Religion-Regime Relations in Zimbabwe: Co-operation and Resistance [1 ed.] 9781003332435, 9781032365121, 9781032365183

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Religion-Regime Relations in Zimbabwe

This book explores religion-regime relations in contemporary Zimbabwe to identify patterns of co-operation and resistance across diverse religious institutions. Using co-operation and resistance as an analytical framework, the book shows how different religious organisations have interacted with Emmerson Mnangagwa’s “Second Republic,” following Robert Mugabe’s departure from the political scene. In particular, through case studies on the Zimbabwe Council of Churches, Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops Conference and Pentecostals, African Traditional Religions, Islam and others, the book explores how different religious institutions have responded to Mnangagwa’s new regime. Chapters highlight the complexities characterising the religion-regime interface, showing how the same religious organisation might co-operate and resist at the same time. Furthermore, the book compares how religious institutions co-operated or resisted Mugabe’s earlier regime to identify patterns of continuity and change. Overall, the book highlights the challenges of deploying simplistic frames in efforts to understand the interface between politics and religion. A significant contribution to global scholarship on religion-regime interfaces, this book will appeal to academics and students in the field of Religious Studies, Political Science, History and African Studies. Ezra Chitando is a professor of History and Phenomenology of Religion at the University of Zimbabwe. His recent co-edited publications include “African Perspectives on Religion and Climate Change” (Routledge 2022) and “Religion and the COVID-19 Pandemic in Southern Africa” (Routledge 2022). Lovemore Togarasei is a professor in the Department of Religious Studies and Philosophy at the Zimbabwe Open University. Joram Tarusarira is Assistant Professor of Religion, Conflict and Peacebuilding at the University of Groningen, The Netherlands.

Routledge Studies on Religion in Africa and the Diaspora

3. Politics and Religion in Zimbabwe The Deification of Robert G. Mugabe Edited by Ezra Chitando 4. Personality Cult and Politics in Mugabe’s Zimbabwe Edited by Ezra Chitando 5. Race, Class and Christianity in South Africa Middle-Class Moralities Ibrahim Abraham 6. Religion and the Covid-19 Pandemic in Southern Africa Edited by Fortune Sibanda, Tenson Muyambo and Ezra Chitando 7. African Perspectives on Religion and Climate Change Edited by Ezra Chitando, Ernst Conradie and Susan M. Kilonzo 8. Religion and Transnational Citizenship in the African Diaspora Akan London Mattia Fumanti 9. Religion, Public Health and Human Security in Nigeria Abiodun Alao 10. America and the Production of Islamic Truth in Uganda Yahya Sseremba 11. Religion-Regime Relations in Zimbabwe Co-operation and Resistance Edited by Ezra Chitando, Lovemore Togarasei and Joram Tarusarira

For more information about this series, please visit: www.routle​d ge.com/ser ​ies/routle​d ge-stud ​iesrelig ​ion-afr ​ica-diasp​ora/RSRAD

Religion-Regime Relations in Zimbabwe Co-operation and Resistance Edited by Ezra Chitando, Lovemore Togarasei and Joram Tarusarira

First published 2024 by Routledge 4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2024 selection and editorial matter, Ezra Chitando, Lovemore Togarasei and Joram Tarusarira; individual chapters, the contributors The right of Ezra Chitando, Lovemore Togarasei and Joram Tarusarira to be identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN: 978-1-032-36512-1 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-032-36518-3 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-33243-5 (ebk) DOI: 10.4324/9781003332435 Typeset in Bembo by Newgen Publishing UK

Contents

List of Contributors Introduction: Religion-Regime Relations in Zimbabwe: Co-operation and Resistance

vii

1

E Z R A C H I TA N D O, L OV E M O R E T O G A R A S E I A N D J O R A M TA RU S A R I R A

1 “The March is Not Ended!” ZCBC’s Pastoral Letter, God and the Crises of Politics in Zimbabwe

17

M A S I I WA R AG I E S G U N DA

2 The Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe (ELCZ) and the Politics of Zimbabwe: Silence and Critical Solidarity

48

H E R B E RT M OYO

3 Depoliticising the Pastoral Role of the Methodist Church in Zimbabwe in the Second Republic

60

M A RT I N M U J I N G A

4 “Prisoners of Hope?” Pentecostalism, Politics and the Quest for a New Dispensation in Zimbabwe

74

K U DZ A I B I R I

5 Who is Doomed, Prophets or Politicians?: Religion and Politics in Zimbabwe’s New Dispensation

92

M E D I E L H OV E , C H I D O M E RC I L L I N A M U S W E R A K U E N DA A N D WA S H I N G T O N M A Z O RO DZ E

6 A Change for No Change: The Ambivalence of Religion in the Second Republic in Zimbabwe BEK ITH EM BA DU BE

107

vi  Contents

7 Religion and Politics in Zimbabwe’s Second Republic: Goodwill Partners?

122

T E N S O N M U YA M B O

8 Islam and Politics in Zimbabwe’s Second Republic

134

S I L I N D I W E Z V I N G OWA N I S E I

9 The Appropriation of the Bible in the Zimbabwean Narrative by the Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops Conference: Lessons for the Second Republic

151

ISH A N ESU SEXTUS GUSH A

10 Interrogating Responses to the Zimbabwe Heads of Christian Denominations’ Call for a National Political Sabbath for Trust Building and Confidence Building

165

N OA H PA S H A PA

11 Religion, Politics and Veteran Masculinities in Post-Mugabe Zimbabwe

182

O B E RT B E R N A R D M L A M B O

12 The Role of Theology in Contemporary Zimbabwe: Insights from the Rise of the Monarchy in the Hebrew Bible

192

XO L A N I M A S E KO

13 Contested Interpretations: The Case of Zimbabweans in the Diaspora in the United Kingdom Responding to the New Dispensation

201

N O M AT T E R S A N D E

Index

215

Contributors

Editors Ezra Chitando is Professor of History and Phenomenology of Religion at the University of Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe, Knowledge Management Advisor at Faith to Action Network and extraordinary professor at the Desmond Tutu Centre for Social Justice, University of the Western Cape, South Africa. Lovemore Togarasei is Professor of New Testament and Christian studies and Programme Leader at the Zimbabwe Open University. His research interest is in the area of the Bible in African (especially Pentecostal) Christianity addressing such issues as leadership, health, environment, politics, popular culture, etc. He has published widely in this area. Joram Tarusarira is Assistant Professor of Religion, Conflict and Peacebuilding at the University of Groningen, the Netherlands. His research interests include religion, conflict, peacebuilding, and climate peace and security. Authors Kudzai Biri is Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy, Religion and Ethics at the University of Zimbabwe. She specializes in African Indigenous religions and Christianity with a focus on religion and gender and religion and politics. Her recent publication is The Wounded Beast?: Pentecostalism, Tradition and Single Good in Zimbabwe. Bekithemba Dube holds a PhD in curriculum studies and is currently an associate professor and Acting Head of Educational Foundation Department at the University of the Free State, South Africa. He is a guest editor of the following journals, alternation, Journal of Cultures and Values, Journal of Curriculum Studies Research, and Journal of Curriculum Studies Research. He serves on the editorial board of various journals as well. Mediel Hove served as Associate Professor in the Department of Peace, Security and Society at the University of Zimbabwe.

viii  Contributors Masiiwa Ragies Gunda (PhD) is a programme executive coordinating work on overcoming racism, xenophobia and related discriminations. Masiiwa is also an adjunct professor at the Ecumenical Institute of Bossey, Switzerland. His research interests lie on the intersection of the Bible, Christian Theology and contemporary socio-theological realities that exploit, oppress and discriminate such as patriarchy, white supremacism, whiteness and hetero-normativity. Gunda explores these and other issues through social justice lenses and critical exegetical exercises. Ishanesu Sextus Gusha is a chaplain in the Diocese in Europe serving in Mallorca, Spain, a senior fellow and subject matter expert at Faculty of Christian Institute for Leadership Education and Development (CILED), and an associate research fellow at the University of Pretoria, Faculty of Theology. His research interests and publications are in Biblical exegesis, Biblical theology, Interfaith/Interreligious Dialogue and Peace Building. He is also a fellow of the following international schools: New Era Educational and Charitable SupportJos, Nigeria 2011; Communities Engaged in Development and ReligionYogyakarta and Bali, Indonesia 2012; Septuagint Studies-Gottingen, Germany 2013; International School for Jain Studies-Delhi, Jaipur, Pune and Mumbai, India 2014 and 2015; SAFCEI-Cape Town, South Africa 2015; KAICIIDAbuja, Nigeria and Vienna, Austria 2018 and 2019. Xolani Maseko is a PhD graduate from the University of Pretoria, South Africa, where he is currently a research associate in the Department of Systematic and Historical Theology. His area of specialty is missional ecclesiology and public theology. He is serving the United Congregational Church of Southern Africa (UCCSA) as the Mission and Ministry Secretary. Washington Mazorodze is a Zimbabwean, has a PhD in Public Administration (Peace Studies) from Durban University of Technology in South Africa (May 2021). He has an MSc in International Relations, Honours Degree in Politics and Administration from the University of Zimbabwe in 2005 and 2003 respectively. He is currently a temporary full-time lecturer at the University of Zimbabwe in the Department of Peace, Security and Society (Faculty of Arts and Humanities). His research interests include domestic, regional and international politics, governance, national and human security, leadership, peace and conflict studies, conflict resolution and transformation. Obert Bernard Mlambo is Associate Professor of Classics at the University of Zimbabwe and an Alexander von Humboldt Renewed Research Fellow at the Institute of African Studies and Egyptology, University of Cologne, Germany. His research perspectives are framed by issues of violence, colonialism, political economy, gender studies and identity. He has published numerous articles on Roman history, comparative histories of classical and contemporary African societies, and Zimbabwe’s land reform history.

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Contributors  ix Herbert Moyo is Associate Professor in the School of Religion, Philosophy and Classics at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. He has diverse research and publication interests straddling theology, pastoral counselling, politics, African traditional religions, sexuality, gender and others. Martin Mujinga is the General Secretary of the Methodist Church in Zimbabwe and the General Secretary Elect of the Africa Methodist Council. He is also a research fellow of the Research Institute for Theology and Religion at the University of South Africa. Revd. Dr Mujinga is an adjunct lecturer at the Midlands State University and United Theological College. His research interest are in the fields of Methodist history and theology, African spirituality, the role of religion in transforming societies, theologies of migration, women and religion, human trafficking, chaplaincy, African theology, liberation theology, political theology, Pentecostal theologies and ecotheology. Chido Mercillina Muswerakuenda is a Zimbabwean, has an MA in War and Strategic Studies, Honours Degree in War and Strategic Studies and a BA General Degree from the University of Zimbabwe in 2019, 2016 and 2014 respectively. She currently teaches at the University of Zimbabwe in the Department of Peace, Security and Society (Faculty of Arts and Humanities). Her research interests include gender and conflict, electoral conflicts, media and conflict governance, peace and conflict studies, conflict resolution and transformation. Tenson Muyambo is a lecturer in the Teacher Development Department at Great Zimbabwe University, Zimbabwe. He is also a research fellow at the Research Institute for Theology and Religion (RITR) in the College of Human Sciences, University of South Africa (UNISA). His research interests and publications focus on indigenous knowledge systems, gender and religion, religion and development, education, and pandemics. Noah Pashapa is a senior lecturer in the Department of Philosophy Religion and Ethics at the University of Zimbabwe. His research interests and publications are in the areas of practical theology, applied ethics, leadership in the African context and transformational development. Nomatter Sande (PhD) is a Practical Theologian. He is a research fellow at the Research Institute for Theology and Religion (RITR) in the College of Human Sciences, University of South Africa (UNISA). Research interest includes disability studies, missions, ecology and gender. Silindiwe Zvingowanisei is a lecturer in the Departments of Philosophy Religion and Ethics & Peace Security and Society at the University of Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe. Her research interests focus on the interface between religion and society, gender and development.

Introduction: Religion-Regime Relations in Zimbabwe Co-operation and Resistance Ezra Chitando, Lovemore Togarasei and Joram Tarusarira Introduction The religion-regime interface has been debated controversially within scholarship. This volume grapples with the problematic by posing a number of questions. These include: What happens to the religion and politics nexus when one political leader who has dominated the scene (such as Robert G. Mugabe in Zimbabwe) (see for example, Chitando, 2020a and 2020b) departs and is replaced by a new political leader (such as Emmerson D. Mnangagwa in Zimbabwe) (Duri et al., 2019)? What happens when a young, zealous Pentecostal pastor enters the political ring as the leader of the main opposition (such as Nelson Chamisa in the 2018 presidential election in Zimbabwe and up to the time of writing) (Tarusarira, 2020)? Does the religion and politics interface change its character and outlook when long term players depart and new actors come on stage? Or, are there underlying ideas and practices that already predetermined how the newcomers approach politics and religion? How, and to what extent, do the new actors seek to repackage themselves as different from, and also in some sense similar to, their predecessors? Is this “new” any different from the “old” (Gusha, 2020)? To what extent do politically inclined Pentecostal prophets/pastors, with their penchant for prophecies, pose a threat to national security (see for example, Ikem, Ogbonna and Ogunnubi, 2020)? These and other related questions are important, as they enable scholars of religion to reflect on some key forces that have the capacity to impact on politics and religion in a specific context. Grappling with the foregoing questions generates another set of questions. These emerging questions include: What is the role of rhetoric, symbolism and theology in characterising one regime as distinct from the other? What are the patterns of continuity, discontinuity, creativity and re-appropriation? Can the study of politics and religion derive new insights from Zimbabwe’s “Second Republic’s”1 engagement with religion? Given the intricacies of politics and religion (see, among others, Gill, 2001; Bellin, 2008; Philpott, 2009; Bokhari and Senzai, 2013; Haynes, 2016; Kaunda, 2018; Haynes, 2019; Offiong and Ekpo, 2020; Musoni, 2021; Gao, 2022), how does the emergence of a new regime in a particular context colour the interface between these two fields? We regard the Zimbabwean setting beyond Mugabe as enabling a sustained engagement with DOI: 10.4324/9781003332435-1

2  Ezra Chitando, Lovemore Togarasei and Joram Tarusarira these and other related questions. In particular, both Mnangagwa and Chamisa soaked themselves in religious rhetoric, evoking God in their politics. Mnangagwa presented himself as a prolific reciter of Bible verses, while Chamisa consistently spoke of how to invite God’s blessings for the nation. Chamisa referenced the need for Repentance, Redemption and Revival while calling for the zero worshipping of idols (his shorthand for the role of African Traditional/Indigenous Religions in the public affairs of the state and the private lives of individuals). Mnangagwa (or “ED”: his initials) or his backers were adept at presenting different religious actors as supporting his bid to remain in office. Thus, diverse groups such as “Madzibaba for ED” (i.e. Apostolic Churches) and “Pastors for ED” (mainline and Pentecostal churches) emerged, suggesting that Mnangagwa had spiritual support for his political project. This was at a time when various “xx for ED” groups were sprouting, including “Men, Young Women, Makorokoza (artisanal miners), Teachers, Touts, etc. for ED.” Like Mugabe before him, the figure of Mnangagwa donning Apostolic white robes or using the sermonic discourse in his interactions with Christians from diverse backgrounds became a common feature. Contributors to this volume are arguing that it is important to reflect on how politicians view religion, and how religious actors view politics. They seek to unlock the religion-regime matrix in a specific African context. This is consistent with observations from other publics, or contexts: politics and religion have an affinity for each other. On our part, we contend that probably, in secret, virtually every politician would strongly endorse the notion that “there is power, power, wonder-working power”2 in religious symbols, ideas and practices. These tend to work wonders for politicians. Thus, it is that the former United States of America president Donald Trump got citizens, who were protesting against the killing of George Floyd, an African American man, by a policeman, pummelled and cleared for him to pose with a copy of the Bible in his hand in front of St. John’s Episcopal Church in Washington, D.C. on 01 June 2020. For Trump, the religious constituency, particularly the white Evangelical cluster, is critical to his politics (Marti, 2018). Further, religious ideas have been key to his framing of foreign policy (Haynes, 2020). Across history and in diverse political contexts, politicians have appropriated and deployed religious symbols to gain political mileage or defend political power. On their part, religious individuals and institutions have also dabbled in politics. In interactions between religious and political actors there is a lot of give and take, thereby challenging the naïve assumption that religion is only there to serve politics. For example, the COVID-19 pandemic that wreaked havoc across the globe in 2020 and 2021 saw a lot of interactions between the two spheres. In some instances, many politicians appealed to religious leaders to assist in passing on the public health messages to their followers. On the other hand, some religious leaders appealed to politicians to accord them certain favours in the wake of COVID-19 protocols relating to the control of worshipping in religious buildings. Some African presidents hosted contested prayer meetings against the pandemic. Cases in point include the prayer meeting President E.D. Mnangagwa held at State House, at which he said, “We have chosen to repent and seek his mercy, help, healing and wisdom in the face of this coronavirus.”3 These meetings

Religion-Regime Relations in Zimbabwe  3 were contested because those in opposition politics saw it as a ploy to mobilise support for the president. The call for scholars in politics to take religion more seriously (Grzymala-Busse, 2012) must, therefore, be embraced as religion tends to feature in politics and vice versa. In the specific context of Zimbabwe, in August 2020, despite the Catholic Church’s participation at the aforementioned prayer meeting the president hosted, there was a dramatic falling out between the Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops Conference (ZCBC) and the government of the day after the latter published a hard-hitting, forthright and unrelenting pastoral letter entitled, “The March is Not Over” (ZCBC, 2020). With the title evoking the African American civil rights activist John Robert Lewis, the authors of the pastoral letter charged that there was a serious dearth of imagination within the political leadership class in Zimbabwe. They insisted that the country was in a crisis of major proportions and criticised the use of strong-arm tactics to silence dissent. The pastoral letter by the Catholic bishops prompted a robust response from different government and ruling party officials (see Chapter 1 by Masiiwa R. Gunda in this volume), with the President donning his party regalia and inviting the bishops into the political ring if they so wished. On the other hand, the pastoral letter triggered solidarity messages in the ecumenical movement from within Zimbabwe and beyond. Clearly, the politics and religion interface is complex and has ramifications for both domestic and international relations. In view of the foregoing theoretical and practical considerations, this volume seeks to examine the interface between politics and religion following Mugabe’s military-enforced resignation on 17 November 2017 and Mnangagwa’s succession as an interim president (2017) and as an elected president (from period 2018 to the time of writing). However, we must hasten to add that his presidency was characterised by sharp contestation from the beginning, with Chamisa and his party, the Movement for Democratic Change Alliance (MDCA) (and later, in 2022, the Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC)) charging that the election result was rigged. That the Supreme Court dismissed Chamisa’s challenge did not settle the matter, as the sharp polarisation continued to dominate Zimbabwe’s political arena. This had a negative impact on the economy, with a dramatic reversal of the momentary gains that had been made following the government of national unity (GNU, 2009–2013), which had brought together the dominant political parties and personalities into an inclusive government, being experienced. In turn, this had direct implications for the politics and religion interface in Zimbabwe (Dube and Nkoane, 2018; Mujinga, 2018; Manyonganise, 2022). However, it is necessary for us to provide some pointers of our understanding of politics and religion in general, before proceeding to analyse the Zimbabwean context in particular. Politics and Religion: A Note on the Intersection Although it is tempting and rather convenient to maintain that everyone has some working definition of politics and religion that they utilise to interpret reality, we are convinced that we need to devote some space and time towards clarifying

4  Ezra Chitando, Lovemore Togarasei and Joram Tarusarira these two key concepts. If religion is notoriously difficult to define (Smith, 1962), politics is equally a slippery concept. Clearly, it is not possible to provide comprehensive definitions of these two concepts within the scope of this introduction. The term religion has had political and racial implications in African contexts (Chidester, 1996; Chitando, 1997; Mndende, 1998). It has been used to promote particular versions of Western Christianity, while suppressing African Traditional or Indigenous Religions. Therefore, we are very much alive to the political and ideological assumptions behind the concept (see Masuzawa, 2005; Fitzgerald, 2000). Instead of dwelling on the intricacies of such debates, what we seek to do here is to raise a few points that are relevant for understanding politics and religion, so as to be able to appreciate their interface during Zimbabwe’s “Second Republic.” First, it must be accepted that academic disciplines are themselves an invention, as it is very difficult for any discipline to ring-fence itself so neatly as not to overlap with neighbouring disciplines (Krishnan, 2009). Thus, the notion that there are unique, stand-alone and pristine fields of study is a figment of the imagination. For example, some scholars of religion have popularised the notion that religion is sui generis, that is, a discipline in its own right, irreducible and not to be explained using categories beyond religion itself (Cox, 1992; Capps, 1995 and Fitzgerald, 2000). We accept that religion does have unique (identifiable) characteristics, such as having beliefs and practices relating to the (putative) unseen world, generating social harmony, fulfilling psychological needs and others, but refuse to accord it special epistemological privileges. Religion shares a lot in common with other phenomena, including politics. For instance that it is relational and invented are qualities that it shares with other notions like “politics,” “nation” and “state” among many others (Fitzgerald, 2000). It is, therefore, often possible and desirable to approach the challenges of humanity by adopting a holistic perspective (see for example, Stinton, 2006) than adopting narrow disciplinary perspectives. Further, Religion and politics are two fundamental dimensions of human society, and yet they are often at loggerheads. Religion appears to belong to a different realm, signifying matters that are permanent and enduring, residing beyond the everyday. Politics appears to involve the secular struggle for power and influence, being driven by interest. I use this verb (to appear) because in fact religion and politics are almost inevitably entwined and they are both deeply concerned with the control or regulation of everyday affairs. (Turner, 2013:1) Second, although we are insisting that religion shares a lot in common with politics, we are aware of those who belong to the non-intersecting school of thought. This category of scholars maintains that politics and religion are separate and distinct disciplines that must not be brought together, both conceptually and practically. If anything, they must be separated. Space considerations preclude the possibility of outlining the historical, ideological, legal, theological, methodological and other

Religion-Regime Relations in Zimbabwe  5 factors that influence scholars belonging to this camp. Most scholars in this school of thought maintain that these two disciplines must remain separate for the sake of intellectual clarity and in order to ensure the separation of spheres of influence. In particular, the separation of Church and State and the preference for secularism over religion in international relations represent such a stance. However, the notion that secularism is superior to religion is problematic (Hurd, 2009; May et al., 2014; Tarusarira, 2020b). Nonetheless, we are also alive to those who define politics and religion in ways that seek to protect those with political power from critiques by religious actors. In this scheme, each group must stay within its lane. That is, religious actors must invest in prayer alone, never to comment on the impact of political policies and actions on the lives of citizens. To do this is to invite the violence and wrath of politicians! Such definitions of politics and religion appear designed to silence religious actors. One contributor to the ZCBC pastoral letter which was published by the official media made the following claim: The ZCBC is rebelling against what God has instituted. Church and politics must never mix for they are like oil and water and are strange bedfellows. The duty of politicians is to create a conducive environment for religious liberty. Conversely, the duty of the church, according to the Bible is to pray for the leaders who were ordained by God. (Shumba, 2020) Third, there is a pressing need to investigate the interface between politics and religion as and when one or both of these change(s). Historical enquiry demands that the changing terrain be investigated in order to capture the continuities, changes, recasting of ideas and repositioning of people across different historical periods. For example, when the political context changes, there is likely to be an accompanying shift in the religious response. Similarly, when there are changes in the area of religion (such as new religious ideologies, new personnel leading religious institutions, etc.), the politics and religion interface is likely to undergo changes. For example, in Zimbabwe, the coming of a new government in April 1980 had a direct impact on Church-State relations (Hallencreutz, 1988). With Mugabe having departed the scene, it becomes necessary to enquire into the interaction between politics and religion during the tenure of his successor. Fourth, it would be naïve to assume that patterns of the interaction between politics and religion that have been established in one part of the world can be generalised for every other part of the world. There would always be regional, national and local variations, as each context colours the relationship between politics and religion. For example, the African socio-economic and political setting influences how politics and religion interact (Ellis and Ter Haar, 2004; Gunda and Kügler, 2012). Given the extent to which religion is interwoven with other social realities and processes in Africa, it would be reasonable to anticipate that religion is heavily implicated in politics in Africa. Consequently, we argue that investing in understanding how politics and religion interact in specific African contexts, as

6  Ezra Chitando, Lovemore Togarasei and Joram Tarusarira we do in this volume, contributes towards broadening the general understanding of these two key concepts. Fifth, the impact of religion on politics is discernible in the extent to which women either participate or are restricted from participating in politics (Ncube, 2020; Mateveke and Chikafa-Chipiro, 2020). In societies where religious and cultural ideologies position men as leaders and women as followers, it is difficult for women to access the topmost leadership positions. This challenge is not limited to the global South, but it is visible in the global North as well. For example, conservative Christian attitudes make it difficult for a woman to become the president of the United States of America. The same challenge also confronts sexual minorities, as religious arguments are marshalled against them. Thus, “… the struggles of women and gays are unique among minorities in the United States because their subordinate positions in society are still justified by religious faith long after theological arguments for racial discrimination have been repudiated” (Wald and Calhoun-Brown, 2011:310). Overall, we consider politics and religion as mutually interacting systems of power. Although they are often separated to facilitate closer analysis, in reality they are constantly interlocking. Occurring in space and time, and responding to concrete and material human conditions, politics and religion seek to govern human beings by directing (sometimes forcing) them along certain, predetermined paths. Writing within the Zimbabwean context, Masitera and Sibanda (2018) are more generous in their interpretation of power. They approach it from the perspective of the capabilities that individuals have to transform their situations for the better. We are more circumspect about power, understanding that politicians and religious people use it to achieve their desired material goals. For us, it is always important to apply a hermeneutic of suspicion whenever politicians court and quote religious actors, sacred texts and engage in religious actions. Equally, it is important for scholars to be on high alert whenever religious actors proclaim the divinity of political actors. Contributors to this volume largely share this perspective; they contend that although we can debate the sincerity of their actions, both political and religious actors tend to act in self-preserving or self-enhancing ways through appropriating and deploying ideas from within the religious sphere. There has been valuable scholarship on the era beyond Mugabe, who had dominated the Zimbabwean political space for decades. Indeed, it is not possible to do justice to the output within the confines of this introductory chapter. For example, Duri et al. (2019) edited the volume, Mugabeism after Mugabe? which interrogates the claims of the “New Dispensation” or “Second Republic.” Also, the Journal of Contemporary African Studies carried articles that reflected on the continuities and changes from Mugabe to Mnangagwa (Helliker and Murisa, 2020). Employing historical analysis, Mashingaidze (2021) charges that the rhetoric relating to the “New Dispensation” is an indistinct rebranding of the status quo, while Nyamunda (2021) reviews the persistence of a poorly performing economy. The volume, The Zimbabwean Crisis after Mugabe (Mangena, Nyambi and Ncube, 2022) interrogates the purported transition and highlights the challenges facing Mnangagwa’s regime. All these reflections are highly informative. However, they

Religion-Regime Relations in Zimbabwe  7 mostly overlooked the regime-religion interface. The current volume seeks to address this particular gap in the extant scholarship. Politics, Religion and the Ongoing Zimbabwean Crises In order to appreciate the dynamic interaction between politics and religion, and the centrality of power to this interface, it is important to highlight the socioeconomic context in which these two concepts related to each other. Although ruling party officials continued the mantra, “There is no Crisis in Zimbabwe,” inherited from Mugabe’s tenure, it became crystal clear that there was need for urgent steps to stop the rapid deterioration in the standard of living for the majority of citizens. Food shortages in both the rural and urban areas, high unemployment, unsustainably low salaries for professionals, never ending strikes by medical personnel and heavy handedness when dealing with dissent were all signs that the “New Dispensation” faced multiple challenges. As Mugabe’s regime struggled on the economic front, so did Mnangagwa’s regime. Thus, There is no good news coming out of Zimbabwe at the moment. The newspaper headlines are mostly focused on; allegations of corruption in high offices, rumours of squabbles amongst political leaders in the two major parties, collapse of social service delivery and a sense of despair. The bromance between citizens and the “new” leadership in the Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) seems to have quickly died down and, in its place, we have returned to high levels of mistrust and a gridlock on how to proceed. (Murisa et al., 2020:1) Culling the context in which Mnangagwa and his team interfaced with religion is crucial since the drama of politics and religion is never staged in a vacuum. It is concrete human conditions that necessitate the deployment of power. Although Mugabe’s departure and Mnangagwa’s arrival were couched in deeply theological terms and projected as heralding a seismic shift, the economy stubbornly rejected any simplistic renaming. If anything, there was a clear regression in the quality of life for the majority. The sharp inequalities that characterised Zimbabwean society deepened, with the elite (deriving mainly from the political, military and business classes) living in stupendous splendour, while the majority wallowed in shocking squalor. Where dollarisation had brought down inflation and ushered economic stability and made the Zimbabwean economy one of the fastest growing within the Southern African Development Community (SADC) during the era of the inclusive government, 2009–2013 (Makochekanwa and Manyeruke, 2017), Mnangagwa’s government rushed to bring back the hugely discredited local currency in June 2019. Inflation returned with a vengeance, real earnings were decimated and penury among the citizens became pronounced. It is in such a dire economic context that both Mnangagwa and Chamisa sought to promise their followers an era of unparalleled prosperity. Mnangagwa preached the futuristic gospel of Zimbabwe becoming an upper middle-income economy by

8  Ezra Chitando, Lovemore Togarasei and Joram Tarusarira 2030. On his part, Chamisa preached the message of prosperity (see for example, Togarasei (2011), Togarasei (2018) and Otonko (2018) for descriptions of the message of prosperity) where Zimbabwe’s fortunes would be turned overnight due to divine favour. Building on his identity as an ordained minister of the Apostolic Faith Mission in Zimbabwe (AFM), arguably the oldest Pentecostal church in Zimbabwe, Chamisa charmed his audiences with the prospects of transforming their economic fortunes in a radical way. He took the prosperity gospel to its extremes, promising his supporters and Zimbabweans “kuvhura pombi dzemari” (opening taps of money)4 and an era of Messianic bliss. In Chamisa’s scheme, God would make the country so prosperous that Zimbabwe’s name would need to be changed to “the Great Zimbabwe!” Deploying his mastery of the biblical text, humour and youthful arrogance, he tantalisingly painted the image of streets plaited with gold to many young people who had never held payslips in their hands. Chamisa would openly call for fasting (Tarusarira, 2020a) or engage openly in religious practices as part of his complex religio-political (or politico-religious) identity. Intriguingly, the different religious actors and institutions that were prominent during the previous titanic battles between Mugabe and (now late) Morgan R. Tsvangirai did not take long to position themselves in the emerging but tense contestation between Mnangagwa and Chamisa. Most African Initiated Churches (AICs) of the Apostolic type (Vapostori or white garment churches) quickly lined up behind Mnangagwa (Dube, 2019; Musoni, 2019). Other individuals who had featured prominently in the “Old Dispensation,” such as Andrew Wutawunashe and his Faith for the Nation Campaign and Nehemiah Mutendi of the Zion Christian Church (ZCC) also came out, under the Zimbabwe Indigenous Interdenominational Council of Churches (ZIICC), to pronounce that God was on Mnangagwa’s side. Mnangagwa was the biblical Joshua who was to complete the task that Moses (Mugabe) had either failed to complete due to his human limitations, or all this was part of God’s glorious plan for the country after God’s own heart, namely Zimbabwe. On the other hand, the Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops Conference (ZCBC) and the Zimbabwe Heads of Christian Denominations (ZHOCD)5 retained their criticism of the government of the day. They were joined by religious actors such as Ancelimo Magaya and Talent Chiwenga who had been critical of Mugabe (Hove and Chenzi, 2017). As with Mugabe, the contestation was over the livelihoods and upholding of the rights of citizens, the need for political dialogue and the detoxification of the political environment. Although Mnangagwa had projected himself as “a Servant Leader and listening President,” his government did not display any patience with or tolerance for religious leaders who dared to criticise him. This led to the question underlying reflections in this volume: Was Mnangagwa’s government “new new,” or “old new?” The “Second Republic”: Old Politics in a Changing Context? With Mugabe having virtually monopolised Zimbabwe’s (and featuring prominently on the continental and global) political spaces, this volume primarily seeks to

Religion-Regime Relations in Zimbabwe  9 understand the politics and religion interface in the post-Mugabe period. Could it be that scholars, analysts and casual observers had overrated Mugabe’s genius when reflecting on the appropriation and deployment of religion to achieve political goals? Could it be that his party, namely the Zimbabwe African Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) had an in-built religio-political ideology that transcended individuals? When Mugabe’s successor, Mnangagwa, performed politics and religion by going through the same processes that Mugabe engaged in (for example, attending AIC prayer meetings, putting on white garments and addressing crowds using sermonic discourses), was he guilty of mimicry, or was he sticking to the pre-existing party (or generally successful) script? When both the sitting president and the leading opposition leader utilise religious concepts with abandon, what type of politics will dominate the nation? Do we witness politics and religion in action, or all politics becomes religion, with all religion becoming political? What are the gains (if any) and the losses? These are important questions, as some critics have already sounded alarm regarding the overbearing nature of religion over politics in Zimbabwe. For example, Chipere (2020: 7) writes, The nation of Zimbabwe is under the spell of superstition and juju Christianity; at the core of this moral degeneration are traditional healers and the selfstyled men of God who have sprouted up across Zimbabwe and sub-Saharan Africa. They make grandiose claims that they can speak to God directly. Their insidious activities range from selling anointed condoms, to alluring women to bring their underwear to church so they can bless them. Other flippant antics include guessing (for show) their supplicant’s home addresses and ID numbers, and predicting the death of old, senile world leaders. Cognisant of this critique (which is overstated, in our opinion) and in the quest to make politics and religion intelligible, in this volume scholars from diverse personal backgrounds, political ideologies or schools of thought, theological persuasions, place of residence, age, gender,6 academic training and other differences tackle the theme of politics and religion in post-Mugabe Zimbabwe. They interrogate the appropriation of religion by the two major protagonists, namely Mnangagwa and Chamisa, as well as questioning whether in the face Mnangagwa’s tenure can properly be described as “the Second Republic” or “the New Dispensation.” 7 Other contributors focus on how different religious actors have interfaced with politicians to tease out the lines of persistence or disjuncture in the marriage between politics and religion in Zimbabwe. What became clear in preparing this volume is that Zimbabwean academics working in the fields of religious studies and theology are passionate about the future of their nation. Challenging the phenomenological ideals of neutrality and value-free analysis of religious phenomena, though trying at all times to practice reflexivity, they address the question of politics and religion, not as disinterested onlookers, but as stockholders.8 The polarisation that characterised the electorate (Bratton and Masunungure, 2018) could also be detected within Zimbabwe’s intellectual class. Perhaps this was

10  Ezra Chitando, Lovemore Togarasei and Joram Tarusarira unavoidable, given the fact that in this instance, the researchers were part of the communities that they researched on. The peer review process was characterised by sharp critiques, haranguing and contestation that confirmed that Zimbabwean scholars have markedly different interpretations of the regime-religion interface. We detected the fears, hopes, anticipations and longings that the authors shared with their fellow citizens. It was clear that after the struggles for survival for those who remained in the country and others being forced into economic exile, both categories of authors shared the same hope as Mnangagwa and Chamisa, namely that Zimbabwe would have its fortunes restored and citizens would enjoy an era of economic and political stability. Whereas the two protagonists differed on the methodology regarding how to achieve this, some of the authors called for dialogue and commitment for the greater national good. The Chapters Does a change in political actors in a specific national context immediately result in a change of the interface between politics and religion? In the event that there are changes, what is the nature of these changes? How do religious actors who have been on the scene prior to the arrival of new political entrants respond to them? Given the changing political and economic realities in Zimbabwe, how have the different religious actors interfaced with political actors? What must religious leaders do in order to promote dialogue and development? The authors of chapters in this volume wrestle with these and other questions in seeking to clarify the politics and religion interface in Zimbabwe. Chapters in the first set focus on the politics and religion in Zimbabwe through the prism of specific denominations, church groups and strands of Christianity. These are denominations, apex bodies and strands of Christianity that were there during the Mugabe era. How have they responded to the claims and actions of Mnangagwa’s “New Dispensation?” The opening chapter, by Masiiwa R. Gunda, reviews the exchanges between the ZCBC and Mnangagwa’s regime. Reflecting on the fiery exchanges and fall out from the Pastoral Letter, “The March is Not Over,” Gunda’s chapter highlights the tension between the two protagonists. His essay draws attention to the underlying continuities and changes, subtly drawing attention to how the Mugabe regime used to respond to ZCBC pastoral letters. Gunda maintains that while the earlier Pastoral Letters were more diplomatic in terms of identifying those responsible for the sorry state of affairs, “The March is Not Over” was unrelenting in blaming the government. In Chapter 2, Herbert Moyo offers an overview of the pressing economic conditions that greeted the “Second Republic.” Moyo critiques the initiatives by Mnangagwa’s government, maintaining that many of the old challenges persisted. Moyo then turns to the responses by one of the mainline Protestant denominations in Zimbabwe, namely the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe (ELCZ). Moyo contends that the ELCZ has a challenging relationship with the State. He identifies the military factor within the leadership of the denomination and the complexities that emerge from this reality. However, using the concept of “critical solidarity,”

Religion-Regime Relations in Zimbabwe  11 Moyo identifies the areas where the ELCZ is collaborating with the State to facilitate development. Chapter 3, by Martin Mujinga, reflects on the controversy and debate surrounding the question of Mnangagwa’s status as a member of the Wesleyan Methodist Church in Zimbabwe (MCZ). Whereas some critics have charged that Mnangagwa’s association with the MCZ is part of political posturing, Mujinga insists that there are adequate theological grounds for the MCZ to accord space to individuals from diverse backgrounds. Adopting a church history perspective, as well as ideas from political theology, Mujinga argues that there is nothing scandalous about MCZ members being actively involved in politics in Zimbabwe. With Pentecostals constituting a significant portion of Zimbabwe’s spiritual market, in Chapter 4 Kudzai Biri interrogates the Pentecostal response to politics in the “New Dispensation.” Biri seeks to examine patterns of continuity in the Pentecostal response to politics in Zimbabwe, drawing attention to how Pentecostals have been consistent in calling for prayer and fasting as resources for building the resilience of citizens in the face of serious socioeconomic challenges. However, she contends that the weak political theology among Pentecostal leaders has prevented them from taking radical positions in the “New Dispensation.” Chapter 5, by Mediel Hove, Chido M. Muswerakuenda and Washington Mazorodze, interrogates the interface between politicians and prophets in the post-Mugabe era through the prism of “doom.” In their formulation, the exchanges between the two categories of actors were characterised by mutual vilification. The prophets insisted that they were dealing with “politicians of doom,” while the politicians contended that they were facing “prophets of doom.” The chapter describes the tension and hostility that marked the politics and religion interface during Mnangagwa’s tenure, while describing how some prophets endorsed the new political leaders. Chapters in the second set focus on the discourse of “change or no change” in relation to how different religious actors either warmed to, or resisted the “Second Republic.” In Chapter 6, Bekitemba Dube reflects on the ambivalence of some church leaders in the face of a guard within the political sphere. This theme is pursued by Tenson Muyambo in Chapter 7. Muyambo is convinced that the “Second Republic” is following the template set by the “First Republic” in its appropriation and deployment of religion. On the other hand, in Chapter 8, Silindiwe Zvingowanisei contends that Muslims found new space in their interactions with the state following the arrival of new players at the helm of national politics. The last set of chapters constitutes reflections on diverse themes relevant to understanding the “radical continuity” or “significant departure” model of the religion-regime interface in Zimbabwe. In Chapter 9, Ishanesu S. Gusha examines the deployment of the Bible in the Pastoral Letter by the ZCBC in their reflections on Zimbabwe’s trajectory since independence and prospects going forward. Chapter 10, by Noah Pashapa, interrogates the politics surrounding the call for a 7 Year Political Sabbatical by the ZCC. Chapter 11, by Obert B. Mlambo, reflects on the complex interplay among the variables of religion, veteran masculinities and politics in Zimbabwe. Mlambo frames the “New Dispensation”

12  Ezra Chitando, Lovemore Togarasei and Joram Tarusarira in terms of shifts within veteran masculinities, where there is a decisive shift of allegiance from Mugabe to Mnangagwa. This shift is simultaneously informed by political, gender and spiritual factors. Mlambo proceeds to highlight that Chamisa’s rise can be interpreted as an expression of resistance by youth masculinities. For Mlambo, then, the emergence of, and tensions during, Mnangagwa’s term can be interpreted through the prism of masculinities that have been spiritualised. In Chapter 12, Xolani Maseko argues that there is an urgent need to invest in sound theology in order to achieve effective social transformation. He reflects on how the divergent positions regarding the shift from the Judges to the monarchy in the Hebrew Bible can be compared to different interpretations of the “Second Republic.” Maseko maintains that although there are differences, the role of prophets or religious functionaries is noteworthy in both transitions. Overall, Maseko calls for a theology that facilitates the health and well-being of Zimbabweans in a trying socio-economic and political context. Due to the Zimbabwean exodus in the quest for better livelihoods, there are now many citizens in the diaspora. In Chapter 13, Nomatter Sande explores the religion-politics in the context of the Zimbabwean diaspora in the United Kingdom. He reflects on how Zimbabweans in the diaspora use the frame of religion to interpret the changing politics back in the country. Conclusion Mnangagwa’s rise to power and performance in politics cannot be separated from religion. Whereas Mugabe sought to project a more intellectual outlook (while sponsoring a flourishing personality cult), Mnangagwa has been less restrained in utilising the God vocabulary in his politics. In turn, his major political rival, Chamisa, was not hesitant to disclose his conversations with God in relation to Chamisa’s “divine right to rule.” As the chapters in this volume demonstrate, this resulted in the political space being saturated with religious and theological concepts. This Zimbabwean case study provides valuable material to the global discourse on politics and religion. When there is a change of political players, there is a decisive shift in the extent to which religion features in the political discourse. However, these changes also confirm the reality that the more things change, the more they remain the same: politics and religion remain constantly conjoined! Notes 1 Due to the ideological and contested nature of the terms, “Second Republic” and “New Dispensation,” we have struggled with whether to retain the quotes or jettison them. In some instances, authors have used the quotes. In other instances, however, the quotes have not been used. This does not suggest an endorsement of their deployment, but only signifies that there was a change of guard in Zimbabwe in 2017/2018. 2 Derived from a Christian hymn. 3 www.aa.com.tr/en/afr ​ i ca/zimbab​ w es-presid ​ e nt-leads-pra​ y er-agai ​ n st-covid-19/ 1878​194

Religion-Regime Relations in Zimbabwe  13 4 Chamisa at Sakubva, Mutare, 14 July 2018, www.faceb​ook.com/Zim​Eye/vid​eos/19256​ 0538​7500​650 (accessed 14 July 2018). 5 An umbrella organisation bringing together the Heads of the Evangelical Fellowship of Zimbabwe (EFZ), the Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops Conference, the Zimbabwe Council of Churches and the Union for the Development of Apostolic Churches in Zimbabwe Africa. For an essay focusing on the first three, see for example, Manyonganise (2020). 6 The number of women contributors to this volume is, sadly, very low. A number of factors contrived to have this clearly untenable outcome. 7 These two concepts are inventions by those with political power and are heavily contested. Some contributors place them in quotes, while others do not. Not placing them in quotes should, however, not be read as an open or tacit endorsement of their deployment by the state propagandists. 8 In the Zimbabwean political landscape, whereas stakeholders participate in an enterprise with a degree of being outside, stockholders are fully immersed in the enterprise. The term was popularised by war veterans (those who fought the 1970s armed liberation struggle) to underscore the fact that they had a direct and abiding interest in who presides over national affairs.

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1 “The March is Not Ended!” ZCBC’s Pastoral Letter, God and the Crises1 of Politics in Zimbabwe Masiiwa Ragies Gunda Introduction The Pastoral Letter by the Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops Conference (ZCBC) on 14 August 2020 torched a storm in Zimbabwe. The letter was not entirely different from previous such letters dating back to the colonial days, but it triggered a different kind of response. Barely 24 hours after the letter had been released, the government of Zimbabwe responded, through the Minister of Information, Publicity and Broadcasting Services, Senator Monica Mutsvangwa. What followed was a flurry of responses which, like Zimbabwe today, can be categorised into pro-government responses and pro-ZCBC responses; there is hardly room for neutrality in crises-ridden Zimbabwe! The pastoral letter basically called “President Emmerson Mnangagwa to order over escalating human rights abuses and worsening political and economic situation in the country, and warned him that his attempts to muzzle angry voices would only make matters worse” (Matenga, 2020a), hardly an assessment that can be contested by any Zimbabwean that has been in Zimbabwe since the ouster of former strong man, Robert Mugabe. The pastoral letter was explicit in its assessment: As your Bishops … It seems as though the poor have no one to defend them. They don’t seem to feature on the national agenda. Their cries for an improved health system go unheeded … It is not clear to us, as your Bishops, that the national leadership we have has the knowledge, social skills, emotional stability and social orientation to handle the issues that we face as a nation. (Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops’ Conference (ZCBC), 2020) In short, the pastoral letter simply suggested Zimbabwe and Zimbabweans have no national leadership on which to hope for a revival of their fortunes. What followed this bold pastoral letter was the usual Zimbabwean way of handling politically hot topics; there were those that came out in full force to defend and support the legitimacy of the government and by implication the right of government not to be criticised, while others came out in full force to support the bold position taken by the Catholic bishops. The Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Information, Publicity and Broadcasting Services, Nick Mangwana, DOI: 10.4324/9781003332435-2

18  Masiiwa Ragies Gunda was one of the earliest to dismiss the pastoral letter by arguing that “there is no crisis, political or otherwise,” and accusing the ZCBC of joining groups seeking “to manufacture crises” (BBC News, 2020). The minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs, in a 24-page response, contended: The Pastoral Letter makes numerous accusations of a serious nature against an elected and constitutionally established Government, without providing any specific details of any transgressions. The impression created, therefore, is that the authors did not fully apply their minds to the various issue-areas they raise. Rather, the Letter appears to have been crafted by persons whose intention it was to level as many allegations as possible with an overall objective of simply smearing and ridiculing the Government of Zimbabwe. (Ziyambi, 2020) Not to be outdone, the Zimbabwe Indigenous Interdenominational Council of Churches (ZIICC) accused the ZCBC of working with groups bent on provoking the government. According to one of the leaders of ZIICC, Rev. Andrew Wutawunashe, “These tactics, have also, from the outset, involved extreme provocation of the elected Government to goad it into reactions that would, if succumbed to, serve to justify the false picture being painted” (Mushanawani, 2020). In other words, this pastoral letter was supposed to “goad the elected government” to respond violently, as it normally does, so that the whole world could then see the crises in Zimbabwe. The government was right, the ZCBC was wrong! It was also highlighted by government and its sympathisers that the Pastoral ignores or does not condemn the ‘punitive sanctions’ that have been identified as the cause of suffering for Zimbabweans. SADC, AU, UN Secretary General, UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food have all condemned sanctions but the Bishops did not. (Ziyambi, 2020) According to the government of Zimbabwe, unless one makes sanctions the only or at least the major factor to all Zimbabwean problems, then the analysis is illegitimate. All these pro-government responses were, however, not as extreme, brutal, intolerant as the very first government response issued through the Minister of Information, Publicity and Broadcasting Services, Senator Monica Mutsvangwa barely 24 hours after the pastoral letter had been issued. In the statement, Mutsvangwa proclaimed: Ahead of the Catholic Sunday Mass, the Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ) draws the attention of the national Catholic congregation shards of a Pastoral Letter issued under the misguided if evil minded leadership of the Archbishop of Harare. Its evil message reeks with all the vices that have perennially hobbled the progress of Africa. It trumpets petty tribal feuds and narrow regionalist

Pastoral Letter, God and the Crises of Politics in Zimbabwe  19 agendas so that it can sow seeds of internecine strife as a prelude to national disintegration. (Mutsvangwa, 2020) This response triggered a flurry of soul-searching reflections among various groups in Zimbabwe and saw several Christian groups, local and international, pronouncing themselves in a way that left no room for neutrality. While, as briefly shown above, the pastoral letter was interpreted in the context of the “regime change” mantra by the government and government sympathisers, others felt the bishops had rediscovered their true calling. The pastoral letter was understood as falling within the legitimate realm of the Bishops’ ministry since “the Bishops, as our Shepherds, are duty bound to call out those in authority in situations of widespread poverty, endemic corruption, human rights violations, poor health delivery especially in times of a huge pandemic, and political instability and uncertainty” (Catholic Professionals Network of Zimbabwe (CPNZ, 2020). In their response to the pastoral letter and the statement by Mutsvangwa, The Zimbabwe Council of Churches (ZCC) expressed grave concern because of the implicit and explicit violence in the government response to the Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops’ Conference (ZCBC) pastoral letter of the 14th of August 2020 entitled, “The March is not Ended” (Zimbabwe Council of Churches (ZCC), 2020). The Zimbabwe Peace Project (ZPP) noted how the government had chosen to launch a tribal and ethnic attack on Archbishop Robert Christopher Ndlovu, instead of self introspecting and at least engaging the clergy to deliberate on the issues raised. Such attacks are concerning, particularly in an environment where dissenting voices have been abducted or arrested. All that the ZCBC has done is, like every other Zimbabwean institution that seeks to see values of democracy being implemented, to reach out to the government with the hope of building a better Zimbabwe. (Zimbabwe Peace Project (ZPP), 2020) According to the Evangelical Fellowship of Zimbabwe (EFZ), Truth may be on the cross today and wrong may be on the throne but on the third day it will rise again because the truth still marches on … we cannot find any reason to condemn them because what they articulated is the truth, and nothing but the truth. (Evangelical Fellowship of Zimbabwe (EFZ), 2020) The lines were clearly drawn, the bishops were either wrong to accuse the government of a litany of offences by commission or omission or they were right! The government was right in its rabid attacks on the bishops because they had been provoked or they were wrong! God was involved in the aspirations, realities and experiences of Zimbabweans or God was not involved! If God was in it, who

20  Masiiwa Ragies Gunda represented God–the bishops or the government? The pastoral letter reminded us of the 2007 pastoral letter, “God Hears the Cries of the Oppressed,” in which the ZCBC wrote: It is the same conflict between those who possess power and wealth in abundance, and those who do not; between those who are determined to maintain their privileges of power and wealth at any cost, even at the cost of bloodshed, and those who demand their democratic rights and a share in the fruits of independence; between those who continue to benefit from the present system of inequality and injustice, because it favours them and enables them to maintain an exceptionally high standard of living, and those who go to bed hungry at night and wake up in the morning to another day without work and without income; between those who only know the language of violence and intimidation, and those who feel they have nothing more to lose because their Constitutional rights have been abrogated and their votes rigged. (Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops’ Conference (ZCBC), 2007, S. 7–8) The pastoral letter forced Zimbabweans to once again reflect on Church-State relations: Is it possible for Christians to divorce their faith from the politics of their country? In the following sections, this chapter will briefly highlight some of the key contours of Church-State relations in Zimbabwe before embarking on an analysis of the pastoral letter, “The March is not Ended” followed by an analysis of the responses from the government. These analyses will be followed by a section on the options that emerged for other concerned Zimbabweans, where responses and statements of solidarity will be analysed. The penultimate section will focus on lessons learned before concluding this chapter. A Brief Socio-Historical Situational Analysis of Church-State Relations in Zimbabwe The general historical question of Church-State relations in Zimbabwe is one that has been dealt with by many historians, especially historians of Christianity in Zimbabwe. This section is only going to highlight elements that are directly important for the development of this chapter. The pastoral letter that we are focusing on in this chapter was not the first from the ZCBC or its predecessor, the Rhodesia Catholic Bishops’ Conference (RCBC). It is the tradition in the Catholic Church for Bishops to issue pastoral letters to address issues of concern to the Church and society at large. Commenting on the pastoral letter, “God Hears the Cry of the Oppressed,” Chitando wrote: In order to put the pastoral letter in its proper historical context, it is important to acknowledge that the Catholic Church has been actively involved in Zimbabwe’s political history. Although it requires a longer narrative to do justice to this theme, it is vital to draw attention to it. The pastoral letter, “God Hears the Cry of the Oppressed” should, therefore, be located within this

Pastoral Letter, God and the Crises of Politics in Zimbabwe  21 larger story of the Catholic Church’s engagement with the ruling elite in the country. (Chitando, 2013:84) This involvement of the Catholic Church in Zimbabwe’s political history is not denied by government in the fallout following the pastoral letter. In fact, Minister Mutsvangwa invoked the legendary figure of Bishop of Mutare, Bishop Donal Lamont, who was persecuted and deported by the Ian Smith government for strongly opposing the oppressive laws and systems used by the colonial government. “The Catholic Church has been instrumental in shaping the history of Zimbabwe both pre and post-independence–they have educated, treated, trained and rebuked all and sundry including the colonial and post-colonial governments and leaders” (Catholic Professionals Network of Zimbabwe (CPNZ), 2020). The “March is not Ended” pastoral letter, therefore, continues a consistent strand going back to the colonial era when at least some of the Catholic bishops pronounced themselves as standing for justice, equality and a fair distribution of the national cake. This must not be taken as suggesting that the whole Catholic Church and its leadership was against the colonial government; in fact, Chitando makes a critically important observation on that regard: As with other denominations, the story of the Catholic Church’s engagement with the colonial state is not a simple and straightforward one. There were periods when the Catholic Church had cordial relations with the colonial state. There were also moments when it challenged the state. Furthermore, different individuals within the Catholic Church had divergent opinions regarding how to relate to the state. Controversial issues relating to the land question, racial segregation and the liberation struggle split the Church. On the one hand were those who felt that the Church could not get involved in “political matters.” For them, the Church has the responsibility to address the “spiritual” dimension of life. On the other hand were those who contended that the Church had to address both dimensions of life. (Chitando, 2013:84) As Chitando rightly points out, the contradictions on whether to support or challenge injustice, oppression, racism and exploitation was found across all denominations during the colonial era; the same continued even after the end of colonisation. The churches were for some time confused as to their role in the new post-colonial state because in the fight for liberation, some church leaders had become friends with freedom fighters who were now the state leaders. The Catholic Church was among the first to pronounce themselves to be loyal to the principles of justice, equality and freedom for all and not to personal friendships, especially through the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, which went on to investigate and expose the Gukurahundi massacres of the 1980s (Gunda, 2018:40–44). The four main bodies of Christian churches (EFZ, ZCBC, ZCC and the Union for the Development of Apostolic Churches in Zimbabwe Africa

22  Masiiwa Ragies Gunda (UDACIZA) in Zimbabwe have come together to form the Zimbabwe Heads of Christian Denominations (ZHOCD). This grouping has suggested that the crises in Zimbabwe are only manifestations or symptoms of systemic challenges of (a) inadequate humanitarian preparedness, (b) failure to find mutually acceptable closure of the hurts of the past, (c) failure of the entrenchment of constitutionalism and the rule of law, (d) the breakdown of social contract characterized by cartelcontrolled and corruption-infested exclusive economy, and (e) continued international isolation of Zimbabwe. (Zimbabwe Heads of Christian Denominations (ZHOCD, 2020a) On 13 July 2020, the ZHOCD invited political parties in Zimbabwe to a consultative meeting as part of a series of consultations lined up by the churches to find consensus on the current but also the long-standing challenges facing the nation. Today’s meeting is a culmination of a week of extensive bilateral engagements in which even those political parties that did not attend today’s meeting gave input. (Zimbabwe Heads of Christian Denominations (ZHOCD, 2020b) Interestingly, the parties headed by the two current dominant politicians, Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa and Nelson Chamisa, were conspicuous by their absence at this meeting. Among other things, the meeting observed that current crises emanate from “the failure to properly bring closure to the many hurts and human rights violations of the immediate and long-past, including, but not isolated to Gukurahundi” (Zimbabwe Heads of Christian Denominations (ZHOCD, 2020b). Where some denominations supported the war of liberation, others were actively offering support to the colonial regimes to maintain their grip on power and privilege, some of which naturally filtered down to white missionaries as well. In some cases, denominations were divided between those who supported the black majority and others who supported the minority colonial regimes. Such a divide in the church was so apparent in the reactions to the World Council of Churches’ (WCC) Programme to Combat Racism, which offered support to freedom fighters during the war, a programme that was endorsed by the Christian Council of Rhodesia (CCR). On this programme, Bishop Paul Burrough of the Mashonaland Diocese of the Anglican Church said, I believe that the conscience of many Christians was outraged recently by the action of the World Council of Churches. The outrage was because the Council said in effect that the violence, which is inherent in Apartheid must, in the name of Christ, be answered by violence. This seemed to deny Christ’s Gospel. (Gunda, 2018:41–42)

Pastoral Letter, God and the Crises of Politics in Zimbabwe  23 This contestation has persisted in independent Zimbabwe, where over the decades Church leaders have always appeared either on the side of the State or against the excesses of State power and its deployment to entrench the rule of the elites. The “The March is not Ended” pastoral letter also led to this contestation to be played out publicly, with the ZIICC quickly organising a press conference in Mutare to show their support to a government under siege! At that press conference, ZIICC’s patron, Bishop Nehemiah Mutendi, said this was not the time to apportion blame, but to come together as the church, as a people, nation and Zimbabwe to make the country great again. As true shepherds they had to encourage their sheep to be productive rather than destructive. Thus, Right from the beginning, God urged man to be productive. Good shepherds should, therefore, urge their sheep to work towards building our country. Isn’t it a shame that Zimbabwe with all the abundant and fertile land that it has, is spending US$40 million a month to import food when in the 1980s it had enough maize to feed itself for three years even if there was drought and had enough grain to last eight years. Good shepherds should advocate for positive and constructive discourse than judgement. (Mushanawani, 2020) This statement is comparable to the one attributed to Bishop Burrough above, where state sympathisers appear more concerned about stability when in actual fact their concern is more on preserving the status quo with all its violence against the citizens. According to Chari (2014:124), the African Initiated Churches (as well as the Prosperity Gospel preachers) have been labelled as “gullible political instruments devoid of independent thinking” (Chari, 2014:124). This has largely been the case because of their supposed association with ZANU PF while the State media has labelled other churches, especially from the mainline strand, as enemies of the state for their supposed anti-ZANU PF rhetoric (Manyonganise, 2014:165). Among the most dominant supporters or sympathisers of the government have been the Apostolic Christian Council of Zimbabwe (ACCZ), which has been derisively called Apostolic Christian Council of ZANU PF owing to its explicit support of the ruling party (Matikiti, 2014:97–98). Matikiti further observes that other notable religious leaders roped into ZANU PF’s campaign trail included Emmanuel Makandiwa (UFI), Nolbert Kunonga (Anglican), Paul Mwazha (Apostolic African Church) and Obadiah Msindo (Destiny for Africa Network). The strategy was aimed at capturing popular personalities’ followers and to win them over, ahead of the planned national elections. ZANU PF hailed Apostolic churches for their support. It claimed to have brought the freedom of worship which the groups did not enjoy during the colonial era (Matikiti, 2014:98). In the 2000s, especially after the formation of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in 1999, the white garment churches, Pentecostal churches and some fly-by-night briefcase ministries have been recruited to form a pro-government Christian voice.

24  Masiiwa Ragies Gunda The multiplicity of voices emerging from the Christian family has always been the greatest weakness of Christianity in Zimbabwe because it compromises efforts that could be put towards making the government accountable to the masses through effective representation of the people’s concerns and aspirations through various bodies, including the Church. In a situation of social, economic and political uncertainty and instability, in a situation marked by multiple crises, the Church-State relations will always be put to the test. The position of God in a society that predominantly does not question the existence of God will be put to the test as well. Is God even involved? Must the Church be involved? If God and Church have a right to be involved, on whose side must they be? In the response by the ZCC, we learn in a paragraph the ZCC’s understanding of Church-State relations when they write: The ecumenical churches’ relationship with the state has been consistent from colonial Rhodesia to independent Zimbabwe. The government response presented by Minister Mutsvangwa, seeks to create false discontinuity between the contemporary bishops and the suffering servants of the past. Such a view misses the importance of continuity of Tradition within Christian theology and practice. The consistency with which the ZCBC and the ecumenical church have pursued justice, peace and unity cannot be forgotten. Coincidentally, the issues raised by the “The March is not Ended” of the 14th of August 2020 are fundamentally similar to calls by Bishop Donal Raymond Lamont in his Open letter to the Rhodesian Government on the 11th of August 1976. In both cases, the message was well-meaning and consistent with the prophetic traditions of Micah, Amos, Jeremiah, John the Baptist and even our Lord Jesus Christ. Those who have responded to this salvation history with repentance found life. Those who rejected it suffered destruction, not only in a spiritual sense but also materially. (Zimbabwe Council of Churches (ZCC), 2020) In short, the relationship between the State and the Church from the planting of Christianity in Zimbabwe in the late 19th century has always been one fraught with contradictions and tensions. There is no single strand of relationship and there is no rigid demarcation between those who were pro-State or anti-State. What is clear is that there were always some who stood by the State and those who felt called to stand with the oppressed, hence standing against the State. That divide remains to this day and was evidently clear in the pastoral letter of 14 August 2020 as well as the reactions and responses that followed it. The March is Not Ended – Unpacking the Import of the ZCBC Pastoral Letter In the preceding section, we noted that the relationship between the Church and the State has depended largely on the obtaining situation in the country; where instances of oppression, injustice, violence, and heavy-handedness by the

Pastoral Letter, God and the Crises of Politics in Zimbabwe  25 State are commonplace, opposing voices from the church have been heard, even if supporting Christian voices have also been allowed space to form a bulwark against other Christian voices. The pastoral letter of 14 August 2020 was not “a bolt from the blue” because there is evidence that there were developments that were pointing to such an eventuality. In fact, just a week before the pastoral letter, on 8 August 2020, the ZHOCD issued a statement in which they stated: The country suffers from severe food shortages with almost half the population in need of food. This situation is only going to intensify between now and March 2021 before the next harvest. The growing levels of malnutrition amongst children can leave permanent damage on their development if the situation is not arrested. There is deepening poverty with about 90% of the population in informal employment which has now been rendered redundant due to the lockdown in response to Covid-19. The collapse of health, education and other social services has increased the burden on the poor and other vulnerable groups in society. The shortcomings of leadership to satisfactorily resolve the grievances of the health sector personnel has left hospitals without being properly prepared to respond to Covid-19. The highlevels of corruption resulting in the expulsion of the Minister of Health, has meant that the resources meant for Covid-19 have not been channelled to where they are needed. The arrest and persecution of the journalists and the civil activists who amplified and detailed the depth of corruption, is worrying. The continued persecution of activists, some of whom have been tortured and treated inhumanly while others are still in hiding for fear of similar treatment, is a cause for serious concern. The violent presence and involvement of the army in the sphere that must be taken care of by the police is also a worrying development since the beginning of the new dispensation in November 2017. (Zimbabwe Heads of Christian Denominations (ZHOCD), 2020a) The fact that this pointed statement did not elicit the kind of response that followed the release of the ZCBC pastoral letter calls for a critical analysis. Why did the State and its supporters think that the ZHOCD statement quoted above was worth ignoring but not the pastoral letter that literally said the same thing a week later? The situation of Zimbabwe is further complicated by the role of Christians in the multiple crises, as observed by the Catholic bishops in their 2007 pastoral letter, “God Hears the Cry of the Oppressed,” when they observed: They all profess their loyalty to the same Church. They are all baptized, sit and pray and sing together in the same church, take part in the same celebration of the Eucharist and partake of the same Body and Blood of Christ. While the next day, outside the church, a few steps away, Christian State Agents, policemen and soldiers assault and beat peaceful, unarmed demonstrators and torture detainees. This is the unacceptable reality on the ground, which shows

26  Masiiwa Ragies Gunda much disrespect for human life and falls far below the dignity of both the perpetrator and the victim. (Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops’ Conference (ZCBC), 2007, S.3–4) Central to the Catholic bishops’ responses to the situation obtaining in Zimbabwe, has been their strong belief in the centrality of the Bible and the Church’s Social Teachings. There is a conviction that the Bible as scripture has models for proper administration of society, whose interest is to establish fair distribution of resources. This is what Jesus Christ, the central hermeneutic to a Christian reading of the Bible, represented both in deed and word. (Gunda, 2015:62) While there are many instances in history where the Church has supported injustice, violence and exploitation, the Church has excelled each time it has stood for justice. It is in such a context that we must seek to understand the pastoral letter of 14 August 2020. In the following paragraphs, we will focus on the content of the pastoral letter, what was stated explicitly, implicitly and where possible, also reading between the lines. The Pastoral Letter was given the heading “The March is not Ended,” a phrase credited to the recently departed African American Representative in Congress, who refused to look at the gains achieved since the civil rights march in the 1960s as marking the resolution of all issues. He understood the march would never end because the issues will never be fully addressed, as new issues emerge in each generation. The march, literally and metaphorically, must not end, should not end even! (Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops’ Conference (ZCBC) 2020). That the ZCBC decided to invoke the memory of an African/Black American who had just passed on was telling: this was the concise understanding by a man who had been by the side of Martin Luther King Junior when he was shot dead. His understanding was opposed to that of our own “liberators” who wanted us to see that the march had ended in 1980! This was a challenge to the narrative as presented by ZANU PF and the government. The pastoral letter in driving this new narrative home argues that: There is a divide in Zimbabwe today between those that believe in a past and completed liberation and those who realize the march is not ended. Peace building and nation building are never completed tasks. Every generation has to establish national cohesion and peace. The struggle in Zimbabwe, between those who think they have arrived and those on the march has resulted in a multi-layered crisis of the convergence of economic collapse, deepening poverty, food insecurity, corruption and human rights abuses among other crises in urgent need of resolution. This comes on the backdrop of unresolved past hurts like Gukurahundi, which continue to spawn even more angry new generations. (Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops’ Conference (ZCBC), 2020)

Pastoral Letter, God and the Crises of Politics in Zimbabwe  27 The first and critically important assertion by the bishops in this pastoral letter is their rejection of the ZANU PF narrative that suggests the “March ended in 1980” and that post-1980, Zimbabweans have an obligation to trust and follow the government without questioning its ways. The second key assertion and observation from the pastoral letter is how fear has now become palpable among citizens. Fear of the government, fear of the government actors, fear of violence, fear of survival! The bishops write, fear runs down the spine of many of our people today. The crackdown on dissent is unprecedented. Is this the Zimbabwe we want? To have a different opinion does not mean to be an enemy … Our Government automatically labels anyone thinking differently as an enemy of the country: that is an abuse. (Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops’ Conference (ZCBC), 2020) Zimbabwe has reached that level where citizens have two options, to blindly follow the government and be “good citizens” or to critique government and be “terrorists, regime change agents, and puppets of the West.” With State security agents constantly being accused of abducting activists challenging the government, torturing those arrested, and carrying out extra-judicial punishments, including the disappearance of some activists, it is understandable that the bishops see “fear running down the entire society!” The assumption that not agreeing with the ruling party, government or its agents is tantamount to being an enemy of the state is very unfortunate but real. The third assertion detected in the pastoral letter focuses on corruption! Corruption, corruption and more corruption! According to the pastoral letter, “corruption in the country has reached alarming levels. Government and civic society are agreed that corruption is choking the economy, and compromising our justice system… The “catch and release” approach makes the ordinary man on the street question the sincerity of government to deal effectively with corruption” (Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops’ Conference (ZCBC), 2020). The pastoral letter cites Micah 7:1–6 to show that the myriad of problems being experienced by Zimbabweans are a result of a dearth in leadership because there are no more “servant leaders,” because they are now driven by self-interests instead of the wellbeing of all citizens (Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops’ Conference (ZCBC), 2020). The Bishops question the sincerity of government in fighting corruption because among the alleged corrupt leaders are senior ranking officials in government and the ruling party. While the pastoral letter does not explicitly mention corruption in the private sector, it does acknowledge that corruption in the country has become a metastasised cancer. The fourth area of focus is the national founding narrative that has since independence been constructed and propagated by ZANU PF. The pastoral letter reconfigures this national epic by asserting that the Heroes and Defence Forces holidays were expressions of gratitude for the immense sacrifices made by the war heroes. Most of our people contributed to the success of war effort in various ways … As a nation we must appreciate and be grateful to those,

28  Masiiwa Ragies Gunda who despite not holding a gun, made an immense contribution of supporting the cause. Our leaders are re-creating the war situation of “us against them” (Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops’ Conference (ZCBC), 2020). This is a damning indictment on the ZANU PF leadership that has for long presented itself as the “class of liberators” while everyone else is the “class of the liberated” in which they were the brave ones and everyone else the cowards! This narrative is vividly presented by Gunda (2018:24–25), when he contests the privatisation of the national liberation epic that has systematically deprived all Zimbabweans, unless actively ZANU PF, of any contribution to the liberation of Zimbabwe. While contesting the national liberation narrative as presented by ZANU PF, the pastoral letter invokes one of the popular propaganda lines of the ruling party in the 1980s, the policy of “Gutsa ruzhinji” (satisfying the masses) by asking “what has become of “Gutsa ruzhinji” of the war times and 80s? (Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops’ Conference (ZCBC), 2020). The fifth point of contention that is highlighted in the pastoral letter is the indifference with which issues affecting the poor are handled by the national leaders. To this end, the bishops make reference to the agreement between former commercial farmers and the government. As we engage the global economic community, let us not forget the impoveri­ shed and marginalized Zimbabweans, for example, the recently concluded compensation deal between the government of Zimbabwe and former commercial farmers does not consider the interests or welfare of former farm workers and their families. (Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops’ Conference (ZCBC, 2020) As the agreement was being touted as progress from the lawlessness of the Mugabe era, there was no mention of how former farm workers would be compensated because their lives were turned upside down during the fast-track land reform. These people, who cannot afford lawyers, need to be protected by their government but as the deal showed, they had no one representing their interests. The bishops were right, therefore, when they wrote: It seems as though the poor have no one to defend them. They don’t seem to feature on the national agenda. Their cries for an improved health system go unheeded … It is not clear to us, as your Bishops, that the national leadership we have has the knowledge, social skills, emotional stability and social orientation to handle the issues that we face as a nation. (Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops’ Conference (ZCBC), 2020) The COVID-19 pandemic complicated matters further for poor people because they only had public hospitals to rely on but it was common knowledge that public hospitals had been run down for some years and were not well equipped for them to successfully deal with the pandemic, if it worsened! Thank God, the pandemic did not ravage the country like it did in some developed countries.

Pastoral Letter, God and the Crises of Politics in Zimbabwe  29 Even as the pandemic appeared to be sparing Zimbabweans, the bishops make a worrying observation. In the face of growing numbers of Covid-19 infections, where does the nation turn to? With the necessary tools in short supply in our hospitals, we notice with wounded hearts that government officials seem to have more PPE than our nurses and doctors. (Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops’ Conference (ZCBC), 2020) Pictures of government actors in full PPE at the burial of a national hero alongside nurses covering themselves with hospital bed sheets circulated on social media to show how insensitive the government had become. The poor remained without leaders who cared for them! The bishops did acknowledge that there might be some culpability to be apportioned to external forces, but that actually was stated as the “usual excuse or defence line by a failed leadership.” The reality is that even though Vice President Chiwenga categorically accused former President Mugabe of lying and hiding behind sanctions to cover his failures, Chiwenga said Operation Restore Legacy happened because constitutional power had been usurped by non-State actors and the economy had been allowed to collapse. “… note that even if we were under sanctions, we could have done something … people were not sure of what tomorrow would hold for them. There was no policy consistency, people who were not constitutionally in government were making decisions and even battering the judicial service, firing people left, right and centre” he said. (Mugabe, 2018) In fact, what Chiwenga said in June, Mnangagwa had already said in January when he said, “we cannot continue talking about sanctions, we must have solutions” (Chadenga, 2018). That government now insisted on sanctions as the be-all of Zimbabwe’s problems was not shared by the pastoral letter. The points articulated above all fall under the diagnosis part of the pastoral letter, but it goes ahead to prescribe or propose what it considers to be the right path and approach out of this malaise. The pastoral letter makes reference to the work that was being done by a broad-based coalition, the Comprehensive National Settlement Framework proposal, which had come through engagements among National Church Bodies, Civic Society, Business and Professional bodies under the banner, The National Convergence Platform (NCP), and had identified five core issues that the nation had to resolve to extricate itself from the malaise: 1 A victim-led process which adheres to globally accepted norms and international law 2 A broadly agreed reform process towards constitutionalism and the rule of law 3 A new social contract on the basis of an inclusive national economic vision

30  Masiiwa Ragies Gunda 4 A broad-based and inclusive national humanitarian and emergency response, and 5 Mending of regional, continental and global relations (Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops’ Conference (ZCBC), 2020). The most pointed statement in the pastoral statement was when the bishops proclaimed, “it is not clear to us, as your Bishops, that the national leadership we have has the knowledge, social skills, emotional stability and social orientation to handle the issues that we face as a nation” (Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops’ Conference (ZCBC), 2020). In previous pastoral letters, the bishops never took this step of questioning the competence and legitimacy of the national leadership. Was this the reason why the pastoral letter received the multiple, and rabidly vicious, responses from the government? The Response by Government and State Actors to the Pastoral Letter – A Crisis of the Crises The government responded to the pastoral letter in a way that betrayed a panic attack or some confusion because within a few days, the Minister of Information, Publicity and Broadcasting Services, Senator Monica Mutsvangwa had issued a government response, but the Permanent Secretary in her ministry also responded in his official capacity, then the Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs also responded to the same letter. Besides these, the President touched on the letter when addressing his party’s Politburo meeting, and the party spokesman, Patrick Chinamasa, also addressed the pastoral letter. The multiplicity of these responses clearly shows how seriously the ruling party and the government took the pastoral letter, but it also inevitably created a platform for some inconsistencies to emerge, as the responses appeared not to have been properly coordinated. In unpacking these responses, I will begin by articulating the key points that emerged from the Mutsvangwa press conference and how later responses buttressed or contradicted this initial government response. This initial response came barely 24 hours later, on 15 August 2020, illustrating how seriously the government took the pastoral letter and wasting no time before it went viral. In the introduction, Mutsvangwa did not waste time in highlighting the direction the government was taking in addressing or responding to the pastoral letter. While the bishops had questioned the competence of the national leadership, the government quickly questioned the spiritual competence of the bishops! The pastoral letter, charged Mutsvangwa, was “issued under the misguided if [not] evil minded leadership of the Archbishop of Harare,” the pastoral letter had an “evil message” full of “all the vices that have perennially hobbled the progress of Africa.” The same pastoral letter, she said, “trumpets petty tribal feuds and narrow regionalist agendas so that it can sow seeds of internecine strife as a prelude to national disintegration” (Mutsvangwa, 2020). The government was not wasting time in discrediting the pastoral letter, not by proving that its accusations were false but by showing that the authors were not holy but evil. While attacking all the bishops who signed the pastoral letter, the government singled out the

Pastoral Letter, God and the Crises of Politics in Zimbabwe  31 Archbishop of Harare, Robert Ndlovu for the greatest attacks. The ethnicity of the Archbishop was invoked and used to accuse the bishops of fanning tribalism and wishing to sow seeds of national disintegration. He was accused of donning: the robes of Archbishop Arthanase Seromba who was the chief spiritual ideologist and violent practitioner of the 1994 Hutu-Tutsi Genocide of Rwanda. These crimes against humanity took place during the Rwandan Civil War that saw more than 800 000 Tutsi minority, pygmy baTwa tribe, and moderate Hutus massacred on such a large scale … With nefarious cynicism to history, Archbishop Robert Christopher Ndlovu is inching to lead the Zimbabwe Catholic congregation into the darkest dungeons of Rwanda-type genocide. (Mutsvangwa, 2020) While Archbishop Ndlovu was compared to the Rwandan Archbishop, he was contrasted with Bishop Donal Lamont of Mutare who challenged the Smith regime. Lamont was good, Seromba was evil and Ndlovu had chosen to follow Seromba, according to the government. For what she said was choosing to follow Seromba, Mutsvangwa described Archbishop Ndlovu as “the errant and evil Bishop,” “the malicious and mischievous Archbishop,” “the leader of righteous Ndebele minority fanning the psychosis of tribal victimization,” “sowing seeds of collective guilty on the Shona majority” (Mutsvangwa, 2020). The Archbishop was accused of being a coward, possibly an accomplice with the colonial regime: Archbishop Christopher Ndlovu, you ardently call that the March has not stopped. This is a pathetic admission of the failure of the 31 July 2020 Uprising. You were born into the 1970s Generation thousands of whom became ZANLA-ZIPRA cadres of the guerrilla army that made the supreme sacrifice for freedom and independence. I am even much younger than you yet I fought in that war. Admittedly made that fateful decision to join the armed struggle. What I ask is if you have such a charged political spirit, why did you not answer to that call of heroism in the I970s. (sic) Your pastoral letter feigns contrived courage by a dyed in the wool coward. (Mutsvangwa, 2020) These were very strong words, adjudged to be commensurate with the bishops’ own words in the pastoral letter by the government. The government attack was being led by a woman, who was using her liberation war credentials to question the masculinity of the Archbishop. This leads us directly to consider the second accusation by the government, one that suggests the bishops disrespected the national epic! Having attacked the spiritual, religious and personal credibility of the authors of the pastoral letter, especially Archbishop Ndlovu, the government response picked on areas in the pastoral letter for concerted attacks. The first such response was the accusation that the pastoral letter disrespected the National Heroes and Defence Forces Holidays (Mutsvangwa, 2020). This accusation is easy to

32  Masiiwa Ragies Gunda understand, seeing that the pastoral letter was issued at the end of the week in which these holidays were marked and because of the proximity of these holidays, the pastoral letter made an explicit reference to the import and meaning of these holidays. The 1970s heroes and heroines made “the supreme sacrifice for freedom and independence.” According to Mutsvangwa, by implication, the “march ended in 1980.” And in this national epic, not everyone made this “supreme sacrifice”: only those identified by the ruling party as having made the supreme sacrifice did make the supreme sacrifice. The government was asking the bishops and all Zimbabweans In Mugabe’s rhetoric … to be eternally grateful to the nationalists for delivering freedom, independence, democracy and human rights. Where Ian Smith and the whites had oppressed them and treated them as sub-humans, brave sons and daughters took up arms and restored their dignity. Upon the attainment of independence in 1980, the struggle ended. This is the official thinking in ZANU PF. Consequently, Zimbabweans must endure all hardships and defend the revolution at all costs. (Chitando, 2013:92) This is the context in which Bishop Lamont was invoked; he participated in this struggle and was on the side of the freedom fighters. Whether the erstwhile bishop would continue to endorse the former freedom fighters must not arise because the “struggle ended” and the need for church intervention ended as well. The thinking is simple, if we were right in the 1960s then we are right today! Once right, always right! The 1980s had a national “moment of madness,” according to former President Mugabe, widely known as Gukurahundi, the Matabeleland and Midlands massacres. The massacres were carried by a military unit. Members of the unit told locals that they had been ordered to “wipe out the people [Ndeble] in the area” and to “kill anything that was human”. Mugabe named this Korean trained unit “Gukurahundi Fifth Brigade”, a chiShona term that loosely translates to the early rain that washes away the chaff before the spring rains. The term Gukurahundi not only refers to Fifth Brigade, but also to the period of political and ethnic violence perpetrated by this unit in Zimbabwe between 1983 and 1985. (Cameron, 2017) In its traditional usage, Gukurahundi is the rain that is not selective of what it washes away because anything that is found on the threshing floors after harvesting and threshing of grains would be washed away. Using this rain as a metaphor to describe the task given to the Fifth Brigade could only mean doom for ordinary people in the targeted areas. The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP) estimated that around 20,000 innocent people were massacred in Matabeleland and Midlands (Gunda, 2018:44). This part of Zimbabwean

Pastoral Letter, God and the Crises of Politics in Zimbabwe  33 history has remained emotive yet the government, through Senator Mutsvangwa, asserted, Fellow Zimbabweans Gukurahundi is indeed a dark spot in the tortuous task of nation building by Zimbabwe. The two parties of that needless chapter of history need to be hailed for seeking peace and unity as they avoided the abyss that could have been a full-blown civil war. Happily, we ended up with the 1987 Unity Accord. (Mutsvangwa, 2020) This assertion falls squarely into the line of thinking articulated by Chitando cited above, which maintains that whatever happened, happened but it was concluded. The march ended! In the case of Gukurahundi, the march ended with the Unity Accord of 1987. In this case, for anyone to continue to suggest that Gukurahundi is an open wound, a festering wound, or even a visible scar is to seek to “cause unnecessary, petty tribal feuds!” Interestingly, the government response accuses the bishops of forgetfulness, invoking Bishop Lamont and the CCJP for their work during the colonial period in a very ironic way: The errant and evil Bishop has a nauseating mental amnesia of the blight of minority settler rule and its baggage of exploitative racism against the totality of the black majority popular [population] of Zimbabwe. The levity of his mental amnesia is worsened by the fact that he tears off pages of the progressive crusade for justice and democracy that has hitherto been the shining virtue of the Catholic Church in Zimbabwe. Who can forget the venerable Bishop Lamont of Mutare and his brave defiance of the illegal and racist rule of Ian Smith and his 1965 Unilateral Declaration of Independence? Bishop Christopher Ndlovu is leading a coterie of Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops along the wrong path of bygone petty tribalism, narrow regionalism and the debunked and defeated racial antagonism. The letter is full of generalized accusations. By way of contrast, the meticulous Catholic Peace and Justice Commission of the anticolonial, anti-racist epoch collated, compiled and published dossiers of specific crimes committed by the colonial settler minority regime. The Archbishop and his flock of misled Catholic Bishops have none of that diligence. Instead they wallow in generalized and baseless accusations. Absolutely no shred of reported evidence of so-called victims. (Mutsvangwa, 2020) The same CCJP compiled, collated and published dossiers of specific crimes committed by this government against the people of Matabeleland and Midlands and this government continues to deny what happened. Those were the major takeaways from the initial government response and along with these major points were the usual accusations of pandering to the Americans because the pastoral letter makes reference to an American Civil

34  Masiiwa Ragies Gunda Rights icon. The bishops are also accused of calling people to march against the health pandemic regulations. The march was not being used metaphorically, it was being used literally to refer to the July 31 March against corruption (Mutsvangwa, 2020). The government issued a clarion call to Catholics to choose whether to be with “an incompetent government according to the bishops” or to be with “evil bishops according to the government”: To Catholics in Zimbabwe, you were part to the total rebuff to the call of an Uprising on 31July 2020. You already showed your mettle of sound and mature political judgement. (Mutsvangwa, 2020) If the pastoral letter was taken as a declaration of war by the government, then the response by Mutsvangwa was the launch of the first blow on the bishops, the first and quite powerful; if it landed on the target, the target would not be able to retaliate! It appears, though, that there was too much force that the impact of the blow was threatening the launcher rather than the target! I think this explains the flurry of responses that continued to come, even as the Bishops were silent. But the Bishops were not silent, it is just that, the government response had taken the battle away from the Catholic Church to the wider Christian family! In what followed from the side of government, the most thorough, maybe even a bit more measured than the first, was the response by Ziyambi Ziyambi, the Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs. In his lengthy response, three key issues stand out for our analysis. The first key contribution by Ziyambi was to reframe the accusations against the bishops who signed the pastoral letter: whereas Mutsvangwa had labelled them evil, Ziyambi took a more conciliatory tone without being conciliatory. In the response the direct attacks on the person or persons of the bishops were avoided and an attack on the supposed content of the letter was elevated. The Minister suggested that the government was open to “justifiable and reasoned criticism” from all quarters; however, the government was of the view that the pastoral letter was neither reasoned nor justifiable. In fact, the letter was “combative, inappropriately prescriptive and grossly disrespectful” of the government. The bishops were not necessarily evil but they “had become political” and were being manipulated by regime change forces (Ziyambi, 2020). In short, the pastoral letter was not a pastoral letter, it was a political statement. The Government has taken due note of the Pastoral Letter issued by the Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops’ Conference on 14 August 2020; a communication which, sadly, betrays a markedly unspiritual determination on the part of its authors to breach what is and must always remain the un-breachable firewall between politics and religion in our country … For the most part, the Catholic Church and the State have always co-existed well in Zimbabwe. Where disagreements or tensions have arisen, it is generally when the Church has overstepped its spiritual boundaries and trespassed into the realm of the

Pastoral Letter, God and the Crises of Politics in Zimbabwe  35 secular–as appears to be the intention, now, of the venerable Archbishop and his colleagues … By allowing themselves to be manipulated into joining what is so clearly a fabrication based on distortion, invention and outright falsehood, the Catholic Church does itself injury and its followers a major disservice. (Ziyambi, 2020) On the question of Gukurahundi, again Ziyambi tried to revise or edit the bullish approach taken by Mutsvangwa earlier. Ziyambi admits that Gukurahundi is not a finished matter and even suggested the President was in the midst of finding lasting solutions and bringing closure on the matter. The Government of Zimbabwe is determined that this matter (Gukurahundi) should not be used as a convenient political tool by any political player, organisation or individual. In March 2019, President E. D. Mnangagwa commenced dialogue with Matabeleland-based Civil Society Organisations and Chiefs. Gukurahundi was identified in the dialogue as an issue requiring urgent attention. Significantly, President E.D. Mnangagwa unambiguously stated that Zimbabweans are now free to discuss the issue of Gukurahundi candidly without fear of arrest and victimisation of any sort … On the 29th of June 2020 the Minister of Home Affairs and Cultural Heritage, Honourable Kazembe Kazembe held meetings with Matabeleland Civil Society Organisations to discuss the implementation of resolutions that were made, including the issuing of birth and death certificates that are linked to Gukurahundi. Dialogue under the auspices of the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission (NPRC) and the Government of Zimbabwe is ongoing on the issue of exhumations linked to Gukurahundi. The subject of Gukurahundi is however of such a sensitive nature such that it cannot be resolved through grandstanding. Dialogue on the issue continues. Government regrets any attempt to derail the progressive and peaceful process that is currently gaining momentum in those Gukurahundi engagements. (Ziyambi, 2020) This is a tactful admission that the bishops have a point, but their point is not entirely true because it missed out a bigger point, which is that the President is working on the matter to bring finality, unlike the assertion in the initial response by Minister Mutsvangwa. In fact, two days after this response, the President was reported to have gone to Bulawayo to meet with stakeholders to discuss aspects of Gukurahundi atrocities (Netsianda, 2020). The third and final major point of response by Ziyambi focuses on the competence of the government and other state institutions to address the problems bedevilling Zimbabwe. Ziyambi took exception to the statement by the bishops that questioned the competence of the President and his entire government by noting the successes scored by this government, showing that the President has taken actions to fight corruption, such as the establishment of the Special Anti-Corruption Unit in the President’s Office, the setting up of Special

36  Masiiwa Ragies Gunda Anti-Corruption Courts. He contends that contrary to the public perception that the judiciary is captured, the courts are independent, suggesting that of 25 cases tried in the courts in which government was a litigant, government had only won six cases while losing all the others. Ziyambi went ahead to present President Mnangagwa as a transparent leader who even invited USA and EU election observers, something that had not been done since 2002. The President had also successfully established the Chapter 12 Institutions, the Independent Commissions, which are all functional and carrying out their mandates without interference from the executive. Following the post-election violence on 1 August 2018, the President had set up the Kgalema Motlante Commission of Inquiry to investigate what happened and also set up the Presidential Advisory Council made up of persons from all walks of life, not only from ZANU PF. Finally, the President had created the Political Actors Dialogue (POLAD) platform (Ziyambi, 2020). Thus, these achievements demonstrate(d) how wrong the bishops were in questioning the competence, sincerity and commitment of the president to solving the challenges that Zimbabweans are currently facing. Ziyambi also contrasts the Chin’ono case to that of Pastor Shingi Munyeza, an outspoken government critic, when writing: Pastor Shingi Munyeza is a member of PAC and is also a Government-appointed Director of Zimpapers Holdings. The Catholic Bishops would have noted that recently Pastor Munyeza has used his church sermons to call for the removal of the Government of Zimbabwe, in language that cannot be described as moderate. Not only has Shingi Munyeza retained his position in the PAC and at Zimpapers, but no consequences have visited Pastor Munyeza for his stance. In light of the foregoing, on what basis do the Catholic Bishops, in their eminent wisdom, state that “Our Government automatically labels anyone thinking differently as an enemy of the country: that is an abuse”? (Ziyambi, 2020) In the Ziyambi statement, the government response to the pastoral letter was revised but cemented, adapted but not weakened. Mutsvangwa had overstepped in some word choices but the essence of what she said was correct according to government perception and understanding. Ziyambi highlighted the “good relations” between the State and the Catholic Church and that point was also emphasised by the President when he addressed the 342nd Ordinary Session of the ZANU PF Politburo, noting that “Zanu PF has a close relationship with the Church, dating back to the days of the liberation struggle. In post independence period we continued to work well. Going forward, we remain committed to working well with the church to advance the national development agenda as a united people”, while noting and reiterating the view that the pastoral letter was political not religious, he called on the bishops to “come out and form political parties. As Zanu PF, we are ready for the 2023 elections. We are a people’s party that believes in unity,

Pastoral Letter, God and the Crises of Politics in Zimbabwe  37 love, peace and in championing development. We fought for the empowerment of our people.” (Madzimure, 2020) In order to maintain the cordial relations between the State and the Church, the Government had tasked Foreign Affairs and International Trade Minister Sibusiso Moyo to meet the Apostolic Pro-Nuncio Archbishop Zalewski on issues raised by the bishops that cast aspersions on the Government. Minister Moyo subsequently met Archbishop Zalewski yesterday, but details of the meeting were not made available to the Press by the time of going to print. (Murwira, 2020) Here, the government sought to undermine the local Catholic bishops by meeting the representative of the Vatican in the country. The unstated statement here was that government would interact with their superiors, relegating them to minnows. The idea that when religious leaders speak out against ZANU PF they are being political but when they speak out in support of ZANU PF they are not being political is one of the residues of the Mugabe legacy in the current government. This understanding appeared to be the basis of The Herald editorial opinion; thus, BY now it is beyond debate that the country is yet again the target of a sustained attack from many angles, not least the Church, which is supposed to be apolitical. Thus, it came as no surprise when the Catholic Church, fronted by one Bishop Christopher Ndlovu, and itself a torchbearer of imperialism and neocolonialism waded into the non-existent debate of a non-existent crisis in Zimbabwe. (Zenenga, 2020) The editorial even reiterated the Mutsvangwa position that Gukurahundi was no longer an issue by charging that the position of the bishops was proved in the so-called pastoral letter which tried to whip up tribal sentiments through invoking issues that have been ironed out by the ZANU PF Government as far back as in 1987, the pastoral letter reeked genocidal intentions that are regrettably being authored by the people who are supposed to feed people’s souls and provide the torch during difficult times. (Zenenga, 2020) According to Machingura (2012:226–227), The loss of support by ZANU PF is regarded as not a result of corruption, economic meltdown and populist policies resulting in hunger and poverty. The argument by ZANU PF is that, imperialist forces use money to buy the

38  Masiiwa Ragies Gunda souls and bodies of opposition parties and their followers in order to continue exploiting the Zimbabwean resources. Further, the bishops are, therefore, guilty of not condemning the sanctions that are the sole reason why Zimbabweans are suffering: Evil sanctions that Western countries imposed on Zimbabwe after being stung by the land reform programme still subsist and the general person is still bearing the brunt of these illegal sanctions that have bled Zimbabwe of billions of dollars in potential investment, yet the so-called pastors are dead silent, they haven’t raised a finger because they subscribe to the evil machinations. (Zenenga, 2020) In the statement by the ZANU PF spokesman, Patrick Chinamasa, himself a lay Catholic, the only major addition to the clearly established positions was an explicit tying down of the bishops to the opposition Movement for Democratic Change Alliance party. In the party statement, Chinamasa “claimed that a recent hard-hitting letter written by Catholic Bishops was full of MDC Alliance vitriol, raising suspicion it could have been written by opposition party leaders Nelson Chamisa or Tendai Biti” (Matenga, 2020b). On the issue of Gukurahundi, Chinamasa said Mnangagwa was working tirelessly to address the matter although it would take time. “If you are addressing a calamity like Gukurahundi, it can’t be overnight, it is a process,” Chinamasa said. Mnangagwa was State Security Minister during the Gukurahundi era (Matenga, 2020b). On this point, Chinamasa was in line with Ziyambi and revising the earlier Mutsvangwa assertion. However, when we look at the responses from government, one thing is apparent: the gauntlet was thrown on the Zimbabwean population, particularly the Catholic family–choose for yourselves the bishops or the government! The Choice – Uncritical Faith and Uncritical Patriotism or Faith and Patriotism Once the main antagonists had laid down their positions; as outlined in the two preceding sections, the field was open for sympathisers to come on board. The critical questions that seemingly played in the background were: Has the church got any role to play in the daily material lives of their members and ordinary citizens? Must there be a rigid and strictly enforceable distinction between a religious realm and a political realm? Is it possible to be neutral in an environment like that obtaining in Zimbabwe? Is it possible to be a patriotic Zimbabwean without following ZANU PF unquestioningly? The first black President of Zimbabwe after independence suggested that neutrality in an environment characterised by oppression, injustice and all other evils was impossible because silence was collusion with the status quo (Banana, 1986:7). While on patriotism, Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni and James Muzondidya put this lucidly:

Pastoral Letter, God and the Crises of Politics in Zimbabwe  39 In this reductionist definition of patriotism, Zimbabwe’s guerrilla war veterans and African nationalist leaders, defined by their participation in the fight for political independence, were viewed as having demonstrated their spirit of sacrifice. As the party of liberation, ZANU PF thus expected the nation not only to be eternally grateful for its leaders’ sacrifice but also to continue to support them unconditionally in whatever political agendas they pursued. (Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Muzondidya, 2011:9–10) In effect, from a ZANU PF perspective, anyone who questions the intentions of ZANU PF cannot be a patriot. This explains why those that leave the party (voluntarily or through expulsion) are quickly “undressed” in terms of having their “war record,” the basis of their heroism being revised and having them reduced to ordinary cowardly citizens. It happened with Joice Mujuru (former Vice President) and also with Robert Mugabe. In the fall out following the publication of the pastoral letter and the responses by government, Zimbabweans were forced to pick sides. Some chose to support the government, while others chose to stand with the bishops. In this section, I will briefly highlight these two opposing camps and the key issues that emerged from these camps. It was not lost on government and actors sympathetic to the government that what had started all this was a letter by some religious leaders! Even though government had responded, there was always a feeling of inadequacy. There was need for “like for like” approach, hence a Press Conference, disregarding the COVID19 regulations was quickly organised in Mutare, where, as highlighted earlier, the ZIICC said its membership did not share the perverse desires for conflict exhibited by the Catholic Bishops, but preferred to work together with the government to build a bright future for the nation (Mushanawani, 2020). The ZIICC contrasted a peace-loving government with a perverse and conflict loving church and opted to side with the government. ‘We take strong exception to and categorically dissociate ourselves from calls by certain religious leaders to march against the Government and to reignite conflicts and wounds of the past to heal us, from which God answered our prayers by bringing political leaders to the negotiating table where reconciliation was achieved. Please do not reverse the good that God had done. Our response as God’s servants should not be to call people to revive old grudges, but rather to urge people to go forward in peace.’ ZIICC also called on Zimbabweans to reject irresponsible calls to protest marches and boycotts aimed at provoking violence and worsening the nation’s economic challenges. Since 2018 elections and even before, Zimbabweans have been held to ransom and forced to drink from a poisoned chalice of lethal and adversarial politics whose sole agenda is that the opposition may govern, regardless of the democratic outcome of electoral and legal processes, both of which they participated in. (Mushanawani, 2020)

40  Masiiwa Ragies Gunda In the ZIICC statement, it was the Catholic Church that was fanning conflict, calling for violent uprisings, hence devoid of patriotism and sincerity demonstrated by the Catholic bishops. That is why those who chose to stand with the government charged that the “pastoral letter dovetailed with the country’s detractors’ attempt to manufacture a non-existent crisis in Zimbabwe which was supposed to culminate in subversive demonstrations on July 31, a march that was thwarted by the country’s security forces” (Madzimure, 2020). There was no crisis in Zimbabwe, anyone who suggested there was a crisis was unpatriotic and the bishops were, therefore, unpatriotic! There also was a larger group that chose to stand with the Bishops. In this group, the two major national church bodies, the EFZ and the ZCC, were the leading voices. In this second group, three key positions emerged: First, the bishops were correct about their diagnosis of what was wrong and who was responsible for the mess Zimbabwe finds herself. Second, the Church is within her rights to call out political leaders to order, it is biblical, and it is part of her Social Teachings. Third, the government is highly intolerant that is why it missed the chance for engagement presented by the pastoral letter and instead went on a full-blown attack of the bishops. Based on these major points, this group literally encouraged Zimbabweans to stand with the bishops against the government. Among the many contributors to this second perspective, the Adventist Lawyers Association accused government of not upholding justice, not fighting corruption and not stopping retribution against persons exposing corruption. They expressed alarm at the brutal attack by Mutsvangwa, on the Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops’ Conference generally and on Bishop Ndlovu in particular, in reaction to their exercise of their freedom of expression as enshrined in the Constitution of Zimbabwe (Adventist Lawyers Association (ALA), 2020). The Catholic Professionals Network of Zimbabwe also expressed their disquiet on the government response and wrote: We received with comfort and satisfaction the ZCBC pastoral letter of 14 August 2020. The letter follows the long, proud, pre–and post-independence Catholic tradition of speaking out in support and defence of the large majority of Zimbabweans, many of whom are disadvantaged, marginalized and seemingly powerless. Their voice is rooted in the Christian faith and draws from the Social Teachings of the Church and is based on the Holy Bible itself. (Catholic Professionals Network of Zimbabwe (CPNZ), 2020) The Evangelical Fellowship of Zimbabwe simply stated their position in solidarity with the bishops by asserting that they “cannot find any reason to condemn them because what they articulated is the truth, and nothing but the truth” (Evangelical Fellowship of Zimbabwe (EFZ), 2020). In other words, the government was lying that the bishops had lied! The same understanding was expressed by the Zimbabwe Peace Project (ZPP) that also expressed alarm at the attacks levelled against the person of Archbishop Ndlovu.

Pastoral Letter, God and the Crises of Politics in Zimbabwe  41 It is unfortunate that, instead of self introspecting and at least engaging the clergy to deliberate on the issues raised, the government chose to target and launch a tribal attack on the Archbishop, Robert Christopher Ndlovu, accusing him of being evil minded and misguided. Such attacks are concerning, particularly in an environment where dissenting voices have been abducted or arrested. All that the ZCBC has done is, like every other Zimbabwean institution that seeks to see values of democracy being implemented, reach out to the government with the hope of building a better Zimbabwe. (Zimbabwe Peace Project (ZPP), 2020) The Zimbabwe Council of Churches (ZCC) was also generous to the bishops and adopted similarly strong language against the government, proclaiming in their solidarity statement: The Zimbabwe Council of Churches (ZCC) read with grave concern, the government response to the Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops’ Conference (ZCBC) pastoral letter of the 14th of August 2020 entitled “The March is not Ended”. The government response presented by Mrs Monica Mutsvangwa, the minister of Information, Publicity and Broadcasting Services … The government response to the pastoral letter “The March is not Ended”, also missed its unifying and national orientation but instead appropriated distorted historical links and false comparisons with the Rwandan genocide. While the comparisons are unfounded and outrageous, they also seem to be intentionally or unintentionally stoking ethnic and tribal divisions which actually resulted in loss of thousands of lives in Matabeleland and Midlands during the Gukurahundi. To frivolously associate the bishops’ statement with such a major deep scar in the history of the nation, is not only insensitive to the existing present pain of those affected by Gukurahundi, but also gives the impression that the government is paying lip-service to national healing and reconciliation. The government statement could have been worth ignoring if it was only falsifying history, but it cannot be ignored as it appears dismissive of the invaluable work done by the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, under the ZCBC, to offer documentation of the atrocities committed by the army during that dark period. The legacy of Gukurahundi still stalks the nation as those past hurts remain unhealed. His Excellency, President ED Mnangagwa has on several occasions spoken of the need to find healing on these past hurts, yet the government position gives the false impression that the 1987 Unity Accord brought closure to that episode. (Zimbabwe Council of Churches (ZCC), 2020) The solidarity was further buttressed with a strongly worded pastoral letter or solidarity statement from the World Council of Churches, the Lutheran World Federation, the World Communion of Reformed Churches and the World Methodist Council, who wrote:

42  Masiiwa Ragies Gunda We have heard the laments of our sisters and brothers in your country and we are deeply concerned about the circumstances by which you are afflicted. We express our solidarity with all the people of Zimbabwe yearning for the realization of their human rights, for justice, and for physical and economic security in their communities. (World Council of Churches (WCC), The Lutheran World Federation (LWF), World Communion of Reformed Churches (WCRC) and World Methodist Council (WMC), 2020) (https://www.luther​anwo​rld.org/sites/defa​ ult/files/2020/docume​nts/200817_zimbabwe_solida​r ity​_ let ​ter_ ​fi na ​l _si​g nat​ ure.pdf ) The fact that the church started this episode through a strongly worded pastoral letter, which was followed by some over the top responses from government actors, which were then accompanied or challenged by various other actors taking sides with the government or the bishops, shows or proves what Chitando observed about the status of the church in Zimbabwe. The church is presented as both a blessing and a curse in that while it contributed immensely in the emancipation of the people of Zimbabwe seen through the important role played by missionary education in awakening the people to the reality of oppression and exploitation, it also brought with it a fragmentation that has refused to be healed, thereby weakening the Christian voice to the advantage of political and economic leaders. (Chitando, 2018:11–12) Whether we want to call it a crisis or non-crisis, a challenge or a steppingstone, life as it is currently experienced in Zimbabwe is not how it should be. While there might be several reasons and several players responsible for where we are, as a country, there is no denying that the country’s leadership cannot certainly be “not guilty” of some, if not most, of the culpability! What then are the lessons that we have learned from this spectacular fall-out? Lessons Learned from the Pastoral Letter Fallout A critical analysis of the fallout from the Pastoral Letter by the ZCBC shows there are several critical developments that must be acknowledged. In this section, I will highlight what I consider to be the key findings from this analysis. These findings may be crucial in forging ahead with the quest for democracy, development and freedom for all in Zimbabwe. The following are the key findings: 1 The government is not indifferent – for some time, Zimbabweans have wondered if the government could hear because it appeared as though all their complaints, their requests even their cries, were not being heard at all. However, the government responded to the Pastoral Letter barely 24 hours after it had been issued and continued to respond to it a week after it had

Pastoral Letter, God and the Crises of Politics in Zimbabwe  43 been issued! Clearly, the government can hear; unfortunately, the hearing capacity of the government appears to be one dimensional, government only hears when government feels threatened by what has been said! 2 The Church in Zimbabwe is sitting on unimaginable power and the government appreciates this and is scared about it. The speed with which the government responded clearly shows how important they considered the bishops’ letter. That they continued responding to the letter also shows how worried and scared they were about the impact that letter could have on Zimbabweans. While previous pastoral letters are addressed to “Brothers and Sisters in Christ,” this pastoral letter carries no salutation: it addresses itself to not just Catholics, not just Christians but rather all people of goodwill, all Zimbabweans because what it addresses are issues for all Zimbabweans. Like one earlier pastoral letter, it assumes the superiority of the Church over the state. The tone is certainly unrestrained … Indeed, at that material point in time, there was need for bluntness. However, the tone of the letter was likely to push the state into a defensive mode. This was almost predictable, given Mugabe’s sensitivity to criticism. Speaking with authority and finality runs the risk of alienating the conversation partner. (Chitando, 2013) Clearly, what Chitando said about Mugabe applies similarly for Mnangagwa. 3 Unless the Church speaks directly and explicitly both in diagnosing the problems being experienced by Zimbabweans and in identifying those responsible for compounding the problems of ordinary citizens, the government will not listen to them. The government has shown that it is willing to engage only when the Church throws “quiet diplomacy” and other niceties out the window and focuses on “speaking truth to power.” A resolute church that is willing to speak out and take a stand is what the government fears and is what the government will sit down to listen to. A justice seeking church is possibly the most strategic institution that can take the government to task on what is happening in the country. The government is made up by people who understand how important it is, for their political lives, to be in cordial relations with the church. The church must use that position to fight for the common good. 4 The manner of the government’s response also shows the danger of a fragmented church because it is easily neutralised by the government. By singling out Archbishop Ndlovu and making the pastoral letter appear Catholic in a very narrow sense, the attempt was to minimise consensus making among Christians. This will continue to be a strategy for neutralising religious voices by finding, sponsoring and publicising alternative but contradictory voices, like the hastily convened press conference in Mutare by some religious leaders whose intention was to question the authenticity of the Catholic bishops’ and their supposed perceptions. It is good to see more church bodies coming together to create and propagate one unified Christian voice.

44  Masiiwa Ragies Gunda 5 Churches must learn to translate pastoral letters into pastoral actions. While the pastoral letters are very important in teaching, exhorting and rebuking people as well as redirecting their focus to the Cross, to justice and to development, letters are letters. They are not actions. The situation in Zimbabwe will change following actions targeted at changing the reality of Zimbabwe. The pastoral letters need to be followed by concrete actions undertaken by bishops, clergy and eventually all other Christians. 6 Be quick to listen, slow to talk and measured in response! While the efficiency with which government responded to the pastoral letter/threat would have been applauded by many if it were directed to disaster risk management or corruption busting activities, that it was directed towards unarmed bishops raised alarm among citizens. What was even more worrying, however, were the inconsistencies that emerged from the multiple government responses. Is government a coordinated institution? Are there too many centres of information (if not power) in government? It appears government responded before it had considered the import of the letter and severity of their own response; hence, revisions, corrections and entrenchment of government position could be seen through the different responses. 7 Zimbabwe remains a fragmented society with people divided along political lines more than any other dividing category. Families, believers, villages, etc. are divided along political lines that even the pastoral letter had to be fitted into this national fragmentation for it to be interpreted accordingly. It is not surprising that the letter was associated with the USA, with foreign forces, with the MDC-A as opposed to being associated with ZANU PF. This fragmentation is making it impossible for any critique of government or the main opposition party without being categorised politically. 8 Finally, the letter and the government responses show that there is a crisis of crises in Zimbabwe. This is abundantly clear when one considers the role of sanctions in the mess that is Zimbabwe today. The government accused the bishops of ignoring the sanctions in their letter, yet government had earlier said sanctions were an excuse. Conclusion The Pastoral Letter by the ZCBC of 14 August 2020 was an important milestone in the relationship between the government and the Church in Zimbabwe. For some time, the Church appeared content to speak in riddles and metaphors but in this letter, the church spoke literally and forcefully, maybe even “violently” if one considers the brutal assessment of the competence of the current government. In assessing the presentation of the subject matter by the ZCBC, the EFZ proclaimed, “Only the deceitful or malicious can deny these truths” (Evangelical Fellowship of Zimbabwe (EFZ), 2020). This conclusion appears to have been accepted by other Christian bodies, except ZIICC and others sympathetic to the ruling party and government.

Pastoral Letter, God and the Crises of Politics in Zimbabwe  45 However, the Church must also acknowledge that it has been part of the Zimbabwean problem since its inception in Zimbabwe. A fragmented Church always made unity of purpose a pipedream for most Zimbabweans. We acknowledge recent attempts to make the ZHOCD a functional, efficient and effective body representing the majority of Christians in Zimbabwe. However, the Church must introspect and seek to do more to equip its members in the area of political literacy (Chitando, 2018). The government has a responsibility to defend itself against unwarranted attacks; however, it also has a responsibility to acknowledge its shortcomings in trying to serve its citizens. Going forward, greater engagement between the regime and the Church will need to be nurtured if Zimbabwe is to negotiate its multiple crises with the full recognition that “the march is not ended.” Note 1 Whereas the dominant approach has been to refer to a single, “Zimbabwean crisis,” this chapter maintains that there are, in fact, multiple crises.

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46  Masiiwa Ragies Gunda Gunda, M. R. 2015. On the Public Role of the Bible in Zimbabwe: Unpacking Banana’s “Re-Writing” Call for a Socially and Contextually Relevant Biblical Studies. Bamberg: University of Bamberg Press. Gunda, M. R. 2018. At the Crossroads: A Call to Christians to Act in Faith for an Alternative Zimbabwe. Bamberg: University of Bamberg Press. Machingura, F. 2012. “The Judas Iscariot Episode in the Zimbabwean Religio-Political Debate of ‘Selling Out.’ ” In M. R. Gunda, & J. Kuegler, The Bible and Politics in Africa (pp. 212–235). Bamberg: University of Bamberg Press. Madzimure, J. (2020, August 20). “Church, ZANU PF Bond Unbreakable.” Harare: The Herald. Retrieved August 20, 2020 from www.her​a ld.co.zw/chu​rch-ZANU PF-bond-unbreakable/ Manyonganise, M. 2014. “African Independent Churches: The Dynamics of their Political Participation in Zimbabwe.” In E. Chitando, M. R. Gunda, & J. Kuegler, Multiplying in the Spirit: African Initiated Churches in Zimbabwe, BiAS Vol. 15/ERA Vol. 1 (pp. 161–174). Bamberg: University of Bamberg Press. Matenga, M. (2020a, August 15). “Catholic Bishops Lay into ED.” Newsday. Harare. Retrieved August 15, 2020 from www.news​d ay.co.zw/2020/08/catho​l ic-bish​ ops-lay-into-ed/ Matenga, M. (2020b, August 26). “Catholic Priests Statement Crafted by MDC: ZANU PF.” Newsday. Harare. Retrieved August 26, 2020 from www.news​d ay.co.zw/2020/08/ catho​l ic-prie​sts-statem​ent-craf​ted-by-mdc-ZANU PF/ Matikiti, R. 2014. “The Apostolic Christian Council of Zimbabwe (ACCZ) and Social Transformation.” In E. Chitando, M. R. Gunda, & J. Kuegler, Multiplying in the Spirit: African Initiated Churches in Zimbabwe, BiAS Vol. 15/ERA Vol. 1 (pp. 93–108). Bamberg: University of Bamberg Press. Mugabe, T. (2018, June 30). “Read what Vice President General (Rtd) Constantino Chiwenga Said about Army Coups in Zimbabwe.” My Zimbabwe News. Retrieved September 12, 2020 from www.myz​i mba​bwe.co.zw/news/26936-read-what-vicepresid​ e nt-gene​ r al-rtd-cons​ t ant ​ i no-chiwe​ n ga-said-about-army-coups-in-zimba​ bwe.html Murwira, Z. (2020, August 20). Zimpapers. Retrieved August 20, 2020 from The Herald: www.her​a ld.co.zw/govt-enga​ges-vati​can-envoy/ Mushanawani, C. (2020, August 18). “Indigenous Churches Say no to Conflict in Zimbabwe.” Mutare. Retrieved August 19, 2020 from www.her​a ld.co.zw/just-in-ind​ igen​ous-churc​hes-say-no-to-confl ​ict-in-zimba​bwe/ Mutsvangwa, M. (2020, August 15). “Statement by the Minister of Information, Publicity and Broadcasting Services Monica Mutsvangwa (Senator).” Harare. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. J., & Muzondidya, J. (2011). “Introduction: Redemptive or Grotesque Nationalism in the Postcolony?” In S. J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, & J. Muzondidya, Redemptive or Grotesque Nationalism: Rethinking Contemporary Politics in Zimbabwe (pp. 1–31). Bern: Peter Lang. Netsianda, M. (2020, August 22). “President in Bulawayo to Meet Civil Society.” The Chronicle. Bulawayo. Retrieved August 22, 2020 from www.chroni​cle.co.zw/presid​ ent-in-bulaw​ayo-to-meet-civil-soci​ety/ World Council of Churches (WCC), The Lutheran World Federation (LWF), World Communion of Reformed Churches (WCRC) and World Methodist Council (WMC). (2020, August). “A Pastoral Letter to the Churches and the People of Zimbabwe.” Geneva.

Pastoral Letter, God and the Crises of Politics in Zimbabwe  47 Zenenga, H. (2020, August 17). “Editorial Comment: Bishops’ Unsaintly Letter Taints Pulpit.” Harare: The Herald. Retrieved August 20, 2020 from www.her​a ld.co.zw/editor​ ial-comm​ent-bish​ops-unsain​t ly-let​ter-tai​nts-pul​pit/ Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops’ Conference (ZCBC). (2007, April 5). “God Hears the Cries of the Oppressed”: Pastoral Letter on the Current Crisis in Zimbabwe. Harare. Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops’ Conference (ZCBC). (2020, August 14). “The March is not Ended: Pastoral Letter of the Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops’ Conference on the Current Situation in Zimbabwe.” Harare: ZCBC. Zimbabwe Council of Churches (ZCC). (2020, August 16). “Echoing ‘The March is Not Ended.’ ” Harare: ZCC. Zimbabwe Heads of Christian Denominations (ZHOCD). (2020a, August 8). “Churches’ Appreciation of Global Solidarity.” Harare: ZHOCD. Zimbabwe Heads of Christian Denominations (ZHOCD). (2020b, July 13). “Press Brief: Zimbabwe Heads of Christian Denominations Meeting with Political Parties.” Harare: ZHOCD. Zimbabwe Peace Project (ZPP). (2020, August 16). “Statement in Solidarity with the Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops’ Conference.” Harare. Retrieved August 17, 2020 from kubatana.net/2020/08/16/statement-in-solidarity-with-the-zimbabwe-catholicbishops-conference/ Ziyambi, Z. (2020, August 19). “Government’s Response to the ZCBC Pastoral Letter by the Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs.” Harare.

2 The Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe (ELCZ) and the Politics of Zimbabwe Silence and Critical Solidarity Herbert Moyo Introduction The “fall” of President Robert Mugabe in the dramatic events of November 2017 was celebrated by many as a new dawn in the politics of Zimbabwe (Ndlovu, 2018). Mugabe was succeeded by his long-time protégé, Emmerson Dambudzo Mnagagwa, who promised to direct the affairs of the nation on a more promising path (Asuelime, 2018). Mnangagwa’s maiden speech when he was sworn in as the second Executive President of independent Zimbabwe on 24 November 2017 at the National Sports Stadium was futuristic and reconciliatory, to the joy of many who were tired of the Mugabe era of political violence, poor monetary policies and failing economy. Some of the key points of Mnangagwa’s inauguration speech were: I am required to serve our country as the president of all citizens regardless of colour, creed, religion, tribe, totem or political affiliation…We should never remain hostages of our past. Let us humbly appeal to all of us that we let bygones be bygones, readily embracing each other in defining a new destiny of our beloved Zimbabwe…My government is committed to compensating those farmers from whom land was taken in terms of the laws of our land…Our economic policy will be predicated on our agriculture, our command agriculture, which is the mainstay and on creating conditions for investment-led economic recovery that puts a premium on job, job, job creation … As we focus on recovering our economy, we must shed misbehaviours and acts of indiscipline which have characterised the past. Acts of corruption must stop. Where these occur, swift, swift, swift justice must be served … I stand here today to say that our country is ready and willing for a steady re-engagement with all the nations of the world … As we build a new, democratic Zimbabwe, we ask those who have punished us in the past to reconsider their economic and political sanctions against us. Whatever misunderstandings may have subsisted in the past, let this make way for a new beginning … Brothers and sisters, the people of Zimbabwe, the task before us is much bigger than competing for political office. Let us all play our part to build this great country, together, as Zimbabweans. May God bless Zimbabwe, I thank you. (Spencer, Fleming and Molloy, 24 November 2017) DOI: 10.4324/9781003332435-3

ELCZ and the Politics of Zimbabwe  49 Zimbabweans had hope that the country was taking a new direction after the speech by the president. The words of the president promised so much that resonated with the wishes of many Zimbabweans after many years of the rule of Robert Mugabe. Many Zimbabweans were grateful for Mugabe and the rise of a new leader who promised democracy. Indeed, this was a new dispensation, with the hope that the conflicts that had undermined harmony would now be overcome (Gebremichael et al 2018). This essay discusses the realities of the New Dispensation and the position of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe (ELCZ). What are the general experiences of Zimbabweans in the Second Republic? Is “God in it?” If “God is in it,” how does God intervene where there is abuse of power, corruption, political violence and abuse of human rights? Why should the church be involved in political affairs? How has the ELCZ been expressing itself on the Zimbabwean political scene (Maposa and Chinyoka, 2014)? The chapter employs insights from “critical insidership” to review the ELCZ’s engagement with politics in the New Dispensation/Second Republic. The researcher has intimate knowledge of the denomination and is quite familiar with the key personalities who have shaped the ELCZ’s response to politics. The New Dispensation/Second Republic The true colours of the political captains of the New Dispensation became apparent in the first harmonised elections under the new regime. Zimbabwe held its first post-Mugabe general elections on 30th July 2018. On 3rd August 2018, the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) declared Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa as the candidate who received the requisite number of votes cast, and declared duly elected President of Zimbabwe (Kaaba, 2019). The opposition leader, Nelson Chamisa of the Movement for Democratic Change–Alliance (MDC-A) (later, in 2022, Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC)), challenged the validity of the election in the Constitutional Court by raising questions about the pre-election processes, events during the election and the tallying of the votes. However, he lost the court challenge and Mnangagwa became the President of Zimbabwe. But how did the election processes in the New Dispensation become questionable to the point of having the results challenged in a court of law? President Mnangagwa had promised the nation a new dispensation of honesty and justice, yet during the election mood he used the tactics of his predecessor. In the New Dispensation where we expected a “complete break with the past” (Meyer, 1998), namely the Mugabe era of rigging elections, the leadership seemed to have allowed illegal processes to undermine the legitimacy of the electoral process. The elections were marred by irregularities such as abuse of civil servants, teachers and learners who were forced to attend ZANU PF political rallies, vote buying through distribution of government-funded food, fertilisers and seeds only to ZANU PF supporters at ZANU PF campaign rallies, thereby creating an uneven playing field which worked to the advantage the ruling party. In many ways the ruling party undermined electoral laws and, consequently, the electoral

50  Herbert Moyo process. This undermines public trust in and the legitimacy of the electoral process (Ndakaripa, 2020:8). The ruling party used state resources such as the army, the police, schools, school children and teachers irregularly to strengthen its campaign. Ndakaripa (2020:7) argues that, In addition to a stronger financial base, ZANU–PF abused state resources. For example, in ZANU–PF’s primary elections, the government deployed 420 government vehicles throughout the country … The army also reportedly deployed 5000 soldiers throughout the country to aid ZANU–PF’s campaign. Furthermore, ZANU–PF used civil servants to support its campaign. In addition, state-controlled media was biased in favour of ZANU–PF. The Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) did not take meaningful measures to ensure that the media complied with regulations in the Electoral Act designed to ensure free, equitable and balanced coverage. The activities identified by Ndakaripa are illegal and were not expected by many in the new dispensation. Who will arrest the state if it breaks the law? On the other hand, the opposition parties did not have access to such resources. Ndakaripa (2020:7) concludes that the Zimbabwe harmonised elections of 2018 were not free and fair because of the illegally acquired ZANU PF campaign funds, the abuse of state resources and vote buying through a variety of ways. Thus, “Consequently, civil society organisations and Western observer missions made recommendations to improve the legitimacy of future electoral processes in Zimbabwe” (Ndakaripa, 2020:12). The challenges of corruption, political violence and monetary policies have failed to rescue Zimbabwe from the people’s experiences of the Mugabe regime. This generated questions about the efficacy of the New Dispensation (Mugova, 2019). In the new era, there was post-election violence where the army used live ammunition against protesting citizens. The Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission (ZHRC) report on the 2018 harmonised election says, The most disturbing post-election incident was the violence that erupted in Harare on the 1st of August 2018, during opposition demonstrations at the National Command Centre, Rainbow Towers Hotel. The opposition supporters took to the streets based on allegations that ZEC had delayed in announcing the Presidential election results. These disturbances resulted in the destruction of property, loss of life of at least 6 civilians who were shot dead and the injury of many, following the intervention of the army. The ZHRC issued a press statement on the 2nd of August 2018 condemning the violence and the loss of life due to the intervention and the use of live ammunition by the army on unarmed civilians and urging all players to maintain peace. (ZHRC, 2018:41) The ZHRC physically assessed the deployment of soldiers and abuse of citizens in some locations of Harare and confirmed that there were a lot of soldiers but no

ELCZ and the Politics of Zimbabwe  51 one in government took responsibility for such deployment of troops (ZHRC, 2018:41). In direct contrast to the promise of a new dispensation of peace and democracy as celebrated in the presidential inauguration speech on 24 November 2017, Zimbabwe had gone back to its culture of violence and wanton destruction of property by state operatives against those perceived to be enemies of ZANU PF. Togarasei and Chitando (2011:214) rightly argue that, The history of politics in Zimbabwe is marred by violence. From the time of colonialism, the political arena has been a site of violence. So deeply engraved in the country’s politics is violence that it is celebrated in political rhetoric. Political slogans from almost all parties are punctuated by a series of calls for violence. Those of a different political persuasion are to be destroyed as slogans like “Pasi na …” (Down with …) testify. Election times are almost war times, as they have been characterised by deaths. This is particularly true of all elections following the formation of the MDC in 1999 … Not only have lives been lost during these elections, there has also been wanton destruction of the property of those believed to belong to a different political persuasion. The 2008 elections were the worst in terms of violence. Over three hundred people are said to have died before and after the elections. On 7 September 2018, President Mnangagwa appointed Professor Mthuli Ncube as the new finance minister in the New Dispensation. His major “achievement” as finance minister to date was the re-introduction of the Zimbabwe dollar and the suspension of the use of multi-currencies. Ncube made many changes that did not help Zimbabweans economically. In the Mugabe era, the monetary policy introduced the use of multi-currencies from across the world which saw the US dollar stabilising many businesses. People were also using other currencies such as the South African Rand, the Botswana Pula and the Euro. The new Minister of Finance, Ncube, decided to abolish the use of multi-currencies and introduced the Zimbabwean Dollar arguing that, Abolishing the use of multiple currencies, and making the Zimbabwe Dollar the sole legal tender has always been a key component of our transitional stabilisation programme, and a crucial step in restoring normalcy to our economy … Despite the reported complexity of this decision, day to day, not much will change. Zimbabwean workers will still receive their wages in RTGS dollar and bond notes, and when they go to the shops, the food on the shelves will be priced in the same currency. www.chroni​cle.co.zw/zimba​bwe-curre​ncy-tak​ ing-back-cont​rol/ (01 July 2019) The new monetary policy eroded salaries through a variety of exchange rates. For example, teachers who used to earn about US$450 a month had their salaries reduced to about US$45 equivalent (at the time of writing). There were protests on conditions of service by civil servants, mainly medical doctors and nurses, as well as teachers. There is untold economic suffering by citizens in the new

52  Herbert Moyo dispensation. Inflation went up to more than 500% (Amin, 2020), before slowing down in 2021 up to early 2022, only to begin going up in the second quarter of the same year. Of note is that the multi-currencies were back on the streets and the challenge of official and parallel exchange rates was back in full force. There was confusion on the economic front in Zimbabwe and the loss of earnings was precipitating a major social crisis, including drug and substance abuse. The fact of the matter is that the New Dispensation Zimbabwe has been mired in a multi-fold crisis in many areas such as peace, economy, unemployment, political violence, fear of the state, money, food, water, education, corruption, governance, leadership and health care. Many citizens have felt like “going back to Egypt.” At least in the last years of Mugabe’s tenure, following the government of national unity (GNU, 2009–2013 and up to his removal in 2017), employees were earning in US dollars, not the unstable Zimbabwean dollar. Zimbabwe has an elite political leadership that can manage the socio-economic and political context much better than it is now. That there is continued traumatic crisis in the economy raises suspicion of deliberate sabotage by some government officials and captains of industry who may be benefiting from the chaos and, if so, they do not want to see normalcy in the Zimbabwean economy. Mlambo (2013) is of the view that in Zimbabwe there is a culture of crisis that benefits certain leaders at the expense of all other Zimbabweans. At the time of writing, the world was engulfed by the COVID-19 crisis and its aftermath that was overwhelming the medical and economic systems of the Global North and the world. One wondered how the under-resourced and ill-equipped health facilities in Zimbabwe, where the leadership seeks medical care in South Africa and the Middle East, would cope with the challenges associated with the pandemic. This kind of crisis requires interventions by credible voices to term the tide of suffering currently experienced by Zimbabweans. This is where the Church is expected to step up and contribute towards resolving the multiple crises. The Church has both a social responsibility to be a good steward of all the things of God and theological/biblically based justification to seek peace and justice in the politics of Zimbabwe. This New Dispensation is the right time and right context for the prophetic ministry of the Church to call the state to order for prosperity, peace and justice. This stance has been adopted by some scholars and political party activists. In the following section, I outline its key tenets. God Is in It: Religions as Legitimate Political Players Some scholars and political party activists maintain that religions are legitimate political actors (Yoder 1994). They argue that God is in politics as the almighty. This is a theological position that sees nothing outside God’s sphere of influence. God’s presence can be concretised by the actions of the Church, especially through the acts and words of the clergy in response to political developments. The inaction and silence of the Church is tantamount to the absence of God in politics. Many scholars have justifiably argued that God is involved in the socio-economic and political realities of humanity. The scholars include, but are not limited to,

ELCZ and the Politics of Zimbabwe  53 Togarasei and Chitando (2011), Wallis (1994), Tanner (1992), Englund (1997), Koskenniem (2001), Moyo (2016), Horsley (1993), Prove and Smetters (2006), Hallencreutz and Moyo (1988) and Nürnberger Blom (1991). These scholars show the involvement of God in human political history, especially during moments where there is injustice and suffering. God seemingly takes the side of the vulnerable to tame the power of the state. Jesus is also shown as a saviour who seeks to liberate human beings from all forms of oppression. Jesus fights for humanity such as healing, food and freedom from bondages. According to Togarasei and Chitando (2011:215), the Church “… is mandated by the Scriptures to call for justice, to protect the downtrodden and the underprivileged.” Seeking justice and protection for the vulnerable is a primary concern for the Church. When we say God is in politics, we mean that those who know and believe in God are involved in politics using gospel convictions of equality, love, peace, forgiveness, reconciliation and justice for all. The centrality of politics in human life makes human existence premised on and defined by politics, so that life outside the realm of politics is unimaginable. Human beings are political beings. If church leaders ignore politics, it will be tantamount to ignoring the daily life of their members in particular and that of citizens in general. For that reason, church leaders cannot afford to ignore political developments. The fact that churches are not formally represented in parliament, where decisions about the daily bread of citizens are made, is a mistake that needs to be corrected. Chivanhu or Isintu religion (African Indigenous Religions) is intricately part of politics. Community leaders such as kings/queens and chiefs would make serious decisions such as engaging in war through consulting the spirit world. In some cultures, the king/queen is also a spirit medium; if not, then there should be a spirit medium in the palace to guide the leadership through spiritualties. In a context like Zimbabwe where people are overtly religious, there is already a link between religion and politics. This may be why at times politicians use religious rhetoric to gain political support. With this in mind, church leaders cannot afford to be silent on political developments if they want to be considered as serious spiritual leaders by their membership. The Church has been involved in the New Dispensation. To start with, the Christians are affected by all the crises I have mentioned above. The Church, as in those who believe in Jesus Christ as Lord and Saviour, was part of the marching masses during the fall of Mugabe. Church leaders (clergy) were also part of the celebrations for the new dawn. The Church is also involved in politics at the level of suffering. The Church, as in believers, is involved through carrying the cross of suffering. The Church has been beaten and killed. The Church is praying for political leaders who may have stolen their way into the political office elections that were not free and fair. If so, the church is blessing illegitimate actors. The Church has also been involved by being co-opted by the state. For example, the Vapostori (African Indigenous/Apostolic) churches became the spiritual base for the new leadership in the new dispensation. Musoni (2019) says that Mnangagwa and his vice president, Constantino Guvheya Chiwenga, were attending and addressing church gatherings of the Vapostori churches in Zimbabwe for political mileage.

54  Herbert Moyo The leadership of such churches has allowed itself to be the mouthpiece of the government, without questioning atrocities that are committed by government agents. In its engagement with the state, the Church should adopt what Allan Boesak (2005) calls, “Critical Solidarity.” This is where the Church collaborates with the political authority when government engages in progressive projects that enhance life. The Church should be quick to question and distance itself from the same government when it acts in a manner that goes against the word of God, such as corruption, untruthfulness and injustice. The Church does not uncritically collaborate with the government at the expense of gospel truths such as love, peace, forgiveness and reconciliation and life in abundance for all. Seemingly, most of the Vapostori churches are silent on government abuses and that can be a lack of frame of reference for the relationship between these churches and the state. Maybe this was the warning of Jesus when he said, “Behold, I send you forth as sheep in the midst of wolves: be, ye therefore wise as serpents, and harmless as doves” (Matt 10:16). The “Silence” of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe in the New Dispensation Lutheran pastors, as could be seen in the messages on the WhatsApp group for ELCZ ministers, followed the dawn of the New Dispensation closely. Surely, like the rest of the citizens of Zimbabwe, the pastors expected a radical departure from the R. G. Mugabe era. However, there was an added source of interest, namely the prominence of the participation of (now late) Lieutenant General Sibusiso Moyo in the unfolding events of the fall of Mugabe. Moyo was a member of the Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe. Moyo was also the son of a retired Lutheran Pastor. In my view, seemingly, the involvement of Moyo in the fall of Mugabe, in the minds of the pastors, meant the involvement of the Lutheran Church in transformation. The WhatsApp messages outlined Moyo’s biography, demonstrating his Lutheranism. Pastors also gave varying ideas about the unfolding events, with interesting critical commentary on the politics of Zimbabwe. If Church means all believers/members then, indeed, the Lutheran Church was involved on the side of the government. Moyo is popular for saying, the President … and his family are safe and sound and their security is guaranteed’, and that the military were ‘only targeting criminals around [Mugabe] who are committing crimes’ … that are causing social and economic suffering in the country. (BBC News, 2017) The ELCZ leadership, as in clergy (pastors, bishops and deacons), did not issue any pastoral letter following the fall of Mugabe and the rise of Mnangagwa. In fact, the ELCZ’s position since 2005 has been that, “We will speak through the Zimbabwe Council of Churches.” This has become a cliché and an excuse for not

ELCZ and the Politics of Zimbabwe  55 commenting on political developments as a Church. Bishops, who according to the constitution of the ELCZ can speak on behalf of the church, have surrendered their prophetic voice to the Zimbabwe Council of Churches (ZCC). Let me not dwell on what happened before the dawn of the New Dispensation. The constitution of the ELCZ says, “The Presiding Bishop shall be the representative of the church before other churches, the government and other public bodies and at ecumenical gatherings and other functions” (subsection 71.2 page 56). In as much as the ELCZ constitution is silent on Church and State relations, it does say the Presiding Bishop shall be the representative of the Church before the government. This may mean many things but can also mean that the Church will pass its prophetic messages to the public and to the state through the Presiding Bishop. Of interest is that the ELCZ Presiding Bishop at the time of writing was a retired Zimbabwe National Army Chaplain. He was still being saluted by officers below the rank of Major in the army. Seemingly, once a soldier, always a soldier. This also means that the Presiding Bishop of the ELCZ still saluted army commanders, including the Commander in Chief of the Zimbabwe Armed Forces, President Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa. This put the ELCZ in an unenviable position as the Presiding Bishop, who is the spokesperson for the Church, could not speak as a bishop before his commander, especially where he had to be prophetic and speak against the actions of the political authority. With this unenviable position in mind, this essay acknowledges the possibility that the ELCZ had been swallowed by the state by virtue of the position of the Presiding Bishop and understandably so. As a result, the Presiding Bishop continued to say that the ELCZ will speak through the ZCC. Church members and pastors asked the Bishops about the ELCZ position on political developments and the answer was continuously the same, “We will speak through the Bishop.” Of note is that they did not tell the ELCZ the details of their position, the very same position that would be communicated through the ZCC. The ELCZ has members that are directly affected by the Zimbabwean crisis who need pragmatic pastoral care from their pastors and bishops but this is not forthcoming. Silence has the danger of supporting the status quo. I consider this as a sin of omission by the clergy. Thus, the silence of the ELCZ is actually not silence but a form of communication that justifies the current reality. If the Church is the voice of the voiceless, then the silence of the church is the silence of the voice of the voiceless. If the voice of the voiceless is silent, then the voiceless shall never be heard (Moyo, 2016). The Advantage of Co-option by the State or Is This Critical Solidarity? The obvious outcome of co-option by the state means the Church cannot be prophetic. However, there are some benefits in being co-opted. The Presiding Bishop was able to get the Army civil engineers to build the water system for Mnene Mission Hospital. The Church could not afford using private companies and then the Presiding Bishop used his connections and influence in the Zimbabwe National Army to get engineers to do community service for both the Church

56  Herbert Moyo and the community. In this way, the Presiding Bishop was fulfilling his ELCZ constitutional expectation of being the link between the Church and the government (ELCZ Constitution, n.d.: 56). There are several other areas of the life of the ELCZ that show solidarity between the Church and the State. This may be true for other denominations that have schools and hospitals where the government pays salaries for employees working in Church institutions. In response to the continuous deterioration of quality services in the education and health sectors, the ELCZ has sought to maintain education and health facilities that espouse human dignity. It is providing some of the necessary services that ought to be offered by the government. For example, the ELCZ operates hospitals throughout the Mberengwa and Gwanda rural areas, where there are no government hospitals. These hospitals and schools provide services to all Zimbabweans regardless of political or religious affiliation. The ELCZ provides high school education. All the high schools in Mberengwa belong to the ELCZ, as well as in the rural areas of Gwanda and some parts of Beitbridge. In addition to the provision of schools and hospitals, the ELCZ offers development services in many parts of Zimbabwe. These infrastructural services are very expensive diaconal activities sponsored by the local church and its international partners, including the Church of Sweden, the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America (ELCA), Global Health Ministries, the Lutheran World Federation, the Lutheran Communion in Southern Africa (LUCSA), the Christian Blind Mission and the Berliner Missionswerk (BMW). These initiatives by the ELCZ can be interpreted through the prism of “critical solidarity” that I referred to earlier (Boesak, 2005), a concept where the Church can relate to the state for the common good—as long as it does not involve silencing of the Church’s prophetic voice on issues of injustice. In this case, the ELCZ has partnered with the government in the provision of health and education services. The government gives grants to the hospitals, pays workers, facilitates the importation of various items needed by the hospitals, and provides security for the operation of the hospitals. In the field of education, the government pays the workers and provides for curriculum management and examinations at the end of specific study programs. Here are some instances of the ELCZ’s critical solidarity with the government. 1 Health services. The ELCZ operates four rural hospitals in Mnene, Musume, Masase and Manama; the church also owns one rural clinic in Burure. The ELCZ also has three HIV and AIDS response centres: namely Tariro, Betseranai and Thusanang. In addition, the ELCZ has a training school for nurses in Mnene. These church-related health facilities continue to function at a much higher level than government-owned hospitals and clinics. This greater efficiency is possible thanks to the contribution of the ELCZ’s partners. 2 Education. In response to the challenges faced mainly by rural communities neglected by the government, the ELCZ has continued to offer sound education for human development. The Church has responded to the government’s neglect by offering relatively well-resourced schools to rural communities. At

ELCZ and the Politics of Zimbabwe  57 the time of writing, the ELCZ was running a total of thirteen schools: five primary schools (Burure, Mnene, West Nicholson, Vundembe and Beitbridge Mission) and eight secondary schools (Sumbe, Burure, Chegato, Musume, Masase, Mnene, Zezani and Manama). The Church also operates primary and secondary school resource centres for the visually handicapped at Mnene, Musume, Masvingo, Beitbridge, Chegato and Masase. Although these schools were struggling because of the desperate economic situation of Zimbabwe, they were equipped with high-quality human resources, libraries and computer technology. Computer technology for some of these rural schools is a specialised project sponsored by the Lutheran Communion in Southern Africa. 3 Development and service delivery. In addition to education and health services, the ELCZ also participates in development projects through Lutheran Development Services (LDS), which is the development arm of the ELCZ and an associated program of the Lutheran World Federation for World Service. Services that the government should provide—including safe drinking water, capital for income-generating projects and adult education—are provided by the church through the LDS in rural communities without regard to the recipients’ denominational or religious affiliation. The LDS has helped schools in rural areas, including those owned by the government, to build new classrooms and provide food and stationery for the children, as well as drilling boreholes, building dams and setting up solar-powered electrification projects. In extreme cases of poverty, the LDS distributes food to distressed communities in a nonpartisan way. The government has tried to take over the distribution of food sourced by the LDS, but the Church has refused to give the government the opportunity to seize the Church’s food for partisan political purposes. This is one aspect of the ELCZ’s critical solidarity with the government. In brief, the LDS empowers marginalised communities in Zimbabwe through Christian-based participatory and gender-sensitive relief and development interventions that enable people to take direct control of their livelihoods. Furthermore, the LDS assists these communities in acquiring a sense of dignity through training their people in environmental management, water and food security, economic activities, infrastructural improvement, health care, and emergency and disaster response. Conclusion The ELCZ has continued to argue that it speaks through the ZCC, thereby failing to offer pastoral care to its members who need theological explanations from the clergy about the developments in the politics of Zimbabwe marred with abuse of human rights. The ELCZ leadership is compromised by complex relationships with the political and military leadership at state level, thereby contributing to the church’s silence when it comes to bad governance and abuse of human rights by the state authorities. On the other hand, the ELCZ is contributing to human wellness and human development through schools, hospitals and development

58  Herbert Moyo projects managed in cooperation with the state. This essay concludes by reiterating that in the New Dispensation, the Church should strengthen its critical solidarity with the state for the development of the whole people of God in Zimbabwe. References Amin, H., 2020. Economics: At More Than 500%, Zimbabwe’s Ncube Sees Inflation Stabilizing. Accessed from www.bloomb​erg.com/news/artic​les/2020-01-22/at-more-than-500zimba​bwe-s-ncube-sees-inflat​ion-stab​i liz​i ng Asuelime, L.E., 2018. “Mnangagwa’s Foreign Policy Direction: Old Wine in New Skin?” Journal of African Foreign Affairs, 5(2), pp.9–21. BBC News, 2017, November 15. Zimbabwe Crisis: Army Takes Over, Says Mugabe is Safe. Retrieved from BBC News: www.bbc.co.uk/ne ws/world-africa-41992351 Boesak, A. 2005. The Tenderness of Conscience: African Renaissance and the Spirituality of Politics. Stellenbosch: Sun Press. ECLZ Constitution. n.d. Harare: ECLZ. Englund, H., 1997. Matembo S. Nzunda and Kenneth R. Ross (eds.), “Church, Law and Political Transition in Malawi, 1992–94” (Book Review). Journal of Religion in Africa/ Religion en Afrique, 27(2), p.213. Gebremichael, M. et al. 2018. Zimbabwe Conflict Insight. Addis Ababa: Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies, Addis Ababa University. Hallencreutz, C., Moyo, A. (eds.), 1988. Church and the State in Zimbabwe. Gweru: Mambo Press. Horsley, R.A., 1993. Jesus and the Spiral of Violence: Popular Jewish Resistance in Roman Palestine. Minneapolis: Fortress Press. Kaaba, O.B., 2019. “Nelson Chamisa v Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa and Others CCZ 42/18 (August 2018).” SAIPAR Case Review, 2(1) Available at: https://scho​lars​h ip. law.corn​ell.edu/scr/vol2/iss1/4 Koskenniem, M., 2001. “Human Rights, Politics and Love.” Mennesker og Rettigheter, 19(4), 33–45. Maposa, R. and Chinyoka, K., 2014. “Marching Forward as Soldiers of Christ? The Contributions of the Evangelical Lutheran Church to the Reconstruction of Zimbabwe, 2000–2013.” Scriptura, 113(1), pp.1–10. Meyer, B. 1998. “ ‘Make a Complete Break with the Past’: Memory and Post-Colonial Modernity in Ghanaian Pentecostalist Discourse.” Journal of Religion in Africa, 28(3), 316–349. Mlambo, A. S. 2013. “Becoming Zimbabwe or Becoming Zimbabwean: Identity, Nationalism and State-building.” Africa Spectrum, 48(1), 49–70. Moyo, H., 2016. “The Luther Decade on Reformation and Politics: Luther’s Situational Pastoral Advice in the Treatise on Temporal Authority and Its Impact on the Pastoral Mission of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe (ELCZ) in a Context of Political Violence.” SAGE Open, 6(2). https://doi.org/10.1177/21582​4 401​6636​428 Mugova, S., 2019. “Opportunities and Pitfalls of Corporate Social Responsibility: An Introduction.” In S. Mugova and P. R. Sachs, eds., Opportunities and Pitfalls of Corporate Social Responsibility (pp.1–13). Cham: Springer. Musoni, P., 2019. “White Garment Churches (Vapositori) and ZANU PF Party Politics in Zimbabwe: True Marriage or Marriage of Convenience during and Post-Mugabe Era.” HTS Theological Studies, 75(1), pp.1–7.

ELCZ and the Politics of Zimbabwe  59 N cube, M . ,

n.d. “C urrency: T aking B ack C ontrol.” Accessed from www.zimt​reas​u ry.gov. zw/index.php?opt ​ion=com_ ​cont​e nt&view=arti​c le&id=182:curre​ncy-tak ​i ng-backcont​rol&catid=83&Ite​m id=613 Ndakaripa, M., 2020. “Zimbabwe’s 2018 Elections: Funding, Public Resources and Vote Buying.” Review of African Political Economy, 47(164), pp.301–312, DOI: 10.1080/03056244.2020.1735327. Ndlovu, R., 2018. In the Jaws of the Crocodile. South Africa: Penguin Random House. Nürnberger, K. and Blom, A. (eds.), 1991. A Democratic Vision for South Africa: Political Realism and Christian Responsibility. Pietermaritzburg: Encounter Publications. Prove, P.N. and Smetters, L., 2006. “Faith and Human Rights: Voices from the Lutheran Communion.” LWF Documentation, (51). Spencer, C., Fleming, L. and Molloy, D., 2017, 24 November. New President Sworn in. Accessed from www.bbc.com/news/live/world-afr ​ica-42107​256 Tanner, K., 1992. The Politics of God: Christian Theologies and Social Justice. Minneapolis: Fortress Press. Togarasei, L. and Chitando, E., 2011. “Be Therefore Reconciled to One Another: The Church’s Role in Justice, Healing and Reconciliation in Zimbabwe.” Missionalia, 39(3), pp.210–227. Wallis, J., 1994. The Soul of Politics. New York: New Press. Yoder, J.H., 1994. The Politics of Jesus: Vicit agnus noster. Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing. Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission, 2018. ZHRC Final Report on Zimbabwe 2018 Harmonised Elections.

3 Depoliticising the Pastoral Role of the Methodist Church in Zimbabwe in the Second Republic Martin Mujinga Introduction The pastoral role of the Methodist Church in Zimbabwe (MCZ) to some key political figures has raised controversies in the Zimbabwean religious arena. Those who accuse the MCZ do so claiming that the church is not true to its calling; it is a political ally and is theologically weak. Such sentiments were reactions to the first appearances of President Emmerson Mnangagwa at Mabelreign Methodist Church on 24 December 2017 and the subsequent announcement of his intention to be a member of the MCZ. This chapter grapples with depoliticising this ecclesiastical attendance, arguing that banqueting with and pastoring political figures are two different services and that the MCZ is focusing on the latter. The premises of this argument are drawn from the politico-ecclesiastical theology of the Wesleyan Methodists, starting from John Wesley, the missionaries and the current MCZ sacramental theology. Analysing the existing literature on Wesleyan Methodist Church (WMC) and sources on President Mnangagwa’s church attendance, the chapter argues that to some extent, the political history of Zimbabwe has been shaped by the Wesleyan Methodist’s ecclesiology through a number of both clergy and laity. Using a political theology framework, the chapter maintains that the “conversion” of President Mnangagwa to the MCZ faith is not unique. Neither does it give political mileage to the missiological mandate of the church, but a theological benefit to the first family in general and Zimbabwe in particular because when the Head of State confesses Christ, people will be judged justly. Thus, the quest to depoliticise ecclesiastical attendance at a Methodist Church in Zimbabwe (MCZ) society by President Emmerson Mnangagwa is the major task of this chapter. Structurally, the write up will start by presenting the theoretical framework and methodology, and also analyse the relationship between religion and politics. This analysis will be done with the aim of finding out whether the church attendance by President Mnangagwa was an extension of his political career, a religious engagement or both. It seems a very difficult task to be able to certainly pinpoint the reasons behind President Mnangagwa’s church attendance. However, possibilities can be proffered in the form of opinions. The chapter will also interrogate how the Mabelreign church service attendance of 24 December 2017 by President Mnangagwa attracted the generality of the populace. Wesley’s DOI: 10.4324/9781003332435-4

Depoliticising the MCZ’s Pastoral Role in the Second Republic  61 ethics and theology of the Methodists on politics and politicians, the pastoral role of the Wesleyan Methodist missionaries to the politicians of their time and the MCZ politico-ecclesiology and sacramental theology will also be engaged. Using political theology as a framework, the chapter will conclude by arguing that the Church is the house of God where every sinner has the right to attend, regardless of his or her political affiliation or social status, without politicising the church or religionising politics. Framework and Methodology This chapter benefits from engaging political theology as a framework. Political theology attempts to bring together religion and politics, which are regarded as incompatible by some. According to Richardson & Bowden (1983:452), “there is widespread agreement that religion and politics should be kept apart because the two are joined in battle, each seeking to overcome, dominate and use the other.” Luther, in his doctrine of the two kingdoms, rejects assimilation by arguing that the state is competent in matters of administration and justice and the church in matters of spirit. These two functions should be kept separate: neither the church nor the state interferes in the other’s jurisdiction, but the two kingdoms should work together in harmony (English et al., 1982). Mujinga (2018) agrees with Luther and adds that if the two are drawn closer, religion remains the riding horse of politics. It is pushed aside and the religious values and goals are eliminated as and when politics decides to jettison religion. However, Richardson & Bowden are contra Mujinga because for them, “political theology is not the old, not the best of the old, but the death of the old to bring to life something new” (1983:453). In this chapter, one can argue that religion and politics are both soulmates and antagonists. The arguments raised in this chapter, namely that President Mnangagwa attended the church service not as a politician, resonate well with the point raised by Richardson & Bowden (1983) that, the starting point of political theology is to examine the ways in which politics and religion have been falsely brought together in the past. For example, in Germany, Hitler was presented not just as a political figure, but a messianic religious figure (Hamburg, 1932). In Zimbabwe, Mugabe was also presented not just as a politician, but was also presented by the former youth secretary for Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front) (ZANU PF) Kudzanai Chipanga as the black Moses and Angel Gabriel (Bulawayo24, 2017). Political theology as a framework is conscious of these false ways in which politics is religionised. Political movements seek to use religion for their own ends, and religious movements simply legitimise political interest. Richardson & Bowden mention that, Regardless of these poor relationships, political theology is opposed to the privatization of religion, to the narrowing down of religion merely for the inner life. Religion must always be personal, but not private, it must always be the religion of the particular person, but far from being restricted to the private

62  Martin Mujinga sphere. This means that religion is immediately involved in a variety of political and social relationships and responsibilities. (1983:453) Banana cited by Gifford states that, “Christianity and its mission on earth is about nothing but the total and complete transformation of mankind (sic) in all aspects of life and facets of his activities and politics is one of them” (1988:415). It is this reason also that political theology fits well as a framework for this study because it strives to unite religion and politics for the betterment of the society. The data for this political theology research was gathered through analysing literature on WMC ecclesiastical and sacramental theology and sources on President Mnangagwa’s church attendance. These sources were used as instruments to argue for the depoliticisation of the pastoral role of the MCZ in the Second Republic. The point being driven by this argument is that the MCZ’s pastoral oversight to politicians is theological, and not political. Religion and Politics in Zimbabwe: Brothers or Distant Cousins? The phrase “brothers or distant cousins” is employed to express the symbiotic relationship of religion and politics. In political theology, religion and politics have an impersonator relationship, resulting in Chimuka (2013) wondering whether the two are nascent foes or blessed bedfellows? The phrase “brothers or distant cousins” aims to interrogate the pastoral role of the MCZ and its accommodation of political figures in the Zimbabwean theological/religious landscape. It has to be noted that although religion and politics in Zimbabwe wish to be close partners, antagonism dominates the relationship. During the Mugabe era (1980–2017), scholars engaged critically on the relationship between religion and politics with the aim of unpacking the Mugabeistic religio-political hypocrisy to pacify the church and glorify himself as the Zimbabwean messiah. The volume edited by Chitando (2013) demonstrates how the former President left a legacy of “churchling” his political career, which also became a common phenomenon among other prominent political figures during his time and post his fall. Moreover, the engagement by Duri (2018) answers why probably President Mnangagwa, “offered his life to God” barely a month after his ascension to power. He surmises that this was probably in order to make sure that his new political career was strengthened by religion. Of interest to note on President Mnangagwa’s “return to God” is his choice of Mabelreign Methodist society, exactly a month after his inauguration on 24 November 2017 (Ndlovu, 2018). There are three notable issues that we encounter as we try to analyse the reasons for selecting Mabelreign society and the timing of the attendance. First, the former Prime Minister, Morgan Tsvangirai, and his family were congregants at Mabelreign society. The church services for his late wife Susan, who died in 2009, and Tsvangirai’s memorial service in 2018 were both conducted in this church

Depoliticising the MCZ’s Pastoral Role in the Second Republic  63 (Machamire, 2018). Both former President Mugabe and President Mnangagwa were in attendance. Second, Tsvangirai was the first prominent opposition leader since 1999 whose influence led to the formation of the Government of National Unity in 2009. The day President Mnangagwa attended the Christmas Eve church service, Tsvangirai was still a member at Mabelreign society and at that time he was critically ill. Third, why did the President attend Mabelreign church voluntarily for the first time on the Christmas Eve, exactly one week before the year end and one month after his inauguration? The quest for answers to these religio-political questions informed this research and will be discussed later. What remains evident for now is that the church attendance by the President attracted critics from the political world, civilians, religious leaders and scholars. Motivation for the Study Sunday the 24 December 2017 is reckoned as a worship day that took the Mabelreign MCZ by surprise as unusual visitors in the person of President Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa and his wife Auxillia came to attend a church service. Both Zimbabwean print and electronic media carried varied headlines, all alluding to the fact that having the President’s feet in the church, few days after his inauguration, was a step in the right direction. The Herald newspaper had a headline, “God-fearing President Mnangagwa attends church service.” ZBC Online contained a front-page, titled, “I was born in the Methodist, says Mnangagwa.” Bulawayo24 News said, “Mnangagwa surprises worshippers, attends Christmas Eve church service.” MyZimbabwe online news also had the eye-catching topic, “President Mnangagwa reconnects with God, addresses congregants at Methodist church” (Mpofu, 2017). Moreover, the NewsDay had the title “Mnangagwa turns to God” (Chidza, 2017), while a London-based online newspaper, New Zimbabwe, also carried the headline, “Zimbabwe: Mnangagwa attends Methodist church service amid ululations, says people must put God first.” President Mnangagwa’s action was received with mixed feelings, with some people commenting that, “this was a turning point of the country” (Duri, 2018). The general response of politicians given an opportunity of standing in the place of honour in the church is not always viewed as an innocent gesture, but an opportunity to politicise religion. This chapter will not delve into this area (see Chitando, 2013; Biri, 2013). To analyse President Mnangagwa’s church attendance, we will begin with some comments expressed by different writers. Duri takes us through some of the online responses: ‘It is the goodness of the Lord that leads man to repentance (Romans 2:6)’, ‘Our President is taking the right direction for our destination’. ‘As a country, we want to be led by a Christian that is good news’. ‘Just good to hear those in authority do attend church services’. ‘I think as a national leader, His Excellency is not leading the nation in the wrong God-ward direction’. ‘Long live President. May our dear Lord continue to provide all the necessary requisites to steer our

64  Martin Mujinga great nation to its destiny’. ‘God bless Zimbabwe, everything has a beginning even sins can be cleaned according to the Bible’. ‘At least you can see direction of our new leadership. They prefer a God fearing nation from beginning’. (Duri, 2018:198) Although Duri (2018) feels that President Mnangagwa’s decision to attend church service was a follow-up to the precedence set by his predecessor, Robert Mugabe who believed that ascending to power had God’s blessings, Mnangagwa however gave a pledge to his decision. His choice to attend church service demonstrated his commitment in three ways. First, he stayed in the church service which lasted almost two hours (Bulawayo24 News, 2017). Second, when he was given a chance to greet the congregation, he announced his previous membership in the Wesleyan Methodist and promised his pledge to sustain it (New Zimbabwe, 2017). He added that, I am a congregant of this church. We have come to this church which I grew up in. Most of you were not yet born in the 1940s. I attended this church before migrating to Zambia … but I later left to join the liberation struggle. When we came back from war, I attended church service here briefly while staying in Tynwald but I stopped again. The first Lady convinced me to go to Kwekwe. We argue more often because I had a feeling that God listens to prayers even if you do not make them in church … Today she was successful. We will continue attending church as only God knows what transpires each and every day. I might have some aspiration, but only God knows what the future holds. (ZBC Online, 2017) Third, some would argue that the decision to attend the church service by the President also reflected his humility. This point was stressed by the MCZ Parliamentary Liaison Officer, Revd. Edmore Chiota, who mentioned that, President Mnangagwa is a humble man. He is just showing that he is a human being. He is a servant of the people and is committing everything to the Almighty who is the head of the church. This is what we have been looking for and what we continue to look for–a leader who believes in God like he always says, ‘the voice of people is the voice of God’ in a way he believes so much in God. If you listen to the end of his speeches, each time he says, ‘God bless Zimbabwe’. As the church, we will continue supporting the President with prayers. (ZBC Online, 2017) Mrs Mnangagwa also used the opportunity to announce her MCZ membership, adding that her membership was in Kwekwe. “I am one of you. Let us congregate together” (ZBC Online, 2017). Mrs Mnangagwa was confirmed as a full member of the Methodist Church in 2016. Her membership was at Mbizo in Kwekwe East Circuit (Mugumba, 2019). Mugumba’s membership confirmation came in the

Depoliticising the MCZ’s Pastoral Role in the Second Republic  65 context of the First Lady’s seemingly dual membership that saw her appearing clad in two different church uniforms in the space of just over a week (Pindula, 2019). On 23 May 2019, she was pictured wearing a Methodist Ruwadzano uniform during church service to remember the people who perished during Cyclone Idai at Trinity Methodist Church (Chikwati, Munyoro & Shumba, 2019; Mutabvu, 2019). On 2 June 2019, she was also seen wearing a Zion Christian Church uniform (The Zimbabwean Mail, 2019). This action led some people to question her membership that was fluctuating as evidenced by her changing of uniform colours to the extent of wearing even the white garments as part of Vapostori (African Ingenuous Church). The New Zimbabwe Mail (2019) went further to compare her with the former First Lady, Grace Mugabe, who had the same habit of religionising her philanthropic work. President Mnangagwa’s church attendance was received with mixed feelings, hence the need for further interrogation of the diverse interpretations. For Duri (2018), President Mnangagwa’s repentance may have paid political dividends after winning the hearts of some Zimbabweans. People had the feeling that the announcement to be congregant at this point was part of political grandstanding by the President and Zimbabwe must not be fooled by this act (Duri, 2018:169). One online commentator cited by Duri claimed that, “this man was responsible for the death of thousands in our country. He is trying to sanitize his intentions. Both ways, God will prevail and goodness shall come forthwith. Thus says the Lord” (Duri, 2018:197). According to Duri, President Mnangagwa was following the pattern set by the former president, Mugabe, by seeking political legitimacy through using Christianity in order to enhance his image and to draw some of the church leaders and their congregations in particular and the Zimbabwean populace in general (2018:196). Duri prefers to call this action, “Mnangagwa’s pursuit of political legitimacy through religious posturing” (Duri, 2018:196; see also Mawere, Marongwe & Duri, 2018). Controversial Harare preacher Apostle Talent Chiwenga savaged the MCZ for not being a “true church” (Mpofu, 2019). The attack came after the Methodist church’s perceived failure to rebuke and censure President Mnangagwa for “murdering” citizens when he attended the church’s service at Mabelreign (Mpofu, 2019). Chiwenga’s statements contradict the theology of Banana, that “the role of the church in the society is that of unleashing liberative love upon the world because God himself is love. Liberative love manifests in practical concrete action and service to the people” (Gifford, 1988:419). Background of Wesleyan Methodist’s Relationship with Political Affairs In order to appreciate the MCZ’s approach towards Mnangagwa, it is important to trace the background of the denomination’s engagement with politics. The Wesleyan Methodist’s relationship with politics and politicians has a long history. In this chapter, three stages will be followed: thus, religion and politics in Wesley’s time, the missionary period and, finally, the current MCZ theology will

66  Martin Mujinga be explored. First, the ethics and theology of John Wesley revealed and revered the church’s role in politics. Wesley was obsessed with accountability to God and constituency, respect for every person, respect for political structures, as well as authorities and relationships among people as fundamental pillars in political activities (Madhiba, 2010:vi). Sigsworth (1982:125) argues that, “Wesley had much to say on political issues.” Sigsworth maintains that, Wesley grew up politically in the Tory party tradition. Personally he felt that the King and Parliament were to be respected and loyally supported, especially the King … to him the government was a trust from God rather than the people. (Sigsworth, 1982:125) Wesley stressed that “besides, the Bible lays the principle, ‘there is no power but from God.’ Powers that be are ordained by God” (Sigsworth, 1982:125). Wesley also teaches that only religious people are fit to be in authority. Such men (sic), of whatever party got his endorsement as candidates (Sigsworth, 1982:126). Wesley did not begin by supporting the powers that be, but he did voter education. Elections during the eighteenth century, just like in twenty-first century Zimbabwe, were contentious and mud-slinging campaigns between political parties were evident. It was an issue that Wesley and the early Methodists had to face (Sigsworth, 1982). Wesley’s advice to the Methodists still rings true today. It was a deeply contested election year in England in 1774 (Sigsworth, 1982). The Whig party had dominated parliament for years, but they were beginning to lose ground to the Tory party. The campaigning and denigration between the Tories and the Whigs would easily soil the British political campaigns. As the election drew near, Wesley became concerned about the behaviour of Christians in the election (Sigsworth, 1982). In his Journal entry on 4 October 1774, he offered some advice to voting Methodists. He wrote: I met those of our society who had votes in the ensuing election and advised them, ‘to vote, without fee or reward, for the person they judged most worthy; to speak no evil of the person they voted against and to take care their spirits were not sharpened against those that voted on the other side.’ (Wesley, 1774) Wesley guided Methodists’ understanding and attitude towards any elections, be they in the church or even in the secular society. Wesley also emphasised his teaching on voting for the proper candidate when he wrote in his pamphlet, A Word to a Freeholder, to “vote for the man1 that loves God. Such a man for one thing would be less likely to attempt bribery and an evil be censured strongly” (Sigsworth, 1982:126). When no man was available that loves God, his advice was, “vote for him that loves the King” (1982:126). Wesley did not just support political leaders in power, but he did that with the conviction that they were appointed

Depoliticising the MCZ’s Pastoral Role in the Second Republic  67 by God. Madhiba (2010:68) maintains that Wesley’s political teaching could not escape tenets of the evangelical movement and Paul’s teaching. These teachings were pivotal to Wesley’s political teaching and practice. Paul taught that, Everyone must submit himself to the governing authorities, for there is no authority except that which God has established. The authorities that exist have been established by God … he who rebels against the authorities is rebelling against what God has instituted, and those who do so will bring judgement on themselves. (Romans, 13:1–2) Second, Methodism was brought to Zimbabwe by the missionaries a century after the death of Wesley in 1791 (Thorpe, 1951) and its coming was attached to politics. The involvement of the Wesleyan Methodist in politics during this time has been well documented by Simon Madhiba (2010). In his PhD thesis titled, “Methodism and political life in Zimbabwe: An analysis of the Wesleyan Methodist Church in Zimbabwe’s impact on politics from 1891–1980,” Madhiba takes us through the historical and theological interpretation of Wesleyan Methodists’ political teaching and practice in Zimbabwe from 1891 to 1980. Madhiba applauded the WMCZ’s political teaching and practice during the colonial era basing on four themes, namely politics of land, race relationships, federation and war (Madhiba, 2010:v). One of Madhiba’s objectives was to unveil successes and failures of Wesleyan Methodists in the Zimbabwean political arena and to expose the historical significance of Wesleyan Methodist influence in politics for Zimbabwean history (Madhiba, 2010:v). It is also worth noting that the MCZ had a special relationship with the colonial government due to an invitation by Cecil John Rhodes for the church to participate in the Pioneer Column in 1891 (Thorpe, 1951; Banana, 1991; Zvobgo, 1991; Madhiba, 2010; Gondongwe, 2011; Mujinga, 2017). This point was buttressed by Watkins, the first Wesleyan missionary to Zimbabwe. In his diary, Watkins gave a verbatim account of Tuesday 20 October 1891, rarely a month after their arrival in the new land (Thorpe, 1951:44–45). Watkins took interest in the influence of the missionaries on the political administration led by Cecil Rhodes. From Watkins’ account, we learn that Cecil Rhodes, his Company Secretary, Dr. Harris and Administrator, Dr. Jameson, had agreed to give all the missionaries one farm for missionary work (Thorpe, 1951:44). However, Rhodes overrode the decision of his administration in front of the missionaries (Thorpe, 1951:44–45). The discussion was well put by Thorpe and is not necessary to duplicate. It is, however, worth extracting some of the facts to argue that the Wesleyan Methodists had close ties with the incipient government. First, the colonisers had a policy that each Missionary Society would be allocated one portion of land, but Watkins asked for six more and he was granted (Thorpe, 1951). Thorpe records one of the reasons, saying, “Dr Harris still fought hard against the idea and I answered him point by point.” Rhodes said,

68  Martin Mujinga well Harris, you must remember the Wesleyans will do good to the company … all their people will be of the right sort, they will not bring in loafers, who can do nothing but drink whisky at £4 a bottle … suppose we give you three farms to start with if you want more and the Mission is a success, why not apply for more and I promise shall receive every favourable consideration. (1951:45) Watkins and Rhodes’ relationship determined how ministers responded to government’s approach towards the relationship between religion and politics (Madhiba, 2010:108). This was because of the political influence of Wesley in England that Rhodes remembered. The third point to note is that, the MCZ has a clear role on its involvement in political affairs. The constitution of the MCZ, the Deed of Church Order and Standing Orders (2011, Section 10, 1103:215) clearly states that, It is not permissible for any person conducting divine worship or speaking in any meeting in a Methodist place of worship to submit resolutions or take votes on political or semi-political subjects or for the congregation to vote upon any such matter after the close of the service. The Constitution does not also allow preachers or ministers to preach party politics. It follows that, even if President Mnangagwa wanted to pursue any political advancement, the MCZ constitution would restrain him, especially as it says, “the use of Methodist property for the purposes of party political meetings is not permitted and would be detrimental to the best interest of the local churches by endangering their peace and unity” (2011, Section 10, 1103:215). From the arguments presented, to say President Mnangagwa came to the Sunday church service as a politician is to be uncharitable in interpretation. However, one cannot dismiss the symbolic capital that he would have drawn from such an association. The Wesleyan Methodist Church in Zimbabwe’s Involvement in National Affairs The pastoral involvement of the Wesleyan Methodist Church in government affairs dates back to the colonial era. At Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980, eight Wesleyan Methodists were appointed into Zimbabwe’s first cabinet. These included Revd. (Later, Prof.) Canaan Banana who was appointed Senator and first President of the Republic of Zimbabwe and Chancellor of the University of Zimbabwe (Chung, 2006). Joshua Nkomo, a Local Preacher, was appointed Minister of Home Affairs. Other appointments were Josiah Chinamano, Eddison Zvobgo, Nathan Shamhuyarira, Sydney Sekeramayi, Herbert Ushewokunze and Enos Chikowore. Enock Dumbuchena, who served as the first black Chief Justice (Kadenge, 1991:121–122), was another significant appointment. After independence, there were political disturbances that deteriorated into a civil war. The government reacted harshly to what it characterised as “dissidents.” The suppression also included violence against and killings of civilians who were said to be

Depoliticising the MCZ’s Pastoral Role in the Second Republic  69 supporting the “dissidents.” This conflict is known as the Gukurahundi (Chung, 2006). This conflict continued unabated for about five years, and finally ended with the unity agreement signed in 1987 between ZANU and ZAPU, called the Unity Accord. President Canaan Banana played a leading role in bringing the two political parties together (Chung, 2006; Gunda and Kügler, 2012). The MCZ has been and is still involved in the affairs of the government as a partner in development. This involvement is in four areas, that is health, education, clerics serving in government and as Members of Parliament. The MCZ health services include those rendered at Epworth Clinic and Matthew Rusike Children’s Home. Education is offered at its boarding schools, namely Waddilove Institute, Chemhanza Primary and Secondary Schools, Kwenda High School, Sandringham High School, Thekwane High School, Pakame High School and Moeli High School. The third involvement is in providing its clerics to serve in the government departments. For example, Revd. Josphat Manyakaidze and Pedzisai Tsuro served as army chaplains. Bishop Morrison Chiwundura and Revd. Dr. Elliot Mashonganyika served as police chaplains. Revd. Emmanuel Vuta served as the chaplain in the President’s Office, Revd. John Chisvo was the chaplain in the office of the then Prime Minister, Morgan Tsvangirai. At the time of writing, Revd. Edmore Chiota was serving as the Parliamentary Liaison Officer. The fourth area of engagement is that of clerics serving as Members of Parliament. Thus, Revd. Thandeko Mnkandhla served as the Member of Parliament representing the opposition Movement for Democratic Change. The Wesleyan Methodist Church’s Politico-Ecclesiastical and Sacramental Theology The Wesleyan Methodist’s theology embraces the government as part of its ecclesiastical responsibility. First, the WMC sacramental theology intercedes for political leaders. The liturgy says, “we beseech Thee also to save and defend all Christian Kings, Princes and Governors and specifically Elizabeth our Queen; that under her we may be godly and quietly governed …” (The Methodist Church, 1975:B48). This liturgy is followed by all Wesleyan Methodist Churches globally since this is an international Service Book. When the MCZ liturgy was revised in 2009, it replaced Queen Elizabeth with “mutungamiri wenyika” [Lit. Head of State] (MCZ, 2009:26). This was a decolonial turn on the part of the MCZ and marked a shift from interceding for Queen Elizabeth. Second, the MCZ has the Methodist Development and Relief Agency (MeDRA) and the Christian Social Responsibility and Human Rights Committees. Through the work of MeDRA and the two committees, the Church is involved in civic education, human rights campaigns, national election monitoring, which calls for constitutional reforms. This led to the church being viewed as one of the enemies of the state and not an ally during Mugabe’s tenure (Chitando and Togarasei, 20100). The discernible Wesleyan Methodists’ interest in Zimbabwean politics revealed that both ministers and lay members were involved in political activities.

70  Martin Mujinga Depoliticising Wesleyan Methodist Ecclesiastical Membership in the Second Republic Our political theology discussion in this chapter finds out that President Mnangagwa’s choice of attending the church service can be answered both politically and theologically. The theological base, which is our focus, can be associated with Augustine’s theology about the City of God. In this theology, Augustine was dealing, among many other issues, with the problem of the spiritual Church in a secular world (Bettenson, 1984). For Augustine, the great lesson of the City of God is that, out of all things comes good. Out of religion and politics, comes good. Augustine saw that during his time both Christianity and Rome would each benefit by the good that was in the other and by any good from wherever else it might come (Bettenson, 1984). Augustine argues that for Christianity, assimilation meant acceptance and that was universal in the context of his time. For Rome, it meant transmission and development and the keynote of the City of God is fulfilment, not destruction. The author of this chapter is pushing the same agenda, namely that, much as the MCZ can be labelled to be weak and hypocritical, Augustine feels that the Church is for both the saints and the sinners (Bettenson, 1984). The chapter further argues that accommodating President Mnangagwa in the Sunday church service does not translate to “dining with Caesar,” but is a church’s missional strategy of transmission and development of the country. In depolarising, we also note that membership to the Wesleyan Methodist Church by some senior politicians is not unique to Zimbabwe in general and the Methodist Church in particular. Nelson Mandela was a prominent member of the Methodist Church of Southern Africa and this was never politicised (Forster, 2019). The choice of accepting President Mnangagwa as a new convert by the Wesleyan Methodist Church also corresponds well with Wesley’s teaching that it is the right of all humans to worship God according to their own conscience. This right comes from the Creator (Sigsworth, 1982:127). Conclusion This chapter which applies insights from political theology noted that many denominations in Zimbabwe have suffered political demonisation once some politicians pass through their churches, either for worship or for a solidarity message. This chapter was at pains to castigate this form of toxic theology. The chapter argues that politics and religion are partners who work for the same people: one is worldly and the other is spiritual. Although President Mnangagwa attended a church service, from the position of MCZ’s ecclesiastical theology, there is no way a politician can seek his or political aggrandisement without violating the church’s order of service. The chapter also discovered that it is the mandate of the church to preach to politicians for them to lead in a godly way. In addition, the church is the house of God where every sinner has a right. Therefore, attacking President Mnangagwa for attending a church

Depoliticising the MCZ’s Pastoral Role in the Second Republic  71 service would be misunderstanding the purpose of the church as expressed by Augustine. In addition, the WMC has been and is still having a theology that embraces everyone regardless of their social or political status. As such, it is not a political army. Note 1 The issue of women’s leadership had not yet received the emphasis that it now demands and commands during the contemporary period (Editors).

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72  Martin Mujinga Gondongwe, K., 2011. ‘African Ministers and the Emergence of Resistance to Colonial Domination: The Development of Indigenous Clergy in the Wesleyan Methodist Church in Zimbabwe.’ Unpublished PhD. Thesis, University of KwaZulu-Natal. Gunda, M. R. and Kügler, J., (Eds). 2012. The Bible and Politics in Africa. Bible in Africa Studies. University of Bamberg: Bamberg University Press. Hamburg, L. S., 1932. Making a Leader: How Many Look up to him [Hitler] with Touching Faith as their Helper, their Saviour, their Deliverer from Unbearable Distress. [Online] Available at: www.ushmm.org/pro​paga​nda/the​mes/mak​i ng-a-lea​der/ [Accessed 6 September 2019]. Kadenge, L. C., 1991. “Leaders: Past and Present.” In: C. S. Banana, ed., A Century of Methodism in Zimbabwe. Gweru: Mambo Press, 111–122. Machamire, F., 2018. “Pastor Slams Tsvangirai Family over Wrangles.” Daily News, 20 February. Madhiba, S., 2010. ‘Methodism and political life in Zimbabwe: An analysis of the Wesleyan Methodist Church in Zimbabwe’s impact on politics from 1891–1980.’ Pretoria: Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Pretoria. Mawere, M., Marongwe, N. & Duri, F. T. Eds. 2018. The End of an Era? Robert Mugabe and a Conflicting Legacy. Bameda: Langaa Research and Publishing. Mpofu, M., 2017. President Mnangagwa Reconnects with God, Addresses Congregants at Methodist Church. [Online] Available at: www.myz​i mba​bwe.co.zw/news/12554-presid​ ent-mnanga​g wa-rec​onne​c ts-with-god-addres​ses-cong ​rega ​nts-at-method ​i st-chu ​rch. html [Accessed 15 September 2019]. Mpofu, M., 2019. Chiwenga Blasts Methodists after Mnangagwa Attended Service at Mabelreign Branch. [Online] Available at: www.chiwe​nga-blast-method​ist-after-mnanga​g wa-atten​ ded-serv ​ice-at-mab​elre​ign-bra​nch [Accessed 22 September 2019]. Mugumba, I., 2019. Membership of the First Lady [Interview] (14 August 2019). Mujinga, M., 2017. The Historical Development of Methodism: A North-South Paradigm. Harare: Connexional Bookshop. Mujinga, M., 2018. “ ‘Religion as a Riding Horse of Politics?’ A Critical Evaluation of Political Influence in the Zimbabwean Ecclesiastical Life.” Alternation, Special Edition 23, 244–265. Mutabvu, B., 2019. “First Lady Urges Nation to Remain Strong.” The Sunday Mail. 15 March. Ndlovu, R., 2018. In the Jaws of the Crocodile: Emmerson Mnangagwa’s Rise to Power. Century City: Penguin Books. New Zimbabwe, 2017. “Zimbabwe: Mnangagwa Attends Methodist Church Service amid Ululations, Says People Must Put God first.” [Online] Available at: https://allafr ​ica.com/ stor ​ies/20171​2250​021.html [Accessed 25 September 2019]. Pindula, 2019. Is Auxullia Mnangagwa A Methodist Or An Anglican? [Online] Available at: https://news.pind​u la.co.zw/2019/06/03/pict​u re-is-auxul​l ia-mnanga​g wa-a-method​ ist-or-an-angli​can/ [Accessed 19 September 2019]. Richardson, A. & Bowden, J., 1983. A New Dictionary of Christian Theology. London: SCM Press. Sigsworth, J. W., 1982. World-Changers Karl Marx and John Wesley: A Comprehensive up-todate Comparison (Lives, Thought, Activism and Influence) of Two of Modern History’s Most Effective World Changers. Ontario: The Intelligencer. The Herald, 2017. “God-fearing President Mnangagwa Attends Church Service.” The Herald, 25 December.

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4 “Prisoners of Hope?” Pentecostalism, Politics and the Quest for a New Dispensation in Zimbabwe Kudzai Biri Introduction The crisis in Zimbabwe has increased not only the visibility of Pentecostals in the public space but massive proliferation of Pentecostal prophets and apostles who claim to understand the crisis and destiny of Zimbabwe. This chapter examines the role of prayer and prophecies during the crisis. Zimbabwe has gone through decades of unquestionable crisis and has driven out masses that have the opportunities to exit the country. However, the crisis seems to point to a growing awareness of the power of prayer and prophecy. Regardless of all the vicissitudes of Zimbabwe’s social, political and economic life, many Pentecostals continue to profess their faith and look forward to divine intervention. Giving attention to the emphasis on prayer and the significance of mushrooming prophecies in relation to the political situation in Zimbabwe is a form of political engagement that is enshrined in Pentecostal political theology. Pentecostals have previously been accused of being apolitical but the crisis seems to have given them the chance to theologise the nation’s destiny. Refraining from politics or active participation in politics are all forms of political engagement with an agenda and oftentimes with the backing of biblical interpretation of scriptures (Marshall-Fratani & Corteni, 2001). Yet, the decades of crisis seem to have pushed some believers to demand a pro-active political theology. Hence the developments in Zimbabwe present a dilemma for Christians. They are being caught up between the quests for action and at times just surrendering their situation to God: “the weapons of our warfare are not merely human but they have divine power to destroy strongholds …” (II Corinthians 4:10 NRSV). However, it appears the radical voices that advocate action against the regime (mostly those at grassroots level) are submerged by the dominant voices of the leaders that advocate intercessory prayers and fasting for the nation. Methodology The chapter utilises the lexicon of Marxist sociological view and analysis of religion to argue that the political theology espoused by Pentecostalism in Zimbabwe appears to be compromised, weak, disempowering and hypocritical. The masses DOI: 10.4324/9781003332435-5

Pentecostalism, Politics and the Quest for a New Dispensation  75 have been urged to remain resilient and to intercede for political leaders (Romans 13:1, “Let every person be subject to the governing authorities; for there is no authority except from God, and those authorities that exist have been instituted by God.”). There is a strong underlying manifestation of class conflict and struggles at three levels. First, the class conflict between the political elite and the masses that are exploited, oppressed and suppressed. Second, the conflict between the top religious elite and their congregants which is not open because of the authoritarian structures of Pentecostal denominations that leaves “the man of God” towering at the top and with unquestioned powers and authority to deploy the theology of acquiescence as a weapon of mass control. The conflict between religious leaders and their congregants warrants caution. Protests against the religious leaders are often implicit, as only critical minds question the patronage from political leaders and the deployment of Romans 13 for unconditional intercession for political leaders, in spite of brutality. This is due to the belief that in all socio-economic and political developments “God is in it.” Thus, in the equation, congregants seem to be victims of both political and religious dictates and exploitation, hence, are vulnerable to both their religious leaders and the political elite. Third, there are emerging prophets who have openly criticised the regime. The example of Apostle Talent Chiwenga of Jesus Revelation Ministries, openly criticising political leaders and other Pentecostal leaders as corrupt, is a new dimension in Zimbabwean Pentecostalism. It will be no exaggeration that the increased interaction of academics doing research, who are also members of the different Pentecostal denominations who question issues like the status of the “men of God,” lack of accountability and the making of elite services, commoditising the gospel, prayers and deliverance sessions have helped to bring awareness to some congregants. Most critics advocate action against the regime in order to bring normalcy to the Zimbabwean crisis through confronting the political powers. Thus, there is a complex web in relation to Pentecostalism and politics in Zimbabwe. As such, it is, therefore, necessary to inquire how prayer, prophecies and the deployment of biblical verses shed light on underlying ideologies and conflicts during the crisis. There are many questions that are crucial: • To what extent has emphasis on prayer and prophecy empowered Zimbabweans during the crisis? • Is this focus on prayer and prophecy real empowerment or a sign of low intensity and fatigue of Zimbabwean politic?” The theology is based on the affirmation that God has a plan, a purpose and a task for Zimbabwe. The past (in particular 2008 that is often seen as the peak of the crisis) is used to substantiate the hope as well as to explain the case which plagues Zimbabwe. The period from early 2019 is currently regarded as a “2008 re-loaded” because of the deepening crisis in the so-called “new dispensation” of President Emmerson Mnangagwa, who came to power in November 2017 through a coup that deposed former long serving President Robert Mugabe. A focus on Pentecostal political theology implies investigating a number of issues that include:

76  Kudzai Biri • how Pentecostal leaders engage with politics in Zimbabwe during the crisis • how they interpret the political situation/prolonged crisis • how they deploy biblical verses and frame their theologies of the crisis to congregants • the significance of prayer, prophecies and theologies to the believers and how they impact the nation at large The above questions are significant as they unravel Pentecostal worldview during the crisis and help to evaluate Pentecostal engagement with the crisis. The chapter makes use of teachings from different old and newer Pentecostal denominations, the Evangelical Fellowship of Zimbabwe Women’s Interdenominational Fellowship and published relevant literature on Pentecostalism and politics. The Basis for Intercessory Prayer: Sinful Gates Opened It is important to establish how Pentecostals read the political situation in Zimbabwe. The Pentecostal narratives on the crisis are diverse. However, the rallying point rests on the urgent need to pray without ceasing for several reasons. Political leaders, especially those dubbed “the evil ones,” are perceived as possessed. Thus, the language of warfare to defeat the spiritual bonds that tie the nation and hinder progress and development is dominant (Adogame, 2004; Kalu, 2008). While many people and critics of the regime see created poverty (Vengeyi, 2011), to the Pentecostals, the poverty thesis has a spiritual dimension. Even if Pentecostals acknowledge the misuse of national resources by the political elite, the reason for that lack of responsibility and accountability is explained in terms of regional and territorial spirits that are anti-progress. Thus, the theology of warfare, “to fight on one’s knees,” positive confession and declarations about Zimbabwe remain crucial in order to free the nation from demonic and despotic powers. The process of deliverance moves from the individual to nation, and nations are important in the eschatological worldview of Pentecostals. Kalu (1998:27) says that in the Pentecostal imagination, it is the sins of the people that have opened disastrous gates. There is an investment in identifying the sources of curses and identification of repentance prayer as a solution. There is also spiritual mapping which locates the gates, and that all this is important in the Pentecostal language of the kingdom. According to him, in a way, politics is the discourse of public life and Pentecostal political theology reflects on the perception of the meaning of Jesus, especially in crisis moments. My conviction is that Pentecostals promote individualism and prosperity to extreme levels. This has led to corruption in the churches and individual lives as congregants embrace the quest for upward social mobility as a sign of dominion. This is a moral principle especially typical of bourgeois ideology and morality. Their emphasis on the individual is described by van Dijk (2001:230) as “technologies of self ”:

Pentecostalism, Politics and the Quest for a New Dispensation  77 Both in terms of discourse and practice, the leaders and the churches are eager to construct a new individuality, a context of identification where there are moments of binding one’s identity to these social relations. The combination of social control extended by the churches, and their sheer success in dealing with personal problems in which they show great acumen, turn them into places where a new web replaces a former web of relations that restricted a person to blood-lines and the power of the ancestors. The theoretical foundation of individualism is the recognition of autonomy and the absolute rights of the individual in society. However, it needs to be pointed out that the individualised identity is placed within a new group/family identity of “born agains.” Thus, reinventing the Shona (dominant ethnic group) indigenous communal and kinship ideology, however, based on being born again and membership to the denomination. But how effective is Pentecostal theology in dealing with the national crisis when they encourage unlimited success of individuals amidst crushing forces of underdevelopment, deprivation and poverty? At the same time, some individualistic assumptions cultivated through the notion of empowering the individual, and recommending one to make a “complete break from the past,” fail to focus on shared goods, thereby creating the problem of amassing resources by the few and to identify certain kinds of oppression. A brief systematic and pertinent analysis of the socio-economic and political situation in Zimbabwe is important as the platform to examine Pentecostal political theology and their engagement with issues of personal, social and national identity and transformation in Zimbabwe. The Socio-Economic and Political Climate in Zimbabwe Many scholars have documented the crisis in Zimbabwe from different perspectives. Of significance is Vengeyi (2011), who provides an in-depth historical analysis of man-made poverty in Zimbabwe from the colonial era. Vengeyi utilises the book of the prophet Amos in the Old Testament in his attempt to demystify poverty in Zimbabwe. What is crucial with his study is the challenge to Pentecostal spiritualisation of the Zimbabwean crisis through drawing analogies from the book of Amos where the Prophet had to confront the religious leaders and elites on the socio-economic injustices in Israel. The major crisis is not about demons of poverty as espoused by the Pentecostals but “a historical process of exclusion from economic and social power or disempowerment rather than the absence of material and financial resources.” Pentecostals encourage prayers of repentance and confession of national sins for God to restore glory in Zimbabwe. Chitando (2012) condemned the wrong deployment of 2 Chronicles 7:14 during the crisis. He argues that the crisis has nothing to do with the sins of the nation, and blaming victims as sinners and as not full of prayer is unfair. He maintains that the lack of accountability and misappropriation of resources by the elite is responsible for the crisis.

78  Kudzai Biri Scholars speak with a plurality of voices on how Zimbabwe has been engulfed in a real socio-economic and political crisis. Also, the role of religion has been as significant as ever in post-colonial Zimbabwe. Hence, a detailed study of the roots and development of the Zimbabwean crisis cannot be duplicated in this chapter. However, there is need for a fresh look at the new dimensions that Pentecostal political theology takes at different historical epochs during the crisis, during Mugabe era and also in post-Mugabe era, for there are some new developments. The Zimbabwean crisis saw an increase in calls for fasting in different denominations and also at the national level. Prayer retreats, fasting and all-night vigils have become the order of the day. Prayer and fasting are believed to usher Zimbabwe into a new dispensation of socio-economic and political prosperity. However, the call for prayers and fasting has to be understood against the background of the challenges that are faced by Zimbabweans. After the July 2018 Presidential elections, innocent civilians were shot in the streets as they demonstrated against the alleged rigged elections by President Mnangagwa. It was the most apparent failure to redeem his promises of a democratic government that he promised when he toppled Robert Mugabe in November 2017. Prayers were held for those who lost their lives and it also attracted human rights condemnation. This widespread condemnation of abuse of human rights during the Mugabe era was not given due attention by Pentecostals. In fact, Mugabe’s outright condemnation of homosexuals (Shoko, 2010) and fierce resistance against the British was read in many Pentecostals as the reason God kept Mugabe in power. Concerning apparent electoral fraud after defeat in which he clung to power and unleashed violence on the opposition, the Pentecostals often avoided questions relating to Mugabe’s apparent electoral fraud and violence against the opposition. Biri (2013) has castigated the failure of Pentecostals to promote social justice and to denounce corruption in a manner similar to the Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops Conference (ZCBC). She charges that this is due to structures of corruption, exploitation and abuse of congregants in Pentecostal churches that correspond to the structures of the ruling ZANU PF during the Mugabe era. There are two dominant views on how Zimbabwe arrived at such a static situation. First, the post-colonial legacy is cited and it is argued that the structures were designed by former colonisers to keep former colonies subservient to them. Yet, the decades after independence from British rule have seen corruption and resources plundered by the leaders. As a result, the legacy of colonialism and the “sanctions thesis” seem to be forms of escapism according to the critics of the ruling ZANU PF. More so, Mugabe indigenised the local industries and grabbed farms from the white minority in the name of empowering the black majority but most of these farms remain under-utilised, apart from parcelling out huge tracts of land to both the religious and political elites. This has significantly contributed to food shortages and high prices. Therefore, dining and wining on legacies of colonialism has been regarded as hiding behind the finger of mismanagement of resources and incompetence. Second, people condemned excess and corruption during the Mugabe era, inherited by Mnangagwa, which is the real cause of the crisis. However, in

Pentecostalism, Politics and the Quest for a New Dispensation  79 spite of hatred against corruption and other economic ills during the decades of Mugabe era, many did not reject the values of his governance. Mugabe’s ideas of the empowerment of the black race, negating the superiority of the white race, the redistribution of land seized from the white minority and the strong antigay stance have been welcome news to many Zimbabweans. This placed citizens in a dilemma because the land looms large in God’s covenant and includes the economic, social and political aspects (Kalu, 1998) and is a heritage of the indigenous people (Bakare, 1993). Yet, at the same time there is much centralisation of political power, patronage networks and a mercenary political ethos that is characterised by the acquisition of private wealth by the political elite and those in their networks, including top Pentecostal leaders. This prompts questioning the role of the Pentecostal elite in the contexts of thriving corruption, mismanagement of state resources and brutality by the regime. Will they offer a practical meaningful theology that mobilises the masses to resist oppression and exploitation when they seem to be caught up in the same situation of lack of fiscal accountability and amassing wealth for themselves? It appears the call for intercessory prayers remains a safe move for the Pentecostal leaders to avoid criticism of the political elite that will also entangle them. Another key factor preventing collective action by Pentecostals in Zimbabwe is that they too are caught up in the ethnic fragmentation and tensions. For example, the long existing ethnic tensions between the Shona and the Ndebele took a back seat when tensions began rising among the Shona groups, particularly the Zezuru and the Karanga as two dominant competing ethnic groups for Presidency within the ruling party. While these identities are invented and imagined, their impact is real. This compromised the quest for national integration. In all this, development was side lined as political leaders accused each other of plotting murder, witchcraft and traded counter accusations. For example, in 2016, Grace Mugabe publicly accused the then Vice President, Joice Mujuru, of trying to use witchcraft to topple Robert Mugabe on national television during her “Meet the People Rallies.” Thus, it confirms the observation by Bayart (1993) that “the politics of the belly” on the African continent centre not only around the necessities of survival, but also on the invisible world of sorcery and witchcraft. This invisible world of negative powers is strong in the Pentecostal theology of interceding for the nation in order to defeat these spiritual forces and redeem the nation. The developments angered Zimbabweans but at the same time Mugabe’s ideologies of empowerment remain important to the majority of Christians who have been encouraged to occupy land (participating in land grabbing initiated by Mugabe) by Guti on the pretext that “ivhu hariruzi value” (soil does not lose value) (Biri, 2015). Only a few Pentecostal pastors vehemently and openly condemn the regime in their churches, although they quickly point to the brutality of the regime in case of head on confrontation. Mugabe in his time had warned religious leaders to keep out of politics and threatened dire consequences for those who meddled in politics. This culture of violence is deeply entrenched in Zimbabwean politics (Kaulemu, 2011) and is one of the many weapons that have been used to pacify or silence critics. The likes of General Solomon Mujuru died in unclear

80  Kudzai Biri circumstances in 2012, Itai Dzamara, a critical journalist disappeared (2016) and the Catholic Bishop Pius Ncube had issues of adultery levelled against him and many others. There is also the case of the USD 15 billion which “disappeared” and the government could not account for it. Yet, it was known that the political elite had squandered the earnings from the Chiadzwa diamond fields, and the urban population’s failure to remit money to their relatives in the rural areas who depend on urban folks worsened the crisis. These issues affected members of Pentecostal churches, some of whom became openly critical. New on the religious landscape is Apostle Talent Chiwenga, who has openly denounced and attacked both the ruling elite and Pentecostal church leaders for causing problems in Zimbabwe. Talent Chiwenga has been consistent on his attacks on especially the President, his deputies and the top Pentecostal leaders. This appears to be a new dispensation in the history of Pentecostalism where tithes, forms of offerings and the popular concept of seeding in order to escape life’s vicissitudes are attacked openly within the Pentecostal fraternity. Instead, Chiwenga attacks corruption and amassing wealth from believers in Pentecostal churches, the rise of demigods as the basis of corruption and exploitation in Pentecostal churches. It is against this background of cases of corruption, mismanagement of resources and brutality that one has to question or interrogate the spiritualisation of the crisis and that it is divine will and a process to elevate Zimbabwe above other nations through vicarious suffering. In order to appreciate the complexities of the Pentecostal responses to the persistence of the Zimbabwean crisis, it is necessary to understand the various strands of Pentecostalism that are found in the country. It is to this theme that I turn to next. The Categorisation of Pentecostalism in Zimbabwe Pentecostalism in Zimbabwe is diverse, with older Pentecostal and newer Pentecostal churches. The Apostolic Faith Mission in Zimbabwe (AFM in Zimbabwe) and the Zimbabwe Assemblies of God Africa (ZAOGA) of Ezekiel Guti (who remains crucial and spiritual father of many Pentecostals) represent much older Pentecostal churches that date back to the colonial era. Others, like the United Family International Church (UFIC) of Emmanuel and Ruth Makandiwa, Prophetic, Healing and Deliverance Ministry (PHD) of Walter and Tendai Magaya and Jesus Revelation Ministries of Talent Chiwenga among others are newer Pentecostal churches/ministries. What is important within the Pentecostal fraternity is extreme contestation and castigation of each other as they either make sense of the crisis or castigate political leaders for destroying the socio-economic fabric of the nation. Thus, while there is crisis of leadership in the political arena, there is also crisis of legitimacy and authenticity among Pentecostal leaders. Yet, most Pentecostal leaders are looked upon as father figures by their congregants. There are also contradicting and conflicting approaches towards politics and prophecies about the crisis and the future of Zimbabwe. The mushrooming of Pentecostal churches warrants a multi-dimensional interpretation but it is beyond the scope of this chapter. This chapter does not intend to name and critique

Pentecostalism, Politics and the Quest for a New Dispensation  81 different Pentecostal churches one by one but to provide a critical analysis of the dominant theologies that run across Pentecostalism with regards to the reading and interpretation of the crisis through prophecy and intercession and how it has impacted the well-being of Zimbabweans. While the churches have doctrinal variations, prayer, fasting and prophecy remain at the centre of many Pentecostals. Prophecies: The Birth of a New Zimbabwe? The continued problems in Zimbabwe have witnessed the emergence of many Pentecostal leaders that are known as Apostles and Prophets. Most of these claim to have God’s revelation on Zimbabwe’s future and the divine restoration of the nations’ glory. Others such as Apostle Chiwenga of Jesus Revelation Ministries predict forthcoming events. He is popularly known for critiquing the regime and also emphasising the need to be patient and to wait upon God’s time of deliverance. In one of the prophecies he says, “Mwari vati vachirikusuka zvigubhu zvavo saka vari kuti chimbokuvarai nenzara.” (God says he is still preparing his people for leadership, so he is saying you feel hungry but my time is not yet, continue to experience the hunger for now…) (4-06-2019). It is important to note the emphasis on the need to be patient. The fall of Mugabe was experienced by many Zimbabweans who hoped for a new era as a harbinger of better times ahead. But this optimism was soon crushed after Mnangagwa pledged his allegiance to Mugabe and also retained all the economic policies of the Mugabe regime. The continued decline of the economy through corruption deepened pessimism among many citizens. Critical thinkers within Pentecostalism began to question the authenticity of such prophecies that called upon the citizens to be patient and resilient. These prophecies also became questionable in light of the military action that deposed Mugabe. Does the military action translate to overthrowing God, because Mugabe had been figured as God’s plan for Zimbabwe and that he would give up power on his own?1 A ZAOGA team at Grange Christian church gave the feedback of Eunor (Guti’s wife)’s prophecy in Cana during the October 2014 Israel trip. Eunor Guti delivered the prophecy: “God says; ‘I have heard the cry of my children in Zimbabwe.’ ” The following day, the late Myles Munroe who had come to have a co-tour with ZAOGA team, delivered the same prophecy that emphasised the dawn of a new Zimbabwe. Such prophecies were met with jubilation and optimism and became viral in the church (the researcher is a member of the church). During the Mugabe era, critics felt people like Guti were better positioned to engage Mugabe on the basis of the same age and their positions. Also, as a nodal power point from an old Pentecostal church that is visible in the public space and commanding unquestioned numerical strength in terms of membership and respect, Guti is a spiritual father of many within the Pentecostal fraternity. Yet, it is ZAOGA which emphasises intercessory prayers, especially during the annual Ten Days Prayer (see Musoni, 2021). Therefore, how reliable are prophecies and are they subject to manipulation because of the “religionization of politics and politicisation of religion” (Adogame,

82  Kudzai Biri 2005)? Before the fall of Mugabe, prophetic utterances remained the order of the day. The recurring and dominant theme was that God was in control of the crisis. The prophecy of Cindy Jacobs in Guatemala (see Biri, 2014; Biri & Togarasei, 2015) had a profound effect on the Zimbabwean religious landscape, especially within the Pentecostal fraternity. Cindy Jacobs of The Generals International prophesied in 1998 that the suffering of Zimbabweans was under divine control and that women were to lead a revolution that would transform and restore Zimbabwe to its former economic glory. Influenced by this prophecy, the 2013 run-up to the new constitution saw the Evangelical Fellowship of Zimbabwe (EFZ) (the overall body of Pentecostals and Evangelicals) taking a lead in fasting, praying and proposing that “evils” that had opened the gates for curses on the nation were to be excluded in the new constitution. These supposed “evils” included homosexuality and abortion. They were subsequently dubbed, “evil rights.” The EFZ provided platforms where prophetic declarations and utterances on the situation were made and the future declared. The post-Mugabe era continues to witness many prophetic utterances from different Pentecostal leaders. For example, Apostle Chiwenga’s prophecies and sermons have been met with mixed feelings. While the ordinary people give a nod to them, mostly the political and religious elite have been uncomfortable with him as he exposes the shady deals and theological deficiency within older Pentecostal churches. In particular, he has laid bare the leaders’ failure to be critical of the political elite. He declares his sermons and prophecies publicly as he resorts to street or open space preaching. Prophet Blessing Chiza of Faith in God Eagle Life Assembly also gave warning prophecies in riddles, describing the military takeover and the aftermath (11-10-2018). The dominant message in his prophecies warns Mnangagwa and emphasised the need to apologise to Mugabe for the military takeover that he carried out since he was mentored by Mugabe. The challenge with this approach is that it concentrates on individuals and does not address pressing issues on the national agenda. Some of the prophecies appear to push for the desired Government of National Unity (GNU) between the ruling party and the main opposition, Movement for Democratic Change Alliance (MDC Alliance, later CCC) in order to ease the suffering of Zimbabweans. Many prophecies reflect three dominant themes. First, there is emphasis on waiting upon God’s time. Many Zimbabweans appear to have lost hope after the Mugabe era and discussions in the public space focus on confronting the political elite as many get more frustrated by the Mnangagwa regime. However, having hope in overcoming theruling elitedoes not translate into them losing hope in God’s miracle in ushering a new Zimbabwe. The question of how prayer brings change remains unanswered. Some see in Nelson Chamisa, the MDC Alliance (later, CCC) leader (a Pentecostal), a Messianic figure who has the keys to unlock the glorious future of Zimbabwe. Second, the prophecies assure believers of the restoration of Zimbabwe. There is great nostalgia on Zimbabwe’s past economic glory. Many Zimbabweans cherish the bygone and very early days of Mugabe era (from 1980s) where industries blossomed and flourished and Zimbabwe was the breadbasket of Southern

Pentecostalism, Politics and the Quest for a New Dispensation  83 Africa. The prophecies and sermons exhibit an assurance of restoration in the midst of great suffering and a longing for the past glory. Thus, prophecies are timely as they fall on “fertile ground” that is longing and desperate for transformation. In such a scenario, it becomes difficult for many to question the authenticity of such prophecies. Third, the uniqueness of Zimbabwe is emphasised, far above other African countries. The idea that Zimbabwe is suffering because it is loved by God seems to defy logic, although it remains uncontested in most Pentecostal circles. This seems to be an irony that is always defended in Pentecostal circles and understood as prophetic imagination (Brueggemann, 1978). It revolts against the mind to argue for the blessedness of Zimbabwe far above other nations and as a God-fearing nation against the background of prolonged and intense suffering. When there seems to be nothing good coming out of Zimbabwe, Pentecostals emphasise that God loves Zimbabwe and that it is blessed. Yet, some critics would ask whether suffering is a sign of blessing. Also, developed countries in the West that have legalised perceived sins (such as abortion and homosexuality) that “open gates for God’s curses” continue to prosper, when God’s wrath was supposed to have visited them a long time ago. In spite of all these critical questions, many believers and Zimbabweans at large continue to hope for a better future and pay little attention to how the New Dispensation will be ushered, save to confess that God is in control. This hope and optimism appear to have given many people uncontested resilience that professes that God’s unique ways are inconceivable. How and when Zimbabwe will be ushered into a New Dispensation beyond Mnangagwa’s New Dispensation is not clear. Yet, this prophetic vision lacks both an embracing of the pain of the people and creation of energy to resist the exploitation and suffering. The time remains a mystery and even the prophets themselves emphasise “God’s perfect time!” Why then do believers hold on to prophecies? My contention is that prophecy has played a central role in Pentecostal political theology because of the resilience of the indigenous spirituality. Traditionally, the Shona people (generalisable to many indigenous groups) are accustomed to divining the future by the traditional sacred leaders, especially during difficult times. While Pentecostalism claims “a complete break from the past” and negating the tradition of the forebears, consciously or unconsciously, Pentecostalism in Zimbabwe continues to tap from the traditional wellspring (Kalu, 2008), particularly in the area of prophecy (Biri, 2012). The quest for prophecy from the man/woman of God is deeply entrenched such that the words of prophecy (synonymous with traditional divination) remain central. Hence, the prophecies become attractive during the crisis moments. Apart from the prophecies, sermons have played a crucial role forming the basic theology that has guided believers in their perception and interpretation of the crisis and well-being of the nation. Sermons: Authenticating the Regime In 2016, an AFM pastor in Zimbabwe emphasised on the national radio that Zimbabweans were suffering because they were not praying seriously. Such

84  Kudzai Biri sermons are met with mixed feelings, as many think that such pastors are beneficiaries of the political system. More so, it is believed that state security agents invade the pastoral office and seek to pacify believers and urge people to remain resolute. However, most of the sermons acknowledge the brutality, corruption and all evils of the regime but at the same time point to the permitted will of God that has to be overthrown by God’s perfect will in the fullness of time. The fullness of time will witness a God-fearing leader who will usher Zimbabwe into a real New Dispensation of socio-economic and political glory. But do all Zimbabweans subscribe to this theological diagnosis, explanation and solution to the crisis? If one upholds the observation by Vengeyi (2011), that Zimbabwe has “created poverty,” one then questions the place of prayer and fasting as a remedy to the crisis and as effective tools to realise change. It is prudent to acknowledge the confusion and desperation that has suffused the Zimbabwean state. For example, Tavonga Wutabwashe of the Heartfelt International Ministries (HIM) criticised the government for corruption and brutality before the military action of November 2017 that removed Mugabe from the Presidency. Wutabwashe was not comfortable with the awarding of tenders to the Chinese and the first-class treatment they got in Zimbabwe, at the expense and to the detriment of Zimbabweans. His discontentment was a mark of his sermons during the Mugabe era. In 2018, with Mnangagwa in place, his sermons changed and were characterised by lambasting believers as lazy and waiting for the government to better their lives. As many wondered about his turn around, it was rumoured that he was given a farm by the ruling elite. If the rumour is true, it is one way that has seen religious leaders being pacified during the Mugabe era by being given land to build their churches. If it is a false allegation, it points to the intimidation and brutality that has faced some religious leaders who have been critics of the regime. It should be made clear that the prevailing socio-economic crisis has led to some ministries benefiting from desperate individuals. The crisis boils down to the individuals who are adversely affected. When a believer is directly affected by the crisis and the “men of God” tells him or her to sow, pray and fast in order to better their lives, they seek redemption from the effects of the national crisis that has rendered individuals poor. Some congregants are encouraged to “sow”/“seed”/give to God in order for God to bless them. Yet, the root cause of the individual’s suffering needs to be given attention, especially when it is known and acknowledged that bad governance and all forms of corruption have rocked the economy. Hence, the concept of seeding for transformation appears to be an abortion of justice, a betrayal of the masses who invest much economically and are exploited by the regime and at the same time sow their hard-earned little cash to the church leaders who do not critique the social injustices perpetrated by the ruling political elite. The “politics of the belly” runs through political and religious structures and it explains why most Pentecostal leaders are not critical of the regime. The situation shows the problems and dilemma that the masses in Zimbabwe have. They are being “milked” on both sides: by religious and political leaders. As a result, they remain vulnerable, powerless and hope for God to change their situation.

Pentecostalism, Politics and the Quest for a New Dispensation  85 Thus, it confirms the Marxist view of religion as “the sigh of the oppressed.” All this happens while leaders hardly feel the pinch of the crisis as they continue to live lavish lifestyles, driving expensive cars, building mansions and increasing their wealth, and are not accountable to the congregants who make the contributions. Guti says citizens must not expect the government to change their situation because politicians are evil and have failed (Biri, 2014). Stripping citizens of their right to demand from the government which is the employer who owns the means of production is highly problematic. Workers go for months without salaries and the government has misplaced priorities, for example, the $15 billion that was unaccounted for, hiring of private jets, buying expensive cars for rural chiefs, top political elite, and well-known shady deals by leaders who are spared from the wrath of the law. The Pentecostal leaders have not been forthcoming in taking an active role in denouncing evils perpetrated by the political elite. Yet in contrast, the Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops Conference (ZCBC) has been vocal against social injustices (see Chapter 1 by Gunda in this volume). Mugabe aligned with Pentecostals and some African Independent Churches (AICs) whose sermons and prophecies authenticated his rule. Mugabology, the deification of Mugabe (Machingura, 2012 and Chitando 2020), was challenged by the November 17, 2017 military action that removed him. As argued above, this was significant for a number of reasons. First, it exposes the deficiency of Pentecostal political theology of avoiding confrontation with a corrupt and unjust political elite. Second, it gives a glimpse of the need to re-interpret and deploy Romans 13 in relation to leadership, in particular balancing the divine will on leadership and also factoring in God’s mandate for justice and freedom against oppression. Third, freedom does not come on a silver platter and this confirms the claims of liberation theology that freedom has to be fought for the “workers to lose their chains.” Banking on God in everything seems to portray a weak political theology. Pentecostal leaders perpetuate the patronising culture created by political leaders as many are beneficiaries of the regime who choose to sacrifice their flock and encourage them to be resolute while they enjoy facets of modernity, even to an obscene extent as they collude with the politically powerful. Scriptures like Romans 13 foster obedience, docility, endurance and cultivate hope among Zimbabweans that one day things will be alright. Zimbabweans have been portrayed as peace loving and prayerful. Yet, the other side of the coin might be fear to confront the brutal regime in fear of repercussions and also, the pacifying theologies that are dominant. Kalu also has a very crucial point, using the Nigerian context, but very applicable to Zimbabwe during these moments of crisis: This history is failure to construct a redemptive and empowering theology, a Christian identity and practice which could have helped alleviate pauperism… The failure is indissolubly linked to the failure of the post-colonial state to redeem its promises of democracy and development while at the same time allowing a few to enjoy the facets of modernity to an obscene extent. (1998:6)

86  Kudzai Biri The “men/women of God” seem to have become “men/women of gold,” milking congregants of their hard-earned cash. Thus, most of the Pentecostal leaders have failed to stand in the gap to condemn political injustices but instead focus on intercessory prayer, fasting and prophecies in anticipation of a new Zimbabwe. The AFM in Zimbabwe is not an exception. The secret debates of pastors conniving ways to get as much money and resources from congregants that leaked in the social media and reported in the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (October 2018) and the on-going storms (leadership contests) in the church are an example of how Pentecostal leaders have failed to focus on key issues of basic life but on “politics of the belly” in order to enrich themselves. It is noble that, Pentecostal political theology emphasises the breakdown of ethnic identity, encourages commitment to Mother Africa (Zimbabwe) … in this new form of political engagement the movement taps resources of men, women and children. (Kalu, 1998:29) However, this is watered down by wrong deployment of scriptures and ultimately a deficient theology that is not redemptive and empowering to the suffering masses. That leaders should be Christians is not very helpful in Zimbabwe since most of these politicians belong to different Christian churches. This failure to deal with the crisis is observed by Gifford (2009:233) when he says “… Africans live with their problems because they can’t express harsh opinions especially if it might offend the leaders who blunder, brutalise, destroy …” This observation is valid because Mugabe could not give room for criticism by virtue of his age (seniority has much respect as an embodiment of wisdom). Yet, there are serious challenges and dilemmas that need to be addressed. When the old generation of leaders on the continent have lost touch with global trends and at the same time their position of authority and seniority are deemed unchallenged, it creates crises. Pentecostals, therefore, become part of a dysfunctional system and further the ethos of corruption and unaccountability. Through sermons that unconditionally authenticate brutal and corrupt rule in Zimbabwe, they offer little to foster public virtues and demand responsibility and accountability. However, “reconstruction at the level of spiritual life” becomes a tool of hope in the midst of state retrenchment, collapsed health systems and socio-economic and political problems. The opposition leader, Nelson Chamisa, who is from the AFM, seems to be the expected Messianic figure for many people. His figure seems to affirm the expected leader who is God fearing by virtue of him being a Pentecostal and prayerful young man. The prophecies that have suffused the Christian circles in general predict a God-fearing President who will usher Zimbabwe into a new dispensation. Chamisa, therefore, gives many Zimbabweans hope through his deployment of biblical verses in his political rhetoric that centre on condemning corruption, promoting justice and calling for accountability in state institutions. It has strengthened the hope of Zimbabweans. Prayer, fasting and sowing becomes meaningful and understood in this context of suffering,

Pentecostalism, Politics and the Quest for a New Dispensation  87 aborted justice and expectancy of a “messianic figure” that is to be ushered in God’s unpredictable time. Significance of Pentecostal Political Theology Other Pentecostal leaders have discouraged members from being involved in politics. Are they not partaking in perverting justice on the land by casting a blind eye on the evils? Yet, they give prophecies concerning politics. Many believers remain eager to hear prophetic pronouncements about the future of Zimbabwe. This is an example of contradictory postures that are dominant and manifest in Pentecostalism. Biri and Togarasei (2018 argue that the male prophets as compared to women in Zimbabwe seem to have put the prophetic office into disrepute. Pentecostal women leaders have emphasised the need to shun corruption, unity and transforming Zimbabwe. The ethos of accountability and responsibility advocated in women’s fora are needful as remedy for Zimbabwe’s crisis and this renders questionable the emphasis on prayer and fasting as a solution to place Zimbabwe on the roadmap to economic recovery and political stability. It is important to point to EFZ women’s inter-denominational gatherings. The focus on re-building Zimbabwe is central, calling on a high moral obligation for all leaders to focus on rebuilding and transforming Zimbabwe. Issues of responsibility and accountability come to the fore in these women’s meetings. However, gender politics seem to be at play because the women’s fora are just a wing of a male dominated EFZ in which most of the male founders have ties or are beneficiaries of the current political system. Consistent with the EFZ forums, Tudor Bismark of New Life Ministries has been consistently critical of the ruling ZANU PF in his sermons. However, while we have these few critical voices during the crisis, they seem to be overshadowed by popular newer Pentecostal leaders who claim healing powers and prophecy. As such, they also inevitably occupy a centre stage in how Pentecostalism mediates the economic and political crisis in Zimbabwe. The insistence on calling believers to be on the knees and to repent seems unjust. Chitando (2012) observes the same lurking misdirected deployment of scriptures, especially 2 Chronicles 7:14: “If my people who are called by my name …” The implication of the deployment of the verse is three-fold. First, Zimbabweans committed sins that the nation must repent in order for God to heal and restore the country. The concept of sin is a recurring and dominant theme that calls Zimbabweans to be dedicated to God, repent and shun evil. Second, the continued crisis appears to point to the fact that Christians are not praying enough such that God has not been in a position to be moved to intervene and deliver them. Third, it has become a form of escapism for both religious and political leaders. Sermons of Pentecostal preachers cite perceived sins such as homosexuality and abortion that have angered God who withdrew his merited favour upon the nation (although these have not been legalised in the constitution). Victims (masses) are blamed for the crisis and focus is removed from the leaders’ responsibilities.

88  Kudzai Biri There is no doubt that corrupt politicians take advantage of prevailing theologies. In one of her “Meet the People Rallies” in 2017, Grace Mugabe emphasised that it is a must for the Christians to pray for them as commanded in Roman 13. Her demand came at the height of corruption by the young male politicians that surrounded her, in which she was also part of. The religious leaders are fully aware of the causes of the crisis but the spiritualisation of poverty is testimony of unwillingness to tear into the political arena to confront the politicians. But largely, most Pentecostal leaders are beneficiaries of the political system and it explains volumes of why they resort to the theology of intercession and hope and avoid head-on confrontation. The political form of engagement by Pentecostal leaders has empowered believers to be powerless and hope for the better through a complete surrender to God. As pointed by Maxwell (2005), the believers’ faith acts as a “durawall.” He says, “Pentecostal religion offers hope to those suffering a sense of personal abjection created by the shattered hopes of independence” (2005:6) and offers security in a trying environment. Thus, there is a great irony in how Pentecostalism mediates faith. While to many their faith is protective and they remain hopeful in their suffering condition, the nation experiences an overarching history of absence of an empowering Pentecostal political ideology that encourages people to confront their economic realities and to shake off the chains of oppression, exploitation and brutality into the dustbins of history. The brutality of the ruling elite can be a convincing explanation of why Pentecostal leaders shy away from criticising politicians who are corrupt and unjust. It also exposes Pentecostalism’s failure to establish a normative political theology as compared to other institutional religious movements such as the Catholics. That failure can easily be manipulated by politicians. Sufficient evidence is how the critical ZCBC focuses on social justice and denounces the evils of the political elite. They have been side lined by the regime and Pentecostalism has filled that vacuum. Thus, “theology for the empire” has protected both Pentecostal and political leaders. The observation by Gifford (2009) might as well be applicable in Zimbabwe. He observes that the collapse of the economies from the 1950s created a theology that is political, the theologies for the empires. As noted earlier, Jean Francois Bayart (1993) insightfully describes the politics in Africa as dominated by politics of the belly. The applicability of the politics of the belly is not only confined to the elite but extends to top Pentecostal leaders who run the ministries and denominations as personal properties, through “biblical fundraising” (Gifford, 2009:190) and promotes tribalism with no accountability and lavish lifestyles as a hallmark (Biri, 2013), perpetuating images of “living saints” (Mbukanma, 2004). The creation of demi-gods who cannot be questioned translates to uncritical following by congregants who are continuously told to hold on to the faith and wait upon God to mediate for them. Contradiction emerges when Pentecostal leaders discourage members from actively participating in the face of social injustices and corruption but at the same time emphasising a New Dispensation which will be ushered by God. While it is noble to keep the faith, it appears that believers are trapped in a dilemma of being challenged to be passive in the face of injustices and at the same time continue

Pentecostalism, Politics and the Quest for a New Dispensation  89 to hope for a better Zimbabwe that will be realised through prayer, fasting and prophecy taking a centre stage. However, there are subtle protest voices within Pentecostalism that should not be ignored. Although these voices are submerged by powerful voices (a class struggle for recognition and obedience), they point to the need for rationality and not only faith in practicing religion, for instance, to question the ruling elite. The contradicting voices thus show a struggle based on class (the poor versus the elite) and also the undergirding ideologies of these two groups which culminate in the way biblical scriptures are interpreted and deployed. The weak political theology seems to be a form of fundamentalism in Pentecostalism. It has kept Zimbabwe in a static position because of failure to critique the political elite. At the same time, hope for positive socio-economic and political transformation, literal reading and deployment of Romans 13 and 2 Chronicles 7:14 without sensitivity and awareness to the contexts in which the biblical verses emerged is a cause of concern. Similarly, the neglect of biblical incidence and verses that call for the need for social justice is significant. The books of Amos and Isaiah and Kings, among others, are important books for “men/women of God” who have the responsibility to guard the powerless congregants against exploitation and oppression. This neglect can be read as exposing the agenda, hypocrisy of some Pentecostal leaders who discourage members from politics but they open their churches and give the pulpit for political leaders who campaign at religious gatherings. This only points to the patronisation of religious leaders and the levels of pacification that are deeply entrenched. The failure to critique the regime means all that is dignified among the people is rendered servile. They accept the status quo, siding with oppressors; the failure to speak out is an act of betrayal and is hypocritical. The public role it does not conspicuously play is to provide a serious challenge to the dysfunctional political situation, failure to challenge the patronage state (Gifford, 2009). As a result, the masses are left vulnerable by both religious leaders and politicians and it takes them to realise what Marx calls “the unity of the proletariat to shake off their chains…workers have nothing to lose but their chains …” While political leaders have enslaved the masses and rendered them in poverty, the religious leaders also enslave congregants through espousing a theology of hope that hinges on prayer, fasting, prophecy and sowing to realise a New Dispensation. Instead, Pentecostal leaders should deliver a theology that shows concern for the poor, fortifying and legitimising a culture of political resistance in order to bring about socioeconomic and political empowerment. Conclusion Pentecostalism has played an important role in empowering believers to remain resolute during the Zimbabwean crisis but lacks liberative and empowering theology to resist injustices. It exhibits elitism and there is no control of the people but the rule of “the man/woman of God.” The emphasis on prayers, fasting and prophecies for a better Zimbabwe remains popular. This appears to have given

90  Kudzai Biri corrupt and unjust politicians a prolonged lifeline. The crisis has also helped Pentecostal leaders to become visible in the public and political space through their sermons to justify the crisis as part of the divine order. There is need to go beyond prayer, fasting and prophecy in order to address the root cause of this prolonged crisis and establish lasting and concrete solutions for Zimbabwe. Note 1 Prophecies centred on Mugabe as a God given figure and that Mugabe would give up power on his own. Yet, the military coup brings to question such claims. Worse still, some within Pentecostals circles point to Mnangagwa’s challenges with the economy and political structures as punishment for overthrowing Mugabe.

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Pentecostalism, Politics and the Quest for a New Dispensation  91 Kalu, O. 1998. “The Third Response: Pentecostalism and the Reconstruction Theology, Christian Experience and Reconstruction from 1950–1985,” Studia Historiae Ecclesiasticae 24(2), 1–30. Kalu, O. 2008. Pentecostalism: An Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kaulemu, D. 2011. Ending Violence in Zimbabwe. Harare: AFCAST. Machingura, F. 2012. The Messianic Feeding of the Masses in Post-colonial Zimbabwe: An analysis of John 6 in the Context of Messianic Leadership in Zimbabwe. Bamberg: Bamberg University Press. Marshall-Fratani, R. & Corten, A. (eds.) 2001. Between Babel and Pentecost: Transnational Pentecostalism in Africa and Latin America. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press. Maxwell, D. 2005. “The Durawall of Faith: Pentecostal Spirituality in Neo-liberal Zimbabwe,” Journal of Religion in Africa 35(1), 4–32. Mbukanma, J. O. 2004. “The contradictory Posture of Neo-Pentecostalism: A Philosophical and Theological Critique,” in Akinwale, A. & Kenny, J. (eds.), Tradition and Compromises: Essays on the Challenge of Pentecostalism. Ibadan: The Michael J Dempsey Centre for Religious and Social Research, 61–69. Musoni, P. 2021. “Spiritualised Political Theology in a Polarised Political Environment: A Pentecostal Movement’s Response to Party Politics in Zimbabwe,” HTS Teologiese Studies/ Theological Studies 77(4), a6312. https://doi. org/10.4102/hts.v77i4.6312 Shoko, T. 2010. “Worse than Pigs and Dogs”: Attitudes Toward Homosexual Practice in Zimbabwe,” Journal of Homosexuality 57(5), 634–649. van Dijk, R. 2001. “Time and Trans-cultural Technologies of the Self in the Ghanaian Pentecostal Diaspora,” in Andre Corten & Ruth Marshall-Fratani (eds.), Between Babel and Pentecost: Transnational Pentecostalism in Africa and Latin America. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 216–234. Vengeyi, O. 2011. “Zimbabwean Poverty is Man-made! Demystifying Poverty by Appealing to the Book of Amos,” Scriptura 107, 233–237.

5 Who is Doomed, Prophets or Politicians? Religion and Politics in Zimbabwe’s New Dispensation Mediel Hove, Chido Mercillina Muswerakuenda and Washington Mazorodze Introduction This chapter presents the conflict that emerged between the ‘men of God’ and politicians in Zimbabwe during President Mnangagwa’s leadership, dubbed the New Dispensation or the Second Republic. As the conflict raged on, this became a contest between the ‘prophets of doom’ and the ‘politicians of doom.’ It should be appreciated that the Church’s involvement in politics is not a new phenomenon in Zimbabwe and that prior to 2016 the Christian community was not an inactive entity concerning the subject of politics in the country (Hove and Chenzi, 2017). Again, it is on record that since the medieval era, the Church has been an integral part of the corpus of political life (Mhandara et al., 2013). The relationship between the two dates back to the disintegration of the Roman Empire around AD 400 and the ascendancy of Christianity as the official religion of that Empire in 310 (Boucher and Kelly, 2009). The Church emerged at a time when life in the Empire was horrible and disappointing; hence, society was at the time unhappy and hopeless. The Church entered the fray of politics to give hope and happiness to the affected people. Christianity, thus, emerged to challenge secular rulers and thinkers who desired to maintain a gulf between politics and the Church. The fall of the Roman Empire can partly be explained by the moral corruption of the society. From the foregoing, it is apparent that religion is a universal phenomenon traversing the private life of individuals, as well as domestic and international politics. For example, it plays an important role in promoting the resolution of conflicts, transforming societal norms, values and institutions and is above all capable of influencing state politics (Haynes, 2006). To this end, religion has asserted itself as a revolutionary force that has the capacity to change many aspects of national and global politics, including shaping individual beliefs and political behaviour (Omelicheva and Ahmed, 2018). By and large, religions are of prime significance in the sphere of politics and public affairs (Frahm-Arp, 2018). Linked to the subject under discussion, Chitando evaluates the interface between religion and politics and how politicians harness religious ideologies and DOI: 10.4324/9781003332435-6

Religion and Politics in Zimbabwe’s New Dispensation  93 concepts to serve their own interests. He affirms that politicians can manipulate religious symbols, concepts and persons to consolidate their own power and consequently the focus can shift towards the role of religious leaders as they confront the ruling elite. Similarly, Chimuka notes that it is historical that religious ideas have had tremendous influence on the African experience prior to and even after independence (Chimuka, 2013). He asserted that politicians in almost every part of the world sometimes visit places of worship, especially during election campaigns, for the purpose of winning votes, and Zimbabwe is no exception. Politicians attend annual conventions of Churches and these include the Marange Apostolic Church, Zimbabwe Assemblies of God in Africa and the Apostolic Faith Mission, all in a drive to win support through displaying religious allegiance or respect (Chimuka, 2013). Religion was used by politicians to pacify their supporters and by religious leaders to inculcate nonviolence ideals. Furthermore, the authors used the period between 2000 and 2008, popularly known as the decade of violence, to expose how the ethical teachings of religious leaders were ignored by politicians who deployed violence in quest for victory at whatever cost. Zimbabwe experienced a paradigm shift in its Christian community-state relations due to growing socio-economic and political challenges that divided Zimbabweans into contesting groups since 2000. From 2017, two such contesting groups emerged. The first group composed of the pro-New Dispensation members (‘politicians against doom’) who viewed any prophecy that criticised the Mnangagwa-led government as doomed. The second camp was composed of those that viewed President Mnangagwa and his government as doomed (‘prophets of doom’). Its members prophesied failure of the New Dispensation politicians and asserted that the Mnangagwa leadership was bent on perpetuating the suffering of the poor amid a deteriorating socio-economic and political environment dogged by increasing corruption (Mahere, 2019). Despite its rise to power through military action, the Mnangagwa leadership initially gave hope to most Zimbabweans regarding the socio-economic and political environment through its popular mantras, ‘Zimbabwe is open for business’ (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2020). This was augmented by the claim that, ‘The voice of the people, is the voice of God,’ which appealed to members of the Christian community (some of whom had been criticised by Mugabe as the ‘prophets of doom’) (Hove and Chenzi, 2017). In this regard, some members of the Christian community argued that God anointed Mnangagwa to lead Zimbabwe, whilst those opposed referred to the leaders of the New Dispensation as ‘politicians of doom.’ Doom was prophesied on the Mnangagwa establishment almost in the same manner that the biblical prophet Amos acted when he attacked the Northern Kingdom of Israel, then led by Jeroboam II for its godlessness and immorality. Amos used the hard-hitting language of history: of the sword’s brutalities, captivity, desolate cities and political collapse against the Northern Kingdom of Israel and her neighbours. For this, Amos was castigated as a mad man from Tekoa and was ordered to go back and eat bread there (Amos 7:12). This was the case because the unbelieving, corrupt and unrepentant leaders of the Northern Kingdom of Israel had amassed wealth at the expense of the impoverished many

94  Mediel Hove, Chido Mercillina Muswerakuenda and Washington Mazorodze (Amos 2–4). Likewise, in the Zimbabwean case, the New Dispensation leadership came under attack by Apostle Talent Chiwenga, Ian Ndlovu, Blessing Chiza, Brother Jeremiah and international prophets such as Evangelist Benedict Medju for inability to stem the ever-growing tide of corruption, socio-economic and political challenges afflicting Zimbabweans. This chapter is organised into five sections. The introduction offers a cut version on what the chapter is all about. The second part presents a theoretical framework that guides and attests that what is presented in this chapter is grounded in tried and tested ideas. In the third section the authors assess whether or not there was a departure by the New Dispensation from the Mugabe regime. The fourth part examines the arguments advanced by the ‘prophets of doom’ who argued that the New Dispensation was a doomed system, while the fifth section evaluates arguments that were advanced by the ‘politicians against doom’ who defended the New Dispensation and castigated its critics as sell-outs and regime changers. The last part provides a conclusion. Theoretical Framework In sociology of religion, prophets such as Amos were peripheral, and they functioned as critics, challenging the decayed moral, political and socio-economic structures of their time. The theory uses religious authorities to call into question the complacent assumptions of the community and its leaders and demonstrates that they are acceptable before God (Vengeyi, 2010). Usually, these prophets acted as the watchdogs; hence, the relationship with kings was characterised by tension, suspicion, confrontation and conflict. Accordingly, in Zimbabwe prophets have challenged the political leadership in the colonial and post-colonial periods (Hove and Chenzi, 2017). Influenced by the socio-economic and political challenges experienced under both the Mugabe and Mnangagwa regimes, some members of the Christian community chose to break the silence by openly challenging the government on several issues, which include, but not limited to, lack of service delivery, economic mismanagement, violence, corruption and political misrepresentation. This shows that religious leaders may use their institutional position to challenge unpopular governments as a way of retaining their authority or credibility among parishioners (Gill, 2001:117–138). In this chapter, the authors examine Christian leaders who include Prophet Chiza, Prophet Ian Ndlovu, Apostle Chiwenga, Pastor Abraham and Jeremiah, focusing on how they castigated the New Dispensation on the subject of corruption, human rights violations, socio-economic and political challenges that were experienced in the country. As a consequence, they were castigated and dismissed as ‘prophets of doom.’ Like Amos in the Northern Kingdom of Israel who criticised Jeroboam II, these Christian leaders or ‘prophets of doom’ took it upon themselves to rebuke President Mnangagwa and his New Dispensation. On the contrary, some Christians and politicians (‘politicians against doom’) stood by and backed President Mnangagwa and his government, insisting that he was anointed by God.

Religion and Politics in Zimbabwe’s New Dispensation  95 Was There a Departure from the Mugabe Legacy? When the same violent practices that were experienced under the Mugabe regime reared their ugly head under the Mnangagwa leadership, the ‘men of God’ attacked the New Dispensation as a doomed system. The prophets asserted that this was apparent through the abuse of human rights, failure to address corruption, and neglecting the declining socio-economic and political conditions. In this light, can be argued that there was no departure from the brutal and neglectful system that was headed by the departed former President Robert Mugabe. For the critics, it is difficult to escape from this observation because Mugabeism as an ideology does not appreciate democracy, respect for the rule of law or human rights. Undeniably, the New Dispensation was simply old wine in new wine skins, with nothing new to offer the people ideologically, socially, politically and economically. Consequently, the New Dispensation was dubbed the ‘new deception’ (The Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, 2019). During the struggle against colonialism in Zimbabwe, religious leaders who included Ndabaningi Sithole and Abel Muzorewa among others played significant roles (Uys, 2000; Doudu, 2010). Also, during the Mugabe regime and after, some prophets prophesied doom on political leaders, bemoaning the dire and ever declining socio-economic and political situation in the country (Hove and Chenzi, 2017). In this regard, it is imperative to reflect on how the prophets spelt doom on the Mugabe leadership as a precursor of understanding the relationship between Christians and politicians during President Mnangagwa’s tenure. In the year 2000, the Church-State relations took a twist when the Church became active in rejecting the government’s efforts to introduce a new constitution. More so, this was worsened by the deteriorating socio-economic conditions in the country which also affected the Church. For example, there existed two rival religious organisations: the Zimbabwe Council of Churches (ZCC) and the Zimbabwe Christian Alliance (ZCA). The ZCC was co-opted and enjoyed good relationship with the Mugabe government and often supported it on various issues. In 2006, the then President of ZCC, Peter Nemapare, told the news reporter after his visit to State House that, We know we have a government that we must support, interact with and draw attention to our concerns. Those of us who have different ideas about this country surely must know we have a government which listens. (Dongozi, 2006) In response, the ZCA condemned Operation Murambatsvina (Clean the filth), plus the comments and position of the ZCC arguing that, We totally disagree with the tone and substance of the sentiments voiced by the church leaders who went to the state house. In what way do they support this

96  Mediel Hove, Chido Mercillina Muswerakuenda and Washington Mazorodze government which has shed innocent blood, brutally tortured its citizens and destroyed their homes and livelihoods, and promoted racial hatred? (IRIN 14 June, 2006) The above two statements issued by two rival religious organisations ZCC and ZCA show the extent to which politics polarised religion in the country. Operation Murambatsvina became the subject of attention because it destroyed homes and the so-called illegal structures in all major cities in the country. Following the introduction of the fast-track land reform programme in 2000, Mugabe’s human rights violations in the early 2000, the 2002 Presidential elections, 2005 Parliamentary elections and Operation Murambasvina in 2005, Archbishop Pius Ncube of the Catholic Church became a fierce critic of Mugabe (Amnesty International, 2000; Penketh, 2005). In response, the Mugabe regime threatened him with death and unspecified action several times. In one of his criticisms of Mugabe, Ncube said, There is so much suffering in the country, if he was sensible he would be resigning. He has become really evil. Unemployment is at 80 percent, inflation soaring above 2 000 percent, food, fuel and foreign currency shortages, Zimbabwe is a country in crisis. (Al Jazeera, 2007) Ncube was strongly opposed to Mugabe to the extent that at one moment he prayed and asked the Lord to take Mugabe away. He further mobilised Catholic Bishops to issue a pastoral letter calling Christians to pray for Mugabe’s death (McGreal, 2007). Mugabe warned the Archbishop to refrain from making reckless political statements. In support of Mugabe, the state-owned press alleged and popularised the belief, among the Zimbabweans and beyond, that the Archbishop was a womaniser. On the contrary, some critics and supporters of the Archbishop sympathised with him and alleged that the sex video tape on Archbishop Ncube was a sting operation by the state agents to silence him from his continued attacks on Mugabe’s leadership and his party (Hove and Chenzi, 2017:178). Mugabe was also criticised by various church leaders. They confronted Mugabe’s regime for its failure to address various socio-economic and political problems (Chitiyo et al., 2016:16). In 2016, the leader of the Zimbabwe Divine Destiny, Anselm Magaya called for a press conference where he encouraged the Zimbabwean Christian community to stand up against Mugabe’s government (New Zimbabwe, 2016). Magaya further staged a demonstration in Harare Central District on 25 August 2016 against police brutality, Mugabe’s misrule and the worsening economic situation (Chiripasi, 2016). In response, Magaya and his supporters were arrested and released without any charges. Magaya denounced other Christian leaders who were part of Robert Mugabe’s patronage network (Zhou, 2016). Also, Evan Mawarire organised and held demonstrations against Mugabe’s failure to address corruption, economic challenges, introduction of bond notes,

Religion and Politics in Zimbabwe’s New Dispensation  97 unemployment and lack of personal freedoms (Conor, 2016). At one time, Emmanuel Makandiwa, who has had a generally cordial relationship with the Mugabe and Mnangagwa regimes, told his congregants that Mugabe was being misled by his own close advisers to implement unpopular policies such as those on import ban and the introduction of bond notes (Hove and Chenzi, 2017). Was the New Dispensation Led by ‘Politicians against Doom?’ The New Dispensation has been bridled with controversies from its inception because it failed to deliver what people had hoped for and looked forward to. In fact, its leadership between 2017 and beyond was characterised by human rights abuses, denial of basic human rights and high cost of living (Amnesty International, 2019). The ascendency of President Mnangagwa to power escalated the Zimbabwean crisis and culminated in the increased militarisation of the Zimbabwean state as if the constitution had been suspended (Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, 2019). The 31 July 2018 elections, especially the presidential vote, were deeply contested. Fearing a delay in the release of results, as had been the case after the 29 March 2008 harmonised elections, opposition supporters staged peaceful protests that degenerated into violence and looting on August 1, 2018 (Human Rights Watch, 2018). The aim was to ensure that the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission would not rig elections in favour of the ruling ZANU PF party candidate (Human Rights Watch, 2018). Consequently, after it had emerged that the Zimbabwe Republic Police was overwhelmed in its efforts to maintain law and order, the military was deployed to ‘contain’ the demonstrations. The intervention by the military led to the death of six innocent people (Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, 2019). Again, the army deployed in the country’s high-density suburbs, between 14 and 17 January 2019, to quell a stay-away which turned into violence, looting, burning of vehicles and destruction of property (Sguazzin et al., 2019). During the operation, the security forces terrorised civilians and persecuted the opposition and civic society activists who had to flee for safety (Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, 2019). In the process of dealing with the violent property ransacking, shop looting and road blocking people, 12 lives were lost and about 78 people were injured (Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, 2019). Moreover, it was alleged that the soldiers abducted, tortured and raped civilians in a number of suburbs in the country (Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, 2019). Regardless of the video evidence and pictures of police and army harassing and beating up citizens, both the army and police denied the involvement of their members in the acts of brutality (Ncube and Mushava, 2019). For all these violent episodes, the ZANU PF leaders were viewed as ‘politicians of doom’ who preached hope and peace yet they bred violence and increased instability. Such criticisms were conveyed by religious leaders from diverse backgrounds, including those who publicly rebuked the New Dispensation leadership as ‘politicians of doom.’ On the economic front, the standards of living degenerated, instead of the anticipated improvement under the New Dispensation. The banning of products from other countries, mainly from South Africa, under Statutory Instrument 64

98  Mediel Hove, Chido Mercillina Muswerakuenda and Washington Mazorodze of 2016 in Zimbabwe aggravated the economic woes (Chirisa, 2019). However, unlike the 2008 situation where basic commodities were scarce, under the New Dispensation supermarkets (shops) were full but the consumers were incapacitated to purchase the basic commodities (Chirisa, 2019). In 2019, the regime banned the multi-currency system, but was forced to go back to it in 2020, using the pretext of the unfolding COVID-19 pandemic. More so, on 9 October 2019, Abraham, a prophet of the Church of All Nations, pronounced a prophetic word of doom against President Mnangagwa and the MDC-A president, Nelson Chamisa, concerning their leadership. He claimed that the Lord had heard the suffering of Zimbabweans and was ready to rescue them from what he said was President Mnangagwa’s wicked leadership because he failed to respect the Lord and betrayed his people by being hard-hearted. As a consequence, the President’s throne was weighed and found wanting for allowing foreigners to loot resources, leading the country into a fuel crisis, injecting money into illegal foreign trade, rigging elections and ruthlessness (Church of all Nations, 2019). Abraham and Talent Muzuva (better known as Apostle Talent Chiwenga) on different occasions further accused the President for surrounding himself with ‘false’ churches and ‘false’ bishops in an effort to legitimise his presidency and lying during the run up to the 2018 elections when he said, ‘the voice of the people is the voice of God,’ but in practice chose to ignore the desires of the people ( Jesus Revelation Ministries, 2018 Church of all Nations, 2019). On the contrary, Chamisa came up with the mantra ‘God is in it’ which meant that he (Chamisa) was God’s favourite and he would deliver a prosperous Zimbabwe. The two prophets warned both President Mnangagwa and Nelson Chamisa, leader of the Movement for Democratic Change-Alliance (MDC-Alliance), to refrain from including God’s name in their political activities because such a practice was blasphemous and wrong before God. Evangelist Benedict Medju of Favor Home Ministries International concluded that Mnangagwa’s rulership of the country would be replaced by the MDCAlliance leader Nelson Chamisa and that this would mark the end of the system of Mugabeism (Church of all Nations, 2019; Favor Home Ministries International, 2019). Medju likened this to the biblical story when Saul was replaced by David as the King of Israel (1 Samuel 16). Accordingly, God would not rescue both the ‘false churches’ and Mnangagwa’s new government. Related to this, Talent Chiwenga told his congregants that the New Dispensation was full of ‘politicians of doom’ who were incapable of reaping anything good. He warned Zimbabweans of unprecedented hardships and worsening socio-economic situation in the country where the ‘politicians of doom’ had no clue on how to address the challenges affecting people. Furthermore, he argued that the use of the name of the Lord by President Mnangagwa was a strategy of legitimising his leadership that was characterised by threats, oppression and looting hundreds of millions of dollars to offshore accounts for personal gain at the expense of the poor, as witnessed in many African dictatorships. More so, he blamed the President for specialising in punishment (retribution), especially where he threatened to crack a whip against businesses that overcharged basic commodities saying, ‘tiri kuvarongera yavo

Religion and Politics in Zimbabwe’s New Dispensation  99 shamhu … . ikaiswa pamushana yomboiswa mumvura ine munyu,’ meaning ‘we are preparing a whip specifically for them … we are putting it in the sun and placing it in salted water’ (Nehanda TV, 2019; Ndoro, 2019). Talent Chiwenga concluded that threats were the President’s strategy to cover up his misgovernance that he depended on, instilling fear by silencing the voices of the disgruntled populace, lying and stealing from the people. Furthermore, he noted that Zimbabweans went through three distinct stages of oppression: first under colonial rule, then for 37 years under Mugabe and lastly under the New Dispensation led by President Mnangagwa ( JustiMagine Pictures zw, 2018). This showed that Zimbabwe was still under a system of Mugabeism; thus, the New Dispensation was the old wine in new wine skins (Nkala, 2018). Moreover, Apostle Chiwenga lamented the spilling of blood by the New Dispensation on 1 August 2018 and 14–17 January 2019. This was a sign that President Mnangagwa’s government was made up of ‘politicians of doom’ who angered God by spilling blood at the slightest opportunity. He concluded that as a punishment the country was cursed and its hardships would only end after the repentance of the ‘politicians of doom’ who contributed to the death of people on August 1 2018 and during a supposed stay away between 14 and 17 January 2019. Again, one Jeremiah, an intercessor in Zimbabwe, also prophesied against the leaders of the New Dispensation in the country. Prophets Jeremiah, Chiza and Medju said that the 2018 elections were not free, fair and not credible and warned that God’s wrath would descend upon the leaders (Favor Home Ministries International, 2019). Similarly, international prophets such as Medju prophesied that Zimbabwe would go through four stages of trials before hope and restoration could be realised. Medju pronounced doom on the Mnangagwa leadership because it failed to deliver on the promises that it had made to the people (Favor Home Ministries International, 2019). For peace to prevail in Zimbabwe, dialogue between President Mnangagwa and the MDC-Alliance was required. Also, he warned that lack of communication could lead to a civil war and continued economic decline because of the stubbornness of the new government (Favor Home Ministries International, 2019). Similarly, on 15 December 2019, Ian Ndlovu gave the same prophecy that leadership should be changed and failure to implement these changes could lead to bloodshed. The prophet accused President Mnangagwa of being prideful, selfish, overseeing the socio-economic and political hardships in Zimbabwe and urged Zimbabweans not to pray for him because his leadership had been rejected by God (Divine Kingdom Ministries, 2019). The prophets also brought the word of hope. God was ready to restore Zimbabwe, just as God restored Israel (Amos 9 vs 11ff ) after a series of punishments. Related to this, prophets Chiwenga and Chiza called on President Mnangagwa, Vice Presidents Chiwenga and Mohadi (prior to his resignation in early March 2021) to repent in order for God to elevate the nation (Pindula news, 2019). However, failure by the leadership to repent could culminate in their removal from power and the appointment of new leadership, hence a twofold restoration of the leaders and of the nation (Favor Home Ministries International, 2019).

100  Mediel Hove, Chido Mercillina Muswerakuenda and Washington Mazorodze Are the Critics of the New Dispensation ‘Prophets of Doom?’ As opposed to the above group which prophesied doom, some politicians, prophets and churches strongly supported the New Dispensation and predicted doom on the politicians, churches and prophets who criticised the new leadership. Together with the new government, some church leaders took it upon themselves to discredit any prophet who did not support the New Dispensation as doomed. The government of President Mnangagwa resorted to threats, name-calling and allying itself with some churches to obtain credibility. Related to this, the Vice President Constantino Chiwenga warned ‘fake’ prophets who hid behind the name of God in a drive to attack the national leadership and extort money from the public (Mugabe, 2018). One such prophet targeted was Talent Chiwenga, who came into prominence after a series of pre-election predictions. He claimed that the elections would be rigged and that a number of senior officials linked to the November 2017 coup would die in quick succession (Nehanda TV, 2018). The country’s leadership responded by accusing him of interfering and dabbling in politics instead of concentrating on preaching the word of God (Mugabe, 2018). Talent Chiwenga has, however, remained defiant and reminded the country’s leadership that it was the role of the Church to speak out against the government without fear or favour whenever the government is seen to be acting against the best interests of the people. Vice President Chiwenga warned his cousin asserting that, There are others who are calling themselves prophets. Aripo uyo anonzi ani?, Talent (There is that one, what is his name? Talent). That should come to an end today. Zvatopera pano (It has stopped now/here). We don’t have a culture where one goes around attacking leaders under the guise of preaching the word of God. God does not say go around attacking other people … (Mugabe, 2018) In June 2019, Talent Chiwenga was involved in a car accident which killed his wife and one other passenger along the Harare-Masvingo Highway. Before his accident he had alleged that he was receiving death threats from high ranking government officials and that his life was in danger, as there were people suspected to be state agents who were following him ( Jesus Revelation Ministries, October 2018). However, this could just have been an ordinary accident which had nothing to do with his critical stance on government officials given the bad state of the Harare-Masvingo Highway at the time of the accident. Added to this, Nehemiah Mutendi, leader of the Zimbabwe Christian Church (ZCC), said that the transition in Zimbabwe was peaceful. He heaped praise on President Mnangagwa alleging that, He (President Mnangagwa) escaped death several times. We will be with you and advising our followers on the decision to make. Our people have suffered enough and they do not need to suffer again. We are not politicians, but we guide. (Share, 2018)

Religion and Politics in Zimbabwe’s New Dispensation  101 Mutendi openly declared Mnangagwa as the rightful leader of the country who was divinely appointed by God (Garikai, 2019). He said this in response to all the other prophets who said Mnangagwa was not divinely appointed. Furthermore, on 3 December 2019, a group of churches in Zimbabwe endorsed Mnangagwa as the President of Zimbabwe, with the Family of God Church founder, Bishop Andrew Wutawunashe, declaring him the ZANU PF number one president. Again, Mutendi, the patron of the Zimbabwe Indigenous Interdenominational Council of Churches (ZIICC) affirmed that the indigenous churches were the pioneers of the country’s revolution (Mugabe, 2019). As a result, support from these indigenous churches was used to justify that Mnangagwa was divinely anointed. In January 2020 at a National Day of Prayer held by indigenous churches at the National Sports Stadium, Bishop Shadreck Mukusha of Deeper Life Ministries supported Mnangagwa and urged other political leaders to recognise Mnangagwa’s leadership (Munhende, 2020). He said, Sometimes even if you lose after being rigged you have to accept the result, you have to accept because God would have given his stamp of approval. You have to accept so that the nation goes forward. (Munhende, 2020) Moreover, he urged the nation to rally behind the President even if his leadership was doomed. This was in reference to opposition MDC-A which disputed the results of the Presidential elections as rigged in favour of Mnangagwa. When the ZIICC met Mnangagwa at the State House in December 2019, Wutawunashe supported Mnangagwa and called on the opposition MDCAlliance leader Nelson Chamisa to recognise and respect Mnangagwa as the country’s elected leader. He said that Mnangagwa won the elections and this was confirmed by the courts. He further argued that, We call upon the opposition parties, particularly MDC, not on political partisan basis, but on concern as citizens of Zimbabwe and on concern as church leaders who represent millions of people, to recognise the President of Zimbabwe openly, and to accept the findings of the Constitutional Court as a respect for our constitution and institutions and on top of that, if dialogue is wanted, let it proceed from a place that respects institutions. (Mugabe, 2019) The above statement was in reference to the contested 2018 Presidential election results which were validated by the Constitutional Court after the opposition MDC-Alliance filed a court application challenging the results, citing rigging in favour of the incumbent President Mnangagwa. The Zimbabwe Council of Churches (ZCC) had earlier on called for the suspension of the country’s constitution and the formation of a government of national unity for seven years (Chitagu et al., 2019) (see Chapter 11 by Noah

102  Mediel Hove, Chido Mercillina Muswerakuenda and Washington Mazorodze Pashapa in this volume). In response, Mutendi criticised the ZCC for calling for the suspension of politics for seven years and the formation of a government of national unity, arguing that, A country without law is a jungle. If we say courts and the country’s institutions are useless or say let us suspend everything for seven years, you wonder if these people are indigenous people. We are here to pray for our country and for the good health of all Zimbabweans. (Mugabe, 2019) For this, Mutendi was attacked by Garikai who bemoaned, In Mnangagwa and Mutendi Zimbabwe has both a fooling president and a false prophet and, for good measure, there are plenty more just like them. It is little wonder the country has blundered from pillar to post these last 39 years and sunk deeper and deeper into this man-made hell-on-earth! (Garikai, 2019) Various commentators have criticised the two religious leaders’ statements that implied support for the government as having been captured by the ruling party. Their call for the opposition to recognise the results of the presidential elections was criticised by the MDC-Alliance supporters who reminded the religious leaders to desist from being mouth pieces of the ruling party ZANU PF (Mhlanga and Muponde, 2019). Also, an elder in the Johane Marange Apostolic Church, consistent in its support for the ruling party, claimed credit for Mnangagwa’s 2018 election victory when he said, ‘We do not oppose the ruling party, we follow instructions from our leader. He told us to go and vote for President Mnangagwa. We did so and he (Mnangagwa) won …’ (Staff reporter, 2019). The President responded to the message from the apostolic sect church leader when he visited the church and promised to continue working together with the church and said that, There is a relationship already between ZANU PF and your church. I was here in July last year and the crowd was not as big as it is today and you promised me that you will follow what your leader tells you to vote for me… and you voted for me. You cannot turn your back on people who have voted you into power. You will be a fool. (Staff Reporter, 2019) This shows the strong relationship between some religious leaders and political leadership in Zimbabwe and their influence in determining who controls political power in the country. In this scenario, religious leaders who are supportive of the government indoctrinate their people and influence them to vote for the ruling party candidates who might not have been their choices. The followers

Religion and Politics in Zimbabwe’s New Dispensation  103 were sometimes threatened by their so-called spiritual leaders with death or other unforeseen misfortunes if they voted for the opposition ‘politicians of doom’ who were supported by the ‘prophets of doom.’ Conclusion It is apparent from the chapter that the socio-economic and political situation in Zimbabwe did not improve under the New Dispensation as Zimbabweans had hoped for and looked forward to. Given this disservice, some Pentecostal prophets criticised the New Dispensation’s leadership as ‘politicians of doom’ for their inability to fulfil their promises and improve the socio-economic and political situation in the country. In response, some Christian organisations and prophets behind the New Dispensation condemned the anti-New Dispensation politicians and prophets who denounced it as doomed. Evidently, the New Dispensation did not depart from the Mugabe regime’s leadership style, hence the conclusion that it was old wine in new wine skins. As a consequence, the state became more militarised under the New Dispensation than it was under the Mugabe regime. Human rights abuses, corruption and mismanagement continued as cash shortages plagued the country since the inception of the new government, generating conflict between the politicians and the ‘men of God.’ Overall, the new government rebuked all prophets who criticised it for its failure as ‘prophets of doom’ and it aligned itself to prophets and politicians who praised it or supported the New Dispensation. Also, there was evidence that the New Dispensation failed to improve the socio-economic and political situation, thus accorded its critics a platform to castigate it as a doomed government led by ‘politicians of doom.’ Likewise, the ‘men of God’ proclaimed sometimes personalised and emotional prophecies, most of which did not come true, thus relegating themselves to the podium of the ‘prophets of doom.’ Up to the time of writing, the conflict between the two contending groups raged on. ‘Doom’ marked the clash between religion and politics, portending the continuation of the socio-economic and political crisis in Zimbabwe. References Al Jazeera. 2007. “Archbishop: ‘Evil’ Mugabe Must Go. Archbishop of Bulawayo speaks to Al Jazeera about the future of Zimbabwe,” May 8. www.aljaze​era.com/news/afr​ ica/2007/05/2008​5251​7312​2877​497.html/ [Accessed 24 March 2020]. Amnesty International. 2000. Amnesty International Is Concerned for the Safety of Archbishop Pius. www.amne​sty.org/downl​oad/Docume​nts/132​000/afr​4602​1200​0en.pdf/ [Accessed 24 March 2020]. Amnesty International. 2019. “Mnangagwa’s First Year in Office Marked by a ‘Systematic and Brutal Crackdown on Human Rights,’ ” August 26. www.amne​sty.org/en/lat​ est/news/2019/08/zimba​bwe-mna​n gag ​was-first-year-in-off​i ce-mar​ked-by-a-sys​tema​ tic-and-bru​t al-crackd​own-on-human-rig​hts/ [Accessed 24 March 2020]. Bertelsmann Stiftung. 2020. BTI 2020 Country Report–Zimbabwe. Gutersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung.

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106  Mediel Hove, Chido Mercillina Muswerakuenda and Washington Mazorodze Omelicheva, M. Y. and Ahmed, R. 2018. “Religion and Politics: Examining the Impact of Faith on Political Participation,” Journal of Religion, State and Society 46(1), 4–25. Penketh, A. 2005. “Mugabe Condemns Archbishop who Called for Mass Uprising as ‘Halfwit,’ ” Available from www.inde​pend​ent.co.uk/news/world/afr ​ica/mug​abe-conde​ mns-arc​hbis​hop-who-cal​led-for-mass-upris​i ng-as-half​w it-530​322.html/ [Accessed 20 January 2010]. Pindula news. 2019. “Bulawayo Cleric Blessing Chiza Urges Mnangagwa and His Deputies to Repent.” https://news.pind​u la.co.zw/2019/01/02/bulaw​ayo-cle​r ic-bless​ ing-chiza-urges-mnanga​g wa-and-his-deput​ies-to-rep​ent/ [Accessed 23 March 2020]. Sguazzin, A. et al. 2019. “Before, They Were Beaten. Now Zimbabwe Protesters Are Shot,” January 23. www.bloomb​erg.com/news/artic​les/2019-01-19/bef​ore-they-werebea​ten-now Zimbabwe-protesters-are-being-shot/ [Accessed 30 January 2020]. Share, F. 2018. “Churches Endorse ED,” The Herald, March 6. www.her​a ld.co.zw/churc​ hes-endo​r se-pres-mnanga​g wa/ [Accessed 30 January 2020]. Staff Reporter. 2019. “Sect Elders Claim Credit for ED Poll Victory, Urge President to Stay Close,” July 19. www.newz​i mba​bwe.com/sect-eld​ers-claim-cre​d it-for-ed-pollvict​ory-urge-presid​ent-to-stay-close/ [Accessed 30 January 2020]. Uys, S. 2000. “The Rev Ndabaningi Sithole,” The Guardian. www.theg ​uard ​ian.com/ news/2000/dec/15/guar​d ian​obit​uari​es1/ [Accessed 20 March 2020]. Vengeyi, O. 2010. “Israelite Prophetic Marks among Zimbabwean Men of God: An Evaluation of the Conduct of Selected Zimbabwean Church Leaders in Recent Politics,” Exchange 39(2), 159–178. Zhou, T. 2016. “Mugabe Should Step-Down Now–Magaya.” http://bul​away​o24.com/ index-id-news-sc-natio​nal-byo-91178.html/ [Accessed 23 March 2020]. Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum. 2019. The New Deception: What has changed? A Baseline Study on the Record of the Zimbabwe’s New Dispensation in Upholding Human Rights. Harare: Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum.

6 A Change for No Change The Ambivalence of Religion in the Second Republic in Zimbabwe Bekithemba Dube

Introduction This chapter is informed by the decoloniality theory and problematises the Zimbabwean political landscape in the Second Republic. It argues that while there was transfer of power from Robert G. Mugabe to Emmerson D. Mnangagwa, the religious ideology behind politics has remained the same, with religious leaders acting covertly as regime enablers with praise texts and discourses that have deprived the Zimbabwe religious constituency of democracy. The chapter draws examples from the First Republic, where the religious mandate had been compromised, hijacked and lost in the nexus of politics and religion. To develop the argument, I discuss Bishop Johannes Ndanga vs Bishop Nehemiah Mutendi, and Pastor Obadiah and Msindo vs Prophet Andrew Wutawunashe. In so doing, I expose how religious leaders have become an impediment to democracy in the Second Republic. The chapter ends by challenging the use of praise texts and calls for the reconstruction of the religious terrain within the political space towards embracing a religious mandate such as championing social justice, democracy and social coherence, as opposed to being in relay to push regime enabling agenda. The Context The Zimbabwean political and religious landscape presents very interesting and yet disturbing trends, which should be exposed and challenged in every possible space, including the academia. The Second Republic is not an exception, and perhaps recycles the religious ideology that had underpinned the political matrix in Zimbabwe in the First Republic. This calls for the question of religion to be revisited within the political arena, especially in the contexts where religion is used as a political tool to further an agenda that creates a submissive populace. This trend has continued in the Second Republic. This chapter seeks to address the concern, especially within the decolonial space. The Second Republic emerged in November 2017, with the end of Mugabe’s 37-year rule. It was hoped that the new regime would bring sanity to the political space, which was believed to have been poisoned by Mugabe. The military-assisted transition was assumed to reconfigure Zimbabwe’s autocratic system, breaking from Mugabe’s corrupt and DOI: 10.4324/9781003332435-7

108  Bekithemba Dube patronage-based rule (Noyes, 2020). However, this view ignores that Mugabe was a system, which also included the harbingers of the Second Republic. Effectively, this means the Second Republic was a change which was no change! Mugabe was believed to have failed the political ideology of the Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF). In fact, in 1980, Mugabe was seen as a leader who had inherited the ‘jewel of Africa’ and became a role model of many African states in opposing the Western/Global North hegemonic regimes (Loudon, 2019). As an act to dispose him, there was ‘Operation Restore Legacy’ through which Mugabe was forced out of office and immediately facilitated a transfer of power to his former Vice President, Emmerson Mnangagwa (Beardsworth, Cheeseman & Tinhu, 2019). While Mugabe had his own problems, which led to his subsequent removal, the problem of Zimbabwe was not only Mugabe, but also ZANU PF as a system. Another challenge, often ignored, is that of some of the religious leaders who serve(d) as regime enablers. They have contributed to the national crisis in Zimbabwe. Thus, this chapter seeks to discuss these regime enablers in detail. I argue that some religious leaders have played a relay race in the political space of Zimbabwe. They have simply exchanged roles within the political space to champion the same ideology of being regime enablers, marked by praise songs and discourses. This does not contribute towards creating democratic space in the Second Republic. I delimit the chapter to a few religious leaders during the Mugabe era and the Second Republic. These are Bishop Johannes Ndanga, Bishop Nehemiah Mutendi, Reverend Obadiah Msindo and Prophet Andrew Wutawunashe. I problematise these, based on the observation by Washington, Van Buren & Patterson (2014:181) that religious leaders in the context of politics threaten Africa’s security, politics and development. Informed by this, the chapter seeks to expose, challenge and tease a need for a timeless democratic ideology such as respect for human rights and the need for accountability and integrity which should frame religious involvement in the political space. I maintain that these should remain valid, regardless of the identity of the politicians in power. In the following section, I discuss the theory of decoloniality, which frames the chapter and its central arguments. Theoretical Framing: Decoloniality Decoloniality is a theory I use as a lens for discussion. In terms of its origins, scholars such as Wanderley & Barros (2018) argue that the decoloniality theory has roots in Latin America, with leading scholars like Walter Mignolo, MaldonadoTorres, Quijon and Dussel. According to one of the leading scholars on this theory, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013:11), decoloniality is “born out of a realisation that ours is an asymmetrical world order that is sustained not only by colonial matrices of power but also by pedagogies and epistemologies of equilibrium that continue to produce alienated Africans.” Decoloniality is legitimate in the sense that it authorises the lived experience of those who are at the receiving end of subjection and commands such subjects to declare their locus of enunciation (Sithole, 2014).

The Ambivalence of Religion in the Second Republic in Zimbabwe  109 Furthermore, as observed by Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013:11), decoloniality is a “melee against invisible vampirism of imperialist technologies and colonial matrices of power (coloniality) that continue to exist in the minds, lives, languages, dreams, imaginations, and epistemologies of modern subjects in Africa and the entire global South.” In fact, as suggested by Torres (2007), decoloniality theory aspires to break with monologic modernity through an invitation to engage in dialogue. In short, decoloniality is an ideal theory to earth this chapter in the sense that it searches for better ways of theorising and explaining the meaning of religious liberation and freedom, as well as taking the struggles forward in contemporary surmising (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2015:23). It should be noted that I do not use decoloniality like many other scholars who also speak of Global South vs Global North, but I use it within the Global South context only, where I argue that the problem of Africans is no longer between the Global North and South but also among the people in the Global South themselves. Within the African continent, there is an increase in the number of people who use various systems to deny their own people full liberation. In this case I discuss religious leaders and politicians who have covertly or overtly denied the people of Zimbabwe democracy. Thus, in this context, decoloniality comes to expose oppression among Zimbabweans themselves, challenge and forge a better future for the people of Zimbabwe. To this end, embracing decoloniality is not being fundamentalist— but engaging in shifting the geography of reason with a clear locus of enunciation (Sithole, 2014). Situating the Problem of Religion in the Second Republic: From Bishop Ndanga to Bishop Mutendi—Changing of Regime Enabling Roles In this section, I discuss two prominent religious leaders, who have played a vital role as regime enablers. I also intend to show how the Ndanga and Mutendi roles indicate a relay championing the same agenda of being regime enablers, an indication of a religious mandate being captured, hijacked and also lost. Regime enablers might actually start off with noble intentions. According to Magaisa (2019), “they start from the periphery wearing the label of technocrats but soon enough, they will find themselves deep in the cesspool, wearing scarfs and chanting ridiculous slogans.” Once this has happened they become regime enablers, even though they can deny it. To this end, the politicians gain while the general religious constituency suffers. Drawing near the argument of change for no change or relay religious athletics within the political space, I begin with Ndanga. Bishop Johannes Ndanga was heading the Apostolic Christian Council of Zimbabwe (ACCZ). He was very influential in organising this particular religious constituency for ZANU PF under the Mugabe era. For the purpose of this chapter and remaining within the scope and argument of the chapter, I focus on some incidents where I argue Ndanga was a regime enabler, who lost his religious mandate. New Zimbabwe (2017) cites Ndanga saying,

110  Bekithemba Dube ‘I Ndanga representing all Apostolic Sect members here and all those that are scattered around the country handed over to him (Mugabe) the certificate that he will rule this country until he dies,’ …‘So go and tell Mugabe that he has that mandate till his death.’ He was clear on enthroning Mugabe for life, despite the possibility that the electorate might have thought otherwise. Therefore, he used his power as the president of the Apostolic movement to endorse Mugabe, which of course might or was not a total representation of the country. There were also instances where Ndanga declared that Mugabe could rule forever because he was the leader that was appointed by God. With these sentiments from Ndanga, I concur with Brittain (2014:206) who notes that such leaders often give an ‘ideological support of the nation-state, encouraging people to passively bear injustice in the hope of attaining reward in the afterlife.’ I argue this way because most of the Apostolic members do not object to the representation by their leaders. However, in such cases, religious leaders who do not object to visibly abusive narratives are not the victims, but accomplices as well. Another trajectory I raise with Ndanga is that his role divided the church and it was clear that he championed a divide and rule approach in his role as a regime enabler. To buttress this point, I refer to Saunyama (2016:online) who quotes Ndanga: we are against the churches that emerge during times of crisis, and such churches should not be taken seriously. They have headquarters in the Western countries. The government should only work with the traditional churches like apostolic sects and all will be fine. The above sentiment indicates when a mandate is lost or captured; religious leaders often err even in the basics of their religion. Ndanga is such as an example of how religious leaders can go far in their role of being regime enablers, ignoring the feelings and ideas of the general believers. When reviewed using the decoloniality lens, this must be exposed and challenged. It should be noted that the nexus of politics and religion creates reciprocal relations where politicians return favours and appreciation for regime enabling, and as being harbingers of the political idea of the day. To illustrate appreciation for Ndanga, Mushanawani (2014) quotes former President Mugabe’s appreciation of the church’s contribution: You are a true church who lead by example and ‘walk your talk’. You declared here and prophesied the resounding victory of ZANU PF over MDC factions in the 31st July 2013 harmonised elections, a few weeks earlier. You advised me to go and have peaceful sleep. “Yes, your prophecy came out undiluted and as predicted. Thanks for your resolute support to ZANU PF.” While Ndanga was handy to Mugabe, his demise came in the Second Republic largely because of his association with Grace Mugabe, Mugabe’s wife, who was a

The Ambivalence of Religion in the Second Republic in Zimbabwe  111 great critic of Mnangagwa. His race and role of being a regime enabler threatened to come to an end with the departure of Mugabe from power. In a clear indication that his race had ended and no longer had relevance due to his critique of the Second Republic, Ndanga is cited by Chibamu (2019) saying, “Zimbabwe does not need jokers to be involved in dialogue and we cannot afford to have an election mode all the way without having time for development and reconstruction.” In an attempt to impress Mnangagwa, Ndanga castigated Nelson Chamisa, leader of the opposition, in the hope of impressing the Second Republic. While Ndanga sought to remain relevant, his past haunted him and the process Mutendi obscured his popularity. Mutendi assumes the new role to strengthen the regime. Bishop Nehemiah Mutendi inherited the church leadership from his father, the late Samuel Mutendi. In terms of membership, it is estimated that the Zion Christian Church (ZCC) has more than half-a-million members, and it is regarded as one of the biggest indigenous churches in Zimbabwe (Dana, 2018). After Samuel Mutendi’s death in 1976, there was a squabble on who was to take over between Ruben and Nehemiah Mutendi. Eventually Nehemiah became popular and now leads the bigger part of the faction (Mackay & Motsi, 1988:361–362). He has become a prominent figure in the Second Republic with the relay baton from Ndanga. His presence in the political arena presents nothing new but takes over the regime enabling function. To further illustrate the point, Bulawayo24, 2 November (2020a, cites Mutendi issuing the following statement: The people of Zimbabwe know that MDC is a project of the West, which is why they fail to win elections. The people do not want Chamisa to rule the country because they know the whites will come back and occupy our land. Just like Johannes Ndanga, Mutendi excels in castigating those with a different political ideology from his, defeating the unification of the Christian voice in the political arena. Consequently, the Church cannot have a single prophetic voice and scholars prone to social justice, inclusion and equality must problematise the religious leaders’ role in the Second Republic. It is mostly cancerous and more often the general populace suffers, while the leaders enjoy. I agree with Bottoms et al. (1995:109) that ‘[I]n the long run, society [scholars, religious leaders] should find ways to protect people [against] religion-related abuse, and help religion evolve in the direction of the better treatment of people.’ As it stands, religion as used in the political space does not benefit the majority of the Zimbabwean populace. Besides being open in support of ZANU PF, Mutendi appears to play an appeasing role by asking the people to bear hardship. Those of us that have lived long in both the First and Second Republics know very well that many religious and political leaders have come and promised a better life for the people and the opposite has always been the case. However, for Mutendi, as one with a relay baton to advance the regime enabler agenda, it becomes inevitable to promise people a better future under the Second Republic as it is the only viable way

112  Bekithemba Dube to remain relevant in the relay race. To illustrate this further, Bulawayo24, 2 November (2020b) cited Mutendi saying, We must survive the hardships we are experiencing. This is a passing phase. Wake up! This is your country. Do not give false information to the outside world but seek solutions from the Lord. We want to use the gift of God to enhance and firmly embrace the President’s Vision 2030 Empowerment Agenda. We applaud the work our President is doing in uplifting our souls in prayer. We appreciate his work. With such sentiments, Mutendi is convinced that he plays a central role for the benefit of the religious constituency. However, as argued by Magaisa (2019), the regime is always ahead [of the people and their religious leaders], profiting from their presence in immeasurable ways. Consequently, as history has shown in Zimbabwe that in the nexus of religion and politics, politics always gains. Unfortunately, the lesson seemingly has not sunk very well to many religious leaders in Zimbabwe. Just like Ndanga, Mutendi is cited by Share (2020), playing a regime enabler role by saying, Do not be afraid, President, we are with you. Some people say we are being ruled by soldiers, which is false. We are being led by mature people who came from the war. Those who are still in the army are not here. What is left is for us to go and tell our people on the direction to follow. The religious leaders who were very instrumental during the First Republic were never seen defending Mugabe and with their prophetic declarations when he was being removed from office. Thus, I agree with Sithole, who argues from a decoloniality lens that we need to move away from the deceit of coloniality that hides behind objectivity, neutrality and being free of bias and argues that these are the devices alien to the lived experience of the subject, especially the one who suffers from subjection (Sithole, 2014). Unfortunately, Mutendi and like-minded religious leaders will fail as long as they do not stand on principle but on pleasing the leaders of the day. I agree with Magaisa (2019), that instead of serving the state, they (Mutendi and others) serve the ruling party. Instead of safeguarding the integrity of institutions, they manipulate and abuse them for the benefit of the ruling party. By promoting the regime as opposed to the state, they become complicit in its repressive rule. In the following section, I focus on Musindo and Wutaunashe, centring on the argument that there was a change for no change in the Second Republic. Relay Athletics: From Msindo to Wutaunashe—Of Church Land and Politics in Zimbabwe In this section, I focus on Msindo and go further to discuss the regime enabling agenda of the two, despite the fact that one was active in the first dispensation

The Ambivalence of Religion in the Second Republic in Zimbabwe  113 while the other has become much more active in the Second Republic. Of interest is the issue of land. So far, the reward seemingly given to the general religious constituency for being harbingers of either the First or the Second Republic is church land. The church mandate has been sold and sacrificed on the altar of politics for just a piece of land from the politicians and unfortunately, from both republics, religious leaders and followers have fallen into the same trap. The rise and background of Reverend Obadiah Msindo in the political space is put across by The Zimbabwean (2008), which notes that there is a belief in ZANU PF that there are some religious leaders who sympathise with the opposition. This is why Msindo and Nobert Kunonga (previously with the Anglican Church) have for a long time been courted to give the impression that there are many Christians who support their policies. Msindo led a ZANU PF aligned organisation by the name DESTINY of Afrika Network (Danet), which focused on housing stands for urban dwellers and he made it clear that it was meant for the benefit of ZANU PF members. He is described by Chitando (2005) as ZANU PF’s conduit to sacred power. Chitando & Togarasei (2010) see Msindo representing one of the many parallel structures that the ZANU PF government created to counter criticism and loss of legitimacy. In essence, politicians always find people from the religious constituency to represent their interests, to enact propaganda by promising the people that they are next to power and they can always find solutions for their lives. However, in the Zimbabwean context, this has proven not to be true or possible. Once the politicians gain their milestone, often-religious leaders with no relevance are disposed. Msindo appeared to have access to many residential stands in urban areas in Zimbabwe. At some point, Msindo mobilised votes for ZANU PF and handed over 1200 residential stands to party supporters in Mutare in an attempt to entice the electorate ahead of elections (Mlambo, 2020). This boggles one’s mind; residential stands by design or default in Zimbabwe are very difficult to secure, or when one finds a stand, it is very expensive to buy, especially in the prestigious residential areas. However, one wonders how Msindo managed to have about 1200 stands in Mutare alone. This is notwithstanding the fact that he had other stands throughout Zimbabwe. This proves that there was a powerful political hand behind and, in fact, politicians in most cases have resources. However, these resources are for ensuring that they stay longer on the throne at the expense of the suffering masses. Msindo is a living example of how residential stands can be used as enticement for the Christian masses to vote for ZANU PF. While Msindo was very active in assisting ZANU PF regarding the much needed votes, it came at a cost for his organisation. At some point, Msindo appealed for financial assistance from the party after the Christian outfit used up its resources in political campaigns for the March election in 2005 (Zimbabwean Independent, 2005). Msindo, like other regime enablers, whether in the First or Second Republic, took a swipe at the opponents of ZANU PF. Before the run up to the 2018 election, he accused other churches of hate and misleading people not to vote for ZANU PF. The Standard (2017) cites him saying, “They must be told to come out in the open and declare their interests; there is no need to hide behind fingers.

114  Bekithemba Dube We know they are secretly campaigning for the opposition.” By so doing, Msindo denies others the opportunity he has for supporting and mobilising votes for ZANU PF, indicating the highest level of hypocrisy, which in the decoloniality sense, must be challenged because it does not produce a world that can sustain democracy and free will for all. While he was busy and acknowledged in the First Republic, Msindo became less visible in the Second Republic. Just like any enabler, when one becomes inactive, one is replaced, even though one can remain lurking in the background in the hope that one day the regime might need one’s service. While in the political terraces, he is quoted by Newsday giving advice to Mnangagwa saying, He should do away with people who still have an old mentality and defeating policies on ease of doing business. There is need for the President to surround himself and have people in strategic positions, especially in parastatals who share his vision, not saboteurs. (Newsday, 2019) In any case, politicians do not always want advice from regime enablers but enjoy praise texts, thus one will not be dismayed why he is not significant in the Second Republic. Hence, as the argument of this chapter, Msindo is changed for no change and the relay baton should be given to someone with fresh ideas, but still championing the same state ideology. Given this context, Magaisa (2019) warns the religious constituency that, In some cases, enablers might leave the regime because their contractual relationship has ended. This does not mean they cease to be regime enablers. It simply means they no longer have a formal connection to the regime. They are no longer being paid to perform their contractual duty in service of the regime. Indeed, if given another opportunity, these professional enablers would work again with the regime. While Msindo played a significant role to help the regime to win elections through various ways, his term ended and he had to pass the baton to the active agent of the state in the Second Republic, Prophet Andrew Wutawunashe. Wutawunashe was born in 1953 in the Gutu district of Masvingo province. His early life was characterised by political activism rather than religion (Togarasei, 2005). His active participation in the politics of the Second Republic, therefore, is not surprising. He has always had a political outlook, despite heading a religious movement. In terms of his rise to the religious arena, Wutawunashe rose to prominence in the 1980s under the banner of the Worldwide Family of God (FOG) Church. Over the years, his influence grew as he established several branches of FOG in Zimbabwe and beyond (Togarasei, 2005). The year 2016 was a defining year for his religious life, when he divorced his wife, Rutendo Faith Wutanashe. Consequently, FOG split, with one group following his long serving pastor Bishop Henry Muzhari who formed the Family Covenant Church (Netsianda, 2019).

The Ambivalence of Religion in the Second Republic in Zimbabwe  115 While he played a somewhat dormant or less prominent role in the First Republic, Wutawunashe had a new lease of life in the Second Republic. He uses his popularity to assume the role of regime enabler, which according to this chapter takes over from Msindo. Chimanyawi (2019) poses a rhetorical question that sheds light on Wutawunashe, “So which biblical verse did the Apostle employ to forsake the victims of the current regime?” To the regime, Wutawunashe comes in handy and has impetus to push the propaganda until his relevance expires. To achieve effectiveness as a part of the propaganda machinery, he also uses praise texts, which, I argue in this chapter, have been catastrophic to the Zimbabwean religious constituency. They tend to chant praise songs and political slogans, yet their condition and recognition is ignored in the political arena. Wutawunashe was involved in praise texts even during the Mugabe era. The chronicle (2014) notes Wutawunashe’s commitment to Mugabe in the following way when presenting him as declaring, President Mugabe is a God chosen leader. He was raised by God to lead this nation. He has worked diligently for this country and was given the strength to fight for the nation’s wealth to be owned by the black majority, which has been a success. The praise texts were escalated in the Second Republic and feature in most ZANU PF or government functions where the services of religious regime enablers are inevitable. As an example of praise texts, Herald (2019) quotes Wutawunashe saying, To this end, we as the indigenous (church) leaders, we are also saying there cannot be genuine dialogue based on trying to determine whether you are the President of Zimbabwe; you are the President of Zimbabwe To shed light on the background of the above statement, the 2018 Presidential elections were contested by the Movement for Democratic Alliance (MDC A/ lliance) led by Nelson Chamisa and Mnangagwa as the main candidates. The MDC Alliance claimed there was a misconduct by the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) when it declared Mnangagwa the presidential winner. It is this contestation that was put before the Constitutional Court, which declared Mnangagwa the duly elected leader of the Second Republic. Up to the time of writing, the issue of legitimacy was still being challenged. To bring this closer, Wutawunashe believes that there should be negotiations between the MDC A and ZANU PF as to map the best way forward in the context of the economic downfall of the country. However, he sets the agenda and issues which should not be in the agenda. He takes sides with ZANU PF, thereby opening the wide rift between the warring parties, thus making it difficult to achieve peace in Zimbabwe. Regime enablers at least have rewards for their effort. In some cases, these benefits tend to lure more people to see the Second Republic as compassionate and willing to address the concerns of the religious constituency. Just like during the Msindo era, the rewards include stands for building churches. When the religious

116  Bekithemba Dube constituency agrees to this arrangement, it falls into the same trap that was set in the days of Robert Mugabe and Obadiah Msindo (whose case I reviewed above). Mhetu (2020) notes that President Mnangagwa offered some 101 churches, under the Zimbabwe Indigenous Interdenominational Council of Churches (ZIICC), access to free state land as a matter of urgency to construct places of worship, schools and for farming purposes. It should be noted that it is not all churches, but those led by the Wutawunashe, indicating that politicians often shun religious organisations that resist being used for political mobilisation. Consequently, the religious constituency associated to ZANU PF does not take a holistic approach to address the needs of the Christians as exhorted from the biblical teaching; rather, as argued by Damiani (2002:45), their nexus with ZANU PF ‘destroy[s]‌their personality and replace[s] the void with a regime personality that no longer questions, thinks critically or feels the impact of an abusive system.’ Wutawunashe as a regime enabler did not say anything when the army killed protestors in Harare in the aftermath of the contested elections. While Wutawunashe sings praises of the Second Republic, Chimanyawi (2019) argues that a man who takes pride in shortening the lives of his opponents cannot claim to be God sent. This observation puts Apostles or Prophets in a compromising position as they side with perpetrators of social injustice and there is always a price to pay. Magaisa (2019) puts it clearly by arguing that, Would-be enablers must know that there is a price to pay for being an enabler. However, the price of being an enabler of repressive regimes is not always paid in the courts of law. That price might be loss of reputation, credibility and respect of enablers among peers and in the eyes of the public. Once lost, it is very hard to regain the trust and confidence of those around you. The Second Republic regime enablers should not think they are not replaceable, and often when they are replaced, they soon realise that the regime wasted them. Cognisant of this, there is a need for a new political theology in Zimbabwe devoid of enabling political actors from the ruling elite. This would be a theology that can, ‘[F]ree individuals and groups from suppressive social and ideological situations, particularly those that place socially unnecessary precincts upon development and enunciation of human consciousness’ (Alvesson & Willmort, 1992:432). Consequently, as Mashau (2018) argues, the African churches should embrace a new political theology. This would focus on liberation and promoting the values of democracy. As will be discussed below, this requires a paradigm shift from both the religious leaders and the followers. What Can Be Done? Evoking a Social Justice Oriented Theology This section responds to the call made by Bottoms et al. (1995:109) that ‘[I]n the long run, society should find ways to protect people [against] religion-related abuse, and help religion evolve in the direction of the better treatment of people.’ As has been discussed, the religious mandate is either captured or lost within the

The Ambivalence of Religion in the Second Republic in Zimbabwe  117 political matrix in Zimbabwe; thus, scholars prone to social justice and informed by the decoloniality lens should engage in a struggle to unmask, challenge and reconstruct as alternative to evoke social justice and the need for a better society for all. Thus, the chapter presents a platform on which I engage in that struggle. This struggle is multi-faceted and academia is one of the effective angles in which the capture of religion in the political space can be problematised and reconstructed. Informed by decoloniality, the chapter does not seek revenge, but as proposed by Marcos (2008), the chapter does not only resist, but also begins to propose, to determine how the challenge can be addressed to protect the religious sector from being abused by politicians for their personal gains. Social Justice Oriented Theology

For the problem of religion to be addressed in the Zimbabwean political space, there is need for outside intervention from scholars and theologians prone to social justice. It cannot continue that religion is used for abuse and scholars oriented to social rights and human rights have nothing to say. The battle is difficult yet necessary and rewarding, no matter how long it may take. The struggle underpinned in social justice, as Santos (2014:53) argues, is “rooted in the aspirations of oppressed peoples,” who desire liberation from religious leaders who have made politics their havens. Thus, informed by decoloniality, social justice minded scholars need to challenge hegemonic epistemologies that marginalise, dehumanise and deny the legitimacy of some other epistemologies (Manthalu & Waghid, 2019). Scholars and church leaders keen to promote social justice must ignite this liberation. In this regard, I agree with Marcos (2008) that projects led by the state are vulnerable to manipulation. There is need for projects by the people who would have organised themselves in their local histories and must be delinked from the colonial matrix (Walsh & Mignolo, 2018). The colonial matrix is a challenge and, unfortunately, religion is the tool used to champion an oppressive agenda in Zimbabwe. Thus, those scholars who believe in justice must begin to tease and evoke a new political theology that is not based on praise texts for politicians, but is based on championing values of social justice from every angle possible, until the voice of justice has prevailed in the political space. I conclude this point by agreeing with Louis (2007:130) that ‘[o]‌ur voices may have started out as a low murmur from the margin but it [can] become a distinct and unified cacophony of resistance and distrust’ towards constructing better lives for all in Zimbabwe and beyond facing similar trajectories. Through such, the religious constituency heals together as a community, because we can only be fully human when we are human together (Gade, 2012:493) in the fight to capture the lost or hijacked religious mandate by politicians and religious leaders. Personal Resistance to Captured Theology

While a collective response is required from different scholars, theologians and the religious constituency, the battle cannot be won only on that platform, but

118  Bekithemba Dube also from individual responses to the abuse of religion in the political space. As I begin this point, I agree with Hooks (1992) that, “unless the people transform the way they perceive religion, such radical interventions will fundamentally alter the [Zimbabwean] situation.” Individual religious members must contribute to their liberation. As argued before, being silent when religious leaders do praise texts or use religion to push political agenda does not make them victims but accomplices. I argue this way because in many cases, as also argued by McClure’s (2014: 3), the “victims of spiritual abuse [may] continue to support the abusive leader because of their naïveté or loyalty to the leader.” Thus, the silence of individuals frustrates efforts for liberation, which this chapter challenges within the decoloniality space. Larsen (2010:17) outlines the root cause for silence by arguing that oppressive religious hegemony and its support emanates from black traditions. There is a tendency to give a religious leader the designation ‘Father’ or ‘Daddy,’ Bishop, Apostle, Doctor and Professor, making them untouchable and their abuse overlooked. In addition, Sanni (2016:12) says that the problem in Africa is that we have given unquestionable power to religious leaders; thus, the challenge is to reclaim the power and distribute it to all in order to ensure sustainable development. To this end, Dube, Nkoane & Hlalele (2017) pose a critical question: How can we find a crack code for those oppressed by religion, so that they can see the abuse, which is sugar coated by narratives of obedience to the ‘man of God?’ I agree with Sithole (2014) that there is a need to rethink, and even to go beyond thinking, to the point of exhaustion, to avoid coloniality of mind. To conclude this issue, I call upon all Zimbabweans at individual level to resist religious leaders and narratives that seek to undermine democracy, social justice and respect for human rights. It cannot be that from the First Republic to the second one, Zimbabwean people fall for one trap or another coming through different religious leaders and see no problem with it. I have begun my part through this chapter and hope others who have not started will follow suit. Through this, a better Second Republic is possible where democracy and justice are the core of political theology in Zimbabwe. Conclusion This chapter discussed and problematised the role of religion in the Second Republic. To do so, I argued that there is change for no change in Zimbabwe, and that religious leaders are in a relay race to push the regime enabling agenda. Unfortunately, the Zimbabwean religious constituency has been falling into the same trap. I argued that the crisis in Zimbabwe is partly because of religious leaders who have assumed the role of being regime enablers whether covertly or overtly defeating the purpose of carrying a religious mandate, which under normal circumstances should be centred on human rights, democracy and social justice. I ended the chapter by suggesting two ways the problem could be addressed. Firstly, a collective approach where all unite for one purpose of achieving a better Zimbabwe and secondly, an individual resistance to the abuse of religion in the political matrix of Zimbabwe. As it stands, the religious mandate is captured,

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7 Religion and Politics in Zimbabwe’s Second Republic Goodwill Partners? Tenson Muyambo

Introduction Religion and politics have been intricately intertwined from time immemorial. While this chapter acknowledges this long and protracted engagement between religion and politics, from antiquity to the present, it submits that this engagement was and still is characterised by ambivalence where on the one hand religion ‘sanitises’ politics and on the other hand politics manipulate(s) the religious sphere to justify its activities in society. This ambivalence has received sizeable attention from scholarship in the First Republic Zimbabwe and has not had that much attention in the Second Republic. Using observation and documentary analysis of electronic and print media, the chapter asks the following questions: Are religion and politics the different sides of the same coin? Are there possibilities of religion and politics being partners of goodwill or do they always remain strangers, ever ready to pounce at each other? In that regard, this chapter makes a close, critical and dispassionate analysis of the underlying factors behind the continued interaction between religion and politics in the Second Republic Zimbabwe. It advances the argument that religion and politics in the Second Republic remain the main playing ground for politicians, a marriage of convenience. Despite the seemingly genuine appeal to religion (“God is in it”/ “The voice of the people is the voice of God”) shenanigans, politicians continue to patronise religion and politics for selfish ends. The Second Republic’s perceptions about religion and politics have not significantly changed from the First Republic’s. Religious groupings are either antagonists or allies, depending on their affinity to political parties, mainly Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front) ZANU PF and Movement for Democratic Change Alliance (MDCA, and, in 2022, the Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC)). Outlining the Context The chapter advances the thesis that religion and politics are intricately linked (Shoko, 2007). The chapter attempts to ambitiously address the above raised questions, thereby filling in the lacuna in literature on religion and politics in the Second Republic birthed on 17 November 2019. The chapter sets off by way of an DOI: 10.4324/9781003332435-8

Religion and Politics in Zimbabwe’s Second Republic  123 introduction, background, followed by the conceptualisation of religion and politics, methodology, discussion of the findings of the research and closes by giving concluding thoughts to the relational issues between religion and politics in the Zimbabwean context of the Second Republic. Suffice to say from time immemorial religion and politics have been at the centre of humanity, particularly in Africa. Political leaders, from an African religion perspective (though this is true of other religions), surrounded themselves with religious functionaries such as masvikiro (spirit mediums) who would not only rebuke the political leaders when they erred but would even sanction their stay in power. Many times, it was extremely difficult to separate the office of politicians from that of religious leaders. The two offices often dwelt in or were combined in one person, for example, the traditional chief would preside over political, social, economic as well as religious matters with the assistance of other people. For a chief to be installed as a political leader of his chieftaincy, he1 had to be confirmed and installed by masvikiro. Zimbabwe is made home to diverse religions and political ideologies. Religiously, it houses religions such as Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Rastafari, Hinduism, the Baha’i Faith, African Traditional Religion (taken in its singular form, as argued by Idowu, 1973) and other minority religions. To break down by numbers is difficult as numbers increase or decrease each day as people move from one religious grouping to another. Estimates have been that there are more Christians than any other religious adherents. African religion and other religions are said to make up the remainder. This scenario is contentious though as there is the argument that African religion accounts for the majority of people who then oscillate between it and other religions. Politically, Zimbabwe, using the 2018 plebiscite, has more than twenty-three political parties. Of these, Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) and Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) which went into the elections as Movement for Democratic Change Alliance (MDCA), an alliance of the original MDC and its former splinter groups, boast of a large following. The CCC emerged in 2022 as an alternative expression of the MDCA. Others are minnows who form the remainder. Background to the Study This chapter has been prompted by the realisation that Zimbabwe as a Second Republic after the (un)ceremonious removal of the late Robert Gabriel Mugabe and his subsequent official resignation from office as the president of Zimbabwe on the 21st of November 2017 has found itself entangled in further crises of profound magnitude. Some of the crises (social, economic, political) predate the 2018 elections while others are said to be as a result of the disputed 2018 presidential elections that pitted Emerson Dambudzo Mnangangwa of ZANU PF, Nelson Chamisa of the MDCA and other minnows like Brian Mteki, whose party is not known by many. Theories are in the offing as to what went wrong and what needs to be done. There is a general feeling among Mnangagwa critics that he

124  Tenson Muyambo came to power without religious (Christian or African) blessing as he is accused of having usurped power using the mighty powers of the army and having used questionable means in the 2018 plebiscite. For that reason, this school of thought advances that Mnangagwa has no religious blessings to rule the country, hence the myriad of challenges the nation is facing. The other school of thought emanating especially from the Zion Christian Church (ZCC) is that Mnangagwa is the God chosen leader (Mugabe, 2019) Zimbabweans must rally behind. This school of thought finds expression through the ZCC leader Nehemiah Mutendi who is often heard at his church gatherings, sometimes attended by Mnangagwa, exhorting his members to view Mnangagwa as the leader God has chosen for the Second Republic. Mutendi has gone further to say Mnangagwa’s leadership was prophesied long back, a narrative that is contentious and whose discussion is beyond the purview of this chapter. To worsen the issues at hand is yet another explanation that it is now time that the Second Republic must be led by a religious figure, a Christian. Advocates of this thinking find Nelson Chamisa, who is a pastor in the Apostolic Faith Mission in Zimbabwe (AFM), after being ordained following his study of Theology at Living Waters, a bible college for the AFM. Those who belong to this school of thought regard him as the quintessence of the leader Zimbabwe needs to solve all its crises. The Conceptualisation of Religion and Politics Conceptually, religion and politics are fluid terms that are difficult to pin down precisely by way of definitions. Given the elasticity of the concepts religion and politics, this chapter reflects on the interplay between religion and politics in Zimbabwe’s Second Republic. But before delving into such turbulent waters, there is need to conceptualise the terms, religion and politics. I know this could be a mammoth task, but an attempt is made to put the study into proper context. Religion is conceptualised differently by diverse actors and scholarship is not agreeable to what and whose definition of religion is waterproof. I am aware of the debates that ensue but due to space considerations, I am not delving into such debates and contestations. For purposes of this chapter, religion shall be understood as a conglomeration of a people’s belief and practice system upon which what they say and do revolve in reference to the numinous, the object of faith. Admittedly this definition may fall far short of what other scholars may say but suffice to say for the meantime allow me to define it thus. Equally difficult to define is politics. Politics, as defined by Lasswell (1936) is the process of who gets what, when and how. For him, the study of politics is the study of influence and the influential. In other words, politics is the ability to influence another’s behaviour as it centres on actions among a number of people involving influence. It is a power-authority interaction among people where the more authoritative determines how the less authoritative live. For this chapter, politics refers to the contestation among various actors in the quest to access power at the national level.

Religion and Politics in Zimbabwe’s Second Republic  125 Religion and Politics: A Brief Relational Overview In the history of Europe, it has been shown that religion and the state (another way of saying religion and politics) were closely related for a long time (Mallya, 2010:133). Writing on Karanga religion of Zimbabwe, Shoko (2007) argues that religion and politics are intricately intertwined. This relationship, in some states, has been vibrant; in others, those who hold religious authority have political power as well (Moyo, 1987:67). According to Smith (1971:2) religion in many European contexts was used, among other things, to legitimise state authority. In Africa there appears to be two main categories of religion-state categories. Moyo (1987) cited in Mallya (2010:133) identifies these as confessional states and secular states, where the former states are those that have declared that religion plays a major role in their political processes whereas the latter are states that allow religious freedom for their citizens but separate religion from politics in a more formal way. Religion-State relations are differently termed in Zimbabwe. Chitando, Taringa and Mapuranga (2014:177) refer to these relations as Church-State. In Chitando’s (2013) edited Prayers and Players: Religion and Politics in Zimbabwe most contributors to the book explore the intricate interaction between religion and politics in Zimbabwe during the crises years, 2000–2008. Sibanda (2011:8) compares church-state relations in Zimbabwe, after independence, and South Africa and came to the conclusion that the Church in Zimbabwe is polarised, with two opposing camps, one supporting Mugabe’s Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) and the other critical of his rule. Togarasei (2004:76–77) categorises this polarisation as the ‘pro-ruling party’ and ‘anti-ruling party,’ with the former represented by Canaan Sodindo Banana whose works eulogise ZANU PF, having served in that government and the latter represented by Archbishop Pius Ncube, an avid critic of the ZANU PF. This chapter extends this argument by focusing on this intricate relationship that continues into the Second Republic. Methodology Data for this study were through documentary analysis or review, where other works on the topic were consulted. Central to this chapter was Prayers and Players: Religion and Politics in Zimbabwe edited by Chitando (2013), where the focus was on the First Republic. Newspapers and other forms of media such as the Zimbabwe Television (ZTV) where politicians were captured attending church gatherings were utilised for this study. Observation was another tool that was utilised in this study, given the fact that the writer was an eyewitness of some of the religion-politics relational issues during Zimbabwe’s First and Second Republics. In-depth interviews were also conducted with key informants and activists in both the religious and political spheres. Data were analysed using the emerging themes and patterns approach.

126  Tenson Muyambo Religion and Politics: An Overview of the Pre-colonial Interactions Before the advent of colonialism and its attendant missionary invasion of Zimbabwe, African religion used to enjoy unprecedented monopoly in the political affairs of Zimbabwean communities. There was no clear-cut separation of religion and politics as political leaders such as chiefs also held religious positions and played a number of religious roles in the day-to-day activities in their areas of jurisdiction. This is affirmed by Moyo (1987:67) who argues that those who hold religious authority have political power as well. During this period religion and politics were partners of goodwill. The offices of religion and politics were in one person. The religious component legitimised the political one; hence, the relationship between the two was not only cordial but complementary, although one could be easily manipulated for the sake of the other. The chief had political and religious power. The religious power was in the form of masvikiro (spirit mediums) who were of his blood. Admittedly, this arrangement was easily manipulated but the level of manipulation could have been negligible. The cordiality and complementarity between religion and politics came under check with the advent of colonialism. The settler regime usurped all the political power, leaving the chiefs and other political functionaries not only powerless but also defunct. Religiously, Christianity mostly supported the settler regime to oppress, exploit, annihilate and marginalise the indigenous Zimbabweans. The Zimbabwean land upon which the religious and political authority of chiefs rested was appropriated amongst the whites and their kin and kith, rewarding them for having taken part in the Second World War. This led to masvikiro sensitising and conscientising the Zimbabweans to fight for their land, rights and dignity. Mbuya Nehanda, one of the most revered spirit mediums in Zimbabwe, is alleged to have said, “Mapfupa angu achamuka”: (My bones shall indeed arise, emphasis by the author), although this is contentious (Shoko, 2007). This saw the rise of leaders such as Herbert Chitepo, Joshua Nkomo, Ndabaningi Sithole (who was not only a politician but also a minister of religion) and others, too many to mention, waging a war against the settler regime. During this period Christianity took sides with colonialism whereas African religion, as expected, collaborated with the sons and daughters of the soil (vana vevhu). As the war progressed, right-minded sections (guided by a high sense of justice for which Jesus Christ stood for) of Christianity supported the Zimbabweans by supplying food, clothes and other forms of support, including cash. This scenario where Christianity supported the settler regime and African religion supported the Zimbabwean freedom fighters with some defections from Christianity went on for the duration of the war. The polarity continued beyond the attainment of independence in 1980. Soon after the attainment of independence, the relationship between religion and the state underwent a paradigm shift as is demonstrated in the section below. Religion and Politics in Zimbabwe’s First Republic This section serves as a precursor to the discussion on religion and politics in the Second Republic. It is intended to show the difference (or lack of it) between the

Religion and Politics in Zimbabwe’s Second Republic  127 First and Second Republics. As alluded to earlier on, Moyo (1987) cited in Mallya (2010:133) identifies two categories of religion-state relations as confessional states and secular states, where the former states are those that have declared that religion plays a major role in their political processes whereas the latter are states that allow religious freedom for their citizens but separate religion from politics in a more systematic way. Zimbabwe falls under the second category. This scenario renders Zimbabwe a secular state, although there are sections of the society who perceive the nation as a Christian state (reminiscent of the unsuccessful efforts by the Evangelical Fellowship of Zimbabwe’s early 1999 call to declare Zimbabwe a Christian nation). Constitutionally, Zimbabwe assumes a collectivistic rather than an individualistic pursuit of advancement evident in the traditionalism that abounds in the rural areas. When Mugabe took over the reins of power in 1980, the Roman Catholic Church gained much more currency religiously and politically in the affairs of a young nation still trying to make ends meet after the settler regime onslaught. The church presided over national functions such as Independence Day, Heroes Day and many more. The prominence of the Roman Catholic could be explained by the fact that Mugabe himself was Catholic. Even his departure from active politics was ‘negotiated’ by Father Fidelis Mukonori, a Catholic priest. Just as Mugabe swung from African religion to Christianity, as circumstances dictated, in the affairs of the First Republic there were once again sections of Christianity that opposed his leadership, especially during the darker periods of his reign, from the late 1990s. As he remained in power, he made major mistakes that some members of his own Roman Catholic Church, like Archbishop Pius Ncube, heavily criticised his unjust practices (Chitando, Taringa and Mapuranga, 2014:178) and Father Johnson under the Catholic Commission of Justice for Peace (CCJP), whom the author remember as a student at the University of Zimbabwe (1994–1996), as a consistent critic of the injustices that the Mugabe regime meted out against students at the University of Zimbabwe. However, due to the fact that Christianity took the centre stage in religionpolitics relations, the role of African religion in Zimbabwean politics waned at colonisation and even after the 1980 independence. No visible role of masvikiro was ever witnessed during the Mugabe era, a scenario that traditionalists allege resulted in his dismal failure to run the country. The diesel n’anga saga in Chinhoyi where it was alleged, during the fuel crisis days, that diesel in its finest form was oozing from the underground (Shoko, 2013) was never taken seriously by Mugabe who sent Didymus Mutasa and others as emissaries to the mountain. Mugabe seemed to have lost touch with the African religion which had played an important role during the liberation struggle (Lan, 1985), although he retained the African spiritual map of the universe. The Mugabe-Tangwena escape into Mozambique in 1975 was a case in point of a leader who had some orientation in African religion. At independence he turned to Christianity, particularly the Roman Catholic Church, which enjoyed a lion’s share in Zimbabwe’s religionstate relations. This oscillation is illustrative of how religion can be manipulated to serve political ends.

128  Tenson Muyambo As Mugabe’s reign was subjected to more criticisms and his political power facing unprecedented challenges from Morgan Tsvangirai’s Movement for Democratic Change in the 2000s, he turned to some sections of Christianity to garner support and find legitimacy for his long stay in power. He turned to some African Initiated Churches (AICs) (Chitando, Taringa and Mapuranga, 2014:178). These included the African Apostolic Church of Johane Marange and other white garment churches. This saw Mugabe frequenting their annual gatherings, a scenario most critics viewed as a political gimmick where religion, Christianity (as represented by those white garment congregations), was a rallying point for him. It is alleged that some of the leaders of the AICs got favours such as land and going unpunished when they engaged in underage marriages and gender-based violence through their polygamous marriages. At one-point Mugabe, who was a Catholic, was surprisingly heard supporting polygamy by saying it was biblical. He would dress in the white garments, with the Apostolic tsvimbo (staff ) in hand. What a figure he cast! He did so in order to find political support for himself and his party, which was waning in the face of opposition politics. From the above, while some religions such as Christianity (in its diverse forms) were enjoying unlimited access to and visibility within the political arena, others, such as African religion, were on the margins of Zimbabwean politics during the Mugabe era. The religion-state relations were ambivalent, where some religions were part of the national political cake while others were like the biblical rich man-Lazarus saga, picking leftovers under the table. Thus, the paradox was that while some religions were having their heydays politically, others were peripherised. The religion-state relations were complex, as those enjoying proximity to power assumed a big brother status in relation to other players. The less fortunate ones had to jostle for recognition as well and such a situation cowered most religions into silence. They could not become the voice of the voiceless. Any dissenting voices were either whipped into line or felt threatened. Pius Ncube is a case in point (Chitando, Taringa and Mapuranga, 2014:178) who was forced to resign as Archbishop having been acutely accused of being a womaniser. The First Republic’s relations with religion was a case of a carrot and a whip metaphor, where the AICs were only needed when it was expedient for Mugabe to do so. In most cases, such closeness with AICs was when elections were impending. In this case religion, particularly Christianity in the form of AICs, was used to garner political support. When elections were over, the AICs were abandoned until it was again time for elections. Religion was therefore manipulated to ensure the long stay of Mugabe in power. Religion was used as a means to a political end. Discussion of Findings The findings clearly indicated that 17 November 2017 is a day that shall linger in the memories of many Zimbabweans for a long time. The day echoed the euphoria that engulfed Zimbabwe in 1980 when Zimbabweans got independence, where Mugabe was seen as not only a liberator but a saviour in the mould of Christ himself. This was the day when many Zimbabweans across all sectors

Religion and Politics in Zimbabwe’s Second Republic  129 joined the army (which had its own political interests) against Mugabe’s long stay in power. The march and the impeachment proceedings instituted by parliament forced Mugabe to resign. His resignation was met with happiness by many as Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa took over the reins, thereby ushering in the Second Republic. The Use of Religion as a Means to Political Ends At his inauguration Mnangagwa repeatedly made this statement: ‘The voice of the people is the voice of God,’ a statement that is viewed differently in academia. I argue that while Mnangagwa could have been truly submitting to God for guidance, his statement could be understood as a ploy to ‘sanitise’ the coup against Mugabe. He is viewed as wanting to portray a religious figure who fears and respects God. This was seriously put under check and scrutiny by events of 1 August 2018 when violence, allegedly perpetuated by the army and police, reared its ugly face in the streets of Harare. People who gathered to demand the expeditious release of the presidential results were brutally attacked by the army and police, resulting in some being killed and others being maimed. In one of the informal interviews, one participant submitted thus: “A man who had praised the Zimbabweans for speaking against Mugabe turned and unleashed violence against the same people whom he had labelled as the ‘voice of God.’ ” Thus, religion is used as a manipulating tool to gain political mileage. It is abandoned when the political interests are met. As was the case in the First Republic, the Second Republic in Zimbabwe soon found itself entangled in the politics-religion controversies. No sooner was Mnangagwa installed the head of the Second Republic than he aligned himself with certain sections of Christianity. This includes the Zion Christian Church (ZCC) of Nehemiah Mutendi. His installation was religiously presided over and graced by Mutendi, head of the ZCC (ZTV 24 November 2017). From there onwards Mnangagwa often attended ZCC national and international gatherings at either their Mbungo shrine near Masvingo or Defe shrine in Gokwe. Just like the Roman Catholic Church that used to enjoy unlimited privileges during the Mugabe era, the ZCC has been doing the same under Mnangagwa. Unlike certain Catholics who criticised Mugabe, the ZCC is conspicuously quiet on the injustices being meted out against perceived Mnangagwa critics or opponents. Religion, ZCC in particular, is seen as sanctioning the injustices that characterise Mnangagwa reign. There were also suggestions that Mnangagwa was clandestinely consulting African religion to authenticate his rule. He was said to have met chiefs, in closed doors, in Ngaone, Chipinge where chief Mutema opened up to him and categorically told him about the chiefs’ grievances (Zhakata, 2019). The president is quoted as having said, “We have asked for forgiveness and we have been forgiven. Our chiefs have registered a lot of grievances which we will act on in order to bring about rural industrialisation to the two districts” (Zhakata, 2019). Ngaone is a Mutema chieftaincy territory which is believed to have a traditional religious

130  Tenson Muyambo functionary who played a pivotal role during the liberation struggle. Allegations are that there were certain instructions and charms that leaders of the liberation struggle were given by this Mutema religious functionary that were supposed to be observed religiously and judiciously. But alas! That never happened resulting in the economic, political and social turmoil that the First Republic ‘bequeathed’ to the Second Republic. Mnangagwa’s visit to Mutema svikiro and other local traditional leadership is viewed as an attempt to address the anomaly. If these are true, then Mnangagwa can be understood to have one foot in Christianity (ZCC) and another in African religion in a bid to holistically address the challenges that bedevil Zimbabwe from the First Republic through the Second Republic. In any case, there are more similarities between the ZCC and African religion. Mnangagwa might have been patronising the two to not only safeguard his rule but to solemnise it. This makes it evidently clear that religion and politics are inseparable. We get the sense that politics cannot be safe without an appeal to religion, a scenario that resonates with the biblical narratives of kings and prophets in the Old Testament. Opposition Politics and Religion: ‘God Is in It’ Mantra When Nelson Chamisa of the MDCA took his campaign rallies to all corners of the nation, there was a clarion call that “God was in it.” Even the Constitutional Court challenge of Mnangagwa’s declared win by Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) was punctuated by ‘God is in it’ sentiments. What did this mean for the MDCA and the populace in general? The phrase was coined and became a campaign tool, a thing that never happened in Zimbabwean politics since 1980. Appeals to religion were made (as earlier on mentioned) but never was a time when the phrase ‘God is in it’ was used by politicians. Chamisa together with his legal counsel profusely used the phrase. The explanation for this, in my view, is two-fold. First, Chamisa, being a pastor himself, seemed to his followers, at that time, to be God’s appointee to ‘liberate’ Zimbabweans from a litany of challenges. His association with God, as “a man of God,” is understood in MDCA circles to mean that his campaign was sanctioned by God. Anything against God is bound to fail (as understood and believed by Christians). This perception put Chamisa above his opponent and the attendances that his rallies attracted seemed to have been evident enough of this view. The MDCA, by extension, was viewed as a God’s political movement for peace, justice, plenty and righteousness. From this perspective, religion shapes politics, not vice versa. Religion is seen as sanctioning politics as opposed to politics manipulating religion for its selfish ends. Viewed from this perspective, Chamisa was understood as the quintessence of the kind of leader Zimbabwe needed and people thought finally and decisively, God has intervened. Secondly, the avalanche use of the phrase meant the other side of the coin where religion is manipulated to result in gaining political mileage. Once again, the phrase was used to appeal to Christians as ZANU PF used to do when it attended AICs to gain support. The ‘God is in it’ mantra was a political tool for the MDCA to lure people, mostly those of the Christian faith to rally behind the

Religion and Politics in Zimbabwe’s Second Republic  131 party. In this sense, God is brought in the equation to glorify a political formation that purported to be a different formation from the ZANU PF. Once again, we witness political machinations coming into play, where political movements appeal to religion for party glorification. In other words, God is ‘forced’ into politics to sanitise party activities. This is no different from attempts to blindfold the electorate into thinking God is in it when there is nothing godly about the party. The phrase was used to coerce people into supporting a political movement not because of its potential to give tangible deliverables but because God is said to have sanctioned it. It is this exploitative nature of politics to religion that Talent Chiwenga, a self-proclaimed only true messenger of God, dismisses Chamisa as not pastor at all. This resonates with Karl Marx’s scepticism about the role of religion. It is, therefore, foolhardy to think that God is in Zimbabwe crises. This is a ploy for politicians to pacify people so that people wait for God’s time when politicians devour us. According to Karl Marx, people must outgrow religion and begin to demand from politicians what is rightfully and constitutionally theirs. The ‘God is in it’ and ‘the voice of the people is the voice of God’ mantras are escapist and defeatist attitudes that continue to sanction politics and leave people at the mercy of politicians. Religion and Politics as Siamese Twins To illustrate that religion and politics are Siamese twins, religion in Zimbabwe is quite central in the efforts to initiate national dialogue. Christianity, under the banner of the Zimbabwe Council of Churches (ZCC), the Evangelical Fellowship of Zimbabwe (EFZ) and other sister associations have been at pains to bring all citizens, including different political formations, to come to a round table to find solutions to Zimbabwe’s crises. Unfortunately, no representative of African religion is part of this. This raises eyebrows as to what religion is and how it is understood in Zimbabwe. It is worrisome that while Zimbabweans, including the highest offices, acknowledge that African religion exists and continue to influence how people define and determine their destiny, the religion is never recognised in public during national processes such as the national dialogue. While this may be a subject for another day, the chapter posits that if religion is understood to be a partaker in the politics of the Second Republic, it must be religion in its broad sense, not using Judeo-Christian spectacles in denoting religion. This is problematic. Although Mnangagwa snubbed the dialogue called by the Church at the Harare International Conference Centre (HICC) on 7 February 2019 attended by Chamisa and other ZANU PF figures, the call for the role of the Church in the national dialogue is gathering momentum. Religion is regarded as a peacebroker in conflict areas and examples are plenty. In South Africa, for instance, the late Desmond Tutu became a world-recognised cleric due to his contribution to South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission that was meant to create a safe South African space for the former feuding parties, diametrically opposed on racial lines. In the Zimbabwean context, Father Mukonori brokered a truce between the military and Mugabe by negotiating Mugabe’s retirement.

132  Tenson Muyambo Partners of Goodwill? Concluding Thoughts Given the ongoing, one wonders whether religion and politics are nemeses or partners. What have politics to do with religion and what has religion to do with politics? From the discussion above, it is crystal clear that religion and politics have been in contact from the very long past. A human being is both religious, notoriously religious (Mbiti, 1969:1) and an insatiable political being (Aristotle, 1998 cited in Guremen, 2018). For that reason, a human being oscillates between the two as need arises. Evidence is that religion and politics are inseparable. They determine each other. Where they appear to be partners of goodwill, the people would have been duped to think they are, yet they remain strangers to each other taking advantage of each other as circumstances dictate. In Zimbabwe, politicians use religion for selfish political ambitions. The appeal to religion by politicians seems to be the toast to good governance, justice, righteousness and love. Whenever the two are bedfellows, religion is used to sanitise politics. Note 1 In Africa and Zimbabwe in particular, most chiefs are males, though in some instances we have female chiefs who take over after their fathers’ deaths). The Southern African Development Committee (SADC) as a region is being urged to install female chiefs (Langa, 2018).

References Aristotle. 1998. Politics Books VII and VIII. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chitando, E. (ed.). 2013. Prayers and Players: Religion and Politics in Zimbabwe. Harare: Sapes Books. Chitando, E., Taringa, N.T, and Mapuranga, T.P. 2014. ‘Zimbabwean theology and religious studies during the crisis years (2000–2008): a preliminary study,’ Studia Historiae Ecclessiasticae 40(1), 173–189. Guremen, R. 2018. ‘In what sense exactly are human beings more political according to Aristotle?’ Philosophy and Society 29(2), 170–181. Idowu, E.B. 1973. African Traditional Religion: A definition. London: SCM Press Ltd. Lan, D. 1985. Guns and Rain: Guerrillas and Spirit Mediums in Zimbabwe. California: University of California Press. Langa, V. 2018. ‘Governments urged to install female chiefs,’ Newsday, August 21. Lasswell, H.D. 1936. Politics: Who gets What, When, How. Chicago: Random House. Mallya, E.T. 2010. ‘Faith-based organisations, state and politics in Tanzania’ in B. Bompani and M. Frahm-Arp (eds.), Development and Politics from Below: Exploring Religious Space in the African State (pp. 131–151). New York: Palgrave MacMillan. Mbiti, J.S. 1969. African Religion and Philosophy. Nairobi: Heinneman Moyo, A.M. 1987. ‘Religion and politics in Zimbabwe’ in P. Kirsten (ed.), Religion, Development and Identity (pp.59–72). Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies. Mugabe, T. 2019. ‘Mnangagwa was ordained by God to lead his people: Church bishop tells Zimbabweans, blasts Chamisa,’ My Zimbabwe News, 2 November. www.myz​i mba​ bwe.co.zw/news/55124-mnanga​g wa-was-ordai​ned-by-god-to-lead-his-peo​ple-chu​ rch-bis​hop-tells-zimb​abwe​a ns-bla ​sts-cham ​isa.html [Accessed 19 December 2019].

Religion and Politics in Zimbabwe’s Second Republic  133 Shoko, T. 2007. Karanga Indigenous Religion in Zimbabwe: Health and Well-Being. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Company. Shoko, T. 2013. ‘ “Oozing from the Rock”: The Diesel N’anga saga in Chinhoyi, Zimbabwe,’ in Chitando, E. (ed.). Prayers and Players: Religion and Politics in Zimbabwe (pp. 37–50). Harare: Sapes Books. Sibanda, M. 2011. ‘Churches polarised as politics heats up,’ The Daily News, Harare: Wednesday March 30. Smith, D.E. 1971. Religion, Politics and Social Change in the Third World. New York: Free Press. Togarasei, L. 2004. ‘Let everyone be subject to the governing authorities: The interpretation of New Testament political ethics towards and after Zimbabwe’s presidential elections,’ Scriptura 85, 73–80. Zhakata, A. 2019. ‘President meets 13 Chimanimani, Chipinge chiefs,’ The Chronicle, www.chroni​cle.co.zw/presid​ent-meets-13-chim ​a nim ​a ni-chipi ​nge-chi​efs/ [Accessed 19 December 2019].

8 Islam and Politics in Zimbabwe’s Second Republic Silindiwe Zvingowanisei

Introduction The role of religion in the politics of nation-states is increasingly gaining prominence in recent years. Hitherto, religion had been relegated to the private life of an individual. Western myopia on religious power in the public sphere has been astounding (Scott, 2008). For a long time, scholars assumed that religions were the carriers of tradition and predicted that they would enter into decline because of secularisation and privatisation (Levine, 2000). The recent increase in claims for the recognition and implementation of religious ideas, identities, values, practices and institutions in the governance of nation-states and the lives of their citizens, however, indicates that these predictions were wrong (Eickelman and Anderson, 1999). According to Asad (2003) “a straightforward narrative of progress from the religious to the secular is no longer acceptable.” Generally, in the 21st century, religion has revived in personal and public life—a demonstration of its resurgence. In the last couple of decades, religion has made its mark on the world. It has been instrumental in the Islamisation and Christianisation of Africa (Mazrui, 1985). It has played a significant role in the socio-economic and political spheres of many African societies. Religion is, therefore, a power to reckon with. As Ranger (1986) rightly observed, “society can ignore religion at its own peril.” The role of religion in society is, however, ambivalent. While in some cases religion has contributed to social cohesion and peace, in others it has led to instability and civil wars (Dillon, 2003:3). Similarly, in some contexts, religion has been responsible for positive change, in others it has been an agent for discrimination (Fox, 2000:424). In Southern Africa, for instance, religion has contributed immensely by inspiring anti-colonial struggles in liberation movements (Chimuka, 2013:19). Chitando (2013:vii) argues that it is critical to recognise that although religion has a mystical dimension, it remains a publicly observable phenomenon. According to Bourdillon (1990:2), it is necessary to examine religion within a given context and analyse how it responds to that context as it changes. It, therefore, follows that while earlier studies on religion and politics in Zimbabwe (for example, Chitando, 2013) remain relevant and informative, there is need to analyse DOI: 10.4324/9781003332435-9

Islam and Politics in Zimbabwe’s Second Republic  135 how the changing context brought new challenges and responses. This essay seeks to address this changing context by focusing on the nexus between religion and politics in Zimbabwe with particular focus on the Second Republic. In this essay, politics should be understood as, “the art or science concerned with winning and holding control over a government” (Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 1828). In Zimbabwe, there is significant scholarly literature on the interface between religion and politics during the First Republic. However, there is a dearth of research on the same theme during the Second Republic—the focus of this essay. By using the concept of religion in relation to Islam, the essay investigates the role which it continues to play in Mnangagwa’s Zimbabwe (The New Dispensation). The argument proffered here is that just as Muslims were actively involved in Zimbabwean politics during the Mugabe era, thereby ensuring that he retained power, they have continued doing so in the New Dispensation. In the post-Mugabe era, Zimbabwe has captured global media attention due to the political, economic and social drama that is obtaining in the country. Significant research has been done on how President Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa and his ruling ZANU PF party are conducting their politics and seeking to placate a restive citizenry. Regrettably, there is paucity of literature on how religion is featuring in the Zimbabwean crisis. This essay seeks to contribute towards clarifying the role of religion during this period, focusing particularly on Islam. It seeks to interrogate the role of Islam in the politics of Zimbabwe’s Second Republic. The essay is based on field research and it seeks to demonstrate that Islam has continued to play a key role in the socio-economic and political arenas on Zimbabwe’s New Dispensation just like it did in the First Republic. It employs a phenomenological approach and hence attempts to refrain from a critical assessment of the claims made by the informants. The chapter uses pseudonyms for all the study participants. In order to put the nexus between Islam and politics in Zimbabwe’s New Dispensation into proper perspective, it is vital to first identify the three main Muslim communities in the country, that is, the Muslims of Asian origin, the Africans of Malawian extraction and the indigenous Varemba. This is because Islam in Zimbabwe is not homogenous. The role played by each Muslim community in the politics of the country is influenced by their historical backgrounds and their socio-economic statuses. Asians Apart from the Malawian Muslims in Zimbabwe, the largest group of practising Muslims is the Muslims of Asian origin. This community is the most affluent and elite of all Muslims in the country. They are concentrated in towns and cities, throughout the country where they run different types of businesses (Mandivenga, 1989) ranging from manufacturing, wholesaling and retailing among others. Some are highly educated and operate high profile businesses such as law-firms, surgeries inter alia.

136  Silindiwe Zvingowanisei 2018 Harmonised Elections After Robert Gabriel Mugabe’s resignation from power as the President of Zimbabwe on 21 November 2017, Mnangagwa was voted to be the President of the country in the hotly contested presidential elections which were held on 30 July 2018, after completing Mugabe’s term in between. His election was, however, challenged by some of his competitors in the presidential race, particularly, Nelson Chamisa, leader of the opposition Movement for Democratic ChangeAlliance (MDCA). Chamisa disputed the results of the election arguing that the whole electoral process was flawed and that they had been rigged. He dragged the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) and Mnangagwa to the courts over the issue. In connection with this, a local daily paper, Newsday, carried the following report: Judges will today preside over a matter which will decide on who will lead Zimbabwe for the next five years … Chief Justice Luke Malaba will lead a cast of eight judges picked from the fourteen Supreme Court Judges. These include Deputy Chief Justice Elizabeth Gwaunza, Former Zimbabwe Electoral Commission Chairperson, Justice Rita Makarau, Justices Paddington Garwe, Chinembiri Bhunu, Baratkumar Patel, Ben Hlatswhayo, Tendai Muchena and Lavender Makoni. (NEWSDAY, 22 August 2018) It is quite interesting to note that of the nine Supreme Court Judges who presided over the case, one was a Muslim of Asian origin, that is, Justice Baratkumar Patel. This is clear demonstration that this Muslim community is actively involved in the judiciary and politics of Zimbabwe’s Second Republic up to the highest level. After the hearing, the court ruled that Mnangagwa won the election (this was a unanimous decision by the judges). Chamisa’s case was thrown out with costs for lack of evidence. Directly or indirectly, the 9-member bench had helped Mnangagwa and the ruling ZANU PF party to retain power. Alongside having some representatives in high levels of power, Islam has been actively involved in humanitarian efforts in Zimbabwe. I turn to these engagements in the following section. Islam and Humanitarian Aid Cyclone Idai Disaster

Muslims also contributed to the politics of the Second Republic by offering humanitarian aid to the victims of the cyclone Idai disaster. Zimbabwe experienced one of the most devastating natural disasters in the country’s recorded history. Cyclone Idai, a climate change induced hazard, hit the Eastern parts of Zimbabwe on 15 and 16 March 2019, affecting 270 000 people. Strong winds and heavy rains totalling 200 mm to 600 mm (equivalent to 1–2 seasons) caused flash flooding

Islam and Politics in Zimbabwe’s Second Republic  137 across parts of the provinces of Manicaland, Mashonaland East and Masvingo which are home to 44% of the country’s population leaving a trail of destruction (World Bank Report). The storm and subsequent flooding and landslides left about 340 people dead and many others missing. The force of the cyclone was concentrated in Chimanimani district in Manicaland province with at least 50% of the population affected, and loss of life greatest. There was significant damage to crops, livestock and particularly infrastructure including roads, bridges, water installations, power and communication, and many homes, schools, clinics and community structures were damaged. The cyclone came during a particularly challenging time for the country which was emerging from a drought and was grappling with economic challenges that had exacerbated humanitarian conditions across the country. According to the UN agencies, the cyclone’s impact compounded existing vulnerabilities of an estimated 270 000 people who required food assistance as well as agricultural and livelihood support. Estimates indicated that 4700 hectares of crops were destroyed in Chimanimani district alone, which was the hardest hit. Ironically, the crisis hit as the yearly harvest of food crops was underway. Households in hardest hit villages lost all their farming and livestock assets, together with their homesteads and stored food. According to a news report, Farmers in the worst affected villages of Chimanimani in Manicaland, more than 500km southeast of the capital Harare, said that the cyclone tore through the region on the eve of harvest, wiping out an already poor crop hit by an El Nino-induced drought. (News/Aljazeera, 29 March 2019) Following the President’s announcement of a “State of Disaster” on 17 March 2019, the government established an emergency committee, headed by the Ministry of Local Government, Public Works and National Housing. The military and police were mobilised for search and rescue operations and air-dropping of life saving support, as well as efforts to open road access to many of the affected wards that remained cut off as a result of damage of power and communication infrastructure. Due to the magnitude of the disaster, it became an international issue. Different international organisations such as the United Nations and UNICEF and different countries stepped in, sending humanitarian aid to Zimbabwe for the Cyclone Idai victims. A UN report concluded that, Zimbabwe is facing a multiple of humanitarian challenges as a result of climate and economic shocks. (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) Once again, the magnitude of the crisis necessitated multi-sectoral interventions, religion included. It should be noted that when the disaster struck, President Mnangagwa was out of the country. He had to cut short his visit to the United

138  Silindiwe Zvingowanisei Arab Emirates (UAE) to deal with the cyclone’s aftermath. When he returned, he discovered that churches and other Faith-Based Organisations (FBOs) were already assisting. Relief efforts were, therefore, from government, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), UN agencies, the Zimbabwean public, churches and FaithBased Organisations. Muslims joined hands with other FBOs to offer assistance to the victims of the cyclone. Imam Zidanisi had this to say, The Cyclone Idai disaster was so serious that we as Muslims we realised that the government could not handle it alone. We, therefore, joined hands with other civic and religious organizations and played our part to assist the victims. (Imam Zidanisi: interview, 2020) The Muslims mobilised international support for the victims of Cyclone Idai, many of who were left homeless, without food, clean water, sanitation or health-care. Aid was mobilised from Muslim countries such as Iran, Kuwait and Lebanon. Moreover, the local Muslims played their part as they also made their own contributions. According to Dr Amari (interview, 2019), the Cultural Centre of the Islamic Republic of Iran sponsored the transport and fuel to ferry the goods which included an assortment of food and non-food items as well as building materials to Chimanimani. Local Muslim business people also assisted the victims with food and non-food items, clean water, clothes and blankets amongst other things. Of special mention was Mr Muhammad Mussa, an affluent Asian Muslim businessman who runs several wholesale and retail shops in Harare. He donated truckloads of foodstuffs to the victims. A manager at Muhammad Mussa wholesalers noted that the businessman donated things such as mealie-meal, flour, sugar, salt, beans, cooking-oil, soya chunks and dried kapenta (matemba) inter alia, to the victims of the cyclone (Phimbiri: interview, 2020). Another Muslim businessman, Mr Zaheereri, who owns a fabric shop in Mutare also contributed by giving away blankets. He said he donated blankets because he appreciated the fact that the survivors of the cyclone could suffer from colds, fevers and flu as a result of the floods (Faraoq Zaheereri: interview, 2020). In the same spirit, Mr Janikuni, another Asian Muslim who owns a hardware shop in Mutare, donated mattresses. He also cited the fear that the victims could be affected by colds and fevers as a result of the floods (Ahmad Janikuni: interview, 2020). There were other affluent individual Muslims of Asian origin who assisted in cash or kind. In separate interviews with some of these Muslims, they confirmed that they assisted the Cyclone Idai victims in one way or the other. For example, one study participant, who is based in Mutare, noted that he helped with some haulage trucks and fuel to ferry the donated items from Mutare to Chimanimani.

Islam and Politics in Zimbabwe’s Second Republic  139 He said, The donated goods here in Mutare needed to be ferried to the affected areas. Moreover, some haulage trucks from Harare offloaded their goods in Mutare. So, there was need for transport to ferry the donated items from here to Chimanimani. (Study Participant: interview, 2020) The donations by the Muslims were, however, handed over to the government for central distribution by the army, police and other government officials. It is, therefore, interesting to note that when the Muslim assistance got to the beneficiaries in Chimanimani, they greatly appreciated the government even though it had come from the Muslims. The remarks by one Headman, whose area was amongst the hardest hit by the cyclone, confirm this. He said, Pachikoro chepaDzingire takarashikirwa neana echikoro anodarika 50 nematicha matatu kuCyclone Idai. Asitinobonga yaamho kuna President wedu VaMnangagwa nehurumende yavo pamwe nebato ririkutonga reZANU PF ngekumira nesu teshe isusu anhu euno kwaRusitu kuChimanimani penguva yetakawirwa ngedambudziko guru remafashamo emvura. Tinovabonga yaamho ngerubetsero reshe revakatipa rakaita sechikafu nemabhurangiti. Taidai takafawo ngenzara kana chando. Tinobongahe masoja nemaporisa ngebasa gukutu revakabata. (At Dzingire Primary School we lost about 50 school children and 3 teachers to cyclone Idai. However, we are very thankful to our President Mnangagwa and his government together with the ruling ZANU PF party for standing with us all, we the people of Rusitu in Chimanimani at the time where we were befallen by the disaster of floods. We are very grateful for all the assistance they gave such as food and blankets. Otherwise, we could have also died of hunger or cold. We also thank the army and the police for the great work they did.) (Headman: interview, 2020) In an interview with one Chief under whose chieftaincy a whole settlement called Copa was washed away and now non-existent, about whether they received any assistance from FBOs, his response was, Hatizii. Chetinoziya ndechekuti hurumende yaakatibetsera yaamho. Takapiwa chikafu, mabhurangiti, nguwo dzekusimira, mameturesi nemvura yakachena yekumwa. Zvirozvacho zvaikoaniswa ngemasoja, maporisa neamwe ashandi ehurumende. (We don’t know. What we know is that the government helped us a lot. We were given food, blankets, clothes to wear, mattresses and clean drinking water. The items were distributed by the soldiers, police and other government officials.) (Chief: interview, 2020) Be that as it may, this does not rule out the fact that the Muslims also played their role in offering humanitarian assistance to the victims of Cyclone Idai. It goes

140  Silindiwe Zvingowanisei without say that by so doing the Muslims were directly participating in the politics of the Second Republic. By their participation in the disaster, the Muslims helped President Mnangagwa as the Head of State as well as his ruling ZANU PF party to be appreciated by the people of Chimanimani. It, therefore, could be argued that the Muslims were indirectly helping Mnangagwa and the ZANU PF party to retain power. Muslims also contributed to the quest for peace in Zimbabwe. I turn to this theme in the next section. Islam and Peace

Islam is also contributing to peace-building in the Second Republic. It is apparent that religion is a growing force in public life in Africa, as in many parts of the world. Religion may play a positive role in development in sectors such as to stimulate economic growth, management of natural resources, conflict prevention, peace-building, health, education and governance (Ter Haar and Ellis, 2011). In agreement, Sellinger (2004:539) submits that, “If development is to be effective in the future, religion must be taken account of. Religion has to be accounted for in relation to political, cultural, environmental and economic factors.” While the essay concurs with the above sentiment, it further contends that development can only take place where there is peace and security. Yet, the last decade has seen a resurgence of religion at the centre of local and international conflict. Daily, local and international media—both electronic and print—are awash with news of religiously motivated violence. Thus, in Africa, as in many other places, religion has become a hindrance to, instead of a facilitator of, development as it is found at the centre of conflict. In light of these realities, Asian Muslims are also actively involved in conflictprevention and peace-building in the Second Republic. They are in the forefront advocating for peace among the different religious traditions in the country, mainly African Traditional Religion, Christianity and itself. They are encouraging and promoting co-existence of the three main religious traditions. They are taking preventive measures so that the Second Republic does not degenerate into another Nigeria or Somalia where religious conflicts are the order of the day, mainly pitting Muslims against Christians. For example, the atrocities perpetrated against Christians by Islamic fundamentalist groups Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab in Nigeria and Somalia, respectively. Asian Muslims take cognisance of the fact that a conducive, peaceful environment is a prerequisite for sustainable development in the Second Republic. To this end, the Cultural Centre of the Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Harare has taken it upon itself to initiate inter-religious dialogue. The main objective of the dialogue is not to prove one religion wrong and another one right. Rather, they look forward to arriving at certain points common to all religions so that all people can strive together towards building a better, peaceful world (Grand Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, 1990). Some of the objectives of Cultural Centre are:

Islam and Politics in Zimbabwe’s Second Republic  141 (a) Creating a platform for fostering mutual understanding between the followers of different religions with the aim of bringing about peace in the country. (b) Cooperating with thinkers and leaders of other religions in Zimbabwe. (c) Undertaking research on the common points between different religions. (d) Joining hands with followers of other religions in confronting those vested interests–especially the ones that are politically motivated–that thrive on creating misunderstanding and hostility among peoples of different faiths. (e) Promoting solidarity among the leaders and followers of different religions with a view to encountering the spiritual and political crises in the country, and (f ) Introducing the principles of Islamic thought in general and Shiism, in particular, to promote better understanding about pure Islam as well as to remove the existing misunderstanding. In my view, the last but not least, objective is very critical. This is because much of the misunderstandings and misinterpretation which has marked ChristianMuslim relations in Zimbabwe has been caused by ignorance on the part of Christians and Muslims. This is because many Christians are ignorant of the beliefs and teachings of Islam and vice versa. There is, therefore, a need to learn about, and appreciate other peoples’ religious beliefs. This is important so that people could do away with parochial and self-centred ideas which they hold about others’ religious beliefs (Stenger et al., 2008). In the preface of the book entitled Interreligious Dialogues in Zimbabwe, the former Cultural Counsellor of the Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran aptly summed it up when he argued that, It goes without saying that dialogue is an important factor in having an interrelated society and is a vital enterprise for having a better world. Without good and reasonable relations at international, national and local levels, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to have a safe, secure and successful world. (Shojakhani, 2017) To achieve these objectives, the Cultural Centre of the Embassy of the Republic of Iran in Zimbabwe performs different activities. For example, it organised two conferences in June and October 2019 in collaboration with the Department of Religious Studies, Classics and Philosophy, University of Zimbabwe. The theme of both conferences was “Interfaith Dialogue and Coexistence” between and among various religions in Zimbabwe such as African Traditional Religion, Christianity and Islam. Presenters were invited from academics and also from practitioners of the religions. According to an online article by the Islamic Culture and Relations Organisation/Cultural Centre of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Harare, 26 February 2020, Zimbabwe was praised for religious tolerance and peaceful coexistence as the country commemorated MILAD-UN-NABI. According to the article, As Zimbabwe commemorates Milad-un Nabi, the country has been described as one of the few countries where there is religious tolerance, peaceful

142  Silindiwe Zvingowanisei coexistence between various religious groups and a leader in the promotion of inter-faith dialogue at the highest level. Milad-un Nabi is an annual celebration to mark the birth anniversary of the Prophet of Islam, Muhammad. Speaker after speaker applauded the excellent Muslim-Christian relations in Zimbabwe. Latif submitted that there were more benefits derived from being united in diversity which augur well for the sustenance of good relations between religions. In his closing remarks, Mr Reza, the Cultural Counsellor of the Embassy of Iran, pointed out that unity must be practiced and felt. He also urged all participants who took part in the Unity Week Commemorations to be ambassadors of unity and peaceful co-existence between various religions in Zimbabwe. The ultimate aim of such conferences was to create peace and stability in the country. It is indisputable that when such Islamic initiatives are successful and peace and stability prevail in the country, the people of Zimbabwe would credit President Mnangagwa and this would help him retain power. Besides organising conferences, Asian Muslims invite top government officials to their public functions. For example, in February 2019, the Islamic Republic of Iran held celebrations in commemoration of their independence from the American colonists. In Zimbabwe, the celebrations were held at the Rainbow Towers courtesy of the Harare Embassy. The Iranian Ambassador to Zimbabwe, Dr Ahmad Erphanian, invited the Zimbabwean Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade to attend the function which was also attended by other top government officials. In his speech, the minister hailed the cordial and mutual relations which exist between the two countries. He also outlined the resultant MOUs which had been signed between them in the political, social and economic sectors. Asian Muslims also often appear on Zimbabwe Television (ZTV) hailing and applauding Zimbabwe for the peaceful environment obtaining in the country. For example, on 13 June 2019, the ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran to Zimbabwe and Dr Askari, the Cultural Counsellor of the Embassy of Islamic Republic of Iran, Harare, appeared on ZTV commending the cordial relations between their country and Zimbabwe. Festus Mukungurutse, the ZTV news presenter, concluded the bulletin saying, Zimbabwe and Iran have over the years strengthened bilateral relations through various economic, cultural and political programs. (ZTV news, 13 June 2019) Muslims and Health Service Delivery

As noted earlier, Cyclone Idai caused a lot of suffering and death in the eastern part of the country. The extensive damage and trail of destruction which it left is clearly evident for all to see. The survivors of the cyclone were still grappling with the trauma of its devastating effects at the time of writing. According to a

Islam and Politics in Zimbabwe’s Second Republic  143 UNICEF report, “Chimanimani lies in virtual ruins after Cyclone Idai ravaged the area.” In the same vein, a UN report stated that, The survivors of Cyclone Idai continue to require humanitarian assistance particularly internally displaced persons and temporary camps and living with host families. Idai caused extensive damage with an estimated $622 million. Up to $1.1 billion is needed to support Zimbabwe’s recovery and restore damaged infrastructure and livelihoods. (Zimbabwe Floods Situation Report No.3, 17 April 2019: UN office for the co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs) Consequent to these stark realities, the Member of Parliament for Chimanimai East Constituency (the worst affected part of Chimanimani district), mobilised medical aid from doctors from India. In an interview with the MP (2020), he revealed that 20 specialist doctors from India offered to give free medical assistance to the people of Chimanimani East Constituency and beyond. The services were provided at Mutare Provincial hospital from 26 February to 7 April 2020. It should, however, be noted that some of the doctors were Muslims. According to a councillor in the constituency, “Surgeons confirmed from India from 26 February to 7 April included 4 ophthalmologists, 2 orthopedics, 3 general surgeons, 1 gynaecologist, 2 dentists, 4 anesthesiologists, 1 ENT, 1 plastic surgeon, 1 neurologist and 1 dermatologist” (Councillor: interview, 2020). The services of the doctors proved invaluable to the people of Chimanimani. Almost all the survivors of the Cyclone Idai disaster needed counselling after the traumatic experiences. For instance, the case of a whole settlement called Copa which was washed away and is now non-existent, those who either lost their loved ones or whose loved ones were washed away as far afield as Mozambique, those who lost all their farming and livestock assets together with their homesteads and stored food, and those who were displaced. A UN report noted that 60 000 people were displaced in the four worst affected districts (Buhera, Chimanimani, Chipinge and Mutare). The injured also needed counselling in addition to surgery. According to the same UN report, doctors were needed to offer counselling services to the survivors of Cyclone Idai, some of whom sustained broken hips, pelvis or limbs among other injuries after being trapped under the mud. Interested patients from Chimanimani East Constituency and beyond were invited to come and receive the free medical assistance. While Zimbabwe waited for the arrival of the doctors from India, local Muslim doctors were already on the ground offering medical assistance to the victims of Cyclone Idai. For example, during the crisis, medical personnel from the Clinic of the Red Crescent Society of the Islamic Republic of Iran visited the affected areas and offered free medical services to the victims including medication. The clinic was established in Harare in 2006 to offer humanitarian services in the form of medical assistance to the less privileged members of society. Their services went a long way in addressing the plight of the Cyclone Idai victims.

144  Silindiwe Zvingowanisei One study participant, a grand mother of six, could not hide her gratitude when she said, Pakaitika cyclone ndakarashikirwa ngemusha nezviro zvangu zveshe. Inini neazukuru angu takakwanisa kurarama. Asi takapindwa ngechando, tikaita mazuwa matatu tisina kudya. Takarwara tikade kufa. Asi kwakazouya vanachiremba vakatirapa nekutipa mishonga mahara. Hino taba tagwinya teshe. Tinobonga diko. Pamberi naPresident Mnangagwa, Pamberi neZANUPF. (When the cyclone struck, I lost my entire homestead and property. My grandchildren and I managed to survive. But we were affected by colds and we went for three days without food. We fell sick and almost died. But some doctors came and treated us freely in addition to giving us free medication. Now we are all very fit. We sincerely thank them. Long live President Mnangagwa. Long live ZANU PF.) (Grandmother: interview, 2020) Another study participant, a single mother of four, echoed the same sentiments saying, Mvura yakapinda mumhatso mwendanga ndakaata neana angu arongomuna. Atatu akafiremwo. Ndakakwanisa kubuda neumwe ane mwedzi mitanhatu. Iye akazoitawo fever neflue zvekuti akange akutodawo kufa. Asi tinobonga yaamho madhokota akauya akamurapa mahara nekumupa mushonga. Izvozvi atoti gwindiri. Tinobonga President wedu VaMnangagwa ngekuti haana kutirasha. (Water entered the house where I was sleeping with my four children. Three drowned and I only managed to escape with one who was six months old. He later caught some fever and flue and almost died. But we are very grateful to the doctors who came and treated him freely and gave him free medication. Now he is fully recovered. We thank our President Mnangagwa because he did not forget or abandon us.) (Kufakunesu: interview, 2020) The two interviews clearly demonstrate how President Mnangagwa and his government got the credit even when the assistance was initiated by the Muslims. It is therefore indisputable that Islam is actively involved in the politics of the New Dispensation. Circumcision

Besides the Muslim medical assistance to the Cyclone Idai victims, they are also participating in the male circumcision programme which was initiated by the government. According to a senior Muslim leader, in Islam male circumcision is not really about HIV/AIDS. It is a traditional Muslim practice dating back to the pre-HIV/AIDS era. Every Muslim man must be circumcised as a way of exercising cleanliness. He further submitted that in the wake of the HIV pandemic, scientific research has shown that male circumcision reduces a man’s risk of becoming infected with the HIV during heterosexual intercourse significantly. Muslims

Islam and Politics in Zimbabwe’s Second Republic  145 have therefore been always in the forefront advocating and bringing awareness of circumcision as a measure that reduces HIV/AIDS infection. This explains why there has been a low prevalence of HIV infection among the Muslims. The senior Muslim leader further intimated that, Consequently, an agreement was signed between the government of Zimbabwe through the Ministry of Health and Child Welfare and Population Services International (PSI) and the Muslims through the Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs, mandating and authorizing the latter to circumcise males nationwide. As Muslims, we are therefore involved in outreach programmes throughout the country circumcising males. The program is funded by the Turkish government and the procedures are carried out by some Turkish doctors. (Senior Muslim leader: interview, 2020) The foregoing is indisputably ample evidence of Muslim participation in national activities in Zimbabwe’s Second Republic. Muslims Originally from Malawi The Muslims originally from Malawian make up the other significant section of the Muslim community in Zimbabwe. They are–as indicated–of Malawian extraction and they may be described as the largest single group that migrated to Zimbabwe. This community in Zimbabwe has also in their own way participated directly or indirectly in the politics of the Second Republic. The Malawian Muslims are concentrated on mines and farms where their labour is enlisted (Mandivenga, 1983). Given that agriculture is the backbone of the Zimbabwean economy, it therefore follows that the services of these Muslims are vital in the economic and political sectors of the country. It is indisputable that the first and foremost goal of any elected government is to ensure the food security of the country. To this end, Zimbabwe is no exception, and to achieve this, the government put various measures in place. For example, the Ministry of Agriculture was put in place to oversee agricultural activities and to ensure food security in the country. President Mnangagwa’s government is channelling huge amounts of money into this sector to ensure bumper harvests, especially of maize, the staple food in the country, and the prevention of hunger. As the popular saying goes, “A hungry man is an angry man,” when people’s stomachs are full, chances of rising against the government are minimised, if not totally removed. One strategy being used to ensure food security in the country is what is popularly known as Command Agriculture. This is a system where commercial farmers are loaned agricultural inputs such as seeds, fertilisers and pesticides. The establishment of the Agribank whose mandate is to help farmers with loans to finance their agricultural activities was yet another strategy. In the light of this, it can be argued that anyone who collaborates with the commercial farmers to ensure bumper harvests and food security in the country would be playing a

146  Silindiwe Zvingowanisei pivotal role. The Muslims originally from Malawi are doing so through rendering their labour service which is proving to be invaluable in this sector. An example is Schola Farm in Wedza where the majority of the labour force are the Malawian Muslims. They are popularly known as Machawa, a name derived from the Chewa language which is their mother tongue. Mr Tsungai, a farm worker at the farm had this to say, Sekuru vangu vakabva kuMalawi kuma 1960. Ini ndakabarwa muna 1975 nekureriwa paSikora. Ndakatangawo kusevenza ipapo muna 1992 kusvika izvozvi. Tinorima chibage, sezvo sadza riri iro rinodyiwa nemunhu wese munyika muno. Kana takohwa murungu anotengesa kuGMB. (My grandfather came from Malawi in the 1960s. Myself, I was born in 1975 and bred at Schola farm. I started working there in 1992 up to now. We grow maize since sadza is the staple food in the country. After harvesting, the white man sells the maize to the Grain Marketing Board.) (Tsungai: interview, 2019) In January 2020, Zimbabwe was going through a mealie-meal crisis. This very basic commodity which constitutes the basic diet for the majority of Zimbabweans was in short supply. When one got it from the private millers, the prices would be far beyond the reach of many ordinary Zimbabweans who were already living below the poverty datum line. A local daily newspaper carried the following headline report which clearly demonstrates the magnitude of the crisis. “PUBLIC FREAKS OVER MEALIE-MEAL CRISIS” (The Daily News, 5 February 2020). Faced with the crisis, the Grain Marketing Board swiftly came to the rescue of President Mnangagwa and his government by manufacturing low-cost mealiemeal from straight-run maize for sale, popularly known as Chibataura. The word means if one eats sadza made from that mealie-meal, one would go for a long time before feeling hungry. This was meant to counter the private millers who were charging exorbitant prices for this basic commodity. The majority of Zimbabweans who were already reeling under the economic crisis in the country could not afford the high prices. The GMB was therefore selling a 10 kg bag of Chibataura for $50 vis-à-vis $160 being charged by private millers for the same quantity of refined mealie-meal. Consequently, the poverty-stricken masses of Zimbabwe were applauding President Mnangagwa and his government for being sensitive to their plight. Moreover, during the programme, “Face the Nation,” over the radio on 12 February 2020 a representative of the Ministry of Agriculture revealed that the country had enough grain stocks to last the next 3 months. When asked what people would eat after the stocks had run out, he answered that people would have harvested. He also said that international organisations such as the UN had promised to chip in with food aid. When asked what the government was doing as a country, besides the international aid, to ensure that people did not starve, his answer again was that people would have harvested. The people whom the government official was referring to here include the commercial farmers who enlist the labour of the Muslims originally from Malawi

Islam and Politics in Zimbabwe’s Second Republic  147 and who sell their produce to the GMB. The commercial farmers are the ones who produce to feed the nation unlike the subsistence farmers who produce for their own consumption. The commercial farmers, therefore, rely on the labour of the Muslims originally from Malawi since many of the local Shona people prefer to work on their own pieces of land. Some locals who used to work on the commercial farms left to work on their own small farms which they acquired during the land reform programme. The Muslims originally from Malawi were, therefore, playing a pivotal role in the Second Republic by providing their indispensable farm labour. The Varemba The third group of Muslims in Zimbabwe is the Varemba people. They are the local Shona, Swahili and Sena who were Islamised by the Arab Muslim traders through their direct contact with them (Mandivenga, 1992). Their headquarters is in Mberengwa and their dominating title is Zhou (Zachrisson, 1978). The Varemba are mainly found in the rural areas (Mandivenga, 1983:1; Chitando, 2018:24). Thus, besides their concentration in Mberengwa, the Varemba also have a strong presence in Gutu, Gokwe, Buhera, Mt. Darwin, Wedza, Guruve, Hurungwe, Murewa, Masvingo, particularly in Chivi, Nyajena, Majiri, Zaka and around the Great Zimbabwe area. The July 2018 Harmonised Elections

Many of the Varemba people are also actively participating in the politics of Zimbabwe’s Second Republic (including others who support or are in the leadership of the MDCA or, after 2022, the Citizens Coalition for Change, CCC). For instance, some of them played a key role during the July 2018 harmonised elections, referred to earlier in this essay. They went out to vote in their large numbers. The results of the elections showed that most of the constituencies inhabited by the Varemba people elected a ZANU PF candidate to represent them as their Member of Parliament. The winning MPs for the four Mberengwa constituencies, which we said is the headquarters of the Varemba, clearly demonstrates this point. According to the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission, the MPs declared winners after the harmonised elections were as follows: Constituency Mberengwa North Mberengwa South Mberengwa West Mberengwa East

Winning MP Zhou Tafanana Mpofu Alum Gumbo Joram Raidza Marko

It is interesting to note that all these winners were ZANU PF candidates. Moreover, President Mnangagwa himself hails from Zvishavane in the Midlands Province where the headquarters of the Varemba is located. Many of the Varemba,

148  Silindiwe Zvingowanisei therefore, voted for one of their own, “a son of the soil,” Mnangagwa, popularly known as ED, to be at the helm of the Second Republic. One Headman, a leader of one of the Varemba clans in Mberengwa, summed it up by saying, KuMberengwa totsigira mwana wevhu, wezhira, President Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa (ED) pamwe chete nebato ririkutonga reZANU PF. Hatina umwe President watoziva kunze kwaVaMnangagwa. (In Mberengwa we support the son of the soil, homeboy, President Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa (ED) together with the ruling ZANU PF party. We know no other president except His Excellency Mnangagwa.) (Headman: interview, 2020) All this clearly demonstrates that many of the Varemba are actively participating in the politics of the Second Republic, voting for President Mnangagwa and electing ZANU PF Members of Parliament, as well as ensuring that they retain power. Participation in National Events Besides their participation in relation to their respective communities, Muslims through the Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs also participate in other national events in the country. The Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs in Zimbabwe is the umbrella body for all Muslims in the country. It was founded in 1986 and one of its objectives is to unify and enhance sharing and working together as one Muslim community. At the time of writing, the National Chair of the Council was Sheikh Engineer Sani AbuBakr Mtola, while the President was Sheikh Ishmil Duwa. National Clean-up Coordinating Committee–Religion

One such event is the National Clean-up Campaign, an initiative of the First Lady, Mrs Auxillia Mnangagwa. In this initiative, each religion is responsible for a different task. The First Lady tasked the Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs to be responsible for transport (Interview: Senior Muslim leader 2020). A committee was set up for this initiative code named NCCC-R (National Clean-up Coordinating Committee–Religion). Different people through their respective religions take turns to chair the monthly committee meetings and to lead in the events of that month. Sheikh Duwa, through the Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs in Zimbabwe, was slotted to chair and lead in April 2020 (Senior Muslim leader, interview 2020). Besides participation in the National Clean-up campaign, Muslims from all the three communities also participate at the Independence and Heroes celebrations. Furthermore, about 27 000 Muslims participated in the Anti-Sanction Campaign in 2019, an initiative of President Mnangagwa against the sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe by America (Sheikh Magura: interview 2020).

Islam and Politics in Zimbabwe’s Second Republic  149 The above engagements and many others, too numerous to mention due to space constraints, are clear demonstration that Muslims in Zimbabwe are actively involved in the politics of the Mnangagwa era. Conclusion The essay has attempted an exploration of the relationship between Islam and politics in Zimbabwe’s Second Republic. It has investigated whether Islam is involved in the politics of the country or not. The discussion has clearly demonstrated that Islam played and continues to play a significant role in the political arena of the country. Islam (through its three main communities) in Zimbabwe has sought to be relevant and occupy its place in the public space. In some contexts, Islam has directly participated in the politics of the country. For example, many of the rural Varemba have clearly endorsed Mnangagwa and his party. In other contexts, however, Islam’s contribution to the politics of the New Dispensation has been indirect. For instance, the Asian Muslims and their role in the Cyclone Idai crisis, as well as their initiatives of interfaith dialogues among many other activities. The same is true of the Muslims originally from Malawi and their contribution in the mealie-meal crisis. From the foregoing discussion, it can, therefore, be noted that Muslims are actively participating in the politics of the Second Republic, which is, however, ambivalent. While in some cases it is direct, in other cases it is indirect. References Secondary Sources Aljazeera News. 2019. Cyclone Idai destroys Zimbabwe farms, deepening food crisis. https://www.aljaze​era.com Asad, T. 2003. Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei. 1990. Centre for Interreligious Dialogue at a Glance. Tehran: SAMA. Centre for Interreligious Dialogue, Department of Education and Research, Building No. 14, Islamic Cultures and Relations Organisation, Imam Khameini Complex, Resalat Expressway, Tehran, Iran. Bourdillon, M.F.C. 1990. Religion and Society: A Text for Africa. Gweru: Mambo Press. Chimuka, T. 2013. “Religion and Politics in Zimbabwe: Nascent Forces or Blessed Bedfellows?” in E. Chitando (ed.), Prayers and Players: Religion and Politics in Zimbabwe. pp. 19–36. Harare: Sapes Books. Chitando, E. 2013. “Introduction: Prayers and Players: Religion and Politics in Troubled Times in Zimbabwe,” in E. Chitando (ed.), Prayers and Players: Religion and Politics in Zimbabwe. pp vi–xv. Harare: Sapes Books. Chitando, E. 2018. “The Religions of Zimbabwe in their Plurality,” in L. Togarasei (ed.), Aspects of Pentecostal Christianity in Zimbabwe. pp. 15–32. Cham: Springer. Dillon, M. 2003. “The Sociology of Religion in Late Modernity,” in M. Dillon (ed.), Handbook of the Sociology of Religion. pp. 3–15. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

150  Silindiwe Zvingowanisei Eickelman, D. and Anderson, J. 1999. “Redefining Muslim Politics,” in New Media in the Muslim World: The Emerging Public Sphere. pp. 1–18. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Fox, J. 2000. “Religious causes of Discrimination against Ethno-Religious Minorities,” in International Studies Quarterly 44(3), 423–450. Levine, D. 2000. “The News about Religion in Latin America,” in M. Silk (ed.), Religion on the International News Agenda. Pp. 120–138. Connecticut: Leonard E. Greenberg Center. Mandivenga, E.C. 1983. Islam in Zimbabwe. Gweru: Mambo Press. Mandivenga, E.C. 1989 “The Migration of Muslims to Zimbabwe,” in Journal Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs 10(2), 507–519. Mandivenga, E.C. 1992. “Muslims and Pre-colonial History of Zimbabwe”, in Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 13(1), 99–115. Mazrui, A. 1985. “Religion and Political Culture in Africa,” in Journal of the American Academy of Religion 53(4), 817–839. Ranger, T.O. 1986. “Religious Movements and Politics in Sub-Saharan Africa,” in African Studies Review 29(2), 1–69. Scott, R. 2008. “Retrieving the Missing Dimension of Statecraft: Religious Faiths in the Service of Peace-building,” in Douglas, J. (ed.), Faith-Based Diplomacy: Trumping Real Politik. pp. 231–258. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sellinger, L. 2004. “The Forgotten Factor. The Uneasy Relationship between Religion and Development,” in Social Compass 51(4), 523–543. Shojakhani, M. 2017. Interreligious Dialogues in Zimbabwe. Tehran: Alhoda International Publishing Group. Stenger, F. et al. (eds). 2008. Christian-Muslim Co-existence in Eastern Africa. Nairobi: Paulines Publications Africa. Ter Haar, G. & Ellis, S. (eds.) 2011. Religion and Development: Ways of Transforming the World. London: Hurst and Company. Websters Dictionary 1828 – Online. https://www.wester​sdic​t ion​a ry1​828.com Zachrisson, P. 1978. An African Area in Change: Belingwe 1894–1946: A Study of Colonialism, Missionary Activity and African Response to Southern Rhodesia. Bulletin of Department of History, No. 17. pp. 13–14. Gothenburg: University of Gothenburg.

9 The Appropriation of the Bible in the Zimbabwean Narrative by the Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops Conference Lessons for the Second Republic Ishanesu Sextus Gusha

Introduction This chapter focuses on the appropriation of the Bible in the Zimbabwean narrative by the Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops Conference (ZCBC) (see also Chapter 1 by Gunda in this volume). The context of this appropriation was the 40th independence celebration of Zimbabwe in 2020 and the number 40 was theologised in relation to these celebrations. The primary document for this appropriation has been the Pastoral Letter which was referred to as the 21st-century oracle by the 21st-century prophets. The chapter explores the significance of the Bible in the public space in Zimbabwe and lessons that can be drawn from this appropriation by the Second Republic. The chapter concludes that the 40th independence was an opportunity for a reflection of the past, a window for a new beginning for Zimbabwe and a reconfiguration of the country’s narrative. The Context The Bible is an important book in Zimbabwe. According to Gunda and Kügler (2011: 7), “the Bible has socially occupied an uncontested place in the hearts and minds of many Zimbabweans.” This is not surprising, since the majority of Zimbabweans are Christians. Gunda and Kügler (2011:9) further argues that, “that the Bible is a manual for daily living is attested in almost all Christian denominations, how this role is transformed into practice is clearly an area that remains a contested terrain among Christians.” This means that the influence of the Bible is not limited to the religious space only. Gunda (2010:69) concludes that, “the Bible therefore, has been precisely understood in Zimbabwe as the divine answer book to all human questions, and all one has to do is approach the Bible to get the necessary answer for any circumstance facing them.” The Roman Catholic Church (hereinafter referred to as RCC) is one of the biggest churches in Zimbabwe. They have an approximate membership of one million five hundred and fifty seven thousand two hundred and eighty five (1 557 285) people (www.zcbc.co.zw/index.html). Phiri describes the RCC as, “one of DOI: 10.4324/9781003332435-10

152  Ishanesu Sextus Gusha the most influential civil organisations in Zimbabwe” (Phiri, 2013: II). The RCC is made up of the following dioceses and their respective bishops (at the time of writing): Harare Archdiocese led by Archbishop Robert C Ndlovu, Bulawayo Archdiocese led by Archbishop Alex Thomas Kaliyanil, Chinhoyi Diocese led by Rt Rev Raymond Mupandasekwa, Mutare Diocese led by Rt Rev Paul Horan, Masvingo Diocese led by Rt Rev Michael Dixon Bhasera, Hwange Diocese led by Rt Rev Alberto Serrano, Gokwe Diocese led by Rt Rev Rudolf Nyandoro and Gweru Diocese which is vacant at the time of writing (www.zcbc.co.zw/index. html). The eight dioceses and their bishops come together to form ZCBC. In the Zimbabwean context, ZCBC is listed among the ecumenical bodies, but it is not an ecumenical body in the sense of the Zimbabwe Council of Churches (ZCC) and the Evangelical Fellowship of Zimbabwe (EFZ). These other bodies are made up of different denominations which is a different scenario with ZCBC which is made up of one denomination but different dioceses. The organisational structure of the ZCBC is like that of the Anglican Council of Zimbabwe (ACZ) which is also made up of one denomination but with five different dioceses. ZCBC was constituted on 1 October 1969 by the Roman decree www.zcbc.co.zw/ index.html). In order to meet its missionary mandate, ZCBC has the following commissions and organisations: General Secretariat, Social Communications, Caritas Zimbabwe, Health Commission, Catholic Parliamentary Liaison Office, the Pontifical Mission Societies, National Pastoral Centre Commission, National Marriage Tribunal, Education Commission, HIV and AIDS Desk and Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe (www.zcbc.co.zw/index.html). These commissions and organisations are vehicles through which the ZCBC fulfils its God given mandate. In terms of the hierarchy of the ZCBC, at the time of writing, Archbishop Robert C Ndlovu was the President, Archbishop Alex Thomas Kaliyanil was the Vice President, and Bishop Paul Horan was the Secretary General. All the remaining bishops were members of the ZCBC. Chitando, Taringa and Mapuranga argue that, “theologians and scholars of religion have been quite courageous and creative in challenging the abuse of power in Zimbabwe” (Chitando, Taringa and Mapuranga, 2014:185). The ZCBC is one such institution that has remained prophetic and courageous in the public space and this reputation dates back to the colonial period. For example, in 2008, ZCBC argued that, From colonial times to the post independent times, governments have failed to facilitate the construction of a society that is respectful of the dignity of all persons and guarantee security, justice and peace. Instead, economic, political and social exclusion has encouraged the development of racism, negative ethnicity, gender discrimination and pessimism for the youth. (ZCBC, 2008:1) Tarusarira, however, holds a different opinion as he argues that, “churches in postindependence Zimbabwe, have not provided the required cognitive, emotional and moral guidance in dealing with the legacies of the political past as well as

Lessons for the Second Republic  153 present political challenges to the government” (Tarusarira, 2016:59). Tarusarira’s sentiments should be understood in the context of his criticism of the church’s methodologies in confronting social challenges. He advocates for an aggressive approach to the social challenges that are typical of other civic organisations as opposed to the diplomatic and non-aggressive approach of the Church. Appropriation of the Bible What is appropriation of the Bible? Is not all exegesis already appropriation? This is a long debate that we cannot pursue in this chapter. The background to the issue of the appropriation of the Bible has to do with the subject of interpretation, especially on what constitutes the meaning of the text. Is there a difference between meaning and interpretation? Or are they one and the same thing? The general position from many scholars, for example, Hirsch (1976) is that there is a difference between meaning and interpretation. According to Hirsch (1976:1–2), “meaning is that which is represented by a text; it is what the author meant by his use of a particular sign sequence; it is what the signs represent.” It is different from interpretation in that interpretation is an attempt to put into words the meaning of a text, to explicate meaning in intelligible terms. But interpretation is not meaning. Interpretations are invariably partial, fallible, and more or less adequate. Hirsch further argues that, “meaning is fixed and stable, purposed and intentional, and shareable and public” (Hirsch, 1967:8). The issue of a single meaning in Hirsch is premised on what he calls authorial intention. What was the intention of the author when he/she wrote a text? That original intention is what Hirsch calls the meaning of the text. Whatever meaning is given outside the authorial intention, Hirsch calls it appropriation or significance of the text. Bergmann (2013:39) argues that, “appropriation of biblical texts means that the texts are applied outside of their original historical context to give insight to new issues.” In the words of Rugwiji, “to appropriate is to make what was alien become one’s own” (Rugwiji, 2020:1). This means that a particular text is appropriated differently, from one context to another. In simple words, appropriation and application of a text are one and the same thing. It is, therefore, correct to say, appropriation is a fancy word for application. The Bible is an ancient document and written to a different context than ours (alien); hence, we cannot appropriate it in a straightforward manner. So, how do we appropriate texts? Ernst M. Conradie (2004:130) identifies seven dimensions that are involved in the appropriation of the Bible in a particular contemporary context and these are: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

The world-behind-the-text; The world-of-the-text; The world-in-front-of-the-text; The act of interpretation and appropriation itself; The rhetorical thrust of the act of interpretation and appropriation; The contemporary context; The world ‘below’ interpretation.

154  Ishanesu Sextus Gusha These seven dimensions of appropriation are not explored further in this chapter. What is needed is to pick some thematic issues or theological issues as we appropriate it to our context. Heacock further argues that, “this reality offers a new means of engagement both with the contemporary culture and the text” (Heacock, 2016:4). West concurs with Heacock in that, “appropriation offers information on how the text was appropriated in different contexts and how it addressed social justice” (West, 2013:3). Therefore, in this chapter, one revisits how the Bible has been used by the ZCBC in engaging the government of Zimbabwe in light of the socio-economic challenges facing the country in the past 40 years. The Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops Conference Pastoral Letter on the 40th Anniversary of Zimbabwe’s Independence The Catholic Church has continued to play its prophetic role in Zimbabwe since independence. They have produced notable documents and reports, such as Gukurahundi in Zimbabwe: Report on the Disturbances that took place in Matabeleland in the 1980s (well-known as the CCJP report on Gukurahundi, 1997) and the Zimbabwe We Want which they produced together with ZCC and EFZ (in 2006). However, the findings and recommendations of these documents were suppressed. This chapter discusses the more recently produced Pastoral Letter on the 40th Anniversary of Zimbabwe’s Independence. Pastoral letters have been one of the important methodologies used by the ZCBC in addressing the country’s authorities on challenges facing the nation. Gundani considers pastoral statements/letters by bishops as, Useful, credible, if rudimentary, sources that historians can use in crafting church history. Pastoral statements are not entirely the story of the leadership but often reflections of the faith stories of the entire church that the bishops represent. The bishop’s pastoral statements have traditionally been understood as forming part of the magisterium, that is teaching of the Catholic Church within a particular locality. They are not private but public statements/letters often addressed to Catholics, but sometimes addressed to the wider Christian body or the wider society depending on the nature of the issues under focus. (Gundani, 2008) Pastoral letters/statements are not products of bishops’ creative thinking or reflection but they are as a result of wide consultations within the church. Bishops normally consult respective constituencies within their dioceses before issuing them for public consumption. Levels of consultations vary from deanery councils, diocesan pastoral councils, episcopal commissions, councils for priests, councils for laity and theologians. Therefore, they are inclusive documents; hence, Gundani is correct to say that they reflect the churches represented by these bishops. Since 1980, the ZCBC has produced over one hundred of these letters and they are an important repository of understanding church-state relations or the participation of the RCC in the public space. They are rich documents that demonstrate deep

Lessons for the Second Republic  155 reflection and analysis on the issues on the ground. Tarusarira, however, has a different view of them (pastoral letters) as he argues that, Pastoral letters regardless of how intellectually sharp and thorny they may be, appear[s]‌to make the church distant from the people, and only provide[s] interaction between the letter and the reader, or to be a little more fair, between the reader and the bishops, in an impersonal way, but do not provide a dialogical process. They need to be accessible to the grassroots. (Tarusarira, 2016:61) While Tarusarira’s analysis that the pastoral letters are not accessible to the grassroots may be correct, the most important thing is that they reach their target audience, the political leadership. However, regardless of Tarusarira’s criticism, this chapter would like to equate these pastoral letters with the oracles of the 8th-century BC prophets. Therefore, they are the 21st-century oracles by the 21st-century prophets, the ZCBC. The ZCBC Pastoral Letter on the 40th Anniversary of Zimbabwe’s Independence is therefore the primary document in our discussion on how the Bible is being appropriated in the Zimbabwe’s 40 years’ narrative. The adage, ‘life begins at 40,’ is well known in many societies, but one wonders whether many people understand it. Many people understand it erroneously to their own advantage. They live outrageous behaviours hoping that they have enough time ahead of them to make things right and prosper. However, the notion means that reaching 40 years of age is an important milestone and one ought to have accumulated enough experience to negotiate life’s challenges effectively. Zimbabwe attained her independence in 1980 and 18th April 2020 marked the 40th birthday of the nation of Zimbabwe. They were preparations for the massive independence celebrations and this adage was at the centre of the Second Republic’s discourse to mark the beginnings of the better things to come. The celebrations were, however, dented by the COVID-19 pandemic as the country had to celebrate this important day under a three-week lockdown period. This did not stop the ZCBC from reflecting on the 40 years of independence and issuing of a theological reflection in form of a pastoral letter. The 40th independence celebrations were the immediate context that prompted the writing of the pastoral letter. The Appropriation of the Bible in the Zimbabwean Narrative The pastoral letter begins with the salutation in which it is addressed to the brothers and sisters of good will. This is the same literary feature we find in Pauline epistles. Paul would begin his letters by greeting the brethren in Christ. In the introduction, the letter begins by quoting 2 Corinthians 6:2, “For he says, In the time of my favour I heard you, and in the day of salvation I helped you. I tell you, now is the time of God’s favour, now is the day of salvation.” (Καιρῷ δεκτῷ ἐπήκουσά σου καὶ ἐν ἡμέρᾳ σωτηρίας ἐβοήθησά σοι· ἰδοὺ νῦν καιρὸς

156  Ishanesu Sextus Gusha εὐπρόσδεκτος, ἰδοὺ νῦν ἡμέρα σωτηρίας). This Pauline text is a verbatim citation of Isaiah 49:8a. Sindo argues that, What Paul is driving home is that the Corinthians are to live lives that are compatible with the new dispensation that has been achieved through the death and the resurrection of Christ. Paul wants the Corinthians to know that “the acceptable time” and the “day of salvation” have been fulfilled in the death and resurrection of Christ. If the Corinthians reject Paul as their apostle, then they are rejecting Christ whom Paul represents as an apostle. (Sindo, 2014:143) In the text, we see Paul already appropriating Isaiah 49:8a for his context and audience. Harris (2005:462) echoes that, “Paul now applies the Old Testament text to the contemporary situation. He now focuses on the present.” The ZCBC is, therefore, engaging an appropriated text and further appropriates it in their pastoral letter. This is a second layer of appropriation of the text; therefore, appropriation of a text is an ongoing process. Key to this text is the Greek word καιρὸς (kairos) and the ZCBC links it to the number 40. It means that the theological reflection of the letter is centred on these two concepts and an in-depth analysis of them is needed. The Καιρὸς (Kairos) Moment of Number 40 In Greek language there are many words for time: φορά, ώρα, χρόνος, εποχή, καιρός, συγχρονίζω, κανονίζω τον καιρό and μετρώ τον καιρό, but the common ones are χρονος (chronos) and καιρὸς (kairos). According to Regan, “chronos refers to chronological or sequential or linear time” (Regan, 1993). Chronos is time that is measurable or chronicled. One can measure chronos by looking at a watch or calendar. Delahaye (2016:90) argues that, “it is time as it is experienced in everyday factual life. It sees time as a continuity between every moment and the next.” Chronos is quantitative in nature, while kairos is qualitative. Of particular significance to this chapter is καιρὸς. Sipiora (2002:1) traces καιρὸς to ancient Greece and it was a name of a god who represented opportunity. It means the right or opportune time of supreme time. McFarland (2014:2) defines καιρὸς as, “a moment of undetermined period of time in which something unique and special happens. It is a watershed moment that affects every aspect of the person’s life.” Καιρὸς breaks the linear progression of time and can be measured by sensing the opportune time through psychological attentive to situation or meaning (Regan, 1993). This means that in the midst of χρονος, καιρὸς happens. According to Bekker (2018:2), “it is a force or power that breaks through the expected or the repetitive.” Tillich (1957:32) concludes that, “it implies a consciousness of the present and for action in the present.” The ZCBC takes the attainment of 40 years of independence as the opportune moment. The questions then are: In what sense is 40 years an opportune moment? What is the link between

Lessons for the Second Republic  157 40 years and opportunity? In the introduction, ZCBC articulates this opportunity as follows: For the children of Zimbabwe this is a moment of recognizing the opportunity offered to us by God. It demands that we look back to where we are coming from, acknowledge our gains, sins, and pains, reflect on where we are today and looking into the future, initiate processes that will lead us to the dream that God has and the dream that we have for our country, Zimbabwe. (ZCBC, 2020:1) This deep reflection of the country’s state of affairs had been done through a theological analysis of the biblical usage of the number 40. The Appropriation of the Number 40 in the Zimbabwean Narrative The Zimbabwean narrative in the past 40 years is an interesting one. It is a narrative with mixed episodes of joy, sadness, successes and failures. On reflection on the past 40 years, the ZCBC observed the following: Zimbabwe as a nation was born out of the hunger for freedom from oppression, racism, inequality, violation of basic human rights and dignity, poverty and hunger. The independence came out of a protracted armed struggle. Independence created high hopes and expectations for a just, peaceful and prosperous Zimbabwe. The first decade or so of independent Zimbabwe, witnessed progress on the economic, education and health sectors with special attention given to those who were marginalized under colonial rule. (ZCBC, 2020:2) This does not mean that the first decade was perfect. Though the Catholic bishops seem to be positive about the decade, the first five years of the first decade were the darkest years in Zimbabwe’s 40-year narrative. The Pastoral Letter acknowledges that, “it was a dark chapter in our national memory which led to the killing of many civilians in Matabeleland and parts of Midlands province” (ZCBC, 2020:2). It was like a dark moment for the Israelites in the wilderness when the entire generation was almost wiped in Number 13–14. The first decade was a missed opportunity for national healing and policy of reconciliation. However, what could have gone wrong in the past 40 years as the ship (Zimbabwe) began to sink? The ZCBC’s Pastoral Letter begins by appropriating Genesis 7:12. This is the story of the destruction of the world and the saving of Noah and his family. It rained for 40 days and 40 nights. McKeown (2008:57) argues that, Noah’s family and the animals must enter the ark to escape the flood. Thus two aspects of the same truth are held in tension. God gives the instructions and does the work that is beyond human capacity, but in return the human beings and even the animals must obey.

158  Ishanesu Sextus Gusha These are the same sentiments that are echoed in the Pastoral Letter, the number 40 represents the journey to safety of the family of Noah through their obedience and also the languishing of the rest who did not obey. It is a period of rebuilding, rediscovery which at times came through destruction as in the time of the floods. (ZCBC, 2020: 1) Four important issues are raised in this statement, namely, obedience, rebuilding, rediscovery and destruction. The argument here is that disobedience leads to destruction. This is what happens in the flood story. Is the collapsing of Zimbabwe’s economy and social fabric as a result of disobedience? If the answer is ‘yes,’ then the next question is, disobeying who? The Pastoral Letter acknowledges that destruction is not an end in itself but it leads to rediscovering and rebuilding. There had been a lot of destruction in the past 40 years and the ZCBC argues that this had been time for rediscovery. Have Zimbabweans discovered themselves or they are still in the process of discovering themselves? For any rebuilding exercise to be meaningful, an honest rediscovery process should be fulfilled. The journey from Egypt to the Promised Land was 40 years and according to ZCBC, “it is symbolic of the journey to Israelite freedom” (ZCBC, 2020:1). The 40 years were spent in the wilderness and the question is: What characterises the wilderness? There are three common Hebrew words for wilderness, and these are: ‫( ִמדְ ָבּר‬midbar), translated “barren land” in Isaiah 42:11 and Psalm 65:12; ‫ִציָּה‬ (tzyyah), translated “dry place” in Psalm 78:17 and ‫( ת ֹּהּו‬tohu), translated “desolate, unoccupied or waste place” in Deuteronomy 32:10 and Job 12:24. Therefore, a wilderness is characterised by lack of production, hardships, and lack of direction. The ZCBC opined that, “the days must have been intense, hot and dry” (ZCBC, 2020:3). This analysis typifies the Zimbabwean context in the past 40 years. In the political arena, the environment had been tense. Ploch (2010:3) opined that, “legislative actions by Zimbabwe’s parliament, led by ZANU PF until the 2008 elections, increased concerns about human rights in Zimbabwe.” Repressive laws to silence opposition politics and freedom of expression have been enacted. Some of these laws include the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA), the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) and the Private Voluntary Organizations (PVO) Act. Besides repressive laws, the political environment had been characterised by serious polarisation and pre- and post-elections violence was common. The government led by Mugabe seemed to be reading the script of the colonialists. In the economic sphere, the situation had been hot and dry. Since the early 1990s, the country had faced a serious economic meltdown: closure of industries, high unemployment rate, collapsing infrastructure, huge external debt and economic sanctions (Ploch, 2010). Socially, the country had gone through serious humanitarian crises and some of the highlights include displacement of people from their homes due to political violence and government programmes such as Operation Murambatsvina1 and Fast Track Land Reform Programme, massive migrations to other countries to search for greener pastures and food

Lessons for the Second Republic  159 shortages. The 40 years had been a period of wandering in the economic, social and political wilderness. The argument is that the 40 years of Zimbabwe’s independence did not grant Zimbabweans the expected freedom. The country was liberated from colonial rule 40 years ago, but people are not enjoying the muchexpected freedom they fought for during the Second Chimurenga/revolution. Therefore, the Zimbabwean 40 years of independence narrative is likened to the 40 years of wilderness experience for the Israelite people. Further appropriation of the number 40 is made in line with the Israelite judges and kings. According to the Pastoral Letter, “40 also marks the reign of God through His emissaries as we see in the reign of the judges such as; Deborah, Barak, Eli and Gideon” (ZCBC, 2020:1). These four judges reigned 40 years each. What was typical with their reign was that they were only stewards of God’s rule. They were not kings and their reign was a transition from tribal confederacy towards a monarchy. Their reign was there to facilitate proper settlement into the Promised Land and establishment of a proper nation. The period of the judges was characterised by challenges emanating from a recurring cycle of conflict and stability. This had been the typical situation with the Zimbabwean narrative in the past 40 years. The nation has been going through a vicious cycle of violence, peace, prosperity and poverty. This period finally came to an end with the reign of Kings David and Solomon. Again, the two ruled for 40 years each. Contrary to the period of judges, the Davidic and Solomonic periods were characterised by “restoration, fortification and peace. It was a period of reclaiming honour for Israel and Yahweh” (ZCBC, 2020:2). Through colonialism, Zimbabweans have lost honour and dignity and it was returned by majority rule in 1980. The 37 years of Mugabe’s reign can be likened to the period of judges. The transitions from minority to majority rule had its problems and challenges. The First Republic, therefore, represents an attempt to nation building and setting up of a foundation. The question then is: Who is Emmerson Mnangagwa in this narrative? Is he Saul, representing a transition from tribal confederacy to a monarchy or is he David representing consolidation of power, building of a kingdom, prosperity and fame? This is where lessons for the Second Republic should emanate from. The climax of the appropriation of the Bible to the Zimbabwean narrative by ZCBC is realised in the life and ministry of Jesus. According to the Pastoral Letter, For 40 days he ( Jesus) was in the desert in prayer and fasting and after his resurrection he ministered for 40 days before ascending to the Father. Thus 40 is graduated to mean a time of God’s presence through obedience, it is also a time of obedience to the Father, which affirms our identity to overcoming temptations. (ZCBC, 2020: 2) The subject of obedience in attaining salvation is emphasised once again. The desert experience is encountered once again in the life of Jesus. It is an opportunity for repentance, growth and glory. It is therefore a moment to reflect, reform

160  Ishanesu Sextus Gusha and repent (ZCBC, 2020:2). Jesus had to spend 40 days in the desert under solitary conditions to reflect on the ministry ahead of Him and to be tempted by the devil. As we celebrate our 40 years of independence, have we honestly reflected on the past and contemplated on the future? What have been our achievements and failures? There is a temptation not to balance the two in our reflection. The notable achievement for the past 40 years has been prevention of a civil war like what had happened in some other African countries. Other achievements have been in the areas of education, health, crafting of a new constitution and infrastructural development. Failures have been a dominant feature in the Zimbabwean narrative, and there are also opportunities for reform and repentance. Zimbabweans have failed in the areas of transparency, democracy, governance, international relations and accountability. These are key areas for the lessons for the Second Republic. Lessons for the Second Republic What, then, are the lessons for the Second Republic? Reflections of the Pastoral Letter offer great lessons for the Second Republic in many aspects. I have managed to draw five lessons for the Second Republic from the Pastoral Letter. The first lesson is drawn from Exodus 13:21 where God had to guide Israelites on the journey through a pillar of cloud in the day and a pillar of fire at night. According to the Pastoral Letter, “we are not alone in our journey to the ‘Promised Land.’ We can do ourselves a favour and shorten the journey with more political will and turn the potential that Zimbabwe has into reality.” (ZCBC, 2020:3). Though the 40 years of independence have been characterised mainly by wilderness experiences, Zimbabwe has managed to pull through under the guidance of God. One of the mistakes of the First Republic was to think that they can pull through the journey alone, without the guidance of God or other potential partners. Through Mugabe’s rhetoric on sovereignty, the country was isolated from the international community in the areas of trade and economics. This was the downfall of the country that was once a breadbasket of Africa. For example, in 2003 Mugabe pulled Zimbabwe out of the Commonwealth as a protest against the country’s suspension from the group. Commenting on the issue, New Zealand Prime Minister Helen Clark said, “It is not a crisis for the Commonwealth, but it is a crisis for Zimbabwe” (BBC News 15 December, 2003). The past two decades have proved that disengagement from the international community has serious economic implications. The Second Republic should, therefore, work hard to re-engage the international community. In domestic politics, the First Republic also made a fatal mistake by working alone and excluding the opposition. The only ray of hope was with the formation of the Government of National Unity in 2008 when ZANU PF formed a coalition government with two Movement for Democratic Party formations. Failure to work with the opposition parties created serious political polarisation that has impeded the development agenda. The Second Republic should learn that one cannot make it alone. There is need to work with others along with seeking the guidance and protection of God. President Mnangagwa is always on record for the mantra, ‘the voice of people is

Lessons for the Second Republic  161 the voice of God.’ If he is serious about that mantra, then he should seek people’s guidance in his leadership since they represent God. The second lesson is derived from Jesus’ experiences in the wilderness. Those 40 days have been described as a period of reflection and repentance. The narrative of the First Republic was characterised by abuse of human rights, massacre and torture of civilians, dictatorship, corruption, bad governance and lack of tolerance on divergent ideologies. The First Republic refused to repent and take responsibility for the atrocities that resulted in the massacre of thousands of people in Matabeleland and Midlands provinces in the early 1980s. These atrocities have been infamously known as Gukurahundi. The findings of the Chihambakwe and Dumbutshena Commissions on the atrocities were suppressed. Mugabe consistently refused to facilitate open discussion on Gukurahundi: “The closest he came to officially taking responsibility was after Nkomo died in 1999. Mugabe then described the early 1980s as a moment of madness–an unclear statement that he has never repeated” (Boddy-Evans, 2019). Some have sought to place the blame squarely on Mugabe’s shoulders. Thus, Addressing war veterans, ex-detainees, war collaborators, widowers, widows and children of war veterans at Stanley Square in Makokoba, Bulawayo, war veterans Secretary-General and ZANU PF Politburo member Cde Victor Matemadanda said “Mr Mugabe made an individual decision during the disturbances as he was the Commander-in-Chief of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces.” (Matika and Tshuma, 2018: The Sunday News www.sun​d ayn​ews. co.zw/mug​abe-resp​onsi​ble-for-guku​rahu​ndi-mate​m ada​nda) This is the darkest episode of the Zimbabwean narrative since 1980 that has caused serious polarisation within the country. Besides the Gukurahundi, many political, social and economic sins were committed during the First Republic. In the Pastoral Letter, the Catholic bishops opined that the 40th year of independence should be an opportunity for repentance. The lesson for the Second Republic is that there is no substitute for repentance and dialogue. The past hurts and injustices should not be swept under the carpet like what used to happen with and during the First Republic. The dirt is too much for it to be contained under the carpet, hence the need to clean it through confessions and apologies. The ZCBC proposes the establishment of the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission as the way forward in promoting healing, reconciliation and social cohesion. The Second Republic should learn that sustainable dialogue should take the atrocities of the past seriously and involve everyone. The third lesson is that there are enough natural resources to take the country to the Promised Land. What is needed is the equitable distribution of the resources. In the early 1980s, Zimbabwe was known as the breadbasket of Africa and the poverty levels were reasonably low. The question is: What has happened to the breadbasket of Africa? Zimbabwe is now the begging basket of Africa and the further question is: Have we exhausted all the resources to the extent that they can no longer sustain the country’s population? Zimbabwe is gifted with abundance of natural

162  Ishanesu Sextus Gusha resources such as coal, chromium ore, asbestos, gold, nickel, copper, iron ore, vanadium, lithium, tin and the platinum group metals. It is also gifted with agricultural resources as maize, cotton, tobacco, wheat, sugarcane, groundnuts, cattle, sheep, goats, pigs and horticultural products. Michelina Andreucci (2017) argues that Zimbabwe contains 48 per cent of the world’s strategic mineral resources. This means that Zimbabwe has enough resources to sustain her own people, but why have the past 40 years been characterised mainly by hunger? Although the country is endowed with a lot of natural resources and a high literacy rate, many Zimbabweans wallow in poverty and the unemployment rate is exceedingly high. Many citizens have been forced into the informal sector due to the high unemployment rate. The problem then is not of resources but poor management or unfair distribution of resources. In the Pastoral Letter, the bishops identified corruption and bad stewardship of resources as one of the major sources of the country’s misery. The recommendation is that the equitable distribution of the country’s resources is the major panacea to the country’s woes. The Israelites though in the dessert in Exodus 16:13–35 were fed with quail and manna and everyone was satisfied. The equitable part of the whole story is on Exodus 16:17–18, The Israelites did as they were told; some gathered much, some little. And when they measured it by the omer, the one who gathered much did not have too much, and the one who gathered little did not have too little. Everyone had gathered just as much as they needed. Therefore, there is no reason to lament about external funding since local resources are enough for everyone. The fourth lesson is that the ideals of revolution should be maintained. The Israelites were to keep the ideals of the past covenants to Abraham and Moses for the rest of their lives. The Second Republic revolution in November 2017 was anchored on the philosophy of ‘restoring legacy.’ The question is: Which legacy? The Pastoral Letter proposes the re-aligning of everything to the original vision of our independence as restoring legacy. What was the original vision of our independence? Key ideals to the original vision of our independence were independence and sovereignty, equitable distribution of resources and opportunities, democracy, and protection of our culture and heritage. These were lost legacies due to colonialism and were to be restored for sake of the restoration of dignity and identity of the Zimbabweans. The exodus from Egypt for 40 years to the Promised Land was in some way meant to restore legacies of a chosen nation during slavery. For the Second Republic, 40 years should usher the Promised Land to the Zimbabweans who lost their legacy during the 90 years of colonialism and now they are out of the wilderness. Freedom, prosperity and full-fledged democracy should be given back to people. This should be accompanied by the establishment of non-partisan state structures and a culture of political tolerance. Ultimately, the future of young people should be prioritised.

Lessons for the Second Republic  163 Conclusion The ZCBC Pastoral Letter has adequately demonstrated the significance of the number 40 in the bible and this significance resonates well with the Zimbabwean narrative. The 40th birthday of Zimbabwe was another window to rewrite the national narrative and correct the errors of the past. The 40 years have given Zimbabweans enough lessons to reconfigure the country’s political, social and economic settings that have since been lost. The appropriation of the Bible in the national narrative by the ZCBC was timely and relevant. As this chapter has demonstrated, there are great lessons that the Second Republic can derive from this appropriation. The onus is upon the key actors to move from rhetoric and promote the well-being of all citizens. Note 1 Operation Murambatsvina was a government operation to destroy illegal settlements in the urban cities. The operation left thousands of people homeless in the cities.

References Andreucci, M. 2017. ‘Zim’s Natural Resources: A Key of Progress or Deprivation?’ In The Patriot. February 23, 2017. Retrieved from: www.the​patr ​iot.co.zw/old_po​sts/zims-natu​ ral-resour​ces-a-key-of-progr​ess-or-depr ​ivat​ion/ (Accessed 15 May 2020). BBC News. 2003. ‘Commonwealth and Mugabe: Your Reactions.’ BBC News. Monday, 15 December, 2003. Retrieved from: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/talkin​g _po​i nt/3253​ 240.stm (Accessed 10 May 2020) Bekker, I. 2018. ‘Kairos and Carnival: Mikhail Bakhtin’s Rhetorical and Ethical Christian Vision,’ Religions 9(3), 79. Bergmann, N.W. 2013. ‘Ecological Appropriation of Joel,’ Australian eJournal of Theology 20(1), 34–48. Boddy-Evans, A. 2019. ‘What Was Gukurahundi in Zimbabwe?’ ThoughtCo. Retrieved from: www.though​tco.com/what-is-guku​rahu​ndi-43923 (Accessed 10 May 2020). Chitando, E., Taringa, N.T., and Mapuranga, T.P. 2014. ‘Zimbabwean Theology and Religious Studies during the Crisis Years (2000–2008) a Preliminary Study,’ Studia Historiae Ecclesiasticae 40(1), 173–189. Conradie, E.M. 2004. ‘Towards an Ecological Biblical Hermeneutics: A Review Essay on the Earth Bible Project,’ Scriptura 85, 123–135. Delahaye, E. 2016. ‘About Chronos and Kairos. On Agamben’s Interpretation of Pauline Temporality through Heidegger,’ International Journal of Philosophy and Theology 77(3), 85–101. Gunda, M.R. 2010. The Bible and Homosexuality in Zimbabwe: A Socio-historical Analysis of the Political, Cultural and Christian Arguments in The Homosexual Public Debate with Special Reference to the Use of the Bible. Bamberg: University of Bamberg Press. Gunda, M.R. and Kügler, J. (Eds.). 2011. From Text to Practice. The Role of the Bible in Daily Living of African People Today. Bamberg: University of Bamberg Press.

164  Ishanesu Sextus Gusha Gundani, P. 2008. “Prophecy, Politics and Power: Changing Relations Between the Catholic Church and The Zimbabwean State (1980–2007),” Presentation (St Augustine College of South Africa on 13 March 2008.) Harris, M.I. 2005. The Second Epistle to the Corinthians. A Commentary on the Greek Text. Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. Heacock, C. 2016. ‘Biblical Literacy: Cultural Appropriations of the Scripture and the Potential Impact upon Preaching,’ Retrieved from www.pre​ache​r sfo​r um.com (Accessed on 28 March 2020). Hirsch, E.D. 1967. Validity of Interpretation. New Haven: Yale. Hirsch, E.D. 1976. Aims of Interpretation. Chicago: University of Chicago. Matika, P. and Tshuma, M. 2018. ‘Mugabe Responsible for Gukurahundi: Matemadanda,’ The Sunday News. 27 May, 2018. Retrieved from: www.sun​d ayn​ews.co.zw/mug​aberesp​onsi​ble-for-guku​rahu​ndi-mate​m ada​nda/ (Accessed on 10 May 2020). McFarland, K.L. 2014. Kairos-In God’s Appointed Time. Retrieved from: https://bib​lest​ udyd​ata.com/moo​d le/mod/page/view.php?id=268 (Accessed on 30/04/2020). McKeown, J. 2008. Genesis. Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. Phiri, S. 2013. ‘A Critical Assessment of the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace’s Contribution towards Good Governance in Zimbabwe from 1990–2000,’ Thesis. Natal: University of KwaZulu-Natal. Ploch, L. 2010. ‘Zimbabwe: Background,’ In Congressional Research Service. Retrieved from: www.crs.gov (Accessed on 6 May 2020). Regan, B. 1993. Kairos. Retrieved from http://growin​g hea ​lthy ​pass​ion.com/kai​ros.pdf (Accessed 30/04/2020). Rugwiji, T. 2020. ‘The Quest for Hermeneutics of Appropriation as a Thematic Approach for Critical Biblical Interpretation,’ In HTS Teologiese Studies / Theological Studies 75(3). 1–11 Sindo, V.S. 2014. ‘A Socio-Rhetorical Approach to the Pauline Theology of Reconciliation in 2 Corinthians,’ Dissertation. Potchefstroom: North-West University. Sipiora, P. 2002. ‘Introduction: The Ancient Concept of Kairos.’ In Phillip Sipiora and James S. Baumlim (Eds.), Rhetoric and Kairos: Essays in History, Theory, and Praxis. Albany: State University of New York Press, pp. 1–22. Tarusarira, J. 2016. ‘An Emergent Consciousness of the Role of Christianity on Zimbabwe’s Political Field: A Case of Non-doctrinal Religio-political Actors,’ Journal for the Study of Religion 29(2), 56–77. Tillich, P. 1957. The Protestant Era. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. West, G. 2013. ‘Exegesis Seeking Appropriation; Appropriation Seeking Exegesis: Re-reading 2 Samuel 13:1–22 in Search of Redemptive Masculinities,’ Verbum et Ecclesia 34(2), 1–6. ZCBC. 2008. ‘Position On the Signing of the Memorandum of Understanding Between Z.A.N.U. P.F. and the Two MDC Formations: Towards National Transition to Justice, Peace and Reconciliation.’ Retrieved from: archive.kubatana.net (Accessed on 29/04/2020). ZCBC. 2020. “ZCBC Pastoral Letter on the 40th Anniversary of Zimbabwe’s Independence.” Harare: Synod House.

10 Interrogating Responses to the Zimbabwe Heads of Christian Denominations’ Call for a National Political Sabbath for Trust Building and Confidence Building Noah Pashapa

Introduction This chapter aims to contribute towards reflection and discourse on the interface between religion, socio-economic crisis and politics in Zimbabwe during the period of the New Dispensation or Second Republic whose president is ZANU PF’s Emerson Mnangagwa. It is intended to pollinate this discourse and is located within the larger discourse on the interplay between church and State. Background Discourse on church and State interplay during President Robert Mugabe’s Old Dispensation government in Zimbabwe seems to indicate that during 1980–1991, before the country experienced socio-economic upheavals and poverty, triggered by the IMF-recommended structural adjustment programmes, churches generally viewed government policies and programmes that promoted political-liberation, international donor-agency driven economic-empowerment (not economic independence) and provision of education and public health care to formerly disenfranchised majority black Zimbabweans, as indicative of the government’s compliance with the Divine Mandate to do good and punish evil while promoting godliness, justice, and every citizen’s dignity in society. This is reflected in Canaan Banana’s comment, ‘… fortunately most of the churches adopted a positive attitude (towards government) once it became clear that the government was not bent on creating a Godless society’ (Banana, 1996:335). With the advent of the socio-economic upheavals and poverty beginning in 1991 and thereafter, some churches, along with civic organisations, became more actively engaged with the government as they advocated for respect for human rights, justice, good governance and the rule of law. This was in response to the onset of government-sponsored violence against strong criticism and political opposition to it, from labour and opposition politicians, and consequent government closure of the democratic space through coercion and repressive methods to muzzle dissent. This is reflected in Jonah Gokova’s comment that, DOI: 10.4324/9781003332435-11

166  Noah Pashapa ‘More prophetic church initiatives also emerged to join the restless protest and resistance movement that was taking shape’ (Gokova, 2010:107). Some theologians and church historians have observed that during the earlier period of voluntary depoliticisation on the part of the church (i.e. 1980–1991), the Catholic Bishops’ Conference, through its Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP) had maintained its political engagement with the nationalist politicians, which pre-dated independence. This is reflected in Ambrose Moyo’s comment that, Politically, Churches have avoided criticizing the government openly except for the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace … other churches feel it is not yet time for open confrontation with government since they have access to the government officials concerned to voice their fears and concerns or to seek clarification. (Hallencreutz and Moyo, 1988:212) This general shift in the church’s posturing towards the Old Dispensation government of Zimbabwe before and after 1991 is also highlighted by Ezra Chitando (2002) when he draws attention to the shift in church-State relations. Methodology The combined methodology that has been adopted here incorporates three methods of theoretical reflection. Document Review Analysis is a form of qualitative research that interprets documents as data sources to give voice and meaning to a topic (Bowen, 2009). The Comparative-Analytical method analyses and compares two or more ideas with a view to investigating their similarities and or differences (Bhukari, 2011). It will be knowledge enhancing to compare, contrast and analyse the President and Government of Zimbabwe (PAGZ), Movement for Democratic Change-Alliance and its leader Nelson Chamisa (MDCAL) and Interdenominational Christian Council of Zimbabwe (ICCZ) responses to the Call for a Seven Year National Sabbath for Trust and Confidence Building (7YPSP) and do the same with approaches to brokering peaceful dialogue and socio-political cooperation between polarised indigenous Zimbabwean political parties by the Zimbabwe Heads of Christian Denominations (ZHOCD) and the CCJP. The Participation Observation Method requires the researcher not only to observe a group under study but to participate in its activities. The writer’s interaction with relevant media reports and participation at a five-day highlevel church leaders’ mediation workshop that was organised by the ZHOCD in Bulawayo in 2019, at which the concept of the 7YPSP was adopted for formal communication with the PAGZ and MDCAL, afforded him significant levels of observation and participation from which to draw relevant data. While analysis based on participatory-observation may be susceptible to subjectivism to the point of undermining objective critical analysis, it can be restrained by conscious intentional awareness and intent to engage data as a disinterested and dispassionate data

National Political Sabbath for Trust and Confidence Building  167 assessor, thus unlocking its advantage of a participatory observer’s direct interaction with primary data. Summary of the ZHOCD’s Call for a Seven Year Political Sabbath The first important task is to attempt a nine-point non-verbatim summary of the letter and spirit of the ZHOCD’s three-page 7YPSP dated 7th October 2019 with direct quotations inverted in commas. The non-verbatim summary fits best with the limited space afforded in this chapter. (#1) At its core, it proposed the suspension of all political party contestations for a period of seven years to allow for trust and confidence-building through a broad-based and comprehensive national dialogue to address the current emergency crisis … recognising historical and complex problems making it impossible for any single political entity to resolve them timeously and sustainably. (#2) It draws on the biblical and theological principle of the Sabbath in which the seventh year functioned, in biblical times, as the year for (a) the restoration and healing of relationships, (b) repentance and return to the rule of the law (commandments), and (c) revitalisation and revival of the economy…which may be adopted as a model solution for present day political crises. (#3) While deeply respectful for the country’s constitution, it recognises that the constitution is not an end in itself, as it serves a higher purpose, i.e. the total wellbeing of citizens in the ‘hands of the Almighty God with whom the future of the nation lays’ (Preamble, Zimbabwe 2013 Constitution). While it does not undermine constitutionality (following the letter of the law), it promotes the actualisation of constitutionalism (the government’s self-limitation of exercise of powers for the sake of the greater import of the law). It is ‘bold enough to reject appearances of following the constitution when the quality of doing so has become compromised both in reality and in perception.’ (#4) Assuming that in the context of political party contestation for power and authority, opponents find it difficult to cooperate, it calls for temporary suspension or postponement of competitive politics and advocates for convergence politics. This does not imply the absence of contestation altogether, but that such contestation takes place in the context of dialogue towards building the foundations of constitutional democracy with no immediate and direct power gains. (#5) Though it proposes a sevenyear period, ‘the time allocation is not prescriptive. It calls for a dedicated period long enough to allow for meaningful transition to take place.’ (#6) The proposal prescribes comprehensive and broad-based national dialogue for achieving sustainable peace, true unity, total justice and holistic prosperity, with such dialogue happening at three levels of society: grassroots, organised society and at political and policy levels. (#7) The proposal ‘does not prescribe the structure of government during the 7 year political Sabbath period which should emerge from the dialogue process.’ Though the ZHOCD has couched it in religious language, it does not have a monopoly on how it should be actualised. Thus, the ZHOCD envisages establishment of technical teams made up of diverse competencies and skills drawn from various sectors of Zimbabwean society to support the process. (#8) It recognises that political parties are being asked to concede power

168  Noah Pashapa positioning for the sake of the nation’s progress, given that the ruling party might argue that successive elections gave them alone the right to rule, while the opposition parties eye opportunities for power takeover in the deteriorating national situation. It states that both views make sense politically, but do not offer any space for convergence since they work with zero-sum logic. The proposal seeks to foreground the welfare of Zimbabwean people as the utmost purpose of all political parties rooted in the belief that true leadership consists in willingness to sacrifice personal and group ambitions for the sake of national healing and the welfare of future generations. The proposal assumes that every citizen who desires to see the nation take a new direction may temporarily suspend or postpone their voting rights for the greater good if it becomes necessary. (#9) The proposal envisions trust and confidence within society as essential ingredients for sustained peace and development hence views the Sabbath period as a time when deliberate steps are taken to engender a culture of true reconciliation, to establish and support social systems and institutional structures that deal decisively and sustainably with the wrongs of the past, to encourage the emergence of new relationships and as a space for launching and implementing a shared agenda for the strengthening of constitutional democracy and the rule of law. It is believed that the Sabbath period will give time for shaping a shared national economic vision supported by collective efforts towards international re-engagement while resetting the nation on a path of new and abundant life for all Zimbabweans (ZHOCD Call: 2019:1–3). Summary of the President and Government of Zimbabwe’s Response A non-verbatim summary and analysis of the 19-page PAGZ’s response to the ZHOCD’s 7YPSP dated 17th October 2019 is also enlightening. Direct quotations will be inverted in commas. (#1) The PAGZ’s response is to be understood in the context of the country’s constitution and legislative provisions from which the president derives executive powers which proscribe that any practice or conduct that is inconsistent with its spirit and letter be deemed invalid to the extent of the inconsistency. ‘As such, any law, practice, ideas, custom, conduct or proposal from whosoever and in all circumstances that is adjudged to be inconsistent with the constitution would infringe on it and impinge on the cardinal and democratic principle of the rule of law.’ (#2) Though the constitution acknowledges exceptional circumstances under which its provisions may be suspended and delineates strict procedures applicable to such

National Political Sabbath for Trust and Confidence Building  169 rare and exceptional circumstances, the current political and socio-economic challenges neither require nor warrant the departure from the constitution as proposed by the ZHOCD. (#3) A proposal of a seven-year moratorium on the people’s right to vote for national leaders of their choice due to political and socio-economic challenges would be a subversion of the constitution thus making it unpalatable to the PAGZ. Rather such challenges should be more compelling grounds for elections when they fall due. (#4) The ZHOCD’s 7YPSP requires the president and his party ZANU P.F. to spurn the will of the people who through constitutional harmonized elections in 2018 gave them the constitutional mandate to act as the ruling party in government for a constitutional period of five years. This is tantamount to robbing the winners of their victory and popular mandate, in order to split it with, or hand it to a losing political party and presidential candidate. (#5) It seeks to accommodate losers of those elections for fear of their propensity to violence and threat to withhold cooperation with the winning and now ruling political party, as that losing party’s strategy is to press for an ‘extra-electoral political settlement.’ This would be tantamount to condoning or rewarding lawlessness and violence through undeserved recognition or accommodation. (#6) Regular elections are central and critical to good governance and political legitimacy and a cardinal value and principle of constitutionalism that must be adhered to by all, church leaders included, and never to be undermined by biblically dressed circumstances, reasoning or value system, even when justified in the name of ‘the very people who passed the same constitution and who granted the president the executive authority to run government for a full term of five years which ends in 2023.’ (#7) The proposal is therefore unacceptable, unconstitutional and oddly inconsistent with any law, practice, custom or conduct which upholds our constitution … an invitation albeit dressed in biblical precept for the president to be a co-conspirator in the overthrow of the very constitution which he is sworn to uphold, respect and defend. (#8) As a secular institution, the State defers to the church on all spiritual matters especially its prerogative and competence in interpreting the Scriptures, while government acknowledges the church’s role to meet spiritual needs of citizens and to be the moral conscience of society. Surely, the Sabbath should really be observed inside the church by all who are part of the community of faith and not outside it. (#9) The PAGZ cannot accept a situation whereby the church seeks to undermine sacrosanct rules upon which a secular State is founded and is wary of the

170  Noah Pashapa proposal ‘being turned into a Trojan horse by local and global forces seeking to gain legitimacy or to further pre-meditated plans to keep Zimbabwe distracted, disturbed and destabilized.’ (#10) The PAGZ questions the sincerity of the proposal and finds it suspicious that while calling for a seven-year suspension of political contestation, those years are loaded ‘with political initiatives and processes that easily identify with the manifesto of the MDC-A and which have the potential to take Zimbabwean politics in an uncharted new direction.’ (#11) Instead of acknowledging and throwing its weight behind the government’s efforts to address challenges faced by the nation by way of adopting a political actors’ dialogue incorporating all 2018 presidential candidates, promotion of multiple inclusive non-discriminatory dialogue platforms, strong measures against corruption, government’s efforts to ensure food-security, economic initiatives at various levels of implementation, government’s efforts to ensure food-security at household levels and its efforts to ameliorate negative impacts of the economic downturn and drought, government’s efforts through the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission to broaden the democratic space and address legacy issues affecting the nation, government’s promotion of open debate on the Gukurahundi-massacre issue from the 1980s, ‘the proposal appears to deliberately ignore them and to reflect a shallow grasp of Zimbabwe’s socio-economic context that has been characterized by decades of economic negative growth effected by sanctions and drought-related difficulties.’ (#12) The proposal espouses an insincere and negative disposition that nothing positive is happening in the country until complaints and frets of an opposition party that has rejected election results since 2000 are assuaged by subverting the country’s constitution and adopting a seven-year moratorium on democratic elections, which seven-year Sabbath might not guarantee removal of the country from its current perpetual election mode of contestation, due to the MDCA’s refusal to accept election results. (#13) ‘The proposal is far from being a genuine solution to Zimbabwe’s current national challenges which must be honest, lay blame where it is deserved and fairly and impartially censure rather than condone or reward the wayward and wrong.’ Hence, rather than do justice on the issue of political polarisation, the proposal grossly understates the culpability of the MDC-A, which for reasons of political expediency pursues a political insurgency agenda that undermines the State, sabotages the economy and sacrifices the safety and security of common people at the altar of selfish political ends. ‘Hence, the proposal frames the national question in a way that implies that the socio-economic and political challenges the country faces are solely endogenous and ignores the interference of the West and its alliance with the local opposition which is aimed at sabotaging the potential of Zimbabwean political actors to find each other if left alone’ (PAGZ Response: 2019:1–19). Summary of the Movement for Democratic Change and Its President’s Response Attempting a non-verbatim summary and analysis of the two-page MDCAL’s response, as presented in a letter to the ZHOCD secretary from the office of the

National Political Sabbath for Trust and Confidence Building  171 MDC President dated 28th November 2019, is also quite informative. Direct quotations will be indicated by inverted commas. (#1) ‘It is good to see the clergy providing a guiding hand to navigate out of Zimbabwe’s difficult phase, a task requiring both earthly and spiritual wisdom.’ (#2) Because the MDC is guided by the best interests of Zimbabwe, the party’s democratic principles which include the holding of regular free and fair elections as well as by the principle of political consent through the electoral process, it advances the democratisation and transformation of Zimbabwe using lawful, constitutional, peaceful and non-violent means despite provocation, temptation, violations and repression. (#3) Since 2000, general and presidential elections’ outcomes have been contested and resultant governments have suffered crises of legitimacy, leading to bitter conflicts, international isolation and consequent handicaps on the economy. This is because political referees failed to inspire trust and confidence, resulting in elections precipitating vicious cycles of dissent, violence, illegitimacy and poverty rather than being triggers for consent and development. Such undesirable consequences would have been prevented by holding free, fair and democratic elections, a scenario which calls for the churches to join the MDC to call for political reforms that lead to breaking this vicious cycle. (#4) The seven year political Sabbath is an extra-ordinary and difficult proposition for which the ZHOCD has not supplied details except that it calls for halting elections and electioneering for seven years. Because it has legal and constitutional implications it would have to be backed by the people of Zimbabwe. (#5) Because the party believes in building national consensus to resolve national challenges ‘we welcome practical solutions to our nation’s troubles that are based on a constitutional mandate derived from the people of Zimbabwe because only such solutions can help move the country forward with peace, respect, trust and confidence.’ (#6) While acknowledging your appreciation of the acute and deep Zimbabwean crisis that requires urgent attention and your effort to get a lasting solution, my party shares with you sensitivity to the necessity of a genuine, sincere and honest dialogue and prays that you remain engaged with this noble idea. (MDCAL’s Response, 2019: Nov 28th) Summary of the ICCZ’s Response The response of the ICCZ to the 7YPSP and the model that they prefer on church and State relations were expressed at an ICCZ organised prayer rally attended by President Mnangagwa and his deputy, Kembo Mohadi. A local daily newspaper, ‘The Herald,’ reported that Bishop Nehemiah Mutendi of the Zion Christian Church (ZCC), who is the patron of the ICCZ, having emphasised that indigenous

172  Noah Pashapa churches were the pioneers of the country’s revolution, which according to the author of the current chapter was Bishop Mutendi’s way of casting negative antipatriotism suspicion towards the ZHOCD churches and their Western foreign founders and funders, went on to dismiss the ZHOCD’s 7YPSP as promoting lawlessness by saying, A country without laws is a jungle. If we say courts and the country’s institutions are useless or say let us suspend everything for seven years, you wonder if those people are indigenous people. We are here to pray for our country and the good health of all Zimbabweans. (The Herald, 2019: Dec 13th) At the same gathering, Rev. Andrew Wutaunashe, the convenor of the ICCZ, expressed the umbrella church body’s stance of legitimation and justification towards the government of the day. He said, We also call upon opposition parties, particularly the MDC, not on political partisan basis, but on concern as citizens of Zimbabwe and on concern as church leaders who represent millions of people, to recognise the President of Zimbabwe openly, to accept the findings of the Constitutional Court as a respect for our Constitution and institutions and on top of that, if dialogue is wanted, let it proceed from a place that respects our institutions. Your Excellency, we encourage that you continue to pursue with all the energy you can, dialogue in our nation so that our nation can come to a place of soundness and participation by everybody. We would like to emphasise as the Church that we seek dialogue that begins from the recognition that our State, our nation of Zimbabwe and all its institutions must be preserved and respected. To this end, we as the indigenous (church) leaders, we are also saying there cannot be genuine dialogue based on trying to determine whether or not you are the President of Zimbabwe. (The Herald, 2019: Dec 13th) Discerning Church-State Models from the Proposal and Responses to It It may be surmised that the ZHOCD’s proposal was informed by what may be termed the ‘separation and intersection model.’ This view assumes that the church’s priority and primary separate orbit of obligation and responsibility regarding human and socio-economic transformation are the spiritual and moral dimensions, while the State’s priority and primary separate orbit of obligation and responsibility in this regard are the socio-economic and political dimensions. Independence and intersection between the two institutions requires the church not only to function as the spiritual and moral conscience of the nation and to roll-out non-politically partisan human developmental programmes in the health, education and livelihoods sectors, while staying clear of direct engagement with

National Political Sabbath for Trust and Confidence Building  173 political actors and processes, but to actively engage and cooperate with government and other significant political, civic and economic actors in sociodevelopmental efforts. Such active engagement intends to discover, develop and deploy inclusive and sustainable solutions that address national socio-economic and political crises and problems. The ‘separation and intersection model’ of State-church relations is informed by a perspective on the nature and purpose of the church’s existence in terms of a redeemed community that both embodies, exemplifies and disseminates values and presences of the kingdom of God, such as justice, righteousness, peace, truth, mercy and joy in the Holy Spirit to the world of people and their social, political and commercial systems and institutions. Its members are a separate distinct, redeemed community, an agent of socialtransformation, as well as an integral part of the larger society. Based on this model, the role of the church in society may be referred to as that of being prophetic in the sense of speaking truth to power and promoting just and fair production and consumption patterns and distribution of justice, goods and services among all people, and of being pastoral in the sense of being the spiritual and moral conscience of the nation, while promoting the national interest, moral responsibility and peaceful coexistence among Zimbabweans of all races, creeds, political affiliation and religious persuasions. This seems to be the model that is also reflected in the MDCAL response to the ZHOCD 7YPSP, thereby exposing the ZHOCD to the negative-suspicion–based charge, that has been made against it by the PAGZ, of clandestine partisan collusion with the main opposition political party and Western regime change interests. This apparent convergence of the ZHOCD and MDCAL around a model on State-church relations may be merely partial and strategic due to the opportunity towards an anti-ZANU PF government alliance between the two, which the MDCAL detects to be presented by the ZHOCD’s proposal. This is because in other fora, the MDCAL has expressed convergence between its model on State-church relations and the ‘confrontation and intersection model’ preferred by the Zimbabwe National Pastors’ Conference and the Christian Alliance. In contrast to the ‘separation and intersection model’ is the ‘separation and autonomy model’ on church and State interface, which perceives the two institutions as belonging to two separate, autonomous and dualistic spheres with distinctive worldviews, value-systems and missions in the world, i.e. the sacred and the secular. It proposes that each sphere should remain in its separate lane and orbit of priority and primary obligations and responsibilities without interfering with the other. The ‘separation and autonomy model’ perceives the nature and purpose of the church’s existence in terms of a sacred institution with a sacred mission to indoctrinate people with a sacred spiritual worldview and moral value-system, while it is ruled and guided by sacred leaders, laws and regulations. Thus, separation and autonomy between church and State should be maintained thoroughly by way of the church’s non-involvement in politics as an institution. Some church institutions operating in this model, e.g. Baptists, may, however, provide pastoral support to individual church members, who may be directly involved in politics, while other such churches, e.g. Jehovah’s Witnesses, regulate

174  Noah Pashapa against such individual members’ political involvement. This seems to be the model that underlies the PAGZ’s response to the ZHOCD 7YPSP. The PAGZ highlights the proposal’s shortcomings by not addressing how the proposed political Sabbath would achieve its goals and who would play what roles towards its realisation, with comparatively more robust and comprehensive politicalscientific analysis than is evident in the response by the MDCL. This difference in robustness and comprehensiveness of political-scientific analysis may be testimony to the composition of the two political outfits, whereby ZANU PF is overloaded with trained political scientists and politics-practitioners while the MDC-A is overloaded with trained lawyers, legal-practitioners and labour activists. The New Dispensation PAGZ’s response is also characterised by levels of objective analysis and accommodation towards alternative views and opinions on national political solutions that would not have been the case with the Old Dispensation of former President Robert Mugabe, which assumed that only liberation war veterans and aligned politicians had a monopoly on national independence and socio-economic transformation ideas. Thus, it brooked no external criticism or advice while its propagandists were ruthless in their castigation and demonisation of such. As has been noted earlier, the PAGZ’s response, as highlighted in points 8 and 9, appears to be informed more by the ‘separation and autonomy model’ on the interface between church and State than by the ‘separation and intersection model.’ One can detect, running through the PAGZ’s response, especially in points 4, 5,10,11,12 and 13, a negative thread suggesting that the ZHOCD, under the cloak of religion, theology, the Bible and church identity, may in fact be fronting and therefore to some extent already co-opted by financial, ideological and political interests aligned to the political agenda of the local opposition and its Western allies (i.e. the USA, Britain and the European Union), which it claims aim at regime change in Zimbabwe. This negative-suspicion and tensionfilled interplay between the PAGZ and foreign-funded politically involved non-government organisations was highlighted in my book titled, Spirituality, Churches and Transformation, where, while commenting on the political role of non-governmental organisations in the post-2013 elections-period in Zimbabwe, I highlighted that, The dualistic political environment in Zimbabwe, characterized by ZANU PF’s liberation and indigenization defined developmental policies on one hand, and the liberal democracy and Foreign Direct Investment-defined ones of the two MDC’s on the other, fostered a scenario whereby these local but foreign funded civic and non-government organizations developed social transformational and advocacy agendas shaped and driven by definitions and values that they shared with their funders and political allies. This generated simmering tension, often boiling, into open confrontation between MDC and the ZANU PF government … This divergence of socio-political ideology, economicdevelopment agendas and democratic-human rights definitions and values

National Political Sabbath for Trust and Confidence Building  175 triggered a ‘crisis’ for such non-state actors whose developmental and advocacy agendas were pro-MDC and anti-ZANU PF-oriented, and thereby interpreted by the government to be subversive and a threat to the national interest. (Pashapa, 2018b:41) Thus, the PAGZ’s negative suspicion may be given some benefit of the doubt, given the ZHOCD’s statement, in point #3 of the 7YPSP summary, that expresses negative evaluation of government’s performance by categorically stating that the current government has flouted the country’s constitution. This negative-suspicion towards the ZHOCD by the PAGZ played out as social media and mainstream pro- and anti-government media debate that was triggered by perceived association of the wife of the president of the MDC-A President, who worked as a local office employee for an international donoragency that funded the ZHOCD’s and other civic organisations’ democracy and human-rights programmes in Zimbabwe, with the ZHOCD. Pro-government media had interpreted this association as signifying a nexus of ideological and political interests between the MDC-A, the ZHOCD, local civic-organisations and that particular church-based donor-agency. Anti-government mainstream media on the other hand dismissed these aspersions as government propagandabased fake-news. It is fair to suggest that pro-government media has over the years generally promoted the narrative that portrays internationally funded and supervised local church-based or civic Private Volunteer Organisations as largely pursuing ideological, political and economic interests that are shaped by Western countries, which fund and whose foreign policies inform the agendas of the international church-based and humanitarian donor-agencies, which in turn fund and influence agendas of local church-based and civic organisations, as conduits and outposts through which to extend and promote the West’s regime-change agenda in Zimbabwe. As a participant observer, I am also aware of the debate that ensued in both proand anti-government media regarding the fact that the secretary-general of the Zimbabwe Council of Churches, which was part of the ZHOCD, turned down an invitation by the PAGZ to participate in a Presidential Advisory Council. Progovernment media generated a narrative that he declined from joining this homegrown initiative aimed at growing the democratic and inclusivity space, because of anxiety that such close association with the government would alienate him from his organisation’s Western backers and funders. To establish facts related to these two matters, I made a telephone call to a ZHOCD co-secretary-general who clarified that the wife of the MDC-A President had no direct dealings with the ZHOCD, while the ZHOCD general secretary’s decision not to accept appointment to the Presidential Advisory Council was based on his need to be seen to be non-aligned and non-partisan within the Zimbabwean highly polarised partisan-politics space. On the other hand, it is quite likely that the PAGZ, whose ideological and political genesis and history are tied up with the liberation war movements of the 1970s, and whose understanding of the mediatory and peace-building work

176  Noah Pashapa by ecumenical church bodies, to reconcile conflicted endogenous politicians, is informed by the work of the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace of that era, may have expected of the ZHOCD, anti-imperialistic, nationalistic-patriotic, impartial-mediation and trust-building relational qualities that were exemplified by the CCJP. These qualities are highlighted by Father Fidelis Mukonori in his book, The Man in The Middle, in which he writes, They (ZIPRA and ZANLA) had trust in us and we in them and their motives. The CCJP’s peace building proposal was seen as the measured middle ground for achieving peace-talks by protagonists and peace-sponsors … It prioritized the importance of ease, closeness and trust between peace-builders and fractured protagonists and finding out and understanding their model solutions. (Mukonori, 2017:117) He elaborates by saying, ‘Brokering peace-building cooperation between protagonists required building high levels of trust and honesty with protagonists through regular communication that is transparent and honest’ (Mukonori, 2017:107). Though the political-ideological, nationalistic-patriotic, land repossession-oriented and liberation-war interests of the then endogenous ZANLA and ZIPRA liberation war and political movements are very different from the ideological, political and economic interests of today’s ZANU PF and MDC-A endogenous political movements, it may not be far-fetched to surmise that the PAGZ’s response to the ZHOCD’s proposal, that is replete with negativesuspicions towards MDCAL, may reflect such comparison-based expectations. Criticisms of Father Mukonori, that have been noted elsewhere, to have been captured by nationalist-liberation politics and politicians as he mediated between endogenous nationalist liberation movements and the exogenous imperialistic settler colonial regime, are irrelevant to this discussion on his and the CCJP’s mediation role between two endogenous nationalist liberation war movements, i.e. ZIPRA and ZANLA. It is very likely that the ZCC secretary-general (serving the ZHOCD) and his key lieutenants might not have invested sufficient time and effort in building respectability, credibility, trust-based relationships and a shared national interestloaded vision for building peace and prosperity in Zimbabwe, with ZANU PF and MDC-A, as did the CCJP with ZANLA and ZIPRA, resulting in the convening of the Lancaster House Talks that sealed the end of the liberation guerrilla war and colonialism in the country. The ZHOCD’s response to the PAGZ and MDCAL’s negative critical responses to their 7YPSP by immediately mobilising their constituents towards building an alternative broad-based National Convergence Platform to advocate for similar core outcomes as intended by the 7YPSP may reflect their realisation of the above-mentioned shortcoming of the 7YPSP. This factor might have contributed to the negative-suspicions of the PAGZ towards the ZHOCD’s 7YPSP. It is also likely that the ZCC/ZHOCD secretary-general and his key lieutenants might have been more inclined towards megaphone-dialogue, that communicated delicate and complex matters of political contestation and

National Political Sabbath for Trust and Confidence Building  177 posturing by endogenous political protagonists, through the public media, than was the case with the CCJP which preferred quiet diplomacy. The fact that the CCJP carefully selected seasoned church leaders, such as Bishop Patrick Chakaipa and Father Fidelis Mukonori, who embodied simplicity, justice and peace in their life-styles, and who were perceived by both contesting liberation war movements to be trusted, respectable, patriotic, credible, tried, tested, mature and experienced bona fide church leaders, to front the mediation and peace-building efforts between ZANLA and ZIPRA, might also point to a key difference with, and key shortcoming of the ZHOCD’s processes, with reference to generating high levels of trust with the PAGZ. According to Mukonori, ‘Based on the CCJP’s facilitators’ stature, reputation and credibility as honest and transparent peacebuilders driven by a home-grown agenda, both ZIPRA and ZANLA protagonists sought them out’ (Mukonori, 2017:112). Clearly, the MDCAL’s response though similar to that of the PAGZ in highlighting the threat posed by the 7YPSP to undermine constitutionalism, the will of Zimbabweans expressed through regular democratic elections and the rule of law, reads more sympathetic to the proposal than does that of the PAGZ. It is likely that the MDCAL’s response is more sympathetic to the 7YPSP because it is underpinned by a bias towards the ‘separation and intersecting model’ of churchState interplay in similar fashion to the ZHOCD and strategic political advantage to the MDCAL. While the MDCAL sparingly criticises the proposal’s shortcomings in terms of it being an extra-ordinary and difficult proposition which calls for the suspension of regular elections and electioneering and yet without providing further critical details, the PAGZ on the other hand unsparingly evaluates it negatively for being unacceptable and unconstitutional, an attempt by the church to undermine a secular State, far from a genuine solution to Zimbabwe’s challenges, proposing to rob elections winners of their victory and splitting it with elections losers and loaded with notions that easily identify with the MDC-A manifesto. On the other hand, the sparing criticism by the MDCAL which rings in their appreciation of the church’s sensitivity to the acuteness and depth of the current national crisis which requires urgent attention, of the church’s sensitivity to the urgent necessity to get a lasting solution to the present national crisis and to its efforts to proffer practical remedies, may reflect that party’s reticence to alienate a known or perceived political ally, or its political opportunism by implying or claiming resonance between its agitation for urgent and far reaching political, legal, media, security and economic reforms and the ZHOCD’s 7YPSP. On the other hand, the unsparingly critical response from the PAGZ may reflect intent to alienate from its support base a suspected ally or sympathiser of the opposition. The responses from the two political camps, whereby both the MDCAL and the PAGZ each blame their contesting counterparts for being largely responsible for the current national challenges and for the failure to generate meaningful dialogue that guarantees sustainable inclusive peace and prosperity, may reflect both the entrepreneurialisation and commercialisation of politics by Zimbabwean politicians in both camps, and the prioritisation, by both parties’ elites, of the zero-sum game political powercontestation above the concrete material needs of the electorate.

178  Noah Pashapa The ICCZ’s posturing of uncritically endorsing government rulers and their policies reflects the ‘co-option and assimilation model’ on church-State interplay. In contrast to both the ‘separation and intersection,’ ‘separation and autonomy’ and ‘separation and confrontation’ models, the ‘co-option model’ is at play when the church, due to historical, ideological, political or financial interests, gets co-opted or assimilated by the State and plays the role of handmaiden to the State, promoting its legitimacy and justification uncritically. This is similar to the posturing of the Dutch Reformed Church during Apartheid South Africa, and the Anglican Church during Rhodesia. The Dutch Reformed Church during apartheid South Africa and the Anglican Church during Rhodesia were extensions, outposts and beneficiaries of ideological, political and financial interests of the Belgian and Anglo-Saxon empire-colonial interests, respectively. They, therefore, promulgated Belgian and British imperialistic and Boer and Rhodesian historical colonial, political and religious narratives that justified and legitimised empire and colonial rule uncritically under the guise of church theology. As reflected in comments of their spokespersons, this appears to be the model on the interface between the State and the church that largely informs the response of the ICCZ to the ZHOCD’s 7YPSP. In my book titled, Churches, Politics and Ethical Leadership, I described in great detail three models of church-State relations which coincide with the four models highlighted above (Pashapa, 2018a:124–126). The phrase ‘captured model’ would make an appropriate synonym for the ‘co-option and assimilation model.’ At this point, it is important to highlight and differentiate with the ZHOCD’s model, a fourth model of State-church interface which may be referred to as the ‘separation and confrontation model.’ It is a form of separation and intersection that prefers radical and confrontational critical-engagement with the State rather than the non-confrontational and consultative-engagement characteristic of the ZHOCD’s preferred form of the ‘separation and intersection model.’ It adopts overt protest, resistance and defiance as forms of faith-based critical engagement in challenging the policies of socio-political oppression and exclusion that promote State sponsored or linked violations of human rights, violence, terror, closing down of the democratic space or coercion. It became the model of Statechurch interface preferred by post-1991 faith-based church leaders’ associations cum civic-movements, such as the Christian Alliance and the Zimbabwe National Pastors Conference. This ‘separation and confrontation model,’ preferred by the Zimbabwe National Pastors’ Conference and the Christian Alliance, was underpinned by the considered view that the Old Dispensation Regime ‘had lost all legitimacy and moral authority to continue in power … because of its rule by coercion and repression of all dissent …’ (Gokova, 2010:111). It is a model underpinned by a kind of opposition politics under the guise of religious and civic activism. Their emergence has been variously attributed to the necessity to protest against and confront the closing down of the democratic space to opposition politicians and non-faith-based civic organisations orchestrated by the ZANU PF government. It has also been attributed to the need to effectively address the frustration on the part of a younger generation of pro-opposition politics church

National Political Sabbath for Trust and Confidence Building  179 leaders with the non-confrontational consultative-engagement model of an older generation of black indigenous church leaders, e.g. Ezekiel Guti, Noah Taguta, Nehemiah Mutendi or Paul Mwazha. The lure, in a context of scarcity and hyperinflation, of generous donor funding from international partners keen to promote Euro-Anglo-American type liberal democracy, individual human rights and freemarket capitalism in Zimbabwe, in pursuit of their donor governments’ foreign policies and geo-political interests, has also been cited as a contributory factor to their emergence. Both the Zimbabwe National Pastors’ Conference and the Christian Alliance described their radical and confrontational critical-engagement with government that is typical of the ‘separation and confrontation model’ as prophetic, in the tradition of Old Testament periphery, pre-canonical and canonical prophets such as Elijah, Amos and Micah who confronted the ruling and rich elites regarding politico-economic policies that marginalised, disenfranchised, oppressed and exploited the poor and powerless. The ICCZ’s pro-government ‘co-option and assimilation model’ on the one hand and on the other hand, the ‘separation and confrontation’ posturing of the ZHOCD characterised by non-endorsement of government rulers and policies, as well as the ‘separation and confrontation model,’ illustrates a dominant, postindependence (from 1991, not 1980) characteristic of churches’ posturing towards State-church interface in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwean home-grown churches founded by nationalistic, liberation-agenda and pro-land repossession-oriented black indigenous church leaders and funded by local donations, have generally tended to be more inclined towards a theocratic theology-ideology that prioritises authoritarian-hierarchy, social-order and political stability. Such churches have tended to legitimise and prop up the nationalistic, liberation-agenda and landrepossession and authoritarian-hierarchy loaded policies and programmes of successive ZANU PF governments. On the other hand, churches and faith-based civic movements founded and or funded by Western expatriate mission agencies and donors and thereby oriented towards prioritising individual human rights, liberal individual freedoms and financial-material prosperity above authoritarianhierarchy social order and political stability, have tended to be more negatively critical of the State. This could in turn be a reflection of the historical conflict between, on the one hand, the imperial-colonial Western Christian project, and the nationalistic-indigenising Christian project on the other. Conclusion The problem of church-State interface models is part of an age-old dilemma of power and powerlessness that is faced by religious movements in general. Norman E. Thomas captured it thus: Those who believe that clear separation between church and state increases the power of the church emphasize the freedom from political domination, the freedom to criticize the political process and secular power structure. There is a danger however that such freedoms are connected with powerlessness. On

180  Noah Pashapa the other hand, close institutional connection between the church and the state scarcely avoids the dilemma, because the union raises the likelihood that the church will be used to lend sanctity to a secular power structure. (Yinger, 1970:117; cited by Thomas, 1985:113) Because of the severe partisan political polarisation characteristic of the New Dispensation political landscape in Zimbabwe, it is unlikely that church initiatives may not either be co-opted as legitimation of partisan agendas or condemned as Trojan horses for the other political contestants, no-matter how politically inclusive and neutral they may be packaged. The space in which State and church interface occurs is not only contested, but crowded, risky and also often a violence-ridden space, especially to those openly critical of the State. The extent to which churches and faith-based associations/organisations that are engaged in civil-political advocacy accord levels of legitimacy and moral authority to govern to the State as well as these organisations’ assessment of and adaptation to the State’s responsiveness to their advocacy interventions will determine which model of the State-church interplay they may regard to be most applicable and strategic within prevailing situations. Thus, the question as to which model of State-church interface may be adopted is likely to be determined by situational and adaptation considerations. The apparent relatively higher levels of objectivity and accommodation towards criticism and advocacy by churches, faithbased associations and civic organisations on the part of the New Dispensation, may reflect its double-edged burden to shed off the Old Dispensation’s image of one-partyism, repression, violence and intransigence and to appeal to EuroAnglo-American expectations regarding political, media, legal and other reforms with a view to re-engagement with them. In the context of such objectivity and accommodation, no matter how limited, it might not be most applicable, strategic and effective for churches and faith-based movements to adopt some form of the ‘separation and confrontation model’ that spurns sensitive diplomatic, consultative, corrective and remedial engagement with the State. Radical confrontational critical-engagement characterised only by overt protest, resistance and defiance, especially when perceived to be funded by governments and donor agencies identified as regime change agents by the New Dispensation government, is likely to face resistance from a State underpinned by the liberation agenda ethos. Adopting the ‘co-option model’ only, and seeking to influence government policies and programmes through private non-confrontational consultative engagement, may expose churches to the powerless role of legitimisers and sympathisers of State maladministration, injustice and State-sponsored repression and violence and to be perceived by society in general as compromised and captured by the State. A model for State and church interface in the Zimbabwe New Dispensation that will position the churches to earn such levels of trust, moral authority and respect from the State, the nation in general and key political actors across the political divide in particular, so as to speak corrective truth to power and proffer practical sustainable solutions to national politico-economic and socio-transformational

National Political Sabbath for Trust and Confidence Building  181 crises with high levels of legitimacy and credibility, is yet to be discovered or worked out. References Banana, C. 1996. The Church in the Struggle for Zimbabwe. Gweru: Mambo Press. Bhukari, H.S.A. 2011. ‘What is Comparative Analysis?’ SSRN Electronic Journal. https:// dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1962​328 Bowen, G.A. 2009. ‘Document Analysis as a Qualitative Research Method,’ Qualitative Research Journal 9(2), 27–40. Chitando, E. 2002. ‘Down with the devil, Forward with Christ! A Study of the Interface between Religious and Political discourses in Zimbabwe,’ African Sociological Review 6(1), 1–16. Gokova, J. 2010. ‘Political Participation: An Ecumenical Perspective,’ in Kaulemu, D. (ed.), Political Participation in Zimbabwe. Harare: AFCAST, 114–120. Hallencreutz, C.F. and Moyo, A. 1988. ‘Religion and Political Thought in Independent Zimbabwe,’ in C.F. Hallencreutz and A. Moyo (eds.), Church and State in Zimbabwe. Gweru: Mambo Press, 65–70. MDC President and Party’s Response to the ZHOCD Call for a Seven Year National Sabbath for Trust and Confidence Building, dated 28th November 2019. Harare: MDC. Mukonori, F. 2017. Man in The Middle. Harare: The House of Books. Pashapa, N. 2018a. Churches, Politics and Ethical Leadership. Harare: University of Zimbabwe Publishers. Pashapa, N. 2018b. Spirituality, Churches and Transformation. Harare: University of Zimbabwe Publishers. President and Government of Zimbabwe’s Response to the ZHOCD Call for a Seven Year National Sabbath for Trust and Confidence Building, 17th October 2019. Harare: Government of Zimbabwe. The Herald, 30th December, 2019. Thomas, N.E. 1985. ‘Church and State in Zimbabwe,’ Journal of Church and State 27(1), 113–133. Yinger, M.J. 1970. The Scientific Study of Religion. New York: Macmillan. ZHOCD. 2019. ‘Call for a Seven Year National Sabbath for Trust and Confidence Building,’ 7th October.

11 Religion, Politics and Veteran Masculinities in Post-Mugabe Zimbabwe1 Obert Bernard Mlambo

Introduction This chapter explores the religion and masculinity discourses through which Emmerson Mnangagwa’s rise to power and the eclipse of Robert Mugabe from Zimbabwean politics have been framed in the politics of the post-Mugabe era. The main argument of this chapter is that the emergence of a post-Mugabe political order was characterized by an official appeal to religion and by manifestations of liberation war veterans’ masculinities, in which the liberation war veterans not only played a leading role in Mugabe’s removal from power, but continued to play a significant role in national politics. The chapter thus explores some aspects of veteran-masculinities and their place in Zimbabwean politics after Mugabe. The first part of this chapter explores the function and place of civil religion in the rise of Mnangagwa, and the role of civil religion in the regime’s production and management of its image. The second part examines the spiritual aspects of liberation war veterans’ masculinities, while the third and last part examines the place of veteran-masculinities in the struggles and contestation for power with opposition parties in post-Mugabe Zimbabwe. Civil Religion and the Rise of Emmerson Mnangagwa The concept of civil religion was defined incisively in the context of America as an institutionalized collection of sacred beliefs about the American nation, expressed in American foundational documents and presidential addresses that include belief in the existence of transcendent being called God, and the idea that the American people are supposed to follow the laws, and that this God will guide them and protect them in their new country (Wimberly and Swatos, 1998:94). Civil religion in Zimbabwe involves the institutionalized recollection of the memory of the liberation wars, and the symbolism and rituals that come with it in theory and in practice. This symbolism and rituals include singing the national anthem, respecting the national flag, observing national holidays in commemoration of war heroes and heroines, and the invocation of God and the ancestors in state affairs. Since the inception of Emmerson Mnangagwa’s self-proclaimed Second Republic, the colours of the Zimbabwean flag have become ubiquitous, as scarves DOI: 10.4324/9781003332435-12

Religion, Politics and Veteran Masculinities in Zimbabwe  183 bearing these colours are often seen wrapped around the necks of Mnangagwa, his cabinet ministers and ZANU PF supporters in general. Mnangagwa himself, during the countdown to the presidential elections of 2018, popularized the refrain: “The voice of the people is the voice of God.” This was clearly an effort to portray his political project as divinely inspired. Mnangagwa’s rise to power may be understood to some extent in the context of civil religion and the ethos of the liberation struggle, where liberation war veterans have been represented as embodiments of civic virtue, restorers of good governance and those who fought for the nation during the liberation war. The war veterans’ power has been understood spiritually since the liberation war era, hence the relevance of the metaphysical in the constitution of power in Zimbabwe, and of the ways in which spirituality centrally undergirds interpretations of the material world in African traditional worldviews (see Akyeampong and Obeng, 2005). Such spirituality is quite central among Zimbabwean veterans’ conceptions of power and authority. Traditional African spirituality acknowledges the reality of a nonmaterial world, as the material world is seen as incapable of explaining the totality of human experience (Akyeampong and Obeng, 2005:24). The African spiritual universe in general, and the Zimbabwean spiritual universe in particular, contains invisible participants such as spirits of the dead and the Creator. Since social practice derives from customs, beliefs, symbols and so forth (Schatzki et al., 2006), it is necessary to give an overview of the indigenous religion of the Shona people in Zimbabwe in order to put into clearer perspective how religion has become part of the construction of a veteran-masculinity in Zimbabwe. Practices are always embodied, and they evoke symbolic meaning and power by which they are in turn shaped (Schatzki et al., 2006). In this regard, the war veterans used traditional spirituality to construct power (cf. Mlambo, 2022). Clifford Geertz (1973) has shown that culture is a matter of publicly observable symbols and rituals and the organization of discourses and practices. This perspective enhances an understanding of the importance of spirits for Zimbabwean war veterans, in the context of tasks undertaken for the nation for which they sought to be rewarded. This explains why war veterans have a common belief that “zvinhu zvese ndezva mbuya Nehanda.” (All things belong to Grandmother Nehanda.) In the traditional past, the land was intimately associated with the history of the chiefdom, with the ruling chief and with ancestral spirits who lived in the land (Shoko, 2006:5). Ancestral spirits known as vadzimu (plural, the singular is mudzimu) are spirits of dead relatives, who are considered as central in the Shona community.2 Ancestors are guardians of the land, and play the role of mediation between the Supreme Being Mwari (the Creator and Sustainer of the universe), and living beings (Shoko, 2006:5). The centrality of Zimbabwean veterans’ spirituality in war is shown by the fact that the first Chimurenga war that occurred in 1896–1897 was inspired by the spirit mediums of Mbuya (Grandmother) Nehanda, Chaminuka and Sekuru (Grandfather) Kaguvi, and these mediums led the uprising, although there is debate on the extent of their leadership. In their understanding, the welfare of war veterans, including that of their children, must be provided for by the state. To neglect these bodies as Mugabe had

184  Obert Bernard Mlambo done by not providing for their social and economic needs and also the delay in giving them land was unpardonable as, according to their self-perception, their bodies were not ordinary bodies. Thus, it is crucial to note that the bodies of the war veterans in Zimbabwe were not conceptualized as “merely” corporeal, flesh and blood bodies. Instead, these bodies were vested with deep spiritual significance (Mlambo and Chitando, 2015). Inscribed on them were memories of ancestral promises and oracles. The bodies of the war veterans were spiritual libraries, imbued with declarations by the great ancestor, Nehanda, who had defied death at the hands of the colonizers and had brazenly declared that her bones would rise again (Mlambo and Chitando, 2015). As the creative writer, Chenjerai Hove (1988), showed in his award-winning novel, Bones, there was a strong bond between the body of the freedom fighter and the ancestors. The bodies of the freedom fighters were not autonomous, free-floating bodies. Instead, they were vehicles used by the ancestors to reclaim the inheritance that was taken from them by force. With this view in mind, the war veterans’ thinking is shaped by war-time considerations, which psychologically made them to feel entitled to Zimbabwe as a country and all the affairs pertaining to its politics and governance. Thus, when Mugabe ill-treated the war veterans, he had also ill-treated the great ancestors. The above scenario explains why Mugabe’s removal from power in 2017 and his subsequent replacement by his war-time colleague, Mnangagwa, was largely facilitated by veterans of the liberation war, who gave their gravitas to the latter. Politics in Zimbabwe in a way is defined in terms that identify the state and civic virtue with a masculine ethos. There is a degree to which Zimbabwe conforms to the masculinity of the nation and the decisive determinations of patriarchal/ male power (Mlambo, 2022. In talking of a “masculinity of the nation,” I refer to the making of the modern Zimbabwean state through heroic fighting for land and for political independence from British imperialism, a struggle which includes the post-2000 expropriation of white-owned farmland by war veterans of Zimbabwe’s independence war. Heroic individuals who participated in the processes were recognized and celebrated as makers of a Zimbabwe in which Mugabe’s image loomed large. Liberation fighters were not excluded from this. Thus, the concept of civil religion and its appropriation in masculinity-discourses by liberation war veterans is informed by the function of a masculinity of the polis. In such masculinity-discourses, a liberation war veteran’s body, over and above the fact of its spiritual potency and connection with the national ancestors, was and is depicted as the yardstick of masculinity and valour. The war veterans’ bodies come across as indefatigable and undaunted in their commitment to the anti-colonial struggle (cf. Martin and Johnson, 1981; Chipamaunga, 1983; Mutasa, 1985; Mlambo and Gwekwerere, 2019). There is another dimension to the place of war veterans in Zimbabwean politics. Since the advent of Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980, liberation war veterans’ bodies have featured prominently in national politics, mainly at the service of the ruling ZANU PF party. In Zimbabwean politics, war veterans and their leaders belong in the same political guild of liberators. This guild has religious or

Religion, Politics and Veteran Masculinities in Zimbabwe  185 semi-religious rules or norms that govern the behaviour and the character of its members. Such norms elaborate and give nuances and palpable form to actions, ideals of power, including those that govern the terms of acceptable disposition in political office. They give expression to veterans’ masculinities, emotional proclivities, fears and anxieties, concerning the governing of Zimbabwe. It has been argued that norms get their meaning, and their normative authority and force, from their embodiment in publicly accessible activity (Rouse, 2007), and war veterans’ practices and actions have served as methods for summoning combat-related masculinities. Foucault (1976:138), for example, described how the constitution of present-day activity centrally consists in the fashioning of bodies (e.g., their aptitudes) within disciplinary practices. Such a disposition has provided them with the latitude to become power brokers and kingmakers in Zimbabwe. As a result of the war veterans’ disposition already mentioned, the national history of Zimbabwe has become masculinized. However, the defining characteristics of masculinity have rested in the hands of liberation war veterans and the ruling ZANU PF party, who essentially have defined masculinity in their own image and have supplied the dominant image of masculinity. They have maintained control over the image and definition of the masculine. Other male citizens, especially those who did not fight in the liberation war, have been regarded as powerless and less patriotic. Even dissenting voices within the veterans movement, and veterans who have left the party or been expelled, have been considered cowards and effeminate. On the other hand, women veterans who have maintained loyalty to the party have been lionized and masculinized. This is a method of social control of members of the war veterans’ guild which has inculcated a masculine habitus in members, associated with responsible citizenry, good behaviour (see Tendi, 2020), sexual propriety and the avoidance of effeminacy, and also acceptable disposition of the body and mind. This, however, is not to say that the criteria used have been fair. They have certainly been vulnerable to the manipulative schemes of the most powerful within the rank and file of ZANU PF and its guild of war veterans. It must be stated that the notion of military habitus governed and determined the relationship between Robert Mugabe and his war-time comrades. Mugabe was thus expelled from the guild, because he violated the sacred rules of the guild of liberators. From the war veterans’ perspective, Mugabe sold out, and was guilty as charged! His sins included his failure to live like a real man by submitting himself to his wife’s machinations, in the process threatening his war-time cadres who were waiting in the wings to succeed him. Mugabe’s wife, Grace, had become very influential in the political affairs of the country and ZANU PF. She had become too powerful as she had the latitude of even publicly shaming and insulting senior government officials, including the then Vice-President, Mnangagwa. The veterans who remained in the national army after the liberation war, such as General Chiwenga, General Philip Valerio Sibanda and many others, and those who remained outside, such as Christopher Mutsvangwa, Victor Matemadanda, and others, finally combined to oust their commander, Mugabe. Mugabe’s removal from power was mainly caused, according to liberation war

186  Obert Bernard Mlambo veterans, by his effeminate tendencies, which led to his desire to have his wife Grace Mugabe to succeed him. The second sin which Mugabe is said to have committed had to do with the neglect of the welfare of the liberation war veterans. This must strictly be understood in the military context of how the notion of honour functions. Zimbabwean history shows how pre-colonial wars, the liberation war and the third Chimurenga (the violent land occupations that characterized Zimbabwe as from 1998 to 2008), have become important sites for the historical evolution, first and foremost, of a culture of honour and the ideal of heroism. Thus, the war veterans’ sense of entitlement to land and other rewards stemmed from the fact that their bodies toiled in fighting for the defence or acquisition of the territory of their country in the different stages of the struggle. Although war veterans’ past land expropriations do reflect gender, class and various social divisions, and the subordinated power relations characteristic of a neo-colonial African state (Moyo, 2007), the war veterans’ claim for land was centred on the most heroic and honourable deeds for which they believed they should be rewarded. Firstly, veterans claimed the land on the grounds that they had fought for their country and they deserved the land. Second, veterans were able to claim the land because they could take it by force (and because they had the attitude which came from having fought for their country). This explains why the liberation war veterans sought to constrain Mugabe to force him to accept their demands for pensions and land allotments (Mlambo and Chitando, 2015). The Zimbabwean state is situated within the context of neo-colonial class formation processes and extroverted economic structures, and also shaped by differentiated internal social forces which define actual political power and accumulation (Moyo, 2007). In the eyes of war veterans, Mugabe and his elite had colluded with Western capital at the expense of their welfare. Thus, the war veterans’ action to force Mugabe out of power and their economic emancipation discourses reflect their disgruntlement with the political elite’s accumulation of wealth and farms. Mugabe’s removal from power thus reflects, to some extent, a class struggle which pitted against Mugabe the political elite and the generality of the citizenry, in collaboration with the war veterans and the army, in November 2017. The notion of the ancestors having been disappointed by Mugabe’s alleged failure to honour the war heroes was deployed to justify his removal. The following section examines the nexus of Mnangagwa’s rise to power with masculinity discourses and the war veterans’ gravitas. War Veterans, Masculinity Discourses and Mnangagwa’s Rise to Power In portraying Mugabe’s regime as oppressive and in need of renewal, the veterans mobilized the language of freedom and rights, through which they fostered their active and militant masculinities in assaulting Mugabe’s image. The generality of the population that joined calls for the end of Mugabe’s reign became enrolled in the guild of war veterans as heroes – a process which qualified them

Religion, Politics and Veteran Masculinities in Zimbabwe  187 as patriots. War veterans’ physical bodies, it can be asserted, inhabited the values of the institutions they served. It was during this tumultuous period, leading to Mugabe’s removal from power, that the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA) featured prominently in issuing statements that condemned state brutality and heavy handedness in the face of criticisms from Zimbabweans. Even the former minister of the Ministry of War Veterans’ Affairs, Tshinga Dube, criticized the Mugabe government’s excesses in dealing with dissent. In this regard, the struggle against Mugabe was perceived as a process of restoring the gains of the revolutionary war which were being trashed by Mugabe’s dictatorial tendencies, hence the reference to “Operation Restore Legacy” – a military-initiated process which targeted to arrest corrupt individuals in Mugabe’s government with a view to restore the country back to the revolutionary ideals of an egalitarian and prosperous society. The period leading to Mugabe’s resignation from office was characterized by several rallies and meetings of liberation war veterans who openly denounced Mugabe’s reign. In staging the protests against Mugabe, it is important to state that the war veterans were representing themselves as champions of the people’s new struggle. Their statements and slogans were loaded with combat-related masculinities which were appropriated in their actions and calls for Mugabe to pave way for a fresh pair of hands. The culmination of these processes was a military operation which served proof of the fact that the war veterans who were still in the army, for example, Chiwenga, and those who were not in the army had decided to act. During the “Operation Restore Legacy,” military armoured vehicles invaded the streets of Harare – a process which led to Mugabe’s resignation as President of Zimbabwe. Since a conspicuous characteristic of the revolutionary situation was its celebration of a constellation of values and attributes associated with manliness, Mnangagwa’s government developed an official aesthetic and political discourse of heroic, active, masculinity – a masculinity that was charged with the representation of public, civic, and indeed martial values of war veterans who played a crucial role in Mugabe’s downfall. As such, the veteran symbol became a token of both democracy and redemptive masculine qualities in which Mnangagwa was regarded as founder of the new Zimbabwe. In this light, he was also viewed as one who would restore peace in Zimbabwe after the corrosive rule of Mugabe since 1980. From this perspective, the person of Mnangagwa was the anticipated protector and also guardian of the gains of the legacy of the revolution. Further, he was portrayed as one who would uphold the dictates of the ancestors. It was under these circumstances that Mnangagwa’s anticipated rise to power was celebrated by his supporters. Mnangagwa’s anticipated reign was celebrated as that of a hero who would change the status quo, by making sure that veterans of the liberation war were better looked after than under Mugabe (Chitando and Mlambo, 2020). The celebration included performance of song and dance. We may mention a song by Mukudzei Mukombe (a.k.a. Jah Prayzah), called Mudhara Vachauya. The song’s lyrics concern an expression of a longing for a deliverer, in which reference is made to an older man who was expected to come and address a demanding national situation. In the song, there is reference to shumba inoruma

188  Obert Bernard Mlambo (the lion that devours). Significantly, Mnangagwa’s totem was Shumba (the lion). Thus, Mnangagwa’s lionization as shumba inoruma projected him as a fearless and determined leader (Chitando and Mlambo, 2020), coming from the ancestors. The title “Mudhara” has a connotation of respect, and conveys the idea of one with patriarchal authority and license to discipline, give guidance and, ultimately, right a problematic situation (Chitando and Mlambo, 2020). Another song that celebrated Mnangagwa’s masculinity as a hero and strong ruler was Kutonga Kwaro (His Leadership Style). Kutonga Kwaro was intimately concerned with the quest to move from the Mugabe era to a new era. In Kutonga Kwaro, Jah Prayzah referred to the era of a new hero who would rule, and the new ruler would be a hero who would change the law. This was implied by the words of the song: “Ah hodhi, Tisvikewo pano, Ndakuchinja Mutemo, Zaruraiwo dura, huku dzamawundura …” (We are here, we are changing the law, open the granary gates, whatever you have done, including the chickens you have dressed will not matter because we have changed the course of things.) Jah Prayzah did not beat about the bush in stating that the new hero was someone much feared by his political rivals: “… Kutondizvonda, vanondidedera, Kutondizvonda, ndakava remere…!” (Although they hate me, they fear me … although they hate me, I am tough!) In performing this song, Mnangagwa’s supporters countered the exclusive dominance of Mugabe in Zimbabwean politics, as they openly expressed their desire for a new era. This anticipated new era had a Messianic tinge to it as the masculine hero would inaugurate a New Dispensation. In the scheme popularized by Mnangagwa’s propaganda, for people, when Mugabe was deposed from power, a new era had begun. It is, therefore, instructive to give an account of the state of affairs with regards to the disposition of war veterans in post-Mugabe Zimbabwe. The following section is an examination of Zimbabwe’s political landscape in post-Mugabe Zimbabwe with the aim of accounting for war veterans’ masculinities after the defeat of Mugabe. Did these masculinities become settled after Mugabe’s exit from power in the context of the troubled politics of a postcolonial state? War Veterans’ Masculinities in Post-Mugabe Zimbabwe War veterans during Mugabe’s reign had been notorious for their anti-opposition stance, and have often been considered a paramilitary unit at the service of Mugabe’s power retention schemes. It is necessary to give an account of their post-Mugabe disposition. Liberation war veterans and post-independence intellectual politicians in post-Mugabe Zimbabwe have continued as irreconcilable political nemesis. This stems from the manner in which the war veterans perceive intellectuals. During the liberation war, the guerrillas looked down upon the intellectuals with whom they waged the war as weak and effeminate. Edgar Tekere, a former guerrilla fighter, added his voice to this opinion when he indicated in his book that Mugabe never fired a gun, not even in anger (Tekere, 2007). Mugabe himself, an intellectual, was not counted among the guild of guerrillas, “real men” (Mhanda, 2011; Tendi, 2020), in spite of having led the guerrilla fighters at the helm of the

Religion, Politics and Veteran Masculinities in Zimbabwe  189 Dare Rechimurenga (the ZANLA High Command). The war veterans had the same condescending attitude towards opposition party leaders in Zimbabwe’s political landscape, whom they regarded as effeminate or too young to be counted among the real men. War veterans and ZANU PF politicians demeaned Chamisa’s masculinity with much disdain as woefully inadequate for him to challenge their tried and tested Mnangagwa, a “veteran of the Liberation War.” Veteran masculinities were associated with courage and ancestral blessings. Converts to Christianity and opposition politics were excluded from the category of real men. We may note that Chamisa also attempted to rely on the ideal of virile masculinity, as a political actor, to counter the veterans’ derogatory utterances, who in December 2018 made an attempt to force ZANU PF to make a constitutional amendment to raise the age upwards to 52 years for presidential aspirants in order to block Chamisa, who was 40 years old then, from participating in future elections. He devoted much effort to trying to portray himself as possessing adequate manhood for Zimbabwean politics. At one time, he did some press-ups during a demonstration march in Harare in June 2018 to show off his youthful and energetic body. This was in stark contrast to his then 75-year-old rival Mnangagwa. It is interesting to note that for their own part, well-educated opposition leaders in Zimbabwe confronted the liberation war veterans with their own version of masculinity – an intellectual masculinity to thwart and counter the violent masculinity of liberation war veterans. This intellectual masculinity appealed to the masses of opposition supporters in Zimbabwe. In a debate which brought into view the status of youth and education versus masculinity, the opposition MDC Alliance leader Nelson Chamisa has had a conviction of being a “techno-metro” man: modern, information-technology-compliant, young, educated, endowed with a great legal mind as an advocate, articulate, and, above all, Christian. He faced a challenge to his manliness in Zimbabwean politics, as he was regarded by liberation war veterans and ZANU PF supporters as practically a baby in diapers. Chamisa was still in his mother’s womb in 1978, two years before Zimbabwe’s independence. He did not fight colonialism. He was not part of the veterans’ struggle for land against colonialism. Yet Chamisa activated and enacted a new form of masculinity – an intellectual masculinity, which to a considerable extent shook the post-Mugabe political establishment. This intellectual masculinity was presented as one that was informed by a distinctively Christian ethos, as opposed to the veteran masculinity built on the foundations of valour and commitment to the ancestors. However, greatness is ambiguous (Rogers, 2004); Mnangagwa’s performance in the 2018 presidential elections has been assessed and framed in the context and language of masculinity, sometimes to exalt his macho image in Zimbabwean politics, and sometimes to show exactly the opposite of that. Mnangagwa’s performance has been described in social media as lacklustre and dispirited. Some supporters have implied that his campaign was hamstrung by his lack of testosterone-induced charisma, the bombastic and flowery language usually associated with the rhetorical prowess of not only his younger competitor, Nelson Chamisa, but even his

190  Obert Bernard Mlambo veteran predecessor, Mugabe. Chamisa’s emphasis on what he said was his divine election, call to reject ancestral practices and trust in God appealed to many in a context where Pentecostalism has been gaining momentum. Conclusion Politics in the post-Mugabe era in Zimbabwe has been characterized by the appropriation of religion and masculinity discourses. This chapter has demonstrated that Mnangagwa’s rise and the subsequent attempt to eclipse his predecessor, Mugabe, has been framed within a context of masculinity in which war veterans and their new favourite leader Mnangagwa have loomed large as heroes whose ethos has been touted as a noble ideal for transforming Zimbabwe’s economic and political troubles. Narratives surrounding the rise of Mnangagwa have depicted him and his war veteran supporters as the “new makers” of a new Zimbabwe, who are fulfilling the wishes of the ancestors. What is more, representatives of the war veterans’ masculinity which characterized the Mugabe era have still shown a firm presence in, and control of, Zimbabwe’s political landscape, in a process which has witnessed clashes between liberation war veterans and opposition political leaders, whose intellectual masculinity has been despised as inadequate by the war veterans themselves. Essentially, therefore, we witness a contest between veteran masculinities that are premised on military might and ancestral validation, and youthful, intellectual masculinities purportedly inspired by the Holy Spirit – locked in mortal combat for the heart and soul of Zimbabwe. Notes 1 This chapter was developed for a book provisionally titled “Land Expropriation in Ancient Rome and Contemporary Zimbabwe: Veterans, Masculinity and War” for which the author acknowledges the generosity of the Humboldt Foundation for its funding. 2 Ibid.

References Akyeampong, E. A. and Obeng, P. 2005. “Spirituality, Gender, and Power in Asante History,” in O. Oyewumi (ed.), African Gender Studies: A Reader. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 23–48. Chipamaunga, E. 1983. A Fighter for Freedom. Gweru: Mambo Press. Chitando, E. and Mlambo, O. B. 2015. “Blair, keep your England, and let me keep my Zimbabwe: Examining the relationship of physical space and political order in Zimbabwe’s Land Redistribution Program (2000–2008),” Journal of Pan-African Studies 8(8), 8–26. Chitando, E. and Mlambo, O. B. 2020. “Mudhara Vachauya (The Old Man is Coming) and Kutonga Kwaro (His/Her Style of Governance): Analysing Jah Prayzah’s Music in Zimbabwe’s Tumultuous Political Context,” Muziki 17(1), 94–108.

Religion, Politics and Veteran Masculinities in Zimbabwe  191 Foucault, M. 1976. The Archaeology of Knowledge, trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith. New York: Harper and Row. Geertz, C. 1973. The Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic Books. Hove, C. 1988. Bones. Harare: Baobab. Martin, D. and Johnson P. 1981. The Struggle for Zimbabwe: The Chimurenga War. London: Faber and Faber. Mhanda, W. 2011. Dzino: Memories of a Freedom Fighter. Harare: Weaver Press. Mlambo, Obert B. 2022. Land Expropriation in Ancient Rome and Contemporary Zimbabwe: Veterans, Masculinity and War. London: Bloomsbury Academic Publishers. Mlambo, O. B., and T. C. Gwekwerere. 2019. Names, Labels, the Zimbabwean Liberation War veteran and the third Chimurenga: The language and politics of entitlement in post-2000 Zimbabwe. African Identities 17(2). 130–46. Moyo, S. 2007. “Land in the Political Economy of African Development: Alternative Strategies for Reform,” African Development 32(4), 1–20. Mutasa, G. 1985. The Contact. Gweru: Mambo Press. Rogers, G. M. 2004. Alexander: The Ambiguity of Greatness. New York: Random House. Rouse, J. 2007. “Practice Theory.” Division I Faculty Publications 43. https://wes​scho​lar. wesle​yan.edu/ div1facpubs/43 Schatzki, T. R., Knorr-Cetina, K. and Von Savigny, E. (eds.). 2006. The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory. London: Routledge. Shoko, T. 2006. “My Bones Shall Rise Again: War Veterans, Spirits and Land Reform in Zimbabwe.” Paper presented at University of Leiden’s African Studies Centre: 1–17. Tekere, E. Z. 2007. A Lifetime of Struggle. Harare: SAPES Books. Tendi, Blessing-Miles. 2020. The Army and Politics in Zimbabwe: Mujuru, the Liberation Fighter and Kingmaker. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wimberly, R., and Swatos, W. 1998. “Civil Religion,” in Encyclopaedia of Religion and Society. Walnut Creek: Alta Mirror Press.

12 The Role of Theology in Contemporary Zimbabwe Insights from the Rise of the Monarchy in the Hebrew Bible Xolani Maseko Introduction This chapter follows an interdisciplinary approach, combining the sociological method and biblical theology to achieve its aims. The chapter assumes that there is an inspiration for theology in the stories of the ‘rise of the monarchy in Israel’ as contained in I Samuel 8–9 and Chapter 11. The conclusion will be arrived at through the use of hermeneutics of the biblical literature of the Deuteronomistic History and social analysis of life in the New Dispensation in contemporary Zimbabwe. The area of focus is the New Dispensation in Zimbabwe. This context will be surveyed to facilitate a scientific application of lessons from the biblical text. The approach utilised is the pastoral perspective within the mainline church scholarship. To achieve the whole exercise, the socio-economic and political context of Zimbabwe will be defined, the argument for the role of theology rather than the church examined, hermeneutical considerations made and a strategic position taken, particularly basing on the biblical interpretation. This discussion is conscious of the dominant theologies in the Zimbabwean discourse as demonstrated by different church denominations and this reality is duly acknowledged in the ensuing sections of the chapter. The ‘New Dispensation’: An Overview The contemporary context in Zimbabwe is a culmination of the processes of the old, or the former government which was led by former President Robert G. Mugabe, giving way to the new dispensation that is led by President E. D. Mnangagwa. This was not a normal transfer of power through an election or planned succession. It came about as a result of the events of November 2017 which resulted from the tensions within the ruling party, ZANU PF, leading to the 6 November 2017 expulsion of Mnangagwa from the ruling party. This was viewed a step toward Grace Mugabe and G40 moving into the driver seat of succession struggle. Mugabe’s refusal to dialogue with the army on November 13, 2017, to resolve their differences was the final catalyst for the DOI: 10.4324/9781003332435-13

The Role of Theology in Contemporary Zimbabwe  193 coup, with Chiwenga and others launching “Operation Restore Legacy” the following day, leading to Mugabe’s resignation on November 21, 2017. (Noyes, 2020:6) This narrative points to a resignation by the head of State due to the involvement of the military. This on its own raises concern to anyone who espouses democracy and envisions peace. Noyes (2020) shows the state arriving at a crossroads because of intra-party conflicts within the ruling party when he says Mnangagwa fled to exile in countries that include Mozambique and South Africa. This raises a serious question because these countries were supposedly allies of the ruling party and the then Head of State. Mnangagwa came back two weeks later, and on the 24th of November, he was sworn in as the Head of State. The process of the power transfer to the New Dispensation can be characterised as having types of emotions, namely, euphoria and optimism, as well as despair. Mugabe’s stepping down was met with jubilation as people were seen to work together with the army to see to it that the man who had ruled Zimbabwe for the past 37 years would step down. Even those from the opposition ranks saw what was obtaining as positive for the nation of Zimbabwe. After taking office, Mnangagwa promised a sharp departure from Mugabe’s authoritarian style of rule, promising to implement many political and economic reforms. The second emotion that met the dawn of the New Dispensation may be characterised as that of despair due to the developments around the elections and the thereafter. In the run up to the 2018 elections, there was unusual calm and this promised a better future for Zimbabwe. This was, however, short-lived as reports of discontent started to emerge. It was said that the electoral playing field was not even and the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission was not independent (Noyes, 2020:8). The ‘Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition’ reported in February 2019, that the shock was exacerbated by the August 1 2018 events that led to the killing of at least 6 civilians. According to Chimininge (2019:49), Despite the popular support gain[ed] by Mnangagwa up to the time he assumed office as president, his first 100 day plan brewed a lot of discontent[s]‌ and mistrust among the people of Zimbabwe. The perceived era looks like even worse if (sic) compared to the old order … A closer scrutiny of his policies clearly shows that the new dispensation is the furtherance of the previous regime … This is so because the much-proclaimed new dispensation does not show any differences from the old order. It looks like a new wine in the old skin. What is worrisome in Mnangagwa’s gospel of populism and forgiveness is not producing the much anticipated political, economic and social results. Having outlined the context that gave rise to the New Dispensation in this section, in the following section the chapter will provide an update on the context of Zimbabwe at the time of writing.

194  Xolani Maseko Contemporary Zimbabwe: An Overview of the Socio-economic and Political Context The New Dispensation has been measured against the promises that it has made to the people of Zimbabwe. Some of these are contained in their manifesto of 2018. As quoted by Murisa (2019:7–8), the manifesto says, The focus and the preoccupation of the new administration is opening up the country for business, fighting corruption, creating jobs, modernising the public sector and promoting the investment, economic empowerment, and re-aligning to an investor friendly trajectory that leads to economic growth and job creation. (Zanu PF Manifesto, 2018:1) The preaching of President Mnangagwa across borders has been the mantra, ‘Zimbabwe is open for business.’ The indigenous law requiring the investor to cede 51 per cent has been changed to promote the mantra. Some Acts were passed in parliament in pursuit of political reforms. Media laws that were oppressive were repealed. However, these achievements are seen as piecemeal processes compared to what promises have been made and the potential that has been lost. As has been noted, the nation of Zimbabwe has moved from heightened sense of optimism to despair. The time under the New Dispensation has witnessed three major natural disasters that hit the nation. These include Cyclone Idai, which left “communities displaced, traumatised and injured” (Maseko, 2019:66). There is serious food scarcity due to the rains that were not adequate. While the country was still nursing the social and economic effects of these disasters, the COVID 19 pandemic hit the entire world, and Zimbabwe was not spared. It exposed the country’s inadequacies when trying to address health and economic issues. The social and economic challenges that were there during the First Republic returned to haunt the country in the New Dispensation. These included high levels of inflation, high domestic debt and sharp political divisions. Zimbabwe continues to endure multiple crises. There have been different initiatives to try and unlock the political logjam in the country. According to the Zimbabwe, A Promising National Dialogue Design and Roadblocks, a document for Peace, Healing and Reconciliation by the Heal Zimbabwe Trust (2019:1), Beyond offensive international diplomatic actions, court applications and protests, a national dialogue appears the best alternative to resolve Zimbabwe’s swelling socio-economic and political afflictions. To salvage it from collapse President Emmerson Mnangagwa, on July 22 January 2019, called on political parties, churches and civic society leaders to a national platform. Only political parties were however invited to the inaugural dialogue commencement meeting on the 7th of February 2019. Churches have, on the other hand mooted their own national dialogue process.

The Role of Theology in Contemporary Zimbabwe  195 Does the Church Have a Mandate in such a Context? The history of the struggle in Zimbabwe will not be complete if the role of the Church is not highlighted. Nkomo (2019) writing in ‘Thinking beyond dialogue journal’ has this to say: The church’s role in peacekeeping and unifying society dates as far back as it was founded. The church is a vital institution that stands ready in providing healing to socio-political and economic victims. Its hand cuts across political lines. The church, in the Zimbabwean case, has been a pillar of hope, harmony and unity. Zimbabwe found her independence in 1980 with the church having played an important role during the liberation struggle. Therefore, any national event cannot go without the blessings of the clergymen. When people are hopeless, they (church) provide hope. When people are in disarray, the church provides a platform for unity. The church’s position in our society, must therefore be understood and honoured in this dialogue discourse. (Nkomo, 2019:5) In this argument, Nkomo refers to the historical involvement of the church in the issues of governance. From pre-independence to Lancaster House talks to the mediation between the military and former president Mugabe in 2017, the church was involved. Historically, the Church’s role must always be felt in steering the country and leaders towards a better life that Jesus promises in John 10:10, namely, ‘life in abundance.’ Theologically, the church is the body of Christ. It continues his ministry on earth today. Mbanjwa (2013:1) says, Jesus described His mission which is aimed at the restoration of the full life of human beings and the beloved children of God envisaged in the creation story. This was the Good News (Lk. 4:16–21) that He brought to the whole world… The restoration of justice and the fullness of life for the entire human race were to become the main concern of his disciples and of the church that was to spring forth from their mission. The other imperative for involvement of the Church in social, political and governance issues comes from the liberation motive throughout the Bible. Exodus 3:7–8 reads, and the Lord said, I have surely seen the affliction of my people which are in Egypt, and have heard their cry by reason of their task masters; I know their sorrows; and I am come down to deliver them. (NIV) God reveals himself as a God who is concerned with the affairs of people, he listens and takes action through His Church herein symbolised by Moses (verse

196  Xolani Maseko 10). Therefore, the Church cannot be indifferent to the struggles of the people of God if the Church is to be true to the Church’s mission. Why Talk of the Role of Theology and not the Church in This Chapter? This work refers to the role of theology based on I Samuel 8–9 and 11 and not the role of the Church. The Church is a theological institution made up of believers bound together by a certain theological belief. Theology is born out of reflection in relation to God. Pillay (2018:1) notes that “Historically, the greatest theologians have been pastors and vice versa …” and examples include Justin Martyr, St. Augustine, Martin Luther and many others. In this chapter, the use of the term ‘theology’ is purposefully designed to avoid appearing judgemental on some churches. This is out of the realisation that even though it has been demonstrated historically that the Church has always been involved in the struggle in Zimbabwe, the Church has been divided over political lines because of different theological persuasions. Some denominations tend to support the status quo as they read the Bible literally and uphold the idea that political leaders are ordained by God. Other denominations gravitate to the left because of their preferential option for the poor and wanting to keep political leaders accountable. Still others associate with the leadership because of the conviction that some political leaders stand for the liberation and empowerment of African people. There are many church organisations in Zimbabwe. Most mainline churches are under the banner of Zimbabwe Council of Churches. The Roman Catholic is under the Zimbabwe Catholics Bishops Conference. The Charismatic/Pentecostals are under the Evangelical Fellowship of Zimbabwe. Some of the African Initiated Churches have as their umbrella body, the Fambidzano Yemakereke Avatema (literally, Ecumenical Movement of African Initiated Churches). Paradza (2019:2) gives the list of the different churches, celebrating their coming together under the Heads of Christian Denominations (HOCD). They sometimes come together in advocacy and governance issues; however, most of the time they act independently because of their divergent theological persuasions. The dominant theology which may be accused of exploiting the masses is that associated with the gospel of prosperity and the emphasis on the “man of God.” The other extreme is a kind of theology that frowns upon all forms of wealth. It is not in the interest of this chapter to dwell on the correctness of church doctrinal persuasions, hence the preference of the use of ‘theology’ instead of the role of the Church. In the following section, the chapter utilises sections of the Hebrew Bible (the Old Testament) to reflect on the implications of the rise of the monarchy for theology in contemporary Zimbabwe. The Rise of the Monarchy and the Role of Theology in Contemporary Zimbabwe The background of I Samuel stretches approximately between 1050 and 1000 BC. Eslinger (1985:37) laments the critical inadequacy of the literary critical method

The Role of Theology in Contemporary Zimbabwe  197 that discovered the anti and the pro-monarchic sources in I Samuel. The cry is for a method that can preserve the unity of the bible text. The book is part of what is known as the Deuteronomistic History, and according to Gerbrandt (1986:41), this literary work includes books from Deuteronomy up to II Kings. The book of first Samuel, which is the key focus for this chapter, relates how the nation of Israel made a transition from being a charismatic theocratic state to a monarchy. A theocracy is where there is the direct rule of God. In this case, God was the president or the King, and with the judges as ‘policemen and judiciary’ to enforce and to judge the people over the law of God. On the other hand, under the institution of the king, the king will be the sole authority with some leaders under him to enforce his policies. So this period in Israel can be related with that which obtained in Zimbabwe around November 2017 in that in both cases we see the moment of transition from one leadership dispensation to another. Israel was transitioning from a theocracy to a kingship or monarchy. Zimbabwe was transitioning from the rule under Mugabe, which lasted 37 years, to a ‘new dispensation,’ also dubbed the Second Republic. During this period in Israel, the role of the Judges under the ‘old dispensation’ was dominant as they were the enforcement agents of Yahweh and exercised an oversight role over the nation of Israel. In this period of transition, a Kairos window, it was imperative for them to provide leadership from a theological perspective. They had been chosen by Yahweh for such a time as this. Such was the case in Zimbabwe, as seen through the mediatory efforts of Father Fidelis Mukonori, mediating between the army and the former president, Mugabe. At that time in Israel, Samuel was the last judge and the first of the prophets. Although he may be criticised for having interests, and therefore for not being a fair adjudicator, he was leading during a decisive turning point in the history of the nation. He challenged his compatriots to trust in God alone. Scholarship has proposed that there are two sources related to the rise of the monarchy. For Anderson (1985:131), in I Samuel 8, we have what is called the antimonarchic or theocratic source. This source is against the establishment of the monarchy. I Samuel 8:4–5 says, Then all the elders of Israel gathered themselves together and came to Samuel to Ramah, and said to him, behold, you are old, and your sons walk not in your ways: now make us a king to judge us like all the nations. (NIV) This request displeased Samuel and according to verse 7, we are told that it displeased the Lord too. Samuel then lectures the elders of Israel on the negative things that the king will bring to the Israelites (verses 11–17). Even though this source shows Samuel as against the establishment of the king, He still assisted in his inauguration. Here, the learning for the Zimbabwean theologian is the need for one to put personal feelings aside and work for social transformation. The theologian must be willing to take the risk and articulate the dangers and perils of certain paths that politicians or their followers might wish to pursue.

198  Xolani Maseko The seemingly opposite source that appears to favour the rise of the monarchy is in I Samuel 9:1–10:16; 11. It can be argued that this reveals a positive perspective of kingship. It reveals the reality that God commissions some human beings to be rulers over God’s people. It becomes a sin that some of these people given this authority and commission sometimes abuse it. It is the task of theology to explain that God appoints through the people, God commissions and sends, but does not control the actions of the one who is sent. According to Whang (2011:341) there is little unanimity between Old Testament scholarship on how to reconstruct these traditions but the pro-monarchic source is considered the pre-exilic voice that is sympathetic toward Saul and reflects some semblance of historical events. By contrast, the anti-monarchic source represents a theologised retelling from the divided monarchy or exile, both periods of time when kingship’s disasters necessitated a hasher reassessment of Israel’s experiences with monarchy. If this theory were true, what stands out as an imperative for theology and its institutions is that it should always find a way of explaining the events and experiences of people in the light of God. This is demonstrated in this theory of reconstruction. Even now in current Zimbabwe, people want to hear the theological voice explaining God’s will in the events of the nation. At the heart of the transition or the struggle of the people of Israel was the desire to be like other nations (8:4). Is this democracy? According to Wolf (1947:98–100), democracy means any state of social organisation in which the majority of the people possess the whole sovereignty. It may be argued that what Israel was asking for borders on democracy. The hive and frenzy of many citizens, that was seen on the eve of the transition to the New Dispensation in Zimbabwe, could have been this desire of democracy, to be like other nations. What really necessitated the transition in Israel above the desire to be like other nations? According to Longman (2014:142), the period of the Judges can be described as a period of spiritual confusion, moral depravity and political fragmentation. This can be seen in Judges 21:25 that says, “In those days Israel had no king; and everyone did as they saw fit.” This sore background may have made the Israel desire to have a king. It becomes the task of theology to condemn any social and political systems that undermine the fullness of life of people, as such may yield unrest that can result in some form of protest, transition and sometimes civil unrest. Daniel Durken (2015:143) says this transition in Israel was occurring, “from a scattered tribal confederacy to a unified, centralised state. The certainties of the old ways were not ideal,” and change was needed to save the people from injustice and oppression. Yet there are certain aspects of the old dispensation that were in line with the ways of God. These should not be forgotten and if the government of the day seems to forget, then it is the task of those who have theological integrity to remind the nations of the ways that lead to human flourishing. The Israelites were to always remember the covenant laws and covenant responsibilities

The Role of Theology in Contemporary Zimbabwe  199 that they had. This ambivalence that characterises the text regarding the institution of the monarchy underscores the fact that the transition was necessitated by the socio-political realities within Israel (Whang, 2011:341). This attempt to analyse the pre-conditions in Israel before the monarchy does not equate them with what was obtaining in the First Republic in Zimbabwe. Neither does this chapter imply that the conditions of the life of Israel under the monarchy are the same as the conditions in Zimbabwe under the New Dispensation. There are lessons from the rise of the monarchy in Israel for the person interested in studying and practising theology in the current context in Zimbabwe. The dominant political figures in contemporary Zimbabwe have evoked the name of God to justify their political posturing. As was the case in ancient Israel during the rise of the monarchy, there are different interpretations as to how to interpret the incoming political system. Whereas one reading was that the turn towards the monarchy was a monumental mistake, another interpretation hailed the move. In Zimbabwe, the leader of the New Dispensation has made claims to God being behind his legitimacy. At the same time, the leader of the opposition claims that God is behind him and their struggle as the opposition. This is demonstrated in Chimininge (2019:43), who reflects on Mnangagwa using the saying, “the voice of the people is the voice of God” to his advantage. Similarly, the opposition leader, Chamisa, was quoted as saying, “The Lord has spoken to me over this issue,” meaning that he will rule this country (newzimbabwe.com in www.allafr​ica.com accessed on 07/05/2020). The net effect has been to have the political space dominated by partisan theological declarations. This has the potential of confusing citizens and generating conflicting political theologies. The task of the Zimbabwean theologian, then, is to provide clarity on the extent to which politicians actively manipulate religion to achieve their ambitions. These contending political ideologies in contemporary Zimbabwe are similar to the divergent interpretations of the shift towards the monarchy in ancient Israel. Conclusion Evoking the tension over how to interpret ancient Israel’s transition to the monarchy, this chapter has illustrated how the emergence of the New Dispensation in Zimbabwe has similarly generated sharply divided interpretations. Some politicians and theologians, particularly those sympathetic to the ruling elite, have regarded the new era as a very positive development. On the other hand, there are also other politicians and theologians who consider the New Dispensation to be heralding an era of pain and suffering. This chapter has argued that the task of a theologian in contemporary Zimbabwe is to clarify the complexities of the religion-politics interface and to assist the nation in making life giving choices. In particular, pastoral theology should help the nation to make decisions that enhance life, while avoiding costly decisions that are driven by politicians whose only commitment is to secure and defend power at all costs.

200  Xolani Maseko References Anderson, B.W., 1985. The Living World of the Old Testament. London: Longman. Chibamu, A., 2019. Zimbabwe: The Lord says I shall one day rule Zimbabwe–Chamisa. New Zimbabwe.com in www.allafr ​ica.com [accessed 07/05/2020]. Chimininge, V., 2019. “The voice of the people is the voice of God. A critical reflection on the use of God in promoting Political Legitimacy in the New Dispensation in Zimbabwe,” Journal of Politics and Religion 32(2), 37–59. Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, 2019. Darkness at Noon: Inside Mnangagwa’s New Dispensation. Harare: Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition. Durken, D., 2015. New Collegeville Bible Commentary: One Volume Hardcover Edition. Minnesota: Liturgical Press. Eslinger, L.M., 1985. Kingship of God in Crisis: A Close Reading of 1 Samuel 1–12 (p. 138). Decatur: Almond. Gerbrandt, G.E., 1986. Kingship according to the Deuteronomistic History. Atlanta: Scholars Press. Heal Zimbabwe Trust, 2019, Zimbabwe: A Promising National Dialogue Design and Roadblocks. Peace Healing and Reconciliation Series 1, accessed in https:// kubatana. net Longman III, T., 2014. Old Testament Essentials: Creation, Conquest, Exile and Return. Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press. Maseko, X., 2019. Cyclone Idai and Eco-Theology in Zimbabwe. www.journ​a ls.cuz. ac.zw [accessed 07/05/2020]. Mbanjwa, Z.G., 2013. “Struggle for justice and fullness of life: Catholic Social Teaching in Genesis and development of South African black theology (with specific reference to Buti Tlhagale and Mandlenkosi Zwane),” Studia Historiae Ecclesiasticae 39(2), 259–281. Murisa, T., 2019 New Dispensation? Bravado, Incoherencies and Costly Blunders: An Analysis of Government performance since July 30, 2018. Harare: SIVIO Institute. https://www.siv​ioin​stit​ute.org/wp-cont​ent/uplo​ads/2019/09/New-Dispe​n sat​ion-Brav​ ado-Incohe​renc​ies-and-Cos​t ly-Blund​ers.pdf, accessed 07/05/2020. Nkomo, C., 2019. “Setting the agenda: what are the key issues?” Thinking Beyond–Journal of Alternatives for a democratic Zimbabwe 1(28), 3–6. Noyes, A.H., 2020. A New Zimbabwe? Assessing Continuity and Change after Mugabe. Santa Monica, Calif: RAND Corporation. Paradza, K., 2019, “Kairos consciousness and the Zimbabwean ecclesiology’s response to crisis,” HTS Teologiese Studies/ Theological Studies 75(3), a5621. https://doi.org/ 10.4102/ hts.v75i3.5621 Pillay, J., 2018. The correlation and separation of Academic Theology and the Local Church. Studia Historiae Ecclesiasticae, http://upj​ourn​a ls.co.za /index.php/SHE/index Volume 44/Number3/2018/#3403/16pages. Whang, J., 2011. “Yahweh’s poetic mishpat in Israel’s kingship: a reassessment of 1 Samuel 8–12,” Westminster Theological Journal 73, 341–361. Wolf, C.U., 1947. “Traces of primitive democracy in Ancient Israel,” Journal of Near Eastern Studies 6(2), 98–108. ZANU PF Manifesto, 2018, The People’s Manifesto in https://web​cms.uct.ac.za.files

13 Contested Interpretations The Case of Zimbabweans in the Diaspora in the United Kingdom Responding to the New Dispensation Nomatter Sande

Introduction How to interpret the political transition that happened in Zimbabwe in 2017/2018 has generated debate and controversy among citizens in the country and outside the country. This chapter focuses on how Zimbabwean Christians at home and abroad engaged in biblical and theological reflections to try and make sense of the transition. It highlights how Christianity continues to be a critical aspect of Zimbabwe’s national consciousness. One of its major features, the Bible, is a significant tool used in the democratisation processes in Zimbabwe before and after independence. Some politicians, religious leaders and some groups in Zimbabwe have used the Bible to authenticate the removal of Robert Mugabe from power. They claim this act is justified as ‘God was in it’; that it was a Kairos (divine opportune) time marking the birth of the Second Republic in Zimbabwe. Mugabe was regarded as a ‘political messiah’ when he ascended to power in 1980 after the British colonial rule, but towards the end of his regime there was economic decline and violence which triggered massive migrations. Painful stories and experiences are told about Zimbabweans in the diaspora as they seek asylum, as well as the illegal and legal migrations. This chapter reflects on how the Zimbabweans in the diaspora deconstructed the theological and political voices used during the political processes of the Second Republic of Zimbabwe. Guided by the transnational theory of migration, the chapter qualitatively analyses data gleaned from social media and systematic literature reviews to present diverse interpretations of the transition from Mugabe to Mnangagwa and the status of the opposition. It shows how both supporters and opponents of the regime appropriate and deploy biblical and theological ideas to buttress their arguments and convictions. Background and Context The relationship between religion and politics in Zimbabwe is intricate.1 The dawn of the period which marked the ending of Mugabe’s rule on 17 November 2017 had diverse responses. As such, different terms have been ascribed to this period such as the ‘New Dispensation’ and ‘The Second Republic.’ The First Republic is the independence of the nation from colonialism. Since independence DOI: 10.4324/9781003332435-14

202  Nomatter Sande in 1980, the Zimbabwe African National Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF) has been in power led by Robert Gabriel Mugabe (including the period of the inclusive government, 2009–2013). Mugabe was once labelled a ‘political messiah’ because of his charismatic leadership and political philosophy in dealing with colonial vices. However, there are critics who charge that for the last two decades of his regime, he plunged the nation into an economic standstill, political upheavals, violence, murders and threats. Such socio-economic and political challenges caused many Zimbabweans to migrate to neighbouring countries and beyond. The reality of Zimbabweans in the diaspora elicits different responses, depending on the respondents’ political and ideological persuasions. One perspective sees them as cowards who ran away from the challenges bedevilling their nation. Others view them as patriots enlightened and empowered by different experiences away from home. Be that as it may, there is a gap in the literature when it comes to capturing the voices of the Zimbabweans in the diaspora towards the democratisation processes in Zimbabwe. Using the Zimbabweans in the United Kingdom (UK) as a case study, this chapter reflects on how some of the Zimbabweans in the diaspora deconstruct both the theological and political voices used during the political processes of the Second Republic of Zimbabwe. It brings out the extent to which interpretations of the transition in Zimbabwe differed, with some offering an optimistic reading, while others were not as positive. Theoretical Framework: The Transmigration Theory This study used transmigration theory to reflect on how the Zimbabweans in the diaspora deconstruct both the theological and political voices used during the political processes of the Second Republic of Zimbabwe. According to Anthias (2006:25), the transnational migration theory focuses on showing the experiences of migrants because of the ‘shifting landscape of belonging and identity.’ Consequently, this chapter argues that the experiences of Zimbabweans in the diaspora come from their voices embedded within the religious and political overtones. Accordingly, the transmigration theory is relevant to this study because of the complexities which are brought by the comparisons between the stayers and migrants (Mazzucato, 2008). Using the transmigration theory as a frame helped this study to deconstruct both the theological and political voices of the Second Republic of Zimbabwe using the cases of the Zimbabweans in the diaspora. This study leans towards the suggestion that transnationalism is key to migration matters since it facilitates transactions, exchanges and connections beyond borders. Many Zimbabweans have gone to the diaspora and managed to network, fellowship and worship together in the UK. One question that is answered by the use of transmigration theory in this chapter is: ‘To what extent are Zimbabweans in diaspora affected by the migration processes that make them want to pay attention to what is happening in Zimbabwe?’ Another question is: ‘To what extent do biblical and theological ideas influence how Zimbabweans in diaspora interpret political processes in Zimbabwe?’

The Case of Zimbabweans in the Diaspora in the United Kingdom  203 The Method Data collection was done through online conversations, especially on the role of the Zimbabweans in the diaspora to building the economy of Zimbabwe. I chose social media as a tool to gather data because social media provides uncensored news. Further, the study was undertaken during the COVID-19 lockdowns which prevented face-to-face interaction. Using the European context, Jurgen Habermas (1992:421) argued that modern states connect media to democratic processes. This observation is now happening in parts of the developing world such as Zimbabwe. This is important because the Zimbabwean government-controlled media outlets do not provide equal representation of the political parties in the country. Hence, in this study, I argue that there are robust and honest conversations on the various social media platforms, although some contributors take advantage of anonymity to post views that might be deemed extreme or extremist. Although the economic conditions in Zimbabwe at the time of study were challenging, many people could access WhatsApp, Facebook, YouTube and Twitter. In my view, these social media are a free tool, rich and with diverse voices expressing their political concerns freely. In a sense, social media provides different actors and platforms to proffer public political opinions. Social media is a plural tool that allows the collection and coming together of people to a collective decision. As such, I watched videos of campaign rallies, inauguration speeches and related political activities after the 2018 elections and beyond. Fuchs (2014:57) argues that the framework of the social media theory criticises hegemonic tendencies and makes leaders accountable to their public. As indicated above, the data gathering tools in this study included: first, social media–Facebook, YouTube, WhatsApp and Twitter. Second, I used online electronic databases for searching for data. I used these social media to find statements used by politicians and religious actors in the democratic processes of the Second Republic in Zimbabwe. I focused on statements which would relate to the Bible, politics and Zimbabweans in the diaspora. Other keywords used were, ‘the Second Republic, elections and rebuilding Zimbabwe.’ I analysed data to find some internal patterns, as well as collected paragraphs, sentences and phrases about Zimbabweans in the diaspora, concerning both the Bible and politics. For the validity and trustworthiness of the data, I used ‘thick descriptions’ of the information I gathered. Emerging themes formed a discursive perspective of the contributors. I used such data to infer the theological and biblical discursive motivation. However, in order to put these reflections into their proper context, it is necessary to appreciate the growth of the Zimbabwean diaspora. The following section is dedicated to this task. A Snapshot of the Migration of Zimbabweans Migration is not a new phenomenon; humans move from one part of the world to another for different reasons. Currently, political and economic factors have increased the global flows and processes in the movement of people. The ‘new

204  Nomatter Sande mobilities paradigm’ marked a greater diversity of global migrations in the 21st century. Due to globalisation and improved transport and communication networks, many more people are on the move within borders and across borders. Zimbabweans, like other nationalities, have always been a mobile people. However, the economic decline of Zimbabwe, which started in the early 2000s, forced many Zimbabweans to migrate to other nations. The population of Zimbabwe as at 20th April 2022 was 15,178,979,2 and about four million Zimbabweans have embarked on migration to neighbouring countries and beyond (Pasura, 2010). The United Kingdom (UK) is the second-largest migration destination aside from South Africa. Peel (2013:62) says Britain became one of the destinations because of its former colonial ties, power and political influence, economic and cultural ties to Zimbabwe. Statistics from the 2001 survey show that there were 14,303 Zimbabweans in the UK (Humphris, 2010). There was an increase of migrants from 47,158 in 2000 to about 200,000 during 2008 and of these figures, some 25,045 people applied for asylum (Pasura, 2012:33). Migration has become popular in Zimbabwe and it is branded as ‘kudhayasipora’ (diaspora) by some Shona speakers, and the UK is dubbed, ‘Harare North.’ In the UK, the term ‘new diaspora’ describes Zimbabweans who were displaced by the politico-economic crisis (Crush and Tevera, 2010; McGregor, 2010; Pasura, 2012; Mbiba, 2012). The Zimbabwean migrants to the UK include health professionals as well as economic and political refugees (Mbiba, 2005:32). The literature available about the Zimbabweans in the diaspora has mostly focused on the painful stories of arrivals and settling in the UK and in other nations. Thus, there is limited literature on how Zimbabweans in the UK approach the religion-politics nexus. This chapter addresses this gap in the literature by examining key themes that highlight how Zimbabweans in the UK approach the interface between religion and politics in the context of the political transition that took place in Zimbabwe. Findings and Discussion This study presents findings and discussions simultaneously according to the following emerging themes: home returning, ascending the political throne, the forgiveness placebo and bringing back the technocrats. Returning Home

One of the emerging themes of this study is that the Zimbabweans in the diaspora should return home. Regarding this theme, Mnangagwa said that ‘I appeal to you to come back to Zimbabwe … Zimbabwe is your home’ (Yan, 2017). This sentiment suggests that the Zimbabweans in the diaspora are part of the citizens of Zimbabwe. This finding resonates with Safran (1991:83) who argued that diasporans consider ‘ancestral homeland as their true home…will eventually return when conditions are appropriate …’ In the specific case of Zimbabweans, ideas from African Traditional Religions and Christian theology feature prominently in upholding this concept. Thus, some contributors suggested that theology

The Case of Zimbabweans in the Diaspora in the United Kingdom  205 always teaches that the ‘land of birth’ is a gift from God. For instance, Yahweh promised the Israelites the land of Canaan (Genesis 15:18–21). The Zimbabweans uphold their land as witnessed by grabbing back the land from the white farmers during the ‘third chimurenga,’ that is the fast track land reform programme of the 2000s. Although some scholars, politicians and religious actors condemned the methodology used to grab the land, they did not deny the fact that Zimbabweans deserved getting back their land (Sachikonye, 2005:10; Bakare, 1993). Here, there is some religious and theological (Christian and traditional) harmony between the political declarations by Mnangagwa and the convictions/aspirations of many Zimbabweans in the UK. They uphold the notion that the land belongs to Zimbabweans and that Zimbabweans in diaspora are legitimate heirs to their ancestral and God-given heritage. Another important finding related to returning home agenda is from a tweet which said, ‘the most abusive tweets from the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) Alliance chaps are from the diaspora. What does that mean? Frustration? Hopelessness? Recklessness? Cowards are hiding in their miserable lodgings far away from where things are happening’ (Ncube, 2018). This finding is in agreement with the transnational migration theory which argues that a diaspora community experiences ‘shifting landscape of belonging and identity’ and these are caused by ‘globalised and transnational challenges tied to the home nationstate’ (Anthias, 2006:25). By contemplating this sentiment, some people seem to be angry and feeling left out of the quest for solutions to the crises and bad experiences in Zimbabwe. Explaining transnational theory, Mazzucato (2008) argued that the complexity of transnational lives comes in the context of comparing the stayers and migrants. It is clear that there are many Zimbabweans in the diaspora who are keen to understand and have the desire to participate in the political processes in Zimbabwe. According to Pasura (2012), some of the people who remained in Zimbabwe may view the people who went to other nations as having escaped poverty and economic hardships, but the migration processes and settlement in the UK has had its share of challenges. One finding showed that Zimbabweans in the diaspora are not allowed to participate in elections in their home country, namely Zimbabwe. President Mnangagwa said, We are not there yet in terms of resources, we do not have the resources to make sure that you vote from where you are. Voting will not take you 10 minutes, so if you want to vote, just come home, and in less than 10 minutes you will have finished voting and go back to your work. (Mhlanga, 2018) This finding contradicts the transnational migration theory, namely the notion that there is interconnectivity amongst the economic, political, religious and social border boundaries. This statement by the President may mean that the Zimbabweans in the diaspora are not necessary when it comes to voting. The question is: Why invite them to come home post-elections? Is it for them to

206  Nomatter Sande simply invest in their country? It is possible, therefore, to argue that transnationalism, migration and politics are closely related. Zimbabwean citizens abroad demand the right to participate in the nation’s affairs by evoking what they call their ‘God-given rights.’ In this scheme, religion is deployed by Zimbabweans in the UK to fight political battles. The most striking finding comes from the interaction between Mnangagwa and the then British Prime Minister, Theresa May, which shows that the global family for Mnangagwa goes beyond the Zimbabweans in the diaspora and includes the host nations as well. Mnangagwa appealed for help from all nations, including those who imposed on Zimbabwe what he called ‘illegal sanctions.’ Further, the agenda of strengthening relations with other nations made Mnangagwa participate at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland on 21 January 2018, soon after his inauguration as the head of state. This finding is in accord with the transnational theory, which shows that there is a relationship between migration, sending and hosting nations. In this case, both theological and political statements uttered within the Zimbabwean context have a bearing towards how the Zimbabweans are viewed. For instance, the arrival of the Second Republic made the Zimbabweans in the diaspora who sought asylum to now fear deportation since Mugabe was no longer in power. They feared that the host nation could argue that their security in Zimbabwe was now guaranteed and they could be sent back to Zimbabwe. However, they use biblical and theological arguments to insist on their right to stay in the UK, but continuing to be relevant to politics in Zimbabwe. Ascending the Political Throne

The second emerging theme focuses on the keys to ascending the political throne. During the removal of Robert Mugabe from power, Mnangagwa used the statement that, ‘the voice of the people is the voice of God’ in what was termed a ‘soft-coup d’état’ organised by the military. This statement brings the notion of both the secular – voice of the people – and the sacred – God. From the secular political context, Mnangagwa uses the phrase to authenticate that, it is the people who choose their leaders and therefore, determine who is supposed to rule them. If that route is anything to consider, then whatever the people would have said is equal to a divine decree. Chimininge (2019: 47) argued that Mnangagwa used the term God ambivalently – in one sense referring to the Judeo-Christian God of the Bible and in another to Mwari the Shona concept of the Supreme Being. However, the phrase ‘the voice of people is the voice of God’ brings another meaning if understood from a theological premise. For some critics, theologically, such a statement is blasphemous as the voice of the people cannot be equated to the voice of God. Chimininge (2019:37) argued that Mnangagwa ‘legitimised his accession to power as God-driven.’ Noticeably, it may be the case, therefore, that it is easy to Christianise political statements. Zimbabwean politicians are deified for legitimacy. For instance, Mugabe was regarded as a Messiah anointed to save Zimbabwe. According to Musendekwa (2018:1), the ‘messianic characterisation

The Case of Zimbabweans in the Diaspora in the United Kingdom  207 of Mugabe was used as political rhetoric and propaganda to legitimise the role of Mugabe as the sole liberator and candidate for leadership of the nation of Zimbabwe.’ Chitando (2013:86) was convinced that for his supporters, Mugabe was a ‘shepherd’ ready to protect and provide for his people. It follows, therefore, that the statement ‘the voice of the people is the voice of God’ comes to bear different meanings depending on the position of the hearer. Zimbabweans in diaspora demonstrated this contestation, with some endorsing Mnangagwa’s rise to power, while others challenged what they saw as an abuse of religion by Mnangagwa. When Nelson Chamisa 3 lost the elections under controversial circumstances in 2018, his tweeted message said, today we are in prayer & fasting for our nation. We have dedicated special days in all provinces, calling on all saints & citizens to set aside Mondays & Fridays for prayer & fasting as we humble ourselves before God for peace & HIS will in Zimbabwe. God shall prevail hashtag-Pamabvi. (Chamisa, 2018) This finding seems to be consistent with Vengeyi’s (2013:29) view when he explained that in most African societies, the Bible is the final tool upon which people can swear or fight misfortunes, its invocation represents the final say over the particular matter. The hashtag ‘pamabvi’ (on the knees, praying) used by political leaders is critical in efforts to understand the synergy between politics and religion in Zimbabwe. This declaration by Chamisa found enthusiastic support among many Zimbabweans in the diaspora. They felt that the situation transcended politics and that God’s hand was to be seen in political processes. Perhaps, Zimbabweans in the UK were not surprised by the use of religious statements because they understand the role of religion in migration matters. One finding by Adogame (2013:101–109) demonstrated that African Pentecostal churches in the UK are critical wellsprings of social, cultural and spiritual capital. Many Zimbabweans in the diaspora and their churches hold prayer vigils demonstrating their belief that God is going to restore Zimbabwe one day. For some, the emergence of the Second Republic could be viewed as God restoring what they had lost during Mugabe’s reign. Politically, the Zimbabweans in the diaspora continue to support different political parties in Zimbabwe and participate in peaceful demonstrations. Some political activists in the UK vouching for their political parties held many Facebook discussions, often interspacing their declarations with religious overtones. The Forgiveness Placebo

Forgiveness is another theme which emerged in this study. The President, Mnangagwa, encouraged people in the diaspora by saying that it was time for Zimbabweans, especially the millions who fled to foreign nations during the

208  Nomatter Sande 37-year rule of Robert Mugabe, to return home. Furthermore, ‘Whatever offence we committed to you, please put that behind you … forgive’ (Mitchley, 2017). This was, however, contested, as ‘[T]‌he past is always present in Zimbabwe’ (Peace Direct, Circa, 2017:22). In the context of this study, the evil of the past looms large over the future of Zimbabweans. It was expected that Mnangagwa would expound on the nature of his purported forgiveness because his name features prominently in the Gukurahundi atrocities by the Mugabe regime (Killander and Nyathi, 2015). So, is the ‘forgiveness’ being used as a ‘placebo’ to ease political atrocities and crimes committed, violence, murder, abuse and riots during elections? In this case, religion acts as a tool used to ease political tensions. Critics in the diaspora argued that forgiveness is an act of repentance. If forgiveness does not deal with issues on an ongoing basis and owning up to real crimes committed against the people, then it is an act of politicising forgiveness. For example, on repentance, in the Bible, Zacchaeus said, ‘if I have defrauded anyone of anything, I restore it fourfold’ (Luke 19:8). Maybe, the inclusion of the statement like ‘let bygones be bygones’ in the Mnangagwa inauguration speech may suggest that he was confessing his sins and diplomatically asking for forgiveness. The ecumenical movement in Zimbabwe has advised political parties to deal with forgiveness and reconciliation appropriately, while respecting legal processes. Zimbabweans in the UK have actively participated in these debates, bringing their theological perspectives to bear on the matter. Another critical finding to this study is that religious propositions were regarded as instrumental in removing Mugabe from power. For instance, on 30 October 2017, the Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops Conference (CBC) and the Zimbabwe Council of Churches (ZCC) signed a petition and cited scriptures which were targeting an awakening of the fullness of time. According to Bishop Ishamel Mukuwanda, ‘we see the current arrangement as an opportunity for the birth of a new nation. Our God created everything out of chaos.’ These findings match those observed by Sande (2017:5) who argued that, ‘Christians should be part of politics and not only to complain when things go wrong; instead, the man of God should be an advisor, playing a prophetic role to guide political leaders.’ Many Zimbabweans in the UK, despite having diverse theological standpoints, have maintained that there is a need for visionary leaders to participate in national politics. The Zimbabwe Heads of Christian Denominations issued a statement in a stimulating document titled, ‘Zimbabwe Between a Crisis and a Kairos (Opportunity): The Pastoral Message of the Church on the Current Situation.’ The title suggests that there is a Kairos (God ordained divine time). What this may mean is that the church’s leaders were convinced that what was happening had ‘God in it.’ Proponents of this theology argue that Zimbabwe witnessed a peaceful mass demonstration combining diverse actors such as civilians and the military in solidarity, supporting the notion that Mugabe had to step down from power. Although this brought apprehension to some Zimbabweans in the UK (as it increased the likelihood of being deported for those whose papers were problematic), others saw the hand of God in the process.

The Case of Zimbabweans in the Diaspora in the United Kingdom  209 One of the unexpected findings was a tweet by President Mnangagwa, which said, I invite leaders of all political parties as well as religious and civil leaders to set aside our differences and come together. What unites us is stronger than what could ever divide us. Let us begin a national dialogue. Let us put the people first. (Mnangagwa, 2019) Such moral sentiments may mean that people in Zimbabwe are divided. The Zimbabweans use the term ‘diaspora’ or ‘diasporans’ with connotations of elitism, inferring that there may be a gulf between those prospering in host nations and others who are suffering at home (McGregor, 2010). The unity of Zimbabweans should transcend borders because migration is a human phenomenon. The theology of migrants in the diaspora can be traced to the Jewish tradition showing the spreading of humanity (Cohen, 2008:4). Mnangagwa’s supporters and sympathisers in the diaspora maintained that such an invitation was divinely inspired, while his critics were more circumspect. They contended that he was playing politics and called for free and fair elections. Similarly, at the watershed of Mnangagwa’s inaugural speech was the call for peace. He stated that ‘… we want peace in our country …’ (Mnangagwa Inauguration Speech, 2018). This statement means a lot to the Zimbabweans in the diaspora, especially those who have/had sought asylum in neighbouring countries. In my view, what may hinder the Zimbabweans in the diaspora from answering the call of returning to their homeland is the issue of security. The reason is that some Zimbabweans have established a sense of temporary permanence within these host nations. The violence that Zimbabweans experienced included their families being murdered, and hence they will not be happy to return home due to security issues. This confirms the contention that the diaspora removes people from their nations and expects them to continue to survive. Bringing Back the Technocrats

Another emerging theme in this study was the portrayal of Zimbabweans in the diaspora as technocrats who were expected to return to the homeland, like those who had been exiled in the Bible, to rebuild the country. The President appealed to Zimbabweans in the diaspora to bring the skills they have acquired living in the diaspora and to use these skills in the rebuilding of the Zimbabwean economy and development of their motherland. In another context, the Zimbabweans in the diaspora were urged to let bygones be bygones and look forward to a brighter future with hope. ‘You are so many here in the diaspora because of, in particular, economic challenges that beset our country,’ said Mnangagwa during a speech in Pretoria in South Africa during his maiden foreign trip (Mitchley, 2017). Furthermore, the government of Zimbabwe, in conjunction with International Organisation for Migration (IOM), and the

210  Nomatter Sande United Nations Migration Agency have fostered a framework to engage the Zimbabweans in the diaspora worldwide to contribute towards national development (Mitchley, 2017). These findings corroborate the ideas of the transnational migration theory, which argues that transnationalism has become a worldwide phenomenon, making people connect and interact easily. It is possible to hypothesise that the Zimbabweans in the diaspora have a dual belonging ‘to the sending nation’ and ‘host nations.’ Biblical and theological arguments have been proffered to justify this dual identity. Another significant contribution came from Judith Kateera, the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Macro-Economic Planning and Investment Promotion, who said that ‘[the] diaspora presents social, economic, intellectual and political capital, a pool of knowledge and expertise which must be harnessed for the benefit of the country.’ These findings are in line with Bloch (2008), who suggested that the Zimbabweans in the diaspora were engaged in transnational transactions by actively maintaining family ties and financial obligations. So, embracing the Zimbabweans in the diaspora helps to focus on the ‘brain gain.’ What it means is that the Zimbabweans in the diaspora can reinforce the spirit of excellence, entrepreneurship and integrity. It follows, therefore, that the scattering of Zimbabweans in the diaspora can be justified as confirming the notion that it was inspired and willed by God. Regardless of the challenges that made the Zimbabweans to be in the diaspora, theologically, their predicament is interpreted as having been willed by God who has sent them out in order to come later and rebuild Zimbabwe. President Mnangagwa consistently proclaimed that ‘Zimbabwe is open for business.’ Such a statement is a call for an ethical, moral and professional approach to business. Further, another perspective may mean a new dispensation has come for rebuilding the economy that was destroyed by the Mugabe regime. Zimbabweans in the diaspora maintain transnational families. As argued by Faist (2004:4–8), they ‘share a strong sense of belonging to a common home, seeing themselves as both an economic unit and a unit of solidarity.’ The presence of Zimbabweans in the diaspora, itself a product of politics and economics, is interpreted in biblical and theological terms. Critics, however, argue that in order to achieve the goals of becoming an ‘upper-middle-income country/economy’ by 2030, it is vital to achieve the necessary healing and integration (Chitando, Chikonzo and Chivandikwa, 2020). In this regard, they suggest that religiotheological pronouncements must be accompanied by concrete political and economic actions. Another significant declaration to all Zimbabweans made by the president was that I pledge myself to be your servant. I appeal to all genuine patriotic Zimbabweans to come together. We work together. No-one is more important than the other–we are all Zimbabweans. We want to grow our economy. We want peace in our country. We want jobs, jobs, jobs in our country. (Mnangagwa’s Inauguration Speech, 2018)

The Case of Zimbabweans in the Diaspora in the United Kingdom  211 This finding is in line with the transnational theory which shows that the people in the diaspora negotiate with social, economic and political issues. Accordingly, many Zimbabweans in the diaspora seek to be regarded as patriotic Zimbabweans who continue to support the nation through its difficult times. As argued earlier, they evoke religious arguments to justify their ongoing investment in the politics of the nation. Conclusion This chapter has deconstructed the theological and political voices of the Second Republic in Zimbabwe using the cases of the Zimbabweans in the diaspora. The Bible is at the centre of the democratisation processes of Zimbabwe. Different ecumenical bodies and politician actors continue to use the Bible through theological and prophetic mantras. These statements proffer direction, legitimise leadership and interpret the political-economic situations in Zimbabwe. These theological and political voices have diverse meanings among the Zimbabweans in the diaspora. For instance, the invitation for the Zimbabweans in the diaspora to return home showed transnational ties of migrants to home nation-states. As the chapter has demonstrated, it prompted diametrically opposed responses. Some Zimbabweans in the diaspora sought to give Mnangagwa the benefit of doubt, while others dismissed him as following Mugabe’s template or performing worse than him. This chapter summarised the responses by some Zimbabweans in the diaspora, showing the close connection between religion and politics in the context of migration. It highlighted the fact that through social media, many Zimbabweans in the UK seek to continue to play a key role in national affairs. Further, they deployed theological ideas to make sense of their migration and to justify their participation in Zimbabwean politics, as well as the right to continue to stay in the new spaces in which they now found themselves occupying. Whether they embraced or critiqued the declarations by political actors in Zimbabwe was mostly influenced by their religio-political standpoints. Thus, this chapter confirms that studies on the regime-religion interface should not be confined to the space between the Zambezi and the Limpopo Rivers. It is highly strategic to include the views, reactions and proclamations by Zimbabweans in the diaspora, as this facilitates the development of a more holistic understanding of the complex interplay between religion and politics. Notes 1 Many scholars in Zimbabwe have written on the relationship between religion and politics [see Chitando, Taringa and Mapuranga 2014; Sibanda 2011; Togarasei 2004; Bhebe, 1999; Hallencreutz and Moyo 1988; Chitando (2002)]. 2 https://zimba ​ b we.unfpa.org/sites/defa ​ u lt/f iles/pub-pdf/2022 _population_and_ housing_census_preliminary_r​epor ​t _on ​_ pop​u lat ​ion_ ​figu​res.pdf (accessed 7 October 2022). 3 Nelson Chamisa is the leader of Movement for Democratic Change (later, the Citizens Coalition for Change, CCC, in 2022), the main political opposition party in Zimbabwe.

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Index

Note: Endnotes are indicated by the page number followed by “n” and the note number e.g., 13n5 refers to note 5 on page 13. Abraham (Pastor) 98 Adventist Lawyers Association 40 African Independent Churches (AICs) 85 African Initiated Churches (AICs) 8, 9, 23, 95, 128, 130, 196 Apostolic Christian Council of Zimbabwe 23, 109 Apostolic Faith Mission (AFM) 7, 80, 83, 86, 93, 124 Augustine (St) 70, 196 Banana, Canaan 62, 65, 68, 69, 125, 165 Bible: appropriation of 153–154; centrality of in Zimbabwean life 151; democratisation processes and 201, 210; liberation motif 195–196; meaning vs. interpretation 153; rise of the monarchy in I Samuel 196–199 Bismark, Tudor 87 Burrough, Paul 22 Catholic Church: dioceses and bishops of 152; historical engagement in ZImbabwean politics 20–21, 96; large and influential 151–152; pastoral letter tradition 20, 154–155; rise of prominence in Mugabe era 127; see also Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace; Catholic Professionals Network of Zimbabwe 40; see also pastoral letter (“The March is not Ended,” ZCBC, 2020); Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops Conference Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP) 21, 32, 33, 41, 127, 154, 166, 176, 177

Catholic Professionals Network of Zimbabwe 40 Chamisa, Nelson: despised as effeminate by war veterans 189; election-rigging allegations made by 3, 49, 136; masculine image, Chamisa’s attempts to cultivate 189–190; as Messianic figure 82, 86–87, 124; prosperity gospel 7–8; religious rhetoric, use of 2, 8, 12, 86, 98, 130, 199, 207 Chinamasa, Patrick 30, 38 Chiota, Edmore 64, 69 Chiwenga, Constantino 100 Chiwenga, Talent: attacked by government 100; car accident 100; criticism of Chamisa 131; criticism of MCZ 65; criticism of Mnangagwa regime 75, 80, 94, 98, 99; criticism of Mugabe 8, 29; criticism of Pentecostal leaders 75, 80, 82; Operation Restore Legacy 29; political exploitation of religion 53; prophecies 81, 82 church–state relations in Zimbabwe, history of: Anglican Church, colonial co-option of 178; captured theology, need for personal resistance to 118; church support bought with land 113, 115–116; in colonial period 126; critical solidarity, need for 54, 58; differing denominational responses to war of liberation 22; divided and polarised church attitudes to government 21, 23, 24, 43, 45, 110, 111, 125, 128, 196; economic and political instability, effects of 24, 93, 94, 95; government

216 Index fear of church influence 43; homegrown churches, preference for nationalistic authoritarian politics 179; Indigenous African religions, non-recognition of 131; pastoral action, need for 44; political fragmentation of society 44; prophets, tradition of 94, 95; regimeenabling religious leaders 109–116; religions as legitimate political actors 52–53; secular state, Zimbabwe as 127; Western-linked churches, preference for liberal freedoms and financial prosperity 179; ZANU PF cultivation of religious leaders 23, 53–54 civil religion 182–183, 184 Command Agriculture 145 Comprehensive National Settlement Framework 29–30 COVID-19 pandemic 2, 25, 28–29, 39, 52, 98, 155, 194, 203 Cultural Centre of the Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran 140–142 Cyclone Idai 136–140, 142–143, 194 decoloniality theory 108–109, 112, 117, 118 DESTINY of Afrika Network 113 Dube, Tshinga 187 Evangelical Fellowship of Zimbabwe (EFZ) 13n5, 19, 21, 40, 44, 82, 87, 131, 152, 154, 196 Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe (ELCZ): critical solidarity with government 56–57; failure to respond to political developments 54–55, 57; Presiding Bishop, compromised by military status 55, 57; social services, provision of 55–57 Family of God Church 114 government control of media 203 government of national unity 3, 7, 52, 63, 82, 160 Gukurahundi massacres 68–69; Catholic condemnation of 21, 32, 154; Mnangagwa’s role in 208; Mugabe’s attempts to distance himself from 32, 161; ZANU PF attempts to relegate to history 32–33, 35, 37, 38 Guti, Eunor 81 Guti, Ezekiel 80, 81, 85

Heal Zimbabwe Trust 194 Hitler, Adolf 61 IMF structural adjustment programmes 165 Indigenous African religions: ancestral homeland, concept of 204; clandestinely consulted by Mnangagwa 129–130; condemned as idol worship by Chamisa 2; lack of public recognition of 131; Mugabe’s relation to 127; Mwari concept of Supreme Being 206; role in spirituality of war veterans 183; traditional intertwinement with politics 53 Interdenominational Christian Council of Zimbabwe (ICCZ) 171–172, 178, 179 Islam in Zimbabwe: Asian Muslims, affluent elite status of 135; health service delivery 143–144; humanitarian aid provided by 136, 138–140; Malawian Muslims, as agricultural labourers 145–147; male circumcision programme 144–145; national events, participation in 148–149; peace-building activities 140–142; Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs 148; Varemba Muslims 147–148 Jacobs, Cindy 82 Kateera, Judith 210 Kunonga, Nolbert 23, 113 Lamont, Donal 21, 24, 31, 32, 33 liberation theology 85 liberation war veterans: Chamisa despised by 189; as embodiments of civic virtue 183; Indigenous African religions, influence on self-conception of 183–184; intellectuals despised by 188–189; Mnangagwa, heroic masculine virtues projected onto 188; Mugabe’s perceived failure to provide for 183–184, 186; removal of Mugabe facilitated by 184, 186–187; as yardstick of masculinity 184–185 Luther, Martin 61, 196 Magaya, Ancelimo 8, 96 Makandiwa, Emmanuel 23, 80, 97 Mandela, Nelson 70 Mangwana, Nick 17–18

Index  217 “The March is not Ended” see pastoral letter (“The March is not Ended,” ZCBC, 2020) Marx, Karl 89, 131 Mawarire, Evan 96 Medju, Benedict 98, 99 Methodist Church in Zimbabwe (MCZ): Christian Social Responsibility and Human Rights Committees 69; as development partner of government 69; Mabelreign Church, Mnangagwa’s attendance of 60, 62–64, 68, 70; Mnangagwa’s conversion to 60, 62–63, 70; Methodist Development and Relief Agency 69; politics, involvement in during missionary period 67–68; preaching of party politics forbidden 68; sacramental theology 69; special relationship with colonial government 67–68; Zimbabwe’s first cabinet, Methodists in 68 migration of Zimbabweans: economic decline as cause 204; exclusion of diasporans from Zimbabwean elections 205; forgiveness placebo 207–208; Mugabe regime as cause 202; new mobilities paradigm 203–204; patriotism of diasporans 211; prayer vigils among diasporans 207; returning home 204–205; security concerns, deterred from return by 209; technocrats, call for return of 209–210; transnational migration theory 202, 205, 210 Mnangagwa, Auxillia 63, 64–65, 148 Mnangagwa, Emmerson Dambudzo: appeal for return of emigrants 204, 205–206, 207–208, 209; African religion, exploitation of 129–130; continuity with Mugabe regime 81, 193; Davos, attendance at 206; expulsion from ZANU PF 192–193; Gukurahundi massacres, role in 208; heroic masculinity, embodiment of 187–188; inauguration speech 48–49, 209; intolerance of criticism from religious leaders 8; Mabelreign Church, attendance at 60, 62–65, 68, 70; Methodist Church, conversion to 60, 62–63, 70; Mugabe, imitation of 9; pastoral letter, response to 36–37; prosperity message 7–8; religious rhetoric, use of 2, 7, 12, 54, 98, 129,

183, 199, 206; religious support groups 2, 102; unity, call for 209; Varemba Muslim support for 147–148; war veteran support for 184; ZCC, cultivation of 129 Movement for Democratic Change Alliance (MDCA): Apostolic reactions to 23; challenge to results of 2018 election 101, 115, 136; God’s instrument, self-presentation as 130–131; pastoral letter, government attempt to link party with 38; portrayed by government as agent of Western colonialism 111, 174 Moyo, Sibusiso 54 Msindo, Obadiah 23, 113–114 Mugabe, Grace 79, 88, 110–111, 185–186, 192 Mugabe, Robert: African religion, attitude to 127; black empowerment 78, 79; Catholicism of 127; church attendance 64; continuities with repressive colonial rule 158; electionrigging 49, 78; emigration caused by regime of 202; Gukurahundi massacres, attempts to distance himself from 32, 161; hero status revoked after fall 39; homosexuals, condemnation of 78, 79; intellectual outlook, projection of 12; intolerance of religious criticism 79, 93, 96; land and industry seizures 78, 79, 96; masculine veteran ideals, failure to live up to 185–186, 188–189; Messianic presentation of 61, 85, 90n1, 128, 201, 202, 206–207; monopoly of political spaces 8; Ndanga co-opted by 110; patronage-based rule 108; Pentecostals, alignment with 85; personality cult 12; religious support, cultivation of 128; Tsvangirai, battles with 8, 128; war veterans, perceived failure to provide for 183–184, 186; Wutawunashe co-opted by 115 Mujuru, Joice 39, 79 Mukonori, Fidelis 127, 131, 176, 177, 197 Mukusha, Shadrech 101 Mukuwanda, Ishmael 208 Munyeza, Shingi 36 Mussa, Muhammad 138 Mutendi, Nehemiah 8, 23, 100–101, 111–112, 124, 129, 171–172

218 Index Mutsvangwa, Monica 17, 18–19, 21, 24, 30–32, 36, 37, 40 Mwazha, Paul 23, 179 National Clean-up Campaign 148 National Convergence Platform 29, 176 Ncube, Mthuli 51 Ncube, Pius 80, 96, 125, 127, 128 Ndanga, Johannes 109–111 Ndlovu, Ian 99 Ndlovu, Robert 19, 31, 33, 37, 40, 43 Nemapare, Peter 95 New Dispensation/Second Republic: continuity with misrule of Mugabe regime 95, 97, 99, 103, 108, 193; continuity with religious politics of Mugabe regime 107; corrupt ZANU PF practices in 2018 election 49–50, 78, 97, 124, 193; crisis worsened by 97–98, 103, 123; critics as “prophets of doom” 100–103; elite exploitation of crises 52; fresh start promised by Mnangagwa 48–49, 93, 193; “open for business” mantra 93, 194, 210; “politicians of doom” 98–99; post-election state violence (2018) 50–51, 78, 97, 116, 129, 193; regime-enabling religious leaders 114–116, 124; Vapostori churches, as spiritual base for new leadership 53–54; Zimbabwean dollar, reintroduction of 51–52, 98 Operation Murambatsvina 95, 96, 158, 163n1 Operation Restore Legacy 29, 108, 187, 193 pastoral letter (“The March is not Ended,” ZCBC, 2020): appropriation of Bible in 155–160; corruption, focus on 27, 162; COVID-19, criticism of government response to 29; EFZ, bishops’ sided taken by 40, 44; explicit condemnation of Mnangagwa 17; fear of state oppression, highlighting of 27; fortieth anniversary of independence as context for 155; God’s guidance, importance of 160–161; government indifference to poor, focus on 28; government’s defence of its competence and achievements 35–36; ideals of independence, call for maintenance of 162; inappropriate

political meddling, government accusations of 34–35; international church responses to 42; “liberators” narrative, contesting of ZANU PF monopoly on 27–28; number “40,” symbolism of 157–160; panic and fear, government response characterized by 30, 43; polarised responses to 17–19, 39; preceded by ZHOCD statement 25; questioning of government competence and legitimacy 30; rejection of ZANU PF “march is ended” narrative 26–17; repentance and dialogue, call for 161; squandering of natural resources, focus on 162; unpatriotic, framed by government as 31–33, 44; vicious government response to 18–19, 30–31, 33; ZCC, bishops’ side taken by 40, 41; ZIICC, government’s side taken by 23, 39–40, 44 Pentecostalism in Zimbabwe: authoritarian structures 75; corrupt elite leadership 78, 79, 84–85, 86, 88; criticism of regime by emerging prophets 75; diverse and conflicting categories of 80–81; economic crisis, victims of blamed as sinners 77, 87; ethnic fragmentation, caught up in 79; homosexuality, condemnation of 78, 82, 87; individualism and corruption promoted by 76–77; intercessory prayer, basis for 76; political theology 87–89; prayers and fasting as non-critical response to crisis 77–78, 79, 88–89; prophecy, politics of 81–83, 99; refusal to condemn Mugabe 78; seeding 80, 84; sermons, politics of 84–87; sorcery and witchcraft, combat against 79; visibility of, increased by Zimbabwean crisis 74; women leaders, as force against corruption 87 politics, concept of 4, 124, 135 prosperity gospel 7–8, 196 religion, concept of 4, 124 religion–regime interface: affinity and intertwinement of politics and religion 2–3, 4, 6, 12, 61–62, 70, 92, 125, 132; change and continuity 1, 5; confessional vs. secular states 125, 127; confrontation and intersection model 173; co-option and assimilation

Index  219 model 178, 179, 180; hermeneutic of suspicion 6; non-intersecting school of thought 4–5, 61, 173–174; political theology 61–62; in pre-colonial African societies 123, 126; religiously motivated violence, resurgence of 140; religious symbolism, political exploitation of 2, 92–93; religious-to-secular narrative, failure of 134; resurgence of religion 134; revolutionary force, religion as 92; separation and autonomy model 173–174; separation and confrontation model 178–179, 180; separation and intersection model 172–173, 174, 177; sexual minorities, religious exclusion from politics 6; variation, regional, national and local 5; women, religious exclusion from politics 6 Rhodes, Cecil John 67 Roman Empire, fall of 92 sanctions against Zimbabwe 18, 29, 38, 44, 78, 170, 206 Second Republic see New Dispensation/ Second Republic Seven Year Political Sabbath for Trust and Confidence Building (7YPSP): diplomatic failings of ZHOCD 176–177; government accusations of MDCA agenda 169–170, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177; government’s constitutional rejection of 168–169, 177; ICCZ’s constitutional rejection of 171–172, 178; MDCA’s qualified sympathy for 171, 173, 177; separation and intersection model, proposal informed by 172–173, 177; welfare of Zimbabwean people, placing above party politics 168; summary of 167 Smith, Ian 21, 31, 32, 33, 125 social justice oriented theology 117 stakeholders vs. stockholders 9, 13n8 third chimurenga 186, 205 Trump, Donald 2 Tsvangirai, Morgan R. 8, 62–63, 69, 128 Tutu, Desmond 131 Union for the Development of Apostolic Churches in Zimbabwe Africa (UDACIZA) 22

United Kingdom, Zimbabwean diaspora in 202–208, 211 Unity Accord (1987) 33, 69 Vapostori churches 53–54, 65 Watkins, Owen 67–68 Wesley, John 66–67 Wutabwashe, Tavonga 84 Wutawunashe, Andrew 8, 18, 101, 114–116e Zimbabwe African Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF): African Initiated Churches, association with 23, 128, 130; Apostolic Christian Council of Zimbabwe, association with 23, 109; “class of liberators,” exclusive self-presentation as 28, 32, 38–39; cultivation of religious leaders 23, 53–54, 109–116; Gukurahundi massacres, attitude to 32–33, 35, 37, 38; “march ended in 1980” narrative 26–27, 32; masculinity, monopoly on image of 185; patriotism, attempts to monopolize 39; political scientists and policy practitioners 174; religio-political ideology 9; suspicious attitude to international funding and FDI 174–175; as system of corruption and patronage 108; Varemba Muslim support for 147–148 Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops Conference (ZCBC): Bible as model for just society 26; critical stance towards government 8, 21–22, 24, 85, 88, 152; “God Hears the Cry of the Oppressed” (pastoral letter, 2007) 20–21, 25–26; pastoral letter tradition 20; structure of 152; see also pastoral letter (“The March is not Ended,” ZCBC, 2020) Zimbabwe Christian Alliance (ZCA) 95–96 Zimbabwe Council of Churches (ZCC): co-opted by Mugabe regime 95; ELCZ and 54–55, 57; government of national unity, call for 101–102; pastoral letter, response to 19, 24, 40, 41; suspected by government of Western allegiances 175 Zimbabwe Heads of Christian Denominations (ZHOCD): composition of 13n5, 21–22; critical

220 Index stance towards government 8, 25; National Convergence Platform 29, 176; as unifying body 45; see also Seven Year Political Sabbath for Trust and Confidence Building (7YPSP) Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission (ZHRC) 50–51 Zimbabwe Indigenous Interdenominational Council of

Churches (ZIICC) 18, 23, 39–40, 44, 101, 116 Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA) 187 Zimbabwe Peace Project (ZPP) 19, 40–41 Zion Christian Church (ZCC) 8, 111, 124, 129, 171 Ziyambi, Ziyambi 18, 34–36, 38