Reconsidering Europeanization: Ideas and Practices of (Dis-)Integrating Europe since the Nineteenth Century 9783110685473, 9783110685428

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Reconsidering Europeanization

History and Ideas

New Perspectives in European Studies Edited by Fernanda Gallo, Florian Greiner, and Jan Vermeiren Applying a wider definition of “European Studies”, the series History and Ideas: New Perspectives in European Studies explores discourses and practices of inter- and transnational interaction in the fields of politics, law, society, and the economy, but also in the realm of ideas, identities, and experiences. It will thus go beyond and complement the common focus on the political and institutional history of the European Union and its predecessors. The series covers developments since the early modern period from a wide geographical range, encouraging submissions on themes and actors beyond the usual confines of Western European developments.

Volume 1

Reconsidering Europeanization Ideas and Practices of (Dis-)Integrating Europe since the Nineteenth Century Edited by Florian Greiner, Peter Pichler, and Jan Vermeiren

ISBN 978-3-11-068542-8 e-ISBN (PDF) 978-3-11-068547-3 e-ISBN (EPUB) 978-3-11-068551-0 ISSN 2750-1493 DOI https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110685473 Library of Congress Control Number: 2022933750 Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available on the Internet at http://dnb.dnb.de. © 2022 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston. Cover image: brichuas / iStock / Getty Images Plus Printing and binding: CPI books GmbH, Leck www.degruyter.com

For Lisa

Acknowledgements We would like to thank the participants of the 2019 Graz conference for the stimulating papers and discussions. We are particularly grateful to the various funding bodies whose generous support enabled us to to organize the event. Anita Ziegerhofer (Graz) was the driving force behind the conference and has our deepest thanks. Our authors have been remarkably patient and understanding, given the various delays of the editing and publication process, caused largely by the COVID-19 pandemic. In this context, we are also very grateful to our publisher De Gruyter Oldenbourg and especially to Verena Deutsch and Rabea Rittgerodt for their persistence. Two peer reviewers provided significant input that undoubtedly helped to improve the quality of the manuscript. Daniela Hahn (University of Augsburg) kindly assisted in the formatting of the manuscript and we were fortunate to have Sally Osborn compile our index. The Institute of the Foundations of Law at the University of Graz did not only host the 2019 conference, but also contributed to this publication. We would especially like to thank the Faculty of Law at the University of Graz and its (former) dean Johannes Zollner for their support. We dedicate this volume to our colleague and friend Lisa Dittrich who sadly passed away in March 2021 after finalizing her contribution: we fondly remember our meetings and conversations and will miss her dearly at our future conferences on modern European history.

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110685473-001

Table of Contents Editorial Florian Greiner, Peter Pichler, Jan Vermeiren Reconsidering Europeanization: An Introduction

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Section 1: Theorizing Europeanization Michael Gehler Integration and Disintegration Different Types of Europeanization from the Emergence and Reshaping of Western Europe (1947 – 1989) to a United Europe (1989 – 2007) in 29 Times of Crisis (2008 – 2020) Florian Greiner Europeanization in Historiography Methodological Challenges and the Need for a New Conceptual Approach 69 Johannes Dafinger Europeanization as Detachment from the Global The Case of Nazi Germany and the Post-War European Far 95 Right

Section 2: Intellectuals, Politics, and the Europeanization of Thought Çiğdem Oğuz “We Will Adopt the Technology of Europe but not European Morality” The Quest for Authentic Values in Late Ottoman Politics 125 Kate Papari Narratives and Ambiguities of Europeanization in Greece during the Interwar Years 151

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Section 3: Europeanization from the Bottom Up: Sports, Civil Society, and the Media Nina Szidat An “Active Promotion of the European Ideal”? Ideas and Practices of Europeanization in Town Twinning

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Aline Maldener The Europawelle Saar Youth Mass Media as a Popular Cultural Agent of Europeanization in the 1960s and 1970s 205 Regina Weber Becoming European through Football? The Case of Sturm Graz 235

Section 4: Europeanization in Religion and Law Lisa Dittrich † Europe from the Margins Anticlerical Entanglements, Networks, and Ideas of Europe in the Nineteenth Century 263 Anna Klimaszewska, Michał Gałędek Defenders of the Napoleonic Code as the Heralds of Pan-European Visions of Law The Polish Discourse about the Concept of National Codification at the Beginning of the Nineteenth Century 299

Section 5: Social Europe? Europeanization in the Social and Economic Sphere Willy Buschak Enthusiasm for Europe and Europeanization in the Labor Movement of the 1920s 321

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Heike Knortz The Balance of Payments Deficits “Guest Workers” and Economic Europeanization, 1945 – 1973

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Heike Wieters Between National Welfare Institutions and New European (Welfare‐) Markets German Life Insurance Industry and the Quest of Europeanization, 1945 – 1960 385 List of Contributors Index

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Florian Greiner, Peter Pichler, Jan Vermeiren

Reconsidering Europeanization: An Introduction Europeanization is en vogue. Over the last few years, numerous conferences, research papers, and publications have investigated the history of the concept and its political and economic dimensions. Indeed, the topic is more popular than ever, not least as a consequence of the recent crises of the European Union.¹ Even though the European integration process has never proceeded in a straightforward and unidirectional manner, as some scholars have recently highlighted again, we are undoubtedly witnessing a particularly difficult period in its history.² The European debt crisis, the sudden influx of hundreds of thousands of refugees and migrants from the Middle East, and the decision of the United Kingdom to leave the European Union, commonly known as Brexit, have challenged European solidarity and coherence.³ Moreover, the rise of populism and anti-liberalism in many European member states has undermined the ideational foundations of the European project, such as the principles of representative democracy, the rule of law, the freedom of the press, and the protection of human rights.⁴ Most recently, the COVID-19 pandemic led to temporary restrictions of the freedom of movement and, in connection with the vaccine procurement, un For introductory works on EU integration history and the state of research in this field, see e. g. Wilfried Loth, Building Europe: A History of European Unification (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2015); Michael Gehler, Europa. Ideen – Institutionen – Vereinigung – Zusammenhalt (Reinbek: Lau Verlag, 2018); Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration, 4th ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Desmond Dinan, ed., Origins and Evolution of the European Union, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).  See e. g. Kiran K. Patel, Project Europe: A History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020).  For some thoughtful reflections on the crisis of Europe, see Jürgen Habermas, The Crisis of the European Union: A Response (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012); Anthony Giddens, ed., Turbulent and Mighty Continent: What Future for Europe? rev. ed. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014); Giandomenico Majone, Rethinking the Union of Europe Post-Crisis: Has Integration Gone Too Far? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Jan Zielonka, Is the EU Doomed? (New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons, 2014); Loukas Tsoukalis, In Defence of Europe: Can the European Project Be Saved? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016); Ivan Krastev, After Europe (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017).  See, amongst others, Jan Zielonka, Counter-Revolution: Liberal Europe in Retreat (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), and Ivan Krastev and Stephen Holmes, The Light that Failed: A Reckoning (London: Allen Lane, 2019). For a historical discussion: Silvio Vietta, Europas Werte – Geschichte, Konflikte, Perspektiven (Freiburg im Breisgau: Karl Alber, 2019). https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110685473-002

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dermined the trust in the leadership of the European Union.⁵ These developments have raised questions about the fragile foundations and the resilience of European cooperation.⁶ Against this background, the history of Europeanization processes has attracted particular attention. On a semantic level, the term “Europeanization” first appeared in the 1840s and was in (rare) use during the nineteenth century. The Google Ngram chart shows a first peak in the interwar years.⁷ This was linked to fierce debates on the crisis of Europe after the First World War, the ideological polarization of the Continent, and the deterioration of the international situation since the mid-1930s: tendencies that were accompanied by integration processes, such as the formation of a European unity movement, rapid improvements in communication infrastructures, or new possibilities to travel internationally. In this context, Europe appeared as endangered, but also as a possible solution to the challenges of modernization and ethnic nationalism.⁸ A second peak can be identified in the 1950s and 1960s, the early years of Western European integration.⁹ Following a stagnation during the “Eurosclerosis” period between 1973 and the early 1980s, Europeanization has seen a conspicuous and constant increase in interest that reflects the growing importance of the European Communities. As the semantic history of the term already indicates, Europeanization processes were not limited to the second half of the twentieth century. Indeed, re-

 Peter van Kemseke, Europe Reinvented: How COVID-19 is Changing the European Union (Vilvoorde: Boeklyn, 2020); Pandemic Politics and European Union Responses, special issue of the Journal of European Integration, 42, no. 8 (2020).  See also, more recently, Andreas Grimmel, ed., Die neue Europäische Union. Zwischen Integration und Desintegration (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2020); Kai Hirschmann, Europa zwischen Abbruch und Aufbruch. Die Europäische Union vor existenziellen Herausforderungen (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2020); Marianne Riddervold et al., eds., The Palgrave Handbook of EU Crises (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020).  For a discussion of methodological problems concerning Ngram and an example of its usage for European Studies see Wolfgang Schmale, “European Solidarity: A Semantic History,” European Review of History 24 (2017): 854– 873.  See Florian Greiner, Wege nach Europa. Deutungen eines imaginierten Kontinents in deutschen, britischen und amerikanischen Printmedien, 1914 – 1945 (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2014); Mark Hewitson and Matthew D’Auria, eds., Europe in Crisis: Intellectuals and the European Idea, 1917 – 1957 (New York, NY: Berghahn, 2012); Peter Bugge, “The Nation Supreme: The Idea of Europe 1914– 1945,” in The History of the Idea of Europe, ed. Kevin Wilson and Jan van der Dussen (London: Routledge, 1995), 83 – 149.  See Gilbert Trausch, ed., Die Europäische Integration vom Schuman-Plan bis zu den Verträgen von Rom/The European Integration from the Schuman-Plan to the Treaties of Rome: Contributions to the Symposium in Luxembourg May 17 – 19 1989 (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1993).

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Figure 1: Relative frequency of the term “Europeanis/zation” in English-language publications, 1840 – 2000 (Google Ngram).

cent studies of international and global history have highlighted the interconnectedness of many European countries already in the nineteenth century (and arguably before), for instance regarding trade and economic cooperation, but also various transnational phenomena, such as the exchange of knowledge, ideas, and technology.¹⁰ Industrialization and urbanization triggered fundamental socio-economic changes, while the evolution of parliamentary rule and the growth of the public sphere were key features of political transformation. Often occurring at different times across the Continent, these processes nonetheless provided similar experiences, although rarely recognised as such or even as European phenomena by contemporaries. Hence, from its very beginning, Europeanization must be conceptualized as a multi-directional but also fundamentally reversible process of transnationalization, cooperation, and integration in Europe.

 See Heinz-Gerhard Haupt, “Erfahrungen mit Europa. Ansätze zu einer Geschichte Europas im langen 19. Jahrhundert,” in ‘Europäische Geschichte’ als historiographisches Problem, ed. Heinz Duchhardt and Andreas Kunz (Mainz: von Zabern, 1997), 87– 103; Jan Vermeiren, “Problèmes et perspectives d’une histoire de l’idée européenne de la Révolution française au Printemps des peuples (1789 – 1848/49),” Canadian Journal of History 50, no. 1 (2015): 68 – 85; Christian Henrich-Franke et al., eds., Grenzüberschreitende institutionalisierte Zusammenarbeit von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2019). For detailed studies, see Christopher A. Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, 1780 – 1914: Global Connections and Comparisons (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004); Jürgen Osterhammel, The Transformation of the World: A Global History of the Nineteenth Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014); Richard J. Evans, The Pursuit of Power: Europe, 1815 – 1914 (London: Allen Lane, 2016).

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Indeed, European history has experienced periods of both “more Europe” and “less Europe.” Making things even more complicated, in many cases integration and disintegration phenomena were interconnected or at least influenced one another. This became particularly evident during the nineteenth century when the various national movements started to develop distinct European ideas in order to create a pan-European system of liberal nation-states.¹¹ In a similar vein, the first half of the twentieth century has often been labelled as a period of a “European civil war” or a “Second Thirty Years War.”¹² These notions imply that a European sense of belonging together persisted even in times of violent confrontation.¹³ Another paradigmatic example is Europe’s collective memory after 1945 and the trans-European memorialization of the Holocaust, which centers on the period of Europe’s total disintegration before and during the Second World War.¹⁴ Even though such processes and ambiguities have been on the academic agenda for quite a while now, they require further examination. This appears even more pressing in light of the EU’s poly-crisis

 See e. g. Claude D. Conter, Jenseits der Nation – Das vergessene Europa des 19. Jahrhunderts. Die Geschichte der Inszenierungen und Visionen Europas in Literatur, Geschichte und Politik (Bielefeld: Aisthesis, 2004) or for a case study Anna Procyk, Giuseppe Mazzini’s Young Europe and the Birth of Modern Nationalism in the Slavic World (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2019).  Ian Kershaw, “Europe’s Second Thirty Years War,” History Today 55 (2005): 10 – 17; Enzo Traverso, À feu et à sang: De la guerre civile européenne 1914 – 1945 (Paris: Stock, 2008); Florian Greiner, “Europeanisation and Modernity during the Second Thirty Years War: Discourses on Europe in British and American Print Media, 1914– 1945,” in Européanisation au XXe siècle: Un regard historique, ed. Matthieu Osmont et al. (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2012), 29 – 44.  For the First World War, see Florian Greiner, “Articulating Europe during the Great War: Friedrich Naumann’s Idea of ‘Mitteleuropa’ and its Public Reception in Germany, England and the USA,” Lingue Culture Mediazioni – Languages Cultures Mediation 2 (2015): 131– 148; Jan Vermeiren, “Notions of Solidarity and Integration in Times of War: The Idea of Europe, 1914– 18,” European Review of History 24 (2017): 874– 888; and Matthew D’Auria and Jan Vermeiren, eds., Visions and Ideas of Europe during the First World War (London: Routledge, 2019). For the Second World War, see Holly Case, Between States: The Transylvanian Question and the European Idea during World War II (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009), and the classic research of Walter Lipgens and others on European thought within the resistance movements, e. g. Walter Lipgens, “European Federation in the Political Thought of Resistance Movements during World War II,” Central European History 1 (1968): 5 – 19.  See Henning Grunwald, “‘Nothing more Cosmopolitan than the Camps?’ Holocaust Remembrance and (de‐)Europeanization,” in Europeanization in the Twentieth Century: Historical Approaches, ed. Martin Conway and Kiran K. Patel (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 253 – 270; Aleida Assmann, Der europäische Traum. Vier Lehren aus der Geschichte (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2018). Compare however with Wolfram Kaiser and Anette Homlong Storeide, “International organizations and Holocaust remembrance: from Europe to the world,” International Journal of Cultural Policy 24 (2018): 798 – 810.

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which seems difficult to explain and to analyze with traditional theories of Europeanization, such as the concepts of vertical and horizontal Europeanization that still dominate social science research.¹⁵ Thus, Europeanization both as a concept as well as a historical process needs to be reconsidered. Based on the tenth annual conference of the international and interdisciplinary Research Network on the History of the Idea of Europe in Graz from June 13 to 15, 2019, our volume aims to contribute to a better understanding of the history of Europeanization since the nineteenth century.¹⁶ Taking into account Europe’s recent crises and the increasingly differentiated usage of the notion of Europeanization in scholarship, we intend to provide our readers with some of the necessary theoretical and empirical elements in order to rethink the historical dimensions of Europeanization.

1 The State of Research: Structural Developments and Three Desiderata Since the turn of the millennium, Europeanization research has increasingly gone beyond its traditional focus on the politics and economics of European Union integration. Influenced by the “cultural turn,” scholars have covered a much broader scope of topics, ranging from the Europeanization of infrastructure networks and the genesis of European memory spaces (lieux de mémoire) to the role of mass media in the formation of a European public sphere.¹⁷ Moreover, many now consider a multitude of social and cultural interconnections in European and global history.¹⁸ In short: research has been “widening and deep See the contribution of Florian Greiner in this volume.  For information on the network, see http://www.historyideaofeurope.it/who-we-are. It is hosted by the Institute for the Study of Ideas of Europe ISIE at the University of East Anglia: http://www.ideasofeurope.org (last accessed May 2, 2020).  See e. g. Christian Kleinschmidt, “Infrastructure, Networks, (Large) Technical Systems: The ‘Hidden Integration’ of Europe,” Contemporary European History 19 (2010): 275 – 284; Pim den Boer et al., eds., Europäische Erinnerungsorte 1. Mythen und Grundbegriffe des europäischen Selbstverständnisses (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2012); Jan-Henrik Meyer, The European Public Sphere: Media and Transnational Communication in European Integration 1969 – 1991 (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2010).  For the relationship between Europeanization and globalization see Hartmut Kaelble, “Europäisierung,” in Dimensionen der Kultur- und Gesellschaftsgeschichte, ed. Matthias Middell (Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 2007), 73 – 89 and Paolo Graziano, “Europeanization or Globalization? A Framework for Empirical Research (with Some Evidence from the Italian Case),” Global Social Policy 3 (2003): 173 – 194. For an empirical take and case studies on united Europe’s

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ening” (Patel) to a degree that makes it hard to keep track. Thus, it cannot be our aim to give a detailed overview of existing empirical studies. Instead, we are limiting ourselves to broader, conceptual analyses and interpretations of the history of Europeanization that are representative of current debates.¹⁹ Many recent theoretical approaches to the history of Europeanization are influenced by cultural history. In general, they place a much stronger emphasis on discourses, representations, and ideas of Europe than previous research with its focus on political and economic developments. Moreover, they are firmly committed to a social-constructivist concept of “Europe,” discarding any essentialist notion of it.²⁰ In doing so, they often redefine the term “Europeanization” which traditionally described forms of supranationalization within the European Communities. In an important attempt to broaden the perspective, Ulrike von Hirschhausen and Kiran Klaus Patel defined Europeanization “[as] a variety of political, social, economic and cultural processes that promote (or modify) a sustainable strengthening of intra-European connections and similarities through acts of emulation, exchange and entanglement […] in the course of history.”²¹ Drawing particular attention to the cultural sphere, Wolfgang Schmale suggested to consider

position in a global world, see John M. Headley, The Europeanization of the World: On the Origins of Human Rights and Democracy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008); Claudia Hiepel, ed., Europe in a Globalising World: Global Challenges and European Responses in the ‘Long’ 1970s (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2014).  For more detailed overviews of recent historical research on Europeanization and European integration, see Michael Gehler, “‘Europe’, Europeanizations and their Meaning for European Integration Historiography,” Journal of European Integration History 22 (2016): 141– 174; Wolfgang Schmale, “Europa,” Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht 66 (2015): 461– 487; Kiran K. Patel, “Widening and Deepening? Recent Advances in European Integration History,” Neue Politische Literatur 64 (2019): 327– 357.  See Gerard Delanty and Chris Rumford, Rethinking Europe: Social Theory and the Implications of Europeanization (London: Routledge, 2005), 12– 20; Michael Gehler and Silvio Vietta, eds., Europa – Europäisierung – Europäistik. Neue wissenschaftliche Ansätze, Methoden und Inhalte (Vienna: Böhlau, 2010); Hartmut Kaelble and Martin Kirsch, eds., Selbstverständnis und Gesellschaft der Europäer: Aspekte der sozialen und kulturellen Europäisierung im späten 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2008); Paolo Graziano and Maarten P. Vink, eds., Europeanization: New Research Agendas (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Martin Conway and Kiran K. Patel, eds., Europeanization in the Twentieth Century: Historical Approaches (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).  Ulrike von Hirschhausen and Kiran K. Patel, “Europeanization in History: An Introduction,” in Europeanization in the Twentieth Century: Historical Approaches, ed. Martin Conway and Kiran K. Patel (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 2.

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Europeanization as all “[p]rocesses resulting in the development of a single European culture” that “served to construct coherencies out of diversity.”²² These definitions already indicate that – in theory – there is a wide agreement in recent research regarding certain historical aspects of Europeanization. First, it is best understood as a multi-faceted process that encompassed political, economic, and cultural developments.²³ Second, Europeanization can be vague and ambiguous, and has certainly never been one-dimensional, but rather full of tensions and contradictions. Sometimes, it had fragmenting effects rather than integrating ones.²⁴ Third, Europeanization was not always perceived as something positive by contemporaries, especially as it did not restrict itself to peaceful contacts; in fact, violent transnational encounters and interactions could have much stronger effects.²⁵ Fourth, Europeanization was in no way restricted to any self-proclaimed centre of Europe, but often emerged from the continental periphery or in conflict with the “other.”²⁶ Fifth, Europeanization began long before the second half of the twentieth century and was never a historical one-way street, with many studies stressing its open-endedness.²⁷ While these recent attempts at writing a history of Europeanization have made important contributions and serve as a useful point of departure for this volume, they leave us with some desiderata and challenges: on the one hand, we still lack empirical case studies as “building blocks” of a more nuanced history of Europeanization since the nineteenth century. Many works on ideas of Europe in the nineteenth century or the first half of the twentieth century do not

 Wolfgang Schmale, “Processes of Europeanization,” European History Online (2010), accessed April 4, 2020, http://www.ieg-ego.eu/schmalew-2010b-en.  For a striking example see Guido Thiemeyer, Europäische Integration. Motive – Prozesse – Strukturen (Cologne: Böhlau, 2010).  See Timm Beichelt et al., eds., Ambivalenzen der Europäisierung. Beiträge zur Neukonzeptionalisierung der Geschichte und Gegenwart Europas (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2021).  Robert Gerwarth and Stephan Malinowski, “Europeanization through Violence? War Experiences and the Making of Modern Europe,” in Europeanization in the Twentieth Century: Historical Approaches, ed. Martin Conway and Kiran K. Patel (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 189 – 209.  See Bo Stråth, ed., Europe and the Other and Europe as the Other (Brussels: PIE Lang, 2000); Ute Frevert, Eurovisionen. Ansichten guter Europäer im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 2003); Hartmut Kaelble, Europäer über Europa: Die Entstehung des modernen europäischen Selbstverständnisses im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2001); Peo Hansen and Stefan Jonsson, Eurafrica: The Untold History of European Integration and Colonialism (London: Bloomsbury, 2014).  See Laurent Warlouzet, Governing Europe in a Globalizing World: Neoliberalism and its Alternatives Following the 1973 Oil Crisis (London: Routledge, 2018); already for older research: Peter M.R. Stirk, A History of European Integration since 1914 (London: Pinter, 1996).

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attempt to locate their case studies within a broader spectrum of Europeanization phenomena.²⁸ Furthermore, empirically Europeanization research is still dominated by studies on political ideas and concepts rather than cultural issues.²⁹ While it is true that over the last ten years or so numerous studies have started to go beyond the monothematic emphasis on the integration process after 1945, we still know relatively little about Europeanization “from below.”³⁰ Most research has adopted a top-down approach with ordinary citizens and their perceptions or experiences being marginalized despite frequent claims that Europeanization changed the everyday lives of every European. This even applies to studies on the formation of a European civil society, such as Stefanie Pukallus’ recent book that investigates primarily the efforts of the “Fabulous Artificers,” a group of highranking European politicians and administration officials around Walter Hallstein or Jean Monnet that deliberately promoted the societal side of European integration.³¹ On the other hand, the unbroken dynamics of new scholarship in the field have resulted in an immense diversity of approaches, methods, narratives, and interpretations, which sometimes makes it hard to pin down the notion of Europeanization at all. Against this background, this volume is linked to three crucial objectives. First, building on the thoughts of von Hirschhausen / Patel, Schmale, and others, the historical examination of Europeanization processes needs to be empirically substantiated and widened to include the period since the nineteenth century. While it has become accepted that Europeanization did not appear out of nowhere after the Second World War, this understanding has not yet led to a sufficient amount of empirical analysis. Many cases studies on the Euro Conter, Nation; Jürgen Elvert and Jürgen Nielsen-Sikora, eds., Leitbild Europa? Europabilder und ihre Wirkungen in der Neuzeit (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2009); Vanessa Conze, Das Europa der Deutschen. Ideen von Europa in Deutschland zwischen Reichstradition und Westorientierung (1920 – 1970) (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2005).  See for some exceptions Wolfgang Schmale, Geschichte Europas (Vienna: Böhlau, 2001); Chiara Bottici and Benoît Challand, Imagining Europe: Myth, Memory, and Identity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Randall Halle, The Europeanization of Cinema: Interzones and Imaginative Communities (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2014); Jacob Krumrey, The Symbolic Politics of European Integration: Staging Europe (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018).  See e. g. Wolfgang Schmale, For a Democratic ‘United States of Europe’ (1918 – 1951): Freemasons – Human Rights Leagues – Winston S. Churchill – Individual Citizens (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2019); Hartmut Kaelble, Der verkannte Bürger. Eine andere Geschichte der europäischen Integration seit 1950 (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2019); Maria Fritsche, The American Marshall Plan Film Campaign and the Europeans: A Captivated Audience? (London: Bloomsbury, 2018) or the publications of the book series “Making Europe,” accessed November 9, 2020, https://www.makingeurope.eu/books.  Stefanie Pukallus, The Building of Civil Europe 1951 – 1972 (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019).

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pean unification process do not provide profound historical perspectives. This can be illustrated by one of the most popular accounts in recent years, Luuk van Middelaar’s book “The Passage to Europe.”³² While the author, who is primarily known as a political philosopher, does a magnificent job in narrating the political history of European integration after 1945, he does not contextualise it by looking at longer traditions, social transformations, let alone cultural developments or everyday experiences. Indeed, many histories of European integration still ignore the wider context of Europeanization which includes all kinds of practices, ideas, and discourses. As of now, Trine Flockhart’s complaint about “missing historical content in Europeanization,” made in 2008, still stands.³³ This is even more true for the first half of the twentieth century and the nineteenth century. Second, developing a more profound perspective on historical processes of Europeanization in the sense of a longue durée is necessary not least in order to finally separate the concept from the history of the European Communities. Of course, in theory it has long been accepted that Europeanization and “EU-ization” are two different things.³⁴ However, in terms of practical research, there is still a strong tendency to equate them, as a recent volume edited by Gabriele Clemens illustrates.³⁵ Indeed, despite the widening of research outlined above most studies published in the last two decades still focus on the political system of the European Union and its predecessors or the Europeanization of society within the framework of the integration process after 1950.³⁶ As important as

 Luuk van Middelaar, The Passage to Europe: How a Continent Became a Union, transl. Liz Waters (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2013).  Trine Flockhart, “The Europeanization of Europe: The Transfer of Norms to Europe, in Europe and from Europe,” Danish Institute for International Studies, DIIS Working Paper 7 (2008): 12, accessed May 8, 2020, https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/44641/1/560545533. pdf.  See Trine Flockhart, “Europeanization or EU-ization? The Transfer of European Norms across Time and Space,” Journal of Common Market Studies 48 (2010): 787– 810.  Gabriele Clemens, ed., The Quest for Europeanization: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on a Multiple Process (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2017).  See Charlotte Bretherton and Michael L. Mannin, eds., The Europeanization of European Politics (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Graziano and Vink, Europeanization; Robert Harmsen and Thomas M. Wilson, eds., Europeanization: Institution, Identities and Citizenship (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2000); Robert Ladrech, Europeanization and National Politics (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Timm Beichelt, Deutschland und Europa. Die Europäisierung des politischen Systems, 2nd ed. (Wiesbaden: Springer, 2015); Kiran K. Patel, Europäisierung wider Willen. Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland in der Agrarintegration der EWG 1955 – 1973 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2009); Johnny Laursen, ed., The Institutions and Dynamics of the European Community: 1973 – 83 (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2014); Mathieu Petithomme, ed., L’européanisation

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many of these contributions are, their interpretation – historically – often remains within the rather narrow limits of the older Europeanization paradigm. Thus, we need to expand our specific research aims beyond processes of supranational institution-building and European (Union) integration after the Second World War. Third, in order to make sure that the concept of Europeanization itself gains sharper contours again, empirical research should be underpinned by a methodological and conceptual debate, more than is currently done.³⁷ Writing a sophisticated history of Europeanization requires a willingness to adhere to principles of meta-reflection, as attempted in the contributions by Dafinger, Gehler, and Greiner in this volume. Here, one can imagine a historiographical narratology of Europeanization processes.³⁸ In particular, it becomes necessary to develop concepts of how narratives of both integration and disintegration can be constructed in non-teleological ways. There is currently still a strong normativity inherent in Europeanization research. Originally, the concept was exclusively linked to notions of liberal democracy und the rule of law. While recent research is increasingly shedding light on ideas and manifestations of an “anti-liberal Europe,”³⁹ many studies on Europeanization processes still focus on the European Union and consider it the logical end point of historical developments. It is against this background that Hartmut Kaelble has highlighted that the term Europeanization is only useful as “as long as it is not used teleologically and not restricted to one particular space.”⁴⁰ Both goals mentioned above – empirical innovation and the nurturing of theoretical self-reflection – are intrinsically linked to the challenge of coping with a growing complexity of Europeanization research. Partially, this complexity is the result of a highly dynamic academic field where various disciplines with their different methods, outlooks, and objectives participate and compete

de la compétition politique nationale: Adaptions et résistances en perspective comparée (Grenoble: Presses Universitaires de Grenoble, 2011).  For a rare example of a profound discussion of different disciplinary perspectives on Europeanization, although still limited to European Union history, see Wolfram Kaiser and Antonio Varsori, eds., European Union History: Themes and Debates (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).  See Peter Pichler, Acht Geschichten über die Integrationsgeschichte. Zur Grundlegung der Geschichte der europäischen Integration als ein episodisches historiographisches Erzählen (Innsbruck: Studien Verlag, 2011); Wolfgang Schmale, Gender and Eurocentrism: A Conceptual Approach to European History (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2016).  Dieter Gosewinkel, ed., Anti-liberal Europe: A Neglected Story of Europeanization (New York, NY: Berghahn, 2015).  Kaelble, “Europäisierung,” 87.

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for interpretive authority. It also stems from the fact that in the last few decades Europe has been “provincialized” – in the sense of Dipesh Chakrabarty according to whom the meaning of Europe can only be historicized by exploring its connections with other world regions.⁴¹ Thus, scholars need to consider a variety of spatial concepts from the local and the region over the “West” up to the “global,” which tends to complicate things even further and to blur the European dimension of many processes of transnationalization. Another challenge is the equivocality of Europeanization as a historical development, on the one hand, and a category of analysis, on the other. Thus, it seems necessary to return to the essentials when empirically analyzing Europeanization – without neglecting the historical variety of its manifestations and subsequent developments.

2 Actors, Ideas and Practices: Europeanization as “Becoming European” Building on these objectives, this volume offers several original case studies in the history of Europeanization. We thus hope to provide more empirical evidence and to contribute to a higher degree of definitional clarity. Specifically, the contributions explore how ideas of Europe and processes of political, socio-economic, and cultural integration have been intertwined since the nineteenth century – always keeping in mind that such processes can be accompanied, slowed down, or displaced by counter-processes of disentanglement and disintegration. By focusing on the practices, agents, and experience of Europeanization, we strive to bring together the history of ideas and the history of human actions and conduct, two approaches that are usually treated separately in the field of European studies. Indeed, scholars interested in the history of European ideas have often failed to connect with structural trends in state and society, or to relate the interpretations of intellectuals to decision-making and political action. While going into different thematic directions and thus naturally building on diverse approaches, the contributions in this volume follow Michael Gehler’s conceptual thoughts and understand Europeanization as “becoming European.” In this sense, the term Europeanization describes the multi-faceted, multi-directional, and fundamentally reversible processes in modern history, when on the one hand many different actors for various reasons created Europeanness by formulating ideas and striving to realize them in practice. The essays thus explore a  See Kiran K. Patel, “Provincialising European Union: Co-operation and Integration in Europe in a Historical Perspective,” Contemporary European History 22 (2013): 649 – 673.

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large variety of agents, places, and domains of Europeanization, beyond the group of political actors and institutions. We aim to go beyond the supranational, political integration of Europe and to chronicle a history of Europeanization since the nineteenth century within the economic and legal spheres, civil society, and the media. On the other hand, it is crucial to keep in mind that “becoming European” has not always been an intended and planned result of historical action. Europeanization also can “simply happen,” as for instance the contributions of Lisa Dittrich and Nina Szidat demonstrate. From this perspective, Europeanization can be regarded as a driving force behind the European integration movement after 1950 rather than as a mere result of it. In many ways, the emergence of European ways of thinking and processes of a Europeanization “from below” since the nineteenth century represented a backdrop or perhaps even precondition for the unification of the continent “from above.” For instance, the fact that even in the heydays of nationalism private business leaders started to comprehend the economic sphere in an international, Europeanized dimension rather than in a purely competitive and national(ist) one has long been identified as a prerequisite of the politically initiated economic integration after the Second World War.⁴² We will show that in previous epochs various forms of Europeanization can already be detected, forming an important background for the developments after the Second World War. Investigating various pre-war forms and processes of Europeanization, this volume argues that even then a fundamental process of “becoming European” can be observed, with many Europeans often thinking in a European way more than is generally acknowledged – not always in terms of federal and democratic unification ideas, of course, but with Europe as a reference, a standard of comparison in numerous contexts that were often connected with everyday life. As indicated above and despite some notable exceptions, historical research on Europeanization has largely been dominated by two strands. On the one hand, political history focuses on political (and sometimes economic) practice. On the other hand, the history of ideas – heavily influenced by the new cultural history – examines discourses on Europe. This dichotomy is somewhat misleading. Indeed, ideas are constructed culturally, out of the daily and sometimes mundane contexts of a contingent world. However, they are not mere discursive products that appear out of nowhere, but inevitably represent and reflect “do-

 See Éric Bussière, La France, la Belgique et l’organisation économique de l’Europe. 1918 – 1935 (Paris: Ministère de l’Economie, des Finances et du Budget, 1992); Greiner, Wege: 144– 178.

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ings.” In this sense, discourse has to be considered as a “recontextualization of social practice.”⁴³ In some cases, a de-constructivist “praxeology” was already integrated into the broader discourse of European history and paved the way for innovative ways of writing Europe’s modern history.⁴⁴ However, in general, a praxeology of Europeanization since the nineteenth century still has a rather implicit in nuce quality in current scholarship. In some of the recent theories of Europeanization, an integral view of ideas and practices is implicitly contained, but not yet satisfyingly put into practice. So far, research on concrete practices still tends to reduce Europeanization to institutions, organizations, and politics. One reason for this might be, as Wolfgang Schmale has recently highlighted, that the remembrance culture of the European Union is focusing largely on a handful of “founding fathers” and their individual contributions, thus neglecting the fact that ordinary Europeans have been a central part of Europeanization processes from its very beginning.⁴⁵ Building on that argument, various essays in this volume are discussing the views of a broader range of actors and investigate how those ideas were put into practice in their daily lives or inadvertently triggered European entanglements and perspectives. In this sense, “Doing Europeanization” is considered an integral part of “becoming European” – again, not because these processes were always intentional, but rather as they were often strengthened and enforced by concrete practices within a “lived Europe.” This can be seen in the cases of town twinning links and youth cultures as well as those of civic society projects, labor unions, or legal standardizations. Ideas of Europe have never been purely abstract principles detached from cultural and social realities. They often have political implications, even when there is no distinct political message. Constructed in discourse, they are usually highly contested concepts. Some of them never succeeded and mark “lost Europe.”⁴⁶ Those ideas that did succeed (including the highly elaborated ones of the mystified European “founding fathers,” such as Monnet, Schuman, Spaak

 Theo van Leeuwen, Discourse and Practice: New Tools for Critical Discourse Analysis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).  See Schmale, Geschichte Europas; Michael Wintle, The Image of Europe: Visualizing Europe in Cartography and Iconography throughout the Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Patrick Pasture, Imagining European Unity since 1000 AD (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).  Schmale, United States of Europe. Also see in this context Winfried Böttcher, ed., Europas vergessene Visionäre. Rückbesinnung in Zeiten akuter Krisen (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2019).  See e. g. Christian Bailey, Between Yesterday and Tomorrow: German Visions of Europe, 1926 – 1950 (New York, NY: Berghahn, 2013).

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or Spinelli) were realized with practical deeds – be it in politics, in economy, in society, in law, or in culture.⁴⁷ Thus, conceptualizing ideas and practices of Europeanization integrally as “becoming European” offers important new insights in this regard. The essays by Aline Maldener on mass media and Nina Szidat on town twinning links between Frankfurt and other European cities in this book demonstrate the innovative potential of such an approach. Such a notion necessitates an examination of how these processes were experienced by contemporaries. However, the sphere of experiences, identities, and emotions is rarely discussed in European studies, let alone in the context of Europeanization, as Florian Greiner shows in his contribution.⁴⁸ Key questions in this volume thus are: how have Europeanization trends influenced the circumstances and daily life of Europeans? Did they help to form a common realm of experience within the regions and nations of Europe, and if so, what did it look like? Have facets of Europeanization facilitated the creation of a collective European identity, and what are its reference points and limits? Europeanization in the sense of “becoming European” is an open-ended history. Thus, all the narratives of Europeanization in this collection reflect the nonteleological character of the notion. As the following case studies illustrate, analyzing “becoming European” inevitably leads to insights into “un-becoming European” and seemingly paradoxical constellations, when nationalist ideas and practices had “integrative” effects, as was the case during the Nazi period. This deliberately wider understanding of the concept helps in engaging with the challenges of broadening the scope of Europeanization research, of nurturing theoretical reflection, and of reducing terminological complexities.

3 Overview of the Book: Five Thematic Clusters The 16 contributions in this volume are arranged in five thematical sections. Containing two to four original research papers, each of these sections offer insights into an integral history of actors, ideas, and practices of Europeanization since the nineteenth century. While some of the essays are applying interdisciplinary perspectives, they all aim at providing genuinely historical perspectives on Europeanization.

 See e. g. Paul F. Smets and Mathieu Ryckewaert, eds., Les Pères de l’Europe: Cinquante ans après, perspectives sur l’engagement européen (Brussels: Bruylant, 2001).  For an exception, see Luisa Passerini, Europe in Love, Love in Europe: Imagination and Politics in Britain between the Wars (London: I.B. Tauris, 1999).

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The papers in the first section (“Theorizing Europeanization”) address pressing theoretical questions in the light of recent debates. They all show that attempts at redefining Europeanization have been accompanied by certain methodological and epistemological problems. First, European studies have long been dominated by political and social sciences.⁴⁹ These shaped rather one-dimensional concepts of Europeanization with teleological, even ahistorical traits, which so far have been applied rather uncritically by historians. Building on that, Florian Greiner stresses the need for a truly historiographical approach to Europeanization, while Michael Gehler argues that the concept should only be used in the plural. By tracing different types of Europeanization since the end of the Second World War, Gehler sheds new light on the causes and effects of different waves of integration and disintegration that have affected the European project to the present day. Second, the normative aspects of Europeanization phenomena appear in a critical light. Until at least the 1990s, Europeanization has been firmly linked to liberal values and ideologies. “More Europe” seemed to mean more liberty. Hence, less liberty implied “less Europe.” As already indicated, however, research has recently paid more attention to illiberal ideas and practices of Europeanization. Thus, historical research is facing new challenges when it comes to theorizing Europeanization, as Johannes Dafinger underlines in his essay. Nazi Germany deliberately triggered forms of Europeanization, such as the foundation of European organizations, in order to counter existing international institutions that were democratically run and known for embracing liberal values. The second section discusses the role of intellectuals in the Europeanization of thought in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. While intellectual history marks a long-standing strand of research in European studies, the links between European ideas and processes of Europeanization have not been dealt with adequately so far.⁵⁰ The two case studies illustrate how, when, and why certain thinkers promoted or impeded the adoption of European norms, values, and technologies. Highlighting the complex interwovenness of concepts like the “nation,” the “East” or the “West,” and ideas of Europeanness, they also add to our understanding by offering Southern European perspectives and insights into Europeanization processes from the margins – with all their limits and ambigui-

 See Theofanis Exadaktylos and Claudio M. Radaelli, eds., Research Design in European Studies: Establishing Causality in Europeanization (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).  See Matthew D’Auria and Jan Vermeiren, eds., Narrating Europe: Conceptions of European History and Identity in Historiography and Intellectual Thought, Special issue of History: The Journal of the Historical Association 103, no. 356 (2018).

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ties.⁵¹ The papers show that there is a close connection between attempts at modernization and perceptions of “becoming European.” Kate Papari underlines similar processes in interbellum Greece, where for many Hellenist intellectuals “Europe” served as the embodiment of their hopes and requests for a more modern state; they fervently discussed how European standards could be applied without undermining Greek traditions and culture. Indeed, while certain developments of Europeanization could be seen as something positive, especially in connection with infrastructure, education, and administration, some observers perceived them as a cultural or moral threat and vehemently rejected them, as Çiğdem Oguz elaborates with regard to Islamist and nationalist circles in the late Ottoman era and early Turkish Republic. Focussing on processes of “Europeanization from the Bottom Up,” the contributions in the next section explore Europeanization at “grassroots” level by looking at actors in sports, the mass media, and civil society. Making a case for connecting research on these micro-levels with meso- and macro-levels of Europeanization, they demonstrate how such an approach can enrich current scholarship. In her analysis of contemporary football fan culture, Regina Weber reveals how even supporters of an Austrian club with little experience of international competitions have become truly Europeanized in their outlook. These findings seem to confirm an assessment that was put forward by the Economist already in 2003: “The players do better than the politicians at making Europe loved.”⁵² Following a similar approach, Aline Maldener shows how youth mass media functioned as popular cultural agents of Europeanization. By airing songs of foreign stars and presenting international youth lifestyles, radio programs such as the West German Europawelle Saar had not only an intermediary function but also explicitly tried to connect young Europeans by promoting activities such as cross-border car rallies. Finally, Nina Szidat demonstrates how practices of town twinning that emerged after the Second World War were considered central promoters of a European cultural identity. However, while these efforts created indeed a network of partnerships all over the continent, its European dimension was often rather concealed. In short: the Europeanization of town twinning was much more successful than the Europeanization through town-twinning. The other two sections dedicate themselves to different societal spheres where various processes of homogenization in the sense of a “becoming Europe”  See in general Frank Bösch et al., eds., Europabilder im 20. Jahrhundert. Entstehung an der Peripherie (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2012).  Charlemagne, “How Football Unites Europe: The Players Do Better Than the Politicians at Making Europe Loved,” The Economist 367 (2003): 55.

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took place. Obviously, in the field of religion these did not only begin in the twentieth century. Rather, the political idea of “Christianitas” is generally considered a first expression of Europeanness which manifested itself since the Early Middle Ages largely due to external threats. Notions of a Christian Europe have since represented a key feature of European thought, ideas, and identity.⁵³ In the religious sphere, too, concepts of Europe were influenced by processes of disintegration, a finding that is confirmed by Lisa Dittrich’s essay. Dittrich shows how anticlericals that were marginalized in their own nations not only formed European networks, but in doing so developed the idea of an anticlerical Europe. The legal sphere provides another example of a structural homogenization in European history. While this forms a commonplace regarding the well-researched development of EU law in the second half of the twentieth century, we are still lacking historical studies of earlier periods and lesser-known legal developments.⁵⁴ The case study by Anna Klimaszeswka and Michał Gałędek on the reception of the Napoleonic Code in Poland demonstrates the benefits of such a broader approach to the history of legal Europeanization. They argue that the forced codification of law survived the end of the French protectorate in 1814 as Polish legal elites voluntarily committed themselves to the Europeanization of law. Another area where processes of homogenization in Europe played a crucial role since at least the late nineteenth century is the social and economic sphere.⁵⁵ In her essay, Heike Knortz examines the Europeanization of the Euro-

 See Tim Geelhaar, Christianitas. Eine Wortgeschichte von der Spätantike bis zum Mittelalter (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2015); Karel Sládek et al., The Christian Roots of European Identity:. A Central European Perspective (Vienna: Praesens Verlag, 2019); Brent F. Nelsen and James L. Guth, “Religion and the Creation of European Identity: The Message of the Flags,” The Review of Faith & International Affairs 14 (2016): 80 – 88.  Randall Lesaffer, European Legal History: A Cultural and Political Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Kaius Tuori and Heta Bjorklund, eds., Roman Law and the Idea of Europe (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2019). For an introduction to EU law see: Paul Craig and Gráinne de Búrca, EU Law: Texts, Cases and Materials, 6th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); William Phelan, Great Judgments of the European Court of Justice: Rethinking the Landmark Decisions of the Foundational Period (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019).  See Hartmut Kaelble, “Social Particularities of Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century Europe,” in The European Way: European Societies during the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, ed. Hartmut Kaelble (New York, NY: Berghahn, 2004), 276 – 317; Jan-Otmar Hesse et al., eds., Perspectives on European Economic and Social History / Perspektiven der europäischen Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2014); Günther Schulz and Mark Spoerer, eds., Integration und Desintegration Europas. Wirtschafts- und sozialhistorische Beiträge (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2019).

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pean labour market after 1945. Not only did this development trigger an intra-European migration regime, it also had a major influence on solving structural economic problems like unemployment or the need for unskilled workers in different European nations.⁵⁶ At around the same time, as Heike Wieters argues, life insurance companies formed European networks and organizations in order to prepare themselves for the imminent market integration and promote a distinct European idea of social security. Despite this existence of a “Social Europe,” politically, European integration after the Second World War was primarily shaped by actors from a conservative and Catholic background.⁵⁷ Nevertheless, in his empirical overview Willy Buschak demonstrates the variety and intensity with which labour associations and socialists all over Europe argued for a “United States of Europe” in the first half of the twentieth century. While these efforts failed politically, according to Buschak, they were an expression of as well as a driving force behind a profound Europeanization of the working class that manifested itself in various forms of transnational contacts.⁵⁸ Overall, the empirical contributions to this volume illustrate various ways of “becoming European” since the nineteenth century by linking ideas and concrete practices beyond the sphere of high politics.

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 For another perspective on the development of a European migration system see Emmanuel Comte, The History of the European Migration Regime: Germany’s Strategic Hegemony (London: Routledge, 2018).  See for instance Wolfram Kaiser, Christian Democracy and the Origins of European Union (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Antonin Cohen, De Vichy à la Communauté européenne: Histoire d’un groupe dans l’institution d’une “communauté” européenne (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2012); Marco Duranti, The Conservative Human Rights Revolution: European Identity, Transnational Politics and the Origins of the European Convention (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2017).  Indeed, some of these left-wing, socialist networks lasted well into the second half of the twentieth century. See, for instance: Christian Salm, Transnational Socialist Networks in the 1970s: European Community Development Aid and Southern Enlargement (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), and Francesco Di Palma and Wolfgang Mueller, eds., Kommunismus und Europa. Europapolitik und -vorstellungen europäischer kommunistischer Parteien im Kalten Krieg (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2016).

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Bayly, Christopher A. The Birth of the Modern World, 1780 – 1914: Global Connections and Comparisons. Oxford: Blackwell, 2004. Beichelt, Timm. Deutschland und Europa. Die Europäisierung des politischen Systems. 2nd ed. Wiesbaden: Springer, 2015. Beichelt, Timm, Clara M. Frysztacka, Claudia Weber, and Susann Worschech, eds. Ambivalenzen der Europäisierung. Beiträge zur Neukonzeptionalisierung der Geschichte und Gegenwart Europas. Stuttgart: Steiner, 2021. Bottici, Chiara, and Benoît Challand. Imagining Europe: Myth, Memory, and Identity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. Bösch, Frank, Ariane Brill, and Florian Greiner, eds. Europabilder im 20. Jahrhundert. Entstehung an der Peripherie. Göttingen: Wallstein, 2012. Böttcher, Winfried, ed. Europas vergessene Visionäre. Rückbesinnung in Zeiten akuter Krisen. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2019. Bretherton, Charlotte, and Michael L. Mannin, eds. The Europeanization of European Politics. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. Bugge, Peter. “The Nation Supreme: The Idea of Europe 1914 – 1945.” In The History of the Idea of Europe, edited by Kevin Wilson and Jan van der Dussen, 83 – 149. London: Routledge, 1995. Bussière, Éric. La France, la Belgique et l’organisation économique de l’Europe. 1918 – 1935. Paris: Ministère de l’Economie, des Finances et du Budget, 1992. Case, Holly. Between States: The Transylvanian Question and the European Idea during World War II. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009. Charlemagne. “How Football Unites Europe: The Players Do Better Than the Politicians at Making Europe Loved.” The Economist 367 (2003): 55. Clemens, Gabriele, ed. The Quest for Europeanization: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on a Multiple Process. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2017. Cohen, Antonin. De Vichy à la Communauté européenne: Histoire d’un groupe dans l’institution d’une “communauté” européenne. Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2012. Comte, Emmanuel. The History of the European Migration Regime: Germany’s Strategic Hegemony. London: Routledge, 2018. Conter, Claude D. Jenseits der Nation – Das vergessene Europa des 19. Jahrhunderts. Die Geschichte der Inszenierungen und Visionen Europas in Literatur, Geschichte und Politik. Bielefeld: Aisthesis, 2004. Conway, Martin, and Kiran K. Patel, eds. Europeanization in the Twentieth Century: Historical Approaches. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. Conze, Vanessa. Das Europa der Deutschen. Ideen von Europa in Deutschland zwischen Reichstradition und Westorientierung (1920 – 1970). Munich: Oldenbourg, 2005. Craig, Paul, and Gráinne de Búrca. EU Law: Texts, Cases and Materials. 6th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. D’Auria, Matthew, and Jan Vermeiren, eds. Narrating Europe: Conceptions of European History and Identity in Historiography and Intellectual Thought. Special issue of History: The Journal of the Historical Association 103, no. 356 (2018). D’Auria, Matthew, and Jan Vermeiren, eds. Visions and Ideas of Europe during the First World War. London: Routledge, 2019.

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Graziano, Paolo. “Europeanization or Globalization? A Framework for Empirical Research (with Some Evidence from the Italian Case).” Global Social Policy 3 (2003): 173 – 194. Graziano, Paolo, and Maarten P. Vink, eds. Europeanization: New Research Agendas. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. Greiner, Florian. “Europeanisation and Modernity during the Second Thirty Years War: Discourses on Europe in British and American Print Media, 1914 – 1945.” In Européanisation au XXe siècle: Un regard historique, edited by Matthieu Osmont, Émilia Robin-Hivert, Katja Seidel, Mark Spoerer, and Christian Wenkel, 29 – 44. Brussels: Peter Lang, 2012. Greiner, Florian. Wege nach Europa. Deutungen eines imaginierten Kontinents in deutschen, britischen und amerikanischen Printmedien, 1914 – 1945. Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2014. Greiner, Florian. “Articulating Europe during the Great War: Friedrich Naumann’s Idea of ‘Mitteleuropa’ and its Public Reception in Germany, England and the USA.” Lingue Culture Mediazioni – Languages Cultures Mediation 2 (2015): 131 – 148. Grimmel, Andreas, ed., Die neue Europäische Union. Zwischen Integration und Desintegration. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2020. Grunwald, Henning. “‘Nothing more Cosmopolitan than the Camps?’ Holocaust Remembrance and (de‐)Europeanization.” In Europeanization in the Twentieth Century: Historical Approaches, edited by Martin Conway and Kiran K. Patel, 253 – 270. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. Habermas, Jürgen. The Crisis of the European Union: A Response. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012. Halle, Randall. The Europeanization of Cinema: Interzones and Imaginative Communities. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2014. Hansen, Peo, and Stefan Jonsson. Eurafrica: The Untold History of European Integration and Colonialism. London: Bloomsbury, 2014. Harmsen, Robert, and Thomas M. Wilson, eds. Europeanization: Institution, Identities and Citizenship. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2000. Haupt, Heinz-Gerhard. “Erfahrungen mit Europa. Ansätze zu einer Geschichte Europas im langen 19. Jahrhundert.” In ‘Europäische Geschichte’ als historiographisches Problem, edited by Heinz Duchhardt and Andreas Kunz, 87 – 103. Mainz: von Zabern, 1997. Headley, John M. The Europeanization of the World: On the Origins of Human Rights and Democracy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008. Henrich-Franke, Christian, et al., eds., Grenzüberschreitende institutionalisierte Zusammenarbeit von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2019. Hesse, Jan-Otmar, Christian Kleinschmidt, Alfred Reckendrees, and Ray Stokes, eds. Perspectives on European Economic and Social History / Perspektiven der europäischen Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2014. Hewitson, Mark, and Matthew D’Auria, eds. Europe in Crisis: Intellectuals and the European Idea, 1917 – 1957. New York, NY: Berghahn, 2012. Hiepel, Claudia, ed. Europe in a Globalising World: Global Challenges and European Responses in the ‘Long’ 1970s. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2014. Hirschhausen, Ulrike von, and Kiran K. Patel. “Europeanization in History: An Introduction.” In Europeanization in the Twentieth Century: Historical Approaches, edited by Martin Conway and Kiran K. Patel, 1 – 18. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.

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Hirschmann, Kai. Europa zwischen Abbruch und Aufbruch. Die Europäische Union vor existenziellen Herausforderungen. Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2020. Kaelble, Hartmut. Europäer über Europa: Die Entstehung des modernen europäischen Selbstverständnisses im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2001. Kaelble, Hartmut. “Social Particularities of Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century Europe.” In The European Way: European Societies during the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, edited by Hartmut Kaelble, 276 – 317. New York, NY: Berghahn, 2004. Kaelble, Hartmut. “Europäisierung.” In Dimensionen der Kultur- und Gesellschaftsgeschichte, edited by Matthias Middell, 73 – 89. Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 2007. Kaelble, Hartmut, and Martin Kirsch, eds. Selbstverständnis und Gesellschaft der Europäer: Aspekte der sozialen und kulturellen Europäisierung im späten 19. und 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2008. Kaelble, Hartmut. Der verkannte Bürger. Eine andere Geschichte der europäischen Integration seit 1950. Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2019. Kaiser, Wolfram. Christian Democracy and the Origins of European Union. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. Kaiser, Wolfram, and Antonio Varsori, eds. European Union History: Themes and Debates. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. Kaiser, Wolfram, and Anette Homlong Storeide, “International organizations and Holocaust remembrance: from Europe to the world.” International Journal of Cultural Policy 24 (2018): 798 – 810. Kemseke, Peter van. Europe Reinvented: How COVID-19 is Changing the European Union. Vilvoorde: Boeklyn, 2020. Kershaw, Ian. “Europe’s Second Thirty Years War.” History Today 55 (2005): 10 – 17. Kleinschmidt, Christian. “Infrastructure, Networks, (Large) Technical Systems: The ‘Hidden Integration’ of Europe.” Contemporary European History 19 (2010): 275 – 284. Krastev, Ivan. After Europe. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017. Krastev, Ivan, and Stephen Holmes. The Light that Failed: A Reckoning. London: Allen Lane, 2019. Krumrey, Jacob. The Symbolic Politics of European Integration: Staging Europe. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018. Ladrech, Robert. Europeanization and National Politics. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. Laursen, Johnny, ed. The Institutions and Dynamics of the European Community: 1973 – 83. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2014. Leeuwen, Theo van. Discourse and Practice: New Tools for Critical Discourse Analysis. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. Lesaffer, Randall. European Legal History: A Cultural and Political Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. Lipgens, Walter. “European Federation in the Political Thought of Resistance Movements during World War II.” Central European History 1 (1968): 5 – 19. Loth, Wilfried. Building Europe: A History of European Unification. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2015. Majone, Giandomenico. Rethinking the Union of Europe Post-Crisis: Has Integration Gone Too Far? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014. Meyer, Jan-Henrik. The European Public Sphere: Media and Transnational Communication in European Integration 1969 – 1991. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2010.

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Middelaar, Luuk van. The Passage to Europe: How a Continent Became a Union. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2013. Nelsen, Brent F., and James L. Guth. “Religion and the Creation of European Identity: The Message of the Flags.” The Review of Faith & International Affairs 14 (2016): 80 – 88. Osterhammel, Jürgen. The Transformation of the World: A Global History of the Nineteenth Century. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014. Pandemic Politics and European Union Responses, special issue of the Journal of European Integration 42, no. 8 (2020). Passerini, Luisa. Europe in Love, Love in Europe: Imagination and Politics in Britain between the Wars. London: I.B. Tauris, 1999. Pasture, Patrick. Imagining European Unity since 1000 AD. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. Patel, Kiran K. Europäisierung wider Willen. Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland in der Agrarintegration der EWG 1955 – 1973. Munich: Oldenbourg, 2009. Patel, Kiran K. “Provincialising European Union: Co-operation and Integration in Europe in a Historical Perspective.” Contemporary European History 22 (2013): 649 – 673. Patel, Kiran K. Project Europe: A History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020. Patel, Kiran K. “Widening and Deepening? Recent Advances in European Integration History.” Neue Politische Literatur 64 (2019): 327 – 357. Petithomme, Mathieu, ed. L’européanisation de la compétition politique nationale: Adaptions et résistances en perspective compare. Grenoble: Presses universitaires de Grenoble, 2011. Phelan, William. Great Judgments of the European Court of Justice: Rethinking the Landmark Decisions of the Foundational Period. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019. Pichler, Peter. Acht Geschichten über die Integrationsgeschichte. Zur Grundlegung der Geschichte der europäischen Integration als ein episodisches historiographisches Erzählen. Innsbruck: Studien Verlag, 2011. Procyk, Anna. Giuseppe Mazzini’s Young Europe and the Birth of Modern Nationalism in the Slavic World. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2019. Pukallus, Stefanie. The Building of Civil Europe 1951 – 1972. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019. Riddervold, Marianne, et al., eds., The Palgrave Handbook of EU Crises. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020. Salm, Christian. Transnational Socialist Networks in the 1970s: European Community Development Aid and Southern Enlargement. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. Schmale, Wolfgang. Geschichte Europas. Vienna: Böhlau, 2001. Schmale, Wolfgang. “Europa.” Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht 66 (2015): 461 – 487. Schmale, Wolfgang. Gender and Eurocentrism: A Conceptual Approach to European History. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2016. Schmale, Wolfgang. “European Solidarity: A Semantic History.” European Review of History 24 (2017): 854 – 873. Schmale, Wolfgang. For a Democratic ‘United States of Europe’ (1918 – 1951): Freemasons – Human Rights Leagues – Winston S. Churchill – Individual Citizens. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2019. Schmale, Wolfgang. “Processes of Europeanization.” European History Online (2010). Accessed April 4, 2020. http://www.ieg-ego.eu/schmalew-2010b-en.

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Section 1: Theorizing Europeanization

Michael Gehler

Integration and Disintegration Different Types of Europeanization from the Emergence and Reshaping of Western Europe (1947 – 1989) to a United Europe (1989 – 2007) in Times of Crisis (2008 – 2020)

Introduction Is the European Union of today on the path of more integration or rather on that of its disintegration? In 2010, in the wake of the so called “euro crisis,” and later on in the 2015 “refugee crisis” and in the “Brexit process” 2016 – 2020, the losses of integrity have become evident. A disintegration path seems thus so dominant within the EU to the point of weakening its integration dynamics. Old and new divisions between societies exist in Europe’s social and economic systems and affect European citizens to varying degrees. Structurally, the EU has suffered from a double division, which has repeatedly been associated with “tensile tests” for years. On the one hand, a gap exists between the West and the East of Europe on the question of migration from Muslim countries. On the other hand, there is a dividing line between North and South within the framework of the European single currency.¹ The necessity of dealing with the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated this North-South divide. This especially shows as regards the highly controversial issue of granting “corona bonds,” meaning a kind of joint liability for debts. In light of such recent developments, this contribution wants to answer the following questions: what kind of Europeanizations can we identify and how are they related to European integration and European disintegration? What were the different motives and reasons on the roads to Europe’s integration? Which were the effects of these Europeanizations explaining (a) the development of an integrated Western Europe (1947– 1989) as a first major phase; (b) the two sub-phases (1979 – 1985; 1985 – 1989); (c) the second major phase towards a more or less unified Europe (1989 – 2007); followed by (d) a more or less integrated EU on the wake of new challenges and crises (2008 – 2020)?

 Michael Gehler, “Ein aussichtsloses Unternehmen? Ursula von der Leyens neue Kommission,” Europäische Rundschau 48, no.1 (2020): 53 – 60, 56. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110685473-003

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The Relationship between Europeanization(s) and European Integration “Europeanization”² means “becoming European” and “becoming Europeanized” with a double meaning and a double goal. These meanings and goals must both be placed in an outward as well as in an inward context. Initially, this refers to an orientation towards European forms of culture and living. For that matter, the long-term transfer of European cultural values and political ideas to other continents and vice versa are concerned. Secondly, the alignment and adoption of forms of culture and living within Europe via cultural exchange and travelling (“bottom up”) should be taken into account. Furthermore, the acceptance and standardization of European legal forms, directives, guidelines, and regulations by each member state of the European Union need to be considered.³ In general terms, this essay also refers to arrangements in agreement with a European pattern (or even models), and to the implementation according to European Union (EU) procedures, be it at the political, institutional, legal, or economic level (“top down”) – sometimes even against the will of the nation-states.⁴

 This contribution is based to a certain extent on Michael Gehler, “‘Europe’, Europeanizations and their Meaning for European Integration Historiography,” Journal of European Integration History 22, no.1 (2016): 141– 174. It has, however, been substantially expanded. I thank Deborah Cuccia and Nadine Steinmetz for a final review of the text.  At first, political science literature dominated the discourse on Europeanization, and this was followed by historical reflections and studies; see: Klaus H. Goetz and Simon Hix, Europeanised Politics? European Integration and National Political Systems (London: Severin & Siedler, 2001); Johan P. Olsen, “The Many Faces of Europeanization,” Journal of Common Market Studies 40 (2002): 921– 952; Kevin Featherstone, “In the Name of Europe,” in The Politics of Europeanization, ed. Kevin Featherstone and Claudio M. Radelli (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 6 – 12; Katrin Aurel, “Europäisierung nationaler Politik,” in Theorien der europäischen Integration, ed. Hans-Jürgen Bieling and Marika Lerch (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaft, 2005), 293 – 318; Heinz-Jürgen Axt, Antonio Milosoki, and Oliver Schwarz, “Europäisierung – ein weites Feld. Literaturbericht und Forschungsfragen,” Politische Vierteljahresschrift 48 (2007): 136 – 149; Tanja A. Börzel and Diana Panke, “Europeanization,” in European Union Politics, ed. Michelle Cini and Nieves Pérez-Solórzano Borragán (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 405 – 417; Martin Conway and Kiran K. Patel, eds., Europeanization in the Twentieth Century: Historical Approaches (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); with an interdisciplinary orientation: Michael Gehler and Silvio Vietta, eds., Europa – Europäisierung – Europäistik. Neue wissenschaftliche Ansätze, Methoden und Inhalte (Vienna: Böhlau, 2010); Matthieu Osmont et al., eds., Européanisation au XXe siècle: Un regard historique (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2012).  As an example, see: Kiran K. Patel, Europäisierung wider Willen: Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland in der Agrarintegration der EWG, 1955 – 1973 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2009), 19 – 23.

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According to this author, five answers can be provided to those questions asked above: 1. Europeanization dates back further than European integration. In geographical terms, it encompassed, and continues to encompass, more than the different forms of integration (ECSC, EEC, EC, and EU). 2. Europeanization incorporates several different developments, which at times may occur simultaneously. The term ought not to be used in the singular, but rather in the plural. 3. From the Middle Ages to Modern Times, Europeanizations have been the historically relevant preconditions for the EU Europeanization that took place after 1945 within and outside the European Communities. 4. A distinction must be drawn between “older” (general) Europeanizations – which were at work long before the two world wars – and “new” Europeanizations after 1945, which were dependent on the policies of the European Communities and the Union. 5. Historical and older Europeanizations as backgrounds, preconditions, consequences, and effects are of importance for understanding the origins and development of EU integration.

A Historiography of Varied Europeanizations In writing a historiography of these Europeanizations one can take different general approaches and give some specific examples. 1. The Europeanization of external nation-state policy by means of orientation towards Brussels. With this kind of reconstruction of national policy towards “Europe” and its institutions, value can be placed on goals, intentions, interests, motives, reasons, and strategies of nation-state-policy and governmentpolicy practiced by diplomats, political decision-makers, party politicians, and observers. As part of European milieus, and due to their orientation towards Brussels, Luxembourg, Strasbourg, etc., a gradual Europeanization of national policy representatives and members of the communities came into being.⁵ We can observe this development among Green Party politicians, for in-

 Katja Seidel, The Process of Politics in Europe: The Rise of European Elites and Supranational Institutions (London: IB Tauris, 2010); Katja Seidel and Michel Mangenot, “Consolidating the European Civil Service,” in The European Commission 1973 – 86: History and Memories of an Institution, ed. Éric Bussière et al. (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014), 61– 70.

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stance. Originally, they were generally very critical of the EC, an approach that basically arose from their criticism of “capitalism.” From the moment they were represented in the European Parliament, they became Europeanized and many of them turned into ardent Europeans.⁶ The German-French Daniel Cohn-Bendit, the Italian and South Tyrolean Alexander Langer, and the Austrian Johannes Voggenhuber can be mentioned as examples. Europeanization by means of internal community and union policy – integration by means of the adoption of the common body of law (“acquis communautaire”). National and European interests – that is, state and community-specific interests – have grown together more intensely and can no longer be strictly separated from each other.⁷ A Europeanization began through a convergence by strength of community law and common regulation in the EC and EU Member States.⁸ This development is well illustrated by the example of the Union Treaties of Maastricht (1993)⁹ and Lisbon (2009)¹⁰ and by the reactions to them by the German Federal Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe. Despite the “yes, but – position with reservations,” the verdicts of the Constitutional Court were ultimately always positive. German law finally had to adapt and bow to European law. The Europeanization of national law by the European legal community is reflected in this adjustment. However, in May 2020, for the first time Karlsruhe criticized the decision by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) of 2018, according to which the European Central Bank’s (ECB) purchases of government bonds were not covered by European law and the economic consequences for citizens had not been taken into account. The Lux-

 Elizabeth E. Bomberg, Green Parties and Politics in the European Union (London: Routledge, 2005).  Rainer Eising and Beate Kohler-Koch, Interessenpolitik in Europa (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2005).  Paul Craig and Grainne De Burca, EU Law: Text, Cases, and Materials, 6th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); Trevor Hartley, The Foundations of European Union Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).  Franz C. Mayer, Kompetenzüberschreitung und Letztentscheidung. Das Maastricht-Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts und die Letztentscheidung über Ultra-vires-Akte in Mehrebenensystemen. Eine rechtsvergleichende Betrachtung von Konflikten zwischen Gerichten am Beispiel der EU und der USA (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2000); Ingo Winkelmann, ed., Das Maastricht-Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts vom 12. Oktober 1993. Dokumentation des Verfahrens mit Einführung (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1994).  Peter-Christian Müller-Graff, “Das Lissabon-Urteil: Implikationen für die Europapolitik,” Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 18 (2010): 22– 29; Robert C. van Ooyen, Die Staatstheorie des Bundesverfassungsgerichts und Europa. Von Solange über Maastricht zu Lissabon, 3rd ed. (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2010).

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4.

5.

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embourg judges, however, stressed that only they themselves were entitled to judge whether the action of an EU institution violated European law. The modernization and protection of the national economic, industrial, and social systems by means of Europeanization. The main arguments of this approach are the restoration, protection, renewal, and stabilization of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and European Economic Community (EEC) Member States, i. e. of their economies, industries, societies, and social systems. New perspectives, interests, and options in the foreign trade policies were added, as well as the participation in economic endeavors within the EEC, or the fact of not being excluded from the “Common Market” and profiting from it. French coal and steel policy as well as agricultural policy and the UK’s “integration policy” are examples of that. The ECSC served French interests in Europeanizing coal mining and the production of steel from the Ruhr in order to reduce the competitive pressure on French producers. The British policy of joining the EEC in the 1960s was functional to modernize its national economy through the dynamism of the “Common Market.”¹¹ Europeanization through the search for security guarantees, the retrieval of reliable partners, and the neighborhood policy. For the Benelux countries – which were shaped by the painful experiences of the violations of neutrality in both world wars (1914, 1940) and which had belonged to the Oslo Group of states – the guarantee of protection against future aggressions and annexations was an existential matter. In that sense, states obtained security via Europeanization, but also transatlantization. Due to the conflicts and crises of Cyprus, Kosovo, Georgia, and the Ukraine, the EU’s accession, association, and neighborhood policies from 1999 to 2015¹² cannot be seen as a successful enterprise of Europeanization but further attempts will be made. Europeanization by means of communication, legitimation, and the public sphere. Since the Maastricht Treaty, a politicization of Europe, and also a Europeanization of its politics, can be observed. As a result, citizens’ discours-

 Raymond Poidevin, ed., Histoire des débuts de la construction européenne mars 1948-mai 1950 (Brussels: Bruylant, 1986); Wolfram Kaiser, Großbritannien und die Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft 1955 – 1961. Von Messina nach Canossa (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1996).  Janet Mather, Legitimating the European Union: Aspirations, Inputs and Performance (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 150 – 152; Valentin Naumescu and Dan Dungaciu, eds., The European Union’s Eastern Neighbourhood Today: Politics, Dynamics, Perspectives (New Castle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2015).

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es, political communication,¹³ and a Europeanization of discussions have come into being. In the end, “public spheres and spaces” are increasingly spoken of.¹⁴ Their existence and the communication taking place among them have gained in importance.¹⁵ Referendums, such as those on the “Constitutional Treaty” hold in France and in the Netherlands in 2005 as well as the “Brexit” referendum in the UK in 2016, were the main instruments which could either contribute to a Europeanization of politics, or to a growing politicization of Europe. This, in the end can also mean disintegration and de-Europeanization. Whether this “negated in diversity” always takes place remains to be examined on a comparative European level.¹⁶ The Europeanization of Europe through the opening up of Central and Eastern Europe. The revolutionary years of radical political change from 1989 to 1991 – which include the breakup of the existing socialist forms of rule in Northeastern, Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe and the end of the USSR – have already caught the attention of historiography.¹⁷ However,

 Hartmut Kaelble, Martin Kirsch, and Andreas Schmidt-Gernig, eds., Transnationale Öffentlichkeiten und Identitäten im 20. Jahrhundert (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2002); Thomas Gehring, Die Europäische Union als komplexe internationale Organisation. Wie durch Kommunikation und Entscheidung soziale Ordnung entsteht (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2002); Mariano Barbato, Regieren durch Argumentieren. Macht und Legitimität politischer Sprache im Prozess der europäischen Integration (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2005); Julia Hahn et al., Europa als Gegenstand politischer Kommunikation. Eine Fallstudie zur deutschen Ratspräsidentschaft (Berlin: Frank & Timme, 2008).  Hartmut Kaelble and Luisa Passerini, “European Public Sphere and European Identity in 20th Century History,” Journal of European Integration History 8, no. 2 (2002): 5 – 8, with additional essays on the origin of European openness and public spaces; Marie-Thèrese Bitsch, Wilfried Loth, and Charles Barthel, dir., Cultures politiques, opinions publiques et intégration européenne (Brussels: Bruylant, 2007); Jan-Henrik Meyer, The European Public Sphere: Media and Transnational Communication in European Integration 1969 – 1991 (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2010).  Miriam Karama, Struktur und Wandel der Legitimationsideen deutscher Europapolitik (Bonn: Europa Union Verlag, 2001); Janet Mather, Legitimating the European Union: Aspirations, Inputs and Performance (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Glyn Morgan, The Idea of a European Superstate: Public Justification and European Integration (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005).  Wolf J. Schünemann, In Vielfalt verneint. Referenden in und über Europa von Maastricht bis Brexit (Wiesbaden: Springer, 2017), 136 – 153.  Martin Malek and Anna Schor-Tschudnowskaja, eds., Der Zerfall der Sowjetunion. Ursachen – Begleiterscheinungen – Hintergründe (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2013); Michael Gehler, “1989: Ambivalent Revolutions with different Backgrounds and Consequences,” in The Revolutions of

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a detailed historical analysis of the effects of their European and integration history dimension at a comparable national level is still needed. Such an analysis should also focus on the effects of the ideological, political, and social historical dimension. More than 30 years after these epoch-making breaks, one is compelled to remark that they seem to be closely connected to a trend of renationalization.¹⁸ The role of euro-sceptical politicians from Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary will have to be further investigated in a comparative approach with regard to their de-Europeanization and the renationalization of their political cultures. The Kaczynski brothers, Václav Klaus, Vladimir Meciar, and Viktor Orbán should be considered here. We can in fact widen the debate to issues of “European values”¹⁹ and their Europeanization and de-Europeanization by making reference, for example, to Orbán and the question of whether his party Fidész should remain in the European People’s Party.²⁰ Fidész has been suspended from the EPP. After the suspension of the Hungarian parliament in the wake of the coronavirus crisis, Fidész was threatened with exclusion from the European Christian Democratic party family. In the end Fidész left the EPP faction. Europeanization by means of acculturalization of the EU. The anthropological and cultural turn of the humanities and social sciences also left its mark on the historiography of Europe and of European integration.²¹ The European-

1989: A Handbook, ed. Wolfgang Mueller, Michael Gehler, and Arnold Suppan (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2015), 587– 604.  Andrea Brait, ed., Österreich und die Ostöffnung 1989. Themendossiers zur Didaktik von Geschichte, Sozialkunde und Politischer Bildung 2015, Nr. 8, https://hpb.univie.ac.at/fileadmin/ user_upload/p_hpb/Startseite/hpb_8/hpb_8.pdf, accessed December 1, 2020.  Silvio Vietta, Europas Werte. Geschichte – Konflikte – Perspektiven (Freiburg im Breisgau: Karl Alber, 2019).  Eszter Zalan, “EPP to keep Orban’s Fidesz Suspension,” euobserver, January 29, 2020, accessed April 30, 2020, https://euobserver.com/political/147300; Ester Zalan, “New push to kick Orban’s party out of centre-right EPP,” euobserver, April 3, 2020, accessed April 30, 2020, https://euobserver.com/political/147975; Michael Gehler and Marcus Gonschor, Ein europäisches Gewissen. Hans-Gert Pöttering – Biographie (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 2020), 739 – 745.  Christoph Kühberger and Clemens Sedmak, eds., Europäische Geschichtskultur – Europäische Geschichtspolitik. Vom Erfinden, Entdecken, Erarbeiten der Bedeutung von Erinnerung für das Verständnis und Selbstverständnis Europas (Innsbruck: Studienverlag, 2009); Wolfgang S. Kissel and Ulrike Liebert, eds., Perspektiven einer europäischen Erinnerungsgemeinschaft. Nationale Narrative und transnationale Dynamiken seit 1980 (Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2010); Peter Pichler, Leben und Tod in der Europäischen Union (Innsbruck: Studienverlag, 2014); Peter Pichler, EUropa. Was die Europäische Union ist, was sie nicht ist und was sie einmal werden könnte (Graz: Leykam, 2016).

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ization of cultures constituted the starting point of a culturalization of Europe. Meanwhile, the EU had come to understand culture as “goods.”²² The field of “culture” was then included in the Union Treaty of Maastricht. Such a development sharpened the growing need to approach integration history in terms of cultural history and of cultural studies.²³ A history of the European capitals of culture does exist,²⁴ and a cultural history of Europe’s unification and of the European Union is a field of research that has been started to be explored in the meantime.²⁵ 8. Europeanization by means of the economy and the economization of politics. It is evident that after 1945 the economy was the main driving force of Europe’s integration. In order to understand the relationships between politics and economics, we must take into account that the Single European Act (SEA) and the Single European Market (SEM), together with the euro, formed the hard core of the EU.²⁶ It might appear blatantly obvious that George C. Marshall’s European Recovery Program (ERP) enabled the reconstruction of the European economies,

 In this regard, Pierre Bourdieu would speak of a “political capital.”  Sport history as mass culture, such as soccer, remains a new field of research, see Wolfram Pyta, Geschichte des Fußballs in Deutschland und Europa seit 1954 (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2013); Wolfram Pyta and Nils Havemann, eds., European Football and Collective Memory (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillian, 2015).  Jürgen Mittag, ed., Die Idee der Kulturhauptstadt Europas. Anfänge, Ausgestaltung und Auswirkungen Europäischer Kulturpolitik (Essen: Klartext Verlag, 2008); Kiran K. Patel, ed., The Cultural Politics of Europe: European Capitals of Culture and European Union since the 1980s (London: Routledge, 2013).  Christoph Kühberger and Dirk Mellies, eds., Inventing the EU. Zur De-Konstruktion von ‘fertigen Geschichten’ über die EU in deutschen, polnischen und österreichischen Schulgeschichtsbüchern (Schwalbach: Wochenschau Verlag, 2009); Oliver Rathkolb, ed., How to (re)write European History: History and Text Book Projects in Retrospect (Innsbruck: Studienverlag, 2010); Wolfram Kaiser, Stefan Krankenhagen, and Kerst Poehls, Das Museum als Praxisfeld der Europäisierung (Cologne: Böhlau, 2012); Eugen Pfister, Europa im Bild. Imaginationen Europas in Wochenschauen in Deutschland, Frankreich, Großbritannien und Österreich 1948 – 1959 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2014); see especially Peter Pichler, “Towards a Cultural-Historical Theory of European Integration,” International Encyclopaedia of Ideas of Europe, accessed December 1, 2020, http://www.ideasofeurope.org/encyclopaedia/perspectives/towards-a-cultural-historicaltheory-of-european-integration/.  As one example, see Jonathan Story and Ingo Walter, Political Economy of Financial Integration in Europe: The Battle of the Systems (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997); Alan S. Milward, Politics and Economics in the History of European Union (Graz: The Graz Schumpeter Lectures, 2005); Stephen Broadberry and Kevin H. O’Rourke, The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Europe, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Sylvain Schirmann, ed., L’Europe par l’economie? Des projets initiaux aux debats actuels (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2013).

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which were then brought closer together through the liberalization of trade and payments. However, it was exactly this plan, which thus laid the foundations for Western Europe to become as we know it today.²⁷ The first impulses for Europeanization in the Western part of the continent came from the expansive and export-oriented US economy. This Europeanization was also connected with an Americanization, but it is to be understood as a Europeanization through economization. Against this background – as an allusion to the remark by former US President Bill Clinton, “It’s the economy, stupid!” – the priority had actually to be “economy first,” hence the necessity to write a history of Europe from the perspective of needs, demands, and consumptions. A Europeanization of consumers and their behavior had started via goods and products. Further examples will be provided below. Europeanization of everyday life by means of impact and consumption. This approach has to include the history of everyday life and the history of the citizens²⁸ affected by the unification of Europe in order to demonstrate the area of conflict between “above” (Brussels) and “below” (Graz). From a scholarly point of view, it seems to be even more urgent and more necessary than the fulfillment of the need for the profiling of the historiography of European integration on a cultural studies basis. Recent publications and contributions show how a Europeanization of the national public sphere was initiated by everyday objects such as stamps and postcards. They also show maps of the changing territories of the EEC, EC, and EU and flags of all member states in their variety and diversity. The European institutions with their abbreviations and designations, as well as their places of residence, are depicted. The “founding fathers” Konrad Adenauer, Alcide De Gasperi, and Robert Schuman are shown as well as coins and symbols.²⁹

 Charles S. Maier and Günter Bischof, eds., Deutschland und der Marshall-Plan (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1992); Benn Steil, The Marshall Plan: Dawn of the Cold War (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2018).  Jürgen Nielsen-Sikora, Europa der Bürger? Anspruch und Wirklichkeit der europäischen Einigung – eine Spurensuche (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2009).  Michael Gehler and Otto May, eds., Motiv Europa. Postalische Dokumente zur Geschichte und Einigungsidee von 1789 bis 1945 (Hildesheim: Franzbecker, 2017); Michael Gehler and Otto May, eds., Motiv Europa. Postalische Dokumente zur Geschichte und Einigungsidee seit 1945 (Hildesheim: Franzbecker, 2019); Jasper Trautsch, “European Integration by Mail: European Symbols and Subjects on Postage Stamps,” in Reshaping Europe: Towards a Political, Economic and Monetary Union, 1984 – 1989, ed. Michael Gehler and Wilfried Loth (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2020), 17– 41.

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The First Major Phase: Europeanizations as Consequential Effects for Integrating Western Europe (1947/48 – 1989) It should have become clear that different forms of Europeanization took place and that they contributed to the integration of Western Europe (1947/48 – 1989), to Europe’s unification (1989 – 2004/07), and beyond (2008 – 2020). As a matter of fact, this development was more complex than the triple jump of “ideas,” “institutions,” and “uniting” would suggest.³⁰ Still, this tripartite approach demonstrates that constructive initiatives (“ideas”) and permanent bodies (“institutions”) were indispensable components. In this regard, the combination of seven different factors, all of which worked together, is to be taken into account: 1. Europeanization by violence, war, and resistance experience. ³¹ Between the second half of the 1940s and the first half of the 1950s, a generation of political decision-makers molded by experiences of two world wars and by the resistance against authoritarian governments and totalitarian dictatorships was at the helm in Europe.³² They realized that only cooperation could lead to a democratic community based upon fundamental rights. This was expressed by the founding of the Council of Europe in 1949 and by the drafting of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in 1950 (which entered into force by 1953).³³

 Michael Gehler, Europa. Ideen – Institutionen – Vereinigung – Zusammenhalt (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Lau-Verlag, 2018), 539 – 553.  Walter Lipgens, ed., Europa-Föderationspläne der Widerstandsbewegungen 1940 – 1945 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1968); Walter Lipgens, ed., Documents on the History of European Integration, vol. 1 (Florence: De Gruyter, 1985); Richard Gerwarth and Stephan Malinowski, “Europeanization through Violence? War Experiences and the Making of Modern Europe,” in Europeanization in the Twentieth Century: Historical Approaches, ed. Martin Conway and Kiran K. Patel (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 189 – 209.  Eric Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century 1914 – 1991 (London: Michael Joseph, 1994); Norman M. Naimark, Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth Century Europe (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001); Eric D. Weitz, A Century of Genocide: Utopias of Race and Nation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003).  Michael Gehler, “Dauerauftrag für Staat & Gesellschaft. Vor 65 Jahren, am 3. September 1953, trat die Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention in Kraft. Ein Meilenstein des internationalen Rechts,” Extra. Die Wochenend-Beilage der Wiener Zeitung, September 1, 2018 and September 2, 2018.

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Europeanization by the communist and Soviet threat as well as transatlantization. The advance of the Red Army towards Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) in 1945 – together with the takeover by communist regimes in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland since 1947/48, the disintegration of the CEE countries as well as the risk that communist ideology and communist parties could extend their tentacles in Western Europe and eventually come to power – was considered a serious threat. This became recognizable in the signing of the Brussels Treaty (1948) and in creation of NATO (1949). After a half relaxation (“semi-détente”) in the years 1953 – 1955, since the end of the 1960s, the debate on a pan-European security system between East and West began to gain momentum. On August 1, 1975, the Helsinki Final Act was a first highlight of the policy of détente in Europe. The CSCE conferences, which then followed in Belgrade (1977– 1979), Madrid (1981– 1983), and Vienna (1986 – 1989), contributed to a Europeanization of the debate on human rights, especially in the states behind the Iron Curtain.³⁴ Europeanization by military defeat, political control, and economic integration.³⁵ A completely beaten and prostrate Germany, which was prepared for rehabilitation, reconstruction, reparations, and cooperation with France (Adenauer-Schuman), also offered opportunities, as was documented by the foundation of the ECSC in 1952. The disintegration of Germany into two states forced the FRG to substantially support Western European integration. The GDR was also included in the Common Market via intra-German trade regulations.³⁶ Within the framework of Western European integration, Franco-German relations began to blossom in connection with the ECSC. They lasted for decades, extended all the way to the Banking Union, and were always linked

 Wilfried Loth, Overcoming the Cold War: A History of Détente, 1950 – 1991 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002); Matthias Peter and Hermann Wentker, eds., Die KSZE im Ost-West-Konflikt. Internationale Politik und gesellschaftliche Transformation 1975 – 1990 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2012).  Ludolf Herbst, ed., Westdeutschland 1945 – 1955. Unterwerfung, Kontrolle, Integration (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1986); Ludolf Herbst, Option für den Westen. Vom Marshallplan bis zum deutsch-französischen Vertrag (Munich: dtv, 1989).  Maximilian Graf, “Die DDR und die EWG 1957– 1990,” Revue d’Allemagne et des pays de langue allemande 51, no. 1 (2019): 21– 35; Maximilian Graf, “Nichtanerkennung zu eigenen Lasten? Die DDR und die Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft in den langen ‘1970er-Jahren’,” in Jahrbuch für historische Kommunismusforschung, ed. Ulrich Mählert et al. (Berlin: Metropol, 2020), 225 – 238.

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to a continuous German willingness to assure its full commitment.³⁷ Therefore, the irrevocable law of European integration to keep Germany involved in a controlled manner applies, in almost Kantian terms, to Germany itself: “Act in such a way that your conduct in Europe can become generally valid common legislation.”³⁸ This led to the Europeanization of West Germany, which then tried to Europeanize Western Europe (1952– 1989). Europeanization by internationalization and globalization through a single market economy. Within the scope of a globally oriented economic and monetary order under the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), American reconstruction assistance via the European Recovery Program (ERP) created a first alliance for the liberalization of trade and payments in Western Europe. This liberalization became actually possible with the creation of the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) in 1948 and the European Payments Union (EPU) in 1950. They represented the starting point for currency convertibility in the form of the European Monetary Agreement (EMA) by 1958 and the customs union of the EEC ten years later. The trade-related disintegration of Western Europe with EEC and EFTA (1960 – 1972) was only a short-term development. New innovative approaches can show how Western Europeans coped with the challenges of globalization during the period of economic recession, from the oil shocks (1973/74, 1979) to the mid-1980s. A comparative study of the development of national, European, as well as global economic and social policy in the Federal Republic of Germany, France, and Great Britain could clarify how policymakers reacted to the economic challenges of globalization and, ultimately, how they were induced to realize the project of the Single Economic Market (SEM). International organizations as well as transnational stakeholders played a role here.³⁹ Since the 1980s, a Europeanization of the European economy due to the dynamics of increasing globalization under the sign of new technologies is unmistakable.

 Michael Gehler, “Was trieb und treibt Deutschlands und die (west‐)europäische Integration zum Friedensprojekt EU?” in Interessen, Werte, Verantwortung. Deutsche Außenpolitik zwischen Nationalstaat, Europa und dem Westen. Zur Erinnerung an Hans-Peter Schwarz, ed. Dominik Geppert and Hans J. Hennecke (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2019), 77– 101.  Gehler, Europa, 882– 883.  Laurent Warlouzet, Governing Europe in a Globalizing World: Neoliberalism and its Alternatives Following the 1973 Oil Crisis (London: Routledge, 2018).

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Europeanization by decolonization. ⁴⁰ The increasing process of emancipation by the former European colonies as a result of the Second World War affected four out of the six founding states of the ECSC and the EEC, first and foremost France, but also Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands. The disintegration of these former colonial powers favored the concentration on intra-European cooperation and its intensification. European integration research recognizes a connection between the Suez crisis in autumn 1956 and the signing of the Rome Treaties on March 25, 1957. In light of the available sources, there does not seem to be a direct link with the decisions taken by Konrad Adenauer and Guy Mollet.⁴¹ Still, one can discern some sort of connection rooted in the atmospheric political background of the then Franco-German alliance. Undoubtedly, the termination of the Suez Canal Company on the night from November 6 to 7, 1956 strongly encouraged the feeling of a need for European integration in France. The escalation of the Suez Crisis and the impression of a defeat in the French policy of re-colonization helped to remove the last obstacles to the finalization of negotiations. After the Suez Canal debacle and the failed re-colonization of Egypt in 1956, Paris was in fact more than happy to have found a replacement through its leadership role in the EEC. However, these events were not the decisive factors for the basic decision of French policy to opt for an atomic community along with the “Common Market.” Alan S. Milward had no doubt that the French decision of joining the “Common Market” project was not the result of the Suez defeat. This decision had been taken before 1956.⁴² In this context, the Iraq crisis of 2002 and the Third Gulf War started in 2003 by the Anglo-Americans (opposed by the French and Germans)⁴³ with the “willing allies” from Europe – and above all its repercussions on Europeanization tendencies in the Constitutional Convention on the “Future of Europe” under the sign of a new European security doctrine – are worth inves-

 Giuliano Garvani, After Empires: European Integration, Decolonization, and the Challenge from the Global South, 1957 – 1986 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).  Michael Gehler, “In Past and Present Research Debates: Alan S. Milward, the Origins, Effects, and Significance of the Treaties of Rome,” zeitgeschichte 41, no. 1 (2014): 39 – 61, here 53.  Alan S. Milward, “Conclusions: The Value of History,” in The Frontier of National Sovereignty: History and Theory 1945 – 1992, ed. Alan S. Milward et al. (London: Routledge, 1993), 182– 201, here see 188.  Frédéric Bozo, A History of the Iraq Crisis: France, the United States, and Iraq, 1991 – 2003, trans. Susan Emanuel (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press/ New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2016).

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tigating and comparing to the Suez crisis, also with regard to transatlantic relations. In both cases, respective Europeanizations are evident through the loss of (post‐)colonial power positions. De-Europeanization by self-exclusion and Europeanization by exclusion. The United Kingdom refused to support the first supranational integration steps in Western Europe, i. e. to participate in the ECSC and the EEC. The British self-exclusion from the communities was followed by de Gaulle’s vetoes (1963, 1967) to the UK applications to join the EEC. This veto policy helped to strengthen the integrity of the communities. In this context, it is important to note that de Gaulle himself claimed that he never used the term “Europe of the patriots” (“Europe des patries”), but rather the terms “Europe of the states” (“Europe des états”) and “Europe of intergovernmental cooperation” (“Europe de la coopération entre états”).⁴⁴ Incidentally, he also claimed that he never said “intendance suivra,” which could be translated as “the economy will follow the political will.” In reality, de Gaulle did not ignore the fact that economic and financial factors played a role in the assertion of state power. He did not delve into the details of economic policy, but he understood the connection between economic power, financial solidity, and political influence. Therefore, he supported the EEC, while many observers, including US diplomats, thought he had discarded it when he returned to power in 1958. From this point of view and even in light of the exclusion of Britain, the alleged de Gaulle of the “Europe of the fatherlands” can actually be considered a “Father of Europe.”⁴⁵ Europeanization by Europe’s self-assertion through currency preparation. Following the defeat of the USA in Vietnam, the weakening of the US dollar and the collapse of world currencies in the 1970s, the Franco-German tandem led by President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing and Chancellor Helmut Schmidt launched a monetary policy initiative at the European level.⁴⁶ The initiative took the shape of the European Currency Unit (ECU) and the European Monetary System (EMS), a basket of currencies, previously linked to a “currency snake” and a “currency tunnel,” which also included currencies of non-EC

 See here the transcript of one of his famous interviews: “Entretien avec Michel Droit, deuxième Partie,” Charle de Gaulle paroles publiques, accessed April 29, 2020, https://fresques.ina.fr/ de-gaulle/fiche-media/Gaulle00111/entretien-avec-michel-droit-deuxieme-partie.html.  Laurent Warlouzet, “De Gaulle as a Father of Europe: The Unpredictability of the FTA’s Failure and the EEC’s Success (1956 – 58),” Contemporary European History 20, no. 4 (2011): 419 – 434.  Michèle Weinachter, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing et l’Allemagne: Le double rêve inachevé (Paris: Éditions L’Harmattan, 2004), 223 – 230.

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members.⁴⁷ At the end of the 1960s, Georges Pompidou and Willy Brandt had already proposed ideas concerning monetary integration. It was, however, Giscard and Schmidt who initiated a first currency Europeanization by preparing a monetary system.⁴⁸ In so doing, they also laid the foundations for a first European monetary emancipation from the US dollar. These steps were carried out under the sign of the so-called “Eurosclerosis.”⁴⁹

Some Examples of Europeanizations in Shorter Periods such as the Overcoming of the “Eurosclerosis” (1979 – 1985) and the Reshaping of Europe (1985 – 1989) It should now be pointed out that this first main phase of integration history (1947– 1989) can be divided into two shorter sub-periods with specific Europeanizations, as shown in an anthology on Western European integration (1984 – 1989)⁵⁰ in preparation for a new second main phase (1989 – 2019).

 Heinz Handler, “Vom EWS zum EURO: DM und Schilling Hand in Hand,” in Verschiedene europäische Wege im Vergleich. Österreich und die Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1945/49 bis zur Gegenwart, ed. Michael Gehler and Ingrid Böhler (Innsbruck: Studienverlag, 2007), 285 – 304.  Claudia Hiepel, “Willy Brandt, Frankreich und Europa 1966 – 1969,” in Wir sind auf dem richtigen Weg. Willy Brandt und die europäische Einigung, ed. Andreas Wilkens (Bonn: Bouvier, 2010), 209 – 225; Claudia Hiepel, “Willy Brandt, la France et l’Europe au temps de la grande coalition, 1966 – 1969,” in Willy Brandt et l’unité de l’Europe: De l’objectif de la paix aux solidarités nécessaires, ed. Andreas Wilkens (Brussels: Bruylant, 2011), 213 – 230; Claudia Hiepel, Willy Brandt und Georges Pompidou. Deutsch-französische Europapolitik zwischen Aufbruch und Krise (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2012); Claudia Hiepel, “Willy Brandt und Georges Pompidou – ein schwieriges ‘Paar’ oder Schrittmacher der europäischen Integration?” in Vom Vergleich zur Verflechtung. Deutschland und Frankreich im 20. Jahrhundert, ed. Jörn Leonhard (Berlin: Erich Schmidt-Verlag, 2014), 183 – 199; Claudia Hiepel, “Willy Brandt. Europakonzeptionen und Europapolitik,” in Willy Brandt als Außenpolitiker, ed. Bernd Rother (Wiesbaden: Springer, 2014), 21– 91; see also Wolfram Kaiser and Kiran K. Patel, “Multiple Connections in European Co-Operation: International Organizations, Policy Ideas, Practices and Transfers 1967– 92,” European Review of History 24, no. 3 (2017): 337– 357.  The term was coined by Herbert Giersch, Eurosclerosis (Kiel: Institut für Weltwirtschaft, 1985), referring to the period of the 1970s, which led to some misjudgements of this integration phase (1969 – 1983).  Michael Gehler and Wilfried Loth, eds., Reshaping Europe: Towards a Political, Economic and Monetary Union, 1984 – 1989 (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2020).

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Leading the UK towards less Europeanization and to more de-Europeanization. The long, arduous, and tenacious path to resolve the dispute over the British membership fees for the European Communities (1979 – 1984) demonstrates the tension between half-hearted integration and partial disintegration. In 1984, the Fontainebleau Summit finally marked a breakthrough for the British rebate.⁵¹ Still, the question arises whether this budget solution brought Britain closer to the supranational Communities, or whether it was the continuity of a lasting distance to them, more clearly established than before. It should be clear that the protracted public debates about this controversy had a lasting effect on the memory of both the British and the Communities and that they remained firmly anchored in their minds. In retrospect, the question also arises whether the five-year dispute over British membership fees – which was ultimately a dispute over hard money – led to a less Europeanized and more de-Europeanized Great Britain within the Communities. Europeanization of foreign policy through international crisis management and intergovernmental cooperation. The European Political Cooperation (EPC)⁵² – which was organized by the respective national foreign ministries and their General Secretaries – became more important because of an increase in international and European conflicts, such as the war in Afghanistan by the Soviet Union, the NATO double decision in 1979, and the imposition of martial law in Poland against the trade union movement Solidarnosć in 1981. Until then, the EC and EPC had either worked side by side or against each other. Therefore, the aim pursued was a closer teamwork.⁵³ A Europeanization of foreign policy action through a growing awareness of the need for joint international crisis management coordination by

 Piers N. Ludlow, “A Double-Edged Victory: Fontainebleau and the Resolution of the British Budget Problem, 1983 – 84,” in Gehler and Loth, Reshaping Europe, 45 – 71.  Alfred E. Pijpers et al., eds., European Political Cooperation in the 1980s: A Common Foreign Policy for Western Europe? (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1988); Martin Holland, ed., The Future of European Political Cooperation: Essays in Theory and Practice (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1991); Roy H. Ginsberg, Foreign Policy Actions of the European Community: The Politics of Scale (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1989); Gabriele Clemens, Alexander Reinfeldt, and Telse Rüter, eds., Europäisierung von Außenpolitik? Die Europäische Politische Zusammenarbeit (EPZ) in den 1970er Jahren (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2019), 372– 388; Maria E. Guasconi, Prove di politica estera. La Cooperazione politica europea, l’Atto Unico Europeo e la fine della guerra fredda (Milan: Mondadori, 2020), 208 – 214.  Maria E. Guasconi, “European Political Cooperation and the Single European Act,” in Gehler and Loth, Reshaping Europe, 131– 148.

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the EC can be stated. This also led to a second Europeanization in the form of intergovernmental cooperation. Europeanization of Schengen or Schengenization of Europe. The Schengen complex, which received a decisive impetus in the second half of the 1980s, had a long prehistory that goes back to the first post-war period.⁵⁴ The Schengen agreements between the Benelux countries to dismantle their border controls (1985) were more than obvious due to the proximity of Western Europe. The Federal Republic under Chancellor Helmut Kohl and France under State President François Mitterrand also felt compelled not to exclude themselves from this agreement (1990). Cooperating interest groups, but also the cross-border and export-oriented economy played a significant role in this process. Two parallel tendencies of Europeanizations can be observed: Europeanization through the dismantling of border controls on the one hand, and, on the other, Europeanization through Benelux cooperation, with Luxembourg and Belgium paving the way.⁵⁵ The incorporation of the Schengen acquis into the Treaty of Amsterdam (1999) thus led to a Europeanized Schengen or a Schengenized Europe. Europeanization of the economy by globalized transnational companies. Different companies such as large European firms and international corporations influenced (for instance through the European Roundtable of Industrialists, ERT) Europe’s integration process in getting the SEM off the ground; among them Fiat, Mercedes Daimler Benz, Nestle, Philips, and Siemens.⁵⁶ A complementarity between the various interest groups played a role. They all regarded the SEM as a meaningful objective, precisely due to the challenge of an increasingly globalized economy. However, this process had begun before 1985. Max Kohnstamm as Secretary General of the High Authority of the ECSC, the above-mentioned activities of the ERT of Industrialists, the Jean Monnet’s “Action Committee for the United States of Europe,” as well as

 Michael Gehler and Andreas Pudlat, eds., Grenzen in Europa (Hildesheim: Georg W. Olms, 2009); Andreas Pudlat, “Perceptibility and Experience of Inner-European Borders by Institutionalised Border Protection,” Quaestiones Greographicae 29, no. 4 (2010): 7– 13; Andreas Pudlat, “Der lange Weg zum Schengen-Raum: Ein Prozess im Vier-Phasen-Modell,” Journal of European Integration History 17 (2011): 303 – 325; Andreas Pudlat, Schengen. Zur Manifestation von Grenze und Grenzschutz in Europa (Hildesheim: Georg W. Olms, 2013).  Simone Paoli, “The Relaunch of the Benelux and the Origins of the Schengen Agreement: The Interplay of two Sub-Regional Experiences,” in Gehler and Loth, Reshaping Europe, 73 – 97.  Sylvain Schirmann, “Der Europäische Roundtable of Industrials (ERT) und der europäische Integrationsprozess,” in Geschichte schreiben – Geschichte vermitteln. Hildesheimer Europagespräche V, ed. Michael Gehler, Andrea Brait, and Philipp Strobl (Hildesheim: Georg W. Olms, 2020), 453 – 461.

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the Cangoroo Group were active as networks in the background.⁵⁷ Not only European companies, but also transnational business corporations and globalized companies because of their involvement in the world economy were particularly interested in the Single Market project.⁵⁸ This is how the European economy was Europeanized by transnational globalized companies. Europeanization of law and a new governance by the European Court of Justice. When investigating the White Paper on the EC Commission’s project for the SEM of March 12, 1985, one must consider other key actors, beside Jacques Delors. Among them, the Commissioners for the SEM, the German Karl-Heinz Narjes and the British Lord Arthur Cockfield, but also the Commissioners for Competition, the Irish Peter Sutherland and the British Leon Brittan, as well as the Secretary General of the Commission, the French Emil Nöel, and the Head of Cabinet of Delors, the French Pascal Lamy, played an important role in this process.⁵⁹ The establishment of the SEM inevitably led to a restructuring process of Europe’s economic system, which in turn led to a Europeanization of national economies. In this regard, the Cassis de Djion decision by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) on 20 February 1979 represents a first case where the ECJ was able to play a prominent role.⁶⁰ This was the sign of the first Europeanization of the common body of law (“acquis communautaire”). The project of the SEM also favoured a politicisation of the European Communities, which in turn Europeanized a new governance.⁶¹

 Anjo Harryvan and Jan Van der Harst, Max Kohnstamm: A European’s Life and Work (BadenBaden: Nomos, 2011); Klaus Schwabe, Jean Monnet. Frankreich, die Deutschen und die Einigung Europas (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2016).  Anjo Harryvan, “The Single Market Project as Response to Globalization: The Role of the Round Table of European Industrialists and other non-state Actors in Launching the European Union’s Internal Market (1983 – 1992),” in Gehler and Loth, Reshaping Europe, 211– 225.  Gilles Grin, The Battle of the Single European Market: Achievements and Economics 1945 – 2000 (London: Paul Kegan, 2003); David Vaughan and Adrian Robertson, eds., Law of the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); Catherine Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU: The Four Freedoms, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).  Kai P. Purnhagen, “The Virtue of Cassis de Dijon 25 Years Later: It is not Dead, it Just Smells Funny,” in Varieties of European Economic Law and Regulation, ed. Kai P. Purnhagen and Peter Rott (New York, NY: Springer, 2014), 315 – 342. See also “Judgement of the Court of 20 February 1979: Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein,” accessed December, 1, 2020, https://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/judgment_of_the_court_of_justice_rewe_zentral_case_120_78_20_february_1979-en-30e68ace-b09f-4340-b249 – 29bf692376a1.html.  Eric Bussière, “Le Livre Blanc sur le marché intérieur: Objectif et instrument de la relance Delors,” in Gehler and Loth, Reshaping Europe, 227– 245.

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Europeanization by economic interests and long-lasting negotiation procedures. Spain’s choice to join the EC in 1986 was a decision of political nature, as the country wanted to share the economic benefits of the SEM. This was of particular interest for the local private sector. Under the Socialist Prime Minister Felipe González Márquez (1982– 1986), who got on well with Helmut Kohl, a strong orientation of Spanish politics was developed towards Brussels. German business, in particular, had strong investment interests in the Iberian Peninsula. Spain’s negative trade balance was gradually reduced from 1986 onwards by the profiting export business due to its EC membership.⁶² Under Mário Soares (1976 – 1977, 1978, 1983 – 1985), Portugal’s application for EC membership was linked to Spain’s accession policy, which was, however, more complicated and difficult. Many EC Council presidencies, several governments, various ambassadorial and ministerial meetings, and dozens of months of negotiations were needed. It was in fact the longest negotiation in the history of enlargement of the European Communities at this time. Ultimately, over the long period of struggle for Portuguese membership, the negotiation process also led to the Europeanization of the country on the western Iberian Peninsula.⁶³ Europeanization of security policy by growing awareness of Europe’s own responsibility. In the case of Franco-German defence initiatives, France was the pressing part. When Paris rejected the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) programme of US President Ronald Reagan, Bonn found itself in a dilemma. France worked hard to reach a security policy consensus with the Federal Republic. In 1985/86, a satisfactory agreement was achieved between Kohl and Mitterrand. A certain desire for “strategic independence” arose between the two partners on both sides of the Rhine. In addition, one should not forget the 1986 “Reykjavík effect,” i. e. the disarmament agreements starting between Gorbachev and Reagan, which led to the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty of 1987.⁶⁴ This further promoted the Franco-German security policy rapprochement. The agreement between the superpowers

 Marta Alorda, “The European Community’s Struggle with the Agro-Budgetary Problem: Its Impact on the Spanish Accession Negotiations, 1979 – 1985,” in Gehler and Loth, Reshaping Europe, 349 – 372.  Alice Cunha, “The Least Loved Policy: EEC’s Enlargement to Portugal,” in Gehler and Loth, Reshaping Europe, 373 – 392.  Friederike Schotters, “European Emancipation within the Atlantic Alliance? Franco-German Initiatives in European Defense,” in Gehler and Loth, Reshaping Europe, 461– 476.

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over the European heads led to a Europeanization of the growing awareness of Europe’s responsibility for its own security. 8. Europeanizations out of mutual weaknesses of the FRG and France. It was Delors who convinced Kohl to include a reference to the project of European Monetary Union (EMU) in the Single European Act (SEA). In other words, without the EMU, the President of the Commission did not want to give his approval to the SEA. It was a compromise in progress. In the 1991/92 debate on the Maastricht Treaty, national and sovereign policy then played a major role, while technical issues and monetary policy hardly played any role at all. It was Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher who in his 1988 memorandum indicated monetary policy perspectives. A French quid pro quo in the sense of money for security was emerging by 1988/89. Kohl and Mitterrand dominated their domestic debates on Europe. Both of them had a more European orientation than their own government majorities. While France wanted to Europeanize the Deutschmark, the Federal Republic wanted to Europeanize French nuclear power. In the first case, the intention to contain can be discerned, and, in the other, a desire to participate.⁶⁵ Bonn and Paris Europeanized the other’s policy because of mutual weakness. 9. Europeanization of German unity through monetary integration. The EMU decision-making process can be seen as a struggle between French President François Mitterrand and German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher on the one side (both supported by a tireless Commission President Jacques Delors), and German Finance Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg, his successor Theo Waigel, as well as Bundesbank President Karl Otto Pöhl and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, on the other. German Chancellor Helmut Kohl acted as a key player in the middle of the scene. At the beginning of December 1989, Kohl did recognize that, regardless of the reservations of those seeking to protect the German currency and the associated domestic political risks, the step towards the EMU had to be taken. Otherwise, the growing rapprochement of the two German states – in whatever form and at whatever tempo – might endanger the continued existence and the deepening of the European Community. Based on a shared concern for the European project, he was able to agree with Mitterrand on a formula for German

 Frédéric Bozo, “In Search of the Holy Grail: France and European Monetary Unification, 1984– 1989,” in Gehler and Loth, Reshaping Europe, 283 – 330.

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unity in a European perspective.⁶⁶ This process was pushed by a policy to Europeanize Germany’s unity via the Deutschmark.

The Second Major Phase: Europeanizations as Effects for Uniting Europe as a Whole (1989 – 2009) The political unification of the continent became possible after 1989/90 as a result of the opening up of the East and the end of the USSR. It was prepared in the wake of the establishment of the SEM, and it was set as a goal in the second half of the 1990s.⁶⁷ 1. Europeanization through the experience of the division of Europe and the opening up of the East. The disintegration of Europe as a whole was displayed by the division of Europe, which in turn indirectly contributed to a growing awareness of the necessity to overcome the East-West divide. In the first half of the 1980s, integration actors (Kohl, Mitterrand, and Gorbachev among others) still shared a personal connection through experiences gathered in wartime. As active politicians, they were confronted with the disintegration of Europe during the Cold War. The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) enhanced Gorbachev’s course of reform.⁶⁸ Gorbachev himself supported the succession process to the CSCE in Vienna in 1986 – 1989,⁶⁹ which opened the way to the Europeanization of the Central, Eastern, and Southeastern European states through the collapse of real socialism and the end of the Soviet Union. The fall of the Iron Curtain led to a new feeling of a “Common European House” as a shared space of responsibility by the Charta of Paris 1990.⁷⁰ 2. Europeanization by communist defeat and Soviet implosion. At the end of the 1980s, the Soviet Union found itself in a unique condition of financial and

 Wilfried Loth, “Between France and the Bundesbank: Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Helmut Kohl and the Breakthrough of the Monetary Union,” in Gehler and Loth, Reshaping Europe, 331– 346.  Grin, Battle.  Wilfried Loth, “Mikhail Gorbachev, European Security, and the Common European Home, 1985 – 1989,” in Gehler and Loth, Reshaping Europe, 423 – 441.  Andrea Brait and Michael Gehler, “The CSCE Vienna Follow-up Meeting and Alois Mock, 1986 – 1989,” in Christian Democracy and the Fall of Communism, ed. Michael Gehler, Piotr Kosicki, and Helmut Wohnout (Leuven: University Press, 2019), 75 – 91.  Deborah Cuccia, “The Common European Home: The Soviet Prescription for Reshaping Europe,” in Gehler and Loth, Reshaping Europe, 443 – 459.

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economic weakness. Under Gorbachev, it loosened its grip on the “brother states” of Central and Southeastern Europe.⁷¹ In 1991, it was subjected to a rapid and previously unimaginable implosion.⁷² This process went hand in hand with the end of its organizational system, which consisted of the Council of Mutual Economic Cooperation (COMECON) and the Warsaw Pact.⁷³ The erosion of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in the East ran parallel to the formation of a new Union in the West. The disintegration of the Soviet Union thus strengthened the establishment of the European Union. Europeanization by integrated and unified Germany. The Federal Republic of Germany determinedly took advantage of the chances offered for unity with the GDR. The new Germany did, however, also confirm its ties to the West (NATO), and it remained true to its obligations within the context of European integration. In the framework of the new EU,⁷⁴ it also carried on its cooperation with France,⁷⁵ in spite of both new and continuing differences of opinion, for instance regarding the speed and extent of the EU’s “Eastern Enlargement” 2004– 2007,⁷⁶ the French project of the “Mediterranean

 Helmut Altrichter, Russland 1989. Der Untergang des sowjetischen Imperiums (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2009).  Malek and Schor-Tschudnowskaja, Der Zerfall; Reinhard Lauterbach, Das lange Sterben der Sowjetunion. Schicksalsjahre 1985 – 1999 (Berlin: Edition Berolina, 2016).  Vojtech Mastny and Malcolm Byrne, eds., A Cardboard Castle? An Inside History of the Warsaw Pact 1955 – 1991. A National Security Archive Cold War Reader (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2005); Frank Umbach, Das rote Bündnis. Entwicklung und Zerfall des Warschauer Paktes 1955 – 1991 (Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag, 2005); Torsten Diedrich, Winfried Heinemann, and Christian F. Ostermann, eds., Der Warschauer Pakt. Von der Gründung bis zum Zusammenbruch 1955 bis 1991 (Berlin: Ch. Links, 2009).  Ludger Kühnhardt, European Union – The Second Founding. The Changing Rationale of European Integration (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2008).  Michael Gehler, Three Germanies: From Partition to Unification and Beyond (London: Reaktion, 2020).  Christopher Preston, Enlargement and Integration in the European Union (London: Routledge, 1997); Alan Mayhew, Recreating Europe: The European Union’s Policy towards Central and Eastern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Gabriele Clemens, ed., Die Integration der mittel- und osteuropäischen Staaten in die Europäische Union (Münster: LIT Verlag, 1999); Barbara Lippert, ed., Osterweiterung der Europäischen Union – die doppelte Reifeprüfung (Bonn: Europa Union Verlag, 2000); Barbara Lippert, ed., Bilanz und Folgeprobleme der EU-Erweiterung (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2004); Niall Nugent, European Union Enlargement (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillian, 2004); Geoffrey Pridham, Designing Democracy: EU Enlargement and Regime Change in Post-Communist Europe (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillian, 2005); Hannes Hofbauer, EU-Osterweiterung. Historische Basis – ökonomische Triebkräfte – soziale Folgen (Vienna: Promedia, 2007).

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Union” of 2008, and the actions taken to manage the financial market, currency, and economic crises of 2010 – 2015. At any rate, the goal of enlargement was subordinated to the necessity of deepening first: the Central Eastern European (CEE) countries had to spend 15 years in the waiting room. Europeanization by NATOization. The USA here played an important role.⁷⁷ From a security perspective, Washington constantly regarded the European Communities as a valuable asset in the Cold War, even more so as old and future NATO members could be won with Greece, Portugal, and Spain. The EC’s southern enlargement was in fact an essential geostrategic and security precondition for the growth in membership of both the Atlantic Alliance and the European Communities. These historical events led to the political safeguarding of the southern flank of the continent and to the prospect of democratising and modernising southern Europeans. Kohl, Mitterrand, and US President Ronald Reagan thus anticipated the Europeanization of Southern Europe through NATOization. The subsequent “Eastern Enlargement” of NATO – which was carried out with the determination of the United States to include the central and southern countries of Eastern Europe starting from the late 1990s – anticipated and flanked the EU’s “Eastern Enlargement” and formed an essential geostrategic and security policy precondition for EU-Europe’s political unification. This was also the reason of new dangers of destabilization in the Eastern part of the continent (Georgia conflict 2008; Russian-Ukrainian War since 2014). Europeanization through exclusion and self-exclusion. After the political situation on the Bosporus had been stabilised, Turkey, under the leadership of Turgut Özal, once again applied, on April 14, 1987, for EC membership. The country sought to follow the path of Greece, Spain, and Portugal. However, it had to wait for almost 20 years before accession negotiations could begin. In 1995, Ankara was to be given preferential access to the Single Market by the institutionalization of a customs union. Under Mitterrand and Kohl, however, it had no chance of full membership. A Turkish membership would in fact have been very challenging and burdensome for both sides. In practice, Kohl’s policy deliberately amounted to Europeanization through exclusion, i. e. preventing Turkey from joining the EU (1987– 1998). This remained so until the end of his term of office. It was not until 1999 that Turkey was

 Gunther Hauser, Die NATO – Transformation, Aufgaben, Ziele (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2008); Michael Gehler, “Von der Eindämmungsallianz in Europa zum globalen Interventionsbündnis: Zwölf Thesen zu den transatlantischen Beziehungen im Wandel von Krisenzeiten (1949 – 2009),” in 175 Jahre diplomatische Beziehungen zwischen Österreich und den USA, ed. Felix Schneider (Vienna: Landesverteidigungsakademie, 2014), 73 – 100.

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granted candidate status. After 2005, Kohl’s policy was continued by his successor, Chancellor Angela Merkel. With increasingly autocratic features under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the imposition of a state of emergency for several years, Turkey did not only endanger the negotiation process, but also accepted an increasing self-exclusion from the European Union (2013 – 2020). Europeanization by Europe’s self-assertion through monetary union preparation. After Giscard and Schmidt, due to the looming realization of the SEM and the irresistible dominance of the Deutschmark, the Franco-German tandem under Helmut Kohl and François Mitterrand undertook another monetary policy initiative at European level. The creation of a European single currency was planned, as well as the establishment of a European Central Bank system from which the European Central Bank (ECB) would emerge according to the model of the Deutsche Bundesbank. Reality would however look different decades later. Kohl and Mitterrand thus initiated a new Europeanization through currency establishment and a European monetary policy emancipation from the US-Dollar via the European Monetary Union (EMU). Europeanization by reinvented intergovernmentalism and new institutionalization by failed postcolonialism. In the wake of the decolonization of post-colonialism such as the Arab Spring 2011, the changed forms of a rapidly transforming globalized economic development with new competitors on the world markets compelled the Europeans and former colonial powers to continue to preserve their cohesion. This has happened in the course of recent challenges, current conflicts, and their management through, for instance, the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) in 2010, the European Fiscal Pact (EFP) in 2012 the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) in 2012, and the European Banking Union (EBU) in 2014.

Europeanization and De-Europeanization in the Crisis Decade (2008/09 – 2020) From 2008/09 to 2020, under the sign of more than a decade of crisis, tendencies of Europeanizations and de-Europeanizations can be observed in various sets of questions regarding the “integration”-“disintegration” pair of opposites. 1. Europeanization in the wake of the banking and financial crisis through a European banking and financial policy in 2008/09. After a certain period of waiting and observation on the part of the heads of state and government, the Lehman crash in New York and its repercussions on the European bank-

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ing and financial system led to concrete institutional measures at intergovernmental level through the creation of the European Banking Union (EBU), the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), and a fiscal pact to which all 19 members of the eurozone belong. The cohesion of the euro area was thus further preserved, which in turn made integration stable. Europeanization and de-Europeanization through the Grexit scenario 2010 – 2014/15. Greece’s national debts and the threatened withdrawal from the eurozone necessitated a policy of rescue packages. On the one hand, it was possible to keep Greece in the eurozone by circumventing the “no-bailout” clause and, thus, practically breaking treaty law. On the other hand, the rigid policy of austerity measures alienated large sections of the Greek population from the idea of European unification. At the same time, EU citizens in the other member states started to cast doubts on the democratic and legal legitimacy of such an approach. De-Europeanization through violation of EU law in the wake of the “refugee crisis” and violations of European values since 2015. While dealing with the consequences of the “refugee crisis,” the Hungarian government under Viktor Orbán violated European law. When the EU interior ministers decided by majority decision on the admission of refugee contingents, Hungary was forced to implement this decision, even if its interior minister had voted against it. Budapest then turned to the ECJ in Luxembourg, which however did not grant the appeal. In a unique decision in the history of community law, Hungary refused to recognize this ruling. As far as EU member Poland is concerned, the question of compatibility with the European value of the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary arose when judges were retired and replaced by the ruling Party for Law and Justice (PIS). Both examples show a tendency of de-Europeanization of the system, which raises the question of sanctions (fines, withdrawal of votes or even expulsion). The EU has, however, limited competences to implement these measures. Partial Europeanization of the Ukraine and de-Europeanization of Russia since 2014/15. The Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine showed the limits of the EU Neighborhood Policy. Full Ukrainian membership of the EU was seriously out of the question, Kiev did not meet the Copenhagen criteria for EU membership, and the EU itself was not even capable of accepting and incorporating new, larger members. After the escalating Ukrainian conflict, which resulted in a Putin-backed war in eastern Ukraine, and the economic sanctions imposed by the EU on Russia with corresponding countermeasures, a trade war began. The result was Russia’s further disintegration from the EU. In 2022 the situation escalated when Putin intervened militarily.

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De-Europeanization of the United Kingdom through self-exclusion and a further Europeanization of the EU? Since 2016, the “Brexit” scenario with the referendum on the UK’s withdrawal from the EU has made it clear that the populations of England and Wales, ahead of those of Northern Ireland and Scotland, wanted to leave the Union. The election of the Brexiteer Boris Johnson in 2019 confirmed this trend. On the one hand, the UK’s withdrawal from the EU was linked to British de-Europeanization of Community law or even with the danger of a break-up of the United Kingdom. On the other hand, the SEM could be held together and the removal of British blockades may open up new opportunities for deepening the EU integration process, thus allowing a further Europeanization of the rest of the EU.

Outlook on the Covid19 Crisis: Renationalisation before Europeanization? Since early March 2020, following the outbreak of the widely underestimated coronavirus pandemic in Europe, the EU Member States took unilateral actions through national measures. Decisions were thus quicker and easier taken than in a vote among 27 countries. The EU Commission reacted belatedly. EU Commission’s President Ursula von der Leyen did set up a coronavirus crisis team to coordinate joint measures at political level. Still, criticism was voiced in both directions. The Commission had failed to remind the EU-27 of their obligations, which was its task as the “guardian of the treaties.” Based on their national interests, some Member States had taken advantage of the situation and acted arbitrarily by closing the internal borders. The fact that, in response to the coronavirus crisis, Member States were called upon to suspend EU aid law was an attack on competition law, a core element of the SEM. The announcement of the Commission about further exceptions to rules, as in the excessive deficit procedure, was an additional indication of a trend towards de-Europeanization and renationalization. Not only a lack of loyalty, but also – as already in the case of the “refugee crisis” several years earlier – a lack of solidarity with one another spoke in favor of these tendencies. Furthermore, von der Leyen – established by the heads of state and government and not eligible to stand as a candidate in the European elections and therefore not elected by the European people – was in no position to make a stronger stand vis-à-vis the Member States and to act accordingly.⁷⁸ But

 “EU-Experte wirft EU mangelnde Loyalität vor,” Salzburger Nachrichten, April 22, 2020, accessed April 30, 2020, https://www.sn.at/politik/weltpolitik/eu-experte-wirft-eu-mangelnde-loyalitaet-vor-86583691.

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with the escalating coronavirus crisis, von der Leyen, together with Macron and Merkel, was able to regain profile by designing the Recovery Plan “Next Generation EU” in July 2020. Her political standing remains, however, dependent on the political approval by the heads of state and government.

Conclusions and Final Remarks In conclusion, what can be said on the background of and reasons for the two developments within the context of Europeanizations and European integration? Research has endeavored to trace back to the Middle Ages the roots and structures of “Europe’s separate path” (Michael Mitterauer⁷⁹), to view the modern era along with modernization as the explanation model for European integration (Guido Thiemeyer⁸⁰) or even to consider the principle of rationality (Max Weber⁸¹ and Silvio Vietta⁸²). All these considerations are certainly worth mentioning as socioeconomic and development-dependent background as well as intellectual history precondition. It were, nevertheless, primarily reasons related to the political situation and time-specific conditions – that is, those of contemporary history – which made the integration of Western Europe from the OEEC to the Customs Union (1948 – 1968) possible and, in the end, also the unification of Europe (1989 – 2004/07). In the methodology – that is, the procedures – a not insignificant role was played from the Middle Ages or from the modern era by the division and separation of powers in Central European experiences and traditions and by the industry (industrialization), modernism (modernization), and rationality (rationalization) of Western European experiences and traditions. These trends can also be subsumed under the code word of “older” Europeanizations. The most exciting and thrilling paradigm shift was experienced by Germany within the framework of the 65 years of unification development, from the Mar Michael Mitterauer, Warum Europa? Mittelalterliche Grundlagen eines Sonderwegs (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2004).  Guido Thiemeyer, Europäische Integration. Motive, Prozesse, Strukturen (Cologne: UTB, 2010).  Reinhard Bendix, Max Weber. Das Werk. Darstellung und Analyse (Munich: Piper, 1964); Harold J. Berman, Recht und Revolution. Die Bildung der westlichen Rechtstradition (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1995); Wolfgang Schluchter, Die Entwicklung des okzidentalen Rationalismus. Eine Analyse von Max Webers Gesellschaftsgeschichte (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1979); Stefan Uecker, Die Rationalisierung des Rechts. Max Webers Rechtssoziologie (Berlin: Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, 2005).  Silvio Vietta, Rationalität – Eine Weltgeschichte. Europäische Kulturgeschichte und Globalisierung (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 2012).

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shall Plan (1947/48) to the Fiscal Pact (2012). Originally, the integration project served as a control and integrating instrument under French direction (1950 – 1990). From the 1990s until today, it has served to safeguard and protect the cohesion of the EU, whereby the crisis management took place essentially under German direction (1992– 2015). It is not only national foreign policy but also Germany’s politics which have experienced Europeanizations. Conversely, in contrast to the old Bonn Republic, the new united and enlarged Berlin Republic – along with the EU that to a large extent is sponsored (financed) by it – has not only taken on the characteristic of a central European power,⁸³ but rather more than ever has also stepped up to the world political stage as a trade and economic power and taken on the role of Europe’s currency guardian. A double German Europeanization can be observed: Germany was and is Europeanized, while its integration policy Europeanizes other member states.⁸⁴ Nine findings can be used to draw the following conclusions: 1. The “older” Europeanizations before 1945 were, so to speak, more or less “unintentional” and indirect consequences of decisions and developments. By contrast, as a result of integration policy after the Second World War, the “new” Europeanizations have been more or less “intentional” and direct consequences of economic developments and political decisions. 2. In many cases, Europeanizations were the consequences of crises.⁸⁵ Among them, one may recall the Cold War crises, i. e. crises triggered by Soviet policy in Germany, such as the Berlin Blockade (from which the OEEC and NATO emerged), crises of failed recolonization, such as the Suez Crisis,

 Hans-Peter Schwarz, Die Zentralmacht Europas. Deutschlands Rückkehr auf die Weltbühne (Berlin: Siedler, 1994).  This also has ambivalent consequences which could be observed just before the outbreak of the refugee-crisis, see Ulrich Beck, German Europe (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013), 5 – 10; David Schäfer, “Der Fiskalvertrag – ein Ausdruck deutscher Hegemonie in der Europäischen Union?,” integration 36, no. 2 (2013): 107– 123; Herfried Münkler, Macht in der Mitte. Die neuen Aufgaben Deutschlands in Europa (Hamburg: Edition Körber-Stiftung, 2015), 137– 192; Michael Gehler, “Deutschland als neue Zentralmacht Europas und seine Außenpolitik 1989 – 2009,” in Die Dimension Mitteleuropa in der Europäischen Union, ed. Michael Gehler, Paul Luif, and Elisabeth Vyslonzil (Hildesheim: Olms, 2015), 25 – 78.  Michael Gehler, “Challenges and Opportunities: Surmounting Integration Crises in Historical Context,” in Crises in European Integration: Challenges and Responses, 1945 – 2005, ed. Ludger Kühnhardt (New York, NY: Berghahn, 2009), 109 – 129; Michael Gehler, “From Crisis to Crisis – from Success to Success? European Integration Challenges and Opportunities in Light of Europe’s History (1918 – 2009),” in EU – China: Global Players in a Complex World, ed. Michael Gehler, Xuewu Gu, and Andreas Schimmelpfennig (Hildesheim: Olms, 2012), 45 – 74.

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which helped the Treaties of Rome to achieve a breakthrough, and the crisis of German unification for the European system of states, which made the Union Treaty of Maastricht possible. 3. Different forms of Europeanizations emerged simultaneously. They were induced and initiated by the ECSC and the EEC in the 1960s, and they were followed by Europeanizations related to the EC and the EU in the 1980s and the 1990s. 4. The Europeanization brought about by the deliberate integration policy has been increased, intensified, and consolidated by the formation of institutions (High Authority/Commission, Council of Ministers/Council of the EU, Court of Justice, European Council, Parliament) and by the various treaties (Rome, SEA, Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice, and Lisbon). 5. There have been Europeanizations triggered by extra-Community forums and platforms like the CSCE. The European Council, which had existed since 1974, but became an official part of the European institutional structure through the Lisbon Treaty, also played an important role. 6. In the second half of the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s, Europeanizations intensified to such an extent that the conditions for a new community building, the European Union through Maastricht, became possible. 7. These various tendencies of Europeanizations triggered waves of simultaneous renationalization of varying intensity. They formed a recurring interplay. Integration attempts, therefore, often went hand in hand with disintegration reactions. 8. In various ways, individual forms of Europeanization aroused persistent national opposition forces and strong nation-state resistance, for example against the “European army” in 1954, the Common Agricultural Policy in 1965 in France, the membership fees for Great Britain (1979 – 1984), the common monetary policy in Denmark 2002 and Sweden 2003, and the EU “constitution” in France and the Netherlands 2005. Two partial findings are striking here: the hardest blows came from France and the United Kingdom. No prominent German resistance is known. 9. Europeanizations were strengthened in the 1980s and intensified during the following decade in the context of the challenges of globalization. Europeanization sometimes proved to be a stronger answer to globalization, while renationalization offered only an inadequate solution. The aim of this essay was to show that there was an almost infinite variety of effects of Europeanizations in terms of actions. These Europeanizations were not always followed by renationalizations, but also repeatedly in the sense of reactions. The analysis also showed that Europe’s disintegration was mostly

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caused by nation-states rather than by the Communities and the bodies of the EU. Crises and disintegration always went hand in hand with cohesion and integration along the different waves of renationalizations and Europeanizations. In the end, the latter proved stronger. Further questions consist in examining and demonstrating how these different Europeanizations relate to each other, how they influence each other and whether and if so how they generate new synergy effects. How can we come to a conclusion and a definition? Older Europeanizations constitute a long-term trend that began in the late Middle Ages followed by the modern era long before the history of (Western) European integration. However, they are not to be ignored. They continued after 1945 in a multi-level process (on a local, regional, national and even on a European and global level) inside and outside Europe and were intensified by more recent and newest forms of Europeanizations – if one likes the terms “ECization” and “EUization” – in a multidirectional and multifaced way. Both have worked together in the fields of political culture, currency, diplomacy, economics, industry, legislation and law, and technological development, as well as in all forms of intensified communication within and outside the EU. Europeanizations consist in making, thinking, acting, organizing, and structuring European and more European. This has led to various reactions like acceptance, indifference, even outright rejection or stalling resistance on the part of political systems and their populations. The latter show that attempts at Europeanizations are not irreversible. They can be associated with disintegration and de-Europeanizations. To simply ignore these counter-reactions would mean painting only one part of the picture. Ideally, Europeanizations lead to supranational constructions and common policies, but they do not have to. Coordinations, socialisations, and cooperations at the inner and outer European level can also be understood as preliminary stages of Europeanizations. Ultimately, empirical case-by-case analyses are decisive and lead to further differentiation and a typologisation of Europeanizations.

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Warlouzet, Laurent. “De Gaulle as a Father of Europe: The Unpredictability of the FTA’s Failure and the EEC’s Success (1956 – 58).” Contemporary European History 20, no. 4 (2011): 419 – 434. Weinachter, Michèle. Valéry Giscard d’Estaing et l’Allemagne: Le double rêve inachevé. Paris: Éditions L’Harmattan, 2004. Weitz, Eric D. A Century of Genocide: Utopias of Race and Nation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003. Winkelmann, Ingo, ed. Das Maastricht-Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts vom 12. Oktober 1993. Dokumentation des Verfahrens mit Einführung. Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1994.

Florian Greiner

Europeanization in Historiography Methodological Challenges and the Need for a New Conceptual Approach

Introduction In many respects, Europeanization poses one of the central challenges of our time, affecting politics and business as well as science. This has turned research on Europeanization into an analytical challenge in recent years, particularly in the realm of historiography. The development of this comparatively young strand of research has been accompanied by numerous problems that have not yet been adequately explored, especially those concerning its theoretical and methodological foundations and the delimitation from other sub-disciplines of European studies. To be sure, there is no shortage of conceptual input and appeals for an epistemological realignment of European historiography –– in this regard, this paper will draw on the thoughts of Ulrike von Hirschhausen and Kiran Klaus Patel, who advocate a strong social-constructivist approach and a “reconnection to the discursive level,” to counterbalance a long-running fixation on political history.¹ However, numerous basic premises of recent research, such as the departure from a teleological European master narrative and concentration on the institutional framework of the European Communities, have so far been inadequately put into practice.² At the same time, sound historical research is needed for a comprehensive and critical analysis of the macrosocial relevance of the Europeanization phenomenon, which is unquestionably a core process of recent European history.³

 Ulrike von Hirschhausen and Kiran K. Patel, “Europäisierung, Version 1.0,” Docupedia-Zeitgeschichte, November 29, 2010, accessed December 30, 2019, https://docupedia.de/zg/Europ.C3. A4isierung?oldid=76143. See Martin Conway and Kiran K. Patel, eds., Europeanization in the Twentieth Century: Historical Approaches (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).  See the research overview by Michael Gehler, “‘Europe’, Europeanizations and their Meaning for European Integration Historiography,” Journal of European Integration History 22 (2016): 141– 174.  See Andreas Rödder, 21.0. Eine kurze Geschichte der Gegenwart (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2015), 266 – 337. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110685473-004

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Nowadays, Europeanization is a ubiquitous concept, often used as a catchword to describe processes of interconnectivity within a more or less unspecified European space. Employed uncritically, this term becomes problematic because, in an empirically dubious way, it often attributes Europeanizing trends to past historical processes and events, trends which in truth must be traced to the very different research landscapes of the present. This pertains not only to European integration research in its narrow sense but to historical scholarship in general. To name just one example: recent Holocaust studies often include sweeping statements about a “Europeanization of the Holocaust,” notwithstanding the fact that hardly any integrative, transnational studies exist; instead, one finds thematic fragmentation.⁴ At the same time, Holocaust studies have become strongly internationalized: third-party funding systems in the European Holocaust Research Infrastructure have a strong European focus; there are numerous international fellowship programs.⁵ In short: the same researchers moving through the Europeanized research tectonics of the present are the very ones diagnosing a Europeanization of their research subject in the past. This is not to say that the Holocaust had no European dimension. However, the observation that European Jews were on the victim side and that the perpetrator side included not only Germans but offender groups from many European nations does not by itself provide sufficient empirical proof of a Europeanizing effect of the Holocaust.⁶ Given such a problematic backdrop, this chapter investigates the challenges currently facing historical Europeanization research – as well as possible solutions. How has research been developing in recent years, and which fundamental heuristic problems have accompanied it? How does this discipline relate to European research in general? And which methodological paths can historiography follow in order to open new perspectives?

 See Ferenc Laczó, “The Europeanization of Holocaust Remembrance: How far has it gone, how far can it go,” Eurozine, January 29, 2018, accessed December 30, 2019, https://www.euro zine.com/the-europeanization-of-holocaust-remembrance.  See the website of the European Holocaust Research Infrastructure, accessed December 30, 2019, https://www.ehri-project.eu, and Frank Bajohr, “Zwei Jahre Zentrum für Holocaust-Studien am Institut für Zeitgeschichte,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 64 (2016): 144– 146.  See e. g. Martin Dean, “Local Collaboration in the Holocaust in Eastern Europe,” in The Historiography of the Holocaust, ed. Dan Stone (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 120 – 140.

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European Studies as a Challenge of Historiography In the following, three core problem fields will be introduced. First, there is a noticeable breakdown of boundaries concerning research perspectives, which must be seen primarily against the backdrop of the complete ascendancy gained by the cultural turn, even in the field of European studies. The long and relentless strife between essentialists, who view Europe as an objective given, and constructivists, who interpret Europe as an imagined space, has largely evaporated. Whereas the concept of Europe in older historiography was characterized as being based on specific, clearly recognizable political, religious, and cultural values, and defined particularly and most importantly by democracy, Christianity, and the civilizational legacy of Graeco-Roman antiquity,⁷ the constructivist character of Europe is hardly ever called into question today.⁸ Yet this fact has in no ways made the methods and subjects of research more homogeneous. On the contrary: they have become enormously diverse over the past 20 years, largely due to a veritable explosion of publications in the field, a phenomenon that has caused some observers to discern signs of a “European turn.”⁹ To be sure, the classic historic-political narrative of European integration still exists and has focalized institutional development of the European Communities since the 1950s. However, the most recent differentiations in European research have spawned a plethora of studies illustrating the genesis of modern Europe over and beyond the limitations of official European politics by reconstructing and interpreting processes of transformation and interconnectivity from the vantage point of social and cultural history.¹⁰

 An excellent overview of older historiography on Europe is provided by Martina Steber, “Die erste Blütezeit der modernen Europa-Historiographie,” Jahrbuch für Europäische Geschichte 11 (2010): 199 – 204.  See for constructionist approaches in historiographical European studies: Wolfgang Schmale, Geschichte Europas (Vienna: Böhlau, 2000); Luisa Passerini, “Dimensions of the Symbolic in the Construction of Europeanness,” in Figures d’Europe: Images and Myths of Europe, ed. Luisa Passerini (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2003), 21– 33; Florian Greiner, Wege nach Europa. Deutungen eines imaginierten Kontinents in deutschen, britischen und amerikanischen Printmedien 1914 – 1945 (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2014).  Michael Gehler and Silvio Vietta, “Europa – Europäisierung – Europäistik: Einführende Überlegungen,” in Europa – Europäisierung – Europäistik: Neue wissenschaftliche Ansätze, Methoden und Inhalte, ed. Michael Gehler and Silvio Vietta (Vienna: Böhlau, 2010), 14.  See Wolfgang Schmale, “Europa,” Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht 66 (2015): 461– 487.

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One example for this development is the treatment of the “European Public Sphere.” Although this topic has long attracted the attention of social sciences and media studies, it is only in recent years that historians have begun to research the presence of Europe in public debates, the notions of European unity presented in mass media, and the disputed question of whether structures of a pan-European public sphere were developed during the twentieth century.¹¹ In the same vein, more recent historiographical European studies have turned towards the domain of memory culture. A whole range of studies scrutinizes images of Europe as shown in schoolbooks, European iconography as expressed in monuments, and the Europeanization of the museum sector.¹² Some of these projects are linked to the enhanced memory policies of the European Union, which led to the opening of the House of European History in Brussels in May 2017. A third example is the boom in studies dealing with technological history; under the keyword “hidden integration” they trace forms of Europeanization that manifest themselves in standardization processes and infrastructure networks – this point will be examined more closely later.¹³ Second, one can detect a breakdown of temporal and spatial boundaries within historical Europeanization research, and this is essentially the consequence of the pluralization of methods and perspectives. Greater open-mindedness about the concept of “Europe” enables recent studies to challenge classic caesurae and to explore new and unconventional periodization. The year 1945

 See Manuel Müller, Tobias Reckling, and Andreas Weiß, eds., Communicating European Integration: A Historical Perspective, special issue Journal of Contemporary European Research 10, no. 1 (2014); Jan-Henrik Meyer, The European Public Sphere: Media and Transnational Communication in European Integration 1969 – 1991 (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2010); Sven L.R. de Roode, Seeing Europe through the Nation: The Role of National Self-Images in the Perception of European Integration in the English, German, and Dutch Press in the 1950s and 1990s (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2012); Martin Herzer, The Media, European Integration and the Rise of Euro-journalism, 1950s1970s (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019).  See Maguelone Nouvel-Kirschleger and Ewa Anklam, “Un exemple de recherche binationale: Images de l’Europe et de la Méditerranée dans les manuels scolaires français et allemands,” in La Méditerranée des Méditerranéens à travers leurs manuels scolaires, ed. Pierre Boutan, Bruno Maurer, and Hassan Remaoun (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2012), 45 – 69; Wolfram Kaiser, Stefan Krankenhagen, and Kerstin Poehls, eds., Exhibiting Europe in Museums: Transnational Networks, Collections, Narratives, and Representations (New York, NY: Berghahn, 2014); Michael J. Wintle, The Image of Europe: Visualizing Europe in Cartography and Iconography throughout the Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).  See Thomas J. Misa and Johan Schot, “Inventing Europe: Technology and the Hidden Integration of Europe,” History and Technology 21 (2005): 1– 19; Christian Kleinschmidt, “Infrastructure, Networks, (Large) Technical Systems: The ‘Hidden Integration’ of Europe,” Contemporary European History 19 (2010): 275 – 284.

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can serve as an example here: in general, the Second World War is no longer interpreted as having marked the end of a dark age of nationalism followed more or less seamlessly by the creation of a Europe united under free and democratic auspices. On the contrary, what is steadily being unearthed and identified are long-standing continuities.¹⁴ Anti-liberal concepts of Europe are increasingly being scrutinized, especially notions like the “new European order” promulgated by the National Socialists, which is no longer dismissed as a pure propaganda tool but firmly set within longer historical traditions of German ideas of Europe, which by no means ceased abruptly in 1945.¹⁵ Whether the year 1989 was a caesura is increasingly being called into question as well.¹⁶ Moreover, research on Europe is no longer restricted to Western Europe. On the contrary, there is a boom in historical studies examining European ideas and discourses in Poland, the GDR, and Czechoslovakia.¹⁷ A further sign that research boundaries are dissolving is that regions outside of Europe have moved into focus. For example, several studies inspired by post-colonialism have established the historical connection between Europeanism and colonialism by exploring assumptions and concepts of civilization, modernity, and racism.¹⁸ Accordingly, Europeanization

 See Christian Bailey, Between Yesterday and Tomorrow: German Visions of Europe, 1926 – 1950 (New York, NY: Berghahn, 2013); Vanessa Conze, Das Europa der Deutschen. Ideen von Europa in Deutschland zwischen Reichstradition und Westorientierung (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2005); Mark Hewitson and Matthew D’Auria, eds., Europe in Crisis: Intellectuals and the European Idea, 1917 – 1957 (New York, NY: Berghahn, 2012).  See Dieter Gosewinkel, ed., Anti-liberal Europe: A Neglected Story of Europeanization (New York, NY: Berghahn, 2015); Raimund Bauer, The Construction of a National Socialist Europe during the Second World War: How the New Order Took Shape (London: Routledge, 2019); Mark Mazower, Hitler’s Empire: Nazi Rule in Occupied Europe (New York, NY: Lane, 2008), 553 – 603.  See Peter Pichler, Zeitgeschichte als Lebensgeschichte. Überlegungen zu einer emanzipativen und aktuellen Zeithistoriographie (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2017).  See José M. Faraldo, Christian Domnitz, and Paulina Guliñska-Jurgiel, eds., Europa im Ostblock. Vorstellungen und Diskurse (1945 – 1991) (Cologne: Böhlau, 2008); Heinz Duchhardt and Małgorzata Morawiec, eds., Vision Europa. Deutsche und polnische Föderationspläne des 19. und frühen 20. Jahrhunderts (Mainz: Zabern, 2003); Paulina Guliñska-Jurgiel, Die Presse des Sozialismus ist schlimmer als der Sozialismus. Europa in der Publizistik der Volksrepublik Polen, der ČSSR und der DDR (Bochum: Winkler, 2010); Christian Domnitz, Hinwendung nach Europa. Öffentlichkeitswandel im Staatssozialismus 1975 – 1989 (Bochum: Winkler, 2015).  See Sarah Ehlers, “Europeanising Impacts from the Colonies: European Campaigns against Sleeping Sickness 1900 – 1914,” in Européanisation au XXe siècle: Un regard historique, ed. Matthieu Osmont et al. (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2012), 111– 126; Dirk van Laak, “Detours around Africa: The Connection between Developing Colonies and Integrating Europe,” in Materializing Europe: Transnational Infrastructures and the Project of Europe, ed. Alexander Badenoch and Andreas Fickers (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 27– 43; Florian Wagner, “Private Colonialism and International Co-operation in Europe, 1870 – 1914,” in Imperial Co-operation and Transfer,

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processes were limited neither to the period of European integration nor to the geographical space of Europe. A third problem is the need to define the scholarly identity of historical research on Europeanization, which is a two-sided issue. On the one hand, it raises the question of setting outward boundaries to distinguish it from the other disciplines shaping the field of European studies. On the other hand, the fact that historiography has itself turned into a highly heterogeneous field with different methodological and theoretical approaches must not be overlooked. Competition for the interpretational high ground must thus be understood as working internally as well. The sphere of external relationships refers by nature primarily to social science research on Europe, which is very heterogeneous in itself, embracing a wide spectrum of sub-disciplines with dissimilar development histories.¹⁹ Political science can look back on a long tradition of research on Europe, during which the arguably liveliest debate in the history of European studies raged between functionalists and intergovernmentalists. In fact, interest in Europeanization has somewhat decreased recently.²⁰ In contrast, sociologists have only begun to address the topic of Europe in recent years. As a result of a dominant “methodological nationalism,” sociology long focused on national societies, so that Europe as an entity – as Maurizio Bach states – remained an absolute “side issue” as late as the early 2000s.²¹ Two commonalities shared by the various strands of social science research on Europe seem significant:²² first, it tends to deal with causes and consequences of the integrative process and thus almost exclu1870 – 1930: Empires and Encounters, ed. Volker Barth and Roland Cvetkovski (London: Bloomsbury, 2015), 79 – 105; Jürgen Dinkel, Florian Greiner, and Christian Methfessel, “‘Murder of a European’ – Der ‘bedrohte Europäer’ als Leitmotiv im Kolonialdiskurs vom Zeitalter des Hochimperialismus bis zur Epoche der Dekolonisation,” Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft 62 (2014): 219 – 238.  See the contributions in Monika Eigmüller and Steffen Mau, eds., Gesellschaftstheorie und Europapolitik. Sozialwissenschaftliche Ansätze zur Europaforschung (Wiesbaden: Springer Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2010).  See for an overview Theofanis Exadaktylos and Claudio M. Radaelli, “Europeanisation,” in Research Methods in European Union Studies, ed. Kennet Lynggaard, Ian Manners, and Karl Löfgren (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 206 – 218.  Maurizio Bach, “Beiträge der Soziologie zur Analyse der europäischen Integration. Eine Übersicht über theoretische Konzepte,” in Theorien europäischer Integration, ed. Wilfried Loth and Wolfgang Wessels (Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 2001), 147.  See for a more detailed overview of social science European studies Steffen Mau, “Horizontale Europäisierung – eine soziologische Perspektive,” in Interdisziplinäre Europastudien. Eine Einführung, ed. Ulrike Liebert and Janna Wolff (Wiesbaden: Springer Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2015), 96 – 97.

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sively with the EU.²³ Second, although several qualitative studies are now available,²⁴ the majority clearly still focus on quantitative methods. Dominance of quantitative social research in the field of European studies has been the subject of interdisciplinary debate for some time.²⁵ A primary subject of criticism is the inferential statistics method, which allows conclusions drawn from random sampling to be applied to a whole.²⁶ From the standpoint of historical scholarship, a more problematic factor is that the available data is hardly historicized. This applies for example to one principal source, the Eurobarometer, whose data is used in European studies to analyze questions of European identity, public sphere, and social development. The Eurobarometer was established in 1973 at the behest of the European Commission, with the aim of enhancing the EC’s public relations work while simultaneously “educating” people about Europe.²⁷ Even though this effort was never really crowned with success, one might justifiably doubt the neutrality and value of data compiled twice annually from interviews of 500 to 1,500 persons per member state. Indeed, there are various tendentious questions. A good example is a 1995 telephone survey on the planned EU Eastern enlargement; the question of when Eastern European nations should join the EU limited possible answers to three choices only (in less than five, in five to ten or in more than ten years). A principle “no” or “never” in response to the question was possible only if the respondents brought it up themselves.²⁸ Of course, it would be an overstatement to suspect Eurobarometer surveys of systematic manipulation, since the polling institutes guarantee the transparency of their data collection proc-

 See still valid Beate Kohler-Koch, “Europäisierung: Plädoyer für eine Horizonterweiterung,” in Deutschland zwischen Europäisierung und Selbstbehauptung, ed. Michèle Knodt and Beate Kohler-Koch (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2000), 11– 31.  See for an example the ethnographic study of Kerstin Poehls on the College of Europe: Kerstin Poehls, Europa backstage. Expertenwissen, Habitus und kulturelle Codes im Machtfeld der EU (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2009).  See Rosemarie Sackmann, “Sozialwissenschaftliche Theorie und qualitative Methoden der Europaforschung,” in Liebert and Wolff, Interdisziplinäre Europastudien, 453 – 477.  See Bernhard Ebbinghaus, “Qualitativer oder quantitativer Vergleich? Herausforderung für die sozialwissenschaftliche Europaforschung,” Zeitschrift für Staats- und Europawissenschaften 4 (2006): 388 – 404.  See Anja Kruke, “Aufmerksamkeit für Europa. Eurobarometer, empirische Sozialforschung und die Europäische Kommission, 1958 – 1979,” Comparativ. Zeitschrift für Globalgeschichte und Vergleichende Gesellschaftsforschung 21 (2011): 62– 80.  Martin Höpner and Bojan Jurczyk, “Kritik des Eurobarometers. Über die Verwischung der Grenze zwischen seriöser Demoskopie und interessengeleiteter Propaganda,” Leviathan 40 (2012): 338 – 339.

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ess.²⁹ Nevertheless, as an apparatus that clearly serves to legitimize European integration policy, the Eurobarometer needs to be historicized – as does the data it gathers. This is all the more true because problems of objectivity – that are merely hinted at by von Hirschhausen and Patel – represent a central challenge for European studies, since they immediately impact the research subject. Because Europe is nowadays generally viewed as a construct, European studies do not examine an objective given. On the contrary, the research subject is constituted “entirely through specific interests.”³⁰ This is one reason why the suggestion of von Hirschhausen and Patel that there should be a separation between Europeanization as a historical phenomenon on the one hand and as an analytical concept on the other – doubtless a sensible idea in theory – fails in practice.³¹ Rather, the conceptualization of “Europeanization” as an analytical category is inseparably interwoven with the actual fact of “Europeanization.” Arguably, during the past few decades, the discipline of European studies has understood itself primarily as some kind of research partner of the real-political processes of European integration, a point that has hardly been problematized in the more normatively-oriented social sciences, but which should lead to a clear dissociation from EU data material and the integration process itself in historiography. This point is significant, not least because historiography, communication structures, and even the life environments of researchers have become Europeanized in the twentieth century.³² As far as the position of European studies within historiography is concerned, its two main challenges are currently the relation to transnational history on the one hand and to global history on the other.³³ The passionate interest in transnational history that began in the 1990s has created a boom in empirical

 See Karl-Alois Bläser, “Europa im Spiegel der öffentlichen Meinung. Bilanz und Perspektiven des Eurobarometers nach 40 Jahren,” Leviathan 41 (2013): 351– 357.  Wolfgang Schmale, “Europaforschung,” Mein Europa (blog), October 6, 2015, accessed December 30, 2015, www.wolfgangschmale.eu/europaforschung.  Von Hirschhausen and Patel, “Europäisierung.”  Armin Heinen, “Die Europäisierung der Lebenswelten und die Entnationalisierung der deutschen Geschichtsschreibung. Durchbrochener nationaler Blick 1900, ausdifferenzierte europäische Historiographie heute,” in Europa um 1900 / Europa um 2000, ed. Hein Hoebink (Düsseldorf: Düsseldorf University Press, 2015), 255 – 276.  See Christoph Conrad, “Europa zwischen National- und Globalgeschichte,” Journal of Modern European History 14 (2016): 479 – 484.

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studies.³⁴ Nevertheless, European history and transnational history are by no means congruent; among the multitude of studies on the history of transfer and of interconnectivity carried out in recent years, the amount of work on genuinely European themes remains quite small – in this sense Europeanization, even from the vantage point of practical research, is merely one form of internationalization among many others. In view of the rise of global history during the past years, the question about the place occupied by Europe within the research landscape must also be approached from a different perspective, especially since the mantra of “provincializing Europe” has gained both epistemological and political impetus thanks to Dipesh Chakrabarty.³⁵ In fact, it has become increasingly common to deploy accusations of Eurocentrism as a kind of “killer argument” against Europe-oriented historiography.³⁶ To put it bluntly: why do historians need to study Europeanization at all? This is the reason why Christoph Cornelißen’s thesis that European historiography has profited from transnationalism must ultimately be challenged.³⁷ Rather, scholars are increasingly in need to emphasize the specific analytical value of historiographical research on Europe.

On the Methodology of Historiographical European Studies – the Vécueral Europeanization Approach One solution to emphasize the specific analytical value of historical research on Europeanization might be to strengthen its theoretical and methodological foundations. In fact, the current variety of perspectives, topics, and approaches outlined above has not been accompanied by discussions of methodological principles so far, let alone by the development of a distinct theoretical framework, although the latter is needed in order to sharpen core premises and terminology

 See Philipp Gassert, “Transnationale Geschichte, Version: 2.0,” Docupedia-Zeitgeschichte, October 29, 2012, accessed December 30, 2019, https://docupedia.de/zg/Transnationale_Ge schichte_Version_2.0_Philipp_Gassert.  Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).  Philipp Ther, “‘European History’ as European Area Studies,” Journal of Modern European History 14 (2016): 489.  Christoph Cornelißen, “Transnationale Geschichte als Herausforderung an die Europa-Historiographie,” in Geschichte intellektuell. Theoriegeschichtliche Perspektiven, ed. Friedrich W. Graf, Edith Hanke, and Barbara Picht (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2015), 396.

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and at the same time distinguish the discipline from the vocabulary and tools of the social sciences. This task begins with the very term “Europeanization.” Traditionally, it has been used to describe the growth of authority held by supranational European institutions within certain political fields since the 1950s, or the continent’s growing political interdependence overall. In recent scholarship, a wider interpretation of Europeanization has been suggested. According to von Hirschhausen and Patel, the term ought to “embrace all the political, social, economic and cultural processes which advance European relationships and similarities through imitation, exchange and interdependency.”³⁸ Consequently, Europeanization should be analytically freed from the EU construct and not viewed teleologically as a historical one-way street. Instead, conflicts and fragmentations must also be acknowledged as important driving forces. However, these demands have purely appellative character and do not in themselves constitute a research program. Hence, it remains unclear how this new definition of Europeanization can be implemented in an empirically solid way. In addition to that, there are a number of practical reservations against von Hirschhausen and Patel’s plea for a cultural history of discourse. First, it is obviously neither possible nor desirable for every study to take a discourse analytical approach. Second, deconstructing contemporary concepts of Europe is unquestionably important and indispensable for current research. Nevertheless, it does come up against certain limits. If one wants to reconstruct the motives, ideas, and contexts impacting agents of Europeanization – European politicians, journalists, intellectuals, economists, scientists etc. – as well as the real-political consequences of their actions, this cannot be done primarily by a discourse analysis. In any case, due to a lack of alternatives, historiographical studies on Europeanization still rely on the ideas and methods provided by social science. These generally differentiate between vertical and horizontal Europeanization. While vertical Europeanization analyzes the creation of supranational forms of politics and their effect on national domains, horizontal Europeanization examines European interconnectivity und transnational socialization processes. There is a causal connection between both models in keeping with the equation: “The more vertical Europeanization [there is], the more horizontal Europeanization [there will be].” For several reasons, these concepts are only partially suited to current historiographical European research, mainly because they are intrinsically teleological and thus almost categorically exclude the possibility of Euro-

 Von Hirschhausen and Patel, “Europäisierung.”

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peanization beyond the institutional process. If one is to take seriously Jost Dülffer’s plea for historiographical European studies to be “more than the history of processes within the expanding Communities,” then a methodological reconsideration is required.³⁹ The proposal elaborated in this chapter is that research should consistently include an experienced-based level that can be designated as “vécueral Europeanization.” This term alludes to the common distinctions made in research between an imagined Europe, the Europe pensée, a politically desired Europe, the Europe voulue, and a Europe of everyday experience, the Europe vécue. ⁴⁰ In expanding the horizontal Europeanization approach, vécueral Europeanization no longer focuses solely on inter-state exchanges and trans-border interconnectivity but concentrates firmly on the life environments of contemporaries as well as their perceptions and even their experiences. To avoid false expectations: despite being a neologism, “vécueral Europeanization” does not claim to reinvent the wheel. Rather, the approach builds on assumptions and demands posed in European studies in the last two decades and tries to strengthen their methodological foundation. In particular, it emphasizes that the historical emergence of a Europe vécue must be analyzed as a process as well. “Experience” is here understood in Jörn Leonhard’s sense as the “interpretive appropriation of lived reality.”⁴¹ However, this means more than a mere experiential history of European integration. On the contrary, the objective must be to substantiate and historicize all examined Europeanization processes by looking at how they were experienced by contemporaries. Establishing this critical reconnection of actual integrational moments with the individual perceptions of Europeans must not be understood as a substitute for traditional research, but rather as a useful addition enabling new viewpoints and facilitating relativization and differentiation. In fact, this methodological approach yields many benefits. It would make it easier to identify fractures and non-simultaneities as well as the different ways people experience allegedly pan-European processes, as demonstrated by Jörn

 Jost Dülffer, “Europäische Zeitgeschichte. Narrative und historiographische Perspektiven,” Zeithistorische Forschungen 1 (2004): 51– 71.  See René Girault, “Das Europa der Historiker,” in Europa im Blick der Historiker. Europäische Integration im 20. Jahrhundert: Bewusstsein und Institutionen, ed. Rainer Hudemann, Hartmut Kaelble, and Klaus Schwabe (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1995), 81– 82, and Hartmut Kaelble, “Identification with Europe and Politicization of the EU since the 1980s,” in European Identity, ed. Jeffrey T. Checkel and Peter J. Katzenstein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 204.  Jörn Leonhard, “Europäisches Deutungswissen in komparativer Absicht: Zugänge, Methoden und Potentiale,” Zeitschrift für Staats- und Europawissenschaften 4 (2006): 348.

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Leonhard with the example of liberalism.⁴² The open question about experiences would also relativize the issue of objectivity in European research, since it would automatically bring into focus not only the unifying aspects of European history but its ambivalence and tensions as well.⁴³ Thus, the sociologists’ view of (horizontal) Europeanization as a driving force for social and societal change can be expanded to include an analysis of how that change was appropriated, allowing for a clear-cut separation from social scientific data or rather its historization.⁴⁴ At the same time, the vécueral Europeanization method makes it possible to link together political, social, and cultural approaches to European history. It would also be easier to free Europeanization from “EU-ization” and notions of a distinct European space by focusing more on the recurrent political mantra of a “Europe of citizens” in the form of everyday experiences.⁴⁵

Vécueral Europeanization and its Value for Research As a final step, the potentials of this approach will be discussed by means of a concrete example. In fact, many of the chapters in this volume illustrate its benefits by looking into the way historical developments were experienced by Europeans, such as the emergence of a transnational youth mass media in the 1960s and 1970s, investigated by Aline Maldener. Maldener shows how cross-border notions of “pop” in the everyday lives of many young Europeans helped to foster Europeanization processes “from below.” Nina Szidat’s analysis of town twinning activities identifies vast differences between the original intention behind the practice and its actual implementation and perception at a grassroots level. Looking at day-to-day experiences, Szidat demonstrates that town twinning often had a bilateral rather than a European dimension, questioning the es-

 Jörn Leonhard, “Deutungswissen.”  See on this plea Jörn Leonhard, “Comparison, Transfer and Entanglement, or: How to Write Modern European History today?,” Journal of Modern European History 14 (2016), 162.  See Mau, “Horizontale Europäisierung”.  See Trine Flockhart, “Europeanization or EU-ization? The Transfer of European Norms across Time and Space,” Journal of Common Market Studies 48 (2010): 787– 810, and on the importance of ordinary citizens in European integration history Wolfgang Schmale, For a Democratic ‘United States of Europe’ (1918 – 1951): Freemasons – Human Rights Leagues – Winston S. Churchill – Individual Citizens (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2019); Hartmut Kaelble, Der verkannte Bürger. Eine andere Geschichte der europäischen Integration seit 1950 (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2019).

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tablished narrative that town twinning provided a kind of bottom-up Europeanization after 1945 by helping to foster a European identity. The following empirical example refers to the already mentioned research on Europe’s “hidden integration” during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Using buzzwords like “Materializing” or “Building Europe,” these historians investigate standardization processes, mostly in the realms of transport and communication, and hence explore the consolidation of Europe’s infrastructure in recent history. In doing so, they demonstrate that in the field of road systems, aviation or television, “hidden” European networks of interconnectivity developed that were often not directly recognized as such, but in many cases were able to surmount the boundaries of national states and even the “Iron Curtain” after 1945.⁴⁶ One question that has been addressed insufficiently so far is whether and how the spatial perceptions of Europeans and their “mental maps” have actually changed as a result of these processes. To date, this particular form of Europeanization has been studied either vertically – in the shape of political initiatives and their effects – or horizontally, with a focus on the ensuing degree of European interconnectivity. This seems problematic insofar as the question of experiences is central to judging the significance of this phenomenon in modern European history. Doubts are definitely warranted here: in spite of all the trends towards interconnectivity, for example, the developing European road network stretching from the Atlantic to the Caspian Sea modified neither the demarcation lines of the Cold War nor the persistently national character of traffic systems.⁴⁷ Even today, many Europeans are probably entirely ignorant of the existence of roughly 210 E-roads with a total length of nearly 50,000 kilometers. It is no coincidence that – despite important impulses coming from this branch of research – some studies on “hidden integration” reveal traces of a new teleology suggesting a constant “growth of Europe” during the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, although it should first be proven empirically if and to which extent these processes of interconnectivity were even experienced as European at all by contemporaries. The inclusion of the vecúeral Europeanization approach might thus avoid the danger of silently slipping back into a European master narrative, now based on cultural history. This of course is not to imply that there was no “hidden integration” of Europe; indeed, the opposite is true. However, it is important to differentiate, as il See Alexander Badenoch and Andreas Fickers, eds., Materializing Europe: Transnational Infrastructures and the Project of Europe (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).  See Frank Schipper, Driving Europe: Building Europe on Roads in the Twentieth Century (Amsterdam: Aksant, 2008).

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lustrated by the following example which predates the political integration process in Europe. During the interwar period, the growth of civil aviation and its impact on experiences of space were the subject of wide-ranging debates.⁴⁸ After the First World War, flying competitions became a common feature to illuminate both technological progress as well as new possibilities to travel fast distances. Already in 1919, a high reward offered by Australian prime minister Billy Hughes for the first Australian pilot to travel from the United Kingdom to Australia in a British plane paved the way for an air race between London and Darwin. The goal of the competition, won by famous aviators Ross and Keith Smith, was not least to strengthen imperial identity.⁴⁹ The $25,000 Orteig Prize, offered in the same year by an American businessman for the first successful nonstop flight from New York to Paris, served a similar purpose regarding transatlantic relations. Moreover, it led to large investments in international air travel and a considerable increase of public interest in civic aviation, especially when, in 1925, American pilot Charles Lindbergh succeeded and received the reward.⁵⁰ Thus, flying competitions were neither completely new nor restricted to the geographical space and the “mental map” of Europe when at the end of the 1920s a flight competition named “Air Race Round Europe” was established. The contest took place in the years 1929, 1930, 1932, and 1934 and aroused huge interest as a kind of transnational media event but has so far never been examined historiographically. The international press eagerly followed the air competition, which lasted several weeks and was originally organized by the French Aero Club with an eye towards advancing the technological development of passenger planes. Special correspondents of all major European newspapers as well as some American and even Indian newspapers authored often detailed background reports that supplemented the daily result messages.⁵¹ Most of these

 See Greiner, Wege nach Europa, 375 – 390; Eda Kranakis, “European Civil Aviation in an Era of Hegemonic Nationalism: Infrastructure, Air Mobility, and European Identity Formation, 1919 – 1933,” in Badenoch and Fickers, Materializing Europe, 290 – 326, and Robert Wohl, The Spectacle of Flight: Aviation and the Western Imagination, 1920 – 1950 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005).  See Michael Molkentin, Anzac and Aviator: The Remarkable Story of Sir Ross Smith and the 1919 England to Australia Air Race (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2019).  See Richard Bak, The Big Jump: Lindbergh and the World’s Greatest Air Race (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2011).  See “Der europäische Rundflug,” Kölnische Zeitung, August 2, 1929, 2; “Air Race over Europe on,” New York Times, August 8, 1929, 10; “La Tour d’Europe des avions de tourisme,” Le Petit Parisien, August 11, 1929, 1; “Air Race Round Europe,” The Times, August 12, 1929, 12; “RoundEurope Air Race,” Manchester Guardian, July 21, 1930, 9; “Latest News: Round Europe Air Race,” The Times of India, August 9, 1930, 9; “Flieger jagen durch Europa. 7 500 Kilometer

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articles, which displayed a thinly-veiled zeal for technology, not only attributed a kind of sporting ease and everydayness to flying, but also highlighted its European character by stressing that the competitions were held within the space of Europe. The planning of the route was carefully monitored even in the run-ups to the several races, with maps as well as details about the distances from starting points to destinations at the various stages bringing home to the reader both the scope of Europe and the achievement of modern aviation in overcoming it (cf. Figures 1 und 2).⁵² The maps published for each of the flights focused on Central Europe. However, in addition to the leading aviation countries France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, which were the main organizers of the competition and, on the whole, technically dominant, supposedly peripheral states like Poland and Czechoslovakia stepped into the limelight, not simply because they had to be flown over but because they were home to many rather successful competitors.⁵³ The fact that these maps completely ignored territorial demarcation lines and in most cases even omitted the names of countries underscores how the print media’s treatment of the “Air Race Round Europe” helped construct a European “mental map” that considered political borders insignificant and measured a nation’s degree of Europeanness primarily by how technologically progressive it was. However, a closer scrutiny of this discourse reveals the limitations of its Europeanizing effects. The actual competition experience was strongly influenced by national, frequently rivalrous perspectives which, while not entirely excluding European readings, did relativize them. Thus the Vossische Zeitung was able to stress the unifying element by entitling a report on the competition with the evocative headline “Pan-Europe of the Aerospace”, while equally pointing out that every flyer had been welcomed with his own national anthem upon landing in Berlin.⁵⁴ Moreover, emphasizing the performance of their own countries’ airplanes was a favorite motif of journalists, who were usually less interested in cel-

von Berlin nach Berlin – Rundflug über Seealpen und Nordsee,” Vossische Zeitung, August 4, 1932, 1; “Le challenge international des avions de tourisme,” Le Matin, August 26, 1932, 1; “Eröffnung des Europarundflugs,” Kölnische Zeitung, August 29, 1934, 9.  See “Air Race Round Europe. Inclusion of English Aerodrome,” The Times, January 17, 1930, 7; “Air Race Round Europe. Details of the Course,” The Times, January 29, 1930, 14; “Europa-Flug 1932. Festlegung der Strecke,” Vossische Zeitung, February 26, 1932, Section “Sport/Spiel und Turnen,” 4.  See “Der Europaflug,” Kölnische Zeitung, August 10, 1929, 3; “Take-Off from Berlin in a Downpour,” Manchester Guardian, July 21, 1930, 9; “Die Europa-Flugjagd beginnt. Heute Start der ersten Etappe nach Rom,” Vossische Zeitung, August 21, 1932, Erste Beilage, 1.  “Pan-Europa der Lüfte. Rundflug 1929,” Vossische Zeitung, September 20, 1929, 2; “Europaflieger in Berlin gelandet,” Vossische Zeitung, September 28, 1930, 4.

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Figures 1 and 2: Routes Taken by the Air Race Round Europe 1929 und 1930 in The Times (published on August 8, 1929, p. 9, and July 21, 1930, p. 12).

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ebrating the development of European civil aviation than their respective nations’ success. During the air race, the Kölnische Zeitung repeatedly celebrated German pilots and airplanes with hymns of praise – some politically motivated.⁵⁵ German air pioneer Alfred Hildebrandt, long-time aviation expert for this paper, which was one of the first international dailies to cover the topic extensively, linked reports on the German flight victory of 1930 with an attack on the Allied peace order. If Germany was victorious “although it had less money to spend on passenger and sports aviation than any other European state, as it is forbidden to allocate public funds for this purpose,” then Germany’s future participation in this international competition must depend on whether equal preconditions were put in place for all participants.⁵⁶ All in all, the specific case of the “Air Race Round Europe” is a good example of how national or even nationalist ways of thinking and a Europeanization of spatial perceptions were intermingled in a specific way in connection with questions of technological modernity. That was by no means a historical paradox, but rather marks a characteristic feature of European history. For example, it can also be observed in the field of sports, where early transnational events such as European Championships (the first took place in 1891 in figure skating) or the Mitropa Cup of European football clubs, established in 1927, were always triggered by a desire to prove the strength of national athletes, but invariably caused an increase of cross-border contacts as well (see also the contribution of Regina Weber in this volume). This development led not only to a standardization of rulebooks, which was a precondition for international competition, but also to processes of cultural homogenization and a general enlargement of the perception radius of many contemporaries.⁵⁷ Vécueral Europeanization can thus help to analyze how certain cultural and technical developments influenced and transformed the historical “mental maps” of Europeans. The media sources used in the example are in many ways indicative of those experiences as newspapers constituted a representative platform for public opinion, especially in its cultural, everyday life columns and sections, both by reflecting everyday lives and by expanding the area of communication and the zone of perception

 See “Vorschau auf den Europa-Rundflug. Der Sinn des Wettbewerbs – Die deutschen Neukonstruktionen – Ungewisse Aussichten. Deutschlands Kampf um den Wanderpokal,” Kölnische Zeitung, August 12, 1932, 3; “Was lehrt der Europaflug? Fragen und Wünsche,” Kölnische Zeitung, August 31, 1932, 4.  “Hände weg vom Europarundflug. Nur ein gleichberechtigtes Deutschland soll zum internationalen Flugsport antreten. Bilanz des Europarundflugs,” Kölnische Zeitung, August 9, 1930, 2.  See Greiner, Wege, 413 – 429.

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among their readerships.⁵⁸ However, they would need to be complemented by other sources in order to fully implement the approach outlined above.

Conclusion: Perspectives of Historiographical Research on Europeanization This chapter has argued that in conceptual regard historiographical research on Europeanization has been marked by deficits. As a result, many important topics have been neglected or insufficiently explored. The vécueral Europeanization approach outlined above could help to open up new research perspectives, as illustrated by two conceivable thematic complexes. First, the connection between “Europe” and “region” needs to be further clarified in light of the internationalization processes of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Admittedly, there are several studies on the concept of a “Europe of the Regions” propagated by the European Communities and its historical background.⁵⁹ However, the question of the appropriation and adaptation of Europeanizing trends in regional areas has so far been neglected by historiographical European studies: how much “Europe” actually arrived in the regions, and how was internationalization implemented, practiced, and experienced at the regional level? In the last couple of years research on these questions has been initiated by local history.⁶⁰ It gives evidence of specific dynamics of resistance and contingency.⁶¹ According to these findings, behind the diffusion of Europe into European regions stood concrete encounters with the initially foreign “Other” that were often experienced in very different ways, whether in the form of tourism and migration, exchange programs and language courses, business cooper-

 For a comparable conception of media history see Frank Bösch, Mass Media and Historical Change. Germany in International Perspective, 1400 to Present (New York, NY: Berghahn, 2015).  Undine Ruge, Die Erfindung des ‘Europa der Regionen’. Kritische Ideengeschichte eines konservativen Konzepts (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2003).  See for Germany and Bavaria: Ferdinand Kramer, “‘Wege nach Europa’ – Forschungen zur neuesten Geschichte Bayerns,” Zeitschrift für bayerische Landesgeschichte 78 (2015): 1– 6; Rudolf Himpsl, Europäische Integration und internationalisierte Märkte. Die Außenwirtschaftspolitik des Freistaats Bayern 1957 – 1982 (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2020).  For an empirical case study see Claudia Schemmer, Internationalisierung im ländlichen Raum Bayerns. Traunstein 1945 – 1989 (Kallmünz: Michael Laßleben, 2016).

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ation, and sports competitions.⁶² In particular, regional case studies could help to explore the connection between Europeanization and other phenomena of internationalization in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and shed a new, enriching light on the relationship between Europe and the individual nation. In this context, for instance, it needs to be emphasized that local, regional and state-level politicians were often central promoters of European unification.⁶³ This fact has not been considered enough in the long and controversial debate surrounding Alan Milward’s thesis that the European integration process needs to be characterized as a manifestation of national interest policies.⁶⁴ A second field of research that, in spite of a number of relevant social science studies, has not been adequately dealt with historiographically so far, consists of ideas and practices of European solidarity.⁶⁵ The main reason for this desideratum is that the term is normatively charged and difficult to grasp analytically.⁶⁶ The concept of vécueral Europeanization could help to define “European solidarity” as an analytical concept. Taking into account that the willingness to practice solidarity within Europe constitutes a prerequisite for many political and societal processes of Europeanization, one must still ask how European solidarity in theory and practice contributes to strengthening “European connections and similarities” in the sense of von Hirschhausen and Patel. That all of these forms of solidarity were already regarded as “European” by

 Ferdinand Kramer, “Internationalisierung in Bayern nach 1945,” in Internationalisierung vor Ort nach 1945. Menschen und Schauplätze in Bayern, ed. Claudia Friemberger et al. (Munich: Institut für Bayerische Geschichte, 2013), 8.  See Laura C. Ulrich, Wege nach Europa. Heinrich Aigner und die Anfänge des Europäischen Rechnungshofes (St. Ottilien: Editions of St. Ottilien, 2015); Martin Hübler, Die Europapolitik des Freistaats Bayern. Von der Einheitlichen Europäischen Akte bis zum Amsterdamer Vertrag (Munich: Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung, 2002); Alexander Wegmaier, ‘Europäer sein und Bayern bleiben’. Die Idee Europa und die bayerische Europapolitik 1945 – 1979 (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2018).  Alan S. Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation-State (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1992). See on this debate Wilfried Loth, “Integrating Paradigms: Walter Lipgens and Alan Milward as Pioneers of European Integration History,” in Alan S. Milward and a Century of European Change, ed. Fernando Guirao (New York, NY: Routledge, 2012), 255 – 267.  See Florian Greiner and Jan Vermeiren, eds., The Bonds That Unite? Historical Perspectives on European Solidarity, special issue European Review of History 24, no. 6 (2017). For approaches to European solidarity in political, social, and legal sciences see: Andreas Grimmel and Susanne My Giang, eds., Solidarity in the European Union: A Fundamental Value in Crisis (Cham: Springer, 2017); Michael Piazolo, Solidarität. Deutungen zu einem Leitprinzip der Europäischen Union (Würzburg: Ergon, 2004); Steinar Stjernø, Solidarity in Europe: The History of an Idea (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).  See Florian Greiner, “Introduction: Writing the Contemporary History of European Solidarity,” European Review of History 24 (2017): 837– 853.

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the actors (and not only in historiography), as von Hirschhausen and Patel rightly insist, seems a necessary but by no means sufficient condition for grasping the connected processes of Europeanization analytically. Rather, determining whether and how European solidarity was experienced by all involved is paramount. In other words: did concrete experiential worlds of European solidarity exist in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and what did they look like? Pursuing this question is essential, not least because ideas and practices of solidarity always have community-building effects and unfold their importance not so much outwardly, i. e. towards the target audience of solidarity, but primarily inwardly, within the group of those acting in solidarity. They explore questions of attachment and identity, the boundaries and limits of a community, and a society’s willingness to make sacrifices as well.⁶⁷ Thus, another key premise of von Hirschhausen and Patel – the plea to analyze fragmentations and dissonances as potential driving forces of Europeanization – could be implemented empirically via experiential sources.⁶⁸ The concepts of vertical and horizontal Europeanization do not allow this, as they either exclude the possibility of breaks or interpret them as pathological crisis phenomena. By contrast, with the help of the vécueral Europeanization approach it is possible to demonstrate how – to continue with the example of solidarity – different experiences of European solidarity and their limits led to new ideas of Europe and new forms of Europeanization that were by no means always intended as such. One only needs to think of the extremely heterogeneous experiences in connection with the recent solidarity – or lack thereof – with refugees all over Europe. For regardless of any moral assessment of the concrete issues and the political desirability of this specific kind of Europeanization, one should not overlook the fact that behind the unconventional coalition of refugee critics from Bavaria to Hungary there lurks something distinctively European: a form of European problem diagnosis and clear statements regarding the character and boundaries of European solidarity. In this sense, the vécueral Europeanization approach is especially suitable for contributing towards a “denormatizing” of European studies and will help to minimize the problem of objectivity.

 See Kurt Bayertz, “Begriff und Problem der Solidarität,” in Solidarität. Begriff und Problem, ed. Kurt Bayertz (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1998), 11– 51.  See Rachel Meyer and Howard Kimeldorf, “Eventful Subjectivity: The Experiential Sources of Solidarity,” Journal of Historical Sociology 28 (2015): 429 – 457.

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Hewitson, Mark, and Matthew D’Auria, eds. Europe in Crisis: Intellectuals and the European Idea, 1917 – 1957. New York, NY: Berghahn, 2012. Himpsl, Rudolf. Europäische Integration und internationalisierte Märkte. Die Außenwirtschaftspolitik des Freistaats Bayern 1957 – 1982. Munich: C.H. Beck, 2020. Hirschhausen, Ulrike von, and Kiran K. Patel. “Europäisierung, Version 1.0.” Docupedia-Zeitgeschichte, November 29, 2010, accessed December 30, 2019. https://doc upedia.de/zg/Europ.C3.A4isierung?oldid=76143. Höpner, Martin, and Bojan Jurczyk. “Kritik des Eurobarometers. Über die Verwischung der Grenze zwischen seriöser Demoskopie und interessengeleiteter Propaganda.” Leviathan 40 (2012): 326 – 349. Hübler, Martin. Die Europapolitik des Freistaats Bayern. Von der Einheitlichen Europäischen Akte bis zum Amsterdamer Vertrag. Munich: Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung, 2002. Kaelble, Hartmut, Der verkannte Bürger. Eine andere Geschichte der europäischen Integration seit 1950. Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2019. Kaelble, Hartmut. “Identification with Europe and Politicization of the EU since the 1980s.” In European Identity, edited by Jeffrey T. Checkel and Peter J. Katzenstein, 193 – 212. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. Kaiser, Wolfram, Stefan Krankenhagen, and Kerstin Poehls, eds. Exhibiting Europe in Museums: Transnational Networks, Collections, Narratives, and Representations. New York, NY: Berghahn, 2014. Kleinschmidt, Christian. “Infrastructure, Networks, (Large) Technical Systems: The ‘Hidden Integration’ of Europe.” Contemporary European History 19 (2010): 275 – 284. Kohler-Koch, Beate. “Europäisierung: Plädoyer für eine Horizonterweiterung.” In Deutschland zwischen Europäisierung und Selbstbehauptung, edited by Michèle Knodt and Beate Kohler-Koch, 11 – 31. Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2000. Kramer, Ferdinand. “‘Wege nach Europa’ – Forschungen zur neuesten Geschichte Bayerns.” Zeitschrift für bayerische Landesgeschichte 78 (2015): 1 – 6. Kramer, Ferdinand. “Internationalisierung in Bayern nach 1945.” In Internationalisierung vor Ort nach 1945. Menschen und Schauplätze in Bayern, edited by Claudia Friemberger, Ferdinand Kramer, Daniel Rittenauer, and Claudia Schemmer, 7 – 9. Munich: Institut für Bayerische Geschichte, 2013. Kranakis, Eda. “European Civil Aviation in an Era of Hegemonic Nationalism: Infrastructure, Air Mobility, and European Identity Formation, 1919 – 1933.” In Materializing Europe. Transnational Infrastructures and the Project of Europe, edited by Alexander Badenoch and Andreas Fickers, 290 – 326. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. Kruke, Anja. “Aufmerksamkeit für Europa. Eurobarometer, empirische Sozialforschung und die Europäische Kommission, 1958 – 1979.” Comparativ. Zeitschrift für Globalgeschichte und Vergleichende Gesellschaftsforschung 21 (2011): 62 – 80. Laak, Dirk van. “Detours around Africa: The Connection between Developing Colonies and Integrating Europe.” In Materializing Europe. Transnational Infrastructures and the Project of Europe, edited by Alexander Badenoch and Andreas Fickers, 27 – 43. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. Laczó, Ferenc. “The Europeanization of Holocaust Remembrance: How far has it gone, how far can it go.” Eurozine, January 29, 2018, accessed December 30, 2019. https://www.euro zine.com/the-europeanization-of-holocaust-remembrance.

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Johannes Dafinger

Europeanization as Detachment from the Global The Case of Nazi Germany and the Post-War European Far Right

Introduction In his classic essay “Zur Verfassung Europas” published in 2011, the political philosopher Jürgen Habermas describes the European Union (EU) “as an important step on the path towards a politically constituted world society.”¹ He believes that the successful transnationalization of popular sovereignty in the EU that did not lower the level of democratic legitimation can inspire a similar process on a global scale in the future.² In sharp contrast to this narrative, as this chapter will show, Europeanization has been framed by the European Far Right since the Nazi period as a process of political, economic, and cultural detachment of Europe from other parts of the world. Especially in the Nazi period, building intra-European relations was conceived and instrumentalized as a means to supersede multilateral relations across the borders of Europe. This objective is most clearly visible in the history of the establishment of European institutions by Nazi Germany and its allies, intended to undermine the influence of globally oriented multilateral organizations. In this chapter, this type of Europeanization is called “protectionist Europeanization.”

Note: I wish to thank Raimund Bauer, Sophia Dafinger, Benjamin G. Martin, Alexander Schmied, the editors of this volume, and the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on earlier drafts. I am grateful to Clare Ibarra for her valuable remarks, too, as well as for her thorough language edits.  Jürgen Habermas, Zur Verfassung Europas: Ein Essay (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2012) (first published in 2011), 40; English text cited from: Jürgen Habermas, “The Crisis of the European Union in the Light of a Constitutionalization of International Law,” The European Journal of International Law 23, no. 2 (2012): 336.  Habermas, Zur Verfassung Europas, 48; Habermas, “The Crisis of the European Union,” 338– 339. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110685473-005

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Historiography has paid increasing attention to illiberal trends of Europeanization, especially focusing on the Nazi period. It now seems to be commonly accepted that National Socialism was not an “anti-European” or even “un-European” ideology as previous scholarship claimed.³ The denormativization of the terms “Europe” and “Europeanization” has been a precondition for a more indepth analysis of far-right concepts of Europe, as well as far-right networks and cooperation across borders. While normative approaches associate Europeanization with notions of peace, democracy, the rule of law, or Christianity (this list is not exhaustive), contemporary definitions avoid any such normative connotations.⁴ Building on the definition proposed by Ulrike von Hirschhausen and Kiran Klaus Patel, every historical process which resulted in the strengthening of notions of Europeanness, the advancement of intra-European connections and interdependences, and the foundation of pan-European organizations, that is, the institutionalization of European cooperation, is understood here as a form of Europeanization.⁵ This definition encourages historical research on the different directions Europeanization has taken in the past, and on the different objectives the historical protagonists had for supporting practices that led to a specific version of Europeanization. This chapter is a case study into the latter. It investigates notions of Europeanness in elitist circles of the far right – mainly among those who regarded themselves as right-wing intellectuals – before and after 1945. It also examines initiatives to strengthen intra-European relations, especially the founding of European organizations to that aim. The analysis focuses on the objectives the protagonists pursued in regard to transnational entanglement as such. The chapter hypothesizes that with advancing Europeanization, far-right circles sought to accentuate

 For an examination of the older claims see Raimund Bauer, The Construction of a National Socialist Europe during the Second World War: How the New Order Took Shape (London: Routledge, 2020), 3–4; Johannes Dafinger and Dieter Pohl, “Introduction,” in A New Nationalist Europe Under Hitler: Concepts of Europe and Transnational Networks in the National Socialist Sphere of Influence, 1933–1945, ed. Johannes Dafinger and Dieter Pohl (London: Routledge, 2019), 5–7. Dieter Gosewinkel, “Anti-liberal Europe – A Neglected Source of Europeanism,” in Anti-liberal Europe. A Neglected Story of Europeanization, ed. Dieter Gosewinkel (New York, NY: Berghahn, 2015), 7; Florian Greiner, Wege nach Europa: Deutungen eines imaginierten Kontinents in deutschen, britischen und amerikanischen Printmedien, 1914–1945 (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2014), 179– 181.  Ulrike von Hirschhausen and Kiran K. Patel, “Europeanization in History: An Introduction,” in Europeanization in the Twentieth Century: Historical Approaches, ed. Martin Conway and Kiran K. Patel (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 7.  Hirschhausen and Patel, “Europeanization in History,” 2–3.

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Europeanness and strengthen European interdependencies in order to counteract universalist perspectives and transnational relations beyond Europe. The first section of this chapter focuses on the Nazi period, building on the results of historical research conducted on concepts of Europe and practices of European cooperation under National Socialism in recent years. The argument put forth is closely linked to Benjamin G. Martin’s observations in his book The Nazi-Fascist New Order for European Culture.⁶ Analyzing several international cultural institutions established after 1933, Martin emphasizes that the founding of such institutions by the Nazis was part of their effort to replace the idea of a liberal, democratic, and cosmopolitan order with an authoritarian and völkisch idea of Europe. Madeleine Herren’s theoretical reflections on “fascist internationalism” and Nazi Germany’s policy towards existing international organizations have inspired this study as well. She argues that “[f]ascists rejected internationalism ideologically but attempted to assume and copy its structural pattern.”⁷ According to Herren, such efforts can be characterized as the “infiltration of existing internationalism by fascist projects.” There are numerous, recently published case studies on transnational relations between Nazi Germany, its allies, and neutral countries. These case studies contribute to the ongoing academic debate about fascist internationalism.⁸ The second section of this chapter addresses the period after 1945. The discourse on Europe in far-right circles since the end of the Second World War has yet to receive the same attention in historiography as such discourses in the Nazi period. However, Tamir Bar-On, Roger Griffin, and Benno Hafeneger have published shorter studies on this topic, drawing attention to the anti-globalist drive behind these discourses.⁹

 Benjamin G. Martin, The Nazi-Fascist New Order for European Culture (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016).  Madeleine Herren, “Fascist Internationalism,” in Internationalisms: A Twentieth-Century History, ed. Glenda Sluga and Patricia Clavin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 192; the following quote ibid., 212.  For a thoughtful overview, see Ángel Alcalde, “The Transnational Consensus: Fascism and Nazism in Current Research,” Contemporary European History 29, no. 2 (2020), accessed December 30, 2020, doi:10.1017/S0960777320000089.  Tamir Bar-On, “Fascism to the Nouvelle Droite: The Quest for Pan-European Empire,” in Varieties of Right-Wing Extremism in Europe, ed. Andrea Mammone, Emmanuel Godin, and Brian Jenkins (London: Routledge, 2013); Roger Griffin, “Europe for the Europeans: Fascist Myths of the European New Order 1922–1992,” in A Fascist Century: Essays by Roger Griffin, ed. Mathew Feldman (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); Benno Hafeneger, “Rechtsextreme Europabilder,” in Rechtsextremismus: Einführung und Forschungsbilanz, ed. Wolfgang Kowalsky and Wolfgang Schroeder (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1994).

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The far right’s discourse on Europe in the Nazi period was a rather elitist phenomenon. Most of those who took part in it – academic professionals, writers, diplomats, administration officials, and other members of the functionalist elite – saw themselves as the right-wing intellectual avant-garde.¹⁰ It is likely that the broader public, on the one hand, hesitated to follow them in their endeavor to anti-liberally reframe the concept of Europe and to integrate it into far-right narratives of an envisioned new international order,¹¹ even though right-wing concepts of Europe could relate to older narratives mainly revolving around the concepts of the Abendland, of Mitteleuropa, and – in the German case – of the Reich.¹² Hitler and his closest entourage, on the other hand, were also hardly interested in this discourse on Europe. Only in the last phase of the war, when the situation at the war front became increasingly desperate, the idea of a “New Europe” was picked up as a propaganda slogan behind which the Nazi leadership hoped people in allied, neutral, and even occupied countries would unite in the battle against the war enemies of Germany.¹³ Despite the ignorance of the highest ranks, Nazi authorities in the second or third “row” supported the efforts to conceptualize and implement a far-right version of Europe. The elitist New Right, formed first in France as the Nouvelle Droite (or New Right in English), similarly imagined and conceptualized a right-wing version of Europe after 1945. These self-proclaimed right-wing “intellectuals” maintained

 Right-wing intellectuals in other European countries besides Germany as well as members of the West-European fascist movements took part in this discourse, too. On this, see Tim Kirk, “Nazi Plans for a New European Order and European Responses,” in A New Nationalist Europe Under Hitler: Concepts of Europe and Transnational Networks in the National Socialist Sphere of Influence, 1933–1945, ed. Johannes Dafinger and Dieter Pohl (London: Routledge, 2019); Robert Grunert, Der Europagedanke westeuropäischer faschistischer Bewegungen 1940–1945 (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2012); Bernard Bruneteau, ‘L’Europe nouvelle’ de Hitler: Une illusion des intellectuels de la France de Vichy (Monaco: Éditions du Rocher, 2003).  Detailed studies on this issue are not yet available. For a first approach, see Kirk, “Nazi Plans for a New European Order,” 80–86.  Vanessa Conze, Das Europa der Deutschen: Ideen von Europa in Deutschland zwischen Reichstradition und Westorientierung (1920–1970) (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2005); Jürgen Elvert, “‘New European Order’ of National Socialism: Some Remarks on its Sources, Genesis and Nature,” in Anti-liberal Europe: A Neglected Story of Europeanization, ed. Dieter Gosewinkel (New York, NY: Berghahn, 2015); Jan Vermeiren, “Nation-State and Empire in German Political Thought: Europe and the Myth of the Reich,” in The Space of Crisis: Images and Ideas of Europe in the Age of Crisis, 1914–1945, ed. Vittorio Dini and Matthew D’Auria (Bruxelles: Lang, 2013).  Raimund Bauer, “When Ends Become Means: Post-War Planning and the Exigencies of War in the Discussion about a New Economic Order in Europe (1939–1945),” in A New Nationalist Europe Under Hitler: Concepts of Europe and Transnational Networks in the National Socialist Sphere of Influence, 1933–1945, ed. Johannes Dafinger and Dieter Pohl (London: Routledge, 2019).

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close relations with each other across inner-European borders, too. The big rightwing extremist parties, in contrast, have focused predominantly on their own country. Initiatives for cooperation of far-right members of parliament have always been short-lived so far, even in the case of far-right members of the European Parliament.¹⁴ Nevertheless, some right-wing extremist parties did develop policy objectives for a European polity based on a distinct definition of Europe since the late 1970s (and potentially earlier).

Europeanization as Global Disintegration in the Nazi Period The 1939 version of the German encyclopedia Meyers Lexikon explained to its readers: Internationalism is only thinkable and possible if one understands all human beings and thus also peoples as equal. Racial thinking is opposed to internationalism. Anybody who has cognized that human beings and peoples are of a different kind and value, rejects internationalism as impracticable.¹⁵

Using the typical, elaborated vocabulary of a dictionary, the racist ideology of inequality is ennobled in this quote as an insight gained from superior cognition. Besides, the entry claims that racial thinking and internationalism were incompatible with one another. Indeed, this juxtaposition of internationalism and racial thinking seems reasonable at first glance. The educated guess is supported by the Nazis’ vehement opposition to the concept of internationality. Not only did Germany leave the League of Nations by 1933; the new Nazi government also associated internationalism with elements of (cultural) “modernity” and marked it as “Western,” “French,” or “Jewish.” Jews, in particular, were seen as representatives of internationalism. More precisely, Nazi ideology and propaganda imagined “the” Jews as a “cohesive, politically active subject […] united on a global scale by racial

 Nicholas Startin, “Where to for the Radical Right in the European Parliament? The Rise and Fall of Transnational Political Cooperation,” Perspectives on European Politics and Society 11, no. 4 (2010); Dimitri Almeida, “Europeanized Eurosceptics? Radical Right Parties and European Integration,” Perspectives on European Politics and Society 11, no. 3 (2010).  Meyers Lexikon, 8th ed., s.v. “Internationalism” (Leipzig: Bibliographisches Institut, 1939), 5: col. 298. I owe this quote to Frank-Rutger Hausmann and wish to thank him for bringing it to my attention.

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bonds” and lacking “any allegiance to nation-states.” In their “language,” the Nazis used a collective singular for this imagined political subject: “international Jewry.” Obsessed by the fixed idea of a Jewish global conspiracy, Hitler and his followers identified “international Jewry” as their principal opponent.¹⁶ At odds with the verbal rejection of internationality and the construction of an antagonism between Germans and an imagined agent representing it, however, Nazi Germany maintained international relations on all levels: diplomatically, politically, economically, and culturally – especially with other European countries. Countries outside of Europe – with the exception of Japan¹⁷ – played only minor roles in Nazi Germany’s political, economic, and cultural foreign relations. Even colonial revisionists, despite their hopes, did not find much support from the party leadership.¹⁸ This focus on Europe was partly the result of deliberate political decisions based on an advanced expert discourse.¹⁹ The basic idea behind the German policies was the intention to structure the world into Großräume (literally “Greater Areas”) with limited exchange between different “Greater Areas” and limited influence of one “Greater Area” on another. This idea, conceptualized by Nazi experts as a “European Monroe Doctrine,” was on the one hand heavily influenced by the school of “geopolitical” experts around Karl Haushofer as well as by the expert on international law, Carl Schmitt. Schmitt wanted to implement into international law an “intervention ban for powers alien to the region” which he criticized as being inappropriately “universalistic” in its current form. The League of Nations in particular, Schmitt argued, had used “universalist” theories as a pretence to intervene in “European” affairs in the past.²⁰ On the other hand, the idea of “Greater Areas” was shaped by racist beliefs in ethnic differences between the populations of large regions. Werner Daitz was a key figure

 Jeffrey Herf, The Jewish Enemy: Nazi Propaganda during World War II and the Holocaust (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006), 7.  Cf. Daniel Hedinger, Die Achse: Berlin – Rom – Tokio, 1919–1946 (Munich: Beck, 2021).  Shelley Baranowski, “Axis Imperialism in the Second World War,” in The Oxford Handbook of European History, 1914–1945, ed. Nicholas Doumanis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 484, accessed February 4, 2021, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199695669.013.26.  The other part of the explanation why Nazi Germany’s interest was focused on Europe is that relations with countries outside of Europe were difficult to maintain during the war years anyway.  Lothar Gruchmann, Nationalsozialistische Großraumordnung. Die Konstruktion einer ‘deutschen Monroe-Doktrin’ (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1962), 20–27 and 51–65. For the quote, see the title of Carl Schmitt, Völkerrechtliche Großraumordnung mit Interventionsverbot für raumfremde Mächte. Ein Beitrag zum Reichsbegriff im Völkerrecht (Berlin: Deutscher Rechtsverlag, 1939).

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in this regard, translating racist theories into the language of “Greater Areas.” In particular, Europe was understood by Daitz and in the same vein by numerous other right-wing “intellectuals” as a primordial community of racially kindred “peoples,” additionally connected to each other by a centuries-old “European” civilization (whereby some put more weight on biological “race” as the glue, some more on Kultur). Their propaganda slogan to advertise a largely autarkic European “Greater Area” was “Europe for the Europeans.”²¹ Hitler’s lack of deeper interest in these ideas did not prevent Nazi experts and officials from developing rather in-depth plans. They thought about ways to implement regimes of intra-European economic entanglements (dominated by Germany) to reduce trade with countries outside of Europe in the future. At the same time, a number of European organizations, in particular European federations of professional associations, which fostered European integration at the expense of institutionalized multilateral cooperation beyond Europe, were not only planned but actually established under Nazi leadership, mainly in the cultural sector. Examples for a policy leading to a “protectionist” type of Europeanization can, first of all, be identified on the field of economy. German economists intended to create a “European Großraumwirtschaft,” a common European economy. Racist or völkisch ideological beliefs about the nature of European “peoples” (Völker) led Nazi economists – like others before them – to the assumption that the industrial heart of Europe and the agrarian states at the margins “naturally” complemented each other in a presumably “organic” division of labor.²² The European Großwirtschaftsraum was imagined to be autarkic, and its implementation was supposed to put an end to the “inorganic global exchange of goods.”²³ An intensified European economic cooperation was to supersede (global) free trade. The “coexistence of economic blocs” would replace the “single world market.”²⁴ The intended Europe-wide division of labor was believed to help achieve such an economic order. Because of Southeast Europe’s  Gruchmann, Nationalsozialistische Großraumordnung, 21; Philipp Gassert, Amerika im Dritten Reich: Ideologie, Propaganda und Volksmeinung 1933–1945 (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1997), 296–308 (quote: 300); Birgit Kletzin, Europa aus Rasse und Raum: Die nationalsozialistische Idee der Neuen Ordnung (Münster: LIT, 2002), 126–136, 163–167.  Bauer, The Construction of a National Socialist Europe, 29–30 and 33.  Helmut Strauch, “Die Idee der Großraumwirtschaft in der Handelspolitik der Gegenwart” (PhD diss., University of Würzburg, 1938), 1, quoted in Bauer, Construction, 24.  Karl C. Thalheim, “Die Weltwirtschaft neuer Ordnung,” in Das neue Europa: Beiträge zur nationalen Wirtschaftsordnung und Großraumwirtschaft, ed. Gesellschaft für europäische Wirtschaftsplanung und Großraumwirtschaft e.V. (Dresden: Meinhold, 1941), 171. See also Kirk, “Nazi Plans for a New European Order,” 74–75.

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strong agricultural economy, food imports from outside of Europe would no longer be necessary. Countries in Northern and Western Europe were to be removed from their previous trade networks and integrated into the European Großwirtschaftsraum, too.²⁵ During the Second World War, when the Axis countries were cut off from global trade networks, a return to a “free and uncontrolled movement of goods” and to “free monetary transactions” after the end of the war was ruled out by German economic experts and policy-makers.²⁶ Instead, the German Reichsbank and Economics Minister Walther Funk intended to create a “European monetary and customs union.”²⁷ A European central clearing system – as an alternative to a liberal trade system – was put in operation.²⁸ One of its goals was to reduce trade between economic blocs. Recent research has convincingly concluded that “Nazi experts hoped to fortify Europe as an economic bloc and disengage it from the rest of the world.”²⁹ The ambition to reach self-sufficiency was not limited to those parts of the economy which produced necessities of life, such as agricultural goods or industrial commodities. Quite on the contrary, the film market illustrates the pursuit of autarky particularly well. By standardizing copyright practices and coordinating film distribution within Europe, Nazi experts hoped to tie the film industries of different European countries closer together and to create a common European film market. European films would subsequently become more competitive and could effectively rival US movies.³⁰ In 1935, these considerations led to the foundation of the International Film Chamber (Internationale Filmkammer, IFK). The members of this new organization were the film industries of European countries

 Bauer, The Construction of a National Socialist Europe, 42, 45.  Carl Clodius, “Neue Wege der europäischen Handelspolitik,” in Das neue Europa: Beiträge zur nationalen Wirtschaftsordnung und Großraumwirtschaft, ed. Gesellschaft für europäische Wirtschaftsplanung und Großraumwirtschaft e.V. (Dresden: Meinhold, 1941), 154–155; see also Bauer, The Construction of a National Socialist Europe, 98.  “Aus der vertraulichen Ausarbeitung der Volkswirtschaftlichen Abteilung der Deutschen Reichsbank ‘Probleme der äußeren Währungspolitik nach Beendigung des Krieges’, June 20, 1940,” in Europastrategien des deutschen Kapitals 1900–1945, ed. Reinhard Opitz (Cologne: Pahl-Rugenstein, 1977), doc. 99, quote on 690. See Stephen G. Gross, “Gold, Debt and the Quest for Monetary Order: The Nazi Campaign to Integrate Europe in 1940,” Contemporary European History 26, no. 2 (2017).  Bauer, The Construction of a National Socialist Europe, 110–116.  Gross, “Gold, Debt and the Quest for Monetary Order,” 309.  Benjamin G. Martin, “‘European Cinema for Europe!’ The International Film Chamber, 1935– 42,” in Cinema and the Swastika: The International Expansion of Third Reich Cinema, ed. Roel Vande Winkel and David Welch (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 27.

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in the National Socialist sphere of influence.³¹ According to its Italian president Giuseppe Volti, the IFK intended to create the “autarkic European cinematographic complex of today and tomorrow.”³² Others called the IFK the “fortress of the whole of Europe against the American flood of films.”³³ The IFK resembled other federations and associations which were founded as agents of “protectionist Europeanization” during the Nazi period. These European institutions, established by the Nazi regime and its allies, were to rival existing international organizations with both European and non-European members. The Permanent Council for the International Cooperation of Composers (Ständiger Rat für die internationale Zusammenarbeit der Komponisten, founded in 1934) was perceived at its time as a National Socialist alternative to the democratically run International Society for Contemporary Music (ISCM).³⁴ Historians have also described it as an “anti-ISCM.”³⁵ The Permanent Council itself did everything to be seen as such. For instance, in September 1935 it organized a festival in Vichy on the exact same dates that the ISCM was holding a festival in Prague and tried to overshadow it by inviting more than twice as many composers as its rival. For those composers from outside of Germany who were still members of the ISCM (for example the French composer Albert Roussel who was a member of the ISCM, but also a vice president of the Permanent Council), this meant that they had either to decide which festival to attend or to hurry to leave one festival before it was over to join the remainder of the other.³⁶ The ISCM, founded in 1922, can be seen as “a kind of League of Nations for contemporary composition.”³⁷ Fascists and National Socialists accused the ISCM of pro A “first” International Film Chamber had already been founded in 1935. Lacking the support of several European countries – and also of the USA, which at that time would have still been accepted as a member – it did not have any noticeable impact and was dissolved in 1939. See Martin, “European Cinema for Europe,” 26–28.  Martin, “European Cinema for Europe,” 30.  Theodor Wilhelm, “Europa als Kulturgemeinschaft,” in Europa: Handbuch der politischen, wirtschaftlichen und kulturellen Entwicklung des neuen Europa, ed. Deutsches Institut für Außenpolitische Forschung (Leipzig: Helingsche Verlagsanstalt, 1943), 158.  Anne C. Shreffler, “The International Society for Contemporary Music and its Political Context (Prague, 1935),” in Music and International History in the Twentieth Century, ed. Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht (New York, NY: Berghahn, 2015), 68.  Martin, The Nazi-Fascist New Order for European Culture, 21.  Shreffler, “International Society for Contemporary Music,” 68–70.  Shreffler, “International Society for Contemporary Music,” 60. Contemporaries also used the “League of Nations” analogy to describe the ISCM. See Paul Stefan’s 1935 expression “League of Nations of music” (Völkerbund der Musik) in Martin, The Nazi-Fascist New Order for European Culture, 21.

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moting atonal and twelve-tone music which they dismissed as “foreign” (volksfremd) to national music cultures. The Permanent Council would instead, in the words of the Nazi musicologist Herbert Gerigk, emphasize “the necessity of cultivating national character.”³⁸ And while the ISCM had non-European members, too, the Permanent Council developed into an exclusively European institution. The latter was dominated by Nazi Germany but showed its European ambitions by appointing the Swedish composer Kurt Atterberg as secretary general in 1934.³⁹ Similar dynamics and correlations can be observed in the European Writers’ Union (Europäische Schriftsteller-Vereinigung, 1941) as well as the International Law Chamber (Internationale Rechtskammer, 1941). The European Writers’ Union was created – in the words of the director of the Reich Literature Chamber (Reichsschrifttumskammer), Wilhelm Ihde – as a European “counter-movement or union against the PEN-club.”⁴⁰ The PEN-club was known for its cosmopolitan, liberal values,⁴¹ while the European Writers’ Union was to become “a body for European literature, one rooted in geographical and racist specificity, able to be defined against non-European enemies,” as Benjamin G. Martin convincingly argues.⁴² Likewise, the International Law Chamber rivalled older institutions like the International Law Association and the Institute of International Law (Institut de droit international), both founded in 1873, and presented itself as an alternative to international professional associations, such as the International Association of Lawyers (Union internationale des avocats). With regards to content, the International Law Chamber stood in sharp contrast to liberal concepts of international law guided by cosmopolitan and universalist values, instead proclaiming a “new” order recognizing the allegedly “natural” inequality of “peoples”

 Herbert Gerigk, “Musikfestdämmerung,” Die Musik: Organ des Amtes Musik beim Beauftragten des Führers für die Überwachung der gesamten geistigen und weltanschaulichen Schulung und Erziehung der NSDAP 27, no. 1 (1934): 50, accessed February 25, 2021, http://www.dig izeitschriften.de/dms/resolveppn/?PID=PPN84623971X_027%7CLOG_0022. See also Shreffler, “International Society for Contemporary Music,” 68; Martin, The Nazi-Fascist New Order for European Culture, 17–18.  Martin, The Nazi-Fascist New Order for European Culture, 37.  Wilhelm Ihde (June 1941), quoted in Martin, The Nazi-Fascist New Order for European Culture, 228. See also Frank-Rutger Hausmann, ‘Dichte, Dichter, tage nicht!’ Die Europäische Schriftsteller-Vereinigung in Weimar 1941–1948 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2004), 26–30.  Martin, The Nazi-Fascist New Order for European Culture, 12.  Martin, The Nazi-Fascist New Order for European Culture, 230.

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(Völker).⁴³ A new “continental European law” (Kontinentalrecht) was to replace international law (Völkerrecht).⁴⁴ Arguably, Nazi officials had similar intentions when the European Postal and Telecommunication Union (Europäischer Post- und Fernmeldeverein, EPTU, 1942) was founded in 1942. In the field of postal, telegraph, and telephone cooperation, two older multilateral organizations had already existed for a long time: the Universal Postal Union (UPU, founded in 1874) and the International Telecommunication Union (ITU, founded in 1865 as the International Telegraph Union). The bylaws of both the UPU and the ITU allowed for the foundation of subordinated regional unions, and a Pan-American Postal Union had been established in 1911 and enlarged in 1921.⁴⁵ But already before the Nazis came to power in Germany, the directors of the French and British postal administrations feared that such regional unions had “dissolving effects” that could ultimately lead to the disintegration of the UPU. As the British director Frederick Williamson maintained, the founding of a European Postal Union would be a reactionary move. We hold that the gradual extension of the Postal Union to include the whole world, as it now does, has been one of the most beneficent methods of the international co-operation which has ever been developed. It is the only case in existence of absolutely world-wide co-operation on any subject.⁴⁶

Still, historian Léonard Laborie argues that the EPTU was not intended “to replace or play against the UPU.”⁴⁷ To back up this thesis, he refers to an article which the director of the German Reichspost, Friedrich Risch, published in the journal of the UPU after the establishment of the EPTU. In this article, Risch declared that the EPTU wanted to be the UPU’s official European regional sub-organization.⁴⁸ Laborie’s argumentation does not take into consideration, however, that the technical objectives of the postal and telecommunication experts were not necessarily identical with the political objectives of the Nazi government.

 Benjamin G. Martin, “International Legal Cooperation in the Nazi-Fascist New Order,” International Politics 55, no. 6 (2018).  Martin, The Nazi-Fascist New Order for European Culture, 184–185.  Léonard Laborie, “Enveloping Europe: Plans and Practices in Postal Governance, 1929– 1959,” Contemporary European History 27, no. 2 (2018): 306; Christian Henrich-Franke, “Comparing Cultures of Expert Regulation: Governing Cross-Border Infrastructures,” Contemporary European History 27, no. 2 (2018): 287.  The first quote is by the director of the French postal administration, Maurice Lebon. Both quoted in Laborie, “Enveloping Europe,” 307.  Laborie, “Enveloping Europe,” 311.  Laborie, “Enveloping Europe,” 312.

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As in many other cases, one can assume that the regime was satisfied if the experts presented themselves as “unpolitical” technocrats and did not voice political opinions. The most recent study on the EPTU, placing emphasis on the tensions between Nazi ideology and “technocratic internationalism,” leaves the question open whether the EPTU is to be seen as an integral part of the UPU and the ITU or as a rival organization to the two older institutions.⁴⁹ However, based on archival material, it shows that contemporaries in neutral Switzerland refused to see the EPTU as a regional union of the UPU, pointing to its political character.⁵⁰ Furthermore, there is evidence that establishing the EPTU was intended to deflect “intra-European affairs away from the ITU […] in order to limit the influence of the US telecommunication industry which gained a strong position on international markets.”⁵¹ It seems therefore justified to interpret the founding of the EPTU as an attempt to deliberately weaken both the UPU and the ITU – and by doing so, to contribute to the detachment of Europe from global contexts. The case of the Union of European Copyright Societies (Vereinigung der europäischen Urheberrechtsgesellschaften, 1942) is particularly telling because this institution superseded an organization in which Germany together with Italy was at that time already in the lead, namely the International Confederation of Authors’ and Composers’ Societies/Confédération Internationale des Sociétés d’Auteurs et Compositeurs (CISAC), founded in 1926.⁵² In the second half of the 1930s, first Dino Alfieri and then Richard Strauss presided over CISAC, and from the end of 1941, its Secretary General was an Italian as well. At the same time, its secretariat was moved from Paris to Berlin. But in April 1942, another German board member of CISAC, Leo Ritter, wrote to Strauss that we are about to put the Confederation [CISAC], which is international in the pre-war sense and includes the British and North American copyright societies, somewhat on ice, while we foster a Union of European societies under the leadership of Germany (and Italy) that is healthy (lebensfähig) and adapted to the current circumstances.⁵³

 Valentine Aldebert and Sabrina Proschmann, “L’Union Européenne des Postes et des Télécommunications (1942–1945): Un ensemble d’asymétries complexes,” Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporains 80, no. 275 (2019): 53.  Aldebert and Proschmann, “L’Union Européenne des Postes et des Télécommunications,” 46.  Henrich-Franke, “Comparing Cultures of Expert Regulation,” 288.  Martin, The Nazi-Fascist New Order for European Culture, 210–211.  Leo Ritter, quoted in Martin, The Nazi-Fascist New Order for European Culture, 211.

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Although the British and American societies did not have any practical influence in CISAC any longer, the Nazis decided to establish a new association. The Union of European Copyright Societies was founded in October 1942 and took its seat in Berlin. The European Youth Federation (Europäischer Jugendverband, 1942) came into existence during a week-long conference in Vienna in September 1942.⁵⁴ Baldur von Schirach, then Gauleiter and Reichsstatthalter of Vienna, and Artur Axmann, Schirach’s successor as Reich Youth Leader, prepared the event together with Italian colleagues, despite the opposition of other Nazi officials. Delegates of youth movements in 14 European countries followed the invitation to Vienna. In his speech at the founding ceremony, Schirach stressed that the 14 members of the European Youth Federation had equal rights. But German-Italian domination was demonstrated by the appointment of Axmann and Aldo Vidussoni, the leader of the Italian Youth of the Lictor (Gioventù Italiana del Littorio), as presidents of the new organization.⁵⁵ The relationship of the European Youth Federation to the Boy Scouts International Bureau of the Boy Scout Movement (which had been founded 20 years earlier) has yet to be investigated in detail.⁵⁶ Both Schirach and Axmann mentioned the Boy Scout Movement in their speeches during the congress in Vienna. Schirach criticized that it was a “real English mistake to think that the youth of the whole world could be led by the system of the […] Scout federation.”⁵⁷ Axmann emphasized that the European Youth Federation “served no world state,” and set the new foundation apart from the Boy Scout movement as well: “With the European Youth Federation, the World Federation of the Scouts is overcome on the levels of both idea and deeds.”⁵⁸

 On the European Youth Federation, see Christoph Kühberger, “Europa als ‘Strahlenbündel nationaler Kräfte’: Zur Konzeption und Legitimation einer europäischen Zusammenarbeit auf der Gründungsfeierlichkeit des ‘Europäischen Jugendverbandes’ 1942,” Journal of European Integration History 15, no. 2 (2009); Jürgen Reulecke, “’Baldurs Kinderfest’ oder: Die Gründung des Europäischen Jugendverbandes in Wien am 14.09.1942,” in Geschichte als Last und Chance: Festschrift für Bernd Faulenbach, ed. Franz-Josef Jelich and Stefan Goch (Essen: Klartext, 2003); and most recently Oliver Rathkolb, Schirach: Eine Generation zwischen Goethe und Hitler (Vienna: Molden, 2020), 142–154.  Europa ist mehr als ein Kontinent. Ansprache des Reichsleiters Baldur von Schirach in der Stunde der Begründung des Europäischen Jugendverbandes in Wien am 14. September 1942 (n.d., n.p.), 10–11; Kühberger, “Europa als ‘Strahlenbündel nationaler Kräfte’,” 25–26; Rathkolb, Schirach, 143.  Timo Holste (Heidelberg) will do so in his PhD thesis.  Europa ist mehr als ein Kontinent, 9.  “Die Ansprache des Reichsjugendführers,” Völkischer Beobachter, Wiener Ausgabe, September 20, 1942, 3, quoted after Kühberger, “Europa als ‘Strahlenbündel nationaler Kräfte’,” 27.

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Future research will need to evaluate the role of several hundred other international organizations which were “approved” by Nazi Germany. An incomplete 1943 draft for the Handbook of International Organizations (to be published by the Deutsche Kongress-Zentrale (DKZ), which was covertly controlled by the German Ministry of Propaganda) listed 581 international organizations, some of which had been founded during the Second World War.⁵⁹ Files of international organizations captured by Nazi Germany mainly in Western Europe, where many international organizations had their headquarters, were brought to Berlin and archived by the DKZ. The organizations themselves were planned to be put under the control of a restructured DKZ after the end of the war.⁶⁰ The Nazi take on the work of international academic institutions has already been discussed in a number of insightful publications,⁶¹ but the picture of how Nazi Germany handled international professional associations – outside of academia as well – is far from complete.⁶²

 Herren, “Fascist Internationalism,” 209 (see 211, n. 66 for a list of those which were founded during the war). On the DKZ, see also Madeleine Herren, “‘Outwardly … an Innocuous Conference Authority’: National Socialism and the Logistics of International Information Management,” German History 20 (2002).  Madeleine Herren, Internationale Organisationen seit 1865. Eine Globalgeschichte der internationalen Ordnung (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2009), 73–79.  See especially Sören Flachowsky, “Europäische Großraumwissenschaft unter deutscher Hegemonie: Das Reicherziehungsministerium und die geplante Neuordnung des internationalen wissenschaftlichen Verbandswesens 1940–1942,” in Internationale Wissenschaftskommunikation und Nationalsozialismus: Akademischer Austausch, Konferenzen und Reisen in Geistes- und Kulturwissenschaften 1933 bis 1945, ed. Andrea Albrecht et al. (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2021); Sören Flachowsky, Rüdiger Hachtmann, and Florian Schmaltz, eds., Ressourcenmobilisierung: Wissenschaftspolitik und Forschungspraxis im NS-Herrschaftssystem (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2016); Rüdiger Hachtmann, Wissenschaftsmanagement im ‘Dritten Reich’: Geschichte der Generalverwaltung der Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2007); Frank-Rutger Hausmann, ‘Auch im Krieg schweigen die Musen nicht’: Die Deutschen Wissenschaftlichen Institute im Zweiten Weltkrieg (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2002); Holger Impekoven, Die Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung und das Ausländerstudium in Deutschland 1925–1945: Von der ‘geräuschlosen Propaganda’ zur Ausbildung der ‘geistigen Wehr’ des ‘Neuen Europa’ (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht unipress, 2013).  See Herren, “Fascist Internationalism,” 210.

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Europeanization against Globalization: Far Right Notions of Europe beyond the Nazi period Since the end of the Second World War, the Far Right in European countries has not been in a position to counter the work of international organizations or to frustrate multilateral relations by establishing alternative European networks and institutions. But far-right notions of Europe since 1945 have still followed similar patterns. Especially the French Nouvelle Droite and, in the wake of it, the New Right in other countries have been disseminating ideas of Europe which intended to steer the process of Europeanization into the “protectionist” direction.⁶³ As early as 1951, delegations of far-right movements from 14 countries met in Malmö and adopted the “Malmö Manifesto” which called for the erection of a “European Empire.” For the next two decades, the leader of the French delegation at the Congress of Malmö, Maurice Bardèche, the brother-in-law of the French writer and Nazi collaborator Robert Brasillach, was the most notorious proponent of a far-right Europeanism. He was joined by other far-right ideologues such as the Belgian Jean-François Thiriart, the founder of the transnational right-wing extremist movement Jeune Europe.⁶⁴ The self-proclaimed “fascist writer” Bardèche has been characterized as “the father-figure of Holocaust denial and its methodology.”⁶⁵ And, relying heavily on antisemitic narratives, Bardèche propagated a united and “independent” Europe as a “third force” between the United States and the Soviet Union. Liberal capitalism and parliamentary democracy (which in his eyes allowed Marxism to exist) were to be eliminated. Bardèche also rejected the notion of “mankind” as egalitarian and therefore dangerous to what he perceived to be distinct racial identities.⁶⁶ Together with the former Vichy minister Jean-Louis Tixier Vignancour, Bardèche in 1952, one year after the Malmö Congress, founded the journal Défense de l’Occident which provided a forum for the discussion of far-right ideas for the next 30 years.⁶⁷

 Hafeneger, “Rechtsextreme Europabilder,” 225.  Bar-On, “Fascism to the Nouvelle Droite,” 75–77.  Ian Barnes, “I am a Fascist Writer: Maurice Bardèche – Ideologist and Defender of French Fascism,” The European Legacy 7, no. 2 (2002): 195.  Ian Barnes, “Antisemitic Europe and the ‘Third Way’: the Ideas of Maurice Bardèche,” Patterns of Prejudice 34, no. 2 (2000): 61–62, 66–68.  Barnes, “I am a Fascist Writer,” 205.

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The Nouvelle Droite could build on the groundwork that Bardèche had laid. Nouvelle Droite is not the name of any coherent, formal group or organization. Instead, the term is used for those parts of the far-right movement in different countries which have aspired to a “cultural revolution from the right.”⁶⁸ The New Right expects that once it will have gained “cultural power,” political power will follow. Referring to none other than the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci, it sees itself engaged in a “revolutionary war fought out on the level of world-views, ways of thinking, and culture.”⁶⁹ Not coincidentally, it was in the years of the leftist 1968 students’ movement that circles around the farright ideologue Alan de Benoist started to follow this approach; their creation of the Groupement de Recherche et d’Études pour la Civilisation Européenne (GRECE) in 1968 usually counts as the founding moment of the New Right.⁷⁰ The New Right has adopted political strategies and methods of the New Left and has tried to give concepts of the New Left (see the example of “anti-racism” in the next paragraph) a new meaning. It has seen itself as a countermovement to “68.”⁷¹ Since the late 1960s, publications of the New Right – written by protagonists in different European countries – have variegated the narrative that European “identity” had to be defended against “homogenization,” that is, against universalist, egalitarian, cosmopolitan ideas and policies. A prime example is a collection of papers edited by Pierre Krebs and published in 1988 in which some of the most vocal adherents of these beliefs such as Benoist, Krebs, and Guillaume Faye sought “alternatives to the dogma of equality,” as the subtitle promised, or the dogma of the “unity of humankind,” as Faye put it in his contribution. This “dogma” was, Faye argued, on the verge of finally destroying the “cultural identity” of the Europeans as it took their “right to preservation of their ethnicity.” He foresaw the “de-identifying of the Europeans,” which in Faye’s eyes constituted an “ethnocide” against the Europeans.⁷² From there, it was just another

 Fabian Virchow, “‘Rechtsextremismus’: Begriffe – Forschungsfelder – Kontroversen,” in Handbuch Rechtsextremismus, ed. Fabian Virchow, Martin Langebach, and Alexander Häusler (Wiesbaden: Springer Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2016), 18.  The quotes are from a 1982 publication by Pierre Krebs (Die europäische Wiedergeburt, Grabert: Tübingen), one of the key right-wing “intellectuals” at his time. Here quoted from: Pierre Krebs, “The Metapolitical Rebirth of Europe,” in Fascism, ed. Roger Griffin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 349.  Bar-On, “Fascism to the Nouvelle Droite,” 71.  Tamir Bar-On, “Transnationalism and the French Nouvelle Droite,” Patterns of Prejudice 45, no. 3 (2011): 211–212.  Guillaume Faye, “Die neuen ideologischen Herausforderungen,” in Mut zur Identität: Alternativen zum Prinzip der Gleichheit, ed. Pierre Krebs (Struckum: Verlag für ganzheitliche For-

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small step to an attempt to reflag the concept of anti-racism: those who classified human beings into separate “races” were not racists, and on the contrary those who “wished to eliminate the existence of races and identities” were, Faye maintained. Anti-racism was the “respect for the races and peoples.”⁷³ In Faye’s logic it was consequent to demand the nations of Europe to stand together against the alleged threat of extermination: “One has to unite the national, European identities, to treat them as complementary to one another, not to oppose them to one another.”⁷⁴ The New Right’s “metapolitics” was not directly aimed at gaining political influence through elections. And the big political parties on the far right have usually been regarded as “Eurosceptics” because most of them presented themselves as adversaries to the European Union. Nevertheless, recent research on images of Europe in party documents of the Italian Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI) and the French Front National (FN) between 1978 and 1995 has documented that the scepticism of these two parties against the EU was accompanied by positive images of Europe as a “civilization.” Much in line with the identitarian approach towards Europe by right-wing intellectuals in Nazi Germany, the two parties believed in Europe as a “community of destiny” forced together by a shared history of its nations. Likewise, they supported a European “Third Way” between the USA and the Soviet Union, and identified “existential threats” with which Europe was allegedly confronted. Firstly, party literature stated that communist rule in the Soviet Union posed a threat to Europe, as did “American” culture. Secondly, Europe was confronted with threats resulting from “internal decline.” Thirdly, at least the FN saw Europe endangered by globalization. In a twist typical of the far right’s approaches to the topic of Europe, the European Union itself was depicted as part of this danger to Europe: the EU was perceived as a “Trojan horse” of globalization and a “stepping stone” towards globalism.⁷⁵

schung und Kultur, 1988), 207–211. On the cover of the book, the subtitle reads Alternativen zum Dogma der Gleichheit.  Faye, “Die neuen ideologischen Herausforderungen,” 196.  Faye, “Die neuen ideologischen Herausforderungen,” 214.  Marta Lorimer, “What Do They Talk About When They Talk About Europe? Euro-ambivalence in Far Right Ideology,” Ethnic and Racial Studies, published online August 20, 2020 (not yet part of an issue of the journal), accessed February 2, 2021, doi:10.1080/ 01419870.2020.1807035. As Lorimer notes, the MSI followed a different path, and “globalization never became a central issue for the party” (page numbers not available yet).

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The FN deployed the term “Euromondialisme” to capture this meaning.⁷⁶ Recently, the German Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) has articulated similar beliefs.⁷⁷ The aim of proponents of the New Right and of parts of the far right parties’ family in the twenty-first century remains, in the tradition of Benoist’s writings which are cited in the relevant publications until today, “to position Europe against globalization.”⁷⁸ They are still juxtaposing the Europe they aspire to with the European Union which they identify as an intermediate step or “whistle stop on the route to a world society.”⁷⁹ This recalls the quote by Jürgen Habermas at the beginning of this paper, which is no coincidence; the authors mention Habermas explicitly. They do so because it is exactly Habermas’ positive vision of a “politically constituted world society,” connected with the example set by the European Union, which the Far Right rejects.

Conclusion: Researching Europeanizations from a Global Perspective The history of far-right notions of Europe in the Nazi period shows that for National Socialist and other far-right “intellectuals” and experts, fostering processes of Europeanization has been a deliberate attempt to detach Europe from other parts of the world. The foundation of European institutions on the initiative and under the leadership of protagonists from the Axis powers during the

 Nicholas Startin, “’Euromondialisme’ and the Growth of the Radical Right,” in The Routledge Handbook of Euroscepticism, ed. Benjamin Leruth, Nicholas Startin, and Simon Usherwood (London: Routledge, 2018), 79.  Florian Greiner and Tobias Meßmer, “Ideas of Europe within the ‘New Right’: The Case of Germany,” International Encyclopaedia of Ideas of Europe, August 24, 2020, accessed February 19, 2021, http://www.ideasofeurope.org/encyclopaedia/concepts/new-right/.  Felix Menzel, “Identitäres Europa,” Blaue Narzisse, December 6, 2012, accessed March 31, 2013, http://www.blauenarzisse.de/index.php/anstoss/item/3639-identitäres-europa, memento accessed March 30, 2020, https://web.archive.org/web/20130228110710/http://www.blaue narzisse.de/index.php/anstoss/item/3639-identitäres-europa.  Felix Menzel and Philip Stein, Junges Europa. Szenarien des Umbruchs (Chemnitz: Verein Journalismus und Jugendkultur, 2013), 86, quoted in Daniel Keil, “Europa und die (neue) Rechte: Die Mehrdimensionalität der Europa-Imagination (neu)rechter Bewegungen,” in Autoritäre Formierung: Der Durchmarsch von rechts geht weiter, ed. Friedrich Burschel (Berlin: Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung, 2020), 66, accessed March 30, 2020, https://www.rosalux.de/fileadmin/rls_up loads/pdfs/Manuskripte/Manuskripte_25_Autor_Formierung.pdf. See also Cas Mudde, “Globalisation: The Multi-Faceted Enemy?” CERC (Contemporary Europe Research Centre) Working Paper 3 (2004): 13–14, accessed April 1, 2020, https://works.bepress.com/cas_mudde/11/.

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Nazi period was intended to break the influence of already-existing multilateral institutions whose scope transcended the boundaries of Europe. And since the end of the Second World War, the New Right and, in part, political parties on the far-right political spectrum have been developing narratives which project “Europe” (though not the European Union) as a bulwark against global – in their words, “globalist” – initiatives of cooperation, and they framed Europeanization as an alternative or even an antipode to globalization. This aspect of Europeanization has largely been overlooked in public discourse on European integration so far and has also not received the same attention in historical research as other aspects. The history of Europe has to date mostly been written from an “insider” perspective, that is, from the standpoint of a spectator within Europe. From this view, Europeanizations⁸⁰ appear to be processes of ever closer entanglement of nation-states, slowly overcoming nationalist narratives and stereotypes, civilizing the resolving of conflicts between European countries by binding the members of the European Union to international law and universal human rights, and transferring sovereignty from the EU member states to the European Commission or the European Parliament. This description of Europeanization within the framework of the EU is indeed not inaccurate, and the processes mentioned are precisely the reason why the EU has been so severely attacked by the Far Right until today. However, it is just one perspective and a one-sided picture that looks different from a global perspective.⁸¹ The formation of the “ever closer union” went in some respects hand in hand with closing the doors to the outside world. Europeanization policies in the Nazi period are an extreme example, but the development of post-war European integration is likewise not free from such tendencies. Quite obvious (and well researched) is the fact that what is described as European integration today was mainly Western European integration up until 1990, driven by the desire to weld Western European countries together against the communist East. Moreover, while it is true on the one hand that the common European market can be read as a contribution to post-war efforts to support free trade and to “sit-

 Following Michael Gehler’s proposition, “Europeanizations” is used in the plural to highlight that Europeanization is a “highly complex process on different levels with various types” and that “it includes actions, adaptations, and reactions.” Michael Gehler, “‘Europe’, Europeanizations and their Meaning for European Integration Historiography,” Journal of European Integration History 22, no. 1 (2016): 174, accessed March 1, 2020, doi:10.5771/0947-9511-2016-1-141.  See also Ulrich Beck’s and Edgar Grande’s call for a “methodological cosmopolitism.” Ulrich Beck and Edgar Grande, Das kosmopolitische Europa: Gesellschaft und Politik in der Zweiten Moderne (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2004), 33–34.

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uate Europe in an open global economy,”⁸² on the other hand, access to this market from outside was (and is) constrained also, best visible in the introduction of agricultural duties which are highly protectionist regulations.⁸³ Other members of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) even complained at the time that the trade rules of the European Economic Community (EEC) violated GATT rules.⁸⁴ The allowance of free movement of goods, capital, services, and people within the EEC was accompanied by the introduction of strict border regimes at the outside borders. Access of Algeria as a former member of the European Communities (EC) to the Single Market was for instance made more and more difficult after the mid-1960s, separating the country from the common market.⁸⁵ A more recent example of European institutions engaging in fencing Europe off from the world is the involvement of the European Union’s Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) in illegal pushbacks of migrants at the Greek-Turkish border.⁸⁶ Generally speaking, Europeanizations were quite often the search or the hope for a “third” way separate from other parts of the world. European unification has been modelled by some of its proponents as a way to counterbalance the power of the USA, the Soviet Union, and, more recently, China. Specific industrial projects supported by the EU, such as the navigation satellite system Galileo or the European Space Agency, can be read in this way. Historians also have to look more carefully into the question of why the forerunners of the EU became over time the most important European institutions in the first place, instead of the Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), an agency of the United Nations, which was established earlier, the Council of Europe (CoE) or the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC), to name just a few.⁸⁷ Why did the CoE, with its much broader membership than the EU and the USA, Canada, Japan, Mexico, Israel, and the Holy See as observers, not gain more influence, at least after 1990? Why not the OEEC, later transformed into the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which started to accept non-European member states from 1961?

 Gross, “Gold, Debt and the Quest for Monetary Order,” 309.  Kiran Klaus Patel, Projekt Europa: Eine kritische Geschichte (Munich: Beck, 2018), 125.  Patel, Projekt Europa, 308.  Patel, Projekt Europa, 271–281.  Giorgos Christides et al., “Frontex in illegale Pushbacks von Flüchtlingen verwickelt,” Spiegel online, October 23, 2020, accessed January 26, 2021, https://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/ fluechtlinge-frontex-in-griechenland-in-illegale-pushbacks-verwickelt-a-00000000-0002-00010000-000173654787.  On UNECE, see Patel, Projekt Europa, 23–32.

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On a theoretical level, historiography needs to develop concepts that distinguish different types of Europeanizations according to their degree of disentanglement from or cooperation with other parts of the world.⁸⁸ “Protectionist Europeanization” (1) and “universalist Europeanization” (2) could be used as such concepts. Although in practice processes of Europeanization generally have not been developments of just “protectionist” or “universalist” kinds but a mixture of both, it heuristically makes sense to have terms available for the ideal types. In the real world, they overlap and exist simultaneously. (1) “Protectionist Europeanization” denotes Europeanization processes that secluded Europe from the outside world. As has been shown, conceptions of “protectionist Europeanizations” were supported by self-proclaimed right-wing intellectuals and found their entrance into the agendas of political parties on the far right. Their advocates were driven by their hostility towards globalization as well as by their belief in a European “pan-ideology” which postulated the existence of typically European particularities.⁸⁹ However, support for protectionist Europeanization processes has not been limited to the far-right political spectrum. On the contrary, the idea that Europe had to protect itself against the “outside” world has always been accepted by considerable parts of the society. In the first half of the 1950s, Hannah Arendt warned for example of growing anti-Americanism in (Western) European societies and was even speaking of a “new panEuropean nationalism.” While she was convinced that efforts to federate the European nations were “very healthy and necessary,” she also stated that “the movement for a united Europe has recently shown decidedly nationalistic traits.”⁹⁰ For historical research on Europeanizations, this is a broad and compa It should be noted that ideologues of the Far Right have made a distinction between “a cosmopolitan or globalist Europe” and “a Europe understood as a community of civilisation” themselves and concluded that “there are in fact two radically different conceptions of Europe.” These quotes are from an internal FN party guide as of 1991, quoted after Marta Lorimer, “Europe as Ideological Resource: the Case of the Rassemblement National,” Journal of European Public Policy 27, no. 9 (2020): 1394.  Tilman Lüdke, “Pan-Ideologies,” in Europäische Geschichte Online (EGO), ed. Leibniz Institute of European History, Mainz, March 6, 2012, accessed January 26, 2021, urn:nbn:de:015920110201189. Lüdke (in sections 6 and 7 of the publication) explicitly talks about “Nazi pan-Europeanism”. He warns to put Richard Coudenhove-Kalergis “Pan-Europa” into the category of pan-Europeanism; in contrast, he argues that Coudenhove-Kalergis vision resembled the idea underlying the League of Nations and the later European Union.  Hannah Arendt, “Dream and Nightmare: Anti-American Feeling in Europe,” September 10, 1954, reproduced online, accessed January 30, 2021, https://www.commonwealmagazine.org/ dream-and-nightmare, originally published under the title “Europe and America: Dreams and Nightmare” in Commonweal 60, no. 23 (1954). Cf. Lars Rensmann, “Europeanism and Americanism in the Age of Globalization: Hannah Arendt’s Reflections on Europe and America and Im-

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ratively “unworked” field that has to be worked on. On the one hand, studies can build on a growing body of literature on anti-Communism, anti-Americanism, the anti-globalization movements, and similar topics. On the other hand, historiography could make more use of theories of nationalism and transfer them to the European level. In addition, Ulrich Beck’s and Edgar Grande’s critique of the “imperialist, eurocentric, even racist” idea of the European community as a civilization has yet to capture the attention of historians.⁹¹ (2) Europeanization processes that effected multilateral relations or agreements beyond Europe or aimed at such effects in the future should be called “universalist Europeanization.” Although the European Union – despite Jürgen Habermas’ conviction that the EU was a step towards a politically constituted world society – has wobbled between the universalist and the protectionist type of Europeanization,⁹² one of its main objectives has been seen by many in the effort to overcome nationalism and to help moral universalism get accepted as an idea, especially when it comes to universal human rights. To cite Arendt once more, a federated Europe would ideally “make nationalism itself a thing of the past.”⁹³ For historiography, focusing on “universalist Europeanizations” thus means, firstly, to pay attention to the “cosmopolitan momentum” of the European integration process that transcended the idea of the nation and transformed national sovereignty.⁹⁴ Secondly, it means to research the history of a globally imbedded Europe, that is the history of cross-border processes and of entanglements between Europe and the world outside of Europe. *** For Nazi Germany, Europeanization was a way to undermine multilateral relations between Europe and other parts of the world and to limit the influence of existing international organizations. Their success in the long run was limited, though. Most of the international organizations which Nazi Germany attacked by founding rival organizations survived the era of fascism. The International Soci-

plications for a Post-National Identity of the EU Polity,” European Journal of Political Theory 5, no. 2 (2006), accessed January 30, 2021, doi:10.1177/1474885106061603.  Beck and Grande, Das kosmopolitische Europa, 198–201.  Rather surprisingly, Habermas himself has voiced hopes that European political integration backed by social welfare could offer “protection” for “the national diversity and the incomparable cultural wealth of the biotope ‘old Europe’ […] against levelling in the midst of a rapidly progressing globalization.” Habermas, “The Crisis of the European Union,” 348.  Arendt, “Dreams and Nightmare.”  Beck and Grande, Das kosmopolitische Europa, 36.

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ety for Contemporary Music, the PEN International, the International Law Association, the Institute of International Law, the International Association of Lawyers, the Universal Postal Union, the International Telecommunication Union, the International Confederation of Authors’ and Composers’ Societies, and the successor of the Boy Scouts International Bureau, the World Organization of the Scout Movement, all still exist today, while their Nazi rival organizations have, naturally, long seized to function. However, the ideology of “protectionist Europeanization” that fuelled the foundation of the Nazi organizations has survived. The history of post-war Europe has been influenced by its supporters as well as by the supporters of “universalist Europeanization” ever since, and historians are well advised to pay attention to both types of Europeanization.

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Section 2: Intellectuals, Politics, and the Europeanization of Thought

Çiğdem Oğuz

“We Will Adopt the Technology of Europe but not European Morality” The Quest for Authentic Values in Late Ottoman Politics

Introduction Starting from the late eighteenth century, the Ottoman elite endorsed an idea of reform that was inspired by European military victories. The attempts of the reformist sultans, Selim III (1789 – 1807) and Mahmud II (1808 – 1839) constituted a transition period to the Ottoman age of reform, namely the Tanzimat (Reorganization) era that followed the promulgation of the Edict of Gülhane in 1839, which guaranteed the security of life, property, and honor of all Ottoman subjects regardless of their religious and ethnic identities. The idea of reform was a consequence of various military defeats that the Ottoman Empire had experienced during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In the domestic realm, the reforms aimed at the elimination of decentralization trends that the empire had been undergoing with the rising power of ayans (local notables) and subsequently of the nationalist movements.¹ Centralization and military reform, being the core elements of the idea of reform in the Ottoman Empire, brought about substantial changes to the empire’s social, cultural, and intellectual life. Both of these core elements required financial revenues to be extracted via taxation; a new bureaucracy that would help centralization and the efficient collection of taxes; new schools to train bureaucrats and military personnel with a Europeanstyle education; and finally a new infrastructure that would ease communication between the center and the provinces of the empire, i. e. the government and the bureaucrats.²

 For more information on the context and reforms, see Erik J. Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History, 4th ed. (London: I.B. Tauris, 2017), 3 – 65.  The earlier attempts of reform from the mid-seventeenth century to the late eighteenth century included a program of reorganization of the army via adaptation of new military technology and techniques, the restoration of the authority of the center, and the introduction of new taxation methods to increase the flow of cash into the treasury. Selim III’s reform program, called Nizam-ı Cedid “New Order,” on the other hand, embraced a different reformist mindset than the earlier attempts with a readiness to accept European practices and foreign advisors, and the introduchttps://doi.org/10.1515/9783110685473-006

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Centralization and modernization continued all throughout the Tanzimat era, albeit in a different way than in the periods of Selim III and Mahmud II. The Tanzimat reforms were implemented by the bureaucrats of Bâbıâli (the Sublime Porte) that represented a shift of power from the Palace to the Porte as the latter proved efficient in employing the modern apparatus of governing in the age of diplomacy. Eventually, this trend culminated in the declaration of the Constitution in 1876. The Palace, losing its legitimacy vis-à-vis the new political elite, restored its power during the reign of Abdülhamid II. The Russian-Ottoman War in 1877– 1878 and Istanbul’s insecure position constituted the pretext for the suspension of the parliament and constitution for an indefinite period of time. From that time on, Abdülhamid II held the power in his hands not only as the Sultan, but also as an absolute ruler until the declaration of a new constitution with the Constitutional Revolution of the Young Turks in 1908. The constitutional movement’s aim to stop all kinds of foreign intervention in the empire through the establishment of the rule of law and equal representation in parliament was shortlived and could not be fulfilled owing to internal and foreign pressures. The empire’s eventual downfall came over a period of ten years of war, beginning with the Italo-Turkish War of 1911 and ending with the Greco-Turkish War of 1922, with the Balkan Wars (1912– 1913) and the Great War (1914– 1918) in-between being particularly destructive. It is possible to argue that the discussion of the prospects and limits of Europeanization was the most important debate in the years of rapid transformation in the late Ottoman Empire. The first constitutional movement in the empire, the Young Ottomans, and later the second constitutional movement, the Young Turks, criticized the Tanzimat era for its “excessive Westernization” model and accused the reformists of imitating the West and not taking the regional dynamics into account.³ In this context, morality appeared as a key feature of the debate, with a motto that still echoes in modern Turkey: “We will adopt the technology (science) of Europe, but not their morality.” Those reservations reached a

tion of new communication channels between the elites of European countries and the Ottoman Empire, Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History, 16.  On the intellectual development and inspirations of constitutional movements, see Şerif Mardin, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1962); M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, Preparation for a Revolution: The Young Turks, 1902 – 1908 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Masami Arai, Turkish Nationalism in the Young Turk Era (Leiden: Brill, 1992); Erik J. Zürcher, The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building: From the Ottoman Empire to Atatürk’s Turkey (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010); Zafer Toprak, Türkiye’de Popülizm: 1908 – 1923 [Populism in Turkey: 1908 – 1923] (Istanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2013).

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point where all Western or Western-inspired cultural products, including but not limited to literature, science, philosophy, entertainment and leisure time activities, lifestyles, legislation, and education became subject to a compatibility test in terms of their impact on the moral values of society. In the Ottoman vocabulary of reform, while Europeanization and Westernization had the same meaning and these two were often used interchangeably, the term modernization referred to a rather technical betterment of institutions inspired by the European model. In the cultural sphere, it was mostly Europeanization and Westernization that evoked negative connotations. Earlier research on the age of Ottoman reform had a tendency to follow the modernization theory that viewed the reforms as stages towards progressive evolution of the Ottoman Empire into a modern nation state. In this view, all movements or discourses against reforms were categorically labeled as reactionary without further discussion. However, the protection of the cultural realm vis-à-vis the impact of Europeanization presents a more complicated picture in which intra-elite power struggles, ideological contestations, and intellectual preoccupations played important roles. In this framework, morality appears as a keyword to begin studying this picture. Discourses on morality did not appear only as a reaction to the Europeanization. They had a significant place in political and social life in the Ottoman Empire long before the reforms of the nineteenth century. For instance, corruption and the degeneration of moral values as reasons of the decline of state power and social disorder were primary themes of the literary genre, the nasihatnames “advice letters” since the second half of the sixteenth century. In this sense, “moral renewal” meant political revival and the point of reference for this renewal was often the earlier periods of the glorious Ottoman and/or Islamic past. Yet, the debates concerning the protection of local values against the backdrop of the nineteenth-century reforms were not simply a continuation of Ottoman traditional moral renewal ideas or religious conservatism but were the result of a specific context. I argue that morality served as a filter to prevent possible social and structural damages of modernization in the empire, damages that could emerge as a result of industrialization, urbanization, and social mobility. In this view, the Western ideologies that stirred revolutionary movements were to be resisted through authentic morality. In addition to a shared anxiety over excessive Westernization, some other domestic dynamics played a role in the construction of morality as a central concept of politics and social life. Up until the last decades of the Empire, morality remained a stronghold of traditional circles, such as the members of ulemâ (Islamic scholars) who acted as principal agents in formulating and defending a certain Islamic morality that stipulated religion as the only source of morality.

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Until the rise of Turkish nationalism – the final nationalist movement in the empire – the formulation of Islamic morality remained relatively unquestioned. Only with a new conception of “national morality” which was regarded a key for reaching a level of informed Westernization instead of a superficial one, the Islamic monopoly over morality – at least in the classical sense – had come to an end. Among others, the self-perception of Ottoman Muslim society played a role in the construction of a moralistic discourse that had a significant impact on the construction of an authentic identity that was not only diverse from European and Christian societies, but also from Arabic, Persian, and Islamic ones. This essay considers the construction process of this identity and the political, social, and intellectual impact of Ottoman Europeanization. It focuses particularly on the last decade of the empire when the ideological confrontations accelerated owing to social and political crises that surfaced in a series of destructive wars. In this paper, while for the Tanzimat era various literary works proved to be valuable sources for the study of morality and Europeanization, instructional pamphlets, journal articles, and similar texts written by Ottoman intellectuals were used for the later periods. A sense of belatedness, inadequacy with respect to the West, and a comparison of local and foreign in a wider sense were inherent to the intellectual debates in the late Ottoman Empire. The impact of this line of thought is still observable in Ottoman-Turkish historiography. Recently, a good deal of studies have discussed Ottoman history and the empire’s relations with Europe from different angles. These studies do not only reach beyond the boundaries of the earlier “East and West dichotomy” and the “particularistic” approach to Ottoman history that evaluates the Ottoman State as a unique formation, but also integrate Ottoman history with the European one or even situate it in world history. Yet, the local dynamics need to be studied through a perspective that is sensible to the realities of the empire in a given period.⁴ In this framework, I aim to discuss the morality aspect of the cultural resistance to Europeanization showing the dynamics and the context in which the negative imagery of Europeanization emerged. I deal particularly with these questions: what was the meaning of cultural resistance to Europe beyond religious conservatism? What did becoming

 For a discussion on the recent historiographical trends, see Cengiz Kırlı, “From Economic History to Cultural History in Ottoman Studies,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, no. 46 (2014): 376 – 378; Cem Emrence, “Three Waves of Late Ottoman Historiography, 1950 – 2007,” Middle Eastern Studies Association Bulletin 41, no. 2 (2007): 137– 151. On situating the Ottoman history within European and the Mediterranean historiographical frames and its problems, see Christopher Markiewicz, “Europeanist Trends and Islamicate Trajectories in Early Modern Ottoman History,” Past and Present 239 (2018): 265 – 281.

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European mean to the Ottomans? What was the meaning of informed Westernization? I begin my analysis with the period of Tanzimat, the Ottoman age of “Reorganization.”

Superficial Europeanization: The Snob Typology in the Tanzimat Era The Tanzimat era witnessed the emergence of the novel as a new genre in the Ottoman literary space. One of the distinguishing aspects of the early novels of the Tanzimat was the critique of over-Westernization through a figure of snob (züppe in Turkish, while the terms fop or dandy were also used) as an upper-class character who appeared “Europeanized” only from the outside, but was actually a wannabe, who had no respect for traditions, customs, and the family values in society.⁵ Presented as an anomaly of the period, the snob was the result of excessive and superficial Europeanization. He gambled, consumed alcohol, wandered around the cosmopolitan Beyoğlu district (also known as Pera) that was inhabited by Europeans, and lived the life of a womanizer. The snob in the literary works always ended up with a tragic, disastrous end, which makes the moral of the story very clear. The most famous example of this genre was the work of the pioneering novelist Ahmed Midhat, Felâtun Bey ile Râkım Efendi (Felâtun Bey and Râkım Efendi).⁶ He put two characters in juxtaposition with regard to their moral qualities, with Felâtun Bey being a morally corrupt, alafranca man, while Râkım Efendi is exemplary for his Western education without becoming estranged from his Ottoman lower middle-class background. A similar plot and moral can be observed  For a discussion of the sense of belatedness in Turkish novels from the past to today, see Nurdan Gürbilek, “Dandies and Originals: Authenticity, Belatedness, and the Turkish Novel,” South Atlantic Quarterly 102, no. 2– 3 (2003): 599 – 628. Parla’s work discusses the epistemological foundations of Tanzimat novels, see Jale Parla, Babalar ve Oğullar: Tanzimat Romanının Epistemolojik Temelleri [Fathers and Sons: The Epistemological Foundations of Tanzimat Novel] (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1990). Mardin’s contextualization of how the social and political atmosphere reflected upon anti-Western discourses in Ottoman novels is particularly useful, see Şerif Mardin, “Super Westernization in Urban Life in the Ottoman Empire in the Last Quarter of the Nineteenth Century,” in Turkey: Geographic and Social Perspectives, ed. Peter Benedict, Erol Tümertekin, and Fatma Mansur (Leiden: Brill, 1974), 403 – 46.  Ahmet Mithad, Felâtun Bey Ile Râkım Efendi (Istanbul: Kırk Anbar Matbaası, 1875). Beside many transliterated versions in Turkish, a translation of the novel also appeared in English, see Ahmet Mithad Efendi, Felâtun Bey and Râkim Efendi: An Ottoman Novel, trans. Melih Levi and Monica M. Ringer (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2016).

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in other literary works of the time, such as in Recaizade Ekrem’s Araba Sevdası (The carriage affair), Hüseyin Rahmi Gürpınar’s Şık (Chick) and Şıpsevdi (Quick to fall in love), Nâbizâde Nâzım’s Zehra, and Ömer Seyfettin’s Efruz Bey. ⁷ Such an intense interest in the character of the dandy shows a great deal of discontent about his excessive Europeanization. The moralistic discourse about over-Westernization was a result of a specific ideological and political context. The Tanzimat witnessed the emergence of powerful statesmen such as Mustafa Reşit Pasha and his pupils Ali Pasha and Fuat Pasha who served as the Minister of Foreign Affairs and/or the grand vizier throughout the Tanzimat era. The opposition against Ali Pasha and Fuat Pasha, the second generation of Tanzimat statesmen, found its expression in the constitutional and parliamentarian movement of Young Ottomans in the 1860s. Namık Kemal and other names of the movement criticized the Tanzimat for being disrespectful to Ottoman values, obedient to the European interests, and for pursuing their own self-interests to monopolize the power in their hands. Yet, the reason of this discontent was not the content of the reforms alone. The Young Ottomans were a group of bureaucrats within the reformist circle who were excluded from the power game by the prominent Ali Pasha and Fuat Pasha despite their knowledge and ability.⁸ Muslim values and the rhetoric of morality were also used to mobilize the masses against the Tanzimat elite in a populist way. The Young Ottomans could successfully harness the power of the novel as a literary genre that had the potential to reach a wider audience. The discontent of Muslim masses was clear especially after the Islahat Fermanı of 1856 (“Edict of Reform”) that extended equal rights to the non-Muslim communities in the empire. The edict was regarded as an act to please the European powers in the context of the Crimean War during which a coalition of major powers such as France and Britain sided with the Ottoman Empire against Russia. In addition, the economic burden of the reforms and modernization and the further integration of the Ottoman economy with European capitalism under free trade agreements created a great social discontent among Ottoman society regarding European economic involvement in the country.⁹ The historian Doğan Gürpınar asserts that “demonization” of Tanzimat as a period of subordination to Western imperialism and to excessive demands of non-Muslims in the empire served ideological purposes instead of reflecting

 Mardin, “Super Westernization,” 412; Gürbilek, “Dandies and Originals,” 608.  Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History, 61– 62.  Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History, 58 – 60.

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the reality.¹⁰ He argues that the formation of this discourse lies in the self-image of the Tanzimat itself. Until the reevaluation of the Tanzimat in the 1980s by critical historians, the nationalist historiography evaluated the period in the eyes of the critics of the Tanzimat. The latter emphasized the timid approach of the Tanzimat to the reforms that allowed old and new survive together, its Ottomanist ideology (instead of a national one), and liberal economic policy that opened the Ottoman economy to European imperialism.¹¹ Moral criticism of the Tanzimat can be viewed from this perspective. It served to clarify the contrast between a patriotic Westernization and a superficial one.

Science, Education, and Morality Science was another facet of the Ottoman morality discourse against Europeanization. In adopting the scientific developments in Europe, the moralistic discourse added a clear distinction between science and morality. In this logic, European superiority in science was unquestioned, yet European “morality” was to be avoided, as Islam was considered superior to Christianity. The source of morality for the Muslims was Islam, a religion whose prophet said, “I am only sent to correct morality.” A discourse on science and morality went hand in hand, as discussed by the sociologist Yalçınkaya, due to several reasons, including the inter-elite competition for power and the fear of a disruption of the social order as it happened in European countries during the revolutions of 1830 and 1848.¹² Accordingly, Yalçınkaya writes, in adopting European science, the solution of the new generation of Ottoman bureaucrats was a synthesis of “a sufficient amount of properly understood new knowledge, coupled with an understanding of one’s place that should not be challenged, that is, the combination of science and morality.”¹³ While preserving the social order in a way not to harm their elite positions, morality was injected into the discourse of science as if it was a “natural” component of the latter and thus formulating the scientist as a moral person “serving the state” by using knowledge in the service of the nation.

 Doğan Gürpınar, Ottoman / Turkish Visions of the Nation 1860 – 1950 (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 165.  Gürpınar, Ottoman / Turkish Visions, 181.  M. Alper Yalçınkaya, Learned Patriots: Debating Science, State, and Society in the NineteenthCentury Ottoman Empire (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2015).  Yalçınkaya, Learned Patriots, 54– 55.

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At this point, it is important to note an increasing interest in morality courses in education during the nineteenth century. Starting with the era of Mahmud II in 1808, education campaigns and the opening of new schools that met the need for military and bureaucratic personnel had become core elements of Ottoman modernization. The most remarkable work of the time was the Ottoman statesman Sadık Rıfat Paşa’s Ahlâk risalesi (Treaties on morality) which he wrote for children in 1847. It was later followed by an addendum Zeyl-i risale-i ahlâk (Addendum to the treaties on morality) for adults training to become public servants.¹⁴ The former was written for children and used as a textbook in Ottoman state schools. In defining virtues and vices, Sadık Rıfat Paşa utilized both rational and religious arguments with an emphasis on the harmony of rational actions and God’s principles. Yet, instead of religious punishment for the vices, he underlined social forms of punishment such as the marginalization and exclusion from society. As discussed by the historian Alp Eren Topal, in Rıfat Paşa’s formulation, it is possible to observe a historical background of Ottoman Islamic traditional political thought with adjustments to the new age of reforms.¹⁵ During the Hamidian Era (1876 – 1908), morality gained a particular emphasis in school reforms. Inculcating modern notions of discipline, work, and progress went hand in hand with an increasing role of Islam in Hamidian politics while European imperialism and colonialism discredited the European civilization in the eyes of contemporary Ottoman statesmen. Hamidian public schools sought to instrumentalize moral instruction to fight both “foreign encroachment and internal moral decline.”¹⁶ Even after the Hamidian era, moral instruction remained central to public education in a more secular way, furnished with the discourses of progress and prosperity of the country. During the Balkan Wars and the First World War, a “regeneration thesis,” according to which the loss of morality in the Ottoman Empire resulted in the loss of lands, was also integrated into school textbooks.¹⁷

 Sadık Rıfat Paşa, Müntehabât-ı Âsâr [Selected Works], 11 vols. (Istanbul: Tatyos Divitçiyan, 1873). I am thankful to Alp Eren Topal who has shared a transliterated version of these treaties with me.  Alp E. Topal, “From Decline to Progress: Ottoman Concepts of Reform 1600 – 1876” (PhD diss., Bilkent University, 2017), 126 – 42.  Benjamin C. Fortna, “Islamic Morality in Late Ottoman ‘Secular’ Schools,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 32, no. 3 (2000): 375.  Betül Açıkgöz, “The Epistemological Conflict in the Narratives of Elementary School Textbooks (1908 – 1924): Islamic and Secular Insights into Education” (PhD diss., Boğaziçi University, 2012), 80 – 81.

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Women, Family, and Sexual Morality Sexual morality had a distinctive place in the debates revolving around the negative impacts of European values in the Ottoman Muslim world. For most of the commentators on the issue, European sexual morality was to be avoided for it was associated with uncontrolled sexuality. Men and women uniting under the same roof without the distinction of haremlik and selamlık in public spaces such as theaters, cinemas, trams, ferries, schools or state offices was considered a precursor of “unregulated” sexual relationships.¹⁸ In this view, much importance was attached to veiling as a fundamental principle to keep the boundaries between the sexes recognized. For the most part, preventing any change in gender relations was regarded pivotal in protecting traditional Muslim lifestyle and community values in the empire. Therefore, the realm of the family remained relatively untouched all throughout the Ottoman Tanzimat with a few exceptions.¹⁹ On this topic, gender scholar Deniz Kandiyoti has asserted: The history of Ottoman legal reforms starting with the Tanzimat (1839) illustrates the Turkish response to Western pressures, resulting in changes in every aspect of commercial life but not in the fields of personal status, family and inheritance laws. It is not surprising that the ulema (Muslim clergy) whose powers in Ottoman society were severely restricted by the Tanzimat reforms, claimed the sphere of personal status and family legislation as their own. More to the point, this was the only area where conservatism could create the broadest possible political consensus. The cold facts of Ottoman economic and political dependence decisively restricted the arena in which traditionalists could raise the banners of cultural integrity and relative autonomy.²⁰

In the second half of the nineteenth century, the theme of “women’s emancipation” appeared in the Ottoman press. The first journal taking up this issue was Terakki (Progress) in the 1860s followed by a supplement of the same journal en-

 Çiğdem Oğuz, “The Struggle Within: ‘Moral Crisis’ on the Ottoman Homefront During the First World War” (PhD diss., Boğaziçi University and Leiden University, 2018), 84.  On these exceptions, see Mehmet Ö. Alkan, “Tanzimat’tan Sonra ’Kadın’ın Hukuksal Statüsü” [Women’s Legal Status After the Tanzimat], Toplum ve Bilim 50 (1990): 85 – 95. Despite the lack of a large-scale reform attempt in the sphere of family law, the politicization of female sexuality was a phenomenon of the Tanzimat era during which pregnancy, childbirth, and abortion became a concern for the state due to low population growth among the Muslims, see Gülhan Balsoy, The Politics of Reproduction in Ottoman Society, 1838 – 1900 (London: Pickering & Chatto, 2013).  Deniz Kandiyoti, ed., Women, Islam and the State (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1991), 8 – 9.

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titled Terakki-yi Muhâdderât (Progress of Muslim Women) in 1869.²¹ As is clear from its title, the debate on women was embedded in the discussion of progress of the country. Voices of Ottoman women in the mid- and late-nineteenth century were echoed in literature and in the press when the literacy rate among Ottoman urbanites increased due to education campaigns and increasing participation of elite women in the press.²² Especially after the Constitutional Revolution of 1908, when the Young Turks seized the power with their organization Committee of Union and Progress, an intense press activity took place. This was a consequence of the end of Hamidian autocratic rule with its press censorship and the suppression of political opposition. After 33 years of autocracy, the revolution was welcomed as a glorious event bringing “freedom, equality, and justice” inspired by the previous generation of Young Ottomans, Auguste Comte’s positivism, ideas of the French Revolution, and the constitutional movements in other countries such as Russia and Iran.²³ In this intense social and ideological atmosphere of upheaval, women’s rights issues were no exception, with feminists joining in and demanding freedom for women as well. The journal Kadınlar Dünyası (Women’s World) took up the issue of women’s political and social rights with a contemporary feminist approach and played a vanguard role in advancing women’s position in society.²⁴ The opposition to reforms also rejected more freedom for women. It is very striking to note that the outbreak of the Islamic counter-revolution, known as the March 31 Incident that took place in the immediate aftermath of the Constitutional Revolution of 1908, also demanded restrictions to the free movement of women in public spaces. Its advocates aimed for the “restoration of Islamic Law” even though Islamic Law had not been abolished at all. The armed movement, shedding blood in the streets of the capital city and voicing demands for the imposition of Islamic principles, blamed “Western morality” for the dissolution of the Empire and regarded the presence of women in public space, such as

 Serpil Çakır, “Feminism and Feminist History-Writing in Turkey: The Discovery of Ottoman Feminism,” Aspasia 1, no. 1 (2007): 68.  Elizabeth Frierson, “Women in Late Ottoman Intellectual History,” in Late Ottoman Society: The Intellectual Legacy, ed. Elisabeth Özdalga (London: Routledge Curzon, 2005), 135 – 160.  For a recent comparison of global constitutional movements in the early twentieth century, see Erik J. Zürcher, “The Young Turk Revolution: Comparisons and Connections,” Middle Eastern Studies 55, no. 4 (2019): 481– 98.  See Serpil Çakır, Osmanlı Kadın Hareketi [Ottoman Women’s Movement] (Istanbul: Metis Yayınları, 1994).

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bars and theatres, as well as certain technologies like photography as European violations of Islamic Law.²⁵ Starting with the Balkan Wars of 1911– 1912, the course of events had changed radically. The topic of female emancipation gained a new momentum after various Ottoman defeats and the consequent rise of Turkish nationalism. Accordingly, the Ottomans could achieve a great political revolution (the Young Turk Revolution of 1908), yet without a social reform that could supplement and strengthen it, the efforts to prevent the territorial dissolution of the empire remained futile.²⁶ Turkish nationalists led by figures such as Ziya Gökalp, who openly called himself a feminist, argued for a social reform that was based on the idea of establishing happy and solid families as prerequisites of a strong nation. Long debated issues, such as arranged marriages, polygyny, the right to divorce, segregation in public space, women’s employment, fashion, veiling, and women’s education came to be discussed with a new perspective under the purview of nationalism.²⁷ Hoping to save the Empire from the severe political, economic, and social crises it was facing, the nationalists turned to the discipline of sociology, which many of them admired. Sociology seemed to offer a cure for all the “social diseases” that constituted barriers to national progress. Inspired by the French sociologist Émile Durkheim, the nationalists adopted the social model of tesanütçülük (solidarism) based on principles of unity, harmony, and cooperation in society. In this model, millî aile (the national family) was presented as the most important unit that the nation could rely on, and family morals would reinforce the idea of solidarity.²⁸ In their discussion of the roots of backwardness in Turkish-Muslim society, nationalists attempted to demonstrate that equality of the sexes was a basic prin-

 Tarık Z. Tunaya, İslamcılık Akımı [The Islamist Movement] (Istanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi, 2003), 109.  Çiğdem Oğuz, “‘The Homeland Will Not Be Saved Merely by Chastity’: Women’s Agency, Nationalism, and Morality in the Late Ottoman Empire,” Journal of the Ottoman and Turkish Studies Association 6, no. 2 (2019): 91– 111.  Zafer Toprak, “The Family, Feminism, and the State During the Young Turk Period, 1908 – 1918,” in Premiere Rencontre Internationale Sur L’Empire Ottoman et La Turquie Moderne, ed. Ethem Eldem (Istanbul: Éditions ISIS, 1991), 441– 452; Zafer Toprak, Türkiye’de Kadın Özgürlüğü ve Feminizm (1908 – 1935) [Women’s Freedom and Feminism in Turkey] (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2015).  Zafer Toprak, Türkiye’de Kadın Özgürlüğü, 1– 16; Zafer Toprak, “Osmanlı’da Toplumbilimin Doğuşu” [The Birth of Sociology in the Ottoman Empire], in Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: Cumhuriyet’e Devreden Düşünce Mirası, Tanzimat ve Meşrutiyet’in Birikimi, ed. Mehmet Ö. Alkan et al. (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001), 310 – 27.

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ciple in pre-Islamic Turkish societies. In their view, Islam itself was not a barrier to progress, but false traditions, superstitions, and norms that had been adopted from foreign cultures (such as Byzantine, Arab, and Persian ones) were. Therefore, the nationalists pursued a new “national morality” that embraced the idea of social reform as a program to elevate the role of Muslim women in society. This was the point where morality, once an obstacle to progress, had started to become an ideal way to penetrate previously untouched, unreformed institutions in a secular way. The extraordinary circumstances and necessities of the First World War carved out a new space for Ottoman Muslim women.²⁹ As harsh economic conditions hit the cities, women on the Ottoman home front – like in other belligerent countries in the First World War – were employed in war factories and state institutions as well as in municipalities and marketplaces. Many middle-class women undertook active roles in war aid societies including the Hilâl-i Ahmer (Red Crescent). For the first time in the history of the Empire, women could access university education following the foundation of the İnas Darülfünunu (Women’s University). Although small in number, women also served in paid labor battalions. All these facts, but also increasing prostitution, adultery, and the spread of venereal diseases contributed to the heated debates about women’s place in society and their political and economic rights.³⁰

 On Ottoman Muslim women and work during the war, see Nicole A.N.M. van Os, “Feminism, Philanthropy and Patriotism: Female Associational Life in the Ottoman Empire” (PhD diss., Leiden University, 2013), 337– 78; Yavuz S. Karakışla, Women, War and Work in the Ottoman Empire: Society for the Employment of Ottoman Muslim Women (1916 – 1923) (Istanbul: Ottoman Bank Archives and Research Centre, 2005); Tiğinçe Oktar, Osmanlı Toplumunda Kadının Çalışma Yaşamı: Osmanlı Kadınları Çalıştırma Cemiyet-i İslamiyesi [The Working Life of Women in Ottoman Society: The Society for the Employment of the Ottoman Muslim Women] (Istanbul: Bilim Teknik Yayınevi, 1998).  Yılmaz discusses how the venereal diseases and prostitution were at the center of the contest for political contestation in terms of the discourses on national and religious prestige of the empire, Seçil Yılmaz, “Love in the Time of Syphilis: Medicine and Sex in the Ottoman Empire, 1860 – 1922” (PhD diss., City University of New York, 2016), 237– 81. On prostitution during the First World War, see Çiğdem Oğuz, “Prostitution (Ottoman Empire),” 1914 – 1918-online. International Encyclopedia of the First World War (January 31, 2017), doi: 10.15463/ie1418.11038.

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Debates about the Preservation of Authentic Morality during the First World War During the last decade of the Empire and as a consequence of a sequence of wars, the ideological confrontations and debates reached an intense level. While the official political agenda of catching up with the West remained valid, the quest for authentic Muslim identity gained more popularity. In an atmosphere of social and political upheaval, the conflict between political Islam and Turkish nationalism left a remarkable, long-lasting impact on Turkish politics that has survived until today. Although it is hard to draw a strict line between the intellectual strands of the time with the labels of “Islamist” and “nationalist,” and such a categorization does not reflect the complex political positioning of the era, these categories are still useful for the purposes of analysis.³¹ Here, I use the labels of “nationalist” to indicate intellectual circles who wanted Islam to be adjusted to the needs of society with an emphasis on the visions of a “nation,” and of “political Islamists” for those who wanted society to be adjusted to the rules of Islam with an emphasis on the visions of “umma,” the whole community of Muslims. A cross reading of two journals from these ideological currents, Sebilürreşad (Straight Road) of the Islamists and Yeni Mecmua (New Review) of the nationalists, provides valuable insights into ideas of Westernization and related cultural anxieties during the First World War. In Ottoman-Turkish historiography, Sebilürreşad (published under the name of Sırat-ı Müstakim (the same meaning with Sebilürreşad) between 1908 – 1912) is considered one of the most important Islamist journals in the empire.³² The chief editors of the journal were Eşref Edib and Mehmed Akif, important names in Islamist circles both in the past and today. Mehmed Akif is the “national poet” of Turkey and the author of the Turkish national anthem. While Sırat-ı Mü stakim was more tolerant of non-Islamist voices, the political perspective of the writers for Sebilü rreşad became more radical as a consequence of the Balkan Wars.³³ Although the journal supported the Turkish War of Inde-

 For a discussion on the topic, see Zü rcher, The Young Turk Legacy, 213 – 235.  On Sırat-ı Müstakim and Sebilürreşad, see Sina A. Somel, “Sırat-ı Müstakim: Islamic Modernist Thought in the Ottoman Empire (1908 – 1912)” (MA Thesis, Boğaziçi University, 1987); Esther Debus, Sebilürreşâd: Kemalizm Öncesi ve Sonrası Dönemdeki İslamcı Muhalefete dair Karşılaştırmalı bir Araştırma [Sebilürreşad: A Comparative Research on Islamist Opposition Before and After Kemalism], trans. Atilla Dirim (Istanbul: Libra Yayınevi, 2012).  Somel, “Sırat-ı Müstakim,” 5 – 6.

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pendence (1919 – 1922), it strongly opposed the secularist reforms of the Early Turkish Republic. Eventually, the infamous Takrir-i Sükûn (Law on the maintenance of order), which was enacted to suppress the Kurdish-Islamic Sheikh Said Revolt of 1925, spelled the end of this journal because of its Islamic, oppositional stance. As a representative publication of nationalists, Yeni Mecmua was published between July 1917 and October 1918 with the financial support of the ruling party, the Committee of Union and Progress. The chief editor was Ziya Gökalp, the “founding father” of Turkish nationalist thought, who was also the writer of a column entitled ictimâiyyat, a term that he invented as a translation of the discipline sociology. Not all the writers of Yeni Mecmua were nationalists, yet together they contributed to the formation of a national culture with the creation of a new literary genre called Millî edebiyat (national literature).³⁴ Some of Gökalp’s articles in this journal were later collected in his masterwork which constitutes the most important text of Turkish nationalism, entitled Türkleşmek, İslamlaşmak, Muasırlaşmak (Turkification, Islamization, Modernization).³⁵ Another author who commented on morality and issues of Europeanization was Necmeddin Sadak. He had studied sociology at the University of Lyon and was among the few sociology graduates of the time in the Ottoman Empire. He later served as Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs between 1947 and 1950. An overview of the wartime articles in both journals reveals a great interest in questions of morality and moral decline.³⁶ Despite their differences, what united the ideological discourses was an insistence on authentic morality, their fear of disorder and revolution (as it happened in Russia in 1917), and their critique of the Tanzimat era for its excessive Westernization that disregarded traditional values. According to the Islamists, Islamic morality was superior, because Islam was the most superior religion in the world. The concepts of morality and moral decline were often utilized to criticize Westernists, nationalists, feminists, materialists, and the Bolsheviks. Most of the writers attacked the European-oriented Tanzimat reforms and the “degenerative” impact of the Constitutional Revolution of 1908 on society for corrupting public morality.

 Erol Köroğlu, Ottoman Propaganda and Turkish Identity: Literature in Turkey During World War I (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007), 100 – 115.  For a comprehensive work on Gökalp’s writings in English, see Uriel Heyd, Foundations of Turkish Nationalism: The Life and Teachings of Ziya Gökalp (London: Luzac, 1950).  While Yeni Mecmua stopped its publication at the end of war, Sebilürreşad continued to be published. The latter rendered harsher criticisms toward the nationalists, blaming them also for morally corrupting the country due to their liberal approaches to women’s participation in public events without gender segregation, see Oğuz, “The Struggle Within,” 83 – 88.

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Debates on the emancipation of Muslim women constituted a distinct issue. The writers often focused on topics such as the political and social emancipation of women, opposition to the veil, the demands of women to join public life (especially by working outside the home alongside men), and the rights of women in marriage. They argued that these were incompatible with an Islamic understanding of morality. According to them, since the superiority of Muslims had always derived from their morality – and their moral power from their religion – the deviation from Islam had brought about the end of this superiority. It was not knowledge or science but moral superiority that would revive the Ottoman Empire. For them, the strength of the Muslims lay in their faith in the greatness of God and their respect of the Sharia; once religion lost its power, defeat was inevitable. The declaration of jihad in 1914 by the Ottoman government, meant to instigate rebellions amongst the Muslim population in Entente countries, contributed to concerns about morality and authenticity. An author from Sebilürreşad, Ömer Rıza, wrote that Western predominance in the East was not a product of material strength of the West, but of the moral weakness of the Muslims. Ultimately, jihad was the instrument to change this situation.³⁷ Therefore, Sebilürreşad authors linked the morality of Muslims with the success of jihad and the future of the caliphate. Emphasizing that other Muslim nations were following the news about the Ottoman Empire, the writers pointed to the importance of constituting a “good example” for the Muslim world for the success of jihad.³⁸ Indeed, during the Arab Revolt of 1916, the Sharifian propaganda against Ottoman rule was based on the idea that Sharif Hussein was fighting against those who violated the Sharia by introducing secular laws and lifestyles. For instance, the employment of women in state offices during the war seemed to confirm that the Ottomans were not qualified to rule Muslims.³⁹

 Ömer Rıza, “Şark’da Siyah Buk’a: İngilizler” [The British: Black Dirt in The East], Sebilürreşad 13 (October 1914): 6.  Sebilürreşad listed the publications and events on its pages, which according to their view violated public morality, offended the feelings of Muslims in other countries, and “delighted” the enemies. For some examples to these lists, see Konya’da Münteşir “Türk Sözü’nün Adâb ve Ahlâka Mugayir Neşriyatı ve Ahlâka Mugâyir Neşriyat” [Publications Against Morality and The Publication of the Journal “Turkish Word” Against Morality in Konya], Sebilürreşad 364 (August 1918): 265 – 266; “Memleket Ne Halde, Matbuat Ne İle Meşgul” [The Situation of The Homeland, The Preoccupation of The Press], Sebilü rreşad 372 (October 1918): 149 – 150; “Tü rk Ocağındaki Mü nasebetsizlikler Hakkında” [About Misconducts in Turkish Clubs], Sebilü rreşad 452 (December 1919): 119.  Joshua Teitelbaum, “The Man Who Would Be Caliph: Sharifian Propaganda in World War I,” in Jihad and Islam in World War I: Studies on the Ottoman Jihad on the Centenary of Snouck Hur-

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One of the most important series of articles written on the issues of Westernization and the quest for the preservation of Islamic morality were penned by Said Halim Pasha, the Ottoman Grand Vizier between 1913 – 1917. Sebilürreşad often published his articles on Islam, modernity, European civilization, Ottoman decline, and Islamic morality. His articles constituted seven series that were later brought together under the title of one of his most important booklets, Buhran-ı İctimâimiz (Our Social Crisis).⁴⁰ In his articles, he focused on the domestic reasons for the decline of the Ottoman Empire. According to him, the first reason was the estrangement of the elites (including the intellectuals) from their own culture in favor of the French one, and their admiration of French social life despite its uncritical glorification of “progress.” This attitude had left the rest of society (lower classes) without guidance. In his opinion, the lower classes resented the elites due to the increasing cultural distance between the two, and thus resisted all kinds of novelty and reform that could benefit the country. When the new, modern education institutions were established (during the Tanzimat), the reformers had not drawn a clear line between morality and knowledge, and education and upbringing.⁴¹ Eventually, the absence of traditional social principles resulted in a crisis of the institution of the family, and the lower classes, too, began to follow the elites into moral and spiritual corruption. An authentic elite class, Said Halim Pasha showed himself convinced, could have been an example for the lower classes in pursuing Islamic morality and lifestyle. Instead, the intellectuals of the time had brought materialist thoughts to the Ottoman Empire and, due to their obsession with Europe, imported the conflict between religion and science from Christian countries. However, such a conflict between Islam and science had never existed. Attributing the advancement of Europe to materialism and the liberation from religion, these elites were attacking Islam without hesitation. If there had been some reservations on this issue and traditional values had been observed, scientific thought and empirical method could have been easier to adopt. His views demonstrated a considerable emphasis on elitism, which he defended against the idea of equality – for him another invention of Western Europe that should not have been imitated.⁴² In his view, the women’s movement (and demands for equality) was a consequence

gronje’s ‘Holy War Made in Germany’, ed. Erik J. Zürcher (Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2016), 157.  His booklets and later works are transliterated into Latin alphabet in this volume, see Said Halim Paşa, Said Halim Paşa: Buhranlarımız ve Son Eserleri [Said Halim Pasha: Our Crises and the Last Works], ed. M. Ertuğrul Düzdağ (Istanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 2019).  Said Halim Paşa, Said Halim Paşa: Buhranlarımız ve Son Eserleri, 91– 106.  Said Halim Paşa, Said Halim Paşa: Buhranlarımız ve Son Eserleri, 120 – 22.

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of a social crisis that Ottoman society was undergoing and emerged out of desires to imitate Western women’s life. Feminism was a superficial movement creating fake needs that society had never demanded.⁴³ Similar to the Islamists, the nationalists also recognized the existence of a so-called moral crisis in contemporary Muslim community within the Ottoman Empire. While for the Islamists, the real reason for the moral crisis was a deviation from Islam, nationalists offered a different analysis that attributed a great importance to the context. Gökalp defined “religious morality” as an ascetic and individualistic morality that – as the times had changed – would inevitably diminish in society due to three developments: war, the emergence of the division of labor, and admiration of European civilization.⁴⁴ “Religious morality” could no longer be adopted, since it was anachronistic. In his opinion, the Ottoman Empire was undergoing an intikal devresi (“stage of transition”) and a sense of moral crisis was a natural outcome of this stage. The stage of transition meant a transformation from ummah to nation, from backwardness to advancement, from feudalism to modernity, and from the extended to the nuclear family.⁴⁵ What made nationalist opposition to the Islamists unique was their success of rendering critiques from within Islam. While agreeing with the Islamists on the excessiveness of Westernization during the Tanzimat era, the superiority of Islam over Christianity and Judaism, and the importance of preserving authentic values, the nationalists defined authenticity differently. Instead of opposing Islam and its main principles per se, they offered a new interpretation that treated morality as a separate realm. In Yeni Mecmua, Gökalp wrote: “Both religion and law establish special codes in society; however, both derive their strength from morality.”⁴⁶ This idea was the exact opposite of that of the religious morality defenders in Sebilürreşad. In their lengthy articles in Yeni Mecmua, both Gökalp and Sadak formulated a new, secular national morality that was based on the principles of the division of labor in society. By attaching importance to mores and hars (national culture) and claiming that there was a distinction between culture and civilization, the nationalists interpreted religion and Islamic law anew. Through these interpretations, they touched upon realms such as family formation and dissolution, social conduct in everyday life, religious education, and religious practice. Instead of superstitions, useless traditions, foreign norms, and the imitation of Western cul Said Halim Paşa, Said Halim Paşa: Buhranlarımız ve Son Eserleri, 125 – 36.  Ziya Gökalp, “Ahlak Buhranı” [Moral Crisis], Yeni Mecmua 7 (August 1917): 122 – 124.  Ziya Gökalp, “İctimaiyyat: Cinsi Ahlak” [Sociology: Sexual Morality], Yeni Mecmua 9 (September 1914): 168.  Ziya Gökalp, “Ahlak Buhranı,” Yeni Mecmua 7 (August 1917): 122.

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ture, the new morality should rely on the mores of the “pure nation” and ictimâî vicdan (the collective conscience). The reasons for the moral crisis were conflicts that arose between education in Western-style schools and the realities of Ottoman Muslim society. Therefore, the two scholars emphasized the importance of muhit (milieu) in the moral development of an individual. This did not mean that the moral values of contemporary Muslim society had to be accepted per se; on the contrary, by the end of the transition stage the milieu and new moral values would become compatible.⁴⁷ Gökalp dealt with women’s emancipation in his series of articles on “family morality” and “sexual morality” in Yeni Mecmua. He asserted that sexual morality deserves particular attention because the sense of crisis in terms of sexuality reached an utmost degree during the war.⁴⁸ His goal was to establish an idea of mutual respect between the two sexes. Once human personality was defined as sacred and the “free will” of both woman and man was recognized, this kind of moral crisis would be eliminated. The first stage in the recognition of this free will was to legally recognize the equality of the sexes. Repeating his claim that this was the age of the division of labor, he strongly argued that old moral codes concerning veils and gender segregation created obstacles to women’s participation in the division of labor and had to be eliminated. Conservatives had to accept an understanding of “mental veiling” instead of physical veiling.⁴⁹ Adopting feminism in the social and political spheres also meant educating women in national and professional morality, qualities they had lacked so far but were required for the social division of labor.⁵⁰ One of the most urgent problems that emerged during the First World War was war profiteering which was also a result of the national economic policy that the ruling Committee of Union and Progress had introduced after the Balkan Wars.⁵¹ Accordingly, the traditional Ottoman bourgeoisie, composed mainly of non-Muslim elements, was eliminated from commercial networks due to their ostensible sympathy for European powers, and the accumulation of wealth was to

 Necmeddin Sadak, “Terbiye Meselesi: Genç Kızlarımızın Terbiyesi” [The Matter Of Upbringing: The Upbringing of Girls], Yeni Mecmua 1 (July 1917): 15 – 16.  Ziya Gökalp, “İctimaiyyat: Cinsi Ahlak,” Yeni Mecmua 9 (September 1914): 168.  Gökalp, “İctimaiyyat: Cinsi Ahlak,”168.  Ziya Gökalp, “Aile Ahlakı: Şövalye Aşkı ve Feminizm” [Family Morals: Love For Knights and Feminism], Yeni Mecmua 19 (November 1917): 364.  Feroz Ahmad, “Vanguard of a Nascent Bourgeoisie: The Social and Economic Policy of the Young Turks 1908 – 1918,” in Social and Economic History of Turkey (1071 – 1920), ed. Osman Okyar and Halil İnalcık (Ankara: Meteksan, 1980); Zafer Toprak, Türkiye’de Millî İktisat, 1908 – 1918 [National Economy in Turkey] (Istanbul: Doğan kitap, 2012).

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be left to authentic Muslims. In fact, the war offered many opportunities to implement this project. The grounds for a national economy were laid step by step through a number of initiatives, such as the credit mechanisms and cooperatives favoring Muslim merchants, the exclusive circulation of goods of Muslim merchants as the railways were now under the monopoly of the government, or the obligation to use the Turkish language for commercial activities and correspondences. Obviously, the deportation of Armenians and Greeks in Anatolia and the confiscation of their property helped realize this project further.⁵² Consequently, war profiteers emerged as a specific section of Muslim merchants and as the new “snobs” of the time. They were the principal protagonists of early republican literature where they represented the most resented types of people.⁵³ It is striking that the issue was treated as a moral problem rather than a problem of economic policy. For the nationalists, the sole responsibility for this was the absence of national consciousness, while for the Islamists it was the deviation from Islamic principles. The ideological confrontation between the Islamists and nationalists on the issue of authentic morality vis-à-vis Europeanization had deep political, judicial, and social implications. At the end of the First World War, upon the defeat of the Ottomans, this ideological contest resurfaced. In 1919, the Family Law, which was an outcome of new interpretations of Islam and nationalist thought as well as the social upheavals of the war, was abolished owing to the opposition of both Muslim and non-Muslim clergy.⁵⁴ Public morality once again fell under the scope of ulema under the new şeyhülislam, Mustafa Sabri, an opponent of the Committee of Union and Progress regime. He dedicated his time in office “to revers[ing] the emasculation of the religious establishment and reassert[ing]

 Taner Akçam and Ümit Kurt, The Spirit of the Laws: The Plunder of Wealth in the Armenian Genocide, trans. Aram Arkun (New York, NY: Berghahn, 2018); Uğur Ü. Üngör and Mehmet Polatel, Confiscation and Destruction: The Young Turk Seizure of Armenian Property (London: Bloomsbury, 2013).  For an evaluation of these works and the perception of wealth and war profiteering in Early Republican novels, see Seçil Deren Van Het Hof, “Erken Dönem Cumhuriyet Romanında Zenginler ve Zenginlik” [Wealth and Wealthy in Early Republican Novel], Kültür ve İletişim 13, no. 2 (2010): 81– 106; Mehmet Törenek, ed., Türk Romanında Işgal İstanbul’u [Occupied Istanbul in Turkish Novel] (Istanbul: Kitabevi, 2002).  Ziyaeddin Fındıkoğlu, “Aile Hukukumuzun Tedvini Meselesi” [The Matter Of Codification of Our Family Law] in Tedris Hayatının Otuzuncu Yıldönümü Hatırası Olmak Üzere Medeni Hukuk Ordinaryüs Profesörü Ebül’ula Mardin’e Armağan (Istanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi yayınları, 1944), 709.

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the observance of traditional Islamic norms and practices in the public sphere.”⁵⁵ According to the Armistice of Mudros, signed on October 31, 1918, the Allies had the right to occupy any place if they considered its security to be under threat. Soon after, many parts of the Ottoman Empire were occupied by the Allies. The nationalist movement, led by Mustafa Kemal (Atatü rk), united the military and civil resistance in Anatolia. With the foundation of the national assembly in Ankara on April 23, 1920, there were two governments until the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923: an Istanbul government of the Sultan under occupation and an Ankara government of the nationalist movement. During the occupation era, the Istanbulites became notorious for collaborating with the occupiers. The early republican novel often depicted the wealthy inhabitants of Istanbul as degenerate, morally corrupt, cosmopolitan elites who did not hesitate to work with the Allied powers to preserve their self-interests.⁵⁶ The critique targeting the lifestyle of this wealthy class differed from the early criticisms in the Tanzimat era, however. A new narrative of social destruction replaced stories of individual destruction while these characters’ excessive admiration of the West had finally reached the level of treason.⁵⁷ The common feature of the resented characters from the snob of the Tanzimat era to the non-Muslim comprador bourgeoisie, and from the war profiteers of the First World War to the collaborators of the occupation era, was a lack of national consciousness and morality that could have served as a filter or barrier to selfishness and self-interest.

Conclusion This essay discussed how the contest for authentic morality became the touchstone of Ottoman / Turkish political discourse vis-à-vis the idea of Westernization and modernization. Depending on the context, this contest manifested itself in literary works or in intellectual and ideological texts. Preserving an authentic morality, Islamic or national, appeared as the only solution to supposed destructive impacts of modernization. The quest for authentic morality constituted one

 Amit Bein, Ottoman Ulema: Turkish Republic Agents of Change and Guardians of Tradition (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), 97.  Yakup Kadri’s novel, originally published in 1928, is the best example to this kind of narrative, see Yakup K. Karaosmanoğlu, Sodom ve Gomore [Sodom and Gomorrah] (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2003).  Deren Van Het Hof, “Erken Dönem Cumhuriyet Romanında Zenginler ve Zenginlik,” 96.

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of the most important aspects through which opposing ideologies set forth their positions both toward each other and toward the idea of Europeanization. Today, a strong emphasis on morality remains part of Turkish identity; every Turkish citizen knows the motto, “We will adopt the technology of the West but will never adopt their morality.” In the politically polarized society of Turkey, discourses on national morality are often used by the ruling Justice and Development Party and its leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan against the opposition. The discourse of authenticity has now taken the shape of a simple formulation yerli ve millî (local and national). It was successfully used in the election campaign of November 2015 that cancelled out the June 2015 results when Erdoğan’s party had lost the majority. The discourse was first used against the Kurdish People’s Democratic Party, in connection with a party meeting in Hamburg where, according to Erdoğan, the Turkish flag had not been present among 12 other flags there. The emphasis on yerli ve millî has become a powerful tool also on other occasions, from embracing the Ottoman past and pursuing a Neo-Ottomanist agenda to the confrontations with the European Union over Turkey’s accession to the EU. While employing the discourse of yerli ve millî, Erdoğan often draws attention to the Ottoman past and refers to the Islamist thought about cultural and moral authenticity that was discussed in this paper. As he stated in an interview for a university’s monthly journal, “The problem we have experienced over the last 200 years [the time of Ottoman modernization] is self-estrangement. Since the late Ottoman era, a group that defines itself as intellectuals rather than thinkers or scholars has emerged. These elites, who only imitated the West and preferred to see themselves as Westerners, are alienated from this society, geography, and civilization.”⁵⁸ In another of his speeches at the Third Convention of National Culture, he cited Mehmed Akif, one of his favorite poets, to emphasize that such an alienation leads to the yoke of powerful states.⁵⁹ The scope of yerli ve milli has more recently included everything that is made in Turkey, from technological tools to scientific advancements, from textile to agricultural products, to indicate the level of autonomy that Turkey gained under Erdoğan. Invoking Ottoman history in today’s politics is a noteworthy aspect of contemporary Turkish politics. A new approach to Ottoman / Turkish modernization and the quest for authenticity in morality and culture can also help us understand  “200 Yıldır Yaşadığımız Sorun Kendimize Yabancılaşmadır” [Our Problem For 200 Years Is Self-Estrangement], Açık Medeniyet Gazetesi, accessed March 10, 2020, http://www.acikmede niyet.com/tr/guncel-yazi/200-yildir-yasadigimiz-sorun-kendimize-yabancilasmadir.  “III. Millî Kültür Şûrası Başladı” [Third National Culture Convention Has Started], accessed March 10, 2020, https://kultursurasi.ktb.gov.tr/TR-175196/iii-milli-kultur-surasi-basladi.html.

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today’s politics and the tensions that still divide society and continue to spark major debates on modernity, secularism, and nationalism.

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Oktar, Tiğinçe. Osmanlı Toplumunda Kadının Çalışma Yaşamı: Osmanlı Kadınları Çalıştırma Cemiyet-i İslamiyesi [The Working Life of Women in Ottoman Society: The Society for the Employment of the Ottoman Muslim Women]. Istanbul: Bilim Teknik Yayınevi, 1998. Os, Nicole A.N.M. van. “Feminism, Philanthropy and Patriotism: Female Associational Life in the Ottoman Empire.” PhD diss., Leiden University, 2013. Ömer, Rıza. “Şark’da Siyah Buk’a: İngilizler” [The British: Black Dirt in The East]. Sebilürreşad 13 (October 1914): 6. Parla, Jale. Babalar ve Oğullar: Tanzimat Romanının Epistemolojik Temelleri [Fathers and Sons: The Epistemological Foundations of Tanzimat Novel]. Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1990. Sadık, Rıfat Paşa. Müntehebât-ı Âsâr [Selected Works]. 11 vols. Istanbul: Tatyos Divitçiyan, 1873. Said, Halim Paşa. Said Halim Paşa: Buhranlarımız ve Son Eserleri [Said Halim Pasha: Our Crises and the Last Works], edited by M. Ertuğrul Düzdağ. Istanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 2019. Somel, Sina A. “Sırat-ı Müstakim: Islamic Modernist Thought in the Ottoman Empire (1908 – 1912).” MA Thesis, Boğaziçi University, 1987. Teitelbaum, Joshua. “The Man Who Would Be Caliph: Sharifian Propaganda in World War I.” In Jihad and Islam in World War I: Studies on the Ottoman Jihad on the Centenary of Snouck Hurgronje’s ‘Holy War Made in Germany’, edited by Erik J. Zürcher, 275 – 304. Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2016. Topal, Alp E. “From Decline to Progress: Ottoman Concepts of Reform 1600 – 1876.” PhD. diss., Bilkent University, 2017. Toprak, Zafer. Türkiye’de Kadın Özgürlüğü ve Feminizm (1908 – 1935) [Women’s Freedom and Feminism in Turkey]. Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2015. Toprak, Zafer. Türkiye’de Popülizm: 1908 – 1923 [Populism in Turkey]. Istanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2013. Toprak, Zafer. Türkiye’de Millî İktisat, 1908 – 1918 [National Economy in Turkey]. Istanbul: Doğan kitap, 2012. Toprak, Zafer. “Osmanlı’da Toplumbilimin Doğuşu” [The Birth of Sociology in the Ottoman Empire]. In Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: Cumhuriyet’e Devreden Düşünce Mirası, Tanzimat ve Meşrutiyet’in Birikimi, edited by Mehmet Ö. Alkan, Murat Belge, Ahmet İnsel, Tanıl Bora, Murat Gültekingil, Ahmet Çiğdem, Murat Yılmaz, and Ömer Laçiner, 310 – 27. Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001. Toprak, Zafer. “The Family, Feminism, and the State During the Young Turk Period, 1908 – 1918.” In Premiere Rencontre Internationale Sur L’Empire Ottoman et La Turquie Moderne, edited by Ethem Eldem, 441 – 52. Istanbul: Éditions ISIS, 1991. Törenek, Mehmet, ed. Türk Romanında Işgal İstanbul’u [Occupied Istanbul in Turkish Novel]. Istanbul: Kitabevi, 2002. Tunaya, Tarık Z. İslamcılık Akımı [The Islamist Movement]. Istanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi, 2003. “Tü rk Ocağındaki Mü nasebetsizlikler Hakkında” [About Misconducts in Turkish Clubs]. Sebilü rreşad 452 (December 1919): 119. Üngör, Uğur Ü., and Mehmet Polatel. Confiscation and Destruction: The Young Turk Seizure of Armenian Property. London: Bloomsbury, 2013. Yalçınkaya, M. Alper. Learned Patriots: Debating Science, State, and Society in the Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Empire. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2015.

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Yılmaz, Seçil. “Love in the Time of Syphilis: Medicine and Sex in the Ottoman Empire, 1860 – 1922.” PhD diss., City University of New York, 2016. Ziya, Gökalp. “Ahlak Buhranı” [Moral Crisis]. Yeni Mecmua 7 (August 1917): 122 – 124. Ziya, Gökalp. “Aile Ahlakı: Şövalye Aşkı ve Feminizm” [Family Morals: Love For Knights and Feminism]. Yeni Mecmua 19 (November 1917): 361 – 364. Ziya, Gökalp. “İctimaiyyat: Cinsi Ahlak” [Sociology: Sexual Morality]. Yeni Mecmua 9 (September 1914): 162 – 168. Zürcher, Erik J. “The Young Turk Revolution: Comparisons and Connections.” Middle Eastern Studies 55, no. 4 (2019): 481 – 98. Zürcher, Erik J. Turkey: A Modern History. 4th ed. London: I.B. Tauris, 2017. Zürcher, Erik J. The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building: From the Ottoman Empire to Atatürk’s Turkey. London: I.B. Tauris, 2010.

Kate Papari

Narratives and Ambiguities of Europeanization in Greece during the Interwar Years Introduction: The Peculiarities of a Dialectic in the Interwar Era “Europe” and “Europeanness” have been important themes in the history of modern Greece, since the establishment of the new state in 1832.¹ However, in the early twentieth century, Europeanization was far from consistent. My approach seeks to build on the existing literature on Europeanization and to offer some insights regarding Greece in the interwar years. In doing so, this essay applies a broader definition of Europeanization, reflecting what it meant at the time, as it was a multi-directional and multi-faceted process, especially for the countries of the Mediterranean and Southern Europe. During the interwar period, Greek intellectuals, oscillating between regionalism and cosmopolitanism, expressed a fear of their nation being considered a marginal member of Europe,² and tried to reaffirm the role and importance of it within Europe. Europeanization was regarded as a synonym to modernization, promoting Greece’s “adaptation” – economic, institutional, political, cultural – to West European norms and practices.³ It had gained the support of domestic political and intellectual elites, with internationally oriented identities and interests, who had “internalized” the norms, behavior, beliefs, and culture associated with “Europe.”⁴ Nevertheless, intellectuals saw the risk of losing their own cultural heritage and unique identity through that process.

 Kevin Featherstone, “Introduction,” in Europe in Modern Greek History, ed. Kevin Featherstone (London: Hurst & Company, 2014), 1.  Featherstone, “Introduction,” 13.  Kevin Featherstone and George Kazamias, “Introduction: Southern Europe and the Process of ‘Europeanization,’” South European Society and Politics 5, no. 2 (2000): 4.  Constantine Tsoukalas, “European Modernity and Greek National Identity,” Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans 1, no. 1 (1999): 7– 14. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110685473-007

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In Greece, Modernity has always been more or less synonymous with Europe; Greeks have tended to identify and equate a usually undefined ‘Europe’ with ‘progress’, ‘culture’ or ‘civilization’ […] or at least as a kind of superior benchmark, in varying degrees to be emulated, feared and resented,

Roderick Beaton has suggested.⁵ Moreover, according to the Greek historian Elli Skopetea, the Greeks had two standards of comparison for themselves: their glorious ancestors, who were their credentials or admission ticket to Europe, and the modern-day Europeans whom they wished to emulate.⁶ Thus, “Europeanization,” which the Greeks have identified with the process of modernization and the desire to be considered as equally European, runs parallel with modern Greek history; in this process, Europe has served as a key reference point in questions of national identity, progress, and the capability of belonging to the European constellation. The peculiarity of the Greek case, as I will show regarding the 1920s, lies in the fact that few nations have either experienced “Europe” with such intensity, so much anxiety, and such seemingly contradictory perceptions of superiority and inferiority.⁷ Modern Hellenism has been largely shaped by perceptions of Europe and its relationship with Classical Antiquity.⁸ Ethnocentrism in modern Greek thought was mostly inspired and boosted by Western thought itself.⁹ On the one hand, the European current of Philhellenism and the glorification and idealization of Classical Antiquity by European scholars, artists, and travelers encouraged modern Greek ethnocentrism; on the other hand, European criticism of Western ra-

 Roderick Beaton, “Versions of Europe in the Greek Literary Imagination (1929 – 1961),” in Europe in Modern Greek History, ed. Kevin Featherstone (London: Hurst & Company, 2014), 27. See also Roderick Beaton, Greece: Biography of a Modern Nation (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2019).  Michael Llewellyn Smith, “Greece and Europe, Progress and Civilization, 1890s-1920s,” in Europe in Modern Greek History, ed. Kevin Featherstone (London: Hurst & Company, 2014), 17– 25. See also, Elli Skopetea, Το Πρότυπο Βασίλειο” και η Μεγάλη Ιδέα. Όψεις του εθνικού προβλήματος στην Ελλάδα (1830 – 1880) [The ‘Model Kingdom’ and the Great Idea. Aspects of the National Problem in Greece (1830 – 1880)] (Athens: Polytypo, 1988), 218 – 220, 225.  Featherstone, “Introduction,” 13 – 15.  See for example Spiros Asdrachas, “Ευρώπη και νέος ελληνισμός: τα αυτονόητα” [Modern Hellenism and Europe], in Ευρώπη και Νέος Ελληνισμός [Scientific Symposium], ed. Society for the Study of Modern Greek Culture and Education (Athens: Moraitis School, 2001), 43.  See also Savvas Kontaratos, “Οι αντιευρωπαϊκές τάσεις στην κατασκευή της νεοελληνικής ταυτότητας: Σημειώσεις για την κριτική θεώρηση ενός ιστορικού φαινομένου” [Anti-European Tensions and the Modern Greek Identity: Notes on the Critical Approach of a Historical Phenomenon] in Ευρώπη και Νέος Ελληνισμός [Europe and Modern Hellenism], ed. Society for the Study of Modern Greek Culture and Education (Athens: Moraitis School, 2001), 19.

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tionalism, mechanization, industrialization, and modern lifestyle in general, emphasized Greece’s cultural singularity. Since Europe viewed the spirit of the ancient Greek world as its heritage, by turning to Europe, Greeks moved towards recouping their ancestral cultural inheritance. This argument, according to Konstantinos Dimaras, was initially articulated by Stephanos Koumanoudis in 1845.¹⁰ Nearly a century later, Konstantinos Tsatsos reiterated it, adding that the Greeks, as the natural bearers and heirs of Greek reason, could offer Europe a new saving myth. Tsatsos’ view – one shared by a cohort of like-minded intellectuals at the time – implies an underestimation of Western European civilization and poses the question of its capability to evolve in the right direction, if cut off from its birthplace, Greece and Hellenism.¹¹ This essay discusses the perceptions and representations of Europe amongst Greek intellectuals, academics, sociologists, philosophers, and artists of the 1920s and 1930s, such as Konstantinos Tsatsos (1899 – 1987), Giorgos (George) Theotokas (1906 – 1966), George Seferis (1900 – 1971), Ioannis Theodorakopoulos (1900 – 1981), and Panayotis Kanellopoulos (1902 – 1986). Many of them imagined Greece as part of Europe and/or even as a cultural model and intellectual power within it. Most of these intellectuals had a background that was cosmopolitan, rather than Greek, in the strict sense: in their youth, they had all travelled across Europe, lived and studied in Paris, Vienna, Berlin, or Heidelberg; and, despite the differences in their beliefs regarding Europe as an idea and standard for modern Greece, all considered Greece’s relation to Europe problematic. The sense of Greece having contributed so much to Europe’s cultural heritage – from poetry, philosophy, and drama to economics, mathematics, and many of the natural sciences – had rendered Greece exceptional by default. Many European scholars spanning from the eighteenth century to the 1930s had stressed Greece’s contribution to the cultural unity of Europe. Specifically, if we consider European thinkers of the early twentieth century, we find interesting cases such as Heinrich Rickert (1863 – 1936), the well-known neo-Kantian philosopher who exalted the Greeks as Europe’s youth; Eliza Butlers’ survey on The Tyranny of Greece over Germany (1935);¹² or Walter Rehm and his 1936 work Grie-

 Savvas Kontaratos, “Οι αντιευρωπαϊκές τάσεις στην κατασκευή της νεοελληνικής ταυτότητας,” 21.  Savvas Kontaratos, “Οι αντιευρωπαϊκές τάσεις στην κατασκευή της νεοελληνικής ταυτότητας,” 21.  Eliza M. Butler, The Tyranny of Greece over Germany: A Study of the Influence Exercised by Greek Art and Poetry over the Great German Writers of the Eighteenth, Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). See also Johann Chapoutot, Ο Εθνικο-

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chentum und Goethezeit. In a similar sense, Henry Miller, who visited Greece in the 1930s, stressed that “the light of Greece opened my eyes, penetrated my pores, expanded my whole being” in his celebrated travelogue from 1939, The Colossus of Maroussi. ¹³ However, there were many more academics, archaeologists, artists, writers, philosophers, and thinkers who, inspired by GrecoRoman Antiquity, had either travelled to Greece or devoted their work to modern Greece, among them the Swiss photographer Fred Boissonnas (1858 – 1946) and the British writers Patrick Leigh Fermor (1915 – 2011) and Lawrence Durrell (1912– 1990). For Greeks, this modern glorification of Hellenism implied a new role in Europe. At that time, Greeks identified Europe with the intellectual tradition of the Italian Renaissance, the political tradition of the French Revolution, and the cultural legacy of Ancient Greece. But for Greece, the moment was awkward: the Greek state was, on the one hand, still grappling with the national defeat of 1922 in Asia Minor and the permanent refutation of its imperial visions in South-Eastern Europe and, on the other hand, seeking to overcome its socio-economic backwardness. Traditionally dependent, both economically and technologically, on the West, the Greek economy was pushed to bankruptcy by the world economic crisis of 1930, further adding to an already strained situation after the arrival of thousands of refugees in the 1920s. Greece’s weakness hardly corresponded to the Hellenic myth. These harsh realities notwithstanding, in the public sphere there was a revived rhetoric on the glorious ancestral past of Classical Antiquity that co-existed with that of a “backward” Greece and that would re-enlighten Europe. Greece was to resume its leading spiritual role and counter the “materialistic,” “alienating,” and “vulgar” mass culture of Europe, which was considered a threat to modern mankind.¹⁴ Europe could only be saved by the humanistic values of Greek antiquity. By doing so, the Greeks hoped for a new, organic role of modern Greece in Europe.

σοσιαλισμός και η αρχαιότητα [Le national-socialisme et l’antiquité], trans. Georgios Karampelas (Athens: Polis Publishing, 2012), 201.  Henry Miller, The Colossus of Maroussi (London: Secker & Warburg, 1945), 232.  Yannis Kiourtsakis, Ελληνισμός και Δύση στο στοχασμό του Σεφέρη [Hellenism and the West in Seferis Thought] (Athens: Kedros, 1979), 29.

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Losing Balance: Europe in the Aftermath of the First World War Many significant scholars¹⁵ have discussed the nostalgic turn of European intellectuals and artists in the aftermath of the First World War and its role in the context of a conservative, anti-modernist, at times even reactionary discourse that was articulated against the overwhelming pace and transformations, which modernity and the Great War had brought about.¹⁶ A plethora of thinkers and writers of the interwar years expressed a feeling of insecurity and frustration about modern society, which stemmed from the decline of moral principles and values and the loss of a normative frame that would give meaning to their lives. In other words, the collapse of values undermined the meaning of life itself, which was experienced as unbalanced, empty, and banal. Modernity was described with and attributed to terms of loss, nihilism, deprivation, and groundlessness (not “being at home in the world”).¹⁷ Philosophers, writers, psychologists, and sociologists – from Friedrich Nietzsche and Oswald Spengler to Martin Heidegger and Karl Jaspers – employed terms such as nihilism, barbarism, demolition of values, and existential groundlessness in order to describe modern civilization.¹⁸ They perceived the modern human situation as subjected to destiny and fate beyond reason and control, and, therefore, expressed their worst and deepest fears for the future of European civilization, as they felt it was sinking deeper and deeper into mental and moral decay. This almost escha See for example, Michael Löwy and Robert Sayre, Révolte et mélancholie: Le romantisme à contre-courant de la modernité (Paris: Payot, 1992); Svetlana Boym, The Future of Nostalgia (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2001); David Rosner, Conservatism and Crisis: The Anti-Modernist Perspective in Twentieth-Century German Philosophy (London: Lexington Books, 2012); Peter Gay, Weimar Culture: The Outsider as Insider (New York, NY: Norton, 1968); David Frisby, Fragments of Modernity: Theories of Modernity in the Work of Simmel, Kracauer and Benjamin (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1985); Stuart Hall and Bram Gieben, Formations of Modernity (Oxford: Polity Press, 1992); Jeffrey Herf, Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); David Lowenthal, The Heritage Crusade and the Spoils of History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Peter Gordon and John P. McCormick, eds., Weimar Thought: A Contested Legacy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013); Stathis Gourgouris, Dream Nation: Enlightenment, Colonization and the Institution of Modern Greece (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996).  David Rosner, Conservatism and Crisis: The Anti-Modernist Perspective in Twentieth-Century German Philosophy (London: Lexington Books, 2012), xi.  Rosner, Conservatism and Crisis, 76. See also Roger Griffin, Modernism and Fascism: The Sense of a Beginning under Mussolini and Hitler (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007).  Griffin, Modernism and Fascism, 3.

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tological perception of the future of European culture was expressed in narratives – in literature, visual arts, film, theatre – of cultural pessimism and romantic nostalgia, by placing lost values in an idyllic past. By the 1930s, the topography of this nostalgia was located in and restricted to the nation; it marked the restoration of the “lost home” by referring to national (often nationalistic) fantasies fortified by the idealization of the nation and its people (as “chosen” ones) and reinvention through the overall structure of national symbols, historical monuments, and legends of the nation’s past mission in the modern world. The turn to the past – usually to a utopian past, purified from weaknesses – and its reconstruction aligned in the ways the nation at present imagined its future.¹⁹ Stathis Gourgouris has called this topography of nostalgia a utopian return to a place that never existed and therefore is a paradox. Pantelis Lekkas, for the same reason, has characterized the nation’s nature as “chimerical” because the nation, as perceived by the nationalist ideology, can never be considered as “historically completed.” On the contrary, “the nation is always perceived in an ideal way, as a historical subject, which constantly heads to its fulfillment and to the materialization of its fate.”²⁰ The restoration of the nation required a return to its principal condition, the moment before the fall, to a utopian past that was offered as the perfect snapshot, without marks of decline and decay, eternally young. Idealist intellectuals promoted the Classical past as a standard against the governmental and national impasses of the time, which would ensure the renewal of European culture. In the 1920s and the 1930s, young intellectuals examined the relationship between Europe and Greece, as well as their contribution to it. In this context, some of the most widely-known works are George Theotokas’ Free Spirit [Ελεύθερο Πνεύμα] (1929), Panayotis Kanellopoulos’ The Crisis of Our Time and Socialism [Η κρίσις της εποχής μας και ο σοσιαλισμός] (1929), and The History of the European Spirit [Ιστορία του Ευρωπαϊκού Πνεύματος], as well as the dialogue between George Seferis and Konstantinos Tsatsos, Dialogue on Poetry [Διάλογος για την ποίηση] (1939). All these publications discuss the notion of European Hellenism and examine ways to achieve Greece’s restoration in modern Europe.

 Boym, The Future of Nostalgia, 354.  Pantelis Lekkas, Η Εθνικιστική Ιδεολογία. Πέντε υποθέσεις στην ιστορική κοινωνιολογία [Nationalist Ideology: Five Working Hypotheses in Historical Sociology] (Athens: Katarti, 2006), 92– 93.

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Visions of Europeanization: Hellenism as Coequal In 1929, the promising young playwright and novelist Giorgos Theotokas, preeminent spokesman of the Generation of the Thirties, returned to Greece from his studies in Paris and London; soon after, he published a book under the title Free Spirit. In an optimistic tone, the author observed that, with its ambitions of territorial expansion permanently extinguished, Greece had everything to gain by broadening its cultural horizons and by reinforcing its extroversion, as, in his words at that time, “no one expects anything from Greece” and “at moments like these, if the right people are found, sometimes the most beautiful things happen.”²¹ Theotokas declared that it was time to discard the introverted obsessions of the past and to embrace European modernity; it was time that the new generation of Greeks re-discovered their culture and values by looking outwards to Europe, not inwards to their provincial roots or backwards to the Classical or Byzantine past.²² The defeat of 1922, a disaster on a major scale, created an “empty space” (a tabula rasa, according to Beaton) on which the “free spirit” of modernity would build and develop. In this context, Theotokas referred to Leoforos Syggrou, a new thoroughfare linking central Athens to Faliro, as a symbolic modernization characteristic of the generation of his time.²³ Inspired by this version of a newly-Europeanizing Greece, Theotokas’ friend, the poet and diplomat George Seferis, dedicated a poem to the same theme in 1930, under the title “Syggrou Avenue.”²⁴ Theotokas’ remedy for Greece’s backwardness and problems was the intellectual liberation and emancipation from both the ideological obsession with its past and modern alienating dogmas such as communism, fascism, nationalism, and even avant-gardism. As Beaton notes, Theotokas’ ideal was a free exchange of European and indigenous ideas, in the sense of an equal dialogue. This metaphor of exchange, according to Beaton, carried over even into the future relationship that Theotokas envisaged, between the arts in Greece and those in the rest of Europe. In this context, according to Theotokas’ model, there was nothing wrong with “imports” as long as you also have something

 George Theotokas, Ελεύθερο Πνεύμα [Free Spirit] (Athens: A. I. Rallis, 1929).  Beaton, “Versions of Europe in the Greek Literary Imagination,” 30.  Beaton, “Versions of Europe in the Greek Literary Imagination,” 31– 32.  George Seferis, Ημερολόγιο Καταστρώματος Α΄ [Logbook I] (Athens: 1940), 85: poem “Λεωφόρος Συγγρού” (1930). See also George Seferis, Collected Poems, ed. and trans. Edmund Keely and Philip Sherrad (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995); Beaton, “Versions of Europe in the Greek Literary Imagination,” 31.

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to “export.” While an earlier generation had envisaged the expansion of Greek cultural influence in terms of military operations and territorial conquest, Theotokas, adjusting to the realities of the post-1922 world, proposed a balance of intellectual and cultural transfers instead.²⁵ For Theotokas, modern Greece and Hellenic culture therefore seemed to be in a dialogue, a process of open and free exchange, with the other cultures of Europe. Contrary to Thetokas’ metaphor regarding import and export, Seferis used the metaphor of “appropriation” and “repatriation.”²⁶ Europeans have adopted and adapted much that was originally Hellenic to create something that, according to Seferis, is either not Hellenic at all, or only superficially so. Seferis proposed to replace this “European Hellenism” – the foreign interpretation and appropriation of Hellenic culture – with what he called “Greek Hellenism,” the indigenous cultural physiognomy of Hellenism.²⁷ Seferis was very well aware of the fact that Hellenism had succumbed to European normativity; he asserted that what would be best, most creative, fertile, and effective for the Greeks in their contact with the Western and European civilization would be to draw material from their own roots, to understand deeply and work systematically on their own tradition, in order to hope for a true intellectual revival of their place, which could save Greek identity and inspire new Greek forms in literature and poetry.²⁸ However, their faith in European renewal changed dramatically in the late 1930s and finally collapsed during the Second World War. In 1936, Seferis perceived the rise of National Socialism as a severe crisis of European culture in general, arguing that people were being led blindly “into the zone of bestialità.”²⁹ On August 23, 1939, when the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was signed, Seferis despaired of European politics and seemed to permanently lose his faith in the European idea and concept. “We are talking about Europe, about a ‘Europe-

 Beaton, “Versions of Europe in the Greek Literary Imagination,” 32.  Beaton, “Versions of Europe in the Greek Literary Imagination,” 34.  George Theotokas and George Seferis, Αλληλογραφία (1930 – 1966) [Correspondence (1930 – 1966)], ed. G.P. Savvidis (Athens: Ermis, 1981), 102; Dimitris Tziovas, Ο μύθος της γενιάς του τριάντα. Νεωτερικότητα, Ελληνικότητα και πολιτισμική ιδεολογία [The Myth of the Generation of the ’30s: Modernity, Greekness and Cultural Ideology] (Athens: Polis, 2011); Dimitris Tziovas, Οι μεταμορφώσεις του εθνισμού και το ιδεολόγημα της ελληνικότητας στο μεσοπόλεμο [The Transformations of Nationalism and the Ideology of Greekness in the Interwar Period] (Athens: Odysseas Publishing, 2006).  George Seferis, Μέρες Γ΄, 1934 – 1940 [Days, ΙΙΙ, 1934– 1940] (Athens: Ikaros Publishing, 1977), 133; George Seferis, Δοκιμές [Essays], vol. 2 (Athens: Ikaros, 1974), 28; Kiourtsakis, Ελληνισμός και Δύση στο στοχασμό του Σεφέρη, 111– 129.  George Seferis, Δοκιμές [Essays], vol. 1 (Athens: Ikaros, 1982), 511.

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an nation’, but we fail to see that there is so little Europe inside Europe,” he wrote at the time.³⁰

The Anti-modernist Critique: a European Debate in the Greek Context In the aftermath of the First World War, Oswald Spengler’s (1880 – 1936) two-volume book The Decline of the West, which was published in the summer of 1918, revived the anti-modernist critique, questioning the linear narrative of progress, prosperity, and integration within Europe. In the interwar years, the ostensible conflict between Kultur and Zivilisation came back to the fore. This debate had commenced in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, with several German thinkers critically discussing the capitalist model as a standard of the modern way of life, examining the contradiction between “internal” (Kultur) and “external” civilization (Zivilisation).³¹ Alfred Weber was among the first to introduce this distinction, but was soon followed by many other scholars of his generation, such as Werner Sombart (1863 – 1941), Max Scheler (1874– 1928), and Ferdinand Tönnies (1855 – 1936). In their view, Kultur signified the intellectual and authentic substance of a people, expressing its organic relation to its time and spirit. Its antipode was Zivilisation, the external, materialistic civilization, the technically structured and mechanical expression of modern civilization.³² This neo-Kantian distinction was used extensively, as the main pillar of argumentation against Marxism and communism by both conservative (and in some cases, nationalist) German and Greek philosophers and sociologists, who politically and ideologically opposed socialist ideas. The German sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies, in his popular book Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft (“Community and Society,” 1887), compared the traditional community (a small provincial town, a village, a family) with modern society (factory, metropolis, the nation).³³ In the contradistinction of those two different forms of sociability, community was described as a harmonious world, organized on the basis of its customs, religion, and solidarity (Kultur), while society was based on cold calculation, strife for profit, and the veneration

 Seferis, Μέρες Γ΄ (1934 – 1940), 129.  Löwy and Sayre, Révolte et mélancholie, 75.  Charles Bambach, Heidegger, Dilthey and the Crisis of Historicism: History and Metaphysics in Heidegger, Dilthey and the Neo-Kantians (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995), 137.  Boym, The Future of Nostalgia, 24. See also Rosner, Conservatism and Crisis, 77.

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of technological and industrial progress (Zivilisation). Tönnies’ deprecation of modern society was evident in the phrase that “one goes into Gesellschaft (‘society’) as one goes into a foreign country.”³⁴ This distinction had a major impact on Greek thinkers, who had studied in Germany, were familiar with German academic debates, and were also inspired by anti-Western thinkers in Greece in the early twentieth century, such as Pericles Giannopoulos (1869 – 1910). Those thinkers’ beliefs, anti-positivist, antiWestern and anti-modernist, were often contrary to the views of the spokesmen of the Generation of the Thirties, regarding the role of Greece within Europe. One of the most prominent Greek thinkers who reproduced these arguments during the interwar period was the young Greek sociologist Panayotis Kanellopoulos, who had studied law in Heidelberg in the early 1920s.³⁵ In 1929, he published a book under the title The Crisis of Our Time and Socialism [H κρίσις της εποχής μας και ο σοσιαλισμός]. In a rather pessimistic tone, he described modern times as a period of “chaos,” because of a lack of evaluative orientations that could formulate the values and ideals of the era.³⁶ He accused liberalism, capitalism, and material civilization that dominated the European spirit as responsible for the birth and diffusion of the socialist and communist ideology and movements that threatened the soul, culture, and identity of modern mankind, modern people, and modern nations.³⁷ Kanellopoulos embraced Tönnies’ preference for Gemeinschaft (“community”) over Gesellschaft (“society”), Alfred Weber’s distinction between Kultur and Zivilisation, and Max Weber’s disenchantment with the world. His proposal for a return to an idyllic, traditional organization of society³⁸ was combined with criticism of technological progress and entailed an

 Boym, The Future of Nostalgia, 24.  Kanellopoulos in most of his articles and books in the 1930s is referred to Tönnies’ distinction. Some of them are: “Η πατρίς ως κοινωνιολογική έννοια” [Homeland as Sociological Concept], Politismos 1, no. 6 (July 1932); “Η οικονομία και η ιδέα της ελευθερίας” [Economy and the Idea of Freedom], Αρχείον Φιλοσοφίας και Θεωρίας των Επιστημών 3, no. 4 (1931); Ο άνθρωπος και αι κοινωνικαί αντιθέσεις [Man and Social Contrasts] (Athens: K.S. Papadogiannis, 1934); “Ιστορία και Πρόοδος. Εισαγωγή εις την κοινωνιολογίαν της ιστορίας” [History and Progress: Introduction in the Sociology of History], Αρχείον Φιλοσοφίας και Θεωρίας των Επιστημών 4, no. 2 (1933); Η κοινωνία της εποχής μας. Κριτική των συστατικών αυτής στοιχείων [The Society of Our Time: Criticism of its Constituents] (Athens: K.S. Papadogiannis, 1932).  Panayotis Kanellopoulos, Η κρίσις της εποχής μας και ο σοσιαλισμός [The Crisis of Our Time and Socialism] (Athens: Eleftheroudakis, 1929), 13.  Kanellopoulos, Η κρίσις της εποχής μας και ο σοσιαλισμός, 13.  Panayotis Kanellopoulos, “Η κοινωνιολογία και οι επί την γένεσιν και διαμόρφωσίν της επιδράσαντες πολιτικοί παράγοντες” [Sociology and the Political Factors that Impacted on its Birth and Formulation], Αρχείον Φιλοσοφίας και Θεωρίας των Επιστημών 4, no. 4 (1933): 371– 386.

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anti-modernist thesis regarding Hellenism as a return to the glorified ancient past. In this context, Kultur corresponded to the timeless element of Classical Antiquity, of which the organic, physical, and cultural heir was modern Hellenism, whereas Zivilisation was linked to the dogma of historical materialism, the product par excellence of technological progress and capitalism. Kanellopoulos spoke of an intellectual culture compatible with the ancient Greek standards, against materialistic and technical progress.³⁹ In his 1933 article “History and Progress” [“Ιστορία και Πρόοδος”] he examined how history, as a discipline, relates to the concept of progress. He juxtaposed the ancient Greek civilization with the modern one, concluding that whereas in the former, time was considered to be an eternal, mythical present, the concept of progress emerged as a product of the mechanical civilization of the latter. He assumed that different ancient civilizations prospered and thrived for thousands of years, without facing the problem of progress at all. For the Greeks, the idea of progress was totally unknown, as their creativity responded to trans-historical criteria, to absolute and eternal values. The past for the ancient Greeks existed as a myth; it was eternally present.⁴⁰ The concept of progress, in contrast, was a very recent idea, which had emerged in the eighteenth century, as a product of modernity and, particularly, as a product of scientific discoveries and technological innovation. It was through this lens that Kanellopoulos viewed European positivists, such as August Comte and materialists such as Karl Marx, and dismissed Hegel for systematically developing the theory that History develops progressively. In his 1936 article “The Fundamental Theories of History” [Αι θεμελιώδεις περί ιστορίας θεωρίαι], he also noted that the concept of historical materialism failed to capture both cultural and historical developments and their true meaning, as it explained reality in toto in terms of economic, class, and technological changes.⁴¹ Ioannis Theodorakopoulos, a close friend of Kanellopoulos and fellow Philosophy student at Heidelberg, also criticized historical materialism, as its interpretation of history conflicted with the concept of History as the teleological development of consciousness, by privileging a specific ideological, positivist, and materialistic view of history. For Theodorakopoulos, the peoples that know only

 Panayotis Kanellopoulos, “Ιστορία και Πρόοδος. Εισαγωγή εις την κοινωνιολογίαν της ιστορίας” [History and Progress: Introduction in the Sociology of History], Αρχείον Φιλοσοφίας και Θεωρίας των Επιστημών 4, no. 2 (1933).  Kanellopoulos, “Ιστορία και Πρόοδος.”  Panayotis Kanellopoulos, “Αι θεμελιώδεις περί ιστορίας θεωρίαι (3)” [The Foundational Theories of History (3)], Αρχείον Φιλοσοφίας και Θεωρίας των Επιστημών 7, no. 3 (1936). Translation by author.

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external or material civilization (Ζivilisation) are consigned to historical oblivion.⁴² Both Kanellopoulos and Theodorakopoulos believed that internal civilization (Kultur) did not serve any practical purpose; each expression of culture was in itself absolutely perfect, because its products were eternal as the result of mystic creativity, not of cold rational calculation. They also both shared the belief that the idea of progress destroyed people’s faith in eternal values, and therefore in intellectual culture.⁴³ In 1929, these intellectuals launched their journal, Αρχείον Φιλοσοφίας και Θεωρίας των Επιστημών (Archive of Philosophy and Epistemology), which was published every three months for 11 years until 1940 and whose orientation was very similar to the international discourse on elitism and anti-modernism in European countries, such as Germany, France, and Great Britain. Alongside Kanellopoulos, Tsatsos, and Theodorakopoulos, the editorial board included the diplomat Michalis Tsamados, who was the journal’s main sponsor; Themistoklis Tsatsos, the brother of Konstantinos; and, in the journal’s final year of circulation, Nikolaos Louros. Together, they aspired to acquaint a young reading audience with an idealist philosophy, neo-Kantianism and neo-Hegelianism, sociology, the philosophy of law and new scientific currents of thought. Nevertheless, the intellectual elitism of the board’s members was openly proclaimed in one of the journal’s main aims: “not to popularize philosophical concepts at the level of the common sense” but, on the contrary, “to elevate the man with the true philosophical curiosity to the true scholarly world, which is the antipode of common sense, and to help him gradually see philosophical concepts in their whole grandeur.”⁴⁴ However, the journal’s purpose was broader, more ambitious, and more political than that; it offered a platform with wide appeal, a public podium, in order to fulfill a mission of national pedagogy, i. e. the cultural and political renewal of Hellenism. This “renewal” included the criticism of the modern era and its products – materialism, liberalism, over-democracy, and socialism – and was far

 Ioannis Theodorakopoulos, “Το πρόβλημα της φιλοσοφίας της ιστορίας” [The Problem of Philosophy of History], Αρχείον Φιλοσοφίας και Θεωρίας των Επιστημών 4 (1933).  Panayotis Kanellopoulos, “Ο Alfred Weber και η ιδέα της προόδου” [Alfred Weber and the Idea of Progress], Αρχείον Οικονομικών και Κοινωνικών Επιστημών 11, no. 11 (1931).  Ioannis Theodorakopoulos, “Τα τρία χρόνια του ‘Αρχείου’” [Three Years of the ‘Archive’], Αρχείον Φιλοσοφίας και Θεωρίας των Επιστημών 4 (1933): 6. See also Katerina Papari, Ελληνικότητα και αστική διανόηση στον Μεσοπόλεμο. Το πολιτικό πρόγραμμα των Π. Κανελλόπουλου, Ι. Θεοδωρακόπουλου και Κ. Τσάτσου [Greekness and Bourgeois Intellectuals in the Interwar Period (1922– 1940): The Political Program of Panayotis Kanellopoulos, Konstantinos Tsatsos and Ioannis Theodorakopoulos] (Athens: Asini, 2017).

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closer to idealism and the values of Classical Antiquity; it invoked the past in order to solve the problems of the present. According to the above-mentioned intellectuals, the views of materialists, rationalists, naturalists, and positivists had caused the moral dissolution of modern mankind, which also brought political upheaval at home and in Europe, undermining national unity and the future of European culture as well.⁴⁵ The Αρχείον Φιλοσοφίας και Θεωρίας των Επιστημών inspired the launch of other publications too; these included the periodicals Ιδέα (Idea) (1933 – 1934) and Τα Προπύλαια (Propylaea). The latter was published in 1938, by students of members of the editorial board of Αρχείον Φιλοσοφίας και Θεωρίας των Επιστημών, and followed their principles by emphasizing studies of ancient Greek literature and the universal human cultural values of antiquity.⁴⁶ By 1931, the liberal and modernist Theotokas also seems to have shared this view. Together with Spiros Melas (1882– 1966) and a small group of other young intellectuals, he decided to publish a new journal, to fight both communism and capitalism. The journal was called Idea and was published monthly, from 1933 to 1934. The members of the editorial board agreed that for the benefit of Greece and that of European culture, communism should not prevail, but capitalism should also be replaced by another economic and political system. Both capitalism and communism were regarded as products of materialism and, therefore, as detrimental for the Humanism they dreamt of, not only for Hellenism but for the whole European world. In Theotokas’ words, it was a battle “of two principes fondamentaux of human thought; the principle of materialism and the principle of idealism.” Moreover, they believed that capitalism should be replaced in a way that would not disrupt the consistency and continuity of civilization and culture and would protect the world from falling into a suffocating mechanical barbarism, which would resemble a new Medieval Age in modernity.⁴⁷ Konstantinos Tsatsos, the third classmate in the circle of Theodorakopoulos and Kanellonopoulos in Heidelberg and a life-long friend, argued that modernized Europe had surrendered to material prosperity and was, therefore, “barbarized”; this Europe had to be saved by cultural Hellenism. More specifically, he proceeded to further distinguish Europeans between “the Greeks” and “the barbarians”; by “Greeks” he meant all those Europeans who were nurtured within the ancient Greek intellectual tradition and values, even if these had expired in

 Kanellopoulos, Η κοινωνία της εποχής μας.  Papari, Ελληνικότητα και αστική διανόηση στον Μεσοπόλεμο, 180 – 187.  Theotokas and Seferis, Αλληλογραφία, 63 – 64.

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the modern era, while by “barbarians” he meant all those whose spirit had succumbed to the preoccupation with material wealth.⁴⁸ For these intellectuals, Hellenism was not just a historical phenomenon but a metaphysical idea. Tsatsos envisaged Europeans as Greeks and Europe as Greek, by turning to its metaphysical destination (its Greekness) as a counterweight to its subordination to “barbarism,” material civilization, and the power of the masses that were accused of not having any spirituality at all, but on the contrary, sought only material wellbeing.⁴⁹ Conservative intellectuals, thus, showed an ambivalent relationship with the West; on the one hand, Europe maintained and enriched the ancient Greek spirit through the modern philosophical traditions and German idealism in particular; on the other hand, the ancient Greek spirit, by returning to Greece from where it had sprung, would prepare and cultivate the spiritual hegemony of Hellenism in the West, reassuring not just an equal, but a dominant position of Greece in the European cultural constellation. It is worth mentioning that their ambivalence is expressed from a European rather than a Greek standpoint, as these thinkers explicitly felt more European than Greek, because of their cosmopolitan upbringing. In their biographical works, they often complained about their deficient Hellenism. Tsatsos and Kanellopoulos, for example, were raised by European governesses (nannies)—a Slovenian and an Austrian one, respectively—and neither spoke Greek as a native language. Both were also more acquainted, in their youth, with German and French literature than with the Greek one. Tsatsos would characteristically describe his upbringing as below: My upbringing was not Greek, but cosmopolitan (as in most children of my social environment). I was not familiarized with Greek customs as a child, except very few […]. I was not aware of the Greek traditions and customs, and only when I was older did I learn phrases and proverbs connected to them. Instead, I was familiarized with the European customs; I sang German songs at Christmas, I was playing with French toys, and I was dressed in English clothes. […] I used to think mostly in French and German language rather than in Greek. My world was the world of the West.⁵⁰

Their incomprehension of Hellenism was overcome at the University of Heidelberg in the 1920s and under the philosophical teaching of Heinrich Rickert, Friedrich Gundolf and Ernst Hoffmann, Karl Jaspers and Edmund Husserl; in the so Konstantinos Tsatsos, “Ευρώπη” [Europe], in Η ελληνική παράδοση [The Greek Tradition], ed. Konstantinos Tsatsos et al. (Athens: Efthini, 2000), 172– 173. Translation by author.  Tsatsos, “Ευρώπη,” 173 – 175.  Konstantinos Tsatsos, Λογοδοσία μιας ζωής [The Account of a Lifetime], vol. 1 (Athens: I ekdoseis ton filon, 2001), 64– 65. Translation by author.

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ciology and political theory classes of Max and Alfred Weber; and the law courses of Gustav Radbruch. So plausibly, Heidelberg, as Kanellopoulos has stressed, played a crucial role in the sublimation of the Classical Greek spirit as “eternally present”, not only in modern Hellenism, but in modern Europe as well: “The spiritual tradition of Heidelberg, which was Hellenic to a great degree, not only had not alienated us from Greece, but made more conscious in us the eternal youth of the ancient Greek spirit.”⁵¹ Europe, and here, particularly Heidelberg, had kept the Classical spirit; the German idealist philosophical tradition had not saved it from oblivion, but further continued and developed the Greek idealist philosophical tradition that was handed back to the Greeks, in order to elaborate upon and enrich it. Closely related to this perception was “The Eternal Youth of the Greeks” [“Η αιώνια νεότης των Ελλήνων”], the article their beloved professor, the popular neo-Kantian philosopher Heinrich Rickert, published in 1929. It was the first article of the first volume of the journal Αρχείον Φιλοσοφίας και Θεωρίας των Επιστημών. ⁵² The purpose of the article was to show the timeless and undying youth of Hellenism, by arguing that the Greeks were the first to create the foundations on which modern European civilization was constructed. In Rickert’s words, Europe was inextricably connected to the Greek spirit and by examining the Greeks, Europeans examined their own youth.⁵³ This discussion was reproduced a decade later, in 1938, in the well-known “Dialogue on Poetry”⁵⁴ between Seferis and Tsatsos and evolved into an intense debate (“ending up in two monologues,” in Seferis’ words) on the ontological and metaphysical character of Hellenism and its Europeanness. In this debate, Tsatsos, imbued by philosophical idealism, explained that he perceived Hellenism as a category of History, a moment of the Idea (with a capital I), an a priori canon and an absolute form of life in the course of the Spirit, which for this reason could guarantee the authenticity in Greek works of art and literature.⁵⁵ In this dialogue, Seferis not only remained a fervent defender of modernism in po-

 Panayotis Kanellopoulos, “Heidelberg, ο χρυσός κρίκος του πνευματικού μας δεσμού” [Heidelberg: The Golden Link of Our Spiritual Bond], in Τα Δοκίμια [The Essays], vol. 2, ed. Evangelos Moschos (Athens: Association of Panagiotis’ Kanellopoulos Friends, 2002), 532.  Heinrich Rickert, “Η αιώνια νεότης των Ελλήνων” [The Eternal Youth of the Greeks], Αρχείον Φιλοσοφίας και Θεωρίας των Επιστημών 1, no. 1 (1929 – 1930): 7– 24.  Rickert, “Η αιώνια νεότης των Ελλήνων,” 8, 24.  Konstantinos Tsatsos, “Θεοδωρακόπουλος και Ελληνισμός” [Theodorakopoulos and Hellenism], Τετράδια Ευθύνης 18 (April 1983): 17.  Lukas Kousoulas, ed., Γ. Σεφέρης – Κ. Τσάτσος, Ένας διάλογος για την ποίηση [G. Seferis – K. Tsatsos: Dialogue on Poetry] (Athens: Ermis, 1975), 58.

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etry and art, but he furthermore distanced himself from the monolithic categories of Hellenism promoted by his interlocutor. Seferis counter-argued that by using such an absolutely arbitrary criterion in the evaluation of art, his discussant confused an ideological obsession with an evaluative principle.⁵⁶ However, for Tsatsos, the universal values of Antiquity, precisely because they transcended the boundaries of space and time, showcased Greece as the privileged heir and center of European culture in the modern era.⁵⁷ This universal contribution and value of Greek Antiquity to the West as the cradle of European civilization, a belief that already existed before, was being reproduced during the interwar period by Greek bourgeois intellectuals in narcissist terms. In order to reinvent a significant role for Greece in the modern era, they articulated a narrative according to which European Hellenism was expected to return to the land of its origin, where it would be renewed and would produce a new cultural universality, a new vision that would revive European culture. This idea intensified during the Second World War and especially in the postwar era, judging from the writings, books, and articles of the above-mentioned Greek intellectuals, who insisted upon Hellenism as a new Humanism for Europe. Kanellopoulos, in the Ιστορία του Ευρωπαϊκού Πνεύματος [History of the European Spirit], which was written during the Metaxas regime and was first published in 1940, explored and unfolded in his own manner significant moments of European thought, art, culture, literature, and poetry through the lives and work of significant figures, from Saint Augustine to his own contemporaries.⁵⁸ Kanellopoulos, in his introductory note, clarified that, although he does not make any reference to Greek artists, poets, writers and thinkers in his voluminous work, he regards Greece as the “cradle of Europe” and of the European culture in general. By placing Greece at the dawn of Europe, he claimed that Europe was inconceivable without Greece, while the latter, as the original heir of antiquity, was undertaking a significant mission in the modern European world.⁵⁹ The rediscovery of the values and standards of Classical Antiquity, for

 Kousoulas, Γ. Σεφέρης – Κ. Τσάτσος, Ένας διάλογος για την ποίηση, 27– 28. See also Papari, Ελληνικότητα και αστική διανόηση στον Μεσοπόλεμο, 206.  Charalampos Karaoglou, ed., Περιοδικά λόγου και τέχνης (1901– 1940) [Journals of Speech and Art (1901– 1940)], vol. 3 (Thessaloniki: University Studio Press, 2007), 438. See also Gourgouris, Dream Nation, 236.  Panayotis Kanellopoulos, Ιστορία του Ευρωπαϊκού Πνεύματος [History of the European Spirit], 2nd ed. (Athens: Aetos, 1947). See also Papari, Ελληνικότητα και αστική διανόηση στον Μεσοπόλεμο, 55 – 56 and 105.  Kanellopoulos, Ιστορία του Ευρωπαϊκού Πνεύματος, 23.

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Kanellopoulos and Tsatsos, configured the new, modern myth⁶⁰ that would give meaning to the modern way of life,⁶¹ and at the same time it could dictate and serve post-war Greece’s transformation into a modern European state, promoting European integration. The adherents of the anti-modernist critique placed Greece, geographically, culturally, spiritually, and socially, in Europe. Their debate and elaborations demonstrate their concerns for the role of Greece within Europe, underscoring diversity in European unity. The universalism of ancient Greek values, in their view, should apply to the modern values of a coherent vision of the European constellation.

Conclusion: Europeanization in Process Michael Llewellyn Smith claims that European ideas and values are strongly rooted in Greek culture and the Greek view of the world.⁶² There is much truth in that; since the eighteenth century, in the historical process since the establishment of the Greek independent state, political actors and intellectuals in their elaborations and perception of Europe imply an underlying European idea that connects their nation-state with the European constellation geographically and culturally. The Greek case, in other words, confirms the assumption that the historical examination of Europeanization processes should be widened to the entire period of modern history since the eighteenth century.⁶³ Moreover, Wolfgang Schmale has suggested considering Europeanization as all “processes resulting in the development of a single European culture” that “served to construct coherencies out of diversity.”⁶⁴ In this sense, Greek intellectuals during the interwar period, by discussing the role and contribution of mod-

 Konstantinos Tsatsos, “Ο Μύθος της Νέας Ελλάδας” [The Myth of Modern Greece], Καθημερινή, August 24, 1947, in Konstantinos Tsatsos, Ελληνική Πορεία [The Greek Course] (Athens: Estia, 1967/1952), 89.  “Η Αποστολή της Ελλάδος εις τον σύγχρονον κόσμον. Λόγος του Προέδρου κ. Κωνστ. Τσάτσου” [The Mission of Greece in the Modern World: Speech of the President Mr. Konst. Tsatsos; December 29, 1966], in Proceedings of the Academy of Athens, vol. 41 (Athens, 1967), 553 – 570.  Llewellyn Smith, “Greece and Europe, Progress and Civilization, 1890s-1920s.”  Ulrike von Hirschhausen and Kiran K. Patel, “Europeanization in History: An Introduction,” in Europeanization in the Twentieth Century: Historical Approaches, ed. Martin Conway and Kiran K. Patel (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).  Wolfgang Schmale, “Processes of Europeanization,” European History Online (2010), accessed November 17, 2020, http://www.ieg-ego.eu/schmalew-2010b-en.

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ern Greece in Europe, were not only communicating their concerns for the nation’s modernization, but also seeking the means to compensate for the Greek losses and disenchantments after the 1922 catastrophe in Asia Minor. They were elaborating their concerns for Hellenism, through the dynamic process of becoming European. Theotokas in the beginning of Free Spirit described Europe as “a cluster consisting of infinite contradictions.”⁶⁵ For the cosmopolitan Greek intellectuals at the time, either liberals or conservatives, modernists, and antimodernists, it was clear that a cultural diversity of Europe existed within the framework of a common European civilization, which, despite its discords and juxtapositions, was in search of a common cultural vision for the future. It was exactly in this process of “becoming European” that they realized the cultural contribution of modern Hellenism; by addressing the revival of the Antiquity’s universal values in European culture, they promoted their perception of unity inside the diversity, of universality along with disparity.

Bibliography Asdrachas, Spiros. “Ευρώπη και νέος ελληνισμός: τα αυτονόητα” [Modern Hellenism and Europe]. In Ευρώπη και Νέος Ελληνισμός [Scientific Symposium], edited by Society for the Study of Modern Greek Culture and Education, 35 – 43. Athens: Moraitis School, 2001. Bambach, Charles R. Heidegger, Dilthey and the Crisis of Historicism: History and Metaphysics in Heidegger, Dilthey and the Neo-Kantians. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995. Beaton, Roderick. “Versions of Europe in the Greek Literary Imagination (1929 – 1961).” In Europe in Modern Greek History, edited by Kevin Featherstone, 27 – 41. London: Hurst & Company, 2014. Beaton, Roderick. Greece: Biography of a Modern Nation. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2019. Boym, Svetlana. The Future of Nostalgia. New York, NY: Basic Books, 2001. Butler, Eliza M. The Tyranny of Greece over Germany: A Study of the Influence Exercised by Greek Art and Poetry over the Great German Writers of the Eighteenth, Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012. First published in 1935. Chapoutot, Johann. Ο εθνικοσοσιαλισμός και η αρχαιότητα [Le national-socialisme et l’Antiquité], translated by Georgios Karampelas. Athens: Polis Publishing, 2012. Featherstone, Kevin, ed. Europe in Modern Greek History. London: Hurst & Company, 2014. Featherstone, Kevin, and George Kazamias. “Introduction: Southern Europe and the Process of ‘Europeanization.’” South European Society and Politics 5, no. 2 (2009): 1 – 24.

 Theotokas, Ελεύθερο Πνεύμα, 1.

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Frisby, David. Fragments of Modernity, Theories of Modernity in the Work of Simmel, Kracauer and Benjamin. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1985. Gay, Peter. Weimar Culture: The Outsider as Insider. New York, NY: Norton, 1968. Gordon, Peter, and John P. McCormick, eds. Weimar Thought: A Contested Legacy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013. Gourgouris, Stathis. Dream Nation: Enlightenment, Colonization and the Institution of Modern Greece. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996. Griffin, Roger. Modernism and Fascism: The Sense of a Beginning under Mussolini and Hitler. London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007. Hall, Stuart, and Bram Gieben. Formations of Modernity. Oxford: Polity Press, 1992. Herf, Jeffrey. Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984. Hirschhausen, Ulrike von, and Kiran K. Patel. “Europeanization in History: An Introduction.” In Europeanization in the Twentieth Century: Historical Approaches, edited by Martin Conway and Kiran K. Patel, 1 – 18. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. Kanellopoulos, Panayotis. “Η πατρίς ως κοινωνιολογική έννοια” [Homeland as a Sociological Concept]. Politismos 1, no. 6 (July 1932): 548 – 554. Kanellopoulos, Panayotis. “Η οικονομία και η ιδέα της ελευθερίας” [Economy and the Idea of Freedom]. Αρχείον Φιλοσοφίας και Θεωρίας των Επιστημών 3, no. 4 (1931): 445 – 479. Kanellopoulos, Panayotis. Ο άνθρωπος και αι κοινωνικαί αντιθέσεις [Man and Social Contrasts]. Athens: K.S. Papadogiannis, 1934. Kanellopoulos, Panayotis. Η κοινωνία της εποχής μας. Κριτική των συστατικών αυτής στοιχείων [The Society of Our Time: Criticism of its Constituents]. Athens: K.S. Papadogiannis, 1932. Kanellopoulos, Panayotis. “Η κρίσις της εποχής μας και ο σοσιαλισμός” [The Crisis of Our Time and Socialism]. Επιφυλλίδες 2, no. 2, Athens: Eleftheroudakis, 1929: 3 – 31. Kanellopoulos, Panayotis. “Η κοινωνιολογία και οι επί την γένεσιν και διαμόρφωσίν της επιδράσαντες πολιτικοί παράγοντες” [Sociology and the Political Factors that Impacted on its Birth and Formulation]. Αρχείον Φιλοσοφίας και Θεωρίας των Επιστημών 4, no. 4 (1933): 371 – 386. Kanellopoulos, Panayotis. “Ιστορία και Πρόοδος. Εισαγωγή εις την κοινωνιολογίαν της ιστορίας” [History and Progress: Introduction in the Sociology of History]. Αρχείον Φιλοσοφίας και Θεωρίας των Επιστημών 4, no. 2 (1933): 151 – 197. Kanellopoulos, Panayotis. “Αι θεμελιώδεις περί ιστορίας θεωρίαι (3)” [The Foundational Theories of History (3)]. Αρχείον Φιλοσοφίας και Θεωρίας των Επιστημών 7, no. 3 (1936): 257 – 289. Kanellopoulos, Panayotis. Ιστορία του Ευρωπαϊκού Πνεύματος [History of the European Spirit], 2nd. ed. Athens: Aetos, 1947. Kanellopoulos, Panayotis. “Ο Alfred Weber και η ιδέα της προόδου” [Alfred Weber and the Idea of Progress]. Αρχείον Οικονομικών και Κοινωνικών Επιστημών 11, no. 11 (1931): 91 – 98. Kanellopoulos, Panayotis. “Heidelberg, ο χρυσός κρίκος του πνευματικού μας δεσμού” [Heidelberg: The Golden Link of Our Spiritual Bond]. In Τα Δοκίμια [The Essays], vol. 2, edited by Evangelos Moschos, 373 – 598. Athens: Association of Panagiotis’ Kanellopoulos Friends, 2002. First published 1980.

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Karaoglou, Charalampos, ed. Περιοδικά λόγου και τέχνης (1901 – 1940) [Journals of Speech and Art (1901 – 1940)]. Vol. 3, Αθηναϊκά περιοδικά 1926 – 1933 [Athens Magazines, 1926 – 1933]. Thessaloniki: University Studio Press, 2007. Kiourtsakis, Yannis. Ελληνισμός και Δύση στο στοχασμό του Σεφέρη [Hellenism and the West in Seferis Thought]. Athens: Kedros, 1979. Kontaratos, Savvas. “Οι αντιευρωπαϊκές τάσεις στην κατασκευή της νεοελληνικής ταυτότητας: σημειώσεις για την κριτική θεώρηση ενός ιστορικού φαινομένου” [Anti-European Tensions in the Construction of the Modern Greek Identity: Notes on the Critical Approach of a Historical Phenomenon]. In Ευρώπη και Νέος Ελληνισμός [Europe and Modern Hellenism], edited by the Society for the Study of Modern Greek Culture and Education, 15 – 34. Athens: Moraitis School, 2001. Kousoulas, Lukas, ed. Γ. Σεφέρης – Κ. Τσάτσος, Ένας διάλογος για την ποίηση [G. Seferis – K. Tsatsos: Dialogue on Poetry]. Athens: Ermis, 1975. Lekkas, Pantelis. Η Εθνικιστική Ιδεολογία. Πέντε υποθέσεις στην ιστορική κοινωνιολογία. [Nationalist Ideology: Five Working Hypotheses in Historical Sociology]. Athens: Katarti, 2006. Llewellyn Smith, Michael. “Greece and Europe, Progress and Civilization, 1890s-1920s.” In Europe in Modern Greek History, edited by Kevin Featherstone, 17 – 25. London: Hurst & Company, 2014. Lowenthal, David. The Heritage Crusade and the Spoils of History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. Löwy, Michael, and Robert Sayre. Révolte et mélancholie: Le romantisme à contre-courant de la modernité. Paris: Payot, 1992. Miller, Henry. The Colossus of Maroussi. London: Secker & Warburg, 1945. Papari, Katerina. Ελληνικότητα και αστική διανόηση στον Μεσοπόλεμο. Το πολιτικό πρόγραμμα των Π. Κανελλόπουλου, Ι. Θεοδωρακόπουλου και Κ. Τσάτσου [Greekness and Bourgeois Intellectuals in the Interwar Period: The Political Programme of P. Kanellopoulos, I. Theodorakopoulos and K. Tsatsos]. Athens: Asini, 2017. Rickert, H. “Η αιώνια νεότης των Ελλήνων” [The Eternal Youth of the Greeks]. Αρχείον Φιλοσοφίας και Θεωρίας των Επιστημών 1, no. 1 (1929 – 1930): 7 – 24. Rosner, David. Conservatism and Crisis: The Anti-Modernist Perspective in Twentieth-Century German Philosophy. London: Lexington Books, 2012. Schmale, Wolfgang. “Processes of Europeanization.” European History Online (2010). Accessed November 17, 2020, http://www.ieg-ego.eu/schmalew-2010b-en. Schmale, Wolfgang. “Το πρόβλημα της φιλοσοφίας της ιστορίας” [The Problem of Philosophy of History]. Αρχείον Φιλοσοφίας και Θεωρίας των Επιστημών 4 (1933): 129 – 150. Schmale, Wolfgang. “Τρία χρόνια του ‘Αρχείου’” [The Three Years of the ‘Archeion’]. Αρχείον Φιλοσοφίας και Θεωρίας των Επιστημών 4 (1933): 1 – 7. Seferis, George. Collected Poems. Edited and translated by Edmund Keely and Philip Sherrad. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995. Seferis, George. Ημερολόγιο Καταστρώματος Α΄ [Logbook I]. Athens: 1940. Seferis, George. Δοκιμές [Essays], 2 vols. Athens: Ikaros, 1982. Seferis, George. Μέρες Γ΄, 1934 – 1940 [Days, III, 1934 – 1940]. Athens: Ikaros, 1977. Seferis, George. Μέρες Δ΄, 1941 – 1944 [Days, IV, 1941 – 1944]. Athens: Ikaros, 1977.

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Skopetea, Elli. Το Πρότυπο Βασίλειο” και η Μεγάλη Ιδέα. Όψεις του Εθνικού Προβλήματος στην Ελλάδα (1830 – 1880) [The ‘Model Kingdom’ and the Great Idea. Aspects of the National Problem in Greece (1830 – 1880)]. Athens: Polytypo, 1988. Theotokas, George, and George Seferis. Αλληλογραφία (1930 – 1966) [Correspondence (1930 – 1966)], edited by G.P. Savvidis. Athens: Ermis, 1981. Theotokas, George. Ελεύθερο Πνεύμα [Free Spirit]. Athens: A.I. Rallis, 1929. Tsatsos, Konstantinos. Ελληνική Πορεία [The Greek Course]. Athens: Ikaros, 1952. Tsatsos, Konstantinos. “Ευρώπη” [Europe]. In Η ελληνική παράδοση [The Greek Tradition], edited by Konstantinos Tsatsos et al., 172 – 175. Athens: Efthini, 2000. Tsatsos, Konstantinos. Λογοδοσία μιας ζωής [The Account of a Lifetime]. 2 vols. Athens: I ekdoseis ton filon, 2001. Tsatsos, Konstantinos. “Ο μύθος της Νέας Ελλάδας” [The Myth of Modern Greece]. Καθημερινή, August 24, 1947. In Ελληνική Πορεία [The Greek Course], edited by Kostantinos Tsatsos, 89 – 93. Athens: Ikaros, 1967. Tsatsos, Konstantinos. “Θεοδωρακόπουλος και Ελληνισμός” [Theodorakopoulos and Hellenism]. Τετράδια Ευθύνης 18 (1983): 17. Tsatsos, Konstantinos. “Η Αποστολή της Ελλάδος εις τον σύγχρονον κόσμον. Λόγος του Προέδρου κ. Κωνστ. Τσάτσου” [The Mission of Greece in the Modern World: Speech of the President Mr. Konst. Tsatsou; December 29, 1966]. In Proceedings of the Academy of Athens, vol. 41, 553 – 570. Athens, 1967. Tsoukalas, Constantine. “European Modernity and Greek National Identity.” Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans 1, no. 1 (1999): 7 – 14. Tziovas, Dimitris. Ο μύθος της γενιάς του τριάντα. Νεωτερικότητα, Ελληνικότητα και πολιτισμική ιδεολογία [The Myth of the Generation of the ’30s: Modernity, Greekness and Cultural Ideology]. Athens: Polis, 2011. Tziovas, Dimitris. Οι μεταμορφώσεις του εθνισμού και το ιδεολόγημα της ελληνικότητας στο μεσοπόλεμο [The Transformations of Nationalism and the Ideology of Greekness in the Interwar Period]. Athens: Odysseas Publishing, 2006.

Section 3: Europeanization from the Bottom Up: Sports, Civil Society, and the Media

Nina Szidat

An “Active Promotion of the European Ideal”? Ideas and Practices of Europeanization in Town Twinning

Introduction On October 23, 2019, the German city Essen celebrated the seventieth anniversary of the partnership with its British twin town Sunderland. In his speech, Essen’s lord mayor, Thomas Kufen, described the twinning link as “not just a British-German story but a European story as well.”¹ He has been far from the only politician to make the connection between town twinning and Europe – be it on the local, the national or the European level. Although that claim is particularly frequently made today – with one of the many town twinning anniversaries providing the perfect opportunity –, it is by no means a new development. In fact, the narrative is almost as old as town twinning itself. To name only two instances: the Council of European Municipalities, founded in 1950, considered town twinning, which could be used to raise European awareness within the general public, a fundamental way in which the local level could contribute to processes of European Integration.² Additionally, since 1955, the Council of Europe has described town twinning as one of the central means of “propagat[ing] […] the ideal of European unity.”³ Taking these observations as a point of departure, this article focuses on the supposedly European dimension of town twinning and asks: how European were town twinnings? This simple question entails a number of follow-ups: what aspects of town twinning point to this European dimension? How and when was Europe referenced in individual town twinning schemes? And was the assumed

 Observation, October 23, 2019.  See Ingo Bautz, “Die Auslandsbeziehungen der deutschen Kommunen im Rahmen der europäischen Kommunalbewegung in den 1950er und 60er Jahren” (PhD diss., University of Siegen, 2002), 36.  Council of Europe, “European Prize, Rules and Further Provisions,” n.d., ca. 1955, CCA/3/1/ 16006, Coventry, United Kingdom; see also “Innsbruck wins Europe Prize,” Forward in Europe 6, no. 4 (1964): 11; Council of Europe, The Europe Prize. The top European Award for towns and municipalities, n.d., ca. 2018, accessed October 20, 2020, https://assembly.coe.int/LifeRay/ APCE/prix/EuropePrize/Brochures/EuropePrize-new-EN.pdf. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110685473-008

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Europeanness of town twinning reflected in individual twinning activities, which could in turn foster notions of European awareness among the participants? This cluster of questions points to processes of Europeanization which, in the words of Michael Gehler, “means ‘becoming European’ and ‘becoming Europeanized’.”⁴ Gehler represents an approach in historical science which argues for a broad understanding of Europeanization, which can encompass, according to fellow historians Hirschhausen and Patel, “a variety of political, social, economic and cultural processes that promote (or modify) a sustainable strengthening of intra-European connections and similarities through acts of emulation, exchange and entanglement and that have been experienced and labelled ‘European’ in the course of history.”⁵ In line with the broader definition of Europeanization, the underlying understanding of Europe here is equally wide and encompasses what Hartmut Kaelble termed “Europe voulue,” “Europe pensée” and “Europe vécue,”⁶ i. e. the various European institutions; intellectual constructions of Europe and Europeans; as well as the lived Europe, experienced in the day-to-day of the general public. Europeanization can thus occur in the context of European integration but is far from restricted to the political sphere. Gabriele Clemens, on the other hand, advocates to “sharpen and restrict the use of the term”⁷ to the realm of European integration, i. e. “with regard to processes of political change within the European Community and/or the European Union.”⁸ This definition of Europeanization more closely adheres to its original use in the field of political science and encompasses “the formal transfer of national sovereignty to the EC/EU level, the development of (European) institutions, […] the formulation of policy at the European level[,] […] the impact of European policy on the domestic level, particularly in EC and EU member states.”⁹

 Michael Gehler, “‘Europe’, Europeanizations and their Meaning for European Integration Historiography,” Journal of European Integration History 22 (2016): 142.  Ulrike von Hirschhausen and Kiran K. Patel, “Europeanization in History: An Introduction,” in Europeanization in the Twentieth Century: Historical Approaches, ed. Martin Conway and Kiran K. Patel (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 2.  Hartmut Kaelble, “Europäisierung,” in Dimensionen der Kultur- und Gesellschaftsgeschichte, ed. Matthias Middell and Hannes Siegrist (Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 2007), 77. Similarly, the classification between “Europe constructed”, “Europe imagined” and “Europe emergent” is frequently used. See Hirschhausen and Patel, “Europeanization,” 8 – 10.  Gabriele Clemens, “Introduction,” in The Quest for Europeanization: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on a Multiple Process, ed. Gabriele Clemens (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2017), 19.  Clemens, “Introduction,” 17.  Clemens, “Introduction,” 17.

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As this article will show, not only did both kinds of Europeanization apply to town twinning, they were in fact closely interrelated: European politicians fundamentally accepted that town twinning could promote European awareness and therefore chose to financially support and/or honor such endeavors. Vice versa, the funds made available by the European institutions to support town twinning links – and the guidelines which municipalities had to follow to acquire such funds – increased the need to emphasize the European element in town twinning activities, thus also increasing the likelihood that participants perceived said activities as European. However, it is beyond the scope of this article to assess the actual perception of town twinning. This would require a systematic analysis of sources which are not readily available (personal accounts such as journals and diaries or written output generated during youth exchanges). Instead, this article examines whether the overall practice of town twinning and the involved activities provided the necessary stimuli to enable such reactions. Although town twinning occurred between municipalities of all sizes, down to the village and even (rural) district level, for reasons of space, this article will focus on twinning between larger cities¹⁰ with a population of at least 250,000 ranging to one million inhabitants and more.¹¹ Many ideas and practices of Europe fundamentally boil down to the basic pattern of a plurality coming together as a collective.¹² In keeping with this, the article proposes that the European dimension of town twinning was potentially at its strongest when twin towns as an ensemble were the focus of attention. Although twinning links were usually of a bilateral kind, that was frequently the case, for instance when delegations from several twin towns met up or when town twinning as a movement was discussed.¹³ The first section of the ar-

 In this article, the terms “town” and “city” will be used interchangeably.  Additionally, due to differences in the attached goals and operating principles, it is apt to regard twinning on the village level and twinning between cities as two distinct types. In the latter case, for once, the perceived similarities between twinning partners, which will be discussed in more detail further down, constitute an integral part of the twinning scheme. In contrast, on the village level, the main if not only requirement was that the potential twinning partner was similar in size and/or had a comparable number of residents.  For this fundamental hypothesis, see for instance Quenzel’s findings on the recurring use of network- and tree-metaphors across different topics and policy areas. See Gudrun Quenzel, Konstruktionen von Europa: Die europäische Identität und die Kulturpolitik der Europäischen Union (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2005), 200 – 266.  That is not to say that bilateral relations and processes of Europeanization were mutually exclusive, as discourse surrounding European Integration and the Franco-German relations clearly shows. The Schuman Declaration, for once, named “the elimination of the age-old opposition of France and Germany” a requirement of “the coming together of the nations of Europe”

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ticle serves as an overview of town twinning and shows in more detail how and where this multilateral element was introduced. The next section examines in what ways those multilateral exchanges were framed as European. However, in order to assess the importance of “Europe” in town twinning links, it is equally important to examine how often Europe was not explicitly mentioned and thus how often town twinning was more broadly placed in bilateral or transnational contexts. Taken together, these two sections thus look at Europeanization via or through town twinning. The third section of the article applies a narrower definition of Europeanization in order to examine the impact of the various European organizations on town twinning. The focus thus shifts to the Europeanization of town twinning. By contrasting the Council of Europe’s approach, in particular the Europe Prize, with the EC’s/EU’s funding schemes set up by 1993, one can understand how the latter could more effectively force municipalities to place their twinning activities into a more explicitly European frame of reference. The article largely focusses on cities and twinning links in Western Europe. This does not mean, however, that the processes of Europeanization in question were necessarily limited to that space. Town twinning itself was never a West European phenomenon: for once, there were numerous partnerships within the Eastern Bloc,¹⁴ as well as many which crossed the Iron Curtain.¹⁵

(European Commission, The Schuman Declaration of May 9, 1950 (Brussels: Publications Office of the European Union, 2015), 17, last accessed October 22, 2020, https://op.europa.eu/en/pub lication-detail/-/publication/2fa0afe0-9f7c-426d-9933-fca909c50983/language-en.  See Markus Pieper, “Städtepartnerschaften als ‘brüderliche Kampfgemeinschaften’. Die Kommunalbeziehungen zwischen Polen und der DDR vor 1989/90,” in Städtepartnerschaften in Europa im 20. Jahrhundert, ed. Corine Defrance, Tanja Herrmann, and Pia Nordblom (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2020), 97– 113.  These twinning links have received exceedingly more attention than their Eastern European counterparts, with particular focus being given to their differing settings and functions in democratic and communist states. More recently, historians have attempted to overcome that dichotomy by emphasizing local idiosyncrasies. See, for instance, Malte Thießen, “Uneinige Zwillinge. Britisches ‘Town Twinning’ während des Kalten Krieges,” in Defrance, Herrmann, and Nordblom, Städtepartnerschaften, 161– 181; Dominik Pick, “Zivilgesellschaftliche und politische Aspekte der Städtezusammenarbeit. Volksrepublik Polen und Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1976 – 1989,” in Defrance, Herrmann, and Nordblom, Städtepartnerschaften, 182– 199. For a discussion on incorporating East European countries, in this case the German Democratic Republic, into images of Europe, see Christian Rau, “Die DDR als Teil eines alternativen Europas? Die Fédération mondiale des villes jumelées (FMVJ) und die kommunale Außenpolitik Ostdeutschlands in den 1960er Jahren,” Revue d’Allemagne et des pays de langue allemande (Online) 51– 1 (2019), published online July 2, 2020, last accessed October 20, 2020, doi: https://doi.org/10. 4000/allemagne.1344.

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The International Element in Town Twinning In the wake of the Second World War, town twinning quickly grew as a municipal practice. While municipal networking after 1945 in general could build on pre-war practices of municipal cooperation,¹⁶ town twinning set itself apart from such precursors in three significant ways. First, instead of loosely and generally cooperating with municipalities from other nations, it narrowed the focus to formalized partnerships between two towns with the promise of long-term cooperation. Second, while city representatives, such as mayors and town clerks, still played a vital role in establishing and maintaining the partnerships, town twinning was seen as a means of fostering understanding between ordinary citizens. Thus, exchanges between schools, youth clubs, amateur theatre companies or sports clubs typically made up a large portion of the twinning activities. In fact, if public perception viewed twinning agreements as largely for the benefit of town council members, it could lead to a backlash: in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), the phrase Kommunaltourismus (municipal tourism) was coined to refer to cases which were seen as merely providing a handy opportunity for local politicians to journey overseas, where exchanges between schools or clubs were likely to fail due to the enormous distance and the resulting costs.¹⁷ Third, town twinning frequently contained an emotional element, apparent in the general intention to promote friendship between former enemies or show solidarity between (former) allies.¹⁸ The close bond which was supposed

 On pre-war municipal cooperation, see Oscar Gaspari, “Cities against States? Hopes, Dreams and Shortcomings of the European Municipal Movement, 1900 – 1960,” Contemporary European History 11 (2002): 597– 621.  For debates on municipal tourism in general, see Bautz, “Auslandsbeziehung,” 15. For specific examples, see “Warum keine Städtepartnerschaft in Australien und Alaska?,” Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, August 2, 1971; see also “Amtliche Suche nach fernen Reisezielen,” Essener Stadtanzeiger, June 14, 1974.  The latter often inspired Anglo-French twinning links, for instance. See e. g. the terminology used in Birmingham to refer to their twinning partnership with Lyon: “Establishment of an ‘Entente Amicale’ between cities of Birmingham and Lyons,” General Purposes Committee’s Report, March 13, 1951, City Council Proceedings and Minute Books, Birmingham, United Kingdom. In that way, town twinning continued a practice of the interwar period, when British cities would “adopt” French municipalities which had been devastated by the First World War. See James E. Connolly, “‘Alliierte’ über den Krieg hinaus. Britische Zeitungen und ‘Patenschaften’ mit französischen Städten nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg,” in Defrance, Herrmann, and Nordblom, Städtepartnerschaften, 217– 235.

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to develop between the twins was mirrored in the terminology used, ranging from “sister cities” and “twin towns”¹⁹ to “municipal marriages.” As the term “town twinning” suggests, the links forged were usually of a bilateral nature. The practice quickly gained popularity: by the mid- to late 1950s, twinning had become a common practice all over Europe and the United States. The number of twinning links steadily grew and by the late 1960s and early 1970s, cities commonly twinned up with multiple partners abroad.²⁰ Due to these developments, the focus frequently shifted from individual bilateral partnerships to an ensemble of twinning links in the individual city as well as overall.²¹

 The term “sister city” is predominately used in the United States.  As Thomas Grunert noted in 1981, reliable quantitative data on town twinning is hard if not impossible to come by, since the various organizations involved (IBU, UTO, etc.) keep their own databases, each with their individual criteria on which partnerships to include or to leave out (see Thomas Grunert, Langzeitwirkungen von Städte-Partnerschaften: Ein Beitrag zur Europäischen Integration (Kehl: Engel 1981), 78). This statement still holds true today, since a central database has yet to be established. The most comprehensive numbers are provided by the German Section of the Council of European Municipalities and Regions (CEMR), which unfortunately only lists twinning links involving German towns, thus excluding a vast number of partnerships. The database chronicles a steady increase in the popularity of town twinning in Europe: 183 twinnings are listed between 1945 and 1960, with the amount of new twinning agreements per decade going up continuously (1961– 1970: 679; 1971– 1980: 891; 1981– 1990: 1,114; 1991– 2000: 1,300) (see Rat der Gemeinden und Regionen Europas: Deutsche Sektion, Online-Datenbank, https://www.rgre.de/partnerschaft/online-datenbank/, accessed October 23, 2020). Regarding multiple partners, see the observations in Grunert, Langzeitwirkungen, 124.  Although there are some twin towns dating back to the interwar period, the majority of the partnerships were established after the Second World War, with the first wave largely consisting of British-German and U.S.-German twinning links. Over the course of the postwar period, the popularity of different connections developed dynamically: while Franco-German town twinning links were extremely popular from the 1960s onwards, the end of the Cold War 1989/90 saw an increase of partnerships bridging the divide across Europe. Over the last ten years, twinning arrangements with China have become increasingly popular. In fact, one could even say that every now and then, twin towns with certain geographical foci became almost fashionable: in the course of the Franco-German Elysée Treaty, the overall number of Franco-German twinning links increased significantly – meaning that large German cities which were still lacking a French twin town by the 1970s became more and more anxious to remedy the fact. Take, for instance, Essen, whose contacts with the small French municipality Romans-sur-Isère came to a halt after 1966, and which subsequently intensified its efforts until the successful twinning with Grenoble could be announced in 1974. See “Bürgermeister machte ein Angebot: Grenoble wird Partnerstadt,” Ruhrnachrichten, January 26, 1974. While geopolitical developments certainly influenced twinning opportunities, the relationship between cities and foreign policies is more complicated, with some cities trying to impact world events or at least make a statement with the twin towns they chose.

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The ensemble of a city’s twin towns became especially apparent in a distinctly material dimension, since town twinning links were accompanied by a number of characteristic items which entered the municipal space in various ways: If we trace the typical steps of a twinning partnership, the first important “things”²² were gifts which the guests would bring along. The giving and receiving of presents were considered formal and official acts and thus occurred from one mayor (or other high-ranking members of the municipality) to another. Since the regular visits often established a familiarity between the cities’ representatives, the official gifts were frequently joined by more informal presents intended for the mayor or town clerk as a private individual.²³ The next step, the decision to enter into an official partnership, was accompanied by another characteristic item: the twinning agreement. As a rule, at least two copies were signed so that each partner could retain one – more often than not, that number went up since the agreements were issued in the official languages of all involved municipalities.²⁴ Together with the aforementioned gifts, the twinning agreements were usually displayed prominently within city or town halls. On special occasions, such as a twinning’s round anniversary, particularly lavish gifts could be exchanged, thus adding and elevating the displayed selection. Since most cities over time found more than one twin town, the display cases thus represented a city’s international partners in their entirety. This is particularly relevant regarding questions of Europeanization since, as Ulrike Vedder notes, the ensemble is more than the sum of its parts, as grouping individual items together suggests an overarching reason behind such arrangements.²⁵

 For a discussion on things, objects, and material culture, see Bill Brown, Other Things (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015), specifically the introductory chapter “Things – in Theory” (pp. 19 – 43).  See Hauptamt Protokoll an Obermagistratsdirektor Schmidt, “Geschenkvorschlag für Partnerschaftstreffen 1971 in Birmingham,” September 15, 1971, ISG/A10/53, Frankfurt am Main, Germany.  On the following, see e. g. the display cases in Essen City Hall, Essen, Germany. For reflections on the timing and symbolism of signing ceremonies, see Nina Szidat, “Die Inszenierung des Vertragsschlusses im Kontext von Städtepartnerschaften,” in Praxisformen: Zur kulturellen Logik von Zukunftshandeln, ed. Jan-Hendryk De Boer (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2019), 472– 479. Also, see References to Europe in Town Twinning for a more detailed analysis of the wording of the agreements.  See Ulrike Vedder, “Sprache und Dinge,” in Handbuch Materielle Kultur: Bedeutungen, Konzepte, Disziplinen, ed. Stefanie Samida, Manfred Eggert, and Hans Peter Hahn (Darmstadt: Wissen, Bildung, Gemeinschaft, 2014), 43.

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Through the nature of the items and the places where they were put on display, city representatives emphasized their role in the forging of these international connections. At the same time, town twinning was accompanied by objects which were placed in the public space like street signs, plaques, and signposts, although some cities added to the list in more creative ways.²⁶ Though they could also be found closer to the administrative and geographical heart of a town or city, they were usually more spread out and symbolized the people-oriented approach of town twinning. In fact, one came across the most well-known of these items upon entering the city: either a town sign which also featured the twin towns or a second installation dedicated exclusively to the twin towns.²⁷ Though also a familiar sight in, for instance, the United Kingdom and France, these signs were (and still are) particularly common in Germany.²⁸ These examples highlight not only the creative ways in which towns and cities advertised their twins abroad; they also reveal how a wider population, though not directly involved in twinning activities, could become aware of the intermunicipal ties. Most importantly, specifically regarding the question of Europe, they show how the bilateral twinning partnerships on the material level often merged into an ensemble and thus showcased the network of international municipal links. Although bilateral twinning partnerships remained the norm, some cities went a step further and explicitly entered into multilateral partnerships. These “three-” or “four-way links”²⁹ or “circular partnerships (Ringpartnerschaften),”³⁰ as they were called in German, occurred when all the towns within that group were twinned with each other. Examples include the cluster of Darmstadt (FRG)–Chesterfield (United Kingdom)–Troyes (France)–Alkmaar (Netherlands), or Cologne (FRG)–Lille (France)–Liège (Belgium)–Turin (Italy)–Rotterdam (Neth-

 Some German cities, such as Darmstadt or the small town Wülfrath, feature stalls at their Christmas markets which are dedicated to their twin towns, though it is hard to determine when this practice started. See Lars Hennemann, “Darmstädter Weihnachtsmarkt ist eröffnet,” Darmstädter Echo, November 26, 2018, https://www.echo-online.de/lokales/darmstadt/darm stadter-weihnachtsmarkt-ist-eroffnet_19261298#. See “Zehn gute Gründe, den Herzog-WilhelmMarkt zu besuchen,” Rheinische Post, November 20, 2019, https://rp-online.de/nrw/staedte/ wuelfrath/wuelfrath-herzog-wilhelm-markt-oeffnet_aid-47052031.  “Schilder für die Partnerstädte,” Frankfurter Neue Presse, n.d., ca. 1970.  See Bautz, “Außenbeziehungen,” 36.  “Lists of British Links with Towns Abroad,” February 1965, OD10/159, Ministry of Overseas Development, The National Archives, Kew (London), United Kingdom.  Deutscher Städtetag, “Das Netz der Städtepartnerschaften” (Kommunale Korrespondenz 179), March 12, 1968, ISG/A10/54, Frankfurt am Main, Germany.

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erlands)–Esch-sur-Alzette (Luxembourg),³¹ as well as the bundle of Frankfurt am Main (FRG)–Birmingham (United Kingdom)–Lyon (France)–Milan (Italy), which will be examined more closely in the following paragraphs. Circular partnerships could only be realised under certain conditions. Firstly, since towns usually limited their partners to one municipal twin per country, circular partnerships could only be established if all the involved cities were still “free” to twin with each other. Secondly, twin towns typically found each other because of perceived similarities, either regarding their names, correspondences on the structural level or because of a similar past. For instance, British industrial cities such as Leeds, Sheffield, Newcastle, and Sunderland twinned with German cities in the Ruhr, an area similarly shaped by mining and the steel industry. Coventry, which will play a role in Europeanization of Town Twinning, found its twin towns based on shared experiences of wartime destruction.³² The similarities were necessary to publicly justify the association with “this” rather than another city. More importantly, comparing oneself with others is such a fundamental mode of thinking that it may have guided the considerations of the involved decision-makers³³ more profoundly than they were possibly aware and determined which towns were even thought of as potential twins.³⁴ The notion proved so pervasive that it influenced the terminology of the municipal practice. As Sir Harold Banwell, secretary of the Association of Municipal Corporations of England and Wales, confessed in 1961: “I am not quite sure how the word ‘twinning’ came into existence but I don’t like it very much. I prefer ‘town links’ but we have got so used to the other word that I expect you will find me using it myself.”³⁵

 Deutscher Städtetag, “Städtepartnerschaften.”  For a typology of town twinning links, see Walter Leifer, Rhein und Themse fließen zueinander: Geschichte und Gegenwart der deutsch-englischen Beziehungen (Herrenalb: Horst Erdmann Verlag, 1964), 237– 251. For a more recent and more humorous example, see twin towns Dull (Scotland) and Boring (Oregon, U.S.). See “Dull pairs with Boring and welcomes Bland,” BBC, July 28, 2017, https://www.bbc.com/news/av/uk-scotland-40751601/dull-pairs-with-boring-andwelcomes-bland.  Since many British-German twin towns date back to youth exchanges established in the context of Allied reeducation policy, the British officers who sometimes acted as intermediaries also have to be considered.  For comparison as a fundamental mode of thinking, see Rita Felski and Susan Stanford Friedman, “Introduction,” in Comparison: Theories, Approaches, Uses, ed. Rita Felski and Susan Stanford Friedman (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013), 1.  “Conference organized by the British Section of the Council of European Municipalities at Church House, Westminster,” October 24, 1961, CCA/3/1/17302, Coventry, United Kingdom.

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In the case of Birmingham, Lyon and Frankfurt am Main, as well as Milan, which joined the circular partnership a few years later, a common denominator might not immediately come to mind. Just take Birmingham and Frankfurt: the British “City of a Thousand Trades” emerged as a major hub of enterprise during the Industrial Revolution and was largely shaped by that development. In the case of Frankfurt, on the other hand, its status as one of the most important cities of the Holy German Empire, as a trade fair location and a financial center proved influential factors.³⁶ What motivated Birmingham officials to reach out to Lyon and Frankfurt was their standing within their respective countries, which could be described as the “second city” behind the capital, not necessarily in terms of population size but rather economic or cultural contribution. The debate which city deserved that title had an especially long tradition in the United Kingdom, with Birmingham frequently competing with Manchester over the honors.³⁷ The choice of twin cities thus also gave Birmingham the opportunity to enhance its profile and “lay claim to the title.”³⁸ By that rationale only a very limited number of cities could be considered as potential partners. Given the rising popularity of town twinning as well as the convention of “one city per country,” a further extension of the twinning network was not realized: in 1971, Frankfurt officials considered Leningrad (Soviet Union) as a potential twin city as it already maintained links with Milan. However, the fact that Leningrad was twinned with another West German city, Hamburg, disqualified it from further considerations.³⁹ Moreover, Frankfurt also tried to reach out to Leipzig

 See Julie Brown, et al., From city of thousand trades to city of a thousand ideas, Birmingham, West Midlands, UK. Pathways to creative and knowledge-based regions (ACRE Report 2.3) (Amsterdam: Amsterdam Institute for Metropolitan and International Development Studies, 2007), 23; for Frankfurt am Main’s historic development, see Lothar Gall, “Frankfurt am Main. Traditionen und Perspektiven,” in FFM 1200: Traditionen und Perspektiven einer Stadt, ed. Lothar Gall (Sigmaringen: Thorbecke, 1994), 19 – 27.  See Eric Hopkins, Birmingham: The Making of the Second City 1850 – 1939 (London: Tempus, 2001).  For another city which used its twinning links to promote its image, in this case as a “European capital”, in order to help its chances of becoming the seat of one of the European institutions, see Étienne Deschamps, “Zwischen lokalen Kompetenzen und europäischen Ambitionen. Brüssels städtepartnerschaftliche Erfahrungen in den 1950er Jahren,” in Defrance, Herrmann, and Nordblom, Städtepartnerschaften, 47– 57.  See, also for what follows, “Niederschrift über die erste Sitzung des Arbeitskreises Städtepartnerschaft,” February 12, 1971, ISG/A10/54, Frankfurt am Main, Germany.

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(German Democratic Republic), which had established ties with Lyon in 1964. In this case the effort failed due to tensions between the two German states.⁴⁰ When Birmingham, Frankfurt and Lyon entered into a three-way agreement in 1966, they introduced a large, annual gathering of all three, later four, cities.⁴¹ They took turns hosting the event, thus adapting the reciprocal nature of town twinning exchanges. While reciprocal activities are nothing unusual – as Serge-Christophe Kolm asserts, reciprocity is “a basic, polymorphic and pervasive pattern of human social conduct [which] is present in all social interactions and relations between individuals or groups that are neither overt violence nor based on the threat of it”⁴² –, the principle perfectly encapsulates the claim that town twinning occurs between equals, since no city (at least on the surface) dominates the partnership. In the case of circular partnerships, it had the added benefit of only having to raise the funds, which were necessary to host representatives from multiple cities, every three or four years. The multilateral nature of the partnership was reflected on the material level. First, the city of Frankfurt installed a plaque which featured the four cities’ municipal coats of arms on the Zeil, a central pedestrian zone, and the city’s main shopping street.⁴³ Though placed in the heart of the city and close to its citizens, the reference to the twin towns nevertheless remained somewhat obscure since it was embedded in the pavement. Roughly at the same time, however, Frankfurt found a much more prominent way to highlight its international partners. Also on the Zeil, three pavilions were erected, each housing a casual restaurant to offer shoppers a respite and each named after one of the twin towns.⁴⁴ Located in the same section of the shopping street, the pavilions were identical in their overall appearance apart from the logos and design details. The restaurants inside were inspired by the host countries’ typical cuisines – most of the time already hinted at in the establishments’ names: Birmingham Pub, Bistro Lyon, and (as the odd one out) the Citta di Milano, in the style of an Italian snack bar, a tavola calda.  For a more detailed discussion on the link between Lyon and Leipzig, see Thomas Höpel, “Von der Städtepartnerschaft zum Städtenetzwerk. Die Entwicklung und Ausdifferenzierung interkommunaler Zusammenarbeit in Europa in der zweiten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts,” in Defrance, Herrmann, and Nordblom, Städtepartnerschaften, 289 – 309.  Milan was included in the circular partnership in 1970.  Serge-Christophe Kolm, Reciprocity: An Economics of Social Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 11.  See Aktuell. Die offizielle Informationsschrift der Stadt Frankfurt am Main 6, no. 1 (January 1984): 1.  See, also for what follows, Udo Müller, “Pflege durch die Stadt Frankfurt,” Frankfurt Magazin 3 (March 1988): 20 – 21.

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To sum up, a multilateral element was frequently introduced into town twinning schemes. This could either occur more implicitly via the ensemble of a city’s municipal partners or explicitly if cities departed from the usual bilateral arrangements by entering into circular twinning schemes. In both cases, the ensemble of twinned cities became especially apparent on the material level, since objects, which on their own referred to individual twin towns, were frequently arranged in clusters. While the multilateral element thus had the potential to underline the European dimension, in the following the article examines if and when town twinning was actually framed as European by once again focussing on Frankfurt’s circular partnerships.

References to Europe in Town Twinning Concrete twinning activities can be roughly divided into symbolic, more individual occasions and recurring exchanges. The visits between city representatives were in many ways quite similar to state visits, from the governing principle of reciprocity, which for instance characterized the composition of the delegations and the giving and receiving of gifts, to the challenges of being a good host while not appearing excessive.⁴⁵ No event was perhaps more carefully staged than the signing ceremony of the twinning agreements, not just in terms of the sequence of events on that day but also regarding the phrasing of the twinning agreements, which had to be agreed upon in advance so that the various copies could be prepared. In the case of the twinning agreements between Frankfurt and Lyon, and later Birmingham and Frankfurt, the European dimension played a minor role. Europe is not mentioned at all in the twinning agreement between Frankfurt and Lyon, which instead emphasizes the promotion of peace.⁴⁶ The English version of the Frankfurt-Birmingham twinning agreement

 For the readjustments of West German diplomacy after 1945, see Simone Derix, Bebilderte Politik. Staatsbesuche in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1949 – 1990 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2009). See also Johannes Paulmann, Die Haltung der Zurückhaltung. Auswärtige Selbstdarstellungen nach 1945 und die Suche nach einem erneuerten Selbstverständnis in der Bundesrepublik (Bremen: Wilhelm und Helen Kaisen-Stiftung, 2006). When planning the visit of a delegation from Birmingham in 1954, for instance, Frankfurt’s staff members opposed choosing the city’s finest restaurants since that could lead to the impression of “undeserved prosperity” (Stadtrat vom Rath an Oberbürgermeister, “Gegenbesuch von Vertretern der Stadt Birmingham,” September 6, 1954, ISG/Kulturamt/1.126, Frankfurt am Main, Germany).  Copy of twinning agreement between Lyon and Frankfurt, October 15, 1960, ISG/Magistratsakten/444, Frankfurt am Main, Germany. It is interesting though to highlight the different word-

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refers to the cities “enjoying a European culture and way of life,” which in the German version translates to “abendländisch [occidental],”⁴⁷ thus emphasizing what unites the cities at present instead of their partnership’s contribution in the future. The ultimate aim of the twinning agreement is instead again stated as “peace in the world.”⁴⁸ In contrast to that, in the circular twinning agreement between all three cities, signed on the same day immediately afterwards, all signatories resolved “to further the unification of Europe.”⁴⁹ While there were only a few references to Europe on symbolic occasions, there was even less on the day-to-day level of town twinning, as a survey of Frankfurt’s local newspapers and the city’s own press releases shows. Here, Frankfurt’s twin towns were usually described as just that – “Frankfurt’s twin towns”⁵⁰ – without any further context. The rare occasions when Europe was mentioned highlight the multifarious meanings of the term. In a geographical sense, it was the space wherein Frankfurt’s twin towns were located: “Frankfurt’s partnerships with cities in Europe.”⁵¹ What united the twinned towns was the assessment that “people living in Europe today are basically facing the same problems everywhere.”⁵² Problems, which might be met by “looking to the other for help and maybe learning from their experiences.”⁵³ Here, Europe is both an experiential space of shared challenges and the possible solution, a collaborating community. Additionally, the Europe of the European organizations is addressed, usually in reaction to developments within that sphere, exemplified by the news coverage surrounding the United Kingdom joining the Euro-

ing in the two copies. While the German version uses the phrase “Frieden und Wohlstand” (peace and prosperity), the term “la paix du monde” (world peace) is used in the French copy.  Twinning agreement between Birmingham and Frankfurt, April 19, 1966, ISG/Verträge/467, Frankfurt am Main, Germany.  Twinning agreement between Birmingham and Frankfurt. On the topic of town twinning and peace from a more practical point of view, see Dietmar M. Woesler, “Städtepartnerschaften in neuem Licht,” in Europafähigkeit der Kommunen: Die lokale Ebene in der Europäischen Union, ed. Ulrich von Alemann and Claudia Münch (Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2006), 412.  Copy of circular twinning agreement between Lyon, Birmingham and Frankfurt, April 19, 1966, ISG/Magistratsakten/444, Frankfurt am Main, Germany.  Presse- und Informationsamt der Stadt Frankfurt am Main, “Weihnachtsgruß und Neujahrswünsche für die Partnerstädte,” December 16, 1974.  Frankfurt – Lebendige Stadt 4 (1979): 19.  Rüdiger Moniac, “Vielleicht ein neuer Weg nach Europa?,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, April 29, 1969. Translation by author.  Moniac, “Weg nach Europa.” Translation by author.

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pean Economic Community in 1973. In this context, town twinning is mentioned as a means of paving the way.⁵⁴ In more recent times, since the 1980s, the connection between Europe and town twinning was rarely made, because Frankfurt more and more looked beyond Europe for potential municipal partners.⁵⁵ This development might seem paradoxical at first, as it went hand in hand with Frankfurt’s emergence as one of Europe’s financial centres – not least due to it becoming the seat of the European Central Bank in 1996. Since financial markets tended to increasingly operate globally, it is in fact not contradictory that this growing importance for Europe led to a stronger focus beyond Europe. As the city saw itself on a global scale, this in turn meant that the twinned towns served as indicators of Frankfurt as an “internationally connected city.”⁵⁶ Thus, while the European dimension of town twinning was sometimes evoked at highly symbolic occasions, especially the signing ceremonies of the twinning agreements, those events were infrequent. In the day-to-day business of town twinning, however, Europe was, for the most part, rarely mentioned, with one important exception: the youth exchanges, which frequently paved the way for many a town twinning link and have remained a key aspect of cooperation between twinned cities. Since the 1960s, international youth work had to face the fact that their study trips to twin towns could no longer compete with the rising market of commercial tourism, which offered trips for a cheaper fare to more attractive locations (the fact that twin cities chose each other based on perceived similarities did not help much either, since that logic rarely went along with touristic concerns). To increase their relevance, Frankfurt’s youth workers instead framed international youth work as an integral part of political education, defining the learning objective as “the realization that despite all national differences, despite individually expressing one’s way of life, there exist common interests among the youth in Europe, namely, promoting and securing peace, a wide-ranging social participation of young people, resistance against racist and misanthropic ideas and increasing the democratic rights especially

 See “Jumbo-Verbindung mit Partner Birmingham?,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, October 2, 1971.  By 1990, Toronto and Cairo had joined the ranks of Frankfurt’s twin towns while talks were underway to twin with Guangzhou (see City of Frankfurt, 20 Jahre Städtepartnerschaft, June 1990; see Caren Langer, “Scheidung ausgeschlossen,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, February 10, 2007).  Volker Hauff, “‘Wir müssen Frankfurt international platzieren’,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, June 23, 1990. Translation by author.

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of young people.”⁵⁷ Following that objective, multilateral youth camps between the four twin towns as well as meetings between youth workers were established. This development marked a transitional period from Allied-influenced youth work in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War⁵⁸ towards a stronger focus on Europe or European issues.⁵⁹ Moreover, while town twinning was frequently placed in a multilateral context, that was not always the case. The international framing still had to compete with bilateral exchanges – both in the day-to-day twinning activities as well as the surrounding narratives. This was only logical for cities where bilateral partnerships remained the usual modus operandi, but also occurred in the case of explicitly multilateral partnerships. In the circular partnership Frankfurt-Birmingham-Lyon-Milan, not all twinning activities could be converted into the multilateral model. Even if the people occupying strategic positions had all been equally motivated to accept the additional work that came with setting up and maintaining the exchanges, simple practicalities and structural differences could prove very challenging. For instance, there was the simple matter of finding a date that would work for all participants. In the case of school or youth exchanges, that specifically meant whether the school vacation time overlapped sufficiently in all four countries. Also, the pressure to comply with the official direction of the city council was felt less the further we step away from the municipal administration. Instead, town twinning activities between schools

 “Die Entwicklung des Arbeitsbereiches ‘Internationale Jugendbegegnungen’ in der Abteilung Jugendpflege des Jugendamtes Frankfurt a. M. (Entwurf),” May 30, 1974, ISG/Fürsorgeamt/5.583, Frankfurt am Main, Germany. Translation by author.  See, for instance, Karl-Heinz Füssl, Deutsch-amerikanischer Kulturaustausch im 20. Jahrhundert: Bildung – Wissenschaft – Politik (Frankfurt: Campus, 2004); Friedhelm Boll, Auf der Suche nach Demokratie: Britische und deutsche Jugendinitiativen in Niedersachsen nach 1945 (Bonn: Dietz, 1995); Jaimey Fisher, Disciplining Germany. Youth, reeducation and reconstruction after the Second World War (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2004); Jacqueline Plum, Französische Kulturpolitik in Deutschland 1945 – 1955: Jugendpolitik und Internationale Begegnungen als Impulse für Demokratisierung und Verständigung (Wiesbaden, Deutscher Universitätsverlag, 2005).  As research into questions of youth and Europe shows, municipal youth work lagged behind by more than a decade. For an account on the youth motif in discourses on Europe, see for instance Ludivine Bantigny, “Genèses de l’Europe, jeunesses d‘Europe. Entre enchantement et détachement,” in Histoire@Politique. Politique, Culture, Société 10, January–April 2010, accessed October 10, 2020, https://www.histoire-politique.fr/index.php?numero=10&rub=dossier&item= 98. For the younger generation’s participation in (transnational) pro-European initiatives, see Christina Norwig, Die erste Europäische Generation. Europakonstruktionen in der Europäischen Jugendkampagne 1951 – 1958 (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2016).

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or clubs were usually based on a close familiarity or friendship between the organizers.⁶⁰ In summary, forcing every measure into the multilateral structure most likely would have led to a decrease in overall twinning activities. As a result, on the practical side of town twinning, the bilateral exchanges continued to exist next to the multilateral meetings – and quantitatively dominated the overall twinning activities. That last impression is confirmed if we pay a closer look at the reporting in local newspapers. For once, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung had correspondents in Lyon and Birmingham, who regularly contributed “letter[s] from the twin town[s]” independently of the twinning activities themselves.⁶¹ If actual twinning links were reported, they were usually firmly placed in a bilateral setting. To give only two examples: a twinning week in Birmingham was described as an opportunity to learn “about the English way of life,”⁶² and a culinary event in Frankfurt in honor of a Birmingham delegation’s visit was framed as “Britain invites.”⁶³ Thus, while articles on the European dimension of town twinning were the exception, articles framing town twinning as part of the Franco-German or Anglo-German relationship were the rule.

Europeanization of Town Twinning So far, this article has focused on the Europeanization via town twinning. While the preceding sections painted an ambiguous picture, it is nonetheless significant that the idea that town twinning could enable European unity was embraced on the European institutional level from the 1950s onwards. In this last section, the article’s focus will therefore shift to the relationship between European organizations and the municipal level and thus turn to the Europeanization of town twinning. For most of the post-war period, the key organization at play was the Council of Europe. Tasked with achieving “a greater unity between its members […] by agreements and common action in economic, social, cultural, scientific, legal

 Though schools and individual teachers could of course choose to address European issues and to hold “European” events, such developments are not documented for the cities in question.  See for instance, K.B. Hopfinger, “Brief aus der Partnerstadt Birmingham. Viele Büros stehen vollkommen leer,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, November 5, 1968.  “Die erste Partnerschaftswoche. Birmingham bietet Frankfurter Jugendlichen ein reichhaltiges Programm,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, November 17, 1969.  “Fish’n Chips aus Birmingham,” Frankfurter Rundschau, October 4, 1974.

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and administrative matters and in the maintenance and further realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms,”⁶⁴ two areas the Council focused on were the field of cultural cooperation and encouraging the involvement of local authorities.⁶⁵ Similar to some of the Allied powers’ re-education policies, the municipal level was regarded as a key way to reach a larger population. Moreover, the attention to the local level was also due to the fact that many members of the Council’s Consultative Assembly had been or continued to be active in local politics – among them such prominent names as Guy Mollet and Jacques Chaban-Delmas, both members of the French National Assembly and mayors of Arras and Bordeaux respectively. Aside from setting up a forum to discuss municipal and regional affairs (first, in the form of a special Committee; since 1957 as the annually held European Conference of Local Authorities),⁶⁶ the Consultative Assembly in 1953 also proposed a way to honor municipal contributions to “the ideal of European unity.” As a result, the “European Prize,” later shortened to “Europe Prize,” was created and first awarded in 1955. The criteria as to what the Council of Europe considered suitable steps towards European unity remained extremely vague – not to say virtually non-existent – basically consisting of a verbatim repetition of the Prize’s overall aim: Municipalities shall submit their candidature either through their senior official or through the association of local authorities of which the municipality is a member. Candidatures shall reach the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe at Strasbourg before 1 May each year. Each candidature must be accompanied by a statement of the measures taken by the municipality concerned to propagate the ideal of European unity.⁶⁷

The complete lack of any specifications points to two issues: since “Europe” and “European unity” were multifarious concepts, steps towards the latter could also take a variety of shapes. The Consultative Assembly might have had a vague idea what it was looking for but could not refer to a catalogue of suitable measures. Moreover, on a practical level, the Council of Europe could not be sure how the call would be received. Casting a wider net thus meant not discouraging any potential candidates. The definition process thus also depended on the received candidatures.

 European Treaty Series 1, “Statute of the Council of Europe,” May 5, 1949, art. 1.  See Birte Wassenberg, History of the Council of Europe (Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 2013), 33 – 43.  See Wassenberg, History, 41.  Council of Europe, “European Prize, Rules and Further Provisions.”

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The British city of Coventry, which would become the first recipient of the award, referred to four main aspects in its application: its hospitality in welcoming representatives from other nations interested in learning more about “its post-war reconstruction and development”; its assistance to “the British Foreign Office and British Council in the organization of study tours for […] Austrian and German elected representatives and officials studying local government generally and Dutch, French and German architects and planners studying housing development and reconstruction problems”; its membership in several international organizations and participation at several international conferences; and the “specific links which have been developed between Coventry and a number of European towns,”⁶⁸ in that order. The last aspect in particular seems to have tipped the scales in the city’s favor, judging from the reply by Jacques Chaban-Delmas, since 1952 the president of the Special Committee on Municipal and Regional Affairs: But above all, the Commission tried to reward the city’s courageous efforts made so that such a tragedy (the Second World War) would not repeat itself. It is the network of friendly connections with tormented cities in other European countries, regardless of where they stood during the war or their present views, which the entire commission particularly appreciated.⁶⁹

The phrase “their present views” alludes to the fact that Coventry – undeterred by the division of Cold War Europe and the world into two opposing systems – did not limit its “friendly connections” to Western Europe. At the time of its bid, it had already established links with Belgrade and Sarajevo (both Yugoslavia), Lidice (Czechoslovak Socialist Republic), and Stalingrad (Sowjetunion), though the latter connection dates back to 1944 and thus pre-dates the Cold War era. It stands to reason that the Special Committee on Municipal and Regional Affairs saw municipal links across the Iron Curtain as a means of maintaining some cohesion within a divided Europe. In 1956, a set of twin towns were announced as Europe Prize recipients – Offenbach (FRG) and Puteaux (France).⁷⁰ Although cities could also be rewarded

 Coventry Town Clerk to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, August 29, 1955, CCA/ 3/1/16006, Coventry, United Kingdom.  Jacques Chaban-Delmas to Lord Mayor of Coventry, October 12, 1955, CCA/3/1/16006, Coventry, United Kingdom. Translation by author.  See Council of Europe, Directorate of Information, “Bruges (Belgium) and Aarhus (Denmark) awarded European Prize for 1960,” July 18, 1960, CCA/3/1/16006, Coventry, United Kingdom.

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for contributions other than town twinning, these two early decisions cemented the idea that European unity could above all be achieved by town twinning.⁷¹ The Europe Prize scheme proved so much of a success that the Special Committee on Municipal and Regional Affairs, which was in charge of the award, found itself in the dilemma of having to choose only one winner (sometimes two) and thus disappointing all the other candidatures. By 1962, therefore, they had modified the prize to also reward around ten “runner-ups”⁷² with European flags of honor each year, featuring the emblem of the Council of Europe.⁷³ Although the prize-giving also consisted of a ceremonial act at the Council’s seat in Strasbourg, where representatives from the winning cities were received by the Consultative Assembly, the main event took place in the cities themselves. The rules and regulations stipulated that the Europe Prize should be handed over to the chosen city on a specially announced “Europe Day.” Not to be confused with the day officially adopted by the Council of Europe in 1964,⁷⁴ this “Europe Day” as well as its programme were organized at the discretion of the winning city or cities. A similar practice was adopted for the European flag of honor, which was likewise awarded during a suitably public event, though not necessarily with a European theme.⁷⁵ These stipulations, together with the requirement that the flag or a replica of the Europe Prize would remain in the city and was supposed to be displayed prominently,⁷⁶ allowed the Council of Europe to essentially bring “Europe” to its citizens. Referring back to the previous section of this article, similar to the signing ceremonies of the twinning agreements, the award ceremonies were another type of public event which could be used to place town twinning in a European context. Such was the case when Frankfurt was awarded a European flag of honor in 1969. City representatives arranged for it to be presented during a visit to Lyon when representatives from Birmingham would also be present, thus symbolically sharing the flag with its twin towns and highlight-

 When Bruges won in 1960, for instance, the main reason put forth was that it was home to the College of Europe – though its participation “in the ‘twin cities’ scheme” was also highlighted (see Council of Europe, “European Prize for 1960”).  “Europe Prize 1962,” Forward in Europe 4, no. 5 (1962): 10.  The process was later modified further, with the European flag of honor changing from a consolation prize to a prerequisite for winning the Europe Prize in the first place (see Markus Göldner, Politische Symbole der europäischen Integration (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1988), 240).  See Wassenberg, History, 42. The Council’s Committee of Ministers officially greenlit the project on October 31, 1964; with the first celebration of Europe Day occurring the next year.  See “Europa-Fahne im Römer,” Frankfurter Rundschau, June 25, 1969.  See Council of Europe, “European Prize, Rules and Further Provisions”.

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ing the connection between town twinning and Europe.⁷⁷ That connection was further emphasized within Frankfurt’s city hall, where the flag was displayed in close proximity to the twinning agreements with Birmingham and Lyon. In the narrow sense of European organizations and their policies, one can conclude that the Europeanization of town twinning can be traced back to the 1950s and the efforts of the Council of Europe. The effects, however, seem to have been somewhat limited, both in terms of overall publicity and concrete town twinning activities, as the case of Frankfurt illustrated. Moreover, when Coventry’s town clerk was asked whether the Europe Prize had attracted other events, be it conferences or activities, to the city, his response was somewhat sobering: I do not think it could be said that as a result of winning the Prize the City has obtained any specific advantages. You will appreciate that Coventry was already well known in Europe and that considerable interest has been aroused by our scheme for reconstruction. This additional publicity may, of course, bring additional visitors to the city, but I do not think I could say that we had had any proof of this.⁷⁸

Furthermore, the Europe Prize was awarded retroactively and the existence of twinning links was often considered sufficient proof of municipal commitment to the European cause. Thus, the pressure was relatively low to adapt the design of town twinning activities to more discernibly reflect European elements. Roughly 30 years after the introduction of the Europe Prize, the European Community similarly ventured into the field of cultural policy, in the process also reaching out to the local level. Reacting to public indifference or even negative attitudes towards the Community, as well as low voter turnout at the first elections to the European Parliament in 1979, the European Community gradually discovered culture “as a ‘tool’ to foster European identity and to strengthen the support for European integration among the European people.”⁷⁹

 See “Europa-Fahne künftig im Limpurgsaal,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, June 27, 1969.  Coventry Town Clerk to Lord Mayor of Ostend, April 4, 1957, CCA/3/1/16006, Coventry, United Kingdom.  Jürgen Mittag, “The Changing Concept of the European Capitals of Culture: Between the Endorsement of European Identity and City Advertising,” in The Cultural Politics of Europe: European Capitals of Culture and European Union since the 1980s, ed. Kiran K. Patel (London: Routledge, 2013), 40. For a more extensive timeline of cultural policy development at the European Community level, see for instance Uta Staiger, “The European Capitals of Culture in Context: Cultural Policy and the European Integration Process,” in Patel, Cultural Politics, 19 – 38.

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While the European Capitals of Culture (ECOC) programme constitutes one of the earlier and better-known initiatives,⁸⁰ the European Community also “discovered” town twinning as a possible cultural policy “tool,” in keeping with Mittag’s terminology above. In 1993, the EU’s European Commission added a prize called the “Golden Stars of Town Twinning” to its already existing funding scheme set up in 1989. The two elements were closely linked since only twinning projects “which had received Community grants in the previous year”⁸¹ qualified for the award. Moreover, applicants had to follow specific guidelines to receive funding in the first place, which contained the following points: In the case of exchanges between citizens, priority is given to […] multilateral exchanges involving groups of twinned towns in several countries, exchanges between towns disadvantaged because of their geographical location […] and exchanges concerned with specific themes. […] In the case of conferences, priority is given to conferences [dealing with] the fight against racism, life-long learning, social exclusion linked to drug abuse, poverty and unemployment, European citizenship, the role and importance of a town’s international links, the European Union and its implication for local communities.⁸²

Studying those guidelines, it becomes clear that municipalities were forced to put their twinning arrangements much more explicitly in a European context by either discussing Europe or common European challenges directly or by breaking up the usually bilateral exchanges. The “Golden Stars of Town Twinning” prize provided an additional incentive to put the proposed ideas into practice, thus increasing the chance that the European dimension of town twinning could actually be felt by the participants. Although concrete figures could not be determined, the different financial means of the two organizations should also be considered. The EC’s/EU’s explicit aim to facilitate exchanges between geographically disadvantaged towns necessitated larger expenses for travel. The

 See Staiger, “Capitals of Culture,” 19. Since its launch in 1985, one or more cities is awarded the title European City – later Capital – of Culture on an annual basis. Throughout the year, the current Capital of Culture hosts a variety of cultural events meant to showcase the “richness and diversity of European culture and the features they share, as well as to promote greater mutual acquaintance between European citizens” (“Decision 1419/1999/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of May 25, 1999, establishing a Community Action for the European Capital of Culture event for the years 2005 to 2019,” European Communities, Official Journal, 1419/1999/EC). Since the 1990s, the program has become a means of urban regeneration and of drawing a great number of visitors.  European Commission, A Europe of Towns and Cities: A Practical Guide to Town-Twinning (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1997), 15.  European Commission, Town-Twinning, 14.

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Council of Europe’s history, on the other hand, “is littered with insiders’ complaints about the inadequacy of its funding.”⁸³ In summary, while both the Council of Europe as well as the EC/EU set out to incorporate town twinning into a European frame of reference, the latter introduced a more binding framework which led to a more noticeable Europeanization of town twinning practices. Assessing the impact of the EC’s/EU’s programmes, one has to keep in mind that they did not occur in isolation but rather emerged as part of a large-scale attempt to increase the organizations’ approval ratings among its citizens and to promote a European identity. Aside from the aforementioned European Cities or Capitals of Culture programme, the European Community’s cultural policies also featured the introduction of visible symbols of European identity, for instance, a European flag, anthem, the Europe Day, and the European passport with its uniform design.⁸⁴ Incidentally, the increased influence of the institutional Europe could also showcase the limitations of town twinning, which can be illustrated by once more returning to the circular partnership between Frankfurt, Lyon, Birmingham, and Milan. As highlighted in the first section, the underlying rules of town twinning prevented a further extension of the twinning network. By the 1980s, representatives from Birmingham and Lyon advocated the formation of an alternative forum to more effectively coordinate their position towards the European Communities, both to secure the benefits of the EC’s policies and funds, but also to create a lobby for large European cities in Brussels.⁸⁵ The resulting body, Eurocities, achieved what town twinning could not and gradually assembled all of Europe’s “second cities” within one network.⁸⁶

 Kiran K. Patel, Project Europe: A History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), 40.  For a full catalogue of measures, see Wolfgang Schmale, Geschichte und Zukunft der Europäischen Identität (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2008), 127– 130. Incidentally, several of the adopted symbols – the flag and anthem, for instance – were originally conceived by the Council of Europe, thus highlighting the transfer of ideas from one organization to another.  See, also for the following, Thomas Höpel, “Die Herausbildung kommunaler Europapolitik – das Städtenetzwerk Eurocities,” Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte 100 (2013): 23 – 42.  In addition to the four cities mentioned above, Barcelona and Rotterdam were also founding members. The network was then expanded by encouraging the six cities’ other twin towns to join. See Höpel, “Eurocities,” 28.

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Conclusion The claim that town twinning created a network of municipalities and its citizens across Europe and thus fostered notions of European awareness has been frequently made since the practice’s inception after 1945 – not just by local,⁸⁷ state,⁸⁸ and European politicians,⁸⁹ but also by historians.⁹⁰ By focussing on the “Europeanness” of town twinning, this article contributes to a wider set of research into the cultural dimension of Europe: into cities’ and citizens’ involvement in European integration as well as public representations of Europe that were connected to questions of a European identity.⁹¹ As the article has shown, the European dimension of town twinning links can be characterized as ambivalent, especially if one moves from the narratives surrounding town twinning to individual twinning links. As the first part of the article highlighted, town twinning frequently contained a multilateral element and thus a seemingly ideal starting point to discuss the Europeanness of these arrangements. Most cities over the course of the post-war decades found more than one municipal partner abroad, with the entirety of twin towns then frequently highlighted by material markers within the urban space. In fact, some cities went beyond multiple bilateral twinning arrangements to establish small

 See, for instance, Manfred Rommel, preface to Langzeitwirkungen von Städtepartnerschaften: Ein Beitrag zur Europäischen Integration, by Thomas Grunert (Kehl: Engel 1981), ix.  See German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer to President of the Council of European Municipalities, Muntzke, June 16, 1961, BArch, B 136, no. 3958, Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, Germany.  See Council of Europe, “European Prize for 1960.”  Take, for instance, Patel’s recent assertion of town twinning as one of civil society’s pro-European alternatives to the economic and political integration of the European institutions. See Patel, Project Europe, 128.  See the two edited volumes on the European Capitals of Culture programme: Kiran K. Patel, ed., The Cultural Politics of Europe: European Capitals of Culture and European union since the 1980s (London: Routledge, 2013); Jürgen Mittag, ed., Die Idee der Kulturhauptstadt Europas: Anfänge, Ausgestaltung und Auswirkungen europäischer Kulturpolitik (Essen: Klartext, 2008). See Norwig, Europäische Generation. Additionally, see Richard Ivan Jobs, Backpack Ambassadors: How Youth Travel Integrated Europe (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2017). A number of studies focus on the role of various forms of media, for instance Jan-Henrik Meyer, The European Public Sphere: Media and Transnational Communication in European Integration, 1969 – 1991 (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2010); Ariane Brill, Abgrenzung und Hoffnung: “Europa” in der deutschen, britischen und amerikanischen Presse, 1945 – 1980 (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2014); Florian Greiner, Wege nach Europa. Deutungen eines imaginierten Kontinents in deutschen, britischen und amerikanischen Printmedien 1914 – 1945 (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2014); Eugen Pfister, Europa im Bild: Imaginationen in Wochenschauen in Deutschland, Frankreich, Großbritannien und Österreich, 1948 – 1959 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 2014).

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twinning networks. However, as the article demonstrated in the following section, the Europeanness of individual twinning links was only evoked occasionally: especially highly symbolic occasions, such as signing ceremonies or public events, provided opportunities to underline the European dimension of town twinning. Additionally, that dimension was emphasized in response to outside stimuli, such as current events concerning the political and thus a much more tangible Europe. Aside from that, even multilateral twinning schemes still frequently contained a bilateral element. Studying the framing and the direction of town twinning at the local level thus shows how processes of Europeanization were closely interwoven with processes of transnationalization. As has been alluded to throughout this article, town twinning was never reduced solely to Europe.⁹² Recognizing that town twinning occurred in and between various world regions, and was therefore potentially embedded into processes of decolonization and globalization as well, thus contributes to provincialize Europe and European town twinning.⁹³ The third section of the article focused on the Europeanization of town twinning. Tracing the relationship between the municipal practice and the various European institutions, it demonstrated that initiatives of the Council of Europe preceded those of the EC/EU by at least 20 years – and even more if we are talking about the actual implementation of recommendations into actions. Yet, the EC/EU compensated for their long lack of interest by implementing a tighter

 Municipalities in the United States were among the first to enter into twinning arrangements with their German counterparts. Moreover, one should not forget that while links in Europe were being forged, other ties were in the process of being severed: colonial powers such as France also saw town twinning as a way of maintaining ties with their territories abroad and of weakening decolonization efforts (see Lucas Hardt, “Verbrüderung im Zeichen des Kolonialkriegs. Die ephemere Jumelage zwischen Metz und Blida 1956 – 1962,” in Defrance, Herrmann, and Nordblom, Städtepartnerschaften, 203 – 216). Aside from these strictly colonial settings, partnerships between the Global North and South in general grew in number from the late 1970s and early 1980s onwards (see Nick Clarke, “Globalising Care? Town Twinning in Britain since 1945,” Geoforum 42, no. 1 (2011): 118).  Originally conceived by Dipesh Chakrabarty to criticize the predominance of European thought in a post-colonial world, the concept was adapted by Kiran K. Patel to likewise no longer consider the EC/EU “as a kind of gold standard, […] as the yardstick of interpretation, while other forms of international and global co-operation are marginalized” (Kiran K. Patel, “Provincialising European union: Co-operation and Integration in Europe in a Historical Perspective,” Contemporary European History 22, no. 4 (2013): 652). See also Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000). Regarding a reassessment of the “story” of the EU, see Mark Gilbert, “Narrating the Process: Questioning the Progressive Story of European Integration,” Journal of Common Market Studies 46, no. 3 (2008): 641– 662.

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framework, in all likelihood combined with a larger budget. The article thus joins recent studies on European integration history, which have highlighted the transfer of policy ideas and practices from other European organizations to the European Union and its predecessors.⁹⁴ Feedback from individual twinning schemes suggests that the “EU-ization”⁹⁵ of town twinning had a marked effect on the town twinning activities themselves and indeed resulted in a stronger focus on Europe. The European Communities’ involvement resulted from a perceived democratic deficit,⁹⁶ which launched a large endeavor to raise European awareness – with town twinning considered to be a key contribution.

Bibliography Primary Sources Unpublished Primary Sources Archives and Collections (City Council Proceedings and Minute Books), Birmingham, United Kingdom. Bundesarchiv (BArch, B 136, no. 3958), Koblenz, Germany. Coventry City Archives (CCA/3/1/16006, CCA/3/1/17302), Coventry, United Kingdom. Institut für Stadtgeschichte (ISG/A10/53; ISG/A10/54; ISG/Fürsorgeamt/5.583; ISG/Kulturamt/1.126; ISG/Magistratsakten/444; ISG/Verträge/467), Frankfurt am Main, Germany. The National Archives (OD10/159), Kew (London), United Kingdom.

 See, for instance, Wolfram Kaiser and Kiran K. Patel, eds., Multiple Connections in European Cooperation: International Organizations, Policy Ideas, Practices and Transfers, 1967 – 1992 (London: Routledge, 2018). For transfers between the Council of Europe and the European Communities, see Kiran K. Patel and Oriane Calligaro, “The True ‘EURESCO’? The Council of Europe, transnational networking and the emergence of European Community cultural policies, 1970 – 1990,” in Kaiser and Patel, Multiple Connections, 63 – 86; and Birte Wassenberg, “Between cooperation and competitive bargaining: The Council of Europe, local and regional networking, and the shaping of the European Community’s regional policies, 1970s–90s,” in Kaiser and Patel, Multiple Connections, 87– 108.  Clemens, “Introduction,” 17.  For additional information on the 1970s as a turning point, see Jürgen Nielsen-Sikora, “Europa im Umbruch: Der Tindemans-Bericht von 1975,” Historische Mitteilungen 19 (2006): 277– 96.

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Published Primary Sources Council of Europe. The Europe Prize. The top European Award for towns and municipalities. n.d., ca. 2018. Accessed October 20, 2020. https://assembly.coe.int/LifeRay/APCE/prix/ EuropePrize/Brochures/EuropePrize-new-EN.pdf. European Commission. A Europe of Towns and Cities: A Practical Guide to Town-Twinning. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1997. European Commission. The Schuman Declaration of May 9, 1950. Brussels: Publications Office of the European Union, 2015. European Communities. Official Journal. n.d. European Treaty Series 1, “Statute of the Council of Europe,” May 5, 1949. Rat der Gemeinden und Regionen Europas: Deutsche Sektion. Online-Datenbank. Accessed October 23, 2020. https://www.rgre.de/partnerschaft/online-datenbank/.

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Aline Maldener

The Europawelle Saar Youth Mass Media as a Popular Cultural Agent of Europeanization in the 1960s and 1970s

Introduction This essay discusses youth mass media in the 1960s and 1970s and the special forms of popular, “mainstream” youth culture that it created and disseminated. It is based on the hypothesis that popular youth media were crucial instruments in creating a “Europe of the young” from the bottom up during the 1960s and 70s. The West German broadcasting station Saarländische Rundfunk (SR) and its youth media shall serve as a prime example. As the second smallest station of the ARD,¹ it experienced many financial difficulties, but this struggle for survival (linked with the lack of interest in the station by its parent organization) created a field for experimentation. Besides Radio Bremen, the SR became the media spearhead of the West German pop scene, with the Europawelle Saar (European Radio Wave Saar), founded in 1964, being the first West German radio channel that focused heavily on pop music. Furthermore, the Saarland is a trinational border region located in the heart of Europe, between France, West Germany and Luxembourg. It can be considered what Philipp Ther calls an “intermediary space” (Zwischenraum) – a space which is not just geographically located “in-between,” but in which language, culture, and ethnic groups are in a state of transition or hybridisation.² The SR and its Europawelle Saar as the regional broadcasting station played a crucial role as a transnational intermediary of popular youth culture, as the latter was received by many (even Eastern) European

 ARD is short for “Arbeitsgemeinschaft der öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunkanstalten der Bundesrepublik Deutschland” which means it is a working pool of the broadcasting corporations of the Federal Republic of Germany. The ARD is the umbrella organization for all German broadcasting stations, governed by public law and founded in 1950.  See Philipp Ther, “Einleitung: Sprachliche, kulturelle und ethnische “Zwischenräume” als Zugang zu einer transnationalen Geschichte Europas,” in Regionale Bewegungen und Regionalismen in europäischen Zwischenräumen seit der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts, ed. Philipp Ther und Holm Sundhaussen (Marburg: Verlag Herder-Institut, 2003), IX–XXIX, here XI; Philipp Ther, “Beyond the Nation: The Relational Basis of a Comparative History of Germany and Europe,” Central European History 36, no. 1 (2003), 45 – 73. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110685473-009

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countries. The actors from the Europawelle Saar explicitly proclaimed their wish to contribute to a “better understanding between the European partner countries.”³ According to the broadcasting station’s first director, Dr. Franz Mai, its intention was not just to entertain but to educate on a broad front, and to give reliable information – especially “to our brothers behind the wall,” as he stated in an interview.⁴ Popular youth media like the Europawelle Saar could reach broad and heterogeneous audiences, both in terms of quantity and sociocultural conditions. They addressed and fit a large and socially diverse mass audience and were successful in shaping “Europe” by interconnecting their young, varied audiences in a transnational community of ideas and values. In this way, the Europawelle Saar strongly supported youth work of political institutions and organizations by complementing these official activities with popular cultural events that gained a lot of publicity and popularity. Official political initiatives, such as youth exchange programs, were often ideological and elitist, almost entirely addressing the youth from upper class milieus, grammar school attendees, students or specific religious or political groups that represented a minority among European youth in the 1960s and 1970s.⁵ These official programs really gained something from the environment of popular youth media that were working as distributors and multipliers. Apart from this, the Europawelle Saar also succeeded with its own instruments of youth work that were highly attractive because of their – either programmatic or sublime but in any case, workable – combination of “politics” and “pop.” In this sense, the essay should serve as a further example of the idea that popular culture and politics are no dichotomy, which is now common sense – also in historiography – thanks to studies by David Looseley, Detlef Sieg-

 See letter from Dr. Heinz Garber to Rudolf Stachels from January 24, 1974, File 05127: Hörerpost, neues Programm-Schema. Allgemeine Hörerpost, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken.  Jochen Taßler, SR 1 – 50 Jahre SR 1: Start der Europawelle Saar, accessed February 13, 2020, https://www.sr-mediathek.de/index.php?seite=7&id=22567.  See e. g. Eva S. Kuntz, “Das deutsch-französische Modell in der Zivilgesellschaft: das deutschfranzösische Jugendwerk (DFJW) als transnationaler Akteur,” in Deutsch-Französische Beziehungen als Modellbaukasten?: zur Übertragbarkeit von Aussöhnung und strukturierter Zusammenarbeit, ed. Stefan Seidendorf (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2012), 91– 109; Inge Kazamel, Grenzenlos: deutsch-deutsche Jugendbegegnung zwischen Mauerfall und Einheitsstaat (Hamburg: Ergebnisse Verlag, 1992); Michael Schmidt, Die Falken in Berlin: Antifaschismus und Völkerverständigung, Jugendbegegnung durch Gedenkstättenfahrten 1954 – 1969 (Berlin: Verlag für Ausbildung und Studium, 1987).

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fried, and others.⁶ This article questions the ways in which popular youth media managed to connect adolescents from different European places. In order to do so, it discusses two different types of such activities by the SR and its Europawelle Saar on the basis of radio programs, internal correspondences, and readers’ letters, which are held in the SR’s archives. First, from the mid-1960s onwards, the SR’s departments for young listeners organized cross-border radio quizzes, motorbike or car rallies and other short trips abroad for teenagers and young adults. With this specific liaison of educational, informative ambitions molded in hedonistic, “pop-cultural” media formats, the broadcasting station demonstrated its ambition to strengthen understanding especially among adolescents from different European countries, and thereby functioned as an intentional, programmatically political agent: it literally showed its Sendungsbewusstsein (sense of mission). It is exactly this spirit that Christina Norwig showed for the first “European Youth Campaign” of the early 1950s. The SR program editors were inspired by the idea of creating a “European generation,” with adolescents leading the way. They considered them to be ideal intermediaries because of their assumed open-mindedness and liberal beliefs, thinking that they would become the vanguard of a new, modern vision of Europe.⁷ The idea of being able to build a “bridge to Europe” lies in the specific history of the Saarland as a permanent point of contention between West Germany and France. After decades of changing national affiliation, the Saarland became an autonomous state between 1947 and 1957, with a strong Francophile political and cultural elite. At the same time, debates went on about proclaiming Saarland’s capital, Saarbrücken, the office of the European Coal and Steel Company.⁸ The actors from the Europawelle Saar, who were mostly in their thirties and thereby socialized in this political climate, acted along these guidelines: evoking

 Diana Holmes and David Looseley, ed., Imagining the Popular in Contemporary French Culture (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013); Detlef Siegfried, Time is on my Side. Konsum und Politik in der westdeutschen Jugendkultur der 60er Jahre (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2006); Kaspar Maase, Was macht Populärkultur politisch? (Wiesbaden: Springer Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2010); Dietmar Hüser, “Westdeutsches ‘Demokratiewunder’ und transnationale Musikkultur – Dimensionen des Politischen im Populären der langen 1960er Jahre,” in Populärkultur transnational. Lesen, Hören, Sehen, Erleben im Europa der langen 1960er Jahre, ed. Dietmar Hüser (Bielefeld: transcript, 2017), 301– 336.  See Christina Norwig, Die erste europäische Generation: Europakonstruktionen in der Europäischen Jugendkampagne 1951 – 1958 (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2016).  See e. g. Rainer Hudemann, Annette Maas, and Raymond Poidevin, eds., Ein Problem der europäischen Geschichte, 2nd edition (München: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2014); Johannes Schäfer, Das autonome Saarland: Demokratie im Saarstaat 1945 – 1957 (St. Ingbert: Röhrig Univ.-Verl., 2012).

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Europe by strengthening the Franco-German relationship, which was, in general, political common sense during the 1960s, when both countries were considered the “motors” of European integration.⁹ Secondly, the broadcasting station also linked teenagers from all over Europe as “pen-friends” and served as a swap-meet for pop records, posters, autograph cards, and more. Here, the focus lay on bringing adolescents into contact via material entities of popular culture. The political impact was more implicit, much more of a positive “side-effect.” In this context, I would like to apply Alf Lüdtke’s notion of “Eigen-Sinn” that also exists in popular culture – denoting a certain willfulness, spontaneous self-determination or a kind of self-affirmation, the idea of popular culture for its own sake, its implicit political content that, especially in a transnational setting, could foster processes of democratization and liberalization.¹⁰ Many items of popular culture in the 1960s and 1970s had no striking slogans but demonstrated their political significance by consumption, fashion, language, tastes in music, and dancing. Popular culture in this sense represents, according to Denis-Constant Martin, “des objets politiques non-identifiés:” objects that were “unpolitically political.”¹¹ So, by connecting pen friends but especially by providing popular cultural products for East European teenagers, the Europawelle Saar overcame systemic political frontiers en passant. Popular culture began to conquer the Western world in the middle of the nineteenth century, but it was just after the Second World War – especially during the long 1960s – that popular culture saw an expansion in quantity, a differentiation in quality and a high degree of transnationalization. Pascal Ory describes the comic literature in France as form of “Desamericanization” for the period between 1945 and 1950, while Andreas Fickers interprets the invention of the Eurovision, especially the “Eurovision Song Contest” in 1956, as proof of a European television culture from the early years of the new medium.¹² It is cru-

 See e. g. Ulrich Krotz and Joachim Schild, Shaping Europe: France, Germany, and embedded bilateralism from the Elysée Treaty to twenty-first century politics (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2013).  Alf Lüdtke, Eigen-Sinn: Fabrikalltag, Arbeitererfahrungen und Politik vom Kaiserreich bis in den Faschismus (Münster: Verlag Westfälisches Dampfboot, 2015); Alf Lüdtke, The History of Everyday Life: Reconstructing Historical Experiences and Ways of Life (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018).  Denis-Constant Martin, ed., Sur la piste des OPNI (objets politiques non identifiés) (Paris: Editions Karthala, 2002).  See Andreas Fickers, “Eventing Europe – Europäische Fernseh- und Mediengeschichte als Zeitgeschichte,” in Medien – Debatten – Öffentlichkeiten in Deutschland und Frankreich im 19.

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cial therefore to widen the horizon for inner-European flows and processes of adaptation in terms of popular culture and further denying the idea of unilateral ways of integrating US-American goods and practices in different European societies.¹³ In the long 1960s, while broadcasting editors at the SR often had a concrete political agenda, “Europe” was more or less a style of living and consuming in a modern and liberal way for the young radio listeners. Explicit discourse around “Europe” or becoming “European” rarely showed up in the sources. Nevertheless, according to the well-known Aristotelian dictum, this “Europe of the young” as a whole, constructed by the Europawelle Saar on the basis of various bilateral initiatives and links (especially Franco-German ones and those between the FRG and the GDR) is more than just the sum of its parts. It is the Europawelle Saar, this popular youth media platform, that focused all these ideas.

The Implementation of the Europawelle Saar In the history of youth mass media, the year 1964 represents a caesura or point of culmination. From now on, the formerly cautious tendencies of Europeanization accelerated greatly. The landscape of British youth mass magazines was characterized by a “boom,” a real explosion, of sometimes short-lived pop magazines that were launched at the peak of “Beatlemania”, trying to cash in on the huge commercial success of this phenomenon. British pirate radio stations overtook those governed by public law and relied heavily on pop music. In various European movie theatres, the film “A Hard Day’s Night” (“Quatre garçons dans le vent” in France and “Yeah, Yeah, Yeah” in West Germany) excited female fans of the Fab Four. At the same time, this youth mass media hinged on potent sponsors from the classified ads section, as well as on cooperation and mutual financial participation. This youth mass media was created by an entangled “youth mass media ensemble” embracing mainly Western but also Eastern European states.

und 20. Jahrhundert, ed. Dietmar Hüser and Jean-François Eck (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2011), 283 – 306.  See Pascal Ory, “Mickey go home! La désaméricanisation de la bande dessinée (1945 – 1950),” in “On tue à chaque page!” La loi de 1949 sur les publications destinées à la jeunesse, ed. Thierry Crépin et al. (Paris: Éditions du Temps/Musée de la band dessinée, 1999), 71– 86; for the general impact of inner-European flows of popular culture see Dietmar Hüser, ed., Populärkultur transnational: Lesen, Hören, Sehen, Erleben im Europa der langen 1960er Jahre (Bielefeld: transcript), 2017.

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At the time, the Saarländische Rundfunk broke onto the scene with a highly controversial decision that in some West German journals was critically discussed as evidence of “Americanization” (an exclusively negative connotation): it introduced the Europawelle Saar, a medium-wave channel that played a lot of pop music, and furthermore was the first West German radio program that was widely sponsored by advertising costumers, as was already common practice in the USA.¹⁴ However, around 1963, culturally conservative debates about “Americanization” were not so virulent anymore, and the fact that the Europawelle Saar broke with West German traditions and ethics of radio journalism by adopting a typically American private program pattern revitalized this figure of thought.¹⁵ In its preliminary stages, this idea caused a lot of trouble within the ARD. The SR was accused of being capitalist and fuelling the competitive situation between the press, film, radio, and television, which were all dependent on advertising. The traditional media and press feared competitive distortion.¹⁶ The other ARD members even threatened to exclude the SR from the umbrella organization.¹⁷ Nevertheless, the SR won this battle and the Europawelle Saar went on air in January 1964.

 See e. g. Anonymous, “Nein zu Plänen des Saar-Funks,” Deutsche Zeitung mit WirtschaftsZeitung, November 21, 1963, n.p., File Europawelle Debatte 1. Werbesendungen. Pressedokumentation Nov. 1963/Dez. 1963, Archive of the Saarländischer Rundfunk (SR Archiv), Saarbrücken; Anonymous, “Dreifrontenkrieg im deutschen Äther: Ticken Zeitzünder in der ARD?,” RheinSaar-Spiegel, November 23, 1963, File Europawelle Debatte 1. Werbesendungen. Pressedokumentation Nov. 1963/Dez. 1963, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken.  For theoretical and methodological debates on “Americanization,” “Europeanization,” “Westernization,” and “Globalization” see e. g. Margrit Pernau, Transnationale Geschichte (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2011); Victoria de Grazia, Das unwiderstehliche Imperium. Amerikas Siegeszug im Europa des 20. Jahrhunderts (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2010); Reiner Marcowitz, Nationale Identität und transnationale Einflüsse. Amerikanisierung, Europäisierung und Globalisierung in Frankreich nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg (München: Oldenbourg, 2007).  See e. g. Anonymous, “Verleger kämpfen gegen Funk und Fernsehen,” Hofer Anzeiger, December 5, 1963, n.p., File Europawelle Debatte 2. Nov.-Dez. 1963. Presseauswertung, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken.  See Horst-Werner Hartelt, “Streit droht um Notsender Saarbrücken,” Neue Rhein-Ruhr-Zeitung, November 15, 1963, n.p., File Europawelle Debatte 1. Werbesendungen. Pressedokumentation Nov. 1963/Dez. 1963, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken; Wolfgang Bartsch, “Radio Saarbrücken zieht auf die bunte Welle,” Frankfurter Rundschau, November 19, 1963, n.p., File Europawelle Debatte 1. Werbesendungen. Pressedokumentation Nov. 1963/Dez. 1963, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken; Anonymous, “Programmpläne abgelehnt. Saarländische Politiker gegen kommerziellen Rundfunk,” Saarbrücker Zeitung, November 26, 1963, File Europawelle Debatte 1. Werbesendungen. Pressedokumentation Nov. 1963/Dez. 1963, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken; Anonymous, “Hauskrieg bei den Funkanstalten. Der Saarländische Rundfunk steht isoliert,” Rheinische Post, November 29, 1963, File

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The intentions behind this channel were twofold. First, for some time, the SR had noticed an exodus of (especially young) listeners to the popular peripheral and commercial radio stations near the border of France and Luxembourg: Europe 1 and Radio Luxembourg. The director of the SR, Dr. Franz Mai, stressed the importance of the Europawelle Saar as a West German competitor to these two stations.¹⁸ This argument is in need of explanation as it seems somewhat paradoxical: a Europe-wide radio station should simultaneously serve as a national rampart, bringing back the lost German-speaking community of listeners. But this strategy has its own logic, which is quite typical for many entities of popular culture: it is the combination, the interplay of national and transnational aspects, which is important. Founding the Europawelle Saar as a national actor in “a central European economic region”¹⁹ was an important way of modernizing the SR by program revisions. This led to a transnational increase in attractiveness, and likewise represented an important factor for the West German economy: opening outwards meant consolidation inwards, which points to the second reason for installing the Europawelle Saar. With around 290,000 paying listeners, the SR was the second lowest-rated broadcasting station in the ARD. Although it gained about 1.7 Million DM per year in aerial rent from Europe 1, and besides the fact that the other ARD stations had subsidized the SR with 18 million DM between 1958 and 1961, the cost of the newly-built master control room (about 38 million DM) and the running costs for the program production far exceeded its income.²⁰ The SR was thus desperately dependent on further financial support by advertising costumers to maintain its programs. Consequently, the Europawelle Saar was born, broadcasting at 300 kilowatts until two o’clock in the morning – a frequency by which Eastern and Southern European countries could easily be reached, and with a colorful mix of hit parades, listener greetings, programs for drivers, quizzes and news. The popular and innovative formula was 80 % (pop) music,

Europawelle Debatte 1. Werbesendungen. Pressedokumentation Nov. 1963/Dez. 1963, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken.  See Anonymous, “Deutsch-Französische Kulturbrücke mit Reklameslogans,” Berliner Zeitung, December 20, 1963, n.p.; and Anonymous, “Nein zu Plänen des Saar-Funks,” Deutsche Zeitung mit Wirtschafts-Zeitung, November 21, 1963, n.p., File Europawelle Debatte 2. Nov.-Dez. 1963. Presseauswertung, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken; Anonymous, “Kotau vor Radio Luxemburg?,” Neue Rhein-Zeitung, December 10, 1963, n.p., File Europawelle Debatte 2. Nov.-Dez. 1963. Presseauswertung, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken.  Anonymous, “Sender Saarbrücken. Rebellion der Verarmten,” Der Spiegel 50 (1963): 56.  See Anonymous, “Sender Saarbrücken. Rebellion der Verarmten,” Der Spiegel 50 (1963): 56, 61.

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10 % advertising, and 10 % information.²¹ The single spots and commercials were interspersed in the program and not in blocks, as was common before. Furthermore, companies and firms had the opportunity to finance whole programs or parts of them. Only between eight and ten o’clock in the evening was there no advertising on the Europawelle Saar. This time slot was reserved for operas, concerts, jazz, and discussions.²² In 1973, this European radio wave reached up to 3,149,000 listeners per day: about 600,000 of these in Eastern France and around 140,000 in Luxembourg.²³

Cross-border Travelling: Quizzes, Rallies and Tourist Trips In 1963, the West German ARD and the French Radio Télévision France (RTF) founded the “Franco-German radio committee” in the context of the Elysée Treaty to strengthen cooperation between the two countries in terms of radio and television broadcasting. Dr. Franz Mai, director of the Saarländische Rundfunk, became the chairman of this commission.²⁴ In the course of its fourth meeting (from June 22, to June 23, 1965), the committee also deliberated on questions of youth work and decided to enhance the cooperation between the youth program editors and the Franco-German Youth Office.²⁵ Against the background of

 At the beginning of the 1960s, it was the intention of West German radio stations (which were governed by public law) to function first and foremost as cultural institutions, stressing the educational aspects of programs. Augmenting the entertainment programs – as Dr. Franz Mai did with the Europawelle Saar – was considered taboo, ringing in a change to the medium as a whole from one that led to one that accompanied. See Winfried Longerich, “Radiosender/ Radiosendungen,” in Handbuch Popkultur, ed. Thomas Hecken and Marcus S. Kleiner (Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler Verlag, 2017), 133 – 135; see Konrad Dussel, “Vom Radio- zum Fernsehzeitalter,” in Dynamische Zeiten: die 60er Jahre in den beiden deutschen Gesellschaften, ed. Axel Schildt, Detlef Siegfried, and Karl Christian Lammers (Hamburg: Christians, 2003), 673 – 694.  See, “Sender Saarbrücken,” 61; Anonymous, “Radio Saarbrücken baut um,” Kölnische Rundschau, November 12, 1963, n.p., File Europawelle Debatte 1. Werbesendungen. Pressedokumentation Nov. 1963/Dez. 1963, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken.  See SR Informationen, January 1973, File 468: Saarland Funk hier allgemein 1971 bis 1973, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken.  See Christoph Vatter, “Hörfunk,” in Lexikon der deutsch-französischen Kulturbeziehungen nach 1945, ed. Nicole Colin et al. (Tübingen: Narr Verlag, 2015), 300 – 302.  “Chronik der ARD. Deutsch-Französische Hörfunkkommission plant weitere Kooperation,” accessed February 13, 2020, http://web.ard.de/ard-chronik/index/6695?year=1965&month=6.

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his exposed role in the committee, the SR and its Europawelle Saar were deeply involved in all projects before and after this decision. An early binational youth media initiative transferred via the Europawelle Saar was the “Franco-German youth quiz,” which took place with a live audience, in the large broadcasting hall of the SR on April 20, 1965, at 8pm. It was conceived by the SR as the first bilingual youth radio quiz in West Germany, and sponsored by the Franco-German Youth Office.²⁶ This event demonstrates interdependencies between official political initiatives of youth exchange and the “popular cultural transformation or extension” of it through youth media: the Franco-German quiz was the youth media’s contribution to the first official school exchange between Saarbrücken and Nantes, in the context of the newly-completed twinning of these two towns in April 1965.²⁷ Here, the Europawelle Saar “backed up” this official Franco-German initiative with additional youth broadcasting. This political program, which followed educated middleclass principles, gained much more publicity and could diffuse into other social strata: it was embedded in a popular-cultural media format that was received by a far-reaching and diverse community of listeners. Some draft papers from the SR archive demonstrate the intention, procedure, and medial dissemination of this quiz. The broadcast was explicitly created to maintain and to strengthen the idea of getting young French and West German people into contact. Selected adolescents from Saarbrücken and Nantes travelled for nine days to their neighboring country, in order to explore the region and gain information about various country-specific topics, such as the economic and political systems, cultural institutions, monuments, and sights. All the participants were to record their impressions on cassettes. The SR utilized their experiences in a two-part broadcast: a travelogue feature and a complementary public quiz, in which two mixed-gender teams of four French and four West German teenagers should answer multiple-choice questions and correct false re-

 The Franco-German Youth Office took over the travel costs of both the German and the French youth group. Additionally, they donated money and funds for further excursions, see “Aktennotiz von Dr. Heinz Garber über die Besprechung im Deutsch-Franz. Jugendwerk am 22. 2.1965,” February 22, 1965, File 2000223: Junge Leute – heute. Presse, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken. 1966/1967. Another contribution by the Franco-German Youth Office to the quiz was to send one of its employees, Dr. Heyer, as a jury member. See Anonymous, “Mit dem gesamten Publikum: Das erste deutsch-französische Jugendquiz an der Saar,” Saarbrücker Allgemeine Zeitung, April 17/18, 1965, n.p., File 2000231: Junge Leute – heute. Presse, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken.  See Kulturamt Saarbrücken, 25 Jahre Städtepartnerschaft Nantes – Saarbrücken: Pressespiegel (Saarbrücken: n.publ. 1991); Anonymous, “Lebendige Freundschaft. Jugendaustausch Nantes-Saarbrücken in vollem Gange,” Saarbrücker Zeitung, n.d., n.p., File 2000231: Junge Leute – heute. Presse, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken.

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sponses. Questions touched on the French and West German school systems, for example, or the teams had to guess a certain city of their neighboring country. A special part was the “Quiz of Europe,” which had to be answered by both the French and West German quiz teams. In this section, the youth had to answer questions about European authorities, European history, and contemporary European political problems. The young audience at the large SR broadcasting hall were invited to join in the quiz. Correct answers were rewarded with book prizes. The broadcast was accompanied by musical performances from the Fritz Maldener Quartet – a Saarland jazz combo.²⁸ The quiz was won by the French team.²⁹ The SR director Dr. Franz Mai commented on the quiz results: “One team has won but no one has been defeated.” Neither educational nor national prestige would have been important in this context, just the spirit of Franco-German friendship.³⁰ Subsequently, the editors from the Saarländische Rundfunk came to a rather ambiguous assessment of the quiz. In general, those responsible were satisfied with the broadcast’s status as a pioneering format. Nevertheless, they saw room for improvement – especially concerning the cooperation with the French Office de Radiodiffusion Télévision Française (ORTF), the successor of the RTF. In a memorandum, Dr. Heinz Garber, director of the school’s broadcasting at the SR, complained about the unreliability of his French colleagues. According to him, the ORTF offered support when the pupils from Saarbrücken arrived in Paris, but no one took care of them after this. Furthermore, neither the French ORTF radio programs nor the German Program from Radio Strasbourg requested a copy of the quiz from the broadcast – a problem that could not be solved. Because this and other upcoming radio quizzes were produced solely in German, the RTF was not able to send them. Language barriers were a burden, though

 See “Vorläufiges Konzept einer Quiz-Sendung für Jugendliche aus Deutschland und Frankreich,” October 22, 1964, File 2000231: Junge Leute – heute. Öffentliche Veranstaltungen, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken; Anonymous, “Ein deutsch-französisches Jugendquiz,” Westpfälzische Rundschau, April 7, 1965, n.p.; Anonymous, “Deutsch-französisches Jugendquiz,” Saarbrücker Landeszeitung, April 8, 1965, n.p.; Anonymous, “Mit dem gesamten Publikum,” n.p.  See Anonymous, “Schüler aus Nantes siegten beim Quiz,” Westpfälzische Rundschau, April 22, 1965, n.p., File 2000231: Junge Leute – heute. Presse, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken.  Anonymous, “Schüler aus Nantes siegten beim Quiz,”; see further Anonymous, “Schüler aus Nantes siegten beim Jugend-Quiz,” Birkenfelder Zeitung, April 22, 1965, n.p., File 2000231: Junge Leute – heute. Presse, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken; Anonymous, “Die Gäste siegten beim Quiz,” Saarbrücker Zeitung, April 22, 1965, File 2000231: Junge Leute – heute. Presse, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken; Anonymous, “Gute Gewinner und gute Verlierer,” Saarbrücker Landeszeitung, April 22, 1965, File 2000231: Junge Leute – heute. Presse, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken.

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this is not to underestimate in the work of the Franco-German radio committee.³¹ According to Sybille Burmeister, the main reason for these difficulties lay in the different structures and sizes of the French and West German radio stations. Whereas broadcasting stations in the Federal State of Germany were autonomous institutions, the regional studios in France were nothing more than branches of the ORTF’s Parisian headquarters.³² Apart from that, the SR editors realized that the radio quiz format was not very attractive for young listeners. As television viewers, they were used to more elaborate quiz productions that were also much more appealing on an aesthetic level. Against this background, the SR became aware of the fact that they had to try harder in terms of the framework program in which the radio quiz would be embedded.³³ Consequently, the next broadcast, from September 30, 1966, was set up as a “Jazz and Quiz” and conceived as transnational youth radio quiz cooperation between the SR, Radio Luxembourg, and the Sender Freies Berlin. Grammar school pupils from Saarbrücken, Luxembourg, and West Berlin competed with each other.³⁴ This time, the event was framed by prestigious international jazz performances: the “Blues and Stomps Company” from Frankfurt am Main was hired, and the jazz singer Shirley Thompson even came over from the United States.³⁵ Other important initiatives organized by the youth program editors of the Europawelle Saar, supported by colleagues from other West German broadcasting stations and the ORTF, were Franco-German youth motorbike and car rallies that took place between 1967and 1971.³⁶ The rally routes led through several pla-

 See “Vorläufiges Konzept einer Quiz-Sendung für Jugendliche aus Deutschland und Frankreich,” October 22, 1964, p. 5, File 2000231: Junge Leute – heute. Öffentliche Veranstaltungen, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken.  See Sybille Burmeister, “Ein Projekt im Anschluß an den Elysee-Vertrag. Die deutsch-französische Hörfunkkommission (1963 – 1969),” Rundfunk und Geschichte 25 (1999): 37– 45, here 40.  See Aktennotiz Deutsch-Französisches Jugendquiz am 20. April 1965, May 21, 1965, File 2000231: Junge Leute – heute. Öffentliche Veranstaltungen, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken.  This quiz was first planned to be held by teenagers from a working-class background. Unfortunately, there is no information in the archival documents for why this plan was not realized and why the editors again engaged grammar school pupils instead.  See “Notiz in eigener Sache,” File 2000231: Junge Leute – heute. Öffentliche Veranstaltungen, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken; see further letter from Axel Buchholz to Sven Trittelvitz from September 30, 1966, File 2000231, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken.  The first Franco-German motorbike rally for teenagers took place from April 7 to 17, 1966, leading its participants on the route from Paris to Munich. It was organized by the German Bayerische Rundfunk (BR) and the French ORTF in cooperation with the Maison des Jeunes et de la Culture, as well as the Bundesjugendring and its concept, which was the basis for all rallies

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ces in the Federal Republic of Germany and France, and were not sport competitions but events with a cultural and educational character. Written concepts of the rallies held in the archive of the Saarländische Rundfunk clearly show their explicitly (socio‐) political objectives. The rallies aimed to promote and develop mutual understanding between young French and West German people, to deepen their knowledge of traffic laws and thereby augment road safety, to discover the beauty of the landscapes, and to improve their knowledge of French or German.³⁷ There was also some “pop” amusement, of course. At each stage of the motorbike journey, there was a mobile discotheque, and in the evenings the stage winners could choose their personal favorites from a pool of records, thereby creating the “rally hit parade” that was also broadcast on the Europawelle Saar. ³⁸ Each year, these events gained huge public attention through repeated daily radio and television broadcasts. The Europawelle Saar reported about the rally three times a day in its most popular youth broadcasts: Junge Leute – heute and Hallo Twen with presenter Manfred Sexauer.³⁹ This was important for reaching the intended overall goal: promoting the Franco-German friendship “in a likewise spectacular and innovative way.”⁴⁰ As an introduction to a broadcast stated: “with a motorbike rally, one can also do politics.”⁴¹ It becomes quite clear that these rallies were intended to be (youth) media events.⁴²

that followed, see “Bericht über die 1. Deutsch-französische Moped-Rallye der Jugend 1966 ParisMünchen 7.–17. April,” File 2000242: Moped Rallye, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken.  See “Moped-Rallye 67 München-Paris vom 3. Juli – 14. Juli 67,” File 2000242: Moped Rallye, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken; “Exposé für die gemeinsame Veranstaltung einer Auto-Rallye 1970 zwischen ARD und ORTF,” File 2000242: Moped Rallye, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken; “Ausschreibung für die Deutsch-Französische Jugend-Rallye für Verkehrssicherheit – Touristische Zielfahrt – vom 7. bis 12. Juni 1971,” File 2000242: Moped Rallye, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken.  See e. g. Pressedienst Bayerischer Rundfunk 26/68, “Rallye ‘68 Paris-Bonn,” File 2000242: Moped Rallye, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken.  See Letter to Mister Ganz of the SR press office from May 30, 1967, File 2000242: Moped Rallye, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken; Letter from Hans-Dieter Brennecke to Manfred Sexauer from May 30, 1967, File 2000242: Moped Rallye, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken; see further “Fahrplan Sondersendung II. Deutsch-französische Moped-Rallye,” July 5, 1967, File 2000242: Moped Rallye, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken.  See “Moped-Rallye 67 München-Paris vom 3. Juli – 14. Juli 67,” File 2000242: Moped Rallye, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken. Citation translated from German.  “Fahrplan für Sondersendung II. Deutsch-französische Moped-Rallye,” July 4, 1967, File 2000242: Moped Rallye, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken. Citation translated from German.  For the phenomenon of media events, see Frank Bösch and Patrick Schmidt, Medialisierte Ereignisse: Performanz, Inszenierung und Medien seit dem 18. Jahrhundert (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2010).

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Arguably, these events were highly attractive despite their political intentions, or because these ambitions were rather modest, not obvious (and sometimes not even noticeable). For many teenagers, the biggest incitement for applying for the Franco-German rally was to have the opportunity to go on a foreign trip, to drive a motorcycle, the sheer hedonistic enjoyment of driving as such – and there are no great differences considering applications from grammar school attendees, commercial or industrial trainees. The intention to serve as a kind of youth ambassador or references to the Elysée Treaty appeared only rarely in the applications. Occasionally, there was the notion to dismantle existing stereotypes between the French and the West German people, coming to terms with their common past and helping to create a “cooperation between all European nations.”⁴³ Only a few applicants referred to the idea that “the young ones from today are the Europeans of tomorrow.”⁴⁴ Furthermore, it is open to debate whether these explicitly politically-driven motivations were genuine or just proclaimed in a sense of “preemptive obedience” to increase the chance of being chosen as a rally participant. But no matter what the real intentions behind the application were, all adolescents who drove on these motorbikes across the frontiers, accompanied by a huge youth media campaign and thereby noticed by a transnational public, were personal transmitters in a process of Europeanization – willingly or not. The first Franco-German motorbike rally in which the Saarländische Rundfunk participated as an organizer lasted from July 3 to July 14, 1967, running from Munich to Paris via Freiburg, where the participants crossed the FrancoGerman border.⁴⁵ In total, there were 15 French and 15 West German teenagers between 17 and 22 years of age, brought together in socially and nationally diverse, mixed-gender teams of three participants each. There were also two rally participants from the SR’s broadcasting area: two male pupils from Saarbrücken and Lebach. The young motor-bikers passed the French and West German landscapes on either a vehicle made by the West German company Zündapp or its French counterpart Vélosolex. The winning team got to keep the motorbikes they used in the contest as a prize. Contributions towards the

 See “Deutsche männliche Teilnehmer an der Moped-Rallye 1967,” File 2000242: Moped Rallye, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken. Citation translated from German.  “Fragebogen von Arthur-Ernst O., Lehrling zum Industriekaufmann, zur Moped-Rallye ParisBonn. 21. Juni – 7. Juli 1968,” File 2000242: Moped Rallye, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken. Citation translated from German.  Apart from the Saarländische Rundfunk, the Bayerische Rundfunk and the Südwestdeutsche Rundfunk (SWR) were engaged in this rally.

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costs was about 180 DM: the rest of the expenses were subsidized by the FrancoGerman Youth Office.⁴⁶ In the context of this rally, the young French and West German teams were required to overcome differences in mentality and to prove their ability to work together in an intercultural team.⁴⁷ They had to solve a lot of problems and take part in curious, sometimes highly stereotypical competitions: for example, Bavarian curling in midsummer, learning to dance the Schuhplattler, blowing the alpenhorn, playing Boules, and going on a boat trip on the river Seine.⁴⁸ Considering these clichéd notions of France and West Germany, it is a debatable point whether the explicit goal of the rallies – to promote and develop mutual understanding between young French and West German people – could be realized. Apart from such competitions, the youth had to answer questions about (art) history, culture, folklore, politics, tourism, and gastronomy. The guidelines that were distributed to the teams before their trip actively encouraged them to get help from local tourist bureaus and passers-by to succeed, which was a further element of connecting people transnationally. In Paris, the young teams were welcomed by a state ceremony: they had to participate in French Bastille Day festivities, in deployments at the Champs Elysées, and to stand on the same tribune as President Charles de Gaulle. Another major task was to interview French and West German people on either side of the border about their views on FrancoGerman relations.⁴⁹ Through these interactions with local inhabitants, the Franco-German youth rallies clearly served as popular cultural agents for the mission of building Europe. Further rallies which took place between 1968 and 1971 followed the same general principles and guidelines as the ones before. Nevertheless, there were

 See “Moped-Rallye 67 München-Paris vom 3. Juli – 14. Juli 67,” File 2000242: Moped Rallye, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken; see further “Moped-Rallye 67 München – Paris. Zeitplan,” File 2000231: Junge Leute – heute. Öffentliche Veranstaltungen, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken; Anonymous, “Moped-Rallye München – Paris. Deutsch-Französisches Jugendwerk lädt ein,” Saarbrücker Landeszeitung, June 2, 1967, n.p., File 2000242: Moped Rallye, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken.  See e. g. Anonymous, “Diesmal München – Paris,” Saarbrücker Landeszeitung, May 18, 1967, n.p.; File 2000242: Moped Rallye, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken; Anonymous, “Mit ‘flinken Bienen’ auf Freundschaftskurs. Moped-Rallye München – Paris schlug erneut Brücken,” Radmarkt Bielefeld, August 15, 1967, n.p., File 2000242: Moped Rallye, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken; Anonymous, “Deutsche und Franzosen ziehen ‘am gleichen Strick’,” Saarbrücker Zeitung, July 4, 1967, n.p., File 2000242: Moped Rallye, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken.  See e. g. Anonymous, “Moped-Rallye gestern im Allgäu. Rudern – Jodeln – Alphornblasen,” Füssener Blatt, July 7, 1967, File 2000242: Moped Rallye, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken.  See “Moped-Rallye 67 München-Paris vom 3. Juli – 14. Juli 67,” File 2000242: Moped Rallye, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken.

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some conceptual changes. The case of one motorbike rally from June 24, 1968 to July 5, 1968 is the most remarkable one because it would have been the only event with a real European character, but the rally was cancelled by the ORTF because of the May 68 riots.⁵⁰ For this rally, apart from 20 West German and 20 French participants, the organizers wanted to include eight additional adolescents from other EEC countries (Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg).⁵¹ Furthermore, as a kind of symbolic act, the motorbike drivers were to cross the Europabrücke (Bridge of Europe) in Strasbourg in the night from June 30, 1968 to July 1, 1968 – the day customs barriers within the EEC fell.⁵² “May 68” did not just foil this rally, but even worse: it put a clear break in the youth work of the Franco-German radio committee. After these events, all discussion and conference broadcasts for teenagers that had been Franco-German coproductions vanished.⁵³ Nonetheless, the rallies went on for some years, but with a different thrust. From 1970 to 1971, the SR and its colleagues took a step further and relaunched rallies no longer staged on motorbikes, but in cars. In this context, the broadcasting stations cooperated with the French Route Prévention Frontière, the German Road Safety Organization, and the General German Automobile Association. Again, the Franco-German Youth Office sponsored the events.⁵⁴ Given these participating organizations, it is quite reasonable to assume that the constantly increasing numbers of road fatalities in the 1960s and the crisis-oriented (media) discourse about it – in 1971, the West German news weekly The Spiegel complained about “the slaughter we call traffic”⁵⁵ – played a crucial role for this repositioning of the rallies. Furthermore, these rallies had a new slogan. In the conceptual papers, they were now explicitly described as “Franco-German youth rallies for road safety”: to learn the traffic rules in France and West Germany

 See e. g. Letter from Dr. Heinz Garber and Dieter Brennecke of the SR to an applicant for the motorbike rally, n.d., File 2000242: Moped Rallye, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken.  See Pressedienst Bayerischer Rundfunk 26/68, “Rallye ‘68 Paris-Bonn,” File 2000242: Moped Rallye, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken.  See “Merkblatt Rallye 1968 Paris-Bonn,” File 2000242: Moped Rallye, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken.  See Burmeister, Die deutsch-französische Hörfunkkommission, 42.  According to the minutes of preliminary discussions of the rallies, the FGYO sponsored these events with 12,000 FF (1970) and 15,000 DM (1971), see “Protokoll über die Vorbesprechung zur deutsch/französischen Rallye 1971,” File 2000242: Moped Rallye, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken; see “Protokoll der Arbeitssitzung am 9. April 1970 in Paris zwischen La Prévention Routière, Deutsche Verkehrswacht, La Maison des Jeunes in Le Peq, ORTF und ARD über eine Auto-Rallye 1970,” File 2000242: Moped Rallye, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken.  Anonymous, “Das Gemetzel, das wir Verkehr nennen,” Der Spiegel 27 (1971): 32– 48.

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stood as the center of the event.⁵⁶ This rebranding of the rally touches on ambivalent notions of Europeanization: On the one hand, increasing motorization and traffic led to the further consolidation of Europe from the bottom up. On the other, it brought new difficulties in road safety that needed solutions on a European level through training. At these remodelled rallies, the young participants were between the age of 18 and 27, still grouped in mixed Franco-German teams, and had to make five daily stages in their own cars.⁵⁷ As before in the motorbike rallies, they had to undertake various tasks, answer questions on French or West German history, and discuss current political problems, including their European dimension. This time, they also had to prove their skills as traffic participants and to pass competitions in slalom driving and take security training in their cars. Apart from this, the groups visited different cultural institutions and touristic attractions. All were lodged with West German or French families, in youth hostels or housing from the youth organizations that were involved in the rallies. Every participant had to pay an entry fee of 150 FF (1970) or 50 DM (1971). The winning team was rewarded with a four-week stay in a water sports center.⁵⁸ In the 1970s, Franco-German broadcasting cooperation became increasingly tense. Both the ORTF and ARD noted that the organization of motorbike or car rallies had created many difficulties and they decided not to continue these initiatives.⁵⁹ The car rally from 1971 was thus the last to be arranged. Although it is not mentioned explicitly in the documents, one can assume that organizational and logistic problems, the crisis of the events’ main sponsor – the Franco-German Youth Office (FGYO) – from the late 1960s on, as well as the enormous costs of these rallies and the effort of organizing them probably contributed to

 See “Ausschreibung für die Deutsch-Französische Jugend-Rallye für Verkehrssicherheit – Touristische Zielfahrt – vom 7. bis 12. Juni 1971,” File 2000242: Moped Rallye, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken.  Unlike the motorbike rallies, sponsorship from car companies was not allowed, see “Exposé für die gemeinsame Veranstaltung einer Auto-Rallye 1970 zwischen ARD und ORTF,” December 26, 1969, File 2000242: Moped Rallye, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken.  See “Exposé für die gemeinsame Veranstaltung einer Auto-Rallye 1970 zwischen ARD und ORTF,”; “Ausschreibung für die Deutsch-Französische Jugend-Rallye für Verkehrssicherheit – Touristische Zielfahrt – vom 7. bis 12. Juni 1971,” File 2000242: Moped Rallye, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken.  See “Niederschrift der 18. Sitzung der Deutsch-Französischen Kommission für die Hörfunkzusammenarbeit zwischen ARD und ORTF vom 21. und 22. Juni 1973,” p. 18, File 03646: Drugstore 1421. 1973/74, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken.

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the decision.⁶⁰ Furthermore, research indicates that there was a diminishing attractiveness of political and educational events, especially of those from official institutions like the youth exchange programs by the FGYO or the Workcamps. Instead, adolescents wanted more touristic trips, often organized by commercial travel agencies specialized in youth tours.⁶¹ The SR also changed its formula. Now, youth program editors offered travel abroad that was still inspired by the idea of getting European youth together, informing them and letting them discuss (European) politics. However, tourism played a greater role, and the relation between “pop” and “politics” was more balanced than before. One example of such a trip is the “Salut les voisins! ⁶² Drugstore-Reise ins Nachbarland” (Hello neighbours! Drugstore trip to the bordering country) that took place from November 4 to November 9, 1974, and was broadcast every evening at 7.30 p.m. on the SR youth program “Drugstore 1421,” on the Europawelle Saar. During “French Week” on the SR, its youth editors sent 30 West German pupils between 14 and 18 years of age from a grammar school in Bad Bergzabern⁶³ on a special “Tour de France,” which was nevertheless financially supported by the FGYO. Their mission was to compare the situation of their French contemporaries with their own lifestyle in West Germany. They went to Verdun and Compiègne, experienced the often tense Franco-German past using manon-the-street interviews, talked with politicians like Sigismund von Braun (the West German ambassador to Paris), met French apprentices and pupils to discuss problems of educational policy, the French school system, and structural changes. At the same time, they were to report on a Parisian fashion show, fancy boutiques or fashionable discotheques, like the “Drugstore” in Saint-Ger-

 Considering the FGYO’s crisis see e. g. Katja Marmetschke, “Krise und Neugestaltung des DFJW in den siebziger Jahren,” in Deutsch-französische Begegnung und europäischer Bürgersinn: Studien zum Deutsch-Französischen Jugendwerk 1963 – 2003, ed. Hans Manfred Bock (Wiesbaden: Springer Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2003), 91– 122.  See Diether Breitenbach, Kommunikationsbarrieren in der internationalen Jugendarbeit: ein Forschungsprojekt im Auftrag des Bundesministers für Jugend, Familie u. Gesundheit (Saarbrücken: Breitenbach, 1980).  It is quite likely that “Salut les voisins!” was meant to be a reference to “Salut les Copains” which was the name of the most popular French youth magazine of the 1960s and 70s, which was also well-known in Germany.  Before the trip, there was a competition titled “Kennt ihr Frankreich?” [Do you know France?], hosted by the Europawelle Saar, which addressed all the schools in its broadcasting area. A grammar school in Bad Bergzabern won: see Hermann Stümpert, “Drugstore – Tour de France. Projekt der Redaktion ‘Drugstore 1421’ aus Anlaß der Französischen Woche des SR 74,” File 03646: Drugstore 1421. 1973/74, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken.

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main-en-Laye.⁶⁴ Furthermore, the adolescents had nearly each evening at their disposal, and they now partly lodged in hotels instead of just staying with French host families as their peers had done in the motorbike and car rallies of the 1960s.⁶⁵ Another example that perfectly demonstrates the altered interests of the youth and the conceptual transformations of the SR’s youth travels that followed is the “London trip” of March 1974 that was also hosted by the youth program “Drugstore 1421” and subsidized by the Jugendferienwerk. This tour was conceived as a weekend trip, with a lot of sightseeing, a visit to a pop concert, and a lot of shopping opportunities. The intention of getting West German teenagers into contact with British ones was most implicit. The youth program editors hoped to strengthen connections between themselves and their listeners’ community by placing 100 adolescents on a chartered plane and showing them around the Thames metropole.⁶⁶ In the guidelines distributed to the participants, one could read the following: We have thought for a long time about offering a full programme for the London trip, but we have had negative experiences with over-organised group tours. Therefore, we will give you as much spare time as possible, because most of you will have your own plans.⁶⁷

In general, these guidelines reflected the change in mentality and attitude of the young travelers as consumers. For example, the organizers apologized for the un-luxurious youth hostel they booked them in, and advised them to go by taxi to the clubs and pubs they wanted to visit.⁶⁸ This “London Trip” is a paradigmatic example of a bottom-up act of Europeanization, in which popular youth media functioned as “travel agencies” for connecting teenagers in a European consumer community.  See letter from Hermann Stümpert (youth program editor) to Dieter Brennecke (program planning) from October 14, 1974, File 03646: Drugstore 1421. 1973/74, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken; Teleprint from Hans-Jürgen Koch and Robert Hetkämper (youth program editors) to Agence France Presse, File 03646: Drugstore 1421. 1973/74, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken; Letter from Hans-Jürgen Koch to FGYO, September 13, 1974, File 03646: Drugstore 1421. 1973/74, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken; see further “Sendeunterlagen Drugstore. 11. 3.1974– 12.1.1975,” File 04467, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken.  See “Frankreichreise Drugstore. Endgültiger Terminplan,” File 03646: Drugstore 1421. 1973/ 74, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken.  See e. g. Anonymous, “So lernte eine Funkredaktion ihre Hörer kennen,” TV Hören + Sehen no. 3 (1974), n.p., File 2000252: Stümpert. Drugstore. Vorbereitung, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken.  See “Tips London-Trip,” File 03646: Drugstore 1421. 1973/74, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken. Citation translated from German.  See “Tips London-Trip.”

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European Contact Exchange: Pop Swap and Pen Friend Correspondence After having shown that quizzes and rallies were explicit instruments of international understanding, it is important to show other initiatives from the Europawelle Saar that were rather non-programmatically political, and can clarify the function of popular youth media as non-intentional but nevertheless very effective agents of Europeanization. The following examples demonstrate how popular youth media crossed borders, even between East and West, socialism and capitalism, dictatorship and democracy. During the 1960s and 1970s, Western European youth mass media were a kind of “transmission belt” for popular youth culture into countries where political and ideological borders normally prohibited their youth from consuming products of the Western “culture industry.”⁶⁹ Popular radio broadcasts can be considered “trans-ideological” media par excellence: radio waves could not be stopped by national borders.⁷⁰ The Saarländische Rundfunk listener responses, especially from the German Democratic Republic, confirm this finding.⁷¹ These letters express the search for creative, productive coping strategies, for latitudes and gaps in the national policy system, and demonstrate the desire to participate in popular culture by youth mass media. A young Brandenburg girl who regularly listened to the broadcast Hallo Twen with Manfred Sexauer in 1966 wrote to the radio station: Unfortunately beat music is not welcome here. We are currently facing a total prohibition of beat music. It’s horrible. Beat bands have a lot of difficulties here. The most common and popular ones are not allowed to play in public. About Western beat bands we are just getting information through the Western radio stations and via television. If someone receives

 See e. g. Sascha Trültzsch and Thomas Wilke, “Populärkultur und DDR. Phänomenologische Präliminarien aus medienwissenschaftlicher Perspektive,” in Heisser Sommer – Coole Beats. Zur populären Musik und ihren medialen Repräsentationen in der DDR, edited by Trültzsch and Wilke (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2010), 7– 16.  See especially Heiner Stahl, Jugendradio im kalten Ätherkrieg: Berlin als eine Klanglandschaft des Pop (1962 – 1973) (Berlin: Landbeck, 2010).  At their eleventh plenum, the East German Central Committee banned Beat music in the GDR totally, and local Beat groups lost their licenses to play. Because of its radical character, this committee went down in history as the “eradication plenum” (Kahlschlag-Plenum). Listener responses to the Saarländische Rundfunk from the GDR reflect these political regulations: for the broadcast “Junge Leute – heute,” the amount of letters from East German listeners rose from 0.1 to 1 percent between 1964 and 1966 due to the thaw in the West-East German relations, decreasing continuously thereafter: in 1971, only two of the 2,368 letters came from the GDR. File 2000230: Junge Leute heute. Statistik, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken.

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a copy of ‘Bravo’ magazine or ‚Musikparade’ by post, everyone springs at it and the magazines are treated as treasure.⁷²

A letter from listener Dorothea H. from Dresden in 1966 shed some light on the GDR’s indoctrinating and manipulative handling of popular culture: the restrictions and limitations, and the official statements.⁷³ Her text further emphasizes the role of European youth mass media as transnational and a compensatory, even escapist element in the context of popular culture. Why aren’t we allowed to receive youth magazines like Bravo or collect autographs from FRG stars, artists and other extraordinary people? Here [in the GDR, A.M.] they can always rain on our parade and we cannot fight it, the post is confiscated but there are ways out of it […] I questioned why they prohibit youth magazines and autographs in the GDR, and once I was told that the people in Western Germany get infatuated via music, youth magazines etc. so that the government would not be disturbed in setting up nuclear weapons. That would be the reason for the huge Schlager market! Up to the present day, I am not sure whether to believe it or not […] To take my mind off the worries of politics and the fact that Germany is a divided country and we are caught here, I tune into Radio Luxembourg or Europawelle Saar because they will always provide us with jolly and unpolitical entertainment, like broadcasts from Dieter Heck, Martins Musikbox etc..⁷⁴

It becomes quite clear that GDR teenagers faced a “popular cultural vacuum.” In some Soviet satellite countries of Eastern Europe, such as Hungary or Czechoslovakia, Western European or US-American items of popular youth culture could be bought in so-called “pop shops” for horrendous prices. Youth from the GDR either had to travel to neighboring countries, buy on the black market or hope to get “care packages” from Western relatives filled with the “pop” they were longing for.⁷⁵ The SR and its youth programs thus often served as a kind of “trade centre” or “swap-meet” for popular youth culture where GDR young ones could get pop items even for free.

 Listener’s letter from Marion N. from Eggersdorf, February 15, 1966, File 2000235: Junge Leute – heute. Hörerpost, SR Archive, Saarbrücken. Citation translated from German.  See especially Michael Rauhut, “DDR-Beatmusik zwischen Engagement und Repression,” in Kahlschlag: Das 11. Plenum der ZK der SED 1965, ed. Günter Agde, (Berlin: Aufbau-TaschenbuchVerl., 2000), 122 – 133.  Listener’s letter from Dorothea H. from Dresden, December 2, 1966, File 2000233: Junge Leute – heute. Hörerpost, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken. Loosely translated from German because of heavy grammatic and semantic faults in the original text.  See e. g. Ulrich Mählert and Gerd-Rüger Stephan, Blaue Hemden – Rote Fahnen: Geschichte der Freien Deutschen Jugend (Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 1996), 263 – 264; Michael Rauhut, Beat in der Grauzone. DDR-Rock 1964 bis 1972 – Politik und Alltag (Berlin: BasisDruck, 1993), 54.

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A revealing case is Bernd G. from Sangerhausen, a 22-year-old who wrote to the editors of “Traxor”⁷⁶ [sic!] to ask for partners to exchange pop records. All his earlier efforts had been without success, and because the Saarländische Rundfunk had already helped him to find a pen-friend in the past, he addressed the broadcasting station again. At the end of his letter, he reminded the radio editors not to mention his address, fearing “difficulties” from the GDR authorities.⁷⁷ Another letter from a young girl from Großrosseln in Saarland, which reached the SR in 1968, gives some further information about the GDR beat scene and demonstrates that popular cultural transfers across ideological borders sometimes took many stages, and thereby stresses again the role of the SR and Saarland in this context. […] Perhaps you could help me and give some young guys from the eastern zone great pleasure. A combo (beat group) with a female singer asked me for three or four full scores of songs. They want to please their audience there with music from here. The young singer writes: ‘You do certainly know, referring to music, that our Schlager cannot compete with yours.’ […] apart from that, they would be very thankful for older recorded audio tapes. I would be very pleased, dear Dieter Thomas Heck, if you could help these young people from the eastern zone (Magdeburg). I am going to forward it to them […].⁷⁸

Apart from such items of popular youth culture as records and music sheets, teenagers often asked for pop star pictures, autographs, and postcards that they could either collect, stick in an album or exchange. A British listener of Junge Leute – heute, Chris H. from Walthamstow in London, wrote to the Europawelle Saar in 1965 to get some postcards from West Germany, because she had started to make a scrapbook. As a quid pro quo, she promised to send some postcards from London.⁷⁹ Again, it is mainly listener responses from the GDR that contained such requests for “star material.” The Brandenburg girl from earlier was one of these. After having explained her unpleasant situation as a teenager in the GDR, she went on in her letter:

 The writer likely meant the youth program “Drugstore 1421.” The incorrect spelling of the English word refers to the lack of English lessons in many GDR schools – a fact that will be explained further in the context of the pen pal correspondences in this chapter.  See listener’s letter from Bernd G. of Sangerhausen, GDR, July 30, 1977, File 04469: Hörerpost Drugstore 1978/79, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken.  Listener’s letter from Erna H., October 3, 1968, File 01489: Europawelle Hörerpost. Schlagerparade D.-Th. Heck, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken. Citation translated from German.  See listener’s letter from Chris H., August 18, 1965, File 2000233: Junge Leute – heute. Hörerpost, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken.

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Now I have a request. Would you be so kind as to send me some photos and autographs? A lot of them if possible, because there is no other way for me to write to you again. You would really please me by sending photos of The Beatles, The Rolling Stones, The Lords, The Rattles, The Boots, Chris Andrews or The Beach Boys.⁸⁰

A final example gets to the very heart of the interwoven, multiple structures that were characteristic of those unilateral West-East transfers of popular culture via youth mass media. In 1970, Ingrid G. sent a postcard to the SR from the socialist (but in terms of Western popular culture, much more liberal) Czechoslovakian capital Prague, asking for photos of Axel Buchholz, Elke Herrmann, and Alf Wolf – all presenters of the popular youth program “Junge Leute – heute” on the Europawelle Saar – for her son that lived and studied medicine in Halle/ Saale in the GDR at that time.⁸¹ Here, it was again the practice to have a personal intermediary outside the GDR, that likewise took care of making contact to the youth media, and forwarded the eagerly-anticipated pieces of popular culture. Another crucial instrument for the Europe-wide transfer of popular culture by youth mass media were pen friend forums. They functioned as socio-communicative collecting points, and overcame political and ideological frontiers by connecting adolescents from Eastern European states with their Western contemporaries. In 1967, the “Penmate Circle” in the British youth magazine “Fabulous 208” had 150 Swiss, 100 Austrian, and 900 West German girls looking for British pen friends. Its French counterpart “Salut les Copains” in the column “Les correspondants” brought adolescents from France, West Germany, the Benelux countries, the USA, and even former French colonies like Tunisia or Morocco into contact with each other from 1962. The West German youth magazine “Bravo” offered such an option in the 1970s under the title “Treff.” There, readers looked for German- or English-speaking pen friends from their own country, Switzerland, Austria, Luxemburg, the USA but also from the GDR or Eastern European states like Poland or the former Czechoslovakia. These kinds of popular cultural forums of contact exchange were not just part of youth magazines but existed in radio and television broadcasts for adolescents, such as in the SR youth programs Junge Leute heute and Hallo Twen with its special Hallo Twen Briefclub. ⁸² A manuscript of a broadcast from Junge

 See listener’s letter from Chris H., August 18, 1965.  Listener’s letter from Ingrid G., October 21, 1970, File 01462: Hörerpost ab 25.09.1970, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken.  See “Junge Leute – heute. Winterprogramm 1966/67,” File 2000230: Junge Leute – heute. Presse, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken; Broadcasting manuscript titled “Briefecke,” August 31, 1966, File 2000235: Junge Leute – heute. Hörerpost, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken; Tausendste Sendung

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Leute – heute from 1966 indicates the concrete practices of matching pen friends via radio: on air, the presenters gave the short biographical notes of a selection of listeners, including name, age, residence, hobbies, and their expectations from a pen pal. If other listeners were interested in corresponding with one or several of them, they were encouraged to write to the SR, who would put them in touch. Considering the huge number of incoming letters, there were only single pen pal requests broadcast due to airtime limitations that could only serve as “teasers.” The main work lay behind the scenes. Each month, more than 10,000 letters from listeners of these programs reached the SR. Many of them had an international profile. They came from every corner of Europe: Hungary, Poland, Sweden, Italy, Spain, and Britain, and even from overseas and North Africa.⁸³ A penpal request from a Romanian girl broadcast via the Europawelle Saar in 1970 reveals the ways in which such transnational networks via popular youth media could emerge. The young girl was looking for pen friends abroad and contacted youth program editor Axel Buchholz from the SR, who read out her request on his broadcast Zwischen heute und morgen. The SR archive contains responses from the FRG, Scotland, France, and South Tyrol.⁸⁴ Considering the very European, even international circulation of listeners’ letters, it is no wonder that these radio-based pen pal forums also functioned as non-intentional tool in terms of education policy: many of the adolescents looking for transnational correspondences were anxious to improve their knowledge of a foreign language, mostly English, French or German. The English listener Chris H. from London regularly followed the SR youth programs during the 1960s and stressed that – although she had only been learning German for three years at school – she could understand nearly all of the broadcasts. Since she had planned to study German at university after having taken her Alevels, she was looking for German-speaking pen friends to improve her language skills.⁸⁵ In the heydays of “Beatlemania,” the SR was very pleased about a listener from the “Swinging City” and offered to send its winter program so that she would be reliably informed about when to tune into Junge Leute – heute. Furthermore, she was encouraged to give her opinion about any topic

“Hallo Twen,” SR Informationen, January 6, 1970, File “Hallo Twen,” Hitparaden 1965 –,SR Archiv, Saarbrücken.  Tausendste Sendung “Hallo Twen,” SR Informationen, January 6, 1970.  See listener’s letter from Berchtold G., September 25, 1970, File 01462: Hörerpost ab 25.09. 1970, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken.  Listener’s letter from Chris H., July 12, 1965, File 2000233: Junge Leute – heute. Hörerpost, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken.

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of this youth program in advance, which would be read out on air, because the editors were convinced that the view of a “London girl” interested a lot of young Europawelle Saar listeners.⁸⁶ Furthermore, the interest in learning or improving a foreign language was obviously linked to regional aspects: living in a border region may cause the desire to understand the language of one’s neighbors. It is no wonder that youth from Saarland or from France wanted to correspond in either French or German. 15-year old Angelika from Ottweiler hoped to find a male pen friend from France or Belgium, while 16-year old Harry from Rehlingen was looking for a French girl to correspond with, and Claude-Michel B. from St. Prix wanted to improve his German skills.⁸⁷ But it was not mere interest in learning their neighbor’s language. A random sample of oral interviews with people from Saarland that spent their youth in this region during the 1960s and 1970s showed that they had a huge interest in French popular culture in general. They even crossed the border regularly to buy French youth magazines with posters from stars like Mike Brant or Michel Polnareff, who rarely featured in the West German “Bravo.” A young viewer of the West German pop music television series Beat Club, who lived in St. Ingbert (Saarland) in the 1960s, wrote a letter to director Mike Leckebusch begging for French chanson in his telecast, reminding him that there were also teenagers that were not just interested British Beat music.⁸⁸ Special cases were pen friend requests from the GDR. These letters from adolescents “over there” looking for postal correspondences are again instructive in many ways. These documents shed some light on real practices of producing and consuming popular culture across national and political borders that first and foremost reveal informal, clandestine, and successful ways of doing so. Fearing that their letters would never reach the SR, listeners from the GDR either sent them several times, hoping that at least one copy would manage to get through, or – as already mentioned – they asked relatives or friends from the FRG to forward their letters, or to write to the SR on their behalf.⁸⁹ Interestingly, there were  See letter from Axel Buchholz (editor of Junge Leute – heute) to Chris Harvey, August 26, 1965, File 2000233: Junge Leute – heute. Hörerpost, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken.  See listener’s letter from Claude-Michel B., August 24, 1967, File 2000234: Junge Leute – heute. Hörerpost, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken; see further broadcasting manuscript titled “Briefecke,” August 31, 1966.  Interview with Silvia G. from Lebach-Aschbach, May 14, 2015; interview with Franz-Rudolf M. from Hasborn, June 25, 2015; viewer’s letter from Evelyn P. from St. Ingbert to Mike Leckebuch, March 21,1967, File Sig. B60 – 12916. Beat Club 18. 11. 3.1967, Archiv Radio Bremen, Bremen.  See listener’s letter from Eva L. from Gotha, March 15, 1966, File 2000235: Junge Leute – heute. Hörerpost, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken; for West German relatives and friends that functioned as mediators, see postcard from Margarete K. from Hamburg, February 3, 1969, File 2000235:

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often explicit and astonishingly similar references to these practices: listeners mentioned that they had to write “in a roundabout way” (auf Umwegen) and that letters could “get lost” or “get away” (verloren gehen, wegkommen), which was definitely tongue-in-cheek.⁹⁰ The SR knew about the difficulties their East German listeners had to contact them, and helped by giving out dummy addresses to put on their envelops to deceive the East German Ministry for State Security.⁹¹ The pen pal request from Holm R., an 18-year old grammar school student from Dresden, received by the SR in 1966 discloses important aspects of media usage and popular cultural practices among adolescents in the GDR. According to the first lines of his letter, Holm corresponded with Chris H. from London. This communication should serve to improve his knowledge of English, he noted. He was willing to “expand the correspondence to all over Europe (especially the FRG, England, Austria, Switzerland, France)” that could take place in either German, English or Russian.⁹² Furthermore, Holm reported on his hobbies and pop culture amusement. He liked “good dance music, picture and star postcards,” and enjoyed reading magazines, especially “Bravo” and “Hobby” that, unfortunately, were rarely available in the GDR.⁹³ Luckily, Holm went on, the reception quality of Europawelle Saar was so good that he could record music, and the SR broadcasts were widely known and appreciated among the GDR youth, so they were often discussed during school breaks.⁹⁴ Through these pen pal forums, the Saarländische Rundfunk had the status of a “subsidiary educational institution,” because youth, from the GDR especially, Junge Leute – heute. Hörerpost, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken; listener’s letter from H. Scheerbarth from Frankfurt am Main, September 22, 1966, File 2000235: Junge Leute – heute. Hörerpost, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken.  See listener’s letter from Dieter H. from Wilmshagen, March 21, 1966, File 2000235: Junge Leute – heute. Hörerpost, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken; listener’s letter from Bernd G. from Sangerhausen, July 30, 1977.  The SR advised their listeners from the GDR not to mention the broadcasting station but instead to address their letters either to “66 Saarbrücken Halberg Castle” or just to “66 Saarbrücken POB 1050,” see letter from Dr. Heinz Garber and Dieter Brennecke to Margarete K., March 20, 1969, File 2000235: Junge Leute – heute. Hörerpost, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken; listener’s letter from Werner F. from Daskow, March 13, 1966, File 2000235: Junge Leute – heute. Hörerpost, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken.  Listener’s letter from Holm R., October 7, 1965, File 2000235: Junge Leute – heute. Hörerpost, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken. Interestingly, the letter was dated October 1965 but did not reach the SR before February 1966, which again proves the difficulties for GDR youngsters in contacting Western media. Citation translated from German.  Listener’s letter from Holm R., October 7, 1965.  Listener’s letter from Holm R., October 7, 1965.

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looked for English-speaking correspondence from the USA or Britain to improve their knowledge of English, which could only be poorly learnt in their socialist public schools, as Russian was the first foreign language and therefore obligatory.⁹⁵ Pen pal forums were then hubs within the youth media network, and thereby a kind of “subsidiary public” building, a space for discourse that was not allowed in public debate, for political or systemic reasons.

Conclusion The case studies discussed here confirm that youth mass media functioned as popular cultural agents of Europeanization in many ways: they fostered “Europe” on a grassroots level because of the combination of “pop” and “politics,” either in events such as the motorbike and car rallies and pop quizzes, or nonintentionally by matching pen friends and sharing pop items all across Europe, which attracted a significant number of adolescents from every social strata. The initiatives of the Europawelle Saar demonstrate this two-folded function of youth mass media in a very clear way: this radio channel truly lived up to its name, because its transmitting capacity on medium wave was so high that its broadcasts could be received in many European countries. Furthermore, the SR was the first West German broadcasting station that implemented the Europawelle Saar as a channel, which was sponsored by advertisements and therefore able to afford to play a lot of pop music. SR “youth work” initiatives were embedded in a decisive pop culture as well as European context, and therefore very attractive for adolescents in its broadcasting area. It could be shown that the SR editors were engaged in creating Europe by strengthening Franco-German understanding, the “motor” of European integration. Their activities were embedded in official structures of transnational broadcasting cooperation in the context of the Franco-German broadcasting committee, and were actually top down-instruments in origin, but the popular cultural setting in which they took place – as a rally or quiz – obfuscated their intended political impact. During the 1960s, and in the context of mass motorization (when the car was the most popular object of teenage consumers’ desires), adolescents were keen on driving vehicles and therefore thankfully accepted the option to do so. Becoming a European citizen in this way was surely not their priority but it was the consequence, to a certain extent at least. Unfortu-

 See e. g. Patrick Wagner, Englischunterricht in der DDR im Spiegel der Lehrwerke (Bad Heilbrunn: Verlag Julius Klinkhardt, 2016), 21– 41.

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nately, quizzes and motor rallies were labor and cost-intensive events. The weakness of the FGYO as a main sponsor and the difficulties in French and West German broadcasting station cooperation foiled the realization of such activities in the long run. It becomes clear here that, besides these official events embedded in youth media structures, the more informal and consumption-oriented processes of popular cultural transfers between East and West Europe mediated by the Saarländische Rundfunk played a crucial role. Listener letters from the SR archive give insight into the SR’s general popularity among youth from various European countries, as well as existing practices of producing and consuming popular culture with the aid of youth mass media. Letters from the GDR demonstrate that the Europawelle Saar often allowed East German teenagers to participate in Western popular youth culture. These letters show the indispensable role of the Europawelle Saar, and that its agency is by no means a way of stylizing itself, but truly a lived experience of adolescents from socialist countries. The SR translated its ambition to reach “German brothers” beyond the Iron Curtain into concrete practice: it created a dummy address to enable adolescents from the GDR to contact the broadcasting station without having to fear prosecution, and supplied them with the material entities of Western consumer culture. However, it is important to understand that the broadcasting station and its popular youth media did not just offer products to the GDR teenagers. The goods the SR provided did not just emerge from a totally different economic system, but were carriers of meaning with an inherent ideology. Fan posters, autographs, and music sheets were symbols of freedom, modernity, liberality, and, in the end, democracy. Learning about other countries in entertaining quizzes or motorized competitions, thereby gaining intercultural knowledge and competence, getting to know stars and trends from abroad via broadcasts as well as communicating with likeminded contemporaries throughout Eastern, Western, and Southern European countries per letter – in all these senses, youth mass media served as an agent of Europeanization from the bottom up, creating and sharing a notion of Europe that was not just imagined or desired by the “upper ten thousand,” but truly tangible and connected to the everyday lives of millions of teenagers: a notion of Europe that was low-threshold, participative, progressive, and creative, a Europe that, in the end, was “Pop.”

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Bibliography Archive material File Europawelle Debatte 1. Werbesendungen. Pressedokumentation Nov. 1963/Dez. 1963, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken. File Europawelle Debatte 2. Nov.-Dez. 1963. Presseauswertung, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken. File “Hallo Twen”, Hitparaden 1965 –,SR Archiv, Saarbrücken. File 468: Saarland Funk hier allgemein 1971 bis 1973, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken. File 2000223: Junge Leute – heute. 1966/1967, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken. File 2000231: Junge Leute – heute. Presse, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken. File 2000231: Junge Leute – heute. Öffentliche Veranstaltungen, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken. File 2000233: Junge Leute – heute. Hörerpost, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken. File 2000234: Junge Leute – heute. Hörerpost, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken. File 2000235: Junge Leute – heute. Hörerpost, SR Archive, Saarbrücken. File 2000242: Moped Rallye, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken. File 2000252: Stümpert. Drugstore. Vorbereitung, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken. File 01462: Hörerpost ab 25. 09. 1970, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken. File 01489: Europawelle Hörerpost. Schlagerparade D.-Th. Heck, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken. File 03646: Drugstore 1421. 1973 74, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken. File 04467: Sendeunterlagen Drugstore. 11. 3. 1974 – 12. 1. 1975, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken. File 04469: Hörerpost Drugstore 1978/79, SR Archiv, Saarbrücken.

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Regina Weber

Becoming European through Football? The Case of Sturm Graz

Introduction How can leisure world experiences construct a European identity at the beginning of the twenty-first century? This is the core question of this chapter. The past decades have seen an enormous body of literature dealing with aspects of Europeanization of identities, or what can be called “becoming European.” Most of these works have a specific focus that is either based on a narrow political understanding of Europe (often limited to the European Union) or addresses elite segments of the society.¹ For the elite level, it is known that the intensified collaboration in Europe has shaped the identities and minds of the people affected.² Transnational contact and exposure, too, shape identification, although the cause of direction is not always clear: transnational interaction might contribute to a more Europeanised self-identification, but potentially, those with a more pro-European attitude tend to strive towards more exposure, as the case of student exchange programs illustrates.³ This chapter addresses some of the shortcomings of approaches that understand Europeanization as outlined above. With football fandom, it investigates a

Note: This chapter draws upon work from the EUFoot project (https://eufoot.github.io). I thank Alexander Brand, Florian Koch, and Arne Niemann who all contributed significantly to the conceptual and empirical work that informs this chapter.  Matthias L. Maier and Thomas Risse, eds., Europeanization, Collective Identities and Public Discourses: Final Report (Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, 2003); Thomas Risse, A Community of Europeans? Transnational Identities and Public Spheres (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010); Jeffrey T. Checkel and Peter J. Katzenstein, eds., European Identity (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Theresa Kuhn, Experiencing European Integration: Transnational Lives and European Identity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).  Michael Bruter, “Winning Hearts and Minds for Europe: The Impact of News and Symbols on Civic and Cultural European Identity,” Comparative Political Studies 36, no. 10 (2003): 1148 – 1179.  Theresa Kuhn, “Why Educational Exchange Programmes Miss their Mark: Cross-border Mobility, Education and European Identity,” Journal of Common Market Studies 50, no. 6 (2012): 994– 1010. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110685473-010

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leisure world example that is not in the strict sense political and draws on masses who invest emotion, time, and money in following the sport and their team. The arena of football is heavily Europeanised, as the governance structures have been dramatically shaped through and by transnational and European influence. This leaves fans exposed to a Europeanised game and confronts them regularly with players, officials, rivals, and competitions beyond national borders. The specific research question of this essay is thus: given the Europeanization of football governance and structures, how have fan identities been Europeanised, how are they “becoming European”? Aiming to disentangle the blurry term “identity,” a more precise and empirically applicable conceptual framework is established that seeks to capture identity as a triad of identifications, self-understandings, and groupness.⁴ This framework includes two dimensions, communities of belonging and frames of references to capture both in-group and out-group mechanisms (communities of belonging) and reference levels between the local, national, and European (frames of references) that are inherent for football. It is applied to empirical data from online discourses among and interviews with fans of Sportklub (SK) Sturm Graz, a club playing in the first Austrian league with several appearances in the qualification stage of European competitions during the past decade. It has a low share of foreign players and is located outside the top leagues of European football, thus providing a hard case⁵ in terms of case study research: If we can trace Europeanization of identification among the fans of this club, it is likely that such traces are prevalent in more Europeanised club environments. The chapter starts with an outline of the main trends in the Europeanization of football structures and its (potential) implications on fandom experiences. Following this, the two data sources, online message boards and interviews, are described in more detail. The empirical part follows the analytical scheme of two main dimensions of Europeanised identities: communities of belonging and frames of references. It should not be expected that the national level is deemed irrelevant by the fans, but Europe is probably an important reference point as the gold standard in football. In a perspective of “becoming” European through football, regional, national, and European self-understandings and reference points are potentially intertwined.

 Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, “Beyond ’Identity’,” Theory and Society 29, no. 1 (2000): 1– 47.  Jason Seawright and John Gerring, “Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research,” Political Research Quarterly 61, no. 2 (2008): 294– 308.

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Objective and Subjective Europeanization in Football The backdrop of “becoming European” through football is the ongoing Europeanization of football structures and governance. In political science, “Europeanization” usually refers to domestic changes resulting from change on the European level of governance.⁶ While such a concept is useful to analyze the European Union-nation state-nexus, the analysis of Europeanization in football requires an understanding that emphasizes dynamics on the domestic level as well as cross-national activities of domestic actors.⁷ Two different strands of Europeanization have been identified⁸: first, European level pressures (i. e. action taken by the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) or the EU-Commission) and attempts to initiate or influence such measures from the domestic level. They must be distinguished from a second strand of Europeanization dynamics, which is fed by transnational processes, i. e. the formation of the transnational lobby network European Club Association (ECA) or the creation of a pan-European football league system and various attempts to influence this system through transnational club cooperation.⁹ Europeanization of football can be understood as the dynamics that influence how national football cultures are Europeanised in decisive aspects of the match.

Background of Europeanization in Football Europeanization in football has a long history reaching back to its very formation in Europe at the turn to the twentieth century. Its associations, such as the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) in 1904 and the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) in 1954, have been created

 Vivien A. Schmidt, “Europeanization and the Mechanics of Economic Policy Adjustment,” Journal of European Public Policy 9, no. 6 (2002): 894– 912.  Arne Niemann and Alexander Brand, “Die Europäisierung des Fußballs: Von der Umsetzung politischer Vorgaben zur Gestaltung europäischer Realitäten,” in Europäische Sportpolitik: Zugänge – Akteure – Problemfelder, ed. Jürgen Mittag (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2018), 167– 180.  Alexander Brand, Arne Niemann, and Georg Spitaler, “The Two-track Europeanization of Football: EU-Level Pressures, Transnational Dynamics and their Repercussions within Different National Contexts,” International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics 5, no. 1 (2013): 95 – 112.  Brand, Niemann and Spitaler, “The two-track Europeanization of football”; Niemann and Brand, “Die Europäisierung des Fußballs.”

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out of cooperation between national associations.¹⁰ Matches between clubs across countries have a tradition reaching back to occasional tours of English clubs to their central European counterparts in 1901, followed by Europeanwide club competitions such as the Mitropa-Cup from 1927 and the Inter-Cities Fairs Cup from 1955 – 1971.¹¹ The sport mirrored societal developments in politics and economics, both as a cause for cooperation (as in the case of the early transnational matches and the establishment of the associations) and conflict (as in many proclaimed “football wars” and rivalries).¹² Additionally, the game was able to go beyond political and economic borders, for instance during the Cold War, when sports events, especially football matches and organized competitions, contributed to an understanding and building bridges between East and West.¹³ Waalkes concluded that the game “follows globalization trends more than it causes them in the areas of politics and economics.” At the same time, he argues that “in the cultural realm, the global game forms a language that facilitates communication between fans of the game.”¹⁴ Europeanization in football thus has two sides: its structures follow more general Europeanization trends which strongly accelerated during the past few decades. From the perspective of the fans, these changes of the game influence their cultural experience of the game towards a way of experiencing Europe.

Contemporary Europeanization of Football Structures and Governance Four mechanisms constitute the contemporary Europeanization in football: the regulation of player markets following the “Bosman rulings” by the ECJ in 1995, the Europeanization of match broadcasting rights, a cross-national coordination of clubs on the European level, and the development of European club

 Philippe Vonnard, Grégory Quinn, and Nicolas Bancel, Building Europe with the Ball (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2016).  Vonnard, Quinn, and Bancel, Building Europe with the Ball; Florian Greiner, Wege nach Europa: Deutungen eines imaginierten Kontinents in deutschen, britischen und amerikanischen Printmedien, 1914 – 1945 (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2014), 423 f.  Scott Waalkes, “Does Soccer Explain the World or Does the World Explain Soccer? Soccer and Globalization,” Soccer & Society 18, no. 2– 3 (2017): 166 – 180.  Philippe Vonnard, Nicola Sbetti, and Grégory Quinn, eds., Beyond Boycotts: Sport during the Cold War in Europe (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2018).  Waalkes, “Does Soccer Explain the World or Does the World Explain Soccer? Soccer and Globalization.”

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leagues.¹⁵ These dynamics have shaped the game across the continent since the mid-1990s.

Europeanization of Player Markets The Bosman case is the best-known case of European Union interference in football, significantly changing the rules of player transfers. The term summarizes rulings of the ECJ in 1995, abrogating the traditional system of transfer fees to be paid for out-of-contract players as it infringed upon the right to move freely under Article 48 of the Treaty of Rome and a second ruling that abolished the limit of the number of foreign players in a club’s squad.¹⁶ Both practices were ruled illegal as discriminating against EU-nationals and breaching common market rules. As a result, national football associations reformed their domestic systems of transfer rules and player restrictions to be compatible with European law. These dynamics lead to the re-establishment of heterogeneous national regulations, ranging from very liberal ones (e. g. in Germany) to those just acceptable within the legal frame (e. g. Austria).¹⁷ The ruling was essential as it clarified that sport governing bodies have to follow EU free movement rights but restrictions can be justified to keep up higher aims such as competitive balance in sports.¹⁸ The implications for the player markets in Europe were enormous.¹⁹ Despite national differences, the share of non-national players across the European leagues increased significantly. Most foreign players in all European leagues are nowadays from other European countries.

 Alexander Brand and Arne Niemann, “Football and National Identity in Europe,” Panorama: Insights into Asian and European Affairs 1 (2014): 43 – 51.  Borja García, “He Was Not Alone: Bosman in Context,” in The Legacy of Bosman, ed. Antoine Duval and Ben van Rompuy (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2016).  Arne Niemann, Alexander Brand, and Georg Spitaler, “The Europeanization of Football: Germany and Austria Compared,” in The Making and Mediatization of Modern Sport in Europe: States, Media and Markets 1950 – 2010, ed. C. Young, D. Holt, and Alan Tomlinson (London: Routledge, 2011), 187– 204.  Antoine Duval and Ben van Rompuy, eds., The Legacy of Bosman (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2016), 2.  The role of the rulings as a cause for deregulation of player markets has been challenged (see e. g. García, “He Was Not Alone: Bosman in Context”), but no matter whether it was the main cause or just one important aspect within an ongoing de-regulation, the legal implications were clearly accelerating national reforms of the transfer rules.

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Broadcasting In the early 2000s, the broadcasting rights of football matches created tensions between the football associations and the European Union. The German FA (alongside the English FA) got involved in serious arguments with the Commission concerning the marketing of broadcasting rights. While the European Commission was considering the central marketing of broadcasting rights for the main football events (i. e. Bundesliga, but also Champions League matches) as a potential restriction of competition and as such against EU law, the clubs argued for central marketing as preserving the culture of equal competition within a league. Despite heterogeneous interests among the clubs – a few top clubs, especially Bayern München, Borussia Dortmund, and Bayer Leverkusen preferred decentralized marketing to maximize their own benefit – they managed to coordinate their interests.²⁰ Through a mere strategy of lobbying on the European level the final agreement saw some compromise with the EU-Commission that partly exempted football broadcasting from direct competition. This example shows that EU-level pressure spurs partial adjustment in football governance, while core policies remain intact despite their potential friction with EU legislation.²¹

European-level Club Coordination and Networks The past two decades have seen increased transnational coordination among clubs, usually those that consider themselves to be the national top clubs. Associations like FIFA and UEFA are umbrella organizations of national football associations. They usually outbalance diverging interests of all their members with their own organizational interests. This resulted in the formation of “top clubs” from several European countries into what became known as the G14. Their main aim was to influence the UEFA and the FIFA by using pressure and their individual power position as “best-selling” clubs in European football. The compensation for players playing for the national teams led to conflicts, but above all stood the aim to reform the European club competition system, mainly the

 Alexander Brand and Arne Niemann, “Europeanisation in the Societal/Trans-National Realm: What European Integration Studies Can Get Out of Analysing Football,” Journal of Contemporary European Research 3, no. 3 (2007): 182– 201.  Arne Niemann and Alexander Brand, “The Impact of European Integration on Domestic Sport: The Case of German Football,” Sport in Society 11, no. 1 (2008): 90 – 106, see 100 – 101.

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Champions League, to the benefit of the top clubs.²² G14 eventually dissolved in 2008, but the transnational club coordination aside from national associations remains intact – in the bigger and more encompassing European Club Association (ECA), which despite its c. 200 member clubs merely represents the top clubs and their particular interests.²³

European Club Competitions The evolvement of the year-old competitions between European football clubs into a de facto league system of the Champions League (CL) and the Europa League (EL) is probably the most visible and approachable sign of Europeanization in football. The competition replaced the European Champion Clubs’ Cup in 1992, now allowing multiple clubs from national leagues to participate. Europe’s strongest national leagues can provide up to five teams for the competition. A positive perspective on this development emphasizes its unifying function: a transnational media event with a Europeanised spectatorship could create transnational narratives and a sense of belonging. Games like the quarter-finals, semifinals, and finals attract spectators way beyond the home countries of the respective participating teams.²⁴ An opposing perspective highlights the detrimental effects of the CL on competitive balance in the national leagues.²⁵ It connects the CL with a growing split between a small group of powerful elite clubs, mostly from a few (West‐)European leagues, and a increasing number of smaller leagues, where the national competitions get destroyed through the influence of the European super league.²⁶ Both perspectives suggest relevant implications

 Matthew Holt, “The Ownership and Control of Elite Club Competition in European Football,” Soccer & Society 8, no. 1 (2007): 50 – 67; Jürgen Mittag, “Europäische Sportpolitik zwischen Wachstum und Differenzierung: Entwicklungslinien, Analyseperspektiven und Erklärungsansätze,” in Mittag, Europäische Sportpolitik, 13 – 49.  Berndt K. Keller, “Sectoral Social Dialogue in Professional Football: Social Partners, Outcomes and Problems of Implementation,” etui (European Trade Union Institute) Working Paper 04 (2018), accessed October 16, 2020, https://www.etui.org/publications/working-papers/sec toral-social-dialogue-in-professional-football-social-partners-outcomes-and-problems-of-im plementation.  Arne Niemann and Alexander Brand, “The UEFA Champions League: A Political Myth?,” Soccer & Society 21, no. 3 (2020): 329 – 43.  Thomas Peeters, “Broadcasting Rights and Competitive Balance in European Soccer,” University of Antwerp, Department of Economics Research Paper 9 (2009), accessed October 16, 2020, https://ideas.repec.org/p/ant/wpaper/2009009.html.  Niemann and Brand, “The UEFA Champions League: A Political Myth?”.

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of the Europeanization of the competitions for supporters and their experience of the game. The quick review of four important contemporary dynamics of Europeanization in football shows that essential structures in the governance of football have been influenced by European integration. This is both caused by actors on the domestic level, the clubs and club associations, and the European level, the ECJ and the EU-Commission, as well as by transnational realms of actors, especially the football clubs organizing themselves across borders to overthrow “official” lobbying ways through the national associations.

Subliminal Identification with Europe in Football The potential impact of Europeanization dynamics on fan experiences can be summarized as follows: the aftermath of the Bosman rulings accelerated the Europeanization of player markets. A European, sometimes even an international, squad is the norm in most clubs and there are many indicators to believe that this does not infringe on the ability of fans to identify with “their” team.²⁷ The development of the European club competitions to a de facto European league system influences the match experience of football supporters: they are frequently exposed to competitions between foreign clubs and clubs in their domestic league (either their own club or their club’s main rivals). This suggests that the elaborated Europeanization influences not only the structure of domestic football structures, but also fandom. Early on researchers identified a growing “European consciousness” of football fans in England. King explored the idea of a growing “European consciousness” amongst a group of Manchester United fans.²⁸ He argued that these fans begin to see themselves as more European, as the increased opportunity to travel across Europe brought about by the greater number of CL games made supporters progressively see themselves as “European.” Also, the increased coverage of European leagues on British television made supporters more aware of other national leagues, and therefore also cities and countries. Millward found that Liverpool F.C. fans were identifying with Europe as a competitive football space, while

 David Ranc, Foreign Players and Football Supporters: The Old Firm, Arsenal, Paris Saint-Germain (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2012).  Anthony King, “Football Fandom and Post-national Identity in the New Europe,” British Journal of Sociology 51, no. 3 (2000): 419 – 42; Anthony King, The European Ritual: Football in the New Europe (London: Routledge, 2003); Anthony King, “The New Symbols of European Football,” International Review for the Sociology of Sport 39, no. 3 (2004): 323 – 36.

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Oldham Athletic F.C. supporters – a team in the English lower divisions – did not express such self-understandings.²⁹ His works indicate that especially unofficial, “societal” mechanisms, such as i. e. travel or online message board discussions, can foster identification with Europe. Levermore and Millward conclude that football and the organization of pan-European club competitions is a master example of a pan-European identification area.³⁰ Football officials have also been studied. Brand and Niemann established evidence for a changed mindset of football officials due to the ongoing Europeanization of governance structures.³¹ They suggest that frequent interaction of club officials may have altered their perspectives, e. g. in terms of increasingly looking at European competitors instead of national ones, and by forming alliances across borders. Officials have understood to organize and lobby beyond national borders, both through their national football associations and the UEFA but also using cross-national networks with other clubs.³² Mittag has investigated the development of cross-national club coordination between self-proclaimed top clubs. He traced how these clubs have formed a sustainable transnational organization during the past two decades, acknowledging that common interests of similar clubs (i. e. in financial or competition aspects) across national borders begin to outweigh national interests among clubs from the same country.³³ The examples suggest an effect of trans-border activities on perceptions and articulations of football fans. The focus on football fans allows the evading of some problems inherent in the existing research. First, the focus on football fandom allows one to study “everyday life” activities – unlike rather elite focused topics such as job mobility among the more educated strata of society. Second, the focus on subliminal articulations avoids studying conscious identity concep-

 Peter Millward, “’We’ve All Got the Bug for Euro-Aways’: What Fans Say about European Football Club Competition,” International Review for the Sociology of Sport 41, no. 3 – 4 (2006): 375 – 93; Peter Millward, Getting into Europe: Identification, Prejudice and Politics in English Football Culture (Saarbrücken: VDM, 2009).  Roger Levermore and Peter Millward, “Official Policies and Informal Transversal Networks: Creating ‘Pan-European Identifications’ through Sport?,” The Sociological Review 55, no. 1 (2007): 144– 64, see 149 ff.  Brand and Niemann, “Europeanization in the Societal/Trans-National Realm”; Niemann and Brand, “Die Europäisierung des Fußballs.”  Niemann and Brand, “Die Europäisierung des Fußballs.”  Mittag, “Europäische Sportpolitik zwischen Wachstum und Differenzierung: Entwicklungslinien, Analyseperspektiven und Erklärungsansätze.”

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tions only.³⁴ In line with the approach of Brubaker and Cooper, who replaced the term “identity” with three specific concepts, “identification,” “self-understanding,” and “communality, connectedness and groupness,” the empirical work focuses on elements in discourses which are less conscious and subliminal.³⁵

Case, Data and Analytical Scheme The existing work on how football fans imagine Europe indicates that the Europeanization of the sport structures has left a mark on its fans. At the same time, most of the ground-breaking work focuses on English football fans. While English clubs have an extraordinary rich history of participation in European competitions, it seems reasonable to shift the focus to fans that cannot take European matches as a matter of course. How are their self-understandings related to Europe? This essay focuses on fans of the Styrian football club SK Sturm Graz 1909. The following section elaborates the case and the reason for this choice as well as the data of the empirical analysis.

A Summary of the Case The Austrian Bundesliga is not very Europeanised, both regarding the player market and the participation of its clubs in European competitions. Its share of non-Austrian players is relatively low compared to many other European first leagues. The average share of foreign players in the past five seasons was 27 %. This puts the league in the lower quarter among UEFA members’ first leagues. The league ranks number 12 in the UEFA country ranking. The rank is based on the results of all associations’ clubs in the five previous Champions League and Europa League seasons. The rankings determine the number of places allocated to the respective league in forthcoming club competitions. Rank 12 allows for two clubs to start in the CL qualification round and for three clubs to start in the EL qualification.³⁶

 Steffen Mau, Social Transnationalism: Lifeworlds beyond the Nation-State (London: Routledge, 2010), 115 – 123.  Brubaker and Cooper, “Beyond ʻIdentity.’”  Own calculations based on data from transfermarkt.at. Data based on the seasons 2013/14– 2017/18, as of July 18, 2018. Information about the UEFA country ranking from https://www.uefa. com/memberassociations/uefarankings/country/#/yr/2020, accessed January 30, 2020.

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The Europeanization mechanisms, as discussed above, especially the topdown pressure resulting from the ECJ rulings regarding the organisation of the player market, have been accepted by the Austrian association rather unwillingly. The league and the football association adopted a special fund that allocates financial means to the clubs based on the minutes that Austrian players play in the national competitions. The regulation requires a limit of non-Austrian players to be eligible to the fund.³⁷ This mechanism was introduced as a reaction to the Bosman ruling and the increase of foreign players in the top leagues of the country. It has been identified as legally “somewhat dubious” as it “introduces at least an incentive to discriminate between Austrians and EU-nationals.”³⁸ Consequently, the share of foreign players dropped since the introduction of the mechanism in 2004 from 41 % to the aforementioned 27 % in 2017/18.³⁹ SK Sturm Graz is a football club located in Graz, Styria. The club has played in the first Austrian league since 1965 and has regularly participated in European competitions (at least at the level of qualification matches) throughout the past.⁴⁰ It can be considered a representative club for the Austrian Bundesliga in its share of foreign players. On average throughout the past five years, the squad had a share of 26 % non-Austrian players, 55 % of them from European countries (EU-28 and EEA countries). In the context of the other Austrian clubs, where the minutes played by Austrian nationals are a relevant measurement for receiving financial benefits, the club reached very different stages, ranking between fourth place with a share of 83 % Austrian players during the first half of the 2016/17 season and second last with 60 % by the mid-point of the 2019/20 season.⁴¹  Oefbl.at, “Zuschauer, Österreicher-Topf & Spielfeldreporting – Organisatorischer Rückblick auf die Herbstsaison 2019,” accessed January 30, 2020, https://www.oefbl.at/oefbl/re daktionsbaum/news/zuschauer-oesterreicher-topf-spielfeldreporting-organisatorischer-rueck blick-auf-die-herbstsaison-2019/.  Alexander Brand, Arne Niemann, and Georg Spitaler, “The Europeanization of Austrian Football,” in Transformation of European Football: Towards the Europeanization of the National Game, ed. Arne Niemann, Borja García, and Wyn Grant (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2011), 171– 186, see 177.  Brand, Niemann, and Spitaler, “The Two-Track Europeanization of Football”; Barbara Liegl and Georg Spitaler, “Between Trans-Nationality and Identity Politics: Austrian Migration Regimes and Professional Football (1945 – 2008),” SWS-Rundschau 49, no. 2 (2009): 234– 55.  Martin Behr, Wir sind Sturm! 100 Jahre Grazer Fußballgeschichte (Graz: SK Puntigamer Graz, 2008).  Oefbl.at, “Zuschauer, Österreicher-Topf & Spielfeldreporting – Organisatorischer Rückblick auf die Herbstsaison 2019”; Bundesliga.at, “Halbzeitbilanz der Tipico Bundesliga,” accessed October 17, 2018, https://www.bundesliga.at/de/redaktion/news/17-18/tbl/halbzeitbilanz-der-tipi co-bundesliga/.

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The case selection thus allows us to analyze fans of a club that has a history of participation in European competitions though playing in a league where national belonging – at least on the level of the team roster – is institutionally reinforced and financially rewarded. At the same time, the league is not among the big European football leagues and operates rather at the margins of European football. This provides potential access to fans who are potentially influenced by contradicting mechanisms that foster both European self-understandings and national or domestic emphasis. The empirical material will show how both aspects influence the articulations of the fans.

Database The data used in this chapter is based on two sources: it draws on discussions in the Sturm Graz subforum on the online message board www.austriansoccerboard.at during the seasons 2017/18 and 2018/19 and on interviews with Sturm Graz supporters conducted in January 2020. Both text corpora have been analyzed using qualitative content analysis and a deductive coding scheme that is based in the two dimensions “communities of belonging” and “frames of references” (see below).⁴² As for the online message board, threads were sampled according to the following. A full text search using meaningful terms such as “Europa,” “Champions League,” “Europa League,” “UEFA,” and their different abbreviations has been applied to identify topics of interest. These topics cover three strands of discussion: 1. Discussions about rivals and competition: the threads have been selected into the corpus based on a random sample of matches across the two seasons. Additionally, a thread discussion about the club in Europe has been analyzed. 2. Transfer discussions: two threads explicitly relating each to one transfer window during the two seasons 2016/17 and 2017/18 have been analyzed. 3. Travel and ticketing discussion: travel and ticketing both for home and away games, in the national league and European competitions is the third type. Here, fans discuss ticket offers and searches as well as information about the organization of travel.

 Margrit Schreier, Qualitative Content Analysis in Practice (Los Angeles, CA: SAGE, 2012).

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In total, 6,768 posts in ten threads in the online message board have been included in the analysis.⁴³ The database further consists of ten interviews, each of about one hour. The participants were recruited through social media, during test matches and using snowball sampling techniques. The final interview partners were selected to cover a maximal range of age, fandom intensity (frequency of visiting matches and involvement in fan activities), and their general attitude towards player transfer and competitions.⁴⁴ All interviews were conducted using a semi-structured questionnaire around the issues of rivalries, national and European competition as well as player transfers. The semi-structured approach allowed the focus on these pre-selected issues while there was enough room for individual narrations and specific topics that arose during the interview. The data was transcribed and analysed using qualitative content analysis.⁴⁵

Analytical Scheme To catch the subliminal and subtle articulations and self-understandings that football fans express with regards to Europe, the empirical material will be analyzed by using a coding scheme consisting of two analytical dimensions: “communities of belonging” (COB) and “frames of reference” (FOR). “Communities of belonging” include in-group/out-group phenomena, perceptions of “foreignness” and delineations vis-à-vis other groups. In contrast, “frames of reference” refer to the attractiveness assigned to different forms of competition (national vs. European level), the reasons for such peer orientation (being top or being a national representative), and the normalisation of “going to Europe,” i. e. travelling for football matches and experiencing Europe this way (see Table 1).

 See Appendix, Table 1.  For an overview of the relevant characteristics see Appendix, Table 2.  Jochen Gläser and Grit Laudel, Experteninterviews und qualitative Inhaltsanalyse als Instrumente rekonstruierender Untersuchungen (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2009).

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Table 1: Analytical framework with the two dimensions, communities of belonging and frames of reference. Dimension

Category

Aspects

communities of Inclusion and exclusion belonging (COB) Relations among fans

In-group and out-group phenomena, targeting fans, players, and other actors Coalitions and networking with fans across clubs and borders Encoding of events in narra- Narrations related to event creating community tives and discord

frames of reference (FOR)

National competitions European competitions Context of competitions

Relevance and perception of national competitions Relevance and role of European competitions (representation vs. competition) Rivalries, travel, as well as watching and attending matches

Communities of belonging addresses dynamics of inclusion and exclusion, understandings of in-group and out-group as well as the process of identification and accompanying narratives. As a category, “communities of belonging” is used to summarize the different ways in which football fans perceive and articulate their “sameness.”⁴⁶ This concept addresses what makes the distinction between “us” and “them,” how groups are constructed and what constitutes “the other.” The aim of the analysis is to understand whether fans articulate their belonging primarily in national contexts and references or whether and how they refer to Europe as an idea or a community. The second aspect of the concept, communities of belonging, is the relationship between fans across teams and across countries. The aim is to understand the interactions, references, and allusions between fans (either of the same club or of different clubs) to grasp their sense of belonging. The third aspect of communities of belonging is the collective remembrance of events. How do certain events trigger or foster a narrative and how are such narratives shaped by European or national aspects? The work seeks to identify events that are the source for such narratives and the aspects of communities and belonging. Frames of reference include articulations of attention resulting from actions (following football events, travel activities, tourism in the context of away games, network building). This dimension incorporates national competitions, European competitions, and the relation between these two. The first aspect of frames of

 Brubaker and Cooper, “Beyond ’Identity’,” 7.

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reference is the appreciation of national club competitions. The aim is to capture how the supporters perceive national competitions. This includes the activities that are related to experiences of match days and the investment that is connected to such activities. The second aspect of frame of references are European club competitions. The aim is to understand whether the supporters perceive the European club competitions as normal or extraordinary, both with regards to the own club and in general. It should also be analyzed how and why participation in a European club competition is considered important. The third aspect focuses on the attractiveness of the different competitions. These questions are analyzed with a focus on the relation between the two levels of competition, national and European.

Regionalized Europeanization among Sturm Graz Supporters The analysis reveals two aspects of “becoming European” among Sturm Graz fans. First, they see a limited capacity of their club to perform on the European level. This is embedded in the self-understanding of being an underdog among European football leagues. Europe, in relation to their club, is prevalent in remembrances of “good old times,” mainly the exceptional success of the club in the CL in 2000/01. Second, Europe comes into play with a focus on the regional context. The special relation of both the city of Graz and the club with former Yugoslavia and the Balkan countries is emphasized by the fans.⁴⁷ Thus, on the level of self-understanding, a regionalised Europeanization is visible among the fans. These two aspects connect to the analytical dimensions of communities of belonging and frames of references in different aspects.

Communities of Belonging: Local Embedding within Europe The message board talks of the fans indicate that they perceive their club as a top club in an underdog league. A widespread attitude is that the club is among the

 This reflects a wider societal trend and may not be seen as a pattern limited to football only. The fans mirror the longstanding historical connections of Styria, in particular the city of Graz, and subsequently the club with the Balkan area, reaching back to the beginning of the twentieth century. (Cf. Anita Ziegerhofer and Roland Radlinger, Vom Rand ins Zentrum Europas: Die Geschichte der Steiermark ab 1918: analog und digital erzählt (Graz: Leykam, 2020)). This shows how football is socially embedded in its locality, but it also reproduces its surrounding social world.

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top clubs within the Austrian Bundesliga, but that it cannot compete with European top elite clubs. Before the first match in the European competition, this perspective is expressed as characteristics of an underdog self-understanding. It sets the boundary between themselves as a passionate (though not necessarily successful) club and the successful clubs as influenced by international money: “Stirring up Europe as an underdog, the name says it all, Sturm Graz against the power of the bloody capitalist clubs, the international corporations and oil sheikhs, with passion and a fighting spirit.”⁴⁸ But while this pre-match attitude indicates that fans assume being able to compete on the European level, even if they are not a favorite, the self-image in more generic discussions about transfer markets conveys that they feel rather like an outsider on the European football level, where the rules are made to fit the top clubs: “Unfortunately, we as small nations can’t really make the rules of the game – an unsuccessful politician once said: He who has gold makes the rules – I don’t think that was meant for us.”⁴⁹ While these expressions highlight an attitude towards European football that locates Austrian football on the outside, their community of belonging is by no means national. The fans’ in-group and out-group formation has a regional focus stretching beyond national borders. The local (or regional) connection to players with origins in Graz and Styria is heavily emphasized. During a discussion about legal restrictions that apply when contracting under-18 players, the local integration of young players is emphasized. The self-understanding that other European leagues might be more interesting for good players is seen as reason to emphasize regional belonging in educating young players: “I think, ESPECIALLY for players from our own academy, who live here with their parents, attend school, i. e. have their life here, it should be possible, for a club that provides football training, to enter into a long-term (i. e. 5-year) contract with the player.”⁵⁰ This writer connects a self-understanding as being in a minor league with a demand for regional connection. Similar expressions of a locally embedded selfunderstanding are prevalent in the interviews. The local connectedness is relevant as it might guarantee stability in the squad and make players stay longer due to their regional connection: “A regional footballer, a Styrian […] who comes from the national league and who is able to establish himself and

 Quote from the discussion thread: Sturm in Europa. See appendix for links to all threads. All quotes translated from German by the author.  Thread Wintertransfer 17– 18.  Thread Wintertransfer 17– 18.

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plays once and then really is awarded a place in the team, he won’t go away so quickly.”⁵¹ This demand for a regional connection should not be misunderstood in a tribal sense. Another fan emphasizes that he is not interested in the nationality or a possible migration background of the players, but the local connection to the club is relevant for him: “Where they actually come from in the sense of migration background, I don’t care at all, just to state it clearly, but it would be important that they were trained in the club. Whether they have an Austrian passport or not, is not even second, but last, of interest for me.”⁵² Another fan re-emphasizes this non-tribal regional connection, extending it to the Balkan region: Sturm is a showpiece that has a very, very long history with players from the Balkans, a very successful history with players from the Balkans, and coaches from the Balkans, so it’s certainly not impossible that there are some of us and our fans who care a lot about that. Personally, I always like to see Styrian talents in the squad, of course, but whether or not they are from Austria is not important for me.⁵³

This special connection to the close-by Balkan countries is not limited to football, as another fan extended it to the whole city as she elaborates the specific role of Ivica Osim as trainer for the team. I find this background very, very exciting […] to come from a Balkan country, to come from ex-Yugoslavia, to come from Bosnia and then to be a coach of a team like Sturm for so long and so successfully, especially in a city like Graz, where a lot of people live who fled from the Balkan wars, it has a very special touch for me and a very integrative touch actually.⁵⁴

Even though not all fans are so decisively denying the significance of nationality, there were only a few references that addressed the need for Austrian players. These comments highlight a predominantly instrumental motivation for national belonging. As the specific regulations in the Austrian Bundesliga award money to clubs based on the share of Austrian players, this regulation influences what fans consider relevant for the squad. When explicitly asked whether it matters that a player is Austrian or not, a fan emphasized the related financial interests of the club:

   

Interview Interview Interview Interview

Sturm Sturm Sturm Sturm

Graz Graz Graz Graz

fan fan fan fan

(2). (3). (5). (6).

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No, that doesn’t make any difference to me [whether someone is Austrian, R.W.], it’s just that because of the legionnaire regulation for TV revenues, the places for non-Austrians are more or less limited for a club like Sturm, that’s why there’s something like this, that you always have to think about who you can get with a non-Austrian passport.⁵⁵

Another fan argues pragmatically, even beyond financial considerations. For him, it is imperative to employ the best players no matter where they come from, despite financial losses. In his opinion, it is more important to compete successfully both on the national and European level: “So if there are three or four players from abroad in the starting line-up, but they are the best players, I’d like to see them. I wouldn’t say no to that, I’d give up a little bit of the money [from the TV revenues for Austrian players, R.W.], with good league positions and European successes we’ll get it back.”⁵⁶ The communities of belonging of the Sturm Graz fans are thus located between the regional and the cross-national in Europe. They focus on their region, but do not limit their self-understanding to national borders except for practical reasons.

Frames of References: Underdog Football in a Regionalized Europe Regarding the frames of references, the Austrian Bundesliga is the main reference frame, but coming with a negative attitude about the league not being very valuable. Limited financial and infrastructural opportunities are frequently mentioned, with many references to clubs that are perceived as top clubs with prestigious names, better infrastructure, and more money.⁵⁷ The interviews reiterate such a perspective. Fans argue that this division in football makes European football less relevant for them in terms of a competition worth taking part in: Champions League, Europa League […], it’s not really interesting for me now. Simply because in the Champions League you can see it now, all the clubs in the round of sixteen come from the top five nations, in the European club rankings. There’s no variation anymore, simply because the top clubs are already drifting so far away from the rest. A club from the Ukraine, Turkey or Austria can never keep up with clubs from Germany, England, Italy or something like that, so it’s just not attractive for me anymore.⁵⁸

   

Interview Sturm Graz fan (1). Interview Sturm Graz fan (4). See various posts in the thread “Sturm in Europa 2018/19.” Interview Sturm Graz fan (4).

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Another fan elaborates why he is not interested in participation in the European competitions, as this would always remain occasional and mean lost matches. This negative attitude towards the top European league comes along with the fear that the club would lose its character when being too successful on the European level: “To go back to the successes we had back then, to win the group or to be promoted, I think that is completely unrealistic and I don’t know if I would want that for my club today, this kind of success, because it always also implies a kind of distance to the values of your own club – and you can see this with all the clubs that play up there a lot.”⁵⁹ As a result, fans see the main potential for success on the national level. They value a national win (league champion or cup win) more than playing on the European level. But not all fans share a negative attitude towards European competitions. While the CL is generally seen as out of reach and a closed doors event for a few clubs, the EL is seen as a potential alternative. This shows that the negative attitude towards the CL and what fans associate with “European football” does not scale their football interest down to the national level. The self-understanding as a European underdog is reflected in positive references towards the minor European leagues, as the same interview partner argues: From a fan’s point of view, I think the Europa League is the more exciting competition and I’m actually looking forward to this Europa League 2, this third competition, because I believe that this is a great opportunity for many traditional clubs that are no longer at the top of the league for various reasons to present themselves internationally […] I believe that the potential in these other European Cups is immensely greater than in the Champions League.⁶⁰

Other fans are more positive about the CL. Playing here is seen as an exceptional opportunity for travel. The discussion about a qualification match against Ajax Amsterdam underlines this perspective.⁶¹ In that sense, the match is predominantly seen as an extraordinary event, while some see it also as a chance to represent Austria and increase its five-year UEFA coefficient.⁶² One fan emphasized such self-understanding of playing in a minor league and refers to the interest in European competitions. Despite being unrealistic, the top of European competitions is still referred to as the preferred occasion for fan travel:    

Interview Sturm Graz fan (5). Interview Sturm Graz fan (5). Thread 2. Qualirunde Champions-League: Ajax Amsterdam – SK Sturm Graz. Thread Sturm in Europa 2018/19.

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It would be nice if we’d play in a European competition, don’t talk about a title anyway, but it would be nice to play in Europe, just because of the travels, so I would like that again, to travel somewhere with Sturm […] so if I had the choice between titles in Austria or European competitions, I’d prefer European competitions. Of course, if we win a title, we’re automatically set in the group stage in Europe, but in principle I’d prefer the second.⁶³

This indicates that football matches are understood as an opportunity to travel around Europe. This is both normalized, as it states that the fan would take up the travel, but also shows how exceptional the European competitions are compared to the average national league matches. The cross-border regionalisation is visible also within the frames of references and related to travel. Fans describe how their football travel focuses on the neighbouring countries, often as a result of short travel distances and easy access to matches. While several fans express support for clubs in the Italian Serie A, the interest in smaller leagues in neighboring countries is more remarkable. As the following quote shows, this interest is directly motivated by regional connection and short travel distances: Yes, I already have a good knowledge about the leagues that are located around Austria, I always check whether I could watch a match somewhere, Also, when I make an away trip to Altach, I maybe also try to see a game at St. Gallen, its just across the border, and also Slovenia is half an hour south of the border, there you always get to watch games.⁶⁴

The fan connects his travelling across the borders close by to his own team. For him, cross-border rivalries are potentially relevant in the context of European competitions: “So I don’t go to clubs that don’t interest me sports-wise, but when I go to Maribor, for example, I’m very interested in how they play, because I can compare between Austria and Slovenia, why they get into the group stage of the Champions League and we don’t, what they do better and so on.”⁶⁵ Other fans emphasize their interest in Eastern European football, too, connecting football and their travel experiences with the area as such: It was very fascinating for me in the beginning, […] the big stadiums, the big clubs, the clubs that really attract the large masses, that has shifted very much now also to clubs and stadiums that have special characteristics and for me, especially the East has become very exciting and I find it very exciting again and again, and I always find it very exciting to simply travel to countries where completely different circumstances are a matter of course

 Interview Sturm Graz fan (8).  Interview Sturm Graz fan (4).  Interview Sturm Graz fan (4).

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[…] From this point of view it is above all Eastern Europe that I find incredibly exciting and really, all the way from the Baltics to the southeast, and of course the entire Balkans.⁶⁶

The analysis of the frames of references shows that the pattern of a regionalized Europeanization is also reflected in how the fans refer to the different leagues on different levels. While the main frame for potential success is the national level, European football remains a dream. At the same time, current European top football is critically assessed, and more regional and cross-border references are made towards leagues and clubs in neighboring countries.

Conclusion This chapter started on the assumption that the Europeanization of football structures has left its mark on the identities of its fans. We discussed the main developments of accelerated Europeanization in football and their impact on the experience and attitudes of fans. The case of Austrian Bundesliga club SK Sturm Graz supporters served to illustrate how Europe is mirrored in fans’ perceptions and how it might contribute to them “becoming European.” The fans showed a dominant self-understanding that is regional, but European. The results demonstrate a regional perspective of the fans that incorporates a non-national, border-crossing Europeanised view on how they see the game and their own role in it. This is described as “regionalised Europeanization”: they are “becoming European,” but in a regionalised sense: while they have a strong local and regional focus on the city of Graz and the Styrian area, they cross national borders within the larger region of neighboring countries. Their references to Austria and national belonging remain cursory and are often driven by pragmatism. At the same time, the fans’ view on the Europeanization of the game is ambivalent. While they use football to cross borders and to travel in the region, some express decisively negative attitudes towards the Europeanization of the game as commercialisation. Their self-image as underdog in the European football space is combined with a very critical opinion of European football as a closed circle of rich clubs which can afford the best players on the transfer market. It remains important to note that these negative attitudes are not anti-European or re-emphasising the national as a positive alternative to such commer-

 Interview Sturm Graz fan (5).

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cialised football. The fans’ critical perspective remains a European one but focuses on European football that is perceived as less commercialised. The case study focused on fans from a club that plays in a football league which is less Europeanised than the top leagues on the continent. They do not rank among the top10 leagues in the UEFA rankings and the percentage of domestic players is rather high. The club’s participation in European competitions has been limited recently to qualification matches. This makes the club a hard case for the Europeanization of fans’ self-understanding, as they are less exposed to European football via their club. Despite that, the influence of European football on the self-understanding and perception of fans is evident. The potential implications of the work are that the role of leisure world experiences is relevant for our understanding of the Europeanization of individual minds. The results indicate that “becoming European” should not only be understood as a generic identification with “Europe,” but might take the form of a more complex picture of cross-border and transnational identifications with regions in Europe. Local connections seem to remain important, but this locality is not limited within national borders. The added value of this work is to show that leisure world experiences of Europe provide a good example for such a regionalised Europeanization, as especially in this case uncomplicated travel opportunities make regionalized cross-border activities more likely. The impact of leisure world related activities on the political sphere remains subliminal in the data. Both online message board discussions and interviews revealed that travelling and easy access to European destinations are key to the cross-national experiences of the fans. Such travelling across the continent and of visiting matches in foreign countries would be more problematic without European Union regulated basic freedoms. The fact that these topics are not relevant for the fans emphasizes that they are taken for granted. This does not assure a general pro-European attitude in a strict political sense, but it shows that the conditions in Europe, especially freedom of movement, became the norm, even though they are predominantly used when borders are nearby.

Bibliography Behr, Martin. Wir sind Sturm! 100 Jahre Grazer Fußballgeschichte. Graz: SK Puntigamer Graz, 2008. Brand, Alexander, and Arne Niemann. “Europeanisation in the Societal/Trans-National Realm: What European Integration Studies Can Get Out of Analysing Football.” Journal of Contemporary European Research 3, no. 3 (2007): 182 – 201. Brand, Alexander, and Arne Niemann. “Football and National Identity in Europe.” Panorama: Insights into Asian and European Affairs 1 (2014): 43 – 51.

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Brand, Alexander, Arne Niemann, and Georg Spitaler. “The Europeanisation of Austrian Football.” In Transformation of European Football: Towards the Europeanisation of the National Game, edited by Arne Niemann, Borja García, and Wyn Grant, 171 – 86. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2011. Brand, Alexander, Arne Niemann, and Georg Spitaler. “The Two-Track Europeanization of Football: Eu-Level Pressures, Transnational Dynamics and Their Repercussions within Different National Contexts.” International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics 5, no. 1 (2013): 95 – 112. Accessed July 2, 2018. Brubaker, Rogers, and Frederick Cooper. “Beyond ‘Identity’.” Theory and Society 29, no. 1 (2000): 1 – 47. Accessed June 2, 2018. Bruter, Michael. “Winning Hearts and Minds for Europe: The Impact of News and Symbols on Civic and Cultural European Identity.” Comparative Political Studies 36, no. 10 (2003): 1148 – 1179. Bundesliga.at. “Halbzeitbilanz der Tipico Bundesliga.” Accessed October 17, 2018. https:// www.bundesliga.at/de/redaktion/news/17-18/tbl/halbzeitbilanz-der-tipico-bundesliga/. Checkel, Jeffrey T., and Peter J. Katzenstein, eds. European Identity. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2009. Duval, Antoine, and Ben van Rompuy, eds. The Legacy of Bosman. The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2016. García, Borja. “He Was Not Alone: Bosman in Context.” In The Legacy of Bosman, edited by Antoine Duval and Ben van Rompuy, 13 – 30. The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2016. Gläser, Jochen, and Grit Laudel. Experteninterviews und qualitative Inhaltsanalyse als Instrumente rekonstruierender Untersuchungen. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2009. Greiner, Florian. Wege nach Europa: Deutungen eines imaginierten Kontinents in deutschen, britischen und amerikanischen Printmedien, 1914 – 1945. Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2014. Holt, Matthew. “The Ownership and Control of Elite Club Competition in European Football.” Soccer & Society 8, no. 1 (2007): 50 – 67. Keller, Berndt K. “Sectoral Social Dialogue in Professional Football: Social Partners, Outcomes and Problems of Implementation.” etui (European Trade Union Institute) Working Paper 04 (2018). Accessed October 16, 2020. https://www.etui.org/pub lications/working-papers/sectoral-social-dialogue-in-professional-football-social-part ners-outcomes-and-problems-of-implementation. King, Anthony. “Football Fandom and Post-national Identity in the New Europe.” British Journal of Sociology 51, no. 3 (2000): 419 – 442. King, Anthony. The European Ritual: Football in the New Europe. London: Routledge, 2003. King, Anthony. “The New Symbols of European Football.” International Review for the Sociology of Sport 39, no. 3 (2004): 323 – 336. Kuhn, Theresa. “Why Educational Exchange Programmes Miss Their Mark: Cross-Border Mobility, Education and European Identity.” Journal of Common Market Studies 50, no. 6 (2012): 994 – 1010. Kuhn, Theresa. Experiencing European Integration: Transnational Lives and European Identity. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.

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Levermore, Roger, and Peter Millward. “Official Policies and Informal Transversal Networks: Creating ‘Pan-European Identifications’ through Sport?” The Sociological Review 55, no. 1 (2007): 144 – 164. Liegl, Barbara, and Georg Spitaler. “Between Trans-Nationality and Identity Politics: Austrian Migration Regimes and Professional Football (1945 – 2008).” SWS-Rundschau 49, no. 2 (2009): 234 – 255. Maier, Matthias L., and Thomas Risse, eds. Europeanization, Collective Identities and Public Discourses: Final Report. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, 2003. Mau, Steffen. Social Transnationalism: Lifeworlds beyond the Nation-State. London: Routledge, 2010. Millward, Peter. “‘We’ve All Got the Bug for Euro-Aways’: What Fans Say about European Football Club Competition.” International Review for the Sociology of Sport 41, no. 3 – 4 (2006): 375 – 393. Millward, Peter. Getting into Europe: Identification, Prejudice and Politics in English Football Culture. Saarbrücken: VDM, 2009. Mittag, Jürgen, ed. Europäische Sportpolitik: Zugänge – Akteure – Problemfelder. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2018. Mittag, Jürgen. “Europäische Sportpolitik zwischen Wachstum und Differenzierung: Entwicklungslinien, Analyseperspektiven und Erklärungsansätze.” In Europäische Sportpolitik: Zugänge – Akteure – Problemfelder, edited by Jürgen Mittag, 13 – 49. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2018. Niemann, Arne, and Alexander Brand. “The Impact of European Integration on Domestic Sport: The Case of German Football.” Sport in Society 11, no.1 (2008): 90 – 106. Niemann, Arne, and Alexander Brand. “Die Europäisierung des Fußballs: Von der Umsetzung politischer Vorgaben zur Gestaltung europäischer Realitäten.” In Europäische Sportpolitik: Zugänge – Akteure – Problemfelder, edited by Jürgen Mittag, 167 – 80. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2018. Niemann, Arne, and Alexander Brand. “The UEFA Champions League: A Political Myth?” Soccer & Society 21, no. 3 (2020): 329 – 343. Niemann, Arne, Alexander Brand, and Georg Spitaler. “The Europeanization of Football: Germany and Austria Compared.” In The Making and Mediatization of Modern Sport in Europe: States, Media and Markets 1950 – 2010, edited by C. Young, D. Holt, and Alan Tomlinson, 187 – 204. London: Routledge, 2011. Oefbl.at. “Zuschauer, Österreicher-Topf & Spielfeldreporting – Organisatorischer Rückblick auf die Herbstsaison 2019.” Accessed January 30, 2020. https://www.oefbl.at/oefbl/re daktionsbaum/news/zuschauer-oesterreicher-topf-spielfeldreporting-organisatorischerrueckblick-auf-die-herbstsaison-2019/. Peeters, Thomas. “Broadcasting Rights and Competitive Balance in European Soccer.” University of Antwerp, Department of Economics Research Paper 9 (2009). Accessed October 16, 2020. https://ideas.repec.org/p/ant/wpaper/2009009.html. Ranc, David. Foreign Players and Football Supporters: The Old Firm, Arsenal, Paris Saint-Germain. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2012. Risse, Thomas. A Community of Europeans? Transnational Identities and Public Spheres. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010.

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Schmidt, Vivien A. “Europeanization and the Mechanics of Economic Policy Adjustment.” Journal of European Public Policy 9, no. 6 (2002): 894 – 912. Schreier, Margrit. Qualitative Content Analysis in Practice. Los Angeles, CA: SAGE, 2012. Seawright, Jason, and John Gerring. “Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research.” Political Research Quarterly 61, no. 2 (2008): 294 – 308. Vonnard, Philippe, Grégory Quinn, and Nicolas Bancel. Building Europe with the Ball. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2016. Vonnard, Philippe, Nicola Sbetti, and Grégory Quinn, eds. Beyond Boycotts: Sport during the Cold War in Europe. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2018. Waalkes, Scott. “Does Soccer Explain the World or Does the World Explain Soccer? Soccer and Globalization.” Soccer & Society 18, no. 2 – 3 (2017): 166 – 180. Ziegerhofer, Anita, and Roland Radlinger. Vom Rand ins Zentrum Europas: Die Geschichte der Steiermark ab 1918: analog und digital erzählt. Graz: Leykam, 2020.

Appendix Table 2: Overview of online message board posts used in the analysis. Thread name

Posts Url

Rivalry . Runde Graz vs Red Bull Salzburg, ..



https://www.austriansoccerboard.at/topic/-runde-sturm-graz-vs-red-bull-salzburg/

. Runde SV Ried – Graz, . . 



https://www.austriansoccerboard.at/topic/-runde-sv-ried-sk-sturm-graz/

Graz – RB Salzburg, ..



https://www.austriansoccerboard.at/topic/-runde-sk-sturm-graz-rb-salzburg/

FK Austria Wien – Graz, . . 



https://www.austriansoccerboard.at/topic/-runde-fk-austria-wien-sk-sturm-graz/

Ajax vs. Graz, CL Quali, ..



https://www.austriansoccerboard.at/topic/-qualirunde-champions-league-sk-sturm-graz-ajax-am sterdam/

Graz – Larnaca, EL Quali, ..



https://www.austriansoccerboard.at/topic/-qualirunde-europa-league-sk-sturm-graz-aek-larnaca/

Sturm in Europa /



https://www.austriansoccerboard.at/topic/sturm-in-europa-/

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Table : Overview of online message board posts used in the analysis. (Continued) Thread name

Posts Url

Transfer Sommertransfers /



https://www.austriansoccerboard.at/topic/-som mertransfers-/

Wintertransfers /

, https://www.austriansoccerboard.at/topic/-win tertransfers-/

Travel Zuschauer/Tickets



Total

,

https://www.austriansoccerboard.at/topic/-zu schauertickets/

Table 3: Overview of interviews used in the analysis. Interview No. Gender Age length

Fandom General attitude to player intensity markets and competitions

Current Education work status



male



’’

high

cosmo

higher ed.

unemployed



male



’’

medium

cosmo-commu

basic ed.

pensioneer



male



’’

medium

cosmo

higher ed.

working



male



’’

high

cosmo

basic ed.

student



male



’’

high

cosmo

higher ed.

working



female 

’’

medium

cosmo

higher ed.

working



male



’’

medium

communitarian

basic ed.

pensioneer



male



’’

high

communitarian

basic ed.

working



male



’’

medium

communitarian

basic ed.

working



female 

’’

high

cosmo

basic ed.

pensioneer

Section 4: Europeanization in Religion and Law

Lisa Dittrich †

Europe from the Margins Anticlerical Entanglements, Networks, and Ideas of Europe in the Nineteenth Century

Introduction In 1906, the liberal French journalist John Grand-Carteret (1850 – 1927) published a cartoon anthology entitled Contre Rome. La bataille anticléricale en Europe to demonstrate that the “Kulturkampf” was being waged outside France and that French legislation on the separation of church and state had also been supported from abroad. In the 260-page book, Grand-Carteret collected anticlerical cartoons from various European countries, from the time of the French Revolution until the separation of church and state in France in 1905. He also printed a survey among public figures on the topic of French separation legislation. Wellknown representatives of European anticlericalism, such as the German free thinker and zoologist Ernst Haeckel (1834– 1919), the editor of one of Spain’s anticlerical newspapers, Los Dominicales del Libre Pensamiento, Fernando Lozano (1884 – 1935) or Alfred Naquet (1834– 1916), a republican politician and campaigner for divorce law in France, had their say. This volume is a telling example of the European networking of anticlericals and of the formation and maintenance of a Europe-wide anticlerical culture in the long nineteenth century. During this period, anticlericals fought all over Europe for a stronger separation between state and church or even a secular state and for a society with less influence of religion and the Churches. They took advantage of the increasing communication, particularly within Europe, which was based on the expansion of telegraphs and news agencies and the improved transport network enabling the formation of a European public sphere. Moreover, the church critics are an example of the internationalizing networks of civil society actors.¹ The anthology

Note: The title is borrowed from a series of keynote lectures held by the Institute for European History Mainz in 2016, Europe and its margins.  See F.S.L. Lyons, Internationalism in Europe 1815 – 1914 (Leyden: A. W. Sythoff, 1963); Martin H. Geyer and Johannes Paulmann, eds., The Mechanics of Internationalism: Culture, Society, and Politics from the 1840s to the First World War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110685473-011

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not only illustrates the networking of activists and the exchange and circulation of printed matter, but also demonstrates that anticlericals saw themselves as part of a European struggle, to such an extent that they developed their own, specifically anticlerical ideas of Europe. Grand-Carteret, for example, set “Europe cléricale”² against anticlerical Europe in the introduction to the anthology. However, the anticlerical Europe was not as homogeneous as the editor would have us believe. In the survey, the activists differentiated between Spain, Italy, and France, for example, or distinguished between Latin and Protestant Europe: in contrast to France, some activists considered the countries of the European South not yet mature enough for a legal separation, and other respondents stated that the path of the Catholic countries led directly from Catholicism to rationalism, while in the Protestant-centred countries the latter was unfortunately the most underdeveloped.³ In the course of the nineteenth century, such typical demarcations within the framework of culture wars not only gave rise to specific ideas of Europe and its internal and external borders, but also influenced European networks of communication. In research on Europe, it is often argued that increasing networking constituted a common experience and that consequently a European identity developed.⁴ Frank Bösch points out that transnational networking as a whole does not necessarily lead to more communication and a common orientation.⁵ Research on the relationship between Europeanization and European ideas, on the one hand, and the national realm or ideas of nation, on the other, has also shown that simple notions of processes of transcendence do not do justice to the relationship between the two reference spaces. The national and the European converged and permeated each other, but also mutually excluded or replaced each other, and therefore the relationship of both reference spaces

 John Grand-Carteret, Contre Rome: La bataille anticléricale en Europe (Paris: Michaud, 1906), 16.  See Grand-Carteret, Contre Rome, 298, 307.  See Hartmut Kaelble, Martin Kirsch, and Alexander Schmidt-Gernig, “Zur Entwicklung transnationaler Öffentlichkeit und Identität im 20. Jahrhundert. Eine Einleitung,” in Transnationale Öffentlichkeiten und Identitäten im 20. Jahrhundert, ed. Hartmut Kaelble, Martin Kirsch, and Alexander Schmidt-Gernig (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2002), 8; Florian Greiner, Wege nach Europa: Deutungen eines imaginierten Kontinents in deutschen, britischen und amerikanischen Printmedien, 1914 – 1945 (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2014), 453 – 454.  See Frank Bösch, “Entgrenzungen? Transnationale Medien und regionale Kommunikation seit dem späten 19. Jahrhundert,” in Deutsche Zeitgeschichte – transnational, ed. Alexander Gallus, Axel Schildt, and Detlef Siegfried (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2015), 227.

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must be redefined for each individual historical case.⁶ By analogy, it also makes sense to determine the relationship between European networking and reference to Europe (as an identity or an idea) for each individual case, especially since references to Europe were often subject to strategic use.⁷ On the basis of these considerations, this chapter presents three case studies to investigate how the practices of transnational communication, social mobilization, and ideas of Europe were interwoven in multiple ways, showing dynamics of increasing Europeanization as well as counter-processes and constraints. Focussing on case studies of day-to-day anticlericalism in the second half of the nineteenth century, I will highlight two aspects: first, I will show that processes of Europeanization and ideas of Europe had a compensatory function. Groups marginalized in their national contexts constructed the idea of an anticlerical Europe as an argument for their cause and used European networks to call for support.⁸ In a similar way, the use of the European media network helped them to overcome difficulties stemming from censorship.⁹ Secondly, I show that the development of a common European identity could limit further Europeanization on a structural level because of inclusion and exclusion mechanisms. The anticlerical ideas of Europe were constructed in opposition to negative national examples, thereby putting the anticlericals of those nations in a dilemma. Although these anticlericals referred positively to anticlerical Europe as a model, they also indirectly excluded their country from this community of values, and this could, in some cases, lead to the structural networking not being pursued further. In the following, Europeanization initially represents an analytical concept with which to interpret communicative networking, the exchange of ideas and

 See Jörg Requate and Martin Schulze Wessel, “Europäische Öffentlichkeit. Realität und Imagination einer appellativen Instanz,” in Europäische Öffentlichkeit: Transnationale Kommunikation seit dem 18. Jahrhundert, ed. Jörg Requate and Martin Schulze Wessel (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2002), 22– 30; Bösch, “Entgrenzungen?,” 235; Greiner, Wege nach Europa, 459.  For strategic use see Florian Wagner, “Von der kolonialpraktischen Kooperation zum ‘europäischen Ideal’: Kolonialverbände in Deutschland, Frankreich, Spanien und Belgien (1870 – 1914),” in Frank Bösch, Ariane Brill, and Florian Greiner, eds., Europabilder im 20. Jahrhundert: Entstehung an der Peripherie (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2012).  See Heinz Duchhardt, “Der deutsche Europa-Diskurs des 19. und frühen 20. Jahrhunderts,” in Option Europa: Deutsche, polnische und ungarische Europapläne des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts, ed. Włodzimierz Borodziej et al. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2005) 1: 15 – 16; Requate and Schulze Wessel, “Europäische Öffentlichkeit,” 15.  See for such a mechanism in regarding the role of the Allgemeine Zeitung in Europe, Requate and Schulze Wessel, “Europäische Öffentlichkeit,” 25.

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printed matter, personal networks, and mutual perceptions.¹⁰ Secondly, Europeanization refers more specifically to European self-understanding and identities. To address both levels, I take up the concept of a European public sphere. Historians have pointed out that a European public sphere was momentarily constituted in the course of the nineteenth century.¹¹ In these studies, Europe is a set space of public discourse. Both such a set Europe and the idea of the public sphere cause methodological problems as analytical tools. The idea of a European unity falls apart immediately on closer inspection. Moreover, both, such a set Europe and the concept of the public sphere are normatively charged. In order to avoid falling into a normative and predetermined understanding of Europe and the public sphere, the analytical concept is combined with a social constructivist concept.¹² Therefore, a double concept of public sphere is used.¹³ As explained, on the one hand, the question of structural networking is posed.¹⁴ On the other hand, Habermas’ normative concept of the public sphere as a critical instance is used in a constructivist way and it is asked to what extent the historical actors understood themselves as being part of a common public sphere.¹⁵ In order to

 For Europe vécue see, Florian Greiner, “Die Pluralisierung eines imaginierten Raumes – Tendenzen, Perspektiven und Herausforderungen der zeithistorischen Europaforschung,” Zeitschrift für Staats- und Europawissenschaften 14, no. 4 (2016): 555 – 558.  See e. g. Jörg Requate and Martin Schulze Wessel, eds., Europäische Öffentlichkeit: Transnationale Kommunikation seit dem 18. Jahrhundert (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2002); Hartmut Kaelble, “The Historical Rise of a European Public Sphere?,” Journal of European Integration History 8, no. 2 (2002), accessed October 19, 2010, https://www.zgei.nomos.de/fileadmin/zgei/doc/ Zgei_02_02.pdf; Jan-Henrik Meyer, The European Public Sphere: Media and Transnational Communication in European Integration 1969 – 1991 (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2010).  See for this combination and the problem of normativity in the research on Europeanization Ulrike von Hirschhausen and Kiran K. Patel, “Europeanization in History: An Introduction,” in Europeanization in the Twentieth Century: Historical Approaches, ed. Martin Conway and Kiran K. Patel (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); for the criticism of the concept of public sphere, especially on Jürgen Habermas, e. g. Craig J. Calhoun, ed., Habermas and the Public Sphere (Cambridge, MA.: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1999); Andreas Gestrich, “The Public Sphere and the Habermas Debate,” German History 24 (2006).  See for this approach using the German concept of Appelationsinstanz (court of appeal), Requate and Schulze Wessel, “Europäische Öffentlichkeit.”  See e. g. Jürgen Gerhards and Friedhelm Neidhardt, “Strukturen und Funktionen moderner Öffentlichkeit: Fragestellungen und Ansätze,” in Öffentlichkeit, Kultur, Massenkommunikation: Beiträge zur Medien- und Kommunikationssoziologie, ed. Stefan Müller-Doohm and Klaus Neumann-Braun (Oldenburg: Bibliothek- und Informationssystem der Universität Oldenburg, 1991).  Due to the development of mass press in the second half of the nineteenth century, the relationship between public sphere, media actors, politics, and society changed. In the following, however, the questions about the changes in the character of the public sphere in the so-called

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weigh the European content, a distinction is made between two levels. First, I will examine whether the anticlericals identified themselves as European. Second, their secular European ideas will be elaborated.¹⁶ Identity concepts are constituted by alterities and are not always associated with positive self-inclusion. A separation of the levels of identity concept and self-understanding therefore makes it possible to describe inclusion and exclusion processes more precisely. The empirical basis of the analysis are anticlerical protests in the press and face-to-face mobilizations in response to transnational events that provoked Europe-wide reactions during the second half of the nineteenth century. The analysis of such events is used to examine both the transformations in the increasing media networking as well as the change in norms and ideas negotiated in the context of reporting.¹⁷ The exemplary procedure makes it possible to study momentary Europeanizations in terms of media and their relationship to European identity and ideas of Europe and the norms implied therein, and to follow their development over a longer period. I have chosen the three most reported transnational events in European nineteenth century anticlericalism: the kidnapping of the Jewish boy Edgardo Mortara (1858), the First Vatican Council (1869 – 70), and the execution of Francisco Ferrer in 1909. The chapter will follow the chronological order of the events. The paper examines material mainly from France, Germany, and Spain and from various groups, such as liberals, republicans, socialists, anarchists, freethinkers, Protestants, and Jews, all of whom can at least partly be assigned to the anticlerical spectrum.¹⁸ With the three countries, it attempts to capture a wide range of countries, both in terms of the question of the role of anticlericalism and of media networking. With France, I will analyse a country that today is

“second structural change” (Habermas) cannot be addressed and the debate about the public sphere as a critical instance and its democratization must remain unconsidered. See Frank Bösch, Öffentliche Geheimnisse: Skandale, Politik und Medien in Deutschland und Großbritannien 1880 – 1914 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2009); footnote 14 on Jürgen Habermas’ concept.  See Priska Jones, Europa in der Karikatur: Deutsche und britische Darstellungen im 20. Jahrhundert (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2009), 27.  See for a similar approach studying scandals, Bösch, Öffentliche Geheimnisse; Norman Domeier, Der Eulenburg-Skandal: Eine politische Kulturgeschichte des Kaiserreichs (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2010).  The role of religious actors in anticlericalism is disputed. See for Jewish anticlericalism Ari Joskowicz, The Modernity of Others: Jewish Anti-Catholicism in Germany and France (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014); for the role of protestant anticlericals and the similarities of protestant anticatholicism and anticlericalism Manuel Borutta, Antikatholizismus: Deutschland und Italien im Zeitalter der europäischen Kulturkämpfe (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2010).

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still considered the precursor for the establishment of a secular state in Europe.¹⁹ In historical literature, Spain is generally regarded as a case of failed secularization in the nineteenth century.²⁰ With Germany, a country with a bi-confessional structure is covered, too. At the same time, with France and the Havas news agency and Germany with newspapers as influential in Europe as the Allgemeine Zeitung, two countries at the center of the transnational media network are discussed, while Spain marks an area located on the periphery, both in terms of transport and media networking. As a result of these differences between the selected countries in terms of religious and medial structure, it can be convincingly shown that, despite different starting points, a Europeanization of anticlericalism took place.²¹ Furthermore, we gain insights into the impact of the different media structures. Using the example of anticlericalism, the chapter also aims to provide new insights into nineteenth century ideas of Europe. This period has naturally gotten less attention from historians and day-to-day concepts in particular are still under-explored.²² The chapter will draw special attention to the role of religion in the construction of Europe, which generally means Christian Europe.²³ I would

 See e. g. Jean Baubérot, La morale laïque contre l’ordre moral (Paris: Seuil, 1997), 287; Benoît Pellistrandi, “Clericalismo y anticlericalismo en Francia: ¿Una denominación de origen?,” in La secularización conflictiva: España 1898 – 1931, ed. Julio De la Cueva Merino and Feliciano Montero García (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2007), 23.  See e. g. Paul Aubert, “Luchar contra los poderes fácticos: el anticlericalismo,” in Religión y sociedad en España (siglos XIX y XX), ed. Paul Aubert (Madrid: Casa de Velázquez, 2002), 221.  See for the question of different religious structure in European anticlericalism Borutta, Antikatholizismus; Lisa Dittrich, Antiklerikalismus in Europa: Öffentlichkeit und Säkularisierung in Frankreich, Spanien und Deutschland (1848 – 1914) (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2014).  The main focus is on intellectual ideas of Europe; see Hartmut Kaelble, Europäer über Europa: Die Entstehung des europäischen Selbstverständnisses im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2001); Ute Frevert, Eurovisionen: Ansichten guter Europäer im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 2003); Jean Nurdin and Jacques Bariéty, Le rêve européen des penseurs allemands 1700 – 1950 (Lille: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion, 2003); Claude D. Conter, Jenseits der Nation – das vergessene Europa des 19. Jahrhunderts: Die Geschichte der Inszenierungen und Visionen Europas in Literatur, Geschichte und Politik (Bielefeld: Aisthesis, 2004); Włodzimierz Borodziej et al., eds., Option Europa: Deutsche, polnische und ungarische Europapläne des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts, 3 vols. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2005).  See e. g. Heinz Gollwitzer, Europabild und Europagedanke: Beiträge zur deutschen Geistesgeschichte des 18. und 19. Jahrhunderts, 2nd ed. (Munich: C.H. Beck 1964), 284– 302, 338 – 340; Mary A. Perkins, Christendom and European Identity: The Legacy of a Grand Narrative since 1789 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2004); Wolfgang Schmale, “Eckpunkte einer Geschichte Europäischer Identität,” in Europäische Identität: Voraussetzungen und Strategien, ed. Julian Nida-Rümelin and Werner Weidenfeld (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2007), 67– 69; for confessional divisions see Mikael

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like to shed light on another dimension, the under-explored ideas of a secular Europe, which emerged in the nineteenth century in conflict with the Christian idea of Europe.²⁴

The Mortara Affair In autumn 1858, the local church leaders of Bologna took the Jewish boy Edgardo Mortara from his parents because a servant had supposedly baptized him and therefore the Vatican claimed that the Catholic Church was obligated to educate him in the Christian faith.²⁵ To protest against the kidnapping, the boy’s parents turned to the network of Jewish communities in Italy, which wrote to the official Jewish representations in France and Great Britain to seek diplomatic help from the respective government and to make the case public.²⁶ The parents’ complaints against the fate of their son were heard by the European press. The major daily newspapers as well as the Jewish magazines reported on the issue until the beginning of 1859, discussing the action of the Vatican and more generally the rights of the Catholic Church and the relationship between state, society, and Church. Roughly two camps were formed in the process: while Jews, liberals, and democrats were fighting for natural law and freedom of religion and conscience, the Papal States and the Catholic press defended the action with reference to canon law provisions.²⁷ In the course of time, anticlericals published pamphlets that systematically gathered the reporting on the affair. Some of af Malmborg and Bo Stråth, eds., The Meaning of Europe: Variety and Contention Within and Among Nations (Oxford: Berg International, 2002).  For first insights into ideas of a secular Europe see Wolfram Kaiser, “‘Clericalism – That is our Enemy!’: European Anticlericalism and the Culture Wars,” in Culture Wars: Secular-Catholic Conflict in Nineteenth-Century Europe, ed. Christopher Clark and Wolfram Kaiser (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 76; Robert Frank, “The Meanings of Europe in French National Discourse: A French Europe or an Europeanized France,” in Malmborg and Stråth, The Meaning of Europe; more generally on the orientalization of religion in the culture wars see Manuel Borutta, “Der innere Orient: Antikatholizismus als Orientalismus in Deutschland, 1781– 1924,” in Religion und Grenzen in Indien und Deutschland: Auf dem Weg zu einer transnationalen Historiographie, ed. Monica Juneja and Margrit Pernau (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht Unipress, 2008).  See David I. Kertzer, The Kidnapping of Edgardo Mortara (New York, NY: Random House, 1998), 3 – 12, 35 – 42.  See Kertzer, The Kidnapping, 42– 73, 85 – 127, 143 – 146, 162– 171; Gemma Volli, “Il caso Mortara nell’opinione pubblica e nella politica del tempo,” Bollettino del Museo del Risorgimento 5 (1960): 1120 – 1121.  See Dittrich, Antiklerikalismus in Europa, 150 – 151.

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them were translated. In this way, the church critics also exploited the affair in the long run to debate fundamental questions.²⁸ The daily reporting was characterized by difficulties in obtaining information. In the beginning, the Vatican had no interest in the case being discussed in public, although over time the Catholic press started a campaign defending the actions of the Church.²⁹ Moreover, in 1858 the major news agencies had not yet divided the world up among themselves; the first such contract was signed a year later.³⁰ In this phase of the nineteenth century, news mostly originated from correspondents’ own reports, or other, often foreign, in this specific case Italian, journals were frequently quoted, thus creating European connections. Problems with receiving news were particularly evident in the fact that the same news was cited again and again in different newspapers from the same sources.³¹ In this way, complex transnational information chains were created.³² In the Mortara affair, the Europeanization of communication was born out of necessity.³³ A minority pleaded for help and a lack of information was overcome. The uncertain basis of information was accompanied by the fact that there were always phases in which there was nothing to report on the Mortara affair. Over time, this led to the reporting being supplemented with parallel cases that suddenly appeared everywhere. Often these were stories of historical cases, which, under pressure from the authorities, had had a happy end, because the kidnapped victims (not only children who had forcibly been baptized but also mentally ill patients, or women in love, or men who had fainted) were returned

 See e. g. Roma e la opinione pubblica d’Europa nel fatto Mortara: Atti, documenti, confutazioni: Il diritto canonico e il diritto naturale par l’abate Delacouture professore in teologia (Turin: Unione Tipografico-Editrice, 1859); Wolffberg, Mortara oder das Ereigniß in Bologna: Nach authentischsten Quellen. Ein Beitrag zur Culturgeschichte des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts (Stettin: R. Graßmann, 1859); Edgard Mortara: Den Israeliten des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts, den Vätern und Müttern aller Nationen und aller Religionen gewidmet (Leipzig: Otto Wigand, 1860).  See for the first silence E. Pauchet, La Presse, September 29, 1858, unpag.  See Pierre Albert, Histoire de la presse, 10th ed. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2003), 32– 37; Michael B. Palmer, Des petits journaux aux grandes agences: Naissance du journalisme moderne 1863 – 1914 (Paris: Aubier, 1983), 103 – 104.  See e. g. Las Novedades, November 7, 1858, 2, and “Noticias Varias,” La Discusión, November 8, 1858, unpag. or O.C., “Italien,” Schwäbischer Merkur, November 9, 1858, 1201, and “Italien,” Vossische Zeitung, November 11, 1858, 6.  See “Italien,” Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums 22 (1858): 636 – 638, which cites a Turin paper citing the Opinione, which in turn cites the L’Indépendance Belge as its source.  For similar mechanisms, see the examples of transnational communication during the First World War, see Barbara Lambauer and Christian Wenkel, eds., Entstehung und Entwicklung transnationaler Kommunikationsräume in Europa zu Kriegszeiten 1914 – 1945, special issue, Comparativ. Zeitschrift für Globalgeschichte und vergleichende Gesellschaftsforschung 28, no. 1 (2018).

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to their families.³⁴ In the course of reception, parallels were drawn between the history of Edgardo Mortara and other cases from different European countries, making the Mortara affair a proverbial cipher for forced baptisms. In 1871, the freethinker journal La Humanindad still spoke of a “new Mortara.”³⁵ In this communicative spin-off process, the anticlericals merged the criticized actual behaviour of the Catholic Church in 1858 into narratives about kidnapped people that became part of a common European cultural repertoire of anticlericalism. This reflected the feeling of a common experience of religious intolerance. Coming back to 1858, there had been concrete efforts to regard the protests in the Mortara affair as a common European phenomenon. This can be seen in the brochure entitled Roma e la opinion pubblica d’Europa nel fatto Mortara,³⁶ which assembled different reports and positions from all over Europe. Moreover, the anticlerical press also presented the debates in other countries, thus creating the idea of a common protest.³⁷ However, the reception was different in the three countries surveyed. The anticlerical liberals and democrats found themselves in unalike situations in 1858: while in France the affair fell into a phase of quite open and vehement debate on the relationship between religion and society, with Napoleon III at the same time still intent on reconciliation with the Catholic Church until 1859, in Spain the Moderados (conservative liberals) ruled and the anticlerical position was in the opposition.³⁸ In the German states, the anticlerical positions of liberals, which were mostly denominational, gained strength during the Restoration, but could only really steer politics with the beginning of the legal culture wars in the 1860s and 1870s, while the anticlerical democrats  See e. g. Journal des Débats, November 9, 1858, unpag.; Émile de la Bédollière, “France: Paris – 1er Octobre 1858, Courrier,” Le Siècle, October 2, 1858, unpag.; S. Bloch, “Nouvelles diverses: Intérieure,” Univers Israélite, 14 (1858/1859): 211; “Chronique du mois,” Archives Israélites 19 (1858): 653 – 657, 655; “Allemagne,” Le Lien 3 (1858): 148; “Faits divers,” Monde Maçonnique 1 (1858): 588 – 598; “Italien,” Vossische Zeitung, October 15, 1858, 8 – 9; “Der religiöse Fanatismus,” Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums 22 (1858): 516; “Nachrichten,” Protestantische Kirchenzeitung 5 (1858): 808.  La Humanidad, July 24, 1871, 198. These and all other translations were done by the author.  Roma e la opinione pubblica.  See Émile de la Bédollière, “France: Paris – 1er Octobre 1858, Courrier,” Le Siècle, October 2, 1858, unpag.; “Chronique du mois,” Archives Israélites 19 (1858): 653 – 657, 653 – 654; Las Novedades, November 13, 1858, 3; J. Dominguez, “Correspondencia de El Estado,” El Estado, October 23, 1858, 2; “Italien,” Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums 22 (1858): 636 – 637. Interestingly enough, the numerous protests in the U.S. were largely ignored.  See e. g. for France René Rémond, L’anticléricalisme en France: De 1815 à nos jours, 3rd ed. (Paris: Fayard, 1999), 132– 170; for Spain Gregorio Alonso García, “La ciudadanía católica y sus enemigos: Cuestión religiosa, cambio político y modernidad en España (1793 – 1874)” (PhD diss., Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, 2008).

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increasingly faded away after 1848.³⁹ The Mortara affair was discussed especially in the French press, with questions of national politics, such as the stationing of parts of the French army to secure papal rule in 1858, being debated in particular.⁴⁰ In the other two countries, there was significantly less reporting, in part due to censorship based on the press laws and the special protection religion enjoyed therein.⁴¹ However, especially in Spain, the debates abroad were increasingly reflected.⁴² This was probably a means of escaping censorship.⁴³ Europeanization as the perception of events beyond the borders could thus be referred back to the national level, as in France, and at the same time represented an opportunity to circumvent national political repression, as in Spain. Europeanization was again a method of compenzation. Europe as a common collective self-image was central in the reporting. The journalists who protested against the kidnapping of the Jewish boy constantly referred to Europe. Europe stood for the space in which the protests took place as well as for a common public sphere.⁴⁴ As one newspaper remarked, the Mortara affair “has been cited in the Court of Public Opinion in Europe.”⁴⁵ It was not clearly defined which countries represented Europe geographically. Journalists used the term “Europe” to describe the civilized world, as the qualification of the term by various adjectives illustrates.⁴⁶ The observing and judging community was also grasped with other collective terms, such as humanity or

 See e. g. Borutta, Antikatholizismus, 62– 95; Dittrich, Antiklerikalismus in Europa, 120 – 122.  See e. g. Louis Alloury, “France: Paris, 18 Octobre,” Journal de Débats, October 19, 1858, unpag.; Ad. Guéroult, La Presse, October 18, 1858, unpag.  See for Spain Kertzer, The Kidnapping, 123; for France, where the government intervened by censoring, but only after a debate that lasted several weeks, Léon Plée, Le Siècle, November 22, 1858, unpag.  See e. g. La Discusión, October 22, 1858, unpag.; Las Novedades, November 7, 1858, unpag.; Diario Español, October 26, 1858, 3.  See for this method Palmer, Des petits journaux, 127.  See e. g. as space of the protest Journal des Débats, October 15, 1858, unpag.; Ad. Guéroult, “Non possumus,” La Presse, November 5, 1858, unpag.; La Discusión, October 22, 1858, unpag.; J. de Granda, “Europa,” Clamor Público, October 23, 1858, unpag.; for the public sphere, E. Pauchet, “Nouvelles de l’Exterieur: Italie,” La Presse, October 24, 1858, unpag.; La Discusión, October 25, 1858, unpag.; “Correspondencia de El Estado,” El Estado, November 9, 1858, 2; J. de Granda, “Correo Estrangero,” Clamor Público, November 21, 1858, unpag.  Prevost Paradol, “France: Paris, 28 Septembre,” Journal des Débats, September 29, 1858, unpag.  See e .g. Louis Jourdan, “La loi civile et les lois ecclesiastique,” Le Siècle, October 20, 1858, unpag.; Journal des Débats, October 18, 1858, unpag.; Ad. Guéroult, “Les Debats et l’Univers,” La Presse, October 12, 1858, unpag.; La Discusión, October 25, 1858, unpag.; J. de Granda, “Correo Estrangero,” Clamor Público, October 31, 1858, unpag.

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the world. Behind these global terms, however, there was a European idea due to the labelling as civilized and the lack of perception of the protests in the USA.⁴⁷ The idea of Europe in the Mortara affair was the concept of a superior European civilization, known from the history of political thought.⁴⁸ Europe was equated with the values the anticlericals were supporting: natural justice, freedom of consciousness, progress, and morals grounded in the individual conscience. This anticlerical Europe was opposed by the occidental Christian Europe in the Catholic Press.⁴⁹ Interestingly, in 1858, the anticlerical Europe stood for a certain concept of Christianity, too.⁵⁰ However, there were differences in the frequency of the use of the term in the national spheres. These differences corresponded to the degree of appropriation of the affair and the public mobilization. Europe was used less frequently in the German press than in the French and Spanish press, where the term was mentioned in almost every second article. In the last case the reference to Europe had a compensatory function as the Spanish press wrote about the case without relating it to the national level due to a possible political repression.

The First Vatican Council (1869 – 1870) This assembly of bishops met on December 8, 1869 to discuss the role of the Catholic Church in a rapidly changing world, with the aim of defining nothing less than the relationship of the church towards modernity. The work of the assembly remained unfinished due to the outbreak of the Franco-German War and was never completed; in 1870 other issues became more important because of the Capture of Rome by the Italian troops and the end of the papal state. The main result was the definition of papal infallibility in July 1870 – a dogma which completed the hierarchical structuring of the church towards Rome, one

 For the protests in the USA see e. g. Timothy Verhoeven, Transatlantic Anti-Catholicism: France and the United States in the Nineteenth Century (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 57– 74.  See e. g. Kaelble, Europäer über Europa, 28 – 31, 52– 62; Wolfgang Schmale, Geschichte und Zukunft der europäischen Identität (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2008), 91– 100.  See Martin Zöller, “Publizistik und Protest im Fall Mortara (1858): Kulturkämpfe und jüdische Emanzipation im Spiegel eines ‘Kinderraubes’” (MA thesis, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität Munich, 2005), 73 – 82.  See La Discusión, November 8, 1858, unpag.; Las Novedades, November 7, 1858, unpag.; in general for the Christian content and its disappearance in the ideas of Europe see Schmale, “Eckpunkte einer Geschichte,” 67– 69.

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of the main aims of ultramontanism.⁵¹ The Bishops’ Conference was primarily an intergovernmental event,⁵² but both the Catholic and the secular press reported on the meeting.⁵³ All of the anticlerical groups (liberals, democrats, socialists, Freethinkers, Protestants, and Jews) covered the assembly but the issue was far from being at the center of the attention. Anticlericals used the Council to explain their positions, in particular of legal nature, to present the Catholic Church as repressive and morally depraved, and to discuss questions of faith.⁵⁴ International and European reporting in 1869/1870 was based on the reports of correspondents who had been dispatched to Rome.⁵⁵ Furthermore, one could now use the service of the agency Havas, which counted Italy to their monopoly area.⁵⁶ The telegraph enabled messages to be transmitted on the same day.⁵⁷ At the same time, however, the improved flow of news was considerably limited by the politics of the Papal States, as the consultations were subject to strictest secrecy. Attempts to obtain information about the discussions in the Vatican were punished by the expulsion of the correspondent, and, in several countries, reporting was censored.⁵⁸ As in the Mortara affair, this situation led to the Europe-

 See Roger Aubert, Vaticanum I. (Mainz: Matthias-Grünewald-Verlag, 1965), 15 – 41.  See Aubert, Vaticanum I, 101– 108, 201– 215; Klaus Schatz, Vaticanum I 1869 – 1870, vol. 1 (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1992), 275 – 286; Klaus Schatz, Vaticanum I 1869 – 1870, vol. 2 (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1993), 281– 293.  See for catholic reporting Schatz, Vaticanum I, 1: 197– 238, 1: 247– 274.  See e. g. for general criticism, “Roma, 14 de diciembre,” El Imparcial, December 28, 1870, unpag.; for the repression, Ed. Scherer, “Le Concile Oecuménque,” Le Temps, April 8, 1869, unpag.; Julian Ayerdi, “Correspondencia particular de la Discusion,” La Discusión, July 2, 1870, 2; “El próximo concilio ecuménico,” La Igualdad, September 18, 1869, unpag.; for the moral, the serialized novel “Concile de Constance,” National, December 28, 1869 till February 9, 1870; for faith issues, Ch. de Bouzet, “Le Concile,” Le Temps, January 7, 1870, unpag.; “El Concilio ecuménico,” El Pueblo, July 1, 1870, unpag.; for legal questions, Ulysee Ladet, “Bulletin du jour: 8 Mars,” Le Temps, March 9, 1870, unpag.; P. A., “El Concilio,” La América, December 13, 1869, 6; E. Müller, “Über den Primat der Päpste VIII,” Vossische Zeitung, December 19, 1869, 203 – 204.  See Jacques Hébrard, Le Temps, June 8, 1870, unpag.; “Roma, 14 de diciembre,” El Imparcial, December 28, 1870, unpag.; “Italien,” Vossische Zeitung, December 19, 1869, 6.  See for the agency’s contract Volker Barth, “The Formation of Global News Agencies, 1857– 1914,” in Information Beyond Borders: International Cultural and Intellectual Exchange in the Belle Époque, ed. Warden B. Rayward (London: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2017); for the use of Havas’ service, Le National, June 25, 1870, unpag.; “Despachos telegráficos,” La Discusión, June 25, 1869, 3; “Italien,” Vossische Zeitung, December 29, 1869, 7.  See e. g. the telegram informing about the vote on the July 15, 1870 was printed in Le National, July 16, 1870 and in Allgemeine Zeitung, July 16, 1870.  See Schatz, Vaticanum I, 2: 219; for the expulsion, J. Ryan Beiser, The Vatican Council and the American Secular Newspapers, 1869 – 70 (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press,

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anization of reporting. Certain newspapers had contacts in church circles with better access to information, so the entire press relied on the reporting of these papers. For example, the frequently quoted Allgemeine Zeitung obtained its information from the German Church historian Ignaz von Döllinger (1799 – 1890), who in turn got his information from his friend, the British historian and liberal Catholic Lord John Acton (1834– 1902), who was in close contact with the bishops, as well as from the Prussian and Bavarian legations.⁵⁹ Additionally, Döllinger drew upon the European press to obtain further information.⁶⁰ The Europeanization, in the sense of networking of the public, was again a product of necessity and, as a result, there was a standardization of reporting. One can also detect a transnational observation of reactions from other nations in the European reporting, but it was primarily focussed on the Catholic reactions.⁶¹ Throughout the meeting it was unclear to what extent the decisions of the assembly would influence the relationship between the church and state as well as secular society. Therefore, for the majority of the anticlericals, the First Vatican Council remained an event of the Catholic world, which was observed from the outside. The anticlericals also rarely referred to a public as a critical authority in their reporting. However, individual groups of civil society actors clearly went further in their appropriation and in their European networking. The mobilization of civil society concentrated on those groups that pursued religious interests in a broad sense. Thus, Protestants and freethinkers organized assemblies, although

1941), 55; for national censoring, Margot Weber, Das I. Vatikanische Konzil im Spiegel der bayerischen Politik (Munich: Stadtarchiv, 1970), 61; Josef Urban, Die Bamberger Kirche in Auseinandersetzung mit dem Ersten Vatikanischen Konzil, 2 vols. (Bamberg: Historischer Verein für die Pflege der Geschichte des Ehemaligen Fürstbistums Bamberg, 1982), 1: 42, 1: 292, 1: 297; A.S. Morin, “Le Concile Oecumenique,” L’Excommunié, September 11, 1869, unpag.  See Victor Conzemius, “Die ‘Römischen Briefe vom Konzil’: Eine Entstehungsgeschichte und quellenkritische Untersuchung zum Konzilsjournalismus von Ignaz von Döllinger und Lord Acton,” Römische Quartalschrift für christliche Altertumskunde und Kirchengeschichte 59 (1964): 187; Victor Conzemius, “Die ‘Römischen Briefe vom Konzil’: Eine quellenkritische Untersuchung zum Konzilsjournalismus Ignaz von Döllingers und Lord Actons,” Römische Quartalschrift für christliche Altertumskunde und Kirchengeschichte 60 (1965); other examples in Victor Conzemius, “Preussen und das Erste Vatikanische Konzil,” Annuarium historiae conciliorum 2 (1970): 387; Schatz, Vaticanum I, 2: 289.  See Franz Xaver Bischof, Theologie und Geschichte: Ignaz von Döllinger (1799 – 1890) in der zweiten Hälfte seines Lebens. Ein Beitrag zu seiner Biographie (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1997), 203.  See Joseph Doucet, Le National, May 14, 1869, unpag.; La Igualdad, October 1, 1869, unpag.; “El proximo Concilio y la supremacia temporal del Papa,” El Imparcial, September 16, 1869, unpag.; C. Müller, “Über das Primat der Päpste,” Vossische Zeitung, October 31, 1869, 173 – 174.

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these took place only within a national framework.⁶² The exception is the first international freethinker assembly, the so-called Anti-Council of Naples. This assembly represents the starting signal for the international networking of mainly European freethinkers, which ten years later led to the founding of the international organization, Fédération Internationale de la Libre Pensée. ⁶³ On the initiative of the republican parliamentarian Giuseppe Ricciardi (1808 – 1882), the day after the ceremonial opening of the Vatican Council a few hundred people met in Naples. The majority of those present were Italians, but there were also Romanians, Belgians, Hungarians, Spaniards, and French as well as Mexicans, Argentinians, and Americans among the delegates.⁶⁴ Prior to this, local organizations had held preparatory meetings in various countries and elected their delegates.⁶⁵ The meeting in Naples itself could be described as a national, international or worldwide meeting. However, it was in fact a European meeting. The letters of support came primarily from other European countries and the European attendees were at the core of the event, determining the debates.⁶⁶ Moreover, the dis-

 See e. g. for the protestants, P. Vesson, “Paris, 10 décembre 1869,” Vrai Protestant 2 (1868/ 1869): 241– 244; Theodor Granderath, ed., Acta et decreta sacrosancti oecumenici concilii Vaticani: Cum permultis aliis documentis ad concilium ejusque historiam spectantibus (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1892), 1132– 1135; for published talks, H. Modon and Ph. Moulinez, La suprématie papale. Le droit d’absolution ecclésiastique. Deux conférences à l’occasion du concile de 1869 (Marseille: Barlatier-Feissat Père et Fils, 1870); Gerhard Uhlhorn, Das römische Concil: Vier Vorträge im Evangelischen Verein zu Hannover gehalten (Hannover: Meyer, 1870); for the free thinkers, Fritz Schütz, “Das Freidenker-Concil zu Leipzig,” Deutschkatholisches Sonntags-Blatt 20 (1870): 3 – 4.  See Pedro F. Álvarez Lázaro, Masonería y librepensamiento en la España de la restauración: Aproximación histórica (Madrid: Universidad Pontificia Comillas, 1985), 13 – 29; Daniel Laqua, “‘Laïque, démocratique et sociale’? Socialism and the Freethinkers’ International,” Labour History Review 74 (2009).  See Guiseppe Ricciardi, L’Anticoncilio di Napoli del 1869: Promosso e descritto da Guiseppe Ricciardi (Foggia: Edizioni Bastogi, n. d.) [reprint, first 1870]); the catholic book Emilio Moreno Cebada, El Santo Concilio Ecuménico del Vaticano: Historia de esta augusta asamblea, 2 vols. (Barcelona, n. d. [1869/1870]), 1: 54– 65; Massimo Fiore, “L’anticoncilio di Napoli del 1869 tra le visioni del libero pensiero e la realtà del clerico-moderatismo,” in Chiesa e religiosità in Italia dopo l’unità (1861 – 1878): Communicazioni II (Milan: Vita e pensiero, 1973); Aristide Ricci, Giuseppe Ricciardi e l’Anticoncilio di Napoli del 1869 (Naples: Regina, 1975).  See for the German countries, Deutschkatholisches Sonntags-Blatt 19 (1869): passim; Deutschkatholisches Sonntags-Blatt 21 (1869): passim; for France, H. Verlet, “Le congrès philosophique de Naples,” L’Excommunié, November 10, 1869, unpag.; for Spain, “El congreso de los libre-pensadores,” La Igualdad, February 9, 1869, unpag.; “La asociación libre-pensadora de Madrid a sus correligionarios de provincias,” La Igualdad, February 17, 1969, unpag.  See Ricciardi, L’Anticoncilio, 97– 211; “Das Gegenconcil,” Deutschkatholisches Sonntags-Blatt 20 (1870): 5.

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cussions demonstrated that the Anti-Council saw itself as European and not as national or international. They considered themselves as a meeting of “brothers strewed all over Europe,”⁶⁷ marginalizing thereby the attendance from other parts of the world. Ricciardi’s appeal had set in motion a Europe-wide movement that organized its own European Congress, which was then reported in the European press. However, it was short-lived: the police disbanded the assembly after its second session, as the debates were supposedly on political issues.⁶⁸ The end of the Anti-Council presents once again a case in which a group on the margins of society turned to like-minded European people and Europe to confer legitimacy on their cause. In the case of the First Vatican Council, Europe as a self-conception or as an identity did not play an important role in the anticlerical mobilization. When the concept was used, it stood for a community of states or the common protest. Europe representing European civilization came in third place after these other two interpretations.⁶⁹ As in the Mortara affair, in addition to the concept of Europe, diffuse global collective concepts were also used, which were characterized as “civilized,” “educated” or “modern” and thus probably above all articulated a European self-understanding.⁷⁰ In 1869/1870, the level of mobilization did not correspond with the frequency of references to Europe. Therefore, it seems reasonable to examine both aspects separately. In contrast to the Mortara affair, the case of the Spanish reporting on the Vatican Council shows that allusions to Europe as a community of values did not always have to go along with stronger European networking and perception. Whereas the mobilization in Spain against the conference of the bishops was relatively weak, the concept of Europe played an important role in the Spanish an-

 L’Excommunié, October 30, 1869, unpag.; “La asamblea de libres pensadores y la juventud española,” La Igualdad, September 3, 1869, unpag.; Henri Verlet, 1793 – 1869. Le peuple et la révolution: L’athéisme et l’Être Suprême, 4th ed. (Paris: Aux Bureaux de la Libre Pensée, n. d. [1870]), 8; for the European reporting, “A vol d’Excommunié,” L’Excommunié, January 8, 1870, unpag.; Igualdad, December 4, 1869, unpag.; La Discusión, February 12, 1869, 2; “Zum Gegenconcil in Neapel,” Deutschkatholisches Sonntags-Blatt 19 (1869): 186 – 187.  See Fiore, “Anticoncilio di Napoli,” 349.  See for the community of states, A. Erdan, “Lettres d’Italie,” Le Temps, March 20, 1870, unpag.; “Die Regierungen und die Concilsbeschlüsse,” Allgemeine Zeitung, March 19, 1870, 1199; for a common protest, J. Vilbort, “Nouvelles du concile,” Le Siècle, February 18, 1870, unpag.; “Das Concilium und die Civilta,” Allgemeine Zeitung, March 14, 1870, 1115 – 1116; for civilisation, Joseph Doucet, “Le Concile Oecumenique: III,” Le National, September 30, 1869, unpag.  See E. Scherer, “Le Concile (I),” Le Temps, March 8, 1870, unpag.; La Iberia, July 22, 1870, unpag.

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ticlerical press.⁷¹ The lack of Spanish anticlerical reactions can be attributed to two main reasons: firstly, the ongoing revolution of 1868 probably occupied much of the attention of potential critics. During these years, the anticlerical newspapers covered in the first place national politics. Secondly, the position of anticlericalism was still weak in Spanish society. The strong presence of the concept of Europe beyond the Pyrenees is another example of its use by groups which felt being at the margins of national politics: “All the peoples of Western Europe are preparing to send their circle of philosophers to this brilliant congress. Spain, the homeland of Servetus, one day […] brutalized by the rottenness of fanaticism and ignorance, […] enlarged and regenerated today by new ideas, has responded with dignity to the call of civilization.”⁷² This comment from the republican daily newspaper Igualdad on the preparations for the Anti-Council shows that Spanish anticlericals used the concept of Europe to fight for fundamental changes in Spanish state and society. Europe was called upon to get help from outside the national realm. However, the quote also shows a more problematic constellation: The close link between state and church and the deep Catholicism of the Spanish nation were reasons why Spain’s belonging to Europe was questioned.⁷³ This double bind, the opposition and the reference to Europe, will be treated again in the third example – the case of Ferrer – and shows how difficult Europeanization from the margins could be.

The Case of Ferrer (1909) The Spanish libertarian, freethinker, and pedagogue Francisco Ferrer (1859 – 1909) was found guilty by a court-martial of being the instigator of the anticlerical riots in the Semana Tragica in Barcelona in July 1909 and was executed on October 13 the same year.⁷⁴ As a republican and anarchist, Ferrer stood on the margins of Spanish society where, after the turn of the century, the church

 See La Federación, November 14, 1869, unpag.; La Iberia, July 22, 1870, unpag.; “La asamblea de libres pensadores y la juventud española,” La Igualdad, September 3, 1869, unpag.  “La asamblea de libres pensadores y la juventud española,” La Igualdad, September 3, 1869, unpag.  See La Federación, November 14, 1869, unpag.; “Los Borbones y la Corte de Roma,” El Imparcial, March 4, 1870 and July 21, 1870, unpag.  See Joan Connelly Ullman, La semana trágica: Estudio sobre las causas socioeconómicas del anticlericalismo en España (1898 – 1912) (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1968).

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was still a supporting pillar of the state.⁷⁵ Ferrer played the trump card “Europe.” When he was arrested, he turned directly to the European public. Ferrer had lived in French exile for 15 years, after having supported a republican uprising attempt in 1885. During his exile, he had been in contact with republicans and socialists as well as freemason lodges and freethinker societies.⁷⁶ Anarchists, such as Enrico Malatesta (1853 – 1932) or Pjotr Kropotkin (1842– 1921), published their work at his publishing house founded after his return from exile.⁷⁷ In addition, he founded an international network for libertarian education, the Ligue internationale pour l’éducation rationelle de l’enfant, to which Ernst Haeckel and the Swedish pedagogue Ellen Key (1849 – 1926) belonged.⁷⁸ It was through this diverse network that he made his arrest known. He wrote to the socialist leader Jean Jaurès (1849 – 1914), whom he knew from his time in Paris and who was a driving force in the initial phase of the protests in Paris with his daily newspaper Humanité. ⁷⁹ Haeckel organized public addresses by intellectuals in the German Empire in support of Ferrer.⁸⁰ The arrest caused a Europe-wide mobilization in the press, in meetings, and on the streets – with a general strike in Rome and riots in Paris⁸¹ – only in Spain

 See Frances Lannon, Privilege, Persecution, and Prophecy: The Catholic Church in Spain 1875 – 1975 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1987), 119 – 120; William J. Callahan, The Catholic Church in Spain, 1875 – 1998 (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2000), 30 – 31.  See for Ferrer and his contacts, Juan Avilés Farré, Francisco Ferrer y Guardia: Pedagogo, anarquista y mártir (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2006); Jean Crouzet, “Francisco Ferrer y Guardia y las logias francesas,” in La masonería española y la crisis colonial del 98, ed. José A. Ferrer Benimeli (Zaragoza: Centro de Estudios Históricos de Masonería Española, 1999); Pedro F. Álvarez Lázaro, “Un librepensador abanderado de la revolución: Francisco Ferrer Guardia,” Bulletin d’histoire contemporaine de l’Espagne (2012).  See Francine Best et al., eds., L’affaire Ferrer (Castres: Centre National et Musée Jean Jaurès, 1991), Annexe II.  See Pere Solà Gussinyer, Las escuelas racionalistas en Cataluña (1909 – 1939), 2nd. ed. (Barcelona: Tusquets, 1978), 43 – 57; Avilés Farré, Francisco Ferrer, 178 – 187.  See Jean Jaurès, “Les voix qui s’élèvent,” Humanité, October 7, 1909, unpag.; “L’œuvre de militaires espagnols,” October 8, 1909, 1– 2; Francisco Ferrer (Denée: Davy, 1984) [reprint of the publication Comité de Défense des Victimes de la Repression Espagnole, Martyre de prêtre 1909], 56 – 59.  See Sol Ferrer, La vie de Francisco Ferrer, un martyr au XXe siècle (Paris: Librairie Fischbacher, 1962), 192.  See for Rome Pascale Iuso, “October 1909: Rome and Francisco Ferrer,” in Contro la chiesa: I moti pro Ferrer del 1909 in Italia, ed. Maurizio Antonioli, Jorge Torre Santos, and Andrea Dilemmi (Pisa: Biblioteca Franco Serantini, 2009); for French protests and their international dimension, Vincent Robert, “‘La protestation universelle’: Lors de l’exécution de Ferrer: Les manifestations d’octobre,” Revue d’histoire moderne et contemporaine 36 (1989); Tiidu P. Park, “The European Reaction to the Execution of Francisco Ferrer” (PhD diss., University of Virginia, 1971).

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were the protests quite small, although they had a big impact: they caused the resignation of the conservative Prime Minister Antonio Maura (1853 – 1925).⁸² The protests initially appeared to be a criticism of the Spanish state, but the reporting was dominated by an anti-clerical thrust. It was assumed that the Catholic Church was to blame for the arrest and execution.⁸³ The attribution of blame was based less on concrete evidence than on the natural opposition between the freethinker Ferrer and the church, as well as on individual statements by Spanish churchmen, laymen of denominationally oriented organizations, and the religious press, who had declared Ferrer, the founder of secular schools, an instigator of the insurgents.⁸⁴ European papers covered the case intensively, both before and after the execution. After the initial mobilization of the personal network, the entire leftist press in Europe reported and the case was also discussed in North and South America as well as North Africa. Alongside freethinkers, anarchists, republicans, and socialists, liberals also protested. Conservative forces, on the other hand, considered Ferrer guilty and protested against international interventions.⁸⁵ In 1909, the press again had problems obtaining information, because the Spanish government had declared a state of emergency after the uprisings in July and therefore exerted a tight control over the press.⁸⁶ The newspapers continued to be informed because Havas, with its network of correspondents and telegraphs, ensured that a minimum of information was made available. A change was becoming evident here: the compensatory function of publicity became increasingly superfluous, since the transnational flow of information was increasingly institutionally secured. In the case of Ferrer, however, this path was also controlled by the press policy of the Spanish government, which even launched fake news via the Spanish news agency Fabra, which cooperated with Havas. ⁸⁷ For this rea-

 See Park, “The European Reaction,” 170 – 180; Avilés Farré, Francisco Ferrer, 259 – 261.  See “La conscience universelle soulevée: Contre le crime. Seuls l’Église et les moines demandent la mort de Ferrer,” Humanité, October 13, 1909, 1; J.L. de Lanessan, “Crime contre la Libre-Pensée,” Le Siècle, October 15, 1909, unpag.; “La inquisición en Barcelona,” El País, October 10, 1909, unpag.; “Spanien: Gegen den weißen Schrecken,” Vorwärts, September 29, 1909, morning edition. unpag.  See Luis Simarro Lacabra, El proceso Ferrer y la opinión europea, vol. 1 (Madrid, 1910), 122 – 295.  See Park, “The European Reaction.”  See for censuring “A mis lectores,” El Motín, October 7, 1909, 1.  See for false information “Le procès de Ferrer: Le compte rendu censure,” L’Action, October 12, 1909; for its diffusion, “La réaction en Espagne: Comment Ferrer fut condamné,” Le Siècle, October 13, 1909, unpag; “Der offiziöse Schwindelbericht,” Berliner Tageblatt, October 12, 1909, evening edition, unpag.

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son, the journalists also resorted to alternative information channels, such as private correspondence, business letters or correspondents at the border stations,⁸⁸ as well as to other European newspapers, such as the well-informed Humanité or Matin. In addition to the lack of information and the structural internationalization of the news sector, transnational reporting was also driven by an interest in presenting the protest in the press as a European movement. Under headings such as “Ferrer and Europe,” the major European newspapers compiled daily reports on the protests at the European level.⁸⁹ Discussions also developed across national borders and the anticlerical press became a European communication community.⁹⁰ International cooperation also developed beyond the press. In the following years, in certain left-wing circles the anniversary of the pedagogue’s death was commemorated annually.⁹¹ An outstanding initiative was the monument in honour of Ferrer in front of the Free University in Brussels, which was erected on the

 See for alternative ways of conceiving information, “Lettre d’Espagne : La répression à Barcelone,” Le Siècle, September 8, 1909, unpag.; “Un procès historique a Barcelone: La peine de mort requise contre Ferrer,” Petit Parisien, October 10, 1909, unpag.  “Ferrer et l’Europe,” Le Matin, October 18, 1909, unpag.; see “Dernière heure: La protestation universelle,” L’Humanité, October 9, 1909, 3; “La protestation universelle,” Le Siècle, October 14, 1909, unpag.; “L’opinion a l’étranger: La Presse allemande,” Petit Parisien, October 14, 1909, unpag.; “Tumultos y manifestaciones: La protesta de Europa,” El Liberal, October 18, 1909, unpag.; “La prensa civilizada,” España Nueva, October 17, 1909, unpag.; “Der Weltprotest gegen die spanischen Mörder,” Vorwärts, October 19, 1909, Supplement, unpag.; “Die Manifestationen für Ferrer in Italien,” Berliner Tageblatt, October 13, 1909, evening edition, unpag.; “Die Erschießung Ferrers : Kundgebungen,” Frankfurter Zeitung, October 14, 1909, evening edition, 1; “Die Erschießung Ferrers,” Kölnische Zeitung, October 19, 1909, noon edition, unpag.  See e. g. Auguste Bertrand, “Antécédants de la sedition,” Temps Nouveaux, November 20, 1909, Supplement, 253 – 254; “Contre le Fauves d’Alphonse,” Voix du Peuple, October 17 till 24, 1909, unpag.; “Alphonse XIII parle,” Le Siècle, November 3, 1909, unpag.; “Après l’exécution de Ferrer,” Le Temps, October 18, 1909, unpag.; “Kundgebungen,” Frankfurter Zeitung, October 16, 1909, second morning edition, 2; “Ein ‘Rettungsversuch’,” Berliner Tageblatt, October 19, 1909, morning edition, unpag.; Camille Pelletan, “España ante el extranjero Un juicio de Pelletan,” El País, October 13, 1909, 3; España Nueva, October 16, 1909, unpag.; Gabriel Alomar, “Un artículo notable,” El Motín, November 4, 1909, 2.  See the special edition Der Anarchist, October 13, 1910; for the reporting on the freethinker congress 1910 in Barcelona, “A todos los librepensadores,” Solidaridad Obrera, October 7, 1910, unpag.; Baldomoro Agente, “Ferrer,” Heraldo de Madrid, October 30, 1911 unpag.; for the freemasons, Centro Documental de la Memoria Histórica, 760-B-7; Boletin Oficial de la Gran Logia Simbólica Regional Catalana-Balear 16 (1914): 15; in Spain in general El País, October 18, 1910, unpag.; for France, Archives de la Préfecture de Police de Paris, BA 1075; the naming of streets in the honor of the pedagogue see Jean-Francois Aguinaga, “Francisco Ferrer et l’École Moderne de Barcelone” (PhD Diss., Université Paris X, 1992– 93), 212– 289.

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initiative of the freethinkers of the city. Money for the monument, that still stands today, came not only from Belgium, but also from France, the German Empire, Spain, Romania, and Italy. At the unveiling in November 1911, letters from well-known European representatives of the protests, such as Haeckel, were read out. Ferrer’s eldest daughter, anarchistic and republican friends from Spain, and a British acquaintance from the educational network personally travelled to the celebration.⁹² The European communication community resulted in a strong similarity of reporting in the Ferrer case.⁹³ In the longer term, the joint protest also helped to form a shared anticlerical culture. Not only was the death of the pedagogue commemorated simultaneously in various places in Europe in the years to come, but the anticlericals also made him their martyr. In the anticlerical discourse of the nineteenth century, European church critics repeatedly referred to historical figures who had died as martyrs for the common cause, such as Giordano Bruno (1548 – 1600) or Jan Hus (ca. 1369 – 1415).⁹⁴ This gallery of heroes conveyed the idea of a shared European experience of religious persecution, just like the narratives developed in the course of the Mortara affair. After the protests in 1909, Ferrer, dubbed “Apostle” or “Martyr” or “Saviour” in the reports, was included among these anticlerical heroes.⁹⁵

 See for the history of the monument Avilés Farré, Francisco Ferrer, 277– 278; Sofia Vergara, “El monumento a Ferrer” (Translation of the MA thesis: Le culte Francisco Ferrer en Belgique, Universidad Libre de Bruselas 1987), 124– 143; for the international connections Ferrer, Vie de Francisco Ferrer, 184– 190; Park, “The European Reaction,” 209.  See the description of Ferrer’s last hours “Die Erschießung Ferrers: Die Exekution,” Frankfurter Zeitung, October 16, 1909, evening edition, 2; “Die Trägodie von Montjuich,” Menschentum 38 (1909): 176.  See for the lists, for example, “A Paris: Un manifeste du Grand-Orient,” L’Action, October 16, 1909, unpag.; Manuel de la Revilla, “El Concilio del Vaticano,” Justicia Social, January 28, 1870, 1; “La carta del padre Jacinto,” El Imparcial, September 25, 1869, unpag.; Paul Harms, “Technik und Menschlichkeit,” Berliner Tageblatt, October 16, 1909, evening edition, unpag.; Bruno Wille, “Märtyrer der Freiheit,” Freidenker 17 (1909): 162.  See on the term “apostle,” René Besnard, “La conscience universelle,” La Lanterne, September 20, 1909, unpag.; “En Portugal. Protestas del Directoria Republicano,” El Liberal, October 21, 1909, unpag.; “Die Trägodie von Montjuich,” Menschentum 38 (1909): 173; on the term “martyr,” L. Jouhaux, “Au meutre!,” Voix du Peuple, October 24 till 31, 1909, 1; Henry Berenger, “La leçon de martyr,” Le Siècle, October 14, 1909, unpag.; “La lection du martyre,” L’Action, October 14, 1909, 1; Sicard de Plauzoles, “Francisco Ferrer: Discours prononcé au Grand Orient de France,” L’Acacia 24 (1909): 122; V.G., “Saludemos al Maestro,” Tierra y Libertad, October 13, 1911, 2; “A todos los librepensadores,” Solidaridad Obrera, October 7, 1910, unpag.; “El fusilamiento de Ferrer: V aniversario,” El Socialista, October 13, 1914, 1; “En Bruselas: Inauguración del monumento á Ferrer,” España Nueva, November 5, 1911, 2; “En honor de Ferrer,” Palabra Libre, October 29,

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The successful European networking on the initiative of a social outsider was countered by relatively restrained national support in Spain. Several reasons made it difficult for the Spanish anticlericals to protest. The first was above all the rigid censorship regime.⁹⁶ Secondly, the pedagogue was assessed much more critically by moderate forces in Spain and his innocence doubted because of his revolutionary past.⁹⁷ Third, Ferrer had problematic relationships to some of the anticlericals, such as the republicans or the anarchists. Potential defenders had been involved in the July riots of the Semana Trágica and therefore Ferrer functioned as a scape-goat too.⁹⁸ The fourth reason was the ambivalent position of the Spanish anticlericals in the interplay of identities in the protests, as I will now explain. During the protests, European anticlericals portrayed Spain using the typical stereotypes of the leyenda negra. The term “black legend” refers to the narrative of the negative image of Spain, which is based on the depictions of the atrocities during the conquest of America, the persecution of the Jews and Moors, and the Spanish Inquisition, and has been repeated since the sixteenth century.⁹⁹ Critics evoked the inquisition and portrayed the Jesuits as the masterminds of Ferrer’s execution, with the government only the tool of the clergy.¹⁰⁰ Moreover, the anticlericals used a second topos, the discourse of the inferiority of the Catholic nations, which was common to the culture of the nineteenth century.¹⁰¹ One article commented “this all-powerful [clerical, L.D.] class in Spain has so far managed to maintain the mentality of most of the peninsula on the level of what it was under Charles V.”¹⁰² For the anticlericals, the backwardness of Spain resulted

1911, unpag.; “Aus dem Schuldbuch der alleinseeligmachenden Kirche,” Der Anarchist, October 13, 1910, Supplement, unpag.; “Frankfurt, 14.10.,” Frankfurter Zeitung, October 14, 1909, evening edition, 1; Bruno Wille, “Märtyrer der Freiheit,” Freidenker 17 (1909): 162; on the depiction as “saviour,” “Freudvolle Trauer,” Der Anarchist, October 13, 1910, unpag.  See Aguinaga, “Francisco Ferrer,” 204– 206.  See Avilés Farré, Francisco Ferrer, 258 – 261.  See Aguinaga, “Francisco Ferrer,” 304– 306; Avilés Farré, Francisco Ferrer, 259.  See e. g. Julián Juderías, La leyenda negra: Estudios acerca del concepto de España en el extranjero (Salamanca: Junta de Castilla y León Consejería de Cultura y Turismo, 2003); Henry Kamen, Del imperio a la decadencia: Los mitos que forjaron la España moderna (Madrid: Temas de hoy, 2006).  See Theodor Wolff, “Das Verbrechen von Montjuich,” Berliner Tageblatt, October 14, 1909, morning edition, unpag.  See Martin Baumeister, Parität und katholische Inferiorität: Untersuchung zur Stellung des Katholizismus im Deutschen Kaiserreich (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1987).  Comité de défense des victimes de la répression espagnole, Un martyr des prêtres: Francisco Ferrer (10 janvier 1859 – 13 octobre 1909). Sa vie – son œuvre (Paris: Librairie Schleicher, 1909), 8.

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from the overwhelming influence of the clergy,¹⁰³ who were responsible for the irrational faith of the people, their poor education, and for the bad economy.¹⁰⁴ This picture of the Spanish nation was constructed against the image of Europe. Spain was implicitly or explicitly excluded from Europe. The renowned liberal journalist Theodor Wolff (1868 – 1943) wrote in an editorial in the liberal daily newspaper Berliner Tageblatt as a commentary on the execution: “The well-known dictum ‘Il n’y a plus de Pyrénées’, ‘the Pyrenees are no more’, has even less meaning since yesterday than before.”¹⁰⁵ Europe was the central image of self-description of the protests. The anticlericals spoke of “l’Europe consciente,”¹⁰⁶ “Europe’s cultural conscience”¹⁰⁷ and articulated the self-image of a critical public.¹⁰⁸ Again, it was the idea of a superior European civilization

 See “Barcelone, 12 Septembre 1909,” Temps Nouveaux, October 2, 1909, 6; Sicard de Plauzoles, “Francisco Ferrer: Discours prononcé au Grand Orient de France,” L’Acacia 24 (1909): 125; Harmel, “Der Terror in Spanien,” Der Anarchist, October 16, 1909, 3; Eduard Bernstein, “Der Tod Ferrers und die Macht der Öffentlichen Meinung,” Sozialistische Monatshefte 13 (1909): 1402; Paul Michaelis, “Politische Wochenschau,” Berliner Tageblatt, October 17, 1909, unpag.; Roger de Flor, “Der graue Schrecken: Die Herrschaft der Kutten in Spanien,” BZ am Mittag, October 19, 1909, unpag.; Ferdinand Freiligrath, “Ein Held, ein Rächer….,” Der Freidenker 17 (1909): 162.  See for the faith Sicard de Plauzoles, “Francisco Ferrer: Discours prononcé au Grand Orient de France,” L’Acacia 24 (1909): 125; “Aus dem Schuldbuch der alleinseeligmachenden Kirche,” Der Anarchist, October 13, 1910, Supplement; Eduard Bernstein, “Der Tod Ferrers und die Macht der Öffentlichen Meinung,” Sozialistische Monatshefte 13 (1909): 1402; Paul Michaelis, “Politische Wochenschau,” Berliner Tageblatt, October 17, 1909, unpag.; for education, Pierre Broodcoodens, “La Cas Francisco Ferrer,” Société Nouvelle 11 (1909): 70; Charles Dumont, “Vive l‘éco..le!,” L’Action, October 20, 1909, 1; Camille Pelletan, “Impressions de voyage: L’Espagne noire,” Le Matin, October 13, 1909, unpag.; Internationaler Freidenkerbund, “Aufruf an alle Freidenker der Welt,” Der Freidenker 17 (1909): 177; for the economic backwardness, Camille Pelletan, “Impressions de voyage: L’Espagne noire,” Le Matin, October 13, 1909, unpag.; Pierre Broodcoodens, “La Cas Francisco Ferrer,” Société Nouvelle 11 (1909): 70; Harmel, “Der Terror in Spanien,” Der Anarchist, October 16, 1909, 3; J. S., “Für Ferrer,” Berliner Tageblatt, October 9, 1909, morning edition, unpag.  The metaphor of the vanishing of the Pyrenees is used to indicate that Spain had caught up with the rest of Europe in its political, cultural, and economic developments. See Theodor Wolff, “Das Verbrechen von Montjuich,” Berliner Tageblatt, October 14, 1909, morning edition, unpag.  “La Réaction en Espagne: La suspension des garanties constitutionnelle. Le Gouvernement ne se laisserat influencer,” L’Action, October 11, 1909, 1.  Hermann Wendel, Francisco Ferrer: Ein Kapitel Reaktion und Inquisition. Erweiterter Vortrag (Frankfurt am Main, 1909), 13.  See J. Grave, “Une défaite, un défi, un leçon,” Temps Nouveaux, October 30, 1909, 1; Jean Jaurès, “Les voix qui s’élèvent,” Humanité, October 7, 1909, unpag. “Le Senat: France et Espagne. Declarations de M. Pichon,” Le Matin, October 20, 1909, unpag.; A. Aulard, “Opinions republicaines: A propos de Ferrer,” Le Siècle, October 10, 1909, unpag.; “La Réaction en Espagne,” L’Action, September 13, 1909, unpag.; “Manifestacion de Madrid,” El Socialista, October 29, 1909,

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that had to be defended.¹⁰⁹ Also in 1909 there were worldwide protests and global collective terms in the reporting, but again Europe was dominant both in the perception of the actors and in self-description. Europe stood for civilization, culture, and progress, for the values of Ferrer, laical education, reason, and enlightenment.¹¹⁰ It was equated – in contrast to the trial of Ferrer – with the rule of law and justice, as well as with freedom, especially from the clergy.¹¹¹ These values were thought to be universal. However, at the same time Spain was excluded from the space of their validity via the binary construction of the identity concept.¹¹² Of course, the invocation of Europe was pronounced with the

unpag.; Eduard Bernstein, “Der Tod Ferrers und die Macht der öffentlichen Meinung,” Sozialistische Monatshefte 13 (1909): 1401– 1405; “Ferrer zum Tode verurteilt?,” Berliner Tageblatt, October 11, 1909, evening edition, unpag.; without the direct use of the term, “De la Semana,” Nuevo Regimen, Ocotber 16, 1909, unpag.; “Contra España,” El Motín, October 21, 1909, 1; “Contra España,” El Liberal, October 17, 1909; unpag.; Harmel, “Der Terror in Spanien,” Der Anarchist, October 16, 1909, unpag.; E. Vogtherr, “Francisco Ferrer und die spanische Inquisition von 1909,” Der Freidenker 17 (1909): 168.  See for civilization and culture Charles Dumont, “Vive l‘éco…le!,” L’Action, October 20, 1909, 1; “Ferrer zum Tode veruteilt?,” Berliner Tageblatt, October 11, 1909, evening edition, unpag.; for progress “Le G. O. de France: Pour notre F. Ferrer,” L’Acacia 24 (1909): 247; “Der Weltprotest gegen die spanischen Mörder,” Vorwärts, October 15, 1909, Supplement, unpag.; Paul Michaelis, “Politische Wochenschau,” Berliner Tageblatt, October 17, 1909, unpag.  See “Contre le Fauves d’Alphonse,” Voix du Peuple, October 17 till 24, 1909, unpag.; H. Monin, “Le procès de Ferrer et la Franc-Maçonnerie espagnole,” L’Action, October 11, 1909, unpag.; “Manifestacion de Madrid,” El Socialista, October 29, 1909, unpag.; Paul Michaelis, “Politische Wochenschau,” Berliner Tageblatt, October 17, 1909, unpag.  See for rule of law, Jean Jaurès, “Le mauvais coup,” L’Humanité, October 14, 1909; “Le prêtre: Voilà l’ennemi!,” La Lanterne, October 16, 1909, unpag.; Jean Herbette, “Bulletin de l’Exterieur: Une protestation nécessaire,” Le Siècle, October 15, 1909, unpag.; Anselmo Lorenzo, “Revolucion y solidaridad,” El Socialista, October 22, 1909, unpag.; “Los mintins de Zaragoza,” El País, October 25, 1909, unpag.; “Frankfurt, 14.10.,” Frankfurter Zeitung, October 14, 1909, evening edition, 1; for freedom, Theodor Wolff, “Das Verbrechen von Montjuich,” Berliner Tageblatt, October 14, 1909, morning edition, unpag.; Pierre Carvin, “Recommencements,” Temps Nouveaux, November 13, 1909, 1; Parti Socialiste, Fédération de la Seine, “Au peuple de Paris,” L’Humanité, October 16, 1909, 1; “Le prêtre: Voilà l’ennemi!,” La Lanterne, October 16, 1909, unpag.; “Manifestacion de Madrid,” El Socialista, October 29, 1909, unpag.; “Aufklärer oder Anarchist,” Der Anarchist, October 22, 1909, unpag.; “Der Weltprotest gegen die spanischen Mörder,” Vorwärts, October 15, 1909, Supplement, unpag.; “Erschießung Ferrers: Die Hinrichtung Ferrer und der Ursprung der Aufstände,” Frankfurter Zeitung, October 17, 1909, third morning edition, 1.  See the construction of Europe via Othering in general, Bo Stråth, ed., Europe and the Other and Europe as the Other (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2000); for Europe’s peripheral or inner Other, e. g. Ezequiel Adamovsky, Euro-Orientalism: Liberal Ideology and the Image of Russia in France (c. 1740 – 1880) (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2006); Helge V. Holm, Sissel Lægreid, and Torgeir Skorgen, eds., Europe and Its Interior Other(s) (Aarhus: Aarhus Universitetsforlag, 2014); Katarina Ge-

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demand for Spain to adapt, but the identity images created a hierarchy. The exclusive character of the European identity image was accompanied by real exclusion too. Besides anticlerical violence against churches and church institutions, in the demonstrations the Spanish flag was burned, Spanish emblems pulled down, and the buildings of consulates and embassies attacked.¹¹³ Furthermore, unionists organized a boycott of Spanish goods in some French ports, thereby excluding Spain from the trade market.¹¹⁴ Of course, these attacks caused reactions in defense of Spain. The Spanish government refused to tolerate the violent attacks and demanded that the governments of the countries in which the protests were taking place stop them. However, these responded only sporadically to the Spanish demands.¹¹⁵ But what were the reactions of the possible supporters of Ferrer in Spain – how did they cope with these hetero-stereotypes and the ostracism? In the first place, they adopted the anti-Spanish criticism. Spanish anticlericals used the execution of Ferrer to express their criticism of the status quo of Spain: the influence of the clergy, the inquisitional procedure of the government, the fanatic religiosity, the economic situation. Europe ended for them too at the Pyrenees.¹¹⁶

phardt, The Idea of Europe in British Travel Narratives, 1789 – 1914 (London: Taylor and Francis, 2016).  See for anticlerical violence, Park, “The European Reaction,” 271– 276; Luis M. Lázaro Lorente, “El proceso de Francisco Ferrer Guardia: Repercusiones nacionales e internacionales,” Tiempo de historia 7, no. 84 (1981): 36; Pere Solà Gussinyer, “Las consecuencias europeas del fusilamiento de Ferrer i Guàrdia,” Historia y vida 18, no. 211 (1985): 37– 38; Fernando García Sanz, “El caso Ferrer: imagen y relaciones internacionales de España,” in Actes de les jornades sobre la Setmana Tràgica (1909): Barcelona, 5, 6 i 7 de maig de 2009 (Barcelona: Balmesiana, 2009), 350, 455; for the violence against the symbols of Spain, Archives Nationales de France, Police, F/7/ 13066.  See Solà Gussinyer, “Las consecuencias europeas,” 31.  See Park, “The European Reaction,” 230; Solà Gussinyer, “Las consecuencias europeas,” 32; Fernando García Sanz, Historia de las relaciones entre España e Italia: Imágenes, comercio y política exterior (1890 – 1914) (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1994), 347– 377; José Manuel Allendesalazar, La diplomacia española y Marruecos, 1907 – 1909 (Madrid: Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional Instituto de Cooperación con el Mundo Arabe, 1990), 233 – 254.  See for autoexclusión, “Semana en la Iglesia,” El Liberal, October 18, 1909, unpag.; “Mis escrúpulos,” El Motín, October 28, 1909, 1; for the criticism and the power of the clergy, “Saludemos al Maestro,” Tierra y Libertad, October 13, 1911, 2; “A todos los librepensadores,” Solidaridad Obrera, October 7, 1910, unpag.; “Mis escrúpulos,” El Motín, October 7, 1909, 1; Joaquin Dicenta, “Con Europa,” El Liberal, October 21, 1909, unpag.; for the economic influence, “Saludemos al Maestro,” Tierra y Libertad, October 13, 1911, 2; Joaquin Dicenta, “Con Europa,” El Liberal, October 21, 1909, unpag.; in respect of education, “Manifestacion de Madrid,” El Socialista,

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They referred to Europe in almost every article, describing their shame and dishonor in view of the incident and the feeling that they were in front of the tribunal of liberal Europe: We are harshly judged, outraged, destroyed, and the name of Spain is pronounced today all over the world with indignation, anger, or contempt, and we are threatened with all kinds of reprisals; […] we are for much of foreign opinion, the plague of civilization, the pariahs of human dignity, those who must be conquered, hunted, exterminated¹¹⁷

wrote the anticlerical and republican daily newspaper El Motín. The vehement self-criticism put the Spanish anticlericals in a dilemma. By adopting the binary images of Europe and Spain, the Spanish anticlericals accepted that European values did not have validity in Spain, although they laid claim to them. Spain did not yet belong to Europe in their self-image and thus did not share its world of experience. A way out of this blind alley was to determine the direction in which Spain had to develop. But, in front of the official Spain, in front of the black Spain, which Maura represents, there is another Spain, which joins its voice to that of Europe in the Press, in the Athenaeums, in the parliaments, in the Councils, in the ‘meetings’, everywhere. That Spain has spoken loud and strong […]. The other Spain that of today […] will proclaim […] its reincorporation into the future, its identity of free and progressive humanity.”¹¹⁸

As in this article from the daily newspaper Liberal, the anticlericals made use of the idea of the “other Spain” – a Spain that was part of modern Europe and its values. This debate took up the ongoing discussions on the two Spains, which determined Spain’s identity discourse in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.¹¹⁹ In particular, the so-called disaster of 1898 and the loss of Cuba and Puerto Rico as the supposed end of the empire led to an intensified debate on the future national orientation. Europe was the central reference point in this debate at the turn of the century, standing for enlightenment, progress, and liberalism. In 1909, liber-

October 29, 1909, unpag.; Un clérigo de esta corte, “La Semana en la Iglesia,” El País, November 3, 1909, unpag.  “Contra España,” El Motín, October 21, 1909, 1.  Joaquin Dicenta, “Con Europa,” El Liberal, October, 21, 1909, unpag.  See e. g. for the two Spain José Álvarez Junco, Mater dolorosa: La idea de España en el siglo XIX (Madrid: Taurus, 2001), 383 – 431; Santos Juliá Díaz, Historias de las dos Españas, 5th ed. (Madrid: Taurus, 2006).

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al and enlightened as well as conservative and Christian Spain were once again in conflict with each other, with only the former referring positively to Europe.¹²⁰ This dispute over the national self-image complicated the situation of the anticlericals in 1909 even more: the Spanish anticlericals had to defend themselves against the reproach of conservatives of being antipatriotic.¹²¹ The radical anticlericals such as the republicans answered that it was they who were truly patriotic.¹²² Others like the liberals, in contrast, gave their protest an anti-governmental direction, only employing some of the anti-Spanish hetero-stereotypes and omitting any anticlerical criticism, although in 1909 in general the Spanish liberals had put anticlericalism on their agenda.¹²³ Both reactions show the ambivalent position, which implied the binary image of Europe and Spain and the exclusionary character of the former. Such identity-building processes are typical for supposedly peripheral European countries, as studies on Italy, Finland, and Portugal illustrate. In a complex process of containment and exclusion, the parties in the various cases sought to define national identity in terms of a

 In other moments Europe could also stand for Christian and traditional values and thus act as a positive reference for the “other,” the conservative Spain, see Johannes Großmann, “‘Baroque Spain’ as Metaphor: Hispanidad, Europeanism and Cold War Anti-Comunism in Francoist Spain,” Bulletin of Spanish Studies 91 (2014). For the discourse on Spain and Europe in general see e. g. Pedro Laín Entralgo, España como problema, 2nd ed. (Madrid: Aguilar, 1957); Francisco Villacorta, “Les espagnols et le défi européen au XXe siècle,” in Les Europe des Européens, ed. René Girault (Paris: Université Institut Pierre Renouvin, 1993), 31; José Luis Abellán, El reto europeo: Identidades culturales en el cambio de siglo (Madrid: Trotta, 1994); Birgit Aschmann, “Spanien: ‘Eine seltsame Ente im europäischen Teich’? Zur Bedeutung von Europa und Europabildern im spätneuzeitlichen Spanien,” in Leitbild Europa? Europabilder und ihre Wirkungen in der Neuzeit, ed. Jürgen Elvert and Jürgen Nielsen-Sikora (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2009).  See Pedro Voltes, La Semana Trágica: 1953 [sic!], 26 julio (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1995), 200 – 204.  See P., “Jesuitismo de Maura,” El País, October 30, 1909, unpag.; “El gobierno español y la solidaridad internacional,” España Nueva, October 15, 1909, unpag.; Gabriel Alomar, “Davant l’opinió d’Europa,” Campana de Gràcia, November 27, 1909, unpag.  See e. g. “Momentos criticos,” El Imparcial, October 15, 1909, 1; for the liberal anticlericalism at that time see Julio De la Cueva Merino, Clericales y anticlericales: El conflicto entre confesionalidad y secularización en Cantabria (1875 – 1923) (Santander: Universidad de Cantabria, 1994), 38 – 45, 217– 223; María P. Salomón Chéliz, “El anticlericalismo en la calle: Republicanismo, populismo, radicalismo y protesta popular (1898 – 1913),” in La secularización conflictiva: España 1898 – 1931, ed. Julio De la Cueva Merino and Feliciano Montero García (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2007), 134– 137; Manuel Suárez Cortina, “Entre cirios, barricadas y bayonetas el anticlericalismo en España de fin de siglo,” in La semana trágica de Cataluña, ed. Antonio Moliner (Barcelona: Nabla, 2009), 37– 39.

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strenuous European orientation or a clear demarcation towards Europe.¹²⁴ In the case of Ferrer, this process hampered a complete affiliation of the Spanish anticlericals with the protests of their European fellow campaigners. In 1909, thus, the development of ideas of Europe did not go hand in hand with Europeanization in the sense of networking; rather, the anticlerical idea of Europe hindered a stronger European orientation.

Conclusion In the nineteenth century, anticlericals increasingly became Europeanized in the sense of Europe being a central reference point of church criticism. Anticlericals used the press, the telegraph, and the growing institutional connections of news agencies for their cross-border protests. They published writings with a European focus, established personal contacts between European countries, and founded European associations. They developed a European network. Some of the connections also took on a global character, but their core was predominantly European, as was the perceptual space. As a result of these entanglements, a European culture of anticlericalism emerged, which manifested itself, for example, in a shared church-critical repertoire of narratives and common heroes as well as in the idea of a common experience of religious intolerance.¹²⁵ Anticlericals also became more European as they developed notions of a common self-understanding or a common identity. The increasing networking could lead to the development of the self-understanding as a European public. However, this did not happen automatically. The prerequisite for this was an appropriation of the specific case, which had to have a thematic connection for the potential protesters, as the restrained reporting on the First Vatican Council and the mobilization of civil society groups in 1869/1870 show. Moreover, anticlericals established a specific European identity in their discourse. As well as being a community of states, Europe was fashioned as a com-

 See Mikael af Malmborg, “The Dual Appeal of ‘Europe’ in Italy,” in Malmborg and Stråth, The Meaning of Europe; José E. Franco and Teresa Pinheiro, “Being the Face of Europe or Bringing Up the Rear – Ideas of Europe in Portugal, 16th to 18th Century,” in Ideas of/for Europe: An Interdisciplinary Approach to European Identity, ed. Teresa Pinheiro, Beata Cieszyńska, and José Eduardo-Franco (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2012); for Spain see Aschmann, “Spanien”; Stefan Nygård, “Die Moderne übersetzen: Visionen und Gebrauchsweisen von Europa in Finnland,” in Bösch, Brill, and Greiner, Europabilder im 20. Jahrhundert.  The emergence of this anticlerical culture did not of course mean that there were no national differences. See Borutta, Antikatholizismus; Dittrich, Antiklerikalismus in Europa.

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munity of shared values. Anticlericals equated Europe with natural law, the rule of law, freedom of conscience or freedom from the clergy in general, with progress, secular education, reason, and enlightenment. In their struggle, they called upon the image of a secular Europe that increasingly no longer contained religious traits. In 1858, Europe was equated with a certain idea of Christianity. In the light of the sources of 1909, it seems that this religious element diminished as increasingly secularist anticlerical thinking and a materialistic worldview emerged.¹²⁶ This anticlerical Europe stood for the superior civilization common to nineteenth-century political thought. This idea of Europe, which has so far received little attention, was only one concept of Europe among several in the nineteenth century and conflicted with other ideas, such as the Christian idea of Europe. The three cases examined here have shown that references to Europe as an area of perception, as well as the idea of Europe, were primarily sought from marginal positions. It was not only spatial periphery¹²⁷ which referred to Europe in its various dimensions, but also social positions at the margins of society. Reference to Europe had above all a compensatory function. In the case of a poor flow of European information or a repressive national press policy, one oriented oneself towards Europe. The comparison of countries shows that the peripheral position in media networking certainly had a crucial influence, even if the role of censorship as a whole must be regarded as decisive for the second half of the nineteenth century. The use of Europe as a common identity was a source of legitimacy and particularly interesting for the marginalized groups or countries that were supposed to be at the periphery. Europeanization in the sense of networking and the development of European ideas did not necessarily go hand in hand. As the second case study shows, the European ideas developed in the context of the Vatican Council in Spain did indeed represent a source of legitimacy for national political demands, but this did not lead to increased networking and mobilization, which was hindered by the attention given to national questions. And the case of Ferrer demonstrates that the binary structure of the constructed European identity also limited increasing Europeanization in terms of networking: during the protests in Spain in 1909 the exclusionary character of anticlerical Europe was at odds with the

 See e. g. Jacqueline Lalouette, La libre pensée en France: 1848 – 1940 (Paris: Albin Michel, 1997), 175 – 183; Álvarez Lázaro, Masonería y librepensamiento, 7– 13, 107– 210; Frank Simon-Ritz, Die Organisation einer Weltanschauung: Die freigeistige Bewegung im Wilhelminischen Deutschland (Gütersloh: Kaiser, 1997), 57– 165.  See Frank Bösch, Ariane Brill, and Florian Greiner, eds., Europabilder im 20. Jahrhundert: Entstehung an der Peripherie (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2012).

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national identity image. The anticlerical European identity called upon universal values but was constructed in a binary way, which could exclude especially those nations thought to be on the margins of Europe and hinder Europeanization in terms of networking as well as the development of a common experience. What can we draw from all this regarding the questions of Europeanization, the European public sphere, and European ideas? First, I would argue that we must abandon the idea of automatic transcendence, even though the different levels of Europeanization and European ideas interact with each other in multiple ways: increasing European communicative networking does not end with the emergence of a communication community. The formation of ideas of Europe as sources of legitimacy is not necessarily the result of Europeanization and does not necessarily help to strengthen Europeanization. With regard to the question of developing a European public sphere, this means the following: on the one hand, a European public sphere as a communication context in a system-theoretical understanding does not imply that a self-understanding as a critical public sphere develops at the same time. On the other hand, the discursive idea of a unity of Europe can arise without a Europe-wide communication structure. Therefore, the various aspects of a European public sphere should always be considered together but differentiated. Second, the empirical examples and the findings on the compensatory character of Europe give rise to the hypothesis of a change, which could become a task for future research: As the press regime was liberalized and societies were increasingly pluralized, the European media network lost some of its attractiveness. Such a historicization of the elaborated structural function, however, should not be restricted to simple causal relationships. Instead, we should follow on from this by asking what types of European networking existed in each case, elaborating their function, and analyzing the effect on European self-understanding and identity formation.

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Anna Klimaszewska, Michał Gałędek

Defenders of the Napoleonic Code as the Heralds of Pan-European Visions of Law The Polish Discourse about the Concept of National Codification at the Beginning of the Nineteenth Century

Introduction Nowadays, in the age of harmonizing the law within the European Union, the issue of distinguishing characteristics of the Polish legal system is often brought up in public debate. Many Polish politicians and publicists underscore the need to retain these idiosyncratic institutions and voice concerns regarding the dangers of imposing solutions that run against Polish traditions and national needs. Slogans such as “national identity,” “national needs,” or “national legal tradition” have been the leitmotif of public debate in Poland for a few years now. However, similar issues and debates have emerged in Polish public debates a number of times in the past. In the mid-eighteenth century, Poland was a failed state as regards its structure and the principles which governed public life. This situation was aggravated by an inept estate-based and feudal justice system and an anachronistic legal system devoid of codification and largely predicated on customary law and legal particularism. Its outdated character became more evident as a consequence of the French Revolution and its impact on European political thought and ideology. Following the three partitions of its territories, by 1795 Poland was erased from the map of Europe. The annexed territories were now governed by the legal systems and instruments of Prussia, Austria, and Russia. Subsequently, in the wake of the Napoleonic Wars of 1807, the Duchy of Warsaw was created as a French protectorate.¹ Its establishment, however, did not result

Note: This publication was prepared as part of the project “National Codification – A Phantasm or a Realistic Alternative? In the Circle of Debates over the Native System of Law in the Constitutional Kingdom of Poland,” supported by funds from the National Science Centre, grant number UMO-2015/18/E/HS5/00762.  Antoni Wyczechowski, Myśli względem prawodawstwa narodowego [Thoughts on National Legislation], Princes Czartoryski Library in Krakow, manuscript no. 5259 V, 70 – 71. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110685473-012

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in the restitution of the pre-partition Polish legal order, against the expectations of a large part of the Polish political elite and nobility.² Instead, Napoleon decided to implement the Napoleonic Code as the new civil law in the Polish territories. French codes – of civil procedure and commercial law – were also adopted, as well as many other legal institutions modelled on the French template.³ The authorities of the Duchy also decided to uphold Prussian and Austrian penal law. The fall of Napoleon put an end to the Duchy of Warsaw, which fell under Russian occupation in 1813. Until then, the Polish political elites of the Duchy – who opposed the introduction of Napoleonic codes in Polish territories and advocated the reinstatement of Old Polish laws, or the development of a new national code based on them – had not had any way to effectively enforce their program. The Russian takeover changed this situation.⁴ This article discusses how members of the intellectual elite envisaged the rearrangement of the Polish legal order at the time the constitutional Kingdom of Poland was established, in 1815. It focusses in particular on memoranda by two eminent Polish lawyers: the Judge of the Supreme Court, Antoni Wyczechowski, and one of the most esteemed Polish legal historians of the nineteenth century and Dean of the Faculty of Law and Administration at the University of Warsaw, Jan Wincenty Bandtkie. They were both appointed by the Codification Commission, the main authority entrusted in 1815 with the codification of law in its various areas, to assess whether it was possible to develop a national code, given that the Kingdom of Poland had inherited the conglomerate of European legal codes mentioned above. It is uncertain whether other specialists were asked to express their opinion on these issues, but in the surviving sources – among other writings related to the activities of the Codification Commission – only these two refer to the reform of the legislation. The fundamental problem for Wyczechowski and Bandkie was identifying the national needs of the Poles in the nineteenth-century reality – identifying  Aleksander Kraushar, “W setną rocznicę Kodeksu Napoleona” [On the Centenary of the Napoleonic Code], Gazeta Sądowa Warszawska 22 (1908): 331– 332; Katarzyna Sójka-Zielińska, Kodeks Napoleona. Historia i współczesność [The Napoleonic Code: History and Contemporaneity] (Warsaw: LexisNexis, 2008), 195 – 196.  Władysław Sobociński, “Rozwój ustawodawstwa cywilnego w Królestwie Polskim i w Rosji do rosyjskiej reformy sądowej (Zarys historyczno-porównawczy)” [Development of Civil Legislation in the Kingdom of Poland and Russia until the Russian Court Reform (A Historical and Comparative Outline)], Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Skłodowska, Sectio G (Ius) 12 (1965): 122.  Szymon Askenazy, “Zagrożenie Kodeksu Napoleona przy utworzeniu Królestwa Polskiego” [The Threat of the Napoleonic Code at the Beginning of the Kingdom of Poland], in Szymon Askenazy, Szkice i portrety [Sketches and Portraits] (Warsaw: Biblioteka Polska, 1937), 374.

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what Polish legal tradition actually meant for them as well as its place in Europe. At the same time, being perceived as a gauge of modernity, Europe and its legal ideas and standards of codification appeared both as an expression of hope and as a threat,⁵ being unsuited to Polish society and provoking heated controversies in social discourse.⁶

A Shared European Legal Identity In his memo, written most likely at the end of 1815, Wyczechowski, first of all, contemplated the essence of the national legal tradition which, as he observed, many of his contemporaries wished to bring back. He gave much thought to the Polish legal culture and the extent to which old pre-partition laws reflected the national spirit of nineteenth-century Poland. In analyzing these issues, he first and foremost noticed that Poles, since they had become a “Christian nation,” began to lose their “original laws and customs.”⁷ “Religion has brought all Christian nations together as one family,” “ushered in from foreign lands, it also ushered [into Poland] foreign laws and customs,” contributing to a sense of common European cultural identity. Wyczechowski believed that the spreading of the Christian religion constituted a natural stimulus for the Polish legal system to follow the same path as other European cultures. According to him, this was caused by the fact that, along with religion, Roman law – and partially canon law as well – became the “sources of law for all Christian nations.”⁸ From this, he drew the conclusion that the national Polish law was nothing but “mere modifications of Roman and canon laws which grew out of the mixture of these laws with national laws and customs; [as well as] out of the influence of neighbouring laws and customs.”⁹ Therefore, for Wyczechowski, the tendency

 See Florian Greiner, Peter Pichler, and Jan Vermeiren, “Reconsidering Europeanization: An Introduction” in this volume.  For more see “Prace Komitetu Cywilnego Reformy nad przygotowaniem narodowej kodyfikacji prawa cywilnego i procedury cywilnej w przededniu utworzenia Królestwa Polskiego (1814– 1815) – edycja źródłowa. Część I” [Works of the Civil Reform Committee on the Civil Law and Civil Procedure Codification on the Eve of the Establishment of the Kingdom of Poland (1814– 1815) – Historical Source Edition, Part I], ed. Michał Gałędek, Anna Klimaszewska, and Piotr Pomianowski, Krakowskie Studia z Historii Państwa i Prawa 12, no. 2 (2019): 239 – 275; Tadeusz Mencel, “L’introduction du Code Napoléon dans le Duché de Varsovie (1808),” Czasopismo PrawnoHistoryczne, 1, no. 2 (1949): 141– 198.  Wyczechowski, Myśli, 62. Unless otherwise noted, all translations are the authors’.  Wyczechowski, Myśli, 62– 63.  Wyczechowski, Myśli, 62.

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to make legal systems uniform resulted on the one hand from the formation of a shared Christian European legal legacy, and on the other hand, from a particular body of ideas, principles, and institutions which had emerged on the foundations of Roman and canon laws. As for the direct influence of “neighbouring laws and customs” (mainly German) on the legal system in the Polish territories since the Middle Ages, Wyczechowski highlighted a general rule characteristic of peripheral countries. He pointed out that “with the growth of civilisation, it is natural to reach for [praised] foreign laws of those nations from which we take illumination, customs, and needs, behind which there is an opinion.”¹⁰ The reason why certain foreign legislations were considered templates had a wider dimension and was visible both in the legislative work and in the process of the application of law. The anachronism and outdatedness of the domestic legal system, explained in more detail in the next subchapter, gave many an occasion to borrow from other legal cultures. According to Wyczechowski, this practice became more commonplace along with the development of international relations. At the same time, he emphasized that “express laws” did not always have to be diffused. More often, a shared “spirit and custom brought them to [a given] country.”¹¹ All this was facilitated by belonging to the same cultural circles based on the Christian/Roman legal tradition. On the other hand, however, Wyczechowski could not deny that Poland, as a state which had existed continuously since the tenth century, and which had successfully contended for the title of one of the largest and most populous states in Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, had all the means to create its own, unique components of national legal culture. Wyczechowski, while aware of these elements, tried not to overestimate their significance, but he did point out that the features of Polish uniqueness consisted not only of the legislative acts issued in the Polish territories (royal statutes and Sejm constitutions), but also of “original national customs which had developed over centuries, court practice, prejudicata, and the clout of authors who had written about the laws and had been consulted in Poland in cases connected with municipal matters and bills of exchange.”¹² Similarly, as in the case of the permeation of foreign customs, Wyczechowski approached his analysis of the process through which the national legal culture emerged in the context of the jurisprudential practice of courts, as best known to him. He pointed to the diversified

 Wyczechowski, Myśli, 64.  Wyczechowski, Myśli, 62.  Wyczechowski, Myśli, 62.

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case law that developed in different countries under the influence of manifold local conditions.¹³ To him, this was “the source of new laws and of the rectification of foreign laws and customs” adjusted to the local conditions.¹⁴ Based on judicial practice, he explained the process of legal Europeanization and cultural separateness at the same time. In the context of the general reform of law in Europe in the nineteenth century, the main problem, in Wyczechowski’s opinion, lay elsewhere. He argued that the emergence of a unique national legal culture marked not only a given country, but also the historical era in which it occurred. Along with the arrival of a new age, and with the severance of ties that connected it to the previous era, the old national element should only be used to a limited extent and should not be the foundation for a national code of law in the spirit of new times. In Wyczechowski’s European narrative, generational differences should not be ignored or relegated to a secondary plan.¹⁵ This is why he argued that “while reading the laws [of a given historical] era, we can hardly ever understand them well without having first acquainted ourselves with the state of legal interests and the beliefs of the time.”¹⁶ Moreover, as Wyczechowski noted, there was a fundamental difference between laws created in pre-Enlightenment times and the legal systems which began to emerge in the eighteenth century and which were perfected – in terms of legislative technique – in the subsequent century. As he observed, pre-Enlightenment laws “do not elucidate their provisions as clearly and precisely as what we are used to in our century, but rather succinctly mention the rules understandable only to their contemporaries.”¹⁷

The Deterioration of the Polish Legal Heritage In Wyczechowski’s view, the main problem with the Polish legal output lay in the fact that at a certain point in time, its development did not proceed in parallel with that of other nations.¹⁸ As he stated, “at the time when the Polish nation’s legislation was still a match for its neighbours, and in many respects even out-

 Wyczechowski, Myśli, 64.  Wyczechowski, Myśli, 64.  For more on this tendency in European narratives see Matthew D’Auria and Jan Vermeiren, “Narrating Europe: (Re)Thinking Europe and its Many Pasts,” History: The Journal of the Historical Association, 103 (2018): 385 – 400.  Wyczechowski, Myśli, 64.  Wyczechowski, Myśli, 65.  Wyczechowski, Myśli, 65 – 66.

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performed them [i. e. in the sixteenth century], it was not even in need of using all of its natural force.”¹⁹ Moreover, “on the territories of the Crown, at different periods of time, the need for a collection of laws was acknowledged and the task attempted, yet unfavourable circumstances always invalidated the many drafts of solid collections, so sorely needed by the nation.”²⁰ In the seventeenth century, the developmental path of the legal system in Poland started to diverge from Western Europe’s: “At this point, the common history of our legislation, shared with neighbouring nations, stopped.”²¹ The same time frame, in the words of Wyczechowski, marked “the most opportune age for our neighbours’ legislative development, while the Polish nation, battered by a steady succession of misfortunes, set on its course of decay.”²² Along with the collapse of the state, the project of creating national legislation was set back as well.²³ Thus, the first and foremost difficulty in the effective and modern reform of the law, adjusted to the national needs, resulted from the fact that Polish legal heritage was not expressed in the form of a written collection of laws. Another problem stemmed from the fact that the fall of the Polish state in 1795, and the substitution of national laws with the laws of the partitioning powers, interrupted the continuity of the Polish legal heritage, which was replaced by foreign rule, thus also breaking up the relay channels through which the knowledge of the legal principles of national law was transmitted from one generation to another.²⁴ As Wyczechowski wrote, in 1806, when [another] change of government came about [from Prussian to Polish under French tutelage], the influence of Prussian rule over the country’s inhabitants became evident in terms of mentality. Former Polish officials, who took care of domestic affairs, soon realised that … the nation in which they had once lived and which they had served was no longer there.²⁵

As a consequence of the two above-mentioned reasons, a complete reproduction of the Polish legal heritage was unfeasible.

 Wyczechowski, Myśli, 69.  Wyczechowski, Myśli, 66.  Wyczechowski, Myśli, 66.  Wyczechowski, Myśli, 66.  Wyczechowski, Myśli, 66.  Wyczechowski, Myśli, 70. This was even more noticeable since, after the partitions, the Prussian government, “wanting … our countrymen to speak their language, in order to be completely infused with Prussian laws and solutions, excluded them from offices and granted access to service to the country to youth only” (Wyczechowski, Myśli, 72).  Wyczechowski, Myśli, 72.

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The problem with drafting a modern code based on purely national patterns was aggravated by the backwardness and anachronism of the former Polish laws, which had been shaped in pre-partition times. Wyczechowski noticed that the social relations which the old regulations related to had ceased to exist.²⁶ According to him, “as a result of revolutionary changes” that had occurred within the previous few decades, “the cases of today” have become “more subtle, linked to ideas that we have taken over from foreign laws and nations […]. We have already owned this transformation; no one will smooth it out anymore, because no one can change the past. According to Wyczechowski,²⁷ the legislator then had to adjust the changes in the binding law to the existing social reality and “these changes must necessarily breathe a foreign spirit, as they must apply to cases that have grown out of ideas taken from foreigners.”²⁸ For him, Europeanization seen as a “foreign spirit” in legal relations had already occurred in the social stratum. The European sensibility of society had existed outside the corridors of official power and actually predated them.²⁹ Thus, the Europeanization which emerged de facto must be reflected de iure – in proper adjustments of law. For this reason, Wyczechowski was an adamant opponent of the idea to “return all the way to the Old Polish laws”,³⁰ even if the Europeanization of Polish legal culture, as a result of violent foreign policies of other European nations, was not viewed positively by the majority of the Polish political elites.³¹ After the fall of the Polish state in 1795, the Prussian (in the north-western part of the country, including Warsaw) and Austrian (in the southern part of the country) laws and codes became applicable. However, the genuinely profound reforms of the legal system, which echoed the spirit of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, related to the subsequent seizure of these territories by Napoleon. This was noticed by Wyczechowski, who listed the introduction of civil marriages, divorces, and civil registry offices, as well as the change of the legal status of peasants who were made formally equal in legal relationships

 Wyczechowski, Myśli, 72.  Wyczechowski, Myśli, 81.  Wyczechowski, Myśli, 80.  This approach in regard to the twentieth century is discussed in part I of Europeanization in the Twentieth Century: Historical Approaches, ed. Martin Conway and Kiran Klaus Patel (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).  Wyczechowski, Myśli, 80.  For more on Europeanization through war experiences and violence see Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945 (London: Penguine Books, 2006); James Sheehan, Where Have All the Soldiers Gone? The Transformation of Modern Europe (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2008); and Robert Gerwarth and Stephan Malinowski, “Europeanization through Violence? War Experiences and the Making of Modern Europe,” in Europeanization, 189 – 209.

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with all other people.³² “All these changes have left a deeper mark in internal relationships than the Prussian and [Austrian] Galician laws, which, although different in detailed solutions from the Old Polish laws, stemmed from a common [i. e. feudal] system.”³³ Bandtkie echoed him when he pointed out that “complaints against the code and yearning for the volumes of law and the Lithuanian Statute” coming from the conservative noble circles were primarily a reflection of their particular interests to restore the formal legal privileges of the noblemen.³⁴ Consequently, Wyczechowski and Bandtkie believed there was no returning to the old laws, because they could not imagine the possibility of restoring social relations in the same form in which they had functioned in the pre-partition legal space. For them, attempts at modernisation and the perception of “becoming European” were both sides of the same equation.

Towards a Higher Level of Legislation The embodiment of a modern state was modern legislation. Wyczechowski believed that the legal code should be “a higher level of legislation”, drafted to reflect the “politics and general interest of the country”.³⁵ He emphasised that “since the time when the artificial powers of the government […] mean more than the natural powers”, the authorities have “recognised that legislation is an indispensable nexus of this artificial machine, which aids and perfects its movement.”³⁶ Wyczechowski’s strong belief in the potential of a high-quality, gap-free code of law ascribed him to the mainstream of the European discourse, whose paradigm is well known from the works of Montesquieu or Bentham, to mention but a few.³⁷ Both Wyczechowski and Bandkie were fully aware of the

 Wyczechowski, Myśli, 75.  Wyczechowski, Myśli, 75 – 76.  Jan Wincenty Bandtkie, Prawo prywatne polskie napisane i wykładane przed rokiem 1830 [Polish Private Law Written and Taught Prior to 1820] (Warsaw: Drukarnia Banku Polskiego, 1851), 59. See Władysław Sobociński, “Jan Wincenty Bandtkie obrońcą Kodeksu Napoleona (Przyczynki biograficzno-naukowe i memoriał z 1815 r.)” [Jan Wincenty Bandtkie as the Defender of the Napoleonic Code (Biographical and Scholarly Contributions and the 1815 Memo)], Rocznik Lubelski 1 (1960): 160.  Wyczechowski, Myśli, 67.  Wyczechowski, Myśli, 67.  See Dean Alfange Jr., “Jeremy Bentham and the codification of law,” Cornell Law Review 55, no. 1 (1969): 73 – 77; Alfredo Mordechai Rabello, “Montesquieu et la codification du droit privé (Le Code Napoléon),” Revue internationale de droite comparé 1 (2000): 147– 156; Gunter A. Weiss,

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fact that in the absence of its own codification traditions, the Polish state was therefore forced to follow the path mapped out by other countries, to use their experiences and borrow patterns to meet the challenges of the new era. Wyczechowski searched for the distinguishing features of a truly modern code. In terms of legislative technique, it should consist of general, not casuistic, norms. To him, some Prussian laws constituted a model example of “a higher level” of legislation,³⁸ since in creating this legal system, “[the Prussian] government … had no intention of adjusting to the customs or national and local ideas, but rather it always strove [toward] a system of generalisation”.³⁹ Despite their shortcomings, Wyczechowski saw the advantages of both Prussian and Austrian law in the Polish territories.⁴⁰

The French Civil Code as a Compromise Nevertheless, in his view their quality was not comparable with the potential of the French law, imbued with the spirit of the Enlightenment and of the French Revolution, on the one hand, and “[being] not a new creation, but rather a collection of laws from previous times”, on the other.⁴¹ At the same time, Wyczechowski tried to remain cautious in his overt advocacy of the Napoleonic Code as an embodiment of the heritage of the French Revolution. He presented the view that “the principles so openly and solemnly expressed by the French Revolution, although not all of them may be applied in every country and to the objectives of each government, must not be rejected merely because they are the

“The Enchantment of Codification in the Common-Law World,” The Yale Journal of International Law 25, no. 2, (2000): 452, 458, 476 – 480.  Evoking Prussian laws, he referred to the Landrecht of 1794, which, despite its shortcomings (lack of transparency, casuistic regulations, and the maintenance of many institutions of feudal law) already partially met the standards of modern codification. Moreover, he believed that selected ordinances should be followed – like those on mortgages or deposits – on the basis of which the Prussian government implemented normative institutions and solutions, allowing for the planned influence of the state over society to encourage the achievement of set objectives (Wyczechowski, Myśli, 67– 68, 70, 72).  Wyczechowski, Myśli, 70.  Wyczechowski, Myśli, 73 – 74. According to him, Polish elites were unable to foresee “how the Prussian laws and solutions could still be very convenient to us” because both Prussian and Austrian laws were known only in part of the country and rather only to people who performed official duties under the Prussian and Austrian governments (Wyczechowski, Myśli, 76 – 78).  Wyczechowski, Myśli, 76.

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fruit of a revolution, but rather explored and understood better.”⁴² He also emphasised that even in France the ancien régime legal system was not re-established despite the Bourbon restoration. Like other legal scholars,⁴³ he noticed that the Napoleonic Code efficiently reconciled modern liberal, lay, and anti-feudal principles and institutions with the extensive and valuable pre-revolutionary legal substratum. Skilfully combining French ancient customary law, royal ordinances, and revolutionary achievements with the two cornerstones of legal universalism in Europe – that is, Roman law and canon law – made the Napoleonic Code a symbol of Pan-European codification. This, combined with its esteemed technical side, especially the clear and general language of its provisions, contributed to its international career even after the fall of Napoleon.⁴⁴ For Wyczechowski, it was clear that the social transformation associated with modern Enlightenment ideas had already taken root in Polish territories and that there was no going back. He also emphasised that although not enough time had passed for French institutions to penetrate fully into Polish legal culture, the knowledge of the French civil code a few years after its implementation became “most widespread” among the Poles.⁴⁵ In an attempt to at least partially neutralise the massive criticism aimed at the Napoleonic Code following the emperor’s downfall, Wyczechowski observed that “we have previously heard praises of the Code; today we hear words of condemnation. But both the praises and the condemnation are directed at the ruler who is considered the author of the Code, [while] a more thorough exploration of the sources will prove this to be a mistake.” After all, he argued, the code was not le produit d’un siècle,⁴⁶ since its roots could be traced all the way back to the previous centuries.⁴⁷ This combination of the old with the new came to

 Wyczechowski, Myśli, 77– 78.  See André-Jean Arnaud, Les origines doctrinales du Code civil français (Paris: Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1969).  The literature on this subject is vast. To mention but a few, see Code civil 1804 – 1904. Livre du centenaire du Code civil 1804 – 1904, ed. Jean-Louis Halpérin (Paris: Dalloz, 2004); The Code Napoleon and the Common Law World, ed. Bernard Schwartz (New Jersey: Lawbook Exchange, 1998); Le Code civil 1804 – 2004 – Livre du Bicentenaire, ed. Jean Carbonnier et al. (Paris: LexisNexis/Litec, 2004); L’influence du Code civil dans le monde: travaux de la semaine internationale de droit (Paris: Société de législation comparée, 1950).  Wyczechowski, Myśli, 76.  Jacob, Verduchène, Observations critiques sur le code civil Néerlandais , comparé avec le code Napoléon. Livre I, Tit. I au VIe (Maastricht: Van Osch-America, 1860), preface.  Wyczechowski, Myśli, 76.

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the fore in his analysis of various parts of the Code.⁴⁸ Wyczechowski maintained that the part which deals with property law was anchored in pre-revolutionary output and “based partially on the centuries-old maxims of Roman law, which prevailed in France more visibly than anywhere else – without a mixture of national and foreign laws and customs, maintaining its original shape – and thus cannot entail any great novelties.”⁴⁹ The part relating to the law of persons, however, including regulations on acquiring and losing civil rights, on paternity, adoption, custody, guardianship, and personal marriage law, was “an emanation of new ideas of philosophy and a result of the French Revolution.”⁵⁰ This did not mean that it was to be discredited, as “it does not signify that the current order of things is […] contrary to all the principles of the law of persons in the code.”⁵¹

The Napoleonic Code as the Optimal Solution according to Jan Wincenty Bandtkie Jan Wincenty Bandtkie, in his memorandum of 1815, also emphasized the merits of the Code, although he voiced some reservations. He did not consider it “a work of superhuman greatness” and admitted that it had its imperfections, even in “the general order, that is, in the layout and connections of individual matters.”⁵² Nevertheless, Bandtkie indicated that “the French legislation is one of the latest ones,” which implied that it was the most highly developed. According to him, “the French nation has excelled in the solid teaching of the law for a long time, longer even than the Germans, and can still boast a high level of aca-

 Wyczechowski, Myśli, 76.  Wyczechowski, Myśli, 76 – 77.  This is certainly an oversimplification. See the preparatory work by Jean-Guilleme Locré, La législation civile, commerciale et criminelle de la France, ou, Commentaire et complément des codes français (Paris: Treuttel et Würtz, 1827– 1832); Pierre-Antoine Fenet, Recueil complet des travaux préparatoires du Code civil (Paris: au Depot, rue Saint-Andre des Arcs, 1836). As Bonnie G. Smith pointed out, “By the time the Napoleonic Code went into effect, little remained of liberal revolutionary programmes for women except the provisions for equal inheritance by sisters and brothers.” Bonnie G. Smith, Changing Lives: Women in European History Since 1700 (Lexington: D.C. Heath and Company, 1989), 121– 122. See also Michèle Riot-Sarcey, Histoire du féminisme (Paris: La Découverte, 2002), 24– 66.  Wyczechowski, Myśli, 77.  Jan Wincenty Bandtkie, “Myśli o zmianie prawodawstwa krajowego” [Thoughts about the modification of national legislation], in Sobociński, “Jan Wincenty Bandtkie,” 169, 171.

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demic education.”⁵³ Furthermore, by availing themselves not only of Roman law, but also of domestic and foreign legal acts and textbooks⁵⁴ in the course of legislative work on the civil code, the French underlined its shared European legal heritage. As an analysis of his memoire clearly shows, Bandtkie was a vehement advocate of maintaining the French Civil Code with only minor modifications of its content.⁵⁵ He thought that a national code was a pipe-dream, a mirage, yet he was careful not to make his opinion too obvious in his memo. He did, however, state that If, … for reason of changes being perhaps harder than new systems, or for national honour, in order to avoid [at any price] the rule of foreign laws, the need to draft entirely new codes were recognised, in such case it would be more recommendable to gaze at the Austrian and Bavarian legislations, subsequent to the French legislation.⁵⁶

Bandtkie left no doubt, however – developing this code of law “would perhaps take a number of years of the work of people unburdened with any other du-

 Bandtkie, “Myśli,” 168. He referred to Jacques Cujas, Barnabé Brisson, Hugues Doneau and Denis Godefroy.  Bandtkie, “Myśli,” 168.  He was of the opinion that the Napoleonic Code should be upheld, with only such amendments that would be justified by “imperfections” of some of its institutions. These imperfections fell into three categories: (1) ineffective solutions, (2) solutions incompatible with the “teachings of morality and the state of our civilisation,” and (3) solutions subject to change owing to organisational or political reasons. “Futile and tortuous formality,” according to Bandtkie, favored the abrogation of the French institution of care, which should be “returned to the direct competence of the courts”. Similarly, the abrogation of secret mortgage was justified with the harmfulness of this institution which, in the opinion of Bandtkie, was “an advantage to [very few and] to the general population a danger and an obstacle to obtaining credits.” For this reason, he postulated that it should be replaced with a solution “similar to Prussian laws.” He also believed it would be recommendable to simplify prenuptial agreement provisions, after the Prussian model, “yet with the maintenance of cautionary measures prescribed by the French code.” The second group included, in his opinion, the need to abolish divorces, but he also believed that, regardless of the clergy’s pressure, marriage annulment should remain an option (based on premises established in accordance with the relevant religious laws) available to lay courts, “as the opinion of clerics will always be one-sided in this respect.” Bandtkie also believed that, if need be, clergymen should be entrusted with the task of running the vital records, as long as it would be considered their public law duty (Bandtkie, “Myśli,” 170). See Michał Gałędek and Anna Klimaszewska, “A Controversial Transplant? The Debate on the Adaptation of the Napoleonic Code on Polish Territories in the Early Nineteenth Century,” Journal of Civil Law Studies 11, no. 2 (2018): 293 – 294.  Bandtkie, “Myśli,” 173.

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ties”⁵⁷ and the optimal solution would be to return to the formal legal perfection of the Napoleonic Code, next to which the Bavarian and Austrian codes could only play “an auxiliary and secondary role.”⁵⁸ He was clearly impressed by the “succinct, supple, and noble style of the French legislation,” which should always “be held up as the standard, the model” for new codes.⁵⁹ For Bandtkie, thus, sticking to the old national legal tradition at any price was inapt in terms of progress. It is also of significance that in the proposed amendments, Bandtkie never brought up the usefulness of any institutions of Polish pre-partition law. He did not even symbolically mention the national legal tradition. He focussed on those titles and sections of the Napoleonic Code which he considered to be objectively ineffective, and proposed replacing them with other solutions, drawn from other foreign legal systems known to him, that is, the Austrian or Prussian ones, but not old Polish law. Just as in the case of Wyczechowski (born in 1780), the reason for this could be the fact that Bandtkie (born in 1783) had never had any practical contact with pre-partition Polish law. It should also be noted that Bandtkie did not hesitate to propose combinations of solutions from different origins. Therefore, the Napoleonic Code was a universal work to him, suitable for transplantation onto any territory. Its adaptation to Polish conditions required only a few adjustments, e. g. the rejection of lay marriages, which he thought a Catholic country was not ready to accept.⁶⁰ Bandkie was not so optimistic as regards the other branches of law, owing to the imperfections of different foreign codes in force in the Polish territories. He was nonetheless a proponent of adjusting the most suitable European templates instead of creating an original national code from scratch.⁶¹

Conclusion Both memos complemented each other. Wyczechowski sought to build a new definition of identity by producing what Deutsch and others almost 150 years later would aptly call a “we feeling” among leaders engaged in nineteenth-century co-

    

Bandtkie, Bandtkie, Bandtkie, Bandtkie, Bandtkie,

“Myśli,” “Myśli,” “Myśli,” “Myśli,” “Myśli,”

173. 173. 173. 169 – 170. 171– 173.

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dification efforts in the Polish territories.⁶² Based on Christianity as the main marker, he tried to develop an idea of a shared European identity alongside national identification, since the principal conflict was the one between the nationstate and Europe. Integration through Christianity is therefore not a twentiethcentury concept.⁶³ For Wyczechowski, Roman law and canon law were two essential pillars of this common European identity. He readily considered the French Civil Code an embodiment of European history, present identity, and future aspirations. Along with the reforms of the polity, the judiciary, administration, and various areas of law that took place in the Polish territories in the previous two decades, a profound transformation of society towards Europeanization had occurred. In terms of further modernization, the Napoleonic Code was a sensible choice according to Bandtkie. To support his arguments about the predominance of the Napoleonic Code over other European legal codes, he provided the opinion of Ernst Wilhelm von Reibnitz⁶⁴ and unnamed scholars publishing in the Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung, considering them an authoritative source of evaluation.⁶⁵ Both Bandtkie and Wyczechowski agreed on the basic issue – the old pre-partition Polish legal templates should not be duplicated unless Polish society wanted to un-become a part of European legal culture. The dilemmas faced by Bandtkie, Wyczechowski, and other members of the Polish elite engaged in Polish legal reforms seem to be exemplary of a semi-peripheral country involved in the building of a new legal order, or in a fundamental transformation of the old order under the pressure of modernization. A similar situation was occurring in the majority of Central and Eastern European countries, not only in the nineteenth century, but also in more recent times. Semi-peripheral countries were facing the problem of choosing the optimal path, which could reconcile the need to modernize, determined by the civilizational and socioeconomic backwardness, with an equally strong need to retain,

 Karl W. Deutsch et al., Political Community in the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957).  See Brent F. Nelsen and James L. Guth, “Religion and the Creation of European Identity: The Message of the Flags,” The Review of Faith & International Affairs 14, no. 1 (2016), 80 – 88; Brent F. Nelsen et al., Religion and the Struggle for European Union: Confessional Culture and the Limits of Integration (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2015); Hugh McLeod, “Christianity and nationalism in nineteenth-century Europe,” International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church 15, no. 1 (2015): 7– 22; The Religious Roots of Contemporary European Identity, ed. Lucia Faltin and Melanie J. Wright (London-New York: T&T Cark Theology, 2007).  Ernst Wilhelm von Reibnitz, Versuch über das Ideal einer Gerichtsordnung (Berlin: Neue Societäts-Verlags-Buchhandlung, 1815).  Bandtkie, “Myśli,” 171, 172.

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strengthen, and consolidate their own national identity. Addressing both of these partially contradictory needs was the striving to make the new code of law both national and modern in character. The modernization processes which Poland was undergoing within the span of a few decades were so rapid that the reformatory output of the last decades of the eighteenth century could have already been considered an anachronism by the beginning of the nineteenth century. For this reason, the enlightened representatives of the intellectual elite, like Wyczechowski and Bandtkie, did not search for eighteenth-century legal templates that they could employ in the Polish codification projects of the nineteenth century. Moreover, they also noticed that it would be challenging to explicitly take advantage of the Constitution of May 3, 1791 in the new reality. Even though it was a symbol of national achievements and was considered an indicator of progress in Poland in the eighteenth century, it did not even become the principal model to be followed in the drafts of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Poland of 1815. It was replaced in this role by the hitherto binding Constitution of the Duchy of Warsaw of 1807, which had been imposed by Napoleon and, just like the French Civil Code, met with fierce opposition from some part of the political elite. Thus, like the entire old Polish legal system, the Constitution of May 3, 1791 – as a product of the reforms from the end of the eighteenth century – had also lost its appeal and practical use for the intellectual circles in Poland at the beginning of the nineteenth century.⁶⁶ Thus, the shape and the direction of the changes in Western Europe determined the acceleration of changes in Poland.⁶⁷ Work on the codification continued throughout the entire existence of the constitutional and relatively autonomous Kingdom of Poland. Some parts of the reformed national code were issued in the form of laws from 1818 to 1825, such as the mortgage law based on the Prussian model and the law of natural persons.⁶⁸ The latter was a copy of the first book of the Napoleonic Code, with the exception of the most heavily criticized elements, especially the lay model  See Michał Gałędek, “Legal Transfers and National Traditions: Patterns of Modernisation of the Administration in Polish Territories at the Turn of the 19th Century,” in Modernisation, National Identity and Legal Instrumentalism: Studies in Comparative Legal History, ed. Michał Gałędek and Anna Klimaszewska (Leiden-Boston: Brill Nijhoff, 2020), 48. Michał Gałędek, National Tradition or Western Pattern? Concepts of the New Administrative System for the Congress Kingdom of Poland (1814 – 1815) (Leiden-Boston: Brill Nijhoff, 2021), 102, 104.  See Martijn van der Burg, “Cultural and Legal Transfer in Napoleonic Europe: Codification of Dutch Civil Law as a Cross-National Process,” Comparative Legal History 3, no. 1 (2015): 107– 109.  “Prawo hipoteczne Królestwa Polskiego” [Mortgage law of the Kingdom of Poland], Dziennik Praw Królestwa Polskiego, vol. 5, no. 21, 293 – 387; “Kodeks Cywilny Królestwa Polskiego” [Civil code of the Kingdom of Poland], Dziennik Praw Królestwa Polskiego 10, no. 41 (1825): 3 – 289.

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of marriage. In turn, personal matrimonial law was shaped following a mixed model embodied in the provisions of the Austrian Civil Code of 1811 (Allgemeines bürgerliches Gesetzbuch). The laws adopted at the time thus drew to a very limited extent on the pre-partition heritage. The French, Prussian, and Austrian models indeed constituted the main points of reference for the new legal acts. It can therefore be assumed that the idea of the shared modern European legal identity outlined by Wyczechowski and Bandtkie was followed by the drafters. The process of creating a national code of law came to a halt with the end of the constitutional period in Congress Poland. After the November Uprising of 1830 – 1831, there began a period of assimilation for the Kingdom to resemble other territories under the rule of the House of Romanov. Polish legal elites started to manifest an increasingly strong attachment to the French law modified in the years 1818 – 1825, as the law that set the central Polish territories apart from Russia. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when the official language of the Kingdom was Russian and the systems of administration and education had been partially unified, civil law remained one of the principal elements that distinguished the central Polish territories from Russia. European identity thus allowed Poles to preserve and protect their national identity.

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Locré, Jean-Guilleme. La législation civile, commerciale et criminelle de la France, ou, Commentaire et complément des codes français. Paris: Treuttel et Würtz, 1827 – 1832. McLeod, Hugh. “Christianity and nationalism in nineteenth-century Europe.” International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church 15, no. 1 (2015): 7 – 22. Nelsen, Brent F., and James L. Guth. “Religion and the Creation of European Identity: The Message of the Flags.” The Review of Faith & International Affairs 14, no. 1 (2016): 80 – 88. Nelsen, Brent F., James L. Guth, John C. Green, Ted Jelen, and Mark Rozell. Religion and the Struggle for European Union: Confessional Culture and the Limits of Integration. Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2015. “Prace Komitetu Cywilnego Reformy nad przygotowaniem narodowej kodyfikacji prawa cywilnego i procedury cywilnej w przededniu utworzenia Królestwa Polskiego (1814 – 1815) – edycja źródłowa. Część I” [Works of the Civil Reform Committee on the Civil Law and Civil Procedure Codification on the Eve of the Establishment of the Kingdom of Poland (1814 – 1815) – Historical Source Edition. Part I], edited by Michał Gałędek, Anna Klimaszewska, and Piotr Pomianowski. Krakowskie Studia z Historii Państwa i Prawa 12, no. 2 (2019): 239 – 275. “Prawo hipoteczne Królestwa Polskiego” [Mortgage law of the Kingdom of Poland]. Dziennik Praw Królestwa Polskiego 5, no. 21 (1818): 293 – 387. Rabello, Alfredo Mordechai. “Montesquieu et la codification du droit privé (Le Code Napoléon).” Revue internationale de droite comparé 1 (2000): 147 – 156. Reibnitz, Ernst Wilhelm von. Versuch über das Ideal einer Gerichtsordnung. Berlin: Neue Societäts-Verlags-Buchhandlung, 1815. Riot-Sarcey, Michèle. Histoire du féminisme. Paris: La Découverte, 2002. Sheehan, James. Where Have All the Soldiers Gone? The Transformation of Modern Europe. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2008. Smith, Bonnie G. Changing Lives: Women in European History Since 1700. Lexington: D.C. Heath and Company, 1989. Sobociński, Władysław. “Jan Wincenty Bandtkie obrońcą Kodeksu Napoleona (Przyczynki biograficzno-naukowe i memoriał z 1815 r.)” [Jan Wincenty Bandtkie as Defender of the Napoleonic Code (Biographical and Scholarly Contributions and the 1815 Memo)]. Rocznik Lubelski 1 (1960): 157 – 167. Sobociński, Władysław. “Rozwój ustawodawstwa cywilnego w Królestwie Polskim i w Rosji do rosyjskiej reformy sądowej (Zarys historyczno-porównawczy)” [Development of Civil Legislation in the Kingdom of Poland and Russia until the Russian Court Reform (A Historical and Comparative Outline)]. Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Skłodowska, Sectio G (Ius) 12 (1965): 113 – 178. Sójka-Zielińska, Katarzyna. Kodeks Napoleona. Historia i współczesność [Napoleonic Code: History and Contemporaneity]. Warsaw: LexisNexis, 2008. Szafrański, Wojciech. Kodeks Stanisława Augusta [Stanislaw August Code]. Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 2007. van der Burg, Martijn. “Cultural and Legal Transfer in Napoleonic Europe: Codification of Dutch Civil Law as a Cross-National Process.” Comparative Legal History 3, no. 1 (2015): 85 – 109. Verduchène, Jacob. Observations critiques sur le code civil Néerlandais , comparé avec le code Napoléon. Livre I, Tit. I au VIe. Maastricht: Van Osch-America et. Co., 1860.

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Weiss, Gunter A. “The Enchantment of Codificiation in the Common-Law World.” The Yale Journal of International Law 25, no. 2 (2000): 435 – 532. Wyczechowski, Antoni. Myśli względem prawodawstwa narodowego [Thoughts on National Legislation]. Princes Czartoryski Library in Krakow, manuscript no. 5259 V. Zarzycka, Anna. “Próby zmian Kodeksu Napoleona w Księstwie Warszawskim w latach 1814 – 1815” [Attempts of Napoleonic Code Changes in the Duchy of Warsaw in the Years 1814 – 1815]. Krakowskie Studia z Historii Państwa i Prawa 1 (2004): 173 – 178. Zarzycka, Anna. “Próby zmian prawa rzeczowego z Kodeksu Napoleona w Królestwie Polskim w latach 1815 – 1818” [Attempts of Property Law Changes from the Napoleonic Code in the Kingdom of Poland 1815 – 1818]. Krakowskie Studia z Historii Państwa i Prawa 2 (2008): 175 – 193.

Section 5: Social Europe? Europeanization in the Social and Economic Sphere

Willy Buschak

Enthusiasm for Europe and Europeanization in the Labor Movement of the 1920s Introduction: Labor and the Beginning of Europeanization Jean Jaurès (1859 – 1914), French labor leader and one of the emblematic figures of European socialism before the First World War, suggested in 1900 the creation of a European Federation in order to resist forthcoming economic pressure from Asia.¹ The German social democratic economist Richard Calwer (1868 – 1927) saw in European economic co-operation a peaceful alternative to Emperor Wilhelm’s imperialistic politics.² Gerhard Hildebrand (1877–?), a social democratic journalist also from Germany, published in 1910 a thorough analysis of how to promote the further well-being of workers through European co-operation.³ In September 1913, the Scottish socialist Keir Hardie (1856 – 1915), founder of the Independent Labour Party (ILP) in 1893 and of the Labour Party in 1900, addressed the congress of the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) in Jena with a message focusNote: The word “labor” is used here in a very general sense and means the totality of socialist organizations, free trade unions, and labor’s cultural organizations in Europe. When anarchists and communists are included, this will be indicated particularly. My contribution does not deal with labor’s attitude to the “Plan Briand” and similar efforts to organize Europe. It seemed more important to me to describe the extensive, but not very well known, process of Europeanization which took place in the labor movement in the 1920s. On labor, Briand, and similar plans see Willy Buschak, Die Vereinigten Staaten von Europa sind unser Ziel. Arbeiterbewegung und Europa im frühen 20. Jahrhundert (Essen: Klartext, 2014), 178 – 203.  Jean Jaurès, “L’Europe,” Petite République, August 5, 1900, in Oeuvres de Jean Jaurès, ed. Max Bonnafors (Paris: Éditions Rieder, 1931), 1: 239. On Jaurès and Europe see Jürgen Lauer, “Jean Jaurès (1859 – 1914),” in Europas vergessene Visionäre: Rückbesinnung in Zeiten akuter Krisen, ed. Winfried Böttcher (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2019), 319 – 328.  Richard Calwer, “Deutsch-französische Annäherung,” Sozialistische Monatshefte 14 (1908): 663 – 666. On Calwer’s contribution to European integration see Willy Buschak, “Welches Europa? Richard Calwer, Max Cohen, Hermann Kranold und Georg Ledebour,” in Weltkrieg, Spaltung, Revolution: Sozialdemokratie 1916 – 1922, ed. Uli Schöler and Thilo Scholle (Bonn: Dietz, 2018), 46 – 61.  Gerhard Hildebrand, Die Erschütterung der Industrieherrschaft und des Industriesozialismus (Jena: Gustav Fischer, 1910). About Hildebrand, see Willy Buschak, ed., Arbeiterbewegung in Europa im frühen 20. Jahrhundert: Dokumentenband (Essen: Klartext, 2018), 398 – 405. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110685473-013

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ing on internationalization and Europeanization: “Trade, Industry, Arts and Sciences are international. It should therefore be the highest task of European statesmen not to increase the incitement of peoples through permanent armaments, but to promote peace and reconciliation of peoples and to eventually bring about the United States of Europe.”⁴ The Europeanization of socialist political thinking and of political concepts was already well on its way, as these few examples illustrate. The transnational conference of French and German parliamentarians, which had been initiated by Jean Jaurès and the German socialist Ludwig Frank (1874– 1914) and took place in May 1913 in Bern, exemplified the Europeanization of political discourse.⁵ The exchange of labor delegations between France, Germany, and Great Britain intensified as well. Such delegations aimed to learn how the “others” worked, how they built up their party organizations, their trade unions, and co-operative societies.⁶ Labor’s Europe was becoming a space of practical learning from each other. Labor organizations were growing out of their traditional national framework. The abstract principle of international solidarity preached at congresses of the Second International was here implemented in practical terms and within a European context. The “other” was no longer an anonymous working class, or a faceless mass of workers from another country. The delegations discovered each other’s culture, history, living, and working conditions, and developed first ties of emotional solidarity across borders. In the 1970s, Ralf Dahrendorf (1929 – 2009) described “Europeanizm” as the “natural feeling of belonging” to Europe, of “feeling at home in this continent.”⁷ Arguably, such a sentiment had existed before 1914 when the impression was rapidly gaining ground within the labor movement that Europeans shared a common culture and that nations were complementary to each other. The British labor leader Ramsay MacDonald (1866 – 1937) perfectly illustrated this feeling when he welcomed a German labor delegation to Manchester in 1911. “What would these two great nations, Germany and

 Protokoll über die Verhandlungen des Parteitages der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands, Abgehalten in Jena vom 14. bis 20. September 1913 (Berlin: Buchhandlung Vorwärts, 1913), 210 [own translation].  Stenographisches Protokoll der deutsch-französischen Verständigungskonferenz abgehalten am Pfingstsonntag, den 11. Mai 1913 zu Bern. Herausgegeben vom Organisationskomitee (Bern: Unionsdruckerei, 1913).  On the pre-war contacts between British, French, and German Labor, see Willy Buschak, “British Labour and Europe,” Socialist History 57 (2020): 70 – 93.  Ralf Dahrendorf, A Third Europe? Third European Monnet Lecture (Florence: European University Institute, 1979), 6.

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Great Britain, be, the one without the other?”, he asked.⁸ Even during the First World War, this feeling did not disappear, as we can see from the French socialist author Jules Romains (1885 – 1972) who wrote in 1915 that European countries all have their own traditions, but are provinces of the one “fatherland,” Europe.⁹ To a certain degree, Europeanization was even accelerated during the war, as Europe moved into the center of Labor’s reflections on how to avoid future wars. As Arthur Ponsonby (1871– 1946), founder of the British pacifist organisation Union of Democratic Control and later on a Labour MP, wrote in 1915, “European unity” should become the “normal and permanent foundation of European policy.”¹⁰ Austrian and German social democrats like Georg Ledebour (1850 – 1947), Karl Kautsky (1854– 1938), and Max Cohen (1876 – 1963), French writers like Jules Romains, and Italian socialists such as Giuseppe Modigliani (1872– 1947) had the same understanding.¹¹

Labor’s Perception of Europe After 1918, Labor’s perception of the continent changed dramatically. Before the war, Europe was seen as the world economy’s center, quite in contrast to the post-war period when global economic affairs were shaped much more by the

 Ramsay MacDonald, “Deutschland und England,” Rheinische Zeitung, February 2, 1924. I could not find a contemporary publication of MacDonald‘s speech in the German or British Press. The Rheinische Zeitung published the text in 1924 when MacDonald was elected first Labor Prime Minister of Great Britain.  Jules Romains, “Pour que l’Europe soit,” Europe, April 15, 1930, 457– 487. The text was written 1915 but the full version was not published before 1930 in the journal Europe. At the end of the Second World War, the ILP-members F.A. Ridley (1897– 1994) and Bob Edwards (1905 – 1990) were still convinced that “a common literary, artistic and intellectual tradition (…) constitutes so to speak, the spiritual cement of a common European civilisation, which is, above all, a cultural unit.” See F.A. Ridley and Bob Edwards, The United Socialist States of Europe (London: National Labour Press [1944?]), 10.  Arthur Ponsonby, “Towards a Permanent Peace. The Case for a United Europe,” Labour Leader, April 1, 1915. Michael Gehler underlines that when looking for the origins of European integration we have to pay much more attention to the time right after the First World War. Michael Gehler, “Was heißt ‘Europäistik’ für eine Geschichtsschreibung der europäischen Integration?,” in Europa-Europäisierung-Europäistik: Neue wissenschaftliche Ansätze, Methoden und Inhalte, ed. Michael Gehler and Silvio Vietta (Vienna: Böhlau, 2010), 7. See also Matthew d’Auria and Jan Vermeiren, eds., Visions and Ideas of Europe during the First World War (Abingdon: Routledge, 2020).  See Buschak, Die Vereinigten Staaten von Europa, 39 – 54. A collection of texts about Europe’s dethronement in Buschak, Arbeiterbewegung in Europa, 52– 81, 344, 406 – 411.

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United States and the Pacific, as for instance the Walloon socialist Jules Destrée (1863 – 1936) noticed.¹² When socialists described Europe’s situation in the world, they used metaphors like: illness, balkanization, fragmentation, de-Europeanization, dethronement.¹³ Europe was presented as old and sick, agonized by recession; the United States of America, to the contrary, as young, dynamic, and enjoying strong economic growth. The United States had advantages, Labor’s economists concluded, that Europe did not have: more coal, more cars, more steel, more finances.¹⁴ Above all: the USA were a huge space with one common market, Europe instead was a fragmented conglomerate, separated by tariff walls and borders. In 1927, the British trade unionist Ernest Bevin (1881– 1951), General Secretary of the Transport and General Workers Union, perfectly illustrated the sentiment of his generation in a speech to the annual Trades Union Congress (TUC) in Edinburgh: I have recently been to the Continent of America. I was asked to go out to investigate some of the reasons for American prosperity. I did not find out that the American capitalist was any more beneficent than the British Capitalist. I did not find that there was any greater genius in America for organisation (…) What I did find was this, that I went there from a little Island, and I was asked to compare its possibilities with a Continent (…) and I came to the conclusion that if we are to deal with the problems of Europe, we have got to try to teach the people of Europe that their economic interests, their economic development have to transcend merely national boundaries.¹⁵

 Jules Destrée, “Paneuropa,” in Jules Destrée, Pour en finir avec la guerre: Par une organisation federative de l’europe, la constitution d’une police internationale et la reconnaissance pour les citoyens du droit de refuser le service militaire pour le crime de la guerre d’agression (Brussels: L’Eglantine 1931), 14. Pour en finir avec la guerre is a collection of Destrée’s articles for the Belgian socialist press.  See, for example, Richard Calwer, Was soll aus Europa werden? (Berlin: Wirtschaftstatistisches Bureau von Richard Calwer, 1920). The 51 pages of the manuscript were hectographed and a few hundred copies were distributed to labor organisations in Germany. See also Henry Noel Brailsford, “French Iron and German Coal,” Daily Herald, June 21, 1921. Erna Haberzettl, “Blick auf Europa,” Frauenwelt, July 21, 1935. On the feeling of a threatened Europe, which was fundamental for triggering Europeanization, see Hartmut Kaelble, “Europäisches Selbstverständnis und gesellschaftliche Entwicklungen im 20. Jahrhundert,” in Selbstverständnis und Gesellschaft der Europäer: Aspekte der sozialen und kulturellen Europäisierung im späten 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, ed. Hartmut Kaelble and Martin Kirsch (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2008), 421– 447.  Tony Sender, “Im Wettkampf der Kontinente,” Betriebsräte-Zeitschrift, May 9, 1925, 289 – 293. Henry Noel Brailsford, “Amerika und Europa,” Arbeiter-Zeitung, January 27, 1929.  Report of proceedings at the 59th Annual Trades Union Congress Held at Edinburgh September 5th to 10th 1927: Reported by J. McIntosh, Official Reporter to the Congress. Published by Authority of the Congress and the General Council (London: Congress and General Council [1927]), 391.

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His German female colleague Tony Sender shared this view: based upon their small, sometimes minuscule home markets, European countries could not really compete with the USA unless they joined forces in a customs union.¹⁶ A paradigm shift was happening in the world economy, she and others argued: the energy basis switched from coal to oil, which weakened European states with their small oil resources. Modern means of communication, such as telephone and telegraph, and air traffic altered the way of running a business. A new type of transnational companies emerged: no longer American, French or British, but international.¹⁷ No single nation-state was powerful enough to control such giants, as Harry Graf Kessler (1868 – 1937), a German cosmopolitan, stated in his speech at the International Peace Congress in The Hague in 1922. On the contrary, such companies controlled nation-states.¹⁸ Trade unions feared that transnational companies might no longer negotiate salaries and working conditions, but dictate them. One solution came to mind almost inevitably: the political organization had to follow or reflect such economic developments. While a nation-state could not control giant companies, the United States of Europe would be able to do so. The labor movement therefore turned into one of the most active promoters of European integration. Within labor, a genuine enthusiasm for Europe originated.

About Bevins‘ speech see Allan Bullock, The Life and Times of Ernest Bevin, vol. 1 (London: Heinemann, 1960), 380 – 388.  Tony Sender, “Die Wirtschaftslage Amerikas,” Sächsisches Volksblatt, January 3, 1927. Adolf Reichwein, “Weltwirtschaft. Eine Studie,” Gewerkschafts-Archiv, May 1926, 200. J.P. Haessaert, “Europe,” Avenir Social, March 1928, 176.  The Swiss company Nestlé, for example, in existence since 1867, transformed into a real transnational company in the 1920s. It had locations outside of Europe, moved production between countries, and business was directed transnationally. Die deutsche Kakao- und Schokoladenindustrie: Darstellungen und Untersuchungen einzelner Zweige der Nahrungsmittel- und Getränkeindustrie (Berlin: Verband der Nahrungsmittel- und Getränkearbeiter, 1931), 41– 52. See also Françoise Berger and Eric Bussière, “La France, la Belgique, l’Allemagne et les cartels de l’entre-deux-guerres: une méthode pour l’organisation économique de l’Europe,” in Ces chers voisins: Le Benelux, l’Allemagne et la France aux XIXe et XXIe siècles, ed. Michel Dumoulin, Jürgen Elvert, and Sylvain Schirmann (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2010), 221– 242. Details about labor’s discussion in Willy Buschak, Edo Fimmen: Der schöne Traum von Europa und die Globalisierung. Eine Biographie (Essen: Klartext, 2002), 115 – 132.  Report of the International Peace Congress Held at The Hague Under the Auspices of the International Federation of Trade Unions December 10 – 15, 1922 (Amsterdam: International Federation of Trade Unions, 1923), 159.

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Clarion Calls from the Labor Movement Almost every single labor periodical from the 1920s published articles dealing with Europe, European integration, a European customs union, the European labor movement, the European economy, and so forth. This applies to national dailies like the Austrian Arbeiterzeitung, the German Vorwärts, the Belgian Le Peuple, the French Le Populaire, the Spanish El Socialista, and the British Daily Herald, but also to regional newspapers like the Dresdner Volkszeitung, the Rheinische Zeitung (Cologne), and the Forward (Glasgow). Trade union journals and the pacifist press, communist journals like Cahiers du Bolchévisme in France, anarchist papers like Revista Blanca in Spain, and even Nervio in Argentine followed European developments very closely.¹⁹ Socialist publishing houses and leftist book clubs had many titles dealing with Europe in their program. Between 1925 and 1933, the small Belgian francophone publisher L’Eglantine for example issued at least half a dozen titles dealing with European integration.²⁰ Socialists from all parts of Europe and from all political tendencies of socialism shared the enthusiasm for Europe. The SPD’s left-wing Reichstag deputy Tony Sender (1888 – 1964) and its right-wing journalist Max Cohen (1876 – 1963),²¹ the Belgian economist Max Drechsel (1901– 1989) and his French homo-

 Willy Buschak: “Arbeiterbewegung und Europa im frühen 20. Jahrhundert. Bibliographie,” annexed on CD-Rom to Buschak, Arbeiterbewegung in Europa. For studies about particular journals see Pia Le Moal-Piltzing, “La revue ‘Die Linkskurve’ et l’Europe,” in Le discours européen dans les revues allemandes (1918 – 1933)/ Der Europadiskurs in den deutschen Zeitschriften (1918 – 1933), ed. Michel Grunewald (Bern: Peter Lang, 1997), 252– 264. Peter Friedemann, “Frankophilie und Europabild – Grenzen der Wahrnehmung am Beispiel der ‘Sozialistischen Monatshefte’ 1918 – 1933,” in Grunewald, Le discours européen (1918 – 1933), 265 – 288. Jürgen Schlimper, “Der ‘Kulturwille’ Leipzig. Ein sozialistischer Förderer internationalen Zusammenwirkens des Proletariats,” in Grunewald, Le discours européen (1918 – 1933), 289 – 312. Thomas Keller, “Das rheinisch-revolutionäre Europa: Die Exilzeitschrift ‘Die Zukunft’ (1938 – 1940),” in Le discours européen dans les revues allemandes (1933 – 1939)/ Der Europadiskurs in den deutschen Zeitschriften (1933 – 1939), ed. Michel Grunewald (Bern: Peter Lang, 1999), 63 – 94. See also Florian Greiner, Wege nach Europa: Deutungen eines imaginierten Kontinents in deutschen, britischen und amerikanischen Printmedien, 1914 – 1945 (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2014).  To mention some of the titles: Erich Grisar, Mit Kamera und Schreibmaschine durch Europa: Bilder und Berichte (Berlin: Bücherkreis, 1932). Anna Siemsen, Daheim in Europa: Unliterarische Streifzüge (Jena: Urania, 1928). Hector Masson, Quelques aspects de l’Europe actuelle (Brussels: L’Eglantine, 1925). Zénéide Kotchetkova, Soyons Européens (Brussels: L’Eglantine, 1929). Carel de Dood, Le plan Briand et le mouvement ouvrier international (Brussels: L’Eglantine, 1931). Isi Delvigne, Pour une Union économique Franco-Belge (Brussels: L’Eglantine, 1933).  Max Cohen was President of the Central Council of the Workers’ and Soldiers’ Councils during the German Revolution, 1918 – 1920.

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logue Francis Delaisi (1873 – 1947), the Swiss religious socialist Leonhard Ragaz (1868 – 1945), the former Menshevik Peter Garwy (1881– 1941), one of the organizers of the Russian Revolution 1905, and the former Bolshevik Vladimir Voitinsky (1885 – 1960), member of the Petrograd soviet in 1917, contributed to the debate about European integration and Europeanization.²² Female voices played an important part in this debate – worth mentioning here are in particular Tony Sender and Judith Grünfeld from Germany, Zénéide Kotchetkova from Belgium, and Erna Habertzettl from Czechoslovakia.²³ The tremendous success Edo Fimmen, the General Secretary of the International Transport Workers Federation (ITF), had with his book “Die Vereinigten Staaten Europas” underlines that prominence of the topic of European unity.²⁴ First published in 1924 in Germany, his book was translated between 1924 and 1927 into English, Russian, Czech, Hungarian, Norwegian, Swedish, and Finnish. The “Daily Herald” praised Fimmen’s book as a “clarion call.”²⁵ Fimmen argued that labor should meet the internationalization of capital with an international response, particularly through transnational collective bargaining. His book already contained all the principal elements of the “Strategy for Labor” by the French sociologist André

 Drechsel wrote in Mouvement Syndical Belge and Belgische Vakbeweging. Ragaz was a regular contributor to the Friedenswarte. Peter Garwy published in Arbeiter-Jugend. Voitinsky (Woytinsky) was the author of various books dealing with Europe: Die Vereinigten Staaten von Europa (Berlin: J.H.W. Dietz, 1926); Les États-Unis d’Europe, trans. Albert Jaumin (Brussels: L’Eglantine, 1927); Tatsachen und Zahlen Europas (Vienna: Paneuropa, 1930).  Sender was editor-in-chief of two influential magazines, the Betriebsräte-Zeitschrift for members of the Metal Workers Union, and the Frauenwelt for socialist women. Grünfeld, of Russian origin, had studied economics at the University of Vienna, lived as a journalist in Germany, and wrote about Europe’s declining position in world economy. See Judith Grünfeld, “Die Entwicklungstendenzen des Welthandels,” Betriebsräte-Zeitschrift, September 25, 1926, 617– 620; October 9, 1926, 661– 634; October 23, 1926, 683 – 688. Judith Grünfeld, “Das amerikanische Finanzkapital und die europäische Wirtschaft,” Die Arbeit, June 1929, 351– 358. After 1933, Grünfeld was forced into exile in the USA, where she became a contributor to The Nation and other journals. Unfortunately, there are no further biographical details available. I could not find details about Kotchetkova’s life after 1939. See Erna Haberzettl, “Blick auf Europa,” Frauenwelt, January 27, 1935. After the German occupation of Czechoslovakia, she joined the resistance against the Nazi dictatorship.  Edo Fimmen, Vereinigte Staaten Europas oder Europa AG: Ein internationaler Ausblick (Jena: Thüringer Verlagsanstalt und Druckerei [1924]). Fimmen was a Dutchman, but wrote the book in German, which he mastered like his mothertongue.  “A Clarion Call,” Daily Herald, September 1, 1924. The English title of Fimmen’s book is Labour’s Alternative: The United States of Europe or Europe Limited, trans. Eden and Cedar Paul (London: The Labour Publishing Company, 1924). For the book‘s history see Buschak, Fimmen, 115 – 132. A collection of manuscripts, publishing advertisements, foreign language editions, and reviews can be found in Modern Records Centre, University of Warwick, ITF papers 159/10/24.

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Gorz from the late 1960s.²⁶ Throughout the entire 1920s, European integration remained high on labor’s agenda and moved even higher with the world economic crisis from 1929 onwards. Both Émile Vandervelde (1866 – 1938), legendary leader of the “Parti Ouvrier Belge” (POB, Belgian Workers Party) and Henri Polak (1869 – 1943), chairman of the Dutch Diamond Workers Union, one of the most influential trade unions of the Netherlands, considered economic nationalism as the principal cause of the crisis and suggested the same way out: the creation of the United States of Europe.²⁷

“This Congress is in Favor of Europe becoming an Economic Entity” – The United States of Europe as a Goal of Labor Movement Conferences To underpin their enthusiasm, many labor organisations adopted resolutions in favour of European unity. At its congress in Hamburg, in August 1924, the ITF with its already two million members demanded the creation of the United States of Europe as the best way to preserve peace and advance workers’ interests.²⁸ In 1925, the SPD (844,485 members) adopted at its Heidelberg congress a new party program which requested the establishment of the United States of Europe.²⁹ A European customs union was demanded by the Labor and Socialist International (LSI, 3,600,000 members in Europe) at its conference in Brussels on February 21, 1926.³⁰ The 1927 annual conference of the British Trade Union Congress  André Gorz, Strategy for Labor: A Radical Position (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1968).  Émile Vandervelde, “Briand und die europäische Föderation,” Sozialdemokrat, May 31, 1930. On Vandervelde’s European commitment see Geneviève Duchenne, Esquisses d’une Europe Nouvelle: L’Européisme dans la Belgique de l’Entre-Deux-Guerres (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2008). Henri Polak broadcasted his message; the text was then published as “Henri Polak‘s radio speech,” Weekblad van den Algemeen Nederlandschen Diamantbewerkersbond, July 3, 1931.  ITF, Report of the International Congress held from 7 to 12 August 1924 in the large hall of the Gewerkschaftshaus Besenbinderhof Hamburg (Amsterdam: International Transport Workers Federation, 1924), 11, 47– 48. Membership figures in Buschak, Fimmen, 138.  Sozialdemokratischer Parteitag 1925 in Heidelberg: Protokoll mit dem Bericht der Frauenkonferenz (Berlin, 1925; Glashütten im Taunus: Auvermann, 1974), 85, 272– 282. Citations refer to the reprint. Das Heidelberger Programm: Grundsätze und Forderungen der Sozialdemokratie (Berlin: Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, 1925), 69.  “Konferenz der SAI über Zoll- und Handelspolitik, 27. 2.1926 in Brüssel,” in Dritter Kongress der Sozialistischen Arbeiter-Internationale, Brüssel, 5.–11. August 1928. Erster Band (Abteilung I – IV): Berichte und Verhandlungen (Zürich: 1928; Glashütten im Taunus: Auvermann, 1974), I: 53 – 54, II: 60. Citations refer to the reprint.

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(4,125,000 members) in Edinburgh adopted a resolution “in favour of Europe becoming an economic entity.”³¹ Similar resolutions were passed by the Spanish socialist Unión General de los Trabajadores (General Workers Union, UGT, 985,411 members) in September 1932³² and by the International Federation of Trade Unions (IFTU, around ten million members in Europe) at its Congress in Brussels in 1933.³³ These resolutions demonstrate that the Europeanization of political thinking, political conceptions, and strategies had already well advanced in the labor movement. Some researchers still promote the view that “trade unions (…) are traditionally more deeply rooted in the nation states,”³⁴ but trade unions and socialist parties were leaving the nation-state’s framework already in the 1920s and looked for European solutions concerning all major issues they were confronted with. One could argue that congress resolutions were adopted once and then forgotten and had little impact. This was not the case. The SPD referred again and again to its Heidelberg Programme. For instance, on October 2, 1926 the Vorwärts wrote: “The Social Democratic Party has written Franco-German understanding on its banners. The Party speaks up for the United States of Europe.”³⁵ The ITF resolution from 1924 also had a long-lasting effect. John Marchbank (1883 – 1946), General Secretary of the National Union of

 Report of Proceedings at the 59th Annual Trades Union Congress 1927, 391.  “XVII. Kongress des Allgemeinen Spanischen Gewerkschaftsverbandes (UGT) in Madrid, 14.– 19. Oktober 1932,” Internationale Gewerkschaftsbewegung, January 1933, 3. Membership figures in Walther L. Bernecker: Geschichte Spaniens im 20. Jahrhundert (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2010), 105.  “Zollpolitischer Zusammenschluss Europas, Programm des IGB im Kampf gegen die Krise, Planwirtschaftliche Forderungen des IGB, angenommen vom VI. Ordentlichen Internationalen Gewerkschaftskongress, Brüssel, Internationaler Gewerkschaftsbund 1933,” Internationale Gewerkschaftsbewegung, January/April 1935, 6. Johann Sassenbach, “Internationaler Gewerkschaftsbund,” in Internationales Handwörterbuch des Gewerkschaftswesens, ed. Ludwig Heyde, vol. 1 (Berlin: Verlag Werk und Wirtschaft, 1931), 834, mentions 14 million IFTU members in 1931. German trade unions with around four million members were forbidden in 1933, so an estimation of around ten million members for the IFTU in 1933 is therefore realistic.  Donatella della Porta and Manuela Caiani, Social Movements and Europeanisation (Oxford: University Press, 2009), 4. In contrast to this, Stefan Rüb points out that trade unions never had an exclusively national character. See Stefan Rüb, Die Transnationalisierung der Gewerkschaften: Eine empirische Untersuchung am Beispiel der IG Metall (Berlin: edition sigma, 2009), 14.  “Paneuropa,” Vorwärts, October 3, 1926. The program was even reprinted in 1947: Sozialistische Dokumente: Das Heidelberger Programm, Beschlossen auf dem Parteitag der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands in Heidelberg am 18. September 1925 (Offenbach: Bollwerk Verlag, 1947). The program apparently had more impact than is assumed in historical literature, see Klaus Schönhoven, Der Heidelberger Programmparteitag von 1925: Sozialdemokratische Standortbestimmungen in der Weimarer Republik (Heidelberg: Stiftung Reichspräsident Friedrich Ebert Gedenkstätte, 1995).

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Railwaymen and leading member of the ITF, felt committed to it during his entire lifetime. “We of the ITF have always favoured the creation of the United States of Europe,” he wrote in March 1944, when he was working on a European transport program.³⁶

Labor’s Image of Europe Labor’s image of who belonged to Europe was influenced by political, economic, and cultural reasons and very much by values rather than geographical aspects. The United States of Europe should be built around “the triple alliance of England, France and Germany,” the “Vorwärts”, the flagship of German socialism, demanded in 1921.³⁷ Europe without Great Britain, the Bavarian human rights activist Franz Carl Endres (1878 – 1954) affirmed, was no Europe.³⁸ The support of the powerful British labor movement would make it much easier to build European unity upon a democratic basis, but continental and British also thought that for Great Britain, the link with Europe was vital. They pointed to the centrifugal tendencies within the Empire and saw Britain’s future definitely within Europe.³⁹ John Scurr (1876 – 1932), Poplar Labour MP between 1923 – 1931, and Labor’s geographer Francis Horrabin (1884 – 1962) stressed that trade with the Continent was the life-blood of whole British regions.⁴⁰ Walter Milne-Bailey (1891– 1935), head of the TUC’s Research Department and author of the 1930 TUC report on Empire Trade, however, preferred the Empire to Europe, as the production of food, raw materials, and industrial commodities was balanced within the Empire, but not between Britain and the Continent.⁴¹ Nevertheless,

 John Marchbank, “A European Transport System,” Left News, March 1944, 2801.  “Dreibund der Zukunft,” Vorwärts, December 20, 1921. The Vorwärts tied in with the FrancoGerman parliamentarian’s conference from 1913, organized by Jean Jaurès and Ludwig Frank.  Franz C. Endres, Vaterland Europa (Berlin: Schwetschke & Sohn, 1925), 120 – 125.  Woytinsky, Vereinigte Staaten von Europa, 151– 168.  John Scurr, “Trade with Russia,” Daily Herald, September 29, 1920. Normal Angell wrote in 1921 that “the very life of our population” depends on the economic unity of Europe. Norman Angell, “The Lies That Will Starve Our Children,” Daily Herald, March 14, 1921.  Walter Milne-Bailey, “Vereinigte Staaten von Europa,” Arbeit 7 (1930): 445 – 453. This was wishful thinking, already revealed as such by contemporary literature. See Normann Angell, Foreign Policy and our Daily Bread (London: W. Collins, 1925), 29 – 35. James F. Horrabin, Grundriss der Wirtschaftgeographie (Vienna: Verlag für Literatur und Politik, 1926), 129 – 145, demonstrated that the Empire was self-sufficient only in the area of food production, and only if one disregarded transport costs. For a cartographic interpretation of the Empire’s trade, see James F. Horrabin,

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the pro-Europeans remained a very strong group within British Labor, as we can see from the Australian British socialist Ronald William Gordon Mackay (1902– 1960), who wrote in 1941, right in the middle of the Second World War, that a sustainable Europe needed the three countries Great Britain, France and Germany.⁴² Whether Russia belonged to Europe or not was the subject of a passionate debate during the 1920s.⁴³ The Austrian pacifist Rudolf Goldscheid (1870 – 1931) and Vladimir Voitinsky (Wladimir Woytinsky) emphasized economic reasons for Russia’s integration into a united Europe. In their view, Russian agriculture was essential for Europe’s food supply and Russian oil for its energy supply.⁴⁴ Others, like the Swiss socialist Leonhard Ragaz, argued the same case with cultural motives, pointing out that Russian and European culture were deeply interwoven.⁴⁵ Jules Destrée, however, considered Russia as an Asiatic, not a European, power.⁴⁶ A majority within European labor thought that as long as there was a Bolshevist dictatorship in the country, it was not possible to decide on the potential relationship between Europe and Russia. Whether a mutual rapprochement was possible or not depended upon the growth of democratic forces within the country.⁴⁷ Others, like the German periodical “Sozialistische Monatshefte” (Socialist Monthly) or Zénéide Kotchetkova assumed that neither the UK nor Russia were a part of Europe, although a unified Europe should look for cooperation with both.⁴⁸ Experience with Stalinism changed

An Atlas of Empire (London: Gollancz, 1937). For contemporary statistics see Statistical Abstract for the Several British Overseas Dominions and Protectorates (London: Stationary Office, 1926).  Ronald W.G. Mackay, Peace Aims and the New Order: Being a Revised and Popular Edition of ‘Federal Europe’ (London: Michael Joseph, 1941), 108 – 116. See also Mary Saran, The Future Europe: Peace and Power Politics? (London: International Publishing Company [1942]), 2– 5, 22– 26. Walter Padley, The Economic Problem of the Peace: A Plea for World Socialist Union (London: Gollancz, 1944), 114– 123. It should not come as a surprise that they saw Germany as part of a united Europe. They made a difference between National Socialism and the German people. See also G.D.H. Cole, Europe, Russia and the Future (London: Gollancz, 1941), 143 – 156.  The debate always concerned Russia, not the Soviet Union.  Rudolf Goldscheid, “Der Ausbau des Paktes von Locarno und der Zusammenschluss Europas,” Friedenswarte, September 1926, 270 – 276. Woytinsky, Vereinigte Staaten von Europa, 151– 168.  Leonard Ragaz, “Paneuropa und der Völkerbund,” Friedenswarte, August 1926, 236.  Destrée, Pour en finir avec la guerre, 59. Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi had the same vision. See his article on “Weltpolitik 1924,” Pan-Europa 9, no. 10 (1924): 15 – 19.  See for example J.A. Hobson, “Der wirtschaftliche Zusammenschluss Europas,” Die Gesellschaft 10 (1926): 322– 333.  Felix Stößinger, “Auf dem Wege zum Frieden: Eine Rechtfertigung der Kontinentalpolitik,” Sozialdemokrat, September 2, 1926. Kotchetkova, Soyons Européens, 9 – 10.

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views drastically and made a majority of labor sceptical concerning Russia’s role in Europe.

Alliances for Europe From the outset, the labor movement looked for allies on the path towards the United States of Europe and found them within other social movements, particularly the peace movement, the women’s movement, and the human rights movement. Organizations like the “Deutsche Friedensgesellschaft” (German Peace Society), the “Deutsche Liga für Menschenrechte” (German League for Human Rights), the International Women’s League for Peace and Freedom, the World Peace Congress, the Interparlamentarian Union, Franco-German student-associations, and others fought alongside the labor movement for European unity. The list of personalities that were in favor of European unification and supported labor’s demand is long and impressive, including the famous Austrian pacifist Alfred H. Fried (1864 – 1921), Peace Nobel Prize winner of the year 1911, the French Geographer Albert Demangeon (1872– 1940), the Swiss lawyer Georg Wettstein (1880–?), the Belgian entrepreneur Dannie Heinemann (1872– 1962), and Albert Thomas (1878 – 1932), the first director of the International Labor Office.⁴⁹ In the middle of the 1920s, the labor movement in some countries like Germany managed to involve centrist and right-wing parties in the discussion about European unity.⁵⁰ Initially, the labor movement welcomed very much the foundation of Count Coudenhove-Kalergi’s Pan-European Union. Coudenhove’s central argument that only a federation of European states could avoid the political and economic marginalization of Europe had been familiar to socialists since 1914. They admired Coudenhove’s passionate enthusiasm.⁵¹ The socialist press announced his meet-

 See Buschak, Arbeiterbewegung und Europa, 80 – 81, 383 – 384, 406 – 408, 454– 461, 526 – 527 for their texts.  See “Für europäische Verständigung,” Rheinische Zeitung, November 23, 1926, the report of a meeting between the SPD, the DDP (German Democratic Party), and the Deutsche Volkspartei (German People’s Party, a right wing party) about Europe. See also Toni Sender, The Autobiography of a German Rebel (New York, NY: Vanguard Press, 1939), 229 – 274.  Eugen Prager, “Staatenbund All-Europa: Der Kern einer Idee,” Vorwärts, October 19, 1924. “Paneuropa,” Vorwärts, October 3, 1926. Bernhard Düwell, “Zur Geschichte Paneuropas,” Vorwärts October 30, 1926. “Paneuropa,” Arbeiter-Zeitung, May 23, 1926. The Paneuropean Union had 6,000 – 8,000 members which was not that impressive, compared with the millions organized by trade unions and socialist parties. See Anita Ziegerhofer-Prettenthaler, Botschafter

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ings, reported favourably about his activities,⁵² and published his articles.⁵³ In October 1926, the “Vorwärts” described Coudenhove as “writer and propagandist by rank and name, a prophet and real politician at the same time.”⁵⁴ The breaking point was Coudenhove’s disturbed relationship to democracy and his inclination towards authoritarian regimes: in 1927, he tried to win over the Italian dictator Mussolini for his movement.⁵⁵ Utterly disappointed, the German Social Democrat and president of the Reichstag Paul Löbe (1875 – 1967) left the Pan-European Union in 1928, and with him many others.⁵⁶ Europeanization played a considerable part in this break. According to the predominant opinion in the labor movement, European unity could only be achieved through a process of Europeanization of the masses, of their feelings of belonging, and their sense of identity. Coudenhove, however, seemed to despise the masses.⁵⁷

Contradictions of Labor’s Enthusiasm for Europe Labor’s pro-European attitude was not always free from contradictions. Sometimes, the arrogance of bigger nations stood behind the complaints about Europe’s fragmentation and Balkanization. In 1928, the Sächsische Gewerkschafts-

Europas: Richard Nikolaus Coudenhove-Kalergi und die Paneuropa-Bewegung in den zwanziger und dreißiger Jahren (Vienna: Böhlau, 2004), 104.  “Coudenhove spricht im Plenarsaal des Reichswirtschaftsrates,” Vorwärts, May 30, 1925. “In Berlin sprach gestern der junge Führer der jungen paneuropäischen Bewegung,” Vorwärts, June 7, 1925. “Vorkämpfer für Pan-Europa,” Vorwärts, December 12, 1925. “Die Vereinigten Staaten von Europa – eine Umfrage,” Vorwärts, February 5, 1926.  R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, “Kontinentale Weltbewegung,” Vorwärts, August 19, 1926. R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, “Für ein paneuropäisches Locarno,” Dresdener Volkszeitung, September 3, 1927.  “Paneuropa,” Vorwärts, October 3, 1926.  Coudenhove’s ideal was not democracy, but a paternalistic aristocracy. See Anita Ziegerhofer-Prettenthaler, Botschafter Europas, 58 – 65, 147– 148. Ina U. Paul, “Die ‘Paneuropa’ 1933 – 1938 und Coudenhove-Kalergi: Ein ‘getreues Spiegelbild seines Denkens und Wirkens’,” in Grunewald, Le discours européen (1933 – 1939), 165 – 166. Mussolini was responsible for the murder of the Italian socialist Matteotti in 1924 and the following violent suppression of the Italian labor movement.  “Die Differenzen bei Paneuropa,” Vorwärts, December 7, 1928. Ziegerhofer-Prettenthaler, Botschafter Europas, 180 – 194. Buschak, Arbeiterbewegung und Europa, 679 – 739.  Max Cohen, “Locarno und Kontinentaleuropa,” Sozialistische Monatshefte, December 10, 1925, 731– 736. Coudenhove’s contempt for masses is underlined by Georg Kreis, “Der ‘vierte Tag’ der Paneuropabewegung,” Basler Zeitschrift für Geschichte und Altertumskunde 91 (1991): 353 – 361.

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Zeitung mentioned in the same breath Europe’s Balkanization and unification, protesting that small countries, called “economic absurdistans,” behaved like “presumptuous parvenus,” although economically they had no right to exist.⁵⁸ Europeanization and nationalistic language could go together. The German Metal Workers Union warned in 1924 against the risk of an American “infiltration” of the German car industry⁵⁹ and issued shrill alarm signals like “Ford ante portas.”⁶⁰ A considerable number of labor organisations could not imagine Europe without colonies and subordinated other people’s interests and wishes to Europe’s ostensible economic needs. “Without Tropics no Europe,” the Dutch socialist J.L. Vleming (1879 – 1965) argued in 1927. Colonies, he believed, were essential for the provision with raw materials, important as markets for European industrial products, and as a settlement area for Europe’s surplus population.⁶¹ The German socialist Max Cohen seriously believed in a civilizing mission of Europe in the colonies, above all in Africa.⁶² There were, however, many others, who had strictly opposite viewpoints. Eugen Prager, Francis Delaisi, Vladimir Voitinsky, and Max Drechsel argued that the economic importance of colonies was greatly overestimated and that Europe’s time as a colonial power had definitely passed. Good trade relations with the USA, Canada, and Australia were more important than the possession of colonies, and new markets should be explored within Europe.⁶³

 “Die Lage der europäischen Exportindustrie und die neue Taktik der englischen Gewerkschaften,” Sächsische Gewerkschaftszeitung, January 15, 1928. The German expression “Wirtschaftslächerlichkeiten” is hardly translatable. Its meaning is very contemptuous. “Economic absurdistans” is my best approximation.  F.A. Petrich, “Die Gefahr der Überfremdung,” Betriebsräte-Zeitschrift, May 24, 1924.  Karl Maier, “Ford vor den Toren Europas,” Betriebsräte-Zeitschrift, September 27, 1924.  J.L. Vleming jr., Zonder tropen geen Europa (Amsterdam: N.V. Ontwikkeling, 1927). For a similar opinion, see Morgan Philips Price, Die europäischen Wirtschaftsprobleme vor und nach dem Kriege (Berlin: R. Klett, 1929), 163. Hans Bauer and H.G. Ritzel, Von der schweizerischen zur europäischen Föderation (Zürich: Europa Verlag, 1940), 55 – 56.  Max Cohen, “Für eine deutsche Kolonialzukunft,” Sozialistische Monatshefte, October 11, 1926.  Eugen Prager, “Für die europäische Einheit,” Volksstimme: Organ der deutschen Sozialdemokratie der Republik Polen, October 20, 1925. Francis Delaisi, Les deux Europes (Paris: Payot, 1929), 89 – 119. Max Drechsel, “Le deséquilibre économique d’Europe,” Mouvement Syndical Belge, July 3, 1926, 194– 195, ibid., July 17, 1926, 211– 213. For a summary of the debate about Europe and the colonies, see Buschak, Die Vereinigten Staaten von Europa, 146 – 149. See also Peo Hansen and Stefan Jonsson, Eurafrica: The Untold History of European Integration and Colonialism (London: Bloomsbury, 2014).

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Europe is a Hopeless Spot While a majority of the labor movement supported the request for the United States of Europe, there were also skeptics like Oswald Mosley (1896 – 1980), who joined the ILP in 1924 and argued at the Party’s annual conference in the same year that Europe was “the least hopeful spot from the international point of view.” The ILP should support international rather than European unity.⁶⁴ A German trade unionist also expressed doubts whether the momentum for unifying Europe had not already passed and whether jealousies between European nations were too big to overcome.⁶⁵ In general, however, enthusiasm for Europe remained a shared position within the socialist labor movement. Things were different in Christian trade unions, which were influential in Flanders, the Netherlands, Austria, Germany, and Poland. They did not believe that the nationstate had reached its limits and were no particular friends of a supranational unit like the United States of Europe. But they supported at least a limited Europeanization: the harmonization of basic social conditions like health and safety at the workplace and the co-ordination of currency policy.⁶⁶ Anarchists criticized European integration because they feared that the United States of Europe might turn into a centralist super-state. They had a different model of European unity in mind, where people cooperated directly at local and regional level.⁶⁷ Communist organizations were severe opponents of European unity throughout the 1920s. As Lenin’s writings were canonized in the 1920s, nobody dared to speak out out against his verdict from 1915 that the United States of Europe were either reactionary or impossible. Solomon Abramovich Lozovsky (1878 – 1952), the head of the Communist Red International of Labor Unions (RILU), declared all discus-

 Independent Labour Party: Report of the Annual Conference held at York April 1924 (London: Independent Labour Party [1924]), 136. In 1934, Mosley founded the British Union of Fascists.  Ursus, “Europas weltwirtschaftlicher Niedergang,” Gewerkschafts-Zeitung, November 8, 1924, 439. “Ursus” is a pseudonym which unfortunately I could not resolve. In any case, his opinion was not shared by the ADGB leadership which edited the Gewerkschafts-Zeitung. See Wilhelm Eggert, “Gewerkschaftsprobleme zur europäischen Zollunion,” in Europäische Zollunion: Beiträge zu Problem und Lösung, ed. Hanns Heimann (Berlin: Reimar Hobbing, 1926), 96 – 108.  See for example Georg Wieber, “Paneuropa und die Arbeiterschaft,” Der Deutsche Metallarbeiter, July 26, 1930. Wieber was editor-in-chief of the Christian Metalworkers journal.  See Eugen Relgis, “La joven Europa,” Revista Blanca, April 15, 1931, 537– 539. Eugen Relgis, “Estados Unidos de Europa o Federación Europea,” Revista Blanca, January 15, 1931, 377– 379. Walther Borgius, Der Paneuropa-Wahn (Berlin: Verlag der Neuen Gesellschaft [1927]).

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sions about European integration without further ado as idle talk.⁶⁸ There is, however, an impressive list of Communists who criticized Lenin’s dogma, developed their own thinking about the United States of Europe and, as a consequence, left the Communist movement. Such was the case of Albert Treint (1889 – 1971), founding member of the French Communist Party, of Walter Öttinghaus (1883 – 1950), Fritz Fränkel (1892– 1944), and Willi Münzenberg (1889 – 1940), all three founding members of the German Communist Party, and of the Austrian-French Communist Lucien Laurat [Otto Maschl] (1898 – 1973), who was a high-ranking official of the Communist International.⁶⁹

Labor’s Proposals how to Unify Europe Labor’s European enthusiasm inspired a whole series of practical suggestions – how to realise the European union, which supra-national institutions were needed, and what kind of politics they should pursue. In February 1919, well before Jean Monnet, Max Cohen proposed a Franco-German coal and steel community as the starting point of European integration.⁷⁰ The German trade unionist Max Engelmann suggested to begin with political co-operation: labor governments should convoke a European conference to elect a European bureau steering the further process. Zénéide Kotchetkova proposed various regional communities, formed by close neighbors like Belgium and the Netherlands, which at a

 Lenin had declared in 1915 that the United States of Europe were either reactionary or impossible. See W.I. Lenin, “Über die Losung der Vereinigten Staaten von Europa,” in Lenin: Sämtliche Werke (Vienna: Verlag für Literatur und Politik, 1929), 18: 306 – 310.  Louzon left the party in 1924, Treint was excluded in 1928, Laurat left in 1933, Fränkel was excluded in 1938, Öttinghaus in 1939, Münzenberg left the Party in 1939. See Aurélien Durr, “Albert Treint: Itinéraire politique, 1914– 1939” (PhD diss., Université de Paris, 2006). Siegfried Mielke, “Walter Oettinghaus,” in Emigrierte Metallgewerkschafter im Kampf gegen das NS-Regime, ed. Siegfried Mielke and Stefan Heinz (Berlin: Metropol, 2014), 237– 252. Klaus Täubert, ‘Unbekannt verzogen…’: Der Lebensweg des Suchtmediziners, Psychologen und KPD-Gründungsmitglieds Fritz Fränkel (Berlin: Trafo, 2005). About Münzenberg, see the various contributions in Bernhard H. Bayerlein, Kasper Braskén, and Uwe Sonnenberg, eds., Global Spaces for Radical Transnational Solidarity: Contributions to the First International Willi Münzenberg Congress 2015 in Berlin (Berlin: International Willi Münzenberg Forum, 2018). Michel Dreyfus, “Lucien Laurat,” in Le Komintern: L’Histoire et les Hommes. Dictionnaire Biographique de l’International Communiste en France, à Moscou, en Belgique, au Luxembourg, en Suisse (1919 – 1943), ed. José Gotovitch and Mikhaïl Narinski (Paris: Les Editions Ouvrières, 2001), 383 – 385.  Max Cohen, “Der Weg der Außenpolitik für das neue Deutschland,” Sozialistische Monatshefte, February 9, 1919, 79 – 84.

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later point in time would merge into the United States of Europe.⁷¹ When socialists described Europe’s form of governance, some spoke of a “European Federation,” others used the term “United States of Europe,” “European Union” or “European Customs Union.” Whatever the preferred term, the labor movement conceived the unified Europe as a parliamentary democracy, either with two chambers – the first chamber elected by universal suffrage and representing the people, the second chamber consisting of delegates of national governments, as Kotchetkova suggested – or with one chamber only which had all the legislative power, as the Australian-British socialist Ronald William Gordon Mackay proposed. Both placed a European executive with far-reaching competences on top of the institutional architecture.⁷² Labor’s plans recommended the establishment of a common European infrastructure, with a transport network comprising roads, railways, air traffic, channels, rivers and harbors, and the electrification of the entire continent. Labor suggested a European Central Bank, a joint currency, as well as a common foreign, economic, financial, and trade policy, and a European Army. Company law and particularly the antitrust legislation should be harmonized and dealt with at European level. A European Union with its farreaching economic capabilities would implement an ambitious social policy, an unemployment protection scheme, joint standards for working conditions and working time, and a European Housing Program. The Europeanization of monetary policy would contribute to an upward harmonization of wages. There was to be a guarantee of free movement of persons within Europe and Europeans were to travel with a European passport.⁷³  Max Engelmann, “Drei Auffassungen über das Problem der Vereinigung Europas,” Gewerkschafts-Archiv, June 1932, 271– 289. No biographical data about Engelmann is available. Kotchetkova, Soyons européens, 11, 14, 23.  Kotchetkova, Soyons Européens, 23 ff. Ronald W.G. Mackay, Federal Europe: Being the Case for European Federation Together with a Draft Constitution of a United States of Europe (London: Michael Joseph, 1940). Right in the middle of the Second World War, a popular version of his book was published, Peace Aims and the New Order: Being a Revised and Popular Edition of ‘Federal Europe’ (London: Michael Joseph, 1941). On further European constitutional projects see Włodzimierz Borodziej, Heinz Duchhardt, Małgorzata Morawiec, and Ignác Romsics, eds., Option Europa: Deutsche, polnische und ungarische Europapläne des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts, 3 vols. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Rupprecht, 2005). Bert Riehle, Eine neue Ordnung der Welt: Föderative Friedenstheorien im deutschsprachigen Raum zwischen 1892 und 1932 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Rupprecht Unipress, 2009).  Woytinsky, Vereinigte Staaten Europas, 124. Paul Kampffmeyer, “Zu einer europäischen Wirtschafts- und Sozialpolitik,” Sozialistische Monatshefte, January 11, 1926, 17– 19. Eggert, “Gewerkschaftsprobleme,” 104. De Dood, Le plan Briand, 21– 29. Kotchetkova, Soyons européens, 23 – 41. I.A. Hobson, “Der wirtschaftliche Zusammenschluss Europas,” Die Gesellschaft 10 (1926): 322– 333. “Die Visumplage muss verschwinden,” In die weite Welt, August 1927, 2.

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There was, however, one bitter pill to swallow. The labor movement expected that a common market would initially create tremendous distortions. Many companies would leave traditional locations behind and move beyond the borders, towards their “natural location”: places with raw materials like coal, iron, potash or sugar within easy reach. Thousands of workplaces would not survive the restructuring process. Labor politicians therefore insisted on a rather smooth and long-term transition towards a common market, with a gradual dismantlement of tariffs only, accompanied by joint industrial and social policy and particularly by a European unemployment protection scheme.⁷⁴ In 1929, the French economist Francis Delaisi, economic adviser of the socialist Confédération Général du Travail (General Confederation of Labor, CGT), offered a solution of how to mitigate the effects of the restructuring crisis. There was not one but two Europes, he wrote: the industrialized European North – the “steam power” Europe or “Europe A” – and the agrarian South and East – the “horsepower Europe” or “Europe B.” “Horsepower Europe” had basically no infrastructure and needed railways and roads, “steam power Europe” lacked markets. The co-operation of “Europe A” and “Europe B” would stimulate the economic development all over Europe.⁷⁵

Labor – a Mass Movement for Europe One could argue that the enthusiasm for Europe and Europeanization was a matter for labor leaders and delegates at labor conferences, not for the rank and file. Again, this was not the case. Socialist high schools and workers’ educational societies, regional trade union conferences, and local party groups all over Europe had meetings on topics like European culture, a European customs union, the economic and political integration of Europe, Europe and the League of Nations, and so forth.⁷⁶ In 1925, Hermann Krätzig (1871– 1954) gave 31 talks in Saxon cities about “Europe’s economy in a world context.” Taken together he had 3,000 lis-

 Woytinsky, Die Vereinigten Staaten von Europa, 108. Wilhelm Grotkopp, “Zollabbau durch organisierte europäische Wirtschaft,” Die Arbeit, January 1930, 33. J.P. Hassaert, “Europe,” Avenir Social, March 1928, 173.  Francis Delaisi, Les deux Europes (Paris: Payot, 1929). What he suggested was an early version of European regional policy. Delaisi’s book caused a sensation in the French-speaking world and got much attention elsewhere, although it was never translated into other languages. See also Eric Bussière, Olivier Dard, and Geneviève Duchenne, eds., Francis Delaisi: Du Dreyfusisme à ‘L’Europe Nouvelle’ (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2015), 150 – 152.  Buschak, Die Vereinigten Staaten von Europa, 234– 236.

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teners.⁷⁷ On December 2, 1927, Peter Graßmann (1873 – 1939), member of the Executive of the Allgemeiner Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund (ADGB, General Confederation of German Trade Unions), spoke in Dresden to 700 trade union officials about the unification of Europe.⁷⁸ In October 1929, 200 officials of the German Metal Workers Union from the Ruhr district had a meeting on the need for a European customs union.⁷⁹ In February 1930, the Austrian socialist Karl Leuthner (1869 – 1964) spoke about the United States of Europe at a meeting of socialists in Vienna-Josefstadt,⁸⁰ and his colleague Karl Hans Sailer (1900 – 1957) did so at a socialist meeting in Vienna-Hietzing in June 1930.⁸¹ In the same month, the fifteenth section of the Socialist Party’s Fédération de la Seine convened a meeting about the United States of Europe in Paris.⁸² In October 1930, the Socialist Youth of Drancy had the United States of Europe on its agenda.⁸³ The labor movement represented from the beginning what Count Coudenhove-Kalergi’s Paneuropean Union never was: a mass movement for European unity. Europe was the over-arching topic at many mass events organized in the 1920s. Tens of thousands of worker athletes from all over Europe participated in the workers’ Olympic Games in Frankfurt in July 1925. A contemporary wrote about the event that the participants would certainly “fight more energetically than ever before for the idea of Europe, for international conciliation and for peace.”⁸⁴ His description was confirmed by other reports of similar meetings. In July 1929, a group of young socialists from East Prussia wanted to participate in Vienna’s International Day of Youth. With their Estonian, Latvian, and Polish comrades, they took a special train from Warsaw, organized by the Poles. Stepping out of the train in Vienna, the young people did not fall apart in various national groups, but stayed together all the time and formed what they called a “little international.”⁸⁵ In July 1930, 20,000 socialists and trade unionists

 Geschäftsbericht des Sozialdemokratischen Bezirksverbandes Dresden, vom 1. April bis 31. Dezember 1925 (Dresden: Verlag des Bezirksvorstandes [1926]), 45. Krätzig, a weaver by profession, was a social democratic member of the German Reichstag.  “Dresden,” Sächsische Gewerkschaftszeitung, January 1, 1928.  “In Europa müssen die Zollschranken fallen,” Metallarbeiterzeitung, October 19, 1929.  “Vereine und Versammlungen,” Arbeiter-Zeitung, February 16, 1930. Leuthner was a socialist member of the Austrian Nationalrat (National Parliament) 1920 – 1934.  “Vereine und Versammlungen,” Arbeiter-Zeitung, June 1, 1930. Sailer was a journalist at the Arbeiter-Zeitung.  Advertisement in Le Populaire, June 12, 1930.  Advertisement in Le Populaire, October 8, 1930.  A. Katzer, “Kulturelle Betrachtungen zur ersten internationalen Arbeiterolympiade in Frankfurt a. M. vom 24. bis 28. Juli 1925,” Kulturwille, September 1, 1925.  Rudi Haetzel, “Ostpreußische Arbeiterjugend in Wien,” Freie Presse, August 7, 1929.

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from Belgium, the Netherlands, and Germany demonstrated in Aachen for peace and co-operation between their countries, for “Labor’s Pan Europe,” as the “Rheinische Zeitung” from Cologne titled a report about the event. The manifestations were repeated in Liège (Belgium) in 1931 and in Maastricht (Netherlands) in 1932.⁸⁶ Such meetings Europeanized the “feelings of belonging.”⁸⁷ Participants felt part not only of a national, but of a wider European group. They developed a deeper sense of solidarity, as the international working class, the reference point of their solidarity, turned from an abstract into a concrete entity.⁸⁸ The importance of such manifestations lies in the many improvised meetings and spontaneous talks on the fringes, about living and working conditions in other countries, which widened participants’ horizons and made them aware of “similarities among national causes.” They contributed to a considerable extent to “the construction of a shared European identity.” Recent research on Europeanization carefully describes the process of building a shared European identity as such, but places the beginning far too late. Europeanization and the development of a European identity have deep roots in history, are much older than the European Union itself, and are not dependent upon the existence of European institutions.⁸⁹ Kiran Klaus Patel argues that the project Europe is first of all a foundation of nation-states but underlines, also with Ulrike von Hirschhausen, that Europeanization cannot be located only in an institutional context.⁹⁰ Labor’s enthusiasm for European integration affirms above all the latter argument and shows that a mass movement prepared the grounds for the initiative of nation-states and influenced governments during the entire process of European  “Das Paneuropa des sozialistischen Proletariats auf dem Vormarsch,” Rheinische Zeitung, July 31, 1930. Gewerkschafts-Zeitung, September 12, 1931, 590. “Grenzlandtreffen im Westen,” Der Abend, August 22, 1923.  Dahrendorf, A Third Europe?, 6.  Dahrendorf, A Third Europe?, 6. See also Hartmut Kaelble, “Europäisches Selbstverständnis,” 421– 447. See also Hartmut Kaelble, Europäer über Europa: Die Entstehung des europäischen Selbstverständnisses im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2001). Kaelble focuses much on European identity replacing the national one. For the labor movement in the 1920s, both identities went well along with each other. Participants at the manifestations in Aachen, Liège or Maastricht did not lose their Belgian or German identity, but did enlarge their national identity by a European dimension.  Della Porta and Caiani, Social Movements, 171.  Kiran K. Patel, Projekt Europa: Eine kritische Geschichte (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2018), 19. See also Heinrich Pehle and Roland Sturm, “Die Europäisierung der Regierungssysteme,” in Die EU-Staaten im Vergleich, ed. Oscar W. Gabriel and Sabine Kropp (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2008), 155 – 178. Ulrike von Hirschhausen and Kiran K. Patel, “Europäisierung 1.0,” in Docupedia Zeitgeschichte (November 11, 2010), accessed October 30, 2020, doi:10.14765/zzf.dok.2.313.v1.

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integration. Europeanization predates European institutions and the labor movement was one of the biggest impulse generators of the 1920s for European unity.⁹¹

Images, Emotions, and Experiences when Travelling across Borders Workers’ travels abroad – travels of individuals and of groups, for leisure or out of professional and political reasons – contributed further to the Europeanization of “feelings of belonging” and to the construction of a European identity. Such travels abroad were booming in the second half of the 1920s, after the inflationary crisis of 1923 was overcome. Collective bargaining and legislation extended the duration of holidays – up to 12 working days in Germany, more than seven working days in the Netherlands. Workers’ travel organizations in the UK, in the Netherlands, in Belgium, Austria, Switzerland, Germany, and Czechoslovakia organized cheap journeys throughout Europe. The possibility to pay by instalments over various years permitted average workers to book such travels. Their objective was not only touristic. They wanted to gain a better understanding of people, more knowledge about social relationships, working conditions, and the labor movement abroad in general. A journey abroad usually included direct contacts with representatives of the local labor movement.⁹² In August 1926, for example, the Czechoslovakian “Urlaubsreiseorganisation” (URO) organised a 12-day-trip to Paris, Brussels, and Cologne. The seventh day was spent in Brussels and involved a visit to establishments of co-operative societies and the labor college in Uccle, a presentation about the Belgian labor movement, and  Christian Stadler, “Europäische Identität und ihre geistig-philosophischen Grundlagen,” in Gehler and Vietta, Europa, 271– 285, uses the term “impulse generator.” The importance he gives to Coudenhove-Kalergi and Churchill is debatable as Coudenhove did not produce particularly original ideas about Europe and Churchill did not enter the field before the 1940s.  See for example “Der Weg zur Völkerversöhnung,” In die weite Welt, March 1927. “1. Volksreisebewegung,” Freie Presse, March 7, 1929; Emil Heßler, Osterreise 1930: Brüssel-Ostende (Bern: Bildungsausschuss der Arbeiterunion Bern, 1930), 4– 6. See Christine Keitz, “Organisierte Arbeiterreisen und Tourismus in der Weimarer Republik: Eine sozialgeschichtliche Untersuchung über Voraussetzungen und Praxis des Reisens in der Arbeiterschicht” (PhD diss., Freie Universität Berlin, 1992). Bruno Frommann, “Reisen im Dienste politischer Zielsetzungen: Arbeiter-Reisen und ‘Kraft durch Freude Fahrten’” (PhD diss., Universität Stuttgart, 1993). Maricke Denolf, “En zij leerden hun volk reizen: De Arbeiderstoeristenbond ‘De Naturvrienden’,” Brood en Rosen 2 (2003): 31– 46. Francis Williams, Journey Into Adventure: The Story of the Workers’ Travel Association (London: Odhams Press, 1960). Buschak, Vereinigte Staaten von Europa, 271– 344.

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meetings with Belgian comrades.⁹³ In June and August 1930, the German “Reichsausschuss für sozialistische Bildungsarbeit” carried out two journeys to Bornholm. During each of the journeys, one evening was reserved for a meeting with local colleagues from Bornholm’s biggest town, Rønne.⁹⁴ A particular moment for travelling workers was the crossing of borders. Many travellers had a clearly structured idea of Europe in their heads, with borders dividing a “here” on the one side from a “there” on the other side. In reality, however, they reported back home, people, cities, and landscapes at both sides of a border resembled each other.⁹⁵ Travelling thus helped to reduce prejudicies and to discover similarities. Coming back from a trip to Paris in 1924, a British trade unionist confessed: “I went to Paris, knowing no French, and with a marked feeling of dislike towards the French people. I have returned still ignorant of the language, but with feeling of friendship and understanding towards the French in general and the French working class in particular.”⁹⁶ Travelling Europeanized the memory landscape of workers. Memory was no longer linked exclusively to the immediate surroundings, to the workplace, the family’s flat, the local trade union house or the home town. Places far abroad, such as Paris, London, Marseille, and others, entered the memory landscape; they were no more considered “alien”, but part of home. Workers began to feel “at home” in Europe, as the German pedagogue Anna Siemsen put it.⁹⁷ It is impossible to provide the total number of men and women sent abroad by workers’ travel organisations. We have figures for individual travellers, for some workers’ travel organisations, and for some years. In 1926, the “Urania,” a Czechoslovakian travel organisation located in Karlsbad, sent 2,600 female and male workers, mainly from the Sudetenland and Saxony, abroad.⁹⁸ In 1931, the British Workers’ Travel Association (WTA) enabled almost 14,000 work-

 Uro-Ferienfahrten 1928/29 (Bodenbach: Uro, 1929), 9.  Ferien- und Studienreisen für Arbeiter, Angestellte und Beamte 1929 (Berlin: Vorwärts Buchdruckerei, 1929), 5, 8.  Felix Poersch, “Unsere Hollandfahrt,” Arbeiterjugend, August 1924, 213. Erich Fischer, “Frankreich,” In die weite Welt, April 1926, 4. Trude Wiechert, “Reisebericht,” Volkswille, November 1929.  Letter to the Daily Herald, May 31, 1924.  See Siemsen, Daheim in Europa. Erich Fischer, “Frankreich,” In die weite Welt, April 1926, 4; Karl Honay, “Unsere erste Reise nach London,” In die weite Welt, October 1928, 3; Lotte Belina, “Paris: Der Höhepunkt,” Aufstieg, January 1931; A. Weber, “Streifzüge durch Pariser Straßen,” Aufstieg, March/April 1932.  “Woher kamen die 2.654 Reiseteilnehmer im Jahre 1926,” Der Strom, November 1, 1926.

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ers to spend holidays on the Continent.⁹⁹ In 1931, the “Reichsausschuss für sozialistische Bildungsarbeit,” based in Berlin, sent 1,807 workers from all over Germany abroad.¹⁰⁰ These figures may look small but have to be multiplied. Back home the participants reported what they had seen to their local party or trade union group, in public meetings and in private, to their friends and families. Travels and the stories told by them further contributed to the Europeanization of mindsets in the labor movement, with the travelers ideas, images, and emotions passed between the countries. Travelers constructed their own European space.¹⁰¹ Della Porta and Caiani rightly underline the importance of such an “imagined Europe” for the “construction of collective identities.”¹⁰² The pre-war practice of sending study missions abroad was taken up again soon after the war had ended. One of the most favourite destinations of such tours was Vienna. Throughout the 1920s, all kinds of groups and individuals, from all parts of Europe, came to Vienna to study its “municipal socialism” and particularly the housing program of the socialist city administration.¹⁰³ There were in fact numerous study missions going abroad. Just to give a few examples: in 1924, Swiss railway workers came to the UK to study the British railway system. The same year, eight different groups of British workers went to Ghent in Belgium to see the International Co-operative Exhibition there and to make contact with their Belgian comrades.¹⁰⁴ In 1926, the Workers’ Travel organisation (WTA) organized special tours around co-operative establishments in Switzerland and municipal institutions in Belgium.¹⁰⁵ In September 1929, a group of German trade unionists, full-time officers, and rank-and-file members  Tenth Annual Report of the Workers’ Travel Association for the Year Ended October 31, 1931 (London: The Workers’ Travel Association [1931]), 5.  Buschak, Die Vereinigten Staaten von Europa, 313.  That ideas travelled along with people is underlined by Hartmut Kaelble and Martin Kirsch, “Zur Europäisierung des Selbstverständnisses und der Gesellschaft der Europäer im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert,” in Kaelble and Kirsch, Selbstverständnis und Gesellschaft der Europäer, 11– 26, see 14. Della Porta and Caiani stress the importance of the “imagined Europe,” see Della Porta and Caiani, Social Movements, 19 and 23.  Della Porta and Caiani, Social Movements, 19.  Buschak, Vereinigte Staaten von Europa, 340 – 342. Tourism within Europe, study missions abroad, and practical co-operation across borders were much less frequent within the communist movement, which had above all the objective to promote the Soviet Union and not to better understand Europe. See Joachim Schröder, Internationalismus nach dem Krieg: Die Beziehungen zwischen deutschen und französischen Kommunisten 1918 – 1923 (Essen: Klartext, 2008).  Annual Report of the Workers’ Travel Association for the Year Ending December 31, 1924 (London [1924]), 3 – 4.  Annual report of the Workers’ Travel Association for the Year ending October 31, 1926 (London [1926]), 2.

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from the big fluvial port of Duisburg visited their colleagues from the socialist Transport Workers Union at the port of Antwerp. As transport business was already internationalized, the Germans felt the urgent need of getting to know how their Belgian colleagues worked, what kind of facilities Belgian trade unions offered to their members, and what could be learned thereof.¹⁰⁶ In May 1930, returning from the International Miners’ Federation Congress in Krakow, Poland, 30 British miners visited mines in the German Harz mountains.¹⁰⁷ To get a complete picture how many socialists and trade unionists crossed borders, we also have to consider the numerous congresses and conferences organized by the Labor and Socialist International, by the International Federation of Trade Unions (IFTU) and its Trade Secretariats like the International Transport Workers Federation, and by co-operative societies and other organizations, such as the Friends of Nature. Trade unions did not only meet at congresses, but also organized cross-border efforts. In 1920, the IFTU campaigned to save starving children in Vienna 1919/1920 and arranged help against the famine in Russia. The same year, the International Union of Food Workers (IUF) organized a Europeanwide boycott of the Swiss Chocolate Company Peter & Cailler & Kohler, which had violated trade union rights. The boycott ended with an agreement recognizing trade union rights, concluded between the company and the IUF – the first international social agreement in history. Such actions needed co-ordination and brought even more people into contact. Trade unionists developed their European networks across borders and constructed their own European space.¹⁰⁸ Again, it is almost impossible to give a total number of all trade unionists and socialists travelling for a certain purpose through Europe and being involved in the construction of networks and a European space. Estimates for some groups, however, are possible. Taking the participants of LSI congresses and international trade union congresses only, we already have 2,500 persons being in contact with each other, not only at congresses, but also in-between.¹⁰⁹ Every year, a few hundred trade unionists attended international training courses, made experiences abroad, and established contacts.¹¹⁰

 Gustav Sander, “Beim belgischen Transportarbeiterverband,” Deutscher Verkehrsbund, October 19, 1929.  Mitteilungsblatt der Arbeitsgemeinschaft Die Freunde der Internationalen Kleinarbeit, July 1930. Ibid., October 1930.  The expression is used by the Italian researchers Della Porta and Caiani, Social Movements, 44.  Buschak, Die Vereinigten Staaten von Europa, 245.  Buschak, Die Vereinigten Staaten von Europa, 264.

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Labor’s Understanding of “Europeanization” The notion of Europeanization was already familiar to the labor movement before 1914. At that time it meant spreading the same lifestyle and the same values beyond Europe, and could be understood in two ways: positive, as adaption to progress and democracy, for example in Russia or Turkey, or negative as the displacement of autochthonous culture by European one.¹¹¹ Beyond this cultural connotation of Europeanization, in use throughout the 1920s and 1930s,¹¹² new meanings came up after 1918. The Russian German Economist Vladimir Voitinsky even created the term “De-Europeanization” (“Enteuropäisierung” in German) in order to describe the disproportionate retreat of Europe from the world market.¹¹³ Europeanization was now more and more identified with the harmonization of markets, products, and social relationships across European borders. The French Minister for Trade, Maurice Bokanowski, a left-wing Republican, for instance, envisaged the “Europeanization of working conditions.”¹¹⁴ Along with “Europeanization,” notions like “unification,” “standardization” or “harmonization” were used, which all meant establishing a level playing field in Europe. In her booklet “Soyons Européens,” the Belgian socialist Zénéide Kotchetkova not even once used the word Europeanization, but the entire brochure was an impassioned appeal to feel and behave as Europeans and to Europeanize people’s minds as well as economic policy, currencies, working time, and working conditions within Europe. Quite a number of labor journalists preferred to speak of internationalization instead of Europeanization. In practice, the difference between the two notions was not that big. Advocates of both terms stressed the need of a harmonization of working conditions in Europe, of a common European policy on transport, communication, control of diseases, and many other items. Requests for internationalization were often aiming directly at Europe. Edo Fimmen’s plea for the internationalization of collective bargaining was ad-

 “L’Européanisation de la Chine,” L’Humanité, December 21, 1905. “Als Nationalökonom um die Welt,” Gleichheit 4 (1914). Robert Willbrandt, “Japanische Ökonomie,” Gleichheit 12 (1915): 45 – 46. See also Michael Gehler and Silvio Vietta, “Europa-Europäisierung-Europäistik: Einführende Überlegungen,” in Gehler and Vietta, Europa, 9 – 36.  The Daily Herald reported in 1938, that “even the Chief Eunuch of Stanboul is happy in the new Europeanised Turkey.” T.H. Wisdom, “Gossiping across Europe,” Daily Herald, September 2, 1938.  Woytinsky, Die Vereinigten Staaten von Europa, 72, 88, 116.  “Le Sénat a approuvé la politique économique du gouvernement,” Le Peuple. Quotidien du Syndicalisme, February 23, 1927.

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dressed first of all to European transport workers unions and was therefore in reality an appeal to Europeanize. Internationalization would follow afterwards. According to some research on Europeanization, the involvement of “social movement organizations in the debate on European integration” is a new trend.¹¹⁵ As we have seen, trade unions and other labor organizations, which we can certainly classify as social movement organizations, contributed to the debate on European integration a hundred years ago, thus their involvement can no longer be considered as new. Europeanization is often seen as “the possible impact of the EU (institutions, ideas) on national systems of Member States” or interpreted as the “process of resistance, transformation and adaptation to European policies in member states.”¹¹⁶ Europeanization is also defined as the answer of national organizations to the societal and institutional changes within the European Union. One cannot avoid the impression that too much prominence is given to European institutions triggering the process of Europeanization. The history of labor’s enthusiasm for Europe reveals a different source of Europeanization, which started long before there was any European institution in sight. Europeanization was a response of the labor movement and social movements to the catastrophe of the First World War and to changes in capitalism, such as the appearance of transnational companies. It was an effort to remedy the deficiencies of the labor movement before 1914 and to realize international solidarity, which was far too abstract, in European terms. It was not the institutions that triggered Europeanization, but rather the other way around: Europeanization started a process towards European integration and European institutions.

Conclusion Since the end of the First World War, labor’s enthusiasm for Europe was one of the most remarkable features of the movement. Labor did much for the approximation of people in Europe through congresses and manifestations, through joint work across the borders and transnational exchange programs, through travels and study tours abroad. Trade unions and socialist parties, cultural organizations of the labor movement like workers’ travel organizations, and workers’ sports organizations were a grassroot movement building Europe from below. This is an important strand in Europe’s history, unfortunately almost for-

 Della Porta and Caiani, Social Movements, 4.  Della Porta and Caiani, Social Movements, 10.

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gotten after 1945 and not yet sufficiently recognized in the history of European integration.¹¹⁷ Labor’s enthusiasm for Europe inspired resistance against the National Socialist dictatorship in Europe and laid the foundations for European integration after the Second World War. An impressive example of programmatic and personal continuity is the Dutch Trade Unionist Arie Treurniet. In the 1930s, he worked as a researcher at the ITF, which was strongly committed to European integration, as we have seen. He was imprisoned by Nazi authorities and sent to the Buchenwald concentration camp, where in 1945 he signed the Manifesto of Democratic Socialists of Buchenwald, which called for European integration. The manifesto inspired the Socialist Movement for the United States of Europe in the 1950s, which was one of the important mass movements backing European unity.¹¹⁸ One of the persons strongly influenced by the Walloon socialist Isi Delvigne, an outspoken supporter of European unity, was Paul Finet, secretary of the socialist metalworkers trade union in Charleroi from 1929 onwards. In 1958/1959, Finet became President of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community.¹¹⁹ One of the authors of the Ventotene manifesto “For a free and united Europe” from 1941, based upon the socialist thinking of the 1920s, we have got to know here, was Altiero Spinelli, European Commissioner from 1970 to 1976 and afterwards Member of the European Parliament.¹²⁰

 The Dutch historian John Francis Patrick Wrynn thought to have exhausted the field by mentioning four socialist authors only, see John F.P. Wrynn, “The Socialist International and the Politics of European Reconstruction” (PhD diss., Amsterdam University, 1976). In his study concerning German plans for a new order in Europe, Jürgen Elvert does not mention socialist suggestions, see Jürgen Elvert, Mitteleuropa! Pläne zur europäischen Neuordnung (1918 – 1945) (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1999). Ute Frevert, Eurovisionen: Ansichten guter Europäer im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 2003), 11, assumed that in the 1920s European integration was a matter for elites. The House of European History in Brussels only presents Coudenhove-Kalergi as a forerunner of European unity. The state of research concerning the labor movement and European unity is reviewed in Buschak, Arbeiterbewegung und Europa, 33 – 44.  Hermann Brill, Gegen den Strom (Offenbach: Bollwerk, 1946), 100. Wolfgang Röll, Sozialdemokraten im Konzentrationslager Buchenwald 1937– 1945 (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2000), 162– 170, 245 – 260.  Rainer Fattmann, Das Europa der Arbeiter: Leitbilder gewerkschaftlicher Europapolitik bis in die Mitte der 1970er-Jahre (Düsseldorf: Hans-Böckler-Stiftung, 2018), 124– 125, 185 – 197.  See Bertrand Vayssière, “The Ventotene Manifesto (1941): The Birth Certificate of European Federalism,” Guerres Mondiales et Conflit Contemporains 217 (2005): 69 – 76.

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Heike Knortz

The Balance of Payments Deficits “Guest Workers” and Economic Europeanization, 1945 – 1973

Theoretical Fundamentals and Historical Context The historiography of European integration is, as Wolfram Kaiser stated some years ago, still theoretically and methodologically unsatifactory. As a result, normatively orientated historiography has been complemented by an analytical deeconomisation.¹ Therefore, the history of integration remains inadequate from the point of view of economic history. Important insights into the driving force of European integration are still missing. For example, the usual teleological view of historians of the integration of the coal and steel markets consistently ignores Jean Monnet’s primary intention: to put French industry under competitive pressure for national economic reasons.² As a consequence, economic historiography should focus on the driving forces of a “negative integration”³ such as the abolishment of tariffs rather than on the building of supranational organisations. To overcome this desideratum, in the following Europeanization will be analyzed as an economic process, rather than a political development driven by political actors or elites. Here, “Europeanization” means the process of overcoming national markets by the European division of labor: an original economic mutual dependence by the exchange of goods and services, as well as the capital and labor which finally end within a single market. European economies had become intertwined before the First World War. Arguably, in an economic sense, Europe had already come into being. In the interwar period, however, intra-European trade declined greatly. After 1945, the United States believed the European division of labor would bring prosperity back to Europe and to the USA. This was the idea behind the Marshall Plan, which en-

 See Wolfram Kaiser, “Brussels calling: Die Geschichte der Europäischen Union und die Gesellschaftsgeschichte Europas,” in Gesellschaft in der europäischen Integration seit den 1950er Jahren: Migration – Konsum – Sozialpolitik – Repräsentationen, ed. Arnd Bauerkämper and Hartmut Kaelble (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2012), 45 – 54.  See Gerhard Brunn, Die Europäische Einigung von 1945 bis heute (Stuttgart: Reclam, 2009), 74.  See Guido Thiemeyer, Europäische Integration. Motive – Prozesse – Strukturen (Cologne: Böhlau, 2010), 125 – 126. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110685473-014

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sured the recovery of Europe by reconstructing the European division of labor. However, by refusing to participate, the states under Soviet influence limited this economic integration to West Europe. In fact, by the end of the 1960s, this Europe had again reached an economic intertwining comparable to that existing before 1914. This essay analyzes the process of West European economic integration between 1945 and 1973 beyond the common historiography of institutions and the normative decision-making processes. It explains practices of Europeanization as a result of the interdependence and reciprocal impacts between markets and national governmental decisions.⁴ This integration process will be analyzed using historical methods based on international trade theory⁵ and employing a vast range of archival documents and data on the labor market. The United States of America is considered an important agent within this early European process of integration. Using the labor market as an example, it is necessary to look at early intraEuropean labor migration, remittance functions and, in accordance with the balance of payments imbalances, their connection with the European division of labor. There are numerous theories⁶ to explain migration, such as the PushPull model of the renowned sociologist Everett S. Lee. However, they seem inappropriate here, for a number of reasons, including certain theoretical omissions.⁷ Most importantly, governmental documents do not support the conclusions of

 In contrast see Emmanuel Comte, The History of the European Migration Regime. Germany’s Strategic Hegemony (Routledge: London, 2018). Comte analyzes how the current European migration regime was shaped by German influence, German geopolitical, and German geo-economic interests. Within the chapters dealing with the time until 1973, recent research approaches are turned upside down by focusing mainly on the interests of countries of immigration. Therefore, the author neglects Italy’s economic problems, its overpopulation, and ignores the resulting Italian diplomatic activities intended to achieve Italian labor migration and, later, free movement in order to solve its problems.  International trade theory is concerned with goods-and-services flows across international boundaries, international factor movements, economic integration as well as policy issues such as tariffs. It is based on international differences in resources, preferences, and institutions and explains the consequences of interactions between the inhabitants of different countries. See James E. Anderson, “International trade theory,” in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 3rd ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 516 – 522.  See Marina Liakova, “Migrationstheorien,” in Deutschland Einwanderungsland. Begriffe – Fakten – Kontroversen, ed. Karl-Heinz Meier-Braun and Reinhold Weber (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2013), 35 – 38.  See Heinz Faßmann and Rainer Münz, “Europäische Migration und die Internationalisierung des Arbeitsmarktes,” in Innovation und Beharrung in der Arbeitspolitik, ed. Burkhard Strümpel and Meinolf Dierkes (Stuttgart: Schäfer-Poeschel, 1993), 26.

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various historians working with Lee’s model, according to which northern European countries signed recruitment agreements as a result of labor shortages.⁸ In contrast, migration research based on economic theory has long assumed that “[l]abour export appeared to be a solution to many ills, particularly employment and balance-of-payments problems which were seen to be hampering further economic progress.”⁹ However, Sarah Collins expressed this view for the time after the onset of dynamic expansion with its demand for additional workers in the north-western European countries as their economies approached both full production and full employment at the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s. Relevant records in the archives of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, of Economy, and of Finance in Paris, Rome, Koblenz, and Berlin as well as of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) in Florence underline that this theoretical assumption is particularly true for the period of European economic reconstruction with its intra-European labor migration, which then consisted primarily of Italian workers. Therefore, this essay will focus on the circumstances which forced Italian governments to sign recruitment agreements and will explain the function of migrants’ remittances under the conditions of economic reconstruction in Europe. In order to do so, the social and economic background, including the fundamental economic problems in Europe and particularly in Italy after 1945, will initially be outlined. Correspondingly, one must analyze the motivation behind state-enforced Italian migration into northern European countries and, more specifically, Italian migration into the Federal Republic of Germany within a broader historical context.¹⁰

 For this point of view for example see Jochen Oltmer, “Einführung: Migrationsverhältnisse und Migrationsregime nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg,” in Das ‘Gastarbeiter’-System: Arbeitsmigration und ihre Folgen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und Westeuropa, ed. Jochen Oltmer, Axel Kreienbrink, and Carlos Sanz Díaz (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2012), 10 and 14.  Sarah Collinson, Europe and International Migration (London: Pinter, 1993), 65.  This essay is based essentially on the results of the detailed study by Heike Knortz, Gastarbeiter für Europa: Die Wirtschaftsgeschichte der frühen europäischen Migration und Integration (Cologne: Böhlau, 2016).

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Italian Reconstruction: Surplus of Labor and Imports under the Conditions of Missing Currency Convertibility The Italian economy was still semi-agrarian after the Second World War and thus needed not just a simple reconstruction, but also modernization. This required foreign capital and an increase of imports. Furthermore, the Italian domestic market was too small to support a self-contained development process.¹¹ For this reason, those in charge of politics and the economy decided early to open up the Italian economy as widely as possible to foreign trade. The economic and political considerations of acting Italian politicians, as well as the influence of the USA, contributed directly towards European economic integration. This led at first to the Italian participation in the European Recovery Program (ERP), the OEEC which coordinated Marshall Plan funds, as well as in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).¹² Concurrently, a large Italian trade deficit against the USA, in conjunction with a more restrictive US-immigration policy, caused a politically forced shift of imports from the USA to imports from European countries. In the 1950s Karel Holbik already called this procedure “Europeanization.”¹³ However, the problem of the “Dollar Gap” in Europe, the shortage of US currency in relation to import requirements, was not solved. This is why the US initiated the Marshall Plan through which it provided European countries with 13 billion US dollars for their reconstruction. For the purpose of this essay it is not necessary to give a description of the institutional organization and the functional economic aims of the Marshall Plan.¹⁴ In any case, the plan also targeted

 See Michele Salvati, Economia e politica in Italia dal dopoguerra a oggi (Milan: Garzanti, 1984), 13 – 25; Gioachino Fraenkel, Die italienische Wirtschaftspolitik zwischen Politik und Wirtschaft (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1991), 106.  See Augusto Graziani, L’economia italiana dal 1945 a oggi (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1979), 13 – 74; Ennio Di Nolfo, “Das Problem der europäischen Einigung als ein Aspekt der italienischen Außenpolitik 1945 – 1954,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 28 (1980): 145 – 167.  Karel Holbik, Italy in International Cooperation: The Achievements of her Liberal Economic Policies (Padova: Cedam, 1959), 46; see also Rolf Petri, Von der Autarkie zum Wirtschaftswunder: Wirtschaftspolitik und industrieller Wandel in Italien 1935 – 1963 (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 2001), 461.  For further information see Axel Lehmann, Der Marshall-Plan und das neue Deutschland: Die Folgen amerikanischer Besatzungspolitik in den Westzonen (Münster: Waxmann, 2000); see also Imanuel Wexler, The Marshall Plan Revisited: The European Recovery Program in Economic Perspective (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1983).

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the reconstruction of the European division of labor, as it included the migration of Italian labor.¹⁵ Economic historians stated long ago that the main purpose of American policy for Europe was not primarily “the intelligent placement of resources within individual countries but the successful instrumentalization of those supplies for the forced reconstruction of the European division of labour.”¹⁶ Against this background, Italian workers and their remittances represented a part of this forced reconstruction, which historical research has neglected so far. This can be demonstrated by the example of the European Payments Union (EPU), founded in 1950 by the countries participating in the ERP which had been put under pressure to do so by the USA. A fundamental problem in the opening of the Italian economy for foreign trade was, in addition to the Dollar Gap, the lack of convertibility of the European currencies until 1958. The European central banks at this time lacked foreign exchange reserves to enable unlimited currency exchange for transfers into foreign countries. Thus, European currencies represented purely internal currencies. Under these conditions, bilateral trade agreements had to be concluded which again made foreign trade a bartering process. Such government-administrated commercial deals required individual agreements with each trading partner, which made trade very cumbersome. Last but not least, a counterbalanced trade in the case of each trading partner was required. A lack of currency convertibility meant that the value of products imported by one country from another should not exceed the value of products exported to that same country.¹⁷ The EPU established a multilateral clearing mechanism of trade balances based on US dollars. After clearing, countries with deficits received credits from the Bank for International Settlements. However, credits were conditional: with each credit tranche the obligation for a repayment in gold or US dollars grew, thus a repayment in liquid funds gained by the export of goods. The creditors had to fulfil contrary obligations. That meant that the EPU also demanded a reduction of payment imbalances from countries with a surplus of exports. This

 See Archives diplomatiques de Paris, 193QO/253. Statement by J.D. Zellerbach for Congressional Hearings on extension of ECA, 57; see also Archives diplomatiques de Paris, 7QO/127. Mesures Financières et d’organisation adoptées par le gouvernement Italien en faveur de l’émigration, 95 – 96; Comitato interministeriale per la ricostruzione: The Development of Italy’s Economic System within the Framework of European Recovery and Cooperation (Rome: Stampa, 1952), 337– 338.  Helge Berger and Albrecht Ritschl, “Die Rekonstruktion der Arbeitsteilung in Europa,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 43 (1995): 475.  For further details see Volker Hentschel, “Die Europäische Zahlungsunion und die deutschen Devisenkrisen 1950/51,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 37 (1989): 719 – 720.

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became relevant later in the case of the German-Italian “recruitment agreement.” For the reconstruction of Europe and the European division of labor, it was necessary to circumvent the possibility that one country only imported goods while another country stockpiled foreign exchange exclusively.¹⁸ In addition to the lack of convertible currency, increased import demands, a shortage of foreign exchange, and chronic balance of payments deficits since at least 1952, Italian governments faced a rapid growth of population. After 1945, the Italian population of working age grew by 300,000 people per year due to the high birth rate. The influx of repatriates from the lost colonies and ceded territories also increased the population. At the same time, traditional migration paths remained blocked.¹⁹ Reliable statistics reported two million registered unemployed by the end of 1946, which meant an unemployment rate of around 10 %. Further, Italy experienced hidden unemployment of more than one million people in northern industry alone as well as substantial underemployment in agriculture.²⁰ For this reason, contemporaries spoke of a “population” or, more precisely, a “labour surplus.”²¹ Thus, for Italy, the “export” of labor was an obvious solution. Indeed, with labor migration Italy could reduce unemployment and discharge its balance of payments through migrants’ remittances.²² Between 1946 and 1957, the period when the Italian lira was not convertible, Italy paid at least 4.5 %²³ of its imports through officially transferred remittances. For the take-home of cash or transfers of merchandise while visiting the homeland the International Labour Organisation (ILO) estimated a comparable amount. This indicates that remittances ex-

 For further details see Barry Eichengreen, Reconstructing Europe’s Trade and Payments: The European Payments Union (s.l.: Manchester University Press, 1993); Hentschel, “Europäische Zahlungsunion.”  See Archives diplomatiques de Paris, 193QO/257. Confidential. Tripartite Meeting of Experts on European Migration. Report to Foreign Ministers, 87. See also: Comitato interministeriale per la ricostruzione, Development of Italy’s Economic System, 6 – 7.  See Bureau International du Travail, Les Migrations Internationales 1945 – 1957 (Geneva: Bureau International du Travail, 1959), 409; Comitato interministeriale per la ricostruzione, Development of Italy’s Economic System, 7.  See Archives diplomatiques de Paris, 7QO/127. Organisation Européenne de Coopération Économique. Comité de la main-d’œuvre. Rapport sur l’absorption des excédents de main-d’œuvre, Paris le 15 décembre 1949, 10 – 19.  To support this thesis as a whole see Knortz, Gastarbeiter für Europa.  Own calculations according to Bureau International du Travail, Migrations Internationales, 411.

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ceeded Italy’s revenues from freight or tourism, and they were primarily a source of provision for urgently needed foreign exchange.²⁴ On the other hand, the remittances of Italian migrants strained the balance of capital transactions of the migrants’ countries of residence, i.e. the balance of foreign exchange or rather the currency reserves (see Table 1). This is the reason why, under these circumstances, extensive diplomatic negotiations rapidly increased. But far-reaching international or supranational approaches were out of the question as long as the possibilities for Italian migration into other European countries were limited. For example, West Germany and the Netherlands were also considered overpopulated, the former due to its refugees and displaced persons, the latter because of the influx from its colonies. Italian politicians were thus continually forced to find solutions in bilateral agreements or, at least, through an exchange of diplomatic notes. Indeed, Italian governments were successful in concluding bilateral agreements during the immediate postwar period. These agreements allowed the emigration of Italian labor to as many countries as possible; they also created the conditions for the prompt executions of remittances (see Table 2). Italy adjusted these agreements on the European level in accordance with its balance of payments and, as a result of Italian politics, the borders between labor recruitment and immigration were fluid. To be able to conclude as many agreements as possible, Italian negotiators were very flexible when confronted with the wishes and expectations of their contractual partners.²⁵ Table 1: Simplified illustration of a balance of payments. account

debit (payments to abroad)

credit (receipts from abroad)

A. current account – balance of trade – services balance – unilateral transfers balance

imports of goods imports of services transfers (own)

exports of goods export of services transfers (foreign)

B. capital account

capital exports

capital imports

C. currency reserves

inflows of currencies

outflows of currencies

Source: Author’s own creation.

 See Bureau International du Travail, Migrations Internationales, 411.  See Archives diplomatiques de Paris, 7QO/127. Accords d’émigration stipulés par l’Italie pendant cet après-guerre, 101.

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Table 2: Early Italian migration agreements, 1946 – 1950. 

contracting party

agreement/diplomatic note concerning

? .. ..

Austria France Belgium

? recruitement of miners final emigration of Italian miners

 .. .. .. ..

Great Britain Czechoslovakia Argentina Sweden

recruitement of workers for metallurgy final emigration of Italians final emigration of Italians final emigration of Italians

 .. .. ..

Luxembourg Switzerland Netherlands

immigration of Italian agricultural workers immigration of Italian workers immigration of Italian miners

 ..

Brazil

final emigration of Italians

/

Italy was also negotiating with Australia Chile Colombia Mexiko Venezuela

Source: Archives diplomatiques de Paris, 7QO/127. Accords d’émigration stipulés par l’Italie pendant cet après-guerre, S. 99 – 101; ibid., 193QO/257. M. Jacques Fouques Duparc, Ambassadeur de France en Italie à Monsieur le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères – Direction des Affaires Administratives et Sociales – 18 janvier 1952, S. 118; Die Wiedergesundung Europas: Schlußbericht der Pariser Wirtschaftskonferenz der sechzehn Nationen, Teil II: Technische Berichte, Heft 4: Arbeitskräfte, Regierungserklärungen über Wirtschafts- und Finanzreformen (Oberursel/Ts: Europa-Archiv, 1948), 14.

Early Italian Labor Migration to Belgium and France Already in 1947, the ILO had pointed out that Italian governments considered extensive migration a necessary component of Italy’s economic reconstruction. Accordingly, early emigration was based on different governmental agreements in-

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itiated by Rome.²⁶ Because the import of coal was needed for Italy’s reconstruction, the recruitment agreement signed on June 23, 1946 guaranteed that Belgium would deliver three million tonnes of coal in return for an Italian workforce of 50,000 to be employed in mining.²⁷ This was a way to deal with the problem of currency conversion with other countries, too, although Italy as a country without a significant mining industry had no skilled miners of its own.²⁸ While Belgium successfully implemented the agreement, French-Italian barter deals proved to be difficult. One reason can be found in the weakness of the French economy, its balance of trade deficits, and its need for capital imports. The Dollar Gap and non-convertible European currencies enabled remittances only of small portions of wages so the recruitment of 20,000 miners for the French mining industry remained out of reach.²⁹ Remittances had become a heavy burden for the French balance of foreign exchange, thereby for the balance of payments, at least from the moment when the French balance of trade showed a deficit against Italy. The following table shows that France, which in any case was dependent on US loans, found itself in this dilemma two years later (see Table 3). That is why the preferential exchange rate for remittances to Italy was reduced regularly in favor of the French balance of foreign exchange. The reduced preferential rates for Italian remittances in combination with already low wages and the high cost of living in France posed a serious threat for French coal production.

 See International Labour Organisation, “Industrial and Labour Information,” International Labour Review 27 (1947): 100.  See ILO, “Industrial and Labour Information,” 100; Anne Morelli, “L’appel à la main d’œuvre italienne pour les charbonnages et sa prise en charge à son arrivée en Belgique dans l’immédiat après-Guerre,” Belgisch Tijdschrift voor Nieuwste Geschiedenis/Revue belge d’Histoire contemporaine 19 (1988): 89 – 90.  Die Wiedergesundung Europas: Schlußbericht der Pariser Wirtschaftskonferenz der sechzehn Nationen, Teil II: Technische Berichte, Heft 4: Arbeitskräfte. Regierungserklärungen über Wirtschafts- und Finanzreformen (Oberursel: Europa-Archiv, 1948), 31.  See Centre des Archives économiques et financières Paris (hereafter CAEF), B-0010782/1. Ministère du travail et de la sécurité sociale, Direction générale du travail et de la main-d’œuvre, au Ministre des finances, ca. September 26, 1946.

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Table 3: French net exports with Italy and migrants’ remittances to Italy, 1948 – 1950 (in m. Lire).

  

net exports (exports – imports)

remittances

– , – , – ,

– , – , – ,

Source: Centre des Archives économiques et financières Paris (CAEF), B-0010781/2. Ambassade de France en Italie, l’Attaché financier, 15 juillet 1951. Les paiements franco-italiens en 1950, 15. 07. 1951.

The French coal districts had always depended on large quotas of foreign manpower and the requirements increased due to the losses of war. But while wages paid in Belgium ranged between 31,000 and 90,000 lire, wages in France were only 15,000 to 55,000 lire monthly. Migrants who came to France thus preferred employment outside of mining with its hard physical strain; in addition, the motivation and performance of Italian workers in mines left much to be desired.³⁰ An additional reduction or even the abolishment of the preferential exchange rate for remittances further limited the possibilities for recruitment. While, for example, Belgium at the beginning of 1951 easily engaged 5,000 additional miners, the 1,000 workers for French mines could barely be recruited at the same time. Moreover, after the exchange rate had deteriorated due to French administrative decisions, numerous Italian workers resigned from their contracts in France. Additionally, there was the worry that the 4,341 migrants working in the northern coal basins and mines near the French-Belgian border could drift over to Belgium.³¹ The same had happened in 1949 when aggravated conditions reduced remittances, which led to the exit of around 3,000 workers, i. e. about a quarter of the workforce of the Charbonnages de France. ³² Economic weakness became a vicious circle, which was accompanied by organized interests and major diplomatic efforts stemming from a variety of motives. Considering its dependence on foreign labor in mining, by November 20, 1945 France had unsuccessfully offered Italy to provisionally put into effect  See for this the detailed evidence in Knortz, Gastarbeiter für Europa, 88 – 89 and 98 – 99.  See CAEF, B-0010783/2. Le Ministre de l’Industrie et du Commerce à Monsieur le Ministre des Finances et des affaires Économiques, Direction du Budget, du 10 mars 1951.  See CAEF, B-0010783/2. Charbonnages de France à Monsieur de Lattre, Direction des Finances extérieures, Ministère des Finances, 16 février 1951.

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the French-Italian labor agreement from 1919 in order to be able to recruit 20,000 miners as quickly as possible.³³ Also, subsequently, French governments were only interested in the recruitment of miners and not in the recruitment of workers from other professions.³⁴ However, in addition to existing illegal Italian immigration to France, the first recruitment agreement from February 22, 1946 contained enough loopholes for Italian workers to be able to escape employment underground.³⁵ Contrary to its denomination, the Accord franco-italien d’immigration, signed on March 21, 1947, aimed to strengthen the impact of the former agreement and avert negative side effects; a separately negotiated part of the accord made it clear that France only intended to recruit workers for its coal mines. In connection with this, there was a clear attempt to strengthen the exclusive right for recruitment of the Office National d’Immigration (ONI) and to prevent illegal labor migration to France.³⁶ While since 1945 French governments aimed to recruit workers for their coal mines, Italian interests required unlimited migration. The plan for an economic union³⁷ with the free movement of people, goods, and capital between France and Italy, which should have been implemented by the middle of the 1950s, is an example of Italian maximum demands. The first part, to be completed by 1950, was a French-Italian customs union.³⁸ In this context, the general economic complementarity between both countries was highlighted, in particular the reciprocal endowment of capital and workforce³⁹: France was to supply capital, in-

 See Archives diplomatiques de Paris, 193QO/86. Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Direction Générale des Affaires Administratives. Note a. s. Relations franco-italiennes, 3 décembre 1945, 30.  See Bernard Auffray, “Les Rapports Franco-Italiens en matière de main-d’œuvre,” Revue française du travail 12 (1947): 251 and 248– 249.  See “Arrangement relatif au recrutement d’ouvriers italiens comme travailleurs du fond pour les mines françaises, signé à Rome le 22 février 1946,” in Accords bilatéraux publiés et non publiés au Journal Officiel de la République Française 1945 – 1949. Vol. 4 of Recueil général des Traités de la France (Paris: Documentation française, 1982), 42– 43.  See Archives diplomatiques de Paris, 7QO/51. Projet de communication du Ministre du Travail au Conseil des Ministres au sujet de son voyage à Rome, 177.  See Pierre Guillen, “Le projet d’union économique entre la France, l’Italie et le Benelux,” in Histoire des débuts de la construction européenne (mars 1948–mai 1950), ed. Raymond Poidevin (Brussels: Bruylant, 1986), 143 – 164.  See CAEF, B-0010780/1. N° 7165. Assemblée Nationale. Session de 1949. Projet de Loi, autorisant le Président de la République à ratifier le traité d’Union douanière entre la France et l’Italie signé à Paris le 26 mars 1949. See also: Guillen, “Projet d’union économique,” 145.  See Francesca Fauri, “Italy in International Economic Cooperation: The Franco-Italian Customs Union and the Fritalux-Finibel Negotiations,” Journal of European Integration History 2 (1995): 29.

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vestment goods, and commodities for Italy, while Italy would export its labor surplus into sparsely populated regions in the south of France or into industrial sectors.⁴⁰ The leading motive for the planned French-Italian customs union might well have been the influence of the US, conveyed through the Marshall Plan. Had the American desire for a customs union in Europe been granted, this would have been rewarded with financial incentives.⁴¹ Inspired by the wish for political rehabilitation, Italy also considered deepening its general relations with France through this projected union in order to simplify negotiations in terms of Italian immigration to France.⁴² But although the two countries also wanted to act as an economic counterbalance against West Germany,⁴³ the plan for a customs union failed. This was due to the resistance of French organized interests⁴⁴ which stressed the dangers for the French labor market and French reconstruction in view of two million unemployed Italians. While Italian negotiators had already tried to incorporate the freedom of movement of people into the customs union, their French counterparts were under domestic pressure. The Confédération Générale du Travail, for example, complained that the aim of the Italian government was “to end unemployment as an Italian problem and make it Franco-Italian.”⁴⁵ As a consequence, the March 7, 1950 agreement in support of a customs union, which included regulations about migration, was never ratified. Similarly, this happened with “Fritalux” or “Finebel,” the planned economic union with the Benelux countries. Here, too, the Italian negotiation delegation requested the freedom of movement of people, which was refused by the Labor Minister of France for fear of imported unemployment and pressure on wages.⁴⁶ By accepting labor recruitment exclusively for real labor demand and

 See Fauri, “Italy in International Economic Cooperation,” 37.  See Fauri, “Italy in International Economic Cooperation,” 28; Guillen, “Projet d’union économique,” 144. In extenso for this see Gérard Bossuat, “La France, l’aide américaine et la construction européenne 1944– 1954,” ed. Ministère de l’économie et des finances, 2 Vols. (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1992), 2: 708 – 722.  See Fauri, “Italy in International Economic Cooperation,” 28.  See Guillen, “Projet d’union économique,” 144.  See Fauri, “Italy in International Economic Cooperation,” 38; Guillen, “Projet d’union économique,” 150 – 151.  William Diebold, Trade and Payments in Western Europe: A Study in Economic Cooperation 1947 – 51 (New York, NY: Harper, 1952), 370.  See Pierre Guillen, “L’immigration italienne en France après 1945, enjeu dans les relations franco-italiennes,” in Mouvements et politiques migratoires en Europe depuis 1945: Le cas italien. Actes du colloque de Louvain-la-Neuve des 24 et 25 mai 1989, ed. Michel Dumoulin (Louvain-laNeuve: Ciaco, 1989), 44.

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for the professions requested by employers, French trade unions prevented unregulated Italian mass migration to France.⁴⁷ In addition to the problems with foreign currency, the trade unions acted as a strong counterbalance against the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs which supported Italian labor migration to France. Furthermore, the Italian government was not interested in the fulfilment of its contractual obligations, namely the recruitment of 20,000 workers for French mines, as due to the lack of lire, France could not transfer the full remittances in lire. The main part of these remittances was accumulated in French francs in a special account for the benefit of Italy. It was contractually stipulated that for these sums France had to deliver additional quantities of goods to Italy as well as other goods the initial trade agreement had stipulated. But because of the weakness of the French economy, France was only able to deliver those goods which had already been set out within the trade agreement.⁴⁸ Then, with the accord from 1947, the remittances in the special account were no longer expected to be cleared within the Franco-Italian trade and payments transactions, but should be sent directly to the migrants’ families in Italy. Now France had “extreme difficulties” in supplying itself with lire because imports from Italy grew while the value of French exports to Italy and other countries remained lower than the imports. As a result, soon migrants’ remittances could no longer be executed.⁴⁹ Analogous to the proceedings of Belgium, the French government now intended to deliver coal in return for an Italian workforce employed in mining. Because Italy was dependent on coal for reconstruction, France hoped that this arrangement would be motivation enough for the Italian government to provide the French mining industry with the much needed reliable workforce.⁵⁰ Nevertheless, the condition of the French balance of foreign exchange continued to deteriorate, so Italy voluntarily provided a lump-sum of 16.6 billion lire (which was the equivalent of about 26.6 million US dollars) to France as reparation for the damages of war, under the condition that this amount should be used for migrants’ remittances only. The final aim was to strengthen the econom-

 See Archives diplomatiques de Paris, 20QO/309. Direction Générale des Affaires Économiques et Financières. Service de Coopération Économique. Note a. s. Immigration, December 17, 1954, 256.  See CAEF, B-0010782/1. Direction des Conventions Administratives et Sociales Note pour la Direction des Affaires Économiques & Financières, November 19, 1946.  See CAEF, B-0010782/1. Direction générale des Affaires administratives et sociales. Note pour la Direction générale Économique, October 5, 1946.  See CAEF, B-0010782/1. Conférence de presse fait par M. le Ministre du Travail le 21 mars à Rome.

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ic relationship between the two countries within the framework of general European cooperation.⁵¹ Strictly speaking, one can say that the Italians compensated their working compatriots in France themselves and in addition arranged that they could continue exporting goods to France. However, the French trade deficit against Italy grew while France made use of nearly the whole EPU drawing rights, i. e. the right to get foreign exchange as credit.⁵² By using the account “lires reparations” for the import of goods, France ultimately contravened the agreed regulations. As a consequence, this special account was exhausted by the end of 1950.⁵³ Subsequently, the French government first abolished the preferential exchange rate in favor of workers in mines and in agriculture,⁵⁴ until the transfer of the remittances to Italy was completely stopped in 1954.⁵⁵ The Italian government was then forced to seek alternatives within the framework of its European policy to ensure continued labor migration and to be able to reduce its own balance of payments deficit through migrant remittances.

Labor Markets, Reconstruction of the Division of Labor, and European Integration Arguably, some individuals in charge in the French administration (the “Démographes,” dealing with aspects of population policy alone, in contrast to the “Économistes” with their focus on economic feasibility⁵⁶) expected a labor shortage in the forseeable future, as did some within the West German government. Nevertheless, with the exception of a few sectors, immigration was less of a problem for French industry between 1945 and 1955.⁵⁷ Additionally, the confederation of German employers (Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände)  See CAEF, B-0010783/2. Ministère des Finances, Direction du Budget N° 4870. Direction des Finances Extérieures, May 2, 1949. Note pour le Ministre. See also CAEF, B-0010783/2. Assemblée nationale, Session de 1949. Projet de Loi N° 7434; and for the preciding see Knortz, Gastarbeiter für Europa, 104– 107; Guillen, “L’immigration italienne,” 37– 51.  See CAEF, B-0010783/2. Monsieur de Lavanier, Attaché Financier auprès de l’Ambassade de France à Rome, 01.03.1950.  See CAEF, B-0010769/2. Note, November 16, 1950.  See CAEF, B-0010783/2. Le Ministre des Finances et des Affaires Économiques à Monsieur l’Attaché Financier auprès l’Ambassade de France à Rome, 6 mars 1951.  See Guillen, “L’immigration italienne,” 47.  See Alexis Spire, Étrangers à la carte: L’administration de l’immigration en France (1945 – 1975) (Paris: Grasset, 2005), 138 – 139.  See Catherine Wihtol de Wenden, Les immigrés et la politique: Cent cinquante ans d’évolution (Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politique, 1988), 100.

The Balance of Payments Deficits

369

was not able to identify any need for recruitment as late as 1955, the year of the signing of the German-Italian recruitment agreement. After the reduction of existing unemployment, West German employers planned to increase rationalization. Only if their labor demands could still not be met after the implementation of rationalizations would they accept labor recruitment.⁵⁸ If one accepts the judgement of the OEEC as a basis, the organization which distributed the Marshall Plan funds, the estimates of employers were more realistic than those officially stated by governments. Thus, if workers were needed at all, there was a demand for skilled workers, especially for workers employed in European deep mining, which could not be satisfied through transfrontier migration and certainly not within Italy.⁵⁹ Hence, it can be concluded that early Italian labor migration in general was not a consequence of industrial demand, and that the establishment of agreements to initiate larger migrant flows was an integral component of the efforts to reconstruct the European division of labor and subsequent European economic integration. Through these bilateral agreements industry and agriculture in the north-western European countries were provided with an instrument with which employers would, in due time, have straightforward access to the large labor supply of Italy. Because labor demand at this time was insignificant, the Italian labor surplus was, strictly economically speaking, a problem of the supplier. Consequentially, from 1945 to at least 1957, the year of the signing of the Treaty of Rome, no Italian government ever missed the opportunity of requesting and enforcing labor emigration. For this purpose, the governments reported continuously on an international level about Italy’s population surplus and pointed out how the international community could reach an international equilibrium of workforce through Italian migration, thereby seeking a multilateral solution.⁶⁰ Italian concerns were shared by France which, even in 1953, considered the problem of the Italian population surplus a European issue.⁶¹ Significantly, Italy was also an important factor in French security interests against Germany, so that the ques-

 See Bundesarchiv Koblenz, B 149/6228. Schreiben der Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände an den Bundesminister für Arbeit vom 1. Juni 1955, Aktenzeichen IV-161– 3/ Moe.  See Steinert, Migration und Politik, 207; “Die überschüssigen Arbeitskräfte in Westeuropa,” Europa-Archiv 4 (1949): 1911– 1916.  See Steinert, Migration und Politik, 86 – 90.  See Archives diplomatiques de Paris, 193QO/222. M. Jacques Fouques Duparc Ambassadeur de France en Italie à Monsieur le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, Direction d’Europe a. s. La France et l’Italie au début de 1953, 23 – 24. Kursorical for this see also Guillen, “L’immigration italienne,” 46.

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tion of the equilibrium of a European workforce could be seen as more than a national concern for the countries of emigration and immigration.⁶² A further reason for French involvement might well have been that Paris, at this time, was continuously pressured by Italian demands for increased migration to France, while the French government itself was unable to fulfill these demands for the above reasons. The USA assured Italian decision-makers that they would put their population problem on the European, if not on the global, agenda as well.⁶³ This was also for economic reasons because, for the USA, European reconstruction was based on the intra-European division of labor. Therefore, Europe’s economic integration depended on the free movement of goods and capital as well as on the free movement of labor.⁶⁴ These principles had been fixed in the OEEC’s founding convention of April 16, 1948.⁶⁵ The view that liberalization would not be possible if the free movement of goods did not correspond to the free movement of the factors of production, especially the free movement of labor, was repeatedly emphasized by Italian governments within the Manpower Committee.⁶⁶ The Manpower Committee of the OEEC had been established at the instigation of Italy. Through this committee, the USA was able to exert pressure on its European partners⁶⁷: already in 1949, anti-liberal restrictions on OEEC members’ labor markets had been identified as an obstacle for increasing Italian emigration. The missing freedom within national labor markets also prevented increasing economic prosperity in Europe. The US warned that investment and production programmes within the OEEC would only be implemented to support the European equilibrium of workforce.⁶⁸

 See Steinert, Migration und Politik, 81.  See Archives diplomatiques de Paris, 193QO/257. M. Jacques Fouques Duparc, Ambassadeur de France en Italie à Monsieur le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, Direction des Affaires Administratives, October 5, 1951, 106.  See Archives diplomatiques de Paris, 7QO/127. Organisation Européenne de Coopération Économique. Comité Exécutif. Rapport du Comité de la main-d’œuvre sur le programme d’action pour l’absorption des excédents de main-d’œuvre. Paris, le 6 avril 1950, 22.  See “Wortlaut des Abkommens über die Organisation für europäische wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit (OEEC),” Europa-Archiv 3 (1948): 1345 – 1346, Artikel 8.  See Archives diplomatiques de Paris, 193QO/257. Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères [italien] à S. Ex. Monsieur Jacques Fouques Duparc, Ambassadeur de France. Rome, 7 janvier 1950, 15 – 16.  See Lehmann, Marshall-Plan, 55.  See Archives diplomatiques de Paris, 7QO/127. Organisation Européenne de Coopération Économique. Comité de la main-d’œuvre. Rapport sur l’absorption des excédents de main-d’œuvre. Paris, le 15 décembre 1949, 16.

The Balance of Payments Deficits

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In addition to their activities within the OEEC, Italian officials were also involved in the negotiations relating to the European Coal and Steel Community as well as the process of establishing the subsequent European Economic Community (EEC). Within the ECSC a type of a single-market for coal and steel was established. Obstacles to the free movement of factors of production, among them workers skilled in coal and steel industries, were to be abolished. During the negotiations concerning the relevant article, Italian delegates insisted for a long time on using the term “worker” rather than “skilled worker,” for the freedom of movement for skilled workers alone would not bring about the desired and noticeable relaxation in the Italian labor market with its huge surplus of unskilled workers.⁶⁹ Thereafter, the EEC included a clause to ensure the free movement for all workers within a ten-year transition period in article 48 of its founding contract. Following continued Italian pressure throughout the 1960s, in 1968 the EEC initiated complete freedom of movement in Western Europe and complemented it in 1971 by the equal treatment of matters relating to social security.⁷⁰

The German-Italian “Recruitment Agreement” – the Last Step towards the Reconstruction of the European division of Labor In view of Italy’s high unemployment figures and despite various political initiatives on bilateral and international levels, the success of Italian governments in reducing Italy’s labor surplus through mass emigration was kept within limits

 See Bundesarchiv Koblenz, B 149/5853. Der Bundesminister für Arbeit IIa 4 – 2072.3 – 725/ 54 – vom 15. Mai 1954, betr. Besprechung mit den zuständigen Ressorts und den beteiligten Arbeitgeberverbänden und Gewerkschaften über die Freizügigkeit der anerkannten Kohle- und Stahlfacharbeiter gemäß Artikel 69 des Vertrages über die Montanunion am 29. April 1954 im BMA, 2.  See Hans von der Groeben, Hans von Boeckh, and Jochen Thiesing, Kommentar zum EWGVertrag, 2nd. ed. (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1974), 1: 411– 412; see also “Vertrag zur Gründung der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft,” in EG-Verträge. Vertrag zur Gründung der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft – Vertrag über die Europäische Union (Herne: Neue Wirtschaftsbriefe, 1992), 51– 52; and “EWG-Verordnung Nr. 1612 vom 15.10.1968, Amtsblatt L 257 vom 19.10.1968 bzw. Gesetz über Einreise und Aufenthalt von Staatsangehörigen der Mitgliedsstaaten der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft (AufenthG/EWG). Vom 22. Juli 1969,” in Bundesgesetzblatt I (1969), 927– 930.

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(see Table 4).⁷¹ Moreover, the balance of trade remained in deficit, burdening the balance of payments⁷² and evolving into an acute problem especially in 1952 and 1953.⁷³ Therefore the Italian government took diplomatic steps in the immediate post-war period to push for European economic integration, in particular by strengthening German-Italian relations as the German Reich had been one of Italy’s most important trading partners before the Second World War and represented an irreplaceable purchasing and sales market for post-war Italy. Accordingly, the politicians in control demanded a prompt solution of the German question as for them it was key to the reconstruction of Europe. From the beginning, Italy had hoped for the redistribution of its labor. But the economic development of West Germany, already considered overpopulated, was far from stable, and its balance of payments evolved alarmingly, especially during the Korea crisis.⁷⁴ This is why Italian governments had first concentrated on France as a destination for its migrants as well as a provider of foreign exchange, raw materials, and semi-finished products. Table 4: Development of Italian emigration (balance of “final” emigration and remigration), 1937 – 1957. emigration

immigration

balance

intercontinental

continental

intercontinental

continental



,

,

,

,

,



,

,

,

,

,



,

,

,

,

−,



,

,



,

,



,

,

,

,

,



,

,

,

,

,



,

,

,

,

,



,

,

,

,

,

 See also Simone A.W. Goedings, Labor Migration in an Integrating Europe: National Migration Policies and the Free Movement of Workers, 1950 – 1968 (The Hague: Sdu Uitgevers, 2005), 77 and 123.  See Knortz, Gastarbeiter für Europa, 201– 202 (Table 35).  See Banco di Roma, ed., Review of the Economic Conditions in Italy: Ten Years of Italian Economy 1947 – 1956 (Rome: Staderini, 1957), 187– 189.  See Hentschel, “Europäische Zahlungsunion,” 734– 751.

The Balance of Payments Deficits

373

Table : Development of Italian emigration (balance of “final” emigration and remigration),  – . (Continued) emigration

immigration

balance



,

,

,

,

,



,

,

,

,

,



,

,

,

,

,



,

,

,

,

,



,

,

,

,

,



,

,

,

,

,



,

,

,

,

,

Source: International Labour Office, Year Book of Labour Statistics, 12th Issue 1951 – 52 (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1952), 337; 1957: 508 and 1958: 600.

When Italian labor migration to France decreased to an almost insignificant level as a consequence of French foreign exchange weakness (see Table 5), the international community remained reserved towards Italy’s demand for a general freedom of movement of persons. Now, within the EPU the Federal Republic was required to act. In the course of the Korean War, the West German economy began to boom and generated currency influxes. As a consequence, extensive deficits in other European countries, particularly in Italy, now faced a West German trade surplus. Because of the mechanism of the EPU, pressure on Germany and Italy grew. Therefore, the discussion about adjustments to reduce balance of payments deficits became the main topic of German-Italian negotiations from 1952.⁷⁵ However, the Italian trade deficit continued to increase until 1954, forcing the Italian government to find measures for compensation. When the deficit reached about one billion dollars, the question of importing fruit, vegetables, and wine from Italy as well as increasing tourism to Italy became less significant in the negotiations between West Germany and Italy. In view of the simultaneous, persistently high unemployment in Italy, the Italian government now pro-

 See Francesco Masera, “Italy’s Balance of Payments in the Post-War Period,” in Review of the Economic Conditions in Italy: Ten Years of Italian Economy 1947 – 1956, ed. Banco di Roma (Rome: Staderini, 1957), 177 and 196; Yong-Il Lee, Die Ausländerbeschäftigung als ein Bestandteil des deutschen Produktionsregimes für die industrielle Wachstumsgesellschaft 1955 – 1973. Die offene Arbeitsmarktpolitik der BRD im Vergleich mit der geschlossenen Arbeitsmarktpolitik Japans (Berlin: Lit, 2011), 69.

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posed to the German diplomatic delegation the deployment of Italian workers. This was supposed to reduce the balance of payments deficit through laborers’ remittances and to enable Italy to continue to trade with the Federal Republic.⁷⁶ For Italy, the only alternative would have been a protective trade policy, thus undermining European economic integration.⁷⁷ The Federal Republic could equally have exported fewer goods but this would have subsequently generated less prosperity. The quid pro quo “trade liberalization against immigration” expressed in the Italian proposal can already be found in a memorandum for an expert conference in Paris in 1950.⁷⁸ Table 5: Italian labor migration to France 1946 – 1955. migrants           ∑

, , , , , , , , , , ,

Source: George Tapinos, L’immigration étrangère en France 1946 – 1973 (Gap: Presses universitaires de France, 1975), 29 and 34.

In contrast to Italian labor migration to France, which was determined by the French Ministry of Finance, the West German Foreign Office became the main

 See Bundesarchiv Koblenz, B149/22333. Niederschrift der U.Abteilung II b mit Geschäftszeichen II b 4 – 2472– 14. April 1954.  See Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts Berlin, B 85 (2. Abgabe)/548. Der Bundesminister für Arbeit, II b 4 – 2472, 25. Juli 1954. Vermerk über die am 2. und 9. Juli 1954 mit dem Handelsattaché der italienischen Botschaft in Bonn, Dr. Morante, stattgefundenen Besprechungen über die Durchführung der deutsch-italienischen Gastarbeitnehmervereinbarung und die Beschäftigung italienischer Arbeitskräfte in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland.  See Archives diplomatiques de Paris, 7QO/127. Memorandum italien sur le problème du surplus de main d’œuvre en Italie, 71– 128.

The Balance of Payments Deficits

375

agent thanks to the Federal Republic’s comfortable trade surplus. This ministry – at the time controlled by Chancellor Konrad Adenauer – claimed that the question of Italian labor migration was a consequence of German-Italian economic relations. Solving this problem was essential for the further development of the economies of both countries.⁷⁹ However, the Federal Ministry of Labour refused the planned recruitment of foreign workers because of high West German unemployment rates, the presence of 9.4 million refugees and expellees from Germany’s former eastern territories, as well as continuous migration from the German Democratic Republic. The Foreign Office received backing from the Federal Economics Ministry which considered the Italian employment issues closely linked with the question of international payments transactions,⁸⁰ and the solving of which it treated as a national and European duty.⁸¹ This point of view was addressed specifically by Ludwig Erhard, the Minister of Economy, in a letter from October 1954. Referring to the employment of seasonal workers in West German agriculture, he wrote to his colleague from the Ministry of Labour: “The ongoing loss-making development of Italian trade within the EPU, which is mainly a result of German-Italian economic relations, endangers our mutual attempts for closer European economic cooperation. In my opinion, the only solution for the clearing up of the dangerous Italian payment situation is the employment of Italian seasonal workers in the Federal Republic.”⁸² In the meantime, foreign trade and payments built up even greater economic pressure and there was an increasing need for political action. But because of the West German inter-ministerial conflict, the German-Italian recruitment agreement was not signed until December 20, 1955. The initiative and constant demands therefore came from the Italian government, which struggled continuously with high unemployment and fears of social conflict, including a possible communist revolt.⁸³ Contrary to official statements and the legal designation

 See Bundesarchiv Koblenz, B 149/6228. Vermerk des RD Dr. Sicha, Abteilung II, Geschäftszeichen II b 4 – 2472 – 7. Januar 1955.  See Bundesarchiv Koblenz, B 149/6228. Vermerk Abteilung I, Geschäftszeichen Ia 8 – 2359/ 54II, 19. Januar 1955.  See Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts Berlin, B 62/54. Anlage 3 zur Aufzeichnung über die Besprechung mit dem italienischen Haushaltsminister Vanoni vom 15. Dezember 1954: Aufzeichnung über die Besprechung im Bundesministerium für Arbeit mit Vertretern der italienischen Delegation am 14. Dezember 1954.  Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts Berlin, B 62/54. V C 4 a – 38 072/54, 8. Oktober 1954, Abschrift eines Schreibens Ludwig Erhards an den Bundesminister für Arbeit, Herrn Anton Storch.  See for further details Heike Knortz, Diplomatische Tauschgeschäfte: ‘Gastarbeiter’ in der westdeutschen Diplomatie und Beschäftigungspolitik 1953 – 1973 (Cologne: Böhlau, 2008), 67– 83.

376

Heike Knortz

as a governmental agreement “about the recruitment and placement of Italian manpower to the Federal Republic of Germany,” the German-Italian recruitment agreement was a consequence of economic Europeanization. On December 29, 1955, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung reported another transfer of currency: the payment of German child benefits to Italian workers whose children had remained in Italy.⁸⁴ The newspaper thus informed its readers of a concession not yet fixed in written form. In the face of the Italian balance of payments deficits, the Italian government had attached great importance to this transfer. From the West German point of view, the newspaper interpreted labor migration and child benefits as a concrete type of European solidarity. Above all, however, the article emphasized the European component of the “recruitment agreement,” and the fact that the deployment of an Italian workforce in West Germany would advance European integration. Indeed, this was expressed similarly in retrospect: “From the beginning, labour migration was a European project. The first German recruitment agreement with Italy from 1955 had already referred to the spirit of European solidarity.”⁸⁵ Insofar, the German-Italian recruitment agreement was a direct consequence of the recovery of the European division of labor. This integration of the West European economic area must be traced, firstly, to real market outcomes and, secondly, to the institution of the EPU which had to cope with these economic outcomes. Of course, the employment of Italian workers in the Federal Republic developed in line with economic trends, that is to say it advanced dynamically with a time-lag in the 1960s from about 6,500 workers in 1954 to nearly 410,000 in 1973 (see Table 6). Also, Italy’s urgent trade and payment problems were not immediately solved by the signing of the recruitment agreement and developed in an unsteady manner. Nevertheless, workers’ remittances were useful for Italy, which is demonstrated by a reduced Italian trade deficit against West Germany and a tenfold increase of imports from the Federal Republic between 1955 and 1973 (see Graph 1).

 See “Arbeiter aus Italien,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung December 29, 1955; Bundesarchiv Koblenz, B 149/6228. Abteilung II, Geschäftszeichen IIb 4 – 2472 – 18. März 1955, Bericht über die deutsch-italienischen Besprechungen für die Vorbereitung einer Vereinbarung über die Vermittlung von Arbeitskräften.  Deniz Göktürk et al., eds., Transit Deutschland: Debatten zu Nation und Migration. Eine Dokumentation (Konstanz: University Press, 2011), 25.

The Balance of Payments Deficits

377

Table 6: Employment of Italian workers in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1954 – 1973. year*)

workers

                   

, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

*) Reference date between 1954 – 1960 was July 31, between 1961 – 1972: September 30, and in 1973: January 30. Source: Bundesarchiv Koblenz, B 139/8846. Referat IV/3 (ORR Schreiber) an den Bundeskanzler vom 19. Februar 1973, betr. Besprechung mit den Regierungschefs der Länder am 23. Februar 1973. Anlage “In der Bundesrepublik Deutschland beschäftigte ausländische Arbeitnehmer.”

Outlook To sum up, early European labor migration, which had already begun in 1945 and consisted, at that time, primarily of Italian workers, soon developed within a European policy context. This was due to macro-economic imbalances which West European and US decision-makers tried to eliminate by labor migration in the course of the reconstruction of the European division of labor. The basis for the success of this European project was the robust economic development of the Federal Republic of Germany prior to 1973 as without the booming West

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net exports

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Graph 1: Development of Italian trade with the Federal Republic of Germany, 1948 – 1973 (in m. DM). Source: Based on data from Brian R. Mitchell, European Historical Statistics 1750 – 1975. 2nd revised edition (New York/London/Basingstoke: Palgrave, 1980), 560 – 561.

German economy, Italy would not have achieved its aims in terms of emigration and remittances, and the US and West Europeans would not have successfully managed European economic integration. In fact, the determination to Europeanize reached its preliminary peak in connection with the Vanoni Plan, the Italian ten-year-plan for the period between 1955 and 1964. With this plan the Italian government had tried to solve its complex structural economic problems multilaterally. Named after the Italian Minister of Finance, the Italian government was successful in making the Vanoni Plan an international project, and by strengthening the Italian economy, it also promoted European economic integration and vice versa.⁸⁶ The core aim of the plan was the coordination of all governmental economic projects in order to

 See Archives diplomatiques de Paris, 193QO/254. Étude sur le développement du revenu national et de l’emploi au cours de la période 1955 – 1964. S. 250/3.

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strengthen the competitiveness of the Italian export industry in international markets and to tackle the unemployment problem systematically.⁸⁷ By utilizing extensive investment programmes for agriculture, public service, and other selected sectors, accompanied by a balance between the north and the south, a promotion of exports and the improvement of general education as well as vocational training, Vanoni wanted to strengthen domestic demand as well as Italy’s balance of payments and employment. More precisely, the national income was set to increase by about five percent annually and four million jobs were to be created by 1964. For this purpose, international aid and a massive injection of capital were essential.⁸⁸ Emigration was still seen as essential to improve Italy’s labor market situation, which is why Vanoni planned on the emigration of 800,000 laborers or 80,000 per year between 1955 and 1964. He also budgeted in their remittances to reduce the anticipated balance of payments deficits.⁸⁹ While the remittances of the migrants amounted to 84 billion lire or about 136 million US dollars in the year 1954, they were to increase by 47 percent within ten years to reach 125 billion lire or 200 million US dollars in 1964.⁹⁰ Even before its publication in Italy in January 1955, Vanoni had presented his plan in Bonn, Washington, and at the OEEC.⁹¹ So, one can conclude that the OEEC had “indirectly cooperated with Italy’s economic plans (especially with the Vanoni Plan) and […] [had] considered her needs in all its Payments Schemes, par-

 See Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes Berlin, B 62/54. V C 2 B, vom 8. Dezember 1954, betr. Besprechung mit dem italienischen Haushaltsminister Prof. Dr. Ezio Vanoni am 13. und 14. Dezember in Bonn. For the Vanoni Plan detailed: Orlando d’Alauro, “Aktuelle Probleme der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung in Italien,” Europa-Archiv 10 (1955): 7439 – 7448; also: Horst Männel, “Der Vanoni-Plan: Ein Aktionsprogramm für die Arbeitsbeschaffung und wirtschaftliche Expansion Italiens für den Zeitraum 1955 – 1964,” Europa-Archiv 10 (1955): 7553 – 7558.  See Archives diplomatiques de Paris, 193QO/254. Étude sur le développement du revenu national et de l’emploi au cours de la période 1955 – 1964, 250/119.  See Archives diplomatiques de Paris, 193QO/225. Centre d’étude de politique étrangère, Paris, Comité d’étude des problèmes franco-italienne. Document de travail. Le Plan Vanoni, 538. See also Ezio Vanoni, “Development of Employment and Income in Italy,” Review of Economic Conditions in Italy 4 (1955): 322 and 340.  See Archives diplomatiques de Paris, 193QO/254. Étude sur le développement du revenu national et de l’emploi au cours de la période 1955 – 1964, 250/79.  See Archives diplomatiques de Paris, 193QO/254. M. Jacques Fouques Duparc, Ambassadeur de France en Italie, à Son Excellence Monsieur le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, Direction des Affaires Économiques. a. s. Plan Vanoni – Exposé et critique. Rome, le 28 janvier 1955, 255; Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes Berlin, B 62/54. V C 2 B, vom 8. Dezember 1954, betr. Besprechung mit dem italienischen Haushaltsminister Prof. Dr. Ezio Vanoni am 13. und 14. Dezember in Bonn.

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ticularly in the EPU.”⁹² As elements of the Vanoni Plan became part of the Treaty of Rome as the “Protocol on Italy,” the Italian labor market problem had finally been communitised, and the various parties expressly pledged themselves within this protocol “to avoid dangerous tensions, namely with regard to the Italian balance of payments and the Italian labor market, to avoid that Italy put this treaty into question.”⁹³ When, thanks to Italy’s persistence, the freedom of movement within the European Economic Community was finally established, Europe had again come into being.

Bibliography “Arrangement relatif au recrutement d’ouvriers italiens comme travailleurs du fond pour les mines françaises, signé à Rome le 22 février 1946.” In Accords bilatéraux publiés et non publiés au Journal Officiel de la République Française 1945 – 1949, 41 – 43. Vol. 4 of Recueil général des Traités de la France. Paris: Documentation française, 1982. Auffray, Bernard. “Les Rapports Franco-Italiens en matière de main-d’œuvre.” Revue française du travail 12 (1947): 248 – 256. Banco di Roma, ed. Review of the Economic Conditions in Italy: Ten Years of Italian Economy 1947 – 1956. Rome: Staderini, 1957. Bechelloni, Antonio. “Le choix de la destination française vu du côté italien.” In Les Italiens en France depuis 1945, edited by Marie-Claude Blanc-Chaléard, 29 – 40. Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2003. Berger, Helge, and Albrecht Ritschl. “Die Rekonstruktion der Arbeitsteilung in Europa.” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 43 (1995): 473 – 519. Bossuat, Gérard. La France, l’aide américaine et la construction européenne 1944 – 1954. Edited by Ministère de l’économie et des finances. 2 Vol. Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1992. Bureau International du Travail. Les Migrations Internationales 1945 – 1957. Geneva: Bureau International du Travail, 1959. Collinson, Sarah. Europe and International Migration. London: Pinter, 1993. Comitato interministeriale per la ricostruzione. The Development of Italy’s Economic System within the Framework of European Recovery and Cooperation. Rome: Stampa, 1952. Comte, Emmanuel. The History of the European Migration Regime. Germany’s Strategic Hegemony. London: Routledge, 2018. D’Alauro, Orlando. “Aktuelle Probleme der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung in Italien.” Europa-Archiv 10 (1955): 7439 – 7448. Di Nolfo, Ennio. “Das Problem der europäischen Einigung als ein Aspekt der italienischen Außenpolitik 1945 – 1954.” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 28 (1980): 145 – 167. “Die überschüssigen Arbeitskräfte in Westeuropa.” Europa-Archiv 4 (1949): 1911 – 1916.

 Holbik, Italy in International Cooperation, XIII–XIV.  See Europa-Recht: Textausgabe mit ausführlichem Sachverzeichnis und einer Einführung von Ernst Steindorff, 4th ed. (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1979), 101.

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Die Wiedergesundung Europas: Schlußbericht der Pariser Wirtschaftskonferenz der sechzehn Nationen. Teil II: Technische Berichte, Heft 4: Arbeitskräfte, Regierungserklärungen über Wirtschafts- und Finanzreformen. Oberursel/Ts: Europa-Archiv, 1948. Diebold, William. Trade and Payments in Western Europe: A Study in Economic Cooperation 1947 – 51. New York, NY: Harper, 1952. Eichengreen, Barry. Reconstructing Europe’s Trade and Payments: The European Payments Union. S.l.: Manchester University Press, 1993. Europa-Recht. Textausgabe mit ausführlichem Sachverzeichnis und einer Einführung von Ernst Steindorff, 4th ed. Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1979. “EWG-Verordnung Nr. 1612 vom 15. 10. 1968, Amtsblatt L 257 vom 19. 10. 1968 bzw. Gesetz über Einreise und Aufenthalt von Staatsangehörigen der Mitgliedsstaaten der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft (AufenthG/EWG). Vom 22. Juli 1969.” Bundesgesetzblatt I (1969): 927 – 930. Faßmann, Heinz, and Rainer Münz. “Europäische Migration und die Internationalisierung des Arbeitsmarktes.” In Innovation und Beharrung in der Arbeitspolitik, edited by Burkhard Strümpel and Meinolf Dierkes, 11 – 37. Stuttgart: Schäffer-Poeschel, 1993. Fauri, Francesca. “Italy in International Economic Cooperation: The Franco-Italian Customs Union and the Fritalux-Finibel Negotiations.” Journal of European Integration History 1 (1995): 27 – 45. Fraenkel, Gioachino. Die italienische Wirtschaftspolitik zwischen Politik und Wirtschaft. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1991. Goedings, Simone A.W. Labor Migration in an Integrating Europe: National Migration Policies and the Free Movement of Workers, 1950 – 1968. The Hague: Sdu Uitgevers, 2005. Göktürk, Deniz, David Gramling, Antons Kaes, and Andreas Langenohl, eds. Transit Deutschland: Debatten zu Nation und Migration. Eine Dokumentation. Konstanz: University Press, 2011. Graziani, Augusto. L’economia italiana dal 1945 a oggi. Bologna: Il Mulino, 1979. Groeben, Hans von der, Hans von Boeckh, and Jochen Thiesing. Kommentar zum EWG-Vertrag. Vol. 1, Artikel 1 – 136. 2nd ed. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1974. Guillen, Pierre. “Le projet d’union économique entre la France, l’Italie et le Benelux.” In Histoire des débuts de la construction européenne (mars 1948–mai 1950), edited by Raymond Poidevin, 143 – 164. Brussels: Persée, 1989. Guillen, Pierre. “L’immigration italienne en France après 1945, enjeu dans les relations franco-italiennes.” In Mouvements et politiques migratoires en Europe depuis 1945: Le cas italien. Actes du colloque de Louvain-la-Neuve des 24 et 25 mai 1989, edited by Michel Dumoulin, 37 – 51. Louvain-la-Neuve: Ciaco, 1989. Hentschel, Volker. “Die Europäische Zahlungsunion und die deutschen Devisenkrisen 1950/51.” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 37 (1989): 715 – 758. Holbik, Karel. Italy in International Cooperation: The Achievements of her Liberal Economic Policies. Padova: Cedam, 1959. International Labour Office. Year Book of Labour Statistics. Geneva: International Labour Office, 1952 – 1958. Kaiser, Wolfram. “Brussels calling: Die Geschichte der Europäischen Union und die Gesellschaftsgeschichte Europas.” In Gesellschaft in der europäischen Integration seit den 1950er Jahren: Migration – Konsum – Sozialpolitik – Repräsentationen, edited by Arnd Bauerkämper and Hartmut Kaelble, 43 – 62. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2012.

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Knortz, Heike. Diplomatische Tauschgeschäfte: ‘Gastarbeiter’ in der westdeutschen Diplomatie und Beschäftigungspolitik 1953 – 1973. Cologne: Böhlau, 2008. Knortz, Heike. Gastarbeiter für Europa: Die Wirtschaftsgeschichte der frühen europäischen Migration und Integration. Cologne: Böhlau, 2016. Lee, Yong-Il. Die Ausländerbeschäftigung als ein Bestandteil des deutschen Produktionsregimes für die industrielle Wachstumsgesellschaft 1955 – 1973. Die offene Arbeitsmarktpolitik der BRD im Vergleich mit der geschlossenen Arbeitsmarktpolitik Japans. Berlin: Lit, 2011. Lehmann, Axel. Der Marshall-Plan und das neue Deutschland: Die Folgen amerikanischer Besatzungspolitik in den Westzonen. Münster: Waxmann, 2000. Liakova, Marina. “Migrationstheorien.” In Deutschland Einwanderungsland. Begriffe – Fakten – Kontroversen, edited by Karl-Heinz Meier-Braun and Reinhold Weber, 35 – 38. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2013. Männel, Horst. “Der Vanoni-Plan: Ein Aktionsprogramm für die Arbeitsbeschaffung und wirtschaftliche Expansion Italiens für den Zeitraum 1955 – 1964.” Europa-Archiv 10 (1955): 7553 – 7558. Masera, Francesco. “Italy’s Balance of Payments in the Post-War Period.” In Review of the Economic Conditions in Italy: Ten Years of Italian Economy 1947 – 1956, edited by Banco di Roma, 165 – 202. Rome: Staderini, 1957. Mitchell, Brian R. European Historical Statistics 1750 – 1975. 2nd rev. ed. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 1980. Morelli, Anne. “L’appel à la main d’œuvre italienne pour les charbonnages et sa prise en charge à son arrivée en Belgique dans l’immédiat après-Guerre.” Belgisch Tijdschrift voor Nieuwste Geschiedenis/Revue belge d’Histoire contemporaine 19 (1988): 83 – 130. Oltmer, Jochen. “Einführung: Migrationsverhältnisse und Migrationsregime nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg.” In ‘Das Gastarbeiter’-System: Arbeitsmigration und ihre Folgen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und Westeuropa, edited by Jochen Oltmer, Axel Kreienbrink, and Carlos Sanz Díaz, 9 – 21. Munich: Oldenbourg, 2012. Petri, Rolf. Von der Autarkie zum Wirtschaftswunder: Wirtschaftspolitik und industrieller Wandel in Italien 1935 – 1963. Tübingen: Niemeyer, 2001. “Ratsbeschluß des Europäischen Wirtschaftsrates (OEEC) zur Regelung der Beschäftigung von Angehörigen der Mitgliedstaaten. Bekanntmachung des BMA und des BMZ vom 27. Februar 1957 (in der Fassung der Änderungen vom 5. März 1954, vom 27. Januar 1956 und vom 7. Dezember 1956).” Bundesarbeitsblatt 10 (1957): 363 – 364. Salvati, Michele. Economia e politica in Italia dal dopoguerra a oggi. Milan: Garzanti, 1984. Spire, Alexis. Étrangers à la carte: L’administration de l’immigration en France (1945 – 1975). Paris: Grasset, 2005. Steinert, Johannes-Dieter. Migration und Politik: Westdeutschland – Europa – Übersee 1945 – 1961. Osnabrück: Secolo, 1995. Tapinos, George. L’immigration étrangère en France 1946 – 1973. Gap: Presses Universitaires de France, 1975. Vanoni, Ezio. “Development of Employment and Income in Italy.” Review of Economic Conditions in Italy 4 (1955): 315 – 343. “Vereinbarung zwischen der Regierung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Regierung der Portugiesischen Republik über die Vermittlung von portugiesischen Arbeitnehmern nach Deutschland vom 17. März 1964.” Bundesanzeiger 104 (1964).

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“Vertrag zur Gründung der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft.” In EG-Verträge. Vertrag zur Gründung der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft – Vertrag über die Europäische Union, 29 – 121. Herne: Neue Wirtschaftsbriefe, 1992. Wexler, Imanuel. The Marshall Plan Revisited: The European Recovery Program in Economic Perspective. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1983. Wihtol de Wenden, Catherine. Les immigrés et la politique: Cent cinquante ans d’évolution. Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politique, 1988. “Wortlaut des Abkommens über die Organisation für europäische wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit (OEEC).” Europa-Archiv 3 (1948): 1345 – 1348.

Heike Wieters

Between National Welfare Institutions and New European (Welfare‐) Markets German Life Insurance Industry and the Quest of Europeanization, 1945 – 1960

Introduction When the German journal Versicherungswirtschaft was published for the first time in 1946 under Allied license, its editor-in-chief, Alex Möller, wrote in his opening statement: Thanks to the allied forces, the free press is about to rise again. The freedom of the press will help to ensure the freedom of the people, and will, in the spirit of tolerance and humanity, help to build foundations for a new beginning. […] Today the very first volume of ‘Versicherungswirtschaft’ is published. It is not our aim to foster egoistic interests in opposition to the needs of the people. On the contrary, its editors want to deepen the understanding of the positive economic, social and cultural impact of individual insurance on all parts of society.¹

This editorial is interesting for a number of reasons. First, because of its apologetic tone and the explicit claim that the editors had their eyes set on the common good, instead of being driven by egoistic (supposedly economic) motives. Secondly, and linked to this, it is remarkable how and to which degree the journal’s aim of lobbying for private insurance was framed as a noble, deeply democratic, and communicative venture for society at large. Finally, Möller addressed both German readers and a broader international public: while the Allied forces are mentioned in particular, the author and his co-editors firmly believed that the insurers’ contribution to welfare and security was a truly international venture that could only be tackled in a cooperative and transnational fashion from now on. Möller’s perception that the German economy would soon be inextricably connected with its neighboring markets may seem a little surprising, after a

 Alex Möller, “Zum Geleit,” Versicherungswirtschaft 1 (1946): 1 (all direct quotations from VSW translated from German by the author). https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110685473-015

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lost war and in the context of tight capital and currency controls imposed by the Allies.² In this essay I will argue, however, that German business executives – and leaders of life insurance companies in particular – were absolutely convinced that insurance markets are, by definition, transnational. They firmly believed that the concept of insurance required the spreading of risks and therefore that cross-border business, particularly with highly developed neighboring economies, was an absolute necessity. From the beginning, it was against this backdrop that German insurance professionals had set their eyes on “Europe”: as early as the late 1940s – long before the institutional framework of the European Economic Community (EEC) was established – major insurance companies in Europe had already started focusing on joint European regulations for crossborder capital transfers, on networks facilitating an eventual liberalization of service markets, and the exchange and diffusion of business practices across borders. In doing so, life insurers developed a very particular vision of Europe and a distinct set of practices related to the eventual West European integration of insurance and so-called “welfare” markets across national borders.³ This paper will examine these early visions of a Europeanization of commercial insurance and analyze how the actual steps taken by West German insurance companies interlocked with concrete measures taken by the West German government, European institutions, and international organizations. Europeanization, it is argued henceforth, was not a term the insurers ever used, nor a concept or goal they explicitly pursued. They did, however, very consciously, aim to administer business matters within European organizational frameworks, and they intuitively understood future markets as transnational markets framed by national, European, and international regulations at the same time. This mindset was based on contemporary economic insurance theory and the assessment of future trends in the insurance market. But it also grew out of experience, since the insurance trade had started out as cross-border business centuries ago.

 Barry J. Eichengreen, The European Economy Since 1945: Coordinated Capitalism and Beyond (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 73 – 77; Gerold Ambrosius, Wirtschaftsraum Europa: Vom Ende der Nationalökonomien (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer-Taschenbuch-Verlag, 1998).  Martin Lengwiler, “Competing Appeals: The Rise of Mixed Welfare Economies in Europe, 1850 – 1945,” in The Appeal of Insurance, ed. Geoffrey W. Clark, et al. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010), 173 – 200. Lengwiler argues convincingly that there are various traditions of integrating market players into welfare schemes across Europe. Frank Berner, “New Private Pensions in Germany: A Pension Market or a Branch of the Welfare State? Contested Regulatory Issues,” in The New Regulatory State: Regulating Pensions in Germany and the UK, ed. Lutz Leisering (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 127– 49, focuses more on the discursive divide between public and private spheres of old-age provision and points to growing proximity only from the late 1990s onwards.

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The Historical Background of Cross-border Insurance in Europe until 1945 Commercial insurance firms first emerged in Great Britain in the context of marine trade in the sixteenth century.⁴ The concept of managing risk by commercially insuring not only goods but also lives was especially appealing to the rising economic elite and grew in significance throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.⁵ Insurance firms emerged all across Europe in the context of what has been dubbed the “first wave of globalization.”⁶ As Peter Borscheid and others have shown, the companies took advantage of relatively liberal trade regulations and low capital barriers, leading to the emergence of three strongly interdependent centers of the insurance business: an English-speaking area, a Francophone area (including France, Belgium, and parts of Switzerland, Italy, and Spain), and a German-speaking area (also covering Austria, the Balkans, Scandinavia, and part of Russia).⁷ By the end of the nineteenth century, crossborder insurance existed in almost all insurance sectors: life and fire insurance, trade insurance, and especially in the re-insurance business. However, this changed drastically during the twentieth century. The first half of the century, above all the period from 1914 onwards, brought about ever tighter capital controls and a radical deglobalization of markets.⁸ While certain business standards, means for international regulation, and particularly the practice of cross-border re-insurance continued to emerge, cross-border investment and the development of multinational enterprises were severely hindered by econom-

 See: Burkhardt Wolf, “Riskante Partnerschaft. Shakespeares ’Merchant of Venice’ und die Geburt der Versicherung aus dem Meer,” in Sicherheit und Risiko: Über den Umgang mit Gefahr im 21. Jahrhundert, ed. Herfried Münkler, Matthias Bohlender, and Sabine Meurer (Bielefeld: transcript, 2010), 53 – 72; Giovanni Ceccarelli, “Risikostrategien auf den Versicherungsmärkten der Frühen Neuzeit am Beispiel Florenz,” in Wagnisse: Risiken eingehen, Risiken analysieren, von Risiken erzählen, ed. Stefan Brakensiek, Christoph Marx, and Benjamin Scheller (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2017), 63 – 89.  Geoffrey Clark, “Insurance as an Instrument of War in the 18th Century,” The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance. Issues and Practice 29, no. 2 (2004): 247– 257.  Geoffrey Jones, Multinationals and Global Capitalism: From the Nineteenth to the Twenty-first Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 19 – 26.  Peter Borscheid, “Europe: Overview,” in World Insurance: The Evolution of a Global Risk Network, ed. Peter Borscheid and Niels V. Haueter (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 37– 66.  Adam J. Tooze, The Deluge: The Great War and the Remaking of Global Order, 1916 – 1931 (New York, NY: Viking Press, 2014); Jan-Otmar Hesse, Roman Köster, and Werner Plumpe, Die Grosse Depression: Die Weltwirtschaftskrise 1929 – 1939 (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2014).

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ic crises – particularly the Great Depression – increased capital controls, nationalist policies, the closing of borders, and the raising of tariffs between countries in the context of the two world wars.⁹ Thus, most insurance companies in Europe decided to focus on business within national borders (including their colonies¹⁰) which led to an overall decline in international insurance traffic. During the Second World War, international insurance markets practically broke down or fell back into highly fragmented clusters, resulting in almost entirely national market designs, or rather a patchwork of merely regional operations among insurance firms in 1945.¹¹

The German Life Insurance Industry after 1945 The distortion and regional fragmentation of insurance markets after the end of the Second World War was particularly apparent in Germany. First, because German life insurers had lost a considerable share of their assets, which had been invested in government issued war-bonds.¹² Germany’s defeat left insurance companies struggling to even keep the business afloat, with virtually no margin for any type of foreign investment or acquisitions abroad. Secondly, German firms were banned from partaking in international business by the Allied forces until the early 1950s (a very limited number of foreign insurance companies were operational in Germany though).¹³ In addition, any foreign assets formerly held by German firms had been seized by the victorious Allied governments at the end of the war. Given that Germany was also no longer holding any colonial

 Peter Borscheid, “A Globalisation Backlash in the Inter-War Period?,” in Internationalisation and Globalisation of the Insurance Industry in the 19th and 20th Centuries, ed. Peter Borscheid and Robin Pearson (Marburg: Philipps-Universität Marburg, 2007), 129 – 141.  Research in the Indian insurance market shows, however, that Indian firms used the first half of the twentieth century to gain ground, compared to British firms, see: Adrian Jitschin, “Insurance Development in India – an Overview,” in Internationalisation and Globalisation of the Insurance Industry in the 19th and 20th Centuries, ed. Peter Borscheid and Robin Pearson (Marburg: Philipps-Universität Marburg, 2007), 182– 193.  On NS-policies and the insurance sector in Europe see for instance: Stefan Karlen, et al., Schweizerische Versicherungsgesellschaften im Machtbereich des ’Dritten Reichs’: Veröffentlichungen der Unabhängigen Expertenkommission Schweiz – Zweiter Weltkrieg (Zürich: Chronos, 2002).  Peter Koch, Geschichte der Versicherungswirtschaft in Deutschland (Karlsruhe: Verlag Versicherungswirtschaft, 2012); Arno Surminski, Versicherung unterm Hakenkreuz (Berlin: Ullstein, 1999).  Barbara Eggenkämper, Gerd Modert, and Stefan Pretzlik, Die Allianz: Geschichte des Unternehmens, 1890 – 2015 (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2015), 251– 255.

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ties, cross-border trade and service provision by German life insurance companies were almost negligible in 1945.¹⁴ Thirdly, German life insurance companies, alongside private pension funds in countries such as France or the Netherlands, were slowly growing into particular niches in the institutional designs of their respective national welfare states.¹⁵ By providing old age insurance for self-employed people (and partially to public servants), life insurers became subject to specific national legal frameworks.¹⁶ These regulations did not only affect the overall institutional design of each national insurance sector, they often also privileged national companies over foreign competitors on the grounds of protecting social security interests and the pension savings of domestic citizens.¹⁷ Thus, new and especially foreign competitors on the life insurance market were compelled to transfer considerable securities to blocked government accounts and agree to high scrutiny and regulation before starting any new business abroad. German life insurers were therefore faced with a three-fold task in the 1940s and 1950s: (1) the re-establishment of individual companies and functional national insurance markets, (2) the need to find and develop their role as socio-economic players within the emerging German welfare state (and those of its neighbors), and (3) keeping an eye on foreign markets and competitors, potential shifts towards cross-border trade, and any signs of a liberalization of service markets in Europe and beyond. In order to trace these efforts through the postwar years, and in an attempt to shed light on the creation of the first European insurance market designs, it is helpful to take a quick glance at the challenges and decisive junctures that insurance businesses faced in Germany. After the war, every German insurance company had to find its own way to reestablish customer relations and to become

 Peter Borscheid, “Germany: Insurance, Expansion and Setbacks,” in World Insurance: The Evolution of a Global Risk Network, ed. Peter Borscheid and Niels V. Haueter (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 98 – 117.  Noel Whiteside, “Adapting Private Pensions to Public Purposes: Historical Perspectives on the Politics of Reform,” Journal of European Social Policy 16, no. 1 (2006): 43 – 54.  Winfried Schmähl, Alterssicherungspolitik in Deutschland: Vorgeschichte und Entwicklung von 1945 bis 1998 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2018), 274 f.  Christopher Kopper, “Versicherungskonzerne in der ’Deutschland AG’,” in Der ’Rheinische Kapitalismus’ in der Ära Adenauer, ed. Hans G. Hockerts and Günther Schulz (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2016), 169 – 185; Heinz-Dietrich Steinmeyer, “Das Verhältnis der Selbständigen zur staatlichen Versicherung und die Rolle privater Vorsorge: Vom Kaiserreich bis in die Bundesrepublik,” in Geschichte und Gegenwart der Rentenversicherung in Deutschland: Beiträge zur Entstehung, Entwicklung und vergleichenden Einordnung der Alterssicherung im Sozialstaat, ed. Stefan Fisch and Ulrike Haerendel (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2000), 209 – 223.

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operational and profitable again. Nonetheless, most companies sought close professional and scientific cooperation with competitors in the same field. Sectoral integration of insurance business in Germany was based on two central pillars. The first pillar was the formation of standing business boards. These business boards were not a postwar invention but had been instrumental in coordinating capitalism in Western Europe since the 1920s, as Philipp Müller has shown in recent research.¹⁸ After the end of the Second World War, these boards were re-established (albeit set up as new bodies) and quickly turned into important cornerstones of reconciling societal goals and new welfare regimes with liberal democracy and individual profit seeking.¹⁹ Hence, several insurance branches decided to set up associations as soon as the Allied authorities permitted collective association across zones. In 1947, life insurance companies in the Western sectors set up the Verband der Lebensversicherungsunternehmen e.V. with Alex Möller as its president.²⁰ Only little later, the Gesamtverband der Deutschen Versicherungswirtschaft (GDV) was founded. Its members were insurance companies from across the industry (including life insurers) and the association aimed at “advancing the interests of private insurance” while promoting the branch’s valuable contribution to security and social responsibility at large.²¹ The GDV was founded for a twofold purpose, as its first president, Harald Mandt, put it in 1949: “towards the outside: to advance the interests of German insurance business, towards the inside: to foster coordination, consultation, information and exchange of views.”²² The GDV’s membership quickly sprang from 189 firms signing the original articles of association in June 1948 to 346 official members a month later. It offered German insurance companies both political and economic clout towards governments and regulation authorities, and a platform to coordinate their joint business strategies and (social) policy interventions within and beyond Germany. The second pillar of cross sectorial integration in Germany was the above-mentioned journal Versicherungswirtschaft. It was founded by Alex Möller, who was un Philipp Müller, Zeit der Unterhändler: Koordinierter Kapitalismus in Deutschland und Frankreich zwischen 1920 und 1950 (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2019).  Wolfgang Streeck, Gekaufte Zeit: Die vertagte Krise des Demokratischen Kapitalismus (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2013), here 51 f.  Koch, Geschichte der Versicherungswirtschaft, 342.  On the association’s mission see: BArch Koblenz, Nachlass Möller (1369), Box 2019, “Satzung des Gesamtverbandes der Versicherungswirtschaft e.V. i. d. F. der Beschlüsse des Präsidialausschusses vom 15.10.1952 in Hamburg und der Mitgliederversammlung vom 21./22.10.1954 in Hannover.”  Harald Mandt, “Mitgliederversammlung des GDV in Bad Neuenahr,” June 2, 1949, quoted from Koch, Geschichte der Versicherungswirtschaft, 345.

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doubtedly a central figure for the German insurance industry: Möller became CEO of Karlsruher Lebensversicherung in 1945 and president of the life insurers’ marketing board in 1947. A lifelong member of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), he eventually even became Federal Minister of Finance between 1969 and 1971.²³ Möller was, in a way, both the picture of an unhumorous German businessman and a dazzling political personality in his own right. Repeatedly portrayed as the “red millionaire”²⁴ in the press, he was politically and socially well-connected, and tireless when it came to the advancement of the idea, role, and impact of private insurance as a “pillar of any modern society,”²⁵ as he had put it. Möller and his four co-editors of Versicherungswirtschaft (all distinguished CEOs of German insurance companies: Allianz, Münchner-Rück, Victoria Düsseldorf, Hamburg-Mannheimer) managed to turn the journal into a major player and forum for the insurance sector in Germany and German-speaking regions across Europe.²⁶ The journal served as a source of reliable information for insurance professionals by providing company data, financial graphs, conference reports, background articles, and prognoses by insurance scientists and experts. Moreover, it served as a (transnational) forum for debate and offered a lively exchange of best practices in international insurance marketing, management, and accounting. Finally, the journal was also used as a political communication tool. Möller and his co-editors were well connected with both businesspeople and political leaders around the world. Hence, the journal regularly featured guest posts by leading German politicians as well as interviews with international CEOs, leaders of international organizations or European regulative bodies, which allowed its readers a better assessment of national and international as well as particular European trends and developments in the insurance industry.²⁷

 Gabriele Metzler, “Alex Möller (1903 – 1985),” in Politische Köpfe aus Südwestdeutschland, ed. Reinhold Weber (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2005), 321– 331.  Fritz R. Allemann, “Im Zeichen der Knausrigkeit. Alex Möller – Genosse Generaldirektor,” Die Weltwoche, March 6, 1970.  Alex Möller, “Die Versicherungswirtschaft im Demokratischen Staat,” in Staat, Wirtschaft, Assekuranz und Wissenschaft, ed. Rudolph Henn and Walter F. Schickinger (Karlsruhe: Verlag Versicherungswirtschaft, 1986), 373 – 385; Alex Möller, Ein Arbeitsleben für die Assekuranz (Karlsruhe: Verlag Versicherungswirtschaft, 1973). This is but one of Möller’s memoirs he published during his lifetime; this one on the occasion of his twenty-fifth anniversary of service to KLV.  Robert Schwebler, “Verein und Verlag Versicherungswirtschaft,” in Kontinuität und Wandel des Versicherungsrechts, ed. Manfred Wandt (Karlsruhe: Verlag Versicherungswirtschaft, 2004), 821– 828.  Ludwig Erhard, “Was erwarten wir vom Neuaufbau der Wirtschaft im Jahre 1947?,” Versicherungswirtschaft 1 (1947): 3 – 4; Konrad Adenauer, “100jährige Erfahrung,” Versicherungswirtschaft 1 (1949): 1.

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Early International Orientation, 1946 – 1949 The immediate postwar reconstruction period in Germany war marked by almost feverish local initiative. The future of German private insurance business was at stake since, during the war, considerable assets had been lost, vital personal and financial data had been destroyed, and thus a number of companies were barely operational. Besides the immediate issues of company succession and leadership, office management, and data retrieval, insurers were also occupied with tackling the effects of the German monetary reform of 1948, questions of debt settlement, and the effects of seizures of foreign assets. It did not take long, however, until topics such as new European economic relations and a potential internationalization of life insurance markets eventually took a more important position on the insurer’s agenda. As early as December 1947, the journal Versicherungswirtschaft provided its readers with an informational preview on the future role of the World Bank in international lending and the proliferation of international trade, thereby offering a first glimpse of cross-border investment and the future of money markets.²⁸ Not long after, another article about the United Nations followed, in which this relatively new international body was introduced as “maybe the world’s biggest insurance association based on reciprocity.”²⁹ However, the main issue that German insurance companies and national insurance associations debated between 1947 and 1949 was their exclusion from cross-border business in Europe and beyond. In February 1947 Arthur Lauinger, a member of the Versicherungswirtschaft editorial board, reflected on the future of insurance business in Germany, stating: “German insurance business has every reason to foster Germany’s reintegration into the global economy. The law of large number demands a reaction on our part, otherwise accruing risks might soon force us out of business.”³⁰ In 1948, Harald Mandt, CEO of Albinga insurance and first president of GDV, underscored that the continuous ban of German insurance from business abroad was not only an economic problem, but also a situation that might again foster xenophobic development. Taking the nationalization of re-insurance business in Peru, Brazil and Argentina in the 1930s as an example (hence circumventing National Socialist policies during the intervening decade), Mandt concluded that the vicious circle of government tariffs on cross border insurance would have been unthinka-

 “Aus dem Wirtschaftsleben,” and “Die Tätigkeit der Weltbank,” Versicherungswirtschaft 8 (1946): 16.  “United Nations Organization,” Versicherungswirtschaft 4 (1947): 76 – 78, here 76.  “Versicherung im Umbau,” Versicherungswirtschaft 2 (1947): 38.

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ble, if governments had had to respect the foreign interests of their insurance companies in the first place.³¹ The GDV eventually even sent an open letter to the Allied High Command in 1948, asking for an end to “enforced German autarky” in insurance business and pointing to the economic absurdity of “atomizing” risk, instead of spreading it via the international insurance business.³² At the same time it was of quite some concern to insurance professionals that foreign insurance companies were allowed to operate in Germany. This market asymmetry would – so it was feared – eventually “lead to significantly rising market shares among non-German companies” and thus harm both the business community and the welfare state at large.³³

Restarting International Cooperation, 1949 – 1955 While general concerns regarding Germany’s exclusion from the international insurance business after the Second World War were repeatedly discussed with Allied authorities, German life insurers did not shy away from advancing their knowledge of foreign competitors, their business practices, and the regulatory contexts in which they operated (or rather hoped to be able to operate again soon). In July 1949, the first international congress on the insurance of “substandard lives” took place in Rome, after repeated cancellations of this international gathering for 12 consecutive years. West German insurance mathematicians and medical experts joined their (mainly Western-European) colleagues in an “attempt to reestablish professional cooperation.”³⁴ However, these first steps towards the re-integration of German insurance professionals into international gatherings and scientific meetings were not taken for granted. Rather, there was a recognition that the present conjuncture was a unique opportunity to move beyond the recent past towards a more unified, collaborative future. As a German insurance physician wrote in her report on another international congress that had taken place just a month earlier: “The hosts were kind enough not

 Harald Mandt, “Die deutsche Versicherungswirtschaft und das Ausland,” Versicherungswirtschaft 24 (1948): 405 – 406.  Gesamtverbands der Versicherungswirtschaft, e.V., “Untragbare Autarkie der deutschen Versicherung,” Versicherungswirtschaft 24 (1948): 406 – 407; Geschäftsbericht des Gesamtverbands der Versicherungswirtschaft, e.V. 1948/49 (Berlin: Verlag Versicherungswirtschaft, 1949), 53 f.  Walter Breitbarth, “Ausländische Versicherungsunternehmen in Deutschland,” Versicherungswirtschaft 2 (1949): 15 – 16.  Jakob Gugmus, “Versicherung ‘minderwertiger Leben’. Internationaler Kongress in Rom unter Teilnahme deutscher Vertreter,” Versicherungswirtschaft 14 (1949): 288.

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to mention what had happened during the last 10 years in Germany. […] Hence our visit to Rome was not only a chance to listen to the presentations with our ears, but also with our hearts. It consoled us and has given us hope.”³⁵ In early 1950, closer cooperation within Western Europe became more and more tangible. The Council of Europe had been established in Strasbourg the previous year, and observers by and large forecasted concrete progress towards a closer integration of Franco-German markets – even though the Schuman Declaration, proposing an integration of the French and German coal and steel sectors, had not yet seen the light of day.³⁶ German insurers were expecting with quite some certainty that a “European Economic Union” was – in one way or another – imminent. Hence in its first issue of 1950, Versicherungswirtschaft featured various statements of “distinguished international insurance experts” dealing with the coming union. For instance, Raoul Messerschmidt, co-director of a French re-insurance company in the north-African region, underscored: “The experience of Strasbourg needs to teach us a lesson: Europe has to be built, meaning that every country admitted to the European community has to contribute to a new economic order.”³⁷ Most private insurance companies – having fought quite vigorously against recurring plans to nationalize private insurance companies after the war – were convinced that progress and prosperity would only thrive in a free (albeit unified) European market economy. In late January 1950, a number of large insurance companies across Europe met in Paris for the first time – on invitation of the Fédération Française des Sociétés d’Assurances (FFSA) – to discuss steps towards a European cooperation of the insurance industry. The German delegation was led by Willibald Gerlach (Board member of Albingia insurance) and Gerd Müller (CEO of Allianz) among others. The German attendants reported a very constructive exchange of ideas and business practices and agreed that it was particularly fortunate that the German insurance industry had been awarded one of only seven seats in the preparatory committee of the next European congress of insurers.³⁸ The host of this first European gathering, Gabriel Cheneau de Leyritz, president of FFSA, had been a prominent proponent of increased cooperation between European insurance companies since the war had ended. As early as 1949 he had

 Elfriede Kuhr, “Internationaler Kongress für Lebensversicherungsmedizin,” Versicherungswirtschaft 15 (1949): 315.  Mark Gilbert, European Integration: A Concise History, 2nd ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012), 27– 31.  Raoul Messerschmitt, “Europäische Zusammenarbeit der Versicherungswirtschaft,” Versicherungswirtschaft 4 (1950): 1– 2.  “Auslandsnachrichten,” Versicherungswirtschaft no. 4 (1950): 86.

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published various articles on “Insurance in Europe” urging an end to nationalist autarky and a new phase of (Western) European cooperation, new institutions for the advancement of European insurance markets, and more liberal trade regulations.³⁹ Practicing what he preached, Cheneau de Leyritz eventually even contacted Alex Möller of KLV directly, in an attempt to learn more about the company and its business practices, and to talk about a joint campaign geared towards lowering taxation on private life insurance contracts.⁴⁰ Hence, just as in other parts of the economy, insurance experts also began to intensify their efforts to bring about basic forms of European cooperation and knowledge exchange in their respective professional environments.⁴¹ On July 1, 1950 Germany joined the European Payments Union (EPU), a clearing house that had been established on the initiative of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC).⁴² It was coordinated by the Bank for International Settlements and helped shift bilateral trade agreements to multilateral ones, established basic rules for currency convertibility, and “pledged members to reduce barriers to trade among themselves as part of the goal of increasing regional economic integration and increased growth.”⁴³ While the EPU was seen as a harbinger of a “liberalization of European insurance trade” by insurers⁴⁴ and did indeed open up the European transport and re-insurance market to German companies such as Munich-Re and Allianz,⁴⁵ it did not lead to massive surges in cross-border capital investments at first. As economic historians such as Thorsten Beckers and Christoph Kopper have shown, life insurance companies in particular were highly reluctant to invest in capital markets throughout the 1950s, both in Germany and abroad.⁴⁶ Even after the  Gabriel Cheneaux de Leyritz, “Assurance en Europe,” Revue générale des assurances terrestres 20, 4 (1949): 22– 31.  BArch Koblenz, Nachlass Alex Möller (1369), Box 273, letter from the President of the FFSA to Alex Möller, August 27, 1951.  Alexander Nützenadel, Stunde der Ökonomen: Wissenschaft, Politik und Expertenkultur in der Bundesrepublik, 1949 – 1974 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2005).  Jacob J. Kaplan, “Networks and Institutions in the Origins and Operations of the European Payments Union,” in Réseaux Économiques et Construction Européenne/ Economic Networks and European Integration, ed. Michel Dumoulin (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2004), 381– 90.  Catherine R. Schenk, International Economic Relations Since 1945 (London: Routledge, 2011), 37.  “Liberalisierung des europäischen Versicherungsverkehrs,” Versicherungswirtschaft 20 (1950): 423.  See Eggenkämper, Modert, and Pretzlik, Die Allianz, 252.  Thorsten Beckers, Kapitalmarktpolitik Im Wiederaufbau: Der Westdeutsche Wertpapiermarkt zwischen Staat und Wirtschaft 1945 – 1957 (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2014), 189 f; Kopper, “Versicherungskonzerne.”

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London Debt conference of 1952 and the signing of the Debt Agreement in 1953, most neighboring countries demanded high securities from any foreign competitors entering their markets.⁴⁷ German insurance companies – still trying to reach bilateral debt settlements with the governments of areas they had been doing business with before the war – mostly shied away from somewhat incalculable risks and high capital involvements at this point and decided to focus on less straight-forward internationalization strategies instead.⁴⁸ If actual European business and investment across borders was rather slow to develop in the early 1950s, visible progress was nonetheless made on the organizational level. In 1953, the Comité Européen des Assurances (CEA) was founded in Paris. It had grown out of the above-mentioned international gathering in Paris in 1950 and started out as a kind of observative and coordinative body.⁴⁹ Its membership consisted of 18 national insurance bodies, including the GDV, the “European-Co-Operation Committee” of the British Insurance Companies, the Swiss Association des Compagnies Suisses d’Assurances, the Spanish Sindicato National de Seguro as well as the Turkish Re-insurance Council.⁵⁰ From its onset, the Comité Européen des Assurances was very closely connected to the OEEC and regularly sent experts to meetings of the OEEC Committee for Invisible Transactions, dealing with a prospective liberalization of monetary markets between OEEC member countries. However, soon after its inception in 1953, CEA also started monitoring developments on the level of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) as well as the developments leading up to the Treaty of Rome and the foundation of the EEC in 1957.⁵¹ From the outset, the CEA thus closely monitored various institutional contexts that were likely to have an impact on the future development of the European cross-border insurance trade.

 Ursula Rombeck-Jaschinski, Das Londoner Schuldenabkommen: Die Regelung der Deutschen Auslandsschulden nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2005).  Harald Mandt, “Auslandsfragen der deutschen Versicherung,” Versicherungswirtschaft 21 (1952): 464– 465.  Richard Wiedemann, “Tätigkeit der Westeuropäischen Versicherungsvereinigung,” Versicherungswirtschaft 8 (1954): 182.  BArch, Nachlass Möller (1369), Box 2017, “Liste der dem Comité Européen des Assurances angehörenden westeuropäischen Versicherungsverbände” [1958].  Hans-Joachim Wilke, “Aufgaben der Verbände bei der Gestaltung des Gemeinsamen europäischen Versicherungsmarktes,” in Versicherungen in Europa heute und morgen, ed. Franz W. Hopp (Karlsruhe: Verlag Versicherungswirtschaft, 1991), 225 – 34.

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The Treaty of Rome and the Beginning of European Insurance Trade in the EEC The year 1957, when the Treaty of Rome was signed, was a particularly involved one for German life insurance companies. This was the case not only because of European developments but mainly because of the fact that in spring 1957 the German public pension system received the biggest overhaul since its inception in 1891.⁵² This meant that government pensions were “dynamized” (pegged to real wages) and the whole system was shifted from a capital based to a payas-you-go scheme.⁵³ Throughout 1956 both the GDV and individual life insurance companies were more than busy dealing with the variety of reform plans on the table. Various CEOs used the forum of Versicherungswirtschaft to discuss data and comparative statistics from neighboring welfare economies to underscore the insurers’ claim that the German state was about to “undermine private initiative,” while accepting huge financial and social liabilities which were as likely to impact Western European welfare economies at large as they were to impact Germany.⁵⁴ While most commentators from the business community had predicted the public pension reform of 1957 to be the doom of private life insurance in Germany, the contrary turned out to be true: after the reform was eventually passed in March 1957, German private life insurance companies ended up with record growth in new contracts for 1957⁵⁵ and have kept increasing their financial volumes ever since.⁵⁶ This unexpected growth had at least two reasons: the first was that the reform left old-age provision for self-employed people to private contractors, put these contracts on more solid legal footing, and even granted tax incentives to people willing to save for old age. Secondly, the reform helped to ease the acute problem of poverty in old age and offered perspective and confidence for

 Sandrine Kott, Sozialstaat und Gesellschaft: Das Deutsche Kaiserreich in Europa (Göttingen: Vandenhock & Ruprecht, 2014), see chapter 2.  Schmähl, Alterssicherungspolitik, 254– 256; Cornelius Torp, Gerechtigkeit im Wohlfahrtsstaat: Alter und Alterssicherung in Deutschland und Großbritannien von 1945 bis heute (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2015), see chapter 2.  Helmut Kracke, “Stellungnahme des Vorstandes der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Versicherungsmathematik zu finanziellen Belastungen durch die Rentenreform,” Versicherungswirtschaft 24 (1956): 661– 662.  Schmähl, Alterssicherungspolitik, 279.  Borscheid, “Germany: Insurance.”

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the rising middle classes.⁵⁷ Hence, additional private life insurance became more and more attractive to new social groups such as skilled workers or housewives, a fact that opened new opportunities for life insurance companies within the architecture of the evolving German welfare state. Given domestic struggles related to pension reform, some of the developments on the European level certainly received relatively little attention in Germany, despite their important repercussions for future insurance trade in Europe. On November 15, 1955, for instance, the OEEC signed a liberalization codex for invisible transactions, which impacted the way passive and active transactions in insurance business were handled. In Germany, working groups on the ministerial level as well as within the GDV and its individual member organizations were formed, but it took the experts months to fathom the consequences of this new OEEC code for insurance companies.⁵⁸ While the Federal Ministry of Economics eventually supported liberalization plans and was open to allowing affiliation of additional foreign life insurance companies in Germany, many German CEOs, Alex Möller included, warned that this might bring competition on the national insurance market to dangerous levels.⁵⁹ Parallel to OEEC liberalization discussions, European deliberations about insuring the risks of atomic energy had started. This topic was coordinated in the context of a working group of the Comité Européen des Assurances, which had by then turned into the central private body for inter-European insurance coordination.⁶⁰ The apparent “limits of insurability” and the risks involved in calculating the costs of potential atomic doom would keep national ministries, new European institutions (particularly EURATOM), national insurance associations, and industrial bodies across Europe busy for years.⁶¹ From the perspective of most European life insurance companies, however, another (or rather additional) European institutional framework was becoming

 Christophe Lorke, Armut im geteilten Deutschland: Die Wahrnehmung sozialer Randlagen in der Bundesrepublik und der DDR (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2015), 78 – 80; Hans G. Hockerts, “Integration der Gesellschaft: Gründungskrise und Sozialpolitik in der frühen Bundesrepublik,” Zeitschrift für Sozialreform 32, no. 1 (1986): 25 – 41.  Albrecht Siegert, “Privater Versicherungsverkehr mit dem Ausland, Neuregelung der Devisenrechtlichen Bestimmungen,” Versicherungswirtschaft no. 16 & 17 (1955): 413 – 414; 443 – 444.  BArch, Nachlass Alex Möller (1369), Box 462, letter from Alex Möller to Verband der Lebensversicherungsunternehmen, reg. “Liberalisierung auf dem Gebiet der Lebensversicherung,” August 28, 1956.  “Europäische Versicherer prüfen Atomrisiken,” Versicherungswirtschaft no. 3 (1956): 71.  See for example Christoph J. Wehner, “Grenzen der Versicherbarkeit – Grenzen der Risikogesellschaft. Atomgefahr, Sicherheitsproduktion und Versicherungsexpertise in der Bundesrepublik und den USA,” Archiv für Sozialgeschichte 52 (2012): 581– 605.

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more and more important.⁶² By early 1957 deliberations for the establishment of the EEC and a future integration of European markets were finally yielding tangible results. Preoccupied with social reform in Germany and its “European implications” – meaning the alleged increase of (welfare) state influence on individual lives and provisional frameworks – German life insurers did not regard too highly at first the developments leading up to the Treaty of Rome. The secretary of VSW concluded in spring 1957 that national particularities will only with time be united to a common thread. This trend towards common ground is based on economic necessities, but it will also be necessary to include mental considerations into this amalgamation process. This will be all the more important when it comes to different traditions of law […] While it might be possible to resort to collision law in single cases of economic conflict, an increase in the number of ’international’ incidents does indeed insinuate that a more general European solution is necessary.⁶³

While this need for a “more general European solution” regarding cross-border insurance markets was certainly not made a top priority at first, the Comité Européen des Assurances still set up a joint committee on the common market in early 1957 which held its first meeting in Monte Carlo in September. A short time later, the GDV followed suit with an ad-hoc working group which was to deal with the consequences of § 59 of the Treaty of Rome, stipulating that “restrictions on freedom to provide services within the Community shall be progressively abolished during the transitional period in respect of nationals of Member States who are established in a State of the Community other than that of the person for whom the services are intended.”⁶⁴ While diving deeper into the actual meaning of this new European treaty, it eventually dawned on the members of the GDV working group that “the execution of the principles of the common market may not only have impact on our relations to foreign countries but may also heavily impact the German market as such.”⁶⁵ The ad-hoc group was hence upgraded to an independent committee in early 1958. In March 1958, the CEA committee on the common market met in Munich to discuss the issue of market liberalization in greater detail. Discussions

 Kiran K. Patel, Projekt Europa: Eine kritische Geschichte (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2018), 45.  “Die Schriftleitung meint: Im Zeichen der Europäischen Integration,” Versicherungswirtschaft no. 5 (1957): 123.  European Commission, The Treaty of Rome, accessed April 29, 2020, www.https//ec.europa.eu › tratatul_de_la_roma.  BArch, Nachlass Möller (1369), Box 2017, letter from GDV to member associations, reg. “common market,” March 28, 1958.

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at this stage not only showed that different national preferences on how to proceed existed, but participants also underscored that liberalization of insurance services would necessarily have to be fitted to realities in different insurance sectors. While trade and transport insurance were taken to be possible fields for more or less easy liberalization, other sectors – life insurance in particular – were excluded from the start, since the vital interest of pensioners all across the EEC member states seemed to be at stake.⁶⁶ What came to the fore, however, was that both freedom of service provision and freedom to establish companies were very closely linked to the question of European regulation of insurance markets. As the GDV working group reported back to CEA in August 1958: “While it is possible to envision a legal approximation within the EEC member countries leading to a harmonization of insurance regulatory law that might render the question of which national court to appeal to unnecessary […] not all kinds of insurance contracts can be included.”⁶⁷ Especially in those areas where private insurance was partly obligatory (liability, health or life insurance, etc.) almost insurmountable difficulties were predicted. As subsequent meetings showed, regulation did indeed turn out to be the central matter. This did not only concern the EEC and the liberalization of insurance markets between the EEC member countries, but just as much (or even more so) it concerned liberalization as agreed upon in the context of the OEEC. When the Comité Européen des Assurances met again in Wiesbaden in late 1959, both OEEC and EEC liberalization plans were discussed in great length. After intensive, and somewhat controversial deliberations, CEA members agreed that cooperation between national regulatory bodies would be the cornerstone of any kind of further liberalization of insurance markets in the EEC, the OEEC member countries, and beyond. There was one thing, however, that all attendants of this international CEA meeting agreed on: under no circumstance whatsoever would upcoming deliberation on insurance regulation in Europe be left to governmental or international regulatory bodies alone. Hence the final report concluded that all attendants held “cooperation of insurers to be indispensable, if the task ahead is to be completed successfully.”⁶⁸ By the late 1950s inner-European business cooperation and future joint European regulation of welfare markets in private old age insurance had clearly be-

 BArch, Nachlass Alex Möller (1369), Box 2017, letter from GDV to members of subcommittee on common market, March 28, 1958.  BArch, Nachlass Alex Möller (1369), Box 2017, letter from GDV (Nebelung) to General Secretary of CEA, August 11, 1958.  BArch, Nachlass Alex Möller (1369), Box 2017, report on work of OEEC, information note of General Secretary, CEA member assembly, Wiesbaden September 24/25, 1959.

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come an important topic for insurance companies across Europe. And while all associations agreed that the obstacles to truly European service markets were plenty and that any removal of national barriers would require time, compromise, and joint planning, they were convinced that both their contributions and their expertise were essential if any progress was to be achieved.

Conclusion When it comes to historical literature on the liberalization of European (insurance) markets, research is still sketchy and, in addition, almost entirely focused on the EEC commission, the European Council, and the governments of the European member states – and hence on the level of top-down and multi-level economic policy making in the EEC/EU. This means that the focus is usually on regulatory issues, while neither the vision nor the agency of international organizations or private insurers are considered very relevant to the making of European (market) integration. This may explain why the standard narrative regarding the Europeanization of insurance markets usually has a rather surprising starting point: Andrew McGee’s study on “The single Market in Insurance,”⁶⁹ for instance, has its starting point in the 1980s, after the EEC Directive 73/239⁷⁰ and Directive 79/267⁷¹ (coordinating insurance matters for the non-life and life insurance sectors) had eventually been passed. The fact that it took more than two decades after the signing of the Treaty of Rome to put the first EEC directive on the life insurance business into effect does not mean, however, that these decades condemned European insurance companies to inactivity and passive waiting. On the contrary, if we consider the run-up and deliberations leading to these directives,⁷² the coordinative steps towards liberalization of insurance matters taken within the OEEC/OECD context, as well as the plethora of coordinative

 Andrew McGee, The Single Market in Insurance: Breaking down the Barriers. (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998).  “First Council Directive of 24 July 1973 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the taking-up and pursuit of the business of direct insurance other than life assurance,” Official Journal of the European Communities, Vol 16, No L228, August 16, 1973, 3 – 19.  “First Council Directive of 5 March 1979 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of direct life assurance,” Official Journal of the European Communities, Vol 22, No L 63, March 13, 1979, 1– 19.  Historical Archives of the European Commission, BAC 3/1978, 1296, letter from Peter Verloren van Themat (general director of DG 14) to Günther Seeliger (general director for the exterior) on Réunion du groupe de travail sur les controles d’assurance de l’ OECD, January 25, 1962.

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ventures initiated by insurance companies, national and European insurers associations, and lobby groups,⁷³ then the period from the 1950s to the late 1970s was marked by almost hectic activity and the emergence of many new coordinative committees and corporatist mechanisms to facilitate future European market integration. Hence, it is not enough to limit “Europeanization” processes to active cross-border capital flows and top-down European market regulation alone: there were countless other forms of European (business) cooperation, such as professional cross-border association, scientific knowledge transfer among companies, or studies and expertise provided to government/EEC institutions by insurance think tanks which need to be considered and analyzed in greater detail in order to shed light on the “making of Europe” in all relevant dimensions. As shown, it was precisely these early forms of cooperation – jointly fathoming both risks and opportunities of market liberalization in Europe – that paved the way for eventual cross-border business and European regulatory frameworks for life insurance companies. In short, the emergence of European frameworks for the life insurance business was as much an achievement and project of private players as it was a project that was eventually agreed upon by the governments of the EEC member countries in the Treaty of Rome and subsequent EEC directives. Put together, private insurers had their eyes set on Europe long before the text of the Treaty put a liberalization of service markets on the official government or EEC agenda. Moreover, other international organizations such as the OEEC, the World Bank, or the Bank for International Settlements were just as instrumental in preparing the grounds for a European integration of markets as the EEC. It was these organizations that private insurance companies turned to first, in an attempt to offer and receive expertise and input on feasible ways of organizing transnational European business affairs. However, research remains to be done on the nature and dynamics of cooperation between international organizations, EEC institutions, government players, and private business. It is necessary to shed light on the question of how the variety of efforts made towards a Europeanization of service markets interlocked in practice on the different levels. We still know far too little about the various visions and strategies of private enterprises regarding European integration as a long-term goal and practical business project.  One exception (albeit one that focusses on the period after the 1970s) is Matthieu Leimgruber, “Bringing Private Insurance Back in: The Geneva Association as a Transnational Insurance Think Tank (1973 – 2000s),” in European Economic Elites: Between a New Spirit of Capitalism and the Erosion of State Socialism, ed. Friederike Sattler and Christoph Boyer (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2009), 473 – 495.

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List of Contributors Willy Buschak lives as an independent historian in Bochum. He has written about the history of social movements, the German Revolution of 1918/19, Europe and the labour movement, and resistance against National Socialism. His most recent publication deals with memorial sites in Dresden. Johannes Dafinger is an Assistant Professor (Universitätsassistent, Postdoc) of Contemporary History at the University of Salzburg. Research interests include: academia and science in the Nazi period, as well as transnational entanglements of the conservative and far right. Recent publications include: with Dieter Pohl (eds.), A New Nationalist Europe under Hitler (London/ New York: Routledge, 2019). Lisa Dittrich (1977 – 2021) was an Assistant Professor of Contemporary History at the Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich. Her PhD thesis on anticlericalism in nineteenth century Europe was awarded the Max Weber Prize of the Bavarian Academy of Sciences and Humanities in 2012. She was carrying out a research project on marriage and partnership in both German states between 1945 and 1990. Michał Gałędek is Professor in the Department of Legal History at the University of Gdańsk and Founding Director of Studies on Research Methodology in Legal Science. He is also Vice President of the Polish Society of Legal History. His current research focuses on Polish constitutionalism, administration and the development of Polish legal culture in the 19th and 20th centuries. He recently published National Tradition or Western Pattern? Concepts of the New Administrative System for the Congress Kingdom of Poland (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2021). Michael Gehler is a Professor (Jean Monnet Chair) and Head of the Institute for History at the University of Hildesheim, a corresponding member of the Austrian Academy of Sciences, and a Professor at Andrássy University Budapest. His publications focus on Austrian, German and European history, European integration, empires, transnational party cooperation of Christian Democrats and Conservatives, and the South Tyrol question. Florian Greiner is an academic researcher at the Stiftung Reichspräsident-Friedrich-Ebert-Gedenkstätte in Heidelberg and Privatdozent at the University of Augsburg. His research interests include European integration history, the history of death and dying, historical game studies, as well as media and cultural history in general. Heike Knortz is a Supernumerary Professor at the Pädagogische Hochschule Karlsruhe. Her field of research is economic history, particularly of the twentieth century, with a main focus on European economic integration history, the history of labour migration, as well as the economic and social history of the Weimar Republic. Anna Klimaszewska is Associate Professor in the Department of Legal History at the Faculty of Law and Administration of the University of Gdańsk and Founding Director of the Inter-University School of French Law created in cooperation between the University of Gdańsk and https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110685473-016

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the University Toulouse 1 Capitole. As a leader of several research projects, she is particularly interested in the influence of French legal culture on the evolution of the Polish legal system and in the intertwining of legal cultures. Aline Maldener is Managing Director at the German General Secretariat of the Franco-German Cultural Council. Between 2014 and 2021, she was an academic researcher, lecturer, and PhD candidate at Saarland University and the Université du Luxembourg. Her doctoral thesis is a transnational and comparative study of European youth mass media of the 1960s and 1970s. Çiğdem Oğuz is a Junior Assistant Professor at the Alma Mater Studiorum University of Bologna. Her research interests include late Ottoman social and intellectual history and state-society relations, citizenship studies, war studies, and women and gender in the Middle Eastern context. She recently published Moral Crisis in the Ottoman Empire: Society,Politics, and Gender during WWI (London/New York: I.B. Tauris, 2021). Kate Papari is a Postdoctoral Researcher at the University of the Peloponnese and Director of the Hellenic Open University Press. Her research interests include Modern Greek and European history, intellectual history, the history of philosophy, the history of ideas, and historical theory in general. Peter Pichler is a Postdoctoral Researcher at the University of Graz, where he leads the research project “Breaking the law?! Norm-Related Sonic Knowledge in Heavy Metal Culture. Graz and Styria since 1980”. His fields of expertise are European Union cultural history, metal music studies, and historical theory. Nina Szidat is a PhD candidate and researcher in the University of Duisburg-Essen’s research project “‘Active promotion of the European ideal’? – References to Europe in German-British Town-Twinning”. Her research interests include European integration history, urban history, and the history of German-British relations. Jan Vermeiren is Associate Professor in Modern German History and Founding Director of the Institute for the Study of Ideas of Europe at the University of East Anglia. He is particularly interested in the history of German nationalism and geopolitical thought, the First World War, and questions of European integration. Regina Weber is a researcher at the German Centre for Rail Traffic Research (DZSF) in Bonn and a lecturer at the University of Duisburg-Essen and at Rhine-Waal University, Cleves/Germany. Her research interests cover the Europeanization of everyday life, cross-border mobility, and political behaviour in a Europeanized context. Heike Wieters is Juniorprofessor for Historical Research on Europe and European Integration at the Department of History at Humboldt University of Berlin, Germany. Her research interests include European integration history, the history of humanitarianism and non-governmental organizations, and social and economic history with a special focus on international businesses and cross-border markets for food and insurance.

Index Acton, Lord John 275 Adenauer, Konrad 37, 39, 41, 375 ADGB (Allgemeiner Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund) 335, 339 adolescents 207 – 208, 213, 217, 219, 221 – 222, 226 – 231; see also teenagers; youth AfD (Alternative für Deutschland) 112 Afghanistan 44 Africa 227, 280, 334, 394 agriculture 33, 102, 114, 145, 331, 360, 362, 368 – 369, 375, 379 – Common Agricultural Policy 57 air; see also aviation – races 82 – 85 – travel 81 – 82, 325, 337 Air Race Round Europe 82 – 85 Ajax Amsterdam 253, 259 Akif, Mehmed 137, 145 Albingia insurance 392, 394 Alfieri, Dino 106 Allgemeiner Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund; see ADGB Allied powers 41, 85, 98, 144, 189, 191, 385 – 386, 388, 390, 393 Alternative für Deutschland; see AfD Americanization 37, 210 – anti-Americanism 115 – 116 – Desamericanization 208 anarchists 267, 278 – 280, 282 – 283, 321, 326, 335 Andrews, Chris 226 Ankara 51, 144; see also Turkey anticlericalism 19, 263 – 291 Arab Revolt 139 Arab Spring 52 Arabic societies 128, 136 ARD 205, 210 – 12, 220 Arendt, Hannah 115 – 16 Argentina 276, 326, 362, 392 Armenia 143 Asia 154, 168, 321, 331 Athens 157; see also Greece https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110685473-017

Atterberg, Kurt 104 Australia 82, 334, 362 Austria 18, 192, 226, 229, 236, 239, 244 – 245, 250 – 255, 299 – 300, 305 – 307, 310 – 311, 314, 335, 341, 362, 387 autarky 101 – 103, 393, 395 authenticity 139, 141, 145, 165 autographs 208, 224 – 26, 231 aviation 81 – 83, 85; see also air Axis countries 102, 112 Axmann, Artur 107 Balkanization 324, 333 – 334 Balkans 249, 251, 255, 387 Balkan Wars 126, 132, 135, 137, 142, 251 Bandtkie, Jan Wincenty 300, 306, 309 – 314 Banwell, Sir Harold 183 Barcelona 196, 278; see also Spain Bardèche, Maurice 109 – 110 Bavaria 88, 218, 275, 310 – 311, 330; see also Germany Bayerischer Rundfunk 215, 217 Bayer Leverkusen 240 Beach Boys 226 Beat Club 228 Beatles, The 226 – Beatlemania 209, 227 beat music 223, 225, 228 Beaton, Roderick 152, 157 Belgium 45, 228, 276, 282, 332, 345; see also Benelux countries – decolonization 41 – insurance 387 – labor movement 340 – 344 – migration 363 – 364 – socialism 326 – 327, 345 – town twinning 182 Belgrade 39, 192 beliefs 100 – 101, 110, 112, 151, 153, 160, 207, 303 Benelux countries 33, 45, 226, 366 Bentham, Jeremy 306

410

Index

Berlin 56, 83, 106 – 8, 153, 215, 343 – Blockade 56 Berliner Tageblatt 284 Birmingham 180, 183 – 186, 189 – 190, 193 – 194, 196 Bokanowski, Maurice 345 Bonn 47 – 48, 56, 379; see also Germany borders – crossing 223, 243, 248, 250, 254 – 255, 281, 322, 342, 344 – 346, 386, 396 – ideological 223, 225 – internal 54, 95 – 96, 99, 264 – external 114, 264, 272, 338 – political 83, 223, 228, 236, 238, 242 – 243, 252, 256, 324, 386, 388 Borussia Dortmund 240 Bosman rulings 238 – 239, 242, 245 Bosnia 251 Bourdieu, Pierre 36 Boy Scout Movement 107, 117 Boy Scouts International Bureau 107, 117 Brandt, Willy 43 Brant, Mike 228 Bravo 224, 226, 228 – 229 Brazil 362, 392 Brexit 3, 29, 34, 54 Britain, see UK British Council 192 British Union of Fascists 335 British Workers’ Travel Association 342 broadcasting – football 238, 240 – 241 – German 205 – 209, 211, 213 – 216, 219, 221, 223 – 231; see also Europawelle Saar Brussels – Belgium 282, 328 – 329, 341 – Brussels Treaty 39 – EU 31, 37, 47, 196 Buchenwald 347 Buchholz, Axel 226 – 227 Budapest 53; see also Hungary Bundesliga 240 – Austrian 244, 245, 250 – 252, 255 business – cooperation 86 – 87, 400, 402 – effect of Europeanization 69

– leaders 14, 390 – practices 386, 393 – 395 – strategy 390, 396, 402 – transnational 46, 325, 344, 386, 388, 392, 402 – see also industry Butler, Eliza M. 153 Calwer, Richard 321 Canada 114, 334 capital 114, 327, 355, 358, 361, 363, 365, 370, 379, 386 – 388, 395 – 397, 402 capitalism 32, 109, 130, 159 – 161, 163, 210, 223, 250, 324, 346, 390 Capitals of Culture 36, 195 – 196 Catholic Church 269, 271, 273 – 274, 280 Catholicism 20, 264, 275, 278, 283, 311 CEA (Comité Européen des Assurances) 396, 398 – 400 censorship 134, 265, 272, 275, 283, 290 Central and Eastern Europe 34, 39, 312 centralization 125 – 126; see also decentralization Chaban-Delmas, Jacques 191 – 192 Chakrabarty, Dipesh 13, 77, 198 Champions League 240 – 241, 244, 246, 252 – 254 Cheneau de Leyritz, Gabriel 394 – 395 Chile 362 China 114, 180 Christianity 19, 71, 96, 128, 131, 140 – 141, 268 – 269, 273, 288, 290, 301 – 302, 312, 335; see also Catholicism; Protestantism; religion church; see also Catholic Church – critics of 282, 289 – relationship with state 263, 275, 278 – 279 – violence against 286 Churchill, Winston S. 341 CISAC (International Confederation of Authors’ and Composers’ Societies) 106 – 107 cities 136, 242, 249, 251, 255, 342, 343 – Eurocities 196 – twinning 16, 175, 177 – 189, 192 – 195, 197

Index

citizens 10, 179, 185 – domestic 145, 389 – European 29 – 30, 32 – 33, 37, 53, 80, 193, 195 – 197, 230 civilization 71, 73, 101, 141, 145, 152, 155, 159 – 164, 278, 287, 302, 312 – European 111, 115 – 116, 132, 140 – 141, 153, 155, 158, 165 – 166, 168, 273, 277, 284 – 285, 290 clergy 133, 143, 283 – 86, 290, 310; see also church Clinton, William J. (Bill) 37 coal 33, 183, 324 – 325, 336, 338, 355, 363 – 365, 367 – 369, 371, 394; see also ECSC – miners 344, 362 – 365 Codification Commission 300 Cohen, Max 323, 326, 334, 336 Cold War 49, 51, 56, 81, 180, 192, 238 colonies 41 – 42, 52, 73, 198, 226, 334, 360 – 361, 388; see also decolonization COMECON (Council of Mutual Economic Cooperation), 50 Comité Européen des Assurances; see CEA Common Agricultural Policy 57 Common Market 33, 39, 41, 114, 239, 324, 338, 399 communism 39, 49, 111, 113, 157, 159 – 160, 163, 321, 335 – 336, 343, 375 – anti-Communism 116 Communist International 336 Communist Red International of Labor Unions 335 competition – Commissioners for 46 – cultural 216, 218, 221, 231 – European football 18, 236, 238, 240 – 250, 253 – 254, 256 – flying 82 – 85 – insurance 389 – 390, 393, 396, 398 – law 54 – media 210 – 211 – motor 220, 231 – national football 241, 245 – 249, 254 – restriction of 240 – sports 87 Comte, Auguste 134, 161

411

Conféderation Générale du Travail (CGT) 338 Confédération Internationale des Sociétés d’Auteurs et Compositeurs; see CISAC Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe; see CSCE consciousness 161, 273 – European 242 – national 143 – 144 conservatism 133 – religious 127 – 128 constitutional movements 126, 130, 134, 138, 337 Consultative Assembly 191, 193 consumers 37, 222, 230 – 231 cooperation 5, 38 – 39, 50, 58, 96, 99, 105, 113, 115, 135, 209, 217, 237 – 238, 281, 336, 390, 393, 400, 402 – cultural 191, 212, 214 – 215, 220, 230 – 231 – economic 5, 101, 321, 375 – European 4, 41 – 42, 96 – 97, 331, 338, 340, 368, 375, 394 – 395 – intergovernmental 44 – 45, 101, 400 – municipal 179, 188 coronavirus; see COVID-19 Coudenhove-Kalergi, Richard 115, 331 – 333, 339, 341, 347 Council of Europe (CoE) 38, 114, 175, 178, 190 – 191, 193 – 194, 196, 198, 394 Council of European Municipalities and Regions 175, 180 Council of Mutual Economic Cooperation; see COMECON Coventry 183, 192, 194 COVID-19 3, 29, 35, 54 – 55 credit mechanisms 143, 359, 361, 368 Crimean War 130 crisis 3 – 4, 6 – 7, 29, 33, 35, 41 – 42, 52, 54 – 57, 58, 128, 135, 140, 158, 220, 338 – economic 3, 29, 51 – 52, 154, 328, 341, 387 – 388 – management 44 – 45, 56 – moral 141 – 142 – refugee 29, 53, 56 CSCE (Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe) 39, 49, 57

412

Index

Cuba 287 culture 16, 18, 36, 104, 110, 111, 136, 138, 140 – 141, 145, 157 – 158, 160 – 162, 166 – 167, 194, 205, 218, 263 – 264, 272, 282 – 283, 285, 322 – consumer 231 – European 9, 15, 30, 151 – 152, 154, 156, 163, 166 – 168, 187, 289, 301, 331, 338, 345 – Europeanization of 36 – football 237, 240 – legal 301 – 303, 305, 308, 312 – memory 72 – political 35, 58 – popular 206, 208 – 209, 211, 223 – 226, 228 – 231 – youth 15, 205, 223 – 225, 231 currency 40, 43, 48, 51, 56, 58, 335, 345, 358 – 359, 361, 367, 373, 376, 386 – convertibility 40, 359 – 360, 363, 395 – single 29, 52, 337 customs, national 129, 159, 164, 301 – 303, 307, 309 customs union 40, 51, 55, 102, 219, 325 – 326, 328, 337 – 339, 365 – 366 Czechoslovakia 39, 73, 83, 192, 224, 226, 327, 341, 362 Czech Republic 35 Daitz, Werner 100 – 101 decolonization 41, 52, 198 de-Europeanization 34 – 35, 42, 44, 52 – 54, 58, 324, 345 Delaisi, Francis 327, 334, 338 Delors, Jacques 46, 48 democracy 3, 71, 96, 162, 223, 231, 333, 345 – liberal 12, 390 – parliamentary 109, 337 democratization 208, 267 Denmark 57 dependence – economic mutual 355 – interdependence 78, 96, 356 – political 133 Destrée, Jules 324, 331 Deutsche Bundesbank 52

Deutsche Kongress-Zentrale 108 Deutschmark 48 – 49, 52 disintegration, see also integration – of Europe 6, 12 – 13, 17, 19, 29, 34, 39 – 41, 44, 49, 52, 57 – 58 – global 99 – of the Soviet Union 50, 53 diversity 9, 34, 37, 116, 167 – 168, 195 divorce 135, 263, 305, 310; see also marriage Drechsel, Max 326, 334 “Drugstore 1421” 221 – 222, 225 Durrell, Lawrence 154 Eastern Europe 17, 29, 34, 39, 49 – 51, 75, 113, 128, 178, 205, 208 – 209, 211, 223 – 226, 231, 238, 254 – 255, 312, 338; see also Central and Eastern Europe East Germany 39, 50, 73, 209, 223 – 226, 228 – 229, 231; see also Germany EC (European Communities) 4, 8, 11, 31, 44, 46 – 48, 51, 69, 71, 86, 114, 176, 194 – 196, 199 ECJ (European Court of Justice) 32, 46, 53, 237 – 239, 242, 245 economic – blocs 101 – 102 – cooperation 5, 101, 375 – crisis 51, 135, 154, 328 – integration 7, 14, 39, 356, 358, 365, 369 – 370, 372, 374, 378, 395 – policy 40, 42, 131, 142 – 143, 337, 345, 401 – problems 20, 40, 136, 154, 356 – 357, 378, 392 – sanctions 53 – sphere 14, 19, 238 – system 8, 29, 33, 46, 78, 163, 176, 213, 231 – weakness 50, 364 ECSC (European Coal and Steel Community) 31, 33, 39, 41 – 42, 45, 57, 347, 358, 371, 396 education 18, 125, 127, 129, 132, 134 – 136, 140 – 142, 188, 207, 214, 216, 221, 227, 279, 285, 290, 310, 314, 379

Index

EEC (European Economic Community) 31, 33, 37, 40 – 42, 57, 114, 219, 371, 386, 396, 399 – 402 EFTA (European Free Trade Association) 40 Eigen-Sinn 208 elite 98, 235, 347 – cultural 207 – economic 387 – football clubs 241, 243, 250 – intellectual 151, 300, 313 – legal 19, 314 – Ottoman 125, 130, 140, 144 – 145 – Polish 300, 305, 312 – political 126, 313, 355 – power struggles 127, 131 – women 134 Elysée Treaty 180, 212, 217 emancipation 41, 43, 157 – female 133, 135, 139, 142 – policy 52 emigration 370; see also immigration; migration – Italian 361 – 362, 369 – 373, 378 – 379 employment 357, 364, 375 – 377, 379; see also unemployment – female 135, 139 Endres, Franz Carl 330 energy 325, 331, 398 Engelmann, Max 336 EPTU (European Postal and Telecommunication Union) 105 – 106 EPU (European Payments Union) 40, 359, 368, 373, 375 – 376, 380, 395 equality 110, 134 – 135, 140, 142; see also inequality Erdoğan, Recep Tayyip 52, 145 Erhard, Ludwig 375 ERP (European Recovery Program) 36, 40, 358 – 359 Essen 175, 180 – 181 EU (European Union) – and COVID-19 54 – 55 – crises of 3, 29, 58 – disintegration 6, 12 – 13, 17, 19, 29, 34, 39 – 41, 44, 49, 52, 57 – 58 – enlargement 47, 50 – 51, 75 – exclusion from 51 – 52, 145

413

– foundation of 15 – 16, 50, 57, 336 – 337 – integration 3 – 4, 8, 10 – 11, 14, 20, 29, 31, 35, 37, 39 – 41, 43, 50, 55, 58, 70 – 71, 74, 76, 79, 87, 101, 113, 116, 167, 175 – 176, 194, 197, 199, 208, 230, 242, 325 – 328, 335 – 336, 340, 346 – 347, 355, 376, 386, 402 – law 19, 53, 240, 299 – member states 3, 30 – 33, 37, 53 – 54, 56, 75, 113, 176, 346, 399 – 402 – opposition to 111 – 113, 145 – political system 11, 30, 199 EU-ization 11, 58, 80, 199 EURATOM 398 euro 29, 36, 53 Eurocentrism 77, 116 Europawelle Saar 205 – 213, 215 – 216, 221, 223 – 231 Europe – pensée 176 – vécue 79, 176 – voulue 79, 176 Europe Day 193, 196 Europe Prize 175, 178, 191 – 94, 200 Euroscepticism 111 European – “becoming” 13 – 18, 20, 30, 168, 176, 235 – 237, 249, 255 – 256, 306 – citizens 10, 14 – 16, 18, 29, 32 – 33, 37, 53, 80, 193, 195 – 197, 230, 389 – civilization 158, 165 – 166, 168, 273, 277, 284 – 285, 290 – civil society 10, 18, 263, 275 – 276 – cooperation 4, 41, 96 – 97, 368, 394 – 395 – culture 9, 18, 156, 158, 163, 166 – 168, 187, 289, 301, 331, 338 – ideas 6, 13 – 14, 17, 19 – 20, 73, 167, 264, 267, 290 – 291 – identity 16, 18 – 19, 75, 81, 194, 196 – 197, 235, 264 – 265, 267, 286, 289 – 291, 312, 314, 340 – 341 – integration 3 – 4, 8, 10 – 11, 14, 20, 29, 31, 35, 37, 39 – 41, 43, 50, 55, 58, 70 – 71, 74, 76, 79, 87, 101, 113, 116, 167, 175 – 176, 194, 197, 199, 208, 230,

414

Index

242, 325 – 328, 335 – 336, 340, 346 – 347, 355, 376, 386, 402 – member states 3, 30 – 33, 37, 53 – 54, 56, 75, 113, 176, 346, 399 – 402 – organizations 17, 96, 101, 178, 187, 190, 194, 199 – politicians 10, 78, 177, 197 – project 3, 17, 48, 376 – 377 – public sphere 8, 72, 263, 266, 291 – solidarity 3, 87 – 88, 376 – values 17, 35, 53, 133, 287 Europeanization 3 – 20, 29 – 58, 127 – 130, 151 – 152, 157, 177 – 178, 264 – 268, 270, 272, 275, 289 – 291, 312, 337, 376, 378 – definitions of 5, 13, 30, 78, 127, 151, 176, 265 – 266, 345, 355, 358 – de-Europeanization 34 – 35, 42, 44, 52 – 54, 58, 324, 345 – and Far Right 95 – 117 – of football 237 – 245, 249, 255 – 256 – historiography of 31 – 54, 69 – 88 – horizontal 7, 78 – 81, 88 – of identities 235 – 236, 255 – 256 – of insurance 386, 401 – 402 – of labor movement 321 – 323, 327, 329, 333 – 334, 338, 340 – 343, 345 – 346 – legal 303, 305 – limits of 126, 335, 402 – and mass media 209, 217, 220, 222 – 223, 230 – 231 – and morality 126 – 131, 138, 143, 145 – processes 167 – 168, 176 – 178, 355 – 356, 402 – of town twinning 181, 183, 190, 194, 196, 198 – vécueral 77, 79 – 81, 85 – 88 – vertical 7, 78, 81, 88 Europeanness 13, 17, 19, 83, 96 – 97, 151, 165, 176, 197 – 98 European Banking Union 52 – 53 European Capitals of Culture 36, 195 – 196 European Central Bank 32, 52, 188, 337, 359 European Champion Clubs’ Cup 241 European Championships 85 European Club Association 237, 241

European Coal and Steel Community; see ECSC European Commission 75, 113, 195, 240 European Communities; see EC European Council 57, 401 European Court of Justice; see ECJ European Currency Unit 42 European Customs Union 326, 328, 337 – 339 European Economic Community; see EEC European Empire 109 European Federation 321, 337 European Financial Stability Facility 52 European Fiscal Pact 52 European Monetary Agreement 40 European Monetary System 42 European Monetary Union 48, 52 European Parliament 32, 99, 113, 194 European Payments Union; see EPU European People’s Party 35 European Postal and Telecommunication Union; see EPTU European Recovery Program; see ERP European Stability Mechanism 52 – 53 European Union, see EU European Writers’ Union 104 European Youth Campaign 207 European Youth Federation 107 Eurovision Song Contest 208 expansion – cultural 158, 208 – European 47, 50 – 51, 75, 357 – territorial 157 exports 359, 361, 364, 367, 378 – 379 fan culture 18, 231, 235 – 236, 242 – 243, 247, 251 – 254, 260 far right 95 – 99, 109 – 113, 115 fascism 97 – 98, 103 – 104, 109, 116 – 117, 157 Faye, Guillaume 110 – 111 Federal Republic of Germany, see West Germany Fédération Française des Sociétés d’Assurances 394 Fédération Internationale de Football Association; see FIFA

Index

feminism 134 – 135, 138, 141 – 142 Ferrer, Francisco 267, 278 – 286, 289 – 290 FGYO (Franco-German Youth Office) 212 – 213, 215, 218 – 221, 231 FIFA (Fédération Internationale de Football Association) 237, 240 film 156 – American 102 – 103 – European 102 – market 102, 210 Finet, Paul 347 Finland 288 First World War 4, 82, 132, 136 – 137, 142 – 143, 155, 159, 179, 270, 321, 323, 346, 355 football 18, 36, 85, 235 – 256 Bfers 238 – 239, 242, 244 – 245, 247 foreign exchange 359 – 61, 363, 367 – 368, 372 – 373 foreign policy 44, 56, 180, 305 France 34, 39 – 41, 45, 47 – 48, 50, 57, 83, 98, 130, 162, 205, 207, 263 – 264, 267 – 273, 282, 308 – 309, 322, 326, 330 – 331, 387, 389 – civil code 307 – 308, 310, 312 – 313 – culture 208 – 209, 211 – 212, 215 – 216, 218 – 219, 221, 226 – 229 – foreign labor 363 – 370, 372 – 374, – French Revolution 134, 154, 263, 299, 305, 307, 309 – town twinning 182 – 183, 192, 198 Franco-German Youth Office; see FGYO Frank, Ludwig 330 Fränkel, Fritz 336 Frankfurt 193 – 194, 215, 339 – twinning 16, 183 – 190, 196 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 190, 376 French Aero Club 82 FRG, see West Germany Fried, Alfred H. 332 Front National 111 Garber, Heinz 214 Garwy, Peter 327 GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) 40, 114 de Gaulle, Charles 42, 218

415

GDR (German Democratic Republic), see East Germany GDV (Gesamtverband der Deutschen Versicherungswirtschaft) 390, 392 – 393, 396 – 400 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, see GATT General Confederation of German Trade Unions; see ADGB General German Automobile Association 219 General Workers Union (UGT) 324, 329 Gerigk, Herbert 104 German Democratic Republic, see East Germany German Metal Workers Union 334, 339 Germany 39, 49 – 50, 55 – 56, 83, 85, 105 – 106, 162, 239, 267 – 268; see also East Germany; West Germany – insurance industry 388 – 402 – Nazi Germany 17, 95, 97 – 101, 103 – 104, 108, 111, 116 – town twinning 179, 182 – trade unions 322 – 323, 330 – 332, 335, 340 – 341, 343 Gesamtverband der Deutschen Versicherungswirtschaft; see GDV Giscard d’Estaing, Valéry 42 – 43, 52 globalization 7, 40, 57, 113, 198, 238, 387 – anti-globalization 109, 111 – 112, 115 – 116 – deglobalization 387 Goldscheid, Rudolf 331 goods 36 – 37, 143, 209, 231, 286, 355 – 356, 359 – 361, 367 – 368, 374, 387 – free movement of 101 – 102, 114, 365, 370 Gorbachev, Mikhail 47, 49 – 50 governments 38, 47, 144, 286, 336 – 337, 340, 369, 390, 393, 396, 401 – 402 Grand-Carteret, John 263 – 264 Graßmann, Peter 339 Graz 245, 249 – 251, 255; see also Sturm Graz Great Britain, see UK Greece 18, 51, 53, 151 – 168 – ancient 152 – 154, 161, 166 – 167 – culture 158, 167

416

Index

– Hellenism 18, 152 – 154, 156, 158, 161 – 166, 168 Grenoble 180 growth – of civilization 302 – democratic 331 – economic 324, 395 – population 133, 360 – of public sphere 5 Grünfeld, Judith 327 Gundolf, Friedrich 164 Habermas, Jürgen 95, 112, 116, 266 – 267 Haeckel, Ernst 263, 279, 282 Hamburg 145, 184, 328 Hardie, Keir 321 Haushofer, Karl 100 Heck, Dieter Thomas 224 – 225 Heidegger, Martin 155 Heidelberg 153, 160 – 161, 163 – 165, 328 – 329 heterogeneity 74, 88, 206, 239 – 240 Hildebrand, Gerhard 321 Hitler, Adolf 98, 100 – 101 Hoffmann, Ernst 164 Holbik, Karel 358 Holocaust 6, 70, 109 home 163, 278, 342 – 343, 360 – being at 155, 322 – countries 241 – games 246 – “lost” 156 – markets 325 – working outside 139 homogenization 18 – 19, 71, 85, 110, 264 Horrabin, Francis 330 Humanism 154, 163, 166 human rights 3, 38 – 39, 113, 116, 191, 332 Hungary 35, 39, 53, 88, 224, 227, 276 Hus, Jan 282 Husserl, Edmund 164 idealism 156, 162 – 165 ideas – cosmopolitan 110 – exchange 5, 343, 394

– of Europe 6, 8 – 9, 13 – 15, 17, 73, 78, 87 – 88, 109, 157, 167, 177, 199, 206, 209, 264 – 268, 289 – 291, 301, 341, 343, 346 – far-right 16, 101, 109, 188 – local 307 – political 10 – 12, 30, 43 – religious 19, 302 – of renewal 127, 134, 137, 278, 305, 308 – 309 – socialist 159 identity 82, 88, 128, 151, 160, 236, 243 – 244, 255, 267, 283, 285 – 289, 311, 333, 343 – cultural 110, 301 – European 16, 18 – 19, 75, 81, 110 – 111, 194, 196 – 197, 235, 264 – 267, 277, 286, 289 – 291, 301, 312, 314, 340 – 341 – Europeanization of 235 – 236 – Muslim 137 – national 145, 152, 158, 287 – 288, 291, 299, 313 – 314, 340 – racial 109, 111, 125 ideology 17, 35, 115, 127, 130 – 131, 134, 138, 144, 161, 166, 206, 231, 299 – borders 223, 225 – 226 – communist 39, 160 – nationalist 156 – 157, 159 – opposing 4, 128, 137, 143, 145 – racist 96 – 97, 99, 101, 106, 109 – 110, 117 IFTU (International Federation of Trade Unions) 329, 344 Ihde, Wilhelm 104 ILO (International Labour Organisation) 332, 360, 362 ILP (Independent Labour Party) 321, 323, 335 immigration 356, 358, 361 – 362, 365 – 366, 368, 370, 372 – 374; see also emigration; migration imports 102, 358 – 361, 363 – 364, 367 – 368, 373, 376, 378 – of ideas 157 – 158 Independent Labour Party; see ILP India 82, 388 industrialization 5, 55, 127, 153, 338

Index

industry 55, 58, 322, 355, 360, 368 – 369, 379; see also business – car 334 – culture 223 – insurance 388 – 391, 394 – mining 183, 363, 367 – steel 183 – telecommunication 106 inequality 99, 104 infrastructure 4, 7, 18, 72, 81, 125, 252, 337 – 338 Institute of International Law 104, 117 institutions – cultural 97, 113, 212 – 213, 215, 220 – 221 – educational 140, 229 – European 15, 30 – 31, 33, 37 – 38, 53, 57, 69, 71, 95, 103 – 104, 106, 109, 112, 114, 176 – 177, 190, 196 – 198, 337, 340 – 341, 346, 356, 376, 386, 398, 402 – international 17, 356 – legal 300, 307 – 308, 310 – 311 – municipal 136, 343 – political 14, 206 – religious 286, 302 – supra-national 12, 78, 336 – welfare 389 insurance – commercial 386 – 387 – companies 386 – 391, 393 – 394, 396 – 397, 401 – 402 – cross-border 392, 396 – life 20, 385 – 402 – market 386, 388 – 389, 391 – 392, 395, 398 – 401 – re-insurance 387, 392, 394 – 395 integration, see also disintegration – criticism of 335 – 336 – cultural 13 – economic 14, 39, 43, 48, 338, 356, 358, 369 – 370, 372, 374, 378, 395 – European 6 – 7, 10, 17, 20, 36, 38 – 41, 44, 49 – 50, 52 – 53, 55, 58, 74, 101, 113, 159, 167, 176, 194, 197, 199, 208, 230, 242, 323, 325 – 328, 336, 340 – 341, 346 – 347, 376, 402 – hidden 72, 81

417

– history of 3 – 4, 8, 11, 35 – 37, 43, 58, 71, 79 – 80, 355 – 356 – of insurance markets 386, 390, 394, 399, 401 – 402 – local 250 – policy 56 – 57, 76 – political 14, 42, 82, 116, 338 – process 3 – 5, 10 – 12, 29, 31 – 33, 45, 54, 76, 87, 116 – religious 312 interconnectivity 5, 7, 70 – 71, 77 – 79, 81, 206 interdependence 78, 96 – 97, 213, 356, 387 International Association of Lawyers 117 International Confederation of Authors’ and Composers’ Societies; see CISAC International Federation of Trade Unions; see IFTU International Film Chamber 102 – 103 internationalism 97, 99, 106 internationalization 40, 77, 86 – 87, 263, 281, 322, 327, 344 – 346, 392, 396 International Labour Organisation; see ILO International Law Association 104, 117 International Law Chamber 104 International Monetary Fund 40 International Peace Congress 325 International Society for Contemporary Music; see ISCM International Telecommunication Union 105, 117 International Transport Workers Federation 327, 344 International Union of Food Workers 344 International Women’s League for Peace and Freedom 332 interwar period 4, 82, 151, 155, 159, 160, 166 – 167, 179 – 180, 355 investment 47, 82 – cross-border 387, 392, 395 – 396 – foreign 388 – programs 370, 379 Iran 134 Iraq 41 Iron Curtain 39, 49, 81, 178, 192, 231 ISCM (International Society for Contemporary Music) 103 – 104

418

Index

Islam 18, 29, 130 – 131, 133, 135 – 144; see also religion – law 134 – 135, 137, 141 – morality 127 – 128, 138 – 140, 144 – 145 – opposition to 140 – 141 – political 132, 137 Israel 114 Istanbul 126, 144; see also Turkey Italy 41, 106, 182 – 183, 219, 227, 252, 264, 269, 274, 282, 288, 357, 387 – labor migration 360 – 380 Japan 100, 114 Jaspers, Karl 155, 164 Jaurès, Jean 279, 321 – 322 journalism 78, 83, 210, 263, 272, 281, 284, 321, 326 – 327, 339, 345 Judaism 70, 99 – 100, 141, 267, 269, 274, 283; see also religion Junge Leute 216, 225 – 227 justice 134, 273, 285, 299 Kaelble, Hartmut 7, 12, 176, 324, 340, 343 Kanellopoulos, Panayotis 153, 156, 160 – 167 Kautsky, Karl 323 Kemal, Mustafa 144 Kemal, Namık 130 Key, Ellen 279 Kiev 53; see also Ukraine Klaus, Václav 35 KLV 391, 395 knowledge 130 – 131, 139 – 140, 254, 304, 308, 341, 393 – exchange 5, 395, 402 – improving 216, 227, 229 – 230 – intercultural 231 Kohl, Helmut 45, 47 – 49, 51 – 52 Kohnstamm, Max 45 Korean War 372, 373 Kotchetkova, Zénéide 327, 331, 336 – 337, 345 Koumanoudis, Stephanos 153 Krätzig, Hermann 338 – 339 Krebs, Pierre 110 Kropotkin, Pjotr 279 Kufen, Thomas 175

labor – division of 101, 141 – 142, 355 – 356, 359 – 360, 369 – 370, 376 – 377 – market 20, 356, 366, 370 – 371, 379 – 380 – migration 356 – 357, 359 – 361, 365, 367 – 369, 373 – 377 – movement 321 – 322, 325 – 326, 329 – 330, 332 – 333, 335, 337, 339 – 341, 343, 345 – 347, 370 – shortage 357, 368 – surplus 360, 366, 369, 371 labor unions, see trade unions Labor and Socialist International 328, 344 Laborie, Léonard 105 Lauinger, Arthur 392 Laurat, Lucien 336 law 16, 44, 58, 133, 139, 141, 209, 212, 216, 263, 272, 299, 337, 400 – codification of 19, 299 – 314 – European 19, 32 – 33, 46, 53 – 54, 239 – 240 – Europeanization of 19, 32, 46, 54 – international 100, 104 – 105, 113 – Islamic 134 – 135, 141 – natural 269, 290 – rule of 3, 12, 53, 96, 126, 285, 290 legislation 40, 58, 127, 133, 240, 263, 300, 302 – 304, 306 – 307, 309 – 311, 337, 341 Ledebour, Georg 323 Lee, Everett S. 356 – 357 Leipzig 184 – 185; see also East Germany Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich 335 – 336 Leningrad 184 letters – advice 127 – from East Germany 223 – 226, 228 – 229, 231 – listeners’ 223 – 229, 231 – pen pal 225, 227, 229 – 231 – readers’ 207 – from twin towns 190 liberalism 6, 12, 17, 80, 97, 104, 160, 162 – 163, 168, 207, 287, 308 – anti-liberalism 3, 12, 17, 73, 96, 98, 370

Index

– political 12, 97, 104, 109, 163, 168, 267, 269, 271, 274, 280, 284, 288, 390 liberalization 208, 291, 370, 398 – market 396, 398 – 402 – trade 37, 40, 102, 374, 386 – 387, 389, 395, 400 – 402 lifestyle – European 127, 221, 345 – youth 18 – modern 153 – Muslim 133, 140 – secular 139, 144 Lisbon Treaty 32, 57 Liverpool F.C. 242 Louros, Nikolaos 162 Lozano, Fernando 263 Lüdtke, Alf 208 Luxembourg 31, 45, 53, 183, 205, 211 – 212, 215, 219, 362 Lyon 179, 183 – 186, 189 – 190, 193 – 194, 196 Maastricht 340 Maastricht Treaty 32 – 33, 36, 48, 57 MacDonald, Ramsay 322 – 323 Mackay, Ronald William Gordon 331, 337 magazines 209, 221, 224, 226, 228 – 229 Malatesta, Enrico 279 Malmö Congress 109 Manchester 184, 322 Manchester United 242 Mandt, Harald 390, 392 – 393 Marchbank, John 329 – 330 market – black 224 – coal 355, 371 – film 102 – financial 51, 188, 392, 395 – 396 – insurance 386, 388 – 389, 392 – 393, 395, 398 – 401 – international 52, 106, 379, 387 – 388 – labor 20, 356, 366, 370 – 371, 379 – 380 – national 325, 355, 358, 385, 396 – player 238 – 239, 242, 244 – 245, 250, 255, 260

419

– single 20, 33, 36, 39 – 41, 46, 51, 101, 113 – 114, 324, 338, 355, 371, 394, 399, 401 – 402 – steel 355, 371 – tourism 188 – trade 286, 334, 338, 345, 372, 376, 394 marriage 135, 139, 305, 309 – 311, 314; see also divorce Marshall Plan 355, 358, 366, 369 Marx, Karl 161 Marxism 109, 159 Meciar, Vladimir 35 Melas, Spiros 163 membership, EU 47, 51, 53, 114 – fees 44, 57 member states, EU 3, 30 – 33, 37, 53 – 54, 56, 75, 113, 176, 346, 399 – 402 – non-members 43, 114 memory 6 – 7, 44, 72, 342 Merkel, Angela 52, 55 Messerschmidt, Raoul 394 Mexico 114, 276 Midhat, Ahmed 129 migration 3, 20, 29, 86, 114, 251, 356 – 357, 359 – 362, 364 – 370, 372 – 377, 379 Milan 183 – 185, 189, 196 Miller, Henry 154 Milne-Bailey, Walter 330 Mithad, Ahmet 129 Mitterrand, François 45, 47 – 49, 51 – 52 modernism 55, 165 – anti-modernism 162 modernization 4, 18, 33, 55, 126 – 127, 130, 132, 138, 144 – 145, 151 – 152, 157, 163, 168, 211, 312 – 313, 358 Modigliani, Giuseppe 323 Möller, Alex 385, 390 – 391, 395, 398 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact 158 monetary – policy 42, 48, 52, 57, 337 – reform 392 – system 42 – 43, 396 – transactions 102 – union 43, 48, 52, 102 Monnet, Jean 10, 15, 45, 336, 355 moral – decline 129, 138, 140, 144, 155, 163, 274

420

Index

– instruction 132 – renewal 127 – values 127, 129, 142, 155 morality 126 – 128, 130 – 132, 136, 138 – 145, 273 – 274, 310 – family 135, 142 – religious 139 – 141 – sexual 133, 141 – 142 Mortara, Edgard 267, 269 – 273, 275, 277, 282 Mosley, Oswald 335 motor rallies 207, 215 – 217, 219 – 220, 222, 230 movement, free 114, 134, 239, 337, 356, 365, 370 – 371 Movimento Sociale Italiano 111 Müller, Gerd 394 Munich 215, 217, 399 Münzenberg, Willi 336 music 104, 205, 208 – 211, 214, 223 – 225, 228 – 231 Mussolini, Benito 333 – 334 Mustafa Reşit Pasha 130 Napoleon I 300, 305, 308, 313 Napoleon III 271 Napoleonic Code 19, 300, 307 – 313 Napoleonic Wars 299 Naquet, Alfred 263 nationalism 4, 14, 16, 18, 73 – 74, 85, 113, 115 – 116, 125, 128, 135 – 138, 141, 143 – 144, 156 – 157, 159, 328, 334, 388, 395 National Socialism 73, 96 – 97, 103, 112, 158, 331, 347, 392 NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) 39, 44, 50 – 51, 56 NATOization 51 Netherlands 34, 41, 57, 182, 219, 328, 335 – 336, 340 – 341, 361 – 362, 389 networking 179, 248, 263 – 268, 275 – 277, 283, 289 – 291 networks 7, 19 – 20, 46, 72, 81, 96, 102, 109, 142, 198, 227, 243, 263 – 266, 344, 386 Newcastle 183 New Right 98, 109 – 113 New York 82

Nietzsche, Friedrich 155 nostalgia 156 Nouvelle Droite 98, 109 – 110 OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) 114, 401 OEEC (Organization for European Economic Cooperation) 40, 55 – 56, 114, 357 – 358, 369 – 371, 379, 395 – 396, 398, 400 – 402 Office de Radiodiffusion Télévision Française, see ORTF Office National d’Immigration 365 Oldham Athletic F.C. 243 Orbán, Viktor 35, 53; see also Hungary Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, see OECD Organization for European Economic Cooperation, see OEEC organizations – European 17, 20, 96, 101, 178, 187, 190, 194, 199 – football 240 – international 40, 43, 97, 103, 108 – 109, 116, 192, 386, 391, 401 – 402 – labor 321 – 322, 332, 335, 341, 344, 346 – 347 – multilateral 95, 105 – political 206, 322, 325 – town twinning 180, 195 – 196 – youth 219 – 220 ORTF (Office de Radiodiffusion Télévision Française) 214 – 215, 219 – 220 Öttinghaus, Walter 336 Ottoman; see also Turkey – elite 125, 131, 142 – 143 – Empire 125 – 128, 132, 135, 138 – 140, 144, – era 18, 125, 129, 145 – 146 – morality 131 – 133 – novels 129 – 130 – reform 127 – 128 – Russian–Ottoman War 126 – snob typology 129, 143 – 144 – Tanzimat era 129 – 131, 133, 138, 144 – values 127, 130, 140 – 142, 144 – 145 – view of women 133 – 134, 136, 141 – 142

Index

– Young Ottomans 126, 130, 134 – Young Turks 126, 134, 135 Özal, Turgut 51 Paris 41, 47 – 48, 82, 106, 153, 157, 214 – 215, 217 – 218, 221, 279, 339, 341 – 342, 357, 370, 374, 394, 396; see also France parties – left-wing 39, 329, 332, 346 – right-wing 99, 111 – 113, 115, 332 Parti Ouvrier Belge 328 partnerships 18, 33, 206 – trading 359, 361, 372 – town twinning 175, 177 – 189, 196 – 197 peace 9, 85, 96, 186 – 188, 321 – 322, 325, 328, 332, 339 – 340 pen pals 208, 225 – 230 pensions 389, 397 – 398 Polak, Henri 328 Poland 19, 35, 39, 44, 53, 73, 83, 226 – 227, 299 – 302, 304, 313 – 314, 335, 344 political – action 13 – 14, 81 – capital 36 – change 5, 34, 175 – culture 35, 58 – ideas 10, 19, 30, 206 – 207, 213 – influence 42, 216 – 217, 230, 390 – integration 13 – 14, 20, 82, 116, 197, 338 – system 11, 58, 87, 213, 325 – unification 49, 51 – values 71, 329 politicians 10, 18, 31, 35, 38, 49, 78, 87, 175, 177, 179, 197, 221, 250, 299, 333, 338, 358, 361, 372 politicization 33 – 34, 46 politics 36, 191, 218, 221, 230, 238, 336 – European 3, 7, 14 – 16, 20, 33, 71, 158 – Europeanization of 34, 70, 322 – French 154, 272, 299 – German 56, 100, 105 – 106, 271 – 272, 321, 391 – Greek 151, 154, 162 – 163, 167 – Italian 358, 361, 366, 371 – New Right 110 – 111, 113

421

– Ottoman 127 – 128, 130, 132, 134 – 137, 144 – 146 – Spanish 47 – 48, 278 – global 56, 78, 95, 112, 116 Polnareff, Michel 228 Ponsonby, Arthur 323 popular culture 206, 208 – 209, 211, 223 – 224, 226, 228, 231; see also film; music Portugal 47, 51, 288 postcolonialism 52, 73, 132, 198 postwar period 45, 113, 117, 166 – 167, 180, 190, 192, 197, 323, 361, 372, 389, 392 power 42, 55 – 56, 110, 114, 125 – 127, 130 – 131, 133 – 134, 139, 164, 240, 305, 337 press 82, 85, 187, 190, 210, 263, 266 – 275, 278 – 281, 284, 287, 289 – 291, 326, 332, 376, 391 – European 82, 269, 272 – 273, 275, 277, 280, 287 – free 3, 385 – Ottoman 133 – 134 – religious 269 – 270, 273, 280 – 281 progress 127, 132, 134 – 136, 140, 152, 159, 273, 285, 287, 290, 311, 313, 345, 394, 396, 401 – concept of 161 – 162 – economic 357 – technological 82 – 83, 160 – 161 propaganda 73, 98, 100 – 101, 139, 333 Protestantism 264, 267, 274, 276; see also Christianity; religion protests 269, 271 – 273, 277 – anticlerical 267, 279 – 286, 288 – 290 Prussia 275, 299 – 300, 304 – 307, 310 – 311, 313 – 314, 339 public sphere 5, 7, 33, 37, 72, 75, 144, 154, 263, 266, 272, 291 Puerto Rico 287 Putin, Vladimir 53; see also Russia quizzes

207, 211 – 215, 223, 230 – 231

racism 73, 99 – 101, 104, 116, 188, 195 – anti-racism 110 – 111 Radbruch, Gustav 165

422

Index

radio 18, 205, 207, 209 – 216, 219, 223, 225 – 227, 230; see also pen pals; quizzes Radio Bremen 205 Radio Luxembourg 211, 215, 224 Radio Strasbourg 214 Radio Télévision France; see RTF Ragaz, Leonard 327, 331 rallies, see motor rallies Reagan, Ronald 47, 51 reciprocity 185 – 186, 356, 365, 392 reconstruction 31, 36, 39, 40, 192, 194, 357 – 360, 362 – 363, 366 – 368, 370, 372, 377, 392 Red Army 39 Red Crescent 136 Red International of Labor Unions 335 reform 49, 312 – 313 – legal 300, 303 – 305, 312 – monetary 392, 397 – 399 – Ottoman 125 – 127, 131 – 136, 138, 140 refugees 3, 29, 53 – 54, 88, 154, 361, 375 regionalism 151, 249, 254 – 256 regulation 30, 32, 39, 114, 238 – 239, 245, 251, 305, 309, 366, 368, 386 – 387, 389, 395, 400, 402 Rehm, Walter 153 Reibnitz, Ernst Wilhelm von 312 religion 19, 127, 131 – 132, 138 – 141, 143, 159, 271, 290; see also Christianity; Islam; Judaism – freedom of 269 – protection of 272 – role of 263, 268, 301 religious – conservatism 127 – 128 – groups 206, 276 – identity 125 – intolerance 271, 282, 289 – morality 141 – press 280 – structure 268 remittances 357, 359 – 361, 363 – 364, 367 – 368, 374, 376, 378 – 379 reparations 39, 368 resistance 38, 57 – 58, 86, 128, 144, 188, 346 – 347, 366

Ricciardi, Guiseppe 276 – 277 Rickert, Heinrich 153, 164 – 165 Ritter, Leo 106 Rıza, Ömer 139 Rolling Stones 226 Romains, Jules 323 Rome 273 – 274, 279, 357, 363, 393 – 394; see also Italy RTF (Radio Télévision France) 212, 214; see also ORTF Russia 53, 134, 299 – 300, 314, 331 – 332, 344 – 345, 387; see also USSR – Russian-Ottoman War 126, 130 – Russian Revolution 138, 327 – Russian-Ukrainian War 51, 54 Saarbrücken 207, 213 – 215, 217 Saarland 205, 207, 214, 225, 228 Saarländischer Rundfunk; see SR Sabri, Mustafa 143 Sadak, Necmeddin 138, 142 Sadık Rıfat Paşa 132 Said Halim Pasha 140 Sailer, Karl Hans 339 Sarajevo 192 Scandinavia 387 Scheler, Max 159 Schengen Agreement 45 Schmidt, Helmut 42 – 43, 52 Schmitt, Carl 100 schools, see education Schuman Declaration 177, 394 Schuman, Robert 15, 37, 39 Scurr, John 330 Second World War 6, 10, 12, 14, 17 – 18, 20, 41, 56, 73, 97, 102, 108 – 109, 113, 158, 166, 179 – 180, 189, 192, 208, 331, 347, 358, 372, 388, 390, 393 secularism 132, 136, 138 – 139, 141, 146, 263, 267 – 269, 275, 290 security 33, 39, 41, 47 – 48, 51, 125, 144, 220, 369 Seferis, George 156 – 158, 165 – 166 self-understanding 236, 243 – 244, 246 – 247, 249 – 250, 252 – 253, 255 – 256, 266 – 267, 277, 289, 291 Sender, Tony 325 – 327

Index

Serie A 254 services 114, 355 – 356, 361, 386, 389, 399 – 402 Sexauer, Manfred 216, 223 Seyfettin, Ömer 130 Single European Act (SEA) 36, 48, 57 Single Market 36, 40, 46, 51, 114 Slovakia 35 Slovenia 254 snob typology, see Ottoman Soares, Mário 47 soccer, see football Social Democratic Party, see SPD socialism 20, 34, 49, 159 – 160, 162, 223 – 224, 231, 267, 274, 279 – 280, 321 – 324, 326 – 327, 329 – 332, 335, 337 – 339, 343 – 344, 346 – 347 society 16, 18, 29, 33, 88, 115, 127 – 130, 132 – 138, 140 – 142, 145, 155, 159 – 160, 209, 235, 243, 263, 269, 271, 275, 277 – 278, 290 – 291, 387, 390 – 391 – change 13, 80, 238, 249, 267, 312, 346 – civil 10, 14 – 15, 18, 197, 263, 275 – 276, 289 – Europeanization of 10 – 11, 87, 305 – national 74, 145, 278 – 279, 301, 307, 312 – world 95, 112, 116 societies – co-operative 341, 344 – educational 338 solidarity 3, 54, 87 – 88, 135, 159, 179, 322, 340, 346, 376 Sombart, Werner 159 South America 280 Southern Europe 17, 51, 151, 211, 231 Soviet Union, see USSR Spain 47, 51, 227, 264, 267 – 268, 271 – 273, 277 – 280, 282 – 290, 326, 329, 387, 396 SPD (Social Democratic Party of Germany) 321, 326, 328 – 329, 391 Spengler, Oswald 155, 159 sport 18, 83, 85, 87, 179, 238 – 239, 346; see also football; motor rallies SR (Saarländischer Rundfunk) 205 – 207, 209 – 217, 219, 221, 223 – 231, 234

423

Strasbourg 31, 191, 193, 219, 394 Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) 47 Strauss, Richard 106 Sturm Graz, SK 236, 244 – 246, 249 – 252, 254 – 255 Styria 245, 249 – 250, 255; see also Sturm Graz, SK Suez Crisis 41 – 42, 56 supranationalization 8, 12, 14, 42, 44, 58, 78, 335 – 336, 355, 361 Switzerland 106, 226, 229, 325, 341, 343 – 344, 362, 387, 396 SWR (Südwestdeutsche Rundfunk) 217 Tanzimat era, see Ottoman teenagers 207 – 208, 213, 215, 217, 219, 222, 224 – 225, 228, 230 – 231; see also adolescents; youth Theodorakopoulos, Ioannis 153, 161 – 163 Theotokas, Giorgos (George) 153, 156 – 158, 163, 168 Thomas, Albert 332 Tönnies, Ferdinand 159 – 160 Topal, Alp Eren 132 tourism 4, 82, 86, 188, 337, 361, 373 – cultural 30, 213, 218, 220 – 222 – football 238, 242 – 243, 246 – 248, 253 – 256 – municipal 179, 192, 195 – workers’ 341 – 344, 346 town twinning 15 – 16, 18, 80 – 81, 175 – 199, 213 trade 5, 53, 101 – 102, 184, 286, 330, 334, 355 – 356, 358 – 359, 367, 374 – 376, 378, – balance 47, 358 – 359, 361, 363, 368, 372 – 373, 376 – free 101, 113, 130 – insurance 389, 392, 395 – 396, 398, 400 – liberalization 37, 40, 102, 374, 387, 395 – networks 102 – policy 33, 337, 374 – regulation 39, 114 Trades Union Congress see TUC trade unions 44, 322, 324 – 326, 328 – 329, 332, 335 – 336, 338 – 339, 342 – 344, 346 – 347, 367

424

Index

transfer – cultural 30, 158, 225 – 226, 231 – currency 359 – 361, 367 – 368, 376, 386 – of ideas 196, 199, 402 – of football players 239, 246 – 247, 250, 255, 260 – of sovereignty 113, 176 Treint, Albert 336 Tsatsos, Konstantinos 153, 156, 162 – 167 Tsatsos, Themistoklis 162 TUC (Trades Union Congress) 324, 330 Turkey 51 – 52, 114, 126, 137, 145, 252, 345, 396; see also Ottoman UEFA (Union of European Football Associations) 237, 240, 243 – 244, 246, 253, 256 UK (United Kingdom) 33, 40, 42, 44, 46, 48, 54, 57, 130, 162, 187, 230, 269, 323, 325, 330 – 331, 362 – aviation 82 – 83 – Brexit 3, 34, 54 – culture 106 – 107, 209, 222, 225 – 228 – football 243 – insurance 387 – 388, 396 – town twinning 175, 179 – 180, 182 – 184, 190, 192 – unions 105, 322 – 324, 328, 330 – 331, 341 – 344 Ukraine 33, 53, 252 UNECE (Economic Commission for Europe) 114 union – customs 40, 51, 102, 326, 328, 338 – 339, 365 – 366 – ever closer 113 – monetary 52, 102, 365 – 366 – unification 11, 14, 36 – 38, 49, 51, 53, 55, 87, 114, 187, 332, 334, 339, 345 Union of European Copyright Societies 106 – 107 Union of European Football Associations; see UEFA United Kingdom, see UK United Nations 114, 392 United States of America, see USA

United States of Europe 20, 45, 322, 325, 328 – 330, 332, 335 – 337, 339, 347 unity – European 4, 72, 153, 167 – 168, 175, 190 – 191, 193, 266, 291, 323, 327 – 328, 330, 332 – 333, 335, 339, 341, 347 – German 48 – 50 – of humankind 110 – national 163 – principle of 135 universalism 97, 100, 104, 110, 115 – 117, 166 – 168, 308 Universal Postal Union (UPU) 105 – 106, 117 USA (United States of America) 42, 51, 82, 109, 111, 114, 209 – 210, 273, 276, 324 – 325, 334, 355 – 356, 358 – 359, 370; see also Americanization – companies 325, 334 – culture 103, 105 – 107, 111, 210, 215, 224, 226 – policy 51, 358 – 359, 366 – reconstruction assistance 40, 370 – town twinning 180, 198 USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) 34, 44, 49 – 50, 109, 111, 114; see also Russia values – cultural 71, 163 – eternal 161 – 162 – European 17, 30, 35, 53, 133, 167 – 168, 206, 287, 291, 330 – moral 127, 142, 155 – Muslim 130, 133 – shared 253, 265, 277, 285, 290, 345 – traditional 129, 138, 140 – 141, 154, 157, 161 – 163, 166 – 167, 288 Vandervelde, Émile 328 Vanoni, Ezio 378 – 379 Vanoni Plan 378 – 380 Vatican 269 – 270, 274 Vatican Council 267, 273 – 277, 289 – 290 Ventotene manifesto 347 Vidussoni, Aldo 107 Vienna 39, 49, 107, 153, 339, 343 – 344 Vietnam war 42 Vietta, Silvio 55

Index

Vignancour, Jean-Louis Tixier 109 Vleming, J.L. 334 Voitinsky, Vladimir 327, 331, 334, 345 von der Leyen, Ursula 54 wages 337, 363 – 364, 366, 397 Warsaw 305, 339 – Duchy of 299 – 300, 313 Warsaw Pact 50 Washington 51, 379; see also United States Weber, Alfred 159 – 160, 165 Weber, Max 55, 160, 165 Western Europe 4, 29, 37 – 40, 42 – 43, 45, 55, 58, 73, 102, 108, 113, 115, 140, 153, 178, 192, 223 – 224, 278, 304, 313, 371, 390, 393 – 395, 397 Westernization 126 – 131, 137 – 138, 140 – 141, 144 West Germany 40, 45, 47 – 48, 50, 179, 209 – 231, 357, 375 – 377; see also Germany – economy 211, 366, 372 – 373 – insurance 386, 393 – media 18, 205, 207, 209 – 222, 226, 228, 230 – 231 – overpopulation 361, 372 – town twinning 182 – 184, 192 – unemployment 368 – 369, 375 Wolff, Theodor 284 women – education 135 – 136, 142 – emancipation 133 – 134, 138 – 139, 142 – employment 135 – role 134, 136, 139 workers – foreign 322, 375 – free movement of 371

425

– Italian 357, 359, 362, 364 – 365, 367 – 368, 374 – 377 – seasonal 375 – skilled 369, 371, 398 – sports 339, 347 – travel 341 – 344 – unskilled 20, 371 – well-being of 321, 328, 338 Workers’ Travel Association (WTA) 342 – 343 World Bank 392, 402 World Peace Congress 332 World War I, see First World War World War II, see Second World War Woytinsky, Wladimir, see Voltinsky, Vladimir Wyczechowski, Antoni 300 – 309, 311 – 314 Yeni Mecmua 137 – 138, 141 – 142 Young Ottomans 126, 130, 134; see also Ottoman Young Turks 126, 134, 135; see also Ottoman youth – broadcasting 213, 216 – clubs 179 – culture 15, 205, 223 – 225, 231 – exchange programs 177, 183, 188 – 189, 206, 213, 221 – magazines 209, 221, 224, 226, 228 – media 18, 80, 205 – 206, 209, 216 – 217, 222 – 224, 226 – 228, 230 – 231 – motor rallies 215 – 220 – movements 107 – quizzes 213 – 215, 218 – tours 221 – 222 youth work 188 – 189, 206, 212, 219, 230 Yugoslavia 192, 249, 251