Public Administration in Conflict Affected Countries (Governance and Public Management) 3030749657, 9783030749651

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Public Administration in Conflict Affected Countries Edited by Juraj Nemec · Purshottama S Reddy

Governance and Public Management Series Editor Paul Joyce INLOGOV University of Birmingham Birmingham, UK

IIAS Series: Governance and Public Management International Institute of Administrative Sciences (IIAS)—Setting the Governance Agenda Worldwide Website: http://www.iias-iisa.org Edited by Paul Joyce To cover the diversity of its members, the IIAS has set up four sub-entities: – The EGPA (European Group for Public Administration) – The IASIA (International Association of Schools and Institutes of Administration) – The LAGPA (Latin American Group for Public Administration) – The AGPA (Asian Group for Public Administration) Governance and Public Management Series This IIAS series of books on Governance and Public Management has a focus and breadth that reflects the concerns of the International Institute of Administrative Sciences. The Institute, which was set up in 1930, involves academics and governments from all around the world. The Institute’s work involves supporting both practitioners and academics, which it does by encouraging the production of relevant knowledge on public governance and public management and by facilitating its dissemination and utilization. It is the intention of the series to include books that are forward-looking, have an emphasis on theory and practice, are based on sound understanding of empirical reality, and offer ideas and prescriptions for better public governance and public management. This means the books will include not only facts about causes and effects, but also include ideas for actions and strategies that have positive consequences for the future of public governance and management. The books will offer a point of view about responses to the big challenges facing public governance and management over the next decade, such as sustainable development, the climate crisis, technological change and artificial intelligence (A.I.), poverty, social exclusion, international cooperation, and open government. All books in the series are subject to Palgrave’s rigorous peer review process: https://www.palgrave.com/gb/demystifying-peer-review/792492 More information about this series at http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/15021

Juraj Nemec  •  Purshottama S Reddy Editors

Public Administration in Conflict Affected Countries

Editors Juraj Nemec Faculty of Economics and Administration Masaryk University Brno, Czech Republic

Purshottama S Reddy University of KwaZulu-Natal Durban, South Africa

ISSN 2524-728X     ISSN 2524-7298 (electronic) Governance and Public Management ISBN 978-3-030-74965-1    ISBN 978-3-030-74966-8 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74966-8 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Foreword

The International Institute of Administrative Sciences (IIAS) celebrates its 90th anniversary this year. In its long history, it tried to stay relevant to the public administration agendas of the time. Through its various research groups and events, it produced knowledge that marked different periods of public administration development in the world. This book, co-edited by Juraj Nemec, VP for Publications for the International Association of Schools and Institutes of Administration (IASIA), an IIAS affiliate with a focus on the teaching and training of Public Administration, and PS Reddy, Chair of the Program and Research Advisory Committee of IIAS, tackles an important context of public administration (PA) across the world, namely PA in conflict-affected countries. The inception of this project was in a conflict-affected country, namely Palestine, where the joint IASIA/MENAPAR (Middle East and North Africa Public Administration Research Network) conference took place in July 2017. This adds to the authenticity of the book content. In a collection of sixteen country cases spanning countries from all continents, Nemec and Reddy try to disentangle the relationship between conflict and PA; how does conflict affect PA performance and in return how does PA cope with conflict in rebuilding state capacity to deliver services and ‘leave no-one behind’. Inevitably, the UN strategic development goals (SDGs) become a core pursuit of PA systems that can no longer be looked at as technical rational systems of service delivery, but complex socio-political systems situated within a web of internal and external interactions and performing variably depending on a variety of factors, some of which are common like corruption and transparency, but others are specific to different countries, v

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ranging from access to the European Union, state capture by the elites against the interests of the common citizen, lack of sovereignty and so on. While there can be no definitive answer on to how to recapacitate the state and its public administration during or post-conflict, the variety and richness of the country cases, written by researchers ‘on the ground’, provide a solid terrain to draw lessons and best practices from the different experiences. This book is all the more relevant to a post-Covid-19 era which has made many countries of the world, if not most, akin to conflict-affected countries. Indeed, PA across the world has to cope nowadays with situations similar to those engendered by conflict. At IIAS/IASIA, we are proud to add this book to our collection of seminal works, authored by two of our most distinguished scholars. International Institute of Administrative Sciences, Brussels, Belgium 

Sofiane Sahraoui

Contents

1 Introduction, Contextual Background and Scope  1 Purshottama S Reddy and Juraj Nemec 2 The Role of Public Administration in the State-Building Process: A Literature Review 21 Bardhyl Dobra 3 Public Administration in Egypt After the Arab Spring 61 Laila El Baradei 4 Public Administration in Iraq: The Post-ISIS Transition 77 Pavol Kosnáč and Tadeáš Pala 5 Public Administration in Conflict Affected Countries: The Case of Palestine 99 Jehad Y. Alayasa and Hussam Musa 6 Reconstructing Governance and Public Administration Capacities in Managing the Resettlement of Displaced Persons in North-East Nigeria121 Stanley Osezua Ehiane and Leonard Lenna Sesa

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7 Post-Conflict Reconstruction, Governance and Development: Has the Tide Turned in South Africa?135 Purshottama S Reddy 8 Thirty-Five Years of Reforms in Uganda: Is the Glass Half Full or Half Empty?155 Dmitry D. Pozhidaev 9 Bangladesh: Passage Through Conflict to Stability and Public Administration Reform179 Amitava Basu 10 Public Administration in the Philippines: Overcoming Conflict and Post-Conflict Challenges197 Alex B. Brillantes Jr and Maria Pilar Lorenzo 11 Croatian Public Administration: Good Governance Accompanied by an Authoritarian Legacy217 Teo Giljević, Goranka Lalić Novak, and Iva Lopižić 12 Public Administration in Countries in Conflict: The Case of Georgia235 Eka Akobia 13 Rebuilding Public Administration in Post-war Kosovo257 Bardhyl Dobra 14 Serbia: Stumbling Through to Better Compliance but Worse Performance289 Dmitry D. Pozhidaev 15 Ukrainian Public Administration at a Cross-Road311 Svitlana Khadzyradieva, Maya Sitsinska, and Sergii Slukhai 16 Public Administration, Institutional Capacity and Internal Conflict in Colombia: An Intertwined Relationship347 Pablo Sanabria-Pulido and Mauricio Velasquez-Ospina

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17 Public Administration Reforms in Paraguay: Challenges to Professionalization369 Cristina A. Rodriguez-Acosta 18 Venezuela: Devastating Effects of a Long Conflict of Political Instability387 Rosa Amelia González 19 Synthesis: The Relations Between Conflict and Public Administration Performance411 Juraj Nemec, Purshottama S Reddy, and Stanley Osezua Ehiane Index447

Notes on Contributors

Eka  Akobia has studied international relations (IRs) at Tbilisi State University (PhD, 2016), Baylor University (MA, 2004) and Hartwick College (BA, 2002). Since 2016 she has been Dean and associate professor of the School of Governance at Caucasus University. She is also a member of the steering committee of the Network of Institutes and Schools of Public Administration in Central and Eastern Europe (NISPAcee). Her research and teaching interests include European security, IR theories and the inter-relationship between public administration, democracy and security. She has 11 years of experience of public service at the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and holds the diplomatic rank of Counselor. Jehad Y. Alayasa  was educated at the Hatfield School of Government at Portland State University in the USA. He is Assistant Professor of Public Administration and a former director of the Master’s Program in Government and Local Government in Birzeit University, Palestine. He is the author or co-author of many studies and articles in the field of public policy reform. He is also an authorized evaluator of higher education programs in the field of public administration, for the Palestinian Ministry of Higher Education. He joined the Middle East and North Africa Public Administration Research network (MENAPAR). Amitava  Basu  holds a Master’s degree in Commerce and Bachelors in Law from the University of Kolkata. Basu is a fellow of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India. As Executive Director of xi

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PricewaterhouseCoopers, he worked with various government agencies in India and abroad in the public policy domain and reform strategies. He has also been teaching postgraduate students in leading business schools in India. He has authored the book Sustainability Reporting and articles in various national and international professional journals. He is a member of the Governing Council of the Centre for Environmental Management and Participatory Development, a research organization with pan-India network. Alex B. Brillantes Jr.  is a professor and former Dean of the University of the Philippines National College of Public Administration. He was recently conferred the title UP Scientist by the Board of Regents of the University of the Philippines. He is also Chair of the Board of the School for Experiential and Entrepreneurial Development (SEED) of Gawad Kalinga. He is the immediate past president of the Asian Association for Public Administration. From 1993 to 1997, he was Executive Director of the Local Government Academy of Department of Interior and Local Government where he headed the design and implementation of a massive capacity building program for local governments. From 2013 to 2017, he was appointed by the President as Commissioner (Deputy Minister) of the Commission on Higher Education. He has served as consultant for international agencies including the WB, ADB, USAID, AUSAID, CIDA, UNDP and JICA.  He has written three books andseveral contributed chapters in books and published extensively in  local and international journals. Bardhyl Dobra  is a PhD candidate at Ghent University in Belgium. He is also the former Executive Secretary of the International Association of Schools and Institutes of Administration (IASIA) and Accreditation Officer at the International Commission on the Accreditation of Public Administration Education and Training Programs (ICAPA). His research focuses on public administration, public policy and socio-economic development in conflict-affected states with a particular focus on Kosovo. Laila  El Baradei is Professor of Public Administration at the Public Policy and Administration Department, School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, the American University in Cairo (A.U.C.), Egypt. Her areas of teaching include strategic management, essentials of public policy and administration, organizational behavior, development management, human resource management and research methods for public administra-

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tion. El Baradei is directing the ‘Public Policy Hub’ at the School of GAPP/AUC which is a project aiming at building the capacity of graduate students and alumni in public policy analysis, research and effective communication. The project follows a demand-­based approach, where government organizations get to determine the policy issues to be researched, while the young policy analysts use their creativity in coming up with evidence-based policy alternatives and innovative communication tools. Teo Giljević  is an assistant professor in the Department of Administrative Science of Faculty of Law, University of Zagreb, Croatia. He holds a PhD from the Faculty of Law of the University of Zagreb (2014). His areas of scientific interest are reform of public administration, coordination in public administration, migration and integration governance, administrative capacities, local government and human resources management. Rosa  Amelia  Gonzalez  holds a PhD in Political Science from Simón Bolívar University (2002). She is a full professor at the Instituto de Estudios Superiores de Administración (IESA), where she served as Academic Director (2012–2018). She coordinates with the Center of Public Policy and teaches various classes, including public management and design and evaluation of policies and programs. Her research has been focused on public policy analysis (decentralization process, local ­government finance) and management of public and non-profit organizations. Publications include scholarly articles in books and journals and teaching cases. She has also worked as a consultant for the Inter-­American Development Bank and CAF Development Bank of Latin America. Svitlana  Khadzyradieva has studied Public Administration at the National Academy for Public Administration under the President of Ukraine (NAPA) (PhD 2006). Since 2008, she is a professor at the Department of Public Administration and Civil Service (NAPA). Her main research interests focus on solving problematic issues of management decisions in indeterminate conditions as well as professionalization of public service in the conditions of modern changes and social transformations. She is the author of 3 monographs, 36 chapters in collective monographs and manuals, and 280 scientific articles. In 2017, she was awarded the Honorary Title of Academician of the Academy of Sciences of Public Administration and Public Service (Ukraine). Pavol Kosnáč  is a PhD researcher at the Department of Political Science, Masaryk University in Brno, Czech Republic. He studied comparative

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religion studies in Bratislava, Oxford and LSE and eventually focused on overlaps between ideology, religion, violence and war. He spent the last five years mapping motivations and values of members of paramilitary organizations and foreign fighters in Central-Eastern Europe and the Middle East. He also works as a consultant for humanitarian organizations and universities, presently in Slovakia, Iraq and Thailand. Goranka  Lalić  Novak  is an associate professor in the Department of Administrative Science of Faculty of Law, University of Zagreb, Croatia. She holds a PhD from the Faculty of Law, University of Zagreb (2012), and Master of Politics (MSc) from the Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb (2009). Her scientific interests include migration and integration governance, Europeanization of public administration, reforms of public administration and administrative capacities. Iva  Lopižić is a postdoctoral researcher at the Department of Administrative Science, Faculty of Law, University of Zagreb, Croatia. She holds a PhD from the Faculty of Law of the University of Zagreb (2017). Her areas of scientific interest include decentralization and deconcentration, local self-government, comparative public administration and human resources management. Maria Pilar Lorenzo  is a PhD candidate at Ghent University and recently obtained an MSc degree in International Politics (KU Leuven, 2020), an Advanced MSc degree in Cultural Anthropology and Development Studies (KU Leuven, 2019) and a Master’s degree in Public Administration (University of the Philippines, 2018). She is a research associate of the Philippine Society for Public Administration, an associate member of the National Research Council of the Philippines, a fellow of the Royal Society of Arts and a member of ASEAN Think Tanks Network. Recently, she formed part of a research team that provided strategic advice to the Philippine Local Government sector with regard to the ongoing National Rightsizing Program and co-­ supervised a study on government innovations. Hussam Musa  was educated at the University of Economics, Bratislava, Slovakia. He is Professor of Business Economics and Management and director of the Masters and PhD.  Program in Business Economics and Management at the Faculty of Economics and he was vice-dean of the faculty and is Head of the Department of Finance and Accounting at Matej Bel University in Banska Bystrica, Slovakia. He is the author or co-

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author or editor of around 13 books and 120 articles. He has six-­year experience of working in a significant position in the Commercial Bank and Business. Juraj  Nemec is full-time Professor of Public Finance and Public Management at the Faculty of Economics and Administration, Masaryk University in Brno, Czech Republic, and part-time professor at the Faculty of Economics, Matej Bel University in Banska Bystrica, Slovakia. In 2016, he was elected as the President of the Network of Institutes and Schools of Public Administration in Central and Eastern Europe (NISPAcee). He is the Vice-President of IASIA and the project director of the IASIA permanent working group. He is a member of the Committee of Experts on Public Administration at United Nations. He has published almost 500 books and scientific articles. Stanley Osezua Ehiane  holds a PhD in International Relations from the University of KwaZulu-Natal. He also holds Master’s and Bachelor’s (Hons) degrees in Political Science, Master of Business Administration (MBA), Master of Cybersecurity and Ethical Hacking and Postgraduate Diploma (PGD) in Educational Management. He received training under United Nations Peace Operation Training Institute (POTI) on Peacebuilding, Human Rights and International Conflict Resolution, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and Preventing Violence Against Women and Promoting Gender Equality in Peacekeeping. Recently, he was awarded as a top ten publisher at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. His research interest lies in the fields of international relations, terrorism, counterterrorism, migration and displacement, cybercrime and cybersecurity, gender-based violence and hate crime. Tadeáš Pala  is a PhD student and researcher at the Department of Public Economics, Masaryk University in Brno, Czech Republic. His primary field of study is security issues (at Masaryk University’s security and strategy studies). He is interested especially in issues connected to field research in the case of the Ukrainian conflict. Another focus of his expertise is the humanitarian and non-profit sector. Dmitry D. Pozhidaev  is Regional Technical Advisor for Southern and East Africa at the United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF) since 2010. Educated at Moscow University, University of Birmingham and Geneva Business School, he holds a PhD in Development Economics.

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He previously worked with the World Bank, European Union, Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, and Adam Smith International in Europe, Middle East and Southeast Asia. He has designed and guided programs for public sector reforms, focusing in particular on development finance and public financial management. He has authored reports, articles and book chapters on public administration, local development, finance and investment. Purshottama S Reddy  is a senior professor and subnational governance specialist at the University of KwaZulu-Natal. He is a member of the University Council and also serves on its Staffing Committee. Reddy is the editor/co-editor of ten books on subnational government and serves on the editorial/advisory committee of seven journals in South Africa, India, Estonia, the UK and Australia. Reddy was the founding Project Director of the Working Group on Sub-national Governance and Development of the IASIA. He has also served as a full/alternate member of the Board of the Commonwealth Local Government Forum (CLGF) (London). He is the Vice-President of Programmes of IASIA. Cristina  A.  Rodriguez-Acosta holds a PhD in Public Affairs from Florida International University (2016) in Miami, FL, a Master’s degree in Latin American Affairs from Georgetown University (1994) in Washington, DC, and Bachelor’s degree in International Relations from the University of El Salvador in Argentina. Her research interest focuses on decentralization and modernization of the state, subnational levels of government and inter-governmental relations. Rodriguez-Acosta has published several articles in both English and Spanish, and has been a consultant on administrative reforms for USAID, the Swedish Cooperation Agency, the United Nations and several regional organizations in the Americas. Pablo  Sanabria-Pulido is an associate professor at the School of Government Universidad de los Andes, Colombia, and Affiliate Professor of the Public Administration Division of Centro de Investigación y Docencia Economicas, CIDE Mexico. He holds a PhD in Public Administration and Policy from American University in Washington, DC, and a Master’s degree in Public Policy from the London School of Economics. His areas of interest are public management and policy analy-

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sis, organizational behavior, corruption and transparency, local government and public affairs education. His research has been published in key public administration and policy outlets and he has been editor of a series of books on public employment and human resources in the public sector and policy analysis. He has served as board member of IRSPM, of INPAE, and is serving as a member of the executive committee of NASPAA. Leonard Lenna Sesa  is Lecturer in Political Science in the Department of Political Science and Administrative Studies (PAS), Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Botswana, with specialization of the following subjects and research interests under political science and international relations: comparative politics, Botswana politics and Africa in world politics, security sector governance, introduction to international relations and electoral politics and reforms. Maya  Sitsinska has studied Public Administration at the National Academy for Public Administration under the President of Ukraine (PhD 2015). Since 2015, she is a professor in the Department of Philosophy and Political Science at the University of the State Fiscal Service of Ukraine. Since 2017, she is chief research fellow at the Department for Coordination of Scientific Events, International Cooperation and Grant Activities in Khmelnytskyi University of Management and Law. She has authored more than 80 publications (monographs, textbooks and articles). Her research interests include communicative management, conflict management, democratic civil control over security and defense, mechanisms for implementing state national security policy. Sergii  Slukhai  has studied Economics at Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, Ukraine (PhD in Political Economy 2005). Since 2006, he is Professor of Economics at Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv. His main research interest is the public sector economics, public finance and inter-governmental fiscal relations in the transition countries, public policy and public administration. He has worked as a leading research fellow at Scientific and Research Financial Institute and participated in and led many projects sponsored by OSI, DAI, PROUN and other international agencies. He has authored 2 monographs and several textbooks and more than 200 other publications.

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Mauricio  Velasquez-Ospina is an assistant professor at School of Government, Universidad de los Andes, Colombia. He holds a PhD in Political Science from The University of California Los Angeles. He is interested in the convergence of agendas on the titling of vacant lots and environmental sustainability within the framework of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). He recently developed research on the first year of implementation of the peace agreement in three Colombian municipalities with an emphasis on Development Programs with a Territorial Approach (PDET). He has written a bill on vacant land titling based on the experience of Brazil and the USA. He has been a volunteer and researcher in Uganda and Brazil.

List of Figures

Fig. 2.1 Fig. 4.1 Fig. 4.2 Fig. 4.3 Fig. 5.1 Fig. 8.1 Fig. 8.2

Fig. 8.3 Fig. 10.1

Fig. 12.1 Fig. 14.1 Fig. 15.1

The stages in rebuilding states. (Source: Author) 42 Worldwide Governance Indicators: Iraq. (Source: Authors based on World Bank data) 83 Fragile States Index: Iraq. (Source: Authors (based on The Fund for Peace, 2020)) 85 Corruption Perception Index—Score for Iraq. (Source: Authors based on Transparency International data) 86 Oslo agreement map 1994. Source: Authors 106 Uganda Corruption Perception Index, 2010-2018. Source: author, based on TradingEconomics.com, Transparency International163 Public service numbers and wage bill, 1990-2015. Source: Author, based on Sendyona (2010); Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS) annual abstracts; IMF Government Finance Statistics164 Composition of the Institutional Framework for Coordination of Policy and Program Implementation in Government. Source: Author 166 Ranking of the Philippines in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, 2012–2019. (Source: Compiled by the authors based on the data from Transparency International)206 Variables affecting Georgia’s PA performance (author’s own construction)236 PAR coordination structure. (Source: Author) 296 Ranking of the features of an ideal civil servant, 2016 (percentage of respondents). (Source: Authors) 331 xix

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List of Figures

Fig. 15.2 Fig. 18.1 Fig. 18.2 Fig. 18.3 Fig. 19.1 Fig. 19.2 Fig. 19.3 Fig. 19.4 Fig. 19.5

Public perception of a civil servant in Ukraine, 2017 (percentage of respondents). (Source: Authors) 332 Average number of years lasted by cabinet members. (Source: Author’s compilation from different sources) 403 Government Effectiveness Indicator, Latin America countries, 2018. (Source: Author, based on World Bank data) 406 Worldwide Governance Indicators, Venezuela and Latin America & Caribbean median. (Source: Author, based on World Bank data) 407 Government effectiveness. (Source: Authors, based on World Bank data) 423 Regulatory quality. (Source: Authors, based on World Bank data)424 Rule of law. (Source: Authors, based on World Bank data) 424 Control of corruption. (Source: Authors, based on World Bank data) 425 Life expectancy and GDP per capita for investigated countries. (Source: Authors, based on World Bank and WHO data) 426

List of Tables

Table 1.1 Table 2.1 Table 2.2 Table 2.3 Table 3.1 Table 5.1 Table 5.2 Table 9.1 Table 9.2 Table 10.1

Impact of fragility/conflict on the MDGs 5 Impact of fragility/conflict on the MDGs 33 The five dimensions of fragility 38 An overview of main trends shaping fragility 39 Figures related to the turbulence in Egypt from 2011 to 2019 62 Historical administrative eras in Palestine 101 PLO main institutions and their functions 103 Political regime in Bangladesh up to 1990 182 Summary of administrative reforms 185 Percentage of government personnel vis-à-vis Philippine population, 1968–2008 204 Table 12.1 Worldwide governance indicators—Georgia 249 Table 16.1 Nine moments of change and conflict in Colombia’s public administration351 Table 16.2 Rural areas and state presence problems identified in the Havana Peace negotiations 361 Table 17.1 Salary ranges of public employees 376 Table 18.1 Conflicts of the political instability type 389 Table 18.2 Changes in the structure of the national government 394 Table 18.3 Number of appointments, ministries and calculation of rotation401 Table 18.4 Government of Venezuela—Sectorial Vice presidencies 2020 405 Table 19.1 Main features of the conflicts in the analysed countries 421

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction, Contextual Background and Scope Purshottama S Reddy and Juraj Nemec

1.1   Introduction Recent global history has been replete with frequent wars and conflicts and in some cases there is the added danger of countries reverting to a conflict situation once again (African Union, n.d.; IASIA, 2017). States emergent from conflict are at risk with almost 25 per cent of all-inclusive reconciliation settlements brokered collapsing due to a possible reversion into conflict and in some cases to a greater devastating calamity of authority and high levels of armed violence (NEPAD, 2005; UNDP, 2010a). It is a given that conflict not only has negative consequences for socio-economic

P. S. Reddy University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] J. Nemec (*) Faculty of Economics and Administration, Masaryk University Brno, Brno, Czech Republic e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 J. Nemec, P. S. Reddy (eds.), Public Administration in Conflict Affected Countries, Governance and Public Management, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74966-8_1

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welfare, but also on public health care and ultimately on the quality of life of the populace. However, it is also a key factor for the disproportionate number of illegal immigrants and refugees internationally (UNDP, 2016) who are in turn creating challenges in some of the countries they have moved to relative to basic services provision. It also has health and safety implications, more so relative to the global COVID-19 pandemic. Global surges in conflicts in the past decade have given rise to the largest number of displaced people in fragile countries, almost 59.5 million, the highest ever including those impacted by the Second World War. The estimated annual cost of the violence is almost $100 billion, which certainly exceeds the aid received by the countries in question (UNDP, 2016). It has been estimated that at least one-fifth of the global populace and that as many as one-third of the poorest people live in contexts described as fragile. It is estimated that out of the global population of 7.12 billion, approximately 1.5 billion are living in countries that are experiencing high levels of violence (UNDP, 2016). It is projected that by the year 2030, a significant percentage (1.9 billion people) of the global population will be residing in countries and regions of the world where there is chronic violence leading to political instability (Saferworld, 2014; IASIA, 2017). Keeulers (2017), demonstrating the huge cost of conflict worldwide, points out that the cost of global conflict is $3 trillion annually or 13% of the international GDP, equal to every person spending $5 daily annually, not to mention of course the human cost, which is beyond calculations. Conflict-affected states are unable to undertake the principal functions of public governance or discharge basic service provision and suffer from political paralysis, arbitrariness, corruption, severe dispossession, abject poverty and political distrust. The prevailing situation is intensified in post-conflict contexts where the customary development processes are overwhelmed by the need to steer the state to some sort of normalcy after violent conflicts and a period of turbulence (UNDP, 2010b).

1.2   Background and Context 1.2.1  Peace, Development and Post-Conflict Reconstruction Spiralling violent conflicts have been witnessed over the past few decades in different parts of the world and these events have directly and indirectly impacted the sequence of development and more specifically economic

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growth (UNDP, 2016). Fragility and conflict are by their very nature progressively multifaceted, context specific and prolonged. In certain instances, conflict has resulted in grievances being harboured over a very long period which could last several generations (State of Palestine, 2019). Fragility is a deep-rooted characteristic and at least 90% of civil wars in the first decade of the twenty-first century occurred in states that had already experienced periodic conflict in the previous three decades (World Bank, 2011). The global drivers of conflict are: • Grievances: the unmet needs of groups due to inequality and discrimination are readily available for armed conflict; • Opportunities: are provided for livelihoods, accumulation and power; • Feasibility: state unable to counter/buy off rebellion because it is weak; illegitimate/absent; and • Catalysts: external shocks (political/security/economic and environmental) increase the intensity of internal fragility factors (UK Department of International Development and World Bank in UNDP, 2016). States, both failed and weak, together with the majority of post-conflict states are viewed as a risk to global safety, and consequently it is imperative to prioritise their reconstruction and development. The lack of peace and stability in certain countries and regions of the world also has the resultant effect of hindering development on the continents in question (Saferworld, 2014; UNDP, 2016). It is a given that peace and development are inextricably linked and are viewed as being interdependent and interrelated. In the absence of peace, no development will take place, and in the absence of development there can never be any eternal peace (NEPAD, 2005). The transition from conflict to peace in the case of conflict-affected countries is steered by their own peculiar conditions and specific post-conflict rebuilding systems, which develop as agreed and exclusive to their prioritisation, configuration, scheduling and sequencing (NEPAD, 2005; African Union, n.d.). It is essential to reform and for that matter to restore the public institutions in these countries as they could be totally damaged or in some cases non-existent (Ryan, 2018). Globally, post-conflict countries differ in the form and gradation of damage experienced. However, virtually all them have experienced not only the loss of assets and skills, but also of the political, economic, financial, organisational, physical, technical and social

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systems which provided the basic infrastructure for state functionality (UNDP, 2010a). On a global level, the key role players and stakeholders involved in governance and development in conflict-affected and post-conflict countries have to address and respond to certain issues, which are also high on the international development agenda. This will relate specifically to the rebuilding of the affected countries, that is the physical/institutional infrastructure; reconstruction of the governance/public administration systems; and enhancing service delivery with the desired effect of improving the quality of lives of the citizenry (IIAS/IASIA, 2019). Post-conflict reconstruction seeks to provide concurrent short, average and lengthy programmes to avert differences escalating, avoid reverting into violent conflict and for advocating and promoting reconciliation. In the final analysis, it is directed at responding to the origin of the conflict and to reinforce the essentials for societal justice and supportive peace and development (NEPAD, 2005). Post-conflict states in transition have to be responsive to human resource gaps, restoration of public administration and public resources transferal from predominantly an emergency/security logic to one of public governance and service delivery (African Union, n.d.). Whilst transitional short-term policies have proved ineffectual and at times counterproductive, there is mounting acknowledgement that multi-­ dimensional approaches are more in line with facilitating a robust social contract between the citizenry and state and its citizenry which is a strategic component for resilient peace and sustainable development (UNDP, 2016). Consequently, the development of capacity in such contexts cannot be conducted in a context not totally impartial, but at the same time involves theoretically conflicting developments and in the final analysis creating “winners and losers” (UNDP, 2010a). 1.2.2  Transition from MDGs to SDGs The majority of post-conflict countries have not made substantial advancement towards the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and some of them have been harshly affected and have experienced regression in human development (UNDP, 2010a). The World Bank (UNDP, 2016) then also pointed out that the progress achieved towards the MDGs can be reversed for countries relapsing into conflict.

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The immediate effect of fragility and conflict on sustainable human development is substantial as highlighted by the (Table 1.1): A significant majority of the fifty countries categorised as fragile, conflict or crisis affected only managed to achieve one/two of the fifteen MDGs in 2015 (UNDP, 2016). The World Bank (Saferworld, 2014) has pointed that “fragile” or “conflict-affected” states are possibly more likely to be off target four times than they are to have achieved any of the MDG goals on track to do so. The MDGs ushered in 2000 did not contain anything explicit on peace and security as a global goal; however, this was implied more specifically in the Millennium Declaration which constituted the basis of the MDGs. There was agreement that the focus of the MDGs was not expansive enough to cover all the challenges currently being faced by the international community today, notably poor governance, state corruption and a dramatic intensification of overt conflict and consequently needed to be extended. There is currently an acknowledgement, according to Keeulers (2017), that the basic performance of public administration reconstruction to make it functional is critical in any post-conflict country in terms of regaining its capability as a nation; resilience of its populace and institutions; and flexibility of its institutions and reinstatement of trust and social cohesion. The need for an operational public administration is more of a necessity presently given that all countries (including conflict-affected) are required to implement the ambitious 2030 development agenda. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development provides a vision to respond to the trials of the most susceptible societal groupings to make Table 1.1  Impact of fragility/conflict on the MDGs

Halving poverty Child survival Education Water

Fragile/conflict-affected countries

Other countries

Two-thirds failed to halve poverty

One-third of developing countries failed to halve poverty One in seven reached the goal of lowering child mortality Fifty per cent among developing countries Sixty-one per cent of other countries are on track

Only one in fifty reached the goal of lowering under 5 child mortality Twenty per cent are on track to meet the education target Twenty per cent are on track to meet the water target

Source: Authors, based on OECD (2015)

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certain that they are included in economic growth benefits, improvements in communal developments and environmental safety. The notion of “leaving no one behind” is an integral part of all the SDGs and particular emphasis has been placed on income inequality, discrimination and those viewed as being disadvantaged (Republic of South Africa, 2019). At the 68th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, held on 13 September 2013, several global leaders highlighted the importance of peace and the linkage to development (Saferworld, 2014: 4): “In advancing the development agenda, we must cherish peace as we do our eyes, … to uphold peace is the purpose of the UN Charter as well as the pre-­ conditions for the MDGs” (China); “Our Continent stands ready to continue to engage the rest of the world as a partner in formulating a global development agenda that will guarantee peace and stability”. The nexus and positive linkage between sustainable development and peace, stability and security has been high on the governance agenda globally over the years and consequently is not a new discourse in public governance. It has been a key focus of the philosophy and practice of post-conflict governance (NEPAD, 2005; UNDP, 2016). A recent study conducted in 2018 by the Overseas Development Institute (2018) pointed out that only 18% of states viewed as being fragile and conflict affected are on track to meet particular SDG targets relative to unmet rudimentary needs. Approximately two billion people currently reside in countries beset by fragility, violence and conflict and the probability is overwhelming that millions of people will be left behind, notably the poorest and those disadvantaged due to their ethnicity, religion, age, sex, disability, political belief and geographical location (UNDP, 2019). The implementation of the 2030 agenda is dependent on effective, transparent and accountable public administration, as pointed out by Keeulers (2017) for the following reasons: • it provides many of the services required to attain many of the targets under different goals; • it is the principal instrument through which many states exercise their legitimate authority to collect taxes to finance development and invest in environmental sustainability and disaster resilience; • plays a critical role in strengthening the participation of states in global governance institutions;

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• it remains the primary vehicle through which the executive at national and subnational levels engages with the populace, civil society and private sector and also facilitates public participation and gender equality; and • it is one of the fundamental institutions of government that can promote rule of law and all human rights of the populace. Sustainable Development Goal 16 of the post-2015 development agenda seeks to promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels (UNDP, 2016). This is the basis of public administration and essential for good governance, and more specifically it seeks to: • promote the rule of law nationally and internationally and ensure equal access to justice for all; • substantially reduce corruption/bribery in all forms; • develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels; • ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory representative decision-­ making at all levels; • broaden/strengthen the participation of developing countries in global governance institutions; • ensure public access to information and protect fundamental freedoms in accordance with national legislation/international agreements (State of Palestine, 2019). The key challenges experienced by developing countries in implementing the above relative to public administration include, inter alia, intransigent public sector and limited responsiveness to global economic/political changes; widespread corruption impacting socio, cultural and administrative sectors in states; inflexible public leadership, complicated regulations/ laws/administrative processes and resistance to change inherent in the culture/conduct of state institutions; and political instability that hinders state-building efforts in weak/conflict-affected states despite efforts to develop a stable public administration system (State of Palestine, 2019). Political instability implies state incapacity to effectively manage crises and conflicts within societies, which in some cases lead to political violence. Conflict-affected states are among the most corrupt globally and it is

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viewed as particularly damaging to state-society relations (UNDP, 2016; African Union, n.d.). Transforming public administration in post-conflict states globally entails some critical challenges that need to be addressed, namely: 1. Developing effective leadership: transforming behaviours/atti tudes/beliefs of public functionaries in democratic contexts to perform effectually. Leadership and institutional development complement each other as conflict is directed to relevant structures (legal/political); 2. Building operative bodies: all-inclusive institutional growth is imperative as all sectors (public/private/non-governmental) are overhauled to address state necessities and the historical/political/ cultural framework. Principles of fairness, uprightness and commitment have to be inculcated; 3. Consolidating human resources: philosophies, approaches, attitudes and capabilities of public representatives should change for effective functioning in democratic settings; 4. Creating instruments for inclusive governance: all societal groupings should be included with decentralisation facilitating participation/advancement; and 5. Improving citizen-centric service delivery: vibrant democracies and a stable/responsive public service have to enhance service delivery. Impartial social policies should endorse fair/efficient public administration in all public sectors (United Nations and United Nations Development Programme in Reddy, 2018). It is quite apparent that certain defined pre-requisites are key to developing a resilient post-conflict state which is viable and sustainable. In responding to the issues highlighted above, the following needs to be taken cognisance of: • Sustain political stability in developing mutual trust and confidence amongst all parties within the state to facilitate development; create a democratic code of ethics in public policy-making; encourage dialogue amongst the citizenry to acknowledge their needs and targeted development to achieve them; and • Challenge conflicts by combining the rule of law; key regulations of national laws; court decisions; eradicating the movement of unlawful

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weapons; approving interim development solutions/policies. Global energies should be directed towards promoting peace, rebuilding affected countries and facilitating humanitarian/development initiatives due to displacement of people (State of Palestine, 2019). Strong public administration in post-conflict countries globally is key for public policy-making to support political, economic and social stability in the broader context of the SDGs (IASIA, 2017: 11). SDG policies need to be linked within the broader context of open government and technological advancement despite limited resources (State of Palestine, 2019; UNDP, 2019). As pointed out by Keeulers (2017) the 2030 agenda has unreservedly placed a well-functioning public administration at the core of development, human rights, peace and security.

1.3   Locus and Focus of This Book The International Association of Schools and Institutes of Administration (IASIA) in collaboration with the Middle East and North Africa Public Administration Research Network (MENAPAR) organised its annual international conference in Ramallah, Palestine, in 2018. The conference theme “Public Administrations Role in Building and Strengthening Post-­ Conflict States” proved to be very relevant and appropriate to the region in question given the location of Palestine. Despite the fact that many delegates did find it challenging travelling to Ramallah amidst the security situation, the conference was well-attended and attracted a large number of delegates and international development organisations (IIAS/ IASIA, 2019). The crucial findings emanating from the conference on governance of post-conflict states, highlighted by Ryan (2018), include (1) lack of a defined strategy, (2) extreme politicisation, (3) overlapping responsibility/accountability, (4) patronage/lack of appointments on merit, (5) absence of trust/breakdown of social contract, (6) poor public service delivery/productivity, (7) low levels of professionalism, (8) infrastructural incapacities and (9) corruption (UNDP, 2016). Recommendations made following the conference include, inter alia, greater clarification on post-conflict terminology in the international literature; international development organisations/citizenry have a fundamental part to play in participation and developing the required trust; international development organisations have to develop common

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frameworks/networks to enhance co-ordination and feedback from the field staff so that the context is factored in when responding to local needs/aspirations (IIAS/IASIA, 2019). This provided the impetus for this publication as it was felt that this particular theme and issue had to be interrogated in greater depth as it not only impacted global development, but also a more significant percentage of the world’s populace relative to their quality of life. The original title of the book was “post-conflict” countries; however, after commencing the research, the co-editors came to the conclusion that the nomenclature “conflict affected countries” is more appropriate to the title as it is all encompassing—in that it includes both countries, where conflict is still prevalent (conflict-affected) and countries which are trying to recover from previous conflict which is for all intents and purposes definitely over (“post-conflict”). Such a mix certainly provides a really interesting base for synthesis and fusion as it also brings into sharp focus the gradation of the conflict and how it has impacted public administration theory and practice in different countries and regions of the world. There are very few published academic books in the field dealing with the issue of the quality of public administration in conflict-affected countries and the current situation is covered dominantly by reports of international development agencies and organisations. The aim of this book is to fill the existing gap—to focus on the situation in selected conflict-affected countries in designated regions internationally. The findings of country studies should especially highlight the main factors determining the quality of public administration in conflict-affected countries and to assess to what extent the conflict determines and impacts on this performance. This kind of book would not only be critically needed for all standard PA programmes globally, willing to deal not only with the situation in developed and established democracies, but also public governance in conflict-­ affected countries, particularly in the developing world. According to Dobra, more recently the conception of universal state construction has included the role played by international development organisations quite often guided by academic research, more specifically related development theories and ultimately public policy. In recent years, state reconstruction and development has taken diverse forms depending on the theories to be applied and more specifically the context of the region and country in question. However, he adds on a global level the international development results have not really been that successful or for that matter that convincing, given the resources, both financial, human

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and technical, that have been devoted to responding to these issues and initiatives over the years (IIAS/IASIA, 2019). Policy commitments for investing in fragile and conflict-affected countries need to be co-ordinated by investments in the capacity to spend effectually. Institutional capacity stems primarily from the experience, skills and creativeness of its populace. In fact, the majority of the good lessons and practices are based on having supportable established capacity to analyse, participate, reflect resourcefully, monitor, study and unravel problems (OECD, 2016). However, donors whilst committing themselves publicly to working more successfully in fragile, at-risk and conflict-­ affected countries, government-wide financial limitations, at the same time, have forced many of them to freeze their institutional budgets and staff and streamline workloads and increase organisational efficiency (OECD, 2016). Consequently, it cannot be business as usual as many of the donor communities have to review their modus operandi in line with the resources at their disposal. Education and training in public administration is key to capacity development in post-conflict or conflict-affected states (UNDP, 2019). To enhance capacity development and more specifically organisational efficacy and success, it is imperative that the attitudes and values of public servants be prioritised. Universities and institutions providing training in conflict-affected countries should acclimatise the core curriculum to the needs and requirements of the public sector in the country/region in question (IASIA, 2017). An integral part of curriculum transformation in conflict-affected countries should be education and training in elementary analytical and political proficiencies and capabilities thereby enabling public functionaries to think critically, originally, creatively, innovatively and modernly. They should be au fait with applicable public sector governance practices, be quite skilled in human relations and be able to work collectively in teams to achieve well-defined objectives in taking the new administration forward and responding to the needs of the populace (IIAS/ IASIA, 2019). Faced with addressing the short-term needs of the populace, while concurrently investing in medium-term priorities in post-­ conflict states, international development organisations experience major challenges prioritising the need for capacity development against the request for instant relief and delivery of services (UNDP, 2010a, 2016). Lessons in post-war peace studies have demonstrated that progressive state rebuilding processes necessitate mutual relations between the society and the state. A prosperous state is one that provides services based on the

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positive engagement of political and social groupings, which necessitates the existence of inclusive and transparent political developments and instruments to negotiate state-society relations (UNDP, 2010b). It is also imperative that SDG 16 is interrogated in great depth and is taken to its logical conclusion relative to public administration, reconstruction and development in conflict-affected countries. Public administration reform and modernisation is an integral part of the reconstruction and consolidation of post-conflict states and consequently they need to be prioritised in terms of “leaving no one behind” in the global quest to attain the SDGs. Government leadership and strengthening state capacities to plan, co-ordinate, communicate and implement the 2030 development agenda and more specifically the SDGs are critical (UNDP, 2019). International development organisations and resident role players and stakeholders in post-conflict/conflict-affected countries should work towards the creation of inclusive, transparent and accountable public institutions and structures. In this context, political stability, rule of law and the acknowledgement of fundamental civil liberties are imperative for a credible election and to take the public governance process forward. In a similar vein, public functionaries also require strong ethics and integrity, policies, principles and doctrines, and accountabilities and responsibilities. Furthermore, there should be a move towards an inclusive society where there is cooperation and trust and robust citizen engagement which includes particularly the minorities and women (UNDP, 2016). Public leadership should be dominated by morally upright and principled public functionaries who are incorruptible and more importantly public spirited and working in the interest of the local communities and the citizenry at large (IIAS/IASIA, 2019).

1.4   Structure of the Book The analysis by the set of country case studies was to a large extent based on EUPACK methodology (European Public Administration Country Knowledge—EUPACK) which augments awareness and understanding of the prominence and transformation dynamics of public administration in EU member states, including the impact of external support for humanising its quality in this area in the future. Its core syntactical output summarising findings for all EU members is the publication “A Comparative Overview of Public Administration Characteristics and Performance in EU28” by Thijs et al. (2017).

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The selected country studies (1) highlighted the problem statement; (2) provided a descriptive analysis of the problematic context/history and the organisational structure of the central government; (3) highlighted the peculiarities inside the administration at the central level, notably in relation to, inter alia, the civil service system (recruitment and careers, salaries, job performance, corruption); transparency and accountability; rule of law; policy-making, co-ordination and regulation; efficiency and effectiveness of the administrative system and overall government performance, and (4) relating the peculiarities to the post-conflict situation. 1.4.1  Chapter Content The country studies are preceded by an Introduction which highlights the locus and focus of the research as well as a literature review of the Role of Public Administration in the State-Building Process, followed by a Concluding chapter highlighting lessons and good practices. Purshottama S Reddy and Juraj Nemec introduce the background and context for public administration in conflict-affected states in Chap. 1. The positive linkage between peace, development and reconstruction is demystified and the new thinking in this regard is highlighted particularly in relation to the post-2015 development agenda. Given the large populace in conflict-affected countries, particular emphasis is placed on the fact that “no one is left behind” relative to responsive public administration and more particularly efficient and effective basic services provision. The locus and focus of SDG 16 are emphasised as part of the post-2015 international development agenda and the resultant implications for public administration globally is reviewed. In Chap. 2, Bardhyl Dobra developed the conceptual and theoretical framework through a literature review of the role of public administration in the state-building process. Existing literature suggests that the understanding of state fragility, state failure as well as state-building determines the place of the public sector in the process of rebuilding conflict-affected states. The Western perception of the abovementioned phenomena and the resulting “one-size-fits-all” models have contributed to a diminishing reduction of the place of the public sector in state-building. To be successful, state-building models should be jointly developed and implemented with local stakeholders. Instead of according priority to security and stability, the international community should also prioritise building strong institutions functioning on good governance rules such as democracy,

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accountability, rule of law and transparency. The public sector is vital in conflict-affected states as it reinforces state legitimacy, delivers public goods and services, promotes sustainable human and socio-economic development and eases tensions between different communities. The bureaucracy in Egypt has, according to Laila El Baradei in Chap. 3, endured the Arab Spring and the subsequent turbulence that followed. Centralisation, overstaffing, parallel structures, low compensation and a distinctive organisational structure with high power distance are, and have been, the main features of the bureaucracy for the past few decades. The current government is implementing multiple reforms; however, there are still problems with the parallel systems, an ambiguous policy-making process, weak measures for the rule of law, transparency and public accountability. In Chap. 4, Pavol Kosnáč and Tadeáš Pala analysed the situation in Iraq, including the former ISIS-held Iraqi territories, through economic transformation and the relationship between the remaining conflict environment and civil administration reconstruction. Former ISIS-held territories including the second-largest city of Mosul comprise at least one-third of the Iraqi landmass. The government of Haider al-Abadi recaptured the country with the assistance of the anti-ISIS coalition forces, led by the United States. There have been several attempts by the government to revive the infrastructural, economic and administrative development of the country and this has been a major challenge, despite the international support. Global governance indicators have demonstrated that Iraq’s public administration structures suffer from rather poor performance and this has been confirmed by similar findings from field research. The government is competing with the de facto independent armed actors of traditional local authorities for control of the country. The Palestinian governance system as highlighted by Hussam Musa and Jehad Alayasa in Chap. 5 represents a unique case study of public administration under crises conditions among past and present conflict-affected countries. An important lesson is that the absence of full power and sovereignty can serve as an obstacle to public administration reform and development. Even with power in the governance system, there has to be political will which is crucial for facilitating administrative reform and development. Stanley Osezua Ehiane and Leonard Lenna Sesa have pointed out in Chap. 6 that in some African countries, notably Nigeria, the devastating effects of violent conflict in terms of destruction of lives and property have

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been recurring and been well-documented over the years. However, the significance of reconstruction of governance and public administration remain the utmost priority for the country emerging from violent conflicts over a period of time. Hence, the need to establish public institutions to undertake and facilitate development tasks and service delivery remained unquestionable and absolute. Purshottama S Reddy has pointed out in Chap. 7 that the new South African Constitution ushered in 1996 following watershed democratic elections held on 27 April 1994 has a developmental ethos and was key to responding to basic service delivery challenges inherited from the apartheid era. However, the South African populace in its entirety are fast losing confidence in the government as a great number of public institutions are dysfunctional and incapable of discharging even rudimentary service provision. Increasing municipal service delivery protests is ample evidence of this. There is a need for strong political and management will to revitalise and strengthen good public governance and development. The role of public administration in re-constructing Uganda following the ushering in of the National Resistance Movement (NRM) government under President Yoweri Museveni in 1986 constituted the basis of Chap. 8 by Dmitry Pozhidaev. The first decade of reforms (1986–1996) under the NRM government in 1986 was hailed as the most successful. Security was re-established in most of the country, government bureaucracy reformed and basic public services re-instated, at least, in urban areas. Out of the three priorities, the NRM government succeeded largely in re-­ establishing security and in particular securing the monopoly of state on violence. In the absence of strong national commitment and a clear strategic direction, the public sector reform agenda is likely to continue to be driven by donors, lack coherence and deliver mixed results. Amitava Basu chronicles the evolution of Bangladesh in Chap. 9 through struggle and strife, prolonged conflict and political unrest in the subsequent period, and eventually attaining political stability at the end of the conflict; and the process and progress of enhancement of public administration during the corresponding period spread over almost half a century. It is political stability and commitment in a conflict-free environment that could strengthen public administration and facilitate socio-­ economic development as demonstrated by Bangladesh. Philippine Public Administration, according to Alex B.  Brillantes Jr. and Maria Pilar Lorenzo in Chap. 10, as a discipline and practice, has played a key role in institution building and capacity development, even

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during conflict and post-conflict periods. Contemporary Philippine governmental structures and public administration are analysed through its three co-equal branches, in terms of inter-state and intra-state conflict which was confronted historically. Public reorganisation initiatives within the ambit of the inter-state backdrop of post-Second World War reconstruction are highlighted, and thereafter how public administration mechanisms/institutions were designed and set-up as a response to intra-state conflict in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region, which has seen an armed struggle by Muslim minorities since the 1970s against the central government. Teo Giljević, Goranka Lalić Novak and Iva Lopižić in Chap. 11 trace the evolutionary development of Croatia in developing as an independent state in Europe in the 1990s, following hundreds of years of external rule, from the previous Yugoslavia. The Croatian War of Independence (1991–1995) and the post-war period hindered the prospect for developing the public administration system in a contemporary democratic context in the 1990s. However, it would appear that beyond 2000, the main strategic foreign policy objective of Croatia was joining the EU which implied that the reformation and improvement of public administration was not viewed as a strategic priority. Georgia has thousands of years of statehood as highlighted by Eka Akobia in Chap. 12; however, the development of the modern state has unfolded against the backdrop of three waves of consecutive interventions by its larger and dominating neighbour during all three of its Imperial, Soviet and Federate forms. This has resulted in various forms of domination: Imperial conquest, Soviet invasion and modern Russia’s Hybrid warfare, with a two-prong approach of fanning of secessionism and conflict with Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region, South Ossetia and a continued hybrid pressure on Georgian politics with a spike of a hot phase in 2008. To date, conflict is being used as a leverage, mixed with asymmetric tools of disinformation and propaganda. The latest World Bank-supported Worldwide Governance Indicators for Georgia point to the fact that since 2003 the country has managed to largely isolate negative externality caused by conflict and accelerated state-building; however, prevalence of a hybrid warfare continues to be a factor of vulnerability in terms of “political stability”. Bardhyl Dobra in Chap. 13 points out that in post-war Kosovo, most of the legislative framework and governance institutions at the local and central level have been (re)built over the years. However, although these

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institutions deliver public goods and services to the citizenry of the country, they continue to remain weak due to widespread problems, which are deeply rooted in the governance system built by the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and reinforced by individual and political interests of a number of local stakeholders involved in the process. Serbia, according to Dmitry Pozhidaev in Chap. 14, is a curious case of sui generis of a (post)-conflict country. On the one hand, it saw a fair share of conflict between 1991 and 2000, culminating in the bloody and tragic civil war in 1991–1996 and the Kosovo crisis in 1998–1999. These events delayed Serbia’s government reforms for almost a decade. After the toppling of Slobodan Milošević’s regime in 2000, Serbia embarked on wide-­ ranging political, economic and social reforms in line with its officially proclaimed goal of joining the European Union. Public sector performance has declined in the past five years along practically all key governance indicators against the background of high compliance with EU formal requirements. It would appear that the EU accession process has proved to be as much a driver as a brake on public sector development in Serbia. The important challenges of public administration reform in Ukraine and how they have been addressed in the context of a sharp external conflict and a hybrid war with the Russian Federation constitutes the basis of Chap. 15 by Svitlana Khadzyradieva, Maya Sitsinska and Sergii Slukhai. It appears that Ukraine has moved from the Soviet legacy of public administration and the civil service and that war with Russia has speeded up the process; however, it is still not finalised: these achievements must be supported by steady state efforts to make them irreversible and to significantly raise public administration efficiency. Political power changes that occurred in 2019 have a potential risk to reverse Ukrainian public administration reforms made thus far. Following negotiations for peace in Cuba, the Colombian government of President Juan Manuel Santos and guerrillas from FARC-EP announced a concluding pact to end the struggle, according to Pablo Sanabria-Pulido and Mauricio Velásquez-Ospina in Chap. 16, although, a referendum to endorse the agreement failed. Thereafter, the Colombian government and the FARC signed a revised peace agreement in November 2016, approved by the Colombian Congress. The government commenced with a process of revitalising the country, including reforming the public administration system. The process is still ongoing and is yet to be completed.

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Cristina A. Rodriguez-Acosta reflecting on the experiences of Paraguay in Chap. 17 believes that the aim of creating strong democratic public institutions able to deliver services effectively and efficiently was essential to the country’s transition to democracy in the early 1990s. Authoritarian governments have over the years resulted in public administration being highly politicised, characterised by patronage and clientelism. There have been many attempts to reform and increase capacity which have occurred under the auspices of, and mostly funded by, multilateral organisations and cooperation agencies, sometimes in collaboration with national and foreign universities. These efforts have lacked continuity and have not been able to create a more professional public administration in the country. A left-wing populist social movement and resultant political processes in Venezuela led by the late President Hugo Chávez were referred to as the Bolivarian Revolution as pointed out by Rosa Amelia Gonzalez in Chap. 18. Chávez endured numerous political tests, and was re-elected as President in December 2006 for another term and October 2012 for a third term. The latter did not materialise as he was ill and passed away on 5 March 2013 and was succeeded by Nicolás Maduro in the same year. Poverty and inflation have steadily increased since the beginning of this decade, and given that Venezuela is an oil exporter and the country is reliant on this, the decrease in the international oil prices has exacerbated the situation. Consequently, given all these developments, the country is in full turmoil. Chapter 19 by Juraj Nemec, Purshottama S Reddy and Stanley Osezua Ehiane summarised the key findings from all the analytical case studies documented and thereafter underscores the lessons learned, both good and bad. More specifically, it underlines possible good practices that can be replicated elsewhere internationally, and furthermore provides an indication on how to limit the impact of a conflict situation on PA performance in any country.

1.5   Conclusions Globally, the priority in conflict management has advanced from peacekeeping, which sought to prevent violence, to post-conflict reconstruction peacefully in a broader development and change context. The resultant effect is that the global public interest has in turn shifted from having to deal with the change and evolution from violent clashes to that of practical

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peace and reconciliation, development and progress. Public administration reform and modernisation is an integral part of the reconstruction and development agenda of post-conflict/conflict-affected states globally as they need to be responsive to the needs of the citizenry. Consequently, public administration has to be prioritised in terms of being high on the governmental agenda in terms of ensuring that the maxim “leaving no one behind” is realised in the global quest to attain the SDGs and guarantee access to basic services. It is critical that pertinent public policies are developed or are directly linked to the SDGs by boosting the enhanced roles of public administration through open, democratic, accountable, transparent and accessible governments within the limited resources available and galloping technological advancement. In this context, post-conflict/conflict-­ affected states have to respond to filling gaps in human capital, rebuilding of public administration and a transferal of public resources from primarily a reasoning based on security and safekeeping to one of responsive public governance and basic service delivery to the populace.

References African Union. (n.d.). Draft Policy Framework for Post-conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD). African Union. IASIA. (2017). Protocol from the Conference of the International Association of Schools and Institutes of Administration (IASIA) and The Middle East and North Africa Public Administration Research Network (MENAPAR), Organized in Close Cooperation with The General Personnel Council (GPC) 3–7 July 2017 in Ramallah, Palestine. IASIA. IIAS/IASIA. (2019). IIAS/IASIA Presentations at the First International Ministerial Roundtable on Public Administration in the City of Ramallah, Palestine, held on 1 April 2019 by General Personnel Council. IASIA. Keeulers, P. (2017). Keynote Address at the 2017 Conference of the International Association of Schools and Institutes of Administration (IASIA) and The Middle East and North Africa Public Administration Research Network (MENAPAR), Organized in Close Cooperation with The General Personnel Council (GPC), held on 3–7 July 2017. IASIA. NEPAD. (2005). African Post-conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework. NEPAD Secretariat: Governance, Peace and Security Programme. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2015). States of Fragility 2015 Meeting Post-2015 Ambitions: Highlights. OECD.

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Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2016). Good Development Support in Fragile. At Risk and Crisis Affected Contexts: OECD Development Policy Papers: No. 4. OECD. Overseas Development Institute. (2018). SDG Progress: Fragility, Crisis and Leaving No One Behind. Overseas Development Institute. Reddy, P. S. (2018). Evolving Local Government in Post-Conflict South Africa: Where to? Journal of Local Economy, 33(7), 710–725. Republic of South Africa. (2019). South Africa’s Implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development: Voluntary National Review Report. National Planning Commission. Ryan, R. (2018). Report of Working Group X: Public Administration’s Role in Building and Consolidating Post-conflict States. IASIA. Saferworld. (2014). Conflict and the Post 2015 Development Agenda: Perspectives from South Africa. Saferworld. State of Palestine. (2019). Minutes from the First International Ministerial Roundtable on Public Administration in the City of Ramallah, Palestine, held on 1 April 2019. General Personnel Council. Thijs, N., Hammerschmid, G. and Palaric, E. (2017). Characteristics of EU Public Administrations: Synthesis report. Brussels: EU Commission. United Nations Development Programme. (2010a). Capacity Development in Post-conflict Countries: Global Event Working Paper. United Nations. United Nations Development Programme. (2010b). Leadership and Change in Post-conflict States: A Case of Liberia. United Nations. United Nations Development Programme. (2016). Local Governance in Fragile and Conflict Affected States. A UNDP How to Guide: Building a Resilient Foundation for Peace and Development. United Nations. United Nations Development Programme. (2019). Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in Crisis? Emerging Findings from the Voluntary National Reviews (VNPs) of SDG Implementation in Fragile and Crisis Situations. Keeping SDG Implementation in Fragile States on Track. United Nations. World Bank. (2011). World Development Report: Conflict, Security and Development. World Bank.

CHAPTER 2

The Role of Public Administration in the State-Building Process: A Literature Review Bardhyl Dobra

2.1   Introduction Recent decades have been marked by numerous conflicts and new approaches to rebuilding conflict-affected states. These new approaches mostly include international organisations and interventions by other states. In discussing the concepts of fragility, failure and state-building, this chapter considers the place of the public sector, especially public administration, in the process of state-building. There is a consensus among scholars in saying that public administration has a central role in rebuilding a conflict-affected country, starting from providing basic services such as shelter, food and security, in other words building peace (Brinkerhoff, 2007; Van de Walle & Scott, 2009). Effective governance is critical in rebuilding conflict-affected societies, to avoid long-term stagnation and to promote development (Brinkerhoff & B. Dobra (*) Ghent University, Gent, Belgium e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 J. Nemec, P. S. Reddy (eds.), Public Administration in Conflict Affected Countries, Governance and Public Management, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74966-8_2

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Brinkerhoff, 2002; Marenin, 2014; Van Dijk, 2008). Over the past two decades, a specific model of state-building, brought by the United Nations (UN), international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) states, has been implemented in post-conflict countries. This model consists of promoting democratic governance and market-oriented economic reforms (Paris, 2010). However, in recent years, several scholars have considered this model as ineffective and inappropriate because the same model cannot be assumed to be effective in every context (Kauzya, 2003; Lemay-­ Hébert et al., 2014; Blunt & Turner, 2005). It is worth noting that, as Van de Walle and Scott (2009) argued, the literature on state-building has exploded in terms of volume, focusing however mainly on the political and security dimensions rather than on the role of public administrations, and very little on the reasons why the public sector is important in the process of state-building. Based on a literature review, this chapter aims to bring forward a general overview of the topic, starting with the factors causing fragility and failure and the resulting state-building conception. After having clarified, among others, the concept of state and state-­ building, this chapter tries to answer the following questions: (1) How do the understanding of fragility and failure and the conception of state-­ building influence the actual position of the public administration in the process of state-building? (2) What does the literature tell us about the public administration in the state-building process and what role could it play in this process? To answer these questions, this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 provides brief definitions of the key terms used in this chapter. Subsequently, we give an overview of the causes of state fragility and failure and present some of the main factors that are involved in such phenomena. Section 2.4 addresses the concept of state-building and the various models promoted by the international community to rebuild conflict-affected states. Then, we address the consequences of state failure and state-building models that are used while showing the role the public sector could play in state-building.

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2.2   Terminology and Definitions The multiplication of fragile and failed states in recent decades has pushed academics and practitioners to highlight the value of rebuilding these states and their public institutions (Van de Walle & Scott, 2011; Fukuyama, 2005; Brinkerhoff et  al., 2009). Hence, before discussing the causes of state failure and theoretical aspects of state-building, we will try to define the state and what it entails. 2.2.1  The Concept of State When considering state-building, the ‘state’ is the very core of the topic. The subject has evolved over centuries, and many philosophers and scholars have written about it, from Plato to Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Weber, Fukuyama and many more. In this chapter, we will start with definitions given by eminent philosophers such as Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau. Assuming that the ‘natural state of man’ leads to a permanent conflict between human beings, Hobbes (1651) argued that, in exchange for protection, citizens delegate power to a third party, the Leviathan, the Commonwealth or the State. The state model of Hobbes can take the form of monarchy, aristocracy or democracy and it is in charge of justice, law and government. In modern times, the model proposed by Hobbes would be considered authoritarian as it relies on obedience. The definition of the state evolved with Locke (1690) and Rousseau (1762) as they replaced the concept of due obedience with a social contract. Locke argued that citizens should be protected by an entity, the State, but the latter should not deprive them of their natural rights, in which case, they have the right to resist. Similarly, Rousseau considered that citizens are equal and united, thus creating a moral and collective body which takes the name of Republic, State or Sovereign. It may be argued that by advocating democracy and the separation of legislative and executive powers, Locke’s and Rousseau’s legacies have laid the foundation of modern democracy. In more recent times, Max Weber (1919: 86) defined the state “as a human community that successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory”. Furthermore, Weber (1978: 56) argued that the state “possesses an administrative and legal order subject to change by legislation, to which the organised activities of the administrative staff, which are also controlled by regulations, are oriented”. The Weberian state is born and will be adopted in most of the European

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Western democracies: a state which controls its territory enforces the law and has a modern, professional, non-political public administration. Van Creveld (1999: 416) argued that the three main characteristics of the state are: sovereignty, territoriality and being an organisation. The third characteristic describes the state as an organisation which is not a person or a community, but a corporation with an independent persona and which “is recognised by law and capable of behaving as if it were a person in making contracts, owning property, defending itself, and the like”. Based on the definition of Van Creveld, the state makes the rules, creates institutions and is also an actor as it operates inside its territory and interacts with its citizens as well as with other “corporations”, that is, other states or supranational corporations—international organisations such as the European Union or the United Nations. There has always been a debate, especially in economics, about the size and role of the state. On the one hand, academics preaching for a minimal state (some even for an ultraminimal state) and, on the other hand, others advocating a state which is highly interventionist and provides a large range of public goods and services, that is, the welfare state or what Piketty (2014) calls the social state. In the classical liberal theory, the minimal state is also called the night-watchman state and delivers the strict minimum to its citizens as it is “limited to the functions of protecting all its citizens against violence, theft, and fraud, and to the enforcement of contracts” (Nozick, 1974: 26). Even though there are numerous schools advocating a minimal state, their main common arguments are that markets regulate themselves, that private is better and more efficient than public, and therefore any intervention of the government is counterproductive (Facchini & Seghezza, 2018). However, many scholars have demonstrated that pure and perfect competition or self-regulating markets are an illusion because market failures are a reality due to, among others, bounded rationality, externalities or provision of public goods (see Simon, 1972; Tresch, 2015). When discussing the scope of government intervention, Borre and Goldsmith (1998) highlight not only the increasing range of government activity, but also the increasing degree to which governments engage in such activity. Although the scope and function of government varies from one country to another, the government is involved in more and more activities: government is responsible, inter alia, for running the country, regulating, taxing and spending money for redistribution and for delivery of public goods and services (Ulbrich, 2011). Musgrave identified them as

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the allocation, distribution and stabilisation functions of government (see Musgrave & Musgrave, 1989). Piketty (2014) argues that, in present times, some people are in favour of a greater role for the state in economic and social life, whereas others are in favour of dismantling it. He then points out that the state has never before been as much involved as it is now. If in the nineteenth century, governments fulfilled mainly their ‘regalian’ functions, they now also accomplish broader social functions and play an active role in healthcare and education, pay replacement income (pensions and unemployment compensations) and transfer payments (family allowances, guaranteed income etc.), but also set rules, produce, tax, borrow money and own capital (Piketty, 2014). Thanks to public spending statistics, Hillman (2009) shows how the involvement of government has changed over time. Indeed, in the England and Wales of the year 1776, the government spending for the poor represented 1.59% of the Gross National Product (GNP), whereas in 1820, it had increased to 2.66%. If public spending for public education had not existed in 1776 or 1820, it represented 0.07% of England and Wales GNP in 1850 (Hillman, 2009: 742). Furthermore, the share of social spending in most developed countries was around 1% in 1910, but, in 1995, it had increased to 12% of GNP in Japan, 23% in the United Kingdom, 27% in France and 33% in Sweden (Hillman, 2009: 745). In fact, it is the general government spending, which includes social spending, healthcare, education, infrastructure, public employment and functioning of state institutions, among others, that gives an idea about the real size and scope of government. In 2018, Ireland ranked last among OECD countries with government spending representing 25.4% of GDP and France had the highest government spending which represented 55.9% of the country’s GDP (OECD, 2020). It is noteworthy to mention that it is after World War II (WWII) and under the impulsion of Keynesianism that the welfare state has known a rapid expansion, especially in Western and Northern Europe. With the government taking on the central role in economic and social life in the decades that followed WWII, criticism of the welfare state by scholars and politicians pushing for less state gained ground in the 1970s and the 1980s, and an attempt to reduce the size as well as the scope and meaning of a state’s action was made through academic and political campaigns and then put into action by leaders such as Reagan, Thatcher or Pinochet through massive deregulation, privatisation and outsourcing. Van Creveld’s consideration of the turning point is precisely the attempt to reduce the scope of states as in a number of countries many public

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services were privatised or opened to the private sector as well: the education system, the healthcare system and in some cases even the judicial system by outsourcing penitentiary services to private companies. Indeed, with new theories emerging in the 1970–1980s, such as the New Public Management (NPM), the concept of state and its characteristics has also evolved. NPM promotes a smaller and more efficient public sector while giving more space to the private sector by outsourcing public services as much as possible (Drechsler & Randma-Liiv, 2015; see also Drechsler & Kattel, 2008). However, and as seen above, the size of the state or its scope of function has not necessarily been reduced despite the temptation and attempts to do so, but the state and its institutions have become a recurrent target for criticism by almost everybody. Having said that, it may be argued that scholars’ analyses have mainly focused on the scope and size of the state rather than on its strength. Fukuyama (2005) pointed out that although the size and scope are important, the strength of the state, that is, its capacity to implement and enforce public policies and law, is, at least, as important as the size and scope (see also Borre & Goldsmith, 1998). The role and size of the government and its public administration will depend on the scope that is chosen, whereas the scope is subject to political and financial choices. This implies that the definition of the state and its functions not only has an impact on well-established states, but also on state-building and the model to be adopted when rebuilding a post-­ conflict country. Although many authors have addressed the topic of the state and even if the views of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau or Weber are dominant, it is arguable that there is no universal definition as the concept of state has evolved and is constantly disputed. Therefore, the most appropriate definition to be used when discussing modern state-building is a definition which considers the state as an entity that can protect its citizens from external and internal enemies, that makes laws, regulates and enforces the rule of law, that uses its administrative apparatus to collect taxes, to finance and deliver public goods and services, and that contributes to the improvement of citizens’ lives through social spending and public enterprise while not undermining but promoting also the private sector (see de Vries, 2001). Irrespective of the scope, the state is composed of different constituents, a well-defined population, territory, government and other institutions.

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2.2.2  Population, Territory and Sovereignty Although defining a population, territory and sovereignty is not an easy task, the three of them are constituents of the state. A population is understood as a group of people living in a defined area, and, generally, but not always, sharing common traits such as language, ethnicity or religion. Such a population lives in a defined territory where, at least in theory, the laws of a state apply. Territoriality is a characteristic of the state—along with sovereignty (Van Creveld, 1999). Krasner (1999) identified four different types of sovereignty: international legal sovereignty, Westphalian sovereignty, domestic sovereignty and interdependence sovereignty. International and Westphalian sovereignties refer to mutual recognition and independence of a state towards other states, including non-­ interference in internal affairs. According to Krasner (1999), domestic sovereignty refers to “the formal organisation of political authority within the state and the ability of public authorities to exercise effective control within the borders of their own polity”, whereas interdependence sovereignty is about regulating cross-border flows and their impacts within the territory (p. 4). The three notions are nonetheless sometimes disputed. There are states recognised by other states, and there are cases when they are not, for instance, not being allowed to be a member of the United Nations (cf. Kosovo); there are states that do not fully control their territory and are not able to ensure the rule of law in parts of their territory, but are recognised by the international community (cf. Afghanistan); similarly, in some countries, a group of people considers itself as not being part of the population of a country and seeks for independence (cf. Kosovans during Milosevic’s Yugoslavia), or a group of people is discriminated against and not considered as equal by other groups of the population or the government (cf. Jews in the 3rd Reich, Roma in Middle and Eastern Europe). 2.2.3  Government, Governance, Public Institutions and Administration The government is an integral component of the state and is in charge of defining and making public policy on behalf of a population in a given territory. De Vries (2016) defines the government as “the totality of political and administrative organisations and institutions within a nation, authorised to allocate collectively binding values and services, i.e. public values

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and services” (pp. 19–20). He then explains that citizens transfer authority to the government for various reasons such as the need for social structures, the need for collective action, the evolution of civilisation, religious convictions or by force. Government, as well as institutions that are part of it, are needed to provide collective action and day-to-day running of state affairs. Hughes (2010) argues that the term governance in most cases is used to describe the process of running and steering organisations. Governance is the process of interplay between political actors, state institutions, corporate interests, civil society and transnational organisations in achieving the next four activities: articulating a common set of priorities for society, creating coherence across a large range of policy areas, steering the involved actors in the implementation process and ensuring the accountability of the actors involved in delivering governance to the society (Pierre & Peters, 2005; Pierre, 2000). In the same direction, Ongaro (2020: 10) defines public governance as the “broader processes of steering of society by public institutions and engaging non-governmental actors into public policy, as opposed to the stricter focus on governmental authoritative decisions and administrative processes”. Similarly, Hughes (2010: 89) brings a definition of 2005 of the OECD about public governance which is seen as “the formal and informal arrangements that determine how public decisions are made and how public actions are carried out, from the perspective of maintaining a country’s constitutional values in the face of changing problems, actors and environments”. As mentioned above, the concept of governance remains still unclear; however, in our context, governance refers to policy and rule-making and their successful implementation as well as running and steering public organisations while cooperating with other stakeholders (civil society, private sector), a process which is dominated by public sector bureaucracy under the supervision of governments (see Derlien, 2008). Not only the term ‘governance’ is unclear, it is also the case with the term ‘institutions’. According to North (1991), institutions are “the humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction”, or in other words, institutions are the rules of the game (p. 97). Institutions can be formal (constitutions, laws and property rights) and informal (customs, traditions, codes of conduct). Although evolving with time, institutions connect the past with the present and the future, thus creating order and reducing uncertainty. The term ‘institutions’ has been widely discussed and it now incorporates a wide range of

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phenomena. For instance, Acemoglu et al. (2005) focused on economic institutions, among others on property rights and markets, whereas Hodgson (2006) considers that the term also incorporates organisations, language and money, among others. In this regard, international organisations such as the United Nations (e.g. when discussing SDG 16), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) or the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) use, especially in contexts of conflict-affected states, the terms ‘public institutions’, ‘public sector institutions’, ‘public administration institutions’, ’state bureaucracy’ or ‘state institutions’ when speaking about ‘public administration’ (UN-DESA, 2010; UNDP, 2018; OECD, 2011). A clarification about ‘public institutions’ is also given by Weber (1978: 644) who, when talking about administration, argues that in the same way that there is a private administration (a household or a business enterprise), there is an administration “carried on either by the state or by other public institutions (i.e. either institutional organs of the state itself, or heteronomous institutions deriving their powers from the state)”. Based on the above, it may be argued that public institutions are organisations whose powers derive from the state and, as such, are not autonomous but under the state’s control and operate based on specific regulations and laws. The practice of public administration has existed for millennia, but as a discipline it is mentioned only at the end of the nineteenth century (cf. Woodrow Wilson’s work). Public administration is another term which is vague and means many things; it is often used as a synonym for public sector, public institution or bureaucracy. Starting with a simple definition, public administration is about developing and implementing public policies to serve the public good (de Vries, 2016). According to Riggs (2006: 26) public administration is the “administrative apparatus or bureaucracy charged with the task of implementing a set of goals and policies known as the ‘laws’ and ‘regulations’”. In this definition, public administration becomes responsible for translating laws into public policies and implementing them. Peters and Pierre (2003) argue that public administrators (or the public bureaucracy) not only contribute to the making of laws, but also draft the secondary legislation which makes legislation clearer and easier to implement, and by implementation they also mean delivering public services to citizens. As mentioned above, public administration is more than a vague concept but not only that: it is a set of structures operating under a set of laws and regulations and it is the administrative apparatus of the state and government which delivers public services to citizens.

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In his book Economy and Society, Weber (1978) considers that public administration includes legislation and adjudication as well as government activities. Public administration activities are taken care of by public bureaucracy. For Weber, bureaucracy is the optimal organisational form which exists. He describes the ideal bureaucracy as hierarchical, rational, with a strict division of tasks, as an organisational form based on rules and written documents, where recruitment is made through formal examination and career advancement is possible based on employee’s qualification, performance and seniority (Weber, 1978; Drechsler, 2020; de Vries, 2016). Drechsler (2020) points out that what we call today the Weberian public administration is often used interchangeably with the term ‘bureaucracy’. Through an example, Kingdom (2000) best illustrates the shape of public administration. He argues that: public administration in Britain takes place through a diversity of state agencies with varying histories, functions, and patterns of political control and accountability. These include the civil service (the central government bureaucracy); a large number of local bureaucracies serving an elective system of local government; another mammoth organisation administering the National Health Service (NHS) and, under the acronym ‘quango’, a diverse range of organisations responsible for a miscellany of administrative, consultative, advisory and regulatory roles. In addition, there is a complex of tribunals, inquiries, an ombudsman system and the judiciary, which together dispense administrative justice. (Kingdom, 2000: 14)

It is, however, necessary to point out that the shape and structure of public administration vary from one state to another. Hence, for the purpose of this chapter, ‘public administration’ should be understood as the set of state structures operating at different levels of government (national, regional or local), transforming laws into policies, implementing public policies, delivering public services and acting for the public good under the rule of law. Peters and Pierre (2004: 2) define public service as “the structure that delivers services publiques to the citizens and plays a role in determining who gets what from the public sector”. Lane (2000: viii) considers the public sector as “a set of institutions that coordinate the interests of different groups that ask in various ways for public activities of different kind”. He then goes (2000: 15–17) on to consider that there are several possibilities to define what the public sector is:

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• (DF1) ‘Public sector’ = def. ‘Government activity and its consequences’ • (DF1′) ‘Public sector’ = def. ‘State general decision-making and its outcomes’ • (DF2) ‘Public sector’ = def. ‘Governmental consumption, investment and transfers’ • (DF3) ‘Public sector’ = def. ‘Government consumption and investment’ • (DF4) ‘Public sector’ = def. ‘Government production’ • (DF4′) ‘Government provision’, (DF5) ‘ownership’ or (DF6) ‘employment’. According to the above, the public sector can be understood in different ways. It can be just the public authority, but it can also be the legislative and public authorities, that is, law and regulation-making, decision-making and implementation of public policy, in other words public administration. However, the public sector can be more than public administration: the public sector represents all state organisations which consume for self-function, which tax in order to redistribute through social spending, which produce, co-produce, finance, co-finance and deliver public goods and services, but also own property, capital or production means, and employ personnel under different status (public servants or employees with private contracts). Based on the aforementioned, the public sector can be considered as the whole of state institutions, independent or semi-independent institutions as well as public enterprises whose power derives from the state or the constitution and which operate under the rule of law, legal regulations and governmental or parliamentary directives. The concept of the state has evolved over time and the place for government is more limited than in the past. Supranational entities have emerged, crucial prerogatives and powers have been transferred to such entities, private companies can directly influence public policies, citizens organise themselves in groups and civil society organisations replace government institutions in delivering numerous public services to the community. In recent decades under the influence of the Washington consensus and more generally of globalisation (see de Vries, 2001; Krasner, 1999), the scope and place of government have deviated from the tendency seen in the last hundred years with the state willing to be more and more involved and to provide more and more goods and services. Reducing the

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state activity has often been understood as cutting capacity in all sectors, which in some cases has contributed to a weakening of states.

2.3   Fragility and State Failure The terms ‘weak’, ‘fragile’ and ‘failed’ are often used interchangeably by scholars and international organisations. In practice, as a result of weakness, fragility or failure, many countries enter a cycle of violence with perpetual conflicts and suffering. While most but not all fragile or failed states are conflict-affected states, all conflict-affected states are at least fragile, if not failed states. In this part, fragility and failure will be discussed as they appear; such phenomena are more frequent in recent decades and affect countries that suffer from certain common features. In theory, but also practice, fragility and failure are highly interconnected as failure is likely to succeed fragility. According to Ghani and Lockhart (2008: 3–4), failed states cannot “serve de facto their population and act as responsible members of the international community”, leading to a situation called the “sovereignty gap”. In such situations, at least one of the four forms of sovereignty mentioned by Krasner (1999) is not fulfilled. Serving a population and acting responsibly at the international level involves internal and external state legitimacy. In addition, another crucial component of state failure is the lack of ability to deliver public goods and services. A state is to be considered as failed when it no longer has a connection with its citizens and cannot guarantee their free participation in politics, their freedom, civil and human rights as well as the respect of state institutions and control over the entirety of the state’s territory (Rotberg, 2004; Van de Walle & Scott, 2009). Governmental institutions, international organisations, universities or research institutions, most of them based in North America and Western Europe, have established indexes and models to better understand fragile and failed states; to name a few: the Political Instability Task Force in the United States, the World Bank, the OECD, the Fund for Peace, or the Brookings Institution. Established by the Fund for Peace and based on 12 political, social and economic indicators and over 100 sub-indicators, the Fragile States Index 2019 (FSI) ranks 178 countries from very high alert to very sustainable. An overview of the top 11 most unstable countries in the world is presented in Table 2.1. The index uses 12 indicators in total classified in five categories—cohesion (C1–C3), economic (E1–E3), political (P1–P3), social (S1–S2) and cross-cutting (X1); some of the indicators

Rank C1: Security apparatus

C2: Factionalized elites

C3: Group grievance

Source: Author, based on The Fund for Peace (2019)

Indicators (0 = very sustainable; 10 = very high alert) Yemen 1st 10.0 10.0 9.6 Somalia 2nd 9.6 10.0 8.9 South 3rd 9.7 9.7 9.4 Sudan Syria 4th 9.8 9.9 10.0 5th 8.8 9.8 10.0 Congo Democratic Republic 6th 8.6 9.4 8.3 Central African Republic Chad 7th 9.5 9.8 8.2 Sudan 8th 8.4 9.7 10.0 Afghanistan 9th 10.0 8.6 7.8 Zimbabwe 10th 8.8 10.0 6.7

Country

8.1 9.4 8.9 7.5 8.6

9.9

9.0 7.7 7.5 7.9

8.8 8.3

8.7

9.0 8.1 8.6 8.1

E2: Economic inequality

9.7 8.8 9.8

E1: Economy

Table 2.1  Impact of fragility/conflict on the MDGs

8.5 8.3 7.8 7.3

7.1

8.4 7.0

7.3 9.2 6.5

E3: Human flight and brain drain

9.6 9.8 9.0 9.4

9.1

9.9 9.4

9.8 9.0 10.0

P1: State legitimacy

9.1 8.6 9.8 8.6

10.0

9.4 9.2

9.8 9.4 9.8

P2: Public services

8.8 9.4 7.9 8.2

9.5

10.0 9.6

9.9 9.3 9.3

9.5 9.4 9.3 9.0

9.1

7.9 9.8

9.7 10.0 9.7

S1: P3: Human Demographic pressures rights

9.5 9.6 9.6 8.2

10.0

10.0 10.0

9.6 9.4 10.0

S2: Refugees and IDPs

8.0 8.9 9.1 7.3

9.2

10.0 9.7

10.0 9.2 9.4

X1 external intervention

108.5 108.0 105.0 99.5

108.9

−2.3

0.2 −0.7 −1.6 −2.8

111.5 110.2

113.5 112.3 112.2

Total (0 = very sustainable; 120 = very high alert)

0.1 −0.5

0.8 −0.9 −1.2

Change from previous year

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are the following: security apparatus, economy, inequalities, state legitimacy, public services or external intervention. Based on existing literature as well as on Fragility indexes (e.g. Fund for peace, OECD), it may be argued that several factors of different natures are involved in state failure, and they are highly interconnected. The first and main factor causing state fragility and failure is domestic and international conflict. The OECD argues that fragility and conflict are traditionally strongly correlated (see OECD States Fragility, 2018). Most of the fragile states and most of the conflict-affected states lose the monopoly on the use of force and control over parts or complete territory of their states, and their security apparatus is severely damaged (cf. Indicator C1 on Table 2.1). In Table 2.1, states such as Yemen, Somalia, South Sudan and Syria appear to be the most fragile states; their scores on Indicators P1 State Legitimacy and X1 External Intervention are close to 10 (very high alert) because each of these states went through an armed conflict in 2019, a war with a neighbouring country, an interstate or inter-ethnic conflict or a large-scale war against a terrorist organisation (see also Global terrorism index of IEP, 2019). Many scholars argue that state failure is caused by internal and/or external sources (see Reilly, 2008; Chomsky, 2006). On the one hand, external factors such as the position of states in the world system, the influence of liberal democracies and their powerful agencies, NGOs and even specific multinational companies, as well as the degree to which states are dependent on external aid or support cause state failure. In addition, powerful states such as the United States, France, the United Kingdom and Russia intervene militarily for security or humanitarian reasons, which is considered by Chomsky (2006) as illegal, counterproductive and a cause of state failure. Reilly (2008) argues that location in the globalised world is of critical importance, and the threat of external intervention is an additional pressure which leads many fragile states to failure. Furthermore, by constantly interfering in internal affairs, Western powers cause more harm than good. In exchange for aid (financial, military or political support), Western powers destabilise fragile states by pressuring governments to follow specific agendas which do not necessarily respond to their citizens’ needs and, sometimes, even delegitimise local elites, who are, in the end, blamed for state failure. Wealthy and militarily powerful states tend to disregard developing countries, labelling them as ‘failed and bad’ states, and sometimes putting sanctions on them or extreme terms in exchange for aid (cf. IMF practices). On the other hand, internal factors such as bad

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institutions or abuse of power are also considered to cause state failure. The lack of effective institutions is another factor that leads to conflict and state failure. Acemoglu and Robinson (2013) argued in their seminal book Why Nations Fail that institutions are crucial to a state, and therefore nations’ success or failure depends primarily on institutions (see also Fukuyama, 2005). They claimed that exclusive institutions do not enforce the rule of law; they obstruct fundamental freedoms and dissuade private enterprise and economic prosperity. If nations and therefore states fail, it is because extractive economic and political institutions impoverish people as the power is concentrated in the hands of a few who use their position to extract resources and enrich themselves and their clans; instead of delivering services, the elites exploit the population. Ghani and Lockhart (2008) have a quite similar position as they argue that political regimes, bad leadership and bad governance are the core problem in failed states; governments use power to extract resources for personal benefits. Exclusive institutions and the abuse of power go hand in hand. In this sense, the abuse of power by individuals, organisations or states can also be considered as a factor which leads to state failure. Indeed, both exclusive institutions and abuse of power create an appropriate environment for massive and institutionalised corruption as well as increasing inequalities and poverty among the most fragile categories of the population. For instance, corruption and bad leadership undermine public governance and promote ineffective policies, thus affecting people’s lives and diminishing trust in institutions. Exclusive institutions exist because they are seized by individuals or organisations that use state institutions for personal benefits (see Indicator C2 Factionalised Elites in Table 2.1). In most of the states in Table  2.1, the state is seized by the few, the resources are unequally distributed and there is a clear abuse of power by an individual, a group of people or an ethnic group which is also privileged in front of the law. In addition, public services are not effectively and equally delivered; therefore, these states have failed to serve their citizens. Such situations where the state is seized are common and explain many state failures. As Fukuyama (2005) pointed out, the neo-patrimonial regimes that exist in sub-Saharan Africa are characterised by predatory behaviour with a person holding the power and distributing resources to a family, tribe or ethnic group. He mentioned the case of Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo); however, more recent cases could be mentioned, such as Libya under Gaddafi, Zimbabwe under Mugabe or Syria under Assad’s family. Having said that and while discussing the concept of abuse of power,

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Chomsky (2006) signalled the abuse of power by rich and powerful states. Using the case of the United States, he argued that Western democracies’ abuse of power can also have damaging effects on other states. He claimed that even though the United States does not respect international law and treaties, it is still not considered a failed state by international organisations. Based on Chomsky’s analysis, it may be argued that state failure depends also on the point of view. It may be argued that internal and external factors jointly contribute to state failure. External factors are less harmful in well-functioning states, whereas many states unwillingly become a battleground for geopolitical contests thereby causing state failure (see the 12 trends of fragility OECD 2018). There are additional aspects such as context, history, cultural and ethnic identity which can contribute to state failure. Tusalem (2016) stated that colonialism and its historical legacies play a role in state failure. His findings suggest that the type of colonial rule and its duration impact state failure, and as a result, there is a lower risk of state failure in former British and Spanish colonies than in former French and Portuguese colonies. In this regard, Lemay-Hébert (2018) argued that Haiti’s fragility and resilience are a result of historical legacy, starting with its path to independence and the more recent international interventions and state-building processes (see also Verner & Egset, 2007). Geographical or economic factors could also be considered to contribute to state fragility and failure. For instance, several countries are resource-dependent: in the case of Venezuela where the fall in petrol prices caused serious damage to a state which was already weak because of state seizure. Identity also plays an important role as it has a direct impact on social cohesion, which, if lacking, weakens the state. Practice has proven that inter-ethnic tensions and similar factors very often lead to armed conflicts causing irreparable damage to civilians and in some cases, annihilating states and their administrative capacities. Inter-ethnic and cultural tensions have the destructive capacity to also block the effective functioning of institutions by slowing processes, approving and enhancing neopatrimonialism as well as the exclusion of others (Rotberg, 2004). The definition and understanding of fragility and failure are problematic, and there is no real consensus on such definitions. In addition, although international organisations have built indexes to measure the fragility or failure of states, such measurements remain an issue and have consequences of their own. For instance, the Fund for Peace has built, for its FSI, a methodology using three main streams (content analysis,

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quantitative data and qualitative review), but there is always some concern regarding the collection of data especially in countries torn by war such as Syria or Yemen—which is extremely difficult; the reliability and analysis of such data can very easily be disputed as we are not dealing with so-called hard-science. In the last 30 years, state fragility and failure have been considered through a very specific prism built by international donors whose ideas were often influenced by the neoliberal discourse (see also Chomsky, 2006; Kruglova, 2015). First, the selected criteria do not consider important factors such as context or informal institutions but rather focus on the criteria of Western democracy. To be more inclusive and fairer, other indicators such as public debt could also be incorporated. Although fragility is obvious in many cases, declaring a state as fragile or failed because it does not correspond to the pure Weberian state is extreme and has consequences of its own. Kruglova (2015) argued that there is a type of failure which she calls ‘alleged’ because it is a failure identified by international experts or organisations, which, however, does not correspond with the opinion of the state or its population. Belgium, for instance, ranks as the 18th most sustainable state in the world in the FSI 2019, just after Singapore, but is better ranked than France, South Korea, Japan, the United Kingdom or the United States. But the terrorist attacks which took place in 2015 in Paris and 2016 in Brussels revealed that the state does not control parts of its cities (cf. Molenbeek) and that the police, judiciary and government institutions are fragmented, making Belgium, to some extent, a misfunctioning state (King, 2015). King stated that historical aspects, socio-ethnic structures and decades of patrimonialism and mismanagement have contributed to make Belgium a failed state. In addition, in 2018, Belgium’s public debt reached 100% of its GDP and the question is why such an indicator does not make Belgium more fragile than a country whose national debt amounts to only 50% of its GDP. Why is Belgium not on the list of fragile or failed states so that the United Nations or the European Union could send a state-building mission which is based on its best practices, Kosovo or Timor Leste? A potential answer to this question could be the perception of state fragility and failure, especially from international organisations dealing with the phenomena. In 2006, the OECD defined fragile states as “those failing to provide basic services to poor people because they are unwilling or unable to do so”, and argued that the tackling of poverty would be the solution these states were in need of (OECD, 2006: 147). Years later, the OECD (2012) considered that a fragile state “has weak capacity to carry out basic

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governance functions, and lacks the ability to develop mutually constructive relations with society” (p.  15). As pointed out by Lemay-Hébert (2018), this definition has evolved with time because the OECD is gradually changing its view on fragility and no longer uses the term ‘fragile states’ but rather ‘fragile situations or contexts’. The OECD (2016: 22) now sees fragility as “the combination of exposure to risk and an insufficient coping capacity of the state, system and/or communities to manage, absorb or mitigate those risks”. In Table 2.2 it can be seen that the OECD distinguishes five dimensions of fragility: economic, environmental, political, security and societal dimensions. The five fragility dimensions capture the vulnerability to specific risks that are associated with each type of fragility. According to the OECD (2016), it may be concluded that there are interlinkages between the different dimensions of fragility and violence. Conflict is more likely to arise in contexts of economic and societal fragility: for instance, high unemployment and increasing inequalities augment internal tensions which can lead to conflict. Environmental fragility, especially if combined with other types of fragility, increases the risk of violence and armed conflict: the case of Haiti showed that the earthquake destroyed the state’s capacity to react, creating an environment where crime and violence significantly increased Table 2.2  The five dimensions of fragility Dimension

Aims

Security

Identify and evaluate the vulnerability of citizen security to all types of crime and violence. Political Identify and evaluate the vulnerability to risks inherent in political processes, events or decisions, to society’s ability to accommodate change and avoid oppression, the vulnerability to the lack of political inclusiveness and transparency, and to the presence of corruption. Economic Identify and evaluate the vulnerability to risks resulting from the weaknesses in economic foundations and human capital including macroeconomic shocks, unequal growth and high youth unemployment, among others. Societal Identify and evaluate the vulnerability to risks affecting societal cohesion that stem from vertical and horizontal inequalities, including inequality among culturally defined or constructed groups and social cleavages. Environmental Identify and evaluate the vulnerability to environmental, climatic and health risks affecting citizens and their means of subsistence. Source: Author, based on OECD (2016)

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(Berg, 2010). Similarly, the Katrina hurricane in the United States proved that in the aftermath of a natural disaster, violence can arise in developed countries as well. Global warming will affect more and more areas, and the fight over water resources could lead to conflict in many areas of the world (see Reilly, 2008). Last, but not least, violence rates are very high in contexts of political and security fragility (OECD, 2016). All dimensions are important when considering fragility. Nevertheless, it may be argued that conflict directly affects fragile states, whereas fragility feeds conflict. In the 2018 States of Fragility report, the OECD has pushed further its view on fragility. It has now identified 12 trends or issues that affect fragility and are affected by fragility, as seen in Table  2.3 (OECD, 2018). Among the identified trends, the first trend emphasises the need to review the definition of fragility and no longer consider it as exact a definition which was given in 2006 or 2012: fragility is not only about economic growth, institutions or conflict, it is a more complicated issue, and such acknowledgement is crucial for future state-building missions (see OECD, 2006, 2012). The 2018 OECD States of Fragility report also places emphasis on aspects which are often put aside, such as city fragility, gender issues, geopolitical aspects or climate change. In addition, it highlights a disturbing issue by pointing out that 10 out of the 15 top-level lessons which appeared on a report in 2003 were also on a report published in 1949. It appears that international organisations have failed to learn top-­ level lessons that have been mentioned for half a century in international Table 2.3  An overview of main trends shaping fragility Trends Fragility continues to challenge assumptions Fragility contexts are increasingly battlegrounds in geopolitical contests City fragility is as important as state fragility Engagement on fragility creates tension between interests and values Fragility will inform aid in the future Addressing fragility hinges on forging inclusive social contracts New attention to gender stereotypes in fragile contexts is required Development must deliver on hope Violent extremism feeds off violence and violence feeds off fragility Illicit economies and criminal networks thrive on fragility Climate change is compounding risks in fragile contexts Fragility is a complex and dual-system problem Source: Author, based on OECD (2018)

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reports, and it becomes legitimate to ask whether this is a result of a lack of knowledge, preparation and maybe coordination with other organisations, or also a result of a lack of interest in the topic and the desperate people living in fragile states. This implies that international organisations must review their work methods, learn from their past missions and, instead of blaming local elites, share with them the responsibility for state-­ building failure. Through the identification of these 12 trends, the OECD addresses a new message to scholars and international organisations involved in fragile contexts: fragility is a complex issue with multiple facets and factors which, sometimes, influence each other. In essence, the European Union uses the definition and the five fragility dimensions provided by the OECD, whereas the World Bank considers that fragile states are states with low income, “weak institutional capacity, poor governance, and political instability, IDA eligible, with a Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) score of 3.2 or below, and/or have had a UN or regional organisation peacekeeping mission present at any time in the last three years” (IEG/World Bank, 2014: 2–3). The definition of fragility or failure that international organisations have is normative and could be viewed as ‘mechanically filling in a form’ to decide about the status of a state. Following years of failure in state-building, international organisations have recently started to review their definition of fragility and the use of pure statistics or data which are gathered and analysed remotely with the same analysis framework and without taking into consideration contextual aspects (Lemay-Hébert, 2018). Even if fixing weak and failed states has not been fully successful in the last years, Ghani and Lockhart (2008) argued that solutions to problems such as state failure are still to be found in state-building projects which had already been conducted. The definition and conception of fragility and failure are mostly narrow and that includes numerous misunderstandings and a lack of knowledge about the context (political, social and cultural) and situation on the ground. As a result, they have severe consequences for the rebuilding process as well as the long-term future of states.

2.4   State-Building In recent decades, numerous state-building missions have taken place around the world and consequently, many scholars have addressed the topic. However, the results obtained suggest that discussion must

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continue (Fukuyama, 2005; Rondinelli & Montgomery, 2005; Paris, 2004; Brinkerhoff, 2010; Van de Walle & Scott, 2011; Chandler, 2013; Capussela, 2015). This section will discuss the process of state-building as defined by scholars and implemented by international donors in many conflict-affected states. 2.4.1  What Is State-Building? In the first section of this chapter we have defined the state as an entity with a defined population and territory over which it exercises sovereignty, that is, protects its citizens from external and internal enemies, an entity which makes and enforces laws and regulations, which cooperates with the private sector and civil society organisations, which produces and delivers public goods and services to its citizens through public enterprises and administration at central and local levels. State-building is an interdisciplinary topic and although the definition of state-building is broad, it is often described as a process which consists in building from scratch and/ or strengthening existing state institutions, including legislation, public administration and other governmental bodies (Lotz, 2010; Fukuyama, 2005). State-building is also seen as the development of transparent and accountable political institutions, a sustainable economic system, a professional public administration and civilian-controlled forces (Capussela, 2015). Van de Walle and Scott (2011: 8) explained that literature sees state-building as restoring and rebuilding the institutions and state apparatus, whereas nation-building is state-building combined with “building a cultural identity that relates to the particular territory of the state”. It is noteworthy to mention that state-building is already a challenge for international state-building missions. International organisations such as the OECD, World Bank or UNDP consider state-building as the process of (re)construction and socio-­ economic development of a state by establishing strong, democratic, accountable and transparent institutions promoting peace and sustainable socio-economic development and an interaction between citizens, the civil society and the state (OECD, 2010; UNDP, 2012; World Bank, 2012). Based on the definitions above, it may be argued that international state builders have used parameters developed in and for the ‘OECD countries’ (see for instance World Bank governance indicators). Fukuyama (2005) claimed that rebuilding post-conflict states requires three phases: stability, self-sustaining state institutions and strengthening

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Emergency/relief

Rehabilitation

Administration of suvival concerns (Massive external technical, financial, logistical, and human assistance)

Administration rehabilitating basic infrastrucure, facilities, equipment, logistics, and basic human capacities

Reform

Reconfiguration

Redesigning institutions, systems, structures, human capacities etc. (Concerns of effectiveness, efficiency, economy etc.)

Participatory redesign of public adminsitration to include the governed (civil society,private secot, at all levels)

Fig. 2.1  The stages in rebuilding states. (Source: Author)

of the state. He stated that if the first phase has some limited success, most of the state-building processes face serious issues in the second phase. The same process defined by Kauzya (2003) is described in Fig. 2.1 and has four stages: emergency, rehabilitation, reform and reconfiguration. The first two steps of this process focus on the emergency and initial reestablishment of public institutions, whereas the two other steps are about sustainable capacity development, democratisation and preparation of the environment to support economic development. The duration and success of the process depend on the local situation, but also on the human and financial resources available to the state builders as well as their ability to coordinate among themselves and with local stakeholders. For a long time, state-building remained an ‘affair’ developed and implemented by international organisations such as the World Bank, the IMF, the OECD, the European Union, United Nations agencies together with powerful states such as the United States, the United Kingdom or France. To do so, international state builders developed models based on existing theories and used indicators that were already used in developed countries to measure democracy, governance and socio-economic development.

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2.4.2   A Neoliberal Approach to State-Building In post-conflict states, it is vital to rebuild institutions that can promote peace and push the danger of conflict repetition away (Brinkerhoff, 2007; Collier et  al., 2006). For several decades, scholars have attempted to develop models to rebuild conflict-affected states. With the neoliberal economic theory and New Public Management (NPM) becoming popular especially in the 1980s and 1990s, many states reduced the size of the state by decreasing public administration and privatising public enterprises and outsourcing services to private companies. In this section, we will discuss the different state-building models that emerged from this approach. International state builders have used the liberal peace model the most in recent decades. The model aims at installing democracy and promoting a free market economy. In other words, liberal peace is the NPM theory but applied to state-building: it promotes a small public sector and a rapid economic liberalisation. Paris (2004: 5) described liberal peace as at least a two-dimensional operation which in fine promotes liberalisation: In the political realm, liberalization means democratization, or the promotion of periodic and genuine elections, constitutional limitations on the exercise of governmental power, and respect for basic civil liberties, including freedom of speech, assembly, and conscience. In the economic realm, liberalization means marketization, or movement toward a market-oriented economic model, including measures aimed at minimizing government intrusion in the economy, and maximizing the freedom for private investors, producers, and consumers to pursue their respective economic interests.

In recent decades, while economic policies and structural reforms based on the ‘Washington consensus’ were fashionable (see also de Vries & Nemec, 2018), international organisations such as the United Nations, the European Union, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank Group (WB) have adopted and imported the liberal peace model to many countries in need. De Guevara (2010: 124) considered the liberal peace model as a set of Western norms that aim to make a change in all areas of society, in economic, political and social spheres. To begin, such models made local stakeholders adopt new constitutions, which include the very good principles of modern Western values, organise elections, send ‘experts’ to set up institutions and invest in civil society organisations. In parallel, they launched large-scale privatisation, reduced the role of the state in the economy, opened the economy to international

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companies, or, in some cases, pushed for free-trade agreements with neighbouring countries (Paris, 2004; Lemay-Hébert & Murshed, 2016; De Guevara, 2010; Heathershaw & Lambach, 2008; Chandler, 2013; Goldfinch & DeRouen, 2014; Richmond, 2006; Richmond & Tellidis, 2014; MacGinty & Williams, 2009). The liberal peace model has for a long time been considered by international donors as a universal model that can be implemented anywhere, a ‘one-size-fits-all’ model which eventually became a legitimate target for criticism, notably because it is seen as a top-down model and because of its real lack of interest on state capacity, institutions and governance (Paris, 2004; Chandler, 2013; Goldfinch & DeRouen, 2014; Lemay-Hébert, 2009). By and large, there is a consensus among scholars that the quality of government matters because it directly affects citizens’ lives, and, hence, governance aspects should also accompany security and development discourses in state-building processes. While the fuzzy concept of governance was widely discussed in academia in the 1990s (Derlien & Peters, 2008), international organisations heavily invested in creating “good governance in less well-governed societies” (Pierre & Peters, 2005: 1). Although the definition of good governance varies from scholar to scholar, the experts of the Council of Europe defined good governance as no less than the process of conducting public affairs and managing public resources in a responsible manner. With time, international donors started to include governance aspects in their state-building agenda. Originally, ‘Good Governance’ focused on key aspects of government such as effectiveness, accountability and transparency, and the respect for rule of law; it now includes additional key principles, including democracy and participation, bureaucratic expertise and machinery of government, effective public service delivery, decentralisation, respect for human rights, gender and ethnic equality, corruption control and many others (Grindle, 2017; Goldfinch & DeRouen, 2014). Many scholars argued that state-building as it now exists and the liberal peace model are a way to introduce and consolidate neoliberalism and a free market in these countries (Marquette & Beswick, 2011; MacGinty & Williams, 2009). Similarly, in many developing countries, good governance is seen as a form of “Neo-Colonialist Imperialism” (Drechsler, 2004: 389). In addition, both models, the liberal peace and the good governance agenda, are seen as being imposed from the outside. As such, they are considered as ‘top-down’ approaches that do not consider the local context, the socio-cultural aspects nor the needs of the population,

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and, consequently, cause more harm than good. If liberal peace is criticised for its lack of attention to institutions, good governance is singled out for its normative and standardised aspects, but also the technocracy and its very wide scope, thus undermining the real impact on long-term capacity building and development (Drechsler, 2004; Menocal, 2011). In the end, the good governance approach seems to promote the establishment of inappropriate institutions for most conflict-affected states as it implies establishing the same institutions as in developed countries regardless of feasibility aspects, putting once more into question the context, the role and place of the state, government and institutions in the process of state-building (see also Andrews, 2008). As a result of such controversies, scholars have called for different approaches among which ‘institutionalisation-before-liberalisation (IBL)’, the ‘good enough governance’ or for hybrid models with a predominance of local stakeholders. The first model, IBL, proposed by Paris (2004) promotes gradual and long-term institutionalisation and aims at first helping post-conflict and new states to obtain the necessary institutions which are able at a later stage to implement the policy praised by liberal peace, thus avoiding brutal liberalisation to cause irreparable damage. This model seems to be more appropriated but requires long-term investment and planning, which international donors are not committed to doing. Because good governance agenda has its limits, especially due to its high standards and requirements, Grindle (2005) has proposed the “Good enough governance” approach which is seen as more realistic since it has more consideration for local and historical context. Described as an ‘antidote’ to the good governance agenda, Grindle (2010: 14) depicts good enough governance as a model which gives priority to the “minimal conditions of governance necessary to allow political and economic development to occur”. She argues that, when rebuilding governance institutions, it is necessary to adapt the means to the conditions of individual countries (see also Grindle, 2007). The approach is innovative in the sense that donors would eventually recognise their limits and build their models based on more knowledge about the context and with better strategies and plans; however, the willingness of international donors to ‘trade-off’ their good governance and universal principles is questionable. Models and strategies known as top-down do not include enough local stakeholders and hence hybrid solutions are proposed, the local turn or local ownership. Local ownership as an approach consists in engaging local communities in a set of processes (Schirch & Mancini-Griffoli,

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2015). In this approach, local stakeholders should be in charge of designing and implementing the pattern that best fits the needs of the population and the country that will be rebuilt. In addition, the principal ideas consist of involving national actors in resource allocation, in decision-­ making, and in defining and implementing public policy (Lotz, 2010; McCandless, 2013). However, the difficulty is in building partnerships between international and local stakeholders as both have different information, interests, capacity and means. Lately, there has been a shift towards resilience approaches that aim at putting the society at the centre of the reconstruction process. Regarding resilience in state-building, Chandler (2013: 279) stated that the approach is based on a mutual understanding that international donors alone cannot fix fragile states’ problems, but also fragile states cannot fix them without external assistance. In addition, he claimed that “Resilience approaches thereby seek to work at the societal level, focusing on addressing the transformation of societal processes and understanding the ‘root causes’ of problems”. Indeed, each case is unique and solutions cannot be imposed based on fragility index’ indicators, but solutions must be built together with local populations as there is a need for a better understanding of what Chandler (2013: 278) calls societal self-production of threats and insecurities (see also Lemay-Hébert, 2018). It appears that the most used state-building models, liberal peace and good governance agenda, have not fully accomplished their missions. Both models are, first of all, considered as ‘one-size-fits-all’ models that are imposed by international donors. The ‘modern’ conception of state-­ building is a narrow one, a conception which deviates from the historical conception with a strong and clear role for the public sector. In recent decades, state-building missions managed to rebuild states with weak capacities and reduced scope of functions, thereby making the contribution of the public sector less visible.

2.5   What Role Could Public Administration Play in State-Building? While the strength of states is measured by their ability to deliver, among others, political or public goods and services, many countries around the world are not able to deliver on these political goods; these are the fragile and failed states. The OECD (2018) argued that one-fifth of the world population, 1.8 billion people, currently live in fragile contexts and this

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figure is expected to reach 2.3 billion by 2030. Such an increase can be explained by the growth of the world population, but also by the multiplication of states that lack the capacity to deliver public goods while being simultaneously faced with severe risks and challenges. Fragile and failed states are a major concern and a permanent danger for the world as they are a permanent source of conflict. Fragility and failure often cause internal conflicts as well as conflicts with other countries. In situations where the government does not control its borders, a conflict could spread and affect neighbouring countries (Iqbal & Starr, 2008), or create space for criminal groups to establish their reign, terrorise civilians or impose taxes. It appears that fragile and failed states are nests for terrorist organisations to build their headquarters and training camps. As a result, thousands of people lose their lives, public institutions collapse, and public and private infrastructures are destroyed. For instance, Afghanistan was used by Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups to plan and execute the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Another consequence of fragile and failed states is the collapse of public administration, and, as a result, public goods and services are no longer delivered. In such situations, the state fails to provide basic services such as security, rule of law, healthcare or education (Rotberg, 2004). Nonetheless, public services are what makes the state visible to its citizens and contributes to strengthening its legitimacy (Van de Walle & Scott, 2009, 2011). According to Fritz and Menocal (2007: 12) for instance, in Somalia in 2012, “just 7% of the population had adequate access to adequate improved water sources such as household connections, public standpipes, and protected wells or springs”. The lack of public services also has serious consequences for the population: health deterioration, if any education is delivered then its quality is low, long-term human capacities are strongly affected and much more damage is caused. As a consequence of state failure, socio-economic problems dramatically increase. Indeed, with the collapse of the state, public and private investments shrink and therefore economic activity abruptly decreases. As a result, unemployment rises, informal economy flourishes—no taxes are collected therefore future investments are compromised, the inequalities reach peaks and so does crime. In fact, the consequences are far more dramatic as ethnic or religious tensions in such situations increase and so does the probability for conflict continuity (Rotberg, 2004). Furthermore, as mentioned by Acemoglu and Robinson (2013), in the case of state failure, exclusive institutions create opportunities for state seizure and abuse of

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power. In fragile contexts, predatory behaviours are more likely to take place than in stable situations. Under such circumstances, the probability for a military coup to take place is higher and so does the seizure of power by individuals or groups (cf. the coup d’état in Mali in August 2020). Fragility and failure have dramatic consequences and, in some cases, a potential wrong understanding of such phenomena by international organisations and the remedies proposed have similar effects. Indeed, as mentioned earlier, international state builders use indexes that label states according to a set of criteria that reflect the modern Western state. However, such indexes and understanding of the state’s function, strength or fragility do not encompass many aspects that are valuable in certain regions of the world. Hence, the misunderstanding of local realities and the lecture of fragility through a normative way aggravates the situation in some cases. Because of a narrow conception of state-building, the process is seen as a very technical process that does not take into consideration the local context and needs and relegates the public sector to a position of secondary importance. Therefore, the outcomes of state-building are so far not satisfactory. Focusing on immediate results rather than long-term stability and gradual reconstruction has proven to be a wrong solution. Similarly, by attempting to abruptly install democracy and open the economy without the appropriate institutions, international donors do not strengthen public institutions; they reduce the size, scope and capacity of the state. In many cases, the state remains seized by individuals or a group of people or an organisation that holds the power, and in many other cases, there is power rotation accompanied with terrible bloodbath which in fine brings state seizure back. Rebuilding an effective, professional and accountable public administration should be the priority in the state-building process, because public administration will then become an engine for stability, peace and prosperity. Because the liberal peace model and the good governance agenda are not adapted to most of the conflict-affected states, they have mostly contributed to the establishment of states with inappropriate and limited capacities. As a consequence of misunderstanding the situation on the ground and the inappropriate models that have been used, the potential contribution of the public administration in rebuilding conflict-affected states has been neglected. In other words, state-building models have neglected the potential of public administration in tackling fragility and building long-term stability and development. In extraordinary conditions

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such as the aftermath of a war, many goods and services such as food, housing, water supply and healthcare cannot be provided by the market. In many cases, international donors deliver such services, but by doing so, they undermine the state’s legitimacy, or, at best, do not contribute to strengthening it. According to Van de Walle and Scott (2009: 11), public services play a crucial role in the process of state-building as they allow the state to make itself visible in territories where it does not exercise its full legitimacy; they also make possible “the creation of a common culture through the presence of similar and readily identifiable public services” and last but not least, public services may help bring different communities together (Hume, 1999). For long-term human and socio-economic development, the public sector must remain the main provider of primary and secondary education, and, when possible, tertiary. High-quality education and training are essential to developing human resource capacities for the private and public sectors: fragile situations are subject to an increase in inequalities; therefore, public education helps to prevent it and also helps to heal inter-ethnic tensions (Morcone, 1999a). Consequently, the public sector has the potential to save lives, strengthen state legitimacy and contribute to healing the wounds of conflict by delivering public goods and services. The restoration of governance and the deployment of state administration across the territory are crucial as they reinforce state legitimacy and service delivery. Such a deployment requires human resources and infrastructure. Physical infrastructure is important in the sense that it contributes to the integration of population throughout the territory of the state (Van de Walle & Scott, 2011) and is considered as the sine qua non condition for economic development (Blunt, 2009). The public sector can, therefore, contribute to sustainable human and socio-economic development which also helps to prevent conflict. Hence, during the process of state-building, the public sector can decrease unemployment and keep under control social peace until it creates an environment that promotes economic activity in the private sector. In addition, through redistribution, public sector institutions can reduce inequalities and support the most vulnerable. The public sector and its employees implement public policies and consequently contribute to reinforce the state and promote, among others, peace, development and well-being. It is noteworthy to mention that the neoliberal theory preaches for minimal government. However, even neoliberal scholars claim that the public sector must enforce property rights, the rule of law and national

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defence (see Fukuyama, 2005). Experts claim that insecurity, violence and the lack of rule of law, in general, affect the provision of basic services, as well as the reestablishment of government authority and public administration, and that they also delay the economic development (UN-DESA, 2007, 2010; Marquette & Beswick, 2011; Brinkerhoff, 2005; Tolbert & Solomon, 2006; Ante, 2010). In conflict-affected states, it is essential to create institutions such as police or armed forces and judicial institutions that can protect peoples’ lives, private and public property, investors and their capital, that can deliver justice to the victims and contribute to avoiding revenge and a potential fast-reverse into conflict but also take care of veterans, their demobilisation and reintegration into society (Hume, 1999; Brinkerhoff, 2005, 2007; Morcone, 1999b). Thanks to the security forces and the judicial institutions, the public sector can restore state legitimacy, ease tensions and contribute to economic development. In order for this to happen, state builders should primarily focus on rebuilding a well-functioning public administration. Fukuyama (2005) illustrated the role public administration can play in economic development with the industrial successes of Japan and South Korea. He argued that governments and their economic planning agencies intervened in industrial policy by allocating credit and speeding up the process of industrial development. He emphasised that when such a process is put into “the hands of competent, non-corrupt technocratic bureaucracy, industrial policy can be used effectively” (Fukuyama, 2005: 102). In periods of transition, effective and responsive public sector institutions are vital in avoiding the seizure of public assets or in regulating and controlling the process of economic liberalisation for example (see Dobra & de Vries, 2016). Indeed, the public sector can contribute to economic development by building capacities for administrative courts and executive agencies which is necessary, especially in attracting international investors—protecting property rights and contracts is essential, but also by facilitating the setting up of new businesses, reducing red tape, simplifying administrative procedures for business registration and tax payments, or utility connections (Khan, 2012, 2015; Aron, 2003). It can do so, for example, by establishing a tax and customs administration that can collect taxes and control what products enter the country, contribute to increasing state legitimacy, fight informal economy, protect public health and generate financial means for the state. Similarly, it is noteworthy that the public sector is in charge of managing public enterprises and natural resources. When well-managed, natural resources and public enterprises

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can be an important source of revenue for the government, it can also contribute in tackling unemployment and poverty—a serious problem in post-conflict situations (Goldfinch & DeRouen, 2014; Knudsen, 2010). The risk of relapse into conflict is high in post-conflict countries, and this is why the government and public administrations must work together to build institutional and human capacities, to deliver high-quality public services, and create an environment which enhances socio-economic development. Failing to deliver on such a crucial mission causes irreparable long-term damages (Marquette & Beswick, 2011; Collier, 2004; Collier et al., 2006).

2.6   Conclusions This chapter scanned part of the existing literature in order to identify the causes of state fragility and failure and to better understand the process of state-building and the contribution the public sector can make in this process. Interdisciplinary academics must work together with practitioners to better analyse past state-building missions and identify the mistakes made. Due to different historical and political experiences, cultural background and social settings, citizens have varying perceptions about public governance and civic participation. In addition, they have varying public values and types of trust in public institutions: a reason why Western theories and models cannot be universally implemented. It appears that the international community, especially the United Nations, has to review its viewpoint on fragility and failure, and avoid biased lecture of statistics or other indexes when creating state-building missions. In addition, they could avoid the ‘one-size-fits-all’ models which have proposed inappropriate solutions by constantly reducing the place of government in state-­building. They could recognise the vital role of rebuilding effective and democratic institutions because security and stability can be achieved only if there is institutional stability. Having said that, institutional stability can be achieved only if the rebuilding is based on strategies built with local populations (Chandler, 2013). The NPM principles of reducing the state for profitability purposes and using market tools to assess public sector performance do not correspond to conflict-affected states as in the aftermath of a conflict, the needs for state intervention are greater than in normal situations. International donors should focus on building strong institutions that function based on good governance rules such as democracy, transparency, accountability

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and the rule of law. Such institutions must be able to regulate and control the process to avoid sliding into anarchy or a state that is seized by individuals, groups or organisations (see Dobra & de Vries, 2018). In the aftermath of a conflict, states do not necessarily need models which look at economic performance of the public sector, but rather a system that brings different communities together, a public sector which shares common values and is driven by these values (for more see de Vries & Kim, 2011; UN-DESA, 2010). The public sector is important in all states, whereas in conflict-affected states the public sector is indispensable. In practice, its significance in state-building is at best undervalued, if not neglected. A well-functioning public sector and especially a public administration that delivers and functions effectively is crucial to prevent conflict, but it is also indispensable in effective state-building. Such a fact might be a key element for another type of state-building model that is wished for and expected in many corners around the world.

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CHAPTER 3

Public Administration in Egypt After the Arab Spring Laila El Baradei

3.1   Introduction Egypt has recently gone through a rough period of political turbulence that started with the 25 January Revolution in 2011 and was followed with numerous repercussions (Table 3.1). The calls and chants by the masses during the Revolution were for ‘bread’, ‘freedom’, ‘human dignity’ and, in other instances, ‘social equity’. It was a time of hope. It was part of the ‘Arab Spring’ storming through many of the Arab nations. The masses, led by the youth, who mobilized through the social media, rose against their autocratic leaders and decided to end long decades of corruption, inefficiencies and inequities. Now, almost ten years later, and with so many changes taking place between then and now, many are wondering whether the situation is back to square one. The situation is described as a “restructuring of

L. El Baradei (*) The School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, The American University in Cairo, Cairo, Egypt e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 J. Nemec, P. S. Reddy (eds.), Public Administration in Conflict Affected Countries, Governance and Public Management, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74966-8_3

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Table 3.1  Figures related to the turbulence in Egypt from 2011 to 2019 Variable

Number Description

Number of presidents

4

Number of parliaments changed

3

Number of national elections and referenda

9

Number of prime ministers

9

Number of ministers responsible for administrative reform

7

 •  President Mubarak ousted in February 2011  • The Supreme Council of Armed Forces took over from 11 February 2011 to 30 June 2012  • President Mohamed Morsi was elected on 30 June 2012 and deposed on 3 July 2013  • President Adly Mansour took over during the transition period that was from 4 July 2013 to 8 June 2014  • President Abdel Fattah El Sisi was elected on 8 June 2014–Present  •  2010 Parliament dissolved after the 2011 Revolution  • 2012 parliament elected, then dissolved by the Supreme Constitutional Court on basis of unconstitutionality  •  2012–2015: Egypt was without parliament  •  2015: Current Parliament in place  •  2011: Referendum on Constitutional Amendments  •  2012: Presidential Elections  •  2012: Referendum on New Constitution  •  2011/2012: Parliamentary Elections  •  2014: Presidential Elections  •  2014: Referendum on New Constitution  •  2015: Parliamentary Elections  •  March 2018: Presidential Elections  •  April 2019: Referendum on Constitutional Amendments  •  Ahmed Nazif till 2011  •  January 2011–March 2011: Ahmed Shafik  •  March 2011–December 2011: Essam Sharaf  •  December 2011–August 2012: Kamal El Ganzouri  •  August 2012–July 2013: Hesham Qandil  •  July 2013–March 2014: Hazem El Beblawi  •  June 2014–September 2015: Ibrahim Mahlab  •  September 2015–June 2018: Sherif Ismail  •  June 2018–Present: Mostafa Madbouli  •  Minister Ahmed Darwish changed in 2011  •  2011: Acting Minister Ashraf Abdel Wahab  •  2012: Acting Minister Ahmed Samir  •  2013–2014: Minister Hani Mahmoud  •  2014: Minister Adel Labib  •  2014: Minister Ashraf El Arabi  •  2017–Present: Minister Hala El Saiid

Source: Author, based on Ministry of Planning, Monitoring and Administrative Reform webpage; Encyclopedia Britannica webpage; Government of Egypt portal; State Information Service website

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authoritarianism in Egypt after a fleeting rupture in 2011” (Hatab, 2017: 579), as an “incomplete [transition]” (Rutherford, 2018: 185) or even a “failed transition” (Brown, 2013: 45). Where and how was the bureaucracy amid all that turbulence? The main question raised by this chapter is figuring out the situation of the bureaucracy amid the turbulence that followed the Arab Spring, how it has endured, how it has been affected and where it is likely to head in the near future. If we want to review the extent of the turbulence over the past few years starting from 2011 till the present date, it may be a good thing to check some of the many events Egypt passed through that characterized this era, including the number of presidents, parliaments, elections of all types, referenda, prime ministers and ministers responsible for the administrative reform portfolio. Over the period from 2011 to 2019, Egypt has had four presidents of the Republic, three houses of parliament, nine different types of national elections and referenda, nine prime ministers, and seven different ministers and acting ministers in charge of the administrative reform portfolio. Table 3.1 presents some of the relevant data describing the turbulent period from 2011 to 2019. These changes took place amid street demonstrations, police violence, terrorist acts, citizens’ enforced disappearances and repeated renewal of the emergency laws.

3.2   Overview of the Problematic Context/ History and the Organizational Structure of Central Government Egypt is an agrarian-based country, with the River Nile, which flows from South to North through its lands, representing its life line. The majority (nearly 95%) of the approximately 100 million citizens live in the narrow Nile valley which represents less than 5% of the total size of its territory. Scholars such as Nazih Ayubi (1980) have written extensively about the impact of this agrarian economy, on the preference of the Egyptian citizens to settle down beside the Nile, on their cultural values, and most importantly on the level of centralization needed to administer their affairs. As such the Egyptian government has been known since the Ancient Egyptian times to be highly centralized. If there is a need to enumerate the main distinguishing features of the Egyptian bureaucracy, perhaps what comes to the fore are centralization, overstaffing, parallel structures, low compensation and a distinctive organizational culture.

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3.2.1  Centralization Over the years there have been repeated attempts and initiatives to enhance the degree of decentralization. Sometimes pilot initiatives have succeeded in realizing progress in specific sectors through international donors’ support; an example being the support directed by the USAID over the past decade to support decentralization efforts especially in the education sector (El Baradei, 2015). Nevertheless, all decentralization initiatives are usually met with a lot of resistance from government officials for many reasons, ranging from a lack of full understanding of what the term implies to a fear that decentralization may undermine national security. For this reason, although Egypt is divided into 27 governorates, we never use the term ‘local government’ but rather the preference is for the term ‘local administration’ in full realization that the governorates and the responsible governors are not fully empowered and that we follow a centralized system. 3.2.2  Overstaffing Overstaffing has also been one of the serious problems afflicting the Egyptian bureaucracy for many decades. There are an estimated 6.4 million (ECES, 2019) government employees for a population of 99 million citizens. The beginning of the problem goes back to President Nasser’s decision in the early 1960s, during the socialist era, of securing jobs in government for all university graduates, in an attempt to encourage youth to pursue university-­ level education. The policy was implemented smoothly for a number of years, but after a while, there were no real jobs available in government to accommodate the increasing numbers and cohorts of fresh graduates, year after year. The government started to suffer from ‘ghost employees’, from additional numbers of employees who had no real jobs but were just timeservers, and consequently a huge burdensome wage bill. Repeatedly the ministers and the top-level officials responsible for administrative reform in Egypt have made public statements regarding how Egypt only needs half the actual number of public employees. “We now have one employee for every 17 citizens, but we still have a huge surplus in the State Administrative Agency because the internationally accepted ratio is one employee for approximately every 80 citizens”, says Safwat El Nahass, former director of the Central Agency for Organization and Administration (Khalil, 2019: 3).

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Although downsizing and rationalization of the size of the bureaucracy were always mentioned by successive governments, there were political pressures that prohibited implementation. Even during the Revolution years, thousands of employees were given tenured appointments. Those were originally contractual staff, but during the turbulence years, the government in place, in an attempt to appease the civil servants, agreed to change all the contractual appointments to tenured appointments. Estimates of the additional tenured appointments to governments since the 25 January Revolution in 2011 to the present day range from 900,000 to 1 million employees (Elfagr, 2016; Akhbarelyom, 2015). The latest legislation put in place, in an attempt to curb the overstaffing problem, is the New Civil Service Law No. 81 for 2016. According to the law, all requests by government agencies for new appointments have to go through the Central Agency for Organization and Administration (CAOA), which seeks to publicize the vacancies approved by the Cabinet of Ministers through its website. All applicants then sit for an electronically administered entrance exam and appointments are decided based on the results of that exam (Khalil, 2019). Although having entrance exams was one of the very early reforms in the field of traditional public administration, and was implemented in the U.S. through the Pendleton Act and in the U.K. through the Northcote-Trevelyan Report in the mid-­ nineteenth century (Hughes, 1994), the idea is still considered a novelty in the Egyptian public administration and people are hopeful that it may be the way out of nepotism and excessive hiring of unneeded staff. 3.2.3  Parallel Structures One of the distinguishing features of the Egyptian bureaucracy over the past two decades was the reliance on parallel structures to overcome the routine and red tape of the bureaucracy (El Baradei, 2011). The phenomenon of parallel structures reached its apex during the years preceding the 2011 Revolution. The majority of ministers and top-level officials in government created their own policy and technical support offices, employed mostly young graduates with language and computer skills, got them paid through different donor support agencies, and relied on them heavily in getting things done. The ‘technical offices’ had more flexibility compared to the traditional bureaucracy. Not only was their pay scale different, but their hiring and recruitment did not follow any structured mechanism. Feelings of animosity and lack of cooperation characterized the

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relationship between the traditional bureaucrats and the younger employees in the technical offices. The parallel structures were a ‘quick fix’ for many problems but were not a sustainable solution. As soon as donors’ funding expired, the technical offices were dissolved denying the opportunity for a build-up of any institutional memory. During the 2011 Revolution, there were street calls to dismantle the technical offices and get rid of the highly paid consultants, for the sake of greater equity within civil services. As a result, many of the technical offices’ employees, but not all, were laid off for a while. Later, when things calmed down, ministers once again started repeating the practice and having their policy support staff hired as consultants through donors’ money. 3.2.4  Low Compensation One of the distinguishing features and ills of the Egyptian bureaucracy is the relatively low compensation received by government employees (CIPE, 2009; Abdelhamid & El Baradei, 2010). The problem was exacerbated partly by the overstaffing problem, the rising wage bill and the government’s limited resources. Starting 2016, with the currency devaluation decision, implemented by the Government of Egypt upon the recommendation of the International Monetary Fund, there was an additional sharp decline in the real value of the government employees’ pay. Overnight, the value of the Egyptian pound to the US dollar dropped by almost 50%, from $1 being equal to 8.8 EGP to $1 reaching nearly $18 EGP (Noueihed & Alsharif, 2016). Although the devaluation is expected to have positive impacts on economic growth, the government employees were hit hard (El Baradei, 2019b). Successive efforts by the government since then have tried to alleviate the pressure by raising the minimum wage and adding bonuses (Youm7, 30 March, 2019a). Although the minimum wage was raised from 1200 EGP in 2014 to 2000 EGP starting July 2019 (Ahram Online, 2019), with the added increase, the value of the minimum pay, when calculated in dollars, is less than what it was before the devaluation (1200 EGP/8 = $150 vs. 2000 EGP/18 = $111). Interestingly, another unique feature of the Egyptian bureaucracy is that despite the relatively low level of pay in government jobs, they are reported to be in high demand. Several explanations were given for that odd situation, including the prestige still associated with working for the government compared to having a blue collar job in the private sector, the greater security and stability associated with tenure in government, the

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ability to combine the government’s job in the morning and having another job in the evening to supplement one’s overall income, the attractiveness of the government job especially to females because of the fixed working hours, long paid and unpaid vacations and perceived safety from the potential harassment that females may be subjected to in the private sector (Barsoum, 2014, 2015). 3.2.5  Distinctive Organizational Culture It is important to understand a national culture and how it impacts the work environment. Reverting to Hofstede’s Cross-Cultural model, the famous model that analyses organizational cultures and enables crosscountry comparisons, Egypt can be characterized as being high on power distance, collectivism, femininity and uncertainty avoidance (Hofstede Insights, n.d.). Being high on power distance means that public employees consider hierarchy as a given and that it is acceptable to have employees occupying a higher-level position to have more privileges and be treated differently and formally. Egypt is a collectivist society, its public employees have to be managed as a group and the employer/employee relations are perceived like family relations. Meanwhile, the high femininity dimension for public employees means the focus at work is on quality of life, more than on competition, and conflict is avoided in favour of compromises and better quality of work life. Finally, being high on uncertainty avoidance means that public employees favour security and stability, accept rules easily and are not keen on innovation and change (Hofstede Insights, n.d.; El Baradei, 2018). These interesting attributes—although definitely not set in stone—may be useful in better understanding the context of the Egyptian public service.

3.3   Peculiarities Inside the Administration at the Central Level: Civil Service System The New Civil Service Law No. 81 lately ratified by parliament in 2016 came by with a number of aspirational changes to the recruitment and appraisal systems for civil servants. For the first time, it is now stated that all employees will have to sit for a computerized examination system before receiving tenure in government. The law also called for a 360-degree appraisal system, although implementation is still sketchy. The executive

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regulations for the law issued a year later in 2017 provided more explanation about operationalization (Decree No.1216, 2017). For example, regarding the 360-degree appraisal system, Article 67 of the executive regulations states that “each authority will develop its own employee appraisal system that includes one or more dimension for evaluation, such as self-evaluation, evaluation by the superiors, evaluation from the direct manager, peer evaluation, evaluation of the employee by the citizens dealing with the unit, and general evaluation of the unit in which the employee works”. Reading carefully through the aforementioned article, it seems that the 360-degree appraisal is optional, and units may decide to go for a unidimensional appraisal, if they so wish. President Sisi’s government is taking a strong stance against administrative corruption. According to the Worldwide Governance Indicators, Egypt is starting to show improvement on the ‘fighting corruption’ dimension within the good governance assessment. The Administrative Control Agency, the entity in charge of investigating and reporting corruption in public service, is reported to be quite active over the past few years, and newspapers abound with reported cases of discovered corruption by top-level officials in the government, including ministers, governors and assistant governors.

3.4   Public Administration Performance According to the World Bank Governance Indicators the performance of the Egyptian government on all five dimensions of good governance from 2007 to 2017 shows that there was deterioration in all but the control of the corruption dimension. 3.4.1  Transparency and Accountability Transparency and accountability of the Egyptian government is lacking in many respects. Transparency is lacking in several aspects of the current government’s operation, where citizens are usually presented with major policy decisions as done deals; an example being the new Administrative Capital of Egypt, and the new Suez-Canal branch that was completed in a record time of one year instead of three years. Means of government accountability are severely weakened. Media is repressed. Emergency law has been enforced repetitively over the past eight years. Every time the three-month limit of emergency expires, it gets

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to be renewed. Political parties are nearly non-existent. Civil society is hampered by the NGO law and the restrictions imposed on the operations of civil society organizations in general, including syndicates, labour unions, political parties and non-governmental organizations. According to the Freedom House 2019 Report, Egypt is classified as ‘Not Free’ and is given an aggregate freedom score of 22/100, where least free is 0 and most free is 100 (Freedom House, 2019). 3.4.2  Rule of Law Measures for the rule of law, and for voice and accountability, exist from the Worldwide Governance Indicators and from the World Justice Project WJP index. Egypt is faring very poorly. The country is reported as ranking 121/126 globally on the Rule of Law Index (World Justice Report, 2019). The Index is generated for 126 countries based on household and expert surveys. 3.4.3  Policy-Making, Coordination and Regulation The policy-making process is in general ambiguous and non-transparent. The current parliament is not very credible for several reasons at the top of which is its record approval of more than 300 laws, during the first two weeks of operation: laws that had been issued by the President of the Republic during the gap period when there was no parliament in place. Only the Civil Service Law was rejected and sent back for modification, before being approved a short time later. Parliament is dominated by a coalition that names itself ‘in support of Egypt’ that basically works hard to support the government and President Sisi in whatever they do, a matter that goes against the ‘raison d’etre’ of parliaments, that are supposed to be responsible for holding government accountable. A third reason that casts doubt on parliament’s credibility is its most recent approval of the 2014 constitutional changes that extend the terms of the presidency from two four-year periods to two six-year periods and allow the current president to benefit retroactively from that change, and not only that, but also allows the current president, on an exceptional basis, through what is referred to as a ‘transitional constitutional article’ to run for elections one more time following his extended two terms, and thus possibly continue in power until the year 2030. The presidents of the republic have always

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had a major impact on the policies chosen to the extent that it is common practice for any government official or minister to start his speech by saying ‘According to the directions received from the President’. 3.4.4  Efficiency and Effectiveness of the Administrative System, Overall Government Performance The efficiency level of Egyptian government employees has always been traditionally a cause for ridicule and sarcasm by many. One infamous study, which is always cited and often mis-quoted by Egyptian researchers, is that by the Al-Ahram Centre for Strategic and Political Studies that tried to measure the productivity levels of Egyptian bureaucrats and concluded that it was “exceptionally low” (Palmer et al., 1988: 149). Another study also over-cited is that by Ayoubi where he states that “On average, the Egyptian civil servant was estimated to ‘work’ solidly only for a period of between twenty minutes and two hours every working day” (Leila et al., 1985: 349). Government effectiveness is also monitored on a regular basis by the Worldwide Governance Indicators. Egypt’s record for government effectiveness improved in 2017 compared to 2014, but was much better in 2007 (World Bank, 2019). Many administrative reform plans have been formulated over the years and a good number of reform programmes have been implemented. The current two entities responsible for the portfolio of administrative reform in the government are the Central Agency for Organization and Administration and the Ministry of Planning, Monitoring and Administrative Reform (MoPMAR). Currently in the pipeline there are huge efforts exerted to digitize government operations. E-government was first introduced heavily to the government through Mubarak’s era under the guidance of the then active Minister of State for Administrative Reform, Ahmed Darwish, who had a computer engineering background. During his time, Egypt managed to win the United Nations Public Service Award (UNPSA) in recognition for its successful efforts in transforming the public university application system, from a tedious manual system to an electronic system serving more than 300,000 students each academic year. A number of regular government services were also provided online through the Government of Egypt online portal, some of which are working effectively to this day, and some are not (Gebba & Zakaria, 2015).

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3.5   Relating the Peculiarities to the Post-Conflict Situation One of the remarkable peculiarities related to the bureaucracy and the years of political turbulence is the proven resilience of the bureaucracy during the repeated presidential changes, cabinet changes, demonstrations and street violence. Citizens were still capable of renewing their national IDs, and issuing birth certificates, even when the street demonstrations were most rampant. Another peculiarity is the re-introduction of the parallel structures to the bureaucracy even though during the Revolution peak, many of the highly paid consultants were let go. Bit by bit the ministers realized the continuing need for the equivalent of ‘political appointees’ and young, highly qualified staff with abilities that were missing among members of the traditional bureaucracy. Parallel structures also started taking new forms. Examples of the new parallel forms in recent years include the establishment of a special fund called “Long Live Egypt”, or “Tahya Masr”, that collects donations mostly from businessmen and uses the resources to implement the government’s developmental and philanthropic initiatives in support to existing government entities. Another example is the establishment of a ‘Charity Endowment’ for pre-university public education for the purpose of supplementing the salaries of school teachers (Al-Ahram, 2014; El Baradei, 2019a; Al-Youm, 2019). A good Governance Unit was established at the Ministry of Planning, Monitoring and Administrative Reform. The Governance Unit was established by virtue of ministerial decree No. 115 for the year 2014 with the responsibility of integrating ‘democratic governance’ principles in public policy-making and implementation, plus building the capacity of all national institutions based on good governance principles (National Management Institute, webpage). A cooperation protocol was signed between the Governance Unit and a Public Administration Research and Consultation Centre (PARC) at Cairo University in order to implement a number of joint training workshops and conferences to disseminate the culture of good governance amongst government employees (ElMogaz, 2018). In April 2019, the Governance Unit organized in Cairo what was referred to as “Africa’s First Forum on Governance and Development”, the declared aim of which was to showcase the achievements realized by African countries as regards good governance, and to emphasize the Government of Egypt’s efforts in that regard as well. Other than that, very

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little information is available about the details of its workings and findings. With the dismal performance and ranking of the Government of Egypt on international good governance indicators and rule of law, it may be appropriate to refer to the efforts made so far by the Governance Unit as ‘cosmetic governance’, a term coined earlier by a political economy scholar in describing the Mubarak regime’s efforts to instil good governance values in a corrupt context (Fawzy, 2012: 59). The Voluntary National Report (VNR) of 2018 on the Government of Egypt’s implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals included a section on SDG 16: the goal that tackles peace, justice, strong institutions and implicitly good governance. However, only one quantitative indicator was reported regarding SDG 16, the one dealing with an improvement in the corruption perception index. Other very general ambiguous comments were made regarding the government’s efforts to improve on good governance, such as adopting a four-year National Anti-Corruption Strategy in 2014, and in 2016 creating a ten-year National Strategy for Combatting Illegal Migration. Additionally, it was reported that the polls conducted by the independent Egyptian Centre for Public Opinion Research (Baseera) showed an improvement in how the public perceived the country’s security situation, and that a recent Gallup poll reported by BBC suggested Egypt as one of the safest countries in the world (Arab Republic of Egypt, 2018: 57). Nothing further was mentioned about, for example, promoting the rule of law, ending violence against children, developing accountable and transparent institutions at all levels, or ensuring public access to information. This is despite the fact that all the preceding are agreed to global targets related to SDG 16 (United Nations Global SDG Database, n.d.).

3.6   The Move of Public Employees to the New Capital In March 2015, President Sisi announced the plan to establish a new Administrative Capital for Egypt. According to the State Information Service, the plan for the capital was already there since 2007 during President Mubarak’s era, but was shelved because of other perceived priorities. The new Administrative Capital—still unnamed—will be located around 40 kilometres away from Cairo and the plan is to move to it all the ministries, parliament, embassies, central bank, main judiciary system,

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courts and other government agencies. The goal is to attract new investments, alleviate population density in the old capital and create new job opportunities (Abdel Aleem, n.d.). The challenge is how to move the nearly six million government employees from their offices in different parts around old Cairo to the new city. Some of the hurdles identified include the expected high cost of moving, the housing and means of transportation availability, and dealing with the anticipated resistance of government employees to the move. A policy brief tackling the issue and prepared by the Public Policy Hub at the American University in Cairo discussed the above challenges and proposed a number of recommendations including being more transparent about the move to guarantee buy­in by employees, making sure that transportation facilities are offered at discount for public employees, offering incentives for those moving and making available affordable housing (Mahmoud et al., 2018). In June 2019 the Ministry of Planning, Monitoring and Administrative Reform announced the broad headlines for the new national administrative reform plan. The plan will be implemented over two phases and will cover 2443 government entities. The first phase will involve moving the bureaucracy to the new Administrative Capital and will continue over three years starting from the fiscal year 2020/2021, whereas the second phase will run over three to five years and will focus on improving the efficiency, effectiveness, governance and accountability of the administrative system and contribute to the achievement of the national development goals (Youm7, 25 June, 2019b). More specific features of the plan included legislative reform, establishing new units for internal auditing, and for monitoring and evaluation, increasing investments in the capacity building of public employees through cooperation with local and international universities and research centres and training of trainers (Elwatannews, 2019).

3.7   Conclusion As seen, the Egyptian bureaucracy is a centralized, overstaffed body, with a distinctive organizational culture that offers relatively low compensation to its employees, resorts to parallel structures as a quick fix and yet its jobs continue to be in high demand by many. It endured during the turbulent years and has continued to deliver its basic services to citizens, although with less than an optimum level of efficiency and effectiveness.

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The Government of Egypt has a number of plans for implementing dramatic reforms to the government bureaucracy, including the move to the new capital, the accelerated fight against corruption, enhanced digitization, and the implementation of the new civil service law allowing for computerized entrance exams and 360-degree performance appraisals. Some positive steps have been undertaken including the development of a Governance Unit within the Ministry of Planning, Monitoring and Administrative Reform, and the submission of National Voluntary Reports on the implementation of the SDGs. The real challenge remaining, to be able to have a more responsive, efficient and effective public administration, is to have improvements in all good governance indicators. If we cannot hold the government accountable, if there is no transparency or freedom of expression, then there is little chance of achieving real reform.

References Abdel Aleem, M. (n.d.). The New Administrative Capital: New Crossing Towards the Future. State Information Service Website. http://www.sis.gov.eg/UP/ Egyptians%20Abroad%20Magazine%2038/002.pdf (In Arabic) Abdelhamid, D., & El Baradei, L. (2010). Reforming the Pay System for Government Employees in Egypt. International Public Management Review, 11(3), 59–86. Ahram Online. (2019). Egypt’s Sisi Announces First Raise in Minimum Wage for State Employees Since 2014—Politics—Egypt. http://english.ahram.org.eg/ NewsContent/1/64/329104/Egypt/Politics-­/Egypts-­Sisi-­announces-­first-­ raise-­in-­minimum-­wage-­.aspx Akhbarelyom. (2015). Organization and Administration: One Million Citizens Appointed to Government after January Revolution. Retrieved July 17, 2019, from https://akhbarelyom.com/news/newdetails/142637/1/ Al-Ahram. (2014). Presidency Announces the Establishment of ‘Tahya Masr’ Fund with Direct Supervision from Sisi and Under the Surveillance of the Auditing Agency. http://gate.ahram.org.eg/News/510600.aspx (In Arabic) Al-Youm, A.-M. (2019). Egypt’s National Investment Charity Fund for Education Is a Milestone: Minister. Egypt Independent. https://egyptindependent.com/ egypts-­national-­investment-­charity-­fund-­for-­education-­is-­a-­milestone-­minister/ Arab Republic of Egypt. (2018). Egypt’s Voluntary National Review 2018. https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/20269EGY_ VNR_2018_final_with_Hyperlink_9720185b45d.pdf

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Ayubi, N.  N. M. (1980). Bureaucracy and Politics in Contemporary Egypt. Ithaca Press. Barsoum, G. (2014). Young People’s Job Aspirations in Egypt and the Continued Preference for a Government Job. Economic Research Forum. Working Papers 838. Barsoum, G. (2015). The Public Sector as the Employer of Choice among Youth in Egypt: The Relevance of Public Service Motivation Theory. International Journal of Public Administration, 39(3), 205–215. Brown, N.  J. (2013). Tracking the “Arab Spring”: Egypt’s Failed Transition. Journal of Democracy, 24(4), 45–58. CIPE. (2009). Tackling the Leviathan: Reforming Egyptian Bureaucracy for Improved Economic Growth. Center for International Private Enterprise. http://www.cipe-­arabia.org/files/pdf/Bureaucracy-­EN.pdf Decree No.1216. (2017). Executive Regulations for the Civil Service Law No. 81 for 2016. Official Gazette, Issue 21 (Repeated). ECES. (2019). MoP: Administrative Reform Plan will be Applied to 2443 Entities. The Egyptian Center for Economic Studies: Views on News, Issue 547. El Baradei, L. (2011). Parallel Structures in the Egyptian Government Bureaucracy: A Problematic Quick Fix. Public Administration, 89(4), 1351–1366. El Baradei, L. (2015). The Case for Decentralization as a Tool for Improving Quality in Egyptian Basic Education. Egyptian Center for Economic Studies (ECES), Working Paper, No. 180. El Baradei, L. (2018). We Need Less Power Distance in Egyptian Bureaucracies. PA TIMES Online. https://patimes.org/we-­need-­less-­power-­distance-­in-­ egyptian-­bureaucracies/ El Baradei, L. (2019a). Egypt’s Currency Devaluation & Impact on the Most Vulnerable. International Relations and Diplomacy, 7(7), 303–316. El Baradei, L. (2019b). Forms of Duality of Institutions and the Reasons Why: Egypt’s Case. PA TIMES Online. https://patimes.org/forms-­of-­duality-­ of-­institutions-­and-­the-­reasons-­why-­egypts-­case/ Elfagr. (2016). Sisi: Appointing 900 Thousand Employees in the State Administrative Agency after the 25th of January Revolution. Retrieved July 17, 2019, from https://www.elfagr.com/2236084 ElMogaz. (2018). Minister of Planning Resorts to the Governance Unit for the Training of Employees to Fight Corruption. http://www.elmogaz.com/ node/485496 (In Arabic) Elwatannews. (2019). Ministry of Planning ends the Public Service Day: Administrative Reform in Egypt. Retrieved July 17, 2019, from https://www. elwatannews.com/news/details/4231490 (In Arabic) Fawzy, S. (2012). Accumulative Bad Governance. IDS Bulletin, 43(1), 54–61. Freedom House. (2019). Freedom in the World 2019: Egypt. https://freedomhouse.org/country/egypt/freedom-­world/2019

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Gebba, T. R., & Zakaria, M. R. (2015). E-Government in Egypt: An Analysis of Practices and Challenges. International Journal of Business Research and Development, 4(2), 70–79. Hatab, S. (2017). Abortive Regime Transition in Egypt: Pro-democracy Alliance and Demand-Making Framework. Democratization, 25(4), 579–596. Hofstede Insights. (n.d.). Egypt. Hofstede Insights. https://www.hofstede-­ insights.com/country/egypt/ Hughes, O. E. (1994). Public Management and Administration: An Introduction. Macmillan Press. Khalil, B. (2019). Al-Ahram Opens Up the File of Citizens’ Dealings with Governmental Agencies. Al-Ahram Newspaper, p. 3. Leila, A., Yassin, E., & Palmer, M. (1985). Apathy, Values, Incentives and Development: The Case of the Egyptian Bureaucracy. Middle East Journal, 39(3), 341–361. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4327127. Mahmoud, Dina, Perihan Tawfik, Sarah El Gerby & Soraya El Hag (2018). Moving Governmental Staff to the New Capital City. Cairo: The Public Policy Hub Publications. https://documents.aucegypt.edu/Docs/GAPP/Public%20 Policy%20Hub%20Webpage/6-%20Moving%20Governmental%20Staff%20 to%20the%20New%20Capital%20City%20Policy%20Paper.pdf. Noueihed, L., & Alsharif, A. (2016). Egyptian Central Bank Floats Pound. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/egypt-­currency/egyptian-­central­bank-­floats-­pound-­idINKBN12Y0Z3 Palmer, M., Leila, A., & Yassin, E. S. (1988). The Egyptian Bureaucracy. Syracuse University Press. Rutherford, B. K. (2018). Egypt’s New Authoritarianism Under Sisi. The Middle East Journal, 72(2), 185–208. United Nations Global SDG Database. (n.d.). SDG Indicators. United Nations. https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/indicators/database/ World Bank. (2019). Worldwide Governance Indicators. Retrieved April 24, 2019, from https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#home World Justice Project. (2019). Rule of Law Index 2019. https://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/documents/ROLI-­2019-­Reduced.pdf Youm7. (2019a). Finance Ministry Reveals Salary Increases in July after Raising the Minimum Wage to 2000 EGP.  Retrieved July 17, 2019, from https:// www.youm7.com/story/2019/3/30/ Youm7. (2019b). Planning: Administrative Reform Plan to be Implemented on 2443 Entities. Retrieved July 17, 2019, from https://www.youm7.com/ story/2019/6/25/

CHAPTER 4

Public Administration in Iraq: The Post-ISIS Transition Pavol Kosnáč and Tadeáš Pala

4.1   Introduction Even though the history of Iraq begins with the history of mankind, since it geographically finds itself in the area of the “Fertile Crescent”, we will focus on the modern era, which is no less dramatic than ancient times. Our attention is focused on the historical events mostly defining the recent development, beginning with the twilight of the Saddam Hussein era, followed by international interventions and occupation, especially in 2003. A brief overview of these historical milestones may offer us help

P. Kosnáč Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University in Brno, Brno, Czech Republic e-mail: [email protected] T. Pala (*) Department of Public Economics, Faculty of Economics and Administration, Masaryk University in Brno, Brno, Czech Republic e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 J. Nemec, P. S. Reddy (eds.), Public Administration in Conflict Affected Countries, Governance and Public Management, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74966-8_4

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when it comes to developing a better understanding of the effectiveness of public structures and their peculiarities. It is crucial to seek the explanations of the recent state in the past. The Saddam regime had influenced the country’s future deeply, mostly in a negative way. Saddam’s regime was based on an aggressive authoritarianism, bolstered by the personality cult of its leader who did not tolerate any opposition. It governed its population by enforcing its obedience and hunting down its critics. Even under the cover of the official Baathist ideology, which is supposed to be secular and nationalist pan-Arabism, there was an increasing division of population according to their ethnic and religious status. This phenomenon fully manifested itself especially after the fall of the regime, like a lid falling off a pressure cooker. The oppression of minorities, such as the Kurds or the Shia (majority), bore bitter fruits in a strong hostility potential between various ethnic and religious groups. This is noteworthy for the purpose of a public sector analysis, because it frames the relationship between the ruling elites and the rest of the population. With inevitable affiliations towards one or another group, the current elites were prone to side with their own group, and to overlook or even harm the opposition. This legacy of a corrupt state may have deeper roots than the Saddam regime, but its administration was literally based on corruption, mafia-like loyalty-based structures, nepotism, clientelism and oppression of the opposition. Unfortunately, these characteristics have remained as a “hereditary disposition” also for the following administrations. Therefore, we must be aware that our analysis of the failure of public structures that led to the rise of ISIS has its foundations in the long-term ineffectiveness and inherent unfairness of the whole system. The goal of this analysis is to clarify the significant aspects of Public Administration performance in the context of the Iraqi conflict. We aim to focus especially on the malicious behaviour of some agents of Public Administration, as well as on the deficiencies in the system as a whole. The factors that will be described in our analysis are very important sources of Iraqi Public Administration fragility and consequently the sources of its poor performance. We consider it crucial to take in account the dimension of armed conflict, with particular emphasis on security aspects. The findings are based both on the analysis of reports from international organisations and on field research and observation. The chapter has been elaborated as one of the outcomes of the research projects (MUNI/A/1106/2018) and (MUNI/A/1056/2019).

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4.2   Background Data/Information In order to better understand the success of ISIS, the rise of Shia militias and other factors that contribute to the general weakness of the Iraqi state, we must briefly present the territorial, ethnic and religious circumstances which occurred in Iraq at the beginning of the second decade of the twenty-first century. These determinants will also define the object of our analysis. 4.2.1  (De)Centralisation The geographical structure of Iraq is based on the results of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the following British colonial mandate. Iraq, similar to a number of other Middle Eastern states, suffered an arbitrary approach in the process of both border formation and power division by the former colonial empires. A culturally insensitive setting caused many problems and complications for the future of the region. In 2011, just before the growth of ISIS, the Iraqi population consisted of a few major ethnic groups. It was reported that approximately 70% were of Arab population, 15% were Kurds, 10–13% of Turkmen minorities and 5% were others such as Chaldean, Assyrian and so on (Central Intelligence Agency, 2018). The population of Iraq, on an ethnic basis, is situated rather heterogeneously. The northern part of the country is mostly inhabited by the Kurdish minority that is mostly Sunni, but the primary source of its identity is ethnic, not religious—which means it is more defining for an individual to be a Kurd than to be a Sunni Muslim. On the other hand, the southern part of the country, along with the capital of Baghdad, is populated mostly by Shia Arabs (Č erný & Tureček, 2015). Iraq consists of 19 administrative regions. For centuries, the primary identity indicator was affiliation with a clan or a tribe, with occasional exceptions in the case of strong believers, who might primarily identify with their faith, which in the Shia context usually means with a concrete line of religious authorities—clerics and ayatollahs. As mentioned above, Iraq consists of several ethnically based territories. It is important to understand some territorial specifics such as the existence of Iraqi Kurdistan, the so-called Kurdistan Region. Since the time of British colonisation, the Kurdish nation/ethnicity/tribes have been struggling for their own independent and sovereign state and government.

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After deadly clashes with Saddam’s regime, which included ethnic cleansing by chemical weapons of mass destruction on Saddam’s part, the Kurds played an important role in supporting the invasion by Western countries in 2003. Since then, the Kurds have achieved regional autonomy at a formerly unprecedented level. Since that time, the Kurdistan region has been a specific item on the Iraqi government budget. Iraqi Kurdistan has its own infrastructure and government, ruled by a regional president. As we can see, the identity of Iraqis is multi-layered—tribal, religious, ethnic, political and also including combinations of the aforementioned. 4.2.2  Tribes Tribes are a pre-modern form of administration. However, for many Iraqis it still is the most relevant form of Public Administration. Tribal affiliation is common among Iraqis—approximately 75% are members of one of Iraq’s 150 tribes, the largest having hundreds of thousands of members (Hassan, 2007). The tribal structure resembles a pyramid. The largest unit is a tribal confederation, which may span across several states and be made of dozens of tribes. The confederations consist of tribes which can be broken down to lower organising units—clans. A clan can be described as a larger number of families, but the tribal system uses a “house” as a subgroup as well, and several families can live in a house. Multi-generational households are relatively common in Iraq (Bobseine, 2019). This structure is typical for Arabs as the largest ethnic group in Iraq. The Kurds do not usually have the confederation superstructure, and smaller groups like the Assyrians and the Chaldeans are usually only members of clans, but not tribes, and their clans often lack formal figureheads such as sheiks. A tribe is traditionally headed by a sheikh. The main responsibility of the sheik is protecting his tribesmen from harm, providing a social safety net, mediating disputes and making peace. Tribal laws and customs may vary, but there are significant overlaps among Sunni and Shia tribal customs and tribal law, estimated by tribal jurists at 80%. According to Bobseine (2019), most discrepancies are limited to the price of “diya”, a type of financial compensation made to settle disputes. Tribes are a systematically underestimated phenomenon of Middle Eastern societies on the part of Western researchers and decision-makers.

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4.2.3  Religion After the invasion in 2003, the government and administration led by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki—the head of the Islamic Dawa Party— intended to create an effectively functioning state. Unfortunately, his intentions did not transform into reality. Maliki’s administration was not able to settle rather explosive tempers among the different groups. His main failure was the inability (or unwillingness) to hinder the overgrowing ambitions of the majority Shia population, ranging from simple preferential treatment to silent willingness to overlook mass revenge killings, for example, when Shia death commandos hunted former Sunnis associated with Saddam’s regime that had persecuted the Shia majority. It is no surprise that ISIS, motivated and fuelled by an extreme and militant branch of Sunni-Wahabi Islam, found most supporters in the central area with the Sunni majority (O’Driscoll, 2015). It is also important to mention religious conditions. Before the war against ISIS, most of the Iraqi population were Shia, approximately 60%, followed by Sunni 30%, Christian 5% and 2% Yezidi (Central Intelligence Agency, 2018). Nowadays, after the most violent phase of insurgency, we may witness a significant decrease in Christian and Yezidi populations as a result of ISIS cleansing “their” territories of those they did not like, similar to the abovementioned case of Shia reprisals. Reports on the ground indicate massive redistribution of population and change in human geography on an ethno-religious basis (Isakhan, 2015). These frictions were visible not only in the contexts of governing, influence and other administrative fields, but, for example, also in the case of security issues. The example of this lack of sensitivity was the inability of incorporating Sunni militias into government forces. The case of the dissolution of the so-called Sons of Iraq was later found rather unfortunate and imprudent (Benraad, 2009). Many members of Sunni militias and tribes chose to collaborate with extreme Islamists due to the government’s previous unwillingness to cooperate. 4.2.4  ISIS The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is a transnational Sunni insurgent group operating primarily in western Iraq and eastern Syria, ideologically adherent to the school of Islamic political thought of Jihadi-Salafism. First appearing with the name ISIL (April 2013), it launched an offensive

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in early 2014 that drove Iraqi government forces out of key western Iraqi cities. Simultaneously in Syria, it fought both government forces and rebel factions in the Syrian Civil War. In June 2014, (after making significant territorial gains in Iraq) the group proclaimed the establishment of a caliphate led by the leader of ISIL, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. International forces successfully defeated the group, which led to its subsequent decline. In November 2017, both Syria and Iraq claimed that ISIL was effectively defeated, though ISIL continued to hold a small amount of territory as late as March 2019 (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2016). The group has been designated a terrorist organisation by the United Nations (UN) as well as by many international organisations and individual countries. The UN holds ISIS responsible for committing human rights abuses, genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity (Larson, 2014). ISIS was able to build a de facto parallel society, and eventually took over a third of Iraq. The ability of ISIS to do so seemed unbelievably quick from the Western perspective. To a certain extent, it is due to the fact that in the West nation states are strong and have no real competition in providing public services. In a large part of the Middle East, local tribes or religious organisations are parallel providers of social systems, including a social safety net. Alternative law enforcement or a parallel system of justice is not uncommon. When ISIS arrived and established its own parallel structures, it was not anything new in the lives of the local inhabitants, especially since many Sunni Arabs considered them a better and more just alternative than the Shia-dominated government in Baghdad, which meant that many cooperated with ISIS, including public servants. What helped ISIS win local Sunni Arabs’ confidence was its strategy to apply most changes very gradually. During the first 6 months ISIS mostly refrained from introducing and enforcing changes according to their interpretation of Sharia law, and focused on improving public services instead, providing better security, enforcing market and food-quality standards, rooting out corruption in the local justice system and greatly improving the speed and the impartiality of the courts. All this resulted in making it popular among the locals, since the torture and public executions that horrified global media were not rare at that time in Iraq. Al-Qaeda or Shia militias had committed those crimes even before. These were the sentiments ISIS was able to generate among a large part of the Sunni Arab population in the first months of its conquest of Iraqi towns. Later on, many residents realised that it was only the first phase of ISIS’s

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agenda. While their control of the area gradually grew, the strict enforcement of ISIS’s interpretation of Sharia was enforced. However, by that time it was too late to change one’s mind (Reuter, 2015).

4.3   The Performance of the Public Administration System in Iraq 4.3.1  The Overall PA Performance Not only security issues were handled sub-optimally. The Iraqi regime regularly scores at the lowest rates of international comparison charts. Despite the limits of the international comparison metrics, it is obvious that “something is rotten in the state of Iraq”. Useful data are provided by the World Bank. We use the cluster of indicators called Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI, 2020). If we look at Fig.  4.1, we may observe some interesting trends in particular indicators. It is important to focus on the period of the rise of ISIS. We can observe that the already low scores of most of the indicators are decreasing. Voice and Accountability, 100

Voice and Accountability

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Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism Government Effectiveness

80

Percentile Rank

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Rule of Law

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Control of Corruption

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Fig. 4.1  Worldwide Governance Indicators: Iraq. (Source: Authors based on World Bank data)

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Political Stability and Absence of Violence, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality and Control of Corruption are more or less worsening in the period of ISIS rule. However, the indicator Rule of Law shows a slight improvement for a limited period of time. This may be easily caused by limited access to relevant data, but it is still a very interesting moment, worth a deeper examination. In a separate chapter, we will focus on the role of ISIS’s concept of rule of law as well as on people’s perception of it. All the presented indicators refer to the alarming levels of the inability of the Iraqi state to stabilise public services. In general, all the indicators have expressed a very poor level of management. Its evaluation report has stated the main problems: legal framework; human resources; managerial capacity; administrative structures and functionality; sector management and service delivery. One of the most painful issues is the overstaffing of the government and administrative institutions. This may also be caused by the legacy of the Saddam regime, since there was a rule to provide jobs for people, including new graduates (Shubber, 2016). Some sources refer to the widespread ineffectiveness among the state employees represented by the figure of 17  minutes of productive work during an average working day (Cockburn, 2016). The governmental and administrative positions were also provided to loyalists and did not necessarily reflect the predispositions and capabilities of staff. As a result, we could observe an overgrown and expensive apparatus that lacked effectiveness. The costs needed for the operation of this structure were very high. According to Taylor (2011), 78–80% of the government’s operating budget was spent on salaries. The cost of salary-­ related expenditures almost doubled between 2005 and 2011. The situation described poses a significant threat to private companies and enterprises, which are in rather disadvantageous positions since they are not able to provide sufficient competition to the state sector (Ministry of Planning and Hikma, 2014). 4.3.2  Iraq as a Fragile State Useful data are provided by the internationally respected Fragile States Index. It is developed by the Fund for Peace—it goes even further and indicates not only the results, but also the observed factors in more detail (Fig. 4.2).

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85

100

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improvement

Total Country Score

worsening

120

20

0 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

Year

Fig. 4.2  Fragile States Index: Iraq. (Source: Authors (based on The Fund for Peace, 2020))

Since Maliki took over in 2006, we can observe that Iraq has found itself among the top 15 fragile states of the world. The trend of this phenomenon is stable and fragility has been a sizeable issue for Iraq for more than a decade. The Fragile States Index is published annually with the cooperation of the American magazine Foreign Policy. It is based on multiple indicators grouped in categories such as cohesion, political, social and economic. Results are based on data combined from multiple sources represented by local observers and international contributors. Reliability of the index is limited, but when combined with other measures, it may offer a useful deduction. All partial factors as well as the index itself indicate a high level of fragility. The worst part that we can observe is the unbroken trend of results. In the 16-year period after the invasion by international forces, Iraqi elites were not able to make any significant progress.

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4.3.3  Corruption

max

Another interesting and generally accepted index is the Corruption Perception Index, which identified Iraq as one of the most corrupted countries (Fig. 4.3). According to a Transparency International survey, the population is routinely exposed to corruption. The 2013 data by Transparency International (Agator, 2013) discovered that 29% of Iraqi adults reported to having paid a bribe to at least one of eight services in the previous 12 months. The majority of people also reported that they thought corruption in Iraq was on the rise, with 60% saying it had increased either a lot or a little over the past two years. Only 16% reported that they thought corruption had decreased, and a further 25% said that they thought the level of corruption had stayed the same. Bureaucracy is mostly driven by weak institutions, enlarged bribery and corruption, ghost employment, in-group loyalty and a general belief that “he who does not steal, steals from his family”. It is important to focus on this segment of Iraqi public services—because security has been one of the most important issues and challenges since the international invasion. The conditions in which the police and namely the army had found themselves before the rise of ISIS were catastrophic. Unreliability and the lack of effectiveness of security forces led to the wide spread of various militias. This had a boosting impact on the spread of violence and grievances. 100 90 80 70

Score

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Fig. 4.3  Corruption Perception Index—Score for Iraq. (Source: Authors based on Transparency International data)

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The next issue worth mentioning is related to the personal aspects of Public Administration. One aspect that concerns everyone is the performance of the security and defence forces. The widespread phenomenon of patronage, nepotism and clientelism among security forces has been reported by international surveys since the beginning of the Maliki administration (Pring, 2016). An issue that can illustrate the situation of the disintegration of the Iraqi governing and Public Administration services is international development spending. The overall transparency level is very low. This can be demonstrated by the ability to clearly incorporate foreign aid. The combination of large aid income and weak administration created the milieu of mismanagement and rent-seeking behaviour. Transparency International provides evidence of misappropriation and corruption that resulted in the loss of approximately 8 billion dollars of the 60 billion dollars provided by the USA as long-term reconstruction support (Bowen, 2013). 4.3.4  Tax Collection: A Rentier State An important issue that has weakened the stability of the Iraqi state may seem rather paradoxical. It is known that Iraq, as one of the top petroleum-­ reserve holders, is highly dependent on oil. Unfortunately, the Iraqi elites have never been able to use this advantage for their own country’s sake. Saddam’s war adventures and the following international intervention prevented the country from the successful integration of necessary reforms and modernisation. Iraq’s massive dependence on oil revenue has caused a difficult situation in which Iraq now finds itself. We can claim that Iraq fits perfectly into the category of the so-called rentier states (Beblawi, 1987). In the case of Iraq, the revenue from crude oil production and export constituted the largest part of the state’s public revenue—97.4% in 2012. Oil production contribution to the GDP reached up to 70% (Ministry of Planning and Hikma, 2014). This problem has not only economic and geopolitical consequences, but also a great impact on the public sphere, services and accountability. In Iraq, the connections between the population, its government and public administrators are broken. One of the reasons—explained by the theory of a “rentier state”—is the fact that the state income which is available to the government does not come from its population—or more specifically—from its taxpayers. The level of tax collection in Iraq, especially personal taxation, is very low. The government and public services do not

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depend on people’s opinion expressed in taxation. The government’s decision-making is not reliant on the population and therefore not accountable. The population is very sensitive to possible changes since the tax burden is low and any attempt to change causes protests. The electorate does not feel important and heard. In the case of Iraq, the total tax-to-­ GDP ratios have not exceeded 1%. This is a low share of the economy compared to the average ratio in similar countries in the region, where it is more than ten times larger (IMF Country Report, 2017). 4.3.5  Rule of Law Rule of law was one of the main objectives of the coalition’s state-building efforts in Iraq. In 2003, the Department of Justice (DoJ) sent 13 American judges and related professionals to assess the situation. Their conclusion described a dangerous vacuum in the law enforcement authority, especially after the emptying of prisons, disbanding the Iraqi military and dismantling the security apparatus. Crime, including kidnapping, rape and robbery, skyrocketed. It was estimated that possibly 5–10% of the courts worked in a limited fashion. Court buildings were destroyed, and judges were in hiding, afraid of retaliation. The legal system was not independent but served the Ba’ath Party. Corruption was commonplace, since legal professionals were not making a living wage, that is, court-appointed defence attorneys made the equivalent of $2–$3 for an entire legal case, and court clerks, administrators and police officers had incomes equivalent to several dollars a month. According to the DoJ report, judges were better off “largely due to what one judge said was simply a time-honoured tradition: accepting ‘gifts’” (Thomas, 2008: 22). Another problem was Saddam’s legacy of property disputes, forcing owners from their land and redistributing property to party loyalists. These loyalists often sold it on to someone else who had no previous knowledge of the origin of the land or property. The DoJ describes a great number of conflicting claims to significant portions of the property with multiple claimants with good claims. Conflicts arising from these disputes were threatening the stability of the whole country, since many powerful actors—individuals as well as whole clans or tribes wanted their property back. One of the largest problems was the de facto acceptance of torture by the criminal code, including permitted coerced confessions, if supported by other evidence. An outcome was the absence of the right for the accused

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to remain silent. The situation described by the DoJ in 2003 had not changed much in 2019—the new Anti-Terror Law of 2005 allows Iraqi judges to continue accepting torture during interrogation as a non-­ disqualifier in the court of law, despite Iraq being a signatory of the U.N. Convention Against Torture and promising the U.N. Human Rights Council it will stop and discourage acts of torture (Marshall, 2019). This law allows designating every person accused of having a role—no matter how big or small—in a terrorist event as guilty. The sentence can be up to 20 years in jail or the death sentence. The current outcome of this situation is a high number of executions and steep jail sentences even for minor transgressions, such as selling vegetables to ISIS, because “Iraqi judges and lawyers feel under pressure and are under threat because if they defend or forgive an accused, they might be considered ISIS supporters” (Bellingreri, 2019: 1). The outcome is effectively a denial of the right to an adequate defence for individuals accused of being affiliated with ISIS. According to reports, it goes as far as security officers threatening and sometimes arresting lawyers in court who were seeking to defend ISIS suspects and families, effectively eliminating the due process in the court of law (Amnesty International, 2018). The position of a judge is often a family profession. It means that if the father is a judge, then often his sons are judges as well or their uncles may be judges. This may create complications for the state in the sense of nepotism and similar phenomena. However, a more worrying trend among Sunni Arab judges arose in the last several years, namely the conflict of interest in the form of blood vengeance through the judicial profession. Since ISIS went after judges in the area they controlled, many Sunni Arab judges were executed by ISIS. Many of those judges had family and friends in Baghdad who were also judges. That resulted in the situation when family members of ISIS victims preside over the court rulings of the persons accused of ISIS affiliation (Mironova, 2018). The situation of a judge is sensitive. If a judge argued that maybe those associated with ISIS, if proven that they were ordinary citizens not cooperating with the organisation, are only trying to survive and carry on their business, he might get labelled an “ISIS defender”. He will therefore not maintain this position. ISIS went after judges and killed them, so they have a score to settle. The situation of defence lawyers (barristers) is very similar. Dozens of defence lawyers were attacked or arrested because they only did their state-­ appointed duty—represented their client in the court of law. Some were attacked, because people misunderstood that a “defence lawyer” is a

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formal title in judiciary, and not a lawyer that defends ISIS because they like them. The fear that grips the defence lawyer profession contributed to the situation where ISIS suspects effectively lack defence in court, because the defence lawyer is afraid to speak, so they simply stay silent and eventually only ask for mercy for their client. And mercy is not given. To sum up, massive inefficiency is symptomatic. It is a common transition problem in authoritarian regimes and strongly hierarchical societies: personal initiative is almost non-existent. If instructions from the top do not arrive, no work nor change of significance is done. It was a self-­ preservation mechanism before, since initiative could be seen as a threat to one’s superiors or even worse—one could be seen as an independent thinker, meaning they think they may “know better” than their superior representing the ruling party. The possible punishment ranged from the suspicion of unreliability and the freezing of promotion to execution. It became so ingrained that it now contributes to the general inefficiency of Iraqi public service everywhere including the courts and law enforcement. This situation has resulted in a large percentage of Iraqi judiciary and law enforcement professionals being incompetent and refuse any personal initiative.

4.4   Security As of the writing of this chapter, Iraq has three main groups that represent Iraqi security forces. The Iraqi Armed Forces are an army in the traditional sense, consisting of army, navy and air force. They are controlled by the Ministry of Defence. Iraqi police, or Federal police, as it is more often called, fulfils the traditional law enforcement role and is overseen by the Ministry of Interior. The last major part of the security forces is represented by the Popular Mobilisation Units (PMU), al-Ḥ ashd ash-Shaʿbı ̄ in Arabic, commonly referred to as “the Hashd”. PMU is an umbrella term for several dozen mostly Shia Arab militias formed in 2014 as a response to the ISIS threat. They are formally supervised by the Ministry of Interior but have a semi-independent structure inside the ministry and report directly to the prime minister (Nordland, 2015). All three are crucial in securing Iraq, but most space will be devoted to the PMU. They have the most peculiar position, and as a confederation of militias are the least known and understood while being one of the main players in the security environment of Iraq.

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4.4.1  Iraqi Army and Federal Police Iraqi security forces were completely reformed and re-staffed after the US invasion in 2003. The “de-Baathification” process, forbidding higher-­ level Baath party members to serve in any governmental positions, led to the purge of tens of thousands of soldiers, police officers and intelligence personnel. Those struggled to find other jobs, since the state was—and still is—the largest employer in Iraq. That action was possibly the largest single-decision contribution to the instability of post-invasion Iraq. The country lacked security forces—and former security professionals joined anyone who offered employment—from emerging local militia groups to the criminal underground and to Al-Qaeda and other similar organisations. In sum, what happened was the large transfer of the best trained and most experienced security personnel from state employment to a free market. Thus, many of the new militias, mafias or terrorist groups had new members with better training and equipment than the official renewed Iraqi Army and police. Since then, Iraqi security forces have never regained their former power. Nothing has highlighted the full extent of the weakness and the dysfunctionality of the Iraqi Army and federal police better than the Fall of Mosul in the summer of 2014 (see the ISIS sub-chapter). Apart from the typical problems plaguing all levels of Iraqi Public Administration such as corruption and nepotism, the Iraqi Army has a problem with sectarianism. In order to guarantee representation of all the main Iraqi population groups, many high-level military positions are allocated by sect or ethnic group, that is, if a Sunni Arab commander dies or retires, he must be replaced by a Sunni Arab, whether that person is the most qualified person in line for the position or not. Arguing over these appointments can take years. Some Sunni commanders that fell during the offensive on Mosul in 2016 or 2017 have not been replaced yet. If the commander is Kurdish, he must be approved by the Kurdish Regional Government, which in practice means that both main Kurdish parties must support his nomination, prizing political acceptability over military skill (Mironova & Assi, 2020). The quota system should prevent discrimination in top ranks, but it does not always seem to work. Sunni officers complain that many Sunni generals are hired so that their ranks stay balanced, but they are not given real command or positions of responsibility and often end up in office jobs.

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4.4.2  PMU: Shia Militias Iraq has a long tradition of paramilitary entities on its territory. They vary extensively in their political affiliations, ideologies and objectives. Some were affiliated with the state while others have stood against it. Originally formed mostly along sectarian lines and around particular political and tribal leaders, today some 60 paramilitary groups have coalesced under the PMU umbrella body (Felbab-Brown, 2019). The Hashd were crucial in defending Baghdad and eventually defeating ISIS. As Felbab-Brown writes: A fatwa by Iraq’s Grand Ayatollah Ali al-­Sistani, the country’s most influential Shia cleric, stimulated and legitimised their formation. In the case of some groups, the fatwa merely permitted their reestablishment. … Along with international military support for the Iraqi government, the paramilitaries were important in ending ISIS’s three-year reign at the end of 2017. As of summer 2019, ISIS no longer controls significant territory in Iraq, though it still conducts terrorist attacks, ambushes, raids, and kidnappings, generating significant insecurity for local communities in parts of the country. (Felbab-Brown, 2019: 2)

It is for that reason the Shia militias became heroes in the eyes of the common Shia Arab majority—a narrative they systematically support. Apart from the valuable services they have provided to the Iraqi state and society, they also represent a major problem for both. PMU militias have deeply penetrated the state and its still-developing political institutions and have started to exploit their power. They are also active participants in the region’s geopolitical rivalries and already act, or could act, as proxy forces for the local powers, particularly Iran. PMU is led by the PMF Commission. Felbab-Brown (2019), who spoke to the Commission leadership, states it has 152,000 fighters on its official register, though it is possible that as many as 70,000 are ghost fighters. Of those, 122,000 receive official government salaries, while the rest receive salaries from other unspecified sources. More than 30,000 other fighters operate in unregistered paramilitary groups, not covered by the PMU umbrella. Some are supposedly traditional or newly constituted tribal forces. Another 30,000 additional slots were expected to be allocated for salaries in 2019. During the height of the anti-ISIS campaign, the paramilitary groups may have numbered as high as 250,000, of which some 100,000 self-demobilised after ISIS was besieged in Mosul and the

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situation was no longer critical. It is important to note that these numbers are unverified estimates, with both national and local government officials and military officers often having little clarity as to which Hashd groups operate in a particular area and with what manpower. In 2016, Iraqi legislation institutionalised the Hashd as a separate military branch and sought to create a separation between Hashd military capacities and any political, party and social framework the militias had. In practice, the separation between key Hashd political leaders and the groups is minimal, and individual militias have retained their allegiances to political leaders. In the May 2018 parliamentary elections, many politicians affiliated with the Hashd were elected or received offices, significantly increasing the political power of the Hashd. 4.4.3  The Peshmerga of Iraqi Kurdistan The last larger actor worth mentioning is the Kurdish Peshmerga. Capturing the spotlight of international media in the wake of ISIS, they were one of the more effective forces fighting it, though it should be noted that they did not face the brunt of the ISIS attack, since in the beginning ISIS was not focused on Kurdistan, but rather Sunni and later Shia majority territories. Peshmerga is a fighting force formally representing the Kurdish Regional Government, a semi-autonomous area in Northern Kurdistan. In reality, it consists of two major politically affiliated militias—the KDP Peshmerga and the PUK Peshmerga, referencing its allegiance to two main Kurdish political parties and the families that lead them—the ruling Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) led by the Barzani family and its main opposition, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, led by the Talabani family. (McDowall, 2004) The semi-tribal loyalties are not surprising, since Peshmerga originated as a tribal militia guarding the borders of historical Kurdistan during the Ottoman and Persian Safavid times (Lortz, 2005). Peshmerga, despite its factionalism, was able to defend Kurdish regions from ISIS in 2014 and 2015, with the assistance of a Western-led coalition. Peshmerga is considered to be one of the most reliable partners of the USA in the region, dating back to the 1992 US-led intervention after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The USA has established a no-fly zone over Kurdish territories, which directly led to the high level of current autonomy of Kurdistan (Fawcett, 2001). Relationships between Peshmerga and other Iraqi security forces are ambiguous, and usually reflect the relations

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of their KDP or PUK faction with other important players in the region, including different Iraqi political parties, religious leaders, Turkey (especially for KDP), Iran (especially for PUK) and the USA (Frantzman, 2019).

4.5   Conclusion As observed, we may state that Iraq is adequately described as a semi-failed state. Deep ethnic, religious and identity-based disintegration is present. The legacy of authoritarian regimes (Ottoman Empire, British colonial regime and Saddam’s dictatorship) combined with the inability to control its own security forces and territory—including the behaviour of the strong rentier state—has prevented the formation of an effective government. On the contrary, ineffectiveness, deep corruption, injustice and mainly the inability to perform necessary reforms contributed to the rise of ISIS. Almost all divisions of Public Administration were negatively burdened by various negative habits. The fall of Mosul was a very significant point in the history of Iraq. ISIS’s takeover of Mosul demonstrated several widespread security and Public-Administration-related problems: . The inability of the government in Baghdad to control its territory. 1 2. A generally weak social cohesion of the Iraqi society and the failure of ruling Shia elites to persuade a large part of the Iraqi population that they have their best interest at heart. 3. The low level of loyalty of a large part of the Iraqi population towards the central government. The recent conflict has deeply scarred the Iraqi society, but it can be concluded that the battered situation the Iraqi state finds itself in today is not due to the conflict, that is, due to the insurgency and rise of ISIS. The conflict is not the main cause of the Iraqi problems, as demonstrated for example by the fall of Mosul, but rather the result of the decades of dictatorial rule as well as the result of 16-year-long consolidation attempts by foreign powers and local political alliances riddled with sectarianism and corruption. The Shia-based regime was not able to provide other ethno-religious groups with an equal share of justice, security and prosperity. The creation of the PMU militias contributed to the solution of the immediate military

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problem, that is, the rise of ISIS. However, it is now contributing to sectarian divisions and further deterioration of the perception of equality in the aforementioned justice, security and prosperity. Bureaucracy and patronage resulted in overstaffing and widespread ghost employment, which has tied the hands of the state budget. Inaccessibility of services and lack of accountability became the norm in the case of Iraq. Various examples show that Iraq still finds itself in a state of constant disruption. Recent massive protests with escalating civilian casualties are evidence of this. The lesson learned in the context of the Iraqi government and Public Administration consists in the following: Until some preconditions are met, we can expect perpetual violence and suffering on the part of the Iraqi population. The most important condition is the implementation of necessary far-reaching reforms, not just signalling them. Niall Ferguson expresses scepticism towards the endeavour aiming to implement a “Western-style democracy” in Iraq (Ferguson, 2011). This idea, brought in mainly by some US representatives, is not accepted and understood by a large part of the Iraqi population. He concludes that many preconditions for democracy that were present for example in Eastern Europe in 1989—like an employed and highly educated population or economic growth not based on a rentier state—are not met (Glaeser et al., 2007). In the first place, corruption in all forms, but especially the massive tribal and political distribution alliances, must be countered. Otherwise small parallel states inside the state will continue to exist. The Iraqi government will never be able to achieve at least the basic cohesion of its population that would allow for independent decision-making of its citizens, since most of them will rely on the provision of social safety nets or other necessary services from someone else. This means they will vote not according to their preferences but by necessity and owed loyalty. For the Iraqi population, it is crucial to understand that if Public Administration should serve the common good, it has to be staffed with genuine public servants and not by rent-seekers or people that only represent an interest of their political party, ethno-religious group or their tribe. Only once these reforms are implemented will it be possible to achieve the functioning Public Administration and the governance of which many Iraqis dream.

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References Amnesty International. (2018). Iraq Report. Retrieved January 15, 2020, from https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/middle-­east-­and-­north-­africa/iraq/ report-­iraq/ Beblawi, H. (1987). The Rentier State in the Arab World. Arab Studies Quarterly, 9(4), 383–398. Bellingreri, M. (2019). The Iraqi Judges Fighting to Reform the System from Within. The Middle East Eye. Retrieved January 11, 2020, from https://www. middleeasteye.net/news/iraqi-­judges-­fighting-­reform-­system-­within Benraad, M. (2009, July–December). Études rurales: “Une lecture critique de la Sahwa ou les mille et un visages du tribalisme irakien”, No. 184, 95–106. Bobseine, H. (2019). Tribal Justice in a Fragile Iraq. The Century Foundation. Bowen, S.  W. (2013). Learning from Iraq. Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. Central Intelligence Agency. (2018). The World Factbook: Iraq. Retrieved February 12, 2020, from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-­ world-­factbook/geos/iz.html Č erný, K., & Tureček, B. (2015). Význam kmenové spolec ̌nosti v 21. století. Metropolitní univerzita. Cockburn, P. (2016). Iraq The West Shakes Up the Middle East. Independent Print Limited. Encyclopaedia Britannica. (2016). Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. Retrieved January 6, 2020, from https://www.britannica.com/topic/ Islamic-­State-­in-­Iraq-­and-­the-­Levant#ref323712 Fawcett, L. (2001). Down But Not Out? The Kurds in International Politics. Review of International Studies, 27(1), 109–118. Felbab-Brown, V. (2019). Pitfalls of the Paramilitary Paradigm: The Iraqi State. Brookings Institution. Ferguson, N. (2011). Niall Ferguson  – Muslim Legacy and Imperialism. Retrieved February 15, 2020, from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v= wJcHbaNNIM4 Frantzman, S. (2019). Is Washington Creating a Peshmerga Problem? The National Interest. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/middle-­east-­watch/ washington-­creating-­peshmerga-­problem-­82766 Glaeser, E., Ponzetto, G., & Shleifer, A. (2007). Why Does Democracy Need Education? Journal of Economic Growth, 12(2), 77–99. Hassan, H.  D. (2007). Iraq: Tribal Structure, Social, and Political Activities. Congressional Research Service. International Monetary Fund (IMF). (2017). Iraq: Selected Issues, Country Report No. 17/252. https://www.imf.org/-­/media/Files/Publications/ CR/2017/cr17252.ashx

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Isakhan, B. (2015). The Legacy of Iraq: From the 2003 War to the “Islamic State”. Edinburgh University Press. Larson, N. (2014). UN Probe: ISIS Committing ‘crimes against humanity’ in Syria. The Daily Star. https://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-­ East/2014/Nov-­1 4/277641-­u n-­p robe-­i sis-­c ommitting-­c rimes-­a gainst-­ humanity-­in-­syria.ashx Lortz, M. (2005). Willing to Face Death: A History of Kurdish Military Forces – The Peshmerga – From the Ottoman Empire to Present-Day Iraq. Florida State University. Marshall, D. (2019). Iraq Brings the Islamic State to Justice. Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/05/22/iraq-­b rings-­t he-­i slamic-­s tate-­ to-­justice/ McDowall, D. (2004). A Modern History of the Kurds. I.B. Tauris. Ministry of Planning & Hikma, B. (2014). Iraqi Youth: Challenges and Opportunities. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ IraqNHDR2014-­English.pdf Mironova, V. (2018). Rule of Law in Post ISIS Mosul. University of Maryland. Retrieved January 21, 2020, from http://vmironova.net/rule-­of-­ law-­in-­iraq/. Mironova, V., & Assi, D. T. (2020). The Iraqi Military Won’t Survive a Tug of War Between the United States and Iran. Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy. com/2020/01/15/the-­iraqi-­military-­wont-­survive-­a-­tug-­of-­war-­between-­ the-­united-­states-­and-­iran/ Nordland, R. (2015). After Victory Over ISIS in Tikrit, Next Battle Requires a New Template. The New  York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2015/ 04/08/world/middleeast/iraq-­isis-­anbar-­sunni-­shiite.html O’Driscoll, D. (2015). Autonomy Impaired: Centralisation, Authoritarianism and the Failing Iraqi State. Ethnopolitics, 16(4), 315–332. Pring, C. (2016). Iraq: Overview of Corruption and Anti-corruption. Transparency International. Retrieved February 1, 2020, from https://www.transparency. org/files/content/corruptionqas/Country_profile_Iraq_2015.pdf Reuter, C. (2015). Secret Files Reveal the Structure of Islamic State. Spiegel International. Retrieved January 21, 2020, from https://www.spiegel.de/ international/world/islamic-­s tate-­f iles-­s how-­s tructure-­o f-­i slamist-­t error-­ group-­a-­1029274.html Shubber, K. J. (2016). Aspects of Public Administration in Iraq Current Problems and Reform Proposals. Al-Bayan Center. Retrieved January 2, 2020, from http:// www.bayancenter.org/en/wp-­content/uploads/2016/09/55656565.pdf Taylor, A. J. (2011). Iraq Public Sector Modernisation Programme. United Nations Development Programme.

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The Fund for Peace. (2020). Fragile States Index  – Country Dashboard Iraq. Retrieved February 12, 2020, from https://fragilestatesindex.org/ country-­data/ Thomas, L. D. (2008). Establishing Justice in Iraq: A Journey into the Cradle of Civilization. International Journal for Court Administration, 1(2), 19–25. Transparency International. (2020). Corruption Perception Index Overview. Retrieved February 14, 2020, from https://www.transparency.org/research/ cpi/overview WGI. (2020). Worldwide Governance Indicators – Iraq. Retrieved February 14, 2020, from https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/Home/Reports

CHAPTER 5

Public Administration in Conflict Affected Countries: The Case of Palestine Jehad Y. Alayasa and Hussam Musa

5.1   Introduction The Palestine public administration system represents a unique case of public administration under crises conditions in post-conflict countries. There are two challenges of this case: First, the Palestinian public administration system has been developed on the aftermath of many different administrative systems starting with the Ottoman Empire and ending with the Israeli occupation. This colonial history has created a unique administration based and controlled by the interest of colonial forces more than the interest of the Palestinian people. Second, the current Palestinian public administration system including public services came about as a result

J. Y. Alayasa Faculty of Law and Public Administration, Birzeit University, Birzeit, Palestine e-mail: [email protected] H. Musa (*) Faculty of Economics, Matej Bel University, Banska Bystirca, Slovakia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 J. Nemec, P. S. Reddy (eds.), Public Administration in Conflict Affected Countries, Governance and Public Management, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74966-8_5

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of a unique but not fully completed transformation from military resistant movements, which historically formed the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) into a civil government represented by the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). The chapter provides a historical overview of the Palestinian public administration system during many eras with a focus on the major historical milestones that formulated the current structure of the system. The chapter then discusses how the Palestinian public administration system evolved under crisis conditions of an unstable political and economic environment. The critical argument of this chapter is the question of how the Palestinian public administration system survived and functioned under such incredible and challenging circumstances. In some critical eras such as Uprising One and Uprising Two, or what is so called the First Intifada and the Second Intifada, the question was not the quality of services, rather it was the existence of public services that was at risk. In such a context when formal public agencies disappeared or were being challenged by closure or even destroying its infrastructure, creativity and innovation became tools of survival and continuity. Besides the incompatible administrative heritage, the Palestinian public administration struggled with the dilemma of a civil state building process driven by military status. However, the civil state building process itself has been struggling with the challenge of severity that the PNA has been facing since the signing of the Oslo agreement in 1993.

5.2   Short Descriptive Overview and Historical Background As Table 5.1 indicates, historically Palestine was governed by a multiplicity of diverse laws and regulations introduced by foreign powers; each of them had its own legal and administrative systems and political agenda. However, many of these laws are still currently applied in Palestine. Since the second half of the nineteenth century, the Ottomans, during their governance over Palestine, applied civil laws (so called Tanzimat) side by side to the Islamic Sharia laws that were governing Palestinian People’s life. During the Ottoman time, for example, land was divided into five categories under the Ottoman Land Code of 1(856), for the purpose of gradually registering land to facilitate agricultural tax collection: “Mewat”, “Miri”, “Matruka”, “Waqf”, and “Mulk” (Waltz & Isaac, 2010; Dajani,

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Table 5.1 Historical administrative eras in Palestine

Administrative eras

Period of time

The Ottomans The British Mandate The Jordanian Custody (WB), Egyptian Authority (GS) Israeli Military Occupation Palestinian National Authority (PNA)

1850–1917 1917–1948 1948–1967

101

1967–1994 1994–present time

Source: The authors Note: The Israeli occupation military orders and laws are still applied in the WB despite the limited sovereignty of PNA

2005). Mewat land is owned by the state but uncultivated or uninhabited and exists within at least 2.5 km from community outermost houses. Miri land is also owned by the state and designated for agricultural uses and exists in the area between the outermost houses of a community and the Mewat land (Zeid & Thawaba, 2018). Later on, the Israeli occupation used the Ottoman land code (1856) to transfer the ownership of Mewat and Miri land to the state of Israel. The British (1917–1948) who succeeded the Ottomans imposed their own mandatory laws and administrative systems. During the British mandatory period, the British governor in Palestine (so called Mandoob Assami), through legal and administrative codes and orders, facilitated controlling Palestine and facilitated transferring land and power to the new Jewish immigrants. In terms of administrative planning, the British mandatory authority issued a regional outline to control and mange urban and rural areas in Palestine. Accordingly, Palestine was divided into six main districts; each district has its own plan. For example, plan RJ/5 was used for Jerusalem and plan S/15 was used for Nablus area (Shalev et al., 2008); however, the Israeli occupation is still using these plans, with some changes, to control Palestinian districts. Between 1948 and 1967, Palestine has been under the custody of the Hashemite Kingdome of Jordan. Jordanian authorities have applied almost the same legal and administrative system that has been used by the British mandate. In 1950, the Jordanian government declared a new constitution for the two parts of the Kingdom (West Bank and East Bank); at the same time, Egyptian laws were applied in the Gaza Strip. Although most, if not all, of the administrative codes mentioned above were initiated to serve

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occupiers, mandates, and custodians, the newly established PNA, established in 1994, was forced to build on these codes before being able to start building its own national administrative and legal system; however, some of the previous codes and laws still apply in Palestine. This is because the Israeli occupation did not tolerate creating an independent Palestinian administrative system and also because of the lack of experience of the PLO in civil administration because it was established as a military movement. 5.2.1  A Unique Administrative System Formed by Institutional Integration of the PLO and PNA After the Jordanian withdrawal from the West Bank (WB) and the Egyptian end of control over the Gaza Strip (GS), a new player started building both military and administrative control over WB and GS; it is the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). The PLO consists of eight major Palestinian military and political movements and parties, except Hamas and Islamic Jihad. The PLO was established in Jerusalem in 1964, and later produced the (PNC) as a parliament that represents Palestinians inside Palestine and in Diaspora. In fact, the current administrative system is highly influenced by the historical heritage of the PLO as a military movement. The PLO was established in 1964 as a political and military organization that represented Palestinian people inside historical Palestine and in the Diaspora. Over time, the PLO built many administrative institutions to help Palestinians in their civil affairs and also to fight and prevent Israeli control over WB and GS; Table 5.2 shows these institutions and their purposes. The PLO was the legitimate political body who negotiated with Israel under international custody and signed peace agreements such as the Oslo agreement. Accordingly, the PLO provided legitimacy to the establishment of PNA. This fact resulted in a unique interacted system where most PLO leaders are also in charge of PNA institutions (Alaysa & Musa, 2020). Yasser Arafat, for example, was the head of the PLO and was also elected as president of PNA. After his death, Mahmoud Abas became head of the PLO and also elected as president of PNA. Up to the current time, most PNA positions and decision-making processes are highly influenced by political domination of the PLO or by having top leaders of PNA institutions originally leaders in the PLO (Alaysa & Musa, 2020; Abdal-Rahman, 1987; Sayigh & Shikaki, 1999). Table 5.2

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Table 5.2  PLO main institutions and their functions PLO institutions

Functions and purpose of establishment

Palestinian National Council (PNC) The Executive Committee PLO Political Department The Palestinian National Fund Samed Institution

Palestinian parliament outside Palestine

Department of Refugees Voice of Palestine PLO Research Centre Palestinian Liberation Army

PLO cabinet Responsible for political and diplomatic affairs Responsible for financial resources and dispersing payments to PLO institutions It was responsible for securing Palestinians’ public employment, investments, and job opportunities Responsible for Palestinian refugees’ affairs Palestinian first radio was established in Cairo in 1965 Responsible for conducting studies and collecting and analyzing data The formal military body of PLO existed in many Arab countries

Source: The authors.

shows some of PLO institutions and their responsibilities. It is worth saying that most of these institutions formed the core start of PNA institutions by merging with them; but many of PLO institutions are still functioning up to the current time. It is important to mention that most of the PLO institutions mentioned in Table  5.2 have transferred their offices and administrators to work in Palestine, some of them kept representatives outside of Palestine, and therefore played a key role in establishing PNA institutions. 5.2.2  The Israeli Period: Civil Services Under Military Orders Between 1967 and 1994, in some cases up to that moment, all Palestinian civil affairs in WB and GS were controlled by military orders and managed by Israeli Army Generals. During this era, the Israeli Military Administration, through army generals, took charge of all institutions in the WB and GS, including education, health, agriculture, transportation, and other public services. Shehadeh (1988) indicates that the Military Administration enacted more than 1264 military orders to ensure its full control over Palestinians. The policies of this administration were hostile to the local

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population, and therefore resisted, as they aimed at control and expropriation of land and resources. For example, in 1967, Israeli Military Administration froze land registration and used the Ottomans codes of Mewat and Miri to take over 70% of Palestinian land because owners could not prove land ownership. The circumstances created by the Israeli Military Administration forced Palestinian residents of WB and GS to first resist the occupation, and second to develop their own human development and administrative tools. Unions, political movements, NGOs, universities, and other civil society organizations played a key role in preserving Palestinian society and its ability to persevere. These efforts could not survive and were unsustainable without political, administrative, and financial support from PLO institutions; however, this experience prepared for the establishment of PNA in 1994 on the aftermath of the Oslo agreement. 5.2.3  Palestinian National Authority Era (1994–2019): Administration Under Lack of Sovereignty The Oslo Agreement, among other political agreements between Palestinians and Israelis, led to the establishment of the PNA in May 1994. In 1996, the first general election for the presidency of PNA and the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) took place; it is important to point out that these elections included about 250,000 Palestinian residents in East Jerusalem. Yasser Arafat, the former PLO Head, was elected as president of PNA and 88 members were elected for PLC at a 75% participation rate. The main components of the newly established authority were the following: The President’s Office (Dewan), the PLC, the ministerial cabinet with its 24 ministries and other agencies, and the judicial authority. The legitimacy of the PNA was mainly derived from the political agreements signed with Israel, and the subsequent decisions made by PLO relevant institutions. These agreements and PLO decisions were not presented to the Palestinian population for a referendum, leading some in the opposition to believe that they were illegitimate. In 2005, Mahmoud Abas, the current president of the PLO and PNA, was elected as a representative of the PLO and Fatah Movement. In 2006, the second general elections for PLC was arranged and led to the victory of Hamas Islamic Movement with 76 parliament seats out of 132—a participation rate of 77%.

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According to the 2006 elections, it was legitimate for Hamas to form the government. In March 2006, Hamas formed the tenth Palestinian Government that did not last long because of its political program that was totally opposite to President Abbas’ program; basically the problem was the relationship between the Palestinian National Authority and Israel and the peace process that President Abas was committed to protect (The Palestinian Information Agency, 2018). Led by Mr. Ismael Haniyyi, the tenth government failed to control Palestinian public institutions including ministries and relevant public agencies because most of the public servants (the bureaucracy) belong to the president’s political movement Fatah; they refused to enable Hamas government. This clash of programs led to the political division, lasted from 2007 until present, between WB where Fatah took over government and the GS were Hamas remained in government. The most important document that has been enacted during the PNA era is the Palestinian Basic Law (constitution) that has been approved by PLC in 1997 and signed by PNA president in 2003. In addition, the PNC has approved many important laws such as civil service law, investment promotion law, local councils’ elections law, environment law, public budget and financial affairs law, and labor law, among others (The Palestinian Information Agency, 2018). Unlike other post-conflict regimes, the PNA was not granted full sovereignty according to the Oslo agreement signed in 1993. Withdrawal of Israeli forces was partial pending final status negotiations that were supposed to start in 2000 but were suspended because of the uprising (Intifada) at that year. According to the Oslo agreement, the WB was divided into three areas: A, B, and C. The PNA was granted full control over area A that constituted just 17% of total area of WB and GS, but Israeli forces have the right to act when there is any security need. In area B, which compromised 23% of the land, PNA has control over civilian affairs only while security matters remained in the hands of Israeli security forces. In area C, which makes up about 60% of the land, both security and civil administrative affairs remained in the Israeli hands (Government of Israel and Palestinian Liberation Organization 1994). This fragmentation had a catastrophic impact on the Palestinian public administration particularly on planning and service delivery. In area C, there is 125 Israeli colonies covering more than 63% of the area, state land, and military zones cover 34%, and the land where Palestinians are permitted to build on represents only 0.5% (Kadman, 2013; United Nations, 2015). The map in

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Fig.  5.1 (PASSIA, 2018) shows Oslo Agreement 1994 division of land and sovereignty in the WB.  Figure 5.1 shows Israeli colonization in Palestinian territories and division of Palestinian land among areas A, B, and C, settlements, and military zones.

Fig. 5.1  Oslo agreement map 1994. Source: Authors

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5.2.4  Organizational Structure Despite the Israeli control and dominance over many key aspects such as: top security matters, water and underground natural resources, international export and import, boarders and entrances, Palestinians have a unique administrative system that combines the PLO and PNA. The following discussion will explain major positions and the interaction of roles between PLO institutions and their counterparts in PNA President of PNA The Palestinian Basic Law explains all aspects related to the position of PNA president. Article (34) states that the president must be directly elected by the general public according to the Election Law. The same article states that the president is the higher commander of the security forces. In the Palestinian case it is restricted to internal security and police forces, as there is no army. The Basic Law gives the president further authorities including signing all legislations, the appointment of foreign delegations and the acceptance of foreign diplomatic missions to the PNA, and granting special pardon. The president is exempt from being accountable to the PLC; in fact, he has equal and parallel powers. The PLC has no authority to remove the president. In contrast, the ministerial cabinet is obliged to report to the president. In this sense, the president does not only hold executive power but also legislative as he, in emergency cases, has the right to make decisions that becomes powerful as laws. This combination also provides him with the right to veto all decisions made by the PLC. The president continuously utilizes a Fatah majority in the PLC to pressure its members to make concessions and, in some ways, to impose his well on the legislature. Furthermore, the relationship between the president and the ministers is one of almost full control; they are unable to make any significant decisions without referring back to the president. This control extends to most new appointments in the executive branch. He is also in charge of appointments in the judicial branch. He appoints the general attorney, district attorneys, and the judges in all courts. In many ways, the judicial system became an organ of the executive (Alaysa & Musa, 2020). Both PNA presidents, former Yasser Arafat and current Mahmoud Abas, occupied the position of PNA and PLO president as well.

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 rime Minister’s Position P The position of the prime minister in the PNA authority was introduced recently in 2003 and came as a direct result of international pressure on Palestinian former President Yasser Arafat. This new position was introduced mainly for political reasons in an attempt to reduce the authorities and powers of the president. However, the fact that a prime minister was appointed had an impact over the administration of the PNA. The prime minister according to the Basic Law (amended in 2003) has the following tasks: to form a ministerial cabinet, add, or accept the resignation of its members; call for and reside over the weekly cabinet meetings; supervise the work of the ministers and heads of government institutions; introduce regulations within his capacity and according to the law; appoint a deputy in case of his absence. Many critiques argue that the appointment of the prime minister did not create any power shift in Palestinian political structure. It also led to limited changes in executive and legislative powers. The president is still the focal point in Palestinian decision-making system (Alaysa & Musa, 2020). The Cabinet The Palestinian Basic Law explains all aspects of the executive power (the Cabinet and the Prime Minister). According to article (69) of the Palestinian Basic Law, the cabinet is considered the executive branch of the government; it works within the parameters of the legislations created by the PLC. The cabinet is in charge of the following tasks: develop public policies in line with government general policy directions approved by the PLC; prepare the public budget for PLC approval; put together an administrative public cadre, structure, and hierarchy and provide the staff with the needed resources to implement policies; supervise the work of all ministries and government institutions and oversee their performance; establish new institutions and cancel existing ones according to public interest needs. The clarification of duties and structures did not resolve the problems related to performance. The various ministries still work as separate units without real coordination. Their work is highly scattered and misguided by personal conflicts and interpretations (Alaysa & Musa, 2020).

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 ocal Level Governance and the Claim of Decentralization L Historically, local municipalities existed before any other Palestinian organizations. Since the establishment of the Ministry of Local Governance in 1994, the PNA built on PLO efforts to establish a local governance system. Data show that the number of local authorities is 521 in the WBG (107 municipalities, 11 local councils, 374 village councils, and 29 refugee camp directors). The most recent local elections took place on May 13, 2017, and in October 2012  in the West Bank only, while the last local elections in both the West Bank and Gaza were in 2006. In many ways, the deteriorating power of the central government and its lack of control and resources led to vague relations between the local governments and the central authority. The relationship between them became one of confusion and lack of harmony. Strong local councils became somewhat stronger and weak ones became even weaker. The weak performance of the three branches of government led to the weakening of local councils. In contrast, the weak presence of the PNA in some communities encouraged local participation and initiative. This implied the establishment of various community-based organizations. Local councils played a major role in this process (Ministry of Local Governance, 2014). Among Palestinian policy makers, a consensus seems to exist on the vital role of decentralization. Those are reflected in the literature of the Ministry of Local Government and the various laws including the Basic Law and the Local Councils Law. In reality, local councils remain subordinate to central government bodies. Community participation is restricted to the reception of services and executing decisions made by central government. All heads and members of local councils were appointed by central government through the Ministry of Local Government. A number of these councils had to resign as they were unable to function according to their illegal status, viewed by community members, and because of lack of support from central government (Iqtait, 2017; Alaysa & Musa, 2020). In addition, articles 8 and 11 of the financial system of local councils (March, 1999) state that councils have no right to amend the budgets without the approval of the Minster of Local Government. Local councils also do not receive their share (90%) of local property taxes and licensing fees collected by the Ministry of Finance. The financial crisis is further amplified by the fact that the majority of residents are unable to pay their dues, mainly as a result of the economic crises and increasing poverty rates. The Palestinian local authorities historically fulfilled a critical role not only as a key public service provider but also as the government tier closest

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to citizens, with elected councils critical for representation and accountability to citizens. Politically, both the PLO and PNA relied on local municipalities in creating legitimacy and representation. Local elections were based on politicized tribes, families, and individuals. However, the Israeli occupation also historically tried to include local authorities and leaders sometimes by soft support of money and power; while other times by force, arresting and kidnapping some of their leaders. Despite the critical unstable and fragmented situation of the local government sector, Palestinian local government units (LGUs) have almost achieved universal coverage in terms of access to basic services; still service quality is a big challenge that LGUs need to work hard to improve (World Bank, 2017). For example, although the West Bank is scoring better than the Gaza Strip in terms of delivering good drinking water to citizens, the financial sustainability of water departments is a critical challenge in both areas. In terms of quality, “The World Bank’s, 2017 WASH Poverty Diagnostic finds that the majority of the 260 municipal wells in the Gaza strip do not meet the salt and nitrate maximum thresholds set by the World Health Organization (WHO), forcing 97% of the population in Gaza to acquire drinking water from private tanker trucks. In the West Bank in contrast, access to improved drinking water sources reaches (94%), with village councils having slightly higher access rates (95%) than municipalities (93%)” (World Bank, 2017: 24) Unfortunately, local government performance was highly negatively influenced by conflict. Civil service (facilitated or prevented) was subject to political objectives (Alaysa & Musa, 2020). It was used by political parties, Hamas and Fatah among other parties, to earn publicity. They used LGUs through supporting service delivery access to citizens to achieve political goals; on the other hand, civil service was prevented from entering Gaza Strip as a result of sanctions and due to the political fragmentation between West Bank and Gaza Strip. The Israeli occupation was in contrast used to obstacle services, through sage and sanctions, in areas where local leaders and citizens resist the occupation. Besides conflict, there are some other factors that influence effectiveness of performance of local government units. The World Bank (2017) states that LGUs struggle with lack of sufficient own-tax and nontax revenues to provide the public services they have been assigned. Increased financing of LGUs should come in large parts from own-revenue sources. In this regard increasing transparency and improving service delivery will be key to increasing the willingness to pay the citizens. In addition, in

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order to improve LGUs revenues, more attention should be given to the efficiency with which taxes are collected. Local government units should be more responsive to citizen’s needs. International donors have also played a critical role in directing LGUs through development projects and programs. LGUs usually respond to donors’ agenda. For example, The International Cooperation Agency of the Association of Netherlands Municipalities (VNG), one of the key donors for the Palestinian local governance sector, focused on their strategic agenda 2016–2020 on both decentralizations of the local government sector and economic development. Accordingly, most activities of the Palestinian Ministry of Local government responded to these priorities including organizing a national conference on economic development in 2017 and establishing a new unit of economic development in most municipalities. Municipalities who were able to respond to these priorities benefited from the donor’s money (VNG International, 2019; Ministry of Local Government, 2014). Further research on service delivery and policy making from the local level should be conducted to better understand the picture in marginalized areas such as small villages and refugee camps; so that policy could be better decided on evidence-based structure.

5.3   Performance of Civil Service The Palestinian civil service system has not been developed through a well-planned process; rather it was a response to crisis conditions and conflict with occupiers and custodians. However, performance was influenced by multiple experiences that have been inherited from difference political and legal systems. Despite this fact, the Palestinian service system has succeeded to meet minimum needs of the Palestinian people in WB and GS. 5.3.1  Civil Service System The Basic Law articulated the functions and authorities of public administration. Article (86) of the Law specifies that “all public appointment at all government ranks must conform to the legal requirements”. Another article (87) states that “The law organizes all aspects of civil services. The Public Employment Office, in coordination with all relevant governmental institutions, must seek to develop and promote public administration. The Public Employment Office must be consulted regarding the laws and bylaws concerning public administration in the PNA.”

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The PNA public sector grew rapidly during the period of 1995–1998. The various data reveal that over 142,000 Palestinians were employed by the PNA. In 1997, 20% of the labor force was employed in the public sector (about 28% in Gaza and 15% in the West Bank). Over 40% were employed in security-related institutions. The average increase in the number of PNA employees was 30% per annum between 1994 and 1997 (43% in the security sector and 57% in the civil sector). At the end of 2016, the number of public sector employees was 156,930. In part, the dramatic increase in employment in the public sector came as a result of higher unemployment rates resulting from the continuous closure of the Israeli market, and the deterioration of economic conditions. The PNA sought to reduce unemployment and poverty rates through public sector employment. The increase is also due to the duplication and overlap in the work of governmental institutions. Palestinian General Personnel data indicate that the total number of public employees in the WB and GS is 90.860; 63.805  in the WB and 27.057 in GS, 69.9% of them work in educational and health institutions. Public employees are distributed on 83 public institutions. In terms of gender, females form about 42.70% of public employees while males form 57.30% (Palestinian General Personnel Council, 2017). In one of the most important actions against corruption and toward improving public agencies performance and the integrity system, the Palestinian Government launched and adopted its National Policy Agenda: Citizen First (2017–2022). The agenda stands as a strategic plan for the government, while many sectoral work plans were verified to ensure effective management of public funds and performance. One of the major strategic goals of agenda 2017–2022 is promoting the government’s responsiveness to citizens’ needs at all levels of government. Another strategic goal is promoting sustainable development and achieving the United Nations SDGs. Furthermore, a special evaluation form on the implementation of the agenda was integrated in the quarterly and annual report system in order to examine the particular implementation (The Palestinian Government, 2016). This evaluation system is a forward step toward holding the government accountable for policy implementation stated in the agenda as well as improving the role of over sighting bodies. In 2017, and due to the importance of codes of conduct and professional ethics in public service, the Palestinian Anti-Corruption Commission and the General Personnel Council have recently initiated a training

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program that has targeted around 48 thousand public employees in WB to raise their awareness about codes of conduct and ethics of public service (Palestinian General Personnel Council, 2017). Aman as a non-­ governmental body concerned about transparency and integrity, conducted integrity Index in 2017 that indicated a mark of (600) from a (1000) concerning the code of conduct that was adopted by PNA agencies (Aman Transparency Palestin, 2017). 5.3.2  Accountability and Responsibility One of the most challenging features of Palestinian public administration system is the huge number of public employees especially those who are occupying top management positions; those most likely belong to 50–60-years-old-age section. This overstaffing came as a result of political appointments that Fatah movement (ruling the WB and Hamas movement (ruling GS)) used particularly after the political division that happened in 2008 on the aftermath of Hamas winning the elections and formulating the tenth government. This politicization of the public service system (Alaysa & Musa, 2020) encouraged corruption and nepotism in both WB and GS despite all efforts toward the monitoring and accountability mechanisms. Palestinian public administration system and its performance are monitored through many governmental and non-governmental mechanisms. Internal monitoring is implemented through the Directorate of Monitoring and Auditing that is usually responsible for financial auditing through financial monitoring units in each ministry. External monitoring and auditing is implemented through the State Audit and Administrative Control Bureau, the Public General Personnel (both are public agencies) in addition to the Palestinian Independent Commission for Citizens Rights (quasi-governmental). Moreover, the PLC (it is not functioning now because of the political division) is supposed to monitor and control the government’s actions through providing a periodical report evaluating the government’s performance and take critical and correction stands against corruption and poor performance. However, monitoring from outside the government is worth mentioning as many NGOs (e.g. Aman Transparency Palestin, 2017) usually criticize the government’s performance through annual reports that are usually published and discussed with the public. Aman Coalition for Integrity and Accountability has indicated, through many reports that the

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PNA monitoring system is not accompanied with a sufficient or proper legal system that organizes the work of the different monitoring and controlling agencies. The latest Integrity and Combating Corruption Report 2017 states that “The Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) has been dysfunctional for the past 11 years, which led to the deepening of the impact of the loss of the most important official instrument of control and accountability, first and foremost over the executive authority (presidency, government and security services). The absence of the role of PLC, which not only includes control and accountability as mentioned, but also in drafting and approving legislations, has become rather normal and is not dealt with as odd. This fact includes political parties and factions, and especially those in power. This led to a continuation of the state of non-principled competition even among those that are considered part of the political system. It also contributed to the continuation of the struggle for power and conflict between officials of public institutions and those in power in parts of the country giving them the freedom to act without any actual accountability” (Aman Transparency Palestin, 2017:14). In 2013, Palestine joined the Open Government Partnership (OGP); an international organization that helps nations, NGOs, and institutions to improve transparency and policy reform. OGP was launched in 2011 to provide an international platform for domestic reformers committed to making their governments more open, accountable, and responsive to citizens. In 2015, the Palestinian Government has formed a national team to be responsible for evaluating the annual improvement in governance and governmental performance. Nevertheless, Palestine has so far showed limited progress in meeting OGP points of requirement (Palestinian General Personnel Council, 2017). 5.3.3  Rule of Law Palestine is still under Israeli military occupation practices such as checkpoints, lockouts, blockades, arrests, prosecuting people, and violating Palestinians rights; in general, all these practices indicate a weak rule of law status. In a recognizable step toward improving the rule of law in Palestine, the PNA adopted, on June 23, 2002, the “100 Day Plan”, in which the PNA committed itself to promoting the rule of law, restructuring ministries and official agencies, and creating efficient and effective institutions. This plan was followed by another one named the “Emergency and Public

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Investment Plan 2003–2004”. The plan aimed at continuing institutional reform and providing better public services to Palestinians. However, these plans were subject to Israeli obstacles such as arresting officials, preventing public employees from moving freely from one city to another, stealing resources, and destroying public agencies building. Internally, the Palestinian Independent Commission for Human Rights (ICHR) indicates in its 2017 annual report that “the judicial system in Palestine continued being subject to the security agencies and executive authority dominance which undermined the judicial performance and independence. This constitutes a violation of the law and the principle of the separation of powers. Furthermore, the Decree Law on High Criminal Court breaches the safeguards of the right to a free trial, restricts the right to defence, and violates the judicial integrity and independency.” In the same context, ICHR highlighted many violations that weaken the rule of law in Palestine, such as disrespect of the court rulings, the right to the due legal process; including arbitrary arrest on the grounds of political affiliation, the right to physical integrity; including torture, ill-­ treatment, and excessive use of force, the right to peaceful assembly. The report also states “we observed increasing detentions in the Governor’s custody, as well as in the custody of the Joint Security Committee (JSC) and heads of security agencies, which are all unconstitutional measures in violation of the Basic Law, and the relevant legislation and conventions to which Palestine State has acceded”. Additionally, the absence of the presidential and legislative elections, since the political division between WB and GS, is negatively influencing the rule of law in both parts of Palestine; this means lack of accountability of the performance of executive agencies. During the period of political division between WB and GS, both governing parties (Fatah in the WB, Hamas in GS) used claims of acting against the rule of law and human rights against each other’s to score some points in terms of earning international support on the expense of each other’s. 5.3.4  Main Factors Limiting Progress The World Bank (2019), in its Worldwide Governance Indicators, shows that Palestinian (West Bank and Gaza) service system was improving step by step between 2007 and 2017  in all governance aspects. The lowest score of all governance indicators (the best number was around 12 points in 2017) was for political stability and balance of violence, while the highest score was (around 60 points in 2017) for regulatory quality indicator.

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Low scoring in political stability is due to both the occupation and the political division between West Bank and Gaza. However, the West Bank and Gaza generally scored below world countries standards in all indicators and also below scores of countries of Middle East and North Africa, except in regularity quality; West bank and Gaza scored higher than Middle East and North Africa. Although the government effectiveness scores improved between 2007 and 2017, the gap is still huge compared to international standards and Middle East and North Africa. This might also be due to the fact that the Palestinian Government in Ramallah has no complete sovereignty over Gaza, because of the political division, nor complete sovereignty over West Bank because of the occupation. Palestinian public administration system indicates reasonable results in meeting international good governance indicators and has benefited from international experiences and support in many aspects such as regulatory quality, improving governance and rule of law. However, the quality of services at both national and local level has been negatively influenced by the Israeli occupation limitations such as preventing clearing taxes money and reducing PNA sovereignty. Many times the PNA was unable to pay public servants salaries and was forced to freeze many public projects because of withholding of clearing taxes by the Israeli occupation. Therefore, the occupation is considered the main challenge against promoting good governance in Palestine. Political division between WB and GS is another challenge that has negatively influenced good governance efforts. Both sides used to use civil service to punish citizens from the political opposition. Public administration and state building in war/conflict and post-war contexts is a very complex process basically because of disagreement of agendas of national players (governments and societies) and war controllers (occupiers, regional, and international war parties). War and post-war context not only destroys physical infrastructure of states and societies but also destroys trust between people and governmental bodies, which is the necessary part of building and rebuilding states and administration systems. In cases like Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, Syria, rebuilding security agencies and reconstructing public infrastructure, without paying attention to trust building, were not enough to reform and rebuild public administration systems in such cases (Alaysa & Musa, 2020). In fact, focusing on economic reform and military empowerment was not able to produce stability and development; instead it produced corruption and more violence (Cooper & Vargas, 2004). The case of Palestine is a

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remarkable one that one can learn from as it has been passing through different stages and still struggling to build the promising independent state.

5.4   Conclusions This chapter presents a chronology of public administration in Palestine as a case study in conflict and in a colonial context. The unique part of this experience is that Palestinians have developed their own public administration system without complete sovereignty of their own state. Rather they developed it under different colonial and custody powers. The Palestinian public institutions have been developed from the ruins of war and conflict; therefore, public services are negatively influenced by political instability that in many cases influenced resources. Despite all barriers the Palestinian administrative system has achieved a reasonable level of good governance according to international requirements. Many lessons could be learned from the Palestinian experience. First, absence of full power and sovereignty serves as obstacles to public administration reform. Even when there is power, political will is crucial to administrative reform. In the case of Palestine, power was divided between the Israeli occupation, the PNA, and the PLO; and even between West Bank rulers and Gaza Strip rulers. Second, in conflict contexts, when national governments are either weak or absent, innovation is a key factor to success and solving problems. Third, one of the biggest challenges that faced Palestinian efforts in their state building is relying heavily on international players and donors while downsizing the self-reliance approach. In conflict situations, governments and societies under conflict usually rely heavily on outside donor and powers. This reliance results in feeding conflicts as international political agendas dominates national and local agendas. Regarding the Palestinian case, all donor programs and projects are subject to Israeli control and monitoring and in many cases rejection if these projects are not coping with their agendas. Nonetheless, donor communities have helped PNA to improve their administrative system compared to international systems and other good systems in the Middle East and North Africa. Fourth, in conflict contexts such as Palestine, the local level of good governance and administration of services and development might be more functional than national level as central government is usually weak, has incomplete sovereignty, and very limited resources. In the case of Palestine, Palestinian municipalities and local administrations, they are

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older than any administrative body including the PLO, were key players in empowering both the PLO and PNA and building the first national service system. Further research is recommended about the role of Palestinian municipalities in building public administration in Palestine. Finally, governments and societies under crisis conditions should build their own self-reliance state building approach with the help of supporters with no political agendas. For the purpose of building this self-reliance approach, strong and well-organized local level administration is crucial to success and protecting society from turmoil. It is recommended that the international donor community should exert some kind of pressure on the Israeli occupation to protect the Palestinian civil services and good governance achievements that has been developed over time by the donor’s money. The rule of law in Palestine is a critical aspect in terms of promoting a good administrative system and should receive more attention by the PNA, the PLO, and their alliances. More efforts should be put in reforming legal systems such as the preparation of legal document, training of lawyers and judges. Despite the good improvement in accountability, transparency, and fighting of corruption, PNA should make more efforts to improve civil services and PNA’s image among the international community. Public administration in conflict contexts such as Palestine needs to pay special attention to ethics such as women and youth empowerment and involvement in decision-making, organizational ethics, democratic management, and decision-making that is based on evidence. The PNA and such crisis contexts need to develop transparent financial systems; financial strategies, financial planning, government accounting, and so on. This is very crucial in state building and improving governmental performance. Transparency and accountability are very key elements in reform efforts. The PNA needs to adopt a creative approach for decentralization in crisis and conflict time as local level development indicates success in such conditions. This is possible through reforming the legal and administrative system that organizes the relationship between the central government and local government authorities.

References Abdal-Rahman, A. (1987). The Palestine Liberation Organization, Its Foundations, Founding, Its Path. Cyprus: Palestinian Research Center. Alaysa, J., & Musa, H. (2020). The Turnover of Palestinian Governments and its Selected Impacts on the Sustainability of Public Policy. NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy, 13(1), 9–34.

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Aman Transparency Palestin. (2017). Integrity and Combating Corruption—2017. Retrieved January 5, 2019, from https://www.aman-­palestine.org/en/ reports-­and-­studies/8967.html?_ri=1 Cooper, P.  J., & Vargas, C.  M. (2004). Implementing Sustainable Development: From Global Policy to Local Action. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Dajani, S. R. (2005). Ruling Palestine: A History of the Legally Sanctioned Jewish-­ Israeli Seizure of Land and Housing in Palestine. Bethlehem: BADIL Resource Center. Iqtait, A. (2017). The Decentralization of Palestinian National Discourse. Retrieved January 1, 2019, from https://www.marsad.ps/en/2017/10/23/ decentralization-­palestinian-­national-­discourse/. Kadman, N. (2013). Acting the Landlord: Israel’s Policy in Area C, the West Bank. Jerusalem: B’Tselem. Ministry of Local Governance. (2014), Image of the Ministry of Local Governance in Palestinian Municipalities. Retrieved January 1, 2019, from http://www. molg.pna.ps/studies/2012.pdf. Palestinian General Personnel Council. (2017). Strategic Plan of 2017–2022. Retrieved January 1, 2017, from https://www.gpc.pna.ps/diwan/resources/ pdf/plan2017.pdf. PASSIA (Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs). (2018). Palestine. Retrieved December 31, 2018, from http://www.passia. org/maps/38?page=3 Sayigh, Y., & Shikaki, K. (1999). Strengthening Palestinian Public Institutions: Report of an Independent Task Force. New  York: Council on Foreign Relations Press. Shalev, N., Cohen-Lifshitz, A., & Mardi, D. (2008). The Prohibited Zone: Israeli Planning Policy in the Palestinian Villages in Area C. Jerusalem: Bimkom. Shehadeh, R. (1988). Occupier’s Law: Israel and the West Bank. Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies. The Palestinian Government. (2016). National policy Agenda 2017–2022: Citizen First. Retrieved January 5, 2019, from http://palestinecabinet.gov.ps/ WebSite/Upload/Documents/GOVPLAN/NPA%20Arabic.pdf. The Palestinian Information Agency WAFA. (2018). Retrieved December 22, 2018, from http://info.wafa.ps/ar_page.aspx?id=3588. United Nations. (2015). ‘One UN’ Approach to Spatial Planning in Area C of the Occupied West Bank. East Jerusalem: Un-Habitat. VNG International. (2019). Annual Update 2019 VNG International. Retrieved February 14, 2019, from https://annual-­update-­2019.vng-­international.nl/. Waltz, V. & Isaac, J. (Eds) (2010). The Fabrication of Israel—About the Usurpation and Destruction of Palestine through Israeli Zionist Spatial Planning. Dortmund.

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World Bank. (2017). The Performance of Palestinian Local Governments. An Assessment of Service Delivery Outcomes and Performance Drivers in the West Bank and Gaza. Report No: ACS22456. World Bank Group Publications. Zeid, M., & Thawaba, S. (2018). Planning Under a Colonial Regime in Palestine: Counter Planning/decolonizing the West Bank. Land Use Policy, 71, 11–23.

CHAPTER 6

Reconstructing Governance and Public Administration Capacities in Managing the Resettlement of Displaced Persons in North-East Nigeria Stanley Osezua Ehiane and Leonard Lenna Sesa

6.1   Introduction The long-term effects of violent conflicts are innumerable and incalculable, not only in terms of destruction of lives and properties but also in terms of how it creates implacable and fierce enmity between different people within the state and how it shatters a nation’s vision, allegiance, and trust. Most countries emerging from violent conflicts are faced with infrastructural deficits and huge backlogs of essential service delivery S. Osezua Ehiane (*) Department of Political Science & Administrative Studies, University of Botswana, Gaborone, Botswana e-mail: [email protected] L. L. Sesa Department of Political Science and Administrative Studies, University of Botswana, Gaborone, Botswana © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 J. Nemec, P. S. Reddy (eds.), Public Administration in Conflict Affected Countries, Governance and Public Management, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74966-8_6

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affecting the basic and human needs of citizens. Furthermore, these countries are facing the challenge of rebuilding their public administration systems (United Nations, 2010). Due to violent conflicts, they are left with ineffective and dysfunctional public administration (Meyer, 2003). However, building public services is necessary for post-conflict nations and significant in the reconstruction of governance and public administration is of utmost importance to establish viable institutions to undertake the most significant public service delivery task, such as basic services, health, and security. Reconstructing public institutions for improved public service delivery has been the preoccupation of most countries; it is considered as a prerequisite and an absolute necessity in post-conflict recovery and reconstruction (Kauzya, 2003). Not surprisingly, public administration bears the more discernible and noticeable effects of the conflict. This is in agreement with the submission of Kauzya (2009) that all countries coming out of conflicts, such as Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Somalia, and Sudan, are in a complex development situation. This is because the situation of post-conflict societies is more demanding and cannot be handled the same way as nations with normal public management situations. In reconstructing governance and public administration in a post-conflict country, the major driving force is improved public service delivery (Ramsingh, 2009). Given the fragile nature of post-conflict states and the increased rates of violence as well as the collapse of most institutions, all modes of intervention, such as peacekeeping, humanitarian aid, governance, and development, must be imbued with a sustained awareness and sensitivity to their potential conflict-mitigating and conflict-inducing effects. There is no doubt that governance capacities in post-conflict societies include the need to rebuild infrastructure and provide relief to the immediate suffering of the people. Reconstruction of the existing institutions and the establishment of new forms of governance and public administration capacities may be required to achieve the objectives of development. Successful sustainable recovery from violent conflict, particularly in north-­ east Nigeria, depends upon reconstructing all sectors of the polity and society (Rosenblum-Kumar, 2003). It is important to note that the reconstruction of physical infrastructure, like those vital for the citizenry’s access to water, electricity, roads, and educational institutions, is the major focus in post-conflict reconstruction; while the public administration and governance structures responsible for the breakdown of institutions of the state are neglected. The central

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proposition of this study is that there is a need to reconstruct governance, public administration, justice, and security sector bodies. The study specifically looks at the case of reconstructing governance and public administration capacities in managing the resettlement of displaced persons in the north-east Nigeria. However, the Federal Government of Nigeria has been engaged in governance reform, rehabilitation, and reconstruction since the inception of insurgencies in the north-east. Through achieving governance transformation, the government has established the Presidential Committee on the North-East Initiative (PCNI) and the North-East Development Commission. These twin commissions would serve as advisory and coordination bodies for all humanitarian interventions and developmental efforts in the north-east. However, a few years after, the challenges of successfully reconstructing democratic and sustainable public institutions remain a subject of serious concern.

6.2   The Nigerian State and Conflict Dynamic Nigeria is often regarded as Africa’s giant or big brother, who can address issues that concern African peoples. The country of Nigeria is addressed as the Federal Republic of Nigeria, with a population of about 172 million people and is positioned in West Africa. The area of the country is 923,768 square km, with water bodies of about 13,000 square km. Half of the population of Nigerian is Muslim, 40 per cent are Christian, and the rest belongs to indigenous religions. Nigeria is famous for many languages, ethnic groups, distribution of the population in 36 states, and religion. Nigeria became an independent country within the Commonwealth on 1 October 1960. In 1963, Nigeria became a republic within the Commonwealth. However, to comprehend the Nigerian society and politics, the following should be taken into consideration: the widespread of Islam in northern Nigeria, which later extended to the South-Western region of Nigeria, led to the establishment of Sokoto Caliphate, which also spread Islam to another part of present-day Nigeria. This situation accounts for the dichotomy between the South and the North. Secondly, there is the social impact of the forced migration as a result of the transatlantic trade, which is attributed to the spread of Christianity, Islamic conversion, and the need for the promotion of cultural and political autonomy between the North and the South (Falola, 1999). Nigeria has been experiencing an increase in violent conflicts. These conflicts include ethnic conflicts, kidnappings, armed conflicts, and

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terrorism. These non-state conflicts have undermined the security of the Nigerian state and development. These non-state actors, according to Onuoha (2014), include the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), and Boko Haram, now the Islamic State of West Africa (ISWA). The country’s status as the giant of Africa has been eroded owing to the various forms of internal security challenges, ranging from armed struggles to ethno-religious crises, and presently, terrorism. However, an effort to impose the religious ideology on the secular, independent Nigeria, occasioned the Maitatsine rebellions of 1980 in Kano, 1982 in Kaduna, Bulunkutu (Maiduguri) in 1984, in Jimeta (Yola), in Bauchi in 1985, and the ongoing terrorist crises spearheaded by Boko Haram (Akaeze, 2009). The raging violence brought about by Boko Haram has raised questions about the country’s capacity to resolve its internal conflicts (Bagaji, 2012: 34). The most striking feature of Nigeria today is that it is wracked by violence in some parts and recovering from the conflict in others. A conflict has been raging in the north-east region for over a decade, involving the armed forces and the Boko Haram terrorist group. Despite the counterterrorism operation of the Nigerian armed forces and the multinational Joint Task Forces (MJTF), made up of the four Lake Chad Basin states, the violent attacks by Boko Haram insurgents continue. This has increased the number of internally displaced persons in the region. For instance, in a study carried out by the International Office of Migration (IOM) in 2016 “of the total figure of Internally Displaced peoples (IDPs), the assessment indicates that 13.33 per cent were displaced due to communal clashes, 0.99 per cent by natural disasters and 85.68 per cent because of insurgency attacks by Islamists”. Despite the efforts made by the Nigerian government, it has been observed that Internally Displaced people (IDPs) have continued to face harsh conditions in displacement camps. The Nigerian government in 2015 declared Boko Haram “technically defeated”, but victory is far from claimed. The government has tried different approaches to contain Boko Haram, none of which could be considered successful (Okeke-Uzodike & Onapajo, 2015). Figures released by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), an offshoot of the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and an independent, non-­ governmental humanitarian organization as of April 2015, estimated that about 1,538,982 people that fled their homes in Nigeria were still living in internal displacement camps scattered across Nigeria. In Nigeria, “2,241,484 IDPs identified in Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba,

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Yobe, Nasarawa states and Abuja” through the IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM), as of February 2016 (UNHCR, 2016: 21). Furthermore, the years of conflict further devastated the region’s social infrastructure. However, it was obvious that “75 per cent of the sanitation and water facilities and 45 per cent of the health infrastructure have been damaged” (UNDP, 2018: 3). According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report, over 2.9 million pupils have no access to classrooms and returning basic services to normalcy has been a great challenge (Brechenmacher, 2019; UNDP, 2018). Evidence shows that internally displaced people in urban settings, such as Maiduguri, face a range of challenges in accessing services and employment and that these are specifically related to their displacement (Crisp et al., 2012). While some efforts are made by civil society organizations and government agencies to address some of the basic needs of IDPs, their vulnerability tends to be increased by barriers in accessing education, employment, healthcare services, economic activities, and information for participation in decision making affecting their lives. As argued by Matfess (2015: 15), “rehabilitation, resettlement, and reintegration of IDPs in Nigeria have continued to pose a colossal challenge to the government due to unabated terrorist attacks in the country, particularly in the north-­ east”. The strain of caring for the IDPs is already taxing the state and community’s resources, prompting calls for the reconstruction of destroyed communities and the resettlement of the displaced as soon as possible (Matfess, 2015). Contemporary Nigeria is beleaguered with the difficulties of low-­ capacity utilization, large-scale unemployment, technological backwardness, widespread poverty, inadequate and decayed social and physical infrastructure, high incidence of disease, and a high crime rate, among other things. These disturbing socio-economic indicators in Nigeria are among the worst in the world. The situation is so complex that attempts to reverse it must be both strategic and systematic; hence the need for the Nigerian public administration, with which national development is intricately interrelated, is to be repositioned for better performance; because, “a strong bureaucratic/administrative machinery can enhance genuine efforts at national development, and vice versa” (Apeh, 2018: 3). In the words of Achimugu et al. (2013: 13), “any attempt at meaningful sustainable national development must begin with reforming, repositioning and developing the internal capacity of public administration to support and drive the process of national development”.

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6.3   Efforts at Reconstructing Governance and Public Administration Capacities in the North-­East Region of Nigeria Nigeria’s development has been hindered by a series of violent conflicts. These range from the long-running militant movement in the Niger Delta to the explosive Boko Haram insurgency in the Northeast. Many of the conflicts involve threats of direct armed confrontation with the state and the destruction of governance and public administrative machinery. Unarguably, a strong correlation exists between governance, peace, stability, and security. Thus, the developmental failure and security challenges being witnessed in Nigeria are a direct consequence of the pattern of governance offered by the successive governments. A critical view of the system of governance in Nigeria revealed an aberration of globally acceptable governance norms. As argued by Kaufmann et al. (2011), the governance system in Nigeria is a complete departure from governance indicators. This laxity in governance has also culminated in the formation of different militant organizations, which negates the attainment of sustainable peace in Nigeria. Reconstructing the current trend of governance could be the only solution to Nigeria’s development. Violent conflicts have historically led to a significant impact on society, with attendant losses of life, destruction of property, infrastructure, and disruptions of communal and individual relationships. North-east Nigeria has been confronted with similar challenges. However, the efforts for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the region seem to not be systematically and scientifically organized or driven. Post-conflict recovery is possible if public administration can earn the trust of the people, provide services to them, and operate in an effective, transparent, and accountable manner. Therefore, the development of social and physical infrastructure, as well as investment in human capital, is important in post-conflict reconstruction (Ibrahim & Olu, 2015). However, in recent years, Nigeria has implemented far-reaching governance and public administration reform. There is no doubt that more needs to be done to reposition public institutions for emerging challenges. This is because governance and public administration systems hinge on leadership capacities to build broad-based national and regional coalitions and channel energies towards the provision of welfare services to the citizens. The current space for the reconstruction of the north-east is occupied by several initiatives that are trying to address different issues. These

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include the Presidential Committee on North-East Interventions (PCNI), the Presidential Initiative for the North-East (PINE), the Victims’ Support Fund (VSF), the Safe School Initiative (SSI), and the work of ministries, departments, and agencies, such as the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), the State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA), the Commission for Refugees, the Ministry for Women’s Affairs, the Ministry of Education, and the affected State Governments (Ibrahim & Olu, 2015). Restoring basic local service delivery will help foster greater trust in citizens towards government and improve perceptions of state responsiveness. Besides government initiatives, there are also international organizations, such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (Brechenmacher, 2019). The other UN international sister agencies include the United Nations Children Funds (UNICEF), Food Agricultural Organization, (FAO), World Health Organization (WHO), and United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) (UNHCR, 2019). The Family Health International (FHI) and the INTERSOS-Italy are international, non-governmental organizations (UNHCR, 2019). These international organizations are working with the Nigerian government in various capacities. However, all the working partners share the mission to reconstruct governance and build a strong public administration in the conflict-affected areas in the north-east Nigeria. The success of the various initiatives depends on the capacity of the administrative system and its commitment, though some level of success has been recorded in terms of management of the displaced. Nevertheless, other activities carried out by the stakeholders, including sexual and gender-based violence and psychological counselling, livelihood and peacebuilding, access to justices, and capacity building and awareness (Presidential Committee on North East Initiative PCNI, 2016). Despite the success recorded in the management of displaced people, it has been observed that one of the drivers of conflict is a lack of accountability and a lack of input from the community. The lack of community input is evident in the rehabilitation and reintegration programmes of the government in Gombe, Bauchi state, and the community does not trust the effectiveness of the programme due to poor communication (Adepegba, 2017). Again, the Gombe people are very apprehensive over what may happen in the community after the release of former Boko

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Haram members after rehabilitation (Ehiane, 2019). The involvement of, and good communication with, the community would have suppressed any misconceptions regarding the integration of the former fighters into the community. This gap has hindered the role of public administration in the post-conflict era, particularly in the north-east Nigeria.

6.4   Post-Conflict Public Administration Performance in Nigeria Post-conflict situations are ubiquitous with challenges to the technical, institutional, social, physical, and psychological rebuilding of societies. The challenges are discouraging, as the post-conflict administration strives to ensure peace and security, promote development, and foster social reconciliation and effective leadership, and good public administration is possible if the citizens can trust the government. The reconstruction of governance and public administration capacities is not accidental; it needs to be planned and well-executed. In this regard, the timing of the various processes is of utmost importance as no one size fit all in crafting the solution to poor administration performance. The Nigerian citizen, over the years, lacks confidence in public service institutions due to nonperformance, accountability, transparency, and high levels of corruption. The nonperformance, accountability, and transparency issues can be attributed to the failure of the Tsangaya model school programme, an integrated educational programme designed for the Almajiri (the term Almajiris originated from the Arabic context Al-muhajirun to connote cohorts of “the holy Prophet Muhammed who indeed migrated with the prophet from Mecca to Medina”) by the former President of Nigeria, Goodluck Jonathan (The Guardian, 2019). The programme was to enhance the Almajiri education by integrating it with the existing basic Western education structure to reduce the vulnerability of illiterate youths to extremist radicalization and to build up the rates of literacy in the northern part of the country (Onitada, 2015). The Goodluck Jonathan administration spent 15 billion Naira on the construction of more than 100 model schools in the North to reduce the number of Almajiri roaming the streets (The Guardian, 2019). The failure of the programme was attributed to non-­ commitment, poor accountability, and the corrupt nature of some stakeholders, while some of the stakeholders (State governors) demanded that the programme should have been executed by them, even though it was a federal government project (Onitada, 2015).

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However, there is no doubt that the central cause of violence in Nigeria is weak governance, which results in poverty and economic inequality as well as poor public service delivery across the country. Nevertheless, the significant priority of post-conflict public service delivery, as is required in north-east Nigeria, needs to strengthen the capacity builders of the state. In the current situation, the leaders must have a vision, particularly with regard to post-conflict reconstruction to enhance human resources, manage scarce resources, and promote innovation and technology. The Nigerian experience of leadership in the North-East, and consequently the entire country, in the post-conflict reconstruction and administration, exhibits few or fewer opportunities for development, thereby prolonging the conflict in the affected region (Jabareen, 2012). However, the common belief that postconflict administration reduces conflict is a mirage in north-east Nigeria as development which ought to have reduced conflict suffers setbacks. Hitherto, clashes among different ethnic groups, such as the recent farmer and herders and religious groups that have partaken in overtime, lead to the destruction of infrastructures and the country becomes more divided than before. Post-conflict governance in the region is characterized by weak and sectional leadership that has not been able to transform patterns of divisive oppositional politics in Nigeria. However, leadership and institutional development are extremely significant in post-­ conflict reconstruction; thus, Nigeria leaders create institutions, but they have been unwilling to submit to their created institutions. With that said, post-conflict public administration reconstruction cannot be achieved without transforming the attitudes, behaviours, and beliefs of political leaders and civil servants. The challenges of reconstruction in post-conflict society are not limited only to Nigeria but differ based on the past and present government institutions, leadership capacities, structures, practices, and the priority reconstruction takes in the post-conflict state, which all vary greatly (United Nations, 2010). Countries like Sierra Leone, Liberia, Burundi, Somalia, Rwanda, East Timor, Kosovo, and Nigeria experience different challenges of post-conflict reconstruction. Besides the challenges inherent in Nigeria’s situation, after the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, their public administration was destroyed and had to be entirely rebuilt (United Nations, 2010). However, while many of the listed countries were left to rebuild their public administration on their own, a few had the intervention of the United Nations. Of course, Nigeria has benefitted from various United Nations partners and international non-governmental organizations, but the post-­ conflict public administration reconstruction has not been highly successful.

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6.5   Conclusion The conclusion drawn from this chapter is that the breakdown in a governance structure is considered as one of the drivers for violent conflict, and the collapse of the state architecture is manifested in the reduction of society into a Hobbesian state of nature where, “life is short, nasty and brutish”. It is, therefore, important to note that the reconstruction efforts in Nigeria tend to ignore the reconstruction of governance and public administration capacities which are crucial for the attainment of sustainable peace and development. There is no doubt that the reconstruction of governance lays a foundation for overall reconstruction efforts and acts as a catalyst for anchoring the peace by mainstreaming prevention policies and practices in all the other spheres of reconstruction, such as economic revitalization, security, infrastructure development, peacebuilding human capital development, and political and social integration. Reconstructing public administration capacities in a post-conflict society is a long-term process that needs to materialize in a peaceful environment. It requires the capacity of leaders to build confidence in their people and the human capacity development needed for the execution of public services with a virile civil society to work for the development of wealth creation and development of the country overall. However, due to the absence of the proper reconstruction of governance and public administration capacities in the post-conflict situation in Nigeria, all efforts of the government will flounder based on their faulty foundation. Governance and public administration reconstruction do not, therefore, represent the only context within which capacity-building activities can and should be undertaken to build a virile society. It is equally, if not more, important to engage capacity-­building towards the prevention and preparedness for conflict before it arises. However, the reconstruction of governance and public administration capacities in managing the reintegration and resettlement of displaced persons in Nigeria should incorporate re-orientation programmes and integrate community-based planning into service delivery to help identify priority and foster representation. The reconstruction of governance systems in a diverse society like Nigeria requires conflict-sensitive constitutional amendments which address and accommodate issues of education, language, religion, ethnicity, culture, and minority agitations. Thus, to achieve the aforementioned, there should be an appropriate mechanism for power-sharing and provided avenues for conflict resolution that satisfy

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the various groups’ articulations of their interests. Successful mechanisms for the reconstruction of governance and public administration in Nigeria must go beyond addressing institutional and structural problems and address social and psychological issues that, if left unaddressed, may otherwise lead to further violence in post-conflict societies.

References Achimugu, H., Stephen, M. R., & Aliyu, A. (2013). Public Administration and the Challenge of National Development in Nigeria: Issues and Concerns. Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, 4(6), 113–118. Adepegba, A. (2017). Boko Haram rehab centre unsettles Gombe residents. Available at https://punchng.com/boko-­haram-­rehab-­centre-­unsettles-­ gombe-­residents/ Akaeze, A. (2009). From Maitatsine to Boko Haram. Newswatch. https://beegeagle.wordpress.com/2010/05/08/from-­maitatsine-­to-­boko-­haram/ Apeh, E. I. (2018). Public Administration and National Development in Nigeria: Challenges and Possible Solutions. International Journal of Public Administration and Management Research, 4(3), 49–59. Bagaji, A. S. Y., et al. (2012). Boko Haram and the Recurring Bomb Attacks in Nigeria: Attempt to Impose Religious Ideology Through Terrorism? Cross-­ Cultural Communication., 8(1), 33–41. Brechenmacher, S. (2019). Stabilizing Northeast Nigeria After Boko Haram. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Working Report. Crisp, J., Morris, T., & Refstie, H. (2012). Displacement in Urban Areas: New Challenges, New Partnerships. Disasters, 36(1), 23–42. Ehiane, S.  O. (2019). De-radicalisation and Disengagement of the Extremist Group in Africa: The Nigerian Experience. Journal of African Foreign Affairs, 6(2), 123–138. Falola, T. (1999). The History of Nigeria. The Greenwood Histories of the Modern Nations Series. Greenwood Press. Ibrahim, S. G., & Olu, I. A. (2015). The Political Economy of Reconstruction and Rehabilitation of North Eastern Nigeria in the Post-Boko Haram Era: The Gap in Contribution Between Africa and Europe. International Journal of Multidisciplinary Research and Modern Education, 1(1), 179–190. Jabareen, Y. (2012). Conceptualizing “Post-Conflict Reconstruction” and “Ongoing Conflict Reconstruction” of Failed States. International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society, 26(2), 107–125. Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., & Mastruzzi, M. (2011). The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues. Hague Journal on the Rule of Law, 3(2), 220–246.

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Kauzya, J. M. (2003). Approaches, Processes and Methodologies for Reconstructing Governance and Public Administration in Post-Conflict Countries: Selected Cases of UNDESA’s Experience in Africa. In Reconstructing Governance and Public Administration for Peaceful, Sustainable Development (pp.  74–90). United Nations. Kauzya, J.  M. (2009). The Role of Political Leadership in Reconstructing Capacities for Public Service after Conflict. In Lessons Learned in Post-Conflict State Capacity: Reconstructing Governance and Public Administration Capacities in Post Conflict Countries (pp. 16–30). United Nations Publication. Kumar, G.  R. (2003). An Analysis of Strategic Processes for Conflict-Sensitive Reconstruction of Governance and Public Administration. In Reconstructing Governance and Public Administration for Peaceful, Sustainable Development (pp. 3–22). United Nations. Matfess, H. (2015). Nigeria Is Winning the Battle with Boko Haram But It Is Still Losing the War. https://qz.com/africa/582933/nigeria-­is-­winning-­the-­ battle-­with-­boko-­haram-­but-­it-­is-­still-­losing-­the-­war/ Meyer, M.  J. (2003). The Role of Governance and Public Administration in Developing a Foundation for Participatory, Peace-Sustaining Governance. In Reconstructing Governance and Public Administration for Peaceful, Sustainable Development (pp. 41–61). United Nations. Okeke-Uzodike, U., & Onapajo, H. (2015). African Renaissance – The Rage of Insurgency: Why Boko Haram May Remain Untamed. African Renaissance, 12(2), 49–70. Onitada, I.  T. (2015). A Pilot Study of the Challenges of Infusing Almajiri Educational System into the Universal Basic Educational Programme in Sokoto, Nigeria. Journal of Education and Practice, 6(16), 10–16. Onuoha, F. C. (2014). Why Do Youth Join Boko Haram? US Institute of Peace. Presidential Committee on the North East Initiative (PCNI). (2016). Rebuilding The North East The Buhari Plan. Volume I.  Emergency Humanitarian Assistance Social Stabilization and Protection Early Recovery (Initiatives Strategies and Implementation Frameworks). Retrieved November 10, 2020, from https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/5b42ec184.pdf Ramsingh, O. (2009). The Role of Political Leadership in Reconstructing Capacities for Public Service after Conflict. In Lessons Learned in Post-Conflict State Capacity: Reconstructing Governance and Public Administration Capacities in Post Conflict Countries. United Nations Publication. The Guardian. (2019). Jonathan’s N15b almajiri Schools Rot Away. https:// guardian.ng/news/jonathans-­n15b-­almajiri-­schools-­rot-­away/ UNDP. (2018). Business Case Assessment for Accelerating Development Investments in Famine Response and Prevention. Case Study North-East Nigeria. Retrieved July 15, 2019, from https://www.undp.org/content/ dam/undp/library/crisis%20prevention/UNDP_FamineStudy_Nigeria.PDF

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UNHCR. (2016). Nigeria UNHCR Fact Sheet February 2016. https://data2. unhcr.org/en/documents/details/49186 UNHCR. (2019, February 11–22). UNHCR Nigeria: North-East Nigeria Situation Update External. Retrieved November 9, 2020, from https://data2. unhcr.org/en/documents/details/68117 United Nations. (2010). Reconstructing Public Administration After Conflict: Challenges, Practices and Lessons Learned (Rep.). United Nations.

CHAPTER 7

Post-Conflict Reconstruction, Governance and Development: Has the Tide Turned in South Africa? Purshottama S Reddy

7.1   Introduction The issue of conflict amongst others has been a major limitation to development on the African continent over the past few decades. Conflict is a dominant issue, and it includes inter alia, insurgencies, resources and identity conflicts, and post-conflict stabilization, to growing threats from piracy, narcotics trafficking, violent extremism and organized crime (Neethling, 2017). On average, African states involved in wars since 2011 exceed 20, and a significant number of countries continentally are in some form of conflict, be it sporadic or permanently viewed as being “post conflict”. The DBSA (2011) points out consequentially that abject poverty; collapse of systems, structures, and societies; widespread corruption; political regulation of the economy; and an unpredictable governance

P. S. Reddy (*) University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 J. Nemec, P. S. Reddy (eds.), Public Administration in Conflict Affected Countries, Governance and Public Management, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74966-8_7

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environment are key characteristics of the typical post-conflict African state. The experience in South Africa—notwithstanding apartheid rule over a 48-year period—was affirmative, as there was an agreement which was negotiated and finalized with predominantly the African National Congress (ANC) and other liberation movements (Kotze, 2017a). The universally condemned system of apartheid has left behind a legacy of bad governance, poverty, inequality and underdevelopment. This legacy has impacted negatively on South African society and must be factored into the developmental agenda presently and in the future (Reddy, 2015; Schwella, 2017a). A representative and inclusive post-conflict post-democratic state was steered in 1994, with a much vaunted globally acknowledged public governance model, which prioritized public participation and socio-economic progress in the broader context of addressing basic needs (Bekink, 2006). South Africans have jointly created a world-class Constitution (1996) following lengthy and robust discussions and debate both theoretically and practically on post-1994 public governance. In this context, the Constitution serves as a solid base to introduce and implement policies on good governance and more responsive service delivery. However, although the country has made steady progress constitutionally and institutionally, and introduced a National Development Plan, an analysis of governance trends and developments, global, national and local assessments has indicated that South Africa has stalled and retrogressed in the past decade particularly in relation to good governance, robust policymaking and efficient and effective service delivery (Schwella, 2017c; De Vries, 2015; Reddy, 2015). Trends relative to rudimentary services, more specifically education, health, safety and security have highlighted deficiencies due to inter alia, ineffective governance; inappropriate policies, bad public leadership, lack of political and management will and poor implementation of policies. There is a strong view that South Africa must transition to fundamentals relative to good governance and basic service delivery. According to Brand (2019: 8), “the country is at a turning point following nine years of former President Zuma’s ruinous administration. It needs strong principled leaders to put the country on a path of economic growth and to improve the quality of governance”. This chapter critiques post-1994 reconstructive governance/development in South Africa within a proclaimed developmental state; critically reviews the restraints/challenges hindering the public governance system; and puts forward proposals/recommendations for ensuring that the

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system can successfully discharge its constitutional mandate in the Sixth Administration ushered in 2019 following the general elections. Certain guiding principles are highlighted as a response to some of the thematic issues highlighted and discussed. The material in the chapter constituted a critical analysis of primary and secondary literature, both past and current impacting on the area of focus that is post-conflict reconstruction governance and development in South Africa. More specifically, a desktop reading of particularly books/chapters in books, journal articles, official publications of international development organizations, legislation/policies/publications of the post-1994 South African government, newspapers and websites constituted the basis of the research. Random ongoing discussions with executive public functionaries in South Africa also assisted in gaining a deeper understanding of issues and contributed to the development of this chapter.

7.2   The Post-Conflict State Clarified and Demystified Conflict in a governance context has been there for centuries, but the aspect of reconstruction and development beyond a given conflict period has been a recent phenomenon which only surfaced on the political agenda internationally in the past few decades. Conceptually, a post-conflict state cannot be clearly and precisely defined as there are different international contexts describing the complexities, circumstances and conditions. Nkurungiza in Reddy (2018) believes that if “post conflict” vocabulary signifies that countries evolving from a conflict have distinct attributes that separate them from others deemed to be passive, by implication the post-­ conflict era ends when the peculiar features central to the conflict are no longer the source of control. In fact, it is not possible to predict when a country will become normal again and consequently the post-conflict era has been subjectively demarcated as at least a decade after a conflict has ended (Reddy, 2018). South Africa has moved beyond the realm of a post-­ conflict state; however, it is the issue of reconstruction and development that is still grappling with and is still a contentious subject. Securing human rights, safeguarding peace/security and promoting reconciliation/social cohesion are three different goals in national rebuilding in post-conflict locations (United Nations, 2010) all of which are weighty in the South Africa case. Globally, security and peace are viewed

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as critical components of development, and more importantly it can lessen some tensions that have resulted in the conflict. According to the United Nations (2007), an end to violence and societal conflict is rudimentary fundamentals for states to progress globally. The state delivers basic services to local communities and the citizenry at large regardless of whether it is delivered directly or is outsourced. Government capacity to deliver public services is dependent on inter alia, socio-economic/political conditions; national safety and resource sufficiency relative to systems; public infrastructure and staffing/skills (United Nations, 2010). All of these aspects will be interrogated in greater detail relative to the South African experience in the sections that follow.

7.3   Problematic Context and the History and Organizational Structure of Central Government 7.3.1  “The struggle for liberation” Apartheid was practiced under Dutch and British colonial rule in some form or other since 1652 and thereafter formalized by the National Party in 1948, when it assumed power, until the advent of democracy in 1994. The 1948 victory by the then National Party enabled it to consolidate its power and focus on a concerted effort to exercise greater control over the African majority populace (Welsh, 2017). In pursuance of this, several legislative and policy measures which constituted the basis of apartheid were introduced, thereby regulating the movement of the people, where they could live and work and with whom they could have relations. This is highlighted in some of the key legislative enactments below (Botha, 2017; Welsh, 2017): • Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act, 1949 (Act 55 of 1949) outlawed marriage across the races; • Population Registration Act, 1950 (Act 30 of 1950) defined the different races and a “non-white” classification implied that an identity document, notoriously referred to as a “pass” had to be carried at all times; • Immorality Amendment Act, 1950 (Act 21 of 1950) which restricted couples from having sexual relations across racial lines;

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• Group Areas Act, 1950 (Act 41 of 1950) which segregated “whites” and “non-whites” in terms of where they could live/work; • Natives Abolition of Passes and Co-ordination of Documents Act, 1952 (Act 67 of 1952) which extended pass laws to women of colour. Territories were created in terms of the apartheid policy that served as “homelands” for the different African ethnic communities, namely Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei which were deemed to be independent states. These states were not acknowledged then internationally as they were created in terms of the apartheid policy. Other homelands were declared as being self-governed, namely Gazankulu, KwaNdebele, KaNgwane, Kwazulu, Lebowa and Qwaqwa (Botha, 2017). The African majority were accorded the franchise to vote, ownership rights and other rights in their respective homelands, but not in the so called White South Africa. The bitter resistance to apartheid was initially fought by the African National Congress (ANC), and Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), both banned organizations that were deemed illegal (Welsh, 2017). The intense opposition to apartheid internally as well as internationally culminated in an armed struggle between the liberation movements and the security forces of the then ruling party. Regular states of emergency, economic sanctions and loss of foreign investment were part of the equation and this provided the impetus for initial talks with the banned ANC which was then in exile. Mr. F W de Klerk, the then state president ended the armed struggle and lifted the ban on the ANC, PAC, Communist Party and 33 other outlawed organizations as well as individuals on 2 February 1990 (Botha, 2017; Welsh, 2017). It allowed political exiles to return to South Africa and it was a defining period for the country’s transition from apartheid to democracy (De Jager, 2017). The apartheid policy was viewed nationally, continentally and internationally as a dehumanizing, immoral and criminal governance system and the United Nations General Assembly then officially declared it as a crime against humanity in 1973 (Schwella, 2017a: 142). Consequently, the political policy of racial segregation and white domination, in common parlance, referred to as the apartheid policy and system provided the impetus for the liberation struggle and eventually the emergence of the post-1994 democratic South African state.

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7.3.2  Post-1994 Dispensation and Governance According to Statistics South Africa (2017: 1–2) the national population of 56.52 million in the country comprises Africans who constitute 80% of the population, Coloureds 8.8%, Whites 7.9% and Indians/Asian 2.6%. There is considerable diversity in the ethnic composition which has also impacted on governance issues, especially in terms of ensuring representivity. South Africa is highly urbanized and industrialized comparatively in the continent, and Picard and Mogale (2015) believe this has implications for delivery of rudimentary services. The country is endowed with mineral wealth. De Vries (2015) points out that its gross domestic product (GDP) trebled over the past two decades to an estimated 400 billion dollars in 2010, making it one of the few countries viewed by the World Bank as being middle-income continentally. On 27 April, a constitutional democracy emerged following the extraordinary historic elections. There is a bicameral parliamentary system consisting of 400 members elected to a National Assembly and 90 members who constitute the National Council of Provinces (NCOP) (CLGF, 2018). The governmental structure is a unitary system divided into three spheres, which are interdependent, interrelated and independent transforming nationally into nine provinces and 257 municipalities. The leader of the dominant political party is Head of State/Government and is elected indirectly for five  years by the National Assembly. Seats in the National Assembly are assigned closed with one national and nine provincial lists by means of a proportional representation system. Allocation of seats is done according to the Droop quota. The president appoints the cabinet drawn from members of the National Assembly. According to Thornhill and Cloete (2014), the membership of the provincial legislatures ranges from 30 to 80, and they indirectly elect the NCOP members. Provinces vary in geography, size, population, scope and complexity and elections are conducted based on a proportional representation list. Notwithstanding constitutional mandates and a Parliamentary Oversight and Accountability Model being in place, there have been concerns raised over parliament’s somewhat sedentary performance as an overseer of government activities (Graham, 2017a).

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7.4   Peculiarities Inside the Administration at the Central Level Public administration value standards nationally, as detailed in 195 of the Constitution (1996), stipulate that “public administration must be governed by democratic values and principles” and pertinent to all governmental spheres and state organs/entities are highlighted in this regard. Ethical, transparent and accountable governments, as well as efficient and effective resources usage, are key guiding principles. The public service nationally and provincially as represented by the governmental spheres respectively is structured by the Public Service Act 103 of 1994, which incorporates routine aspects relating to terms of office, employment conditions, discipline/discharge and retirement of public servants. This Act highlighted in the Constitution (1996) lays down that there must be an operative public service defined by national legislation (Brand, 2017). Public servants can however be recruited, promoted, transferred and dismissed as provinces have the requisite power in this regard. The legal framework for public administration at the local sphere is detailed in the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000, which provides for local administrations; appointment of staff/human resources; capacity development and an applicable staff code of conduct (Republic of South Africa, 2000). This requirement is highlighted in section 195 of the Constitution (1996), whilst local government objectives are detailed in section 152. It should be noted that sustainable services provision and democratic and accountable local government are deemed a priority and have been constitutionalized (section 153). The ANC plan for the first democratic elections in 1994, the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), advocated for the creation of opportunities for all South Africans (Tshishonga, 2015a). If the country has to achieve its full potential as a developing country, more specifically in addressing unemployment, poverty and inequality challenges, a merit-based human capital development system is a key pre-­ requisite, thereby enabling the populace to participate relative to creativity, skills and knowledge. Adding a political dimension to public sector staffing is directly linked to partisan appointments based on the “cadre deployment” policy adopted by the ruling party at its 2007 national conference. “Cadre deployment” is a practice where supporters from the ruling party are “deployed” to

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public sector posts, as they could be trusted politically and not because they are suitably and appropriately qualified for those positions (Reddy, 2016; Siddle & Koelble, 2012; Welsh, 2017). This policy has since become deeply entrenched in the South African bureaucracy at all governmental spheres. Siddle and Koelble (2012) add that an unproductive and ineffectual workforce, appointments deemed inappropriate and, in some cases, nepotistic, poor morale and ill-discipline are the resultant effects of this policy. This has been further aggravated by inter alia, ineffective recruitment practices, inadequate training, no matching of skills to the post-­ requirements and poor commitment and limited interest by the staff in question. Through this policy, card-carrying members of the ruling party scramble for limited jobs in the public sector irrespective of whether they qualify or not (Reddy, 2016; Tshishonga, 2015a). This has also implied that those individuals who are politically and economically connected are often given priority over the general populace. Cadre deployment has severe consequences for an evolving democracy like South Africa which is in transition as it tends to destroy the required separation between the party and state (Jeffery, 2009). It is an accepted fact that the increasing public protests in the past two decades against bad local governance, and more particularly poor service delivery, can be ascribed to incompetent and underqualified public functionaries who are by and large political appointments. 7.4.1  Transparency and Accountability The Constitution (1996) encourages public institutions to be transparent in their activities and ensure that they provide accurate information which is accessible and timely. Transparency, in this context, necessitates processes and actions by public functionaries which are honest and open and subject to public scrutiny. If this does not happen, this is likely to arouse suspicions of fraudulent and unethical conduct by members of the public  (Schwella and Public Service Report in Mle 2015). Parliament has introduced the Promotion of Access to Information Act of 2000, which guarantees the right to use public information constitutionally for the exercise/protection of any rights or matters related thereto. South Africa, according to the Transparency International Index, was placed 72 out of 177 states, resulting in a score of 42 out of 100. In terms of ranking, South Africa was placed 38  in 2001 and declined to 72  in 2012, a reduction by 34 positions in 11 years (Schwella, 2017b). In terms

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of corruption, a score of 51 in 2007 declined to 49 in 2008, 47 in 2009 and 45 in 2010 (Corruption Watch, 2013). International perceptions on corruption levels have become progressively negative, impacting adversely on the financial and economic prospects, resulting in inter alia, the decision by Moody’s to downgrade the country’s investment status (Schwella, 2017b). Accountability implies answerability, a responsibility to expose and expound one’s actions publicly thereby encouraging debate and constructive criticism (Schwella in Mle 2015). Governance issues in public institutions and most state entities relating to non-compliance with legislative requirements are an ongoing challenge. Both the Public Finance Management Act and the Municipal Finance Management Act have been designed to eradicate corruption in government. Lack of oversight, accountability, tolerance of corruption, inappropriate appointments in critical posts and weak management/technical capacities have contributed to the governance challenges (Brand, 2019). Developing this argument further, Kotze (2017b) adds that the major obstacle and hindrances to democratic consolidation are bad leadership, corruption and limited accountability. It is imperative that the institutions of public accountability be restructured, and the rule of law be bolstered. This a fundamental challenge faced by all at-risk democracies. 7.4.2  Corruption According to Moreira (Natal Mercury 12 July 2019), “corruption is hindering Africa’s economic, political and social development. It is a major barrier to economic growth, good governance, and basic freedoms”. Corruption in South Africa undermines the rights of people entrenched in the Constitution (1996), as well as democratic and ethical values and morality. In addition, rule of law is compromised as well as the trustworthiness of government. Local development resources are diverted and continentally, this implies that rudimentary services like housing, water and electricity are compromised. This implies that certain select groups or individuals are favoured as opposed to the larger interests of society (Reddy, 2015). Transparency International’s Global Corruption Barometer alluded to the fact that in 2013 approximately 47% of the populace in the country allegedly paid a bribe the year before for a basic service. The global average is 25% and placed South Africa in the same ranking as Afghanistan

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(Schwella, 2017b). Schwella (2017b) points out further that governance in the country is generally viewed as being quite corrupt and this applies equally to political parties and parliament. Persistent action is required to deal with corruption. Government has condemned corruption publicly and anti-corruption policies/legislation/bodies have been ushered in; however, there is no firm political and management will to respond to issues decisively. Schwella (2017b: 236) adds that there is also evidence of a “cynical abuse of procedural justice, afforded by the Constitution to postpone or evade public and personal accountability in cases where corruption is alleged and even, clearly visible”. Governments have to ensure that all anti-corruption statements and commitments made publicly are followed through by probing and taking legal action against all guilty parties be they in the public, private or non-­ governmental sector. The law must take its course and there has to be serious consequences for those found guilty of corruption. There should be strategies in place for developing principled and strong procurement practices as well. The Regional Advisor of Transparency International, Banolia (Natal Mercury 12 July 2019), has pointed out that African countries, to lessen the weighty liability of corruption on the populace and ordinary people, should endorse and effectually implement the African Union Convention to Prevent and Combat Corruption, if they have not committed to date. He added that the citizenry on the continent is of the view that they can make a difference, and consequently they must be allowed the required space to do so. 7.4.3  Rule of Law Rule of Law includes several pointers which measure the level of confidence of the citizenry in terms of consenting to societal rules of which they are a part of. These include inter alia, perceptions of instances of crime; the predictability and effectiveness of the judiciary and contracts enforceability (World Bank in De Vries, 2015). This is one area which has demonstrated that it is a major test in the country given the increasing levels of crime, the unpredictability of the judiciary in pursuing particularly criminal cases relating to inter alia, corruption by senior public functionaries. Questions have also been raised about the competence and the independence of the Public Protector given the judgements made recently in high level corruption cases. There are currently moves afoot to remove

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the incumbent Public Protector through parliament, as it is believed that she is supporting one or other faction within the ANC and that furthermore, she is politically selective in terms of action being taken, in the cases that she is handling. 7.4.4  Policymaking, Coordination and Regulation Policymaking and implementation in the South African context are unpredictable given inter alia, the complexity of the society inherited; ensuing governance and resultant challenges of service delivery as a result of inequality, unemployment and poverty and visionary aspirations. The country is also viewed as being constitutionally developmental and conceivably challenged in this regard (Schwella, 2017c; Welsh, 2017). A significant part of this difficulty can be attributed to the apartheid era and unsatisfactory post-1994 governance, characterized by the large number of public protests fuelled by debauched governance and policy failures, poor service delivery and corruption (Kotze, 2017a; Reddy, 2015; Welsh, 2017). The country being a constitutional state has to uphold the notion of constitutionalism, human rights and rule of law. This can also be a constraint to policymaking and implementation, where in serious corruption cases, the culprits are entitled to inter alia, a fair trial, employment rights and matters related thereto (Schwella, 2017c). This is indeed a serious test to the meeting out of swift justice to the alleged perpetrators. In this regard, De Vries (2015: 23) has pointed out that “legislation alone does not do the job” and that it has “failed to produce actual results and thus does not accomplish what it intended to accomplish”. An additional concern is that the country is viewed as being constitutionally developmental which implies that engagement with the citizenry and public participation is an essential component of governance (Kotze, 2017b; Tshishonga, 2015b). This results in long processes of participation and consultation which in turn imply delayed action on policy and implementation thereby impacting negatively on service delivery (Reddy & Naidu, 2012; Schwella, 2017c). The country has proclaimed itself to be a developmental state; however, policy implementation has not been firm and resolute in terms of addressing the post-1994 governance challenges and consequently growth has been uneven and the benefits of it has not been widespread (Nnyamnjoh in Tshishonga, 2015b; De Vries, 2015). Schwella (2017c) and Gumede (2017) point out that a developmental state should facilitate rapid and

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sustainable transformation socio-economically through active, intensive and effective intervention, more specifically in relation to economic and social underdevelopment. Valued lessons can be drawn from countries in East Asia which have followed the trajectory of a development state since the 1960s with significant positive outcomes. In this regard, Schwella (2017c) points out that South Africa is much more favourably disposed towards a developmental state given the positives, namely an established corporate sector, access to natural resources and a stronger civil society. This implies the possibilities of partnership governance, jointly developing policies and co-provision of service delivery (Brand, 2019). Schwella adds (Schwella, 2017c) that the developmental state denotes that it must be key to state transformation and this extends beyond just political and public commitment. A public sector that virtually leads the transformation process is required. The bureaucracy in transformative state development as highlighted in the National Development Plan (Republic of South Africa, 2011) requires highly skilled public functionaries who must be recruited and a sense of corporate identity developed as a result of a communal purpose. Consequently, a developmental state necessitates public functionaries who are competent implementers, who can ensure the completion of the tasks at hand and public policy can be a vehicle for developmental/transformative public institutions to respond to challenges of capability (Gumede, 2017). Schwella (2017c) believes that the limited state capacity is a motive and certainly not an excuse to create a developmental state. 7.4.5  Efficiency and Effectiveness of the Administrative System and Overall Government Performance South Africa is doing well continentally, relative to democratic governance, but is lagging behind internationally and more specifically when compared with the middle-income countries belonging to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (De Vries, 2015). Data, based on perceptions, collated by the World Bank, in its World Governance Indicators on inter alia, the state of accountability, political stability, corruption, rule of law, regulatory quality and quality service delivery success, points to some interesting results. The country is ranked in the centre for each of these areas, that is it is performing better than its immediate neighbours in Sub-Saharan Africa (Schwella, 2017b), but doing equally worse than Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)

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countries with high income. Political stability has increased post-1994 arising from uncertainties from the transition period during the apartheid era in the 1990s to democracy in 1994. However, Schwella (2017c), De Vries (2015) and Brand (2019) have highlighted other challenges, namely the control of corruption and ineffectiveness of government which have deteriorated. There is a linkage between the two in that funds earmarked for service delivery “ends up in the pocket of service delivers themselves, this is one cause of failing service delivery” (De Vries, 2015: 20). The decline in effective and ethical governance in South Africa and the general underperformance of government have raised some concerns nationally and internationally. There has been deficient delivery of basic services due to inter alia, ineffective governance, inappropriate policies; debauched public leadership and poor implementation of policies. The resultant effect has been a decrease in public confidence and trust in government by inter alia, national and international organizations, private sector, civil society, media and the citizenry (Cogta and Oberholzer in Reddy, 2015). There has been a “repressive” and “anti–democratic”(Graham, 2017b: 197) response from government to date, which if not addressed appropriately will in the long term render South Africa a failed instead of a developmental state. Brand (2019) points out that there has to be innovative solutions to some of South Africa’s major challenges, notably inadequate/poor housing; high crime/public safety and poor education quality. On a daily basis, the average citizen experiences the full impact of dysfunctional municipalities, which, as a matter of urgency, has to be transformed to be responsive effectual communal public institutions. The notion of co-production of services where there is the utilization of both public and private sector expertise in designing and delivering public services should be considered and used. South African governance challenges will be addressed if the majority of public functionaries acknowledge and gravitate towards a culture which demonstrates a strong commitment to care, compassion and empathy for their fellow compatriots (ubuntu), in an open servant leader attitude. It is imperative that public functionaries appointed or elected have the required skills and competencies, in addition to the qualities mentioned above to facilitate that process (Reddy, 2015).

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7.5   Relating the Peculiarities to the Post-Conflict Situation De Vries (2015) believes that the post-1994 South African state is a robust, representative and participative democracy, where public participation is an integral part of elections, policymaking, implementation and evaluation processes. Consequently, it is possible to pronounce on government performance relative to public needs. The African Union (2014) noted that public participation extended beyond the electoral processes and there is ongoing participation in integrated development planning, performance management, municipal budgeting, local economic development, the provincial growth and development strategies and “imbizos” (“the callings together”). South Africa has transitioned beyond the apartheid era and has made significant progress in responding to some of the challenges inherited from the past, particularly in relation to democratization, deracialization and basic services provision. Despite these positive developments, there are, however, entrenched challenges which will remain on the political agenda and impact negatively on present and future governance. The capacity issue and financial capability for implementing social programmes, state spending and service delivery particularly at the provincial, district and local levels will remain a major constraint and impediment. More specifically, the challenges identified include inter alia (African Union, 2014; Reddy & Naidu, 2012; De Vries, 2015; Welsh, 2017; Kotze, 2017a, b; Schwella, 2017a, b; Reddy, 2015): • Unemployment has increased and is perpetuating inequality; • Education outcomes are poor and the basic education quality is substandard; • Public service delivery is poor and performance uneven resulting in public protests daily; • Capacity/capability of the state needs to be developed; • Infrastructural investment/development/maintenance needs to increase to prevent social exclusion due to poor service delivery. Economic growth is also delayed; • A deteriorating health system with poor outcomes and huge disease burden (HIV/AIDS; tuberculosis; malaria and other communicable diseases). Children’s nutrition/health/development has to be enhanced;

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• Policy development consultation, education and feedback are minimal/inadequate; • Computer/internet access, research/development and new patents registered are limited impacting negatively on innovation and creativity; • Corruption undermines the legitimacy of the state/national integrity and service delivery; • Spatial challenges marginalize the indigent and result in a divided society. Effective land use contributes to sustainable rural livelihoods; • Savings rate is low with increasing consumer indebtedness restricting growth of the economy; • Undocumented/illegal immigration from neighbouring African countries has increased and economic as opposed to formal citizenship is prioritized, resulting in violent xenophobia, inhumaneness and anarchy; • Mining and manufacturing contribution to GDP has decreased from 38% in 1986 to 23% in 2013. Labour and mining uncertainties have reduced investment resulting in capital flight. Credit ratings have dropped, impacting negatively on foreign loans/finances. • Limited/lack of political/management will to implement good governance measures; and • Politicization of the bureaucracy and instability of political-­ administrative interface. South Africa is a struggle democracy where the ruling party was initially a liberation movement which fought for democracy. The initial decade of democracy resulted in considerable progress being made on the governance front, notably in relation to new legislation/policies, basic service provision, community consultation/engagement and promoting the democratic ethos of the country. The majority of the struggle veterans, community activists and leadership of non-governmental organizations were in government and the governance culture then was to serve the public at large by enhancing the quality of their lives. The promotion of self-interest and aggrandizement was prevalent then, but limited. Politicization and factionalism were evident then, as the Nelson Mandela era and aura were still a guiding factor and influence during that period. Thabo Mbeki, the second democratic president of South Africa, had a tough act to follow. He managed to steer the country in the right direction in terms of basic economic growth and responding to some of the

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developmental challenges. However, there was a political impasse and he was forced to step down in the last six months of his term of office, when he was replaced by a populist president, Jacob Zuma. The last decade of democracy proved to be quite challenging in South Africa where there has been blatant politicization of the public sector, rampant corruption, mismanagement of the state-owned entities (SOEs), poor service delivery and low economic growth. Unethical behaviour, lack of integrity, greed and crazy public consumption have become societal norms which have plagued the development of the country and has manifested itself in different ways impacting negatively on good governance, growth and development. The South African society in general and the government have to elevate the country above this deep immoral compass and ensure that there is an upward trajectory relative to good and sustainable governance so that it can benefit the majority of the populace. Brand (2019) believes a visible method of enhancing public accountability and ultimately governance would be to ensure that the Zondo Commission of Enquiry into State Capture deliberations has consequences and result in successful criminal prosecutions. Other practical measures proposed include: • Stronger political will and leadership to assume control and implement good governance measures. • Stabilizing the political–administrative interface and limiting politicization of the bureaucracy; • Defining set targets for the ministers/premiers and members of the executive committees of provinces with systematic reports on their performance; • Enhancing integrity, accountability/transparency as part of good governance; • Sourcing candidates who are skilled and qualified for public management posts; • Appointing a “chief ethics officer” as part of the national/provincial cabinet secretariat; • Strengthening the oversight roles in the nine provincial legislatures/ parliaments; • Effectual use of information technology to promote good governance; and

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• Building an empowering environment for active citizen involvement in service delivery (Brand, 2019; Kotze, 2017a; Reddy, 2015; Graham, 2017b; Republic of South Africa, 2011). The National Development Plan (Republic of South Africa, 2011) highlights the need for government to facilitate the building of state capacity within a robust democratic system (Reddy, 2015). Directly linked to this is the administrative reform challenge which seeks to ensure optimal structures and functioning of policy implementation and service delivery systems which are deemed to be sustainable. Consequently, it can be seen that the legislation, policies, systems and strategies are in place in to facilitate good governance and the discharge of effectual and operative service delivery. However, the challenges are securing ethical, responsive and dedicated leadership who are patriotic and committed to improving the quality of life of the majority of the populace.

7.6   Conclusions The post-1994 democratic government inherited public institutions that were uneven, patchy and not broadly representative of the South African populace. During the apartheid era, the locus and focus of public governance and resultant service delivery focused on a small percentage of the citizenry in the country. A key priority of the post-1994 government was extending, particularly basic services to the entire country. Progress has been achieved particularly in relation to access to basic services, despite services provided being far short of the targets and expectations set. Public policies deemed “world class” were introduced, but implementation has been slow, delayed and in some cases not implemented at all. Consequently, agitated and frustrated communities engaging in violent service delivery protests have become a daily manifestation. The last decade has seen a steady deterioration and decline in public governance, economic growth, basic service delivery, law and order and societal norms in terms of ethical behaviour and morality. All of this has impacted negatively on the development of the country and the quest for a developmentally orientated, responsive and sustainable democracy as envisaged in the Constitution. Political conflict has not really been an issue in post-1994 South African politics, but factionalism has surfaced within the ruling party impacting negatively on good governance and responsive

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service delivery. It has also been a dominant factor in the issue of the so-­ called state capture saga. Good governance has also been an illusion, particularly in the last decade or so. Rampant corruption, the politicization of the public sector and increasing lawlessness have all impacted negatively on good governance. Low economic growth, limited investment, questionable macro-­ economic policies and an underperforming public sector have also served as constraints to the much-vaunted notion of job creation and poverty alleviation. Good governance, respect for law and order and political and management will are key to steering the post-1994 South African state out of its present decadence and dysfunctionality to a vibrant and progressive developmental state as originally espoused in the Constitution. There has to be firm and decisive political and management leadership which is not self-serving and committed to changing the narrative of the country to one of economic growth, responsive and effectual delivery of services and a higher living standard for the populace. There has to be some serious introspection and committed and morally upright and ethical leadership to change the narrative so that there will be “a good story to tell”. The alternative which may seem extreme is a dysfunctional and failed state of which there are many in the African continent.

References African Union. (2014). African Peer Review Mechanism. Ethiopia. Bekink, B. (2006). Principles of South African Local Government Law. LexisNexis Butterworths. Botha, C. (2017). South African Governance: The Context. In E. Schwella (Ed.), South African Governance (pp. 76–127). Oxford University Press. Brand, D. (2017). South African Governance – The Institutions. In E. Schwella (Ed.), South African Governance (pp. 192–224). Oxford University Press. Brand, D. (2019, May 27). It Can’t Be Business as Usual After the Ruinous Rule of Zuma. Pretoria News, 8. Commonwealth Local Government Forum (CLGF). (2018). Commonwealth Local Government Handbook 2017/2018. London: CLGF. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. (1996). South Africa. Corruption Watch. (2013). Annual Report. Johannesburg. Development Bank of South Africa. (2011). Doing Business in Post-conflict and Fragile States: Challenges and Risks. Working Paper No. 23. Development Planning Division.

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Graham, V. (2017a). The Birth of a Constitutional State. In N. D. Jager (Ed.), South African Politics: An Introduction (pp. 95–120). Oxford University Press. Graham, V. (2017b). Civil Society and Civic Participation. In N. D. Jager (Ed.), South African Politics: An Introduction (pp. 173–200). Oxford University Press. Gumede, V. (2017). Economic Policy in Post-apartheid South Africa. In N.  D. Jager (Ed.), South African Politics: An Introduction (pp.  226–246). Oxford University Press. Jager, N. D. (2017). Apartheid to Democracy. In N. D. Jager (Ed.), South African Politics: An Introduction (pp. 76–94). Oxford University Press. Jeffery, A. (2009). Chasing the Rainbow: South Africa’s Move from Mandela to Zuma. South African Institute of Race Relations. Kotze, J.  S. (2017a). Introduction: The Theory and Practice of Democratic Development. In N.  D. Jager (Ed.), South African Politics: An Introduction (pp. 2–26). Oxford University Press. Kotze, J. S. (2017b). Political Culture in South Africa. In N. D. Jager (Ed.), South African Politics: An Introduction (pp. 247–272). Oxford University Press. Mle, T. R. (2015). Corruption Needs to Distinguish Between Facts and Solutions. In P.  S. Reddy & M.  S. Vries (Eds.), Quo Vadis?: Local Governance and Development in South Africa Post 1994 (pp. 147–166). Bruylant. Natal Mercury. (2019, July 12). Africa Beset by Increase in Corruption. Natal Mercury. Neethling, T. (2017). South Africa in a Complex Regional Continental and Global Order. In N.  D. Jager (Ed.), South African Politics: An Introduction (pp. 274–299). Oxford University Press. Picard, L. A., & Mogale, T. (2015). The Limits of Democratic Governance in South Africa. Lynne Rienner. Reddy, P.  S. (2015). Post 1994 Local Governance and Development in South Africa: Quo Vadis? In P.  S. Reddy & M.  S. Vries (Eds.), Quo Vadis?: Local Governance and Development in South Africa Post 1994 (pp. 323–340). Bruylant. Reddy, P. S. (2016). The Politics of Service Delivery in South Africa: The Local Government Sphere in Context. The Journal for Transdisciplinary Research in Southern Africa, 12(1), 1–8. Reddy, P. S. (2018). Evolving Local Government in Post Conflict South Africa: Where to? Journal of Local Economy, 33(7), 710–725. Reddy, P. S., & Naidu, R. A. (2012). Development and Local Governance: The South African Experience. In A.  N. Roy & B.  S. Baviskar (Eds.), Local Governance: A Global Perspective (pp. 90–107). Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India. Republic of South Africa. (2000). Local Government: Municipal Systems Act, 2000. Govt. Printer. Schwella, E. (2017a). South African Governance: The Challenges. In E. Schwella (Ed.), South African Governance (pp. 128–158). Oxford University Press.

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Schwella, E. (2017b). South African Governance  – The Current Reality. In E.  Schwella (Ed.), South African Governance (pp.  226–273). Oxford University Press. Schwella, E. (2017c). South African Competent Governance  – From Policy to Implementation. In E. Schwella (Ed.), South African Governance (pp. 320–353). Oxford University Press. Siddle, A. M., & Koelble, T. A. (2012). The Failure of Decentralisation in South African Local Government: Complexity and Unanticipated Consequences. UCT Press. Statistics South Africa (SSA). (2017). Mid-year Population Estimates (Rep.). Government Printer. Thornhill, C., & Cloete, J. J. (2014). South African Municipal Government and Administration. Van Schaik Academic. Tshishonga, N. (2015a). The Increased Politicisation of Human Resources Recruitment. In P. S. Reddy & M. S. Vries (Eds.), Quo Vadis?: Local Governance and Development in South Africa Post 1994 (pp. 129–146). Bruylant. Tshishonga, N. (2015b). Bring in the Experts. In P. S. Reddy & M. S. Vries (Eds.), Quo Vadis?: Local Governance and Development in South Africa Post 1994 (pp. 167–181). Bruylant. United Nations. (2007). The United Nations Development Agenda: Development for All (Rep.). Department of Economic and Social Affairs. United Nations. (2010). Reconstructing Public Administration After Conflict: Challenges, Practices and Lessons Learned. World Public Sector Report 2010. Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Vries, M.  D. (2015). Local Governance and Development in South Africa. In M. D. Vries & P. S. Reddy (Eds.), Quo Vadis? Local Governance and Development in South Africa Since 1994 (pp. 13–30). Bruylant. Welsh, D. (2017). Apartheid and Its Legacies. In N. D. Jager (Ed.), South African Politics an Introduction (pp. 28–55). Oxford University Press.

CHAPTER 8

Thirty-Five Years of Reforms in Uganda: Is the Glass Half Full or Half Empty? Dmitry D. Pozhidaev

8.1   Introduction: Old Conflicts and New Crises This chapter explores the role of public administration in rebuilding and re-constructing Uganda following the coming to power of the present National Resistance Movement (NRM) government under President Yoweri Museveni in 1986. Preceding this takeover was a turbulent period of the birth of an independent Uganda in 1962. The government of President Obote fell nine years later as a result of a coup d’état by Idi Amin who unleashed a regime of terror against his own people characterized by political repression, ethnic persecution, extrajudicial killings, nepotism and corruption. International estimates put the number of people killed by the regime as high as 500,000 (Keatley, 2003). Amin was ousted in 1979 and the next seven years saw five successive regimes until the last of them under Tito Okello was overthrown in 1986 by Museveni’s NRM, which waged a bush war against those regimes from 1981.

D. D. Pozhidaev (*) United Nations Capital Development Fund, Kampala, Uganda e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 J. Nemec, P. S. Reddy (eds.), Public Administration in Conflict Affected Countries, Governance and Public Management, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74966-8_8

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When the NRM took power in 1986, the economy was in ruins. In the previous 15 years, per capita output had fallen by 42 per cent. With the shrinking size of the economy came retrograde structural changes as the share of manufacturing fell from 9 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) to 4 per cent, while the share of agriculture rose from 42 to 62 per cent. The government was effectively bankrupt and could no longer afford the most basic public services. According to Robinson (2006), Uganda’s public administration in 1986 was bloated, corrupt and inefficient. The public service wage bill was just 2.3 per cent of GDP. Public servants were forced to survive on allowances, by moonlighting or through corruption. Furthermore, the advent of the new NRM regime generated a conflict of its own in the northern part of the country which lasted for over two decades. The ensuing violence spearheaded by the infamous Lord Resistance Army (LRA) precipitated a humanitarian crisis with two million people displaced (Mills, 2014:128-129). Most assessments of Museveni’s Uganda are ambivalent about its overall success, stressing the complexity and rigidity of the president’s creeping authoritarianism; simmering internal and external conflicts ̶ social, economic and ethnic ̶ and the potential for their escalation (Tripp, 2010; Reid, 2017). According to a recent International Crisis Group (ICG) report tellingly titled Uganda’s Slow Slide into Crisis, “Uganda suffers from inefficient patronage politics and a downward spiral of declining governance, poor economic performance and local insecurity… sliding into a political crisis that could eventually threaten the country’s hard-won stability” (ICG, 2016: 2). One is tempted to call Uganda a (post)conflict country par excellence. Yet, all concerns and criticisms notwithstanding, the country ostensibly did remarkably well since 1986. The country’s GDP has risen more than sevenfold from USD4.1 bn in 1986 to USD30.3 bn in 2018 (although the growth in per capita GDP was less impressive, from USD274 to USD709 over the same period). According to a Government of Uganda report (2016), “between 1991 and 2014 life expectancy rose from 48.1 to 63.3 years; infant and under-five mortality rates dropped from 122 and 203 deaths per 1,000 live births to 53 and 80 respectively; literacy levels rose from 54.0 to 72.2 per cent; income poverty declined from 56 to 19 per cent; and the proportion of the national budget that is funded from domestic sources increased, from 64.7 per cent (FY 1991/92) to 82 per cent (FY 2014/15)”. The 2019 Sustainable Development Report scored Uganda at 54.9, higher than the sub-Saharan Africa average of 48.8,

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indicating good prospects for the country to achieve the ambitious Agenda 2030 (SDG Center for Africa, 2019). What has been the contribution of the public sector to these achievements? Did the public sector manage to overcome the structural impotence that characterized it in the late 1980s and transform into a (relatively) efficient mechanism? How have the continued conflict and instability affected public administration and how has the latter been reacting to withstand and retain its service delivery capability? These are the questions that will be considered in the following sections. This chapter uses a combination of two theoretical perspectives to investigate these questions: the political theory of hybrid and neopatrimonial regimes (Bratton & Walle, 1994; Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith, 2002; Tripp, 2010) and the strains of public administration theory that deal with governance reforms in post-­ conflict and transitional societies (Brinkerhoff, 2005; Grindle, 2012; Nemec & Vries, 2012; Jackson, 2013).

8.2   Uneasy Path of Public Sector Reforms The sorrow state of the Ugandan public sector in 1986 required urgent action. Similar to the other countries of East Africa, Uganda inherited its public administration from the colonial government. As the socio-­ economic situation continued to deteriorate through the 1970s and early 1980s, the shrinking opportunities in the formal sector coupled with an increase in the share of predominantly informal employment in agriculture propelled the public sector to the role of a key formal employer. The dire economic conditions during this period led to the significant deterioration of the terms of service for public officials: at the end of the 1980s, a graduate entry public servant received a monthly salary of just USD7, while even a permanent secretary, the highest-ranking public official, only received USD23 (Sendyona, 2010:90). The combined result of all these developments was a bloated public sector of about 320,000 civil servants shaped by adverse selection: deterring qualified professionals and attracting opportunists seeking to misuse their public office for private gain. Unsurprisingly, when the NRM government came to power in 1986, it viewed the re-building of the public service as a pre-requisite for long-­ term national reconstruction that would address three interconnected challenges that characterize any post-conflict situation: (1) reconstituting legitimacy, (2) re-establishing security and (3) rebuilding effectiveness (Brinkerhoff, 2005; Jackson, 2013).

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Two historical trends defined the NRM government’s approach. The first was NRM’s own decentralized origin in a system of local resistance councils that were formed in territories under the control of the movement during the bush war. As Paul Smoke (2013: 192) notes, “decentralization was a central part of the of the NRM strategy to develop Uganda” and the system of decentralized local government that was fully developed in the 1990s was based on the multi-layered NRM governance system from a village to a district/city. However, a genuine but ambitious programme of building local government structures (and the corresponding assignment of functions to different layers of government) was designed without a full appreciation of the repercussions and the actual capacity of local governments to deliver their devolved responsibilities, leading to partial recentralization in the 2000s. The second factor was the global ideological trend that promoted leaner and more effective governments through a combination of structural adjustment programmes (particularly their divestment component) and good governance programmes based on a New Public Management (NPM) model that came into existence at about the same time (Hood, 1991). Vries and Nemec (2013) distinguish between two streams of NPM reforms: one aimed “to improve the quality of the public service delivery on behalf of its customers” and the other with “an emphasis on the need to downsize the public service”, because in neo-liberal terms there is no way out for the public sector but to leave everything to the private sector. Uganda tried to balance between the two, although the early stages of the reform (1989-1997) had a definitely neoliberal flavour. The World Bank supported both a Structural Adjustment Program with its emphasis on liberalization, privatization and stabilization, and a comprehensive Uganda Civil Service Reform Programme (CRSP). As Bukenya and Muhumuza (2017) indicate, the public sector reform focused on “restructuring and downsizing of ministries and agencies; retrenchment and voluntary redundancies of civil servants; progressive salary enhancements; introduction of improved personnel management systems; and strengthening government capacity to implement the reforms”. The neoliberal orientation of the reforms manifested itself in particular in three areas. One was a drastic downsizing of the public sector, for example, through a massive privatization programme that saw a sale-off and restructuring or liquidation of 103 public enterprises (PEs), “leading to increased output, higher tax payment and more meaningful job creation” (Sejjaaka, 2004: 106). The second area, in line with the NPM emphasis on

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improved public service delivery and an institutional separation of public demand functions and performance management (Toonen, 2001: 186), included creation of autonomous government agencies responsible for specific service delivery areas (as discussed below, this trend has eventually resulted in astonishing 153 agencies and commissions). Lastly, in line with yet another NPM tenet that emphasizes a greater role for the private sector in service delivery, the reforms entailed an increased emphasis on cost recovery for services provided as part of the fiscal reforms leading to commodification of service provision across the main social sectors (Nystrand & Tamm, 2018). The initial results of the reform were very impressive, resulting in a drastic reduction in the number of civil servants from 320,000 in 1990 to 157,159 in 1997 (Sendyona, 2010: 96). This period saw a reduction in government ministries by half and an increase in staff salaries (although the civil service has grown since then, not least because of the ambitious decentralization programme that involved creation of new local governments). Simultaneously and commensurate with the improving economic situation, the wage bill of the public sector increased from 2.3 per cent of GDP at the outset of the NRM government to 3.8 per cent in 1997 (Sendyona, 2010: 96). The present structure of Uganda’s public administration is a product of three decades of political evolution, struggle and compromises. From the outset there was some tension between the NRM decentralization tendencies and the continental “strong man” authoritarian tradition. This has resulted in a hybrid regime, which Tripp (2010) and others describe as semiauthoritarian where the need to hold to power trumps other considerations, such as nationhood, meritocracy and democratic elections. The NRM regime could be described as a (neo)patrimonial rule supported by the president’s ruling group that uses state power to advance private economic interests and functions through a far-reaching business and political network. The Ugandan civil service and the public sector in general have thus been transformed into a highly politicized network of patronage drifting towards competitive clientelism (Bukenya & Muhumuza, 2017). According to the 1995 Constitution, all executive power is vested in the president serving simultaneously as the Head of State, Head of Government and Commander-in-Chief of the Uganda People’s Defence Force. The president appoints a vice-president and cabinet ministers with the approval of the Parliament by a simple majority. Uganda has 19 sector ministries and a number of independent agencies. In addition, Office of

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the President and Office of the Prime Minister also have the status of government ministries and support the functioning of the president and prime minister, respectively. Together with the State House, they make up the centre of government (CoG) where the most important policy decisions are taken. Independent government agencies deal with different specialized areas, such as civil aviation (Civil Aviation Authority), revenue collection (Uganda Revenue Authority), planning (National Planning Authority), elections (National Elections Commission), to name just a few. There are presently 153 government agencies, commissions and statutory authorities. The creation of agencies was motivated by different reasons and often promoted by donors (e.g., splitting energy production, transmission and distribution). The other stated factor was the need to attract good professionals in specialized areas by paying them above the normal civil service scale. According to the Ministry of Public Service, these entities have been taking about 37 per cent of the total government wage bill (Kaaya, 2018). However, the resulting mishmash of overlapping functions, dubious efficiency of at least some agencies and the mounting wage bill have compelled the government to announce in 2018 the plans to rationalize and merge or disband 71 government agencies. But the decision met significant opposition from within the agencies concerned and appears to have been shelved. Three institutions are of particular importance for the public sector: Ministry of Public Service, Public Service Commission (PSC) and the Inspectorate of Government. PSC is a constitutionally mandated agency with the responsibility to appoint, promote and exercise disciplinary control over public servants and to review the terms and conditions of service, training and qualifications of public officers and issues related to staff management and development. Although the PSC competences appear sweeping, they are subject to Article 72 of the Constitution that stipulates that the president may, acting in accordance with the advice of the Public Service Commission (or other relevant government agencies), appoint public officers of the rank of Head of Department or above. This implies presidential control over all medium and senior level appointments in the government extending beyond the central institutions to local governments as well. Due to the patronage arrangements within the public sector (particularly in its higher echelons), the president has to maintain a careful balance between various religious and ethnic groups resulting in appointments (and re-appointments when

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high-level officials are removed) from the same interest groups with little consideration given to professional qualifications of the appointees. Much as local governments enjoy devolved powers (including appointment of district civil servants), the government in 2007 recentralized the appointment of senior local government officials such as Chief Administrative Officers (CAO), deputy CAOs and town clerks. The process of recentralization is driven by multiple causes (Smoke, 2013), but in this particular case (direct appointment of senior government officials) it was clearly motivated by the desire to re-establish political control over the districts where NRM suffered electoral losses.

8.3   Public Sector’s Performance: Corruption, Effectiveness and Efficiency This section looks at the peculiarities of Uganda’s public administration at the central level. However, rather than following a standard pattern of describing various components of the public sector, it examines how the public sector deals with three big issues: corruption, effectiveness and efficiency (coordination). Since corruption undermines the faith of citizenry in the fairness of a regime, it is of critical importance to the regime’s legitimacy, and any discussion of Uganda would be incomplete without discussing rampant corruption in the public sector. The other pillar of a regime’s legitimacy is its ability to address the basic needs of the population. NRM claims its continued legitimacy on a series of socio-economic achievements (Museveni, 2019a)—and hence a critical analysis of the public sector’s effectiveness is unavoidable. Lastly, there is an issue of efficiency. Efficiency of the public sector is to a large extent determined by how smooth the complex state machinery runs and its different components interact. Uganda has a robust legal framework and regulations that guide the functioning of its public service. Chapter 10 of the 1995 Constitution and the amended Public Service Act of 2008 provide a comprehensive legal framework, whereas the public service Standing Orders of 2010 offer detailed guidelines to make it operational. The recruitment system, although in principle merit-based and competitive (100 per cent of all government jobs are now filled through an open competitive process), is highly politicized as already discussed. Corruption has been long recognized as an endemic public sector malaise. The 2010 World Bank survey estimated that Uganda loses up to

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USD300 million annually through corruption and inadequate procurement practices. Corruption pervades virtually every area: politics, public funds and public asset management including public land (Mukwaya et al., 2018) and access to basic services. President Museveni (2019a) in his 2019 State of the Nation Address characterized corruption as “public enemy no. 1” and promised a “crackdown on Public Officers who have illicitly acquired wealth at the expense of effective service delivery to the citizens”. Yet, despite the rhetoric and continuing corruption investigations and scandals, there has been no improvement in the past 10 years in Uganda’s Corruption Perceptions Index that has stagnated around 26 points (on a scale from 0 to 100) between 2009 and 2018 (Trading Economics, 2019). Furthermore, as recognized by the president himself, corruption is spreading into the political sphere destroying the social fabric of society (Museveni, 2019c). The lack of success in fighting corruption cannot be attributed to the legal and regulatory frameworks, which provide a solid foundation for dealing with corruption. A dedicated Ani-Corruption Act of 2009 details various corruption-related crimes and establishes severe penalties for their commitment. The Leadership Code Act 2002 is designed to increase transparency and to curb corruption among senior public officials. In addition to the already mentioned Inspectorate of Government, a plethora of other institutions have anti-corruption responsibilities as part of their mandate. These include the Directorate for Ethics and Integrity (DEI) located in the Office in the Presidency, police, judiciary, Directorate of Public Prosecutions (DPP), Auditor-General’s Office and parliament (Fig. 8.1). Most analysts agree that the failure to curb corruption is due to four interrelated factors. One is the nature of the regime itself. As Milanović (2019) argues, corruption is endemic to neoliberal regimes and political capitalism they engender, and it is impossible to eradicate it. In a public sector where loyalty is valued more than integrity, a legal action against a loyalist may be seen as an attack on the regime as a whole, regardless of the merits of the case (Sejjaaka, 2004). Uganda’s recent history offers a few examples of political intervention (including coming from the president) to quell high-profile corruption investigations against the NRM cadre. So, the lack of law enforcement is another factor that perpetuates corruption. While lack of political will is certainly a factor, a weak enforcement capacity is a known issue that besets not only the fight against corruption but other sectors as well. As Brinkerhoof and Goldsmith

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Fig. 8.1  Uganda Corruption Perception Index, 2010-2018. Source: author, based on TradingEconomics.com, Transparency International

(2002: 19) argue, “clientelistic politics and patrimonial administration can be strong contributors to weak policy implementation capacity, which can undermine both regular service delivery according to basic principles of equity, entitlement and need, and reforms that seek to change the mix of goods and services provided or the delivery mechanisms used”. Global Integrity (2019) scored Uganda at 23 (“weak”) on transparency and accountability despite all legal bases covered exactly because of lack of enforcement and implementation of its otherwise comprehensive legal framework. A popular culture of complacency and tolerance towards corrupt practices is also mentioned as an explanation for stubborn corruption in the public sector. As Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (2002: 16) point out: “In patrimonial societies, people expect friends in high places to bend the rules for them. They may think it wrong not to receive special consideration under such circumstances. From a relativist perspective, ‘corruption’ stems from social norms that emphasize gift giving and that put loyalty to family or clan above the legal code”. The Uganda Public Administration Sector Development Plan for 2015/16-2019/20 ascribes low interest of salaried employees in the democratic processes to lack of trust in elected leaders and perception that elections do not cause any significant changes in their lives. In this situation, as Vorholter (2018: 329) argues, “pursuit of individual economic interests (like profit or survival) has replaced a belief in and commitment to ideologies, programmes and alliances”. Bukenya and

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350,000

5.5%

300,000

5.0%

250,000

4.5%

200,000

4.0%

150,000

3.5%

100,000

3.0%

50,000

2.5%

-

Wage bill as a % of GDP

Number of public servants

Muhumuza (2017: 26) even quote a popular Ugandan adage “akuwa obwami akuwa kulya”, loosely translated as “an opportunity to serve in a public office is an opportunity to feast”. Lastly, the inadequate material conditions of civil servants make them susceptible to corrupt practices. The low pay to public servants is believed to cause “low morale, a lack of discipline, and to breed corruption since some officials may use it as a coping mechanism in circumstances where the cost of living is higher than their salaries” (Bukenya & Muhumuza, 2017: 12). Over the years, the Ugandan public sector has seen a pendulum movement from the highest point of 320,000 employees in 1990 to a minimum of 156,803 in 1995 to a new high point of 469,216 in 2018. At the same time, the share of the public sector wage bill as a percentage of GDP had been growing from 2.6 per cent in 1990 to a maximum of 5.6 per cent in 2002 and then started declining to the present 4.4 per cent (2016), which is significantly lower than the regional average of 6.5 per cent for East Africa (Fig. 8.2). A clear indication of the low attractiveness of civil service (notwithstanding the high level of Uganda’s unemployment and an estimated

2.0% 1990

1995

2000

Number of public servants

2005

2010

2015

Wages & salaries

Fig. 8.2  Public service numbers and wage bill, 1990-2015. Source: Author, based on Sendyona (2010); Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS) annual abstracts; IMF Government Finance Statistics

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40,000 university graduates entering the job market every year) is a high level of vacancies in the public sector. In 2018, the public sector had a total of 157,229 vacancies (34 per cent) across ministries, departments, authorities and local governments. According to Mubiru (2019), “The vacant posts included key staffing posts such as doctors, clinical officers, professors, theatre staff, human resource officers, legal officers and commissioners among others. The government blamed it on inadequate budgetary allocations, high turnover in some careers, and unfavourable policies among other issues.” The confusing coordination arrangements in the anti-corruption sector reflect a more general challenge of coordination within the government (but also between the government and donors). A recent report on the coordination function at OPM (GoU, 2017: 20) describes coordination as a complex challenge, noting that it is further “complicated by the involvement of development partners with resources largely managed outside the national planning and budgeting process and funds channelled through numerous implementing partners such as UN agencies and NGOs”. The present Institutional Framework for Coordination of Policy and Program Implementation in Government (IFCPPI) was formally established in 2003 under the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) to ensure proper comprehensive monitoring and evaluation of all government programmes. OPM is responsible for coordination and implementation of government policies across ministries, departments and other government agencies. However, a great deal of OPM coordination concerns either area-based governance or development programmes (e.g., Northern Uganda) or cross-cutting issues, such as disaster management and refugees. So, in practice, four other institutions also play important coordination roles: the Office of the President, the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MoFPED), the National Planning Authority (NPA) and the Ministry of Local Government which is entrusted with coordination of the implementation of government policies and programmes at the local level (Bukenya & Muhumuza, 2017:10). The IFCPPI is composed of the following structures presented in Fig. 8.3 (GoU, 2017): • The Policy Coordination Committee chaired by the prime minister and responsible for policy coordination and monitoring progress on the implementation of government programmes.

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Cabinet Parliament Policy Coordination Committee (PCC)

Implementation Coordination Steering Committee (ICSC)

Institutional Framework for Coordination of Policy and Program Implementation in Government

Technical Implementation Coordination Committee (TICC)

Sector Working Groups (WG) Accountability; Agriculture; Education; Energy & Mineral Development; Health; Information & Communication Technology; Justice, Law and Order; Lands, Housing & Urban Development; Legislature; Public Administration; Public Sector Management; Social Development; Security, Tourism, Trade & Industry; Water & Environment, Works & Transport

Fig. 8.3  Composition of the Institutional Framework for Coordination of Policy and Program Implementation in Government. Source: Author

• The Implementation Coordination Steering Committee, consisting of Permanent Secretaries and chaired by Head of Public Service and Secretary to Cabinet, directs implementation of activities. • The multi-sectoral Technical Implementation Coordination Committee, chaired by the Permanent Secretary (Office of the Prime Minister), coordinates and monitors programme implementation across ministries and sectors. It is supported by 16 joint Sector Working Groups responsible for implementation of the National Development Plan and service delivery at sector level as well as by thematic and ad hoc coordination groups. The study on the coordination function (GoU, 2017: 21) reports that few sectors have been effective while “many are struggling to develop effective coordination systems”. The presence of multiple institutions on the coordination node “breeds conflict and unnecessary duplication” (Bukenya & Muhumuza, 2017: 10). While effective coordination is a challenge even in more developed

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countries, this state of “uncoordinated coordination” in Uganda may not be surprising given the neopatrimonial nature of the regime. In a situation when decisions are ultimately an outcome of informal political bargaining, multiple checks and deliberate ambiguity about institutional roles and responsibilities create a system that is rational and functional from the regime’s point of view. It helps the regime in which politicians instinctively mistrust technocrats to maintain control on government business while leaving enough space for clientelism and patronage. The last but probably the most important issue concerns efficiency and effectiveness of the public sector and the overall government performance. After all, the NRM from the outset established its legitimacy on the promise to “correct the wrongs” and outperform previous regimes across all vital areas from peace and security to social and economic developments. Indeed, the past 30 years have seen a number of reforms designed to improve public sector’s performance and delivery. PFM reforms have been particularly characteristic in this respect, starting with introduction of a medium-term expenditure framework to enable predictability of the budget and harmonization of aid in the late 1980s, followed by establishment of the Uganda Revenue Authority to increase domestic revenue collection and expand fiscal space for service delivery and introduction of fiscal decentralization to improve allocation of public resources and strengthen public sector accountability in the 1990s, and results-oriented management reforms in the 2000s-2010s to upgrade budgeting from output-­ based to programme-based to outcome-based. It was expected that these measures in combination with other civil service reforms (previously discussed) will create an effective modern public administration. However, Uganda’s reality demonstrates two conflicting narratives about the government’s performance over the past 30 years, which may be called “Uganda as a success” and “Uganda in crisis”. The official “Uganda as a success” narrative (advanced by the government and shared by a number of influential international actors such as the World Bank, IMF and the UN) praises Uganda’s sustained economic growth and its steady progress in poverty reduction, social development and gender empowerment. The achievements are described as “admirable”, “impressive” and “remarkable”. The Introduction provides a typical example of this upbeat narrative. The second narrative is the narrative of the “people on the street”, political opposition, some sections of the academia, the media and some international think-tanks. This second narrative focuses on the state

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capture by a small group of elite close to the president, nonresponsive and aloof government, a corrupt and inefficient public sector. In the National Governance Baseline Survey (UBOS, 2014), 40 per cent Ugandans reported that politicians did not respond at all to people’s concerns and needs while 47 per cent of the respondents rated the performance of their local governments (LC VI and LC V) as “poor” or “fair”. To understand the reasons behind these two widely different narratives, it is necessary to analyse the performance of government along three dimensions: (1) the reality behind the achievements claimed by the government; (2) contribution of the public sector to these achievements; and (3) costs of these achievements (i.e., un- or under-reported socio-­economic effects). On the first dimension, a number of achievements appear to be inflated while others are misrepresented. The claims that Uganda has been the fastest growing country in the world by GDP (Museveni, 2019a) are an obvious example. Apart from the fact that a number of countries have been growing faster (neighbouring Rwanda is such a case with 9.34 per cent of average annual growth rate in 1995-2018 against Uganda’s 6.56), GDP has been generally recognized as an imperfect and outright misleading measure of development (Stiglitz et al., 2019). In another example, the official dropout rate in public primary schools was reported at 14 per cent and in secondary schools 34 per cent whereas an assessment by the UNESCO Institute of Statistics indicated a much higher dropout rate of 60 per cent in primary schools (Nystrand & Tamm, 2018:167). As an example of misrepresentation, whereas school enrolment rates did increase, quality education remains a challenge. According to official statistics, at primary level proficiency in numeracy declined from 45 per cent to 40 per cent between 2012 and 2013 (Kasaja, 2016). Similarly, the better healthcare outcomes reported in official statistics are real but achieved primarily due to an increased coverage and immunization without substantive improvements in the quality of health services (Wane & Martin, 2013). The second dimension requires an analysis of the government’s contribution, monetary and nonmonetary. It has long been argued that Uganda’s much touted economic growth was contingent upon aid inflows, which have enabled an expenditure-driven growth but also promoted elite corruption (Amundsen, 2006; Asiimwe, 2018). Donor financial support was particularly instrumental in the areas where the government claims most success, such as access to electricity, road construction and social services. According to UNICEF (2018), official development assistance (ODA)

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covered 24 per cent of total social expenditure including education, health (where it amounted to almost 36 per cent of the total budget), social development and water and environment in 2012-2016. There are healthcare sub-sectors entirely dependent on external financing, such as the HIV/AIDS response, 90 per cent funded by donors. Moreover, a large proportion of official aid (about 40 per cent, according to OECD data as reported by Hiddink et  al., 2019) bypasses the government completely and is channelled through non-government organizations (NGOs) considered more efficient than the government (Asiimwe, 2018: 147). The third dimension is the one that fundamentally challenges the “Uganda as a success” narrative from the perspective of the social and economic costs of Uganda’s economic growth incurred by the society at large. Most significantly, “the recorded growth and assumption of ‘trickle down’ have not reflected in transformed production and local capacity, but rather accelerated poverty, inequality and unemployment” (Asiimwe, 2018:146). According to the Nuwagaba and Muhumuza study of inequality in Uganda (Nuwagaba & Muhumuza, 2016), even as the economy has grown, income inequality in Uganda, as measured by the Gini coefficient, increased from 0.365  in 1992/93 to 0.395  in 1999/2000 to 0.426  in 2009/10 and to 0.47 in 2014. Uganda has seen “growth with exclusion”, where relatively few have benefited from economic gains. Uganda’s rapid progress in reducing poverty headcount (from 44.4 per cent of the population in 1999 to the record low 19.7 per cent in 2012) has been somewhat reversed to 21.4 in 2016 (UBOS, 2014). The initial estimate was as high as 27 per cent but after a few months of political arm twisting, UBOS (Uganda Bureau of Statistics) revised the figure downwards  (noteworthily, this poverty rate is measured against the national poverty line which is just one half of the international poverty line of USD1.90 a day). However, “despite this impressive decline in the poverty rate, 43 percent of the population continues to live just above the poverty line and therefore remains highly vulnerable and at risk of falling back into poverty in the case of economic shocks” (World Bank, 2016). Neoliberal reforms in education and healthcare have shifted the state responsibility to the vagaries of the market, leaving the majority of Ugandans stuck with poor quality basic services. The present state of economy is characterized by growth without quality (Kanbur et al., 2019). The economic growth and improved social indicators do not translate into a more vibrant structurally transformed economy that offers more jobs. Subsistence agriculture remains the

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backbone of the economy employing about 75 per cent of population. This sector absorbs most of the 600,000 entrants into the job market every year as the formal labour market can offer only around 200,000 jobs, translating to 67 per cent un- or under-employment rate among young people (Nuwagaba & Muhumuza, 2016:51). Whereas the formal job market has been growing at 9.8 per cent on average between 2010 and 2017 (Kasaja, 2016), most jobs are low-paying and low-qualified. Hence, the overall performance of the public sector appears less impressive than the official “Uganda as a success” narrative suggests. Despite many, often genuine, efforts to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the sector through a succession of public sector reforms, the results have been mixed at best.

8.4   Public Sector Contradictions How did the continued conflict and instability shape the Ugandan public sector? This section analyses the impact of instability and security threats (real or perceived) through a series of contradictions that characterize the Ugandan public sector. In fact, these contradictions are different aspects of one immanent contradiction of the regime: its neoliberal leaning that presumes a lean public sector run by an apolitical and merit-based civil service and its neo-patrimonial character that necessitates clientelist relations and patronage networks. From the beginning, security concerns dominated over the two other dimensions of post-conflict governance reform, reconstituting legitimacy and rebuilding effectiveness. The NRM government viewed sectarian divisions as a major security threat and focused its efforts in this direction believing that once the religious and ethnic divisions are quelled, legitimacy and effectiveness would materialize as a consequence (assisted by economic liberalization). President Museveni (2019c) has summarized the NRM approach as “peace, Uganda first, and liberalization”. But as the NRM showed some cracks in the 1990s and 2000s, while the conflict in the north reduced, security efforts shifted from ethnic/sectarian to political opponents. In this situation, politization of the public sector was all but inevitable. Loyalty necessarily trumped all other considerations, such as professional qualifications. The need of the regime to create enough space to co-opt different interest groups to secure their support (contrary to its stated position that ethnic and religious identities

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are destructive) further limited the space and opportunities for a merit-­ based civil service. Political establishment vs. public administration. Lack of trust between the political establishment and public administration has been another distinct feature of the NRM government. One consequence was the creation of multiple institutions with overlapping and conflicting responsibilities to ensure a check in case a particular public sector institution “misbehaves”. The other outcome was establishment of a large number of specialized government agencies in ostensibly technical areas. These agencies offer service conditions much better than the “regular” public sector. The salary differential may be 10 times and more: for example, a director in a Government Ministry earns UGX 2,369,300 per month, while a deputy director in one of the statutory agencies earns UGX 27,000,000 per month (Uganda Equal Opportunity Commission 2017). This has led to the appearance of a privileged segment of the public service with the vested interest and loyalty buoyed by generous cash handouts. Public sector vs. military/security. The same mistrust has also resulted in some militarization of the public sector in that some civilian functions have been transferred to the army. Appointments of military staff to the police have been going on for many years but the most recent example of such militarization is Operation Wealth Creation, an agricultural extension programme implemented by UPDF. Frustrated by the performance of the National Agriculture Advisory Services (NAADS) riddled with allegations of corruption and misappropriation of funds, the President assigned the task of transforming agriculture to the army in 2014. In a situation when a public sector agency underperformed, the government saw it more appropriate to engage the military rather than to try to improve the efficiency of that agency. This development clearly reflects the regime’s belief in the army as a key pillar of government with a broad responsibility for social well-being and cohesion beyond defence (Museveni, 2019b). Yet another feature of the regime is a growing military budget, not necessarily because UPDF needs more money but because of its large “classified funds that can be used outside the regular budget process to fund such activities as the NRM election campaign” (Tangri & Mwenda, 2013: 26). Rule of law vs. political imperatives. Yet another area that has seen significant damage is rule of law. Malleability of public sector rules in view of “political imperatives” has become a talk of the town. No sooner than the government had enacted the Public Finance Management (PFM) Act 2015 (lauded by many as a remedy for politicized spending via

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supplementary budgets), it was amended just seven months into implementation to “give the government leeway to reallocate 3 percent of the total national budget without parliamentary approval” (Asiimwe, 2015). Asiimwe further points out that these amendments were affected at the height of the 2016 presidential and parliamentary elections, which suggest a consistent effort by the government to tap into the public purse to acquire electioneering resources. External vs. internal drivers of reforms. Lastly, the public sector reforms (with the exception of the decentralization programme) did not originate internally from a holistic vision of the political leadership whose personal commitment to reforms resonates throughout the executive branch (Bukenya & Muhumuza, 2017). Rather, the reforms have been promoted and pushed by various donors. There is hardly a leaf from the NPM cookbook that Uganda has not tried: privatization of public services, contract-­ based provision, unbundling of the public sector, introduction of measurable service standards, performance goals and output controls and so on. Because of differing donor agendas and weak coordination in general (see the previous section), these reforms were at times poorly coordinated resulting in suboptimal outcomes, whereas their actual implementation also suffered. As one reformist fashion replaced another (and donors’ interests shifted accordingly), some reforms were dropped mid-way without conclusive results. In addition, lack of national ownership and strong political commitment weakened reform implementation and their sustainability. In particular, the very strong policy and regulatory framework created with donors’ support has not translated into concrete actions (or has been circumvented as the PFM Act) and has not led to improved performance.

8.5   Conclusion: No Progress Without Political Transformation How does the Ugandan public sector fare in the three areas of post-­ conflict governance reforms (reconstituting legitimacy, re-establishing security and rebuilding effectiveness)? The first decade of reforms (1986-1996) is hailed as the most successful. This was a period when security was re-established in most of the country, government bureaucracy reformed and basic public services re-­ instated (at least, in urban areas). Out of the three priorities, the NRM government succeeded most in re-establishing security and in particular

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securing the monopoly of state on violence. Any serious security threats to the regime had been effectively eliminated by the mid-2000s. Moreover, “securitization” has spread into some parts of the public sector, giving the military and police control over functions normally performed by civilian agencies. As the previous sections document, success in other areas has been uneven and differed depending on the time period. Legitimacy has taken the biggest hit since the regime came to power in 1986. As Brinkerhoff (2005: 5) stresses, “without a minimum degree of legitimacy, states have difficulty functioning; and loss of legitimacy in the eyes of some segment of the population is an important contributor to state failure”. Riding on the wave of popular protests against, and discontent with, the previous governments, NRM enjoyed significant legitimacy in the eyes of the population. However, as the time passed, that credit seemed to dissipate rather than strengthen. Neopatrimonialism and the hybrid nature of the regime where democratic institutions play a second subservient role to the interest of elites who rule through a network of personal patronage are undermining the popular trust in the fairness of the regime and its willingness and capacity to respond to citizens’ needs and demands. Rampant corruption and continued scandals further erode the regime’s legitimacy. As for rebuilding effectiveness of the public sector, the Ugandan civil service has gone through three successive waves of reforms, each ostensibly aiming at improved performance of the public sector through better coordination, improved transparency, enhanced skills and so on. On the one hand, there are certain undeniable achievements in economic and social areas. On the other hand, the contribution of the government to these achievements is not always apparent. The role of the private sector and civil society, the other two sectors of critical importance to effective service delivery (Brinkerhoff, 2005: 5), is not sufficiently recognized in these achievements. The continued tension between the state bureaucracy, supposedly apolitical and meritocratic, and the patronage-based political establishment further gnaws at public sector efficiency. The public sector is struggling to deal with key challenges such as a widening gap between the haves and have nots, popular dissatisfaction with the social and economic outcomes of the regime and social conflicts along a number of ethnic, political and urban/rural fault lines. In the absence of strong national commitment and a clear strategic direction, the public sector reform agenda is likely to continue to be driven

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by donors, lack coherence and deliver mixed results. The root cause is NRM’s utilitarian approach to public sector reform and good governance in general: it is valued not on its inherent merits but only to the extent it contributes to NRM’s continued political survival. Overall, the challenges of the Ugandan public sector are of political rather than technical nature. Historically, as the experience of other countries demonstrate, “patronage systems have only slowly given in to reformers, under significant political pressure” (Grindle, 2012). The future of the Ugandan public sector and its capacity to deliver will depend on the transformation of the present political system.

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Nuwagaba, A., & Muhumuza, F. (2016). Who Is Growing?: Ending Inequality in Uganda: A Study of the Drivers of Inequality in Uganda. Kampala, Uganda: Oxfam. Nystrand, M. J., & Tamm, G. (2018). Social Service Provision and Social Security in Uganda: Entrenched Inequality Under a Neoliberal Regime. In J. Wiegratz, G.  Martiniello, & E.  Greco (Eds.), Uganda the Dynamics of Neoliberal Transformation (pp. 163–177). London: Zed Books. Reid, R. J. (2017). A History of Modern Uganda. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. Robinson, M. (2006). The Political Economy of Governance Reforms in Uganda. Brighton: Institute for Development Studies. SDG Center for Africa and Sustainable Development Solutions Network. (2019). Africa SDG Index and Dashboard Report 2019. Kigali and New  York: SDG Center for Africa and Sustainable Development Solutions Network. Sejjaaka, S. (2004). A Political and Economic History of Uganda, 1962–2002. In F. B. Bird & S. W. Herman (Eds.), International Businesses and the Challenges of Poverty in the Developing World (pp.  98–110). Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. Sendyona, M.  G. (2010). Public Service Restructuring and Pay Reform. In F. Kuteesa, E. Tumusiime-Mutebile, A. Whitworth, & T. Williamson (Eds.), Uganda’s Economic Reforms: Insider Accounts (pp. 89–102). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Smoke, P. (2013). Recentralization in Developing Countries: Forms, Motivations and Consequences. In J. Öjendal & A. Dellnäs (Eds.), The Imperative of Good Local Governance: Challenges for the Next Decade of Decentralization (pp. 179–203). Tokyo: United Nations Press. Stiglitz, J. E., Fitoussi, J. P., & Durand, M. (2019). Measuring What Counts: The Global Movement for Well-Being. New York: The New Press. Tangri, R. K., & Mwenda, A. M. (2013). The Politics of Elite Corruption in Africa: Uganda in Comparative African Perspective. London: Routledge. Toonen, T. (2001). The Comparative Dimension of Administrative Reform: Creating New Villages and Redesigning the Politics of Administration. In B.  G. Peters & J.  Pierre (Eds.), Politicians, Bureaucrats, and Administrative Reform (pp. 183–201). New York: Routledge. Trading Economics. (2019). Uganda Corruption Index, 2009-2018. Retrieved September 1, 2020, from https://tradingeconomics.com/uganda/ corruption-­index. Tripp, A. M. (2010). Museveni’s Uganda: Paradoxes of power in a hybrid regime. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS). (2014). Uganda National Governance Baseline Survey (UNGBS) 2014 Report (Rep.). United Nations Development Program (UNDP).

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UNICEF Uganda. (2018). Uganda: Fiscal Space Analysis (Rep.). Kampala, Uganda: UNICEF. Vorhölter, J. (2018). Youth as ‘Identity Entrepreneurs’: Emerging Neoliberal Subjectivities in Uganda. In J. Wiegratz, G. Martiniello, & E. Greco (Eds.), Uganda: The Dynamics of Neoliberal Transformation (pp.  318–333). London: Zed. Vries, M. D., & Nemec, J. (2013). Public Sector Reform: An Overview of Recent Literature and Research on NPM and Alternative Paths. International Journal of Public Sector Management, 26(1), 4–16. Wane, W., & Martin, G. (2013). Education and Health Services in Uganda: Data for Results and Accountability. Washington, DC: World Bank. World Bank. (2016). From Smart Budgets to Smart Returns: Unleashing the Power of Public Investment Management. Uganda Economic Update. Washington, DC: World Bank Group.

CHAPTER 9

Bangladesh: Passage Through Conflict to Stability and Public Administration Reform Amitava Basu

9.1   Introduction: Background to the Evolution of Bangladesh The two-nation theory propounded that Indian Hindus and Muslims are distinct entities. The theory advocated separate homelands for the Hindus and Muslims of British ruled India. On the basis of this theory, Bengal, a province in British ruled India, was partitioned at the time of independence. Two sovereign nations—India and Pakistan—were established. The Muslim dominated East Bengal became part of Pakistan, and the predominantly Hindu inhabited West Bengal formed part of India. Pakistan constituted of two parts—East Bengal, which on 8 September 1955 was named “East Pakistan”, and West Pakistan comprising Sind, West Punjab, Baluchistan and North-Western Frontier Province. The

A. Basu (*) Governing Council, Centre for Environmental Management and Participatory Development, Kolkata, India © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 J. Nemec, P. S. Reddy (eds.), Public Administration in Conflict Affected Countries, Governance and Public Management, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74966-8_9

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distance between these two parts of Pakistan was about 1,400 kms and geographically separated by India. Apart from the physical distance, the Eastern and Western parts of Pakistan had different languages, cultures and traditions. The only commonality between these two regions was religion. The seeds of dissension between East and West Pakistan were sown following the partition of Bengal and the creation of Pakistan. A few months after the formation of Pakistan, differences arose between East and West Pakistan relating to determination of the state language. Urdu was made the official language of Pakistan, ignoring the demand of East Pakistan to have both Urdu and Bangla as the official languages. This enraged the people of East Pakistan. Protests, general strikes and demonstrations started. The protests continued for several years till 1956 when Bangla along with Urdu were declared as the official languages of Pakistan. Language movement signalled the first sign of conflict between East and West Pakistan. East Pakistan was under-represented in the civil services and the armed forces of the country. In both these services, West Pakistanis vastly outnumbered East Pakistanis. People of East Pakistan felt the policy decisions of the country were mostly in favour of West Pakistan due to the domination of civil servants belonging to West Pakistan. Following a partisan policy, the national government encouraged and facilitated industrial and economic development of West Pakistan, neglecting the eastern part. Growing dissensions between East and West Pakistan were further fuelled by the national political leadership continually squabbling following the creation of Pakistan. In 1956, the civil government was overthrown by a military coup. During the military regime, the differences between East and West Pakistan further widened.

9.2   Emergence of Bangladesh The people of East Pakistan started to feel that though freedom had been secured from the British imperialist regime, a new group of colonialists from West Pakistan started dominating them. This disgruntlement gave birth to a political movement that was termed “Our Demand for Existence”. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, a popular political leader of East Pakistan, announced a six-point programme to oppose and bring to an end the economic and socio-political discrimination and also sought more autonomy for the provincial government of East Pakistan.

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The government of Pakistan did not pay heed to this demand. In 1968, the national government framed a case against Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and other prominent leaders of East Pakistan and imprisoned them which enraged the people of East Pakistan. The people of East Pakistan reckoned that the national government would not grant them equitable treatment unless they raised their voices more strongly and actively. There was a mass uprising to free the leaders. The mass movement was brutally suppressed. Despite atrocious oppression by the police, the movement continued. On 22 February 1969, the government of Pakistan had to unconditionally release Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and other leaders and withdraw the case against them (Banglapedia-National Encyclopedia of Bangladesh, 2014). The movement further intensified. The military government announced that elections would be held for the national assembly and the provincial assemblies on 5 October 1970 and 22 October 1970 respectively. Elections were held at the end of 1970. The Awami League, led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, emerged victorious with an absolute majority. However, a political wrangling started by the People’s Party of Pakistan on the formation of the government led to an impasse. The people of East Pakistan erupted in anger. A national strike across East Pakistan was called for by the Awami League. The student wing of the Awami League made an announcement on 3 March 1971 entitled “Declaration and Programme for an Independent and Sovereign Bangladesh”. Government work in East Pakistan came to a complete standstill. To resolve the issues, the military rulers held discussions with Awami League leaders. While discussions were continuing, preparations were ongoing to transport arms, equipment and soldiers from West to East Pakistan. After all the preparations were complete for carrying out an offensive on East Pakistan, the Pakistani Army committed genocide in Dhaka on the night of 25 March 1971. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was arrested, flown to West Pakistan and imprisoned. In protest against these brutal killings, an armed liberation war started on 26 March 1971. On 10 April 1971, the leaders of the Awami League formed a government-in-­ exile, which took its oath on 17 April 1971 at Baidyanathtala in the Meherpur district of East Pakistan. The liberation war continued for nine months until, on 16 December 1971, the Pakistani army surrendered. A new nation was born—Bangladesh. Leaders of the new nation emphasised socio-economic development, fairness, justice and equity for all. In 1972, the Constitution was framed

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on the basis of four cardinal principles—nationalism, socialism, democracy and secularism. On 7 March 1973, parliamentary elections were held under the new Constitution. In this election, the Awami League emerged victorious with a resounding absolute majority.

9.3   Resurface of Conflict The challenges before the nation were—(a) establishment of law and order, (b) disarmament of civilian freedom fighters, (c) rehabilitation of refugees, (d) reconstruction of infrastructure, (e) negotiation with the international community for recognition of the new nation and assistance, (f) reorganisation of industries and factories, banks and insurance companies, and such other institutions. The state had limited capacity for such undertakings. Pressure for reconstruction and rehabilitation mounted and the progress of state activities was slow. Allegations of corruption against many leaders of the Awami League were raised. Discontent grew against the regime. In 1974, the country was devastated by floods, faced both a food deficit and shortage of foreign currency reserve. International banks were unwilling to provide loans and no aid could be garnered from multilateral donor agencies. Famine spread across the country. During these challenging times, a group of militants plotted to overthrow the government. On 15 August 1975, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and most of his family members were assassinated resulting in unrest and uncertainty which continued till 1990. During this period, the country witnessed two major military coups. Instability and unrest in the country is reflected through changes in government as presented in Table 9.1. Parliamentary democracy was restored in 1991. However, a continuous showdown between the two principal political parties—Awami League Table 9.1  Political regime in Bangladesh up to 1990 Period

Regime

Form

Fate

1972–1975 Awami League Civilian Removed by military coup 1976–1982 Bangladesh National Party Civilianised military Leader assassinated 1982–1990 Jatio Party Civilianised military Overthrown by mass uprising Source: Author

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and Bangladesh Nationalist Party—continued unabated till 2008. The country was often brought almost to a standstill by frequent strikes, demonstrations and blockades of public transportation. The situation so worsened that at times, civil society groups and international donor agencies had to intervene to resolve the political deadlock. Since 2008, Bangladesh has gradually moved to political stability and could focus on public administration. After 2008, the Awami League further strengthened its position and had resounding victories in the next two successive elections in 2014 and 2018. Continuity of the same party in government and diminished political unrest brought long overdue stability and took the country out of the conflict era which facilitated reforms in public administration.

9.4   Reforms and Progress of Public Administration Since its formation, Bangladesh has undergone several changes in the form of government. There were periods of military rule interspersed with civil governments. However, the Constitution adopted in 1972 was never abrogated, though the provisions of the Constitution may not have been fully followed. Every regime ruled partly in pursuant to the provisions in the Constitution, and partly by decree or ordinance. The Constitution of Bangladesh defines the legal structure of administration. It comprises three basic organs: (a) Legislative Branch (Articles 65 to 93); (b) Executive Branch (Articles 48 to 58); and (c) Judicial Branch (Articles 94 to 116). The Parliament of Bangladesh is unicameral. It is vested with legislative powers. The members of the Parliament are elected on the basis of “one person one vote” under an adult franchise system for a five-year term. The President, as the Head of State, has limited powers. The duties of the President are usually formal as the official Head of the State. The Prime Minister, as chief executive, holds all the real power. The Prime Minister selects the council of ministers and recommends them to the President who then appoints the cabinet ministers who are collectively accountable to the Parliament. The Executive is organised on the basis of ministries, and within ministries, there are divisions. A cabinet minister heads a ministry, while a permanent civil servant, designated as secretary, is administrative head of the Ministry.

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In Bangladesh, the judicial system comprises four judicial institutions: Supreme Court, Subordinate Courts, Magistracy and Administrative Tribunals. The judges of the Supreme Court are appointed by the President on the recommendation of the Ministry of Law. The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary, with a separation of powers between the Executive and the Judiciary. 9.4.1  Administrative Reforms Despite political turbulence in the early years of the nation, significant milestones were achieved in the domain of public administration during that period. Between 1972 and 1996, successive governments appointed over 20 major administrative reform commissions and committees. Attempts were also made to decentralise administration and extend democracy and adult franchise down to the grass-roots level. In this regard, significant progress was made in the latter part of 1980. The government embarked on participatory development activities, focused on village government, and undertook different development programmes. The administrative reforms undertaken before 1991 and thereafter up to 2000 are summarised in Table 9.2. Out of the public administration reforms listed in the below Table 9.2, those of significance are given below:  ecruitment and Training for Public Administration Service R As per the Comparative Study of Public/Civil Service Commissions of the Member States of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) conducted by SAARC Secretariat and published in December 2014, the Bangladesh Public Service Commission, a constitutional body primarily to recruit persons for various services and posts in the government, was strengthened. It has also been involved in the decision-making process relating to other service matters such as promotion, posting, transfer, discipline and appeal of the government servants. This body ensures that all decisions relating to recruitment and other service matters are made consistent with the principles of merit and equity. The Bangladesh Public Administration Training Centre was formed in 1984 as an autonomous institution to plan, organise and impart training to civil servants of various levels and was later reinforced. Additionally, another training institution by the name of the Bangladesh Civil Service Administration

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Table 9.2  Summary of administrative reforms Period Administrative reform action Before 1991 1972 Administrative Service Reorganising Committee (ASRC) 1976 Pay and Service Commission (PSC) 1982 Martial Law Committee for examining organisational set-up of Ministries/ Divisions/ Directorates and other Organisations (MLC) 1983 Committee for Administrative Reorganisation/ Reform (CARR) After 1991 1993 Cabinet Committee of Administrative Reform

1996

Administrative Reorganisation Committee (ARC)

2000

Public Administration Reform Committee (PARC)

Focus of reform Service structure Services structure and pay issues Organisation and rationalisation of manpower in the Public Sector Organisations Reorganisation of sub-national level administration Recognition and review the reports of Public Administration Sector Study (UNDP) and towards better Government in Bangladesh. Structure and rationalisation of manpower across Ministries/ Departments/ Directorates Administrative change and development in the light of New Public Management

Source: Author

Academy was established in 1987 to provide basic training on law and administration to young and mid-level civil service officers.  ublic Administration Reform Under World Bank Initiative P In 1996, under the initiative of the World Bank, a reform of public administration was undertaken. The reform exercise encompassed redefining the frontiers of the public sector; expanding the scope of operations for the private sector and NGOs; enhancing the level and nature of accountability and responsiveness; streamlining regulations, laws and processes; and overhauling the rules and processes and maintaining an efficient, committed and professional public service. This initiative had been taken forward. In 2000, the Public Administration Reform Commission (PARC) was formed and the reform efforts, clearly influenced by the New Public Management protocols, were continued by the PARC.

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Decentralisation Priority was given to reorganisation of the government to decentralise decision-making and speed up development projects. The Committee for Administrative Reorganisation/Reforms was appointed. Sweeping changes were instituted in  local administration. Institutions such as the Public Service Commission, University Grants Commission and Telecommunication Regulatory Authority were fully revamped. Decentralisation continued to be a priority focus even in later years.  ther Reform Measures O A Better Business Forum was formed to simplify official rules and regulations and strengthen the role of government as facilitator of private initiatives. The constitution of the National Human Rights Commission and Truth Commission were approved. The devolution of powers to local governments was underway within the framework of a strengthened three-­ tier system (i.e. District, Sub-District, Union/Village levels) and a Local Government Commission was formed. Concepts like a citizens’ charter, service standard, model police stations, help-desk, helpline and one-stop service centres were introduced to improve services delivered by public sector agencies. Restraint to Progress It needs to be underlined that the commitment of the country’s leadership is a driving force behind the implementation of administrative reforms. In Bangladesh, commitment of the leadership had been constrained by clientele politics which had distracted the leaders in power from embarking on comprehensive reform programmes. As a result, successive governments failed to push through the reform initiatives in high earnest. Moreover, a showdown between the two main political parties—the Awami League and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party—reached such a deadlock stage that administration was severely impacted which disrupted development. Attempts to streamline and rationalise public administration could not progress as desired. 9.4.2  Focus on Good Governance After 2008, the Awami League further strengthened its position and had resounding victories in the next two successive elections in 2014 and 2018. The continuity of the same party in government, firm

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administration with renewed energy and significantly diminished political unrest brought long-awaited stability and took the country out of the conflict era. Good Governance was a priority on the governmental agenda. Pursuant to this, significant measures were adopted to strengthen public administration and continue the reforms that had been undertaken on an ad hoc basis during the different regimes in the past. The major reforms in government structures and administration framework implemented by the government included: • Separation of the judiciary from the executive through enactment of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) 2009. • Fixation of a new pay scale for government employees who were underpaid and consequently susceptible to corruption. • Approval of a second poverty reduction strategy paper to alleviate poverty. • Declaration of Information Technology Policy for its use in public administration and proliferate use of IT in government and public service work under the Digital Bangladesh Programme. • Decentralisation of Anti-Corruption Commission to facilitate a multi-pronged approach to fight corruption. • Granting permission to 50 merchant bankers to boost the country’s stock market. With emphasis being laid on good governance, a review of different sectors including education, local government and health was carried out. Granting autonomy to radio and television and civil administration was considered. New industrial and health policies were promulgated. Elections to village councils were held. An important element of good governance is the participation of the private sector, NGOs, civil society and media in the governance process. In Bangladesh, all these entities have become quite active. The media, in particular, has been playing a leading role in this regard. As a consequence, the law enforcement agencies are vigilant in the protection of citizens’ rights. Civil societies are working constructively to uphold the national and public interest. NGOs and human rights organisations are working towards empowering the community, protecting people’s rights and interests of the poor, vulnerable and backward citizens through various

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educational, micro-credit, awareness building and public interest litigation aid programmes. To further reforms of public administration and build an enabling environment for good governance, various notable steps that have been taken are discussed in the ensuing paragraphs. E-Governance To end the old traditional ways of government services that did not reach many citizens and caused suffering to millions of people, a “Digital Bangladesh” programme was launched. The main aim of this programme is connecting citizens by having government services delivered to their doorsteps. Digital centres have been established at publicly accessible locations such as the office of the Village Council. To bring transparency in public administration, access to government documents and reports has also been introduced. Nearly 5000 Rural Information Service Centres have been set up for e-service delivery. Examples of some significant e-­services available to rural Bangladesh are telemedicine services, video-­ conferencing for treatment of diseases and video-conferencing for administrative activities. Around 8000 village post offices and approximately 500 sub-district post offices have been converted into e-centres. Mobile money order and postal cash cards have been introduced. Other e-services made available include registration for admission to educational institutions, publication of examination results, registration for overseas jobs, registration for pilgrimage, delivery of official forms, online submission of tax returns, online tendering, online banking, SMS services for lodging complaints to police stations, online bill payments for utility services, e-­passports and more. The activities of various ministries have been computerised. Websites containing important information for several ministries have been developed. The Ministry of Finance developed software for budget planning, sensitivity and impact analysis. The Ministry of Communication created a database containing information about contractors and tenders. It also created a project monitoring system for tracking project progress. The Bangladesh Planning Commission has a file sharing system through a Local Area Network with the capability for video-conferencing, and also maintains a digital library. It has also created software for interfacing between development and revenue budgets. Even though the nation, with well over 120 million mobile subscribers and 43 million internet subscribers, enjoys the fruits of e-governance in

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numerous areas of activities, there are instances of deprivation of this privilege in several rural areas and remote locations. It is necessary to eliminate the digital divide between rural and urban areas and between other sections of society to expand the boundaries of e-governance and extend its benefits to all the people. E-Procurement System The Final Report of the Japan International Cooperation Agency & Crown Agents on the Study of Public Procurement Systems and Capacity in South Asian Countries published in February 2013 stated that to fortify the principles of transparency in governance and mitigate corruption, an e-procurement system in public tenders was necessary to be introduced. This move is aimed at the avoidance of collusive bidding practices and ensuring transparency in the public procurement system. In this connection, the National e-Government Procurement (e-GP) portal has been developed. It is owned and operated by the Central Procurement Technical Unit and Implementation Monitoring Evaluation Division of the Ministry of Planning. The e-GP system provides an online platform to carry out the procurement activities by the public agencies. Accountability The traditional mechanism of accountability of public administration that existed in Bangladesh was weak and ineffective. Along with transparency and ease of availability of government services, accountability of civil servants and evaluation of performance of the government have been introduced. Accordingly, the Annual Performance Agreement system has been instituted together with the Government Performance Management System. The ministries are mandated to set their vision, mission and strategic goals with reference to the development priorities of the government, the long-term perspective plan and the five-year plan and accordingly provide the budgetary allocation. Furthermore, delegation of power to subordinate and field officers, mechanism for performance monitoring of the ministries against the set targets and audit of government agencies by the Comptroller & Auditor General have been instituted. Also, a transparent and neutral recruitment policy is enunciated for vacancies in government service. Accordingly, recruitment by the government is carried out through open competitive examinations conducted by the Bangladesh Public Service Commission.

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Furthermore, to institute financial transparency and accountability, a Tax Ombudsman was established through an enactment of the Tax Ombudsman Act, 2005. As the institution was ineffective in terms of achieving its objective, it has since been abolished. The Anti-Corruption Commission is empowered and its functions expanded to replace the Tax Ombudsman. Transparency To strengthen accountability and transparency and further public participation, the Right to Information Act was enacted in 2009. This Act aimed to enhance the power of citizens to participate in and attain government programmes for reinforcing their rights. The Act also intends to enhance the power of various institutions such as the Human Rights Commission, Anti-corruption Commission and Comptroller & Auditor General to ensure accountability of government officials and mitigate misuse of power or illegitimate exercise of power or any form of corruption. Later, an Information Commission was established to serve the citizens’ needs for information.  raining and Capacity Building T A change in the mind-sets of the civil servants who carry the colonial legacy and feudalistic attitude is an integral part of good governance. Orientation to the new model of governance assumed importance. Hence, training and capacity building of the bureaucracy commenced at the Bangladesh Public Administration Training Centre, supported by the Japan International Cooperation Agency. The aim of this endeavour was to remove the legacy of colonialism and feudalistic rule, instil a citizen-­ oriented approach and reinforce the professionalism of the new public administration. Decentralisation The Constitution of Bangladesh provides for local government bodies or institutions at each level of administration, viz. District (Zila), Sub-District (Upazila), and Village Councils (Union) for rural areas; and city corporations and municipalities for urban areas. However, due to the lack of commitment of successive regimes in the past, the devolution of power to local government did not take place in reality. Despite a cursory approach taken towards decentralisation, certain initiatives have provided a push in the right direction.

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As part of the decentralisation process and to ensure better utilisation of public resources, measures have been taken to empower the local governments through devolution of power, responsibility and financial management. The reform of the property tax base is considered important to provide financial autonomy and strengthen local governments. Besides, provision has been made for holding open budget meetings, preparation and declaration of a citizen’s charter and measures for public participation. Presently, elected local government bodies exist at all levels. However, it can be seen that, unlike in the past, decentralisation does not serve as the sub-national political support base for any regime. Human Rights The rule of law and human rights are the fundamentals of good governance. Though Articles 27 to 44 of the Constitution enshrine the rule of law and fundamental rights, persistent abuse of power and authority by the law enforcing agencies resulted in violations of law, a worsening of law and order, and extra-judicial killing, giving rise to gross violations of human rights. To arrest this trend and guard against infringement of human rights, the National Human Rights Commission is empowered as a legally mandated and dedicated institution for the protection of human rights, and, furthermore, is independent from the government. The current situation has largely improved from what it was in recent decades.

9.5   Achievements Despite the limitations and constraining factors, public administration in Bangladesh has facilitated remarkable progress, especially with a cessation of strife and conflicts. The impact of changes and reforms in public administration and governance could be noticed through the economic successes. In the period 2002 to 2006, the average GDP growth rate remained above 6 per cent. The per capita national income rose from USD 374 in 2000-2001 to USD 482  in 2005-2006. The foreign exchange reserve rose over USD 3 billion from a mere USD 1 billion in 2001. Inflow of remittances almost trebled from 2001 to exceed USD 5 billion at the end of 2006. Industry-friendly policies filliped industrial growth and enabled the industry sector to contribute approximately 17 per cent to the country’s GDP. Foreign Direct Investment amounted to an all-time high level of USD 2.5 billion during the period 2002 to 2006. Equal attention was given to the development of supporting infrastructure facilities such as

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telecommunication, road connectivity and power to help industries. Growth rates of 6.4 per cent and 6.2 per cent were achieved during 2006-2007 and 2007-2008 fiscal years respectively. Export growth was recorded at 16 per cent, while growth in remittances sent by expatriate Bangladeshis was an unprecedented 30 per cent. According to the World Economic Monitor Database, foreign exchange reserve consistently remained at over USD 5 billion during the period. Since 2006, the gross domestic product (GDP) has been on an increasing trajectory, and at present, the GDP growth rate is 7 per cent. It needs to be underlined that Bangladesh, which was liberated from Pakistan in 1971, after prolonged suffering from severe financial and cultural exploitation, has surpassed the GDP growth rate of Pakistan by almost 2.5 per cent every year since 2006. With reference to the international poverty line of USD 1.90 per person per day, the poverty figure in the country declined from 44.2 per cent in 1991 to 13.8 per cent in 2016–2017. The most significant attainment is that Bangladesh secured middle-income country status from the United Nations Committee for Development Policy. Another significant success has been on the socio-economic front. Remarkable improvement has been achieved in the health and education sectors. The mortality rate has decreased. The average life expectancy of Bangladeshis has increased to 72 years, compared to 66 in Pakistan. There is considerable improvement in children’s health. A number of programmes have been undertaken to provide healthcare services to the doorsteps of the average citizen and develop concomitant infrastructural facilities. Open defecation has been minimised. On the education front, the literacy rate has increased, net enrolment rate in primary schools increased to 97 per cent, education for girls has been made free up to class 12 and gender parity has been achieved between boys and girls in schools. Simultaneously, the madrasa education system (i.e. religious educational institutions) was modernised. A number of new public sector universities have been set up to expand and extend the opportunities for higher education. Considerable progress has also been achieved in digital use by the people. It is evident from the fact that out of adults having bank accounts, about 34.1 per cent carried out online or digital transactions in 2017, compared to an average rate of 27.8 per cent for South Asia. According to the “Global Gender Gap Report 2018” of the World Economic Forum, Bangladesh is ahead of all other countries in Asia, except the Philippines, in regard to gender equity.

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Significant progress has also been made on poverty alleviation. A Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) was prepared as a medium-term plan document in line with the Millennium Development Goals declared by the United Nations. The country has fulfilled several targets of the Millennium Development Goals such as reduction of child mortality rate and on other health parameters. Annual budgetary allocation for poverty alleviation programmes has been regularly increased. The Social Safety Net Programmes were expanded to extend the benefits to the hardcore poor and the underprivileged people in the rural areas for graduating out of poverty. Between 2001 and 2006, the number of the population below the poverty line in the country declined by around 9 per cent. According to a World Bank Report of 2016, the percentage of extremely poor people in Bangladesh has reduced from 18.5 per cent in 2010 to 12.9 per cent in 2016, and, as projected by the World Bank, Bangladesh would attain the goal of reducing extreme poverty to less than 3 per cent by 2030. According to a report of the United Nations Development Program, Bangladesh ranked 135 among 189 countries in respect to Human Development Index (HDI) in the year 2019. From 1990 to 2018, the HDI of Bangladesh increased from 0.388 to 0.614, representing a 58.3 per cent increase over about 3 decades. This could have been achieved due to a reduction in poverty, along with gains in life expectancy, education and access to health care, which underlie the effectiveness with which public administration has been working. Bangladesh is one of the three Asian countries that received the award for attaining the Millennium Development Goals, especially in the health-related sector. On account of its success on the socio-economic front and attainments in poverty alleviation, Bangladesh could be called “the land of impossible attainments”. Despite the progress on the socio-economic front and having political stability, in the midst of turbulence prevailing in the region, Bangladesh experienced a moderate level of political violence and protest compared to the rest of South and Southeast Asia. Strong action has been taken against terrorism and violence; and has largely been brought under control. This is reflected in the fact that Bangladesh went up 28 notches in the anti-­ money laundering and counter terrorist financing index of the Basel Institute on Governance according to the 2017 edition of Basel Anti-­ Money Laundering (AML) Index. This definitely speaks volume about the efficacy of the administration.

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9.6   Limitations in Progress 9.6.1  Factors Impacting on Progress Despite the measures taken and considerable achievements on the socio-­ economic front, progress in the reform of public administration in the country has been inhibited by a number of factors. Corruption is a major impediment to the impartial and fair functioning of public administration. Though the Anti-Corruption Commission has been very proactive and independent in terms of interrogating any ruling political or bureaucratic elite, the corruption graph of the country is on the rise. At the same time, militant outfits grew in large numbers. These two factors led to some uncertainty and unrest in the country. As a corollary to corruption, there is nepotism that provides an unfair advantage and special favours to some people close to the bureaucracy and political leadership, depriving deserving people and the masses in general. Corruption and nepotism are encouraged by politicisation of government institutions, which largely emerges from the absence of good governance to the desired standard. It is a common phenomenon in Bangladesh that recruitments made through public service examination consist of a large number of administrators having knowledge on subjects other than administration. On top of that there is a frequent transfer of skilled administrators from one department to another. The cumulative effect of all these deficiencies is a delay in proper planning and decision-making, which impacts on development. Furthermore, the lack of coordination among different departments and agencies and prompted by inter-service rivalry and inherent resistance to change adversely impacts policy and programme implementation. 9.6.2  Legacy Issues As stated earlier, the colonial legacy inherited by the public administration system and the feudalistic approach that had continued over decades caused aversion to people-centric administration. The situation was exacerbated with encouragement from the political leadership provided to the existing factional strife within the public bureaucracy such as rivalry between freedom fighters versus non-freedom fighters, pro-Awami League versus pro-Bangladesh Nationalist Party civil servants, civil servants with a

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military background versus civil servants with civilian backgrounds and factionalism based on district affiliation. Being a largely aid-dependent country, Bangladesh remained susceptible to the pressures of the international donor agencies in formulating and reformulating its reform agenda; and the prescribed development models following the trail of models in the western countries that could not work properly in the social, cultural and political environments and conditions locally prevalent.

9.7   Conclusion Achieving the desired level of reform and enhancement in public administration is not an easy task, especially for Bangladesh which has a long history of conflict, unrest and uncertainty, and carries a legacy of struggle and resistance. As described earlier, Bangladesh has multi-faceted problems. To move and push improvement and strengthening of public administration, a clear path with political commitment for reform and restoration of discipline in the governing system are of prime importance. Priority is needed to make administration free of political intervention to the maximum extent. Simultaneously, enforcement of statutory and administrative provisions for law and order, and capacity building of the bureaucracy require top focus. These steps require being followed by micro-level reforms of the public administration system. To move up to an upper-­ middle income country by its 50th anniversary in 2021, Bangladesh needs to urgently implement structural reforms, expand investments in human capital and continue public administration reforms. Despite there being a democratic government, there is some criticism about the modalities of elections held, especially when a major political party boycotted the electoral contest. Free and fair election is one of the pre-requisites of good governance, which has remained under question. The issue of rule of law is also an important indicator of good governance. The government has been committed to ensure good governance, but in reality, it has been found that the law is applied differently on different political considerations, including partisan ideology. In respect of transparency and accountability, which are significant elements of good governance, the government has done quite well in ensuring the transparency and accountability of the decision-making process. Particularly, introduction of the Rights to Information (RTI) Act has created scope for the general public to hold government accountable for its

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actions. People can also request any information from the government under the provision of RTI legislation. The independence of judiciary is another important feature of good governance. The judiciary is allowed to act independently. Pervasive corruption at levels of governance, inefficiency of the bureaucracy and politicisation of administration are hindering the process of establishment of good governance in the country. From the foregoing discussions, it follows that certain elements of good governance exist in the country, while some others are still missing. Hence, it can be concluded that good governance is yet to take a formal and full-fledged shape in the country. Good governance and development are interrelated. In the case of Bangladesh though many of the elements of good governance do not exist, the country, emerged from conflict, has made an effort to introduce order in public administration and attained tremendous success in economic and social development. This underlines the need and importance of political stability, firm leadership and honesty and sincerity of the government. With political stability in place, and the attainments so far reached, the silver lining of effective and efficient public administration in the country holds good promise.

References Banglapedia-National Encyclopedia of Bangladesh 2014 Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh (1972), available at http:// hrlibrary.umn.edu/research/bangladesh-­constitution.pdf

CHAPTER 10

Public Administration in the Philippines: Overcoming Conflict and Post-Conflict Challenges Alex B. Brillantes Jr and Maria Pilar Lorenzo

10.1   Introduction The Philippines is an archipelagic country located in Southeast Asia surrounded by the Philippine Sea in the East, Celebes Sea in the South, and West Philippine Sea/South China Sea in the West. It comprises 7641 islands—with three major islands namely Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao— covering a total area of 300,000 km2, or 115,800 square miles. Based on the latest statistics, the estimated population of the Philippines is 109,581 million belonging to the country’s 110 ethno-linguistic groups.

A. B. Brillantes Jr (*) University of the Philippines National College of Public Administration, Quezon City, Philippines e-mail: [email protected] M. P. Lorenzo Ghent University, Gent, Belgium e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 J. Nemec, P. S. Reddy (eds.), Public Administration in Conflict Affected Countries, Governance and Public Management, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74966-8_10

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Its population is predominantly of Malay stock but also includes other ethnic races mainly of Chinese ancestry (Cariño, 1988). The national language is Filipino; however, there are eight major languages that are widely spoken and at least 120 languages that are in use in total. In terms of religious affiliation, the country is predominantly Catholic, but there are more than 96 other religions that are practiced. The contemporary public administration and governance system of the Republic of the Philippines has been a response to the multifarious yet unique needs and demands of the Filipino people, and may therefore be regarded as a tool to bolster institution building and capacity development. The next sub-chapters discuss the array of government responses toward the country’s experience of inter-state and intra-state conflicts that can be located within a colonial context and that have subsequently transformed into various competing internal interests and struggles. The Philippines was under three different colonial regimes (the Spanish, the American, and a brief interval of the Japanese occupation) since mid-­ sixteenth century until mid-twentieth century. Having the status of being under the United States of America (US)’s protectorate in the twentieth century, the Philippines was devastated from an inter-state war, specifically, World War II (WWII) (Helak, 2017). As José (2001) argues, the Philippines was plunged into the battle between the US and Japan simply by virtue of being a US colony in 1941. Set against this backdrop that various mechanisms for post-war reconstruction were undertaken. Some of the significant public sector reforms in the post-war era are the various public reorganization initiatives of the Philippine government (Genato-­ Rebullida, 1988; Gonzalez & Deapera, 1987). With the ensuing neoliberal global economic systems that were put in place in the post-World War II era, these reforms were designed to jumpstart the country’s macro-­ economic growth and to catch up and compete in a liberalizing world. In the decades following the WWII era, the Philippines was caught up in intra-state wars with the presence of long-standing insurgencies and the rise in extremist organizations. A range of different types of contemporary conflict (these include the following: “violence by state actors against civilians; clan related violence; political and armed conflicts by nationalist/separatist groups in Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago; a communist-inspired guerrilla campaign mainly in western Mindanao; violent extremist and criminal groups; anti-drug vigilantes; other criminal violence; domestic and gender-based violence; protests; violence around elections; and local conflicts over resources and community rights”—Herbert, 2019: 2) have erupted in the country, but one of the most persistent scenarios of violence and

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instability revolves around the Muslim-led armed resistance in Mindanao in the 1960s and 1970s. This conflict in the Southern Philippines dates back to the colonial encroachment wherein the original inhabitants of the Mindanao region, who describe themselves collectively as Moros (the term “Moros” originally had a pejorative term, however, in late 1960s, Philippine Muslim nationalists transformed the term and started using it as a positive symbol of their collective identity—McKenna, 1998), due to the fact that they form part of the various ethno-linguistic groups mostly made up of Muslims, had been able to resist the colonial subjugation during Spanish Occupation and thus, retained their original social, cultural and political beliefs in spite of the hundreds of years of colonial experiences of the country. Due to its different ethnic and religious composition compared to the rest of the country, the Muslim-dominated region has been wrongly regarded and marginalized, resulting in organized rebel movements that have voiced the plight of the Moros (Brillantes, 2005; Buendia, 2006). The various challenges relating to the consequences wrought by the inter- and intra-state conflict situations that the Philippines has been entangled with are manifest to a certain degree in the country’s categorically poor performance in some quantitative indicators such as the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators, World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Reports, Transparency International’s Corruption Index, and Philippine Statistics Authority’s poverty, subsistence, and literacy indicators. Worldwide Governance Indicators with available data spanning from 1996 to 2018, break down a government’s performance into six indicators: (1) voice and accountability, (2) political stability and no violence/ terrorism, (3) government effectiveness, (4) regulatory quality, (5) rule of law, and (6) control of corruption. The Philippines fares most poorly in the area of political stability and no violence/terrorism, dropping to its lowest ranking of 5.21 (with 0 being the lowest and 100 the highest) in 2010, followed by a ranking of 5.34 in 2004, and 6.16 in 2009. In terms of voice and accountability, governance effectiveness, and regulatory quality, its ranking ranges above 40 to a little over 60. In terms of rule of law, its ranking is above 30 to mid-50s while in the area of control of corruption, its ranking ranges from a little higher than 20 to mid-40s. In response to the specific needs of a country that has witnessed a long history of colonization and consequently of conflict, Philippine public administration, as a discipline and a practice, has continuously played a

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role in institution building and in strengthening capacity development to make the public sector responsive to the needs of the Filipino people. The next sub-chapters unravel these further by teasing out the following two areas: (1) public reorganization and civil service initiatives in the post-­ WWII era within the context of an inter-state war, and (2) politico-­ administrative structures in response to the conflict in Mindanao within the ambit of an intra-state war.

10.2   The Philippines in Post-World War II Era: Public Reorganization and Civil Service Initiatives 10.2.1  Public Reorganization Initiatives Notable among the public sector reforms are the efforts to reorganize the Philippine bureaucracy in order to build institutions and strengthen the capacities of its administrative systems as the country has tried to reconstruct itself in the post-WWII era set within a neoliberal economic system. Nation building after the conflict and ravages wrought by the war was a priority. After all, the Philippines was granted political independence in 1946 immediately after the war. These public sector reforms are located within the overarching label of reorganization. Reorganization interventions were labeled during various periods of implementation by different administrations as reengineering, reinventing, rationalizing, and rightsizing. All these were designed to attain the classic 3 Es of management—economy, efficiency, and effectiveness. Over time, other fundamental governance principles like transparency, accountability, participation, and equity have been included, in accordance with the fundamental attributes of new public administration and good governance. The central emphasis placed on the 3Es can be attributed to the market-oriented scheme that was promoted after World War II so as to stimulate economies and engage governments in competitive practices, leading to the retreat of government from the economy and making the market gain the upper hand, thereby allowing it to affect major social and political decisions in the process. Drawing from the works of Gonzalez and Deapera (1987), Genato-­ Rebullida (1988) and a recent study by the authors, the following section surveys the various government reorganization initiatives from the early twentieth century marked by the independence from Spanish regime

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leading up to the recent administrations that can be characterized by privatization efforts.  re-government Survey Reorganizational Commission P The reorganization attempts in this period were oriented toward the Filipinization of the Philippine bureaucracy and its revitalization in the post-WWII era. The Revised Administrative Code of the Philippine Islands of 1917 served as the earliest attempt to carry out government reorganization in the country (Viloria, 1961). Through the Commonwealth Act No. 5 issued in 1935, it created a Government Survey Board in 1936 that was mandated to evaluate the needed re-structuring in the government. This took on greater relevance in the period following World War II as the country tried to recover from the war from which it had been heavily devastated. The Executive Order No. 94, s. 1947 was released, and this provided greater leeway for public reorganization through executive orders and legislative bills (Gonzalez & Deapera, 1987).  overnment Survey Reorganizational Commission G The first comprehensive effort to reorganize the Philippine bureaucracy was carried out during the term of President Ramon Magsaysay through Republic Act No. 997, which established the Government Survey Reorganizational Commission on 9 June 1954 (Gonzalez & Deapera, 1987). Reorganization efforts were designed and implemented to strive for general principles of economy and efficiency within the overarching pursuit of the country’s rapid macro-economic development after the war.  residential Commission on Reorganization P The administration of President Ferdinand Marcos espoused a development-­oriented approach in its government reorganization efforts through its Integrated Reorganization Plan (IRP; Salas, 1969). A Presidential Commission tasked to assess the IRP was instituted through the Executive Order No. 281 on 29 December 1970. Reorganization attempts in this period not only pursued the predominant government principles of economy and efficiency but also, at least in theory, emphasized national development. Moreover, reorganization in this period was different from previous attempts in the sense that it employed solely Filipinos in the management team that supervised the reorganization studies. No foreign consultants, advisers, or management firms were

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tapped for advice. It also involved more experts from various fields and a larger participation of the private sector (Fabella, 1978).  residential Commission on Government Reorganization P The reorganization of government continued to be among the priorities of all succeeding administrations (Brillantes & Perante-Calina, 2015). President Corazon Aquino succeeded Marcos in 1986 after he was deposed by what has been referred to as People Power Revolution I. Corazon Aquino was President until 1992, and she set up the Presidential Commission on Government Reorganization (PCGR) with the broad goals of decentralization and economic rationality in addition to what she referred to as the imperative to “deMarcosify” the bureaucracy (Genato-­ Rebullida, 1988; Gonzalez & Deapera, 1987). In spite of reorganization attempts, the PCGR was criticized for being private-centric as manifest in the 78-22 ratio of private-sector consultants vis-à-vis government sector consultants (Gonzalez & Deapera, 1987).  residential Commission on Streamlining the Bureaucracy P Former President Fidel V.  Ramos spearheaded reorganization initiatives marked by a central emphasis on reengineering influenced by reinventing the government movement in the 1990s that swept different parts of world. He embarked on a new governance model hinged on steering rather than rowing, thereby designing his reorganization and reengineering efforts in order to attenuate bureaucratic gigantism and to achieve the broad goals of economic growth. His government moves were characterized by the liberalization of the economy with the practice of deregulation of key industries and privatization of public enterprises. Under the helm of Ramos’ leadership, Bustos (1993) argues that the government’s privatization program was fast-tracked so as to truncate the government’s revenue shortfall and to propel the administration’s infrastructure projects. S ucceeding Government Reorganization Attempts: Effective Governance, Rationalization, and Rightsizing During this era, the reorganization moves were continuously associated with the need to adapt to a globalizing world, hence, the emphasis on a results-based bureaucracy and the principles of economy, efficiency and effectiveness. President Joseph Estrada (1998–2001) continued the Reengineering Program and streamlined the executive branch of the government by privatization and by transferring sectoral activities of the

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government to the business sector and civil society (Executive Order No. 165). President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (2001 to 2010) pursued government reorganization through her Rationalization Program implemented through some key directives. She streamlined government programs (Executive Order No. 72, s. 2002); abolished eight agencies and transferred functions to other agencies (Executive Order No. 145, s. 2002); stipulated rationalization programs (Executive Order No. 366, s. 2004), and directed the Department of the Interior and Local Government to examine the needed decentralization and devolution reforms for all departments, agencies, and bureaus. President Benigno Aquino III (2010 to 2016) continued the abovementioned rationalization program. In his first year in office, he issued Executive Order No. 18, s. 2010 that sought to minimize redundant or overlapping agencies, and removed non-operational agencies. This also resulted in the transfer of functions that could be absorbed by local government units or could be rendered by private sector. President Rodrigo Duterte (2016 to present) initiated the Rightsizing Program and made it one of his urgent and priority bills. This latest government reorganization plan seeks to be in sync with the AmBisyon 2040, or the collective vision of the Filipino society that entails a quality life characterized by three features, namely, matatag (strongly rooted), maginhawa (comfortable), and panatag (secure)  (National Economic and Development Authority, 2016). However, the rightsizing proposal has not received sufficient backing from lawmakers, and the focus is presently centered on undermanned and underfunded agencies. In all, through the post-World War II years since the 1950s, there have been many variants of reorganization centering on the basic management purposes, that is, effectiveness, efficiency, and economy. The number of government personnel through the years evinces some of the consequences of the rationalization and rightsizing programs that have been rolled out. In recent decades, the following figures demonstrate that the proportion of the number of government personnel vis-à-vis the total number of Filipinos they have to cater to has grown smaller in recent decades (Table 10.1).

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Table 10.1  Percentage of government personnel vis-à-vis Philippine population, 1968–2008 Year

1964

1974

1984

1994

2004

2008

Total no. of 272,845 280,167 991,445 1,225,676 1,475,699 1,313,538 government personnel Philippine 29,958,688 40,144,248 52,827,040 68,180,859 84,710,542 90,901,965 population Percentage 0.91 0.69 1.88 1.79 1.74 1.45 (%) Source: Authors, based on Mangahas and Tiu Sonco (2016)

10.2.2  Civil Service Initiatives Similar to other emerging nations after independence, the Philippines has been beset with internal challenges, with imprints that are still palpable until today. Due to issues relating to nepotism and corruption that became more rampant during the war (Corpuz, 1965), certain reforms in the civil service system had to be undertaken. The American administration formally established a civil service system characterized by merit and fitness, professionalism and careerism, and a political neutrality that ushered in civil service examinations and standards for appointments. These civil service reforms are in contrast to the rampant former practice of political appointments and partisan politics that had become ingrained due to the highly politicized, graft-ridden, and feudal-based practices in the Spanish era (Corpuz, 1965). Under American supervision, the Philippine Commonwealth was established in 1935  in order to prepare the colony for its independence. A constitution was ratified and instituted a presidential system characterized by a unitary government that maintained three distinct but co-equal branches of the government, namely, the executive, the bicameral legislative, and the judiciary. However, the Commonwealth government was interrupted and went into exile for three years during WWII following the Japanese invasion. After the war, the Philippines gained independence from the Americans in 1946 and retained the 1935 Constitution along with the political-administrative patterns inherited from American legacy, albeit adapted to the vagaries of the Filipino culture manifesting its distinct characteristics and traits.

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Through the years, the Philippine government has carried out institutional frameworks to bolster the quality of meritocracy and professionalization in its civil service system such as the conduct of civil service examinations and standard for appointments. In the context of the post-WWII era, some laws were signed to further bolster the quality of civil service. In 1959, Republic Act (RA) No. 2260 of the Civil Service Law was adopted, integrating and superseding the previously scattered administrative orders and memoranda released since 1900. This law established the necessary personnel policies that serve as important features influencing even the present civil service system. These include a system of promotions, performance appraisal system, and participatory approach in management of and interactions with civil servants. Moreover, a salient aspect of it is transforming the Bureau into the Civil Service Commission in which the head of the office receives the rank of a Department Secretary. The adoption of RA No. 6040 of 1069 amended the previous law, and this laid down the foundation for the decentralization of some civil service functions such as in the area of examinations, appointments and administrative discipline. Moreover, Presidential Decree No. 1, set during the time of the Marcos dictatorship, emphasized the same decentralization of functions, and re-structured it in a way that it would more accommodate the Commission’s quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial functions. Presidential Decree No. 807, known as the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines, meanwhile revamped the function of the Commission, making it the central personnel agency of the government (Mangahas & Tiu Sonco, 2016). After the end of the Marcos dictatorship, the 1987 Philippine Constitution was promulgated. This stipulated the necessary framework for the professionalization of the civil service system upon the reinstitution of democracy in the country. In particular, Executive Order No. 292 or the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 set out the Civil Service Commission (CSC) as the central government personnel agency tasked with supervising and administering the civil service system. Its mandate is to “strengthen the merit and rewards system, integrate all human resources development programs for all levels and ranks, and institutionalize a management climate conducive to public accountability” (1987 Philippine Constitution, Article IX, Sections 2-3). The CSC oversees all branches and agencies of the government, including government-owned and controlled corporations that possess their own charters, and it is headed by a

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39 38 37 36 100 being very clean and 0 being highly corrupt

35 34 33 32

2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

Fig. 10.1  Ranking of the Philippines in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, 2012–2019. (Source: Compiled by the authors based on the data from Transparency International)

Chairperson and assisted by two commissioners (Mangahas & Tiu Sonco, 2016). However, in spite of the abovementioned civil service initiatives, bureaucratic issues such as red tape, nepotism, and graft and corruption— issues that are intertwined—still hound the Philippine government. These are apparent to a certain extent on how the country fares in the Corruption Perceptions Index (2012–2019). Corruption turned rampant in various colonial regimes, became intensified during the war, and has continued in ensuing Philippine presidential administrations. Endriga (1979) associates the cause of corruption with the practice of merced (grant or favor in exchange for an act performed for the king) and the sale of public offices during the Spanish regime while Corpuz (1965) lays stress on the habits formed during the Japanese occupation, specifically pointing to corrupt practices in order to sabotage the colonial regime. In the post-war period, bureaucratic corruption has become a well-entrenched problem, pervading through various Philippine administrations in subsequent decades until contemporary time (see Fig. 10.1).

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10.3   Politico-administrative Structures in Response to Conflict in Mindanao One of the three major islands of the Philippines, the Mindanao region, is the home of the majority of Muslims in the Philippines. The Moros have been beset by conflict for a long period of time mainly arising from disputes over ancestral land, religious and cultural factors, neglect by the government, and clamor for self-determination. The Spanish Regime executed a policy of subjugation in order to conquer the region, and this was carried on until the time of the American colonial government. The predicament of the Moros has persisted even after the country had already attained its independence due to the centralized system that was instituted in the colonial period (Abinales, 2000; Muslim, 1994). The infamous Jabidah Massacre in 1968, a slaughter of Moro army recruits on Corregidor Island, further aggravated the grievances of the Moros and consequently ignited the Moro insurgency. Nurullaji (or most commonly known as Nur) Misuari, who was then a professor of Political Science at the University of the Philippines, decided to form the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) that has rallied for the independence of the Moros in Mindanao. The MNLF had for a long time been the major organization representing the armed Muslim groups, but a breakaway group, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), emerged in 1977 due to unsettled hostilities during peace talks arrangements. Since then, the rebel movements in Mindanao have been primarily led by the MNLF and the MILF, and have been at times simplistically labeled as Muslim secessionist movements. As the deep-seated grievances of the Moros continue to be inadequately addressed, the persistence of conflict in Muslim Mindanao has ensued. The rebel movements have served as a platform for the Muslim minorities in the Philippines to clamor for self-determination and to voice their general dissatisfactions against the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP), which is accused of forsaking the plight of the Moros. This neglect is evident, for instance, in the high poverty and subsistence incidence rate, and low literacy rate in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) or presently turned over to the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao—BARMM (Brillantes et  al., 2019). The ingrained grievances of the Filipino Muslims have led to protracted wars in the region that, in turn, have tainted the image of the region to the extent that it has gained the appellation of being the

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“Mindanao problem”. Likewise, Moros’ antagonistic sentiments rooted in each government’s neglect of them have been one of the bases for the infamous description for the national government as the “Imperial Manila”. The abovementioned situation of Mindanao has been the context of the various responses and public administration initiatives that have been launched to address the conflict situations in the area. In light of the insurgencies incited by the marginalized Moros, it can be argued that from a public administration lens, the responses of the Philippine government can be delineated into two general types, namely, a) legislative and executive frameworks, and b) various mechanisms for peace processes. Although there are arguably other modes (such as through military force and development programs) in which the GRP has managed the conflict in Mindanao, these would constitute for another paper (Brillantes, 2005). 10.3.1  Legislative and Executive Frameworks Through the years, there have been a range of legislative and executive responses that generally pertain to a constitutional provision for regional autonomy, an application of general laws (like the Local Government Code of 1991) to the formulation of specific laws (such as the Organic Act), and a set of plebiscites and consultations in order to assess and obtain knowledge about the sentiments of the marginalized Muslim people. Of all these institutional mechanisms and arrangements, there are four notable categories of government response that can be highlighted (Brillantes, 2005). S etting the Geographical Configurations One of the early institutional frameworks in response to the Muslim needs was the creation of a separate and distinct geographical configuration. During the American regime in the Philippines, the Military District of Mindanao and Jolo was established in 1899, and thereafter the Moro Province in 1903. During the regionalization initiatives of the Philippine government in the 1970s in the time of the Marcos presidency, the Muslim-dominated areas were designated as part of Regions IX and XII. These same provinces within the said regions also formed part of the autonomous region constituted in the Tripoli Agreement of 1976. The 1987 Constitution, which is still binding until today, re-introduces and re-defines the autonomous regions, including the Cordillera region and

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the ARMM. Moreover, the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao was also promulgated in 1989 to geographically identify the provinces involved in the area of autonomy. This led to the creation of the ARMM that provided the basic structure of government for the Moros but remained within the overall framework and provisions of the Philippine Constitution (Brillantes, 2005). I ntegrating the Muslim Minorities A fundamental response that has also been utilized is to establish institutional apparatuses that could incorporate the Muslim groups into the mainstream politico-administrative system. The objective is to integrate the various ethnic groups that have often been marginalized into the larger Philippine society in which they are situated. This is done in a way that the neglected Muslim people can fully take part in the community without losing their original customs and traditions. This institutional strategy is best exhibited in the formation of the Commission on National Integration in 1957, the Presidential Assistance on National Authorities in the 1960s, and the Southern Philippine Development Authority in 1978. These policies institutionalize mechanisms to address historical injustices to the Muslim minorities and to mainstream them into the body politic (Brillantes, 2005).  pplying Democratic Means A Another strand of institutional response is the adoption of formal democratic means in order to assess the needs and concerns of the affected citizens. These are usually carried out through the conduct of plebiscites, referenda, and special elections. A good example demonstrating this is the plebiscite in 1989 in which the concerned Filipino people voted for the adoption of RA 6734, commonly known as the Organic Act for the ARMM, which paved the way for the creation of the ARMM. However, these traditional democratic means could also be hijacked as manifest, for instance, when President Marcos attempted to legitimize his hegemonic policies and programs through a referendum plebiscite by way of Presidential Decree 1092 in 1977 (Brillantes, 2005).  stablishing the Needed Politico-administrative Structures E Another predominant government strategy was to introduce institutional structures in the bureaucracy in administering the Mindanao region as evident in the establishment of the Office of the Regional Commissioners

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for Regions IX and XII in 1975. In view of the results of the referendum that took place in 1977, a regional executive and legislative assembly was inaugurated. A major and more relevant institutional response that can be considered is the setting up of politico-administrative configurations through the Organic Act that has operationalized the ARMM government. Through this legal structure, the election of the Regional Governor and the appointment of regional cabinet secretaries by the Governor have been legally mandated (Brillantes, 2005). 10.3.2  Various Mechanisms for Peace Processes Conflict resolution has been consistently waged between the GRP and the rebel groups. Some of the more crucial institutional interventions in line with this are the peace agreements between conflicting parties. The following paragraphs outline the prominent peace agreements in pursuit of comprehensive peace in Mindanao. Tripoli Agreement The early forms of peace processes can be traced back to 1976 with the Tripoli agreement signed between the GRP and the Muslim rebel groups during the Marcos administration. In these peace agreements, the MNLF represented the armed groups while the former first lady Imelda Marcos, designated as the special emissary to Libya, represented the Marcos administration. Libya acted as the third party to mediate between the two parties. The elevation of the conflict issues to the international level also sought the participation of other countries of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, specifically Malaysia and Indonesia. These countries helped carry out the peace talks and assisted in threshing out the unique needs of the Muslims in Mindanao. These peace negotiations resulted in the Tripoli Agreement, whereby the demands of the MNLF shifted from independence to self-­ determination. The Agreement defined the autonomous administrative divisions, created a judicial system following Sharia law, and introduced an economic system by forming the Islamic Bank. The Legislative Assembly and the Executive Council were also created, with officials selected through elections and appointments. Upon ratification of the Agreement, a ceasefire also took effect. Furthermore, a significant offshoot of the Tripoli Agreement is the conduct of a plebiscite that resulted in the formation of two regions, namely, Regions IX and XII (Brillantes, 2005).

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 987 Philippine Constitution 1 Article X, Sections 15–21, of the 1987 Philippine Constitution stipulates provisions for an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao within the legal limits of the constitutional framework. Specifically, in Section 15, it states “there shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao… within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as the territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines” (Philippine Constitution, 1987). The Constitution paved the way for the passing of Republic Act 6734, or the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, that created the ARMM. Throughout the years however, the failure of the ARMM has become apparent. The Filipino Muslims in Mindanao have increasingly become frustrated with the ARMM, and pinpointed the failure to the top-down approach and to the corruption and mismanagement by its officials (Brillantes, 2005). It is within this context that it would later on be modified by RA 9054, which sought to enlarge the territory and powers of the ARMM, and was later replaced by a new political entity called the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. S ix Paths to Peace A more integrative institutional approach was achieved during the time of President Fidel Ramos. He mandated the National Unification Commission (NUC) to provide viable recommendations based on nationwide multi-­ sectoral consultations. The result was the “Six Paths to Peace”, which was later adopted by the national government through Executive Order (EO) 125 Series of 1993. The six paths involve the following: (1) social, economic and political reforms addressing the root causes of social unrest, (2) consensus-building and empowerment through national and local consultations, (3) negotiations with armed groups, (4) measures for reconciliation and reintegration for former combatants, and reconstruction of damaged areas, (5) measures for conflict reduction and protection of civilians, and (6) creation of a positive climate for peace through education and advocacy. President Ramos also established the Office of the Presidential Adviser on Peace Process (OPPAP) in 1993 that was envisioned to take on the work of the NUC. A cabinet-level position was created with the new agency, creating the position of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (Brillantes, 2005; Morea, 2008). The culmination of Ramos’ peace initiatives was the Final Peace Agreement signed in 1996 between the GRP and the MNLF that was supposed to put an end to the

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24-year struggle of the MNLF for independence and autonomy. However, the peace initiatives of Ramos were deemed not comprehensive enough, and as such, conflict still persisted and even escalated in the next term under the administration of President Joseph Estrada, who waged an “all-­ out-­war” strategy against the MILF.  angsamoro Basic Law B Due to the failure of the ARMM, a struggle for better autonomy and provisions had been sought for the Moros. It is in this vein that the GRP and the MILF inked the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro envisioned to act as the roadmap for the new self-governing region in Mindanao called the Bangsamoro. The term “Bangsamoro” comes from the Malay word for nation, and thus, the term signifies “nation of the Moro”. In December 2012, the Bangsamoro Transition Commission (BTC) was founded to craft the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL), which is the fruit of 17 years of negotiation. A notable accomplishment of these negotiations was the involvement of other relevant stakeholders such as non-Muslim indigenous peoples, Christian settlers in the region, migrants and their descendants, internally displaced persons, young people and women, and other social, political, and religious groups who are also situated in the Bangsamoro communities. Several versions of the BBL were proposed and submitted to the Congress and Senate during the administration of President Benigno Aquino III, but none passed through the Senate and the Congress. The previous smooth-sailing peace processes between the two sides during the Aquino III administration were tainted heavily by the controversial Mamasapano incident in which the Special Action Force of the GRP clashed with the combined MILF and Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters in their bid to track down a high-­ value terrorist.  rganic Law for the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region O in Muslim Mindanao The ratification of the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL) on 25 January 2019 after the plebiscite held on 21 January 2019 forms part of the recent move of the GRP under the administration of President Duterte Rodrigo to address the demands and grievances of Muslims in Mindanao. The BOL was later called the Organic Law for the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao or OLBARMM (Republic Act 11054, 2017). The OLBARMM is the latest result of decades-long negotiations

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to address the long-standing concerns and grievances of the Moros. It abolishes and replaces the ARMM with the new autonomous political entity called the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM). Duterte increased the number of members of the BTC in order to give representations to the indigenous peoples, local government, sultanates, and other religious and socio-cultural groups (Gutierrez, 2019). The notable difference of BAR from ARMM is the greater degree of autonomy provided for and the lesser degree of intervention by the national government. The Bangsamoro government would have greater autonomy from the government vis-à-vis other regions in the Philippines. The management of this asymmetrical relationship with the government is expedited through the Intergovernmental Relations Body that is comprised of representatives from both the Bangsamoro government and the Philippine central government, with 57 from the Bangsamoro, nine seats from the central government and 14 as concurrent powers for both.

10.4   Conclusion Contemporary Philippine Public Administration, both as an academic discipline and a practice, has been an assemblage of influences and systems springing forth from its pre-colonial and (neo-)colonial history. The public administration situated at the national level, as a reaction to an inter-­ state post-World War II context, has been designed and adopted to attain the needed development of the country that has been heavily associated with macro-economic growth. In the post-World War II era, the Philippines was impelled to reconstruct itself and concurrently compete in a global world subject to a neoliberal economic order marked by privatization and deregulation. It is within this ambit that the government principles generally called the 3 Es (economy, efficiency, and effectiveness) have many times been served as the foremost criteria in designing government arrangements and government reorganization. However, such 3Es are insufficient in this day and age of post-modern public administration. The importance of equity, ethics, and accountability cannot be ignored. Hence the authors have suggested the imperatives of the 5Es and an A in reforming institutions in post-modern public administration: efficiency, economy and effectiveness, equity, ethics, and accountability (Brillantes & Lorenzo, 2021). At the local level, the type of Philippine politico-administrative responses that have been effectuated cater to an intra-state war rooted in the

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long-standing plight and clamor for autonomy of the Moros (hence the importance of “equity”) who have undergone a history of neglect and marginalization. The conflict in the southern Philippines rooted in Muslim rebellion against the central government illustrates how local public administration structures and institutions have been designed and experimented on with various degrees of autonomy in order to address the conflict. It is within this context of the provision of full autonomy that the move to federalism has been proposed to once and for all resolve the conflict in Mindanao. The notion of local autonomy and of devolution is to transfer functions, powers, and authorities to each of the sub-national governments, which are in a better position to evaluate and respond to the local needs. Within the overarching concept of decentralization, the maximum degree of autonomy that can be provided within the legal bounds is through a constitutional change and the subsequent adoption of federalism. At the core of the concept of federalism is the need to empower sub-­ national governments in order to make them more agile and responsive to the specific characteristics and features of a particular geographical area and to the peculiar needs of their people. In sum, this chapter has shown how the Philippine government has initiated various politico-administrative mechanisms in response to conflict situations whether inter- or intra-state war. In the process of doing so, Philippine Public Administration has to contend with exigent external forces as (neo)colonial baggage, clash of cultures and competing interests arise. Within the discipline itself, tensions form shape as government principles diverge. In spite of all of these, however, Philippine Public Administration and its institutions continue to struggle to be relevant and serve as a concrete mechanism to address conflict situations and to generate efforts that can bring about responsive, transparent, and participatory governance attuned to the time and to the needs of the Filipino people.

References Abinales, P. N. (2000). Making Mindanao: Cotabato and Davao in the Formation of the Philippine Nation-State. Ateneo de Manila University Press. Brillantes, A. B., & Lorenzo, M. P. (2021). Philippine Public Administration: 5Es and an A. In A. Farazmand (Ed.). Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance. Springer, Cham. ­ https://doi.org/ 10.1007/978-3-319-31816-5_4134-1

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Brillantes, A., & Perante-Calina, L. (2015). Dynamics, Issues and Concerns of the Philippine Politico-administrative System: Decentralization and Reorganization, Comparative Politics in ASEAN. In ASEAN and Asia Studies Center National Institute of Development Administration, Information for National Library of Thailand, ASEAN and Asia Studies Center, National Institute of Development Administration (Ed.), Comparative Politics in ASEAN (pp.  353–400). Semadhama. Brillantes, A., Raquiza, M.  V., & Lorenzo, M.  P. (2019). Social Equity in the Philippines: A Continuing But Elusive Promise. In J.  Morgen (Ed.), Social Equity in the Asia-Pacific Region: Conceptualizations and Realities (pp. 187–213). Palgrave Macmillan. Brillantes, A.  B. (2005). Institutional and Politico-Administrative Responses to Armed Conflicts. Philippine Journal of Public Administration, 49(1–2), 1–39. Buendia, R. (2006). Mindanao Conflict in the Philippines: Ethno-Religious War Or Economic Conflict? In A.  Croissant, B.  Martin, & S.  Kneip (Eds.), The Politics of Death: Political Violence in Southeast Asia (pp.  147–187). Lit Verlag Berlin. Bustos, F. U. (1993). Economic Brief No. 15. The Philippine Privatization Program. East-West Center. Cariño, L. V. (1988). The Land and the People. In R. P. Guzman & M. A. Reforma (Eds.), Government and Politics of the Philippines (pp.  3–17). Oxford University Press. Corpuz, O. D. (1965). The Philippines. Prentice-Hall. Endriga, J. N. (1979). Historical Notes on Graft and Corruption in the Philippines. Philippine Journal of Public Administration, 23(3–4), 241–254. Fabella, A. (1978). Organizing for Development: A Presentation Prepared for the Interim Batasang Pambansa (Or Interim National Assembly). Philippine Journal of Public Administration, 21(1), 383–409. Genato-Rebullida, L. (1988). Reorganizing the Executive Branch of Government for Political Development: The Philippine Experience. Philippine Journal of Public Administration, 32(1–2), 105–134. Gonzalez, J., & Deapera, L. (1987). A Review of Philippine Reorganization. Philippine Journal of Public Administration, 31(3), 257–278. Gutierrez, B. (2019). Fast Facts on the Bangsamoro Organic Law. Retrieved April 20, 2020, from https://pia.gov.ph/features/articles/1018364 Helak, M. M. (2017). World War II in the United States Colony of the Philippines: Beyond the Bataan Death March and Douglas MacArthur. Inquiries Journal, 9(3), 1–21. Herbert, S. (2019). Conflict Analysis of the Philippines. K4D Helpdesk Report 648. Institute of Development Studies.

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José, R.  T. (2001). War and Violence, History and Memory: The Philippine Experience of the Second World War. Asian Journal of Social Science, 29(3), 457–470. Mangahas, J. V., & Tiu Sonco, J. O. (2016). Civil Service System in the Philippines. In E.  M. Berman (Ed.), Public Administration in Southeast Asia: Thailand, Philippines, Malaysia, Hong Kong, and Macao (pp. 423–462). CRC Press. McKenna, T. (1998). Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines. University of California Press. Morea, G. J. (2008). From Enduring Strife to Enduring Peace in the Philippines. Military Review, 88(3), 192–202. Muslim, M. A. (1994). The Moro Armed Struggle in the Philippines: The Nonviolent Autonomy Alternative. Mindanao State University. National Economic and Development Authority. (2016). Ambisyon Natin 2040: A Long-term Vision for the Philippines. Republic of the Philippines. Philippine Constitution. (1987). Art. X, § 15. Salas, R. (1969). Orientation for Government Reorganization. In J.  V. Abueva (Ed.), Perspectives in Government Reorganization. College of Public Administration, University of the Philippines. Viloria, A.  A. (1961). Reorganization in the Philippine National Government Prior to 1954. Philippine Journal of Public Administration, 5(1), 31–51.

CHAPTER 11

Croatian Public Administration: Good Governance Accompanied by an Authoritarian Legacy Teo Giljević, Goranka Lalić Novak, and Iva Lopižić

11.1   Introduction Croatia gained independence, after hundreds of years of foreign rule, at the very beginning of the 1990s through the dissolution of former Yugoslavia. The conflict began soon after, and during its War of Independence (1991–1995), Croatia suffered substantial casualties and economic damage, resulting in heavy loss of life and injuries, and significant damage to infrastructure and housing. In parallel to war events, Croatia faced an influx of internally displaced persons and refugees fleeing war events, as well as human rights violations in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992–1995). The ethnic composition of the state changed, also due to the flight of ethnic Serbs after the military operations in 1995. After the war, reconciliation between ethnic groups, mainly Croats and Serbs,

T. Giljević (*) • G. Lalić Novak • I. Lopižić Faculty of Law, University of Zagreb, Zagreb, Croatia e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 J. Nemec, P. S. Reddy (eds.), Public Administration in Conflict Affected Countries, Governance and Public Management, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74966-8_11

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remained a challenge. During the war and in the post-war period, there were many challenges which hindered the democratisation processes in Croatia, such as: full respect of human rights, including minority rights; compliance with the obligations assumed under the agreements for the peaceful resolution of the conflict (the Dayton/Erdut Agreements), especially the implementation of the process of return of displaced Serbs, and full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for crimes in former Yugoslavia (ICTY); regional cooperation with the countries of the Western Balkans; and the full democratisation of the media. Both the war and the immediate post-war periods hindered the opportunity of building the public administration system in a modern democratic way. After the national elections of 2000 and the change of Government, Croatia took steps towards its democratisation and long-term stabilisation, struggling to find appropriate solutions to earlier political and economic shortcomings. The main impetus for governance and public administration reforms was accession to the European Union. However, compared to other Central and Eastern European countries that became Member States in 2004 and 2007 respectively, Croatia had been lagging in joining the EU for almost a decade. During the accession period, Croatia had to address many issues connected with the capacity of public administration for integration to the EU, as it had not fully adjusted to the post-socialist, postnationalist situation, and was considered to be inefficiently resourced and insufficiently professional. Emphasis was placed on legislative, regulatory, organisational, and human resource issues in all parts of public administration, based on good governance standards, such as legitimacy, effectiveness, accountability, transparency, and plurality (Ott, 2004). In this regard, the EU provided substantial financial support for public administration reforms for Croatia to become fully prepared for membership in the EU. After almost a decade of negotiations, Croatia joined the EU in 2013. Today, Croatia is a predominantly centralised country with a dense state administration network within its territory. State administration is mainly grounded on the continental European “Weberian” model inherited from the pre-socialist period characterised by legalism, formalism, rigid leadership, and discipline (Koprić, 2019a: 23). Many contemporary issues and challenges of central state administration are a consequence of war and post-war political developments, such as the position of national minorities and politicisation in the civil service system, high fragmentation and centralisation, the perception of widespread corruption in the political and administrative system, and the lack of influence of civil society and citizens in policymaking. These issues will be further elaborated in this text.

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11.2   The Political System and Public Administration in Croatia: Past Developments and Organisation at the Central Level Croatia was part of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from 1945 to 1990. Former Yugoslavia was a decentralised federation with a so-called socialist democracy and self-management system. The Communist party had an integrative and dominant role in the whole of society, especially during the 1950s and 1960s, when nomenclature was in full force, while liberalisation and moderate democratisation began in the 1980s. Croatia announced its independence from Yugoslavia on 25 June 1991, and the UN recognised its independence in May 1992. The first democratic Constitution of 1990 radically changed the governance system in Croatia by introducing a semi-presidential system based on the French model with pronounced authoritarian characteristics (Bičanić & Franičević, 2003; Petak, 2018). Based on the new Constitution, the first parliamentary and presidential elections were held in August 1992, and Franjo ̵ Tudman was elected the first President. The semi-presidential system was later transformed into a parliamentary system. Almost immediately after Croatia declared its independence, hostilities erupted. Consequently, in 1992, more than one-quarter of Croatia’s territory with large Serb populations was designated UN Protected Areas. During two military operations in 1995, the Croatian Armed Forces recaptured the majority of the occupied territories in so-called Krajina and Western Slavonia. During and immediately after the military operations, around 200,000 ethnic Serbs fled Croatia, mostly to Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Due to human rights violations during and after the military operations, “which cast a shadow on Croatia’s democratic record and respect for the rule of law”, the EU suspended its PHARE assistance programme, as well as negotiations concerning an EU/Croatian Trade and Cooperation Agreement and a Transport Agreement. The peaceful reintegration of the remaining occupied territories—Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium—began in January 1996 with the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1037. The Croatian territory was fully re-­ integrated in 1998. With political stabilisation, the return of Serbs to Croatia started at a slow pace, hampered by many problems, such as the incomplete reconstruction of their properties, the animosity of local populations, and a negative perception of the security situation in the war-­ affected areas. The demographic composition of the state changed

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significantly—before the war, ethnic Serbs made up 12.2 per cent of the Croatian population, and, in the 2011 census, their share fell to 4.4 per cent. In the post-war period, the President and the ruling party had a centralised influence over the whole system, with a lack of transparency or accountability as the main characteristics of governance processes. The ruling party (the Croatian Democratic Union—HDZ) enjoyed unchal̵ lenged power from 1990 until President Tudman’s death in 1999. According to Bičanić and Franičević (2003), several important points have to be taken into account when discussing the specific circumstances which affected further developments in the Croatian political and administrative system, including privatisation and other transformation-related reforms implemented during and alongside the war which influenced the actors’ behaviour and the transformation path taken (such as privatisation through the “transformation” of social ownership and denationalisation following transformation). The political environment transformed radically early in 2000 with a change in the ruling party when a centre-left coalition of six parties came to power. The Amendments to the Constitution of 2000 and 2001 marked the beginning of the processes of democratisation and decentralisation. The new Government was determined to establish a well-developed democracy and respect for the rule of law, although it was faced with many challenges. It had to consolidate democracy to support long-term political and social stability, as well as to implement a broad programme of structural reforms to achieve a political and economic transition. These steps ended Croatia’s political and economic isolation, leading to the rapid enhancement of relations with the EU, and, from 2000, accession to the EU became the main strategic foreign policy objective. By signing the Stabilisation and Association Agreement in 2001, Croatia established contractual relations with the EU. In 2004, the Commission confirmed that Croatia had met the Copenhagen criteria and conditionalities of the Stabilisation and Association Process, and accession negotiations opened in 2005. During the accession period, there were many public administration issues that were scrutinised by the EU: the decentralisation of government functions to strengthen local government; the streamlining of public administration through horizontal decentralisation; the reform of the judiciary; the development of proper and efficient law enforcement mechanisms; improvement of the efficiency of public administration; improvement of coordination and supervision at the central level; the development

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of technical and administrative capacities for EU integration; and improvement of the policymaking capacity of central public administration. Over the years, many reforms were conducted in order to meet the accession criteria, and, finally, in July 2013, Croatia became a full EU Member State. However, despite all the efforts, public administration is still “based to a significant degree on a climate of formalism, procedures, secrecy, obedience, resistance to change, evasion of responsibilities, and a top-down approach without much initiative, innovation or focus on results” (Koprić, 2018: 129). Contemporary public administration in Croatia consists of state administration, local and regional self-government, and public services (services of general interest). According to the State Administration System Act (hereinafter: SASA), adopted in 2019, the state administration system includes ministries and state administrative organisations. While ministries are established to perform state administrative tasks in one or more administrative areas, state administrative organisations perform administrative tasks which require a particular degree of autonomy or the adoption of specific conditions and working methods or which are necessary for the implementation of European Union legally binding acts (Art. 55 and Art. 58 SASA). However, the main difference between these organisations is that ministries are of greater political importance since the heads of ministries are members of the Government, which is not the case with the heads of state administrative organisations. Currently, the total number of central state administration bodies is 32, including 20 ministries and 12 state administrative organisations. In 2017, a total of 46,474 people were working in the state administration system. The new SASA introduced two changes in the organisational structure of the state administration system: cutting down the state administration system at the central level by abolishing county administrative offices as first-instance state administration bodies, and abolishing state offices as a type of central state administration body. According to the SASA, only ministers, ministerial state secretaries, heads of state administrative organisations and their deputies are political appointees, while heads of administrative organisations within ministries are no longer political appointees, but senior civil servants (Art. 45). This legislative change aimed to promote the professionalisation of state administration. However, since these senior civil servants are still appointed by the Government, this normative solution has not constituted a significant step towards the depoliticisation of state administration, as there is no

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guarantee that professional standards would be respected in their appointment (Koprić, 2019b: 10). Central state administration bodies can establish their own territorial branch offices. Even though national strategies on the development of the public administration system propose their integration, no measures in this direction have yet been implemented. There were a total of 1464 central state administration branch offices in 2018, compared to 1279 branch offices in 2015. There are no complete data on the number of officials working in branch offices during that time, but available data on the number of officials working in territorial units of some ministries suggest that their number has been increasing (Lopižić, 2018). In 2016, 28,334 officials were working in branch offices (the majority in territorial administrative units of the Ministry of Agriculture followed by the Ministry of the Interior), which is higher than the number of officials working in local and regional self-government units (Koprić, 2016). The territorial organisation of branch offices is highly complex since only 30 per cent of them follow the country’s division into counties, which further encourages the fragmentation of the state administration system within the territory. However, the new SASA provides that branch offices should be established in one or several counties (Art. 50), which might lead to the standardisation of their territorial organisation. The fragmentation of the deconcentrated state administration system was severely criticised in European Commission reports since it leads to the poor coordination of public policies, the poor monitoring and evaluation of their implementation, and increased costs and inefficiencies in public spending. Besides state administration bodies, a great number of legal entities with public authorities also operate at the central level under different names (agencies, public funds, public institutions, centres), all of which could be labelled as state agencies. Despite continuing efforts to reduce their number, there have been around 74 state public agencies and other public authorities in the last ten years, many of which were established as a precondition for EU membership (Musa, 2019). The Croatian agency system has been characterised by enormous complexity, diversity, and a lack of common standards (Koprić, 2018). Even though national strategic documents recognise the need to adopt a law on public agencies, the draft law on public agencies prepared during 2017 was abandoned, while the new SASA failed to offer unique and comprehensive regulation of the public agencies system.

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11.3   Contemporary Features of Central State Administration in Croatia The civil service system. Croatia adopted the Civil Service Act (hereinafter: CSA) in 1994, which promoted a career-based civil service system. In 2001, new Civil Service Act endorsed the position-based concept. In 2005, the new CSA introduced norms harmonised with basic European standards and values (Marčetić, 2005). Despite all efforts, the civil service is still dominated by a high degree of politicisation and lack of professionalism. Political values still prevail at all levels of the administrative system— from appointing senior civil servants, and a lack of merit criteria in their recruitment and promotion, to poor compliance or a lack of legal rules in certain areas. According to Koprić (2018), the main problems of the Croatian civil service and human resource management (HRM) are the following: (a) a fragmented legal regulation structure; (b) the poor design of working positions based on level of education and length of work experience (ignoring knowledge, competences or skills); (c) the establishment of new working positions arbitrarily, without objective analyses of real needs (the influence of politics); (d) the inadequate educational structure of a large share of civil servants in the state administration system (70 per cent with secondary education or lower); (e) the lack of assessment of in-­ service training needs based on objective criteria; (f) appraisals not based on objective criteria of performance and quality of work; (g) an extremely fragmented salary system with many inconsistencies; (h) many weak points in the system of public ethics and integrity; (i) a lack of university programmes for core civil servants. Regarding the recruitment of civil servants, Croatia has only formally fulfilled the requirements of the European Commission regarding the introduction of merit criteria, without significantly changing the actual procedures. Thus, we can speak of a shallow Europeanisation of the civil service system. The recruitment policy has been on an ad hoc basis from year to year, with the strong influence of politics. The selection and recruitment procedure for senior civil servants is less demanding than that for other civil servants. Senior civil servants are recruited based on an interview with an official, and appointed by the Government, so, in practice, the appointment procedure for a managerial position is politicised (Giljević & Lopižić, 2019; Lalić Novak & Džinić, 2016). The CSA established promotion criteria, but there is neither an obligation nor an established basic framework for a system of promotion and

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salary increase. The CSA does not relate pay to performance, so there is a lack of motivation for civil servants. The wage-setting framework has been under preparation for 15 years, but the Croatian Parliament has yet to pass a new Act. According to the Constitutional Act on the Rights of National Minorities, national minorities are entitled to be represented by national minority members in state administration bodies. In addition, in local government units where the minority population includes at least a third of the local population, the equal use of the minority language and script is allowed. Transparency and accountability. The democratisation of Croatian central state administration through the implementation of the transparency principle in the work of public bodies can be tracked through three phases. The first phase (2003–2010), which started with the adoption of the Act on the Right of Access to Information (hereinafter: ARAI) in 2003, had only a slightly positive impact on improving overall transparency due to the inadequate institutional context and support. The second phase (2010–2013) was characterised by the incorporation of the transparency principle in the Constitution and the adoption of amendments to the ARAI, which significantly improved the legislative framework of the transparency regime through measures aimed at broadening understanding of the transparency principle and the procedural arrangements to protect it. The third phase (2013–today) began with the adoption of the new ARAI and the introduction of the Public Information Commissioner (PIC) as an independent body with broad formal powers that should ensure adequate protection and promotion of the right of access to information (Musa, 2019: 341–342). The improvement of the legislative protection of the right to information can be seen in the significant increase in citizens’ requests to protect these rights. The number of such requests was under 5000 before 2010 (except for 2004) and rose to an average of 20,000 after 2010 (Koprić, 2019b: 9). The obligation to conduct public consultations when adopting new regulations, as a supplement to the transparency principle, was incorporated in the Regulatory Impact Assessment Act in 2013. In 2015, the Registry of Public Bodies was formed. In the same year, there were 6045 public bodies, of which 4425 had an information officer (Koprić, 2019b: 10). The annual reports of the Public Information Commissioner show that the protection of the right of access to information has been advancing over the years. All state administration bodies respect their obligation to

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submit reports on the enforcement of the Act and have made steps towards the proactive publication of information. Public bodies have resolved around 94 per cent of citizens’ requests for information within the legal deadline. In 2018, 17.8 per cent of total complaints to the PIC were against state administration bodies, of which 38.24 per cent were dismissed, which is 10 per cent higher than in 2017. In the same year, a consultation plan was published by 90.32 per cent of state administration bodies (compared to 86.67 per cent in 2017). State administration bodies conducted a total of 933 public consultations, compared to 494 consultations in 2016. The average consultation period in state administration bodies significantly increased (from 15.67 days in 2015 to 28.83 days in 2018). However, there is room for further improvement, especially concerning the length and the overall quality of the consultation process. The primary mechanism for ensuring the financial accountability of state administration bodies is through the work of the State Audit Office, an independent organisation that was founded in 1993 and whose status and responsibilities are regulated by a special Act. The State Audit Office audits financial reports and operations in order to improve the legality, efficiency, and effectiveness of public bodies. The new 2019 State Audit Office Act aims to address the low implementation of its instructions and recommendations by introducing sanctioning mechanisms, and increases the scope of the State Audit Office’s audits, which includes the Croatian National Bank. Alongside other newly adopted acts, primarily the new Fiscal Responsibility Act, it strengthens the fiscal and legal framework for state administration bodies. Rule of law. Respect for the rule of law in Croatia has for many years been a source of concern, although this principle is considered, according to the Constitution, as one of the highest values of the constitutional order (Art. 3). The main issues connected with the rule of law over the years have included: limited legal certainty due to inconsistent and outdated regulation and complicated bureaucratic procedures; the questionable quality of the judicial system and of the proper functioning of the judiciary, including high case backlogs; and corruption as one of the key issues facing the political and administrative system. Long and complicated administrative procedures are considered to be a primary factor hindering the development of the business environment and the inflow of foreign investments in Croatia. Over the past decade, there have been several attempts to reduce the administrative burden and remove unnecessary regulations for entrepreneurs and citizens. However,

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Croatia is still one of the worst performing EU countries for ex-post reviews. Although there has been some progress regarding the continuous removal of the identified administrative burden, parafiscal charges are still limiting business activities. A significant problem is inconsistent, frequently changing regulations, combined with a lack of necessary legal expertise in central state administration. As a result, citizens often lack confidence in administrative procedures, and frequently perceive the acts of administrative bodies to be arbitrary. During negotiations over EU accession, one of the significant issues was the independence and quality of the judiciary. Although the number of judges and court personnel in Croatia is among Europe’s highest per capita, the long duration of judicial procedures and the high backlog of cases continue to be a significant problem in Croatia’s judicial system. A reform of the administrative justice system took place in 2012 when a two-­ tier system was established. Four administrative courts in Zagreb, Split, Rijeka, and Osijek rule on actions against the individual decisions of bodies governed by public law, actions taken against the conduct of bodies governed by public law, actions for failure to adopt individual decisions, and actions taken against administrative agreements and the execution of administrative agreements (Art. 3, Administrative Disputes Act). The High Administrative Court has review, appeal, and exclusive competences. Although the judiciary in Croatia is independent of political structures, in terms of the perceived independence of courts and judges among the general public, the judiciary in Croatia is considered to be the worst among the EU Member States. A similar situation continues within anti-corruption policies. According to the most recent EU report, Croatia is amongst the worst performing Member States in terms of the perception and control of corruption, with no trend of improvement (European Commission, 2019). However, it has established sound anti-corruption legislation and an institutional structure for the monitoring of anti-corruption measures. A cornerstone of Croatia’s anti-corruption policies is enhancing integrity and transparency in the public sector. The primary legislation in this respect is the Act on the Prevention of Conflict of Interest which regulates the exercise of public office by high-level elected and appointed officials at both central and local level. The Commission monitors the implementation of the Act on the Prevention of Conflict of Interest. However, despite some progress, Croatia’s capacity to prevent and sanction instances of corruption remains

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limited due to the fact that legislative initiatives do not offer adequate enforcement tools against corruption, and due to weak control. Policymaking, coordination, and regulation. The State Budget Act of 2008 introduced the obligation for all central state bodies to enact three-­ year strategic plans in 2008. The first generation of strategic plans was enacted in the 2010–2012 period. The main problem of strategic management is connecting the annual work plans of central state bodies with the strategic plan, the budget, and especially with the working tasks of single civil servants (Manojlović, 2017). Croatia adopted a Code of Practice on Consultation with the Interested Public in Procedures of Adopting Laws, Other Regulations and Acts in 2009, as part of reforms undertaken during the EU accession process. Because this Code was not legally binding, consultations with the public were not often performed. Therefore, in 2011, the Regulatory Impact Assessment Act introduced obligatory public consultations on new regulations. The Act on the Right of Access to Information in 2013 expanded obligatory public consultations to all public bodies when preparing regulations and decisions, strategic documents, and planning documents that relate to citizens’ interests. It also stressed the importance of publishing consultation documents and providing feedback on the outcomes of consultation processes. Civil servants and officials are not in favour of the implementation of the regulatory impact assessment procedure (RIA). They find the procedure complicated, over-regulated, and the whole process is not easy to implement in a system with so many ad hoc laws and regulations since the prerequisite for an RIA is planning (Giljević, 2017). Policy advice is concentrated in the ministries, with some formal and informal channels of expert and public participation. The primary formal formats include various working groups, usually made up of experts from universities, stakeholders including civil society organisations, and civil servants. Informal contacts and channels play a significant role, and often make up for gaps in the formal structure, such as tardiness, and accelerate the gathering of information. The influence of politicians is relatively high because they provide guidance and support to the expert level, while the political leadership determines the priorities of public policies. The influence of civil society on drafting legislation is relatively weak, except in some cases, such as war veterans’ associations and associations close to the Catholic Church. On the other hand, the influence of large companies and businesses through various business associations is relatively strong (Koprić, 2018).

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The adoption of legislation under the urgent procedure has also turned out to be an essential coordination problem. The Constitutional Court expressed concern in its Report on Law Enactment Procedures and on the Standing Orders of the Croatian Parliament because “in the recent parliamentary practice the procedure of enactment of laws under urgent procedure has become almost a rule and not an exception”. The efficiency and effectiveness of the administrative system and overall government performance. Public administration in Croatia is characterised by its high cost and relatively low effectiveness, mostly due to inefficient government bureaucracy and policy instability (Manojlović Toman & Lalić Novak, 2019). However, public sector performance has grown somewhat in the last few years, reaching 35.8 per cent, thus putting Croatia in 122nd place out of 141 countries. According to WEF, Croatia’s public administration performance score is the fourth lowest in the EU, better only than Malta, Greece and Lithuania. Croatia’s taxpayers are paying a high price for public services, almost as much as Scandinavians, but receive lower quality services. In support of this conclusion, research shows that less than 30 per cent of citizens perceive public services to be of good quality. The Government is spending a great amount of money inefficiently, and there is an opportunity for substantial savings and efficiency improvements without compromising the quality-of-service delivery. The high costs and reduced quality, effectiveness, and sustainability of service delivery are caused by the significant fragmentation of the public administration system, a fragmented planning framework with more than 130 strategies, and an overlap between central and local government responsibilities that hinders the implementation of public policies (WB, 2016: 22). Croatia also features one of the lowest absorption rates of European Structural and Investment Funds, which stood at only 17 per cent for all EU certified ESI Funds at the beginning of 2019.

11.4   Post-conflict Developments: Modernisation Followed by Shadows from the Past Some of the peculiarities in state administration, elaborated in the previous part of this chapter, are related to the war and post-war circumstances in Croatia. Here, we will reflect on some of the most important: the position of national minorities in state administration; politicisation in the civil service system; high fragmentation and centralisation in state

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administration; the perception of widespread corruption in the political and administrative system; an authoritarian administrative culture; and the lack of influence of civil society and citizens in the policymaking and legislative process. Regarding the civil service system, at the beginning of the 1990s, rigorous screening took place in the civil service based on political, national, and similar criteria, which changed the picture of the entire public sector (Koprić & Marčetić, 2000). This “secret clean-up operation” was implemented even though the legislation provided for the right to employment priority aimed at ensuring the proportional representation of national minorities in public administration bodies, according to their share in the total population. Over the years, the implementation of employment priority measures has been particularly limited concerning the provisions on minority representation in state administrative bodies and the police. Available studies show that in the period from 2006 to 2015, the number of persons employed in state administration bodies belonging to national minorities decreased in relation to the total number of employees, but also that the share of members of national minorities in the total number of employees was not nearly proportional to their share in the total population (3.4 per cent, while the share in the total population is approximately 8 per cent). This indicates problems in implementing the special measures for the employment of national minorities in Croatian public administration. However, some progress can be seen, as the right to employment has become a priority for the Croatian Government. In addition, a mechanism was introduced for monitoring the exercise of the right to the representation of national minorities in the civil service, and therefore institutionalisation occurred (Tomić, 2017). Besides, protests against the application of bilingualism, especially bilingual signs, in Vukovar, where the Cyrillic alphabet has co-official status due to the significant presence of a local minority population (according to the 2011 census, a 34 per cent Serb minority population). Bilingual signs were first mounted on state institution buildings in Vukovar in 2013, an act which sparked a series of protests during which some of the signs were smashed, sprayed over, or forcibly taken down. The Constitutional Court decision of 2019 regarding the use of the languages and scripts of ethnic minorities stipulated that national minorities had the right to bilingualism in parts of Croatia, although it is within the authority of the local government unit to decide on the gradual implementation of these rights.

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Politicisation had for decades been one of the main problems in the Croatian civil service, and depoliticisation in state administration was an important goal during accession to the EU. Strong centralistic governance, which was necessary during the war, continued in the post-war period, mainly due to the interests of politics, and included the widespread recruitment of civil servants based on their affiliation to the ruling party. Despite legal provisions which created preconditions for the depoliticisation and rationalisation of the number of politically appointed officials in the administration, no significant changes occurred in practice. Subsequent legislative changes made it possible for politically appointed officials to remain in key management positions as top civil servants under more favourable conditions than those applicable to other civil servants. The politicisation of the senior civil service is one of the sources of clientelism, political corruption, and lack of accountability towards citizens. According to a survey conducted by Giljević (2015), civil servants in two surveyed ministries consider that, in general, there is an insufficient number of qualified civil servants in state administration, which, given the scope of work of ministries, very much affects their quality and performance. In addition, according to the survey, there is a lack of interest among the best students in being employed in state administration. Turnover and retention are therefore continuous structural problems of state administration in Croatia. Citizen confidence in the Government’s ability to prevent corruption is low (SGI, 2019). This perception is underpinned by a number of mediumand high-level corruption cases which are being investigated, or where indictments have been issued, such as against a former Prime Minister, a former Deputy Prime Minister, and a former Minister of Defence. Partly inherited from the socialist period, but to a greater extent genuinely created during the1990s, an authoritarian administrative culture based on obedience, secrecy, reluctance to changes, and evasion of responsibilities has seriously undermined citizen confidence in public administration (Koprić, 2019a). The influence of civil society is still relatively weak due to the lack of tradition of cooperation between NGOs and the public sector, and because many NGOs were, during the war and in the post-war period, considered under foreign influence and working against national interests. For many years, NGOs and citizens were absent from policymaking and legislative processes. However, there are cases of the strong influence of certain types of organisations, such as war veterans’ associations which organised a

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year-­and-­a-half-long protest in Zagreb in 2014–2016, demanding the resignation of the then minister and several other high-ranked officials in the Ministry of Croatian War Veterans, as well as the fulfilment of several claims connected with their status and rights. The protest lasted until April 2016, after both the centre-left president and the coalition government lost power.

11.5   Conclusions Socialist legacies, the War of Independence (1991–1995), and the democratic and economic transition in the post-conflict period have had a significant influence on the overall development of Croatia as an independent state. The first years of the institution building period were hindered by war events, while a large part of Croatia’s territory was occupied. In such a situation, all the Government’s resources and administrative capacities were directed towards re-establishing security and providing public goods and services for citizens. Once the conflict was over, Croatia had to invest major efforts in its legal and institutional development, and had to establish and improve many policies, regulations, and institutions and bodies. However, the experiences and memories of the war events had important societal effects in the years after the war. Post-conflict institution building focused on reducing the political, economic, and social consequences of the war, while the development and further modernisation of public administration was neglected by political elites for many years. Even today, many of the contemporary challenges can be traced back to the war and post-war political developments (such as the protest of war veterans, or opposition to the application of bilingualism in the parts of Croatia where the Cyrillic alphabet has co-official status due to the significant local minority population), which can undermine (still) fragile Croatian institutions. An important accelerator of reforms was accession to the EU, since Croatia, in order to become a full member, had to harmonise its public administration with basic European standards and values, based on good governance standards. The Europeanisation process was used as a justification for many unpopular structural reforms—some to satisfy formal EU requirements, and others to strengthen institutional capacities and overcome the visible and hidden burdens of conflict. In general, the EU induced significant administrative reforms in all parts of Croatian public administration and the public sector. Some of the most important results

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of Europeanisation include: the establishment of a regional development system; changes in the system of civil service system; the reform of the administrative justice system and administrative procedure; the adoption of a new concept of services of general interest; the introduction of organisational changes in the central state administrative system; the full ratification of the European Charter of Local Self-Government; the introduction of innovations in public policymaking (Koprić et al., 2014). At the level of central state administration, as analysed in the previous parts of this chapter, changes have affected the organisational, personal, functional, decision-making, and coordinative aspects of administration, including the civil service system; transparency and accountability; respect for the rule of law, policymaking, coordination and regulation; efficiency and effectiveness; and government performance. However, despite all the efforts, central state administration is still facing many challenges and problems, such as a fragmented public administration, politicisation and patronage in the civil service, and the lack of influence of civil society and citizens in policymaking. In comparison to other EU Member States, Croatia has made only moderate progress regarding the professionalism and impartiality of the civil service. In addition, the lack of strong political will to reform state administration is evident. The reform processes seem to have slowed down even more since Croatia’s accession to the EU. The most pressing concern regarding public administration in Croatia is the high dissatisfaction of citizens with the quality of administration and governance. Comparative data show that Croatia is at the bottom of the list of EU countries relating to citizens’ trust in state institutions. Citizens’ trust in state institutions slightly increased from 2007 to 2016, but is still rather low (less than 4 on a scale from 1 to 10). Citizens’ trust in political institutions is even lower, not even reaching 3.5 points on the trust scale. The enforcement of regulations is politicised and subject to corruption, creating conditions of clientelism and regulatory capture. The 2017 Eurobarometer survey shows that trust in public administration at the EU28 level is increasing, with almost half of Europeans (49 per cent) trusting public administration. In Croatia, however, trust in public administration is still in decline, with only 23 per cent of Croatians trusting it.

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References Bičanić, I., & Franičević, V. (2003). Understanding Reform: The Case of Croatia. Balkan Observatory. European Commission. (2019). Country Report Croatia 2019 Including an In-Depth Review on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances. https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/ file_import/2019-european-semester-country-report-croatia_en.pdf. Giljević, T. (2015). Upravni kapacitet hrvatskih ministarstava: Izmedu̵ profesionalizacije i politizacije. Zagrebac ̌ka Pravna Revija, 4(2), 207–229. Giljević, T. (2017). Impact of the Organizational Environment on Administrative Coordination: The Case of Two Croatian Ministries. In I. Koprić & P. Kovač (Eds.), European Administrative Space: Spreading Standards, Building Capacities (pp. 249–265). NISPAcee. Giljević, T., & Lopižić, I. (2019). Zapošljavanje u hrvatskoj javnoj službi: što (ni) smo naučili iz europskih iskustava. In G. Marčetić, T. V. Tomić, & I. Lopižić (Eds.), Normalizacija statusa javnih službenika: Rješenje ili zamka (pp. 37–68). Institut za javnu samoupravu. Koprić, I. (2016). Reforma javne uprave u Hrvatskoj: Ni bolni rezovi ni postupne promjene – nužna je nova upravna paradigma. Politic ̌ke Analize, 7(26), 3–12. Koprić, I. (2018). Public Administration Characteristics and Performance in EU28: Croatia. Publications Office of the European Union. Koprić, I. (2019a). Novi zakoni o državnim službenicima i o sustavu državne uprave. Hrvatska I Komparativna Javna Uprava, 19(2), 7–14. Koprić, I. (2019b). Public Administration Reform in Croatia: Slow Modernization During Europeanization of Resilient Bureaucracy. Public Administration Issues, 1(5), 7–26. Koprić, I., & Marčetić, G. (2000). Kriza socijalne države, reforme javne uprave i hrvatsko upravno osoblje. Hrvatska i Komparativna Javna Uprava, 2(1), 25–82. Koprić, I., Marčetić, G., Musa, A., Đulabić, V., & Lalić Novak, G. (2014). Upravna znanost: Javna uprava u suvremenom europskom kontekstu. Pravni fakultet. Lalić Novak, G., & Džinić, J. (2016). Upravno obrazovanje u Hrvatskoj: Stanje i perspektive. In A. Musa (Ed.), Profesionalna javna uprava: Stanje i perspektive obrazovanja za javnu upravu (pp. 25–44). Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Lopižić, I. (2018). Dekoncentrirane državne službe i lokalna samouprava: Faktor kapaciteta. In A. Musa (Ed.), 14. Forum za javnu upravu (pp. 25–44). Friedrich Ebert Stiftung i Institut za javnu upravu. Manojlović, R. (2017). Strategic Management and Performance Measurement – A Connected or Disconnected Duo? Evidence from Croatian Public Administration. International Public Administration Review, 15(1), 11–31.

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Manojlović Toman, R., & Lalić Novak, G. (2019). The (Lack Of) Demand for Performance Information by the Croatian Parliament. Transylvanian Review of Administrative Sciences, 58 E, 100–115. Marčetić, G. (2005). Javni službenici i tranzicija. Društveno veleučilište u Zagrebu. Musa, A. (2019). Croatia: The Transparency Landscape. In D.  C. Dragos, P.  Kovač, & A.  T. Marseille (Eds.), The Laws of Transparency in Action: A European Perspective (pp. 339–387). Palgrave Macmillan. Ott, K. (Ed.). (2004). Croatian Accession to the European Union: Institutional Challenges. Institute of Public Finance. Petak, Z. (2018). Policy-Making Context and Challenges of Governance in Croatia. In Z.  Petak & K.  Kristijan (Eds.), Policy-Making at the European Periphery. The Case of Croatia (pp. 29–45). New Perspectives on South-East Europe Series. Palgrave Macmillan. SGI. (2019). Croatia Report. Sustainable Governance Indicators. https://www. sgi-network.org/docs/2019/country/SGI2019_Croatia.pdf. Tomić, T. V. (2017). Suvremeni pristupi i modeli zapošljavanja društvenih manjina u javnoj upravi. Hrvatska I Komparativna Javna Uprava, 17(3), 365–388. WB. (2016). Croatia Policy Notes 2016. https://documents.worldbank.org/ curated/en/876601468000628285/pdf/103938-WP-P156959-PUBLICCroatia-Policy-Notes-2016-EN.pdf.

CHAPTER 12

Public Administration in Countries in Conflict: The Case of Georgia Eka Akobia

12.1   Introduction The violence that Georgia has witnessed since its independence from the USSR has taken many forms and has, to a great extent, been Soviet in origin. The conception of a Georgian national community as a single State was fractured during the Soviet period by “ethnofederalism”, according to which the USSR was divided, mostly along ethnical lines, into a hierarchical system of union republics, autonomous republics, autonomous okrugs and autonomous oblasts. The Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) included two autonomous republics—Abkhazia and Adjara—and one autonomous oblast, South Ossetia. This territorial arrangement was reinforced by Soviet policies aimed at promoting ethnic over civic forms of consciousness. Following the disintegration of the USSR, the lack of civic identities, the State’s inability to provide public goods for all and heavy-­ handed Russian meddling caused ethnic aspirations to burst into separatist

E. Akobia (*) Caucasus School of Governance, Caucasus University, Tbilisi, Georgia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 J. Nemec, P. S. Reddy (eds.), Public Administration in Conflict Affected Countries, Governance and Public Management, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74966-8_12

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conflicts instead of pursuing nation and State-building processes (i.e. establishing a European-style State with wide regional autonomy to accommodate diversity). These conflicts, in turn, caused violent clashes between the central governments and the constituent regions of many newly independent post-Soviet republics, and in Georgia this led to devastating violence in the Abkhazia and Tskhinvali regions. In order to encompass the multi-faceted effect of the complexity of conflict on Georgia’s public administration (PA) performance, we will rely on a proposition put forward by Wheatley, who argues that “[the] three interrelated processes that have set the parameters for transformation in most former Soviet republics… are: State building, nation building and democratization” (2009: 119). This chapter advances the hypothesis that democratization and violence are the main intervening variables (Int.V.) that affect the independent variables (I.V.) of State-building and nation-­ building and the dependent variable (D.V.) of overall PA performance in Georgia. Moreover, the chapter will argue that certain external conditions—European and Euro-Atlantic partnerships and the integration process, on the one hand, and Russian pressure and aggression on the other—stand out as two extraneous variables (E.V.), with the former promoting democratization and strengthening the State’s ability to accommodate its citizens, and the latter fuelling instability and violence, slowing down State- and nation-building and eventually degrading the country’s PA performance. The inter-relationship between these variables is shown in Fig. 12.1.

Fig. 12.1 Variables affecting Georgia’s PA performance (author’s own construction)

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12.2   The Perils of Building a State in the 1990s: The Mirror Trends of Violence and Democratization After 70 years of Soviet governance, Georgia was one of the frontrunners to declare its independence on 9 April 1991, as decided by a people’s referendum held on 31 March 1991. This was followed by the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December of the same year, with Russian Federation becoming its heir and gradually embracing most of its predecessor’s dominating tendencies towards its neighbouring republics. After the independence, the lack of civic identity and the foreign manipulation of ethnic sentiments led to the emergence of a full-blown separatist movement and the subsequent outbreak of armed clashes in Tskhinvali region\South Ossetia in 1991–1992, leading to displacement of people and a deterioration of the security environment. This conflict ended with the Sochi Agreement and the deployment of Joint Peacekeeping Forces (JPKF) on the ground, with Russia playing a central role as mediator and a military power. This mission failed, however, to bring about a settlement between the parties or to ensure that no further violence broke out. The inability to provide adequate security for civilians, or to mediate on the ground, led to frequent episodes of violence, spiking in 2004, that resulted in further deaths. Another fratricidal war erupted in Abkhazia in 1992–1993. This resulted in the ethnic cleansing and exodus of nearly 80% of the local population (predominantly Georgians) from their homes, as well as the region’s de facto separation from the rest of Georgia (OSCE, 1994). The war ended with a 1994 cease-fire agreement and a UN-mediated peace process which relied on the presence of CIS peacekeepers on the ground, mostly Russian. This force, throughout its deployment, failed to fulfil any of the tasks in its mandate (e.g. facilitating the return of IDPs and refugees, disarmament, peaceful dialogue). On the contrary, in May 1998, a six-day guerrilla war led to the displacement, right under the noses of the CIS peacekeepers, of a further 30–40 thousand Georgians from the Gali region. The conflict then continued in a frozen state until 2008, when the status quo—far from being resolved—worsened abruptly, as explained below. From 1994 to the early 2000s, the conflict continued to smoulder, unresolved but not actively violent. From 2004 to 2008, however, as Tbilisi embarked upon a path of fundamental reform and European and

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Euro-Atlantic integration, relations with Russia deteriorated. In 2008, in response to local skirmishes between Georgians and South Ossetians, Russia—the officially mandated peacekeeper and mediator—began to move armed forces into Georgia through North Ossetia. This full-scale invasion (by land, air and sea) expanded, disproportionally and unjustifiably, to the rest of Georgia, and occupied territory hundreds of kilometres away from the place of incident (Asmus, 2010; Cornell & Starr, 2009). Despite the EU-brokered six-point cease-fire agreement (2008), Russia never fully withdrew to its status quo ante positions, and indeed further cemented its military presence in the Abkhazia and Tskhinvali regions with another illegal act: the unilateral recognition of their independence (RFE/RL, 2008). This act remains illegal under international law, and the international community overwhelmingly recognizes Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The only other countries that recognize these break-away regions, under Russian pressure, are Venezuela, Nicaragua, Syria and Nauru—but their reasons for doing so have more to do with their own problems with the rules-based international order than the actual conflict in Georgia. In response, in October 2008, Georgia adopted a Law on Occupied Territories to regulate the legal aspects of policies and conduct vis-à-vis these regions and began to pursue a two-­ prong policy of preventing international recognition of the regions (“non-­ recognition”) while encouraging people to people relationships across the conflicts’ dividing lines. This policy, however, remains crippled due to heavy Russian policy of precluding meaningful contacts. Currently, there is no active discussion on possible administrative-­ territorial arrangement that would accommodate involved actors (central and de facto governments). The only effective measure in place remains the cease-fire, as there has been no active conflict since 2008. A meaningful conflict resolution prospect has not been in sight for a long 29 years. Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia (representing roughly 20% of Georgia’s total territory) remain outside Georgia’s central governance system, while 259,247 registered internally displaced persons (IDPs) and thousands more refugees and IDPs  abroad continue to await the time when they will be able to exercise their universal right to return home (Mra.gov.ge 2019). But although the cease-fire is in place, Georgia nonetheless suffers from constant infringements of her security due to, and under the guise of, illegal agreements that Russia concluded with Sokhumi and Tskhinvali in 2014. Although illegal under international law, these agreements are named as the basis for occupying ever more Georgian

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territory through the illegal demarcation of the break-away regions, so-­ called international borders, and criss-crossing local residents’ households with barbed wire fences and trenches (called the “borderization”) while continuing these regions’ extreme militarization. The humanitarian situation deteriorates daily due to “borderization” as well as ongoing ethnic targeting of the remaining Georgians in both regions (Zurabashvili, 2016). Contributing factors to this conflict in Georgia were also rooted in the structural violence (Galtung, 1969) that ensued after the disintegration of the USSR, resulting in inability of the central government to ensure the provision of adequate public goods and services to all of its citizens, including minorities, throughout the 1990s. This caused high levels of crime, corruption, unemployment and poverty, poor living conditions and extreme levels of mistrust in public institutions, as well as weak State control over its territory and institutions. After the dissolution of the USSR, government became the biggest employers, but wages were low, were paid late and were undermined by high inflation. Compared to previous years, Georgia’s GDP had fallen by 7% in 1989, 15% in 1990, 21% in 1992 and 45% in 1993, while annual consumer price inflation had reached 163% by 1995 (World Bank, 2018). Overwhelming poverty fuelled the nefarious practice of favours and bribes. Most notoriously, public servants from the interior and other government ministries were taking bribes from citizens, directing revenue away from the State budget. Despite the fact that there were 21 different taxes in place, revenue collection was meagre. All of this contributed to low morale and a sense of impunity among public servants and prevented the State from adequately providing public goods (Bennet, 2011). Overall, the dire quality of life further fuelled conflict, and, vice versa, the conflict made it difficult for newly independent Georgia to build an effective State apparatus and democratize. Cross-­referencing available data shows the negative inter-relationship between violence and democratization, and reveals the fact that when democracy indicators are low, conflict-related violence is prevalent and vice versa. The tide began to turn following the peaceful Rose Revolution in 2003, when the country began an ambitious programme of State reforms, completely revamping its public administration system and becoming one of the world’s top reformers, lauded for its success in reducing corruption, collecting taxes, increasing government effectiveness, strengthening institutions and promoting civic cohesion (Gilauri, 2017; Gvindadze, 2017). On the other hand, coupled with Russia’s continuous use of hybrid methods to destabilize the country (Nilsson, 2018) coupled with some of

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the more lingering Soviet legacies—such as a growing tendency towards monopolization of State power, a lack of effective checks and balances and the persistent challenges of ensuring both territorial integrity and civic unity—have led to a number of perilous internal political situations (e.g. the events of November 2007 or those of 26 May 2011), during which Georgia saw its Rose Revolution momentum dashed somewhat. The mental revolution that took place from 2003 onwards, however, was more pervasive and strongly rooted in Georgia’s European and Euro-Atlantic aspirations, a goal held in high esteem by Georgia’s ruling elite at that time (Gvalia et al., 2013). In 2012, therefore, despite Russia’s hybrid attempts to sink country in another civil unrest failed, and rather than a new phase of chaos, political processes have led to the first ever peaceful change of power through election from one ruling party—the governing United National Movement (UNM) to another—the “Georgian Dream” coalition. This was a power transition which, with the exception of the Baltic States, was unprecedented in the entire former Soviet Union, giving a new momentum to the country’s prospects for further democratization. Following this new sign of Georgia’s increasing democratic maturity, there was a perceived surge in positive developments, such as improved media environment, expectations related to the promises to effectively reforming the justice system and the judiciary, to reinforce public administration and to continue to follow the path of European and Euro-Atlantic integration. But although the change of power that took place in 2012 was, in many ways, a new pivotal moment for the Georgian State, a new threat emerged: one which could be collectively labelled as the malice of informal rule endorsed by a wealthy Georgian oligarch, Bidzina Ivanishvili, as he took up a prominent role in Georgian politics. Thus, from 2014 onwards, Georgia’s democratization began to stall or even falter in certain areas revealing lingering tendencies for centralized rule and bringing the question of appropriate checks and balances to the forefront of discussions on Georgia’s democratization agenda.

12.3   Georgia’s System of Public Administration: Democratization and the Shadow of the Past Reviewing country’s system of checks and balances in the light of ongoing evolution of important State institutions has direct meaning for understanding the current state of democracy as well as the public administration in Georgia.

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From 1995 onwards, Georgia was a presidential republic whose president wielded most executive powers. This changed somewhat in 2011, when a series of constitutional amendments shifted the centre of power towards the prime minister and parliament while leaving the president some important responsibilities in the fields of foreign policy and security. The latest constitutional amendments, adopted in 2017, further strengthened the focus on parliament and enabled Georgia to complete its transition towards becoming a fully parliamentary republic. Hence, today Georgian parliament exercises supreme legislative power (Constitution of Georgia, 1995, Article 36); whose government, led by the prime minister, wields executive power (Article 54); and whose president serves as the Head of State. As such, in 2018, the President of Georgia was, for the last time, directly elected for a six-year term. Constitutional amendments have largely made presidential powers purely symbolic: President exercises representative roles in foreign policy with the consent of the government, serves as the head of the Armed Forces and has the ability to grant citizenship or amnesty. The next presidential elections in 2024 will be indirect, entrusted to a 300-member electoral college made up of all the country’s members of parliament, the supreme representative bodies of the Autonomous Republics of Abkhazia and Adjara, and other members nominated by the political parties of local self-governing authorities on the basis of quotas defined by the Central Electoral Commission (Article 50). The parliament of Georgia currently consists of 150 members, of whom 77 are elected according to a proportional electoral system and 73 according to a majoritarian one. This mixed system of elections has always been strongly criticized by both Georgia’s opposition parties and civil society, and the Georgian Dream (GD) coalition that came to power in November 2012 had included a shift towards a fully proportional electoral system among its pre-electoral promises. However, it took the GD until 2017 to finally insert a relevant clause in the new Constitution—and even then, this amendment only called for proportional elections in 2024, retaining the mixed system for the October 2020 parliamentary elections. The question of electoral rule is particularly relevant to the system of checks and balances for a country with unresolved problem of territorial integrity. Due to the conflict, Georgia’s parliament is unicameral sine die pending the restoration of its jurisdiction over the entire country (Article 37), after which it will become bicameral, consisting of a Council of the Republic and a Senate (Article 37, para. 1). This temporary arrangement,

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caused by the fact that two regions are outside the Constitutional order, hampers the establishment of a balanced system of checks and balances for governance in Georgia, resulting in a lopsided arrangement with no real counter-balance to the dominance of the central government. The current impossibility of a bicameral parliament is detrimental to the overall political system, particularly as no body (in this case, a Senate) represents all the regions. Moreover, in the mixed electoral system, 73 MPs are chosen from single-mandate districts, and these majoritarian MPs have traditionally been used by the incumbent political party to gain an undue advantage during each election. In 2012, for instance, when the United National Movement lost power after receiving only 41% of the popular vote to the Georgian Dream’s 55%, the GD—on top of this victory—also received a de facto constitutional majority as UNM single-­ mandate winners switched sides and joined the winning party. Likewise, in 2016, the GD received only 48% of the vote, but this translated into over 75% of the seats in parliament. Such results are due to the fact that majoritarian seats usually go to the party which gains the most votes in the proportional part of the elections. Furthermore, the indirect election of the president aimed to transform the latter office into a neutral arbiter, in order to avoid the Georgian system developing the practice of exclusively electing the president by a parliamentary majority. This prospect could, however, be realized in full if MPs were elected by a proportional system, as this would ensure pluralism in the electoral college. But against the opinions of civil society, the opposition and international observers (e.g. the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission and the OSCE), the ruling Georgian Dream party, while enjoying a super-majority in parliament, fought to make sure that the electoral system would not become proportional until 2024. This insistence on maintaining a mixed electoral system for the key 2020 legislative elections caused a political turmoil in the country while further revealing GD’s intentions for power centralization, putting it even further away from the goals of promised progressive democratic changes. After much uproar the government and the opposition have agreed on March 8, with the help of international mediation, that the 2020 elections would take place with a modified election system: 120 members will be elected through proportional and 30 members through the majoritarian system; a 1% electoral threshold and a capping mechanism will be introduced, meaning that no single party can form a majority if it receives less than 40% of the votes. With this transitional arrangement and then the

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2024 fully proportional elections, the system of checks and balances should become more sensible, granted other factors follow the standards of democratic governance. Another peculiar side-effect of Georgia’s unresolved conflict is the inability to carry out any referenda. According to the Constitution, the president can call for a referendum (with the co-signature of the prime minister) at the request of parliament or the government or on behalf of at least 200,000 voters. The result of a referendum is binding, and can only be disputed before the Constitutional Court. However, according to the Constitution, a referendum needs to be carried out across all of Georgia. This condition has been widely interpreted as being mandatory for a referendum to be held, and the consensus is therefore that, until Georgia’s full territorial integrity is restored, referenda cannot be carried out. This denies the political process the use of this particular instrument, which is often needed to settle outstanding disputes between the government and the opposition. Several such issues have emerged in recent years, including the questions of whether the president should continue to be directly elected after 2024, and whether the electoral system should become fully proportional. In both cases, the ruling party made its own decisions, and its opponents were unable to call for a referendum on the matter. Plebiscites could be used as a substitute, but because holding them is the government’s prerogative and because their results are not binding, they have failed to effectively substitute the role of referenda in Georgia. In this situation, the only theoretical counter-balance to a strong government is the president, but since presidential powers have already been significantly limited, and since from 2024 the president will be elected by an electoral college, in reality no effective counter-balance is possible. The absence of a bicameral parliament and the inability to hold referenda are, therefore, two important obstacles to Georgia’s further democratization and efforts to establish an effective system of public administration. The Judiciary is one of the most important branches of governance in democracies. In Georgia, this branch is independent and is exercised by the Constitutional Court and the common courts. The Supreme Court of Georgia is the country’s Court of Cassation, whereas the High Council of Justice is charged with ensuring the independence and efficiency of the common courts and with the appointment and dismissal of judges. The foremost step towards judicial reform was taken with the introduction in 1997 of an “Organic Law of Georgia on Common Courts”. Important reforms began to be made in 2005, and until the change of

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government in 2012 there were two waves of judicial reforms. A third and a fourth wave of judicial reforms were subsequently carried out by the GD government. Reforming the judiciary and transforming it from a post-Soviet system into a transparent, strong, independent and effective branch of government has been one of the main goals of changes to Georgia’s public administration since independence—but, at the same time, the scope and intensity of these reforms have at times become more or less entangled with the objectives of each ruling party to maintain its influence and grip on power across all branches of government. The latest attempts (since 2012) to modernize the system have been no exception, and have been somewhat compromised by the desire of the ruling GD party and Georgia’s informal ruler, the oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili, to retain power. The main challenge to properly reforming Georgia’s judiciary has always been the fact that Georgia, given its Soviet past, has historically never enjoyed an independent judiciary and suffers from shortcoming in political will to reform the system in good faith. The prime minister is accountable to parliament and is charged with reporting annually on the implementation of government programmes (as well as particular projects if requested). The prime minister defines and organizes government activities, co-ordinates and controls the activities of ministers and signs the government’s legal acts; he or she also represents Georgia in foreign relations and concludes international treaties on the country’s behalf (Article 54). Legal acts of the president, besides certain exclusions, require the prime minister’s countersignature, whereas political responsibility for countersigned legal acts lies with the government (Article 53). Currently, the government consists of ten ministries and one State Ministry, which together ensure the administration of State policy and governance. The local governance—which is taken to regulate and embody issues of local importance through representative and executive bodies of local self-­ government—is another area which has significance for the system of checks and balances. The basis for local self-governance in Georgia is the Constitution and the Organic Law on Local Self-Government (2014), which supposedly is in line with the European Charter of Local Self-­ Government that Georgia joined in 2004. According to the Constitution, self-government is exercised in self-governing cities and self-governing communities. The representative body is the municipality (sakrebulo), elected for a four-year term. Executive power in a municipality is held by

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the Mayor, who is accountable to it and the population and is elected for a four-year term. According to the new Code, all of the local executive offices have become elective. There are currently 69 self-governing units (64 municipalities and 5 self-governing cities). The 2014 law created seven more self-governing cities, but this was reversed in 2017, prompting civil society criticism of the process of decentralization in Georgia. The law also stipulates measures for Georgia’s occupied regions, exercising local self-government in the occupied territories of Georgia. Based upon this law, the municipalities of Akhalgori, Eredvi, Kurta, Tighva and Azhara elected in 2006 continue to exercise powers sine die pending the date when local authorities are re-established in accordance with Georgian legislation. The greatest challenge that remains is ensuring the financial independence of local self-governing units, equalizing incomes and expenses for different public services at the local level; a further challenge is related to attaining higher standards of transparency and accountability. In 2018, the Georgian government adopted a mid-term decentralization strategy for that very purpose. This strategy envisions revising legislation, improving the participation of citizens and increasing the openness of governance. Its results are expected to be visible in future. However, the 2019 national assessment of local self-government shows that the average result of relevant municipalities is 28%—which is seven points higher than in 2017, but remains very low, especially if checked against the country’s constitutional and internationally declared obligations concerning local governance and decentralization (IDFI, 2019).

12.4   Georgia’s Public Administration Performance: The Challenges of Democratization Georgia’s total workforce is estimated at c.1.9 million, of whom c.1.7 million are considered employed, and the official rate of unemployment is 11.6%. Public sector employment, as a percentage of total employment, was 17.65% in 2018, compared to, for example, 20.36% in 2007 (Geostat, 2019). Compared to Scandinavia, for example, this is still comparatively low, as public sector employment there stands at 28–35%, but is high compared to Japan or South Korea (7.9% and 7.6%, respectively); the OECD average is 21.3% (OECD, 2015). However, there is no clear indication of what this figure can tell us about the health of the public sector. A more

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important indicator would be the activities undertaken and the effectiveness of public service delivery. Georgia’s model of public administration and the main principles of its civil service evolved in three main stages: in the 1990s, during the period that followed the Rose Revolution (2003–2012), and since the country’s first peaceful political transition (November 2012 onwards). The former law on civil service (1997) did not really define a model of public administration (PA). Overall, the PA system was corrupt, ineffective and enjoyed the lowest level of trust among the country’s public institutions (or indeed none at all). After the 2003 Rose Revolution, significant changes were made and enforced, and PA gradually moved towards greater transparency, effectiveness of service delivery and good governance. The government’s operational model at the time resembled the so-called New Public Management (NPM) model, and most of the reforms it undertook were liberal. As Georgia’s evolution in the Worldwide Governance Index rankings shows, the years 2003–2012 were an era of fast and effective change, which made Georgia one of the world’s top reformers and increased the State’s capacity to provide public services. For example, according to the World Bank and the International Finance Corporation, “Georgia was the top reformer in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and led the global top 10 reformer rankings on the ease of doing business in 2005–2006.” Georgia has continued to progress in this regard ever since and currently ranks seven in the world with a score of 83.7 points—ahead of Great Britain, Norway, Sweden, Germany, Lithuania and others (World Bank Group, 2020). The country has also earned international recognition for its improved public services in specific areas, receiving various UN prizes, for example, “Preventing and combating corruption in the public service” (in 2012 and 2013) and for “Improving the delivery of services” in 2012, 2013 and 2015. In 2013, in an abrupt break from the previous largely NPM approach, Georgia’s new GD government shifted towards a mostly Weberian concept of civil service reform, whose first major step was drafting (2015) and adopting (2017) a new law on civil service. The latter’s declared aim is to “establish a legal basis for the formation and functioning of a stable, unified public service in Georgia based on career promotion, merit, integrity, political neutrality, impartiality and accountability”. The new law has established a strongly centralized civil service that demands uniform professional development and career growth based upon performance evaluation. Significantly, it also promoted

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revolutionary changes different from the pre-2013 competitive system: (1) all civil servants now require certification prior to recruitment (Article 29); (2) civil service becomes a life-long employment (Article 33); and (3) open competition for civil service jobs remains only for the fourth (lowest) rank, while the upper ranks can only be filled via internal promotion, the pool of candidates being restricted to (a) current public servants, (b) contracted employees and (c) the public servants reserve (Article 34). In light of these legal requirements, it has become crucial to determine whether or not Georgia’s system of governance ensures adequate training and professional development. Responsibility for this is largely entrusted to the Civil Service Bureau, as by Law it becomes the only avenue to provide the Georgian civil service with a suitable and suitably qualified workforce (which, as mentioned above, accounts for 17.65% of country’s total employment). Historically, three models have been employed: decentralized (pre-2013), semi-centralized and centralized (as introduced by the new law). Dolidze (2016) has concluded, based upon a multi-method study, that of these three models the semi-centralized scheme is the most justified in the existing context, giving enough flexibility to the government to control the professional qualifications and career growth of its employees and, at the same time, to allow the development of a free market, creating a competitive environment among providers and their ability to enhance the cooperation network. This re-alignment, from a competitive approach, towards a more career-­ based professional system is an ongoing process whose outcome will continue to be studied, contributing to scholarly debates on the NPM, classical Weberian or Neo-Weberian State approaches to organization in Central and Eastern Europe. Randma-Liiv (2008) has argued in favour of the Neo-Weberian State approach (as opposed to the classical Weberian one) for CEE countries for two reasons: the impossibility of remaining isolated, as “modernizing public management in highly developed countries will keep influencing developments in the CEE region”; and “the issue of path dependency in CEE countries: as many fundamental State-building efforts have already been based on NPM-like approaches, the NWS is more realistic to be developed”. Furthermore, and contrary to the prevalent voice in the PA literature, Dan and Pollitt (2014) have argued, via carefully reviewed empirical studies across a ten-year period, that “there is enough evidence to show that some of the central ideas in NPM have led to improvements in public service organization or provision across different organizational settings”. However, short of vindicating the NPM

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approach, the authors concluded that “claims that either see NPM as a generic solution to most public sector ills or those that dismiss NPM altogether are not consonant with the available evidence”. In Georgia’s case, “drawing back to the pure Weberian system might be regarded as a neglection of the success, which though in a scattered form, but still can be traced in the period of 2004–2009” (Dolidze, 2015: 15). In Georgia, the battle of the “two models” was mostly political in nature, as the new ruling majority chose to opt for a complete reversal from previous approaches, turning its back on the NPM model. Despite laudable declared aims, this process has been fraught with violations, including politically motivated dismissals, cases of nepotism and cronyism, slow rates of progress towards streamlining public service mechanisms (e.g. certification, training and evaluation) and a growing trend of abuse of power and corruption. It also remains unclear, how this new law and the system it has established will correspond to the country’s socio-­ economic needs, particularly given the fact that it prohibits open competition except for the lowest rank, and only allows promotion from within the civil service. This could seem utterly out of line given the Georgian civil service’s ongoing need to attract a qualified workforce—especially problematic given faulty evaluation and training and the doubtful overall quality of existing civil servants after waves of politically motivated dismissals and appointments. While the academic jury is still out, Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) evidence is indicative. The Government Effectiveness Index (ranges from −2.5 to 2.5) reflects perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of a government’s commitment to such policies. Georgia’s score grew from −0.637 in 1996 to 0.606 in 2012, since when it has been through various waves, reaching 0.615 by 2018. The growth was steep from 2004 to 2012 but that progress has since stalled. Since Georgia’s most successful phase of State-building was rooted in the NPM approach— that is championing competitive market efficiency and not overly relying on the State monopoly in providing social services (Batley & Larbi, 2004)—it is clear that the country would benefit from continuity in terms of PA management. On the other hand, granted certain shortcomings to the NPM approach, it would indeed appear necessary to search for alternative administrative models—but this should be done without simply reversing the past model, instead moving on to forward-looking new

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models, such as digital-era governance (Dunleavy et al., 2006), and not reverting to a highly centralized and competition-free system in an environment in which nepotism and cronyism appear to be increasing. The same trend is visible across all six broad dimensions of the WGI. As Table 12.1 shows, there is an upward growth (percentile rank from 0 to 100) in Georgia’s world ranking across all indicators, but growth during the period 2004–2012 was much stronger than during 2013–2018. This points to two important conclusions: Firstly, the Georgian government must adopt a better model for PA if it is to sustain the continuity of growth and translate ongoing progress into effective State-building and democratization that will be reflected at the level of every individual citizen. Secondly, Georgia’s “political stability and absence of ­violence/terrorism” scores rank the lowest out of the six dimensions in each benchmarked year (from a nadir of 7.45 in 1996 to barely 30 in 2018). While the country’s low score in the 1990s was due to direct violence, its low political stability, since 2004, is no doubt attributable to both a lack of democratic culture as well as to the effects of external hybrid threats coming from Russia. Manipulating the internal weaknesses and exerting pressure in order to prop-up those political parties or movements that are more susceptible to the Russians, such as the policy of keeping Georgia away from European and Euro-Atlantic structures, is a source of ongoing tensions for Georgia’s foreign policy, marked as it is by the discrepancy between actively pro-EU and pro-NATO policies of integration (championed by the opposition and civil society) and the more inconclusive Table 12.1  Worldwide governance indicators—Georgia Georgia

1996 1998 2003 2004 2007 2008 2012 2013 2014 2015 2018

Voice and accountability Political stability Government effectiveness Regulatory quality Rule of law Control of corruption

38.5 39.3 42.3 46.6 38.5 39.4 50.2 55.4 57.6 56.6 56.2 7.4 7.9 12.6 19.4 24.6 16.8 24.2 31.3 34.8 29.5 30.0 30.6 29.5 42.3 36.4 56.8 65.5 70.1 69.7 71.6 67.3 74.0 15.8 29.5 26.5 36.4 60.7 64.6 74.4 74.4 79.3 78.8 83.2 11.1 10.0 18.8 32.1 45.4 47.6 54.9 54.0 64.9 64.4 63.9 1.1 18.0 28.3 37.1 54.4 54.4 68.7 69.7 76.4 74.5 76.4

Source: Author, based on World Bank data

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policies pursued by the ruling Georgian Dream. This instability is further aggravated by disinformation which seeks to propagate myths and falsehoods about the EU and NATO, playing on xenophobia, homophobia, the fear of a loss of cultural and religious identity and so on. According to a local study, evidence from the past few years (2015–2018) suggests that this process is centrally run and that “the Kremlin’s information influence activities to shape public opinion against the West employ both negative i.e. destructive strategies as well as oblique-destructive strategies”, and that “in parallel to demonizing the West, a positive i.e. constructive strategy portrays Russia as the alternative to the West” (Kintsurashvili, 2019). Significantly, Georgia’s leading performance across all of the WGI indicators holds true for a wider regional setting as well. If we compare the 2018 WGI indicators of the six Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries— Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine—we can observe that Georgia is a front-runner in all indicators except for “Political stability and absence of violence”, where Georgia ranks at its lowest −0.43. Belarus is the only country in the EaP region with a positive score of 0.35 for this indicator, but lags behind in the other categories. This paradox can be explained by two external factors: of the six EaP countries, Belarus is the only one that has no meaningful format for integration with the EU or NATO, hence no triggers for Russia to meddle heavily in internal political processes, unlike it has done so in other EaP countries. In conclusion, while Georgia’s growing democratization is strongly correlated with the low number of conflict-related deaths in the country, the twin challenge of an external threat and a weak and still young internal culture of democracy represents a major test to Georgia’s nation- and State-building processes in the present and immediate future.

12.5   External Drivers for Public Administration Performance: Europeanization In contrast to the destabilizing external factor of Russian interference, civil service performance, driven by democratization, is reinforced by Georgia’s European and Euro-Atlantic integration formats. In this respect, 2014 was a milestone for Georgia with the signing of an Association Agreement with the EU that included a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement. (The Agreement came into force on 1 July 2016, but some chapters were provisionally implemented from 2014.) Within this

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framework, the government decided to make public administration reform (PAR) the backbone of its strategy of reforms and enlisted the support of the EU and the EU-OECD “Support for Improvement in Governance and Management” (SIGMA) initiative. A PAR roadmap for 2016–2020 was developed in 2015 to provide a comprehensive conceptual framework for ongoing and future reforms, including in the light of Georgia’s EU commitments. This document identified six broad areas for reform: • Policy Planning and Co-ordination, which aims to improve the quality of policy-making; • Human Resources Management, to professionalize the civil service; • Accountability, to promote greater accountability and transparency; • Public Finance Management, for the more effective distribution of State finances and mobilization of income in order to ensure greater financial stability; • Service Delivery, to increase the accessibility of public services; and • Local Self-Government, for greater decentralization and regional development. SIGMA’s first baseline measurement for Georgia, however, covers only the field of “Policy Development and Co-ordination”. Having identified 12 principles for a theoretical maximum score of 297, it awarded Georgia 105 points, which shows a rate of preparedness of barely 35.35%. In response to these findings, the Georgian government sought to increase its efforts in terms of policy development and co-ordination, and in February 2020 unveiled a “Policy Development and Co-ordination System”, which it claims mirrors European principles of public administrations. It remains to be seen how the reporting, monitoring and evaluation will proceed. Possible shortcomings could include the super-centralization of the process within the government administration, which currently has a small Policy Planning Unit. On the other hand, as with civil service reform, the overall centralization of power in the executive and problems of informal rule continue to openly endanger the otherwise positive developments of State-building. Similarly, the World Bank’s 2018 systematic country diagnostic stated that Georgia “does not require reinventing the wheel, but rather transitioning from ‘reformer to performer,’ or ensuring that the significant investments made in building the Georgia brand—accountable

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government, openness to trade and investment, a pro-business stance— are effectively converted into growth and welfare payoffs”. Another area of good governance in which Georgia has made exemplary progress (particularly as a former Soviet state) is the fight against corruption. However, the country made its greatest gains during the period 2003–2013 and that the rate of improvement has since stalled, indicating that corruption within the governing elite remains a problem. In some cases, this corruption has taken the form of nepotism or cronyism, while the effective enforcement of anti-corruption laws and regulations is impaired by the lack of an independent judiciary and effective law enforcement. Transparency International’s latest (2019) report identifies problematic areas for Georgia’s democracy: a lack of accountability among law enforcement bodies; corruption and political interference in the judiciary; State capture; government-sponsored attacks on independent civil society; and the absence of an independent anti-corruption investigative agency. Last, but equally relevant, is the rate of democratic participation in Georgia, including e-participation: according to the latest UN E-government Development Index (2018), with a score of 0.69, Georgia ranks 60th among 193 countries. Among post-Soviet countries, Georgia ranks 7th in e-government and 12th in e-participation, indicating that challenges remain. Recent hurdles to Georgia’s democratization are all essentially linked to the problem of the informal rule of oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili, who having made his money in Russia in the 1990s returned to Georgia as a multibillionaire. Although he currently holds no public office and is therefore not democratically accountable to the people, Ivanishvili has monopolized the official political agenda and effectively rules the country through his vast wealth and influence, impairing the capacity of public officials to be loyal to institutional processes (Freedom House, 2019). Georgian democracy-­watchers argue that the imminent threat of this informal rule is a degree of State capture that could compromise all the progress the country has made.

12.6   Conclusions This chapter has attempted to shed light on the impact that conflict has had on Georgia’s PA performance since the country’s independence in 1991. It concludes that the conflict prevalent in the 1990s was supplanted

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with reforms and State-building from 2003 onwards and that violence and instability are strongly correlated with low PA performance, whereas democratization correlated with better PA performance. Qualitative and quantitative evidence show that internal drivers for reform—coupled with reinforced Euro-Atlantic integration and, most importantly, the process of Europeanization under the EU-Georgia Association Agreement—have strongly contributed to democratization and to nation and State-building, as visible in Georgia’s upward trends in all six WGI indicators. In order to maintain the growing trend in PA performance, there is a need for improvements capable of promoting a depoliticized and career-­ based professional civil service. As Georgia’s public service system develops, it is also crucially important to consider the questions of institutional independence, impartiality and capacity. Further democratization, stronger institutions and better governance are hurdles that the country must still pass. This chapter maintains that these considerations are absolutely central given the numerous shortcomings of Georgia’s lopsided system of checks and balances, the country’s high capacity for concentrating power in the executive and the judiciary’s lack of independence and political entanglement with the ruling party. Moreover, the country’s other Constitutionally designated “balance”—the office of the president—has been made largely symbolic, leaving Georgia with an uneven system of central governance. The country also suffers from severe shortcomings in terms of decentralization and local self-governance, and citizen participation indicators remain low. Topped with an informal governance problem, all these together, pose challenges that need to be addressed. These lingering internal weaknesses of governance are compounded by external threats emanating from Russia. Direct or hybrid acts of aggression continue to upset the country’s performance, and the current lack of institutional democracy and the problem of informal rule, coupled with foreign propaganda and disinformation, pose threats to institutional democratization and diminish the positive returns of Europeanization. It is only by combining the potential of internal and external drivers for democratization that the full potential of Georgia’s public administration system could be reached, which would in turn contribute to opening up wider prospects for greater political stability, conflict resolution and good governance.

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References Asmus, R. D. (2010). A Little War That Shook the World: Georgia, Russia and the Future of the West. Palgrave Macmillan. Batley, R., & Larbi, G. (2004). Changing Role of Government: The Reform of Public Services in Developing Countries. Palgrave Macmillan. Bennet, R. (2011). Delivering on the Hope of the Rose Revolution: Public Sector Reform in Georgia, 2004–2009. Innovations for Successful Societies, Princeton University. Budapest Summit Declaration, CSCE Budapest Document. (1994). Towards a Genuine Partnership in a new era. p. 18. Found online: [https://www.osce. org/mc/39554?download=true] Cornell, S. E., & Starr, S. F. (2009). The Guns of August 2008: Russia’s War in Georgia. Routledge. Dan, S., & Pollitt, C. (2014). NPM Can Work: An Optimistic Review of the Impact of New Public Management Reforms in Central and Eastern Europe. Public Management Review, 17 (9), 1305–1332. Dolidze, N. (2015). Public Administration Reforms in Georgia: Establishing Administrative Model for State Organizations. Caucasus Social Science Review, 2(1), 1–18. Dolidze, N. (2016). Comparison of NPM and Neo-Weberian Approaches to the Public Administration Reform in Georgia. The 24th NISPAcee Annual Conference Spreading Standards, Building Capacities: European Administrative Space in Progress. May 19–21, 2016, Zagreb, Croatia. Dunleavy, P., Margetts, H., Bastow, S., & Tinkler, J. (2006). New Public Management Is Dead – Long Live Digital-Era Government. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 16(3), 467–494. Freedom in the World Report, Georgia. (2019). Found online: [https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2019/georgia] Galtung, J. (1969). Violence, Peace, and Peace Research. Journal of Peace Research, 6 (3), 167–191. Geostat. (2019). Public sector employment as part of total employment (2007–2018). Data found online: [https://www.geostat.ge/ka] Gilauri, N. (2017). Practical Economics: Economic Transformation and Government Reform in Georgia 2004–2012. Palgrave Macmillan. Gvalia, G., Siroky, D., Lebanidze, B., & Iashvili, Z. (2013). Thinking Outside the Bloc: Explaining the Foreign Policies of Small States. Security Studies, 22(1), 98–131. Gvindadze, D. (2017). Transformation of Georgia from 2004 to 2012: State building, Reforms. Growth and Investments. Palgrave Macmillan.

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IDP statistics. Ministry of Internally Displaced Persons from the Occupied Territories, Accommodation and Refugees of Georgia. (2019). Found online: [http://mra.gov.ge/eng/static/55] Kintsurashvili, T. (2019). Anti-Western Propaganda – 2018. Media Development Fund. http://mdfgeorgia.ge/eng/view-­library/119 National assessment of Georgian municipalities (2019). IDFI.  Found online: [https://idfi.ge/public/upload/IDFI_2019/General/ LSGINDEX_Report_ENG_WEB3.p] Nilsson, N. (2018). Russian Hybrid Tactics in Georgia. Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program. OECD. (2015). Government at a Glance 2015. Found online: [https://www.oecdilibrary.org/governance/government-at-a-glance-2015_gov_glance-2015-en] Randma-Liiv, T. (2008). New Public Management Versus the Neo-Weberian State in Central And Eastern Europe. Journal of Public Administration and Policy, 2(1), 69–82. Russia Recognizes Abkhazia, South Ossetia, RFE/RL. (August, 2008). Found online at: [https://www.rferl.org/a/Russia_Recognizes_Abkhazia_South_ Ossetia/1193932.html] World Bank. (2018). systematic country diagnostic done by World Bank, p. XVI.  Found online at: [https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/ handle/10986/29790/GEO-SCD-04-24-04272018.pdf?sequence=1& isAllowed=y] Zurabashvili, T. (2016). Restricting Education in Native Language in Gali District: In Search of Solutions Policy Document. Georgia’s Reforms Associates (GRASS).

CHAPTER 13

Rebuilding Public Administration in Post-war Kosovo Bardhyl Dobra

13.1   Introduction It has been 20 years since the war in Kosovo ended, yet the rebuilding of public administration remains a challenge. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the ranking in the fragile context index reflects the performance on achieving the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16. The latter promotes peace and strong institutions; it incorporates both peacebuilding and state-building which are two topics that are part of the vicious circle currently affecting many countries that go through war (Syria, Yemen, Ukraine or Sudan). Kosovo is a country that went through a war during the late 1990s and promptly started a process of reconstruction which is still going on. In the aftermath of the war, one of the top priorities was to rebuild public administration contributing to re-establish the delivery of public services and ease tensions. The response of the international community to the lack of

B. Dobra (*) Ghent University, Gent, Belgium e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 J. Nemec, P. S. Reddy (eds.), Public Administration in Conflict Affected Countries, Governance and Public Management, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74966-8_13

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legitimate institutions was the deployment of the United Nations mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) which assumed direct governance at all levels and sectors, that is, making rules and running and steering political institutions and public organisations (Lemay-Hébert & Murshed, 2016). It was the first time a mission of the United Nations (UN) took control of an entire state apparatus. Over time and with international support, Kosovo managed to reconstitute the structure of its administration, and local stakeholders gradually took control of the institutions. Before and after Kosovo declared its independence, on 17 February 2008, international donors helped reinforce the existing institutions and create additional institutions such as a tax administration, a police and security force, a banking authority and a customs agency. In this chapter, the expressions “public institutions” and “public administration” will be used interchangeably and such terms describe all state structures whose legitimacy and power derive from the laws and regulations and are in charge of making and transforming legislation into public policy and implementing it with the purpose of delivering public services to citizens. It is evident that Kosovo has developed a number of institutions during the 20 years of the post-conflict era. The consolidation of these institutions remains, however, unaccomplished. It may be argued that the international community has given priority to short-term stability in the country rather than to effective and long-term institution building. Effective institutions are required to ensure long-term stability, the rule of law, the effective delivery of public goods and services as well as in creating an environment which supports the private sector. In addition, because of lacking financial and especially highly qualified human resources, the implementation of public policies, legislation and the rule of law, in general, remain a concern that needs to be addressed (Capussela, 2015). In addition to public institutions, the weakness of the private sector to employ several thousand young graduates every year has caused serious repercussions on employment in the public sector, which has become a tool for politicians for personal benefits and also in reducing social tensions. The aim of this chapter is, therefore, to explore the current state of Kosovo’s public administration resulting from a progressive reconstruction since the end of the war in 1999. Did international and local stakeholders succeed in building a professional public administration that fulfils good governance criteria, to name a few, transparency, accountability, efficiency and effectiveness, ethical conduct or the rule of law? This chapter made use of an analysis of qualitative data obtained in the field, including interviews with a variety of stakeholders, as well as existing

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literature, reports and official documents. The next section of this chapter presents the methodological aspects of the research. The third section gives a short historical background on Kosovo and describes the structure of the central administration and the legislative framework in Kosovo. The fourth section describes the as is state of the civil service and the progress of Kosovo to install good governance aspects. The fifth section suggests some potential lessons for future rebuilding processes.

13.2   Research Methodology Relevant to This Chapter This research aims to understand the state of public administration resulting from the rebuilding of Kosovo’s institutions. This chapter is based on the analysis of documents and reports produced by local and international research institutions. To this end, official documents and reports published by UNMIK and the institutions of the Republic of Kosovo, as well as the European Union (EU) and many other local and international organisations were consulted. Also, because the topic is understudied, semi-structured interviews were conducted in the field with politicians and public officials from the central government, as well as civil society stakeholders. The interviewees were selected based on their involvement in the process of rebuilding institutions. Participants, therefore, include different personalities with extensive experience in Kosovo’s institutions or stakeholders who have researched Kosovo institutions. First, politicians and policymakers will be focused on, namely: • Mimoza Kusari, member of Parliament, former mayor of Gjakova, first female mayor in Kosovo who has also been Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Industry, spokesperson and advisor to the Prime Minister of Kosovo since 1999 • Korab Sejdiu, a former member of Parliament and a partner at the law firm Sejdiu & Qerkini In addition, public officials working for different ministries were interviewed, notably at the level of Secretary-General which corresponds to the highest non-political position in the public administration of Kosovo. The interviewees were selected for their position within the administration as

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well as the link of their ministries and/or office with the theme dealt with in this chapter. This includes: • Arton Berisha, Secretary-General of the Ministry of Public Administration (MAP); • Rozafa Ukimeraj, Secretary-General of the Ministry of Local Government Administration; • Qemajl Marmullakaj, Secretary-General of the Ministry of Justice, and former Director of Strategic Planning Office under the Office of the Prime Minister of Kosovo; • Demush Shasha, former Secretary-General at the Ministry of European Integration and Executive Director of the think-tank EPIC; • Tefik Mahmuti, Director of the Department of Civil Service at MAP; • Naser Shamolli, Director of the Legal Department at MAP; and • Rexhep Vasolli, Director of the Department for European Integration and Policy Coordination at the Ministry of Finance. The third category of interviewees includes civil society organisation representatives. This category includes heads or senior staff members of independent organisations or institutes which conduct research on the topic or monitor public institutions in Kosovo with whom the rebuilding process since the end of the war was extensively discussed. The list includes: • Besa Luzha, a civil society activist and Manager of Friedrich Ebert Stiftung in Kosovo; • Besa Shahini, a civil society activist and current Minister of Education of Albania; • Agron Demi, Executive Director of GAP Institute; • Visar Rushiti, a former policy analyst at GAP Institute and current policy analyst at the non-governmental organisation (NGO) Democracy Plus (D+); • Artan Canhasi from Kosova Democratic Institute, a branch of Transparency International; • Arbresha Loxha, Executive Director of the Group for Legal and Political Studies; • Rinor Beka, senior programme manager at the National Democratic Institute; • Rasim Alija, Researcher at Democracy for Development; and

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• Rron Gjinovci, Executive Director of ORCA, an NGO aiming at improving the quality of higher education in Kosovo. The interviews were conducted between 2016 and 2019 during several field research trips in Kosovo where the author had the opportunity to hold discussions with local citizens and stakeholders. It is worthwhile mentioning that many other public officials were contacted but refused to give an interview or to have their name mentioned in the study, even if anonymity was proposed to each of them; many of them fear they could be recognised and as a result put their job in danger. The author conducted the interviews in the field to obtain first-hand answers, to obtain the point of view of stakeholders who have directly participated in the reconstruction of public administration in Kosovo and/or have continuously been monitoring such a process; individuals who have deep knowledge about the topic.

13.3   Kosovo Through History and the “Renaissance” of a “New” Administrative System In the first part, the historical context is given to explain why Kosovo is part of the conflict-affected states category. It also reveals the complexity of the reconstruction process and allows a better understanding of the current state of public administration. The second section describes the structure of the central government and the legislation relevant to public administration instilled by two major approaches, namely the liberal peace model and the good governance agenda, and brought by international organisations to Kosovo. 13.3.1  Historical Overview With a population of approximately 1.8 million inhabitants and a surface area of 10,887 square km, Kosovo is a small country located in the Balkans. Around 93% of the Kosovan population is of Albanian ethnicity (Kosovo Albanians) and the remaining 7% comprise other ethnicities such as Serbs (Kosovo Serbs), Bosnians, Ashkali, Egyptians, Turks, Montenegrins, Croats and Gorans. It is not exactly known, but there is an estimation that in the last 40 years around 1 million Kosovo Albanians have emigrated

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mostly to Western and Northern Europe as well as North America. In addition, several hundred thousand Kosovo Albanians were pressured by the Yugoslav regime earlier in the twentieth century to emigrate to Albania and especially to Turkey. Also, a number of Kosovo Serbs had emigrated to Serbia by the end of the Kosovo war in 1999, but many of them have since returned and settled especially in northern Kosovo. Like the entire region, Kosovo has had a tumultuous history. A territory which has been disputed between Albanians and Serbs for centuries. The Kosovo Albanians claim to be indigenous in Kosovo and have very strong ties with the Albanians living in Serbia, North Macedonia, Montenegro and of course Albania, whereas the Serbs, despite their arrival in the region around the sixth century AD consider Kosovo as their cradle, especially because of the Battle of Kosovo in 1389 against the Ottomans and the myth created around it (Métais, 2006; Malcolm, 1998). Kosovo, as the rest of the Western Balkans, was colonised by the Ottoman Empire for 500 years to be then directly annexed by Serbia in 1912 and eventually integrated in the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1919 at the Congress of Versailles. After World War II, Kosovo was part of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), within which it obtained autonomy in 1974. During the socialist period, Kosovo had its political institutions and public administration. However, this situation would substantially change when, in 1989, the Milosevic regime abolished Kosovo’s autonomy and took control of public institutions and enterprises (Ante, 2010). In the following years, the majority of Kosovo Albanian public servants were fired and replaced by Serbs from Kosovo, Serbia and Serbs leaving Bosnia and Croatia due to war (Dobra & de Vries, 2016). Being deprived of their public institutions, Kosovars, under the leadership of Ibrahim Rugova, set up their parallel institutions, delivering thus basic services to citizens, essentially education and healthcare, both financed by the diaspora that massively emigrated to Western Europe during this period (B. Luzha, see also Knudsen, 2010). Although they managed to deliver public services, the quality was poor and the situation in which they operated was extreme. Private buildings were turned into schools and universities; the NGO Mother Teresa set up medical centres in private houses and offered services for free. During this time, Albanian public servants became very rare in the official Kosovo administration; for the Albanian population, the public service became a place where they were discriminated against, a place of fear and extortion (M. Kusari).

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After the wars in Bosnia and Croatia, an Albanian guerrilla movement called the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) emerged in 1997 and started fighting against the regular army and police of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). The war escalated and ended in June 1999 with the international military operation led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Around 13,000 Kosovo Albanians, most of whom were civilians, and a few hundred Serbian soldiers and policemen died during the two-year direct conflict. Currently, it is estimated that 1600 Kosovo Albanians are still reported missing. In addition, one million Kosovo Albanians were sent to refugee camps in Albania, Macedonia and Montenegro (Lemay-Hébert & Murshed, 2016). Tens of thousands of these refugees were welcomed by countries around the world. This new wave of immigration worsened the already difficult situation of brain drain that occurred in the first years of the 1990s and contributed to the loss of an administrative culture that was built during the Yugoslavia era. On 10 June 1999, the United Nations Security Council approved resolution 1244 which put an end to the rule of Kosovo by the Milosevic regime and installed for the first time in history a UN mission to govern a country, the UNMIK. Milosevic’s regime and armed forces left Kosovo on 12 June. From that day and on, UNMIK and the associated international organisations and NGOs gradually rebuilt the damaged public infrastructures, the civilians’ houses, as well as basic institutions required to govern the country. In compliance with Articles 10 and 11 of the UN Resolution 1244, UNMIK took control of governance institutions at all levels and was entrusted with the organisation of elections and rebuilding self-­ governing institutions. To this end, the UN deployed thousands of international administrators from member countries. UNMIK was led by a Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG) who was vested with full powers, including revoking legislation voted in by the Parliament and decisions taken by the Provisional Institutions for Self-­ Governance (PISG) created by UNMIK itself with the cooperation of local stakeholders. UNMIK was structured in four pillars, each of them managed by an international organisation but all of them were in theory accountable to the SRSG: humanitarian assistance (UN High Commissioner for Refugees), civil administration and police (United Nations), Democratisation (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) and Reconstruction (European Union). NATO assumed the security responsibilities through its Kosovo Force mission (KFOR). In addition, an important number of international organisations and NGOs were involved

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in providing assistance and/or funding. Numerous NGOs built projects which aimed at creating and then reinforcing civil society organisations (CSOs) able to help public administration not only to deliver but also to monitor its functioning and protect citizens. However, from the onset, UNMIK faced operating issues especially because of its size and the difficulties of coordination with the numerous stakeholders involved. In addition, the deployment of UNMIK staff was slow; the organisation often lacked professional staff with appropriate knowledge about the context in which the mission would take place, about the culture of the country and the people they would work with. In fact, the slow deployment of UNMIK created room for former guerrilla members to occupy positions within public administration, most of them not being qualified for the positions they held. As in previous cases, such as Rwanda and Bosnia, the slowness of the UN, the ill-equipped missions and a staff that lacks knowledge about the conflict or the country of deployment have proved to be devastating in terms of human casualties. If, in Kosovo, the damage caused by the abovementioned issues was not thankfully translated in direct victims, UNMIK’s slow deployment and its lack of preparation for effective duty have proven to be a major issue even today for the building of an effective public administration (B. Luzha). Last but not least, UNMIK and other international organisations and the high wages they offered attracted local highly qualified staff, thereby leaving the Kosovo institutions with even less qualified personnel to rebuild its public administration. Many of the locals that worked for international organisations continued their careers outside Kosovo, often with international organisations, worsening the existing brain drain issue. UNMIK and local stakeholders worked together to create and progressively build viable institutions; responsibilities were gradually transferred to locals (B. Shahini, R. Vasolli). Eventually, Kosovo declared its independence on 17 February 2008 and has since been recognised by 116 states but is not a member of the UN because Russia and China use their veto in the UN Security Council to block any decision in this regard. Following a request from Serbia, the International Court of Justice ruled in 2010 that “Kosovo’s declaration of independence violated neither international law nor the governing UN Security Resolution 1244”. The next part describes the institutional structure which has been built in post-war Kosovo.

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13.3.2  The Structure of Public Administration in the Newly Created State During the 1980s and 1990s, the New Public Management (NPM) theory called for reforms preparing the public sector to a market-oriented era to market liberalisation. Based on this theory, two dominant approaches aiming at rebuilding conflict-affected states emerged: the liberal peace model and the good governance approach. The liberal peace model (or liberal peacebuilding) is the most applied model to post-conflict countries and consists of promoting democracy and a liberal economy. Imported to fragile countries and implemented by international organisations such as the UN, the EU, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the World Bank Group (WB), liberal peace aims at shaping states by drafting new constitutions, creating political parties and organising elections, and building state capacities as well as a sustainable civil society. NPM also aims at liberalising the economy especially by mass privatisation and decreasing the role of the state in the economy (Lemay-Hébert & Murshed, 2016; Chandler, 2013; Richmond, 2006). In addition to liberal peace, the so-called Good Governance Agenda emerged in the 1980s and put greater emphasis on governance aspects. Again, good governance is a broad topic (Corkery, 1999), and while there is no clear definition, scholars have reached a consensus on some principles such as participation and inclusiveness, respect for institutions and laws, accountability, transparency, efficiency and effectiveness (Menocal, 2011). The paradigm has evolved with time as it now comprises other aspects of what are perceived as fundamental values in western democracies such as human rights, democracy and participation, a professional civil service or gender equality (Grindle, 2017). The international intervention in Kosovo brought numerous stakeholders such as national institutions, international organisations and many renowned non-governmental organisations mainly from Europe and the United States. In the aftermath of the war, these institutions participated in the rebuilding of institutions, each of them applying its ideology or method. Although focusing on political stability, they all promoted good governance, democracy, transparency and accountability and free-market economy. Kosovo institutions were built based on the abovementioned approaches, and responsibilities progressively transferred to local stakeholders (T.  Mahmuti). On 17 February 2008, the Kosovo Assembly

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declared its independence and adopted the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo which came into force on 15 June 2008. In 14 chapters and 162 articles, the constitution proclaims a parliamentary republic based on the principle of separation of powers and checks and balances, where all citizens are equal before the law and minorities have special rights. The Kosovo governmental system consists of two levels of government: national and local. The national level consists of the President, Parliament and the government. The state administration consists of the office of Prime Minister, ministerial systems and regulatory agencies. The government is led by the head of government and the number of ministries depends on the political coalition—the law regulating the organisation and functioning of the government has still not been approved by Parliament (R. Alija; N. Shamolli). Each ministry is composed of a series of departments, each of them having at least two divisions. In addition, regulatory and executive agencies fall under the responsibility of Parliament, the ministries or, in some cases, the Prime Minister. Although Kosovo had already adopted several laws and regulations relative to its public administration, the EU and other international donors encouraged the government to adopt a new set of legislation which regulates and harmonises the organisation and functioning of public administration: a new legislation that avoids overlapping of responsibilities and discrepancies which were noticed from one institution or sector to another (A. Loxha, R. Ukimeraj). In February 2019 and following several years of preparation, Parliament adopted Law on public sector salaries which was supposed to come into effect on 1 December 2019 but was declared fully unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court of Kosovo in July 2020. Parliament also adopted Law on the organisation and functioning of public administration and independent agencies which came into effect on 1 April 2019, and last but not least, it adopted Law on public officials which entered into force on 11 September 2019. However, the Constitutional Court declared as unconstitutional several parts of Law on public officials dealing with civil servants working for institutions that are in the Constitution as independent institutions such as the Kosovo Judicial Council, the Kosovo Prosecutorial Council, the Constitutional Court, the Ombudsperson Institution, the Auditor-General of Kosovo, the Central Election Commission, the Central Bank of Kosovo and the Independent Media Commission. The decision is justified by the fact that these independent institutions should be allowed to decide about their organisation

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and personnel without any interference from the executive power. The law came into effect on 9 July 2020 for the remaining concerned institutions. The new set of legislation is meant to regulate the organisation and functioning of public administration in Kosovo and, as such, separates public sector employees into two categories: public officials and public functionaries; the difference being the status of the latter category (elected officials, high-level appointed managers, specific categories of military and judiciary sectors). The vast majority of public sector employees fall into the category of public officials. Public officials are divided into four groups. It is estimated that Kosovo has around 89,000 public officials. From public officials, around 18,000 civil servants are employees that work for the central and local governments and their careers are managed and coordinated by the Ministry of Public Administration (T.  Mahmuti). Public servants are a particular category of public officials who directly deliver public services to citizens and operate under the responsibility of their line ministries: for instance, teachers work under the responsibility and regulations of the ministry of education. Cabinet employees are a category of staff that performs for the cabinets of the President, the President of the Parliament and the Prime minister. The law on public officials does not regulate the public functionaries. In this category, two groups can be distinguished: the regular public functionaries (elected representatives, ministers, vice-­ ministers, etc.) and the functionaries with special status (prosecutors, judges, army command and military personnel, police, intelligence and non-civilian customs personnel, executive and regulatory agencies management). In addition, the law does not address at all the status of employees of public companies owned by central or local governments. The establishment of UNMIK and provisional institutions of Kosovo marked the beginning of a process of agencification which has become problematic in recent years: in 2016, Kosovo had 96 independent or semi-­ independent institutions (A. Berisha). Jointly with SIGMA, the Ministry of Public Administration assessed the situation and published a report which is meant to serve as a roadmap for the government and parliament to take action and significantly reduce the number of independent and semi-independent agencies. The report showed in some cases inappropriate staff allocation, structure issues, overlapping responsibilities, extreme politicisation, mismanagement, corruption and insufficient capacities of the parliament or government to supervise a number of them (V. Rushiti, A.  Demi). With the adoption of Law No. 06/L-113 on Public

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administration and independent agencies, the structure, organisation and functioning of ministries and agencies are well-defined and overlapping is supposed to have been eliminated (N. Shamolli). The law defines the role of each public servant at every level of the hierarchy for public officials. It also regulates the rules in terms of management, supervision and performance management within each ministry or agency. Based on Law No. 06/L-113, the Secretary-General is the highest civil servant within a ministry and is responsible for the management of the administrative and professional staff (A. Berisha); the model is based on the British system with a Secretary-General because, under UNMIK, the public administration reform was mostly funded and led by the Department for International Development of the United Kingdom (D.  Shasha). The office of the Secretary-General manages and supervises departments which must have at least two divisions; the number of departments and divisions varies according to the size and “importance” of the ministry. Specific departments or divisions can be placed under the direct authority of the minister or Secretary-General (A. Berisha). In the last 30 years, brutal changes such as exclusion, brain drain and war have made the implementation of reforms more painful and less effective. Having said that, Kosovars, with the assistance of international stakeholders, have managed to build institutions that are functional and deliver public services.

13.4   Public Administration in Kosovo—20 Years After the War This section describes the current state of public administration in post-­ war Kosovo. It goes through fundamental aspects of public administration that are promoted by the liberal peace and good governance approaches such as a small but professional civil service, the democratic and transparent institutions that are accountable towards citizens, the rule of law, effective policymaking and effective government. These areas constitute major parts of the reforms agenda requested by the EU to Kosovo (A. Loxha). 13.4.1  Building a Professional Civil Service The development of the civil service in Kosovo has been largely impacted by the country’s recent history. The lack of continuity and the turbulences

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during the 1990s in the public sector in combination with the destruction of infrastructure and loss of lives of former civil servants have impacted the evolution of the post-war civil service in Kosovo. Besides, and although crucial, the reconstruction of the administrative system during the UNMIK era is questionable as its heritage still negatively impacts the performance of the civil service (A. Berisha). Indeed, even 20 years after the conflict, some civil servants occupy positions without being qualified nor trained to occupy these positions (A. Demi; R. Gjinovci). The slow deployment of UNMIK gave time to groups of people to capture key positions within the administration who then became collaborators of UNMIK staff; a significant number of them are still occupying these positions without being productive. To date, the civil service in Kosovo numbers approximately 18,000 staff members of which around 10% work on service contracts. The recruitment and careers of civil servants are regulated by Law No. 06/L-114 on Public Officials, which came into effect in July 2020; this law is supposed to drastically improve the situation, especially the recruitment element. It is crucial to note that until this law was approved, each institution published vacancies and recruited its staff (A. Berisha), allowing politicians to fill not only the civil service but also the country’s public institutions with family members and political militants (B. Shahini). Arguably, recruitment and career management in the civil service have significantly promoted corruption practices in Kosovo instead of promoting meritocracy, and the situation has not improved with time. Unqualified and unmotivated staff occupy key positions within the administration which, in the end, is translated into a lack of implementation of public policies and therefore an absence of effective public service delivery (R.  Alija; A.  Demi; A.  Loxha). Indeed, many cases have been reported when selection committees or interview panels have selected a candidate because of the political or personal connection with a senior manager within the same institution or another public institution, or a connection with an influential politician or businessman (B.  Luzha). The so-called Pronto affair, a telephone tapping scandal, brought to light all the manipulations with recruitment made by a group of politicians who were in office. In most of the phone conversations, there is a question of selecting or appointing individuals that are politically close to the politicians in power, relatives or friends of theirs, including individuals who did not apply on time for the position, who were not aware there is a vacancy or who did not meet the elementary criteria for the position. Research and

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surveys conducted by Loxha (2018) show that a large proportion of civil servants believe that personal or political connections help employees to obtain bonuses or a salary increase. In addition, disciplinary measures are very rare or such measures are approved but not implemented creating a sense of impunity which is immediately translated into a lack of liability and a total indifference towards one’s duty. Rinor Beka states that “the basic issues in the public service are the recruitment, the professional development of employees and their advancement or promotion. The system needs a profound reform”. Based on Law No. 06/L-114, the Department for Management of Public Officials (DMPO), operating under MAP, will each year collect the demands of each institution for new staff and launch a call for applications for general openings to be filled through its Human Resources Management Information System (HRMIS). The HRMIS is a platform for HR management for vacancy publication and application submissions. For each group of positions (general or special administration), an Admission Commission (AC) is appointed for a two-year term. Based on Article 34 of Law No. 06/L-114, the AC has at least five members: one from the admission unit (MAP), three middle or lower managers specialising in the field for which the recruitment is made, one external expert from a specialised organisation or a university, and two observers, one from the trade unions and one from the civil society. The Commission is in charge of evaluating the applications and examinations as well as conducting the interviews. In this regard, the Government of Kosovo shall prepare a sub-­ legal act to adopt detailed rules on establishment, composition and activities of the Commission, as well as detailed rules on the procedure of competition and evaluation of candidates. Once applications are submitted on HRMIS, the first step of selection is made based on the submitted documents such as diplomas, training certificates and experience certificates (20 points); selected candidates take a written examination worth 70 points. Candidates who obtain at least 60 points out of 90 are shortlisted and go through an oral interview counting for 10 points (N. Shamolli). Those candidates who receive in total 70% or more are admitted and ranked by the Admission Commission according to the points received. The selected candidates who are ranked highest are entitled to choose and to be appointed to any vacant position of the group for which recruitment was conducted and in any other vacant position of the same group. Within seven days from the announcement of the list or the creation of a vacancy, the Responsible Unit shall organise the selection

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process and appoint candidates in accordance with the preferences of candidates and their ranking in the list. Yet, Article 36 of Law No. 06/L-114 includes some additional directions for special appointments. It stipulates that “candidates from among communities, category of disabled people and less represented gender, if they meet requirements under paragraph 9 of Article 34, shall be given a priority for appointment in a vacant position in order to fulfil the representation quota or quota required by Law”. It is worth noting that Article 9 of the law defines a minimum quota of 10% for non-majority communities in all categories of public officials provided the candidates fulfil the admission criteria, whereas at the local level it should be in accordance with the percentage of the population in the municipality. Furthermore, each employee is subject to a one-year probation period. This law also regulates the transfers within the category and promotions in the civil service as well as the performance appraisal of civil servants, and the appointments to senior managerial positions. Similarly, and until a law on public officials’ salaries comes into effect, there is no unique salary grid for public sector employees, the old system remains in place (T. Mahmuti); according to Loxha (2018), 58 legal documents are regulating the salaries of public sector employees. As a result, for instance, a public relations officer with the same qualification and same experience receives a different pay from one institution to another (V.  Rushiti). The Law 06/L-111 for Salaries in the Public Sector supposed to come into force on 1 December 2019 (instead of 1 November) has been rejected by the Constitutional Court by a decision published on 9 July 2020 on the basis that it does not include important institutions such as the judiciary and independent agencies and, as such, does not respect the Constitution. The law has been sent back to the Government and Parliament of Kosovo for fundamental changes, which they have promised will be dealt with swiftly. In principle, this law was supposed to clearly define for the first time a salaries’ grid for all employees, except for the Kosovo Intelligence Agency and Kosovo Security Forces, the rules for a pay rise, for special allowances, the salary classes and coefficients. However, if it is again proceeded with and ratified, its full implementation will depend on several factors, including the ability of MAP and each ministry to draft the sub-legal acts and the financial ability to cover the significant cost which is estimated between 60 and 100 million euros per year (V. Rushiti). A greater cooperation with CSOs, especially those focusing on the public sector, is indispensable and could speed up reforms and also prevent

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issues with constitutionality of laws as previously mentioned. With the assistance of the EU and other donors, CSOs are getting more and more involved in monitoring public administration reforms (PAR) in Kosovo. An example of such involvement is the participation of an organisation from Kosovo in the WeBER project along with six CSOs from the Western Balkans; the project is funded by the EU and assesses PAR reforms against SIGMA Principles but also in a comparative way within the participating countries (Loxha, 2018). Although the package of the three aforementioned laws prepared by the government of Kosovo was approved before WeBER becomes fully operational, it seems the organisation which implements the project in Kosovo, the Group for Legal and Political Studies, will be involved in future legislation preparation and other public administration reforms in Kosovo. The contribution of CSOs has been vital in monitoring government action in the last 20 years. However, the system is far from being perfect. It appears that in the OECD countries, public employment represents on average 21.1% of total employment, whereas in Kosovo it represents 30.8% of total employment. If public employment was reduced in the State-Owned Enterprises because of privatisation, it increased in other institutions. The public sector employment in Kosovo suffers from a structural issue, a misbalance between the needs of a specific institution and the actual number of personnel. Employment in public enterprises, in some independent institutions or within the civil service remains higher than required, whereas other institutions which deliver public services such as education, healthcare and the judiciary are understaffed. In 2019, the national broadcaster “Radio Television of Kosovo” had 815 employees whereas the Anti-­ Corruption Agency had only 47 employees. The civil service, that is, the central and local government bureaucracy numbers around 18,000 staff members, to which are to be added the employees out of payroll and with special service contracts. In 2019, approximately 4500 individuals were employed out of payroll or with special service contracts in public office, it is however impossible to know what exact percentage of them actually works solely in the civil service. There is a consensus that the civil service is oversized, highly politicised and not fully professional, an observation made in 2017 and which remains valid in 2019 (A.  Demi; A.  Berisha; D. Shasha; V. Rushiti).

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13.4.2  Transparency and Accountability Although absent on the Index of Public Integrity, Kosovo does poorly in other rankings produced by Transparency International or Freedom House that review good governance aspects such as transparency, voice, accountability and corruption. Transparency and accountability are key principles of good governance and as such are important duties that Kosovo must adhere to one day to become a member of the EU. For Pasquier and Villeneuve, transparency “generally means the opening up of the internal organisational processes and decisions to third parties, whether or not these third parties are involved in the organisation” (2007: 148). They argue that transparency, as a fundamental right, has become a necessity to fight irregularities such as corruption, fraud or financial scandals and to promote good governance in public and private organisations, and is a crucial element in the process of accountability and legitimisation of public authorities (Pasquier & Villeneuve, 2007: 148). However, there is clear evidence that transparency in practice is not a priority for all institutions in Kosovo and the degree of transparency differs from one institution to another (K. Sejdiu). It appears that Parliament is the most transparent institution in Kosovo, whereas the judicial sector is the least (R. Beka; A. Canhasi). Parliament publishes all documents which have been approved on its website, including detailed expenses of members of parliament and the institution itself. The WeBER project judges that transparency and accessibility to budgetary documents from the Ministry of Finance is in line with international standards. However, according to the same project, Public Internal Financial Control (PIFC) reports which “contain comprehensive information, including the state of play in implementing internal control in public sector organisations and statistics” are not available on the website of the Ministry of Finance and annual reports on PIFC are not regularly published (Loxha, 2018). In this regard, Shamolli (2017) argues that many institutions should make significant efforts to publish all documents on their websites; such an action would help to restore trust in public institutions. Transparency and accountability improve governance and trust in public institutions. According to Lindberg, accountability means that “when decision-making power is transferred from a principal (e.g. the citizens) to an agent (e.g. government), there must be a mechanism in place for holding the agent accountable for their decisions and tools for sanction”

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(2013: 203). This implies that the agent is identifiable and identified, the area of competence and the tasks are clear, the principal has the means to ask for accountability, that is, there are standards for measurement, and that the principal has the means to sanction the agent if the latter is not accountable or has not correctly accomplished the tasks. Lindberg (2013) identifies, among others, three forms of accountability: citizens–politicians, politicians–bureaucrats or judges–citizens, but we can also speak about accountability between state institutions or inside an institution (horizontal accountability) and accountability from institutions towards citizens or civil society organisations (vertical accountability). Although the term accountability is often used in Kosovo, in practice the situation is quite different. On the one hand, horizontal accountability is a major issue. EU Kosovo progress reports 2017 and 2019 point out that public administration is fragmented thereby creating a situation where there are no effective lines of accountability between institutions nor inside the same institution. Also, there is an issue with responsibility delegation which creates a discontinuity in the chain of command (Q. Marmullakaj). On the other hand, vertical accountability is also a major issue, that is, accountability towards civil society organisations and especially towards citizens is very low (B. Shahini; A. Loxha). Such a lack of accountability is dangerous as it creates a situation where public officials make decisions without consulting or informing citizens thereby creating a principal– agent problem. CSOs have a positive impact and exert pressure on governments to perform better and to be more accountable and transparent, which in other words creates a relationship of cooperation between the state and the civil society (Meyer, 2003). CSOs serve as an intermediary between the state and citizens. In this regard, in Kosovo, civil society organisations and international donors have massively invested in citizens’ sensibilisation to seek information and to require more transparency and accountability from public institutions. Even though more and more citizens have become involved in recent years, it is the CSOs such as Çohu, Kosovar Civil Society Foundation, Kosova Democratic Institute (a branch of Transparency International in Kosovo), FOL Movement and many others that have raised their voice the most against corruption, the lack of transparency and accountability and many other negative phenomena. However, despite the numerous efforts, if we look at the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), Kosovo performs poorly on “Voice and Accountability”: on a scale of −2.5 to +2.5 where the higher values correspond to better

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performance, Kosovo scored −0.36  in 2004 and then marked a slight improvement over time to achieve −0.12 in 2018. Such small progress in this area could be explained by the weakness of punitive measures (K. Sejdiu), the lack of ownership of decision-making and the lack of sense of responsibility (M. Kusari). Indeed, in the last 20 years, the international community has massively intervened in decision-making and as a result, leaders have always been accountable to the international community and donors but not to Kosovan citizens and taxpayers. 13.4.3  Rule of Law The reform of the judiciary is among the most important but also the toughest aspects to implement. In weak states, where the rule of law and accountability are weak, corruption and organised crime grow rapidly (Marenin, 2014). With the assistance of international donors, Kosovo has managed to develop its legislation and institutions in charge of the rule of law (T. Mahmuti). Nonetheless, the implementation and application of such legislation is problematic and makes the system unfunctional in the sense that it does not entirely fulfil its duties (K. Sejdiu). The application of laws is problematic and suffers, among others, because of a weak judicial system that fails to implement punitive measures for lawbreakers. Although the general working conditions and salaries have improved in recent years, the system suffers from political interferences and ties with specific political parties, from an important lack of professionalism, poor performance and absence of punitive measures, from lack of technical staff and from mismanagement as well as a critical mass of files inherited from the past. Kosovo is not performing well with regard to accountability, independence and impartiality of the judicial system, even if the essential components are enshrined in the constitution and legal framework. The codes of ethics for judges and prosecutors, as well as disciplinary procedures and measures, are in place, but their implementation has failed thereby not contributing to improve accountability within the judicial system (K.  Sejdiu). In addition, the courts in Kosovo are the least transparent institutions in the country; judges and prosecutors have numerical targets but choose the easiest cases to deal with (A. Canhasi) and do not deal in a timely way with high-profile cases. Several prosecutors having ties with political parties, being appointed based on their affiliation and also ruling

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in favour of well-known politicians have become public in an affair of taping (cf. Pronto Affair). As a result, the processing of a file in civil courts takes up to 15 years for some cases, diminishing citizens’ trust in the system (K.  Sejdiu; D.  Shasha; V.  Rushiti). Several CSOs, such as the Movement FOL, monitor the judicial system and regularly publish reports and information on the functioning of the courts, on the publications of judgements by Courts and other matters that affect the judiciary. Based on the assumption that Kosovo must give priority to the enforcement of the rule of law, the international community has, since the end of the war in 1999, deployed significant financial and human resources in this field, especially the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) deployed in 2008. Article 2 of the Council Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP states the mission of EULEX as follows: EULEX Kosovo shall assist the Kosovo institutions, judicial authorities and law enforcement agencies in their progress towards sustainability and accountability and in further developing and strengthening an independent multi-ethnic justice system and multi-ethnic police and customs service, ensuring that these institutions are free from political interference and adhering to internationally recognised standards and European best practices.

The mission statement of EULEX is remarkably ambitious, especially taking into consideration the context in Kosovo: the country was about to unilaterally declare its independence and five EU members states were against and the EU already knew how difficult it was to run this type of mission as the EU itself was in charge of Pillar IV of UNMIK for reconstruction and economic development. According to Article 3 of the same document, to fulfil its mission, EULEX was, among others, in charge of the following tasks: monitor, mentor and advise the competent Kosovo institutions on all areas related to the wider rule of law; ensure the maintenance and promotion of the rule of law, public order and security, fight political interference in the rule of law services; contribute to the fight against corruption, fraud and financial crime; ensure that cases of war crimes, terrorism, organised crime, corruption, inter-ethnic crimes, financial/economic crimes and other serious crimes are properly investigated, prosecuted, adjudicated and enforced; contribute to strengthening cooperation and coordination within the judicial system, and so on. The same article clearly mentions some elements which are identical to UNMIK such as the executive responsibilities of EULEX and the ability “to

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reversing or annulling operational decisions taken by the competent Kosovo authorities” as well as the immunity for EULEX staff. However, the decision of the EU to send a rule of law mission in Kosovo was very welcomed by Kosovo citizens who believed the mission would investigate war crimes and the cases of 1600 missing citizens since the war of 1999, corruption cases in general, and specifically politicians who had become rich overnight by capturing the economy and the state. The expectations of Kosovo citizens were comprehensibly high when considering the mission statement and the description of tasks as well as the budget allocated to the mission—from 2007 to 2011, the total budget of EULEX was 582 million euros, or a little more than 100 million per year, most of which went on salaries for international staff. In reality, the mission had several issues: first, it was preoccupied with its organisation and human resources—an issue already faced by UNMIK; second, it was highly politicised as it had staff from countries that do not recognise Kosovo; and third, it mostly dealt with inter-ethnic crimes but never dealt with high-level corruption or organised crime. EULEX was authorised to recruit 2500 staff of which 2042 were international staff; however, the mission never managed to recruit all the pledged staff and then reduced its objectives in terms of hiring. The European Court of Auditors (ECA) found that, for some positions, member states had sent unqualified staff for the mission, which is another common point with UNMIK. Canhasi (2017) says that “the expectations of Kosovo citizens were very high but the results are not satisfactory; this is contradictory because the EU has spent millions on this mission, even if a major part of this money was spent on the salaries of EULEX staff”. The mission indicted very few cases of high-profile politicians or public officials for corruption, but none of them were condemned. As a consequence, the small number of prosecutions in all areas went unnoticed and ECA criticised the mission for wasting European taxpayers’ money. The ECA report concluded that the mission has not been sufficiently effective and that very little progress has been made in fighting corruption and crime, and zero progress in establishing the rule of law in the north of Kosovo. The report pointed out several issues which led to this lack of success: the political situation, the discrepancies between the objectives of the mission and the capacities to achieve them, the lack of coordination between EU internal security objectives and external policy objectives, the lack of coordination inside the EU member states, the slow deployment of staff, the qualification of some personnel who lacked adequate professional skills or skills for

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capacity building, especially given that a crucial part of the mission was to build sustainable capacities able to take over after EULEX departure. Furthermore, ECA judged problematic that the mission has no legal personality. On its website, EULEX argues that “the accountability concept of EULEX is complex and includes a number of diverse but inseparable elements that, taken together, make up the EULEX accountability”. Such a statement is a good indication that there are issues of accountability. It appears that there is some confusion between informing the institutions and the people of Kosovo about EULEX activities and being really accountable to them. In fact, the mission is not accountable to the people nor the institutions of Kosovo as these two do not have any means of sanction over EULEX, especially given that the latter’s staff has full immunity in Kosovo; similarly, it is also not clear how accountable the mission is towards Brussels. Indeed, EULEX has gone through a number of scandals where a number of EULEX prosecutors raised concerns over potential bribe-taking at top levels in EULEX: legal battles are still ongoing between the mission and the whistle-blowers. Overall, EULEX has failed to fulfil its mission (R. Alija). In conclusion, the legal framework for Kosovo is available and of good quality, but there is a consensus in Kosovo, which could also be perceived in the interviews conducted with individuals working for public institutions or civil society organisations, that the implementation of law and regulations and above all their application in practice is not satisfactory at all. As a result, corruption is very high. This dramatic situation is also observed in international reports or indicators measuring, among others, the rule of law. According to Transparency International, corruption remains high in Kosovo: on a scale from 0 to 100 where 0 means highly corrupt and 100 very clean, Kosovo scored 34 in 2012, then recorded an improvement to 39 in 2017, but then again, the situation worsened and the score went down to 36 in 2019. Corruption remains a major obstacle not only in rebuilding effective and democratic institutions but also in promoting economic development and attracting foreign investments. Similarly, according to WGI, the rule of law indicator for Kosovo improved between 2004 and 2018, but the situation remains worrying. Indeed, on a scale of −2.5 to +2.5 where higher values correspond to better governance, the rule of law indicator shows a slight improvement as it changed for the better and went from −0.79 in 2004 to −0.37 in 2018. The rule of law remains the biggest governance issue in Kosovo. The situation is best illustrated by a constant that could be observed in the interviews

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conducted with local stakeholders as well as in the EU Kosovo progress reports—Kosovo is at an early stage in developing a well-functioning judicial system as well as in fully establishing the rule of law. The international community has given priority to short-term stability in Kosovo rather than building democratic, transparent and accountable institutions that obey and promote good governance and the rule of law. In fact, the WGI on Political Stability deteriorated from +1.01 in 2008 to −0.61 in 2018, proving that short-term stability, or what we could call “apparent stability” or “superficial stability”, can easily be reversible rather than focusing on building good governance and democratic institutions. It is noteworthy to mention that the tensions in Kosovo remain political and not at all ethnical or religious. Nevertheless, it may be argued that this decision to trade-off long-term rebuilding versus short-term stability will have long-term repercussions for Kosovo citizens. 13.4.4  Ad-Hoc Policymaking in Kosovo, This Terrible Evil De Vries (2016) argues that collective problems require collective action. It is through public policy that governments aim at finding solutions to collective problems. As several governmental entities are involved in the policymaking cycle, there should be appropriate coordination among different stakeholders involved in the processes. In Kosovo, the policymaking system is in place, but the system is weak because of ad-hoc policymaking. The latter is, therefore, a real obstacle for inclusive and evidence-based policymaking (European Union, 2019; Loxha, 2018). Indeed, special interests have the power to intervene at every moment in the policymaking cycle (Q. Marmullakaj). Meanwhile, the main pusher for reform is the international community, especially the EU through the European Reform Agenda (ERA), setting thus the agenda for policymaking. Negotiations are part of policy formulation and legitimation. However, in the case of Kosovo, policy formulation and legitimation are subject to very high political pressures which lead to drastic changes in legislation that are approved (cf. law on public officials’ salaries). Furthermore, and according to Rexha (2018), policy implementation can be considered as poor and policy evaluation is missing. Although there is an office for strategic planning inside the office of the Prime Minister and a national development agenda, policymaking in Kosovo suffers because of the lack of standardisation and alignment of strategies of different institutions with the national development agenda;

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fragmentation, which is observed in Kosovo public administration, is also observed in this case as each institution has its own strategy, often overlapping with other strategies, very often not addressing citizens’ needs and issues but catering rather to the special interests or donors’ requirements (Q. Marmullakaj). Because there is no long-term national development agenda and no institution that is at the centre of reforms, there is a clear issue of coordination among responsible stakeholders. In addition, in most cases, public institutions do not prepare a feasibility study and financial planification, increasing thus the chances for drastic changes in the process of policymaking and especially rendering difficult their implementation. On a scale from −2.5 to +2.5 where higher values correspond to better governance, the Regulatory Quality Indicator of WGI, measuring the ability of the government to formulate and implement policies and regulations, shows that the situation indeed worsened in Kosovo between 2008 and 2018 as the indicator went from −0.01 to −0.28. It appears that Kosovo institutions currently have 104 strategies, half of which have been drafted without any financial planification (D.  Shasha). Significant efforts are also made by the Ministry of European Integration which pushes for an alignment of legislation, strategies and public policies with the Acquis Communautaire (R. Vasolli). Conscious of the situation, the government of Kosovo has now drafted a strategy for improving policy planning and coordination; a proper policy training might also help with this process. In Kosovo, the strength and will of the government is vital, among others, in policymaking and policy implementation. 13.4.5  The Weakness of the Government and the Resulting Stagnation of the Administration As mentioned, Kosovo is a parliamentary republic, the government being the executive branch. Although Kosovo adopted a decentralisation process—mandatory under the independence plan proposed by President Ahtisaari in 2008, the main power remains in the hands of the government, as it controls the financial resources in particular. Hence, development or stagnation depends on the government’s action, especially because we observe a political instability and fragmentation of the political spectrum (R.  Beka). For instance, in 2017, a government was created by a coalition of 23 political parties and counted 5 vice prime ministers, 21 ministers and more than 80 vice-ministers and 4 national coordinators,

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making it one of the biggest governments in the world, despite the small size of the country and the numerous national and international calls for a smaller government (GAP, 2019). As a result, the government was dependent on each political party that was part of the coalition and therefore on specific interests that damaged effective governmental action. Ad-hoc decisions, the lack of coordination and overlapping of responsibilities were a serious concern. In other words, the government was weak and the situation worsened day by day and this can also be observed in the WGI which states that government effectiveness in Kosovo slightly worsened between 2013 and 2018, as the indicator, on a scale from −2.5 to +2.5 where the higher value corresponds to better governance, went from −0.38 to −0.43 (V. Rushiti). Overall, and despite the numerous issues, public administration in Kosovo is functional and delivers public goods and services to citizens. The quality of services and goods has improved since the end of the war, and the European Commission are of the opinion that the reforms are on the right track (D. Shasha). Nevertheless, it is difficult to speak about a significant efficiency improvement as the number of public employees has constantly increased in the last 20 years. Available statistics from the Ministry of Finance show that from 2007 to 2019, the number of public employees went from 75,394 to 85,963, without counting several thousand employees who are not on payroll or who work with special service contracts, or several other thousand still working for state-owned enterprises despite massive privatisations, and it is impossible to know whether all the agencies’ employees are reflected in these statistics. Exact statistics are very difficult to be found because there is an issue of transparency and accountability especially when it comes to this tool that is public employment for politicians. In all cases, the OECD estimates that public employment represents 30.8% of total employment in Kosovo. According to Kusari (2017), the administration exists and functions; it delivers services to citizens but is heavily politicised and bureaucratic. Because of the political situation and government weakness, public administration has fulfilled its duties but has not been proactive. The next section will highlight some of the key issues encountered in the process of rebuilding public administration in Kosovo and will attempt to identify some potential lessons.

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13.5   Possible Lessons Did Kosovo manage to rebuild a professional public administration and democratic, transparent and accountable institutions where the rule of law is respected? This section attempts to give answers to that question. The two main paradigms that were mostly applied at the time when Kosovo reconstruction took place, namely the liberal peace and the good governance agenda influenced international organisations that were in charge of the process in Kosovo. Tired of communism and violence, Kosovans fully embraced these ideas. However, in practice, the results are very different and essential lessons can be learned from the Kosovo case. First, the implementation of one-size-fits-all models has its limits. The slow deployment of UNMIK staff, its lack of knowledge of the context and cultural aspects, as well as in some cases a lack of professionalism, combined with the difficulties to operate due to the size of the mission and to the lack of coordination among different stakeholders has had severe consequences in rebuilding fully functional and effective institutions in Kosovo (B. Luzha). The international community cannot copy-­ paste models; it should take into consideration local realities and avoid failures such as the privatisation process in Kosovo (Dobra & de Vries, 2018). Taking advantage of UNMIK difficulties, a proportion of armed men and women who fought the war wanted their fair share that led to a massive occupation of public administration institutions with unqualified and unskilled staff. UNMIK and the international community tolerated such actions. Consequently, the public sector grew massively to create a situation of overlapping responsibilities and unnecessary bureaucracy (R. Beka; A. Loxha). A similar phenomenon can be observed in most of the post-conflict states. Second, public administration has been seized by particular individuals and groups. The new elite has used the public sector as a tool to win elections and tighten its grip on the system, while at the same time employing family members and political militants, which is a form of corruption, as well as for monetary gains through public tenders and corruption practices. Under such circumstances, meritocracy, public sector reform and the idea of building a professional public administration did not take place. Priority should be given to reforming the recruitment process as well as the education system which does not provide enough highly qualified personnel (R. Gjinovci). Recruitment could, for instance, be centralised and include representatives from international organisations to avoid nepotism

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and cronyism (V.  Rushiti; D.  Shasha). The depoliticisation of public administration should be a priority for future governments by installing performance tools, effective and applicable punitive measures which lead to dismissals and prosecution of individuals who exert political influence. Third, while advocating timidly for good governance, the international community gave priority to political stability rather than firmly promoting and implementing good governance and, through it, achieving stability. By doing so, it created an environment where the rule of law is undermined, corruption and criminal activities are tolerated instead of being punished. Although Kosovo has developed good quality legislation, its implementation and application are weak mostly because of an unfunctional and politicised judicial system. Overall, Kosovo scores low on good governance indicators such as government effectiveness, rule of law and the control of corruption or regulatory quality (Dobra & de Vries, 2016). The lack of enforcement of the rule of law in Kosovo is best illustrated by the fact that many members of Parliament smoke cigarettes inside the Parliament building where a law prohibiting smoking in indoor public places has been approved. This illustrates the perception of the rule of law and the idea that the law is seen as a recommendation but not an obligation. The rule of law should have priority as it conditions the rebuilding of professional, democratic, transparent and accountable institutions. Fourth, the government’s weakness is a major issue especially when it comes to policymaking or painful reforms such as public administration reform. The lack of a driving force or a reform champion within the government has slowed down the progress of state-building in Kosovo (D. Shasha). In a situation of government weakness and absence of punitive measures, the performance and effectiveness of government and public administration are strongly visible. In such circumstances, long-term policies and development suffer because of ad-hoc policymaking, special interests’ satisfaction as well as lack of coordination between stakeholders; it has been observed that whenever cooperation between institutions is required, the level of bureaucracy significantly increases, delaying policy implementation (Q. Marmullakaj). The international community should not support politicians who guarantee short-term peace and stability while they block reforms, seize the state and approve corruption. Lastly, CSOs have gradually been rebuilt with the assistance and funding of international donors. In Kosovo where good governance and the rule of law are enshrined in the legal framework but not implemented, CSOs play a significant role as they seek transparency, make scandals

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public and try to hold government and public officials accountable. Further attention should be paid to the reinforcement of the civil society as the latter not only helps to increase awareness among the population but also puts pressure on governments to deliver on transparency, accountability and overall good governance and democracy. While discussing fundamental principles, local stakeholders must take their responsibilities and be held accountable for their actions. The same should apply to international stakeholders. International staff members should not automatically benefit from immunity as such practices guarantee impunity and therefore increases the chances for bad governance. Although mentioned earlier, international donors must review their missions and mechanisms of coordination among themselves and with local stakeholders. Indeed, there is a serious criticism on the lack of coordination among donors, each of them having an agenda, as well as the need to justify their work to their own taxpayers, which often leads to short-term programmes (2–3 years), without a detailed diagnosis of the conditions and needs of the country, of the potential obstacles and ability to provide sustainable aid (Woodward, 2011; Rondinelli, 2006, Walle & Scott, 2011).

13.6   Conclusions This chapter assessed the rebuilding of public administration in post-war Kosovo. Kosovo is an interesting case as many public administration related aspects happened for the first time in history: NATO intervention, a UN mission governing a country and an EU rule of law mission. In the aftermath of the Kosovo war, the international community had good intentions to rebuild democratic institutions that promote and guarantee individual rights, transparency and accountability, in other words, to promote good governance and socio-economic development. Nevertheless, the implementation of such plans turned out to be more complicated than expected. Most of the interviewees indicated that the effectiveness and performance of the government and public administration, as well as the rule of law, are weak in Kosovo. Arguably, significant progress has been made in rebuilding public administration in Kosovo. However, 20 years after the war, public administration in Kosovo can be described as oversized, highly politicised, lacks professionalism and is not accountable. Also, the system is used for personal and political interests. Public institutions are the main employer in Kosovo and as such are used to buy social peace and to distribute public

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money to particular groups of people through corruption and mismanagement. Unemployment remains high, and poverty and inequalities have increased. As a result, between 2008 and 2018, 529,647 citizens or 30% of the Kosovo population has immigrated to Western Europe (EPIC, 2019). Highly qualified personnel such as doctors, nurses or engineers are leaving the country in search of a better life, a place where meritocracy has priority over connections, a place where the rule of law is respected. The Kosovo conflict led to the establishment of a set of institutions managed by external players who delivered an “imperfect” job as they created a governance system which was and still is used to accommodate the newly established local elites and to protect their interests. Even today, these elites do not have a real interest in improving public administration’s performance because such a move would endanger the existing system. Rebuilding public administration in the aftermath of war takes time, financial resources and continuous efforts (R.  Ukimeraj; R.  Vasolli). An effective reform of public administration in Kosovo requires a mindset change, a new generation of politicians, policymakers and young leaders who can make bold decisions, including reorganising and downsizing the administration. In Kosovo, there was a perception that the elections of 6 October 2019 could mark a change as the winning parties had promised to give priority to the rule of law and cross-sectoral reforms. If in the past, the international community had given priority to political stability over good governance and functional institutions, the EU had the opportunity and potential to support the new government by assisting when needed and by using the EU perspective to require profound reforms, including the reform of public administration. Because of a lack of alignment with regard to the dialogue Kosovo-Serbia between the United States and the EU on one side, and the United States and Kosovo government on the other, the reformist government fell during the Covid-19 pandemic. As a result, the old parties and elites are back to business as usual, but the popular support for the reformist politicians has significantly increased. The recent backward steps show that for the time being even the option of possible EU accession seems to be an insufficient motivation for current Kosovo elites to make significant progress in public administration reforms. Kosovo remains a potential candidate for EU accession, but the repetitive EU failures to deliver on matters that are important to Kosovo citizens such as visa liberalisation, EULEX’s lack of results in combatting crime and corruption or the lack of recognition of Kosovo as an independent state by five EU states have weakened the leverage of EU towards Kosovo

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government. Time will tell whether a new government in Kosovo will make the historical change Kosovans have been waiting for during the last 20 years and whether the EU membership possibility will become a critical factor in the future and boost reforms in public administration.

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Marenin, O. (2014). Styles Of Policing and Economic Development In African States. Public Administration and Development, 34(3), 149–161. Menocal, A.  R. (2011). The “Good Governance” Agenda and Its Discontents. Presented at Overseas Development Institute 13 June 2011. Métais, S. (2006). Histoire des Albanais: Des Illyriens à l’indépendance du Kosovo. Fayard. Meyer, M.  J. (2003). The Role of Governance and Public Administration in Developing a Foundation for Participatory, Peace-Sustaining Governance. In Reconstructing Governance and Public Administration for Peaceful, Sustainable Development (pp. 41–61). United Nations. Pasquier, M., & Villeneuve, J. (2007). Organizational Barriers to Transparency. International Review of Administrative Sciences, 73(1), 147–162. Rexha, A. (2018). Policy Report 02/2018. Policymaking Cycle in Kosovo: A View on Systemic Challenges and Potential Reform Directions. Group for Legal and Political Studies. Richmond, O.  P. (2006). The Problem of Peace: Understanding the ‘Liberal Peace’. Conflict, Security & Development, 6(3), 291–314. Rondinelli, D.  A. (2006). Reforming Public Administration in Post-conflict Societies: Implications for International Assistance. USAID. Vries, M. S. (2016). Understanding Public Administration. Palgrave Macmillan. Walle, S. V., & Scott, Z. (2011). The Political Role of Service Delivery in State-­ Building: Exploring the Relevance of European History for Developing Countries. Development Policy Review, 29(1), 5–21. Woodward, S.  L. (2011). State-Building for Peace-Building What Theory and Whose Role? In P. Fortunato & R. Kozul-Wright (Eds.), Securing Peace: State-­ Building and Economic Development in Post-conflict Countries (pp.  87–112). Bloomsbury Academic.

CHAPTER 14

Serbia: Stumbling Through to Better Compliance but Worse Performance Dmitry D. Pozhidaev

14.1   Introduction: Serbia’s Conflict Transformation—From External to Internal Serbia is a curious case sui generis of a (post-)conflict country. One may wonder if Serbia is indeed a post-conflict country. It has seen a fair share of conflicts between 1991 and 2000, which involved a bloody and tragic civil war in 1991–1996 (that engulfed the three former Yugoslav republics of Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia) and the Kosovo crisis in 1998–1999. These events delayed the Serbian government’s reforms for almost a decade. But this time lag was relatively short, and as Nemec and Vries (2012) point out, there were some other latecomers in Central and Eastern Europe. After the toppling of Slobodan Milošević’s regime in 2000, Serbia embarked on wide-ranging political, economic and social reforms, in line with its officially proclaimed goal of joining the European Union (EU) (Gevorkyan, 2018). Against this background, there appears to be

D. D. Pozhidaev (*) United Nations Capital Development Fund, Kampala, Uganda e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 J. Nemec, P. S. Reddy (eds.), Public Administration in Conflict Affected Countries, Governance and Public Management, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74966-8_14

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something “Orientalist” in the sense implied by Said (1979) when Serbia is labelled as “post-conflict”. At times, such categorisation appears to stem from very specific interpretations of past events from the perspective of Serbia’s otherness and primitiveness (Bakić-Hayden, 1995). However, in some important sense, Serbia may be described not just as a post-conflict country, but as a country in conflict—not so much in conflict with the external world as in the 1990s, but in conflict with itself. The fault lines dividing the society are caused by opposing interpretations and beliefs about the Yugoslav civil war of 1991–1996 and its legacy extending to the Kosovo quagmire and possible solution alternatives; the challenge of democratisation and emergence of a “party state” (Pešić, 2007); its long-term strategic political orientation and alliances (Staletović, 2019). This bigger picture helps understand Serbia’s ambivalent attitude, despite its official rhetoric, to some international institutions, including the European Union. Serbia’s political establishment is divided on the issue of EU membership, and a recent reputable public opinion poll indicates widespread Euro-scepticism, with only 30% of the respondents believing that the country should orient itself towards the EU (Alvarado, 2019). Nevertheless, the EU integration process, with all its limitations, has been the defining feature of Serbia’s public administration reform (PAR) for over the past 10 years. This chapter considers the outcomes of the reforms as a series of compromises between three partly coinciding but partly contradictory trends: (1) the official pro-European agenda and the need for formal compliance with the accession requirements; (2) the internal political dynamic that views progressive European integration as a threat to the interests of political elites and even to the national interests; and (3) the genuine need for a modern, more efficient and client-oriented public administration. Despite Serbia’s characterisation as a “(post-)conflict” country, neither the post-conflict state-building agenda in general (see, e.g., Bogdandy et al. (2005) for a useful summary captured in the title) nor the tri-partite explanatory framework for government reforms offered by Brinkerhoff (2005)—reconstituting legitimacy, re-establishing security and rebuilding effectiveness—are particularly relevant or helpful for understanding governance reforms in Serbia. Through the crises, the state legitimacy remained relatively strong, its monopoly on the use of violence was relatively intact, and there was no major breakdown in the delivery of basic public services. Rather, the overall theoretical perspective adopted here is grounded in new institutionalism, particularly its strand known as “new institutional economics” (Furubotn & Richter, 2005). The following points are of

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particular importance to the ensuing discussion (North, 1990): (1) social institutions represent a combination of formal and informal rules of the game; (2) institutions establish a stable structure to reduce uncertainty, but it is not necessarily efficient or optimal and creates space to incorporate informal rules; (3) public bureaucracy is not separate from politics and its shape and content reflect the same strategies, interests and resources that drive the overall political process; (4) decisions taken by the public sector agencies are not necessarily motivated by considerations of productive efficiency and public interest; and (5) institutions typically change incrementally, but even discontinuous changes are embedded in informal constraints and are never completely discontinuous. This framework is superimposed on the current global and regional trend of the rise of illiberal non-meritocratic capitalist systems. The key difference from the Western liberal meritocratic system is the stifling of genuine political and economic competition as well as a capture of the state by bureaucratic and business elites merged into one politico-capitalist class (Milanović, 2019). This chapter makes a twofold argument. One is that Serbia is sliding towards such a socio-economic system (or probably has never left this path as Mujanović (2018) argues), which explains many peculiarities of its public administration. The other is that the current state of the country’s public administration is to a large extent an outcome of an ever-present tension about the EU integration and an ambiguous role that the EU has played and continues to play in shaping Serbia’s public institutions and policies.

14.2   Two Decades of Reforming and European Integration: Are We There Yet? By the time Milošević’s regime fell in 2000, Serbia’s public administration—inherited from the 1990s—had been in a rather poor condition. The gap between the demand for modern public services and the public sector’s capacity was widening, resulting in a reduced quality and scope of public services. Demoralised, under-appreciated, poorly managed and paid, public administration struggled to attract an adequately qualified cadre. Similarly to the other Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) countries, public sector reforms in Serbia, after 2000, started on the wave of overall democratisation, to be later put in a more formal framework of the EU

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accession (Bouckaert et al., 2011). This process included three successive phases of public sector reforms. The first phase (2000–2004), called by Džinić (2011) as “re(dis)orientation”, started with the first democratically elected government of the Democratic Opposition of Serbia, which declared reforms of public administration as one of its main goals. However, in the absence of a clearly formulated strategy, the reforms did not produce significant results. Nevertheless, this period laid the foundation for the next phase of reforms launched in 2004. The second phase (2004–2013) started with the adoption of the first PAR Strategy (called the State Administration Reform Strategy, or SARS) in 2004 (incidentally, four years before Croatia adopted its Strategy of State Administration Reform). The 2004 strategy focused primarily on setting up a legal framework. In line with Serbia’s European orientation, the strategy declared the principles of organisation and functioning of public administration in the EU countries as the model and the ultimate objective of PAR in Serbia. The strategy identified six key reform areas, including decentralisation, fiscal decentralisation, building a professional civil service, new organisational and management framework, introduction of information technology and control mechanisms. However, many planned reforms were significantly delayed or not implemented at all due to the lack of funding, poorly functioning institutional framework and, even more importantly, lack of political will, design and implementation capacity of the responsible agencies and political interruptions (Džinić, 2011: 1080). After signing the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU in 2008, and in line with its obligation to harmonise its legislation with the acquis Communautaire, the government revised its PAR strategy and adopted a new action plan for 2009–2012. This period saw the adoption of strategic frameworks and laws to regulate public administration in three areas: general conditions of public service (Law on Civil Service), structure of the central government (Law on State Administration, Law on Ministries, Law on Public Enterprises), and local government structure, functioning and financing (Law on Territorial Organisation, amended Law on Local Self-Government, Law on Local Government Finance, Law on Local Elections). Whereas the two phases of PAR in 2004–2013 strengthened the legal and regulatory environment, they also revealed some fundamental weaknesses of the reforms: lack of strategic planning, coordination and management, inadequate implementation capacity and political interference

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̵ (Đordević , 2011: 913). The limited scope of the reforms (focus on the legal framework and central government administration) and the lack of clear and measurable time-bound objectives were also much criticised (Džinić, 2011). Faced with more specific and comprehensive requirements of the EU negotiation process launched in 2014, the government adopted, in January 2014, a new PAR strategy, which marked the beginning of the third phase of PAR. Adoption of the strategy also coincided with a more robust EU approach to the accession requirements reflected in the SIGMA Principles of Public Administration issued in 2014. The strategy has a broader scope, expanding from around 25,000 central government staff to around 500,000 public administration employees. The strategy unequivocally links the country’s PAR and the EU accession: “The Government sees the public administration reform and European integration as two interconnected processes”. This fits with the EU’s “Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2014–2015”, which identified PAR (although there is no specific acquis chapter) as one of the three “fundamentals” of the strategy, along with the rule of law and economic governance. The overall objective of the PAR strategy is to “improve the ability of the public sector to deliver high quality services to citizens and business entities, as well as significantly contribute to the economic stability, and increase of the living standard”. The five specific objectives include: improvement of organisational and functional sub-systems of PA, introduction of harmonised public service system relying on merits and improvement of HR management, enhancement of public finance and public procurement management, enhancement of legal certainty and upgrading of business environment and quality of PA services, and improvement of transparency, ethical and responsible approach in discharging the PA duties. While an improvement over the 2004 strategy, the 2014 PAR strategy is still considered by the EU to have failed to clearly identify and conceptualise the intended reforms (including a clear definition of the scope of the public administration to be addressed and a selection of prioritised problems to address from among all issues identified) and to define corresponding outcome-level measurements. The mid-term evaluation of the PAR found that the implementation progress of the strategy by the end of 2017 was limited (on average only 23% of targets of the 2015–2017

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Action Plan were achieved), although the achievement rate by early 2019 was estimated at around 50%. The progress of the reforms should be considered in the context of the Serbian government’s arrangements. Serbia is a parliamentary republic where executive power is vested in the government, led by the prime minister appointed by the parliament. Yet, the existing legislation leaves enough vaguely identified scope for the president’s executive authority to allow his intervention in the government’s work. This legal ambiguity fits well with the prediction of the new institutional theory about the space intentionally created by formal institutions to accommodate informal rules. In today’s Serbia, the president overshadows the prime minister (who does not have her own power base) and is playing a de-facto role of the head of government. Serbia’s central government consists of 18 sector ministries and a number of public agencies. Introduced during the first phase of the country’s PAR in 2001, public agencies, with varying degrees of independence and delegation by the government, have proliferated over the past 15 years, resulting in about 37 public agencies as of today. The exact number is a matter of some debate due to the legal ambiguity of the status of a public agency (Milenković & Milenković, 2013). By the number of ministries, Serbia is slightly above the EU average of 15, and by the number of other central government agencies, it is at the lower end of the EU range (Thijs et al., 2017). With 133,592 employees as of October 2019, Serbia’s central government accounts for 22% of the total public sector employment, and this share has been fairly stable for the past five years. The public sector has shed some workforce in the process of fiscal consolidation, resulting in a 4% decrease of the total public sector size. The public administration (inclusive of two autonomous provinces—Vojvodina and Kosovo and Metohija) has remained at approximately the same level, whereas the public state enterprises (i.e., central government agencies) have lost about 14% of their workforce. Serbia’s ratio of public officials per 1000 inhabitants has slightly increased over the past five years as the downsizing and other consolidation measures have been offset by the negative population growth, but remains at the EU average of about 89. The total size of the public sector by expenditure—32.6% of the GDP in 2018—compares favourably to the EU average of 48.5% during the same year. The central government’s budget accounted for 22% of the GDP, slightly below the EU average of 25% the same year, including 7.5%

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for employee compensation, which was further driven down to 6.8% in 2019. Another meaningful financial indicator is the general government final consumption expenditure, which is a proxy for the value of the services delivered by the government. By this indicator, Serbia was not far from the EU average of 20.5% of the GDP, recording 17% in 2016, according to the National Statistical Office. As this discussion demonstrates, Serbia’s public sector and its central government specifically are within the EU parameters by size of their budget and numbers. This, of course, says nothing about the quality and scope of the government’s services, nor is it a testimony of the appropriateness and efficiency of the existing governmental structures, the more so that the EU itself records great variability in these indicators, ranging, for example, from 11 ministries in Cyprus to 26 in Romania. As the Serbian government itself recognises, rather self-critically, in a position paper published in 2005, that  the (existing) cumbersome, expensive and inert administrative structure leaves no space for investments, economic development programmes and satisfying the dynamic needs of citizens. As in other EU member states (and other enlargement countries), it is the “Centre of Government” (CoG) which is responsible for the coordination of administrative reforms. In the case of Serbia, it is the Office of the Prime Minister that presides over the PAR Council (PARC) established in 2016, which is in charge of the PAR strategic and political management (Fig.  14.1). The council is supported by the Inter-Ministerial Project Group (IMPG) at the level of secretaries of the ministries responsible for expert coordination and monitoring of the PAR implementation. On the operational level, the Ministry of Public Administration and Local Self-Government (MPALGS) is responsible for PAR implementation and coordination. In total, there are 16 various government bodies in charge of implementing the PAR strategy, notably the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Justice and Ministry of European Integration to address the financial and legal aspects of the reform as well as its compliance with the EU standards. In the background, the EU is a major stakeholder in the PAR process. The EU accession requirements are determining the overall content of the PAR strategy at the level of principles, objectives and expected results. PAR action plans are based on the SIGMA indicators and incorporate many of them in the PAR monitoring framework. Regular SIGMA technical assistance missions, with their observations and recommendations, have been part and parcel of the implementation progress, which is

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Fig. 14.1  PAR coordination structure. (Source: Author)

reflected in the EU Commission’s annual country reports. Last, but not least, the EU is the principal financier of the reforms, having pledged €80 million for 2017–2020, whereas the government financed just 46% of the PAR activities in 2018. What are the results of this “Euro-push”?

14.3   A Widening Gap Between Public Sector Regulation and Performance: The Rise of Political Capitalism and a Party State 14.3.1  Robust Regulations and… Serbia’s legal basis for the horizontal and vertical scope of the civil service is described as “solid” and the material scope of the civil service as “well defined, encompassing all employment relations and management of civil servants” (SIGMA, 2017: 61–62). The key laws regulating the scope of the civil service at the central level are the Law on State Administration (LSA), the Law on Civil Service and the Law on the Salaries of Civil Servants and Employees. The Law on Civil Service and the supporting

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secondary legislation regulate all necessary HRM aspects, from the principles and classification of civil service to recruitment and selection, the rights and obligations of civil servants, their remuneration, professional development and so on. The state administration (i.e., the central government) employs political appointees (high-ranking officials appointed by the government) and two types of professional staff: civil servants and clerks, the latter being responsible for technical tasks. There are two types of appointments: permanent and fixed term. The latter is intended to address time-bound specific tasks due to a temporary absence of a permanent contract holder, a temporary surge in the workload and so on. However, this type of contracting has become more widespread against the background of staff ceilings imposed by the Law on the Maximum Number of Employees in the Public Sector in 2015 and most recently extended until the end of 2019. Temporary appointments, which have increased by 60% in the past five years (Blic, 2019), allow bypassing the legal restrictions while minimising the need for competitive recruitment. The material conditions of civil servants have been improving (albeit unevenly as is explained further). Public sector wages have consistently remained 10–50% above private sector wages in 2010–2019. The disparities are particularly large with public enterprises, where the salaries may be 50% more, and with government administration, which outperforms the private sector by about 30%. Serbia’s average wage in 2019 was RSD 54,115 much closer to the public sector average than to the private sector average, reflecting the disparity as well as a high share of the former in total official employment (almost one-third). As is the case with the other aspects of central government functioning, the legal system for civil service salaries is fair, clear and transparent, albeit the implementation of the Law on the Salary System in the Public Sector has been postponed three times, most recently until 2020, since its adoption in 2016. Three important planned changes are yet to be effected: inclusion of the security sector in a common salary system, introduction of one common base salary and determination of common coefficients for each position to reflect the job complexity rather than it belonging to a particular ministry or sector. The PAR period after 2008 (and particularly after the adoption of the new SAR Strategy) has seen steady legal and regulatory improvements in fairness, openness, transparency and accountability of the public sector. The Law on Civil Service embeds the principles of equality and

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non-­discrimination while also encouraging positive discrimination for candidates from disadvantaged groups. Competitive merit-based recruitment has become a norm; annual performance appraisals are also well regulated. Anti-corruption measures are included in the Law on Civil Service and Code of Conduct for Civil Servants, and further elaborated in the Law on the Prevention of Corruption adopted in May 2019. A rather elaborate system, comprising a number of institutions and processes, underpins central government policymaking, including for the European integration process. The Public Policy Secretariat (PPS), established in 2014, is tasked with providing support to the government in the planning, development, adoption and coordination of public policies and implementation of the regulatory reform. The PPS focuses on three functions: support to the planning and coordination of public policies, support to the development and economic analyses of public policies and quality control of public policies and laws during the development stage. A new law on the planning system, from 2018, contributed to an improved strategic planning system, setting out clear rules for developing, monitoring and reporting on sector strategies. 14.3.2  …Declining Performance As the previous discussion confirms, Serbia has developed a robust, solid and well-defined (with some relatively minor exceptions) legal and regulatory framework for the public sector, highly compliant with the requirements of the European Administrative Space (EAS) and EU legal acqui (the latest SIGMA report for 2019 ranks Serbia at 3 or 4 out of 5 for 9 out of the 11 indicators assessed). Yet, the fundamental factors, highlighted by new institutional economics and discussed in the introduction, have not allowed a commensurate improvement in the effectiveness and efficiency of the public administration and the overall government performance (despite an undeniable overall progress in the World Bank’s government effectiveness indicator from 47.6 in 2008 to 56.7 in 2018). Serbia is lagging across all governance indicators, not only behind the OECD countries (which with 22 EU members serve as a proxy for the EU), but also behind its regional peers—Croatia and Slovenia. The lag is particularly noticeable in three indicators—voice and accountability, rule of law and control of corruption—where the difference with the OECD countries is close to 100%.

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The discrepancy between the legal framework and its practical application is a well-known phenomenon in the context of public administration reforms, particularly in transition countries, commonly referred to as the “challenge of implementation” (see Dunn et al. 2006 for a comprehensive analysis of implementation challenges in CEE countries). In practical terms, the full potential impact of the laws and regulations is restricted by their partial or selective application. As the nineteenth-century Russian satirist Mikhail Saltykov-Shchedrin quipped about the Russian legal system, “the severity of existing laws is alleviated by the lack of obligation to fulfil them”. 14.3.3  What Factors Are at Work? Several factors have been at work. As could be expected, informal, culturally embedded rules of the game have persisted, proving to be much harder to change than formal legal arrangements. As Dahrendorf (1990: 92–93) suggested, it takes “roughly six months to adopt a constitution, six years to build a market economy, but sixty years to develop social foundations for democratic institutions in general”. Having studied the impact of culture of the PAR in Serbia, Mojić et al. (2018: 665) come to a conclusion that Serbia is characterised by a strong “power culture”, which encourages dependence on superiors, paternalistic expectations and shirking responsibility. In their opinion, these cultural traits undermine reforms aiming at a merit-based, impartial and fair public administration. Admittedly, there is some risk of falling into yet another Orientalist trap by interpreting Serbia’s cultural bias towards collectivism and egalitarianism in exclusively negative terms to blame it for the lack of its progress in PAR. However, most analysts agree that the lingering political culture of a one-party rule, combined with a spoils system, is producing an adverse effect on PAR reforms and on the public sector in general. As indicated in the introduction, this phenomenon is given different names: a party state ̵ (Pešić, 2007), partocracy (Đordević , 2011), political capitalism (Milanović, 2019) or competitive authoritarianism (Bieber, 2018). However, the essence is the same—a system where the state is captured not by an autocratic ruler and his (semi)criminal clique, as was the case under Milošević, but by an oligopolistic political structure consisting of a small number of the parties belonging to the government coalition. These parties operate as enterprises with an objective to maximise access to public resources through the means of political power and establish a vertical system of

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government from the national level down to cities and municipalities staffed with their loyalists, considered as party “employees”. As is the case with any oligopoly, the objective is to “cartelize” the participants’ common interest in appropriating public goods, institutions and public services (Pešić, 2007) and to extract political and economic rent by stifling genuine political competition as well as by blocking new entrants to the political market. In such a system, important decisions are taken through an informal non-transparent process of reconciling party interests and outside official institutions, which serve as merely a rubber stamp. The 2019 European Commission report emphasises “an urgent need to create more space for genuine cross-party debate” in the context of the ruling coalition’s parliamentary practices that have led to “a deterioration of legislative debate and scrutiny, and undermined the Parliament’s oversight of the executive”. Whereas de-politicisation and professionalisation of public administration is one of the stated objectives of the 2014 PAR Strategy, the evaluation report of the PAR Action Plan 2015–2017 expresses a concern about further politicisation of the PA management during this period. New institutional economics postulates that public bureaucracy is inseparable from politics, and public bureaus are created for certain political objectives. In this sense, the structure and modus operandi of the Serbian public administration has been gradually adapting to the political imperatives of a “party state”, where the principal-agent challenge is addressed by merging the principals and agents together in a symbiotic political bureaucracy structure. The existing legal loopholes make cartelisation of Serbian politics even easier. As already discussed before, the top bureaucratic positions are not subject to a competitive recruitment process at all, whereas with respect to the other positions, the head of the institution is not legally required to select the highest-ranked candidate. Furthermore, “the head of the institution does not need to provide a justification and has no deadline… and can even reject the list of three candidates provided by the selection committee and request a new competition” (SIGMA, 2017: 71). The legal loopholes are exacerbated by selective application of legal provisions and, in combination, undermine the credibility of the stated principle of meritocracy in public administration, opening it up to political interference. As the SIGMA report (2017) indicates, the entire promotion system in practice is still not based on merit due to the lack of a mandatory internal competition, dysfunctional operation of the performance appraisal system and broad discretion of the managers. The provision in the law that

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allows appointments to “acting positions” for six months (with a maximum extension of three months) has been often misused to avoid competitive merit-based recruitment. The European Parliament brief, tellingly called “Serbia at risk of authoritarianism?”, notes that “the National Assembly is failing to exercise effective oversight”, pointing to several worrying trends, such as an increasing number of laws passed with less and less debate. The oversight function of the National Assembly has been further undermined by the boycott of parliamentary debates by the opposition parties since February 2019 out of frustration at their exclusion from meaningful participation in parliamentary work. As the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index (BTI) Project reports, “advice from independent state bodies, such as the Fiscal Council, State Audit Institution or Anti-Corruption Council, are not seriously taken into account or are disregarded”. With the parliamentary oversight function and other control mechanisms in decline, government accountability has become an issue of serious concern. Since the current government was installed in 2017, different scandals, in which high-level members of the ruling coalition (including the ministers of defence, interior and finance) are implicated, have fol̵ lowed one after another. However, as Đordević (2011: 932) argued some time back, “dependent position of the prosecution bodies hinders the processing of possible criminal activities of the government members… and prosecution happens only with the change of government”. The situation has not changed since then as the office of the public prosecutor has recently dismissed several high-profile criminal cases against representatives of the ruling coalition. In fact, the president weighed in himself in one such case (the so-called “afera Krušik” related to arms sales, in which the Minister of Interior was reportedly involved) to say that he had studied the case personally and did not find anything criminal. Praising the quality of Serbia’s anti-corruption legislation, the latest EU report on Serbia stresses that “corruption is prevalent in many areas and remains an issue of concern”. Despite a high-quality law on protection of whistle-blowers, the process of receiving protection for whistle-blowers is in reality coupled with many obstacles, the most recent example being the arrest of the whistle-­blower in the already mentioned case of Krušik for allegedly disclosing commercially sensitive information. The BTI report of 2018 characterises the actual implementation of anti-corruption legal and regulatory frameworks in Serbia as “a far cry from being satisfying”, noting the lack

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of political will to actually eradicate corruption as the biggest challenge because it “will close many opportunities for personal gains of officials”. Viewed dynamically, Serbia has regressed on all key governance indicators since 2014. The regress is particularly noticeable in two indicators (a drop of about 10 percentage points): voice and accountability, and control of corruption. Serbia has slipped from 41 points out of 100 in 2014 on the Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index to 39  in 2018. Unsurprisingly, in the context of the previous discussion, the only governance indicator that is steadily improving is regulatory quality (from 55.77  in 2014 to 56.25  in 2018). To express this trend in quantitative terms, there is a slightly negative correlation between regulatory quality (the independent variable) and the government’s performance (adjusted R2  =  −0.39) and a moderately negative correlation between regulatory quality and voice and accountability (adjusted R2 = −0.47). Although both correlations happen to be statistically significant, this is of course not to say that there is a causal relationship between improved regulation and deteriorating government performance. Rather, this reflects the disconnect between regulation and its actual application. In 2019, the US-based NGO, Freedom House, downgraded Serbia from the category of “free” countries to “partly free”. Freedom House justifies this status downgrade by “deterioration in the conduct of elections, continued attempts by the government and allied media outlets to undermine independent journalists through legal harassment and smear campaigns, and President Aleksandar Vučić’s de-facto accumulation of executive powers that conflict with his constitutional role”. No wonder that an increasing number of Serbs express disappointment and mistrust in government institutions, especially among the younger generation. The government, parliament and the president are competing for losing the hearts of the young (Mitić, 2020): 63% among those between 15 and 30 years old do not trust the government, 58% do not trust the parliament and a record 60% place no or little trust in the president (only two percentage points above NATO, to put the figures in perspective). This summarises the current state of Serbia’s public sector: advancing in legal and regulatory terms, but reducing its performance and losing the confidence of its citizens, particularly the younger ones.

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14.4   Serbia’s Accession… to Where? The introductory section makes reference to three fault lines running through the Serbian society: interpretations and beliefs about the Yugoslav civil war of 1991–1996 and its legacy; the Kosovo quagmire and possible solution alternatives; the challenge of democratisation and emergence of a “party state”; its long-term strategic political orientation and alliances. It has also been mentioned that the public sector reform agenda has been only partially owned nationally and to a large extent driven by the EU accession requirements. As already discussed, public bureaucracy is not separate from politics and its shape and content reflect the same strategies, interests and resources that drive the political process in general. In this respect, the above conflicts influence, to a varying degree, not so much the shape of the government or its overall strategy (this of course has to be in line with the requirements of the European Administrative Space and EU legal acqui), but its actual content and functioning. The previous discussion demonstrates that the discrepancy between the shape/strategy and performance is indeed the key challenge for Serbia’s public sector. The three conflicts are producing a dynamic that effectively stymies (and even reverses) genuine improvements in public sector performance despite an overall improvement in laws, regulations and bureaucratic structures. At the heart of this dynamic, which may be described as a precarious balance act to satisfy external and internal actors pursuing different (and at times contradictory) interests and objectives, is the lack of a genuine commitment to a merit-based and rule-based democratic government. In this respect, the EU accession process has been as much a driver as a break on the development of the public sector. The genuine home-grown enthusiasm for public sector reforms, which characterised the early 2000s, was short-lived and replaced with formal EU accession requirements. Had the process of earnest democratisation continued, this would not have been so much of an issue (although as Dunn and his colleagues (2006) argue, partial and incomplete reform implementation has beset all countries in transition). However, the trend towards political capitalism, coupled with a lack of national ownership, has resulted in a growing divide between the official (EU compliant) rhetoric and an ambivalent attitude towards the European project in practice. This is reflected in the statements of some cabinet members, including the prime minister herself,

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who lamented “the double standards” that the EU applies for Serbia (Alvarado, 2019) as well as some opposition figures who decried EU’s “colonial tendencies”, suggesting that Serbia should withdraw from the EU negotiations altogether (Mitrović, 2019). This suspicion towards the EU political objectives vis-à-vis Serbia (and more generally, the values it promotes) is further fed by its requirement to “conclude a fully comprehensive and legally binding agreement between Serbia and Kosovo, in line with international law and EU acquis and acceptable to EU Member States and the region”, which would set the ground for an eventual recognition of Kosovo’s independence. There are certain red lines (not least Kosovo’s status as part of Serbia fixed in the Constitution) that no government would be able to cross without a dramatic political change, less so the current government with its high tolerance of a nationalist rhetoric. Serbia’s Minister of Defence recently argued that “the EU is failing to prevent the realisation of a ‘Greater Albania’ through its push for normalised Belgrade-Pristina diplomacy”, calling for a reassessment of the Serbia-EU relationship (Alvarado, 2019). With trust in the EU values thus undermined (and therefore the need for compliance with systems based on such values), the issue of political orientation comes to the front with more frequent references to alternative values. These are not necessarily the traditional values discussed by Mojić et al. (2018), but the values of political capitalism exemplified first and foremost by China and Russia. Serbia is proud of being the biggest recipient in the Balkans of Chinese investments of €1.3 billion in 2010–2019 (Dobromirović, 2019). At the end of 2019, Serbia signed a free-trade agreement with the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EES) to facilitate its growing trade with the bloc, which amounted to $3.4 billion in 2018 (RFE/RL, 2019). The latter development happened despite veiled warnings from the EU in a clear demonstration of the ruling elite’s conflicting attitude to the EU and its values. As Eror (2018) points out, the EU leverage over the government is also limited as “EU officials are wary of exerting too much pressure on Vučić lest he look East instead”. Although some suspect this to be a clever game of leveraging Serbia’s relationship with Russia to obtain concessions from Brussels, this behavioural pattern fits well with the overall strategy of the government to keep a careful balance between opposing forces and assure as much discretionary space as possible to perpetuate a system of political capitalism embodied in a party state. But Eror (2018) makes a further point: this situation also satisfies the EU for as

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long as Serbia remains on the periphery of the Union, “Brussels is able to dissociate itself from Vucic’s antics” while benefitting from his regime as a reliable enabler of its geo-strategic goals in the Balkans. The regime offers stability in a volatile region, coupled with the “right” economic policies (such as the successfully implemented IMF austerity measures in 2015–2018) and a relatively moderate political rhetoric on relations with the neighbouring countries, including Kosovo. Between principles and real politik, the latter prevails on both sides.

14.5   Conclusions As the practice elsewhere in the region and in the world demonstrates, public administrations may be kept in a semi-reformed state for a long time, with policy and regulatory advancement producing little effect on their real functioning and performance (Peters, 2008; Nemec & Vries, 2012). When the regime delivers on its key promises of socio-economic well-being in the context of the social contract, this results in a relatively stable equilibrium. The global and regional context should not be ignored either. A decline in governance indicators is not unique to Serbia. Some other countries in the region (e.g., Hungary, Greece, Italy, Spain) are also demonstrating a downward trend in the past five years. With the EU ambivalent attitude to its own enlargement and hollowing-out of the enlargement process (and no party in a particular hurry to finalise this process in the case of Serbia), the EU leverage extends only so far. In addition, EU’s half-hearted support to enlargement has been, on its own, sometimes counterproductive to substantive reform because of its preoccupation with box-ticking exercises and has resulted in institutional overcomplexity for some Western Balkans nations. Furthermore, after the accession the future of public administration reforms is even bleaker: as Bouckaert et  al. (2011: 27) point out, following the accession to the EU, “the ex-ante control of the European Commission was replaced with much weaker instruments of ex-­ post control in the case of non-implementation or delayed implementation”, reducing the willingness of the new EU members states to engage in coherent public management reforms. The conflicts dating back to the 1990s and early 2000s (starting from the ill-fated and terribly misguided “anti-bureaucratic revolution” of 1988–1990) and briefly reviewed in the Introduction continue to shape the implementation of public administration reforms, so that their

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substantive content becomes of little importance, being substituted with formal compliance indicators. These conflicts are mostly internal, between different elites and their followership, although periodic regional spillovers reaching Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo are not unusual. As this text is finalised, Serbia is inaugurating its new government, which is over 50% female. The new cabinet has pushed Serbia from the bottom of the list to among the top 10 countries when it comes to gender equality. This is an undisputable achievement. But this is also a cabinet elected by a parliament with no opposition whatsoever because of the opposition’s boycott of the last elections in June 2020. This situation is emblematic of Serbia’s public administration reforms, with their focus on formal compliance. So long as the uncertainty about the outcome of the simmering conflicts persists, the incumbent political elites retain the position to manage public administration reforms to minimise any substantive performance improvements, to protect and perpetuate their privileges. These factors do not inspire much optimism about the future of Serbia’s public sector. Without a substantive political transformation of the regime opening it up to genuine political competition and more inclusive and consensual policymaking, the public sector is likely to continue to stumble through against a background of seemingly robust laws and regulations. However, the most recent developments in Serbia, which involve a mounting wave of a protest against the partocratic system of government, may create a different dynamic altogether. The popular protests that started in 2018 and continued throughout 2019 under the slogan of “One out of Five Million” focused on issues such as greater press freedom, more political freedom and plurality, more government transparency and against corruption and perceived dictatorship of President Vučić (Jovanović, 2019). However, the government still marshals significant public support through a system of loyalists at all levels in public administration, access to the administrative resource and domination of the mass media discourse. Serbia’s overall progress towards a more effective and capable public sector over the past 20 years is undeniable, even when the most recent regressive trends are taken into account. A sound macroeconomic policy has resulted in a twofold increase in total GDP and GDP per capita between 2000 and 2018 (in constant US$), modest levels of unemployment at about 13%, stable income, inequality levels at 38–39 Gini coefficient points (albeit higher than the EU28 level) and a poverty rate of about 5%. However, a public sector, susceptible to political influence and corruption, increases the risk of reversing these achievements and slipping into what is known as a “middle-income country trap”. A genuine

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home-grown momentum for building an effective depoliticised and meritocratic public sector oriented towards results rather than processes (as is the case now) will be critical for avoiding this negative scenario and taking Serbia to the next level of development.

References Alvarado, J. (2019). Assessing Serbian Enthusiasm for EU Membership. Retrieved September 1, 2020, from https://europeelects.eu/2019/01/11/ assessing-­serbian-­enthusiasm-­for-­eu-­membership/ Bakić-Hayden, M. (1995). Nesting Orientalisms: The Case of Former Yugoslavia. Slavic Review, 54(4), 917–931. Bieber, F. (2018). Patterns of Competitive Authoritarianism in the Western Balkans. East European Politics, 34(3), 337–354. Bogdandy, A. V., Häuβler, S., Hanschmann, F., & Utz, R. (2005). State-Building, Nation-Building, and Constitutional Politics in Post-Conflict Situations: Conceptual Clarifications and an Appraisal of Different Approaches. Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, 9(1), 579–613. Bouckaert, G., Nakrošis, V., & Nemec, J. (2011). Public Administration and Management Reforms in CEE: Main Trajectories and Results. NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy, 4(1), 9–29. Brinkerhoff, D.  W. (2005). Rebuilding Governance in Failed States and Post-­ conflict Societies: Core Concepts and Cross-cutting Themes. Public Administration and Development, 25(1), 3–14. Dahrendorf, R. (1990). Reflections on the Revolution in Europe: In a Letter Intended to Have Been Sent to a Gentleman in Warsaw, 1990. Chatto & Windus. Dobromirović, M. (2019). Kineska ulaganja u Srbiju. Srpska Ekonomija, 26, 12–16. ̵ Đordević , S. (2011). Public Service Reform in Serbia. Croatian Comparative Public Administration, 11(4), 925–946. Dunn, W.  N., Staronova, K., & Puškarev, S.  G. (2006). Implementation: The Missing Link in Public Administration Reform in Central and Eastern Europe. NISPAcee. Džinić, J. (2011). Public Administration Reform in Serbia. Croatian Comparative Public Administration, 11(4), 1075–1105. Eror, A. (2018). How Aleksandar Vucic Became Europe’s Favorite Autocrat. Retrieved September 1, 2020, from https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/03/09/ how-­aleksandar-­vucic-­became-­europes-­favorite-­autocrat/ Furubotn, E.  G., & Richter, R. (2005). Institutions and Economic Theory the Contribution of the New Institutional Economic (2nd ed.). University of Michigan Press.

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Gevorkyan, A.  V. (2018). Transition Economies: Transformation, Development, and Society in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union. Routledge. Jovanović, S. M. (2019). “One out of Five Million”: Serbia’s 2018-19 Protests against Dictatorship, the Media, and the Government’s Response. Open Political Science, 2(1), 1–8. Milanović, B. (2019). Capitalism, Alone: The Future of the System That Rules the World. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Milenković, M., & Milenković, M. (2013). Administrative Reform and Debates Over Public Agencies’ Role in Serbia. Annals FLB Belgrade Law Review, LXI(3), 135–150. Mitić, A. (2020). …A mislili smo da će deca da nam rastu u demokratiji: Generacija ̵ rodena posle Petog oktobra prvi put izlazi na izbore. Retrieved September 1, 2020, from https://www.nedeljnik.rs/a-mislili-smo-da-ce-deca-da-namrastu-u-demokratiji-generacija-rodena-posle-petog-oktobra-prvi-put-izlazina-izbore/ Mitrović, M. (2019). Serbia Should Turn Its Back on EU Integration, Radulovic Says. Retrieved September 1, 2020, from https://balkaneu.com/ serbia-­should-­give-­up-­from-­eu-­integration-­radulovic-­says/ Mojić, D., Jovančević, J., & Jovančević, S. (2018). Culture and Public Administration Reforms in Postsocialist Transformation: The Case of Serbia. Sociologija, 60(3), 653–669. Mujanović, J. (2018). Hunger and Fury: The Crisis of Democracy in the Balkans. Hurst & Company. Nemec, J., & Vries, M. S. (2012). Public Sector Dynamics in Central and Eastern Europe. NISPAcee. North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge University Press. Pešić, V. (2007). Partijska država kao uzrok korupcije u Srbiji. Republika. Retrieved September 1, 2020, from https://pescanik.net/partijska-drzava-kaouzrok-korupcije-u-srbiji/ Peters, G. B. (2008). Mixes, Matches, and Mistakes: New Public Management in Russia and the Former Soviet Republics. In G. B. Peters (Ed.), Mixes, Matches, and Mistakes: New Public Management in Russia and the Former Soviet Republics. Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative, Open Society Institute. Said, E. W. (1979). Orientalism. Vintage Books. SIGMA. (2017). Monitoring Report: The Principles of Public Administration. SIGMA. Staletović, L. (2019). Izmedu̵ Istoka i Zapada. Srpska Ekonomija, 26, 24–28. Thijs, N., Hammerschmid, G., & Palaric, E. (2017). A Comparative Overview of Public Administration Characteristics and Performance in EU28. European Commission.

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̵ Blic. (2019). Broj zaposlenih “na odredeno” veći za 60 odsto. 17 November 2019. Retrieved September 1, 2020, from https://www.blic.rs/biznis/strategija/broj-zaposlenih-na-odredjeno-veci-za-60-odsto-evo-sta-je-donelazabrana-zaposljavanja/v9m65xg Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL). (2019). Serbia Signs Trade Agreement With Russia-Led Eurasian Economic Union. Retrieved September 1, 2000, from h ­ ttps://www.rferl.org/a/serbia-to-ink-trade-agreement-withrussia-led-eurasian-economic-union/30235917.html

CHAPTER 15

Ukrainian Public Administration at a Cross-Road Svitlana Khadzyradieva, Maya Sitsinska, and Sergii Slukhai

15.1   Introduction Ukraine has been in an internal conflict situation since 2013. Being disappointed by the unexpected change of the nation’s development vector towards Russia and an attempt to suppress the peaceful mass protests by use of rough force, the people succeeded in toppling the Yanukovych corrupt government after several months of bloody clashes (these events were later called the Revolution of Dignity) and created the prerequisites for returning the country to a European vector of development.

S. Khadzyradieva National Academy of Public Administration, Kyiv, Ukraine M. Sitsinska Khmelnytskyi University of Management and Law, Kyiv, Ukraine S. Slukhai (*) Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, Kyiv, Ukraine e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 J. Nemec, P. S. Reddy (eds.), Public Administration in Conflict Affected Countries, Governance and Public Management, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74966-8_15

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The Russian Federation exploited the moment of Ukraine’s institutional weakness when all the top government officers fled the country (February 2014) to annex the Crimean Peninsula (February–March 2014). In April 2014, Russia-inspired tensions in many regions of Ukraine escalated into a war that affected the Donetsk and Luhansk regions; Ukraine failed to restore authority over some territories which were called “the separate districts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions”. Russian military vehicles and convoys crossed the Ukrainian border at several locations at that time. The military and financial support from Russia for the two separatist quasi-states in the parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions is ongoing. Consequently, the internal political and social conflict developed into an external one resulting in excess of 13,000 Ukrainian military and civilian deaths, more than 1.5 million displaced persons as well as economic losses to the country in the billions of USD. In addition, both conflicts affected the country’s development and had a strong effect on the public administration sector (further referred as PA). The new national authorities formed in 2014 faced the significant risk of losing the national statehood which is why one of most important tasks of the newly formed government following snap parliamentary and presidential elections was to restore PA in the country and to cardinally reform it. The Ukrainian government had to overcome the burden of the lasting Soviet legacy through extensive efforts so a substantial move to PA reform was implemented by the signing of the Ukraine-EU Association Agreement in 2014. This laid down the cornerstone for its modern development as the country ranks among those with the lowest government efficiency and demonstrates no significant dynamics with regard to this sphere (World Bank, 2019). In the period following the Revolution of Dignity, there have been several key events that have affected PA in Ukraine, that is, both snap and regular presidential elections (2014, 2019) along with snap parliamentary elections (2014, 2019), establishing civil and military administrations, the launching of approximately 60 reforms, among which PA reforms and decentralisation of power were the most palpable ones for society in general. At the paradigm level, the main task of the PA reforms in Ukraine can be formulated as a transition from direct control of the social activity subjects to control of the factors systemically important for this activity. In other words, in the centre of democratic governance there is an informal control over those factors of social environment that determine the

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behaviour, motivation and orientation of the activities of certain subjects of political and administrative activity, which are determined by the concepts of social modernisation and information revolution. The analysis of the latter allows for the conclusion that in general the social modernisation process is considered as the acquisition of new management opportunities by the Ukrainian society and as the optimisation of the ways of social functioning where the main role is assigned to the managerial factor. In the context of Ukrainian modernisation reforms, the search and formation of an effective PA model in Ukraine have not yet been completed. Despite some undisputable achievements in PA reform since 2014 (among others the most significant are decentralisation and optimisation of administrative-territorial composition, raising the quality of the civil service, institutionalising anti-corruption policies, granting transparency within the public administration sector), the PA in Ukraine is still facing many challenges. Among them is not only a slow-down of the reforms and their incompleteness, but also the possibility of a reversal of the positive developments due to the political vulnerability of the process as a whole. There is still a risk that political bias and lack of administrative competence could create chaos in PA as has happened in some countries experiencing political turbulence.

15.2   Public Administration at the National Level: From the Past to the Present 15.2.1  Public Administration Before 2014: Applying a Rule of Thumb Similar to many other post-socialist nations, Ukrainian PA has experienced drastic changes since independence. The internal drivers of these changes are common for the entire post-socialist world: unleashing market forces after decades of command economy which requires new approaches to state regulation of economy, macroeconomic instability (or even economic decline) and the total mistrust of the population towards public institutions. PA in Ukraine has undergone many turns since independence (one of the surveys is presented in Lykhach, 2017), each of which could be attributed to some important changes to the political and economic life of the nation.

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The origin of these changes can be found in the late 1980s–early 1990s when the initial destruction of the command-administrative model and of the respective PA system started. However, the real changes to PA occurred after Ukraine gained its independence following the dissolution of the Soviet Union (1991) under the presidency of Leonid Kravchuk. The first stage in PA reform (1991–1996) was characterised by formation of the independent nation’s PA bodies. In 1991, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (furthermore CMU) as the highest PA body was institutionalised and the post of President as the head of the Executive was introduced; CMU was subordinated to the President. In 1992, 26 ministries were formed; however, the status of the other Central Executive Bodies (CEBs) remained unchanged in comparison to the Soviet era where dozens of state committees that duplicated the functions of the ministries existed. During this period an institute of public service was introduced by special law (1993) and a network of public servant training was formed. The local state administrations in the regions, districts and cities held all the power at the territorial level and had double-subordination—to the President and CMU. One of the first attempts at CEB reform was their achieving functional and branch status (1995) and building a vertical PA hierarchy (ministry— regional administrations—local administrations). The PA institutional structure and their authorities were then fixed in the Constitution and adopted in 1996. After adoption of the new Constitution, the second stage in PA evolution began (1996–2003) which is characterised by the first approach initiated by the newly-elected President Leonid Kuchma to reform PA in a systematic way (1994). The legislation on the government, CEBs, local state administrations that aimed to raise the role of the Executive under the President was adopted. However, due to political tensions between the President and Parliament, it became impossible to restructure the CEBs and to fully implement the new PA approaches. During this time, some reduction in CEB numbers occurred (the number of ministries was cut to 18), but the state committees and special CEBs with their respective duplication of administrative functions still remained. The Law “On Local State Administrations” (1999) increased their role and contributed to further ongoing PA centralisation within the presidential vertical. The strategy of economic and social development for 2000–2004 proclaimed a course on EU integration along with some measures to enhance the state capacity which also included some steps towards PA modernisation.

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As a result of these policies, some improvements in CEB structure along with cuts of 40 per cent to their administration costs occurred. In order to improve the civil service, the Central Authority for Civil Service of Ukraine was established; there were some steps undertaken towards civil service professionalisation including the definition of a civil servant’s legal status. In 2001, a state secretary institute in the ministries was introduced; the state secretaries were appointed directly by the President. Those persons appointed to these positions had quite significant administrative and political functions which meant a weakening of the influence of CMU and the ministers onto an administrative vertical and a respective gain in influence for the President. In 2003, this institute was abolished due to political considerations (President Kuchma intended to switch to a Premier-Minister chair). It is also worth emphasising some steps taken towards raising transparency in PA bodies functioning in this period of time: the order of publicising the information on public bodies’ activities, the mode of their interaction and the civil society organisations. In addition to the abovementioned, the basis for a political system of cronyism was established during L.  Kuchma’s two terms as president (1994–2004); control over political power was transferred to oligarchs who had acquired their wealth during the period of initial transformations of Ukrainian economy. A new stage in PA development (2004–2009) was started by the revisions of the Constitution (2004) that significantly weakened the functions of the President and increased the role of Parliament (a shift to a parliamentary republic) and by political crisis (the Orange Revolution) that ended with the election of Viktor Yushchenko as the President of Ukraine. The changes in the Constitution called for the initiation of some PA changes; however, for the most part they have not been realised. In 2005, the administrative-territorial reform was announced that had the aim of granting empowerment to local self-governance, but these intentions were not realised. The new CMU programme “Peoplewards” included several directions for PA reform. In order to increase the PA efficiency, the National Council for Public Administration and Local Self-­ Governance was established in 2005. A revision of CEB status commenced resulting in many of them losing their special status; a Secretary of the President was established instead of the Administration of the President. In 2005, the National Council for State Building, Local Self-Governance and Regional Development was established as a counselling body by the

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President in order to elaborate proposals for PA and local self-governance reform; it did not, however, start functioning. The Ministry for Regional Development and Construction was instituted in 2007 with a goal to foster administrative reforms. A bundle of documents dedicated to raising public awareness about state activities were adopted. Public service adaptation to EU standards also experienced its actual start; Ukraine joined the EU Twinning and TEAIX programmes. A new element introduced into the PA domain was a policy analysis think-tank in each CEB whose task was to analyse specific issues within the relevant CEB’s field of responsibility and offer their respective solutions. In 2006, CMU introduced the Quality Management System for Executive Bodies Programme with regard to international standards ISO series 9000. Despite some positive developments, the situation in the PA domain was preconditioned by the growing tensions between President Yushchenko, who sought to regain powers that the President had had before 2004, and Prime Minister Tymoshenko, who was relatively independent as she had been appointed by the parliament. The new revised CMU law adopted in 2006 was not signed by the President and was followed up by attempts to limit the powers of the Prime Minister. Most PA reform activities were blocked because of concurring policies initiated by the President and the CMU which is why most of them remained only on paper. The political system of cronyism had not been eliminated; it had become more powerful. The PA system demonstrated its inefficiency during the economic crisis in 2009 when the real GDP dropped by 1/3 which contributed to the subsequent change in the nation’s political vector. The next stage was marked by the electoral victory of Viktor Yanukovych who became the new President in 2010. Its beginning started out with the restoration of the 1996 Constitution which was empowered by a decision of the Constitutional Court. This meant that Ukraine reverted to a presidential republic resulting in even greater presidential powers; the CMU now became subordinated to the President. In 2010, administrative reform commenced and included CEB optimisation. The former state committees were substituted with services, agencies and inspectorates; the number of special CEBs was reduced from 29 to 3. These changes were incorporated into a new Law “On Central Executive Bodies” (2011). It is also worth mentioning the adoption of the Law “On Access to Public Information” (2011) that ordered the method of publicising public information; the adoption of the e-governance concept (2011); the Law “On

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Administrative Services” (2012) which set a list of such services and the order of their rendering to the citizens. However, the changes listed above did not have any systematic character; the President instituted newer CEBs (among them, e.g., the Ministry of Revenues and Levies and the Ministry for Industrial Policy); the provisions of the Law “On Public Service” were not enacted because of a lack of money. The Economic Reform Programme 2010–2014 called “Prosperous Society, Competitive Economy, Efficient State” was a major document that delivered a reform vision; however, it was actually only a formal document because generally correct reform ideas appeared to be in complete contradiction with the actual policies pursued by the state heads and which were based on political and economic corruption. An authoritarian PA model was formed within which the state served the interests of some oligarchic clans that had managed to seize the power. In autumn 2013, the political tensions within the nation came to a head because of an unpredicted turn in the governmental policy—rejection of integration with the EU. The ensuing mass demonstrations gradually turned to bloody clashes in the national capital; the internal political conflict was resolved after Yanukovych fled to the Russian Federation. Shortly afterwards Russia annexed a part of Ukrainian territory—the Autonomous Republic of Crimea—and unleashed general unrest in the eastern regions of Ukraine. After several months of intensive fighting some parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions appeared to be under some puppet quasi-­ governments controlled from Moscow. These events meant new challenges for the Ukrainian state and speeded up numerous important changes in politics and the economy, including intensive PA reform activities. The following PA developments in Ukraine were preconditioned by the fact that the nation passed through a severe internal political conflict in 2013–2014; these events created the prerequisites for the country’s about-­ face turn for integration into Europe. In this context, the external drivers (pressure from the side of international organisations, especially the World Bank and EU) began to play a more significant role and the government was compelled to seriously take them into account.

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15.2.2  A Challenge of Systematic Public Administration Reforming Since independence, there have been several attempts to adapt the Soviet PA model; however, as it transpired, this model was inadequate to face modern challenges. PA reforms implemented since 1991 in Ukraine were more of an “aesthetic” nature as they were incapable of touching the hardware of the state machine inherited from the past, so the power of these internal drivers appeared to be insufficient. In addition, they proved to be unsuccessful due to the political bias in their implementation (each new President tried to adapt PA in a way to secure more political power for themselves, but not to raise the PA quality and efficiency). It is for this reason why the public bodies received limited legitimacy and popular mistrust in their reform activities. The governing elites failed to make PA modernisation a common deal for all economically and politically active citizens. Previous PA reforms were basically oriented on achieving short-term results, but not necessarily the strategic ones. As a result, Ukraine achieved an obsolete, very inefficient and volatile PA system. This situation showed signs of change after the mid-2010s, as the reform activities of the then government were deemed to reflect popular preference for the European development vector which was in stark contrast to the Russian version which had been supported by the former government. Resolving the internal political conflict in 2014 gave birth to some new developments in PA. The 2014 snap presidential elections and snap parliamentary elections brought to power the parties of an anti-Yanukovych coalition and Petro Poroshenko as the President of Ukraine. The new governing coalition restored the important provisions of the Constitution of 1996 concerning division of powers and initiated activities to overcome the legacy of misgovernment introduced by the dismissed President Yanukovych and previous government. The new government were obliged to address the following challenges: reforming the PA system and civil service, improving the regulatory framework for their functioning, extending the rights and powers of local self-government authorities, bringing institutional environment into compliance with the EU requirements, enshrining and creating mechanisms for implementing such principles as the balance of centralisation and decentralisation, ubiquity, subsidiarity and capacity, as well as the transformation of the civil service in accordance with the European standards.

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In 2016, the government adopted the public administration reform strategy of Ukraine till 2020 (later extended till 2021) in order to bring the national PA system in line with the European standards and to enhance the country’s competitiveness. According to the Sustainable Development Strategy “Ukraine 2020”, the objective of the PA reform is to build a transparent public administration system, to create a professional civil service institute, and to ensure its effectiveness. The result of the reform implementation has to be the establishment of an efficient, transparent, open and flexible public administration structure that uses up-to-date information and communication technologies (e-governance) enabling production and implementation of a coherent public policy aimed at sustainable social development and adequate response to internal and external challenges. The strategy foresaw many directions of reform activities to be checked and updated each year. In order to coordinate the reform activities, the Counsel for public administration reform was instituted. Since 2017, the PA reforms received important support from the EU within the Support for Improvement in Governance and Management Program (SIGMA). The key components of this comprehensive PA reform strategy include: • forming the capable ministries as the reform implementation drivers; • focusing the government on strategic issues and solving the key problems; • introducing strategic planning in governmental activity; • allocating limited public resources based on priority goals and securing their sustainable funding; • increasing the quality of governmental decisions through introduction of policy analysis, tools of decision impact evaluation, counselling with stakeholders and so on; • transforming the CMU Secretariat to a powerful, efficient and modern “government core”; • introducing modern personnel management technologies in civil service and seeking its professionalisation; and • providing quality administrative services and implementing modern e-governance instruments. It is obvious that the PA reform policy adopted in 2016 was aimed at improving the functioning of the Executive’s central level; the objects chosen were CEBs and civil service.

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The Ukrainian CEB system has basically undergone mostly aesthetic changes since independence because it was previously utilised in order to support the power base of those at the top of the state, but not to grant better management of the country for the sake of its prosperity. It became obvious that the existing CEB system is very far from modern standards as it appeared to fail in maintaining the efficient management of the country in terms of foreseeing, evaluating and mitigating internal and external shocks and cost-efficiently rendering administrative quality services to the citizens due to its being short-sighted and self-reliant. Considering a civil service as a public institution, it is charged with increasing the standards of life quality for the population by delivery of high-quality administrative services, forming and ensuring the implementation of the state policy, supervision and control over legal compliance of the activities of public bodies and officials. Unfortunately, the civil service in Ukraine falls short in meeting these objectives and requires substantial reforming; hence a new Law on Civil Service was adopted in 2015. The considerations regarding the importance and necessity to reform the national civil service system are also being strengthened within the context of exacerbation of the current economic and political turbulence. The urgent nature of such far-reaching PA transformations was preconditioned by the escalating military conflict with the Russian Federation in the east of the county. The inefficiency in PA at the national level could not be tolerable anymore because Russia considers Ukraine as its own political domain that must follow the suzerain; its political course and actual actions are aimed at destroying the Ukrainian statehood and arrogating Ukraine as a “failed state”; if not completely arrogating it, then most certainly weakening it and making it a satellite similar to many other former Soviet republics. In order to sustain itself in such harsh circumstances, the Ukrainian state is compelled to effect massive popular support; the only way to do so is by instilling anew trust in the state and convincing the people that the state is there to serve them and not vice versa. Despite the recent reforms Ukrainian PA has not yet achieved a format that permits securing stability of the state. The Fragile States Index demonstrates that the Ukrainian state is still not stable; in 2015 the value for Ukraine was 76.3, in 2019 71.0. Ukraine still ranks among the group of states whose situation is labelled as “warning”. Having felt the consequences of the political and economic turbulence, the citizens did not believe in the success of reforms launched by the post-revolution

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government and this mistrust resulted in the incumbent President Petro Poroshenko failing in his bid for re-election in 2019. Conversely, this means that the government should continue with the reforms whilst simultaneously improving communication with the people. 15.2.3  Changes at the National Public Administration Level Since 2014 The modern Ukrainian PA organisational structure is a result of multiple changes. Over the years of Ukraine’s independence, approximately 400 transformations of CEBs took place; since 2011, the number of CEBs almost halved. As of 31 March 2018, 63 CEBs operated in Ukraine, including 18 ministries, 23 state services, 14 state agencies, 4 state inspections and 7 other CEBs; as of 29 February 2020, there were 66 CEBs, including 19 ministries, 20 state services, 14 agencies and 9 other CEBs. Optimisation of the CEB system is a key precondition for reforming and modernising the civil service: it opens up the possibilities for significant reductions in expenditures on management and staff, approximates administrative service delivery to the consumer and contributes to a reduction in the duplication of functions and fosters deregulation. Due to the challenges associated with the war in the eastern part of Ukraine, the PA system has experienced some specific structural changes since 2014. As of 3 February 2015, the military-civil administrations were instituted in line with the Law “On Military-Civil Administrations”. These provisional public bodies were established in villages, cities, districts and regions in order to guarantee the rule of law, security and a normal way of living for the population, to counteract any acts of military aggression, sabotage, acts of terror, prevent humanitarian disasters in the Ukrainian territories affected by military activities. These bodies function as an integral part of the Anti-terrorist Centre of Ukrainian Security Service (later United Armed Forces of Ukraine Operation Headquarter). To date, they operate in parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions controlled by the Ukrainian state adjacent to the line of contact between Ukrainian Armed Forces and pro-Russian military corps. In April 2016, the Ministry of Temporarily Occupied Territories and Internally Displaced Persons was established in order to develop and realise the public policy dealing with the temporarily occupied territories in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions as well as in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol. Its scope of objectives includes: reintegration of

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the temporarily occupied territories and their populations; reintegration of specific territories in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions where the Ukrainian public bodies cannot temporarily fulfil their authority and of their population; overcoming subsequent consequences of the conflict; humanitarian cooperation; protection of the population during military conflict and peace development. Improving the structure is important; however, it cannot improve the overall PA quality and efficiency. One of the first steps that would permit launching really positive changes in the functioning of the national PA system was by reviewing functions at government level. In 2014, the first important step in optimisation of the CEB functions was undertaken: the CMU Resolution “On Optimisation of the System of Central Executive Bodies” was approved which included a revision of their control and supervisory functions that should, as suggested, be understood as auditing the compliance of public authorities, local self-government authorities, their officials, legal entities and citizens, with mandatory rules and norms of behaviour in the economy and public life as established by the Constitution of Ukraine, laws of Ukraine and other regulations, the differentiation of the normative and the actual state of the control object and implementation of measures aimed at bringing the control object into a normative state. As noted by some Ukrainian researchers (Motrenko, 2010), a built-in conflict of interests, which is caused by the necessity to implement conflicting types of functions in one body (similar to a combination of statutory regulation, with the function of delivering administrative services or oversight functions, managing state property and implementing oversight measures) was present in the functioning of CEBs. This conflict resulted in the following consequences: CEBs carried out all administrative procedures from adopting a regulation up to controlling its compliance and strategic decisions were displaced by tactical/operational actions. The typology of CEB functions put forward in 2010 (state policy formulation, approval of statutory instruments, control and supervision in a certain sphere of activity, delivery of public services and public property management) resulted in the formulation of criteria for determining the function types and the CEB system in 2010–2011; it also preconditioned the main tasks of civil servants according to the Law On Public Service as of 2015. This long-standing tradition was severed in 2014. Consequently, the CMU decided to leave 680, out of 1032, control functions belonging to different CEBs (there were 1623 in 2010) and to

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reduce the number of bodies with control functions by 51 per cent. The aim of such a decision was to reduce the pressure on business and the downsizing of the level of corruption. The implementation steps included: preparation of a target model of the CEB system, optimisation of the CEBs with regard to the number of their staff, reducing the number of functions and eliminating their duplication and; devolving part of the authority to the local authorities or self-regulated organisations. Since the change in the number of oversight functions had to reduce the pressure on business and ensure more efficient control, it was reduced through the dissolution of some CEBs, consolidation of the functions of the controlling CEBs, deprivation of certain CEBs of control functions and abolition of some control functions. In the period 2014–2017, most of the line ministries were deprived of control functions in the field of economic activity; these control functions were consolidated in the newly formed CEBs; part of the control functions (such as price control, assay supervision, construction and topographic-geodetic control) was cancelled at the national level together with the devolution of the supervision in housing and utilities to local self-governments. Since 2016, the government has focused on the revision of both its own functions and the CEBs’ functions concerning managing public assets, which means the exercise of the powers of the owner regarding state-owned natural resources, state property (including that transferred to state enterprises and institutions), as well as management of shares in state-owned open joint-stock companies. The steps regarding the changes in the CEB functions executed in 2017–2018 were aimed at distinguishing the functions in formulating the state policy and in adopting laws and regulations within CEBs’ scope of responsibility. The first ones are to identify the basic priorities and directions of development, the methods to achieve them, set conditions and expected socio-economic outcomes in a particular area of the economy and public life; the others are to issue norms and rules that govern relations in a particular sphere, extend to an indefinite number of individuals and are binding for the public authorities, local self-government authorities, their officials, legal entities and citizens based on and pursuant to the Constitution of Ukraine and the laws of Ukraine. The existence of significant drawbacks in this field was officially recognised, so several measures were taken with regard to: (1) solving possible conflict within the ministries between the functions of state policy formulation and certain functions in implementing the state policy, in particular

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regarding the management of state-owned objects, inspection/supervision activity and delivery of administrative services; (2) achieving new quality in policy formulation based on its analysis and strategic planning that in order to detect, predict, prevent issues in the relevant areas, achieve the long-term goals and constrains the reform processes in the state; (3) achieving clearer allocation of authority thereby minimising function duplication and burdening the national bodies with superfluous functions. In 2017, the CMU, its Secretariat and ministries as institutions for implementing the state policy formulation function changed their organisational structure, formed directorates and initiated procedures to fill vacancies in them after taking into account the government decision. It should also be noted that hiring personnel is partly assigned to the National Civil Service Agency of Ukraine and the State Agency for e-Governance where general departments have been established. According to the provisions on ministry directorates, the following tasks are assigned to them: (1) ensuring state policy formulation based on ongoing analysis of the state of affairs within its competence, elaboration of alternative solutions for the existing problems; (2) monitoring and evaluating the results of state policy implementation, drawing up proposals regarding its continuation or correction; (3) ensuring statutory regulation within its competence. The directorates of the CMU Secretariat perform tasks in coordinating activities in strategic planning, organising drawing up the proposals to the Prime Minister regarding the priorities of the state policy, drafting plans of priority actions of the government and coordination of their further implementation, analysing powers and functions of CEB executive authorities, evaluating their performance and rendering CMU expert-analytical and other support. The new distinction of positions within the ministries contributes to the emphasis on their functions in state policy formulation regarding performing political and administrative functions and for this purpose the positions of state secretaries were introduced, in the Law of Ukraine “On the Central Executive Bodies” the words “deputy minister—staff senior manager” were replaced by the words “state secretary of the ministry”. Thus, the emphasis of the government policy regarding changing the functions of the CEBs on a short-term horizon (2017–2019) has been given to distinguishing and resourcing of the function for developing and implementing a coherent state policy. This function includes the following components: analytical (constantly analysing the state of affairs in the sphere and developing alternative solutions to the existing problems);

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monitoring (overseeing and evaluating the results of the state policy implementation, elaborating proposals regarding the continuation or adjustment of the policy); coordination (coordination of the state policy implementation, interaction with other authorities); regulatory (development of laws and regulations related to the policy). The implementation of this function depends on drafting and submitting draft regulations on amendments to the Regulations of the CMU regarding policy coordination, strategic planning and agreement of draft acts of the CMU; development of the methodology of preparation and examples of programme/strategic documents of the state policy (policy brief, “green book”, “white book”, concept, strategy, programme etc.) and identification of their specific features and purpose in the process of formation, implementation and monitoring of the state policy. Without these documents, the measures to implement the Public Administration Reform Strategy of Ukraine cannot be executed in this area. Moreover, state policy implementation, and hence the classical PA, will cover the functions of administrative service delivery, oversight and state property management regarding which the possibility of their deconcentration or decentralisation must be constantly monitored. Revision of CEB functions should be institutionally supported by respective strengthening of lower-level governmental bodies. In this regard, the issue of decentralisation is very important. The change in functions involving their reallocation between the state and local self-government bodies is a subject of ongoing discussions in the academic, expert and managerial environments lasting since the declaration of Ukraine’s independence. However, the processes of amalgamation of territorial communities that started after approval of the Concept of Reforming Local Self-Government and Territorial Structure of Power in April 2014 and the Law “On Voluntary Amalgamation of Territorial Communities” (February 2015) have become a significant factor in addressing this issue. Therefore, the state demonstrated its readiness to decentralise all the issues of local concern related to economy, finance, management of communal property (local finances, economic development of communities, communal property management, communal land use and use of local natural resources, planning and development of settlements, maintenance and construction of local roads, sewage, electricity, gas and water supply, public lighting, housing construction, local public transport, beautification, preschool institutions, primary and secondary education, healthcare etc.). Some functions concerning social protection,

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health and education, functions in delivery of administrative services were also transferred to local authorities based on the assessment of the ability of local self-government bodies to implement them. However, the state appeared to be quite cautious towards the property transfer, and therefore the functions of managing it. For example, with regard to land management, the respective draft act (No. 4355 as of 31 March 2016) has already been on the shelf in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine for three years. Regarding the functions in delivery of administrative services which include issuing the permits (licences) for certain types of activities and/or particular actions by the state authorities, local self-government authorities, their officials at the request of individuals and legal entities; registration of acts, documents, rights, objects, as well as issuance of individual legal acts, they were deconcentrated when taking into account the possibilities of the established centres for administrative services. The national government should certainly transfer its functions downwards more vigorously if the Constitution of Ukraine was amended by respective provisions regarding decentralisation of power. In any case, the state should reserve the right to control/supervise the compliance of actions of local authorities with the Constitution and laws of Ukraine, acts of the President of Ukraine, the by-laws issued by the CMU and the CEBs of Ukraine, provide coordination of activities of territorial CEBs and control over financial transactions of local self-government bodies within the limits set by legislation. However, some state functions could be transferred down without making changes to the Constitution. In particular, in compliance with the new version of the Law of Ukraine “On State Registration of Legal Entities, Individual Entrepreneurs and Public Associations” as of 26 November 2015, the functions of administrative service delivery (such as registration of legal entities and individual entrepreneurs) were transferred from justice authorities to the local self-­ government bodies. Currently, a process of transferring the functions of the State Architectural and Construction Inspectorate concerning construction commissioning to the local self-government bodies is observed. To facilitate such a transfer, it is sufficient to analyse the functions implemented by the CEBs, primarily through their territorial bodies and local state administrations to discover if they comply with the subsidiarity principle while conducting the subsequent legislative regulation of this transfer.

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15.2.4   Reform Implementation: Lack of Consistency The problems with the ongoing PA reforms at the national level embrace several aspects: (1) high risk of PA disintegration; (2) insufficient legal support; (3) bureaucratic bias. Firstly, the risk of PA disintegration. Notwithstanding all the attractiveness of changing the CEB functions and vesting on them mainly a sectoral policy development function, there are several risks associated with it that should be taken into account that have yet to be fully addressed: (1) if the ministries do not take over the functions traditionally performed by the CMU Secretariat, in case the latter did so in view of the staff limit of slightly more than 1000 civil servants, then by year 2020 the number of specialists for reforms at the ministries can reach 5500 persons; (2) the loss of traditional PA functions by the ministries (e.g. the functions of state policy implementation) will require the issue of another reallocation of functions to be solved resulting in another reorganisation of CEBs and the redundancy of civil servants (and taking into account the continuing reorganisation of the CEBs, this will cause another “organisational stress” both for the state and for society); (3) it is difficult to imagine such dramatic changes, for example, in the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine, the Ministry of Finance of Ukraine or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, taking into account the functions that they are currently performing. Such a radical change in the functions of the ministries, or the transit to the target model of the ministries therefore requires a well-reasoned approach in order not to turn the ministries into an additional security apparatus of the CMU, not to destroy the integrity of the state administrative apparatus and not to create a system that will produce reforms and ideas without any opportunities for their practical implementation. It is appropriate to have “reform teams” or state experts over time consisting of up to 20 persons as one of the minister’s services, provided that the institutional relations of this service with the ministry staff are established. Moreover, in order to implement the idea of assigning the strategic planning functions to the ministries and ensuring the state policy formulation, it is necessary to legislatively define the sectors of public policy and PA. Consequently, a minister has to be responsible for state policy formulation in one or more sectors and positions of deputy ministers would have to be created. The functions of the state secretary of a ministry should be limited to management of the ministry’s staff and general organisational

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matters without any direct responsibility for the sectors of state policy (Suray, 2017). The confirmation of this idea is found in the draft law as of 14 July 2016. Many experts and industry associations warned at the very start of reforming that rapid re-assignment of oversight functions would require a considerable follow-up enhancement regarding: the need to adhere to the principle of preserving “reasonable state regulation”, especially in those areas that seriously endanger the lives of the citizens; clear understanding that it is necessary to proceed not from the number of inspectorates but from the necessary functions and for these functions there has to be a certain body; changes in the function quality of the newly-established bodies, so that the next deregulation reform would not bear signs of changing only the number of supervisory and inspection bodies; reduction of control bodies by consolidating services while preserving the same functions is inappropriate (Brehelskyi, 2014). In short, the high risk of PA disintegration stemmed from the low institutional capacity of CMU and the CEBs; that in turn could be explained by the low involvement of the ministers and the CEB heads in implementation of PA reforms, resistance and even sabotage on the part of mid-level public servants who are afraid of the reform consequences, their low level of professionalism and lack of motivation. These risks could also be multiplied when taking into account the low coordination of reform activities and problems with cost estimation associated with specific reform activities as noted in the last SIGMA evaluation (SIGMA, 2018). Concerning legal support. Practical implementation of the revision of the functions of the CMU and the ministries; the report “The Action Plan Fulfilment for Implementing the Strategy of Public Administration Reform in Ukraine for 2016–2020” shows that some important measures such as amendments to the Laws of Ukraine “On the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine” and “On Central Executive Bodies” regarding organisation of strategic planning and analysis of state policy are yet to be undertaken. It is worth mentioning that no legislative act on self-regulation organisations has been passed within the last five years (it was included in the agenda of the eighth session of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of the eighth convocation among the issues prepared for consideration in plenary meetings on 20 March 2018); so the agents who should accommodate a part of the state oversight functions were not institutionalised. According to the experts, in early 2018, the CMU was reluctant to lose the rights, among others, to create, reorganise and dissolve business entities; appoint and

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dismiss their managers; decide about discarding, alienation or transfer of property; corporate rights; approve financial plans of enterprises and approve the leasing of state property (Vyshnevskyi & Kondyk, 2018). The seriousness of the government’s steps in this direction of changing functions could be confirmed by the elaboration by the CMU of a draft act “On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of Ukraine Regarding Deprivation of the CMU of Non-Relevant Authorities” as a legislative initiative and its active support in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. A similar draft act has to be developed regarding depriving the CEBs of similar functions. Bureaucratic bias. The important elements of the Ukrainian state machine are all inherited from the Soviet past which cause high levels of bureaucracy in administrative processes leading to irrationally organised work processes for the civil servants. The internal administrative procedures in CEBs still remain very bureaucratic and time-consuming whereby the civil servants are also overloaded by ongoing assignments stemming from the state top echelons that divert them from the policy issues. There is a lack of internal communication with those who are assigned to implement the PA reforms both at the level of political leadership (so the ministers and other top servants do not comprehend the essence of the reforms), as well as at the level of civil servants. It is perhaps this fact that could explain the quite significant delays in reform implementation: in 2017, the plan for PA reform activities was accomplished by 55 per cent and in 2018 it was 63 per cent. Many important procedures introduced within reform activities remain very non-transparent which in turn creates a fertile feeding ground for nepotism/cronyism and could reduce the positive effects in PA development especially with regard to hiring and dismissing civil servants and setting efficiency measures for evaluation of their performance. The reorganisation in those ministries chosen as pilots was not accomplished; however, the reorganisation of all CEBs was planned to be accomplished by the end of 2018; the staff of “reform teams” in the ministries was not fully recruited (only 600 professionals had been hired instead of the 3000 required). The changes at the central PA level described above have not brought significant positive changes to the Ukrainian economy. According to the Global Competitiveness Index published by the World Economic Forum, Ukraine ranked 73rd out of 144 countries in 2012–2013, 84th out of 148 in 2013–2014, 76th out of 144 in 2014–2015, 79th out of 140 in 2015–2016 and 85th out of 138  in 2016–2017. According to the

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Federation of Employers of Ukraine, in 2017, the Business Ombudsman Council received 1638 complaints regarding the actions of control and law enforcement authorities (twice as many as in 2016), 61 per cent of which were related to the actions of the fiscal service and tax authorities.

15.3   Civil Service Developments After 2014 Civil service constitutes a key pillar of the national PA system. The public attitude towards civil service, its organisation and regulation, to its performance by officials is an indicator of the quality of the state mechanism and its apparatus. The civil service system consists of institutional (legal, organisational) and procedural components, as well as of civil servants themselves—persons who are specially trained and professionally employed in the public authorities. The social purpose of the civil service is making possible the effective operation of public institutions, to reach the optimal combination of personal, group and state interests, to express and protect the interests of all strata of population. It has to be a channel of daily communication between the state and the people, of their interaction. It can be provided only by such a state apparatus and staff which can reasonably put forward standards of behaviour and work that are understandable and appropriate for people. The Law “On Civil Service” (2015) sets basic principles of the civil service in Ukraine which are in line with those in European countries. These principles embrace the rule of law (priority of human rights and liberties); adherence to legislation; professionalism; patriotism; respectability; effectiveness; equal access to hiring possibilities in the civil service; political non-prejudice; transparency; stability. In order to grant non-biasness and stability, the civil service reform initiated in 2015 foresees delineation of political and administrative positions; optimisation of public body’ structure; introduction of patronage assistant positions; prohibition of political party participation for top public managers and so on. 15.3.1  Public Perception of Civil Service: Core Problems and a Need for Reform In order to understand how the common people perceive the pre-reform situation in the Ukrainian civil service, the opinion of the public would be very useful.

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Public perception concerning the basic features of a civil servant was tested by the public pool in 2016 when about 1000 people were asked to rank the features of the ideal civil servant (see Fig. 15.1). As one can see from Fig. 15.1, Ukrainians do value the level of a civil servant’s competence and that person’s attitude towards clients; however, they do not value highly such features as cost-efficient execution of duties, adherence to the law and putting public interests before private ones. This kind of attitude towards the civil service could explain to some extent why corruption in Ukraine is so deeply rooted—because the citizens consider it as a normal phenomenon and are accustomed to it. This ideal picture of the civil servant must be matched by the factual perception of this actor. Actually, the public perception of a civil servant in Ukraine appeared quite negative because people feel a striking difference with the ideal image as presented in Fig. 15.1. Figure 15.2 demonstrates that virtually all the features of a civil servant are not present in real life in most cases; such features as patriotism and loyalty to the government body are more or less sufficiently present. This can mean that huge issues exist with civil servants in Ukraine because they are generally perceived as being very far from the ideal, disregarding whether or not we consider such ideals as reasonable. It also means that the civil service reform in Ukraine must be supported not only by policy

A specialist in his area Looks for solving the question, not for rejection Obeys the legislation Respects the citizens Right-minded Resposible Knowledgable Polite Performs duties in accountable and transparent way Politically neutral Unbiased Result-oriented Trustfull Puts public interests before private ones Is a Ukrainian patriot Sticks with rule of law Efficiently uses resources for reaching the goals of public policy Loyal to the state and public body where works

37 37 34

15 0

10

20

30

40

50 49 46 45 42

50

65 62 59

60

70

74 74 74 73 70 70

80

Fig. 15.1  Ranking of the features of an ideal civil servant, 2016 (percentage of respondents). (Source: Authors)

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A specialist in his area Looks for solving the question, not for rejection Obeys the legislation Respects the citizens Right-minded Responsible Knowledgable Polite Performs duties in accountable and transparent… Politically neutral Unbiased Result-oriented Trustfull Puts public interests before private ones Is a Ukrainian patriot Sticks with rule of law Efficiently uses resources for reaching the goals… Loyal to the state and public body where works

0

36 30 31 31 31 32 36 37 28 33 31 27 33 28 44 32 30 48 20

64 70 69 69 69 68 64 63 72 67 69 73 67 72 56 68 70 52 40

60

Mostly positive Mostly negative

80

100

Fig. 15.2  Public perception of a civil servant in Ukraine, 2017 (percentage of respondents). (Source: Authors)

measures directed at changing the level of professionalism of the civil servants, but also at changing the public perception of them. Being asked in the course of the same polling what prevents a civil servant from being closer to the ideal, the respondents pointed to bureaucracy (70 per cent), insufficient skill levels (55 per cent), lacking motivation concerning professional development (56 per cent) and a low level of remuneration (63 per cent). It should be noted that such a negative perception of a civil servant as in Fig. 15.2 is closely attached to the civil service itself; Ukrainians perceive it as a corrupt and bureaucratic institution and as such that disposes of innovations, does not care about cost-efficiency and does not originate any positive changes. The end perception is of an obsolete civil service system inherited from the Soviet era that was intended to serve the interests of the “nomenklatura” (the governing establishments), but not the societal needs, as well as a low quality of civil servant selection process (the main criterion was personal loyalty, not professionalism), all of which preconditions public perception of the present day Ukrainian civil service. As the incentives for civil servants look very weak, the respondents were asked what kind of incentives are important for them in reality. 67 per cent of respondents pointed out “useful relations”, 64 per cent “extra privileges”, 60 per cent “lawless profiteering”, 44 per cent “possibility to lobby

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business interests”. In the view of the public, the widespread western incentives such as promotion opportunities, prestige of work and level of remuneration (not speaking about serving society and possibility of further training) do not play a significant role in motivating a Ukrainian civil servant to effectively and responsibly perform his/her official duties. The reform initiated in 2015 seems to reflect the popular expectations concerning having better civil service staff as it includes: (1) introduction of a new system of staff selection and evaluation; (2) modernisation of staff management in public authorities based on HR management principles; (3) implementation of “life-long training” for Ukrainian civil servants. 15.3.2  Main Directions of Civil Service Reform According to the Civil Service Reforming Strategy, the civil service reform introduced in this document intends to undertake the following measures to solve problems: minimise corruption; introduce open competitive selection of candidates for all civil service positions with regard to their proficiency level and diligence; define the requirements for civil service positions; form a clear and transparent mechanism of responsibility for civil servants for contravening legislation and nonfulfillment of their duties; grant civil servants social protection; improve civil servant remuneration system; secure correspondence of public bodies and authorities and functions they perform; raise institutional capacity of public service; renew the activity content of HR departments in public bodies; improve the system of civil servant training and re-training; establish coordination between research and practical needs of public bodies; raise civil service prestige. Regarding PA quality, the most important challenges are raising the standards for those to be hired by public bodies, improving their performance through an annual evaluation, changing staff management style and improving the remuneration system. Concerning the civil service candidate selection, the current Law “On Civil Service” as of 2015 defined the categories of Ukrainian citizens that have the right to enter civil service as employees. The candidates must have come of age, be fluent in the state (Ukrainian) language and have achieved a level of higher education not lower than: for the positions of level A (top management staff at the ministries and other CEBs of national level) and “B” (chiefs of ministerial departments and alike)—Master’s Degree; for the positions of level “C” (all remaining staff)—Bachelor’s

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Degree or Junior Bachelor’s Degree. To ensure a high level of professionalism, those persons applying to fill level A positions are required to have at least seven years’ work experience and master some European language; in B level positions—at least two years’ work experience in civil service or other top managerial positions. The following persons cannot enter the civil service: (1) persons who have reached the age of sixty-five; (2) persons declared incapable or of limited capability in the manner prescribed by the law; (3) persons who have been convicted for an intentional crime, if it has not been removed from official records or expunged in accordance with the law; (4) persons who are disbarred by the court ruling from engaging in activities related to performance of the state functions or from holding the respective positions; (5) persons who were imposed an administrative penalty for corruption or a corruption-related offence—during the three years since the respective decision entered into force; (6) citizens of other states; (7) persons who have not passed a special check and have not given consent to such a check; (8) persons who are subject to the ban stipulated by the Law of Ukraine “On Cleansing of Power” as of 16 September 2014. Several steps in granting high staff quality through selection procedures have been realised till now. Firstly, the three-level entry competitions (testing qualification requirements, testing skills, interview) for filling civil service positions based on equal requirements for all the candidates have been introduced. Secondly, three types of selection commissions have been instituted: for A level officials; for B and C level staff; disciplinary commissions to assess possible claims against civil servants. In order to grant public control over civil servant selection and effective results of selection, 1/3 of the commissions have to be filled by representatives of civil society organisations, academic institutions and high-level experts. Improving the work quality through regular performance evaluation was the second important challenge for the Ukrainian civil service. The annual evaluation for was launched in August 2017 when the CMU approved the standard procedure of evaluation of civil servants’ official activities. This evaluation procedure is applied on an annual basis to all the public service staff (thus, involves categories A, B and C) in the event that a person has occupied the position for at least six months. Evaluation pursues several goals: to evaluate the public servant performance concerning his/her official duties; decide on bonus payments; plans the person’s career; assesses the need for a person’s additional professional training.

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Evaluation results may be of three types: positive, negative or excellent. In the event that an employee was given an excellent performance evaluation they could be illegible for annual bonus payments and/or recommended to compete for a higher position; if an employee received negative evaluation results, they must be re-evaluated after three months and will be dismissed from the civil service if the second evaluation is once again negative. An analysis of the governmental by-laws dedicated to civil servant performance evaluation states that the civil servant evaluation procedure introduces a new model of manager-subordinate relationship; it is perceived as an instrument of personnel management designated to achieve mutual understanding between the civil service body manager and the subordinated personnel aiming to plan, monitor and analyse the official goals of civil servants and their contribution to public body performance. Evaluation involves the following stages: (1) defining and reviewing the tasks and key performance measures (by the December of a preceding year of the current year) or in the course of ten days following their appointment; (2) evaluation interview; (3) defining and stating the results of evaluation. The standard procedure approved by the CMU states that evaluation shall be performed according to a five-grade-scale based on key performance measures taking into account the official duties of a civil servant as well as taking into account the general ethical rules and legal requirements concerning prevention of corruption. The first full public servant evaluation cycle was performed in October-December 2018. However, all these positive achievements concerning the introduction of civil servant performance evaluation have to be assessed with regard to their quality. While doing this, we could point out that the CEB heads appeared to have not been introduced to the modern approaches to personnel evaluation that are presented by international organisations. Concerning staff management, the HR departments in most of the public bodies were instituted as well as personal development plans for all the staff categories being introduced. Several institutions have been involved in public service skill evaluation and different forms of professional training. For example, the Ukrainian School of Governance under the National Agency for Public Service provides advanced training for all the public service staff categories as well as services in assessment of candidates for vacant positions; the National Academy of Public Administration provides advanced training for all categories of civil servants (around 20,000 persons went through different programmes in 2018) as well as

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full education majoring in Public Administration on Bachelor and Masters programmes. Another challenge was the remuneration system inherited from the past which created significant obstacles in fighting corruption due to the fact that inadequate pay made civil servants prone to bribery. As of 2019, the remuneration of civil servants in Ukraine is regulated by: (1) provisions of the Law “On Civil Service”; (2) norms of labour legislation and international treaties ratified by Ukraine in regard to relations not regulated by the Law and are general norms of the legal institution of civil servant remuneration that are compatible with the norms of the Law “On Labour Remuneration” (1995) (norms for determining the minimum salary, the differentiation of the general and base rate of salary, equal salary for work of equal value etc.); (3) separate statutory regulations of labour in regard to the relationships that are not regulated by the law and are not meaningfully related to its norms (salary payment deadlines, determination of the amount of overtime compensation, as well as weekend, holiday and non-working days, night overtime pay etc.). When referring to the specific features of civil service, the legislation restricts civil servant opportunities to protect their right to labour remuneration. In addition, a civil servant has no right to organise and participate in strikes. In the event a civil servant reveals the facts of a violation of the law by the public authorities or their officials inside or outside the office, to ensure the rule of law, they have to contact a CEB which ensures the formulation and implementation of state policy in civil service. This also applies to the issues of remuneration of civil servants. At the same time, state regulation of extra salary schemes, bonuses, allowances and payments to civil servants virtually eliminated the possibility of being influenced by civil servants and their trade unions on solving these issues (except through consultations of the relevant government authorities with the representatives of civil servant trade unions). The modern composition of public servant remuneration in Ukraine is inefficient and bears high corruption risks. Approximately 30 per cent of it is salary; another 70 per cent consists of allowances and after-payments. The civil service reform foresees an inversion of this proportion: 70 per cent for salary and 30 per cent for other payments. However, just inverting the pay proportion would not eliminate the risk of corruption which is why some additional steps must be undertaken which should not be limited only to a raise in salary, which is, of course, important (Soroka, 2018). Salary motivation should be complemented by raising the social

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status of a civil servant and granting additional significant benefits making the firing from a position due to breaching ethical rules and so on very painful. After the change in political power following the 2019 presidential elections, the new President Zelenskyi declared a “reload of the power” which also included revisions of the situation within the civil service. Respective legal acts were approved which meant some important changes in civil service reform implementation through revisions of the Law “On Civil Service” (2015). The most important changes include simplification of hiring and firing civil servants and introduction of a civil service contract for all public positions (the contracts will be signed for three years with possible extension for an additional three years, the contract service will extend to seven per cent of civil service staff); possibility of home office for civil servants; setting the minimum level of civil servant remuneration (at least double the subsistence minimum set by the law). In this way a civil servant can be fired without any long bureaucratic procedure that was prescribed in the law adopted in 2015. 15.3.3  Problems in Civil Service Reform Implementation Based on some estimations concerning implementation of the public administration reform strategy of Ukraine till 2020, it can be suggested that Ukraine has achieved some progress in reforming the civil service especially in the selection of CEB personnel and enhancing ministries’ human capacity. It is also possible to observe numerous different positive developments within Ukrainian civil service; however, their effect on societal development is still quite modest. The most problematic characteristic feature of Ukrainian public governance, namely systematic corruption, is still at a high level despite anti-­ corruption legislation being launched and instituting national anti-corruption investigation bodies. Moreover, after the political turn of 2019, the level of corruption increased even more as witnessed by Ukraine losing two points from its Corruption Perception Index in comparison to that in 2018. Why has no progress been observed here? The answer is that there are many important factors at play that cause corruption and create a nutritious medium for it and are as yet to be touched by the reforms. Moreover, with the deepening economic problems, political instability and unemployment growth, some of them have simply been more aggravated. The main ones are:

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• poverty of the majority of the population, the excessive stratification of society with 5 per cent very rich and the rest, who barely make ends meet. Along with this, the concept of labour as a source of well-­ being is diminished which creates a corresponding atmosphere in society; • the controversial attitude of society towards such a phenomenon as corruption (see Fig.  15.2 above). On the one hand, people reject and condemn corruption in society, and on the other hand, they eagerly try solving their personal problems by evading the requirements of the law; • low quality of legislation, which creates legal conflicts and allows ambiguous interpretations, regulation of a large number of issues by subordinate legislation (this problem has been aggravated since the new government came to power following the 2019 elections; legal acts were approved by the mono-coalition in a so-called turbo-­ regime, without due discussion and a step-by-step balancing of the interests of the stakeholders). Further additional factors enhancing corruption worth mentioning are: excessive regulation of entrepreneurial activity; imperfect tax system; the possibility to make a profit; mainly by being in close proximity to the authorities; ineffective law enforcement and judicial system; mismatch between the remuneration level of persons authorised to perform PA and the scope of their authority. The gain in PA efficiency is not observable by society in general. Public perception of achievements in this field is still more negative than positive. It means that not only the new legislation should be passed, but also significant changes in the quality of work of civil servants must occur. To achieve this, the selection of civil servants should become much stricter with regard to their qualifications and moral qualities. This is a challenge for Ukraine following on from the refurnishing of all public structures in the course of changes in both political and administrative spheres after the 2019 presidential and parliamentary elections. According to the surveys of the Democratic Initiatives Foundation, bureaucracy is still the #1 obstacle to implementing the reforms (Soroka, 2018). This could also mean that civil servants themselves are not motivated enough in implementing PA reforms. It also transpired that many inefficient civil servants could not be fired due to the very strong legal protection they enjoyed. The annual evaluation has not yet become an

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efficient instrument of staff qualification; in 2018, only 58 persons out of 15,000 working in the CEBs received a negative assessment; simultaneously, the salary bill almost doubled in 2018 (Soroka, 2019). The introduction of a selection procedure based on candidate qualifications could be considered as a right step to professionalisation of the civil service; however, independent experts pointed out the low professional and organisational quality of the actual selection procedures being conducted in the CEBs has led to such an important instrument of civil service improvement being compromised. The changes introduced into the civil service regulations by the new government in 2019 enhanced the political bias in civil servant staff management because the guarantees for more or objective estimation of a civil servant’s work have been significantly lessened. The minister can now fire an A level civil servant without any procedure and performance evaluation; a practice of “advance leave notice” in the public administration sector has spread (before signing a contract or being appointed a civil servant must deposit his/her undated leave notice that allows them to be fired at any moment). This weakened the position of public servants as a professional who has some personal attitude towards dismissal and could have some critical attitude towards decisions taken by the principal. Expansion of the contract practice in the civil service can lead to dismissal becoming widespread because of “contract conditions not being fulfilled”. Similarly, cuts to civil servants’ salaries could, in turn, contribute again to the deprofessionalisation of the Ukrainian civil service. Another problem is a new approach to candidate selection introduced by the recent amendment to the Law “On Civil Service” (2019) according to which a CEB head can choose from five (!) candidates recommended by a selection commission; in truth, this provision provides more than ample room for political bias and a subjective judgement of the candidates. There is still not much progress in improving the remuneration system for civil servants. The most visible civil service problem that recently attracted huge public attention was the very high salaries of some top public servants (ministers and public company managers) in comparison to the average salary in Ukraine. It became publicly known that despite a significantly less efficient PA many Ukrainian ministers and other top administrators receive much more than their colleagues from other post-­ socialist countries and even from many developed ones.

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It is impossible to solve all the issues in Ukrainian civil service within a short period of time, although there is a demand for “quick” solutions from the populace. One example of this may be the act “On Cleansing of Power”, which in fact not only failed to meet its adoption initiators’ expectations, but also caused obvious damage to the PA sphere because thousands of experienced civil servants who had served under the Yanukovych regime (2010–2014) had been fired. Unfortunately, a generalised image of an official has been created in the eyes of the public, namely someone who bears the brunt of all negative assessment of the government’s actions. At the same time, it is forgotten that a civil servant is the same as others from other professions who require not only professionalism, but are also limited by certain legal frameworks. It is worth mentioning that the above analysed reform activities did not touch the public service in  local governments. Ukraine still needs to improve specific legislation regulating this sphere because the Law on Service in the Local Self-Government Bodies was adopted in 2001 and does not fully reflect the current situation despite some amendments passed recently.

15.4   The Future Prospects of Ukrainian Public Administration: What Should Be Done After Volodymyr Zelenskyi won the presidential elections in 2019, a reasonable question was asked: what will happen to the PA reforms initiated by the previous government? Will they be reviewed and continued or discontinued? There is no clear answer to this question yet. The action plan of the new government appointed in September 2019 does not contain much information concerning PA reform except PA digitalisation (“the state in a smart phone”). Some ambitious plans related to economic growth, foreign investments and well-being were announced; however, they have not been realised; this government was dismissed in March 2020. Most activities concerning civil service improvement were dedicated to realisation of the strategy approved by the previous government (the one dismissed in September 2019). An action plan of the new-new government has not yet been announced. However, it is clear that its functioning will be preconditioned by the permanent conflict that affects all aspects of societal life in Ukraine and serves as a driver of urgent reforms.

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Consequently, there is an optimistic view that PA reforms initiated in 2015 will be continued. It should be understood that the conflict situation in Ukraine cannot be solved so quickly. Despite the declared willingness of the new administration elected in 2019 to bring peace to the nation and re-integrate the country, it looks obvious that these processes will take a long period of time. The reasons for preserving the situation are hard-core contradictions between the Ukrainian vision of its own path of development and that of Russia. Russia considers Ukraine as its own domain denying its subjectivity as an independent nation whereas Ukraine seeks reinforcement of its statehood and moving towards Europe. It is for this reason why the conflict in Eastern Ukraine has not been resolved so easily and why an uncertain length of time will pass until Russia ceases its attempts in supporting this conflict as an instrument of destabilisation of independent Ukraine. Under such circumstances Ukrainian PA must evolve and achieve better shape. There are several directions in PA reform initiated in 2015 that need finalising. Firstly, it is necessary to bridge the shortage in training highly skilled PA specialists. Ukrainian PA reform requires a professionally trained staff in order to be successful. The dynamics of reforms require the PA transformation through the professionalisation of the civil service and service in the local self-government bodies, which are connected with the competence of civil servants and local self-government officials (public servants). The policy here has to be aimed at creating conditions regarding training, re-training, advanced training and assessment of professional competencies during the civil servants’ professional life. This context requires developing a system of professional training for civil servants with the simultaneous assessment of their qualifications and the level of professionalism in Public Management and Administration. The legislation concerning civil service development enacted in 2015–2019 defines the goal-setting in transforming the civil service; directions of the state policy and regulatory framework of civil servants’ professional training; sets professional qualification requirements for PA personnel, its training and advanced training and frames the content of education. Thus, the further institutionalisation of civil servant professional development in public management and administration has to include: • developing and implementing a sectoral qualifications framework, taking into account the National Qualifications Framework;

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• development of civil service professional standards and service in  local self-government bodies based on a competence approach (with participation of stakeholders and their approval); • development and implementation of standards in the major 281 Public Management and Administration of the area 28 Public Management and Administration” and the educational standard for the training of public servants; • introduction of a nationwide qualification examination for persons who receive higher education in the major Public Management and Administration of the area Public Management and Administration; • development and adoption of educational-professional and research-­ educational programmes of the major Public Management and Administration of an innovative nature; • advanced training in the programmes for specialised short-term training courses, perpetual and short-term thematic seminars, trainings, workshops on urgent issues of social development. Ukraine is also doomed to reform its administrative-territorial system and to decentralise power. So far, all the attempts to carry out the administrative-­territorial reform have been unsuccessful and did not go beyond concepts that are very controversial in their nature. On 5 February 2015, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine passed the Law “On Voluntary Association of Territorial Communities”. The purpose of this act is to consolidate territorial communities through voluntary association, which should eventually lead to an increase in their capacity and efficiency. However, a detailed analysis of this act shows its significant defects, the main of which is the discrepancy of its norms with the current Constitutional provisions and acts. Moreover, the implementation of the act in practice can lead to unpredictable social consequences, which is opposite to the declared goal, as the experts expressly say. For example, the conclusions of the Main Scientific and Expert Department of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine indicate: “Practical implementation of the draft act in case it is passed in the proposed version is unlikely to allow forming self-sufficient territorial communities that would have the appropriate material or financial resources and public amenities necessary for the effective performance of the bodies’ tasks and functions or to improve the quality of delivering administrative, social and public services to the communities”, as stated in the explanatory note. Besides, the proposed voluntary amalgamation of territorial communities does not take into account the special features of

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separate territories, for example, the southern districts of the Odessa region where national minorities are concentrated. This reform is still not accomplished as about 3000 rural communities are still reluctant to amalgamate; the borders of rural districts should also be reconsidered. However, the new reform initiatives in this field put forward in 2019 by the government, such as introducing the district and region prefects (subordinated to the President) that could stop any decision of the local council and even declare its dismissal as well as a special status for Eastern regions, were sharply criticised and therefore put on the shelf for now. The other directions embrace the further improvement of PA structure and functions in terms of deepening CEB concentration on public policy development.

15.5   Conclusions Today, under the conditions of the socio-economic and political turbulence caused by conflict and by other internal and external factors, the Ukraine’s PA faces a wide range of problems, including the negative balance of society’s trust, the lack of balance of centralisation and decentralisation, bad communication both within the power structures and between the state and society, a shortage of skilled personnel, the low quality of administrative services and insufficient level of moral and ethical consciousness of civil servants. After the Revolution of Dignity, the Ukrainian government initiated an assortment of reforms. Rebuilding the obsolete PA was an integral part of these efforts. An important factor in the PA reform implementation is the optimisation of political and administrative interaction, the delineation of political and administrative decision levels within the state. It is for this reason why a revision of CEB was initiated in Ukraine with the aim to concentrate the ministries and other national executive bodies on policy development. This reform track was to some extent realised in Ukraine, however, with many delays and incompleteness. When we observe the civil service in Ukraine, we can identify a number of innovations aimed at improving the performance and ensuring the quality of the civil service, namely: separation of administrative and political positions; clarification of the legal status of a civil servant; separation of the civil service from political activity; establishing an exhaustive list of

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persons who are not subject to the civil service legislation; introduction of a new approach to the classification of civil servants’ positions; a competency-­based approach to the selection of candidates for the civil service; defining legislatively common approaches to entry, performance and separation from civil service; improving professional skills and professional training of civil servants, their labour remuneration, bonus payments and encouragement, as well as disciplinary responsibility. Reforming the civil service legislation has become the most important step towards PA reform. Despite the imperfection of the newly passed legislation, as evidenced by the constant changes to it, nevertheless it should be noted that the direction in which legislators and reformers are working is right. The last developments in the PA domain show that Ukrainian PA is in a very unstable situation caused by the low professionalism of the new government appointed in autumn 2019. The first quarter of 2020 showed a GDP drop previously observed in 2016; the delays in wage and salary payments are constantly growing, the Pension Fund deficit reached such a large amount that some of the top administrators began to speculate about its liquidation and finally the prospects of continuation of cooperation with the IMF in 2020 when Ukraine has to repay significant amounts of external debts look gloomy.

References Brehelskyi, A. (2014). Problemy provedennya reform z optymizaciyi system centralnyx organiv vykonavchoyi vlady. Retrieved February 15, 2020, from http:// nbuviap.gov.ua/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=341:opitu vannya-­kompaniji-­gfk-­ukraine-­3&catid=8&Itemid=350 Lykhach, Y. (2017). Mexanizmy reformuvannya derzhavnogo upravlinnya: dosvid krayin sxidnogo partnerstva. Dysertaciya. Chernihiv. Motrenko, T. (2010). Plan modernizaciyi derzhavnogo upravlinnya: propozyciyi shhodo pryvedennya derzhavnogo upravlinnya ta derzhavnoyi sluzhby Ukrayiny u vidpovidnist` iz pryncypamy i praktykamy demokratychnogo uryaduvannya. Centr adaptaciyi derzhavnoyi sluzhby do standartiv Yevropejs`kogo Soyuzu. SIGMA. (2018). Baseline Measurement Report: The Principles of Public Administration. SIGMA. Soroka, S. (2018). Reforma derzhavnoyi sluzhby. Chy spravdi zarplaty vyrishuyut` use? Retrieved February 2, 2020, from https://rpr.org.ua/civil-­servic/

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Soroka, S. (2019). Perezavantazhennya derzhavnoyi sluzhby: prychyny, ryzyky ta naslidky. Retrieved January 14, 2020, from https://www.pravda.com.ua/ columns/2019/10/10/7228465/ Suray, I. G. (2017). Between Politics and Public Service (State Secretary of the Ministry in Ukraine). Public Management, 1(6), 171–177. Vyshnevskyi, A., & Kondyk, P. (2018). Chomu i yak treba reformuvaty Kabmin, i shho zavazhaye ce robyty? Retrieved December 1, 2019, from https://dt.ua/ internal/chomu-­i -­y ak-­t reba-­r eformuvati-­k abmin-­i -­s cho-­z avazhaye-­c e-­ robiti-­268125_.html World Bank. (2019). Worldwide Governance Indicators. Retrieved 20 April 2020, from https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/

CHAPTER 16

Public Administration, Institutional Capacity and Internal Conflict in Colombia: An Intertwined Relationship Pablo Sanabria-Pulido and Mauricio Velasquez-Ospina

16.1   Introduction State presence and institutional capacity have been elusive concepts in the history of Colombia’s public administration, particularly due to the prominent role that the internal conflict and political violence have played in the development path of the State in this Latin American country. By using the theoretical framework provided by the historical institutionalism, this chapter aims to explore the influence of the internal conflict in the evolution of institutional capacity, public administration reforms, and

P. Sanabria-Pulido (*) School of Government, Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá, Colombia Public Administration Division CIDE, Mexico City, Mexico e-mail: [email protected] M. Velasquez-Ospina School of Government, Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá, Colombia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 J. Nemec, P. S. Reddy (eds.), Public Administration in Conflict Affected Countries, Governance and Public Management, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74966-8_16

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State presence in Colombia during the twentieth century. It particularly focuses on the process that led to an agreement with the FARC-EP (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia—Ejército del Pueblo— Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People’s Army) guerrilla group in 2018. Colombia has been frequently depicted as a failing democracy with enduring challenges and institutional threats that erode the historical fragile presence of the public administration apparatus and state agencies and public servants across the territory (Sanabria, forthcoming). However, the Colombian case also epitomizes an exceptional process whereby, in spite of the presence of key contests to the institutional apparatus (guerrilla movements, drug trafficking, and paramilitarism, among others), the State and the Colombian society have still managed to continue increasing the State presence in the territory and to improve the institutional capacity of its public administration as well as having a sound and thriving economy. But Colombia is hardly a finished case of success, particularly considering the strong incidence that illegal actors have historically gained in different parts of the territory, even until today. This work explores, from both spatial and temporal dimensions, the evolution of State presence and administrative capacity in the country, through the analysis of different metrics that help us identify key milestones in the configuration of State capacity and presence. In this vein, the chapter intends to contribute to the understanding of some key drivers of a process that has produced a relatively stable market democracy, an increasing process of institutional strengthening, concurrently as it has faced one of the longest internal conflicts in the Western Hemisphere.

16.2   The Colombian Background: Violence, Conflict, and Precarious State Presence Gabriel García Márquez’s novel One Hundred Years of Solitude depicts the isolation (and foundation) of Macondo, a village located in the middle of nowhere. That is, nonetheless, a metaphor of Colombia’s population distribution across a relatively wide territory: relatively sparse and scattered in small, disconnected communities. Indeed, Colombia’s republican history has been mediated by profound challenges in terms of State presence in a vast and diverse land, highly fragmented by different geographic features and barriers: the Andes mountain range, the plateaus in the East and the

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North, the Amazon woodland areas in the south. Such unique geographic configuration and other sociodemographic elements such as the predominance of population in the Andean region—as opposed to other areas of the country which appear to be peripheral—defined a pattern that historically limited the presence of the State to the most populated urban areas on the mountains and, to a lesser degree, on the Caribbean coast. Perhaps because of this social and territorial fragmentation, violence and conflict also appear to be a defining feature of Colombia’s history. Since the very country’s independence, fratricidal wars and struggles have existed, around institutional arrangements and their effects on the polity and the distribution of the pork barrel and of the public sector payroll. Common to these wars is that they were fought over key aspects of the operation of the public administration, the structure of government, and the distribution of resources between territorial units and political factions. In other words, the structure of institutions and their effects over political and economic interests have been at the forefront of the Colombian conflict along its republican history. Take the case of the post-independence wars that were strongly related to the federalist-centralist structure of the Colombian public administration, which meant that in no less than 60 years (between 1830 and 1886) the country had six different constitutions, jumping from federal forms of organization of public administration to more centrist models (Sanabria, 2010). By the end of the nineteenth century, the conservative 1886 constitution created a strong centralized structure of government that was paradoxically accompanied by the practical incapacity to effectively project state power across the land (Sanabria, forthcoming). The national government in the capital city of Bogotá could hardly dominate other developed regions in the Andes mountain range such as Antioquia, or the Valle del Cauca, much less the vast land further South where the legacies of the brutality against indigenous communities at the hand of the rubber boom are still a legend. The lack of State presence in areas of the Pacific Ocean coastal region, the Amazonian rainforest, the Eastern plains, as well as in remote rural areas in the Andes and the Caribbean coast is a characteristic trait of Colombia’s progression as a country. Later, during the twentieth century the rise of social movements fighting for land and labor rights produced an explosive atmosphere around issues of citizenship, electoral rights, the financial sustainability of the Colombian State, the distribution of power between regions, and their political participation in the rents of the central government. Among

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them, there was a key aspect that would unleash strong confrontations between the liberal and conservative parties in what would be known as the era of political violence: public employment. The violent bipartisan confrontations would trigger a long-lasting internal displacement movement that would enhance the already low level of presence of the State in most of the territory. Since the displaced people would move toward even more distant lands, the Colombian State would be almost permanently lagging behind their movement. Thus, the lack of professional and independent civil service in Colombia (Sanín, 2017; Sanabria, forthcoming) would become a driver of the internal conflict around the public payroll, amid strong political patronage practices. One could argue that the history of the independent state in Latin America actually begins with the challenges of building institutions in post-conflict situations (Centeno, 2002). Hopes of liberal modernization along the English or American lines quickly collided with practical challenges such as producing a non-confessional system of education against the much more efficient one run by the church or attempting to free all slaves against the wishes of the landlord classes represented in the legislature (Ocampo & Bértola, 2013). In short, governing colonial inherited structures that determined, for practical purposes, both the territorial scope of the state and its capacity to penetrate the social structures of domination. The effect of such traits certainly characterized the slow evolution of Colombia’s public administration toward greater capacity.

16.3   Conflict and Public Administration Capacity: An Intertwined Relationship in Colombia’s History Perhaps no other country in Latin America has remained as entangled in the recurring dynamics of post-conflict institutional building as Colombia. Indeed, Sanabria (forthcoming) states that the process of development of the Colombian state and its public administration can be chronologically distributed into nine moments of change since the time when it was a Spanish colony, several of them strongly influenced by the use of violence as a legitimate way to deal with battles on the allocation of resources and people for public administration. As we show in Table 16.1, all those nine moments have been systematically characterized by continuous situations of conflict, internal struggles, and institutional threats. True, a good part of these conflict situations revolved around issues related to government

Low relevance compared to other Spanish colonies Extractive and patrimonialistic, cronyism model. Few and poorly connected power centers, land distribution establishes patterns of population configuration such as indigenous encomiendas, and slavery, as well as the role of local elites. Very low capacity of public administration. More priests than public servants per inhabitant. First attempt to build a nation-state, La Gran Colombia (today’s Colombia, Panama, Venezuela, and Ecuador) was dissolved in 1830. The territory that is known today as Colombian begins a long process of dispute over the State model. Six different constitutions between 1830 and 1886, each constitution fluctuating between centralism/conservative and federalism/liberal models. Frequent confrontations and struggles regarding the functioning of the state, the distribution of resources, and its forms of operation. Political Constitution enacted in 1886, conservative, centralist, confessional. Fiscal poverty, minimalist vision of the State, bipartisanship articulates regional power networks, party membership prevailed over an idea of national identity. Patronage and political patronage as representation practices. This constitution lays the foundation for the first permanent organizations of the State. Panama’s separation in 1903 on claims autonomy and abandonment by the central government. “Spoils system” state payroll as loot. Violence as a mechanism of partisan opposition to governments. Model of high partisan representation in which it was difficult to maintain the rule of law and public order. First technocratic efforts to reform institutions and to professionalize the bureaucracies. Aggravation of the conflict, known in Colombia as the “age of the violence”, military government.

 1. Colony (1494–1830)

 4. The Liberal Republic and “The Violence” (1930–1957)

 3. The Conservative republic (1886–1930)

 2. Independence and first attempts (1830–1886)

Description

Moment

Table 16.1  Nine moments of change and conflict in Colombia’s public administration

(continued)

High levels of political violence between members of the liberal and conservative parties over the public payroll.

Internal war between the two political parties continued regarding the permanence in power and control of the army.

Frequent wars over state administration and the distribution of political power in partisan and regional terms.

Intense conflict over rents and resources extraction by the Spanish authorities.

Conflict and level of intensity

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 7. Threats to a Weak Institutionality (1980–1991)

 6. State Reforms Failure (1968–1980)

Military Board Government. Agreement between the two political Parties, Plebiscite 1957, modernizing focus, and strengthening of state apparatus. Import substitution industrialization. Coffee boom. National Front. Civil service reform. Creation of numerous sectorial and specialized public entities, especially at the central level. Increasing role of state in the public provision of goods and services, more welfare state, greater focus on citizens and society. Interwoven urbanization and massive displacement of population due to political violence.

 5. Pacification and first State modernization (1957–1968)

Conflict and level of intensity

Reduction of partisan violence, entry into the Cold War with the emergence of left-wing guerrilla movements with peasant origins, Colombia is the only country in Latin America to send troops to fight in Korea. 1970s. Radicalization of partisan machinery, a system of local elites in collusion Surge of paramilitary and with regional electoral barons. Low capacity from the national elites to control guerrilla violence, mainly local political bosses and to curtail regional elite interests and their rents across rural areas. extraction model. Weak civil service. Merit-based practices existed de jure, but strong political patronage de facto. Relative reduction of bipartisan political violence. Clashes between technicians (islands of efficiency) and politicians. Growth of the cultivation and traffic of illegal crops. Urbanization accelerates, greater citizen demands and strengthening of the State capacity in greater urban areas. High levels of poverty and inequality. 1980s. Appearance of pressures and serious threats on institutionality: drug Terrorism and attacks to trafficking, capture of institutions, and subsequent frontal attack through institutionality from massive terrorism strategies. Exacerbation of violence and collusion with druglords and drug cartels. guerrilla movements. Natural disasters expose low institutional capacity from Peace process with most national and subnational governments. Exacerbation of poverty and inequality, guerrilla movements and as well as rural and urban violence. Terrorism and assassinations of political demobilization of some of leaders by the drug cartels and resurgence of paramilitary/illegal movements as them. a weapon of pressure to the State and the Colombian society.

Description

Moment

Table 16.1 (continued)

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Political Constitution 1991. Late 1980s and early 1990s governments carry out extensive institutional reforms to build administrative capacity and to enhance the State and economy. High social mobilization against drug and guerrilla threats. Demand for institutional changes and for greater state action and intervention. Reintegration of the guerrilla movement of intellectual elites origin (M-19 guerrilla movement). Popular election of mayors and governors. Constituent Assembly. New constitution focusing on the social state of law, decentralization, merit and professionalization of the public function at the constitutional level. Technocracy consolidation and enhancement of islands of efficiency. Improved institutional capacity, advance of New Public Management (NPM) practices, focus on results, contracting out and private sector provision of public goods and services. Advances and challenges implementation of the 1991 constitutional mandates, Civil service improved merit-based practices but limited in capacity. First Stage: Public administration reform project 2002–2010. New public management practices are strengthened. Uribe government focused on private sector practices, mergers and downsizing, but it also sought to improve professionalism and service building on the advances of previous governments. Second Stage: New Governance Model and Neo-Weberian State. Santos Government reverses some reforms and focuses on better service, public service ethos, creation of new agencies (delivery office, quangos), Open government and Transparency.

 8. The New Republic (1991–2002)

Source: Authors

 9. The Implementer State (2002–2020)

Description

Moment

First stage: Conflict escalation (2002–2010). Second Stage: Peace process with FARC and ELN (2010–2018).

Increase in guerrilla and paramilitary violence in rural and urban areas. Failed peace negotiations with FARC-EP and Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN).

Conflict and level of intensity 16  PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY AND INTERNAL… 

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transitions and political power, but also over the control of the state apparatus and of its resources (both financial and human). Thus, the history of these Latin American countries shows a particular path whereby the functioning of Colombia’s public administration has been a defining part of the internal conflict, and conversely, the conflict has influenced the capacity and functioning of the country’s public administration. According to Sanabria (forthcoming), the evolution of the state and the Colombian public administration identifies three key critical junctures (Pierson, 2004) within those nine moments (Table 16.1): . The enactment of the Political Constitution of 1886 1 2. The plebiscite of 1957 3. The process of the Political Constitution of 1991 The analysis of those three moments of reform indicates that, in all three of them, State reform played a pivotal role as a means to attempt stabilizing the country and to generate capacity to tackle pressing societal problems and high levels of violence. According to Sanabria, these three critical junctures of reform in Colombia’s public administration are characterized by three common elements: The first common characteristic is that they take place at maximum points of long periods of high political and social turbulence, reflecting the reach of thresholds (e.g. historical institutionalism) that necessarily lead to a change of direction. A second common feature seen at the junctures is the accumulation of enough political capital to advance unpopular reforms and face actors and interest groups usually opposed to reform and modernization processes that affect their particular stakes. Third, the state reforms at the junctures are characterized by being carried out as part of global reform processes, including general aspects of the economy and politics…. (Sanabria, forthcoming)

In the aforementioned three critical junctures, political violence and the internal conflict have contributed to reach the aforementioned thresholds. Conflict in Colombia has been a defining force that has somehow pushed the Colombian society to look for structural reforms, not only to public administration itself, but more generally to the role and scope of the market and the State in society. The historical and extensive lack of institutional capacity in the Colombian case appears to

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be both a cause and an effect of the almost permanent struggles regarding political power and control of the State. In other words, conflict has been a driving force for the society to look for structural reforms but has also been a curse for the homogeneous development of administrative capacity across the country. Hence, in line with authors like Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), the lack of institutional capacity, the rent-seeking model of different economic and political groups, and the clientelistic approach to the functioning of the state in Colombia have determined the failure of the State itself. Moreover, those elements have nourished the internal conflict. In this context, Colombia has ended up within a vicious circle whereby the conflict has worsened the ability of Colombia’s public administration to accomplish its mission and, in turn, the lack of presence of the State and the heterogeneous distribution of institutional capacity across the territory have facilitated the escalation of the conflict, and the presence of illegal actors, and reduced the chances of a more homogenous development across the territory. In spite of such challenges, Colombia has managed to develop institutional capacity and strength, a certain level of technical and bureaucratic sophistication, and some islands/pockets of efficiency across the public administration. The urban polycentrism (four large cities spread through a vast part of the territory), which has characterized Colombia during the last century, has also helped to develop a solid presence of the State in the largest and medium-sized cities. Thus, the conflict has somehow helped to develop two dissimilar levels of State presence: one in the urban agglomerations and another in rural areas within the country. Whereas the large and medium-sized cities have developed a high coverage of public services and utilities, and display a relatively high level of technical sophistication in the design and implementation of public policies, the rural areas appear to be more exposed to the presence of illegal actors and criminal groups who attempt to take the space that the State appears not to fill. This has implied that the cities have eventually become the receptors of large numbers of displaced people migrating from the most violent areas of the country. This internal displacement ignited by the conflict with the guerrilla and the paramilitaries has demanded even more capacity from the urban administrations in response to the effects of the political violence and the internal conflict. Thus, Colombia epitomizes a particular duality in which the urban areas, by having stronger public administrations, have borne the effects of the conflict and supplemented the absence of the State in the rural areas

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which have been the locus of the internal conflict. Having said that, even in the largest urban areas, there are still remaining challenges to the authority of the State, as well as the presence of local public administration is highly heterogeneous in some parts of cities like Bogotá, Medellín, Cali, or Barranquilla.

16.4   Building Institutions for Peace? 16.4.1  A Brief Introduction to the Last Stages of the War: From Uribe to Santos The botched peace process between FARC-EP and the Pastrana administration—from 1998 to 2002 (Velásquez, 2015)—changed Colombian politics. During the 1990s Colombia was one of the few Latin American countries where the semi-bipartisan system remained relatively intact with liberals handing power to conservatives and vice versa. With the fatal end of the Pastrana peace process such arrangements came crashing as none of the traditional parties appeared strong enough to engage in total war with FARC-EP. Yet, Álvaro Uribe, the former governor of Antioquia, rose in the polls to win the presidency by a significant margin with a rhetoric of military defeat against FARC. Uribe then went on to become the dominant force of Colombian politics for the next two decades, effectively becoming one of the few presidents on the right in a continent that was shifting toward the left by that time. After eight years in power Uribe handed power to his minister of defense, Juan Manuel Santos, the leading figure in forcing FARC-EP into drastic retreat. Indeed, using massive funds from the United States “war against terror”, Santos had managed to shift the dynamics of the war from FARC-EP’s army baleful presence at the outskirts of cities by the end of Pastrana’s term (in the literature Colombia was the classic example of a failed state), to a massive redeployment across rural areas in what amounted in reality to a much weaker guerrilla force. True, victory was no longer possible for FARC-EP, but victory for the Colombian government, even if possible, would take years if not decades. Now we know that by the time Santos came into the presidency he had made up his mind already to try, once again, but on a much narrower set of terms, to negotiate peace with FARC-EP.  For Uribe this was a clear

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betrayal that only confirmed his previous suspicion that Santos was determined to use his lineage as a member of the most traditional political families of Bogotá to resist his political influence. From then on Uribe did not rest until seeing Santos’ agenda shattered. Any negotiation with FARC-EP had thus to consider a number of restrictions. First, it would have to be advanced in the context of a virulent and powerful opposition by Uribe and his nascent right-wing party, the so-called democratic center (Centro Democrático). Second, given the balance of forces, clearly in favor of the government, the agenda for the negotiation available to discuss with FARC-EP was extremely restrictive and basically focused on offering FARC-EP a way to disarm, plus a single substantive policy area that allowed to “sell” de negotiation to its bases of support: the agenda of rural reform. Combined these restrictions produced an interesting result: growing indifference in cities about the fate of the negotiations. In October 2016 a narrow majority of Colombians rejected the peace agreement. 16.4.2  From War to Post-conflict: The Role of Integrated Rural Reform (RRI) Indeed, a key aspect of the agreement was its relatively narrow scope. Compared to previous processes of negotiation with FARC this agreement had only six elements: (1) victims, (2) disarmament, (3) transitional justice, (4) political participation, (5) the issue of drugs, and (6) rural reform. Of these elements only rural reform implied a substantive level of institutional transformation. Such transformation in rural policy was important to both sides in the negotiation table. Not just because the agrarian dimension had played a key role in either producing—as FARC put it—or prolonging the conflict—as the government considered—and therefore had to be transformed to compensate victims and avoid repetition, but also because there was a certain consensus that the agrarian sector required a modernizing transformation. Indeed, while Latin America was experiencing a boom in commodity prices in agriculture, in Colombia a series of corruption scandals during Uribe’s government (Caracol, 2019) left the entire sector in shambles. Rural reform, in itself a very wide concept, became a rallying point for all parties in the process, with each side pressing to advance their own vision of rural development.

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16.4.3   New Theories, New Institutions, Old Politics, and Weak Bureaucracies In this section we describe the institutional theory behind RRI as well as its specific building blocks. The consequences of Colombia’s complex civil war—the longest ongoing internal conflict in the Western Hemisphere— have fallen heavily on peasant communities in Colombia’s rural zones (Cramer & Wood, 2017; Courtheyn, 2018). Fifty years of conflict have seen hundreds of thousands of lives lost, millions displaced, and widespread violations of human rights. Yet the 2016 peace accord with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia—Ejercito del Pueblo; FARC-EP) opened a window of opportunity for the reconstruction of Colombia’s devastated rural territories. The theory behind rural reform came from an elaborate set of lessons accumulated after decades of war. First, as we saw, the government was fully aware that the state presence of rural territories had to go beyond the military presence. After decades of war, populations had all kinds of reasons to be skeptical of the army’s presence and therefore a new relationship between institutions and the population had to be built. Second, there was significant agreement between the government and FARC that weak or poorly designed rural institutions governing land rights had contributed to the logics of the war—such as massive displacement and forced land dispossession. Finally, there was agreement that given the consequences of the war and the historic concentration of assets across rural areas, some form of redistributive politics was required, particularly on the issue of land. In this spirit the language of the accord coined the term “paz territorial” or territorial peace, which specifically aimed to prioritize the needs of “historically abandoned” zones, through three core objectives. Sergio Jaramillo, one of the government’s chief negotiators explained the rationality of the agreement against the legacies of armed conflict: “The historical error has been to think that a process is simply about the demobilization of some groups, without thinking about transforming the territories, without thinking about radically changing conditions on the ground”. In turn, the chief negotiator of the FARC, Iván Márquez, said: “Peace is not the simple demobilization … This is not a space to solve the particular problems of the guerrillas, but the joint problems of society” (Liévano, 2018: 39). First objective was, by the terms of the accord stipulated a correction to the historical urban bias of Colombian development by establishing “rural development plans” to deliver roads, electricity, water, and sanitation.

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The second objective of “territorial peace” was to promote substantive reconciliation between communities and the State, as well as within communities, and finally with returning ex-combatants. This process was known as “development program with a territorial focus” (Programas de desarrollo con enfoque territorial PDET). Village neighbors would discuss their visions and understandings of the conflict, their relationship to their territories, and their development needs and priorities. Through participatory approaches to building consensus and catalyzing programs for action at the level of veredas (rural neighborhoods) and up to the sub-regional level, the terms of the accord aimed to promote dialogue among survivors in prioritized territories. Finally, the third major objective of territorial peace is the reconciliation of the inhabitants of these zones with local institutions. This implies the rebuilding of links among a broad range of groups and institutions, including mayors and governors, on the one hand, and representatives and associations of agricultural producers, victims, women, and ethnic communities (among others), on the other. Direct citizen participation was not intended to replace democratic representation, but to recognize and compensate for institutional weaknesses, including by providing more direct avenues to combat corruption as well as to curtail the influence of armed groups. A critical factor for reconstructing the relationship between state and citizens, then, is the simple recognition of insufficient state support for local administrations. A participatory process must allow the voices of rural dwellers, historically marginalized by the state and by local institutions, to emerge unmediated by representatives, particularly in cases where representative politics has been shaped by violence. Thus, the peace agreement clearly aimed high in order to finally improve administrative and institutional capacity in the regions and rural areas most afflicted by the conflict, a new post-conflict State. However, the later developments of the process have appeared to derail such intentions.

16.5   A New Institutional Set Up for the Post-­conflict State in Colombia? In spite of the precarious presence of the State in the territory and the almost permanent state of internal conflict, Colombia has shown a relatively stable path of development that has made it one of the countries in Latin America with the lowest number of economic contractions in the last century and with one of the most sophisticated public administrations in the region. The Colombian public administration is consistently ranked

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in the upper group of countries with better civil service and public administration capacity in Latin America by the Inter-American Development Bank—IDB (Velarde et  al., 2014)—and it has been confirmed by the OECD (2020) using data from the Institute of Quality of Government. Also the OECD (2020) has indicated that Colombia appears to have a medium-sized public sector compared to other Latin American countries in terms of expenditure (11th out of 21 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean) and a small size of public sector employment as percentage of the total employment (21st out of 21 same countries). Although the country has been in different moments identified by external sources as a failed state, the evolution of institutional strength capacity within the country has appeared to overcome (or at least to be still working on) key challenges to the State and its public administration (Sanabria et al., 2020). Yet, most of its problems regarding the internal conflict appear to be still unsolved (Fiertz, 2020). The most evident effect of such situation is the configuration of a mostly modern state in most of the urban territory, a continuous democracy, and a historically thriving economy, combined with low institutional capacity in places and areas of the country subject to illegal forces and non-state powers. As we mentioned before, this duality in the development of institutional and administrative capacity appears to be reciprocally related to the conflict. The places and portions of the territory where State is weaker are also those where the conflict has been tougher. The last decade shed some light on the need to develop stronger State presence in order to achieve peace, yet the recent developments appear to curtail the efforts to achieve such purpose, as it is explained ahead. 16.5.1  What Was the Set of Institutions Designed to Promote Territorial Peace and State Presence? The peace agreement was truly ambitious in its attempt to transform the presence of the State and the administrative capacity in the rural sector. Even if one could argue that it fell short of offering a radical transformation with an agrarian reform to reduce land concentration, it is undeniable that the integral rural reform represents a serious attempt to modernize institutions and to promote equality across the Colombian rural areas. Table 16.2 schematically shows the most pressing problems identified at Habana, the solution enacted in the peace agreement, the institutional design implied, and finally the set of institutions in charge of implementation

Table 16.2  Rural areas and state presence problems identified in the Havana Peace negotiations Problem

Solution

Institutional design

Institution involved

Obsolescence information on agrarian production (last agrarian census from 1971) Information obsolescence leading to land conflicts and low payments of land taxes

Agrarian census of 2014

Increases in funding for statistical institutions

National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE)

A new multi-purpose cadaster

New legislation, increases in funding for cadaster institutions

Geography Institute Agustin Codazzi (IGAC) Ministry of Agriculture Land registry office Department of Planning Slow and A supply side municipal New legislation Ministry of complicated system to cover in a and greater power Agriculture: National institutional single administrative for institutions in Agency of Land response to solve process the universe of charge of agrarian (ANT) land conflicts land conflicts (OSPR) programs Land registry office through a case by And the creation of an New legislation to Judicial branch case demand-side agrarian jurisdiction create the agrarian system with specialized judges jurisdiction Inequality in access A “land fund” aiming New legislation, Ministry of to land to collect from different and larger powers Agriculture: National sources and redistribute for institutions in Agency of Land to peasants 3 million charge of agrarian (ANT) hectares programs Poor institutional Create a new central New central Ministry of capacity to bring government institution government Agriculture: Agency state services across in charge of agency: “Agency of territorial rural areas, including  1.  coordinating all of territorial renovation (ART) lack of coordination the agencies during renovation” across government the peacebuilding (ART) in charge agencies and a process and of coordinating non-democratic  2.  developing the the programs of interaction with participatory the IRR rural communities component of the agreement (PDET) Low rural access to National plan for the Each ministry in Ministries in several services such as rural reform in charge of a sector sectors drinking water, infrastructure and social designs a plan of health, education, development intervention and electricity

Source: Authors

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The first two sets of problems show the systematic problem in Colombia with the quality of information guiding policy in the agrarian sector. Since 1971, when the last agrarian census had been conducted, the country had relied entirely on representative surveys to inform policy. In the same vein, an old and often non-updated cadaster has been one of the obstacles to collecting progressive land taxes on commercially valued land. The obsolescence of the cadaster was thus commonly associated with incentives to accumulate land as a form of speculation. To fix this situation the government agreed to conduct an agrarian census as the negotiations progressed, and then, both sides incorporated within the agreement specific clauses calling for the enactment of legislation to launch a modern multi-­purpose cadaster. Next was the slow and complicated institutional response to protect property rights on the land, offer timely access to justice, and set in place robust policy to provide land access for poor peasants. Rows 3 and 4 show these problems and introduce the three main mechanisms contemplated within the rural reform to solve them. First was a transformation of the service model of the National Agency of Land (ANT by its Spanish acronym). Instead of processing thousands of petitions from across the country, the ANT would prioritize a model of comprehensive intervention where all the rural plots in a municipality would be formally granted property rights after a clarification process to determine the rightful owner (which could also include the state as owner of public lands). Second, there was agreement on the need to set up a specialized agrarian jurisdiction that could deal exclusively with the land question and would apply legal principles specific to such areas of the law. Finally, responding to the historic need for a policy of land redistribution to provide access to land for poor peasants—which was central to the grievance discourse by FARC—a land fund aiming to collect and distribute 3 million hectares from several sources was called for. Finally, but equally important is “territorial peace” (rows 5 and 6  in Table 16.1). Indeed, a state that had specialized in counterinsurgency had forgotten problems of poor institutional capacity to bring state services across rural areas, including lack of coordination across government agencies and a non-democratic interaction with rural communities. Hence, at Habana the idea of territorial peace represented a clear embrace of the “local turn” in contemporary peacebuilding recognizing successful implementation as critically depending on both articulating structural solutions

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to rural problems and listening to the voices of rural dwellers to better understand and co-create the peacebuilding effort. The Agency for Territorial Renovation (ART) was created with such a mandate. 16.5.2  Balancing Political Support with Bureaucratic Concessions Unfortunately recognizing the agrarian dimensions of conflict and the importance of integral rural reform was not enough to guarantee the peacebuilding effort. The inequality in wealth distribution and political power driving the conflict did not die at the negotiation table. Indeed, politically integral rural reform (RRI) was born under stringent political limits. A negotiated peace centered on the agrarian question was a betrayal to Uribismo as the commanding political force in the country. Uribe organized the reaction under a new political party and led the opposition on narratives linking Venezuela’s left turn and the coming expropriation of land at the hands of “Colombian communism” (Revelo & Sottilotta, 2020). In 2014, Santos narrowly won re-election against the Uribismo candidate by promising to close the deal with FARC. This took the next two years of his second term in office, in the middle of a marked deterioration of economic conditions brought by a shock in oil prices (Grigoli et al., 2017). Santos was increasingly seen as a lame duck as he tried to push the peace agreement through ever narrowing majorities in the legislative. He ended up paying an extortive political and bureaucratic price to the traditional political class that resulted in the appointment of figures notably opposed to land reform in key peacebuilding sectors such as agriculture and rural development (Trujillo, 2020). Unfortunately, none of this was enough to pass the legislation required for the implementation of rural reform. Furthermore, Uribe came back to power in 2018 with his candidate, Iván Duque. 16.5.3  A Traumatic Implementation: Uribismo Returns to Power Together with Brexit and the victory of Trump in the United States, the result of plebiscite on peace in Colombia came as a shock to the entire political class, including the victorious Uribismo. In the weeks after the

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victory, the director of the campaign for the “No” candidly informed the press that the main strategy for victory was to invite an angry vote based on messages with specific regional and demographic tactics, none based on the actual content of the peace agreement (El País, 2016). The upshot of the “No” victory was to marginally modify the agreements, but most importantly, launch a political coalition to compete for the presidency in 2018. Conservatives, evangelicals, and Uribe as party boss agreed to hold a multi-party primary to choose the coalition’s candidate. Ivan Duque, Uribe’s chosen candidate, won the primary and thereafter the presidency when the moderate candidates supporting the peace agreement fell short of the votes required for the runoff. Duque won against Gustavo Petro, the candidate from the left wing. In the legislature these multiple coalitions and divisions produced during the presidential campaign led to a surprising result, Uribismo won the presidency but could not hold control of Congress, the only place where structural changes to the peace agreement could be advanced. Duque, a young public figure with no experience in public administration, one-term senator with the Uribismo, who collaborated as ghost writer for Uribe’s autobiography (Winter, 2018), took over a peace process the Uribismo despised. Even though different outlets qualified Santos’ initial implementation of the peace process as mediocre (El Tiempo, 2018; Velásquez et  al., 2021). In Duque’s time, however, the constitutional mandate of the peace agreement became a forbidden topic for an Uribista bureaucracy that had alloyed during the struggle against Santos’ and his peace agreement. The result may be described as “obeying without complying” (incidentally a similar expression was coined in Spanish América during colonial times. “Se obedece pero no se cumple” was meant to indicate that although every mandate from the king had to be obeyed, under certain circumstances some could be unapplied, therefore squaring the circle). Indeed, Duque’s first years represented an ambiguous combination (Vélez, 2019; Llach, 2019), first of paying lip service to some of the aspects of the peace agreement prioritized by international donor’s—particularly the European Union—such as the participatory component of the agreement and the protection of ex-combatants in reincorporation zones. Meanwhile, however, the president spent all of his political capital in Congress trying to either eliminate or at least drastically modify the transitional justice system (Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz—JEP). Even though reforming JEP has so far failed, Duque’s government has been overwhelmingly dominated by Uribe’s daily polemics against the system of transitional justice set in

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place by the peace agreement (Ospina & Tamayo, 2019). As a result of this convoluted atmosphere until the COVID-19 crisis arrived, Duque’s popularity was in freefall, in fact the worst for a president in decades (Loaiza, 2018), Santos’ popularity surpassed Uribe’s for the first time, and support for the peace agreement was now predominant among Colombians (Semana, 2019).

16.6   Conclusions This chapter illustrates the case of the only country in Latin America that, as of today, has maintained a long-lasting internal conflict. The analysis shows that the evolution of the country, from the very beginning during the colony, and later on during the republican era, has been marked by the almost permanent presence of violence and internal conflict. The conflict itself has configured a particular vicious circle which has negatively affected the development of public administration in Colombia, whereby the lack of State presence across the territory has led to the emergence of illegal armed groups that have challenged the rule of law and the authority of the State. In turn, the greater levels of violence in those areas have produced a pattern of poor state development and presence in urban areas catalyzed by displaced citizens demanding greater institutional capacity and a greater supply of public goods and services. Such bifurcated mode of development has made more difficult the improvement of the State presence in the regions most affected by the internal conflict. This vicious circle, and the almost permanent presence of violence in Colombia, has consistently led the country to complex thresholds, leading to critical junctures, which have made it necessary to reform the state itself in order to define new institutional frameworks that help the country overcome its tragic history (Sanabria, forthcoming). From this, the three critical junctures identified by Sanabria (forthcoming) (Constitution of 1886, Plebiscite of 1957, and Political Constitution of 1991) with obvious variations, share a strong emphasis on reform in the politico-­ administrative apparatus, in the functions and the scope of the State itself and in the disposition of resources for the operation of the public administration. The last four governments in Colombia have addressed the implementation of a constitution designed to provide a greater role to the State as well as continuous (and divergent) efforts to overcome the internal conflict with the guerrilla. The evolution of the implementation process of the recent peace agreement with the FARC guerrilla movement has been

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more traumatic. While the Santos government had to risk a large part of its political capital to advance key aspects of the negotiations, the result of the 2016 plebiscite affected any likelihood of successful progress of the agreements. Subsequent development has shown a slowdown and a loss of priority on the issues in the deal. The budgetary and resource changes have affected the network of agencies created for the post-conflict period (and their own capacity) and have called into question the State’s resources destined to fulfill the agreements, care for victims and improve the state presence (beyond the military) in the areas most historically affected by the conflict. In this context, the incoming Duque government has shown less interest than the Santos government in advancing key aspects of improving the provision of public goods and services in accordance with the provisions of the peace agreement. Recent developments have shown significant social activism in the largest Colombian cities at the end of 2019, demanding, among other items on the agenda, greater attention by the Duque government to the key aspects of the post-conflict. However, the evolution of the events and the arrival of the COVID-19 pandemic once again sent the issue of post-­ conflict and improvements in the capacity of public administration in conflict zones to the end of the agenda. Thus, Colombia continues to be enveloped in the eye of the hurricane without knowing whether it will come out of the conflict, if it is in a transitional phase or if the conditions of the unresolved conflict will return and with them the increase of the violence. In any case, although the conflict has determined important moments of reform and improvement for the country’s public administration, the developments in the post-peace negotiations process with the FARC seem once again to leave the country in the vicious circle of its institutional development and threaten to return to political violence and to maintain the heterogeneous state presence in a territory that cries out for peace and better quality of life.

References Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2012). Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty. Crown Publishing Group. Caracol Radio. (2019). Así se destapó el escándalo Agro Ingreso Seguros. https:// caracol.com.co/radio/2019/07/13/judicial/1563047346_428578.html Centeno, M.  A. (2002). Blood and Debt: War and the Nation-State in Latin America. Pennsylvania State University Press.

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Courtheyn, C. (2018). Peace Geographies. Progress in Human Geography, 42(5), 741–758. Cramer, C., & Wood, E.  J. (2017). Introduction: Land Rights, Restitution, Politics, and War in Colombia. Journal of Agrarian Change, 17(4), 733–738. El País. (2016). Las polémicas revelaciones de promotor del No sobre estrategia en el plebiscito. https://www.elpais.com.co/proceso-­de-­paz/las-­polemicas-­ revelaciones-­de-­promotor-­del-­no-­sobre-­estrategia-­en-­el-­plebiscito.html El Tiempo. (2018). Sale la directora del Fondo Colombia en Paz. https://www. eltiempo.com/politica/proceso-­d e-­p az/sale-­l a-­d irectora-­d el-­f ondo-­ colombia-­en-­paz-­202982 Fiertz, N. (2020). Colombia’s Peace Deal Unravels. https://fragilestatesindex. org/2020/05/10/colombias-­peace-­deal-­unravels/ Grigoli, F., Herman, A., & Swiston, A. J. (2017). A Crude Shock: Explaining the Impact of the 2014-16 Oil Price Decline Across Exporters (Working paper No. No. 17/160). IMF. Liévano, A.  B. (2018). Los debates de La Habana: Una mirada desde adentro. Barcelona: Fondo de Capital Humano para la Transición Colombiana. Instituto para las Transiciones Integrales (IFIT). Llach, A.  R. (2019). Una paz austera. https://www.dejusticia.org/column/ una-­paz-­austera/ Loaiza, M. V. (2018). Iván Duque es el presidente de Colombia más impopular en décadas. https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2018/12/04/ivan-­duque-­es-­el-­ presidente-­colombiano-­mas-­impopular-­en-­decadas/ Ocampo, J. A., & Bértola, L. (2013). El desarrollo económico de América Latina desde la Independencia. Fondo de Cultura Economica/Mexico. OECD. (2020). Government at a glance: Latin America and the Caribbean 2020. OECD Publishing. Ospina, L.  A., & Tamayo, N. (2019). El hundimiento de las objeciones a la JEP. https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/politica/el-­hundimiento-­de-­ las-­objeciones-­a-­la-­jep/ Pierson, P. (2004). Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis. Princeton University Press. Revelo, D. R., & Sottilotta, C. E. (2020). Barriers to Peace? Colombian Citizens’ Beliefs and Attitudes Vis-à-Vis the Government-FARC-EP Agreement. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 1–22. Sanabria, P. (2010). Dos pasos adelante, uno hacia atrás: Colombia y la configuración de un servicio civil profesional y meritocrático. Boletín Política Pública Hoy, 7(1), 4–8. Sanabria, P. (forthcoming). Modernización de la gestión pública en Colombia: Coyunturas críticas y dependencia del sendero en un proceso no lineal. In P.  Sanabria & S.  Leyva (Eds.), El Estado del Estado. Ediciones Uniandes/ Editorial EAFIT/Departamento Administrativo de la Función Pública.

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Sanabria, P., Rubaii, N., & Guzmán-Botero, A. (2020). The Policy Analysis Movement in Colombia: The State of the Art. In P.  Sanabria & N.  Rubaii (Eds.), Policy Analysis in Colombia (pp. 11–30). Policy Press. Sanín, F. G. (2017). La destrucción de una república. Taurus. Semana. (2019). Los colombianos dudan de las promesas del Acuerdo de Paz. https://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/encuesta-­los-­colombianos-­no-­ creen-­en-­las-­promesas-­del-­acuerdo-­de-­paz/621203/ Trujillo, A. G. (2020). Peace and Rural Development in Colombia the Window for Distributive Change in Negotiated Transitions. Routledge. Velarde, J. C., Lafuente, M., & Sanginés, M. (Eds.). (2014). Serving Citizens: A Decade of Civil Service Reforms in Latin America (2004–2013). Inter-American Development Bank. Velásquez, M. (2015). The Battle of Bogotá. Colombia Between War and Peace. New Left Review, 9(1), 103–125. Velásquez, M., Ávila, N., Villota, M., Quintero, F., & Arbeláez, S. (2021). Largely on their own: Dealing with the rural legacies of conflict through local participatory peacebuilding. Journal of Agrarian Change, 21(2), 313–331. Vélez, J. (2019). Duque no hizo trizas el Acuerdo en 2018 pero tampoco le dio protagonismo. https://lasillavacia.com/duque-­no-­hizo-­trizas-­el-­acuerdo-­ en-­2018-­pero-­tampoco-­le-­dio-­protagonismo-­69526 Winter, B. (2018). Una mirada personal al verdadero Iván Duque. https://www. eltiempo.com/politica/gobierno/la-­relacion-­de-­ivan-­duque-­y-­alvaro-­uribe-­ desde-­antes-­de-­la-­presidencia-­255848

CHAPTER 17

Public Administration Reforms in Paraguay: Challenges to Professionalization Cristina A. Rodriguez-Acosta

17.1   Introduction: Transition to Democracy and the Post-authoritarian Institutional Framework A country of approximately 6.95 million inhabitants (2018), Paraguay has a long and proud history of asserting itself while surrounded by powerful and, at times, hostile neighbours with whom it went to war in the mid-­ nineteenth and early twentieth centuries with devastating political, social, and economic consequences for the country (the Triple Alliance War or the Great War 1864–1870 against Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay which decimated the country’s male population; and the Chaco War 1932–1935 against Bolivia). These wars initiated long periods of institutional instability and political turmoil among the ruling elites and the political parties they represented which continued until 1954 when General Alfredo Stroessner took complete control of the government. Without major

C. A. Rodriguez-Acosta (*) Jack D. Gordon Institute for Public Policy, Florida International University, Miami, FL, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 J. Nemec, P. S. Reddy (eds.), Public Administration in Conflict Affected Countries, Governance and Public Management, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74966-8_17

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migratory movements, detached from global cultural trends, and wary of attack from its larger neighbours, Paraguay’s political culture encompasses strong nationalism and proud independence. 17.1.1  The Stroessner Years: 1947–1989 General Stroessner’s administration was characterized by the extreme repression of anyone who opposed the government, the monopoly of power, the militarization of politics, the politicization of the armed forces, and the militarization of the Colorado Party. The Colorado Party became the conduit for clientelism and patronage: Party membership was a prerequisite for entrance into the military academy, the police, or any civil service job. Economically, any company aiming to provide services to the State needed to have the approval of the Colorado Party. “The price of peace” of the Stroessner years was rampant corruption, contraband, and drug and arms dealing, among other illegal activities done by regime supporters (Rodriguez, 1991; Flecha, 2013; Flecha & Martini, 1994). By the late 1980s, the international community was changing and was supportive of democratic regimes in the Southern Cone. In Paraguay, internal divisions within the Colorado Party (always latent) intensified as the General aged and succession questions challenged the status quo. Economic malaise and poor economic performance further challenged the business elites’ alliance with the government and frictions within the military led to a revolt against Stroessner—who was deposed in 1989. It was the beginning of Paraguay’s transition to democracy, but the process would be marked by years of political instability, as well as by the power struggles within the Colorado Party and its allies for the control of the State and its resources (Arditi, 1989; Flecha & Martini, 1994). 17.1.2  The Transition to Democracy From 1989 onwards, and through many political upheavals that included the assassination of Vice President Luis Maria Argaña in 1999 and the impeachment of the first non-Colorado president ever elected (Fernado Lugo 2008–2012), the history of democratic transition in Paraguay is strongly linked to the evolution of different factions within the Colorado Party, and how each was able or unable to prevail over others because control of the party meant control of the resources of the State and the government (Rodriguez-Acosta, 2016; Carreras & Antonio, 2012; Paredes, 2012).

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There is consensus that in its early stages, Paraguay’s transition to democracy was characterized by the permanence in government institutions of authoritarian and traditional actors who were part of the old system, but who had been part of the coup, as well as the inclusion of some new leaders and political parties of the opposition in the political process but without conditions or a unified democratic vision. The elections in some instances presented some irregularities and lack of public information. An important achievement was the immediate modification of the armed forces’ structure, as well as proposals for the reform and modernization of the State and the privatization of public services. A major weakness had been a loosely defined legal framework that showed poor control mechanisms of governmental institutions. The State, and access to government, has traditionally been perceived as the best way to advance politicians’ careers and benefit those who support them. The Paraguayan transition to democracy occurred from above and from within the power system itself. Those who were close to Stroessner’s deposed regime—namely the armed forces and a sector of the Colorado Party—accomplished the transition. It was not a revolutionary coup or an abandonment of the prevailing system (Arditi, 1989; Flecha, 2013; Paredes, 2008). Given Paraguay’s long history of authoritarian regimes and centralism, the challenge was not to “regain” democracy but to establish and create new democratic institutions in a context lacking any democratic history (Flecha, 2013; Carreras & Antonio, 2012). 17.1.3   The 1992 Constitution: New Design of a New Institutional Framework A milestone of the Paraguayan transition to democracy was the 1992 new Constitution that replaced the 1967 one enacted during the Stroessner era, defining the country as unitary and decentralized. In the new Constitution, the principle of decentralization is clearly expressed with the new political/administrative structure established for the administration of the territory. Furthermore, the 1992 Constitution, for the first time in Paraguayan history, gave administrative autonomy to the regional level (called Departments) and reaffirmed the existing autonomy of the municipalities. Regarding presidential power, the new Constitution eliminated all the prerogatives in the former one that allowed power to be concentrated on

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the president. He/she is no longer allowed to dismiss Congress or govern by decree. The president can no longer order a state of emergency without the approval of Congress, nor is re-election permitted. The curtailing presidential power does not mean that the Executive is reduced in attributions. The president remains the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, is head of the government and the State, names and removes ministers of the Executive without the approval of Congress, establishes the guidelines of the government, and can propose legislation to Congress; the president can also veto laws approved by Congress and can condone or pardon sentences. The introduction of the figure of a vice president did not reduce the preeminence of the president within the political system (Salgueiro, 2011). The role of Congress was also redefined. In addition to the traditional enacting of laws, it must approve the national budget and international treaties. Congress was also given new oversight authority over the government. The Senate and the House of Representatives (Cámara de Diputados) can summon ministers of the Executive and senior civil servants for questioning. They can propose a vote of no confidence, and they can propose a motion removing the implicated minister or civil servant (to the president), though the president is not obliged to comply. Congress can appoint investigative commissions, and it can demand information and documentation from different private and public agencies (Rodriguez-­ Acosta, 2016). The introduction of impeachment procedures (juicio politico) is evidence of the intent to strengthen the oversight role of Congress (Article 255). The House of Representatives can initiate impeachment procedures against the president, the vice president, ministers, members of the Supreme Court, and other senior government officials for misconduct or crimes committed while in office. The Senate is charged with judging and, if found guilty, the accused will be removed from office. The 1992 Constitution introduced reforms to ensure the independence of the Judicial system. The president no longer appoints all judicial posts, including the members of the Supreme Court who are now appointed by the Senate for life, in agreement with the Executive, from a list proposed by a Judicial Council or Consejo de la Magistratura (in itself a newly created institution). Lower court judges are named by the Supreme Court but also nominated from lists proposed by the Consejo de la Magistratura. The Constitution also guarantees the economic independence of the judicial system by stating that no less than 3% of the national budget should

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be allocated to it, and the Supreme Court administers these funds. To avoid electoral fraud and political manipulations, an Electoral Court was established and charged with registering voters and organizing, conducting, and verifying the electoral process in general (Flecha, 2013; Salgueiro, 2011). In a country without a tradition of decentralized governance, the Constitution also created significant tension between the principle of decentralization and the concept of a unitary state, defining many responsibilities but not clearly establishing what level of government (if national, regional, or local) was responsible for them (Salgueiro, 2011).

17.2   Public Administration and the Central Government: Civil Service in Paraguay Paraguay’s national government combines a highly centralized Executive branch with a very fragmented administration. The Executive branch consists of 22 executive secretariats with ministerial rank and agencies that report directly to the president, 12 ministries, the Paraguayan Central Bank, 4 regulatory agencies, 23 autonomous and with full autarchy entities, 5 social services entities, 5 public companies, 8 national universities, 2 binational agencies (hydroelectric plants), 4 companies partially owned by the state, and 17 Departmental governments (OECD, 2018). The National Civil Service Law (Law 1626), approved in the year 2000, regulates the work of the 65,000 civil servants including personnel who work for the national, regional (Departamentos), and municipal governments, and all those who work for state agencies (OECD, 2018). It does not include the education sector, diplomats and consular employees, the military and police, and the judicial branch. It replaced Law 200 of 1970 which established the Statute of the Public Administrator. Law 1626 creates the Secretariat for Civil Service (Secretaría de la Función Pública) as the agency in charge of establishing the norms of the system and overseeing its implementation. It includes the formulation of human resource policies for the public sector; the establishment of the rules and procedures for the hiring process, the evaluation, and promotion of public employees; and being part of the retirement and pension system for public employees. The Secretary is directly named by the president for five years after an open-merit-based competition. The Secretary is advised by a Consultative

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Board composed of one representative from each of the branches of government. Though the Board has never been effectively established. Paraguay’s civil service is classified into four groups, and in seven categories within the groups which also determine their salary ranges. The four groups include political appointees (Cargos de Confianza): these are personnel who can be directly named by the responsible authority and need not go through open competition. They serve at the discretion of the naming authority. They are explicitly included in Law 1626 and in Law 3966 of 2010 in the case of local governments. Political appointees include Ministers and Vice Minister of the Executive branch, the National Prosecutor, and those named by the president to independent government agencies, Secretaries, Directors, Head of Departments, Divisions, and Sections of agencies of the office of the president. The Chief of Staff, Private Secretary, Administrative Director, and the Finance Director of the Cabinet ministries of the Executive Branch, as well as presidents and the members of the boards and directorates of decentralized agencies, are all included in this group. Finally, ambassadors, consuls, and representatives to international organizations are also considered political appointees. The second group, Civil Servants (Funcionarios públicos), are all public sector employees who are part of the civil service career system. Their positions and salaries are part of the national budget approved by Congress and cannot be modified without changing the national budget. Civil servants cannot be fired without an administrative process and justified cause. Once hired a probatory period of six months is required before being granted permanence in their positions. After two years of service, and with good performance and evaluations, the civil servants reach “permanent stability” (estabilidad definitiva) and can only be removed by an administrative summary (sumario administrativo). The Public Service Secretariat must name the administrative judge in cases of administrative summary process against a civil servant. The third group of government employees includes contractors who are hired for a specific job and for a limited time. An important difference with civil servants is that their salaries are not part of the national budget and do not have the same benefits as those in the civil service career. The relationship with the employer is based on the Civil Code and contract law. According to the law, only four reasons justify the hiring of contracted personnel: (i) to fight epidemics; (ii) to carry out the census, surveys, or

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electoral events; (iii) public emergencies; and (iv) to perform specialized professional services. A final category is those defined as support personnel who provide services to the state and their contracts are based on the Labour Code (drivers, janitors, cleaning services). Their hiring is done according to the internal procedures of each government entity previously approved by the Public Service Secretariat. After ten years of service, they obtain stability or permanence in their jobs. As previously mentioned, Paraguay’s public administrators are divided into seven categories or levels. Political Leadership (Conducción Política) is in category or Level A which includes all elected officials, political appointees, those specifically established by the Constitution, and by special laws. Level B includes the Senior Leadership (Conducción Superior) or those who work directly with the Ministers or other elected officials. This category includes Directors General, Chiefs of Staff, Secretary Generals, and Controllers. Level C is Upper Middle Management (De Mandos Medios Superiores) or those responsible for the design and implementation of government plans and actions and included Auditors Coordinators, Department Chiefs, Professional (I), and Secretary (I). Level D includes Administrative and Technical Middle Management (De Mandos Medios Administrativos y Técnicos), all those professionals overseeing the successful implementation of programmes and actions of their specific area. This category includes Professional (II), Secretary (II), and Technician (I). Operative Middle Management (De Mandos Medios Operativos) is Level E category, and their roles include the achievement of specific objectives within operative plans. This group includes Division and Section Chief, Technician (II), Secretary (II). Technical and Administrative Support (De Apoyo Administrativo y Técnico) or Level F are those positions requiring technical and administrative abilities of a certain complexity. It includes Administrative Assistants. And finally, Level G or Auxiliary Services (De Servicios Auxiliares) includes all those positions that under direct supervision and guidance are required to fulfil individual or group activities. Their work is clearly defined by standard procedures and manuals. It includes Administrative Technical Assistant and Service Assistants. Groups and categories determine the salary range of all public employees. As of August 2019, they were the following (Table 17.1): The Law also establishes a disciplinary system and guidelines by which civil servants can be dismissed (Arrua, 2011). The disciplinary system for public administrators has many problems that make its implementation

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Table 17.1  Salary ranges of public employees Level

From*

G F E D C B A

2,041,123 (US$342) 2,500,000 (US$419) 4,000,000 (US$670) 6,000,000 (US$1005) 8,000,000 (US$1342) 10,000,000 (US$1676) 15,000,000 (US$2514)

To To less than To less than To less than To less than To less than To less than And more

2,500,000 (US$419) 4,000,000 (US$670) 6,000,000 (US$1005) 8,000,000 (US$1341) 10,000,000 (US$1676) 15,000,000 (US$2514)

*Exchange rate: Gs. 5965 = US$1 https://www.exchange-­rates.org/Rate/USD/PYG/8-­1-­2019 Source: Author

and effectiveness questionable. Some of the problems include a lack of a sufficient number of administrative judges (who are, in fact, senior administrators and are named as such for the process), who are often overwhelmed and do not comply with the deadlines established, thus many public administrators do not lose their jobs and are rarely held accountable. Lack of knowledge and understanding about procedures, norms, and the process in general and a lack of financial resources to carry on the investigation and the process in general. The normative requires that the government agency that brings the complaint must fund the process. Many times, the budgets of the agencies do not allocate funds for these cases, thus many administrative processes cannot move forward. In many instances, collecting information about the alleged misdeed is poorly done, the evidence is not collected, or investigations are poorly handled. Moreover, the relationship between the administrative disciplinary process and the penal system is not clear. If the alleged misdeed would also carry a penal consequence, for example, Law 1626 requires that the administrative process be put on hold while the penal process takes place. The accused is suspended with salary and if absolved, is reappointed to the position. In many instances, the penal process does not move forward and neither does the administrative one. Another serious problem is confusion in interpreting the concept of permanence in the job and how to fire those with provisional permanence (those who have served for six months but less than two years) the Public Service Secretariat argues they can be fired without an administrative process but this view has been challenged in the courts. Law 1626 also requires that civil servants who do not pass two consecutive performance

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reviews must be terminated within 30 days, but lack of evaluation and performance review systems make difficult the implementation of this provision. The disciplinary process for contracted and auxiliary personnel also presents challenges as even though in theory should be more flexible, in practice the courts have, in many instances, ruled that both groups should have the same administrative process as civil servants, which makes their firing very difficult. Finally, many government agencies (including the Office of the Controller, the National University of Asuncion, the Central Bank, the Supreme Court, and others) have challenged the constitutionality of the Law, putting on hold its administrative and disciplinary processes provisions. Much effort has been invested by the Paraguayan government, especially since 2013, to modernize and professionalize the country’s civil service. The use of technology to improve the efficiency and transparency of the public sector and to make it more merit-based are key elements of the reform (OECD, 2018). The system is centrally regulated but operationally decentralized: The Civil Service Secretariat, as previously indicated, is responsible for formulating human resources (HR) policies and guidelines for the public sector but each HR unit within the government agencies implements them. Technology has been put at the centre of civil service reform. Information on human resources and data is kept under the Centralized Integrated System for Administrative Career (SICCA—Sistema Integrado Centralizado para la Carrera Administrativa) which was developed with funding from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). It is “a web platform through which public institutions are expected to standardize their HR data and processes to make them transparent and open” (OECD, 2018: 141). It has nine subsystems including (1) Job position planning; (2) Selection and admission; (3) Labour mobility and promotion; (4) Performance management; (5) Training; (6) Digital file management; (7) Compensation; (8) Legal processes; and (9) Termination. The implementation of the different subsystems is very heterogeneous. The OECD indicates that the remuneration subsystem is being implemented in 352 institutions, but only one institution is implementing the legal processes subsystem. Different digital toolboxes have been created

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by the Civil Service Secretariat to support SICCA but its implementation level varies among agencies. Also, part of the Civil Service Secretariat is the Paraguayan Institute for Public Administration (INAPP—Instituto Nacional de Administración Pública Paraguaya) created in 2002 and in charge of providing training, technical assistance, and capacity building to the civil service. Reforms have been implemented to ensure transparency and merit-­ based competition in public sector recruitment. Those interested in applying must do so through a dedicated portal (Paraguay Concursa). To improve transparency Law 5189 (2014) established the obligation to all government agencies of publishing—every month—the salaries of all civil servants. In 2009, a system to evaluate the level of development and the needs of the public sector to improve its professionalization was created (Indice de Gestión de Personas—IGP) with support from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). Many of the reforms seem to have had an impact as civil service has become more transparent and accountable making it more attractive to skilled professionals. Since 2012 the number of candidates applying for positions has increased from 3 applicants per job to 14  in 2017 (OECD, 2018). Despite the many efforts at reforms implemented by the Civil Service Secretariat since its creation, and especially since 2010, many weaknesses remain. In particular, the Secretariat is poorly funded and does not have enough personnel. Moreover, many of the major reforms (centralized recruitment process, the single employment portal Paraguay Concursa, the creation of INAPP) have been implemented by decree and thus are vulnerable to political winds and changes. They can all be eliminated. The institutionalization of the reforms is of the utmost importance.

17.3   The Persistence of Corruption and Clientelism As noted at the beginning of this article, corruption and clientelism have been a characteristic of Paraguay’s public administration. The nature of the authoritarian regime ingrained these practices in anybody who wanted to access a position in the government. Lack of jobs and opportunities,

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high poverty rates, and an often-uncertain future still make working for the government an attractive proposition for many. Perceptions of corruption in Paraguay’s public administration are of both political corruption—defined as the violations committed by elected officials—and bureaucratic corruption—defined as when appointed public employees themselves engage in corrupt practices (Neshkova & Kalesnikaite, 2019). In a 2008 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), almost 20 years after the return to democracy, corruption at all levels of government is still identified as one of the major problems of the country’s public administration (Secretaría de la Función Pública, 2019). The methodology—based on interviews of senior government administrators, mid-level administrators, and focus groups—finds a consensus among those interviewed that the country’s public administration is one where corruption is rampant, abuse of power is frequent, lack of accountability is the norm, and citizens distrust it. From citizens’ perception, corruption is everywhere and is one of the main factors that help explain the country’s poverty, insecurity, lack of opportunities, and the enrichment of a few who are well connected. For those interviewed, corruption is perceived as a central problem of political ethics; and it is understood as the use of the State for private benefit, above the interests of the people. For many, civil servants are named based not on merit but on their political and family connections. Corruption in the public administration is seen as the cause of a profound distortion in the relationship between state institutions and citizens: public officials do not respond to citizens but to the politician who placed them there in return for their militancy or their favors. (Secretaría de la Función Pública, 2019: 18)

In focus groups of civil servants carried out by UNDP, clientelism (amiguismo) was strongly identified as the element that permeates all levels of public administration. The majority of those interviewed affirmed that only through clientelism and patronage is it possible to get a job in the public sector. The connection need not be political but personal. The web of connection is also how civil servants can access training, better pay, and professional advancements. Merit is not seen as a prerequisite to advancement. Those who meet the merit requirements are usually side-lined by political

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appointees. Thus, resentment and lack of trust among civil servants characterized Paraguay’s public administration. Interviews with senior civil service administrators showed their concerns about corruption, the size of the State, lack of administrative capacity, and its inability to provide public services to all. In their interviews, the consensus was that “budgets are not executed, not only because of lack of funding, but most importantly, because of civil servants’ lack of capacity and knowledge of administrative procedures, internal processes, and corrupt practices” (Secretaría de la Función Pública, 2019: 27). Asked about what the government should do to advance public administration reform, the majority identified improving the capacity and labour conditions of civil service as the most important, followed by increasing citizen participation and achieving political consensus that could ensure continuity of public policies after each election. Though most leaders do not believe that change is possible. Three reasons were identified: (i) clientelism and patronage are too ingrained. The long history and prevalence of clientelism are seen as part of the nation’s culture and people see access to a government job as a way of obtaining benefits otherwise not available; (ii) political parties do not have an interest in reforming a system they benefit from; and (iii) opposition from civil servants themselves and the unions that represent them. As the previous section indicated, the administration of President Lugo (2008–2012) initiated many reforms aimed at fighting corruption, professionalizing civil service, modernizing the state, and implementing the provisions of the Civil Service Law which had been approved almost ten years earlier (three initiatives were particularly important: (1) ensuring that no civil servant was paid below the minimum wage; (2) enforcing the 8 hours workday and eliminating double compensation; and (3) establishing a new job classification system and pay scale, but only the first two were achieved). His administration sought to improve the Public Service Law, develop and integrate human resource management policy for all ministries and regulated by an executive decree, develop and implement an information system to monitor the civil service career, implement open competition for merit-based hiring and promotion, and strengthen the Public Service Secretariat. The Civil Service Secretariat was able to introduce important initiatives to improve HR hiring procedures in targeted ministries, as well as improving their professionalization and institutional capacity. Merit-based hiring became accepted and expected through media campaigns and outreach.

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The institutional capacity of the Secretariat was also greatly improved funded in large part by international cooperation. The fragmentation and intense conflict within his government coalition and the opposition Colorado Party made many of the attempts to reform very difficultly to achieve. President Horacio Cartes elected after Lugo’s impeachment (2013–2018) made merit-based hiring a priority and sought to depoliticize personnel management in government institutions. In 2014 a national anti-corruption agency (SENAC—Secretaría Nacional Anticorrupción) was created to help all units of the executive branch develop anti-corruption units within them but its impact has been limited at best. As previously noted, the Paraguay Compra initiative was started also in 2014 to promote transparency in public procurement. But even with all these initiatives, corruption continues to be one of the greatest weaknesses of Paraguay’s public administration, seriously hindering public trust and with implications for the country’s development. The country continuously ranks at the bottom of Transparency International rankings (137/180), the OECD reports (2018) that only 28% of citizen express trust in government, and that 74% of them believe that corruption is widespread.

17.4   Governance Coordination and Collaboration: Challenges to Public Administration The president of Paraguay is a powerful figure and the Constitution makes him/her responsible for setting the general guidelines of the administration of the country (Art. 238). But the national government’s coordination capacity has been difficult due to a tortuous and complicated process of democratic consolidation with tensions often rooted in infighting within, and among, political forces. A highly fragmented public administration and the fact that Paraguay lacks a regulatory framework that organizes the work and integration of different ministries and secretariats at the national level, make coordination and collaboration in the delivery of public services very difficult. Most Secretariats and ministries remain sector-based operationally and only three Secretariats perform cross-cutting tasks (the Civil Service Secretariat, the Anticorruption Office, and the Presidential Technical Secretariat) (OECD, 2018).

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The OECD (2018) reports that between 2003 and 2017, Paraguay benefitted from favourable international economic conditions and that citizens’ level of satisfaction with housing, education, health, perception of vulnerability, opportunities for citizen participation, empowerment, work, consumption, and life satisfaction are in general adequate. This assertion should be taken cautiously as current and expected well-being outcomes set for in the National Development Plan (approved in 2014) will likely not reach most of the populations due to serious geographical, social, and economic inequalities. To overcome the many constraints to Paraguay’s development (weak governance institutions, lack of public trust in government, corruption, lack of transparency and accountability, access to justice, inequality and poverty, urban/rural inequalities, the informal economy, low levels of education and a poorly educated workforce, and poor provision of services such as health, education, and water to name a few) efforts to professionalize and modernize its public administration must continue, while reducing the influence of politicians, special interests, and unions. To achieve the professionalization of the civil service, some initiatives need to be reinforced including the strengthening merit in recruitment and promotion. Even though progress has been made in this area, merit-­ based hiring is still not used by all institutions and not all positions are covered by the system. There are still too many political appointees (15% of positions) and many of them are named without having the necessary skills and experience contributing to low morale, impacting continuity, and becoming a source of instability. Recruitment for middle management positions in many instances is still paper-based or done outside of the SICCA system and retention of good professionals continues to be an issue. A major weakness continues to be the fact that the Civil Service Secretariat is understaffed, and its funding is insufficient for the task. Increasing transparency and making compensation strictly merit-based is another area that needs continued support. Compensation is still not necessarily merit-based and there are too many salary categories (though in 2016 a new salary matrix reduced them from 1700 to 340). Wage imbalances play a significant role in the capacity to recruit and retain, and the accumulation of multiple salaries by civil servants is a persistent problem. The lack of integration between the SICCA system and the remuneration system (SIARE—Sistema Integrado de Administración de Recursos del Estado) which is managed by the Ministry of Finance allows for double compensation to go unnoticed and increases mistrust in the system.

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Finally, some contractors have multiple agreements in several agencies which is against the rules. The final two initiatives that need continued support include providing adequate motivation and incentives to attract and retain skilled professionals, as well as increasing capacity building and training to benefit more public administrators. The National Institute of Public Administration (INAPP) is poorly funded (it has no budget from the government and though institutions have budgets for training activities, INAPP is not authorized to receive those funds) making it highly dependent on donor support to carry on its duties. This has an impact on the number of people who can benefit from their training activities. The OECD (2018), for example, reports that it only trains about 350 civil servants per year. Political support and changes in cultural and political values are key to overcome the challenges of Paraguayan public administration. Throughout the transition to democracy, the “pervasive logic of clientelism” (Brun, 2012) has been a constant impediment to reforms regardless of who controlled the Executive or the Congress, weakening institutions and damaging citizens’ trust in government. The clientelistic practices and corruption that were part of the authoritarian regime continue to “limit the efficiency of public service delivery, the equality of treatment and the efficacy of enforcement” (OECD, 2018: 26).

17.5   Conclusions Understanding post-conflict institutional choices require sensitivity to legacies, both long-term and more recent (Shugart, 1997). Paraguay’s transition to, and consolidation of, democracy has been marked by the legacy influence of the Colorado Party’s clientelistic and patronage system established during the authoritarian government of General Alfredo Stroessner. From the start of the transition to democracy in 1989, and throughout the years since the modernization of the State to provide better service to its citizens has been a priority of all post-authoritarian governments. Strengthening and professionalizing public administration is key to this goal but Latin American bureaucracies have often functioned as an employment system in the hands of politicians or corporate interests (Iacoviello & Essayag, 2014). Paraguay has been part of this tradition. The difficulties in implementing and institutionalizing civil service reforms as described in this chapter can only be understood in the long

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and firmly rooted authoritarian political legacy of the country (Sondrol, 2007). Culturally ingrained values of clientelism, prebendalism, reliance on government jobs for stability and prosperity cannot be undone in a few years. Paraguay fits the model of a stable low-quality democracy characterized by a relatively stable authoritarian political culture and weak institutions (Bourscheid & González, 2019). In that context, reforms are hard to achieve. Nevertheless, two main types of reforms implemented need to be highlighted, namely the de-politicization reforms that sought to diminish political control over the bureaucracy and patronage; and the professionalization reforms aimed at modernizing public administration making it more transparent, accountable, and better at providing and implementing public policies. As described in previous sections, results have been mixed, but they are steps in the right direction. The Paraguayan public administration experience in reconstituting legitimacy after the authoritarian regime which involves expanding participation, increasing accountability and transparency, reducing inequality, delivering services, and combating corruption (Brinkerhoff, 2005) is perceived as mostly inadequate. Nevertheless, Paraguay has made some important improvements especially from 2013 onwards (and after the country survived some of its most important political crises), in the quest to modernize and professionalize its civil service. As described here, it includes the enactment and implementation of the Civil Service Law, the emphasis on the use of technology to improve transparency, the creation of the Anti-Corruption Office, and the creation of control and accountability systems among others. Modernizing the State and reforming public administration after decades of centralism and authoritarianism is a difficult process and it involves advances and setbacks that are to be expected. Nevertheless, the experience of Paraguay offers some important lessons including: 1. The emphasis on rulemaking does not necessarily reduce politicization. Rather, advances in civil management practices are sometimes better and more efficient. Seeking the support of citizens through awareness and information campaigns can help depoliticize public administration. 2. Implementation is likely to be more successful if done progressively and in stages.

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3. Strengthening civil service agencies such as the Public Service Secretariat and improving HR practices within government agencies are the best safeguards against clientelism and politicization. 4. The need to build a broad-based coalition is fundamental to the success of the proposed reforms. To build a resilient democracy, able to provide efficient and equitable public services to its citizens requires a modern, transparent, merit-based civil service. This chapter has shown that Paraguay has taken many steps in that direction but there still is resistance by many institutions, political actors, civil servants themselves, and corporate interests. Corruption and lack of transparency are still a grave concern. More human and financial resources, as well as political will by all stakeholders, need to be committed for the institutionalization of the enacted reforms.

References Arditi, B. (1989). Adiós a Stroessner: Nuevos espacios, viejos problemas. Nueva Sociedad, 102, 24–32. Arrua, E. S. (2011). Reforma del servicio civil. Desvinculación del Personal Público en el Paraguay (Nuevos aportes para las políticas públicas en Paraguay). CADEP. Bourscheid, J. I., & González, R. S. (2019). Transición y precarización democrática paraguaya: Los efectos de la baja calidad institucional y del comportamiento político negativo. Colombia Internacional, 98, 31–65. Brinkerhoff, D.  W. (2005). Rebuilding Governance in Failed States and Post-­ conflict Societies: Core Concepts and Cross-Cutting Themes. Public Administration and Development, 25(1), 3–14. Brun, D. A. (2012). Estatalidad y calidad de la democracia en Paraguay. América Latina Hoy, 60, 43–66. Carreras, F., & Antonio, L. (2012). La consolidación democrática en Paraguay. América Latina Hoy, 60, 67–82. Flecha, V. (2013). Paraguay, república independiente y soberana, 1813–2013. ServiLibro. Flecha, V., & Martini, C. (1994). Historia de la transición: Pasado y futuro de la democracia en el Paraguay. Ultima Hora. Iacoviello, M., & Essayag, S. (2014). El Desafio De Profesionalizar La Función Pública En América Latina. https://1library.co/document/7q076v3z-­desafio-­ profesionalizar-­funcion-­publica-­america-­latina.html

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Neshkova, M. I., & Kalesnikaite, V. (2019). Corruption and Citizen Participation in Local Government: Evidence from Latin America. Governance, 32(4), 677–693. OECD. (2018). OECD Public Governance Reviews: Paraguay: Pursuing National Development Through Integrated Public Governance. OECD Publishing. Paredes, R. (2008). Por qué cayó el Partido Colorado. ServiLibro. Paredes, R. (2012). Por qué cayó Lugo. Servilibro. Rodriguez, J. C. (1991). Los laberintos de la obediencia. Paraguay 1954/1989. Nueva Sociedad, 112, 49–55. Rodriguez-Acosta, C.  A. (2016). The Impact of Decentralization and New Intergovernmental Relations on Public Service Delivery: A Comparative Analysis of Colombia and Paraguay. FIU Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2470. Salgueiro, J.  S. (2011). La Constitución de la República del Paraguay del 20 de junio de 1992. Boletín Mexicano de Derecho Comparado. UNAM Biblioteca Jurídica Virtual. Secretaría de la Función Pública. (2019). Clasificación de Funcionarios y Funcionarias por categoría y nivel de ingreso mensual. https://www.sfp.gov. py/sfp/articulo/14315-­c lasificacion-­d e-­f uncionarios-­y -­f uncionarias-­p or-­ categoria-­y-­nivel-­de-­ingreso-­mensual-­.html Shugart, M.  S. (1997). Politicians, Parties, and Presidents: An Exploration of Post-Authoritarian Institutional Design. In B. Crawford & A. Lijphart (Eds.), Liberalization and Leninist Legacies: Comparative Perspectives on Democratic Transitions (pp. 40–90). University of California. Sondrol, P. C. (2007). Paraguay: A Semi-Authoritarian Regime? Armed Forces & Society, 34(1), 46–66.

CHAPTER 18

Venezuela: Devastating Effects of a Long Conflict of Political Instability Rosa Amelia González

18.1   Introduction Compared to the rest of the countries studied in this book, the Venezuelan conflict is not easy to characterize. Experts and analysts of the process cannot agree on what type of conflict it is, but they do agree on one thing: its seriousness. An example of this is the inclusion of Venezuela in the list of the 10 Conflicts to Watch in 2019 produced by the International Crisis Group (Malley, 2018). According to IMF, the International Monetary Fund, Venezuela’s economy has seen a 65% contraction since 2013, putting it among the deepest contractions around the world over the last half-century. Alejandro Werner, director of the IMF’s Western Hemisphere Department, said: “The Venezuelan decline is historic because it is unprecedented in the hemisphere and also because it is the only one among top global five-year contractions that is unrelated to armed conflicts or natural disasters” (Lugo, 2019).

R. A. González (*) Instituto de Estudios Superiores de Administración (IESA), Caracas, Venezuela e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 J. Nemec, P. S. Reddy (eds.), Public Administration in Conflict Affected Countries, Governance and Public Management, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74966-8_18

387

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R. A. GONZÁLEZ

Moreover, shortage, rationing and/or poor quality are factors common to all utilities (electricity, water, sewage, transportation and broadband internet services) as well as social services (health, education and security). The infrastructure (roads, airports, subway, lighting, hospitals and schools) is mostly in poor condition, hindering the development of productive and human activities. Unofficial figures indicate that 48% of Venezuelan households live in multidimensional poverty and 94% of Venezuelans say they do not have enough money to buy food (UCAB-UCV-USB, 2018). In June 2019 the number of Venezuelans leaving their country reached 4 million. Globally, Venezuelans are one of the single largest population groups displaced from their country (UNHCR, 2019). In the midst of the Coronavirus pandemic, other issues have arisen that may have an even more devastating effect on the country’s situation: the shortage of gasoline, the continued takeover of poor neighborhoods by criminal gangs and the use of quarantine as mechanism of social control by the government. According to the International Institute of Strategic Studies, the crisis in Venezuela cannot be considered an armed conflict. To qualify as a conflict, both parties involved must be organized and have a main use of violence over a sustained time. Instead, the fight for control of Venezuela is one-sided with the government being the main aggressor against the citizens (Today News, 2019). The Global Conflict Tracker classifies the Venezuelan conflict as Political Instability. Other countries that accompany Venezuela in this category are Egypt, Lebanon and Democratic Republic of Congo. Table 18.1 presents the indicators used in each case as evidence of the conflict as well as its status. Note that Venezuela is the only one of the four cases where the conflict is considered to be getting worse. Venezuela’s political instability became evident in the late 1980s–early 1990s with three shocking events: the Caracazo, a social outbreak that took place on February 27, 1989, after the implementation of a plan for economic adjustment by the government of Carlos Andrés Pérez, and the two attempted coup d’état against President Pérez, registered in February and November 1992. One factor that contributed to accelerating political instability was the decentralization process that began with the direct election of state governors in December 1989 (Penfold-Becerra, 2001). This process created strong political competition within fully centralized parties characterized

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Table 18.1  Conflicts of the political instability type Egypt Indicators Estimated total youth unemployment: 32.6% (World Bank)

Estimated number of Islamic State fighters in Egypt: 800–1200 (Congressional Research Service) US foreign aid in 2019: $94 million (USAID)

Conflict status

Unchanging

Lebanon

Democratic Venezuela Republic of Congo

Estimated number of refugees: 1.5 million (UNHCR)

Estimated number of internally displaced persons: 4.5 million (UNHCR)

US foreign aid: $236 million (USAID)

Estimated number of UN peacekeepers: 11,309 (UN Peacekeeping) Unchanging

Estimated number of refugees and migrants from Venezuela: 3.4 million (UNHCR/ IOM) Total UN Percentage of personnel: 20,025 population in (MONUSCO) need of assistance: 25% (United Nations) Human 2019 projected Development inflation rate, Index rank: 176 average (UNDP) consumer prices: 10 million (IMF) Unchanging Worsening

Source: Author, based on different sources

until then by the exercise of a strong vertical discipline to which said structures could not respond. From then on, the bipartisan model AD-COPEI (AD, Democratic Action, and COPEI, the Independent Electoral Political Organization Committee, were the two most important political parties in Venezuela since democracy was established in 1959 until 1994 when Rafael Caldera was elected president for a second term without the support of COPEI) that had operated in Venezuela for three decades collapsed and the possibility was opened for new emerging political actors to gain power. This is how Hugo Chávez, leader of the coup attempt in February 1989, became president-elect of Venezuela in December 1998 and the so-called Bolivarian Revolution began. From very early on, Chávez and his supporters promoted a series of changes to guarantee full control of the institutions and they staged a

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continuous fight against any political, economic or social actor that they considered a threat to their hegemonic power. Starting in 2013, with Nicolás Maduro’s arrival to the presidency, the confrontation intensifies, and its economic and humanitarian impacts become devastating. Another consequence of conflict, less visible to the international community, is the progressive deterioration of the Venezuelan Public Administration at the point to become virtually inoperative. This work will try to answer the following questions: What are the underlying issues in Venezuela? What does the conflict imply for the functioning of the public administration? Are there specific peculiarities that are results of the conflicts in the country?

18.2   Overview of the History and the Organizational Structure of the Central Government In 1958 the dictator, General Marcos Pérez Jiménez, was overthrown by a military and popular uprising and democracy was reinstated in Venezuela. During the period 1958–1973, although there was no political commitment to create a professional civil service, the Venezuelan bureaucracy worked relatively well in terms of its capacity to respond to or cope with the population’s needs. The coverage of the public services was considerably expanded and the foundations of some model organizations—such as the Central Bank and the National Library—were established. In 1968, Rafael Caldera (Independent Electoral Political Organization Committee, COPEI) won the election, having a minority in Congress. Democratic Action (AD) now out of power, but with a large presence in Congress, decided to approve the Administrative Career Law to create a civil service and limit executive power over the bureaucracy. After 1973, closely related with the first oil boom of Venezuelan democracy, the bureaucracy began a process of progressive decline. The goals supposed to be accomplished by the Administrative Career Law were distorted and it only served as a guarantee of job stability for public employees. The political party affiliation was the main criteria used to determine entry. More importantly, salaries became inadequate to attract qualified people into the civil service. There was virtually no performance evaluation for civil servants and the process of training was totally left to the side. During the first administration of Carlos Andrés Pérez (1974–1979), the

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central government grew significantly. The number of ministries increased from 13 to 17. There was also a tremendous growth in the decentralized public administration. According to Bigler (1981: 56) 163 new entities were created; this is 2.86 times more created entities than in any other government since Juan Vicente Gomez in 1928. However, the nationalization of the oil industry in 1976 and the creation of the state-owned oil monopoly Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) showed a long-term commitment with the company’s autonomy and efficiency. Other pockets of efficiency were also maintained—for example, the Central Bank and some state-owned companies, such as Edelca (a large hydroelectric generator) and the Caracas Metro (a subway). In 1984, the Jaime Lusinchi administration created COPRE, a presidential commission to study political and institutional reforms. In 1989, COPRE presented a proposal for Public Administration reform. It was based on a diagnosis of two main dysfunctions: the spoils system and the excessive centralization. The spoils system was based on the government use of oil fiscal revenue to distribute particular benefits (jobs, scholarships, contracts and subsidies) among its partisans. These benefits also included entry into a stable job within the public administration. In the early 1990s, during the second administration of Carlos Andrés Pérez, some reforms were implemented to solve part of the problems identified and to prepare organizations in charge for the implementation of the economic adjustment plan adopted by the government. Those reforms included: 1. A new salary scale with better payment for the top positions, closer to their opportunity cost. The wage ratio of top salaries over minimum salaries increased to 16. 2. Structural reforms in a few public organizations as the Tax Authority (SENIAT) and the Ministry of Industry and Commerce (MIC). In those cases, competitive compensation and career development were reinforced in order to attract and maintain qualified personnel. 3. The creation of independent technical advisory offices in Congress and the Ministry of Finance. The creation of these organizations was tied to loans given to the Venezuelan government by the Inter-American Development Bank. 4. A new law of the Central Bank of Venezuela that strengthened its autonomy and eliminated the corporatist nature of its board of direc-

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tors. The appointment of the president of the Bank by the Executive began to require Congress ratification (with a two-thirds majority). During the following years, due to the prevailing political and economic instability, no further changes in public administration were implemented. In early 1993, AD (the president’s party) decided to go along with other political parties and allow the impeachment of Pérez for misuse of public funds. Congress elected Senator Ramón J. Velásquez as interim president until elections were held in the end of 1993. Rafael Caldera— after leaving COPEI—won the presidency for a second time without the support of the traditional political parties, setting the stage for a dramatic transformation of party politics in Venezuela. By 1996, Caldera implemented an economic reform program that included an important devaluation and the opening of the oil sector. Despite a recovery in 1997, the administration’s popularity remained very low, paving the way for the emergence of Hugo Chávez as a viable political alternative. Hugo Chávez assumed the Presidency of Venezuela in January 1999. In April he obtained the support of 81% of the voters in a consultative referendum for the calling of a National Constituent Assembly (NCA). In the NCA members’ election, held in July, the combination of the representation mechanism used, the strong coordination of the Chavista vote and the lack of unity between the opposition forces allowed Chávez and his supporters to obtain 96% of the seats with only 53% of the vote. In addition to drafting a new constitution in less than three months, the NCA dissolved the Congress of the Republic and created the National Legislative Commission, which exercised the functions of the National Legislative Power until August 2000.

18.3   Performance of Public Administration in Venezuela 1999–2019 According to the Central Budget Office, when Hugo Chávez began his presidency in 1999, public employment amounted to about 1,068,000 workers, of whom 35% (approximately 377,000) corresponded to the central government. On the other hand, total personnel expenditure (corresponding to all public employment) as a percentage of GDP was 9%, similar to the percentage observed in countries such as Spain (9.18%) and the United Kingdom (9.22%). At that time, the central government was

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made up of 16 ministries and 4 central offices, dependent on the Presidency of the Republic. A study carried out in 2001 concluded that the Venezuelan public sector was not excessively large neither in terms of the number of employees nor in economic terms. This suggested that the perception of an oversized public administration that prevailed in Venezuelan public opinion responded above all to a cost-benefit evaluation; that is, how the amount of human and material resources assigned to public administration compared to its performance (González, 2002: 3). When Chávez assumed power in 1999, one of his first decisions was to reduce the number of ministries to 13, arguing that a restructuring of the public administration was necessary to make it more efficient. However, after two decades of Chavismo governments, the structure of public administration is twice as large, much more complicated and totally dysfunctional (Table 18.2). In this section we will explain what the particularities of the public administration in Venezuela are and how they relate to the conflict that the country has experienced in the last 21 years. 18.3.1  Transparency and Accountability One of the main consequences of the conflict between Chavismo and the rest of Venezuelan society is the absence of transparency and accountability of the government as well as the progressive deterioration of the system of checks and balances between the public powers. Some situations that demonstrate this are described below. After dissolving the National Congress and assuming its legislative functions, one of the laws passed by the National Legislative Commission of the NCA was the Organic Law on Financial Administration of the Public Sector, which was approved on September 5, 2000. This law established that as of 2003, the Consolidated Budget of the Public Sector would be presented to the National Executive for approval and sent to the National Assembly (NA) for information purposes only—this, when it was already known that the 5th Republic Movement (Chávez’s party) had obtained the simple majority, but not the qualified majority, in parliamentary elections. It is important to keep in mind that the Consolidated Budget of the Public Sector is the document that contains the information on the production of goods and services and on the human resources that are estimated to be used as well as the relationship of both aspects with financial resources. Since then, citizens have not had access to the data,

 2. Foreign Affairs

 3. 

Family

Education

Finance

 5. 

 6. 

 7. 

 4. Health and Social Assistance

Finance

 6. Planning and Development

 5. 

 4. Education, Culture and Sports

 3. Health and Social Development

 1. Internal Affairs and Justice

 1.  Internal Affairs  2.  Justice

Foreign Affairs

H. Chávez (first changes, August 1999)

R. Caldera (1993–1998)

 2.  MPP for Foreign Affairs  3.  MPP for Health  4.  MPP for Communes and Social Protection  5.  MPP for Women and Gender Equality  6.  MPP for Youth  7.  MPP for Sports  8.  MPP for Education  9.  MPP for University Education  10. MPP for Culture  11. MPP for Planning and Finance

Vice Presidency of the Republic

Vice Presidency of the Republic  1.  MPP for Internal Relations and Justice

 11. MPP for Planning

 9. MPP for Culture  10. MPP for the Economy and Finance

 8. MPP for University Education

 7. MPP for Education

 6. MPP for Youth and Sports

 5. MPP for Women and Gender Equality

 3. MPP for Health  4. MPP for Communes and Social Movements

 2. MPP for Foreign Affairs

 1. MPP for Internal Relations, Justice and Peace

N. Maduro (June 2020)

H. Chávez (end of Presidency, 2013)

Table 18.2  Changes in the structure of the national government

394  R. A. GONZÁLEZ

 7. Secretariat of the Presidency

 8.  Defense  9. Production and Trade

 8. Secretariat of the Presidency

 9.  Defense  10. Industry and Trade

Labor

 11. 

 13. 

Labor

 10. Energy and Mines

 12. Energy and Mines

 11. Agriculture and Livestock

H. Chávez (first changes, August 1999)

R. Caldera (1993–1998)

N. Maduro (June 2020)

Development  22. MPP of Electric Power

(continued)

 20.  MPP of Labor and  23. MPP for the Social Process of Social Security Labor

 19. MPP of Electric Power

 12. MPP Office of the  12. MPP Office of the Presidency and Presidency Monitoring of Government Management  13. MPP for Defense  13. MPP for Defense  14. MPP of Trade  14. MPP for Domestic Trade  15. MPP of Industries  15. MPP of Industries and Domestic Production  16. MPP for Tourism  16. MPP for Tourism and Foreign Trade  17. MPP for  17. MPP for Productive Agriculture Agriculture and and Land Land  18. MPP for Urban Agriculture  19. MPP for Fisheries and Aquaculture  18. MPP of Petroleum  20. MPP of Petroleum and Mining  21. MPP for Ecological Mining

H. Chávez (end of Presidency, 2013)

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Source: Author

 15. Urban Development  16. Environment and Renewable Resources

 12. 

 14. Transportation and Communications

 14. Science and Technology

 13. Environment and Natural Resources

Infrastructure

H. Chávez (first changes, August 1999)

R. Caldera (1993–1998)

Table 18.2 (continued)

 25. MPP for Science and Technology  26. MPP for Communication and Information  27. MPP for Food  28. MPP for Indigenous Peoples  29. MPP for Prison Service

 21. MPP of Ground Transportation  22. MPP of Air and Aquatic Transportation  23. MPP for Housing and Habitat  24. MPP for the Environment

H. Chávez (end of Presidency, 2013)

 33. MPP for Prison Service

 31. MPP for Food  32. MPP for Indigenous Peoples

 30. MPP for Communication and Information

 29. MPP for Science and Technology

 25. MPP for Housing and Habitat  26. MPP for Public Works  27. MPP for Eco Socialism  28. MPP for Water Care

 24. MPP of Transportation

N. Maduro (June 2020)

396  R. A. GONZÁLEZ

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397

which were the most reliable for knowing the size and characteristics of public employment. The only source that is still available is the Household Survey carried out by the National Statistics Institute (NSI). The information in the survey comes from the citizens themselves, who report which sector they belong to (public or private) and what type of activity their employer carries out. From there, you can find out the number of people employed in community, social and personal service activities in the public sector. This figure is the best approximation that exists of the total number of public administration workers; however, it does not allow discrimination between the central government, sub-national governments and functionally decentralized administration and may include state companies. According to the data, total public employment went from 1,319,796 workers in 1999 to 3,355,155 in 2018, which implies a growth of 154%. For its part, community, social and personal services activities grew 128% from 1,189,740 workers in 1999 to 2,716,839 in 2018. It is important to note that the public sector did not stop growing during the period, regardless of the emigration of Venezuelans, which reached 4 million people in June 2019 (according to UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency and IOM, the International Organization for Migration). In December 2015, the political opposition gathered and coordinated its forces at the Democratic Unity Table (DUT), achieving its first major electoral victory in 17 years. The DUT obtained 112 of the 167 seats in the NA, that is, the qualified majority of two-thirds. Shortly after, the Supreme Court of Justice (SCJ) suspended the inauguration of three indigenous deputies from the Amazon State, arguing the purchase of votes in their election. It should be noted that without these three representatives, the opposition lost the qualified majority necessary to make decisions such as the appointment of the members of the National Electoral Council and the SCJ magistrates. While the measure imposed by the judiciary was still active, indigenous parliamentarians were incorporated into the NA one day after its installation in January 2016. In response to that act, on January 11, 2016, the SCJ declared that all the acts carried out by the NA would be considered null while the swearing-in of the three deputies continued in force. That same year, arguing the contempt of the NA deputies and the powers assumed by the president within the framework of the decree of the State of Exception and Economic Emergency of September 21, 2016, the SCJ authorized the consignation of the National Budget before its

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Constitutional Chamber rather than before the legislature. Since then the National Budget has ceased to be a public document. Another situation that contributed significantly to the lack of transparency of the central government’s management was the creation of the so-called Misiones. The origin of these dates back to the end of the year 2000 when the new NA, with a majority from Chávez, approved an Enabling Law that allowed the president to legislate for a year on various areas, including the economic and social one. In mid-2001 and shortly before its expiration, Chávez quickly approved 49 decrees, many of which were highly controversial. Among the most controversial laws were: the Hydrocarbons Organic Law, which increased the taxation of transnational corporations from a minimum of 16 2/3 to 30% on oil extraction activities and set the minimum participation of the State in joint ventures at 51%, and the Land and Agrarian Development Law, which allowed expropriating large estates. The political opposition, together with businessmen and unions, demanded that the government make changes to these laws, but the latter refused and decided to radicalize the conflict, dismissing the board and the high-level managers of PDVSA who were more aligned with the opposition. In April 2002, various opposition actors organized a general strike that led to a coup d’état and the removal of the president. However, three days later, Chávez was restored to power by a sector of the military. After his return, international organizations and particularly the OAS Secretary General, César Gaviria, promoted mediation efforts between the government and the opposition to seek an electoral solution to the political conflict. Meanwhile, Chávez decided to rebuild his base of support and reach new voters, particularly the poor, through the Misiones. These are similar to the social funds that were implemented in various Latin American countries in the 1990s to support people’s development and poverty alleviation (like PRONASOL—Carlos Salinas de Gortari, and PROGRESA— Ernesto Zedillo and Vicente Fox in Mexico, Social Infrastructure—Alberto Fujimori in Peru and the social programs of Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Luis Ignacio Lula Da Silva in Brazil), focusing directly on the most underprivileged population (Morley & Coady, 2003). These funds generally operate outside the regular administrative structures of the government and have the political backing of the president (Siri, 2000). The literature on social funds and clientelism in Latin America has warned that politicians, particularly when faced with weak institutional restrictions,

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may use the resources of these funds in a clientelist manner to improve their political or electoral support. That was what happened in Venezuela between 2002 and 2004 (Penfold-Becerra, 2007). Despite the efforts made by international actors, the struggle continued and in December 2002, another general strike took place, which included the support of senior managers and PDVSA workers. The strike lasted more than 45 days and stopped Venezuela’s oil supply for almost two months, but it did not achieve the objective of making Chávez resign. After the strike, the government took control of PDVSA. The opposition then decided to activate the recall referendum contemplated in the 1999 Constitution. The process was slow and plagued with obstacles brought by the National Electoral Council (NEC), which was and is totally loyal to the government. Thus, after collecting the signatures twice and a complicated verification process, the consultation was scheduled for August 15, 2004. Anticipating the challenge of the recall, the government used the time gained from the delay in the referendum to expand the Misiones, now having the resources of PDVSA in clear increase thanks to the increase in oil prices. The option of NOT revoking the president obtained 59.1% of the votes. Through government announcements and web pages, 30 Misiones and 17 Grandes Misiones (great missions) were recorded in the areas of education, health, protection and social assistance, work, housing, food, security and basic services; however, some are not new but “relaunches” of the existing ones. With the exception of the Great Venezuela Housing Mission, the great missions appeared in the presidency of Nicolás Maduro, after the enactment in 2014 of the Organic Law on Missions, Great Missions and Micro-Missions. Although in practice it is difficult to distinguish between them, the law indicates that great missions have an inter-sectorial character. For their part, despite the fact that they are contemplated in the law, there is no information on any micro-mission. The main characteristic of these programs is the streamlining of state processes, since they are outside the formal administrative structure and report directly to the Presidency. For this reason, there is no reliable information on its scope, results and the human and financial resources employed. The Housing Mission was relaunched in 2011 as the Great Venezuela Housing Mission to build or rebuild the homes of thousands of people who lost their homes as a result of heavy rains and to shore up what would be the last presidential campaign of Hugo Chávez. In 2012, public spending grew by more than 20% and a good part of that spending went to the

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Great Venezuela Housing Mission. On October 7, 2012, Chávez was re-­ elected for a third six-year term. 18.3.2  Civil Service System The conflict has also affected the civil service system, mainly through three dynamics: political apartheid, turnover of authorities and qualified personnel migration. Although the exchange of public employment for partisan loyalties was not new in Venezuela, with the arrival of Chávez in power, what was a clientelist practice became political apartheid. This was more pronounced after the 2004 recall referendum. Citizens who exercised their right to call a referendum were threatened with retaliation and with being blacklisted to prevent them from obtaining government jobs and services. After describing the referendum initiative as an act “against the homeland,” Chávez ordered the electoral authorities to provide deputy Luis Tascón with a list of all the names of those who had signed the referendum petition, which was subsequently made public via internet. The so-called Tascón List, as well as an even more detailed list of all Venezuelans’ political affiliations called the “Maisanta Program,” was used to politically discriminate against opponents of the government. In 2016, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights ruled on the case of the arbitrary termination, in March 2004, of the professional services contracts that Rocío San Miguel Sosa, Magally Chang Girón and Thais Coromoto Peña had with the National Border Council, an entity belonging to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, after having signed a request to call a recall referendum on the mandate of the then President of the Republic, Hugo Chávez Frías. The Commission concluded that the Venezuelan State was responsible for the violation of political rights, the right to freedom of expression, and the right to equality before the law and non-­ discrimination. Among others, the Commission recommended that the State reincorporate the victims to the public function in a position of the same category as they would have at the time if they had not been separated from their positions or, if it is not possible, to pay compensation for this reason; it also recommended adopting necessary non-repetition measures to prevent similar events from occurring in the future. It is important to note that to date, none of the Commission’s recommendations have been followed.

401

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Table 18.3  Number of appointments, ministries and calculation of rotation Number of appointments Number of ministries Rotation Start End Average Hugo Chávez (1999–2013) 203 Nicolás Maduro (2013–2019) 177

13 29

29 33

21 31

9.67 5.71

Source: Author’s compilation from different sources

In 2016 the Venezuelan opposition tried to activate a referendum again, this time to revoke Nicolás Maduro’s mandate. It was suspended by the NEC in response to allegations of fraud in the collection of signatures, presented by the ruling party. Within the framework of this process, in August, Nicolás Maduro ordered his ministers to remove managers and officials from their positions who supported the recall referendum on his mandate, promoted by the opposition. The second dynamic that affects the civil service is the constant rotation of the authorities of the ministries, other public organizations and state companies. Between 1999 and 2019 there were 380 appointments of ministers, that is, about 18 appointments per year. The following Table  18.3 presents the disaggregated data for the Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro mandates. It is important to note that each of these movements affects the people who occupy positions of trust, plus a certain number of hiring and resignations related to personal relationships with the authorities, so the result is a high degree of instability of the personnel who are found at the service of the national public administration. This phenomenon is linked to another that has been repeatedly denounced but that cannot be empirically verified due to the opacity of the information, which is the progressive increase in employment contracts to the detriment of career positions. This, with the aggravating circumstance that in a scenario where there is no independence between the public powers, the labor courts usually make decisions in favor of the government employing entities. The reasons for the constant change of authorities can be several, among which performance problems cannot be ruled out; however, an important factor related to the conflict is the deep distrust of the government in those around it. This explains why over and over again the responsibility of occupying high public positions is assigned to the same people, regardless of how good or bad their management is. For example, Elías

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Jaua, who does not hold any position at the present time, was the Minister of Education (2017–2018), the Minister for Communes and Social Movements (2014–2015), the Minister of Foreign Affairs (2013–2014), the Vice President of the Republic (2010–2012), the Minister of Agriculture (2006–2010), the Minister for the Communal Economy (2003–2006) and the Minister of the Secretariat of the Presidency (2000–2001). Distrust also explains the increasing proportion of military personnel occupying positions that had historically been reserved for civilians, as well as the presence of personnel of Cuban origin participating in activities such as the issuance of ID Cards and public notaries. As of June 2020, 9 of the 33 ministers in President Maduro’s cabinet are retired military personnel and the Cuban Ambassador is a permanent guest at the Council of Ministers. Additionally, it must be taken into account that since 2019 to today, four parliamentary elections, two elections for the National Constituent Assembly, six regional elections and five municipal elections have been held in Venezuela. For all of them, Chavismo has had to nominate candidates so that the most trusted people in the regime have alternated between positions in the high government and positions of popular election. For instance, Aristóbulo Istúriz, the current Minister of Education (in office since September 2018), was also a Deputy of the National Assembly, a member of the National Constituent Assembly and Governor of the Anzoátegui State. Finally, another factor that has negatively affected the civil service and that is a direct consequence of the conflict is the migration of Venezuelans abroad. Initially, the migratory movement was fundamentally oppositional with a high educational level and a medium-high socioeconomic level. Over time, however, the movement expanded to people with different political preferences, less education and lower socioeconomic levels. Although their number and profile are not known, there is extensive anecdotal evidence of the loss of officials by public organizations and their replacement by people of lesser qualifications and experience. 18.3.3   Policymaking, Coordination and Regulation Since 1999 policies have become more volatile and incoherent than ever before, in part as a consequence of political instability. Almost all reforms implemented during the previous administrations have been reversed,

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2.50 2.24 2.03

Average Number of Years

2.24

2.10

2.07

2.00 1.78

1.78

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1.45

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M

ad

ur

o

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I Ch

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Pe

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on i Le

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Be

ta

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ou rt

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Fig. 18.1  Average number of years lasted by cabinet members. (Source: Author’s compilation from different sources)

including the decentralization process. Compared with the previous governments, with the exception of the second presidency of Pérez (which faced two attempted coup d’état and an impeachment that removed him from power in 1993), the Chavista government’s Cabinet turnover has significantly increased (see Fig. 18.1). As noted above, in a context of extreme mistrust, the Chávez and Maduro governments put unconditional loyalty over the quality of management. In addition, they had a very peculiar way of responding to citizens’ demands, creating ministries and launching Misiones to send the message that the government was taking care of the problems. For example, in June 2011, there was a riot in the El Rodeo I and II prisons, located on the outskirts of Caracas, which left 22 people dead. Inmates maintained control of Rodeo II for over a month. In response to the crisis, in addition to negotiating with prisoners to regain control of the prison, President Chávez announced the creation of the Ministry of People’s Power (MPP) for the Penitentiary Service. Similarly, in December 2009, after severe rationing in the electricity service, President Chávez decreed

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an electrical emergency and created the new MPP for Electric Power. In the case of the Misiones, the aforementioned example of the Great Venezuela Housing Mission was the response to the thousands of victims after the rains registered in 2011. During the government of President Maduro, the pattern is the same. In 2016, when the acute food shortage forced thousands of Venezuelans to make huge queues in supermarkets and mom-and-pop stores became evident, Maduro announced the creation of the MPP for Urban Agriculture. Also in 2016, the Nicolás Maduro government granted mining concessions in 112,000 square kilometers of the northern region of the Bolívar and Amazonas States, south of the Orinoco River. In this territory, called the Orinoco Mining Arch, local and foreign companies can legally exploit coltan, gold and diamonds, in the hope that this activity will replace oil and become a new source of income for the State. After handing over the concessions and in the face of criticism from environmental specialists and organizations, the government created the MPP for Ecological Mining Development, ensuring that exploitation in the Mining Arc would be done respecting people and the environment. This proliferation of Ministries and Misiones has generated an increasingly fragmented and complex government structure, as public policy issues are addressed in isolation and the reporting lines to the Presidency multiply. Faced with this reality, instead of rationalizing the number of ministries, the government of President Maduro created the figure of the Sectorial Vice presidencies in 2014. The following Table 18.4 shows the existing Sectorial Vice presidencies in June 2020. The permanent confrontation of the government with the private sector has resulted in public policy regarding production and trade being particularly volatile and inconsistent. In general terms, the government has followed the philosophy: as much State as possible and as much private sector as it is indispensable. According to Iturbe (2018), the number of public companies attached to the central administration went from 92 companies in 1999 to 990 in early 1998. Although there are no reliable data in this regard, it is known that a significant proportion of the companies that passed into the hands from the State were expropriated or simply confiscated. Historically, the performance of the Venezuelan State as an entrepreneur has been quite poor, but from 1999 to this date it is even worse. The few well-functioning public companies, including three crown jewels PDVSA, Edelca and the Caracas Metro (subway), are currently in ruins. In

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Table 18.4  Government of Venezuela—Sectorial Vice presidencies 2020 Economy

Coordinates the ministries with competence in the fields of industry, commerce, foreign investment, oil, mining, economy, banking, finance, food, agriculture, land, fishing and aquaculture Planning Ministry of Planning Socialism in the social Coordinates the ministries and missions with competence in and territorial health, indigenous peoples, women, gender equality, sport, youth, work, education, science and technology, habitat, housing, communes and social movements Political sovereignty, Coordinates the ministries with competence in matters of foreign security and peace policy, defense, presidential office, monitoring of government management, prison services, internal relations, justice, peace and borders Communication and Coordinates the ministries with competence in matters of culture communication, information, tourism and culture Public works and Coordinates the ministries with competence in matters of services ecosocialism, water, transport, public works and electrical energy Source: Author’s compilation from different sources

their trial and error process to manage the economic activities of production and trade, the governments of Chávez and Maduro have repeatedly modified the organizational structure of the sector, through the creation, merger, separation and disappearance of ministries. That, added to the constant rotation of its authorities, has produced a government apparatus totally incapable of maintaining coherent public policies. For its part, regulation of the private sector has been very hostile and discretionary, using it as a mechanism of political control. 18.3.4  Efficiency and Effectiveness of the Administrative System, Overall Government Performance As noted above, the lack of transparency on public management has been a constant in Venezuela during Chavismo’s 21 years in power, so there are no official statistics that allow evaluating government performance. Consequently, we must resort to the available international sources. Figure 18.2 presents the results of the Government Effectiveness Indicator published by the World Bank. As can be seen the effectiveness of the government has fallen dramatically, widening the gap between Venezuela and the rest of the region. Although with the exception of Chile, Uruguay and Costa Rica, the effectiveness of governments is not

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Chile Uruguay Costa Rica Argentina Panama Colombia Mexico Peru Ecuador Bolivia El Salvador Brazil Paraguay Honduras Guatemala Nicaragua Venezuela

-2.00

-1.50

-1.00

-0.50

0.00

0.50

1.00

Fig. 18.2  Government Effectiveness Indicator, Latin America countries, 2018. (Source: Author, based on World Bank data)

particularly good; the Venezuelan case is practically an outlier in the region. These results are consistent with everything that has been referred to in the previous sections. Another international data source that may be useful in evaluating the performance of the Venezuelan government is the Worldwide Governance Indicators. Figure 18.3 shows the values of the indicators for Venezuela and the median for Latin America & Caribbean at four points: 1998, before Hugo Chávez accession to power; 2006, the year of Chávez’s reelection for a new period of six years; 2012, the year prior to the election of Nicolás Maduro and 2018, the last year of available data. In all dimensions, from 1998 to 2018, the value of the indicators for Venezuela becomes more negative, showing worse governance. The results are particularly bad in the dimensions of Regulatory Quality and

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Voice and Accountability -2.5

-2

-1.5

-1

-0.5

0

0.5

Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism 1

1.5

-2.5

-2

-1.5

-2

-1.5

-1

-0.5

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-1.5

-1

-0.5

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Latin America and Caribbean median

0

0.5

1

1.5

1998

2006

2006

2012

2012

2018

2018

Regulatory Quality 1

-2.50 -2.00 -1.50 -1.00 -0.50 0.00

1.5

0.50

1.00

1.50

1998

1998

2006

2006

2012

2012

2018

2018

Rule of Law -2.5

-0.5

1998

Government Effectiveness -2.5

-1

Control of Corruption 0.5

1

1.5

Venezuela

-2.5

-2

-1.5

-1

-0.5

0

0.5

1

1.5

1998

1998

2006

2006

2012

2012

2018

2018

Latin America and Caribbean median

Venezuela

Fig. 18.3  Worldwide Governance Indicators, Venezuela and Latin America & Caribbean median. (Source: Author, based on World Bank data)

Rule of Law. Additionally, the comparison with the average for Latin America & Caribbean confirms that Venezuela is moving further and further away from its peers in the region.

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18.4   Conclusions The Venezuelan case shows that a conflict of political instability for a long time can have effects as devastating as an armed conflict, mass emigration of the population, unprecedented economic decline and a humanitarian crisis of great proportions. It also shows another consequence, which sometimes goes unnoticed by the international community, such as the destruction of the State’s administrative apparatus. The conflict between Chavismo and the opposition is so deep that discount rates are high and policies are rarely negotiated in institutionalized settings. Policies are generally made as an attempt to maximize political power rather than designed with an efficiency criterion. Cooperation between various social, economic and political actors is completely broken. The “winner takes all” dynamic embodied in the 1999 Constitution (Monaldi et al., 2008: 402) may help explain why Venezuela ranks last in the region in terms of the Governance Indicators and their Government Effectiveness. Some particular features of the Venezuelan case that explain the deterioration of public administration are the total absence of transparency and accountability, the progressive loss of checks and balances among the public powers, political apartheid, turnover of authorities, brain drain, the appointment of the members of the Cabinet with the criterion of absolute loyalty, the multiplication of ministries and Misiones and the constant changes in the structure of the national government (through the creation, merger, separation and elimination of ministries). The Venezuelan Public Administration is virtually inoperative. Consequently, if the necessary political changes were to take place so that the conflict would cease, the challenges to make it functional would be enormous. Hopefully, the post-conflict experiences discussed in this book will provide useful and applicable lessons for the Venezuelan case.

References Bigler, G.  E. (1981). La política y el capitalismo de estado en Venezuela. Editorial Tecnos. González, R. A. (2002). Diagnóstico Institucional del Sistema de Servicio Civil en Venezuela. Paper prepared for the Regional Policy Dialogue at the Inter-­ American Development Bank, Washington, DC. Iturbe, E. (2018). Administración Pública Nacional. In D. A. Deza & S. Ramírez (Eds.), La Consolidación de una Transición Democrática. El Desafío Venezolano III (pp. 207–254). Universidad Católica Andrés Bello.

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Lugo, L.  A. (2019). IMF: Venezuela’s Economic Decline Among Most Severe Globally. Retrieved June 9, 2020, from https://apnews.com/article/9856c6f 8bec6415ca033e08a88bb556e Malley, R. (2018). 10 Conflicts to Watch in 2019. Retrieved June 9, 2020, from https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/12/28/10-­conflicts-­to-­watch-­in-­2019-­ yemen-­syria-­afghanistan-­south-­sudan-­venezuela-­ukraine-­nigeria-­cameroon-­ iran-­israel-­saudi-­arabia-­united-­states-­china-­kurds-­ypg/ Monaldi, F., González, R. A., Obuchi, R., & Penfold-Becerra, M. (2008). Political Institutions and Policymaking in Venezuela: The Rise and Collapse of Political Cooperation. In E.  Stein & M.  Tommasi (Eds.), Policymaking in Latin America: How Politics Shapes Policies (pp.  371–417). Inter-American Development Bank. Morley, S. A., & Coady, D. (2003). From Social Assistance to Social Development: Targeted Education Subsidies in Developing Countries. Center for Global Development. Penfold-Becerra, M. (2001). El colapso del sistema de partidos en Venezuela: Una muerte anunciada. In J.  V. Carrasquero, T.  Maingón, & F.  Welsch (Eds.), Venezuela en transición—elecciones y democracia 1998–2000 (pp. 36–51). Red Universitaria de Estudios Políticos de Venezuela. Penfold-Becerra, M. (2007). Clientelism and Social Funds: Evidence from Chávez’s Misiones. Latin American Politics and Society, 49(4), 63–84. Siri, G. (2000). Employment and Social Investment Funds in Latin America. Socio-­ Economic Technical Paper (SETP No 7). International Labour Organization. Today News. (2019). Experts: Venezuela Is Not an Armed Conflict. http://todayvenezuela.com/2019/06/18/experts-­venezuela-­is-­not-­an-­armed-­conflict/ UCAB-UCV-USB. (2018). Encuesta Nacional De Condiciones De Vida. https:// elucabista.com/wp-­c ontent/uploads/2018/11/RESULTADOS-­ PRELIMINARES-­ENCOVI-­2018-­30-­nov.pdf UNHCR. (2019). Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela Top 4 Million: UNHCR and IOM. Retrieved June 5, 2020, from https://www.unhcr.org/ news/press/2019/6/5cfa2a4a4/refugees-­migrants-­venezuela-­top-­4-­million-­ unhcr-­iom.html

CHAPTER 19

Synthesis: The Relations Between Conflict and Public Administration Performance Juraj Nemec, Purshottama S Reddy, and Stanley Osezua Ehiane

19.1   Introduction As stressed in the introduction, the aim of this book is to focus on the situation in selected conflict-affected countries in designated regions internationally. The findings derived from the contents of country studies should especially:

J. Nemec (*) Faculty of Economics and Administration, Masaryk University Brno, Brno, Czech Republic e-mail: [email protected] P. S. Reddy University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] S. Osezua Ehiane Department of Political Science & Administrative Studies, University of Botswana, Gaborone, Botswana © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 J. Nemec, P. S. Reddy (eds.), Public Administration in Conflict Affected Countries, Governance and Public Management, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74966-8_19

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• highlight main factors determining the quality of public administration in conflict-affected countries; and • assess to what extent the conflict determines and impacts on the performance of public administration in conflict-affected countries. To achieve the overarching goal of the book, sixteen country studies were developed from all relevant continents—America, Africa, Asia and Europe: Bangladesh, Colombia, Croatia, Egypt, Georgia, Iraq, Kosovo, Nigeria, Palestine, Paraguay, Philippines, Serbia, South Africa, Uganda, Ukraine and Venezuela. The authors were invited to follow the EUPACK methodology (introduced in the beginning of this book) in evaluating the performance of public administration in their countries; however, they also received full freedom to focus on the most relevant country specific aspects related to the theme. With this in mind, all the chapters provided some explicit information, but, in particular, they provided a basic overview on the type of conflict affecting the country, its public administration system and its performance, and in the process developed a positive linkage between the conflict and the performance of the country’s public administration. This also enabled the contributors to not only respond to the core research questions highlighted above but also provide interesting information about particular problems of the selected countries. The first part of this concluding chapter shows the differences between the analysed countries; the second and third parts respond to the above core research questions while the final part synthesises the main findings.

19.2   Types of “Conflict-Affected” Countries Included in the Book The sample chosen is really different from the point of view of the type and timing of conflict affecting their current performance. The editors intentionally selected such a diverse sample of countries, where conflicts have different purposes, forms and history. Bangladesh is a country which emerged from a conflict; history records that it was conflict that preceded the birth of Bangladesh, and it was through a violent struggle that the new nation emerged. After the change of leadership at the national level of Pakistan, on 24 March 1969 the then chief of the army was handed power. Approximately eight months later, the military government announced elections to the national assembly

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and the provincial assemblies to be held at the end of 1970. The Awami League led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman won with an absolute majority. However, political wrangling was started by the People’s Party of Pakistan, which led to the postponement of the session then of the national assembly. Such delay tactics allowed the Awami League to form the government. The people of East Pakistan erupted in anger in response to this. The student wing of the Awami League made an announcement on 3 March 1971 titled “Declaration and Programme for Independent and Sovereign Bangladesh”. A general strike was called by the Awami League across East Pakistan. Government work came to a complete standstill. While the military rulers were holding discussions with Awami League leaders to resolve the issues, preparation was ongoing to bring arms, equipment and soldiers from West Pakistan to East Pakistan. After all preparations were complete, the Pakistani Army committed genocide in Dhaka on the night of 25 March 1971. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was arrested, flown to West Pakistan and imprisoned. In protest against these brutal killings, the armed liberation war broke out on 26 March 1971. On 16 December 1971, the Pakistani army surrendered. A new nation was born—Bangladesh. Violence appears to be a defining feature of Colombia’s history. Since the country’s independence, fratricidal wars and struggles have been ever present. Common to these wars is that they have been fought over key aspects of the operation of the public administration, the structure of government and the distribution of resources between territorial units. Also, the structure of institutions has been at the centre of some conflicts. It is possible to say that violence is regularly used in Colombia as a mechanism of partisan opposition to governments. The recent history of major conflict in Colombia began in 1964 with the creation of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). This situation delivered an increase in guerrilla and paramilitary violence in rural and urban areas resulting in the peace negotiations to fail, which led to an escalation in the conflict during 2002–2010. The peace building process was successfully started after 2010 by the peace negotiations of the Santos government. Negotiations began in September 2012 and mainly took place in Havana, Cuba. Negotiators announced a final agreement to end the conflict and build a lasting peace on 24 August 2016. However, a referendum to ratify the deal on 2 October 2016 was unsuccessful and the Colombian government and FARC signed a revised peace deal on 24 November and sent it to Congress for ratification—both houses of Congress ratified the revised

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peace agreement on 29–30 November 2016, thus marking a formal end to the conflict. However, despite an initial overall decline, conflict-related violence has taken new forms and serious abuses continue. Croatia acquired independence, after hundreds of years of foreign rule, at the very beginning of the 1990s following the dissolution of former Yugoslavia. The conflict began soon thereafter, and during its War of Independence (1991–1995), Croatia suffered substantial casualties and economic damage, resulting in heavy loss of life and injury, and significant damage to infrastructure and housing. Croatian territory was fully integrated as late as in 1998. Egypt represents a specific case of internal conflict—the country has recently gone through a bumpy period of political turbulence that started with the January 25 Revolution in 2011 and was followed by numerous repercussions. The calls and chants by the masses during the Revolution were for “bread”, “freedom”, “human dignity” and, in other instances, “social equity”. This Revolution was part of the “Arab Spring” storming through many of the Arab nations. The masses, led by the youth, who mobilised through social media, rose against their autocratic leaders and decided to end long decades of corruption, inefficiencies and inequities. Now, approximately eight years later, and with so many changes having taken place between then and now, many are wondering whether the situation is back to square one. Over the past few years, starting from 2011 till the present date, Egypt has passed through many turbulent changes. During the period from 2011 to 2019, Egypt had four presidents of the Republic, three houses of parliament, nine different types of national elections and referenda, nine prime ministers and seven different ministers and acting ministers in charge of the administrative reform portfolio. These changes took place amid street demonstrations, police violence, terrorist acts, citizens’ enforced disappearances and repeated renewals of the emergency laws. Georgia represents a case of armed conflict which is now in a cease-fire situation, yet is still without a definite end. After the disintegration of the USSR, due to heavy external meddling, ethnic aspirations, coupled with a lack of civic identity and inability of the newly independent State to provide public goods for all, spilled over into demands for independence and caused violent clashes between the State and two inalienable Georgian regions: Abkhazia and Tskhinvali. Foreign dominated fratricidal war in Abkhazia in 1992–1993 resulted in ethnic cleansing and the exodus of nearly 80% of the local population, predominantly Georgian, from their

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homes as well as the de facto separation of the region from the rest of Georgia. The war ended with a 1994 cease-fire agreement, however, with periodic activation of guerrilla fighting. Likewise, externally fanned separatism and a lack of civic consciousness was the fuel that caused a full-­ blown armed conflict in South Ossetia in 1991–1992, which ended with a Sochi agreement. Mediator’s inability to provide adequate security for civilians or effective mediation on the ground led to yet another misguided episode of violence in 2004 in this region. The apex of external meddling in Georgia happened in 2008, when in response to local skirmishes in Tskhinvali region, Russia, while being a mandated peacekeeper on the ground, unleashed an unwarranted invasion of Georgia from North Ossetia. As a result, currently, Georgia has a total of nearly half a million of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) and suffers from creeping annexation, instability along the line of occupation and ongoing humanitarian crises. Although cease-fire is in place, conflict awaits its final end either in terms of bridging the conflict sides to a settlement or in ensuring that no further violence breaks out. The case of recent developments in Iraq represents the combination of different types of conflict. First, of the government being the main aggressor against its own citizens during the Saddam Hussein era. Internal problems have been exaggerated by international interventions and occupation, especially in 2003. The Iraq War began in 2003 with the invasion of Iraq by a United States-led coalition and the conflict continued for much of the next decade. US troops were officially withdrawn in 2011, but the Obama administration decided to redeploy US forces to Iraq in 2014, when the so-called War in Iraq (2014–2017) started. In 2014, the Iraqi insurgency escalated into a full-scale war and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as ISIS or IS) was established as a result. The fall of Mosul was a very significant point in the history of Iraq. ISIS’s takeover of Mosul demonstrated several widespread security and public-­administration-­ related problems for this country. Kosovo is another example of a country with armed conflict influencing its developments. After the wars in Bosnia and Croatia, an Albanian guerrilla movement called the Kosovo Liberation Army emerged in 1997 and started fighting against the regular army and police of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The war escalated and ended for the first time with the intervention of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and an international military operation. On 10 June 1999, the United Nations Security Council approved resolution 1244 which put an end to the rule of Kosovo

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by Milošević’s regime and installed for the first time in history a UN Mission to govern a country. Milošević’s regime and armed forces left Kosovo on 12 June. The UN Mission took control of governance institutions at all levels and was entrusted with the organisation of elections and rebuilding self-governing institutions. The most striking feature of Nigeria today is that it is wracked by violence in some parts and recovering from conflict in others. A conflict has been raging in the north-east region for over a decade, involving the armed forces and the Boko Haram terrorist group. Despite the efforts by the Nigerian armed forces in the north-east, the violent attacks by Boko Haram insurgents continue. The Nigerian government declared Boko Haram “technically defeated” in 2015, but the success is far from claimed. As a result of this internal conflict, millions of people had to flee their homes in Nigeria and are still living in internal displacement camps scattered across the country. Besides which, the years of conflict further devastated the region’s social infrastructure, for example 75% of the sanitation and water facilities and 45% of the health infrastructure have been damaged. Palestine is another really interesting case. Its territory was under external administration since 1948 (Egypt and Jordan administration) and then occupied by Israel after the Six-Day War in 1967. The Oslo Agreement between Palestinians and Israelis led to the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) in May 1994, and in 1996, the first general election for the presidency of this Authority and the Palestinian Legislative Council took place, electing Yasser Arafat as President of PNA. However, these elections cannot be marked as the start of a peace period. Internal (between Hamas and Fatah) and external (with Israel) conflicts continue, as the PNA was not granted full sovereignty according to the Oslo agreement. Withdrawal of Israeli forces is only partial and the territory of what should be independent Palestine is divided into several isolated areas, from which the PNA was granted full control only over the area which constituted just 17% of the total area of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The conflict in Paraguay is also not an armed one. Beginning in 1954, one person (General Alfredo Stroessner) and one political party (the Partido Colorado) ruled the country for 37 years. Together they controlled almost every aspect of political, economic and even social life. General Stroessner’s administration was characterised by the extreme repression of anyone who opposed the government, the monopoly of

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power, the militarisation of politics, the politicisation of the armed forces and the militarisation of the Colorado Party. From 1989 onwards and through many political upheavals, the history of democratic transition in Paraguay is strongly linked to the evolution of different factions within the Colorado Party, and how each was able or unable to prevail over others because control of the party meant control of the resources of the State and the government. Given Paraguay’s long history of authoritarian regimes and centralism, the challenge was not to “regain” democracy but to establish and create new democratic institutions in a context lacking any democratic history. The most important conflict in Philippines is an internal one. One of the three major islands of the Philippines, the Mindanao region, is the home of the majority of Muslims in the Philippines. This area has been beset by conflict for a long period of time mainly arising from disputes over ancestral land, religious and cultural factors, neglect by the government and clamour for self-determination. The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) was formed and has rallied for the independence of the Moros in Mindanao. The MNLF had for a long time been the major organisation representing the armed Muslim groups, but a breakaway group, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), emerged in 1977 due to unsettled hostilities during peace talk arrangements. Since then, the rebel movements in Mindanao have been primarily led by the MNLF and the MILF and have at times been simplistically labelled as Muslim secessionist movements. As the deep-seated grievances of the Moros continue to be inadequately addressed, the persistence of conflict in Muslim Mindanao has ensued. Serbia is a case of two main conflicts which affected its recent developments. It saw a fair share of conflict between 1991 and 2000, which involved a bloody and tragic civil war in 1991–1996 (namely the war in Slovenia, the war in Croatia and the war in Bosnia) and the war in Kosovo in 1998–1999, all of them under Slobodan Milošević’s regime, which ended in 2000. The war in Slovenia was the shortest and least critical one—it is called the “Ten-Day War” (Slovenian War of Independence). This brief conflict followed Slovenia’s declaration of independence from Yugoslavia on 25 June 1991 and the “actors” were the Slovenian Territorial Defence and the Yugoslav People’s Army. This war lasted from 27 June 1991 until 7 July 1991, when the Brioni Accords were signed. The Croatian War of Independence (1991–1995) represents the fight between Croatian forces loyal to the government of Croatia and the Serb-controlled

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Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) and local Serb forces. The Bosnian war is commonly viewed as having started on 6 April 1992 and ended on 14 December 1995. The Kosovo War started in late February 1998 and lasted until 11 June 1999. It represented the fight between the forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (i.e. Serbia and Montenegro) and the Kosovo Liberation Army, supported by air support from the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). NATO intervened, justifying the campaign in Kosovo as a “humanitarian war”. The “conflict” experience in South Africa represents domestic and dominantly non-armed violence—the existence of apartheid rule over a 48-year period. Apartheid was practiced under Dutch and British colonial rule in some form or other from 1652 onwards and thereafter formalised by the National Party in 1948, when it assumed power, until the advent of democracy in 1994. The bitter resistance to apartheid was initially fought by the African National Congress and Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), organisations that were deemed illegal by the apartheid government. The intense opposition to apartheid both internally and internationally culminated in the armed struggle between the liberation movements and the security forces of the then ruling party. Mr F. W. de Klerk, the then State President, ended the armed struggle which became a defining period for the country’s transition from apartheid to democracy. Consequently, the political policy of racial segregation and white domination, in common parlance referred to as the apartheid policy and system, provided the impetus for the liberation struggle and eventually the emergence of the post-1994 democratic South African state. Uganda is an example of internal conflict and its current era follows the coming to power of the present National Resistance Movement Government under President Yoweri Museveni in 1986. This takeover was preceded by a turbulent period after the birth of an independent Uganda in 1962. The government of President Obote fell nine years later as a result of a coup d’état by Idi Amin who unleashed a regime of terror against his own people characterised by political repression, ethnic persecution, extrajudicial killings, nepotism and corruption. Amin was ousted in 1979 and the next seven years saw five successive regimes until the last of them under Tito Okello was overthrown in 1986 by Museveni’s movement, which waged a bush war against those regimes from 1981. Despite its positive developments, one may say that Uganda´s internal conflict is not yet fully managed. The advent of the Museveni regime generated a conflict of its own in the northern part of the country which lasted for

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over two decades. The ensuing violence spearheaded by the infamous Lord Resistance Army precipitated a humanitarian crisis with two million people displaced. Most assessments of Museveni’s Uganda are ambivalent, stressing the complexity and rigidity of the President’s creeping authoritarianism, simmering internal and external social, economic and ethnic conflicts and the potential for their escalation. Ukraine has been in the same internal conflict situation since 2014. After the people managed to dismiss the corrupt Yanukovych regime (the Revolution of Dignity) and created the prerequisites for returning the country to a European vector of development, the state’s institutional weakness was used (according to most sources) by Russia to succeed in destabilising two important regions—the Crimean Peninsula and the Eastern part of Ukraine (Donetsk and Luhansk regions). In this way, an internal political and social conflict turned into an external one which took a massive death toll measured in the thousands. On 27 February, masked troops (according to most sources sent by the Russia) without any insignia took over the Supreme Council (parliament) of Crimea and captured strategic sites across the region, which led to the installation of the pro-­Russian Aksyonov government in Crimea. Later, the (according to Ukrainian law illegal) Crimean status referendum was organised, which as reported by Aksyonov’s government voted for leaving Ukraine and joining the Russian Federation, followed by the declaration of Crimea’s independence on 16 March 2014. Russia formally accepted Crimea to be a part of the Russian Federation on 18 March 2014. The overwhelming majority of the countries, including the USA and the EU, consider this development to be a violation of international law and of Russian-signed agreements safeguarding the territorial integrity of Ukraine (a legal reason for imposing sanctions against Russia). Concerning the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine, demonstrations against the central government in April 2014 (most countries feel that Russian-inspired demonstrations) escalated into armed conflict between the “pro-Russia” forces and the Ukrainian army that ended up by self-declaration of two unrecognised quasi-states in the part of the territory of these regions which are considered by Ukraine as “territories which are temporarily occupied by Russia”. The participants of the Trilateral Contact Group (Ukraine, Russia and OSCE with involvement of the representatives of both unrecognised “newly established” republics) signed an agreement to halt the war (the Minsk Protocol) on 5 September 2014. However, the conflict remains unsolved—since its start more than 20 ceasefires have been agreed, but none of them have stopped

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the violence. Ukrainian’s will to get back the sovereignty over temporarily uncontrolled territories is still to be resolved. Compared to most of the other countries studied in this book, the Venezuelan conflict is not easy to characterise. Experts and analysts of the process cannot agree on what type of conflict it is, but they do agree on one thing, its seriousness. The conflict in Venezuela cannot be considered an armed conflict; the fight for control of Venezuela is one-sided, with the government being the main aggressor against its own citizens. Probably the best option is to classify the Venezuelan conflict as a “Political Instability” based conflict. Venezuela’s political instability became evident in the late 1980s—early 1990s, with three shocking events: the “Caracazo”, a social outbreak that took place on 27 February 1989 after the implementation of a plan for economic adjustment by the government of Carlos Andrés Pérez, and the two attempted coup d’états against President Pérez, registered in February and November 1992. From then on, the bipartisan model (AD-COPEI) that had operated in Venezuela for three decades collapsed and the possibility was opened for new emerging political actors to gain power. This is how Hugo Chávez, leader of the coup attempt in February 1989, became President-elect of Venezuela in December 1998 and the so-called Bolivarian Revolution began. From very early on, Chávez and his supporters promoted a series of changes to guarantee full control of the institutions and they staged a continuous fight against any political, economic or social actor that they considered a threat to their hegemonic power. Starting in 2013, with Nicolás Maduro’s becoming president, the confrontation has intensified and its economic and humanitarian impacts become devastating. Table 19.1 summarises the main features of the sample of conflict-­ affected countries and documents that the book covers in a comprehensive set of different cases.

19.3   The Quality of Public Administration in Conflict-Affected Countries As argued in Chap. 2, the process of state-building after a conflict should include the (re)construction and socio-economic development of a state by establishing strong, democratic, accountable and transparent institutions promoting peace and sustainable socio-economic development and an interaction between citizens, civil society and the state. According to

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Table 19.1  Main features of the conflicts in the analysed countries Form of violence Bangladesh Armed

Type of conflict Current status

Remarks Establishing the country through conflict Separatism, invasion

Georgia

Armed

Colombia

Armed

Specific case: liberation Dominantly external Internal

Philippines

Armed

Internal

Venezuela

Non-armed

Internal

Paraguay

Non-armed

Internal

Iraq

Armed

Internal and external

Croatia

Armed

External

South Africa Serbia

Non-armed

Internal

Armed

External

Ukraine

Armed

Kosovo

Armed

Uganda

Palestine

Dominantly non-armed Dominantly non-armed Armed

Internal and external Specific case: liberation Internal

External

Nigeria

Armed

Internal

Egypt

Source: Authors

Internal

Post-­ conflict Conflict not solved “Semi” post-­ conflict Conflict not solved Conflict not solved Post-­ conflict “Semi” post-­ conflict Post-­ conflict Post-­ conflict Post-­ conflict Conflict not solved Post-­ conflict Post-­ conflict Post-­ conflict “Semi” post-­ conflict Post-­ conflict

Violence continues

Mindanao area in focus Regime versus citizen Regime versus citizen Invasion by US-led coalition, fight with ISIS, full peace not yet achieved Invasion by Yugoslavian army Apartheid Serbia both aggressor and attacked country Separatism, supported externally by Russia Establishing the country through conflict Conflict not yet fully managed Violence (especially terrorism) continues Clashes with Israel continue, territory not homogeneous Boko Haram terrorist group, conflict not yet fully solved

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Fukuyama (2005) rebuilding post-conflict states requires three phases: stability, self-sustaining state institutions and strengthening of the state. Kauzya (2002) speaks about four stages of state-building after a conflict: emergency, rehabilitation, reform and reconfiguration. Taking this into account, one may argue that good governance is the precondition for effective post-conflict state-building, at the same time however, systematically improving quality of governance is the result of such a process. The quality of governance matters because it directly determines the state-building capacity after the conflict—reconstructing public institutions is considered as a prerequisite and an absolute necessity in post-conflict recovery and reconstruction. However, it also matters because it affects citizens’ lives and, hence, aspects of governance should also accompany security and development discourses in state-building processes. The definition of good governance varies between international organisations and between scholars and is measured in different forms by different think tanks. Most frequently, good governance includes such key aspects of government as effectiveness, accountability and transparency, the respect of rule of law, democracy and participation, bureaucratic expertise and machinery of government, effective public service delivery, decentralisation, respect for human rights, gender and ethnic equality, corruption control and many others. However, not all these key values are systematically measured worldwide to allow for comparison of the quality of governance/public administration performance between countries and some of the existing measured indicators which are (at least partly) normative. To respond to this limitation, it was decided in this text to focus on four frequently used dimensions as measured by the World Bank Governance Indicators—Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and Control of Corruption. The core focus of the following evaluation is progress not the absolute position. The data collected by the World Bank for almost the last 20 years indicate really different patterns between the countries included in the sample. As regards government effectiveness (Fig.  19.1) one can see only two countries where continual improvements are really evident. Georgia is the forerunner, Paraguay, with some reservations, is the second-best performing country. Limited progress with some “depressions” is visible for Ukraine. Croatia started from high level figures and possibly because of this it shows only little progress (despite its involvement in the EU enlargement process). South Africa started from the highest level of performance

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90 80 70 60 50

2000

40

2005

30

2010

20

2015

10

2018

0

Fig. 19.1  Government effectiveness. (Source: Authors, based on World Bank data)

from all the included countries, but their positions deteriorate slowly. The critical negative examples are Egypt and especially Venezuela—the level of government effectiveness in Venezuela recently dropped to almost zero. The information about the regulatory quality (Fig.  19.2) delivers a relatively similar picture. Again, the best performing country is Georgia, followed by Paraguay and to some extent also by Ukraine. The specific case is Palestine, with enormous progress during 2005–2010, but stagnation afterwards and also Serbia, with a similar increase for 2000–2010. Venezuela is again an example of critical deterioration (towards zero) and Iraq is an example of a country with a permanently low level of regulatory quality. All data for the regulatory quality in this part should be treated carefully, particularly in light of the recent revelations about the problems with the “Ease of Doing Business Index”. The data for the rule of law (Fig.  19.3) again show almost a similar picture as the previous two cases—with Georgia as best performer and Venezuela as the most visible “loser”. The data about the control of corruption (Fig.  19.4) document is probably the most critical area of a government’s performance. The best performer is again Georgia, relatively positive improvements are achieved also by Croatia, Serbia and Bangladesh (although there have been some recent problems). Compared to the previous three performance areas

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90 80 70 60 50

2000

40

2005

30

2010

20

2015

10

2018

0

Fig. 19.2  Regulatory quality. (Source: Authors, based on World Bank data) 70

60 50 40 30 20 10 0

2000 2005 2010 2015 2018

Fig. 19.3  Rule of law. (Source: Authors, based on World Bank data)

detailed, Palestine shows some deterioration whilst Venezuela is again the worst performing country—both in terms of progress and in terms of absolute levels. Certainly, there are many other indicators which could be used to measure the quality of public administration in conflict-affected countries.

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90 80 70 60

2000

50 40

2005

30

2010

20

2015

10

2018

0

Fig. 19.4  Control of corruption. (Source: Authors, based on World Bank data)

It would be interesting and beneficial for example to look at the experiences and outcomes from the citizens’ perspectives, by checking if citizens feel safe in their respective communities; what are the levels of criminality; what is the satisfaction with life and living conditions; what is the satisfaction with the most important public services and their outcomes (education/literacy rate, health care/life expectancy and social care/risk of poverty) and so on. However, it is difficult, or very difficult, to measure such indicators (perceived values are very difficult to compare), or such indicators are very dependent on the wealth of the country (see Fig. 19.5 as example). It is also very difficult to access and measure these indicators in some of the countries that are still involved in violent conflict and daily life is far from normal.

19.4   The Relation Between Conflict and Public Administration Performance 19.4.1  General Framework There is no clear agreement in the literature on whether there is a strong relationship between public administration and conflict. The nature of these links has been contested. In justifying the claim, some scholars assert that public administration does not have conflict mitigating potential

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90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

Life expectancy

Nigeria

Uganda

South Africa

Iraq

Philippines

Egypt

Ukraine

Kosovo

Bangladesh

Palestine

Paraguay

Georgia

Venezuela

Serbia

Colombia

Croatia

GDP per capita

Fig. 19.5  Life expectancy and GDP per capita for investigated countries. (Source: Authors, based on World Bank and WHO data)

(Schou & Haug, 2005; Bigdon & Hettige, 2003). These scholars argue that it provides a non-violent platform to manage inter-group tensions, it increases representation and participation and it improves service delivery, all of which reduce the likelihood of conflict. Conversely, scholars like Siegle and O’Mahoney (2007), Scott (2007) or Sanchez and Chacon (2005) are of the opinion that public administration can exacerbate conflict. They further observe that ineffective, corrupt and partisan local political institutions cause frustration, resentment and feelings of exclusion and increase the likelihood of violent conflict. Conclusively, it can be argued that effective and efficient public administration reduces the causes of conflict, whereas ineffective public administration increases the risk of violence. Drawing from the conclusion, public administration affects conflict, but it is not a neutral actor in conflicting societies. In a post-conflict society, the responsibility of reconstructing governance and public administration institutions is one of the most central tasks necessary for a peaceful and prosperous society (Musoni, 2003). There is no doubt that post-conflict reconstruction efforts seek to respond to the needs of society emerging from the armed conflicts and strives to improve the efforts of major actors in rehabilitation and reconstruction operations by identifying and filling the gaps within the current capacities of public administration. Post-conflict reconstruction plays a significant

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role towards going beyond conflict conditions to a peace situation within the affected community, through rebuilding the socio-economic activities of the affected community. Post-conflict reconstruction does not only mean reconstruction of the affected physical infrastructure, but also rebuilding the stable socio-economic activities that existed before the conflict. The relevance of public administration cannot be underestimated (Romeo, 2002). Romeo (2002: 5) argues that public administration is imperative because it serves as the vehicle for re-establishing the presence of the state in post-conflict societies. Public administration plays a significant role in post-conflict reconstruction due to better access to information on local conditions and needs, a greater ability to interact with communities and traditional authorities, a mandate for economic development and service delivery and the potential to realise “allocative and operational efficiency in the use of scarce public resources”. Indeed, in the post-conflict reconstruction of public administration four phases are involved. The first stage is the emergency/relief stage which deals with the administration of survival concerns. The second stage involves the rehabilitation and reconstruction phase where public administration focuses on the reconstruction of basic amenities destroyed during violent conflicts. The third phase includes the reform stage where institutions are restructured with concerns for efficiency, effectiveness and economy. The last stage involves reconfiguration and the redesign of public institutions (Kauzya, 2002). The identified phases, if comprehensively implemented, will further strengthen post-conflict public administration reconstruction.  econstructing Governance and Public Administration R Capacities’ Development The task of reconstructing a state after conflict has to do with reconstructing the governance structure and public administration to enable it to effectively spearhead the delivery of efficient public services (Mekolo, 2003). Reconstructing the capacities of public administration in the post-­ conflict period is an important task requiring huge amounts of funds as well as capable and dedicated public officials (Kauzya, 2009). Therefore, capacity development means supporting national counterparts in developing their capacities to manage, lead, achieve and account for national development priorities. As such, it is a process of establishing effective means for goal setting, procedures, decision-making, planning,

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implementing, monitoring and evaluation. It also entails modalities and processes for endowing these systems, institutions and organisations with a common ideology while working to enhance the development of the individuals who function within them. Public administration capacity-­ building is an all-embracing activity which involves the enhancement of human resource capabilities, increased financial and material resources, introduction of supportive legal frameworks and the introduction of new technologies (Mekolo, 2003). Public administration capacity-building is most likely to succeed when it is a strategic action with a comprehensive, clear, shared vision, mission and strategy for the entire governance structure of the state. The purpose of building the capacity of public administration is shown and is evident in the wider context of governance of the state. Capacity development of governance and public administration is a multidimensional process, which involves legislative bodies, electoral processes, rule of law and access to justice, decentralisation, local governance, human rights, service delivery, accountability and transparency. Capacity-­ building of governance and public administration is important for sustainable human development in socio-economic, political and environmental contexts. It involves the establishment of effective teams, networks and functional communities. Capacity development is a complex and painstaking process. In the best of circumstances, capacity-building is a challenging task. In the context of countries emerging from conflict, capacity-building is particularly arduous; in so far as a conflict not only causes death but also inflicts significant damage on the economic and social infrastructures, destroys institutions and unravels social trust. Capacity-building in a post-conflict context invariably conjures up the image of rehabilitation of institutions. In a post-conflict era, renewed governance and public administration capacities are needed to achieve people-centred governance and sustainable development. Post-conflict reconstruction of governance and public administration institutions are more important because they underpin all other components and aspects of reconstruction. Therefore, governance interventions that strengthen the participation and consolidation of systems for representation, and institutions for the peaceful settlement of disputes, are important to ensure sustainability towards democratisation and to avoid the re-occurrence of the conflict (Rosenblum-Kumar, 2003). In this regard, reconstructing governance and public administration systems are among the most important aspects of post-conflict recovery. This

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shows that the reconstruction of the state apparatus underpins all other recovery efforts in any society.  ey Issues for Public Administration in Conflict/Post-Conflict Contexts K Given the overwhelming and multifarious responsibilities that rest on the shoulders of the public institutions in a post-conflict environment, the United Nations (2008) submits that policymakers and public officials working in post-conflict recovery must ensure that (a) public administration is reconstructed in a transparent and inclusive manner; (b) the public administration is adequately and effectively prepared to undertake important tasks; and (c) public officials and the citizens are made an essential part of the transformative process and allow them to be part of the recovery efforts. In this regard, the United Nations (2007) identified four main areas where the effective performance of public institutions and agencies are crucial in changing the attitudes and rebuilding the trust of the society. Public administration can be instrumental in building the trust and confidence of the people after violent conflict in the following ways: • engaging in capacity-building of public institutions so as to undertake the required tasks; • improving and sustaining public service delivery; • must be transparent in the discharge of its constitutional duties and responsibilities; and • engaging in participatory decentralisation of powers so that local authorities will have the required autonomy to respond to specific situations. The key issues for public administration in conflict/post-conflict contexts include the following: Political economy analysis: The political economy has remained a critical concept in understanding the political environment of public administration in a post-conflict context. Public administration literature has been predominantly “technocratic”—focusing on administrative and technical solutions to large, complex problems in developing countries. Recent literature on governance has increasingly pointed to political analysis as a way of understanding why these technical solutions rarely pay dividends. This can be linked to the fact that public administration is operating in a political environment. Therefore, public administration is about where to locate power and decision-making—it is therefore a highly political issue.

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When considering public administration in a post-conflict context, it is even more crucial to pay attention to the underlying political economy as public administration environments are generally characterised by weak formal institutions but extremely strong informal institutions. Lister and Wilder (2005: 46) therefore warn that good political economy analysis is important as “technocratic interventions to strengthen subnational administrations that fail to understand the political context could actually result in strengthening de facto power holders rather than the de jure state”. Patronage and elite capture: A review of the literature shows that patronage is common in a post-conflict context. The environment typically has weak formal administrative systems, which has led to the emergence of very strong informal political institutions, particularly patronage practices. The informal political, economic and military spheres are often entirely entwined with the formal (Blunt & Turner, 2005). Powerful patrons and ruling elites in post-conflict environments generally have military resources at their disposal which strengthens their position. This inevitably weakens public administration as inappropriate, often inexperienced staffs are given formal administrative positions. Not only does this inhibit public administration capacity, it also distorts developmental interventions. Public administration policy and practice therefore becomes driven by allegiance to an individual rather than to developmental aims of the state or to the generality of the people in the society (Brinkerhoff, 2005). Reform: Several scholars express concern about the idea of simply re-­ forming pre-conflict public administration and governance structures as “previously existing structures have been shown to be contributors to state fragility or failure” (Brinkerhoff, 2005: 21). Jackson (2005), Brinkerhoff (2005) and Manor (2006) argued in this regard that re-­ forming the existing structures is tantamount to producing the very structures that led to conflict in the first place. Service delivery: Most cases of service provision in conflict, fragile and post-conflict contexts emphasise the importance of public administration in these environments. Service delivery may seem like an obvious, non-­ controversial entry point, but interventions must be designed carefully (Brinkerhoff, 2005 or Salomons, 2002). The assertion that service delivery is a good entry point seems to assume that the provision of services is a neutral, apolitical activity, which benefits all people (Batley, 2004). There is a growing consensus that reconstructing governance and public administration capacities has a role to play in improving service delivery. Many (but not all) post-conflict states are full of pockets of resistance and

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armed militia also after the conflict finishes (due to weaknesses in governance, organised crime is rife in post-conflict contexts). Criminal activity gives rise to a significant flow of resources that underpin the control of warlords and strong men. Public administration therefore clearly has a strategic role to play in bringing about security in these areas, and yet this dimension is almost totally overlooked in the literature. In this regard, Lister (2007) or Bachler (2004) argued that the security sector reform is important in post-conflict reconstruction. In the same vein, Romeo (2002) posits that disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration are major aspects of the security sector reform and are crucial aspects that public administration needs to address. 19.4.2  Is There Any Link Between Conflict and Public Administration Performance? The general framework highlighted above suggests that there might not be any general and direct relationship between conflict and public administration performance. The sample chosen confirms such expectation, where some conflict-affected countries progress very well, some stagnate and some deteriorate. The data also tend to suggest that there is no general linkage between the type of conflict and public administration performance, and an in-depth analysis of the different types of countries is not able to provide any definite patterns in this regard. The following brief summary highlights documented differences which do appear substantial between the different types of conflict-affected countries and their public administration performance. Some countries progress, based on existing data—the best example is Georgia (external, armed and non-solved conflict), a country, which significantly improved its public administration performance during the last 20 years, with some teething problems in the area of control of corruption (as indicated by World Bank data and sketched out in the country chapter). Relatively good figures are shown also by Croatia and Serbia (in both cases external, armed and conflicts solved) and Paraguay (non-armed, internal and conflict solved). Some other conflict-affected countries stagnate, that is do not show visible and systematic trends towards progress from the point of view of their public administration performance. Such cases are, for example, Philippines (armed, internal and conflict not solved), Bangladesh (armed,

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external and conflict solved) or Uganda (non-armed, internal and conflict not solved). Palestine (external, armed and conflict not solved) represents the example with very uneven developments for the selected four indicators. Its government effectiveness first shows progress and in later stages some level of regress, regulatory quality increases while rule of law and capacity to control corruption decrease. The countries with visibly decreasing performance are for example Egypt (non-armed, internal and partly solved conflict) and South Africa (non-armed, internal and conflict solved), but both countries still have relatively good absolute levels, and especially Venezuela (non-armed, internal and conflict not solved), where the quality of governance is today close to zero. If one uses a different angle, one can also demonstrate how two post-­ conflict countries with a similar conflict (liberation) do not show equal patterns—Kosovo is to some extent deteriorating, whereas Bangladesh is marginally progressing from the point of view of their public administration performance. The other example of a relatively similar type of conflict (non-armed, internal and solved), but of different performance, is South Africa (deterioration of post-conflict public administration performance) versus Paraguay (significantly improved post-conflict public administration performance). 19.4.3  Selected Factors Determining Performance of Public Administration in Conflict-Affected Countries The analysis above suggests that each country is unique from the point of view of the relation between conflict and its public administration performance. Such a statement implies that other internal and external environment factors are decisive. One is not able to provide any final and full classification of such factors, as countries and conflicts really differ. With respect to this, the following text focuses only on those factors which are directly and visibly raised by the country chapters of this book (external and internal, general but also country/region specific factors). However, it is obvious and natural that many other factors might be found when investigating other conflict-affected countries, and some such factors are even implicitly covered by the chapters. For example, cleavages in society have the potential to limit public administration performance significantly. The quality of civil society might be another really critical

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factor, which is not directly covered by the book; however, some chapters (like Egypt) indirectly suggest that without, for example, an appropriate quality of civil society, the results from “revolutions” may be very unsatisfactory. As already indicated, some such factors “between” conflict and public administration performance may have both the character of “dependent” and “independent” variable. The rule of law and the quality of legal institutions in the country can be such an example. The extent of conflict (especially of internal conflict) can be impacted upon by the quality of legal institutions in the country (weak legal institutions may significantly worsen the conflict) and vice versa, where escalating conflict may well result in a significant deterioration of the rule of law and the performance of legal institutions.  xternal Factor: European Accession E This factor is intentionally started with, as it represents critical regionally specific motivation to improve a country’s public administration performance. Every country that aspires to join the European Union needs to follow a standard procedure—the country submits an application; the EU Commission submits an Opinion on the application and on this basis EU Member States must decide unanimously to grant the country candidate status. After these conditions are met, the accession negotiations are opened with the agreement of all Member States and the EU Commission proposes a negotiating framework as a basis for the talks. During negotiations, the country works on the implementation of EU laws and standards. After a certain time, based on the agreement of all EU members on fulfilment of all requirements, the negotiation process is closed and with the consent of the European Parliament the country is invited to sign the EU Accession Treaty. Today, the accession process also includes a public administration dimension (opposite to the first wave of new EU enlargement). The SIGMA OECD developed the document “Principles of Public Administration” in 2014 and updated it in 2017. The Principles define what good public governance entails in practice and outline the main requirements to be followed during the EU integration process. They also feature a monitoring framework to enable regular analysis of progress made. In such an environment, the external pressure to improve public administration performance in the candidate countries is extreme, but visibly—as the following text documents—it is not the only factor in force.

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Our sample includes one conflict-affected country, Croatia, which is already an EU member which joined the EU on 1 July 2013. The first years of institution building in the country were hindered by war events while a large part of Croatia’s territory was occupied—the development and further modernisation of public administration had been neglected by political elites for many years. However, accession to the EU changed the situation, since Croatia, in order to become a full member, had to harmonise its public administration with basic European standards and values. The Europeanisation process was used as the justification for many unpopular structural reforms—some to satisfy formal EU requirements, and others to strengthen institutional capacities and overcome the visible and hidden burdens of conflict. As a result, the EU induced significant administrative reforms in all parts of Croatian public administration and the public sector. The fact that the progress of the quality of the public administration system slowed down after the accession (see Figures 19.1, 19.2, 19.3, and 19.4) is well explained by scientific literature and is called the “post-accession” crisis (see, e.g., Palaric et al., 2017). Fortunately, this “crisis” is not so visible in Croatia, compared to other countries which accessed earlier, also because of the mechanisms of the European Semester process, where the European Commission reviews all Member States for many progress indicators, including international standards that concern the quality of public administration. This kind of ex-post control is however a much weaker instrument when compared to “accession” motivation. Serbia is the only “EU Candidate” country in the sample and its public administration performance critically improved between 2000 and 2015 after the toppling of Slobodan Milošević’s regime in 2000, when Serbia embarked on wide-ranging political, economic and social reforms in line with its officially proclaimed goal of joining the European Union. However, as the country chapter clearly documents, the internal political dynamic that views progressive European integration as a threat to the interests of political elites and even to the national interests may now be a really critical barrier to any further progress. In this respect, the EU accession process has been as much a driver as a brake on public sector development. Kosovo has the formal status of a “Potential Candidate”. In post-war Kosovo, most legislative framework and governance institutions at local and central level have been (re)built. Compared to other countries with EU accession ambition, such reconstruction was realised (in the earlier phases) by “external forces”. After Milošević’s regime and armed forces

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left Kosovo on 12 June 1999, UNMIK and the associated international organisations and NGOs started the gradual rebuilding of the damaged public infrastructures, civilians’ houses, as well as basic institutions required to govern the country. These responsibilities were only gradually transferred to locals—Kosovo declared its independence on 17 February 2008. The international community had good intentions to promote good governance and socio-economic development. UNMIK’s slow deployment, its lack of preparation for effective duty and its “One size fits all approach” have proven to be a major issue even today for the building of an effective public administration. Moreover, UNMIK’s approaches allowed public administration to be seized by particular individuals and groups—these new elites use the public sector as a tool to win elections and tighten their grip on the system, while at the same time use it for various corruption practices. As a result, the performance of the government and public administration in Kosovo are still weak and have not been improving recently; public administration in Kosovo can be described as oversized, highly politicised, lacks professionalism and is not accountable. The conflict resulted in external players being invited in who have in turn delivered an “imperfect” job whilst the newly established political elites do not have any real interest in improving public administration performance. The option of possible EU accession is insufficient motivation for improvement today but may become a critical factor in the future. Two other countries from the “EU” influenced region are Georgia and Ukraine, both with a formally claimed perspective of EU memberships, but with significantly different development patterns. Georgia is the best progressing country from the sample. The qualitative and quantitative data analysed in the respective chapter support the conclusion that the conflict and structural violence prevalent in the 1990s has been supplanted with reforms and state-building from 2003 onwards, resulting in significantly improved governance indicators. However, the ongoing tendency to centralise power and the practice of informal rule since 2014 openly endanger the achieved positive developments in public administration. Would the fact that the EU-Georgia Association Agreement which came into force in July 2016 have the potential to outweigh the abovementioned growing internal limits? Ukraine is more or less stagnating for the core governance indicators whilst its main problem is control of corruption. The recent Ukrainian conflict started with the Revolution of Dignity (2013–2014) and the subsequent Russian annexation of Crimea and the establishment of two

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separatist quasi-states within the parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. This crisis radically changed the country’s political landscape and led to a number of reforms in public administration which did not deliver significant improvements in the quality of governance in Ukraine. Signing the Ukraine-EU Association Agreement in 2014 laid down a cornerstone of modern development of Ukraine, but the potential of this motivation has not been fully utilised. Today, under the conditions of the socio-­ economic and political turbulence caused by conflict and by other internal and external factors, the Ukraine’s PA faces a wide range of problems, including the negative balance of society’s trust, the lack of balance of centralisation and decentralisation, bad communication both within the power structures and between the state and society, shortage of skilled personnel, low quality of administrative services and insufficient level of moral and ethical consciousness of civil servants.  xternal Factor: The Role of International Organisations E and Other Donors Several countries from the sample represent cases where massive external support has been provided for recovery by major international organisations and many other donors. In most cases such “help” did not work in an effective way. The chapters explain some purposes why. The public sector reforms for example in Uganda have been to a large extent promoted and pushed by various donors—and most of the changes have been based on New Public Management (NPM) ideology. There is hardly a leaf from the NPM cookbook that Uganda has not tried: privatisation of public services, contract-based provision, unbundling of the public sector, introduction of measurable service standards, performance goals and output controls and so on. However, NPM proved not to be a functional ideology—especially for less developed countries. Another problem is many different donors and donor agendas caused the reforms to be at times poorly coordinated resulting in suboptimal outcomes whereas their actual implementation also suffered. As one reformist fashion replaced another (and donors’ interests shifted accordingly) some reforms were dropped midway without conclusive results. Another case that is critical is that of Kosovo. From the outset, UNMIK faced operating issues especially because of its size and the difficulties of coordination with the numerous stakeholders involved. The deployment of UNMIK staff was slow; the organisation often lacked professional staff with appropriate knowledge about the context in which the mission would

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take place, about the culture of the country and the people they would work with. This created room for former guerrilla members to occupy positions within public administration, most of them not being qualified for the positions they held. As in previous cases, such as Rwanda and Bosnia, the slowness of the UN, the ill-equipped missions and a staff that lacked knowledge about the conflict or the country of deployment have proved to be devastating in terms of human casualties. Not only this—as indicated, the capacity development involves interlinked but hierarchical levels: institutional, organisational and individual (see, e.g., the World Bank report on Capacity Development 2005). The problems of public administration may be often explained by the uneven progress at these levels as, for example, specific agencies responsible for implementation of an institutional framework simply cannot deliver it due to lack of relevant capacities despite the framework itself being of high quality. This, incidentally, was the case of Kosovo. UNMIK from the start engaged in massive law-making based on the Anglo-Saxon models (less so on European), which was not organically developed from within the society and was viewed as alien by the nascent public administration (in addition, neither adequate organisation nor personal capacity was there). In this situation, confused and disoriented public administrations continued business as usual, simply adapting the new language to the existing practices without any substantive change. The country studies also indicate that the liberal peace model (or liberal peacebuilding) is probably the most applied model to post-conflict countries and consists of promoting democracy and a liberal economy. Imported to fragile countries and implemented by international organisations such as the UN, the EU, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the World Bank Group (WB), liberal peace aims at shaping states by drafting new constitutions, creating political parties and organising elections, by building state capacities as well as a sustainable civil society. NPM also aims at liberalising the economy, especially by mass privatisation and decreasing the role of the state in the economy. However, such a model cannot suit everyone, and its positive results in underdeveloped countries without a “working” civil society are very doubtful. Moreover, there does not exist one size fit all model in crafting the solutions to poor administration performance and serving for effective capacity development.

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I nternal Political Factors: Absence of Strong National Commitment, of Capacity to Reform and of a Clear Strategic Direction Internal factors seem to block the progress in all the investigated countries, but of a different scale (and timing). Even Georgia, the best performing country, recently “slowed down” due to what the chapter author names as “an informal governance problem”. From other EU influenced countries one can observe what can be called a “post-accession crisis” in Croatia as the limiting internal factor, whereas in Serbia the three internal conflicts are producing a dynamic that effectively stymies (and even reverses) genuine improvements in public sector performance. At the heart of this dynamic, which may be described as a precarious balancing act to satisfy external and internal actors pursuing different (and at times contradictory) interests and objectives, it is a lack of a genuine commitment to a merit- and rule-based democratic government. In Kosovo the newly established political elites do not have real interest in improving public administration performance. In regard to the other continents, the case of Bangladesh, for example, suggests that protracted unrest, political warfare and internal conflicts characterised by protests, demonstrations, violence and general strikes often result in administration being brought almost to a standstill. Added to this, autocratic regimes weaken a democratic set up and infect public administration with an elitist approach. The developments in South Africa show that the post-apartheid government has had the capacity to respond to basic political and service delivery challenges inherited from the apartheid era. Nowadays, however, the South African populace is fast losing confidence in the government as a significant number of public institutions are dysfunctional and incapable of discharging even rudimentary public services. In the past decade, the public governance system has been marked by lawlessness; misuse of party—political power and endemic corruption; dysfunctional public institutions and resultant financial challenges; crumbling infrastructure; political strife/turbulence and factionalism and violent protests against poor service delivery/governance. In such a situation all governance indicators of the country deteriorate step by step. Globally respected governance indicators are showing that Iraq’s Public Administration structures suffer from rather poor performance. The purposes are a deep ethnic, religious and identity-based disintegration, the legacy of authoritarian regimes combined with the inability to control its

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own security forces and territory, the behaviour of the strong rentier state; all these factors prevent the formation of an effective government. In Nigeria the reconstruction efforts also tend to ignore the reconstruction of governance and public administration capacities which are crucial for the attainment of sustainable peace and development. In such a situation the progress in quality of governance is “mission impossible”. I nternal Factor: Ongoing Internal Armed Conflict From the sample, first, the Philippines represents a country with an ongoing internal conflict. One of the three major islands of the Philippines, the Mindanao region, is the home of the majority of Muslims in the Philippines—the Moros. The area has been beset by conflict for a long period of time mainly arising from disputes over ancestral land, religious and cultural factors, neglect by the government and clamour for self-­ determination. As the deep-seated grievances of the Moros still continue to be inadequately addressed, the persistence of conflict in Muslim Mindanao ensues. The Philippine government has initiated various politico-­administrative mechanisms in response to conflict situations, but it seems that the only definite solution is critical constitutional changes, with subsequent federalism. Even in times of critical internal conflict the Philippine Public Administration and its institutions continue to struggle to be relevant, even though they are able to maintain (but not to improve) the quality of governance and serve as a concrete mechanism to address conflict situations. The second country of this type is still Colombia—the only country in Latin America that, as of today, has maintained an internal guerrilla paramilitary internal conflict (but with significantly limited scale, compared to the situation a few years ago). The evolution of the country from the very beginning has been marked by an almost permanent presence of violence and internal conflict. The presence of such a conflict has configured a particular vicious circle—the lack of state presence has led to the presence of illegal armed groups that have challenged the rule of law and the authority of the state in rural and peripheral areas. In turn, the greater levels of violence in those areas have catalysed the demands for a greater state institutional capacity. Today Colombia continues to be “enveloped in the eye of the hurricane”, without knowing if it will come out of the conflict, if it is in a transitional phase or if the conditions of the unresolved conflict will return and with them the violence will increase once again.

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I nternal Factor: Corruption Unfortunately, the problem of corruption is common for all the investigated countries, just in differing forms and to differing scales. Corruption is a major impediment in the impartial and fair functioning of public administration. As a corollary to corruption, there is nepotism that provides an unfair advantage and special favours to some people close to the bureaucracy and political leadership, depriving deserving people and the masses in general. Corruption and nepotism are encouraged by politicisation of government institutions, which largely emerges from the absence of good governance of the desired standard. Some studies may argue that corruption can be connected to the historical legacy of the countries investigated. However, this is very much disputable. For example, in Central and Eastern Europe petty corruption was the typical case for “socialist” countries; however, “systemic corruption” (Langr, 2018) is the case now. In South Africa’s case the expression “endemic corruption” is used to show that the path-dependency may not be the most important (if at all) factor to generate it. Only a few countries from the sample are “somehow” successful (according to the World Bank data) in recently fighting corruption. According to the World Bank Governance Indicators, the performance of the Egyptian government on all five dimensions of good governance from 2007 to 2017 shows that there was deterioration in all but the control of the corruption dimension. The current government is taking a strong stance against administrative corruption. The Administrative Control Agency, the entity in charge of investigating and reporting corruption in the public service, is reported to have been quite active over the past few years. Also, newspapers abound with reported cases of corruption by top level officials in government, including ministers, governors and assistant governors being uncovered. I nternal Factor: Elites “Against” Nation The most critical example of this specific type of a conflict is represented by Venezuela. After the victory of Hugo Chávez in the presidential elections, political polarisation began and over time, this situation turned into a long conflict of political instability. The consequences of this conflict (experts and analysts of the process do not fully agree on what type of conflict it is, but they do agree on its seriousness) are similar to those observed in other countries as a result of armed conflicts or natural disasters: mass emigration of the population, unprecedented economic decline

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and a humanitarian crisis of great proportions. The conflict also generates the progressive deterioration of the Venezuelan Public Administration—as some international sources show the Venezuelan government is absolutely ineffective. Paraguay may serve as “navigation” for Venezuela’s possible restoration, showing factors and barriers of rebuilding the country. From 1954 one person (General Alfredo Stroessner) and one political party (the Partido Colorado) ruled the country for 37 years. Together they controlled almost all aspects of political, economic and even social life and the country deteriorated. Paraguay’s transition to democracy in the early 1990s aimed on creating strong democratic institutions able to deliver services effectively and efficiently. Many attempts to reform and to increase capacity have occurred. However, because these efforts have faced strong opposition from many stakeholders (including public administrators), they have not been able to fully establish a more professional public administration and civil service in the country. S pecific Case: Palestine The Palestinian public administration system represents a unique case study of public administration in post-conflict countries. The current Palestinian public administration system emerged as a result of a unique, but not fully completed, transformation from an administration based on military resistant movements—by transformation of the historically formed Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) into a civil government represented by the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). The Palestinian public administration system evolved under crisis conditions of an unstable political and economic environment and is expected to function under incredible and challenging circumstances. During both the First and Second Intifadas, the question was not if the quality of services was at risk, rather it was the existence of public services itself that was at risk, and formal public agencies disappeared or were being challenged by closure or even destruction. The Palestinian public administration system also represents an “administration under lack of sovereignty”. Unlike other post-conflict regimes, the PNA was not granted full sovereignty—withdrawal of Israeli forces was only partial. According to the Oslo agreement, the PNA was only granted full control over an area that constitutes just 17% of the total area of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, but Israeli forces also have the right to act in this territory when there is any security need. In an area, which

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makes up about 60% of the “Palestinian land”, both security and civil administrative affairs remained in the Israeli hands. This fragmentation has a catastrophic impact on Palestinian Public Administration, particularly on planning and service delivery. Such an absence of full power and sovereignty serve as obstacles to public administration reform. However, such an absence is not the only source of problems—as visible from the up and down development of Palestinian governance indicators. Even when there is power, political will is crucial to administrative reform.

19.5   Conclusions The main value added by this book, namely analysing the linkage between conflict and the performance of a country’s public administration on the comprehensive sample of conflict-affected countries from different regions and of different types, is confirming the general expectation that there is no direct and universal link between “dependent and independent variable”: between the conflict and the public administration performance (and vice versa). One may need to argue that each country differs and specific factors of internal and external environments determine the trends of each country’s public administration performance in conflict-affected countries. Taking cognisance of the above, this book may suggest that any rigid and final normative conceptualisation/theoretisation of public administration in conflict-affected countries does present a mammoth and never ending challenge. To be more direct, it can perhaps be viewed as a “mission impossible” in the public sector context, given the distinct and unique circumstances of each country and more particularly each conflict. This can be developed further and is suggestive of the popular adage where a “one size fits all” approach cannot be the panacea for the public governance of all conflict-affected counties. Each country and conflict is unique, and consequently this has to be factored in terms of post-conflict governance and public administration What could be confirmed by the sample is the fact that ongoing (external but also internal) conflict directly impacts on public administration performance of any country, the only question is, to what extent? However, the example of Georgia shows that even in times of (in this case relatively still) conflict, the country may have the capacity to progress fast. The opposite: Venezuela is an example of a completely different

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situation—because of its internal conflict between elites and the nation, the country is close to total collapse. It could be also confirmed on the basis of information collected by our sample that the most critical success factors of post-conflict recovery of public administration systems in conflict-affected countries are internal political/management will, internal (absorption) capacity and effective external motivation and support. The book documents that the situations of post-conflict countries really differ, depending on the set of external and internal factors determining local developments. In addition, it also documents that—what is of utmost interest—the same factors may work differently in different countries and in different times. EU accession perspective seems to be the main catalyst of massive progress in Georgia; however, it does not motivate much in Kosovo. It also shows that probably the most critical barriers to progress in post-conflict countries are corruption and the vested interests of local political elites which are constraints to development and need to be addressed as a matter of urgency.

References Bachler, G. (2004). Conflict Transformation Through State Reform. Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management. Batley, R. (2004). The Politics of Service Delivery Reform. Development and Change, 35(1), 31–56. Bigdon, C., & Hettige, S. (2003). Local Governance and Conflict Management. University of Heidelberg. Blunt, P., & Turner, M. (2005). Decentralisation, Democracy and Development in a Post-Conflict Society: Commune Councils in Cambodia. Public Administration and Development, 25(1), 75–87. Brinkerhoff, D. (2005). Rebuilding Governance in Failed States and Post-conflict Societies: Core Concepts and Cross-Cutting Themes. Public Administration and Development, 25(1), 3–14. Fukuyama, F. (2005). Building Democracy After Conflict: “Stateness” First. Journal of Democracy, 16(1), 84–88. Jackson, P. (2005). Chiefs, Money and Politicians: Rebuilding Local Government in Post-War Sierra Leone. Public Administration and Development, 25(1), 49–58. Kauzya, J. (2002). Approaches, Processes, and Methodologies for Reconstructing Public Administration in Post-Conflict Countries. The Fourth Global Forum on Reinventing Government, Morocco. United Nations.

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Kauzya, J. (2009). The Role of Political Leadership in Reconstructing Capacities for Public Service after Conflict. In United Nations: Lessons Learned in Post-­ Conflict State Capacity: Reconstructing Governance and Public Administration Capacities in Post Conflict Countries (pp. 16–30). United Nations. Langr, I. (2018). Public Procurement in the Systemic Corruption Environment: Evidence from the Czech Republic. Journal of Public Administration and Policy, 11(2), 53–79. Lister, S. (2007). Understanding State-Building and Local Government in Afghanistan. Crisis States Research Centre. Lister, S., & Wilder, A. (2005). Strengthening Subnational Administration in Afghanistan: Technical Reform or State-Building? Public Administration and Development, 25(1), 39–48. Manor, J. (2006). Aid That Works: Successful Development in Fragile States. The World Bank. Mekolo, A. (2003). Experiences, Challenges, and Frameworks for Reconstructing Public Service Capacity in Post-Conflict Situations in Africa. In Reconstructing Governance and Public Administration for Peaceful, Sustainable Development (pp. 91–112). United Nations. Musoni, P. (2003). Reconstructing Governance and Public Administration Institutions for Effective, Conflict-Sensitive Rule of Law. In Reconstructing Governance and Public Administration for Peaceful, Sustainable Development (pp. 62–73). United Nations. Palaric, E., Thijs, N., & Hammerschmidt, G. (2017). A Comparative Overview of Public Administration Characteristics and Performance in EU28. European Commission. Romeo, L. (2002). Local Governance Approach to Social Reintegration and Economic Recovery in Post-Conflict Countries: Towards a Definition and a Rationale. Discussion paper for the Workshop on ‘A Local Governance Approach to Post Conflict Recovery’, 8th October, New York. Rosenblum-Kumar, G. (2003). An analysis of Strategic Processes for Conflict-­ Sensitive Reconstruction of Governance and Public Administration. In Reconstructing Governance and Public Administration for Peaceful, Sustainable Development (pp. 3–22). United Nations. Salomons, D. (2002). Local Governance Approach to Social Reintegration and Economic Recovery in Post-Conflict Countries: Programming options for UNDP/ UNCDF Assistance. Discussion paper for the workshop ‘A Local Governance Approach to Post-Conflict Recovery’, 8th October, New York. Sanchez, F., & Chacon, M. (2005). Conflict, State and Decentralisation: From Social Progress to an Armed Dispute for Local Control, 1974–2002. (Working Paper no. 70). Crisis States Programme. Scott, Z. (2007). Literature Review on State Building. Governance and Social Development Resource Centre.

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Schou, A., & Haug, M. (2005). Decentralisation in Conflict and Post-Conflict Situations. NIBR. Siegle, J., & O’Mahoney, P. (2007). Assessing the Merits of Decentralisation as a Conflict Mitigation Strategy. USAID. United Nations. (2007). Public Governance Indicators: A Literature Review. United Nations. United Nations. (2008). Strengthening Governance and Public Administration Capacities for Development. United Nations.

Index

A Abkhazia, 16, 235–238, 414 Accountability, 9, 12–14, 28, 30, 44, 51, 68–69, 73, 83, 87, 95, 110, 113–115, 118, 127, 128, 142–144, 146, 150, 163, 167, 185, 189–190, 195, 199, 200, 213, 218, 220, 224, 225, 230, 232, 245, 246, 251, 252, 258, 265, 273–276, 278, 281, 284, 297, 298, 301, 302, 379, 382, 384, 393–400, 408, 422, 428 Administrative reforms, 14, 63, 64, 70, 73, 117, 151, 184–186, 231, 295, 316, 414, 434, 442 Administrative structures, 84, 295, 371, 398, 399 African National Congress (ANC), 136, 139, 141, 145, 418 Amalgamation, 325, 342 Apartheid, 15, 136, 138, 139, 145, 147, 148, 151, 400, 408, 418, 438

Appointments, 9, 65, 91, 107, 108, 111, 113, 141–143, 160, 161, 171, 204, 205, 210, 222, 223, 243, 248, 271, 297, 301, 335, 363, 392, 397, 401, 408 B Bangsamoro Autonomous Region, 16, 207, 211–213 Brain drain, 263, 264, 268, 408 Bureaucratic bias, 327, 329 C Cartelisation, 300 Central Executive Bodies (CEB), 314–317, 319–329, 333, 335–337, 339, 343 Centralization, 14, 63, 64, 218, 228, 242, 251, 318, 343, 391, 436 Checks and balances, 240–244, 253, 266, 393, 408

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 J. Nemec, P. S. Reddy (eds.), Public Administration in Conflict Affected Countries, Governance and Public Management, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74966-8

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INDEX

Civil service, 17, 30, 66–68, 74, 103–105, 110–118, 159, 160, 164, 167, 170, 171, 173, 180, 185, 200–207, 218, 223, 228–230, 232, 246–248, 250, 251, 253, 259, 265, 268–272, 292, 296, 297, 313, 315, 318–321, 330–344, 350, 360, 370, 373–378, 380, 382–385, 390, 400–402, 441 Conflict management, 18 Constitution, 28, 31, 43, 101, 105, 136, 141–144, 151, 152, 159–161, 181–184, 186, 191, 204, 208, 211, 219, 220, 224, 225, 241, 243, 244, 265, 266, 271, 275, 299, 304, 314–316, 318, 322, 323, 326, 349, 365, 371–373, 375, 381, 392, 399, 408, 437 Constitutional framework, 211 Coordination, 10, 13, 40, 69–70, 108, 111, 123, 145–146, 161, 165, 166, 172, 173, 194, 220, 222, 227, 228, 232, 251, 264, 276, 277, 279–284, 292, 295, 298, 324–326, 328, 333, 362, 381–383, 392, 402–405, 436 Corruption, v, 2, 5, 7, 9, 13, 35, 44, 61, 68, 72, 74, 78, 82, 86–88, 91, 94, 95, 112, 113, 116, 118, 128, 135, 143–147, 149, 150, 152, 155, 156, 161–171, 173, 182, 187, 189, 190, 194, 196, 199, 204, 206, 211, 218, 225–227, 229, 230, 232, 239, 246, 248, 252, 267, 269, 273–278, 282, 283, 285, 298, 301, 302, 306, 317, 323, 331, 333–338, 357, 359, 370, 378–385, 414, 418, 422, 423, 425, 431, 432, 435, 438, 440, 443

D Decentralization, 8, 44, 64, 79–80, 109–111, 118, 158, 159, 167, 172, 186, 190–191, 202, 203, 205, 214, 220, 245, 251, 253, 280, 292, 312, 313, 318, 325, 326, 343, 371, 373, 388, 403, 422, 428, 429, 436 Development, v, 2, 21, 73, 77, 104, 122, 135–152, 157, 180, 198, 218–222, 228–231, 240, 268, 295, 311, 330–340, 347, 378, 388, 415 Developmental state, 136, 145–147, 152 Downsizing, 65, 117, 158, 285, 294, 323 E Effectiveness, 13, 44, 70, 73, 78, 84, 86, 110, 116, 127, 144, 146–147, 157, 161–170, 172, 173, 193, 199, 200, 202, 213, 218, 225, 228, 232, 239, 246, 258, 265, 281, 283, 284, 290, 298, 319, 330, 376, 405–407, 422, 423, 427, 432 E-government/e-governance, 188–189, 252, 316, 319, 324 EU accession/EU integration, 17, 218, 220, 221, 226, 227, 230–232, 250, 285, 290–296, 298, 303, 305, 314, 317, 433–436, 443 European Union (EU), vi, 12, 16, 17, 24, 37, 40, 42, 43, 218–222, 226–228, 230–232, 250, 251, 259, 263, 265, 266, 268, 272–274, 276, 277, 279, 284–286, 289–296, 298, 301, 303–305, 314, 316–319, 364, 419, 422, 433–435, 437, 438, 443 External conflict, 17, 156

 INDEX 

F Failed states, 23, 32, 35–37, 40, 46, 47, 152, 320, 356, 360 G Good governance, 7, 13, 44–46, 48, 51, 68, 71, 72, 74, 116–118, 136, 143, 149–152, 158, 174, 186–191, 194–196, 200, 217–232, 246, 252, 253, 259, 261, 265, 268, 273, 279, 282–285, 422, 435, 440 Governance indicators, 14, 17, 41, 72, 74, 115, 116, 126, 283, 298, 302, 305, 408, 435, 438, 442 Government structure, 158, 187, 209, 292, 295, 349, 404, 413 Guerrilla, 17, 198, 237, 263, 264, 348, 355, 356, 358, 365, 413, 415, 437, 439 H Homelands, 139, 179 I Inequality, 3, 6, 34, 35, 38, 47, 49, 129, 136, 141, 145, 148, 169, 285, 306, 363, 382, 384 Institutional capacity, 11, 40, 231, 328, 333, 347–366, 380, 381, 434, 439 Internal conflict, 47, 124, 311, 347–366, 414, 416, 418, 419, 433, 438, 439, 442, 443 Internal displacement, 124, 350, 355, 416 International community, 5, 13, 22, 27, 32, 51, 118, 182, 238, 257,

449

258, 275, 276, 279, 282–285, 370, 390, 408, 435 International development organisations, 9–12, 137 Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), 78, 79, 81–84, 86, 89–95, 415 L Language movement, 180 Liberal peace, 43–46, 48, 261, 265, 268, 282, 437 Liberation, 139, 149, 418, 432 Liberation war, 181, 413 M Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), 4–9, 33, 193 Modernization, 12, 19, 87, 228–231, 313, 314, 318, 333, 350, 354, 371, 380, 383, 434 N National Civil Service Agency of Ukraine, 324 National Development Plan, 136, 146, 151, 166, 382 National Resistance Movement (NRM), 15, 155–159, 161, 162, 167, 170–174, 418 Neopatrimonial regime, 157 Nepotism, 65, 78, 87, 89, 91, 113, 155, 194, 204, 206, 248, 249, 252, 282, 329, 418, 440 New institutional economics, 290, 298, 300 New Public Management (NPM), 26, 43, 51, 158, 159, 172, 185, 200, 246–248, 265, 436, 437

450 

INDEX

O Overstaffing, 14, 63–66, 84, 95, 113 P Paramilitary, 92, 355, 413, 439 Party state, 290, 296–304 Peace, 2–6, 9, 11, 13, 17, 19, 21, 34, 41, 43–46, 48, 49, 72, 80, 102, 105, 126, 128, 130, 137, 167, 170, 207, 208, 210–213, 237, 257, 261, 265, 268, 282–284, 322, 341, 356–366, 413, 414, 416, 417, 420, 427, 437, 439 Policy-making, 9, 13, 14, 69–71, 111, 251, 402–405 Political capitalism, 162, 296–304 Political commitment, 15, 146, 172, 195, 390 Political instability, 2, 7, 40, 117, 149, 280, 337, 370, 387–408, 420, 440 Political patronage, 156, 350 Professionalization, 205, 221, 300, 315, 319, 339, 341, 369–385 Public administration disintegration, 327, 328 Public perception, 330–333, 338 Public policies, 10, 19, 26–31, 46, 49, 71, 108, 146, 151, 222, 227, 228, 258, 269, 279, 280, 298, 319, 321, 327, 343, 355, 380, 384, 404, 405 R Reconstruction, 2–5, 10, 12–16, 18, 19, 46, 48, 87, 122, 123, 125, 126, 128–131, 135–152, 157, 182, 198, 211, 219, 257, 258, 261, 263, 269, 276, 282, 358, 422, 426–429, 431, 434, 439

Rentier state, 87–88, 94, 95, 439 Responsibility, 9, 12, 40, 71, 80, 91, 103, 113–114, 143, 158, 160, 162, 167, 169, 171, 191, 221, 225, 228, 230, 241, 244, 247, 263–267, 274–276, 281, 282, 284, 299, 316, 323, 328, 333, 344, 373, 401, 426, 429, 435 Rule of law, 7, 8, 12–14, 26, 27, 30, 31, 35, 44, 47, 49, 50, 52, 69, 72, 84, 88–90, 114–116, 118, 143–146, 171, 191, 195, 199, 219, 220, 225, 232, 258, 268, 275–279, 282–285, 293, 298, 321, 330, 336, 365, 407, 422–424, 428, 432, 433, 439 S Socialist legacy/ies, 231 Stability, 3, 6, 8, 9, 12, 13, 15, 41, 48, 51, 66, 67, 87, 88, 115, 116, 126, 146, 147, 156, 179–196, 199, 220, 249–251, 253, 258, 265, 279, 283, 285, 293, 305, 320, 330, 375, 384, 390, 422 State-building, 7, 13, 16, 21–52, 88, 100, 116–118, 236, 247–251, 253, 257, 283, 290, 420, 422, 435 State legitimacy, 14, 32, 34, 49, 50, 149, 290 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), 4–9, 12, 13, 19, 29, 72, 74, 112, 257 T Transparency, v, 13, 14, 44, 51, 68–69, 74, 87, 110, 113, 114, 118, 128, 142–143, 150, 162, 163, 173, 188–190, 195, 200, 218, 220, 224, 226, 232, 245, 246, 251,

 INDEX 

258, 265, 273–275, 281, 283, 284, 293, 297, 306, 313, 315, 330, 377, 378, 381, 382, 384, 385, 398, 405, 408, 422, 428 Tribe, 35, 79–82, 88, 95, 110 Tskhinvali region, 16, 236–238, 414, 415 Turnover, 165, 230, 400, 403, 408 Two-nation theory, 179

451

U United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), 17, 258, 259, 263, 264, 267–269, 276, 277, 282, 435–437 W War of Independence, 217, 231, 414