggle for the Chinese Soviet Government? T h e Chinese Communists will answer . . . In principle as in ideology, we firmly believe that only by having the soviet can we save the entire Chinese people and entire mankind; . . . only by having a soviet can a weak and defenseless nation be changed into a strong and defensible nation . . . . 98 B u t in the spring of 1936, M a o was not given to such a devious line of thinking. H e must have k n o w n f r o m his experiences in Kiangsi that the K u o m i n t a n g w o u l d grant a de facto ceasefire only under one set of circumstances: a military conflict between C h i n a and Japan. So w h y w a i t passively for war? Between February and M a y the R e d A r m y invaded Shansi P r o v i n c e 9 9 — q u i t e possibly over objections from Moscow. 1 0 0 O n the face of it, it conformed to Mao's basic line in the W a y a o p a o Resolution. T h e C C P formally declared its bellicose intention i n manifestos. O n M a r c h i, it proclaimed, Whereas Japanese imperialism [commits] outrage in north China, no one stops [it]. Chiang Kai-shek, Yen Hsi-shan, Sung Che-yuan [put on] the appearance of slaves and [bend their] knees in servitude, sycophancy with foreigners having become their nature. Ruination of the whole country is imminent; 97 Wang Ming

hsiian-chi,

I, i2g.

88 Ibid.,

p. 141.

For the best account of the raid, see Chùgoku kyòsanto 1936-nen shi, pp. 3-55. 100 A recent Soviet publication blames the raid on Mao's ambition. K. V. Kykyshkin, "The Comintern and Anti-Japanese United Front in China," L. P. Delyusin, et al., eds., Comintern i Vostok [The Comintern and the East] (Moscow, 1969), cited in James P. Harrison, The Long March to Power, A History of the Chinese Communist Party, 1921-J2 (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973), p. 264. 99

36

RESISTANCE

AND REVOLUTION

IN

CHINA

the Chinese Soviet People's Republic . . . dispatches this army to go east and resist Japan. 101 T h e purpose of the expedition, according to the A p r i l manifesto, was to "engage in direct combat with Japan." 102 It denounced Chiang Kai-shek for sending the central forces to aid Y e n Hsi-shan, thus blocking the path of the R e d Army's march eastward while using C h a n g Hsiieh-liang and Y a n g Hu-ch'eng to disturb the Shensi-Kansu Soviet. Hatano Ken'ichi suspected that with the arrival of Mao's and Hsu Hai-tung's forces in the new soviet, food and other supplies were exhausted. T h e raid looked to him like a foraging. 103 T h e R e d Army took twenty-seven hsien, roughly one-third of the province, and carried out severe and bloody land confiscation and redistribution. T h e R e d A r m y had no trouble in routing Yen Hsi-shan's forces in battle after battle. But the nine divisions of the central forces commanded by Ch'en Ch'eng and Shang Chen were a different matter. T h e R e d Army seemed to have been mauled seriously. L i u Chih-tan, w h o founded the Shensi Soviet, was killed in action. T h e Red Army retreated across the Yellow River in early May. 1 0 4 T h e r e was nothing which suggested that the C C P was not serious in its declared intention to "engage in direct combat with Japan." If obstructed, the Communists stood to gain a propaganda victory. If unobstructed, the Red Army could have moved into Chahar or eastern H o p e i and conducted hit-and-run raids on the Japanese garrisons. T h a t would have created a grave international crisis. T h e Japanese Army was likely to take a stern retaliatory measure against Nanking, as was the pattern in every incident. T h e Nanking government might try to win time by assuming responsibility for the act of the "bandits" and by making further concessions. T h e Umezu-Ho Ying-ch'in and Doihara-Ch'in Te-ch'un Agreements of June 1935, belonged to this class of events. 103 T h a t would have only inflamed public opinion more and pointed up the vulnerability of Nanking's position. W h a t the Shansi raid demonstrated was that the decision for war or peace still rested in T o k y o and Nanking rather than in Yenan or Moscow at this time and that as long as there was international iOl Mao Tse-tung-chi, V, 41. Ibid., p. 44. 103 Hatano, Gendai Shina, pp. 336-337. 104 Chugoku kyosanto 1936-nen shi, pp. 5-55. 105 Anti-Japanese terrorist activities prompted the Japanese government to impose these demands. By these agreements the Kuomintang was forced out of the area north of Paoting in Hopei, including Peiping and Tientsin as well as C h a h a r Province. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ed., Nihon gaiko nempyo narabi ni shuyo bunsho, 1840-1945 [Chronology of Japan's diplomacy and m a j o r documents, 18401945] (Tokyo: Hara shobo, 1965), pp. 293-295.

TWO THEORIES

OF R E V O L U T I O N

37

peace the Kuomintang government was capable of containing Chinese communism. It seemed that the miserable result of the Shansi raid induced the C C P to propose a ceasefire for a second time. On May 5, Mao and Chu Te, representing the soviet government and the Red Army respectively, issued the Circular telegram on ceasefire and peace negotiation to unite in resistance to Japan to the Military Commission of the Nanking government. 106 It made no mention of the united front. Outwardly, Mao seemed to concede Wang Ming's point, raised in February, that "it is utterly impossible to fight with Japan without waiting for the completion of the united popular front." 1 0 7 But serious differences remained between them. Ho Kan-chih states that with the ceasefire proposal of May the policy of "forcing Chiang to resist Japan" (pi-Chiang k'ang-Jih) was adopted. 108 T h e CCP's options were not simply for or against the united front with the Kuomintang. T h e initiative to choose between those options rested in Nanking, and it showed no interest in ceasefire or cooperation at this stage. According to Chiang Kai-shek, Chou En-lai and P'an Han-nien, the latter representing the Comintern, came to Shanghai shortly after May 5 for a peace talk. Conditions laid down by the Kuomintang amounted to a demand for total surrender by the Communists: 1. A b i d e by the T h r e e People's Principles. 2. O b e y Generalissimo C h i a n g Kai-shek's orders. 3. A b o l i s h t h e " R e d A r m y " a n d integrate it i n t o t h e N a t i o n a l Army. 4. A b r o g a t e t h e soviets a n d reorganize t h e m as local g o v e r n m e n t s . 1 0 9

Thus, even if full scale cooperation in the united front was the CCP's desired goal, a simple pledge of allegiance and show of sincerity on its part would not necessarily lead to that result. It had to maintain a high state of vigilance and military alertness while showing its willingness to cease hostility on a reciprocal basis. Above all, it had to exert public pressure to make the government's stance untenable. Thus the policy of "forcing Chiang to resist Japan" could be either an end in itself or a means to attain a fuller cooperation in 106 Mao Tse-tung-chi, V, 47-49. 107 Chugoku kyosanto 1936-nen shi, p. 146. 108 Ho Kan-chih, p. 302. Note, however, that on April 25, while the Red Army was still in Shansi, the Central Committee issued a proclamation proposing a "popular front" to the Kuomintang and other groups. Chung-Kung chung-yang wei ch'uang-li ch'iian-kuo k'e-tang k'e-p'ai ti k'ang-Jih jen-min chan-hsien hsilan-yen [Declaration of the CCP Central Committee for establishing anti-Japanese popular front among the nation's parties and groups], cited in Wang Chien-min, Chungkuo Kung-ch'an-tang, III, 55-56. 109 Soviet Russia in China, p. 73.

38

RESISTANCE

AND

REVOLUTION

IN

CHINA

"resist Japan along with Chiang" (lien-Chiang k'ang-Jih) or "support Chiang to resist Japan" (yung-Chiang k'ang-Jih). T h e differences between Mao and W a n g Ming seem to have been over the kind of pressure to be exerted on the Kuomintang government. It is interesting to note that both the Internationalists and Mao approved of the December Ninth Movement. 1 1 0 But it is doubtful that Mao seriously expected the Kuomintang to grant even a ceasefire unless its hands were forced by a "united front from below." T h i s was indicated by the circular telegram of July 11, The Declaration on behalf of the Departure of the Kwangtung-Kwangsi Forces for North to Resist Japan, signed by Mao and C h u T e . 1 1 1 Addressed to the forces of Li Tsung-jen and Ch'en Chi-t'ang, it was an open encouragement for rebellion in the two provinces in the name of resistance. Predictably, Moscow and W a n g Ming were dismayed by this revolt. 1 1 2 Let us now consider what was behind this residue of sectarianism in Mao. Since the Wayaopao meeting where Mao averred that "the people's republic stands in direct opposition to the jackals of imperialism, the landed gentry and the comprador class," there had been discussion in the C C P as to the class composition of the united front. T h e Wayaopao Resolution included the rich peasants and the petty bourgeoisie in the united front. It is my inference that the Internationalists considered the Kuomintang to be a party of the national bourgeoisie in order to enlist it in the united front. After all, it was so defined by the C C P before the rupture of the first united front. A major stumbling block between Mao and W a n g Ming seemed to be Mao's insistence that the Kuomintang was also a party of the landlord class. Mao was evidently opposed to abandoning the policy of confiscating and redistributing the property of the landlord class. T h i s was the motive power that energized the revolutionary peasant movement. Without it his machine in the rural areas would be without fuel. O n July 22, the Party issued the Directive concerning the Land Policy.113 T h e Directive renewed the standing order to confiscate all land and property of traitors. In addition, as though to clear up the confusion following the relaxation of the policy toward the rich peasants, it reconfirmed the order to confiscate land, grain, houses, and property of the landlord class. W h a t a landlord would be allowed to keep to meet his own needs for sustenance was left to the majority decision of the peasants in the area concerned. 110 Mao Tse-tung-cki,

V , 210.

111 Ibid., pp. 55-58. 112 Wang Ming ksuan-chi, X, 139; Van Slyke, p. 64. 113 Mao Tse-tung-chi, V, 63-65.

TWO

THEORIES

OF

REVOLUTION

39

Earlier in July, C h a n g Nai-ch'i a n d three other well-known leaders of the national salvation m o v e m e n t h a d published an open letter. T h e y straddled the positions taken by M a o a n d W a n g M i n g , though they leaned toward W a n g Ming's side. T h e y stated that "if a local authority dispatches an army to resist J a p a n under the conditions of opposition to the central government, it is b o u n d to fail." B u t they also said, " . . . resistance against J a p a n and national salvation is the most urgent enterprise . . . . W e can never agree to the policy of resistance w h i c h waits for the completion of mobilization of the entire country." 1 1 4 M a o wrote a reply to the f o u r leaders, stating, [the Red Army] is capable of conducting a lone operation against Japanese imperialists, and it will necessarily unite with all armies and the people of the whole nation in the course of a protracted resistance, thus achieving a victory in a coordinated war. Your opinion that "the final victory is attainable only on the basis of concentrating the energy of the whole nation . . ." is correct. But you are mistaken in holding that "real resistance against Japan cannot be initiated unless the energy of the whole nation is concentrated." It is possible to resist Japan with a partial force. 115 T h e letter by C h a n g Nai-ch'i, et al., further demanded that the R e d A r m y adopt a lenient policy toward the rich peasants, the landlords, a n d the merchants in its area of occupation. 1 1 6 I n his reply, M a o expressly acknowledged this point. H e explained the C C P ' s new policy toward the rich peasants a n d merchants but avoided any reference to the landlords. 1 1 7 Exactly one week later, the C C P issued its Directive Concerning the Land Policy. C h a n g Nai-ch'i wrote again shortly afterward and deplored the Party's decision, saying, In the letter written to the four of us recently, Mr. Mao Tse-tung made clear that he accepts our political program . . . . What needs to be pointed out is that their method is still revolutionary. Substantively there is considerable distance between this and the reformist method which we have proposed. It is impossible for us to demand that the program of the united front in China stipulate confiscation of the landlords' land through the insurrectionary method of the peasants. 118 B y the m i d d l e of 1936 anti-Japanese p u b l i c sentiment in the cities h a d reached flood proportions. It was independent of any "outside 114 "Shen Chiin-ju teng t'uan-chi yfi-wu ti chi-ke chi-pen t'iao-chien yu tsui-ti yao-ch'iu" [Some basic conditions and minimum demands of Shen Chiin-ju, et al., on unity and resistance], Kuo-Kung ho-tso, p. 61. u s Chugoku l i e Kuo-Kung

kyosanto 1936-nen shi, p. 416. ho-tso, p. 68.

117 Chugoku kyosanto 1936-nen shi, p. 418. 118 Ibid., pp. 434-435. W e cannot rule out the possibility that Chang Nai-ch'i had a close connection with W a n g Ming.

40

RESISTANCE

AND REVOLUTION

IN

CHINA

agitators"; hence it was exerted upon any group that stood in the way of national unity and resistance. Chang Nai-ch'i's letter shows that Mao, no less than Chiang Kai-shek, was under pressure. T h e CCP's Northern Bureau was evidently very sensitive to the demands of the intellectuals in the Peiping-Tientsin area with whom it was working closely. Shortly after the May Politburo conference, the Bureau advised the Party Center to adopt a policy more in tune with the nonparty masses. 119 In February, 1937, the C C P announced in its telegram to the T h i r d Plenum of the Kuomintang's Fourth Central Executive Committee (CEC) that confiscation of the property of the landlord class was to be discontinued as the CCP's concession to the united front. 1 2 0 However, the landlord class was never included in the second united front throughout its entire existence. M a o stated in May of 1937 that the C C P was "prepared to solve the land problem by legislative and other appropriate means." 1 2 1 What was meant by this remark will be shown in subsequent chapters. T h e C C P adhered to the policy of initiating a war first to create a " u n i t y " as of the end of J u l y 1936. By August, W a n g Ming's line evidently prevailed. On August 25, the Ceneral Committee issued a letter to the Kuomintang and urged it for the first time to join the united front. T h e C C P conceded that "the key to K u o m i n t a n g Communist cooperation is at present in the hands of your honorable party." 1 2 2 T h e letter also pledged the C C P to the goal of building a "Democratic Republic." 1 2 3 B y this act it renounced the title of "People's R e p u b l i c " for its government. T h i s made it possible to admit the national borgeoisie into the united front at the Politburo conference in September. 1 2 4 Simultaneously, the C C P began to show restraint. B y October 15, the R e d Army had been ordered to refrain from initiating any hostile action against the Kuomintang forces, and not to obstruct them in their movement if it was related to actions against the Japanese forces. 1 2 5 What accounts for this shift must be left to conjecture at present. It is possible that the C C P was influenced marginally by public pressure. In this respect the CCP's contacts with Chang Hsiieh-liang are of some importance. Ishikawa T a d a o suggests that Chang was truly a middleman between the Kuomintang and the C C P in the 119 Hatano Ken'ichi, Chugoku kyosanto 1937-nen shi [History of the Chinese

Communist Party, 1937] (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1938), p. 137. 120 Selected Works, I, 269. 121 Mao Tse-tung-chi, V, 199. 122 Ibid., p. 75.

123 Ibid., p. 72. Kung-fei huo-kuo, III, 357. 125 Mao Tse-tung-chi, V, 81-82.

TWO

THEORIES

OF

REVOLUTION

41

political spectrum at the time. 1 2 6 T h e C C P was negotiating w i t h h i m by early summer in order to enlist h i m in a regional united front in the northwest against C h i a n g Kai-shek and Japan. I n the course of this liaison, C h o u En-lai was persuaded to move one step closer to C h a n g Hsüeh-liang. C h a n g is said to have inquired of C h o u how serious the Communists were about resistance to Japan. U p o n hearing an affirmative answer, he i m p l o r e d the C C P delegation to accept the "support C h i a n g to resist J a p a n " line. C h o u En-lai settled for "resist J a p a n along w i t h C h i a n g . " 1 2 7 B u t by September, a m u c h greater force than the left-of-center public o p i n i o n was at work to b r i n g the K u o m i n t a n g and the C C P together. A c c o r d i n g to Izvestia, the Sino-Soviet negotiation that led to the nonaggression pact of August, 1937, h a d been underway "for more than a year" prior to it. 1 2 8 Since Soviet solicitation for rapprochement w i t h C h i n a h a d been l o n g standing, the initiative must have been taken by N a n k i n g . C h i a n g Kai-shek dates the b e g i n n i n g of pro-Soviet policy from October, w h e n he appointed T . F. T s i a n g the new ambassador to Moscow. 1 2 9 A s early as September 1, the C C P leadership was apprised of N a n k i n g ' s move toward an "alliance w i t h Russia." 1 3 0 In view of Japan's nervousness about such an alliance, the K u o m i n t a n g must have undertaken the negotiation w i t h f u l l awareness of its repercussion on Japan. I n fact, it seems logical to connect the b e g i n n i n g of the Sino-Soviet negotiation w i t h the visibly stiffened attitude of N a n k i n g toward Japan. I n September a series of discussions designed to adjust the Sino-Japanese relations were started between Chinese Foreign Minister C h a n g C h ' ü n and Japanese Ambassador K a w a g o e b u t the discussions made little headway. A n unmistakably hard anti-Japanese line came to the fore in N a n k i n g in early N o v e m b e r w h e n irregular Mongol forces, masterminded by the K u a n t u n g A r m y , invaded Suiyiian Province. T h e C h a n g - K a w a g o e talk d e a d l o c k e d 1 3 1 w h i l e C h i a n g 126 Chügoku kyosanto shi kenkyü [A study of Chinese Communist Party history] ( T o k y o : K e i o tsüshin, 1962), p p . 230-245.

127 Jbid., p. 239. Ishikawa quotes Miao Feng-hsia, Chang's adviser. 128 Charles B. McLane, p. 86. 129 Soviet Russia in China, p. 71. However, cultural exchanges with obvious political implications were revived in late 1935 under Sun Fo's leadership. See Chügoku kyosanto

igj6-nen

shi, p p . 261-270.

130 photostatic copy of Chou En-lai's letter to Ch'en Li-fu and Ch'en Kuo-fu, dated September 1, 1936, in this author's possession. 131 Hata Ikuhiko, Nitchü senso shi [History of the Sino-Japanese War] (Tokyo: Kawade shobo, 1961), pp. 101-104; Association of International Political Studies of Japan, ed., Taiheiyo senso e no michi [The road to the Pacific War], Vol. Ill: Nitchü senso [The Sino-Japanese War] (Tokyo: Asahi shinbunsha, 1962), No. 1, p p . 219-220.

RESISTANCE

43

AND R E V O L U T I O N

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CHINA

Kai-shek arrived in Taiyuan (Shansi) to direct the successful Chinese operation against the Mongols. In sum, the strong anti-Japanese line in Nanking, the improvement of Sino-Soviet relationship, and the softening of the CCP toward Nanking occurred almost simultaneously. There is some indication that Mao was on the defensive in the Party in August and September. 132 Probably considerable differences remained between him and Wang Ming over the means of bringing about the united front, primarily because the Kuomintang's attitude remained unchanged. T h e practical result of the CCP's August proposal was, therefore, a rather subtle one. By openly recognizing that war of resistance depended on the Kuomintang, the CCP seems to have conceded that Nanking could not be mechanically forced into war by means of local incidents. Rather, it seems, the emphasis shifted to political mobilization of the Kuomintang from within. This probably meant continued encouragement for the splinter groups such as Chang Hsüeh-liang and Yang Hu-ch'eng, insofar as they demanded war. T h e delicate nature of the CCP's stance—neither supporting the Kuomintang nor opposing it—can be seen in the CCP's resolution of September. It amounted to a tactical revision of the Wayaopao Resolution: I n order to concentrate the strength of the whole nation to resist the invasion of the J a p a n e s e bandits . . . we must put together still broader power of the people . . . .

T o propel

and

to take part

its armed

condition

forces

the Kuomintang,

the Nanking

in the anti-Japanese

government,

war is the

necessary

for carrying o u t a national, large-scale, and strenuous anti-Japanese

armed struggle. B u t this is absolutely n o t to neglect stringent criticism of and struggle against all the mistaken policies of the K u o m i n t a n g . . . .

T h e Cen-

ter must point out strongly: in struggle to realize the most extensive antiJ a p a n e s e united front the Communist Party must n o t only wage a strenuous struggle against the public and secret enemies of the united front but also maintain perfect freedom to criticize those pseudo a n t i - J a p a n e s e

elements

who agree in speech but drag their feet in practice. . . . But

important

thing

is to use all means

tiously a large-scale,

and exert

nationwide

all power

and true armed

so as to promote struggle

against

the most

expedi-

Japan.133

132 T h e resolution of the September Politburo conference expressly repudiated two points in the Wayaopao Resolution. See Chungkuo Kung-ch'an-tang kuan-yü k'ang-Jih chiu-wan yün-tung ti hsin-hsing-shih yü min-chu kung-ho-kuo ti chüeh-i [The CCP's decision concerning the new situation in the anti-Japanese salvation movement and the democratic republic], Kuo-Kung ho-tso, p. 46. T h e Wayaopao Resolution stated that in Party recruitment social background is not the main criterion and that carelessly administering blows on erring cadres should be stopped. Mao Tse-tung-chi, V, 38-39. 133 Kuo-Kung ho-tso, pp. 42-43. Emphasis added. For the full title of the resolution, see above, note 132.

TWO

THEORIES

OF

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43

War was the immediate goal. T h a t would force Nanking to seek domestic unity. But the united front would also stiffen its back and induce it to initiate the war. Therefore, it became the twin goals of the CCP to pursue k'ang-Jih ("resistance against Japan") and min-chu ("democracy"), a variation of anti-imperialist and anti-feudal struggle. Mao had moved one step closer to Wang Ming. From this point on, the idea of the united front with the Kuomintang as such was no longer an issue between them. Yet the collusion of the Red Army and the Northeastern and Northwestern Armies went on. On December 3, Chiang Kai-shek flew to Sian to push for the last bandit suppression or possibly a peaceful "abolition" of the Red Army. It is not necessary to go into the details of the Sian Incident here, as my purpose is to outline the different strategies advocated by Mao and Wang Ming. One major cause of the incident, however, needs to be borne in mind: In spite of his already stiff anti-Japanese attitude, Chiang's stand was still "unification first." This meant that the CCP was in need of some decisive leverage. Both Edgar Snow and Chang Kuo-t'ao report that Mao intended to put Chiang on a public trial and eliminate him. 134 Here was an opportunity beyond anyone's wildest dream. It is not surprising that the thought of destroying Chiang should have crossed Mao's mind. But it is not by any means certain that he actually demanded such a course of action. It was Mao's highest disideratum to force the Kuomintang into war. Execution of Chiang Kai-shek under the circumstances was likely to place the Nanking government in the hands of Wang Ching-wei and Ho Ying-ch'in, both pro-Japanese and anti-Communist. Hence, if the CCP could extract a promise of ceasefire from Chiang in captivity, it had all the more reason for working for his release. Still, in view of Mao's opposition to the united front with Chiang in the recent past, the news of the incident must have caused genuine consternation in Moscow. Stalin cabled the CCP on December 13, the day after Chiang's capture, countermanding any scheme to eliminate him. 135 On the fourteenth, the Soviet press began to condemn the incident categorically as a Japanese plot. 136 T h e Kuomintang, too, has scrupulously avoided blaming the Communists ever since. Chiang Kai-shek did agree to a ceasefire in Sian. What other agreement, if any, was reached is not known. Judging from subsequent 134 Snow, Random Notes, p. 1; " W o ti hui-i," Ming Pao, No. 55, July, 1970, p. 86. In plotting to kidnap Chiang Kai-shek, C h a n g seems to have had in mind a traditional remonstrance. See also Snow, Random. Notes, p. 6. 135 " W o ti hui-i," Ming Pao, no. 55, July, 1970, p. 87. 136 Charles B. McLane, p. 82.

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events, he seems to have agreed to a ceasefire pending further and fuller discussion of the terms of united resistance. H e left suddenly with C h a n g Hsueh-liang without making any public commitment. T h e C C P was left with nothing but what Chou En-lai called Chiang's "self-appointed heroism" to make good his promise. 137 O n that rested the CCP's line of domestic unity before resistance. It remained to be seen how the C C P would dodge the Kuomintang's terms of "cooperation" by delaying tactics until war commenced. In February 1937, the Kuomintang called the T h i r d Plenum of the Fourth C E C to "settle a large number of questions which arose out of the Sian affair." 138 Mao was apparently buoyed by this event, for it seemed as though public opinion would not permit Chiang to renew the civil war. H e professed to believe that "the stage of 'fighting for peace' was over" and that the new task of the Party was "fighting for democracy." 139 In order to commit Chiang Kai-shek to the united front, Mao was demanding that the C C P increase its public pressure. "However, some comrades argue," Mao complained in May, "that this view of ours is untenable . . . ." W h a t concerned Mao's opponents was the fact that the Japanese government had realized in early 1937 that its policy of confrontation in north China was too risky. "Japan is retreating," said Mao's opponents, "and N a n k i n g is wavering more than ever; the contradiction between the two countries is becoming weaker and the contradiction within the country is growing sharper." 140 T h e y further maintained that " to put the emphasis on democracy is wrong . . . . T h e majority of the people want only resistance . . . ." 1 4 1 In rebuttal, Mao articulated his conception of the relationship between "anti-imperialist" and "anti-feudal" struggle: As the contradiction between China and Japan has become the principal one and China's internal contradictions have dropped into a secondary and subordinate place, changes have occurred in China's international relations and internal class relations . . . M 2 T h u s Mao conceded the point that W a n g M i n g had been raising against him. But he continued to clash with his opponents over the question, T o what extent should the united front with the Kuomintang be exploited for the CCP's own purposes? In order to see what was at issue, we must know the content of 137 " W o ti hui-i," Ming Pao, N o . 56, A u g u s t , 1970, p . 87. 138 Hollington K. T o n g . , II, 491. 139 Selected 1 4 0 Ibid.

Works, I, 285.

141 Ibid., p . 288. 142 Ibid., p . 263.

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"democracy" which Mao was championing. Apparently in response to the Kuomintang's demand for "abrogation" of the soviets, the C C P in August of 1936 proposed the slogan of "Democratic Republic." As far as the soviets were concerned, the new appelation meant no change in substance, according to Ho Kan-chih. 143 But the slogan did not apply exclusively to the Communist government any longer. It was a goal to be attained across the entire nation in the course of the resistance and within the framework of the united front. Hence, the content of "democracy" to which Mao's opponents took exception was identical in substance with the "Democratic Republic" he was seeking to establish. Many of Mao's comrades are said to have raised questions concerning it. 144 " T h e class character" of the democratic republic," said Mao, is based on the union of several classes, and in the future it can develop in the direction of non-capitalism. O u r democratic republic is to be established under the leadership of the proletariat; and it is to be established in the n e w international circumstances (the victory of socialism in the Soviet U n i o n a n d on the eve of the world revolution). T h e r e f o r e , though according to the social conditions it will not in general transcend the bourgeois state character, yet according to the concrete political conditions it ought to be a state based on the union of the workers, the peasants and the bourgeoisie. T h u s , regarding perspectives, although it still may face toward capitalism, it does have the possibility of robustly turning in the direction of non-capitalism, and the party of the Chinese proletariat should strive hard for the latter p r o s p e c t . 1 4 5

Mao fell just short of saying that the Chinese Communists would seek to establish socialism in the course of the war or at the end of it, but he also fell just short of expressly recognizing the current stage as bourgeois-democratic in nature. This formulation foreshadowed the concept of "New Democracy" he was to enunciate in 1940. In the remainder of this book, I will treat further development of Mao's thoughts on this point. But one thing was clear at the stage. For Mao, the task of the C C P was to create a "Democratic Republic." T h i s meant that the C C P would struggle with the Kuomintang for leadership over the united front. 1 4 6 Fundamentally Mao's position had remained the same since Wayao143 He states that "the two slogans, 'for a people's republic' and 'for a democratic republic,' meant essentially the same thing despite the differences in wording," p. 303. 144 Selected. Works, I, 275. 145 Mao Tse-tung-chi, V , 203. 146 For taking this stand, Mao appears to have been accused of being a Trotskyite. See his defense of the tenuous distinction between the theory of permanent revolution and the "theory of the transition of the revolution," in Mao Tes-tung-chi, V , 214.

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pao. He was trying to use the united front as a shield to protect the interest of the revolution during its growth into socialism. Consternation among Mao's opponents was justified. However, it cannot be said that Mao's position on the united front with the Kuomintang was in essence more opportunistic than that of his opponents. His position amounted to a sweepingly logical resolution of the problem which was posed by no other than Wang Ming himself when he proposed the united front. T h a t problem was how to reconcile friendship with hostility; unity with struggle; and revolution with counter-revolution. If Mao's position was difficult to maintain, so was that of his opponents. Their difficulties stemmed from the fact that neither unity nor struggle alone would suffice to preserve the united front and therewith the CCP. Hence, their consensus on the need for the united front with the Kuomintang did not eliminate internal disagreement. For instance, Wang Ming offered a practical rule for dealing with the Kuomintang. It was intended to minimize the Kuomintang's anxiety and suspicion as to the Communists' intention and to reduce friction in the united front. Speaking of the popular front in Europe as an example in July 1936, he upheld the French slogan, "Everything for the popular front." 147 T o preserve the united front the C C P was to clear its decisions and policies with the Kuomintang government. Unless a prior consent was forthcoming, the C C P was to refrain from acting. While insisting on the CCP's independence, Wang was admitting that the united front would not function without Nanking's support. Mao ridiculed the "French" or the "Spanish method." 1 4 8 T h e slogan, "everything through the united front," became a slur and a weapon against the Internationalists later. T h e process of the development of the united front, especially the resolution of the Sian Incident, was inconclusive in vindicating the correctness of Mao's line or Wang Ming's. Hence, both of them remained convinced of their respective positions. In December 1936, Mao delivered one of the longest lectures of which we have record to the Red Army College in Yennan. Entitled "Strategic Problems in China's Revolutionary War," it was "the result of one great controversy which indicated the views of one line in opposing another and is also useful for the current war against Japan," according to its author. 149 T h e lecture reviewed in detail all the battles involved in the five encirclement campaigns in Kiangsi and drew generalizations from 147 Wang Ming hsuan-chi, I, 148. 148 Kao ch'iian-tang t'ung-chih shu [A letter to the comrades of the entire Party] (April 14, 1937), Kuo-Kung ko-tso, p. 98. 149 Mao Tse-tung-chi, V, 83.

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them. It affirmed the major assumption underlying the T s u n y i Resolutions: victory or defeat of the revolution in China depends primarily on armed struggle. T h i s was Mao's message to the officers of the college as well as to his critics. T h e Fukien Incident, the symbol of the united front, was mentioned just once in passing. 150 In July and August of the following year, amid the initial turmoil of the war, two more lectures of higher theoretical abstraction were delivered. Entitled " O n Practice" and " O n Contradiction" respectively, they were directed against "doctrinarism" and "empiricism" but especially the former. T h e criticism of "doctrinarism" was but a forerunner of Mao's later criticism of W a n g M i n g during the Rectification Campaign. T h e central thesis of " O n Contradiction" was the postulate: two aspects of a contradiction are at once in struggle with, and identical with, each other because they transform themselves into each other. It was a theoretical justification of the C C P ' s doubleedged policy toward the Kuomintang in the united front. H e drew out the logic which was only hesitantly advanced by W a n g M i n g earlier. From then on the united front as simultaneous unity and struggle became a maxim for Mao. I have outlined the internal disputes in the C C P in 1935 and 1936. In the course of the disputes, two distinct strategies of revolution were articulated. One placed its reliance on the forces generated in urban areas, on anti-imperialist struggle, and on cooperation with the party of urban middle class. T h e other insisted that the Party's line of civil war period was essentially correct. It put its major reliance on peasant revolution and the R e d Army. For Mao, the united front with the Kuomintang was but a tactical retreat for carrying the rural revolution forward by legal and public means. T h e CCP's strategy in the war against Japan was a synthesis of the two. T h e y did not sit well with one another, but neither alone could have sufficed to lead the C C P to its victory. 150 T h i s is the only reference to the Fukien Incident in all of Mao's Works.

Selected

Ill FROM T H E L U K O U C H I A O INCIDENT T O THE SIXTH PLENUM

On the night of July 7, 1937, two companies of Japanese infantry troops—part of the force that was stationed in north China in accordance with the Boxer Protocol—were engaged in a routine maneuver along the bank of the Yungting River in the western suburb of Peiping. A t 10:40 P.M. and again later, they were fired upon from some unknown source. A defensive reaction invited reaction. Less than a month later, China and Japan were at war. Focusing attention exclusively on the Chinese Communists and looking at events from their standpoint, one might be led to believe that they alone retained the initiative, while the other parties were pushed along by events to move on a trajectory which insured the CCP's success. But this was definitely not the case. T h e initiative continued to rest for a long time in the Kuomintang government and Tokyo. T h e margin of maneuverability for the CCP was very small. T h e united front remained fragile after the commencement of hostilities because the continuation of the war itself was far from certain. For the CCP to adopt a double-edged policy of carrying on "anti-feudal" struggle within the united front was risky. T h e dispute as to how much revolution was compatible with the resistance continued in the Party as long as there was the possibility of peace between China and Japan. In this chapter I will trace the outline of that dispute and its provisional settlement at the Sixth Plenum. Marxist theory imputes the quality of necessity to revolutions in modern times. T h e Chinese Communists make no exception of their case. If this judgment had a semblance of validity, it is pertinent to ask, T o what aspect of the revolution could this quality be plausibly 48

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ascribed? In 1936 and 1937 it would have taken a wholly sanguine temperament to prophesy that peasant revolution would inevitably triumph. What did seem unavoidable was a collision between China and Japan. T h e judgment that it was inevitable seemed well nigh unassailable from the time of the Far Eastern Military Tribunal. It assumes that the Nanking government had pursued consistently a policy of appeasement toward Japan between the Mukden Incident and the "China Incident." Thus, the cause of the war is sought in factors internal to Japan, namely, its alleged policy of deliberate and unremitting expansion into north China. Recent research shows, however, that the latter assumption is questionable. 1 I cannot of course hope to settle the question of what caused the war, nor to exonerate Japan's part in it. Still, to bring to light Mao's strategy of "forcing Chiang to resist Japan" is necessarily to reopen the possibility that the war resulted from an interaction of several complex factors—including those internal to China itself. It also implies that the war—on which peasant revolution so utterly depended—was a contingent event rather than a foregone conclusion. Japan's major interest on the continent was to husband Manchuria. It could not and would not relinquish Manchuria, from which it had expelled Chinese and Russian powers at the cost of two wars. It was willing to incur the resentment of the Anglo-American powers and to withdraw from the League of Nations, if necessary, to keep its hegemony there. In the 1930s the major threat to Manchuria was posed by the Soviet forces. North China was the rear of Japan's defense against this threat. As the Kuomintang's national unification proceeded, the Kuantung Army became preoccupied with the question of how to neutralize China in the event of a conflict with Russia. Incursions into north China started when the Kuantung Army found it difficult to control the anti-Japanese guerrillas—as yet only remotely connected with the CCP—operating in the stretch of areas from Jehol to Liaotung Peninsula. T h e Kuantung Army saw that Nanking's refusal to recognize Manchukuo's independence was ultimately responsible for local instability. A desire to deprive the guerrillas of the sanctuary in Jehol and beyond the Great Wall to the south led to the creation of a demilitarized zone in 1933 (the T'angku Agreement). With eating came appetite, defined vaguely in pan-Asian terms, and by 1935 the Japanese government openly pursued the policy of excluding the Kuomintang government from north China by fostering "au1 James B. Crowley, Japan's Quest for Autonomy: National Security Policy, (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, ig66).

and

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MAP I. T h e Frozen Battleline: T h e China Expeditionary Forces in late 1939

MAP

2. Co-habitation of the Communists and the Japanese: An overview of the Communist bases during the war

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tonomy" based on collaboration of warlord regimes. In June two local agreements between the Japanese Army and the Chinese authority forced the Kuomintang's influence out of Hopei and Chahar Provinces.2 Still, Nanking leaned over backward to avoid direct confrontation, and in September, Chiang Kai-shek proposed de facto recognition of Manchukuo in exchange for Japan's support of the Kuomintang in north China. 3 But Japan persisted in its anachronistic scheme, and some time in the summer and fall of 1936 its policy seems to have pushed Nanking over the brink. Having invited a situation quite adverse to its basic interest, Japan belatedly decided to reverse itself. In April, 1937, the Hayashi cabinet abandoned the policy of detaching north China.4 Yin Ju-keng's Eastern Hopei Autonomous Government was to be liquidated. 5 I have already shown how the Communist leaders concerned themselves with this retreat. Thus the outbreak of the war cannot be explained solely in terms of Japanese actions. Who fired the mysterious shots at Lukouchiao will perhaps never be known. I can think of at least two groups which might have been involved in the provocation, the Chinese Communists and the disgruntled Chinese puppet officials. But the question of "outside agitators" is irrelevant to urban nationalism. Much more important was the question of whether the Nanking government was in control of militant public opinion or was controlled by it. On July 11 a local truce was established between the Tientsin Garrison Army and Sung Che-yiian's forces. ". . . but the public pronouncements of the generalissimo, as well as his veto of the local settlement," states James Crowley, "eventually yielded a major crisis which vindicated his prognosis of subsequent Japanese demands." 6 By July 27, the Konoe cabinet was demanding a "fundamental solution of the Sino-Japanese relations" involving de facto recognition of Manchukuo, an anti-Comintern pact, and the creation of a demilitarized zone in the Peiping-Tientsin area.7 Yet only three divisions were dispatched to north China with the intention of confining the hostility to this area. The Operations Division of the Army General Staff in Tokyo was simply unwilling to be drawn away from Soviet threat.8 Thus, when the Chinese government advanced more than 50,000 troops to Shanghai against 4,000 Japanese marines there on August 13, Tokyo was caught off guard. 8 2 See above, note 105, chap. II. Hata Ikuhiko, p. 135. 6 3 Crowley, p. 227. Crowley, p. 340. 7 * Imperial Army General Staff, No. 1, pp. 422-423. Ibid., pp. 340-347. 8 See the role of Colonel Ishiwara Kanji, the head of the Operations Division, in the debate in Tokyo, in Imperial Army General Staff, No. 1, pp. 430-456.

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It was speculated that China was spreading the fire to the lower Yangtze valley, the hub of British colonial interest, to invite AngloAmerican intervention on its behalf. 9 Chinese leaders also appear to have been unduly optimistic about the efficacy of the German-trained Chinese divisions. T h e fateful war was on. Yet it seems reasonable to suggest that there was an even chance for a modus vivendi on the basis of Kuomintang control of north China and Japanese control of Manchuria before the Lukouchiao Incident. Furthermore, several attempts were to be made, both in China and Japan, to return to that formula in search of peace. T h e realization of uneasy domestic peace after the Sian Incident enabled the C C P to use a wider assortment of means to hasten the coming of war, including steps to assure the Kuomintang of its loyalty. Chou En-lai handled the extremely tense negotiation with Chang Chung, a member of the Kuomintang's Central Executive Committee. Nanking still adhered to it searlier demand for surrender by the Communists. Precisely what it was that the C C P agreed to is not certain. Chang Kuo-t'ao states that the Kuomintang allowed only yes-or-no answers to its terms and that the C C P Center instructed Chou En-lai to accept them in spite of the fear that, unless war commenced soon, the Communists would be forced to live up to them. 10 When the secret agreement was reached, I infer, the Kuomintang instructed the CCP to issue a public statement asking for peace. T h e Kuomintang, according to this plan, would then respond by offering its terms. On February 10, the C C P issued its statement addressed to the T h i r d Plenum of the Kuomintang's Central Executive Committee; but the CCP's terms were at variance with the Kuomintang's. T h e C C P promised that: (1) T h e policy of armed insurrection to overthrow the National Government will be discontinued throughout the country; (2) T h e Workers' and Peasants' Democratic Government will be renamed the Government of the Special Region of the Republic of China and the R e d A r m y will be redesignated as part of the National Revolutionary Army, and they will come under the direction of the Central Government in N a n k i n g and its Military Council respectively; (3) a thoroughly democratic system based on universal suffrage will be put into effect in the areas under the Government of the Special Region; and (4) the policy of confiscating the land of the landlords will be discontinued

9

Crowley, p. 347. 10 " W o ti hui-i," Ming Pao, No. 57, September, 1970, p. 96. Chiang Kai-shek also states that his terms were accepted prior to the Lukouchiao Incident, in Soviet Russia in China, p. 73.

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and the common programme of the anti-Japanese national united front resolutely carried o u t . 1 1

T h e crux of this statement was that the CCP did not promise anything more than redesignation of the Red Army, renaming of the soviets, and discontinuation of confiscation. Moreover, the CCP was united on these points. Wang Ming railed at the "harsh demands" of the Kuomintang and opposed "bodily disintegration" of the Red Army during the negotiation. 12 T h e Kuomintang's conditions were formally announced in The Resolution Concerning the Complete Eradication of Red Menace passed by the Third Plenum on Febraury 21. T h e Resolution demanded "thorough liquidation of the so-called 'Red Army' " ; a similar liquidation of the soviet governments; cessation of Communist propaganda; and cessation of class struggle. 13 Most writers take this Resolution to be a subterfuge to conceal the fact that Nanking was granting a ceasefire to the CCP. But it must be pointed out, in the light of subsequent events, that the Kuomintang was serious in its declared intention to "eradicate Red menace." T h e Resolution simply signified that Nanking was willing to forego military means for the time being to attain this end. Therefore the Third Plenum can be regarded as the major turning point in the Kuomintang's strategy. It was here that the Kuomintang switched from the strategy of "unfication first" to one which sought unification within the framework of resistance —an exact counterpart of the CCP's strategy. T h e CCP's position was precarious, and only a full scale war could have given it a respite. Whether the CCP played a part in triggering the fighting cannot be known; but it was obviously more than a mere bystander. T h e conference of the Party delegates in May —at which Mao was rebuked by his critics for his radicalism—was the occasion on which the CCP placed itself on war footing. From this conference, Party organizers were dispatched to many parts of north China in anticipation of war. 14 On the night of July 7 the initial shooting took place at 10:40 P.M.; Tokyo did not receive a rather routine report until early the next morning. 15 T h e situation was uncertain and murky, since it resembled several other instances of attack on Japanese citizens and troops that had preceded it. But the CCP reH Selected Works, I, 281-282. 12 " T h e key to the salvation of the Chinese nation," Chügoku kyösantö lyjj-nen shi, pp. 92-1 ig. In this criticism of the Kuomintang's Third Plenum, Wang Ming vows that the Red Army will keep all offices of political workers and that the soviet will retain its soviet character, ibid., pp. 107-108. 13 Wang Chien-min, III, 103-105. 14 See below, p. 91. 15 Imperial Army General Staff, No. 1, p. 429.

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acted with surprising swiftness. On July 8 the Central Committee issued a circular telegram urging armed resistance.16 Following the local truce of July 11, tense confrontation continued between Sung Che-yiian's 29th Army and the Japanese forces. For several nights both sides complained that the other side was firing at night in violation of truce. On the night of July 22, Japanese military police entered the no man's land lying between the two sides and arrested a band of Chinese students who were firing guns into the air. They confessed that they were working under Liu Shao-ch'i's direction. 17 The CCP forwarded a declaration on the united front to the Kuomintang on July 15 with the expectation that Chiang Kai-shek would make it public at his discretion with a parallel declaration of his own. But Chiang-Kai-shek kept the declaration in abeyance for more than two months thereafter. 18 On August 21, one week after the fighting spread to Shanghai, he signed a nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union. By an accompanying agreement, the Soviet Union promised a credit of 100 million yuan (some US$30 million). 19 On the following day, Nanking announced the appointment of Chu T e and P'eng Tehuai as the supreme and vice commanders respectively of the 18th Group Army, to be made up of former Red Army forces. The 18th Group Army or the Eighth Route Army, as the Communists preferred to call it, was assigned to the Second War Zone in northern Shansi Province under Yen Hsi-shan's command. The timing of this announcement suggested Russian involvement in the united front, but what was agreed upon, if anything, remains unknown. At last, on September 22, the Kuomintang made public the CCP's declaration. The four-point pledge made by the CCP on this occasion is identical with those points in the February 10 statement with respect to the status of the Communist army and government. But the CCP made some additional concessions: it dropped its earlier demand for a "common program" and pledged its support for Sun Yat-sen's Three People's Principles.20 On September 23 Chiang Kai-shek reciprocated with his own message commending the Communist party 16 Chungkuo Kung-ch'an-tang wei Jih-chiin chin-kung Lukouch'iao t'ung-tien [Circular telegram of the CCP on Japanese attack on Lukouchiao] Kuo-Kung ho-tso, pp. 102-103. iTTeradaira, Nihon no higeki, pp. 282-287; Imperial Army General Staff, No. 1, p. 446. 18 Selected Works, I, 37. 19 Arthur N. Young, China and the Helping Hand, {Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 22. 20 Chung-Kung wei kung-pu Kuo-Kung ho-tso hsilan-yen [The CCP's declaration for the proclamation of Kuomintang-CCP cooperation], K'ang-Jih min-tsu t'ung-i chan-hsien chih-nan [Guide to the anti-Japanese national united front] (hereinafter cited as Guide) (Chieh-fang-she), II, 18-20.

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T h i s formalized the second united

T h e war and the united front were on. B u t the C C P leadership suffered from internal differences and did not have coherent policies for the resistance or the united front. Moscow was evidently concerned over the indirection of the C C P and smuggled W a n g M i n g back to Yenan in late 1 9 3 7 . 2 2 T h e dispute between him and M a o came to a climax shortly thereafter. T h e subjects of dispute in the Party were as follows: (1) T h e most generic question was the nature and purpose of the united front. W a s it to be primarily an anti-imperialist struggle based on the unity of all Chinese, transcending old partisan differences? Or was it to be a combination of anti-imperialist and anti-feudal struggles? (2) W a n g M i n g sought to convene the C C P ' s Seventh Party Congress early with a blessing from the Comintern. 2 3 T h i s Congress was to formally terminate the Party's line of the civil war period and to bring the C C P in line with the new popular front line of the Comintern. (3) T h e C C P demanded in its February 10 telegram that the Kuomintang and the C C P adopt a common program for the united front. T h i s raised two questions. First, there was a question as to whether the C C P should presume to be the full equal of the Kuomintang and propose such a thing at all. Second, if the Kuomintang were to rebuff the C C P , there remained a question as to what sort of public platform the C C P should adopt. Such a program amounted to a statement of the C C P ' s goals for the bourgeois-democratic stage of the revolution or an outline of the "Democratic R e p u b l i c " it vowed to build. In either case, this program would spell out a broad range of reforms for China, e.g., convocation of a national assembly to promulgate a new constitution, convening of a new parliamentary institution to replace the Kuomintang's "tutelage," the nature of the "national defense government," social and economic reforms, and the like. (4) Questions related to organizational form of the second united front. Even though the Cominterm stipulated at the Seventh Con21 Chiang Kai-shek, The Collected Wartime Messages of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, 193J-1945 (New York: T h e John Day Co., 1946), I, 42. See Chiang Kaishek's own understanding of the agreement, in Soviet Russia in China, p. 81. 22 All Russian flights in China had to have the government's permission, but this was one of the exceptions. Chang Kuo-t'ao puts the date of W a n g Ming's return as late December. " W o ti hui-i," Ming Pao, No. 61, January, 1971, p. 90. 23 T h a t the Comintern supported the convening of the Seventh C C P Congress is my own inference.

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gress that "right opportunism" which blurred the class line must be avoided, 24 specific questions seem to have been left open. T h e C C P had to decide whether its members should join the Kuomintang as individuals as during the first united front; whether, instead, the two parties should act as equals in a coalition; or whether the Communist party should infiltrate Kuomintang organizations. (5) T h e land program of the CCP during the resistance period. This was formally subsumed under the question of common program. Although some major decision had already been made by May, the CCP seems to have been still divided when the war began. T h e Kuomintang demanded, and the CCP agreed to, cessation of confiscation of the property of the landlord class. T h e seriousness of problems entailed by this agreement can hardly be overstressed. Could the CCP carry out peasant revolution without distributing land among the poor? Should the Communist forces subsist on the government's pay and not expand themselves? Because of its importance, I will deal with the land program in Chapters IV and VII. (6) Questions concerning the organization of the Communist forces, the Eighth Route Army in the north and the remnants of the Red Army in central China. T h e key question was, Should the Communist forces be integrated into the Kuomintang forces? (7) T h e question above was a part of larger issues having to do with the CCP's military strategy in the war. Different solutions to these issues affected two other major questions which were, however, never explicitly articulated on their own terms. One concerned the struggle for power between Mao Tse-tung and Wang Ming. With respect to the united front with the Kuomintang, formal differences between them disappeared during the Sian Incident. T h e essence of the contention from then on was the extent and manner in which the united front should be made to serve different visions of the Chinese revolution. T h e other question—bound up with the first one—concerned the latent differences between nationalism in the Chinese Communist movement and the interest of Soviet Russia. On August 25, the Politburo opened an important conference at Loch'uan in Shensi Province to lay down policy guidelines for the 24 Georgi Dimitrov, "Fa-hsi-ssu chu-i ti chin-kung ho Kung-ch'an-kuo-chi wei tsao-ch'eng kung-jen chieh-chi fan-tui fa-hsi-ssu chu-i ti t'ung-i erh tou-cheng ti j e n - w u " [Fascist aggression and the Communist International's struggle and task in uniting the proletariat against fascism] (Dimitrov's report to the Seventh Comintern Congress, passed on August 20), Mu-ch'ien hsing-shih ti fen-hsi [Analysis of the c u r r e n t situation] (no date, no publisher listed) (Hoover), p. 16. F o r a good study of t h e gradual shift in the Comintern's line in 1935, see Van Slyke, pp. 48-53.

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Party on the eve of the departure of the Eighth Route Army to the front. Military leaders such as P'eng Te-huai, Ho Lung, Liu Po-ch'eng and Lin Piao were present.25 Several major decisions—representing a compromise between Mao and his opponents—were made. T h e conference debated a common program for the united front. A ten point program appeared originally in Wang Ming's speech to the Comintern Congress and in the August First Declaration. It was his platform for the united front. On July 23, 1937, Mao had offered an Eight Point Program and contrasted it sharply with another set of measures, which he identified with the government of "the bureaucrats, compradors, gentry and landlords." 26 T h e Loch'uan conference adopted the Ten Point National Salvation Program (Shih-ta chiu-kuo kang-ling).27 A textual comparison of the three programs does not reveal any significant differences since they all consisted of abstract generalities. But internal differences over a common program remained. Mao apparently demanded a program for the united front as he defined it, i.e., one in which the CCP would exercise independent leadership. Wang Ming, I surmise, maintained on the contrary that a common program must be acceptable to the Kuomintang. T h e CCP's September 22 declaration, which received Chiang Kai-shek's compliments, dropped the earlier demand for a common program. Shortly after the convocation of the Kuomintang's Extraordinary National Congress (March 27-April 2, 1938), which adopted the Program of Resistance and Reconstruction, Wang Ming announced that he was prepared to accept the Kuomintang's program as the common program of the united front. Ch'in Pang-hsien and Chou En-lai concurred.28 T h e Loch'uan conference also debated the CCP's participation in the Kuomintang government, though a resolution was not issued until September 25.29 It forbade C C P members to take part in the government at any level so long as it remained a "one-party dictatorship" 25 " W o ti hui-i," Ming Pao, No. 58, October, 1970, p. 90. 26 "Policies, Measures and Perspectives for Resisting the Japanese Invasion," Selected Works, II, 13-20. It is possible that Mao was criticizing W a n g Ming by criticizing the Kuomintang. 27 "For the Mobilization o£ A l l the Nation's Forces f o r Victory in the W a r of Resistance," ibid., pp. 25-28. T h i s document was originally issued by the Propaganda Department of the CCP on August 15 as agitation-propaganda manual. See Guide, II, 11-17. A footnote in Selected Works, II, 23, states that Mao wrote it. B u t the document ends w i t h W a n g Ming's slogan, "independent, free, and happy China." See below, p. 80, for m y inference that this slogan was W a n g Ming's. 28 Ch'en Shao-yii, Ch'in Pang-hsien, Chou En-lai, "Wo-men tui-yu pao-wei W u h a n yu ti-san-ch'i k'ang-chan wen-t'i ti i-chien" [Our opinion concerning the defense of W u h a n and the third stage of resistance], Guide, V, 126. 28 Selected Works, II, 72-73.

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under the Kuomintang. Participation in a government which did not acknowledge the CCP's own program, it was feared, would undermine the Party's independence. There were two exceptions to this rule: Communists can participate in the local governments of certain particular regions such as the battle areas, where on the one hand the old rulers, unable to rule as before, are in the main willing to put into effect the proposals of the Communist Party and the Communist Party has obtained freedom of open activities, and on the other the present emergency has made Communist participation a necessity, in the opinion of both the people and the government. In areas occupied by the Japanese invaders, Communists should furthermore openly come forward as organizers of the political power of the anti-Japanese united front. 3 0

The other exception was participation in a popular assembly such as the National Political Council which the Kuomintang established shortly thereafter. Chang Wen-t'ien gave a keynote report with Mao's support and revived the thesis of the Wayaopao Resolution that the CCP should combine the resistance with the revolution. Chang Kuo-t'ao led the opposition by pointing out that such a policy was likely to compel the Kuomintang to join hands with Japan against the Communists. The report was withdrawn. It was revised by deleting all direct references to revolutionary effort. 31 As approved later the report stated that "a great danger lurks in the present state of resistance. The main reason for this danger is that the Kuomintang is still unwilling to arouse the whole people to take part in the war." 32 The report demanded that, in order to turn the war into a total national war, the CCP should mobilize the masses by assuming the leadership over the united front. The report was meant to be a theoretical justification for the solution of two urgent problems on hand. The order of battle for the Communist forces had just been issued by Nanking. 33 T h e three divisions of the Eighth Route Army—the 115th under Lin Piao, the 120th under Ho Lung, and the 129th under Liu Po-ch'eng—were to move out of the newly designated Shensi-Kansu-Nighsia Border Region to join Yen Hsi-han's command. The questions of their relationship to the Kuomintang's command and their conduct on the battlefield had to be decided. The Kuomintang still clung to the hope of integrating the Communist forces into its own. It proposed to attach its officers as cadres 30 Ibid., p. 73. 31 " W o ti hui-i," Ming Pao, No. 59, November, 1970, p. 86. 32 Resolution on the Present Situation and the Tasks of the Party, Selected Works, II, 70-71. 33 Soviet Russia in China, p. 83.

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of the Communist forces. In addition, it demanded the abolition of the system of political commissars and political department.34 Mao and Jen Pi-shih were reported to have opposed any compromise of the independence of the Communist forces.35 Chou En-lai and Chu T e were inclined to move closer to the Kuomintang's demand. Chang Went'ien worked out an internal compromise.38 The office of political commissar was abolished and the former commissars were re-appointed as deputies to the commanders of a unit or as directors of the political department. The political department was to keep its organization and function intact but was renamed the political training department.37 The Eighth Route Army was to refuse any Kuomintang officers, but a small staff was to be allowed to work in Yenan for liaison purposes.38 However, the changes in the system of political commissar and political department were undone by November, and these offices functioned as before. 39 T h e question of reorganization was actually subsidiary to the more fundamental issues concerning military strategy of the CCP in the war. The war situation as it confronted the Party leadership at the end of August, 1937, demanded answers to several urgent questions. What were Japan's intentions in China and elsewhere? Did Japan renounce the policy of localizing the war when it vowed to "chastise" the Chinese government in August? Was not the policy of "chastisement" still limited in its purpose? Was Tokyo secretly in touch with Nanking in an attempt to arrive at some political solution to the war? What were the chances of intervention or mediation by a third power? What was Japan's capability in military as well as in broader terms to back up its announced intentions? How did the Japanese forces compare with the Kuomintang forces with which the Red Army had had long experience? Were tactics sanctioned by the Party leadership for use against the latter equally adequate against the former? What should be the relationship of the Eighth Route Army to the Kuomintang's regular forces and other "friendly forces" on the battlefield? If the initial thrust of the Japanese invasion could be maintained, would the Kuomintang defense collapse or would it be able to hold out in the interior? What sort of strategy should it follow to stay in the war? Should the Eighth Route Army actively assist the other Chinese forces or should it follow an independent course? 34 Selected Works, II, 67. 35 Warren Kuo, " T h e Conference at Lochuan," Issues and Studies, October, 1968, p. 43. Kuo quotes Chen Jan, his informer, here. 36 Ibid., pp. 43-44; " W o ti hui-i," Ming Pao, No. 59, November, 1970, p. 85. 37 Selected Works, II, 67. 38 " W o ti hui-i," Ming Pao, No. 59, November, 1970, p. 86. 39 Selected Works, II, 67.

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Inasmuch as the role of the army loomed so large under the wartime conditions, these questions brought out all the political differences in the Politburo. T h e conference was wracked by a sharp clash of opinions and had to be adjourned for three days to recompose itself.40 It was reported in 1967 that the meeting "decided to adopt the strategy of independent guerrilla warfare in the mountains." 41 This was Mao's line. Extrapolating from later events, it can be assumed that Chu Te, P'eng Te-huai, and Liu Po-ch'eng, among the military leaders, sided with Chang Kuo-t'ao against Mao. 42 A military strategic dispute, comparable in significance to the one that took place at Tsunyi, was under way. Both Mao and his opponents produced a considerable amount of literature to develop and defend their respective positions taken at Loch'uan. T h e nature of the dispute will become clear in the light of subsequent events. As the Peiping-Tientsin area was cleared of the Chinese resistance, the Japanese forces, now beefed up to eight divisions and a mixed brigade, were placed under a new command, the North China Army Army under Terauchi Hisaichi. In early September, the Area Army began its advance southwestward toward Paoting to attack the Chinese forces led by Wan Fu-lin. Once unleashed, the Japanese forces did not stop until they took Taiyuan in early November. T h e Area Army moved in three prongs, the main force moving down the PeipingHankow railway, another force on its southern flank moving along the Tientsin-Pukow railway. A third, made up of the Fifth Division commanded by Lieutenant General Itagaki and a detachment of the Kuantung Army was to secure the northern flank across the Great Wall in Chahar. T h e Itagaki Division crossed the Wall around Nank'ou and began sweeping westward along the Wall toward Lingch'iu, where it was to cross the Wall again to enter Shansi Province. T h e pass was defended by the Shansi Army (Yen Hsi-shan's forces) led by its deputy commander Yang Ai-yiian.43 Lin Piao's 115th Division, along with Ho Lung's 120th and Liu Po-ch'eng's 129th Divisions, had crossed the Yellow River near T'ungkuan in early September and moved northeastward by the Tat'ung-P'uchow railway to join the Second War Zone's command. T h e 115th Division and the 17th Army 4° "Wo ti hui-i," Ming Pao, No. 59, November, 1970, p. 85. Li Hsin-kung, "Settle Accounts With Peng Teh-huai for His Heinous Crimes of Usurping Army Leadership and Opposing the Party," Peking Review, September 1, 1967, p. 13. 42 Ibid. This author accuses P'eng Te-huai of following the second Wang Ming line at the Loch'uan conference. 43 A very good study of the Battle of P'inghsingkuan, using Communist sources, is in Sydney Liu, " T h e Battle of P'inghsingkuan: A Significant Event in Lin Piao's Career," The China Mainland Review, December, 1966, pp. 161-173.

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0

oj^-^l

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o \

Kuanglirig L i n g c h ' iu

in

o Laiylian

V, » -jvFanshi Y enmenkuanO

o Hsiakuan .éhench'ihckkffù o \120D < ; H5D ^ ; S, Y ü aanp n p ' iingcnen ngchen i o p o u p i ng o.Wut' ai' \ ¿h'iiyang r ifi I \ ' Iii f \ ' » v \ )

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V Niangtzukuarr

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Shihchiachuang

TI

—»» Oct.-Nov. guerrilla dist.

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MAP 3. T h e 8th Route Army's Movements, September-November, 1937

of the Northeast Army led by Kao Kwei-chih were to take part in the campaign around Lingch'iu by taking flanking actions. Bitter fighting commenced when the Japanese 21st Brigade, composed of three infantry battalions, was surrounded by Yen Hsi-shan's forces, ten divisions strong, on September 22. Post-war Japanese accounts show that the Shansi Army fought courageously and nearly decimated the 21st Brigade before the Brigade was rescued by the

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main force a week later.44 The Shansi Army and the Communist forces appeared to have been poorly coordinated, however. Both Yang and Lin ignored the original plan and failed to send reinforcements to each other.45 Lin left the battle four days before Yang but not before he had laid a successful ambush independently on a unit of the 21st Brigade in a narrow gap near P'inghsingkuan. Two days before the ambush, Lin Piao spent a good deal of time by himself at the bivouac site writing up a report to be presented to the cadres of the division the following day. The report lasted for two hours. According to an eyewitness, Lin Piao said at the end, At present we want to have combat in this area, to give the beastly army a blow, to show the friendly forces [ours] cooperation, and to give our forces a tonic. . . . These several days I have been involved in a study to see what method will be required of this battle to win a complete victory, to capture several prisoners to send straight back to the rear, and to drum up sentiment for resistance and confidence in victory among the masses . . . . 4 6

The division moved out during the night to take up positions along a narrow gap overlooking a highway. In the immediate battlefield were the 343rd Brigade and an independent regiment of roughly 6,500 troops, backed up by a protective force of the 344th Brigade of 5,000 near by.47 In the early morning of September 25, a transport unit of the First Battalion of the 21st Brigade moved into the ravine. The trap was sprung by disabling the leading vehicle. Then the entire unit was wiped out. It was a good example of a set-piece battle of annihilation. Only four men survived. Chinese Communist propaganda has claimed ever since that Lin Piao annihilated the 21st Brigade of 4,000 troops.48 According to the survivors as well as to P'eng Te-huai's revelation, however, the unit concerned was no more than one hundred in strength, including an escort of one platoon.49 The Communist account stated that the battle lasted from 7 A.M. until 3 P.M. and included the successful repulse of a Japanese counter45 44 Pacification War, N o . i , p p . 3 7 - 3 9 . S y d n e y Liu, p p . 1 6 4 - 1 6 5 . 46 L i n P i a o , et al., Chin-pei yu-chi chan-cheng chi-shih [ A n n a l s of guerrilla w a r i n n o r t h Shansi] ( C h a n g s h a : C h a n - s h i h ch'u-pan-she, 1938) (BI), p. 37. 47 Sydney L i u , p. 169. 48 K'ang-Jih chan-cheng shih-ch'i ti Chung-kuo jen-min chieh-fang chiXn [ T h e C h i n e s e People's L i b e r a t i o n A r m y d u r i n g the resistance against J a p a n ] ( h e r e i n a f t e r c i t e d as PLA during resistance) (Peking: J e n - m i n c h ' u - p a n - s h e , 1954), p . 14. 49 Kyodo butai hishi: 2ii, yanagi no hana to heitai to [Secret history o f t h e h o m e t o w n troops: the 21st I n f a n t r y R e g i m e n t , t h e w i l l o w b l o s s o m s a n d soldiers] ( T o t t o r i shi: S h i m a n e s h i n b u n s h a , 1962), p p . 1 1 7 - 1 3 7 . I n c i d e n t a l l y , t h e survivors recall b e i n g s t r a f e d i n the r a v i n e b y aircraft m a r k e d b y " b l u e sky a n d w h i t e s u n . " P ' e n g T e h u a i r e v e a l e d later t h a t L i n Piao's d i v i s i o n c o l l e c t e d less t h a n 100 rifles, i n Kungfei huo-kuo, III, 3 5 1 .

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charge to take a hill overlooking the road. 50 According to Chang Kuo-t'ao, Lin Piao's division suffered casualties of one thousand or more. 51 Both of these stories seem too inflated to be true. As organized resistance subsided toward the end of the battle, the Communist forces were treated to an eerie sight. T h e surviving Japanese troops, most of them probably wounded, destroyed the supplies, the wagons, and themselves. T h e Communist troops had approached them with the assumption that they were like any other foe encountered in the civil war. T h e y stood up and called out to the Japanese to surrender, but to no avail. 52 Lin Piao wrote "summing-up" reports of his experiences at P'inghsingkuan, for external and internal consumption. Both served political purposes. In sharp contrast to the Party's propaganda and his own external report, the internal report indicated that the battle had had a sobering effect on him. One of the reports, dated October 17, is summarized below. 53 (1) Once the enemy gets to a combat in the mountains, his fighting capacity and special strength decline greatly. His artillery, tanks, and aircraft are not very useful. (2) T h e enemy has built up a habit of belittling the Chinese armed forces. He disregards proper caution and reconnaissance, and is reluctant to do construction work and neglects field fortification. We often find him resting in a ditch even under our attack. (3) The enemy relies considerably on transport from the rear for his ammunition. His food is all shipped from Japan. The enemy's rear has already extended for several thousand li. [Chinese mile]. Once cut off from his supplies, his difficulty is easy to imagine. This is precisely what we did at P'inghsingkuan. (4) T o strike the enemy's flank or rear when he is engaging our friendly forces in the latter's position is the best method of fighting. This is better than engaging him while in movement or when he has just arrived at a position and not yet established his perimeter. (5) In order to avoid his artillery and aircraft, we must quickly advance on the enemy upon the commencement of combat, and throw in hand-to-hand assault in successive waves. This will make his artillery useless. (6) Coordination by the friendly forces is in reality extremely bad. They decide on a plan for attack but are unable to follow through with it themselves. "You strike, they stand by and watch." They are irresolute and unable to strike a decisive blow at the enemy. They do not know how to concentrate 50 Jen-min jih-pao, August 1, 1963. 51 " W o ti hui-i," Ming Pao, No. 60, December, 1970, p. 88. P- 1 7 8 - 1 7 9 . Ibid., pp. 179, 1 8 1 . 60 68 Ibid., I I , 63, 178, 179. Ibid., p. 180.

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Route Army was understrength at roughly 30,000 when the war began; 62 it had no artillery; in training and combat experience it was no match for the Japanese forces. Lin Piao's report was very emphatic that the Japanese were much tougher than the Kuomintang forces. It followed that strategies and tactics to be used against the Japanese forces should be different from those sanctioned by the Party vis-à-vis the Kuomintang forces in the civil war. T h e sober tone of his internal report stemmed from this political purpose. When Mao proposed at Loch' uan that the Communist forces should fight "independent guerrilla warfare in the mountains," he was in fact advocating a new military line in a rudimentary form. T o use current terminology, Mao was ordering the Communist forces to de-escalate. He was discouraging "mobile warfare" for the Communist forces. He was opposed by P'eng Te-huai. P'eng issued a directive in October on his initiative as the deputy secretary of the Front Branch of the Military Commission demanding "mobile guerrilla warfare." 63 Against this backdrop of political dispute in the Party, the other element in Mao's military proposal took on added significance. T o retain the element of surprise and initiative in battle had always been an important part of Mao's military line. But in the context of the second united front, "independent guerrilla warfare" or "to fight on our own initiative" meant refusal to follow the directions of Kuomintang command and to assist the "friendly forces." Again there were good reasons for avoiding tight tactical coordination with sundry Chinese forces operating on the battlefield. Parochial concern of regionalized Chinese forces for self-preservation was reinforced by old suspicion toward the former Red Army. A t Loch' uan Mao expressed the fear that the Kuomintang command might use the Communist forces as a sacrifice to the Japanese forces.64 But ultimately Mao's line of "independent guerrilla warfare" was dictated by his revolutionary goal. T h e areas behind the advancing Japanese line was the only place where the Communist forces would enjoy freedom from the Kuomintang forces. Hence, Mao instructed his forces to carry out "exterior-line operations within the interior-line operations." 65 T h e strength of the opposition to Mao did not rest solely on the authority of the Comintern. As was to become a pattern hereafter, the political fortunes of the opposing sides were tied to the objective developments in the war. T h e war was going badly for China toward 62 "Wo ti hui-i," Ming Pao, No. 58, October, 1970, p. 90. 63 The Case of Peng Teh-huai, p. 190. 64 "Wo ti hui-i," Ming Pao, No. 59, November, 1970, p. 86. 65 Selected Works, II, 82.

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the end of 1937. Taiyuan fell in November in spite of stubborn resistance by a combined operation of the central forces, the Shansi Army, and the Eighth Route Army. A wedge was driven southwestward along Tat'ung-P'uchow and the Peiping-Hankow railways. Shansi Province with its rich mineral resources and a good part of north China was about to fall. After the fall of Shanghai, Nanking was threatened; the Chinese government moved its seat upriver to Wuhan on November 16. In Tokyo an intense debate was going on between the Army General Staff and Premier Konoe. Colonel Ishiwara Kanji of the Army General Staff led the group which demanded a quick settlement of the war in order to build up the forces in Manchuria and to proceed with long-range preparation against the Soviet Union and the United States. He insisted that Japan should seek a political end of the war in China by offering terms which would be acceptable to the Kuomintang government.66 The cabinet decided on October 22 to probe the Kuomintang government's willingness to enter into peace negotiations by using the channel provided by the German government.67 Chiang Kai-shek in effect refused the initial terms by demanding the status quo of July 7. But as the Japanese forces shifted their weight to central China and started advancing toward Nanking, he reconsidered his original position. On December 2, Chiang was reported to have met with Pai Ch'ung-hsi, T'ang Sheng-chih, Hsu Yung-ch'ang, and Ku Chu-t'ung. The meeting decided to accept the earlier Japanese conditions as the basis for negotiation. On the following day, Chiang notified the German ambassador O.P. Trautmann of his decision.68 The CCP got wind of the peace contact.69 It is interesting to note that the CCP was informed of every major peace discussion between China and Japan from this point on. The Politburo met for a conference between December 9 and 13. How to keep China in the war, I infer, was the question of overriding urgency at the conference. The Japanese terms of peace of November 3 were relatively lenient. If, having demonstrated its military superiority, the Japanese army suddenly withdrew from north China, the militant public opinion that demanded a reckoning with Japan would have been dampened. Moreover, the terms of peace stipulated China's cooperation with Japan against the Comintern. With or without such an agreement, the end 66 Crowley, pp. 351-353. 67 Ibid., pp. 354-358. 68 Ibid.., p. 358; Kindai no senso [Modern wars], Vol. V: Imai Takeo, Chugoku to no tatakai [The war with China] (Tokyo: Jinbutsu orai-sha, 1966), p. 103. 69 Warren Kuo, "The Conflict between Chen Shao-yu and Mao Tse-tung," Issues and Studies, November, 1968, p. 40.

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of the war was likely to bring about a renewed campaign to suppress the Communist forces. At this time, Mao's dialectics took him quite far in a sectarian direction. At a meeting of the Party activists in Yenan in November, he characterized his opponents by saying, "class capitulationism is actually the reserve force of national capitulationism . . . . " 7 0 This remark was evidently divorced from the sentiment of the majority in the C C P leadership. "Resistance against Japan is of paramount importance," said Wang Ming, a n d e v e r y t h i n g m u s t b e s u b o r d i n a t e d to its needs; all efforts m u s t b e d i r e c t e d at t h e a n t i - J a p a n e s e u n i t e d f r o n t , all t h i n g s m u s t b e c h a n n e l e d t h r o u g h t h e anti-Japanese united front . . . .

it is n o t i m e to e n g a g e in a p o w e r s t r u g g l e

for leadership.71

With Wang Ming's presence, the most basic questions concerning the united front were revived. Later, in December, the Party issued a manifesto to allay the Kuomintang's suspicions and restore credibility to its pledge of cooperation. It pointed out that the main stumbling block in the resistance was not China's military weakness but "rather the intensified Japanese plot to 'pit Chinese against Chinese.' " 72 It even went so far as to promise to "cooperate with the Kuomintang for national reconstruction after the successful conclusion of the war." 73 T h e military critics of Mao fell in line. As military men, they were as conscious as Mao of the power of the new enemy and the relative inferiority of the Kuomintang and the Communist forces. A retreat in the initial phase was inevitable. But the war would be "protracted" only if "capitulation" was averted. Undue stress on "self-preservation" (Mao), "trading space for time" (Chiang Kai-shek), "scorched earth strategy" 74 and other negative defenses only tended to strengthen the attitudes of passivity, despondency, and longing for Western intervention. T h e military leaders might have differed from Mao in the first instance in their judgement on the combat capability of the Eighth 70 Selected Works, II, 70. T h i s was delivered on November 12 and " m e t with immediate opposition from the Right opportunists in the Party," ibid., p. 61. 71 " T h e Current Situation and Tasks in the W a r of Resistance," cited in Warren Kuo, " T h e Conflict between Chen Shao-yu and Mao Tse-tung," Issues and Studies, December, 1968, p. 49. 72 Chungkuo Kung-ch'an-tang tui shih-ch'ii hsiian-yen [ T h e CCP's declaration on the current situation], Guide, III, 2. 73 Ibid. 74 i n November, 1938, the Chinese garrison in Changsha set the city on fire in the name of "scorched earth war." T h i s prompted W a n g Ching-wei to point out the ominous implications of the destructive war for Republican China.

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Route Army. This was ostensibly an empirical question. On the grounds that it was as yet weak and understrength, Mao counseled its expansion and buildup. T o his opponents in the army, expansion of the army made sense only if it were directly applied to armed resistance. It was one thing to argue for strategic defensive. It was something else to de-escalate. Both P'eng Te-huai and Chu T e were convinced that guerrilla warfare could not make a dent in the Japanese military power. P'eng and Chu T e maintained that the Eighth Route Army was capable of carrying out missions large enough to inflict substantial losses on the Japanese forces.75 T h e extent of opposition to Mao among the army leadership was surprising. They rested their case formally on military grounds, though they were no doubt aware of the implication of their stand for internal politics. Military professionalism and nationalism seem to have swayed some of them to become strange bedfellows of Wang Ming, so to speak. But then there were others whose opposition to Mao was more overtly political. Hsiang Ying, the vice commander of the New Fourth Army, was the most outspoken advocate of mobile warfare. His personal conflict with Mao dated back to Kiangsi. This was said to be one of the reasons that he was left behind in Kiangsi to fight a diversionary action as the main Red forces departed. After his death during the New Fourth Army Incident, and Wang Ming's demise, the Party chose to single Hsiang out as the major culprit in the disaster in southern Anhwei. T h e Party's indictment was that he neglected to guard the Party's "independence" in the united front by conniving with the class enemy. 76 His stand on the military question was evidently based on his support for the Internationalists, and contemporary evidence corroborates the Party's charges against him. For instance, one finds him making very strong statements in support of mobile and positional warfare as late as January, 1939, more than one year after the Sixth Plenum. 77 Taking into account the fact that the New Fourth Army had then just crawled out of conditions of "primi7 5 For further discussion of the military dispute, see Kataoka, "Mao and Strategic Disputes in the C C P in the W a r against Japan," presented to the annual meeting of the Association for Asian Studies in April, 1970. 76 See, for instance, T e n g Tzu-hui, "Hsin-ssu-chiin ti fa-chan chuang-ta yii liangt'iao lu-hsien ti tou-cheng" [Strong development of the New Fourth Army and the struggle of the two lines], Hsing-huo liao-yiian (Peking: Jen-min wen-hsueh ch'upan-she, 1962), VI, 375-400. T h i s volume was published when Mao and the "revisionists" were struggling over P'eng Te-huai's status after his dismissal. Hence, Teng's comment on Hsiang Ying has a peculiar double-edged character. 77 Hsiang Ying chiang-chun yen-lun-chi [Collection of general Hsiang Ying's speeches and essays] (Chi-na ch'u-pan-she, 1939), p. 61.

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tive men" (in the words of one of its officers), 78 one sees how subjective (i.e., political) Hsiang Ying's stance on the strategic question was. T o summarize, Mao's opponents in the army maintained: (1) T h e major burden of fighting rested on the Kuomintang's regular forces, and they should be supported by the Communist forces. None probably went so far as to call Mao's line treason, as Chang Kuo-t'ao did when he defected from the Party in early 1938. T h e y maintained that the C C P ' s survival rested on the continued resistance by the Kuomintang. (2) T h e combined Chinese forces should rely mostly on mobile warfare but should not shun positional defense of some key points under favorable circumstances. By the time of the December conference of the Politburo, the assault on Nanking was in progress and a siege on W u h a n appeared a matter of time. Mao's military opponents rallied to W a n g Ming's call for a decisive campaign in defense of W u h a n . (3) T h e Communist regular forces should fight mobile warfare behind the Japanese lines. T h e y should do so in some flexible coordination with the "friendly forces" without abandoning the independence of tactical command. (4) Underneath the opposition of professional soldiers to Mao was a pervasive desire to advance their forces to a regular status and their dislike of return to guerrilla status. 79 Regularization in turn presupposed close cooperation with the Kuomintang government to receive military supplies. 80 Guerrilla warfare, on the other hand, meant going down among the peasants to build up popular forces through mass work. T h i s was in turn connected with the land revolution. Between December 13 and 15, the Japanese forces committed shocking genocide in the course of mopping u p the last Chinese resistance in Nanking. O n December 16, Chiang Kai-shek issued a statement expressing China's determination to fight on. 81 But the T r a u t m a n n mediation was continuing. It was not the "rape of Nanking" that ended the negotiation. Additional demands heaped upon the original terms by the Konoe cabinet following the victory in Nanking caused the Chinese government to procrastinate. T h e n on January 16, 1938, Konoe terminated the negotiation in spite of strong opposition from the A r m y General Staff. "Henceforth we will not deal with the Kuomintang regime," went the ill-considered demarche of Konoe. H e 78 Hung-ch'i p'iao-p'iao (Peking: Chungkuo ch'ing-nien ch'u-pan-she, 1958), XII, 117. 79 See, for instance, Liu Chen, "Huai-hai-ch'ii cha-ken chi" [Memory of setting roots in the Huai-hai District], Hsing-huo liao-yiian, VI, 454-464. so See below, pp. 159-160. 81 "After the Fall of Nanking," Collected Wartime Messages, I, 49-52.

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proclaimed the goal of establishing a "New Order in Asia" by cultivating a friendly government in China. 82 This left the Kuomintang government no choice but to fight on. T h e Japanese forces in central China moved inland in pursuit of a decisive engagement. T h e Chinese forces did not offer that opportunity and retreated farther west. It was anticipated that the war would reach a turning point as the Japanese supply line stretched. Public attention and concern was focused on the fate of Wuhan in early 1938, and the tension mounted as the year wore on. It was against this background that Wang Ming gambled his career in an attempt to impose his concept of the united front both on Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tsetung. He unfurled the banner of "defense of Wuhan." 83 Proposing a joint, determined effort by all Chinese to defend the city, he sought to re-create the defense of Madrid. This was to be China's finest hour. If successful, his notion of the united front would have been vindicated. As the foremost Communist spokesman of Chinese nationalism, he launched the campaign in Wuhan. T h e earliest of Wang Ming's essays on military questions was written in August, 1937, after the fighting had spread to Shanghai. 84 He asked, "Will China's armed struggle against Japan be victorious or not?," and answered himself affirmatively. He castigated those in China who were afflicted with the "disease of Japanese scare." 85 He granted all the points mentioned by them, which added up to Japan's superiority over China in military terms, e.g., China's lack of modern industry and armaments, its unpreparedness, etc. True, he admitted, China could not hope to win the war without modern armaments. But this was no excuse in his mind for not carrying out determined armed resistance, particularly since Japan's war aim was precisely to deprive China of what little foundation in modern industry and commerce she already possessed. Wang Ming understood the rationale for the "autonomous defense state" advanced in the Japanese military circles. Japan was trying to create satellite states in occupied areas "to provide for war by means of war." As large modern cities of China fell one by one without much resistance, the balance might be tipped so far in favor of Japan as to be irreversible. 82 Crowley, p p . 371-374. 83 Ch'en Shao-yii, et al., "Wo-men . . . ti i-chen," p p . 95-130. 84 "Jih-k'ou ch'in-lüeh ti hsin-chieh-tuan yii C h u n g k u o jen-min tou-cheng ti hsinshih-ch'i" [ T h e new stage in aggression by the J a p a n e s e bandits a n d the new period in the struggle of the Chinese people], Wang Ming hsüan-chi, I, 151-184. 85 Ibid., p. 155.

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W a n g b e m o a n e d the likelihood that Shanghai w o u l d be lost. H e p o i n t e d o u t the danger this posed for China's ability to contract foreign loans in the future. 8 6 H e was aware that C h i a n g Kai-shek's power rested largely on the support and the vitality of the so-called K i a n g s u - C h e k i a n g financial clique based in the lower Yangtze valley. W h a t dire consequences were in store for the K u o m i n t a n g ' s continued resistance if it were to meekly abandon Shanghai, Canton, W u h a n , and the most p o p u l o u s part of C h i n a , and retreat into the hinterland? H e seems to have d o u b t e d whether the K u o m i n t a n g , uprooted from its urban, coastal constituencies, could survive for l o n g in the countryside. Should not the K u o m i n t a n g attempt a determined defense of one of the remaining cities, mustering all its might? D i d not China's sons give a good account of themselves in Shanghai in 1932 and again in 1937? W a n g M i n g was thus advocating a forward strategy. A c c o r d i n g to his reckoning, the first stage of the w a r ended w h e n the invasion began, and the second stage w o u l d last until the siege of W u h a n . T h e last stage was counter-offensive. W a n g M i n g was in effect advocating a twostage theory of war: the defense of W u h a n was to be the pivot. 8 7 C h i n a was to turn the defense of W u h a n into a counter-offensive to drive the Japanese out. A s N a n k i n g was lost in December, forcing the K u o m i n t a n g governm e n t to seek peace w i t h Japan, he gained wider support in the Party. W i t h the Comintern's authority b e h i n d him, he set to work to readjust the united front relationship. T h e r e was a reorganization of the central leadership organs in accordance w i t h the Comintern's directives. 88 T w o regional bureaus, the Yangtze B u r e a u a n d the Southeastern Bureau, were created. T h e former was to supervise the Party's work in the K u o m i n t a n g areas, while the latter controlled the N e w F o u r t h Army's area. 89 Intense factional struggles a n d maneuvers were under way, and were paralleled by doctrinal disputes. A t the December conference of the Politburo, a resolution was passed calling for the Seventh Party Congress to be "convened as soon as possible." 90 M a o m a n a g e d to become the chairman of the preparatory committee for the Congress. 9 1 W a n g M i n g still kept his initiative. T h e M a r c h conference proposed 86 Ibid.,

p . 158.

87 See Mao Tse-tung-chi, VI, 183, for Mao's criticism of those who opposed his three-stage theory of war. 88 "Wo ti hui-i," Ming Pao, No. 61, January, 1970, p. 93. According to Warren Kuo, citing Chen Jan, Wang Ming coveted the post of the General Secretary but the post was abolished. "The Conflict between Chen Shao-yu and Mao Tse-tung," Issues and Studies, 89 Ibid., p . 41.

N o v e m b e r , ig68, p . 40. »0 Ibid., D e c e m b e r , 1968, p . 5 1 .

s i Ibid.,

p . 52.

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the defense of Wuhan as the urgent common objective of the C C P and the Kuomintang. 92 On June 15, Wang Ming, Chou En-lai, and Ch'in Pang-hsien jointly published an article proposing the defense of Wuhan. "Naturally the crux of the problem no longer lies in whether we have general capability to defend Wuhan," they stated, "it lies mainly in how we proceed to implement the work . . . ." 93 China had the wherewithal, the defense was a matter of will. Everything else Wang Ming wished to accomplish hinged on the retention of Wuhan. His stated views on cooperation with the Kuomintang lost that cautious double-edged character which he had maintained when he was initially proposing the united front. In criticizing Mao's radicalism, he abandoned the previous attempts to distinguish himself from Ch'en Tu-hsiu: T h e National Government is the all-China government which needs to be strengthened, not reorganized. The unified national defense government, with improvement in its top-level institutions and coordination among its lower echelons, must be based on the unity of the people. Democracy and freedom must be geared to the task of fighting Japan and not run counter to it. Improvement of the people's livelihood must be realized for the task of fighting Japan and not against it. T h e people's armed forces must grow in their fighting with the Japanese and must not contradict this fighting.94

As he was prepared to accept the Kuomintang's Program for Resistance and Reconstruction as the basis of cooperation, so was he willing to defend it as the government of all Chinese—or so he was saying. This was made more explicit in regard to the question of military command. From March on, he began advocating "national defense divisions" (kuo-fang-shih), an outgrowth of his former idea of "united anti-Japanese army." These divisions would be staffed by and recruited from the elite elements in all the Chinese forces including the Eighth Route Army. 95 They would be equipped with modern weapons in order to undertake mobile and positional warfare. These divisions as well as all the other Chinese forces, Wang insisted, "must use every means to tighten the unity of all forces on the front—all existing units must clearly understand that they are part of the unified National 92 Wang Ming, "San-yiieh cheng-chih-chii ti tsung-chi" [The summing-up of the March Politburo conference], Guide, IV, 21-54. In addition to the questions of Wuhan and mobile warfare, the conference again pressed for convening of the Seventh Congress. 93 Ch'en Shao-yii, et al., "Wo-men . . . ti i-chen," p. 98. 94 "The Current Situation and Tasks in the War of Resistance," cited in Warren Kuo, "The Conflict between Chen Shao-yu and Mao Tse-tung," Issues and Studies, December, 1968, pp. 94-95. 95 "Wo-men . . . ti i-chen," pp. 107-108.

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Revolutionary Army, and they must completely do away with the various so-called organizational viewpoints of the past . . . ." 96 It was quite apparent that most of Wang Ming's project depended on the consent of the Kuomintang government. He was making a risky assumption that Chiang Kai-shek would reverse his policy of strategic retreat at the doorstep of Hankow. Where was Wang Ming to acquire the influence necessary to prevail on the suspicious government? Stalin was showing active interest in China's defense. He extended new credits of US $50 million each in March and July. 97 But the Soviet Union was not in a position to influence the strategic decisions of the Chinese government. Thus, the only leverage Wang Ming had was public opinion in the Kuomintang's own constituencies. He hoped to mobilize one million men directly for the defense of Wuhan. 98 T h e cause of the Chinese nation became indistinguishable from the factional interest of the Internationalists in restoring China's revolution to the cities. While criticizing the way in which Mao put "democracy" to use, Wang Ming, too, obviously needed "democracy" as an integral part of his scheme. Hsin-hua jih-pao (the New China Daily News) began publication in Hankow in January and became an important instrument of propaganda for Wang Ming's point of view. T h e CCP's agitation for popular assembly resulted in the establishment of the National Political Council by the act of Kuomintang's Extraordinary National Congress. Seven CCP members were appointed as members. Wang Ming personally led the Communist members at the first session in July and succeeded in passing resolutions which were intended to commit the government to defense of Wuhan. 99 Mao was forced to rebut his critics and defend his position. Nineteen thirty-eight was one of the most productive years in his career as a political writer and pamphleteer. In the span of six months between May and November, he wrote all of his best-known essays dealing with military problems in the anti-Japanese war. They consumed his soul. 100 "Strategic Problems in the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla War" was addressed to those who viewed guerrilla war only from a tactical point of view and, justifiably perhaps, missed its strategic significance. Mao concurred with his critics that guerrilla warfare was insignificant from 86 Ibid., p. 102. 87 Young, China and the Helping Hand, p. 57. See also Stalin's letter of J u n e 10 to Chiang Kai-shek, in Soviet Russia in China, p. 87. 9s Joho, No. 31, December 1, 1940, p. 12. 99 Ibid., No. 7, December i, 1939, p. 37. 100 J e r o m e Ch'en, Mao and the Chinese Revolution (London: O x f o r d University Press, 1965), pp. 208-209.

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a strictly military point of view and in the short run: the war could not be finally settled except by a "decisive battle" in regular warfare. T h r o u g h o u t the essay, Mao used the term "strategic." T o understand what Mao meant by the term is to understand the true import of his stand. A l l the varied meanings of the term were subsumed under one root meaning, which had to do with Mao's grand strategy: guerrilla warfare was strategically significant to the extent that it developed into mobile and regular warfare at the end of the war. A s he put it, The mobile warfare of the third stage will no longer be undertaken solely by the original regular forces; part, possibly quite an important part, will be undertaken by forces which were originally guerrillas but which will have progressed from guerrilla to mobile warfare . . . . 1 0 1 T h a t is to say, the strategic task of the C C P was to expand its forces within the three-cornered struggle between Japan, the Kuomintang, and itself into a fully regular force capable of defeating both of its foes in the end. T h e whole point of fighting in the "strategic interior-line" was to use the Japanese presence to segregate the Kuomintang army from the Communist forces. T h i s purpose would be undermined if the Communist forces drew the attention of the Japanese forces by revealing their strength prematurely; it would not do to escape the pursuit of one enemy only to fall into the hands of the other. If that were to happen, the Kuomintang would certainly "stand by and watch" (Lin Piao) and not come to the aid of the Communist forces. W i t h respect to the Japanese forces, the choice of the "strategic interior-line" for the Communist theater of operation was based on several prior assumptions. (1) Guerrilla warfare should create a diffuse sense of insecurity for the Japanese forces over the entire occupied area rather than jolting them with sharp shocks. 102 (2) Even if the Japanese forces were alarmed by Communist expansion, their ability to suppress and uproot the Communist guerrillas and their infrastructure would be far inferior to that of the Kuomintang forces in civil war. For one thing, the force level of the Japanese army would be such as to leave many areas simply unoccupied. 1 0 3 (3) Some native forces might contribute to the "Sinification" of the war, so to speak. But Mao assured his audience that puppet forces would be wholly ineffective against the Communist partisans fighting a patriotic war. 104 (4) Both Mao and L i n 101 Selected

Works, II, 173.

102 T h e diversionary effect of this diffuse sense of insecurity was the upper ceiling of the C C P ' s "cooperation" with the K u o m i n t a n g . T h i s was what Mao meant b y "strategic coordination," the only kind he permitted. W h e r e he talked of tactical cooperation between regular and guerrilla forces, he clearly had in mind cooperation of Communist regulars and Communist guerrillas. See ibid., pp. 91-92, 1 0 9 - 1 1 1 . 108 Ibid., p. 99.

104 Ibid., p. 97.

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Piao dismissed the possibility that the Japanese forces could adopt the blockhouse method (i.e., clear and hold type of mission) of the Kuomintang because of the insufficiency of troops and different military tradition. 105 (5) T h e significance of guerrilla warfare was not in its ability to inflict decisive damage on the enemy. T h a t is, local and tactical inferiority of the guerrillas to the Japanese was of no account. T h e significance of popular war was to force the enemy to engage in an indecisive war for a very "protracted" period of time in the context of an international conflict which might expose the enemy to strategic hazard emanating from other sources. Mao seems to have placed his hope on eventual disintegration of Japan and on a third power intervention. 106 T h e Kuomintang was bound to be alarmed by the prospect of continued Communist expansion. T h e CCP had to expand while judiciously holding the political tension with the Kuomintang just below the point where it might touch off an open civil war. It was Mao's judgment that such an expansion was possible only if it took place at the expense of the national enemy and not of the Kuomintang. I surmise that this judgment was derived from two lessons in the CCP's own experiences. One was the rather surprising persistence of Chinese guerrilla activities in Manchuria in spite of disorganized and incompetent leadership. T h e Nanking government refused to intervene militarily there, but on the other hand it never formally abandoned Manchuria. T h e parallel between this and the situation after 1937 is obvious. T h e other lesson, a negative one, seems to have been born of the civil war. During that time the Communist bases were always behind the Kuomintang forces as the latter faced foreign menaces on China's frontiers. During the Chinese Eastern Railway crisis of 1929, the CCP harassed the government's rear as it sought to deal with the Russian incursion into Manchuria. This provoked Ch'en Tu-hsiu's criticism of the Party. T h e C C P continued to exploit every Japanese menace after 1931. T h e Chinese government could not deal with foreign and domestic foes simultaneously. Hence, it appeased Japan. This meant that an international war, the vital precondition of a revolution, would not last very long even if it came. T h e war would be protracted only if the C C P took part in the resistance. "On the Protracted War" was written for public release—much to 105 Ibid., p. 105. Lin Piao elaborated this point by enumerating f o u r reasons: (1) the size of the occupied area; (2) insufficiency of Japanese troops; (3) the lack of natural material f o r fortification in north China, such as timber; and (4) the absence of "blockhouseism" in the Japanese military tradition, in "Lun hua-pei cheng-kui-chan . . . ," p. 71. 106 Selected Works, II, 122-123.

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the consternation of P'eng Te-huai, it was reported. 107 T h e essay was a masterpiece for its synthetic quality. O n the one hand, it was a prognosis of how the war would be necessarily protracted. This point was made vis-à-vis the pessimists outside the Communist party. On the other hand, it was a plea for protracting the war, a point made vis-à-vis Wang Ming and his "hawkish" followers inside. But the potentially antagonistic points were sewed up into a seemingly consistent whole; the protracted war seemed at once inevitable and desirable. Judging from Japan's over-all war-making capacity, Mao apparently perceived in May that the war was soon entering "on the new stage." 108 He divided the war into the well-known three stages and assigned specific forms of warfare to each: China's strategic retreat based on mobile warfare; strategic stalemate based on guerrilla warfare; and strategic counter-offensive by means of mobile and positional warfare. 109 Provided China survived the stage of strategic retreat, the subsequent stage of stalemate was the most important one for the revolution. T h e protracted nature of the whole war derived from the protracted nature of stalemate. Mao was apprehensive of the "impetuous friends" who might gamble on the destiny of the nation in a strategically decisive engagement in which victory was not certain. 110 This would be the "worst policy." Refusal to fight decisive engagements meant abandonment of territory. But, said Mao, "we must have the courage to do so . . . ." 1 1 1 This was formally a message to the hawks in the Kuomintang who wished to defend Wuhan. But Chiang Kai-shek's agreement with Mao on this point made the advice superfluous. Mao quoted Chiang extensively in his report to the Sixth Plenum. 112 In so doing, he was in fact lecturing Wang Ming against defense of Wuhan on no less an authority than Chiang Kai-shek. Wang Ming was to Chiang and Mao at this time what Mao was to Chiang before the Lukouchiao Incident: a hawk and a source of embarrassment. Mao's three-stage theory of the war was directed in part at Wang Ming. In calling for abandonment of Wuhan during the stage of stalemate, he was trying to deprive the Internationalists of an urban base. T h e pessimists outside of the C C P (the "theory of national subjugation") were the more difficult ones for Mao to rebut. He counted on 107 P'eng said, " A book written by own name, but not in the name of Teh-huai, p. i g i . 108 This was the title of his report 163-240. 109 Selected Works, II, 136-138. 110 Ibid., p. 114.

an individual can only be published in his the Central Committee," The Case of Peng to the Sixth Plenum, Mao Tse-tung-chi, m Ibid., p. 181. 112 Mao Tse-tung-chi, VI, 174.

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Japan's imperialistic ambition to foreclose political settlement of the war in the first stage. But as Japan exhausted its power, he expected, it would seriously seek such a solution. T h e second stage was most likely to give rise to "capitulationism" in China; and the longer the stalemate, the stronger it would grow, Mao admitted. This was precisely what his opponents maintained. Yet Mao could offer no plausible solution to the problem except that the CCP should operate behind the Japanese lines. T H E SIXTH P L E N U M

T h e Sixth Plenum met in a very long session—between September 28 and November 6 according to one source 1 1 3 —to compose the differences in the Party and to lay down coherent policies. T h e time was inauspicious for the Internationalists. T h e Japanese assault on Wuhan and Canton began in late August. T h e Chinese government did not wish to be forced by public opinion into a risky campaign. Least of all was it willing to dance to the tune called by the Chinese Communists and perhaps the Soviet Union. It suppressed the CCP's mass mobilization. It suspended the Hsin-hua jih-pao three times and disbanded sixteen mass organizations of more radical character in August. 114 By October 7, Chou En-lai was editorializing in the Hsin-hua jih-pao against staking everything on the defense of Wuhan. Canton and Wuhan fell on October 21 and 27 respectively while the Sixth Plenum was in session. A t the Sixth Plenum Mao's military line since the Loch'uan conference was formally accepted as the Party's line. A t the juncture of the civil and international wars, he said, "our change in strategy was an extremely serious one." He went on to say, "In this special situation we had to transform the regular army of the past into a guerrilla army . . . . " 1 1 5 For the first time, Mao offered an empirical referent for his concept of guerrilla and mobile warfare and gave them substantive content. According to him, there were actually two kinds of guerrilla warfare. One was used in the early period of the civil war. T h e other was the guerrilla warfare conducted by the regular forces of the Eighth Route Army in the early period of the war against Japan. T h e latter was in fact not different from the regular warfare of the later period of the civil war. It was a regular warfare of the "Chinese type." It was "only guerrilla warfare raised to a higher 113 W a r r e n K u o , " T h e C C P a f t e r t h e G o v e r n m e n t E v a c u a t i o n of W u h a n , " and Studies, M a y , 1969, p. 41. 114 Joho, N o . 31, D e c e m b e r i , 1940, p. 12. U S Selected Works, I I , 228.

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level." 1 1 6 Mao's line was clear: the regular forces of the Eighth Route Army were to fight guerrilla warfare. This was the end of the first round of the strategic dispute. T h e Comintern was apparently very satisfied with the changes that took place in the C C P through the summer of 1938. 117 Mao made many verbal concessions to the Internationalists, and therewith to the Kuomintang at the Plenum. It seemed that Mao's report, On the New Stage, was jointly authored by him and W a n g Ming. 1 1 8 It repeated the CCP's pledge to cooperate with the Kuomintang into the post-war years. 119 It stated that the democratic republic which the C C P was trying to establish would be "independent, free, and happy." 120 T h i s was W a n g Ming's slogan for the second united front. It was his counterpart of Sun Yat-sen's T h r e e People's Principles, i.e., nationalism, democracy, and people's livelihood. In addition, the report stated, The anti-Japanese national united front is based on the Kuomintang and the CCP, and of the two parties the Kuomintang is the foremost and the larger party. The commencement and the support of the war of resistance is unthinkable without the Kuomintang. 121

But on substantive decisions passed by the Plenum, in addition to the one concerning the strategic questions, Mao had his way. T h e Plenum passed another resolution calling for the Seventh Congress, but Mao's report stated that "because the preparatory work is still incomplete, it is difficult to convene the Congress this year." 122 As the chairman of the preparatory committee for the Congress, he seemed to have tabled it for the time being. T h e Plenum passed a Fifteen Point Program, apparently a model for the administrative program of border region governments. 123 It is my inference that a tax policy and treatment of the landlord class were in this Program. 116 ibid.., p. 227. 117 Mao Tse-tung, Lun hsin-chieh-tuan [On the new stage], Mao Tse-tung-chi, VI, 166. l i s I n addition to the points noted below, this report also proposed the "creation of mechanized army g r o u p , " ibid., pp. 211-212. 11» Ibid., p. 223. 120 Ibid., p. 233. 121 Ibid., p. 198. 122 ibid., p. 239. 123 P'eng Chen, "Kuan-yii Chin-Ch'a-Chi pien-ch'ii mu-ch'ien ti shih-cheng kangling" [Concerning the current administrative program of the Chin-Ch'a Chi B o r d e r Region], Chieh-fang, No. 119, p. 22. It is possible that the first administrative prog r a m to come into existence, the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region Administrative Program (passed in April, 1939), was based on the Fifteen-Point Program. See Shen-Kan-Ning pien-ch'ii ts'an-i-hui wen-hsien hui-chi [Collection of Shen-KanNing Border Region political council's documents] (Peking: K'e-hsiieh ch'u-pan-she, 1958), pp. 39-41.

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Correspondingly, a definite policy for handling of traitors was adopted, though I have no access to this document either. 124 T h e Plenum decided on further expansion of Communist power. T h e CCP was to become "an all Chinese, vast mass-character, bolshevized political party." There was also a decision on the organization of local Party hierarchy. I infer that there were corresponding decisions on the parallel hierarchies of government and military districts.125 T h e Plenum's resolution proposed an organizational form of the united front to the Kuomintang. On this issue the formal differences between Mao and Wang Ming are impossible to detect. In Wang Ming's original proposal for a "national defense government," the Kuomintang and the C C P were to maintain their distinct identity, organization, and ideology. Formally it was a coalition of two independent parties. In late 1937, Mao was vowing that the C C P would not enter the government as long as it was a "one-party dictatorship." One exception was made in a resolution apparently proposed by Mao in September 1937: the CCP was to take an active part in a local or regional united front behind the Japanese lines. 126 Upon returning to China, Wang Ming upheld Mao's stand, but he also stated that "if the Kuomintang is in need of our assistance, it may seek our participation." 127 What they meant by participation is not clear. Neither of them objected to participation in a popular assembly such as the National Political Council; hence, the reference seems to have been to participation in administrative posts. Wang Ming approved of the Kuomintang's appointment of Chou En-lai as deputy director of the political department of the National Military Commission under Ch'eng Ch'en in February, 1938.128 T h e decision of the Plenum was enigmatic. T h e telegraphic message to the nation pledged that the CCP would "not establish secret organization of the Communist Party within the Kuomintang and its armed forces." 129 But it proposed that the CCP members be allowed 124 Tang

ti cheng-ts'e

chiang-shou

t'i-kang

[Manual

for e xp l ai n i n g

the

Party's

tactics] (central Anhwei?, 1942) (BI), p. 45. 125 S e e b e l o w , p p . 137-139. 127 Chugoku

kyosanto 1937-nen

126 Selected

Works, I I , 73.

shi, p. 472.

128 W a n g Ming, "San-yueh cheng-chih-chu ti tsung-chi," 37-38. T h e day after Chou's a p p o i n t m e n t , M a o is reported to have reiterated his objection to C o m m u nist participation i n the government. Warren Kuo, " T h e 6th P l e n u m of the CCP 6th Central Committee," Issues and Studies, March, 1969, p. 41. 129 Selected

Works, I I , 439; Kung-fei

huo-kuo,

I I I , 68, 74. B u t b y 1940 t h e

CCP

was ordering its members to infiltrate the K u o m i n t a n g and the San-Min-Chu-I Youth Corps. See Kuan-yu pao-chia-ch'ang kung-tso ti shih-chih [Directive concerni n g the work of pao-chia chiefs], ibid., p. 534.

8a

RESISTANCE

AND R E V O L U T I O N

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to join the Kuomintang and the San-Min-Chu-I Youth Corps. 130 The Plenum's resolution suggested two alternative methods. One was identical with the "bloc within" tactics of the first united front: the CCP members were to join the Kuomintang individually by announcing their Communist affiliation. The resolution, however, rejected a reciprocal arrangement to let the Kuomintang members join the CCP. 1 3 1 The other method was cooperation of two distinct party organizations. The resolution stated that the first method was the "best organization form" for the united front. 132 Judging from the subsequent action of the CCP, there were additional decisions of extreme importance, though these were not necessarily the decisions of the Plenum as such. Ho Lung and the 120th Division were ordered to move out of the Chin-Sui Border Region (actually northwestern Shansi) into central Hopei to help reorganize Lii Cheng-ts'ao's former Northeastern Army and consolidate the area as a part of the Chin-Ch'a-Chi Border Region. The 115th Division also began to move out of Shansi, across Hopei, and into Shantung in force in early 1939. It is likely that this decision, too, was made during the Plenum. The most important decision concerned the redeployment of the bulk of the New Fourth Army's units from the southern bank of the Yangtze River to northern Kiangsu across the river. 133 This was a direct application of Mao's strategic principle. T h e southern bank of Yangtze belonged to the Kuomintang's Third War Zone; north Kiangsu was behind the Japanese lines. Subsequent chapters will deal with the far-reaching consequences of this decision. I have reviewed the process by which the contending factions in the CCP implemented their respective concepts of the united front. The dispute concerned the extent to which the united front with the Kuomintang could be exploited for the CCP's interest. Mao's position followed from the premise that the end of the war with Japan was the beginning of a Chinese civil war. Therefore, the Chinese Communists could not do otherwise than to capitalize on the war to strengthen themselves. For him the united front meant an absence of peace be130 Chungkuo Kung-ch'an-tang k'uo-ta ti liu-chung ch'iian-hui tien-wen [Telegraphic messages of the CCP's Sixth Plenum], K'ang-chan chien-kuo shih-liao wenhsien [Collection of historical materials concerning the resistance and reconstruction], No. 3, p. E - g . 131 Mao Tse-tung-chi, VI, 288. 132 Ibid. 133 Liu Shao-ch'i states that the Sixth Plenum decided to establish the Central Plains Bureau, in Chugoku kyosanto kachu-kyoku dai-ichi-ji kakudai kaigi ketsugi [The resolution of the first plenary meeting of the Central China Bureau of the CCP] (hereinafter cited as Central China Bureau First Plenum) (Shanghai: Embassy of Japan, 1942), p. 1. T h e Central Plains Bureau was renamed the Central China Bureau in the winter of 1940, ibid. It was located in north Kiangsu.

LUKOUCHIAO

INCIDENT

TO T H E

SIXTH

PLENUM

»3

tween China and Japan. He was beginning to revert to the stand he took at Wayaopao, but total dependence of the war on the Kuomintang's efforts at this stage weakened his position. Wang Ming's position was not an enviable one either. He would gain an upper hand internally only when the Kuomintang appeared to be on the verge of collapse. This was because, unlike Mao and Chiang Kai-shek, he did not have his own army, a prerequisite for political power in China. But his setback at the Sixth Plenum was only a temporary one. The compatibility of the united front with the revolution was yet to be fully tested.

IV THE INITIAL EXPANSION IN N O R T H C H I N A

T h i s chapter will describe the initial expansion of the Communist forces and their bases in the rural areas of north China. I attribute the spectacular expansion of Communist power during the first stage of the war to three factors. First and foremost was the fact that the Communist forces were virtually all alone as an organized force in the rural areas for the first two years of the war. T h i s also explains in part the second factor: the Communist forces were able to carry out a revolutionary land program, which accomplished basically the same results as in the civil war days but by different means. A third factor which aided Communist expansion was what Philip K u h n calls the "militarization" of China's countryside or the mobilizational potential of the peasantry within the traditional social and political structure. 1

T R O O P M O V E M E N T S AND B A S E C O N S T R U C T I O N

T h e Kuomintang government's hold on north China was never firm. Its strategy after the Lukouchiao Incident was to draw the Japanese forces deep into central China, its own stronghold, for a stiff resistance. It left the defense of north China to the collateral warlord forces, which easily crumbled. Hardly a hsien magistrate could be found remaining in his post behind the advancing Japanese forces. T h e C C P seemed to have anticipated just such a state of affairs. Since as early as the spring of 1936, when the Communist forces raided Shansi Province, the C C P had been working toward initiating a local war with the Japanese forces. T h e raid failed because the central government 1 Philip A . Kuhn, Rebellion

84

and Its

Enemies.

INITIAL

EXPANSION

IN

NORTH

CHINA

85

came to the aid of Yen Hsi-shan. In 1937, the Japanese forces removed that obstacle. Single-mindedly the invading horde pursued the retreating Kuomintang forces into the interior. Liu Shao-ch'i noted with glee in early 1938 that the plains of Hopei and Shantung Provinces were empty. 2 T h e Japanese forces occupied only major towns and the transportation link between them at this stage. T h e CCP's activities and the deployment of its forces before and during the invasion indicated that it was ready to move into the vacuum and begin constructing "anti-Japanese bases." T h e C C P intended to take Shansi Province as its permanent home base. Good ground work had been done through the local united front since 1936. From Shansi, the Communist forces began to move eastward across the Peiping-Hankow railway into Hopei in the spring of 1938.3 T h e shortage of troops and cadres prevented the C C P from moving further east into Shantung in force until the spring of 1939,4 though local guerrillas were already organized there. There was very extensive and spontaneous mobilization of the peasants for self-defense in the wake of the invasion. But such mobilization had limited parochial goals which were often inimical to the CCP's purposes. Communist mobilization proceeded entirely from "above to below." For this reason the relative freedom enjoyed by Communist organizers injected from the outside was important. T h e CCP's Northern Bureau drew on a huge pool of educated and patriotic youths who had taken part in various phases of popular front type organizations that sprang up after the August First Declaration of 1935. T h e first big demonstration of the anti-Japanese feeling among the students was the December Ninth Movement. During this campaign the mobilized youths were led by Liu Shao-ch'i down into the countryside to conduct agitation and propaganda among the peasants.5 After this, the tense international situation in north China spurred the organizing activities of various National Salvation Associations on college campuses. Prior to the outbreak of hostilities, the focus of activities was public demand for resolute resistance and cessation of the civil war. Some students went through short para-military 2 " H u a - p e i chan-ch'ii k u n g - t s o ti c h i n g - y e n " [ E x p e r i e n c e s o f work i n n o r t h C h i n a w a r zone], Kung-fei huo-kuo, III, 300. 3 Growth of one revolutionary base, p. 26. 4 Y a n g Shang-k'un, " H u a - p e i t a n g c h i e n - s h e - c h u n g ti chi-ke w e n - t ' i " [Several p r o b l e m s in the process of b u i l d i n g t h e Party i n n o r t h China], Y a n g Ch'ing, et al., Kan-pu pi-tu chung-yao wen-hsuan [Selected i m p o r t a n t d o c u m e n t s r e q u i r e d of all cadres] (no date, n o p u b l i s h e r listed) (BI), p . 335. 5 1 - e r h - c h i u yii ch'ing-nien [ T h e D e c e m b e r N i n t h a n d the y o u t h ] ( H u a - c h u n g h s i n - h u a s h u - t i e n , 1948), p. 19.

86

RESISTANCE

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training and fraternized with the troops of Sung Che-yuan's forces.6 During the Lukouchiao Incident a small band of students, under Liu Shao-ch'i's direction, took part in more direct actions to sustain the momentum of hostility. 7 When the full scale war was on, they descended on the rural areas in considerable numbers to help organize "anti-Japanese governments." They were usually given the appellation of "refugee students from Peiping and Tientsin" (Fing-Tsin liu-wan hsiieh-sheng) and cropped up in widely scattered areas of north China. 8 T h e activities of the Sacrifice League (or the League for National Salvation through Sacrifice, Hsi-sheng chiu-kuo t'ung-meng-hui) were the best example of the role played by mobilized urban youths. T h e Sacrifice League was also an example of the "united front from below" tactics of Mao directed at warlord groups prior to the war. In many ways Yen Hsi-shan's predicament from 1935 onward prefigured Chiang Kai-shek's. Both were subjected to three identical pressures: the Japanese, the Communists, and each other. Yen's position was particularly vulnerable because he was surrounded by all three sources of pressure without having a rear. Shansi Province bordered on Suiyiian and Chahar Provinces, the object of the Kuantung Army's manipulation, and was itself one of the five northern provinces included in Japan's scheme of autonomy. After 1935, the main forces of the Red Army arrived one after another to build up the ShensiKansu Soviet across the Yellow River to the west. Communist military pressure on Yen's domain erupted in the raid in 1936. Yen's rear was occupied by Chiang Kai-shek, intent on "centralizing" the country under his rule. When Yen asked for Nanking's help against the threat posed by the Communists and then the Japanese, the central government's action revealed its ulterior motive. During the Shansi raid, Yen's request for aid was met belatedly by the dispatch of the central forces, which let it be known upon arrival that "we did not come to fight the Reds." 9 During the Suiyiian Incident, Chiang Kai-shek appeared in STeradaira, Nihon no higeki, pp. 40-41. 7 See above, p. 55. 8 Liu Shao-ch'i put it this way later: " T h e revolutionary enthusiasm o£ the student masses as aroused by the 'December 9' Movement . . . had no way of widespread development until the 'July 7 Incident' in 1937 . . . . It was then that the revolutionary students in the cities were able to unite with the broad masses of workers and peasants as well as the armed forces of workers and peasants . . . . Many of those who took part in the 'December 9' Movement now became military commanders on battlefields behind the enemy, political personnel, local administrators a n d directors of economic a n d cultural work . . . ." Collected Works of Liu Shaoch'i (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1969), I, 456. 9 Donald G. Gillin, Warlord Yen Hsi-shan in Shansi Province, 1911-1949 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 288; Chugoku kyosanto 1936-nen shi,

p. 5 1 1 -

INITIAL

EXPANSION

IN N O R T H

CHINA

87

person in Taiyuan but refrained from using his forces in the fighting against Prince Te's forces. It was widely rumored that he was using the occasion to assert his control over north China. 10 The vulnerability of Yen's position induced him to opt for the united front sooner than did Chiang Kai-shek, and presumably he in turn hastened Chiang's move toward the united front. Later, when the Communists became his major threat, he would turn to the Japanese. The examples of Yen Hsi-shan and Chang Hsiieh-liang point up the basic structural weakness of the Chinese polity and lend support to Mao's thesis that the central government could be stampeded into the united front by means of a regional united front. Yen Hsi-shan was evidently compelled to go to great lengths to compete with and outbid the Communists in a time of peasant unrest and student agitation. Within the framework of opposition to communism, rather surprising programs of economic and social reforms were undertaken. Even before the Communist raid into Shansi, Yen proposed to nationalize and redistribute cultivated land in Shansi to absorb the landless.11 Most of the measures he put on the statute book, however, he was powerless to enforce. He also created the Justice Force (or Force for the Promotion of Justice, Chu-chang kungtao t'uan), an anti-Communist mass organization staffed by his followers.12 Its purpose was to curb the abuse of the poor by the rich and powerful. The progressive character of his reforms, however, provided a convenient cover for the Communists to exploit in the name of the united front. Liu Shao-ch'i mockingly described Communist pressure on Yen this way: At first supreme commander Yen was afraid of the Communist party. While in Taiyuan we proposed setting up a college to train young cadres, but he would not agree. Later when we set up a training group and gathered all the youths, he quickly set up the so-called "People's Revolutionary College" in Linfen. Then concerning the abolition of heavy and miscellaneous taxes, supreme commander Yen would not agree to the proposals we made in the past. Later when we began to win the support of the vast masses, then supreme commander Yen promulgated the statute . . . , 13

If there was a demand among Yen's liberal followers for resistance along with the Communists, he met them more than halfway. Po I-po states that he, as a Communist, was invited openly to come to Shansi to assume the leadership of the new Sacrifice League, a col10 Gillin, p. 233. 11 Ibid,., pp. 201-207.

12 Ibid., pp. 220, 229; Van Slyke, pp. 131-139, passim. i s Liu Shao-ch'i, "Hua-pei chan-ch'ü . . . ," p. 297.

n*

•V

CIRCLES REPRESENT VARIOUS CHINESE FORCES J

""^"Vir

i NAO/ BT \

MAP 4. Confused Battlefront in N o r t h C h i n a

RESISTANCE

90

AND REVOLUTION

IN

CHINA

lateral organization of the Justice Force created to accommodate younger men of talent on the basis of the united front. 14 T h e League came into existence in September, 1936. Yen apparently set great store by the new organization and appointed his close confidants, Liang Hua-chih and Liang Tun-hou, to leadership positions. 15 By early 1937, a total membership of 600,000 was reported in the League. 18 T h e organization of the League was shoddy and chaotic because it had a rather diverse membership as a united front organization. Around Wut'ai, Yen Hsi-shan's home, strong local elites related to Yen may have controlled the League. T h e radicals there took over the Mobilization Committee, another local mass organization formally created by Yen Hsi-shan.17 T h e rather uneven distribution of the League members in Shansi Province was also related to the internal politics of the CCP. Nieh Jung-chen and the unit of the 115th Division that opened up the forerunner of the Chin-Ch'a-Chi (ShansiChahar-Hopei) Border Region northeast of Wut'ai did not draw on a large number of civilian cadres for mass work. 18 T h e Sacrifice League's presence was most conspicuous in the southeastern corner of Shansi, which was the home of the 129th Division and P'eng Te-huai. P'eng was very concerned about the united front with Yen Hsi-shan, his immediate superior. 19 It seems that the Sacrifice League provided a cushion between them. A t what point, and for what motive, Yen Hsi-shan turned over the local administration of his province to the leaders of the League is obscure. According to one source, it was not until the northeastern half of the province fell to the Japanese forces that he appointed the League members to administrative posts in the occupied areas.20 This paralleled Chiang Kai-shek's practice toward the Communists. Sung Shao-wen was given the post of hsien magistrate in Wut'ai. 21 T h e n 14 Gillin, p. 232.

I« Ibid.

i t L i n Piao, et al., Chin-pei

yu-chi

16 V a n Slyke, p. 134. chan-cheng

chi-shih,

p p . 79-80, 105-106. A c -

cording to this account, the Mobilization Committee was authorized only in areas occupied by the Japanese forces. 18 K'ang-Jih

yu-chi-tui

ti tsu-chih

yii chan-shu

[ O r g a n i z a t i o n a n d tactics of a n t i -

Japanese guerrillas] (K'ang-Jih chan-cheng yen-chiu-hui), p. 41. One other area where hostility toward the Sacrifice League is often expressed by the Communist cadres is northwestern Shansi, commanded by Ho Lung. See Lo Kui-po, "K'ang-chan liang-chou-nien ti Chin hsi-pei yti wo-chun" [Northwestern Shansi and our a r m y on the second anniversary of resistance], Chun-cheng tsa-chih (hereinafter cited as Military Affairs Journal) (Chun-cheng tsa-chih-she, the Eighth Route Army), September, 1938, pp. 58, 60. 19 The Case of Peng Teh-huai, p. 191. T h e Chin-Chi-Yu District had many cadres who supported the W a n g Ming line on united f r o n t questions. T h e i r local slogan was "everything through Shansi." Growth of one revolutionary base, p. 199. 20 Pacification

War, No. 1, p. 211.

21 Ibid., p. 86. He was to head the Chin-Ch'a-Chi Border Region government.

INITIAL

EXPANSION

IN

NORTH

CHINA

91

Yen interceded with Nanking to secure recognition of the Communist base in this area as a border region. 22 Precisely what was authorized is not known. But it is certain that neither Yen nor Chiang authorized what was later called the Chin-Ch'a-Chi Border Region, which went beyond the Second War Zone in Shansi.23 In addition, the third district special commissioner's office in the southeast (Po I-po), the fifth district in the southwest (Jung Wu-sheng), and the sixth district in the northwest (Chang Wen-ang) were given to the Communist members of the League. 24 In these places Communist bases were built up on the basis of the pre-existing government structure or through "united front from above." 25 Outside of Shansi, Communist bases had to be constructed from the ground up. Just before the Lukouchiao Incident, the CCP dispatched small groups of Party cadres as organizers to many areas of north China. T h e Conference of Party Delegates in May of 1937 seems to have been the occasion for putting Communist organizations on war footing in north China. For instance, some thirty cadres— "professional revolutionaries"—began building the forerunner of the Chin-Chi-Yii District Party Committee by reviving old underground contacts.26 A similar work began in Shantung. "Far in advance of the war of resistance," it was reported, responsible Communist

party members who returned

to Shantung

from

a

m e e t i n g i n Y e n a n p l a n n e d h o w to d e v e l o p g u e r r i l l a w a r f a r e w h e n t h e J a p a n e s e b a n d i t s a t t a c k e d . B e f o r e t h e r e was a n y i n v a s i o n o f S h a n t u n g b y

the

e n e m y , e a c h l o c a l P a r t y o r g a n i z a t i o n in all o f S h a n t u n g e n t e r e d t h e s t a g e o f d e t a i l e d i m p l e m e n t a t i o n . . . .27

By early November, six divisions and one brigade of Japanese forces remained in north China. At this point, the Party Center issued its directive stating that the stage of regular warfare by the Kuomintang forces was ended. 28 This was an order to the Communist units to concentrate their efforts on base construction. All four quadrants of Gillin, p. 275. 23 T h e Eighth R o u t e Army was authorized to operate in northern Shansi. Soviet Russia in China, p. 83. In 1937, the areas along the Peiping-Hankow railway were designated as the First W a r Zone. Pacification War, No. 1, p. 52. T h e y did n o t belong to Y e n Hsi-shan's command. 24 Van Slyke, p. 136. 25 Growth of one revolutionary base, pp. 48-49. 26 Ibid., p. 198. See also ibid., pp. 18-20, 198-206, for a most detailed account of P a r t y expansion in the early stage of the war. 27 K'ang-Jih chan-cheng shih-ch'i chieh-fang-ch'ü kai-kuang [General conditions of the liberated areas during the anti-Japanese war] (hereinafter cited as Liberated Areas) (Peking: J e n - m i n ch'u-pan-she, 1953), p. 81. 28 Growth of one revolutionary base, p. 16. 22

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Shansi Province, divided by the Tat'ung-P'uchow railway running north and south and the Chengting-Taiyuan railway running east and west, were taken up. After the Battle of P'inghsingkuan in the northeast, the 115th Division left a unit of 2,000 men around Wut'ai under Nieh Jung-chen's command to build the forerunner of the Chin-Ch'aChi Border Region. Below the Wut'ai area on the southern side of the Chengting-Taiyuan railroad and Niangtzukuan was the home of the 129th Division led by Liu Po-ch'eng. What was later to become the Chin-Chi-Yii (Shansi-Hopei-Honan) District of Chin-Chi-Lu-Yu (Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan) Border Region started from a tiny circle around Hoshun, Yiishe, and Liao hsien. In the northwest corner between the Yellow River and the Tat'ung-P'uchow railway the 120th Division led by Ho Long dug in on both sides of the Great Wall around Ningwu, Shuo, and Shench'ih hsien.29 The main force of the 115th Division, led by Lin Piao, followed the Japanese forces moving into the southwestern corner of the province. Apparently it was ordered to build a base in Chungt'iao mountain, which runs north and south on the west side of the T'aihang mountain. 30 Lin Piao's unit had once taken this area in the spring of 1936. Some of its troops were natives of the area recruited on that occasion. There is no evidence, however, that the division succeeded in building a base here. Shortly afterward, the division was redeployed to Shantung. P'eng Te-huai was later accused of ordering some Communist units withdrawn from the Linfen area for fear of offending Yen Hsi-shan.31 It is my inference that he was removing Lin Piao's unit from the area for the sake of better relations in the united front. In contrast, Nieh Jung-chen's vigorous efforts in building the Chin-Ch'a-Chi base so closely conformed to Mao's line that his base was upheld as the "model anti-Japanese base" in 1939. 32 The speed of expansion of this base was phenomenal. Until about March, 1938, it relied almost wholly on the original contingent of military personnel to conduct its mass and political work. A desperate shortage of cadres was reported, though this was not peculiar to this area. "From all sides," we are told, "came the cry, 'we need cadres.' " Old security personnel, clerks, stable hands, and cooks were all assigned to the task of being a guerrilla leader or a cadre "whether or not they wanted it." 33 The first winter was cold and miserable. But with the setting up 29 Johnson, Peasant Nationalism, pp. 104-106. 30 Mao Tse-tung-chi,V, 325. 31 The Case of Peng Teh-huai, p. 191. 32 See Mao's prefatory remark to K'ang-Jih mo-fan ken-chii-ti Chin-Chi-Ch'a piench'ii [The model anti-Japanese base Shansi-Hopei-Chahar Border Region] (Chuncheng tsa-chih-she, 1939), pp. i-a. This was written on March 2, 1939. 33 Jbid., p . 6 .

INITIAL

EXPANSION

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93

of the infrastructure and mass organizations, the system of requisitioning grain from the countryside began to work. Already in February most of the guerrilla units began training and regrouping for "regularization." 34 In March, the army withdrew from the job of running mass work and played only a supplementary role in it. 35 What started as a guerrilla district was gradually growing into a base. In January, the Border Region Temporary Administrative Commission came into being. In March, hsien representatives of various national salvation associations—mass organizations—met.36 This base expanded eastward into central Hopei by establishing a liaison with the remnants of the Kuomintang forces under Lii Cheng-ts'ao. The union of Lii and the Eighth Route Army was in fact the tail end of the long process of the CCP's united front from below with Chang Hsiieh-liang, which earlier resulted in the disintegration of his forces and his revolt against Chiang Kai-shek at Sian. Lii began his military career as a youth by joining Chang Tso-lin's Northeastern Army and moved upward rapidly to become an officer. After the Mukden Incident he was assigned to work under General Wan Fu-lin. By the time the CCP started to infiltrate the Northeastern Army, then being used for anti-Communist campaign, Lii was a regimental commander. It is said that Chang Hsiieh-szu, Hsiieh-liang's younger brother, had persuaded Lii to join the CCP secretly by the time the war began.37 During the defense of Paoting in October, 1937, his regiment separated from Wan Fu-lin who connived with the Japanese to flee. The military hardware of Lii's regular unit impressed the poorly-equipped Communist forces. Nieh Jung-chen contacted him and succeeded in recruiting the whole unit into the Eighth Route Army. Lii also served concurrently as the head of the Central Hopei Administrative Office. It is quite possible that the Communists had some difficulty in dealing with the troops of the Northeastern Army under Lii's command.38 In early 1939, Ho Lung descended on central Hopei with the main force of the 120th Division and secured

J o Fei, " H u a - p e i yu-chi-tui yii min-chung yu-chi chan-cheng fa-chan ti chingyen" [Guerrillas in north China and experiences of developing popular guerrilla war], Cheng-chih kung-tso lun-ts'ung [Collection of essays on political work] (Chuncheng tsa-chih-sha, 1940), p. 1 1 8 . 35 Shu T ' u n g , "Chin-Ch'a-Chi pien-ch'u k'ang-chan san-nien-lai cheng-chih kungtso kai-kuang" [Overview of political work in the Chin-Ch'a-Chi Border Region in the three years of war], ibid., p. 2 1 5 . 36 K'ang-Jih mo-fan ken-chii-ti Chin-Chi-Ch'a, p. 18. 37 H u a n g Chen-hsia, ed., Chung-Kung chun-jen-chih [Mao's Generals] (Hong Kong: Research Institute of Contemporary History, 1968), pp. 97-98. 38 Kusano Fumio, Shina henku no kenkyu [A study of China's border regions] (Tokyo: Kokuminsha, 1944), pp. 1 5 - 1 7 .

94

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IN

CHINA

the area as a source of grain for Nieh Jung-chen's mountain base. In the spring of 1938, Sung Shih-lun and Teng Hua led a unit of the 120th Division, called the Yenpei Detachment into eastern Hopei. This area constituted the link between Manchuria and north China. The Detachment settled in Fanshan hsien in Yenshan mountain range. It was made up of six hundred soldiers of southern extraction from the former Red 29th Army, and they appeared to have abused the peasants. The natives organized themselves into an association called Liu-shan-hui and refused to supply the Detachment with grain. The conflict erupted into a peasant insurrection, in the course of which the peasant association was destroyed.39 It is not known whether the Japanese were behind this insurrection. In that summer, the Japanese forces in turn launched a campaign against the Communist unit and routed it. Later Sung Shih-lun was reprimanded by the Party for his failure and for his abuse of the peasant masses.40 In the following winter, Hsiao K'e, the vice commander of the 120th Division, led a unit into the same area to resume Sung's mission. By the summer of 1941, he had established a guerrilla base called the Chi-Je-Liao (Hopei-Jehol-Liaoning) Military District, subordinated to the Chin-Ch'a-Chi Border Region. The unit maintained a lean existence. It became the task of the 129th Division, operating in the Shangtang area just below the Chengting-Taiyuan railway in Shansi Province, to expand eastward into the southern Hopei where it borders on Shantung. Southern Hopei provided the lateral link between the durable bases in the mountains of Shansi and Shantung. In the spring of 1938, a small reconnaissance patrol of cavalry descended on the plain and was met by a band of guerrillas organized by refugee students from Peiping and Tientsin. 41 The guerrilla group was led by Yang Hsiu-feng, formerly a professor of history at the National Normal College in Peiping and the Director of the Education Department in the Hopei Provincial Government. Some time during the political upheaval preceding the war, he had been recruited by Liu Shao-ch'i to work with the CCP. For a brief while after the war, he worked in the Paoting headquarters of the Kuomintang forces in mobilizing the 38 Ibid., pp. 22-23. 40 Kuan-yii Sung Shih-lun t'ung-chih ti chiieh-ting [The decision concerning comrade Sung Shih-lun], cited in Pao-shu, ed., Chien-uiei chung-yao ts'an-k'ao tzu-liao hui-pien [Collection of important reference data about traitors and puppets] (no date, no publisher listed) (BI), p. 35. 41 Growth of one revolutionary base, p. 25.

INITIAL

EXPANSION

IN N O R T H

CHINA

95

youths. 42 He took with him some units of the Hopei People's Army, a Kuomintang regional force. Between March and May, his and several other guerrilla units were joined by the regular units. Hsu Hsiangch'ien and Sung Jen-ch'iung brought with them parts of the 129th and the 115th Divisions. Yang Hsiu-feng moved into Nankung with T e n g Hsiao-p'ing, the political commissar of the 129th Division, to build a base government for the Southern Hopei Military District. 43 By September, they were competing with the Kuomintang's Hopei governor Lu Chung-lin who was dispatched to Nankung to reclaim the lost area. In the spring of 1938, as Hsiichow and K'aifeng on the Lunghai railway fell, the CCP seems to have anticipated that the North China Area Army and what was then called the Central China Expeditionary Forces, moving up Yangtze River, would link up with each other across Honan Province. W u Chih-p'u and P'eng Hsueh-fen organized the Sixth Detachment of the New Fourth Army, in what was then called the Yu-Wan-Su (Honan-Anhwei-Kiangsu) Border Region, with the help of students from K'aifeng. 44 T h e anticipated link-up of the Japanese forces of north and central China did not take place, and the area was designated the Fifth War Zone by the Kuomintang. T h e designation of the Yu-Wan-Su Border Region was later withdrawn by the CCP. 45 One should not be misled by the CCP's maps of its border regions into thinking that they indicate the boundaries of Communist areas in the early stage of the war. These maps show the state of affairs at the end of the war; they conceal the difficulties encountered in some areas by the Communist forces early in the war. In contrast to the initial success in most of Shansi Province, the C C P encountered serious problems in Shantung and on the border of southern Shansi, northern Honan, and western Shantung. For some reason there is very little data concerning the Communist forces in Shantung. What little that are available today show that the Eighth Route Army did not make much headway there until the war was nearly over. In the early part of the war, serious opposition to the Communists came from the natives, not the Japanese forces. T h e border area of southern Shansi, western Shantung, and northern Honan was called Hsiao Chi-Lu-Yu (Small Hopei-Shantung-Honan) District to distinguish it from the latter-day Chi-Lu-Yii (Hopei42 Who's Who in II, 748. 43 Growth of one 44 Central China 45 Growth of one

Communist

China

( H o n g K o n g : U n i o n Research Institute, 1970),

revolutionary base, p . 26. Bureau First Plenum, pp. revolutionary base, p . 7.

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98

RESISTANCE

AND

REVOLUTION

IN

CHINA

Shantung-Honan) or the T a Chi-Lu-Yii (Large Hopei-ShantungHonan) District, which encompassed the Southern Hopei District and the Hsiao Chi-Lu-Yii District. 46 P'eng Te-huai went on an inspection tour of north China to solve "local confusion" at the behest of Chiang Kai-shek in the spring of 1938. He conceded that the conditions in northern Honan were most unsatisfactory. "There are no genuine mass movements there yet," he said, "and the feudal Hui-men organization is still very widespread." 47 Northern Honan along the Lunghai railway was the stronghold of the China Youth Party, a rival of both the Kuomintang and the CCP. In 1938, the Japanese Army sought to prevail on W u P'ei-fu to lead a puppet government, but he refused. Native cooperation with the Japanese in the Hsiichow-K'aifeng area was the by-product of that plot. T h e China Youth Party had a membership of 20,000 at the end of 1940, and its own military forces actively assisted in the defense of the Lunghai and the TientsinPukow railways. 48 T h e T a Chi-Lu-Yii District included western Shantung west of the Tientsin-Pukow railway. Here was one of three clusters of Communist guerrilla activities in Shantung. In this marshy area in the Old Yellow River basin, the father and son team of Fan Chu-hsien and Fan Shu-shen activated traditional rural self-defense when the warlord governor of Shantung, Han Fu-ch'ii, fled from the Japanese forces. Fan Chu-hsien was the Kuomintang's Sixth Area Special Commissioner. It is reported that he was assisted by 1,600 students.49 In the twelve hsien in the Sixth District around Liaoch'eng, he organized 30,000 peasants into ten groups (t'uan). Early in the war he seemed to have been on good terms with Shen Hung-lieh, Han Fu-ch'ii's successor. Shen paid for and equipped the peasants. T h e guerrillas grew to a force of 50,000 in thirty units. 50 In November, 1938, however, the Kuomintang's Shantung Provincial Government organized the landlords and the Hui-men into a "big insurrection." Many

46 ibid.,

p p . 29,50.

47 "Chien-ch'ih hua-pei k'ang-chan yii kung-ku t'uan-chi," [Uphold the resistance in north China and strengthen the unity], Ch'un-chung, No. 8-9, May 25, 1938, p. 241. 48 Pacification

War, N o . 1, p p . 69, 417-419, 486.

49 J o h n s o n , Peasant Nationalism, p. 1 1 1 . no Fan Chu-hsien fu-tzu hsiin kuo-nan [Sacrifice of F a n C h u - h s i e n f a t h e r a n d son

for national crisis] (The Political Department, the Kweilin Headquarters), pp. 9, 14. This, a Kuomintang propaganda pamphlet, gives us to believe that Fan Chu-hsien was killed by the Japanese. Actually, the Japanese forces were not capable of tracking down and assassinating a popular leader like him.

INITIAL

EXPANSION

IN

NORTH

CHINA

99

thousands of peasants put down Fan Chu-lisien's guerrillas and killed Fan Chu-hsien himself. 51 After this, western Shantung had only one cluster of guerrilla activities. T h e Hsien Party Committee of T'aian, a short distance south of Tsinan, organized guerrilla bands in Mt. T'ai (T'aishan). T h e force grew to one thousand by May, 1938, and called itself a unit of the Shantung Column. It was also assisted by students. T h e activities of this band were indistinguishable from ordinary peasant insurrection. It seemed to have made its living by attacking landlords. 52 Mt. T ' a i was in the large square bounded on the north by the TsintaoTsinan railway, on the west by the Tientsin-Pukow railway, on the south by the Lunghai railway, and by the Yellow Sea on the east. In the center was Mengshan, which provided the base of operation for the Kuomintang forces until 1943. After the fall of Tsinan and Tsingtao, regional forces led by the new governor Shen Hung-lieh moved into the area. T h e foundation of his power was 260 local self-defense groups, including militia (min-t'uan) and Hui-men. 53 Toward the end of 1938, the Kuomintang government was alarmed by the expansion of the Chinese Communist bases in unauthorized areas in north China, and it began sending its officials and armed forces behind the Japanese lines. Yii Hsueh-chung was appointed commander of the Shantung-Kiangsu War Zone. He and Shen Hung-lieh cooperated with L u Chung-lin, the governor of Hopei, against the Communists. By April of 1939, the Kuomintang forces were beefed up by the 51st and 57th Armies which had infiltrated into western Shantung. 54 T h e CCP, too, overcame its initial shortage of cadres as the bases in Shansi and Hopei were built up. Ch'en Kuan, who assumed the command of the 115th Division when Lin Piao was wounded in 1938, moved the 343rd Brigade from southeastern Shansi. A t the same time Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien, the vice commander of the 129th Division, led a part of the Division into western Shantung. 66 T h e life of the Communist regulars of the Shantung Column seems to have been rather difficult. According to Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien, in late 1940, "the development of the anti-Japanese forces is uneven" in Shantung. He continued, ". . . strictly speaking up until today Shantung is still not a consolidated base." He mentioned the T'aishan area in western Shantung and Fenglai, Huanghsien, Kaiyang, and Yehhsien in 51 Growth of one revolutionary base, p . 305. 52 Liberated Areas, p p . 81-82; H o K a n - c h i h , p . 333. 63 Liberated Areas, p . 83. 54 Pacification War, N o . 1, p . 160. 65 H u a n g C h e n - h s i a , Mao's Generals, p . 281.

100

RESISTANCE

AND

REVOLUTION

IN

CHINA

C h i a o t u n g as the only two areas where the C o m m u n i s t forces were in control. 5 6 T h e guerrilla movement in C h i a o t u n g was evidently an outgrowth of the tradition of coastal self-defense as well as piracy. Shantung's coast had been ravaged by Japanese pirates in M i n g a n d early C h ' i n g times, and fishermen a n d peasants of these areas h a d a tradition of para-military organization. In m a n y places defensive fortifications against o l d pirates still remain. T h e peninsula also h a d its o w n pirates. B y September, 1938, the so-called F i f t h D e t a c h m e n t of the E i g h t h R o u t e A r m y ' s S h a n t u n g C o l u m n h a d come into being, a n d included a water-borne force. 5 7 N o t very m u c h is k n o w n about the conditions i n northwestern Shansi, the forerunner of the Chin-Sui (Shansi-Suiyiian) Border Region. T h e m o v e m e n t of the C o m m u n i s t forces here was confined to the narrow strip between the P e i p i n g - S u i y i i a n railway in the n o r t h a n d the L i s h i h - F e n y a n g h i g h w a y to the south. Y e n Hsi-shan kept his o w n forces below the L i s h i h - F e n y a n g highway, in the southwestern corner of the province. T h e r e were twenty-seven hsien in the northwestern corner, b u t the C o m m u n i s t control of the area appeared to be tenuous. Northwestern Shansi was very m o u n t a i n o u s and underpopulated. Its value was in the fact that it was the corridor connecting Shen-Kan-Ning w i t h Chin-Ch'a-Chi and other n o r t h C h i n a bases. B u t this route was nearly severed later w h e n Japanese pacification intensified. Peasant mobilization in the area was frustrated, and collaboration by the landlords w i t h the Japanese forces was conspicuous. 5 8 T h i s may have been related to Y e n Hsi-shan's hostility toward the Communists and to the collaboration of the M o n g o l s in the north. H o L u n g , w h o c o m m a n d e d the C o m m u n i s t base here, spent all of 1939 in central H o p e i w i t h the m a i n u n i t of the 120th Division. D u r i n g that time one brigade and one regiment of regular troops stayed behind. N o local government came into existence until 1941. O n e notable development in this base was the g r o w t h of the Shansi N e w A r m y , a regional force that was wrested from Y e n Hsi-shan's c o m m a n d by the Sacrifice League. H s u Fan-t'ing played a m a j o r role in the N e w A r m y . 5 9 56 Chieh-fang, 57 Hsiieh-chan

N o . 119, p . 26. pa-nien ti Chiaotung

Affairs Journal,

A p r i l , 1939, p p . 5-9.

tzu-ti-ping

[ S o n - a n d - b r o t h e r - s o l d i e r s of C h i a o -

tung in eight years of bloody war] (Chiaotung hsin-hua shu-tien, 1945), p. 3. 58 Lo Kui-po, "K'ang-chan liang-chou-nien ti Chin hsi-pei . . . ," p. 56; Ho Lung, "Chin hsi-pei chih chin-hsi" [Northwestern Shansi today and yesterday]. Military 59 About Hsu Fan-ti'ing and the origin of the Shansi New Army, see Johnson, Peasant Nationalism,

p p . 105-106; V a n Slyke, p p . 135-138.

INITIAL

EXPANSION

IN

NORTH

CHINA

101

T h e foregoing survey of the Communist bases in the early stage of the war shows that their development was highly uneven. T h e gross and imprecise nature of available data does not permit accurate assessment. But it is safe to conclude that a spectacular growth of Communist power was correlated, on the one hand, with the disintegration of the old regime in the wake of the Japanese blitz and, on the other, with the careful groundwork that preceded the war. T h e CCP enjoyed both of these conditions in Shansi. T h e strength of the opposition in most of Shantung Province seemed to have something to do with local organization of the landlords and its linkage with regional Kuomintang leadership. It is interesting to recall that the Japanese forces stopped at the door to Shantung and negotiated for nearly three months with Han Fu-ch'ii for a peaceful surrender before moving in. This was very unlike the manner in which Hopei was taken. This fact might have given the local elites a chance to prepare for possible anarchy. Clearly there were some conditions peculiar to Shantung. Unfortunately, we do not know what accounts for the success of Communist mobilization in the Chiaotung area and the failure elsewhere. T h e case of the Liaoch'eng area, where the peasants were mobilized by one set of government officials and countermobilized by another, suggests the importance of leadership at this stage.

SPONTANEOUS MOBILIZATION WITHIN THE T R A D I T I O N

It is well known that in developing the rural strategy of revolution with the sanction of the Sixth Congress, the Chu-Mao Group put together some axioms to be followed in selecting the sites for the revolutionary bases. T h e soviets were to be built in areas difficult of access; they should fall between the spheres of influence of various warlords, and between the jurisdiction of several provincial authorities. In addition, areas where pre-existing social organizations were well entrenched and hostile to the revolution had to be avoided. These organizations included armed landlords, lineage organizations, secret societies, bandits, and the like. In November, 1928, Mao reported from Chingkanshan that "wherever the Red Army goes, it finds the masses cold and reserved; only after propaganda and agitation do they slowly rouse themselves . . . We have an acute sense of loneliness and are every moment longing for the end of such a lonely life." 60 Subsequently, this base was abandoned. Mao wrote to the Party Center of the advisability of building the soviet in southern Kiangsi 60 SIT, I, 99.

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COMMUNIST TABLE

BASES

255

10

R E N T AND INTEREST REDUCTION AND SOCIAL MOBILITY IN THE T'AIHANG DISTRICT 1

Class

landlord

self-managing landlord 2

rich peasants

middle peasants

poor peasants

hired peasants

Period

before May, 1942 after May, 1942 campaign after 1944 campaign before May, 1942 after May, 1942 campaign after 1944 before May, 1942 after May, 1942 campaign after 1944 before May, 1942 after May, 1942 campaign after 1944 before May, 1942 after May, 1942 campaign after 1944 before May, 1942 after May, 1942 campaign after 1944

Percentage of household

Percentage of land held

23.04

2-75

2.02 1.65

8-79

Average land per household (in mou)

98.64 42.28

3-64

0.50 O.41

I-59

0-33

37-32

0.91 0.58

21.82

18.68

30-37

14-53

17.18

20.74

5-99

37.80

37.02

46.79

54-87

11.56 11.54

7-25

6.90

60.85

55-2O

18.98 20.05 17.01

48-95

42.12 33-33

1.88 Q-95

0.49

0.25 .

O-39

4-57

4.69

1-57

4.26

0.18

1 Growth of one revolutionary base, p. 1 2 7 . T h e s e statistics were taken f r o m fifteen " t y p i c a l villages" in the following twelve hsien: T s a n h u a n g , Hotung, Hohsi, T ' a i k u , Yiishe, Hsiangyiian, L i p e i , P'ingshun, H u k u a n , She, L i n p a i , a n d Hsingt'ai. 2 Ching-ying ti-chu. T h i s is defined as a landlord w h o " m a n a g e s his own land, adopts capitalist exploitation method, hires labor, takes part in production, exploits surplus labor w i t h o u t engaging in the productive labor . . . ." P'eng T e - h u a i in Kung-fei huo-kuo, I I I , 403. T h e r e were m a n y o£ them in central H o p e i , according to him.

ation in the size of the rich peasant households. In 1937, 8.45 percent of the total households was rated as rich peasant. By 1941, the size of this group declined to 1.78 percent. T h e n it expanded again to 7.88 percent by 1942. 1 0 0 A good number of the rich peasants in 1942 were 100 ibid., p. 184.

256

RESISTANCE

AND

REVOLUTION

IN

CHINA

former middle or poor peasants who rose in status, i.e., the "new rich." Some former landlord families which had declined in status were also in the group. Effects of social mobility due to the land program of the CCP are always blunted in such a presentation because it includes downward mobility due to division of inheritance (fenchía). Effectiveness of the taxation and rent and interest reduction is documented dramatically in Table io, showing "class relations" in the T'aihang District, taken from a post-war Communist source. In the winter of 1944 and early spring of 1945, the T'aihang District carried out "the most thorough campaign of rent and interest reduction" for a second or even a third time in many villages. 101 Rapid increase in the number of middle peasants and a steady decline in the number of the poor peasants are clearly noticeable. A much slower rate of social change can be seen from the data taken from Anle hsiang in Laianhsien, some eighty kilometers northwest of Nanking in the Huainan Su-Wan Border Region. This investigation was made in late 1943. Anle was made up of five villages with a total population of 2,001 in 434 households. Its pre-war population was 1,379 in 297 households. According to the investigator, actual social change was much greater than is indicated by the table, since there were many divisions of inheritance and new migrants from Shantung after the war began. Still the continued survival of the "big landlord" is striking. Actual income of the poor peasants might have been larger than indicated as they worked on the property of landlords, (see Table 11.) In the areas of Shen-Kan-Ning which had completed land revolution before the coming of the united front, social change was most conspicuous. According to Lin Po-ch'ii's report of November, 1941, I n the ruins of the war, the people have not only restored the destroyed houses and fields, they are slowly beginning to prosper. Two-thirds of the peasants have draft animals . . . the peasants are better off year after year. T h i s is shown mainly in the rapid increase of middle and rich peasants. Moreover middle peasants have become the most important elements in the villages. 1 0 2

In the four hsiang of Anting, the rich and middle peasants increased from 7 percent before the revolution to 61 percent. In the four hsiang of Anhsi, the middle peasants increased from ten to sixty-four house101 Growth of one revolutionary base, pp. 126-127. 102 Shen-Kan-Ning pien-ch'ü ts'an-i-hui wen-hsien hui-chi,

p. 94.

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-< «i N n s 945. 308 C o m m u n i s t power: conditions of, 8-9, 14-15, 86-87, 304, 308-309 Constitutionalism: C C P d e m a n d for, 56, 241; K u o m i n t a n g ' s support for, 168; K u o m i n t a n g ' s postponement of, 241 Craigie, Sir R o b e r t : British ambassador to J a p a n , 165 Creel, H. G., 309 Crowley, James B., 49, 52 C u l t u r a l R e v o l u t i o n : o n Battle of O n e H u n d r e d Regiments, 216 Dare-to-die c o l u m n , 177-178 D a t e Junnosuke, 204 December Incident: in Shen-Kan-Ning, 174-176; in Shansi, 177-178 December 9th M o v e m e n t : Internationalists' a p p r o v a l of, 38; Mao's a p p r o v a l of, 38; L i u Shao-ch'i on, 86 Democratic centralism: in T h r e e - t h i r d s system, 240 Democratic R e p u b l i c : proclaimed by Chinese C o m m u n i s t Party, 44-46 Desertion: cause of, 281-283 Detachment: size of, 136-137 D o i h a r a - C h ' i n T e - c h ' u n A g r e e m e n t , 36, 52. See also U m e z u - H o Ying-ch'in Agreement E i g h t e e n t h G r o u p A r m y : f o r m a l designation of C o m m u n i s t a r m y in n o r t h C h i n a by K u o m i n t a n g government, 55. See E i g h t h R o u t e A r m y E i g h t h R o u t e A r m y : a u t o n o m y of R e d A r m y b e i n g m a j o r issue in united front negotiations, 28, 53, 55, 59-60; initial K u o m i n t a n g order of battle, 55; authorized combat zone, 55, 209210, 212; aversion of officer corps tow a r d guerrilla warfare, 7 1 ; c o m b a t tactics of, 64-65, 220, 213-274; regular-

ization dependent on external source of supply, 71, 160, 305; K u o m i n t a n g provisions for, 122, 166; C h i n - C h ' a - C h i Military District a h e a d in mass mobilization, anti-traitor w o r k , aggressive military operation, 134, 274; armyp a r t y relationship, 139, 279; a u t h o r ized force level, 145, 212; c o m b a t report of B a t t l e of O n e H u n d r e d Regiments, 219; headquarters attacked, 274; localization of, 276-279; desertion from, 281-283; e x p a n d e d again a t end of war, 306 E i g h t h R o u t e A r m y : 115th Division: in Battle of P'inghsingkuan, 61-65; failed to take southwestern Shansi, 92; redeployed to Shantung, gg; did not take p a r t in offensive initially, 217; c o m m i t t e d atrocities, 233 E i g h t h R o u t e A r m y : 120th Division: transferred to central H o p e i to reorganize w a r l o r d a r m y , 82, 93-94; returned to northern Shansi, 173; transferred u n i t to Shen-Kan-Ning, 173 E i g h t h R o u t e A r m y : i 2 g t h Division: exp a n d e d i n t o south H o p e i , 94-95; close cooperation w i t h Sacrifice L e a g u e , 90; in 1940 offensive, 218-219 Fan Chu-hsien, 98-99 Far Eastern M u n i c h , 164-166 F e n g C h i h - a n : division c o m m a n d e r under Sung Che-yuan, 34 F e n g Shou-p'eng, 203 F i f t h Encirclement and Suppression C a m p a i g n : K u o m i n t a n g ' s strategy in, 15; W a n g Ming's appraisal of, 1 6 - 1 7 ; Jerome C h ' e n on, 144 First C h a n g s h a C a m p a i g n : fierceness o f , 171; C C P ' s concern over, 172 France: inclined to appease J a p a n , 164, 166; surrendered to G e r m a n y , 208; closed Indochina route t o C h u n g k i n g , 208, occupation of French Indochina, 208 Friction between K u o m i n t a n g a n d C o m m u n i s t forces, 95, 154, 157, 167, 168, 192, i 9 7 - i g 8 , 222, 233. See also Decemb e r Incident, N e w 4th A r m y Incident Fukien Rebellion: Mao blamed for h a n d l i n g of, 17; Mao's reluctance to speak of, 47 G e r m a n y : trained K u o m i n t a n g a r m y , 17, 53; proposed anti-Soviet defense alliance to T o k y o , October, 1935, 29;

3

i8

Germany (cont.) anti-Comintern pact with Japan, November, 1936, 29; mediation in war, 68, 71, 208, 223; pact with Soviet Union, 165; overture for alliance with Japan, 165; Axis alliance completed, 222; invaded Soviet Union, 264 Grain ticket, 128 Guerrillas: total number in north China in Communist estimate, 114; in Japanese estimate, 203; irregular security forces formally enlisted by Japanese, 205-206; total Communist irregular forces, 206, 308; convergence of Chinese tradition with Communist infrastructure, 297-302. See also Chinese Communist Party, Rural self-defense Han Chün, 177 H a n Fu-ch'ü, Shantung governor: fled from Japanese, 98; executed by Kuomintang, 288 H a n Te-ch'in, Kiangsu governor: attacked New 4th Army, 197; forces of, routed, 222; fled province, 287; forces of, on Kiangsu-Anhwei border, 291 Hard wall and clean field, 279 Hata Shunroku: commander of China Expeditionary Forces, 268 Hinton, William, 116, 118 Ho Kan-chih: cited, 37, 45, 215; on Soviet intervention in united front, 227 H o L u n g : in Battle of O n e Hundred Regiments, 218; on rural self-defense, 299 H o Ping-ti, 309 H o Ying-ch'in: in Umezu-Ho Ying-ch'in Agreement, 36, 52; in Sian Incident, 43; military report to Kuomintang's 5th Plenum, 155; report of illegal Communist activities to U.S., 173; message to C C P , October, 1940, 222223; second message to C C P , December, 1940, 225; denounced by C C P for New 4th Army Incident, 227 Hofheinz, Roy, Jr., 295 H o u Ju-yung, 178 Hsi-k'uan, 123 Hsi-liang, 123 Hsiang Ying: advocated mobile warfare, 70-71; supported Internationalists and objected to CCP's order to move north, 159; defended united front with Kuomintang, 160; November, 1940 letter to Kuomintang, 224; killed in New 4th

INDEX Army Incident; some mystery surrounding his death, 226 Hsiao Ching-kuang, 176 Hsiao K'e, 94, 272 Hsieh-tou, 299 Hsu Fan-t'ing: organized Shansi New Army, 100, 177; strange reaction to December Incident, 179 Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien: moved into south Hopei, 95; on difficulty of penetrating Shantung, 99; attacked Shantung government, 211 Hsu Yung-ch'ang, 68 Hu Tsung-nan: in December Incident, 178 Hu Yu-chih, 23 Hua-cheng wei-ling, 279 Hua Fu (Otto Braun), 20 Hua hsia-ch'u, 279 Huai River Valley: in Mao's plans for last challenge agaisnt Chiang Kai-shek, 3°8 Huaipei Su-Wan (North H u a i KiangsuAnhwei) base: founded, 196; administrative program of, 238 H u a n g Yung-sheng, 272 Huangch'iao: first battle of, 211; second battle of, 222 Hui Peiple's Detachment, 272 H u l l Note: impact of, on united front, 264 Huntington, Samuel P., 104-105, 295 Hut'uo River, 272 I'chang Campaign, 199 Imai T a k e o , 190 Indochina. See France Intellectuals: "reliable ally" of C C P , 31; subverted warlord forces, 34; sabotaged local ceasefire at Lukouchiao, 55; pre-war agitation of, 85-86; Liu Shao-ch'i on, 86; as cadres in Communist bases, 86-91, 139, 230-231; Li Wei-han on, 231; tension with old army cadres, 231. See also Sacrifice League Internationalist: controlled C C P during Fifth Encirclement Campaign, 16; views of, on CCP's defeat, 16-17, 1820; view of, on Fukien Rebellion, 17; connection between urban line and softness toward Kuomintang, 26-27, 72-73, 262-263; accused Mao of L e f t deviation, 45, 78, 261; struggle for power with Mao, 73, 160, 161-163; tried to retain foothold in W u h a n

INDEX and Shanghai-Nanking-Hangchow delta, 74, 159; undermined by Kuomintang, 79, 210; in Shansi Province, go; demanded bolshevization of CCP, 161; final defeat of, 227-228. See also C h a n g Wen-t'ien, Ch'in Pang-hsien, Soviet Union, W a n g M i n g Iriye Akira: on U.S. intervention in China war, 265-266 Ishikawa T a d a o , 40 Ishiwara Kanji, 68 Itagaki Seishiro, 61, 191 Jao Shu-shih: on political complexity of central China, 290 Japan: feared China's unification under Kuomintang, 9; Stalin wanted neutrality pact with, in 1931, 29; in antiComintern pact with Germany, 29; sought to readjust relation with China in 1936, 41-42; retreated from north China in 1937, 44, 52; origin of second Sino-Japanese war, 48-49, 52-53; Army General Staff opposed China war, 52, 68; proclaimed "New Order," 71-72; set u p Temporary and Restoration Governments in China, 149-150; Imperial conference decision of November, 1938, 150; invited China to take part in "New Order," 150; negotiated with W a n g Ching-wei, 150-151; JapanW a n g Ching-wei agreement, 151; new war policy, November, 1938, 151; new war policy, December, 1938, 151; border wars with Soviet Union, 155, 165, 171; sought British cooperation against China, 164-166, 208; hesitated between alliance with Britain and Germany, 165; impact of SovietGerman pact on, 165-166; explored sphere of influence agreement with Hitler and Stalin, 165; neutrality pact with Soviet Union, 1941, 165; established China Expeditionary Forces in 1939, 166; campaigns in 1939, 171; came close to defeat in Kuomintang's winter offensive, 171; landing in Kwangsi coast, 171, 199; peace exploration through Kiri Operation, 189-191; Tch'ang Campaign, 199; sought to withdraw troops from China, 199, 266; began to pursue Communist troops primarily in late 1939 in north China, 200; extended blockade line into Shansi, 206-207; "southward advance" advocated, 208, 264; plans to take In-

3*9 dochina to encircle China, 208; impact of Battle of One Hundred Regiments on, 219, 264; joined Axis, 222; last peace exploration before recognizing W a n g Ching-wei regime, 223-224; accepted Kuomintang's peace terms, 224; troop level in China in 1941, 266; motive for attacking Kuomintang forces in Shansi in 1941, 266-267; began most intense phase of pacification in north China, 268; penetration of Communist bases, 268-276; passim; setback in Pacific, 284; began to reduce pacification zone in north China, 284; force level in pacification campaigns, 284-286; parallel between China war and Vietnam war, 286; cooperation with Yen Hsi-shan, 287-288. Jen Pi-shih, 60, 244 Johnson, Chalmers, 4-5, 311 Jung Wu-sheng 91, 177 Justice Force, 87 Kagesa Sada'aki, 150 Kao Ching-t'ing, 159, 195 Kao Kang: review of Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region's history, 298; on connection between Communist movement and bandit movement, 298 Kao Shu-hsün, 192 Kataoka, 240 Kao Tsung-wu: visited Japan as Kuomintang's emissary, 150; defected back to Chungking, 179 Kenkoku dainigun, 203-204 Kiri Operation, 189-191, 223 Kolaohui, 107-108 Konoe, Fumimaro, prime minister: first peace exploration, 68; refused to deal with Kuomintang, 71; proclaimed " N e w Order," 150; explored "panregion" arrangement with Germany and Soviet Union, 165; in Kiri Operation (in second cabinet), i g i ; last peace exploration, 223-224; recognized W a n g Ching-wei government, 224 K u Chu-t'ung: in decision to accept German mediation, 68; appointed 3rd W a r Zone commander, 153; in New 4th Army Incident, 226, 227 Kuan Hsiang-ying, 218 Kuan Wen-wei, 211 Kuhn, Philip A., 6, 84, 300 K'ung Hsiang-hsi: threatened Britain with prospect of Sino-Japanese alliance, 164

INDEX

320 Kuomintang: traditional, rather than fascist, dictatorship, 7; force level in 4th and 5th encirclement campaigns, 13, 15; debilitated by warlordism, 15, 86-87; compelled to appease imperialist powers before national unification, 15, 77; new tactics in 5th encirclement campaign, 15; refused ceasefire with CCP, May, 1936, 37; moved toward alliance with Soviet Union, 41; abandoned appeasement of Japan, 41-42; abandoned armed struggle with Communists at 3rd Plenum of 4th CEC, 44, 54; hoped to check Japan with Anglo-American intervention, 53, 265, 304; shift of anti-Communist strategy, 54; order of battle for 8th Route Army, 55; accepted united front, September, 1937, 55-56; assigned CCP in northern Shensi, 55; in southern Kiangsu, 159; in Shen-Kan-Ning, 174; in northern Shantung, 212; Program of Resistance and Reconstruction, 58; provisions for Communist army in early stage, 122; total force level, 145, 305; strategic options against Japan and CCP, 148-149; rebuffed "New Order," 150; 5th Plenum, 152-155; military reorganization and centralization, 153, 154; new order of battle, 153; rejected "block within," 153; War Area Party and Political Affairs Commission, 154; anti-Communist measures, 154; expelled Wang Ching-wei, 155; stage of counter-offensive, 155; commenced Shen-Kan-Ning blockade, 164; new stage in anti-Communism, November, 1939, 168; decided to convene national assembly, 168; stopped supply of ammunition to CCP, 169; First Changsha Campaign, 171; nearly defeated Japanese 11th Army in winter offensive, 171; plotted December Incident, 174; T'ienshui Headquarters, 175; penalized Yen Hsi-shan, 177; terms of peace with Japan in Kiri Operation, igo; warning to CCP against unauthorized expansion, 191; regional forces in Hopei liquidated by Communists, 192; Wei Li-huang pushed back Communist forces, 192; 7th Plenum, 208; in critical international situation, 208; first counterproposal to CCP, 208-210; ordered New 4th Army out of central China in final decision, 211-212; anticipated

Communist insurrection in August, 1940, 214; second deadline for Communist compliance, 223; peace terms with Japan, November, 1940; 224; third deadline for Communist compliance, 225; attacked New 4th Army, 226; disbanded New 4th Army, 226; plans to attack New 4th Army in north Kiangsu, 226-227; subsequent negotiations with CCP in war, 228; hoped for Russian intervention, 303; hoped for U.S. landing in China, 304; changed mind after U.S. intervention in Shen-Kan-Ning crisis of 1943, 306 Lai Ch'uan-chu, 227 Land revolution: July, 1936 directive of CCP reconfirmed expropriation of landlord class, 38; land confiscation indispensable for peasant mobilization, 40, 309; landlord class kept out of united front, 40, 119; standard sequence in Communist land revolution in Kiangsi, 117-118; land investigation, 118, 245; development of land program from 1935 to 1937, 118-119, 122; unified progressive tax, 122, 248; land confiscation during war, 122-123, 128, 132; national salvation public grain, 123; hsi-liang, 123; hsi-k'uang, 123; rent and interest reduction early in war, 124; rational burden, 124-127; village class rational burden, 125-127; hsien class rational burden, 125; tax rates in Shansi 128-129; tax rate on poor, 129; handling of traitors, 132135; landlord class forced to become traitors, 134; CCP's ban on free market, 236; CCP removed ban on free market, 237; CCP decision on land policy, January, 1942, 246-247; tax rate after 1941, 248-249; tax exemption of properties after 1941, 248; squeeze on landlord class after 1941, 249-250; rent reduction after 1941, 249; tactics adopted in rent and interest reduction, 251; CCP policy on interest rate after 1941, 251-252; tax exemption of industries, 252-253; transformation of landlord class, 252253; social mobility of peasants, 253258; continuity of CCP land program from Kiangsi to Yenan periods, 310 Large Hopei-Shantung-Honan definition of, 95, 98 Lei Feng, Corporal, 301

District:

INDEX Li P'in-hsien, 197-291 Li Shou-wei, 222 Li T e (Albert List), Comintern agent, 276 Li Tsung-jen: revolt against Chiang Kaishek, 1936, 38; appointed gth War Zone commander, 153 Li Wei-han: critical of rural orientation, 231 Liang Hua-chih, 90 Liang Tun-hou, 90 Lich'eng Conference: CCP Northern Bureau curbed radical excess, 193-194, 234 Lin Hsi-min, 106 Lin Piao: report on Battle of P'inghsingkuan, 64-65; supported Mao on base construction, 66-67; failed to take southwest Shansi, 92 Lin Po-ch'ii, 243, 256 Lindsay, Michael, 248 Liu Chih-tan, 36, 108 Liu Kuei-t'ang, 203-205 Liu Po-ch'eng, 193-194, 218 Liu Shao-ch'i: on intellectuals, 86; on Yen Hsi-shan, 87; report on guerrilla war in north China, 104 ff.; as chief of Central Plains Bureau, 160, 195; on cultivation of a Communist, 163; political commissar of New 4th Army, 227; on conditions in central China, 289; feared premature Russo-Japanese war, 303 Lo Jui-ch'ing, 232 Long March: See Chinese Communist Party, Maoist history, Mao Tse-tung Lii Cheng-ts'ao: recruited by CCP before Sian Incident, 93-94; in action in central Hopei, 272 L u Chung-Iin: appointed Hopei governor, 95, 157; appointed Hopei-Chahar War Zone commander, 153; suffered setbacks in friction, 168; fled Hopei, 192 Luntung Incident: See December Incident Mao Tse-tung: resistance as "peasant war," 3; China as "semi-colonial," "semi-feudal" country, 5; on preconditions of " R e d political power," 8; originated myth of Long March, 13; advice of, ignored by CCP leadership, 16; began to criticize his opponents, 16; blamed defeat on personal tactical error of opponents, 17, 19; monopo-

321 lized radio communication on Long March, 18; on validity of rural strategy at Tsunyi, 18-19, 20; Tsunyi Conference as military coup, 20; blamed Chang Kuo-t'ao at Meoerhkai, 21; insisted on Shensi as destination of Long March, 21; conceded Wang Ming's authorship of August First Declaration, 22; ended Long March with 4,000 troops, 26; objected to ceasefire proposal, 27; objected to united front from above, 28-30; sought to combine revolution and war, 32-34; attitude of, toward landlord class, 3840; revealed ways to force China into war, 3; on contradiction, 47; Eight Point Program of, 58; ordered Communist forces to disengage from enemy and concentrate on base construction, 66; strategic analysis of, 66-71; controlled preparation for 7th CCP congress, 73; strategic analysis of, 75-79; opposed defense of Wuhan, 78; military policy of, prevailed at 6th Plenum, 79-80; postponed 7th CCP congress, 80; had his way on substantive decisions of 6th Plenum, 80; ordered expansion into Hopei, Shantung, north Kiangsu, 82; upheld Chin-Ch'a-Chi Border Region as model to be emulated, 92, 157; on difficulty of subduing armed peasants, 101-102, 104; on typical land revolution sequence in Kiangsi, 1 1 7 - 1 1 8 ; on tax rates, 129; predicted troop level necessary to defeat Kuomintang, 143-144; on Far Eastern Munich, 164; on second stage of world war, 166-167; announced stage of stalemate, September, 1939, 167; laid down tactics for piecemeal expansion, 180-182; conception of revolutionary united front, 182; view of, on Kuomintang government, 182; on New Democracy as post-bourgeoisdemocratic stage, 187; close resemblance of, to Heinz Neumann, Besso Lominadze, Ch'ii Ch'iu-pai, 187-188; on China as Asiatic society, 188; birthday greeting to Stalin, 188-189; objected to Battle of One Hundred Regiments, 216-217; power of, consolidated after New 4th Army Incident, 227-228; against ostracism of intellectuals, 231; opposition to parliamentarism, 240; attitude toward enlightened gentry, 241; republished Rural Survey,

INDEX

322 Mao Tse-tung (cont.) 244-245; criticized capitalism in bases, 259; on dispensing with October Revolution in China, 261; criticized P'eng Te-huai's liberalism, 262; picked troops and simplified administration program of, 277; on loss of troops and population in war, 281; views of, shifted between primacy of army and peasantry, 296; on Chinese revolution as armed struggle, 308 Maoist history: "Maoist strategy," 3-4; on validity of rural strategy, 4; on Long March, 12-13; on defeat in Kiangsi as purely tactical subjective error of incumbent leaders, 18-20; common denominator of Mao's critics, 262-263; birth of Maoist myth on peasant revolution, 307-308 Maoerhkai Conference, 20-22 Matsuoka Yosuke: discussed "pan-region" arrangement with Hitler and Stalin, 165; in search of peace with China, 223-224 Military district, 137, 139 Militia: established, 279 Mobilization Committee: hostile to Yen Hsi-shan in Communist areas, go; organization of, 116 Moore, Barrington, Jr., 7 Mou Ch'eng-liu, 203 Moukung: See Maoerhkai Conference Myers, Ramon, 234 National Assembly: Kuomintang's agreement to convene, 168; postponed, 241 National Political Council: demanded defense of Wuhan, 75; pressed for national assembly and constitutionalism, 168 National salvation by detour, 287. See also White skin, red heart New Democracy: economic components of, 247; political intentions behind, 260-263. See also Chinese Communist Party, Land Revolution, Three-thirds system New 4th Army: See Chinese Communist Party, Hsiang Ying New 4th Army Incident, 226 Newly organized village, 126, 141 Nieh Jung-chen: upheld by Mao as model in base construction, 92, 157; in Battle of One Hundred Regiments, 217; number of troops under, 272

Nishio Chuzo: first commander of China Expeditionary Forces, 166 Nomonhan Incident, 165, 171 North China Area Army: established, 61; jurisdiction in north Kiangsu, 197 North Kiangsu: Communist penetration of, came late in war, 274, 286, 294 North Yangtze Command, 195 Northeastern Anti-Japanese Army: proposed Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tsetung unite against Japan, October, »935. 27 Northwest Route, 173 Okamura Yasuji: appointed commander of North China Area Army, 268; sankô seisaku of, parodied by Communists, 273 One-half system: precursor of Threethirds system, 240 O-Yu-Wan (Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei) Soviet: loss of, 13 Pacification: zone of, 152; degree of, in Japanese statistics, 268-269 Pai Chien-wu, 204 Pai Ch'ung-hsi: revolted against Chiang Kai-shek, 34; in Kuomintang decision for peace discussion, 68; messages to Communists, 222-223, 225 P'an Han-nien: dispatched to Moscow from Maoerhkai, 23; in ceasefire negotiation with Kuomintang, 37 P'ang P'ing-hsiin: attacked Communists in December Incident, 178; succeeded Lu Chung-lin as Hopei governor, 209; defected to Japanese, 288 Panyushkin, A. S., 170 Peasants: tradition of militarization, 6, 84, 300; conditions for supporting Communists, 14-15, 265, 286; land expropriation and redistribution indispensable for mobilization of, 40, 309; "semi-feudal" traits of, and their linkage to Communist infrastructure, 101116, 136-142, 298-299; Lo Jui-ch'ing's view of, 232; revolutionary potential of, 295-297; Cheng Weisan's view of, 297-298, 300; Max Weber on, 299 Pearl Harbor: impact of, on united front, 265 Peiyiieh District, 271-272 P'eng Chen, 238 P'eng Hsiieh-fen: organized guerrillas in northern Honan, 95; disagreed with

INDEX Liu Shao-ch'i's order to move behind Japanese line, 196; attacked by Kuomintang, 290 P'eng T e - h u a i : appointed vise-commander of 18th G r o u p Army by Kuomintang, 55; opposed Mao a t Loch'uan Conference, 61; belittled Lin Piao's achievement, 63; protested Lin Piao for taking away Yen Hsi-shan's credit, 65; accused by Mao of warlordism, 66; d e m a n d e d mobile war against Japanese, 67, 7 0 - 7 1 ; patronized Sacrifice League, 90; transferred Lin Piao o u t of Shansi for fear of Yen Hsi-shan, 92; sought to save Chungking's face a f t e r December Incident, 178-179; protest message to Ch'en Ch'eng, 191; a t Lich'eng Conference, 193-194, 233-234; motive for launching Battle of O n e H u n d r e d Regiments, 214-216; 1959 self-criticism on offensive, 216; message to Kuomintang, November, 1940, 224; presumptive a u t h o r of prototype of Three-thirds system, 240; lenient on tax policy toward rich, 247-248; on r e n t a n d interest reduction, 250-251; d e m a n d e d p e r m a n e n t democracy, 262; wounded by Japanese, 274; 1942 selfcriticism on offensive, 276; criticized d u r i n g 7th P l e n u m of 6th Central Committee, 283 P'inchiang Incident, 233 P'inghsingkuan, Battle of, 61-64 Po I-po: organized Sacrifice League, 87; organized Dare-to-Die Columns, 177 Puppetization: K u o m i n t a n g troops in Shantung, 288-289 Quebec Conference, 304 Refugee students f r o m Peiping a n d Tientsin, 86, 94. See also Intellectuals, Sacrifice League Regional force: on CCP side, 139-140, 278-279; on Japanese side, 205-206 R u r a l self-defense: tradition of militarization, 6, 84; in n o r t h e r n H o n a n , 98; in Shantung, 99; Mao on difficulty of subduing a r m e d landlords, 101-102, 104; in n o r t h e r n Shensi, 104; bandits in n o r t h China, 106; Kolaohui, 1 0 7 108; secret societies in Hopei, 107; Lienchuanghui, 108-109; organization of, log, 112; total n u m b e r of a r m e d peasants estimated, 114, 203; liquidation of bandits, 133; landlord insurrec-

323 tion against Communists, 197; defection of irregular Chinese forces, 2 0 1 203; p u p p e t forces, 205-206; revolutionary Peking opera T i g e r M o u n t a i n relates t h e tale of, 289; "native diehards," 291-293; in H u a i p e i District, 291-295; bandits in Huaipei, 292; "native Communists," 294; H o Lung's views on, 299-300; connection of, w i t h Communist movement, 300-301 Sacrifice League: original organization of, 86-91; as regional force of Communist army, 177-178. See also Hsti Fant'ing, Yen Hsi-shan Sank5 seisaku, 273 Schwartz, B e n j a m i n : on Maoist strategy, 3-4 Security Strengthening Campaigns, 268 Seigo (Clearing the village) Program, 268 Selden, Mark, 122, 174, 240 Self-defense corps, 140, 278-279 Service, J o h n S., 182, 306 Shangkuan Yunhsiang, 227 Shangtang, 125 Shansi New Army, 1 7 7 - 1 7 8 S h a n t u n g Column, 99, 275-276 S h a n t u n g District: conditions of, early in war, 95-100; n o t assigned to CCP except n o r t h e r n part, 212; administrative program of, 238; conditions of, in 1941-42, 275-276, 288-289; suffered from collaboration of K u o m i n t a n g troops, 288-289; 203-205 Shantung tzu-chih lien-chiin, 204 Shen Hung-lieh: a p p o i n t e d Shantung governor, 98; attacked Fan Chu-hsien, 98-99; attacked by Communist forces, 211 Shen-Kan-Ning order Region: administrative program of (1939), 122, (1941) 238; K u o m i n t a n g blockade tightened, 164, 223, 304; Kuomintang-CCP disp u t e over, 174-176; Kuomintang-CCP proposals on, in b o u n d a r y dispute, 207212 Sheng Shih-ts'ai, 170, 175 Shih Yu-san: in friction w i t h Communist forces, 192; requested defection, 203; a p p o i n t e d C h a h a r governor, 209; executed, 288 Shippe, Heinz, a Sian Incident: CCP's p a r t in, 33-34, 40-41; Mao's stand on, 43; Moscow's reaction to, 43; settlement of, 44

INDEX

324 Sino-Soviet nonaggression pact, 41, 55 Small H o p e i - S h a n t u n g - H o n a n District, 95. 98 Snow, Edgar, 2, 43 Soong, T . V., 281 South H o p e i District: established, 95 South Yangtze C o m m a n d , 195 Southeastern B u r e a u : creation of, 73; reduced i n significance by Central Plains B u r e a u , 160-161 Southwestern W a r : a n t i - C h i a n g antiJapanese character of, 34, 38; Moscow a n d W a n g M i n g dismayed by, 38 Soviet-German pact, 165-166 Soviet People's R e p u b l i c , 31 Soviet U n i o n and C o m i n t e r n : C o m i n t e r n r a d i o contact w i t h C C P o n L o n g M a r c h , 18; C o m i n t e r n instruction on Kiangsi evacuation, 21; C o m i n t e r n directed C C P a n d M a n c h u r i a n Communists to propose ceasefire, 27; Soviet interest in m a i n t a i n i n g Sino-Japanese tension, 29; Soviet proposed neutrality pact to J a p a n , 29; Soviet a t t e m p t to i m p r o v e relations w i t h C h i n a , 29; Soviet disapproval of w a r l o r d revolt against C h i a n g Kai-shek, 38; Soviet overture f o r anti-Japanese alliance, 41; Soviet ordered to save C h i a n g Kaishek's life a t Sian, 43; Soviet assistance to C h i n a i n war, 55, 75, 169-170, 225; Comintern satisfied by CCP 6th P l e n u m , 80; Soviet-Japanese b o r d e r wars, 155, 165, 171; Soviet-Japanese nonaggression pact forecast b y C C P , 165; Soviet expansion in northwest C h i n a , 169-170; Soviet intervention in u n i t e d f r o n t d u r i n g crisis, 169-170, 225, 227; C o m i n t e r n T s c h i t a Conference ordered building Northwest R o u t e , 173; C o m i n t e r n T s c h i t a Conference ordered C o m m u n i s t offensive against J a p a n , 199; Soviet i m p a c t on second u n i t e d front assessed, 303-304 Special administrative commissioner's office, 139 Special district, 139 Stilwell, Joseph, 300 Su T ' i - j e n , 205 Suiyuan Incident, 41-42, 86 Sun Fo: regarded as C C P ' s ally, 222 Sun T ' i e n - y i n g , 203 S u n g Che-yiian, 33-34, 175 S u n g Jen-ch'iung, 95 S u n g Liang-ch'eng, 192

Sung Shao-wen, 90, 140 Sung Shih-lun, 94 Sung T z u - l i a n g , 190-191 Suzuki T a k u j i , 189 T a d a Shun, 150 T a i h a k u kosaku (Yen Hsi-shan operation), 287-288 T ' a i h a n g District: as second class military district, 139 T ' a i y i i e h District, 207 T ' a n g En-po, 227 T ' a n g heng-chih, 68 T ' a n g Yang-tu, 205 T ' a n g k u A g r e e m e n t , 49 T ' a o Hsi-sheng, 179 T e n g Hsiao-p'ing, 95 T e n g T z u - h u i : o n rationale f o r taking n o r t h Kiangsu, 158; i n B a t t l e of O n e H u n d r e d R e g i m e n t s , 218; a p p o i n t e d director, political department, N e w 4th A r m y , 227; in struggle against native opposition i n H u a i p e i , 291 T e r a u c h i Hisaichi, 6 i T h o r n t o n , R i c h a r d C., 4, 5, 188 T h r e e - t h i r d s system: announced, 233; Mao's opposition to similar institution, 240; p r o t o t y p e of, devised by Mao's critics, 240; a n d constitutionalism, 241; intermediate groups in, 241242; dispute i n C C P over, 243-244; turnover of officials in, 245-246; as m e a n s of political change, 245; P ' e n g T e - h u a i ' s views on, 262 T i g e r M o u n t a i n , revolutionary P e k i n g opera: as episode on armed landlord, 289 T i n g Shu-pen, ig2 T r a i t o r : p r o g r a m for h a n d l i n g , at 6th P l e n u m , 81; l i q u i d a t i o n of, 133-134; reason w h y landlords became traitors, 134 T r a u t m a n n , O . P., 68, 71 T r o t s k y i t e , struggle against, 233 T s a p ' a i , 203, 224 T s e n g Y a n g - f u , 27 T s o C h ' i i a n : concern for security of Sinkiang R o u t e , 215; killed in action, 274 T s u n y i Conference, 17-20 T u a n Hai-chou, 291 T'uan, e x t e n d e d m u l t i p l e x , 300 T u c h m a n , Barbara, 2 T u n g T a o - n i n g , 150 T u n g y a t'ung-meng tzu-chih-chun, 204

INDEX Umezu-Ho Ying-ch'in Agreement, 36, 52 United front: See Chinese Communist Party, Kuomintang, Mao Tse-tung United front from below and above, 32 United States: post-Vietnam view of Chinese revolution in, 2; critical role in Chinese revolution by, 10, 264, 304; merely reiterated Open Door until 1940, 164; began to commit itself to Chinese side in September, 1940, 221; impact of Export-Import Bank loan on united front, 221; began to enforce Open Door after Axis pact signed, 223; intervention in China not inevitable, 264-265; demanded status quo of 1931, 264; Army Observer Section in Yenan, 305; decided on landing in China, 306 Usui Shigeki, 190 Van Slyke, Lyman P., 5 Von Seeckt, 17 Wakeman, Frederick, 6 W a n g Ching-wei: concerned with survival or Republic in W a r , 69; negotiation with Japan, 150-151; expelled from Kuomintang, 155; futile efforts to mediate between Japan and Kuomintang, 155-156; Internationalists chose to be upset by, 156-157; subordinates of, defected back to Chungking, 179-180; questions of, figured in Sino-Japanese peace talks, 189-191, 223-224; established Kuomin government in Nanking, 191; formal recognition of, by Japan, 224; impact on united front of formal recognition of, 225 W a n g Chung-lien, 291 W a n g Kuang-hsia, 291 W a n g M i n g (alias for Ch'en Shao-yii): view of, on 5th Campaign as of 1934, 16-17; a s possible author of August First Declaration, 22; report to 7th Comintern Congress, 23-24; criticized rural revolution, 25-26; stated August 1st Declaration proposed ceasefire to Chiang Kai-shek, 27; proposed lenient policy toward rich peasants, 29; united front policy of, 34-35; disapproved of revolt against Chiang Kai-shek, 38; returned to China, 56; demanded defense of W u h a n , 72-73; two stage

325 theory of war, 73; defended Kuomintang as Chinese government, 74; on national defense divisions, 74-75; slogan of, for united front, 80; disturbed by W a n g Ching-wei defection, 156157; sought bolshevization of C C P , 161; 244-245; disturbed by December Incident, 180; possible role of, in Battle of One Hundred Regiments, 199; possible role in Kuomintang-CCP negotiations of 1940, 220-221; selfcriticism of, 228; skeptical of peasants' revolutionary potential, 296 Warlordism: as precondition of Communist power, 8-9, 14-15, 86-87, 308309; charge of, in C C P , 141 Weber, Max, 299 Wei Li-huang: appointed 1st W a r Zone commander, 153; forced Eighth Route A r m y to withdrew from northern Honan and southern Shansi, 192-193; actually supervised Yen Hsi-shen, 192; expelled from Shansi, 266 W h i t e skin, red heart, 280-284, 293. See also National salvation by detour Wilson, Dick, 13 Winter offensive of 1940, 171 W u chih-p'u, 95 W u h a n , fall of, 79 W u Hua-wen, 288 Wujench'iao, 235 Wu-kung-tui, 284 W u Man-yu, 258-260 W u P'ei-fu, 98 W u Tsan-chou, 205 Yang Ch'eng-wu: as sub-district commander, 272; on peasants' morale under pacification, 280; combat report of, 219 Yang Hsiu-feng, 94-95 Y a n g Hu-ch'eng, 33 Y a n g Shang-k'un: supported Internationalists, 163; review of party organization by, 230-231; deplored ban on free market in bases, 237 Yangtze Bureau, 73 Yeh T ' i n g , 224, 226 Yen, 126 Yen Hsi-shan: relationship with Sacrifice League, 86-91; authorized Communist base, 90-gi; authored rational burden, 125; penalized by Kuomintang for early support of united front, 177; struggle with Shansi New Army,

326 Yen Hsi-shan (cont.) 177; liaison with Japanese, 203; defection to Japanese, 287-288 Yin Ju-keng: abandoned by Japanese, 52 Yu Hsüeh-chung: in Shantung, 99; appointed Shantung-Kiangsu W a r Zone commander, 153; penalized by Kuo-

INDEX

mintang, 154; troop size under, 197; liaison with Japanese, 203; fled from Shantung-Kiangsu zone, 287 Yu-k'ang, 283 Yii-Wan-Su Border Region: liquidation of, 95. !9 6 Yiian Kuo-p'ing, 226