Realism and the Background of Phenomenology

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REALISM AND THE BACKGROUND OF PHENOMENOLOGY

THE LIBRARY OF PHILOSOPHICAL MOVEMENTS GENERAL EDITOR:

Paul Edwards

OTHER VOLUMES IN THIS SERIES

Logical Positivism, edited by A. J. Ayer The Idealist Tradition, edited by A. C. Ewing

REALISM and the

BACKGROUND of

PHENOMENOLOGY Edited by

RODERICK M. CHISHOLM BROWN

UNIVERSITY

The Free Press of Glencoe, Illinois

Contents PREFACE

V

EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION

3

Selections 1. Franz Brentano

"THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN MENTAL AND PHYSICAL PHENOMENA"

39

2. Franz Brentano

"PRESENTATION AND JUDGMENT FORM Two DISTINCT FUNDAMENTAL CLASSES"

3. Franz Brentano

"GENUINE AND FICTITIOUS OBJECTS"

4. Alexius Meinong

"THE THEORY OF OBJECTS"

5. Edmund Husserl

62 71 76

......__ ... _. _____ ._

118

''PHENOMENOLOGY''

6. Edmund Husserl

"PHENOMENOLOGY AND ANTHROPOLOGY"

7. H. A. Prichard

"APPEARANCES AND REALITY"

8. E. B. Holt, W. T. Marvin, W. P. Montague, R. B. Perry, W. B. Pitkin, and E. G. Spaulding "INTRODUCTION TO 'THE NEW REALISM' "

[ vii ]

129 143------151

Contents

[ viii ]

9. Samuel Alexander "THE BASIS OF REALISM"

10. Bertrand Russell "THE ULTIMATE CONSTITUENTS OF MATTER"

11. Arthur C. Lovejoy "A TEMPORALISTIC

12. G. E. Moore "A DEFENCE

REALISM"

OF COMMON SENSE"

186 223 238 255

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

283

INDEX

305

_\/

REALISM AND OF

THE BACKGROUND

PHENOMENOLOGY

Editor's Introduction

in 1904, Bertrand Russell formulated a set of theses which might be taken to define "realism," in one of its most significant philosophical senses. Russell's theses were these: "that every presentation and every belief must have an object other than itself and, except in certain cases where mental existents happen to be concerned, extra-mental; that what is commonly called percep­ tion has as its object an existential proposition, into which enters as a constituent that whose existence is concerned, and not the idea of this existent; that truth and falsehood apply not to beliefs, but to their objects; and that the object of a thought, even when this object does not exist, has a Being which is in no way dependent upon its being an object of thought. "1 These theses, taken with Franz Bren­ iano's doctrine of "intentionality"-his description of what it is for a presentation or belief to have an object-will help us to under­ stand the development of twentieth-century realism and the back­ ground of phenomenology. The thesis that the objects of presentation and belief are ordi­ narily extra-mental was formulated in opposition to idealism and was common to all of the forms of realism. But Husserl was to reject it in the later stages of his phenomenology. The realists were to differ among themselves as to what the "object of presentation" might be in the case of perception. And the final thesis-that "the object of a thought, even when this object does not exist, has a Being which is in no way dependent upon its being an object of thought"-was rejected, for different reasons, by Brentano and by Meinong. In tracing the history of these and related ideas, we may begin with the doctrine of intentionality that Brentano set forth in 1874. WRITING ON MEINONG

I. Bertrand Russell, "Meinong's Theory of Complexes and Assumptions," Mind, n.s. XIII ( 1904), 204. Russell notes, "I have been led to accept these theses by Mr. G, E. Moore," and adds: "Except Frege, I know of no writer on the theory of knowledge who comes as near to this position as Meinong." [3]

Editor's Introduction

[4]

I Franz Brentano distinguished between experimental and descrip­ tive psychology-between Psychologie and Psychognosie. Experi­ mental psychology is a causal study, concerned with the causal conditions of those states and processes that are described by descriptive psychology. Brentano made important contributions to experimental psychology, more particularly to the psychology of sensation. But it was his contributions to descriptive psychology and to the philosophy of mind which were to affect the growth of phe­ nomenology and which are in the tradition of philosophical realism. In his Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt in 1874, Bren­ tano proposed the concept of "intentional inexistence" as a means of characterizing what is mental or psychological; the chapter in which this doctrine was set forth is the first of the selections included here. Our psychological activities-thinking, believing, desiring, lov­ ing, hating, and the like-are "directed upon" objects, Brentano said, in a way that distinguishes them from anything that is merely physical. Whenever we think, we think about some object; whenever we believe, there is something we believe. But the objects of these activities need not exist in order to be such objects; the things upon which these activities are directed, or to which they refer, need not exist in order thus to be directed upon or referred to. No physical phenomenon, according to Brentano, has this type of freedom; the objects of our physical activities are restricted to what does exist. We can desire or think about horses that don't exist, but we can ride on only those that do. Brentano's criterion of the psychological or mental might be put in this way: From the fact that a certain thing is the object of an intentional act or attitude, one cannot infer either that that thing exists or that it does not; from the fact that a proposition is the object of an intentional act or attitude, one cannot infer that the proposi­ tion is true or that it is false; everything that is psychological involves what is thus intentional; but nothing that is physical can similarly "contain its object intentionally within itself"; intentionality, there­ fore, may serve as a criterion of the psychological or mental. Brentano's use of the expression "intentional inexistence" (he didn't use the term "intentionality") may also suggest an ontological or metaphysical doctrine concerning the types of being or existence. Did he mean to say that, in order for us to direct our thoughts toward

Editor's Introduction

[5] objects that do not exist, such objects must be available to us in at least some kind of "inexistence"? If he was inclined to accept any such realm of being in 187 4, he explicitly rejected it in his later writings. In his later view-which is represented in the second and third selections included here (first published in 1911)-Brentano repudiated all attempts to show that there is anything other than concrete individual things; and he contended that such distinctions as that between "being" and "existence" are unintelligible. The only "genuine objects," according to this later doctrine, are concrete individual things. Brentano concedes that it is often con­ venient to use words that ostensibly designate abstract, general, or incomplete objects. In mathematics, for example, one may speak of "negative quantities" and of "irrational" and "imaginary" numbers; in political discourse, one may speak of "the decrees of Parliament" or of "the will of the people." Here words ostensibly designating abstract objects are convenient "fictions" (Brentano also calls them "abbreviations"); the sentences in which they occur may be trans­ lated into other sentences whose terms refer only to "genuine objects" -to individual concrete things. Philosophers also tend to use ab­ stract words. On learning that there are horses, a philosopher may say: "The being of horses exists" or "The property of being a horse is manifested in reality." But in these cases, the fictional subject terms, according to Brentano, do not even have the advantage of being abbreviations. 2 This linguistic theory of fictions is quite in the spirit of later positivistic philosophy and of one phase of twentieth­ century realism; the Polish philosopher Tadeusz Kotarbinski devel­ oped his "reism," or "concretism," under the influence of Brentano's writings.3 But is this later theory of Brentano consistent with Bren2. Brentano's doctrine is set forth in detail in the following posthumous works: Volume II of the Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt (1925); Wahrheit und Evidenz (1930); Kategorienlehre (1933); and Die Lehre vom richtigen Urteil (1956). Complete references may be found in the Selected Bibliography at the end of this book. The 1925 edition of the Psychologie is edited and annotated by Oskar Kraus; Kraus traces the development of Brentano's philosophy in detail and relates the views presented in the present volume to Brentano's later philosophy. 3. A clear statement of Kotarbinski's views may be found in his paper, "The Fundamental Ideas of Pansomatism," Mind, LXIV (1955), 488-500; This is a trans­ lation of a paper which originally appeared in the Polish journal, Przeglad F ilozo­ ficzny, in 1935. But where Kotarbinski was a "pansomatist," holding that "every object is a [material] body," Brentano held that the psychological subject is a spiritual (geistige) substance, having no spatial dimensions, but capable of causal interaction with material bodies. See Brentano's Religion und Philosophie (1954), p. 221 ff.

Editor's Introduction [6] tano's earlier description of intentional phenomena? This question takes us to Meinong. We shall see that still other aspects of Brentano's philosophy were to be reflected both in later realism and in phenomenology.

II Meinong tells us that by reflecting upon intentionality-upon the fact that psychological activities may be directed toward all sorts of objects that do not exist-we may be led to see that "the totality of what exists, including what has existed and what will exist, is infinitely small in comparison with the totality of objects." What Meinong called "the theory of objects" (Gegenstandstheorie) has this totality as its subject matter; hence it is broader in scope than metaphysics, which is concerned only with what exists, or-at most -with what is real. Without giving in to idealism, we may say that "object" ( Gegenstand) , in the broadest sense of the term, desig­ nates anything toward which a psychological act or attitude may be directed. In the selection included here, Meinong proposes two in­ teresting theses about the totality of objects: first, a thesis about the being of "ideal objects," and secondly, the principle of the inde­ pendence of Sosein from Sein. Meinong's views about "ideal objects" may be illustrated by reference to what he calls Objectives. Suppose I judge that there are black swans. Since my judgment is true, Meinong says, it follows, not only that there are black swans, but also that there is an object in virtue of which my judgment is true. The object in virtue of which the judgment is true is not itself a black swan; it is, rather, the being of black swans. And the being of black swans is an object-in Mei­ nong's terminology, an Objective-which, according to Meinong, subsists (besteht) rather than exists. Had my judgment been false, it would have been false in virtue of that Objective which is the non-being of black swans. Again, if I judge that the round square does not exist, my judgment is true, not in virtue of the round square (for there is no round square) , but in virtue of the non-being of the round square; this Objective-the non-being of the round square­ also subsists. Other philosophers have used the term "proposition" pretty much as Meinong uses "Objective"; Meinong's term has an advantage in that it does not carry the linguistic and psychological connotation of "proposition." Meinong's distinction between those objects that are not Objec-

Editor's Introduction

[7] tives and those that are-between (existing) swans and the (sub­ sisting) being of swans, between the (non-existing) golden mountain and the (subsisting) non-being of the golden mountain-is typical of the distinctions with which the "theory of objects" is concerned. Believing, assuming, knowing, and other such acts and attitudes take Objectives as their objects; we believe, assume, or know that a certain state of affairs obtains or does not obtain-that a certain Objective subsists or does not subsist. The Objective consisting of the being of black swans has black swans as a constituent; the Ob­ jective consisting of the non-being of the golden mountain has the golden mountain as a constituent. In relation to its constituents, Meinong says, the Objective is an "object of higher order." This relation of Objective to constituent is different from that of whole to part. For if a whole exists, or has being, then its parts must also exist, or have being; but no such principle can be affirmed of Ob­ jectives. The non-existing, non-subsisting golden mountain is a con­ stituent of that subsisting Objective which is the non-being of the golden mountain. Brentano's theory of fictions, mentioned above, might enable us to dispense with some of Meinong's "ideal objects." Possibly "The Objective which is the non-being of round squares subsists" tells us only that there are no round squares, and "The Objective which is the being of black swans subsists" tells us only that there are black swans. But no such theory of fictions can be applied to the other thesis we have mentioned-that of the independence of Sosein from Sein. (The presuppositions of this thesis are challenged, however, in the second selection from Brentano included here.) Let us consider, once again, the objects over which our thoughts and other psychological activities may range; we may think about things which do exist, about things which do not exist, about things which cannot exist, and even about things of which it would be a logical contradiction to say that they exist. Hence, although the round square does not exist, although it cannot exist, we may make true assertions about it; we may say, for example, that we are now thinking of the round square. (As Brentano had pointed out, it will not do to say that, when a man says he is thinking about the round square, what he is really thinking about is the idea of the round square. When I consider the round square and decide that it is im­ possible, it is not the idea of the round square that I take to be impossible. Moreover, if there is such a thing as the idea of the round square, then this idea has the round square as its object.)

[8]

Editor's Introduction

And there are truths which hold of those things which are never the object of anyone's thought. Such objects have, for example, the characteristic of never being thought of. Moreover, even if no one had ever thought of the round square, "The round square does not exist" would still be true of the round square; the object needn't be thought of in order not to exist. Meinong writes: "Those who like paradoxical modes of expression could very well say: There are objects of which it is true to say that there are no such objects." But a mode of expression more accurate to Meinong's intention, I believe, would be one omitting the first "there are": viz., "It can be truly said, of certain objects, that these objects do not exist." Hence, Meinong concludes, we may affirm "the independence of Sosein from Sein."4 The Sosein of any object-the object's having the characteristics it has-is affected neither by its Sein nor by its Nichtsein. The fact that there is no round square has no bearing upon the fact that the round square is both round and square. Al­ though we can truly say, of every object, that that object either does or does not exist, the existence, or non-existence, of the object is foreign to its essential nature. The pure object is ausserseiend, stand­ ing beyond being and non-being (jenseits von Sein und Nichtsein) . This view must be distinguished from Meinong's theory of "ideal objects" and from any kind of Platonic realism. Indeed, it is of metaphysical interest largely because it denies one of the principles to which the Platonist tacitly appeals. The Platonist sometimes reasons in this way: ( i) there are truths which hold of things that do not exist, i.e., things that do not exist may yet have properties; (ii) only that which is real can have properties; therefore (iii) there are real things that do not exist and reality is thus not coextensive with existence. With the Platonist, Meinong accepts premise (i) , but since he denies ( ii) , 5 he deprives the Platonist of one of his most convincing arguments for (iii) -even though, on other grounds, Meinong accepts the Platonism of (iii) . Meinong would say that the Platonist, along with most philosophers, has a prejudice in favor of the real or actual (hat ein Vorurteil zugunsten des Wirklichen) . The totality of objects, according to Meinong, includes not only those real things with which Plato was concerned, but also everything that is 4. This prin cipl e was firs t propos ed by Meinong 's asso cia te Erns t Mall y. 5. Th us Meinong rejects th e prin cipl e, referr ed to in the quo ta tion from R uss ell a �ov e, .a c �or ding to whi ch th e o b ject of tho ugh t m us t hav e som e kin d of b eing . On th is pr mc1p le, co mpar e Pla to 's Theaetetus, 1 89. "S o cra tes : 'And if so meon e thin k s mus tn 't h e thin k of so mething ?' Th ea etetus : 'H e m us t do so .' S o cra tes : 'And if h ; thin ks of so meth ing , musn 't it b e so mething rea l?' "

Editor's Introduction

[9] impossible-such objects as the round square which aren't to be found in any of the realms of being. The round square, though it has no kind of reality at all, is not a bare nothing (ein blosses Nichts ) ; for when we refer to it, we refer to something. Most philosophers may be inclined to reject Meinong's prin­ ciple and to say that the totality of objects is no wider than the totality of what exists or is real. Indeed, we may wish to say of the expression "everything that exists or is real," that it is redundant, adding nothing to "everything" taken by itself. But if we wish to show that Meinong is mistaken, that his principle of "the independence of Sosein from Sein" is false, then we should be prepared to show, of what seem to be "truths about objects that do not exist," either that they are not truths at all or else that they need not be construed as referring to objects that do not exist. In some instances we would have no difficulty. "Unicorns do not exist," for example, need not be taken to say, of certain things that do not exist, that they do not exist. It says, of those things that do exist, that none has the property-of­ being-a-unicorn (i.e., that none is both single-horned and equine) . "Round squares are both round and square," we could say, doesn't predicate anything of non-existent objects; it says, of each of those things that do exist, that if it were both round and square, then it would be round and square. But Meinong's position is somewhat stronger in the case of those propositions whose subject terms are singular, as in "The round square is round and square." And it is stronger still when the proposition describes an intentional phenom­ enon, as in "The thing that Peter is thinking of is a golden mountain." The word "golden," in "The thing Peter is thinking of is a golden mountain," would seem to describe the non-existent object of Peter's thought, just as in other sentences-for example, "The Queen possesses a golden ring"-it may be used to describe some object that exists. If we choose, we may say with Brentano that the word "golden" has different uses in the two sentences just quoted­ that it occurs in obliquo in the first and in recto in the second. 6 Nevertheless, if we wish to teach someone the meaning of "golden" as it is used in the sentence about Peter's thought, we may do so 6. See Vol. II of Brentano's Psychologie vom Empirischen Standpunkt, p. 1 34. Cf. G. Frege's distinction between "direct" and "indirect" reference, in "Ober Sinn und Bedeutung," Zeitschrift fur Philosophie und philosophische Kritik, n.s. C ( 1 8 92 ) , pp 25-50, esp. p. 38. English translations of Frege's paper appear in H. Feigl and W. S. Sellars (eds.) , Readings in Philosophical Analysis (New York, 1 949) , and in Peter Geach and Max Black (eds.) , Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege (Oxford, 1 952) .

[ 10 ]

Editor's Introduction

by explaining its use in "The Queen possesses a golden ring." We cannot say that the words "golden" and ''mountain" are used to describe Peter's thought; for, if they were, then there would be some­ thing-namely, Peter's thought-which is a golden mountain. Hence Meinong may be justified in saying that the words "golden" and "mountain" in the intentional sentence about Peter's thought are used to predicate properties of something that does not exist. Bertrand Russell had objected that if, as Meinong contends, "The round square is both round and square" is true, then the law of contradiction is violated; hence, Russell concluded, Meinong is mis­ taken in saying that the sentence is true. 7 To this objection, Meinong replied by saying that the law of contradiction holds only of what exists, or is real, and is thus not violated by the sentence in question. To be sure, nothing that exists is both round and square ; but we can hardly expect the law of contradiction to hold of objects, such as the round square, which cannot possibly exist. Russell then ob­ jected that if, as Meinong contends, the round square is both round and square, then the existent round square must be round, square, and existent-and that this consequence would imply the false prop­ osition that there is a round square. Meinong replied by saying that although the existent round square is existent, it does not exist. 8 He also said, somewhat more plausibly, that "is existent" and "exists" are not predicates ; we add nothing to the Sosein of an object when we call that object "existent" ; and therefore, although 7. In "On Denoting" (Mind, n.s. XIV [ 1905 ] , 479-93 ) Russell proposed a "theory of definite descriptions" which, he thought, could be used to show that Meinong was mistaken. The theory shows, what is of fundamental importance to logic and the philosophy of mathematics, how to indicate uniqueness without using "the" and without referring to any numbers. It tells us that any sentence of the form, "The thing which is F is G," where the "the" is used to indicate unique­ ness, may be formulated in this way : "There exists an x such that x is F and x is G ; and, for all y, i f y i s F then y i s identical with x." (With most contemporary logi­ cians, Russell uses "for all y" in such a way that "for all y that exist or are real'� would be redundant; on Meinong's view we could say that the second expression designates a subclass of what is designated by the first. ) But if we apply Russell's formula to the sentences "The round square is round and square" and "The thing Peter is thinking of is a golden mountain," both of which, according to Meinong, are true, we derive sentences which are false; therefore, Meinong is justified in saying that Russell's theory of descriptions does not give an adequate interpretation of the kind of sentences Meinong was considering ( one of which refers to some­ thing that doesn't exist and the other of which refers to the object of an intentional act or attitude) and hence does not show that he was mistaken. 8. To which Russell rejoined : "I must confess that I see no difference between existing and being existent; and beyond this I have no more to say." (Review of Meinong's Vber die Stellung der Gegenstandstheorie im System der Wissenschaften,. in Mind, n.s. XVI [ 1 907 ] , 439. )

Editor's Introduction

[ 11 ] "the round square" applies to an object having the properties round and square, "the existent round square" does not apply to an object having the additional property of existence. With Brentano, Meinong holds that our emotions and desires­ what might also be called "interest-phenomena"-may be classi­ fied as correct or incorrect, justified or unjustified. If, say, a man takes a positive interest in a certain object, or Objective, then he does so either correctly or incorrectly; his interest is either justified or unjustified. Such interest-phenomena present us with two further types of object. In Vber emotionale Priisentation ( 19 17) , Meinong points out, what many philosophers seem not to have realized, that there is a striking analogy between what might be called presentation-by­ means-of-sensation-that is to say, ordinary sense perception-and presentation-by-means-of-emotion. And he proposes, as a "heuristic principle," that we carry this analogy as far as possible. If it is by means of sensation that we perceive the cathedral to be dark, it is by means of emotion or feeling that we perceive it to be sombre. And, similarly, it is by means of emotion or feeling that we per­ ceive it to be beautiful. In none of these cases would it be correct to say that our immediate experience-the sensation or the feeling -is the object we perceive. And it would be wholly inaccurate to say, either of sense perception or of emotional presentation, that we arrive at its object by means of inference or conscious inter­ pretation. Whatever can be said about the "objectivity" of ordinary sense-perception holds with equal justification, according to Meinong, of emotional presentation. (Samuel Alexander makes a similar point in Section 8 of "The Basis of Realism," in the present volume.) If I take a positive interest in an object, then, as Brentano had said, my interest is correct if the object is worthy of this interest­ provided it merits or deserves being valued. And if I desire an object, if I desire to actualize some Objective, then my desire is correct provided the object is something that ought to be, or pro­ vided at least that it is not something that ought not to be. We have seen that, according to Meinong, things constitute one type of object and objects-having-properties constitute a second, and higher, type of object. Meinong now adds the following : objects-being-worthy­ of-interest and objects-being-such-that-they-ought-to-be. We thus have things (Objekte) , Objectives, Dignitatives, and Desideratives. Things, as we have seen, may be said to exist or have being (sein) ; those objectives which are the objects of correct judgment subsist

Editor's Introduction [ 12 ] (bestehen ) ; those dignitatives which are the objects of correct in­ terest have worth (gelten ) ; and those desideratives which are the objects of correct desire ought to be (sollen ) . Meinong's account of the interrelations among such objects, and his discussions, in his writings on value, of justice, right, obligation, and value are "phe­ nomenology" in the best sense of the word, it seems to me, and contain much that is of permanent philosophical significance. Meinong's epistemology-his theory of evidence-is concerned with describing the ways in which we apprehend such "objects." Where Brentano had said that a judgment cannot be evident unless it is true, Meinong contends that we sometimes have adequate evidence for suppositions which are false. Thus our senses may de­ ceive us, even after we have taken every possible precaution; when they do, we have adequate evidence for what it is that they present. Meinong's theory of perception enables him to throw light on the puzzles which were to trouble the British and American realists. In Vber A nnahmen, the first edition of which was published in 1902, Meinong describes and compares still other ways in which psychological acts are related to their objects. The acts and attitudes of pretending, supposing, commanding, questioning, reasoning, and lying, as well as most art forms and many forms of play, involve characteristic types of intentional relation. Meinong here discusses in detail the various uses of language and emphasizes the distinction (which later philosophers were to revive) between what a sentence refers to (bedeutet) and the psychological state which the sentence expresses (ausdruckt) . More than any other twentieth-century philosophers, Meinong and Brentano share the concerns both of British and American "realism" and of what Husserl calls "phenomenology. " In this re­ spect, they are less provincial than are subsequent philosophers in either tradition.

III Although Husserl was to accept a version of idealism, the origins of his phenomenology were not unlike those of British and American realism. The first volume of his Logische Untersuchungen ( 1900) is an important defense of a realistic-as opposed to a "psychologistic" -interpretation of the truths of logic. What Husserl has to say about our knowledge of these truths leads us to his "phenomenology." According to Husserl, the logical statement,

Editor's Introduction

( 1 ) If all Greeks are men and all men are mortal, then all Greeks are mortal, is "apodictically evident," "superempirical," and necessarily true. We can see, by a kind of logical reflection, that the state of affairs (in Meinong's terminology, the Objective) expressed by the if-clause necessarily involves the state of affairs expressed by the then-clause. The "eidetic" relation between these two states of affairs might also be expressed in this way : (2) All-Greeks-being-men and all-men-being-mortal involves all-Greeks-being-mortal. The first state of affairs-all-Greeks-being-men and all-men-being mortal-contains the second as a necessary constituent. We can see, moreover, that the two states of affairs have "structures" of such a sort that anything having the structure of the first will also have the structure of the second. And we can grasp this fact even if we don't know the meanings of the particular nouns and adjectives, "Greeks," "men," and "mortal." Husserl treats other logical statements analogously. "All squares are rectangles," for instance, is said to tell us something about essences or properties; the essence or property being square is said to include the essence or property being rectangular. We may also say that the one concept involves the other-the concept of being square includes that of being rectangular-provided that this use of ''concept" does not lead us to psychologism. '"Psychologism" is the name that Husserl, along with Frege, Meinong, and Russell, applies to the psychological interpretation of the laws of logic which some nineteenth-century philosophers had accepted. Logical statements, according to this interpretation, are empirical generalizations about the ways in which people think. Thought-processes-not "objectives," "states of affairs," or any other kind of "superempirical" entity-constitute the subject-matter of logic. Thus Theodore Lipps had said : "Logic is either the physics of thought or it is nothing at all." 9 A "psychologistic" interpretation of our logical statement ( 1) , for example, might be this: ( 3 ) Whoever believes that all Greeks are men and all men are mortal cannot help but believe that all Greeks are mortal. 9. T heodo re Lipps , "Die Aufgabe der Erkenntnistheorie," Philos. Monatshefte XVI ( 1880 ) ; quo ted by Husserl, in Logische Untersuchungen, I, 55. Husserl 's earl ier wor k, Phi/osophie der Arithmetik ( 189 1 ) , had defended a vers ion of "ps y­ cholog is m."

Editor's Introduction [ 14 ] And, analogously, a possible "psychologistic" interpretation of our analytic statement, "All squares are rectangles," would be: "No one can think of anything as square without also thinking of that thing as rectangular." To see why Husserl rejected the "psychologistic" interpretation of the principles of logic and mathematics, we have only to consider whether statement ( 3) can convey what is conveyed by statement ( 1 ) . Surely the content of ( 3) is quite different from that of ( 1) . Since ( 3) is a generalization about all believers, it can be supported only by extensive psychological investigation; but we don't need to go to psychology to get support for ( 1) . As Frege has said, "it would be strange if the most exact of all the sciences had to seek support from psychology, which is still feeling its way none too surely. " 1 0 Moreover, since ( 3) is an empirical generalization, it is probable at best and it is at the mercy of a single contrary instance; the existence somewhere of one unreasonable individual, someone who believed that all Greeks are men and all men are mortal but who refused to believe that all Greeks are mortal, would be suffi­ cient to insure that ( 3) is false. But ( 1) , unlike ( 3) , cannot be thus refuted. Nor is ( 1 ) a statement which is only probable; ( 1) , as Husserl had said, is "apodictically evident" and necessarily true. If we found a man who accepted the if-clause of ( 1) but denied its then-clause, this fact would not have the slightest bearing upon the truth of ( 1 ) . It would prove only that there are men who are not always reasonable-that there are men who do not reason in ac­ cordance with the principles of logic and mathematics. And we know, of course, that there are such men; we know that in all probability ( 3) is false. But if ( 3) is false and ( 1 ) is true, the content of ( 3) is not the same as that of ( 1 ) . The proponent of "psychologism" will look for some way to modify ( 3 ) -some way of making the subject-matter of ( 3) more like that of ( 1) . Lipps had spoken, not only of the "physics of thought," but also of the "rules" of thought. Can't we modify (3) so that it will refer to the rules of correct thinking? Our psychologi­ cal statement might be put this way : (4) Whoever believes that all Greeks are men and all men are mortal will, if he follows the rules of thought, also believe that all Greeks are mortal. Statement (4) , like ( 1 ) , cannot be falsified by the existence of 1 0. G . Frege, Die G rundlagen der Arithmetik (Breslau, 1 884) , Sec. 27; English translation by J. L. Austin (Oxford, 1950 ) .

Editor's Introduction

[ 15 ] people who reason fallaciously; for such people cannot be said to follow the rules of thought. Husserl points out, however, that the expression "rules of thought" is ambiguous : it may be taken descrip­ tively to refer to the ways in which we do think; or it may be taken normatively to refer to the ways in we ought to think. If we take "rules of thought" descriptively in ( 4) , we can say that ( 4) is an empirical generalization; but we can no longer distinguish ( 4) from ( 3). And if we take "rules of thought" normatively in ( 4), we can distinguish ( 4) from ( 3), but we can no longer say that ( 4) is an empirical generalization. As a normative statement, ( 4) tells us how we ought to think; and as such, Husserl would say, it cannot be justified by reference to any psychological investigation of the ways in which people do think. The step from ( 3) to ( 4) is thus disastrous for "psychologism." For ( 4), unlike ( 3), is not a gen­ eralization from psychology and, unlike ( 1), it is not even descrip­ tive. The logic of Husserl's argument will be the same if "rules of thought" in ( 4) is replaced by any other normative expression­ say by "rational" or "reasonable" or by "right," "ought," or "cor­ rect ' ' as applied to thinking. 1 1 There is a sense, of course, in which our logical statement ( 1), or ( 2), may be said to justify the normative statement ( 4). If a man wishes to think correctly, then his thoughts must conform to the truth of ( 1); he must not reject the conclusion of a syllogism if he accepts the premises. But in this sense, logic is no more norma­ tive than any other science. "In a similar way every general truth, no matter to what theoretical sphere it may belong, can provide the foundation of a general norm of correct judgment." 1 2 If a man wishes to think correctly about physics, astronomy, or geology, then, simi­ larly, his thoughts must conform to the truths of physics, astronomy, or geology. Even if we were to discount all of the foregoing, Husserl says, we could see that any attempt to derive logic from psychology must involve a vicious circle. For we cannot derive logic from psychology without presupposing some of the principles of logic. Indeed, if we 1 1 . Thi s t ype of lo c ution wa s p refe rre d by Brentano . Thus Brentano p ut s the la w of cont ra di ction t hi s wa y: "It i s i mpo ssi ble fo r an yone to den y rig htl y [richtig] somet hin g t hat so meone e lse rig htl y a ffirms, an d fo r an yone to a ffirm rig ht ly some ­ t hing t hat so meone el se rig htl y denie s" (Die Lehre vom Richtigen Urteil, p . 202) . In t hi s wa y, Brentano atte mpt s to con st rue t he law of cont ra di ction , not a s a law a bo ut a bst ra ct o bje ct s such a s p roposit ion s, but a s a law a bo ut peop le an d th us co n­ c rete o bje ct s. 1 2. H usse rl , Logische Untersuchungen, I, 1 57.

Editor's Introduction [ 16 ] do not begin by accepting some logical principles, then we cannot derive any principles from any subject matter. A similar argument will apply to a thesis to which certain later philosophers have been attracted-the thesis that logical statements are empirical generalizations about language. The analogue of ( 3 ) , i n "linguisticism," would be something of this sort : "Whoever is prepared to utter the words 'All Greeks are men and all men are mortal' is also prepared to utter the words 'All Greeks are mortal.' " But such a statement is so implausible, as an interpretation of the logical fact asserted by ( 1) , that the "linguisticist" will introduce the normative concept of rule-this time in "rules of language"­ at an early stage in the formulation of his position. Husserl also rejects every psychologistic theory of evidence. To say that a man has evidence for some proposition is not to say merely that he is inclined to believe it, or that he prefers it to its alternatives, or that he accepts it with such-and-such a "degree of belief." The difficulties of psychologism in logic have their analogues here. Psy­ chologism may also be found in moral philosophy. According to some "naturalistic" theories, statements about what is right are empirical generalizations describing what it is that people are inter­ ested in or what it is that they approve of or value. 1 3 In "Philosophy and Anthropology," the second of the selections from Husserl in­ cluded here, Husserl finds psychologism revived in the Lebensphilo­ sophie of Wilhelm Dilthey. According to Husserl, then, the propositions of logic express truths about "essences." And we grasp these truths by means of an insight into essences. The insight which tells us that ( 1) is true is perhaps better expressed by ( 2) -the statement saying that one state of affairs necessarily involves another. This insight or appre­ hension is gained by means of the direct inspection of abstract objects-das Sehen des Eidos, or, more briefly, Wesensschau. Logic and pure mathematics may thus be called "eidetic sciences" ; they are a priori, "apodictic," and "superempirical." They are presup­ posed by the empirical or natural sciences; the abstract objects con­ stituting their subject-matter are "the common estate of all the sciences." But, unlike the natural sciences, the "eidetic sciences'' contain no causal or genetic statements; they give us no information about what causes what. They rest upon pure phenomenological descriptions. 1 3. The criti cism of "nat uralism," in G. E. Moore's Principia Ethica ( 1 903 ) , sho ul d be viewe d as a part of the at tack upo n ps ycholo gis m.

Editor's Introduction

[ 17 ]

In one of its many senses, the term "phenomenology" refers to the purely descriptive study of mental or subjective phenomena. Sir William Hamilton had defined "phenomenology" as the "descriptive analysis of mind. " 14 Brentano's interpretation of "descriptive psy­ chology" (Psychognosie ) is close to Husserl's sense of "phenome­ nology." The descriptive psychologist, according to Brentano, is concerned with the accurate description of psychological states and processes-states and processes which are available to our "inner perception." Brentano's descriptive psychologist, unlike the experi­ mentalist and the genetic psychologist, is not concerned with the physiological or psychological causes of these states and processes or with what may happen to be correlated with them. And, unlike the introspectionist, he does not restrict himself to such phenomena as sensations, feelings, and images. The descriptive psychologist undertakes to describe perceiving, believing, judging, and all of the other phenomena that Brentano had called intentional. (Husserl says that Brentano's "conversion of the scholastic concept of intentionality into a descriptive root-concept of psychology constitutes a great discovery, apart from which phenomenology could not have come into being at all." 1 6 ) In earlier writings Husserl apparently took the term "phenomenology" in this sense, to mean "the purely descrip­ tive study of mental phenomena." Other senses of "phenomenology" may be obtained by stressing either "mental phenomena" or "purely descriptive. " Hegel's "phenomenology of mind" stresses the former concept at the expense of the latter; in describing the growth of mind, or spirit, Hegel does not hesitate to make statements which are causal and genetic and thus not purely descriptive. But, for Husserl, phenomenology is a "pure descriptive discipline which studies the whole field of pure transcendental consciousness in the light of pure intuition." 1 6 It is in connection with this sense of the term that we find Husserl's other characteristic doctrines. Phenomenology is concerned with ihe experiences that can be grasped and analyzed in intuition in their essential generality, but not with empirically apperceived experiences 14. In his Lectures on Metaphysics (1 858 ) . 1 5. Husserl, Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phtnomenology, p . 23. In Meine letzten Wunsche fur Osterreich, firs t pu b lished in 1 895, Bren tano said o f "descrip tive psycho logy" tha t, i f i t were proper ly carr ied ou t, i t cou ld "serve as the founda tion for a characteristica universalis, such as Lei bni z, and be fore him Descar tes, had en ­ visaged ." (See p . xvii o f Os kar Kraus 's In troduc tion to the 1924 ed ition o f Volume I o f Bren tano 's Psychologie. ) Husserl though t o f "phenomenology" in s imilar terms. 1 6. Op. cit., p. 1 76.

Editor's Introduction [ 18 ] as real matters of fact, as experiences of experiencing people or animals in the appearing world, posited as a matter of fact of natural experience. The essences directly grasped in essential intuition, and the connections based solely upon the essences, are brought to expression descriptively in concepts of essence and lawful statements of essence. Every such state­ ment is an a priori one in the best sense of the term. 17

The experiences upon which this "a priori" and "eidetic" science may be said to be based can be witnessed only from a peculiar and non-natural point of view. The phenomenologist "sets aside" his natural standpoint ; "performing an epoche," he "puts into brackets" everything which, as an active human being, he may happen to know about the particular concrete objects with which he is in fact involved. If he wishes to describe the "intentional structure" of seeing, for example, his concern will not be with the physical things that may happen to be stimulating his sense organs. Standing on the sidelines, he will observe himself in the act of seeing without becoming an "accomplice" in that act; he will achieve a "phenome­ nological reduction" to the facts themselves ( zu den Sachen selbst ) -to the experience whose essence he wishes to describe. Like Kant, Husserl brings a new technical vocabulary to philos­ ophy, with the result that his descriptions are often difficult to follow. Among the best examples available in English are the de­ scriptions of consciousness and of evidence to be found in /deas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology. In Parts III and IV of this work, Husserl describes such psychological "acts" as per­ ceiving, believing, valuing, and feeling; the "intentional structures" with which he is here concerned are, for the most part, something that no one has described before. In The Foundation of Phenome­ nology, Marvin Farber reproduces the more important descriptions in the Logische Untersuchungen, where Husserl discusses not only "pure logic," but also such relations as that of whole to part, and the concepts of meaning, thinking, and intentionality in general. Erfahrung und Urteil, which was published posthumously in 1 93 9 , is concerned with the concept o f evidence and with the various types of predication and judgment ; its subject-matter is very much like that of Meinong's Ober A nnahmen, which, I believe, Husserl did not sufficiently appreciate. In other writings Husserl takes up such "activities" as remembering, being aware of time and space, and of corporeality and apprehending "the other." 1 7. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, II, Part I, 2. Translated by Marvin Farber, in The Foundation of Phenomenology (Cambridge, Mass., 1 943 ) , p. 198.

Editor's Introduction

( 19 ] According to Husserl, then, phenomenology is to be thought of as a science; like logic and mathematics, it is capable of yielding results that are both necessary and certain. The phenomenologist is thus to be contrasted with the traditional philosopher who does little more than grope his way through a maze of philosophical riddles and puzzles. Yet Husserl himself, when he sets out to de­ scribe the essences of psychological phenomena, encounters one philosophical puzzle of the traditional sort-a puzzle which is ex­ traordinarily perplexing. The solution he proposes is fundamental, not only to his conception of phenomenology, but to his philosophy as welL And although it is one possible solution to a very perplexing problem, it can hardly be said to have the certainty and apodictic necessity of mathematics and logic. Husserl's problem concerns the status of the self; we may introduce the problem by considering a statement by David Hume. When Hume said that he, like the rest of mankind, is "nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions," he defended his paradoxical statement with the following words: "For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception." 1 8 These words are paradoxical, for, in denying that there is a self which experiences all of his perceptions, Hume seems to say that there is such a self. Hume wishes to say that there are only perceptions which are related in certain ways; but he cannot formulate his evidence for this assertion without referring to the self which has these perceptions. He must say, "/ cannot catch myself at any time without a perception," and if his statement is true, then there is a self-the one who cannot catch himself without a perception. And if Hume knows that his statement is true, then he knows that there is such a self. Using Kant's terminology, we may say that Hume ignores the " 'I think' " which "must be able to accompany all my presenta­ tions."19 Using Wittgenstein's terminology, we may put the matter this way : "There is therefore a sense in which in philosophy we can talk of a non-psychological I. The I occurs in philosophy through the fact that the 'world is my world.' The philosophical I is not the man, not the human body, or the human soul of which 1 8 . David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Book I, Part IV, Sec. vi. 1 9. Critique of Pure Reason, A 341 ff.

Editor's Introduction [ 20 ] psychology treats, but the metaphysical subject, the limit-not a part of the world." 20 And using Husserl's terminology, we may say that Hume ignores the facts that are made known by transcendental subjectivity. In his Ideas Husserl describes "transcendental subjec­ tivity" in minute detail; in "Phenomenology," the first of the two selections from Husserl included here, he puts it succinctly. "Psychical subjectivity"-the self that may be studied by psy­ chology, or by psychiatry-may be found within the world. "Psy­ chical subjectivity" might be described in terms of our inmost thoughts and feelings; perhaps it also involves our body and its behavior. In either case, it is part of the world that we ourselves experience. "We that are, indeed, men, spiritual and bodily, existing in the world, are, therefore, appearances unto ourselves, a parcel of what 'we' have constituted, pieces of the significance 'we' have made. The 'I' and 'we' which we apprehend presuppose a hidden 'I' or 'we' to whom they are present." The hidden 'I' or 'we' is "transcendental subjectivity." (Compare pages 57-8 of the first Brentano selection included here.) I believe that "transcendental subjectivity" is something that must be taken into account by any serious philosophy of mind and certainly by any adequate "phenomenology." One cannot describe it, so far as I can see, in terms of bodily states or even of thoughts or feelings. But when Husserl describes the place of transcendental subjectivity in the world--or, rather, the place of the world in rela­ tion to transcendental subjectivity-he proposes a philosophical thesis which, it seems to me, goes considerably beyond the mere description of evident psychological phenomena (and one which many of his followers could not accept) . This thesis is a form of idealism-"transcendental-phenomenological idealism." Unlike the idealism of the nineteenth century, Husserl said, "transcendental­ phenomenological idealism" is no mere philosophical theory; it is a science which "is in all real essentials unassailable. " 2 1 In his Preface to the English edition of Ideas, he writes: The result of the phenomenological clarification of the meaning of the 20. Tractatus Logico-Philosophius (Lon do n, 1922) , p. 1 5 3. 2 1. Huss erl, Ideas, p. 1 8. Nine teen th -cen tury i de alism is a me re "theo ry" be - � cause , ins tead o f des cribing phenomen a whi ch are imme diate ly e vi dent, i t posit sJ uno bs erv ed "faculti es o f the min d." Un li ke some o f the nine teen th -cen tury i de alis ts ,1 Husse rl does no t wish to s ay th at ph ysi cal th ings are imm anent "in the min d." W is "a fun damen tal erro r to s uppose th at p ercep tion ( an d e ve ry o the r t ype o f the l in �ui ti �n o � , things, e_ ach afte r i ts o wn m anne r ) fails to come into cont act wi th the t thing itse lf (op. ell., p. 1 3 5 ; cf. pp. 1 59-60. ) '..

Editor's Introduction

[ 21 ] manner of existence of the real world ( and, eidetically, of a real gener­ ally ) is that only transcendental subjectivity has ontologically the meaning of Absolute Being, that it only is non-relative, that is, relative only to itself; whereas the real world indeed exists, but in respect of essence is relative to transcendental subjectivity, and in such a way that it can have its meaning as existing reality only as the intentional meaning-product of transcendental subjectivity. 22

Husserl's reasoning may be summarized in the following steps. ( i ) The world cannot b e experienced, o r even thought, except as being relative to transcendental subjectivity, to the "I think" that must accompany all presentations. We cannot conceive of an object without thereby conceiving something that is "intentionally consti­ tuted," something that is a synthesis of our intendings. "Change worlds as we may, each must ever be a world such as we could ex­ perience, prove upon the evidence of our theories, and inhabit with our practice. " 23 Therefore, (ii ) everything that exists and every­ thing that could possibly exist is necessarily relative to the "I think." Or, in other words, "relativity to consciousness is not only an actual quality of our world, but, from eidetic necessity, the quality of every conceivable world. " 24 But ( iii ) transcendental subjectivity itself is not thus relative to anything else. The "I think" that must accompany all p resentations does not exist for anything in the sense in which all p resentations-and all possible presentations-are relative to the "I think." 25 And therefore ( iv ) transcendental subjectivity is the Absolute to which all else in the world is relative. The first of Husserl's premises may well be unassailable. But it does not imply the second. And, therefore, whether or not we accept the third, our acceptance of the first does not commit us to Husserl's conclusion. Hence I believe that Husserl is mistaken in saying that he has shown "every form of current philosophical realism to be absurd. " 26 Although Husserl was eager to disassociate himself from the idealism of the nineteenth century, one of the argu­ ments which, as we shall see, the realists were to criticize in this idealism was very much like Husserl's step from ( i ) to ( ii ) . 27 22. Op. cit., p. 2 1 . 23. Quoted from Sec. I I o f "Phenomenology," the first of the Husserl selections included here. 24. Ibid. 25. But Husserl says, in the Cartesianische Meditationen , that the transcendental ego "is what it is only in relation to intentional objects" (par. 30 ) . 26. Ideas, p. 1 9. 27. It is accurate to say that the argument commits what Ralph Barton Perry called the "fallacy of the egocentric predicament" ; see Sec. II of the Introduction to

Editor's Introduction

[ 22 ]

Husserl's "transcendental-phenomenological idealism," like other forms of idealism, runs the risk of implying that the philosopher himself-or the reader-is the only person in the world. In the lec­ ture, "Philosophy and Anthropology," the second selection from Husserl included here, Husserl concedes that there may be an "initial illusion of transcendental solipsism." But further intentional analysis, he says, will dispel this illusion and lead one to "the transcendental others who are my peers." The questions involved in the phenome­ nology of "the other," and of my relation to "the other," become central questions for "existential" phenomenology. "Existentialism" in twentieth-century philosophy derives partly from the attempt to provide a phenomenological description of man's place in the world-of what Heidegger has described as our "In­ der-Welt-Sein" and Merleau-Ponty as "notre engagement affectif dans le monde." 28 In its existential version phenomenology is no longer concerned merely with "essences"; for, according to the existentialist, we cannot describe man's place in the world and his apprehension of other men without considering that relation be­ tween essence and existence which is peculiar to man. This side of phenomenology-which existentialists believe to accord with Hus­ serl's later writings-is not within the scope of the present volume. IV The British and American "realists" of the first half of the present century stood together in rejecting idealism. But on other questions of epistemology, or theory of knowledge, they were very much divided. The most important of these questions may be pre­ sented by reference to a set of propositions I shall call "the sub­ jectivist argument." Variants of this argument may be found in the writings of some of the nineteenth-century idealists, and it resembles the argument of Husserl we have just considered. It was never made explicit in the way I shall formulate it here, but the present formulation has an advantage : each of the steps to be sin­ gled out played an important role in the development of twentiethThe New Realism, the e ig ht h o f t he se le ct ions in clude d here . Marv in F ar ber m akes th is po int in "Des cr ip tive Philosophy an d Hum an Existen ce," in Philosophical Thought in France and the United States, e d. Marv in F ar ber ( B uffalo , 1950 ) , p. 429. 28. The intro duct ion to M. Mer le au Ponty's Phenomenologie de la perception

(Par is , 1945 ) , is an e xce llent st atement o f t he re lat io n between Husser l's phe no m­ e no logy and e xistent ialism.

Editor's Introduction

[ 23 ] century realism; by referring to these steps we may see the relations among views that were expressed in widely diverging terminologies. At the basis of "the subjectivist argument" lies one form of the principle of empiricism-the assumption that all of our knowledge about "the external world," i.e., all of our knowledge about physical things, rests upon what are variously called "sense-impressions," "sensations," "ideas," or "appearances," and not upon what we take to be our perception. It is often said, in behalf of this principle, that the information we claim to derive from any particular percep­ tual experience is in fact derived, not from that experience alone, but from that experience taken together with what we already happen to know. I may say, for example, that I saw Mrs. Jones buy bread from the grocer. But had I not brought to that experience a large body of previous information-the information enabling me to recognize that one of the people was Mrs. Jones and another the grocer, indeed the information enabling me to recognize that I saw people at all, not to mention what I know about the activities of buying and selling-I might have seen something but not that Mrs. Jones was buying bread from the grocer. What I learned by sight alone (so the reasoning goes) pertained only to "sense-data" or appearances. Appearances were the "sensory core" of my experi­ ence; the rest was information previously acquired. Any belief about the external world that is substantiated. in a particular experience (so it is assumed) thus rests upon two foundations : first, the appear­ ances constituting the sensory core of that experience and, secondly, one's previously acquired information. This is the reasoning at the base of "the subjectivist argument. " Although it is difficult to formulate its point precisely, we may put it here as follows : ( 1) On those occasions when we think we are perceiving an external physical thing, our senses are informing us only about some appearance or group of appearances. We might put the same conclusion, even less precisely, by saying that the knowledge we derive from experience concerns only the ways in which things appear-or, better, the ways in which we are ap­ peared to. The second step of the subjectivist argument proceeds from a familiar fact about appearances, or the ways in which things appear to us. We know that by changing the conditions under which we perceive things (or think we perceive things) we can produce changes in the ways the things appear to us; for example, we may change the look of the things in the room by changing the lights, or moving

Editor's Introduction [ 24 ] about, or doing something to our eyes. For the ways in which things appear to us depend in part upon our psychological and physio­ logical condition. Given this fact, most philosophers assume with­ out question : ( 2 ) Things do not appear in any way at all unless they appear in some way to someone. Step ( 2 ) , in the terminology of "appearing," is transformed as fol­ lows into the terminology of "appearances" : ( 3 ) The appearances we are aware of depend for their existence upon ourselves. If there were no perceivers, then, according to ( 3 ) , there would be no appearances. Given ( 1 ) and ( 3 ) , the subjectivist argument now draws this conclusion : ( 4 ) Whenever we think we are perceiving an external physical thing, our senses are informing us only of something that depends for its existence upon ourselves. Many of the idealists preferred the traditional term "idea" to "ap­ pearance" ; hence they expressed ( 1 ) by saying that, whenever we think we perceive some external physical thing, our senses are in­ forming us only about some idea, or group of ideas. But ideas, they said, are intrinsically mental. Indeed, they argued, it would be contradictory to speak of an idea existing independently of anyone's awareness of it. Hence, they assumed, ( 4) may be re-expressed in this way : ( 5 ) Whenever we think we are perceiving an external physical thing, our senses are informing us only of something that necessarily depends for its existence upon ourselves. Proposition ( 5 ) , then, is the conclusion of what we are calling the "subjectivist argument." The subjectivist argument was, of course, but one of the idealistic arguments ; it does not lead us to the positive idealistic philosophy unless we combine it with certain further doctrines about logic and about the nature of Mind, or Spirit. But it was essential to most versions of idealism in nineteenth-century Western philosophy. And, as I have said, the steps here singled out will show us the logical relations among the various forms of twentieth-century realism. Let us consider, then, the "realistic" criticisms of the par­ ticular steps of the argument. We may begin with the final step and work back to the others. The rejection of (5 ) . Even if the first four steps of the sub­ jectivist argument are justified, the derivation of ( 5 ) , as described

Editor's Introduction

[ 25 ] above, depends upon an equivocation. In deriving ( 5) , the idealist reasoned in this way : "The appearances of which we are aware are ideas in our minds. Hence, since ( 1 ) is true, we may say that, whenever we think we perceive an external thing, what we are aware of is some idea, or group of ideas. But an idea is what is intrinsically mental; having an idea of a thing entails being conscious of that thing; and it would be contradictory to speak of there being a con­ sciousness of a thing apart from any knowing subject. Hence we may accept proposition ( 5) . Whenever we think we perceive an external thing, we are perceiving only something of which it would be con­ tradictory to say that it could exist apart from any knowing subject." In the first and secou.d sentences of this quotation, the word "idea" must be taken as a synonym for "appearance," as "appearance" is used in the earlier steps of the subjectivist argument. But in the third sentence "idea" is taken as a synonym for "consciousness" or "aware­ ness." Hence an essential step is omitted in the derivation of ( 5) : the idealist must show that whatever is an idea, in the first sense of the word, is also an idea in the second sense of the word; he must show that the appearances of which we are aware are identical with our awareness of them. The foregoing criticism of the step to proposition ( 5) is essen­ tially that made by G. E. Moore in "The Refutation of Idealism. "29 On the basis of ( 5 ) , the idealist had said : "It is impossible to get outside the circle of our own ideas." But Moore objected, on the basis of the foregoing criticism, that merely to have an idea-to be aware of an appearance-"is already to be outside that circle. It is to know something which is as truly and really not a part of my experience, as anything which I can ever know."30 Brentano had made a similar criticism; see pages 5 3-55. One significant version of twentieth-century realism is compatible with rejecting ( 5) while accepting the earlier steps of the subjectivist argument-and thus asserting, with (4) , that whenever we think we perceive an external thing, what we are really aware of is some­ thing that depends for its existence upon ourselves. Descartes and Locke had been led to conclude that, although there are physical things in the world around us, the "external world" is in fact some­ thing we never perceive; the objects of our perception are the 29. Th is essay first appeared in Mind, n .s . XII ( 1903 ), and was reprin te d in Moore 's Philosophical Studies ( Lon don, 1922) . It is incl uded in A . C . Ewing 's The Idealist Tradition ( Glencoe , Ill ., 1957), in t he present "Li brary o f Philo ­ so ph ical Mo vemen ts ." 30. Philosophical Studies, p. 27. C f. the first o f R ussell's t heses cited a bove .

Editor's Introduction [ 26 ] appearances, or sense-impressions, that external things may cause us to sense. This "dualistic" view seems also to have been held by Brentano and by some of the American "Critical Realists" ; 3 1 Love­ joy defends it in "A Temporalistic Realism," reprinted here. Whitehead described dualism by saying that it "bifurcates" the universe, for each of us, into two worlds : a world of appearances which are within our field of consciousness and a world of material things which are not. What we take to be the red glow of the sunset is-if dualism is true----our own "psychic addition" to the world; unperceived nature is a "qualitative vacuity."32 In accepting the sub­ jectivist argument through (4) , the dualist finds it difficult to avoid scepticism. If, as ( 1 ) says, our knowledge of physical things is derived solely from our awareness of appearances, and if, as the dualist says, these appearances are merely subjective effects of the process of perceiving, then one may well ask whether we do know anything about external things. 33 Some of the Critical Realists con­ ceded the point; George Santayana's Scepticism and A nimal Faith ( 1923) is a dualistic defense of scepticism. Other realists held in effect that dualism allows too much to the subjectivist argument. The rejection of (4) . Suppose, then, we reject proposition (4) -"Whenever we think we are perceiving an external physical thing, our senses are informing us only of something that depends for its existence upon ourselves"-and retain the earlier steps of the argu­ ment. Would this be a tenable view? If a philosopher were to accept ( 1 ) through (3 ) -if he were to say that, whenever we think we are perceiving something, our senses are informing us only about appearances, and if he were to say further that appearances depend for their existence upon ourselves-how could he avoid committing himself to ( 4) ? Bertrand Russell faces a problem of this sort in 3 1. The Ame ri can C riti ca l Rea lists-Love joy, Du rant Dra ke, James B . Pratt, A rthu r K. Roge rs , Ge orge S anta yana , Roy Wood S e lla rs, and C . A . S t rong ­ pu blished a v olume ent it led Essays in Critical Realism: A Co-operative Study of the Problem of Knowledge (New York, 1920 ) ; this v olume was in pa rt a rea cti on against a sim ila r c o-ope rative stud y by the Ame ri can "New Rea lists " ( 1 9 12) , t o be dis cussed be low. 32. A. N. Whitehead, The Concept of Nature (Cam bridge , 1920) , cha p. i. C ompa re Hen ri Be rgs on, M atiere et Memoire (Pa ris, 1 896), chap. i. 33. "The resu lt is ," the idea list M c Tagga rt had pointed out, "that matte r is in the same p os iti on as the Gorg ons or the Ha rpies . Its e xisten ce is a ba re possi ­ bi lit y t o whi ch it wou ld be foolish t o atta ch the least imp ortan ce , sin ce the re is nothing t o ma ke it at a ll pre fe ra ble t o an y othe r h yp othesis, h oweve r wi ld " ( J. E. M. M c Tagga rt, Some Dogmas Concerning Religion [Lond on, 1906 ] , p. 95) .

Editor's Introduction

[ 27 ]

"The Ultimate Constituents of Matter" ( 19 15) , reprinted here. The solution he proposes is a version of what other philosophers have called ''phenomenalism. "34 According to phenomenalism, our ordinary beliefs about physical things are in fact beliefs about appearances. Or, somewhat more precisely, all of our ordinary beliefs about physical things can be expressed in such a way that they can be shown to refer only to appearances. The relation of appearances to material things re­ sembles that of the British Government, or of the average man, to particular men. Statements about such entities as the British Gov­ ernment, or the average man, are a convenient shorthand for complex groups of statements about particular men. In Russell's terminology, the British Government and the average man are "logical con­ structions" upon particular men. In Principia Mathematica ( 19 1015) , Russell and Whitehead had developed the techniques of mathe­ matical logic to the point where they could show that cardinal numbers are, similarly, "logical constructions" upon classes and particular objects. They were able to show (among other things) that sentences ostensibly about cardinal numbers-for example, "Two and three are five"-can be translated into other sentences referring only to particular objects and to classes. Principia was said to have removed the need of supposing that numbers are something in addition to particular objects and classes. In defending phenome­ nalism, Russell hoped to show similarly that material things are "logical constructions" upon appearances. 35 If material things can thus be "reduced" to appearances, we can accept propositions ( 1) through ( 3) of the subjectivist argument without committing ourselves to (4) . The average man is reducible to particular men, even though the average man, unlike any par­ ticular man, can never be found in any particular place. Material things may be reducible to appearances, even though every material thing, unlike any appearance, is independent of ourselves. 36 But 34. At the beg inn in g of "The Ult imate Const ituents of Matter ," Russell says that he is defen din g a kin d of dual ism ; note, however , that he uses the ter m "dualis m" in a different sense from that in which we have use d it a bove . In The Problems of Philosophy (firs t pu blishe d in 1912) , Russell defen de d a form of dual ism , in our sense of that wor d. 3 5. Like Brentano 's v iews a bout "genu ine o b jec ts ," phenomenal ism may be de ­ scr ibe d as a "theory of fict ions." But Brentano , unl ike the pheno menal ist , di d no t a ttempt to re duce mater ial th ings to appearances . 36. Phenomenal ism is somewhat l ike the ideal istic v iew of B ishop Berkeley. Bu t Russell, who accepte d the argument of Moore 's "Refuta tion of Idealism ,"

Editor's Introduction [ 28 ] Russell was to decide-after the publication of the article reprinted here-that material things are not reducible to appearances. He was unable to show that statements about material things can be trans­ lated into statements that refer to appearances and not to material things. 37 Russell's difficulty may be traced back, I think, to one of the familiar facts upon which the early stages of the subjectivist argu­ ment depend-to the fact that the ways in which things appear to us depend in part upon our own psychological and physiological condition. To translate a thing statement into a collection of appear­ ance statements, we must find some group of appearances which can be uniquely correlated with the physical fact described by the thing statement. But we cannot correlate any group of appearances with any particular physical fact unless we describe those appear­ ances by reference to some other physical fact-to some particular set of physical observation conditions. It is the joint operation of the things perceived and of the conditions under which they are per­ ceived that determine how the things are to appear to us. The attempt to translate all thing statements into appearance statements thus fails, for whenever we seem to reach such a translation we find ourselves left with a set of thing statements which describe physical observation conditions and which have not been translated into state­ ments about appearances. Russell had hoped to show that physical objects-the "external" things we perceive as well as our own bodies -are "functions of sense-data" alone; his task might be compared with that of a physicist who set out to define size in terms of shape alone. The rejection of (3 ) . By rejecting proposition (3) of the sub­ jectivist argument-"The appearances we are aware of depend for their existence upon ourselves"-we approach "the New Realism." This view, in one of its forms, tells us that certain appearances are denie d th at appe aran ces are ment al. An d, alth ough he accepte d p roposition ( 3 ) of the su bje cti vist argument , he s ai d th at the appe aran ces we sense are depen dent , not upon ou r min ds , but upon ou r bo dies. 37. In The Analysis of Matter ( Lon don, 1 927 ), Russe ll cont inue d to ho ld th at mate ri al things are "logi cal const ru ctions ," b ut he mo di fie d his e arlie r vie w in t wo fun dament al respe cts . ( i ) He he ld th at appe aran ces ( "pe rcepts " ) are on ly so me of t he constituents fro m whi ch m ate ri al things are const ru cte d; the "u lti mate constituents " of the un ive rse are events, some of whi ch are appe aran ces. (ii) Ap­ pe aran ces are constituents , no longe r o f things e xte rn al to the bo dy, but of the b rain of the pe rson who is s aid to e xpe rien ce them . The se con d p art of th is vie w is re adi ly acco mmo date d to the su b je cti vist argu ment , whi ch Russe ll see ms t o accept th rough s tep ( 4 ) ; he thus s ays , p arado xi cally, th at when we see e xte rnal physi cal th ings , wh at we re ally see are parts ( co nstituents ) of ou r b rains .

Editor's Introduction

[ 29 ] identical with external physical things. Some of the appearances I sense when I look at the box on the table are identical with the box itself-or at least with some part of the box. The process of per­ ception does not "create" or "generate" these appearances; it selects and brings into my field of awareness certain appearances which would have existed even though no perceiver had been present to sense them. Where dualism is a "generative," or "creative," theory of appearances, the present view is a "selective" theory. 38 If we can accept such a view, then we can reconcile proposition ( 1) of the subjectivist argument-"When we think we are perceiving an external thing, our senses are informing us only about some appear­ ance"-with our "naive" conviction that we perceive some physical things directly. 3 9 For the appearances we are sensing are the very things we think we are perceiving. This view had been proposed by T. P. Nunn in England and by some of the American "New Real­ ists"; it has been defended at times by G. E. Moore. 40 The philosophical sentence, "Certain appearances are identical 3 8. Cf. C . D. Broad, Scientific Thought ( London, 1923), p. 523 ff. Russe ll, in his essay, "The Re lat ion of Sense -data to Phys ics," firs t p ub lished in Mysticism and Logic ( 1917), attempted to com b ine phenomena lism w ith a vers ion of the se lect ive the ory, ho ld ing that there are "unsensed sens ib ilia " wh ich are like sense ­ da ta e xcep t t ha t they are no t sensed or e xper ienced by anyone . The term "ne utra l mon ism ," wh ich bot h Russe ll and some of the Amer ican New Rea lists had app lied to the ir own v iews, was somet imes ta ken to des igna te s uch a com b ined theory; a vers ion of it was defended by William James in h is essays, "Does Consc io usness Exis t " and "A Wor ld of Pure Exper ience," firs t p ub lished in 1904 and repr inted in Essays in Radical Empiricism (New Yor k, 1912). 39. The technica l term, "na ive rea lism," is used amb ig uo us ly, somet imes to des ignate the "se lect ive theory" descr ibed a bove, and somet imes to des igna te the sing le propos it ion tha t we do perce ive e xterna l th ings. 40. T . P. Nunn proposed th is v iew in "Are Secondary Qua lit ies Independen t of Percept ion ?" Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, n.s. IX ( 1909), 191-218. G. R Moore defends it in h is Philosophical Studies (London, 1922), p. 18 1, and in "A Rep ly to my Cr it ics," in The Philosophy of G. E. Moore, ed . P. A. Sch ilp p (Evanston, Ill., 1942) ; h e d isc usses i t in Part I V of " A Defence of Common Sense," repr inted here . The Amer ican "New Rea lis ts " were E. B. Ho lt, W. T . Marv in, William Peppere ll Montag ue, Ra lph Barton Perry, Wa lter B. Pit k in, and E. G. Spa ulding ; they p ub lished jo int ly "The Program and F irst Pla tform of S ix Rea lis ts," in the Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Method, XII ( 19 10), 393-401, and The New Realism: Co-operative Studies in Philosophy (New Yor k, 1912) ; in the la tter vo lume, the v iew d isc ussed a bove is de fined in deta il in E. B. Ho lt 's essay, "The Place of Illusory Exper ience in a Rea list ic Wor ld," pp. 303-73. Ho lt and Perry a lso defended a behavior ist ic theory of m ind, denyin g Brentano 's c la im that intent iona lity, or reference, is menta l. They proposed a be ­ hav ior istic theory of reference wh ich, in its essent ia ls , says th is: we may be sa id to refer to an o b ject, if we ma ke (or are prepared to ma ke ) responses spec ific to tha t o b ject. But the concep t of "spec ific response "-part ic ular ly tha t of a res ponse s pecific to some o b jec t tha t has never e xis ted-was o bsc ure .

[ 30 ]

Editor's Introduction

with physical things," must be reconciled with the familiar facts to which early stages of the subjectivist argument refer. Should we say that all of the appearances that a particular object may present are parts of that object? If the top of the box represents a rectangular appearance from here and, at the same time, a diamond-shaped ap­ pearance from there, the top cannot be identical with both of these appearances, for they are not identical with each other. Are the tactual appearances identical with one kind of part and the visual with quite another? Or are some of what we call the appearances of the box identical with certain physical things other than the box? With what physical things? Should we say that the appearance of warmth is in the fire? Shouldn't we also say, on the same grounds, that the feeling of pain is there as well? 41 What are we to say of the ap­ pearances of stars that no longer exist? If the stars don't exist, and the appearances do, how can they be the same? And what of the appearances involved in illusions, dreams, and hallucinations? E. B. Holt conceded that, according to his own version of New Realism, "the physical or so-called 'outer' or 'real' world is through and through contradictory. "42 G. E. Moore suggested that it might even be necessary to distinguish between appearances and the ways in which appearances appear. 43 But there was something odd about the sentence, "Certain ap­ pearances are identical with physical things." The rejection of (2 ) . Many philosophers have spoken inter­ changeably of "the appearances of things" and "the ways in which things appear," on the assumption that, whenever we can say of some material thing that it appears to have a certain characteristic, then we can say of the appearance of the thing that it has that char­ acteristic. If the walls appear blue, then, surely, they present an appearance that is blue. But the assumption is false. "He appeared to be eating his breakfast" doesn't imply that his appearance was eating his breakfast; nor does "He appeared hungry" imply that his appearance was hungry. The inference from "appears" to "appear­ ance," exemplified in the step from ( 2 ) to ( 3 ) in the subjectivist argument, is invalid, as H. A. Prichard points out in "Appearances and Reality," included here. 4 4 We will do well, therefore, to express 4 1 . Cf. John Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book II, chap. viii, Sec. 1 6. 42. E. B. Holt, The Concept of Consciousness ( London, 1 9 14) , p. 2 7 1 . 43. Philosophical Studies, p. 245.

44. Cf. also chap. ii of Kant's Theory of Knowledge (Oxford, 1909) , by H. A. Prichard.

Editor's Introduction

[ 31 ] our philosophical conclusions in terms of the relational term "ap­ pears" instead of the substantival term "appearance." The New Realism was a view about appearances; it said, among other things, that there are appearances which no one senses. Hence, if we avoid the substantive "appearance," we can no longer formulate the New Realism. But we can formulate, in its place, still another version of twentieth-century realism. Instead of saying "There are appearances which no one senses," we may say that certain things appear without appearing in any way to anyone; i.e., instead of denying ( 3 ) , we may deny ( 2) . Samuel Alexander and Alfred North Whitehead developed cos­ mologies which are most plausibly interpreted, I believe, in terms of the denial of ( 2) . In "The Basis of Realism" ( 1 9 1 4) , reprinted here, Alexander suggests that "compresence-the fundamental re­ lation of mind and its object" is "the simplest and most universal relation between any two existences in the world whatever." I think we may say that two things are "compresent," in Alexander's sense of this term, when each of them appears in some way to the other. In Space, Time, and Deity ( 1920) , Alexander developed this view in further detail. 45 Whitehead's metaphysical system, according to which "all actual things are subjects, each prehending the universe from which it arises," may be interpreted similarly: A prehends B when B appears in some way to A. 46 If we say that things other than percipient organisms may be appeared to, we must explain what it is that sense-organs and the rest of our perceptual apparatus do for us and why it is that other prehending entities do not need such aids. A world in which things can appear without appearing to any biological organism is almost as puzzling as the world that was envisaged by the New Realists. Such metaphysical views, considered merely as ways of avoiding the consequences of the subjectivist argument, would seem to be needlessly complex. Some realists have felt that there is an easier way out. The rejection of (1 ) . Let us go back to proposition ( 1 ) of the subjectivist argument : "On those occasions when we think we are perceiving some external thing, our senses are informing us only about some appearance or group of appearances." This assumption has played an essential role in Western philosophy; but our simplest course, surely, is to reject it. 45. S amue l Alex an de r, Space, Time, and Deity (Lon don , 1920) ; se e esp . VoL II, c hap . v ii. 46. A. N. Whi te hea d, Process and Reality (C am b ridge , 1929) , p . 89.

Editor's Introduction [ 32 ] The most plausible defense of ( 1) proceeds in this way. It is noted that the information we claim to derive from any perceptual experience is in fact derived, not from that experience alone, but from that experience taken together with what we already happen to know. And it is then inferred that, if we subtract what we already know from any such experience, we will be left with a "sensory core" of information pertaining only to the ways in which we are appeared to. But this inference is not valid. Another possible in­ ference, consistent with everything that is known about perceiving, would be to this conclusion: that many perceptual experiences are such that, if we subtract from them all of our previously acquired information, we will be left with a "sensory core" of information, not about appearances merely, but about the things that are ap­ pearing. This "sensory core" might consist of propositions about some of the sensible qualities of the things we are perceiving­ propositions affirming that the things have certain colors, or shapes, or that they are solid, or liquid, or that they are making sounds of a certain sort. If we put the matter this way, we may reject ( 1) . What we are aware of when we think we perceive some physical thing is-at least on occasion-just that physical thing we think we are perceiving. We perceive those things which, as a result of stimulating ou sense-organs, appear to us in some way or other. Although we would not perceive any physical thing unless it ap­ peared to us in some way, only conceptual confusion would lead one to suppose that we are aware of appearances and not of the things that appear. 47 There is little ground for thinking that, geneti­ cally, people begin with beliefs about appearances and then make inferences from such beliefs to hypotheses about "external things. n Reasoning from appearances to things-"lt must be that I'm looking at a so-and-so, inasmuch as I am aware of such-and-such an appear­ ance"-seems to occur only at a fairly sophisticated stage in our intellectual development. And, so far as the "order of evidence" is concerned, there is little ground for supposing that our "ultimate premises" must refer only to appearances. Indeed, if we are justified in believing any of the things we do about the objects around us, then, it would seem, we can not say that the "ultimate premises" of our knowledge refer only to appearances. 48 We should say some­ thing of this sort instead : that whenever we think we perceive a 47. Husser l, despite his "tr anscen dent al -phenomeno logic al i de alism," m ake s thi s point c le arly in his Ideas; see esp . S ecs . 43 an d 52. 48. C f. Thom as Rei d's re jection o f "the i de al theo ry" o f Britis h em piricism , i n th e Intro duction to his Inquiry into the Human Mind ( 1 764 ) .

Editor's Introduction

[ 33 ] physical thing to have some sensible characteristic, then the fact that we think we perceive it is prima facie evidence for our belief that the thing does have that characteristic. 49 If we deny proposition ( 1) of the subjectivist argument, then we may assert propositions ( 2) and ( 3) without committing ourselves to the paradoxical propositions (4) and (5) . We may say, with (2) , that nothing appears without thereby appearing in some way to someone; if we exercise proper care, we may say, with ( 3) , that appearances depend for their existence upon a perceiving subject. These statements will no longer commit us to the doctrine that the only object of our perceptual awareness is something which is itself subjective. The statement that a physical thing is red need not be taken to imply that the thing takes on red appearances which no one senses or that it appears red without appearing red to any living organism. "This thing is red," so far as appearances are concerned, says only that when this thing stimulates observers like ourselves in ordinary light it will appear red to us. As a result of being thus stimulated and "appeared red to," we may perceive that the thing is red. 50 Rejecting proposition ( 1) of the subjectivist argument, the real­ ist may accept, not only propositions ( 2) and ( 3) , but even the principie which the idealist had used in passing fron :i ( 4) to (5 ) ­ though he may not, of course, accept propositions ( 4) and (5 ) them­ selves. In other words, the realist may reject the argument of Moore's "Refutation of Idealism." Moore's argument presupposes that, whenever something appears red to me, there exists a red appearance which is related to my awareness as its object. Accepting Moore's category of awareness, we may now say, however, that "being appeared red to" designates a kind of species of awareness and not a situation wherein one is related by means of awareness to a red appearance or to a way of appearing which is red. This posi­ tion has economy in its favor, for it involves fewer categories than does Moore's; we no longer have to say that there are appearances of which we are aware. 51 But one may feel that something is amiss in all of this. Are we 49. C f. H. H. Pr ice , Perception ( Lon don , 1932), p. 1 85. 50. Parts of th is view are suggeste d by Me inong , by Ro y Woo d Se llars an d C. A . Strong (two o f the Amer ic an "Cr it ic al Re alists ") , an d by A . E . Murphy; see the b ib liogr aphy at the en d of th is wor k. In Perceiving: A Philosophical Study (Ith aca, 1957), I h ave de fen de d it in det ail. . . ,, 5 1. C f. G. F . Stout , "Are Present at ions Ment al o r Ph ys ic al? Proceedmgs of and Time, Space, , der an ; lex A The Aristotelian Society, n .s. IX ( 1909) S amue l , alle (LaS Death and Mind, Nature, , asse Duc J. C. 12; I, 1902), don, (Lon Deity m., 195 1 ), pp. 287-90.

Editor's Introduction [ 34 ] proceeding improperly in thus givmg up proposition ( 1 ) of the subjectivist argument? Are we revising our conception of evidence merely to accommodate a prejudice that we know something about physical things? What ground is there for supposing that we do have such knowledge? These questions take us to G. E. Moore's "Defence of Common Sense."

V In Part I of "A Defence of Common Sense," G. E. Moore de­ scribes a certain class of propositions which, he says, all of us know with certainty to be true-such obvious truisms, for example, as those expressed in the statements, "That mantelpiece is at present nearer to my body than that bookcase," "I see the mantelpiece," and "I see that the mantelpiece is nearer to my body than the bookcase." Since we know with certainty that these propositions are true, Moore says, it follows that any philosophical theory that is incon­ sistent with any of them is false. Hence, one way to refute a philos­ opher is to show, if we can, that his theory has consequences that are inconsistent with these propositions. The subjectivist argument -so it would seem-implies that I do not now see the mantelpiece ; hence we are justified in saying that at least one of its premises is false. And the familiar sceptical arguments, designed to prove that we know very few of the things we think we know, can be similarly refuted : since they imply that I do not know, and thus do not see or perceive, that the mantelpiece is nearer to my body than the book­ case, they make use of one or more premises that are false. If a philosopher presented me with a theory purporting to prove that I cannot know any such common-sense truism as those listed above, or ( to borrow another example from Moore ) to show that I cannot know that this is a finger, I could point out to him, first of all, that my common-sense proposition is far more worthy of my belief, far more credible, than are the conclusions, or the premises, of his philosophical theory. If he tried to defend his theory, I could point out that he appeals to premises that are far less worthy of my belief, far less credible, than is the "common sense" proposition that this is a finger. It seems to me a sufficient refutation of such views as these, simply to point to cases in which we do know such things. This, after all, you know, really is a finger : there is no doubt about it : I know it, and you

Editor's Introduction

[ 35 ] all know it. And I think we may safely challenge any philosopher to bring forward any argument in favor either of the proposition that we do not know it, or of the proposition that it is not true, which does not at some point, rest upon some premise which is, beyond comparison, less certain than is the proposition which it is designed to attack. The ques­ tions whether we do ever know such things as these, and whether there are any material things, seem to me, therefore, to be questions which there is no need to take seriously : they are questions which it is quite easy to answer, with certainty, in the affirmative.52

If Moore is right, we may say that, whenever we know that there is a genuine conflict between a philosophical statement and a statement of common sense ( or, at least, a statement of the sort exemplified above), we should reject the philosophical statement. But it is not always easy to show that there is a genuine conflict between a philo­ sophical statement and a statement of common sense. A philosopher who says, "You do not now see that there is a hand before you," may only seem to be in conflict with the common-sense statement, "I now see a hand before me." For the word "see," in the philos­ opher's statement, may well be used with a meaning or intention quite different from the meaning or intention that it has in the common-sense statement; some philosophers, for example, have said such things as "You do not now see that there is a hand before you," but have understood the particular words in such a way that their sentence, expressed in the language of other philosophers, would be : "None of the appearances of which you are now aware is itself a hand"-a sentence which does not conflict at all with the common-sense statement that you now see a hand. Hence, to show, of some philosophical statement which may seem to conflict with common sense, that it does in fact conflict with common sense, we must show that the philosopher's words are intended by him in their ordinary or "correct" sense. Moore's philosophical refutations often require that we contrast the ordinary or "correct" uses of certain words with their philo­ sophical uses. But in such arguments Moore is not concerned merely to show that the philosopher whom he refutes is using words incor­ rectly; he is not concerned merely to show that the philosopher intends certain words in senses different from those in which they are ordinarily intended. For he realizes that, from the fact that a philosopher is using certain words incorrectly'. it d� es not fo!low that the philosopher's statements, in the sense m which the philos52. G. E. Moore, Philosophical Studies, p. 228.

Editor's Introduction [ 36 ] opher intends them, are false. Indeed, he realizes that by showing a philosopher to be using certain words incorrectly, he may thereby show that what the philosopher says is true. (For example, some philosophers have used words in such a way that the sentence, "We have no reason for accepting any proposition about the future," as understood by them, says only that no proposition about the future is logically deducible from any propositions about the past; in learn­ ing what it is that they have thus incorrectly expressed, we discover that they are saying something which we have known all along to be true. ) To refute a philosopher, therefore, is not the same thing as to show that he is using words incorrectly. To refute a paradoxical statement by means of Moore's technique, it may be necessary to show that the words of which it is made up are used correctly. If we show that the philosopher is using words incorrectly, we may only expose him-by showing that, since his statement does not mean what one would ordinarily take it to mean, it is no longer para­ doxical or even interesting; or by showing that, in using certain words now in their correct or ordinary sense and now in some incorrect or extraordinary sense, he has fallen into confusion. Some contemporary philosophers are primarily concerned with showing how language may thus mislead philosophers.

Selections

•

1

The Distinction between Mental and Physical Phenomena BY

FRANZ BRENTANO

( TRANSLATED BY D. B . TERRELL )

I THE DATA of our consciousness make up a world* which, taken in its entirety, falls into two great classes, the class of physical and the class of mental phenomena. We spoke of this distinction much earlier, in the course of defining the concept of psychology, and we returned to it again in our investigation of method. But what was said is still insufficient; what was then only suggested in passing we must now delineate more firmly and rigorously. The fact that neither unity nor complete clarity has yet been achieved regarding the line of demarcation between the two areas seems to make this all the more necessary. We have already had occasion to see how physical phenomena which appear in the imag­ ination have been taken to be mental. But there are many other cases of confusion as well. Even psychologists of considerable imporTh is se lec tion is from B ren tan o's Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt, Volum e I , Boo k I I , cha p. i, a wor k firs t pu b lishe d in 1874 an d re prin ted by Fe lix Me iner , of Ham bu rg , in 1955 (Vol. I) and 1959 (Vo l. I I) . A ll se lec tions fro m B ren tan o are p ublis he d he re w ith the kin d permissio n o f the Fe lix Me ine r Ver lags buchhan dlung , Ham b urg. * [T RANSLATOR'S NOTE: Th e or ig ina l, wh ich rea ds, "Die gesa mte We lt unse re r Ersche in ungen," wo uld be too mis lea ding in li te ra l tran sla tion a s "the en tir e wor ld of our phen omena ," or "o f o ur a ppea rances ." B ren tano re jec te d th e Kan tian in te r­ pre ta tion o f "phenomenon " i n the firs t cha pter o f the Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt, an d for h im the wor d Erscheinung func tions ve ry much as di d "idea " fo r Loc ke an d "perce ption " for Hume , i.e ., as a gene ra l te rm for any da tum o f c on sc iou sne ss. The en tire sen tenc e i s ve ry pro ba b ly an echo o f the beginn in g of Bain 's Mental Science: "Human Knowle dge , Exper ie nce , or C onscio usnes s, fa lls un der two great de partme nts . . . . " D.B .T . ] [ 39 ]

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tance may find it difficult to vindicate themselves against the charge of self-contradiction. 1 We occasionally encounter such assertions as that sensation and imagination are differentiated by the fact that one occurs as the result of a physical phenomenon, while the other is evoked, according to the laws of association, by means of a mental phenomenon. But along with this the same psychologists admit that what appears in sensation does not correspond to its efficient cause. Accordingly, it turns out that what they call physical phenomena never appear to us in actual fact, and that we have no presentation of them whatsoever; surely this is a strange way in which to misuse the term "phenomenon" ! When affairs are in such a state, we can not refrain from taking a somewhat closer look at the problem.

II We do not aim to clear up the matter by a definition according to the traditional rules of logicians. These rules have lately been sub­ jected to impartial criticism of various kinds, and there is still much more that might be added to what has been said against them. Our object is the elucidation of the two terms : physical phenomenon­ mental phenomenon. We wish to exclude misunderstanding and con­ fusion in connection with them. And for this we needn't be con­ cerned about the means used, if only they really serve to produce clarity. Giving more general, superordinate definitions is not the only 1 . Thus I, a t leas t, am una ble su c cessfully to bring in to harm ony the various de fini ti ons whi ch A . Bain has given in one of his la tes t psych ol ogi cal w orks , Mental Science ( Lon don , 3d e d., 1 872 ) . On page 1 20, N o. 59, he says tha t men tal s cien ce (S cien ce of Min d, whi ch he als o calls S u b je c t S cien ce ) is base d on self-c ons ci ous ­ ness or in trospe c tive a tten ti on ; the eye , the ear, the organs of t ou ch , are means of observing the physi cal w orl d, the "obje c t w orl d," as he expresses himself. On the other han d, on page 198, N o. 4 he says tha t : "The percep ti on of ma tter or the O bje c t c ons ci ousness is c onne c te d wi th the pu tti ng forth of Mus cular Energy, as opp ose d to Passive Feeling ." An d in his explana ti on he a dds. "In purely passive feeling , as in th ose of our sensa ti ons tha t do n ot call forth our mus cular energies , we are n ot perceiving ma tter, we are in a s ta te of su bje c t c ons ci ousness ." He explains this in terms of the sensa ti on of warm th when one ta kes a warm ba th , an d in terms of th ose cases of gen tle c on ta c t in whi ch n o mus cular a c tivi ty oc curs , an d explains tha t un der the same c on di ti ons , s oun d, even p ossi bly ligh t an d c ol or as well , can be purely su bje c t -e xperien ces . Thus for examples of su b je c t-c ons ci ousness , he draws on th ose very sensa ti ons by way of eye , ear, an d organs of tou ch whi ch in the other passage he ha d in di ca te d to be the me dia tors of obje c t-c ons ci ousness in c on ­ tras t to su bje c t-c onsci ousness . [All qu ota ti ons from s ources originally wri tte n in Eng lish are given in the original versi on, ra ther tha n having bee n re transla te d from Bren tan o's German versi on . ]

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useful means that can be employed for such an end. Just as induc­ tion is contrasted with deduction in the sphere of demonstration, here definition by way of the specific, i.e . , by way of an example, is con­ trasted with definition by means of the more general. And the former method will be more appropriate as long as the particular term is more intelligible than the general. Hence, it may be a more effective procedure to define the term "color" by saying that it des­ ignates the general class for red, blue, green, and yellow, than to choose to give an account of red-following the opposite procedure -as a particular species of color. Definition by way of particular cases will perform still more useful service in connection with terms, such as those involved in our case, which are not at all common in ordinary life, while the names of the particular phenomena compre­ hended under them are familiar enough. So let us start with an attempt to make our concepts clear by way of examples. Every presentation ( Vorstellung ) of sensation or imagination offers an example of the mental phenomenon; and here I understand by presentation not that which is presented, but the act of presenta­ tion. Thus, hearing a sound, seeing a colored object, sensing warm or cold, and the comparable states of imagination as well, are ex­ amples of what I mean; but thinking of a general concept, provided such a thing does actually occur, is equally so. Furthermore, every judgment, every recollection, every expectation, every inference, every conviction or opinion, every doubt, is a mental phenomenon. And again, every emotion, joy, sorrow, fear, hope, pride, despair, anger, love, hate, desire, choice, intention, astonishment, wonder, contempt, etc., is such a phenomenon. Examples of physical phenomena, on the other hand, are a color, a shape, a landscape, which I see ; a musical chord, which I hear; heat, cold, odor, which I sense ; as well as comparable images, which appear to me in my imagination. These examples may suffice as concrete illustrations of the dis­ tinction between the two classes.

III Nevertheless, we will attempt to give a definition of the mental phenomenon in another, more unified way. For this, there is avail­ able a definition we have used before, when we said that by the term, mental phenomena, we designate presentations and, likewise,

FRANZ BRENTANO [ 42 ] all those phenomena which are based on presentations. It scarcely requires notice that, once again, by presentation we understand here not what is presented but the presenting of it. This presentation forms the basis not merely of judgments, but also of desires, as well as of every other mental act. We cannot judge of anything, cannot desire anything, cannot hope for anything, or fear anything, if it is not presented. Hence, the definition which we gave embraces all of the examples just introduced and, in general, all of the phenomena belonging to this domain. It is a sign of the immature state in which psychology finds itself that one can scarcely utter a single sentence about mental phenomena which would not be disputed by many. Still, the great majority agree with what we just said; presentations are the basis for the other mental phenomena. Thus, Herbart is quite correct in saying: "In every case of emotion, something, no matter how diversified and complicated, must be in consciousness as something presented; so that this particular presentation is included in this particular feeling. And every time we have a desire . . . [ we] also have in our thoughts that which we desire. " 2 Herbart then goes farther, however. He sees nothing but certain states of presentation, which are derivable from presentations, in all other phenomena; a viewpoint which has already been attacked repeatedly, especially by Lotze, on decisive grounds. Among others, J. B. Meyer recently set forth a lengthy criticism of it in his exposi­ tion of Kant's psychology. But he is not satisfied with denying that feelings and desires can be derived from presentations ; he maintains that phenomena of this sort can exist even without any presenta­ tion. 3 Indeed, Meyer believes that the lowest animals have only feelings and desires, but no presentations, and that the life even of the higher animals and of human beings begins with mere feeling and desire, while presentation first emerges as development pro­ gresses. 4 In this way he, too, seems to come into conflict with our contention. Nevertheless, if I am not mistaken, the contradiction is more apparent than real. From several of his expressions it seems to me to follow that Meyer understands the concept of presentation more narrowly than we have understood it, while he broadens the con-

2. Psych. als Wissensch, Part II, Sec. 1 , chap. i, § 103. Cf. also Drobisch, Empir. Psycho/., pp. 38 and 348, and others of Herbart's school. 3. Kant's Psychologie (Berlin, 1 870) , pp. 92 ff. 4. Ibid. , p. 94.

[ 43 ] cept of feeling to an equal extent. "Presentation," he says, "first enters in when the sensed change in one's own state can be under­ stood as the result of an outer stimulus, even if this expresses itself, at first, only in the unconscious looking or feeling around for an external object which results from it." If Meyer were to understand the same thing under presentation as we do, then it would be im­ possible for him to speak in this way. He would see that a state like the one which he describes as the origin of presentation would already include an abundant number of presentations: for example, presentations of temporal proximity, of spatial proximity, and of cause and effect. If all of this must already be present in the soul in order thac a presentation in J. B. Meyer's sense might be formed, it is surely clear that such a thing cannot be the basis of every other mental phenomenon. On the contrary, the very state of being present ( Gegenwartig-sein) which belongs to each of the things named is precisely a state of being presented ( Vorgestelltsein) in our sense. And such is the case generally, wherever something appears in consciousness: whether it be hated or loved or regarded indifferently; whether it be affirmed or rejected, or, in the case of complete withholding of judgment-I cannot express myself better than by saying-presented. As we use the word "to present," "to be presented" comes to the same thing as "to appear." Even J. B. Meyer recognizes that a presentation in this sense is presupposed by every feeling, even the most lowly feelings of pleasure and displeasure; but deviating from us in his terminology he calls it a feeling and not a presentation. This seems to me to follow from these words: "Between non-sensation and sensation there is no intermediate state . . . Now the simplest form of sensation does not need to be more than the mere sensing of the change in one's own body or a part of it which results from some stimulus, A creature endowed with sensation of this sort would then have only a feeling of its own states. A sensibility of the soul for the changes which are advantageous or harmful to it could very well be immediately connected with this vital feeling for the events beneath one's own skin, even if this new sensitivity were not simply derivable from that feeling; such a soul could have /eelings of pleasure and displeasure along with the sensation . . . A soul so endowed would still possess no presentation . . . "5 We see clearly The Distinction between Mental and Physical Phenomena

5 . Kant 's Psycho!., p . 92. J. B. Meye r appea rs to un de rstan d sensation just as Ue be rwe g does in his Logik, I, 36 ( 2d e d., p . 64) : "Pe rception is distin guished fro m me re sensation . . . by t he fact t hat consciousness i n t he latte r is attac hed

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that what is, in our opinion, the only thing to deserve the name "feeling," also arises, in J. B. Meyer's opinion, as a successor [ to something else. Its predecessor] falls under the concept of presenta­ tion, as we understand it, and forms the indispensable presupposition of the other. Hence it appears that if Meyer's viewpoint is translated into our language, the contradiction disappears of its own accord. Perhaps the same is also true of others who express themselves similarly to Meyer. Still, we may surely find that, as regards some kinds of sensual feelings of pleasure and displeasure, someone does actually hold the opinion that there is no presentation, even in our sense, on which they are based. We cannot deny a certain temptation in that direction, at least. This holds, for example, in regard to feelings which are caused by a cut or a bum. If someone is cut, then for the most part he has no further perception of touch; if he is burned, no further perception of heat; but pain alone seems to be present in the one case and the other. Nonetheless, there is no doubt that even here the feeling is based on a presentation. In such cases we always have the presentation of a definite spatial location, which we ordinarily specify in relation to one or the other of the visible and palpable parts of our body. We say that our foot hurts, or our hand hurts, this or the other place on our body is in pain. In the first place, then, those who look on such a spatial presentation as something originally given by means of the neural stimulation itself will therefore be unable to deny that a presentation is the basis of this feeling. But others, too, cannot avoid making the same assumption. For we have within us not merely the presentation of a definite spatial location, but also that of a particular sensory quality, analogous to color, sound, and other so-called sensory qualities, a quality which belongs among the physical phenomena and which is definitely to be distinguished from the accompanying feeling. If we hear a pleasant, mild sound or a shrill one, a harmonious chord or a discord, it will occur to no one to identify the sound with the accompanying feeling of pleasure or pain. But, likewise, when a cut, a burn, or a tickle arouses a feeling of pain or pleasure in us, we must maintain in a similar manner the distinction between a physical phenomenon, which enters in as the object of outer perception, and a mental phenomenon of only to the subjective state, but in perception it is directed to an element which is perceived and accordingly . . . stands over against the act of perception as a distinct and objective thing." If this opinion of Ueberweg concerning sensation as distinct from perception were correct, sensation would none the less include a presentation in our sense. Why we hold it not to be correct will be shown later.

[ 45 ] feeling, which accompanies its appearance, even though the super­ ficial observer is rather inclined to confusion here. The principal basis of the illusion is probably the following. It is well known that our sensations are mediated by the so-called afferent (sensibeln) nerves. It was believed earlier that specialized nerves served exclusively as conductors for each class of sensory qualites, color, sound, and so on. Recently, physiology has inclined more and more to the opposite point of view. 6 Particularly, it teaches almost universally that the nerves for tactile sensations, when stimu­ lated in one way, produce in us the sensations of heat and cold, and when stimulated in another way, produce the so-called sensations of pain and pleasure. In fact, however, something similar holds for all nerves, insofar as a sensory phenomenon of the kind just mentioned can be aroused in us by way of every nerve. If they are very strongly stimulated, all nerves arouse painful phenomena, which are not distinguished in kind one from another. 7 If a nerve serves as the medium of diverse classes of sensations, it often happens that it serves as the medium of several at the same time, as, for example, looking at an electric light results simultaneously in a "beautiful" sensation of color; i.e., one that is pleasant to us, and a painful phenomenon of another class. The nerves of the tactile sense fre­ quently communicate at the same time a so-called sensation of touch, a sensation of heat or cold, and a so-called sensation of pain or pleasure. Now it is manifest that when several sensory phenomena appear together, it is not seldom the case that they are regarded as being one. This has been demonstrated in a striking way in con­ nection with the sensations of taste and smell. It is established that almost all of the differences which we are accustomed to look upon as differences of taste are, in fact, only differences in simultaneously occurring phenomena of smell. It is a similar matter when we eat a food cold or warm : we often believe ourselves to have differences in taste which are in fact only differences in phenomena of tempera­ ture. It is not to be wondered at, then, if we do not always maintain a strict distinction between what is a phenomenon of temperature and what is a tactile phenomenon. Indeed, we would perhaps not distinguish them at all if they did not ordinarily appear indepen­ dently of each other. But if now we consider the sensations of feel­ ing ( Gefuhlsempfindungen) we find that for the most part they are bound up with sensations of another class and that when the excitaThe Distinction between Mental and Physical Phenomena

6. Cf. espe cia lly Wun dt, Physiol. Psycho!., pp. 345 ff. 7. Cf. bel ow, B ook II, chap. iii, § 6.

FRANZ BRENTANO [ 46 ] tion is very strong these other sensations sink into insignificance beside them. It is very easy, then, to account for the fact that we should be deceived about the occurrence of a particular class of sensory qualities and believe ourselves to have a single sensation in­ stead of two. Since the supervening presentation was accompanied by a relatively very strong feeling, incomparably stronger than the one which followed upon the first kind of quality, this mental phe­ nomenon was regarded as the only one which had newly been ex­ perienced. And if the first kind of quality disappeared entirely, then we would believe that we possessed nothing besides a feeling, with­ out any presentation on which it was based. A further basis of the illusion is that the quality on which the feeling ensues, and the feeling itself, do not bear two distinct names. We call the physical phenomenon, which occurs along with the feel­ ing of pain, itself pain in this case. We do not say that this or that phenomenon in the foot is experienced with pain so much as we say that pain is experienced in the foot. To be sure, this is an equivoca­ tion such as we find elsewhere, whenever things stand in a close relationship to each other. We call the body healthy, and in con­ nection with it, the air, food, facial color, and so on, but plainly in different senses. In our case, a physical phenomenon itself is called pleasure or pain, after the feeling of pleasure or pain which accompanies its appearance, and here too the sense is modified. It is as if we should say of a harmonious sound that it is a pleasure to us, because we experience a feeling of pleasure on its occurence; or that the loss of a friend is a great sorrow to us. Experience shows that equivocation is one of the foremost hindrances to our knowl­ edge of distinctions. It must necessarily be very much so here, where a danger of being deluded exists in and of itself, and the transference of the term was perhaps itself the result of a confusion. Hence, many psychologists were deceived, and further errors were tied up with this one. Many arrived at the false conclusion that the experiencing subject must be present at the place of the injured limb in which a painful phenomenon is localized in perception. For, insofar as they identified the phenomenon with the accompanying feeling of pain, they regarded it as a mental, not as a physical, phenomenon. And for just that reason, they believed its perception in the limb to be an inner, and consequently, an evident and infallible perception. 8 But their opinion is contradicted by the fact that the same phenomena

8. This is th e op inion of th e Jesui t , Tongiorgi , i n his very wid ely cir cula t ed philoso phy t ext boo k.

[ 47 ] often appear in the same way after the limb has been amputated. Others accordingly argued rather to the opposite effect, skeptically opposing the self-evidence (Evidenz ) of inner perception. This is all resolved, if one has learned to distinguish between the pain in the sense in which the term designates the apparent property of a part of our body and the feeling of pain which is tied up with sensing it. But if one has done this, then one is no longer inclined to hold that the feeling of sensory pain which one experiences on being injured is not based on any presentation. We may, accordingly, regard it as an indubitably correct def­ inition of mental phenomena that they are either presentations or (in the sense which has been explained) rest on presentations as their basis. In this we would thus have a second definition of the concept [ of mental phenomena] which breaks down into fewer terms. Yet it is not entirely unified, since it presents mental phenomena as divided into two groups. The Distinction between Mental and Physical Phenomena

IV The attempt has been made to give a perfectly unified definition which distinguishes all of the mental phenomena, as contrasted with the physical, by means of negation. All physical phenomena, it is said, manifest extension and definite spatial location, whether they are appearances to sight or another sense, or products of the imag­ ination, which presents similar objects to us. The opposite, however, is true of mental phenomena; thinking, willing, and so on appear as unextended and without a situation in space. According to this view, we would be in a position to character­ ize the physical phenomena easily and rigorously in contrast to the mental, if we were to say that they are those which appear extended and spatial. And, with the same exactitude, the mental phenomena would then be definable, as contrasted with the physical, as those which exhibit no extension or definite spatial location. One could call on Descartes and Spinoza in support of such a differentiation, but particularly on Kant, who declares space to be the form of intuition of outer sensation. A. Bain has recently given the same definition: "The depart­ ment of the Object, or Object-World," he says, "is exactly circum­ scribed by one property, Extension. The world of Subject-experience is devoid of this property. "A tree or a river is said to possess extended magnitude. A

FRANZ BRENTANO [ 48 ] pleasure has no length, breadth, or thickness; it is in no respect an extended thing. A thought or idea may refer to extended magni­ tudes, but it cannot be said to have extension in itself. Neither can we say that an act of the will, a desire, a belief, occupy dimen­ sions in space. Hence all that comes within the sphere of the Sub­ ject is spoken of as the Unextended. "Thus, if Mind, as commonly happens, is put for the sum total of Subject-experiences, we may define it negatively by a single fact -the absence of Extension. "9 So it appears that we have found, negatively at least, a unified definition for the sum-total of mental phenomena. But here, too, unanimity does not prevail among the psycholo­ gists, and for diverse reasons we often hear it denied that extension and the absence of extension are differentiating characteristics distin­ guishing physical and mental phenomena. Many believe that the definition is false because not only mental, but also many physical phenomena, appear without extension. Thus, a large number of not unimportant psychologists teach that the phe­ nomena of certain senses, or even of the senses in general, originally manifest themselves free of all extension and definite spatial char­ acter. This is very generally believed [ to be true ] of sounds and of the phenomena of smell. According to Berkeley, the same holds true of colors, and according to Platner, of the phenomena of the sense of touch. According to Herbart and Lotze, as well as Hartley, Brown, the two Mills, H. Spencer, and others, [it is true] of the phenomena of all the external senses. To be sure, it appears to us as if the phe­ nomena which the external senses, particularly vision and the sense of touch, manifest to us were all spatially extended. But the reason for this, it is said, is the fact that on the basis of prior expe­ rience we connect with them our gradually developed presentation of space ; originally without definite spatial location, they are later localized by us. If this should really be the only way in which physical phenomena attain definite spatial location, then we could plainly no longer distinguish the two realms by reference to this property. [ The possibility of such a distinction] is decreased still more by the fact that mental phenomena are also localized by us in such a way, as, for example, when we mistakenly place a phenomenon of anger in the irritable lion, and our own thoughts in the space that is filled by us.

9. Mental Science, Intro., chap. i.

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So that would be one way, from the point of view of a large num­ ber of important psychologists, in which the stated definition must be contested. When all is said, even Bain, who seems to advance it, is to be counted among these thinkers; for he follows Hartley's line of thought completely. He is able to speak as he has spoken only because (even though without complete consistency) he has not included the phenomena of the external senses, in and for them­ selves, among the physical phenomena. 10 Others, as I have said, will reject the definition for contrary reasons. It is not so much the claim that all physical phenomena appear extended that arouses their opposition. It is the claim, rather, that all mental phenomena lack extension; according to them, certain mental phenomena also manifest themselves as extended. Aristotle appears to have been of this opinion when, in the first chapter of his treatise on sensation and the object of sense, he regards it as evident, immediately and without previous proof, that sense per­ ception is the act of a physical organ. 1 1 Modern psychologists and physiologists express themselves similarly at times in connection with certain affects. They speak of feelings of pleasure and pain which appear in the external organs, sometimes, indeed, even after the amputation of the member; and surely, feeling, like perception, is a 1nental phenomenon. Many also say of sensual desires that they ap­ pear localized; and the fact that poets speak, perhaps not of thought, but of bliss and yearning which suffuse the heart and all the parts of the body, is in accord with that view. So we see that the stated distinction is assailed with regard to both physical and mental phenomena. Perhaps both points raised against it are equally unfounded. 1 2 Nevertheless, a further defini­ tion common to mental phenomena is still desirable in any case. For conflict over the question whether certain mental and physical phe­ nomena appear extended or not shows at once that the alleged attri­ bute does not suffice for a distinct differentiation; furthermore, for the mental phenomena it is negative only. 1 0. S ee note 1 . 1 1 . De sens. et sens 1. p . 436, b , 7. See also what h e says i n D e anim. I . 1 . p . 403, a, 16 about the a ffects , especia lly those of fea r. 1 2. The cla im that e ven m ent al phenomena appea r exten de d rests plainly on a con fusion between physic al an d me ntal phenomen a sim ilar to the one we became con vince d o f a bo ve , when we es t ablishe d tha t e ven senso ry fee lings are ne cessa ri ly b ase d on a p resent ation .

[ so J

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V What positive attribute will we now be able to advance? Or is there, perhaps, no positive definition at all which holds true of all mental phenomena generally? A. Bain says that in fact there is none. 1 3 Nonetheless, psycholo­ gists of an earlier period have already directed attention to a par­ ticular affinity and analogy which exists among all mental phenomena, while the physical do not share in it. Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional ( and also mental ) 14 inexistence (lnexistenz ) of an object ( Gegenstand) , and what we could call, although in not en­ tirely unambiguous terms, the reference to a content, a direction upon an object (by which we are not to understand a reality in this case ) , or an immanent objectivity. Each one includes something as object within itself, although not always in the same way. In presentation something is presented, in judgment something is af­ firmed or denied, in love [ something is] loved, in hate [ something] hated, in desire [ something] desired, etc. 1 5 This intentional inexistence is exclusively characteristic of mental phenomena. No physical phenomenon manifests anything similar. Consequently, we can define mental phenomena by saying that they 1 3 . The Senses and the Intellect, Intro. 1 4. They also use the expression "to be in something objectively," which, if we should wish to make use of it now, could possibly be taken in just the opposite sense, as the designation of a real existence outside of the mind. Nevertheless, it reminds one of the expression "to be immanently objective," which we sometimes use in a similar sense, and in which the "immanently" is intended to exclude the misunderstanding that was to be feared. 1 5. Aristotle has already spoken of this mental inherence. In his books on the soul, he says that what is experienced, insofar as it is experienced, is in the one experiencing it, that sense contains what is experienced without its matter, that what is thought is in the thinking intellect. In Philo we likewise find the doctrine of mental existence and inexistence. In confusing this, however, with existence in the strict sense, he arrives at his doctrine of the Logos and Ideas, with its wealth of contradictions. The like holds true of the Neo-Platonists. Augustine touches on the same fact in his theory of the Verbum mentis and its internal origin. An­ selm does so in his well-known ontological argument; and many have alleged the basis of his fallacy to be the fact that he regarded mental existence as if it were actual existence (see Ueberweg, History of Philosophy, Vol. II ) . Thomas Aquinas teaches that what is thought is intentionally in the one thinking, the object of love in the person loving, what is desired in the person desiring, and uses this for theological purposes. When the scripture speaks of an indwelling of the Holy Ghost, he explains this as an intentional indwelling by way of love. And he also seeks to find in intentional inexistence, in the cases of thinking and loving, a certain analogy for the mystery of the Trinity and the procession of the Word and Spirit.

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are such phenomena as include an object intentionally within them­ selves. But here, too, we come up against conflict and contradiction. And it is Hamilton in particular who denies the alleged property of a whole broad class of mental phenomena, namely, of all those which he designates as feelings, of pleasure and pain in their most diverse shades and varieties. He is in agreement with us concerning the phenomena of thinking and desire. Obviously, there would be no thinking without an object which is thought, no desire without an object which is desired. "In the phenomena of Feeling-the phe­ nomena of Pleasure and Pain-on the contrary, consciousness does not place the mer..tal modification or state before itself; it does not contemplate it apart-as separate from itself-but is, as it were, fused into one. The peculiarity of Feeling, therefore, is that there is nothing but what is subjectively subjective; there is no object dif­ ferent from self-no objectification of any mode of self. "1 6 In the first case, there would be something there which, according to Hamil­ ton's way of expression, is "objective"; in the second, something which is "objectively subjective," as in self-knowledge, whose object Hamilton therefore calls subject-object; Hamilton, in denying both with regard to feeling, most definitely denies any intentional inexist­ ence to it. However, what Hamilton says is surely not entirely correct. Cer­ tain feelings are unmistakably referred to objects, and language itself indicates these through the expressions it uses. We say that a per­ son rejoices in or about something, that a person sorrows or grieves about something. And once again : that delights me, that pains me, that hurts me, and so on. Joy and sorrow, like affirmation and denial, love and hate, desire and aversion, distinctly ensue upon a presenta,/ tion and are referred to what is presented in it. At the utmost, one could be inclined to agree with Hamilton in those cases in which one succumbs most easily, as we saw before, to the illusion that feeling is not based on any presentation : the case of the pain which is aroused by a cut or burn, for example. But its basis is none other than the very temptation toward this hypothesis, which, as we saw, is erroneous. Moreover, even Hamilton recog­ nizes with us the fact that, without exception, presentations form the basis of feelings, and consequently [ do so] in these cases as well. Therefore, his denial that feelings have an object seems so much the more striking. 16. Leet. on Metaph., I, 432.

FRANZ BRENTANO [ 52 ] To be sure, one thing is to be granted. The object to which a feeling refers is not always an external object. Even when I hear a harmonious chord, the pleasure which I feel is not really a pleas­ ure in the sound, but a pleasure in the hearing [ of it] . Indeed, one might not be mistaken in saying that it even refers to itself in a certain way and, therefore, that what Hamilton asserts, namely, that the feeling is "fused into one" with its object, does occur more or less. But this is nothing which does not likewise hold true of many phenomena of presentation and knowledge, as we shall see in our study of inner consciousness. Nevertheless, in them there is still a mental inexistence, a subject-object, to speak Hamilton's lan­ guage; and the same will therefore hold true of these feelings as well. Hamilton is mistaken when he says that, in them, everything is "subjectively subjective," an expression which is indeed really self-contradictory; for where we can no longer speak of an object, we can no longer speak of a subject either. Even when Hamilton spoke of a fusion-into-one of the feeling with the mental modifica­ tion, he gave witness against himself if we consider the matter exactly. Every fusion is a unification of several things; and conse­ quently the pictorial expression, which is intended to make us con­ cretely aware of the distinctive character of feeling, still indicates a certain duality in the unity. We may thus take it to be valid that the intentional inexistence of an object is a general distinguishing characteristic of mental phenomena, which differentiates this class of phenomena from the class of physical phenomena.

VI It is a further general characteristic of all mental phenomena that they are perceived only in inner consciousness, while only outer perception is possible for the physical. Hamilton advances this dis­ tinguishing attribute. 1 7 One could believe that such a definition says little, since it would seem more natural to take the opposite course, defining the act by reference to its object, and so defining inner perception, in contrast to all others, as perception of mental phenomena. But inner percep­ tion has still another characteristic, apart from the special nature of its object, which distinguishes it: namely, that immediate, infal17 . Ibid.

[ 53 ] lible self-evidence, which pertains to it alone among all the cases in which we know objects of experience. Thus, if we say that mental phenomena are those which are grasped by means of inner percep­ tion, we have accordingly said that their perception is immediately evident. Still more! Inner perception is not merely unique as immediately evident perception; it is really unique as perception ( Wahrmehmung) in the strict sense of the word. We have seen that the phenomena of so-called outer perception can in no way be demonstrated to be true and real, even by means of indirect reasoning. Indeed, we have seen that anyone who placed confidence in them and took them to be what they presented themselves as being is misled by the way the phenomena hang together. Strictly speaking, so-called outer per­ ception is thus not perception; and mental phenomena can accord­ ingly be designated as the only ones of which perception in the strict sense of the word is possible. Mental phenomena are also adequately characterized by means of this definition. It is not as if all mental phenomena are intro­ spectively perceivable for everyone, and therefore that everything which a person cannot perceive he is to count among the physical phenomena. On the contrary, it is obvious, and was already expressly remarked by us earlier, that no mental phenomenon is perceived by more than a single individual; but on that occasion we also saw that every type of mental phenomenon is represented in the psychical life of every fully developed human being. For this reason, reference to the phenomena which constitute the realm of inner perception serves our purpose satisfactorily. The Distinction between Mental and Physical Phenomena

VII We said that mental phenomena are the only ones of which a perception in the strict sense is possible. We could just as well say that they are the only phenomena to which actual, as well as inten­ tional, existence pertains. Knowledge, joy, desire, exist actually; color, sound, heat, only phenomenally and intentionally. There are philosophers who go so far as to say that it is self­ evident that no actuality could correspond to a phenomenon such as we call a physical one. They maintain that anyone who assumes this and ascribes to physical phenomena any existence other than mental holds a view which is self-contradictory in itself. Bain, for

[ 54 ]

FRANZ BRENTANO

example, says that some people have attempted to explain the phe­ nomena of outer perception by the hypothesis of a material world, "in the first instance, detached from perception, and, afterwards, coming into perception, by operating upon the mind." "This view," he says, "involves a contradiction. The prevailing doctrine is that a tree is something in itself apart from all perception; that, by its luminous emanations, it impresses our mind and is then perceived; the perception being an effect, and the unperceived tree [i.e. the one which exists outside of perception] the cause. But the tree is known only through perception; what it may be anterior to, or independent of, perception, we cannot tell; we can think of it as perceived but not as unperceived. There is a manifest contradiction in the sup­ position; we are required at the same moment to perceive the thing and not to perceive it. We know the touch of iron, but we cannot know the touch apart from the touch. "1 8 I must confess that I am not in a position to be convinced of the correctness of this argument. As certain as it is that a color only appears to us when it is an object of our presentation [ wenn wir sie vorstellen] , it is nevertheless not to be inferred from this that a color could not exist without being presented. Only if being pre­ sented were included as one factor in the color, just as a certain quality and intensity is included in it, would a color which is not presented signify a contradiction, since a whole without one of its parts is truly a contradiction. This, however, is obviously not the case. Otherwise it would be strictly inconceivable how the belief in the actual existence of the physical phenomenon outside of our presentation of it could have, not to say originated, but achieved the most general dissemination, been maintained with the utmost tenacity, and, indeed, even long been shared by thinkers of the first rank. If what Bain says were correct: "We can think of [ a tree] as perceived, but not as unperceived. There is manifest contradiction in the supposition," then his further conclusion would surely no longer be subject to objection. But it is precisely this which is not to be granted. Bain explains his dictum by saying: "We are required at the same moment to perceive the thing and not to perceive it." But it is not true that this is required: For, in the first place, not every case of thinking is a perception; and further, even if this were the case, it would only follow that a person could only think of trees perceived by him, but not that he could only think of trees 18. Mental Science, 3d ed., p. 198.

The Distinction between Mental and Physical Phenomena

[ 55 ] as perceived by him. To taste a white piece of sugar does not mean to taste a piece of sugar as white. The fallacy reveals itself quite dis­ tinctly when it is applied to mental phenomena. If one should say : "I cannot think of a mental phenomenon without thinking of it ; and so I can only think of mental phenomena as thought by me ; hence no mental phenomena exists outside of my thinking," this mode of inference would be exactly like the one Bain uses. Nonetheless, Bain himself will not deny that his individual mental life is not the only thing to which actual existence belongs. When Bain adds, "We know the touch of iron, but it is not possible that we should know the touch apart from the touch," he uses the word "touch," in the first place, obviously, in the sense of what is felt, and then in the sense of the feeling of it. These are different concepts even if they have the same name. Accordingly, only someone who permits him­ self to be deceived by the equivocation could make the concession of immediate evidence required by B ain. It is not true, then, that the hypothesis that a physical phe­ nomenon like those which exist intentionally in us exists outside of the mind in actuality includes a contradiction. It is only that, when we compare one with the other, conflicts are revealed, which show clearly that there is no actual existence corresponding to the inten­ tional existence in this case. And even though this holds true in the first instance only as far as our experience extends, we will, never­ theless, make no mistake if we quite generally deny to physical phe­ nomena any existence other than intentional existence.

VIII Still another circumstance has been taken as a distinguishing char­ acteristic for physical and mental phenomena. It has been said that mental phenomena occur only one after the other, while many physi­ cal phenomena, on the other hand, occur at the same time. This has not always been asserted in one and the same sense ; and not every sense which has been attached to the contention appears to be in accord with the truth. H. Spencer expressed his opinion on this subject recently : "The two great classes of vital actions called Physiology and Psychology are broadly distinguished in this, that while the one includes both simultaneous and successive changes the other includes successive changes only. The phenomena forming the subject-matter of Physi-

FRANZ BRENTANO [ 56 ] ology present themselves as an immense number of different series bound up together. Those forming the subject-matter of Psychology present themselves as but a single series. A glance at the many continuous actions constituting the life of the body at large, shows that they are synchronous-that digestion, circulation, respiration, excretion, secretion, etc., in all their many sub-divisions, are going on at one time in mutual dependence. And the briefest introspection makes it clear that the actions constituting thought occur, not to­ gether, but one after another."19 Thus, in making his comparison, Spencer has particularly in view the physiological and physical phe­ nomena within one and the same organism to which a consciousness is attached. If he had not done this, he would have had to grant that several series of mental phenomena can also run concurrently, since there is, surely, more than one living thing in the world en­ dowed with consciousness. But even within the limits he gives, the contention he advances is still not entirely true. And Spencer himself is so far from failing to recognize this fact that he immediately calls attention to those kinds of lower animals, e.g., the Radiata, in which a manifold psychological life spins itself out within one body. Here, he says-something which others, however, will not readily admit­ that there is little difference between mental and physical existence. And he makes still further concessions, according to which the al­ leged difference between physiological and mental phenomena is weakened to a matter of a mere more or less. Still more! If we ask ourselves what Spencer understands by physiological phenomena, alterations in which are supposed to occur simultaneously, in con­ trast to mental phenomena, it appears that he does not really mean physical phenomena by this term, but their causes, which are in themselves unknown ; for with respect to the physical phenomena which present themselves in sensation, it may be undeniable that they could not vary simultaneously unless the sensations also ad­ mitted of simultaneous variations. Hence we could not arrive at a distinguishing characteristic for the two classes in this way. Others have chosen to see a peculiarity of mental life in the fact that only one object can ever be grasped in consciousness, and never several at the same time. They point to the noteworthy case of error in time-determination which regularly occurs in astronomical ob­ servations, in that the simultaneous swing of the pendulum does not enter into consciousness simultaneously with, but earlier or later

1 9. Principles of Psycho[., 2d ed., Vol. I, § 1 77, p. 395.

[ 57 ] than, the moment when the observed star touches the hairline in the telescope. 20 Thus, mental phenomena always merely follow one an­ other in a simple series. But certainly a person would be mistaken to generalize on the basis of what such a case (involving the utmost concentration of attention) shows, without any further evidence. Spencer, at least, says : "I find that there may sometimes be detected as many as five simultaneous series of nervous changes, which in various degrees rise into consciousness so far that we cannot call any of them absolutely unconscious. When walking, there is the loco­ motive series; there may be, under certain circumstances, a tactual series; there is very often (in myself at least) an auditory series, constituting some melody or fragment of a melody which haunts me; and there is the visual series : all of which, subordinate to the domi­ nant consciousness formed by some train of reflection, are continually crossing it and weaving themselves into it. "2 1 Hamilton, Cardaillac, and other psychologists make similar reports on the basis of their experiences. But if it were assumed to be correct that all cases of perception are like the astronomer's, would we not always have to grant at least that we often have a presentation of something and simultaneously make a judgment about it or desire it? So there would still be several simultaneous mental phenomena. Indeed, one could more correctly advance the opposite contention, that, often enough, several mental phenomena are present but never more than one physical phenomenon. What is the only sense, then, in which we might say that in­ variably only one mental phenomenon is apparent but, on the other hand, that many physical phenomena appear simultaneously? We can say this insofar as the entire multiplicity of mental phenomena which appear to someone in inner perception always manifests itself to him as a unity, while this does not hold true of the physical phe­ nomena which he simultaneously grasps by means of so-called outer perception. As is commonly the case elsewhere, many persons have confused unity with simplicity here and therefore maintain that they perceive themselves in inner consciousness as something simple. Others, in contradicting the simplicity of the phenomenon, at the same time denied its unity. But just as the former group could not The Distinction between Mental and Physical Phenomena

20. Cf. Bessel, Astron. Beobachtungen (Konigsberg, 1 823) , Intro., Part. VIII; Struve, Expedition Chronometrique, etc. (Petersburg, 1 844) , p. 29. 2 1 . Ibid., p. 398. Likewise, Drobisch says, it is "a fact, that several series of presentations can go through the mind simultaneously, but at different levels, as it were" (Empir. Psych., p. 1 40) .

FRANZ BRENTANO [ 58 ] maintain a consistent position, since, as soon as they described what was within them, a great number of different factors came to be mentioned, so the latter could also not prevent themselves from testi­ fying involuntarily to the unity of the mental phenomenon. They speak, as do others, of an "I" and not a "we," and sometimes call this entity a "bundle" of perceptions, sometimes by other names which describe a state of hanging-together in an internal unity. When we perceive simultaneously color, sound, heat, smell, nothing hinders us from ascribing each to a particular thing. On the other hand, we are obliged to take the diverse set of corresponding acts of sensa­ tion, seeing, hearing, sensing heat, and smelling, and with them the willing and feeling and considering going on at the same time, and the inner perception by which we are aware of all of them as well, to be partial phenomena of a unified phenomenon which includes them, and to take them to be a single, unified thing. We shall thor­ oughly discuss the reason we are obliged to do so somewhat later and shall present in greater detail and more fully at that time more that is pertinent to the question. For what we touched on here is nothing other than the so-called unity of consciousness, a fact of psychology which is one of the richest in its consequences and which is, nevertheless, still disputed.

IX In conclusion, let us summarize the results of our comments on the distinction between physical and mental phenomena. First of all, we made ourselves concretely aware of the distinctive nature of the two classes by means of examples. We then defined mental phenomena as presentations and such phenomena which are based upon pres­ entations; all the rest belong to the physical. We next spoke of the attribute of extension, which was taken by psychologists to be a distinctive characteristic of all physical phenomena ; all mental phe­ nomena were supposed to lack it. The contention had not remained uncontested, however, and only later investigations could decide the issue ; that in fact mental phenomena do invariably appear unex­ tended was all that could be confirmed now. We next found inten­ tional inexistence, the reference to something as an object, to be a distinguishing feature of all mental phenomena; no physical phe­ nomenon manifests anything similar. We further defined mental phenomena as the exclusive object of inner perception; they alone are therefore perceived with immediate evidence; indeed, they alone

The Distinction between Mental and Physical Phenomena

[ 59 ] are perceived in the strict sense of the word. And with this there was bound up the further definition, that they alone are phenomena which possess actual existence besides their intentional existence. Finally, we advanced it as a distinguishing [feature] that the mental phenomena which someone perceives always appear as a unity despite their variety, while the physical phenomena which he may perceive simultaneously are not all presented in the same way as partial phenomena within a single phenomenon. There can be no doubt but that the characteristic which is more distinctive of mental phenomena than any of the others is intentional inexistence. We may now regard them as distinctly defined, over against the physical phenomena, by this, as well as by the other properties which were introduced. The definitions of mental and physical phenomena which have been given cannot fail to throw a brighter light on our earlier def­ initions of mental science and physical science (psychischer und Naturwissenschaft ) : indeed, we said of the latter that it is the science of physical phenomena and of the former that it is the science of mental phenomena. It is now easy to see that both definitions im­ plicitly include certain limitations. This holds true principally of the definition of physical science. For it is not concerned with all physical phenomena; not with those of imagination, but only with those which appear in sensation. And it determines laws for these only insofar as they depend upon physi­ cal stimulation of the sense organs. We could express the scientific task of physical science precisely by saying that physical science is the science which attempts to explain the succession of physical phenomena which are normal and pure ( not influenced by any par­ ticular psychological states and events ) on the basis of the hypothesis [ that they are the effect] of the stimulation of our sense organs by a world which is quasi-spatially ( raumiihnlich ) extended in three dimensions and which proceeds quasi-temporally ( zeitiihnlich ) in one direction. 22 Without giving any particulars concerning the abso­ lute nature of this world, [ physical science] is satisfied to ascribe to it powers which evoke the sensations and mutually influence each other in their working, and to determine the laws of coexistence and succession for these powers. In those laws, it then indirectly 22. On t his point see Ue berweg (System der Logik), in whose ana lysis , to be s ure , not ever yt hing is deserving of approval . He is mista ken partic ular ly when he consi ders t he e xterna l ca uses to be spatial instea d of quasi -spa tial , tempo ral instea d of quasi -te mporal .

FRANZ BRENTANO [ 60 ] gives the laws governing the succession of the physical phenomena of sensation when, by means of scientific abstraction from concomi­ tant psychological conditions, these are regarded as pure and as occuring in relation to a constant sensory capacity. Hence, "science of physical phenomena" must be interpreted in this somewhat com­ plicated way, if it is made synonymous with physical science.23 We have seen, along the way, how the expression "physical phe­ nomenon" is sometimes misused by being applied to the above­ mentioned powers themselves. And, since the object of a science is naturally designated as the one for which it determines laws directly and explicitly, I believe I make no mistake in also assuming with respect to the definition of physical science as the science of physical phenomena that there is ordinarily bound up with this term the concept of powers belonging to a world which is quasi-spatially extended and which proceeds quasi-temporally, powers which evoke sensations by their effect on the sense organs and which reciprocally influence one another, and for which physical science investigates the laws of coexistence and succession. If one regards these powers as the object [ of physical science] , this also has the convenient fea­ ture that something which truly and actually exists appears as object of the science. This last would be just as attainable if we defined physical science as the science of sensations, implicitly adding the same limitation of which we just spoke. What made the expression "physical phenomenon" seem preferable was, probably, primarily the fact that the external causes of sensation were thought of as corresponding to the physical phenomena appearing in it, (whether this be in every respect, as was originally the case, or whether it be, as now, in respect at least to extension in three dimensions) . From this, there also arose the otherwise inappropriate term, "outer perception." It is pertinent, however, that the act of sensation mani­ fests, along with the intentional inexistence of the physical phe­ nomenon, still other properties with which the physical scientist (Naturforscher) is not at all concerned, since sensation does not give through them similar information about the distinctive rela­ tionships of the external world.

23. The interpretation would not be quite as Kant would have it; nevertheless, it approximates his interpretations as far as is feasible. In a certain sense, it comes closer to the viewpoint of Mill in his book against Hamilton ( chap. xi ) , but still without agreeing with him in all the essential respects. What Mill calls permanent possibilities of sensations has a close relationship with what we call powers. The relationship to, as well as the most important departure from, Ueberweg's view was already touched upon in the preceding note.

The Distinction between Mental and Physical Phenomena

[ 61 ]

With respect to the definition of psychology, it may be apparent in the first place that the concept of mental phenomena is to be broadened rather than narrowed. For the physical phenomena of imagination, at least, fall completely within its scope just as much as do mental phenomena, in the sense defined earlier ; and those which appear in sensation can also not remain unconsidered in the theory of sensation. But it is obvious that they come into considera­ tion only as the content of mental phenomena, when the character­ istics of those phenomena are being described. And the same holds true of all mental phenomena which possess exclusively phenomenal existence. It is only mental phenomena in the sense of actual states which we shall haYe to regard as the true object of psychology. And it is exclusively with reference to them that we say psychology is the science of mental phenomena.

2

Presentation and Judgment Form Two Distinct Fundamental Classes BY

FRANZ BRENTANO

( TRAN SLATED BY D. B. TERRELL )

WHEN WE SAY that presentation ( Vorstellung) and judgment ( Ur­ teil ) are distinct basic classes of mental phenomena, what we mean by this, according to what has been remarked before, is that they are two entirely different ways of being conscious of an object. By this we do not mean to deny that every judgment presupposes a presentation. We maintain, rather, that every object of judgment enters into consciousness in two ways, as an object of presentation and as an object of affirmation or denial (als anerkannt oder ge­ leugnet ) . Thus, the relationship would be similar to the one which is assumed (rightly, as we saw) by the great majority of philos­ ophers, by Kant no less than by Aristotle, to hold between presenta­ tion and appetition ( Begehren ) . Nothing is an object of appetition which is not an object of presentation. Nevertheless, appetition is an entirely new and distinctive type of reference to the object, an entirely new way in which it enters into consciousness. It is also true Th is se le ct ion is from F ran z B rentano 's Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt, Boo k II, chapte r vii ; a lso pu b lish ed as chapte r iii o f Von der Klassification der psychischen Phiinomene ( Le ipzig , 191 1). The passages t rans lated appea r on pages 35, 44-45, 48-50, 55-57, and 60-63 in Vo lume II of th e ed it ion of th e Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt in the Ph ilosoph is ch e B ib liothe k ( Le ip zig : Fe lix Me ine r 1925). [TRANSLATOR'S N oTE : The most fam ilia r o f th e do ct rines ad van ced by B ren ­ tano , th e do ct rin e o f the int ent iona lity o f m enta l ph eno mena , is clos ely lin ke d w ith anoth er equa lly dist in ct ive thes is con cern ing th e class ificat ion o f menta l ph e­ nomena. The class ificat ion, B rentano ma inta ins , is based on the fundamenta l d ifferen ces in th e way in wh ich menta l ph enomena refer to the ir o b je cts. Th e th re e bas ic classes so dist inguished a re Presentat ion , Judgment , and A cts o f Lo ve an d Ha te. The dist in ct ion b etween p resentat ion and judgmen t wh ich is d eve lop ed in these se le ct ions is of fundam enta l sign ifican ce to B rentano 's id eas on pro b lems relating to log ic, ep ist emo logy and onto logy. D. B . T. ]

[ 62 ]

Two Distinct Fundamental Classes

[ 63 ] that nothing is judged which is not presented, but we maintain that when the object of a presentation becomes the object of an affirming or rejecting judgment, consciousness enters into a com­ pletely new kind of relationship to it. It is taken up into consciousness in a doubled way then, as an object of presentation and as held true or denied, just as when desire is directed upon it, it inheres in con­ sciousness as presented and as desired at the same time . . . It is a very common opinion that making a judgment consists in a combining or a separating which is realized within the realm of our acts of presentation. The affirmative judgment, and in a some­ what modified way, the negative too, is therefore usually described as a compound or relating act of thought and thus contrasted with mere presentation. Interpreted in this way, what constitutes the dif­ ference between judgment and mere presentation would really be nothing but a difference between the content of the judgment and the content of the merely presentative thought. If a certain kind of union or relation of two properties were thought, the thought would be a judgment, while every thought which had no such connection as its content would have to be called a mere presentation. But this view is untenable. If we assume it to be correct that a certain kind of union of sev­ eral properties always forms the content of a judgment, then this will surely distinguish judgments from some presentations, but in no way will it distinguish judgments from all of them. For, obvi­ ously, it does occur that an act of thought which is nothing but a mere presentation has as its content a combination of attributes which is wholly similar to, indeed perfectly identical with, that which in another case forms the object of a judgment. If I say that some tree is green, then green as a property bound up with a tree forms the content of my judgment. But someone could ask me : Is any tree red? and I, lacking sufficient knowledge of plant life and forgetful of the autumn color of the leaves, could withhold all judgment on the ques­ tion. But I would nevertheless understand the question and, as a consequence of this, have a presentation of a red tree. The red com­ bined with a tree as its property, just as the green was in the previous case, would then form the content of a presentation without any judgment. Or consider a person who had seen only trees with red leaves and never one with green: on being asked about green trees he might grasp in a mere presentation the very same combination of attributes which was the content of my judgment, and not just a similar one . . . But there is still more. It is not even true that in all judgments

FRANZ BRENTANO [ 64 ] a combination or separation of presented attributes takes place. Assertion or denial is no more exclusively directed to combinations or connections than is desire or aversion. A single attribute which is an object of our presentation can also be affirmed or denied. When we say, "A exists," this sentence is not, as has often been supposed in the past and even now, a predication in which existence as predicate is combined with A as subject. It is not the conjunction of an attribute, "existence," with "A," but "A" itself which we affirm. Similarly, when we say, "A does not exist," this is no predica­ tion of the existence of A in a contrary sense, no denial of the con­ junction of an attribute, "existence," with "A." On the contrary, "A" is the object which we deny. So that this may become quite clear, I call attention to the fact that anyone who affirms a whole affirms inclusively every single part of the whole. Therefore, anyone who affirms a conjunction of attributes affirms inclusively each particular element of the conjunc­ tion. Anyone who affirms that a learned man exists, i.e., the con­ junction of a man with the attribute, "being learned," affirms in­ clusively that a man exists. Let us apply this to the judgment, "A exists. " If this judgment were the affirmation of the conjunction of an attribute, "existence," with "A," then it would include the affirma­ tion of each individual element of the conjunction, and consequently the affirmation of A. Hence, we would not be able to avoid the ad­ mission of an included simple affirmation of A. But in what way would this simple affirmation of A be distinguished from the affirma­ tion of the conjunction of A with the attribute, "existence," which is supposed to be expressed by the proposition, "A exists"? Obviously in no way whatsoever. Consequently, we see that the affirmation of A is the true and complete sense of the proposition and that nothing besides A is object of the judgment. Let us examine the proposition, "A does not exist," in the same way. Perhaps by considering it we will make the truth of our interpretation even more obvious. If one who affirms a whole af­ firms inclusively each part of the whole, it does not equally hold that one who denies a whole denies inclusively each part of the whole. Anyone who denies that there are blue and white swans does not on that account deny inclusively that there are white swans. And naturally so; for even if only one part is false, the whole can not be true. Therefore, anyone who denies a conjunction of attributes in no way denies inclusively every single attribute which is an ele­ ment of the conjunction. Anyone, for example, who denies that there

[ 65 ] is a learned bird, i.e., denies the conjunction of a bird with the attribute, "being learned," does not deny inclusively that a bird or learning exists in reality. Let us apply this to our case. If the judg­ ment, "A does not exist," were the denial of the conjunction of an attribute, "existence," with "A," then A itself would not be denied at all. But no one could possibly maintain that. On the contrary, it is clear that just this and nothing else is the sense of the proposi­ tion. Consequently, nothing but A is the object of this negative judgment . . . Even if some thinkers are not prepared to admit that the inter­ pretation of the existential proposition we have advanced is correct, still all grant, without exception, another truth from which it can be inferred with the utmost stringency. Even those who misconstrue the nature of the "is" and "is not" in the existential proposition nevertheless make a completely correct judgment about the "is" and "is not" which is added on to a subject and a predicate as copula. They may believe that the "is" and "is not" in the existential prop­ osition signify something in and of themselves, that the former brings the presentation of the predicate, "existence," to the presenta­ tion of the subject in order to combine them; yet they recognize that the copula, having no meaning when taken by itself, serves only to supplement the expression of presentation, making it the expression cf an affirmative or negative judgment. Let us hear, for example, from John Stuart Mill, who is our opponent in the interpretation of the existential proposition : "A predicate and a subject," he says, "are all that is necessarily required to make up a proposition : but as we cannot conclude from merely seeing two names put together, that they are a predicate and a subject, that is, that one of them is intended to be affirmed or denied of the other, it is necessary that there should be some mode or form of indicating that such is the intention; some sign to distinguish a predication from any other kind of discourse . . . this function is more commonly fulfilled by the word is, when an affirmation is intended, is not, when a negation; or by some other form of the verb to be. The word which thus serves the purpose of a sign of predication is called the copula. "1 He then expressly distinguishes this "is" or "is not" of the copula from that which includes the concept of existence within its meaning. That is not only Mill's theory, but it may be said to be the theory of all who do not agree with us in the interpretation of the existential Two Distinct Fundamental Classes

1. Deductive and Inductive Logic, chap. iv, Sec. 1, p. 66.

FRANZ BRENTANO [ 66 ] proposition. We find it to be advanced by grammarians and lexi­ cographers as well as logicians. And when John Stuart Mill credits James Mill with having been the first to have developed this inter­ pretation clearly,2 he is very much mistaken. He might have been able, for example, to find it in exactly the same form in the Port Royal Logic. 3 Well then-it requires no more than this admission, which our opponents universally make with respect to the copula, in order to deduce from it that no other function can be ascribed to the "is" and "is not" of the existential proposition either. For it can be shown most clearly that every categorical proposition can be translated into an existential one without any change in meaning and that then the "is" and "is not" of the existential proposition take the place of the copula. I will prove this with some examples. The categorical proposition, "Some man is sick," has the same meaning as the existential proposition, "A sick man exists," or "There is a sick man." The categorical proposition, "No stone is living," has the same meaning as the existential proposition, "A living stone does not exist," or "There is no living stone." The categorical proposition, "All men are mortal," has the same meaning as the existential proposition, "An immortal man does not exist," or "There is no immortal man."4 The categorical proposition, "Some man is not learned," has the same meaning as the existential proposition, "A non-learned man exists," or "There is a non-learned man." Since all of the four classes of categorical judgments which logi­ cians are accustomed to distinguish are represented in the four examples I chose,5 the possibility of the linguistic transformation of categorical propositions into existential propositions has thus been demonstrated; and it is clear that the ''is" and the "is not" of the existential proposition are nothing but equivalents of the copula,

2. Ibid., p. 95. 3. Logique, ou /'art de penser, Part I I, chap . iii . 4. Or di nar y logi c sa ys that the judgme nts, "A ll me n are mo rta l," a nd "No me n are not morta l," are e quipo lle nt . (C f., e .g ., Ue be rweg , Logik, Pa rt 5, 96 2d ed., p . 325.) The tr uth is that the y are i de nti ca l. 5. The parti c ular a ffirmati ve , the uni versa l negati ve, a nd the so -ca lle d (mis ­ ta ke nly) uni versa l a ffirmati ve a nd parti c ular negati ve . The tr uth, as the a bo ve re ductio n to the e xiste ntia l form ula re vea ls c lear ly, is that no a ffirmati ve judgme nt is unive rsal (i n ge nera l it m ust the n be ca lle d a judg me nt with individual co nt ent (Materie) , a nd no ne ga tive ju dgment i s pa rticular.

Two Distinct Fundamental Classes

[ 67 ] and so they are not predicates and are entirely meaningless taken all by themselves . . . This serves in two ways to confute the mistaken opinion that judgment is distinguished from presentation by the fact that judg­ ment has a conjunction of attributes as its content. In the first place, in the reduction of the categorical to the existential proposition, the ''being" of the existential proposition replaces the copula and so lets it be known that it no more involves a predicate term than the latter does. Further, it is seen quite plainly how the compounding of several elements which was believed to be so essential for the general and the specific nature of judgments, the combination of subject and predicate, is in fact nothing but a matter of linguistic expression. Had this been known from the beginning, no one would have distinguished presentation and judgment by saying that the content of the former is a simple, and that of the latter a compound, idea. For there is truly not the slightest difference in content. One who affirms, one who denies, and one who uncertainly questions, all have the same object in consciousness ; the last has it merely as a pre­ sentation, the first two have it as a presentation and at the same time affirm it or deny it. And every object which is the content of a pre­ sentation can also become, under certain circumstances, the con­ tent of a judgment. There are certain cases in which such a reduction [ of categorical to existential judgments ] could be attacked on the basis of more specific considerations. Although I do not wish to interrupt the course of the inquiry in the text for the sake of these cases ( since many will not find them very disturbing anyway ) , it seems well to consider them at least in a note. * In one section of his logic, John Stuart Mill wishes to exhibit the different natures of the "being" of the copula and of the "being" of the existential proposition which, in his opinion, includes the concept of existence, and to illustrate his point, he cites the propo­ sition, "A centaur is a poetic fiction." This, he says, cannot possibly assert existence since, on the contrary, it entails that the subject possesses no real existence. (Book I, chap. iv. ) On another occa­ sion he cites the proposition, "Jupiter is a Non-ens," for a similar * [TRANSLATOR'S Norn : This pa rt of the di scu ssio n o riginally a ppeared as a foot note. ]

FRANZ BRENTANO [ 68 ] purpose. In fact, these propositions are of such a kind that the possi­ bility of reducing them to existential propositions appears to be at a minimum. In correspondence with Mill I once brought up the question of existential propositions. In opposition to his view about the relation of "being" in existential propositions and the copula, I said that every assertion is reducible to an existential proposition. In his reply he held to his old interpretation. And although he did not expressly deny the reducibility of all other assertions to existential ones, which I had set forth, I nevertheless suspected that I might not have made this point of my proof sufficiently plain to him. For this reason I came back to it once more and specifically discussed the examples in his logic. Since I find a rough draft of this letter among my papers, I will repeat the brief comment verbatim. I wrote : "It might not be unserviceable if I showed the possibility of such a reduction specifically in terms of a proposition which you cite in your logic as an example in which the opposite is manifest. The proposition, 'A centaur is a poetic fiction, ' requires (as you remark correctly) not that a centaur should exist, but the opposite. But in order for it to be true it requires that something else should exist, namely a poetic fiction which combines in a particular way the upper parts of a human body with the body and legs of a horse. If there were no poetic fiction and if there were no centaurs imagina­ tively created by poets, then the proposition would be false; and its meaning is actually none other than that 'There is a poetic fic­ tion, which conceives the upper parts of a human body to be joined to the body and legs of a horse ' or (which comes to the same thing) 'There is a centaur imaginatively created by poets.' The like holds true if I say that Jupiter is a Non-ens, i.e., that he is something which exists merely in the imagination, not in reality. The truth of the proposition does not require that there should be a Jupiter, but that something else should exist. If there were not something which exis ted merely in the presentation, then the propo­ sition would not be true. The special reason why, with sentences like 'The centaur is a fiction,' one is inclined to doubt their reducibility to existential propositions lies in a relationship of their predicates to their subjects which, it seems to me, has previously been over­ looked by logicians. Adjectives ordinarily enrich the concept of the substantive to which they are adjoined with new properties, but some­ times they simply modify it; similarly for predicates and the subject

Two Distinct Fundamental Classes

[ 69 ]

with which they are combined. The former holds true, for example, when I say 'A man is learned' ; the second, when I say 'A man is dead.' A learned man is a man; a dead man, however, is not. Hence the proposition, 'A dead man is,' does not presuppose, in order to be true, the existence of a man, but only the existence of a dead man. And likewise the proposition, 'A centaur is a fiction,' does not demand that there should be a centaur, but only that there should be an imagined centaur, i.e., the fiction of a centaur, and so forth." This explanation may remove a doubt which some might have. It turned out, however, that Mill himself did not require it. He re­ plied to me on February 6, 1873 : "You did not, as you seem to suppose, fail to convince me of the invariable convertibility of all categorical affirmative propositions into predications of existence [ he means affirmative existential propositions, which naturally I would not have designated as "predications of existence"] . The sugges­ tion was new to me, but I at once saw its truth when pointed out. It is not on that point that our difference hinges, etc." The passage from his letter which I have cited makes it manifest that, despite the admitted reducibility of all categorical propositions to exis­ tential propositions, Mill held fast to his opinion that the "is" and "is not" include within them a predicate-concept, existence, as he did earlier, and he stated this still more decidedly in what fol­ lowed. But how he could hold fast to his theory of the copula under those conditions, he did not reveal. Consistency would re­ quire that he give it up and that much of his Logic (as, for example, Book I, chap. v, 5) be essentially transformed. I hoped, following his invitation to Avignon in early summer, that in conversation I could more easily come to an understanding with him on these points and others which were pending between us, and did not urge the point any further. But his sudden death thwarted my hopes. I will add only a brief note more to my comment against Mill. Propositions like "A man is dead" are not, in the true sense of the word, to be called categorical at all, because death is not an attri­ bute but, as I have said, entails a modification of the subject. What would be said of the categorical syllogism : "All men are living creatures; some man is dead; therefore, some dead creature is liv­ ing"? But if the minor premise were a true categorical proposition, the argument would be a valid syllogism in the third figure. If we now wished to assume, along with Kant, different classes of "rela­ tion" of judgment corresponding to such different forms of assertion,

FRANZ BRENTANO [ 70 ] then here again we would have to make new "transcendental" dis­ coveries. The truth is, however, that the special formula of assertion is easily laid aside, for the existential proposition, "There is a dead man," says absolutely the same thing. And so I hope people will finally cease to confuse differences of language here with differences in thought.

3

Genuine and Fictitious Objects BY

F R A N Z B R E N TAN O

(TRANS LATED BY D. B. TERRELL )

refer to things. In many cases, the things to which we refer do not exist. But we are accustomed to saying that they then have being as objects. This is a loose ( uneigentlicher ) use of the word, "to be," which we permit with impunity for the sake of convenience, just as "com­ ing up" and "going down" are permissible when applied to the sun. All it means is that a mentally active subject is referring to them. It is only being consistent to go on and permit such statements as "a centaur is half man, half horse," although a centaur does not exist in a strict sense, and so, in a strict sense, there is no centaur which has a body that is half of human form and half in the form of a horse. Just as the mentally active subject's distinctive property of re­ ferring to things has led to talk about objects which have their being in the subject, so the fact that the subject refers in different ways to the same thing has led to talk about something which is somehow more than the object, includes the latter within itself, and likewise exists within the subject. It has been called the "content" of the mental reference. Especially in connection with the mental act of making judgments, there has been talk of a content of judg­ ment as well as an object. If I make the judgment, "A centaur ALL M EN TAL REFEREN CES

Th is se le ct ion is fr om S upp lementar y Essa y IX t o Fran z Brentan o's Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt, one of e le ven s uch s upp lementa ry essa ys pre ­ pare d for a new e dit ion of Book II, chapters v-ix of the or ig inal te xt . The se chapters , with the s upp lementar y essa ys , were p ublishe d in 191 1, un der the tit le , Von der Klassification der psychi.schen Phiinomene ( Le ip zig, 191 1 ) . The passa ges trans late d appear on pages 1 58-60, 1 6 1 -63, an d 1 7 1-72 in Volume II of the e dition of the Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt in the Ph ilos oph is che Bibliothe k ( Le ip zig: Fe li x Me iner , 1925) . [ 71 ]

FRANZ BRENTANO [ 72 ] does not exist," then it is said that the object is a centaur, but that the content of the judgment is that a centaur does not exist, or the non-existence of a centaur. If it is said that this content has its being in the active subject, then once again the word "to be" is being used in a loose and improper sense and means nothing dif­ ferent from what is expressed by the use of "to be," in its proper sense, in the words : "A mentally active subject is denying a centaur in the Modus praesens." Some have been led still further in this regard, however, and out of consideration for the difference between correct and incorrect judgment, have spoken of contents which exist in actuality and of those that do not exist in actuality. Hence, for example, since anyone who denies a centaur makes a correct judgment, it is said that the non-existence of the centaur is actual, while the existence of the centaur is not actual. And contrariwise, because it is true that there are trees, it is said not merely that trees exist, but also that the existence of trees is and that their non-existence is not. Thus, contents are treated analogously to objects, among which we distinguish some which have their being only in a loose and im­ proper sense, in the mental act, and some which have being in the strict and proper sense outside of it, where they belong to the realm of real things. Since there has been some hesitation, however, in declaring the non-existence of a centaur to be a real thing, it was believed that the difference, on the one hand, and the similarity, on the other, could be taken account of at the same time by calling contents "Objectives." Yet in this case we are certainly concerned with nothing but fictions. If one says that the non-existence of a centaur has being, or even answers the question as to whether a centaur does not exist by saying "That is so," he means to say only that he denies cen­ taurs in the Modus praesens, and consequently also believes that anyone who denies a centaur judges correctly. Aristotle is quite correct, therefore, in saying that the "That is so" by which we indi­ cate our agreement with a judgment means nothing but that the judgment is true, and that truth has no being outside of the person judging; in other words, it exists only in that loose and improper sense, but not strictly and in reality. It would lead to the most disastrous complications, if we let ourselves go astray regarding this Aristotelian doctrine and took those fictions to be things which have being in the proper sense of the word. There would then be, besides an apple, the existence of an apple as well, the non-existence

[ 73 ] of the non-existence of an apple, and so on ad infinitum, and infinite complications would be infinitely multiplied. Suppose that, in defense of the claim that the non-existence of a centaur subsists genuinely and in reality, someone appealed to the principle, "The truth of a judgment is its agreement with reality," and said that this agreement would be missing in the case of a negative judgment if there were nothing corresponding to it in real­ ity. The answer to be given is that in this case the meaning of those old and traditional words is being misinterpreted. They mean no more than that an affirmative judgment is called true when that, which the judgment says exists (or did, or will exist) , does exist (or did, or will exist) . A negative judgment is called true when that, which the judgment says does not exist (or did not, or will not exist) , does not exist (or did not, or will not exist) . It is a question of positive agreement with a thing only in the case of the affirmative judgment in the Modus praesens, while it is sufficient for the negative judgment in Modus praesens that there is no dis­ harmony, as there would be, for example, for the denial of centaurs if there really were centaurs. Consider now the analogy sometimes drawn between contents ([nhalten ) and objects ( Objekten ) , which is supposed to consist in this fact: that certain contents, like certain objects, have being in a loose and improper sense as well as in a proper sense, and that other contents, like other objects, do not. This analogy has no justification. Just as contents cannot have being in the proper sense, they cannot have being in that loose and improper sense in which objects have being either; that is, they cannot become objects, just as, on the other hand, no object can constitute the whole of a content. It is easy to see how this statement ties up with what has been said before; for if a content, e.g., Napoleon's existence or his non­ existence, could become an object, then it would also have to hold true of it that it either is or is not, and we would have to be able to say, in the proper sense, of Napoleon's existence as well as of Napoleon, that at one time it has being and that at another time it does not, that it now begins and now ends. A content is never pre­ sented in the sense of being object of the presentation, nor is it ever affirmed, in the sense in which an object is affirmed, not even by those who believe that it is to be affirmed. At the same time, I naturally do not wish to deny that, according to another even more common usage, we can say that a person affirms that a thing exists, Genuine and Fictitious Objects

FRANZ BRENTANO [ 74 ] instead of saying that he affirms a thing. But absolutely the only thing which is presented is a person who is making the judgment concerned, and the judgment is made that insofar as we think of such a person, we are thinking of someone who judges correctly. Strictly speaking, therefore, we do not even express ourselves quite correctly if we say we deny that the content of a judgment exists. We ought rather to say we deny that anything exists for which the word "content" is a name. In the same way, words like "of" and "but," which standing by themselves have no meaning, name no thing. "An 'of' does not exist," "a 'but' does not exist," has no more sense than "a Poturi-Nulongon does not exist." But it does, indeed, make sense to say : There is no thing which is named by the prepo­ sition, "of," or the conjunction, "but." Hence, we are certain: One cannot make an object of the existence or non-existence of a centaur as one can of a centaur. One can make an object only of someone affirming or denying the centaur, in which case the centaur, to be sure, becomes at the same time an object in a special Modus obliquus. And so it holds true generally that nothing other than things ( Dinge ) , which fall entirely within the same concept of real entity (Reales ) , can provide an object ( Gegenstand) for mental reference. Nothing else can ever be, like a real entity, the thing to which we mentally refer as an object : this is true of present, past, and future, of present things, past things, and future things, of ex­ istence and non-existence, of necessity and non-necessity, of possi­ bility and impossibility, of the necessary and the non-necessary, of the possible and the impossible, of truth and falsity, of the true and the false, of good and bad; it is also true of the so-called actuality (energeia, entelecheia ) or Form (eidos, logos, morphe ) , of which Aristotle speaks, and which we express in our language by means of such abstractions as redness, shape, human nature, and the like; and it is true further of objects as objects ( Objekte als Objekte) ­ of that which is affirmed, denied, loved, hated, presented. It would lead us too far here to demonstrate this in terms of each particular case. And so let it be remarked in general only, that anyone who carefully studies a case in which one could be inclined to assume the contrary, will discover that in those cases we always have things as objects, sometimes directly, sometimes indirectly; and [he will discover] further that for every sentence which seems to have one of the things mentioned as its subject or predicate, he can form an equivalent in which subject and predicate are re-estab-

[ 75 ] lished as real entities. Leibnitz knew this, particularly as concerns so-called N omina abstracta, and in his Nouveaux Essais, Book II, chap. xx.iii, Section I, took cognizance of a translation such as we have indicated, with which one might see removed a host of subtle and abstruse debates which have perplexed metaphysics and logic. This is not to deny that in many cases the fiction that we have, as an object, something other than a real entity-for example, that that which lacks being as such, as well as that which has it, may be an object-proves itself harmless in logical operations; indeed, by means of this fiction these operations can be facilitated, because they are simplified in expression and even in thought itself. It is similar to the way mathematicians are accustomed to use with advantage the fictions of numbers less than zero, and many others. By this method a presentation and judgment, complicated in various ways, permit themselves to be handled as if they were simple, and one is spared the trouble (which is useless in some cases) of clarifying more exactly a confusedly grasped mental event. . . . The fact that such fictions are useful in logic has led many to believe that logic has non-things as well as things as its object and, accordingly, that the concept of its object is more general than that of the real. This is, however, thoroughly incorrect; indeed, accord­ ing to what has been said, it is downright impossible, for there can­ not be anything at all other than real objects, and the same homo­ geneous concept of the real, as the most general concept of all, comprehends everything which is truly an object. Also, the terms of ordinary language are most often not psychologically, but only grammatically, names. They do not name things, but it remains none the less true that the discourse in which they are involved is con­ cerned with nothing other than things. The object of logic is really much narrower than the concept of thing. Logic is a technical disci­ pline, and is intended to put us in a position to acquire knowledge by means of inquiry and proof. It is an art of judgment. Only insofar as, in judging, we have things of all kinds as objects, do these come within our view-indirectly, as it were; while directly it is knowl­ edge (strictly speaking, the knowing subject) which is to be desig­ nated as the object of logic. Genuine and Fictitious Objects

4

The Theory of Objects BY A L E X I U S MEIN O N G (TRANSLATED B Y ISAAC LEVI, D. B . TERRELL, AND RODERICK M. CHISHOLM

1. THE PROBLEM THAT KNOWING 1s IMPOSSIBLE without something being known, and more generally, that judgments and ideas or presentations ( Vorstel­ lungen ) are impossible without being judgments about and presenta­ tions of something, is revealed to be self-evident by a quite elementary examination of these experiences. I have been able to show, almost without special investigation, that this is also true in the realm of assumptions (A nnahmen) , even though psychological research has but recently turned in their direction. 1 The situation is more com­ plicated in this respect, however, in the case of feelings. There is no doubt that language is somewhat misleading in referring to joy or grief, or to pity or envy, and the like, as being that which one feels. There are also complications in the area of desires, insofar as we think from time to time that we should revert to the possibility of desires which are not desires for anything, despite the linguistic evidence, which is here once again entirely unambiguous. However, even one who would disagree with my view that feelings, like de­ sires, are dependent psychological states insofar as they have ideas as their indispensable "psychological presuppositions," 2 would unThis essay first appeared in Untersuchzmgen zur Gegenstandstheorie und Psychologie ( Leipzig, 1 904 ) , edited by Meinong. Other essays, by philosophers and psycholo­ gists associated with Meinong at the University of Graz, were included in the same volume. The essay also appears in Volume II of Meinong's collected works. 1. Ober Annahmen ( Leipzig, 1 902 ) , pp. 256 f. [The references in the present selection to V ber Annahmen are to the first edition, not to the second, revised edi­ tion of 1 9 10.] 2. See my Psychologisch-ethischen Untersuchungen zur Werttheorie (Graz, 1894 ) , pp. 34 f. Also Hofler, Psychologie, p. 389.

[ 76 ]

The Theory of Objects

[ 77 ] hesitatingly concede that we are happy about something, interested in something, and, at least in the majority of cases, do not wish or intend without wishing for or intending something. To put it briefly, no one fails to recognize that psychological events so very commonly have this distinctive "character of being directed to something" (auf etwas Gerichtetsein ) as to suggest very strongly (at least) that we should take it to be a characteristic aspect of the psychological as opposed to the non-psychological. The purpose of the following remarks is, nevertheless, not to explain why I hold this way of looking at the matter to be firmly established, despite the many difficulties confronting it. There are so many cases in which reference, indeed explicit directedness (Ge­ richtetsein ) , to that "something," or (as we say quite naturally) to an object, unquestionably forces itself upon our attention that, even if they alone were to be considered, the question would soon be answered for anyone who investigated these matters scientifically. The partitioning of whatever deserves and needs theoretical con­ sideration into different scientific realms, and the careful delimitation of these realms, may often be of little practical importance in ad­ vancing the research connected with it. What matters in the final analysis is the work that is accomplished, and not the banner under which it is done. However, obscurities as to the boundaries of the diverse areas of science can become significant in two contrasting ways : either the areas which are actually investigated encroach upon one another, or they are separated from each other, and conse­ quently leave an intermediate area untouched. The significance of such obscurities, within the sphere of our theoretical interest, is exactly the opposite of their significance within the sphere of prac­ tical affairs. In the latter, the "neutral zone" is a guarantee (always desired but rarely capable of being realized) of amicable neighborly relations, while the overlapping of territorial claims presents the typical case of conflict of interests. But in the realm of theoretical activity, where such conflicts, at least, have no justification, it is a gain, objectively considered, if the frontier districts coincide, for as a result they are investigated from different sides. A separation, on the other hand, is always a disadvantage, the seriousness of which depends on the size and significance of the intermediate territory. The intent of the problem raised here is to call attention to just such an area of knowledge, which is sometimes overlooked, some­ times not sufficiently appreciated in its distinctive character. The question concerns the proper place for the scientific investigation of

[ 78 ]

ALEXIUS MEINONG

the Object ( Gegenstand) taken as such and in general-we wish to know whether, among the sciences that are accredited by scientific tradition, there is one within which we could attempt a theoretical consideration of the Object as such, or from which we could at least demand this. 2.

THE PREJUD ICEIN FAVOR OF THE ACT UAL

It was no accident that the foregoing account took cognition as its starting point in order to arrive at the Object. To be sure, cognition is not unique in "having" an Object. It has it in such a distinctive manner, however, that whenever we are speaking of Objects, we are influenced to think first of all of the Object of cognition. For, to be precise, the psychological event we call cognition does not con­ stitute the cognitive situation in and of itself : knowledge is, so to speak, a double fact (Doppeltatsache) in which what is known confronts the act of knowing as something relatively independent. The act of knowing is not merely directed toward what is known, in the way in which a false judgment may be directed toward its Object. In knowing, on the contrary, it is as though what is known were seized or grasped by the psychological act, or however else one might attempt to describe, in an unavoidably pictorial way, some­ thing which is indescribable. If one concentrates exclusively on the Object of knowledge, the problem about the science of Objects which was raised above is initially placed in a rather unfavorable light. A science of the Objects of cognition: does this mean any­ thing more than the demand that what is already known as the Object of cognition be now made the Object of a science, and thus the Object of cognition for a second time? In other words, are we not asking for a science which either is made up of the sum-total of the sciences taken together, or one which would have to accomplish all over again what the recognized sciences jointly accomplish any­ way? We should guard ourselves against concluding from these con­ siderations that the idea of a universal science, in addition to the special sciences, is absurd. This understanding of the nature of the world in its entirety and of its ultimate foundations, which the best minds have always considered to be the final and most estimable goal of their pursuit of knowledge, can only be the subject of a comprehensive science in addition to the special sciences. Indeed, the

The Theory of Objects

[ 79 ] discipline which goes under the name of metaphysics has been thought to be exactly such a science. No matter how many disap­ pointments have been associated with this name, and are associated with it, the responsibility for them lies with our intellectual capaci­ ties, and not with the idea of such a science. May one go so far, therefore, as to take metaphysics to be the science whose legitimate function is to deal with Objects as such-or Objects in their totality? If we remember how metaphysics has always been conceived as including in its subject matter the farthest and the nearest, the great­ est and the smallest alike, we may be surprised to be told that meta­ physics cannot take on such a task. It may sound strange to hear that metaphysics is not universal enough for a science of Objects, and hence cannot take on the task just formulated. For the inten­ tions of metaphysics have been universal ( a fact which has so often been disastrous to its success ) . Without doubt, metaphysics has to do with everything that exists. However, the totality of what exists, i ncluding what has existed and will exist, is infinitely small in com­ parison with the totality of the Objects of knowledge. This fact easily goes unnoticed, probably because the lively interest in reality which is part of our nature tends to favor that exaggeration which finds the non-real a mere nothing-or, more precisely, which finds the non-real to be something for which science has no application at all or at least no application of any worth. How little truth there is in such a view is most easily shown by ideal Objects 3 which do indeed subsist ( bestehen), but which do not by any means exist ( existieren), and consequently cannot in any sense be real ( wirklich). Similarity and difference are examples of objects of this type : perhaps, under certain circumstances, they sub­ sist between realities ; but they are not a part of reality themselves. That ideas, as well as assumptions and judgments, are nevertheless concerned with such Objects ( and often have reason to be very intimately concerned with them ) is, of course, beyond question. Similarly, number does not exist in addition to what is numbered, supposing the latter does exist; this we clearly know from the fact that we can also count what does not exist. Again, a connection does not exist in addition to what is connected, supposing the latter does exist : That their existence is not indispensable is proven by the 3. Co ncer ni ng the se nse in whi ch I i nte nd to e mploy the e xpress io n "i deal ," whi ch u nfor tu na te ly is am b iguo us in or dinary la nguage, see my essa y, "Ober Gegen ­ s tande h oherer Ord nung , e tc., " Zeitschrift fur Psycho/ogie, XXI, 198. [This essay appe ars in Volu me II of Mei no ng 's colle cted wo rks ; see Sele cted Bi bliogra phy.]

ALEXIUS MEINONG [ 80 ] connection between the equilaterality and equiangularity of a tri­ angle. Moreover, where existing objects are concerned, such as atmospheric and thermometric or barometric conditions, the con­ nectedness does not unite these realities themselves so much as it does their being or even their non-being. In knowing such a connec­ tion, we are already dealing with that special type of Object (mit jenem eigentumlichen Gegenstandartigen) , which, as I hope I have shown, 4 is related to judgment and assumptions ( Urteilen und A n­ nahmen) in the way in which the Object, in a strict sense, (der eigentliche Gegenstand) is related to presentations ( Vorstellungen) . I have recommended the name "Objective" ( Objetkiv) for this type of Object, and I have shown that the Objective itself can assume the functions of an Object in the strict sense. In particu­ lar ) it can become the Object ( Gegenstand) of a new judgment, or of some other intellectual operation, which is related to it as to an ordinary object (Objekt) . If I say, "It is true that the antipodes exist," truth is ascribed not to the antipodes, but to the Objective, "that the antipodes exist." But this existence of the antipodes is a fact (Tatsache) which, as everyone sees immediately, can very well have a subsistent status, but cannot be still another existent entity in its own turn, as it were. * This holds, likewise, for all other ob­ jectives, so that every cognitive act which has an Objective as its Object represents thereby a case of knowing something which does not exist. What has been stated here only in terms of isolated examples is supported by the testimony of a very highly developed science­ indeed the most highly developed one : mathematics. We would surely not want to speak of mathematics as alien to reality, as though it had nothing to do with what exists. Indeed, we cannot fail to recognize that mathematics is assured of an extensive sphere of application in practical life no less than in the theoretical treatment of reality. However, pure mathematical knowledge is never concerned with anything which must, in the nature of the case, be actual. The form of being (Sein) with which mathematics as such is occupied is never existence (Existenz) . In this respect, mathematics never transcends subsistence (Bestand) : a straight line has no more exist­ ence than a right angle; a regular polygon, no more than a circle. It can be regarded only as a peculiarity of the mathematical use

4. Ober Annahmen, chap. vii .

* [ dass sie zwar sehr wohl bestehen, aber nicht ihrerseits sozusagen noch einmal existieren kann.]

[ 81 ] of language that this usage makes quite explicit existence-claims. 6 Even though the mathematician may use the term "existence," he cannot but concede that what we would otherwise call "possibility" is, in the final analysis, all that he requires of the objects of his theoretical consideration; it is very noteworthy, however, that a positive turn is being given to this ordinarily merely negative concept. Together with the prejudice in favor of our knowledge of reality, alluded to previously, the basic independence of mathematics from existence enables us to understand a fact which would be fairly surprising if these points were not considered. Attempts to system­ atize the sciences as parts of a whole usually find themselves in an embarrassing position in connection with mathematics, and they must be extricated, with varying degrees of success, by more or less artificial expedients. This is in striking contrast to the recognition­ one might straightaway say popularity-which mathematics has acquired for itself even in lay circles by its achievements. But the organization of all knowledge into the science of nature and the science of mind (Natur- und Geisteswissenschaf t ) , appearing to be an exhaustive disjunction, really takes into account only the sort of knowledge which has to do with reality ( Wirklichkeit). Con­ sequently, when we look at the matter more closely, we should not be at all surprised to find that this organization does not do full j ustice to mathematics. The Theory of Objects

3.

ICHTS EIN SOS EIN AN D N

There is thus not the slightest doubt that what is supposed to be the Object of knowledge need not exist at all. But our account up to now may seem to leave room for the conjecture that wherever existence is absent, it not only can be but must be replaced by subsistence. But even this restriction is inadmissable, as may be seen by contrasting the characteristic functions of judging and assuming, a distinction I have attempted to maintain by contrasting the "thetic and synthetic function" of thought.6 In the former case, the act of thought grasps a Sein, in the latter a "Sosein." In each case, naturally, it is an Objective that is grasped; it is reasonable to speak of a 5. Cf. K. Zindler: "Beitrag e zur Theorie d er mathe rnat isch en Erkenntnis," Sitzungsberichte der kais. Akademie der Wissenschaften in Wien, phi/. hist. Kl., C XVIII ( 1889) , p. 3 3 and 53 f. 6. Ober Annahmen, pp. 142 ff.

ALEXIUS MEINONG [ 82 ] Seinsobjektiv and of a Soseinsobjektiv, respectively. * Now it would accord very well with the aforementioned prejudice in favor of existence to hold that we may speak of a Sosein only if a Sein is presupposed. There would, indeed, be little sense in calling a house large or small, a region fertile or unfertile, before one knew that the house or the land does exist, has existed, or will exist. However, the very science from which we were able to obtain the largest number of instances counter to this prejudice shows clearly that any such principle is untenable. As we know, the figures with which geometry is concerned do not exist. Nevertheless, their properties, and hence their Sosein, can be established. Doubtless, in the area of what can be known merely a posteriori, a claim as to Sosein will be completely unjustifiable if it is not based on knowledge of a Sein; it is equally certain that a Sosein which does not rest on a Sein may often enough be utterly lacking in natural interest. None of this alters the fact that the Sosein of an Object is not affected by its Nichtsein. The fact is sufficiently important to be explicitly formulated as the principle of the independence of Sosein from Sein. 7 The area of applicability of this principle is best illustrated by consideration of the following cir­ cumstance: the principle applies, not only to Objects which do not exist in fact, but also to Objects which could not exist because they are impossible. Not only is the much heralded gold mountain made of gold, but the round square is as surely round as it is square. To be sure, insights of actual importance regarding such Objects have been noted only in exceptional cases. Nevertheless, even from them some light might be shed on domains which are especially important for us to know. But such things may be alien to our natural way of thinking; it is even more instructive to recall this trivial fact, which does not yet go beyond the realm of the Seinsobjektiv: Any particular thing that isn't real (Nichtseiendes) must at least be capable of serving as the Object for those judgments which grasp its Nichtsein. It does not matter whether this Nichtsein is necessary or merely factual ;

* [Appro ximate trans lations o f the Ge rman te rms in the text are the fo llowing . The Sein o f an o b je ct is its e xist ing , or its being rea l ; its N ichtsein is its not e xist ­ ing, o r its being unrea l; its Sosein is its having chara cteristi cs . A Seinsobjektiv is an o bje ctive consisting of something existing , or of something being rea l ; ana lo ­ gous ly fo r Soseinsobjektiv and Nich tseinsobjektiv.] 7. This prin cip le was first enun ciated by E. Ma lly in his t reatise whi ch was hono red by the Wa rtinge r p rize in 1903 , and whi ch appea rs in comp lete ly revised form as No . III o f t hese papers ; see chap . i , § 3 , o f Ma lly's paper . [Meinong he re re fers to the vo lume in whi ch his own essay o rigina lly appeared . Mally's pape r is e ntitle d "Unte rsu chunge n zu r Gege nstandstheo rie des Messe ns ." ]

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[ 83 ] nor does it matter in the first case whether the necessity stems from the essence of the Object or whether it stems from aspects which are external to the Object in question. In order to know that there is no round square, I must make a judgment about the round square. If physics, physiology, and psychology agree in asserting the so-called ideal character of sense-qualities, they implicitly assert something about color as well as about sound, namely, that the one exists no more than the other. Those who like paradoxical modes of expres­ sion could very well say: "There are objects of which it is true that there are no such objects." The fact, familiar the world over, which is meant by this statement throws such a bright light on the relation of objects to reali�y, or their relation to being, generally, that a somewhat closer examination of the matter, which is of fundamental importance in its own right, is entirely in place in our present study. 4. THE AUSSERSEIN O F THE PURE OBJECT

A recourse to certain psychological experiences suggests itself as a natural way of resolving the paradox which seems to lie before us. I have attempted to present the most essential points pertaining to this problem in another work. 8 But, according to my account here, if we were now to maintain the aforementioned subjectivity of sense­ qualities, we could speak of the object of a presentation of blue only in the sense of something which is a capacity of that presentation, from which reality withholds, as it were, the opportunity for its realization. Considered from the standpoint of the presentation, this still seems to me to touch on something of essential significance. However, I cannot conceal from myself at present the fact that it is no more necessary to an Object that it be presented in order not to exist than it is in order for it to exist. Further, even if there were a reference to it, the most that could result from its being presented would be a sort of existence-"existence by way of idea (in der Vorstellung) "-and so, more precisely, "pseudo-existence." 9 To express it more exactly : If I say, "Blue does not exist," I am think­ ing just of blue, and not at all of a presentation and the capacities it may have. It is as if the blue must have being in the first place, before we can raise the question of its being (Sein) or non-being (Nichtsein) . But in order not to fall into new paradoxes or actual 8. V ber Annahmen, pp. 98 ff. 9. See "Ober Gegenstande hoherer Ordnung, " loc. cit., pp. 186 f.

ALEXIUS MEINONG [ 84 ] absurdities, perhaps the following tum of expression may be ap­ propriate : Blue, or any other Object whatsoever, is somehow given prior to our determination of its being or non-being, in a way that does not carry any prejudice to its non-being. We could also de­ scribe the situation from its psychological side in this way: if I should be able to judge that a certain Object is not, then I appear to have had to grasp the Object in some way beforehand, in order to say anything about its non-being, or more precisely, in order to affirm or to deny the ascription of non-being to the Object. This fact, despite its commonplace character, is seen to be of a very peculiar type. We could hope to do justice to it with somewhat greater theoretical rigor by means of the following considerations. As I have stated elsewhere, 1 0 that a certain thing, A, is not-more briefly, the Nichtsein of A-is just as much an Objective as is the Sein of A. And the degree of certainty with which I am justified in saying that A "is not" is the degree of certainty that the Objective, "Nichtsein of A," itself has a Sein (or, more precisely, as mentioned above, that it has subsistence [Bestand} ) . Now an Objective, whether it is a Seinsobjektiv or Nichtseinsobjektiv, stands in relation to its Object ( Objekt ) , albeit cum grano salis, as the whole to its parts. But if the whole has being, so must its parts. This seems to mean, when it is extended to the case of the Objective: if the Objective has being (ist ) , so, in some sense or other, must the object which be­ longs to it, even when the Objective is an objective of non-being ( Nichtseinsobjektiv ) . Furthermore, since the Objective strictly pre­ vents us from assuming that A has being, (being, as we have seen, can sometimes be understood as existence, sometimes as subsistence) , it appears that the requirement that the Object have being (which was inferred from the being of the Nichtseinsobjektiv ) makes sense only insofar as the being in question is neither existence nor sub­ sistence-only insofar as a third order of being, if one may speak this way, is adjoined to existence and subsistence. This sort of being must belong, therefore, to every Object as such. A Nichtsein of the same type cannot be set in opposition to it, for a Nichtsein even in this new sense would have to immediately produce difficulties analog­ ous to those which arise from Nichtsein in its ordinary sense, and which the new concept was to have eliminated. The term "Quasisein" seemed to me for a while to be a completely suitable expression for this rather oddly constituted type of being.

1 0. V ber Annahmen, chap. vii.

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[ 85 ] This designation, however, like others that were approved earlier (for instance, "Pseudoexistenz" and "Quasitranszendenz," 1 1 ) runs the risk of causing confusion. More important, meanwhile, are the following pertinent considerations . Can being which is in principle unopposed by non-being be called being at all? However much we are permitted in this connection to judge that there is a being which is neither existence nor subsistence, nowhere else do we find grounds for such a postulate. Must we not take thought to avoid it in our case also wherever it is possible? The consideration which seems to force us to such a postulate is, to be sure, an experience which is easily observed. As we have seen, A must be "given" to me in some way or other if I am to grasp its non-being. This produces, however, as I have already shown elsewhere, 1 2 an assumption (A nnahme) possessing affirmative quality : in order to deny A, I must first assume ihe being of A. What I refer to, so far as the being of A is con­ cerned, is thus something which is to a certain extent only a claimant to being ( ein gewissermassen vorgegebenes Sein des A). But it is of the essence of assumption that it direct itself upon a being which itself does not need to be. Without a doubt, it would be comforting to be able to say that the strange kind of being which belongs to that which does not have being (Sein des Nichtseiendes) is just as absurd as it sounds. Such a view could recommend itself to us were it not for the fact that the Objective, which has being, always seems to require in turn an Object which has being. For the present, this requirement is based solely on the analogy to the part-whole relation : an Objective is thereby treated as a complex of some kind and the Object belonging to it as a kind of component. In many respects this may be in accordance with our insight into the nature of an Objective, which is as yet still exceedingly defective. However, no one will deny that this analogy is only an initial expedient in our embarrassment and that there would be no grounds for following this analogy rigorously even for part of the way. Thus, instead of deriving the being of an Object from the being of an Objective, even on the basis of a questionable analogy where the Objective is an Objective of non-being, it would be better to conclude from the facts with which we are concerned that this analogy does not apply to the Objective of non-being-i.e. , that the being of the Objective is not by any means universally dependent upon the being of its Object. 1 1. Vber Annahmen, p. 95. 1 2. Loe. cit., pp. 1 05 ff.

ALEXIUS MEINONG [ 86 ] This is a position which speaks for itself without any further ado. If the opposition of being and non-being is primarily a matter of the Objective and not of the Object, then it is, after all, clearly under­ standable that neither being nor non-being can belong essentially to the Object in itself. This is not to say, of course, that an Object can neither be nor not be. Nor is it to say that the question, whether or not the Object has being, is purely accidental to the nature of every Object. An absurd Object such as a round square carries in itself the guarantee of its own non-being in every sense; an ideal Object, such as diversity, carries in itself the guarantee of its own non-existence. Anyone who seeks to associate himself with models which have become famous could formulate what has been shown above by saying that the Object as such (without considering the occasional peculiarities or the accompanying Objective-clause which is always present) stands "beyond being and non-being." This may also be expressed in the following less engaging and also less pre­ tentious way, which is in my opinion, however, a more appropriate one : The Object is by nature indifferent to being (ausserseiend), al­ though at least one of its two Objectives of being, the Object's being or non-being, subsists. What one could thus call with propriety the principle of the in­ difference of pure Objects to being ( den Satz vom A ussersein des reinen Gegenstandes) finally eliminates the appearance of a paradox which was the immediate occasion for the assertion of this principle. As soon as it is recognized that, apart from special cases, both being and non-being are equally external to an Object, it is then under­ standable that nothing more, so to speak, is involved in comprehend­ ing the non-being of the Object than there is in comprehending its being. The above-mentioned principle of the independence of Sosein from Sein now presents a welcome supplement to this view. It tells us that that which is not in any way external to the Object, but constitutes its proper essence, subsists in its Sosein-the Sosein attaching to the Object whether the object has being or not. We are finally in a position to see with sufficient clarity what confronted us above as the prejudice in favor of the existence, or at least the being, of all possible Objects of knowledge. Being is not the pre­ supposition under which knowledge finds, as it were, its point of attack; it is itself such a point of attack. Non-being is equally as good a point of attack. Furthermore, in the Sosein of each Object, knowledge already finds a field of activity to which it may have access without first answering the question concerning being or non­ being, or without answering this question affirmatively.

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[ 87 ]

5. THE THEORY O F OBJECTS AS PSYCHOLO GY We now know that those Objects which exist, and even those which have being, run far short of the sum-total of Objects of knowl­ edge, and we can see therefore how inaccurate it would be to regard a science of the actual, or a science of being in general, no matter how comprehensive its scope, as a science of Objects of knowledge taken simply as such. Moreover, in the previous paragraphs, we have considered only the Objects of cognition. But the question raised at the very outset of this exposition had to take into consideration the fact that not only cognition but every case of judgment and presentation has its Object-not to mention the Objectivity ( Gegen­ standlichkeit ) * of extra-intellectual experiences. This all-embracing importance of Objectivity for the psychical side of life-it may indeed be precisely its distinguishing characteristic, as I have briefly mentioned already-may now suggest to us that (owing to our ex­ clusive attention to cognition) we permitted ourselves to be led down a detour that might easily have been avoided. For the science which most naturally would have to do with Objects as such would be the very one whose business it is to deal with this Objectivity. This task, in view of what I have just touched on once again, seems to belong to psychology. In any event, it must be conceded that the current direction of psychology is not entirely opposed to such a conception of its task. There is, for example, a psychology of sound as well as a psychology of color, within which by no means the least important tasks are taken to be the ordering of the diverse Objects belonging to the sensory domain concerned, and the investigation of their distinctive nature. 1 3 It is also natural that the science of psychological facts draws into its range of investigation the distinctive activities of the psychological sphere-in particular, intellectual activities. It would be an odd psychology of judgment that took no notice of that cap­ acity which (under sufficiently favorable circumstances) reaches out beyond itself to take possession of reality in some way. There is * [By "O b jectivity" is me ant here merely the characteristic o f re ferring to so me O b ject. It has no di rect connection with the usual philosophic al sense of "o bjec ­ t ivity" in Eng lish, where o b jectivity is oppose d to su bjectivit y.] 13. For more deta ils, see my "Be mer kungen iiber den Farben k orper un d das Mischungsgeset z," Zeitschrift fur Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane, XXXIII, p. 3 ff. [This pape r is inclu de d in Volu me I of Me inon g's collecte d works.]

[ 88 ]

ALEXIUS MEINONG

something besides reality which can be known, and it is something which we are in a position to know with the aid of certain intellectual operations. Psychology, therefore, certainly cannot refrain from con­ sidering both this capacity to know and also that something outside of reality (A usserwirkliche ) toward which these characteristic ac­ tivities are directed. To this extent, therefore, the Objects of judging, assuming, and presenting, as well as the Objects of feeling and desiring, undoubt­ edly gain entry into psychology. But everyone will notice at once that this science does not take these Objects into consideration for their own sakes. In practice, both inside and outside of scientific pursuits, it is, frequently enough, quite an incidental matter as to what result is a primary goal, and what is just accepted as an acci­ dental by-product. For example, it is certainly useful to archaeology that what philologists often find necessary merely for textual inter­ pretation points to the "real things," yet is no proper part of classical philology. Otherwise, the latter science could easily lay claims to being the most basic discipline, since work on ancient languages has provided the starting point for all sorts of scientific activity. Similarly, psychological inquiry can bear fruit for related areas as long as they belong to sciences which are either less developed than psychology or have not yet been formally recognized as separate sciences at all. Nothing more clearly demonstrates that this has happened in the case of theoretical consideration of Objects than the example of colors mentioned above, where investigation of the psychological facts first led to the investigation of facts concerning Objects ; an example is the investigation of the relationships among colors conceived in spatial terms ( der Farbenkorper auf den Far­ benraum ) . 1 4 The reference to linguistic science, already introduced, shows in another respect how little psychology can qualify as the true science of Objects. In dealing with the meaning of words and sentences, 1 5 linguistic science is necessarily also concerned with Ob­ jects, and grammar has done the spadework for a theoretical grasp of Objects in a very basic way. Thus, in point of fact, the viewpoint from which psychology was to have been conceded any prerogative in this matter is not apparent; rather, it is clearly seen that neither of these two disciplines can be that science of Objects we are seeking. After it had been shown that the sciences of being in general, including the one which has to do generally with whatever is actual, are inadequate to the task of the science of Objects, it would be 14. Cf. foe. cit., pp. 1 1 ff. 15. Cf. Ober Annahmen, pp. 27 1 ff.

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[ 89 ] strange if one of these sciences were unexpectedly to demonstrate its qualifications for this task. Moreover, one can state precisely the portion of the entire realm of Objects capable of being handled by psychology even under the most favorable circumstances. Psychology can take interest only in those Objects toward which some psycho­ logical event is actually directed. Perhaps we could put this more briefly : psychology can take interest only in those Objects which are actually presented, whose presentations thus exist, and which, accordingly, themselves exist at least "in our presentation of them," or, more correctly, have pseudo-existence. 1 6 For this reason, it was relevant to note above that the geometrical figure presenting color­ relationships (Farbenkorper), as an abstract summary of all of the colors which actually exist in the experience and imagination of men, constitutes one of psychology's concerns. But even this is not strictly true, for such a totality is no more capable of constituting a con­ tinuum without the aid of changing events than is a set of points. 17 On the other hand, the idea of color-relationships conceived in spatial terms (die Konzeption des Farbenraumes) is based only on the nature of the Objects in question, and is thus entirely non­ psychological, although it doubtless has to do with the theory of Objects. Perhaps the basic difference between the standpoints adopted in the one case and in the other can be traced out immediately in the example, without the assistance of any special comments. Only one consideration could seem adapted to wipe out the im­ pression of complete dissimilarity between psychology and the theory of Objects, or at least to make it plausible that, strictly speaking, no object could be given that does not belong to psychology as the Object of a presentation (a view which is contrary to the interpre­ tation just advanced in connection with color) . One could hold the view that, no matter how we may have come to introduce the Ob­ ject in question for theoretical consideration, we must, after all, have comprehended it and thus have had it as a presentation; because of this, however, the Object falls within the ranks of those pseudo­ existing Objects which are the concern of psychology as well. Thus, if I should think of a white which is brighter than any that human eyes have ever seen, or will see, the white is nevertheless a presented white. To this extent, no matter how a theory is framed, it could never be applied to an Object which is not presented. This thought is reminiscent of an argument of the "idealists" 16. "Ober Geg enst an de h oher er Or dnung ," Zoe. cit., pp. 186 f. 1 7. C f. E . Ma lly, in the th ir d of these stu dies, chap. i, Sec . 1 5 ; chap . iii, Sec . 20; c hap. iv, Sec . 25. [Se e foo tno te 7. ]

NO

ALEXIUS MEINO [ 90 ] which, strange to say, has not yet entirely been forgotten. This argu­ ment states that if "esse" need not be precisely "percipi," it must at any rate be "cogitari"; for no one can think of an_ "ess�" without­ thinking of it. In any case, the effect of such cons1derat1ons may be more opposed to, than in accord with, their intent. If, fo_r example, the ultrawhite mentioned above is brought into the domam of theo­ retical consideration just by means of a conception directed towards it, then the novel psychological events which come to life could engender new work for psychology. To be sure, this is by no means necessary. In the case of the example we are considering here, such work is scarcely to be expected, since an abundance of similar con­ ceptions is already available. However, the possibility must cer­ tainly be kept in mind, and if it is once actually realized, then how little the conception of ultrawhite is a part of psychology will be­ come quite clear. By virtue of this conception, the work of the theory of Objects is to a certain extent already completed, but that of psychology has yet to be done. It would be odd to consider the accomplished task a psychological one just because of the task that is still to be done.

6.

THE THEORY OF OBJECTS AS A THEORY O F

THE OBJECTS O F KNOWLEDGE

What psychology cannot provide us might better be sought, therefore, in those areas where the very nature of what we investi­ gate is constituted, in part, by Objects. On the basis of our previous discussion, it can hardly be doubted that in cognition we have before us facts of this type. Cognition is not merely a judgment that happens to be true; it is true by its own nature-true from within, as it were. A judgment is true, however, not insofar as it has an Object that exists, or even one that has being, but only insofar as it grasps an Objective that has being. That there are black swans, but that there is no perpetuum mobile, are both true judgments; but the first con­ cerns an existent object, the second a non-existent object. In the one case, the being of the Object in question subsists; in the other case, its non-being subsists. Truth is always bound up with the being of Objectives and is therefore partially constituted out of it. The judgment would not be true if there were no Objective to which it referred. Nor would the judgment be true if it were constituted dif­ ferently than it is and therefore did not agree with the facts. The

[ 91 ] coincidence of the one subjective and the other objective requirement can thus be entirely accidental : as when one draws a true conclu­ sion from false premises. Now such an accidental or external character is surely foreign to the relation between knowing and what is known. In the case of knowing, it belongs to the nature of the judgment that it does not miss its aim at what is to be known. This distinctive feature of cognition achieves a place in the forum of psychological investigation through what we know as evidence (Evidenz). However, the evident judgment itself does not constitute the fact of cognition. It is essen­ tial to grasp the Object with respect to the Objective, and for this the being of the latter is indispensable. In this respect, the cognition entirely resembles the judgment which is true per accidens, as it were. For this reason, it was possible even at the beginning of the present essay to call knowledge a double fact (Doppeltatsache). Anyone who wishes a scientifically closer view of this compound fact must not restrict himself to the psychological aspect of it; he must also take into consideration, as quite expressly a part of the problem set before him, the other side, i.e. , the Objective which has being and the Object which is implicated in the Objective. With regard to our major problem, we have in some measure re­ turned to a standpoint which we abandoned in the previous para­ graphs, for we have appealed to the fact that objects belong not only to cognition, but also to false judgment, to presentation, and to psychological activities which are totally non-intellectual. If we con­ clude that the theory of Objects falls most naturally within the scien­ tific treatment of cognition, we are confronted with this question : By restricting ourselves to cognition and thus excluding other psy­ chological events, do we not cut ourselves off from certain Objects and give up that universality which is required in dealing with Ob­ jects as such? The doubt is unfounded. In order to see this, one must, above all, remember the characteristic difference between psychology and the science of knowledge. It is obvious that psychology is concerned only with real psychological events and not with the merely possible. A science of knowledge cannot set similar limitations on itself, be­ cause knowledge as such has value, and therefore something which is not but could be may draw attention to itself as a desideratum for knowledge. Accordingly, not only are pseudo-objects in general, and hence all objects which are actually judged or presented, to be included as Objects of our scientific knowledge ( Wissens), but also The Theory of Objects

ALEXIUS MEINONG [ 92 ] all Objects which are Objects of our cognition only i� possi ?i!i�y. However there is no Object which could not at least m poss1b1hty be an Object of cognition; at any rate, we may say this if we adopt the instructive fiction that the capacity for knowledge is not impaired by limitations, such as stimulus thresholds and thresholds of discrim­ inations, which are laid down by the constitution of the subject and are never entirely absent. Assuming an intelligence of unlim­ ited capacities, there is nothing unknowable ; and what is know­ able, is. However, since the preferred usage is generally to apply "it is" (es gibt ) to things which have being, and particularly to existing things, it would perhaps be clearer to say : All that is know­ able is given-namely, given to cognition. To this extent, all objects are knowable. Given-ness as a most general property can be ascribed to Objects without exception, whether they are or are not. The consequence of these considerations for the relation of the Objects of cognition to the Objects of other psychological activities scarcely needs to be drawn more explicitly. Regardless of the other types of experience one might have of Objects, all Objects are, with­ out exception, Objects of knowledge. Consequently, anyone who undertakes a scientific treatment of Objects from the standpoint of cognition need not fear that he might thus exclude any area from the totality of Objects.

7.

THE THEORY O F OB JECTS AS "PURE LO GIC"

It is in accord with long-established tradition to think of logic first, when considering a scientific treatment of cognition. Actually, it is only very recently that problems have been set for one of the main parts of logic, the so-called pure or formal logic, 1 8 which agree unmistakably with what must properly be demanded of a theoretical treatment of Objects as such. 19 I have already expressed elsewhere my basic agreement with E. Husserl's attack against "psychologism" in logic. 20 I did this at a time when external circumstances prevented me fr?m obtai �ing more than a preliminary and very incomplete acquamtance with the extensive work of this author. Today, when I trust that through penetrating study I have done justice in some 18. See E. Husser l, Logische Untersuchungen, two vo lumes , (Leip zig and Ha lle , 1900 and 1901). "Pure " and "Forma l" Log ic are explici tly iden ti fied in Vo l. I, p. 252. 19. In part icular , Vo l. I, pp. 243 ff. ; a lso Vo l. II, pp. 92 ff. 20. Vber Annahmen, p. 196.

The Theory of Objects

[ 93 ] measure to the merits of the publication in question, I can com­ pletely support my previous expression of agreement and extend it still further to many another of those "problems." It is, then, per­ haps a dissent of relatively minor importance that I would not refer these problems precisely to "pure logic." I am influenced above all by this fact : it is only with great diffi­ culty that the notion of logic can be separated from that of a tech­ nology devoted to the advancement of our intellectual powers. Con­ sequently, logic always remains a "practical discipline."2 1 We may say at most that a transition can be made from the work of this practical discipline to what I have occasionally characterized as a "theoretico-practical discipline."22 When logic is thus called "pure logic, "2 3 I would prefer to say that the result is not logic at all. And I would refer the problems set for "pure logic" to that theoretical discipline, or to one of those theoretical disciplines, to which logic, like all other practical disciplines, must finally be traced. I am in complete agreement with the author of the Logische Untersuchungen, as I have just mentioned, in insisting that recourse is not to be made exclusively to psychology. Indeed, when I con­ sider the guiding idea to which our author returns again and again in his polemic against "psychologism" in order to characterize this extra-psychological domain of knowledge, it is difficult for me to avoid the impression that he was not entirely able to free himself from what he had opposed with as much zeal as truth. "Pure" logic has to do with "concepts," "propositions," "arguments," and the like. * But are not concepts, after all, presentations which may be used for theoretical purposes, but which are nevertheless presenta­ tions? If one disregards the obtrusive grammatical meaning of the word "proposition" (Satz ) , as is explicitly demanded, e.g., by Bal­ zano, will one then be able to disregard the psychological process ( assumption or judgment) expressed by the grammatical proposi2 1 .I have tried to presen t this i n grea ter de tail i n m y wor k, Vber philoso­ phische Wissenschaft und ihre Propadeutik (Vienna, 1 88 5 ) . S ee particu lar ly pp .

96 f. 22. Loe. cit., p . 98. 23.I find the e quiva lent term, "forma l logic," o b jectiona b le in tha t it brings to mi nd wha t used to be taugh t under this n ame and wha t has proper ly been opposed and apparentl y overcome . Is this o b jec tion based mere ly on a personal idios yncras y? We mus t a lso give some weigh t to the fact tha t the term "form " canno t provide a cle ar pic ture of wh at i t is supp csed to me an. * [It is impossi b le to re produce in Eng li sh the fu ll signi fic ance of Meinong 's remar ks here and be low. There is no Eng lish word or e xpression which du plicates the am bigui ties of the German "Satz!' The word "Satz" is here trans lated as "proposi tion ," bu t o bvious ly "propositio n of con tradictio n" is to be avoided . ]

ALEXIUS MEINONG [ 94 ] tion? More precisely: If we do this, what will be retained that can in some measure lay claim to the name "proposition"? Still, there is an extralogical sense here in which one can talk of a "law (Satz) of contradiction," or the "Carnot law (Satz)" and so on, 24 although, to be sure, this has the feel of a rather extended usage of words. As far as I can see, such an extralogical sense is completely lacking in the case of the word "inference" (Schluss). Even if one speaks quite naturally of "the" syllogism in modus Darapti, of "the" hypo­ thetical syllogism, and the like, one means an intellectual event or the possible results of such an event, just as one means a physio­ logical event when one speaks of "the" circulation of the blood. To contrast "objective" inferences and proofs with those that are subjective25 might thus seem to obscure rather than to clarify the facts of the matter. But the entire tenor of the Logische U nter­ suchungen, as well as many of the particular statements that are con­ tained in it, convinces one that, despite certain differences in detail (at present unavoidable) , the author's goal is the same as our own. It is a goal to which he has been forced by mathematico-philosophical studies26 and by certain distinctions which are in part genuinely, and in part only supposedly, psychological; I refer to the distinction between content (/nhalt) and Object27 and, what is even more to the point, to that between Object and Objective. 28 Under such cir­ cumstances, the common cause will be better served if I cease dwell­ ing on these considerations (which may be largely terminological anyway) and, instead, try to show briefly how, in my opinion, we may deal more adequately with the danger of "psychologism"-a danger which, in spite of the attention devoted to it, may not yet have been entirely avoided.

8.

THE THEORY O F OBJECTS AS EPISTEMOLO GY

Before we do this, however, we may draw an obvious practical consequence from the criticisms we have directed against the ex­ pression "pure logic." There is no need to invent a name for a theory of scientific knowledge ( Wissen) which sets itself no practical 24. What is inv olved here is, of c ourse , the O bje ctive ; see Ober Annahmen, p . 197. 25. Logische Untersuchungen, II, p. 26; als o pp. 94 and 101. 26. See op. cit., Pre face to Vol . I, p. v. 27. "Ober Gegen st an de boherer Ordnung ," lac. cit., pp . 1 85 ff. 28. Ober Annahmen, pp. 1 50 ff.

The Theory of Objects

[ 95 ] goals and accordingly represents a theoretical science. One could not wish for a more natural name than the designation, "Theorie des Erkennens," or more briefly, "Erkenntnistheorie." Therefore, I choose to speak of "theory of knowledge" instead of "pure logic," and I now hope to show that the question of "psychologism" in the theory of knowledge returns us immediately to the theory of objects, from which the remarks made above may have seemed somewhat remote. "Psychologism," as the name of a natural or considered tend­ ency to solve problems with predominantly psychological means, involves no blame in itself. 29 However, within a certain sphere of problems, including just those problems that concern us here, the word does not lack a pejorative connotation : what is meant is simply the inappropriate use of psychological method. Since cognition is an experience, the psychological way of considering things is cer­ tainly not to be banished in principle from the theory of knowledge. The theory of knowledge must deal with concepts, sentences (judg­ menis and assumptions ) , inferences, and the like, and will certainly have to do so psychologically. But knowing stands over against the known. As I have said repeatedly, cognition is a double fact. One who neglects the second side of this fact and so proceeds in the theory of knowledge as if there were only a psychological side of cognition, or one who would foist the viewpoint of psychological events on this second side, is not to be spared the reproach of psychologism. Can we make clear to ourselves why there is this danger of falling into such a psychologism, a danger from which scarcely anyone who has concerned himself with epistemological matters has withheld his tribute? The double aspect (Doppelseitigkeit) of cog­ nition is so striking that hardly anyone could overlook it even if only existing things were to be known. However, as we have seen, all of mathematics, and particularly geometry, deals with the non­ real. Thus, the prejudice in favor of reality that I have repeatedly called to attention leads here to a dilemma which seems to be quite illuminating and which is, nevertheless, basically very singular. To be sure, we may not become explicitly conscious of it easily, but 29. The pro ven o b je cti vity of Oberweg -Hein ze 's presentation of fa cts assures me of this in my own case . They p la ce my o wn s cientific a ctivity under the general title of "Psycho logis m." (Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie, 9th ed ., Part IV, pp. 3 1 2 ff. ) The sense in whi ch I myself might agree with this chara cter ization may be seen in Vber Annahmen, p. 196.

ALEXIUS MEINONG [ 96 ] it may be formulated approximately in the following manner : either the Object to which cognition is directed exists in reality or it exists solely "in my idea" (more briefly, it "pseudo-exists") . Perhaps nothing bears more eloquent testimony to the naturalness of this dis­ junction than the use of the word "ideal." According to modem usage, without regard for its historical meaning, the word "ideal" means the same as "thought of" or "merely presented"; hence it pertains, apparently, to all of those objects which do not exist or which could not exist. What does not exist outside of us, so one automatically thinks, must at least exist in us. Such an Object, it is supposed, belongs before the forum of psychology; one then makes room for the thought that the knowledge of existing things (and along with this knowledge reality itself) can perhaps be treated "psychologically." And perhaps this prejudice in favor of what is actual can be traced one step farther back by exhibiting the truth from which it could have originated. It would certainly be mistaken to believe that every instance of knowledge must concern existence or something existent. But is it not correct to say that all cognition as such ul­ timately has to do with something which has being (mit einem Seienden)? That which has being, the "fact," without which no cog­ nition could count as cognition, is the Objective. It is the Objective which is grasped by the relevant cognitive act and to which being (Sein) or, more precisely, subsistence (Bestand) belongs, whether it is positive or negative, whether it is an Objective of being (Sein) or of Sosein. Would it be too risky to suppose that the factuality of its Objective, which is unfailingly associated with any instance of cognition, has undergone a sort of transference to the Object (which is almost the only thing considered by theory) and that it is then exaggerated into the tacit demand that everything that confronts knowing be real? The question may remain undecided here. Our problem is not the psychology of psychologism. This much, however, stands be­ yond all doubt : psychologism in the theory of knowledge is invari­ ably based on the neglect or misunderstanding of the Object side of the cognitive state (the word "Object" being here taken in its widest sense, in which it includes the Objective) . One falls into psychologism if one fails to grasp the significance and the distinctive character of the Objective and, accordingly, looks to the Object for the being which belongs to all cognition. In such a case one does not sufficiently appreciate the possibility of Nichtsein and Sosein, and one says that something actual must be involved in anything

[ 97 ] that has being. And surely, whoever wishes to free himself from this misconception need not make it his task to keep psychology at a distance from the theory of knowledge. The psychology of cognition must always constitute an integral part of the theory of knowledge. The only thing against which he must guard himself is taking for psychology that part of the theory of knowledge which is and must remain the theory of Objects. If the theory of the Objects of knowledge or, more briefly, the theory of Objects, is presented to us as an integral part of the theory of knowledge,30 the answer to the initial question of our present dis­ cussion can easily be found. The proper place for investigating Ob­ jects as such, we could then say, is the theory of knowledge. And, in fact, this result could be left standing without much damage to the theory of Objects. The more clearly the theory of knowledge becomes aware of its tasks, the more certainly it will become and remain, by virtue of one of its fundamental parts, a theory of that which is to be known, of the "given" in the sense in which the word was employed above, and consequently of the sum-total of Objects generally. Often enough, epistemological interests will quite naturally prepare the way for an interest in the theory of Objects. Neverthe­ less, if I see rightly, we must go one step further if we are really to do justice to the claims which a theory of Objects is competent to make in virtue of its distinctive nature. The Theory of Objects

9.

IEN CE THE THEO RY O F OB JECTS AS A SEPARATE SC

The position of psychology, which along with the theory of Objects must be given a fundamental share in the theory of knowl­ edge, points to this fact. We have already seen it to be self-evident that there can be no theory of knowledge which does not concern itself with the act of knowing and which is not to this extent also a psy­ chology of cognition. However, no one would consider the signifi­ cance of psychology for the theory of knowledge to be an adequate characterization of the position of psychology in the system of sci­ ences. No one would wish to regard psychology as nothing more than a piece of epistemology. Shall we be satisfied with a wholly analogous characterization of the theory of Objects? Is it necessary 30. Ag reemen t is exp ressed mos t re cen tly by A. H ofle r, "Zur gegenwart igen Na turphi losoph ie ," in Vo l. II o f Abhandlungen zur Didaktik und Philosophie der Naturwissenschaft, ed. F . Pos ke , A. Hofle r, a nd E. Grimsehl ( Be rlin, 1904 ) , p. 1 5 1 (p. 9 1 of the se pa ra te edi tio n ) .

ALEXIUS MEINONG [ 98 ] for our interest in the theory of Objects to proceed, as it were, by way of our interest in cognition? It seems that anyone who has involved himself closely with the problems of the theory of Objects has plenty of direct experience to the effect that this is not the case. We may acknowledge that epistemology may utilize every detail which competent inquiry in the theory of Objects has produced and will produce, to afford some further information, perhaps less directly, but no less clearly. We can fully appreciate the basic significance of what the theory of Objects has to show us concerning psychologism in epistemology, as we have just done, and at the same time admit that the theory of Objects raises problems whose solutions are interesting for their own sakes. This becomes particularly clear when we make an assumption which may still involve much that is obscure, but concerning whose essentials I have no fear of making any mistake. I have referred before to the fact that a suitable place for mathematics could never be found in the system of sciences. If I am not mistaken, the anoma­ lous position of mathematics had its basis in the fact that the con­ cept of a theory of Objects had not yet been formed. Mathematics is, in its essential features, a part of the theory of Objects. I say "in its essential features" in order to explicitly leave open the possibility of a specific differentiation of mathematical interests (which I believe is one of the unexplained matters mentioned above) . 3 1 Apart from that, it seems quite obvious to me that both internal and external factors have secured for mathematics an advantage within its own domain, while the theory of Objects must set the entire domain of objects before itself as its task or hold this domain before its eyes as an unattainable ideal. If this consideration is justified, then, as soon as some account is taken of the more specific aspects of the theory of Objects we cannot fail to see how little our interests in it are epistemological interests. From what has been said, I draw the conclusion that the theory of Objects has a claim to the status of a discipline independent even of the theory of knowledge, and, accordingly, to that of an inde­ pendent science. This claim cannot be elevated to the level of an accomplished fact, but, on the contrary, is scarcely beginning to be fulfilled, for the theory as a whole is something to be developed, and not something ready to be exhibited. The high stage of devel­ opment of one of its parts constitutes an external obstacle to the

3 1. For th e b eginnings of th e rel evant wor k, s ee E . Mal ly, in No . III of thes e stu di es : Int ro., S ec . 2 ; ch ap. vii, S ecs . 40 ff. [S ee foo tno te 7 .]

The Theory of Objects

[ 99 ] recognition of its claims, which can hardly be overestimated. A mathematician might well be disturbed by the suggestion that he is "really" a theorist of Objects ( Gegenstandstheoretiker) . How­ ever, no one will demand that a physicist or chemist consider him­ self to be a metaphysician. This is so because a science which al­ ready exists cannot be either characterized or even named in terms of a science which is still merely an object of aspiration. More­ over, a relatively general science as such can and must set itself goals which are foreign to the relatively specialized sciences. This second point is somewhat obscured, in the case of the relation of mathematics to the theory of Objects, by the fact that in the do­ main of the theory of Objects mathematics represents not one (of several) but, at least for the time being, the only special sci­ ence of its type which is known and recognized. A twofold task, perhaps quite dissimilar in its two aspects, is, accordingly, to be ascribed to the theory of Objects. On the one hand, the theory of Objects has the problems of a science of the highest degree of gen­ erality and comprehensiveness. On the other, it has, as if stand­ ing in the place of a whole group of specialized sciences, those problems which so far have not received any special consideration. Because of the necessity for descending into relatively specialized domains which arises from this situation, its nature as a general science is unavoidably again obscured. Consequently, the subsump­ tion of mathematics under the theory of Objects can easily appear to threaten the distinctive character and special claim of the former. However, such external and accidental matters ought not to hamper insight into the essential connection between mathematics and the theory of Objects to the extent that that connection exists. This not entirely simple situation can, perhaps, best be given its due by saying: Mathematics is certainly not the theory of Objects, but is now as before a science in its own right. However, its Objects are included in the domain which the Theory of Objects, also having its own justification, must deal with as a whole.

1 0.

THE THEORY O F OBJECTS AN D OTHER SCIEN CES ;

GEN ERAL AN D SPECIALIZED THEORY O F OBJECTS

The theory of science can adopt two approaches to its subject matter-that is to say, the various sciences themselves-with which it deals. In the natural approach, it can proceed with assurance if it obeys the principle of all the factual sciences : first the facts and

[ 1 00 ]

ALEXIUS MEINONG

then the theory. The several sciences must first be given. Then the necessity for examining more closely their nature and mutual rela­ tionship may become justified. However, science is also, at least partially, the result of premeditated activity. In employing such fore­ sightedness, the theory of science can also deal with sciences which do not yet exist but should exist. It can find itself directed toward rendering the idea and the tasks of such sciences as precise as pos­ sible in anticipation of them. In the preceding discussion we found ourselves compelled by our interest in Objects to considerations which belong to the theory of science. In this connection, it is incumbent upon the theory of science to function in the second of the two ways mentioned above. The theory of Objects, which we must claim to be a proper sci­ ence, is, in the main, a science that for the time being hardly exists at all-especially as a separate discipline explicitly recognized in its own right. But, although no investigations have been carried out in the name of the theory of Objects, we must not suppose that this science has been wholly neglected. If we were to trace out in detail the numerous and intimate rela­ tions which the science we have just proposed bears to ways of thinking that have been followed in the past, we would see that it justifies itself by what it has to offer. This is not the proper time to trace these connections; nevertheless, in introducing this new science it is appropriate to make some mention of them. Thus, some notice can be taken of necessities which have been felt for a long time and which have already found expression in the most diverse ways, necessities which have arisen in consciously working out interests that are very widespread, but which have often been unconscious of their real goal. In fact, I believe that no special historical investigation is actually required to establish that, although the theory of Objects may not have been pursued "explicitly" heretofore, it has all the more fre­ quently been pursued "implicitly." To this I must add that, at least in practice, the implicit status has degrees which smooth transition to the explicit status. Anyone who wishes to pay attention to such transitions and their onsets should bear in mind that we have met with interests of two different types pertaining to the theory of Objects : those in regard to questions about certain special domains of Objects, and those in regard to questions which concern the domain of Objects as a whole. We can in this sense, even if it be only for momentary understanding, separate a specialized and a general theory of Objects.

[ 101 ] The Theory of Objects We have referred above to the fact that specialized (in a cer­ tain sense the most specialized) theory of Objects has found in mathematics the most splendid representation that could be desired. This luster has long led to efforts to make the procedure, more mathematico, accessible to other sciences-I might say, other do­ mains of Objects. We shall scarcely be tripped up by any signifi­ cant error if we add : whenever such attempts have been undertaken, then to that extent an effort has been made also to do the task of specialized theory of Objects in areas outside of mathematics. Of course, not every application of mathematical procedures need thus be taken into consideration. When the merchant or the engineer cal­ culates, he has as little to do with the theory of Objects as with any other theory. However, certain presuppositions having to do with Objects lie naturally at the base of such practical applications; it is not otherwise when the application results in a theoretical inter­ est. In contrast with the technique of calculation which demands complete attention, the nature of these presuppositions can remain fully in the background. This is illustrated most clearly by the theory of probability and the theory of probable error, which even now are still not recognized by everyone as naturally belonging to logic and psychology. The nature of these assumptions can possibly put the calculations in question at the service of the theory of Objects (as we can see in the case of the theory of combinations) . Meanwhile, geometry seems better prepared than arithmetic to extend a hand beyond its narrow borders to discoveries in the theory of Objects. If one observes that the domain of spatial quantities belongs to arithmetic, then what is offered as the translation (so familiar to everyone) of the geometrical view from space to time is already extramathematical and, moreover, pertains to the theory of Objects. It pertains to the theory of Objects because it is in no way tied up with the so-called reality, or more precisely, real existence of time. It is obvious that the analogy is valid for phoronomy to a much greater measure; if-what seems to me to need no proof-A. Hofler is correct in contending that tension is the "third fundamental phenomenon of mechanics" along with space and time, 32 then an additional direction is indicated in which this science, without preju­ dice to its naturally empirical character, engages the interests of the 32. A. Hofler, "Zur gegenwartigen Naturphilosophie," p. 84 (p. 24 in the separate edition ) , note 23 ; also p. 1 64 ( 104) . In any case, "the theory of dimen­ sions" mentioned on p. 147 ( 8 7 ) , ibid., deserves to be mentioned in connection with the point before us.

[ 1 02 ]

ALEXIUS MEINONG

theory of Objects through the most thoroughgoing a priori treatment of its subject matter possible. The way in which the geometrical point of view tends to reach out beyond its own domain becomes even clearer in those cases where, because of some peculiarity of the area it has taken in, it meets with only partial success. In this respect, the efforts of modem psy­ chology to order the "perceptual Objects" ( "Empfindungsgegens­ tiinde" ) 33 belonging to the different senses and, where possible, to understand their multifarious aspects in terms of spatial representa­ tion are particularly instructive. Even if, in regard to visual sensa­ tion, where these efforts have brought forth the most tangible results, 34 the name "color-geometry" implies far more praise than is actually deserved, it still becomes undeniably apparent that the character of the pertinent investigations belongs much more to the theory of Objects than to psychology. I trust that it is not excessively personal for me to report at this time that much of the essential nature of the way in which the theory of Objects frames its ques­ tions originally occurred to me while I was engaged in supposedly exclusively psychological labors toward clarification of these matters. What I have called the encroachment of the mathematical ap­ proach beyond its strictest limits has an instinctive and unconscious character in comparison with the completely explicit attempts to expand that domain and to generalize to the fullest extent possible that way of framing a problem. These have probably already achieved some importance under the name of the general theory of functions; one cannot fail to see this in such designations as "the theory of extension" and "the theory of manifolds," and even under the fre­ quently misunderstood catchword, "meta-mathematics." From the point of view we have adopted here, these strikingly significant inves­ tigations represent the transition from the specialized to the general theory of objects. A similar status may be ascribed to the endeavors and results customarily grouped under the general name of "mathe­ matical logic," even though those endeavors are in many respects intended for an entirely different purpose. On the other hand, it is likely that the treasure of valuable assertions and suggestions, which (non-mathematical) logic, epistemology, and metaphysics from Aris­ totle to the present have contributed to the area with which we are 33. A term introduced by Witasek, which seems to me very useful. ( Cf. his G rundlagen der allgemeinen Asthetik [Leipzig, 1 904] , pp. 36 ff.) 34. Cf. my "Bermerkungen tiber den psychologischen Farbenkorper," loc. cit., pp. 5 ff.

[ 1 03 ] concerned, will be primarily of use to the general theory of Objects. Their full value has not yet been realized, despite present knowl­ edge of the history of philosophy. The same applies to linguistic science, in particular to grammar, whose significance, in fact, has not been fully surveyed either by the old or by the new logic; indeed its significance could scarcely be appreciated until the dis­ tinction between Object and Objective had been recognized in the distinction between the meaning of words and the meaning of sen­ tences. 35 However different the two cases may be on the whole, one is tempted to say that the general theory of Objects must learn from grammar just as the specialized theory of Objects must learn from mathematics. As this quick survey shows despite its somewhat cursory nature, the theory of Objects is by no means completely dependent upon work which is yet to be performed. Indeed, one might ask whether the attempt to introduce a "theory of Objects" means any more than a new name for an old concern. One could easily go on to find that it is indifferent to the investigation itself whether it is under­ taken by a mathematician, physicist, logician, or a student of the theory of Objects. Nevertheless, a misunderstanding would lurk in this last move-a misunderstanding which was countered explicitly at the beginning of this exposition. It is certainly immaterial who solves theoretical problems and under which name he solves them. If recognition as a special discipline should be successfully obtained for the theory of Objects, one would, now as before, always have to be thankful to mathematicians, physicists, linguists, and the repre­ sentatives of other sciences for their energetic furthering of the in­ terests of the theory of Objects, even when they do not mean to have departed from the legitimate territory of their own science. But� for many, recognition of this science would clarify the nature of the problems to be solved--especially where (as is commonly the case) the most relevant works are not of the greatest importance. A natural consequence of this is that old problems are rendered precise and new ones introduced. From the point of view of the theory of Objects, the problems and concerns which we have just grouped together-and which at first glance would seem so diverse-present themselves as belonging together; the value of such a point of view is thus confirmed. The Theory of Objects

3 5. Cf. Vber Annahmen, esp. pp. 1 9 ff., 1 75 ff.

[ 1 04 ]

1 1.

ALEXIUS MEINONG

PHILOS OPHY AND THE T HEORY OF OBJECTS

If I may hope to have shown that the theory of Objects is a science in its own right, distinct from the other sciences, it is now time to consider its relationship to these other sciences. In other words, it is now time to determine, to some extent, the place of the theory of Objects in the system of sciences. The difficulties which one must resolve, particularly if one endeavors to start from the more or less satisfactory definitions of the relevant sciences, are by no means to be charged solely to the account of the theory of Ob­ jects or to the "idea" of such a science which has been advocated here. We see constantly that the growth and success of the most diverse sciences is quite undisturbed by the fact that, so far, no completely unobjectionable definition can be found for them. I con­ clude from this, not that effort to obtain such definitions should be relaxed, but that the imperfect definitions we already possess may have their uses. Besides, we can test in this way how far we can get along on the basis of certain concrete knowledge without any formal definition. On such a basis, it will not be difficult, especially for anyone who is at all intimately acquainted with any of those sciences grouped together under the name "philosophy," to recognize one of them as the theory of Objects.36 The theory of Objects is also philosophy, therefore, and the only question that remains concerns its place in relation to the other "philosophical disciplines." But I already have devoted the major part of the previous exposition to answering this question. It has been shown that the theory of Objects is neither psychology nor logic, and we have seen why this is so. I believe that I have also been able to prove that the theory of Objects is inde­ pendent of the theory of knowledge. Nevertheless, as I have already indicated, I would like to place less weight on this result. That one cannot work in the theory of knowledge without also working in the theory of Objects, or at least utilizing the most important discoveries of the theory of Objects, seems to me beyond doubt.37 Therefore, if someone should claim that these studies are properly 36. Mor e d eta ils on this point ar e to be found in m y wor k, Vber philosophische Wissenschaft und ihre Propadeutik, chap . i. S ee, mos t r ecentl y, Hofler , "Zur g eg enw art ig en Naturphilosophi e," Joe. cit., pp. 1 23 (63 ) ff. 37. Cf. a lso Hofler, Joe. cit., p. 1 5 1 (91 ) .

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pursued only in the name of the theory of knowledge, his claim may not be a significant dissent. On the other hand, "ordered relations" between the theory of Objects and another neighboring science which has been mentioned over and over again in the preceding remarks seem to me of much more importance to the position of the theory of Objects. I am re­ ferring to metaphysics, under whose name the history of philosophy has actually entered many of the most significant ideas advanced in the theory of Objects. Even one who would consider the theory of Objects to be a part of the theory of knowledge, in the sense which has just be�n allowed, must face the following problems of demarcation : does the theory of Objects pertain to those areas, or does it in the end constitute just that area, in regard to which epistemology and metaphysics have, as is well known, not yet been able to reach agreement? Unfortunately, in the very case of metaphysics, understanding without any appeal to definitions is not to be achieved. Bearing this in mind, I may at least mention A. Hofler's proposal, which came to me while I was writing the present study. Based on an ingenious conception of J. Breuer, 3 8 it proposes to characterize metaphysics as the science of the "metaphenomenal."39 My reason for not ac­ cepting this proposal is essentially the same as my reason for having so long preferred to regard the "phenomena" (Phanomene ) of light, sound, etc., as the subject matter of the physicist, and "psycho­ logical phenomena" as the subject matter of the psychologist. Phe­ nomena, as such, are a class, albeit a very important class, of pseudo­ existing Objects. In the case of a Pseudoexistenz, what really exists is invariably only ideas ( Vorstellungen ) which are determined at any time with respect to content. To speak only of physics (for the sake of simplicity) : ideas are never Objects of physical inquiry, as Herner himself has demonstrated by means of arguments which are wholly convincing. 40 The phenomenon is certainly not the phe­ nomenal; the appearance is not that which appears-if by the latter we mean that which is known by means of the appearance, and whose existence therefore can be inferred from the fact of the appearance. I would certainly not deny that the things that thus appear are of interest to the physicist. But I cannot imagine how the "phenomena" 3 8. Co mmu nicated in Supp le men t I of Hofle r's repeated ly cited wor k, "Zu r gegen wartigen Naturphi losophie." 39. Ibid., pp . 1 54 (94) ff. 40. Cf. "Zur ge ge nwartige n Naturphi lo soph ie ," es p. pp. 1 3 1 ( 7 1) ff.

[ 1 06 ]

ALEXIUS MEINONO

of these ( e.g. , the "phenomena" that come after the beginning and the end of the appearing thing) can be excluded from the domain of metaphysics An appropriate evaluation of the importance of what Breuer and Hofler suggest would require me to digress too far from the main theme of this study. For now, these few hints may be enough to show why it still seems to me to be most appropriate, in the characterization of metaphysics, to place the major emphasis on the element of greatest possible generality, where "greatest possible gen­ erality" means the most comprehensive range of applicability pos­ sible for the ideas it advances. 4 1 Metaphysics is neither physics, physical biology, nor psychological biology. Instead, it includes in its realm of investigation the inorganic as well as the organic and psychological, in order to ascertain what has validity for everything that falls in such diverse realms. Of course, the emphasis which this definition places on universality renders the necessity for clarifying the relations between metaphysics and the theory of Objects espe­ cially obvious. This is so because our attention has also been drawn by the exceptional breadth of the area pertaining to the theory of Objects. But perhaps it is precisely by the simultaneous considera­ tion of the theory of Objects that we are led to a standpoint from which we can perfect our characterization of metaphysics and thereby silence many of the doubts which may previously have been raised about it. In this way, moreover, I can fall back on what has been said before and, to that extent, cut my discussion short. If, as we may well believe, everything that exists in the world is either psycho­ logical or physical, then metaphysics, insofar as it is concerned with the psychological as well as the physical, is the science of reality in general ( von der Gesamtheit des Wirklichen) . To this extent, then, to cite an example, both the fundamental thesis of monism, which asserts the essential identity of the physical and the psychological, and that of dualism, which asserts their essential dif­ ference, are metaphysical. But any one who knows things to be identical or different certainly knows something about these things; yet his knowledge, however, also concerns identity and/or differ­ ence, and identity itself is as far from being a thing as is difference. Both identity and difference stand outside of the disjunction between the physical and the psychological, since they stand beyond the real 4 1 . Vber philosophische Wissenschaft, etc., p. 7.

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( ausserhalb des Rea/en) . There is also knowledge of what is not actual ( von Nichtwirklichem) . No matter how generally the prob­ lems of metaphysics are construed, there are questions which are even more general; these questions, unlike those of metaphysics, are not oriented exclusively toward reality. The questions of theory of Ob­ jects are of this kind. But one will immediately ask: is it not forced, or at least arbi­ trary, to exclude in principle all ideal objects42 from the area of metaphysical investigation? I answer that in the first place they are by no means excluded in every sense. Our metaphysical interests would certainly be in a sorry plight indeed, as the example of monism and dualism has just shown, if one could not speak in metaphysics of identity and difference, nor of cause, purpose, unity, continuity, and many other objects which are either entirely or par­ tially of an ideal nature. However, many Objects of this type are also discussed in physics, although no one would count them among the Objects of physical inquiry. In any case, the restriction of the realm of metaphysics to reality is intended with a very definite res­ ervation. Presupposing such a reservation, however, I believe in fact that this restriction is entirely compatible with the spirit in which metaphysics has been carried on both in ancient and in mod­ �rn times, in accordance with that natural pre-eminence of the real which has been repeatedly touched upon. "Ontology," the "theory of categories," and the other subjects assigned more or less unani­ mously to metaphysics have occasionally allowed a place for interests extending beyond the limits of the real; but this is an indication only of the correctness and unavoidability of these interests. However, as far as I can see, there is no room for doubting that the fundamental intention of all metaphysics has always been directed toward com­ prehending the "world" in a strict, natural sense, i.e., the world of reality. This is so even when this comprehension seems to show that what is to be comprehended has no claim at all to the title of a real object. But even if our present view of the character of metaphysics up to this time should not convince everyone, indeed even if it should be shown to be historically incorrect, the error concerns only the definition "de lege lata," as it were, and the defi­ nition "de lege ferenda"43 would remain open for consideration. On this assumption, the characterization of metaphysics advanced above would be a proposal for a definition: the restriction of the 42. "Ober Gegenst an de h oherer Or dnung," pp . 198 ff. 43. Breuer, in Hofler, loc. cit., p . 189 ( 129) .

ALEXIUS MEINONG [ 1 08 ] name "metaphysics" to the general science of reality would be just as desirable in the interest of a clear formulation of the problems of metaphysics as it would be in the interest of its distinct delim.ina­ tion in relation to the theory of Objects. Only one point concerning the latter problem still requires clari­ fication. If metaphysics is a general science of the real, should we say that the theory of Objects is, in contrast, the general science of the non-real? This would obviously be too narrow. Why should real Objects be excluded from the theory of Objects as such? Or would it be more appropriate to describe the theory of Objects as the theory of the subsistent, contrasting the words "subsist'' and "ex­ ist"44 in such a way that, whereas all existing things subsist, it is not true that all subsisting entities (e.g., difference) also exist? Even in this case, the area which the theory of Objects comprehends, as we have seen, would not be included in its entirety; the non­ subsistent, the absurd, would be excluded. To be sure, the nonsubsis­ tent is of little concern to the natural interest, and it provides an even smaller point of purchase to intellectual understanding. 45 But it does belong to the "given" (Gegebenen) , after all, so that the theory of Objects can by no means ignore it. Such an omission can be met simply by the stipulation that the theory of Objects concern itself with the given, without paying any attention to its being (Sein) , and that it consider only the knowledge of its Sosein. Yet, something which might give us pause in connection with this definition is already intimately tied up with the theory of Objects. If the theory of Objects chose to make one of its fundamental principles that of indifference to being, then it would have to renounce all claims to be a science, and even the knowledge of Sosein would thereby be excluded. As we know, it is completely unnecessary that the Object of knowledge should have being. However, all knowledge must have an Objective which has being; and if the theory of Objects concerns itself with a Sosein which did not have being itself, then, provided that we ignore the exceptional situations to be passed over here, it no longer has any claim to be a theory. Of course, the fundamental principle could always be formulated as follows : the theory of Objects neglects being only in the case of its Objects, but not, however, in the case of (certain) Objectives. But why then the absence of uniformity? Moreover, or perhaps first of all: whether this or that Object is

44. "Obe r Gegen stan de h oherer Or dnung," p. 186. 45. See E. Mally, i n No . III o f the se stu die s, chap . i, Se c s. 5 f.

[ 1 09 ] absurd by nature, whether it subsists or could equally well exist­ these are questions which are actually of interest to the theory of Objects and which are ultimately questions about being. In brief, therefore : even the restriction to Sosein probably cannot be brought into harmony with the essential nature of the theory of Objects. There may be, however, a rather simple source of assistance here. It is a methodological distinction, and one which, so far as it concerns the nature of the sciences, people heretofore have sought to make with too much, rather than too little, ardor. As is generally known, some cases of knowledge are justified in terms of the char­ acteristics, the Sosein, of their Objects or Objectives. Again, there are other cases of which this is not so. 46 The first type of knowl­ edge has long been called a priori, and the latter, empirical. Nowa­ days we occasionally meet with failure to recognize this distinction, but such failure no more affects the validity of the distinction than does the fact of color blindness affect the distinction between the various colors. ( The state of color blindness, however, is psychologi­ cally much more interesting.) If we now make use of the distinction between a priori and empirical, we will have no difficulty, it seems to me, in making a satisfactory differentiation between our two disci­ plines. What can be known about an Object in virtue of its nature, hence a priori, belongs to the theory of Objects. This involves, in the first place, the Sosein of the "given." But it also involves its being ( Sein ) insofar as that can be known from its Sosein. On the other hand, that which is to be determined about Objects only a posteriori belongs to metaphysics, provided that the knowledge is of a sufficiently general character. That the domain of reality will not be overstepped as long as the knowledge in question is affirma­ tive in nature is assured by the a posteriori character of this knowl­ edge. There are, therefore, precisely two sciences of highest gen­ erality : an a priori science which concerns everything which is given, and an a posteriori one which includes in its investigations every­ thing which can be considered by empirical knowledge, i.e., reality in general. The latter science is metaphysics, the former is the theory of Objects. The most striking feature of this definition is that metaphysics appears as an empirical science; yet the representatives of the sep­ arate sciences have reproached both ancient and modem meta­ physics mainly for a lack of sufficient empiricism. I would not wish The Theory of Objects

46. Ober Annahmen, pp. 1 93 f.

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ALEXIUS MEINONG

to defend anyone deserving such a reproach. I would hope to be far from this in what I have said above, for, in the very definition of metaphysics, I have rendered a just account of the claims of empiricism. Ultimately, experience is the only source of knowledge at the disposal of any science of reality, whether that science be special or general. I say "ultimately" because what is required is, not that everything be experienced directly, but that we be able to infer from experience what is not experienced, and perhaps even what cannot be experienced. But the indispensable foundation of empirical knowledge always remains empirical and is toto coelo different from the general epistemological character of the a priori. In this sense, there is no knowledge of what exists other than em­ pirical knowledge. If the experiences which would be necessary for the characteristically general thesis are not suitable to metaphysics, then-there is no metaphysics, or at least no scientific metaphysics (and it is only with scientific metaphysics that we are concerned) . It has already been mentioned that, for purposes of the present dis­ cussion, we need not consider here the extent to which the desire for a scientific metaphysics has so far been realized. So it is only an apparent paradox, which can be removed by brief reflection, if I must say : No matter how much or how little metaphysical knowl­ edge is accessible to us, this knowledge ultimately can be nothing but empirical knowledge. If one objects, however, that the word "metaphysics" has often been used as a name for intellectual endeavors or even for results which employ, unmistakably and perhaps downright fundamentally, extra-empirical (and consequently a priori) methods, he forgets that we are now taking the standpoint, sit venia verbo, of "definitio ferenda." Naturally I am aware that the two areas of knowledge we are now concerned to mark off clearly are by no means always thus marked off. However, that the present division cannot be en­ tirely worthless-assuming that I have succeeded in making it clear -may be indicated here by the ontological argument, or at least by arguments like it (even now there may be some who have not outgrown such reasoning) . The ontological argument is characteristic of attempts to solve a metaphysical problem in merely a priori fashion-to deal with it on equal terms with a problem that be­ longs to the theory of Objects. This and similar arguments are to be judged by this fact. It is improbable that all difficulties concerning the boundary be­ tween metaphysics and the theory of Objects are eliminated by means

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of this division. But it would be unfair to demand in this instance what has not been clearly achieved in any instance of contiguous sciences. A more important objection emerges specifically from the standpoint of the theory of Objects. We have treated this as if it were simply a general science, even though we had to make a quite explicit distinction above between a general and a specialized theory of Objects. Here is an imperfection which cannot be removed, at least in the present state of knowledge of matters pertaining to the theory of Objects ; there are practical reasons for this. It is clear that mathematics, insofar as it is a specialized theory of Objects, could be accompanied by still other specialized theories of Objects, their number scarcely to be determined. However, these areas are at present so incompletely known to us that in studying them there is not yet any need to specialize. The specialized theories of Objects divide at this time, therefore, into mathematical and non-mathe­ matical. What can now be said about the second member of this wholly primitive division is so obvious that it easily finds a place within the limits of the general theory of Objects. To this extent, there is at present no specialized theory of Objects other than mathematics. Of course, one cannot predict how long this will be so. Development along these lines will not be forestalled by the defini­ tion proposed above. Just as specialized empirical sciences are set over against the general empirical science, specialized a priori sci­ ences can accompany the general a priori science. For the time being, this possibility is realized only in mathematics; in subsuming mathematics under the standpoint of the theory of Objects, we have placed it alongside of disciplines which are not now actual, but they are disciplines which at least are possible. In any event, mathematics need no longer find itself in that odd isolation from which earlier theoretical conceptions of mathematics suffer. 47 I must finally return to placing the theory of Objects among the philosophical sciences, which was accomplished above without ap­ pealing to a definition. On occasion, I have attempted to classify as philosophical those sciences which are occupied only with psycho­ logical matters or which are occupied also with psychological matters. The opinion has been expressed very recently48 that my work in the theory of relations and complexes may have led me by now to ascribe an essentially twofold object to philosophy : firstly, psy­ chological matters and, secondly, relations and complexes. That 4 7. See above, Secs. 2 and 7.

48. By Hofler in his study, "Zur gegenwartigen Naturphilosophie," p. 124 (64) .

ALEXIUS MEINONG [ 1 12 ] such a modification would destroy completely the unity of the origi­ nal definition is amply evident. One should be scandalized to find the objects of philosophy turning out to be a hodgepodge of left­ overs from the natural sciences, unless one believed that philosophy should generally be characterized by reference to whatever the nat­ ural sciences happened to leave over. 4 9 On such a view the function remaining for philosophy could hardly be called worthy. And even if the introduction of a scientific activity intended essentially for picking up left-overs could have some practical justification, this should scarcely alter the theoretical fact that in themselves these left-overs taken together do not comprise materials for a science. On the other hand, it is certain that complexes and relations, insofar as they are ideal-today I would rather say : ideal complexes and ideal relata50-are neither physical nor psychological ( psychisch ) ; for they are not real at all. But to include them within philosophy­ in other words, to be able to consider the theory of Objects as a philosophical discipline-we need not revise our conception of phi­ losophy any more than we do in connection with the other universal science. If I may count metaphysics among the philosophical disci­ plines because it conceives its problems broadly enough that, along with the physical, the psychological is also to be included in it, then nothing hinders our treating the theory of Objects as a philosophi­ cal science for the same reasons. The theory of Objects has to do with the given taken in its entirety; we may recognize that the psychological belongs to the given, but without prejudice to the fact that physical and ideal Objects are likewise included therein and must be considered too. The foregoing can be said quite independ­ ently of the fact that, in connection with ideal Objects (which by nature are always superordinate [superius] ) , psychological Objects can sometimes enter into consideration as indispensable subordi­ nates (inferiora ) . Of course, I do not hesitate to admit that the parallelism which has just been shown to hold between the theory of Objects and metaphysics also holds in other matters which are fundamentally of more practical than theoretical significance. From the fact that metaphysics is concerned with the psychological, and not only with the psychological but also with the physical, I have concluded, on the side of metaphysics, that the representative of the psychological

49. Cf. J. Br euer , in H ofler , loc. cit., p . 190 ( 1 30) . 50. Conc erning the r eas ons for this chang e in th e t ermin ol ogy I have us ed her etofor e, s ee No. III of t hes e st ud ies by Mally, c hap. i, Secs . 9, 1 1 .

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[ 1 13 ] sciences, as well as the representative of the physical sciences, can legitimately deal with metaphysical problems and may be called upon to do so. Now it seems to me that one cannot help but make exactly the same concession for the theory of Objects. Indeed, as far as research techniques are concerned, those engaged in the sci­ entific study of psychological experiences may have a certain ad­ vantage in the theory of Objects as well as in metaphysics. In the theory of Objects it is disastrously easy, as we know, to collapse into psychology; this fact speaks a language which is not to be misunder­ stood. But these are considerations only of technique; even in terms of what has just been said, we cannot fail to see that under special circumstances such considerations may be more than balanced by some particular technique contributed by another science. Insofar as mathematics in particular can be regarded as a specialized theory of Objects, it would be ungrateful to forget that research of the type which belongs to the theory of Objects often leads to splendid results without any thought for other philosophical interests.

1 2.

CONCLUSION

If the foregoing exposition has demonstrated-at least in rough outline-the nature and the legitimacy of a distinctive science, "the theory of Objects," and of its place among the sciences in general, it may now be appropriate to explain more precisely the problems and the methods of the new science. We should note, on the one hand, that the most important of these considerations has already arisen quite of its own accord : for once the subject matter of a science is known, its problems are, in general, already defined. This is particularly true if the a priori nature of the science in question has been shown. And the latter qualification determines what is most important as far as method is concerned. On the other hand ( and of primary significance ) , however, making plans is notoriously "many, many times a vain and ostentatious intellectual show." And showing others a path one declines to take oneself is even more so. I may hope that my previous relations to this science will exclude any suspicion that I am one who is content to set up projects without putting a hand to their fulfillment; otherwise the foregoing treatise about a science that is only coming into being might better have been withheld. It requires so much more to be a Prometheus than an Epimetheus, that I shall certainly not appear to indulge in self-

ALEXIUS M EINONG [ 1 14 ] praise if I note that for years-indeed for decades-my scientific endeavors have been under the influence of interests pertaining to the theory of Objects without any suspicion of the true nature of these interests having occurred to me. The fact that their nature at first burst in upon me with complete autonomy in practice, and later-I could scarcely say exactly when myself5 1-in theory, pre­ sents me with a new argument for the validity of the claims which have been made above in the name of the theory of Objects. (This is clearly not a formally rigorous argument, but its force is none­ theless not to be underestimated.) The claims themselves thus signify for me a view which is much more retrospective than anticipatory. Given the chance to demonstrate how fruitful the point of view of the theory of Objects can be, in the face of old problems as well as ever so many new ones, I would say that any attempt to gain rec­ ognition for this point of view, by outlining its distinctive charac­ ter, can by no means be premature. However, the occurrence of this essay in the framework of the present collection of studies has a more special motive. It was in­ evitable that researches along the lines of the theory of Objects should receive devoted attention in the circle where its significance was first appreciated. Thus it has been possible to place two studies* devoted to the theory of Objects at the beginning of the present collection; other parts of the collection may bear witness here and there to the utility of knowledge and skill in the theory of Objects for psychological research. In consideration of this, it seemed fitting to mention the theory of Objects explicitly in the title of the entire collection and to permit a sort of basic explanation of what is meant by this expression to precede the two treatises indicated. Thus, even in the present publication, what has been said above about a new science is not presented as a comfortable dream of the future or as some utopia, but as a goal which we may clearly hold before our eyes, and which we have already begun to use our best abilities to achieve. Accordingly, if the present explanations are to function at the same time as a kind of special preface to the part of the present book which has to do with the theory of Objects, this is the appro-

5 1. In any case , it was long be fo re 1903, when I too k an oppo rtunity fo r the first ti me to re fer to the theory o f O bje cts exp licit ly by this name . C f. "Bemer kunge n iiber den Far ben k orper, et c.," foe. cit., pp. 3 f. * The essays to whi ch Meinong he re re fe rs a re : "Be it rage zu r Grundlegung de r Gegenstan dstheor ie ," by Ru do lf Amese der , and "Untersu chu nge n zur Gege n­ st andstheorie des Messe ns ," by E. Ma lly.

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[ 1 15 ] priate place for a few remarks about the two works which follow. It is not only the editor of these essays who speaks in these remarks but perhaps even more the academic teacher, who, not too long ago, had the pleasure of introducing the authors of the following investigations to the philosophical sciences, and who thereby con­ siders himself authorized ( or under the present circumstances, obliged) to bar the way at the outset against certain obvious mis­ understandings about the intentions of the works I am discussing. After what has gone before, I can hardly be suspected of ingrati­ tude for the preparatory work that has been so useful to the theory of Objects on many sides, if I nevertheless go on to say : the theory of Objects is a young, a very young, science. Anyone who betakes himself to its domain finds an immeasurable wealth of problems-to-be and possible solutions. However, even with the most careful consider­ ation, he cannot hope to hit the correct answer every time. Instead, he must expect that wha� he believes to have been established firmly will oftentimes fall victim to advanced knowledge and to the developed research techniques of the future. It is also obvious that in the begin­ ning the individuality of the investigator must play a more determina­ tive role in the results than it does in times of established traditions and more polished methods of investigation. The opinions advanced in the following essays are not put forward as conclusive results. They are, rather, preliminary considerations ( though, as the editor can testify, by no means hastily conceived ) ; they are advanced with the expectation that much still remains to be improved-with the thought, therefore, that which is offered here is intended less for the reader's passive absorption than for his criticism and further culti­ vation. On such a presupposition, there will be no grounds for objection if the opinions advanced in the two essays do not always agree as to ideas and as to terminology with each other, and with the concep­ tions I have introduced myself, even though they have more than once found themselves forced to go into basic questions, and con­ sequently sometimes to go into ones I have touched on. This is itself a sign of the primitive state of the theory of Objects. One might very well reproach us for not having smoothed out our differences in oral conversation in order that we might appear before the public with a firmly unified system of harmonious concepts and terms. The demand that controversies ought to be decided in private rather than in print is certainly legitimate, but I can report that we are not sparing of discussion in the Graz Philosophical Institute. Naturally,

ALEXIUS MEINONG [ 1 16 ] the principle of the greatest possible freedom of conviction holds at the same time; had we decided not to allow individual views to be expressed beyond certain limits, we would have paved the way for predispositions which can be most harmful at the beginning of inquiry. And if in what follows we had offered something more rounded and more unanimous, we would have been able to do it only at the price of forfeiting stimulating influences which might be fruitful for the further development of the theory of Objects. Another defect in the two contributions which follow, one with which the authors themselves are well acquainted, is at least in part based on analogous considerations. The literature on a given sub­ ject may stimulate one person who sets out to explore that subject; but it may also serve, by the power of suggestion, to cut off any capacities for development he may have. I hope that herein lies at least part of the justification for the fact that for a very long time I have followed and taught as a first principle of research the funda­ mental law: First observe and consider, then read. But I cannot fail to recognize the fact that to some extent this fundamental law in­ volves the danger that the use of literature may become too abbre­ viated, especially if the completion of a work is bound to a definite time, or special circumstances make access to the literature difficult. Both of these things have happened in the following studies in the theory of Objects. Since the outward occasion for the present publi­ cation required the appearance of the book before the end of 1 904, I was obliged to press the authors to finish off their contributions, at a time when they certainly had no illusions about the conclusive­ ness of these works. On the other hand, as indicated by the occasional citations above, 52 access to the literature on the theory of Objects is anything but easy at this time. It is scattered to the four winds, and it can be disclosed, to say nothing of being fully absorbed, only by a deeply penetrating study of adjoining sciences. Thus one will search in vain in the two treatises which follow for anything resembling a uniform usage of the relevant mathematical literature, despite the profound importance it has for the foundation of the theory of Ob­ jects. None of us believes the matter can rest there. For my part, I hope that the principle of considering and reading will always be maintained in spite of special circumstances. If I am not mistaken, the reader will take no offense at the great number of new concepts and terms, of which many may appear to

52. See Se c . 10.

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[ 1 17 ] be superfluous and burdensome (and insofar as they really are, they will certainly not endure ) . Nor will he take offense at the fact that we have decided to give this or that concept a name different from the one I have used in earlier works. A good term is as much as half a discovery; and it is better to replace a bad term when a better one has been found than to continue dragging along the evil conse­ quences of the old for the sake of conservatism. I may now summarize. In the foregoing, an attempt has been made to demonstrate the legitimacy of the theory of Objects as a separate science in its own right. The two treatises that follow­ incidentally and implicitly the other studies assembled in this book as well-are intended to make contributions to this science. In this respect, to demand completeness and irrefutability can hardly be reasonable as things now stand. It is enough if we should have been able successfully to set forth a consideration and critique of ideas that strive to go still further, and by this to show that the path we have taken is worthy of confidence, and one by which anyone who resolves to take it will be advanced. It is to be hoped that what we have been able to offer here will bring friends and recognition to the new science of the theory of Objects.

5

Phenomenology BY

EDMUND HUSSERL

( TRANSLATED BY C . V. SOLOMON )

PHENOMENOLOGY denotes a new, descriptive, philosophical method, which, since the concluding years of the last century, has established ( 1) an a priori psychological discipline, able to provide the only secure basis on which a strong empirical psychology can be built, and (2) a universal philosophy, which can supply an organum for the methodical revision of all the sciences. I.

PHENOMENOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY

Present-day psychology, as the science of the "psychical" in its concrete connection with spatio-temporal reality, regards as its material whatever is present in the world as "ego-istic"; i.e . , "living," perceiving, thinking, willing, etc. , actual, potential and habitual. And as the psychical is known as a certain stratum of existence, proper to men and beasts, psychology may be considered as a branch of anthropology and zoology. But animal nature is a part of physical reality, and that which is concerned with physical reality is natural science. Is it, then, possible to separate the psychical cleanly enough from the physical to establish a pure psychology parallel to natural science? That a purely psychological investigation is practicable within limits is shown by our obligation to it for our fundamental conceptions of the psychical, and most of those of the psycho-physical. But before determining the question of an unlimited psychology, Rep rinted from the a rti cle , "Phe nome nol ogy," by Edmu nd Hu sse rl, i n t he 1 4th edi ­ ti on of t he Encyclopaedia Britannica ( 1929) , with the kind perm issi on of the pu blish ers.

[ 118 ]

Phenomenology

[ 1 19 ] we must be sure of the characteristics of psychological experience and the psychical data it provides. We tum naturally to our imme­ diate experiences. But we cannot discover the psychical in any expe­ rience, except by a "reflection," or perversion of the ordinary attitude. We are accustomed to concentrate upon the matters, thoughts, and values of the moment, and not upon the psychical "act of experi­ ence" in which these are apprehended. This "act" is revealed by a "reflection" ; and a reflection can be practised on every experience. Instead of the matters themselves, the values, goals, utilities, etc., we regard the subjective experiences in which these "appear." These "appearances" are phenomena, whose nature is to be a "conscious­ ness-of" their object, real or unreal as it be. Common language catches this sense of "relativity," saying, I was thinking of some­ thing, I was frightened of something, etc. Phenomenological psy­ chology takes its name from the "phenomena," with the psychological aspect of which it is concerned: and the word "intentional" has been borrowed from the scholastic to denote the essential "reference" character of the phenomena. All consciousness is "intentional." In unreflective consciousness we are "directed" upon objects, we "intend" them; and reflection reveals this to be an immanent process characteristic of all experience, though infinitely varied in form. To be conscious of something is no empty having of that something in consciousness. Each phenomenon has its own intentional structure, which analysis shows to be an ever-widening system of individually intentional and intentionally related components. The perception of a cube, for example, reveals a multiple and synthesized intention: a continuous variety in the "appearance" of the cube, according to differences in the points of view from which it is seen, and corre­ sponding differences in "perspective," and all the difference between the "front side" actually seen at the moment and the "backside" which is not seen, and which remains, therefore, relatively "indeter­ minate," and yet is supposed equally to be existent. Observation of this "stream" of "appearance-aspects" and of the manner of their synthesis, shows that every phase and interval is already in itself a "consciousness-of" something, yet in such a way that with the con­ stant entry of new phases the total consciousness, at any moment, lacks not synthetic unity, and is, in fact, a consciousness of one and the same object. The intentional structure of the train of a perception must conform to a certain type, if any physical object is to be per­ ceived as there! And if the same object be intuited in other modes, if it be imagined, or remembered, or copied, all its intentional forms

EDMUND HUSSERL [ 1 20 ] recur, though modified in character from what they were in the perception, to correspond to their new modes. The same is true of every kind of psychical experience. Judgment, valuation, pursuit, these also are no empty experiences having in consciousness of judgments, values, goals and means, but are likewise experiences compounded of an intentional stream, each conforming to its own fast type. Phenomenological psychology's comprehensive task is the sys­ tematic examination of the types and forms of intentional experience, and the reduction of their structures to the prime intentions, learning thus what is the nature of the psychical, and comprehending the being of the soul. The validity of these investigations will obviously extend beyond the particularity of the psychologist's own soul. For psychical life may be revealed to us not only in self-consciousness but equally in our consciousness of other selves, and this latter source of experience offers us more than a reduplication of what we find in our self­ consciousness, for it establishes the differences between "own" and "other" which we experience, and presents us with the characteristics of the "social life." And hence the further task accrues to psychology of revealing the intentions of which the "social life" consists. Phenomenological-psychological and Eidetic-Reductions. The Phenomenological psychology must examine the self's experience of itself and its derivative experience of other selves and of society, but whether, in so doing, it can be free of all psycho-physical admixture, is not yet clear. Can one reach a really pure self-experience and purely psychical data? This difficulty, ever since Brentano's dis­ covery of intentionality, as the fundamental character of the psychical, has blinded psychologists to the possibilities of phenomenological psychology. The psychologist finds his self-consciousness mixed everywhere with "external" experience, and non-psychical realities. For what is experienced as external belongs not to the intentional "internal," though our experience of it belongs there as an experi­ ence of the external. The phenomenologist, who will only notice phenomena, and know purely his own "life," must practice an iTrox11- He must inhibit every ordinary objective "position," and par­ take in no judgment concerning the objective world. The experience itself will remain what it was, an experience of this house, of this body, of this world in general, in its particular mode. For one cannot describe any intentional experience, even though it be "illusory," a self-contradicting judgment and the like, without describing what in the experience is, as such, the object of consciousness.

Phenomenology

[ 121 ]

Our comprehensive t1roX11 puts, as we say, the world between brackets, excludes the world which is simply there ! from the sub­ ject's field, presenting in its stead the so-and-so-experienced-per­ ceived-remembered-judged-thought-valued-etc., world, as such, the "bracketed" world. Not the world or any part of it appears, but the "sense" of the world. To enjoy phenomenological experience we must retreat from the objects posited in the natural attitude to the multiple modes of their "appearance," to the "bracketed" objects. The phenomenological reduction to phenomena, to the purely psychical, advances by two steps : ( 1) systematic and radical £1rox/J of every objectifying "position" in an experience, practised both upon the regard of particular objects and upon the entire attitude of mind, and ( 2) expert recognition, comprehension and description of the manifold "appearances" of what are no longer "objects" but "unities" of sense. So that the phenomenological description will comprise two parts, description of the ''noetic" ( vot:w ) or "experi­ encing" and description of the "noematic" ( vo 77 µa ) or the "experi­ enced. " Phenomenological experience, is the only experience which may properly be called "internal" and there is no limit to its prac­ tice. And as a similar "bracketing" of objective, and description of what then '"appears" ("noema" in "noesis") , can be performed upon the "life" of another self which we represent to ourselves, the "re­ ductive" method can be extended from one's own self-experience to one's experience of other selves. And, further, that society, which we experience in a common consciousness, may be reduced not only to the intentional fields of the individual consciousness, but also by the means of an inter-subjective reduction, to that which unites these, namely the phenomenological unity of the social life. Thus enlarged, the psychological concept of internal experience reaches its full extent. But it takes more than the unity of a manifold "intentional life," with its inseparable complement of "sense-unities," to make a "soul." For from the individual life that "ego-subject" cannot be disjoined, which persists as an identical ego or "pole," to the particular intentions, and the "habits" growing out of these. Thus the "inter-subjective," phenomenologically reduced and concretely apprehended, is seen to be a "society" of "persons," who share a conscious life. Phenomenological psychology can be purged of every empirical and psycho-physical element, but, being so purged, it cannot deal with "matters of fact." Any closed field may be considered as regards its "essence," its t:LOoi;, and we may disregard the factual

EDMUND HUSSERL [ 1 22 ] side of our phenomena, and use them as "examples" merely. We shall ignore individual souls and societies, to learn their a priori, their "possible" forms. Our thesis will be "theoretical," observing the invariable through variation, disclosing a typical realm of a priori. There will be no psychical existence whose "style" we shall not know. Psychological phenomenology must rest upon eidetic phenomenology. The phenomenology of the perception of bodies, for example, will not be an account of actually occurring perceptions, or those which may be expected to occur, but of that invariable "structure," apart from which no perception of a body, single or prolonged, can be conceived. The phenomenological reduction reveals the phenomena of actual internal experience; the eidetic reduction, the essential forms constraining psychical existence. Men now demand that empirical psychology shall conform to the exactness required by modern natural science. Natural science, which was once a vague, inductive empiric, owes it modem char­ acter to the a priori system of forms, nature as it is "conceivable," which its separate disciplines, pure geometry, laws of motion, time, etc., have contributed. The methods of natural science and psychol­ ogy are quite distinct, but the latter, like the former, can only reach "exactness" by a rationalization of the "essential." The psycho-physical has an a priori which must be learned by any complete psychology, this a priori is not phenomenological, for it depends no less upon the essence of physical, or more par­ ticularly organic nature.

II.

TRANSCENDENT AL PHENOMENOLOGY

Transcendental philosophy may be said to have originated in Descartes, and phenomenological psychology in Locke, Berkeley and Hume, although the latter did not grow up primarily as a method or discipline to serve psychology, but to contribute to the solution of the transcendental problematic which Descartes had posed. The theme propounded in the Meditations was still domi­ nant in a philosophy which it had initiated. All reality, so it ran, and the whole of the world which we perceive as existent, may be said to exist only as the content of our own representations, judged in our judgments, or, at best, proved by our own knowing. There lay impulse enough to rouse all the legitimate and illegitimate

Phenomenology

[ 1 23 ]

problems of transcendence, which we know. Descartes' "Doubting" first disclosed "transcendental subjectivity," and his "Ego Cogito" was its first conceptual handling. But the Cartesian transcendental "Mens" became the "Human Mind," which Locke undertook to explore; and Locke's exploration turned into a psychology of the internal experience. And since Locke thought his psychology could embrace the transcendental problems, in whose interest he had begun his work, he became the founder of a false psychologistical philosophy which has persisted because men have not analysed their concept of "subjective" into its two-fold significance. Once the transcendental problem is fairly stated, the ambiguity of the sense of the "subjective" becomes apparent, and establishes the phenom­ enological psychology to deal with its one meaning, and the tran­ scendental phenomenology with its other. Phenomenological psychology has been given the priority in this article, partly because it forms a convenient stepping-stone to the philosophy and partly because it is nearer to the common attitude than is the transcendental. Psychology, both in its eidetic and empirical disciplines, is a "positive" science, promoted in the "natural attitude" with the world before it for the ground of all its themes, while transcendental experience is difficult to realize because it is "supreme" and entirely "unworldly." Phenomenological psychology, although comparatively new, and completely new as far as it uses intentional analysis, can be approached from the gates of any of the positive sciences : and, being once reached, demands only a re-employment, in a more stringent mode, of its formal mechanism of reduction and analysis, to disclose the transcendental phenomena. But it is not to be doubted that transcendental phenomenology could be developed independently of all psychology. The discovery of the double relativity of consciousness suggests the practice of both reductions. The psychological reduction does not reach beyond the psychical in animal realities, for psychology subserves real existence, and even its eidetic is confined to the possibilities of real worlds. But the transcendental problem will include the entire world and all its sciences, to "doubt" the whole. The world "orig­ inates" in us, as Descartes led men to recognize, and within us acquires its habitual influence. The general significance of the world, and the definite sense of its particulars, is something of which we are conscious within our perceiving, representing, thinking, valuing life, and therefore something "constituted" in some subjective genesis.

[ 1 24 ]

EDMUND HUSSERL

The world and its property, "in and for itself, " exists as it exists, whether I, or we, happen, or not, to be conscious of it. But let once this general world, make its "appearance" in consciousness as "the" world, it is thenceforth related to the subjective, and all its existence and the manner of it, assumes a new dimension, becoming "incompletely intelligible," "questionable." Here, then, is the transcendental problem; this "making its appearance," this "being for us" of the world, which can only gain its significance "subjectively," what is it? We may call the world "internal" because it is related to consciousness, but how can this quite "general" world whose "immanent" being is as shadowy as the consciousness wherein it "exists," contrive to appear before us in a variety of "particular" aspects, which experience assures us are the aspects of an in­ dependent, self-existent world? The problem also touches every "ideal" world, the world of pure number, for example, and the world of "truths in themselves. " And no existence, or manner of existence, is less wholly intelligible than ourselves. Each by himself, and in society, we, in whose consciousness the world is valid, being men, belong ourselves to the world. Must we, then, refer ourselves to ourselves to gain a worldly sense, a worldly being? Are we both psychologically to be called men, subjects of a psychical life, and yet be transcendental to ourselves and the whole world, being subjects of a transcendental world-constituting life? Psychical subjectivity, the "I" and "we" of everyday intent, may be experienced as it is in itself under the phenomenological-psychological reduction, and being eidetically treated, may establish a phenomenological psychology. But the transcendental subjectivity, which for want of language we can only call again, "I myself," "we ourselves," cannot be found under the attitude of psychological or natural science, being no part at all of the objective world, but that sub­ jective conscious life itself, wherein the world and all its content is made for "us," for "me." We that are, indeed, men, spiritual and bodily, existing in the world, are, therefore, "appearances" unto ourselves, parcel of what "we" have constituted, pieces of the significance "we" have made. The "I" and "we," which we apprehend, presuppose a hidden "I" and "we" to whom they are "present." To this transcendental subjectivity, transcendental experience gives us direct approach. As the psychical experience was purified, so is the transcendental, by a reduction. The transcendental re­ duction may be regarded as a certain further purification of the psychological interest. The universal is carried to a further stage.

[ 1 25 ] Henceforth the "bracketing" includes not the world only but its "souls" as well. The psychologist reduces the ordinarily valid world to a subjectivity of "souls," which are a part of the world which they inhabit. The transcendental phenomenologist reduces the already psychologically purified to the transcendental, that most general, subjectivity, which makes the world and its "souls," and confirms them. I no longer survey my perception experiences, imagination experiences, the psychological data which my psychological experi­ ence reveals: I learn to survey transcendental experience. I am no longer interested in my own existence. I am interested in the pure intentional life, wherein my psychically real experiences have occurred. This step raises the transcendental problem ( the trans­ cendental being defined as the quality of that which is conscious­ ness) to its true level. We have to recognize that relativity to consciousness is not only an actual quality of our world, but, from eidetic necessity, the quality of every conceivable world. We may, in a free fancy, vary our actual world, and transmute it to any other which we can imagine, but we are obliged with the world to vary ourselves also, and ourselves we cannot vary except within the limits prescribed to us by the nature of subjectivity. Change worlds as we may, each must ever be a world such as we could experience, prove upon the evidence of our theories and inhabit with our practice. The transcendental problem is eidetic. My psycho­ logical experiences, perceptions, imaginations and the like remain in form and content what they were, but I see them as ''structures" now, for I am face to face at last with the ultimate structure of consciousness. It is obvious that, like every other intelligible problem, the transcendental problem derives the means of its solution from an existence-stratum, which it presupposes and sets beyond the reach of its enquiry. This realm is no other than the bare subjectivity of consciousness in general, while the realm of its investigation remains not less than every sphere which can be called "objective," which considered in its totality, and at its root, is the conscious life. No one, then, can justly propose to solve the transcendental problem by psychology either empirical or eidetic-phenomenological, without petitio principii, for psychology's ''subjectivity" and "con­ sciousness" are not that subjectivity and consciousness, which our philosophy will investigate. The transcendental reduction has sup­ planted the psychological reduction. In the place of the psychological Phenomenology

[ 1 26 ]

EDMUND HUSSERL

"I" and "we," the transcendental "I" and "we" are comprehended in the concreteness of transcendental consciousness. But though the transcendental "I" is not my psychological "I," it must not be considered as if it were a second "I," for it is no more separated from my psychological "I" in the conventional sense of separation, than it is joined to it in the conventional sense of being joined. Transcendental self-experience may, at any moment, merely by a change of attitude, be turned back into psychological self­ experience. Passing, thus, from the one to the other attitude, we notice a certain "identity" about the ego. What I saw under the psychological reflection as "my" objectification, I see under the transcendental reflection as self-objectifying, or, as we may also say, as objectified by the transcendental "I." We have only to recognize that what makes the psychological and transcendental spheres of experience parallel is an "identity" in their significance, and that what differentiates them is merely a change of attitude, to realize that the psychological and transcendental phenomenolo­ gies will also be parallel. Under the more stringent i:rrox� the psychological subjectivity is transformed into the transcendental subjectivity, and the psychological inter-subjectivity into the trans­ cendental inter-subjectivity. It is this last which is the concrete, ultimate ground, whence all that transcends consciousness, includ­ ing all that is real in the world, derives the sense of its existence. For all objective existence is essentially "relative," and owes its nature to a unity of intention, which being established according to transcendental laws, produces consciousness with its habit of belief and its conviction. Phenomenology, the Universal Science. Thus, as phenomenology is developed, the Leibnitzian foreshadowing of a universal ontology, the unification of all conceivable a priori sciences, is improved, and realized upon the new and non-dogmatic basis of phenomenological method. For phenomenology as the science of all concrete phe­ nomena proper to subjectivity and inter-subjectivity, is eo ipso an a priori science of all possible existence and existences. Phe­ nomenology is universal in its scope, because there is no a priori which does not depend upon its intentional constitution, and derive from this its power of engendering habits in the consciousness that knows it, so that the establishment of any a priori must reveal the subjective process by which it is established. Once the a priori disciplines, such as the mathematical sciences, are incorporated within phenomenology, they cannot thereafter be

[ 1 27 ] beset by "paradoxes" or disputes concerning principles : and those sciences which have become a priori independently of phenomenol­ ogy, can only hope to set their methods and premises beyond criticism, by founding themselves upon it. For their very claim to be positive, dogmatic sciences bears witness to their dependency, as branches, merely, of that universal, eidetic ontology, which is phenomenology. The endless task, this exposition of the universum of the a priori, by referring all objectives to their transcendental "origin," may be considered as one function in the construction of a universal science of fact, ·where every department, including the positive, will be settled on its a priori. So that our last division of the complete phenomenology is thus : eidetic phenomenology, or the universal ontology, for a first philosophy; and second philosophy as the science of the transcendental inter-subjectivity or universum of fact. Thus the antique conception of philosophy as the universal science, philosophy in the Platonic, philosophy in the Cartesian, sense, that shall embrace all knowledge, is once more justly re­ stored. All rational problems, and all those problems, which for one reason or another, have come to be known as "philosophical," have their place within phenomenology, finding from the ultimate source of transcendental experience or eidetic intuition, their proper form and the means of their solution. Phenomenology itself learns its proper function of transcendental human "living" from an entire relationship to "self." It can intuit life's absolute norms and learn life's original teleological structure. Phenomenology is not less than man's whole occupation with himself in the service of the universal reason. Revealing life's norms, he does, in fact, set free a stream of new consciousness intent upon the infinite idea of entire humanity, humanity in fact and truth. Metaphysical, teleological, ethical problems, and problems of the history of philosophy, the problem of judgment, all significant problems in general, and the transcendental bonds uniting them, lie within phenomenology's capability. Phenomenological philosophy is but developing the mainsprings of old Greek philosophy, and the supreme motive of Descartes. These have not died. They split into rationalism and empiricism. They stretch over Kant and German idealism, and reach the present, confused day. They must be reassumed, subjected to methodical and concrete treatment. They can inspire a science without bounds. Phenomenology demands of phenomenologists that they shall Phenomenology

[ 1 28 ]

EDMUND HUSSERL

forgo particular closed systems of philosophy, and share decisive work with others toward persistent philosophy. *

BIBLIOGRAPHY.t-E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, 2 vols. ( Hall, a/S., 1 900-0 1 ; 4 vols., 1 92 8 ) ; principal organ of the phenomenological movement, Jahrbuch fur Phiinomenologie und phiinomenologische For­ schung ( Halle a/S., 1 9 1 3 et seq. ) : including ( also to be had separately) Ideen zu einer reinen Phiinomenologie und phiinomenologischen Philoso­ phie ( Halle a/S., 1 922 ) by Husserl; Ontology by M. Heidegger, H. C. Martins; Logic and Psychology by A. Pfander, Ethics by M . Scheler; Philosophy of State and of Law by A. Reinach; E. Stein, A esthetics by M. Geiger; Philosophy of Science by 0 . Becker; Leibniz by D. Mahnke; Hume's Philosophy by C. V. Salmon. Other works : M. Scheler, Vom Umsturz der Werte ( Bonn, 1 9 1 9 ) ; Vom Ewigen im Menschen ( Leipzig, 1 92 1 ) ; Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft ( Leipzig, 1 926 ) ; Jean Hering, Phenomenologie et philosophie religieuse ( Strasbourg, 1 925 ) ; K. Stavenhagen, A bsolute Stellungnahmen Erlangen, 1 925 ( The Phenom­ enology of Religion) ; R. Odebrecht, Grundlegung einer iisthetisch Wer­ theorie ( Berlin, 1 92 7 ) ; H. Lipps, Phiinomenologie der Erkenntnis ( Bonn, 1 92 7 ) ; Felix Kaufmann, Logik und Rechtswissenschaft (Tiibingen, 1 922 ) , Die Kriterium des Rechts (Tiibingen, 1 922) ; F . Schreier, Grundbegrifjc und Grundformen des Rechts ( 1 924 ) ; Gerh. Husserl, Rechtskraft und Rechtsgeltung ( Berlin, 1 925 ) ; smaller phenomenological studies in the Philosophische A nzeiger ( Bonn, 1 925, et seq. ) . * The final sentence of the Encyclopedia Britannica article reads : "Phenomenol­ ogy demands of phenomenalists that they forego particular closed systems of philosophy, and share decisive work with others toward persistent philosophy." Com­ parison with the original manuscript in the Husserl Archives at Louvain indicates that "phenomenologists" should replace "phenomenalists." I am indebted for this information to Prof. H. L. Van Breda, director of the Archives. Ed.

t This

Bibliography was inserted at the end of Husserl's article in the Encyclo­

pedia Britannica. For further references, consult the Selected Bibliography.

6

Phenomenology and Anthropology BY

EDMUND HUSSE RL

( TRANSLATED BY RICHARD G . SCHMITT )

IT 1s A WELL-KNOWN FACT that the younger German philosophers have recently become increasingly interested in philosophical anthro­ pology. Wilhelm Dilthey's Lebensphilosophie, a new kind of anthro­ pology, which is very influential at present and has even affected the so-called phenomenological movement, maintains that true philos­ ophy should seek its foundations exclusively in man and, more specifically, in the essence of his concrete worldly existence. This reform is considered indispensable if the original constitutive phe­ nomenology is ever to reach what is regarded as the truly philosoph­ ical dimension. A complete revision of principles has here taken place. Initially, phenomenology, conceived as transcendental doctrine, refused to derive any part of the foundations of philosophy from any science of man and opposed, as "anthropologism" and "psychologism," all attempts in this direction. But now, on the contrary, one looks to human existence as the sole basis for the reconstruction of phe­ nomenological philosophy. Thus, the old contrasts which have always agitated philosophy recur in a modern guise. The subjectivistic tendency which characterized our period of history from the very beginning develops in two opposite directions : one is anthropologistic (or psychologistic) , the other, transcendentalistic. While everyone feels that philosophy needs to be subjectively grounded, one party claims that this must, of course, be done by psychology; the other demands a science of transcendental subjectivity, a science of a comThis selection was originally delivered by Husserl as a lecture in Berlin on June 1 0, 1 9 3 1 . It was first published, under the title, "Phanomenologie und Anthropologie," in Ph ilosophy and Phenomenological Research, 1 94 1 , and is reprinted here with the kind permission of the editor of that periodical.

[ 1 29 ]

EDMUND HUSSERL [ 1 30 ] pletely new kind, without which psychology and the other sciences cannot be grounded philosophically. Is it inevitable that this controversy should reappear in every age, differing only in its historic guise? We cannot accept this. Philosophy needs its own method of grounding its statements; this method must be implicit in the character and in the fundamental meaning of the task of philosophy. If this meaning is necessarily subjective, the specific meaning of this subjectivity must also be determined a priori. It must, therefore, be possible to choose, once and for all, between anthropologism and transcendentalism without reference to any historical form of philosophy and anthropology (or psychology) . Yet everything depends on whether we really possess the insights which this decision presupposes and for the lack of which the controversy has continued unabated. Have we attained these insights? Are the principles and methods of philosophy so radically clear, and their concepts apodictically defined, that we may ground the ultimate choice on them? I shall try to convince you that, indeed, the results of the development of constitutive phenomenology enable us to do so. Without tracing the development itself, I wish to try to outline the transcendental-philosophical method whose purification it brought about and to present you at least with the idea of the transcendental philosophy which this method enabled us to begin to work out systematically. The fundamental, that is to say, definite, decision of the question under discussion, how far philosophy and, specifically, phenomenological philosophy can derive its method from "phil­ osophical" anthropology is contained in the insights which we are going to acquire. Let us begin by contrasting pre-Cartesian and post-Cartesian philosophy. The former bears the stamp of the original objectivistic conception of philosophy; the latter was pervaded by a tendency toward a new subjectivistic transcendentalism. The modern struggle for a true philosophy (and the methodological controversies men­ tioned above) conceals the struggle to put this new conception of philosophy and science in the place of the older ones. This substi­ tution means that the older conceptions are, at the same time, preserved by revealing their true meaning as relative and tran­ scendental. It is well known that science, as we Europeans understand it, was created, in its general outlines, by the Greeks. Its original name is philosophy; its object is the universe of whatsoever exists. It

[ 131 ] branches out into the special disciplines whose main branches are called sciences, while only those disciplines are called philosophical which treat questions that apply equally to all that exists. Neverthe­ less, the ancient concept of philosophy as the concrete totality of the sciences will always remain indispensable. The aims of philosophy and of science, conceived only dimly at first, are clarified, shaped, and established step by step in the course of a long period of development. Cognition in the attitude of 0avµ,ahiv, of purely "theoretical" interests, yields science in a first sense, which, however, soon proves insufficient. Merely em­ pirical, descriptively classificatory (inductive) knowledge is not yet science in the full sense of the word. It merely furnishes relative truth, tied to specific situations. Philosophy, genuine science, aims at absolute, ultimately valid truths which transcend all relativity. Such truth defines what exists, as it exists in itself. The world of percep­ tion and of prescientific experience reveals itself, of course, as a really existent world in spite of its relativity, but its properties, true in themselves, transcend naive experience. Although philosophy, genuine science, can only be approximated gradually, it is reached by appealing to the eidos, the pure a priori, which anybody can grasp in apodictic insight. The development tends toward the following idea. Philosophical cognition of the given world requires, first, universal a priori cog.. nition, or, one might say, a universal ontology which is not only abstractly general but is concretely rational, which grasps the change­ less essential form, the pure Ratio of the world down to all its regional spheres of existence. In other words, the cognition of the actual world presupposes universal cognition of the essential possi­ bilities, without which neither any possible world nor the actual world can be conceived as existing. This a priori places within our reach a rational method of know­ ing the actual world in the form of rational factual sciences. Experi­ ence will remain, but will be rationalized so as to share in the pure Ratio which grounds cognition on its foundation to produce a rational explanation and cognition of facts. In physical nature (for in­ stance) , pure mathematics as a priori of any conceivable nature makes genuine philosophical, i.e., mathematical, natural sciences possible. Yet this is more than just an example : pure mathematics and mathematical natural sciences first brought to light, albeit only within a limited sphere, the goals of the original, objectivistic idea of philosophy and science. Only more recent developments showed the need for a furPhenomenology and A nthropology

EDMUND lflJSSERL [ 1 32 ] ther distinction which we must now introduce, that between the formal and the material aspects of this conception. Formally, it is a conception of universal cognition of the totality of being, which is also rational cognition in the sense specified above. But in the entire tradition the formal concept of "what is" or of "something" has always had a sense connecting it to the material, namely, the sense of "being in the world," i.e., of being real and deriving its existential meaning from the existing world. It is the aim of philosophy to be the science of the sum total of reality, but, as we shall see immedi­ ately, the dedication to this aim has begun to waver in modern times. The modern philosophic development which begins with Des­ cartes differs sharply from all preceding developments . A new kind of motive begins to function which attacks, not philosophy's formal ideal of being a rational science, but its material meaning, which, in the end, it changes completely. No longer is the world naively presupposed as self-evidently existing and self-evidently given in experience : self-evidence becomes a problem. The Cartesian regress from this given world, from the subjec­ tivity experiencing the world and thus to the subjectivity of con­ sciousness in general, opens up an entirely new dimension of sci­ entific questioning which we shall call transcendental even before investigating it. As a basic philosophic problem this new dimension manifests itself in various ways : as the problem of cognition or of consciousness, as the problem of the possibility of objectively valid science, or of the possibility of metaphysics, etc. In all these manifestations the problem is never precisely for­ mulated in scientific concepts of original coinage. It always retains an aura of ambiguity and, being vague, permits absurd formulations. It is difficult to state and express the new dimension of cognition; traditional concepts are too alien to its nature to do anything but misrepresent it. Thus, modem philosophy constantly strives to enter into this new dimension, to formulate the proper concepts, ask the proper questions, develop the proper methods. This is a distant goal and, so far, all serious dedication to the scientific ideal has failed to replace the existing plurality of contradictory systems with one philosophy which fully expresses the transcendental motivation. Has this situation improved in our time? Dare we hope that in the confusion and in the rapid coming and going of fashionable philos­ ophies, there is one in which the transcendental tendency of the modern period has been completely clarified and which has pro­ duced a definitely established, apodictically necessary idea of tran�

[ 1 33 ] scendental philosophy? Has it produced a method of autonomous, strictly scientific work? Has this work been begun, and is it being carried on systematically? I answered these questions in my intro­ ductory remarks. I cannot help regarding transcendental or con­ stitutive phenomenology as that transcendental philosophy which is established free from impurities and is now being worked out in a genuinely scientific manner. Although much discussed and much criticized, it is, in fact, still unknown. Natural and traditional preju­ dices act as a screen which does not allow the real meaning of phenomenology to penetrate. Criticism, far from helping or improv­ ing, has not even touched it. My task is now to make this true meaning of transcendental phenomenology evident to you. This will lead us to those funda­ mental insights which will help us decide whether philosophical anthropology is possible. The most convenient starting point is the Cartesian Meditations. We shall be guided only by their form and by the resolute scientific radicalism which pervades them, while disregarding the content which is vitiated, in many respects, by unnoticed prejudices. We shall try to practice extreme scientific radicalism. All modem philosophy originates in the Cartesian Meditations. Translated into objective form, this historical fact means that all philosophy really originates from meditations, from solitary reflections. Autonomous philosophy (in an age like ours, incidentally, in which mankind stands on the threshold of autonomy) comes into being in the solitary and radical attempt of the philosophizing individual to account and to be ac­ countable only to himself. Isolation and meditation alone make him a philosopher and make philosophy necessarily begin in him. Ac­ cepting only what is evident to me, I, as an autonomous ego, must pursue to its ultimate grounds what others, following the tradition, regard as scientifically grounded. These ultimate grounds must be immediately and apodictically evident. Only in that way can I account for and justify my thought absolutely. There is no precon­ ception, therefore, however self-evident it might be, which I can allow to pass unquestioned and ungrounded. When I seriously try to fulfill this task, I am amazed to discover a self-evident belief never before noticed or made explicit, a uni­ versal belief in the existence of the world, which pervades and sup­ ports my entire life. Imperceptibly, it also permeates my philosophi­ cal project, the creation of a universal science of the world and, later, of special sciences of the separate spheres of the world. The Phenomenology and A nthropology

EDMUND HUSSERL [ 1 34 ] world and its existence is always self-evident; I assume it tacitly. The source of this assumption is, of course, universal experience with its constant certitudes of existence. Is this experience evident? As far as individual realities are concerned, its evidence frequently cannot withstand scrutiny. Its certitude of existence occasionally becomes dubious and is sometimes even cancelled because it is invalid and illusory. Why is it, on the other hand, that the certitude of my experience of the world as the totality of those realities which really exist for me, remains unshaken? It really is quite impossible for me to ever doubt, let alone deny, it. Does this supply sufficiently radical grounds for this certitude? Is not, perhaps, the certitude of existence which inheres in the con­ tinuity of the experience of the world based on many different grounds? Have I ever pursued and explicated this certitude by questioning and by trying to account for the sources and the scope of the validity of experience? No! I have based my previous life and scientific activities on it without ever justifying it. But it may not remain unjustified ; it must be questioned. I cannot even seriously begin working scientifically and autonomously without complete and apodictic justification. This is given by providing ultimate grounds by means of question and answer. After the certitude of existence, implicit in the experience of the world, has become questionable, it can no longer serve to support judgments. This imposes upon us, upon me as the meditating, philos­ ophizing ego, the obligation to practice a universal epoche of the existence of the world with all its individual realities which experi­ ence, even consistently coherent experience, offers as realities. What remains? Is not the world the universe of all existents? Am I left with nothing? Can I still make judgments, and can they be supported by any experience in which I perceive existents originally, before they are made the objects of judgments? Our answer is similar to, but not identical with, that of Descartes : Let the existence of the world be questionable for me now because it is not yet grounded, let it be subject to the epoche; I who question and practice the epoche, I exist nonetheless. I am conscious of my existence and can grasp it immediately and apodictically. I experi­ ence myself as this being who practices the epoche, an experience which I can justify immediately and actively. This is not experience of the world, because the validity of the experience of the world has been suspended-yet it is experience. In it I apprehend myself as the ego in the world-epoche, with all that is inseparable from it. As

Phenomenology and A nthropology [ 1 35 ] this apodictic ego, therefore, I am prior to the existence of the world because I exist as this ego whether or not the world's existence can be accepted and accounted for. Only as such an ego, obviously, can I justify the existence of the world and can I, if at all, practice a science which requires radical justification. We must now take a further important step : I have deliberately emphasized the term, "this ego." Having reached this point, I notice that my philosophizing ego has been genuinely revolutionized. At first, when I began my meditation, I regarded myself as this indi­ vidual who sought philosophic solitude only for a time in order to liberate himself from the judgments of his fellow men. In spite of everything, I lived in the world of experience whose existence I took for granted. But since this world of experience must now remain in question, my being as man among men and among other realities of the world has become questionable too and is also subject to the epoche. Due to this epoche, human solitude has been transformed into transcendental solitude, the solitude of the ego. As an ego I am not this man in the existing world, but the ego who doubts the existence of the world, as well as its being thus-or-so, without reservations, or, in other words, the ego which still has its universal experience but has bracketed its existential validity. The same applies to all those non-experiential modes of consciousness in which the world possesses practical or theoretical validity. The world still appears as it appeared formerly; the life in and of the world is not inter­ rupted : the world is now a bracketed "world," a mere phenomenon; it is the flow of experience and consciousness, in general-which now, however, is transcendentally reduced consciousness-possess­ ing only phenomenal validity. This "world" with phenomenal valid­ ity is obviously inseparable from transcendentally reduced con­ sc10usness. This completes the description of the phenomenological reduc­ tion in transcendental phenomenology. It is not a temporary, but a permanent, deliberate abstention from belief in the existence of the world, an abstention which I, as phenomenologist, am bound to observe permanently. In this sense it is only the indispensable prerequisite for the reflective activity of experiencing and of theo­ retical judgment in which an essentially new field of experience, the transcendental field, opens up. Our new theme, which can become thematic only through the epoche, is my transcendental ego, its transcendental cogitationes, i.e., the transcendentally reduced living

EDMUND HUSSERL [ 136 ] content of consciousness in all its typical forms, and also the cor­ responding cogitata : whatever I am conscious of in the modalities of such consciousness-all this while maintaining the epoche. All this constitutes the ego's transcendental domain of consciousness, which, though changing, remains unitary at all times. But this is only the beginning, although a necessary one. Transcendental re­ flection, if continued, soon leads us to the transcendental property, "I can," and to habitual dispositions and to many other things, as (for example) the universal phenomenal validity of the "world" in contrast to the varieties of consciousness of that world. The phenomenological reduction discloses an entirely unsus­ pected, vast field of research. This is, first, a field of immediate and apodictic experience, the soil in which all transcendental mediate and immediate judgments are rooted. Descartes and his followers were, and remained, blind to this. It was, of course, extremely dif­ ficult to elicit the pure meaning of the transcendental change of attitude and to bring out the fundamental contrast between the tran­ scendental ego and its transcendental sphere, on one hand, and the worldly sphere with the human ego and the psychical sphere, on the other. Even after the contrast had been perceived and the pure meaning of the task of a transcendental science understood, as, e.g., by Fichte and his successors, the infinite transcendental ground of experience was difficult to perceive and to exploit. Since German Idealism failed at this point, it lost its way in a mire of speculations whose unquestionably unscientific character is by no means to its credit, notwithstanding contemporary opinion to the contrary. It is, of course, extremely difficult to do justice to the entirely new problem of a philosophical method intended as the method of a scientific philosophy, i.e., a science which is ultimately accounted for. But, in the final analysis, everything depends on the method of beginning with the transcendental reduction. If we miss the meaning of the reduction, everything is lost. The temptation to misunderstand is almost irresistible. What is more obvious than saying that it is I, this human being, who employs the method of the transcendental change of attitude and who thus re­ treats to his pure ego? What else is this ego but an abstract stratum in the concrete human being, what else but his pure spiritual being in abstraction from the body? To say this is to obviously relapse into the naive and natural attitude and to think in terms of the given world rather than of the epoche. If I regard myself as a human being, I presuppose the validity of the world. The epoche, how-

[ 1 37 ] ever, makes it clear that the apperception, "human being," receives its existential meaning within the universal apperception, "world," only in the life of the ego. But even if one has reached the point which we have now reached, even if he can keep the transcendental fields of experience and judgment strictly separated from the natural and worldly field, and even if he observes that a vast region of possible research opens up here, it is not easy to see what purpose such research might serve, to see, in other words, that it is destined to launch a genuine philos­ ophy. How could investigations of a purely egological nature, which are subject to a consistent and strictly maintained epoche, have any philosophical relevance? As man in the world I address all theoretical and practical questions, all questions concerning my destiny, to the world. Can I set these questions aside? But must I not do so, if the existence of the world is and remains subject to the epoche? In that case, it seems that I shall never return to the world and to all those problems of life which led me into philosophy in quest of science as the rational and radical reflection on the world and human existence. Let us consider whether the consistent renunciation of the world through transcendental reduction is not the only way to a true and ultimately valid cognition of the world, since such cognition can only be sought within this epoche. Let us not forget how all this is connected with the meaning of the meditations in which the epoche acquired its significance and its cognitive function. Renouncing the world or "bracketing the world" does not mean that the world ceases henceforth to be thematic, but rather that it must now be our theme in a more profound way because a whole new dimension has been added. We merely relinquished the naive attitude in which we allowed experience to present the world as existing and being thus-and-so. This naive attitude disappears as soon as we obey our motivating impulse to interpret, as autonomous and responsible sub­ jects, the validity conferred by experience, and to seek the rational insight which allows us to justify this validity and to determine its scope. Instead of accepting the world naively and asking naive questions about it (about truth in the ordinary sense of the word) , we now ask new questions about the world. These are questions about the world purely as experienced or as an object of other modes of world consciousness, i.e., a world which has received meaning and validity purely in us and, first and foremost, purely from me and in me, specifically in me as the transcendental ego. Phenomenology and A nthropology

EDMUND HUSSERL [ 138 ] But we must bring this to a clearer focus: The existence of this world is self-evident for me because it is self-evident only in my own experience and consciousness. This consciousness is the source of the meaning of the world and of any worldly objective facts. But, thanks to the transcendental epoche, I perceive that whatever is in the world, including my existence as a human being, exists for me only as the content of a certain experiential apperception in the mode of certitude of existence. As a transcendental ego I am the ego which apperceives actively and passively. This happens in me although it is concealed from reflection. In this apperception the world and the human being are first constituted as existing. Any evidence gained for worldly things, any method of verification, whether pre-scientific or scientific, lies primarily in me as transcendental ego. I may owe much, perhaps almost everything, to others, but even they are, first of all, others for me who receive from me whatever meaning or validity they may have for me. They can be of assistance to me as fellow subjects only after they have received their meaning and validity from me. As transcendental ego I am thus the absolutely responsible subject of whatever has existential validity for me. Aware of myself as this ego, thanks to the transcendental reduction, I stand now above all worldly existence, above my own human life and existence as man. This absolute position above everything that is or might ever be valid for me, including all its possible content, is necessarily the position of the philosopher. It is the position which the phenomenological reduction assigns to me. I have lost nothing of what existed for me in the naive attitude, nothing, in particular, whose real existence was assumed. In this absolute atti­ tude, I know the world itself and know it now, for the first time, for what it always was and had to be by its very essence: a tran­ scendental phenomenon. In this way I have brought into play a new dimension of questions never asked before about just this exist­ ing reality. Only the answers to these questions will bring to light the concrete and full existence of the world and its complete and ultimate truth. Is it not self-evident that the world, which for the natural atti­ tude is the universe of all that exists without qualification, possesses only transcendentally relative truth, and that only transcendental subjectivity exists without qualification? But here an objection occurs to me: It is true that I had ideas about the world and spoke about it meaningfully because it had meaning and validity for me by virtue of my own apperceptive acts,

Phenome nology and A nthropology

[ 1 39 ]

such as my thinking. But is it not insane to suggest that the world exists only through an act of mine? Perhaps it would be a more correct formulation to say that my "idea or image of the world" takes shape in my ego through its own transcendental activity and passivity, while the world itself is, of course, outside myself. But is this an adequate solution? Is not the meaning of these terms, "outside" and "inside," if they have any meaning at all, con­ ferred and verified by me? I must not forget that nothing that I could ever conceive as existent lies outside the universal scope of the possible and actual consciousness of myself, the ego. This answer is cogent, but nevertheless unsatisfactory. It may be absolutely necessary to acknowledge that all existents and, accord­ ingly, the entire existing world is transcendentally relative, but if presented only formally as it is here, this statement is completely incomprehensible, and will remain so if we allow ourselves to be drawn into speculative arguments which have always been the bane of so-called epistemology. But was not transcendental subjectivity revealed as a field of ex­ perience and of cognitions referring to it? Does this not, in fact, open the way to a solution of the new transcendental puzzle about the world? Differing toto caelo from any ordinary puzzle about the world, this transcendental puzzle lies in the fact that transcendental relativity, as it confronts us when we discover the transcendental attitude and the transcendental ego, is incomprehensible. But this initial incomprehensibility is not final. It is clear, at least, what must be done to make comprehensible what is incomprehensible and to attain really concrete and radically grounded cognition of the world. We must undertake a systematic study of concrete transcendental subjectivity. The question is how this subjectivity confers meaning and validity upon a world objective in itself. My own self, the essen­ tial structures of my entire sphere of consciousness together with the structures of actual and potential meanings, and the conferring of validity, must all be made the themes of an eidetic science by me, the ego. As a philosopher, of course, I do not want to remain on the level of transcendental facts. My first task is, therefore, to grasp the eidetic typology of what lives in my consciousness in its imma­ nent temporality. This is what Descartes called the stream of my cogi­ tationes. The fact that they are intentional makes them what they are. Every single cogito, and every combination of them into the unity of a new cogito has its corresponding cogitatum. And the latter, qua cogitatum, taken exactly as it appears, is essentially

EDMUND HUSSERL [ 1 40 ] inseparable from the cogito. On the other hand, I must, of course, also trace the essential bond between the cogitationes and the cor­ responding dispositions. Also, dispositions like "I can," "I do," "I have a permanent disposition," have the character of essences, as do all of the ego's dispositions for conscious activity. The ego, which makes its appearance at first as a center without content, brings with it problems of its own, namely, the problems of dispo­ sitional qualities. But the correlation between consciousness as it is had and that which it is conscious of (the cogitatum) must be in­ vestigated first of all. Here it is important not to overlook crucial points. As ego I must, therefore, center my attention on the con­ nected manifold of subjective modes of consciousness which belong together because they are modes of consciousness of one and the same supposed object. For instance, the manifold modes of appear­ ing which compose the perception of a thing and through which we become immanently conscious of the thing belong together by virtue of the syntheses of identity which necessarily occur in the transition. The thing which presents itself unified and perhaps even unchanged to the naive observer becomes the transcendental guide for the systematic and reflective study of the varieties of conscious­ ness which belong to this one thing. This is true of every single real something and also of the world as total phenomenon. The existence of these apodictic essential laws of correlation was an entirely new discovery of far-reaching importance. All this requires very extensive descriptive studies, but never­ theless merely begins the ascent to ever new levels of transcendental investigations which derive their concrete apodictic evidence and autonomy from concrete experience and description. All these in­ vestigations are possible only if we understand the method of ques­ tioning regressively, starting from the intentional object by means of concrete discovery, which is the method for studying correlations. Genuine analysis of consciousness is hermeneutic of the life of consciousness insofar as this consciousness intends something which always exists ( something identical) , which constitutes itself inten­ tionally in its essential manifolds of consciousness. Rather than "interrogate" nature, as Bacon recommended, we must, therefore, interrogate consciousness or the transcendental ego, in order to force it to betray its secrets. Due to an essential characteristic of the life of consciousness itself, these problems and methods could remain entirely hidden. In the natural attitude the ego's attention is always engrossed by some given object, so that the essential features of the stream of con-

Phenomenology and A nthropology

[ 141 ]

sciousness, in which syntheses are effected, remain anonymous and hidden. But what is hidden can be revealed. It is of the essence of the ego that it can reflect and that it can redirect its thematic atten­ tion; that it can ask intentional questions regressively and, through systematic explanation, bring to light and render intelligible the process of effecting syntheses. Now we can also understand that when I turn away from the naive exploration of the world to the exploration of the self and its transcendental egological consciousness, I do not turn my back on the world to retreat into an unworldly and, therefore, uninter­ esting special field of theoretical study. On the contrary, this alone enables me to explore the world radically and even to undertake a radically scientific exploration of what exists absolutely and in an ultimate sense. Once the inadequacy of the naive attitude has been realized, this is the only possible way of establishing science in its genuine radicality-more precisely, the way to the only possible, radically grounded philosophy. It is true that this monumental task requires an extremely diffi­ cult procedure when we come to the abstract stratification of the transcendental sphere and to the corresponding problems. This pro­ cedure is necessary in order to proceed, in this work, from one level cf problems to the next in a fixed order. This means, above all, that we abstract from the transcendental contributions of empathy on the first level of investigations. Only in this way can we apprehend the essential prerequisites for understanding just this contribution and, thus, for comprehending what was at first distressingly incom­ prehensible, i.e., for dispelling the initial illusion of a transcendental solipsism, which perplexes us when we begin. But this is not achieved by empty argumentation, but by concretely intentional analysis. In the course of these studies a fundamental distinction comes to light, within the ego's transcendental sphere of cognition, between that which belongs to his own person and that which is alien to him. Starting out from myself as ego constituting existential mean­ ing, I reach the transcendental others, who are my peers, and at the same time the entire open, infinite transcendental intersubjective realm. In this transcendental community the world as "objective" and as the same for everybody is constituted. This, then, is the path of transcendental phenomenology, from the naive attitude of everyday, natural life and from philosophy in the old style to absolute transcendental cognition of what exists as such. We must never lose sight of the fact that this transcendental

[ 1 42 ]

EDMUND HUSSERL

phenomenology does nothing but interrogate just that world which is, at all times, the real world for us; the only one which is valid for us, which demonstrates its validity to us; the only one which has any meaning for us. Phenomenology subjects this world to inten­ tional interrogation regarding its sources of meaning and validity, from which sources, of course, its true existence also flows. Only in this way can we arrive at all conceivable problems about the world and, beyond those, at the problems of being which are only uncov­ ered by the transcendental method and which are, therefore, not merely the old problems reinterpreted transcendentally. If one has understood our aims and the systematic theory which is being worked out concretely with absolutely compelling evidence, one can no longer doubt that there is only one ultimate philosophy, only one kind of ultimate science, the science inseparable from tran­ scendental phenomenology's method of exploring origins.

7

Appearances and Reality BY

H. A . PRICHARD

THE DISTINCTION between "reality" and appearance, between what a thing really is and what it appears to be, is fundamental to our ordinary consciousness. Hence it is natural to make use of the distinction in metaphysics, and the result is a tendency to maintain one of two theories. According to the first theory, we know things only as they appear to us, and not as they are in themselves. In particular, things are not really spatial or temporal, but only appear so to us; space and time are only the appearances of a non-spatial reality. According to the second theory, we know only "phenomena" or "appearances, " certain elements within our own minds; reality proper is beyond the mind and is not known at all. This view some­ times, as in Kant, tries to treat the appearances as being objects in space and time. We know them but not the thing in itself. These positions may be said to differ in degree of scepticism. The former allows that reality is presented to us in perception, but in­ sists that its nature becomes distorted in the process. The latter denies that reality is presented to us at all and substitutes for it another object, viz., "appearances." Further, these positions are not always distinguished. Kant, for instance, states his view sometimes in the form "we only know things as they appear to us," sometimes in the form "we only know phenomena," and he fails to notice that the two statements are different. The truth is that the first theory is a half-way house to the second. We are forced to go from the first to the second to gain some object of which it can be said that we know in the proper sense not only that it is but what it is. But for all that the second theory is the more sceptical, because it leaves Thi s sel ec t ion first app ea red in Mind, 1 906. It i s reprint ed h ere wi th the kind p er­ missio n of Mrs. Pri chard a nd th e edi tor o f Mind. [ 143 ]

[ 1 44 ]

H. A. PRICHARD

the real object wholly unknown and regards knowledge as about something else. In both cases the result is reached by the use of the common distinction between reality and appearance. The distinction relates primarily to objects of vision, and therefore the justification of its use in the theory of knowledge requires analysis of its nature in its original application. Only such an analysis will reveal the true nature of the distinction, and consequently the legitimacy of the theory of knowledge built upon it. It will here be contended( 1) That it is a certain analysis of the distinction which leads to the first theory and thence to the second. ( 2) That this is a mis-analysis and that the distinction really understood leads to the contrary conclusion. We can easily trace the origin of the view that we only know things as they appear to us, by taking any case where we distinguish between "appearance" and "reality." Take, for example, Plato's in­ stance of a straight stick partly submerged in water, which, as we say, looks bent, though in reality it is straight. If some one knows nothing about refraction and confines himself to a single perception, he will assert that the stick is bent; and if he is asked why, he will answer, "because I see it to be so." But if afterwards he sees the stick under other conditions and has learned about refraction, he will say that the stick only looks bent and is really straight. Thus having just identified what the stick is and what it looks, he after­ wards draws a distinction between them. And this distinction presents an obvious difficulty to knowledge in general. If a thing is not necessarily what it looks, how are we to learn what it really is? A thing in the sense in question is an indi­ vidual; to get at it therefore we must perceive it. But the perception, to be of value, must give us the thing as it is. And that it does so is implied by the original assertion "the stick is bent, because it is seen to be so." Seeing is believing. The subsequent assertion, how­ ever, denies this, "the stick only looks bent, but it is not what it looks. " Perception, that is to say, does not give us the thing as it really is. The conclusion at once seems to follow that we only know things as they look or appear to us and not as they are. And from this it is but a short step to the second view that we only know "appearances" or "phenomena." To put the difficulty shortly. Access to things implies perception. Yet if perception only gives us things as they look and not as they

[ 1 45 ] are, access to things as they are is impossible. But perception does in fact only give us things as they look, for this is presupposed by the distinction we actually draw between what they look and what they are. This conclusion can only be avoided by maintaining that the reality of the distinction is still compatible with the position that perception at least gives us things as they are in some qualified way; that after all there is some identity between what things look and what they are. And a closer analysis of the distinction vindicates this identity. That the analysis may be as concrete as possible, it will be well to bear in mind three prominent types of case. ( 1 ) That of refraction already mentioned. (2 ) That due to the nature of perspective. E.g. ( 1 ) Railway lines may be said though really parallel to look convergent. ( 2 ) A horizontal building may be said to look as though it were lower in its more distant parts. (3 ) That due to distance from the observer. E.g., the moon may be said to look as large as the sun. These types suggest that the distinction between appearance and reality at least primarily relates to the spatial qualities of things. The only exception seems to be the case of temporal relations; we certainly say that a certain event appeared to take a long time, though it really did not. 1 Again these cases bring before us by way of contrast the existence of spheres of perception where the distinc­ tion is wholly inapplicable, e.g., those of pain and sensation generally. A pain is necessarily what I feel it to be; distinction between what it is, and what I feel or perceive it as, is meaningless. Similarly a noise, in the sense of a sensation as distinct from its physical con­ ditions, is what I hear it as. In fact it is just the absence of the dis­ tinction here that gives much of its plausibility to the view that we only know phenomena. If we once allow that our objects are states of ourselves, we seem unable to deny that at least we apprehend them as they are, i.e., that we really know phenomena. We may now proceed to the analysis. The general form of state­ ment to be analysed is, "a thing looks or appears so and so, though we know that it is not so in reality." The following seem the main points : -

A ppearances and Reality

1 . "App ea ring " and "loo king " a re trea ted as distinc t in mea ning fro m "see m­ ing "; the y sta nd for phainiothai as opposed to dokein.

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H. A. PRICHARD

(1) Such a statement is in no sense about "appearances." For (a) its subject is not the appearance or look of the thing but the thing. When I assert that the moon looks as large as the sun, I make an assertion about the moon and not about its look. ( b ) Its predicate is always "real," i.e., it is always of a kind ap­ propriate to real things, as opposed to their look or appearance. Thus the stick looks bent; the moon looks as large as the sun; the railway lines look convergent. If we seek for a predicate suitable to "appear­ ances," we naturally think of such terms as "deceptive" and "un­ trustworthy." Our statements then about appearances are expressed in the same terms as the reality from which we distinguish them. It at once follows(a) That statements about appearance imply that we at least know enough about reality to say that real things have certain pos­ sible predicates, e.g., bent or convergent. To deny this is to be wholly unable to state how things look. (b) That the issue involved in distinguishing appearance from reality concerns not the general character of the attributes of real things but their relation to a particular subject. The question is not, "Is convergence or bentness the attribute of any real thing?" but, "Is it an attribute of particular real things, this stick or these lines?" It follows that the distinction between reality and appearance relates solely to the details of our knowledge and not to its general or structural character. The attributes of reality cannot belong to gene different from those of appearance. Doubt about its details implies certainty as to its general character. ( 2) Whenever we say that a thing only looks so and so, we are really questioning some immediate judgment of perception. But this presupposes that, at least in certain cases, such judgments are not to be questioned but give us things as they are. Thus the assertion that the moon looks as large as the sun implies that there is something in perception which suggests that the moon is as large; and this is only possible if, under certain circumstances perception gives the real relative size. And under certain conditions, it does so. If ob­ jects are equally distant from the observer, perception successfully gives their relative size. If we thought that there were no circum­ stances under which we should perceive the real relative size, we could never assert that one object looks as large as another. Simi­ larly the statement that the stick looks bent implies that, given certain physical conditions, we should see the true shape of objects. Even in the case of perspective the same thing is true. If we really mean

A ppearances and Reality

[ 1 47 ]

that the roof of a building looks converging towards the ground, we must allow that in the right position we should see it as it really is, viz., horizontal. It may be objected that the necessity of foreshort­ ening renders this impossible. But the answer is that if we admit the impossibility, we at once reconsider our original assertion and maintain that after all the roof does not look sloping. ( 3 ) Our possession of the distinction between appearance and reality and our power of determining in particular what is appear­ ance and what is reality presuppose that we understand how our apprehension of objects is conditioned by relation to us as observers. It is only because we know that our distance from an object affects its apparent size, that we can draw a distinction between the size it looks and the size it is. If we forget this, we can draw no distinc­ tion at all. The same knowledge is presupposed by that power to discount difference of distance which enables us to determine the real relative size of two objects. It is the same in the case of refrac­ tion. To be able to say that a stick looks bent, we must be aware that our perception is somehow physically conditioned, and we can only determine its real shape if we know the special nature of the physical conditions. Similarly, it is because we understand the con­ ditions of perspective that we can discount them and assert-if we do assert-that objects look different in shape from what they are in reality. Lastly it is precisely because there are no such spatial relations between observer and observed in the case of pain, that, with respect to it, no distinction between reality and appearance can be drawn. It follows that the distinction, as used in our ordinary experience, arises from the special nature of the spatial relation between the object and the observer. Hence its application to knowledge in gen­ eral and in a different connexion should arouse suspicion. To apply these results. The essential feature of the first theory referred to, is that things suffer distortion in being presented to us. Two kinds of attributes are presupposed, those belonging to things as they are in themselves, and those belonging to them as presented to us. And we know only the latter. The falsity of the theory should now be obvious. ( 1 ) Even if we allow the distinction between the attributes of things as they are in themselves and their attributes for us, we are obliged to allow that we know the general nature of the former. Accordingly we must know not only the detailed nature of the at­ tributes for us but also the general nature of the real attributes. ( 2 ) The distinction just referred to is wholly false. There is no

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such thing as an attribute of a thing as presented to us. All attributes used in stating how things look are primarily applicable to things as they are. The theory takes a distinction of detail and converts it into one of general structure. And the preceding analysis, if suc­ cessful, shows that the distinction between reality and appearance presupposes that we at least know the general nature of reality. ( 3) It has been pointed out that to distinguish between reality and appearance, we must be aware of and understand a special spatial relation in which we stand to objects as observers. Such a presupposition is excluded where the problem is the purely general one of the relation of reality in general to us as percipients. It should now be possible to formulate more clearly what con­ stitutes (1) the plausibility of the theory in question, and ( 2) the wrong step in the argument leading to it. The plausibility is due to the real fact that in making use of perception to judge of the nature of an object, we have to take into account the special relation of the object to the perceiving subject, and that consequently we must discount what we should judge it to be, if we relied on the verdict of immediate perception. This sug­ gests that in knowing generally, we must discount an element which belongs to objects only in appearance through their relation to a perceiving subject, i.e., that relation to a percipient affects for the percipient the general nature of reality as well as its details. The mistake in argument arises from a mis-statement of the real fact. "The moon looks as large as the sun" is taken to mean "while I do not believe it is as large, I perceive it to be as large, i.e., for my perception, it is as large." The distinction between what a thing looks and what it is has to be stated, and it is stated by saying that for perception it is one thing, while in itself it is another. Then per­ ception being the only means of access to the thing, it follows that we only know the thing as it is for perception. But ( 1 ) the statement that something is so "for perception" is vicious in principle. An assertion claims to be the recognition of objective fact, i.e., of what is. If the words "for perception" are significant, they constitute a restriction; they must mean "only for perception." But the assertion that something is so only for per­ ception is a contradiction in terms. For perception is perception of what is; it involves judgment and its formula is, "we perceive something to be so and so." And it is just this objectivity of percep­ tion which is the main factor in the transition from the view that we know "things only as they appear" to the view that we know

A ppearances and Reality

[ 1 49 ]

oniy appearances. We hesitate to assert that objects are so and so for perception and therefore transform this statement into another, viz., that the appearances of objects are so and so. By making the appearance into a new object, it admits of no distinction between what it is and what it is for perception. The new statement, how­ ever, is obviously false. Not only is the assertion "the look of the moon is not as large as the look of the sun" not the equivalent of "the moon looks as large as the sun" but it is not sense. There is the same absence of meaning in the statement in which Kant's view that space is a phenomenon ought to find expression, viz., "the look of things-in-themselves is spatial." ( 2 ) The statement "the moon looks as large as the sun" is only in appearance an assertion about present perception. It is not true that I now perceive the moon to be as large as the sun. It is not so for my perception. For, as has already been urged, perception implies the belief that what I perceive is as I perceive it. The true meaning of the statement is, "If I were to forget my position as an observer, l should assert that I perceived the moon to be as large." The theory in question takes "look" to mean "is for perception," which as opposed to what "really is" involves a contradiction. "Look" prop­ erly means "would be perceived to be, if certain conditions were forgotten." The proper way to describe the process of taking into account the conditions under which we perceive, is to state it as a process of "discounting" or "correction." We begin with an immediate judg­ ment of perception, "I perceive the moon to be as large as the sun." Then reflexion on my position as an observer forces me to modify this judgment, and I assert, "The sun is really larger, though if I were to forget the difference of distance, I should say that I saw it to be as large." The point is that the immediate judgment of per­ ception does not remain side by side with the judgment that corrects it. And only if it remained could I say, "for my perception the moon is as large. " The fact is that the hold of the phenomenalist view upon us arises from the almost inexpugnable conviction that the distinction between appearances and reality involves two distinct things, ob­ jects and their appearances. It is this conviction which lends colour to the view that when we have discovered that something is not really so and so, it still is so for perception. For it enables us to assert that the appearance remains, even when we have discovered that it is only an appearance.

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Yet it seems impossible to avoid the conclusion that there are no such things as appearances at all. An appearance seems neces­ sarily to mean one of two things, either (1) a perception, or ( 2) simply a sensuous image. In the former case a judgment is involved, but a judgment which disappears upon reflexion on our positions as observers. In the latter case the desired result is not gained even if we disregard the activity of thought necessary to apprehend the image. For the image stands in no relation to the object, except possibly as its effect. And whatever it is, it is not its appearance or the appearance of anything. And if that be so, no distinction be­ tween reality and appearance remains. There are two kinds of reality, objects without the mind and images within it, and we know the one and we do not know the other. Lastly, examination of instances leads us to the same result. However much I see an object distorted through bad glass or in reflexions, it is the thing which I see. There is strictly speaking no "look" or "image" of the thing; there is only the thing with its characteristics distorted. The word "look" or "appearance" properly refers to a judgment, and that not a judg­ ment I make now, but one which I should make under certain conditions.

8

Introduction to The New Realism1 BY

E . B . H O L T, W. T. M A R V IN, W. P. M O N TA G U E ,

R . B . P E R R Y, W. B . P I T K IN,

AND

E . G . S PA U L D I NG

I THE new realism M AY BE S AID to be at the present moment some­ thing between a tendency and a school. So long as it was recognized only by its enemies it was no more than a tendency. But war has developed a class-consciousness, and the time is near at hand, if indeed it is not already here, when one realist may recognize an­ other. This dawning spirit of fellowship, accompanied by a desire for better understanding and a more effective co-operation, has prompted the present undertaking. It is perhaps inevitable that the new realism should for a time remain polemical in tone. A new philosophical movement invariably arises as a protest against tradition, and bases its hope of construc­ tive achievement on the correction of established habits of thought. Neo-realism is still in a phase in which this critical motive dominates, and is the chief source of its vigor and unanimity. Before, however, a philosophy can come of age, and play a major part in human thought, it must be a complete philosophy, or must at least show promise of completeness. If it is to assume the role, it must under­ take to play the whole part. The authors of the present book thus entertain the hope that they may have succeeded not only in ampli­ fying, clarifying, and fortifying the realistic critique, but also in This selection is from The New Realism ( 1 9 1 2 ) , published by the Macmillan Company, New York, with whose permission it is here reprinted. 1 . The following introduction expresses opinions common to the several authors of this book; but it has proved convenient to make use of parts of the following articles which have already appeared in print : Montague, "The New Realism and the Old," Journal of Philosophy ( 1 9 12 ) , pp. 9 and 39, and Perry, "Realism as a Polemic and Program of Reform," Journal of Philosophy ( 19 10 ) , pp. 337 and 365.

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et al.

exhibiting that critique as a basis for the solution of special philo­ sophical problems, and for the procedure of the special sciences. The new realism is not an accident, nor a "tour de force," nor an isolated and curious speculative eruption. Whatever may be thought of its correctness or power to endure, it must at least be accorded a place in the main current of modern thought. It is a fundamental and typical doctrine-definable in terms of the broad play of intellectual forces, and peculiarly characteristic of their pres­ ent conjunction. The historical significance of the new realism appears most clearly in its relations with "naive realism," "dualism" and "sub­ jectivism." The new realism is primarily a doctrine concerning the relation between the knowing process and the thing known; and as such it is the latest phase of a movement of thought which has already passed through the three phases just indicated. Neo-realism, in other words, seeks to deal with the same problem that has given rise to "naive realism," "dualism" and "subjectivism" ; and to profit by the errors as well as the discoveries for which these doctrines have been responsible. 1 . The theory of naive realism is the most primitive of these theories. It conceives of objects _g_� directly presented to conscious­ ness and being precisely what they appeai- fo be. Nothing intervenes between the knower--and the world external to him. Objects are not represented in consciousness by ideas ; they are themselves directly presented. This theory makes no distinction between seeming and being; things are just what they seem. Consciousness is thought of · as analogous to a light which shines out through the sense organs, illuminating the world outside the knower. There is in this naive view a complete disregard of the personal equation and of the elaborate mechanism underlying sense perception. In a world in which there was no such thing as error, this theory of the knowledge relation would remain unchallenged; but with the discovery of error and illusion comes perplexity. Dreams are perhaps the earliest phe­ nomena of error to arouse the primitive mind from its dogmatic realism. How can a man lie asleep in his bed and at the same time travel to distant places and converse with those who are dead? How can the events of the dream be reconciled with the events of waking experience? The first method of dealing with this type of error is to divide the real world into two realms, equally objective and equally external, but the one visible, tangible, and regular, the other more or less invisible, mysterious, and capricious. The soul

Introduction to The New Realism

[ 1 53 ]

after death, and sometimes during sleep, can enter the second of these realms. The objectified dreamland of the child and the ghost­ land of the savage are the outcome of the first effort of natural realism to cope with the problem of error. It is easy to see, however, that this doubling up of the world of existing objects will only explain a very limited number of dream experiences, while to the errors of waking experience it is obviously inapplicable. Whenever, for example, the dream is concerned with the same events as those already experienced in waking life, there can be no question of appealing to a shadow world. Unreal events that are in conflict with the experience of one's fellows, and even with one's own more in­ clusive experience, must be banished completely from the external world. Where, then, shall they be located? What is more natural than to locate them inside the person who experiences them? For it is only upon him that the unreal object produces any effect. The objects of our dreams and our fancies, and of illusions generally, are held to exist only "in the mind." They are like feelings and de­ sires in being directly experienced only by a single mind. Thus the soul, already held to be the mysterious principle of life, and endowed with peculiar properties, transcending ordinary physical things, is further enriched by being made the habitat of the multi­ tudinous hosts of non-existent objects. Still further reflection on the phenomena of error leads to the discovery of the element of rela­ tivity in all knowledge, and finally to the realization that no external happening can be perceived until after it has ceased to exist. The events we perceive as present are always past, for in order to per­ ceive anything it must send energy of some kind to our sense organs, and by the time the energy reaches us the phase of existence which gave rise to it has passed away. To this universal and necessary temporal aberration of perceived objects is added an almost equally universal spatial aberration. For all objects that move relatively to the observer are perceived not where they are when perceived, but, at best, where they were when the stimulus issued from them. And in addition to these spatial and temporal aberrations of perception we know that what we perceive will depend not only upon the nature of the object but on the nature of the medium through which its energies have passed on their way to our organism; and also upon the condition of our sense organs and brain. Finally, we have every reason to believe that whenever the brain is stimulated in the same way in which it is normally stimulated by an object we shall expe­ rience that object even though it is in no sense existentially present.

E. B . HOLT, et al. [ 1 54 ] These many undeniable facts prove that error is no trivial and ex­ ceptional phenomenon, but the normal, necessary, and universal taint from which every perceptual experience must suffer. 2. It is such considerations as these that have led to the abandon­ ment of naive realism in favor of dualism, the second of the afore­ mentioned theories. According to this second theory, which is exem­ plified in the philosophies of Descartes and Locke, the mind never perceives anything external to itself. It can perceive only its own ideas or states. But as it seems impossible to account for the order in which these ideas occur by appealing to the mind in which they occur, it is held to be permissible and even necessary to infer a world of external objects resembling to a greater or less extent the effects, or ideas, which they produce in us. What we perceive is now held to be only a picture of what really exists. Consciousness is no longer thought of as analogous to a light which directly illumines the extra-organic world, but rather as a painter's canvas or a photo­ graphic plate on which objects in themselves imperceptible are rep­ resented. The great advantage of the second or picture theory is that it fully accounts for error and illusion ; the disadvantage of it is that it appears to account for nothing else. The only external world is one that we can never experience, the only world that we can have any experience of is the internal world of ideas. When we attempt to justify the situation by appealing to inference as the guarantee of this unexperienceable externality, we are met by the difficulty that the world we infer can only be made of the matter of experience, that is, can only be made up of mental pictures in new combinations. An inferred object is always a perceptible ob­ ject, one that could be in some sense experienced ; and, as we have seen, the only things that according to this view can be experienced are our mental states. Moreover, the world in which all our interests are centered is the world of experienced objects. Even if, "per im­ possible," we could justify the belief in a world beyond that which we could experience, it would be but a barren achievement, for such a world would contain none of the things that we see and feel. Such a so-called real world would be more alien to us and more thoroughly queer than were the ghostland or dreamland which, as we remember, the primitive realist sought to use as a home for certain of the unrealities of life. 3. It seems very natural at such a juncture to try the experiment of leaving out this world of extra-mental objects, and contenting ourselves with a world in which there exist only minds and their

Introduction to The New Realism

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states. This is the third theory, the theory of subjectivism. Accord­ ing to it, there can be no object without a subject, no existence without a consciousness of it. To be, is to be perceived. The world of objects capable of existing independently of a knower (the belief in which united the natural realist and the dualistic realist) is now rejected. This third theory agrees with the first theory in being epistemologically monistic, that is, in holding to the presentative rather than to the representative theory of perception; for, accord­ ing to the first theory, whatever exists must be perceived. Naive realism subsumed the perceived as a species under the genus existent. Subjectivism subsumes the existent as a species under the genus perceived. But while the third theory has these affiliations with the first theory, it agrees with the second theory in regarding all perceived objects as mental states-ideas inhering in the mind that knows them and as inseparable from that mind as any accident is from the substance that owns it. Subjectivism has many forms, or rather, many degrees. It oc­ curs in its first and most conservative form in the philosophy of Berkeley. Descartes and Locke, and other upholders of the dualistic epistemology, had already gone beyond the requirements of the picture theory in respect to the secondary qualities of objects. Not content with the doctrine that these qualities as they existed in ob­ jects could only be inferred, they had denied them even the infer­ ential status which they accorded to primary qualities. The secondary qualities that we perceive are not even copies of what exists ex­ ternally. They are the cloudy effects produced in the mind by com­ binations of primary qualities, and they resemble unreal objects in that they are merely subjective. The chief ground for this element of subjectivism in the systems of dualistic realism immediately pre­ ceding Berkeley, was the belief that relativity to the percipient implied subjectivity. As the secondary qualities showed this relativity, they were condemned as subjective. Now it was the easiest thing in the world for Berkeley to show that an equal or even greater relativity pertained to the primary qualities. The perceived form, size, and solidity of an object depend quite as much upon the relation of the percipient to the object as do its color and temperature. If it be axio­ matic that whatever is relative to the perceiver exists only as an idea, why, then, the primary qualities which were all that remained of the physical world could be reduced to mere ideas. But just here Berkeley brought his reasoning to an abrupt stop. He refused to recognize that ( 1 ) the relations between ideas or the order in which

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et al.

they are given to us, and ( 2 ) the other minds that are known, are quite as relative to the knower as are the primary and secondary qualities of the physical world. You can know other minds only in so far as you have experience of them, and to infer their inde­ pendent existence involves just as much and just as little of the proc­ ess of objectifying and hypostatizing your own ideas as to infer the independent existence of physical objects. Berkeley avoided this obvious result of his own logic by using the word "notion" to describe the knowledge of those things that did not depend for their existence on the fact that they were known. If you had an idea of a thing-say of your neighbor's body-then that thing existed only as a mental state. But if you had a notion of a thing-say of your neighbor's mind-then that thing was quite capable of existing inde­ pendently of your knowing it. Considering the vigorous eloquence with which Berkeley inveighed against the tendency of philosophers to substitute words for thoughts, it is pathetic that he should himself have furnished such a striking example of that very fallacy. In later times Clifford and Pearson have not hesitated to avail themselves of a quite similar linguistic device for escaping the solipsistic con­ clusion of a consistent subjectivism. The distinction between the physical objects which as "constructs" exist only in the consciousness of the knower, and other minds which as "ejects" can be known without being in any way dependent on the knower, is essentially the same both in its meaning and in its futility as the Berkeleian distinction of idea and notion. For the issue between realism and sub­ jectivism does not arise from a psychocentric predicament-a diffi­ culty of conceiving of objects apart from any consciousness-but rather from the much more radical "ego-centric predicament, "2 the difficulty of conceiving known things to exist independently of my knowing them. And the poignancy of the predicament is quite in­ dependent of the nature of the object itself, whether that be a physical thing such as my neighbor's body, or a psychical thing such as my neighbor's mind. Some part of this difficulty Hume saw and endeavored to meet in his proof that the spiritual substances of Berkeley were themselves mere ideas ; but Hume's position is itself subject to two criticisms : First, it succeeds no better than Berkeley's in avoiding a complete relativism or solipsism-for it is as difficult to explain how one "bundle of perceptions" can have any knowledge of the other equally 2. Cf. be low , Se cti on II.

Introduction to The New Realism

[ 1 57 ] real "bundle of perceptions" as to explain how one "spirit" can have knowledge of other "spirits." Second, the Humean doctrine suflers from an additional difficulty peculiar to itself, in that by destroying the conception of the mind as a "substance," it made meaningless the quite correlative conception of perceived objects as mental "states." If there is no substance there cannot be any states or accidents, and there ceases to be any sense in regarding the things that are known as dependent upon or inseparable from a knower. 4. Passing on to that form of subjectivism developed by Kant, we may note three points : ( 1) A step back toward dualism, in that he dallies with, even if he does not actually embrace, the dualistic notion of a "ding-a11-sich," a reality outside and beyond the realm of experienced objects which serves as their cause or ground. ( 2) A step in advance of the subjectivism of Berkeley and Hume, in that Kant reduces to the subjective status not merely the facts of nature but also her laws, so far, at least, as they are based upon the forms of space and time and upon the categories. ( 3 ) There appears in the Kantian system a wholly new feature which is destined to figure prominently in later systems. This is the dualistic conception of the knower, as himself a twofold being, transcendental and empirical. It is the transcendental or noumenal self that gives laws to nature, and that owns the experienced objects as it states. The empirical or phenomenal self, on the other hand, is simply one object among others, and enjoys no special primacy, in its relation to the world of which it is a part. The post-Kantian philosophies deal with the three points just mentioned in the following ways : ( 1 ) The retrograde feature of Kant's doctrine-the belief in the "ding-an-sich"-is abandoned. ( 2) The step in advance-the legislative power conferred by Kant upon the self as knower-is accepted and enlarged to the point of viewing consciousness as the source not only of the a priori forms of relation, but of all relations whatsoever. ( 3) The doctrine of the dual self is extended to the point of identifying in one absolute self the plurality of transcendental selves held to by Kant, with the result that our various empirical selves and the objects of their experience are all regarded as the manifestations or fragments of a single, per­ fect, all-inclusive, and eternal self. But it is not hard to see that this new dualism of the finite and the absolute selves involves the same difficulties as those which we found in the Cartesian dualism of conscious state and physical object. For either the experience of the fragment embraces the experiences of the absolute, or it does not.

E. B . HOLT, et al. [ 1 58 ] If the former, then the absolute becomes knowable, to be sure, but only at the cost of losing its absoluteness and being reduced to a mere "state" of the alleged fragment. The existence of the absolute will then depend upon the fact that it is known by its own fragments, and each fragmentary self will have to assume that its own experi­ ence constitutes the entire universe-which is solipsism. If the other horn of the dilemma be chosen and the independent reality of the absolute be insisted upon, then it is at the cost of making the ab­ solute unknowable, of reducing it to the status of the unexperience­ able external world of the dualistic realist. The dilemma itself is the inevitable consequence of making knowledge an internal rela­ tion and hence constitutive of its objects. Indeed, a large part of the philosophical discussion of recent years has been concerned with the endeavor of the absolutists to defend their doctrine from the attacks of empiricists of the Berkeleian and Humean tradition in such a way as to avoid equally the Scylla of epistemological dualism and the Charybdis of solipsism. But, as we have seen, the more empirical subjectivists of the older and strictly British school are open to the same criticism as that which they urge upon the abso­ lutists; for it is as difficult for the Berkeleian to justify his belief in the existence of other spirits, or the phenomenalistic follower of Hume his belief in bundles or streams of experience other than his own, as it is for the absolutist to justify those features of the absolute experience which lie beyond the experience of the finite fragments. 5. And now enter upon this troubled scene the new realists, offering to absolutists and phenomenalists impartially their new theory of the relation of knower to known. From the standpoint of this new theory all subjectivists suffer from a common complaint. The ontological differences that separate such writers as Fichte and Berkeley, Mr. Bradley and Professor Karl Pearson, are, for a realist, overshadowed by the epistemological error that unites them. The escape from subjectivism and the for­ mulation of an alternative that shall be both remedial and positively fruitful, constitutes the central preeminent issue for a realistic pro­ tagonist. It is prior to all other philosophical issues, such as monism and pluralism, eternalism and temporalism, materialism and spirit­ ualism, or even pragmatism and intellectualism. This does not mean that the new realism shall not lead to a solution of these problems, but only that as a basis for their clear discussion it is first of all essential to get rid of subjectivism. The new realists' relational theory is in essentials very old. To

Introduction to The New Realism

[ 1 59 ] understand its meaning it is necessary to go back beyond Kant, beyond Berkeley, beyond even Locke and Descartes-far back to that primordial common sense which believes in a world that exists independently of the knowing of it, but believes also that that same independent world can be directly presented in consciousness and not merely represented or copied by "ideas." In short, the new real­ ism is, broadly speaking, a return to that naive or natural realism which was the first of our three typical theories of the knowledge relations; and as such, it should be sharply distinguished from the dualistic or inferential realism of the Cartesians. But the cause of the abandonment of naive realism in favor of the dualistic or picture theory was the apparently hopeless disagreement of the world as presented in immediate experience with the true or corrected system of objects in whose reality we believe. So the first and most urgent problem for the new realists is to amend the realism of common sense in such wise as to make it compatible with the facts of rela­ tivity. For this reason especial attention has been given in the present volume 3 to a discussion of those special phenomena, such as illusion and error, which are supposed to discredit natural realism, and set going a train of thought that cannot be stopped short of subjectivism. It is necessary to inquire closely into the mechanism of perception, and into the logic of contradiction and falsity. And it is necessary to obtain a definition of the central thesis of realism, the thesis of independence, that shall not be so loose as to violate the facts, nor so vague and formal as to disregard them.4

II.

THE REALIST IC PO LEMIC

Inasmuch as subjectivism, renewed and fortified under the name of "idealism," is the dominant philosophy of the day, it affords the chief resistance which an innovating philosophy such as realism has to overcome. The realistic polemic is therefore primarily a polemic against subjectivism; but the errors of which realism finds sub­ jectivistic philosophies to be guilty, are not necessarily confined to such philosophies. They may be generalized; and in so far as they are generalized their discovery is of greater moment. The following 3. Cf. be low, No s. I V, V, VI. ["A Real isti c Theory of Truth an d Error," b yW. P. Montague ; "The Pla ce of Il lu so ry Ex per ien ce in a Rea list i� '\Yor ld," b y E. B. Ho lt ; and "Some Rea list ic Imp licat ions of B io log y," by W. B . Pit k in . ] 4. Cf. below, No. II . " [ A Realist ic Theory of In de pen den ce," b y R. B . Perr y.]

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E. B . HOLT,

et al.

are some of the traditional errors which nee-realism has thus far succeeded in generalizing. l . The fallacy of argument from the ego-centric predicament. The "ego-centric predicament" consists in the impossibility of find­ ing anything that is not known. 5 This is a predicament rather than a discovery, because it refers to a difficulty of procedure, rather than to a character of things; It is impossible to eliminate the knower I without interrupting observation;·- hence the peculiar difficulty of discovering what characters, if ariy, things possess when not known. When this situation is formulated as a proposition concerning things, the result is either the redundant inference that all known things are known, or the false inference that all things are known. The former is, on account of its redundancy, not a proposition at all; and its use results only in confusing it with the second proposition, which involves a "petitio principii." The falsity of the inference, in the case of the latter proposition, lies in its being a use of the method of agreement unsupported by the method of difference. It is impossible to argue from the fact that everything one finds is known, to the conclusion that knowing is a universal condition of being, because it is impossible to find non-things which are not known. The use of the method of agreement without negative cases is a fallacy. It should be added that at best the method of agreement is a preliminary aid to exact thought, and can throw no light what­ soever on which can be meant by saying that knowing is a con­ dition of being. Yet this method, misapplied, is the main proof, perhaps the only proof, that has been offered of the cardinal prin­ ciple of idealistic philosophies-the definition of being in terms of consciousness. It is difficult, on account of their very lack of logical form, to obtain pure cases of philosophical fallacies. Then, too, this particular fallacy has so far become a commonplace as to be regarded as a self-evident truth. The step in which it is employed is omitted or obscured in many idealistic treatises. In others it is spread so thin, is so pervasive and insidious, that while it lends whatever support is offered for the cardinal idealistic principle, it is nowhere ex­ plicitly formulated. But the following will serve as a typical illustra­ tion. "Things exist," says Renouvier, "and all things have a common character, that of being represented, of appearing ; for if there were no representation of things, how should I speak of them?"6 It is 5. In th is conne ction , "known " me ans "g iven as an o b je c t of thought ." 6. Renouv ie r, Mind, 1 877, pp . 2, 378.

Introduction to The New Realism

[ 161 ]

clear that no more is proved by this argument than that things must be "represented" if one is to ''speak of them." That all things have the common character of being "spoken of," which is the funda­ mental thesis restated in a new form, is left without any proof whatsoever. 2. The fallacy of pseudo-simplicity. There is a disposition in philosophy as well as in common sense to assume the simplicity of that which is only familiar or stereotyped. This error has conspired with the error just examined to lend a certain plausibility to sub­ jectivism. For one would scarcely assert with so much gravity that the world was his idea, or that the "I think" must accompany every judgment, unless he supposed that the first personal pronoun referred to something that did not require further elucidation. Self-conscious­ ness could never have figured in idealistic philosophies as the im­ mediate and primary certainty if it were understood to be a complex and problematic conception. Yet such it must be admitted to be, once its practical simplicity, based on habits of thought and speech, is discounted. Similarly the common dogma, to the effect that con­ sciousness can be known only introspectively, is based on the as­ sumption that it is known introspectively, and that thus approached it is a simple datum. Traditional spiritistic conceptions of will, ac­ tivity, immediacy, and life, rest on the same fundamental misappre­ hension as does the materialistic acceptance of body as an irreducible entity. Thus what is really at stake here is nothing less than the method of analysis itself. In exact procedure it is not permitted to assert the simplicity of any concept until after analysis. That the concepts enumerated above are not analytically simple, is proved by the fact that when they are treated as simple, it is necessary to give them a complex existence also in order to account for what is known about them. It is customary to say that this is a "manifesta­ tion" or "transformation" of the simple and more fundamental reality ; but this is to reverse the order which is proper to thought as the deliberate and systematic attempt to know. It is equivalent to asserting that the more pains we take to know, the less real is the object of our knowledge ; a proposition which is never asserted without being contradicted, since it expresses the final critical analysis of the thinker who asserts it. The following is a characteristic ex­ ample of the error of "pseudo-simplicity," as applied to the con­ ception of activity. "Every man," says Professor Ward, "knows the difference be­ tween feeling and doing, between idle reverie and intense thought,

[ 1 62 ]

et al. between impotent and aimless drifting and unswerving tenacity of purpose, being the slave of every passion or the master of himself. . . . It must surely ever remain futile, nay, even foolish, to attempt to explain either receptivity or activity; for what is there in experience more fundamental? And being thus fundamental, the prime staple of all experience, it is absurd to seek to prove them real, since in the first and foremost sense of reality the real and they are one. " 7 Nevertheless, activity and passivity are capable of being analyzed in a variety of ways, logical, physical, and psychological; 8 and their nature can be regarded as a simple datum only in so far as such analysis is deliberately avoided. They are simples only in so far as they are not yet analyzed. 3. The fallacy of exclusive particularity. It is ordinarily assumed that a particular term of any system belongs to such system ex­ clusively. That this is a false assumption is proved empirically. The point b of the class of points that constitutes the straight line abc may belong also to the class of points that constitutes the intersecting straight line xby. The man John Doe who belongs to the class Re­ publican Party may belong also to the intersecting class captains of industry. Unless this multiple classification of terms were possible, discourse would break down utterly. All the terms of discourse are general in the sense that they belong to several contexts. It is this fact that accounts for the origin and the usefulness of language. Without this generality of terms the world would possess no struc­ ture, not even motion or similarity; for there could be no motion if the same could not be in different places at different times, and there could be no similarity if the same could not appear in different qualitative groupings. It is little wonder, then, that the virtual re­ jection of this principle by philosophy has led to a fundamental and perpetual difficulty. To this error may perhaps be traced the unten­ ability of Platonic universalism, recognized apparently by Plato himself, and the untenability of modern particularism, attested by the desperate efforts which almost every modern philosopher has made to save himself from it. The most familiar variety of particularism is found in naturalism. This may be traced to the naive bias for the space-time order, or that historical series of bodily changes which constitutes the course of nature. Naturalism asserts that this is the only system, and that E. B. HOLT,

7. Ward, J., Naruralism and Agnosticism, pp. 2, 52, 5 3 . 8. Cf., e.g., James, W., "The Experience o f Activity," i n Essays in Radical Empiricism, No. VI.

Introduction to The New Realism

[ 1 63 ] its terms, the several bodily events, belong to it exclusively. That this theory is untenable is evident at once, since in order that bodily events shall possess the structure and connections necessary to them, being must contain other terms, such as places, times, numbers, etc., that are not bodily events. But historically, naturalism has been dis­ credited mainly by its failure to provide for the system of ideas, a system without which the bodily system itself could not be known; and it is the exclusive particularity of the terms of this latter that has figured most prominently in philosophical discussions. In dualism of the Cartesian type the terms of nature and the terms of knowledge are regarded as exclusive, but in order that knowledge shall mean anything at all, it is assumed that there is some sort of representative relation between them. Spinoza and Leibniz endeav­ ored to bring them together through a third and neutral term. Among the English philosophers the impossibility of showing how the mind can know nature if each mind is a closed circle, possessing its con­ tent wholly within itself, leads finally to the abolition of nature as an independent system. Thus the pendulum swings from naturalism to subjectivism; and in the whole course of this dialectic the mis­ taken principle of exclusive particularity is assumed. 4. The fallacy of definition by initial predication. This form of error is a natural sequel to the last. A subject of discourse is viewed initially under one of its aspects, or is taken initially as a term in some specific complex or relational manifold. Then, owing to the error of exclusive particularity, it is assumed that this subject of dis­ course can have no other aspect, or belong to no other rational manifold. Thus the initial characterization becomes definitive and final. Subjectivism, again, affords the most notable instances of the error. Any subject of discourse may be construed as such; that is, as a thing talked about or "taken account of," as an object of expe­ rience or knowledge. The vogue of the psychological, introspective, or reflective method in modern thought has given rise to the custom of construing things first according to their place in the context of consciousness. Similarly, the habit of self-consciousness among phi­ losophers has emphasized the relation of things to self; and the prominence of epistemology in modern philosophy has tended to an initial characterization of things according to their places in the proc­ ess of knowledge, just as the prominence of religious issues led early Christian ascetics to name things first after their part in the drama of the soul's salvation.

[ 1 64 ]

E. B . HOLT,

et al.

Thus, idealism, quite unconscious of having prejudged the main question from the outset, "seeks to interpret the universe after the analogy of conscious life, and regards experience as for us the great reality. " 9 Or, as another writer expressed it, "we must start . . . from the whole of experience as such." 1 0 But all such initial charac­ terizations must be regarded as accidental. Allowance must be duly made for alternative and complementary characterizations; and the question of the priority of the characterization to which any subject of discourse submits must be discussed quite independently of the order which is determined by habit or bias. In short, the very general disposition at the present time to begin with a psychological or epistemological version of things must not be allowed in the least to prejudice the question as to whether that version is definitive or important. 5. The speculative dogma. By the "speculative dogma" is meant the assumption for philosophical purposes that there is an all-suffi­ cient, all-general principle, a single fundamental proposition that adequately determines or explains everything. This assumption has commonly taken one or the other of two forms. By many it has been assumed that such a principle constitutes the proper content or subject matter of philosophy. Thus Plato said: "And when I speak of the other division of the intelligible you will understand me to speak of that other sort of knowledge which reason herself attains by the power of dialectic, using the hypotheses not as first prin­ ciples, but only as hypotheses-that is to say, as steps and points of departure into a region which is above hypotheses, in order that she may soar beyond them to the first principle of the whole; and clinging to this and then to that which depends on this, by successive steps she descends again without the aid of any sensible object, beginning and ending in ideas." 1 1 And Caird makes the same as­ sumption when he says that "Philosophy professes to seek and to find the principle of unity which underlies all the manifold particular truths of the separate sciences." 1 2 But such an assumption is dogmatic, because it ignores the prior question as to whether there is such a principle or not. So far as the general task of philosophy is concerned, this must be treated as an open question. Philosophy does aim, it is true, to generalize as widely and comprehend as adequately as pos9. Lindsay, J., Studies in European Philosophy, p. 207. 1 0. Baill ie, J. B., Idealistic Construction of Experience, p. 105. 1 1. Pl at o ( Jowe tt, tran s.), Republic, 5 1 1 B. 12. Cai rd, E., ThP Social Philosophy and Religion of Comte, p. xii.

Introduction to The New Realism

[ 1 65 ] sible; but a loosely aggregated world, abounding in unmitigated vari­ ety, is a philosophical hypothesis. The discovery of a highly coherent system under which all the wealth of experience could be subsumed would be the most magnificent of philosophical achievements; but if there is no such system, philosophy must be satisfied with something less-with whatever, in fact, there happens to be. By others, in the sec­ ond place, it has been assumed that the idea of such a principle or system is the property of every thoughtful person, the existence of an object corresponding to it being alone doubtful. This assumption gave rise to the ontological proof of God, which carried conviction only so long as man did not question the definiteness and meaning of the idea; for the assumption obscured a problem, the problem, namely, as to whether there is any idea corresponding to the words "ens realissimum." The possibility of defining, on general logical grounds, a maximum of being or truth, is, to say the least, highly questionable; and it is certain that this problem must properly pre­ cede any inferences from such a maximal idea. The speculative dogma has been the most prolific cause of the verbal abuses which abound in philosophy, and which are to be considered separately. It is through this dogma that various words have been invested with a certain hyperbole and equivocation, in consequence of the attempt to stretch their meaning to fit the specu­ lative demand. A further evil arising from the speculative dogma is the unjust and confusing disparagement of positive knowledge through invidious comparison with this Unknown God to which the philosopher has erected his altar. 6. The error of verbal suggestion. Words which do not possess a clear and unambiguous meaning, but which nevertheless have a rhetorical effect owing to their association, lend themselves to a specious discourse, having no cognitive value in itself, and standing in the way of the attainment of genuine knowledge. This is Bacon's famous idol of the forum. In philosophy this reliance on the sug­ gestive, rather than the proper denotative or connotative function of words, is due not only to man's general and ineradicable tendency to verbalism, but also to the wide vogue of doctrines that are funda­ mentally inarticulate. We have already examined two errors which lead philosophers to accept such doctrines. The error of pseudo­ simplicity involves a reference to topics that cannot be analytically expressed; they cannot be identified and assigned an unequivocal name. The speculative dogma has, as we have seen, led to the use of words which shall somehow convey a sense of finality, or of

E. B . HOLT, et al. [ 1 66 ] limitless and exhausting application, where no specific object or exact concept possessing such characters is offered for inspection. This is what Berkeley calls the "method of growing in expression, and dwindling in notion. " Ordinarily the words so used have a precise meaning also, and there results a double evil. On the one . hand, the exact mearung of sueh terms as "force, " "matter, " "consciousness," "will," etc., is blurred and vitiated; and on the other hand, their speculative meaning borrows a content ,to which it is not entitled. The desire of philosophers to satisfy the religious de­ mand for an object of worship or faith, doubtless one of the funda­ mental motives of the speculative dogma, leads to yet another variety of verbal suggestion, in which a technical philosophical conception is given a name that possesses eloquence and power of edification. Thus philosophers commonly prefer the term "eternal" to the term "non-temporal," and "infinite" to "series with no last term," or "class, a part of which can be put in one-to-one correspondence with the whole." Such terms as "significance," "supreme," "high­ est," "unity," have a similar value. Or the same end may be achieved by decorating almost any word with a capital letter, as is exemplified by the emotional difference between truth and Truth, or absolute and Absolute. Finally, there is a verbal abuse which is worse, even, than equivocation; for it is possible to invent utterly fictitious concepts simply by combining words. In such cases, the constituent con­ cepts, if the words happen to signify any, are not united. They may be positively repugnant, or simply irrelevant. At any rate, they have not been tested for consistency, and whether they do or not constitute a true system or complex concept remains wholly prob­ lematic. Such, for example, is the case with Eucken's "total activity, which by its own movement develops into an independent reality and at the same time comprehends the opposition of subject and object, subjectivity and objectivity." 1 3 Such procedure is the prin­ cipal source of the fallacy of "obscurum per obscurius" and affords an almost unlimited opportunity for error. 7. The fallacy of illicit importance. This is one of the most in­ sidious errors which has ever been foisted upon mankind, and it is the idealist who has popularized it. It consists in inferring that, because a proposition is self-evident or unchallengeable, therefore it is important. There is a healthy animal instinct behind the fallacy.

1 3. Eucken (Pogson , trans. ) , Life of the Spirit, p. 320.

Introduction to The New Realism

[ 1 67 ] Men have early learned that the certain affords, on the whole, a safer basis for conduct than the uncertain. The merchant who is sure of his market grows rich faster than his ignorant competitor. The statesman who is sure of his constituents acts with directness and decision. So it is throughout all practical life. Now, the practi­ cal man never reflects upon his own mental processes, and thus he fails to note that the certainty he feels toward things is not an attribute of them, but only a certain precision in his attitude to­ ward them. But the fact that the relations are unequivocal and clear is no proof that they happen to be of much significance. A may surely be C, and yet its being C may be the most trivial circumstance. A man, for instance, may be absolutely sure he likes cucumbers; but this does not prove that cucumbers are the true foundation of dietetics, nor that his liking of them reveals either his own nature or the nature of cucumbers. Undeterred by such obvious cases, however, the idealist is wont to reason that all philosophy and all science must be built upon the one fact that nobody can make any unchallengeable assertion about anything except his having an immediate experience. One might ask the idealist whether he is any more certain of being aware than he is of the presented object; whether, for ex­ ample, in addition to saying: "I am certain that I am experiencing" -he cannot say with equal assurance : "There certainly is a tree of some sort over yonder." But to take up this debate is to pass beyond the fallacy which he has committed. And no solution of the question alters the fact that he has erred logically in holding that, because A is undeniably B, therefore B is an important character­ istic of A . There is no sure connection between the axiomatic and the significant. To think there is, is vicious intellectualism. The fal­ lacy is curable only by the use of strict logic, but by this very easily. If one person is certain that a distant object is a tree, while his companion is equally certain that the same object is an auto­ mobile, is it not obvious that certainty is a negligible factor in the problem of deciding what the object really is.

III.

THE REALISTIC PRO GRAM O F REFORM

Philosophy has repeatedly thrown off its bad habits, and aroused itself to critical vigilance. Furthermore, there is good ground for asserting that there has never before been so great an opportunity

E. B . HOLT, et al. [ 1 68 ] of reform. Logic and mathematics, the traditional models of pro­ cedure, are themselves being submitted to a searching revision that has already thrown a new light on the general principles of exact thinking; and there is promise of more light to come, for science has for all time become reflectively conscious of its own method. The era of quarrelsome misunderstanding between criticism and positive knowledge is giving way to an era of united and comple­ mentary endeavor. It must not be forgotten that philosophy is pe­ culiarly dependent on logic. Natural science in its empirical and experimental phase can safely be guided by instinct, because it operates in the field of objects defined by common sense. But the very objects of philosophy are the fruit of analysis. Its task is the correction of the categories of common sense, and all hopes of a profitable and valid result must be based on an expert critical judg­ ment. The present situation, then, affords philosophy an opportunity of adopting a more rigorous procedure and assuming a more sys­ tematic form. It is with reference to this opportunity that it is worth while here to repeat the advice which is our common inheritance from the great philosophical reformers. None of these canons is original, but all are pertinent and timely. l . The scrupulous use of words. This is a moral rather than a logical canon. There is need in philosophy of a greater fastidious­ ness and nicety in the use of words. A regard for words is, in philos­ ophy, the surest proof of a sensitive scientific conscience ; for words are the instruments of philosophical procedure, and deserve the same care as the lancet of the surgeon or the balance of the chemist. A complacent and superior disregard of words is as fatuous as it is offensive. It is a healthier intellectual symptom to feel as Maclan felt in Chesterton's The Ball and the Cross. "Why shouldn't we quarrel about a word? What is the good of words if they aren't im­ portant enough to quarrel over? Why do we choose one word more than another if there isn't any difference between them? If you called a woman a chimpanzee instead of an angel, wouldn't there be a quarrel about a word? If you're not going to argue about words, what are you going to argue about? Are you going to convey your meaning to me by moving your ears? The church and the heresies always used to fight about words, because they are the only things worth fighting about." 1 4 2. Definition. "The light of human minds," says Hobbes, ''is

14. Chesterton, The Ball and the Cross, p. 96.

Introduction to The New Realism

[ 1 69 ] perspicuous words, but by exact definitions first snuffed and purged from all ambiguities." Words are properly signs. They are service­ able in proportion as they are self-effacing. A skillful word will introduce the hearer or reader to his object, and then retire; only the awkward word will call attention to itself. It follows, then, that the only means of escaping quarrels about words is to use words with discrimination, with careful reference to their objective purport, or usefulness as means of access to ideas . Furthermore, a word is essen­ tially a social instrument, whether used for record or communica­ tion, and requires that its relation to an object or idea shall be agreed on and conventionalized. This is the only means of bringing several minds together ir. a common topic of discourse. "Syllables," says John Toland, "though never so well put together, if they have not ideas fix'd to them, are but words spoken in the air, and cannot be the ground of a reasonable service. " 15 Philosophy is peculiarly dependent upon a clear definition of the reference of words because, as we have already seen, its objects are not those of common sense. It cannot rely on the ordinary denota­ tion of words. This fact affords a perennial and abundant source of confusion, from which there is no escape save through the creation of a technical vocabulary. Bacon's observations on this matter are worthy of being quoted in full. "Now words," he says, "being com­ monly framed and applied according to the capacity of the vulgar, follow those lines of division which are most obvious to the vulgar understanding. And whenever an understanding of greater acuteness or a more diligent observation would alter those lines to suit the true divisions of nature, words stand in the way and resist the change. Whence it comes to pass that the high and formal discussions of learned men and oftentimes in disputes about words and names, with which ( according to the use and wisdom of the mathematicians) it would be more prudent to begin, and so by means of definitions reduce them to order. " 1 6 Definition, then, means, in the first instance, the unequivocal and conventional reference of words. But there is a further question which arises from the use of single words to refer to complex objects. If such a reference is to be unequivocal, it is necessary that there should be a verbal complex mediating between the single word and the complex object. Thus if a circle is defined as "the class of points equidistant from a given point," this means that a circle is a complex 1 5. To lan d, Christianity Not Mysterious (2d e d. ), p. 30. 1 6. Bacon, Novum Organum (e ditions of E llis an d S pe dding) , IV, 6 1 .

E. B . HOLT, et al. [ 1 70 ] object whose components are specified by the words in the given phrase. The single word is virtually an abbreviation of the phrase. The clarity of words depends in the end on their possessing a con­ ventional reference to simple objects. But with the progress of analysis and the demonstration of the unsuspected or unexplored complexity of things, the single word which at first denoted the ob­ ject in its pre-analytical simplicity, comes to stand for several words which denote the components of the object in their post-analytical simplicity. Definition, then, means two things : first, a convention regarding the substitution of a single word for a group of words ; second, a convention regarding the reference of words to objects. 17 3. Analysis. The term "analysis" properly refers not to the spe­ cial method of any branch of knowledge, but to the method of exact knowledge in general, to that method of procedure in which the problematic is discovered to be a complex of simples. Such proce­ dure may lead to the discovery of fine identities in the place of gross differences, or fine differences in the place of gross identities. Anal­ ysis in this sense means only the careful, systematic, and exhaustive examination of any topic of discourse. It cannot, then, be proper to assert that such procedure destroys its object. It does, it is true, require that naivete and innocence of mind shall give place to sophistication ; or that ignorance shall give place to some degree of explicitly formulated knowledge. But even the discovery that such psychological or moral values are lost is itself the result of analysis. Nor is there any difficulty in providing a place for such values within the psychological or moral systems to which they belong. In the second place, it cannot be proper to assert that there is anything which necessarily escapes analysis, such as "real" change or "real" activity. The method of analysis does not require that change and activity shall be anything other than what any investigation shall discover them to be. Analysis may show either that they are unan­ alyzable or that they may be further reduced. If they turn out to be unanalyzable, it can only be because they exhibit no complexity of structure, no plurality of necessary factors. If they turn out to be reducible, then they must be identical with the totality of their components. If they appear to differ from such a totality, then they must appear so to differ in some respect, and this respect must at once be added to complete the totality. It is especially important not to forget the combining relations. A toy is not identical with the

1 7. The de fini tion of things , rather than words ' is apparen tl y the same a s knowle dge i n genera l.

Introduction to The New Realism

[ 171 ] collection of the fragments into which it has been shattered, but it is identical with those fragments in that particular arrangement which has been destroyed. Similarly dynamics does not reduce motion to the occupancy of positions, but to the occupancy of posi­ tions in a temporal order. There is a perfectly clear difference between geometry or statics, on the one hand, and dynamics on the other. It is important also not to confuse analysis and synthesis with the physical operation that often accompanies them. For the purposes of knowledge it is not necessary to put Humpty Dumpty together again, but only to recognize that Humpty Dumpty is not himself unless the pieces are together. The common prejudice against analysis is due in part to this false supposition that it is an attempt to substitute a collection of parts for an arrangement of parts. But it is due also to a more or less habitual confusion between things and words. Those who have employed the analytical method have been by no means guiltless in the matter. So soon as any word obtains currency it begins to pose as a thing in its own right, and discourse is constantly tending to take on the form of a logomachy. It has not unnaturally been sup­ posed that analysis intended to verbalize reality, to give to its parts the artificial and stereotyped character of words, and to its processes the formal arrangement of grammar. But, as we have already seen, verbalism cannot be avoided by a deliberate carelessness in the use of words. If words are to be both useful and subordinate, it is neces­ sary that they should be kept in working order, like signposts kept up to date, with their inscriptions legible and their pointing true. 4. Regard for logical form. Logic is at the present time in a state of extraordinary activity, and able both to stimulate and to enrich philosophy. The principal contribution which modern logic is pre­ pared to make to philosophy concerns the form of exact knowledge. This problem is by no means wholly solved, and there is important work to be done which only philosophers can do. But the mathe­ matical logicians have already broken and fertilized the ground. The theory of relations, the theory of "logical constants" or inde­ finables, the theory of infinity and continuity, and the theory of classes and systems, concern everything fundamental in philosophy. No philosopher can ignore these and like theories without playing the part of an amateur. The mathematical logicians may be quite mis­ taken, or they may have failed to go to the root of things; but in that case they must be overtaken in their error and corrected on their own grounds, if the field of scientific philosophy is not to be aban-

E. B . HOLT, et al. [ 1 72 ] doned to them altogether. The present situation is certainly intoler­ able; for philosophy deals with the same topics as modern logic, but treats popularly and confusedly what modern logic treats with the painstaking thoroughness and exactness of the expert. There is another respect in which modern logic should be of service to philosophy. In the course of a reconstruction of the foun­ dations of mathematics, certain general canons of good thinking have come to light; and these are directly applicable to philosophical procedure. 1 8 We refer to such canons as "consistency" and "sim­ plicity." These canons are new in the sense that they are now well enough defined to afford a means of testing any theory. A theory is consistent when its fundamental propositions actually generate terms, or when a class can be found which they define; and a theory satis­ fies the criterion of simplicity or parsimony when none of its fun­ damental propositions can be deduced from the rest. It behooves philosophy, then, both to ally itself with logic, in the investigation of the most ultimate concepts, such as relations, class, system, order, indefinable, etc., and also to apply to its own constructive procedure the most refined tests of scientific form. It is one of the major pur­ poses of the new realism to justify and to extend the method of logic and of exact science in general. For this reason one of the essays in this volume 1 9 is especially devoted to defending the truthfulness of that method and giving it full ontological validity. 5. Division of the question. Although philosophy is especially charged with correcting the results obtained from other investiga­ tions, it is folly to ignore the necessity, humanly speaking, of dealing with one problem at a time. Not only is the attempt to raise and answer all questions together futile, but it prevents either definite­ ness of concepts or cogency of reasoning. Exact knowledge must be precisely limited in its application. A disposition in philosophy to employ terms in an unlimited sense, and to make unlimited asser­ tions, is the principal reason why philosophy at the present time possesses no common body of theory. And for the same reason philosophy is today without any common plan of work to be done. English and American philosophers have been much exercised dur­ ing the past decade over what is called "the problem of truth." It is assumed that the various parties to this discussion are referring to the same thing; but it is doubtful if this would ever be suspected, did they not specifically mention one another's names and writings.

1 8 . Cf. S ch midt, "Crit ique of Cogn ition and i ts Princ iples ' " Journal of Philosophy ( 1909) , pp . 6, 28 1 . 19. No . III. [ ''A De fen ce of Anal ys is," b y E . G. Spa ulding . ]

Introduction to The New Realism

[ 1 73 ] These quarrels are perhaps due less to disagreement on the merits of any question, than to an irritable determination to be heard. If a sober and patient attempt were made to reduce the present differ­ ences of philosophical opinion to debatable propositions, the first result would be a division of the question at issue. It would cer­ tainly appear that the present-day problem of truth is one problem only so long as it is a symbol of factional dispute; discuss it, and it at once proves to be many problems, as independent of one an­ other as any problems can be. If one undertakes to enumerate these problems, one readily finds as many as seven : ( 1 ) The problem of non-existence: What disposition is to be made of negated proposi­ tions, of non-temporal propositions, and of imaginary propositions? ( 2 ) The problem of the one and the many: How many elements belong to one system? ( 3) The problem of logical form: What are the ultimate categories? ( 4) The problem of methodology: How shall one best proceed in order to know? ( 5 ) The problem of universality: How can that which is known at a moment transcend that moment? ( 6) The problem of the values of knowledge: What are the criteria of right believing? ( 7) The problem of the relation between belief and its object: In what respect does belief directly or indirectly modify its object? If agreement, or even intelligent disagreement, is to be obtained, philosophical issues must be sharpened. If any steady advance is to be made, special problems must be examined in order, and one at a time. There is a large group of such special problems that is by general consent assigned to philosophy. In addition to those already enumerated, there are such problems as consciousness, causality, matter, particularity and generality, individuality, teleology, all of them problems whose solution is of the first importance both for the special sciences and for religious belief. These problems are examined by the traditional philosophy; but they are not sufficiently isolated, nor examined with sufficient intensive application. They find their place in most philosophical treatises as application of a general system, and not as problems to be examined independently on their merits. 6. Explicit agreement. The recent discussion of the desirability and expediency of a "philosophical platform" has developed a dif­ ference of opinion as to whether agreement should be explicit or implicit. 20 Agreement of some sort is conceded to be a desideratum, but there are some who believe that a common tradition or historical 20. Cf. Schmidt, Creighton, and Leighton, Journal of Philosophy (1 909) , pp. 6, 1 4 1 , 240, 5 1 9, 673.

E . B . HOLT, et al. [ 1 74 ] background is all that is necessary. Now is it not evident that in theoretical or scientific procedure there is no agreement until it is explicitly formulated? The philosophical classics afford no basis for agreement, because they are open to interpretation. The difficulty is merely complicated through the necessity of first agreeing on the meaning of a text. To employ terms and propositions in their his­ torical sense is to adopt precisely the course which is adopted by common sense. It means the introduction into what is supposed to be exact discourse of the indeterminate human values with which tra­ dition is encrusted. In exact discourse the meaning of every term must be reviewed; no stone can be allowed to go into the building that has not been inspected and approved by the builder. Otherwise the individual philosopher is no more than an instrument in the hands of the "Weltgeist." He must be possessed by a fatalistic confidence that the truth will take care of itself if he only repeats the formulas that he has learned in the schools or in the market place. But the most precious and cherished privilege of philosophy is the critical independence of each generation. Every philosophical reformer from the beginning of European thought has been moved by a distrust of tradition, and has proclaimed the need of a perpetual watchful­ ness lest the prestige of opinion be mistaken for the weight of evidence. If agreement is to be based on tradition, then tradition, with all its ambiguity, its admixture of irrelevant associations, and its unlawful authority, is made the arbiter of philosophical disputes. That no theo­ retical difference is ever really judged in this way is abundantly proved from the present situation in philosophy. We sympathize, but we do not agree; we differ, but we do not disagree. It is of more importance in theoretical procedure that two or three should agree, than that all should sympathize. "If the trumpet gives an uncertain sound," says Toland, "who shall prepare himself to the battle?" Agreement and disagreement alike require the explicit formulation of theories in terms freshly defined. It is not to be supposed that those who insist on the necessity of explicit agreement have in mind any general unanimity. The principle would be satisfied if a single philosopher could be found to agree with himself-provided the agreement were explicit. For then it would be possible for others to disagree with him, and to disagree explicitly. We should then have before us a number of carefully formulated propositions, which could be tested and debated in the light of the evidence, propositions which would be the common property of philosophers and the material with which to construct an impersonal system of philosophical knowledge.

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The first duty of philosophers, then, is not to agree, but to make their implicit agreements or disagreements explicit. Moreover it is not easy to see how this duty can be escaped without entirely abandoning philosophy's claim to be a theoretical discipline. If we cannot express our meaning in exact terms, in terms that we are will­ ing should stand as final, if like the sophists of old we must make long speeches and employ the arts of rhetoric; then let us at least cultivate literature. At present we are bad scientists and worse poets. But philosophy is not necessarily ineffable. 21 The difficulties which some philosophies have in meeting the demands of exact discourse are gratuitous, and are due to a habit of mixing theory, on the one hand, with the history of theory, and, on the other hand, with com­ mon belief. It is not necessary that philosophy should abandon its interest in either history or common belief, but it is necessary that it should isolate those interests, and not permit them to compromise its direct study of problems. 7. The separation of philosophical research from the study of the history of philosophy. A problem can be solved only by the attentive examination of that which the problem denotes. But a problem of historical exegesis, and an original philosophical problem, necessarily denote different things and direct the attention to different quarters. Thus the problem of Hume's conception of causality di­ rects attention to a text, whereas the problem of causality directs attention to types of sequence or independence exhibited in nature. It is worth while to formulate this commonplace because there is a present-day habit of procedure that obscures it. It is customary to assume that it is the mark of rigorous scholarship in philosophy to confine oneself to commentaries on the classics. To raise the ques­ tion of the importance of the history of philosophy is not necessary. That it has an indispensable place in human culture and in the disci­ pline of every philosopher is not to be doubted; but that it has a higher dignity than a direct and independent analysis of special problems seems to be nothing more than a superstition. What dig­ nity the history of philosophy possesses it derives from the originality of the individual philosophers whose achievements it records. If philosophy were to consist in the study of the history of philosophy, it would have no history. Doubtless the by-product of originality is charlatanry and sophomoric conceit ; but mankind is not less well served by this than by the complacent pedantry which is the by­ product of erudition. 2 1. C f. She ffer, H. M ., "Ine ffa ble Philoso phies ," Journal of Philosophy ( 1909) , pp. 6, 1 23.

E. B . HOLT, et al. [ 1 76 ] But whether the historical form of treatment does or does not lend dignity to philosophical discourse, it certainly adds complexity and difficulty. Ferrier, good Hegelian though he was at heart, con­ fided to his readers the hopelessness of undertaking to show whether his conclusion agreed with Hegel's or not. "It is impossible to say to what extent this proposition coincides, or does not coincide, with his opinions; for whatever truth there may be in Hegel, it is certain that his meaning cannot be wrung from him by any amount of mere reading, any more than the whisky which is in bread . . . can be extracted by squeezing the loaf into a tumbler. He requires to be distilled, as all philosophers do more or less-but Hegel to an extent which is unparalleled. A much less intellectual effort would be required to find out the truth for oneself than to understand his exposition of it. " 22 Ferrier does not exaggerate the difficulty of histori­ cal exegesis; for it is true not only that the great philosophies require to be distilled, but that they also require to be translated from the terms of their own traditional context to the terms of another. More­ over there must always be a large marginal error in any such inter­ pretation. This being the case, it is not only gratuitous, but suicidal, to add the difficulties of this problem to the difficulties of each special philosophical problem.

IV.

REALISM AS A CONSTRUCTIVE PHILOSOPHY

As is almost universally the case with conscious and methodical criticism, realism finds itself committed to certain positive beliefs. The very act of criticism itself cannot but define, however broadly and tentatively, the outline of a general philosophy. Thus, the grounds on which realism rejects subjectivism determine to some extent the superstructure which is to be reared in its place; while the very fact of the rejection of subjectivism excludes one of the leading metaphysical alternatives, and gives heightened emphasis to the alternatives that remain. 1. Perhaps the most notable feature of a realistic philosophy is the emancipation of metaphysics from epistemology . 23 This means that the nature of things is not to be sought primarily in the nature of knowledge. It does not follow that a realist may not be brought in the end to conclude that moral or spiritual principles dominate the 22. F erri er, Institutes of Metaphysics, pp . 96-97. 23. C f. b elow, No . I. ["The Emancipation of Metaph ysi c s fro m Epistemolog y ' " by Walte r T. Ma rvin .]

[ 1 77 ] existent world, but only that this conclusion is not to be reached by arguing from the priority of knowledge over its objects. Moralism and spiritualism must take their chance among various hypotheses; and the question of their truth is to be determined by the place of such principles among the rest within the world. The general fact that whatever the world be judged to be, it is at any rate so judged, and therefore an object of cognition, is to be ignored; and one is left to decide only whether on empirical grounds one may fairly judge the world to be spiritual or moral in part only, or on the whole. It will be seen at once that the chief ground on which a spiritualistic or ethical metaphysics has latterly been urged is re­ moved. But at the same time the metaphysical significance of life, consciousness, and morality as facts among facts is at once increased ; and these may now be employed for the formulation of hypotheses that are at least pragmatic and verifiable. 2. Again, in rejecting anti-intellectualism and espousing the analytical method, realism is committed to the rejection of all mys­ tical philosophies. This holds of all philosophies that rely on im­ mediacy for a knowledge of complexness; of all philosophies that regard the many in one as a mystery that can be resolved only by an ineffable insight. A neo-realist recognizes no ultimate immediacies nor non-relational nor indefinable entities, except the simples in which analysis terminates. The ultimate terms of knowledge are the terms that survive an analysis that has been carried as far as it is possible to carry it; and not the terms which possess simplicity only because analysis has not been applied them. Such a course of pro­ cedure is fatal, not only to a mystical universalism in which the totality of things is resolved into a moment of ecstasy, but also to those more limited mysticisms in which complexes such as substance, will, activity, life, energy or power, are regarded despite the obvious manifoldness of their characters, as nevertheless fused and inar­ ticulate. It follows that neo-realism rejects all philosophies in which metaphysics is sharply divorced from the special sciences, on the ground that while the latter must analyze, specify, and systematize, the former may enjoy a peculiar illumination of its own, in which the true heart of things is made apparent, and the facts and laws of science are reduced to dead abstractions, or mere instrumental arti­ facts. 3. For several reasons the new realism tends, at least in the pres­ ent state of knowledge, to be metaphysically pluralistic rather than monistic. Most metaphysical monisms have been based on one or Introduction to The New Realism

et al. the other of two grounds. The first of these is the internality of rela­ tions; the supposition that the nature of terms contains their rela­ tions. It is easy to argue from this premise, that since all things are interrelated, the nature of each contains the nature of all. Realism rejects the premise that all relations are internal, because it is be­ lieved that it is contrary to the facts of existence, and to the facts of logic. The second ground of monism is the universality of cog­ nition. The rejection of this is, as we have seen, the very starting­ point of realism. Without one or the other of these grounds it is not possible to construct a monism dialectically or a priori. This question also becomes an empirical question, and in lieu of the dis­ covery of a law, or set of postulates that shall explain everything, we must at least remain skeptical. The evidence at present available indicates that while all things may perhaps be related, many of these relations are not constitutive or determinative; that is, do not enter into the explanation of the nature or existence of their terms. 4. Again, the primary polemical contention of realism, its re­ jection of subjectivism, has its constructive implications. If cog­ nition is not the universal condition of being, then cognition must take its place within being, on the same plane as space, or number, or physical nature. Cognition, in other words, has its genesis and its environment. When knowledge takes place, there is a knower inter­ acting with things. The knower, furthermore, since it cannot legiti­ mately be saved from analysis, and referred to a unique mystical revelation, must take its place in one manifold with the things it knows. The difference between knower and known is like the differ­ ence between bodies, or states of consciousness, or societies, or colors, or any grouping of things whatsoever in the respect that they must be brought into one field of study, and observed in their mutual transactions. In all this it is presupposed that if there is to be knowledge, there must be something there to be known, and something there to know; "there" meaning the field in which their relation obtains. Their correlation is not a basic and universal dichotomy, but only a special type of correlation, having no greater "prima facie" dig­ nity than the many other correlations which the world exhibits. It is not to be taken in bare formal terms, but is to be observed concretely, and in its native habitat. The realist believes that he thus discovers that the interrelation in question is not responsible for the characters of the things known. In the first place being known is something that happens to a preexisting thing. The char[ 1 78 ]

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[ 1 79 ] acters of that preexisting thing determine what happens when it is known. Then, in the second place, when the knowing takes place, these characters are at least for the most part undisturbed. If they are disturbed, or modified, then the modification itself has to be explained in terms of certain original characters, as conditions of the modification. So that even if it proved necessary to conclude that illusion and hallucination are due to modifications of the stimulus by the reacting organism, this very conclusion would imply the pre­ existing and independent character of the body in which the stimu­ lus originated. 5. In immediate and intimate connection with this doctrine of the independence of things known and the knowing of them, stands another special doctrine-to the effect that the content of knowl­ edge, that which lies in or before the mind when knowledge takes place, is numerically identical with the thing known. Knowledge by intermediaries is not denied, but is made subordinate to direct or presentative knowledge. There is no special class of entities, quali­ tatively or substantively distinguished from all other entities, as the media of knowledge. In the end all things are known through being themselves brought directly into that relation in which they are said to be witnessed or apprehended. In other words, things when con­ sciousness is had of them become themselves contents of conscious­ ness; and the same things thus figure both in the so-called external world and in the manifold which introspection reveals. 6. Finally, because he regards analysis and conception as means of access to reality, and not as transformations or falsifications of it, and because he asserts the independence of reality in the knowing of it, the neo-realist is also a Platonic realist. He accords full ontological status to the things of thought as well as to the things of sense, to logical entities as well as physical entities, or to sub­ sistents as well as existents. 7. In short, for realists, knowledge plays its part within an inde­ pendent environment. When that environment is known it is brought into direct relations with some variety of agency or process, which is the knower. The knower however is homogeneous with the environ­ ment, belonging to one cosmos with it, as does an attracting mass, or physical organism, and may itself be known as are the things it knows. The world is of an articulate structure that is revealed by analysis, consisting of complexes, like bodies, persons, and societies, as well as of simples. The simple constituents of the world comprise both sensible qualities and logical constants. Both enter into the tis-

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sue of fact, and both possess an inherent and inalienable character of their own. There is no safe refuge from this conclusion in any abandonment of intellectual rigor. Hence all speculative versions of the world that require the withholding of analysis, or that depend on the unique and preeminent status of the act of cognition, must be rejected, no matter how eagerly they may be desired for the justification of faith. They must be rejected in favor of such hypoth­ eses as may be formulated in terms of the evident composition of the known world, and verified by its actual interrelations, history, and trend. These conclusions in the aggregate can scarcely be said to be negative. It is true that they constitute neither a complete philosophy, nor, even so far as they go, an absolutely systematic philosophy. But that a philosophy should be absolutely systematic in the sense of being deducible from one principle is itself a philosophical doc­ trine that the realist is by no means prepared to adopt. Moreover that his philosophy should be as yet incomplete is, to the realist at least, a wholesome incentive, rather than a ground for uneasiness. There are endless special philosophical questions to which there is no inevitable realistic answer, such questions as mind and body, teleology, the good, and freedom; and there is verdict on the issues of religion. Nevertheless, the foundations and the scaffolding of the realistic universe are already built ; and it is even possible for some to live in it and feel at home.

V.

REALISM AN D THE S PECIAL SCIEN CES

1. It is the earnest hope of those who have identified themselves with this movement, that it may afford a basis for a more profitable intercourse with the special sciences than that which has latterly obtained. There are common problems which have been hitherto obscured by a radical difference of method, and an incommensur­ ability of terms. So long as philosophy is simply the exploitation of a unique and supreme insight of its own, it remains either irrelevant to the special sciences or, through its claim of superiority, a source of irritation and an object of suspicion. Such has, to some extent, at least, been the case during the later philosophical regime. Idealists have benevolently assimilated science to a universal consciousness; irrationalists have appealed to revelation for insight that overrules and makes naught of all the hard-won truths of science. In either

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[ 181 ] case, science is not helped by philosophy, but after being allowed to do the work of truth finding, is graciously assigned to headquarters labeled "Appearance" or "Mere Description," where it may enjoy the patronage of a superior. Realism advances no all-inclusive conception under which sci­ ence as a body may be subsumed; it claims no special revelation, and asks no immunity from the pains of observation and analysis. What is thus lost of eminence and authority, may, it is hoped, be made up by a more cordial and profitable association with fellow­ workers in a common task. For, after all, the division of the disci­ plines is less significant than the identity of problems and the single­ ness of purpose that should animate all rigorous seekers after knowledge. Consciousness, life, infinity, and continuity are genuine and identical topics of investigation, whether they happen to be alluded to by psychologists, biologists, logicians, and mathemati­ cians, or by philosophers. And it is reasonable to hope that the dif­ ference of training and aptitude between the special scientist and the philosopher should yield a summation of light, rather than mis­ understanding and confusion. 2 . Thus psychology, for example, has for its very subject matter the concrete process of consciousness, and is therefore vitally con­ cerned in anything true which philosophy has to say about con­ sciousness in general. But the alleged discovery of subjectivism, that all things are mental, is so untrue to the phenomena on which psy­ chology has to work, that this science has been brought thereby to a peculiar state of embarrassment. In the concrete processes of perception and cognition, the "corpus vile" of psychology, the stimuli, howsoever "mental" they may be in some last and remote analysis, are assuredly not mental in the sense in which the correlated sensa­ tions and ideas are so. Precisely because the psychologist has to accept the direct evidence for the existence of particular minds, he can take no part in the conspiracy to make of mind a universal predicate. The result is that idealism has meant nothing to the actual psychologist, who has in his laboratory remained a Cartesian dualist. And it is unmistakable that the results of the soul are today, and have been through the last three centuries read off and tabulated in terms of two substances-matter and mind. Sensations and ideas, alleged to be peculiar and private to each percipient, are conceived as invisible pawns which are correlated one-to-one with the "brain­ cells" or other cerebral structures, and are superfluous to the actual

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processes of the brain in spite of frantic efforts to assign to them some regulative function; and they have none but the most chimerical and unstatable relations to the outer objects which these pawns are said to represent. The supposed need of interpreting the results of empirical psychology, or rather of "observing" all mental processes in terms of two substances, has thoroughly stultified the science as a whole. The artificial and unsupportable situations to which this course has led are numerous, but one in particular is so preposterous and unendurable that it alone would demand a complete revision of the current "presuppositions" of psychology. This is the concrete situation when two persons are making a psychological experiment. One is called the experimenter, the other the observer or "subject," and between them lie the instruments for giving stimuli and record­ ing results. The experimenter, by hypothesis, has direct and imme­ diate knowledge of these instruments and in particular of the stimuli which he employs. By hypothesis the observer, although similarly a human being with the same gift of cognition, has not a direct or immediate apprehension of these instruments and stimuli, but this observer's knowledge is limited to the field of invisible pawns which "represent" the stimuli, and which enjoy an otherwise inscrutable status of one-to-oneness with some structures within the observer's skull. So the situation is interpreted, until presently the two experi­ menters exchange their roles, whereupon by a process of magic the just-now-observer acquires a direct apprehension of the instruments of stimulation, the scales have fallen from his eyes and are adjusted to the other man's, whose conscious field now shrivels and is merely the fitful flux of the intracerebral and invisible pawns. This is the situation which attends every psychological experi­ ment in which two persons take part. It is absurd, and can be miti­ gated only by a theory which gives a satisfactory epistemological status to the "outer objects" which are the terms common to all human experiences. Neither dualism nor idealism provides such a status. This condition of things is sufficient to induce the psycholo­ gist to look toward realism; and yet this is merely one of several insupportable results attendant on a dualistic psychology. In general, it may be said that any argument which makes dualism indefensible in philosophy makes it concretely intolerable in psychology. Psy­ chology has not yet found the right fundamental categories, and will not find them as long as dualism continues to hold sway. Meanwhile its particular findings lie accumulated in incoordinated heaps and investigators are beginning to sense an "impasse," and are somewhat

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[ 1 83 ] inconsequently turning away to various forms of an "applied" science. 3. A similar state of things exists in biology ; for here a realistic philosophical basis is even more clearly presupposed. Indeed, the realistic point of view and all its fundamental propositions may be served on the biologist as a "mandamus" ; for to him are assigned such problems as the origins of life, the origins of species, the man­ ners of growth, of variation, and of adaptation. Now each and every one of these problems presents a situation wherein there is an en­ vironment independent of a given creature which is being affected by that environment and is, in turn, manipulating itself and parts of the environment. Such a world is realistic; it is no piece of human imagery, and its texture is made of other stuff than mere thoughts. It is full of minds which it has somehow made and which it, by a mere invisible lesion, can destroy. As with the world, so with the organisms in it. They are not the products of the minds they bear. Although these minds do not even suspect the form and flux of their sustaining organs, yet the latter operate, day and night, indifferent to that ignorance. They are as independent of the mind as is the wind which sighs around the house while the mind sleeps. It is true that many biologists look with favor upon idealistic