Relevance of European Studies in Asia 9819977851, 9789819977857

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Maria Stoicheva S. G. Sreejith Indranath Gupta   Editors

Relevance of European Studies in Asia

Relevance of European Studies in Asia

Maria Stoicheva · S. G. Sreejith · Indranath Gupta Editors

Relevance of European Studies in Asia

Editors Maria Stoicheva Sofia University, St. Kliment Ohridski Sofia, Bulgaria

S. G. Sreejith Jindal Global Law School O.P. Jindal Global University Sonipat, Haryana, India

Indranath Gupta Jindal Global Law School O.P. Jindal Global University Sonipat, Haryana, India

ISBN 978-981-99-7785-7 ISBN 978-981-99-7786-4 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-7786-4 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore Paper in this product is recyclable.

Acknowledgements

We are extremely grateful to all those who have taken time out of their busy schedule and ensured timely completion of this project. This has been made possible because of the extraordinary efforts of all the contributors. The authors especially Indranath Gupta is indebted to the Jean Monnet Chair at JGU and to the generous grant received as a part of this Chair position. Also, we will remain grateful to the European UnionNextGenerationEU, BG-RRP-2.004-000 project. The authors are also thankful to Isha Gaba for her valuable support. We admire the unconditional support of our Vice Chancellor, Prof. C. Raj Kumar.

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Contents

1 Epistemologies, Paradigms, and Practices: The Rising Relevance of European Studies in Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Maria Stoicheva, S. G. Sreejith, and Indranath Gupta

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2 European World Heritage Sites in Asia: Sharing Cultural Experiences to Improve Protection and Understanding . . . . . . . . . . . . Elizabeth Brandon

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3 Towards Understanding of Europe: Exercise in Social Imagination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Łucja Piekarska and Zdzisław Mach

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4 Perceptions of the European Union. A View from the Outside . . . . . . Maria Stoicheva 5 “Bologna” and Beyond: The Role of European Studies in the Process of Cooperation Between European and Asian Universities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Francesca Longo

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6 The Use of Simulations in Teaching EU Foreign Policy in a Non-european Educational Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Daniela Irrera

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7 Teaching EU Law Outside the EU: An Explorative Analysis of Eight Case Studies in Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Irene Wieczorek and Qianyu Wang

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8 Can European Mechanisms on Human Rights Be Applied in South Asia? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131 Abhinav Mehrotra and Vesselin Popovski 9 The Never-Ending Poly-Crisis: European Union Governance and Legitimacy Beyond COVID-19 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145 Vihar Georgiev vii

Chapter 1

Epistemologies, Paradigms, and Practices: The Rising Relevance of European Studies in Asia Maria Stoicheva, S. G. Sreejith, and Indranath Gupta

Transcending the Time–Space, Europe While “European Studies” have already achieved a disciplinary status, the epistemic interest in the discipline has largely been limited to Europe. One can, however, witness a growing interest in Europe in many non-European states, for the European Union (EU) has been expanding its foreign relations as a single political union under a unitary social, political, and economic approach and goal. The said political shift of a unitary EU in inter-state intercourse with non-European States has prompted many non-European states to take an interest in Europe. As a corollary, many think tanks and policy institutes dealing with EU relations and research centres for European Studies have been established in non-European states, which is in addition to introducing several postgraduate, graduate, and certificate courses in European Studies and setting up visiting scholars programmes and scholarships for students willing to engage with European Studies. However, these collaborations have been more the result of EU’s interest in non-Europe and less of non-European interest in the EU. Yet it is a fact that European Studies is a disciplinary choice for Indian students in the type of institutions mentioned above. However, there has not been any regular and systematic audit conducted on the modalities of imparting European Studies in non-European states and the educational institutions therein. Such an audit is important given that European Studies, like every other Regional Studies of similar M. Stoicheva Sofia University, St Kliment Ohridski, Sofia, Bulgaria e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] S. G. Sreejith · I. Gupta (B) Jindal Global Law School, O.P. Jindal Global University, Sonipat, India e-mail: [email protected] S. G. Sreejith e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 M. Stoicheva et al. (eds.), Relevance of European Studies in Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-7786-4_1

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character and nature, does not have the inherent quality to get localised anywhere and everywhere such that any audit or standardisation is not required. As a matter of fact, European Studies is a disciplina specialis and hence does not offer methods and tools that can freely transcend disciplinary boundaries. In other words, European Studies has an ontology that is profoundly historical and pertinently context-specific, which limits the scope of the discipline to transcend a given time and space. This character has rendered European Studies more of a discipline that deals with the political affairs (and everything surrounding that, including history, culture, etc.) within Europe. If that is the case, what interest can European studies engender for non-European states? The simple answer is that European Studies help non-European states to obtain inputs for their inter-state political relationships. But that only causes a strategic interest by non-European states for Europe that does not warrant any serious systematic intellectual engagement with European Studies. This scepticism is fuelled by an epistemological dogma that the “political” (resulting from the European and nonEuropean relations) does not lead to the “intellectual” (which is the subject matter of epistemologies) without intervening variables.1 Aiming a different outcome, if we consider European Studies as a disciplina generalis, as any other Regional Studies, and as possessing knowledge that comfortably transcends time and space, there is no better relief, as generalisation defies the uniqueness of European Studies, writes Antonin Cohen, We are not looking here at a discipline, with boundaries more or less monitored by institutional gatekeepers; nor a profession, with claims of jurisdiction more or less in line with social power struggles; nor, even, an actual field, with an autonomy protected, to a greater or lesser extent, by objectivized principles of hierarchisation.2

But European Studies offers non-European states—as much as it offers European states—imaginations and inputs for “intercultural competence development”.3 This competence is often an orientation that goes deeper into studies on Europe’s history, polity, economy, and society, providing certain skills and developing certain attitudes.4 We, however, do not get into those hard conversations, although their existence alongside other challenges substantiates the concern we have about the absence of an audit on the situation of European Studies in Asian contexts.

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Antonin Cohen and Cadenza Academic Translations, “The Atlantic Structuration of European Studies”, Revue française de science politique (English Edition) I, vol. 67, no. 1, 2017, pp. I–XXVIII at I. 2 Ibid. 3 Refiya Scheltinga, Eveke Louw, and Claudia Bulnes, “Added Value of an Intentional Training”, De Zeitschrift für Hochschulentwicklung, vol. 12, no. 4, 2017, pp. 73–94 at 77. 4 Ibid.

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Setting Uniform Standards An early response to the problem of the context-specificity of European Studies— especially of it becoming the purveyor of ideas for driving non-European partnerships—has been the “Bologna Process”. The Bologna Process has the desire for “harmonisation” ingrained in it. But harmonisation of what? At an abstract level, the Bologna Process has been perceived as a process to engender and instil common European values into European Studies.5 At the same time, with the fall of grand narratives of all forms, as local narratives are reshaping cultural and indigenous identities, the Bologna Process is often perceived as “part of the Europeanization which aims at creating a common European identity” that does not fit into the postmodern self-discovery of social subjects.6 So, is the Bologna Process a means of institutionalising the European pride, as critiqued by Czeslaw Milosz? Treasure your legacy of skills, child of Europe Inheritor of Gothic cathedrals, of baroque churches … Successor of Descartes, Spinoza, inheritor of the word “[honour]”,

Posthumous Child of Leonidas Perhaps the accusation of Europeanization against the Bologna Process is far stretching things to a historical consciousness that’s not in the present scheme of things. Rather Bologna Process, and its claims of harmonisation, is a way to present Europe as an ahistorical socio-economic reality to which non-Europe could look up for soci0-economic pursuits.7 Does that kind of a marketing approach to the Bologna Process render it poor in content? The answer is in the negative if things are seen from a historical and evolutionary perspective. The Bologna Process is the culmination, if not an advanced stage, of the “international cooperation initiatives within Europe since the 1980s”.8 The Sorbonne Declaration of 25 May 1998, which sets the context for the Bologna Process to be in motion, evinces an ambition that goes way beyond mere branding and marketing of Europe:

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Devrim Vural Yılmaz and Alper Tütünsatar, “Bologna Process, Europeanization, and Turkish Higher Education: A Research from the Field”, SDU Faculty of Arts and Sciences Journal of Social Sciences, vol. 42, 2017 pp. 227–246 at 244. 6 Ibid. 7 Ole Henckel and Susan Wright, “The Bologna Process: A Voluntary Method of Coordination and Marketization?”, Learning and Teaching: International Journal of Higher Education in the Social Sciences, vol. 1, no. 2, 2008, pp. 1–24 at 2. 8 Gary Schaub, Henrik Ø. Breitenbauch, and Flemming Pradhan-Blach, “A Megatrend in International Higher Education”, Report: Invading Bologna, 2013, pp. 20–28 at 21.

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M. Stoicheva et al. Europe is not only that of the Euro, of the banks and the economy: it must be a Europe of knowledge as well. We must strengthen and build upon the intellectual, cultural, social and technical dimensions of our continent.9

The Bologna Process, therefore, cannot be presented as driven by a singular goal; rather, it is both an endeavour to construct an education system and standards thereof, and to make Europe a “global site” for the pursuit of higher education. Bologna Process alongside other similar commitments and frameworks, establishes “the European Higher Education Area on the global market for higher education”. It is in fact the latter version, that makes Europe and European Studies relevant for regions like Asia. European Standards Outside Europe The “perspectives” provided by the Bologna Process have given a certain level of standard and consistency in designing and imparting European Studies in European states.10 That has, however, not been the case with non-European states. In the United States, the Bologna Process and the following standardisation have been seen as a strategic challenge—as both “opportunities and risks”—to the U.S. Higher Education.11 In Russia, although Russia committed to becoming part of the Bologna Process, there was resistance to the Process from the academia about the potential loss of the Russianness and concerns about the Process being antithetical to Russian state policies.12 In Africa, there is an appreciation of the Bologna Process, although concerns about a brain-drain to Europe eclipse the potential gain of the Process.13 Despite these concerns—we call them “core concerns”, as they pertain to the substance of the Process—there is no dispute as to the internationalising possibilities of higher education through the Bologna Process.14 The Process also has a political dimension to it that helps build inter-state relations within and outside of Europe. It is in this dimension that the epistemological potential and relevance of European Studies gain significance. Due to the partial reception of the Bologna Process outside Europe, European Studies is neither designed nor taught based on any standards set in Europe 9

Sorbonne Joint Declaration: Joint Declaration on Harmonisation of the Architecture of the European Higher Education System, 1998. 10 Miguel Portela, Carla Sá, Fernando Alexandre and Ana Rute Cardoso, “Perceptions of the Bologna Process: What do Students’ Choices Reveal?”, Higher Education, vol. 58, no. 4, 2009, pp. 465–74. 11 Laurel S. Terry, “The Bologna Process and Its Implications for U.S. Legal Education”, Journal of Legal Education, vol. 57, no. 2, 2007, pp. 237–52. 12 Galina Telegina and Hermann Schwengel, “The Bologna Process: perspectives and Implications for the Russian University”, European Journal of Education, vol. 47, no. 1, 2012, pp. 37–49. 13 Isaac N. Obasi and Akinpelu O. Olutayo, “Globalization, the Bologna Process and African Universities: Limits and Contradictions of Market-Oriented Higher Education Reforms”, Journal of Higher Education in Africa, vol. 7, no. 1/2, 2009, pp. 159–87. 14 See Manja Klemenˇ ciˇc, “20 Years of the Bologna Process in a Global Setting: The External Dimension of the Bologna Process Revisited”, European Journal of Higher Education, vol. 9, no. 1, 2019, pp. 2–6.

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by the Bologna Process. This is particularly due to a sense of “relevance” the Bologna Process has failed to create in non-European states thanks to the “European localisation” (perhaps alleged or perceived to be) of the Bologna Process. While there have been efforts to make the Bologna Process globally relevant, it is yet to achieve better results outside Europe. It is likely that the continuing mismatch between the outreach efforts of the Bologna Process and the reception of the same by non-European states is a result of the differences in expectations and contexts. That is to say, in European states, the interest in European Studies is prompted by the discourses on European integration, whereas in non-European states, it is the latter’s interest in foreign relations with the EU that has engendered interest in this discipline. This approach has the European states, mindful of European integration, constituting European Studies with discourses on the history, culture, politics, and economics of contemporary Europe. Absent such a motivation among non-European states, European Studies is constituted largely with the socio-economic and foreign policy of the EU. On balance, one finds a lack of uniformity in the epistemology of European Studies outside Europe.

The Idea Europe Outside Europe The above trend becomes particularly manifest in the case of Asian states—their interest in Europe is limited to their foreign relations with the EU than to the EU integration process or other historical and cultural factors which are the constituents of the EU integration project. The “identity questions” associated with the EU integration process squarely miss the “foreign policy ambitions” of the Asian states. But why should that be a problem if we are willing to give allowance to the Asian states’ interest in Europe for all political and strategic reasons? Why should there be an epistemological insistence that the idea of European identity should be prevalent and present in all versions of European Studies? Why not non-Europe, including Asia, read European Studies to understand Europe in all its contemporary political and economic complexities? In fact, many modules in European Studies serve both the interest and perspectives of European and non-European states. These inter alia include discourses on European institutions, linguistic diversity, and foreign policy of the EU. For further streamlining the content of European Studies, what the discipline should make sure is that there is an idea of Europe in European Studies which is both “political” and “economic” such that Europe engenders a politically and economically relevant imagery of Europe—that of a worthy bedfellow—among nonEuropean states. But this does not mean that Europe does not present itself to nonEurope as a historical and cultural entity. Inez Baranay captures the classical image of Europe elsewhere in verse, [W]hen viewed from Asia, let alone other parts of the world,

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M. Stoicheva et al. Europe appears to be a bastion of human history, dignity, and, yes, this word again: culture.15

But Europe should mean beyond that imagery if Europe is to be actualised in the practice of non-European states in the form of relationships and mutually beneficial outcomes. The question is, what type of narrative should that be? Should it be the Europe in all its historical and cultural complexities or the Europe that is more serviceable for non-European partners? Perhaps a manufactured narrative of the latter category, although not profound, would be functional. What should then be the form and substance of that narrative, that idea of Europe, that epistemic product of strategic utility? Asking this question does not mean we are trying to set a sole direction for European Studies. There are many other pertinent questions on the larger theme under discussion, answers to which can provide direction and guidance to European Studies. Whether the variations discussed and suggested above in the form and substance of European Studies substantially impact the philosophy of the discipline? Would accepting as a norm contextual behaviour and situational adjustments defy the ontology of the discipline? Would Asian states have an interest in European Studies, if the discipline remains predominantly a discourse on European integration? What use of integration discourses will be for non-European states? Can the integration discourse be streamlined to make it appealing to non-European states? Could at least certain re-imagination or renewalism be brought into the discourse such that non-European states could subjectively receive the integration discourse within their respective frame of reference, propelling further their political interest in Europe? How would an acceptance of the foreign policy focus of European Studies in Asian states augment the epistemology of the discipline? How can the approach of non-European states towards European Studies be streamlined with the Bologna Process?

The Book Through this book, we tried to create a framework—an opportunity—to reimagine the disciplinary foundations of European Studies and the utility of the discipline to Asian states. This is done by bringing together scholars from Europe and Asia to deliberate broadly on the meditations above. Our idea was not to make any scholar respond to any particular question, which would have straight-jacketed their imaginations. Rather we wanted to invoke their ingenuity which lies in rich and varied experiences reflecting on Europe. Hence, we decided to submit foundational questions in the necessary sequential order from “epistemology” to “technology” as they are spread over the discipline. The following are the questions we submitted: 15

Inez Baranay, “The Idea of Europe”, Antipodes, vol. 25, no. 2, 2011, pp. 164–67 at 167.

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1. What is the epistemology and philosophy of European Studies, generally and particularly? 2. What is the scope of multidisciplinarity in European Studies? 3. How are society, polity, and economy dealt with in European Studies? 4. What is the role of the Bologna Process in Streamlining European Studies? 5. What is the relevance of European Studies for non-European states, and Asia in particular? 6. How can European Studies be made relevant to Asia? 7. To what extent can studying European languages contribute to revitalising European Studies in Asia? 8. How can European Studies become lessons for Asia, especially in terms of regional integration, foreign policy, science and technology, and democratic governance? 9. What can EU institutions contribute to the regional development of Asia? While our authors responded to these questions, organising the answers which we received within a rational framework remained solely ours. We fulfil that responsibility herein.

Knowing Europe: Ways and Means Since there have been questions surrounding the idea of Europe in Asia, and since we are of the conviction that European presence in Asia—in whatever form—is a source of imagination, we read the chapter by Elizabeth Brandon entitled, “European World Heritage Sites in Asia: Sharing Cultural Experiences to Improve Protection and Understanding”, with a lot of keenness. We wanted to explore how “sight” and the associated emotions engender and sustain, respectively, an idea. The presence of an artefact in a given site—as a historical remnant—in a given region is an indication of the social presence of a culture. It is also a stark reminder of a time–space—that is to say, a reminder of socialisation that happens within, from, or through that site. The artefact on the site could be either a symbolic signifier of a culture or something beyond, e.g., a vestige of lives. Brandon confirms our idea that these sites are “representative of interactions between local and European cultures”. The nature of the socialisation that happened in these sites can be conjectured from the type of relicts the sites bear—they “range from civic and religious buildings to fortifications and lighthouses”—which primarily were centred inter alia around trade and commerce. However, it is noteworthy that these sites, and any relicts thereof, were colonial establishments, and it is less likely that they evoke memories that could be anything other than that of domination and subordination. It is this sentiment that Brandon problematises by focusing on the approach of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) which is responsible for the preservation of these cultural sites. If the preservation is limited to material maintenance of the sites, that’s less likely to yield any intercultural results.

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On the contrary, their presence runs the risk of reinforcing the horror of colonialism, reproducing contempt and xenophobia in the minds of the Asian populace. However, this does not need to be the case always, e.g., in the case of Churches, they have evoked a sense of marvel and reverence in the minds of the Asian populace. Brandon’s review of the mandate of UNESCO in guaranteeing compliance by the host state of the provisions of the World Heritage Convention, 1972 throws light on the possibilities of the site—and the thought surrounding the site by the states concerned—becoming a means for intercultural exchange and an internalisation of the idea of Europe thereof. Brandon’s critical approach is two-pronged—towards the UNESCO regime and towards the member/host state. The presence of European heritage in Asian states opens the door for “heritage diplomacy”, which is predicated on many narratives and shared sentiments among the states. Primarily it is a matter of affinity-formation for the Asian states, which gradually transforms into a socio-political motivation to connect and collaborate at various levels of socialisation with the European partner. The material presence of Europe in Asia is a source of European imagination— and a very powerful one, indeed. But what about such Asian states that do not have a European presence in the form of a site within the boundaries of the former? Things then become a matter of perceptions, the formation which cannot be regulated. In other words, the sight of Europe, which we alluded to earlier, can also exist in the abstract. Abstracting Europe is extremely important given that such an idea of Europe will be the cause and sustenance of all interactions between Europe and non-Europe. Inputs on Europe—and their source—for idea-formation for states which do not have any “European presence” in the sense in which Brandon uses the term deserve serious consideration. This puts the spotlight on European Studies and repeats the question: What language should European Studies speak to non-European states who rely on European Studies solely for understanding Europe? Łucja Piekarska and Zdzisław Mach, in their chapter, “Towards Understanding of Europe: Exercise in Social Imagination”, think from the standpoint of non-Europe, referring to the non-European perceptions as the “external eye”. The external eye is a cognitive framework within which would happen the interplay of numerous considerations. The internal churning that leads to the idea- and identity-formation there at will be qualitatively different from the similar process that happens in European minds. Piekarska and Mach draw the distinction between idea- and identity-formation in European and non-European minds. The formation of the idea of Europe in European minds is a matter of internalising history and historical moments which gradually set in and take shape as a critical cognitive standpoint of the “European subject” to explore its situationality and a perspective to imagine its future. This obsessive focus on the insides of Europe often renders non-Europe an “extimate other” for the European subject whose conditions, and the lives lived there at, it remains ignorant of. While this self-centeredness might serve the Europe subject in the social production that happens within Europe, it does not help much in its interactions with states, systems, and subjects outside Europe. This is a case of a dialectical absence which

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has the risk of rendering the European subject self-contained to a planet of its own. Inter-state relations of Europe thus could get limited to only those states that were part of European history directly or tangentially. Asia, sadly, does not become partakers of or subjects in such histories. If this is the discursive scheme of European Studies and the fate of the European subject which develops its identity through the discipline, the non-European subject which uses European Studies to develop the idea of Europe perceives Europe as a walled province impervious to it. This impression of the non-European subject, when collectivised, has the risk of becoming state positions towards Europe. Piekarska and Mach, therefore, make a case for European Studies to develop an idea of Europe which better reflects the aspirations and goals of the Europe of today. This does not mean forging a forgetfulness of European history, but does mean retention of essential history for the non-Europe to understand the social self-becoming of Europe as a unity, and wherever and wherever essential, in its particularities. What is that essential history? Piekarska and Mach say that it is the outcome of the historical process which Europe went through. The outcomes are in the form of values and sensibilities which became European per se and Europe’s gift to the world: The Platonian concept of “idea”, the concept of “pure science” … the idea of individual creativity, and the Enlightenment ideas of progress and individualism … universal human rights, liberal democracy, and … the principle of self-reflection and self-criticism.

Many non-European states and peoples used these ideas dialectally to gain their independence from their colonial masters (including Europeans), constructively in their social self-becoming, and discursively in their continued socialisation within and outside their socio-political boundaries. It is this potential of the European ideas which Piekarska and Mach develop as epistemological inputs for European Studies in their chapter. When non-European states and subjects start to trace the ontology of their sociopolity from European history, they develop an interest in Europe. Their interest in the history of ideas gets them to engage with European history. And when they critically question the presence of European ideas in their society and polity, it leads to the exploration of common grounds and shared values among Europe and non-Europe. It is such an interaction of histories, history and ideas, and ideas which European Studies should aim at if the discipline has to become relevant for non-European, Asian states. Piekarska and Mach also imaginatively focus on the discursive character of European Studies. If European Studies is to reimagine itself for speaking to a nonEuropean audience, it should rely less on the narratives cast in iron which would only have a rhetorical effect. Hence, the best way to present European history—as facts and as outcomes of facts—to non-European audiences is through symbolisms—that is, bringing the baroque touch to things. Art, according to Piekarska and Mach, can be an invitation to the essential Europe. Art, as against oral and literary narratives, bestows the freedom of construction for the perceiver. Art, thanks to its semiotic power, lets a Europe form in the non-European imagination deeply and powerfully.

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This idea of Europe, which is not imposed but formed through the freedom of imagination and reflection, will cause the socialisation that Europe and non-Europe have been aiming at. Reading Brandon and Piekarska and Mach, despite the apparent differences in their approaches and illustrative subject matter—the material and meta, respectively—has a commonality among them. That is, they emphasise on the role of semiotic mediums to address non-European subjects. Brandon speaks about a silent and perpetual conversation between Europe and non-Europe through the semiotic medium of historical sites and relics. Piekarska and Mach speak about the possibilities of using the semiotics of art to engage in a similar conversation. Both of them try to create alternative means of knowing Europe for the non-Europe. We find these chapters as a great starting point for the book, for they answer some of our concerns on the relevance of general and particular European histories—a European thing in itself—in all their correlative and dynamic complexities for non-Europe. They set the tone for presenting more epistemic schemes for advancing European Studies as the discipline should be for non-Europe, particularly Asia. If we keep apart the above said commonality of the authors’ reliance on semiotic mediums, Maria Stoicheva joins the conversation on knowing Europe through European Studies. Her chapter, “Perceptions of the European Union: A View from the Outside?” answers the question: How does non-Europe understand Europe? Stoicheva starts with the issues surrounding the problematisation of the tension between the “internal” and the “external” perspectives on Europe. In fact, the tension would have been a better problem for exploring further, but here the case is that of overlapping boundaries between the internal and the external. Stoicheva uses the phenomenology of the internal—that of a “self” and an “inner-self”, what she refers to as the “appreciated” and the “banal” sense of Europeanism, respectively— to give a form and substance to the external. The internal, with its many internal inconsistencies, conflicts, and complexities, can be dubbed as the European identity sensu lato. Stoicheva has interesting accounts which capture many viewpoints on the internal. That, however, we leave it to the readers to explore. We focus on the external. For external perceptions to form, there should be an internal—a core—to that external. But the internal herein is a duality—perhaps a combination—of the appreciated (EU as a historical consciousness) and the banal (EU in the totality of its systems and processes). Internally European subjects can afford a strict differentiation between the appreciated and the banal, but not when the internal becomes the core of the external. EU, for the sake of the external, becomes a bricolage. This idea, in its totality, should become part of European Studies, and that’s easier said than done. Mind you, European Studies is not a nascent epistemological category; rather, it has become a full-fledged discipline with deep-seated methods, credos, and convictions. Hence, Stoicheva suggests a “decentring” approach both as an epistemological and political agenda. Decentring, according to the author, “urges for wide decentring and overcoming of Eurocentrism, ‘western-centrism’ in disciplines like international relations, research on non-western theories of international relations and approaches and opening and recognition of ‘diversity’”. On a more

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practical level, decentring happens through openness to include discourses on nonEuropean little narratives as against the grand narrative of European integration. Part of the decentring agenda is also to diminish the “us and them” (the One and the Other) dialectics and the “West and the rest” approaches in European Studies. Stoicheva’s joining the conversation between Brandon and Piekarska and Mach becomes interesting when things are viewed from their respective approaches. They all have common epistemological and renewalist sensibilities. However, when Stoicheva speaks about the need to diminish the over-reliance on dialectics (self and the other), she takes a position that’s diametric to Brandon and also Piekarska and Mach, who see dialectic possibilities in the presence of European sites in nonEurope and dialectic possibilities in the organic ideas and values which originated in Europe, respectively. Then again, when we juxtapose Stoicheva’s approach with that of Piekarska and Mach, there is a common spirit of reinvention in them—the former speaks about reinventing the nature of the discourse (from grad to local narratives), and the latter speaks about reinventing the discursive medium (from text to art). If we let all the above-mentioned authors speak in an essential sequential order, we should listen to Brandon first—her idea of semiotic discursivity. Then we should hear Piekarska and Mach—their ideas on using the relaying power of art to convey the idea of Europe. Then we should listen to Stoicheva—her ideas on presenting Europe as an integration of pure consciousness (Europe) and the self-consciousness (European Union). As we proceed, we see a tale being spun, the tale of the selfbecoming of a discipline. European Studies is forming an idea of Europe that would excite and interest Asia.

Advancing the Epistemology: Pedagogic Possibilities An ideal starting point for any conversation on the episteme and pedagogy of European Studies is the Bologna Process. Francesca Longo initiates such a conversation in her chapter, “‘Bologna’ and Beyond: The Role of European Studies in the Process of Cooperation between European and Asian Universities”. Longo revisits the process of internationalisation of Europe through the EU in order to problematise the process as something that’s deeply limited within itself. Limitedness is understood not in terms of the idea and narrative of Europe but more in the way European Studies and higher education are treated within the larger scheme of European integration. Longo’s analytical originality is in the fact that she is concerned about the integrative logic of higher education within the larger integration schemes and narratives. She is concerned about higher education being the “last thing” or “one of the many factors” in the grand scheme of integration. This type of approach has rendered the internationalisation of Europe, in the higher education sector, limited to funding and mobility in larger quantitative terms. Longo herein brings in the sanguinity that reliance on Bologna Process, what she refers to as an “attractive force” in letter and spirit, can have a transformative impact. Bologna Process has the imagination of “externalisation” (of EU policies)

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deeply ingrained in it such that it gives the quality and character of being a model to many EU domestic policy-actions. Externalisation is an openness to engage in dialogues between Europe and the non-Europe which naturally broadens the scope of the European Higher Education Area (EHEA), which is understood in this scheme of things more as a meta-geography—partly a dialectical space—wherein interest and empathies are engendered. While the Bologna process has the potential to produce a dialectic relationship between Europe and non-Europe, it needs to upgrade itself in form and substance, as irrespective of the constitutive possibilities of the Bologna process, it cannot cause “norm localisation”. By way of advancing the Bologna process towards norm localisation such that Europe in its historical and narrative totality invites non-European interest, Longo proposes the 4JR method, which in fact, is a framework of deliberation on the contents of European Studies—a sort of juxtaposition of perspectives. Despite the allusions to norm diffusion, Longo models the European Studies using the clay of Bologna process into a model of integration for the Asian and other non-European states. If Longo’s point is about bringing Europe closer (and making it relevant) to Asia (non-Europe) through a re-imagination of the Bologna process, Daniela Irrera goes for a pedagogical re-imagination to obtain the same results. In her chapter entitled, “The Use of Simulations in Teaching EU Foreign Policy in a Non-European Educational Environment”, she “discusses the relevance of active learning tools, like simulations and games, in teaching EU foreign policy in non-European contexts, particularly in Asian universities”. Irrera’s problematisation has elements generalisable with Longo’s and other writers’: Europe in Asian imagination, in the absence of particular motivations, is characterised by “extimacy”, which often leads to any efforts at pairing the two rather synthetic and yielding spontaneous outcomes which have only transitory relevance. Neither these coming together nor the outcomes they produce lead to any internalisation of the other. Barring some immediate results, which are prompted by Europe being a “unique example” of some aspects of human socialisation (“a fusing of the contemplative and creative consciousness”), Europe largely remains an esoteric composite of human willing and acting in many historic timescales.16 Irrera, in the same vein as Longo, suggests that Europe’s self-discovery and self-perfecting in its own collective consciousness is a model of self-becoming for anyone. This story is narrated splendidly by Irrera in the language of contemporary socio-political realities. But how should one present this model before an Asian audience who chooses to understand Europe through European Studies? Irrera points out that Asian students should learn about Europe from the inside, feeling Europe by being part of its daily decision-making. Simulations of real decision-making scenarios thoroughly and meticulously designed can be excellent tools for knowing the self-forming of Europe. Irrera also presents such a simulation model—“Games of Peace”—which is well-supported by many elegant meditations on the methods and materials.

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See Philip Allott, “The Concept of European Union”, Cambridge Yearbook of European Studies, vol. 2, 1999, pp. 31–59.

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There is a third chapter on pedagogy by Irene Wieczorek and Qianyu Wang. This chapter—“Teaching EU Law Outside the EU: An Explorative Analysis of 8 Case Studies in Asia”—verifies the problematisation made at theoretical levels by other scholars of European Studies in the way its disciplinary knowledge is imparted in Asian universities. Their survey of universities which spanned over countries like China (and its Special Administrative Regions of Macau and Hong Kong), South Korea, India, Pakistan, and Singapore, informs the presence of European Studies as a disciplinary category and research interest in non-European regions and countries. Wieczorek and Wang start the survey with an interesting proposition, which has an interrogative possibility to it: Why is Europe of interest to countries where EU law does not directly apply? This is also the epistemological question that prompted this volume. There are numerous answers to this question which sadly reflect a utility function to the knowledge of Europe rather than any epistemological intimacy to the discipline by the learners outside of Europe. However, things are more reassuring on the teachers’ side—they are motivated by a research interest in the EU which often cascades as EU teaching that often fails to provide student interest in the discipline and its subject matter thereof. Whatsoever, teaching or research, Europe is approached and studied through a heavy reliance on comparative perspectives, which often misses the ontology of European Studies and renders Europe a subject matter of comparative studies. This type of approach does not create the necessary “internalisation” which European Studies, when taught in Europe, causes. Students who study European Studies are driven purely by opportunities in Europe, so much so that if they fail in their career pursuits, their education in European Studies becomes irrelevant in the social contexts of, and the professional opportunities in, their respective countries. Wieczorek and Qianyu Wang hence pose the question: “How non-European job market can reward this type of expertise”? If we take the chapters by Wieczorek and Qianyu Wang, Longo, and Irrera in that sequential order, they follow each other despite the variations in their subject matter—although not in their spirit and goals. Once we accept the verification of the problem by Wieczorek and Qianyu Wang, the following excerpts from Longo and Irrera summarise and make the point. They set a fine sequence and continuity of ideas apropos of the larger project at hand: Longo profoundly concludes, Knowledge is international in its essence. It knows no borders, no boundaries. It is timeless and is the universal language of all who would seek wisdom. Universities are therefore international in their core function. The political, economic and financial realities facing both countries [Europe and non-Europe] and universities require the development of a worldview and perspective in curriculum formulation and implementation.

Assimilating this vision in her project, Irrera takes charge and advances with plans to realise their shared commitments, The expansion of knowledge of the EU, its activities and aims, even in non-European contexts, definitively contributes to a more multicultural, vivid and open-minded education environment, which is necessary for training future citizens and young leaders. Offering

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Finally, a word on the complementarity between Longo and Irrera: There is no doubt that if Irrera’s simulation project is put through the 4JR approach, it will fully qualify. It is projects like Games of Peace which help actualise the ambitions of a framework like 4JR.

Europe, a Model for Asia? Some Best Practices Notwithstanding whether the “European way”, as in European Studies, leads to norm localisation or becomes a model for non-Europe, non-Europe, particularly Asia, has an interest in Europe. Vesselin Popovski and Abhinav Mehrotra, in their chapter, “Can European Mechanisms on Human Rights be Applied in South Asia?” test the utility and compatibility of a European model. Popovski and Mehrotra juxtapose through a detailed review of the human rights mechanisms in Europe, ASEAN, and Africa. This information becomes the input to examine the ontology of human rights in the conflict between universality and cultural relativism. The authors make a strong case for the universality of human rights—as universality helps prevent abuses of human rights in the name of national sovereignty and cultural uniqueness—thereby exploding the myth that the European origin of human rights is a reason for resisting it with cultural relativism. Popovski and Mehrotra draw our attention to Europe versus Asia positions which are often seen in conversations on human rights. They consider these positions as “unnecessary counter-positioning” against the universal values, which are the bedrock of human rights, and defy their significance and import. The authors wax eloquent on this position: The values cannot be different in their substance, because people everywhere would value the good; and would try to prevent, mitigate, or correct the bad. Values and human rights therefore arose and developed in different times, in different places, and in different ways, they had different names in different languages and were specific in adherence to them. Values, as well as human rights, are universal not only in their applicability to all human beings in every village in the world but also universal because they originated from every village in the world.

The position taken by Popovski and Mehrotra gives us a certain discriminative ability—that is, the ability to separate “values” from “practices” on matters in which Europe becomes a model for Asia. Values are mostly human specific, and hence building value-models is foolhardiness; rather focus should be on best practices within successful models of governance. In the rest of the chapter, the authors give us best practices on human rights in the EU system that have the potential to become models for Asia. However, the Asian systems do not need to be forgetful of their local conditions and should optimise their practices accordingly. But the specificity of a culture is not antithetical to the universality of values. Values are both European and Asian, and if one does not exist, the other too does not.

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In the chapter, “The Never-Ending Poly-Crisis: European Governance and Legitimacy Beyond COVID-19”, Vihar Georgiev critically approaches the institutional resilience of the EU, primarily from a policy perspective. The policy response is the first reaction—what Georgiev refers to as “agile governance”—of robust institutions against crisis and resilience in the form of “adaptive governance”, which ensures sustainability. However, many a time, due to the unprecedented and unpredictable nature of the crisis, institutions fall into policy paralysis. Georgiev studies the EU’s response to the crisis using the cases of the Eurozone crisis, migration, and COVID-19. It is the author’s point that effective policy response and subsequent action, which obtain adequacy and efficiency, are signs of legitimacy. The analytical framework he develops has the means to test whether the above-said drivers of legitimacy are present in given institutions or not. In this chapter, Georgiev puts the EU’s policy response and actions through the analytical test and discovers that the EU’s policy response has not attained the level of efficiency due to the divergent preferences of member states. He concludes that, EU’s crisis response was more agile than adaptive, mainly due to the inability of EU’s institutions to reduce strategic uncertainty caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, and to mitigate undesired behaviours, actions, and policies by certain Member States, leading to suboptimal policy outcomes.

By overcoming these challenges and reform, Georgiev suggests that within the institutional mandates and functional styles of the EU, there should be scope for particular preferences of people (through “participatory governance”) alongside the high-priority for building regional/political union. What has Asia—an altogether different union, if at all, and a consciousness—to learn from the EU’s [ineffective] policy response? Georgiev suggests that the policies and narratives on regional cohesion should be carefully and critically observed. However, we believe there is no such narrative in Asia—whatever narratives on cohesion exist in Asia, they are driven by the region’s economic, social, and cultural progress. This motivation shall not be mistaken as a desire for regional cohesion in the EU’s sense—which is historical, political, and cultural in an ontological and phenomenological sense—but a desire to maintain the rule of law in the region for exercising sovereign powers to its fullest productive possibility. As if sensing a response as the above said, Georgiev further suggests that Asia should emphasise the heterogeneity of state preferences and allow for “creative flexibility of policy implementation”, which the EU ought to have paid attention to. Asia also has a lot to learn from the idea of participatory governance. Georgiev’s chapter is a caution for Asia. He presents a model that has not been developed in the EU and that it ought to have been developed and implemented. Yet, as much as Popovski and Mehrotra, Georgiev also leaves an EU model for Asia to look at critically.

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Conclusion The eight chapters which we have briefly presented before have addressed the nine questions which we raised earlier in this chapter. There are variations in their themes and subject matter of presentation and analysis. However, all the authors of these chapters share a common spirit, an epistemological spirit, to advance and make the discipline of European Studies relevant. Europe, in all their analyses, is a “living thing” which has been actualising a glorious vision. Europe in its present tense—the EU—is the culmination of a historical process in this moment and its continuity to the next. It does not cast a normative sway on other similar spaces and times but stands as a striking example of human consciousness-forming and of humanity’s social self-becoming. Europe’s self-becoming and self-sustenance have a pattern, hence knowledge of any of it has the architectonics of an order. Knowing this, architectonics is a process that is highly standardised in terms of methods and materials, the Bologna process. Our authors have explained the general scope of these standards and their particular possibilities of them. There is an art of knowing Europe—the European mind and the European act—an art that is in the imaginations and approaches of European Studies. Our authors have presented that art in its finest subtleties. Europe is a melting pot, but it is not a cauldron of disorder. It’s willing and acting in the social, the cultural and the political have a semiotic impact. Philip Allott explains the above said power of Europe, The European mind has traditionally expressed the dialectical potentiality of law in the concept of justice. Actualising the ideal of justice in the social justice generated by the legal system of a given society at a given time, a society nevertheless retains the supra-societal transcendental ideal of justice as both a critical negation of the actual and a permanent aspiration within the actual.17

It is this potential of Europe to discover the actual experience of the real that makes it a model for non-Europe. Our authors have well-presented the process of realityforming in Europe’s historical and political self-consciousness for non-Europe, especially Asia. And that makes our pursuit in this book meaningful.

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Ibid. at p. 47.

Chapter 2

European World Heritage Sites in Asia: Sharing Cultural Experiences to Improve Protection and Understanding Elizabeth Brandon

Abstract This chapter considers the institutional role of UNESCO, the international body responsible for the World Heritage Convention, in promoting and ensuring the preservation of European heritage sites in Asia. Such sites tend to be selected for protection on the basis of their significance for the cultural and economic development of the region, and in particular the cross-cultural exchange of ideas. Examples of specific sites are used to illustrate UNESCO’s dual role in ensuring implementation of the World Heritage Convention and promoting broader cultural heritage protection in Asia. The importance of developing Asian perspectives on European heritage is considered in this context. The chapter then proposes that the World Heritage institutions enhance opportunities for dialogue between Asia and Europe on shared cultural World Heritage sites.

Introduction The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) has had a long-standing presence in the Asian region, having established its first regional office in Bangkok, Thailand in 1961.1 Its activities have been wide-ranging, in accordance with its broad remit, but UNESCO has had a particularly active role in the protection of cultural heritage. Since the Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (the World Heritage Convention) opened for signature in 1972, it has been ratified by 44 countries in the region, with a total of almost 200 cultural heritage sites and 12 mixed cultural/natural heritage sites listed for protection under the Convention by 2022 (UNESCO, 2022k). UNESCO and the World Heritage institutions—in relation to cultural heritage, these include 1

For purposes of this chapter, this region approximately correlates to the Asian component of ‘Asia and the Pacific’ region, as referred to by UNESCO in relation to the World Heritage Convention. E. Brandon (B) University of Stirling, Stirling, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 M. Stoicheva et al. (eds.), Relevance of European Studies in Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-7786-4_2

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the World Heritage Committee, World Heritage Centre, the International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property (ICCROM) and the International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS)—are responsible for overseeing implementation of the Convention. The World Heritage Convention has been criticised over time for its historical European bias, resulting in a concept of ‘heritage’ that has been defined largely by European countries (King, 2016; Meskell, 2013), and a preponderance of World Heritage sites in the region. Despite recent efforts by UNESCO and its institutions to address this imbalance, cultural World Heritage properties in Europe and North America still comprise over half the global total, compared to 21% in the Asia– Pacific region, and even less in other regions. Europe and North America together had 468 cultural World Heritage properties by 2022 (52% of the global total of 897), compared with 195 in the Asia–Pacific region (UNESCO, 2022m). This persistent imbalance highlights the need to give greater representation to regions other than Europe in the operation of the World Heritage Convention, and UNESCO itself. A small proportion (approximately seven per cent) of the cultural sites that are listed under the World Heritage Convention in Asia are representative of interactions between local and European cultures, and these ‘shared heritage’ sites are referred to here as ‘European World Heritage’. They range from civic and religious buildings to fortifications and lighthouses, constructed as a result of colonisation and trading activities engaged predominantly by the British, Dutch, Portuguese, Spanish and French from the fifteenth century to the twentieth century. It was not uncommon for more than one European country to interact with specific Asian countries, either simultaneously or consecutively, as colonies changed hands or trading companies vied for business. As a result, some World Heritage sites in Asia have been influenced by three or four different European cultures, combining to produce a multi-layered and multifaceted concept of ‘cultural heritage’ in each instance. Knudsen et al. (2022: 8) observe that the long-term impacts of colonisation vary markedly between countries and regions, with European influences on indigenous cultures differing accordingly. However, according to Aygen and Logan (2016: 413), the colonial era was far from a one-way street, with studies “now showing that the colonizer was frequently influenced by the colonized, and what has been thought of as ‘imposed colonial’ in character has in fact considerable local content”. Asian cultural influences are now seen not only within other parts of the region, but have “flowed out to the rest of the world, where they have been internalized as part of living culture, especially among younger people” (Aygen & Logan, 2016: 413). It is imperative to acknowledge the negative consequences of colonisation, and the divergent views as to the merits of preserving colonial heritage. This is an essential debate that is rightly gaining momentum at both the national and global levels. As Sullivan (1991: 16) noted three decades ago, “to some extent […], the current international heritage conservation conventions, and to a large degree their adaptation to various non-Western countries, is in itself a postcolonial phenomenon, or at least a relic of Western influence”. However, the focus of this chapter is primarily on the role and effectiveness of UNESCO in protecting European World Heritage sites in

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Asia, rather than the inherent value of preserving these sites as distinct from other World Heritage sites in the region. It should also be acknowledged that the Western view of what constitutes ‘heritage’, particularly ‘cultural heritage’, is problematic in many ways. For instance, when considering the implications of imposing the Western model of heritage conservation on Asian systems, Sullivan (1991: 16) observes that “it is clear that the Western model, as well as Western rationale and methodology, can be an imposition on top of traditional values and lifeways that differ from it, and which run ‘across the grain’”. Yan (2018: 14) comments that the Eurocentrism of World Heritage is not about the dominance of European States Parties in the World Heritage Committee but about the hegemony of conceptions […] World Heritage (and in a broader sense the concept of heritage itself) is challenged as an embodiment of the hegemonic dissemination of Western values into non-Western cultures.

On this basis, the following discussion of European World Heritage in Asia acknowledges the inherent dissonance in the notions of ‘heritage’ and ‘cultural heritage’ relied upon by the World Heritage regime. Ongoing and future activities of the World Heritage institutions need to respond in a sensitive and inclusive manner, to ensure these key concepts represent the values of all States Parties. Asian countries themselves, particularly local communities within which World Heritage properties are situated, should be able to determine the meaning of ‘heritage’ and what aspects of this heritage they wish to protect, in accordance with their own values, needs and conditions.

The Significance of European World Heritage Properties in Asia One of the key features common to all of the European World Heritage sites in Asia is their manifestation of a cross-cultural exchange of ideas, often over an extended period of time. They reflect an era of intensive interaction among a wide range of actors, each potentially contributing different values, customs, religions, technologies, architecture, town planning systems, artforms and languages. For example, the Melaka and George Town World Heritage property in Malaysia is recognised (ICOMOS, 2008: 77) as representing: Excellent examples of historic colonial towns on the Straits of Malacca that have endured a succession of historical events, mostly related to their former function as trading ports linking East and West [and] a reflection of the coming together of cultural elements from the Malay Archipelago, India and China with those of Europe to create a unique architecture, culture and townscape without parallel.

This cultural interaction not only impacted many aspects of life for local populations, but often also communities much further afield. The latter may have come to rely upon the success of trading ports or colonies in Asia for their income, and this undoubtedly aided the rise (and fall) in prosperity and empire-building aspirations

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of several European countries. European World Heritage sites in Asia may therefore have broader significance for the interconnected economic and cultural development of Europe and Asia. As noted above, it is now common knowledge that many harmful impacts were caused by European colonisation and trading practices across the world, and these were not confined to Asia. The presence and preservation of any tangible evidence of European cultural influences that remains may therefore be a highly sensitive issue for some Asian countries. As Leung (2009: 24) notes, “colonial heritage in post-colonial contexts is particularly sensitive and political. Colonial heritage properties are representations of occupation and unequal power relations in history”. Nonetheless, several sites have been selected by their national governments, and formally recognised by the World Heritage Committee, at least partly on the basis of their ‘outstanding universal value’ in representing interactions between European and local cultures. According to Aygen and Logan (2016: 412), A growing number of Asian scholars and heritage practitioners are now taking a more nuanced view of the colonial period, and the protection of colonial heritage is increasingly accepted by government authorities across Asia.

It should be acknowledged that governments may have different motives from their citizens in seeking World Heritage status for particular properties. There may be considerable political and economic gains from a successful nomination, for example through property and tourism development. As discussed below, ‘heritage diplomacy’ is also a growing phenomenon across Asia, with governments seeking to increase their soft power and cultural influence within and beyond the region. The nomination process for some European World Heritage properties has been controversial, with governments at times criticised for making ‘top-down’ decisions to nominate a property without consulting fully with local populations, or on the basis of foreign experts’ opinions (for example, Luang Prabang, Laos: Logan, 2011: 116; and Melaka and George Town, Malaysia: King, 2012: 16). The selection process for World Heritage sites was described by Cleere (1996) as ‘Western-oriented’, operating “in accordance with an aesthetic and historical perspective that is grounded in European culture”. Reyes (2019) contends that this perceived bias may have led Asian, Latin American and African governments to strategically select cultural relics that date from their colonial occupation – rather than native monuments of the pre-colonial era – because they suspect such places most closely align with UNESCO’s vision.

In light of this, it is pertinent to consider whether citizens themselves (particularly local communities) view European World Heritage sites as significant and meriting special protection under the World Heritage Convention. Although there appears to be a lack of comprehensive research on this issue, some insights may be found in studies on specific properties. It should be noted that these studies are of limited scale and tend to be undertaken only after a property has been added to the World Heritage List, so their findings should be treated with some caution. An example of such research is Melaka and George Town (Malaysia), where studies were carried out for each of the two cities within a few years of gaining

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World Heritage status. Whilst the values of a small selection of domestic visitors and stakeholders cannot be equated with those held by the local community, nor the Malaysian population as a whole, they are suggestive of some recognition of the cultural importance of Melaka and George Town, each on their own particular merits. In the first study, interviews conducted with a small sample of domestic visitors to Melaka (King, 2012: 42–43), found that: Invariably Malaysians referred to the important position of Melaka in Malaysian history and in national heritage terms rather than as a multicultural site; visitors emphasized the importance of not forgetting their history and the need to get to know more about it.

King (2012: 42–43) notes that the Malaysian government has played a significant role in communicating to citizens the “central position of Melaka in the formation and development of Malay culture and identity and […] Melaka as a site of cultural development, encounters and exchange”. In the second study (Omar et al, 2013: 89–91), on stakeholder perceptions of George Town, 70% of those surveyed saw World Heritage status as recognition of the international importance of their cultural heritage, and 97% thought that restoration and conservation of George Town’s heritage buildings was either ‘important’ or ‘extremely important’. Although some of the stakeholders included tourism operators, who perhaps stood to profit from any conservations works, local residents and other groups were also included in the survey. Another example is that of Goa (India), where domestic visitors to the World Heritage site considerably outnumbered foreign visitors by a factor of 5:1 during the period 2011–2014 (Raj, 2015: 7). However, no details are provided as to domestic tourists’ reasons for visiting, so its perceived cultural significance may be only one of several possible explanations for this disparity. Passing reference is also made to the general lack of awareness by local residents of the importance of Goa’s heritage, who offered little resistance to ‘unwanted intrusion’ and contributed to an overall impression of ‘negligence’ (Raj, 2015: 11). Lack of awareness within the local community may be attributed to a range of factors, such as a lack of political will and failure by authorities to engage in meaningful public consultation or provide adequate funding and expertise. It is therefore difficult to draw any informed conclusions as to the cultural significance of Goa to either the local community or domestic visitors more broadly. An example of more in-depth research on the significance of European World Heritage to the local community can be found for Galle Fort (Sri Lanka). Rajapakse and Silva (2020: 474) make the insightful observation that: Heritage is mostly appreciated by and meaningful to members of small local groups with shared cultural and historical experiences and emotional connections to their heritage (Zimmerman 2013). This applies very much to Galle Fort. The architecture of the fortifications and town houses was not necessarily a part of their recognised heritage. What the community valued most was the intra- and inter-community relationships that were strong and unique to the place through kinship structures and ethnic harmony among residents. This was their heritage (Rajapakse, 2013). A tremendous sense of pride and status also emerged

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In some Asian countries, colonial buildings have been converted into museums of local or national culture and history, and these tend to be valued by local communities and domestic visitors as serving an important purpose, increasing the cultural heritage value of a site. For example, in Melaka (according to King, 2012:25), “most of the European buildings which were bequeathed the independent Malaysian state have been converted into museums which celebrate not a colonial legacy but one which serves a local agenda”. King gives the example of the Stadthuys, which houses the Museum of History and Ethnography, and “presents the history of the sultanate and European and Japanese occupation, Melakan society, cultures and everyday life” (2012:25). Once inscribed on the World Heritage List, some properties have been adversely affected by various factors, including rapid or large-scale commercial development, transport infrastructure, illegal activities and inadequate management plans. Paradoxically, these adverse effects are often a direct result of the enhanced profile and increasing popularity of the World Heritage properties themselves, among both residents and visitors from further afield; an example of this can again be seen in Luang Prabang (Logan, 2011: 116; Caust & Vecco, 2017: 7).

European World Heritage Properties in Asia Although relatively few in number, World Heritage properties that historically played a role in interactions between ‘East’ and ‘West’ span the length and breadth of Asia. Although not a definitive list, such properties include the Churches and Convents of Goa, Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus and Victorian Gothic and Art Deco Mumbai (India), Old Town of Galle and its Fortifications (Sri Lanka), Luang Prabang (Laos), Hoi An (Vietnam), Kulangsu International Settlement and Historic Centre of Macao (China), Tomioka Silk Mill (Japan), Vigan and Baroque Churches (Philippines), Melaka and George Town (Malaysia), Botanic Gardens (Singapore), Ombilin Coalmining Heritage (Indonesia) and Levuka Historical Port Town (Fiji). In addition, there are several other ‘tentative’ European cultural heritage sites in Asia that are formally being considered by governments for nomination under the World Heritage Convention. There are also numerous sites that are not currently being considered for the tentative list, but are the subject of special conservation efforts by local governments and NGOs, sometimes assisted by European actors. As evidenced by the widespread ratification of the World Heritage Convention among Asian countries, value is attached to the protection of cultural heritage sites more generally by governments across the region. Sullivan (1991: 16) observes that [the] prevailing conception of heritage is […] a very powerful and attractive idea. It is seen as good citizenship in the international community and as a potentially powerful tool for new nations seeking to build a ‘modern’ society and to foster national identity and self-esteem in their citizens.

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Connected to this concept of ‘nation-building’ is the propensity for countries to use World Heritage listing to enhance their international profile. Governments then have a basis for engaging in ‘heritage diplomacy’ to pursue cultural links with other countries in the same region or those with a ‘shared history’. Another incentive for participating in the Convention is likely to be the economic benefits derived from a property gaining World Heritage status, particularly in terms of development and tourism. However, as in the case of Luang Prabang and other European World Heritage sites, inappropriate development and over-tourism can lead to significant impacts on the heritage value of a property, threatening its status as a World Heritage site.

The Role of UNESCO in the Protection of European Heritage in Asia UNESCO does not have a formal role specifically in the protection of European heritage in Asia, as distinct from other types of cultural heritage. However, there are two key aspects to UNESCO’s role in furthering cultural heritage protection more generally in Asia: firstly, ensuring implementation of the World Heritage Convention by the State Parties, and secondly, promoting heritage protection more broadly through informal channels. It achieves the former goal primarily through the World Heritage Committee and the World Heritage Centre, assisted by the Advisory Bodies for cultural heritage matters, ICCROM and ICOMOS. The second, more informal, role is pursued mainly through UNESCO’s regional office in Bangkok, several ‘cluster offices’ across the region, and national offices in Bangladesh, Vietnam, Nepal and Cambodia. These offices also play a supportive role in ensuring implementation and compliance of the Convention by States Parties.

UNESCO and the Implementation of the World Heritage Convention in Asia The institutions tasked with ensuring implementation of the World Heritage Convention, under the auspices of UNESCO, engage with relevant national governments throughout the entire process, from nomination of properties for inscription on the World Heritage List, to reporting and compliance procedures. Under the Convention, States Parties are required to submit an inventory (or ‘tentative list’) of important cultural heritage properties for potential inscription on the World Heritage List, then to prepare nomination dossiers for selected properties. UNESCO’s global and regional institutions provide various types of assistance at this stage; for example, ICOMOS has published detailed guidance on developing tentative lists of World Heritage properties (ICOMOS, 2020) and preparing nominations (ICOMOS, 2011d)

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and it holds regional training sessions on the nomination and listing process, which are usually coordinated by UNESCO or the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR). Some technical and financial assistance is also available to States Parties lacking the resources to prepare nomination dossiers for prospective World Heritage properties (Art. 15 of the Convention; Operational Guidelines 2021: Part VII). Various European World Heritage sites in Asia have benefited from such assistance. For example, the Philippines received funding to prepare its nomination dossier for the Historic Centre of Vigan, a former Spanish colonial town that was subsequently inscribed on the World Heritage List in 1999 (UNESCO, 2022d). However, financial assistance tends to be minimal due to the very limited resources of the World Heritage Fund, and the well-resourced States Parties may therefore have a higher success rate in having their nominations approved by the Committee. Nominations are independently evaluated by the Advisory Bodies, whose reports should, in theory, inform the final decision of the World Heritage Committee, although Meskell (2013: 487) notes that in practice this does not always occur. A decision may then be made by the World Heritage Committee to approve, defer or reject a proposed nomination, based on information received and any other relevant considerations. The nomination process, in general, has been widely criticised over the past decade for its politicisation, cost and other perceived flaws (see, for example, Meskell, 2013). The reporting and compliance procedures under the Convention and its Operational Guidelines allow the World Heritage Committee to assess how comprehensively the Convention has been implemented by the States Parties, and the adequacy of protection for individual World Heritage properties. The procedures are also designed to identify and address any threats to World Heritage properties in a timely and cooperative manner. The World Heritage bodies can use mechanisms under the Convention and its Operational Guidelines in cases of lack of implementation or a failure to safeguard properties. Examples of such intervention for European World Heritage properties in Asia—ranging from short- to long-term measures—include Goa (India), Melaka and George Town (Malaysia), Macao (China) and Galle (Sri Lanka). The mechanisms of ‘Periodic Reporting’ and ‘Reactive Monitoring’ play a key role in ensuring implementation of the Convention. Periodic reports contain both general (national) information and site-specific details, which can alert the Committee to any lack of implementation, or potential changes in the state of conservation of particular World Heritage properties. They are submitted by the States Parties themselves, every six years, but collated on a regional basis (World Heritage Convention: Art. 29). This regional approach is intended to facilitate both collaboration among countries, and a more informed response to the specific characteristics of each region. Preparations for the Third Reporting Cycle (covering the period 2018–2024) for the Asia–Pacific region commenced in late 2020. A State of Conservation Report is generally requested for any newly inscribed properties, or those that have been earmarked for monitoring at previous sessions of the Committee, have recently come under threat, or are on the List of World Heritage in Danger. State of Conservation reports should contain details of the legislative,

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administrative and other measures that a State Party has taken to implement its obligations under the Convention (Art. 29(1)). If the Committee has concerns about actual or potential threats to a World Heritage property, it can formally identify these in its response to the State of Conservation report and arrange an advisory mission or reactive monitoring mission (Operational Guidelines 2021: para 169) if necessary. In some cases, the issues are resolved through consultations between the World Heritage Centre and the relevant State Party, or the provision of expert advice, making recommendations for specific measures (UNESCO, 2022h). In any case, as State of Conservation reports are discussed at sessions of the Committee and published online, this presents an opportunity for international scrutiny. An example of a successful reactive monitoring mission can be seen in Goa (India), to which a mission was undertaken in 1999. The World Heritage Centre assisted local authorities in developing a cooperative heritage project with the cities of Guimarães in Portugal and Brighton in the United Kingdom, under the ‘European Asia URBS’ programme (1998–2005). As a result of its site visit, the Centre raised some concerns about the visual and spatial integrity of Goa World Heritage property, which were being adversely impacted by landscaping and street-widening measures, and the neglect of archaeological ruins (UNESCO/World Heritage Centre, 2009). These problems were subsequently resolved by the State Party to the satisfaction of the World Heritage Committee, and no further missions or state of conservation reports have since been necessary. Another example of monitoring and compliance in the context of European World Heritage in Asia is that of Galle (Sri Lanka). The town of Galle was established in the sixteenth century by the Portuguese, and is considered as “the best example of a fortified city built by Europeans in South and South-East Asia, showing the interaction between European architectural styles and South Asian traditions” (UNESCO, 2022e). The involvement of UNESCO in the protection of the Galle World Heritage site has been intensive and sustained, particularly over the past decade. Five missions have been conducted to assess threats to the property since its inscription, the most recent being an advisory mission in 2016 (UNESCO, 2022f). Multiple threats to the property, ranging from inadequate legal and management frameworks to the impacts of tourism and commercial development, have been identified over time, resulting in numerous formal requests by the World Heritage Committee for the State Party to take appropriate action (UNESCO, 2022f). The protracted consultations between the UNESCO bodies and the State Party over management of the Galle World Heritage site reveal both strengths and weaknesses in the World Heritage regime. Despite regular missions, detailed recommendations on improvements and formal requests for action, the property continues to face multiple threats. Most of the factors still considered by UNESCO to be affecting the property in 2021—notably, illegal activities, inadequate management and marine transport infrastructure—have persisted for over a decade, with commercial development a more recent addition to the list (UNESCO, 2022g). Modest progress has been made by the State Party, constrained by a lack of resources, a major natural disaster, and other factors. It has received technical and financial assistance for conservation measures from other countries, including the Netherlands and Japan. UNESCO

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and its institutions have either instigated or facilitated much of this progress and cooperation, but its success in achieving comprehensive improvements has been limited. Some of the challenges experienced by the Sri Lankan authorities in addressing issues at Galle may be attributed to the flaws in the World Heritage regime itself, which was designed largely on ‘Western’ models of heritage preservation. As Sullivan (1991: 17) notes, these models are often out of scale with the societies or nations that seek to adopt them. Many Western solutions are costly and require an infrastructure and level of maintenance that are unavailable in the region, and that are based on assumptions about conditions and priorities that are out of touch with local circumstances.

Sullivan also points to the irony of the changes to heritage management introduced through the World Heritage Convention having been made necessary by the ‘development’ of non-Western countries, which was itself a Western import. However, she emphasises (1991: 17) that it is easy to overestimate the difficulties in applying this model of heritage protection in non-Western countries, and to overlook the strengths of the existing methodology, particularly if it can be carefully adapted to local needs. States Parties are expected to give advance notice to the Committee of their intention to undertake or authorise any major restoration or new construction in an area protected under the World Heritage Convention, which may affect the outstanding universal value of the property (Operational Guidelines 2021: para 172). However, in some cases, such notice may not be provided promptly or at all. In recognition of this, the World Heritage Convention contains a significant feature: it allows for third parties (such as non-governmental organisations or concerned individuals) to notify the World Heritage Centre regarding the serious deterioration of a property or a failure by a State Party to take corrective measures (Operational Guidelines 2021: para 174). The Historic Centre of Macao (China) provides an insightful example of the thirdparty notification mechanism at work. This former Portuguese colony was inscribed on the World Heritage List in 2005 on the basis that it constituted “a unique testimony to the meeting of aesthetic, cultural, religious, architectural and technological influences from East and West”, as a port city that had witnessed the earliest encounters between China and Europe (UNESCO, 2022i). On three occasions between 2007 and 2020, the World Heritage Centre received third-party notifications of potential threats to the property, triggering compliance measures under the Convention and informing the Centre’s response. Although this mechanism has not achieved satisfactory results in every respect—as shown by the delay of a decade in finalising Macao’s management plan—overall, the level of protection for the Historic Centre of Macao has improved. States Parties may also seek financial and technical assistance to implement urgent measures to protect properties that are already inscribed on the World Heritage List (Art. 15 of the Convention; Operational Guidelines 2021: Part VII). Assistance may be requested for other activities, such as raising public awareness of a World Heritage

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property, improving the technical skills of conservation workers, or training professionals in site management. For example, funding was granted in the late 1990s for the formerly Spanish site of the Baroque Churches of the Philippines, to undertake management training and prepare promotional materials (UNESCO, 2022a). States Parties generally request assistance from the World Heritage Fund themselves, but the Committee can also direct them to do so if appropriate. The latter approach was taken when India was asked in 1999 to apply for funding to improve conservation measures and prepare a detailed plan for the World Heritage site of Goa, the former capital of the Portuguese Indies. In summary, threats to European World Heritage sites in Asia have, in some cases, led to monitoring and compliance measures by UNESCO and its relevant bodies under the World Heritage Convention. UNESCO plays a key role in ensuring that World Heritage properties in Asia are adequately protected, both through full and timely implementation of the Convention, and responding to any risks that arise thereafter.

UNESCO’s Broader Role in Promoting European Heritage Protection in Asia Apart from ensuring compliance with specific procedures under the World Heritage Convention (and its key implementation tool, the Operational Guidelines), UNESCO and its institutions also promote cultural heritage protection more broadly across Asia. Key activities include raising public awareness of the issue through educational initiatives and offering capacity-building workshops and training sessions for stakeholders. Regional consultation meetings have also been held to help States Parties prepare for the third periodic reporting cycle for Asia, most recently in 2022. For its part, ICCROM recently launched a project on ‘Cultural heritage for inclusive growth in Southeast Asia’ (ICCROM, 2022a), supported by the British Council, which aims to explore the needs, challenges, and opportunities for the contribution of built heritage conservation and management towards the inclusive growth of communities in Southeast Asia through the sharing of field experiences of heritage institutions, NGOs, civil society organizations, professionals and researchers from the region and the United Kingdom.

Since 2021, ICCROM has also coordinated a capacity-building initiative under the World Heritage Leadership Programme. The ‘Heritage Place Lab’ seeks to foster the development of practice-led research, with eight teams having participated in the pilot phase, including one from India (ICCROM, 2022b). The World Heritage Centre has published detailed manuals, guidelines and toolkits to assist those involved in heritage protection. Examples of these are the Resource Manual on Managing Cultural World Heritage (UNESCO, 2013) and Guidance on Heritage Impact Assessments for Cultural World Heritage Properties (ICOMOS, 2011a). ICCROM has also published papers with a specific Asian focus, on concepts

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of cultural authenticity (2020a), and applying traditional knowledge to conservation and management practices (2020b). The results of initiatives such as ICCROM’s Heritage Place Lab are also published in academic journals and widely disseminated online. The UNESCO Asia–Pacific office in Bangkok claims to take “a leading role in safeguarding the region’s diverse histories, cultures and traditions” (UNESCO 2021: 18). It supports policymaking and dialogue among stakeholders on cultural heritage and is currently developing programmes and initiatives for capacity-building, training and education, particularly in the areas of heritage impact assessments, tourism and disaster risk management (UNESCO, 2021a: 18–19). In 2000, the Bangkok Office launched an award scheme, the Asia Pacific Awards for Cultural Heritage Conservation, for cultural heritage conservation that recognises outstanding efforts by the private sector to preserve cultural heritage. European World Heritage properties that have received Asia Pacific Awards for Cultural Heritage Conservation include Goa (2008), Galle Fort Hotel (2007) and Macao (2004 and 2012). More recently, the Bangkok Office published a ‘Competence Framework for Cultural Heritage Management’ (UNESCO, 2021b) to assist with site assessments and improve the skills of cultural heritage professionals. It also supports the activities of regional organisations and institutions involved in heritage, such as the Asian Academy for Heritage Management. The World Heritage Centre has arguably been instrumental in facilitating cooperation between European and Asian countries, at the municipal level, on the management of World Heritage historic cities across Asia. An illustration of this can be seen in the World Heritage property of Luang Prabang (Laos), which has benefited from the long-term technical support of municipal authorities in Chinon, France. This support has resulted in a wide range of improvements, including new heritage protection laws and urban conservation regulations, procedures for monitoring construction projects, a heritage advisory service for the local community, and loans and subsidies to help residents meet the costs of conservation (UNESCO/World Heritage Centre, 2003: 38). The Luang Prabang-Chinon scheme is characteristic of a gradual change in policy by the World Heritage Centre since the mid-1990s, involving a shift towards decentralised cooperation among national and local authorities for capacity-building purposes (UNESCO/World Heritage Centre, 2003: 38). During the late 1990s, the World Heritage Centre coordinated a programme for the Safeguarding and Development of Asian World Heritage Cities for the 21st Century, which aimed to preserve the historic fabric of Asian cities (UNESCO, 2022c). Two cities with European World Heritage sites—Vigan (Philippines) and Luang Prabang—were among several selected for this programme, which involved the municipal and provincial authorities, tourism sector, academics and local communities of both recipient and donor countries. The programme provided assistance for strengthening legal and administrative frameworks for conservation and development, establishing ‘heritage advisory centres’, conserving and reusing historic buildings, preparing sustainable tourism development plans, educational and promotional activities, and engaging local communities in conservation (UNESCO, 2022c).

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UNESCO’s ‘World Heritage Cities Programme’ was established in 2005, in response to calls for a new standard-setting instrument on integrating urban heritage conservation with socioeconomic policies, and technical assistance for States Parties to implement new urban heritage measures (UNESCO, 2022j). This resulted in UNESCO’s Recommendation on the Historic Urban Landscape, which was adopted in 2011 (UNESCO, 2011). This non-binding instrument is intended to supplement, rather than replace, existing frameworks for managing urban heritage. Of the three European World Heritage sites participating in the World Heritage Cities Programme (Melaka and George Town, Malaysia; Galle, Sri Lanka; and Macao, China), at least one (Macao) is purportedly following the Recommendation in its urban planning and heritage protection policies (Government of China, 2018). Apart from global and regional initiatives to promote cultural heritage, UNESCO also has led country-specific projects with the technical and financial assistance of donor governments. For example, from 2006–2013, the France-UNESCO Cooperation Agreement provided support to the UNESCO Regional Office in New Delhi to establish, conserve and promote a network of historic cities in India, the ‘Indian Heritage Cities Network’ (IHCN Foundation 2022). Ten cities were selected for the initial phase of the project, which involved a wide range of activities, from seminars and training to site visits. The Network has since become an independent organisation that continues the original core aims and provides for ongoing collaboration between Indian and French heritage professionals. Another demonstration of the wider potential scope of UNESCO’s influence, beyond protecting specific sites, is its ability to recommend broader measures as part of the reactive monitoring process. For example, in its 2002 mission report on the Galle World Heritage site (Sri Lanka), the World Heritage Centre suggested that a ‘workplan’ be devised by the State Party to establish a nationwide programme to protect urban heritage (UNESCO/World Heritage Centre, 2002: 6). The report identified several components of the suggested workplan, and how these might be achieved through specific measures. It is unclear whether these suggestions were subsequently adopted by the State Party, although recent academic commentary suggests there remains a lack of coherence and integration between national planning policies, and among government departments (Bohingamuwa, 2019: 33). For its part, ICOMOS has held regular conferences in Asia, at which numerous declarations on heritage matters have been announced, such as the Hoi An Declaration on the Conservation of Historic Districts in Asia (2003), the Xi’an Declaration on Conservation of the Setting of Heritage Structures, Sites and Areas (2005); and the Paris Declaration on Heritage as a Driver of Development (2011b). It has also issued guidance, particularly on international ‘best practice’ for heritage impact assessments (ICOMOS, 2011a). A heritage impact assessment (HIA) is “a planning tool intended to provide decision-makers with an understanding of the potential effects that human actions may have on the cultural heritage environment” (Rogers, 2017: 17). The influence of ICOMOS’ guidance is evident from the case studies below, which demonstrate how States Parties have conducted heritage impact assessments at the request of the World Heritage Committee, and how these have informed their decision-making on the management of specific properties. As with other impact

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assessment tools, heritage impact assessment is not immune to criticism for its shortcomings (e.g. Patiwael et al., 2019; Rodwell & Turner, 2018), particularly its susceptibility to political expedience (Rogers, 2017: 26). However, heritage impact assessments are more likely to be effective when they have a strong legislative basis, supplemented by clearly defined standards (Rogers, 2017: 26). It is significant that organisations in Asia have been influential in the formulation of the heritage impact assessment tool over the past decade. Rogers (2017: 17) notes that a ‘consensus methodology for Asia’ has been developed by a range of stakeholders, including UNESCO-related bodies, the World Bank, government representatives, academics and heritage professionals. Extensive training has been provided in the use of the methodology, resulting in its growing uptake by professionals in the heritage sector (Rogers, 2017: 17). Accordingly, Rogers (2017: 17–18) argues, “Asia has played an important role in furthering HIA process, practice and theory building”.

The Growing Role of ‘Heritage Diplomacy’ in Asia The use of ‘heritage diplomacy’ is an increasingly common practice worldwide. It allows actors, particularly governments, to project a favourable image at the regional and global level, whilst also creating or retaining cultural, political and economic influence beyond their borders (Winter & Daly, 2011: 29; Winter, 2014: 327). As ˇ Lähdesmäki and Ceginskas (2022: 638) demonstrate, there are many ambiguities in the term ‘heritage diplomacy’ and controversies surrounding both the concept and the practice. However, at a general level, it can be distinguished from other types of diplomacy, in that “it utilizes historical narratives, traditions and material cultures— and the frameworks with which these are governed—as forms of soft and hard power” (Clarke, 2018a: 420). Two examples of heritage diplomacy provided by Clarke (2018b) are noteworthy in the Asian context: firstly, a narrative of ‘shared’ or ‘mutual’ heritage that serves as a rationale for bilateral or multilateral relations that include not only conservation, but tourism and infrastructure development, resource deals, political influence and market access; and secondly, a strategy for small or ‘middle power’ countries seeking to enhance bilateral relations by supporting the heritage of other countries. Some former colonial powers have maintained their links with European World Heritage sites in Asia through cultural partnerships, funding schemes and capacitybuilding programmes. As Winter and Daly (2011: 29) observe: For the former European powers of Britain, France, Portugal and Spain, for example, the export of heritage projects and assistance often aligns with governmental priorities for maintaining ties with former territories, including those in the Asian region. The heritage sector provides the ideal forum through which linguistic and cultural links can be celebrated, promoted and re-affirmed.

Conversely, there has been a growing tendency for some Asian countries to forge new partnerships, or build on existing links with other countries, for heritage-related

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initiatives. India, China, Japan and South Korea have been particularly active in promoting cultural heritage protection across Asia and beyond (Wiktor-Mach, 2019: 1601–1604; Winter, 2014: 329). An example of such practice is the considerable financial and technical assistance that Japan has provided for heritage conservation projects in many countries since the 1980s, through organisations such as the Japan Consortium for International Cooperation in Cultural Heritage (JCIC, 2022a). Since 2000, JCIC has led a project on cooperating to protect World Heritage and other cultural sites in the Asia–Pacific region, and in 2011 it established a sub-committee on Europe (JCIC, 2022b). Japan has also been a major regional source of funding for UNESCO, and was instrumental in developing the intangible cultural heritage regime under its auspices. Winter (2014: 326) argues that Japan’s eventual (re)emergence as an international leader in heritage conservation should thus be regarded as a highly successful program of cultural diplomacy. […] Unlike the former colonial powers of Europe, whose late 20th century diplomatic relations directly drew on the institutional knowledge and connections of earlier empires, Japan’s heritage diplomacy has, in some ways, needed to be born anew.

China has also made a concerted effort to lead on cultural heritage matters, both in the region and globally. For example, in 2021 it hosted the 44th Session of the World Heritage Committee, at which the Fuzhou Declaration was adopted, acknowledging the progress made over the 50 years of the Convention and how this has fostered international understanding and dialogue of civilizations through mutual respect of cultural identities and appreciation of the diverse cultural expressions contributing to global peace and sustainable development (World Heritage Committee, 2021)

In the same year, China hosted a conference titled ‘Asian Dialogue for Cultural Heritage Conservation’, at which various cultural heritage initiatives were launched. The World Heritage Institute of Training and Research for the Asia Pacific Region (WHITRAP) is based in Shanghai, and has actively promoted the uptake of UNESCO initiatives across the region in recent years through expert meetings, training sessions, seminars and publications (e.g. UNESCO, 2020). According to Winter (2014: 328), the location of WHITRAP “signaled China’s clear intention to play a leading role in the area of conservation science, restoration, and capacity building for the Asia Pacific region”. India is another country that has established strong links with the European Union and other countries on cultural heritage matters, for example through the EU–India Partnership for Cultural Heritage Conservation, which was launched at a conference in 2018. This strategic partnership aims to facilitate “intensified exchanges between cultural stakeholders, educational institutions, and creative industries” to protect and promote the world’s cultural heritage, through a “rich intercultural dialogue” (European Union External Action, 2021: 4). According to the Indian Minister for Culture and Tourism, Dr Mahesh Sharma (European Union External Action, 2021: 5):

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E. Brandon This exchange of best practices between conservationists and professionals is of great significance as it provides a unique platform for knowledge-sharing that can be adapted for practical purposes at heritage sites across the country. […] The conference […] shone a spotlight on the heritage sites dotted across the country that have a European legacy, and which are now being restored and preserved under the auspices of European Union Member States in close collaboration with local and state authorities, and individual organizations working in the field of heritage conservation. The unique cooperation being undertaken in this field by Indian and European counterparts is crucial towards strengthening our cultural exchanges and will only gain momentum in the coming years, as both sides appreciate the mutually beneficial partnership and continue to share new technologies and established methodologies to preserve our rich and diverse cultural legacy. I am convinced that India and the European Union have tremendous knowledge and skills in conserving their cultural heritage and much can be gained by bringing these together.

India has also worked with individual European countries, such as France and Denmark, specifically on European cultural heritage sites. One example is the former French colony of Chandernagore (now Chandannagar, West Bengal), which is not currently inscribed on the World Heritage List. The arrangement between India and France has involved collaboration between architects from both countries on a restoration and adaptive reuse project for the former court building (Krishnan, 2022), following the success of a similar initiative between the West Bengal government and the National Museum of Denmark in nearby Serampore, the former Danish colony of Frederiksnagore, from 2009 to 2020 (National Museum of Denmark, 2020). Given the increasing prevalence of heritage diplomacy within and beyond the Asian region, the potential for cross-cultural exchange of knowledge and values in relation to heritage management is also likely to grow in future. To some extent, this trend will be dependent on economic growth, as well as the capacity and political will of individual governments. It is no coincidence that those Asian countries pursuing heritage diplomacy most actively to date, tend to have the strongest economies and dedicated government bodies for doing so. Winter observed in (2016) (at 31) that the practice of donor states providing financial assistance to other states for heritage preservation was “changing on the back of rapidly developing non-Western economies and a wider shift in the global order”. The severe disruption caused by the Covid-19 pandemic may result in a greater focus on domestic politics than external influence over the short- to medium-term. However, as countries seek to rebuild their economies and boost tourism, heritage diplomacy may once again be prioritised as part of broader efforts to engage with other countries. It is evident that State actors play a significant role in bilateral and regional cultural heritage initiatives within Asia itself, but their influence on World Heritage properties in Europe is more difficult to discern. Ongoing cultural links between European countries and their former territories in Asia should, in theory, provide fertile ground for knowledge exchange in both directions. Aygen and Logan (2016: 411) contend that the heritage profession, especially practitioners in the West, need to know more about Asia’s heritage places, site management projects, and conservation approaches. In accepting the need to learn more about Asian ways of understanding and managing heritage, however, we

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should not underestimate the significance of the impact that Asia has already had on heritage practice across the world.

Yet, apart from India’s partnership with the EU above, there are few indications of cross-cultural influence flowing in both directions; most interaction appears to follow the well-established path from Europe to Asia. This lack of two-way engagement is unfortunate, given the valuable insights that could be gained by a closer examination of heritage practices in Asian countries by their European counterparts. However, if the sentiments expressed by proponents of the EU–India partnership are any indication, the historical imbalance is gradually being addressed. Indeed, Aygen and Logan (2016: 420) predict that “if current trends continue, the next decades will see a two-way flow of heritage ideas and influences, leading to hybridization rather than a simple East versus West division”. In-depth knowledge exchange could be of particular benefit for the management of World Heritage sites in Europe that have links to European World Heritage sites in Asia. For example, the town of Angra do Heroismo in the Azores (Portugal), inscribed on the World Heritage List in 1983, was a port of call for Portuguese fleets sailing to the East Indies from the fifteenth to the nineteenth centuries, and is thus “directly and tangibly associated with a development of a universal historical significance, the maritime exploration that allowed exchanges between the world’s great civilizations” (UNESCO, 2022b). Several other inscribed and tentative World Heritage properties in Portugal are considered to be representative of this era, with similar symbolic ties to formerly Portuguese colonies and trading posts across Asia. Reflecting the lack of official dialogue at the UNESCO level on cross-cultural knowledge exchange from Asia to Europe, there has been little academic commentary on this issue to date. However, some observers have noted the growing influence of particular sub-regions of Asia on UNESCO’s World Heritage regime more broadly. For example, according to Meskell et al., (2015: 458), the UNESCO World Heritage regime has seen a historic dominance by North-East Asia and a more recent ‘dynamism’ by South-East Asia. The determination of countries in North-East Asia and South-East Asia to redress the historical bias of the World Heritage Convention in favour of European and North American notions of ‘heritage’ may partly explain this trend. In the Fuzhou Declaration (2021), the World Heritage Committee specifically called for increasing support [to] be provided to countries in need […], in order to establish a balanced, credible and geographical equally representative World Heritage List, which can also benefit awareness-raising, capacity-building and preservation activities of cultural and natural heritage

Asian countries have been engaging with UNESCO more proactively over the past decade, seeking to shape its current and future priorities to take Asian perspectives into account. As Aygen and Logan (2016: 411–412) note, this trend is likely to continue, and may result in “greater weight being given by the international heritage bodies […] to Asian heritage philosophical stances, identification and management

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approaches, and technical practices”. Both formal and informal channels of communication between Asia and UNESCO on heritage matters are likely to be strengthened and diversified.

Conclusions The growing commitment by Asian countries to cultural heritage protection is evidenced not only by their increasing participation in the World Heritage Convention, but their willingness to engage in ‘heritage diplomacy’ at the bilateral, regional and global levels to pursue this goal. In the light of this trend, together with the ongoing absence of a formal mechanism for Asia-to-Europe knowledge sharing, it is proposed that more could be done by UNESCO—and specifically within the World Heritage regime—to draw on the experience of Asian countries in managing World Heritage sites. This could be achieved by either strengthening the existing initiatives overseen by UNESCO, or establishing a new programme specifically for ‘shared heritage’ properties. The new programme could initially focus on European heritage in Asia in the pilot phase, with a possible extension to shared heritage sites in other regions in future. A more proactive approach by the World Heritage institutions, with a specific focus on European World Heritage in Asia, would serve a dual purpose: firstly, to highlight any effective practices used by Asian countries to manage their World Heritage, to the potential benefit of their European counterparts; and secondly, to facilitate a twoway dialogue regarding the significance and protection of European World Heritage sites in Asia. The latter would give former colonial powers a more balanced view as to how their historical activities have impacted Asian countries, which may help to inform national education policies and enhance intercultural understanding. As European countries come to terms with their colonial past, these goals should be prioritised not only by those former colonial powers involved in Asia, but by the World Heritage institutions themselves.

References Aygen, Z., & Logan, W. (2016). Heritage in the “Asian century”: Responding to geopolitical change. In W. Logan, M. Nic Craith, & U. Kockel (Eds.), A companion to heritage studies (pp. 410–425). Wiley. Bohingamuwa, W. (2019). The Galle Fort heritage site: A nature-culture approach to the conservation of cultural heritage along the southern coast of Sri Lanka. Journal of World Heritage Studies, 29–37. Caust, J., & Vecco, M. (2017). Is UNESCO World Heritage recognition a blessing or burden? Evidence from developing Asian countries. Journal of Cultural Heritage, 27, 1–9. Clarke, A. (2018a). Heritage diplomacy. In Y. Watanabe (Ed.), Handbook of cultural security (pp. 417–436). Edward Elgar.

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Clarke, A. (2018b). Heritage diplomacy. Australian Policy and History, 9 October 2018. https:// aph.org.au/2018/10/heritage-diplomacy/. Accessed 25 September 2022. Cleere, H. (1996). The concept of ‘outstanding universal value’ in the World Heritage Convention. Conservation and Management of Archaeological Sites, 1(4), 227–233. Government of China. (2018). Historic centre of Macao—conservation status report 2018. https:// whc.unesco.org/en/list/1110/documents/. Accessed 1 July 2022. European Union External Action. (2021). EU-India partnership for cultural heritage conservation. ICCROM. (2020a). Revisiting authenticity in the Asian context. ICCROM CHA Conservation Forum Series, Number 2. ICCROM. (2020b). Traditional knowledge systems for conservation and management of Asia’s heritage. ICCROM CHA Conservation Forum Series, Number 3. ICCROM. (2022a). Cultural heritage for inclusive growth in Southeast Asia. https://www.iccrom. org/ch4ig/. Accessed on 1 July 2022. ICCROM. (2022b). Developing practice-led research in the Heritage Place Lab. https://www.icc rom.org/news/developing-practice-led-research-heritage-place-lab . Accessed 1 July 2022. ICOMOS. (2003). Hoi An declaration on the conservation of historic districts in Asia. http://orcp. hustoj.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/hoi-an-declaration.pdf. Accessed 1 July 2022. ICOMOS. (2005). Xi’an declaration on conservation of the setting of heritage structures, sites and areas. Adopted by the 15th General Assembly of ICOMOS (Xi’An, China), 21 October 2005. ICOMOS. (2008) Evaluation for Melaka and George Town (Malaysia), No. 1223. https://whc.une sco.org/en/list/1223/documents/. Accessed 1 July 2022. ICOMOS. (2011a). Guidance on heritage impact assessments for cultural World Heritage properties. ICOMOS. (2011b). Paris declaration on heritage as a driver of development. Adopted by the 17th General Assembly of ICOMOS (Paris, France), 1 December 2011. ICOMOS. (2011c). Valletta principles for the safeguarding and management of historic cities, towns and urban areas. Adopted by the 17th General Assembly of ICOMOS (Paris, France), 28 November 2011. ICOMOS. (2011d). World Heritage resource manual: Preparing World Heritage nominations (2nd ed). ICOMOS. (2020). Guidance on developing and revising World Heritage tentative lists. Indian Heritage Cities Network (IHCN) Foundation. (2022). Highlighting the Indian city as a living cultural resource. http://ihcn.in/. Accessed 1 July 2022. Japan Consortium for International Cooperation in Cultural Heritage (JCIC). (2022a). Japan’s cooperation activities abroad. https://www.jcic-heritage.jp/en/projectlist/list/. Accessed 1 July 2022. Japan Consortium for International Cooperation in Cultural Heritage (JCIC). (2022b). Promotion of cooperation for the protection of World Heritage and other cultural properties of the Asia Pacific region. https://www.jcic-heritage.jp/en/project/asia_pacific_201411/. Accessed 1 July 2022. King, V. T. (2012). UNESCO in Melaka: Cultural politics, identities and tourism in a World Heritage site. Leeds East Asia Papers, New Series No. 4 (e-series). King, V. T. (2016). UNESCO in Southeast Asia: World Heritage sites in comparative perspective. Studies in Asian Topics No. 55. Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies. Knudsen, B. T., Oldfield, J., Buettner, E., & Zabunyan, E. (2022). Introduction. In B. T. Knudsen, J. Oldfield, E. Buettner, & E. Zabunyan (Eds.), Decolonizing colonial heritage: New agendas, actors and practices in and beyond Europe (pp. 1–22). Routledge. Krishnan, M. (2022). Restoration of West Bengal French heritage site gets new lease of life. Radio France Internationale. 20 February 2022. ˇ Lähdesmäki, T., & Ceginskas, V. L. A. (2022). Conception of heritage diplomacy in scholarship. International Journal of Heritage Studies, 28(5), 635–650. Leung, M. W. H. (2009). Fates of European heritage in post-colonial contexts: Political economy of memory and forgetting in Hong Kong. Geographische Zeitschrift (European Heritage—In Europe and Beyond). Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 24–42.

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Logan, W. (2011). States, governance and the politics of culture: World Heritage in Asia. In P. Daly & T. Winter (Eds.), Routledge handbook of heritage in Asia (pp. 113–128). Routledge. Meskell, L. (2013). UNESCO’s World Heritage Convention at 40: Challenging the economic and political order of international heritage conservation. Current Anthropology, 54(4), 483–494. Meskell, L., Liuzza, C., & Brown, N. (2015). World Heritage regionalism: UNESCO from Europe to Asia’. International Journal of Cultural Property, 22, 437–470. National Museum of Denmark. (2020). The Serampore initiative 2009–2020. https://en.natmus.dk/ historical-knowledge/historical-knowledge-the-world/asia/india/the-history-of-serampore/theserampore-initiative/ . Accessed 1 July 2022. Omar, S. I., Muhibudin, M., Yussof, I., Sukiman, M. F. & Mohamed, B. (2013). George Town, Penang as a World Heritage site: the stakeholders’ perceptions, Procedia—Social and Behavioral Sciences 91, 88–96. Patiwael, P., Groote, P., & Vanclay, F. (2019). Improving heritage impact assessment: An analytical critique of the ICOMOS guidelines. International Journal of Heritage Studies, 25(4), 333–347. Raj, H. (2015). Old Goa: a heritage city—urban threats and revival strategies. Seminar report, University of Stuttgart. Rajapakse, A., & Silva, K. D. (2020). Transient heritage values, conflicting aspirations, and endangered urban heritage in the Historic Galle Fort, Sri Lanka. In K. D. Silva (Ed.), The Routledge Handbook on Historic Urban Landscapes in the Asia-Pacific (pp. 462–475). Routledge. Reyes, V. (2019). ‘World Heritage’ site selection is Eurocentric—and that shapes which historic places get love and money. The Conversation, 24 May 2019. Rodwell, D., & Turner, M. (2018). Impact assessments for urban World Heritage: European experiences under scrutiny. Built Heritage, 2, 58–71. Rogers, A. P. (2017). Built heritage and development: Heritage impact assessment of change in Asia. Built Heritage, 2, 16–28. Sullivan, S. (1991). In G. H. Margaret & MacLean (ed), Cultural heritage in Asia and the Pacific: Conservation and policy. Proceedings of a Symposium held in Honolulu, Hawaii, 8–13 September 1991. UNESCO. (2011). Recommendation on the historic urban landscape. UNESCO General Conference, 10 November 2011 (adopted by the 17th ICOMOS General Assembly on 28 November 2011). UNESCO. (2013). World Heritage resource manual: managing cultural world heritage. UNESCO. (2020). WHITRAP seminar: the historic urban landscape approach. https://whc.unesco. org/en/events/1548. Accessed 1 July 2022. UNESCO. (2022a). Baroque churches of the Philippines—Description. https://whc.unesco.org/en/ list/677. Accessed 1 July 2022. UNESCO. (2022b). Central zone of the town of Angra do Heroismo in the Azores—Outstanding universal value. https://whc.unesco.org/en/list/206. Accessed 1 July 2022. UNESCO. (2022c). Cities for Asia—Heritage for the future. https://whc.unesco.org/en/activities/ 498/. Accessed 1 July 2022. UNESCO. (2022d). Historic city of Vigan—Description. https://whc.unesco.org/en/list/502. Accessed 1 July 2022. UNESCO. (2022e). Old town of Galle and its fortifications—Description. https://whc.unesco.org/ en/list/451/. Accessed 1 July 2022. UNESCO. (2022f). Old town of Galle and its fortifications—Documents. https://whc.unesco.org/ en/list/451/documents/. Accessed 1 July 2022. UNESCO. (2022g). Old town of Galle and its fortifications—Factors affecting the property in 2021. https://whc.unesco.org/en/soc/4091 . Accessed 1 July 2022. UNESCO. (2022h). Reactive monitoring process. https://whc.unesco.org/en/reactive-monitorin g/#2. Accessed 1 July 2022. UNESCO. (2022i). Statement of outstanding universal value—Historic Centre of Macao. https:// whc.unesco.org/en/soc/848. Accessed 1 July 2022.

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UNESCO. (2022j). World Heritage cities programme. https://whc.unesco.org/en/cities/. Accessed 1 July 2022. UNESCO. (2022k). World Heritage list. https://whc.unesco.org/en/list/&order=region. Accessed 1 July 2022. UNESCO. (2022m). World Heritage list statistics. https://whc.unesco.org/en/list/stat. Accessed 1 July 2022. UNESCO (Bangkok Office). (2021a). Competence framework for cultural heritage management—A guide to the essential skills and knowledge for heritage practitioners. UNESCO (Bangkok Office). (2021b). What is UNESCO? Our work in the Asia Pacific. UNESCO/World Heritage Centre. (2002). Report—UNESCO reactive monitoring mission to Galle. UNESCO/World Heritage Centre. (2003). The state of World Heritage in the Asia-Pacific region. World Heritage Report No. 12. UNESCO/World Heritage Centre. (2009). WHC mission report: Churches and convents of Goa. https://whc.unesco.org/en/documents/140293/. Accessed 1 July 2022. UNESCO/World Heritage Centre. (2021). Operational guidelines for the implementation of the World Heritage Convention. Wiktor-Mach, D. (2019). Cultural heritage and development: UNESCO’s new paradigm in a changing geopolitical context. Third World Quarterly, 40(9), 1593–1612. Winter, T. (2014). Heritage conservation futures in an age of shifting global power. Journal of Social Archaeology, 14(3), 319–339. Winter, T. (2016). Heritage diplomacy: Entangled materialities of international relations. Future Anterior: Journal of Historic Preservation, History, Theory and Criticism, 13(1), 17–34. Winter, T. & Daly, P. (2011). Heritage in Asia: converging forces, conflicting values. In T. Winter & P. Daly (Eds.), Routledge handbook of heritage in Asia (pp1–35). Abingdon: Routledge. World Heritage Committee. (2021). Fuzhou declaration. Decision 15 EXT.COM 3. Adopted at the Extended 44th Session of the World Heritage Committee (Fuzhou, China), 16–31 July 2021. Yan, H. (2018). World Heritage craze in China: Universal discourse, national culture, and local memory. Berghahn Books.

Chapter 3

Towards Understanding of Europe: Exercise in Social Imagination Łucja Piekarska and Zdzisław Mach

Abstract The chapter reflects on both the “external eye” and its input into selfdefinition of the Western culture and on the elements which may be defined as the Europeanization of heritage, both interlinked and mutually reinforcing one another. The main thesis of the chapter lies in the conviction that it is not the historical knowledge, but rather the paradigm of thinking about “Europe in the wider world” that should be taught within the framework of European studies. Such an open, dialogical approach allows for seeing Europe in its global relations, and understanding selfreflection and self-criticism as constitutive elements of European identity. Therefore it is recommended to put special emphasis on teaching about European symbolic resources and their interpretations as much as on exercising sociological imagination in terms of the construction of social bonds and conflicts, just to name a few. Eventually, it is through the understanding of the culture and society, that any collective construction can be studied, so it is worthwhile to focus not only on practices of analysis but also on those of interpretation.

The objective of this paper is to demonstrate how a multidisciplinary approach to teaching about European civilisation may enrich current curricula, especially when one considers civilisational process, the values of Europe, and history of ideas as a central framework for the programme. Teaching about Europe may be seen as a process of transferring information about its history, its culture and its traditions, as well as the political, economic and social processes that are currently developing in Europe. Usually, students are more interested in learning about the present than trying to comprehend the past, hoping to acquire practical knowledge and competencies which will make them more competitive in the labour market. Teachers, on the other hand, often believe that in order to understand Europe in its current developments at least a basic knowledge Ł. Piekarska · Z. Mach (B) Jagiellonian University, Kraków, Poland e-mail: [email protected] Ł. Piekarska e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 M. Stoicheva et al. (eds.), Relevance of European Studies in Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-7786-4_3

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of history is necessary. This may well be true, but one may ask if as a result of such studies, students who get to know the basics, really understand the essentials of the European civilisation. The question is then what is the aim of European studies, and how to teach about Europe? Students obviously have the right to expect that their studies will equip them with practical, useful knowledge, which they may then apply in their work. This applies to European and non-European students alike. But it is also important, especially in those European studies programmes which are offered by universities that combine teaching with research and have the ambition to offer general knowledge to their students, that they learn to understand Europe, in its specificity and its relations with other continents, in the historical development of its civilization.

Us and Them The question is then what is the main aim of the European studies curriculum? To put it short, it is understanding Europe. Not only the EU but the whole of Europe, in its historical, economic, political, social and cultural aspects. For this, it is necessary to know not only about facts, events and processes but first of all to understand European values, approaches and perceptions, something that may be called the “European way of thinking”, as they have developed over time. What are the main questions and dilemmas which Europeans have been trying to solve and answer? How do they become elements of the process of construction of European identity, or identities? What are the key moments in European history, which brought new ideas and new perceptions, new values and patterns of thinking which determined the course of European social and cultural history? The Platonian concept of “idea”, the concept of “pure science” as opposed to applied knowledge, the idea of individual creativity, and the Enlightenment ideas of progress and individualism as key concepts in the European modern philosophy, universal human rights, liberal democracy and, perhaps, particularly important in the context of education about Europe, the principle of self-reflection and self-criticism. The ability and tendency to look upon themselves as if from the outside, through the eyes of others, in a broader, global context is essential for the attempt to construct the European identity. The main reason is that identity, individual and collective, is always created in relation to others, in the context of dialogue, exchange and interaction with others, especially those who are seen as particularly significant. One of the main problems with the European identity is that the European school education provides Europeans with a lot of facts and interpretations concerning relations and conflicts within Europe—between some Europeans and some other Europeans. Much less emphasis in the historical education in Europe is put on relations between Europe and others, those who are outside of Europe who were nevertheless significant for the whole continent. Perhaps relations with Islam are an exception (which, by the way, makes it easy to generate anti-Islamic sentiments), but in general, Europeans mainly learn about their internal processes, achievements and problems. On the

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other hand, since the end of the Middle Ages, and the beginning of the Renaissance, Europeans began to look at themselves as if from the outside. The Great Geographic Discoveries of the sixteenth century were the beginning of the large-scale encounter of Europeans with others, although, of course, some contacts had existed since the ancient era. Renaissance Europe began to ask questions about other people (first of all having secured the Pope’s opinion regarding the human identity of those others),1 and consequently about themselves. The eighteenth-century great European novels like Gulliver’s Travels and the Adventures of Robinson Crusoe are in fact stories not only of adventures of Europeans in exotic or imagined lands but first of all reflections about Europeans, their own ways of thinking and life, normality and diversity, challenging fixed images of the identity of European people. In modern times critical self-reflection became one of the main characteristics of the European culture. It can be seen as a continuous struggle between two tendencies: to be critical of Europe and its civilization and to glorify it as superior and progressive. Today this tendency continues, together with the post-colonial syndrome of guilt and responsibility. On the one hand, there is a very strong and growing interest in non-European cultures and political correctness requires that they should be considered equal or in many ways superior to European, while the European culture is often criticised even to the extent of self-destructive sentiment. On the other hand, there is still in Europe an awareness of the strength and potential of the European society and its way of life, as demonstrated through a great deal of achievements, which make Europe a globally appreciated example to follow and an attractive destination for so many potential immigrants. But in any case, the need to think about our own way of life and values critically has become one of the main instruments which generate development, change and a constant need for improvement. Modern Europeans were thinking about their identity in relation to others mainly in the frame of a nation-state. Their significant others were other Europeans—citizens of other nation-states or non-Europeans in some significant, important (from the European perspective) nations outside Europe. In the postmodern era, where traditional reference frameworks such as nations, gender or cultural capital are questioned, a more complex, diverse and multi-dimensional global frame of reference has been constructed. The reflection on postmodern identity construction in Europe requires the external look provided by Europeans who can externalise their own views on Europe, by travellers, and, of course, by others, the non-Europeans. The importance of such an external look has been one of the undisputed factors for the European selfdefinition, which nowadays includes the presence of minorities, immigrants, and in general the concept of Europe as a multicultural society in which various cultures and identities must be integrated. Teaching about Europe today must therefore take into account this global frame of reference, in other words, it ought to be about “Europe in the wider world” as it is said in the motto of the Euroculture MA programme, one of the most successful European

1

In 1537 Pope Paulus III declared that inhabitants of newly discovered lands (Americas) were real humans, with souls, and as such could be converted to Christianity.

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studies joint master programmes which are currently being offered to international students.

Individualism and Creativity Among the main values and ideas which may be seen as keys to the understanding of Europe, the concept of individual creativity ought to be mentioned as a good example of how new ideas are born in the process of history and included in what may be seen as the European identity. The idea that individuals have the right, or even an obligation to be creative may be seen as perhaps the most important contribution of the Renaissance to the European culture, in contrast to the collectivism and anonymity of the previous, Medieval era when authors of literary or artistic works were not expected to sign them and should rather modestly see their work as their humble act of submission for the glory of God. In fact, a human being could and should in this context be seen as nothing more and nothing less than the manifestation of the will of God. The Renaissance changed it and this new image of a creative individual human being became one of the main features of the European culture. A Renaissance artist had the right to be fully recognised in his (at that time almost always his, not her) creativity. A good example could be Michaelangelo Buonarotti, who was commissioned to paint the Pope’s chapel, the Sistine Chapel. He came up with one of the most amazing, original, creative works of all time—the painting of the story of Genesis. Apparently, Pope Julius II could not understand the unique way in which Michaelangelo designed his composition, and argued about it with the artist. However, he eventually let the artist have his way and accepted his right to execute his own artistic view. It would be difficult to imagine that a mere painter could gain such recognition from a Pope in the previous, Medieval era; to argue with a Pope about his own chapel and, of all things, about the presentation of the biblical theme would be unimaginable. In the Renaissance it was possible, and it shows the extent to which the times had changed and the value of individual creativity was recognised. The Enlightenment was the beginning of modernity and the European domination of the world. The colonial empires, which were an important source of European economic power and cultural global domination are today not only criticised as a system of exploitation and oppression of non-European people but also are seen as a realisation of the European modern idea of progress. From the European point of view of the modern era, the whole world would develop according to the same model of evolution which would eventually bring the entire world to the same state of economic development and prosperity. It was only when the Western world experienced global wars, negative sides of modern technology, weapons of mass destruction, genocide executed according to the principles of modern technological rationality and the environmental crisis, that people of Europe began to realise that post-Enlightenment ideas of modernity should not be seen as a universal recipe for

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happiness.2 And yet, even if we are sceptical today about the concept of universal progress, the liberal philosophy of Man is not only the basis of Western European society (the EU Treaties clearly express individualistic liberal values as the axiological foundation of the European integration) but individualism may be seen as the core value of contemporary Europe. In fact, the conflict between individualism and collectivism, between the values of a human individual (dignity, individual freedom, non-discrimination, equality of all people, including gender equality) and those of a traditional community (such as an ethnic nation, a family or a church) is still one of the main problems of European integration. This conflict lies at the bottom of problems with multiculturalism, and the relation between the European main-stream and immigrant communities, but it is also the essence of criticism of EU integration by some religious institutions (especially the Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox churches) and by nationalists for whom an ethnic-national community is considered as the main value, superior to individual freedom of choice and individually created identity. Here again one can see a tension between the European modern concept of the universal value of achievements of European civilization, and the post-colonial and postmodern idea of equality of all cultures which rejects the notion of European superiority. Universal human rights, which are certainly at the core of contemporary European values, are not called universal because they are a product of some universal culture, as there is nothing of the kind. They are not universal because of being universally accepted on the global scale. They are believed to be universal because in Europe, and the West more generally, they are considered a central condition of a well-organised human society and are promoted as such. Europe is not prepared to negotiate them or give them up as the central value of their culture—the ban on torture, elimination of capital punishment and gender equality—to name just those few—do not seem to be negotiable no matter how difficult it may be for some European traditionalists or for some immigrants to identify with them. The dilemma of individualism versus collectivism is a particularly difficult issue in the debate about multiculturalism. Some authors, such as Bhikhu Parekh tend to believe that the value of cultural diversity is so important for contemporary societies that in the name of preservation of traditional cultures it may be justified to accept restrictions that tradition imposes on individual human rights. Liberals, such as Will Kymlicka believe that individual rights are of utmost importance and that traditional communities should be offered as much freedom as they may require to protect their collective identity but only if they are prepared to grant the same amount of freedom of choice to their own members.3 This problem is often illustrated by conflicts between the traditional norms and values protected by traditional

2

Zygmunt Bauman, who was one of the founders of postmodern ideas famously linked the Holocaust to modern rationality and the concept of a perfect society. (Z. Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, Cornell University Press 1989). 3 See: B. Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006; W. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, Clarendon Press, 1995.

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communities and the individual freedom of their members, especially young and females.

Beyond Practical Reason Apart from liberal values and the idea of progress, the Enlightenment brought the development of science and technology. Modern science is, of course, one of the main pillars of European civilisation, and scientific rationality is one of the key concepts which define European identity. But it also revived one of the old questions which characterised European civilization since its ancient beginning: that of pure versus applied knowledge. We believe that ancient Egyptians considered knowledge to be mainly an instrument of technology and political power. At least this is how we see their civilisation. Greeks, on the contrary, valued knowledge also for its own sake.4 Early philosophers of nature asked abstract and not particularly applicable questions about elements. Socrates is a symbol of knowledge for the sake of art, and he himself famously neglected any particular profits that the use of his wisdom could bring. Copernicus made a discovery without which we could hardly imagine our contemporary world, and yet at his time, there was no practical use for it. Today this dilemma is as alive as ever, especially since scientific research is increasingly expensive. On the one hand, technology and industry require applied science, which costs a lot and is believed to be the best possible investment. On the other hand, seemingly useless basic research is a necessary foundation of applied sciences, and it is worth paying for even if for most people the immediate use of it is rather enigmatic. Humanities and social sciences are particularly often seen as useless, but on the other hand, their contribution to the quality of life cannot be overestimated. For education, especially at the higher level, this is a key question. It may be argued that pure knowledge, including social science and the humanities, ought to be developed and taught for the benefit of the global society, especially if its diversity is to be appreciated and understood. Pure, “curiosity-driven” research may be considered as the condition of the global development of society. The issues raised and discussed above illustrate the approach to European Studies, where understanding Europe remains the ultimate goal of the curriculum. The authors of the chapter share a belief that teaching about Europe is much more than educating about its history, its institutions or legal conditions. If, however, students are expected to understand Europe: the ways in which Europeans think, the questions and dilemmas they have or the structures that organise complex cultural systems— European Studies should include courses which support a critical and interpretative approach to Europe. Only in such a way students can gain competencies and knowledge that would help them to imagine the world in a European way and express doubts and criticism related to it. European Studies may provide many opportunities and

4

See: N. Davies, Europe, Oxford University Press, 1996.

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excuses not only to teach about the principles of European civilization (such as individualism, human dignity, the rule of law, tolerance or faith in collective progress based on the accumulation of knowledge and know-how) but also to promote the training of the imagination, where some unspoken and invisible rules are present and wait to be captured and exercised.

The Power of Everyday Among many possible forms of expression, painting has earned itself a significant position in European culture. Not only does it demand the artistic skills of the author (gr. Techne), but it strives to depict and record some moments of time that are never to return (as popularly believed by Europeans), therefore standing as evidence of observation, sensitivity and often intelligence. The micro universe presented on a picture is framed as such for a good reason—highlighting or hiding the observer’s perspective but also resulting in the creation of meaningful context—by pointing out what matters and leaving out what does not. The choice of technique, size, colours, proportions, and rhythms on the picture all add to the complexity of what should be included in the analysis of the picture… yet for most spectators, pictures just speak with no words. Or remain silent, which is when the viewers pass by. So why are pictures so powerful? Being symbolic messages they address much of the unconscious but they also refer to the knowledge of the viewers. They may bring pleasure or create discomfort, but they may also provoke posing questions, which is effectively one of the goals of education, and most definitely academic activities. They are always both subjective, heavily influenced by an individual eye, mind and hand, and objectified: standing for the episteme of the time of the artist as well as left for the interpretation of the viewers. In the approach discussed and elaborated in this chapter, we argue that supporting the development of critical thinking as well as curiosity should be considered a fundamental principle of teaching European Studies. As teaching about Europe provides many opportunities to provoke both curiosity and reflectiveness, it is important to see how to break through the layer of the obvious and encourage such cognitive situations where the perception of knowledge would be stimulated by own interests of students. It goes without saying that teaching about issues which are relevant to the learners is more effective, but the problem remains how to induce the relevance of topics that are taught. And there’s another problem, how to teach about the “invisible” rules and values of European civilisation in such a way that they do not remain distant and too abstract to be considered relevant. Let’s then look closer at one exemplary case which will illustrate how one painting includes some important visible elements as well as embodies invisible principles— which usually remain unseen and omitted unless a reflective analysis of the artwork is carried out. The picture chosen here as an example of an object used in interdisciplinary teaching about Europe is just one of the numerous artworks and other cultural

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texts, which by focusing on one thing at a time allows to understand much more than just an anecdote behind a picture. “The Little Street” by Johannes Vermeer presents three women whose faces we do not see, each of them immersed in her own activities and minding her own business. They seem to be busy with some activities which are known to them, but which somehow seem needed and useful. But how do we (viewers) know that what they are doing is useful? Why don’t we get the details of their faces? Why doesn’t it matter what exactly they are doing (if it is not shown)? And finally, why are they doing it at all? Is their work somehow coordinated? What are the relations between them? The image depicts a scene which might be called ordinary. And, to start with, already the question of “ordinary” or “normal” is one of the first curiosities of any social or cultural science. If the scene is supposed to show “normal” life, then it must follow some norms, which themselves embody values, introduced and sustained by culture. What are these values exactly? How are they present in the activities of the people portrayed in the picture? What behaviours are actually appropriate and why? Who actually decides about the appropriateness? What is well seen? The painter has chosen a scene that takes place in a space which is both private and public. What the women are doing can be easily witnessed by the trespassers and they do not seem to be hiding anything. The door to the house is open, in such a way that “there is nothing to hide” as if no privacy had born a secret. The transparency of activities the women undertake may be, however, misleading, but we cannot guess merely by looking at the picture. Do the activities of the women concentrate around the household only or do they also act in the public sphere? The walls of the houses, which are painted with great artistry and craftsmanship, reveal that only a small, lower part of the house’s wall is painted white. Why is it so? Is it the sense of modesty that or being a scrooge or maybe a fashion? There seems to be some tenderness in the way that this simple scene is narrated. Everything seems to fit well in the picture and there is some sense of harmony, coming from the co-presence of small fragments. What makes this story so well told? In what way should it be seen as representational (and of what)? What is happening behind the painter and next to the scene which we see? In fact, these questions, which are only a small portion of many which might be posed here, not only reflect some of the natural curiosities and themes exercised in social sciences and humanities but also may be seen as a part of the approach where some fragments of the world are to be described, analysed and interpreted in order to bring us closer to the understanding. This logic, aiming at understanding, creates a very particular learning situation, which we see as the most convenient for such teaching about Europe where its understanding is the ultimate goal. We argue that teaching about Europe should be embedded in a holistic and interdisciplinary approach, where students not only learn about facts and figures but what is more important acquire skills of posing good questions, practice critical thinking that goes beyond stating the obvious and are ready to interpret the world in its various dimensions. Just like Vermeer discussed above, do not limit the reading of the artwork to the narrative and to what is pictured, but look for connections that make its elements dynamic.

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It should be clear that besides learning facts and figures, students should be challenged to understand history, especially its civilizational processes. To tell the story of Europe in full one must capture the social history and not only go beyond its official narratives but also look at what exactly shaped them. This is why European studies need to include the reflection of the meta-level and not only focus on what happened but also on how it is remembered (or why is it forgotten) and in what way it has been a consequence of the civilizational values constituting its programme.

Social Memory and the Presence in the Afterlife The most general question of social sciences (and as such also a large part of European Studies) is why people act in the way they do or why they do what they do. To a large extent, this question asks us to look at the meaning which is attached to and produced by the way of various human activities. Understanding how people give meaning to their lives and define their own existence would be another goal of social sciences, which itself would focus on cultures as —among others—systems of norms and values helping humans to organise diversities of their lives as well as the world where they live. Tradition and the past have always been relevant sources of inspiration for many, while social memory may be seen as much more than evidence for the past to have happened but also the phenomenon allowing us to see which and what societies tend to keep as own reference frameworks but also resources for future generations. Why and what people remember remains to be a fascinating topic for research. No lesser is the question of what and why they decide to forget. Some objects carrying specific memories are stored in museums as pieces of evidence of the past, while many more are thrown away right after they lose their practical use. Let’s have a look at one of the well-recognised museum exhibits to conduct a similar interpretive exercise, as with Vermeer’s picture to define with its help the meaning of social memory as stored in objects. Dodo used to be a living animal but was effectively killed by Europeans who considered it to be clumsy (being a bird dodo could not fly and had a rather heavy belly which most unfortunately made him an easy hunting target). With the use of taxidermy dodo—reified as an exhibit—has been commemorated in a museum in Oxford5 as well as in a number of books, among which “Alice in Wonderland” is probably the most famous. Dodo, an extinct species, represents not only the stupidity and vanity of humans, who managed to make the species disappear but also the power of human memory. Every year thousands of visitors come to visit the last dodo, stored in a museum which itself is an institution giving shelter to many meaningful objects and memories Europeans want to keep alive. But how in fact is the dodo alive if it

5

In September 2022 the remains of Dodo were no longer to be seen by visitors—they are kept in some kind of a safe apparently for security reasons.

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is dead? How is its memory stored and cherished? What stories are told to make his presence real? Consequently, Dodo’s interpretation goes far beyond its biological sense—it deals with culture and history, but it also stores some mysteries that help to reconstruct some of the questions of the Europeans. Even though dodos are dead they still make an important part of European heritage, a discourse of memory, forgetfulness, commemoration or to say, in short, the complex phenomenon revolving around collective European identity. It is in heritage where one can learn about the past as it is reorganised from the perspective of the present. At the same time, it is a very subtle discipline of reflection within humanities and social sciences, where not only historiography is present but also most fundamental issues of human conditions can be studied. It is very challenging to understand European heritage in its unity and diversity without knowing Europe’s history, but there is so much more there to explore. Teaching about European heritage and memory allows enriching the European Studies curriculum in such a way that contemporary politics may be understood while the past may gain an unexpected—more general dimension. The dodo—dead but alive as an idea—can be a good symbol of the relevance of teaching European heritage, also as an element of presenting the principles of civilisation and its inner processes. It is, after all the Platonian invention of an idea, which has made it possible for the European civilization to flourish but also to encapsulate it as a collective entity, comprehensible only with the use of continuous self-reflection and criticality. Eventually the question of dodos—extinct species still invigorating collective imagination—is evidence of the power of stories and storytelling. It was our aim in this short paper to draw the reader’s attention to the main goal of European Studies, which is understanding Europe as a historical/civilizational space. We briefly discussed some examples of values and dilemmas with which Europeans have been struggling for centuries and which are, in our opinion, crucial for the understanding of the European way of thinking. We believe that to understand Europe we must first all grasp the way Europeans think about themselves, their identity in relation to others, and how they try to solve problems they are confronted with in this process. We believe that this should be the essence of teaching European Studies—to make students think as Europeans do. But we also hope that by doing this students of European Studies will learn how to think in a more general, abstract and critical way, how to go beyond the concrete facts, figures and regions, and how to think not only about Europe but about the world and its challenges.

References Bauman, Z. (1989). Modernity and the Holocaust. Cornell University Press. Davies, N. (1996). Europe. Oxford University Press. Kymlicka, W. (1995). Multicultural citizenship. Clarendon Press. Parekh, B. (2006). Rethinking Multiculturalism. Palgrave Macmillan.

Chapter 4

Perceptions of the European Union. A View from the Outside Maria Stoicheva

Abstract In this paper, we examine what we can learn about European Union (EU), EU policies including EU external relations and European identity in particular from a “decentred” perspective or “outside-in” perspective. This approach fits within a broader academic debate on “decentring” or “provincialising” Europe and international relations (Keukeleire & Lecocq, 2018). It uses as an assumption the concept of banal Europeanism as a context in which the study of the view from outside can contribute to reducing the “dangerous cognitive dissonances” between self-representation and perceptions of the EU from outside. Examining of EU policies, citizens’ attitudes and EU values is not sufficient for gaining a better understanding of the necessity to adopt a more decentring perspective. The paper focuses on some approaching and operationalisation proposals of a “decentric agenda”. The paper highlights its role in teaching European studies outside Europe and researching European integration and policies.

Introduction We live in a world, which is “more connected, contested and complex”, which is the relevant context of the development of A Global Strategy of the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy (EEAS, 2016: 13). As a consequence of that the foreign policy of the EU cannot be considered as purely European. It is rather a function of the mutually engaging inclusion between Europe and the non-European world where foreign policy roles are shaped in constant interaction with external actors (Mayer, 2013). Two EU strategies of 20031 and 2016 put foreign policy at the centre

1 The European Security Strategy 2003 and the Global Strategy of EU’s Foreign and Security Policy 2016 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/30823/qc7809568enc.pdf; https://www.eeas.europa. eu/eeas/global-strategy-european-unions-foreign-and-security-policy_en.

M. Stoicheva (B) Sofia University, St. Kliment Ohridski, Sofia, Bulgaria e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 M. Stoicheva et al. (eds.), Relevance of European Studies in Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-7786-4_4

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of the European Union agenda. They also bring to the fore the belief that knowledge of the external images of the EU is key to the evaluation of whether there is mismatch between the expectations and the realities of the influence of the EU and its scope in a global perspective. This raises the interest in exploring the role of perceptions of the EU in a global perspective. The study of perceptions has an impact on the effectiveness of negotiations on complex global issues. It can contribute to preventing deterioration of already problematic processes and allows for the better mutual understanding in a long-term perspective as well as consolidation of bilateral and multilateral relations and cooperation with different countries. In this sense, “images and perceptions of other nations provide the basic framework within which the conduct of international relations and conflict resolution takes place” (Mohavedi, 1985: 19). There is and there always will be tension between internal and external images irrespective of whether we talk about states, organizations or the European Union. Actually, often there is a clear mismatch between them. The discrepancies between them can be explained with specific prejudices and reservations shaping the behaviour of individuals, organizations and states but also with the inability to clearly understand one’s own identity and role in the process of interaction with other actors. A rich set of theoretical frameworks derived from different disciplinary fields has contributed to the study of perceptions and images—from the area of international relations, political science, foreign policy of the EU, communication studies, cognitive linguistics and psychology. External and internal cannot be always clearly differentiated. Governments are sometimes viewed as “they/the other”, as opposed to various internal political organizations, parties and citizens. The same refers to the EU context where often European institutions are portrayed as “they/other” as opposed to the Member States. This aspect of studying the perceptions of the EU is not a part of this chapter. Here we will deal mostly with the European Union and the outside world into which the EU can see reflected and study its mirror image. Member States are part of the EU architecture and variations of the image of the EU in different national contexts are not a specific theme of this chapter. In an essay in 1954 entitled “Dream and Nightmare” Hannah Arendt reflected on the anti-American feeling in Europe after the Second World War when “the Marshall Plan benefited every class of the population and American officials frequently went out of their way to find some remedy for the worst social injustices” (Arendt, 1954: 7) and when apparently “America and Europe had parted company” (Arendt, 1954: 2). Arendt asks the question of the image Europe had of America and reflected on the “faithfulness of such images to the original”: ‘whether it is a reflection of the actual conditions in this country, whether it contains an evaluation of America’s role in international politics and whether it expresses the attitude of the nation with respect to both’. Reflecting on the counter positioning of Europe and America, Arendt argues that such images ‘cannot, and are not meant to, conform to standards of photo’ following the rule if graphic objectivity and as a result it can be compared to the images nations used to form for each other in the course of history and mutual relationships (Arendt, 1954: 1).

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This chapter tries to provide answers to the question of the role of the external perceptions of the EU or “the view from the outside” as problematized in academic literature by considering two significant aspects of the current context. Firstly, the perception of the EU from inside with a focus on the acuteness (or the level of manifestation) of the collective identification with the EU under the topic of banalization of European identity as a context from inside for the study. Secondly, presenting the role of the perceptions from outside in functioning and understanding the specific role of the EU from internal and external perspectives. This, in my view, is a critical aspect in expanding European studies outside the EU and can provide important insights into the way that European studies can become part of higher education curricula in countries outside the EU and potentially “centre stage2 ” in some specific areas of higher education or higher education institutions.

Banal Europeanism Before considering the image of the EU from the outside, the question of “what image does Europe and European citizens have of Europe” should be asked. The focus is not on the various perspectives of the ways European citizens feel belonging to the EU or identify themselves as EU citizens and the extent to which the identification with the EU is a reflection of the actual conditions of the European integration and the European Union and embeds an evaluation of its role. Here we take one perspective on the manifestation of the process of identification and the embedded images of the EU, namely its “banalisation”. We should start by pointing out the ambiguity and inaccuracy of the consideration of who is inside and outside of the European Union. There are various examples in the process of enlargement of the European Communities which inevitably influence the contemporary interpretation of what is meant by the “core of the European Union”. The territorial expansion of the European Communities before and the European Union after 1992 is a multilayered process, which is accompanied by a process of deepening of the integration process for some of the countries (for example the Schengen area and the Eurozone) but also by opting out for some other countries to join some of the common policies (the UK before Brexit but also Denmark, the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary), by political integration and inclusion in the economic area of the countries of the European Economic Area, by the overlap with other international agreement engagements (for example, NATO) and by the expansion of the scope of concluding agreements for free trade in a larger scope than the European space. Thus, a complex institutional structure is created, which reflects the multiple aspects of belonging and identification. There is not one single type of relation of 2

I owe this formulation to Prof. Shashikala Gurpur, Symbiosis Law School, Pune. She used it in her keynote speech in a conference organized under the EU-funded project under the Erasmus + Programme EURASIA: Revitalizing European Studies Across Asian Universities, coordinated by Sofia University St Kliment Ohridski.

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the countries that identify themselves as European. This marks the multiplicity of the understanding of what European identity and Europeanism mean and how it is understood. It is now accepted as a valid point that we cannot talk about a monolithic scheme on which the politics of identity and identification with the political entity can be founded. It is, however, very improbable that Europe will be tempted by the supranational construction of European identity similar to national identity writ large. as Hannah Arendt feared in her reflection on the mutually exclusive power of the counter positioning of Europe and America (Arendt, 1954: 8). Literature on European identity positions it in the context of national identity as a legitimizing factor for political entities. This context presupposes the strengthening of European identity3 in a game of balancing European and national identities, often interpreted as a game of weakening and strengthening. The theories which take it as a presupposition that the two types of identities need not be considered in opposition and competition, focus on the ways of their reconciling and non-damaging coexistence. Medrano and Guttierez (2001) talk about “nested identities”, Risse (2004) introduces the metaphor of the “marble cake”, Citrin and Sides (2004) consider the issue of “hybrid identities”, Laitin (2001) introduces the notion of “layered (multiple) identities” and further Ichijo and Spohn (2005) present them as “entangled identities”. Contrary to this general concept (in some sense incomplete in its formation), there is a different understanding of European identity as inhabiting Europe at an everyday level—a banal experience of Europeanism as a feeling of belonging. This represents the difference between implicit and conscious identification. It is opposite to the dominant heroic sense of nationalism and introduces a new contextual perspective of the banal interpretation of Europeanism. Europeanism therefore does not usually correlate with an explicit consent and identification with the EU and additionally, can be experienced as something every day, routine, “banal” which also means flat, unrequited, and lacking emotion. The community created is dependent on extensive and effective communication between members of a certain group of people (not with others outside the group) on a wide range of topics (Deutsch, 1966: 97). In Billig’s view nationalism does not have to be experienced predominantly in a heroic manner and does not presuppose depth of feelings and emotions in various contexts. It is not always passionate or heroic and is not always associated with “outbreaks of hot nationalist passion”, but may also be mundane, “even banal” (Billig, 1995: 44; Cram, 2010: 6). In Billig’s view models of social interaction become usual and routine and become taken for granted, “enhabited” in everyday life. National identity does not manifest itself always in this routine and “unflagged” manner but there is a significant degree of banal nationalism. In a similar line of argument, Cram argues that both implicit and explicit, conscious Europeanism (European identification with the EU) are essential in “securing consent to the continued functioning of the EU” (Cram, 2010: 2). For example, a conscious or

3

This is a term used in documents of the European Commission, e.g. the Communication from the European Commission “Strengthening European Identity through Education and Culture” from 2017.

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appreciated Europeanism might not have clearly emerged. Then, ‘an implicit or subconscious identification with, or attachment to, the EU, is essential to the continued functioning of the EU’ (Cram, 2010: 2). Both “banal” and “appreciated” Europeanism contribute to the creation of an imaginary including the European unification as a real component of the order of significations. Therefore, Europeanism is implicitly part of a framework for understanding of “how we stand to each other, how we got to where we are, how we relate to other groups, and so on”. Implicit Europeanism in particular contexts becomes a marker of a ‘positive meaningful presence’ in the daily lives of citizens. This is manifested in an, albeit sub-conscious, normalisation of the EU as a legitimate political authority such that to challenge this norm is to challenge the status quo. Banal Europeanism may also play an important role in creating a latent political community which may be mobilised by interested actors or significant events. (Cram, 2010: 13)

The term “Europeanism” needs clarification as similar to the term “identity” it is “too ambiguous, too torn between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ meanings, essentialist connotations and constructivist qualifiers, to serve well the demands of social analysis” (Brubaker & Cooper, 2000: 2). It has become critical in European studies to distinguish between identification as a European, identification with the EU and support for the EU. Cram maps them in different areas as for example identification as is a “self-allocated label or role”, identification with is “the state of being” while support for the EU is a type of “political behaviour” (Cram, 2010: 10). They mark various aspects of how the process of European unification is present in the worldview of citizens and potentially allow for imagining and re-imagining of the European institutions, their functioning and the process as a whole. For example, “identification as” does not link the self-allocate label to the European unification process and does not presuppose attachment or support for the EU in some of its manifestations. Support for the EU could be a line of political behavior which is not motivated by European feelings of attachment but by interests and material benefits. In two speeches before the European Parliament—in 1994 and 2000, the President of the Czech Republic Vaclav Havel asks the question: So what exactly do we mean by Europeanism? If I look deep into my heart and try to identify the point at which I start to feel European, and what unites me to Europe, the first thing I feel is mild surprise at the fact that it is only now, under the pressure of topical political issues and duties, that I even ask myself the question. Why did I not put this question to myself a long time ago, when I started to make my way in the world and reflect on the world and my place in it? Did I consider my attachment to Europe as a purely extrinsic factor of little significance, a factor which did not need to concern, let alone torment, me? Or, on the contrary, did I consider my Europeanism as so self-evident that it did not warrant interrogation, examination or further thought? (Havel, 2000)

Havel draws the attention of a personal experience of a devoted European to the fact that there is a sense of identification with the European Union of a routine, somehow unconscious, inappreciable and non-salient nature. Holding a European passport and driving licence, and passing by the European flag are examples of this

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banal way of identification and more importantly complying with the EU legislation. With its somewhat more advanced communication policy today, requiring logos and disclaimers for EU contribution and funding, there are more examples of presence and banal ways of identification including labels on goods, the use of the Euro, information posters acknowledging the use of EU funding, EU passport control lines, etc. These everyday, repetitive events and objects in the sight of citizens with a reference to the EU and EU policies become a component of the normal social environment. The EU becomes normalised as individuals stop noticing the presence of the EU flag amongst other national flags, find their EU driving licences and passports unremarkable, take for granted signs indicating the support of EU funding, automatically walk through the EU nationals’ channel at customs, or have an awareness, however vague, of EU rights in relation to equal pay or access to health care. (Cram, 2010: 17)

The concept of banal Europeanism provides an additional perspective for understanding the extent of identification and the features of the perception of the current EU and the potential of its being re-imagined. The social space has already been to a considerable extent re-configured on an everyday level and has generated cultural symbols and practices that work towards affirmation of the EU institutions as a legitimate political power even in areas in which the EU has no competences. The EU as any emerging political order has to strengthen its legitimacy by re-formatting citizens’ assumptions concerning the locus of political authority and power. For “imagined” Europe the symbols and everyday practices are the raw material for political power and for the EU citizenship. This constitutes a cultural infrastructure, which is there but still in a feeble form compared to the cultural infrastructure of nationalism. The cultural infrastructure of the nation state is constructed to instigate emotional allegiance and powerful feeling of belonging. The EU is still viewed in an abstract, distant and apt-to-controversy manner. In this sense, it still bears the features of political power, banalised and tolerated, but as banal it lacks clearly manifested affective relations. The imagined community of the EU can also be described as “localising” the European unification as it embeds national symbols and practices in its shell. This is the “normal” manner of conceptualizing the European unification and of its possible development in the future. This is well articulated in the area of culture with the basic principle of respect for cultural diversity. There have been, though, moments in which the EU has stepped beyond this cultural strategy, for example with the Draft Constitutional Treaty developed at the beginning of 2000 but abandoned after the negative vote at the French and Dutch referenda. The failure of the European constitution demonstrated the limitations of the EU as a banal political power. The constitutional episode in the process of European unification can be interpreted as taking out in the open the banal power of symbols and practices of the EU, addressing the political circles and the general public, who are not yet ready for such a major step. In Cram’s terms, banal (implicit) Europeanism resisted turning into “appreciated” (explicit identification with) Europeanism. Although identities are apt to re-ordering or revision or to be re-imagined, the “actual imaginary” did not allow for this radical

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re-ordering of the social significations. Brexit and the series of crises recently cannot add a positive note to this statement. However, it supplemented the perception of the role of the European institutions with new expectations related to effective tackling of the series of crises in which it seems Europe has permanently entered. There could be the question of why we start from here when our aim is to focus on perceptions from the outside. European identity and the way it is experienced by citizens of the EU has a direct link to the actual imaginary/image of the EU inside carrying these features of being banal, the everyday, often unnoticed reality of our surrounding, not flagged and appreciated and making it not clearly articulated. The study of the perceptions of the EU from the outside inevitably requires a reference to the internal context and the explanatory insights for European identity formation in the context of enhanced European integration. Inversely, external images have a significant impact on shaping the political identity among Europeans and the self-image of the EU itself. Social psychology highlights the role of Others in the formation of identity, which functions as a mirror against the image of a community that is modelled and made up.

The Perception from the Outside In the past years, there has been an attempt to overcome the Eurocentric approach to the topic of European integration and European identity and its being closed in the European context by considering as an important component the reference to the image of Europe in general from the outside. Lucarelli argues that this is a rather novel, underexplored topic (Lucarelli, 2008). There is also an unjustified attitude and assumption that the EU functions as if its external image was very similar to the self-representation of the Union itself. This by itself creates “dangerous cognitive dissonances” that can negatively influence the foreign policy of the EU (Lucarelli, 2009: 4). The external image of the EU impacts also the way of self-perception of Europeans as a political group and the extent to which they identify themselves with the EU. Therefore, the limitation of the field of study to the process of enlargement and the close neighbourhood does not constitute a realistic picture for the perception of the Union in a broader context in the real global political context. The concept of “normative power of the EU” in a certain sense combines the role of the EU from an internal perspective and in the context of external relations. The effective realization of this power is a function of the relation and the compatibility between the internal political identity and the external image or the image of the Others in the process of interaction. There is a dynamic interaction between the political identity and the role (mainly political role of the EU). As a basic component of its own political identity the process of self-identification by the Europeans is “also subject to reinterpretation once the external images that are acknowledged by domestic constituencies diverge dramatically from those of relevant Others” (Lucarelli, 2009: 4). This dissonance has its influence on the displacement and the blurring of the image of self-identification of the actors that act in

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the dynamic interactive context of formation and transformation of identities. The external image of the EU is linked to the identification with the EU as an active factor for recognition—indispensable element of the process of self-identification (Lucarelli, 2009: 12). The consideration of the external image of the EU ensures distance that is necessary for reflection and answering the question “who and what we are”. This resembles a mirror in which EU citizens can look at themselves as a political or other type of group. The study of the foreign policy of the EU provides an insight into the actions and their justification by the proclaimed values and thus has its place in legitimisation of the political entity itself. This even to a larger extent is valid for the insufficiently “consolidated political identities” which is largely the case with the emerging European identity (Lucarelli, 2009: 12). At the beginning of the twenty-first century several research projects have focused on the theme of the perception of the EU outside its borders and the borders of its immediate neighbourhood. Some of them look at the periphery of Europe. The surveys on the perception of the EU from farther away are not numerous. The interest in this topic has its own conceptual inspirations related to the need to define the future of the EU and its identity more clearly as well as the pragmatic justification of the lack of available basic background knowledge of the ways of perceiving the EU and its policies and actions. The area of external perceptions of the EU is an emerging and growing area of research in the field of EU foreign relations (Lucarelli, 2014; Elgström & Chaban, 2015; Chaban & Holland, 2014, 2015). There is an important corpus of publications already and attention in a global perspective on the topic of perception of the EU from outside (Holland, 2005, 2007; Holland & Chaban, 2014a, 2014b; Holland et al., 2009; Scheipers & Sicurelli, 2008), developed mostly in the framework of the Forum “Asia—Europe” and of the research programmes of the EU (6th and 7th Framework Programmes and the Jean Monnet Action of the EU). Several projects can be given as an example: “Global Perceptions of the EU” from 2002 covering 30 world locations; the two phases of the research project The External Image of the European Union under EU 6th Framework Programme 2005–2010; the 7th FP project EuroBroadMap, covering 18 countries and EUmagine located in four countries. New projects were carried out in the 2010s by the survey of the perceptions of the EU in 10 countries—strategic partners of the EU of 2015 and with the Eurobarometer survey of 2017 based on 11 countries. They are supplemented by surveys of the perception of the EU and its policies in separate countries as well. A series of surveys on the “Future of Europe” have been carried out by Eurobarometer after 2006. They look into the ways the EU is perceived by Europeans including the EU values, and its strengths including the opinion on the role of the EU in the world. However, for the first time in 2017, a survey of general public opinion of citizens of 11 countries outside of the EU was carried out—as already mentioned in eleven strategic partners of the EU.4 The main focus is on the opinion regarding the EU, its political influence, values, and its strengths. The survey is rather similar in its design to the surveys concerning the Future of the EU carried out among European citizens, which allows for comparison between internal and external perceptions. 4

https://data.europa.eu/data/datasets/s2141_450_eng?locale=en.

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However, due to the different contexts there should be caution and conditionality in the application of the comparative approach. The surveys carried out under the framework of some of the research projects mentioned above could be considered as presenting a higher extent of validity the results as they take into account the different contexts of the surveys, they have a clear focus on a category of respondents and are well informed by previous theoretical research. Yet, very interesting is one of the main results and conclusions of Eurobarometer 450/20175 : Respondents from Brazil (94%), China (84%) and India (83%) to the highest extent tend to have positive opinion of the European Union. Countries geographically close to the EU (Turkey, Russia, Norway, Switzerland) to the lowest extent are likely to have positive opinions. (Flash Eurobarometer 450/2017:4)

To what extent we can consider that there is a sound theoretical basis for the field of research on the perception of the EU can be still a matter of academic discussion. Some authors consider the theoretical framework not sufficiently extrapolated. Others insist that it is theorized from different perspectives and researchers do not necessarily apply the same conceptual language. The reason here is largely in the very phenomenon of perceptions, which are studied in many different disciplines applying a myriad of theoretical models. Yet a true interdisciplinary framework of theoretical reflections is still missing and a bridge between different divisive research frameworks cannot be well demonstrated. Chaban et al. (2018) propose that literature in this research field can be grouped into several clusters: “studies that use International Relations (IR) theories (e.g. image theory, role theory, strategic narratives theory); EU foreign policy models (e.g. expectations-capabilities gap, Normative Power Europe); communication studies theories including political communication models (cascading activation framing model, agenda-setting theory, common knowledge paradigm); identity theories (e.g. social identity theory, othering) and cognitive research (e.g. conceptual metaphor theory, mental mapping, visual semiotics)” (Chaban et al., 2018:10). Earlier research has the assumption that perceptions vary depending on the location/place, time, the issue and are specific for the cohort of the survey in a certain context. Later, a significant part of the literature proposes research of the perceptions and their differentiation at systemic level, at the level of the country and in relation to individual specificities. Time and distance mark specific variations. New research trends are closely linked to theories of cognitive mapping and are informed by the conceptualization of spatial and temporal models developed by Braudel (Braudel, 1980). Although still considered as “underexplored” and not sufficiently conceptually founded the study of perceptions of the EU from the outside opens a new, exciting field of growing engagement of researchers with a manifested interdisciplinarity and collaboration between scholars developed under different academic and methodological paradigms. There is also a significant potential for collaboration with scholars from outside European studies as a research and teaching subject and from different 5

This is the first Eurobarometer survey designed to investigate the opinion of people living in 11 non-EU countries on the future of Europe, their view on the EU, its assets and values and how much political influence they think it has globally. https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/2141

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academic traditions. Engaging in research of this type can effectively help overcome the clearly Eurocentric nature of European Studies as they are conducted and taught nowadays.6 It is considered very appropriate and well suited for higher education studies making EU studies more interesting, localized and engaging.

How Others Imagine the EU Most of the authors emphasize that the perception of the EU from the outside is dependent firstly on the historical context and the established stereotypical practices and attitudes towards Europe and towards the current state of high level of political integration on the European continent. Jain argues that “Indian perceptions of modern Europe have been the result of a specific historical experience of a cultural and colonial encounter with the West and a selective admiration of Europe” (Jain, 2014: 34). For India this is a significant factor for development and awareness for a long period of time, more than 500 years after the first arrival of the Portuguese, the Dutch and later the British. There is also a deep impact of European political ideologies and political thought on the Indian national political context. A specific attitude towards Europe, allegedly shared by the Chinese is the view “only Europe shares with China the experience of being a very old civilisation and therefore boasts a similar sense of cultural continuity” (Vergeron, 2014: 51). Related to this aspect is the importance that China attaches to cultural diplomacy exemplified by the wide expansion of the Institute Confucius throughout the work in the past 20 years, which enhances bilateral relations for most of the cases of EU Member States. Historically close contacts existed with certain countries in the context of colonial and post-colonial policies which can have a limiting effect on the wider interaction with the rest of the European states. In the case of India contacts with continental Europe are rather weak, which continues to be the case nowadays. Despite these historical and cultural contacts for most of the population of these distant countries, Europe retains the image of “a strange land and an exotic place for tourism, to which only a privileged layer of society had access until recently” (Jain, 2014: 34). Research also shows that a lot of historical and cultural contacts, common historical references and frameworks of historical narratives between the previously closely linked countries fade with time as result of globalization, as a result of the specificity of their regional development and the participation of the countries in it. It is a result also of the growing influence of the American economic and cultural expansion creating preferences for contacts with the USA and recognition of images in the political and cultural space related to the framework of Americanisation. Apart from the historical context and the specific contacts, an important factor for how Europe is seen from outside is the way these countries (especially India, China, Brazil and others) perceive their own role and place in world affairs. In this sense, 6

See Nicolaïdis, K, Sebe, B. and Maas, G. (eds) (2015); https://www.eui.eu/research-hub?id=dec entering-eurocentrism-1&subpage=description.

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the perception of Europe is a changing perception of the country’s own development and international status and the breadth of the scope of their relations with the EU. The variations in the perception and image of the EU depends on how citizens/ communities in these countries themselves perceive their own country and what the vision is for their development in short- and long-term perspective. Therefore, the perception of Europe is a function of where China sees itself in the next 20–30 years or what the road for India’s own development is. This is particularly the case with the emerging nations and BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) which are often considered as a new alternative power axis in international politics—an axis of nations outside Europe located in Asia, America and Africa representing both the West and the East and developing economic policies and political discourses different from the EU and North America. The perceptions of the EU by Others “reflect both the essence of the ‘other’ as well as the core of the times themselves” (Wang, 2009: 67). Perceptions in this sense hold unique characteristics. They are also specifically shaped by the attitude towards the self-image of the EU as “normative power”. Self-perception and the perception of others are different and the self-perception can be contested and challenged by the perception of others. “Seen from Chinese historical and cultural perspectives”, in Wang’s view, “it becomes quite obvious to what extent the EU’s normative power actually has its contradictions and limitations” (Wang, 2009: 71).7 For some of the countries mentioned the high rate and perspectives of their own development create a different prism through which the image of the EU and its role in the international arena is transmitted and filtered. “What has been opened up over the past few years, most brutally, is the issue of European competitiveness in a world economy that has been, and will continue to be, substantially defined by the rise of Asia and emerging countries such as Brazil” (Vergeron, 2014: 47). This imaginative prism creates a framework for the perception of Europe and the EU whose “relative power is declining rapidly” which is additionally reinforced by the series of crises in the financial and economic sphere the EU faces in the past 10–15 years. Therefore, we can talk about a process of “change of perceptions” as a result of objective economic processes, which become more acute and gradually replace the historically established images of the Old Continent.8 The external image of the EU partially represents the “information deficit” of Europe and the EU visibility in various forms including in the most popular media. This is another aspect of the EU external relations whose intensity presupposes an influence on the perception of the EU mainly as a trade partner. For example, India 7

Wang refers to the discrepancy in the understanding of normatively informed power which according to traditional Chinese culture is linked to the four concepts: Li; Tao; Fa and Shu. “Because of the absence of the so-called Tao realm, the EU remains eager to intervene in the internal affairs of others” (Wang 2009: 71). 8 Vergeron (2014) refers to a change in perceptions brought about by a set of factors among which the economic ones are not the major ones. There is no significant restructuring in trade relations, for example between the EU and India and China which to bring forward the change of economic facts in the mutual relations. The role of media and mass communication is important for the formation and transformation of the perception of the EU outside Europe (Holland et al., 2007).

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and China are not close to each other according to their place as trade partners of the EU with China taking the second place and India the last place of the first ten. Potentially this can explain the different attitudes in India and China related to the economic, political and demographic perspectives of the EU. Some authors consider the then more intensive relations (a lot has changed since then though), including diplomatic, between the EU and China as a factor for more positive and optimistic attitudes in the Chinese context compared to the more cautious and less definite attitudes in the Indian context (Vergeron, 2014: 47). EU–China and EU– India relations have different rate and scope. In the past years, there has been a level of intensification in the relations with China in the economic but also in the cultural and social areas. But another factor can be pointed out. These countries and other international partners recognize and are accustomed to the global policies and role of the United States but they are not that confident about the European Union. For example, according to Wang “most Chinese, [..] the people as well as the leading elite, are used to the global policies of and relations with the United States and are insecure about the European Union. … whether the Eu is in essence a hard power or a soft power, or whether it just tries to hide its real interests behind normative considerations” (Wang, 2009: 68). In view of the level of political and economic integration attained in Europe the EU has become a natural reference model for regional integration in Asia (Holland, 2007: 14). However, as a whole the EU remains a “complex and unknown” economic and political community whose perception is shaped in three main frameworks, not equivalent in their weight: the traditional framework of representing the EU as an economic actor, as a political (rather as an emerging and in some sense self-affirming) actor and as an actor in the social space. The third image of the EU to the greatest extent is near the EU’s self-perception as a normative power since in the scope of the social sense of the EU such aspects as the acknowledgement and transformation of social norms, values and legislation are included. It is exactly in this sense in which the EU is perceived as a factor (normative power) in the area of environmental protection, for example. The research on the perception of the EU in Asia (Holland et al., 2007, 2009, 2014a) shows data in support of the dominant framework of perceiving the EU as an economic power from an international perspective. The third framework (the social one) according to the same survey is the least visible and perceived among the three in the images of the EU in the media, the perception of the EU by the general public including among the political, economic and media elite of the countries included in the survey (Holland et al., 2007: 51). Holland argues that there is a process of increase of the visibility of the EU in the context of international relations, but this does not justify the statement about the compatibility of the internal image of the EU and its perception in the context of the external relation and outside Europe. It is not possible to talk about a corresponding perception outside of the EU in terms of its own basic concept as a “normative power” (Manners, 2002) or as an international actor with specific qualities distinguishing it from traditional powers (as a “civilian power” Duchêne, 1972, 1973, “norm-creator” Björkdahl, 2005 or “normative area” Therborn, 2001). This justifies the statement of the “dangerous cognitive dissonances” (Lucarelli, 2009: 4), in which there is a

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discrepancy between the self-image of the EU and the external image of the EU. This, according to Lucarelli, inevitably has a negative effect on the external relations of the EU or the EU’s actual influence. This remarks a degree of widening the normative gap between the EU and the emerging world economies thus opening a field of critical interpretation of Europe as “imposing norms and standards irrespective of a country’s own development” (Jain, 2014: 35). The EU is linked to practices of Othering which are often associated with insufficient respect for diversity and imposition of a measure of being developed or underdeveloped in political or other aspects. Although there is the discourse of the perception of the EU as a model for the countries outside the EU and in an international plan, the focus is mostly on the EU as “the most advanced project of integration, and the paths it had followed since its birth in the 1950s tended to guide other regional projects” (Pecequilo, 2014: 60). One aspect of this image can be viewed as to a certain extent creating obstacles in the relations between the EU and countries outside Europe as fair partnership. Arendt’s reflection on the image of America in Europe resonates here again when she says: In the words of Aristotle, no friendship could ever exist between a man and a god. The same holds true for the relationships between nations where the equalizing force of friendship does not operate. (Arendt, 1954: 5)

These difficulties are mostly visible in the discourse on identity and recognition. The changing circumstances and tensions in international relations and in the rather radically transformed world after the pandemic and the war in Ukraine add new perspectives to the issue and require further investigation of how Europe is perceived from outside the EU.

The Decentring Agenda The European Union is presented as a unique actor in world politics based on the assumption that the EU foreign policy follows principles and values associated mainly with multilateralism and soft power and that they are fundamentally different from those of nation states that define the aims of their foreign policy in accordance with the doctrine of “national interest”. The analysis of EU policies and of the concept of European identity, the historical path of European integration, citizens’ attitudes and the fundamental values of the EU does not readily support the necessity of overcoming of the Eurocentric perspective. In this part we refer to several approaches to overcoming the embedded Eurocentric perspective presented in the “decentring agenda” (Keukeleire & Lecocq, 2018) or “provincialising” Europe (Chakrabarty, 2000). Keukeleire and Lecocq have been working, since 2016, on a project related to the analysis of the foreign policy of the EU from a non-Eurocentric or from a “decentring” perspective (Keukeleire, 2016; Keukeleire & Lecocq, 2018; Keukeleire et al., 2021a, 2021b). The analytical framework developed by them in 2018 proposes operationalization of the decentring agenda and significantly supplements the theme of

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the perception of the EU from outside in a series of examples of “views from outside” presenting in a different way the need for overcoming of Eurocentrism in the analysis of EU foreign policy. Keukeleire and Lecocq (2018) argue that “Eurocentrism in the analysis of European foreign policy often renders scholars blind to other world views and realities” (Keukeleire & Lecocq, 2018: 277). On the other hand, they insist that researchers of the EU foreign policy generally do not possess tools and conceptual lenses for overcoming of the Eurocentric bias in their analyses. They enter the debate arguing for the need for decentring agenda in the practices of international relations of the EU reflecting the notion of Europe as a post-colonial power, making sense of “our multipolar order” and “reconstituting European agency in a non-European world”(Fisher Onar & Nicolaïdis, 2013; quoted by Keukeleire & Lecocq, 2018: 278). This agenda urges for wide decentring and overcoming of Eurocentrism and “western-centrism” (Fisher Onar & Nicolaïdis, 2013: 284) in disciplines like international relations, research on non-western theories of international relations and approaches and opening and recognition of “diversity”. Despite the existing corpus of literature on the perception of the EU from outside (Lucarelli & Fioramonti, 2010; Mayer & Zielonka, 2012; Chaban and Holland 2014, etc.), Keukeleire & Lecocq argue that Eurocentrism remains dominant. In this sense, the work done by Keukeleire in the past 6–7 years is of great significance as its aim is to develop a research framework introducing a new perspective based on the application of the approach of decentring. Keukeleire et al. (2014), Keukeleire and Lecocq (2018) identify six components partially overlapping, five of which refer to ontological questions and the sixth category constitutes the decentring of the discipline with reference to epistemological and methodological issues. The analytical understanding of decentring is presented on the one hand as questioning the validity of the Eurocentric explanatory lines of arguments and the Eurocentric myth of civilizational primacy. On the other hand, it is a process of enriching our knowledge and learning from Others and engagement with the viewpoints and the assumptions of the perspectives of Others outside Europe (Keukeleire & Lecocq, 2018: 279). The main ontological categories include space and time, related to understanding of the geographical, spatio-material and historical trajectory. These two basic ontological categories present the specific perception of space and time that have their temporal and material references and in the European context demonstrate specific Eurocentric historicism linked to the paradigm of modernisaton and modernity. Studies of the EU create additional assumptions reinforcing them as conventionally Eurocentric field of studies (Keukeleire & Lecocq, 2018: 280). However, spatial and temporal trajectories are significantly different inside and outside Europe and often, even as an educational paradigm, they are perceived as separate, if not parallel lines of development. Their correlation, if at all possible, requires special efforts of proportionating or reconciliation of frameworks, paradigms and scope. The third category in the analytical framework refers to the different prioritized norms in a wide spectrum of universal norms among which rights and responsibilities, individualism and collectivism, interrelations between secular and religious norms and their hierarchy and application. Language situations are part of the ontological categories where different modes of communication, ways of understanding of meaning and interpretation of

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basic concepts are highlighted including engagement with non-Western languages without mediation of the English language, without taking for granted existing and established criteria for style in the Western world, translation and reference primarily to Western sources of information. Keukeleire and Lecocq (2018) apply for their categories the analytical dimensions proposed by Fisher Onar and Nicolaidis (2013) in their decentring agenda: provincializing and engagement (Fisher Onar and Nicolaïdis (2013). As explained, “provincialising means ‘to unpack the social scientific categories, assumptions and paradigms that underpin Eurocentric truth claims’ and to question ‘Eurocentric accounts of world history and politics’ as well as ‘Eurocentric “civilisational” assumptions’” (Keukeleire & Lecocq, 2018: 279). Engagement implies learning about and from others’ perspectives and accounts of the world and engaging with the assumptions, worldviews and value systems that underpin them (Fisher Onar & Nicolaïdis, 2013: 286; quoted by Keukeleire & Lecocq, 2018: 279). The analytical framework developed by Keukeleire & Lecocq is intended to draw the attention and effectively contribute to meeting some of the challenges and pitfalls of the applied paradigm research frameworks by Western researchers. It has to be admitted that engagement with decentring agenda might be very difficult if not impossible for researchers of the dominant “Eurocentric box” shaped and sustained by “the western-centric and cultural legacy” (Keukeleire & Lecocq, 2018: 280). The socalled “Eurocentric box” constitutes a frame of reference and a filter which tends to constantly direct to ideas and approaches which resonate in it and filter out ideas, which are not easily compatible with it, but which might have their standing and significance in other contexts. The attempt to operationalize the decentring agenda has its practical dimension as a heuristic tool since Keukeleire & Lecocq offer a series of subcategories that can lead to clarifying the process, avoiding the dazzling effect of the dominant Eurocentric framework and re-arrange the conceptual schemes with categories and factors with local salience, which figure low or invisible by the applied Eurocentric analytical approaches. This methodological approach opens space for a new methodological look at new contexts. Keukeleire & Lecocq warn that this process of “analytical decentring” does not presuppose normativity but assists scholars in “detecting, labelling and understanding concepts, ideas and practices that do not fit within their usual frames of reference, without making a priori normative judgements” (Keukeleire & Lecocq, 2018: 280). It is also important to avoid simplification and the focus on differences sometimes “artificially created between ‘the West’ and ‘the Rest’” which tends to be “a recurrent theme in various articles” (ibid.) thus allowing for perceiving the conceptualizing the complexity and hybridity in the contemporary world. The two authors insist also on avoiding the concept of decentring which “leads to case-specific knowledge”, to ad hoc knowledge “without relevance for other cases or the potential for comparative analysis”. The focus on the decentring agenda is significant for creating better methodological grounds for teaching European studies outside Europe. It also opens space for collaborative research and mutually enriching and informative collaboration based not on knowledge of our locally created toolbox, which carries its Eurocentric nature wherever it goes and is applied. It might be of use in clarifying some aspects of the

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emerging identification with the EU within the EU, the self-identification of citizens with the EU in a more informed and explicitly manifested way, their emergence from a more banalised mode of support and acceptance of the European unification.

Conclusion It is becoming a common belief that Europe cannot reflect on itself just by contemplating its own development and by staring at the moments of its own brilliant or unsuccessful performance and advancement. As Lucarelli points out After years of collective fascination with the idea of the EU as a ‘special’ global actor, some scholars have started to investigate whether such a perception of distinctiveness is shared by people, institutions and intellectuals outside of Europe. (Lucarelli, 2014: 1)

The view from outside is not just a new field of research undertaking, a new avenue of studies but like a mirror reflects questions and fears concerning the position of Europe on the global arena, for example the perspective of Europe shrinking, the loss of status of a great power in a multipolar world marked by the emerging of new giants. The role of higher education and the ambition to include topics related to European integration and the EU in curricula globally9 is becoming significant in creating the grounds of the international rule-based order that the EU strives to contribute to attaining. However, merely exploring the perception of the EU from outside is not enough. It has to be combined with a possibility of a change represented by ideas of the “decentring agenda” as a research, explanatory and heuristic tool different from the established “Eurocentric toolbox” as the main source for inspiration in teaching, research and policy making. This is even more significant from an internal perspective. The concept of banalisaton of Europeanness presents a specific context inside of the European Union in which Europeanism and European identification experienced in a routine, everyday, unconscious and unappreciated way has its influence on self-representation and self-image of the EU for its citizens. This phenomenon further underscores the specific significance of studying external perceptions of the EU.

References Arendt, H. (1994[1954]). Dream and Nightmare. In H. Arendt, Essays in Understanding. New York: Schocken. Billig, M. (1995). Banal Nationalism. Sage. Björkdahl, A. (2005). Norm-maker and norm-taker: Exploring the normative influence of the EU in Macedonia. European Foreign Affairs Review, 10(2), 257–278. 9

This is the main objective of one of the most successful EU-funded programmes globally—the Action Jean Monnet subsidizing teaching positions on European Studies in various countries all over the world.

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Braudel, F. (1980). On history. University of Chicago Press. Brubaker, R., & Cooper, F. (2000). Beyond “Identity.” Theory and Society, 29(1), 1–47. Chaban, N., & Holland, M. (2014). The evolution of EU perceptions: From single studies to systematic research. In N. Chaban, and M. Holland (Eds.). Communicating Europe in Times of Crisis. External Perceptions of the European Union. Palgrave Macmillan. Chaban, N., & Holland, M. (2015). EU external perceptions: From innovation to an established field of study. In A. K. Aarstad, E. Drieskens, K. E. Jørgensen, K. Laatikainen, & B. Tonra (Eds.), Handbook of European Foreign Policy (pp. 672–686). Sage. Chaban, N., Knodt, M., & Headley, J. (2018). Introduction: The EU and Its eastern neighbours— perceptions and strategic dialogue in the region. European Foreign Affairs Review 23. Special Issue, 2018, 1–22. Chakrabarty, D. (2000). Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial thought and historical difference. Princeton University Press. Citrin, J., & Sides, J. (2004). More than nationals: How identity choice matters in the new Europe. In R. Herreman, and T. Risse (eds.), Transnational Identities: Becoming European in the EU. Lanham MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Cram, L. (2010). Does the EU Need a Navel? Banal Europeanism, Appreciated Europeanism and European Integration, Paper presented at the ECPR Fifth Pan-European Conference, Porto 24–26 June 2010. Deutsch, K. (1966 [1953]). Nationalism and social communication. An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationalism. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. https://archive.org/details/NationalismAndS ocialCommunication. 14/06/2015. Diez Medrano, J., & Guttierez, P. (2001). Nested identities, National and European identity in Spain. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 24, 753–778. Duchêne, F. (1972). Europe’s Role in World Peace. In R. Mayne (ed.) Europe Tomorrow: Sixteen Europeans Look Ahead. London: Fontana/Collins and Chatham House: PEP. Duchêne, F. (1973). The European Community and the uncertainties of interdependence. In M. Kohnstamm and W. Hager (eds.), A Nation Writ Large? Foreign-Policy Problems Before the Community. London: Macmillan. Elgström, O., & Chaban, N. (2015). To study external perceptions of the EU: A conceptual approach. In V. Bachmann, & Müller, M. (Eds). Perceptions of the EU in Eastern Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa. Palgrave. Fisher Onar, N., & Nicolaïdis, K. (2013). The decentring Agenda: Europe as a post-colonial power. Cooperation and Conflict, 48(2), 283–303. Havel, V. (1994, 2000). Address to the European Parliament, Strasbourg. http://www.europarl. europa.eu/sides/getDoc.dopubRef=-//EP//TEXT+CRE+20000216+ITEM-012+DOC+XML+ V0//EN. 03/12/2015. Holland, M. (ed.) (2005). The EU Through the Eyes of the Asia-Pacific: public perceptions and media representations. NCRE Research Series No.4, Christchurch. Holland, M. (ed.) (2007). EU Through the Eyes of Asia. Singapore: ASEF. Holland, M., & Chaban, N. (2014a). Communicating Europe in the times of crisis: External perceptions of the European Union. Palgrave-McMillan. Holland, M., & Chaban, N. (2014b). Europe and Asia: perceptions from afar. Baden-Baden: Nomos. Holland, M., Chaban, N., & Ryan, P. (2009). EU through the Eyes of Asia Vol II: new cases: new findings. New York: World Scientific. Ichijo, A., & Spohn, W. (Eds.). (2005). Entangled identities: Nations and Europe. Ashgate. Jain, R. (2014). India and Europe: Towards a new narrative. In: The Dwarfing of Europe? A dialogue between Brazil, India, China and Europe, Volume 2. Amsterdam: European Cultural Foundation. Keukeleire, S., & Lecocq, S. (2021a). Decentring European foreign policy analysis. In S. Gstöhl, & S. Schunz (Eds.). The Externa; Action of the European Union: Concepts, Approaches, Theories. Basingstoke: Macmillan International. Keukeleire, S., Lecocq, S., & Volpi, F. (2021b). Decentring norms in EU relations with the southern neighbourhood. Journal of Common Market Studies, 59(4), 891–908.

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Keukeleire, S., & Lecocq, S. (2018). Operationalizing the decentring agenda: Analysing European foreign policy in a non-European and post-Western World. Cooperation and Conflict, 43(2), 277–295. Keukeleire, S. (2014). Lessons for the practice and analysis of EU diplomacy from an “Outside– In” perspective. In S. Gstöhl & E. Lannon (Eds.), The Neighbours of the European Union’s Neighbours (pp. 227–241). Ashgate. Laitin, D. (2001). National identities in the European state. In M. Keating, & J. McGarry (eds.), Minority Nationalism and the Changing International Order. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lucarelli, S. (2008). European political identity, foreign policy and others’ image: An underexplored relationship. In F. Cerutti, & S. Lucarelli (eds.). The Search for a European Identity. London: Routledge. Lucarelli, S. (2009). European political identity, foreign policy and the others’ image: An underexplored relationship. In The External Image of the European Union—Phase Two—Research Report on the Project: Garnet—Jointly Executed Research Project 5.2.1 Forum on The Problems of War and Peace & University of Bologna. Lucarelli, S., & Fioramonti, L. (2010). External Perceptions of the European Union as a. Lucarelli, S. (2014). Seen from the outside: The state of the art on the external image of the EU. Journal of European Integration, 36, 1–16. Manners, I. (2002). Normative power Europe: A contradiction in terms? Journal of Common Market Studies, 40, 2. Mayer, H., & Zielonka, J. (2012). Special issue ‘Europe as a global power: View from outside’. Perspectives: Review of International Affairs, 20, 5–129. Mayer, H. (2013). The challenge of coherence and consistency in EU foreign policy. In The EU’s Foreign Policy: What kind of Power and Diplomatic Action? 105–117, 108. Mohavedi, H. (1985). The social psychology of foreign policy and the politics of international images, Human Affairs 8/18–37. Nicolaïdis, K., Sebe, B., & Maas, G. (Eds.). (2015). Echoes of Empire. Memory, Identity and Colonial Legacies. L.B.Tauris. Pecequilo, C. S. (2014). Brazil and the European Union: Partner, model or threat? In M. Cremer, & S. Mors (eds.) The Dwarfing of Europe? A dialogue between Brazil, India, China and Europe, Volume 2. Amsterdam: European Cultural Foundation. Risse, T. (2004). European institutions and identity change: What have we learned? In R. Herrmann, M. Brewer & T. Risse (eds.), Identities in Europe and the institutions of the European Union. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. Scheipers, S., & Sicurelli, D. (2008). Empowering Africa: Normative power in EU-Africa relations. Journal of European Public Policy, 15, 4. Therborn, G. (2001). Europe’s break with itself. The European economy and the history, modernity and world future of Europe. In F. Cerutti, & E. Rudolph (eds.), A Soul for Europe. On the cultural and political identity of the Europeans. Vol. II: An Essay Collection. Leuven: Peeters. Vergeron, K. L. de V. (2014). Chinese and Indian views of Europe and the role of culture in European external affairs. In The Dwarfing of Europe? A dialogue between Brazil, India, China and Europe, Volume 2. Amsterdam: European Cultural Foundation. Wang, Y. (2009). The identity dilemmas of EU normative power: Observations from Chinese traditional culture, In A. Gerrits (eds.), Normative Power in a Changing World. Netherlands Institute of International Relations. Clingendael.

Chapter 5

“Bologna” and Beyond: The Role of European Studies in the Process of Cooperation Between European and Asian Universities Francesca Longo

Abstract Internationalization is one of the most powerful forces for change and innovation in contemporary higher education. The prevalent version of internationalization across universities is a minimalist, instrumental, and static view which intends internationalization strategy as securing funding for international exchange of students. In same and residual cases there is a middle range level, with attention to the activities of conducting research internationally. But actually it is time to adopt a view of internationalization as a complex, all-encompassing, and policy-driven process, integral to and permeating the life, culture, curriculum and institution. In this framework, the so-called “Bologna Process” has given a certain level of standard and in designing new vision for the international dimension of the higher education with particular regard to the process of standardization of models for designing curricula. Seen from an academic perspective it has been considered as a strong pivot for enlarging the concept of internationalization. Nevertheless, the Bologna Process mainly has a regional dimension. It has demonstrated some weakness in enlarging its activity in non-EU countries, with particular regard to the Asian Universities. This chapter analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of the Bologna process in “exporting” the EU model of higher education and it proposes a new method for re-launching cooperation between “Bologna partners” and third countries.

Introduction Many Asian and European past and ongoing initiatives of regional integration have acknowledged the impact of internationalization on the educational system, with particular regard to the universities’ system. From this perspective, all the major stakeholders involved in regional integration processes have generally pointed out F. Longo (B) University of Catania, Catania, Italy e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 M. Stoicheva et al. (eds.), Relevance of European Studies in Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-7786-4_5

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the relevance of cooperation among universities in order to manage and meet the challenges of globalization. Student and staff mobility, mutual accreditation systems and recognition of qualifications, quality assurance, and interoperability of curricula are the key elements of this process. But in the last few years, other topics enriched the agenda of cooperation among universities in the specific field of higher education (EH). The first topic is the exploration of new form of teaching and the re-designing of curricula. This topic has especially affected the European Union (EU) studies. In the last years, this area of studies has been strongly interested in the events that have been taking place either at EU and at the external level. Domestic crises such as financial and economic crisis, migration flow, and the exit of the United Kingdom (Brexit) have posed serious challenges to the European integration project. EU and its Member States (MSs) have developed exceptional levels of cooperation for coping with the consequences of these critical events. Moreover, in the last years EU has produced not only crisis but also the launching of innovative development programs as the EU green deal, or the digital agenda. At this end, in the first part of the chapter, the final development of the EU studies is analyzed in order to assess the “state of the art” of the debate among scholars of EU Studies and to explore how each approach can explain cooperation in the field of HE. In the second part this chapter explores the way in which the European model of HE has been expanded in the Asian region. The main aim is to explore how the process of spreading of European HE model toward third countries can be reviewed in order to providing the “Bologna process” with a more cosmopolitan approach.

EU Theories and the Emerging of a European Education Policy European Studies offer different interpretations of the nature of the EU, of its functioning in terms of key actors and mechanisms of development and, eventually, of its final form. Traditionally, much of the scholarly research on the EU has historically been focused on broad questions regarding EU ontology. The core of this debate occurs between those who see the EU as an exceptional form of organization, a n of 1 (Caporaso, 1997; Haas, 1958/2004), and those who consider it as a political system “like any other” or a “post-modern” state, or a “state like organization” (Hix, 1994; Fabbrini, 2019). Some traditional “grand theories” of European integration are embedded in this debate: intergovernmentalism is focused on measuring and analyzing the power relation between the “new system” and the nation-state; neofunctionalism is focused on the transnational dynamics that lead to further integration, and on the process of politicization that has developed as a result of the deepening of integration; neo federalism claims for a transformation of EU into a genuine federal state. More recently, new theoretical perspectives enriched the plateau of EU studies. The perspective of “differentiated integration” conceptualizes the EU as a

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system based on a model of multiple speeds integration in which the differentiation occurred at an internal level, among Member States, and at an external level, between EU and some non-Member States selected for policy integration. (Hooge & Marks, 2009; Leuffen et al., 2013; Schimmelfennig, 2014; Schimmelfennig et al., 2015). The EU’s role in international politics is a further path of research in EU studies. Scholars’ debate developed different analysis about the nature of the EU as international actors (Elgstrom & Smith, 2006). EU has been considered as a unique form of international actor playing the role of super power in the making (Galtung, 1973), normative power (Manners, 2002, 2006), ethical power (Aggestam, 2008), civilian power (Duchene, 1973), and norms exporter (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2009). In the 2000s, new perspectives have emerged with a focus on the EU’s activities on global system (Smith, 2003, 2005; Barbè & Morillas, 2019) and the emergence of the EU as a key regional actor in certain global policies (Farrel, 2005). They are focused on the “ability” of the EU to act at international level with other means than the traditional military capabilities. In this theoretical framework the concept of “external dimension of domestic policies” has been elaborated. It analyzes the inclusion of some policies, traditionally related to the domestic arena, in the EU external relations1 and it aims to verify the hypothesis that the EU’s international actorness is described by the capability of the Union to spread domestic models of policy in different areas. The process of internationalization of universities is at the crossroads of these different theoretical approaches. From the signature of the Rome Treaty—1956— till the end of the ’70s education was omitted from the integration process2 . The first entrance of this topic into the EU’s informal political agenda started in the late 70s (Pepin, 2007). It formally entered the institutional agenda in June 1987 with the launching of The EuRopean Community Action Scheme for the Mobility of University Students program, best known as ERASMUS program. Nevertheless, even if from that date EU developed a multilayered policy on training and education, it remains among the supporting competences and its management remains under the sovereignty of Member States. Article 165.4 of the Treaty of Lisbon excludes any harmonization of the educational laws and regulations of the Member States and the Union can only adopt incentive measures and recommendations. Intergovernmentalism can provide a theoretical background for this choice. Educational processes were traditionally perceived as intensely associated with the process of the creation

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On JHA see Cremona et al. (2011), Lavenex and Wichmann (2009); on migration see Lavenex (2006), Longo (2022). 2 Article 128 of the Treaty of Rome referred to the drawing up of general principles for implementing a common vocational training policy only, without any reference to education the limits of the concept of “spillovers” in explaining the entrance of the education in the EU agenda. Even if in 1992 the Maastricht Treaty included education among the EU policies and it achieved a legal dimension, nevertheless, the legal status of education remains among the “supporting competences” of the EU and its policy making system is grounded on the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), that is classified under the intergovernamentalist method (Lelieveldt & Princen, 2011, 85) since it produces cooperation through non-binding voluntary agreements among MSs.

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of statehood as it was analyzed by Stein Rokkan (1975) and the “logic of diversity” (Hoffmann, 1966) seems to characterize educational policy. However, from the 1980s onward, the EU developed a new framework for the education policy (Walkenhorst, 2008; Pagliarello, 2020). The launch of the Erasmus program, the Bologna Process, and the inclusion of the education in the Lisbon strategy changed the nature of EU education policy. It was considered a crucial segment of common strategies. This new approach could be explained as a consequence of spillover effect, defined by neofunctionalism as the process whereby “a given action, related to a specific goal, creates a situation in which the original goal can be assured only by taking further actions, which in turn create a further condition and a need for more, and so forth” (Lindberg, 1963: 9). Neo-functionalism considers EU as a political system which follows the logic of incremental expansion of competences and spillover is the dynamics linking the objectives of the cooperation in the field of education policy and the expansion of the EU political agenda. The original inclusion of this form of cooperation in the DG Commission for Social Affairs and the attachment of educational policy to article 128 of the Treaty stated by the European Court of Justice in 1985 is a paradigmatic case of functional spillover among policies. Education policy is considered as strongly connected with “the free movement of persons, the mobility of labour and the improvement of the living standards of workers. It follows that the conditions of access to vocational training fall within the scope of the Treaty”.3 Moreover, since the 80s the European Commission motivated the growing salience of cultural and education policy in the EU agenda with discourses on the contribution these policy areas should provide to other integrated areas, (Walkenhorst, 2008), such as competitiveness (European Commission, 2004), single market (European Commission, 1989), social policy (European Commission, 1993). Spillover effect worked in those areas which required coordination in national education and training system to better “achieving the economic, social and environmental goals set in Lisbon for the European Union” (Council, 2003). Some scholars (Cino Pagliariello, 2020) stressed. Neofunctionalism gives relevance also to a second logic standing beyond the development of education policy: the importance the common policies have in promoting the citizen loyalty toward EU system and its institutions. This provides theoretical basis for understanding a further “discourse” which was at the foundation of the cooperation on education and which is based on the idea that educational policy contributes to the larger aim to “reforms on higher education on the basis of common key values”.4 The development of a common higher educational area was established with the main aim to “give an European dimension”5 to education. From the first meeting of the Ministries of Education of the MSs in 1971 it produced

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Judgment of the Court of Justice, Gravier, Case 293/83 (13 February 1985). EHEA website at: http://www.ehea.info/. 5 Resolution of the Council and of the Ministers of Education, meeting within the Council, of 9 February 1976 comprising an action programme in the field of education (OJ C, C/38, 19.02.1976, p. 3). 4

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a complex system of cooperation designed as a “mixed system” (Jones, 2018; Pepin, 2007) merging voluntary cooperation and a relevant role of common institutions. This perspective is the starting point for analyzing the logic and the practices of the Education policy in the EU and the role of the European Higher Education Area (EHEA) in the relation between the EU and other regions, Cooperation on education between Member States (MS) started in the late 1960s at informal level (Pepin, 2007). In 1976 MS agreed on a resolution6 establishing an action program for promoting closer relationship between educational system in Europe. It was the first attempt to founding a common system of mobility for students and staff across the European University. In 1988, The Sorbonne Declaration was signed by the ministers of France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Italy. It aimed at creating a common frame for facilitating the establishment of the EHEA. At that time, mobility both for students and teaching staff and the promotion of qualifications were considered the main instruments for achieving the EHEA. In 1999 the Bologna Declaration7 relaunched the Sorbonne Declaration. It was signed by 29 countries8 which declared the intention to establish the European area of higher education and to promote the European system of higher education world-wide. The Bologna declaration listed some main objectives to be reached by the signatories: adoption of a system of comparable degrees grounded on the three cycle degree system, the promotion of mobility for students, teachers, researchers, and administrative staff by overcoming obstacles to the effective exercise of free movement, promotion of European cooperation in quality assurance with a view to developing comparable criteria and methodologies. The program created common understandings for internationalization in the signatories countries and it could be considered as a driver for increasing the international attractiveness of European Universities. The Bologna process is an attractive force: the 29 signatory countries were all the MS, the member candidates at that time, and four third states: Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland. Other countries joined from 2001 onward, so as of 2022 there were 49 countries engaged in the process. It was designed as a voluntary convergence with an intergovernmental approach and it has led to the establishment of successful intra-regional cooperation. The process in the past years has headed the creation of some milestones of the EHEA. The overarching Framework for Qualifications of the EHEA, the European Credit Transfer and Accumulation System (ECTS), common standards and guidelines for quality assurance in the EHEA (ESG), the Lisbon Convention on the recognition of Diploma, the common Register of QA Agencies, the Diploma supplement, are the main instruments which established a 6

Resolution of the Council and of the Ministers of Education, meeting within the Council, of 9 February 1976 comprising an action programme in the field of education (OJ C, C/38, 19.02.1976, p. 1, CELEX: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:41976X0219). 7 http://www.ehea.info/page-ministerial-conference-bologna-1999 8 Bologna Declaration signatories: Austria—Belgium—Bulgaria—Czech Republic—Estonia— Denmark—France—Finland—Germany—Hungary—Greece—Ireland—Iceland—Latvia— Italy—Luxembourg—Lithuania—Malta—the Netherlands—Norway—Poland—Portugal— Romania—Slovak Republic—Slovenia—Spain—Sweden—Swiss Confederation—United Kingdom.

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common framework guided, and are guiding, the process of national universities’ curriculum assessment and reform.

An “Asian Way” to Bologna? The Bologna framework has set a model for other regions of the global system, with particular regard to the Asian region. The relevance of the dialogue with extra-European countries was stressed since the adoption of the Bologna declaration. It claimed that the establishment of the EHEA aims at promoting the European system of higher education world-wide and it was intended as a way for improving cooperation with HE in other regions of the world. This specific topic was relaunched at the Vienna meeting in 2018 when a Coordination Group on Global Policy Dialogue was set up with the task to improve regular dialogue and cooperation with other regions on matters relating to higher education. This global perspective is to be considered as a result of the dynamic of the Bologna Process, characterized by “many special characteristics, among them its expanding geographical scope and thematic outreach” (Enders & Westerheijden, 2011, p.4). Emphasis on EHEA’s external dimension has been supported by the European Commission. The establishment of specific actions aiming at launching the incoming and outgoing extra EU mobility, such as Erasmus Mundus, KA 107/ 171, and RISE—Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions, are embedded in this process of enlargement of the geographical scope of the EHEA, that can be defined as externalization of the EU higher education policy. The concept of externalization of EU policies, as stressed above, is a new approach to EU studies and it has been applied to different policy areas: Justice and Home Affairs (Longo, 2013), Migration (Longo, 2022; Carrera et al., 2009). In a broader perspective, externalization of domestic policy is intended as the process of transfer of domestic policy models to third countries. Damro and Friedman (2018) analyzed the process of externalization of the Bologna Process by stressing the relevance of the international influence EU exercises by providing third countries funding, structures, and policy models. This approach is a starting point for understanding how the Bologna process has affected the Asian region in the process of developing international cooperation on HE. The relation between the EU and the Asian region on education had a first milestone with the establishment of the Asia-Link Program in 2002. It aims at promoting networking between higher education institutions in EU MS and South Asia, SouthEast Asia, and China. The program provides European and Asian institutions of higher education with financial and technical resources for the creation of partnerships. Moreover, the main pillar of the EU/Asia cooperation in the field of education is the SHARE program. It was launched in 2015 with the aim to support ASEAN in its objective to establish a regional higher education area and to strengthen inter-regional cooperation. It is founded on four main pillars: qualification framework, quality assurance, credit

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transfer system, and student mobility scheme.9 The Erasmus+ is a further instrument for EU/Asian cooperation in the field of education. Between 2015 and 2020 the Erasmus+ budget for Asia represented 15% of the entire international mobility budget. This developed 2951 projects for bilateral partnerships that activated mobility for over 30600 students, researchers, and staff. Moreover from 2014 to 2020, action produced 62 cases of universities from China (30), India (24), Indonesia, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, and Thailand taking part as full hosting partners in 34 Erasmus Mundus Joint Master Degree and 242 Asian organizations have taken part in Erasmus Mundus programs in this period as associate partners. Capacity Building in Higher Education (CBHE) projects granted 1594 Asian institutions included in 272 inter-regional projects.10 This cooperative framework is founded on the European model of cooperation in the area of HE, as it has been developed in Europe since the activation of the Bologna process. The main pillars of cooperation are mobility schemes, adoption of the bachelor and master two cycles system of Degrees, adoption of the credits method, and the introduction of quality assurance. They design a case of policy transfer, defined as “a process in which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions etc. in one time and/or place is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements and institutions in another time and/or place” (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000, p. 344). Some scholars noted that the Bologna Process greatly influenced the formation of an East Asian Higher Education Area (Chao, 2011). Nevertheless, other scholars stressed the need for further analysis. Chou and Ravinet (2017) stressed that, even European and Asian cooperation model on HE share some similar policy ideas—political cooperation, networks between institutions and student mobility—, the Asian region developed a distinctive “Asian way”. This latter has its own model with a distinctive way of handling specific regional features and has developed a specific institutional structure, different from the European model and designed for preventing any potential conflict between national administration and ASEAN representatives. Adopting Acharya’s notion of “norm localization” (Acharya, 2004) it can be argued the Bologna Process cannot be simply adopted as a regional model to export. It could serve as a pattern that local actors reconstruct in order to find the goodness of fit with the local features. Differences in regional historical, demographic, and socioeconomic structure account for the development of the model which takes account of the local specificities. In this direction EU studies are required to provide a new frame for understanding new directions of cooperation between EU and other regions on HE. Strategic partnerships between Western and Asian universities could be seen as a part of a larger revision of the European strategy of cooperation in the field of HE with third countries aiming at providing it with a more cosmopolitan approach. A new active approach in this specific area of cooperation should go beyond the 9

See more at: https://www.share-asean.eu/. See at: https://ec.europa.eu/assets/eac/erasmus-plus/factsheets/regional/asia-reg-erasmusplus2020.pdf. 10

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traditional strategy grounded on the features of the European HE and focused on securing funding for international exchange of students and faculties and, in same cases, for enhancing the activities of conducting research internationally.

Beyond the Bologna System: The 4JR Method The political, economic, and financial realities facing both countries and universities require the development of a world view and perspective in curriculum formulation and implementation, and in the definition of research areas and questions posed by researchers in the various disciplines. Moreover, academia has remained the venue for promoting some core values of mankind such as global citizenship, cooperation, and solidarity. A new approach toward cooperation between the EU and third countries is required. It should be based on an interactive process of cooperation grounded on a mechanism of continuous exchange of competences and experiences between European and third countries universities, namely the Asian partners. This system might aim at reaching a truly interoperative cooperation system designed with the contribution of each partner on an equal basis. It should be founded on a 4 JR method working on: (a) joint revision of teaching; (b) joint review of creditation and quality management mechanisms; (c) joint redraft of double/joint degree programs; (d) joint re-design of mobility schemes. This approach serves as a method to provide cooperation with a genuine shared mechanism able to fit European principles to the specific local characteristic. The joint revision of teaching and researching priorities may reflect cooperation in the content of programs of studies or courses. Study plans and syllabuses which are intended as follow up of cooperation between EU and third countries may be designed with partner countries and they may be highlighted from a comparative perspective with the partner countries’ visions. The joint review of creditation and quality management mechanisms may disentangle the complex relationships among different units of evaluation and measurement and at the same time assure a more flexible system for mutual recognition of titles and diplomas. The joint re-draft of double/joint degree programs may take care of the principle of multiculturalism of ethnic origin, social values, and cultural features. At this end, the process of developing joint or double degree programs might include all the partners and it may ensure a level playing field. The joint re-design of mobility schemes might elaborate more flexible prerequisites to facilitate credit transfer between EU and partner universities. An easy end smart system for recognizing abroad study and systematic planning and reporting of results should be developed. Moreover, provision of short courses and continuing study programs, both credit bearing and non-credit bearing for students should be designed in order to enrich the plateau of academic offer beyond the traditional Erasmus system. Cooperation between EU and third countries in the field of HE is the

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main pillar of the internationalization process of universities. Internationalization, defined as “the process of integrating an international perspective into the teaching/ learning, research and service functions of a higher education institution” (Knight & de Wit, 2018), is one of the most powerful forces for change and innovation in contemporary higher education. This definition emphasizes the global dimension of internationalization and the need for a cooperative approach across the international system. Knowledge is international in its essence. It knows no borders, no boundaries. It is timeless and is the universal language of all who would seek wisdom. Universities are therefore international in their core function. The political, economic, and financial realities facing both countries and universities require the development of a world view and perspective in curriculum formulation and implementation, and in the definition of research areas and questions posed by researchers in the various disciplines. Asian and European Universities have acknowledged the impact of internationalization on the educational system and are involved in a process of intra- and inter-regional cooperation. The Bologna process has demonstrated to be a useful pattern providing some miles stone as student and staff mobility, mutual accreditation systems and recognition of qualifications, and quality assurance. Moreover, in the last years, the need to enrich the European model for cooperation with new forms of relations with non-European Universities arose. In this chapter a model for refreshing the model of designing HE. C start from the strategic Bologna process with a more cosmopolitan approach

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Chapter 6

The Use of Simulations in Teaching EU Foreign Policy in a Non-european Educational Environment Daniela Irrera

Abstract This chapter discusses the relevance of active learning tools, like simulations and games in teaching EU foreign policy in non-European contexts, particularly in Asian universities. Understanding the EU’s actions in the global political system may be a difficult task for students enrolled in Asian Universities, where EU studies are not the main focus. Difficulties may be particularly due to the fact that some very peculiar characters of EU, its institutions, policies and dynamics are not always deeply studied. The EU is the result of its own member states’ preferences and purposes. At the same time, the Europeanisation processes and integration are visible in several policy fields. This uncertain balance is more visible when the EU acts as a global actor, particularly as a peace provider and in the promotion of conflict resolution. The chapter discusses the use of Games of Peace, a negotiation model which has been developed by the author within her courses of International Relations and Global Civil Society. By describing different aspects of the simulation, it is demonstrated how the mechanisms put in practice by states and EU institutions in the preparation of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) strategy and a common position towards a specific crisis can be replicated. The chapter is composed of three parts. Firstly, the main difficulties encountered by students enrolled in nonEU universities, in the study of EU foreign policy are discussed. Secondly, the main steps, roles and characteristics of the Games of Peace experience are given. Lastly, the main outcomes are used to assess the reason for understanding how active learning tools can be useful in teaching EU study courses in Asian universities. Keywords EU institutions · Foreign policy · Global actorness · Simulations · Asian students

D. Irrera (B) University of Catania, Catania, Italy e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 M. Stoicheva et al. (eds.), Relevance of European Studies in Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-7786-4_6

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The Challenges of Teaching EU Foreign Policy in Asian Universities Like all political actors in the global system, the European Union (EU) is experiencing difficult times. The COVID-19 outbreak has challenged states and intergovernmental organisations, putting at risk their preparedness and capacities to cope with the health, economic and social aspects of the pandemic. However, well before the current situation, some relevant political processes, economic trends, social phenomena and conflicts were putting the EU into a crisis of identity. Major scholarly debates and practitioners’ points of view have been focusing on the capacity of the integration project to resist and survive major effects of crises, mainly on member states (Rieker & Blockmans, 2019; Rittberger et al., 2018; Smith, 2018). A non-European student would definitively find it difficult to understand the rationale of the dynamics of the integration process and the need for binding alliances among states. Commonly, unions among different member states are fragile. All parties will have to agree to accommodate different preferences and objectives. Unions are built on common goals and practices and on the conception of cooperation as a collective advantage for decreasing costs and improving resources. The nature of the EU is essentially intergovernmental. Political changes affecting member states will necessarily impact the EU’s performance and its policies. At the same time, member states have contributed to growing and nurturing the spirit of the Union, through a series of socialisation processes that have produced policies and practices (Radaelli, 2018; Risse, Caporaso, & Cowles, 2018; Mastenbroek, 2018). Although the EU has always been perceived as a unique example, the literature on regionalism has demonstrated that, in some historical periods and specific circumstances, regional partnerships have been created for expanding commercial markets, building confidence, strengthening security or limiting the impact of existing conflicts (Börzel et al., 2019; Caporaso, 2018; Laurse, 2018; Telò, 2018). This has happened in various regions of the world, whereas on the European continent it has produced its most ambitious results, especially with the conception and formulation of a common foreign policy. The need to develop a unique strategy has been strongly related to the international actorness of the EU, which has been demonstrated in all those international contexts in which multilateral policies prevail (Lütz et al., 2021; Larsen, 2020; Rhinard & Sjöstedt, 2019; Hill, 2016). This has been driven by two major paths: on the one hand, the need to strengthen peace and security inside the borders; on the other, the will to promote cooperation in the neighbourhood and far beyond, based on common principles and to provide a model of peace and security (Aggestam & Bicchi, 2019; Barbè & Morillas, 2019; Attinà, 2021). The European security strategy has been shaped over decades, following major political events and fluctuations in multilateral dynamics. The document issued by High Representatives Javier Solana in 2001 (Council of the EU, 2003) after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the document launched in 2016–the EU global strategy (EUGS) (Council of the EU, 2016)—consolidates global actorness and the EU

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commitment towards peace and prosperity, not only inside its borders but also and more importantly outside them. Over the decades, the project has reached a higher level of ambition, including the creation of common defence and military capabilities, more functional humanitarian aid, and greater support to local civil society actors. Since the 2000s, more than 30 civilian and military missions have been deployed on three continents (Europe, Africa, and Asia) and the EU become the largest aid provider to developing countries (Attinà, 2014; Cañamares, 2018; Irrera, 2018a, 2018b; Versluys, 2016). However, maintaining such high standards and commitment in the present period may become hard, due to the renewed return to sovereignty and lack of trust in multilateralism and cooperation. The aspiration to bring peace and prosperity even outside the EU’s borders, in addition to the need to protect populations exposed to poverty, deprivation and violence, has requested the creation of a complicated political and bureaucratic system that, in the long term, has revealed some inefficiencies. This can only be partially explained by the global effects of the pandemic. Four main policy fields are paradigmatic of challenges such as the EU is living through: the humanitarian aid policy, conflict management and peacebuilding, counterterrorism and migration and refugee movements in the Mediterranean and along the Balkans. These issues constitute a relevant component of the European security strategy. Although their analysis concerns different policies—external relations, defence, justice and home affairs—an overall consideration in EU studies curricula can powerfully contribute to making EU global actorness easier to understand. Additionally, it can facilitate the use of active learning tools. From the start, the EU has been strongly committed to humanitarian emergencies. Facing major crises on all continents, its humanitarian aid policy has slowly progressed accordingly, balancing between member states’ prerogatives and the European Commission’s attempts to promote activities in a more concerted way. Starting from the need to implement and coordinate aid delivery to third countries, the EU then established the Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Management (DG ECHO), expanding its competencies in 2010 to include civil protection mechanisms to manage crises even within the EU’s borders (Dany, 2015; Nikolaidis, 2021; Parker et al, 2019). The policy has been planned to address the complexity of new crises efficaciously and to provide the EU with more sophisticated capacities. By bringing together humanitarian aid and civil protection, the Commission aimed at creating a comprehensive set of mechanisms of reactions and distribution of funds and competencies. The role of ECHO expanded in quantitative and financial terms but, more importantly, it was entrusted with the task of representing the humanitarian face of the EU to the world. Technical aspects of delivery, the selection of partners, identification of priorities and funding are all parts of this process. The core of ECHO activities remains the funding of various humanitarian actors who are essential for implementing projects and executing the EU goals and priorities (Irrera, 2018a). ECHO usually provides funding to an average of more than 200 partner organisations,

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including international organisations, UN agencies and civil society organisations, mainly humanitarian non-governmental organisations (NGOs). At the same time, aid interventions should be complemented and reinforced with those of the member states, according to humanitarian principles, international law and the common EU objectives. Member states can finance bilateral and collective assistance in parallel by making direct donations to a foreign country and indirect donations via the EU’s budget allocation to assistance programmes. Finally, the whole policy framework is complemented with the help of NGOs, which contribute to implementing projects and executing the humanitarian agenda (Rozbicka, & SzentIványi, 2020; Allen & Flynn, 2018; Irrera, 2018a). Humanitarian aid is one of the first priorities the EU has pursued, coherently with its mission and core principles. At the same time, local and global emergencies have slowly but firmly changed over the decades, requiring different kinds of interventions and tools. As affirmed in the EUGS, the EU needs to adapt to the changes occurring in global and regional security and particularly to shape its policies and capacities concerning the rise of more hybrid threats. This entails different kinds of warfare, both conventional and irregular tactics and capabilities. Hybrid threats can include violence, terrorism and criminal activities. The hybridity dimension concerns not only these threats but also the tools that are used to cope with them (Hoffman, 2007; Facon et al, 2008). Crises may distress several policy dimensions and require capabilities and tools that involve different actors and competencies. Bringing these needs into the EU foreign policy system is not always easy if one considers the preferences expressed by member states, which may vary. The development of convergent (or not conflicting) positions with respect to the most relevant contemporary crises (from Donbass to Syria and Yemen), is the ultimate and most difficult goal, along with the need to re-focus on defence. As previously stated, the EU has deployed several missions on different continents, according to the Treaty of Lisbon, which allows civilian and military assets in support of peace-keeping missions, conflict prevention and international security outside the Union (Treaty on European Union Article 42). Therefore, the number of military and civilian missions deployed outside Europe has increased and developed over the years, privileging some areas like Africa, the Balkans, and post-Soviet states. The civilian missions represent a unique feature of the EU impact on multilateral cooperation. They implement several executive tasks, including Security Sector Reform, Rule of Law and Border Control, and deal with the side effects of nontraditional threats like terrorism, organised crime, insurgency crime and terrorist issues (Juncos, 2018; Van der Ljin, 2018). Permanent Structured Cooperation on Security and Defence (PESCO) was established to deepen force cooperation among member states and to facilitate joint commitment and complement states’ preferences (Koenig & Walter-Franke, 2017; Biscop, 2018, 2020). Crisis management abilities have been employed in countries affected by violence and instability. The expansion of the civilian dimension, the involvement of nonstate actors, and economic and social investments in peace- and state-building have complemented the humanitarian dimension and the platform and expertise for

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improving cooperation with third countries and international organisations in the field of counterterrorism and anti-drugs policies (Irrera, 2018b). As already seen, hybrid threats necessarily require more sophisticated tools to catch the intersections among terrorists, criminals and insurgents. In the case of the EU, this means coordination of different policies, actors, and competencies, particularly the CFSP and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). The European Council of Santa Maria de Feira (EU Council 2000) clarified a list of priorities, including counterterrorism, the fight against specific forms of crime, drug trafficking and the consolidation of the rule of law in insecure countries. In such a comprehensive perspective, terrorists produce violence, make use of criminal activities as a source of funding, influence conflicts and open grey zones in which political legitimacy decreases and insecurity rapidly proliferates. Therefore, as recommended by the Council and since then, terrorism should be tackled in the framework of the CFSP with coordination among law enforcement, intelligence, police and judicial operators. The final result is another ambitious set of objectives to be managed inside and outside the borders and requiring a coordination mechanism between the Council and the Commission. More recent scholarly debates have focused on EU efforts towards the deradicalisation of members of terrorist organisations or lone wolves through the involvement of non-state actors, as the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) demonstrates (Foret & Markoviti, 2020; Melhuish & Heath-Kelly, 2021). The list of priorities includes migration, which in recent years has become one of the most contested and urgent issues at the EU level, particularly during the pandemic. Since 2014, some NGOs have started to carry out search and rescue (SAR) operations in the Mediterranean, for alleviating the humanitarian emergency and rescuing more people. The most striking effect was the visibly weak performances of the European Union Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) Med mission. The lack of a common strategy, as well as the absence of any collective solidarity were evident, together with the danger of violations of human rights and liberties (Attinà, 2018; Irrera, 2019; Müller & Slominski, 2021). Migration and refugees’ issues are challenging the EU and its member states’ commitments to be part of a comprehensive strategy that manages both internal and external aspects of the issue. The lack of any solidarity in this approach and the incapacity to find common positions can be read in parallel to the general fragmentation and uncertainty of European peoples. While this is partly due to the pandemic, it reflects a long-term feeling that has been misjudged and manipulated by populist parties and movements. (Kneuer, 2019; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018; Pirro et al., 2018). Humanitarian aid policy, crisis management, counterterrorism and migration issues are the most striking issues the EU is facing when it comes to security and defence. They are connected to the rise of populism and mistrust, which are not different from similar manifestations in different parts of the world order. Inclusive analysis of these issues is twofold: On the one hand, they reflect the complexity and the uniqueness of the EU approach and strategies, while on the other, they offer all necessary lenses for experimenting with more efficient teaching tools.

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Learning EU foreign policy, in its detailed aspects and implications, can be an extremely hard task, even for European students. Therefore, a learning-by-doing experience, mainly possible through simulations, can be useful for understanding the complexity and making it more fluid.

The Relevance of Active Learning Tools Active learning tools like games, role-playing and films are increasingly employed by instructors in bachelor’s and master’s courses to involve students, expand their knowledge and make them understand that political phenomena are common problems for everyone. Simulations, in particular, can be useful for applying theories to real issues, developing problem-solving capacities and abilities to draw potential scenarios and strategies. Although they can be employed in almost all disciplines, in the case of political science courses, students have the chance to experiment with the different steps of the decision-making processes in various policy fields. They can be asked to identify and evaluate the impact of policy outcomes, prepare policy prescriptions and understand why shaping policy-makers’ preferences and needs is always dominant. In other words, simulations and other kinds of games allow students to learn by doing, applying what they usually learn in the classroom to real-world environments (Newmann & Twigg, 2000; Giovanello et al., 2013). Active learning tools are particularly recommended in international studies curricula. Such courses are mainly focused on the need to explain the causes of war and the incentives for peace in the global political system, and simulations can be functional for achieving these aims. They can be used for adapting traditional approaches like foreign policy analysis and military and war studies to changing educational environments. Initially used for training military officers, these approaches have been employed in international relations courses for teaching tactical decisions and for applying theories to decision-making dynamics and actual global problems. Although they require greater effort from instructors in terms of preparation and assessment, several positive reasons and benefits for employing simulations can be listed. The first reason, common to all disciplines, deals with the pedagogic impact and the fact that simulations aim at expanding students’ skills and abilities as individuals and members of groups. Since they are asked to play different roles, mostly far from their usual habits and ideas, students have to make additional efforts to adapt to diverse settings and interactions. Either as members of diplomatic delegations or as states’ representatives of third parties, role-playing increases their awareness and motivation, enhances their personal abilities and skills, and improves their ability to work in teams (Baumann & FitzGibbon, 2021). Simulation dynamics can be frenetic and demanding and, consequently, produce frustration or dissatisfaction, particularly because students know that they are assessed on the quantity of their involvement and

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the quality of their participation, and not just because of their involvement. However, at the end of the experience, results are fruitful and constructive (Asal, 2005). Secondly, simulations are extremely helpful in international studies curricula as an incentive to study and deepen theories, international dynamics and concepts, even the most contested ones. In this sense, they can be functional in understanding EU global actorness and how international relations theories can be used to explain the connection between the EU and other relevant actors. Given that simulations reproduce the global political system, theories are essential in the preparation of scenarios, the distribution of roles and the building up of instructions and rules (Ben-Yehuda et al., 2015; Irrera, 2020). Simulations can be more easily employed to focus on international issues and the management and resolution of conflicts and crises, in other words, in all those contexts in which states are the main agents. This is not only a sign of the dominance of realist and neorealist paradigms in international relations in courses and textbooks but also the perception that other actors, like institutions and organisations, may be difficult to explain or study. Another relevant contribution that simulations bring is increased attention to diplomacy, third-party interventions and all of the more recent developments in the management of crises (Ben-Yehuda, 2020; Rosen & Asal, 2021). For example, simulations based on diplomatic negotiations motivate students to foster their abilities to confer (other than strategically), to adjust their approaches and to react to their counterparts’ actions, in a constant process of negotiation. Therefore, simulations have become useful for studying and applying a variety of international relations theories—other than realism—and additional interactive tools. Some scholars have argued that simulations include the rising importance of pluralism, international democracy and security communities, and the ethnic, civil and transnational dimensions of conflict, together with the traditional inter-state approaches. The inclusion of non-state actors, both international organisations and civil society groups, NGOs and lobbies, has become essential for exploring Track Two approaches and other relevant dimensions parallel to the political arena. Next to traditional negotiations, students are offered a wide variety of concepts to experiment with and incorporate, such as mediation and conflict transformation. Simulations may help instructors to teach some contested concepts, like security culture or comprehensive security. Studies on political fanaticism, for example, have demonstrated how difficult it may be for students to contextualise conflict resolution approaches and to understand why some conflicts may protract for years or decades (Ben-Yehuda & Zohar, 2018). This brings several interpretations and applications, particularly in conflict resolution simulations, but not only then. As discussed in the previous paragraphs, global crises have been managed with the intervention of states and the involvement of international and regional organisations. Studies on the global actorness of the EU have intensified the attempts to reach common positions on the most sensitive issues by overcoming the member states’ preferences and privileges. They have analysed the roadmap that has brought a European security strategy, grounded on a culture of peace promotion, democracy, human rights and social cohesion. As mentioned, a security culture in which the military component

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is not dominant and it is rather based on civilian dynamics can be difficult to explain to students who usually analyse security issues by using a different security culture. Operationalising contested concepts in international relations by using simulations can mitigate such difficulties. Analyses of simulations as applied to wars and conflicts result in more critical thinking among students with respect to management and policy-making (Taylor, 2013). Additionally, empirical analyses reveal that playing simulations are most useful in multicultural groups of students and enhances the value of diversity. Participants have to follow instructions provided by instructors and adapt to widely different roles. However, each of them interacts with others based on personal background, values, habits and expectations. Perceptions of how crisis management may oscillate from war to peace can differ from one student to another, and, as a consequence, converge or clash. The geographical context in which they study plays a relevant role. Some scholars have argued that if asked to play simulations in which local and regional grievances are involved, students based at European and American universities may find it difficult to understand the roots of political violence, war and terrorism. Interacting with non-Western fellows can change their perspectives and shape their views. In contrast, students living in the Middle East or Latin American countries, who daily experience instability or a more militarised life, may have a more sensitive security culture and approaches to concepts like cooperation and integration (Fowler, 2009; Kammerer & Higashi, 2021). Simulation models can be easily applied to a variety of student populations and produce positive results in all contexts, European and non-European, pushing students to share different perceptions of global concerns like terrorism, warfare, civil conflicts, pandemic and lack of capacities on the part of state leaders. In the end, the added value offered by simulations is not only that students can understand that theories and concepts become practical tools to be applied to the problems which millions of people in the world share in daily life. As scholars have stressed, if students are trained to manage problems and to act as potential future leaders, simulations will be a powerful tool to complement courses and internships (Ben-Yehuda & Zohar, 2018). A deeper discussion of the Game of Peace simulation can clarify how this works and how it can enhance courses on EU foreign policy.

The Game of Peace Model After several experiences in the classroom with master’s students, I have developed a theory-driven and role-based simulation, requiring participants to manage a civil conflict, identify a settlement and negotiate along an escalating process that culminates in a final and inclusive peace conference. The simulation is scheduled at the end of the course, and it presumes that students have already studied the main theories and concepts, which should be later applied in the game. The simulation is composed of several phases, usually located at the end of a course after the main theories, institutions and policy fields have been discussed. Within the course, and depending on the number of hours available, one, two or more

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weeks can be devoted to the simulation. One week before the formal start, students receive a political scenario and a series of suggested readings to prepare for the conflict. They are assigned specific roles and teams and are asked to become familiar with all requirements, instruction, simulation schedules and negotiation dynamics (Irrera, 2020). The political scenario is usually focused on real conflicts, like Syria, Donbass, Yemen or Darfur. Students have to prepare themselves about how the conflict has developed, on the actors involved and the regional and global dimensions. They are asked to interact accordingly and to work on the final aim of developing and promoting a sustainable peace plan, based on a power-sharing agreement to be drafted and approved (or rejected) during the peace conference. Further issues, connected to the conflict, like decommissioning, political violence, refugee management, human rights and minorities protection, should be managed and included in the plan. Depending on the relevant political actors involved in the conflict, local and external, students are split into groups. Then, they are asked to analyse their actor’s profile, approach and security culture and, within their group, to identify a policy plan to play accordingly during the whole simulation. In these initial phases, interactions are essential. Given that Game of Peace is a conflict resolution model in which negotiations play a pivotal role, one of the groups is asked to be a diplomatic mediator, the United Nations or the EU representative, expected to facilitate contacts among political actors and promote the agreement. After this preparatory period, the simulation itself continues for at least two rounds, which can be distributed across days or weeks, depending on the time that can be allocated to the simulation within the course (Irrera, 2020). Two different kinds of meetings are scheduled. The first requires informal interactions. Depending on the scenario, groups representing different political actors develop their strategy and start contacting the others to explore their positions. At the same time, the mediator is allowed to interact with all groups and can make use of positive or negative conditionality to convince parties to agree on common positions. As they are requested to work on real conflicts and play authentic political actors, students need to be credible, although they can use all their creativity. The second round is more formal and brings all the results achieved in the previous round to a formal peace conference chaired by the mediator. All political actors, or at least those who agree to join the conference, are invited to introduce their positions. Depending on the time available, the conference may last two hours or a week and ideally ends with various forms of commitment such as the signing of an agreement, a memorandum or a declaration of interest. A final debriefing session is an extremely relevant step at the end of any simulation. After intense and often frenetic work, students are finally free to express their feelings, frustrations, satisfactions and achievements. They usually provide both suggestions and complaints. After several experiences with different groups of students at various universities, Game of Peace has been ameliorated and changed but still constitutes an inescapable part of my courses, focused either on international relations theories, civil society and non-state actors, or counterterrorism. Students perceive how theories become real

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tools and, at the same time, develop relational and soft skills that are quite often not properly employed. As mentioned, this model can be used for various experiments and applied to EU studies, particularly for teaching EU external relations and foreign policy. Not only can it be useful for making concepts and ideas more tangible, but it can also increase the understanding of those students who are not familiar with the EU, who look at this actor as a different and distant one, making it more real. There are obviously some limitations to be taken into account, like the relational difficulties that students may encounter in working in teams or the frustration they may experience if simulated goals are not achieved. However, they are part of the pedagogical dimension of such teaching tools and, in the end, can be turned into a learning experience for students.

Teaching EU Foreign Policy by Using Simulations in Asian Universities Teaching the plethora of actors, bodies, procedures and outcomes which compose the EU CFSP can be extremely challenging. Bachelor’s or master’s courses focused on these issues usually include a theoretical overview and a discussion of the different phases through which common positions are defined and military and civilian missions are funded and deployed. Within such courses, simulations can improve students’ understanding and stimulate their critical thinking concerning the EU’s global actorness. The Game of Peace model, for example, is based on conflict resolution dynamics and usually focuses on the EU as a mediator in a specific conflict. In past experiences, this kind of experiment has produced excellent results. Students asked to play the role of mediator have positively tested the difficulties in balancing the member states’ preferences and the EU’s need to maintain a common view. For this reason, it is important to select a real conflict in which the EU has played or may play an effective diplomatic role. At the same time, the model can be easily applied to different scenarios and, in particular, to the institutional dynamics internal to the EU. In one of my courses, focused on the EU foreign policy, I applied Game of Peace for playing with the building up of a common position towards the conflict in Donbass by involving the institutions that are part of CFSP policy-making. The experiment requires great effort and a large allocation of time but has produced extremely positive results. The main scenario was based on the events occurring in the region during the pandemic, in 2020, with the crisis slowly stagnating, and the living conditions of the local population worsened by the COVID-19 outbreak. Students were asked to work and produce a plan endorsed by the EU. The plan was expected to promote a conflict resolution process by considering military issues and decommissioning, the humanitarian dimension, and health issues related to the pandemic and energy shortage. Preliminarily, students were asked to review the historical and political situation that led to the conflict, the regional dynamics, and relations with Russia. Then, they had to get acquainted with the political process that brings parties

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to a common position and with the institutions involved, that is to say, the Political and Security Committee, the Foreign Affairs Council, the High Representative and the EU Commission and the Council. Ultimately, playing intergovernmental bodies, they had to experiment with how to balance common aims and necessities with member states’ preferences. Students were split into groups corresponding to different institutions, with the majority of them representing member states. The Game of Peace rounds, as described in the previous paragraph, were easily applied. Firstly, all groups met in parallel in separate rooms, or virtual rooms if necessary. The EU Commission was expected to prepare an initial draft plan, whereas the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) met in parallel to negotiate a common position in respect to the conflict. The High Representative (HR), as President of the FAC, prepared for the discussion, assisted by the European External Action Service (EEAS). These preliminary meetings happened according to the rules and procedures but allowed for informal relations and negotiations. The HR had the chance to approach all members and obtain relevant information for chairing consultations, whereas representatives of different member states started to get accustomed to commonalities and divergencies in their positions. Given that this simulation was mainly based on internal EU dynamics, no external actors and/or Ukrainian representatives were included. After this first round, the formal collective sessions started. The EU Commission approved a draft document and submitted it to the PSC. Following a debate within the PSC, the document was approved and submitted to the FAC, chaired by the HR. This last collective session was an extremely formal one during which all member states representatives debated and amended the text. At the end of the session, the FAC approved an official EU peace plan to support the Ukrainian population and invest in the strengthening of good relations. During the debriefing session, several interesting comments and suggestions emerged on the part of students, which were confirmed and deepened in the short reflective essay that each of them was asked to prepare as part of the assessment. The multicultural and multinational nature of the class contributed to making discussions and interactions more dynamic and original and emphasised inevitable frictions and differences. Some students found it difficult to personalise member states properly, as their approaches and diplomatic views were far apart or different; these students had to study more than others. Many of them experienced frustration during the most contested parts of the meetings and mourned the lack of empathy shown by some participants, which impacted the smoothness of negotiations and the outcome. In the end, students realised that the simulation was extremely challenging as it reflected the complexity of the EU institutions’ procedures. They found that this long and intense exercise had been beneficial not only for unveiling and developing their skills but also for improving their learning. Playing institutions made them understand why the EU may appear weak or slow in the face of major crises and clarified the specificities of some external policies and interventions. Asian universities have a consolidated tradition in the use of simulations in international studies curricula, particularly in teaching foreign policy and military dynamics (Doherty & Singh, 2005; McKee, 2017). The study of EU foreign policy, its role as

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an international actor, and its relations with relevant political regions including Asia are rapidly increasing among students and instructors, not only as part of specific courses on EU integration but also in traditional and broader international relations courses. The use of models like Game of Peace can serve multiple purposes. Even in respect of the same conflict, the EU can be analysed in its external functions or its internal dynamics. Theories, concepts, institutions and procedures come to life and enrich knowledge and understanding. As previously discussed, students located in non-European contexts, particularly in Asian universities, may be facilitated in the learning of widely different security cultures, civilian dimensions and diplomacy. The extensive use of simulations and active learning tools can expand their interest in EU foreign policy and facilitate an increase in the number of courses and curricula, contributing to the internationalisation processes.

Conclusions This chapter discusses the use of active learning tools in EU studies courses in Asian universities. Whereas the interest in EU integration and the Europeanisation of policies is already consolidating, teaching more specific topics like EU global actorness, its foreign policy and its actions in the global political system may be a difficult task for both instructors and students. The first problem is related to the unique nature of the EU, constantly balanced between its member states’ preferences and prerogatives and the need to assure common positions and objectives. Secondly, EU international actorness is squeezed between its potentialities and its massive signs of weakness, a complex mixture of external relations, policies and institutional processes. This affects the perceptions other actors may have in terms of promptness and determination, particularly in its role as a peace provider and in the promotion of conflict resolution. Generally speaking, courses on international relations and foreign policy require multiple perspectives to provide students with the right expertise and knowledge. Basic training in historical contexts, external and domestic politics, regional and international balances, economic conditions, military power and security culture is necessary for explaining foreign relations and introducing crisis management and conflict resolution. As the most recent scholarship on active learning has demonstrated, simulations can be extremely useful in such courses and significantly enhance teaching and learning of basic theories and concepts. Depending on the scenario, the specific purposes, the format, and time allocation, simulations are becoming an essential tool for international studies courses. By developing personal and collective soft skills, students are incentivised to study more, increase interactions with their fellows, negotiate and struggle. Given that student mobility is increasing and that universities are becoming more multicultural, discussion on most contested concepts, like security culture, extremism and fanaticism, can be difficult. Playing with scenarios can be

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functional in contributing to disabling potential frictions and inevitable divergencies. Finally, simulations are ideal for decoupling complex topics like EU foreign policy. Although Asian universities have already consolidated interest in European studies, from different methodological perspectives, the EU as an international actor appears as a different actor, grounded on a distant approach and principles, which may be difficult to be efficiently described. Like many other models, the Game of Peace simulation can be employed for various purposes, including the study of CFSP institutional dynamics and allowing students to personalise EU member states and experiment on their own with the difficulties and challenges. The expansion of knowledge of the EU, its activities and aims, even in non-European contexts, definitively contributes to a more multicultural, vivid and open-minded education environment, which is necessary for training future citizens and young leaders. Offering them the chance to play and experiment with real-life situations in the classroom, in parallel to theories and traditional learning, represents an irreplaceable added value.

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Chapter 7

Teaching EU Law Outside the EU: An Explorative Analysis of Eight Case Studies in Asia Irene Wieczorek and Qianyu Wang

Abstract This chapter investigates the state of EU law teaching in Asia. It chooses eight countries/regions as case studies (mainland China, Macau, Hong Kong, South Korea, Japan, India, Pakistan, Singapore) based on their capacity to represent different regions in Asia (East Asia, South Asia, South East Asia) and to include both countries/regions with a colonial past with the EU and without. Given the limited and dated nature of the literature on the topic, which accounts for the originality of this study, the research relies on primary sources for data collection, namely websites and syllabi and elite interviews with EU law professors. The finding shows that firstly, EU law teaching is offered in at least one, and in some cases significantly more than one, academic institutions in each of the surveyed countries/regions. Both the basics of EU constitutional law and substantive policies of EU law (e.g., among others, EU competition law, EU environmental law, EU data protection law) are taught. Secondly, we found a gap between scholarly and students’ interest in EU law. On the staff side, the interest in offering EU law teaching in countries where EU law does not directly apply, stems from a strong scholarly interest in EU law research, and from the role of the EU as a normative global actor in certain fields of law. This makes the inclusion of EU law teaching unavoidable in law schools where comparative law methodology is used extensively as a pedagogical tool. We interpreted this as a spill over effect on the legal education sector of the EU’s well-known norm-diffusion efforts. Students’ reasons for taking, or not taking, EU law courses are however mainly pragmatic and job-market-related and are based on a pre-conception as to EU law’s irrelevance for their career. This was interpreted as a failure to highlight This paper was presented at the Workshop EU law teaching in the UK post-Brexit: learning from EU law colleagues based in other non-EU states and seeking UK solutions, on 12th of June 2022 organised by the University of Reading. We are grateful for the comments received during the workshop, and to the editor of this collection for their helpful comments. We are also indebted to Sungyup (Justin) Kim for his invaluable research assistance on South Korean Universities. I. Wieczorek (B) Durham Law School, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LE, UK e-mail: [email protected] Q. Wang University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 M. Stoicheva et al. (eds.), Relevance of European Studies in Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-7786-4_7

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the existing practical relevance of EU law and how also non-European job market can reward this type of expertise. Students appear to maintain a fairly neutral vision of the EU and the legacy of colonialisation by European countries does not play a role in shaping their views. If anything it fosters more exchanges with European countries. The teaching of EU law is generally adjusted to a non-European audience. This influences the areas of EU law which are taught, but also the level of depth with which these are taught. An added value is identified in relying on non-western readings on EU law, however, there does not seem to be a structured effort to deliver EU law teaching from a non-Eurocentric perspective. This can also explain why students’ critical view of the EU does not seem to be strongly developed. Keywords EU Law teaching · Mainland China · Macau · Hong Kong · South Korea · Japan · India · Pakistan · Singapore

Introduction European Union (EU) law is a long-established scholarly discipline, and a compulsory subject in most law degrees in EU Member States since the early days of the EU. This is obviously unsurprising, as aspiring lawyers wanting to practice law in an EU Member State will have to pass bar exams that are likely to include EU law as a compulsory subject (as in Italy or Ireland, and to date still England and Wales), or will encounter EU law in their practice anyway. Yet, the interest in EU law research and teaching does not stop at the boundaries of Europe. Well-established EU law scholars, programmes, and research centres exist for instance in EU neighbouring states, but also in the United States. For instance, the University of Oslo offers several courses on different aspects of EU law1 ; and one can mention, among many in the US, the European Legal Studies Centre at Columbia University,2 or the European Legal Studies Programme at Michigan Law School.3 Given the lack of obvious link with the legal job market, the teaching of this regionspecific subject outside the borders of the EU has triggered quite some intellectual reflection. The question has been raised as to why and how EU law should be taught in a country where it does not apply to its citizens’ everyday lives. Interesting reflections exist, among others, by US-based scholars (Nicola & Davies, 2017); Norwayand Switzerland-based scholars (Maiani et al., 2019); and Turkey-based scholars (Basar, 2021). Similarly, research exists also on how EU law should be taught in a recently enlarged Europe (Selanec, 2015), and in candidate countries (Krstevska, 2018). Furthermore, Brexit has understandably triggered a significant increase in debates on how to teach EU law outside the EU given the sort of ‘existential crisis’ 1

https://www.uio.no/english/studies/courses/law/jus/. https://european-legal-studies.law.columbia.edu/. 3 https://michigan.law.umich.edu/academics/centers-and-programs/european-legal-studies-pro gram. 2

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British EU law academics were thrown in (Cotter & Dewhurst, 2019; James & Koo, 2017; Barnard & Craig, 2019; Flear & Mac Síthigh, 2019; Clear et al., 2019; Visvizi et al., 2021). However, we find a lack of discussion on the teaching of EU law outside Europe and North America, and especially in the Global South. This is despite the fact that several universities outside the EU, especially in Asia, offer standalone courses on EU law as it is illustrated in this contribution. As our literature review below shows, there is but a handful and dated publications on the teaching of EU law in Asia. Among recent contributions, we are only aware of the edited collection on the future of EU studies in Asia, in which this chapter is included. Our work aims to fill the specific gap of research on the teaching of EU law in Asia. It provides a first mapping of the existing offering for EU law teaching in eight countries/regions in Asia chosen as case studies, of the topics covered, the rationales for staff and students respectively for setting up and for taking EU law courses, and of the different teaching approaches to this discipline. To our knowledge, no up-to-date study similar in scope and methodology has been conducted so far. Our findings show that EU law teaching, both of the basics of EU constitutional law, and EU substantive policies, is offered in at least one, and in some cases significantly more than one, academic institutions in each of the surveyed countries/regions. There is however a gap between scholarly and students’ interest in EU law. Academic staff’s interest in setting up EU law courses stems from a strong scholarly interest in EU law research, and from the need to incorporate EU law as a comparator in those areas where the EU acts as a normative global actor especially. This is particularly important in law schools where comparative law methodology is used extensively as a pedagogical tool. We interpreted this as a spill over effect on the legal education sector of the EU’s well-known norm-diffusion efforts. Students’ reasons for taking, or not taking EU law courses are conversely mainly pragmatic and job-market-related and are based on a pre-conception as to EU law’s irrelevance for their career. This was interpreted as a failure to highlight the existing practical relevance of EU law and of how the non-European job market can reward this type of expertise. Students appear to maintain a fairly neutral vision of the EU and colonial legacy of European countries does not play a role in shaping their views, if anything it fosters more exchanges with European countries. The teaching of EU law is generally adjusted to a non-European audience. This influences the areas of EU law which are taught, but also the level of depth with which these are taught. An added value is identified in relying on non-western readings on EU law, however, there does not seem to be a structured effort to deliver EU law teaching from a non-Eurocentric perspective. This can also explain why students’ critical view of the EU does not seem to be strongly developed.

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Literature Review We are aware of six publications on the teaching of EU law and EU studies in Asia. Two of these are publications by Chinese scholars dating to the early 2000s (Shen, 2000; Zeng & Yao, 2002). Several years later, in 2016, five articles on EU research and teaching in the Asia–Pacific Region were published in a feature issue of the Japanese Journal of European Studies, titled ‘How to teach about the EU effectively and excitingly in the Asia–Pacific Region’. Among them, four pieces focused on Asian countries, three on Japan (Nakamura, 2016; Bacon & Yoshizawa, 2016; Day, 2016), and one on South Korea (Park & Lee, 2016). These scholars have mainly focused on mapping the state of and the direction of EU studies and EU Law research and teaching in the relevant countries, with some analysis of the different forces motivating the setting up of EU law courses outside the EU, students’ interest in EU law and EU studies, or lack thereof, and different teaching approaches to EU law. The literature will first be analysed by country, and then a few general conclusions will be drawn on common trends where present. Chinese scholars have conducted quantitative studies on publications by academics in mainland China on the subject of EU law and EU studies from the 1980s till the early 2000s. If compared to interest in European Studies in general, interest in EU law is more limited with respect to interest in EU politics and economics. Between 1990 and 2002, 919 articles were published in the field of European studies, which is already informative data as to the volume of interest in the discipline, and among these 257 articles were written on European politics (27.9% of the total), 203 articles were written on European economics (22% of the total), and 52 articles written on European law (5.6% of the total) (Shen, 2000). Nonetheless, EU law was identified to be one of the most dynamic and fastest-growing fields in Chinese legal research in that period. Five reasons for the increased academic interests in EU law were identified: ‘China’s reform and opening-up’ since the 1970s; the EU’s increasing political, economic, and legal status; the development of China-EU relations since the 1970s; the uniqueness of the EU legal system; and the rise of exchanges and cooperation projects with the EU both at the governmental and university level (Zeng & Yao, 2002). These authors argue in favour of stronger government intervention for quite ambitious initiatives to foster the teaching and research on EU law specifically, including further exchanges with European Scholars and support the setting up of EU law courses, European research institutes, and European documentation centres in China (Zeng & Yao, 2002). In terms of future directions for EU studies, Chinese scholars put emphasis on developing European studies as a discipline which Chinese characteristics, thus being guided by Marxism-Leninism and Deng Xiaoping Theory (Shen, 2000) also relying on comparative study of EU law and Chinese law (Zeng & Yao 2002); on interdisciplinary research on EU law (Zeng & Yao 2002; Shen 2000); and to include further reflections on legal issues in Sino-European economic and trade relations (Zeng & Yao 2002).

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In terms of teaching, as of 2002, what the authors refer to as the most influential law schools in China all introduced EU law courses, and several of them have developed series of courses focusing on specific fields of EU law (Zang & Yao, 2002). Wuhan University was identified as an exemplar of EU law teaching where six EU law courses were developed, which include introduction to EU law, EU and international organisations, EU human rights law, EU environmental law, EU banking law, and EU external relations. Moreover, it was reported that EU law is referenced during courses on, among others, private international law, international trade law, and company law (Zang & Yao, 2002). South Korean scholars similarly focused on mapping the teaching and research of EU law in South Korea, reporting that 18 Korean universities offered EU law or EU-related courses as of 2016 (Park & Lee, 2016). The reason for introducing these courses was identified as stemming from personal interest of academic staff in the discipline—often due to having studied or having had academic experience in EU Member States. Scholars with this background are inclined to teach EU law as a selfstanding discipline. Other scholars educated abroad but not in Europe arguably show an interest in EU law and the EU but as a part of public international law or law of international organisations. Similar to what had been reported by Chinese scholars, there has been a growing interest on the side of South Korean scholars in many fields of EU law, including EU contract law, EU human rights law, EU investment law, EU public procurement law, EU sports law, EU competition law, EU commercial law, EU IP law, and EU anti-terrorism law; and a growing number of academic publications, both articles and textbooks, written by Korean scholars, or written by European scholars and translated by Korean scholars. But again, as in mainland China, most South Korean societies and research centres researching the EU focus on EU studies, including EU history, economy, politics, and culture rather than EU law. Only the European Constitutional Law Association, founded in 2006, was listed as a law society interested in the EU in South Korea. Despite such flourishing of academic interest in EU law, the authors nonetheless record a declining interest in EU law teaching on the side of the students. The reason the authors identify this is primarily the lack of relatability and usefulness in practice that students associate with EU law. They then further suggest that a more practical approach to the teaching of EU, and a more institutional organisation between research centres, might improve EU law teaching in South Korea. Some Japanese scholars report a similar situation in terms of decline in students’ interest in EU law courses in Japan. This is attributed to students’ perception that EU law might not be relevant for their future professional careers, and a nationalised vision of Europe as composed of nation states which makes the EU as a supranational structure look complex and alien. Similar to what was stated for South Korean universities, these Japanese authors suggest a more practical approach to the teaching of EU law, which exposes the students to the relations between the EU and Japan and allows them to interact with EU officials (Nakamura, 2016). Examples of such more proactive approaches as implemented in Japanese universities are ‘Model EU’ (Bacon & Yoshizawa, 2016), and an Active and Blended learning approach (Day, 2016). Other approaches to the teaching of EU law include comparative regionalism,

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presenting EU law as a discipline at the crossroads between international law and comparative public law, and adopting a law in context approach (Nakamura, 2016). To sum up, the key aspects that emerge from this, although limited, number of publications is that there is an interest in researching and offering teaching of EU law, in these three Asian countries, although in general, it is more within disciplines such as economics, history, cultural studies, or area studies that a strong interest for the EU is displayed. Nonetheless, there seems to be a divergence between scholarly and students’ interest in EU law. Mainland China seems to exhibit an increasing interest in EU law teaching and research, while Japan and South Korea appear to experience a decline in interest mainly due to students’ perception of limited usefulness of EU law expertise. However, it should be noted there might be a temporal factor as the Chinese publications are 15 years older than the Japanese and South Korean ones. They date to the early 2000s when the EU’s economic and political relevance at the global level was at a particular peak given the completion of the internal market, and the introduction of the Euro, and the authors themselves link the raise of interest in EU law teaching to specific historical events such as the widening of EU–China relations. Lastly, a discussion exists as to how to teach EU law to a non-European audience, both in terms of theoretical framework, see the references to Marxist theories, but also simply as to the classification of EU law as part of international law courses as opposed to comparative law ones, and of concrete teaching approaches. These findings are informative to our research. They are nonetheless dated. This chapter aims to build on those and provide a more up-to-date picture of the state of EU law teaching in these three countries (China, Japan, and South Korea), and broaden the study geographically to other five countries/regions in Asia. Moreover, as better explained below under research questions, it will explore more in-depth aspects such as the topic covered by these courses and the rationales for scholars’ and students’ interest in EU law, and teaching approach to EU law.

Research Methods A. Research Questions The broad research question of the study is the state of the teaching of EU law in Asia. More specifically the study investigates: RQ1—Is EU law taught in these eight Asian countries/regions, i.e., mainland China, Macau, Hong Kong, South Korea, Japan, India, Pakistan, and Singapore? RQ 2—What are the universities’ rationales for setting up EU law courses? RQ 3—What policy areas of EU law are covered in these courses? RQ 4—What degree of interest do students show in taking EU law courses, and what are their motivations? RQ 5—Is EU law teaching somehow adjusted to the local context, is there a non-western approach to EU law teaching?

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B. Data Collection 1. Data Selection Criteria The criteria for the selection of the case studies include exhaustiveness and accessibility. Eight countries/regions have been selected among those where information existed, and interviews were possible in either English or Mandarin, the languages spoken by the two researchers, so as to obtain representation from as many regions as possible within the Asian continent, namely South Asia (Pakistan and India), Southeast Asia (Singapore), and East Asia (mainland China, Hong Kong, Macau, Japan, and South Korea).4 Moreover, a choice has been made to include countries or regions which have a colonial past involving a European country which is (or has been) a member of the EU and thus participated in the drafting of EU law—such as Pakistan, India, Macau, Hong Kong, and Singapore—and countries which do not have such historical ties with EU Member States. This factor was considered relevant as, it was hypothesised, it might have an influence on the former colonised countries/regions’ relation with European legal systems, and indirectly EU law. 2. Data Collection Methods In terms of methods, the research collected primary data through analysing primary sources (university webpages, syllabi, and reading lists) and conducting expert interviews. These are interviews with the professional elite who possess expertise in the specific research area (Littig, 2009). The choice in favour of primary data collection and analysis, especially through interviews, as opposed to using secondary sources ensures the data is closely linked to the purpose and the exploratory nature of the study. Considering the very limited literature on the matter, analysis of primary data makes for an indispensable methodological choice. The interviewees are all scholars who both research and teach EU law or EU studies that include a legal component as further explained below, or are informed as to the interest in EU law within universities in the selected countries because of their position (e.g., head of school). Since the study covers both lecturers’ opinions on the rationale for EU law teaching and students’ opinions, an alternative choice could have been to interview both lecturers as expert interviewees and conduct qualitative interviews with students. The choice to only rely on lecturers’ opinions, including on students’ perceptions, is determined by reason of limitation of resources and efficiency. Reliance on expert interviews allows the collection of data as to both the structure of the courses and the state of the research-informed teaching in the relevant country as well as of the lecturers’ impression of the students’ reaction to the offering of EU law teaching. Gathering similar information through interviews with students in all the relevant countries/regions would have required extensive qualitative studies for which at present there were no resources. 4

Hong Kong and Macau have been treated as separate case studies from mainland China, although part of the same country in light of their different colonial past which—the study posited as a research hypothesis—might have an impact on the legal education system.

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Moreover, the choice is also justified in light of the nature of the study, which is meant to be a pilot one aimed to identify relevant themes among students’ perceptions and rationale for taking EU law and EU studies courses. Current data can inform the design of more in-depth research on students’ perceptions in the future, which can be conducted through larger scale quantitative research and qualitative interviews with students directly. The present study relies on responses from 18 scholars coming from academic institutions in the eight countries/regions chosen as case studies. More in detail, the interviewed scholars came from China (Wuhan University, Beijing University of Foreign Studies—BUFS), Macau (University of Macau—UM, Macau University of Science and Technology—MUST), Hong Kong (City University of Hong Kong—CityU, HK), South Korea (Seoul National University—SNU), Japan (Waseda University, Tokyo University, Hitotsubashi University), India (Symbiosis Law School Pune, O.P. Jindal Global University, Manipal Academy of Higher Education), Pakistan (National University of Modern Languages—NUML), and Singapore (National University of Singapore—NSU). Details about scholars’ names, positions, and expertise are included in the table in Appendix 1. All the interviewees were forwarded the same five questions included in a questionnaire also including open-ended questions. These are included in Appendix 2. Fifteen interviewees were interviewed via zoom through semi-structured interviews, which were based on the circulated questionnaire but expanded beyond it. Three scholars answered the questions in writing via email correspondence. The replies to the interviews and to the questionnaires begin with a focus on the teaching of EU law in the academic institution where the interviewed scholar is currently, but then further expanded to discussion of the situation in the country’s higher education sector in general. The information gathered therefore goes beyond the specific institution. Except for Singapore and Pakistan, in each of the remaining six case studies the study includes interviews from at least two scholars so as to be able to compare the results. Where available, e.g., Japan and South Korea, we also relied on secondary literature on the topic to triangulate the results. Reliance on only one interview in Singapore and Pakistan is due to the fact that, to the best of our knowledge, our interviewees were the only ones teaching EU law, or EU studies, in the country, which in itself was considered relevant information. The interviewees are all legal scholars teaching in law schools, or political scientists teaching in the political science department in universities who incorporate EU law content in their courses. The choice to include both is motivated by the need to expand the pool of interviewees. Interviews with political scientists focused on their law teaching, which therefore makes the data comparable across different interviews. C.

Data Analysis

The quantitative data gathered through analysis of websites and courses’ syllabi, as well as interviews were organised in tables in file with the authors. The analysis of the interview transcripts and questionnaires has been a thematic one done through coding. All 15 semi-structured interviews were transcribed upon

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their completion based on zoom recording or zoom transcription and the researchers’ interview notes. Subsequent thematic analysis of data in interview transcripts and questionnaires took an inductive approach, allowing themes to emerge from the data without any prior expectations from the researchers. A deductive approach, with expected and predetermined themes, was neither possible nor advisable, as the researchers in this study did not have any preconceived judgments about the findings due to the lack of existing theories and limited prior research in this area as mentioned in the literature review section. Reflexive thematic analysis was adopted during the inductive coding process, as opposed to using a set of predetermined codes, in light of the flexibility it allows to edit codes as the researchers work through the data. The analysis distinguished quantitative data and qualitative data gathered through the data collection process. Quantitative data, which was quantifiable or already presented in the literature as percentages, includes the answers to whether EU law is taught in the interviewees’ universities, the characteristics of the course, e.g., optional or compulsory, the topics that are covered in the course, and if there is no standalone EU law courses, in what courses is EU law referenced. Such data is quantifiable, and therefore considered forming the basis of quantitative research, to the extent that similar answers popped up and the percentage of their frequency could be quantified. Where possible, the data was verified and supplemented with information from university websites and course syllabus. Qualitative data includes responses to questions such as the rationale for setting up EU courses, the level of student interest from the interviewees’ perspective, the most attractive areas of EU law for teaching and research, the different teaching approaches, including merits of a non-western approach to EU law, and if no EU law courses were set up, the rationale for this situation. Qualitative data was collected mostly through expert interviews and triangulated with information within existing literature, which supported our findings. In the process of coding the qualitative data, reoccurring opinions were highlighted in each transcript. These were then colour coded to enable the compilation of general themes that reoccurred among all interview transcripts. The themes that emerged from the data will be presented and explored in detail in the following sections.

Findings A. Quantitative Data This section focuses on answering RQ1 (Is EU law taught in these eight Asian countries/regions, i.e., mainland China, Macau, Hong Kong, South Korea, Japan, India, Pakistan, and Singapore?). The study found that there is an interest in EU law teaching in Asia, which can be evidenced by the setting up of EU law courses and master programmes in the surveyed Asian universities. The table below describes

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the offerings of 41 universities in the eight countries/regions surveyed both through website analysis, and through interviews and questionnaires. As far as Macau, Hong Kong, South Korea, Japan, India, Pakistan, and Singapore, the information as to the presence of EU law courses is, to the best of our knowledge, based on the replies of our interviewees and independent research, exhaustive. It covers all the institutions in the country which offer EU law courses, or where EU law features in EU studies courses. The information about law school in mainland China is not exhaustive. Surveying the whole of law schools in mainland China, which has over 620 law schools (Mu, 2011), seemed an impractical task. The inclusions of the listed 9 universities in mainland China which we were informed by our interviewees, or from whose website it can be gathered that they, offer EU law teaching is meant to be illustrative of the interest in teaching EU law in mainland China. The data shows that EU law teaching is featured, at present,5 in 34 universities across the eight Asian countries/regions object of the study.6 While EU law is mostly offered as an optional course, there are at least two examples in which it is compulsory on paper (Symbiosis International University, India) or de facto (MUST, Macau). At least three universities offer specialised EU law master programmes (1 in India, 1 in Macau, and 1 in mainland China), to these one should add the seven universities in mainland China which offer such specialised EU law programmes through exchange programmes with European universities. Among the universities surveyed, Symbiosis International University (India) has developed the most comprehensive set of EU law courses with 28 modules covering various aspects of EU law. Following that, Doshisha University (Japan) and UM (Macau) have nine and seven EU law courses on offer, respectively. Among the topics that are covered under EU law courses in Asian universities, introduction of the EU and EU constitutional law are the two most commonly taught areas, with 24 courses among the 28 universities incorporate them as teaching content.7 Because of student audience’s general unfamiliarity with the EU and with EU law, it is not surprising that the EU’s social and historical background and EU constitutional law, which are the foundation of learning EU law, are taught the most.

5

This covers courses offered for the academic year 2021/2022. This is with the caveat that the offerings of optional EU law courses are subject to change every year according to the availability of professors and the circumstances of the universities. For example, in the 21/22 academic year, and incidentally 22/23 NUS (Singapore) did not offer EU law course due to the course leader professor Damian Chalmers unavailability, though the course is still listed on the website. 7 Excluding South Korea: Chonbuk University, Youngnam University, Sogang University, and University of Seoul. 6

Optional Optional Optional N/A N/A

Yes9 Yes10 Yes11 N/A12 N/A14

Wuhan University

Beijing Foreign Studies University

China University of Political Science and Law

Tongji University

Renmin University

1 course: EU Law.

N/A

N/A

UG and PG

UG and PG

PG

Undergraduate (UG)/ Postgraduate (PG) Level

Yes15 (in partnership) (continued)

Yes13 (in partnership)

Yes

No

No

EU law master programmes

See supra n 12.

14

Renmin University Law School offers exchange LLM programmes in Chinese and European Law in partnership with the University of Geneva, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (Spain), Aix-Marseille University (France). Renmin University Law School also has a joint PhD programme with the University of Munich.

15

Tongji University offers a dual-degree programme with Humboldt University of Berlin and University of Konstanz, focusing on Chinese law, German law, and European law.

13

12 Although the university offers a specialised EU law master programme in partnership with European universities, duo to limited information that can be found regarding the master programme, whether EU law is only taught in partner universities is unknown. Thus, we are unable to ascertain whether EU law is offered as a standalone course in the Chinese university.

EU Law Courses are offered by the EU China School of Law which includes a Master in European and International Law. The are two core modules that cover EU Law. The first ‘European Union Law’ covers are Legal Foundations of EU Law and European Political Systems, Internal Market, Area of Freedom Security and Justice, Competition Law and External Relations and Common Commercial Policy. The second one ’European Business Law’, covers European Private Law, and European Company Law, Insolvency Law, Litigation and Arbitration Law, Financial Markets and Regulation.

11

International Institutional law and European Union (UG course for the School of European Languages at BFSU), and Seminar on International Institutional Law (including EU Law) PG course for law students at BFSU.

10

Include both EU Law courses and EU Studies courses that contain some EU law content.

9

Mainland China

Optional or compulsory

Courses on EU law8

Name of University

8

East Asia

Country/ Region

Table 7.1 EU law courses taught in the 38 universities object of the study

7 Teaching EU Law Outside the EU: An Explorative Analysis of Eight … 105

Compulsory23 Compulsory/Optional

Yes22 Yes24

Macau University of Science and Technology

University of Macau

PG

UG and PG

N/A

Yes

Yes

(continued)

Yes (in partnership)

Yes (in partnership)

Yes19 (in partnership)

Yes17 (in partnership)

EU law master programmes

See supra n 12.

1 EU Law course at UG and 1 EU Law course at PG level.

21

22

24 7 courses on EU law: Treaty reforms in the EU, Institutional law of the European Union, Economic law of the European Union, External law and policy of the European Union, EU competition law, EU environmental law, EU natural resources, and energy law.

Chen (MUST, Macau) states the EU law course, although optional on paper, could be seen as semi-compulsory due to the limited number of optional courses offered within the law school. Students have to choose the course to fulfil their graduation credits.

23

See supra n 12.

20

Chongqing University, Northwest University of Political Science and Law and the University of International Business and Economics offer exchange LLM programmes in Chinese and European Law with Paris 2 Panthéon-Assas University. These programmes are administered by the Ministry of Education of China and the Chinese Scholarship Council.

19

See supra n 12.

N/A

N/A21

University of International Business and Economics

N/A

Xiamen University offers an exchange LLM programme which features EU law with the University of Amsterdam and Leiden University.

N/A

N/A20

Northwest University of Political Science and Law

N/A

18

N/A

N/A18

Chongqing University

N/A

See supra n 12.

N/A

N/A16

Xiamen University

Undergraduate (UG)/ Postgraduate (PG) Level

17

Optional or compulsory

Courses on EU law

Name of University

16

Macau

Country/ Region

Table 7.1 (continued)

106 I. Wieczorek and Q. Wang

Yes31 Yes33

Kyung Hee University

University of Seoul

PG

PG

PG

PG

PG

PG

PG

PG

Undergraduate (UG)/ Postgraduate (PG) Level

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

(continued)

EU law master programmes

2 courses on EU law: EU law, EU contract law.

1 course on EU law: EU internal legal governance law.

2 courses on EU law: EU law, EU private law.

The course ‘EU law’ is compulsory for the postgraduate global business law pathway.

1 course on EU law: Korea–US/EU free trade agreement.

29

30

31

32

33

8 courses on EU law: European Union Law, Special topics in European Union law, EU trade law and policy, European economic law, Special topics on EU cooperation law, European tax law, EU administrative law, and European Union criminal law.

28

2 courses on EU law: EU law, European legal history.

Yes30

Ewha Women University

3 courses on EU law: EU law, EU company and security law, EU international relations law.

Optional

Yes29

Sungkyunkwan University

27

Optional Compulsory/Optional32

Yes28

Korea University

1 course on EU law: European Union law.

Optional Optional

Yes27

Yonsei University

26

Optional Optional

Yes26

Seoul National University

South Korea

25

Optional

Chinese University of Hong Yes25 Kong

Optional or compulsory

Hong Kong

Courses on EU law

Name of University

Country/ Region

Table 7.1 (continued)

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Yes40 Yes41 Yes42

Kyungbook National University

Youngnam University

Pusan University

PG

PG

PG

PG

PG

PG

PG

PG

PG

Undergraduate (UG)/ Postgraduate (PG) Level

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

(continued)

EU law master programmes

1 course on EU law: European private law.

5 courses on EU law: The law of the European Union, Theory of European constitutional law, European constitutional law, EU law, US & EU immigration law.

1 course on EU law: European human rights seminar.

1 course on EU law: Economic foundation of US/EU antitrust laws.

39

40

41

42

5 courses on EU law: Freedom of speech in Europe, The great court decisions in Europe, The process of creating the EU, European intellectual property (practical), European intellectual property studies.

38

1 course on EU law: Introduction to EU law.

Optional Optional

Yes39

Chungnam National University

1 course on EU law: EU finance law.

Optional

Yes38

Konkuk University

Inha University

37

Optional

Yes37

3 courses on EU law: EU law, EU law (specialisation), EU law (practical).

Optional Optional

Yes36

Sogang University

36

Optional

Yes35

Hankuk University of Foreign Studies

1 course on EU law: EU law.

Optional Optional

Yes34

Chung-ang University

35

Optional or compulsory

Courses on EU law

Name of University

34

Country/ Region

Table 7.1 (continued)

108 I. Wieczorek and Q. Wang

Optional

Yes48 Yes49 Yes50 Yes51

Hitotsubashi University

Doshisha University

Keio University

Chuo University

UG

UG and PG

UG and PG

UG and PG

UG and PG

UG and PG

PG

PG

Undergraduate (UG)/ Postgraduate (PG) Level

No

No

No

No

No47

No

No

No

(continued)

EU law master programmes

1 Undergraduate Course in the Faculty of Law: Foreign Law (EU Law), and one postgraduate course in the Law School: EU Law I (EU Constitutional Law).

1 Undergraduate Course in the Faculty of Policy Studies: (International Organisation Law, Special Lectures (European Integration and Law: EU Law and Policy)), and 1 undergraduate course in the Faculty of Law: EU Law.

51

50

49 9 courses on EU law: Introduction to EU criminal justice cooperation, European legal history I and II, European law—1 (Competition law and policy), European law—2 (Private International law), International integration, Special topics A—EU law, Special topics B—EU competition policy as a vehicle of integration of European market, Special topics B—32—Introduction to EU policy.

48 European Union Law, and European Union Law seminar (both undergraduate courses); European Union Law (open to graduate school students, students of the law school, both master and doctoral students); European Union Law seminar (graduate school students); the Substantive Law of the EU, and EU workshop.

47 One should note however that Waseda University offers an LLM programme titled ‘Asian Economic Integration and Law’ which, Prof. Nakamura informed us, has a focus on comparative regionalism and EU law is featured in the curriculum design as a comparator for macro-regional institutions.

At the EU Law (I) and EU Law II (UG), then 1 Seminar: Anglo-American Law/EU Law, and 6 courses Foreign Legal Systems (EU Law), Introduction to EU Law, Special Study on European Law (I), and Special Study on European Law (II), EU law, and Comparative Law of Regional Integration (PG).

46

1 Course on EU law: EU Law, and one Seminar on EU Law.

Optional Optional

Yes46

Waseda University

1 course on EU law: EU civil law.

Optional

Yes45

Tokyo University

45

Optional Optional

Yes44

Chonbuk University

1 course on EU law: EU law.

Optional Optional

Yes43

Chonam University

44

Optional or compulsory

Courses on EU law

Name of University

43

Japan

Country/ Region

Table 7.1 (continued)

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Singapore

Pakistan

Elective N/A N/A Optional

Yes53 No54 No55 Yes56

O P Jindal Global University

Manipal Academy of Higher Education

National University of Singapore

National University of Modern Languages

Compulsory/Optional

Yes52

Symbiosis International University

India

UG and PG

UG and PG

PG

UG

UG and PG

Undergraduate (UG)/ Postgraduate (PG) Level

No

No

No

No

Yes

EU law master programmes

2 courses on EU international relations that incorporate legal aspects: International politics of the EU, The EU as an actor in South Asia.

1 course on EU law: EU law.

55

56

The Manipal Academy of Higher Education offers an MA in EU studies with specialisation in Business and Management, Culture and Literary Studies, Education Policy and Management, and Politics and International Relations. The courses in this latter specialisation while not law courses per se, include a strong legal component, a good example being the course ‘Democracy Human Rights, and the Rule of Law in the European Union’.

54

53 There are 5 courses offered under the framework of Jean Monnet Chair held by Professor Gupta, which specifically focus on EU Law, these are ‘Understanding the EU Structure of Informational Privacy’, Building a Global Consensus through EU GDPR: An Assessment of Data Privacy Legislation in Asia (India, China, Philippines and Thailand), The Demands of Business: Data Needs v/s Data Privacy, Privacy and New Technologies—The EU Paradigm and Data, Data, Platforms and the Digital Economy: An E.U. Competition Law Perspective, Privacy and New Technologies—The EU Paradigm.

52 28 courses on EU law: EU Human Rights Law, EU Competition Law, EU Data Protection and Privacy Law, E-justice in the EU, Life and Message of Mahatma Gandhi towards global peace and conflict resolution, EU Environmental Law, Principles and Foundations of EU Law, Legal Environment of Doing Business in EU, Family Law in EU and India, EU Culture Entertainment and Law, Migration and EU Legal Issues, Intellectual Property Rights in EU, Healthcare Law and Ethics in EU, Legal methods, Legal research and Cases (Moot Cases/Interlinking common law) in EU, Law and Culture in EU, Prosecution Policies in Europe and Asian Nations, Law and Diplomacy: India and EU Perspectives, Principles and Practices of Fair Trial in Europe and Asia, Trade and Environment Law in EU, Sports and Law—India EU comparative aspects, Innovation Laws and Policies in EU and India (with special reference to Artificial Intelligence), International Investment Law in EU, EU- Intellectual Property violation on Internet, EU India Free Trade Agreement, Law Relating to Financial Fraud: EU and India, Contemporary Business and Human Rights in EU, Business Strategies for launching green products in single market (European Union).

Southeast Asia

South Asia

Optional or compulsory

Courses on EU law

Name of University

Country/ Region

Table 7.1 (continued)

110 I. Wieczorek and Q. Wang

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Other common areas of teaching include EU environmental law,57 EU internal market law,58 EU competition law,59 and EU external relations.60 We have found through interviews that EU law is featured in courses on other fields of law, including intellectual property and data protection law,61 competition law,62 environmental law,63 and WTO law.64 A particular interest in EU legal standards when researching and teaching the areas listed above is not surprising considering the EU is a global normative actor acting as a trendsetter at least in environmental law (Kelemen, 2010; Mazur-Kumric & Zeko-Pivac, 2020), data protection law (Benediek & Römer, 2019; Kuner, 2021), and competition law (Blauberger & Krämer, 2013; Bradford et al., 2019). Courses which are not specifically on EU law but on European studies put more emphasis on topics such as European political and economic integration. Courses on EU political integration incorporate aspects of EU constitutional law when introducing various EU institutions and the policy-making procedures within the EU.65 B. Qualitative Findings The findings below are based only on the interviews and questionnaires excluding internet search findings, because qualitative data pertinent to the aim of this study is not usually listed on university websites. As was mentioned before, the interviews and questionnaire responses had a main focus on the academic institution where the interviewee is affiliated, but also occasionally expanded to general considerations as to the state of EU law teaching in the country. In what follows it is clearly indicated if the relevant finding pertains to a specific institution or it can be generalised to the whole higher education sector in the country. The following sections will present the findings around four themes: the universities’ or staff’s rationales for setting up EU law courses which incorporate also a discussion on the topics covered (answer to RQ2 and RQ3); the students’ motivations 57

E.g., India: Symbiosis International University; Macau: UM; Japan: Tokyo University and Hitotsubashi University; Singapore: NUS. 58 E.g., India: Symbiosis International University; Macau: UM; South Korea: Korea University, Ewha Women University; Japan: Waseda University and Hitotsubashi University; Singapore: NUS. 59 E.g., India: Symbiosis International University; Macau: UM; Japan: Doshisha University, Tokyo University and Hitotsubashi University. 60 E.g., India: Symbiosis International University; Macau: UM; South Korea: SNU; Singapore: NUS. 61 India: O.P. Jindal Global University; Hong Kong: CityU, HK; Japan: Hitotsubashi University; Macau: UM; Mainland China: Beijing University of Foreign Studies. 62 Hong Kong: CityU, HK; Japan: Tokyo University; Mainland China: Beijing University of Foreign Studies. 63 Japan: Tokyo University; South Korea: Seoul National University; Macau: UM; Mainland China: Beijing University of Foreign Studies. 64 South Korea: Seoul National University. 65 South Korea: Seoul National University; Pakistan: NUML; India: Manipal Academy of Higher Education.

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to take an EU law course (answer to RQ4); students’ general degree of interest in, and perception of, EU law and the EU (answer to RQ4); the teaching approaches adopted by Asian universities in EU law teaching, especially if a non-western approach to teaching EU law can be identified (answer to RQ5). a. Universities’ or staff’s rationales for setting up EU law courses Two macro-reasons for introducing an EU law course were identified. The first reason relates to scholars’ individual research interest in EU law, which is defined by the current study as a scholarly rationale for the teaching of EU law. The second reason is linked to the added value EU law teaching can bring to students in light of the specific qualities of EU law. This is defined as a pedagogical rationale. 1. Scholarly Rationale The scholarly rationale is the most common reason for introducing EU law courses in Asian universities. Individual scholar’s interest in EU law is often linked to personal circumstances and educational background, which translates to a motivation to set up an EU law course. This rationale was identified behind the setting of EU law courses in eight universities across six countries/regions.66 To give a few examples, our interviewees have traced the interest for the teaching of EU law in China, Japan, and India back to one leading and pioneering figure which inaugurated interest to this scholarly field, which eventually translated into teaching. Yao (BFSU, mainland China) mentioned her PhD supervisor Professor Zeng Lingliang was one of the first Chinese professors who studied and published on EU law, which led to the setting up of an EU law course at Wuhan university. That course later developed to become a series of EU law courses covering various aspects of substantive EU law. Similarly, Suami (Waseda University, Japan) noted that in 1970s Japan, EU law courses were rarely set up in Japanese universities, with Sophia University being the only exception, where an EU law course was introduced already at the time by Professor Okamura, who is a well-known Japanese EU law scholar. But this scholarly rationale can also account for more recent introduction of EUrelated courses, which include some EU law content, and research supervisions in NUML (Pakistan). In this case, the setting up of an EU studies course stemmed from Shad’s research interest in the EU. The same is true for EU law courses in Indian universities. Gurpur (Symbiosis International University, India), Poojary (Manipal Academy of Higher Education, India), and Gupta (O.P. Jindal Global University, India) all agree that the setting up of EU law courses in India is, to a large extent, individual-driven, as opposed to a result of an institutional policy. For instance, Gurpur acted as the pioneer in introducing EU law teaching in her law school. And incidentally, she also credited the characterisation of Symbiosis International University as an institution with a strong international outlook and a place welcoming international students to an earlier pioneer figure—a visionary professor in botany—who 66

The 8 universities include BUFS (mainland China), UM and MUST (Macau), Waseda University (Japan), SNU (South Korea), NUML (Pakistan), Symbiosis Law School, and Manipal Academy of Higher Education (India).

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was a leader in the process. Similar individual-driven rationale can also be observed in Korea. Han (SNU, South Korea) said his interest in applying European electoral theories to Korean elections has led him to open courses on the EU at the Graduate School of International Studies at SNU. Professors’ individual research interests can originate from intellectual interest, but also from their educational and personal background, the three rationales naturally being intertwined. For instance, non-European scholars, who are European educated, are more likely to develop an interest in EU law, which then translates into EU law teaching in the university that they currently work. This can be seen in NUML (Pakistan), MUST (Macau), and Symbiosis Law School (India)’s experience.67 Macau is an interesting case where the legacy of Portuguese colonisation remains till today, including the presence of tight exchanges between Macau and Portugal and the presence of Portuguese citizens, or other EU citizens, teaching in Macau.68 These scholars not only have a research interest in EU law, but also have a personal link with the EU, which accounts for the higher interest in EU law teaching, as highlighted by the presence of specialised master programmes and a relatively higher regard for EU law teaching in Macau universities (e.g., EU law is de facto a compulsory course at MUST). Overall, like Koo (SNU, South Korea), said, ‘when [EU law] courses are set up, it’s because a professor has certain interests, then it’s kind of a snowball effect’. Such a snowball effect can be further appreciated when scholars with an interest in EU law succeed in capturing EU funded Erasmus + Jean Monnet actions. These constitute grants offered by the European Commission’s Erasmus + programme to promote EU-related teaching and research. Thanks to this funding, universities can host a teaching post for professors who specialise in EU studies,69 which, Ito (Tokyo University, Japan) reported, can be particularly important for private Universities in Asia that do not receive public funds such as Waseda or Doshisha University in Japan. And university professors who have an interest in EU studies can apply and receive Jean Monnet chairs allowing them, among other things, to set up EU law courses or EU law research centres. One could mention Prof. Katsuhiro Shoji who was a pioneer of EU law studies in Japan and received an ad Persona, Jean Monnet Chair while at Keio University (he is now an emeritus professor at Keio University, and Professor at Chuô University. Gupta (O.P. Jindal Global University, India) stressed that the grants and funding support provided under the Jean Monnet chair is a main driver for setting up EU law courses in Asian universities. And indeed, many interviewees who are responsible for setting up EU law courses within their respective universities were awarded Jean Monnet chairs. For example, Gupta received the 2020 Jean Monnet chair, and he teaches EU law in a comparative fashion in two courses, focussing 67

Shad obtained his PhD from the University of Bucharest in Romania; Chen obtained his PhD from the National University of Ireland; Gurpur spent post-doctoral research periods in Edinburgh and had teaching experience in Ireland. 68 E.g., Miguel Ângelo Loureiro Manero De Lemos, Paulo Canelas de Castro at University of Macau. 69 Further information available at: https://erasmus-plus.ec.europa.eu/opportunities/organisations/ jean-monnet-actions/jean-monnet-chairs.

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on law and technology and IP law at O.P. Jindal Global University (India). Shad was awarded Jean Monnet chair in 2020 and introduced the course titled ‘the EU as an actor in South Asia’ in NUML (Pakistan). Yao (BFSU, mainland China) states her supervisor the late professor Zeng who introduced EU law courses at Wuhan University (mainland China) also received a Jean Monnet chair. Similarly, Chen (MUST, Macau) also identified Jean Monnet chair as one of the main drivers for setting up EU law courses, as evidenced by the comprehensive EU law courses and programmes in University of Macau, which are coordinated by Jean Monnet Chair Paulo Canelas de Castro. Jean Monnet actions also include broader, collaborative, Jean Monnet projects. These are usually a collaboration between different universities and are coordinated by Jean Monnet chairs, which boost the promotion of EU law research and teaching but can also be one university’s endeavour. For example, the University of Macau has a Jean Monnet Action titled ‘European Union Law in the Global Context’, whose one of the main objectives is to feature EU law teaching in the curricula at all levels of higher education in Macau.70 The University of Hong Kong had a Jean Monnet project titled ‘The EU as a Global Actor and EU-China Relations’, which aimed to establish an undergraduate module that analyses the EU’s global role and presence and to explore the particular relationship that has evolved between the EU and China.71 Another example is the project ‘EU-China Legal and Judicial Cooperation’ which involves eight universities across six countries. Three universities are located in Asia, which are Beijing Normal University, Tsinghua University (mainland China), and the City University of Hong Kong. This project aims to advance research in rule of law-based concerns arising from EU–China partnership, which facilitate teaching in this area.72 As a confirmation of the relevance of the scholarly rationale and the individualdriven nature of EU law teaching in Asia, the absence of any faculty members with EU law expertise or interest was quoted as the reason why some universities would not offer an EU law course. There do not seem to be any institutional efforts to proactively seek experts in EU law to offer these courses. Koo (SNU) clearly identified the lack of European educated scholars in South Korea as one of the challenges to set up standalone EU law courses in South Korea. This point was echoed by Chen (MUST), who commented the reason many universities outside Europe do not offer standalone EU law course like his university in Macau, is probably because ‘there’s no suitable faculty member who can lead the course’. Such an individual-dependent character of EU law courses is confirmed by the NSU’s example. Because of the module leader Chalmers’ unavailability in 2021/2022 and 2022/2023 the course was and is not offered during these academic years. The exception to this pattern seems to be law 70

Further information available at: https://jmchaireulawglobalcontext.fll.um.edu.mo/. Further information available at: https://erasmus-plus.ec.europa.eu/projects/search/details/575 459-EPP-1-2016-1-HK-EPPJMO-MODULE. 72 https://erasmus-plus.ec.europa.eu/projects/search/details/599857-EPP-1-2018-1-UK-EPPJMONETWORK. 71

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schools in mainland China, where a large range of partnerships are established with European Universities so as to offer Chinese students the teaching of EU law (see Appendix 1). It is worth noting that also in this case the teaching of EU law is mostly outsourced to Europe-based colleagues, and not taught by local scholars. 2. Pedagogical Rationale The pedagogical reason for the teaching of EU law is linked to the role of the EU as a normative trendsetter in certain policy areas, and to the innovative features of the EU legal order. Interviewees teaching in Japan, India, mainland China, and Macau recalled the emphasis which is put on comparative law teaching in their universities, and the ensuing need to incorporate teaching of EU law also in courses covering substantive fields of law. Japanese scholars, Nakamura and Suami (Waseda University), and Nakanishi (Hitotsubashi University), Ito (Tokyo University) identified comparative legal analysis as a tradition in Japanese legal research and ‘[…] what the school encourages students to do’ as phrased by Suami. ‘[B]ecause EU law covers a range of areas’ continues Suami, ‘EU law cannot be ignored when doing comparative study’. Therefore, to further students’ own research agenda in various areas, the teaching of EU law becomes a necessity. As an example, Suami states ‘for international law students who study security issues, they have to examine the EU’s common foreign and security policy’. Ito refers to teaching of EU law, as a social science, not as a field of positive law, speaking of an EU Law in context approach, which is meant to give students a broader intellectual perspective. Similarly, Yao (BFSU, mainland China) said in mainland China ‘we always make a comparative study’, and similarly, Gurpur (Symbiosis Law School, India) and Gupta (O.P. Jindal Global University, India) both reported comparative law plays a huge role in legal education in India. Briefly, the comparative dimension in these countries’ legal education combined with EU law being the pioneer and trendsetter in various fields of law makes EU law an unavoidable topic to learn, thus justifies its teaching in Asian universities. It is worth noting that under this rationale, teaching EU law is not done for the teaching of EU law’s sake but to facilitate students’ own research agenda and learning. This leads to approaches of EU law teaching that differ from European universities. For example, Suami (Waseda University, Japan) said the content of his EU law teaching to master students actually depends on students’ requests. This is because at the master level, each student has an area of research specialisation, and his EU law course serves to enrich and further each student’s own research. Interestingly, Suami said for 20/21’s EU law cohort, the diversity of students’ interests made finding a common ground, i.e., unified teaching content, too difficult, so he assigned individual reading to each student that catered to their area of research. While this specific approach is only workable for small cohorts of students, the broader idea of adjusting the content of EU law courses to facilitate students’ different areas of

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research was also reported in courses hosting larger cohort of students. Chen said in MUST (Macau), the EU law course focuses more on the basic constitutional structure of the EU rather than on substantive EU law, and ‘the purpose is to support students’ own research agenda’. By focusing on the foundation of EU law, this course gives students the basis to further explore the area of substantive EU law that is relevant to their own research. Ito similarly shared this opinion with respect to the courses taught at Tokyo University (Japan). Even outside policy-specific courses, EU law courses are set up, or EU law teaching is incorporated in other courses, to expand students’ knowledge by exposing them to foreign jurisdictions. Chen (MUST, Macau) said, ‘the most attractive part [about the EU] is the new model of governance and the EU’s deep level of integration’, and an EU law course ‘shows students there is another model of working together’, especially with east Asia being the least integrated region in the world. Gurpur points out one of the reasons for introducing EU law courses at Symbiosis Law School (India) is that it aligns with the university’s ideology—‘promoting international understanding through quality education’, and to achieve ‘internationalism’ it is important to feature EU law in the legal curriculum. Briefly, in our view EU law is regarded by scholars as of pedagogical relevance in light of its ‘quality’. Yao (BFSU, mainland China) nonetheless also noted that by exposing Chinese students to EU law, ‘when they become lawyers, they can have the competence or some link with the European market’. We will see in the next section, that this sort of practical rationale is preeminent in triggering students’ interest in EU law courses. b. Students’ reasons for taking, or not taking, EU law courses This section explores why students choose, or do not choose, to take EU law courses. As was mentioned in the methodology section, the findings below are grounded in lecturers’ understanding of students’ motivations. Some asked their students this question, but most comments are made from general observations of students’ reactions in class. This study has identified three reasons for students to take EU law courses. 1. Pragmatic, Job-Prospect-Related, Reasons The first and most mentioned factor influencing students’ choice to study EU law is a pragmatic one, which was identified by seven interviewees across four countries/ regions.73 Depending on their perception of whether EU law would help their job prospects or not, students would choose to either take or not take EU law courses. Students in Japan and India perceive their domestic job markets to value EU law knowledge more than students in other countries/regions surveyed. For what concerns Japan, Ito (Tokyo University), Nakanishi (Hitotsubashi University), and Nakamura (Waseda University) all stated knowledge about the EU is important, or at least advantageous for job interviews in Japan. Nakamura in his 2016 article said 73

Japan: Ito at Tokyo University, Nakanishi at Hitotsubashi University, Nakamura at Waseda University; India: Gupta at O.P. Jindal Global University, Gurpur at Symbiosis Law School; Mainland China: Yao at BUFS; Macau: Svetlicinii at UM.

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when students start to focus on finding employment, they will realise the importance of the EU in both business and political matters and become ‘suddenly-interested’ in European affairs, which motivates them to take his EU law courses. Similarly, for what concerns India, Gurpur (Symbiosis Law School) and Gupta (O.P. Jindal Global University) reported that students would see studying EU law as a way to increase their job prospects thus choosing the course. Three reasons were mentioned by Gupta (O.P. Jindal Global University, India) when explaining why EU law knowledge is important when seeking employment in India. First, against the background of a global market which India partakes, knowledge about foreign jurisdictions such as the EU are sought after by law firms. Second, because of the competitiveness of Indian law firms, background in EU law gives students an advantage over other candidates and serves to facilitate their everyday tasks within the firm. Third, because networking is one of the main ways of securing an employment opportunity, knowledge about current issues around the world— including the EU, helps them to make informed conversations and connect with other people who are in a more senior position. Furthermore, as identified by Gurpur (Symbiosis Law School, India) knowledge of EU law can also open up employment opportunities in Europe and can be ‘life-changing’ for a student if that job allows them to immigrate to one of the EU Member States. Consistently, where students perceive that EU law knowledge is irrelevant when it comes to job seeking discourages students from taking EU law courses. Macau serves to be an example of this. Compared to other regions, EU law teaching in Macau is more established as mentioned before, however, Svetlicinii (UM, Macau) said ‘promoting [EU law courses] is quite a challenge’, because students in Macau universities mainly come from mainland China, and most students ‘want to complete their master study then go back to their home jurisdiction to practice’, where EU law is not a requisite subject for the bar exam. Most students who take the course are ‘interested in an international career or interested in continuing their study in Europe’. This point was corroborated by Chen (MUST, Macau) who also said EU law knowledge not being necessary for legal practice in China is what demotivates students from taking his course. However, Yao (BFSU, mainland China) said knowledge about the EU can help students in their future career, because it enables them to have the competence to understand the European market—a quality which is sought after by commercial law firms. Therefore, it can be seen that there is a gap between the value placed on EU law knowledge by the domestic job market in reality and students’ perception of the importance of EU law in employment seeking. However, it is the latter that ultimately determines whether students will take EU law courses. To put these findings into context, it is also interesting to observe that Poojary (Manipal Academy of Higher Education, India) reported it is difficult and takes much convincing to get student enrolment for the EU studies programme in general, because of the perception that such programme has low job prospects. However, she

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added such difficulties are not faced solely by courses on European studies in India but by all humanities and social science subjects in general. Because India is highly focused on developing science and technologies, job opportunities are concentrated in such fields, thus making humanities and social science subjects less desirable for students who aim to find employment after graduation. The relevance of this pragmatic rationale is well summarised by Nakamura’s (Waseda University, Japan) observation that (Japanese) students often become ‘suddenly interested’ in EU law when they start seeking employment, at which point they have a more comprehensive understanding about the significance of EU law through their personal experience. Factors mentioned above can also explain the absence, or the difficulty in setting up standalone EU law courses in Asian universities, for instance in Hong Kong. Students’ lack of interest in EU law is relevant because it is the number of students who register for the course that contributes to determining whether it is offered (Park and Lee, 2016). The background to this is that, as one can expect, EU law has no apparent domestic relevance in Asian countries. This emerged in interviews in India, Macau, and Hong Kong. As pointed out by Gupta (O.P. Jindal Global University, India), it is difficult to gather enough student interest for a standalone EU law course when it is not a mandatory subject for obtaining a law degree in India, although as mentioned students still perceive the job market as valuing EU law knowledge. Indeed, Chen (MUST, Macau) said legal education is ‘more professional training than social science, the subject’s relevance to students’ future careers needs to be taken into account’. This point is echoed by Tan (CityU, HK) who said law students are mostly aiming for entry into the legal profession. With EU law knowledge not being mandatory for degree qualification or the bar exam in Hong Kong, he ‘does not see much scope for teaching EU law in any material way’. When interest is shown in legal systems and areas of law which are not strictly relevant to domestic legal practice, for students in Asian universities, other regions in the world may appear more attractive than the EU. The US is a point of reference for South Korean students, due to South Korea’s ‘path dependency’, as Koo (SNU) reported. Whereas China and Chinese law are the main centre of interest for students in Hong Kong and Japan, due to reasons of geographical proximity and China’s growing political and economic significance. This was reported by Tan, He (CityU, HK), and Nakamura (Waseda University, Japan). A similar trend can be observed in European studies courses. Han (SNU, South Korea) said student numbers for European studies courses are shrinking compared to 10 or 15 years ago. He reported most students who take European studies as their postgraduate major study European languages at the undergraduate level. However, in recent years, the size of the European language department is shrinking because students are more interested in Japanese and Chinese, thus leading to declining student numbers for European studies at the postgraduate level.

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2. Personal Interest in European States The second reason for students to take an EU law course is their personal interest, which can consist of both a general interest in Europe, and an academic interest in EU law. This rationale was identified by four interviewees across Japan, South Korea, and Macau.74 As far as a general interest in Europe, none of the interviews reported students, especially undergraduates, as having a strong understanding and perception of the EU as a specific organisation. Those who are interested in that part of the world are rather interested in Europe as a continent, or in the culture of single EU Member States. As was mentioned already, such a ‘nationally compartmentalised’ view of Europe can on the one hand lead to the EU appearing to students as ‘extraneous’ and ‘difficult and complex to understand’ (Nakamura, 2016), which discourages students from taking the EU law course. On the other hand, it can also have a virtuous effect and trigger further interest in EU law or EU studies courses. For example, Koo (SNU) said many South Korean students become interested in Europe because of a popular South Korean TV drama (Memories of Alhambra) which is set in Spain, which translated into higher interest in EU studies. The exception is master students specialising in a certain area, especially in academic institutions which encourage comparative legal research, who would take EU law courses, in light of an academic interest in EU law. They would learn about EU law and use the EU as a comparator for the purpose of improving and fostering their research. This reason was reported as motivating students in Japan both by Suami (Waseda University), Nakanishi (Hitotsubashi University), and in Macau by Chen (MUST) and corresponds with the third rationale for setting up EU law courses mentioned above, namely to further students’ research agenda. This feeling is, however, not universally shared, and contrasts with Nakamura’s (Waseda University, Japan) observation in his 2016 article that ‘even motivated [Japanese] students do not seem to have any specific academic interest in the EU’. 3. Course Characteristics The third reason for students to choose EU law courses is the characteristics of the course and the assessment format, which is identified by three interviewees both with respect to Japanese students and students in Macau.75 In general, at least a portion of students tend to choose courses that are easier to get credits and high marks on. Suami (Waseda University) said Japanese undergraduate students who chose his EU law course probably did it because the exam is open book, which lessens students’ workload to a certain extent. Similarly, Nakamura (Waseda University, Japan) said most students who take the course are ‘just for credits’. Another aspect of this is the language in which the course is taught. For example, Chen’s EU law course in MUST (Macau) is taught in English, and he said it serves as an incentive for students 74

Japan: Suami at Waseda University, Nakanishi at Hitotsubashi University; South Korea: Koo at SNU; Macau: Chen at MUST. 75 Japan: Suami and Nakamura at Waseda University; Macau: Chen at MUST.

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who want to improve their English skills, especially those who want to pursue further study abroad. C. Students’ Perception of the EU Students’ perceptions of the EU are really varied, ranging from neutral to positive yet critical ones. Both Nakamura and Suami (Waseda University, Japan) reported that because students in Asia usually do not have any substantial pre-existing knowledge about the EU, they often feel indifferent about the system. However, a distinction can be drawn between political science students who take EU studies courses and law students taking EU law courses. International relations scholar Poojary (Manipal Academy of Higher Education, India) said students who take her courses which focus on European Politics, EU Policy-Making, and EU external relations, often find the EU ‘fascinating’ but also have a sceptical view about it. Especially when the concept of regional integration and unified European identity is introduced, students often struggle to understand the rationales for setting up a supranational system like the EU, which is evidenced from students asking ‘why are they even doing this’. Law professor Ito also said ‘law students accustomed to positive law analysis find it fascinating to gain a wider politico-social perspective’. One aspect in particular that triggers diverging reactions among political science students and scholars is the EU’s practice of human rights promotion in its external relations policies (Cremona, 2011; Meissner & McKenzie, 2019). Koo (SNU, South Korea) said one of his students who comes from Sri Lanka voiced positive views about the EU’s interest in promoting human rights in Sri Lanka using the Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP) + scheme.76 Conversely, Shad (NUML) reported that local scholars in Pakistan have voiced criticisms of the EU’s GSP system with human rights conditions, as it does not take into account the local and cultural compulsions of the specific country, and argued some margin should be given to them. Admittedly, this is a scholarly view rather than students’ attitudes. However, such professors’ views could have an impact on their teaching content delivery, thus influencing students’ perspectives. Pakistani scholarship on EU affairs otherwise, reportedly, greatly appreciates the EU’s rules-based and ethics-centred external policies. One hypothesis to explain the difference in attitudes between law and political science students can be traced back to the content of EU law courses in Asian universities. Especially considering most law students in Asian countries do not have any prior knowledge of the EU, and the EU legal system being unique and complex, the course content on EU law is ‘simplified a lot’, as reported by Svetlicinii (UM, Macau), Chen (MUST, Macau), and Nakamura (Waseda University, Japan). EU law’s course content is thus often confined to the basic structure and institutions of the EU, i.e.,

76

This is an EU external relation scheme which removes import duties from products coming into the EU market from vulnerable developing countries. The GSP + system is an evolution of the GSP one, and it slashes these same tariffs to 0% for vulnerable low and lower-middle income countries that implement 27 international conventions related to human rights, labour rights, protection of the environment and good governance.

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EU constitutional law.77 So, in an introductory course, law students may not have the opportunity to investigate and critically discuss issues relating to the rationale for the EU’s set up and its external relations policies, which would be the main teaching content in an international relations class. D. Approaches to EU Law Teaching, and Value in a Non-western Approach Finally, when interviewees were asked about whether they adjust their teaching to a non-western audience and whether they think there is value in a non-western approach to EU law teaching, their responses again vary. Svetlicinii and Neuwirth, both working at UM (Macau), answered in negative to the question. The reasons for their response however differ. Neuwirth said he ‘doesn’t think there is a non-western approach to teaching in general’ and believes ‘the greatest value in legal education to be the chance to study and experience as many different teaching styles as possible’. Svetlicinii said he is ‘not sure’ there is a non-western approach to EU law, and he does not adapt his teaching approach too much, because one of the purposes of the EU law course in UM is to give non-European students a better understanding of European culture, system, and value, which includes experience with western teaching approach. However, many scholars acknowledged they teach EU law differently to their current students as they would to European students and identified the values in viewing the EU from a non-western perspective. First, a non-western approach to teaching EU law can be reflected in the teaching content. This was reported in interviews with scholars from Macau and Japan. As mentioned before, EU law courses for Asian students are often introductory and simplified in consideration of students’ backgrounds. Chen (MUST, Macau) said he would add more internal market content when teaching to European students, because of internal market’s domestic relevance to European students. Although Svetlicinii (UM, Macau) expressed doubts as to the existence of a non-western approach, he pointed out that when teaching European students, the content would be normally more detailed, case based, and much more technical. Their reasoning is based on teaching the law in a way that is more relevant to the specific cohort of students. The same rationale would justify the choice to teach external relations to Asian students. For example, Chen (MUST, Macau) said that to further students’ understanding of the role of the EU parliament, he would use EU–China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment, which is a draft EU external agreement whose ratification was blocked by the Parliament. Svetlicinii (UM, Macau) also said when teaching in Macau, external relations of the EU are emphasised more, thereby making the course more relevant to students. Japanese scholars Nakamura (Waseda University) and Nakanishi (Hitotsubashi University) also said EU law teaching in Japan puts more emphasis on the EU’s external relations.78 77

EU constitutional law is the area of EU law that is taught the most in Asian universities’ EU law courses, see Sect. 3.1 on quantitative findings. 78 It should be noted this is however, not a widespread opinion, see above Ito’s opinion that EU law should be taught only as a social science for its intellectual value not for its relatability to daily life.

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The second aspect of the non-western approach is the diversity of reading materials. From interviews with Japanese scholars and Park and Lee’s 2016 article on EU law teaching in South Korea, it can be concluded that EU law courses in Japan and South Korea are rarely delivered in English. Aside from primary law, secondary reading materials are often written by local scholars in Japanese and Korean respectively. The same holds true for many mainland China universities; although there would be an attempt to deliver the majority of the course content in English, many reading materials are written by Chinese authors in Chinese. In these three countries, although including local scholars’ materials is often done for necessity to accommodate the average students’ English skills, such choice is thought by the module leader to also offer a non-western perspective to students to some extent because of the authors’ background. Similarly, in India, Poojary (Manipal Academy of Higher Education) said when compiling reading lists, she will actively search for materials that are written by authors from different countries, institutions, and schools of thought. She acknowledged for certain topics like the EU institutions, it is hard to move beyond European scholars, but she still tries to see whether any Asian scholars have written on the subject which might give a different perspective. Our interviewees reported that the difference between European and Asian scholars’ perspectives, and the added value of a non-western approach to the study and research of EU law can be appreciated in three respects. First, third country national (TCN) scholars are thought as more likely to write about the EU in a more neutral and objective fashion than European scholars. This is identified by Japanese scholars Ito (Tokyo University), Suami (Waseda University), and Nakanishi (Hitotsubashi University). Nakanishi said her impression is that European scholars might in some cases still have ‘an affiliation with their national legal system which can sometimes constitute a bias and make it more difficult to see the EU legal order in a wholly objective way’. She also points out that she has not noticed a lot of cross-referencing between literatures written by European scholars in different European languages. This compounds the issue regarding the lack of comparison between different views and schools of thought. Whereas TCN scholars usually do not have any affiliation with any EU Member States’ domestic legal system, thus as ‘outsiders’, Suami said TCN scholars can provide a more objective viewpoint. Second, TCN scholars can provide a more local-based and non-western analysis on the EU’s external relations policies. This is identified by both Pakistani and Japanese scholars. For example, Shad (NUML) pointed to Pakistani scholars’ criticisms of the EU’s ‘export’ of its human rights policies’ to other countries without taking into account socio-cultural considerations. As an example of a Japanese perspective on the EU’s external relations policies, Nakamura (Waseda University) pointed to the EU’s anti-dumping duty calculation was considered unfair to Japanese companies by local scholars, something which he could not find as widely acknowledged in EU scholarship. (See among the very few scholars who addressed the topics (Messerlin, 1989; Van Bael, 1990; Hindley, 1996). The van Bael and Bellis law firms for defence was the one Japanese company that would resort to defend themselves against EC anti-dumping measures).

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Thirdly, the study of EU law, and of the EU outside Europe often occurs in the context of a comparative methodology, which equally contributes to developing a non-western perspective. As mentioned before, comparative legal research is a tradition in India, Japan, and mainland China. But it is also at times a necessary teaching approach for students who are not familiar with the EU system. Yao (BFSU, mainland China) and Gurpur (Symbiosis Law School, India) both said they often compare the EU with their domestic legal system to further students’ understanding. Such a comparative approach can also be applied when looking at the EU’s external actions. Nakanishi (Hitsubashi University, Japan) reported that comparing the EU– Japan free trade agreement with trade agreements that Japan concluded with other countries/regions, allows to move away from a Eurocentric approach to EU analysis and provide further insights. Ito (Tokyo University, Japan) echoed this point stressing the added value that the view of non-European scholars can bring to critically analyse the position of states that regularly interact with the EU but are not fully integrated into the EU, such as states part to the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), or states that are part of a less integrated system such as the Council of Europe. By way of example, he recalled that US-based scholars have made important contributions to EU studies.

Discussion The findings of this study confirm and amplify what emerged from the literature review. Even dated, the existing articles on EU law teaching in Asia identified trends in terms of offering of EU law teaching, degree and rationales for staff and students’ interests in EU law teaching, and specific teaching approaches to EU law, which persist today in the countries surveyed by the literature (mainland China, Japan, South Korea). And similar trends can be found in the additional case studies included in this study (India, Hong Kong, Macau, Singapore, Pakistan). More in detail, the following general observations can be found. Firstly, the finding we find of the most relevance is that EU law teaching is offered as self-standing or as part of EU studies courses, in some cases even as a compulsory subject, in all the eight countries/regions surveyed (mainland China, Japan, South Korea, India, Macau, Hong Kong, Singapore, Pakistan). This we find remarkable considering that EU law does not directly apply to the territory of these countries/ regions. Secondly, there seem to be a number of gaps between staff and students’ interest in EU law, but also between students’ perception of the usefulness of EU law knowledge and the reality of the job markets. It was highlighted that, with the exception of mainland China where there seems to be institutional investment in promoting the teaching of EU law, and to a certain extent in India, where Symbiosis International University has an institutional focus on internationalisation, the setting up of selfstanding EU law courses is to a large extent determined by individual staff members’ interest in EU law. This is due to, among other aspects, their fascination with an

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ad hoc and original legal system. The relatively large offering of EU law courses attests to this scholarly interest. However, academic interest in the discipline does not feature at all among students’ rationales for taking courses on EU law, whereas pragmatic rationale is on top of the list. With the exception of India possibly, EU law is not universally regarded by students as a ‘useful’ subject for job-market prospects, hence the students’ declining interest which in turn influences the teaching offering which naturally depends on students’ attendance. Yet, staff members highlight how this is a misconception and that job markets, for instance in Japan and mainland China, would actually reward expertise in EU law. It is not surprising then that the suggestions on how to improve the teaching of EU law one finds in literature include highlighting practical relevance and exposing students to the practical side of EU law also having them interact with EU officials. Thirdly, this research highlighted how the EU’s normative power, which has been widely documented in literature (Manners, 2002; Bradford, 2020) has an impact not only on the law of foreign countries, which has been the main focus of the normdiffusion literature, but also on legal education beyond the EU. It was highlighted how EU law is not only studied as part of international law or the law of international organisation, or in general from a constitutional law perspective, but discussion of the law of substantive policies of the EU also features in different law courses. Such courses which are structured following a comparative methodology are widespread in legal education in the countries/regions surveyed. This was interpreted as a spill over effect of the normative influence that EU law has in the selected areas such as competition law, data protection law, and environmental law. Moreover, a more direct, and intentional, effect of EU soft power can be appreciated in the impact that Jean Monnet Actions have on legal education outside Europe. It was highlighted how these are key factors influencing and supporting the expansion of EU law teaching in Asia. While our research was not framed under the angle of the EU norm-diffusion literature, we believe these findings to be of high relevance for those discussions. Fourthly, it has clearly emerged from this study that some adjustments to the teaching of EU law to non-EU audiences do take place. Such adjustments can concern the degree of simplification of the EU law that is taught, which might be higher than when teaching a European audience; the interdisciplinarity of the courses which relies on a law in context approach looking at also European politics to entice students’ interests; and the topics to focus on. For instance, there seems to be a stronger emphasis on EU external relations. The teaching of EU law in the universities surveyed thus appears at the same time more simplified but also richer in other aspects if compared with the teaching provided in Durham Law School (UK) where one of the authors is based. Such adjustments, however, cannot be said to amount to a deliberate effort to structure and organise the teaching of EU law in a non-western way. Our interviewees recognised that an added value, in the sense of a more objective and critical perspective, can come from relying on non-European literature and from their background as non-European scholars. And they provided positive examples of this for instance when discussing EU external relations and EU power dynamics with third states. However, if this alleged more objective perspective influences the content of the courses and the teaching approaches, this seems more an

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unintended positive consequence of pedagogical choices which are made for different reasons. For instance, the need to resort to literature in Japanese, Chinese, or Korean, which arguably could bring a non-western perspective, was rather justified in light of the limited linguistic skills of the students, rather than to purposely transmit a less western approach to students. This obviously does not mean that EU law is taught uncritically, but that the emphasis is not necessarily put on a non-western perspective. Moreover, it was highlighted that, at least in some cases, the need to simplify, or even just identify the key concepts, for non-European audiences the contents of EU law might actually hamper the fostering of critical thinking around the EU.

Conclusion This study is, to the best of our knowledge, the first of this size bringing to light the interesting finding that there is scholarly interest in EU law in Asian universities and that this translates to the offering of EU law teaching in all the eight countries/ regions surveyed. The study has built on previous literature investigating further the rationales for setting up such courses and their content, the rationales for students’ interest or lack thereof, and the different types of approach to teaching that one can appreciate in the eight countries/regions surveyed. It is important to nonetheless acknowledge the limitations of this study which pave the way for future research directions. The first important limitation is that the findings on students’ reaction and interest in EU law are based on their lecturers’ perceptions. The methodological choice for this was justified in the research methods section. However, this points to the first future research avenue—a larger study that can be developed by conducting qualitative research directly interviewing students in the relevant countries. Secondly, the study focuses only on eight Asian countries/regions. To further generalise our findings as to EU law teaching in Asia the scope of the geographical study should naturally be expanded. Further countries to consider could be other ASEAN countries beyond Singapore (e.g., Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam). Given these countries experienced a form of regional integration, it can be hypothesised that at least in some of them there might be some appetite for studying the EU and its legal system. It would also be important to carry out longitudinal studies which chart the evolution of the interest in EU law in these jurisdictions and the transitions these go through. This would allow a more comprehensive understanding of the future of EU studies in Asia, which is the subject matter of this volume. A third limitation is the limited number of interviews conducted for what concerns mainland China, the research being mainly based on literature review and website searches and two interviews. This study has highlighted the presence of a great interest for the teaching of EU law in mainland China, which therefore should deserve a further autonomous study based on empirical data collection.

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Appendix 1: List of Interviewees

East Asia

Country/ Region

Name of University

Name of interviewee

Expertise

Mainland China

Wuhan University

Huang Deming

International Law, Law of Armed Conflict, Foreign Relations Law

Beijing Foreign Studies University

Yao Yanxia

EU Law, Public International Law, Public Procurement Law

Macau University of Science and Technology

Chen Bo

EU Law, Labour Law and Social Security Law, Civil Procedure Law, Disability Law and Policy, International Human Rights Law

University of Macau

Alexandr Svetlicinii

EU Law, Competition Law, International Economic Law, Business Law

Rostam Neuwirth

EU Law, International Trade Law, WTO and International Trade Law, International Trade Law, Intellectual Property Law in the Creative Economy, Transnational Law

Tan Chenghan

Agency, Contract, Corporations Law, Legal Education

Macau

Hong Kong City University of Hong Kong

South Korea

Japan

He Tianxiang European Criminal Law, Intellectual Property Law, Chinese Criminal Law

Seoul National Koo Min Gyo East Asian political economy and University maritime affairs Han Jeong Hun

European Union Politics, Korean Politics, Legislative and Party Politics, Comparative Politics

Tokyo University

Yoichi Ito

EU Law, European Administrative Law

Waseda University

Tamio Nakamura

EU Law, English Law, Comparative Regionalism

Takao Suami

EU Law, International Law

Yumiko Nakanishi

EU External Relation Law, EU Environmental Law, European Union Law, Law of Regional Organizations, EU Constitutional Law

Hitotsubashi University

(continued)

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(continued)

South Asia

Southeast Asia

Country/ Region

Name of University

Name of interviewee

Expertise

India

Symbiosis International University

Shashikala Gurpur

EU Law, Jurisprudence, Media Laws, International Law and Human Rights, Teaching and Research Methodology, Feminist Legal Studies, Biotechnology Law, Law and Social Transformation

O.P. Jindal Global University

Indranath Gupta

Copyright, Information Technology Law, Contract Law and Labour Law, Data Protection Law

Manipal Academy of Higher Education

Priya Vijaykumar Poojary

European Politics, Policy-making in the European Union, EU’s foreign policy, India-EU relations, Migration Governance, and Higher Education Regionalism

Pakistan

National University of Modern Languages

Muhammad Riaz Shad

Politics of European Union, International Politics of Middle East, Cyber Security Research Methodology, Theories of International Relations

Singapore

National University of Singapore

Damien Chalmers

EU Law Law and Comparative Regional Integration International Economic Law

Appendix 2: Questionnaire Forwarded to the Interviewees If there is a specific course on EU Law at your university 1. Is the course on EU law compulsory or elective? 2. Is EU law taught at the undergraduate or postgraduate level? 3. What topics does the EU law course cover (just a brief overview) and what aspects do students find more or less interesting? 4. Do you think EU law should be taught differently to different cohorts of EU, and non-EU students and in EU-based and not EU-based universities? 5. Does your university have researchers active in the field of EU law? Whose scholar active in this area from your country would you recommend reading? 6. What would you understand as a non-western approach to the teaching/research of EU law? And do you think there is value in such an approach in both the teaching and research of EU law?

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If there is not a specific course on EU Law at your university 1. Does any other course at your university (e.g., international law or international relations) cover any aspect of EU law? 2. Do you think EU law should be taught, either as an individual course, or part of other curricula, at your university? 3. Do you think EU law should be taught differently to different cohorts of EU, and non-EU students and in EU-based and not EU-based universities? 4. Does your university have researchers active in the field of EU law? Whose scholar active in this area from your country would you recommend reading? 5. What would you understand as a non-western approach to the teaching/research of EU law? And do you think there is value in such an approach in both the teaching and research of EU law?

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James, C., & Koo, J. (2017). The EU law ‘core’ module: Surviving the perfect storm of Brexit and the SQE. The Law Teacher, 52(1), 68–84. https://doi.org/10.1080/03069400.2017.1394144 Kelemen, R. D. (2010). Globalizing European Union environmental policy. Journal of European Public Policy, 17(3), 335–349. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501761003662065 Krstevska, A. N. (2018). ‘Education4Progress: Regional Cooperation to Improve EU Law Teaching’ conference proceedings. Centre for SEELS. https://eprints.ugd.edu.mk/21551/1/ConferencePr oceedingsEducation4Progress.pdf Kuner, C. (2021). Territorial scope and data transfer rules in the GDPR: Realising the EU’s ambition of borderless data protection. University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper, 20. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3827850 or https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3827850 Littig, B. (2009). Interviewing the elite—Interviewing Experts: Is there a difference?. In A. Bogner, B. Littig, & M. Menz (Eds.), Interviewing experts (pp.98–113) Palgrave Macmillan https://doi. org/10.1057/9780230244276_5 Maiani, F., Pozdnakova, A., & Progin-Theuerkauf, S. (2019). Extra Unionem nulla salus? Teaching and researching EU law in Norway and Switzerland. The Law Teacher, 53(2), 160–172. https:// doi.org/10.1080/03069400.2019.1582206 Manners, I. (2002). Normative power Europe: A contradiction in terms? Journal of Common Market Studies, 40(2), 235–258. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-5965.00353 Mazur-Kumric, N., & Zeko-Pivac, I. (2020). The EU as global trendsetter in the fight against climate change: Is climate-neutral Europe by 2050 feasible? Pecs Journal of International and European Law, 2, 9–30. Meissner, K. L., & McKenzie, L. (2019). The paradox of human rights conditionality in EU trade policy: When strategic interests drive policy outcomes. Journal of European Public Policy, 26(9), 1273–1291. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2018.1526203 Messerlin, P. A. (1989). The EC anti-dumping regulations: A first economic appraisal. Weltwirtshaftliches Archiv, 25(3), 563–587. Mu, Z. (2011). Leveraging industry characteristics, developing legal education. Chinese Higher Education, (20), 55–56. (Original in Chinese) Nakamura, T. (2016). The experience and challenges of teaching EU law in Japan. Japanese Journal of European Studies, 4(3), 51–56. Nicola, F., & Davies B. (2017). EU Law stories: Contextual and critical histories of European jurisprudence. CUP Park, D. & Lee, J. (2016). Research and education of EU law in S. Korea. Japanese Journal of European Studies, 4(3), 76–85. Selanec, N. B. (2015). Report on the conference ‘teaching EU Law.’ Zagreb Law Review, 4(1), 395–406. Shen, Y. (2000). Comment on the development of european studies in China. Academics in China, 84(5), 87–96. Van Bael, I. (1990). EEC anti-dumping law and procedure revisited. Journal of World Trade, 24(2), 5–23. Visvizi, A., Field, M., & Pachocka, M. (2021). Teaching the EU: Fostering knowledge and understanding in the Brexit age. Emerald Zeng, L. & Yao, Y. (2002). European legal studies in China: Past, present, and future. Legal Review, (4), 76–82.

Chapter 8

Can European Mechanisms on Human Rights Be Applied in South Asia? Abhinav Mehrotra and Vesselin Popovski

Abstract This chapter analyzes whether or not the development of the European mechanisms of human rights can serve as a model for similar developments in Asia. It discusses the debate between universality and cultural relativism, the nuances between individualistic and collectivist approaches to human rights, and characteristics between European and Asian historical and cultural contexts. Although many international human rights treaties and conventions are signed and ratified by Asian countries, the absence of intention to implement them in their entirety has obstructed them from having any significant impact. The authors then address human rights mechanisms in ASEAN and Africa and move on to discuss the historically complicated security environment in South Asia, pointing to its specificity and arguing that elaborating on this specificity is needed when considering how to approach human rights trans-nationally within South Asia. This specificity, however, does not affect the significance of human rights at a global level. The authors conclude that, after all, international human rights are not owned by any specific culture or society whether European or any other society and culture, but have their origin from different sources, including inputs from South Asia. Those who say that there are no ‘Asian values’, must also admit that there are no ‘European values’ either. Human rights originated as universal, and are to be protected universally in every corner of the world, in every society and culture.

A. Mehrotra (B) · V. Popovski Centre for the Study of the United Nations, O.P. Jindal Global University, Sonipat, Haryana, India e-mail: [email protected] V. Popovski e-mail: [email protected] V. Popovski Summit Project, University “Sv. Kliment Ohridski”, Sofia, Bulgaria © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 M. Stoicheva et al. (eds.), Relevance of European Studies in Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-7786-4_8

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The European Mechanisms of Human Rights The United Nations was created in 1945 with three main purposes—maintenance of international peace and security, economic cooperation and development, and protection and promotion of human rights. Given that Europe had witnessed two world wars, the creation of regional organizations to deal with peace, development, and human rights was seen as highly needed and important not only for Europe but for the entire world. The European nations started discussing various ideas on what European organizations to establish as to eliminate wars and maintain peace, assist economic and social development, and protect human rights. However, the East– West ideological divide very quickly led to what Winston Churchill described in his famous speech ‘Sinews of Peace’ in March 1946, as an ‘Iron Curtain’ descending on Europe. In another speech at the University of Zurich in September 1946 Churchill proposed the establishment of the ‘United States of Europe’, resembling the United States of America, and this meant that the Western European countries should unite against the Soviet Union. Accordingly, in Europe, it was impossible to create a single organization to deal with peace, economic cooperation, and human rights, rather parallel organizations were created separately in both Western and Eastern Europe. In March 1948 the Western Union Treaty was signed in Brussels by Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom aimed at peace and security. A year later in April 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was established, combining the military power of the United States and Canada with the Western European states. In 1955 the Soviet Union responded to the NATO creation and the adoption of West Germany in it, by creating the Warsaw Pact, a military alliance of East European Communist countries. After 20 years of Cold War confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, in 1975 the Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe began the process of dialogue, détente, and disarmament, and later was transformed into the Organization on Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) with headquarter in Vienna. The OSCE dealt not only with peace and security, but also had two other important ‘baskets’—economic cooperation and human rights. The institutions for economic cooperation in Europe date back to 1946 when ‘La Ligue Européenne de Coopération Economique’ (LECE) was established and its Statute adopted in 1948. After US President Harry Truman generously provided economic aid to Europe (the Marshall Plan) in April 1948 the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) was created to coordinate the implementation of the Marshall Plan. In 1957 with the Treaty of Rome, the already existing 1952 two European Communities (on Coal and Steel, and Tariffs) were united into a single European Community, which later evolved into the current European Union (EU). In Eastern Europe, the Communist countries established a Committee for Economic Mutual Aid (COMECOM) which existed, similar to the Warsaw Pact, until the end of Communism and the dismissal of the Soviet Union in 1991.

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The UN Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) adopted in December 1948 served as an inspiration and a guide for the Western European governments to create the Council of Europe and to adopt the European Convention on Human Rights. Before that the European Movement was created in Paris on 17 July 1947 when four organizations ‘La Ligue Européenne de Coopération Economique’ (LECE, already mentioned above), ‘l’Union européenne des Fédéralistes’(UEF), ‘l’Union parlementaire européenne’ (UPE), and the Anglo-French United European Movements (cochaired by Churchill and Duncan Sandys) met and decided to merge into a Joint International Committee for European Unity, which a year later on 25 October 1948 was renamed into the European Movement. Duncan Sandys was elected its first President, whereas Winston Churchill, Léon Blum, Alcide De Gasperi, and Paul-Henri Spaak were elected as Honorary Presidents (European Movement International, 1947). In May 1948, 800 delegates from around Europe gathered for the Congress of Europe in The Hague, presided by Churchill. Among the participants were Konrad Adenauer, Harold Macmillan, François Mitterrand, Albert Coppé, Altiero Spinelli, and others. The first major achievement of the European Movement was the creation of the Council of Europe in May 1949. It also initiated the creation of the Collège d’Europe in Bruges and the European Centre of Culture in Geneva. One of the major functions of the European Movement from the late 1940s till the 1990s was the setting up of think tanks and a network of mobilization against totalitarian regimes. The European Movement played an essential role in the European integration by building joint institutions, campaigning in favor of direct election in the European Parliament, in favor of creating European Communities and European Court. The objective was to put the rights of citizens at the heart of this integrational development (European Movement International, 1947). On 5 May 1949 in London, the Council of Europe was created with ten founding members, signing its Statute: Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Turkey and Greece joined three months later. On 10 August 1949, 100 parliamentarians drawn from these 12 member states, met in Strasbourg for the first plenary session of the Council’s Consultative Assembly and debated how to reconcile and reconstruct a continent still ruined from war, but already facing an ideological East–West divide. Among other ideas, they launched the concept of a court to protect the human rights and fundamental freedoms of every citizen, and guarantee that the horrors of the Second World War would never happen again. The founding Statute of the Council of Europe set out three basic principles that should guide its work: democracy, human rights, and rule of law. Although the United States of Europe, which Churchill advocated in 1946 never materialized, the Council of Europe had built around the three principles. Its role was especially significant for the protection of human rights. The enthusiasm and the support that the Council of Europe enjoyed in its early years from high-level political leadership, was utilized not only to declare commitment to human rights (as already done with the UDHR), but importantly, into the drafting of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), a charter of individual rights, which contained direct opportunity for individual citizens to challenge and file applications against governments, a procedure, which in

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the United Nations will develop only after 1966 with the adoption of the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). Crucially, where the UDHR was essentially aspirational, the ECHR from its very beginning featured an enforcement mechanism—the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)—to adjudicate alleged violations of various human rights, and to hold governments to account for these violations. This was a radical change, a big leap forward for international justice. A condition to be part of the Council of Europe is to sign and ratify the ECHR, and to be subject to individual petitions in case of violations. The ECtHR rulings are binding on 46 European nations, one less after the Russian Federation was excluded due to the Ukrainian Crisis. This is the most far-reaching system of international justice anywhere in the world. The ECtHR ensures compliance with engagements, undertaken by the contracting states in relation to the European Convention and its protocols. It was established in January 1959 under Art. 19 of the ECHR and its first judges were elected by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. The ECtHR kept a low profile during its first years and did not accumulate much case law. The first finding of a violation happened in Neumeister versus Austria in 1968 (European Centre for Constitutional and Human Rights, 2007), and after that the case law of the ECtHR has accumulated significantly. When the Treaty of Rome established the European Community in 1957 the focus was on economic cooperation, nevertheless human rights were listed in Art. 6, 7, and 13 of the Treaty. The adoption of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in 2012 has demonstrated further the commitment of the EU members to human rights and fundamental freedoms (Commission Regulations, 2019).

Human Rights: Universal or Culture-Related? The right balance is to say that human rights are universal but they exist in various socioeconomic and cultural contexts. One cannot deny universality, and also one cannot deny that human rights exist in national and regional contexts. Denial of universality serves primarily tyrants, who claim that human rights are ‘Western’ imposition. True, the European Enlightenment promoted human rights, however many norms and rules originated and were developed for millennia of years all over the world, much earlier than the USA Constitutions or the French ‘Decleration de Droits de l’Homme’. It is correct that the UDHR was drafted and promoted by Western leaders, however, they did this not as a manifestation of some Western privilege, priority, or leadership. In fact, exactly the opposite, dismayed by the long history of horrible violations of human rights, the Holocaust, the colonialism, and the slavery, they wrote the Declaration out of guilt being ‘Westerners’, not out of pride which is clearly visible in the UDHR which mandates to ensure human rights

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of all regardless of characteristics like race, color, sex, language, and religion, which makes a case for universality. In their eagerness to promote the importance of cultural diversity and group rights, the critics forget that all cultures are composed of individuals and, regardless of cultural upbringing, people tend to think differently. Cultural groups’ rights are important and need protection, but they can be used to suppress individuals, who do not fit the hegemony of that group. Saudi Arabia abstained from the vote on the UDHR, arguing that Articles 16 and 18 (the rights for men and women to marry whom they choose, and the right to freedom of religion) were in opposition to the Islamic faith and teachings which emphasize patriarchal authority (Alwasil, 2010). Importantly, by protecting individuals, human rights do not diminish the group, but merely ensure the protection of everyone within that group. At the same time, cultures are not static, but constantly evolving, as people encounter new ideas and concepts. Because some cultures do not emphasize certain rights at a certain moment, this does not mean that they will never do so. There are certain priorities for different societies that can be respected. For example, impoverished people suffering from hunger and diseases may prioritize their basic economic and social rights for some time before they may engage in—for example—discussing the right to same-sex marriage. But sooner or later all human rights everywhere will be taken indivisibly and universally exactly because all rights are fully compatible with cultural diversity. Every culture can pursue its own vision of a good life, if it doesn’t impinge on the rights of the individuals who exist within that culture. Three-quarters of all states have endorsed the UDHR with a ratification rate of 88%. It has been argued that a progressive interpretation of Sharia Law can be compatible with universal human rights (Qantara De, 2004). The UDHR might not be perfect, and certainly, there are issues regarding enforcement of human rights, for example, the lack of robust international mechanisms to prevent or mitigate violations, the non-cooperation of some states, including large states, the lack of developed civil society organizations in some parts of the world, the state-centric nature of the entire human rights architecture, etc. (Dononho, 2006). However, to diminish human rights on the claim that they are Western and, therefore, incompatible with other cultures, is wrong and unnecessary. What matters is the purpose of human rights—not only their origins—and their ability to protect the individual interests of the powerless, in all cultures. Seen in this light, the 1993 World Conference in Vienna reaffirmed the universality of human rights by emphasizing that human rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent, and interrelated. The declaration did emphasize that national and regional differences must be taken into account but this does not exempt the states from their duty to ensure promotion and protection of all human rights and fundamental freedoms (Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 1993). At the same time, the Asian Regional Meeting, ended by issuing the Bangkok Declaration, which defined and summarized the idea of cultural exception to human rights in terms of considering the specificities and historical, cultural, and religious backgrounds of various regions: (Bangkok Declaration, 1993). The attitude taken in the Bangkok Declaration is that though human rights norms are global in nature, they need to be translated into specific socio-political contexts

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(Mauzy, 1997). The human rights discourse in Asia has largely proceeded as a domestic discourse informed by international ideas. Consequently, in the absence of a regional human rights institution, the reliance has been placed on the municipal constitutional and legislative obligations of different governments in Asia. Through the Bangkok Declaration, the Asian States manifested their rejection of imposing any kind of human rights conditionality for development assistance by relying upon the principles of national sovereignty and territorial integrity as well as non-interference in the domestic affairs of States. Such reasoning is more often than not used by repressive sovereign States to defend their human rights abuses, particularly against minorities (Donnelly, 2007). It cannot be overemphasized that for a society that is developing as most Asian states claim to be, the basic needs will only be met when it is determined in a democratic way. For a government without a political accountability mechanism, it is difficult to respond to the basic needs of the people (Sen, 1997). The cultural relativist arguments are ignorant of politics, or combine politics with culture. As a result, such arguments confuse what people have been forced to adhere to with what they value (Renteln, 1985). Although, the cultural relativists are willing to accept a few universal basic rights with the space to maneuver that the relativity and universality overlap only slightly which goes against the notion that certain rights are bestowed upon human beings, such as the prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment, protection from arbitrary rule, equality under the law, etc. This is further strengthened by the fact that despite the difference in ideology, economic development, and social and political conditions, nearly all states, including in Asia, are signatories to the UDHR and the International Human Rights Covenants (Donnelly, 1984). Some Asian governments argued that the approaches to human rights adopted by the Western countries are not suited for Asia, due to the difference in economic, social, cultural, and political conditions. They consider local traditions as vital and foundational for human rights and accordingly object to the universality, seeing it as a ‘Western’ imposition. Gradually the notion of ‘Asian values’ has been developed and made substantively different from the universal (and Western) values (Engle, 2000). This created an unnecessary counter-positioning between Oriental (Asian) and Western (European) values in prioritizing different categories of rights and different approaches. Political and civil rights have been seen as the main preoccupation of Western human rights advocates, whereas the economic social, and cultural rights— of the Oriental advocates. However, this division is often politicized and not supported by strong evidence. Critics of ‘Asian values’ consider the implementation of constitutional democracy in Asia as not directly engaged with the nature of human rights, and unable to provide justification for the unreasonable authoritarian practices (Davis, 1998). The critique of cultural relativism would lead us to the objection of the ‘Asian values’, but also to the objection of ‘European values’. The values cannot be different in their substance, because people everywhere would value the good; and would try to prevent, mitigate, or correct the bad. Values and human rights therefore arose

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and developed in different times, in different places, and in different ways, they had different names in different languages and were specific in adherence to them.

Human Rights Mechanisms in ASEAN and Africa South Asian countries can investigate how institutions that address the issue of human rights such as the ASEAN and African Union, developed over time. Starting with ASEAN, it was established in 1967 with an aim to enhance economic cooperation in Southeast Asia and never considered itself as an entity and a platform dedicated to human rights and instead focused on the goals of security, economic growth, and development. It was in the joint communique of the 24th ASEAN Foreign Minister’s Meeting (AMM) in 1991 that human rights were mentioned for the first time and subsequently in the 25th AMM, the scope of human rights was defined in context of the cultural, historical, and socioeconomic conditions of each region and highlighted the significance of the national governments and their responsibilities in this regard (Wahyuningrum, 2021). While the issue of human rights was addressed in the above meetings, it was only in 1997 that Asia was hit by a financial crisis that had an adverse impact on the economic development of ASEAN member states. As a result, in 2003 ASEAN member states adopted the Declaration of the ASEAN Concord II that is also known as the Bali Concord II. As per the concord there existed three pillars of the ASEAN Community, out of which the political and security pillar emphasized the importance of fostering human rights cooperation among the ASEAN member states (Ferguson, 2004). This sentiment was echoed in the Vientiane Action Programme (VAP) in 2004 and later also found a place in the 2007 ASEAN Charter. Nevertheless, this inclusion was contested by some member states regarding the scope and power of the work of an ASEAN human rights body. On the one side, there were some member states such as Laos and Myanmar that advocated for an intergovernmental organization and not an independent commission that questions the member states but only represents the ASEAN views on human rights at international forums. On the other hand, there were member states like Indonesia and the Philippines who pushed for the protection of human rights in the region by introducing country visits, cross-border investigations, and periodic reviews under the Terms of Reference that mandates review every five years on the status of the prevailing situation on human rights in ASEAN member states. Thus, to accommodate both sides the body was named the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR). Subsequently, the AICHR was assigned the tasks of standard-setting; providing policy support to the ASEAN community; capacity building; engaging in dialogue and consultation; conducting studies; developing human rights strategies and obtaining information on human rights promotion and protection measures from the ASEAN member states (Wahyuningrum, 2021). What this signifies is the ability of the ASEAN member states from refraining to engaging in a dialogue to agreeing to accept a human rights framework by taking into

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consideration their interests and beliefs based on experiences of dealing with developed states and safeguarding their right of non-interference in their affairs within their jurisdictions. This is something that even the South Asian states can accept and develop a human rights framework after securing their own interests. Despite the above safeguard, there have been instances where the working of the ASEAN has been questioned, specifically the way they responded to the Rohingya Crisis in Myanmar by justifying their support for the Myanmar government based on their principles of sovereignty, non-interference, and consensus decision-making (Barber & Teitt, 2020). Such mishandling is something that the South Asian States need to be wary of. Going further, another region that has developed a comprehensive regional system of human rights is Africa. Under the Constitutive Act of the African Union, multiple human rights organs including the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the Court); the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (PSC), and the African Union Commission on International Law (AUCIL) have been established (Maluwa, 2003). By establishing these bodies, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights has endeavored to put human rights at the forefront of the regional cooperation in Africa between the member states. This attempt has been further strengthened through Article 45 (1) (c) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights that mandates the Commission to cooperate with various institutions at the regional and international level for protection and promotion of human and people rights (African Charter on Human and People Rights, 1981). Before discussing the functions of these organs that can guide the South Asian countries in developing organs on similar lines. It is important to understand the aim of creating such organs. In practice, the aim is to respect the protection of human rights, ensure remedies for the victims of violations, investigate mass violations of human rights, and progressive development of human rights law in Africa (Barber & Teitt, 2020). Coming to the functions of these organs, the AUCIL under Article 45 of the African Charter has been accorded a promotional mandate that requires it to collect documents, undertake studies and research on African problems, organize seminars, symposia, and conferences, encourage national and local institutions concerned with human and peoples’ rights as well as giving its views or making recommendations to governments. Similarly, the African Union created an additional organ of a Peace and Security Council through the Protocol relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union as a standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflicts (Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace & Security Council of the African Union, 2002). Finally, the African Court of Human and People’s Rights that was established through the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights under Article 29(2), on 10 June 1998 which came into force on 25 January 2004. Even though only a few cases have been adjudicated by the African Court, it acts as a forum where the African Commission may submit the case to it under Article 5 (1) (a) of the Protocol in cases where the concerned member state has not complied or is unwilling to comply with its recommendations (Maluwa, 2003).

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International Human Rights in the Context of South Asia The countries in South Asia have adopted various constitutional and legislative rights to remedy the inequalities persisting within the societies based on class, caste, gender, and religion. One such example is India, where under Article 51 (c) of the Constitution directs the state to fulfill its obligation under international law and there also exists Article 253 that confers on Parliament, to implement international agreements, treaties, or conventions (Lavanya, 2017) Further, the Protection of Human Rights Act of 1993 exists that was enacted by the Indian Parliament to promote and protect human rights at the municipal level (Protection of Human Rights (Amendment) Act, 2006, No. 43, Acts of Parliament, 2006). The countries in South Asia share a colonial legacy of ruling, i.e., the administrative culture and governmental tendencies suffer from a colonial attitude or the fact that there was a mass exodus of people at the time of partition and the heavily contested borders of these countries (Sarker, 2017). As a result, society faces many problems like poverty, illiteracy, unemployment, violence, and other social evils like discrimination against women. What this reflects is the existence of the byproduct of the colonial past in these countries as the issues of state legitimacy, governance, and popular identities can be understood from the dominance of the military in Pakistan and the ethnic-religious groups in Sri Lanka. In both scenarios, there exists centralization of power and consolidation of state authority. For example, in Pakistan, although there exists a democratic system, it is fragile, and the real power is exercised by the strong military apparatuses of the state. On the other hand, in the case of Sri Lanka, the exercise of power by the authoritarian state has resulted in acute hostilities and civil war that had stretched over decades before finally coming to an end in 2009. The major reason for the failure of the state is the inability in forging or implementing inter-ethnic agreements to resolve conflicts in a pluralistic society (Shastri, 2001). Some of the reasons cited for the refusal to adopt regional mechanisms include respect for sovereignty, non-interference, and territorial integrity as well as differences regarding economy, religion, history, and the regime type. The most often cited reason is the labeling of regional systems as being individual rightsoriented institutions as the individuals have rights against the states and the fact that such institutions undermine the differences existing between the societies in different parts of the world (Croydon, 2014). What this signifies is the fact that South Asia is not a homogenous region with respect to history, culture, and political orientation except for the fact that they all were colonies. Thus, for the parties to come to an understanding of having a regional mechanism for human rights, there exists a need for the parties to respect each other’s rights amid diversity. Although there does exist a common thread between these countries, i.e., the emphasis is more on economic, social, and cultural rights with an aim to emphasize the concerns of the community over the interests of the individual as opposed to civil and political rights such as freedom of expression and conscience under the Western ideology. It is pertinent to note the reasons behind the lack of focus on civil and political rights in South Asia are the ‘Asian values’

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such as deference to authority and strong government that reflect the social attitude toward political repression, authoritarianism, and opaque government policies in these countries (Bandyopadhyay et al., 2017). In the larger interest, Asian individuals, families, and societies face similar threats to those faced in Western societies, thus they need the same protection of human rights. The larger question that this reflects upon is the question surrounding the argument of Asian Values and the points that are at the core of the disagreement between the West and the East and how it results in prioritizing the economic social and cultural rights over the civil and political rights. In simple terms, the point of departure between the West and the East is on the value attached to liberal democracy, conservatism, and tradition, i.e., whether the Asian States can or should be expected to protect human rights to the same degree despite the varying level of economic, political, and legal developments and to different cultural values on the aspect of the necessity of freedom. To illustrate, emphasis on character building and morality may come in conflict with the right to free speech and expression (Mauzy, 1997). In this context, The South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was established in 1985 with an aim to promote regional peace and development, and under Articles 1 (b) of the SAARC Social Charter (SAARC Social Charter, 2004), it aims to provide all individuals the opportunity to live in dignity and to realize their full potential. However, in practice, these commitments do not get fulfilled when there is a discussion on sensitive issues. As a result, the SAARC is yet to create a common mechanism for human rights. Although SAARC states have adopted a small number of regional human rights instruments, namely the SAARC Convention on Preventing and Combating Trafficking in Women and Children for Prostitution, and the SAARC Convention on Regional Arrangements for the Promotion of Child Welfare in South Asia, both documents were adopted at the 2002 SAARC summit in Kathmandu and the SAARC Social Charter was adopted at the 2004 SAARC summit in Islamabad. It cannot be overemphasized that there is an even stronger need to focus on grave issues like sexual orientation or gender identity, the rights of internally displaced persons, the death penalty, and extrajudicial, summary, and arbitrary executions that are never promoted and protected in the SAARC states but have been highly regarded by the member states in the European Union (EU). In contrast, the SAARC states have focused on issues such as development, international cooperation, unilateral coercive measures, the protection of the family, defamation of religions, or traditional values that are not supported by member states in the EU. Nonetheless, there is a common ground where both SAARC and EU member states have agreed that are the resolutions on National Human Rights Institutions (Ozdowski, 2020). With the passage of time, the human rights mechanisms at the national level have seen some progress since the Vienna Declaration in 1993 and many governments have established national human rights institutions such as India, Sri Lanka, etc. In simple terms, a national human rights institution may come into existence either through the Constitution or an amendment to the Constitution or by legislation and through executive action (Kabir, 2001). In practice, the effectiveness of the national institutions depends upon whether they can follow the Paris Principles that guide

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the working of these institutions. Even though the establishment of national-level institutions is a welcome development, the issues surrounding the effectiveness and independence of these institutions have been a source of concern as they do not comply with the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Framework which has listed factors that measure the effectiveness of the national human rights institutions including independence, defined jurisdiction, and adequate powers, accessibility, cooperation, operational efficiency, and accountability (United Nations Center for Human Rights, 1995).

Conclusion This chapter asked whether or not the development of the European mechanisms of human rights can serve as a model of similar developments in South Asia. The answer is ‘yes and no’. The lessons—positive and negative—learned from the European experience could certainly be useful and needs to be taken into account. However, South Asia is historically and culturally a very specific sub-continent, and its countries are obviously entitled to determine their own modalities of human rights approaches and mechanisms. This is also certainly applicable to other sub-continents and regions. Although international human rights treaties and conventions have been signed and ratified by all South Asian countries, there is a lack of regional dialogue as to a common approach or common framework. Accordingly, the human rights in South Asia remain very ‘domesticated’ and sensitive, bringing powerful claims of sovereignty and non-interference against international monitoring. The ECHR and ECtHR, therefore, seem not to be models fitting into the context of South Asia. The twenty-first century has been claimed as the Asian Century, and accompanying this is the emphasis laid on the social and economic rights and not on the civil and political rights. Given the historical role of Asia in drafting the UDHR by balancing the emphasis on individual rights with the collective rights through inserting the words ‘morality and conscience’ into the declaration and starting with a non-binding declaration that laid the foundation for subsequent binding treaties that led to the development of International Human Rights Law. Thus, Asia and specifically South Asia has contributed to the development of the law and the next step is to come up with a regional intergovernmental mechanism to protect human rights.

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Chapter 9

The Never-Ending Poly-Crisis: European Union Governance and Legitimacy Beyond COVID-19 Vihar Georgiev

Abstract In less than two decades, the European Union (EU) and its institutions have been caught by surprise in at least three separate governance crises: the Eurozone crisis, the migration crisis, and most recently—the COVID-19 pandemic crisis. The significant negative impact of these crises on the European citizens challenges the perceived adequacy and legitimacy of the Union and its policy-making capacity. The paper proposes going beyond the standard notions of input, throughput, and output legitimacy to take into account the relationship between crisis management capacity and legitimacy. This holistic approach is then used to assess the impact of these three crises and the EU institutions’ response to the legitimacy of the EU. While some lessons were learned from both the Eurozone and migration crisis, the crisis governance approach used by EU’s institutions is negatively impacting both policy outcomes and the perceived legitimacy of the Union. There is ample evidence for a combination of “destructive dissensus” and politicization that can significantly undermine the legitimacy of the Union. Seen from this perspective, the current COVID-19 pandemic crisis presents an urgent call for reform of the institutional architecture of the EU, as well as its legitimation strategies. Specific lessons for Asian economic and political integration are also outlined. Keywords European Union · Legitimacy · Crisis governance · Policy-making capacity · COVID-19

Introduction For over 12 years, the European Union (EU) has been engulfed in a continuous polycrisis. This paper reviews the mutually reinforcing policy challenges or dilemmas that can be construed jointly as a poly-crisis of European governance. The paper applies a novel analytical framework for assessing the poly-crisis. The first section presents V. Georgiev (B) European Studies Department, Sofia University “St. Kliment Ohridski”, Sofia, Bulgaria e-mail: vihurg@uni-sofia.bg © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 M. Stoicheva et al. (eds.), Relevance of European Studies in Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-7786-4_9

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the analytical framework developed originally in Georgiev (2018), based on a multidisciplinary review of recent developments in institutional legitimacy research.1 The second section applies the analytical framework to the issues/challenges that are most relevant for the poly-crisis: Eurozone governance, migration, and the COVID19 pandemic. The third section outlines key findings related to legitimacy of the EU and its political institutions, as well as key gaps that should be considered in order to achieve actual improvement of the perceived legitimacy of the EU and its institutions. The Conclusion summarizes the key impacts of the poly-crisis on EU’s institutional mechanism, and outlines specific lessons for Asian economic and political integration.

Theoretical Background and Analytical Framework This section proposes a holistic and comprehensive framework for analysing the performance of EU institutions during the poly-crisis and evaluating proposals for EU institutional reform. The framework was originally developed in Georgiev (2018) and incorporates three interlinked perspectives: efficiency, adequacy, and legitimacy. While research on EU institutions has largely focused on legitimacy, assessed through notions of input, throughput, and output legitimacy (Beetham & Lord, 2014; Piattoni, 2015; Scharpf, 1970, 2009; Schmidt, 2013, 2020), this framework expands the analysis by considering efficiency and adequacy as additional drivers of legitimation processes. In this way the framework addresses the need for incorporating findings from both empirical and normative studies of EU’s legitimacy (Georgiev, 2018; Kreuder-Sonnen, 2018). This paper benefits from recent empirical and theoretical research in political science, sociology, economics, organizational psychology, political psychology, and management science, in order to develop a more comprehensive analytical framework for assessing EU’s institutional response to the poly-crisis from the perspective of legitimacy.2 The framework utilizes two additional dimensions proposed by Georgiev (2018)—efficiency and adequacy—that can be considered as drivers of legitimation processes. Together, these perspectives provide a more nuanced evaluation of institutional performance and reform than legitimacy alone. By drawing on recent empirical and theoretical research across disciplines, this holistic framework moves beyond political legitimacy to capture the balance of functional imperatives and integration fatigue shaping EU institutions. The goal is an integrated analysis that combines normative and empirical research on legitimacy with attention to emerging dimensions of efficiency and adequacy. 1

This chapter adapts the analytical framework developed by the author in Georgiev (2018) with a focus on operationalizing the framework for the analysis of the poly-crisis of EU governance post-COVID-19. 2 See for more details the overviews of current debates provided in Dellmuth and Schlipphak (2020), Haack et al. (2021), and Vila-Henninger (2020).

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Adequacy of Institutions The notion of institutional adequacy can be defined as a Pareto-optimal equilibrium where citizens share the belief that existing institutions, rights, and boundaries are appropriate and worth defending given their personal political preferences (Georgiev, 2018; Weingast, 1997). More generally, adequacy incorporates throughput and output legitimacy (Schmidt, 2013). The adequacy of institutions could also be described as their ability to reduce strategic uncertainty and allow members to form expectations about others’ behaviour based on preferences (Voigt, 1999). Thus, adequacy provides a qualitative measure of whether institutions meet individual or group preferences. Moreover, adequacy depends significantly on the heterogeneity of preferences within a polity. The more heterogeneous the preferences, the harder it is for institutions to achieve Pareto-optimal outcomes. One consequence of perceived institutional inadequacy is a shift towards preferring governance by smaller units rather than the EU (Marks & Hooghe, 2000). In summary, adequacy assesses whether institutions effectively bridge diverse preferences to produce legitimate and sustainable policies (Georgiev, 2018).

Efficiency of Institutions Efficiency of institutions can be defined as achieving a Nash equilibrium in the institutional power structure, even without a Pareto-optimal governance outcome (Georgiev, 2018; Hall & Taylor, 1996). In a Nash equilibrium, individuals adhere to institutions because deviating would make them worse off (Lubell, 2003). For citizens, efficiency means there are no better institutional alternatives or ability to coordinate away from current arrangements without losing access to important goods (Johnson et al., 2006; Marquez, 2016). In order for legitimacy beliefs to be present, they usually need to be deep seated in moral considerations about the public utility of governance (Dellmuth & Schlipphak, 2020). Efficiency can be linked to the notion of input legitimacy (Schmidt, 2013), but is a broader, empirically richer category that goes beyond normative-practical reasoning (Gaus, 2011). Efficiency contributes to the taken-for-grantedness of institutions, along with factors like path dependence and cultural traditions (Deephouse et al., 2017; Powell & Oberg, 2017; Suddaby et al., 2017). Taken-for-grantedness indicates legitimacy, since rule breaking reveals instrumental calculus behind legitimacy (Hurd, 1999). Thus, studying deliberate EU rule non-compliance provides insights into legitimation processes and outcomes. In summary, efficiency assesses if institutions are perceived as optimal given situational constraints, rather than based on normative justification (Georgiev, 2018).

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Agility and Adaptability of Crisis Governance Janssen and Van Der Voort (2020) present two additional dimensions of crisis governance that can shed light on the perceived performance of EU’s institutions during the three crises. “Agile governance” entails primarily working practices and methods that facilitate quick institutional responses. In this way, agile governance is linked to the notion of efficiency of institutions inasmuch as reacting quickly and decisively is often construed as a desired quality of any institution (Born & Beutler, 2006). “Adaptive governance” refers to the ability to deal with complex societal issues involving many stakeholders, diverging interests, and uncertainty about the actions to be taken. Adaptive governance, to a significant extent, overlaps with the notion of adequacy described above. Taken together, agility and adaptability of governance can be understood as dynamic qualities that are made explicit during a policy crisis due to the shortened temporal scale and the high political salience of the problems and challenges posed by the crisis. Response to change is key in both agile and adaptive governance. However, Janssen and Van Der Voort (2020) rightly point out that agility may come at the cost of adaptability, even though both concern change and uncertainty. Policy practitioners generally believe that the EU must become better at detecting and responding to crises wherever and whenever they occur (Rhinard, 2019). In addition, agility and adaptability of crisis governance can explain perceptions of high institutional legitimacy in cases where conditions for traditional input and throughput legitimacy are not present (Yang & Zhao, 2015).

Legitimacy of Institutions: A Multidimensional View Integrating adequacy and efficiency perspectives with legitimacy provides a more holistic framework for analysing the EU’s poly-crisis and proposed institutional reforms (Georgiev, 2018). Legitimacy can be viewed as a property, process, or perception (Suddaby et al., 2017). In all three aspects, adequacy and efficiency help explain, assess, and predict institutional legitimacy. However, a perceptual perspective on legitimacy is most promising, as it allows exploring the micro-foundations of legitimacy in individual attitudes, judgments, and social interactions that shape collective perceptions (Georgiev, 2018; Suddaby et al., 2017). In summary, adequacy and efficiency can be seen as key drivers of perceived legitimacy. The proposed analytical framework encapsulates these dependencies and relevant research questions. Viewing legitimacy as a perception shaped by judgments of institutional adequacy and efficiency, rather than just a property or process, enables a more comprehensive assessment of the EU’s institutional performance during the poly-crisis and proposed reforms. The framework proposed originally by Georgiev (2018) integrates normative, empirical, and perceptual factors to provide a holistic

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Table 9.1 Adequacy and efficiency as drivers of perceived legitimacy3 Driver

Relation to legitimacy as perception

Relevant research questions

Adequacy • Perception of the level of attainment of personal or group preferences • Production and reproduction of heterogeneity of preferences at micro and macro levels • Ability to reduce strategic insecurity • Ability to constrain undesired behaviours, actions, policies, and outcomes • Perception of adaptive governance

• To what extent are personal and group preferences heterogeneous within the polity? • Does the polity contribute to the heterogeneity of preferences? • Is the polity perceived as able to reduce strategic uncertainty? • Is the polity perceived as willing and able to constrain/reduce/mitigate undesired behaviours, actions, policies, and outcomes? • Are institutions of the polity perceived as able to deal with complex societal issues involving many stakeholders, diverging interests, and uncertainty about the actions to be taken?

Efficiency • Perception of polity and its institutions as taken-for-granted • Perception of polity and its institutions as the best available alternative • Perception of the benefits and transaction costs of collective action • Perceptions of agile governance

• To what extent are the polity and its institutions taken for granted? • To what extent are the polity and its institutions perceived as the best available alternative? • How is the balance of benefits and transaction costs of collective action evaluated/perceived? • To what extent are institutional responses perceived as reacting quickly and decisively?

legitimacy analysis. Table 9.1 adapts the analytical framework proposed by Georgiev (2018) to outline the key dependencies, and to present the key research questions. In order to operationalize the framework and to assess the impact of the polycrisis and current proposals for reform of the EU institutional setup, the following key research questions can be used: • Do the poly-crisis challenges affect the perceptions of adequacy and efficiency of the EU and its institutions? • Can we develop comprehensive diagnosis of the citizens’ perceptions of adequacy and efficiency of EU and its institutions? The next section presents briefly the key challenges of the poly-crisis of European governance. However, this analytical framework can, with certain modifications, be applied also to Asian political and economic integration processes and regional institutions. The key strength of the proposed analytical framework is its focus on

3

Adapted from Georgiev (2018).

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a detailed empirical, rather than normative, conception of legitimacy (Rittberger & Schroeder, 2016).

The Poly-Crisis of European Governance During a speech delivered in Athens in 2016, the President of the European Commission summarized the compounded effect of the poly-crisis on the EU’s governance mechanism as follows: Our various challenges – from the security threats in our neighbourhood and at home, to the refugee crisis, and to the UK referendum – have not only arrived at the same time. They also feed each other, creating a sense of doubt and uncertainty in the minds of our people.4

Jean-Claude Juncker defined the problem field of the poly-crisis as a set of mutually reinforcing policy challenges or dilemmas. The key challenges are not defined in the speech in terms of political salience or relative importance, but in terms of their impact on the consciousness of European citizens. This section reviews the three key challenges—the Eurozone crisis, the migration and refugee crisis, and the COVID-19 crisis focusing on their detrimental effect on the legitimacy of European institutions. Given the abundant literature on the Eurozone crisis, and the migration and refugee crisis, more attention is paid to the still developing COVID-19 pandemic in the EU.

The Eurozone Crisis From the very beginning of the Eurozone construction process, there has been concern that the institutional framework put in place is inadequate for the task at hand (Paulson, 1997). There have been doubts about the danger of triggering institutional crises caused by the inability to take effective measures to overcome the inevitable economic and financial difficulties of Member States. A common accusation is that the institutional framework of the Eurozone is in line with the economic interests of the North Member States and mainly serves the interests of Germany (Lapavitsas & Kouvélakis, 2012). Moreover, it is argued that the focus on price stability and balanced public budgets is part of the so-called neoliberal consensus that undermines the foundations of a welfare state built in Western Europe after the end of World War II. Agreement among governments on supranational monetary union reforms may be difficult given that domestic preferences are anchored in different economic conditions. These structural economic conditions are likely to further constrain future Eurozone reform given their embeddedness in different political economic models (Târlea et al., 2019). 4

Speech by President Jean-Claude Juncker at the Annual General Meeting of the Hellenic Federation of Enterprises (SEV), Athens, 21 June 2016.

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It is difficult to argue that EU’s institutions displayed significant levels of agility and adaptability during the Eurozone crisis. The insistence on “one size fits all” solutions to divergent national socioeconomic contexts may have prolonged the recovery of the Eurozone periphery (Schmidt, 2020). More importantly, the practice of “failing forward”—i.e. advancing integration through cycles of incomplete reforms followed by more crises may be politically expedient in the short term, but it most likely undermines public support for the EU over the long term (Jones et al., 2016). The composite picture that emerges is problematic. It appears that the negative tendencies for the legitimacy of the European Central Bank, the European Council, the Council, and the European Commission have probably contributed the most to the overall notion of democratic deficit in the European Union. These tendencies have most likely opened space for opportunistic division based on ethnicity and/or nationality in the European Union, especially between Member States in and outside of the Eurozone, and between Northern and Southern Member States. This division has been also impacted by the perceived lack of output legitimacy, and therefore adequacy, of EMU policies during the crisis. In conclusion, the Eurozone crisis has increased the heterogeneousness of political preferences at different scales, and has led to perceptions of weak or insufficient adequacy, agility, and adaptability of the EU’s institutional system.

The Migration and Refugee Crisis Flows of refugees and economic migrants have been a constant element of EU’s history for at least 40 years. Some of the more recent flows were triggered by significant geopolitical events in the EU’s periphery. The so-called Arab Spring caused an increased migration flow of immigration to the EU, mainly through the Mediterranean routes to Italy and Greece. Currently, however, Afghanistan is the most commonly reported specific origin country (in absolute numbers) by the migrants and refugees (IOM, 2019). The migration and refugee crisis peaked in 2015. Yet, even though the crisis appears to subside, it is continuing. Italy saw an increase in arrivals since 2015, reaching a peak at the end of March 2017. The so-called “urgent” measures taken by FRONTEX and EASO during the migration crisis appear to have had limited success. The current status of border security in the EU remains precarious. A number of serious challenges remain: the widening of the surveillance areas, the growing need for and the extension of search and rescue operations, the lack of facilities to receive and accommodate thousands of persons over a short time, the lack of expertise to detect non-typical travel documents, difficulties in addressing fraudulent declarations of nationality or age, and non-systematic entry of fingerprints to the Eurodac. The uneven distribution of such a multidimensional and growing burden leaves the European multilevel system of asylum and migration governance in a fragile and precarious state. On top of this, far-right, populist, xenophobic parties are on the rise in EU Member States (Heinö et al., 2016; Bergh & Kärnä, 2020).

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The public opinion in Member States remained sceptical of increased flow of migrants. 18% of Europeans consider immigration the main issue facing the European Union, just ahead of unemployment (15%).5 In 22 Member States, majorities of respondents have a negative feeling about the immigration of people from outside the EU. However, the majority of respondents (67%) prefer a common EU policy on migration. It appears that European citizens continue to question the adequacy of EU’s response to the migration crisis rather than the efficiency of the EU’s institutional architecture. The nexus of ethno-political identity, the cultural homogeneity, and the resistance to immigration is utterly unfavourable for the development of the European integration process. Exogenous geopolitical and demographic factors may further weaken EU’s institutional response to the continuing migration crisis (Georgiev, 2017). Current proposals for reforming migration and asylum policies in the EU fail to address the significant heterogeneity of preferences of Member States and European citizens towards migration. The migration crisis has thus contributed to a stronger reliance on informal patterns of cooperation among Member States with the aim of evading EU’s institutional and legal constraints (Niemann & Zaun, 2018). In conclusion, the perception of inadequacy of EU’s institutions and policies during the migration crisis contributes to internal divisions among Member States and undermines the perceptions of EU’s legitimacy due to the increasing heterogeneity of preferences, and the limited capacity of EU’s institutions to reduce strategic uncertainty.

The COVID-19 Pandemic Crisis On 31 December 2019, a cluster of pneumonia cases of unknown aetiology was reported in Wuhan, Hubei Province China. On 9 January 2020, China CDC reported a novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV) as the causative agent of this outbreak. The first COVID-19 cases were registered in the European Union on 24 January 2020 in Bordeaux, France (ECDC, 2020). The significant loss of human life and other negative impacts on human health were combined with the adoption of strict lockdown measures. In combination, those negative impacts have resulted in the most severe recession in recent history (IISS, 2021). Overall in 2020, real GDP contracted by 6.8 and 6.4 percent in the euro area and the EU, respectively, with flash estimates for 2021Q1 showing a further contraction in output, the largest drop since the Second World War (IMF, 2021). Thus, it can be concluded that the COVID-19 pandemic introduced two crisis vectors—the direct impact on public health, and the resulting socioeconomic impact caused by the non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) introduced to contain the 2019-nCoV virus spread. 5

Standard Eurobarometer 94, Winter 2020–2021.

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Public Health Measures At the beginning of the crisis, the EU Member States exhibited a high level of variety in terms of preparedness of their health systems (Aristodemou et al., 2021). Member States had to quickly adapt and improve the resilience of public health and healthcare systems, ensure adequate supply of personal protection equipment (PPE), and at the same time limit the spread of the virus mainly through NPIs. In their reaction to the rapidly evolving pandemic, the governments of Member States have had problems to operationalize common strategies proposed by the humanitarian logistics literature to pool resources and to share them jointly (Wankmüller, 2021). This was especially evident in relation to restrictions on PPE and medicines supply, and intra-EU trade. Initially, the EU institutions were also not prepared for the scale and severity of the impending pandemic crisis. On 17 January 2020 the Health Security Committee (HSC), chaired by the Directorate-General for Health and Food Safety of the European Commission (DG SANTE), included representatives from only 12 Member States, the United Kingdom, and the WHO Europe office.6 The European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) presented its initial risk assessment, which was not particularly alarming: ECDC noted “an indication of person-to-person transmission”, but assessed that the implementation of infection prevention control measures by Chinese health authorities “would reduce the currently low risk to very low for nosocomial transmission”.7 The EU’s immediate health policy responses to COVID-19 used the two key resources that were already available at the start of 2020: ECDC, and the RescEU civil protection mechanism. ECDC’s role was always limited. It had fewer than 300 staff and was manifestly not designed to be the front line of European health emergency response. Civil protection (RescEU), like the EU, initially disappointed (Greer et al., 2021). The ECDC established a COVID-19 network with contact points nominated by each Member State. The network has worked with the WHO Regional Office for Europe and has met on a weekly basis since February 2020. The ECDC’s advice not only informed Member States on surveillance or PPE, but also on containment measures such as lockdowns and de-escalation (Deruelle & Engeli, 2021). According to the ECA (2021), ECDC experts faced challenges obtaining timely, high-quality, complete COVID-19 data from Member States throughout the pandemic. Differing national surveillance and testing strategies also complicated ECDC efforts to compare epidemiological situations across the EU (ECA, 2021). The ECDC shared all updated risk assessments and relevant documents with the Health Security Committee (HSC). The Commission and Member States used HSC meetings to discuss COVID initiatives, share information, and develop common positions, most often on travel restrictions, non-pharmaceutical interventions, testing, contact tracing, vaccines, and preparedness (ECA, 2021). 6

Audio meeting of the Health Security Committee—17 January 2020. Public Flash report. Retrieved November 7, 2021 from https://ec.europa.eu/health/sites/default/files/preparedness_response/docs/ ev_20200117_sr_en.pdf. 7 Ibid.

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A key early response to the COVID-19 pandemic by EU Member States was imposing restrictions on movement across borders (European Parliament, 2020). To maintain the free flow of goods and services in the single market, the European Commission issued guidelines in March 2020 for border management.8 The guidelines called Member States to preserve the free circulation of all goods and to guarantee the supply chain of essential products such as medicines, medical equipment, essential and perishable food products, and livestock. The Member States accepted the Commission’s proposal9 to restrict non-essential travel into the EU for 30 days. However, travel restrictions were also introduced within the EU. By April 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic had prompted 17 Schengen countries to notify the European Commission that they were reintroducing controls at internal borders. Several other Schengen members also imposed restrictions on personal travel affecting their internal borders, such as bans on non-essential movement (European Parliament, 2020). During the spring and summer of 2020, the European Commission adopted a number of additional guidelines and recommendations on restriction to travel and free movement.10 In October 2020, the Council of the EU adopted a recommendation introducing a coordinated approach to the restriction of free movement in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.11 In short, it took Member States more than six months to develop a comprehensive, transparent, and science-based approach to the introduction of travel restrictions as part of their NPIs. The swift and uncoordinated border closures by Member States disproportionately impacted certain countries, particularly those on the periphery or reliant on remittances from posted workers. For example, the border restrictions had an outsized effect on Baltic States, Bulgaria, and Romania, which depend heavily on income sent home by workers in other EU nations. The lack of coordination in imposing travel limitations meant some Member States bore the brunt of the consequences, revealing inadequacies 8

Guidelines for border management measures to protect health and ensure the availability of goods and essential services. C(2020) 1753 final. 9 Temporary Restriction on Non-Essential Travel to the EU. COM/2020/115 final. 10 Commission Guidelines concerning the exercise of the free movement of workers during COVID19 outbreak (OJ C 102I, 30.3.2020, p. 12), Joint European Roadmap towards lifting COVID-19 containment measures’ of the President of the European Commission and the President of the European Council, Commission Guidance on free movement of health professionals and minimum harmonisation of training in relation to COVID-19 emergency measures (OJ C 156, 8.5.2020, p. 1), Commission Communication towards a phased an coordinated approach for restoring freedom of movement and lifting internal border controls (OJ C 169, 15.5.2020, p. 30), Commission Communication on the third assessment of the application of the temporary restriction on non-essential travel to the EU COM(2020) 399 final, Commission Guidelines on seasonal workers in the EU in the context of the COVID-19 outbreak (OJ C 235I, 17.7.2020, p. 1), Commission Communication on the implementation of the Green Lanes under the Guidelines for border management measures to protect health and ensure the availability of goods and essential services (OJ C 96I, 24.3.2020, p. 1), Commission Guidelines on Facilitating Air Cargo Operations during COVID-19 outbreak (OJ C 100I, 27.3.2020, p. 1), and Commission Guidelines on protection of health, repatriation and travel arrangements for seafarers, passengers and other persons on board ships (OJ C 119, 14.4.2020, p. 1). 11 Council Recommendation (EU) 2020/1475 of 13 October 2020 on a coordinated approach to the restriction of free movement in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. OJ L 337, 14.10.2020.

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in synchronizing essential border policies during crises (Russack & Blockmans, 2020). Thus pre-existing centre–periphery cleavages that emerged during the Eurozone crisis persisted and deepened in 2020 (Aristodemou et al., 2021; Conte et al., 2020). Member States were either in deep crisis or feared that they were about to descend into crisis. That made them reluctant to offer up any current PPE and medical equipment surpluses to states in need (Greer et al., 2021). A 2021 European Court of Auditors (ECA) review report found that the Commission’s clearing house for medical equipment (CCH) had limited utilization despite positive reviews. The CCH was established in April 2020 to facilitate EU-level dialogue and information sharing between Member States on supply and demand of medical equipment during the COVID-19 pandemic. It also provided regulatory guidance to industry on adapting production to meet COVID-related needs. However, an internal CCH survey showed that although 63% of national contact points rated the platform as good or very good, less than 20% actually used it to consult or purchase equipment (ECA, 2021). While the CCH was well-received in principle, its tangible impact was restricted by low engagement from Member States. The disconnect between positive reviews and limited use suggests there were barriers preventing the CCH from realizing its full potential for coordinating COVID-19 medical equipment needs across the EU. EU measures taken in the field of health remained relatively uncontroversial and without much public debate, with the important exception of travel restrictions discussed above, and vaccine purchases (Goetz & Martinsen, 2021). At the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, the EU faced legislative and financial barriers to centrally coordinating vaccine procurement and distribution across Member States. New legislation was still required to authorize EU-level organization of joint vaccine purchase and allocation. Additionally, no funding mechanism was established and conditions were not in place for the EU to finance vaccine acquisition. The lack of existing legal and budgetary frameworks to facilitate centralized vaccine procurement and access represents a critical gap that constrained the EU’s capacity to swiftly and effectively respond to COVID-19. The pandemic exposed these inadequacies in the EU’s preparedness for managing a severe cross-border public health crisis (De Ruijter, 2021). In the summer of 2020, some Member States like France, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands began negotiating large vaccine orders unilaterally with AstraZeneca. This fragmented approach risked undermining the internal market and European integration by allowing more powerful states to secure supplies while leaving others behind. It prompted efforts for joint procurement to harness the EU’s collective bargaining leverage for the benefit of all members amidst global vaccine scarcity and limited suppliers. Centralized purchasing aimed to prevent bidding wars between Member States that could disadvantage less influential countries (Bongardt & Torres, 2021). In June 2020, the European Commission presented an EU Strategy for COVID-19 vaccines, proposing Advance Purchase Agreements (APAs) with manufacturers via

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the Emergency Support Instrument (ESI).12 The European Commission proposed the negotiation of Advance Purchase Agreements (APAs) with vaccine producers via the Emergency Support Instrument (ESI). Once any of the vaccines supported proved successful, Member States could acquire vaccines directly based on APA conditions. Selection criteria included scientific robustness, speed, cost, and other factors. Between August and July 2020, the Commission signed APAs with Sanofi, Johnson & Johnson, and AstraZeneca, despite evidence that the front running vaccines were from BioNTech and Moderna. The Commission only placed orders with BioNTech and Moderna in mid-November after 95% efficacy claims, and ordered less than possible quantities (Marcus, 2021). In December 2020, the Comirnaty vaccine by BioNTech was authorized by the Commission.13 Moderna’s vaccine was approved in early January 2021, following evaluation by EMA.14 AstraZeneca’s vaccine was authorized in late January 2021,15 but 22 EU Member States recommended not using this vaccine in individuals between 55 and 70 years due to inadequate efficacy data in this group, undermining confidence and fuelling vaccine hesitancy (Dal-Ré & Launay, 2021). Meanwhile, also in January 2021, the manufacturer AstraZeneca said it would cut deliveries to the EU from 80 million doses to 31 million during the first quarter of 2021, citing lower than expected output at a manufacturing site in its European supply chain (Schiffling & Breen, 2021). This prompted the reaction of the Commission, which adopted an implementing regulation16 that aimed to ensure that exports of COVID-19 vaccine covered by APAs with the EU are subject to a prior authorisation “so that they are adequate supplies”.17 The Member States should ensure that the volume of exports is not such that it would pose a threat to the continuous supply of the vaccines necessary for the execution of the APAs, based on an assessment made by the Commission.18 The mechanism was further strengthened by the Commission in March 2021, and introduced the principles of reciprocity and proportionality as new criteria to be considered for authorizing exports.19 Some Member States, including France, Italy, and Spain welcomed the mechanism. But critics, notably Germany, Sweden, Belgium, the Netherlands, and the drug industry, warned of disruptions to

12

EU Strategy for COVID-19 vaccines. COM(2020) 245 final. Summary of European Union decisions on marketing authorisations in respect of medicinal products from 21 December 2020 to 21 December 2020, OJ C 447I, 24.12.2020. 14 European Commission authorises second safe and effective vaccine against COVID-19. Press release, 6 January 2021. 15 European Commission authorises third safe and effective vaccine against COVID-19. Press release, 29 January 2021. 16 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/111 of 29 January 2021 making the exportation of certain products subject to the production of an export authorization. OJ L 31I, 30.1.2021. 17 Ibid, Preamble, p. 5. 18 Ibid, Art. 2. 19 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/521 of 24 March 2021 making specific arrangements to the mechanism making the exportation of certain products subject to the production of an export authorization. OJ L 104, 25.3.2021. 13

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supply chains and a damaging “vaccine war” (Watson, 2021). During a virtual European Council meeting on 25 March 2021, the leaders of Member States noted “the importance of transparency as well as of the use of export authorisations”.20 During the summit, however, Member States reportedly clashed on how to provide additional vaccine doses to Member States in need of emergency supplies. The demands for redistribution were led by Sebastian Kurz, the prime minister of Austria, who demanded that Austria is part of a group of EU countries given extra doses after being affected by AstraZeneca’s delivery shortfalls (Peel et al., 2021). A letter sent to the presidents of the Commission and of the European Council by the leaders of Austria, Czechia, Latvia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Croatia claimed that “deliveries of vaccine doses by pharma companies to individual EU member states are not being implemented on an equal basis following the pro rata population key”.21 Finally, the Portuguese presidency of the Council of the EU was able to negotiate an agreement, whereas 19 Member States22 receive the pro-rata of 6.66 million vaccines; Austria, Czechia and Slovenia receive the pro-rata of 10 million vaccines, and five Member States23 in addition to the pro-rata of 10 million vaccines, receive pro-rata of 2.8 million doses, as solidarity vaccines.24 In March 2021, several countries including Germany, Italy, Austria, Norway, and Denmark reported cases of severe blood clotting, low platelet counts, and internal bleeding in individuals after receiving the AstraZeneca COVID-19 vaccine (Vogel & Kupferschmidt, 2021). Initially, EMA did not pause it to analyse reported cases of blood clots, unlike many other national regulators.25 Later, in April 2021, EMA concluded that unusual blood clots with low blood platelets should be listed as very rare side effects of the AstraZeneca vaccine.26 Empirical data shows that after the suspension of the AstraZeneca vaccine was lifted, the take-up of this vaccine in Italy significantly declined, resulting in a severe delay in Italy’s immunization program (Deiana et. al 2021). In May 2021, 56% of Germans and 64% of French people considered the AstraZeneca vaccine to be unsafe (Smith, 2021). In summary, the initial response to the public health crisis caused by the COVID19 pandemic in the EU was uneven and led to suboptimal public health responses. While public health is not a shared competence of the EU, the European Commission, 20

Statement of the members of the European Council, 25 March 2021. Letter by the leaders of Austria, Czechia, Latvia, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Croatia from 13 March 2021. Accessed online on 20.07.2021: https://www.gov.si/assets/vlada/Fotografije/PV/03-2021/ATBG-CZ-HR-LV-SI-Letter-on-vaccine-delivery-20210313.pdf. 22 Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, and Sweden. 23 Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, and Slovakia. 24 European Solidarity Vaccines—Agreement on Presidency’s proposal to support Member States most in need. Brussels, 1 April 2021. Accessed online on 20.07.2021: https://www.2021portugal. eu/media/i4fhac3c/press_release_solidarity_vaccines_eu2021pt.pdf. 25 COVID-19 Vaccine AstraZeneca: PRAC investigating cases of thromboembolic events— vaccine’s benefits currently still outweigh risks. Press release, 11.03.2021. 26 AstraZeneca’s COVID-19 vaccine: EMA finds possible link to very rare cases of unusual blood clots with low blood platelets. Press release, 07.04.2021. 21

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the Council of the EU, and, to a lesser extent, of the European Council, were initially unable to coordinate and support Member States’ crisis mitigation measures. The rapid and uncoordinated closure of borders, and the public dispute among Member States on the negotiation and distribution of vaccines contributed to the perceived heterogeneity of preferences, and to the notion of unfairness and lack of solidarity among Member States. Later in the crisis, approaches to both travel restrictions and vaccine distribution were significantly improved. The European Commission itself has admitted to vaccine distribution shortcomings stemming from a lack of negotiation experience with the pharmaceutical industry, which led it to initially underestimate supply issues and the need for production capacity building (Bongardt & Torres, 2021; Gleissner et al., 2021). Economic Measures Similarly to the beginning of the Euro area crisis, the initial reaction to the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic was an increased initial public spending at the EU Member-States level (Ladi & Tsarouhas, 2020). However, the EU institutions also reacted relatively quickly to the evolving economic crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. The European Commission adopted a Temporary Framework for State aid measures to support the economy.27 The Council of the EU agreed to apply maximum flexibility in the EU fiscal framework.28 The measure allowed Member States to take all necessary measures to support health and civil protection systems and the economy. The ECB also reacted quickly by establishing a “Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme” (PEPP) with an overall envelope of e750 billion.29 The Governing Council of the ECB decided to increase the initial e750 billion envelope for the PEPP by e600 billion on 4 June 2020 and by e500 billion on 10 December 2020, for a new total of e1,850 billion.30 Further crisis mitigation measures included the Pandemic Crisis Support, available to all euro area Member States for amounts of 2% of the respective Member’s GDP as of end-2019,31 and the European instrument for temporary support to mitigate unemployment risks in an emergency (SURE)32 27

Temporary Framework for State aid measures to support the economy in the current COVID-19 outbreak. C(2020) 1863 final. 28 Statement of EU ministers of finance on the Stability and Growth Pact in light of the COVID-19 crisis. Retrieved June, 24 2021 from https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/ 2020/03/23/statement-of-eu-ministers-of-finance-on-the-stability-and-growth-pact-in-light-ofthe-covid-19-crisis/. 29 ECB announces e750 billion Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP). Press release, 18 March 2020. Retrieved June, 24 2021 from https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2020/html/ ecb.pr200318_1~3949d6f266.en.html. 30 Pandemic emergency purchase programme (PEPP), Accessed online on 24 June 2021: https:// www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/implement/pepp/html/index.en.html. 31 Eurogroup Statement on the Pandemic Crisis Support. Retrieved June, 24 2021 from https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2020/05/08/eurogroup-statementon-the-pandemic-crisis-support/. 32 Council Regulation (EU) 2020/672 of 19 May 2020 on the establishment of a European instrument for temporary support to mitigate unemployment risks in an emergency (SURE) following the COVID-19 outbreak.

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which has disbursed e90 billion in back-to-back loans. In May 2020, the European Investment Bank (EIB) approved the creation of a e25 billion European COVID-19 guarantee fund. The fund would enable the EIB Group to scale up its support for European companies up to an additional e200 billion—with a focus on SMEs.33 It is important to note that those measures were considered time-limited responses to the shock caused by the pandemic (Ladi & Tsarouhas, 2020). The scale of negative socioeconomic impacts required further mitigation measures. In May 2020, the European Commission proposed an emergency European Recovery Instrument (“Next Generation EU”) amounting to e750 billion, as well as a new Recovery and Resilience Facility in order to support investments and reforms essential to a lasting recovery, to improve the economic and social resilience of Member States, and to support the green and digital transitions.34 However, some Member States did not greet the proposals with enthusiasm. The “Frugal Four” Member States (Austria, Denmark, Netherlands, and Sweden) considered that the proposal went too far, and that financial assistance should be tied to loans instead of grants. In an echo of earlier Eurozone crisis debates, the Frugal Four insisted on conditionality to secure that EU money would be spent by Member States such as Italy, Spain, or Greece in the way intended by the Commission proposals. In addition, northern European states bargained hard to increase their rebate and reduce their net contribution to the Community budget (Ladi & Tsarouhas, 2020). Heterogeneous policy preferences of Member States were not only evident, but also amplified by vocal opponents of the Commission proposal. The main objective of the “Frugal Four” most probably was to reduce Member States’ contributions to the EU’s own resources for the repayment of the bonds issued to raise the e750 billion. The final decision of the European Council was to rebalance the share of grants (from e500 billion to e390 billion), and to increase the share of loans (from e250 billion to e360 billion). Importantly, to ensure that countries like Poland and Hungary would sign up to the final deal, the “rule of law” conditionality clause that countries like the Netherlands wanted to introduce prior to funds’ disbursement was substantially weakened (Ladi & Tsarouhas, 2020). Thus, paradoxically, the COVID-19 pandemic served both as a partial resolution to and an enabler of the democratic erosion in CEE Member States. The EU’s response to the economic crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic can be described as a limited, but substantial success. It is limited in comparative terms—the United States’ federal fiscal and monetary response provides a clear benchmark (Hudson et al., 2021). It is, however, substantial given the scale of the response compared to the Eurozone crisis, and the direction of change—complementing the regulatory, rules-based approach to economic governance with a distinct redistributive dimension (Ladi & Tsarouhas, 2020). 33

EIB Group establishes EUR 25 billion guarantee fund to deploy new investments in response to COVID-19 crisis. Retrieved June, 24 2021 from https://www.eib.org/en/press/all/2020-100eib-group-establishes-eur-25-billion-guarantee-fund-to-deploy-new-investments-in-response-tocovid-19-crisis. 34 The EU budget powering the recovery plan for Europe. COM(2020) 442 final.

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Taking Stock of the COVID-19 Crisis Given the limited competence in the area of health policy, it is quite clear that the EU has neither the authority nor the infrastructure to centralize the COVID19 crisis mitigation measures (Haque et al., 2020; Schomaker et al., 2021). Crisis response models pursued by individual Member States remained heterogeneous, reflecting inter alia the variety of the architecture of public administrations, institutional capacity, policy styles, and the roles, capacities, and powers of individual political leaders (McConnell & Stark, 2021). The COVID-19 pandemic crisis has shown that the EU’s capacity to act as a first responder, or even as a coordinator of first responses, remains weak. The health security and pandemic preparedness mechanisms that exist have worked as designed, but they constitute a small and unambitious system whose capacity is limited by Article 168 TFEU (Greer et al., 2021). Second, it has shown that health solidarity can buckle under the pressure of a crisis (Brooks et al., 2020). Looking at public opinion confirms this assessment. Half of Europeans (49%) are not satisfied with the measures taken by EU institutions to fight the coronavirus pandemic, higher than the proportion who are satisfied (40%).35 Only 5% of European respondents think the vaccine procurement and distribution has been handled very well, compared to 45% who think it has been handled either fairly badly (23%) or very badly (22%; Ash et al., 2021). The national context not only determines how COVID-19 is perceived, but is also important in shaping popular views about how EU initiatives of risk pooling should be organized (Baute & De Ruijter, 2021). The perception of efficiency of the EU’s institutional architecture was somewhat strengthened by the COVID-19 crisis due to the shared understanding of European citizens that a coordinated EU approach to public health crisis is preferable due to economies of scale. Almost four in ten respondents consider that health is the main issue facing the EU at the moment.36 In response to the pandemic, Europeans would like the EU to prioritize the development of a European health policy (32%), investment for treatments and vaccinations (30%), and a European strategy to tackle a similar crisis in the future (26%).37 In conclusion, the adequacy of the EU’s institutional response to the COVID-19 pandemic crisis has been problematic due to the inability to address or mitigate the diverging preferences of both Member States and individual citizens towards public health measures. Only when a common response is perceived by Member States as less politically costly than disagreement, can European-wide public health mechanisms such as the ECDC adopt a more active role (Jordana & Triviño-Salazar, 2020). At the same time, the adoption of a relatively ambitious financial stimulus package, and the decisive action of the ECB, have introduced a distinct redistributive dimension of EU’s approach to crisis mitigation. EU’s crisis response was more agile than adaptive, mainly due to the inability of EU’s institutions to reduce strategic uncertainty 35

Standard Eurobarometer 94, Winter 2020–2021. Ibid. 37 Special Eurobarometer 500. October–November 2020. 36

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caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, and to mitigate undesired behaviours, actions, and policies by certain Member States, leading to suboptimal policy outcomes.

Discussion and Key Findings This section briefly reviews key findings related to legitimacy of the EU and its political institutions. Some key areas requiring further research are outlined. It appears that the poly-crisis has negatively impacted the perception of adequacy of EU’s governance mechanism. More specifically, the poly-crisis has highlighted the heterogeneous political preferences of European citizens within and between Member States. EU’s inconsistent institutional responses to the crises have, in the case of the Eurozone crisis and the migration and refugee crisis, deepened rather than reduced those differences. The poly-crisis has also increased the strategic uncertainty within the EU, thus undermining the notion of adequacy of the Union’s institutions. Rhinard (2019) summarizes the key institutional consequences of a policy crisis in the EU: the Council rises in influence when a crisis strikes; the European Commission enjoys a boost of executive privileges; new organizations emerge; and the European Parliament takes a back seat. A more nuanced summary would include the following elements: • Crisis strikes, taking everyone (including expert EU bodies tasked with early warning) by surprise; • The European Commission and the European Council react quickly with statements, discussions, and policy initiatives; • Ambitious proposals developed by the European Commission are leaked to the press, prompting negative comments by national politicians and stakeholder groups in the media; • Heated discussions in the European Council (also leaked to the media) exacerbate the politicization of the issues at stake; • France and/or Germany take the initiative by forming a coalition of the willing in order to achieve some level of consensus in the European Council; • Given the significant negative impacts of the crisis, a solution is adopted that would not significantly affect redistribution preferences of “frugal”/Eurosceptic governments; • De novo bodies are created over which Member States’ governments exercise a high degree of control (Hodson & Puetter, 2019); • The European Parliament acts more as a political shock absorber rather than as a political entrepreneur. An interesting empirical observation by Lipps and Schraff (2021) is that inequality systematically affects trust in the EU through individuals’ evaluations of national institutions. This might imply that citizens’ perceptions of institutional legitimacy are impacted significantly by a general preference for regional cohesion (Guinjoan & Rico, 2018). In this sense, policies and narratives exacerbating or otherwise affecting

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regional cohesion might be a significant determinant of legitimacy perceptions. More qualitative and quantitative research is needed to confirm this observation given the strong effects of increasing regional wealth gaps on trust in the EU reported by Lipps and Schraff (2021). Both the hypotheses of destructive dissensus and negative politicization are generally confirmed during the three crisis episodes reviewed above. To paraphrase Schilde and Goodman (2021), while EU crisis response struggles to respond to turbulence, it also produces turbulence. The main dynamic is the lack of adequacy of the institutional response. The institutional mechanism of the EU is often unable to intermediate the heterogeneity of preferences at micro and macro levels during the poly-crisis. The unilateral focus on the defence of the national standpoints and the logic of “winners” and “losers” prevail over the quest for common solutions and the cultivation of trusting relationships (Miró, 2021). Put otherwise, the poly-crisis may lead to more politicization; politicization may result in poly-cleavage, cutting across issues and Member States. The poly-cleavage can also be described as an emerging, more complex, conflict space within the EU (Johansson, 2021). Linked to this observation, the institutions of the Union have demonstrated more agility than adaptability during the poly-crisis. Turning to possible solutions to the emerging negative impact of the poly-crisis on the legitimacy of the EU and its institutions, a few reform ideas should be mentioned. In terms of adequacy, a key challenge is achieving greater fiscal and political integration in the Eurozone (Gross, 2017; Wohlgemuth, 2017). Germany believes that reducing fiscal deficits benefits economies long-term. However, other Member States contend that Germany’s surpluses result from competitive wage suppression while their deficits sustain demand (Gross, 2017). The inadequate reduction of strategic uncertainty during the 2008–2013 Eurozone crisis highlights the need for a more comprehensive approach to future crises. An adequacy perspective would evaluate how proposed reforms account for divergent Member State perspectives and enhance the EMU’s capacity to mitigate uncertainty in future crises. Moving forward, a holistic assessment of reform proposals should weigh fiscal sustainability against stimulating demand to ensure the EMU adequately reconciles Member State priorities. A recent review by Crescenzi and Giua (2020) shows that both models of intervention and economic impacts of the cohesion policy are already highly heterogeneous across Member States. Better adaptation of the cohesion policy to the needs and overarching objectives of each individual Member State might be the best complement to the current place-based approach. Regarding adequacy, exploring participatory governance could help ensure EU policies optimize representation and reflect citizens’ preferences (Mcevoy, 2016). Since the Lisbon Treaty, participatory governance has been limited to the European Citizens’ Initiative and Commission consultations with civil society groups. However, it is questionable whether these mechanisms actually enhance the EU’s democratic legitimacy (Georgiev, 2017, 2018; Kamlage & Nanz, 2017). The Commission’s close integration with interest groups may have inadvertently distanced it from public opinion (Richardson, 2018). While the Conference on the

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Future of Europe appears an important opportunity to strengthen participative governance in the EU, the direct involvement of the European Commission, the Council of the EU, and the European Parliament in the conference’s executive board might result in an undesired politicization of the debates (Fabbrini et al., 2021). Enhancing the role of national parliaments in EU decision-making could also improve adequacy (Kreuder-Sonnen, 2018). Strengthening transnational cooperation between regional, national, and EU parliaments may better utilize the EU’s multilevel governance and bring policy closer to citizens. National parliaments are structured to develop Pareto-optimal policies and have high taken-for-grantedness nationally. Thus, empowering them in the EU system could improve the adequacy of EU policies by optimizing outcomes based on better representation of diverse citizen preferences. (Kreuder-Sonnen, 2018). While participatory governance engages citizens directly, integrating national parliaments applies their expertise in reconciling diverse interests into Pareto-efficient outcomes. A multi-pronged approach incorporating both participatory and parliamentary mechanisms may provide the best path to enhancing the adequacy of EU governance. In order to evaluate the perceived legitimacy, as well as adequacy and efficiency of EU’s institutions and policy responses, more qualitative and quantitative research is needed on a number of issues. A non-exhaustive list includes the following38 : • Conceptual and empirical research on the dimensionality of legitimacy beliefs about the EU and its policies going above and beyond analyses of Eurobarometer and European Social Survey results; • Using qualitative methods, such as in-depth interviews or focus group discussions with citizens from different strata of society, to gain insights about the dimensionality of legitimacy beliefs and their drivers. This is particularly important given the strong normative tradition in legitimacy research in European studies; • Research on legitimation and delegitimation narratives and their specific impact on the perceived legitimacy of the EU and its institutions across all Member States39 ; • Evaluations and assessments on the (de)institutionalization of crisis response within the EU during the poly-crisis, as well as on institutional learning and development of crisis protocols; • Qualitative and quantitative research on the link between crisis governance and perceived legitimacy of the EU and its institutions in comparison to national institutions of Member States; • Further research on the assumed politicization of decision-making processes in the European Commission, the Council of the EU, and the European Council, and their impact on the perceived legitimacy of the EU and its institutions. Finally, the analytical framework used in this paper has some important limitations. The notion of consensus—understood as the degree to which individual

38 39

Partially adapted from Dellmuth and Schlipphak (2020). See for example Dingwerth et al. (2020).

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members of a reference group agree that the essence, features, or activities of a legitimacy object are proper for a given social context (Haack et al., 2021)—is not part of the framework. However, the data on both institutional and personal levels reviewed above indicate that there is a degree of dissensus among both European citizens and political actors about the perceived adequacy40 of the EU, its institutions, and its policies. This is also an important venue for future research given the importance of “silencing” of legitimacy beliefs and perceptions, and the potential consequences of exposing the heterogeneity of adequacy perceptions.41 The analytical framework used in this paper does not reflect normative debates about whether political institutions have the right to rule, or whether they can impose political obligations on citizens, mainly relating to input, and to some extent throughput legitimacy. This is due to the current state of empirical research on perceived legitimacy of political institutions, and the EU in particular.

Conclusions This paper has offered a new framework for assessing the impact of the poly-crisis of EU governance. The paper proposed the concepts of adequacy and efficiency as drivers of perceived legitimacy. Their distinctive features are linked to the notions of agility and adaptability of crisis governance, given the specific context of the poly-crisis in the EU. Based on this framework, the paper assesses the impact of three crises—the Eurozone crisis, the migration crisis, and the COVID-19 pandemic crisis. The paper further evaluates the impact of the EU institutional response on the legitimacy of the EU. It appears that the poly-crisis has negatively impacted the perception of adequacy of EU’s governance mechanism. More specifically, the poly-crisis has highlighted the heterogeneous political preferences of European citizens within and between Member States. EU’s inconsistent institutional responses to the crises have, in the case of the Eurozone crisis and the migration and refugee crisis, deepened rather than reduced those differences. The poly-crisis has also increased the strategic uncertainty within the EU, thus undermining the notion of adequacy of the Union’s institutions. Both the hypotheses of destructive dissensus and negative politicization are generally confirmed during the three crisis episodes reviewed in the paper. Due to the limited ability of the EU’s institutional mechanism to intermediate heterogeneous political preferences at the micro and macro level, the poly-crisis may lead to more politicization of the EU’s decision-making and policy implementation processes. This politicization may itself result in poly-cleavage, meaning multiple issues becoming simultaneously salient, polarizing actors in different ways, and mobilizing public opinion on each of the issues at stake (Zeitlin et al., 2019). 40

Haack et al. (2021) refer to propriety; see the discussion in p. 2.1. above about the difference between propriety and adequacy. 41 Ibid.

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Based on the analysis above it can be suggested that the EU, its institutions, and the Member States, should focus on the structural drivers of perceived illegitimacy of the Union as outlined above. Looking at the processes and institutions of Asian economic and political integration, key lessons can be summarized as follows: • National policies and narratives affecting regional cohesion should be carefully assessed for their impact on the legitimacy of regional integration processes and institutions; • Given the high heterogeneity of preferences at both micro and macro levels, Asian integration should focus on the adaptability of policies to national contexts, allowing for creative flexibility of policy implementation; • While difficult to implement, participatory governance (or at least structured stakeholder engagement) should be explored further within regional integration processes and institutions.

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