Regime, Religion and the Consolidation of Zanu-PFism in Zimbabwe: When Religion Becomes a Threat to Democracy (African Histories and Modernities) 3031460839, 9783031460838

Citation preview

AFRICAN HISTORIES AND MODERNITIES

Regime, Religion and the Consolidation of Zanu-PFism in Zimbabwe When Religion Becomes a Threat to Democracy Edited by Bekithemba Dube

African Histories and Modernities Series Editors

Toyin Falola The University of Texas at Austin Austin, TX, USA Matthew M. Heaton Virginia Tech Blacksburg, VA, USA

This book series serves as a scholarly forum on African contributions to and negotiations of diverse modernities over time and space, with a particular emphasis on historical developments. Specifically, it aims to refute the hegemonic conception of a singular modernity, Western in origin, spreading out to encompass the globe over the last several decades. Indeed, rather than reinforcing conceptual boundaries or parameters, the series instead looks to receive and respond to changing perspectives on an important but inherently nebulous idea, deliberately creating a space in which multiple modernities can interact, overlap, and conflict. While privileging works that emphasize historical change over time, the series will also feature scholarship that blurs the lines between the historical and the contemporary, recognizing the ways in which our changing understandings of modernity in the present have the capacity to affect the way we think about African and global histories. Editorial Board Akintunde Akinyemi, Literature, University of Florida, Gainesville, USA Malami Buba, African Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Yongin, South Korea Emmanuel Mbah, History, CUNY, College of Staten Island, USA Insa Nolte, History, University of Birmingham, USA Shadrack Wanjala Nasong’o, International Studies, Rhodes College, USA Samuel Oloruntoba, Political Science, TMALI, University of South Africa, South Africa Bridget Teboh, History, University of Massachusetts Dartmouth, USA

Bekithemba Dube Editor

Regime, Religion and the Consolidation of Zanu-PFism in Zimbabwe When Religion Becomes a Threat to Democracy

Editor Bekithemba Dube Central University of Technology Bloemfontein, South Africa

ISSN 2634-5773     ISSN 2634-5781 (electronic) African Histories and Modernities ISBN 978-3-031-46083-8    ISBN 978-3-031-46084-5 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-46084-5 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: Lucas Ledwaba / Alamy Stock Photo This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland Paper in this product is recyclable.

This book is dedicated to all who have died resisting Zanu-PFism and no one was held accountable. May your souls rest in peace and my hope is that one day we will reunite on the other side of life where Zanu-PFism will not kill anyone opposed to bad governance and repression. It is also dedicated to those who are scattered all over the world and cannot return to Zimbabwe for the fear of the regime. May you find comfort knowing that your struggles are known and that one day our children will appreciate our courage and love for a better Zimbabwe for all including those who support and are captured by zanupfism.

Acknowledgements

This book would not have been possible without the help of Mandy Jampies and Dr. Glen Taylor of the Directorate of Research Development at the University of the Free State who have, over the years, supported my academic journey through funding and availing postdoctoral fellows to assist with my research. Your commitment to scholarship is amazing. Thank you, colleagues. Many thanks to my two girls, Sikhae and Lizelle, who have supported me in this academic journey. I love you, my girls. Thanks to Hettie Human in Namibia, whom I have never met in person, but who worked long hours to ensure that this book project is a success. Thank you, Hettie!

vii

Contents

1 ZANU-PF  as Stockholm Syndrome, and Its Trajectories in Post-Independence Zimbabwe. Juxtaposing the Role of Religion in Thwarting Democracy  1 Bekithemba Dube 2 Mixing  up Priorities? Propagation of Uncritical Patriotism of Zanu-PF by the Church in Zimbabwe 23 Collium Banda 3 The  (Catholic) Church and Resistance to Zanu-PFism in Zimbabwe 45 Gift Masengwe and Bekithemba Dube 4 God  or President Emmerson Mnangagwa? Romans 13:1–7 in Zimbabwe’s Contemporary Church and Elections  73 Theophilus Tinashe Nenjerama 5 Adventist  Silence in the Face of Oppression as a Way to Enact Zanu-PFism in Zimbabwe 97 Gift Masengwe and Bekithemba Dube

ix

x 

Contents

6 Hearing  the Loud Voices of the Silent Church in Zimbabwe115 Kimion Tagwirei 7 Man  of God/Gold and Zanu-PFism in Zimbabwe: The Case of Makandiwa and Angel141 Bekithemba Dube 8 A  Critical Evaluation of Bishop Ancelimo Magaya’s Resistance to Zanu-PFism in Zimbabwe163 Gift Masengwe and Bekithemba Dube 9 CCCism  Versus Zanu-PFism: Religious Response of the Citizens Coalition for Change to the Zanu-PF185 Gift Masengwe and Bekithemba Dube 10 Religion  and the Consolidation of the Zanu-PF Political Ideology201 Sifiso Mpofu and Albert Ncube

List of Contributors

Collium Banda  North-West University, Potchefstroom, South Africa Bekithemba  Dube Central University of Technology, Bloemfontein, South Africa Gift  Masengwe Central University of Technology, Bloemfontein, South Africa Sifiso Mpofu  University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa Albert Ncube  University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa Theophilus  Tinashe  Nenjerama Columbia Theological Seminary, Decatur, GA, USA Kimion Tagwirei  North-West University, Potchefstroom, South Africa

xi

Abbreviations

AACJM African Apostolic Church of Johane Marange AFM Apostolic Faith Mission BCZ Baptist Convention of Zimbabwe CCC Citizens Coalition for Change CCJP Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace EFZ Evangelical Fellowship of Zimbabwe HCCC Harare City Centre Church LRF Legal Resources Foundation MDC Movement for Democratic Change MDC-A MDC-Alliance MDC-T Movement for Democratic Change-Tsvangirai MP Member of Parliament NPRC National Peace and Reconciliation Commission SDA Seventh Day Adventist UDI Unilateral Declaration of Independence UFIC United Family International Church ZAPU Zimbabwe African People’s Union ZCC Zimbabwe Council of Churches ZEC Zimbabwe Electoral Commission ZHOCD Zimbabwe Heads of Christian Denominations ZIICC Zimbabwe Independent Indigenous Council of Churches

xiii

CHAPTER 1

ZANU-PF as Stockholm Syndrome, and Its Trajectories in Post-Independence Zimbabwe. Juxtaposing the Role of Religion in Thwarting Democracy Bekithemba Dube

Why is it that despite being fully aware of their tormentors and the misery they cause, some people still support them? Why do people still vote for individuals who then know are responsible for their suffering? Why is it that people still retain positive feeling towards individuals who have abused them in the past? (Magaisa 2022)

Introduction This chapter seeks to conceptualise Zanu-PFism as a system of governance that has brought facets of Zimbabwean life to a crisis point. I seek to show how, from a religious point of view, the Zanu-PF system has evolved and

B. Dube (*) Central University of Technology, Bloemfontein, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 B. Dube (ed.), Regime, Religion and the Consolidation of Zanu-PFism in Zimbabwe, African Histories and Modernities, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-46084-5_1

1

2 

B. DUBE

is being reproduced by various proxies in postcolonial Zimbabwe. The background of this chapter is that, in most African countries, including Zimbabwe, religion continues to play an important role in social transformation, however, in recent years, studies have shown that religion can be a useful tool for capturing and manipulating and, consequently, creating crises, either by default or design. The negative association between religion and politics in postcolonial Zimbabwe can, as argued by Washington et al. (2014, 181), be a threat to Africa’s security, politics and development. This notion is confirmed by Mpofu (2022), who argues that religion has always had a central place as an organisational force in global politics. The chapter will show how both politically connected and religious figures have resorted to religion to cement oppression and thwart democracy. Zanu-PF, as a system characterised by poor, violent and manipulative governance (I henceforth refer to this system as Zanu-PFism), has been in power since 1980; two presidents have led the party and consolidated it to be a particularly incompetent system of governance; consequently, the country suffers from high inflation, a mass exodus of citizens and tendencies of violence. Hamill (2017) describes Zanu-PFism as being characterised by the following: a belief that it is entitled to rule indefinitely, a refusal to view itself as an ordinary political party, a conflation of party and state and a demonisation of other parties as ‘enemies of liberation’ that seek to restore colonialism or white minority rule. Under normal circumstances, one would assume Zanu-PFism is hated and rejected by the majority for its governance failures. However, a sizeable number of followers still identify with the party and are structured through various ways, including poverty, to maintain their support. Their continued support of the dysfunctional systems suggests they are suffering from Stockholm syndrome. Contextualisation of Stockholm Syndrome in Relation to Zanu-PFism Stockholm syndrome is defined as a ‘disorder whereby abductees bond with or express loyalty toward their captors in an effort to save their lives or make their ordeal more tolerable’ (Strentz 1980, 138). The term was first used in 1973 in connection with the response of a group of employees who had been held hostage in a robbery at a Stockholm bank, where the hostages developed a love for their kidnappers (Adorjan et al. 2012, 454). According to Turner (1985, 706), Stockholm syndrome refers to a variety

1  ZANU-PF AS STOCKHOLM SYNDROME, AND ITS TRAJECTORIES… 

3

of incidents with a confusing multiplicity of goals, perpetrators and victims. In this sense, the captor presents as a saviour that is destined to give people a desired end; unfortunately, victims are unable to perceive that their problems originate with the captors. Stockholm syndrome as it relates to Zanu-PFism is achieved by a combination of elements, such as manipulation, gifts, false hope and lies, which are used to convince the victim that the perpetrator has good intentions that have been always denied to them, the victims who are suffering from Stockholm syndrome. Stockholm syndrome is described by Alex Magaisa (2022): as a psychological response whereby a person in captivity develops positive feeling and partiality towards their captor. Instead of being angry with captor, the captives tend to identify with them and their cause. The abused become the defender and protector of the abuser.

This description is typical of Zanu-PFism, which has, over the years, held people hostage through nationalistic and war credential narratives, sanctions and vote buying, to the extent that it is becoming very difficult to convince people, especially members of the older generation, that there is life outside Zanu-PF.  Consequently, young people also fall prey to Stockholm syndrome; they join Zanu-PF because they are part of a psychologically defeated population. Furthermore, Zanu-PFism provides a safe haven for criminals and violators of social justice. Thus, Stockholm syndrome as premised in Zanu-PFism ‘destroys their [religious followers’] personality and replaces the void with a regime personality that no longer questions, thinks critically, or feels the impact of an abusive system’ (Damiani 2002, 45). This chapter is premised on the understanding that Stockholm syndrome plays a critical role in enacting Zanu-PFism, and religion, with its tendency to discourage questioning, contributes to thwarting justice and democracy in Zimbabwe. I also argue that, in the political arena, the Christian faith has been taken hostage by Zanu-PF and is being used sacrilegiously to persuade religious followers to join and support Zanu-­ PFism, on the premise of Romans 13. In a context such as this, a ‘crisis of governance’ is inevitable if Zanu-PFism fails to provide its citizens with ‘safety, the rule of law, human rights and sustainable economic development’ (Charles 2016, 7). Consequently, the present Zanu-PF ‘crisis is mainly manifesting itself at the ideological, theoretical and epistemological levels’ (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2015, 21) and, to survive, Zanu-PF takes the

4 

B. DUBE

advantage of Stockholm syndrome in connection with the building blocks that will be discussed. Genesis of Zanu-PFism in Zimbabwe At the inception of Zanu-PFism, Mugabe intended for Zimbabwe to be a one-party state and delivered to the country an episode of grotesque genocide by killing over 20,000 ethnic Ndebele people. Mugabe supporters used the argument that the party had liberated the country, and its members had died for Zimbabwe’s independence, and therefore, Zanu-PF should rule permanently (Mpofu 2022, 6). Mugabe’s rule as Zanu-PF leader and president was characterised by an iron fist, and he was considered to be sacred and untouchable; people who opposed his rule were punished severely. There was a time he was seen as indispensable by Zanu-PF followers, and he maintained his rule through terror. In 2017, when he was removed from power, there was hope that the new president, Emmerson Mnangagwa, would not continue the brutal rule of Zanu-PF. However, Mnangagwa exacerbated Zanu-PFism at an alarming rate, and it became clear that yearning for change does not always mean that conditions will improve. People did not realise that a new president, without dealing with Zanu-PFism, meant a mere sugar coating of evil. The second republic under Mnangagwa reproduced and consolidated Zanu-PFism by creating parallel structures as proxies, such as Mapostori4ED, Mawindi4ED, Teachers4ED and Pastors4ED.  These proxies are foot soldiers that ensure that Zanu-PFism is buttressed, and they are richly rewarded for their loyalty and, in all of this, Stockholm syndrome plays a significant role. Hence, I agree with Freire (2000, 144), who contends that oppressed people become so powerless that they do not even talk about their oppression. When they reach this stage of oppression, a culture that forbids even mentioning the injustices that are being committed has been created. The oppressed are silenced. They have no voice and no will. The only way to survive the system is to join it and to loot as much as possible, since there is no guarantee of safety and, in the process, moral degradation is inevitable. In helping to consolidate Zanu-­ PFism, religion plays a critical role—this will be discussed later in the chapter. Cognisant of the foregoing, it is critical that scholars engage with the concept of Zanu-PFism, because it holds danger for humanity, including those who defend it in various ways in a nexus with religious proxies. Hence, I agree with UNESCO (2017, 17) that some aspects of religious

1  ZANU-PF AS STOCKHOLM SYNDROME, AND ITS TRAJECTORIES… 

5

systems and knowledge impinge on national and global mindsets and the development of critical and democratically inclined citizens. Thus, this chapter ‘challenges oppressive hegemony, where there is an exercise of power at a decipherable cost to others’ (Abel and Sementelli 2002, 253), by identifying various building blocks of enacting Zanu-PFism through religious discourses and leaders. In the following section, I focus on the theorisation of the study, in order to explain Zanu-PFism as a by-product of Stockholm syndrome. Theoretical Framework: Gramsci’s Concept of Hegemony The chapter is couched on Gramsci’s concept of hegemony, which first appeared in Gramsci’s Notes on the Southern Question (1926), where he defined it as a system of class alliance in which a ‘hegemonic class’ exercised political leadership over ‘subaltern classes’ by ‘winning them over’ (quoted by Ramos 1982, 3). Hegemony happens as a result of ‘predominance by consenting’ to a dominant group by the weak, and it explains how Stockholm syndrome operates. Hoare and Nowell Smith (1999, in Racine 2021, 2) state that, by manufacturing consent, the ruling class maintains its hegemony (domination) and controls civil society and its apparatus. Yet, this hegemonic power is not exerted by force or coercion, but through subtle mechanisms of social control. Social control regulates society in ways that could be seen as natural and uncritically accepted and perceived as common sense. Thus, hegemony can be described as a condition by which a fundamental class exercises a political, intellectual and moral role of leadership within a hegemonic system cemented by a common worldview or ‘organic ideology’ (Ramos 1982, 4). Centring this chapter on hegemony is critical, based on the observation by Gramsci (1999, 258) that, Every State is ethical in as much as one of its most important functions is to raise the great mass of the population to a particular cultural and moral level, a level (or type) which corresponds to the needs of the productive forces for development, and hence to the interests of the ruling classes.

Zanu-PFism uses a combination of tools to control people, and when other, more amicable systems, such as propaganda, fail, rulers resort to violence, which could then lead to Stockholm syndrome. Informed by the foregoing, I tend to agree with the view that hegemony is one kind of

6 

B. DUBE

social authority—domination of people without using or threatening to use power. Hegemony is acquired through social institutions (Al-amin and Sikdar 2016). In addition to social institutions, Zanu-PFism uses a combination of factors to create Stockholm syndrome, which appears as consent when, in reality, it involves brutality, deception, lies and misuse of religious texts to subdue the populace. In the following section, I describe various ways in which Zanu-PFism is enacted under the auspices of religion, resulting in Stockholm syndrome and hegemony.

Building Blocks of Zanu-PFism: Religion as a Source In this section, I describe some of the building blocks of Zanu-PFism that are in nexus with religion. In so doing, I argue that the building blocks are a by-product of Stockholm syndrome and application of the consent aspect of hegemony. The first point I discuss is the use of violence to punish people with a different political ideology. Using Religious Leaders to Perpetrate Violence Towards People with Different Ideology Researchers have concluded that Zanu-PF is intertwined with violence against its opposition and sometimes even against dissenting voices in the party itself. Violence as used by Zanu-PFism is part of the enlargement strategy of the party, to continue ruling and to silence dissenting voices. Some people join Zanu-PF not because they love the organisation, but because it offers a degree of protection and an opportunity to engage in illicit deals without facing reparations. Tarusarira and Chitando (2017, 5) refer to ‘Zimbabwe Ndeye Ropa Ramadzibaba’ to justify ‘sacred violence’ to ‘defend Zimbabwe against witches/enemies’. To enact violence, Zanu-PF uses various organs of the state, such as the police, the military and the judiciary. In fact, Mnangagwa has been recorded on video as saying Zanu-PF is everything, they are the army, they are the police and more so, everything, thus, implying that acts of violence committed by Zanu-PF members are permitted, as long they advance the agenda of the party. Violence by Zanu-PF can be traced to the former president of Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009, 358) comments as follows: Mugabeism has never been a democratic phenomenon. It has been intolerant, violent, and ever ready to discipline any form of dissent. Its strategy of

1  ZANU-PF AS STOCKHOLM SYNDROME, AND ITS TRAJECTORIES… 

7

‘making the nation-as-people’ has always been dominated by coercion, where autonomous trade unions, women’s organisations, and even religious groups had to be subordinated to the nationalist imperative.

While violence has, since time immemorial, been a tool for suppression and dealing with one’s enemies, the challenge caused by Zanu-PFism in the second republic is that even religious leaders threaten to unleash violence against their critics. An example is Uebert Mudzanire, alias Pastor Uebert Angel, the Zimbabwean ambassador at large for Europe and the Americas, who was revealed to be a member of the gold mafia by an Al Jazeera documentary on gold smuggling from Zimbabwe (Al Jazeera Investigative Unit 2023). After attempting to clear his name in relation to the scandals revealed by Al Jazeera, the prophet encouraged his followers to visit his critics at night to ask questions, and to inform them that critics’ behaviour could be met with violence. Newsday.co.za cites Ambassador Mudzanire saying: Without praying, Phineas took a knife and stabbed the men he saw committing adultery, Munhu anongoda kurohwa mbama, zvekuti anyorereyi ichi, zvekunamata tombosiya! [Someone must be slapped for writing about this, let’s put aside prayer at the moment].

The words of Angel are not only frightening, but also disappointing, coming from a religious leader who is expected to exhibit high moral standards couched with pacifism. Angel buttresses the notion that violence is a critical element of silencing critics, a tool which has been used by Zanu-PF for a long time. Thus, violence against opponents is engraved in the party and, with every election in Zimbabwe, violence is on the menu as a serving for dissenting voices. However, this approach defeats democracy and does not produce a world order that can make Zimbabwe a better place for all. Thus, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013, 10) warns that, What Africans must be vigilant against is the trap of ending up normalising and universalising coloniality [dominance] as a natural state of the world. It must be unmasked, resisted and destroyed because it produced a world order that can only be sustained through a combination of violence, deceit, hypocrisy and lies.

8 

B. DUBE

In short, violence is a critical ingredient of buttressing Zanu-PFism and, unfortunately, some religious leaders resort to violence to deal with their critics. When violence takes place, Stockholm syndrome is ignited by default, so that victims can survive the brutality of the state, which is endorsed by religious leaders such as Angel. In the following section, I discuss another element that consolidates Zanu-PFism—propaganda, which is a building block of Zanu-PFism. Enacting and Buttressing Propaganda Propaganda is one of the elements dictators use to consolidate power. With propaganda, misinformation, lies, exaggerations and manipulation are key to energising the party. In the process the opposition is blackmailed and referred as puppets of the West who wish to return Zimbabwe to white people. In doing so, religious leaders, as ‘mouthpieces’ of God, are used to proclaim the ideology that anyone who is against the president is the enemy of God. A religious leader who is known for disseminating propaganda is Bishop Nehemiah Mutendi. Mutendi is reported as saying the following: We must survive the hardships we are experiencing. This is a passing phase. Wake up! This is your country. Do not give false information to the outside world but seek solutions from the Lord. We want to use the gift of God to enhance and firmly embrace the President’s Vision 2030 Empowerment Agenda. We applaud the work our President is doing in uplifting our souls in prayer. We appreciate his work. (Chibamu 2020)

Mutendi has a constitutional right to appreciate the president and what he has done for people—probably his close allies. However, to assume people who do not support Zanu-PF are being deceived by Western countries is a fallacy that needs to be challenged in every available space. In another attempt to locate propaganda within Zanu-PFism, Gatsi (2022) quotes Obey Mapuranga, a member of the proxy Zanu-PF structure known as Mapostori4ED: As Vapostori for ED we are in agreement [sic] that there are certain individuals in Zimbabwe that have gone to America and begged for sanctions so that this country can be in a quagmire … There are others still living like Nelson Chamisa and other opposition remnants; we know what they did. As

1  ZANU-PF AS STOCKHOLM SYNDROME, AND ITS TRAJECTORIES… 

9

spiritual leaders of this country, we are against all those sorts of invitations to foreign interference.

In light of the foregoing, I agree with Magaisa (2019), who says, ‘they [religious leaders] start from the periphery wearing the label of technocrats but soon enough, they will find themselves deep in the cesspool, wearing scarfs and chanting ridiculous slogans’. Religious leaders have become important instruments for enacting propaganda and, in the process, they have developed a strong Zanu-PF-inclined religious constituency that believes that Zimbabwe has outside enemies whose interests are represented by opposition parties, such as Citizen Coalition for Change (CCC), led by Nelson Chamisa. To conclude, I argue that Zanu-PFism has grown and is sustained through propaganda, among many other strategies. This propaganda produces structured (through Stockholm syndrome and use of hegemony) and programmed followers who can neither see, name or challenge propaganda they are exposed to, but who assimilate it within already existing strategies used by Zanu-PF to expand. In the following section, I discuss the politics of reciprocity, as the ideal instrument for Zanu-PFism to ensure support of the party. Politics of Reciprocity with a Few Religious Leaders Reciprocity has defined the political and religious relationship in Zimbabwe since the time of Robert Mugabe. Zanu-PF has always rewarded religious proxies and punished dissenting voices. Magaisa (2019) poses critical questions: Why, in some circumstances, does evidence of mendacity, crudeness or cruelty serve not as a fatal disadvantage, but as an allure that attracts ardent followers? Why do otherwise proud and self-respecting people submit to the sheer effrontery of the tyrant? Religious leaders submit because they have accepted gifts and favours from the regime, and it is, thus, inevitable that they will engage in behaviour contrary to their vocation to please the paymaster. Consequently, Zanu-PFism grows and continues to recruit religious leaders with a new group called Pastors4ED. To explain the way Zanu-PFism thrives through reciprocity, Musendekwa (2011, 50) reports how an apostolic follower of Madzibaba, Godfrey Nzira, was pardoned by the president for committing sexual abuses against church members. Thus, to protect themselves from being prosecuted for sexual abuse, people hide behind Zanu-PF, and they

10 

B. DUBE

become activists and do so as long they are still relevant to the party. As for Nzira, to reciprocate for being pardoned, he coerced members of the apostolic sect and other churches of Muzarabani to rally behind Zanu-PF ahead of possible elections in 2008. Because of this act, and being a Zanu-PF activist, no court of law in Zimbabwe could prosecute him, because Mnangagwa controls the courts. Consequently, with this arrangement, Zanu-PF became a party that harbours delinquent members of society. I acknowledge that not all who join Zanu-PF have criminal records or avoid prosecution. Some join and support it to gain social capital, business opportunities and even protection from eventualities in the future. One such example is Paul Mwazha, the founder and leader of the African Apostolic Church, which has a huge following. During his church services he chants political Zanu-PF slogans. Chanting slogans is not wrong if someone does it in their personal capacity, but to have the slogans as standard operating procedure in a church service is not ideal. Religious organisations, by their nature, draw followers from different political groupings. The religious space should accommodate people from different political affiliations and an attempt to exclude some could thwart democracy. Mwazha is also known for actively denouncing sanctions imposed against Zimbabwe by the United States of America and other countries and for pledging his allegiance to Zanu-PF. He signed a Zanu-PF anti-sanctions petition relating to travel restrictions imposed on Mugabe and top Zanu-PF officials (Nkala 2011). Mugabe had been restricted to travel, specifically to the United States, as sanction for his violation of human rights in Zimbabwe. Mwazha did not agree with the sanction and registered his displeasure about the travel ban by signing the petition, which had no effect, as Mugabe remained on the sanction list until his death. As a way to reciprocate Mwazha’s effort to have Mugabe removed from the sanctions list, Mwazha received the Order of Merit Award for his outstanding service to the development of Christianity in Zimbabwe and for establishing and sustaining a ‘five star’ indigenous church (Sunday Mail 2012). The Order of Merit, established in 1902 by King Edward VII, is a special mark of honour conferred by a sovereign on individuals of exceptional distinction in the arts, learning, sciences and other areas, such as public service (“Orders and Medals” n.d.). This could be a coincidence, but the logical conclusion may be that the Order of Merit was a reward for Mwazha’s support of Mugabe and Zanu-PF.  This conclusion is

1  ZANU-PF AS STOCKHOLM SYNDROME, AND ITS TRAJECTORIES… 

11

strengthened by evidence that Zanu-PF had rewarded people who were loyal before and those who defended the party, such as Godfrey Nzira. Another example of a religious leader who engages in Zanu-PFism is Bishop Nehemiah Mutendi of the Zion Christian Church in Zimbabwe. Share (2018) quotes Mutendi assuring President Mnangagwa by saying Do not be afraid, President, we are with you. Some people say we are being ruled by soldiers, which is false. We are being led by mature people who came from the war. Those who are still in the army are not here. What is left is for us to go and tell our people on the direction to follow.

Considering the foregoing discussion, my conclusion is that the morality and the voice of reason of religious leaders have been weakened in the political arena. Gifts bestowed by the state have to be paid back somehow, and often the debt is considerable; someone could be required to sacrifice their personal integrity and morality as a token of appreciation. In fact, Zanu-PF continues to oil its ‘violence machinery, [and] targets churches in propaganda drive’ (Zimbabwe Briefing 2011, 1). Thus, I agree with the argument that there is reciprocity between politicians and religious leaders, and Meyer (2006), who explains that, when religion is politicised, it can be dangerous, even to the beneficiaries of the compromised nexus of religion and politics. Often, the decision to work with the regime is driven by demands of one’s personal political economy (Magaisa 2019), as opposed to religious and moral responsibility, which is expected of someone who assumes a role in the clergy. Comparing Political Leaders to the Messiah Another building block for Zanu-PFism is the presence of a messianic undertone in the glorification of political leaders. It is not only religious leaders who do this, but I raise it here because of the religious undertone associated with praise texts. From the time of Robert Mugabe, Zanu-PF followers have seen their leaders as liberators and have compared them to biblical characters, such as Moses, Joshua and Jesus Christ. Praise texts associated with a messianic narrative are used to cement the relationship between the praise singer and politicians. Doing so implies political leaders are beyond criticism and provides them with sense of false hope and security, while structuring people (having people support the political party

12 

B. DUBE

without applying critical thinking to it) follow Zanu-PF as the ‘God-­ given’ party. In developing this point, Shumba (2014) reports that Andrew Wutawunashe described Mugabe in praise texts as a ‘God-chosen leader, raised by God to lead this nation. He has worked diligently for this country and was given the strength to fight for the nation’s wealth to be owned by the black majority, which has been a success’. In same vein, Walter Mzembi, former Tourism minister in the Mugabe era, compared Mugabe to Jesus: ‘I find myself in the same position as the Biblical John the Baptist who was a forerunner to Jesus Christ and of the son of God he said he could not untie the laces of his sandals’ (Nyathi 2020). In addition, The Zimbabwean (2016) quotes Zanu-PF senator, Tapera Machingaifa, who described Mugabe as follows: ‘The President is a brave leader whom I liken to Jesus Christ; he is carrying the cross just like our Lord Jesus did when he died on the cross for our sins’. These are a few examples of how far people were willing to go to please Mugabe, in spite of, later, helping to remove him from his position as president of Zimbabwe. The way they turned against Mugabe, despite their messianic praises, should serve as a reminder that nothing is permanent in this world. In turn, the incumbent president should avoid falling victim to the idea that receiving messianic praise means he will be permitted to lead Zimbabwe for ever. Zanu-PFism has shown that leaders are easy to replace, even if people are singing their praises or engaging in messianic mantras. The messianic praise texts did not end with Mugabe; in fact, they have intensified in the second republic. Even those who sang praises to Mugabe as president-for-life have shifted their support and found a new home with Mugabe’s successor, Mnangagwa, who they passionately call ED. When Mnangagwa was in trouble with the Mugabe regime, he fled to Mozambique for his safety and to devise strategies to depose Mugabe. While in hiding Mnangagwa wrote a letter containing messianic promises to the people of Zimbabwe. In his letter to Zimbabweans, he said I stand prepared … to pay the ultimate price in defence of Zimbabwe … as I leave this post for now … we will very soon control the levers of power … let not your heart be troubled for peace, love, unity … are around the corner. I … shall return to Zimbabwe to lead you. (Zimeye 2017)

The letter resonated with the sentiment expressed by former minister for Masvingo, Josiah Hungwe, who saw Mnangagwa as the ‘The holy Son

1  ZANU-PF AS STOCKHOLM SYNDROME, AND ITS TRAJECTORIES… 

13

of Man’ (Zimeye 2014). At the time of writing this chapter, Mnangagwa is the president of Zimbabwe, who occupies the role of a messiah as promised in the letter. Because of his tenure of a president, people shower him with praises for political and economic convenience. However, singers cannot be trusted as, more often than not, Zanu-PF leaders want their religious beliefs and practices to be sacralized, and declared divine, and unquestionable (Tarusarira and Humbe 2022, 168). Nevertheless, one may argue that Zanu-PF’s support base, while strong, is like water taking the shape of the container. The messianic praises that have sustained Zanu-PF are only designed to please the incumbent president. In this regard, I agree with Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2003, 109) that, ‘the glorification of the nationalist leaders engineered a feeling of indispensability as well as irreplaceability’, while the ‘elevation of the nationalist party above everything else generated rigid party loyalties and a preparedness to kill and be killed in defence of the party’. In essence, there is a culture in Zimbabwe of glorifying political leaders and expressing messianic narratives to enact Zanu-PFism. This practice produces supporters who cannot question politicians, since politicians are on the same level as the Messiah. Such thinking becomes one of the building blocks that sustain Zanu-PFism, even though it is an oppressive system. Dividing the Prophetic Voice The politics of division has characterised Zimbabwe since independence in 1980 (Manyonganise 2022). Politicians in Zimbabwe have managed to create major divisions in the church, which can best be described by the proposition of Hallencreutz (1988) as paper soulmates and antagonists. In implementing these two categories, I agree with Magaisa (2019) that, They [politicians] will manufacture blatant falsehoods to create doubt in the minds of the group. The tragedy is if the hyped members fall for the gimmicks. Signs that they are falling for it include when they start amplifying the so-called good side of the captors, underlying their cruelty. They even defend their tormentors ahead of their group. Authors of divide and rule will keep adding fuel to the fire they created [with help of religious leaders].

In addition, religious leaders use so-called hate speech to express their ideologies and criticise their opponents’ struggle to win people over (Sande and Maforo 2021). By doing so, the acts of religious leaders not

14 

B. DUBE

only encourage misrepresentation of religious beliefs, but they create a culture that perpetuates religious intolerance and discrimination (Gonzalez 2012, 383), which, in the process, consolidates and indirectly feeds into Zanu-PFism. For example, Catholic bishops in Zimbabwe had written a letter, as is the culture of the Church, to communicate with politicians. According to Jere and Magezi (2018), pastoral letters have been pivotal in disseminating important messages from church leadership to congregants, and to government as a whole, thereby reflecting the ideology of the Catholic Church in the political, societal and economic affairs of people. The letter, entitled ‘The March is Not Ended’, refers to various pressing issues affecting Zimbabwe and states, ‘the suppression of people’s anger can only serve to deepen the crisis and take the nation into deeper crisis, the crackdown on dissent is unprecedented’ (ZCBC 2020). It asked a rhetorical question: ‘Is this the Zimbabwe we want? To have a different opinion does not mean be an enemy’ and stated that, we want our politics to build a united nation and not to divide us, turning the military who ought to continue the memory of the late heroes against the people who fed and clothed them … Some of our vocal political leaders are busy re-creating the war situation of us and them. (ZCBC 2020)

In a healthy society, the message of the Catholic Bishops could have been welcomed and supported, especially by other religious groups, as its goal is clearly to enact a better society for all. However, religious leaders prone to Zanu-PFism saw the message as inappropriate. For example, Mutendi described the Catholic bishops’ letter as ‘inappropriately prescriptive and grossly disrespectful’ (Guardian 2020). It is interesting that Mutendi did not quote from the letter what he considered disrespectful and unwarranted in the context of a country in crisis. A logical conclusion is that his response was a knee-jerk response to the Catholic bishops, with the intention of pleasing the paymaster. Wutawunashe, who represents the Zimbabwe Indigenous Inter-denominational Council of Churches (ZIICC), dismissed the concerns of the bishops and ‘categorically dissociates itself [ZIICC] from calls by certain religious leaders to march against the government and to reignite conflicts and wounds for the sake of healing’ (Pindula News 2020). One would expect these religious leaders, instead of attacking the bishops, would rather challenge those responsible for the social ills mentioned in the letter. Instead, most African indigenous

1  ZANU-PF AS STOCKHOLM SYNDROME, AND ITS TRAJECTORIES… 

15

churches endorsed Zanu-PF leaders, such as former president Mugabe and the current president Mnangagwa (Tarusarira and Humbe 2022, 165). Religious leaders who are prone to Zanu-PFism are positioned to oppose any message that calls Zanu-PF to accountability, democracy and respect of human rights. This could lead to the question, what is the role of these religious leaders in making Zimbabwe a better place? In summary, Zanu-PFism has mastered the division of the prophetic voice, which ultimately weakens and spoils the role of religion in political affairs. Religion is used as a tool of manipulation and is exploited to move the nation in the direction of Zanu-PFism. This phenomenon is made worse by the tendency to silence religious leaders who are perceived as dissenting with various mechanisms, such as character assassination and physical violence. In short, dividing the prophetic voice is one of the building blocks of Zanu-­ PFism. In the next section, I discuss avoidance of accountability as a building block for Zanu-PFism. Religious Leaders Use Zanu-PFism to Avoid Accountability In developing this argument, I refer to Magaisa (2020), who reports that, it is often the case that people wonder why certain members of the clergy seem to take sides with an incompetent and corrupt regime. Do they have something on them, people often ask. The scriptures teach that believers shall not steal and that they shall honour their obligations. After all, do the scriptures not say render unto Caesar what belongs to Caesar and to God what belongs to God? Why then, when debts fall due, men and women of the cloth do not seem to render to Caesar things are Caesar’s?

It is becoming clear to the majority of Zimbabweans that, if one is corrupt and does not want to be subjected to accountability for the source of their wealth, Zanu-PFism provides a place to hide. Consequently, Zanu-­ PFism has become a group comprising mostly criminals—the group includes religious leaders—who are prepared to fight to achieve the everlasting enthronement of Zanu-PFism. Hence, we have a partial response to the rhetorical question posed by Magaisa, in the sense that Zanu-PFism is used to escape accountability and to use religion as a coverup. Hence, I agree with Gunda (2012, 39) that the African public sphere is heavily ‘biblified’ and that this biblification has helped the elite to hide behind religiosity to avoid accountability. Consequently, Zanu-PFism grows, not

16 

B. DUBE

as a philosophy of governance, but as a way of being protected and escaping accountability. To develop this point in nexus with religious leaders and to contextualise readers who are not familiar with political and religious dynamics in Zimbabwe, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe is used as an example. Around 2007 and 2008, the Reserve Bank had a programme to lend potential commercial farmers money, as a way to empower local people. The majority of the lenders who benefitted were linked to Zanu-PF and included religious leaders. Though loans were supposed to be repaid to the bank, to date no money has been paid back. It is not surprising that religious leaders who are mute against the atrocities of Zanu-PF benefitted from government loans; these lenders include Ezekiel Gutu, who borrowed US$116,693, Nobert Kunonga (US$98,661), and Nehemiah Mutendi (two loans, of US$271,000 and US$315,600, respectively). It is, therefore, not surprising that these lenders are among the foremost endorsers of the regime (Magaisa 2020). Through avoiding accountability and failing to return the borrowed money to the central purse, they side with the state for the sake of protection and, consequently, negate their moral fibre and their sacred duty to protect the weak and less privileged members of the religious community. This type of behaviour indicates the impetus to endorse Zanu-PFism as a hiding place, where accountability is not required, as long one is connected to Zanu-PF. Cognisant of the foregoing, Magaisa (2022) is right to argue that this unusual phenomenon, of the hostage becoming sympathetic and loyal to their captors and no longer seeing the captor as the problem, is an example of Stockholm syndrome. It is logical to conclude that the religious leaders mentioned here have been incapacitated and can no longer challenge Zanu-PF, in case they are reminded of what they owe the government for their safety and survival.

Impact of Zanu-PFism on Religion and Democracy In this section, I highlight the impact of Zanu-PFism on religion and democracy. I am cognisant that effects cut across various sectors of society, but I will delimit my discussion to the effects that relate to the topic of this book. One of the consequences of Zanu-PFism has been the creation of cartels that run the country while hiding within Zanu-PF. The problems of Zimbabwe, in general, are caused by very few people who are connected to Zanu-PFism being enriched, while the majority suffers. The

1  ZANU-PF AS STOCKHOLM SYNDROME, AND ITS TRAJECTORIES… 

17

cartels also have as members religious leaders who, through their association with Zanu-PFism, are arrogant, confident, spiteful and seemingly invincible, as evidenced by the present power arrangement. Some religious leaders or players have made it to the list of cartel members, and these include Angel, Emmanuel Makandiwa, Passion Java, Mutendi and Wutawunashe (other chapters of the book describe how these individuals have contributed to creating and sustaining Zanu-PFism as an oppressive system of leadership). These religious leaders present the negative side of religion in society, which is oppression and the thwarting of democracy. Informed by the foregoing, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2015, 23) argues that there is a need to find better ways to theorise religion, so that it contributes to solutions to human problems. In light of the foregoing, Beyers (2014) proposes that there is need to, once again, place on the table for debate the relation between politics and religion; so that religion can engage in social issues in a positive way and find new ways of expressing neighbourly love and improving the lives of all. By doing this, the question posed by Mujinga (2018, 261), namely, ‘when is the church going to realize that we are just horses that are being driven by politicians for their selfish reasons?’, would be answered. Mujinga’s question (2018) is a clear indication of how the religious sector has contributed to the building of Zanu-PFism. Furthermore, politicians consider the religious constituency to be an easy target to exploit, and once they are done with the religious constituency, they abandon them for other constituencies that yield better results. The acts of Zanu-PF are evident to many, but religious leaders are turning a blind eye, thereby showing that a religious vocation has now become mere social and financial capital for individuals, rather for the general populace who are affected by misrule. Thus, it is critical that Zanu-PFism—not the party, but the system of oppression, violence and selfishness—is problematised, challenged and suffocated, because it produces a world of leadership that cares for little and structure people to support it by subjecting them to poverty and poor quality of life. There is a need for continuous checks on religious leaders and a narrative to ensure that they continue to represent morality integrity and do not contribute to thwarting democracy and social justice through enacting Zanu-PFism.

18 

B. DUBE

Conclusion This chapter focused on explaining the building blocks of Zanu-PFism as a system of governance in postcolonial Zimbabwe through Stockholm syndrome. It showed how religious individuals and leaders contribute to the building of a system of oppression, hate and violence—by design or default. The chapter does not argue that Zanu-PF as a party needs to be eradicated but problematises the hijacking of the party by a few individuals who, through their acts, produce a thread of misgovernance referred as Zanu-PFism. The final call of the chapter is for people to challenge religious institutions and individuals that contribute to Zanu-PFism in every possible way, because the system is dangerous to society—including to those who support it.

References Abel, C.F., and Arthur Sementelli. 2002. Power, Emancipation and the Administrative State. Administrative Theory and Praxis 24 (2): 253–278. https://doi.org/10.1080/10841806.2002.11029361. Adorjan, Michael, Tony Christensen, Benjamin Kelly, and Dorothy Pawluch. 2012. Stockholm Syndrome as Vernacular Resource. The Sociological Quarterly 53 (June): 454–474. https://doi.org/10.2307/41679728. Al Jazeera Investigative Unit. 2023. Six Secrets Uncovered by Al Jazeera’s Gold Mafia Investigation. Al Jazeera, April 14. https://www.aljazeera.com/ news/2023/4/14/six-­s ecrets-­u ncovered-­b y-­a l-­j azeeras-­g old-mafia-­ investigation Al-amin, M., and Masum M. Sikdar. 2016. Antonio Gramsci’s Political Thought: An Analysis. Research on Humanities and Social Sciences 6 (18): 1–6. Beyers, Jaco. 2014. The Church and the Secular: The Effect of the Post-Secular on Christianity. HTS Teologiese Studies/Theological Studies 70 (1): 12. https://doi. org/10.4102/hts.v70i1.2605. Charles, T. 2016. The Zimbabwean Crisis: Locations of Writing and the Literary Representation of Zimbabwe’s ‘Lost Decade.’ Master’s thesis. Stellenbosch: University of Stellenbosch. Chibamu, Anna. 2020. Church Leaders Fall Over Each Other In Praise of ED. New Zimbabwe, February 2. https://www.newzimbabwe.com/church-­leaders-­fall-­ over-­each-­other-­in-­praise-­of-­ed/ Damiani, Rich. 2002. Spiritual Abuse within the Church: Its Damage and Recovery Process. Evangel 20 (2): 42–48.

1  ZANU-PF AS STOCKHOLM SYNDROME, AND ITS TRAJECTORIES… 

19

Freire, Paolo. 2000. Historical Conditioning and Levels of Consciousness. The Politics of Education, Culture of Silence. Translated by D Macebo. London: Bergi and Garvey. Gatsi, Darlington. 2022. Mnangagwa Group Vows Chamisa-Led CCC Will Never Rule Zimbabwe; Say What ‘What Happened in Zambia Won’t Happen Here.’ NewZimbabwe.com, October 25. https://www.newzimbabwe.com/vapostori-­ for-­e d-­v ow-­c hamisa-­l ed-­c cc-­w ill-­n ever-­r ule-­z imbabwe-­s ay-­w hat-­w hat-­ happened-­in-­zambia-­wont-­happen-­here/. Gonzalez, Michelle. 2012. Religion and the US Presidency: Politics, the Media, and Religious Identity. Political Theology 13 (5): 568–585. https://doi. org/10.1558/poth.v13i5.568. Gramsci, Antonio. 1999. Selections from Prison Notebooks. Edited and translated by Quentin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith. London: ElecBook. Guardian. 2020. Catholic Bishops in Zimbabwe Speak Out for First Time on Human Rights Abuses. The Guardian, August 24. https://www.theguardian. c o m / g l o b a l -­d e v e l o p m e n t / 2 0 2 0 / a u g / 2 4 / c a t h o l i c -­b i s h o p s -­i n zimbabwe-­speakout-­for-­first-­time-­on-­human-­rights-­abuses-­mnangagwa. Gunda, Masiiwa Ragies. 2012. Rewriting the Bible or Debiblifying the Public Sphere? Proposal and Propositions on the Usage of the Bible by Public Figures in Zimbabwe. In The Bible and Politics in Africa, ed. Masiiwa Ragies Gunda and Joachim Kügler, 22–41. Bible in Africa Studies Volume 7. Bamberg: University of Bamberg Press. Hallencreutz, Carl F. 1988. Religion and Politics in Harare 1890–1980. Uppsala: Studia Missionalia Upsaliensia LXXII. Hamill, James. 2017. The Three Barriers Blocking Zimbabwe’s Progress: Zanu-PF, Mnangagwa and the Military. The Conversation, December 29. http://theconversation.com/the-­t hree-­b arriers-­b locking-­z imbabwes-­p rogress-­z anu-­ pf-­mnangagwa-­and-­the-­military-­89177. Jere, Qeko, and Vhumani Magezi. 2018. Pastoral Letters and the Church in the Public Square: An Assessment of the Role of Pastoral Letters in Influencing Democratic Processes in Malawi. Verbum et Ecclesia 39 (1): 9. https://doi. org/10.4102/ve.v39i1.1844. Magaisa, Alex. 2019. The Regime and Its Enablers. Big Saturday Read (blog), December 14. https://www.bigsr.co.uk/single-­post/2019/12/14/Big-­ Saturday-­Read-­The-­regime-­and-­its-­enablers. ———. 2020. BSR Exclusive: Beneficiaries of the RBZ Farm Mechanisation Scheme. Big Saturday Read (blog), July 17. https://bigsr.africa/bsr-­exclusive-­ beneficiaries-­of-­the-­rbz-­farm-­mechanisation-­scheme/. ———. 2022. Beware of the Trojan Horse. Big Saturday Read (blog), January 7. https://bigsr.africa/bsr-­beware-­of-­the-­trojan-­horse/.

20 

B. DUBE

Manyonganise, Molly. 2022. ‘The March Is Not Ended’: ‘Church’ Confronting the State over the Zimbabwean Crisis. Religions 13 (2): 107. https://doi. org/10.3390/rel13020107. Meyer, B. 2006. Religious Sensations: Why Media, Aesthetics and Power Matter in the Study of Contemporary Religion. Vrije Universiteit. Mpofu, Shepherd. 2022. Religious and Political Intersections: The Instrumentalisation of Christianity during Zimbabwe’s 2018 Presidential Elections. Canadian Journal of African Studies/Revue Canadienne Des Études Africaines 56 (2): 383–406. https://doi.org/10.1080/00083968.2021. 1894193. Mujinga, Martin. 2018. ‘Religion as a Riding Horse of Politics?’ A Critical Evaluation of Political Influence in the Zimbabwean Ecclesiastical Life. Alternation 23 (December): 244–265. Musendekwa, Menard. 2011. Messianic Expectations as Prophetic Responses to Crises: A Zimbabwean Perspective. Master’s thesis. Stellenbosch: University of Stellenbosch. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Sabelo J. 2003. Dynamics of the Zimbabwe Crisis in the 21st Century. African Journal in Conflict Resolution 3: 99–134. ———. 2009. Do ‘Zimbabweans’ Exist? Trajectories of Nationalism, National Identity Formation and Crisis in a Postcolonial State. Africa in Development 3. Peter Lang. https://www.peterlang.com/document/1043863 ———. 2013. Why Decoloniality in the 21st Century. The Thinker 48 (10): 5–9. ———. 2015. Decoloniality in Africa: A Continuing Search for a New World Order. The Australasian Review of African Studies 36 (2): 2–50. Nkala, Silas. 2011. Apostolic Sects Slammed. AllAfrica, May 21. www.allafrica. com/stories/201105230866.html. Nyathi, Kitsepile. 2020. Zimbabwe Minister Equates Mugabe to Jesus. Nation, July 3. Kenya Edition. https://nation.africa/kenya/news/africa/zimbabwe-­ minister-­equates-­mugabe-­to-­jesus-­990844. “Orders and Medals.” n.d. UK Honours System. https://honours.cabinetoffice. gov.uk/about/orders-­and-­medals/. Accessed 2 May 2023. Pindula News. 2020. Wutawunashe and The Indigenous Churches Join the Govt in Calling the Catholic Bishops’ Letter to the Govt Genocidal. August 19. h t t p s : / / n e w s . p i n d u l a . c o . z w / 2 0 2 0 / 0 8 / 1 9 / w u t a w u n a s h e -­a n d theindigenous-­churches-­join-­the-­govt-­in-­calling-­the-­catholic-bishops-­letter-­ to-­the-­govt-­genocidal/. Racine, L. 2021. Racialization in Nursing: Rediscovering Antonio Gramsci’s Concepts of Hegemony and Subalternity. Nursing Inquiry 28: e12398. https://doi.org/10.1111/nin.12398. Ramos Jr, Valeriano. 1982. The Concepts of Ideology, Hegemony, and Organic Intellectuals in Gramsci’s Marxism. Theoretical Review 30 (3–8): 34.

1  ZANU-PF AS STOCKHOLM SYNDROME, AND ITS TRAJECTORIES… 

21

Sande, Nomatter, and Byron Maforo. 2021. Hate Speech as a Politico-Religious Tool in Contemporary Zimbabwe. Journal of Religion in Africa 51 (3–4): 348–363. https://doi.org/10.1163/15700666-­12340210. Share, Felex. 2018. Churches Endorse ED. The Herald, March 6. https://www. herald.co.zw/churches-­endorse-­pres-­mnangagwa/. Shumba, Pamela. 2014. President God-given: Church. The Herald, December 29. https://www.herald.co.zw/president-­god-­given-­church/. Strentz, Thomas. 1980. The Stockholm Syndrome: Law Enforcement Policy and Ego Defenses of the Hostage. Annals of the New  York Academy of Sciences 347: 137–350. Sunday Mail. 2012. Archbishop Mwanza Conferred with Order of Merit. July 2. Tarusarira, Joram, and Ezra Chitando. 2017. The Deployment of a ‘Sacred Song’ in Violence in Zimbabwe: The Case of the Song ‘Zimbabwe Ndeye Ropa Ramadzibaba’ (Zimbabwe Was/Is Born of the Blood of the Fathers/Ancestors) in Zimbabwean Politics. Journal for the Study of Religion 30 (1): 5–25. https:// doi.org/10.17159/2413-­3027/2017/v30n1a1. Tarusarira, Joram, and Bernard Pindukai Humbe. 2022. The Ambivalence of African Independent/Initiated Churches in Colonial and Postcolonial Politics. In Religion in Rebellions, Revolutions, and Social Movements, ed. W.S. Goldstein and J.-P. Reed, 158–172. Routledge. Turner, James T. 1985. Factors Influencing the Development of the Hostage Identification Syndrome. Political Psychology 6 (4): 705–711. https://doi. org/10.2307/3791024. Unesco. 2017. Making Textbook Content Inclusive: A Focus on Religion, Gender, and Culture. Paris: Unesco. https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/ pf0000247337.locale=fr. Washington, Marvin, Harry J.  Van Buren, and Karen Patterson. 2014. Pastor Practices in the Era of Megachurches: New Organizational Practices and Forms for a Changing Institutional Environment. In Religion and Organization Theory. Research in the Sociology of Organizations, ed. Paul Tracey, Nelson Phillips, and Michael Lounsbury, vol. 41, 187–213. Bradford: Emerald Group Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1108/S0733-­558X20140000041014. ZCBC. 2020. The March Is Not Ended. Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops Conference Secretariat, Synod House, Harare. http://kubatana.net/2020/08/14/ the-­march-­is-­not-­ended-­pastoral-­letter-­of-­the-­zimbabwe-­catholic-­bishops-­ conference-­on-­the-­current-­situation-­in-­zimbabwe/. Zimbabwe Briefing. 2011. ZANU-PF Oiling Its Violence Machinery, Targets Churches in Propaganda Drive. 25 (May): 1, 4. Zimbabwean. 2016. Mugabe Is Jesus Christ: Says Zanu PF Senator. March 21. https://www.thezimbabwean.co/2016/03/mugabe-­i s-­j esus-­c hrist-­s ayszanu-­pf-­senator/.

22 

B. DUBE

Zimeye. 2014. Chiwenga To Campaign For Mnangagwa in 2018  – Hungwe. Jun 26. https://www.zimeye.net/2017/12/15/chiwenga-­to-­campaign-­for-­ mnangagwa-­in-­2018-­hungwe/. ———. 2017. Full Text: Mnangagwa’s Letter To Mugabe 6 Nov. The Zimbabwean, November 6. https://www.thezimbabwean.co/2018/01/full-text-mnangagwasletter-to-mugabe-6-nov/.

CHAPTER 2

Mixing up Priorities? Propagation of Uncritical Patriotism of Zanu-PF by the Church in Zimbabwe Collium Banda

Introduction and Background From a public theological perspective of the Church as a representative of the kingdom of God on earth, how can we evaluate propagation of the uncritical patriotism regarding Zanu-PF by some Zimbabwean churches? The word church is used generically to refer to the ecumenical community of the Christian faith. This chapter uses church and Christians interchangeably, since Christians constitute the church. The focus of the chapter is on the church as represented by a group of pastors who call themselves Pastors4ED—Pastors for Economic Development—but which, in reality, means Pastors for Emmerson Dambudzo. Emmerson Dambudzo are the names of Zimbabwe’s President Mnangagwa and leader of Zanu-PF. While, in essence, Pastors4ED campaigns for Zanu-PF, it is one of several groups operating outside the official Zanu-PF structures to campaign for C. Banda (*) North-West University, Potchefstroom, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 B. Dube (ed.), Regime, Religion and the Consolidation of Zanu-PFism in Zimbabwe, African Histories and Modernities, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-46084-5_2

23

24 

C. BANDA

Mnangagwa, by adding his initials to their organisation’s name. They are seemingly in opposition to Vice-president Constantino Chiwenga, who is perceived to be working to elbow Mnangagwa out.1 Ironically, Chiwenga has openly endorsed Mnangagwa as Zanu-PF’s only candidate for the forthcoming elections (Chidakwa 2022). Chiwenga reportedly said ED should mean ‘Emmerson Delivers’, because he had been delivering on his electoral pledges. He is quoted endorsing Mnangagwa’s presidential candidature by saying, ‘Over a very space of time he has surpassed our expectations. May he continue to lead and guide us in the next term’ (Chidakwa 2022). This chapter recognises that Pastors4ED does not represent the whole of the Zimbabwean church, because some church bodies, such as the ZBCB, openly criticise Zanu-PF’s narrow patriotism (Dube 2021; Manyonganise 2022; Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops’ Conference 2020). However, the campaign by Pastors4ED for pastors to undergo patriotism training at the Zanu-PF school of ideology is of great consequence and promotes control of the church by the party. By uncritical patriotism we mean promoting a ‘skewed nationalism that is measured by loyalty to the regime, and premised in the adoption of Zanu-PF ideology, and nothing else’ (Dube 2021, 1). Zanu-PF’s uncritical patriotism defines Zimbabwean patriotism as being exclusively loyal to historical foundations and the national vision generated by the party, instead of the values of the country’s constitution.2 This domination of patriotism by Zanu-PF makes it possible to talk of the zanufication of patriotism in Zimbabwe. As an example, nearly all the heroic figures buried at the National Heroes Acres were members of Zanu-PF, while liberation veterans of other parties, or those who had left the party to join other political parties before they died, are not buried in the national shrine. This shows the extent of the zanufication of patriotism in Zimbabwe. Of great concern is that some Zimbabwean Christians, such as members of Pastors4ED, embrace the zanufication of patriotism and preach it 1  In addition to Pastors4ED, other groups that have emerged outside the official Zanu-PF structures to campaign for Mnangagwa include MenBelieED, Young Women4ED, Varakashi4ED and Mahwindi4ED (Nyangani 2022). The list of the groups keeps growing. as all kinds of formations emerge with the suffix ED. 2  It is interesting that one of the initial steps of removing Robert Mugabe in 2017 involved the image of then General Constantino Chiwenga, now vice president of the country, waving a copy of the country’s Constitution and calling for its observation by the leadership of Zanu-PF. This indicated Zanu-PF’s tendency to disregard the constitution in favour of its own ideology.

2  MIXING UP PRIORITIES? PROPAGATION OF UNCRITICAL PATRIOTISM… 

25

as God’s will. Pastors4ED have devised a programme for pastors to undergo patriotism training at Zanu-PF’s Hebert Chitepo School of Ideology. This propagation of the Zanu-PF version of patriotism for Christians raises, among many other questions, questions about the church’s self-understanding of being a representative of the kingdom of God. One could ask what Pastors4ED mean when they pray for the coming of the kingdom of God in the Lord’s Prayer and yet imbue the prayer with Zanu-PF’s narrow patriotism that divides the nation into either patriots or traitors, and the people regarded as traitors are treated violently. In many ways, Zanu-PF’s nationalist patriotism is a form of hate patriotism, as it divides citizens into good and evil according to whether they are considered loyal to the party (Ranger 2005, 15). The zanufication of national patriotism involves brutal violence against citizens, which means that churches that propagate the zanufication of national patriotism ultimately support and participate in the violent brutalisation of citizens.

A Public Theological Assessment of Uncritical Patriotism Methodologically, this chapter uses the lenses of public theology. It argues that the uncritical patriotism promoted by Zanu-PF not only poses a danger to peace and the wellbeing of the nation, but is also a heresy that distorts the justice of the kingdom of God. Church groups such as Pastors4ED seem to propagate the narrow Zanu-PF patriotism without considering their public role as representatives of the kingdom of God in the world. Public theology challenges Christians to be critical of unjust and oppressive systems. In expressing the gist of public theology, Agang (2020, 3) says, ‘As Christians, we should be deeply concerned that Africa is tormented by so many evils, and is so far from being what God desires’. This is true of contemporary Zimbabwe, where the corrupt and oppressive rule of Zanu-PF has resulted in high levels of poverty and divisions that continue to fan interparty violence. Thus, Zimbabwe is far from what God desires. Agang (2020, 3) challenges Christians to be concerned about the evil in their midst, by reminding Christians that, when they pray for God’s kingdom to come to earth every time they recite the Lord’s Prayer, they are not only praying for Christ’s return to set up his kingdom, because, one day, Christ will bring his kingdom regardless of our prayers. Rather, Christians must realise that, when ‘Christ spoke about the kingdom of

26 

C. BANDA

God, he referred to it as a present reality – the reign of God made real in the present, even as we await its fullness’ (Agang 2020, 4). Consequently, public theology is concerned with the manifestation of the kingdom of God in the world in which human beings, created in God’s image, live. Therefore, as God’s representatives in this world, for Christians to pray for God’s kingdom to come in this present world is to pray for God’s just and righteous rule to fill the earth as it is in heaven. It is, therefore, contended that, when Pastors4ED promote Zanu-PF’s toxic patriotism, they are forsaking their role of being agents of God’s kingdom in the world. An important way of understanding the kingdom of God is as the reign of the triune God, which emphasises that the kingdom is permeated with the eternal love that binds the three persons of the trinity, for God is love (1 John 4:8). From this trinitarian view of the kingdom of God, public theology ‘reflects on the love of the triune God for the world’ (Koopman 2010, 123). The triune God of the kingdom is essentially love, therefore, he loves his world and desires that there be peace, order and prosperity in it. Public theology, therefore, ‘reflects on the love of the God who is at work in all spheres of life’ (Koopman 2010, 124). That means that, despite its fallen nature, God still loves his world, and there is no sphere of life that is out of his life. In highlighting the breadth of God’s love in public theology, Koopman (2010, 124) says the field investigates three basic questions: ‘first, the inherent public nature of God’s love; second, the rationality of God’s love for the world; and third, the meaning and implications of God’s love for every facet of life’. Therefore, the church, as an agent of the kingdom of God of love, justice and righteousness, must be critical of Zanu-PF’s narrow patriotism, which spreads hateful divisions in the nation. Therefore, ‘as the representative of that kingdom, we should be working not just for a better society for ourselves but for a society that shows real evidence for God’s love’ (Agang 2020, 5). In other words, ‘We should want to see all human endeavours done in God’s way, for God’s glory’ (Agang 2020, 5). This pursuit to see all human actions done in a God-­ glorifying manner is the gist of public theology that should inform Zimbabwean Christians’ response to the narrow patriotism of Zanu-PF. This is a revolutionising perspective that challenges Zimbabwean Christians’ prioritisation of allegiance to narrow patriotism over allegiance to God’s love that seeks the human dignity of all people. As a framework of assessing Zimbabwean Christians’ uncritical endorsement and propagation of Zanu-PF’s narrow patriotism, public theology challenges them to engage in politics that is guided by the love of God that is encapsulated in

2  MIXING UP PRIORITIES? PROPAGATION OF UNCRITICAL PATRIOTISM… 

27

his kingdom and its implications for all facets of life, including politics. The following section describes the character and nature of the narrow patriotism that Christians are called to engage with, from a perspective of the kingdom of God.

Patriotism as Defined by Zanu-PF Considering God’s kingdom of justice and his attribute of love, Christians in Zimbabwe must be critical of Zanu-PF’s narrow patriotism, which promotes violence by dividing citizens into either patriots or traitors. Patriotism is a foundational element of the essence of any nationhood. While the Bible describes Christians as aliens in this world, it still demands that they are responsible and patriotic citizens of their countries. However, Christians should be alert to and wary of how their nations define patriotism. This section attempts to understand how patriotism is defined by Zanu-PF, the ruling political party in Zimbabwe. Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni poses a question whose answer shows how Zanu-PF defines patriotism in Zimbabwe. He asks, How can the contemporary political history of Zimbabwe be made sense of, particularly the case of a single political party (Zanu-PF and its president, Robert Mugabe), which claims to be the alpha and omega of leadership of the country through its declaration that it alone has primal legitimacy deriving not from elections, but from active participation in the epic anti- colonial struggle? (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2012, 2)

Ndlovu-Gatsheni’s question, which he posed when Robert Mugabe was the leader of Zanu-PF and president of the country, shows the extreme extent to which the party and its leader had defined patriotism in relation to the epic war of liberation from colonialism. Zanu-PF views patriotism as measured by one’s allegiance to the party and recognising the party’s exclusive right to be the only one that governs the country. As Ndlovu-­ Gatsheni indicates, Zanu-PF does not consider its primary legitimacy to rule Zimbabwe to come from elections, but rather from its participation in the epic anti-colonial struggle. The ideology of Zanu-PF is that, since they liberated this country, they will rule it, even if the citizens vote them out of power. Ndlovu-Gatsheni’s question is important for understanding the basis and nature of the zanufication of the essence of patriotism in Zimbabwe. Zanufication is based on the party’s historic participation in

28 

C. BANDA

the war of liberation from colonialism, and its structural nature is the memorialisation of the event of struggle and using it to delegitimise other political parties that attempt to wrest power from Zanu-PF. By owning its historical participation in the war of liberation, Zanu-PF has made itself the measure of patriotism through what historian Terrence Ranger terms ‘patriotic history’ (Ranger 2004).3 This patriotic history is propagated through ‘patriotic journalism’ (Ranger 2005), which promotes a favourable but narrow Zimbabwean story and suppresses all media outlets that are critical of the Zanu-PF-led government.4 Patriotic history zanufies patriotism, by projecting Zanu-PF and its ideology as the only authentic embodiment of Zimbabwe and the only trusted guardian of the country’s liberation from colonialism. Citizens are then ordered to be loyal to Zanu-PF, because it claims it is the only party that can uphold and defend the country from imperial nations, particularly Britain and the United States of America. Consequently, patriotism in Zimbabwe is measured by allegiance to Zanu-PF ideology and policies. As defined by Ranger (2004, 218), patriotic history is different from and narrower than the old nationalist historiography, which celebrated aspiration, modernisation and resistance; patriotic history resents the ‘disloyal’ questions raised by historians of nationalism and regards as unpatriotic any history that does not entrench the rule of Zanu-PF. For Zanu-PF, history is a political discourse; therefore, patriotic history ‘is explicitly antagonistic to academic historiography’ (Ranger 2004, 218). With these observations, Ranger says patriotic history narrowly props up Zanu-PF as the only legitimate actor in the quest for Zimbabwe’s liberation; therefore, Zanu-PF rejects any narration of history that questions the party’s exclusive supremacy in the war of independence. Thus, the official history of liberation in Zimbabwe 3  In a later article, Ranger (2005, 10) explains that he took the term ‘patriotic history’ from the Zimbabwean government’s announcements and state press commentary, which depicts the history that was taught in Zanu-PF militia camps and what was offered under the guise of ‘National and Strategic Studies in Teacher Training Colleges and Polytechnics’. From the history of patriotism, Ranger crafted the term patriotic journalism to describe a narrow and divisive journalism that substitutes objective or factual history with the ideology and analysis that was practiced by the Zanu-PF regime when the professor of political science Jonathan Moyo was the minister of Information. 4  Patriotic history and patriotic journalism (Ranger 2004, 2005; Tendi 2008) emerged when Zimbabwe’s image was becoming even more negative after its controversial seizure of farms owned by white farmers and distribution to indigenous people in 2000. The violent seizure of these farms led to the breakdown of the relationship between the Zimbabwean government and that of the United States of America and western European countries.

2  MIXING UP PRIORITIES? PROPAGATION OF UNCRITICAL PATRIOTISM… 

29

is narrated, not from any point of view but that of Zanu-PF. Thus, the dominating element of Zanufication is to ‘repackage and propagate the country’s liberation history in a narrow and authoritarian narrative’ (Tendi 2008, 379) that favours Zanu-PF. Ndlovu-Gatsheni describes patriotic history as the ideology of revolution denoted by the ChiShona word chimurenga. Chimurenga is the name given to all Zimbabwe’s momentous struggles against colonialism, with the first chimurenga being the initial historical armed resistance of colonialism of 1896/7. The second chimurenga was the struggle for liberation that began in the late 1960s and resulted in the birth of modern-day Zimbabwe on 18 April 1980. The third chimurenga is the struggle for economic emancipation that began in year 2000 and which is characterised by expropriation of land from white people and redistribution of that land to Black people. Chimurenga essentially denotes a culture or ideology of resistance to and liberation from Western imperialism and the assertion of the right to self-rule and self-determination by Black Zimbabweans. Therefore, the chimurenga history is foundational to Zanu-PF political ethos. Zanu-PF has claimed exclusive ownership and guardianship of the chimurenga, which it then uses to construct its patriotic ideology. Since chimurenga is ‘premised on a doctrine of permanent nationalist revolution against imperialism and colonialism’ (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2012, 3), it seems logical for it to be inclusive of the commitment of all the country’s citizens to independence and sovereignty. However, Zanu-PF uses it as an ideology of the party’s supremacy, which is beyond challenge, and its exclusive right to rule Zimbabwe. Essentially, Zanu-PF uses chimurenga ideology as a tool to sacralise itself, by claiming that the spirits of the heroes of the first chimurenga, such as Mbuya Nehanda and Sekuru Kaguvi, now operate through it and have ordained the party to rule Zimbabwe permanently on their behalf. According to Taringa (2006, 195), for Shona people, ‘land has primarily a value linked to a tribe, its chief and the spirits of their ancestors’. By using the framework of land as belonging to the ancestors and the rulers as appointed by the ancestors to rule the land on their behalf, Zanu-PF uses the chimurenga to enact itself as chosen and anointed by the national ancestral spirits to be the only ruling party in Zimbabwe. This means that Zanu-PF believes its rule in Zimbabwe is the great commission of the ancestors to rule the nation on their behalf. As Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2012, 3) explains:

30 

C. BANDA

When Zanu-PF embarked on armed liberation struggle beginning in the late 1960s, it harkened back to the primary resistance of 1896–97 as it ­formulated its liberation ideology, sought oracular blessing from the Shona religion, and claimed to be continuing the unfinished liberation struggle that had begun in the late nineteenth century.

The ramifications of Zanu-PF’s claim to have oracular blessing via the Shona religion effectively sacralises Zanu-PF as the only party chosen and ordained by the national ancestors to rule Zimbabwe. This effectively anathematises and delegitimises anyone who attempts to resist and criticise Zanu-PF as resisting the will of the national ancestors, and ultimately the will of God, the Great Spirit, known in ChiShona as Mudzimumukuru, who occupies the apex of the hierarchy of the spirit world (Taringa 2006, 197). The linking of Zanu-PF, exclusively, with the sacred history of Zimbabwe’s resistance and fight against colonial rule means that the party views itself as the sole centre of national unity.5 Therefore, Zanu-PF operates from the perspective of Zimbabwe as a one-party state under its rule. From this perspective, to oppose Zanu-PF, it claims, is to oppose the hub that holds the nation together. As described by Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2012, 4), Zimbabwean nationalism is thus predicated on the assumption that diversity of ethnic and racial identities has to be homogenized into a singular national identity and that successful nation-building and state-making will culminate in eradication of diverse identities and the projection of the identity of the group that dominates state power. The ideology of chimurenga became the nodal point around which imaginations of a monolithic nation-state had to crystallize.

This zanufication of patriotism and national identity leads to the division of the nation into either patriots or sell-outs. Zanu-PF views its opponents and critics as ‘unpatriotic’ and crudely labels them as ‘sell-outs’, ‘puppets’, ‘un-African’ and ‘pro-colonial’ (Tendi 2008, 380). The 5  Zanu-PF’s self-understanding as the centre of national unity is demonstrated by the continued celebration of 22 December as a public holiday, to commemorate the signing on this day in 1987 of the unity accord between the old Zanu-PF and PF-ZAPU, to form the new, united Zanu-PF. The event continues to be celebrated as a national holiday despite protests from some opposition parties that the signing should be celebrated privately as a Zanu-PF affair.

2  MIXING UP PRIORITIES? PROPAGATION OF UNCRITICAL PATRIOTISM… 

31

consequence of this narrow patriotism is that Zanu-PF and the state have become one, to the extent that it is sometimes difficult to distinguish the party from the state (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2012, 5). Because of the way Zanu-PF uses patriotic history, it has become difficult to remove Zanu-PF from power, because removing the party from power is viewed as being unpatriotic. Effectively, any political ideologies that oppose that of Zanu-PF and attempts to remove it from the seat of power are treated as heresy and apostasy, for which the perpetrator deserves to pay even the ultimate price. Support of any other political power that is not Zanu-PF is considered by the party to be unpatriotic, and as seeking to reverse the gains of the chimurenga wars and restore Western imperial rule in Zimbabwe, which must be resisted by whatever means, even violent eradication. The following section discusses the embrace and propagation of Zanu-­ PF’s narrow patriotic history by Pastors4ED. Mujinga (2018, 249) points out that the ‘politics of Zanu-PF have manipulated the church in a number of ways’. To its credit, Zanu-PF has formulated its chimurenga patriotism in a way that is enticing to people interested in African sovereignty, self-determination and economic development.

The Emergence and Growth of Patriotic Christianity in Zimbabwe From a public theological perspective of Christians as a community of God’s people that represents his just and righteous kingdom and as agents of God’s love for a broken, dark world, the concern of this section is that many Zimbabwean Christians have uncritically endorsed Zanu-PF’s narrow patriotism. Instead of criticising the narrow chimurenga ideology, these church leaders embrace it and demand that other Christians to align themselves to it. We realise that the support of Zanu-PF by Zimbabwean Christians is complex and should not be treated in reductionist manner. Furthermore, Zimbabwean Christians have a constitutional and religious right to choose a political party of their choice. We acknowledge that many Zimbabwean Christians are politically literate and able to discern the political messages of the various parties. Moreover, just as some Zimbabwean Christians are comfortable with Zanu-PF’s narrow nationalism, some are also comfortable with the broad liberalism represented by the Citizens Coalition for

32 

C. BANDA

Change (CCC). However, a foundational issue in Christians’ uncritical endorsement of zanufication of patriotism is the uncritical belief that the Bible demands Christians to be submissively loyal to their governments (Mujinga 2018, 249). Several academic studies have highlighted that many Zimbabwean Christians believe the Bible compels them to be loyal to Zanu-PF as the ruling party (Togarasei 2004; Banda and Senokoane 2009; Biri 2020). Moreover, some Zimbabwean Christian leaders go a step further and say that not only should Christians submit to Zanu-PF as the ruling party, but the party was chosen and anointed by God to rule Zimbabwe permanently. This means Christians must not only be law-­ abiding and good citizens, but must also align themselves with Zanu-PF, the party anointed by God to rule Zimbabwe. This logic is illustrated by Pastor Idirashe Dongo, the national chairperson of Pastors4ED, who wants pastors to undergo patriotism training at the Zanu-PF’s Chitepo School of Ideology. New Zimbabwe (2023) reports that the group had enlisted 10,600 Zimbabwean pastors to undergo patriotism training by Zanu-PF to foster patriotism amongst pastors. Dongo is quoted by New Zimbabwe as saying, Our support for the President is something which is mandated by the Bible. The book of Romans 13:1–6 mandated the people of any land to subject themselves to the governors of their land. The governor of this land is President Mnangagwa.

This statement, attributed to Dongo, shows the logic that sustains the narrow zanufication of patriotism in Zimbabwe. For Dongo and her group, the reference to civil authorities does not refer to the office of the president, but specifically to Zanu-PF and its leader, Mnangagwa. It is important to note that this sacralisation of Zanu-PF did not start with Dongo and her Pastors4ED, but has long existed in Zimbabwe—since the time of Mugabe was president. In Mugabe’s days, church leaders, such as the Anglican Bishop Norbet Kunonga (Gundani 2022), Andrew Wutawunashe (Shumba 2014) and Obadiah Musindo (Bulawayo24 News 2013), hero-worshiped Mugabe and praised his seizure of farms owned by white people as an act of God. These leaders categorically equated Mugabe with Moses, anointed by God to lead Zimbabwe, and to take the land from white people. This partisan sacralisation of political parties and political systems also existed in the former Rhodesian period, when Prime Minister Ian Smith announced that, with his Unilateral Declaration of

2  MIXING UP PRIORITIES? PROPAGATION OF UNCRITICAL PATRIOTISM… 

33

Independence (UDI) from Great Britain, he had ‘struck a blow for the preservation of justice, civilisation and Christianity, and in the spirit of this belief, we have this day assumed our independence’ (quoted by Zvobgo 2005, 382). By this declaration, Smith sacralised his UDI in a similar fashion as Zanu-PF is now doing, except that UDI was projected as a defender of Christianity and Western civilisation, while Zanu-PF projects itself as defending Christianity and pan-Africanism. In the former Rhodesia, the African liberation forces were seen as communist-Marxist agents of the devil, fighting the Western Christian civilisation. Similarly, opponents of Zanu-PF are presented as ungodly elements who fail to realise that the party is the only chosen one and ordained by God to rule Zimbabwe. However, it is also important to realise that the main opposition party CCC has, even when it was known as the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), and later Movement for Democratic Change Alliance (MDC-A), consistently projected itself in sacral terms and considered itself as ordained by God to dethrone the ‘evil’ Zanu-PF regime. In 2018, Nelson Chamisa, the leader of the CCC, then known as MDC-A, contested the general election with the slogan #GodIsInIt. Chamisa, who is both a lawyer and pastor by training, uses Bible verses to characterise himself and his party as the holy instruments of God, sent to unseat the unholy Zanu-PF regime. In fact, as demonstrated by Tarusarira (2020) and Nenjerama (2022), among politicians, Chamisa probably uses the Bible and Christian language the most in his political rhetoric and practice. Tarusarira (2020) and Nenjerama (2022) report the exasperation of Chamisa’s supporters over his churning out of more Christian messages than political ideology. Thus, the same problem seen in Zanu-PF’s narrow patriotism also presents itself in the conflation of religion and politics to promote a narrow patriotism by the CCC. Using Zanu-PF’s narrow patriotism, Dongo, the leader of the Pastors4ED, is quoted as saying: According to 2022 census, 85,9% of people in the country are Christians. If Christians are on that number, it means President Mnangagwa’s vote in the 2023 elections is 85,5%. Going forward, we don’t want another disputed election which will be settled in the courts. We want to hand over a landslide victory to the President (sic.). (New Zimbabwe 2023)

Dongo believes that true Christians in Zimbabwe will understand that they are obligated by God to vote for Mnangagwa. Dongo believes that,

34 

C. BANDA

if 85.9% of Zimbabwe’s population is Christian, it means that Mnangagwa’s vote in the forthcoming elections will be 85.9%. This calculation is premised on the belief that to be Christian is to support Zanu-PF by obeying the Bible’s teaching to Christians to obey civil authorities. By saying that she looks forward to a landslide victory for Mnangagwa, and that they must avoid having to dispute another election in the courts, refers to the 2018 election saga, when Chamisa challenged the official results of the election in the Constitutional Court. The Zimbabwe Election Commission had originally declared Mnangagwa the winner, with 50.8% of the total votes cast, over Chamisa’s 44.3%. The court rejected Chamisa’s challenge of the results and confirmed Mnangagwa the winner, and Mnangagwa was sworn in as the president of the country. Dongo and her Pastors4ED want Christians to awaken to their Christian call to be patriotic Christians who must vote for Mnangagwa. Patriotic Christianity, as expressed by Pastors4ED, is also premised on the view that Zanu-PF is the only party that can develop Zimbabwe. In her address at a conference hosted by Pastors4ED, Dongo reportedly said, ‘We have a part to play in building the nation’s economic, social and political spheres and this can only be achieved if we encourage people to vote for ED in the oncoming presidential elections’ (Masau 2023). The theme of development features prominently in Zanu-PF’s patriotic ideology and is encapsulated by the third chimurenga’s expropriation of land and businesses from white people and redistributing it to the indigenous population. In essence, the third chimurenga is Zanu-PF’s ideology of indigenising the economy. Pastors4ED uses Zanu-PF’s economic indigenisation rhetoric to argue that patriotic Zimbabwean Christians who want a better Zimbabwe will vote for Mnangagwa and Zanu-PF. As reportedly articulated by Dongo: The church has the biggest role to play in the new dispensation. The President has been calling on the church to be part of the national agenda and we have heeded the call. For a long time the church has been taking a back seat in issues of national development. (New Zimbabwe 2023)

Dongo links supporting Mnangagwa and Zanu-PF as an act of advancing national development. From this perspective, a patriot will not reject Mnangagwa but will vote for him and his party; for in rejecting him, one is rejecting that which will give Zimbabwe life.

2  MIXING UP PRIORITIES? PROPAGATION OF UNCRITICAL PATRIOTISM… 

35

Zanu-PF’s economic indigenisation ideology is attractive to many Christians, because it promises national development by the people themselves. As reportedly expressed by Chief Jabulani Matubeko, a delegate at the launch of the Pastors4ED, Zanu-PF’s indigenisation ideology, affirms that ‘a nation is built by its own people [therefore] it is a good thing to see people of God uniting with their President towards building their nation in unity and one accord’ (Chenyedzai 2022). From this perspective, patriotic churches embrace Mnangagwa’s Vision 2030, which aims to build an upper middle-income society in Zimbabwe (Chenyedzai 2022). Addressing the Pastors4ED conference, Larry Mavima, the minister of state for Provincial Affairs and Devolution for Midlands province, reportedly emphasised that, for Mnangagwa’s Vision 30 to be achieved, ‘there is need for a total buy in by the church leadership’ (Chenyedzai 2022). Mavima reportedly called for church members to be educated and mobilised to support Mnangagwa’s vision; he also challenged church members to pursue various business ventures to sustain their families and boost the local and national economy. The pastors were also challenged to be involved in business activities such as mining, agriculture and entrepreneurship, ‘so that they can lead by example in various denominations’ (Chenyedzai 2022). It is argued here that there is nothing wrong with political parties seeking the support of religious communities in order to win elections. Furthermore, governing authorities are within their mandate to formulate visions and programmes for the development of their countries and to seek the support of religious communities in implementing those visions and programmes. Moreover, there is nothing wrong with church leaders urging their members to participate in visions and programmes that will enhance their welfare and boost the development of the local and national economy. Furthermore, there is nothing wrong with pastors challenging their members to be patriotic to their nation and to support the good developmental initiatives formulated by their governments. The Bible does indeed call Christians to be good patriotic citizens of their countries (Titus 3:1–2). Therefore, to some extent, it can be said that Pastors4ED are within their right to encourage Christians to vote for Zanu-PF, because of its developmental stance. It can also be argued that pastors are not only religious people, but also social, economic and political people. However, the problem is not that Pastors4ED are calling Zimbabwean Christians to be patriotic, but that they are promoting a narrow patriotism that defines patriotism as exclusive allegiance to Zanu-PF and not to the country’s constitution or the wellbeing of the nation. This is a patriotism

36 

C. BANDA

that conflates the state and a political party. It is a patriotism that divides the nation into patriots and traitors and results in selective development, because people who do not support Zanu-PF are often marginalised and excluded from government development programmes. In essence, Pastors4ED are promoting the unequal distribution of resources in the country. Therefore, Pastors4ED are criticised for promoting the Zanu-PF patriotic indigenisation ideology without criticising its oppressive, discriminatory and corrupt nature. Furthermore, while it may be necessary for pastors who are members of a political party to learn the values of their party, the idea that pastors must undergo patriotism training at Zanu-PF’s school of ideology can be considered as promotion of brainwashing and political indoctrination by Christians—to destroy individual critical thinking. In African politics, uncritical patriotism breeds intraparty and interparty violence. Ndlovu-­ Gatsheni (2012, 4) points out that Zanu-PF’s patriotic history, which is based on its chimurenga ideology, is sustained through a violent system known as the gukurahundi strategy that destroys ‘all … obstacles to Zanu-PF ascendancy’. The vivid illustration of the gukurahundi strategy refers to the lengthy and violent campaign by the crack army unit, the 5th Brigade, with the same name, Gukurahundi, in the Matabeleland and Midlands provinces from 1982 to 1987. The Gukurahundi was officially sent to attend to dissident elements, but ended up killing at estimated 20,000 people, mostly Ndebele-speakers (CCJP and LRF 1997). As a system of quelling dissension and enforcing and maintaining unquestioning loyalty to the party, the gukurahundi strategy has been used by Zanu-PF since the mid-1970s to discipline comrades considered to be wavering within its ranks, to eradicate the white settler regime, and to punish or destroy elements opposed to the party (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2012, 4–5). The post-1987 period has witnessed various forms of gukurahundi, notably Operation Murambatsvina, officially known as Operation Restore Order in 2005, Operation Mavhoterapapi (Operation Where Did You Place Your Vote), and the killing of six protesters after the 2018 election. All these acts of violence vindictively punished people, ostensibly for their lack of patriotism, because they rejected voting for Zanu-PF or opposed its hold on power. As described by Sithole and Makumbe (1997, 133) gukurahundi is a ‘policy of annihilation; annihilating the opposition (black and white)’. Therefore, pastors promoting Zanu-PF’s chimurenga patriotism promote a toxic patriotism that violates people’s freedom of choice and expression by disabling their power to think critically. The idea that

2  MIXING UP PRIORITIES? PROPAGATION OF UNCRITICAL PATRIOTISM… 

37

pastors must undergo patriotism training at a political party’s school of ideology has the potential to corrupt the Christian ministry, by making ministry an arm of Zanu-PF and turning pastors into servants of the party instead of servants of God’s kingdom.

Uncritical Patriotism and Mixing of Priorities by the Church The question that emerges is, What is it in Zanu-PF’s patriotism that entices Christian leaders to embrace it and propagate it to their churches? As already noted in a statement attributed to leaders of Pastors4ED, these churches have chosen to support Zanu-PF and to be its foot soldiers in campaigning for the party to win elections. What is it that causes church leaders, like the members of Pastors4ED, to be co-opted to become appendages of Zanu-PF? Although it is noted that some churches have been co-opted by the opposition CCC, the focus of this chapter is those churches have been co-opted by Zanu-PF. This question can be answered by pointing out that Zanu-PF has strategically packaged its nationalist patriotism in a way that causes churches to end up mixing up their priorities. One of the serious challenges is that the Zanu-PF nationalist patriotism has managed to divide the country on political grounds, with some people designated as friends of the regime, and other as opponents, with no middle ground between them. Zimbabwean politics has become toxically divisive; both Zanu-PF and the opposition CCC operate on the principle that says if you are not with us, you are against us, and if you are against us, you may not live. The Zanu-PF chimurenga ideology that is enforced through the gukurahundi strategy is brutal to opponents and even to neutralists. Many churches are not prepared to risk the brutality of Zanu-PF and, therefore, choose to prioritise the party’s interests over the biblical view of the church as a politically diverse community of believers in Christ. Many Christians embrace Zanu-PF’s narrow patriotism out of fear of being on the wrong side of history. Given the dangerous polarisation, some Christians go the extra mile to prove their loyalty to the party, to avoid political harassment and to be able to continue with their lives undisturbed. A prominent element of the churches’ mixing up of priorities is its failure to distinguish between party patriotism and national patriotism, which leads many Christians to conflate submission to the state as an instrument

38 

C. BANDA

of God and submission to Zanu-PF as the ruling party. Some Christians serve Zanu-PF thinking they are serving God; they defend Zanu-PF thinking they are defending the state. However, Christian leaders such as Pastor4ED members are committed to flogging Christians into line with Zanu-PF ideology and never criticise the party for failing to be a faithful instrument of God’s righteous rule. Similarly, the pastors promote Zanu-PF rhetoric of development without critiquing the party’s dismal failure to manage the economy, its corrupt practices, and bad policies that destroyed the economy. In ignoring these failures, the pastors demonstrate mixed-up priorities, by serving Zanu-PF instead of serving God and proclaiming his righteousness. Furthermore, many church leaders are swayed by Zanu-PF’s patriotism, because it is couched in frameworks that resonate with conservative Christian moral values, particularly heterosexual values and norms. Using this framework, voting for Zanu-PF is seen as protecting Christian morality, as opposed to voting for the seemingly liberal and human-rights-­ advocating CCC party. As an example, former president Mugabe stated at the 2015 United Nations General Assembly in New  York: ‘We reject attempts to prescribe new rights that are contrary to our values, norms, traditions and beliefs. We are not gays’ (News24 2015). This statement presented him and his Zanu-PF as not just defenders of the country’s conservative cultural values, but also of Christian conservative morality. By defying powerful nations of the West and telling them, ‘We reject the politicisation of this important issue [human rights and gay rights] and the application of double standards to victimise those who dare think and act independently of the self-appointed prefects of our time’ (News24 2015), Mugabe presented himself and Zanu-PF as sure defenders of the country’s cultural and moral values. In a country where the conservative view of sex and marriage as heterosexual is supreme, many Christians are enticed into supporting Zanu-PF.  However, though Christians demonstrate their uncritical patriotism by their willingness to support Zanu-PF’s professed moral conservatism, they do not challenge the party for failing to uphold moral values of just and accountable rule that shuns corruption. It is ironic that some Christians feel safe in Zanu-PF because of its anti-gay stance, but the same party brutalises them and its corrupt rule has caused the deaths of many people, because of its failure to maintain hospitals and provide clean water. A serious weakness in the churches’ embrace of Zanu-PF’s narrow patriotism is their failure to realise that the party uses chimurenga as a red

2  MIXING UP PRIORITIES? PROPAGATION OF UNCRITICAL PATRIOTISM… 

39

herring to avoid accountability for its corrupt and failed rule in Zimbabwe. For example, Zanu-PF blames sanctions for the shortages of medicines in hospitals; the failing economy is a red herring because it distracts people from scrutinising and criticising the government’s poor and corrupt leadership by directing their focus to the nations of the West. Equally, Zanu-­ PF’s rejection of Western criticism of its human rights record and calling it interference and a violation of its sovereignty is a red herring, which shifts the focus from being held accountable to accusing the West of colonial tendencies (Tendi 2008, 379–380). Uncritical patriotism has been detrimental to the Church’s understanding of its mission to the world as a representative of the kingdom of God. By being swayed by Zanu-PF’s ideology, Pastors4ED have opted to advance an unjust and corrupt rule instead of God’s rule. The following section will propose ways Pastors4ED and the church in Zimbabwe can redeem critical patriotism, which will prevent them from mixing up kingdom priorities with those of party politics.

Towards a Critical Patriotism That Advances the Priorities of the Kingdom of God From a public theological perspective Pastors4ED and the Zimbabwean church in general are called to engage in critical patriotism that protects the church from succumbing to the patriotism of Zanu-PF or of any other political party. It is suggested that adherence to the agenda of the kingdom of God will assist Pastor4ED and their followers to engage in a critical patriotism that resists capture by narrow patriotism. We believe Pastors4ED have allowed their patriotism to be informed by Zanu-PF’s narrow and violent patriotism, instead of the kingdom of God. The kingdom of God calls on Christians to be critical thinkers who resist being co-opted by evil worldly systems. Uncritical patriotism thrives on poor discernment that does not look beyond the surface. Seeing the dearth of critical thinking in the African church, Agang (2020, 7) asks, ‘Have we become so focused on saving souls that we have forgotten that we also have to save people’s minds?’. This question is applicable to the Zimbabwean context, where an estimated 85% of the population claim to follow some form of Christianity, and yet many of them subscribe to Zanu-PF’s uncritical patriotism. Agang’s question suggests that the gospel has merely touched people’s hearts and has missed their minds. Therefore,

40 

C. BANDA

the gospel must touch people’s minds and reform their critical thinking, so that people are more circumspect and not as easily enticed by narrow political agendas. Agang says, furthermore, If Africa is rotten today, we should not lay all the blame on African society. Rather, we need to ask the church, ‘Where is the salt and the light?’ … Both our lives and out thinking need to be transformed. (Agang 2020, 7)

In other words, because many people in Africa claim to be Christians, the decay in the continent reflects the state of Christianity, which does not shape and revolutionise believers’ thinking. Critical thinking is important for enabling Christians to resist Zanu-PF’s narrow patriotism. Critical thinking, as defined by Van den Berg (2005, 1–2), is thinking for ourselves and ‘involves a critical attitude of reflecting upon how we think in various aspects of our lives’. It involves paying attention to how we think about issues, what informs and shapes our thinking and the consequences of the actions resulting from our thinking. Zanu-PF’s nationalist patriotism often suppresses critical thinking and the asking of deep questions. The implication is that, When we follow the instructions of others thoughtlessly, accept the authority of others without question, or take things for granted, we are not thinking critically. To reason critically is to think for yourself by challenging authority and critically examining dogma, that is, unquestioned knowledge claims. (Van den Berg 2005, 2)

Critical thinking entails examining, evaluating, questioning and critiquing our beliefs and assumptions. Christian critical thinking should be informed by kingdom of God values, which means Pastor4ED should question the division of the nation into patriots and traitors. Rather than embracing the narrow nationalism of Zanu-PF, which is corrupt and exclusionary, they should question why government officials who have sworn to uphold, protect and defend the constitution of the country allow whole communities to starve, be killed and maimed, simply because they do not belong to Zanu-PF. Critical thinking should lead to critical patriotism that rejects Zanu-PF’s narrow patriotism that divides citizens into patriots and traitors on the basis of their party politics. An important part of critical patriotism that is informed by the kingdom of God is setting a progressive agenda that brings all people together.

2  MIXING UP PRIORITIES? PROPAGATION OF UNCRITICAL PATRIOTISM… 

41

An example is Archbishop Desmond Tutu’s notion of a rainbow nation, which sought to unite the different races and tribes of South Africa and to encourage them to work together and overturn the segregation brought about by apartheid. Although South Africa remains a divided society in many respects, Tutu’s rainbow nation vision provided a notion of patriotism that was not subservient to party politics. Christians in Zimbabwe are, likewise, challenged to creatively promote a notion of patriotism that includes all Zimbabweans and is not subservient to any political party. Christians in Zimbabwe need to awaken to Moltmann’s (1978, 19) assertion that, ‘Where Jesus is, there is life. There is abundant life, vigorous life, loved life and eternal life’. Moltmann’s statement expresses Jesus’ articulation of himself as the giver of abundant life (John 10:10). Zimbabwean church leaders are, therefore, called to wake up and acknowledge that they represent a kingdom that promotes life, abundant life, vigorous life, loved life and eternal life. Therefore, they should stop promoting death-giving narrow patriotism that divides the nation into patriots and sell-outs on the basis of allegiance to Zanu-PF, or any other party, and provide life-enhancing solutions that are informed by the kingdom of God. This calls for interdisciplinary thinking that recognises that pastors are limited in their understanding of socioeconomic and political issues and, therefore, need to involve trained laity. As Forster (2020, 17) points out, ‘The task of theology is to facilitate meaningful engagement with all aspects of life, and not just with the religious aspects of life’. This notion calls for a multidisciplinary approach to addressing national issues—it cannot be left to politicians alone, or pastors and theologians alone, because they do not possess all the needed knowledge and skills (Banda 2020, 124); it calls for pastors to play a facilitating role that brings people together to work for the common good. That church leaders, such as Pastors4ED, see a need to attend patriotism courses at the Zanu-PF school of ideology raises questions about their approach to being agents of the kingdom of God, and their view of the church’s power to set a progressive agenda of national development. Instead of promoting Zanu-PF’s narrow patriotism, Zimbabwean pastors need to be critical and must do the hard work of thinking through ideologies, policies and administrative issues, helping politicians draft good laws and calling for accountability and justice (Agang 2020, 11).

42 

C. BANDA

Conclusion This chapter attempted to answer the question that was stated as, from a public theological perspective of the church as a representative of the kingdom of God on earth, how can we evaluate some Zimbabwean churches’ propagation of the uncritical patriotism Zanu-PF? The propagation of narrow patriotism by Pastors4ED exemplifies how easily churches can lose the focus on their mission as agents of the kingdom of God in the present world. Swayed by narrow patriotism, Pastors4ED have embraced a divisive and violent system that violates the mission of God’s kingdom of saving people and uniting them. We challenge Pastors4ED to re-examine their mandate from the perspective of the kingdom of God. When the church loses its sense of God’s mission, it is easy to succumb to the problem of mixed-up priorities.

References Agang, Sunday Bobai. 2020. The Need for Public Theology in Africa. In African Public Theology, ed. Sunday Bobai Agang, Dion A.  Forster, and H.  Jurgens Hendriks, 3–14. Carlisle: HippoBooks. Banda, C. 2020. Poverty. In African Public Theology, ed. Sunday Bobai Agang, Dion A. Forster, and H. Jurgens Hendriks, 113–126. Carlisle: Hippo Books. Banda, Collium, and B.B. Senokoane. 2009. The Interplay Between the Christian Sacralization of Human Authority and Political Repression in Zimbabwe. Religion and Theology 16: 207–245. Biri, Kudzai. 2020. ‘It Shall Be Well with Zimbabwe’: Pentecostalism, Pan-­ Africanism and Discourses on Nation-Building and Restoration in Zimbabwe. In Politics and Religion in Zimbabwe: The Deification of Robert G. Mugabe, ed. Ezra Chitando, 113–125. London: Routledge. Bulawayo24 News. 2013. Mugabe ‘Given a Special Anointing by God. August 6. https://bulawayo24.com/index-­id-­news-­sc-­national-­byo-­34250.html. CCJP, and LRF. 1997. Breaking the Silence, Building True Peace: Report on the Disturbances in Matabeleland and the Midlands, 1980–198. A Summary. Harare: Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe and The Legal Resources Foundation. Chenyedzai, Praise. 2022. Pastors for ED Movement Officially Launched. New Ziana, November 24. https://newziana.co.zw/2022/11/24/pastors-­for-­ ed-­movement-­officially-­launched/. Chidakwa, Blessing. 2022. Thumbs up for ED … Unanimous Endorsement for President Mnangagwa at Congress. The Chronicle, May 11. https://www. chronicle.co.zw/thumbs-­up-­for-­ed-­unanimous-­endorsement-­for-­president-­ mnangagwa-­at-­congress/.

2  MIXING UP PRIORITIES? PROPAGATION OF UNCRITICAL PATRIOTISM… 

43

Dube, Bekithemba. 2021. ‘To Hell with Bishops’: Rethinking the Nexus of State, Law and Religion in Times of Crisis in Zimbabwe. Religions 12 (5): 304. Forster, Dion A. 2020. The Nature of Public Theology. In African Public Theology, ed. Sunday Bobai Agang, Dion A. Forster, and H. Jurgens Hendriks, 15–26. Carlisle: HippoBooks. Gundani, Paul. 2022. A ‘Decolonisation Project’ That Went Awry. A Missio-­ Ecclesiological Interrogation of the Anglican Diocese of Harare During Bishop Nolbert Kunonga’s Episcopacy: 2001–2007. Missionalia: Southern African Journal of Missiology 50 (1): 27–43. Koopman, Nico. 2010. Some Contours for Public Theology in South Africa. International Journal of Practical Theology 14 (1): 123–138. Manyonganise, Molly. 2022. ‘The March Is Not Ended’: ‘Church’ Confronting the State Over the Zimbabwean Crisis. Religion 13 (2): 107. Masau, Problem. 2023. Zim Ready for Credible, Free Polls: ED. NewsDay, March 20. https://www.newsday.co.zw/local-­news/article/200009481/zim-­ready-­ for-­credible-­free-­polls-­ed. Moltmann, Jürgen. 1978. The Open Church: Invitation to a Messianic Life-Style. London: SCM Press. Mujinga, Martin. 2018. ‘Religion as a Riding Horse of Politics?’ A Critical Evaluation of Political Influence in the Zimbabwean Ecclesiastical Life. Alternation 23: 244–265. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Sabelo J. 2012. Rethinking ‘Chimurenga’ and ‘Gukurahundi’ in Zimbabwe: A Critique of Partisan National History. African Studies Review 55 (3): 1–26. Nenjerama, Tehophilus Tinashe. 2022. ‘#GodIsInIt’: The Appropriation of Christianity into Politics by Nelson Chamisa in the 2018 Zimbabwean Presidential Election Contestations. Journal of Asian and African Studies 0 (0): 1–18. https://doi.org/10.1177/00219096221123741. New Zimbabwe. 2023. 10,000 Pastors Set to Undergo ‘Patriotic’ Training at Zanu PF’s Chitepo School of Ideology. January 7. https://www.newzimbabwe.com/10000-­pastors-­set-­to-­undergo-­patriotic-­training-­at-­. News24. 2015. Homosexuality Contrary to Our Values, Mugabe Tells UN.  September 29. https://www.news24.com/news24/homosexuality­contrary-­to-­our-­values-­mugabe-­tells-­un-­20150929. Nyangani, Kenneth. 2022. Parallel Structures Split Zanu PF. The Zimbabwe Independent, October 3. https://www.newsday.co.zw/theindependent/local-­ news/article/200001402/parallel-­structures-­split-­zanu-­pf. Ranger, Terence. 2004. Nationalist Historiography, Patriotic History and the History of the Nation: The Struggle Over the Past in Zimbabwe. Journal of Southern African Studies 30 (2): 215–234. ———. 2005. The Rise of Patriotic Journalism in Zimbabwe and its Possible Implications. Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture 2: 8–17. https://doi.org/10.16997/wpcc.38.

44 

C. BANDA

Shumba, Pamela. 2014. President God-given: Church. The Herald, December 29. https://www.herald.co.zw/president-­god-­given-­church/. Sithole, Masipula, and John M.  Makumbe. 1997. Elections in Zimbabwe: The Zanu (PF) Hegemony and its Incipient Decline. African Journal of Political Science/Revue Africaine de Science Politique 2 (1): 122–139. Taringa, Nisbert. 2006. How Environmental is African Traditional Religion? Exchange 35 (2): 191–214. Tarusarira, Joram. 2020. Religious Politics in Africa: Fasting for Politics, or Political Fasting in Zimbabwe? Exchange 49 (1): 31–52. Tendi, Blessing-Miles. 2008. Patriotic History and Public Intellectuals Critical Of Power. Journal of Southern African Studies 34 (2): 379–396. Togarasei, Lovemore. 2004. ‘Let Everyone be Subject to Governing Authorities’: The Interpretation of New Testament Political Ethics Towards and After Zimbabwe’s 2002 Presidential Elections. Scriptura: International Journal of Bible, Religion and Theology in Southern Africa 85: 73–80. Van den Berg, M.E.S. 2005. Critical Reasoning and the Art of Argumentation. Pretoria: University of South Africa. ZCBC. 2020. “The March is not Ended”. Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops’ Conference Secretariat, Synod House, Zimbabwe. http://kubatana.net/2020/08/14/ the-­march-­is-­not-­ended-­pastoral-­letter-­of-­the-­zimbabwe-­catholic-­bishops-­ conference-­on-­the-­current-­situation-­in-­zimbabwe/. Zvobgo, Chengetai J. 2005. Church and State in Rhodesia: From the Unilateral Declaration of Independence to the Pearce Commission, 1965–72. Journal of Southern African Studies 31 (2): 381–402.

CHAPTER 3

The (Catholic) Church and Resistance to Zanu-PFism in Zimbabwe Gift Masengwe and Bekithemba Dube

Introduction The Catholic Church, through the Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops’ Conference (ZCBC), has always been at the forefront of resistance to Zanu-PFism. Two pastoral letters in 2020: ‘On the 40th Anniversary of Zimbabwe’s Independence’ (ZCBC 2020a), on 2 April 2020, and ‘The March is not Ended’ (ZCBC 2020b), on 14 August 2020, have been effective in conscientising the church to embrace patriotism, in contrast to the idea that it is a ZANU-PF preserve, and to stand up against the political tyranny that is causing a ‘political crisis’ in Zimbabwe (Machakanja 2010; Dube 2021) by marching to the end (Manyonganise 2022). The church’s resolute stand against the state could provide it with a formidable voice to tame it, using pastoral letters (Manyonganise 2022). The use of pastoral letters to evaluate the behaviour of political leaders has been effectively used by churches, though critics of the church view the publication

G. Masengwe (*) • B. Dube Central University of Technology, Bloemfontein, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 B. Dube (ed.), Regime, Religion and the Consolidation of Zanu-PFism in Zimbabwe, African Histories and Modernities, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-46084-5_3

45

46 

G. MASENGWE AND B. DUBE

of these letters as elitist. However, the introduction of social media platforms of various forms and nature has made it possible for every piece of information generated to reach their end users and benefit the masses. Social media platforms are, thus, useful for conveying the churches’ messages to remote areas of the country and, similarly, are used to mobilise followers regarding issues of concern in the church and in communities. The church has been steadily becoming organised, brave and resolute, and the public actions of the ZCBC towards the state, for instance, have gained the support of other ecumenical partners, especially the Zimbabwe Heads of Christian Denominations (ZHOCD), the Zimbabwe Council of Churches (ZCC) and the Evangelical Fellowship of Zimbabwe (EFZ), who have been openly resisting the skewed type of ZANU-PF nationalism, herein called Zanu-PFism. Pastoral letters are regular documents written by superiors to their juniors or congregations in a particular ecclesiastical season to give instructions, consolation or admonitions (Chisholm 2011, 898). Religious leaders ‘position their narratives to enact social justice, ontological density, peace and accountability, as a healing process to usher in sustainable development’ (Dube 2021, 304). Zimbabwe has experienced problems since the mid-1990s, and they escalated with the institution of land reform in the early 2000s. The church did not speak with one voice. The second republic in Zimbabwe offered hope to the nation that the state was willing to resolve national economic, political and social challenges. The Catholic Church did not share the hope promised by the second republic and hence wrote two pastoral letters to comfort Christians regarding the challenges they were facing (ZCBC 2020a, b). Zanu-PFism developed from a belief of invincibility. Zanu-PF has always believed the party to be impregnable and that no political party would be able to dislodge it from power through the ballot. Insistence on liberation credentials unconsciously influences Zanu-PF’s unchangeable militarism and approach to acquiring power at the expense of human welfare. Political party members and those aspiring to become councillors, members of parliament and senators subordinate their identities to that of Zanu-PF, and their personalities undergo a metamorphosis, into Zanu-­ PFism. One enthusiastic youth said, ‘If you cut my hand, the blood that comes out of it is all Zanu-PF positive’—these are the youths who intimidate elderly people to find ‘safety by voting a party that guarantees their physical security’ (Mwonzora and Mandikwaza 2019, 1135). Even army generals have insisted that the gun is more powerful than the ballot.

3  THE (CATHOLIC) CHURCH AND RESISTANCE TO ZANU-PFISM… 

47

Zanu-­PFism has paralysed democracy in Zimbabwe, because the security sector has been flexing its muscles to defend its causes without regard for the challenges people are facing in the nation. The Catholic Church, however, resists Zanu-PFism through its publication of the pastoral letters. The chapter uses content and critical discourse analysis to assess the two pastoral letters, which encourage inclusivity in the church and the nation. Democracy and development in Zimbabwe require inclusivity, tolerance and reciprocity between people and state leaders. This chapter establishes the Catholic Church’s attempt to resist Zanu-PFism through the pastoral letters because of the teachings of the Catholic Church ‘on natural law, the common good and subsidiarity’ (Witte 1996, 18). The chapter, furthermore, critiques the challenges churches face in relation to political divisions in Zimbabwe.

The (Catholic) Church and Resistance to Zanu-­PFism in Zimbabwe This chapter analyses the ZCBC’s two significant pastoral letters, ‘ZCBC Pastoral Letter on the 40th Anniversary of Zimbabwe’s Independence’ (2 April 2020) and ‘The March is not Ended’ (14 August 2020), which had the aim of opposing Zanu-PFism in Zimbabwe. The Catholic Church has eight dioceses with senior clergymen as bishops, who are supported by auxiliary bishops. The dioceses are arranged according to the demography of their membership. The ZCBC, like other Catholic organisations around the world, communicate with their members and followers through ideological documents called pastoral letters, which are meant to reflect upon the prevailing situations in their countries and to give advice on how to deal with such situations (Jere and Magezi 2018). When public injustice of economic, social or political nature arises, bishops disseminate messages to their members through pastoral letters. The letters are public in nature and reflect the Catholic ideology, as the church carries out its prophetic mandate to the state (Dube 2021). The first letter congratulated the nation on its 40th anniversary, prepared citizens to accept the Christian vocation of affirming animate and inanimate life in the faith of the members and the warned politicians of the impeding challenges posed by political failure. These letters are located at an intersection of political hegemony and conflict, due to the church’s historically indecisive attitude towards failing political systems. While these

48 

G. MASENGWE AND B. DUBE

letters are intended to prepare Christians to engage in effecting peace in the country, the second letter, ‘The March is not Ended’, has been described as inciting violence and conflict in the country. It needs to be accepted that the greatest source of all conflict in the world is religion (Huntington 1996, cited in Manyonganise 2022, 107). Thus, religion shapes the discourses of peace and conflict, as it can be used to exclude and discriminate against people (Manyonganise 2020; Uzochukwu et  al. 2020). The carnal use of religion impedes its ability to perform the expected role and function of the faith in society, for instance, ‘peace-­ building’ instead of causing ‘conflict’ (Manyonganise 2022). The letters the ZCBC released in 2020 came shortly after important dates on the Zimbabwean calendar: the one was issued on 2 April, just before Independence Day on 18 April, and the other on 14 August, two days after the celebration of the Heroes and Defence Forces Days on 11 and 12 August 2020, respectively. The letters encourage healing, reconciliation, peace and social development through the agency of the churches (Manyonganise 2022). Churches, however, are facing the challenge of splintering with the emergence of neo-Pentecostal religious groups of a prophetic type that foment political crises by supporting incumbent politicians, in contrast to the efforts of mainline churches headed by the ZHOCD. The ZHOCD and its member organisations issue and support pastoral letters that are seen as instrumental for challenging the status quo, but also creating a political crisis for the state (New Zimbabwe 2020). Pastoral letters are religious confrontations with the politics of the state. Pastoral letters seek to respond to the unfolding challenges that a country is facing. Zimbabwean politicians tend to listen when churches speak, because of the constituency and moral authority the church carries. The church influences political outcomes and, hence, church groups have become a new avenue for civil-state engagement in a polarised state. In the past, missionary churches were seen as opposing the government, because the message in their pastoral letters criticised the status quo in its wide readership. Currently, the state is condemned by, and the state also condemns, social media platforms and churches that use foreign funding to attack the state. In this context, the two pastoral letters issued by the ZCBC in 2020 are analysed in this chapter.

3  THE (CATHOLIC) CHURCH AND RESISTANCE TO ZANU-PFISM… 

49

The ZCBC Pastoral Letters On the 40th Anniversary of Zimbabwe’s Independence (2 April 2020) The pastoral letter was issued on 2 April 2020, about two weeks before the 40th anniversary of Zimbabwe’s independence was to be celebrated on 18 April 2020. The letter reminded the nation that the anniversary, on 18 April 2020, six days after Easter Sunday (12 April 2020), was a moment of opportunity to ‘acknowledge our gains, sins and pains’ (ZCBC 2020a). The number 40 has been regarded as having great spiritual and theological relevance, because it has been used to mark periods of loving journey to that of safety: for Noah and his family (Gen. 7:12), and for Moses, who received the Will of God for the freedom of the Israelites, hence, moments of rebuilding, rediscovery, freedom and solace (Ex. 20). For Israel, it was an opportunity to reflect, repent and reform. It also represents the reign of God through the judges and a time of advent, for instance, when Samson overcame the Palestinians. The bishops, thus, conclude that the number 40 represents, for Israel, a time of restoration, fortification, peace and reprieve, whose climax was ‘realized in the life of Jesus’ Christ, meaning a time of God’s presence and Christian obedience to the richness in God’s grace, for human opportunity to repent, grow and receive glory (ZCBC 2020a). The letter, furthermore, acknowledges the philosophy behind the liberation struggle that brought independence to Zimbabwe, and ‘freedom from oppression, racism, inequality and violation of basic human rights and dignity, poverty and hunger’ (ZCBC 2020a). This was an euphemism for saying Zanu-PF officials had attempted to inject Zanu-PFism in the bloodstreams of all Zimbabweans, with their claims that independence had brought hope for every Zimbabwean and that the early years of independence must be acknowledged for the positive contributions Zanu-PF made to improve public life (specifically education, the economy and health). However, ‘some things went wrong along the way. We need to acknowledge the dark chapter in our national memory, which led to the killing of [thousands of] civilians in Matabeleland and some parts of Midlands soon after independence’. Because of this ‘dark chapter’, the nation had missed many opportunities for a national vision that distinguished independent Zimbabwe from colonial Southern Rhodesia, by installing unity, peace, reconciliation and healing.

50 

G. MASENGWE AND B. DUBE

The letter acknowledges the adoption of the 2013 national constitution as a positive development worthy of notice. The bishops, however, despair that the wide-ranging constitutional amendment proposals to the 2013 national Constitution by the executive had come too soon before the laws had been aligned to it or had been implemented (Shivamba and Bugeja 2020). Their concern was not about aligning the constitution with existing laws, but that ‘We appeal to our government to ensure that all the laws are aligned with the constitution and constitutionalism becomes the lifeblood of the governance architecture’ (ZCBC 2020a). They referred to the understanding that sin is a reproach to any nation by mentioning God’s command that Israel must obey all the laws if they are to live and occupy the land of Canaan and achieve national prosperity (Deut. 4:1). Changing Zimbabwe’s laws had been premised on dependence on individuals—human beings—that have a life span, rather than on the creator. The bishops acknowledge the establishment of the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission (NPRC) to address past hurts and injustices, notwithstanding other dialogue efforts that were taking place within and outside churches. The biggest challenge to the churches’ relevance on the work of the NPRC is in the operational and duration mandates of the commission. These challenges also manifest in state institutions, which were emasculated and turned into partisan entities, which made political tolerance a stranger to the nation. In addition to reducing citizens to vendors in the informal economy, it has failed to combat corruption, the brain drain, infrastructure collapse and international isolation, which have exacerbated poverty, capital flight and job losses, as industries/factories closed down and agricultural output plummeted (ZCBC 2020a). As the letter was written during a three-week lockdown period due to COVID-19, the bishops implored political leaders to be prepared to emphasise prevention against the spread of the pandemic, in order to protect lives and to work towards national cohesion. The president’s speech on Independence Day ignored the complaints in the bishops’ letter and thanked Zimbabwe’s all-weather friends who had donated equipment and food to ease the economic challenges caused by the health crisis. South Africa, which is home to over 5 million Zimbabweans, was also thanked for hosting Zimbabweans living there, and the responses were not related to the complaints in the bishops’ letter. The bishops, furthermore, refer to the delayed fulfilment of promises, due to wandering journeys in the desert (Ex. 13). While the Israelites

3  THE (CATHOLIC) CHURCH AND RESISTANCE TO ZANU-PFISM… 

51

wandered, God stayed with them (Ex. 13:21). With focus and political will, the Israelites could have taken two weeks to realise their dreams. Similarly, ‘We can do ourselves a favour and shorten the journey with more political will and turn the potential that Zimbabwe has into reality’ (ZCBC 2020a). The bishops acknowledged the national spirituality that entitles all Zimbabweans to access to the natural endowments of the country. Their access can be guaranteed by rebuilding public structures, after the nation has repented of the corruption and bad governance that are associated with political violence. Finally, the bishops admonished the state and ordered it to envision a hopeful future that could begin with the golden jubilee in 2030 and which would also coincide with the national vision of a middle-income economy by emphasising on investing in youths (ZCBC 2020a). Unpacking ‘On the 40th Anniversary of Zimbabwe’s Independence’ The fall of the Union Jack symbolised the sunset of Rhodesia and paved the way for a new nation. The prime minister at the time, Robert Mugabe, said ‘as Zimbabweans, [we need] to trample upon racialism, tribalism and regionalism, and work hard to reconstruct and rehabilitate our society as we reinvigorate our economic machinery’ (Baker 1980, 18). The hope of independent Zimbabwe could only be realised by ‘a government that subjects itself to the rule of law [if it] has any moral right to demand of its citizens obedience to the rule of law’ (Baker 1980, 17). Mugabe stated, furthermore, that ‘Our Constitution equally circumscribes the powers of the government by declaring certain civil rights and freedoms as fundamental. We intend to uphold these fundamental rights and freedoms to the full’ (Baker 1980, 18). Similar proclamations have characterised the second republic, but instead of unifying the nation, it has increased divisions and increased state brutality against civilians. Like the former government, the second republic has subjected the rule of law to the government, by changing sections of the Constitution to suit existing laws, rather than aligning those laws with the Constitution. It has gone even further to rob civilians of their civil rights. An example is Job Sikhala, who languished on remand for 323 days at Chikurubi Maximum Prison without trial or a bail hearing, from 14 June 2022 to 3 May 2023, for purportedly inciting violence to protest against the brutal murder of Moreblessing Ali (Nehanda Radio

52 

G. MASENGWE AND B. DUBE

2022; Matambanadzo 2023; Ndoro 2023). He was finally sentenced to six months in prison, which was wholly suspended on condition that he paid US$600  in three days. Innocent people’s lives are cut short or reduced to imprisonment by a government that values the comfort of the elites more than the livelihoods of common people. The letter can be credited for creating an agenda for the state, because the last question in the pastoral letter became the first answer to be provided in the president’s anniversary celebration message, ‘the decade ahead’ (Chronicle 2020). The president has been consistent with references to his vision of the Zimbabwe we want in speeches, without doing much to achieve this vision. Thus, when he addressed the nation, President Mnangagwa provided a map for the future. Regarding COVID-19, he said he was sad because people were ‘physically separated, [however] we are united in spirit’ (Chronicle 2020). He praised indigenous efforts to combat COVID-19, which were yielding fruit compared to internationally approved methods. It is certain that the pastoral letter influenced Mnangagwa’s speech, which had been carefully constructed to answer questions relating to starvation during the pandemic, and Mnangagwa emphasised that the industrial, education, rural development and health sectors were improving the quality of people’s lives. Mnangagwa has been accused of paying lip service to the Constitution and constitutionalism, because he does not respect citizens, their interests or their will and because he refuses to engage in good faith dialogue with civil society or the opposition. The bishops stated, ‘For the years to come, we urge the government to be a government that puts the needs and the well being of the people first’ (ZCBC 2020a). The reason why armed crime is not tolerated in Zimbabwe is because the richest people are politicians and army generals. The executive pays lip service to democracy and good governance. They blame former rulers of the liberation struggle (especially Mugabe) of having engaged in ‘police brutality, forced evictions, arbitrary demolitions, starvation, poverty and a breakdown in health, education and social services’ (“Independence Day 2020” 2020). The accusation of the former regime ignores the militarisation of Mashurugwi machete gangs that are committing violent crimes in Zimbabwe (Mkodzongi 2020). It is undeniable that selfishness has led to poor service delivery in Zimbabwe, as corruption topped the business agenda of the government throughout Mugabe’s rule. During his rule, infrastructure, agriculture and industry were destroyed, as former liberators became the new oppressors who denied Zimbabwe the fruits of its

3  THE (CATHOLIC) CHURCH AND RESISTANCE TO ZANU-PFISM… 

53

independence. Ironically, President Mnangagwa presents a positive public picture but, in reality, he deals with the people and opposition in a different way. The letter awakened him to present an acceptable message for the Independence Day celebration event, but it does not reflect his life or rule. The bishops urged the government and citizens to respect the rule of law, to observe human rights and to improve economic development by being accountable, transparent and truthful. The March Is not Ended (14 August 2020) This pastoral letter was released three days after the nation celebrated Heroes and Defence Forces Days on 11 and 12 August 2020, respectively. The bishops condemned the culture of hero worship that Zanu-PF has adopted. When citizens still worship their heroes, the letter reveals, the nation will be incapable of becoming a middle-income country in ten years. Hero worship has resulted ‘in a multi-layered crisis of the convergence of economic collapse, deepening poverty, food insecurity, corruption [see Micah 7:3 in the letter] and human rights abuses among other crises in urgent need of resolution’ (ZCBC 2020b). Corruption obviously irks the church, which declares that it has become intolerable. The involvement of Mrs. Auxilia Mnangagwa’s son in the Ministry of Health’s tenders, which led the minister to be dismissed, is one of the events that contradicted the president’s promise that he would end corruption in Zimbabwe (News24 2020). The bishops state, ‘the corruption in the country has reached alarming levels … there hasn’t been equally a serious demonstration by government to rid the country of this scourge’ (ZCBC 2020b; BBC News 2020). A Shona idiom states, Nyoka huru haizvirumi [A big snake cannot bite itself], meaning that the case of a well-connected politician may be exposed, but will not be prosecuted, especially considering that the government is not accountable, and the president changes laws to suit himself, even regarding the appointment of a chief justice. This behaviour prompted the religious community to suggest ways to help neglected, poor and marginalised people. Furthermore, the ZCBC calls on government to respond to the people’s questions, because ‘Suppression of people’s anger can only serve to deepen the crisis and take the nation into deeper crisis. This comes on the backdrop of unresolved past hurts like Gukurahundi, which continue to spawn even more angry new generations’ (ZCBC 2020b). The letter pointedly takes a stance against Zanu-PFism, which suppresses people’s

54 

G. MASENGWE AND B. DUBE

voices, and encourages certain people to act with impunity and claim undue entitlement to the national cake, in the face of millions of their countrymen wallowing in poverty due to state-sponsored corruption and thousands being unjustifiably massacred through political violence (Dube 2021). The bishops ask the government to provide space for differing opinions. Differing opinions were castigated by Zanu-PF during the liberation struggle, and people who did not agree were regarded as povo [an abbreviation referring to people of various opinions]. The bishops state, ‘It feels the poor have no one to defend them. They do not seem to feature on the national agenda’ (ZCBC 2020b). The bishops condemn the Zanu-PFism exhibited in the government’s neglect of poor and marginalised people through failure to provide basic services such as health, education, foodstuffs, public transport, shelter, clean drinking water and electricity. The bishops stated, furthermore, ‘Some of our vocal political leaders are busy re-creating the war situation [between] us and them’ (ZCBC 2020b). Zanu-PFism thus capitalises on the condemnation of independent thinking that was regarded as povo mentality during the liberation struggle. Unfortunately, combatants were politicised to descend into barbarism of unprecedented proportions. Thus, Zanu-PFism departs markedly from the president’s vision of the Zimbabwe we want, and the bishops argue that alternative thinking, regarded as povo mentality by politicians, must be respected, because that is the correct mentality. Rather, Zanu-PF undermine the people by ‘turning the military who ought to continue the memory of the late heroes against the people who fed and clothed them’ (ZCBC 2020b). In fact, it was the so-called povo who provided the camouflage, intelligence and basics for the liberators to enable them to win their battles without challenges. The bishops condemn Zanu-PFism for suppressing public demonstrations on 31 July 2020. They were also unhappy with neighbouring South Africa’s failure to consult with officials from all concerned parties—not only government—on its commission of enquiry into how the demonstrations were suppressed, such as churches, civil society and opposition parties. South Africa, thus, did not help to map the way forward, despite reports of a crisis caused by the number of Zimbabweans fleeing to South Africa. Zanu-PF and its government officials rejected the notion that there was a crisis in Zimbabwe, and the government condemned the organisers of the demonstrations, because they caused people to be fearful. The bishops upheld the merit and substance of the demonstrations by condemning

3  THE (CATHOLIC) CHURCH AND RESISTANCE TO ZANU-PFISM… 

55

the tendency of Zanu-PFism in the government to label every differing opinion as representing enmity to the state. The pastoral letter came out three days after the Heroes and Defence Forces Days celebrations on 11 and 12 August 2020, respectively, and condemned the Zanu-PFism prevalent in the celebrations, which had been reduced to a political party event. The ZCBC reminded the state that the so-called povo had been the cover and support for the military forces during the liberation struggle, yet Zanu-PFism was recreating the colonial situation of abducting vocal but unarmed civilians to ensure their silence, ‘to the detriment of the national common good’ (ZCBC 2020b). The bishops also exposed the weaknesses of the so-called second republic and its re-engagement mantra that did not consider the welfare of the citizens. President Mnangagwa’s regime has not delivered on its promises and, in fact, has worsened the situation because of corruption and maladministration. The bishops argued that it was not clear to them if Mnangagwa’s government had the ‘knowledge, social skills, emotional stability and social orientation to handle the issues that we face as a nation’ (ZCBC 2020b). The incumbency was bent on dividing people and turning the gun against defectors and the so-called povo, while trying to recreate a new memory of heroism that differed from what the citizens upheld. Dube (2021, 5) argues, There is seemingly a notion that political leaders are striving to divide and rule. They are ensuring that the gap between ‘us and them’ is widening by the day; consequently, the rich and those who control (ZANU-PF) the means of production and law are advantaged, and any revolt by poor citizens is tantamount to war, which ordinary people will find difficult to win, since the army, the police and courts are on the side of the oppressors.

The crisis has been exacerbated by the emasculation of the judiciary and the legislature, which was done to silence the nation and questions about economic, health and political challenges. This action was meant to undermine the demand for responsibility and accountability for the deteriorating public life outcomes in Zimbabwe. Zanu-PFism is displayed by officials who blame extraneous factors rather than extraneous reasons for challenges, hence, the bishops argued, All we hear from them is the blame of our woes on foreigners, colonialism, white settlers and the so-called internal detractors. When are you going to

56 

G. MASENGWE AND B. DUBE

take responsibility for your own affairs? When are we going to submit to the requirements for national accountability? (ZCBC 2020b)

In this regard, the church had offered to assist government with dialogue with various stakeholders, but they believed that the Zanu-PF government’s misplaced priorities (see reference to Jer. 9:12  in the letter) undermined these efforts. This point struck at the core of the obstinacy of Zanu-PF, resulting in attacks on the church being personalised on Archbishop Robert Christopher Ndlovu, who chaired the conference. Politicians were irked by the idea that the pastoral letter reflected on what an American politician and civil activist, Robert Lewis, said and did. Politicians feared that the march would be physical, to repeat the failed demonstration of 31 July 2020. The bishops’ pastoral letter, as could be denied by the writers, could be regarded as militant against Zanu-PFism— although bishops might have denied it. There was a possibility that the ZCBC was prepared to incite a political upheaval that would change the government for a better one. Indeed, there is the possibility of another march sometime in the future, because of Zanu-PFism and its officials, which the bishops directly attacked in their letter. Zanu-PFism has the tendency to ignore facts, such as the need to equip health professionals who were fighting the COVID-19 pandemic, as highlighted in the letter. This avoidance of reality by Zanu-PF arises from its belief that it is always right, and its insistence that everyone does things in a certain way; everyone else is always wrong, especially the povo, who are misguided and need the guidance of the party. The letter refers to the pathetic state of citizens, as politicians acquire the best products for themselves, using national resources to get it. Their children receive presidential scholarships and are educated outside the country, their healthcare, which is covered by state resources, includes the best available drugs and protective equipment, which is not even available for local healthcare professionals. They want to win every election, and they claim to be more patriotic than anyone else. The bishops, in resisting Zanu-PFism, challenged politicians to be responsible and accountable by addressing the ‘trajectories’ raised by the people who intended to demonstrate, rather than complain about the crisis, as they usually do. The letter provided an alternative voice against Zanu-PFism and spoke out on behalf of silenced civil society. Finally, the letter refers to the platforms that were formed by civic leaders on 5 August 2020 to engage in a series of dialogues to find a solution

3  THE (CATHOLIC) CHURCH AND RESISTANCE TO ZANU-PFISM… 

57

to Zimbabwe’s public life challenges (political, economic, social and health) called the National Convergence Platform and to establish a framework on how an agenda of the citizens can be mobilised to achieve the national vision, The Zimbabwe we Want, called the Comprehensive National Settlement Framework (Mbanje 2019). The platform and the framework were formed by people who were not politicians to assist politicians to find each other, as well as citizens. The bishops called on the government to recognise the platform and the framework, so that consensus can be established with citizens in Zimbabwe. Reference to the 2018 campaign slogan, the Zimbabwe we want, reiterated the theme of the 2006 National Vision Discussion Document of the EFZ, the ZCBC and the ZCC.  The foci of the National Convergence Platform and the Comprehensive National Settlement Framework were elaborated in the letter. The bishops pleaded for the state to do nation-building and to take responsibility, which they reiterated with John Robert Lewis’s slogan, The march is not ended (ZCBC 2020b). Unpacking ‘The March has not Ended’ This pastoral letter elicited negative comments from Zanu-PF government officials, especially Monica Mutsvangwa, the minister of Information and Publicity, who described the bishops as ‘reckless regime change agents whose objective was to incite the public to rise against the government’ (New Zimbabwe 2020). This outburst indicates that the officials conflated Archbishop Robert Christopher Ndlovu (probably classed together with former Archbishop of Bulawayo Diocese, Pius Ncube) with the enthusiastically vocal ethnic group from the Ndebele tribe called Mthwakhazi, with the belief that the archbishop supports the group’s intentions to re-­ establish the Ndebele state. In a biased response, officials cited distant examples of atrocities committed in Rwanda by Hutu and Tutsi militants in a majorly Catholic Christian nation. They also criticised the archbishop as positing himself as a Ndebele leader who was trying to cause a geopolitical ‘psychosis of tribal victimisation’ (Manyonganise 2022, 8), in the bid to effect a regime change. The letter was seen to be calling on government to be accountable for the atrocities committed by Zanu-PF upon the Ndebele people in the Gukurahundi operations of the early to mid-1980s. The government, however, denied being responsible for the atrocities and accused the bishops of generalising their accusations. Officials, some of whom are implicated in the atrocities, were quick to forget the detailed

58 

G. MASENGWE AND B. DUBE

narratives of the Gukurahundi atrocities captured in Breaking the Silence: Building True Peace (1997), which had been published by the Catholic Church’s advocacy organisation, the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP) and the Legal Resources Foundation (LRF). The CCJP, representing the Catholic Church, was established in Zimbabwe soon after commissioning by the Vatican in the 1970s, and it became impartially committed to achieving social justice in Zimbabwe. These accusations are contrary to the Christian ethic of peace and reconciliation that the Catholic Church has historically advocated through its letters (Manyonganise 2022, 8). The letter acknowledges the excesses of the liberation struggle, colonial oppression and post-independence repressions, which are considered to have distorted Zimbabwean history. Bishops indicated that new hurts were reopening the past pains and wounds of survivors. Government officials used the blame-game to respond and defend themselves and refused to take responsibility for the public crises they had brought upon the people since independence. The effect of the neocolonial agenda of Western nations on domestic politics was hyped to justify state failure. It could be that the government believed the headquarters of the Catholic Church in the Vatican influenced the writing of the pastoral letter, which caused the government’s irrational response. The government regarded the message in the pastoral letter as a foreign-sponsored and foreign-authenticated political message by Western churches that are still giving them financial subsidies. The message of this pastoral letter did not differ from the message in the 2 April 2020 pastoral letter at the time of the independence celebrations, except that the title of the letter had political connotations that referred to the events of 21 November 2017 when the military mobilised civilians to rise against President Mugabe in an orchestrated palace coup. This letter was written after the failed citizen demonstrations of 31 July 2020. The state had used emergency pandemic laws to suppress the demonstrations, because state officials believed the letter was meant to mobilise citizens to demonstrate against the Zanu-PF government. While the message of the letter can be defended as representing a spirit of nation-­ building and peace, it is probable that, in the minds of the bishops, the letter was indeed meant to achieve what the state feared. With that as a possibility, it must be stated that the Catholic Church was continuing its resistance to Zanu-PFism, especially by indicating that the officials lacked the prerequisite skills to govern the country. The third possibility is that the second republic aligned the letter with the influence of former

3  THE (CATHOLIC) CHURCH AND RESISTANCE TO ZANU-PFISM… 

59

president Mugabe, who was a Catholic, with the possibility that Mugabe wanted payback for Mnangagwa and his coup compatriots for humiliating Mugabe by removing him from power through a coup. The overwhelming statements of solidarity with the pastoral letter cowed the state and prevented them from victimising bishops, in fear of an actual uprising (EFZ 2020; Gagare 2020; ZCC 2020; Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum 2020). ‘The March is not Ended’ suggested that Mnangagwa had ‘a listening ear’ (Ndoro 2020), which is ‘a cornerstone of a democratic society’ (Dube 2021), yet he only had a talking mouth. The letter also nullified Mnangagwa’s promise to fight corruption, which the bishops described as having ‘reached alarming levels’ (ZCBC 2020b). An increase in corruption was unavoidable, because the first family could not be implicated. In a case involving the son of the first lady, Auxilia Mnangagwa, the former minister of Health, Obadiah Moyo, lost his job for prejudicing the state to the value of US$60 million for the procurement of COVID-19 kits by giving a son of the president a contract without following proper tender procedures (Dube 2021, 4). The second republic has put more people behind bars for speaking the truth in one term of office than in the time of former president Mugabe, since a strong opposition was formed under former prime minister Morgan Tsvangirai. The government seems to value money more than human lives. Corruption takes place at the expense of poor and weak citizens, and the state fails to take responsibility for its own failures. The bishops castigated the blame-game used by the state, and especially the use of the language of hate, exclusion and racism, and failing to accept responsibility for its failures (Dube 2021, 2, 8, 9). It is the state’s denial of responsibility that indicates to us that Zimbabwe’s problems are far from over. The church is, thus, the only entity the state could not buy or intimidate, which lead the bishops to demand accountability in the letter. Finally, the strategy of dictatorship and tyranny continues to reign supreme in Zimbabwe, as the executive emasculates the judiciary and the legislature. Pastoral letters exhort the nation to unite in spite of frustrating circumstances (Mares 2020), such as using the army to suppress the people (ZCBC 2020b). Suppression of any revolt is meant to ensure that the lower classes remain oppressed; the security sectors and courts are used to ensure this suppression. The church intervenes to help ‘the poor … feature on the national agenda’, especially regarding health, transport and livelihoods in a time of crisis (ZCBC 2020b).

60 

G. MASENGWE AND B. DUBE

Understanding Zanu-PFism in Zimbabwe The church in Zimbabwe has, since independence, experienced unending abuse from the state. Actively engaged missionary churches have been castigated as representing foreign interests. The toxic nature of Zanu-PF’s accusations and allegations against its critics has developed an attitude and system that denies alternative thinking, as such opinions became labelled as originating from enemies of the state. The church has struggled to stand up to the practices and philosophies of the Zanu-PF party—Zanu-­ PFism. These practices and philosophies are exhibited by shifting the blame from government’s failure to deliver to entities other than the responsible parties. The same blame-shifting has been done against the strengthening opposition parties, such as the former Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) under Morgan Tsvangirai and the current Citizen Coalition for Change (CCC) under Advocate Nelson Chamisa in spite of the increasing state-sponsored political violence, mis-governance, corruption and mediocrity. Zanu-PFism is the ever-striving practice and philosophy in the political culture of the Zanu-PF party, and its behaviour has hardly changed from the time when it was an insurgent (i.e. terrorist) party to that of a party in power. This has left a bad legacy for opposition parties who are also reading from their dictatorship guide-book (Mbofana 2023). It continues to behave as if it was fighting the former regime, instead of building up its own structures to rule the country. Zanu-PF became preoccupied with what they term the ‘threat of Western imperialism and agents of regime change’ agenda, rather than human security that has the purpose of crushing any form of dissent, which they see as a sign of a hurdle created by the West through ‘local puppets’ (opposition). The belief that Zanu-PF acted as an insurgent against its own people cannot be denied, because of five distinct operations that were violent and full of vengeance: Gukurahundi—the ethnic cleansing operations against the Ndebele (1983–1987); Jambanja—the fast-track land reform programme (2000–2003); Murambatsvina—removing urban squatters who supported the opposition (2005), Man’uqonde (Vote Well) or Long-Sleeve and Short-Sleeve—managing voting rigging (2008), and Operation Mavhoterei—questioning those who voted for the opposition (2023). While this approach has been ascribed to the education and grooming Zanu-PF received in the liberation struggle (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2003, 100), colonial education has done much to influence political leaders to perceive politics and political processes as militaristic. Consequently, in

3  THE (CATHOLIC) CHURCH AND RESISTANCE TO ZANU-PFISM… 

61

2002, during the parliamentary campaigns, Zanu-PF prided ‘itself [Zanu-PF] in its violent past and its capacity to deploy this infrastructure of violent politics to those who dare challenge it’ (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2003, 103). These tactics helped it to remain in power for 40 years in the face of real election challenges, surviving through rigging, intimidation and violence. To develop Zanu-PFism successfully, the party introduced what it called a one-centre of power, which placed all decision-making responsibilities in the state and party president, called the first secretary of Zanu-PF—first of all other secretaries in the party. This is called a ‘personality cult’, which was developed to glorify President Mugabe as the only option to unite the party and to protect Zimbabwe from its erstwhile colonisers. Mugabeism concretised at the formation of the MDC in 1999, which presented a formidable challenge to the ruling party. The glorification of Mugabe and Zanu-PF led to the personality cult of Mugabeism and Zanu-PFism. Mugabeism saw Mugabe as the only possible leader for the country, while, according to Zanu-PFism, it was only the Zanu-PF party that had the correct ideology for Zimbabwe (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2012). This glorification led to the idea that Mugabe and Zanu-PF were indispensable and irreplaceable. In some circumstances, the ‘elevation of the nationalist party [Zanu-PF] above everything else generated [in some] rigid party loyalties and a preparedness to kill and be killed in defence of the party’ (Ndlovu-­ Gatsheni 2003, 109)—a retrogressively ancient political ideology for Zanu-PF in a postmodern society. Zanu-PFism, as it should be called, is itself a crisis, because it manipulates political narratives at every level to legitimise its existence and its policies. Zanu-PFism has been known for shrinking everything it touched due to the effects of its reckless decisions regarding economic and monetary policies (Bond 2007, 149; Besada and Moyo 2008). The genesis of the Zimbabwean economic crisis, as Manyonganise explains, lies in Zanu-PFism, which ‘underscores the links between political and economic policies and their consequences’ (Manyonganise 2022, 3). Zanu-PFism has not only sunk the economy, it has also sunk morality, as its ‘win-at-all-cost’ attitude has embedded itself in the consciences of its supporters, thereby disrupting the social fabric of Zimbabwe. No two persons supporting two different political parties can exist harmoniously in the same house; it has wrecked marriages, destroyed homes and separated communities. The pastoral letters were written to save Zimbabwe from these deteriorating circumstances.

62 

G. MASENGWE AND B. DUBE

Understanding the Church in Zimbabwe The Zimbabwean Church is a divided entity when it comes to public life, because, in its long history, missionary churches have been labelled as advancing the interests of their colonial benefactors, while indigenous churches were interested in the advancement of the Black nation. The Church (both missionary and indigenous) has been intricately connected to the colonial state (Thomas 1985) as much as with the post-­independence state (Manyonganise 2020). For the missionary church, which originated in numerous countries and backgrounds, led to the souring of relations between pro-white ecumenical bodies and pro-Black ecumenical bodies as early as the 1960s, when Ian Douglas Smith’s Rhodesia Front unilaterally declared itself independent from Britain and formed a dictatorship that oppressed indigenous people (Wood 2005). The ecumenical bodies refused to sacralise the regime and advocated for the humane treatment of indigenous people. Unfortunately, though missionary churches defended the masses, they also oppressed the people (Tarusarira 2016). Unfortunately, at independence, all churches pulled out of the public scene as advocates of justice and fairness, and they concentrated on the pews, because they had achieved the most important and difficult task of their mission to pull down colonialism and bring about independence (Manyonganise 2020, 39). Churches began speaking up again late in first decade of the third millennium, two decades after independence. While the publication of the CCJP and the LRF, Breaking the Silence: Building True Peace (1997), can be seen as a positive gesture, it was when major church bodies came together to write a national Kairos document, The Zimbabwe we want: “Towards a National Vision for Zimbabwe”—A Discussion Document (ZCBC, EFZ, and ZCC 2006) that churches confronted the state to resist state capture by the party. Since then, the three bodies have formed the ZHOCD, which engages the state during difficult times. In order to undermine the influence of the ZHOCD, the state engineered the formation of similar ecumenical bodies by indigenous churches to counter missionary churches, for instance, the Apostolic Christian Council of Zimbabwe (ACCZ) in the first republic and the Zimbabwe Indigenous Inter-Denominational Council of Churches (ZIICC) in the second republic. These efforts have helped to dilute the pointed efforts of the ZHOCD and its member organisations. For instance, in response to the second pastoral letter, the ZIICC, through its spokesperson, Andrew Wutawunashe, argued as follows:

3  THE (CATHOLIC) CHURCH AND RESISTANCE TO ZANU-PFISM… 

63

We take strong exception to and categorically dissociate ourselves from calls by certain religious leaders to march against the government and to reignite conflicts and wounds of the past to heal us, from which God answered our prayers by bringing political leaders to the negotiating table whose reconciliation was achieved. (Mushanawani 2020)

We must accept that religion and politics interact in intricate ways, giving political mileage to religious leaders and religious mileage to political leaders. Religious leaders receive various perks, such as land, houses, cars and loans from politicians, while politicians are invited to campaign in churches where leaders pledge their allegiance and encourage their members to vote for these influential political leaders (Manyonganise 2022, 4). Church leaders who support politicians have been labelled as regime enablers (Dube 2021), because they support the state without regard to violations of human rights and the rule of law. This means there will be division between missionary churches and indigenous churches, because the hand that feeds missionary churches is not the hand that feeds indigenous churches. This division weakens Christian witness in public life. This is not a new challenge, because, even in the colonial era, there were churches for the state and against the state. However, it was the churches that acted out of conscience whose efforts have lived beyond the era of the regime (Tarusarira 2016, 267). In this case, certain churches promoted Zanu-PFism in an attempt to counteract the efforts of the churches resisting it. Further, the church needs to be applauded for providing an alternative civil society when pressure groups and movements that brought the government to account were destroyed. The ZHOCD and its member organisations have survived resolutely without accepting political cohesion. While the ZCBC issued two statements in 2020, it was only the second one that received widespread attention. The Church has condemned rather than fomented violence in Zimbabwe (Manyonganise 2016). The reaction of the state and pro-state churches showed the irrationality of the accusations they levelled against the ZCBC. The ZCBC’s letter, however, was supported and justified by church bodies and organisations classified as being from former missionary institutions. This clean division undermines collaborative efforts between missionary and indigenous churches, and it will continue to affect how the Church witnesses to the state. Despite these differences, the unwavering stand by missionary churches against state violence continues to inform the state that it is not power that

64 

G. MASENGWE AND B. DUBE

matters, but the citizens. Notable church voices include Pastor Evan Mawarire of the #ThisFlag Movement, Tudor Bismack of Jabula New Life Ministries, and Takesure Zama of Worship Addicts. They have used social media, public singing, dance and prayer to express public anger against state failure to attend to public issues raised by Zimbabweans and the lack of change in governance from the first to the second republics. These churches are called ‘non-conformist’ (Tarusarira 2016) because they are not the traditional type of churches, hence, can alternatively be called conventional churches. This study wished to establish how churches resist Zanu-PFism through pastoral letters, despite the challenges that exist among the religious fraternity in Zimbabwe.

The Church’s Resistance to Zanu-PFism in Zimbabwe Pastoral letters written by mainline churches, as well as renditions by isolated religious leaders, to criticise the way politicians rule Zimbabwe remain important markers of how the church stands against Zanu-PFism in Zimbabwe. The reaction of the political establishment to the ZCBC’s letters, particularly ‘The March has Not Ended’, indicates that politicians take the church’s statements seriously. Government officials’ comments indicate frustration that the church successfully resists Zanu-PFism. Reaction to the second pastoral letter, ‘The March has not Ended’, led the state to pull out all its arsenal against the leading bishop of the church that authored the letter, leading the minister of Information and Publicity at the time, Monica Mutsvangwa, to describe the bishops as evil and narrow-­ minded, ‘reckless regime change agents’, who wished to incite the public to march against the government of Mnangagwa. She stated, ‘Its evil message reeks with all vices that have personally hobbled the progress of Africa. It trumpets petty tribal feuds, internecine strife as a prelude to civil war and national disintegration’ (Bwititi 2020). This is the reaction of a state that has been cornered, because Archbishop Ndlovu was not armed to dislodge the state from power, but he was described as inciting the Ndebele people to kill all the Shonas by labelling him as purporting to be the Ndebele leader. The state’s comments indicate that the effects of the messages of the pastoral letters had been piling up for a time and that ‘The March has not Ended’ provided a moment of appropriateness to utter their reactions. Mutsvangwa did not comment on the publication, Breaking the Silence (CCJP and LRF 1997), meaning that it was not the bishops’ statements that were narrow, but her comments. Unfortunately,

3  THE (CATHOLIC) CHURCH AND RESISTANCE TO ZANU-PFISM… 

65

Zanu-PFism has burrowed so deep into the people’s minds that they cannot look reality in the face. Despite the numerous human rights abuses that have occurred in Zimbabwe in the post-independence era, the government chose to ignore the call of ‘The March is not Ended’ that the government respects the rights of citizens in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic. Instead, Mutsvangwa, also minister of Information, Publicity and Broadcasting Services, accused the bishops of failing to specifically tabulate their complaints against the state by giving full evidence of the failures of the state. Mutsvangwa had forgotten that it was the Catholic Church’s advocacy organisation, the CCJP, that had publicised the atrocities carried out by the colonial settler minority (Manyonganise 2016, 118) and postcolonial black majority regimes (CCJP and LRF 1997). Reactions by state officials clearly indicate that the letters drove them into a corner, because the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) fighters, a military wing of Zanu-PF during the war of liberation, depended upon the information, supplies and cover of the masses. The ZCBC’s approach to public life issues in Zimbabwe through its letters have not been applied by any other religious organisation in the country, making the Catholic Church’s fight for social justice a credible one. Civilians have never received protection, either from the security forces of the colonial regime under the Unilateral Declaration of Independence of Prime Minister Smith, or the insurgents under the Zanu-PF leaders of President Mugabe, who purportedly liberated the country by their own efforts without the help of the masses. In postcolonial Zimbabwe, the national army and related security agents have continued to violate the security of citizens under the guise of patriotism and state sovereignty, yet it continues criminality though Zanu-PF militancy. The bishops condemn violence in the strongest terms, because violence violates their Christian values. They call upon the government to exercise true peace by fostering true justice and reconciliation (Manyonganise 2022). The bishops are aware that violence is tearing Zimbabwe apart—physically, emotionally, psychologically and otherwise—and it leaves scars in the lives of people. The letter, however, could not condemn past excesses during the liberation struggle, because such excesses were condemned then and those in power were failing to respect the ideals for which the struggle was fought. The bishops are, thus, calling for Zanu-PF to rise up to the banner of responsibility in a civil society. The church’s resistance to Zanu-PFism has shown the government that it needs to take responsibility for the crises in Zimbabwe. Blaming foreign

66 

G. MASENGWE AND B. DUBE

countries for staging coups to effect regime change in Zimbabwe was treated by bishops as an irresponsible thought by the state, because of all the security systems at its disposal. The thinking that missionary churches are influenced by their foreign sponsors, though credible, does not absolve the state from accountability, because it is the same group of churches that mobilised the march that removed former president Mugabe from office. The bishops rightly declare that ‘The March is not Ended’ because they wish to see the end of Zanu-PFism—sooner rather than later. We believe that there is a likelihood that the bishops were subtly calling citizens to return to the streets and remove the incumbent government, unlike what Molly Manyonganise (2022) thought was a misconstrued message; she claims the bishops were not ‘calling Zimbabweans to return to the streets to march against ZANU PF’ (p.  6). So, we contend that there is a likelihood that the letter was calling people to return to the streets to remove an incompetent regime, despite the risk involved; while, on the other hand, it was asking the government to do a wholesale redress of the concerns of the citizens. This chapter subscribes to the idea that the bishops were actually calling citizens to remove Zanu-PF from power, as presented in the idea of the march that had removed Mugabe, and on that premise, it has not ended until it removes the second republic. The categorical accusation of the government of Mnangagwa of lacking the prerequisite leadership skills to govern Zimbabwe, in the second pastoral letter, could be referring to the arrest of the perceived incompetence, complacency and corruption in the second republic (ZCBC 2020b). There are, in fact, many issues raised that are against this government in the letter that need to be addressed, and such awareness caused a stir in the second republic camp. Finally, it is also probable that the ZCBC could have been influenced by the Vatican or the family of former president Robert Mugabe, who had died a year before the letter was released, to march against the incumbent in similar fashion, to remove him from power. Mugabe, who died very angry, and had stated that he ‘can’t vote for those who have tormented me’ and would vote for another candidate who was not Mnangagwa, for instance, opposition leader Chamisa, may not have, beyond his life, only affected the outcome of the general election, but the behaviour of activists (Onishi 2018). Despite the origin of the motivation to write the letter, the intention was to eradicate Zanu-PFism from the face of Zimbabwe. In other words, if it meant removing the party from power, its practices and philosophy from the political scene in Zimbabwe, and ending the

3  THE (CATHOLIC) CHURCH AND RESISTANCE TO ZANU-PFISM… 

67

possibility of Zanu-PF ever becoming dominant in Zimbabwe again, the letter advocated for this cause. However, this dream was risky and dangerous, not only for the ZCBC, but for the Christian community and for the opposition, because it meant that the incumbent authority would stage its security systems to quell any threat to its stay in power. Zanu-PF, on the other hand, denied the truths raised by the bishops in the letter and tried to defend its outdated practices and philosophies. Interestingly, all ecumenical bodies of former missionary churches came together to support the ZCBC letter, and they all indicated that they were frustrated by the incumbent authority and were aware and ready to march ZANU-PF out of power. Zanu-PF vigilance against the bishops subsided when the party leadership noticed that it had touched on something citizens held dear. The strong support provided by civil society and the legal fraternity spoke volumes about the exhaustion of the nation with Zanu-PFism.

Conclusion The ZCBC has been at the forefront of resisting Zanu-PFism through its pastoral letters. This trend has been adopted by ecumenical groups of similar acumen, such as the ZCC and the EFZ, who together, in weak association with the Union for the Development of Apostolic Churches in Zimbabwe, Africa (UDACIZA), formed the ZHOCD. The pastoral letters discussed in this chapter clearly indicate that Zanu-PFism has lost its appeal to the citizens, especially its emphasis on the liberation struggle, and justifying the churches converging on ending, or at least, resisting its influence on the nation. Reactions indicate that a united church can express its displeasure openly, to the chagrin of Zanu-PF. The pastoral letters indicate that the Church can inspire civic resistance or disobedience. This is a call for us to rethink how the church can influence politics, especially how prophetic-Pentecostal types of churches use their theology to deal with politicians, which markedly departs from how traditional churches deal with politicians (Tarusarira 2016). Pastoral letters are public documents that are meant to challenge social injustice done to the most marginalised people of society. This resistance to Zanu-PFism, however, does not remove all churches, conformist and non-conformist, from the influence of the state, and some continue to support state excess. This indicates that the force of resistance to Zanu-PFism cannot be taken for granted—the state courts, and even some conformist groups, support its cause. Resistance to Zanu-PFism in Zimbabwe can be broad-based,

68 

G. MASENGWE AND B. DUBE

especially with regard to the way different groups supported the pastoral letters of the ZCBC. The churches, and in particular the ZCBC bishops, were motivated to write ‘The March has not Ended’ by a strong sense of peace and justice, which united the majority of other ecumenical churches, civil organisations and the public to support their cause. The pastoral letters can be concretised by taking the action they recommend. In the wake of the political crisis Zimbabwean citizens found themselves in, the church’s power cannot be underestimated. Pastoral letters can be a useful weapon for resisting Zanu-PFism in Zimbabwe.

References Baker, Pauline H. 1980. The Birth of Zimbabwe, a Turning Point for Southern Africa: A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate. US Government Printing Office. BBC News. 2020. Zimbabwe Rejects Catholic Bishops’ Criticism of Corruption and Abuse. August 16. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-­africa-­53798787. Besada, Hany, and Nicky Moyo. 2008. Zimbabwe in Crisis: Mugabe’s Policies and Failures. Africa Portal (blog): Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), October 1. https://www.africaportal.org/publications/zimbabwein-­crisis-­mugabes-­policies-­and-­failures/ Bond, Patrick. 2007. Competing Explanations of Zimbabwe’s Long Economic Crisis. Safundi: The Journal of South African and American Studies 8 (2): 149–181. Bwititi, Kuda. 2020. Govt Blasts ‘Genocidal, Evil-Minded’ Bishops. The Sunday Mail, August 16. https://www.sundaymail.co.zw/govt-­blasts-­genocidalevil-­minded-­bishops. CCJP, and LRF. 1997. Breaking the Silence, Building True Peace: Report on the Disturbances in Matabeleland and the Midlands, 1980–198  - A Summary. Harare: Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe and The Legal Resources Foundation. Chisholm, H. 2011. Pastoral Letter. In Encyclopaedia Britannica, vol. 20, 11th ed. Cambridge University Press. Chronicle. 2020. President Mnangagwa’s Independence Day Speech in Full. The Chronicle, April 18. https://www.chronicle.co.zw/president-­mnangagwas-­ independence-­day-­speech-­in-­full/. Dube, Bekithemba. 2021. “To Hell with Bishops”: Rethinking the Nexus of State, Law and Religion in Times of Crisis in Zimbabwe. Religions 12 (5): 304. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel12050304. EFZ Statement. 2020. Solidarity Statement with the Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops Conference’s Pastoral Letter on the Current Situation in Zimbabwe of 14

3  THE (CATHOLIC) CHURCH AND RESISTANCE TO ZANU-PFISM… 

69

August 2020 – We Stand with Truth as Articulated by the Bishops by Evangelical Fellowship of Zimbabwe. Kubatana.net, August 17. https://kubatana. n e t / 2 0 2 0 / 0 8 / 1 7 / s o l i d a r i t y -­s t a t e m e n t -­w i t h -­t h e -­z i m b a b w e -­ catholic-­b ishops-­c onferences-­p astoral-­l etter-­o n-­t he-­c urrent-­s ituation-­i n-­ zimbabwe-­o f-­1 4-­a ugust-­2 020-­w e-­s tand-­w ith-­t he-­t ruth-­a s-­a rticulated-­ by-­the-­cath/. Gagare, Owen. 2020. The Church in Zim: Indeed, the March Is Not Ended. The Zimbabwe Independent, August 28. https://www.pressreader.com/zimbabwe/the-­zimbabwe-­independent-­9fa3/20200828/283038351928696. Jere, Qeko, and Vhumani Magezi. 2018. Pastoral Letters and the Church in the Public Square: An Assessment of the Role of Pastoral Letters in Influencing Democratic Processes in Malawi. Verbum et Ecclesia 39 (1): 9. https://doi. org/10.4102/ve.v39i1.1844. Machakanja, Pamela. 2010. National Healing and Reconciliation in Zimbabwe: Challenges and Opportunities. Wynberg: Institute for Justice and Reconcilation. Manyonganise, Molly. 2016. Christianity in Zimbabwe. In Anthology of Christianity, ed. Isabel Apawo Phiri, Werner Dietrich, J. Kaunda Chammah, and Kennedy Owino, 766–771. Oxford: Regnum Books International. ———. 2020. Together for Development? The Zimbabwe Council of Churches, The Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops Conference and the Evangelical Fellowship of Zimbabwe. In The Zimbabwe Council of Churches and Development in Zimbabwe, ed. Ezra Chitando, 37–50. Cham: Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-­3-­030-­41603-­4_3. ———. 2022. ‘The March Is Not Ended’: ‘Church’ Confronting the State over the Zimbabwean Crisis. Religions 13 (2): 107. https://doi.org/10.3390/ rel13020107. Mares, C. 2020. Nuncio Meets Zimbabwe Government Minister after Clash Over Catholic Bishops’ Letter. Catholic News Agency, 2020. https://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/nuncio-­meets-­zimbabwe-­government-minister-­after-­ clash-­over-­catholic-­bishops-­letter-­76302. Matambanadzo, Chris. 2023. Job Sikhala Sentenced to Six Months in Jail for Obstructing Justice, Faces Political Ban. iHarare.com, May 3. https://iharare. com/job-­s ikhala-­s entenced-­t o-­s ix-­m onths-­i n-­j ail-­f or-­o bstr uctingjustice-­faces-­political-­ban/. Mbanje, Phyllis. 2019. Churches crank up pressure for national dialogue. Newsday Zimbabwe, November 19. https://www.newsday.co.zw/news/article/50826/ churches-­crank-­up-­pressure-­for-­national-­dialogue. Mbofana, Tendai Reuben. 2023. ‘Opposition parties in Zimbabwe following dark path set by Zanu PF’. Nehanda Radio, 3 April. https://nehandaradio. com/2023/04/03/opposition-parties-in-zimbabwe-following-dark-path-setby-zanu-pf/

70 

G. MASENGWE AND B. DUBE

Mkodzongi, G. 2020. The Rise of ‘Mashurugwi’ Machete Gangs and Violent Conflicts in Zimbabwe’s Artisanal and Small-Scale Gold Mining Sector. The Extractive Industries and Society 7 (4): 1480–1489. Mushanawani, Cletus. 2020. Indigenous Churches Preach Peace. The Herald, August 19. https://www.herald.co.zw/indigenous-­churches-­preach-­peace/. Mwonzora, Gift, and Edknowledge Mandikwaza. 2019. The Menu of Electoral Manipulation in Zimbabwe: Food Handouts, Violence, Memory, and Fear – Case of Mwenezi East and Bikita West 2017 by-Elections. Journal of Asian and African Studies 54 (8): 1114–1128. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Sabelo J. 2003. Dynamics of the Zimbabwe Crisis in the 21st Century. African Journal on Conflict Resolution 3 (1): 99–134. ———. 2012. Rethinking Chimurenga and Gukurahundi in Zimbabwe: A Critique of Partisan National History. African Studies Review 55 (3): 1–26. Ndoro, Collet. 2020. AMH Voices: Is He Really a Listening President? NewsDay, June 24. Ndoro, Nyashadzashe. 2023. 245 Days in Prison, Sikhala’s ‘Biggest Worry Is About His Wife and Children.’ Nehanda Radio, February 14. https://nehandaradio.com/2023/02/14/245-­d ays-­i n-­p rison-­s ikhalas-­b iggest-­w orryis-about-­his-­wife-­and-­children/. Nehanda Radio. 2022. Job Sikhala Arrested after Clashes at Moreblessing Ali’s Funeral Wake. June 14. https://nehandaradio.com/2022/06/15/job-­sikhala-­ arrested-­after-­clashes-­at-­moreblessing-­alis-­funeral-­wake/. New Zimbabwe. 2020. Catholic Bishops Evil Minded, Misled Flock  – Monica Mutsvangwa. New Zimbabwe.Com, August 16. https://www.newzimbabwe. com/catholic-­bishops-­evil-­minded-­misled-­flock-­monica-­mutsvangwa/. News24. 2020. Zimbabwe Health Minister Sacked on Fraud Charges over US$60m Covid-19 Equipment Deal. July 7. https://www.news24.com/ fin24/economy/africa/zim-­health-­minister-­sacked-­on-­fraud-­charges-­over-­ us60m-­covid-­19-­equipment-­deal-­20200707. Onishi, Norimitsu. 2018. As Zimbabwe Prepares to Vote, Robert Mugabe Resurfaces With a Message. The New  York Times, July 29. https://www. nytimes.com/2018/07/29/world/africa/zimbabwe-­election-­mugabe.html. Shivamba, Amanda, and Nicholas Bugeja. 2020. An Analysis of Zimbabwe’s Proposed Constitutional Amendments Relating to the Legislative and Executive Arms of Government. SALC Policy Brief, 2. https://www.southernafricalitigationcentre.org/wp-­c ontent/uploads/2020/05/Policy-­B rief-­N o.-­2 -­ of-­2020-­Final.pdf. Tarusarira, Joram. 2016. Christianity, Resistance and Conflict Resolution in Zimbabwe. In Handbook of Global Contemporary Christianity, ed. Ben Zeller and Terhi Utrianinen. Leiden: Brill. Thomas, Norman E. 1985. Church and State in Zimbabwe. Journal of Church and State 27 (1): 113–133.

3  THE (CATHOLIC) CHURCH AND RESISTANCE TO ZANU-PFISM… 

71

Uzochukwu, Benjamin Sunday, Chinyere Cecilia Okeke, Joyce Ogwezi, Benedict Emunemu, Felicia Onibon, Bassey Ebenso, Tolib Mirzoev, and Ghazala Mir. 2020. Exploring the Drivers of Ethnic and Religious Exclusion from Public Services in Nigeria: Implications for Sustainable Development Goal 10. International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy 41: 561–583. Witte, Kim. 1996. Fear as Motivator, Fear as Inhibitor: Using the Extended Parallel Process Model to Explain Fear Appeal Successes and Failures. In Handbook of Communication and Emotion: Research, Theory, Application and Contexts, 423–450. Academic Press. Wood, J.R.T. 2005. So Far and No Further! Rhodesia’s Bid For Independence During the Retreat From Empire 1959–1965. Trafford Publishing. ZCBC. 2020a. On the 40th Anniversary of Zimbabwe’s Independence. Pastoral Letter by the Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops Conference. Catholic Church News Zimbabwe, April 2. https://catholicchurchnewszimbabwe.wpcomstaging. com/wp-­content/uploads/2020/04/zimbabwe-­40-­40.pdf. ———. 2020b. The March Is Not Ended. Pastoral Letter by the Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops Conference. The Zimbabwean, August 14. https://www.thez i m b a b w e a n . c o / w p -­c o n t e n t / u p l o a d s / 2 0 2 0 / 0 8 / T h e -­m a r c h -­i s -­ not-­ended.pdf. ZCBC, EFZ, and ZCC. 2006. The Zimbabwe We Want: Towards a National Vision for Zimbabwe - A Discussion Document. Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops Conference, The Evangelical Fellowship of Zimbabwe, The Zimbabwe Council of Churches. www.africamission-­mafr.org/zimbabwe.doc. ZCC. 2020. Echoing ‘The March Is Not Ended’. Pastoral Letter. The Zimbabwean, August 20. https://www.thezimbabwean.co/2020/08/echoing-­the-marchis-­not-­ended/. Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum. 2020. Solidarity Statement Issued in Response to the State’s Attack on the Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops’ Conference. CDN Scooper News, August 16. https://cdn.scoopernews.com/static/half/ detail/2259/11291583.html.

CHAPTER 4

God or President Emmerson Mnangagwa? Romans 13:1–7 in Zimbabwe’s Contemporary Church and Elections Theophilus Tinashe Nenjerama

Introduction To whom shall we submit: Christ or Caesar? God or President Emmerson Mnangagwa? This question invites us to discuss Romans 13:1–7 and Zanu-PFism in Zimbabwe under President Emmerson Mnangagwa. This study analyses Romans 13:1–7 in the biblical corpus to examine alternatives to civic duties, such as voting, and the broader Zimbabwean religio-­ political dichotomy. The focus on church and civic duties emerges as Zimbabwe gears up for elections in August 2023. A church movement called Pastors for Economic Development (Pastors4ED), under the leadership of evangelist Idiraishe Dongo, has emerged in Zimbabwe and its diaspora. The launch of the movement in October 2022, attended by 480 clergy members of different churches in Harare and Chitungwiza,

T. T. Nenjerama (*) Colombia Theological Seminary, Decatur, GA, USA © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 B. Dube (ed.), Regime, Religion and the Consolidation of Zanu-PFism in Zimbabwe, African Histories and Modernities, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-46084-5_4

73

74 

T. T. NENJERAMA

coincided with Zimbabwe’s Anti-Sanctions Day,1 organised by the government and the Southern African Development Community (Bulawayo24 News 2023). Pastors4ED runs under the theme, ‘A Prayed-For and Supported Leader Delivers’ (Bulawayo24 News 2023), and its objective is persuading pastors to campaign on behalf of Mnangagwa—thereby Pastors4ED declares its partisan posture. The movement claims that at least 10,600 pastors will undergo training at Chitepo School of Ideology2 to promote the patriotism of pastors (Bulawayo24 News 2023). In Zimbabwe, the initials ED represent the president’s first name: Emmerson Dambudzo [Mnangagwa]; hence the slogan ‘ED pfee’. Pfee is an ideophone symbolising ‘entrance’ in the Shona language. As a slogan it claims Mnangagwa’s outright victory and assumption of office. In October 2022, Pastors4ED tweeted the following list comparing Zanu-PF and Nelson Chamisa’s Citizens’ Coalition for Change (CCC): 1. Zanu-PF is a revolutionary party that fought for independence and is still fighting for total economic emancipation. CCC is a puppet political party formed to reverse the gains of the liberation struggle. 2. Zanu-PF is proactive, CCC is reactive to Zanu-PF policies and programmes. 3. Zanu-PF focuses on national development. CCC focuses on criticising Zanu-PF policies and programmes. 4. Zanu-PF has [a] generational thinking mentality, CCC wants short-­ term gains. 5. Zanu-PF believes that all Zimbabweans must have a role to play in nation building, hence their famous philosophy, nyika inovakwa nevene vayo (the country is developed by its citizens). CCC believe varungu vachauya vovapa mari kuti nyika ivakike (white people will fund them to develop the country). 1  The Zimbabwean government instituted Anti-Sanctions Day to protest the sanctions placed upon selected government officials in the form of travel bans and embargos. ‘President Mugabe and selected elites were placed under “targeted/smart sanctions” when the United States Congress passed the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZIDERA) in 2001. However, Zanu-PF has manipulated the sanctions discourse to absolve itself from any responsibility for the Zimbabwe crisis from 2000 onwards’ (see Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2012). 2  Zanu-PF founded the Chitepo School of Ideology with a nod to the liberation struggle, to promote social cohesion between so-called freedom fighters and the general masses fighting the oppressive white colonial system. Presently, the school is being used to mobilise and educate the masses regarding nation building and economic development (see Chitepo School of Ideology website: https://csoi.online/).

4  GOD OR PRESIDENT EMMERSON MNANGAGWA? ROMANS 13:1–7… 

75

6. Zanu-PF is a well-structured, organised, constitutional organisation with party manifesto. CCC is just a bunch of unstructured, unorganised, unconstitutional organisation without a party manifesto masquerading as strategists. 7. Zanu-PF has continuity, it is perpetual since 1963, 8 August, it’s still fighting to fulfil the African struggle for total socio-political and economic independence. CCC is an extension of our former colonisers used as a proxy to fulfil a western imperialist agenda. Choose what you think is best, vote wisely in 2023 as we say 5 million votes ED pfeee pfeee.3

To legitimise their partisan disposition, the Pastors4ED movement refers to Romans 13:1–7, which encourages Christian followers to submit to the authorities. Romans 13:1–7—often interpreted out of context—is the primary Biblical passage on governmental obedience (Hafer 2021). The text poses challenges for Christians’ relationship with political authorities (Gusha 2020) and informs questions about the relationship between contemporary governance and lived experiences (Gaventa 2017; Ademiluka 2019). A colonial reading of the text was used at the time of the South African apartheid regime to suppress Black South Africans, since the regime defined the text as an ‘unequivocal unrelenting call for blind unquestioning obedience to the state’ (Boesak 1986, 138). Black South Africans, during apartheid, were expected to be subservient to the hegemony, despite the reality of the country’s racial injustice. In the Nigerian context, Romans 13 has been utilised to bolster subservience as the postcolonial government demands absolute allegiance despite human rights violations and economic deprivation (Ademiluka 2019). In the United States, Attorney General Jeff Sessions used the text to defend the zero-tolerance policy for undocumented persons, and unauthorised border crossings into the country, leading to familial separation that was justified because all undocumented immigrants were deemed illegal (Butner 2023). Several scholars have analysed the text using a postcolonial and liberative outlook (Mukuka 2012; Moe 2017; Ademiluka 2019). Scott’s (1990) concept of ‘hidden transcript’ is a condition of postcolonial resistance, rather than a blind subjection to a ‘public transcript’ of domination. Moe (2017) applies the text in liberative theology to subjugated persons in 3  Pastors4ED, Differences between Zanu-PF and CCC, 11 October 2022, 3:27  p.m., https://twitter.com/Pastors4ED/status/1579916559719763969

76 

T. T. NENJERAMA

Myanmar. The liberative framework operates on an implied subversive discourse within Paul’s coded language of empire subversion. Similarly, the text has been studied in Zimbabwe’s second republic as signalling an assumed end to former president Mugabe’s authoritarianism. However, subsequent events in the second republic show that the post-­ Mugabe era has become little more than a mere resurgence of Mugabe’s governance, characterised by state militarisation as exemplified by the political violence on 1 August 2018, protests by citizenry in January 2019, suppression, unprecedented corruption, arbitrary application of laws, gerontocracy, and political intolerance. Gusha (2020, 2) suggests that the text does not address contemporary church–state relations but should be contextually framed in Paul’s time. This contextual understanding helps avert inadequate or subjective literal interpretations. This chapter defines Zanu-PFism as a notion centring on Zanu-PF’s infallibility as the revolutionary party, which simultaneously amalgamates different cultural and political components, such as African traditional structures and religion (e.g., the Pastors4ED and Mapostori4ED movements) amid deteriorating socio-economic and political standards. By analysing the Pastors4ED movement and Zanu-PFism, this study asks, How can contemporary Christians reconcile Rom. 13:1–7 with fulfilling their civic mandate? I argue that the Church should engage in critical scripture interpretation as a theological mandate to allow congregants, as citizens, to reflect on the Church’s culpability as a threat or solution to Zimbabwe’s development.

Of Plots and Coups: Zanu-PFism from Robert Mugabe to Emmerson Mnangagwa The striking similarities between Emperor Nero and Mnangagwa’s political ascension and rule are worth mentioning. Nero assumed power after Claudius was eliminated by family plotting in 54  CE; Nero’s rule was peaceful and Nero removed prominent persons’ treason trials, until 59 CE, when Nero’s rule changed after the matricide of Seneca and Burrus, his advisors, and he started persecuting Christians, thereby ending peace and stability (Witherington and Hyatt 2004, 305). Mnangagwa ascended to power by the November 2017 military-assisted coup that ousted Robert Mugabe. Mnangagwa’s quick rise to power inspired hope in Zimbabweans, since the removal of Mugabe signalled the end of authoritarianism, albeit

4  GOD OR PRESIDENT EMMERSON MNANGAGWA? ROMANS 13:1–7… 

77

falsely. The July 2018 elections and subsequent violence revealed Mnangagwa’s militaristic approach to power. In this chapter, we explain how Zanu-PFism is an overarching ideology that encapsulates Zanu-PF’s political ideology, through which the party exonerates itself from its role in the ‘“Zimbabwean crisis” well-known for its social signatures, signs, symptoms and effects such as the dysfunctional economy, world-record hyperinflation, civil service strikes, massive emigration and contested elections’ (Ncube et al. 2021, 2). This exoneration opened the door to gerontocracy, nepotism, and the annihilation of opposition politics. Zanu-PFism capitalised on the utility of repressive ideological and state apparatuses to obliterate opposition that challenged Zanu-PF and Mugabe. Zanu-PF under Mugabe became the custodian of religio-political infrastructures, including the ‘domestication of ancestral tradition, chieftainship tradition (patrimonialism and clientelism), scapegoating through witchcraft, [ancestor veneration] and revival of traditional religio-cultural festivals [that allowed] Mugabe’s lengthy stay in power, in spite of the internal and external political pressures, social disharmony among citizens and economic collapse’ (Taringa and Museka 2021, 71). The second republic under Mnangagwa has utilised the same approach to sustain Zanu-PFism, through events such as overseeing the unveiling of the statue of Mbuya Nehanda in 2021. Its approach to a traditional understanding of political power persuaded traditionalists and politicians to buttress Zanu-PF’s political agenda. The utility of violence is apparent in Zanu-PFism. Zimbabwe’s elections have characteristically been violent, as seen in the punishment meted out to opposition leaders and supporters, for instance, during the 2002 elections, which succeeded the Movement Democratic Change’s (MDC) formidable 2000 draft constitution referendum win (Gwekwerere and Mpondi 2018). The 2005 Operation Murambatsvina (Operation Clean Up the Filth) involved the destruction of illegal houses and market stalls soon after the April elections in Harare’s high-density suburbs and resulted in human displacement and unemployment (Tibaijuka 2005). Zanu-PF sought to punish urbanites for voting for MDC. During the fiercely contested election of 2008, many opposition party supporters endured violence from Zanu-PF militia, youth vigilantes, and secret service agents. The violent project was dubbed Operation Makavhotera Papi? (Operation for Whom Did You Vote?) and was characterised by the question ‘short sleeve or long sleeve?’, meaning the inhuman amputation of someone’s hand

78 

T. T. NENJERAMA

at either the wrist or the shoulder, as a punishment for supporting the opposition. Consequently, the MDC leader, Morgan Tsvangirai, boycotted the run-off election, which resulted in the intervention and establishment of the Government of National Unity by the South African Development Community, with Mugabe as president and Tsvangirai and Arthur Mutambara as prime minister and deputy prime minister, respectively. The Government of National Unity was short-lived as it ended in 2013 with Mugabe retaining power, albeit having stabilised the economy due to the newly introduced multicurrency system. Mugabe’s advanced age inspired succession disputes in Zanu-PF. Grace, Mugabe’s wife, strategically positioned herself by leading the G404 faction and Zanu-PF Women’s League, while Mnangagwa led the Lacoste5 faction (Kamete 2019). On 6 November 2017, the climax of these succession disputes involved Mugabe expelling Mnangagwa from the vice presidency and the Zanu-PF political party. On 14 November 2017, army officials, led by General Sibusiso Moyo, appeared on national television, thereby marking their interference in civilian politics. The interference heralded Mugabe’s overthrow and Mnangagwa’s reinstatement in the party and appointment as the interim president by the Constitutional Court on 24 November 2017. The army’s involvement in civilian politics was justified by the need to restore the legacy—referring to the liberation struggle—and this made Grace Mugabe an illegitimate incumbent, since she did not participate in the struggle. Upon assuming power, Mnangagwa defined his rule as a ‘New Era’, in which ‘Zimbabwe is open for business’. He promised electoral and economic reforms, global re-engagement, and elimination of government corruption (Beardsworth et al. 2019). However, the façade of a New Era crumbled, resulting in Zanu-PFism’s resurgence as an entrenched core ideology in Zimbabwean politics. While Zanu-PF won more parliamentary seats than Chamisa’s MDC-­ Alliance (MDC-A) in the July 2018 elections, a delay in announcing the presidential results raised suspicions of rigging by the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) in favour of Mnangagwa. Protests led by opposition  G40 refers to members of Zanu-PF born after the liberation war.  Lacoste was a faction led by Mnangagwa, made up of a conglomeration of political leaders who participated in the liberation war. It involved army leaders who had interests in power or the preservation of power by members they were aligned with in the Zanu-PF party and government. 4 5

4  GOD OR PRESIDENT EMMERSON MNANGAGWA? ROMANS 13:1–7… 

79

supporters and sympathisers called for the results to be released immediately. The army was deployed to help the police contain the insurrection, and six unarmed civilians shot and killed, and many others injured. MDC-A challenged Mnangagwa’s win in the courts, citing his win as illegitimate, without success. The court maintained the ZEC declaration and Mnangagwa was sworn in as the country’s president in December 2018. The current Zimbabwean context can be characterised by terms such as militarised state, gerontocracy, and nepotism, as markers of Zanu-PFism.

Romans 13 Background Critical scripture reading requires consideration of a passage’s historical-­ cultural context, because the bible emerged in its own time, space, and culture, which differed from the present (Blackwell et al. 2015, 17–18). Far from being a comprehensive theology on past and present governments by Paul, the passage was historically and contextually produced for the Roman believers, to discourage them from political disobedience, in order to guard the Church’s mission in the empire (Steele 2012). Some scholars regard Romans 13:1–7 as a non-Pauline intrusion (Moe 2017), because it is unrelated to the first 12 chapters centred on justification by faith, sin, death, law, and life in/with Christ (Cobb and Lull 2005; Blackwell et  al. 2015), thus, making civil obedience disparate to Paul’s general corpus. Other scholars attribute authorship to Paul because of acquaintances he mentions, which supposes prior interaction and familiarity (Ademiluka 2019). In Romans 16, Paul sends greetings to numerous members of the Roman church, who could have been acquaintances, including Gaius, described as host to him and the whole church (v. 23) (Ademiluka 2019). Some have identified Gaius as Titus Justus, mentioned in Acts 18:7, whom the apostle had lodged with in Corinth during his missionary work in that city (Sackey 2011; Ademiluka 2019). Thus, Paul wrote the letter in 57 CE, from Corinth at the end of his third missionary journey, partly with the aim of gaining support for his anticipated mission to Spain (Rom. 15:24) (Steele 2012; Ademiluka 2019; Hafer 2021). Historical perspective surmises that, at the time, the relationship between Jews and Christians was antagonistic. Between 33 and 54  CE Christians were victimised by the Jewish establishment, which strongly advocated nationalism and zealotism (Reicke 1984). Cobb and Lull (2005, 168) assume that Paul may have heard that some of the faithful in

80 

T. T. NENJERAMA

Rome had been guilty of insurrection and withholding of taxes. Alternatively, the antagonism of the relationship between Jews and Christians was something he had to manoeuvre, to avoid Christians being expelled from Rome. Hence, to circumvent persecution, it was fundamental that Christians observed the law. Steele (2012) argues that Romans was written in 58 CE. The difference in historical understanding underscores the modern (mis)interpretation and (mis)appropriation of the text, thus, it would be amiss to rely on one scholarly perspective. The Roman empire’s religio-political setting is noteworthy. When Paul wrote the letter to the Romans, ‘emperor Claudius had expulsed Jews from the city of Rome in AD 49 at least twice, removing Jewish believers from the Roman church and therefore leaving only Gentile Christians behind in their stead’ (Steele 2012, 3), thus, ‘making the situation of those who had returned precarious’ (Cobb and Lull 2005, 3). In 54 CE, Agrippina killed her husband Claudius, resulting in her son Nero becoming emperor, who immediately allowed the Jews to return to the city (Steele 2012). However, it is unclear whether the concessions that Rome had extended to the Jews applied to communities of believers in Jesus or what relations existed between these communities and non-Christian Jews (Cobb and Lull 2005). Socio-politically, in 57  CE the empire was quite peaceful, different from Nero’s later chaotic and totalitarian years (Steele 2012) or Claudius’ prior ones (Witherington and Hyatt 2004). With the guidance of Seneca, his advisor, Nero provided a rule different from the Pax Romana of Augustus by eliminating coercive and violent means of rule. However, the peaceful rulership receded beginning of 59 CE, with Seneca’s matricide, loss of Nero’s advisors, and Christian persecution (Witherington and Hyatt 2004; Steele 2012). Considering this fundamental difference, it would be amiss to interpret Romans 13:1–7 as a text written to address a context of persecution and violence, for this would disproportionately strengthen Paul’s ‘pro-Empire’ sentiments (Steele 2012, 3). This pro-­ Empire sentiment is advanced outside of understanding the Pauline corpus and periodisation, since the text’s guidance ‘applies to just governance contexts, it does not address tyrannical governments and persecution of believers or others unjustly’ (Hafer 2021, 234). While Zanu-PFism appropriates the text for purposes of political ideology, this appropriation can be challenged by analysing rampant human rights abuses in Zimbabwe and comparing it to the form of governance functioning when Paul wrote the letter to the Romans.

4  GOD OR PRESIDENT EMMERSON MNANGAGWA? ROMANS 13:1–7… 

81

Contextual philosophical worldviews, such as ‘exousiai  – the Graeco-­ Roman concept of state’ (Morrison 1964, 102), may have been influenced Paul. Exousiai ‘were powers, human and spiritual, divinely appointed to cosmic responsibilities – emphasising an inseparable relationship between the spiritual and physical’ (Morrison 1964, 103). This spiritual-­ cosmological conception led the empire to claim ‘ultimate loyalty, and emperor divinization’ (Cobb and Lull 2005, 4). This philosophical influence is plausible, since the subjection to exousiai was present and practised under Roman rule (Morrison 1964) and was not in tension with polytheistic cults (Cobb and Lull 2005, 4). However, this spiritual-cosmological conception of imperial authority is challenged, ‘based on texts such as 1. Cor. 2:8 which identifies exousiai as meaning invisible angelic powers without mentioning civic authorities whereas Rom. 13:1–7 does’ (Witherington and Hyatt 2004, 310). Thus, Paul’s exouisai refers to ‘hostile powers’, whereas, in Rom. 13:1–7, Paul identifies civic authorities as God-ordained and ordered and does not refer to supernatural power but to human officials functioning as God’s servants (Witherington and Hyatt 2004). This differentiation allows us to criticise the empire’s duty on the grounds of divinisation. If human officials function as God’s servants, any departure from God’s dictates deserves attention and criticism. Zanu-PFism, as a power structure sustained by autocratic principles while utilising the church to garner political support, can be challenged from various perspectives, whether based on human rights or ethical principles.

Reconciling Romans 13, the Biblical Canon, and the Ideology of Pastors4ED A reconciliation of Romans 13 and the biblical canon is warranted, since ‘Paul’s comments about the state in Rom. 13:1–7 are embedded within a larger argument of 13:1–14 and connected thematically and terminologically to the rest of Rom. 12–15’ (Pinter 2015, 146). This section interprets Romans 13 in Pauline and biblical canon corpus and discusses the implications by referring to inclusio, Christology, and Caesar (inclusive of dikaiosyne ̄ and empire), and honour for office rather than the officer.

82 

T. T. NENJERAMA

Inclusio, Christology, and Caesar Inclusio offers a summative interlinking of the text’s beginning and conclusion. In the epistle to the Romans, inclusio brings together different teachings on the Lordship of Jesus versus Caesar. Inclusio allows for the political interpretations, because In the opening verses, Paul deploys a Christological conception and enthronement of Jesus as the Seed of David… the Son of God – to the position of universal Lord – ‘the gospel’. Paul concludes this introduction of the gospel by stressing that all nations should render ‘the obedience of faith’ to the name of Jesus Christ. In Rom. 15:12, Paul concludes the main body of the epistle citing Isa. 11:10, which speaks of Jesus as the Son of David coming to rule the nations and the nations having hope in him. (Kim 2008, 16)

Inclusio outlines the consummative power—religious, spiritual, and political—of Jesus. Other scholars suggest that Romans 1:2–4 demonstrates how the resurrection of Jesus undermines the imperial propaganda about the apotheosis of Augustus and Claudius, by comparing the humble estate of the Son of God—the pre-existent one who was descended in his human nature from the house of David (Rom. 1:3b) with his divine exaltation as the victorious Son of God through the Holy Spirit (see Schreiner 1998; Harrison 2013). The subversion of apotheosis and imperial propaganda emerges with themes of Christology and eschatology. We shall begin with Christology. Paul venerates the Christ who imbues ‘life-transforming power [that] contrasts the military virtues the Roman ruler displays on the battlefield towards the enemy of nations’ (Harrison 2013, 158). Paul’s Christology inverts the Pax Romana ideology, which has similarities with what the Pastors4ED movement is endorsing in Zanu-PF.  Zanu-PFism in Mnangagwa’s government functions as a conglomeration of political structures that draw on repression. For instance, while the government repealed two repressive legislative acts, the Public Order and Security Act and the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, evidence of ongoing repression is rampant in Zimbabwe, which operates as a testimony to the continuity of Zanu-PFism. It is plausible to accuse the Pastors4ED movement of scripture misuse, because Paul underscores the absolute rulership of Christ over all nations, rather than endorsing the imperial structure.

4  GOD OR PRESIDENT EMMERSON MNANGAGWA? ROMANS 13:1–7… 

83

The subversive notion of Paul’s theology defines ‘Christ’s reign and salvation as categorically different from the Roman empirical rule and soteria (socio-political peace, freedom, and justice, and economic prosperity)’ (Kim 2008, 19). Paul was advancing theological announcement of Christ’s infinity and the empire’s finitude. The empire defined itself as the one to offer soteria to the people—that is, the peace and economic realities were believed to be the doing of the empire and the emperor. However, observations that the Roman empire demanded a society that looked and acted like it, had its arrogance, and engaged in its violent colonialising policies (Keesmaat and Walsh 2019, 19) are important to consider in relation to the text and contemporary political spaces. However, within ten years, Nero, the very emperor whose authority Paul had commended, would unleash terrible persecution of the Church, with some believers being thrown to the dogs, nailed to crosses or set alight as human torches to illuminate Nero’s gardens and, in the end, Paul himself was beheaded as part of the persecution in 64 CE (Carter 2004). It is also critical to consider the language of reformation that Mnangagwa and Zanu-PF have championed since November 2017. Zanu-PF and its elites used phrases such as ‘Zimbabwe is open for business’, and regarding the voting culture, the ‘voice of the people is the voice of God’. However, the political culture present in Zimbabwe is at odds with this reformation and conception of God-inspired power. It seems that the voice of the people is only the voice of God when the people endorse the government; if the people challenge the government, then this voice must be quietened. The Pastors4ED movement, in campaigning for Zanu-PF, is influenced by the ideology of passivity demanded by the government of its citizens. For instance, in an October 2022 tweet,6 terms such as ‘struggle’, ‘defending’ and ‘fighting’ connotes a violent conceptualisation of political power. The defending rhetoric emerging from Zanu-PF appropriates the ‘nation’s liberation war history’ and the party’s claim of custodianship of traditional-­ cultural resistance movement symbols, such as the figures of Nehanda, Kaguvi, Mapondera, Mashayamombe, and Mukwati, to claim a connection between the first Chimurenga and the second Chimurenga in the 1890s and 1960s/1970s (Gwekwerere and Mpondi 2018, 8). This positioning enabled Zanu-PF to claim stewardship of Zimbabwe, even in the context of crisis. Kim (2008, 19) states that, 6

 Ibid.

84 

T. T. NENJERAMA

Paul believes in the ekklesia of the people who confess and obey Jesus as their Lord there is (or should be) better socio-political justice, freedom and peace, and greater material sharing than in the society under Caesar’s rule i.e., the ekklesia of the people who confess and obey Caesar as their lord.

Paul’s ekklesia depicts a renewed or new society that upholds the rudiments of social justice as a reflection of Christ. It is based on this calling for a new social standard that the Pastors4ED movement and its application of the Romans 13 text can be analysed. Zimbabwe’s second republic requires transformation aimed at administering democratic principles. I concur with Mukuka (2012, 106), who analyses the text from a postcolonial perspective ‘informed by hybridity, that challenges the African reader to give where praise is due but also to critique and challenge oppressive and undemocratic regimes’. The challenging of oppressive regimes leads the church to deploying its prophetic voice in a militarised state such as Zimbabwe. Paul’s theology heralded communal relations, which ‘is found in Paul’s appeal to a greater cosmology that transcends the one proclaimed by the Roman empire, or any polis is association with that’ (Harris 2013, 383–384). Thus, ‘however shocking, however scandalous to Jews and foolish to Gentiles; this is the royal announcement that from Paul’s point of view fulfils the prophecies of scripture and subverts the imperial gospel of Caesar’ (Wright 2000, 168). A transcendental understanding consists of the eschatology espoused in ‘earlier stages of the story of Yahweh and Israel with the “day of the Lord” being an occasion of salvation and deliverance for Israel and judgment upon those who oppose the purpose of Yahweh’ (Harris 2013, 388–389). There are political connotations to eschatology—imperial power is temporal. By underscoring ‘the primacy of loyalty to Christ, Paul implies that any loyalty to political authorities must be subordinated to Christ’ (Cobb and Lull 2005, 167), implying a hierarchy to loyalty—Christ reigns, Caesar is subordinate. The subordination of power to Christ removes political authority as derivative of Zanu-PF’s own establishment. If political power is derived from Christ, then its implementation follows a Christological perspective. With the derivation of earthly powers from Christological subordination, a question relating to demands placed upon the government that adheres to God’s principles is justified. By endorsing Zanu-PFism, the Pastors4ED movement also endorses Zanu-PF’s political system, which includes the adoption of violent machinations of political control. For

4  GOD OR PRESIDENT EMMERSON MNANGAGWA? ROMANS 13:1–7… 

85

instance, Zanu-PF utilises the Chimurenga ideology to endorse primal political legitimacy that disregards the need for free and fair elections, because it claims that the party received permanent oracular blessings from spirit mediums during the struggle for independence (Chitando 2005). The utility of oracular blessings is evident in the suppression of opposition movements. The disregard of pluralism manifested in Mugabe’s ‘patriotic historic mission’ (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2012) and in the 2008 elections, when Mugabe claimed that, since Zimbabwe had been won by the gun, it was not to be given up through a pen and a ballot. It also manifested in the November 2017 coup, which saw the rise of Mnangagwa, in 1 August 2018 political violence, and the January 2019 suppression of citizens’ protests over socio-economic grievances. In his Christology theology, Paul clarified that ‘the gospel is the announcement that the crucified and risen Jesus of Nazareth is Israel’s messiah and the world’s Lord’ (Wright 2000, 165). The messianic celebration points towards the liberative discourse as espoused in Christ, thus challenging any notion of celebration as emerging from the empire. Similarly, the liberative discourse on which the second republic is grounded has revealed itself as a deceptive rhetoric that caters for the needs of political and military leaders, rather than for the general citizenry. It reflects a Zanu-PFism that has no interest in social transformation for the social good. For instance, after Mnangagwa’s ascendence to power, army officials who played a role in the coup were accorded positions in the government. Generals Constantino Chiwenga and Sibusiso Moyo were appointed as the vice president and minister of foreign affairs, respectively. The endorsement of Zanu-PF by the Pastors4ED movement is rooted in a colonially inflected reading of the text that perpetuates subordination (Mukuka 2012). Subversion endangered Paul’s life. His declarations of Christ as King (Harrison 2013) resulted in Paul’s arrest, torture, and threats from the empire. The arrests also reflect the success of Paul’s gospel. The declaration of Christ as King identifies the emperor in subordination terms. It helps understand that, ‘if Jesus is Messiah, he is also Lord, kyrios’, and challenges the ‘lordship of Caesar which though “political” was also profoundly religious’ (Wright 2000, 168). Zanu-PFism divinises political leaders. Mugabe was divinised by various religious and political leaders. Mnangagwa positioned the second republic as God-ordained through the people’s involvement in the coup (Gusha 2020). However, with his declaration of Jesus as the Messiah, Paul is a

86 

T. T. NENJERAMA

travelling evangelist offering people a new religious experience of an ambassador of a king-in-waiting, establishing cells of people loyal to this new king, and ordering their lives according to his story, his symbols and his praxis, and their minds according to his truth. (Wright 2000, 161–162)

Based on Pauline theology, loyalty should be to Jesus, rather than to the emperor. We can also submit that the citizenry should adhere to Christological principles of social transformation, according to which marginalised people are recentred, and elitist superiority is challenged, thereby making Zanu-PFism a concept removed from the Christological outlook on political power. Christology and dikaiosyne ̄ are important in the text and corpus of Romans. Rome prided itself on the Roman justice bestowed on the empire by the goddess Iustitia, closely identified with emperor Augustus’ reign (Keesmaat and Walsh 2019). Moreover, the Roman goddess Iustitia, like Caesar-cult itself, was a comparative novelty in Pauls’ world: the temple of Iustitia was established on January 8, CE 13, and Iustitia was among the virtues celebrated by Augustus’s famous clypeus virtutis, the golden shield set up in the Senate-house and inscribed with the emperor’s virtues (27 BCE). (Wright 2000, 171)

The fundamental discourse that Paul advances exposes flaws in the belief that justice and righteousness emanated from Rome. In Romans 1:16–17, Paul declares that the ‘gospel unveils righteousness as God’s righteousness … meaning God’s faithfulness to the covenant of Israel, the Abrahamic covenant reaffirmed in Deuteronomy’ (Wright 2000, 170). Therefore, Paul proclaims the God of Israel as the one whose dikaiosyne ̄ is revealed through faith (pistis) (Keesmaat and Walsh 2019, 19). Thus, as practised by the community, justice derives from faith in Jesus, thereby challenging the imperial ideology of the empire as the institute of justice. As dikaiosyne ̄ is revealed through God’s faithfulness to Israel, it has implication for community living as expounded in Romans 9–11. Harris (2013, 383) states that, a range of relational categories is identified from the outset where Paul’s calling as an apostle and slave of Christ not only asserts a right to speak and instruct, but also locates his ministry as a herald of the gospel (1 Cor 1:17) and an instrument by whom the unity is established in Christ – a unity that grows community.

4  GOD OR PRESIDENT EMMERSON MNANGAGWA? ROMANS 13:1–7… 

87

This community living arguably functions as a reflection of the dictates of God’s covenantal conception of community in which, as Wright (2000) states, there are just and balanced community relationships, respect for non-Christians by Christians and Christians among themselves as a diverse group (see Rom. 9–11, 14). The fulfilment of the covenant by God to the Israelites aimed to restore fundamental principles within the Israelite context and, thus, enabled just and healthy community relationships.

Honour the Office Rather Than the Officer In the office versus officer dichotomy, I employ the ‘hidden transcript’ concept advanced by scholars such as Elliot and Scott in analysing the text. Hidden scripts refer to encoded language technologies that allow writers to convey implied subversive discourses, so-called because they ‘are spoken offstage behind the backs of the politically and socially dominant’ (Harrison 2013, 151) and require interpretation by ‘members of a subordinate group’ (Elliott 2006, 167) who, when oppressed, create scripts that obliquely criticise their oppressors (Scott 1986, 1990). This study refers to hidden scripts because the use of anti-imperial codes in ancient literature and iconography is more widespread, and it opens up the possibility that Paul rhetorically employs the technique for his own pastoral purposes in restricted cases such as Rom. 13:1–13; 1 Thess. 4:14–5; 11; 2. Thess. 2:1–12. (Harrison 2013, 151)

Therefore, Paul’s objective was to undermine the institution of power through implied communication with the formerly persecuted Roman Christians. Here, I examine the meaning of the term ‘office’ in terms of duty, as opposed to the person holding office. I derive the duty versus person dichotomy from the text where Paul demands everyone’s subjection to authorities, citing that authority figures are divinely established (Rom. 13:1). What Paul describes as the authorities’ duty operates on duality—to punish wrongdoers and commend those who do right. On this basis, authorities endorse and uphold God’s dictates, thereby ascribing to the text a ‘limited homage far from an enthusiastic endorsement of empire’ (Talbert 2002, 296 cited in Witherington and Hyatt 2004, 310). Accordingly, the question becomes, Do authoritarian governments uphold God’s demands? Contextually, does a corrupt government uphold God’s

88 

T. T. NENJERAMA

demands of an upright society? In 2020, Hopewell Chin’ono, an investigative journalist, reported on alleged COVID-19 procurement fraud of US$60 million by persons in the health ministry, which lead to the arrest and dismissal of Dr Obadiah Moyo, who was then Health minister (Nyoka and Tembo 2022, 4). The government arrested Chin’ono on grounds of inciting public violence, while Moyo was released on bail and has yet to face trial for abuse of office. Elliot’s (1997) observation is important to consider: the text conflicts with observations of lived experiences of governments past and present, and it also conflicts with the first half of the letter regarding the human being, who is subject to the power of sin, but does not do what is right and who may desire the good but produces evil. Paul’s intended audience should also be considered. Gaventa (2017, 13) states that Paul is not addressing the authorities themselves (local magistrates or the emperor), instead, he is addressing communities of believers about their own attitudes and conduct, meaning that categorising this passage as ‘Paul’s doctrine of the state’ can be misleading. Paul’s messages are directed to the Christian community in Rome and not the officials; hence, it cannot be considered a state theology. As a text addressed to the people, the people can question the authority requesting their allegiance. In the Zimbabwean case, the text also gives the option to examine the second republic’s behaviour and policies concerning the wholeness of life as intended by God for humanity. If the government does not offer pathways for wholeness, peace, and freedom, then it does not function as the authority placed by God; hence civil disobedience is justifiable. The text also highlights the notion of ‘undifferentiated authorities’ (Pinter 2015, 148). In the passage, neither ‘Rome, the emperor, or any individual office [is] ever mentioned – they are simply part of the ‘undifferentiated authorities’ (Rom. 13:1). Paul describes them as ‘finite political powers that derive their existence from God’ (Pinter 2015, 148). The institution and office, not necessarily particular individuals, function to uphold God’s will. Therefore, honour is due to the office for the mandate with which it functions. This leads us to identify Nero not as the divinised elite who had to uphold God’s will in Rome, but through the office he held. The notion of ‘undifferentiated authorities’ can be likened to democratic states, of which the president or elite are above the law; thus, the office as an institution is guided by constitutional principles. The story changes when the person in power averts and circumvents these principles to advance counter-constitutional actions and principles, as in authoritarian contexts.

4  GOD OR PRESIDENT EMMERSON MNANGAGWA? ROMANS 13:1–7… 

89

Charting the Way Forward—Theologically Challenging Partisan Church and Zanu-PFism Although Mnangagwa had embarked on a project of differentiation— defining his era as different from Mugabe’s—Mnangagwa’s political rule appropriated Zanu-PFism as a force that was conjured up to sustain Zanu-­ PF’s political rule. For instance, the violence during the 2018 election signalled the continuation of state militarisation to preserve gerontocracy and ZANU-PF’s ‘right’ to political rule. The violent continuum devalues the same rights on which the liberation struggle was predicated. This section is a critical theological offering that re-evaluates how the text can be used for liberative discourses to promote democratic practices in Zimbabwe. After observing the (mis)use of liberation history through electoral violence, corruption, gender inequality, civil wars, and genocides in postcolonial Africa (e.g., Mozambique, Rwanda, Angola, Zimbabwe), ‘African theologians called for ethical reconstruction’ (Chimuka 2020, 111). Citing Jesse Mugambi as the chief proponent of ethical reconstruction, Chimuka points out that the call for reorientation was made because the ‘liberation paradigm had run its course and needed to give way to reconstruction’. To promote development in Africa, ‘churches and their theologians [need] to respond to this new priority in relevant fashion, to facilitate this process of reconstruction [with targeted] efforts of reconciliation and confidence-building, reorientation, and retraining’ (Mugambi 1991, 36). Mugambi’s position challenges the Pastors4ED movement, which references and defends the liberation struggle as a basis for legitimising Zanu-­ PF’s rule. However, while the political liberative frameworks embedded in Africans’ anti-colonial struggles are fundamental, ethical reconstruction would make a transformative contribution in postcolonial Zimbabwe. Referring to the Romans 13:1–7 text, Keesmaat (2017, 153) infers that Paul is calling into being a new body politic, a new people whose overt love, blessing and care for the enemy and persecutor function as a challenge to an empire that knows only how to rule by wrath, sword, and bloodshed.

While the enemy of the Roman Christian community was the Roman empire itself, the Zimbabwean government, on the one hand, is the enemy of the citizens, based on the modalities of governance Mnangagwa’s regime has established. On the other hand, we could ask if partisan church

90 

T. T. NENJERAMA

leaders are the enemies of the larger Zimbabwean Christian community. To this question, let us examine Matthew 12:22–28, in which Jesus exorcises the blind and mute demon-possessed man, and the Pharisees conceived that he had done so by Beelzebub, the ruler of the demons (v. 25). Jesus responded, saying ‘If Satan casts out Satan, he is divided against himself. How, then, will his kingdom stand?’ (v. 27). Two principles emerge: An establishment thrives on unity, and self-contradiction is counterproductive. Pastors4ED, as a partisan church movement, poses challenges for the deployment of reconstruction in Zimbabwe. Gunda (2009, 94) warns that ‘reconstruction could end up in vain, if hijacked by the self-serving African politicians’. Similarly, in campaigning for Mnangagwa, the Pastors4ED movement presents challenges for the development of Zimbabwe’s objective transformation, because ‘for the church to join the gravy-train of African politicians … could be another self-destruct button for the church in Africa’ (Gunda 2009, 94). Therefore, the church, functioning on faith in and the justice of God, should seek to uphold God’s standards. While Pastors4ED asserts that it supports economic development and works to fulfil the 2030 vision of Mnangagwa’s administration, it should also attend to matters affecting Zimbabwe in general, today. In late 2018, public sector workers went on strike and called for unsafe working conditions and unpaid wages to be addressed (Solidarity Peace Trust 2019). Similarly, in January 2019, protests broke out due to the 250% fuel price increase (Pigou 2019; Solidarity Peace Trust 2019). The president of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions, Peter Mutasa, and Pastor Evan Mawarire, founder of the #ThisFlag movement, were arrested for urging people to participate in a peaceful stayaway. The Zimbabwe Republic Police and Zimbabwe National Army were deployed to thwart the protesters and engaged in excessive violence in Mbare, Mutare, Kadoma, Marondera, Hatfield, Kuwandzana, Chitungwiza, Glenview, and Epworth. Solidarity Peace Trust reported 17 extrajudicial killings and 954 arrests, with the capital city, Harare, Bulawayo, and Midlands accounting for 297, 237, and 187 arrests, respectively (Solidarity Peace Trust 2019). Furthermore, invasion of privacy, obstruction of movement, and limitation of media freedoms and access to information were reported (Pigou 2019). Considering the violence and breaching of the law by the government, it is important to question the partisan church and coerced political support.

4  GOD OR PRESIDENT EMMERSON MNANGAGWA? ROMANS 13:1–7… 

91

The questioning of a partisan church leads us to morality, Christian call, and action. I borrow insights from Butner (2023, 65) who, in assessing Romans 13  in relation to undocumented persons in the United States, underscores ‘the virtue of prudence – the disposition or habitus whereby a moral agent can rightly order reason and the will toward moral action in a particular context’. Butner, furthermore, states that this ‘insightful connection helps illustrate the concrete and situational aspects of prudence. Wisdom is a matter of both heart and understanding (Prov. 6:6, 10; 4:4–5; 8:12–14). It leads the wise person to act in a manner appropriate to the circumstances’. In this case, wisdom allows one to harmonise ‘volitional and intellectual factors’ (Butner 2023, 65) with circumstantial realities of Zimbabwe’s socio-economic conditions. Considering the high level of unemployment in the country, is it prudent for unemployed Christian youth to vote for a government those functions on nepotism and gerontocracy? Is it prudent for an unpaid or underpaid civil servant to vote for a corrupt government? Asking these questions helps the Christian community to juxtapose lived experiences and the nature of governance that pro-government Christian leaders are endorsing. Can we then argue for resistance? Paul implores the Christians in Rome to ‘pay taxes’ (v. 6), revenue, respect, and honour to those they are due (v. 7). In principle, taxes are a component of the mandated financial expectations of any government, and, as such, in the Roman context, Christians and non-Christians were expected to adhere to this civil duty—to resist was to ‘break the law’, since Paul says the Christians should ‘not resist the legitimate demand of the government’ (Witherington and Hyatt 2004, 312). However, ‘non-resistance is not passive resistance or civil disobedience, and Paul would have agreed that one should not compromise their faith when the law demands something ungodly’ (Witherington and Hyatt 2004, 312), such as ‘requiring the worship of Caesar’ (Cobb and Lull, 169). Voting is not ungodly; it is a civic duty citizens should exercise as the constitution permits, however, conflict arises when the church persuades people to condone ungodly practices, such as brutality and violence. The conflict brings the Church’s morality and ethical principles into question and advances a case for the argument that the church should engage in voter education, thus, fulfilling a social compass role. In the Church’s function of upholding God’s standards, we can consider Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s concept of ‘the cost of discipleship’. This cost can mean speaking the truth as needed for social transformation. Since the

92 

T. T. NENJERAMA

chapter assesses voting culture, I argue that this costly discipleship does not endorse any political party—ruling or opposition—but engages in holistic education—religious and political—and refutes coercion and subjection. Costly discipleship helps the church denounce Zimbabwe’s systemic injustices. In January 2023, Mnangagwa signed into law a ban on health workers (nurses and doctors) engaging in prolonged strikes and imposing punishment of up to six months in jail for defiant workers or union leaders (Al Jazeera 2023). Unsafe working conditions or unpaid or below-minimum wages, which make it difficult for civil servants to acquire their basic daily needs, are what cause such strikes. It is in relation to such preconditions that this study argues the Church should help congregants understand the broader frame of the socio-political sphere as it relates to coercive demands by the government.

Conclusion It is the Church’s duty to engage in critical theological education of its community and broader society, by examining biblical usage in contemporary politics. In addressing issues relating to taxation, Paul reminds readers that the Christians in Rome to ‘give to everyone what you owe them’ (v. 7b). The exposition of Paul’s sentiments is that ‘everyone’ can be taken to imply the wider social grouping—thus, believers do not function on the notion on partiality. When partisan churches use this text in politics, the wider Christian community must acknowledge Paul’s encounters with political structures. While he was once the one who persecuted the church as an adherent of Judaism, he was now preaching the gospel (Gal. 1:13–14, 23), to the extent that it resulted in him being incarcerated several times and persecuted by the Roman empire. Therefore, the text is not an endorsement of the empire, nor does it conjure up a state theology. It does not prohibit people from denouncing oppressive governments.

References Al Jazeera. 2023. New Zimbabwe Law Threatens Health Workers With Jail Over Strikes. January 12. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/1/12/ zimbabwe-­threatens-­health-­workers-­with-­jail-­if-­they-­strike. Ademiluka, Solomon O. 2019. Romans 13:1–7 in Relation to Nigerian Christians’ Attitudes towards Social Activism. In Die Skriflig/In Luce Verbi 53 (1): 11. https://doi.org/10.4102/ids.v53i1.2467.

4  GOD OR PRESIDENT EMMERSON MNANGAGWA? ROMANS 13:1–7… 

93

Beardsworth, Nicole, Nic Cheeseman, and Simukai Tinhu. 2019. Zimbabwe: The Coup That Never Was, and the Election That Could Have Been. African Affairs 118 (April): 1–17. https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adz009. Blackwell, Ben C., John K. Goodrich, and Jason Maston. 2015. Introduction. In Reading Romans in Context: Paul and Second Temple Judaism, ed. Ben C.  Blackwell, John K.  Goodrich, and Jason Maston. Grand Rapids: Zondervan Academic. Boesak, Allan A. 1986. What Belongs to Caesar? Once Again Romans 13. In Prayer Makes News, ed. Allan A. Boesak and Charles Villa-Vicencio. Philadelphia: Westminster. Bulawayo24 News. 2023. 10,000 Pastors Set to Undergo ‘Patriotic’ Training at Zanu-PF’s School of Ideology. January 7. https://bulawayo24.com/index-­id-­ news-­s c-­n ational-­b yo-­2 26684.html#:~:text=Pastors%20for%20ED%20 National%20Chairperson%2C%20Idiraishe%20Dongo%2C%20said,to%20 undergo%20training%20at%20Chitepo%20School%20of%20Ideology. Butner, D. Glenn, Jr. 2023. Undocumented Prudent Immigrants: De-Centering Romans 13 and Rule of Law in Immigration Ethics. Studies in Christian Ethics 36 (1): 62–83. Carter, T.L. 2004. The Irony of Romans 13. Novum Testamentum 46 (3): 209–228. Chimuka, Tarisayi A. 2020. The Zimbabwe Council of Churches and the Ethical Reconstruction of Zimbabwe. In The Zimbabwe Council of Churches and Development in Zimbabwe, ed. Ezra Chitando, 109–124. Palgrave Macmillan. Chitando, E. 2005. In the Beginning was the Land: The Appropriation of Religious Themes in Political Discourses in Zimbabwe. Africa 75 (2): 220–239. Cobb, John B., Jr., and David J. Lull. 2005. Romans. St. Louis: Chalice Press. Elliott, Neil. 1997. Romans 13:1–7  in the Context of Imperial Propaganda. In Paul and the Empire, ed. R.A. Horsley, 184–204. Harrisburg: Trinity Press. ———. 2006. Liberating Paul. Minneapolis: Fortress Press. Gaventa, Beverly R. 2017. Reading Romans 13 with Simone Weil: Toward a More Generous Hermeneutic. Journal of Biblical Literature 136 (1): 7–22. Gunda, Masiiwa Ragies. 2009. African Theology of Reconstruction: The Painful Realities and Practical Options! Exchange 38: 84–102. Gusha, Ishanesu S. 2020. Exegesis of Romans 13:1–7 and its Appropriation to the New Dispensation of the Second Republic of Zimbabwe. HTS Teologiese Studies/Theological Studies 76 (4): 9. Gwekwerere, Tavengwa, and Douglas Mpondi. 2018. Memory, Identity and Power in Contemporary Zimbabwe: Movement for Democratic Change Electoral Narratives and Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front Counter-Discourse. Africology: The Journal of Pan African Studies 12 (3): 3–23. Hafer, Carleton. 2021. Where Does Obedience to Government End? Understanding Romans 13:1–7. Eleutheria 5 (2). https://digitalcommons. liberty.edu/eleu/vol5/iss2/15.

94 

T. T. NENJERAMA

Harris, J.T. 2013. Pauline Theology. In All Things to all Cultures: Paul Among Jews, Greeks, and Romans, ed. Mark Harding and Alanna Nobbs. Grand Rapids: William B Eerdmans. Harrison, James R. 2013. Paul among the Romans. In All Things to all Cultures: Paul Among the Jews, Greeks and Romans, ed. Mark Harding and Alanna Nobs. Cambridge: William. B. Eerdmans. Kamete, Amin Y. 2019. Decade of Zimbabwe: Politics, Economy and Society 2008-2017. Brill. Keesmaat, Sylvia C. 2017. If Your Enemy is Hungry – Love and Subversive Politics in Romans 12-13. In Character Ethics and the New Testament: Moral Dimensions of Scripture, ed. Robert L. Brawley. Westminister: John Knox Press. Keesmaat, Sylvia C., and Brian J.  Walsh. 2019. Romans Disarmed; Resisting Empire/Demanding Justice. Grand Rapids: Brazos Press. Kim, Syeoon. 2008. Christ and Caesar: The Gospel and the Roman Empire in the Writings of Paul and Luke. Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans. Moe, David Thang. 2017. Reading Romans 13: 1-7 as a ‘Hidden Transcript of Postcolonial Theology’ in Myanmar. Journal of Theology for Southern Africa 157: 71–98. Morrison, Clinton. 1964. The Power That Be: Earthly Rulers and Demonic Powers in Romans 13:1–7. London: SCM Press. Mugambi, J.N. Kanyua. 1991. The Future of the Church and the Church of the Future. In The Church of Africa: Towards a Theology of Reconstruction, African Challenge Series 2, ed. José B.  Chipenda, C.K.  Karamaga, J.N.  Kanyua Mugambi, and C.K.  Omari. Nairobi: All Africa Conference of Churches. http://hdl.handle.net/11295/47586. Mukuka, Tarcisius. 2012. Reading/Hearing Romans 13:1–7. Under an African Tree: Towards A Lectio Postcolonica Contexta Africana. Neotestamentica 46 (1): 105–138. Ncube, Gibson, Oliver Nyambi, and Tendai Mangena. 2021. Negotiating the Zimbabwean Crisis Post-Mugabe. In The Zimbabwean Crisis after Mugabe: Multidisciplinary Perspectives, Routledge Contemporary Africa, ed. Gibson Ncube, Oliver Nyambi, and Tendai Mangena. New York: Routledge. https:// w w w. r o u t l e d g e . c o m / T h e -­Z i m b a b w e a n -­C r i s i s -­a f t e r -­M u g a b e -­ M u l t i d i s c i p l i n a r y -­P e r s p e c t i v e s / M a n g e n a -­N y a m b i -­N c u b e / p / book/9781032028149. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Sabelo J. 2012. Elections in Zimbabwe: A Recipe for Tension or a Remedy for Reconciliation? South Africa: Institute for Justice and Reconciliation. Nyoka, Payidamoyo, and Mary Tembo. 2022. Dimensions of Democracy and Digital Political Activism on Hopewell Chin’ono and Jacob Ngarivhume Twitter Accounts Towards the July 31st Demonstrations in Zimbabwe. Cogent Social Sciences 8 (1): 1–22. https://doi.org/10.1080/23311886.2021. 2024350.

4  GOD OR PRESIDENT EMMERSON MNANGAGWA? ROMANS 13:1–7… 

95

Pigou, Piers. 2019. Revolt and Repression in Zimbabwe. International Crisis Group. Pinter, Dean. 2015. Josephus and Romans 13:1–14: Providence and Imperial Power. In Reading Romans in Context: Paul and Second Temple Judaism, ed. Ben C.  Blackwell, John K.  Goodrich, and Jason Maston. Grand Rapids: Zondervan Academic. Reicke, Bo. 1984. Judaeo-Christianity and the Jewish Establishment, AD 33–66. In Jesus and the Politics of His Day, ed. Ernst Bammel and C.F.D.  Moule. Cambridge University Press. Sackey, S.A. 2011. Authority in Romans 13:1–7: Its Relevance to the Chiefs and People of Gomoa Traditional Area in the Central Region of Ghana. PhD thesis. Kumasi: Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology. Schreiner, Thomas R. 1998. Romans. Grand Rapids: Baker Books. Scott, James C. 1990. Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts. New Haven: Yale University Press. ———. 1986. Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance. New Haven: Yale University Press. Solidarity Peace Trust. 2019. Resurgent Authoritarianism: The Politics of the January 2019 Violence in Zimbabwe. Steele, Joshua. 2012. Romans 13:1–7  – A Contextually-Appropriate Reading. Doctoral thesis. Cedarville University. Taringa, Nisbert Taisekwa, and Godfrey Museka. 2021. Robert Mugabe as an African Traditional Religious Fundamentalist. In Personality Cult and Politics in Mugabe’s Zimbabwe, Routledge Studies on Religion in Africa and the Diaspora, ed. Ezra Chitando. Routledge and CRC Press. https://www.routledge.com/Personality-­C ult-­a nd-­P olitics-­i n-­M ugabes-­Z imbabwe/ Chitando/p/book/9780367899028. Tibaijuka, Anna Kajumulo. 2005. Report of the Fact-Finding Mission to Zimbabwe to Assess the Scope and Impact of Operation Murambatsvina by the UN Special Envoy on Human Settlements Issues in Zimbabwe. United Nations. http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/research/ZIM%20UN%20Special%20Env%20Report.pdf. Witherington, Ben, and Darlene Hyatt. 2004. Paul’s Letter to the Romans: A Socio-­ Rhetorical Commentary. Grand Rapids: William B Eerdmans Publishing. Wright, N.T. 2000. Paul’s Gospel and Caesar’s Empire. In Paul and Politics, ed. Richard A. Horsley. Harrisburg: Trinity Press International.

CHAPTER 5

Adventist Silence in the Face of Oppression as a Way to Enact Zanu-PFism in Zimbabwe Gift Masengwe and Bekithemba Dube

Introduction This chapter highlights a complex and challenging dynamic in the Seventh Day Adventist (SDA) Church in Zimbabwe. It suggests that Kudakwashe Regimond Tagwirei, a prominent member of the SDA Church and advisor to President Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa, has played a role in dividing the church along political lines. Through his position and influence, Tagwirei has acted as a benefactor of Zanu-PF within the SDA Church, thereby creating divisions between those who enable and support the ruling party, Zanu-PF, and those who resist its influence. The chapter suggests that Zanu-PF has utilised its financial power to manipulate and divide the SDA Church. Some pastors and elders may have colluded with the ruling party out of fear of victimisation, while others willingly aligned themselves with Zanu-PF, actively participate in politics, and stray from the teachings and principles of the church (SDA 2020).

G. Masengwe (*) • B. Dube Central University of Technology, Bloemfontein, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 B. Dube (ed.), Regime, Religion and the Consolidation of Zanu-PFism in Zimbabwe, African Histories and Modernities, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-46084-5_5

97

98 

G. MASENGWE AND B. DUBE

These new affiliations and identities within the SDA Church threaten its traditions, doctrines, and founding principles and have the potential to cause division within the denomination. Historically, the SDA Church in Zimbabwe has been politically disengaged and chose to remain neutral in partisan politics and active in addressing social injustices. The ‘SDA has a history of keeping silent on critical issues that befall humanity’ (Mlambo 2022, 2). However, the influence of personalities such as Tagwirei, who promotes Zanu-PFism, challenges the church’s narrative of neutrality. The chapter suggests that this situation has left the SDA Church on the brink of division, with potential implications for its relevance and unity. This chapter discusses the impact of Tagwirei’s involvement in the SDA Church in Zimbabwe and the subsequent politicisation of its structures.

Background to the Study The SDA Church has its roots in the Restoration Movement of the Second Great Awakening in the United States (Fiedler 1995, 98; Masengwe 2020, 3). The church began in 1844 as an Advent Movement led by William Miller. Advent refers to waiting for the imminent return of Jesus Christ, a doctrine based on Revelation 13 and 17. Upon disappointment that Jesus did not return as anticipated, one of the four groups that came out of the Advent Movement formally became the SDA on 21 May 1863. The SDA Church, based on scriptural guidance, follows the belief of worshiping on Saturdays. The church has been involved in constructing education and healthcare centres, including a university, and focuses on teaching its followers to be a distinct brand of Christianity that avoids direct engagement with the world, although its members are represented in every sector of the national economy. It has produced prolific writers and preachers who evangelised and spread the church in Africa, especially in southern Africa, where Jim Mainza (1881–1949), a respected and good African student of the Bible, arrived at Solusi Mission in 1898, near Bulawayo (Anderson 1904; Robinson 1979, 85). His converts became the backbone of Adventist missions in Bulawayo (Solusi), Midlands (Somabhula), and Manicaland (Nyazura). The SDA Church in Zimbabwe has traditionally been respectful and silent about secular life and politics, according to its founding principles and history (Mlambo 2022, 2). Ellen G. White, one of the SDA Church prophets, admonished that political actions such as voting were personal

5  ADVENTIST SILENCE IN THE FACE OF OPPRESSION AS A WAY TO ENACT… 

99

decisions. She states, ‘Do not feel it as your duty to urge everyone to do as you do [i.e. vote]’ (White 2006, 337). However, in Zimbabwe, when the ruling party, Zanu-PF, made efforts to involve all churches, including the SDA Church, in its campaign machinery for the 2023 general elections, the SDA Church was found wanting, as political involvement conflicted with its ethics and values. The SDA Church, unlike the Catholic Church and Ecumenical churches, had not been bothered by changing political and religious landscapes, as it was influenced by its ancient position that it cannot engage in socio-political reform at the expense of evangelism (Cottrell 1965), until the onset of the 2023 harmonised general election campaign in Zimbabwe, when SDA members’ faith was tested. Tagwirei, a prominent businessman and advisor to Zimbabwe’s president, sought to assert Zanu-PF’s influence within the SDA Church. He aimed to counter the influence of Advocate Thabani Mpofu, a constitutional lawyer, who had been associated with the opposition in the 2018 presidential contest and who held a prominent position in the Gweru chapter of the SDA Church. Tagwirei’s involvement in the SDA Church leadership was intended to divide the church and influence the electoral vote of its members. He saw Mpofu as representing a strong opposition presence in the SDA Church, as evidenced by Mpofu’s legal competences at the constitutional court against Chief Justice Luke Malaba (ICJ 2018; TechMag TV 2018), which could not proceed into the next election unchallenged. This interference aimed to undermine the church’s trust in Mpofu and the opposition party Mpofu was associated with, by infiltrating the echelons of SDA structures. Tagwirei calculated on dividing the electoral vote by dividing the SDA Church’s leadership. The behaviour of Tagwirei negated Ellen G. White’s Spirit of Prophesy, that says evangelism must precede politics, as Tagwirei took Christians into world (i.e., secular politics) (White 2006). It also violated the SDA Fundamental Belief Number 13, entitled The Remnant and Its Mission (SDA 2020), which sees the influence of church members joining a political party as taking people from God into the world. However, SDA academics at the University of the Free State in South Africa believe that Zanu-PF had concerns about the potential influence of President Hakainde Hichilema of Zambia on the SDA church in Zimbabwe. Hichilema, a respected SDA elder (Chilufya et  al. 2022), is said to have a close relationship with Nelson Chamisa, implying a connection between Chamisa and the SDA Church in Zimbabwe. The fear expressed by Tagwirei and Zanu-PF is that Hichilema’s influence within

100 

G. MASENGWE AND B. DUBE

the SDA Church in southern Africa may result in the church swaying the presidential results in Zimbabwe in favour of the opposition party, the Citizens’ Coalition for Change (CCC). Claims about the influence of Hichilema, in an often complex and multifaceted situation of political dynamics involving religious communities, remains speculative, as not all perspectives and motivations on Chamisa’s connection to the SDA Church can be validated. Chamisa’s weekly biblical messages, which conclude with ‘Happy Sabbath’, cannot be adequately evaluated to justify Zanu-PF’s fear of Mpofu or Hichilema, but there is a chance that Chamisa’s messages can have an effect on the SDA Church community in totality. The politicisation of SDA structures by Zanu-PF and Tagwirei had implications for the church’s identity, its relationships with other churches, and its mission (Masengwe and Chimhanda 2020). Zanu-PF attempts to align the denomination with its political agenda also led to the militarisation of the SDA. This reminds us of the infamous Professor Walter Kamba’s remark at a graduation ceremony, where he resigned as vice chancellor of the University of Zimbabwe in 1991, that ‘There are too many unprofessional fingers interfering in the running of the University’ (Magaisa 2015). In similar manner it can be argued that Zanu-PF’s unprofessional fingers have interfered in religion, even though it lacks adequate theological or biblical knowledge of how churches should articulate themselves in relation to the culture of Zanu-PF politics. The chapter draws on field reports, archival data, and social media references to shed light on the entanglement of politics and religion in Zimbabwe, specifically within the SDA Church. It highlights the challenges and consequences of such entanglement and the impact of politics on the church’s role and identity in the country. Our discussion begins by describing who Tagwirei is and what his involvement in the SDA Church is.

Kudakwashe Regimond Tagwirei and Empire Building Spree The Person of Tagwirei and His Business Empire Tagwirei’s background is associated with his professional career as the chief executive officer of Sakunda Holdings Group, which operates in the energy sector. The 54-year-old Tagwirei was born into an Adventist family—his father, Phineas Tagwirei, was a modest SDA member (Globe

5  ADVENTIST SILENCE IN THE FACE OF OPPRESSION AS A WAY TO ENACT… 

101

Answer 2021). Tagwirei has expertise in information and technology consultancy and systems development, financial management, and telecoms support and is associated with trading firms and mining companies (including platinum mining) and has shareholding in banks such as the Commercial Bank of Zimbabwe. He is reported to control several mining cartels and has investments in gold mines (Mkodzongi 2020). According to Mpini (2022), Tagwirei’s wife, Sandra Mpunga, played a significant role in establishing Sakunda Holdings while she worked for the Commercial Bank of Zimbabwe. Tagwirei is described as presiding ‘over a sprawling network of more than 40 companies spanning the oil, mining, banking, logistics, transportation, and import/export, which have been linked to alleged corrupt activities and state capture’ (Sharife and Anderson 2021; Ndoro 2023). Revelations contained in an elaborate list of documents found on the internet reveal details of transactions, legal documents and financial statements, and evidence of his access to power that allowed him to utilise offshore financial structures and complex business ownership arrangements to hide his control and involvement in the network of over 40 business companies (Njini 2021; Sentry 2021). It is assumed that Tagwirei uses family trusts and nominee directorships to keep details of the companies from the public. Tagwirei and Command Agriculture Tagwirei was involved in the controversial Command Agriculture programme in Zimbabwe, which was accused of corruption and preferential treatment. Funds were allegedly mobilised by government using treasury bills (Sentry 2022a). There are claims and rumours that Tagwirei allegedly abused the programme to enrich himself without delivering on the promises of the programme. It is suggested that he received government privileges without proper accountability. Tagwirei’s close ties with the president are said to have prevented investigations into allegations of corruption. He is accused of being involved in parallel foreign currency markets in Zimbabwe (Sentry 2022a). Tagwirei’s net worth is estimated to be around US$1.5 billion, and by 2021 he had ascended into the ranks of the top ten richest people in Zimbabwe. However, he has not received any known award for his business accomplishments (Globe Answer 2021). He uses ‘complex corporate structures and seemingly preferential government treatment to build his business empire and enormous wealth’ (Sentry 2021).

102 

G. MASENGWE AND B. DUBE

The appointment of Tagwirei’s Sakunda Holdings (an oil company) to run a billion-dollar project related to Command Agriculture has been criticised for lacking transparency. The procurement process, selection of recipients for the inputs (i.e., preferential treatment), and handling of the programme (i.e., behind closed doors) were allegedly hidden from public view (Nicolson 2022). It is claimed that Tagwirei received unlawful payments for Command Agriculture treasury bills from the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe; however, there is no evidence that it was used to boost commercial agriculture, because no commercial farmer reports having received seed and fertilizer between 2016 and 2019, when the programme was run (Nicolson 2022). Tagwirei proceeded to redeem these unlawful treasury bills under protected rating, so that he could pay off his foreign suppliers. The payment rating was favourable to him alone, as testified in parliament, and was done in hard currency (Nicolson 2022). Tagwirei’s business relationships are opaque and, hence, possibly shady (Sentry 2022b). Tagwirei’s Money Laundering and SDA Sponsorship Strategy Tagwirei is suspected of being involved in money laundering and is facing grand corruption charges. These activities are seen as emblematic of larger structural problems in Zimbabwe, where a few individuals use their power without oversight for systemic corruption. If true, these allegations raise serious concerns about Tagwirei’s support of the SDA Church and the potential impact of this support on the church’s integrity (Heywood 2021). Traditionally, the SDA Church does not accept donations that are the result of shady deals or operations that go against its principles. However, the donations made by Tagwirei, possibly linked to externalisation of foreign currency or money laundering (i.e., in the so-called gold mafia), may have influenced the church’s compliance to Zanu-PFism (Heywood 2021). Tagwirei has been sanctioned by foreign governments, such as the United Kingdom and the United States, for his alleged involvement in undermining human freedoms, and for corrupt activities using his ‘relationship to President Mnangagwa to grow his business empire dramatically and rake in millions of US dollars’ (Ndoro 2023). However, the SDA Church has not confirmed that it has reprimanded or sanctioned him, probably because the church has been muzzled by Zanu-PF money (Heywood 2021; US DoT 2020).

5  ADVENTIST SILENCE IN THE FACE OF OPPRESSION AS A WAY TO ENACT… 

103

Tagwirei is reported to have strong connections regionally, nationally, and internationally, including with Zanu-PF (US DoT 2020; Sentry 2022b). These connections, along with his financial sponsorship of SDA church leaders, are seen as political activities aimed at securing his business interests, which have affected the religious and theological health of the church by sponsoring denominational divisions. Tagwirei’s Support of the Church and Its Pastors Tagwirei’s sponsorship of SDA leadership allegedly threatened the peace (i.e., caused division), unity (i.e., caused discord), and tranquillity (i.e., caused fights) that used to characterise the SDA Church in Zimbabwe. Tagwirei reportedly provided material goods, such as cars and houses, and services to church leaders, which created privilege and disparity among them. It is claimed that the money used for this sponsorship may have come through Tagwirei’s connections with the political party Zanu-PF (ZimReview 2023). The provision of material goods generated by Tagwirei’s business activities and his alleged links to corrupt practices in politics are claimed to have imported corruption and immorality into the SDA Church. We submit to the assertion that Tagwirei, who provides goods and services to the government (i.e., through tenders), has made billions from government contracts, not necessarily legally. In return, President Mnangagwa, his business ally, uses him and his business empire to manipulate the electorate for votes (Ndoro 2023). This ‘has ponderously divided the Seventh Day Adventist (SDA) church in Zimbabwe, leaving its grip on faith solely in the hands of the Almighty God’ (Ndoro 2023). Tagwirei is said to have offered pastors and elders of the SDA church attractive benefits, including loans for housing and top-of-the-­ range vehicles, which don’t necessarily have to be repaid. This practice is seen as cultivating a culture of corruption and immoral behaviour within the church (Ndoro 2023). An interviewee quoted by news outlets reports the following: He is basically cultivating the culture of corruption and immoral behaviour in the church. What worries us right now is the fact that the church leaders no longer have capacity to rebuke or censure him because they are benefiting. Imagine, several allegations of adultery, corruption and using the church for money laundering and illicit financing have been brought to the

104 

G. MASENGWE AND B. DUBE

attention of the church leaders but they turn a deaf ear and blind eye to all of that. (Ndoro 2023; ZimReview 2023)

Accusations of adultery, corruption, money laundering, and illicit financing have been brought to the attention of church leaders, but they have reportedly turned a blind eye and deaf ear to these allegations. This lack of accountability is attributed to the benefits they receive from Tagwirei (Ndoro 2023; ZimReview 2023). In fact, the distribution of benefits to church leaders mirrors the practices of Zanu-PF, which uses farms and housing stands to bribe party supporters into voting failing leaders back into power (Ndoro 2023; Bulawayo24 News 2018). This behaviour has positioned Tagwirei in the higher echelons of the SDA Church leadership, with some members viewing him as a demigod who can make and declare decisions on behalf of the whole SDA Church in Zimbabwe. Tagwirei is said to control a cabal of pastors, including an inner circle of businessmen and advisors (ZimReview 2023). These pastors and businessmen are accused of travelling to the Middle East with top management of Sakunda Holdings and discussing measures to evade sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe by the West (ZimReview 2023). Blessing Nyahuma, a Mabvuku-born pastor who returned to Zimbabwe after studying in Germany, travels in this company and is accommodated at Tagwirei’s table and now blocks other pastors from having access to Tagwirei (ZimReview 2023). Tagwirei, Nyahuma, and Rusukira of the SDA Church are probably the main brains behind the formation of Pastors4ED. Aaron Rusukira, believed to be a medical doctor and pastor of the SDA Church, is suspected to have directly sponsored the formation of Pastors4ED. As noted above, influencing Christians to join political parties violates SDA Fundamental Belief Number 13 (SDA 2020)—it is regarded as pulling members from the church into the world. Worse still, the failures of other members from benefiting from the feeding trough have led such leaders to believe that the Tagwirei cabal needs to start a church of their own (Ndoro 2023; ZimReview 2023). Newspapers mention specific pastors from the SDA Harare City Centre Church (HCCC) who benefit from Tagwirei’s support, such as resident pastor Brian Moyo and his wife, Nyarai Moyo, who owns a flamboyant restaurant in Harare, Yanaya (Ndoro 2023). A new pastor at HCCC, Laven Moyo, is also alleged to have received benefits from the flamboyant ‘Tagwirei of Shurugwi’ (Ndoro 2023). These pastors are criticised for not

5  ADVENTIST SILENCE IN THE FACE OF OPPRESSION AS A WAY TO ENACT… 

105

living their message and for associating with corrupt individuals; the idea is probably that befriending corrupt individuals is indicative of their characters too (Ndoro 2023). The media make reference to Tagwirei’s cronies, including his personal assistant Everton Mlalazi and individuals holding influential posts in his companies, such as Obey Chimuka, Innocent Mugwisi, and Simon Dzete. Dzete, a former Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (ZIMRA) official, is now the chief executive officer of Delfina Customs Clearing and arranges customs and tax clearances for all Tagwirei’s companies (MrBarns 2023; Ndoro 2023). Some of these individuals have been involved in scandals, such as the 2020 Zimbabwe United Passenger Company (ZUPCO) bus saga. Dzete was the chief negotiator for Landela Investments, a company owned by Tagwirei, which, according to leaked government documents, imported buses and sold them to the government at exorbitant prices (Ndaba 2023).

Importing State Violence into the Seventh Day Adventist Church Tagwirei’s security detail, which is believed to be provided by the state, has been reported to cause violence in the SDA Church. An incident was reported where a man suspected of bringing a bomb to a church meeting was manhandled by security. Such incidents of violence in a place of worship (both bringing a bomb and manhandling a suspect) are rare in Zimbabwe. The report reads: ‘So this man came and was carrying stuff that the security assumed were explosives’ (Nehanda Radio 2022). This incident apparently took place when Tagwirei was teaching on Faith Driven Entrepreneurship in the presence of ‘revered South African musical group Sweet Symphony and top government officials including perceived Tagwirei allies’ (Nehanda Radio 2022). It is claimed that some of Tagwirei’s high-alert security detail was inherited from the late Ambassador Sibusiso Moyo, which could explain their vigilance in attacking the bomb-carrying suspect (Nehanda Radio 2022). SDA congregants who have spoken out about the issue have sought anonymity due to fear of Tagwirei. Some members have sought safety in churches that are not influenced by the Tagwirei cabal, and some have even formed new congregations.

106 

G. MASENGWE AND B. DUBE

Tagwirei’s sponsorships of the SDA Church, similar to Zanu-PF’s sponsorships through its cartels, have been seen as a driving force behind the division of the church. It is suggested that Tagwirei attempted to create a united section of the SDA Church that was aligned with Zanu-PF, to influence votes in the 2023 general election. The division between pastors and elders may, thus, have been fuelled by jealousy over the differential treatment church leaders were receiving from the cartel. The merging of politics and religion in Zimbabwe, both during the colonial period and early independence, has had negative consequences. Tagwirei, through Zanu-PF, is seen as attempting to reconstruct the connection between religion and politics within the SDA Church and impacting church unity.

The Moral Effects of Tagwirei on the Seventh Day Adventist Church As a disclaimer, we believe in the constitutional right of people to belong to any religion and political party of their choice. It is, however, concerning when a church becomes closely linked to ruling authorities, because the church may become disconnected from the unmet needs and struggles of the marginalised and disadvantaged people it is meant to serve. This can make churches vulnerable to political manipulation and pre-planned political agendas, as the church may lack the political astuteness of politicians, which can leave them susceptible to political manoeuvres that are in opposition to the best interests of the church or its members (Campbell 2003). The SDA church structures (i.e., of congregational autonomy) can minimise the influence of top leaders on the denomination and especially the periodic appointment and rotation of regional and national leaders. Doing so limits the effects of Zanu-PFism to the beneficiaries, without aligning the denomination in general with a political party. The Church, like any religious institution, should prioritise its spiritual mission and the well-being of its members over political affiliations or the interests of a select few (i.e., continue to uphold its values and serve its community effectively). We submit that it is important for the SDA Church, or any religious institution, to uphold its ethical standards and promote transparency. Any allegations of corruption or immoral behaviour should be addressed promptly and appropriately by the church’s internal processes. In fact, members should feel empowered to report any

5  ADVENTIST SILENCE IN THE FACE OF OPPRESSION AS A WAY TO ENACT… 

107

incidents of unethical behaviour within the church and, if necessary, seek legal recourse. Open dialogue, accountability, and adherence to principles of justice and fairness are crucial for addressing such issues and maintaining the church’s integrity.

Early Interventions of Zanu-PF into the Adventist Landscape: Sponsoring Solusi In 2023, the ruling party, through Tagwirei, the presidential advisor and church elder, made donations to Solusi University, including vehicles for officials and support for agricultural projects (including fuel and tractors). While donations can be beneficial, they can also come with expectations or conditions that may have the potential for causing challenges relating to maintaining influence and decision-making power over the recipient of the donation. Donations received from government could mean that the church must share its rights with government regarding the receiving institution. This could result in the influence of the church in decision-­ making processes and overall governance of Solusi University declining (Ndoro 2023; ZimReview 2023). There are concerns that the Zanu-PF government is contemplating taking over control of all institutions of higher learning run by churches, which means that churches will lose their influence over those institutions. State sponsorships are done in a bid to gain control and influence over the ownership and operations of church universities and colleges. The SDA Church faces the mammoth task of navigating this situation carefully, to ensure that its values, principles, and influence are maintained within Solusi University. Open dialogue, negotiation, and maintaining the church’s autonomy will be crucial for preserving its role and ensuring that the institution continues to align with the church’s mission and values.

Resistance of the Seventh Day Adventist Church to State Intrusion This study would be inadequate if we do not mention that some elders and pastors of the SDA Church have resisted the infiltration of Zanu-­ PFism and the influence of Tagwirei. These leaders view Tagwirei as unfit ‘to be an elder in the church’ (Nehanda Radio 2022) and have raised concerns about his alleged involvement in sex scandals, public corruption,

108 

G. MASENGWE AND B. DUBE

and money laundering. These accusations, although not independently verified, have created tensions and divisions within the church. The resistance within the SDA Church extends to opposing discussions of government tender deals and the formation of businesses within the church (Ndoro 2023). Such activities are seen as turning the house of the Lord (i.e., SDA HCCC) into a den of robbers; there have been complaints that the church has been invaded by money changers and that the moral compass of the SDA Church has been compromised. Elders of the SDA Church have called for Jesus to intervene and discipline (as he did, according to Matthew 21:12–17) those who engage in unethical behaviour. This sentiment reflects their frustration and desire for accountability and righteousness within the church. Further, regarding the issue of sexual immorality and adultery, according to the SDA Fundamental Belief Number 23: Marriage and the Family (SDA 2020), and the seventh commandment, which says ‘You shall not commit adultery’ (Ex. 20:14), Tagwirei committed a public sin that was supposed to be dealt with publicly to show respect for marriage vows. The church’s failure to deal with Tagwirei’s personal life, therefore, interferes with the functioning of the SDA Church. Such allegations are usually confronted by first establishing the truthfulness of the matter according to Matthew 18, by asking a question such as, ‘Pane utsi hurikupfungaira pazita renyu vaTagwirei, munezvokutaura here?’ [There are rumours of wrongdoing in your life Mr. Tagwirei, do you have any defense?]. Failure to do so indicates entrenchment of Zanu-PFism in the SDA Church or fear of Tagwirei by responsible leaders. Tagwirei’s church membership, it has been revealed, was once revoked because of a nasty divorce from his estranged first wife (Nehanda Radio 2022; Ndaba 2023; Ndoro 2023). He later impregnated his other former wife, only identified as Rumbidzai, which breached SDA regulations that forbid sex outside marriage. Tagwirei is said to be currently married to another woman, Sandra. These allegations make it difficult for a church elder who is being accused to influence politicians and public figures to behave ethically, because the elder does not behave in ways that uphold his spiritual mandate. Some elders and resistors, notably, well-respected SDA elder and top constitutional lawyer, Advocate Mpofu, top human rights lawyer and SDA Church member, Paidamoyo Saurombe, pastor and chaplain Munyaradzi Savanhu, and another Gweru-based pastor, Tapiwa Chinyavanhu, have taken their fight against Zanu-PFism and Tagwirei to social media

5  ADVENTIST SILENCE IN THE FACE OF OPPRESSION AS A WAY TO ENACT… 

109

platforms (Ndoro 2023). A post on Facebook on 16 November 2022 by Mpofu, seemingly directed at his rivals in the church, read, They loot the public purse, throw chum to an emaciated few in a pompous ostentation of generosity hoping to make political strides and we are all supposed to clap and sing ndonzwa kunaka dzokorora [I have enjoyed it repeat]. It’s deeply irreligious and satanic of anyone to lend support to such unblushing vulgarity. (Ndoro 2023)

Other pastors and elders have spoken anonymously to newspapers to express concern about the erosion of the Adventist faith and the acceptance of questionable practices. SDA leaders who spoke on anonymity said: Isusu [Us], we decided to transfer from HCCC because we wanted to preserve our faith. It’s no longer the Adventist faith we knew when we came to HCCC. What shall we do when pastors are accepting brown envelopes to protect this guy [Tagwirei]. (Ndoro 2023)

Resistors, such as Pastor Chiriga, a great preacher in Adventist circles and the Christian community in general, provide testimony against the development of Zanu-PFism in the SDA Church. However, Pastor Chiriga is said to be suffering from Tagwirei’s arm-twisting punishment (Ndoro 2023). Some weaker elders and pastors eventually succumbed and now support the development of Zanu-PFism in the SDA Church. The elders who spoke anonymously to the media argued that, ‘Likewise he follows in the footsteps of his boss, vanoita zvavanoda varume ava [These men do what they want]’ (Ndoro 2023). The actions of Tagwirei in the SDA Church, therefore, promote Zanu-­ PFism and play on members’ fears. Disgruntled members of the SDA Church have contemplated writing a petition to the regional office in South Africa to highlight allegations against Tagwirei, and the failure of the local branch to address the issues is an indication of the hurdles members have to overcome to deal with a rich politician who is also a leader in the SDA Church. They hoped that regional leadership would intervene and address the challenges faced by the SDA Church in Zimbabwe. Some of those who spoke anonymously indicated that Tagwirei had enough money to bribe and silence everyone in the regional office, and they were resigned to the situation as fate.

110 

G. MASENGWE AND B. DUBE

While Tagwirei remains determined to advance Zanu-PFism in the SDA Church, resistors need to be acknowledged for their bravery in advocating for integrity, transparency, and adherence to religious principles, because their efforts demonstrate commitment to preserving the faith and upholding the SDA values and ethos.

Conclusion This chapter discussed the challenges posed by the dominance of partisan politics in Zimbabwe, particularly with regard to Tagwirei’s influence and behaviour in the SDA Church. He exerts political dominance over the SDA membership and has introduced the unethical practices of the Zanu-PF government in the church. An eclectic combination of church leaders and members who have been involved in Tagwirei’s activities has compromised the church’s independence and this has led to the neglect of issues related to their spiritual calling. The intrusion of capitalism and alignment with Zanu-PF strategies have reshaped the beliefs and actions of SDA believers in Zimbabwe, thereby creating division between pastors and elders associated with Tagwirei and those with empathy for the suffering of citizens. This division has disrupted the peace and harmony that once existed within the SDA Church. The militarised landscape and the threat it poses for the church’s teachings, traditions, doctrines, and principles are also of great concern. Resistance to Zanu-PFism by the SDA Church has helped to expose the inappropriate intrusion of party politics into the religious sphere. Some church leaders and members have done small acts of defiance or outright resistance against practices such as adultery, corruption, and violence. These resistors have been willing to endure the consequences of their opposition to Zanu-PF’s attempts to reshape the religious and political landscape of the SDA Church in Zimbabwe. The chapter emphasised that the integrity of the church relies on the relationship of the SDA church with Tagwirei and the actions taken by church leadership to address the truthfulness of the allegations. It calls for transparency, accountability, and a commitment to upholding the church’s principles and values in the face of political interference.

5  ADVENTIST SILENCE IN THE FACE OF OPPRESSION AS A WAY TO ENACT… 

111

References Anderson, W.H. 1904. Youth’s Instructor. adventist.org, March 7. https://encyclopedia.adventist.org/assets/pdf/article-­AI7N.pdf. Bulawayo24 News. 2018. Zanu-PF Promise Farms and Stands for Women, Youths. May 8. https://bulawayo24.com/index-id-news-sc-national-byo-134911.html. Campbell, Peter R. 2003. Power and Politics in Old Regime France, 1720–45. Routledge. Chilufya, Lewis B., Peggy M. Milanzi, and Oliver Magasu. 2022. Christianity and Citizens’ Participation in the Electoral Process: A Case of the Seventh Day Adventist Church in Southern Province of Zambia. Asian Journal of Education and Social Studies 29 (1): 1–10. https://doi.org/10.9734/AJESS/2022/ v29i130686. Cottrell, Raymond. 1965. Churches Meddling in Politics. Review and Herald 142 (30): 12. Fiedler, Klaus. 1995. Post-classical Missions and Churches in Africa – Identity and Challenge to Missiological Research. Missionalia: Southern African Journal of Mission Studies 23 (1): 92–107. Globe Answer. 2021. Kudakwashe Tagwirei Net Worth 2023, Biography, Wife, Family, Cars, Age, House, Education, Sanctions, Kids, and Career Details. https://globeanswer.com/kudakwashe-­tagwirei-­net-­worth-­2021-­biography-­ wife-­family-­cars-­age-­house-­education-­sanctions-­kids-­and-­career-­details/. Heywood, Mark. 2021. Dismantling Zimbabwe’s Kleptocracy: Report Lifts Lid on Kuda Tagwirei’s Offshore Dealings and Sanction-Avoiding Strategies  – Zimbabwe in Ruins. Daily Maverick, July 1. https://www.dailymaverick. co.za/article/2021-­07-­01-­dismantling-­zimbabwes-­kleptocracy-­report-­lifts-­ lid-­on-­kuda-­tagwireis-­offshore-­dealings-­and-­sanction-­avoiding-­strategies/. ICJ. 2018. Zimbabwe: Jurists Begin Trial Observation Mission in the Presidential Election Petition. August 22. https://www.icj.org/zimbabwe-­jurists-­begin-­ trial-­observation-­mission-­in-­the-­presidential-­election-­petition/. Magaisa, Alex T. 2015. How Mugabe Strangled the Students’ Movement in Zimbabwe (Part 2). Nehanda Radio, October 28. https://nehandaradio. com/2015/10/28/how-­m ugabe-­s trangled-the-­s tudents-­m ovement-­i n-­ zimbabwe-­part-­2/. Masengwe, Gift. 2020. The Church of Christ in Zimbabwe Identity-and Mission-­ Continuity (in Diversity). Doctoral dissertation. Pretoria: University of South Africa. Masengwe, Gift, and Francisca H.  Chimhanda. 2020. Postmodernism, Identity and Mission Continuity in the Church of Christ in Zimbabwe. Verbum et Ecclesia 41 (1): 1–10.

112 

G. MASENGWE AND B. DUBE

Mkodzongi, Grasian. 2020. The Rise of “Mashurugwi” Machete Gangs and Violent Conflicts in Zimbabwe’s Artisanal and Small-Scale Gold Mining Sector. The Extractive Industries and Society 7 (4): 1480–1489. https://doi. org/10.1016/j.exis.2020.10.001. Mlambo, Morris. 2022. From Orthodoxy to Orthopraxis: A Theological Analysis of the Seventh-day Adventist Engagement with Development, Relief and Humanitarian Crises in Zimbabwe in the 21st Century. Studia Historiae Ecclesiasticae 48 (1): 1–19. https://doi.org/10.25159/2412-­4265/10596. Mpini, Siyabonga. 2022. Revealed: Kuda Tagwireyi’s Wife Made Him Rich. iHarare News, March 23. https://iharare.com/revealed-­kuda-tagwireyis-­wife-­ made-­him-­rich/. MrBarns. 2023. Exclusive: Tagwirei Divides SDA Church in Zim, Forms Dirty Cartel with Pastors. The Observer Zim, January 11. https://theobserverzim. co.zw/2023/01/11/exclusive-­tagwirei-­divides-sda-­church-­in-­zim-­forms-­ dirty-­cartel-­with-­pastors/. Ndaba, Mandisa. 2023. Business Tycoon Kudakwashe Tagwirei Divides SDA Church in Zimbabwe, Captures Some Pastors. Harare.com, January 12. https://iharare.com/business-­t ycoon-­k udakwashe-­t agwirei-­d ivides-­s da-­ church-­in-­zimbabwe-­captures-­some-­pastors/. Ndoro, Nyashadzashe. 2023. Exclusive: Tagwirei Divides SDA Church in Zim, Forms Dirty Cartel with Pastors. Nehanda Radio, January 10. https://nehandaradio.com/2023/01/10/exclusive-tagwirei-­divides-­sda-­church-­in-­zim-­ forms-­dirty-­cartel-­with-­pastors/. Nehanda Radio. 2022. Bomb Scare at SDA Church as Tagwirei Security Pounces on Suspect. June 9. https://nehandaradio.com/2022/06/09/bomb-­scare-­ at-­sda-­church-­as-­tagwirei-­security-­pounces-­on-­suspect/. Nicolson, Greg. 2022. How a Zimbabwean Tycoon Used Food Security Funds to Buy Mines. Daily Maverick, March 21. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/ article/2022-­03-­21-­how-­a-­zimbabwean-­tycoon-­used-­food-­security-­funds-­to-­ buy-­mines/. Njini, Felix. 2021. Zimbabwe Tycoon used State Ties to Hide Assets, Report Says. BusinessNews24.com, July 3. https://www.news24.com/fin24/Economy/ Africa/zimbabwe-­tycoon-­used-­state-­ties-­to-­hide-­assets-­report-­says-­20210703. Robinson, Virgil. 1979. The Solusi Story. Washington, DC: Review and Herald Publishing. Sentry. 2021. Shadows and Shell Games: Uncovering an Offshore Business Empire in Zimbabwe: Investigation Group Uncovers Zimbabwe Tycoon Kudakwashe Tagwirei’s Hidden Business Empire. The Sentry, July. https://thesentry.org/ reports/shadows-­shell-­games/. ———. 2022a. New Investigative Report: Zimbabwe’s Tagwirei and his Companies Received Millions in Possibly Unlawful Payments from Central Bank under Command Agriculture. March 23. https://thesentry. org/2022/03/23/6936/report-­zimbabwes-­tagwirei-­companies-­r eceived-­ millions-­possibly-­unlawful-­payments-­command-­agriculture/.

5  ADVENTIST SILENCE IN THE FACE OF OPPRESSION AS A WAY TO ENACT… 

113

———. 2022b. Legal Tender? The Role of Sakunda and the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe in Command Agriculture. The Sentry, March. https://thesentry. org/reports/zimbabwe-­command-­agriculture/. Seventh-Day Adventist. 2020. Adventist 28 Fundamental Beliefs. adventist. org, June. https://www.adventist.org/wp-­content/uploads/2020/06/ ADV-­28Beliefs2020.pdf. Sharife, Khadija and Mark Anderson. 2021. How a Zimbabwe Tycoon Made a Fortune from a Trafigura Partnership and Spiralling National Debt. OCCRP, October 13. https://www.occrp.org/en/investigations/how-­a-­zimbabwe-­ tycoon-­m ade-­a -­f or tune-­f rom-­a -­t rafigura-­p ar tnership-­a nd-­s piralling-­ national-­debt. TechMag TV. 2018. Chamisa’s lawyer Advocate Thabani Mpofu Presents: Zimbabwe Presidential Election Con-Court Challenge. YouTube, August 22. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fCrKd8bXz1s. US DoT. 2020. Treasury Sanctions Corrupt Zimbabwean Businessman. US Department of the Treasury, August 5. https://home.treasury.gov/news/ press-­releases/sm1082. White, Ellen G. 2006. Selected Messages Book 2. Review and Herald Pub Association. ZimReview. 2023. Business Tycoon Tagwirei Divides Seventh Day Adventist Church in Zimbabwe. ZimReview, January 12. https://zimreview.com/2023/01/12/ business-­tycoon-­tagwirei-­divides-­seventh-­day-­adventist-­church-­in-­zim/.

CHAPTER 6

Hearing the Loud Voices of the Silent Church in Zimbabwe Kimion Tagwirei

Introduction Zimbabwe was once the breadbasket of Africa. Sadly, throughout the long reign of the late Robert Gabriel Mugabe, through the militarised rise of President Emerson Mnangagwa in November 2017, until the present time, 2023, the ruling Zanu-PF party has politicised the country’s economy (Kanyenze et al. 2017, 6) and ruined the nation, to the extent that it is now a basket case instead (Magezi and Manzanga 2016, 1–2; Cook 2017, 1; Fenga 2018, 95–103; Moyo-Nyede 2021, 1–2). As reported by Bhoroma (2019) and Chingono (2021), the Zanu-PF administration is characterised by a dictatorship, political instability, policy inconsistencies, weighty taxation, command policies, and flawed rule of law. When citizens––who bear the brunt of poor governance–complain, Zanu-PF uses the military to close the democratic space, silence and cow them into submission for selfish reasons: conquest and retention of power. The Church is expected to stand up and speak out, as the voice of the voiceless, and the

K. Tagwirei (*) North-West University, Potchefstroom, South Africa © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 B. Dube (ed.), Regime, Religion and the Consolidation of Zanu-PFism in Zimbabwe, African Histories and Modernities, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-46084-5_6

115

116 

K. TAGWIREI

outspoken Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops Conference (ZCBC) can be commended for unwaveringly roaring, through admonitory pastoral letters and press briefings, and fearlessly contextualising their ecclesiology and hermeneutics. Contemporaneously, representative bodies of evangelical and Pentecostal denominations—the Evangelical Fellowship of Zimbabwe (EFZ), mainline Zimbabwe Council of Churches (ZCC) and Zimbabwe Christian Alliance organisation and their umbrella Zimbabwe Heads of Christian Denominations (ZHOCD)—seem sheepish, as they usually reactively write soft letters. Meanwhile, their members generally appear absent even when present by being passive in politics, reportedly due to fear. When the voice of the voiceless, paradoxically, chooses to be indifferent to tragic governance, introspection matters. Considering that Zanu-PF is predominantly militant and vicious (Chikwanha-Dzenga et al. 2001, 2), the relations between the Zimbabwean Church and the state have been characterised by combative engagements, which have not eased over time, but have, instead, retrogressively worsened the situation. Without ignoring the gullibility, corruptibility and partisanship of some church leaders who sanitise Zanu-PFism, this chapter notes the voice of the allegedly silent Church in a turbulent, vindictive and tragic context. The first section reviews and problematises Zanu-PFism. Subsequently, I define the silent Church. Thereafter, Church and political engagement in Zimbabwe is historicised. Then, I unpack the ineffectiveness and uselessness of confrontational approaches to the Zimbabwean predicament. In view of that, the following segment discerns the voice of the Church through her diplomatic, spiritual, social, economic and political contributions to the democratisation and development of Zimbabwe. Although the approach has not eliminated Zanu-PFism, it withstands it progressively, by enlightening, empowering and transforming citizens and communities.

Overviewing and Problematising Zanu-PFism Context and historical background is imperative for the comprehension of a topic under study (Dohn et  al. 2018, 1–17; Mohajan 2018, 5). This chapter is situated in the Zimbabwean political and economic context, which is under the reign of Zanu-PFism. Zanu-PFism is used in this chapter to refer to the governance system of Zanu-PF, which is characterised by self-­serving scheming, conquering and retaining power at all costs; corruption, polarisation, command polices, weaponisation of the law and victimisation and criminalisation of dissenting voices. I agree with Oberdorf’s

6  HEARING THE LOUD VOICES OF THE SILENT CHURCH IN ZIMBABWE 

117

observation that Zanu-PF is ‘a system of patronage, coercion and repression, in which criticism is muted and attempts to weaken the regime’s grip on power are answered with force and violence’ (2017, 13). Since Zimbabwe became independent from colonial rule on 18 April 1980, after dislodging the racist settler regime led by Ian Douglas Smith through a bloody war of independence called the second Chimurenga, Zanu-PF has become vindictive to dissent and accommodative to partisanship. For some historical reflection on the victimisation and persecution of dissent through Zanu-PFism, let us consider the cases of Canaan Banana, Joshua Nkomo, Edgar Tekere and Morgan Tsvangirai. Canaan Sodindo Banana was the first president of Zimbabwe, from 1980 to 1987, and an ordained minister of the Methodist Church in Zimbabwe; he was a theologian and professor of note (Gunda 2012, 23). According to Chitando et al. (2014, 178), Banana upheld Marxism and lost civic trust, as citizens perceived that he was promoting state theology. He was subjected to Zanu-PF and ‘attempted to co-opt the Church as he identified Christianity with socialism’. However, when Mugabe took power as the executive president in 1987, Banana took a prophetic stance and was eventually ensnared and prosecuted for sodomy and silenced. Similarly, when Joshua Nkomo was the leader of the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU), which was in conflict with Mugabe’s Zimbabwe African National Unity (ZANU) between 1982 and 1987, ZANU murdered more than 20,000 people in Matabeleland. According to Makaye and Dube (2014, 231), Joshua Nkomo, who had been given a junior ministry in the first government narrowly escaped death by fleeing into Botswana. The other leaders of PF-ZAPU such as Dumiso Dabengwa, Lookout Masuku, Makhatini Guduza and others were incarcerated on charges of recruiting, inciting and training dissidents and were only released on the eve of unity talks.

The conflict came to an end with the signing of a Unity Accord between the two combatant parties on 22 December 1987, which birthed the Zanu Patriotic Front (PF). However, vindictiveness remains in their system, even today. Tarusarira (2014, 94) explains that Zanu-PFism violently victimises dissent and mentions Gukurahundi [the wind that blows away the chaff], which involved the killing of an estimated 20,000 people, primarily of the Ndebele ethnic group, in the Midlands and Matabeleland provinces after the War for Independence in the mid-1980s, and Operation

118 

K. TAGWIREI

Wavhotera papi [for whom did you vote] in 2008, which accused people who voted for Tsvangirai and his Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) of casting the ‘wrong’ vote. To cement its power, Zanu-PF developed and implemented a one-party-state idea up to 1989. One of its senior leaders, Edgar Tekere, protested, formed the Zimbabwe Union Movement (ZUM) and tried to challenge the system—in vain, as he lost the election, which was deemed unfree and unfair by international observers (Makaye and Dube 2014, 231). Zanu-PF attacked ZUM candidates and supporters and continues to victimise anyone who criticises Zanu-PF. According to Rasch et al. (2021, 736), conflict between Zanu and ZAPU sowed the seeds of violent intolerance, hostility, criminalisation and persecution of dissent. Fast forward to 1999, when the MDC rose to challenge Zanu-PF. Its founding leader, the late Tsvangirai, his subordinates and supporters, faced harassment and criminalisation (Hulec 2019, 76). Today, Zanu-PF continues to terrorise anyone who dares to criticise its rule (Burke 2018). While Zanu-PF remains authoritarian, a number of scholars and the majority of Zimbabweans have been reiterating the role and their expectations of the entire Church to speak out, stand up and raise its voice about the failed governance and economic meltdown in Zimbabwe (Bakare 2008; Mambiravana 2015; Mpofu 2015, 83; Maforo 2020, 17–20; Musoni 2021, 7). Glaringly, only the ZCBC has been unwaveringly candid as the voice of the voiceless (Karombo 2020), by issuing reproving pastoral letters, such as ‘The March is not Ended’ (14 August 2020) and the Catholic Bishops’ Pastoral letter (18 July 2022). In turn, mainline, evangelical and Pentecostal churches have been commenting, albeit softly, through their representative bodies, ZCC, EFZ, ZCA and ZHOCD, respectively (Chitando 2009, 96; Tarusarira 2016, 64–65, 96; Paradza 2019, 5–6; Baloyi 2022, 60). In view of this reaction by the Church, the following section conceptualises the silent Church.

Conceptualising the Silent Church in Zimbabwe The Church carries a holistic mission which, besides kerygma, leitourgia and koinonia, involves diakonia (care for the needy, everyone and everything, as well as advocacy and promotion of citizenship). Through diakonia, God tasks the Church with being prophetic and ambassadorial for the sake of the voiceless. Recent studies reveal that most evangelical and Pentecostal ecclesiologies divorce diakonia from the mission of the

6  HEARING THE LOUD VOICES OF THE SILENT CHURCH IN ZIMBABWE 

119

Church, while others narrow it down to mere social service (Recepcion 2014, 72). However, missio Ecclesiae is supposed to be holistic (Ritchie 2019, 632), to demonstrate the gospel of Jesus Christ in all areas of life (Lee 2019, 23). Thus, the Church should attend to everything that concerns people’s social, economic and political well-being (Nordstokke 2013, 289). When the Church turns passive, it becomes a silent Church. It has been observed that the evangelical, Pentecostal and indigenous Apostolic Church in Zimbabwe is often muted by various factors, ranging from factionalism and political (ab)use (Chitando and Togarasei 2010, 160) to fear, co-option (Dombo 2014, 143) and diplomacy, which Togarasei (2018, 33) describes as ‘Salvationist, quietist, indifferent and unquestioning submission to authority’. Accordingly, in this case, the EFZ, ZCC, ZCA and ZHOCD, which represent the church in Zimbabwe, could be regarded as the silent Church, because they have been soft and not particularly critical about national crises and only react to public outcries with soft pastoral letters. The silent Church also incorporates believers, congregations, denominations and their representative ecumenical bodies that succumbed to polarisation, politicisation, division, exploitation, victimisation and co-option. The Church can, as expressed by Muzondidya (2011, 32), be accused of neglecting democratisation efforts since 2000. Furthermore, some of the former leaders of the so-called quiet churches have submitted to Zanu-PFism and compromised their prophetic voice. Well-known examples include Prophet Andrew Wutawunashe, a former EFZ president who was and remains a Zanu-PF zealot and enabler (Dube 2020, 4). Wutawunashe professes and propels the oppressive and self-­ serving agenda of Zanu-PF by claiming that the ruling government is God’s choice and by manipulating his followers and the whole nation to submit to the party. As noted by Musoni (2021, 8), Wutawunashe declared that Mugabe (who was overthrown in a coup in 2017) and Mnangagwa (who took over from Mugabe) were chosen by God to lead Zimbabwe as Moses and Joshua did successively for the Israelites. Prophet Samuel Mutendi of the Zimbabwe Christian Church is also a Zanu-PF enabler (Dube 2020, 4). Just after the military-assisted overthrow of Mugabe in 2017, both Wutawunashe and Mutendi initiated the partisan Zimbabwe Indigenous Interdenominational Council of Churches (ZIICC) (Baloyi 2022, 57). Early in 2023, they established Pastors4ED fellowship for pastors who support Mnangagwa, to counter critics and drive Zanu-PFism. At the end of March 2023, the ZUCC (Zimbabwe

120 

K. TAGWIREI

Union Council of Churches) and Pastors4ED ‘gifted the president a Bible and gave him a certificate of Recognition and honour for his role in the liberation struggle’ (Herald, 29 March 2023). A number of such chameleon characters command big denominations and a great deal of influence. Their actions divide and weaken the evangelical and Pentecostal church and, it has been argued, doing so muzzles the EFZ, ZCC, ZCA and ZHOCD. Bear in mind that the Church should assume a liberationist Kairos consciousness (Paradza 2019, 1–2), because of her diaconal role to care for the needy and oppressed (Nemer 2016, 27–28; Lee 2019, 23). Thus, the following section recounts Church and political engagements in Zimbabwe. Scholars such as Wyche et al. (2006, 36) and Ukpong (1999, 118) declare that theology and ecclesiology cannot be divorced from politics and that an exploration of history provides information and understanding of the past that can be used to inform current and future considerations and decisions. Thereby, the historical reflection that follows describes preceding encounters and approaches of the Church to Zimbabwean politics. It is from the following reflection that we will then evaluate whether the ‘silent’ Church is indeed quiet.

Historicising Church and Political Engagements in Zimbabwe Zimbabwe is greatly troubled by ‘retrogressive puppetisation of partisan gospel ministers, churches and victimization of those who dare to stand against political ills’ (Magezi and Tagwirei 2022, 1). From the reign of the late, politically shrewd Mugabe, to the ‘crocodile’, tactician Mnangagwa, the revolutionary and oppressive influence of Zanu-PFism represents more than 40 years of exploitative governance, which reduced Zimbabwe from a continental breadbasket to a basket case. As Adelmann (2004, 249) describes, ‘Zimbabwe has become a synonym for bad governance. Shaken by interwoven crises, Zimbabwe, once the granary and hope of Africa, is rapidly deteriorating’. In this setting, the ecclesial and political trajectory has been historically combative—since before Zimbabwe’s independence, until today. A host of scholars (Gundani 2008; Chitando and Togarasei 2010: 132–133; Zakeyo 2012; Magezi and Tagwirei 2022, 2–4; Shoko 2022) agree that political leaders and the Church have had a love–hate, bittersweet relationship since the colonial era, up to today. Reminiscent of

6  HEARING THE LOUD VOICES OF THE SILENT CHURCH IN ZIMBABWE 

121

the colonial era, Zanu-PFism is only accommodative of praise singers and vindictive towards critics (Majome 2016; Mujinga 2018, 253). However, history tells us that the Church played a significant role in the political environment of Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) between 1890 and 1980, as clerics such as Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole of the Methodist Church and the United Methodist Bishop Abel Muzorewa spearheaded African nationalist politics. Sithole was a founding member and leader of Zanu-PF, whilst Muzorewa was the first prime minister of Zimbabwe (Hove and Chenzi 2017, 1–2). That is why Paradza (2019, 3) reports that the Church collaborated strongly with liberation movements during the armed struggle and became a promising mentor of nationalists, by grooming Banana, Nkomo, Mugabe, Muzorewa, Herbert Chitepo and others. Conversely, Dorman (2002, 3–6) maintains that the historical Church–state relationship was always characterised by mixed and opposing experiences, which are accurately described by Mujinga (2018, 261) as a relationship of ‘soul-­ mates and antagonists’, whereby the state courted partisan and victimised prophetic voices. To sum up, Zimbabwe is a prison of its history. Aptly, Dombo (2014, 143) chronicles that the ruling Zanu-PF party has repeatedly co-opted, corrupted, (ab)used, violently tormented and eliminated those who dare to challenge its oppressive system. Obstructive state-schemed polarisation made the prophetic missio Ecclesiae very costly (Chitando et al. 2014, 174; Magezi and Tagwirei 2022, 3). As a result, the Church had to review its engagement strategies. Those who tried to stand up in defence of the oppressed were muzzled, which exposed the viciousness of Zanu-PFism, of which the following are examples.

The Case of Pius Alick Mvundla Ncube Ncube was born on 31 December 1946 to a rural family in Filabusi, Matabeleland South. He attended a Presbyterian primary school in Mbonqane, and a Roman Catholic primary school, Saint Patrick’s School in Makokoba from 1954 to 1962. Then, he completed his secondary studies at Chikwingwizha Roman Catholic School in Gweru between 1963 and 1966 and, in 1967, pursued theological studies at Chishawasha Seminary outside Harare, Zimbabwe’s capital city. He was ordained as a Catholic priest in 1973 and later continued his theological studies at various schools. He served at various dioceses, including St. Joseph’s Mission in Kezi/Matobo District, Empandeni and Embakwe Missions in Mangwe

122 

K. TAGWIREI

District, and at St. Mary’s Cathedral in Bulawayo. According to Tshuma (n.d.), ‘Father Pius Ncube was the first black priest to be ordained as an archbishop of the Bulawayo Archdiocese, taking over from Henry Karlen, a Swiss and prematurely left office on September 11, 2007, two months after being accused of adultery’. Kunaka (2007) reports that ‘Zimbabwe’s state-run media published what it said were photos of Roman Catholic Archbishop Pius Ncube in bed with a woman, a day after the outspoken critic of President Robert Mugabe was sued for adultery’. Kunaka recounts, furthermore, that the government-owned national broadcaster, Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation, state newspapers The Herald and Chronicle published the photos under screaming headlines ‘Pius Ncube Shamed!’, ‘Pius in Sex Scandal!’ and said that the photos were from a security camera hidden in Ncube’s bedroom in Bulawayo by a private investigator hired by Onesimus Sibanda, who is suing Ncube for allegedly having a two-year sexual affair with his wife, Rosemary Sibanda.

Apparently, Ncube had become ‘An ardent Mugabe opponent, [and] Ncube has accused the 83-year-old Zimbabwean leader and his government of human rights abuses and suppressing political dissent’ (Kunaka 2007). Ncube had declared that he was ready to face bullets in antigovernment protests to help bring about democratic change in Zimbabwe, which is mired in a deep economic and political crisis. The truthfulness of the accusation was not clarified, as he resigned from pastoral ministry, did not reveal his side of the story and stopped criticising Zanu-PF, and the complainant eventually withdrew the case. However, the presence of hidden cameras in his bedroom and corresponding state broadcast suggest the involvement of highly ranked Zanu-PF members in silencing dissenting voices. Chitando et  al. (2014, 179) comment that Ncube was muzzled because he stood up to defend the oppressed against the oppressive government. Overall, the case of Ncube provides a dreadful precedent, namely, that dissent leads to ensnarement, invasion of privacy, espionage, humiliation and being crushed at every possible point. Ncube’s case exposes that the democratic space is closed and in dire need of attention in Zimbabwe.

6  HEARING THE LOUD VOICES OF THE SILENT CHURCH IN ZIMBABWE 

123

The Case of Evan Mawarire Mawarire was born into a Christian family with parents in the civil service, on 7 March 1977 in Harare, Zimbabwe. He attended Amandas Primary School in the town of Concession from 1990 to 1992, secondary school Prince Edward School in Harare, and transferred to Salvation Mission Charles Clack High School in Magunje for 1993 to 1994. At the age of 16, he was elected to Zimbabwe’s Children Parliament and also elected Children’s president of Zimbabwe. In 1996, he pursued a course in auto-­ electrical engineering at Harare Institute of Technology. Meanwhile, he operated small enterprises while serving as a volunteer of a children’s ministry. He enrolled for theological studies in 2002 and took up a pastoral role with Celebration Church in Harare. From 2007 to 2010 he lived in the United Kingdom as the regional director of the church. Mawarire (2017) revealed on his Facebook account that he formed had his own church, His Generation Church, in Harare on 8 August 2010. As the Zimbabwean crises worsened, Pastor Mawarire decided to speak out and established the #ThisFlag protest movement in 2015, through which he mobilised and led citizens to protest in favour of national democratisation (Dixon 2016). Moyo (2019, 19–20) explains that Mawarire employed social media activism through an online monologue discussing the violation of the Zimbabwe flag. The #ThisFlag campaign mainly uses the Zimbabwean flag as a symbol of resistance. Mawarire with a flag wrapped around his neck, started posting videos which bemoaned government corruption, national leadership ineptitude and poor service delivery. In line with the social penetration and social exchange theories, his videos consequently went viral and scores of Zimbabweans in the country and diaspora joined his movement. On its Facebook account, the #ThisFlag movement articulates its vision: ‘Our vision is a Zimbabwe where citizens are emboldened to speak out, ask questions and act against corruption, injustice and poverty.’ Its mission was to speak out, ask questions and act … predominantly running from Facebook, Twitter and WhatsApp with occasional activity on YouTube and Instagram. (Moyo 2019, 11)

Mawarire’s protest movement attracted the masses locally and internationally. After a short while, Zanu-PF descended on him heavy-handedly, and he fled the country. In an exclusive interview with The Standard newspaper (2016), he was quoted from exile in the United States as saying that

124 

K. TAGWIREI

My family became threatened severely with many visits; my wife was threatened with rape and my kids were threatened with abduction at their school … I made the decision that I will not allow the people that took my father’s dreams to take mine. They have taken mine, I am 39-years-old but they can’t take my children’s dreams. You can’t do that.

While he declared that no one could stop his movement, state persecution, surveillance by the dreaded Central Intelligence and death threats eventually silenced him. In the same way that Zanu-PF victimised Ncube and Mawarire, it harassed and traumatised various other publicised prophetic voices, such as Apostle Talent Chiwenga, Bishops Levee Kadenge, Sifiso Mpofu and Anselm Magaya, for advocating for democratic spaces in Zimbabwe (Chitando 2011, 45). Other scholars, such as Hove and Chenzi (2017, 3), Paradza (2019, 5), Chitando (2009, 96) and Dube (2021, 7–8), conclude that Zanu-PFism relegates the Church to ‘spiritual matters’, silences her prophetic role and courts some churches. Zakeyo (2012, 10) and Magezi and Tagwirei (2022, 3) refer to the deposed Anglican Bishop Nolbert Kunonga and Destiny for Africa Network founder Reverend Obadiah Musindo, who succumbed to Zanu-PFism and demonised dissenting voices and blessed Zanu-PF under former president Mugabe. In attempts to promote its oppressive power, conquest and retention, Zanu-PF now also strategically co-opts popular and influential prophets, to weaken the Church and strengthen Zanu-PFism, by (ab)using them to sanitise and propel its exploitative agenda. Let us reflect on prophets Passion Java and Uebert Angel, for example.

Enter Passion Java Passion Java is a self-proclaimed prophet who was born on 29 October 1988 in Zimbabwe. He divorced his first wife, Yasmin Java, in 2015, and married an Ethiopian, Lily Tsegaye, in 2016. He founded his church, Kingdom Embassy (now Passion Java Ministries) in 2012 in Harare, and eventually expanded his ministry to the United States, under the mentorship of controversial prophet Uebert Angel. Arguably to gain popularity, attract followers and make money, he has been massively (ab)using social media, especially Facebook, which is accessible to more people than other platforms, due to its cost-effectiveness. A close analysis of posts on his Facebook page (under the username Passion

6  HEARING THE LOUD VOICES OF THE SILENT CHURCH IN ZIMBABWE 

125

Java) reveals that he uses controversy to charm followers by flaunting expensive paraphernalia, using funny street language and sexual innuendo (e.g., ‘Get ready for a prophetic threesome’ (accompanied by a picture of three men), ‘Saka aijazira iku benefita chi?’ (chiShona statement that asks, so, what does Al Jazeera benefit from its documentary about institutionalised and State-protected corruption in Zimbabwe); ‘saka muchaita sei?’ (so, what shall you do? arguably mocking citizens because they cannot do anything about the exposed billion dollar corruption that includes Zimbabwe’s ambassador at large to the Americas and Europe, Angel, the president and other state officials); ‘Habvisike! Haasungike! Haakundike! Saka muchaita sei?’ (chiShona meaning Mnangagwa cannot be dethroned, he cannot be sued. He cannot be overpowered, so what shall you do?)). His utterances also suggest that citizens should just submit to Mnangagwa, regardless of his poor governance, because they cannot do anything about it. Instead of standing as the word-bearer of the loving God who cares for the oppressed, the stance of ‘prophet’ Passion Java exposes the excessive indifference, inconsideration, brutality and impunity of Zanu-PFism. Meanwhile, he uses funny glossolalia in most of his prophetic ministrations (e.g., chiShona words ‘ndokundibhena, ndokunditetena’, which are reminiscent of Zimbabwe’s Black market wild exchange rates from the hyper inflationary year 2008, when those who had access to forex could get rich. Thus, his tongues could refer to unorthodox quick enrichment and enjoyment in volatile times). Considering that people love controversial news, many social media users follow his dubious posts. By 12 April 2023, he had 921,000 Facebook followers. Possibly observing his street wisdom and its effect on followers, Zanu-PF courted him through its stalwart Philip Chiyangwa, who appointed Passion Java as a deputy president of his partisan empowerment grouping Affirmative Action Group to campaign for the party (ZimEye 2021). Since then, Passion Java has sponsored Zimdancehall musicians such as Stephen Kudzanai Mamhare (Enzo Ishall) and Rockford Josphat (Roki); social media actors such as Felistus Edwards (Mai Titi) and Tyra Chikocho (Madam Boss) to promote Zanu-PF in their entertainment productions.

Enter Uebert Angel Uebert Angel (born Hubert Mudzanire) is a British Zimbabwean, who is one of the people Madzokere (2018, 280) and Marongwe and Maposa (2015, 16) refer to as ‘men of gold and gospreneurs’ (gospel

126 

K. TAGWIREI

entrepreneurs). He was born on 6 September 1978  in Masvingo, Zimbabwe. He studied finance and education and founded Spirit Embassy Church (now Good News Church) in Britain and eventually planted various other branches in different countries, including his motherland, Zimbabwe. Having won thousands of followers by claiming to work miracles and televising that, Mnangagwa appointed him an ambassador at large to the Americas and Europe in 2021, purportedly to market Zimbabwe as ‘open for business investments’ (Herald 2021). Recently, an Al Jazeera documentary revealed that Angel is a leader of a self-enriching gold mafia that also involves the president’s family and senior state officials, who are looting millions of dollars and impoverishing Zimbabwe (Al Jazeera Investigative Unit 2023). Overall, the cases of Passion Java and Uebert Angel confirm the co-­ option and (ab)use of church leaders through what Dube and Nkoane (2018) depict as consecration and repudiation to sustain the status quo and advance selfish political endeavours. Even today, Zanu-PF is bent on silencing the Church, cowing her into submission and promoting Zanu-­ PFism. In such a tumultuous milieu, which Lapsley (1986) reports gospel ministers being confronted by the difficult choice of either being neutral, co-opted, conscientious objectors, victimised, or at worst, killed, being confrontational demands an evaluation, as it can only exacerbate the Zimbabwean crisis, because Zanu-PF usually responds bellicosely. So, in view of the allegedly silent Church as that which is non-confrontational, let us evaluate the combative approach to the Zimbabwean conundrum.

Evaluating Confrontational vis-á-vis Diplomatic Approaches to the Zimbabwean Situation Zimbabwe has so much of combative engagements between the Church and state. Confrontational approaches could be, for example, bold pastoral letters, press releases, face-to-face meetings and protests. Let us reflect on pastoral letters issued by the ZCBC. The ZCBC authored numerous reproving pastoral letters, which include one titled ‘The March is not Ended’, which was released on 14 August 2020 (ZCBC 2020). As Manyonganise (2022, 7–8) explains, the letter challenged the Zanu-PF government to do introspection and to acknowledge the multilayered economic and political crises bedevilling Zimbabwe. It also condemned unresolved current failures (for instance, the failure to curb corruption)

6  HEARING THE LOUD VOICES OF THE SILENT CHURCH IN ZIMBABWE 

127

and past murderous evils intended to silence dissenting voices. Furthermore, it expressed citizens’ frustration and aggravation and castigated South Africa’s quiet diplomacy on Zimbabwean crises. According to Dlodlo (2020), Zanu-PF responded to the bishops’ letter with threats and called the bishops ‘detractors’. Anglican bishops and the EFZ and ZCC released solidarity letters defending the Catholic bishops but that did not change anything. Zanu-PF never reformed. Previously, the ZCBC, ZCC and EFZ had produced a document entitled ‘The Zimbabwe We Want’ (ZCBC, EFZ, and ZCC 2006), but The government censored it before it was published, and wooed leaders with invitations to State House … This meeting marked the end of the dialogue as sponsored by the churches and makes one conclude that the Church failed to rise above political patronage. (Tarusarira 2016, 60)

It is clear that pastoral letters have not been effective in easing the Zimbabwean crisis. Zanu-PF is a ruthless revolutionary party that thrives on crushing dissent, and as Tarusarira (2016, 61) explains, pastoral letters, regardless of how intellectually sharp and thorny they may be, make the Church distant from the people, and only provide interaction between the letter and the reader, or to be a little more fair, between the reader and the bishops, in an impersonal way, but do not provide a dialogical process.

While Zanu-PF’s backlashes confirm that it receives and feels the heat of the pastoral messages, the letters have not yielded reformation, transformation or democratisation, which are the primary purposes of the letters. Another confrontational approach is protests. The case of Pastor Evan Mawarire, as explained above, demonstrates the ineffectiveness and inappropriateness of protesting in the context of Zanu-PFism. Mawarire was labelled treasonous, criminalised and eventually forced to flee his motherland as a result of his protest movement. As Musvanhiri (2020) reports, ‘in Zimbabwe, dissent can lead to disappearances and torture’. In such an environment, militancy cannot resolve the crisis. As Mtize (2022, 5) concludes from his study of conflict resolution, that negotiated settlements are far better than confrontational engagements, which usually attract civil unrest. Aptly, Adelmann (2004, 271), in an assessment of former South African President Thabo Mbeki’s quiet diplomacy after the violent 2000 and 2002

128 

K. TAGWIREI

Zimbabwean elections, said that ‘despite its lack of success in bringing a solution to the crisis, South Africa’s policy of quiet diplomacy is by no means irrational’. However, Adelmann suggests that confrontational approaches could have disconnected mediatory engagements and worsened the situation, as Zanu-PF could legally hide behind sovereignty. While scholars such as Brewer et  al. (2011, 1032) believe that the Church should take radical action, beyond issuing letters, which suggests protests, I agree with Chitando et al. (2014, 178) that Zanu-PF tends to quell prophetic voices. It is unfortunate that the majority of humanity ordinarily expects every evil action to attract equal and opposing ecclesial reaction—in this case, many people expect churches to be militant in face of combative Zanu-PFism, even when, unlike Zanu-PF, the church does not have guns. Yet, extraordinarily, the tragedy of confrontation vis-á-vis the wisdom of diplomatic ecclesiology, political theology and strategies needs discernment to be understood. So, while the Church should uphold her Kairos consciousness by boldly speaking and standing out as the voice of the voiceless (Magezi and Tagwirei 2022, 4), combativeness is tragic, and thus, helpless, in the context of intolerant, brutal and armed Zanu-­ PFism. Correspondingly, the following section reports that the allegedly ‘silent’ Church has revised and contextualised her prophetic voice by applying ‘silently loud’ diplomatic strategies to achieve transformation and democratisation in Zimbabwe.

Discerning the Voice of the Silent Church As asserted by Chitando and Manyonganise (2011, 83), ‘criticisms that faith-based communities in Zimbabwe are silent and “have done nothing” to respond to the crisis are unfair and might stem from a refusal to appreciate their efforts’. These authors emphasise that most critics are unaware of the highly dangerous terrain in which religious leaders have to challenge injustice. It is clear that the presumably ‘silent’ church, herein specifically the EFZ, ZCC, ZCA and their umbrella ZHOCD, has been voicing criticism through spiritual, social, economic and political engagements.

The Spiritual Voice of the Church The mission of the Church is multidimensional, as it begins with leitourgia (worship and sacramental services), includes kerygma (proclamation of the gospel) and diakonia (care for the needy, and everything—all creation,

6  HEARING THE LOUD VOICES OF THE SILENT CHURCH IN ZIMBABWE 

129

including advocacy for peace and justice), and ends with koinonia (ecumenical, denominational, congregational and individual fellowships). While our troubled world cries for much diakonia, the Church remembers that her leitourgic (spiritual and worship) service demands much attention, mostly because, as Doss (2015, 30–38) says, it is holistically transformational, because it transforms lives, communities and nations. While the majority of Zimbabweans thought that the Church is silent because she was not confrontational in criticising political and socioeconomic evils, she has been loudly interceding for peace, progressive governance, democratisation and transformation in Zimbabwe. Through its Ministry Development Commission, the EFZ regularly organises and facilitates national prayers and conferences with the aim of the integral improvement of Zimbabwe. Correlatively, as reported by Munetsi (2022), the EFZ, together with the ZHOCD and ZCC, urge the community to continue praying, preaching and advancing peace, to achieve sustainable national development. Even though unbelievers may not value prayer, the Bible proclaims that God answers prayer (Matt. 7:7–8), and the survival and peacefulness of economically and politically hard-pressed Zimbabweans testifies to the power of prayer. Without divine intervention, hotly conflictive Zimbabwe might have, by now, fallen into a disastrous civil war. Complementarily, another church body, the ZCC, which has also been viewed as silent, established a multidisciplinary helpline and psychological support group that offers pastoral and professional counselling and psychological services to communities. In the annual report of the ZCC (2020, 23) it reports that the church acknowledges the volatile situation caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and offers psychosocial and spiritual support. Denominationally and congregationally, churches such as the Assemblies of God (Back to God) and Apostolic Faith Mission (AFM) traditionally observe 1 Timothy 2:1–5, which calls for intercession and submission of humanity and leaders to God to achieve salvation, peace and uprightness. In addition, the church’s evangelism and discipleship programmes have been transformational. Bearing in mind that a number of politicians and state workers are members of churches, they are regularly exposed to the gospel. While Zanu-PFism seems to be prevailing, praying, preaching, discipleship, counselling and related spiritual acts of the church mitigate against evil and sustain the nation.

130 

K. TAGWIREI

The Social Voice of the Church Understanding that Zanu-PFism suppresses citizenship and Ubuntu, the so-called silent church has been advancing and promoting a diaconal ministry. According to Ritchie (2019, 632), Lee (2019, 23), Recepcion (2014, 71) and Jørgensen (2016, 10), diakonia is an essential, comprehensive missionary role of the Church to care for everyone that is needy, and everything in need of help. Makwindi (2022, 10) chronicles that ‘the EFZ has been running a three year experimental devolution awareness project in partnership with the Zimbabwe heads of Christian denominations (ZHOCD) in Masvingo since 2020’. The project enabled the church to promote social cohesion and civic participation within devolution processes. When it realised that the majority of Christian young people neglected secular politics, the EFZ conducted devolution and citizenship campaigns, as well as drama, poetry, anti-drug-abuse and sports activities to foster social cohesion and tolerance, and to curb politically motivated violence. Considering that Zanu-PFism survives by violence, ruins lives and leaves many, especially youths, helpless, frustrated, with poor mental health and susceptible to drug abuse, these Church efforts have a louder voice than protests. While Zanu-PF looted public funds which were meant for Cyclone Idai and COVID-19 relief (Chiri 2021; Mhlanga 2020), impoverished, rendered citizens desperate and vulnerable to vote buying, Manicaland Correspondent (2019) and Muleya (2017) report that some churches, such as United Methodist, donated money, food and clothes to Cyclone Idai victims and, during the COVID-19 pandemic, the Apostolic Faith Church in Zimbabwe, and most other churches, offered prayers, food, clothes and psychosocial support to citizens (Pavari 2020, 316–317). Although these efforts have not dethroned Zanu-PFism, they empower citizens to withstand vote buying and blind submission.

The Economic Voice of the Church Understanding that Zanu-PFism continues to destroy Zimbabwe’s national economy and livelihoods, arguably to subdue the people, the EFZ, ZCC and ZCA have been mobilising their resources and financing and facilitating economic empowerment initiatives in communities across the country. Tagwirei (2022, 3) reports that

6  HEARING THE LOUD VOICES OF THE SILENT CHURCH IN ZIMBABWE 

131

Since year 2012 hitherto today, the EFZ professed and propelled integral mission, employing the Church and Community Mobilization Process (CCMP) which engaged denominations to engage their community, examine their situations, observe problems and, together, work out contextually relevant ways to address identified challenges.

Through the CCMP, the EFZ constructed a bridge and secondary school in Irisvale, staff houses at Espezini clinic in Matebeleland South province, a preschool in Jambezi community in Matabeleland North and a church building for Revival Ministries in Chinhoyi, Mashonaland West. Furthermore, the EFZ trained CCMP facilitators in more than 50 communities, who are spearheading transformative development in their communities. According to Makwindi (2022, 10), the EFZ joined hands with the ZHOCD and registered companies for young people of different churches, to empower and enable them to take up effective involvement in devolution programmes. Similarly, the ZCC ran empowerment projects that imparted entrepreneurship skills and resilience and citizenship awareness campaigns for inclusive nation-building purposes. As displayed on its website under its programmes and projects (ZCA n.d.), the ZCA trained and resourced villagers of Makhovula irrigation scheme and other areas to enhance irrigation farming and to improve their livelihoods. So, the ecumenical bodies saved many citizens from the economic effects of Zanu-PFism.

The Political Voice of the Church While Zanu-PFism scares the Church away from national politics, the EFZ has been driving a three-year (2020–2023) experimental devolution awareness project in partnership with the ZHOCD (Makwindi 2022, 10). The programme addresses citizenship and promotes social cohesion and civic participation within devolution processes. The project brought church leaders together, provided spaces for youths to discuss innumerable issues that concern them, presented social sensitisation training and offered possible solutions to problems identified. Additionally, Munetsi (2022) describes that the EFZ urged the Church to boost peace and development in their communities. The ZCC coordinated peace and conflict management and citizenship and constitutional awareness campaigns throughout the country. The ZCA interfaced with state authorities, such as councils and the police, and ZEC worked with

132 

K. TAGWIREI

church representatives. I attended some of the programmes in Masvingo, Bulawayo, and observed that they created spaces for Church and state authorities to withstand Zanu-PFism through dialogue on issues of concern, such as state capture, constitutional awareness, political violence, voter education and public service delivery. It cannot be guaranteed that these efforts will eventually democratise Zimbabwe, but that the Church enlightens, empowers and transforms citizens from the grassroots mitigates the impact of Zanu-PFism on citizens.

Summary and Conclusions Having observed the intolerance and tragic effects of Zanu-PFism, this chapter reported that engagement between churches and political parties in Zimbabwe has been vindictive and combative. In view of this situation, I evaluated the solution to this turbulent predicament and referred specifically to confrontational vis-á-vis diplomatic actions. Considering that Zanu-PFism is militarised and dissenting voices are victimised, criminalised and sometimes eliminated, the allegedly silent evangelical and Pentecostal churches contextualised the wisdom of diplomacy, because choosing militancy to oppose an armed system while the Church lacks deadly weapons would be useless and unwise. Thus, this chapter investigated the voice of the Church with reference to her diplomatic spiritual, social, economic and political engagements. It unfolded how the Church withstands the impact of Zanu-PFism spiritually through transformational evangelism, discipleship, intercession and providing psychosocial support. Socially, the Church addresses citizenship to curb other effects of Zanu-­ PFism, such as hopelessness, disengagement from national politics, voter apathy, declining mental health, hostility and poverty. Economically, the Church empowers citizens by promoting self-sustainability through the acquisition of individual and collective entrepreneurship skills. Politically, the Church propels devolution and constitutional awareness, interfaces ecclesial leaders and citizens with state authorities to resolve poor governance, state capture, misrule, public service delivery issues and political violence, and provides voter education. All in all, the Church has not been as silent as some people claim, just because the Church decided against belligerent solutions. The Church assessed the environment, realised the mindlessness of combativeness and engaged in diplomatic methods to deal with Zanu-PFism.

6  HEARING THE LOUD VOICES OF THE SILENT CHURCH IN ZIMBABWE 

133

References Adelmann, Martin. 2004. Quiet Diplomacy: The Reasons behind Mbeki’s Zimbabwe Policy. Africa Spectrum 39 (2): 249–276. Al Jazeera Investigative Unit. 2023. Top Zimbabwe Ambassador Involved in Gold Smuggling Scheme. Al Jazeera, March 23. https://www.aljazeera.com/ news/2023/3/23/top-­zimbabwe-­ambassador-­gold-­smuggling. Bakare, Sebastian. 2008. The Role of the Church and its Voice in Zimbabwe Today. The Zimbabwean, November 25. https://www.thezimbabwean. co/2008/11/the-­role-­of-­the-­church-­and-­its-­voice-­in-­zimbabwe-­today/. Baloyi, Ezekiel. 2022. The Relevance of Ecumenism in Zimbabwe: A Theology of Identity. African Theological Journal for Church and Society 3 (1): 54–77. Bhoroma, Victor. 2019. Policy Inconsistency Hurting Economy. Zimbabwe Situation, August 3. https://www.zimbabwesituation.com/news/policy-­ inconsistency-­hurting-­economy/. Brewer, John D., Gareth I.  Higgins, and Francis Teeney. 2011. Religion, Civil Society, and Peace in Northern Ireland. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Burke, Jason. 2018. Zimbabwe Opposition Face Wave of Detentions, Beatings after Election Loss. The Guardian, August 5. https://www.theguardian.com/ world/2018/aug/05/zimbabwean-­opposition-­reports-­human-­rights-­abuses. Chikwanha-Dzenga, Annie Barbara, Eldred Masunungure, and Nyasha Madingira. 2001. Democracy and National Governance in Zimbabwe: A Country Survey Report. Afrobarometer Paper, No. 12. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/98373/ AfropaperNo12.pdf. Chingono, N. 2021. Half of Zimbabweans fell into extreme poverty during Covid. The Guardian, June 21. https://www.theguardian.com/global/development/2021/jun/21/half-­o f-­z imbabweans-­f ell-­i nto-­e xtreme-­p overty-­ during-­covid. Chiri, Mildred. 2021. Bigwigs Loot Cyclone Aid. NewsHawks, June 12. https:// thenewshawks.com/bigwigs-­loot-­cyclone-­aid-­mildred-­chiri/. Chitando, Ezra. 2009. Troubled but not Destroyed: African Theology in Dialogue with HIV and AIDS. Geneva: WCC Publications. ———. 2011. Prayers, Politics and Peace: The Church’s Role in Zimbabwe’s Crisis. Open Space 1: 4348. Chitando, Ezra, and Molly Manyonganise. 2011. Voices from Faith-Based Communities. In Zimbabwe in Transition: A View from Within, ed. Timothy Murithi and Aqualina Mawadza. Fanele. Chitando, Ezra, and Lovemore Togarasei. 2010. ‘June 2008, verse 27’: The Church and the 2008 Zimbabwean Political Crisis. African Identities 8 (2): 151–162. https://doi.org/10.1080/14725841003629633. Chitando, Ezra, Nisbert T. Taringa, and Tapiwa P. Mapuranga. 2014. Zimbabwean Theology and Religious Studies during the Crisis Years (2000–2008): A Preliminary Study. Studia Historiae Ecclesiasticae 40 (1): 173–189.

134 

K. TAGWIREI

Cook, Nicolas. 2017. Zimbabwe: A Military-Compelled Transition? CRS Insight. https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/IN10819.pdf Dixon, Robyn. 2016. Why a Modest Pastor with a Flag is so Threatening to Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe. Los Angeles Times, August 31. https://www.latimes.com/world/africa/la-­f g-­z imbabwe-­f lag-­m an-­s nap-­ htmlstory.html. Dlodlo, Dumisani. 2020. Mnangagwa Issues Veiled Threat against ‘Meddling’ Catholic Bishops. CITE, August 19. https://cite.org.zw/mnangagwa-­issues-­ veiled-­threat-­against-­meddling-­catholic-­bishops/. Dohn, Nina Bonderup, Stig Børsen Hansen, and Søren Harnow Klausen. 2018. On the Concept of Context. Education Sciences 8 (3): 111. https://doi. org/10.3390/educsci8030111. Dombo, Sylvester. 2014. Refusing to be Co-opted? Church Organizations and Reconciliation in Zimbabwe with Special Reference to the Christian Alliance of Zimbabwe 2005–2013. Journal for the Study of Religion 27 (2): 137–171. Dorman, Sara Rich. 2002. ‘Rocking the Boat?’ Church NGOs and Democratization in Zimbabwe. African Affairs 101 (402): 75–92. https://doi.org/10.1093/ afraf/101.402.75. Doss, Thomas Wayne. 2015. Spiritual Transformation and its Implications for Christian Worship. Master’s thesis. Liberty University. https://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/masters/364/. Dube, Bekithemba. 2020. Regime Enablers and Captured Religious Mandate in Zimbabwe. Verbum et Ecclesia 41 (1): a2126. https://doi.org/10.4102/ ve.v41i1.2126. ———. 2021. ‘To Hell with Bishops’: Rethinking the Nexus of State, Law and Religion in Times of Crisis in Zimbabwe. Religions 12 (5): 304. https://doi. org/10.3390/rel12050304. Dube, Bekithemba, and Milton Molebatsi Nkoane. 2018. The Interface of Politics and Religion in Zimbabwe: Rethinking Religious Leaders as Agents of Consecration and Repudiation. Alternation 23 (December): 224–243. Fenga, Vincent Farirai. 2018. Prophetic Preaching in Neo-Pentecostal Christianity during the Socio-Economic and Socio-Political Crisis of Zimbabwe (2000–2012): A Practical Theological Exploration. PhD thesis. University of Pretoria. http:// hdl.handle.net/2263/66336. Gunda, Masiiwa Ragies. 2012. Rewriting the Bible or Debiblifying the Public Sphere? Proposal and Propositions on the Usage of the Bible by Public Figures in Zimbabwe. In The Bible and Politics in Africa, ed. Masiiwa Ragies Gunda, and Joachim Kügler, 22–41. Bible in Africa Studies, Études Sur La Bible En Afrique = Bibel-in-Afrika-Studien, Volume 7. Bamberg: University of Bamberg Press. Gundani, Paul. 2008. Prophecy, Politics and Power: Changing Relations between the Catholic Church and the Zimbabwean State (1980–2007). Studia Historiae Ecclesiasticae XXXIV (1): 211–244.

6  HEARING THE LOUD VOICES OF THE SILENT CHURCH IN ZIMBABWE 

135

Herald. 2021. President Appoints Angel Ambassador. The Herald, March 18. https://www.herald.co.zw/president-­appoints-­angel-­ambassador/. ———. 2023. President honoured. The Herald, March 29. https://twitter.com/ HeraldZimbabwe/status/1641032112756105216. Hove, Mediel, and Vincent Chenzi. 2017. ‘Prophets of Doom’: The Zimbabwean Christian Community and Contemporary Politics. Insight on Africa 9 (2): 173–195. https://doi.org/10.1177/0975087817710054. Hulec, Otakar. 2019. The Development of an Authoritarian Regime in Zimbabwe from 1980 to the Present Day. Asian and African Studies 28 (1): 57–90. https://www.sav.sk/journals/uploads/0521122404_HULEC_final.pdf. Jørgensen, Knud. 2016. Biblical Perspectives on Kerygma and Diakonia. In Evangelism and Diakonia in Context, ed. Rose Dowsett, Isabel Phiri, Doug Birdsall, Hwa Yung, Knud Jørgensen, and Dawit Olika Terfassa, 32–37. Oxford: 1517 Media, Fortress Press. https://www.academia.edu/24459425/ Biblical_Perspectives_on_Kerygma_and_Diakonia. Kanyenze, Godfrey, Prosper Chitambara, and Judith Tyson. 2017. The Outlook for the Zimbabwean Economy. SET (Supporting Economic Transformation). https://set.odi.org/wp-­c ontent/uploads/2017/08/SET-­O utlook-­f or-­ Zimbabwe-­Economy_Sep2017.pdf. Karombo, Tawanda. 2020. Can the Church Do More to Ease Political Tension in Zimbabwe? America, the Jesuit Review, March. https://www.americamagazine.org/politics-­society/2020/03/16/can-­church-­do-­more-­ease-­political-­ tension-­zimbabwe Kunaka, Cris. 2007. Anti-Mugabe Cleric Ensnared in Alleged Sex Scandal. Reuters, July 17. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-­zimbabwe-­bishop-­mugabe-­ idUSL1781552220070717. Lapsley, Michael. 1986. Neutrality or Co-Option? Anglican Church and State from 1964 until the Independence of Zimbabwe. Gweru: Mambo Press. Lee, Song Kon. 2019. Diakonia as Christian Mission: With Particular Reference to Pentecostal and Charismatic Movements in Korea. PhD thesis. University of Birmingham. https://etheses.bham.ac.uk/id/eprint/10402/7/lee2020 phd.pdf. Madzokere, Nyasha. 2018. Prophets or Profiteers? An Interrogative Study of the Selected Contemporary Pentecostal Prophets in Zimbabwe in the Context of Development. Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa 20 (1): 276–289. Maforo, Byron. 2020. The Role of the Church in Promoting Political Dialogue in a Polarized Society: The Case of Zimbabwe Council of Churches 2017–2020. Master’s dissertation. Harare: University of Zimbabwe. Magezi, Vhumani, and Peter Manzanga. 2016. Prosperity and Health Ministry as a Coping Mechanism in the Poverty and Suffering Context of Zimbabwe: A Pastoral Evaluation and Response. In Die Skriflig 50 (1): 1–10. https://doi. org/10.4102/ids.v50i1.2076.

136 

K. TAGWIREI

Magezi, Christopher, and Kimion Tagwirei. 2022. A Critical Assessment of Church and Political Engagement in Zimbabwe under the New Dispensation. Verbum et Ecclesia 43 (1): a2527. https://doi.org/10.4102/ve.v43i1.2527. Majome, Miriam Tose. 2016. Religion, Politics and the Law. NewsDay, September 24. https://www.newsday.co.zw/opinion-­amp-­a nalysis/article/85902/ religion-­politics-­and-­the-­law. Makaye, Peter, and Brian Dube. 2014. Zimbabwe: The Challenge of Democracy from Below, 1980 to 2013. International Journal of Political Science and Development 2 (10): 227–236. https://doi.org/10.14662/IJPSD2014.017. Makwindi, E. 2022. EFZ and ZHOCD’s Devolution Awareness Impactful in Masvingo. Ecclesia Today, July 1–September 30. Mambiravana, Simba Joe. 2015. The Church has let Down the Voiceless. The Standard, October 25. https://www.newsday.co.zw/thestandard/2015/ 10/25/the-­church-­has-­let-­down-­the-­voiceless. Manicaland Correspondent. 2019. Church Donates US$20k to Idai Victims. The Herald, May 2. https://www.herald.co.zw/church-­donates-­us20k-­to-­idai-­ victims/. Manyonganise, Molly. 2022. ‘The March Is Not Ended’: ‘Church’ Confronting the State over the Zimbabwean Crisis. Religions 13 (2): 107. https://doi. org/10.3390/rel13020107. Marongwe, Ngonidzashe, and Richard S. Maposa. 2015. PhDs, Gospreneurship, Globalization and the Pentecostal ‘New Wave’ in Zimbabwe. Afro Asian Journal of Social Sciences VI: 1. Mawarire, Evan. 2017. 7 Years Ago on 8 August 2010, We Began a Journey of Faith to Inspire Generations. Facebook, August 8. https://www.facebook. com/profile.php?id=100068968697620. Mhlanga, Blessed. 2020. Govt Bigwigs Looting COVID-19 Funds. Newsday Zimbabwe, May 2. https://www.newsday.co.zw/news/article/47057/govt-­ bigwigs-­looting-­covid-­19-­funds. Mohajan, Haradhan K. 2018. Qualitative Research Methodology in Social Sciences and Related Subjects. Journal of Economic Development, Environment and People 7 (1): 23–48. https://mpra.ub.uni-­muenchen.de/85654/1/MPRA_ paper_85654.pdf. Moyo, Charles. 2019. Social Media, Civil Resistance, the Varakashi Factor and the Shifting Polemics of Zimbabwe’s Social Media ‘War’. Global Media Journal 12 (1): 1–36. Moyo-Nyede, Simangele. 2021. Zimbabweans Blame Government, Not Sanctions, for Country’s Economic Meltdown. Afrobarometer Dispatch. No. 485. https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/migrated/files/publications/Dispatches/ad485-zimbabweans_blame_government_not_sanctions_ for_economic_meltdown-afrobarometer_dispatch-bh-28oct21.pdf.

6  HEARING THE LOUD VOICES OF THE SILENT CHURCH IN ZIMBABWE 

137

Mpofu, Sifiso. 2015. The Theological Dilemma vis-à-vis the Moral Options for Relevant and Practical Ministry Today: Lessons for the Zimbabwe Council of Churches. Studia Historiae Ecclesiasticae (SHE) 41 (January). https://doi. org/10.17159/2412-­4265/2015/v41n1a6. Mtize, Listen Tererai. 2022. A Review of Negotiated Settlements as Conflict Resolution Strategies in Zimbabwe. Journal of Political Sciences and Public Affairs 10 (2): 14–16. https://doi.org/10.35248/2332-­0761.22.10.002. Mujinga, Martin. 2018. ‘Religion as a Riding Horse of Politics?’ A Critical Evaluation of Political Influence in the Zimbabwean Ecclesiastical Life. Alternation 23 (December): 244–265. Muleya, Thupeyo. 2017. UFIC Donates to Flood Victims. The Herald, December 14. https://www.herald.co.zw/ufic-­donates-­to-­flood-­victims/. Munetsi, Yuekai. 2022. Be Preachers of Peace – EFZ Urges Gweru Community. TellZim, October 6. https://tellzim.com/be-­preachers-­of-­peace-­efz-­urges-­ gweru-­community/. Musoni, Phillip. 2021. Spiritualised Political Theology in a Polarised Political Environment: A Pentecostal Movement’s Response to Party Politics in Zimbabwe. HTS Teologiese Studies/Theological Studies 77 (4): 8. https://doi. org/10.4102/hts.v77i4.6312. Musvanhiri, Privilege. 2020. In Zimbabwe, Dissent can Lead to Disappearances and Torture. DW, June 18. https://www.dw.com/en/in-­zimbabwe-dissent-­ can-­lead-­to-­disappearances-­and-­torture/a-­53862165. Muzondidya, James. 2011. The Zimbabwean Diaspora: Opportunities and Challenges for Engagement in Zimbabwe’s Political Development and Economic Transformation. In Zimbabwe in Transition: A View from Within, ed. Timothy Murithi and Aquilina Mawadza, 112–158. Jacana Media. Nemer, Larry. 2016. Evangelism, Diakonia and Social Responsibility: Perspectives from the History of Mission. In Evangelism and Diakonia in Context, ed. Rose Dowsett, Isabel Phiri, Doug Birdsall, Dawit Olika Terfassa, Hwa Yung, and Knud Jørgensen, 19–30. Oxford: Regnum Books International. Nordstokke, Kjell. 2013. Diakonia and diaconate in the World Council of Churches. International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church 13 (4): 286–299. https://doi.org/10.1080/1474225X.2013.867653. Oberdorf, Jesse. 2017. Inspiring the Citizen to be Bold: Framing Theory and the Rise and Decline Of the #ThisFlag-Movement in Zimbabwe. Master’s dissertation. Utrecht University. https://studenttheses.uu.nl/bitstream/handle/ 20.500.12932/27205/JesseOberdor f%283813983%29FinalThesis_ ThisFlag.pdf?sequence=2andisAllowed=y. Paradza, Kudakwashe. 2019. Kairos Consciousness and the Zimbabwean Ecclesiology’s Response to Crisis. HTS Teologiese Studies/Theological Studies 75 (3): a5621. https://doi.org/10.4102/hts.v75i3.5621.

138 

K. TAGWIREI

Pavari, Never. 2020. The Role of Apostolic Faith Mission in Zimbabwe in the Fight Against Coronavirus. Journal of Public Administration and Governance 10 (3): 306–320. https://doi.org/10.5296/jpag.v10i3.17690. Rasch, Astrid, Minna Johanna Niemi, and Jocelyn Alexander. 2021. Reading Repression and Resistance in Zimbabwean Literature. Journal of Southern African Studies 47 (4): 735–744. https://doi.org/10.1080/03057070. 2021.1964760. Recepcion, Andrew G. 2014. Diakonia: The Main Mission of the Church. In Theology and Diakonia – Faith in Action, ed. Klaus Krämer and Klaus Vellguth, 71–82. One World Theology 3. Quezon City: Claretian Publishers. Ritchie, Angus. 2019. Beyond Help: Diakonia in the Contemporary Church. Political Theology 20 (8): 631–642. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 1462317X.2019.1695404. Shoko, Angela. 2022. Impact of the Church on Conflict Transformation of Political Crises at Community Level: A Case Study of Two Church Denominations in Dzivarasekwa, Harare. African Journal on Conflict Resolution 22 (2). https://www.ajol.info/index.php/ajcr/article/view/245128. Standard. 2016. Why Mawarire fled Zimbabwe. The Standard, August 21. https://thestandard.newsday.co.zw/2016/08/21/mawarire-­fled-­zimbabwe. Tagwirei, Kimion. 2022. EFZ’s CCMP Highly Commendable. Ecclesia Today, July 1–September 30. Tarusarira, Joram. 2014. Religion in Times of Crisis in Zimbabwe: A Case Study of Churches in Manicaland and Its Theodicy of Liberation. In Religion in Times of Crisis, ed. Gladys Ganiel, Heidemarie Winkel, and Christophe Monnot, 93–115. Leiden: Brill. https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004277793_007. ———. 2016. An Emergent Consciousness of the Role of Christianity on Zimbabwe’s Political Field: A Case of Non-doctrinal Religio-political Actors. Journal for the Study of Religion 29 (2): 56–77. https://www.jstor.org/ stable/10.2307/24902914. Togarasei, Lovemore. 2018. History and Characteristics of Pentecostal Christianity in Zimbabwe. In Aspects of Pentecostal Christianity in Zimbabwe, ed. Lovemore Togarasei, 33–48. Springer International Publishing. Tshuma, Mandla. n.d. Archbishop Emeritus Pius Ncube. Religion in Zimbabwe. https://relzim.org/resources/religious-­l eaders-­z imbabwe/archbishop-­ emeritus-­pius-­ncube/. Ukpong, Justin S. 1999. Towards a Holistic Approach to Inculturation Theology. Mission Studies 16 (2). https://doi.org/10.1163/15733831-­90000009b. Wyche, Susan, Phoebe Sengers, and Rebecca E. Grinter. 2006. Historical Analysis: Using the Past to Design the Future. In UbiComp 2006: Ubiquitous Computing, ed. Paul Dourish and Adrian Friday, 4206: 35–51. Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg. https://doi.org/ 10.1007/11853565_3.

6  HEARING THE LOUD VOICES OF THE SILENT CHURCH IN ZIMBABWE 

139

Zakeyo, Marlon. 2012. The Church, Politics and the Future of Zimbabwe. Religion in the Public Sphere 8 (1): 211–235. ZCA. n.d. Projects and programs. https://www.zimbabwechristianalliance.org. zw/projects. ZCBC. 2020. The March Is Not Ended. Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops Conference Secretari-at, Synod House, Harare. http://kubatana.net/2020/08/14/ the-­march-­is-­not-­ended-­pastoral-­letter-­of-­the-­zimbabwe-­catholic-­bishops-­ conference-­on-­the-­current-­situation-­in-­zimbabwe/. ZCBC, EFZ, and ZCC. 2006. The Zimbabwe We Want: ‘Towards a National Vision for Zimbabwe’. A Discussion Document. Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops Conference, the Evangelical Fellowship of Zimbabwe, the Zimbabwe Council of Churches. www.africamission-­mafr.org/zimbabwe.doc. ZCC. 2020. Annual report. The Zimbabwe Council of Churches. https://www. zcc-­eco.org/images/documents/zcc%202020%20annual%20report.pdf. Zimeye. 2021. Passion Java Team up with Zanu-Pf Youth Members in Chiyangwas Indigenous Business Group. April 25. https://www.zimeye.net/2021/04/25/ passion-­j ava-­t eams-­u p-­w ith-­z anu-­p f-­y outh-­m embers-­i n-­c hiyangwas-­ indigenous-­business-­group/.

CHAPTER 7

Man of God/Gold and Zanu-PFism in Zimbabwe: The Case of Makandiwa and Angel Bekithemba Dube

Introduction: Locating the Problem of Makandiwa and Angel in the Zimbabwean Crisis The chapter focuses on Makandiwa and Angel as men of God/god. The chapter emerged in a documentary produced by Al Jazeera on money laundering and gold smuggling in Zimbabwe. The documentary has presented and confirmed the long-standing suspicion that religious leaders have always been part of the problem in Zimbabwe. To narrow the focus of the chapter, I will discuss Makandiwa and Angel, who are esteemed prophets in Zimbabwe and also linked to gold business. As early as 2013 and 2018, Ezra Chitando and Nyasha Madzokere, respectively, had posed questions on whether Zimbabwean neo-Pentecostal prophets were men of God or of gold. The gold referred to prophets using churches as a way of

B. Dube (*) Central University of Technology, Bloemfontein, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 B. Dube (ed.), Regime, Religion and the Consolidation of Zanu-PFism in Zimbabwe, African Histories and Modernities, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-46084-5_7

141

142 

B. DUBE

making money—not literally trading in gold. Chitando (2013, 99) submits that, ‘apart from prophets making money through religion, it should be understood that the economic environment in the “crisis decade” led many Zimbabweans to embrace prosperity theology’. They hoped that an economic solution would emerge through religion, but, unfortunately, it only benefited few powerful prophets and, generally, those linked to Zanu-PF. Many people, especially those affected by Zimbabwe’s corrupt Zanu-PF regime, saw the Al Jazeera documentary as the tip of the iceberg regarding corruption in Zimbabwe. It presented a gloomy picture of prophets being involved in the shrinking of both the Zimbabwean economy and the democratic space. Tendai Biti, the former Finance minister and an opposition leader under the Coalition for Citizen Change (CCC), told the Al Jazeera (2023) that ‘the biggest challenge Zimbabwe now faces is the existential threat that comes from this gold mafia’, of which some members are religious leaders, such as Angel and Makandiwa. Their involvement in gold smuggling has made these two prophets super rich, in a poverty-stricken country with a high level of unemployment and emigration. The Refugee Documentation Centre (Ireland) (2017) makes the following observation on the two prophets in terms of their wealth: There is so much that has captured the imagination of Zimbabweans when one looks at these two leading figures [Makandiwa and Angel] among the mega-church prophets currently operating in Zimbabwe: from their lavish and materially extravagant lifestyles, including the latest and very expensive cars such as a Lamborghini and Bentley for Angel and a Mercedes S600 for Makandiwa.

It is such affluent religious leaders who support Zanu-PF, despite the evident failure of the party. Their support is premised on making people believe that God directs human affairs, such as selecting leaders for a country, and prophet’s duty is to support the current regime. Magaisa (2019) argues that ‘they [religious leaders] start from the periphery wearing the label of technocrats but soon enough, they will find themselves deep in the cesspool, wearing scarfs and chanting ridiculous slogans’. In the public eye and to uncritical viewers, they appear genuine and having the people’s interests at heart. They talk about doing well financially as a result of Gold blessing them and consider those who are not wealthy as unfaithful and unbelieving.

7  MAN OF GOD/GOLD AND ZANU-PFISM IN ZIMBABWE: THE CASE… 

143

However, the Al Jazeera documentary exposed a new avenue of problematising Zanu-PF and prophets, as premised in the description men of God/gold. It is has become clear that, apart from God blessing them, by design or default, gold smuggling is behind the unexplained wealth of these men—therefore, men of God/gold. It cannot be disputed that people involved in Zanu-PF corruption are generally mute about problematising the violence and incompetency of the regime. Instead, they are prepared to defend the regime using their own lives. This has led Magaisa (2019) to posit a critical question in relation to the men of God in Zimbabwe: why, in some circumstances, does evidence of mendacity, crudeness, or cruelty serve not as a fatal disadvantage, but as an allure, attracting ardent followers? Why do otherwise proud and self-respecting people submit to the sheer effrontery of the tyrant?

Despite the foregoing, I realise that discussing these two prophets from a critical and scholarly position will attract negative attention from their followers, who, despite evident abuse by these prophets, remain loyal. I conclude that they suffer from Stockholm syndrome, which is a mental condition described by McClure (2014) that occurs when victims of spiritual abuse may continue to support the abusive leader because of their naïveté or loyalty to the leader. Gunda and Machingura (2013, 23) argue that ‘followers of the “man of God” as in the case of Makandiwa and Angel are very conservative, defensive and sometimes resort to abusive or threatening language whenever their “men of God” are criticized’. To some extent, and particularly regarding Angel, there is a threat of violence against people who write from a critical position about their involvement in gold smuggling. The prophets are accustomed to receiving praise texts that ignite superhuman feeling and, of course, our generation is lucky to have them as prophets. However, criticism suggests that these prophets are at the root of serious problems for our generation, especially their role in thwarting the democratic space in unison with Zanu-PF. Praise texts, as Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni posits, are evidence of the ‘emergence of hegemonic nationalist historiography in Zimbabwe and the concomitant monologic account of the past that currently buttresses the ZANU-PF claim to be the alpha and omega rulers of Zimbabwe’ (2009, 3). The prophets associated with the party have climbed on the train, and as such, they do not take kindly to any expression that is critical of their actions.

144 

B. DUBE

Zanu-PFism and the Capture of the Prophetic Movement In this section, I define what is meant by Zanu-PFism and discuss its connection with the prophetic movement in Zimbabwe. I also address and introduce Prophet Makandiwa and Ambassador Angel. Zanu-PFism, as used in this chapter, denotes a system of governance that takes its principles from Zanu-PF, the ruling party that has been at the helm of leadership since 1980. It is a system that has some characteristics of Mugabeism, about which Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009, 358) argues that: Mugabeism has never been a democratic phenomenon. It has been intolerant, violent, and ever ready to discipline any form of dissent. Its strategy of ‘making the nation-as-people’ has always been dominated by coercion, where autonomous trade unions, women’s organisations, and even religious groups had to be subordinated to the nationalist imperative.

While Mugabeism was evil and destructive, it had elements of professionalism and intelligence that we don’t see when we analyse the post-­ Mugabe era of Zanu-PFism, which is marked by clowns, playfulness, photoshoots with the president and unending variations of Zanu-PF-­ supporting structures, such as Mapostori4Ed, Lecturers4ED, Pastors4ED and Single Mothers4ED. These structures, as an attempt to consolidate Zanu-PF, have made it a laughing stock, marked by the absence of a think tank that had, at least, always characterised Mugabeism. Zanu-PFism is marked by corruption, violence, playfulness, arrogance, Stockholm syndrome and childish acts. I coined the term Zanu-PFism in reference to a system of governance that is seemingly as difficult to undo as it is to oppose it. It is a system marked by a lack of accountability and home to people living scandalous lives. It has a catch-and-release system for cronies but jails opponents for petty reasons and rewards economic saboteurs. Therefore, some people join the system to enjoy protection for the crimes they have committed because when you belong to the system, you are immune to prosecution. Shumba (2015) argues that, once one crosses the line to oppose Zanu-PF, then ZTV, The Herald, ZBC and The Sunday Mail have the green light to make secrets public and to strip opponents naked. The Zanu-PF government will then threaten to arrest the culprits for felonies previously ignored. It is this system that some have fallen into and

7  MAN OF GOD/GOLD AND ZANU-PFISM IN ZIMBABWE: THE CASE… 

145

believe it can lead to a better Zimbabwe. However, I am content with questions posited by Alex Magaisa (2022): Why is it that despite being fully aware of their tormentors and the misery they cause, some people still support them? Why do people still vote for individuals who then know are responsible for their suffering? Why is it that people still retain positive feeling towards individuals who have abused them in the past?

It is in this context that Makandiwa and Angel should be understood as forerunners of Zanu-PFism, through uttering prophetic messages to buttress Zanu-PFism as a God-ordained system of governance. Consequently, they do everything in their power to sustain Zanu-PFism through rhetoric, and, in turn, they get access to gold mafia syndicates, which exacerbate the country’s economic crisis. In this regard, Mujinga (2018, 261) asks a critical question: ‘when is the church going to realize that we are just horses that are being driven by politicians for their selfish reasons?’ In fact, the church does realise that it is being used by Zanu-PF, but as long as prophets such as Makandiwa and Angel benefit from the regime, then Mujinga’s critical question is just rhetoric. Instead, a new question emerges: how can a church benefit from Zanu-PFism? This question emerges because for one to survive, one should have strong political links with Zanu-PF. While religious leaders such as Makandiwa and Angel are clear about their mandate in relation to Zanu-PFism, the general populace are equally to blame for this crisis. As Sanni (2016, 12) argues, the problem in Africa is that we have given unquestionable power to religious leaders. Such loyalty arguably ‘destroys their [religious followers’] personality and replaces the void with a regime personality that no longer questions, thinks critically, or feels the impact of an abusive system’ (Damiani 2002, 45). In doing so, Bible verses become the centre for enacting oppression. Gunda (2012, 39) notes that the African public sphere is heavily ‘biblified’ and ‘that this “biblification”’ makes it easy to use the Bible to exploit people. This chapter seeks to take a bold stance and to question, problematise and make suggestions about the phenomenon of the man of God/gold. The overarching submission is that Makandiwa and Angel, while being celebrated neoprophetic preachers in Zimbabwe, are guilty of fanning the flames of the Zimbabwean crisis through enacting, defending and sustaining Zanu-PFism through biblifying the crisis, which benefits them in the

146 

B. DUBE

form of access to the mafiarised gold industry in Zimbabwe. To this end, the chapter starts with praise texts for Angel and Makandiwa and argues that, unless religion as practised by these two prophets is problematised, the Zimbabwean crisis is far from being over. It becomes critical for decolonial scholars to tease these two characters and to produce a world order where all Zimbabweans, despite religious affiliation, benefit from their country’s natural resources, as opposed to few elites connected to Zanu-PF, such as Makandiwa and Angel. The following section discusses the theory applied to the chapter, which is decoloniality.

Theorisation: Decoloniality This chapter is located within the arguments of decoloniality, with an emphasis on coloniality of being, and power. In terms of its origins, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013, 11) argues that ‘decoloniality is born out of a realisation that ours is an asymmetrical world order that is sustained not only by colonial matrices of power but also by pedagogies and epistemologies of equilibrium that continue to produce alienated Africans’. The idea of decoloniality, as argued by Wanderley and Barros (2018), has its roots in Latin America, under leading scholars such as Mignolo, Maldonado-­ Torres, Quijano and Dussel. This theory is appropriate for making arguments against the man of God/gold since decoloniality is not fiction but legitimate in the sense that it authorises the lived experiences of those who are at the receiving end of subjection and commands such subjects to declare their locus of enunciation (Sithole 2014, 44). Decoloniality stands ‘against the invisible vampirism of imperialism technologies and colonial matrices of power [coloniality] that continue to exist in the minds, lives, languages, dreams, imaginations, religion and epistemologies of modern subjects in Africa and the entire global South’ (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013, 11). In addition, it is relevant to locate this chapter on problematising Zanu-PFism with specific reference to the man of God/gold since decoloniality is not just a political tool for resistance but also a social movement that creates space for Black people to redefine their identities and reaffirm their humanness as Black and African in their very social locations (Dei 2018; Mashau 2018), and this can be done through genuine dialogue (Maldonado-Torres 2007). Another strength of decoloniality is that it can ‘evoke a philosophy of liberation, which entails the rehumanisation of the dehumanised and the courage to care and to love’ (Mpofu 2017, 4). By adopting this approach, decolonial scholars move ‘towards a decolonial

7  MAN OF GOD/GOLD AND ZANU-PFISM IN ZIMBABWE: THE CASE… 

147

liberation struggle to a world beyond eurocentered modernity’ (Grosfoguel 2011, 12). Problematising Zanu-PFism as espoused by the men of God/ gold essentially means working towards a vision of human life that is not dependent on or structured by the forced imposition of one ideal of society over others (Mignolo 2007). In short, using this theory as lens allowed me to evoke ‘alternative ways for (re)imagining and building a democratic, just and non-repressive’ law (Mignolo 2009) that has characterised Zimbabwe since independence. The following section focuses on Makandiwa.

The Man of God and Gold: The Case of Emmanuel Makandiwa The turn of the new millennium exposed interesting yet disturbing trends in the political and religious space in Zimbabwe. Amidst the many events at this time, we cannot escape the presence of a powerful religious figure and businessman, Makandiwa, also known as Shingirai Chirume. For the purpose of this chapter, I will refer to him as Makandiwa. Makandiwa was born on 25 December 1977 and grew up in a Christian home. His family moved to Muzarabani, Mashonaland Central Province, where they farmed cotton, grain and other crops (Henotace.org 2019). Makandiwa became an Apostolic Faith Mission (AFM) pastor, who had undergone training at Living Waters Bible School in Harare (Religion in Zimbabwe n.d.). In 2008, while serving as a pastor at Chitungwiza, Harare Province, he initiated an interdenominational movement that was well attended due to his messages, miracles and charisma, which had never been seen before. This become a problem with AFM, and the board required him to choose between AFM and his interdenominational organisation; Makandiwa chose to leave AFM. It is in this context that the United Family International Church (UFIC) was founded in 2008 at the Harare City Sports Centre, where tens of thousands of people attended services. UFIC has since evolved into a megachurch, with over 70,000 people attending Sunday services (Religion in Zimbabwe n.d.). Over the years, his popularity has grown, and he has become one of the prophets in Zimbabwe and internationally with the greatest following. As Gunda and Machingura (2013) state, it is now common in Harare to see the private cars of Makandiwa’s followers with stickers bearing the UFIC logo and words such as Ndiri mwana

148 

B. DUBE

wemuporofita [I am a child of the prophet]. Something that enabled Makandiwa to rise to prominence is his accurate prophecies and miracles, which were seen as a new dawn for religion across the world. To buttress the foregoing notion, Rupapa and Shumba (2014, 1) report that ‘Makandiwa is known for his controversial miracles ranging from manhood enlargement to changing people’s HIV statuses as well as causing the birth of the baby of a three-day-old pregnancy’. In addition, Makandiwa is very confident of his relationship with God. This is reported by Tazvida (2018), who cites Makandiwa saying: If you get to Heaven, write this down, and you don’t find me there, you would have gone to hell. That’s not Heaven because everything that should be done for a man to secure his life in eternity, I have done it, I have done it, I have done it.

The popularity he commands became a rich hunting ground for Zanu-PF, and at some point, former minister for Tourism, Walter Mzembi, described Makandiwa’s church as a tourist attraction. To this end, avenues were opening for Zanu-PF and Makandiwa to reciprocate benefits, since the survival of any influential person in Zimbabwe requires a certain degree of protection from the regime. Makandiwa rose to visibility in politics during the 2011 antisanctions march that had been organised by Zanu-PF.  According to Religion in Zimbabwe (n.d.), on 1 March, Makandiwa officiated at the launch of the Zanu-PF antisanctions campaign and signed the petition against the travel restrictions imposed on former President Robert Mugabe and Zanu-PF members (Religion in Zimbabwe n.d.). His visible participation confirmed that Makandiwa had joined the Zanu-PF movement, from which it would be difficult for him to disengage. This led him, from time to time, to try to convince people to support Zanu-PF.  Themba Mliswa, the member of parliament for Norton, castigated Makandiwa for his attitude towards Mnangagwa: Makandiwa should just [publicly] join Zanu-PF to stop this elevated posturing, feinting [sic] more enlightenment than everyone else. He is a Pastor for God’s sake and should operate in a smarter way. I’m Independent but openly state the only party I know is Zanu-PF. He should do the same… He can join the party structures and advance the party propaganda openly not hiding behind the pulpit and abusing congregants by foisting on them his personal political positions purveyed with spiritual exousia. (Nehanda Radio 2022)

7  MAN OF GOD/GOLD AND ZANU-PFISM IN ZIMBABWE: THE CASE… 

149

Mliswa’s outburst happened after Makandiwa had praised the president for economic development and said he would be the winner of the 2023 presidential elections. Makandiwa, according to MyZimbabwe (2022), was persuading the nation to rally behind the president and proclaimed: I love your leadership. Your God given ability to concentrate on your work while people talk negative things is beyond measure. You are blessed… My heart bleeds when I see the next generation drowning. Others have made an occupation out of criticising the government. Please focus on the progress.

It became clear that there was an alliance between Makandiwa and Mnangagwa. The president believed the speech by the prophet was so great that it deserved to be broadcast on national television. Clearly, Makandiwa had become a regime enabler, and he was, despite the visible failures of the regime, committed to not only support it but force others, even those in poverty, to support the regime. This ignited Mliswa to argue that the man of the cloth was misfiring. He said: It’s unfair on the suffering people in his church to have their leader slyly operate as a pastor and yet use his spiritual position to advance secular agendas for selfish aggrandisement. His congregation is filled with jobless youths and he tells them Govt isn’t responsible? (Nehanda Radio 2022)

The scope of the chapter does not include all Makandiwa’s alleged scandals, such as duping people out of their money, but it is relevant to refer to it since Zanu-PF operates by reminding people of their scandals, against which they offer protection. However, this protection has to be repaid, and people are required to work for Zanu-PF as activists. Perhaps Makandiwa is in a situation where he is being forced by circumstances to be a regime enabler. In the light of the foregoing, Magaisa (2020) posits that people often wonder why certain members of the clergy take sides with an incompetent and corrupt regime. Does the regime have something on them, people ask? Perhaps, the answer to Magaisa’s question is that prophets and pastors are involved in gold syndicates, which forces them to champion Zanu-PF at all costs. While Makandiwa was not implicated in the Al Jazeera documentary on Zimbabwe’s gold mafia, a deeper analysis is needed, since there are rumours about him being associated with the gold business in Zimbabwe. If the rumours are true, the critical question is,

150 

B. DUBE

then, how does he manage to trade gold when the official routes for trading gold trade are shut down due to sanctions—which is why people use illicit routes for trading gold. If this is the case, how could a man of the cloth be associated with the scandalous sale of gold? If true, it could also explain how the man of the cloth is one of the richest people in Zimbabwe. Could it be from tithes only, or gold is involved? The premise of the chapter is not to argue that Makandiwa should not be involved in the gold business, but that the activities of men of the cloth should be above board to reflect the moral integrity associated with business. Without a doubt, all successful businesspersons in Zimbabwe who are involved in trading gold are associated with Zanu-PF, and they are usually enablers of the regime. Supporting Zanu-PF guarantees protection in the gold trading industry. Makandiwa is believed to have a vast business empire. According to Gambakwe Media (2021), Makandiwa’s businesses involve gold mining, construction, transport, hospitality, entertainment and manufacturing, and these businesses stretch between South Africa, the United Kingdom, the United States and Dubai. It would be uncritical to believe that tithes alone started these businesses—it is likely that access to gold gave him the funds he needed. Because gold is effectively managed by the Zanu-PF regime, most people who are involved are clear supporters of the regime. By arguing this I do not imply that Makandiwa should not have businesses; in fact, he should be encouraged since business creates employment. It only becomes a problem when he uses his proximity to Zanu-PF to thwart democracy by failing to hold the regime accountable for its repression and corruption. Furthermore, regarding gold mining, it is alleged that violence has occurred at his mining sites, and this chapter, being informed by decoloniality, negates violence, since it produces a generation that believes violence is the order of the day. However, violence is supported by Zanu-PF and prophets such as Makandiwa. The Herald (2019) reported on violence in the mining sector as follows: ‘UFIC leader Makandiwa has been implicated in a case in which five men were reportedly kidnapped and tortured for allegedly stealing gold ore from Havilah Gold Mine in Mutoko, which is believed to be owned by the clergyman’. If this report is true, it confirms that people involved in the gold business use violence to ensure the survival of the business, and Makandiwa is no exception. Of course, the prophet might not have been directly involved in the violence due to his position in Zimbabwe’ religious and political space, but his proxies, on his instructions, may have tortured and kidnapped people. In 2013 Makandiwa gave many people hope by making a

7  MAN OF GOD/GOLD AND ZANU-PFISM IN ZIMBABWE: THE CASE… 

151

prophecy on the availability of minerals in Zimbabwe. Bulawayo24 News (2013) reports Makandiwa saying: The lord is setting Zimbabwe free. Divine solutions are coming. The Lord told me ‘tell Zimbabweans to change their focus’. Everyone is saying diamonds, diamonds, but I see another precious mineral for Zimbabwe … gold will be picked up from the ground.

This prophecy could, however, have been a prophecy or announcement to the people that he had access to gold and was giving thanks to Zanu-PF. This may well explain his net worth of US$1 billion (Gambakwe Media 2021)—in a country with sky-high unemployment and high levels of poverty. If not for Zanu-PF and gold, how could he have achieved this net worth? The lesson is that even prophets such as Makandiwa are human beings who want material wealth—like anyone else—though they want their followers to believe they are superhuman. For him to maintain this wealth, he has to be an enabler, since protection in Zimbabwe is only guaranteed by being an enabler of Zanu-PF. However, Prime Kufakunesu, the spokesperson for Makandiwa, denies the prophet’s involvement in the gold business. Newsday (2019) reports: ‘Prophet Makandiwa regularly visits mines owned by his spiritual children, in order to give them guidance and business mentorship. He has always done that and he will continue to do so,’ Kufa said.

Kufakunesu sanitised Makandiwa’s involvement in the mining industry, probably because it is generally characterised by corruption through illicit dealings. This denial leads me to the last issue about corruption. For Makandiwa, corruption has levels, as he explains: Corruption has certain different levels. It has different levels. There are certain dimensions that if there is 10 billion. And the 10 billion is set aside to construct roads. ‘If 5 billion is swindled and the other 5 constructs the road. Corruption is corruption, but this corruption is different from corruption because the whole 10 billion could have been swindled’. (quoted by Ndoro 2022)

Though Makandiwa’s view on corruption could have elements of validity, it presents a problem, especially for a man of the cloth. Such thinking

152 

B. DUBE

will cause Zimbabwe to sink into an abyss since developmental strategies do not permit corruption because it dehumanises and deprives the general populace of opportunities to succeed. For Makandiwa to survive, he has no option but to champion Zanu-PFism by sanitising Mnangagwa. In the sanitising process, Makandiwa is cited saying: Zimbabwe is rising bit by bit, whether Satan likes it or not. We are walking in prophetic steps. From morning until midnight, we are seeing those in power doing what was revealed to us, but God will support until you get embarrassed. If you were a prophet like me, you would do the same. (Zimeye 2022)

However, I submit that, if powerful people such as Makandiwa are involved in sanitising Zanu-PF through returns on gold smuggling, Zimbabwe is positioned to fail. It is, thus, critical that people problematise Zanu-PF and its prophets, who have sold people false hope, in all possible spaces (Dube 2020). Decoloniality thinking presents us with an opportunity to engage in the terrifying but necessary journey of unearthing and problematising the enabling and buttressing of Zanu-PFism in Makandiwa’s regime. In the following section, I discuss Uebert Angel.

Gold Mafia: The Case of Uebert Angel and the Smuggling of Gold from Zimbabwe Uebert Angel was born on 6 September 1978 in Zaka, Masvingo Province, where he grew up attending the Reformed Church in Zimbabwe. He founded the Spirit Embassy Ministries International on 12 March 2007 while he was living in Manchester, England. He emerged in the Zimbabwean prophetic space around 2011. Describing his entrance to the religious space, The Standard gives the following description of Prophet Angel: Flamboyant and sharp tongued, Prophet Angel made his way into the public glare in 2011, championing the gospel of prosperity. The tall and lanky prophet, who dressed with a flourish, quickly became one of the most sought after prophets locally and regionally. Fondly referred to as ‘Papa’ or ‘Major’ by his congregants at Spirit Embassy, the youthful prophet – whose collection of flashy cars endeared him to the youthful group in his church – was unapologetic about his boastful tirades. He reached an all-time high

7  MAN OF GOD/GOLD AND ZANU-PFISM IN ZIMBABWE: THE CASE… 

153

with his miracle money sermons which almost got him into trouble with the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe officials, but [he] wriggled his way out of it and became even more popular. (Standard 2015)

He was marked by controversy from the time he emerged on the Zimbabwean prophetic scene. The Ghana Business News (2023) reports that the United States Department of Justice, through Operation Gold Seal, identified Angel as boasting of degrees he had bought from the phony Saint Regis University. Furthermore, he was involved in the so-­ called miracle money—a scandal that shocked Zimbabwe and Botswana— which allegedly multiplied in people’s bank accounts and pockets. In defending this unusual phenomenon, Angel asserted that: The Lord also instructed Peter to go catch a fish and from its mouth collect money, only if and when you can only tell me where the fish in the Bible got its money, where Jesus’ bread came from and where the fish he multiplied came from, only then can I tell you where this money is coming from. (Religion in Zimbabwe 2013)

It is not the purpose of this chapter to discuss the scandals associated with Angel but to zero in on issues relating to gold. Before I do so, it is important for readers to note that, despite controversy associated with Angel, Mnangagwa, in March 2021, appointed Angel to be Zimbabwe’s ambassador at large for Europe and the Americas. In fact, Matiashe (2023) believes that Uebert is a close friend of Mnangagwa’s wife Auxillia, and his niece Henrietta Rushwaya, who is also the president of the Zimbabwe Miners Federation, which makes him the ideal person to buttress Zanu-­ PFism. There are two reasons for this. Zanu-PF is interested in Angel because of his influence and popularity, which could help Zanu-PF with their mantra of re-engagement, which is underpinned by the theme that Zimbabwe is open for business. The second reason is that Zanu-PF has always wanted to deal with people who have scandals to hide, as they are easy to control by being reminded how the regime protects them from prosecution. Regardless of the view one may take, it is clear that Angel occupies a central role in Zanu-PF and in enhancing Zanu-PFism. The Al Jazeera documentary on gold smuggling in Zimbabwe (2023) exposes Angel as a prominent preacher who facilitates gold deals with undercover investigators who pose as investors from China. In the documentary, Angel seems very energetic, claims he is connected to the first

154 

B. DUBE

family, is second in charge in Zimbabwe, and is immune to being searched, due to diplomatic privilege. Angel, as ambassador at large and presidential envoy to Mnangagwa, told Al Jazeera reporters he would be able to carry large volumes of dirty cash into the country using his diplomatic status (Al Jazeera 2023), with a total disregard of international standards for combating money laundering. He is heard saying to the undercover investigators: You want gold, gold we can do it right now, we can make the call right now, and it’s done… It will land in Zimbabwe  – Zimbabwe can’t touch it too until I get to my house. So, there can be a diplomatic plan. (Al Jazeera 2023)

This means that, as a diplomatic representative, he could easily facilitate a scheme for exchanging unaccounted-for cash for Zimbabwe’s gold (Al Jazeera 2023). This revelation aroused anger and discomfort with Zanu-PF rule among disgruntled Zimbabweans and reminded people that supporting Zanu-PF, especially in the second republic, was a big mistake. It reminded people that nothing can work under Zanu-PF since corruption flows within the veins of the Zanu-PF and, under Zanu-PF, life was likely to become more difficult every day. It was also a reminder that the pledge made by Mnangagwa, that he would be a listening president, was actually a lie that benefited only a few Zanu-PF supporters, including Angel. Some, especially Zanu-PF proxies, considered the Al Jazeera documentary to be the hand of the enemy that seeks to destroy the second republic and prevent the rebuilding of Zimbabwe. These people resented the documentary and claimed that it was fake, but defending the documentary was rather too difficult than to accept it. There has been no meaningful response to the allegations of gold smuggling and money laundering by prophets by the Zanu-PF government. People who know and have studied Zanu-­ PFism know it will be another catch-and-release situation. Angel might even be promoted, indicating how Zanu-PFism as a system is corrupt and rewards its proxies. Any member of the general populace would face sanctions related to money laundering and gold smuggling, but it is permitted for Zanu-PF and its proxies. The chapter, being coached in decoloniality, considers the acts of Angel and Zanu-PF to be a new form of colonisation, which should be challenged. I challenge it by arguing that Angel, as a man of God/gold, is navigating within the space of denying Zimbabweans their right to be part of postmodernity and humanisation. He actually dismembers people, as

7  MAN OF GOD/GOLD AND ZANU-PFISM IN ZIMBABWE: THE CASE… 

155

Thiong’o Ngugi (2009) argues, and as a Zanu-PF proxy, he will not be held unaccountable for his involvement in corrupt deals involving gold. In defence of his involvement in the alleged money laundering deals uncovered by Al Jazeera, Lovemore Madhuku, his lawyer, is reported by New Zimbabwe (2023) as saying: This interaction led to what we are calling a classified national intelligence assignment which meant a decision was taken with intelligence authorities that he would play along and would not cancel his interactions with these persons, he would meet them as if he was going to make arrangements for them to meet the president and be able to do investments in Zimbabwe.

Whatever explanation is given, the damage to Zimbabwe has been done. Angel is working hard to convince the suffering masses that his corruption was for their benefit. However, he promised violence for those who write about his gold scandals, as explained by Bulawayo24 News (2023), which cites Ambassador Mudzanire as saying, ‘Without praying, Phineas took a knife and stabbed the men he saw committing adultery, Munhu anongoda kurohwa mbama, zvekuti anyorereyi ichi, zvekunamata tombosiya! [Someone must be slapped for writing about this, let’s put aside prayer at the moment]’. At the time of writing this chapter, people writing about the prophet, like me, face serious threats that we will be visited and ‘slapped’. Angel states that not all solutions need Bible verses; sometimes a visit after dark is needed to remind people that writing about him invites trouble. However, my commitment to decoloniality leads me to believe that I have to engage in a counter-hegemonic journey, to write more, not less, as I believe this is what we owe our children and the suffering masses. If they fail to expose wrongdoing, scholars are indirectly endorsing Zanu-PFism and its proxies, such as Angel. Surprisingly, when he threatened writers, some of his followers celebrated his threats, thereby indicating mutual zombification at play to thwart democracy and destroy Zimbabwe. According to Mbembe (1992, 2002), mutual zombification refers to the impotence or powerlessness of the ruler and the ruled, each of which having robbed the other of vitality, leaving both impotent. This definition of Mbembe shows that it is critical for us to rethink the situation and to save both the victims and perpetrators of violence, since violence ultimately benefits no one. In making this my argument, I support Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013, 10), who warns that:

156 

B. DUBE

What Africans must be vigilant against is the trap of ending up normalising and universalising coloniality [dominance] as a natural state of the world. It must be unmasked, resisted and destroyed because it produced a world order that can only be sustained through a combination of violence, deceit, hypocrisy and lies.

In closing this discussion, Angel, as a man of God/gold, presents problems for the nexus of religion and politics in Zimbabwe. Prophets and Zanu-PF have agreed to destroy Zimbabwe together by default while claiming to rebuild it. It has taught people that, for religion to succeed in Zimbabwe, it is no longer righteousness and integrity that are important but connection with the gold mafias; the role of religion is to clean or wash the money.

Religion Within Zanu-PFism: What Is Available for the General Populace? I believe that, “[I]n the long run, society should find ways to protect people from religion-related abuse, and to help religion evolve in the direction of treating people better” (Bottoms et al. 1995, 109). Solutions are required to centre Zimbabwe on a path to moral recovery, which is pertinent for economic development. Thus, premising the arguments in the chapter in decoloniality was critical to enable Zimbabweans, including Makandiwa and Angel, to be restored together, as a community, ‘so that we can heal together … because we can only be fully human when we are human together’ (Gade 2012, 493). It is critical to make this point since Makandiwa and Angel have often removed themselves from the zone of being and presented themselves as supernatural beings who cannot be subjected to accountability, especially regarding their elicit relationship with Zanu-PF. Of course, much has to be done to rehumanise these two prophets; in decoloniality argumentation it requires a ‘shift the geography of reason’ (Karkov and Robbins 2014, 7) as well as epistemic disobedience (Mignolo 2009) against prophets who, through their alliance with Zanu-PF, thwart democracy. As Fanon explains, this is a move towards setting foot in a new humanity (Gordon 2004). Looking closely at Makandiwa and Angel, we can expose that they bring a new form of colonialisation, which, if not unmasked, will prevent Zimbabweans from becoming the owners of their own country and its resources, and in the process, the general populace will be dehumanised. Therefore, according

7  MAN OF GOD/GOLD AND ZANU-PFISM IN ZIMBABWE: THE CASE… 

157

to decoloniality thinking, there is a need to move towards a ‘reject[ion of] modernity [especially when it contributes to symmetry of power], which is located on the oppressed and exploited side of the colonial difference, in favor of a decolonial liberation struggle to achieve a world beyond Eurocentric modernity’ (Grosfoguel 2011). Such an approach is critical to reconfigure Zimbabwe and, in the process, ‘[F]ree individuals and groups from suppressive social and ideological situations, particularly those that place socially unnecessary precincts upon development and enunciation of human consciousness’ (Alvesson and Willmott 1992, 432). In the face of victimisation of those that challenge Zanu-PFism as a corrupt system of governance, I agree with Gade (2012, 493) that ‘our voices may have started out as a low murmur from the margin, but it [can] become a distinct and unified cacophony of resistance’ against the ‘embedded logic that enforces control, domination, and exploitation’ (Mignolo 1995). Decoloniality, in this context, positions scholars to fight for a better Zimbabwe for all, including the perpetrators of violence and gold mafias who steal the happiness, identity and self-worth of Zimbabweans, who are scattered all over the world due to hunger, fear of the regime and a search for a better life, which is denied by Zanu-PF and its prophetic proxies.

Conclusion In this chapter, I discussed the prophets Makandiwa and Angel in connection with gold and violence in postcolonial Zimbabwe. The arguments are located in decoloniality theory, which seeks to invent a new dispensation where religion contributes to a free of colonialism, where everyone’s ontology is valued, regardless of political affiliation. I showed how Makandiwa and Angel are regime enablers who buttress Zanu-PFism and are rewarded for their role in the gold business, whether legal or otherwise. Zanu-PFism as it relates to these prophets presents a safe haven and propels them to champion the regime that, in the eyes of ordinary people, has failed and, instead, contributes to economic and social crisis. I end the chapter by arguing that, while the task of challenging prophets who thwart democracy is huge, it must be done, even in the face of threats of violence, which, unfortunately may originate from men of God/gold.

158 

B. DUBE

References Al Jazeera. 2023. Top Zimbabwe Ambassador Involved in Gold Smuggling Scheme. March 23. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/3/23/top-­ zimbabwe-­ambassador-­gold-­smuggling. Alvesson, Mats, and Hugh Willmott. 1992. On the Idea of Emancipation in Management and Organization Studies. The Academy of Management Review 17 (3): 432–464. https://doi.org/10.2307/258718. Bottoms, Bette L., Michael Nielsen, Rebecca Murray, and Henrietta Filipas. 1995. Religion-Related Child Physical Abuse: Characteristics and Psychological Outcomes. Journal of Aggression, Maltreatment, and Trauma 8: 1–11. Bulawayo24 News. 2013. Makandiwa Sees Gold Rush in his 2013 Prophecy on Zimbabwe. January 3. https://bulawayo24.com/index-­id-­news-­sc-­religion-­ byo-­24537-­article-­Makandiwa+sees+gold+rush+in+his+2013+prophecy+on+ Zimbabwe.html. ———. 2023. Another Gold Mafia Exposé Airs. March 31. https://bulawayo24. com/index-­id-­news-­sc-­national-­byo-­229183.html. Chitando, Ezra. 2013. Prophets, Profits and Protests. In Prophets, Profits and the Bible in Zimbabwe, ed. Ezra Chitando, Masiiwa Ragies Gunda, and Joachim Kügler. Bible in Africa Studies 12. Bamberg: University of Bamberg Press. Damiani, Rich. 2002. Spiritual Abuse within the Church: Its Damage and Recovery Process. Evangel 20 (2): 42–48. Dei, George J. Sefa. 2018. ‘Black Like Me’: Reframing Blackness for Decolonial Politics. Educational Studies 54 (2): 117–142. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 00131946.2018.1427586. Dube, B. 2020. Postcolonial Religious Hope as Stratagem to Achieve Political Enslavement in Zimbabwe: A Decoloniality Approach Towards an Uncaptured Theology of Hope. Verbum et Ecclesia 41 (1): a2007. https://doi.org/ 10.4102/ve.v41i1.2007. Gade, Christian B.N. 2012. What is Ubuntu? Different Interpretations Among South Africans of African Descent. South African Journal of Philosophy 31 (3): 484–503. https://doi.org/10.1080/02580136.2012.10751789. Gambakwe Media. 2021. Makandiwa now has biggest mansion in Harare. August 1. https://gambakwe.com/2021/08/01/makandiwa-­now-­has-­ biggest-­mansion-­in-­harare/. Ghana Business News. 2023. Uebert Angel – Man of Gold or Man of God with Double Identity? April 2. https://www.ghanabusinessnews.com/2023/04/02/ uebert-­angel-­man-­of-­gold-­or-­man-­of-­god-­with-­double-­identity/. Gordon, Lewis R. 2004. Fanon and Development: A Philosophical Look. Africa Development/Afrique Development XXIX (1): 71–94. Grosfoguel, Ramón. 2011. Decolonizing Post-Colonial Studies and Paradigms of Political-Economy: Transmodernity, Decolonial Thinking, and Global

7  MAN OF GOD/GOLD AND ZANU-PFISM IN ZIMBABWE: THE CASE… 

159

Coloniality. Transmodernity: Journal of Peripheral Cultural Production of the Luso-Hispanic World 1 (1). https://doi.org/10.5070/T411000004. Gunda, Masiiwa Ragies. 2012. ‘Rewriting’ the Bible or De-biblifying the Public Sphere? Proposals and Propositions on the Usage of the Bible by Public Figures in Zimbabwe. Bamberg: opus. https://doi.org/10.20378/irbo-­51298. Gunda, Masiiwa Ragies, and Francis Machingura. 2013. ‘The Man of God’. Understanding Biblical Influence on Contemporary Mega Church Prophets in Zimbabwe. In Prophets, Profits and the Bible in Zimbabwe, ed. Ezra Chitando, Masiiwa Ragies Gunda, and Joachim Kügler. Bible in Africa Studies 12. Bamberg: University of Bamberg Press. doi:https://doi.org/10.20378/ irbo-­51300. Henotace.org. 2019. Biography of prophet Emmanuel Makandiwa. https:// henotace.org/biography-­of-­prophet-­emmanuel-­makandiwa/. Herald. 2019. Makandiwa Implicated in Gold Mine Kidnap, Torture. The Herald, February 27. https://www.herald.co.zw/makandiwa-­implicated-­ in-­gold-­mine-­kidnap-­torture/. Karkov, Nikolay, and Jeffrey W.  Robbins. 2014. Decoloniality and Crisis. Introduction. JCRT 13 (1): 1–10. Magaisa, Alex. 2019. The Regime and Its Enablers. Saturday Big Read (blog), December 14. https://www.bigsr.co.uk/single-­post/2019/12/14/Big-­ Saturday-­Read-­The-­regime-­and-­its-­enablers. ———. 2020. BSR Exclusive: Beneficiaries of the RBZ Farm Mechanisation Scheme. Saturday Big Read (blog), July. https://bigsr.africa/bsr-­exclusive-­ beneficiaries-­of-­the-­rbz-­farm-­mechanisation-­scheme/. ———. 2022. Beware of the Trojan Horse. Saturday Big Read (blog), January 7. https://bigsr.africa/bsr-­beware-­of-­the-­trojan-­horse/. Maldonado-Torres, Nelson. 2007. On the Coloniality of Being. Contributions on the Development of a Concept. Cultural Studies 21 (2–3): 240–270. https:// doi.org/10.1080/09502380601162548. Mashau, Thinandavha D. 2018. Unshackling the Chains of Coloniality: Reimagining Decoloniality, Africanisation and Reformation for a Non-Racial South Africa. HTS Teologiese Studies/Theological Studies 74 (3): 4920. https:// doi.org/10.4102/hts.v74i3.4920. Matiashe, Farai Shawn. 2023. Zimbabwe: Uebert Angel, the Man of God Accused of Money Laundering. The Africa Report, June 4. https:// www.theafricarepor t.com/311103/zimbabwes-­u eber t-­a ngel-­a -­s elf-­ proclaimed-­prophet-­turned-­crook/. Mbembe, Achille. 1992. Provisional Notes on the Postcolony. Africa: Journal of the International African Institute 62 (1): 3–37. https://doi.org/ 10.2307/1160062. ———. 2002. African Modes of Self Writing. Public Culture 14 (1): 239–273. https://doi.org/10.1215/08992363-­14-­1-­239.

160 

B. DUBE

McClure, J. 2014. AAC Proposal by Holy Trinity Orthodox Church. London: State College. Mignolo, Walter D. 1995. The Darker Side of the Renaissance: Literacy, Territoriality, and Colonization. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press. ———. 2007. Delinking: The Rhetoric of Modernity, the Logic of Coloniality and the Grammar of Decoloniality. Cultural Studies 21 (2–3): 449–514. ———. 2009. Epistemic Disobedience, Independent Thought and Decolonial Freedom. Theory, Culture and Society 26 (7–8): 159–181. https://doi. org/10.1177/0263276409349275. Mpofu, William. 2017. Decoloniality as Travelling Theory: Or What Decoloniality Is Not. Turn: Towards a Latin American Agenda. Seminar. Johannesburg: WiSER – Wits Institute for Social and Economic Research. Mujinga, Martin. 2018. ‘Religion as a Riding Horse of Politics?’ A Critical Evaluation of Political Influence in the Zimbabwean Ecclesiastical Life. Alternation 23 (December): 244–265. MyZimbabwe. 2022. Mnangagwa is Blessed, Even if he Desists From Campaigning, his Works Will Speak for Him: Makandiwa. April 17. https://www.myzimbabwe.co.zw/news/94617-­m nangagwa-­i s-­b lessed-­e ven-­i f-­h e-­d esists-­f rom-­ campaigning-­his-­works-­will-­speak-­for-­him-­makandiwa.html. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Sabelo J. 2009. Do ‘Zimbabweans’ Exist? Trajectories of Nationalism, National Identity Formation and Crisis in a Postcolonial State. Africa in Development 3. Peter Lang. https://www.peterlang.com/ document/1043863. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Sabelo J. 2013. Why Decoloniality in the 21st Century? The Thinker for Thought Leaders 48: 10–16. Ndoro, Tim E. 2022. Zimbabwe’s Prophet Makandiwa Sparks Controversy After ‘Celebrating Acceptable’ Levels Of Corruption. Harare.com, October 3. https://iharare.com/zimbabwes-­prophet-­makandiwa-­sparks-­controversy-­ after-­acceptable-­corruption-­sermon/. Nehanda Radio. 2022. ‘Makandiwa Abuses Congregants with his Political Positions’  – Mliswa. April 19. https://nehandaradio.com/2022/04/19/ makandiwa-­abuses-­congregants-­with-­his-­political-­positions-­mliswa/. New Zimbabwe 2023. Uebert Angel Finally Speaks on Gold Mafia; Claims it was all an Act, a Classified National Intelligence Operation. Uebert Angel finally speaks on Gold Mafia; claims it was all an act, a classified national intelligence operation - NewZimbabwe.com. Newsday. 2019. Makandiwa Disowns Disputed Mine. March 9. https://www. newsday.co.zw/news/article/58413/makandiwa-­disowns-­disputed-­mine. Ngugi wa Thiong’o. 2009. Something Torn and New: An African Renaissance. New York: Basic Civitas Books.

7  MAN OF GOD/GOLD AND ZANU-PFISM IN ZIMBABWE: THE CASE… 

161

Refugee Documentation Centre (Ireland). 2017. Information Relating to Uebert Ange Snr and the Spirit Embassy (The Goodnews Church). Persecution/ Treatment of Pastors Involved in Spirit Embassy. Police/State Protection. Legal Aid Board. Religion in Zimbabwe. 2013. Prophet Angel Produces Miracle Money in Botswana. January 7. https://relzim.org/news/prophet-­angel-­produces-­ miracle-­money-­in-­botswana/. ———. n.d. Emmanuel Makandiwa. https://relzim.org/resources/religious-­ leaders-­zimbabwe/prophet-­makandiwa/. Rupapa, Tendai, and David Shumba. 2014. Thousands Queue for Makandiwa’s Anointing Oil. The Herald, August 11. https://www.herald.co.zw/ thousands-­queue-­for-­makandiwas-­anointing-­oil/. Sanni, John Sodiq. 2016. Religion: A New Struggle for African Identity. Phronimon 17 (2). https://doi.org/10.17159/2413-­3086/2016/120. Shumba, Zanda. 2015. Zanupf-ism, Living in the Past. Bulawayo24 News, April 21. https://bulawayo24.com/index-­id-­opinion-­sc-­columnist-­byo-­66425.html. Sithole, Tendayi. 2014. Achille Mbembe: Subject, Subjection, and Subjectivity. Doctoral thesis. University of South Africa. http://uir.unisa.ac.za/bitstream/ handle/10500/14323/thesis_sithole_t.pdf?sequence=1. Standard. 2015. Zimbabwe: Uebert Angel - From Grace to Grass. The Standard, March 1. http://allafrica.com/stories/201503010267.html. Tazvida, Fortune. (2018). ‘Heaven-bound’ Makandiwa insists. Nehanda Radio, May 14. https://nehandaradio.com/2018/05/13/heaven-­bound-­ makandiwa-­insists/. Wanderley, Sergio, and Amon Barros. 2018. Decoloniality, Geopolitics of Knowledge and Historic Turn. Management and Organizational History 14 (1): 79–97. https://doi.org/10.1080/17449359.2018.1431551. Zimeye. 2022. Makandiwa Torches Social Media Storm Over Corruption Remarks. October 4. https://www.zimeye.net/2022/10/04/makandiwa-­ torches-­social-­media-­storm-­over-­corruption-­remarks/.

CHAPTER 8

A Critical Evaluation of Bishop Ancelimo Magaya’s Resistance to Zanu-PFism in Zimbabwe Gift Masengwe and Bekithemba Dube

Introduction In Zimbabwe, Zanu-PFism, or its political influence and tactics, has led to the puppetisation and victimisation of many religious leaders. Some religious leaders have willingly given themselves over to political manipulation, resulting in a divided religious community and electorate. It has compromised the relationship between the church and the state, as religious leaders, mostly of prosperity churches, have willingly become engaged in partisan politics at the expense of their prophetic voices (Mujinga 2018). Zanu-PFism in Zimbabwe’s second republic, like in the first, has maintained a vindictive posture towards political criticism and contradicts promises of openness and tolerance. This perpetuates a ‘marriage of

G. Masengwe (*) • B. Dube Central University of Technology, Bloemfontein, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 B. Dube (ed.), Regime, Religion and the Consolidation of Zanu-PFism in Zimbabwe, African Histories and Modernities, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-46084-5_8

163

164 

G. MASENGWE AND B. DUBE

convenience’ (Magezi and Tagwirei 2022, 1) between the ruling party and some church leaders. Some church leaders have been driven to accept manipulation, and some have gone underground, though there are yet others who have not succumbed to Zanu-PFism, nor have fallen into the trap of puppetisation or victimisation. To provide context for readers, this chapter focuses on Bishop Ancelimo Magaya, who has demonstrated consistency in resisting Zanu-PFism by maintaining his independence and freedom from the tactics of Zanu-PF.

Defining Zanu-PFism Zanu-PFism is a deeply rooted operational concept derived from the political ideology of the ruling Zanu-PF party in Zimbabwe. Zanu-PF is perceived to be an invincible liberation movement that exists in spite of individual state presidents. The Zanu-PF party’s historical association with the liberation struggle (1975–1979) and land reform (2001–2003) has provided it with a strong base of supporters, including members of religious communities, which has contributed to its ability to manipulate the political narrative (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2011). Zanu-PFism involves entrenched political ideologies that marginalise and minimise other players, and prevent them from taking on significance in the national political landscape, and can do this with the support of religious groups (Tendi 2013). Zanu-PFism dominates the Zimbabwean political space with its views, to the extent that it marginalises the alternative viewpoints of other political actors. The dominance of Zanu-PFism and control over the political landscape of Zimbabwe has created significant barriers for other political players and voices to actively engage in the national political process. This domination calls us to evaluate the fairness of Zanu-PFism, in view of the inclusion and exclusion criteria of the party for younger voices and alternative perspectives in this political space.

Contextualising Religious Adoption and Resistance of the Regime in Zimbabwe Literature indicates that there are divisions in various religious denominations in Zimbabwe, due to players either adopting or resisting Zanu-­ PFism. One of these is Bishop Nolbert Kunonga, with his decolonisation project in the Anglican Church’s Harare Diocese (Gundani 2022).

8  A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF BISHOP ANCELIMO MAGAYA’S RESISTANCE… 

165

Kunonga, who unequivocally spoke in defence of Zanu-PF, ‘continued to be one of the few religious leaders giving Mugabe some moral legitimacy’ (Gunda 2008, 299) and, in return, could rely on state security to guard church premises and to force out those Anglicans who did not subscribe to his political motives. Kunonga adopted the flagrant and disreputable practices of Zanu-PFism, and condoned human rights violations through his propagation of the Davidic-royal ideology (Titaley 1991). The Anglican Church had been turned into a site of struggle (Vengeyi 2012), until the Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr. Rowan Williams, visited Zimbabwe and challenged Robert Mugabe, then president, to be a responsible leader (Weldvum 2011). Before he was deposed, Bishop Kunonga had adopted Zanu-PFism as his operating ideology, unlike Bishop Magaya, who has resisted it. Similar challenges arose in the Church of Christ in Zimbabwe when it adopted a new church constitution (Masengwe and Dube 2023). Some people point out that the leadership of retired judge, Sero Masole Nare, a member of Zanu-PF, could have influenced the divisions before he was reappointed to chair the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission (Moyo 2019). Others point out that the church was manipulated for economic benefits by influential church leaders (Mafohla 2017; Mafa 2018), and not only those linked to Zanu-PF structures; all leaders influenced by economic determinism propagated Zanu-PFism in their churches and advanced churches to divide (Masengwe and Dube 2023, 215). Economic determinism in Zimbabwe, following the influence of Zanu-­ PFism, also affected the Apostolic Faith Mission (AFM) (Ruzivo 2014; Chivasa and Machingura 2018), caused succession battles in the African Apostolic Church of Johanne Marange (AACJM) (Musevenzi 2017; Magaracha 2023), and led to constitutional reform in the Baptist Convention of Zimbabwe (BCZ) (Hlomani 2019; Masengwe and Dube 2023). In the AFM, leaders who had reached the end of their terms of office or were due to retirement refused to leave office; instead, they rewrote the constitution to inscribe continuing benefits for the incumbency. These conflicts led to division in the AFM. Similarly, in the AACJM, the paternity model determined legitimacy for high priesthood. When Noah Taguta—son of Arnold Taguta, elder brother to Johanne Marange (1912–1963), and the founder of AACJM—took over the High Priesthood from 1992 to 2022 (Magaracha 2023; Masengwe and Dube 2023, 209), he (Noah Taguta) created a new model, the genealogy model, to qualify

166 

G. MASENGWE AND B. DUBE

all of the Momberume bloodline in the leadership of the AACJM. In this, Noah Taguta, who predicted and supported Mugabe’s 2013 presidential victory (News24 2013), proposed that President Emmerson Mnangagwa was the anointed leader for the 30 July 2018 elections (Musoni 2019). This led to division in the AACJM. In the case of the BCZ, constitutional reform led to division and the formation of the African Baptist Churches of Zimbabwe. In all, economic determinism affected most denominations between 2005 and 2019, as a result of Zanu-PF strategy to reboot its waning political support.

Magaya’s Conceptualisation of Church and Politics in Response to Zanu-PFism Magaya, leader of the Grace Ablaze Ministries International and a civic organisation, Zimbabwe Divine Destiny, is a prominent religious figure in Zimbabwe. He has been actively engaged in political commentary and criticism, particularly regarding the political dispensations of Mugabe and Mnangagwa. However, there has been limited scholarly exploration and synthesis of Magaya’s engagements in relation to Zanu-PFism. This chapter aims to shed light on Magaya’s contributions to the democratic space in Zimbabwe and to initiate a conversation on his impact on religious life in Zimbabwe. The study seeks to contextualise Magaya’s prophetic stance within the framework of biblical prophecy. It argues that Zimbabwe is plagued by political polarisation, executive corruption, economic instability, and ecclesial divisions. In this context, Magaya fearlessly participated in political discourse and employed deep biblical and theological narratives to critique the state’s failures. The chapter also examines the interface between the church, its teachings, and public-political theologies. It explores the localised and contextualised assessment of Magaya’s fearless involvement in Zimbabwe’s political affairs and considers his activities as a model for other religious leaders to defend and uphold the principles of human dignity (Imago Dei) and Christian identity (Imago Christi). The objective of such political activism by the church is to protect and promote the identity and dignity of humanity (Imago Anthropoi). Furthermore, the chapter delves into the historical background of Magaya and reports on his responses to Zanu-PFism, including his views

8  A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF BISHOP ANCELIMO MAGAYA’S RESISTANCE… 

167

on the Mbuya Nehanda statue and the imprisonment without trial of opposition politicians. These elements provide a comprehensive understanding of Magaya’s engagement with political issues in Zimbabwe and his resistance to retrogressive political practices. Overall, the chapter aims to examine Magaya’s contributions within the context of Zimbabwe’s political landscape and the church’s role in advocating for social justice and human dignity. It presents Magaya as an example of a religious leader who fearlessly defends these principles and influences others to do the same, thereby challenging and resisting the negative aspects of Zanu-PFism.

Bishop Magaya’s Advocacy for Poor and Dismembered People Who Resist Oppression Magaya’s engagement with politics has been characterised by outspoken criticism of former President Mugabe’s misrule, the country’s economic collapse, and the state’s unjust treatment of citizens (African News Agency 2016a). Unlike praise singers for the ruling party, Magaya did not shy away from expressing his concerns and demanding accountability from the government, despite facing consequences (Mujinga 2018). As the economic situation during the rule of former President Mugabe worsened and reports of abuse, abductions, and illegal arrests increased, churches, including Magaya’s coalition of Christian civic organisations (Zimbabwe Divine Destiny, Zimbabwe Christian Alliance, Christian Voice, Zimbabwe Pastors’ Fellowship and Prayer Network Zimbabwe), became vocal in their opposition (African News Agency 2016a). They threatened protests and called for an ‘extraordinary collective response’ to address the dire situation in Zimbabwe. Their demands included the impeachment of ‘the President over failed governance, and [to] subsequently set up a transitional authority to handle the crises and carry the nation through until the next election’ (African News Agency 2016a). The state did not take these threats lightly, as historical precedents show that Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle was nurtured and supported by church leaders (Manyonganise and Chirimuuta 2011). In fact, leaders of political parties, such as Joshua Mqabuko Nkomo (Methodist) and Robert Gabriel Mugabe (Catholic), who had liberated Zimbabwe had a background in religious leadership (Hove and Chenzi 2017). Bishop Magaya fearlessly challenged former President Mugabe to ensure the security of

168 

G. MASENGWE AND B. DUBE

Pastor Evan Mawarire when Mawarire returned from self-imposed exile. Magaya said, ‘My appeal to President and his cabinet is to guarantee Pastor Evans Mawarire’s security. This is his home and he is a citizen of this country. His family is here, his relatives are here’ (Vambe 2016), thereby emphasising Mawarire’s citizenship status and right to protection and safety. However, Magaya’s boldness and fearlessness in engaging with politics led to him receiving threats and warnings to stay out of political matters (African News Agency 2016a). There were attempts to discredit him by comparing Magaya to Archbishop Pius Ncube, a former church cleric who had been involved in political activism and had prayed for former President Mugabe’s death. The message was that Magaya should avoid being embarrassed like Ncube, whose private life had been violated by Zanu-PF (Mufundirwa 2016). Despite taking risks and facing intimidation, Magaya continued to voice his concern and to advocate for justice and accountability. His unwavering commitment to defending the rights of citizens and challenging political leaders has established him as a prominent figure in the resistance against Zanu-PFism in Zimbabwe.

Calling for the Resignation of Former President Mugabe Magaya demonstrated exceptional courage and resistance by publicly calling for the resignation of Mugabe, despite the risks associated with doing so at that time. Under Mugabe’s rule, criticising the sitting president and advocating for regime change were considered serious crimes that were punishable by death or imprisonment. Magaya’s bold stance, unlike that of Apostle Andrew Wutawunashe (Family of God Church) and Bishop Nehemiah Mutendi (Zion Christian Church), and also leaders of the Zimbabwe Indigenous Inter-denominational Council of Churches (ZIICC), distinguished him from other religious leaders who remained silent even when human rights violations were clear, or because they had been co-opted into the ruling party machinery due to their own moral misdeeds, such as their failure to repay the government loans that were corruptly given to each of them by Zanu-PF government (Dube 2020). Magaya’s uneasy relationship with Robert Mugabe intensified when his wife, Grace Mugabe, appeared to have taken charge of government affairs

8  A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF BISHOP ANCELIMO MAGAYA’S RESISTANCE… 

169

and the living conditions became worse for ordinary citizens. Magaya’s criticism of Mugabe’s leadership and calls for Mugabe’s resignation— which was uncharacteristic of church leaders captured by Zanu-PFism— showcased Magaya’s willingness to challenge the status quo, advance alternative views to those of state leadership, and defy the regime’s attempts to suppress dissent (Chingwaru and Manayiti 2016). A notable event occurred on 26 June 2016 when Magaya, as a prophet of God who is responsible and accountable for the life of a soul (the president) that has life after death, held a press conference in Harare to commemorate the United Nations Day Against Torture. At this event he demanded that Mugabe resign due to reports of alleged ‘harassment, abduction and torture of innocent citizens by state security agents’ (African News Agency 2016a; Chingwaru and Manayiti 2016; Mahove 2016; Zhou 2016). Magaya drew parallels for Mugabe, using biblical figures such as David the warrior and Solomon the builder, thereby highlighting that Mugabe’s inclination towards conflict relates to a liberation struggle, rather than the contemporary needs of nation-building. Magaya even threatened to demonstrate and dismantle the Zanu-PF machinery and emphasised the need for peaceful means to effect change. He stated, ‘As long we are peacefully demonstrating it is proper, we need to use all sorts of approaches to ensure this machinery is dismantled’ (African News Agency 2016b; Mahove 2016). He stated, furthermore, There is a clear indication and consensus that President Mugabe has failed us. We feel very strongly that he is also too old to continue. He has failed and we have made observations that whatever difficulties we are going through right now, it is actually a result of the leadership crisis where a leader has failed to provide servant leadership. (Chingwaru and Manayiti 2016)

Such bold criticism was expressed by white liberals during the colonial era (Masengwe and Dube 2021), but such fervency ceased at independence, until 1997, when the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace broke the silence on Gukurahundi (CCJP and LRF 1997). Prophetic voices conscientised the divided church to confront the evils of the state, rather than receive state gifts (African News Agency 2016a; Chingwaru and Manayiti 2016; Mahove 2016; Zhou 2016). Magaya’s stance against the ‘reckless policies’ of the government, such as politicising food, corruption, and disregard of the rule of law (Chingwaru

170 

G. MASENGWE AND B. DUBE

and Manayiti 2016), received support from opposition parties and was commended by individuals such as the Movement for Democratic Change-­ Tsvangirai (MDC-T) spokesperson, Obert Gutu, who said, The involvement of the church in the country’s politics is a new dawn and vindicates what we have always said. We have always called for democracy and Mugabe to step down, but because we are a generally Christian nation, we hope they will accept the church’s call. … The church has always been involved in politics even before independence and it played a big role in fighting oppression. The church is now reawakening and we hope the rest of the nation will look at the situation from the church’s perception. (Chingwaru and Manayiti 2016)

Magaya was undeterred by potential misunderstandings, misjudgements, and violations, as his call resonated with opposition parties and the wider population. His fearless engagement and alignment with the opposition’s demands contributed to growing pressure on Mugabe’s regime. It is worth noting that the church’s involvement and calls for a ‘working political formula or language’ (Chingwaru and Manayiti 2016) influenced the events leading to the November 2017 coup, as various political parties and church organisations engaged in discussions and demands for change. In a YouTube video, Magaya ‘speaks about God’s power in removing President Mugabe from power’ (VOA Zimbabwe 2017), thereby emphasising his faith-driven perspective on political transformation. Magaya’s actions stimulated debate and set agendas for political parties and church organisations, and caused an increased focus on monitoring the economy and financial systems. ‘Meanwhile, Zimbabwe Heads of Christian Denominations (ZHOCD) have urged citizens to be vigilant, tolerant and united in working together towards transformation of the floundering economy’ (Chingwaru and Manayiti 2016). Magaya’s resistance to Zanu-PFism and his unwavering commitment to his country’s well-being have made him a significant figure in Zimbabwean politics and religious activism.

8  A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF BISHOP ANCELIMO MAGAYA’S RESISTANCE… 

171

Magaya’s Response to Idolatry: Mbuya Nehanda The ruling party, Zanu-PF, has exerted efforts to accommodate and capture its religious constituencies as a means of consolidating its power. It has sought to include different theologies and religions, by presenting itself as an all-inclusive society that respects religious diversity. However, this inclusivity is not solely for the purpose of religious respect, but rather a strategy to control and utilise the church to ensure the continued rule of Zanu-PF. As part of this strategy, Zanu-PF erected a statue of Mbuya Nehanda, a spiritual medium who played a role in the first Chimurenga (liberation struggle) in Zimbabwe. Nehanda has significant political importance in Zimbabwean political history. President Mnangagwa’s decision to erect her statue in the capital city, Harare, was intended to honour her and capture the support for Zanu-PF of traditional leaders who value her. By doing so, Zanu-PF aimed to secure the loyalty of these leaders and turn them into party agents who promote Zanu-PFism. However, Magaya viewed the erection of the statue as a direct challenge to the Christian god and a catalyst for the political and economic crises in Zimbabwe. He saw it as the ‘introduction of paganism in the country … attempting to divert the nation’s attention from the worship of one true God’ (Sambiri 2021a, b). In his statement, Bishop Magaya argued that ‘Mr. Mnangagwa wants to entrench the nation into paganism’, which had reached an abysmal stage and is ‘an abomination before God’ (Sambiri 2021a, b). In his statement, entitled ‘Paganistic Practices in Zimbabwean Government: An Abomination Before God’, Magaya drew parallels between the statue of Mbuya Nehanda and the biblical story of King Nebuchadnezzar of Babylon, who had attempted to divert Daniel and his Hebrew companions from the worship of the one true God by entrenching the nation into paganism (Sambiri 2021a, b). Magaya criticised Mnangagwa’s act of erecting a statue to Nehanda as a manifestation of religious syncretism in the life of the president, which raised questions about the genuineness of national prayer days convened at State House, and suggesting that state leaders probably ‘visit spirit mediums at night to get instructions on how they should lead Zimbabwe’ (Sambiri 2021a, b). Magaya also expressed concern about the cost of erecting the statue, which was not revealed to the nation. The idolatrous behaviour of erecting the statue, as Magaya confers, was hand in glove with the state’s

172 

G. MASENGWE AND B. DUBE

simultaneous plan to exhume the interred remains of former President Mugabe for use in idolatrous rituals. He cited Isaiah 1:1–23 to warn that the economies of unjust, corrupt, and idolatrous countries would decline (Sambiri 2021c, d). Magaya extended his warnings to state leaders, by urging them to reflect on their actions and to conduct themselves accordingly. Overall, Magaya’s criticism of the statue reflects his perception of the state’s manipulation of religious symbolism for political purposes, and his belief that such actions would have negative consequences for the nation.

Reprimanding Political Leaders for Their Unrepentant Attitudes Magaya’s courageous stance had a commendable impact on younger pastors, and he inspired them to become conscientious objectors and to raise their prophetic voices in defence of vulnerable citizens. They observed that meaningful engagement with the Zimbabwean state is challenging, due to factional battles, corruption, and economic decline (Magezi and Tagwirei 2022). These woes have hindered the success of the church’s efforts, and the state intentionally masterminds divisions and supports partisan church members to weaken the voice of advocates. However, the church has often lacked the hermeneutical skills needed to engage the state contextually with biblical principles and to ensure that justice is achieved. Magaya stands out for his ability to engage the state using scripture. When Mnangagwa displayed an unrepentant attitude and engaged in corruption (looting and monopolising natural resources), unjustly incarcerated citizens, ordered people to be killed with impunity, ruled by oppressive laws, and used the law to commit evil, thereby raising bloody hands before God, Magaya confronted him (Sambiri 2021c; Ps. 94:20). Magaya emphasised that only through truth, mercy, and justice could Zimbabwe undergo socioeconomic transformation. He warned that, in ‘[f]ailure to do so, would the church be guilty of [complicit in] strengthening the hands of evil doers’ (Sambiri 2021c; Jer. 23:14b). Magaya argued that politicians, especially those representing opposition parties, should refuse gifts from unrepentant regimes. He referred to these gifts as the ‘stinking’ wealth of the president, and he cautioned opposition ‘MPs [members of parliament] against selling their souls to the

8  A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF BISHOP ANCELIMO MAGAYA’S RESISTANCE… 

173

devil’ (Sambiri 2022a). He accused Mnangagwa of using money to divide opposition parties. Magaya also condemned Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC) MPs who participated in looting state coffers while the nation was in need of a new crop of state leaders. Citing 2 Kings 5:26–27, he warned MPs to distinguish when loans and gifts are appropriate, lest they suffer the consequences ‘of Naaman’s leprosy’. Furthermore, Magaya warned Zanu-PF, particularly influential figures in the party, that Zimbabwe’s socioeconomic development is hindered when the country lives a lie. He urged them ‘to embrace the truth, confess and repent so that the nation can move forward’ (Sambiri 2021d). Magaya criticised the Mnangagwa administration for disowning the reason it gave for the 2017 palace coup, of removing corrupt individuals in Mugabe’s government. It is clear that Magaya has resisted Zanu-PFism and has maintained his integrity by refusing to be bribed or compromised and by addressing critical issues in his reflections.

Magaya’s Reflections on the 41st Year of Zimbabwe’s Independence with Zanu-PFism Magaya’s reflection on 41 years of independence in Zimbabwe was critical of past government operations, election anomalies, economic policies, land reform, indigenisation efforts, and atrocities committed against political opponents and the citizenry. He condemned events such as the Gukurahundi war (1983–1987), violence against the Zimbabwe Unity Movement of Edgar Tekere (1988–1990), the economic structural adjustment programme (1990–1995), the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (2001–2003), looting in the name of indigenisation, and committing of atrocities against the opposition party, MDC (1999–2005). He also referred to the ‘heart rending experiences of operations’ such as the 2005 Operation Restore Order and the 2020 forced vaccinations, which inflicted ‘indelible scars born out of the state induced inflictions upon the citizenry’ (Sambiri 2021d). Magaya has criticised opportunistic religious leaders, including Prophet Andrew Wutawunashe, Bishop Samuel Mutendi, Reverend Obadiah Musindo, and Bishop Nolbert Kunonga, who campaigned for Zanu-PF and claimed divine revelation to unify Christians on national issues. He accused them of having a focus on pan-African principles, rather than

174 

G. MASENGWE AND B. DUBE

Christian doctrines, which had led to a fragmented church with different identities in the eyes of the populace. These actions allowed the rise of controversial religious leaders, such as Passion Java, Uebert Angel, and others, who manipulate people into submitting to the regime. These preachers support the state due to their involvement in shady deals (Magezi and Tagwirei 2022). Based on the issues Magaya identified, he castigated Zanu-PF for the wrongs perpetrated in its name that cause hurt, mistrust, division, disunity, and lack of vision. He called for an embrace of the truth to replace propaganda (Sambiri 2021d; John 8:32). He emphasises the need for reconciliation as a solution to these problems by arguing, One, reconciliation promotes an encounter between the opening of an expression of a painful past on the one hand, and the search for the articulation of a long term interdependent future, on the other. Two, reconciliation provides a place for truth and mercy to meet where concerns for exposing what have happened and for letting go in favor of renewed relationships are validated and embraced. Three, reconciliation should give time and space for both justice and peace. (Sambiri 2021d)

Magaya’s political ideology differs from that of other religious leaders, as he boldly resists the regime and its policies. Such a stance can attract counterattacks from the regime, aimed at silencing him or attempting to co-opt him as a regime enabler. The chapter, Bishop Magaya remained vocal in his resistance to Zanu-PFism.

Condemnation of Unjustified Incarceration of Opposition Legislators Magaya has been vocal in confronting Zimbabwe’s president regarding the continued incarceration of Job Sikhala, an opposition activist who had not committed any crimes. Sikhala’s unfair treatment is not comparable to the presidential envoy, Prophet Uebert Angel, who was implicated in the Gold Mafia scandal (as presented by Al Jazeera in Episodes 1–4), but was acquitted without facing any charges. The incarceration of opposition activists through a partisan judiciary demonstrates the incumbent’s lack of readiness for free and fair elections, as the courts make political verdicts to protect the interests of the state. This situation pushed many young preachers to engage in partisan politics, as the president favours

8  A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF BISHOP ANCELIMO MAGAYA’S RESISTANCE… 

175

indigenous religious churches and beneficiaries of partisan treatment justified the silencing of dissenting voices (Dube and Nkoane 2018). Magaya condemned the miscarriage of justice, calling it the cause of Zimbabwe’s socioeconomic troubles. He argued that the state’s tolerance of corruption, from the first family to the rest of the government, was detestable before God (Sambiri 2022b, c; Is. 1:21, 23). Using strong hermeneutical principles, he denounced the unjustified incarceration of opposition supporters, including congregants who had been arrested when they prayed for Zimbabwe. The state kept these individuals on remand, even though they were kept out of jail, to intimidate and discourage anyone who wished to exercise their constitutional rights from doing so (Sambiri 2022b, c). Magaya called on the church to revive the Kairos moment and engage in both political and spiritual matters, and thereby fulfil its political role in the state, such as praying for the country. Praying for the country aimed to open the civic space to the church that had been closed due to state repression. Job Sikhala’s prolonged imprisonment without trial—he spent a total of 323  days in prison and was denied bail more than 15 times—raised concern about the political crisis and shrinking democratic space in Zimbabwe. Magaya challenged Mnangagwa to release Sikhala, saying ‘Mnangagwa wants to keep Sikhala in prison until 2023—after elections’ (Sambiri 2022c). Magaya accused Mnangagwa of being unprepared for a free and fair election. Sikhala’s removal from the political scene by a captured judiciary reinforced the political oppression in the country further; his incarceration denied justice for Moreblessing Ali’s murder (Chingono 2023) and it emphasised the need for a Kairos moment, for which Magaya positioned himself as a prophet, despite the oppressive machinery of Zanu-PF. We argue in this study that selfless leaders such as Magaya represent a small candle flame in a dark room, which illuminates the nation and inspires others to take a stand against selfish opportunists who have become prophets of worldly riches. Magaya’s boldness and bravery in confronting the regime’s injustices deserve commendation and support if the church is to address the pressing issues in the nation (Mujinga 2018).

176 

G. MASENGWE AND B. DUBE

The Ideals of Magaya and Biblical Prophecy on Political Engagement The first aspect we raise on Bishop Magaya is the willingness to be arrested for praying for Zimbabwe. Magaya’s resistance to the regime has come with its challenges, including being arrested. However, his determination to speak out against the regime is rooted in the belief that ‘God is an architect of politics’ (Kadenge 2017), and a conviction that true prophets must be prepared to endure hardship. One of his arrests occurred on 10 June 2022, when he was facilitating a prayer meeting under the #ZimbabweWeWant Campaign in Harare (Sambiri 2022d). Magaya and his congregants (GAMI and Zimbabwe Divine Destiny members) were meeting at the Dutch Reformed Church building in central Harare for a prayer to protest the rocketing cost of living and other national woes. The prayer meeting had been labelled political, and hence banned. Magaya addressed journalists as the leader of the Zimbabwe Divine Destiny on his deep concern for the crisis facing public life in Zimbabwe. Magaya and his congregants were arrested and questioned on the charge of public disorder and security (Sambiri 2022d). Despite facing such difficulties, Magaya remains committed to raising his voice against the regime’s injustices. Refusing to be Silenced by Politicians Magaya’s refusal to be silenced is seen as a testimony of his faith and his commitment to upholding justice and righteousness. By drawing inspiration from biblical teachings, such as being the salt and light of the world (Matt. 5:13–16), he demonstrates his desire to preserve and illuminate society. He advocates for the church to denounce the injustices perpetrated by the ruling party and to stand up for the rights of political prisoners, the poor, and the marginalised. Light dispels darkness and removes chaos, while salt prevents food from rotting (Adams 2020). By refusing to be silenced, Magaya depicted a desire for purity and to uphold human rights. In his morality, he displayed honesty in thought, speech, and conduct (Ogbonnaya 2011). For this reason, he ‘implored the church to denounce Zanu PF barbarism’ (Sambiri 2023). Some people are, however, afraid of Magaya’s closeness to the CCC, as depicted in his comment: ‘We commend and applaud the church’s recent pastoral visit to the Murewa politically motivated victims of violence and their subsequent clear statement calling for peace and restoration of

8  A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF BISHOP ANCELIMO MAGAYA’S RESISTANCE… 

177

people’s freedoms’ (Sambiri 2023). Magaya’s closeness to CCC reflects the way the church treated Zanu-PF at independence. Nevertheless, we support the act of visiting political victims, which is in line with the biblical mission of priests and Levites of realising the identity and dignity of all people who fall victim to robbers [the robbed] (Luke 10:25–37).

Magaya states that the Bible ‘clearly models how the church should lead in good neighbourliness’ (Sambiri 2023). His claim that the church should rise above riches is a true calling that all Christians should embrace—it dispels fear and, thereby, Christians are enabled to serve God and to ‘holding the mystery of the faith in a pure conscience’ (1 Tim. 3:9). Magaya’s refusal to be silent has, therefore, been strengthened by his vision of eternal bliss as a reward for acting justly, and with mercy and love (Jer. 23:14). The hope of eternal bliss gave Magaya a bold response, namely that he was ready to die for freedom and justice, making it worthless for Zanu-PF to ‘crash’ his life (RosGwen24 News 2021). Despite threats on his life following a series of crackdowns on CCC activists across the nation, ‘Magaya encouraged citizens to develop an indomitable spirit of resistance against the government of President Emmerson Mnangagwa’ (RosGwen24 News 2021). When people are persistent, resilient, and ready to die for a cause, arresting one activist calls the whole nation to willingly march, so that everyone can be arrested (Rosgwen24 News 2021). Such a spirit is characterised by the refusal to be silenced by any type of threat, including death threats. It is in the ambit of this attitude that Magaya asked the state to just go ahead and kill or arrest him, rather than threaten to do so. Magaya’s actions align with the prophetic tradition of challenging oppressive rulers and systems. He confronts and exposes compromises made by the state that undermine God’s justice and the well-being of citizens. Like Old Testament prophets such as Amos and others (Amos 2:6–7; Is. 3:14–15; Mic. 3:9–11; Jer. 5:26–28, 9:1–9), Magaya fearlessly engages with politicians and speaks out against corruption, bribery, and the executive abuse of power (Suski 1983; Bariu 2017). Old Testament prophets intervened in the institution of the Jewish monarchy by overseeing the enthronement, dethronement, and eventual replacement of kings, as well as rebuking any waywardness, as in the case

178 

G. MASENGWE AND B. DUBE

of Saul (1 Sam. 9–15) and David (2 Sam. 11–12) (Magezi and Tagwirei 2022). This chapter emphasises the need for the church to engage with political leaders courageously, to push the boundaries of democracy, and to promote the church’s vision and credibility for social evangelism and state stewardship. Magaya’s involvement in politics is seen as an embodiment of courage and a potential catalyst for change in Zimbabwe. The study argues that the church has a responsibility to be the moral conscience of the state, to preserve justice, mercy, inclusion, equality, and tolerance in Zimbabwe, because the church and state, or theology and politics, are inseparable, like ‘Siamese twins’ (Tshaka and Senokoane 2016; Mujinga 2018, 248). While an evil state may be irritated by godly behaviour, we acknowledge that the Church must remain steadfast in speaking truth to power. The Church’s engagement with the state is crucial for the well-being of society and the advancement of God’s kingdom (Tutu 2017). By upholding Christian principles and promoting peace and development, the Church can play a transformative role in politics. Overall, Magaya’s bold prophetic stance and his refusal to be silenced serve as a reminder of the Church’s responsibility to advocate for justice, stand against oppression, and promote the common good.

Final Remarks About Magaya’s Political Involvement in Zimbabwe Magaya’s refusal to be silenced reflects his commitment to purity, righteousness, and honesty in thought, speech, and conduct. If ministers of the Gospel live righteous lives, they can fearlessly denounce oppressive regimes. They can uphold their faith with a pure conscience. Magaya’s vision of eternal bliss called him to act justly, with mercy and love, and to stand up for freedom and justice, despite crackdowns on political parties and church ministers. This courage develops resistance in citizens, who become willing to rise up for a good cause. Magaya’s actions and stance align with the tradition of Old Testament prophets who challenged and rebuked oppressive rulers. These prophets intervened in the affairs of the monarchy, oversaw changes in leadership, and called out waywardness. In a similar vein, Magaya fearlessly engages with politicians and speaks out against corruption and abuse of power. Such responsive consciousness provokes all ungodly behaviour; hence the

8  A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF BISHOP ANCELIMO MAGAYA’S RESISTANCE… 

179

need for true churches and pastors to act as the conscience of the world, who can uphold the principles of justice, mercy, inclusion, equality, and tolerance in Zimbabwe. Magaya’s courageous actions and commitment to speaking truth to power make him a symbol of what Zimbabwe needs to address its current political problems. He embodies the courage and determination needed to bring about a different terrain of recovery and a renewed respect for human rights, which have been under siege during Zanu-PF’s rule. The Church is an open-ended institution that embraces but also breaks barriers for the purpose of spreading the Gospel of salvation. It has an ethos to uphold and principles to guide its actions in the world.

Summary and Conclusion This chapter discussed Bishop Ancelimo Magaya’s engagement with Zanu-PF in both the first and second republics of Zimbabwe. While some clerics have found it difficult to relate with the state, Magaya has unwaveringly engaged both former President Mugabe and now Mnangagwa. The chapter traced the history of Magaya and his church in their engagement with politics, and especially the church’s clarity on theological politics in Zimbabwe, and his engagements as a prophet of God. The Mnangagwa administration is characterised by corruption, violence, factionalism, poverty, and hate—the signs of a state thriving on conquest and manipulation. The Church, however, is driven by love, mercy, and justice, and ethical principles that are negated by a failing state. This chapter has shown that ruling party politicians led Zimbabwe into this conundrum, because of the absence of fearless prophets who display their salt and light to the world (Matt. 5:13–16). Magaya has displayed this phenomenon in his own life and is the definitive model of the church’s mission to the world in all areas of life. He displays godliness and holiness in his willingness to give away his life for the enfranchisement of the vulnerable in prison, for poor and underprivileged people. This attitude calls the Church to engage the state in authentic ways that display the holiness and goodness of God. Magaya contextualises the tenets of biblical prophets and the principles of grace visible in Jesus’ life. This attitude could lead to the curbing of oppression, injustice, and corruption, which brings untold suffering upon the people of Zimbabwe.

180 

G. MASENGWE AND B. DUBE

References Adams, D.D. 2020. This is Our Identity: Salt and Light. Sermon. I//0201.nccdn. net/1_2/000/000/127/0ad/2.9.2020-MESSAGE.pdf (nccdn.net). African News Agency. 2016a. Churches Demand Mugabe Impeachment. Polity, August 24. https://www.polity.org.za/print-­version/churches-­demand-­ mugabe-­impeachment-­2016-­08-­24. ———. 2016b. Zimbabwean Bishop Urges President Mugabe to Resign Over State Torture Allegations. Jacarandafm.com, June 28. https://www.jacarandafm.com/news/news/zimbabwean-­bishop-­urges-­president-­mugabe-­resign-­ over-­state-­torture-­allegations/. Bariu, Richard Mutura. 2017. The Function of Prophetic Forthtelling in Roho Christianity. European Scientific Journal 13 (35): 146. https://doi. org/10.19044/esj.2017.v13n35p146. CCJP, and LRF. 1997. Breaking the Silence, Building True Peace: Report on the Disturbances in Matabeleland and the Midlands, 1980–1988: A Summary. Harare: Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe and The Legal Resources Foundation. Chingono, Nyasha. 2023. Zimbabwe Court Denies Opposition M.P.  Pre-Trial Bail for Fifteenth Time. Global Development/The Guardian, January 5. https:// w w w. t h e g u a r d i a n . c o m / g l o b a l -­d e v e l o p m e n t / 2 0 2 3 / j a n / 0 5 / zimbabwe-­c ourt-­d enies-­o pposition-­m p-­p re-­t rial-­b ail-­f or-­f ifteenth-­t ime-­ job-­sikhala. Chingwaru, Rejoice, and Obey Manayiti. 2016. Zimbabwe: Churches Tell President Mugabe To Resign. How Africa News. https://howafrica.com/ resign-­churches-­tell-­mugabe/. Chivasa, Norman, and F.  Machingura. 2018. ‘One Person’s Meat is Another’s Poison’: Conflict Management in the Apostolic Faith Mission in Zimbabwe. Journal of Religion and Theology 2 (1): 73–84. https://doi.org/10.4102/hts. v73i3.4518. Dube, Bekithemba. 2020. Regime Enablers and Captured Religious Mandate in Zimbabwe. Verbum et Ecclesia 41 (1): 1–7. Dube, Bekithemba, and Milton Molebatse Nkoane. 2018. The Interface of Politics and Religion in Zimbabwe: Rethinking Religious Leaders as Agents of Consecration and Repudiation. Alternation Special Edition 23: 224–243. https://doi.org/10.29086/2519-­5476/2018/sp2‘a10. Gunda, Masiiwa Ragies. 2008. The Reign of Bishop Nolbert Kunonga: Nationalist Spirit or Empire Builder? Missionalia: Southern African Journal of Mission Studies 36 (2–3): 299–318. Gundani, Paul H. 2022. A ‘Decolonisation Project’that Went Awry: A Missio-­ Ecclesiological Interrogation of the Anglican Diocese of Harare during Bishop Nolbert Kunonga’s Episcopacy: 2001–2007. Missionalia: Southern African Journal of Mission Studies 50 (1): 27–43.

8  A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF BISHOP ANCELIMO MAGAYA’S RESISTANCE… 

181

Hlomani, Sineke. 2019. The Impact of Congregational Autonomy on a Baptist Worshipper: A Comparative Analysis of the Baptist Convention of Zimbabwe and African Baptist Churches in Zimbabwe on Congregational Autonomy. Unpublished Honours report. Bulawayo: Zimbabwe Open University. Hove, Mediel, and Vincent Chenzi. 2017. ’Prophets of Doom’: The Zimbabwean Christian Community and Contemporary Politics. Insight on Africa 9 (2): 173–195. https://doi.org/10.1177/0975087817710054. Kadenge, Levee. 2017. God Himself is the Architect of Politics  – Obituaries. The Standard, October 22. https://www.newsday.co.zw/ thestandard/2017/10/22/god-­architect-­politics. Mafa, Shepherd. 2018. Romans 12:14–21 and Social Conflict: A Case Study of the Church of Christ in Zimbabwe. Unpublished Master’s dissertation. Gweru: Midlands State University. Mafohla, Shelton. 2017. Clergy-Laity Relations: An Investigation into Power Relations Between the Clergy and Laity in the Church of Christ in Zimbabwe (COCZ). Bachelor of Honours report. Gweru: Midlands State University. Magaracha, Tendai. 2023. Economic Determinism in the African Apostolic Church of Johane Marange. Doctoral thesis. University of Pretoria. Magezi, Christopher, and Kimion Tagwirei. 2022. A Critical Assessment of Church and Political Engagement in Zimbabwe under the New Dispensation. Verbum et Ecclesia 43 (1): 1–12. https://doi.org/10.4102/ve.v43i1.2527. Mahove, Christopher. 2016. Call for Mugabe to Quit Over Torture Claims. IOL.co.za, June 28. https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/call-­for-­mugabe-­ to-­quit-­over-­torture-­claims-­2039612. Manyonganise, Molly, and Chipo Chirimuuta. 2011. Christians’ Participation in Politics in Zimbabwe: A Privilege or Right? Missionalia: Southern African Journal of Mission Studies 39 (3): 287–305. Masengwe, Gift, and Bekithemba Dube. 2021. The Legacy of Sir Reginald Stephen Garfield Todd in Zimbabwean Public Life History. HTS Teologiese Studies/Theological Studies 77 (4): a6538. https://doi.org/10.4102/hts. v77i4.6538. ———. 2023. Patterning Constitutional Conflicts in the Church of Christ in Zimbabwe. E-Journal of Religious and Theological Studies 9 (6): 206–220. https://doi.org/10.38159/erats.2023962. Moyo, B.J.P. 2019. Retired Justice Selo Masole Nare, chairperson. National Peace and Reconciliation (NPRC), October 15. https://www.nprc.org.zw/ retired-­justice-­selo-­masole-­nare-­chairperson/. Mufundirwa, Rufaro. 2016. Zimbabwe Divine Destiny: a Church or Political Party? Bulawayo24 News, March 3. https://bulawayo24.com/index-­id-­ opinion-­sc-­columnist-­byo-­83718.html. Mujinga, Martin. 2018. ’Religion as a Riding Horse of Politics?’ A Critical Evaluation of Political Influence in the Zimbabwean Ecclesiastical Life. Alternation 23: 244–265. https://doi.org/10.29086/2519-­5476/2018/sp23a11.

182 

G. MASENGWE AND B. DUBE

Musevenzi, Julius. 2017. The African Independent Apostolic Church’s Doctrine under Threat: The Emerging Power of Faith-based Organisations’ Interventions and the Johanne Marange Apostolic Church in Zimbabwe. Journal for the Study of Religion 30 (2): 178–206. https://doi.org/10.17159/2413­3027/2017/v30n2a. Musoni, Philip. 2019. White Garment Churches (Vapositori) and ZANU-PF Party Politics in Zimbabwe: True Marriage or Marriage of Convenience During and Post-Mugabe Era. HTS Teologiese Studies/Theological Studies 75 (1): a5412. https://doi.org/10.4102/hts.v75i1.5412. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Sabelo J. 2011. The Construction and Decline of Chimurenga Monologue in Zimbabwe: A Study in Resilience of Ideology and Limits of Alternatives. In 4th European Conference on African Studies (ECAS4) on Contestations over Memory and Nationhood: Comparative Perspectives from East and Southern Africa (15–8), Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala. News24. 2013. Zim Church Predicts Mugabe Victory. April23. https://www. news24.com/news24/xarchive/multimedia/africa/Zim-­church-­predicts-­ Mugabe-­victory-­20130423. Ogbonnaya, Joseph. 2011. The Church in Africa: Salt of the Earth? In The Church as Salt and Light: Path to an African Ecclesiology of Abundant Life, African Christian Studies Series, ed. Stan Chu Ilo, Joseph Ogbonnaya, and Alex Ojacor, 65–87. Eugene: Wipf and Stock Publishers. RosGwen24 News. 2021. Bishop Magaya Tells Zanu PF They Cannot Crash Someone Ready to Die for Freedom. RosGwen24 News, March 18. https:// rosgwen24.com/bishop-­magaya-­calls-­zanu-­pf-­to-­order/. Ruzivo, Munetsi. 2014. Succession Debates in the Johane Marange African Apostolic Church. In Multiplying in the Spirit: African Initiated Churches in Zimbabwe, ed. Ezra Chitando, Masiiwa Ragies Gunda, and Joachim Kügler, 15–31. Bamberg: University of Bamberg Press. Sambiri, Tinashe. 2021a. Erection of Mbuya Nehanda Statue: Church Leader Warns Mnangagwa against Idol Worship. ZimEye, May 26. https://www.zimeye.net/2021/05/26/erection-­of-­mbuya-­nehanda-­statue-­church-­leader-­warns-­ mnangagwa-­against-­idol-­worship/. ———. 2021b. Bishop Magaya Reprimands Mnangagwa Over Idol Worship. ZimEye, May 26. https://www.zimeye.net/2021/05/26/bishop-­magaya-­ reprimands-­mnangagwa-­over-­idol-­worship/. ———. 2021c. Bishop Magaya Reprimands ‘Unrepentant’ Mnangagwa. ZimEye, January 12. https://www.zimeye.net/2021/01/12/bishop-­magaya-­ reprimands-­unrepentant-­mnangagwa/. ———. 2021d. From Robert Mugabe to Dambudzo Mnangagwa: Church Leader Exposes Zanu PF Callousness. ZimEye, April 21. https://www.zimeye. net/2021/04/21/from-­robert-­mugabe-­to-­dambudzo-­mnangagwa-­church-­leader-­ exposes-­zanu-­pf-­callousness/.

8  A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF BISHOP ANCELIMO MAGAYA’S RESISTANCE… 

183

———. 2022a. Cleric Confronts Mnangagwa Over Sikhala Detention. ZimEye, October 3. https://www.zimeye.net/2022/10/03/cleric-­confronts-­ mnangagwa-­over-­sikhala-­detention/. ———. 2022b. Mnangagwa Cash Stinks – Cleric. ZimEye, December 3. https:// www.zimeye.net/2022/12/03/mnangagwa-­cash-­stinks-­cleric/. ———. 2022c. Zimbabweans Demand Immediate Release of Bishop Magaya. ZimEye, June 10. https://www.zimeye.net/2022/06/10/zimbabweans-­ demand-­immediate-­release-­of-­bisIgaya/. ———. 2022d. Brutal Mnangagwa Planning to Keep Sikhala in Jail Until 2023. ZimEye, October 4. https://www.zimeye.net/2022/10/04/brutal-­ mnangagwa-­planning-­to-­keep-­sikhala-­in-­jail-­until-­2023/. ———. 2023. Church Refuses to be Silenced by Mnangagwa Regime. ZimEye, January 25. https://www.zimeye.net/2023/01/25/church-­refuses-­to-­be-­ silenced-­by-­mnangagwa-­regime/. Suski, Miroslav M. 1983. Politics in Amos. MA dissertation. Western Evangelical Seminary. Tendi, BlI-Miles. 2013. Ideology, Civilian Authority and the Zimbabwean Military. Journal of Southern African Studies 39 (4): 829–843. https://doi. org/10.1080/03057070.2013.858543. Titaley, John A. 1991. A Sociohistorical Analysis of the Pancasila as Indonesia’s Ideology in the Light of the Royal Ideology in the Davidic State. Doctoral thesis. Berkeley: Graduate Theological Union. https://www.proquest.com/openvie w/5b0bc26e279acd40c7111ea0ba73239f/1?pq-­origsite=gscholarandcbl=18 750anddiss=y. Tshaka, Rothney, and Boitumelo Senokoane. 2016. The Christian Politician? An Investigation into the Theological Grounding for Christians’ Participation in Politics. HTS Teologiese Studies/Theological Studies 72 (1): 1–7. https://doi. org/10.4102/hts.v72i1.3300. Tutu, Osei-Acheampong Desmond. 2017. Biblical Perspective on Christians’ Participation in Politics. World Wide Journal of Multidisciplinary Research and Development 3 (9): 165–170. Vambe, Lex. 2016. Mugabe Must Guarantee Pastor Mawarire's Security: Magaya. The Zimbabwe News Live, August 8. https://www.thezimbabwenewslive.com/ mugabe-­must-­guarantee-­pastor-­mawarires-­security-­magaya/. Vengeyi, Elizabeth. 2012. The Bible as a Source of Strength among Zimbabwean Women during Socio-Economic and Political Crises. In The Bible and Politics in Africa, ed. Masiiwa Gunda and Joachim Kügler, 363–378. Bamberg: University of Bamberg Press. https://www.academia.edu/70406537/The_bible_and_ politics_in_Africa. VOA Zimbabwe. 2017. Ancelimo Magaya Speaks About God’s Power in Removing Mugabe from Power. YouTube, November 30. https://www.youtube.com/w’tch?v=hlQh1UBKuCs.

184 

G. MASENGWE AND B. DUBE

Weldvum, A. 2011. Zimbabwe: Tsvangirai Comes Out in Favour of Gay Rights. The World from PRX, October 24. https://theworld.org/stories/2011-­10-­24/ zimbabwe-­tsvangirai-­comes-­out-­favor-­gay-­rights. Zhou, Thobekile. 2016. Mugabe Should Step-Down Now – Magaya. Bulawayo24 News, June 29. https://bulawayo24.com/index-­id-­news-­sc-­national-­ byo-­91178.html.

CHAPTER 9

CCCism Versus Zanu-PFism: Religious Response of the Citizens Coalition for Change to the Zanu-PF Gift Masengwe and Bekithemba Dube

Introduction The chapter discusses the response of the Citizen Coalition for Change (CCC), led by Advocate Nelson Chamisa, to the religious strategies employed by President Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa and his party, Zanu-PF. Mnangagwa, who surrounds himself with pastors, prophets, and Mapostori (traditional religious leaders), uses their influence to legitimise his political power. In response, Chamisa and the CCC have engaged a theological and strategic counterattack. Chamisa has used biblical messages at his rallies and in messages on social media platforms and has employed an activist known as Madzibaba veShanduko to recruit supporters. Chamisa criticises the syncretistic nature of Zanu-PF, particularly the way it incorporates traditional religions. One

G. Masengwe (*) • B. Dube Central University of Technology, Bloemfontein, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 B. Dube (ed.), Regime, Religion and the Consolidation of Zanu-PFism in Zimbabwe, African Histories and Modernities, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-46084-5_9

185

186 

G. MASENGWE AND B. DUBE

example is the erection of the statue of Mbuya Nehanda—in spite of Zanu-PF’s campaign slogan being The Voice of the People is the Voice of God. These actions of Zanu-PF raise questions about the impact of religious strategies on the Zimbabwean populace and the implications they have for Chamisa’s political career. The CCC’s approach, rooted in authentic Christianity and adherence to the Bible (using GodIsInIt as slogan), has garnered support from Christians, including members of mainline churches who observe worship on Sundays and Saturdays. The CCC has built a strong religious foundation by engaging church leaders and encouraging prayer and fasting by its members. Madzibaba veShanduko serves as a satirical response to Zanu-PF’s religious leaders, presenting them as fake and mocking their practices. This approach has yielded positive results for the CCC in terms of increased membership and support leading up to the 2023 democratic elections in Zimbabwe.

The Founding of the Citizen Coalition for Change in Zimbabwe The CCC is a political party that was formed after Chamisa lost in a court challenge that gave the rights to own and use the Movement for Democratic Change-Tsvangirai (MDC-T) party to the Douglas Mwonzora faction (Muponde 2021). Instead of contesting the court decision, Chamisa quickly formed a new political body with a new name, the CCC (Gambakwe Media 2022; Ntali 2022). Chamisa’s leadership recouped the members CCC had lost when it changed from MDC-A (the A is for Alliance), and the party started to counter-plan against Zanu-PF.  CCC contested by-­ elections in 2022 and won most constituencies it had held as MDC-A (Africanews 2022). Regarding religious identity, and as a counter-hegemonic strategy against Zanu-PF’s use of religion, CCC adopted the GodIsInIt slogan, which became a direct challenge to Zanu-PF’s The Voice of the People is the Voice of God and Jehova weHondo. Zanu-PF’s control of the substance and framing of national elections, as well as the presence of the opposition in electoral decisions, has been challenged by CCC, and this is a reality that marks a critical disjuncture for Zimbabwe’s elections in the future (Gambakwe Media 2022; Ntali 2022). This chapter discusses the success of the CCC’s reaction to Zanu-PF’s use of religion in politics.

9  CCCISM VERSUS ZANU-PFISM: RELIGIOUS RESPONSE OF THE CITIZENS… 

187

President Mnangagwa, Zanu-PFism, and Religious Leaders Mnangagwa surrounds himself with prophets and pastors, such as Prophets Emmanuel Makandiwa, Passion Java, Uebert Angel, and Mike Chimombe; Bishop Nehemiah Mutendi and Apostle Andrew Wutawunashe, with the aim of duping the Zimbabwean populace through what Chibango (2016) calls ‘spirituality of shortcuts’, that is, persuading followers they can get quick results in their endeavours, including economic solutions to national woes. While Mnangagwa finds peace in surrounding himself with religious enablers, who are often opposed to the CCC, he has also been in the habit of using prosperity pastors to do shady deals on his behalf, in the belief that their religious image would act as a smokescreen (Rukuni 2021). Mnangagwa officiated at the ground-breaking ceremony of the Hippodrome Beethoven Hotel, which belongs to Angel, Mnangagwa’s envoy and ambassador at large (Zimeye 2021). This attests to Mnangagwa’s insatiable desire to surround himself with pastors and prophets, especially socialites and prosperity prophets, such as Chimombe, Makandiwa, Java, and Angel (Rukuni 2021), and regime enablers such as Mutendi and Wutawunashe (Dube 2020, 2021). Prophets have joined the class of mbingas [local entrepreneurs], such as prosperity gospel preacher Panganai Java (Passion Java of Passion Java Ministries, which claims to perform miracles), who joined the class of Mike Chimombe, the Affirmative Action Group (AAG) Mashonaland West president and other Zanu-PF youths (State Media 2021). Mnangagwa takes selfies with these prophets and uses their religious endorsements of his 2023 presidential candidacy re-election to appeal to the electorate (Rukuni 2021). It is his prophetic claims that he performs miracles that caused Angel to be ‘roped into Mnangagwa’s charm offensive’ (Rukuni 2021) as a presidential envoy and ambassador at large to the West. However, a recent series of trending videos published by Al Jazeera, Gold Mafia (Episodes 1–4), exposed the president’s brutish character and his corrupt alliance with Angel.

188 

G. MASENGWE AND B. DUBE

Chamisa’s Critical View of Traditional Religion (Isaiah 8:19) While Mnangagwa surrounds himself with prophets, Chamisa uses social media messages containing scriptures to criticise the political and religious ideology of Zanu-PF. In a tweet, Chamisa expressed his opposition to the Mbuya Nehanda statue by referring to Isaiah 8:19, which states, ‘When men tell you to consult the spirits of the dead and the spiritists who whisper and mutter, shouldn’t a people consult their God instead? Why consult the dead on behalf of the living?’ (Ndoro 2022). Chamisa blamed Europeans for undermining African Christianity. The tweet received both criticism and support. Critics saw Chamisa separating religion from politics by bending only towards Christianity (Ndoro 2022). Critics said that Chamisa was imposing his own beliefs on everyone, while they felt he should separate himself from being a president and pastor (Ndoro 2022). The bulk of the Christians who are CCC followers applauded Chamisa for displaying the principles of an anointed and God-fearing leader. The criticism of Chamisa’s social media message led to widespread media attention and a great deal of public engagement on social platforms. Other users tweeted on Chamisa’s use of the Bible in his campaigns, as well as the distinction of ancestors and African spiritualism in relation to Christianity as alluded to above (Ndoro 2022). The CCC’s selective religious stance was seen to differ from that of Zanu-PF, which uses any religion as long it advances its political interests. Chamisa’s use of scripture in his political endeavours is supported by renowned religious personalities, such as Bishop Ancelimo Magaya of the Zimbabwe Divine Destiny, who believes that Zimbabwe needs a leader who is God-fearing, principled, and humble in character and who can bring prosperity to the country. Magaya, who sees a connection between political leadership, religious beliefs, and the well-being of Zimbabwe, supports Chamisa and often influences CCC supporters by his stance in support of their leader (Sambiri 2022a). Chamisa aligns himself with Magaya in order to appeal to Zimbabwe’s religiously inclined electorate and to seek a connection with the moral and spiritual values of Christian believers in their political ideologies. Magaya’s stance reflects the belief that a leader’s religious devotion and personal character can positively impact their ability to govern effectively and promote the well-being of the nation. It suggests that Magaya sees faith and moral values as essential components of good leadership. It is worth noting that political and

9  CCCISM VERSUS ZANU-PFISM: RELIGIOUS RESPONSE OF THE CITIZENS… 

189

religious affiliations can be intertwined in various ways, and it is not unique to any particular leader or country. Chamisa, like Zanu-PF officials, has resorted to using social media to promote his religious and political ideas, in line with modern political campaign strategies. Doing so enables him to reach a wider audience and motivate voters who share his views and beliefs. CCC supporters have also taken social media to express their loyalty to God and to Chamisa because they believe that their president’s devotion to God is crucial for effective leadership in Zimbabwe. Some supporters emphasise the importance of faith and reliance on God in leadership, because a president loyal to God will bring about positive change and overcome challenges. The supporters draw parallels with Bible stories, such as Gideon destroying altars to false gods and building an altar to Yahweh, which resulted in victory for Israel against their enemies (Sambiri 2022a; Jud. 6:24–35). Some people supported the complete removal of the statue of Mbuya Nehanda, which they saw as an altar to spiritualism. This view is an expression of supporters’ inner conviction that Zimbabwe should align itself with God’s principles for inner peace and victory. Chamisa’s supporters believe that Chamisa’s faith and commitment to God is central to his ability to lead Zimbabwe effectively (Sambiri 2022a). They draw inspiration from biblical narratives that emphasise the significance of removing idolatry and aligning the nation with God’s principles. Chamisa’s supporters express their own personal beliefs and perspectives, and Chamisa, as a public figure and politician, could interpret their messages in different ways in order to attract a diversity of groups and supporters with different backgrounds and convictions (Sambiri 2022a). People’s interpretations of religious teachings and their application to politics vary. While some may see Chamisa’s approach as unifying and based on biblical principles, others may view it as divisive (for instance, causing conflict between Christians and traditionalists) or inappropriate. Critics argued on Twitter that an aspiring state president should be neutral on religion, desist from capturing the minds of the electorate, and from insulting traditional religion, reduce the influence of religion on his political career, and stop scolding the ancestors and the traditional expressions of faith (Ndoro 2022). In his response, Magaya suggests that criticism of Chamisa’s religious references may be rooted in personal biases (actually, of Christians rather than non-Christians, playing to the gallery) and an excessive desire by Chamisa’s critics to appease Zanu-PF supporters. Magaya stated that

190 

G. MASENGWE AND B. DUBE

criticism was ‘driven by hatred of the scriptures, hatred of Chamisa, and more than an excessive appeasement mindset’ (Sambiri 2022a). Critics of Chamisa expressed views of anger and hatred in their tweets. They also criticised the history of colonialism and slavery, as imposed by Christian countries on Africa. The expressions were biased and limited as they failed to provide specific examples and contexts for the critical tweets in question. Chamisa’s supporters allegedly did not make statements out of anger or hatred—an indication that inclusion of religion in any discussion evokes strong emotions and varied responses, as different people express their opinions differently. Chamisa’s critics opposed Chamisa’s use of scripture during his political discourses, not because they wanted Chamisa’s discourses to improve his political interests. The congratulatory messages for the capturing of Madzibaba veShanduko by Chamisa’s critics are an indication of Zanu-PF supporters’ frustration with Chamisa’s use of religion for political mobilisation. Magaya provided reassurance that Chamisa embraced all citizens as equal, but in Chamisa’s tweets, he quoted scripture to state the holiness demanded by God from his people if they are to enjoy the fruits of Zimbabwe. Magaya rejected the idea that politicians should avoid commenting on Christian issues related to the church and indicated that people say nothing when Mnangagwa instigates violence using Bible-based statements, such as his claim that Takamboti Mwari vambozorora kumbouya Jehovah WeHando [We requested God to rest so we can work with Jehovah (the God of war)] (Bulawayo24 News 2013). Ultimately, prioritising his religious convictions and commitment to the Christian faith, even in politics, especially in relation to #GodIsInIt, Chamisa showed his unwavering stance in the Christian faith, about which he has been unapologetic since his high school days (Sambiri 2022a). His reference to Isaiah 8:19 was not intended to disparage those seeking political guidance and governance strategies from false prophets and spirit mediums, but a bold affirmation of Chamisa’s leadership qualities, to allow those whose views can be aligned with his to make political decisions accordingly (Sambiri 2022a). The support of, and endorsement by, religious figures such as Magaya may resonate with people who share similar religious convictions to shape his public image without alienating individuals preferring secular approaches to politics—as preferred by Zanu-­ PF’s syncretism model (Sambiri 2022a). It is important to consider diverse perspectives and the potential impact of blending religion and politics in an election in a pluralistic society. Chamisa’s blending of religion in

9  CCCISM VERSUS ZANU-PFISM: RELIGIOUS RESPONSE OF THE CITIZENS… 

191

politics helps us to understand his use of an activist to recruit voters, as explained in the next section.

Chamisa, CCCism, and Madzibaba veShanduko The activist Godfrey Karembera, also known as Madzibaba veShanduko, was utilised by Chamisa’s party, the CCC, as a counter-strategy against Mnangagwa’s use of pastors, apostles, and Mapostori. It provides an interesting episode in their respective approaches to politics. Madzibaba veShanduko, who wears custom-made yellow regalia branded with the CCC logo (Kachiko 2022) and resembling the traditional white garments worn by Mapostori (Zimlive 2022; Zimeye 2022), was apprehended and assaulted by police in the capital city of Zimbabwe, Harare, on 9 March 2022, allegedly for supporting CCC and the leadership of Chamisa (Sambiri 2022b, c; Zimlive 2022). He was also told to wear other clothes (Sambiri 2022d; Dube 2022). He became a religious and political symbol of Chamisa’s campaign as a ‘Change Champion’ (Ndoro 2023). Chamisa’s campaign statement is: ‘A vote must not shock those who have voted. A vote must shock those who have been voted out’. Madzibaba veShanduko mobilises supporters for the CCC leader wearing fully CCC-branded yellow regalia, similar to what Mapostori wear (Ndoro 2023). The CCC’s decision to use Madzibaba veShanduko as a counter-­strategy to Zanu-PF’s use of the Mapostori movement is an attempt to neutralise Zanu-PF’s religious constituency. By adopting elements of Mapostori religious practices, the CCC aims to attract supporters from that religious group and challenge Zanu-PF’s dominance over that group. Zanu-PF has been aware of how effectively religion can be used in campaigns since the time of former president Mugabe. Zanu-PF has attempted to neutralise the CCC strategy by victimising Karembera (Ndoro 2023). Zanu-PF also involved traditional leaders who are seen as representing both traditional religion and the ownership of land. Chamisa called on Mnangagwa to stop victimising Madzibaba veShanduko by using Chief Chipuriro to evict Madzibaba veShanduko from his home in Guruve for supporting the CCC (Ndoro 2023). The CCC uses Madzibaba veShanduko as part of a larger strategy to deceive and neutralise Zanu-PF and its supporters. Fadzayi Mahere, a CCC spokesperson, stated, ‘Zanu PF is desperate and seeing shadows and ghosts everywhere’ (Mangwaya 2022). The presence of Madzibaba veShanduko in CCC is supposed to demonstrate to the generally captured

192 

G. MASENGWE AND B. DUBE

Mapostori movement that there is a home for them in CCC. The CCC presents itself as Zanu-PF supporters in public, but they remain opposition at heart, which they express with reference to the strategy of ‘Operation Mango – green outside and yellow inside’ (Mangwaya 2022). This approach allows CCC to avoid confrontations with Zanu-PF activists and blockades during rallies. Madzibaba veShanduko serves as a front to distract Zanu-PF while CCC pursues its community outreach strategies. The CCC’s efforts to find alternative ways to counter Zanu-PF’s influence and regain control over Zimbabwe include using the religious space as an avenue to reclaim the country from Zanu-PF’s grip. ‘Leadership is about the quality of an individual’s actions, behaviour and vision’ (Koni 2022). By using religious symbols and strategies, including biblical messages, the CCC aims to challenge Zanu-PF’s religion-based structure and constituency, particularly within the Mapostori community. This is one of several strategies, which also include avoiding structure in the CCC and making the use of Madzibaba veShanduko effective (ZWNews 2023). Particular perspectives on the actions of Chamisa and the CCC may differ, depending on sources and interpretations of the political dynamics and strategies employed by political parties in Zimbabwe other than Zanu-PF.

Resigning Political Decisions to the Sanction of God The use of religious symbols and slogans in the political discourse of Zimbabwe, particularly by Chamisa and Mnangagwa, highlights the ownership and controversy surrounding the #GodIsInIt brand, which was initially adopted by Chamisa, but which has also been claimed by Mnangagwa through his slogan, The Voice of the People is the Voice of God (Voci Populi, Voci Dei) (Zimeye 2018). The religious tools used in political campaigns often reference Christian symbols and beliefs. Chamisa has consistently emphasised his Christian beliefs and has called for Zimbabwe to become a Christian nation (Zimeye 2018). Chamisa’s political discourse is dominated by biblical messages. He promotes the idea of the Christian God freeing the country from oppression in political, economic, religious, and social aspects (Chibango 2016; Dube 2021). In contrast, Mnangagwa has aligned himself with prophets, through fasting and prayer vigils, who use the so-called spirituality of shortcuts (Chibango

9  CCCISM VERSUS ZANU-PFISM: RELIGIOUS RESPONSE OF THE CITIZENS… 

193

2016) and speculative economics, also called the prosperity gospel, which Chamisa criticises as a belief in miracles without economic production principles (Mudzanire and Banda 2021). The use of prosperity gospel in his speculative economics, Mnangagwa becomes a manipulator who subjugates people through use of biblical principles. Both political parties have appropriated Christian principles in their political discourse (Mudzanire and Banda 2021), though they have different conceptions of using religion for political purposes. The use of religious precepts in politics, such as #GodIsInIt, has attracted criticism and has been labelled a ‘political lie’ (Nyikadzino 2021). It has been suggested that relying solely on religious slogans without hard work and effort is futile and that invoking God without human effort is not sufficient for achieving the positive political outcome that would usher Chamisa into State House (Nyikadzino 2021). They argue that some religious perceptions do not have political application at the polls. While ZANU-PF’s strategies have yielded benefits for the party, there is resistance to Zanu-PF’s repression and a general dissatisfaction with its failure to create a democratic society (Nyikadzino 2021). The party’s use of religious slogans is seen as a means to pacify the electorate, rather than to empower them to critically evaluate politicians’ actions and hold them accountable (Nyikadzino 2021). In fact, politicians have hidden their failures under the cover of religion. Thus, ‘Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC) President Nelson Chamisa’s “GodIsInIt” mantra has riled some of his supporters who have demanded that he do more than just bank on Jehovah’s intervention in the Zimbabwean crisis’ (AllAfrica.com 2023). Religious symbolisms such as #GodIsInIt are unscientific and experts do not expect positive political outcomes from them (Nyikadzino 2021). In summary, the use of religious symbols and slogans in Zimbabwe’s politics, highlighted by the controversy surrounding the ownership of the #GodIsInIt brand and the different approaches of Chamisa and Mnangagwa regarding religion in politics, suggests that relying solely on religious slogans without also taking substantive actions may be seen as a manipulation of religious principles and fails to address the underlying issues in the country. CCC’s dependence on religious slogans, however, does not mean that the symbols have not been used successfully to resist Zanu-PFism and its lies to advance state repression rather than national democratisation.

194 

G. MASENGWE AND B. DUBE

God of Peace Versus God of War CCC and Zanu-PF have contrasting approaches to invoking religious beliefs and strategies in their political activities. The CCC, represented by Chamisa, has utilised fasting, prayer vigils, and messages of love and peace to promote calmness and unity amid a politically violent environment. CCC has invoked the God of Peace as a means of countering the aggressive use of the God of War by Zanu-PF (Bulawayo24 News 2013). However, this approach has been criticised by people who perceive it as weak and ineffective in the face of Zanu-PF’s intimidation strategies, such as cheating, rigging, and violence (Mugabe 2023). While the CCC’s strategies have led to positive turnouts at their rallies and had reduced bloodshed since the 2018 elections, Zanu-PF has taken a different stance (Sunday Express 2021). Zanu-PF has openly acknowledged that it refers to the God of Violence to control dissenting voices and maintain its hold on power. The party believes that they need violence to enforce their ideology and suppress those who do not conform. The CCC’s use of religious scriptures and preaching of peace has been met with scepticism, with some perceiving Chamisa to be a weak opposition leader who is incapable of challenging a violent organisation using only Bible verses (Mutongwiza 2022). However, Chamisa has responded by stating that he is aware of the nature of the enemy he is fighting, and his approach is a tactical one (New Zimbabwe 2022). Overall, the CCC and Zanu-PF have divergent approaches to utilising religious beliefs and strategies: the CCC wishes to promote peace and love, and avoid violence, and Zanu-PF admits to using violence to control dissent and maintain power. People’s perceptions regarding the effectiveness of these respective approaches vary for different segments of the population.

Final Remarks on CCC’s Response to Zanu-PFism in Zimbabwe Chamisa’s use of the #GodIsInIt label and biblical messages, such as obtaining wisdom by seeking God (Ps. 53:1–2), in his political campaigns have had explosive reactions, especially in response to his tweets that quote Bible verses to Sabbath Christians, in spite of him being a Sunday Christian (Bulawayo24 News 2023b), and the tweet about poor governance in Zimbabwe.

9  CCCISM VERSUS ZANU-PFISM: RELIGIOUS RESPONSE OF THE CITIZENS… 

195

Critics argue that Chamisa needs to go beyond quoting verses and sloganeering and should emphasise the need for concrete actions and strategies to win elections (AllAfrica.com 2023). However, this chapter suggests that these critics fail to understand the tactics that Zanu-PF employs to frustrate opposition leaders. Chamisa’s use of #GodIsInIt seems to have confused the ruling party, supporters, and critics alike, which enables him to navigate the challenges leading up to the 2023 general elections, namely, voter recruitment and resource mobilisation (Bulawayo24 News 2023a; New Zimbabwe 2023; Zimbabwe Situation 2023). The obstacles faced by the opposition with regard to the Maintenance of Peace and Order Act (MOPA) the government used to incarcerate Job Sikhala (Sikhala 2023), and being used to prevent CCC rallies from taking place, and the fast-tracked Private Voluntary (PVO) Bill, which undermines funding for opposition parties from foreign funders, are some of the challenges Chamisa voided with his words and actions. CCC, however, continues to work behind the scenes to secure votes, in order to liberate Zimbabwe from tyranny through Chamisa’s faith and trust in God (Zimbabwe Situation 2023). Thus, political analysts such as Vivid Gwede state that it is not fatal for politicians such as Chamisa to express their religious faith in political affairs, though Chamisa should also exert other efforts within his human power to achieve CCC’s intended outcomes (Zimbabwe Situation 2023). Reference to God in political campaigns is a noticeable phenomenon across the political divide in Zimbabwe. The strategy has proven to be effective, because the majority of Zimbabweans are Christians, and religious and spiritual leaders in the country have even made political predictions (Zimbabwe Situation 2023). Both Chamisa and Mnangagwa have used references to religion to capture the popular imagination, with the opposition gaining the upper hand. While Chamisa’s critics pretended to like political messages from him, by calling for more tangible actions, the effectiveness of the use of religion in the Zimbabwean landscape has increased the opposition’s support for the 2023 harmonised general elections (Bulawayo24 News 2023a).

Conclusion This chapter discussed the response of the CCC and its charismatic leader, Chamisa, to the religious strategies employed by Mnangagwa and his party, Zanu-PF.  The CCC employed a theological and strategic

196 

G. MASENGWE AND B. DUBE

counterattack to Zanu-PF’s use of religion in politics. CCC used biblical messages, engaged church leaders, and employed an activist known as Madzibaba veShanduko to recruit supporters. The CCC was formed as a political party after Chamisa lost the use of the MDC-A name to Mwonzora in a court challenge that gave his contenders the ownership of the MDC-T party and its properties. Chamisa quickly formed the CCC as a new political party to counter Zanu-PF. The CCC has built a strong religious foundation by engaging church leaders and promoting prayer and fasting among its members. Mnangagwa has surrounded himself with pastors, prophets, and traditional religious leaders and uses their influence to legitimise his political power. The CCC views this strategy as a form of manipulation and has employed Madzibaba veShanduko to mock and challenge Zanu-PF-­ aligned religious leaders. Mnangagwa’s association with religious figures, particularly prosperity pastors, has elicited criticism and accusations of corruption. Chamisa and the CCC, furthermore, criticise Zanu-PF’s syncretistic approach, particularly its incorporation of traditional religions, such as the erection of a statue of Mbuya Nehanda. Chamisa’s use of biblical scriptures, such as Isaiah 8:19, is seen as a critique of Zanu-PF’s reliance on spirit mediums and false prophets. Chamisa’s approach has garnered support from Christians, including members of mainline churches, and his use of scripture and his alignment with Magaya of Zimbabwe Divine Destiny reflects his commitment to the Christian faith and his belief that a leader’s religious devotion and character can positively impact their ability to govern effectively. Chamisa’s religious references have received both criticism and support, with some arguing that a state president should be neutral on religion. The CCC’s use of Madzibaba veShanduko as a counter-strategy against the Mapostori movement, which is aligned with Zanu-PF, was successfully used to neutralise Zanu-PF’s religious dominance of the Mapostori. By adopting elements of Mapostori religious practices, the CCC attracted supporters from that group and challenged Zanu-PF’s ideological domination of the liberation struggle.

9  CCCISM VERSUS ZANU-PFISM: RELIGIOUS RESPONSE OF THE CITIZENS… 

197

References Africanews. 2022. Zimbabwean Opposition Party Wins Majority in By-Elections. March 28. https://www.africanews.com/2022/03/28/zimbabwean-­opposition­party-­wins-­majority-­in-­by-­elections/. AllAfrica.com. 2023. Zimbabwe: God Is in It  - Says Chamisa After Al Jazeera Expose, as Followers Demand More. March 26. https://allafrica.com/stories/202303270413.html. Bulawayo24 News. 2013. Mnangagwa Speaks on ‘Jehova weHondo. Video. May 20. https://bulawayo24.com/index-­id-­news-­sc-­regional-­byo-­30456-­article-­ Mnangagwa+speaks+on+'Jehova+weHondo'+-­+video.html. ———. 2023a. Chamisa’s CCC Urged to Employ ‘Guerilla’ Tactics. March 10. https://bulawayo24.com/index-­id-­news-­sc-­national-­byo-­228575.html. ———. 2023b. Chamisa’s Supporters Tired of Bible Verses. March 26. https:// bulawayo24.com/index-­id-­news-­sc-­national-­byo-­229016.html. Chibango, C. 2016. Prosperity Gospel, A Pathway Out of a socioeconomic Crisis? Ministries of Walter Magaya, Zimbabwe. International Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences 3 (1): 55–82. Dube, Bekithemba. 2020. Regime Enablers and Captured Religious Mandate in Zimbabwe. Verbum et Ecclesia 41 (1): 1–7. ———. 2021. Religious Leaders as Regime Enablers: The Need for Decolonial Family and Religious Studies in Postcolonial Zimbabwe. British Journal of Religious Education 43 (1): 46–57. Dube, Gibbs. 2022. Zimbabwe Police Beat up Popular Citizens Coalition for Change Supporter ‘Madzibaba veShanduko’. VoaZimbabwe.Com, March 17. https://www.voazimbabwe.com/a/6489343.html#:~:text=A%20popular%20 Citizens%20Coalition%20for%20Change%20%28CCC%29%20 supporter,Karembera%20is%20now%20facing%20charges%20of%20disorderly%20conduct. Gambakwe Media. 2022. BREAKING: Chamisa Announces New Party Name  – Citizens Coalition for Change. January 24. https://gambakwe.com/2022/ 01/24/breaking-­chamisa-­submits-­new-­candidates-­to-­zec/. Kachiko, Tafadzwa. 2022. News in Depth: ‘I Could Have Died’: CCC Member Relives Horror of Zanu PF, Police Terror. The Standard, March 20. https:// newsday.co.zw/thestandard/news/article/9081/news-­i n-­d epth-­i -­c ould-­ have-­died-­ccc-­member-­relives-­horror-­of-­zanu-­pf-­police-­terror. Koni, Leonard. 2022. Opinion and Analysis: Chamisa Tipped to Win 2023 Election. News Day, May 27. https://www.newsday.co.zw/opinion-­analysis/ article/2179/chamisa-­tipped-­to-­win-­2023-­election. Mangwaya, Miriam. 2022. Zanu PF Falls for Chamisa Hoax. Newsday Zimbabwe, September 2. https://www.newsday.co.zw/local-­news/article/17169/zanu-­ pf-­falls-­for-­chamisa-­hoax.

198 

G. MASENGWE AND B. DUBE

Mudzanire, S., and C.  Banda. 2021. Mocking the Just God? A Theological Critique of President Mnangagwa’s Use of the Name of God to Justify his Rule in Zimbabwe. Verbum et Ecclesia 42 (1): 1–10. Mugabe, Tanya. 2023. Elections: Bad News for ZANU-PF – Nelson Chamisa 53 Percent, ED Mnangagwa 40 Percent. My Zimbabwe News, February 8. https:// www.myzimbabwe.co.zw/news/105567-­2023-­elections-­bad-­news-­for-­zanu-­ pf-­nelson-­chamisa-­53-­percent-­ed-­mnangagwa-­40-­percent.html. Muponde, Richard. 2021. Chamisa Loses MDC Alliance Name to Mwonzora. Sunday Mail, August 29. https://www.sundaymail.co.zw/ chamisa-­loses-­mdc-­alliance-­name-­to-­mwonzora. Mutongwiza, Lovejoy. 2022. Chamisa Is Too Weak To Lead. 263Chat, October 12. https://www.263chat.com/chamisa-­is-­too-­weak-­to-­lead/. Ndoro, Tim. E. 2022. Nelson Chamisa Divides Zimbabweans After ‘Mocking’ Ancestors and African Traditional Religion. iHarare.com, April 2. https:// iharare.com/nelson-­chamisa-­divides-­zimbabweans-­after-­mocking-­ancestors-­ african-­traditional-­religion/. Ndoro, Nyashadzashe. 2023. ED Called to Intervene to Stop Eviction of CCC Activist Madzibaba veShanduko. Nehanda Radio, January 10. https://nehandaradio.com/2023/01/10/ed-­c alled-­t o-­i ntervene-­t o-­s top-­e viction-­o f-­c cc-­ activist-­madzibaba-­veshanduko/. New Zimbabwe. 2022. ‘l am Not Soft; We Know What We Are Dealing With’ – Says Chamisa, Dismissing Claims he is Weak to Remove Zanu PF. NewZimbabwe. com, October 28. https://www.newzimbabwe.com/l-­am-­not-­soft-­we-­know-­ what-­w e-­a re-­d ealing-­w ith-­s ays-­c hamisa-­d ismissing-­c laims-­h e-­i s-­w eak-­t o-­ remove-­zanu-­pf/. ———. 2023. God Is In It – Says Chamisa After Al Jazeera Expose, as Followers Demand More. NewZimbabwe.com, March 26. https://www.newzimbabwe. com/https-­w ww-­n ewzimbabwe-­c om-­g od-­i s-­i n-­i t-­s ays-­c hamisa-­a fter-­a l-­ jazeera-­expose-­as-­followers-­demand-­more/. Ntali, Elia. 2022. Chamisa Rebounds With New Party Name. 263Chat, January 24. https://www.263chat.com/breaking-­news-­chamisa-­rebounds-­with-­new-­ party-­name/. Nyikadzino, Gibson. 2021. Chamisa’s GodIsInIt an Unscientific Political Lie. The Herald, August 19. https://www.herald.co.zw/chamisas-­godisinit-­an-­ unscientific-­political-­lie/. Rukuni, Charles. 2021. Mnangagwa Using Prosperity Pastors to Dupe Youth – SA Publication. The Insider. https://insiderzim.com/mnangagwa-­using-­ prosperity-­pastors-­to-­dupe-­youth-­sa-­publication/. Sambiri, Tinashe. 2022a. Bishop Magaya Defends President Chamisa’s Christian Views. Zimeye, April 8. https://www.Zimeye.net/2022/04/08/bishop-­ magaya-­defends-­president-­chamisas-­christian-­views/. ———. 2022b. Special Message from CCC’s Madzibaba veShanduko. Zimeye, March 9. https://www.Zimeye.net/2022/03/09/watch-­special-­message-­ from-­cccs-­madzibaba-­veshanduko/.

9  CCCISM VERSUS ZANU-PFISM: RELIGIOUS RESPONSE OF THE CITIZENS… 

199

———. 2022c. Police Arrest Madzibaba veShanduko for Wearing Yellow Regalia. Zimeye, March 17. https://www.Zimeye.net/2022/03/17/police-­arrest-­ madzibaba-­veshanduko-­for-­wearing-­yellow-­regalia/. ———. 2022d. Madzibaba veShanduko Badly Injured after Being Attacked by Police Details. Zimeye, March 18. https://www.Zimeye.net/2022/03/18/ madzibaba-­veshanduko-­badly-­injured-­after-­being-­attacked-­by-­police-­details/. Sikhala, Job. 2023. Full Text of Job Sikhala’s Speech before he was Sentenced in Court. Nehanda Radio, May 4. https://nehandaradio.com/2023/05/04/ full-­text-­of-­job-­sikhalas-­speech-­before-­he-­was-­sentenced-­in-­court/. State Media. 2021. Passion Java Teams Up with Zanu PF Youth Members in Chiyangwa’s Indigenous Business Group. ZimEye, April 25. https://www. z i m e y e . n e t / 2 0 2 1 / 0 4 / 2 5 / p a s s i o n -­j a v a -­t e a m s -­u p -­w i t h -­z a n u -­ pf-­youth-­members-­in-­chiyangwas-­indigenous-­business-­group/. Sunday Express. 2021. Nelson Chamisa: The Man Who Walked with God to the Plebiscite. March 8. https://zimbabwedigitalexpress.com/2021/03/08/ the-­storyline-­is-­that-­covid-­19-­affects-­men-­and-­women-­differently/. Zimbabwe Situation. 2023. News in Depth: ‘God Is In It’: Chamisa Insists as he Navigates Thorny Path Ahead of Polls. The Standard, March 12. https:// www.newsday.co.zw/thestandard/news/article/200008701/news-­in-­depth-­ god-­is-­in-­it-­chamisa-­insists-­as-­he-­navigates-­thorny-­path-­ahead-­of-­polls. Zimeye. 2018. Who Owns the Brand ‘GodIsInIt’, Chamisa or Mnangagwa? Zimeye, July 3. https://www.Zimeye.net/2018/07/03/who-­owns-­the-­ brand-­g odisinit-­c hamisa-­o r-­m nangagwa/?fbclid=IwAR1AzxLVjwQjylPn p7n-­89MP-­rbi34RaLbwA7xHfJTQ71kFqP6Zmo4gouLI. ———. 2021. President Mnangagwa Officiates Ground-breaking Ceremony of Prophet Uebert Angel’s Hippodrome Beethoven Hotel. April 16. https://www.Zimeyenews.com/news/president-­m nangagwa-­o fficiates-­ groundbreaking-­c eremony-­o f-­p rophet-­u eber t-­a ngel-­s -­h ippodrome-­ beethoven-­hotel. ———. 2022. Madzibaba Veshanduko Assaulted by the Police. March 17. https://www.Zimeye.net/2022/03/17/just-­i n-­m adzibaba-­v eshanduko-­ assaulted-­by-­the-­police/. ZimLive. 2022. CCC Activist ‘Madzibaba veShanduko’ Arrested for Wearing Yellow, Tortured in Custody. March 17. https://www.zimlive.com/2022/03/17/ ccc-­activist-­madzibaba-­veshanduko-­arrested-­for-­wearing-­yellow-­tortured-­in-­ custody/. https://www.pindula.co.zw/Madzibaba_VeShanduko/. ZWNews. 2023. Structure-less ‘Chamisa’ More Dangerous, Warns ex Zanu-PF MP. March 13. https://zwnews.com/structureless-­chamisa-­more-­dangerous-­ warns-­ex-­zanu-­pf-­mp/

CHAPTER 10

Religion and the Consolidation of the Zanu-PF Political Ideology Sifiso Mpofu and Albert Ncube

Introduction The study of religion and politics has emerged as an important area of inquiry, because the relationships between religion, politics, and ideology help mould people’s perceptions of political systems and religious discourses. From an historical perspective, it has been proven that the power of religion to aid or reject political ideologies is significant, hence, the continued struggle between church and state in developing democracies. Regarding this concept, Dudra et al. (2022, 72) observe that, in ‘the integral relationship between religion and politics, constructing a specific external religious policy was also manifested in the effects of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation in Europe’. From this analysis, the Constantinian reign stands out, as Constantine manipulated Christianity for his political expedience by claiming that ‘he dreamt of the cross, in a special form [that was to be the mark of his victory]’ (Horton 2006, 40–41). A deeper analysis of Constantine’s manipulative politics

S. Mpofu (*) • A. Ncube University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 B. Dube (ed.), Regime, Religion and the Consolidation of Zanu-PFism in Zimbabwe, African Histories and Modernities, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-46084-5_10

201

202 

S. MPOFU AND A. NCUBE

reveals that empires rise with the blessing of religious institutions and through insidious claims that give birth to devious theologies that advance an imperial agenda. From this vantage point, Mujinga (2018) describes religion as a ‘riding horse of politics’. In Zimbabwe, the ruling party, Zanu-PF, has been accused of using religion as a political ideology to maintain power and to rally the support of the unassuming masses. Central to this complex relationship of religion and politics is the role of the so-called white garment churches and the prophetic preachers of the new religious right, such as Andrew Wutawunashe, Emmanuel Makandiwa, and Uebert Angel. Such prophets and prophetic movements function as palace prophets, as they prop up the ruling party’s ideology through their prophetic declarations. To facilitate their function, these prophets are given a prominent space in the public media. This collaboration between religion and politics clearly advances an imperialistic ideology that shapes people’s social, political, and economic perspectives. These prophets use religion to rally the spirit of patriotism and promote the political ideology of the most powerful political movement/party in the land, as this analysis demonstrates. It seems these prophets have no interest in social sin and evil in the world. From this premise, it can be argued that religion is a powerful force for promoting a particular political ideology. Thus, it is not surprising that ‘politicians, religious leaders and citizens all give religion a prominent role in influencing society and politics’ (Yadav 2021, 299). On the same trajectory, religion remains pivotal to debates about who belongs, who has the right to speak, to vote and to own and amass wealth. In Zimbabwe, one cannot ignore the impact of prophetic radicalism, which seeks to aid political ideologies at the expense of religious profundity. Of particular interest to this chapter is the relationship between certain selected prophetic preachers and the ideology of Zanu-PF, from November 2017 to the present. But what is an ideology, what is the Zanu-PF ideology, and how does it appeal to those in prophetic circles? An ideology is ‘a set of beliefs about the proper order of society and how it can be achieved’ (Erikson and Tedin 2003, 64). Ideologies are based on a common understanding of fundamental issues, a common vision of and a shared strategy for achieving our goals. Therefore, an ideology brings about social cohesion, which is an ingredient for peace and development. In its ideological formulation, Zanu-PF is a socialist party with a pan-­ Africanist orientation. The Zanu-PF ideology is centralised around a

10  RELIGION AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE ZANU-PF POLITICAL… 

203

powerful authoritarian political leader, state control of critical sectors, and prioritising the empowerment of citizens (Dube 2021b); hence, it meshes well with the authoritarian nature of prophetic ministries and churches. From a relational perspective, prophetic leaders and Zanu-PF ideology function on the same wavelength and can easily learn and borrow from each other.

Convergence in Church-State Relations: Between the Bible and the Sword This characterisation of religion, politics, and ideology does not mean that churches and faith-based organisations have not been part of the broader struggle to achieve justice and to promote democracy in Zimbabwe. In Zimbabwe, the church as an institution has been involved in the politics of Zimbabwe dating back to the time before the liberation struggle (Baloyi 2022, 21). However, the church has never had one united voice; instead, it has been clearly divided regarding its interests in the things that are required for peace and justice for everyone. While the older/mainline churches and the Catholic Church have remained resolute in calling for justice and peace in the land, the newer, popular prophetic and charismatic churches/ministries and some major African indigenous churches have tended to align themselves with the state or the ruling party ideology, which they view as ‘God ordained’, hence, representatives of these churches feature prominently at Zanu-PF functions, where they ‘are proactive in initiating, enhancing and supporting (party) programmes’ in brazenly partisan/patriotic ways while ‘Zanu-PF presidents [are] an ever-present feature in the [the white garment] Shrines during their congregations’ (Baloyi 2022, 29). The church in Zimbabwe has had a long relationship with the state— dating from Zimbabwe’s liberation war—to such an extent that it is almost impossible to separate the church from the state, as the two institutions view each other as partners in the advancement of civilisation. This reality causes many church leaders to behave as functionaries of the state in the public space. This relationship is largely the result of politicians courting bishops and prophets and, in some unique cases, arresting church leaders who preach/speak out against political party ideology (Magezi and Tagwirei 2022, 1). This courtship between religious and political leaders in Zimbabwe has tended to compromise the mandate and role of the

204 

S. MPOFU AND A. NCUBE

church in speaking ‘up for those who cannot speak for themselves, for the rights of all who are destitute. Speak up and judge fairly; defend the rights of the poor and needy’ (Prov. 31:8–9). This compromised relationship between religion and politics (church and state) is glaring in the case of charismatic prophetic movements and indigenous African Christian movements (Hove and Chenzi 2017, 175). The major mainline churches under the Zimbabwe Council of Churches, the older Pentecostal churches under the Evangelical Fellowship of Zimbabwe, and the Catholic Church have been critical through the medium of pastoral letters, of which one states the following: As a Church, we renew our commitment to act as genuine peace-builders in our nation. The Church is a credible partner in creating a broad public consensus to guide our country to peace. The Synod does not only require a mutual dialogue but ‘prophetic dialogue’. The church not only listens to all but as prophet, the church listens carefully to God, is attentive to people’s cries, anguishes and discerning the signs of the times speak truth to power. There is a serious danger in trying to mute the prophetic voice of the Church. The history of Zimbabwe clearly shows how the Church, guided by values of standing against injustice and corruption and promoting respect for life, promoting the common good and the dignity of the human person has contributed to building a better Zimbabwe. History has taught us that when the Church is controlled by the State, the end is disastrous, the Church ceases to speak out for the weak and oppressed, power is corrupted and freedom is denied. (ZCBC 2022, 4–5)

In Zimbabwe, religion is a critical aspect of national consciousness (Hove and Chenzi 2017, 173–174). The indigenous African traditional religion has a symbiotic relationship with politics, since African traditional leaders, that is, chiefs, function as political and spiritual leaders. There is no separation between religion and politics, and the mutual relationship is part of national consciousness. In this context, religion is at the heart and soul of politics. In moments of crisis, religion sanitises politics and gives it its liberative role. Furthermore, in contemporary times, the interface between the church and politics has taken a unique twist, since church and state do not share a common leadership. In Zimbabwe, what is of particular interest is that some prophetic movements—for instance, those led by Makandiwa and some prominent leaders of the white garment churches led by the Johane Masowe Wimbo sect—have been loudly singing praise songs to Zanu-PF, as the only party

10  RELIGION AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE ZANU-PF POLITICAL… 

205

they believe can govern Zimbabwe. To mobilise support for Zanu-PF, ‘Wutawunashe runs the partisan Zimbabwe Independent Indigenous Council of Churches with Samuel Mutendi’ (Magezi and Tagwirei 2022, 3). These Christian leaders use prophetic oracles to campaign for Zanu-PF and encourage their flock to vote for the churches’ preferred political leaders, giving as reason that the party and its political leaders have a divine mandate from God. Those who declare prophecies see themselves as instruments of that ultimate power and claim a mandate to control and inform the people about that which is perceived to be good for them (divine will). From this perspective, the progress of history is premised on this ultimate power; hence, faith in the prophet and prophecy is viewed as the duty of every serious believer as ‘a direct working out of [God’s] purpose, a movement to which all … history had been moving’ (MacCulloch 1987, 4). This understanding of prophecy and religion makes the prophetic ministries and their leaders highly imperialistic regarding the formation and propagation of a political ideology. In the Zimbabwean context of partisan prophetic declarations, the state–church relationship is transactional, since such church leaders glorify Zanu-PF and its leadership and promise to give Zanu-PF votes while indulging in ‘self-configured prophesies that negate social justice’ (Dube and Nkoane 2018, 2), in order to obtain land and farming implements to fulfil their selfish desires. The major mainline church leaders—Catholics, Congregationalists, Methodists and Lutherans—who are not part of the ‘grand plan’ are labelled unpatriotic and are deemed to be puppets of Zimbabwe’s detractors. Such absurd threats have ‘forced countless pastors and congregants into conformity’ (Magezi and Tagwirei 2022, 3). What is evident is that Zanu-PF’s hold over the white garment churches and the new religious right prophets is similar to Nazi Germany’s experience, where the major ‘Churches did not oppose the Nazi ideology for fear’ (Eckardt 1992, 5–7). In a similar fashion, some high-flying Zimbabwean prophetic preachers, including Makandiwa and Wutawunashe, have gone further and promote patronage politics that argues that the state and church ‘have a divine mandate, the State as responsible for all secular matters and the Church responsible for spiritual matters’ (Eckardt 1992, 5). In this context, these prophets promote cheap grace in the midst of serious economic challenges that require the redemptive prophetic voice of the church.

206 

S. MPOFU AND A. NCUBE

After the Robert Mugabe era, ‘Zimbabwe has been seized by retrogressive puppetisation of partisan gospel ministers and churches’ (Magezi and Tagwirei 2022, 2). In the face of partisan prophetic support, the government has escalated its threatening actions against people who dare speak out against the political ills of the day. Consequently, church and state relations have become severely compromised (Mujinga 2018, 248), and most authentic ministers of religion and ordinary citizens live in fear. Civil society groups have been silenced from participating in political engagements through the new PVO Amendment Bill H.B. 10, 2021 (Sect. 67 of the Constitution), which makes them accountable to the state. Political scientists argue that, contrary to Mnangagwa’s pledge when he assumed office in 2017 to establish a progressive ‘new dispensation’, the rights of the citizens have been stifled (Bratton and Masunungure 2018, 1). Amidst such grave challenges, church and state relations are compared to a marriage of convenience, as the government seems to be accommodative of those who support it and vindictive towards those who critique it. This situation has divided the body of Christ, as some pastors dine with the oppressive ruling elites, whilst others side with the oppressed, thus, creating a disturbing state of polarisation. The status quo can be appositely referred to as a puppets’ and opponents’ affair in which the ruling politicians have captured partisan Church leaders and assigned them the role of sanitising their power conquest and retention, whilst vilifying their impartial counterparts as opponents. (Magezi and Tagwirei 2022, 2)

In pursuit of political expediency from Zimbabwe’s broad religious sphere, the major political players, including Mnangagwa of Zanu-PF and Chamisa of the Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC), have vigorously evoked Christian empathy in attempts to align their political ideologies to a divine mandate. Since 2018, the Zanu-PF leader, Mnangagwa, has made it a point to declare that his assertion of public office was part of the divine will of God, hence his clarion call, ‘Vox Populi Vox Dei’ (the voice of the people is the voice of God). This expression is part of a calculated ploy to patronise the Christian church and, in the process, many pseudoprophets have jumped on the bandwagon and declared that Mnangagwa to be a project of God. They do not hesitate to declare in public pronouncements that the Zanu-PF leader is a gift from God and that every Christian must vote for him.

10  RELIGION AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE ZANU-PF POLITICAL… 

207

Mpofu (2021, 394) observes that Mnangagwa’s active involvement at Apostolic church shrines, not to pray or preach but to be prayed for and preached to, shows he is an obedient son and acts like a ‘god’ who answers prayers [through allurements: land and farming equipment] … This shows all power rests in him, regardless of democratic rituals that might dictate otherwise.

In this way, partisan churches are covertly used as platforms that endorse Zanu-PF politics and its revered leadership. In return for their support, church leaders are rewarded with land, money, and food handouts (Nehanda Radio 2021a), against the dictates of prophetic witness. Good prophetic witnessing challenges social evils and rebukes those who are associated with causing the suffering of the people of God for their own selfish ends. True prophets preach ‘truth to the authorities, attacking the crowned heads and the ruling elite for placing more confidence in militia and coalitions than they did in the God who had brought them into that land’ (Hove and Chenzi 2017, 175). The prostitution of genuine prophetic witness starts with politicians using the Bible to dole out messianic innuendos about how they are the only ones who are fit to rule. In response, some charismatic prophetic figures and some African indigenous churches welcome these politicians into their religious spheres to not only help them mobilise political support, but also to curry material favour for themselves (Chitando et  al. 2013). What an unholy alliance when we see churches proactively ‘initiating, enhancing and supporting party programmes’, and yet these are the alliances that have become central to Zimbabwean church witness today! The end result of this convenient relationship between churches and politics is a one-way narrative that crowds out objectivity and moral witness.

Wutawunashe and Zanu-PF Politics Wutawunashe’s prophetic message, which is centred around building a solid and proud people of faith who respect God and their identity, aligns with Zanu-PF’s ideology, which emphasises sovereignty, anti-imperialism, and African nationalism. Critics see this ideology as promoting authoritarianism and suppressing democracy. In the conduct of patronage prophesy, Wutawunashe’s alliance with Zanu-PF creates political leaders who are fanatics, who pretend to be religious loyalists, in contrast to their secular

208 

S. MPOFU AND A. NCUBE

brand; however, it is mainly done to create political drama. Such unholy alliances contribute to the cult status of some prominent political players in the Zimbabwean landscape, and the mushrooming of political mantras such as #Vox-Populi-Vox-Dei and #Godisinit! Prophets such as Wutawunashe enter the fray to declare that such political leaders are ordained by God: President Mnangagwa’s Vision 2030 is our greatest asset as a nation. The vision will not die. It will speak and it will live because this vision is based on God. Whatever has its foundations on God will live. The sound of scolding voices will fade as the vision of ED will live. The vision is bigger than us. It will bring glory and productivity and will restore our nation to its glory and beyond. Let us have hope in the nation. Let us all fight hard knowing what our efforts will yield. Our greatest hope is in the Lord. There comes hope in knowledge that we have a vision because with no vision a nation is destroyed. (Herald 2019)

In an unrestrained attempt to present an ecumenical face of support to the ruling Zanu-PF party ideology, Wutawunashe, on 1 February 2020, launched a ‘patriotic’, Christian, interdenominational fellowship called the Zimbabwe Independent Indigenous Council of Churches (ZIICC) with self-proclaimed Archbishop Samuel Mutendi of the Zion Christian Church. This launch was attended by over 15,000 delegates representing 101 indigenous churches and prophetic movements in Zimbabwe (New Zimbabwe 2020). This ecumenical body was formed because its proZanu-­PF leaders argued that the Zimbabwe Council of Churches was proWest and had failed to provide patriotic spiritual support to the government and people of Zimbabwe. At stake for the ZIICC is the advancement of the political ideology of the ruling party. It is from this premise that Wutawunashe praises the ‘Zanu-PF’s land reform programme whilst criticising the European Union and the United States for imposing sanctions on Zanu-PF leaders’ (Zakeyo 2012, 10). Religion is seen to be in the service of a political agenda. An example of how the ZIICC serves a political ideology is that, during its launch, the ‘clerics were in a quest to outdo each other in heaping praises on President Mnangagwa … they also lashed out at the main opposition leader Nelson Chamisa’ (New Zimbabwe 2020), and accused Chamisa of being a puppet of the West—the same language used by politicians to de-­ campaign each other.

10  RELIGION AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE ZANU-PF POLITICAL… 

209

In advancing his political agenda for Zanu-PF, in 2020, Andrew Wutawunashe established the Faith for the Nation Campaign and claimed that God had instructed him to establish a platform through which the body of Christ would unite and rally people under the leadership of Mnangagwa to ensure that Zimbabwe becomes a prosperous nation (Harris 2019). To confirm that some of these prophetic functionaries are palace prophets, Wutawunashe participates in Zanu-PF events and sloganeers like a Zanu-PF activist, without considering his religious role, which must never be partisan (Zanu-PF 2020). This demonstrates how religion is being used to aid and affirm a political ideology. It is clear that the nexus of religion and politics in the Zimbabwean landscape is a result of power-hungry and impenitent economic sharks whose desire is the accumulation of wealth in the marketplace under the banner of serving God’s will; however, they are clearly manipulating religion for political gain. Of such pseudoprophets, the prophet Jeremiah warns us, ‘Do not listen to what such prophets are prophesying to you; they fill you with false hopes. They speak visions from their own minds, not from the mouth of the Lord’ (Jer. 23:16). Hallencreutz observes that an honest theological discourse must be a manifestation of ‘prophetic relevance from within both religion and politics, as both spheres must be concerned about human dignity’ (1988, 20). True biblical prophets are always in search of elusive justice, equality, and fairness—a theology that ensures that the Cross of Christ is not used to enslave the people of God, but to save them from all forms of socio-political and economic evils.

Uebert Angel and Zanu-PF Politics Besides being a pastor, Uebert Angel is a young, successful businessman whose religious ideology is compatible with Zanu-PF’s ideology of nationalism and black empowerment. His message of hope and prosperity resonates with many Zimbabweans who are struggling to make ends meet. In pursuit of Steiner’s concept of religious soft power (2011, 1), it can be argued that Angel’s religious ideology is a form of soft power that is used by Zanu-PF to maintain its grip on power. As a way of bolstering the party’s political legitimacy, Zanu-PF has exhibited intelligence by co-­ opting this internationally renowned prophet into their international relations team; consequently, Angel has vigorously endorsed ‘the party’s policies and programmes’ (Alexander and McGregor 2017). In the context of this chapter, Angel argues that everything centres in the hands of

210 

S. MPOFU AND A. NCUBE

one power (in this case, Zanu-PF and Mnangagwa), which represents the ultimate good for all. This logic unites God and Mnangagwa into one being, and loyalty to Mnangagwa turns into the trial of divine nationalism and a mark of genuine faith. For their unqualified support, they get rewarded for their loyalty to the party’s ideology and politics. This reward is demonstrated by the appointment of Angel as ‘Presidential Envoy and Ambassador Plenipotentiary (an ambassador with full powers to sign treaties or otherwise act for the state or monarch). His remit covers Europe, North America, South America and Central America’ (Nehanda Radio 2021b). On his part, Mnangagwa ‘is hoping to leverage Angel’s international profile to promote the country (or should I say Zanu-PF)’ (Nehanda Radio 2021b). In cases such as these, prophets ‘become ruling party activists who may practice oppression in anticipation of favours’ (Dube and Nkoane 2018, 233). The palace-aligned prophetic leaders present the character of an imperialistic model, by extending a clear political ideology. They use religion to defend political ideologies by claiming that particular political systems and their leaders are appointed by God to occupy political office. It is now public knowledge that the prophets who eat and dine with politicians tend to be heavily involved in scandalous or even criminal conduct. This is, indeed, true of Angel, who ‘is portrayed as a central figure among powerful gold smugglers from Zimbabwe to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in Al Jazeera’s “Gold Mafia” documentary’ (Matiashe 2023). The Al Jazeera documentary claims that Angel was working in collaboration with the highest office in the land. Mnangagwa hand-picks these prophets out of shallow patriotism and enthusiasm, with a clear mandate to market him and his Zanu-PF party as the genuine overseers and protectors of Zimbabwe’s freedom from neo-colonialism and neo-imperialism. The palace prophets’ emphasis on respect for all authority is enslaving, as it mirrors ‘political gangsterism and inequitable distribution of power and resources’ (Mpofu 2021, 385). Such pseudoprophets succeed by instilling fear in their followers and calling for total obedience to public authority, since they teach that all authority is from God—they demand an act of blind faith, as the believer is not allowed to question or doubt anything that the prophet declares, or any action of a political leader, who is exalted to the realm of angelic icons. Such messages subordinate the faithful followers to the whims of an individual under the guise of prophecy. However, is this not what the Holy Scripture terms lying prophets? Is Jeremiah’s prophecy not speaking to such prophets?

10  RELIGION AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE ZANU-PF POLITICAL… 

211

Concerning the prophets: My heart is broken within me; all my bones tremble. I am like a drunken man, like a strong man overcome by wine, because of the Lord and his holy words. The land is full of [liars] … The prophets follow an evil course and use their power unjustly. ‘Both prophet and priest are godless; even in my temple I find their wickedness,’ declares the Lord. ‘Therefore, their path will become slippery; they will be banished to darkness and they will fall. I will bring disaster on them in the year they are punished’. (Jer. 23:9–12)

In contrast to the authentic Christian view, these new religious right prophets love money and power; they promote a pseudo-theological belief that reward through financial and material gain is the divine will of God for all pious Christians (Wikipedia 2023). Even though the poor performance of Zimbabwe’s economy is largely man-made, these prophets want their followers to believe that Zimbabwe’s economic woes are due to spiritual or satanic evils. Their political and economic concept of salvation is ‘patronizing and selective to an extent that it fails to capture the notion of sin and the work of Christ which is central to Jesus’ salvific work’ (Mpofu 2013a, 163). These prophets deliberately turn a blind eye to the poor performance of politicians and the manifestation of corruption on a grand scale, which has led to the debilitating socio-economic challenges Zimbabwe is facing, and simply blame everything on spiritual forces and the country’s detractors. These prophets ‘promise deliverance and prosperity to their followers [by mere loyalty to Zanu-PF], something that the political situation makes impossible for them to attain. They … discourage seeing things politically’ (Mpofu 2021, 394).

The White Garment Apostolic Churches and Zanu-PF Politics One of the major ways in which the Zanu-PF party has utilised religion for political gain is by associating itself with African independent churches, popularly known as white garment churches, or Mapostori. The Mapostori and Zanu-PF ideologies converge at a cultural and transnational vantage point towards economic prosperity, as they both have a ‘divine’ hatred for foreign dominion over African people. Therefore, we believe that the Mapostori find Zanu-PF ideology appealing and are likely to support the party. Leading politicians actively attend religious conferences and gatherings of these churches to solicit public sympathy. In the excitement of

212 

S. MPOFU AND A. NCUBE

hosting leading national figures, the prophets of these churches, such as Andby Makururu, declare that Zanu-PF was ordained by God to govern Zimbabwe eternally, hence ‘people who vote for Zanu-PF and President Emmerson Mnangagwa will live longer … God will grant 15 more years of life to people who vote for Mnangagwa’ (Bulawayo 24.com 2023). During the Mapostori’s religious gatherings, Zanu-PF’s top hierarchy are visible ‘icons’, clad in white garments to identify with the group’s dress code, and they boldly declare the party’s commitment to Christian values and their respect and allegiance to that particular group/movement’s theology. A good example is Mnangagwa, who, during the 2018 election campaign, visited the Mudzidzi Wimbo shrine and promised to assist the Mapostori in all their endeavours, because they are central to national development and for supporting the ruling party. Mnangagwa argued, furthermore, that Mudzidzi Wimbo Church has an eternal covenant with Zanu-PF and that this covenant will continue to flourish (ZBC News 2022). Within the length and breadth of Zimbabwe, the political influence of the white garments churches is imbedded in a marriage of convenience between religion and politics, which is entered into for motives ‘other than that of a relationship, family, or love’, but has ‘been arranged for personal gain or some other sort of strategic purposes’, such as politics (Messinger 2013, 376). It is in this context that we can speak of these prophets as the face of the Zanu-PF political ideology. It is from this perspective that most of these white garment prophets sacralise Zanu-PF ideology and immortalise its leadership; hence, the claim that it ‘was prophesied way back in 1934 … that (Zanu-PF would) lead this country … [Therefore, no one] should tamper with the presidency; it is sacrosanct. [This position] comes from God’ (Mpofu 2021, 6). The visit of Mnangagwa, then vice president, to Mudzidzi (Apostle) Wimbo’s shrine in 2015 demonstrates the centrality of religion in the advancement of the Zanu-PF ideology. During this visit, Mnangagwa asked who would succeed Mugabe, and Wimbo predicted Mugabe’s descent from power, and that Mnangagwa would take over (Zimbabwe Situation 2015). After Mugabe’s removal from power, it was confirmed by Tsenengamu, the Zanu-PF Youth League secretary, that Mnangagwa’s ascendancy to power had been prophesied by the late apostolic sect leader, Aaron Mhukuta, popularly known as Mudzidzi Wimbo (My Zimbabwe News 2019). In their public posture, these prophets present themselves as agents of political ideologies, since they tend advance the policies of the political ideology of the ruling party. These prophets behave like

10  RELIGION AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE ZANU-PF POLITICAL… 

213

politicians, and they love power, money, and fame. This glaring relationship with the imperial state works against the primordial belief that prophets are messengers of God, who strive to achieve the common good of all. About such prophets, the Bible warns us: ‘I did not send these prophets, yet they have run with their message; I did not speak to them, yet they have prophesied [falsehoods]’ (Jer. 23:21). It is clear that Mnangagwa’s ‘biblification’ of the political space in Zimbabwe has been effective on the ground. This is depicted by an enormously persuasive part played by the Zimbabwean church, which is actively advancing the party’s solidification of its power base. During his visits to the white garment Mapostori (the Apostles) shrines, Mnangagwa never openly condemned the practice of child marriage and the churches’ custom of not encouraging girl children to attend school—these matters are left to be addressed by the Mapostori. Instead, the Zanu-PF leaders promise freedom of worship and freedom of assembly, so that the Mapostori members vote for Zanu-PF.  In 2018, the Mapostori prophets told Mnangagwa to ‘stop bothering with campaigns for the July 30 elections as he has already won the crunch vote’ (New Zimbabwe 2018). When the Zanu-PF leader visits the Mapostori shrines, he is given the assurance that God has already appointed and elected him: ‘You can now even go and stop campaigning because you already have the trophy … And even if thousands of people vote for someone, that will not change. … Your predecessor [former President Mugabe] came here, and he was anointed and given a rod/stuff [staff] … His wife took it and started dictating how things should be done which was against the spirit of the anointing; and look what happened’. In his response Mnangagwa said; ‘We are approaching elections and you have assured me victory … What God has written with his hand is final. My victory has been prophesied here and nothing is going to stand in the way of that prophecy. I thank you all for that.’ (New Zimbabwe 2018)

The theology of the pseudo-prophetic movements is about being politically correct as they manipulate religion and the unsuspecting poverty-­ stricken believer, for their personal aggrandisement. These palace prophets have become the most feared and powerful political players in the name of God, yet they do so for their political correctness and aggrandisement (Mpofu 2013b, 18). This type of prophecy indicates political concern more than religious good. In the prophetic oracles of the day, enlightened

214 

S. MPOFU AND A. NCUBE

people now see the church as a political enterprise that is in partnership with the state, and which is advancing a political ideology or a partisan theology. Clearly, a theology that sees a politician as ordained by God is driven by political interests more than religious interests. Such a theology is modelled on the earthly kingdom (sword of power) and not the heavenly Kingdom (word of God). Such theological discourses are evidence of empire theology—a clear trajectory of promoting a political ideology instead of a religious faith. What we can draw from this kind of theology is that some charlatan prophets are not promoting a saving faith, but rather, an enslaving theology.

Emmanuel Makandiwa and Zanu-PF Politics The conduct and behaviour of some of the palace prophets in Zimbabwe’s mission field make Christianity a joke of a religion, and many people have started to wonder about the role of the church in the face of political subjugation (Randles 1981, 62–71). These prophetic movements turn a blind eye to the political evils of the day, and they never challenge glaring corruption and bad governance, because they are likely an extension of what is prevailing on the political front. The lavish glorification of political leaders, such as Mnangagwa, by Prophet Makandiwa is an example of ‘see no evil and say no evil’: ‘I love your leadership. Your God given ability to concentrate on your work while people talk negative things is beyond measure. You are blessed … Even if you desist from campaigning, the works will speak for you. I cannot look at such a good road and be quiet … Looking at the work that you have been doing I can spend the whole day [testifying about your good deeds] … We could all be dead if it was not for your intervention…’ Charmed by Makandiwa’s praises and adulation, a visibly happy Mnangagwa said that he wished that the preacher’s speech was broadcast across the country. ‘I wish the statement made by Prophet Makandiwa could be broadcast nationwide,’ Mnangagwa said. (Standard 2022)

Of major importance is that these prophets have little interest in condemning the political systems that do not benefit the suffering majority, rather, they are keen to advance the interests of some politicians. The prophets are not interested in promoting good governance and justice, as did biblical prophets such as Amos: ‘For I know the vast number of your

10  RELIGION AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE ZANU-PF POLITICAL… 

215

sins … you oppress good people so those who are smart keep their mouth shut, for it is an evil time. Do what is good and turn away from evil’ (2:12–4). It is clear that these palace prophets play a devious role to please their political masters under the banner of religious oracles. Their partisan prophecy compromises them. The utterances of these charlatan prophets are a clear indication of their role as apologists of the political system they represent. This claim is exemplified by Makandiwa’s assertion that, ‘It is never the responsibility of the government to create jobs for you. The creation of an environment is their responsibility so that you and I prosper, and we have that opportunity in Zimbabwe’ (Zimbabwe Independent 2022). These prophets’ partisan political interest is visible through their willingness to defend political ideologies that deprive people of their God-­ given rights. These prophets have become political commissars through their promotion of ‘a very powerful adaptive force, creating a web in which our consciousness may now be spinning, round and round in endless life cycles … a subtle power indeed’ (Mukwakwami 2010, 1). Some of the bizarre prophecies that have been pronounced in an attempt to manipulate people to vote for Zanu-PF argue as follows: people who vote for Zanu-PF and President Emmerson Mnangagwa will live longer … God will grant 15 more years of life to people who vote for Mnangagwa. … It is even in the Bible to respect your mother and father so that your years on earth will be increased, this is the same when respecting our government and president. … It is even in the Bible that we should respect our government, not opposition. Churches should come in the open to support their government, especially the indigenous churches. (Bulawayo 24.com 2023)

In their prophetic frenzy, these partisan prophets religiously promote a positive view of the political status quo which they affirm as God’s will, ‘even where this can be seen as oppressive to its own adherents. At the same time, congregants seek to prosper through faith, even where such processes appear to restrict their own potential’ (Deacon 2015, 217). Such prophetic assertions demonstrate that these pseudoprophets are ‘beholden to authority, and fearful of that which threatens the status quo’ (Deacon 2015, 217)—a far cry from calling for justice in line with the Holy Scriptures’ clarion call for justice and fair treatment of God’s people: ‘Learn to do good; seek justice, correct oppression; bring justice to the

216 

S. MPOFU AND A. NCUBE

fatherless, and plead the widow’s cause’ (Isa. 1:17), and ‘Give justice to the weak and the fatherless; maintain the right of the afflicted and the destitute’ (Ps. 82:3).

Conclusion The utterance of prophetic pronouncements that support Zanu-PF is a clear sign of the use of religion to sustain a political ideology. The prophetic chorus that ‘Zanu-PF is God’s gift to Zimbabwe just as Moses was given to liberate the Israelites from Egypt’ (Star.FM 2018), as argued by Prophet Passion Java in a radio interview, makes these prophets appendages of Zanu-PF. While uttering such statements, these prophets behave like charlatans—they hold their cell-phones to the ear and claim that they are speaking to God. They zealously advance a political party theology through claims such as, ‘Do not touch my anointed ones’ (Ps. 105:15), in reference to the Zanu-PF president. This is a clear corruption of the text, whose original setting and authentic reference is a warning against the threats directed to the true prophets of God who stood up and spoke out against the evils of state corruption. Regardless of the political threats that have been directed at genuine prophets who rise up to speak up and ensure that justice is done for the common good, we know that political threats directed at clergy who speak up are attempts to silence them and to coerce the church to aid an ideological patronage. What is clear from the Bible is that genuine prophets must ‘Speak up for those who cannot speak for themselves; ensure justice for those being crushed. Yes, speak up for the poor and helpless, and see that they get justice’ (Prov. 31:8–9). In this context, the church’s engagement with the government on matters of justice and fighting against corruption must place the church at the level of Jesus Christ, who always sided with the marginalised and the suffering people of God. In its mandate, the church should ‘oppose wrongdoing and corruption. Anything else … deemed unedifying and not benefiting the society’ (Harris 1999, 12). And when the church engages with the government, it must never submit to the government, but must act as the conscience of the nation and the voice of reason and justice. Therefore, at no material time should the Christian church contradict and compromise its teaching by working to appease politicians. And at no time should the Christian church keep quiet while sin and evil are manifest. This stance is possible, because the Christian church is an agent of transformation; hence, it is

10  RELIGION AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE ZANU-PF POLITICAL… 

217

imperative that the church must seek to build a better society through speaking truth to power, thereby promoting good governance, transparency, and accountability. For the true prophetic church of our day, the main concern must be how to influence the political regime(s), so as to deliver justice and peace to the land, to promote the building of sound economic and political systems that deliver prosperity. Suffice it to say that those who claim to be prophets of the living and loving God should ‘Speak up for those who cannot speak for themselves, for the rights of all who are destitute. Speak up and judge fairly; defend the rights of the poor and needy’ (Prov. 31:8–9). The church needs to be able to give people hope that once they cross the metaphorical Jordan River that lies ahead, they will be able to slay the giants that presently occupy the land (overcome the challenges that stand in their way). In short, the prophetic church should inspire people to strive to create societies that are free, just, and egalitarian—societies that constitute the realised eschatological Kingdom of God.

References Alexander, J., and J. McGregor. 2017. Zimbabwe after Mugabe: Three Scenarios. Institute for Security Studies. Baloyi, E. 2022. ‘The Church and politics in Zimbabwe’ African theological. Journal for Church and Society, 3 (2): 20–38. Bratton, Michael, and Eldred V.  Masunungure. 2018. Heal the Beloved Country: Zimbabwe’s Polarized Electorate. Afrobarometer Policy Paper No. 49, September. https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-­content/uploads/ 2022/02/ab_r7_policypaperno49_heal_the_beloved_country_zimbabwes_ polarized_electorate.pdf. Bulawayo 24.com. 2023. Prophet Andby Defends Bizarre Mnangagwa ‘Prophesy’. March 18. https://bulawayo24.com/index-­id-­news-­sc-­local-­byo-­228784.html. Chitando, Ezra, Masiiwa Ragies Gunda, and Joachim Kügler. 2013. Prophets, Profits and the Bible in Zimbabwe. Bible in Africa Studies 12. Bamberg: University of Bamberg Press. Deacon, Gregory. 2015. Driving the Devil Out: Kenya’s Born-Again Election. Journal of Religion in Africa 45: 200–220. https://doi.org/10.1163/ 15700666-­12340042. Dube, M. 2021b. Zanu-PF ‘as God’ Syndrome Needs to be Dismantled. NewsDay Zimbabwe, May. https://www.newsday.co.zw/2021/05/zanu-­pf-­as-­god-­ syndrome-­needs-­to-­be-­dismantled/.

218 

S. MPOFU AND A. NCUBE

Dube, Bekithemba, and Milton Molebatsi Nkoane. 2018. The Interface of Politics and Religion in Zimbabwe: Rethinking Religious Leaders as Agents of Consecration and Repudiation. Alternation 23 (December): 224–243. Dudra, Stefan, Tytus Jaskulowski, and Ryszard Michalak. 2022. Religious Policy: Between Theory and Practice. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht. Eckardt, A.  Roy. 1992. Reclaiming the Jesus of History: Christology Today. Minneapolis: Fortress Press. Erikson, Robert S., and Kent L.  Tedin. 2003. American Public Opinion: Its Origins, Content and Impact. 6th ed. New York: Longman. Hallencreutz, Carl F. 1988. Church and State in Zimbabwe. Gweru: Mambo Press. Harris, Frederick C. 1999. Something Within: Religion in African-American Political Activism. New York: Oxford University Press. Harris, Lulu Brenda. 2019. Faith for the Nation Campaign. Cite, December 29. https://cite.org.zw/tag/faith-­for-­the-­nation-­campaign/. Herald. 2019. Rally Behind President  – Church Leader. The Herald, May 27. https://www.herald.co.zw/rally-­behind-­president-­church-­leader/. Horton, David. 2006. The Portable Seminary. Bloomington: Bethany House. Hove, Mediel, and Vincent Chenzi. 2017. ‘Prophets of Doom’: The Zimbabwean Christian Community and Contemporary Politics. Insight on Africa 9 (2): 173–195. https://doi.org/10.1177/0975087817710054. MacCulloch, Diarmaid. 1987. Groundwork of Christian History. London: Epworth Press. Magezi, Christopher, and Kimion Tagwirei. 2022. A Critical Assessment of Church and Political Engagement in Zimbabwe under the New Dispensation. Verbum et Ecclesia 43 (1): 1–12. https://doi.org/10.4102/ve.v43i1.2527. Matiashe, Farai Shawn. 2023. Zimbabwe: Uebert Angel, the Man of God Accused of Money Laundering. The Africa Report, June 4. https://www.theafricareport.com/311103/zimbabwes-­u ebert-­a ngel-­a -­s elf-­p roclaimed-­p rophet-­ turned-­crook/ Messinger, Irene. 2013. There is Something About Marrying … The Case of Human Rights vs. Migration Regimes Using the Example of Austria. Laws 2 (4): 376–391. https://doi.org/10.3390/laws2040376. Mpofu, Sifiso. 2013a. The Third Wave Religious Right Movement and the Growth of Zimbabwean Christianity: Faith or Economic Response? Doctoral thesis. University of Pretoria. ———. 2013b. Church Activism: A Mission and a Calling to be Attained. In The Role of the Church in the Struggle for Democratic Change in Zimbabwe, ed. Munetsi Ruzivo, 23–39. Harare: Zimbabwe Institute. Mpofu, Shepherd. 2021. Religious and Political Intersections: The Instrumentalisation of Christianity during Zimbabwe’s 2018 Presidential Elections. Canadian Journal of African Studies 56: 383–406. https://doi. org/10.1080/00083968.2021.1894193.

10  RELIGION AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE ZANU-PF POLITICAL… 

219

Mujinga, Martin. 2018. ‘Religion as a Riding Horse of Politics?’ A Critical Evaluation of Political Influence in the Zimbabwean Ecclesiastical Life. Alternation 23 (December): 244–265. Mukwakwami, L. 2010. Our Subtle Christianity. West-Lake: Book Surge. My Zimbabwe News. 2019. ED Mnangagwa’s rise to power was prophesied by the late Mudzidzi Wimbo. February 14. https://www.myzimbabwe.co.zw/ news/40740-­e d-­m nangagwas-­r ise-­t o-­p ower-­w as-­p rophesied-­b y-­t he-­l ate-­ mudzidzi-­wimbo.html. Nehanda Radio. 2021a. Mwazha and other Church Leaders Support Zanu-PF for Personal Benefit  – Mliswa. December 23. https://www.nehandaradio. com/2021/12/23/mwazaha. ———. 2021b. Prophet Uebert Angel appointed Presidential Envoy and Ambassador at Large … Sworn in at State House Today. March 17. https:// nehandaradio.com/2021/03/17/prophet-­u eber t-­a ngel-­a ppointed-­ presidential-­envoy-­and-­ambassador-­at-­large-­sworn-­in-­at-­state-­house-­today/. New Zimbabwe. 2018. Vapostori say Mnangagwa has Already Won Elections; Grace Mugabe Wa”ning. July 15. https://www.newzimbabwe.com/ vapostori-­say-­mnangagwa-­has-­already-­won-­elections-­grace-­mugabe-­warning/. ———. 2020. Church Leaders Fall Over Each Other in Praise of ED. February 2. https://www.newzimbabwe.com/.well-­k nown/captcha/?r=%2Fchurch-­ leaders-­fall-­over-­each-­other-­in-­praise-­of-­ed%2F. Randles, W.G.L. 1981. The Empire of Monomotapa: From the Fifteenth to the Nineteenth Century. Gweru: Mambo Press. Standard. 2022. Makandiwa sings Mnangagwa Praises. April 17. https://www. newsday.co.zw/thestandard/news/ar ticle/8506/makandiwa-­s ings-­ mnangagwa-­praises. Star.FM. 2018. Prophets Today. May 28. www.star.fm.prophets.and.politics.com. Steiner, S. 2011. Religious Soft Power as Accountability Mechanism for Power in World Politics: The InterFaith Leaders’ Summit(s). SAGE Open: 1–16. https:// doi.org/10.1177/2158244011428085. Wikipedia. 2023. Uebert Angel. June 16. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Uebert_Angel. Yadav, Vineeta. 2021. Religious Parties and the Politics of Civil Liberties. New York: Oxford University Press. Zakeyo, Marlon. 2012. The Church, Politics and the Future of Zimbabwe. Religion in the Public Sphere 8 (1): 211–235. Zanu-PF. 2020. National Day of Prayer. Facebook, June 15. https://www.facebook.com/zanupfparty/posts/2599645150302429. ZBC News. 2022. President Mnangagwa at Mudzidzi waWimbo Church. YouTube, August 25. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tqw2wDLP9KA. ZCBC. 2022. Together on the Journey of Faith and Life. Pastoral Letter, July 18. Harare: Synod House.

220 

S. MPOFU AND A. NCUBE

Zimbabwe Independent. 2022. Prophets and Zanu-PF.  Zimbabwe Independent, 22nd April 2022. http://of-fake-prophets-and-zanupf-air-pies-and-ice-cream/. Zimbabwe Situation. 2015. Mnangagwa in Bizarre Apostolic Rites. Daily News Live, October 6. https://www.zimbabwesituation.com/news/zimsit_w_mnangagwa-­ in-­bizarre-­apostolic-­rites-­dailynews-­live/.