Post-Communist EU Member States: Parties and Party Systems [1 ed.] 0754647129, 9780754647126

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POST-COMMUNIST EU MEMBER STATES

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Post-Communist EU Member States Parties and Party Systems

SUSANNE JUNGERSTAM-MULDERS University of Helsinki, Finland

First published 2006 by Ashgate Publishing Published 2016 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017, USA Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business Copyright © Susanne Jungerstam-Mulders 2006 All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. Susanne Jungerstam-Mulders has asserted her right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as the editor of this work. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Post-Communist EU member states : parties and party systems 1 .Political parties - Europe, Eastern 2.Europe, Eastern Politics and government - 1989IJungerstam-Mulders, Susanne 324.2'43 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Post-communist EU member states : parties and party systems / edited by Susanne Jungerstam-Mulders. p. cm. Includes index. 1. Political parties-Europe, Eastern. 2. Europe, Eastern-Politics and government-1989- I. Jungerstam-Mulders, Susanne. JN96.A979P66 2006 324.209437»dc22 2005032390 ISBN 9780754647126 (hbk) ISBN 9781138264472 (pbk)

Contents List of Tables List of Figures List of Contributors Foreword 1 Parties and Party Systems in Post-Communist EU Member States: Comparative Aspects Susanne Jungerstam-Mulders

vi viii ix xi

1

2 Patterns of Party Formation in Estonia: Consolidation Unaccomplished Evald Mikkel

23

3 Political Parties and the Party System in Latvia Artis Pabriks and Aiga Štokenberga

51

4 The Development of the Lithuanian Party System: From Stability to Perturbation Ainė Ramonaitė 5 Power without Love: Patterns of Party Politics in Post-1989 Poland Aleks Szczerbiak 6 The Rise of the Power Monopoly: Political Parties in the Czech Republic Petr Kopecký

69 91

125

7 Old Parties and New: Changing Patterns of Party Politics in Slovakia Marek Rybář

147

8 The Survival of the Fittest: Party System Concentration in Hungary Zsolt Enyedi

177

9 Slovenia: Between Bipolarity and Broad Coalition-Building Danica Fink-Hafner

203

10 Party System Change in Post-Communist EU Member States Susanne Jungerstam-Mulders

233

Index

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List of Tables Table 1.1 The effective number of electoral parties Table 1.2 The effective number of parliamentary parties Table 1.3 Share of seats (%) and number of seats (in brackets) per country per party group in the EU Parliament Table 1.4 Share of seats per party group, new and old EU member states compared Table 1.5 Turnout in parliamentary elections 1994-2003 Table 1.6 Invalid votes in parliamentary elections 1994-2003 Table 1.7 Volatility in parliamentary elections 1994-2003 Table 2.1 Support of radical parties in Riigikogu elections 1992-2003 Table 2.2 Parliamentary and governmental representation of mainstream Estonian parties 1992-2004 Table 2.3 The electoral system 1992-2003 Table 2.4 Effective number of electoral and parliamentary parties 1992-2003 Table 2.5 Share of left and right-wing parties in Riigikogu 1992-2003 Table 2.6 Changes in major parties’ membership rates in Estonia 1995-2004 Table 2.7 Relative importance of distinct issues for different post-Soviet societies during the initial phase of transition Table 2.8 The move towards independence in Estonia 1987-1991 Table 2.9 The de-communization process in Estonia 1991-1995 Table 2.10 Major issues and political actors in Estonia 1995 to present Table 2.11 Distribution of mandates in Riigikogu according to the way of their acquisition Table 2.12 Support of new and non-parliamentary parties and the level of wasted votes in Riigikogu elections Table 2.13 Voter volatility in elections in Estonia Table 2.14 Party families in Estonia Table 3.1 Alert issues in Saeima elections Table 3.2 Saeima election results 1993-2002 Table 4.1 Results of parliamentary elections in Lithuania (% of votes in the multimember district and total number of seats received) Table 4.2 Results of Polish Electoral Action in parliamentary elections Table 4.3 Voting preferences and socio-demographic characteristics (columns in %) Table 4.4 Voting results (in %) in the European Parliament election: national results and Vilnius’ results compared Table 4.5 Public placement of five ‘traditional’ parties on the left-right scale (from -10 to +10 in 1996)

5 7 11 11 14 14 15 28 30 31 31 33 33 35 38 39 42 44 44 45 49 59 61 72 78 79 79 80

List of Tables Table 4.6 Party membership in Lithuania in 1992-2004 Table 4.7 The effective number of parties and the proportion of wasted votes in multimember districts in 1992-2004 Table 4.8 Acronyms and names of Lithuanian parties Table 5.1 September 2001 parliamentary election results Table 5.2 Polish parties’ European parliamentary links Table 5.3 Party fragmentation in post-1989 Poland Table 5.4 Electoral volatility in post-1989 Poland Table 5.5 Proportion of party income derived from state funding, 2003 Table 5.6 Polish party membership levels 2003-2004 Table 5.7 Level of trust in Polish institutions, 2004 Table 6.1 Electoral results in the Czech Republic (main parties; chamber of deputies) Table 6.2 Party membership (main parties) Table 7.1 Elections to the National Council (150 seats) Table 7.2 Splits and mergers among select Slovak parties Table 7.3 Party membership in old parties Table 7.4 Party membership in new parties Table 7.5 Number of local party units in new parties Table 8.1 The distribution of list votes in Hungarian elections, 1990-2002 in per cent Table 8.2 The distribution of seats in Hungarian parliamentary elections, 1990-2002 in per cent Table 8.3 Effective number of electoral and parliamentary parties in Hungary Table 8.4 Turnout in Hungarian parliamentary elections Table 9.1 Slovenian public opinion (SPO) survey responses to the question of whether the respondents feel close to any party, 1995-2003 (in %) Table 9.2 Slovenian parliamentary parties’ ideological family links before the 2004 parliamentary elections Table 9.3 Continuity of the transition to democracy and electoral support for parliamentary party clusters 1990-2004 Table 9.4 Party system characteristics after elections Table 9.5 Results of parliamentary elections in Slovenia in 1990-2004 Table 9.6 Election turnouts at parliamentary elections Table 9.7 Effective number of parties in the Slovenian parliamentary party arena Table 9.8 Electoral volatility in the Slovenian party arena (1992-2004) Table 9.9 Governments in Slovenia 1990-2004

vii 82 84 89 94 100 105 106 114 116 117 131 133 152 164 167 167 169 183 183 185 186

208 215 219 222 228 229 230 230 230

List of Figures Figure 2.1 Figure 4.1 Figure 4.2 Figure 8.1 Figure 9.1

Major issues in Estonian politics Voting turnout in parliamentary elections in Lithuania Party system development in Lithuania 1990-2004 Patterns of Hungarian party competition Number of political organizations in Slovenia from 1974 to 15 July 2002 Figure 9.2 Proportion of valid votes for clusters of old and new parliamentary parties (regardless of their ideological orientation) in the 1990-2004 period (in %)

40 85 90 196 206

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List of Contributors Zsolt Enyedi, PhD, Associate Professor at the Central European University, Hungary. Danica Fink-Hafner, PhD, Professor, Head of the Centre for Political Research, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia. Susanne Jungerstam-Mulders, PhD, Researcher at the Centre for European Studies, University of Helsinki, Finland; from July 2005 Research Director at the Swedish Polytechnic, Finland. Petr Kopecký, PhD, Research Fellow and Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences, University of Leiden, the Netherlands. Evald Mikkel, MA, Lecturer at the University of Tartu, Estonia. Artis Pabriks, PhD, Associated Professor at Vidzeme College, Latvia; appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs in Latvia in July 2004. Ainė Ramonaitė, PhD, Associate Professor, Institute of International Relations and Political Science at Vilnius University, Lithuania. Marek Rybář, PhD, Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science, Comenius University, Slovakia. Aiga Štokenberga, student of International Relations at Franklin College, Switzerland; in 2005-2006 student of the John Hopkins University, Italy. Aleks Szczerbiak, PhD, Senior Lecturer, Sussex European Institute, School of Social Sciences and Cultural Studies, University of Sussex, United Kingdom.

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Foreword The historical enlargement of the European Union that took place in May 2004 changed the Union considerably. The project of integrating Europe, whose borders up until then had followed the Cold War division, was for the first time extended to cover a major part of what history has known as ‘Europe’. European integration thus started to account for its name. Like all the previous enlargements, the 2004 enlargement implied crucial challenges for the European Union. Some of them were dealt within the framework of the so called Copenhagen criteria. These criteria were established to safeguard that the Central and Eastern European newcomers would assume the key values and objectives of European integration. The Copenhagen criteria were also meant to ensure a sufficient level of harmony was created between the political and economic systems of the newcomers and those of the present EU member states. This was necessary in order to enable the functioning of an enlarged EU. The 2004 enlargement of the EU encompasses also other types of challenges, whose manifestations are not that easily defined. Irrespective of a strengthened focussing on the EU’s legitimacy one can argue that in ideological terms, the position of European integration has been relatively well supported in its Western European member states. A major part of them shares the Cold War history along with the role and meaning European integration was given in this political context. Traditionally, in Western Europe, European integration has enjoyed the support of the major ideological families. In most member states this has implied that major political parties have been in favour of the key steps taken in the framework of European integration while opposition has been limited mainly to the extremist and populist parties on both edges of the ideological field. There are, of course, exceptions, as in the United Kingdom, but in general the anchoring of integration in political parties has also provided a firm basis for its constant deepening. In terms of political ideologies, the 2004 EU enlargement seems – at least for the initial years of the new memberships – to challenge this situation. European integration does not form a similar starting point for peace and prosperity for Central and Eastern European countries as it did for West-European countries after the Second World War. In Central and Eastern Europe, threats to peace are not seen to originate from relations between Western European states. The key conditions for economic prosperity and welfare have again been seen to lie in their own economic reforms. The newcomers do not necessarily share the commitment to the need of changing state sovereignty by means of a semi-federal structure. This commitment and the role of European integration as a peace plan have been the very essential factors in legitimizing the deepening of political integration.

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European integration, consequently, takes a position on the ideological map of the post-communist countries which is different from the one it takes in most West-European political systems. For many of the EU newcomers, the reconstruction of the nation state is still much more important as a political project than community building at the European level. This does not mean that participation in European integration would not be considered important. Its importance stems, however, in the first place from with the economic profits to be gained from the internal market and with the role of EU membership as a guarantee of equality in European politics and of a European identity. This does not mean that the Central and Eastern European member states would not be able to adjust to the goals of political integration. In fact, in the context of the EU’s constitutional treaty most of them have shown a perfect political capacity to adapt themselves to an ever deepening political integration. In the long run these ideological challenges might, however, become more visible. Will the Central and Eastern European member states, once they get a firmer grip on the lead of the integration project and its agenda-setting, be willing to keep integration on the very same political track it has been on so far? Are they willing to approve the gradual deepening of political integration including the reinforcement of the EU’s competencies at the expense of member states or will the EU face an effort of its newest members to change its political course? These questions indicate that the study of political thinking in Central and Eastern European member states should not be ignored in an analysis of the implications of the 2004 EU enlargement. In order to figure out in detail what position the new member states in the long run will take in the EU – and what kind of an EU they will be willing to build – it is essential to grasp the constituent elements of their political systems. The structure and characteristics of their parties and party systems belong to these constituent elements. The study of political thinking approached from the perspective of political parties also shows to what extent the new member states can be treated as a unitary group of states as far as their EU policies are concerned and what kinds of differences exist in this respect. The volume provides a very important piece of research of the constitutive elements of eight Central and Eastern European EU members. It opens a clear perspective to their political present – and future – by analysing their party systems including the political and ideological constituents of these. The idea of the study emerged at the University of Helsinki Centre for European Studies, where EU enlargement had formed one of the foci of research in the beginning of the new millennium. Ten new EU memberships realized at the very same time created an urgent need for academic knowledge about each individual new member; about their histories, societies and political systems. This need was furthermore emphasized by the depth reached by the process of integration that far and which the new members were supposed to enter overnight. The plan of studying the party systems of Central and Eastern European EU members could be realized once the European Commission Representation in Finland had kindly lent its financial support to it. I would like to express my

Foreword

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sincere thanks to the two heads of representation, Timo Mäkelä and Reijo Kemppinen for their invaluable cooperation in this process. The other necessary condition for the realisation of the project was fulfilled when Dr. Susanne Jungerstam-Mulders, a young Finnish specialist on parties and party systems, agreed to edit the book. Susanne gathered an extraordinary group of party experts – one from each of the eight countries – to provide an analysis of the parties and party systems of their respective countries. Susanne steered the project eloquently and drew the results of each individual chapter together into a clear and compact comparison. I was extremely happy to follow how smoothly and speedily the whole project proceeded and I would like to thank Susanne and all the authors for their great contribution. A number of other people have played an important role in the project, too. On behalf of the editor and the authors, I would like to pay a special tribute to Alpona Dey, who corrected the language of the book swiftly and most skilfully, and to Marie-Louise Hindsberg for her invaluable assistance in administrative tasks and in creating the index of the book. We are also most grateful to the University of Antwerp for providing the opportunity for the editor to spend time as a visiting researcher at the university. Finally, we wish to express our sincere gratitude to Ashgate for its decision to publish the book, and for all the help and support provided by Ashgate staff during the publication process.

Teija Tiilikainen Director Network for European Studies University of Helsinki August 2005

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Chapter 1

Parties and Party Systems in PostCommunist EU Member States: Comparative Aspects Susanne Jungerstam-Mulders

Introduction Parties and elections form popular themes of research in political science and in particular in comparative political science. However, the lion’s share of contemporary party system research focusses on Western European party systems, while there is considerably less research into Central and Eastern Europe.1 In fact, considering the richness of empirical data from elections in all of Europe, there is surprisingly little comparative work between the different regions of Europe. Instead, comparative research including East Central and Eastern Europe, including those post-communist countries that entered the European Union in May 2004, is usually conducted in the perspective of the democratization process in that region (cf. Pridham 2003). In this book we focus on those post-communist countries that became new EU member states in 2004, namely the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. Here, I occasionally use ‘new EU member states’ and ‘East Central and Eastern Europe’ parallel to the notion of post-communist EU member states. However, it must be noted that new EUmember states in 2004 also include Cyprus and Malta, though these have been disregarded because of their lack of a communist heritage, and their somewhat longer democratic and market-economy orientation. Moreover, in the literature it is not uncommon that East Central and Eastern Europe refer to a broader set of countries, including not only those former communist countries that we refer to here, but also to South East Europe with Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, and – in addition to Slovenia – all countries formerly included in Yugoslavia. In addition, Eastern Europe usually includes those other European countries that received 1 Lewis (2000), Pridham and Ágh (2001) and White, Batt and Lewis (2003) are notable exceptions dealing with parties and the political developments of East and East Central European countries.

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independence after the collapse of the Soviet Union, except for Russia: Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova.2 Here, the enlargement of the EU provides the logical starting point for comparative party research into former communist Europe, in part because the foundation of the enlargement is the postulate that all member states share some basic characteristics, including representative democracy, respect for human rights and more or less comparable living conditions. This ensures some degree of comparability. Moreover, those post-communist countries that were included in the EU enlargement in May 2004 have been regarded as more or less similar with regard to socioeconomic and political development and stability, first, with regard to each other and, second, with regard to the ‘old’ member states. Yet, considering the lack of comparative studies including all of the new East and East Central EU member states, as well as in-depth national case studies enlightening any comparative findings, these positions rest on a weak analytical basis. Therefore, the main intention of this book is to focus on the development of parties and the party systems in these countries. In doing so, this book compiles descriptive-analytical essays by experts on those new EU member states in focus, concentrating not only on nation specific features of parties and party system development, but also on three classical themes of party system research: (1) ideologies and issues, mainly focussing on ideological cleavages, ideological dimensions and salient issues in present-day politics; (2) party system competition including institutional aspects, such as the design of the electoral system, as well as central measurements of party competition in terms of electoral volatility, turnout and outcome in elections; and (3) party organizations and the role of parties, including linkages between parties and the electorate, and between parties and the State. Based on these common themes the concluding chapter of the book aims to discuss the nation specific case studies in comparative terms – in terms of differences and similarities, in patterns of consolidation and patterns of change. For the final analysis there are four questions posed: (1) What are those nation specific circumstances that are particular to each of the countries’ parties and party systems? (2) What characterizes the parties and party systems of the new post-communist EU member states with regard to their ideological spectrum, party organizations and electoral behaviour? (3) What features do the parties and party systems in post-communist EU member states have in common and which features distinguish the one country from the other?

2

Also, see Batt (2003) on a conceptual discussion on East and Central Europe.

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(4) What developments can we expect in these countries with regard to the parties and party systems in the near future in light of the experience of the past decade? Before turning to the country cases, this chapter aims to provide a comparative view on the countries and the themes of discussion, mainly focussing on established operationalizations of comparative aspects of party system research. First, the intention is to include a number of system characteristics that are frequently addressed in the comparative literature as main features of the functioning of party systems, including the effective number of parties, ideological positions and dynamic structures of elections. The latter refer to electoral volatility and voter turnout. In addition, a discussion on party organizations and the linkage between parties and the electorate, including trust in parties, is included. However, trust in parties, ideological positions and aggregate fragmentation, volatility and turnout in elections say little about the workings of the parties and the party system in real world politics. Nor do they provide explanations or an understanding of why differences or similarities occur. Instead, generalizations of the kind that comparative data, in the shape of fragmentation indexes and volatility indexes offer, enable generalizations which paint the bigger picture and pinpoint diverging experiences, and which are unlikely to be addressed in a single country case study. Subsequently, the country case studies that follow will shed light on the data that I am going to present here whilst discussing the themes in a more holistic approach to parties and party system development in a nation specific context.

Comparing Parties and Party Systems Political parties play an intrinsic role in modern democracies characterized by free and fair elections. Hence, parties are the key players in most parliamentary elections that result in the compilation of assemblies of representation, i.e. parliaments. Therein, a second major function of political parties is the one of forming a basis for government formation, legislation and policy making. However, in fulfilling these functions, parties do not act as independent actors in a vacuum. Together with other parties they form the party system, which could also be described as ‘the patterned interaction of parties resulting from party competition’ (Mair 1990). As a consequence, any thorough investigation into party systems of the new EU member states needs to include a study of the two most important attributes of the party system: first, the total number of parties in the party system and, second, the ideological positions held by the parties interacting in that system. Apart from the fragmentation and the ideological position of parties in a party system, a systematic comparison of parties and party systems should also

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include other aspects, such as elections and the ‘dynamic structure’3 of their political systems, i.e. turnout and volatility. Fragmentation of the Party System There have been many efforts to categorise party systems, of which the categorization of Jean Blondel (1968) was the first effort to disintegrate the multiparty system category that had long been seen as the opposite of the more ‘superior’ two-party system. In doing so, Blondel distinguished between two- and two-and-a-half-party systems (the latter being dominated by three parties; two major parties and one that is considerably smaller), multi-party systems with a dominant party and multi-party systems without a dominant party. And even though this classification ‘did little more than improve the traditional two-party versus multiparty distinction by disaggregating the otherwise overloaded multiparty category’, Blondel’s effort took a party’s relative size into account (Mair 1997). This perception of a party’s ‘relative size’ has later been adapted by political science to a much greater extent, so that most political scientist, today, are quite familiar with notions such as the ‘effective number of parties’ and the ‘fragmentation’ of party systems. The question of the number of parties is a problematic one, since counting the actual number of registered parties – or even the number of parties participating in national elections – may give a disproportionate picture of the relations in a party system. This problem may derive, for instance, from the presence of numerous, but mainly unsuccessful parties participating in elections. These parties may be quite irrelevant to the working of a democracy in view of their political importance and influence on policy formation. However, looking only at parties entering parliament may exclude quite sizeable parties that do influence policy output, but nonetheless do not manage to enter parliament because of high electoral thresholds or similar hindrances. In order to tackle the problem of counting the ‘effective’ number parties and measuring their relative size, the most commonly accepted strategy is to use the index developed by Laakso and Taagepera in 1979, which assigns more weight to larger parties and less weight to smaller parties. This index can be used both with regard to parliamentary parties and to electoral parties; when measuring the effective number of electoral parties, the calculation of the amount of parties is based on the vote share that each party receives in elections. When measuring parliamentary parties, the index is based on a party’s share of seats in parliament.4 3

Müller-Rommel (1993) makes a distinction between static and dynamic structures of political systems. Static structures include system features such as electoral systems, institutions and the federal structure of a state. Dynamic structures refer to characteristics of electoral systems that vary over time, i.e. such aspects as turnout and volatility. 4 The Laakso and Taagepera index is widely used in political science, though there are alternative indexes and a growing awareness of the fact that the Laakso and Taagepera

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In the following calculations of party system fragmentation in post-communist EU member states, I am relying only on election data from 1994 and onwards. This is due to the understanding that the first election(s) after a long period of totalitarian or authoritarian rule often fulfil the function of ‘founding elections’. Moreover, in East Central and Eastern Europe, the first, sometimes also the second and third free elections were more of a plebiscite against communism than anything else (see Jasiewicz 2003). Therefore, it seems that any comparison of parties and party systems in the new EU member states cannot be made based on elections held during the first turbulent years of democratic regime, when party systems were still only beginning to find their shape in these post-communist countries. The dividing line of 1994 results in the exclusion of one election in Hungary, and of two elections in the lion’s share of new EU countries (the second election most commonly held in 1992, except for Latvia and Poland where the second elections were held in 1993). Yet, 1994 has been chosen as a chronological starting point for all countries. Table 1.1 The effective number of electoral parties Average effective number of electoral parties 1994-2004 Czech Republic 4.96 Estonia 6.06 Hungary 4.20 Latvia 7.74 Lithuania 6.43 Poland 4.53 Slovakia 6.67 Slovenia 5.89 Average 8 new EU member states 5.8 Average 15 old EU member states 4.7 Sources: calculations based on fragmentation indexes provided by the authors of this book; calculations on old EU member states based on Ersson (2004) and Nordsieck (2004). Country

A first glance at the fragmentation of parties in post-communist EU member states in Table 1.1 reveals that new EU member states have substantially more fragmented party systems than the old member states, though there are vast differences within the group. In comparison to the aggregate fragmentation of the party system during the past decade between the groups, there are, in fact, only two index has certain disadvantages that could cause problems in quantitative studies, in particular. See Dunleavy and Boucek (2003).

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post-communist EU member states that have a less fragmented party system than the average of the old EU countries: Hungary and Poland. Contemporaneously, only one fifth of the old member states have a fragmentation index that is higher than the average of the new countries, i.e. Belgium, Italy and France (not shown in the table). This clearly indicates that party systems in the new member states are generally more splintered than those in the old EU countries, and that there are most commonly numerous parties in the electoral arena in all the countries concerned. However, the high fragmentation index of most post-communist EU member states mirror somewhat different realities: in some instances the indexes mirror circumstances of several more or less equally strong parties contesting elections, whereas an equally high index may also mirror one or two dominant parties in elections and a great number of challenging parties. The former is true for Slovakia in 2002, for instance. Here, four parties gained between 11 and 19 per cent of the votes in the 2002 elections, whereas there were an additional three parties gaining 6-8 per cent, three parties gaining 3-4 per cent of the vote and 13 parties which shared the remaining votes. In contrast, a high fragmentation index revealing one or two dominant parties and a great number of small challenging parties reflects the case in recent elections in Slovenia, for instance, where the liberal party (Liberal Democracy of Slovenia) has been the dominant party for a long time. This is illustrated by the fact that it gained 36 per cent of the votes in the elections in 2000, whereas the second largest party, a conservative party, gained no more than 16 per cent of the vote in that same election, followed by the third party gaining 12 per cent and an additional five parties gaining between 4 and 10 per cent of the vote. However, focussing on individual elections, fragmentation is largely diminishing in many of the new EU member states, especially as compared to elections in the 1990s. With regards to Lithuania, for instance, electoral fragmentation has dropped from 7.9 in 1996 to 5.8 in 2004, whereas electoral fragmentation in Hungary has dropped from 5.6 in 1994 to 2.4 in 2002. Only Slovakia shows an opposite trend, electoral fragmentation having increased from 5.8 in 1994 to 8.9 in 2002. A high fragmentation of the party system in elections does not automatically translate into a highly fragmented parliament. Instead, different electoral rules and formulas may concentrate the power to a fewer number of parties than the electoral outcome would indicate. Of course, major differences between the effective number of electoral parties and the effective number of parliamentary parties suggest that there is a vast number of ‘wasted’ votes, votes that have not resulted in parliamentary representation of any party. This is often indicated by a (dis-) proportionality index, measuring differences between votes and actual seats. Naturally, majority and plurality electoral systems tend to result in greater disproportionality than proportional electoral systems, though the outcome of PRsystems may also vary greatly.

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Table 1.2 The effective number of parliamentary parties Average effective number of parliamentary parties 1994-2004 Czech Republic 3.78 Estonia 4.77 Hungary 2.83 Latvia 6.03 Lithuania 3.73 Poland 3.28 Slovakia 5.09 Slovenia 4.99 Average 8 new EU member states 4.3 Average 15 old EU member states 4.0 Sources: calculations based on data provided by the authors of this book and data provided by EJPR Data Year Book, several volumes. Country

Table 1.2 shows that the effective number of parties when only the parliamentary parties are considered. Keeping the higher numbers of electoral parties in mind, the effective number of parliamentary parties suggests that there are electoral systems, formulas or rules in place that concentrate the parliamentary power in the new post-communist EU member states more effectively than in the old member states, in order to avoid extreme fragmentation. This is often seen as desirable, because in a lesser fragmented parliament decision-making is usually less troublesome than in more fragmented parliaments. Simultaneously, (majority) governments can be formed with a smaller number of parties, which is usually considered to enhance government stability. Looking at the electoral systems of the new member states, most of these have proportional election systems – with the exception of Hungary and Lithuania that have mixed systems of PR and majority systems. All new member states have adopted electoral thresholds of 4 or 5 per cent for entering parliament, which naturally affects parliamentary fragmentation as compared to electoral fragmentation (see for instance Jasiewicz 2003). Similar thresholds are also found in several of the old EU countries’ electoral systems, however, for instance in Germany (5 per cent electoral threshold), Sweden and Austria (4 per cent), Greece (3 per cent) and Denmark (2 per cent threshold), all of which serve the same purpose: to hinder extreme fragmentation of parliament (Gallagher, Laver, Mair 2001). Therefore, the thresholds alone cannot be the one single mechanism to explain the wide gap between electoral and parliamentary party fragmentation in the post-communist EU member states, or in the electoral disproportionality that follows from a wide discrepancy between electoral and parliamentary parties. Instead, one might suspect that a highly fragmented party system easily emerges

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where previous party linkages are nonexistent or blurred. Moreover, a decrease in fragmentation can be expected to occur over time when party systems stabilise and consolidate. The reason for this is that voters, as well as parties, need time to adjust to the institutional realities of the political system, as well as to develop more lasting alignments and loyalties towards each other before the flux in the system settles. Ideological Positions Ideological positions of parties and the understanding of parties in terms of ideological families5 have been a few of the main topics of party research for quite some time. Several techniques have been developed to analyse parties’ ideological positions based on party programmes, statutes, platforms and the actions of parties as actors in parliament, in congresses etc. In doing so, Arend Lijphart has identified seven ideological dimensions that were present in most democratic party systems during the 70s and 80s, amongst others, a socioeconomic, religious, cultural-ethnic, urban-rural and post-materialist dimension (Lijphart 1990). Today, most of these dimensions can still be identified in various European countries, whereas in former communist EU countries, there is evidence that only two dimensions in politics that appear dominant for present day voting behaviour: the socioeconomic dimension and the cultural dimension (Jasiewicz 2003). Hence, the socioeconomic dimension refers more precisely to the cleavage between those who favour free market economy versus those who prefer welfare orientated state interventionism – a division that is quite similar to the socioeconomic dimension found in present-day Western Europe. The cultural dimension, on the other hand, expresses a division between particularism and universalism, sometimes expressed in a conflict between the traditional and the modern, the confessional and the secular and between nationalism and a pan-European orientation (Jasiewicz 2003). Yet, all of these dimensions were initially identified as separate ideological dimensions in Western Europe by Lijphart. This in turn suggests that party systems in the new EU member countries are formed along similar dividing lines as Western European party systems.6 5

The notion of party families is often derived from Rokkan and Lipset’s concept of social cleavages that are reflected in ideologies. According to Rokkan and Lipset, there were essentially four historical cleavages which developed from the national and industrial revolution and which later converted into party ideologies and translated into party alignments. The first conflict was the one between the dominant and the subjective cultures (between regional interests, the centre and the periphery of a nation or state), the second between church and state, the third between the primary and secondary economy (typically between the countryside and the town) and the fourth between workers and employers or owners (Rokkan 1990). 6 Also, see von Beyme (2001) for a discussion of cleavages and party systems in Central and Eastern Europe, including a revision of the Rokkan cleavage matrix, which covers most parties in both Western and Central and Eastern Europe.

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In studying party families and the ideological positions of parties one may choose from a number of different strategies. Of these, a common strategy is to look at the parties’ origins and histories; another strategy is to try to identify common ideological and/or programmatic stances based on political documents and/or behaviour and/or statements; a third strategy is simply to go by the name or party label. Finally, a last strategy is to study the parties’ transnational affiliations, according to the principle of ‘tell me who your friends are and I’ll tell who you are’ (Mair and Mudde 1998; see also Gallagher, Laver and Mair 2001). Of these, ideological positions of parties based on party origin and history may be most chanceful in Central and Eastern Europe considering the vast changes that party systems in these countries have experienced, including numerous reformations, splits and mergers of parties. Similarly, the strategy of judging parties based on party labels is most chanceful considering that it is not uncommon that parties have misleading or difficult to interpret labels. For instance, a closer look at the different parties in East and East-Central Europe reveal that the former Slovenian Social Democratic Party, now the Democratic Party is in fact a conservative party. Equally confusing is the label of the Estonian Moderate People’s Party, which is a social democratic party, as compared to the somewhat older Swedish Moderate party, which is a conservative party. Therefore, considering party programmes and/or declarations and/or actions in policy issues would be a more accurate way of identifying groups according to the parties’ front stage self-portraits and factual actions. However, this is best done at the country level, leaving us here to deal with the strategy of looking at party families based on international affiliations in organizations, such as the EU parliament. In fact, party groups in the EU parliament offer a solid basis for analysis of dominant parties in (new) EU member countries, reflecting both the self-image of parties and the group’s acceptance of parties to be included in the group. Considering that all parties which are members of a party group in the EU parliament are members of that group of free will, we can also assume that the parties themselves feel that they share some common values with the group. This means that even though one may expect quite some diversity among the parties in individual EU party groups, all parties within one group must be expected to feel more connected to the ideological stance of that one group, rather than to any other. Therefore, for the purposes of comparing the ideological party spectrum of the new EU member states, we will take a look at how the parties of these countries are associated in the EU parliament.7

7

However, whatever method is chosen for comparing the ideological positions of party families in the EU, there are different problems with regard to defining party families and in identifying which parties belong to the same family in each approach. Consequently, Mair and Mudde (1998) also point out that looking only to international association becomes a problem, first, when not all parties are members of an international federation and, second, when some parties are members of different associations at the same level, or

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Moreover, since EU-elections are often seen to reflect national politics in the sense that most national political parties enter elections in EU elections, we will take a look at the distribution of seats between the new countries as well. This is irrespective of the fact that EU-elections are often seen as second rank elections, in which voters, first, are less inclined to vote and, second, make some less traditional choices than in national elections because the effects of one’s voting is not regarded as quite as important. In addition, there are a number of parties participating in EU-elections which do not participate in national elections.8 Regardless of this, a closer look at the distribution of seats between the countries does not reveal so much about the strength of different party groups in different countries, as it does about the existence of relevant parties at the different ends of the political spectrum. A common categorization of present day Western European party systems suggests that we can identify eight main party ‘families’: communist, green, social democratic or labour parties, liberal, agrarian, conservative, Christian democratic parties and, finally, far right parties, here including right-wing nationalist, extreme right-wing, racist and right-wing populist parties. Of these, it is uncommon that liberal and agrarian parties are strong within the same party system, as it is uncommon to have both a strong conservative and Christian democratic party within one party system. In general, the latter parties act as each other’s ‘functional equivalents’, though the party groups may differ with regard to some key issues. The former group of parties, the liberals and the agrarian parties, compete side by side only in the Nordic countries, and in some post-communist countries (see Gallagher, Laver, Mair 2001). When studying the European Parliament, it becomes evident that not all countries have parties within each party group mentioned here, however the majority of dominant parties fit into one of these groups. Most representatives are grouped into seven party groups and one category of independents, the latter includes both regionalists, far right and anti-bureaucratic parties. The dominant groups are the PES (Party of European Socialists); the EPP-ED (European Peoples’ Party-European Democrats), including both conservative and Christian democratic parties, and the ALDE (Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe; previously the European Liberal Democrat and Reform Party, ELDE), the latter also includes agrarian parties. Moreover, the GRE-EFA (Greens-European Free Alliance) and the GUE-NGL (European United Left-Nordic Green Left) both include ‘new politics’ parties, though only the GUE-NGL include post-communist parties and parties that are orientated to the economic far left. Finally, there are the UEN (Union for a Europe of Nations) and the EDD (Europe of Democracies and when the same party is a member of different associations on different levels of party organization. Finally, parties may switch affiliation over time. 8 Also note that election results may differ greatly in terms of seat allocation in proportion to electoral support in comparison to national elections. This is a consequence of different electoral rules in many countries in national and EU elections.

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Diversities), the latter including both EU critical lists and parties which oppose membership to the EU, whereas the UEN, on the other hand, includes some rightwing populist parties (for instance the Danish party Dansk Folkeparti and the Italian Alleanza Nationale). Ideologically these are not very distinct from a few of the parties among the independent parties, the Austrian Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, for instance. This makes both of these groups, together with the independents, ambiguous with regards to ideological position. Table 1.3 Share of seats (%) and number of seats (in brackets) per country per party group in the EU Parliament Country Czech Rep. (24) Estonia (6) Hungary (24) Latvia (9) Lithuania (13) Poland (54) Slovakia (14) Slovenia (7) Share of seats in % (nr of seats)

GUENGL 25.0 (6) -

GREEFA 11.1 (1) -

PES

ALDE

EPP-ED

Others*

8.3 (2) 50.0 (3) 37.5 (9) 15.4 (2) 14.8 (8) 21.4 (3) 14.3 (1)

33.3 (2) 8.3 (2) 11.1 (1) 53.8 (7) 7.4 (4) 28.6 (2)

58.3 (14) 16.7 (1) 54.2 (13) 33.3 (3) 15.4 (2) 35.2 (19) 57.1 (8) 57.1 (4)

8.3 (2) 44.4 (4) 15.4 (2) 42.6 (23) 21.4 (3) -

4.0 (6)

0.7(1)

18.5 (28)

11.9 (18)

42.4 (64)

22.5 (34)

* includes UEN, EDD and independent parties in the EU parliament. Total nr of seats for new East and Central European member states: 151. Source: calculations based on Nordsieck (2004). Table 1.4 Share of seats per party group, new and old EU member states compared

New EU member states Old EU member states Difference old and new

GUENGL

GREEFA

PES

4.0

0.7

18.5

5.9

7.0

-1.9

-6.3

ALDE

EPP-ED

Others*

11.9

42.4

22.5

29.6

11.7

35.3

10.4

-11.1

+0.2

+7.1

+12.1

The total number of seats for all old EU countries amounts to 570 seats, whereas the total number of new members taken into account here amounts to 151 seats. * includes UEN, EDD and independent parties in the EU parliament. Source: calculations based on Nordsieck (2004).

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In the most recent EU elections, East Central and Eastern EU member states produced very diverse results. In only three countries both votes and the countries’ EU representation were concentrated in the three traditional party groups: social democrats, liberals and conservatives / Christian democrats (in Estonia, Hungary and Slovenia), whereas the remaining countries witnessed quite diverse electoral results for different party groups in the EU parliament. In fact, in Table 1.4, the most notable result is that the category of ‘others’ is the largest group for Latvia and Poland, 44.4 and 42.6 per cent, and a dominant group in Slovakia and Lithuania (21.4 and 15.4 per cent). In the Czech Republic the size of the category of others is close to the average of old EU member states (8.3 per cent as compared to the West European the average of 10.4 per cent). However, there is a notable difference between the countries in that there are three different party groups represented among the Polish seats of ‘others’. In Latvia, on the other hand, the high share of seats in the category of ‘others’ is wholly due to the conservative coalition For Fatherland and Freedom/Latvian National Independence Movement. Similarly, the Lithuanian seats among the group of ‘others’ are wholly taken by one party, the Democratic Party. This is also the case for Slovakia, where the People’s Party – Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, accounts for the Slovak seats. Moreover, similar to the Latvian party For Fatherland and Freedom, the Slovak party in the group of ‘others’ has been one of the dominant parties in Slovakia throughout the country’s democratic era. In comparison, one may notice that with regard to the old EU countries, the category of ‘others’ includes mainly two categories of parties. First, there are such parties that are often labelled as right-wing populist (the Austrian Freedom Party and the Danish People’s Party, for instance) and a few extreme right-wing parties such as the Belgian Vlaams Blok and the French Front National. Second, there is a number of anti-EU, anti-bureaucratic and EU critical parties (for instance the UK Independence Party and the Swedish Juni-listan). Though there are a few exceptions, these are the most sizeable parties in proportion to the number of seats held by the electing country included in the category of ‘others’. Here, Ireland is the main exception, and the only old EU country holding a majority of seats in this category, including seats for Fianna Fail, the governing party in Ireland. Therefore, the main conclusion to be drawn from the data presented in Tables 1.3 and 1.4 is that even though most dominant parties in new EU member states appear to identify with ‘traditional’ ideologies that follow the left-right socioeconomic dividing lines between social democrats, liberals and conservatives, there appears to be a substantial number of relevant parties, including a few such parties which have played a leading role in government over a lengthy period of time, which do not identify with EU party group constellations. More specifically, this is the case for two countries in particular, Latvia and Poland. This would suggest that even though the party spectrum in East and East Central European countries covers much of the ‘traditional’ (Western European) ideological space, there is a discrepancy in ideological space between countries, both within the group of new EU member states and as compared to old EU member states. The reasons for this

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result may be twofold, the first obvious explanation being that a comparison based on one EU election may not be all together representative of the ideological spectrum of one country. A second speculative suggestion would be that parties might still not have found their ideological home base. However, a third suggestion would be that a larger share of parties in the post-communist societies of new EU member states simply do not identify with traditional (Western European) ideological cleavages, and that a different set of salient issues and dimensions is arising in these countries. Considering the drawbacks of the above comparison based on EU elections and the limitations imposed by making comparisons out of a Western European categorization of ideologies, the national case studies will provide a more accurate picture of the ideological positions of parties in the new EU member states. Elections National elections decide which parties and candidates will have a seat in parliament and in the extension of elections, these are intended to constitute the foundation of politics and policies in a country. Moreover, elections are symbolic in the sense that they legitimise a country’s political system in the eyes of the electorate, and they give the electorate a feeling of choice and influence over politics. Yet, it is obvious that not all voters feel that their influence is of real importance, or they feel disappointed and disillusioned with the political system, at which time they may opt not to vote. If this feeling becomes wide spread, electoral turnout will drop. However, on a theoretical level there are several competing approaches to the problem of a low turnout, amongst others, there is one line of thought arguing that a low turnout is not so much a sign of disillusionment as it is of political stability (see Poguntke 1996, for instance). Consequently, low turnout could be interpreted either as a sign of disillusion with politics or as a sign of satisfied indifference. However, low turnout in countries with a party system in flux is unlikely to be a sign of indifference since the greater flux already indicates loose voter alignments and constant shifts in voter preferences. Rather, one might expect that a low turnout in countries experiencing a great turmoil in the political arena is a sign of disillusion, discontent and a feeling of confusion with institutional structures and alternatives.9

9

In the literature, turnout levels are also explained by the impact of institutions, including electoral systems and seat allocation rules, the role of obligatory voting, registration procedures, voting age and the difference in the competitive nature of elections in different countries (see Kostadinova 2003). In addition, Kostadinova shows that turnout in post-communist countries is determined not only by the rational response to the electoral law and the institutional setting, but also by the role of transitional elections.

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Susanne Jungerstam-Mulders Table 1.5 Turnout* in parliament elections 1994-2003

Turnout Country 1994-2003 Czech Republic 69.3 Estonia 61.5 Hungary 66.3 Latvia 71.7 Lithuania 55.0 Poland 47.0 Slovakia 76.6 Slovenia 72.0 Average 8 new EU member states 64.9 Average 15 old EU member states 76.5 * turnout as the average of the total of all votes divided by all registered voters. Sources: calculations based on data provided by IDEA (2004). Table 1.6 Invalid votes in parliamentary elections 1994-2003

Country Czech Republic Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland Slovakia Slovenia Average 8 new EU member states Average 15 old EU member states * refers only to the 2002 elections. Source: based on data provided by IDEA (2004).

Invalid votes 1994-2003 0.5 1.2 0.6* 0.7 4.6 4.0 1.5 4.6 2.2 3.8

As seen in Table 1.5, Poland and Lithuania have an exceptionally low turnout by any standard, whereas Latvia, Slovakia and Slovenia come close to the average of old EU member states. However, the latter also include a number of countries with compulsory voting, i.e. Belgium, Italy and Luxembourg. Those countries with a compulsory voting also tend to have high levels of invalid votes (varying from 4 to 8 per cent in individual elections in the three countries, with average invalid votes between 6-7.5 per cent), whereas the vast majority of old EU member states have average invalid vote shares at 0.8 to 1.9 per cent. Compared to the new member states, only Slovakia has ever experienced an election with a turnout

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above 80 per cent, whereas the highest levels of invalid votes are, in fact, found in the two countries with the lowest average turnout levels, Poland and Lithuania. Slovenia, too, has comparatively high levels of invalid votes, considering that invalid votes have amounted to 3.3-5.9 per cent in the past decade. Focussing on individual elections in each country (not accounted for in the tables), it appears that there is a remarkable variation in turnout from one election to another in half of the new member states, namely a drop in turnout from 74 per cent in 1998 to 58 in 2002 in the Czech Republic; a temporary drop from 69 to 57 per cent in Hungary in 1998 – which returned to previous levels in the subsequent elections – and a drop from 69 per cent to 57 in Estonia between the 1995 and 1999 elections. In contrast, there was a significant increase in turnout in Slovakia in 1998 as compared to 1994, from 76 to 84 per cent, though turnout dropped back to 70 per cent in 2002. Only Latvia and Slovenia appear to have rather constant levels of turnout. Yet, the reasons for this remain highly speculative, since there is only little analytical material on turnout levels in post-communist countries. Table 1.7 Volatility in parliamentary elections 1994-2003 Electoral volatility Country 1994-2003 Czech Republic 19.5 Estonia 28.4 Hungary 27.5 42.6 Latvia 48.1* Lithuania 34.6 Poland Slovakia 23.7 Slovenia 20.7* 30.6 Average 8 new EU member states Average 15 old EU member states 12.0 * includes the 2004 elections. Sources: average calculations based on data provided by the authors of this book and Ersson (2004). With regard to electoral volatility, one must distinguish between two kinds of volatility: gross volatility and net volatility. The former takes all voter shifts from one party to another into account, but is difficult to establish without extensive voter surveys. The latter, the net volatility, is the most important one for the electoral result and for the political parties, because it reveals the difference in the total share of votes won and lost as compared to the previous election, i.e. the net change. On this account, Mogens Pedersen has developed an index that measures volatility as half of the total net change, i.e. the cumulated gains of all winning parties, or the cumulated losses of all losing parties (Pedersen 1990, 199). High

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volatility is often seen as a sign of turbulence in a political system, a sign of dealignment in party identification and / or an increase in political supply, i.e. of new parties entering the electoral arena. Table 1.7 reveals that volatility is generally rather high in the post-communist EU member countries, however there is a huge variation not only between countries, but also between elections in the countries themselves. Therein, the average volatility in Slovenia appears rather constant since the mid-1990s (ranging between 17.3 and 25.9 in a total of three elections), whereas the Czech Republic had high volatility indexes in the early and mid-1990s, after which the volatility index has dropped significantly. Similarly, Slovakia has had big shifts, though in an opposite direction: volatility has increased significantly from 1994 (22.3) to the last elections in 2002 (30.0). Among the other East and Central EU member states, Estonia and Hungary have average aggregated volatility indexes close to the new EU member average, though they too have had considerable fluctuations. Finally, volatility indexes in Lithuania, Latvia and Poland are exceptionally high by any standards, and considering these net volatility rates, it would not be surprising if gross volatility indexes would rise far above 50 per cent. This means that we can expect that more than half of the voters have shifted preferences from one election to another. As compared to the old EU member states, it is also obvious that the aggregate volatility in new EU countries is substantially higher than the average volatility in old EU member states. Yet, before jumping to conclusions, one should also recognize that there is a great variation between countries and between elections in the old EU member states as well. For instance, the two countries with the highest average volatility indexes, Italy and the Netherlands, have indexes above 20 (Italy 25.9 and the Netherlands 21.6). These indexes reflect the fact that both countries have experienced a few high volatility elections, Italy in 1994 and 2001 (volatility indexes 37.3 and 26.8) and the Netherlands in 2002 (30.8). In contrast, there are also numerous countries with indexes on average over a ten-year period below 9, i.e. Greece (6.2), Luxembourg (6.6), Germany (7.5), Spain (8.1), United Kingdom and Finland (9.0). The reasons for the high volatility rates in many of the post-communist EU member states may be multiple and interrelated, though the high volatility throughout the 1990s was expected due to the newness of the party system. Similar to the argument with regard to the discrepancy between fragmentation of electoral parties and parliamentary parties, one might expect that volatility decreases when the party system and institutional structures stabilise. However, considering that there is an indication of an increasing volatility in old EU member states as well, it is also plausible that there is a new ‘mood’ entering politics, where voter alignments become weaker and volatility increases. Therefore it is quite plausible that the electorate of the new EU member states will never adapt to similar stable and predictable voter behaviour as has been the case in many of the old EU countries in the past decades.

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Party Organizations In general, political parties have played a crucial role in the process of democratization and in the development of representative democracy in most countries worldwide, including in the post-communist new EU member states. Though the first wave of democratization in the early 20th century was accompanied by the rise of the mass party, the parties which have evolved in the wake of the latest wave of democratization have been characterized by quite opposite features. The new parties in Eastern and East Central Europe are largely characterized by loose party organizational structure, non-existent memberships and no pronounced ties to civil society (Mair 1997). However, a development towards similar party structures is characteristic of parties elsewhere as well. This is a development that has caused scientists as well as mass media to reflect on the ‘decline of parties’ in representative democracies, at large. However, Mair suggests that the interpretation of parties as declining institutions is partially misguided, most notably because parties have different faces and act on different levels. He distinguishes between three different faces of parties: the role of parties in public office (parties in parliament and in government), parties in central office (the party organization of the party apparatus which is often distinct from the party organization in public office) and, finally, parties on the ground (parties as membership organizations). Of these, only parties on the ground have declined, which is evident in decreasing membership figures, the erosion of voter loyalties, popular disenchantment and distrust in parties and the political elite, more generally. In contrast, parties in public and central office have strengthened their positions. This is visible in the increasing dependency on state funding and the development towards an increased autonomy of the different ‘faces’ of the party apparatus. The latter is recognized in a trend towards a dependency upon party representatives and ex-officio members in central office (instead of party members), an increased professionalization of the party organization (work being carried out by consultants and professionals instead of members and activists), for instance. However, in the process of eroding representative value of party organizations, and an increasing distance between party organization and electorate, there is a risk of declining trust on the part of the voter (Mair 1997). In post-communist Europe it appears that the party-voter linkage has remained weak alongside powerful party organizations in public and central office, even though the apparent similarity in parties’ organizational development has its roots in different circumstances. In contrast to Western Europe, this trend has been enforced in post-communist Europe, amongst other things, by the fact that the electorate have largely no previous attachment to the parties, only a vague sense of dominant cleavage structures and group belonging; they usually have no long lasting political identities to hold on to, which for the political parties means that the voters are largely available for all parties. Simultaneously, stakes are high for all parties involved, when any party has a prospect of winning, and anyone winning will have access to power. Parties gaining power have then been in a

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position to shape the state and its institutions, to control new bureaucracies and government agencies, but also to secure their own position (cf. Mair 1997). Consequently, it is conceivable that precisely those characteristics which are argued to characterize present-day Western European parties are magnified in East and East Central Europe, leading to an even more outspoken distrust in parties. Such an assumption is supported by Eurobarometer findings, revealing that distrust in parties (as well as in other democratic institutions) is more widespread in all East and East Central EU Member states, in general, than it is in old member states. However, Eurobarometer data also suggests that there are vast differences between the new member states, where the Polish seem to feel the least trust in parties, as compared to the Estonians who are the least distrustful and the Slovenians who are the most trustful. In 2004, in Poland 86 per cent of respondents mentioned that they ‘tend not to trust political parties’ followed by Slovaks (83 per cent) and Latvians (82 per cent). At the opposite end, 69 per cent of the Estonian respondents tended not to trust political parties, followed by Hungarians (74 per cent). In comparison, Slovenians were still those who tended to trust parties the most (still no more than 16 per cent of the respondents), followed by Estonia (15 per cent), as compared to only 3 per cent of the Polish and 8 per cent of the Slovaks.10 Moreover, the results also show a dramatic decrease in trust, especially in Poland and Slovakia, since 2003 (Eurobarometer 2004).

The Aim and Structure of the Book Concluding from the comparative aspects of the post-communist EU member states, the comparative data presented above clearly indicates that there are a few general trends that are distinguishing for all post-communist EU member states, but also vast differences between the eight new member states in focus. With regard to the general trends, it is obvious that the post-communist member states have substantially more fragmented party systems than old EU member states on average, somewhat higher fragmentation indexes with regard to parliamentary parties, and slightly diverging positions of parties in the ideological spectrum of the EU parliament. Moreover, volatility rates are much higher, on average, whereas turnout is slightly lower, and trust in party organizations is very low. However, as compared to each other, there are large differences on all accounts: electoral fragmentation fluctuates between 4.3 to 7.7, Latvia having the most fragmented party system of all, and in terms of ideological positioning it appears as if dominant parties in Latvia and Slovakia, in particular, but also in Poland and Lithuania are difficult to integrate in the prevailing ideological party groups of the EU parliament. The reasons for this may perhaps be that Western European 10

Note that the fact that not all respondents have an opinion results in that the levels of trust and distrust do not add up to 100.

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ideological dimensions do not entirely catch the central divisions within these countries. Moreover, turnout levels differ greatly between Slovakia, for instance, with comparatively high participation rates between 70 and 85 per cent in individual elections, whereas Poland and Lithuania exhibit exceptionally low turnout levels below 50 per cent in all elections that we have included here. In addition, it appears that precisely those two countries with an extremely low turnout also have high rates of invalid votes, together with Slovenia, and that these countries also have very high electoral volatility indexes. However, except for Poland and Lithuania, it appears that all East and East Central European countries have rather high volatility rates. Yet, data from the individual elections also reveal that volatility has decreased substantially in the Czech Republic and Slovenia, in particular, but also in Hungary in recent elections. At the same time, studies also show that trust in parties is quite low in most post-communist member states, perhaps with the exception of Estonia and Slovenia, and that trust in parties has tended to decrease in the past years. However, having said all of this, we have only pointed to general trends, similarities and differences on an average level over a ten-year period in postcommunist EU member states, and yet we know little about the actual workings of the party system in the countries of concern. Therefore, in the following, we aim to gain a deeper understanding of the new EU member states in the right of their own, focussing on the common themes for analysis within a national context of the development and working of the party system in each and every post-communist member state. This book deals first the Baltic States, then with the countries in Central Europe and finally with South East Europe, i.e. Slovenia. In addition, the concluding section aims to discuss similarities and differences between the countries and regions based on the case studies. The first part of the book focusses on the Baltic States, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia. Though these countries are geographically positioned as neighbours and they all share a past as integrated parts of the former Soviet Union, the present-day political realities of these countries are quite different in many respects. Indeed, all three countries have a Russian-speaking minority, but there are different national frameworks that have shaped the emergence of cleavage structures and party system development. Hence, Artis Pabriks’ and Aiga Štokenberga’s chapter on Latvia deals more thoroughly with ethnic policy issues and the relevance of an ethnic cleavage dimension in society than the other two, whereas the Estonian chapter, written by Evald Mikkel, concentrates on the different stages of the ongoing consolidation process of the Estonian party system. In his essay, Mikkel points to the fact that the alleged consolidation of the Estonian party system is characterized by adverse developments; those characteristics which have provided for a stabilization of the party system in recent years have been counterbalanced by other characteristics. Therein, there is no clear indication of when a consolidation could be expected.

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In a somewhat similar vein, the Lithuanian essay written by Ainė Ramonaitė focusses on the premature conclusion made in the 1990s regarding the consolidation of the Lithuanian party system, comparing developments prior to and after the earthquake elections in 2000. In doing so, she also points to trends in Lithuania’s politics that include some features which are more or less common to all Baltic and East Central European EU member states, such as the erosion of party loyalties and old cleavage structures, and some features that are specific to Lithuania, i.e. the combination of increasing fragmentation and decreasing polarization. The essays on the Central European member states, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, also each take their starting-points in nation specific developments while outlining general trends in party system development in recent years. For this reason, Aleks Szczerbiak’s essay focusses on institutional instability, focussing both on the intra-party instability that has characterized the Polish centre-right throughout the past 15 years, and institutional structures. Therein he discusses the relationship between institutional instability, highly volatile elections, low levels of trust in parties and the exceptionally low levels of voter turnout in elections that Poland shares with Lithuania. Next, Petr Kopecký’s contribution highlights the power monopoly of Czech parties, in particular, which clearly shows an increasing trend towards the strengthening of parties in public and central office, while there is a weak linkage between the parties and their electorate. And even if the aforementioned development appears to be generally true for most post-communist countries, Kopecký shows that Czech parties are persisting organizations with a comparably strong intra-party loyalty and discipline, allowing only very few challengers or non-party members to enter the institutions of power. Moreover, however centralized most parties are, they appear to have an ongoing interaction with local branches, features which add to the overall picture of a well-established party government in comparison. The work of Marek Rybář focusses on the Slovak party system. Therein Rybář highlights three trends in Slovak politics, including the struggle for the rules of the democratic game, the change in dynamics between parties in government coalitions, and the discrepancy in organization and style between old and newly emerged parties. Herein, it is evident that Slovak parties are divided in style and strength; ‘old’ parties still seeking a mass-party model, ‘new’ parties opting for more of a professional-electoral model. In respect of the Hungarian party system, Zsolt Enyedi’s work focusses on the somewhat unexpected drive towards bipolarity despite a basically consensusorientated institutional framework that was initially designed to foster a multi-party system. However, for most parts, the bipolar drive of the Hungarian party system is explained by some majoritarian institutional elements: an increasingly polarized climate, the development towards an increasingly one-dimensional political space; the latter also facilitating regular government-alternation.

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Last but not least, the section on Slovenia, by Danica Fink-Hafner, focusses on the development of the Slovenian party system and party cleavages in a process of gradual transition from liberalization to transitional democracy and to a gradual consolidation characterized by the lack of clear-cut ideological shifts, no imposed electoral engineering, a dominant party in the centre and broad-coalition strategies. The concluding chapter aims to bind these nation specific case studies together in closing interpretations of party and party system development in postcommunist EU member states, in a discussion on similarities and differences, and in an effort to lay out some future perspectives that follow from the essays at hand. References Batt, J. (2003), ‘Introduction: Defining Central and Eastern Europe’ in S. White, J. Batt and P.G. Lewis (eds), Developments in Central and East European Politics (Durham: Duke University Press). Beyme, K. von (2001), ‘Parties and the process of consolidation in East-Central Europe’, in P. Geoffery and A. Agh (eds), Prospects for democratic consolidation in East-Central Europe (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press). Blondel, J. (1968), ‘Party systems and Patterns of Governments in Western Democracies’ in Canadian Journal of Political Science, vol. 1(2), pp. 180-203. Centre for the Study of Public Policy, http://www.cspp.strath.ac.uk, 11.6.2004. Dunleavy, P. and Boucek, F. (2003), ‘Constructing the Number of Parties’, in Party Politics, vol. 9(3), pp. 291-315. Ersson, S., Umeå University, data collection. Eurobarometer 2004.1, ‘Candidate countries eurobarometer, full report’, sections C and Annex B-26, http://europa.eu.int/public-opinion/archives/eb/eb61_en.html, 21.9.2004. European Journal of Political Research, Political Data Year Book (several volumes). Gallagher, M., Laver, M. and Mair, P. (2001), Representative Government in Modern Europe. Institutions, Parties, and Governments (New York: McGraw Hill). Golder, M., http://homepages.nyu.edu/~mrg217/elections.html, 12.5.2004. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance: http://www.idea.int/elections/voter_turnout_europe/voter_turnout.htm, several dates, 2004. Jasiewicz, K. (2003), ‘Elections and Voting Behaviour’ in S. White, J. Batt and P.G. Lewis (eds), Developments in Central and East European Politics (Durham: Duke University Press). Kostadinova, T. (2003), ‘Voter turnout dynamics in post-Communist Europe’ in European Journal of Political Research, vol. 42, pp. 741-759. Lewis, P.G. (2000), Political Parties in Post-Communist Eastern Europe (London and New York: Routledge).

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Lijphard, A. (1990), ‘Dimensions of Ideology in European Party Systems’, in P. Mair (ed.), The West European Party System. (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. [Abridged from: ‘Political Parties: Ideologies and Programmes’ in D. Butler, H. Penniman and A. Ranney (eds) (1981): ‘Democracy at the Polls: A Comparative Study of Competitive National Elections’]). Mair, P. (1990), The West European Party System (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1990). — (1997), Party System Change. Approaches and Interpretations (Oxford: Claredon Press). Mudde, C. and Mair, P. (1998), ‘The Party Family and its Study’ in Annual Review of Political Science, vol. 1, pp. 211-229. Müller-Rommel, F. (1993), Grüne Parteien in Westeuropa. Entwicklungsphasen und Erfolgungsbedingungen (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag). Nordsieck, W., http://www.parties-and-elections.de/eu-ep2004.html, 20.10.2004 Pedersen, M. (1990), ‘Electoral Volatility in Western Europe, 1948-1977’, in P. Mair (ed.), The West European Party System (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.) [Excerpted from ‘The Dynamics of European Party Systems: Changing Patterns of Electoral Volatility’ in European Journal of Political Research, 7/1 (1979)]). Poguntke, T. (1996), ‘Anti-party sentiment – conceptual thoughts and empirical evidence: Explorations into a minefield’, in European Journal of Political Research, vol. 29(3), pp. 319-344. Pridham, G. (2003), ‘Democratization in Central and Eastern Europe: A Comparative Perspective’, in S. White, J. Batt and P.G. Lewis (eds), Developments in Central and East European Politics (Durham: Duke University Press). Rokkan, S. (1990), ‘Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments’, in P. Mair (ed.), The West European Party System (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press).

Chapter 2

Patterns of Party Formation in Estonia: Consolidation Unaccomplished Evald Mikkel

Introduction Students of post-Soviet countries continuously discuss the commonalties and the peculiarities of the party system structure in various political environments. The degree of differences and similarities depend on the perspective of the observer. In general, the Estonian electoral process has shown similar patterns as those in other former socialist countries in the post-Soviet environment: massive fission and fusion of parties, a weak organizational basis, domination of leaders and candidatecentred electoral processes, a relatively low turnout, apathetical and disappointed voters, weak party identification, and high volatility. These are some of those elements that are familiar to all Eastern European societies (see Grofman et al. 2000, Kopecky 1995, Mainwaring 1998, Pridham and Lewis 1996, Rose 1995). However, after the domination of the tabula rasa, the transitional instability and dynamics vocabulary, which characterized mainstream party research in the first years after the collapse of the Soviet regime, there has been an obvious turn to looking at a diverging logic of party competition; everyone has been desperately searching for the first encouraging signs of stability and consolidation in party politics. Indeed, several recent studies have shown clear trends towards stabilization in electoral behaviour (Chan 2001, Krupavicius 1998). However, the last elections in all of the Baltic States have raised serious doubts about the presumed stabilization of the party systems. Time was ripe for the emergence and for the astonishing success of new party players underlying the immature character of the post-Soviet political process (Mikkel 2003a, 2003b; Sikk 2004a, 2004b; Taagepera 2004). In terms of electoral processes there are some specific features that make the Estonian case different to other post-Soviet democracies. In contrast to other Eastern European nations, and to most theoretical presumptions on post-Soviet developments, the Estonian party system is distinguished by two important elements, namely, the general weakness of left-wing parties and a relatively marginal role of ethnic parties. The latter should not necessarily be expected because of the heterogeneous composition of Estonian society, hence there is a

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high potential for parties representing ethnic minorities to develop. Why does the Estonian situation differ from the post-Soviet mainstream and theoretical premises in these respects? What impact have these features had on the Estonian political process in comparison to other post-Soviet countries? Estonia’s radical reform policies have produced a situation of high social inequality and conditions where many voters feel relatively poor and deprived. This might have been expected to provide a basis of support for the political left. Yet, the reality is quite different: left-wing parties have proved to be extremely weak and to perform rather poorly in Estonian elections. The communist successor, the Estonian Social Democratic Labour Party (Estonia Left Party since 2004) only made a brief appearance in parliament (Riigikogu) following the 1999 elections, in a joint candidates’ list together with the United People’s Party of Estonia. The Moderates, who claim to have a modern social democratic ideology, have been struggling with identity problems, since having participated in the previous rightwing governments throughout the 1990s, and backing all of their neo-liberal policies. Only a very poor outcome in the most recent local elections (2002), and bleak prospects for crossing the required 5 per cent threshold for parliamentary representation, forced the Moderates to make serious efforts to move towards the left, not only in their political programme but also in their real political behaviour. This sudden shift in positions probably did not do much to help save them in the 2003 national elections, leaving voters confused and the party with a bleak 7 per cent in support (as compared to 15.2 per cent in 1999). Despite this, the Moderates survived and their continuous gradual move towards the left and the change of their name to the Estonian Social Democratic Party (ESDP) in 2004, which has a high symbolic value, have sent a clear message to the electorate. This established the basis for the surprising outcome of the European Parliament elections. Nevertheless, as a consequence of the long-lasting weak representation of the left, other mainstream parties have been able to shape the political agenda by themselves, defining relevant issue dimensions and leaving the left of the Estonian party spectrum largely unoccupied. In doing so, the right-wing parties have also successfully convinced the electorate that left-wing ideas are not even worth considering. Estonia has inherited a heterogeneous society from the Soviet era, which provides a potentially strong basis for the emergence of ethnic divisions between parties. However, ethnic Russian parties have found it extremely difficult to cross the 5 per cent electoral threshold in all of the elections since independence. Even in the 1995 and 1999 elections, when ethnic Russian parties were able to secure parliamentary representation, their share of the vote was still far below the size of the Russian-speaking electorate1. Hence the majority of Russian speakers tend to vote more and more often for the various mainstream ‘Estonian’ parties. The 1 According to the 2000 Population and Housing Census, the share of Russian-speaking citizens was about 15 per cent, while ethnic Russian parties gained 5.9 per cent of votes in 1995, 8.2 per cent in 1999 and only 2.4 per cent in 2003.

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Center Party was the first non-ethnic party to benefit from this. It was followed by the Moderates, the Reform Party, and Res Publica, which have also been successful in attracting the ‘Russian vote’. However, the weakness of the ethnic Russian parties has had a strong impact on determining the poor showing of the extreme Estonian nationalist parties. None of them has succeeded in securing parliamentary representation since Estonia’s first free elections in 1992. The swift resolution of the independence issue and institutional limits on ethnically based party formation during the initial stages of the transition period, combined with the successful efforts of the established Estonian parties to broaden their electoral appeal to Russian voters, have created effective barriers in the formation of strong ethnic parties (or, at least, delayed this process significantly). One other feature that is quite typical of Estonia is related to the pragmatic nature of the political process. Despite the fact that certain social divisions (independence, ethnicity, de-communization) that were present in the initial stages of the transition phase, were likely to have considerable potential for determining party cleavages, the Estonian political process has been characterized by a high degree of pragmatism on the part of the main political actors. In Estonian politics this means that opposing sides have always found common ground for cooperation and coalition building. Even the animosity between leaders, which has played an important and often crucial role in the post-Soviet political environment, has not created any insurmountable obstacles for such co-operation, the best example being the 2002-2003 year government coalition of the Center Party and the Reform Party. Very few observers would have expected a workable coalition involving the Center Party leader Edgar Savisaar. However, the actual outcome was a smoothly operating government of the two parties and their party leaders (Savisaar and his Reform Party counterpart Siim Kallas) who were, in many ways, poles apart. Considering the dynamics of post-Soviet changes, the whole process of development can be divided into two main stages of transition and consolidation; it is reasonable to apply different theoretical foundations to these two stages of postSoviet developments. The transitional stage is, in general, characterized by the emergence of political forces in response to the dominant conflicts mobilising specific interest groups and societies. Hence, in order to discuss the prospects for the formation of the party system, one must first ascertain what kind of dominant issues, main actors and institutional frameworks develop and interact at the different stages. Further, in order to study the level of the consolidation of the party system, the emphasis will be on the evaluation of the specific elements of the consolidation process. Already in 2001, the Freedom House report ‘Nations in Transit’ (Karatnycky et al. 2001) classified Estonia (together with Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) as consolidated democracies. Consolidation entails, at a minimum, the compliance of the politically relevant actors with democratic institutions and fading popular and elitist beliefs that there

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are alternatives to democracy (Diamond 1994, Przeworski 1991). The main criteria for moving from the transitional stage to consolidation is the acceptance of democratic norms and rules by all main actors, considering democracy as ‘the only game in town’ (Linz and Stepan 1996) and acceptance of a change in power by peaceful power shifts between governmental and oppositional actors (von Beyme 1996, Huntington 1991). These requirements are usually considered necessary for reaching the consolidation stage, and here these conditions are taken as a minimum to move from transition to consolidation. These are the key elements signalling entrance into the consolidation phase, but there is certainly a need for additional conditions for completion of consolidation (e.g. the formation of other structural constraints as counterweights to the domination of parliamentary parties and government during the transition and development of a vital civil society). The level of consolidation of the electoral process could be measured with regard to various aspects. Due to the limited space of the chapter, the focus will be on the three most important elements characterising voter-party relations: (1) the adaptation of actors to a democratic institutional framework; (2) the institutionalization of cleavages and the stabilization of the party system; (3) the development of a stable voter-party linkage. This means that several other important aspects, such as party institutionalization, government formation, and the impact of external factors on the electoral process will not be discussed as they are beyond the particular scope of this chapter.

The Adaptation to a Democratic Institutional Framework Adaptation to a new institutional framework is a complex time-consuming process where short-term personal interests, presumed power divisions and, often, simply accidental paths or coincidents frame the positions and stances of the actors. The outcome of complicated compromises tends to be a complex and controversial collection of rules. The lack of previous experience and precedents produce a lottery-like contest full of unexpected outcomes. Hence, there are a huge number of political entrepreneurs and a high variety of interactions. There are winners and losers in the process, producing opposing and diverging attitudes of either preserving the successful rules or changing and moving towards the institutional framework to achieve success ‘next time’. As winners have an advantageous position in framing the rules, there is an obvious trend towards institutional stabilization. Losers, on the other hand, need to come out with more adequate approaches in order to adapt to the institutional framework, and in order to ensure future success. Inevitably, all main actors need to adapt to the institutional framework in order to survive. The sooner this happens, the better for the adapters. The main question is how fair the rules governing the institutional framework are perceived to be by the majority of the relevant actors. If the rules are not felt to be

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fair, or legitimate, there might be a temptation to seek an alternative solution – to exit from the legal and conventional framework with all of its consequences. Therefore, the opposition needs to feel that the conditions of the institutional framework will not be to their detriment in achieving future electoral success. Moreover, relative success in the second and third elections produces an environment where the former opposition does not feel a need for change, at least not for radical institutional shake-up. The general theory of democratization goes one step further here with the ‘pendulum requirement’ to establish a pattern of continuous rotation in power. The consensus driven formation of Estonia’s constitutional basis, and its parliamentary system with reasonably proportional electoral rules, have provided for the relatively high legitimacy of the institutional framework for the general public as well as among all relevant political players. The most problematic aspect of engineering an institutional framework has been dissatisfaction with the Citizenship Law, leaving a significant number of the Soviet-period immigrants without citizenship, and hence, without the right to vote in national elections2. Moreover, a peculiarity of the electoral law, where voters choose from among favourable candidates, but where the localization of a significant number of seats is decided upon by using closed party lists, also raised serious critical concerns during and after the first free elections. However, with regard to the Citizenship Law, the number of critics has been diminishing gradually. The number of immigrants obtaining citizenship has been increasing slowly, but consistently; further, there has been waning dissatisfaction among this specific group of the population and the political actors representing their interests. Therefore, there seems to be no grounds for the critical anti-regime positions held by the ‘Russian’ ethnic parties. Actually, a clear shift towards moderation, co-operation with various ‘Estonian’ parties and even affiliation of several well-known and recognised Russian political leaders with ‘Estonian’ parties has occurred. This critical issue turned out to be the reality of the last 2003 elections when no ‘Russian’ party, specifically those representing the interests of the Russian community, won any seats in the parliament. Only the future will show whether ‘Estonian’ parties and those Russian politicians in the parliament can properly represent and satisfy the interests of the Russian community in Estonia3. The discrepancy between candidate-based votes and the party-list dominated location of the seats also shows a clearly diminishing trend in concerns among voters and politicians. Firstly, public and main parties have simply got used to the rules; secondly, the changes introduced into the electoral system have been introduced to raise candidates’ popularity as a decisive factor in framing electoral outcomes. 2

All permanent residents can vote in local elections. Eldar Efendijev (Centre Party) , Sergei Ivanov (Reform Party), Nelli Kalikova (Res Publica), Nelli Privalova (Centre Party), Mihhail Stalnuhhin (Centre Party), Jüri Šehovtsov (Centre Party), Vladimir Velman (Centre Party). 3

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The Presence of Radical Parties The presence and acceptance of the radical parties in the political system is an important indicator in assessing the degree of consolidation of the party system. A consolidated party system is best characterized by the conditions allowing the participation of radical parties – at the same time allowing only marginal public support and a marginal role in the political process for these parties. Table 2.1 presents a picture of Estonian radical parties that have participated in national elections and their share of the vote. Table 2.1 Support of radical parties in Riigikogu elections 1992-2003 Election

1992

1995

1999

2003

Radical parties in elections

Estonian Citizen

Central Union of Estonian Nationalists

Russian Party in Estonia

Independence Party

Estonian National Independence Party

Better Estonia / Estonian Citizen

Russian Party in Estonia

Radical party 15.7 4.3 2.0 0.8 support Sources: Author’s calculations based on data from Estonian Electoral Committee (2004). Only the first free elections after regaining independence in 1992 provided an exception when two parties, the Estonian Citizen and the Estonian National Independence Party (ENIP), opposing certain elements of political reality of that moment, gained the support of 15.7 per cent of the electorate and representation in the parliament4. However, these parties never questioned the legitimacy of the political system as such and did not lean towards using illegal methods in the political process. Moreover, it appears that their political life lasted for a relatively short period of time5. In the 1995 elections Better Estonia attempted to enter parliament, with a joint list with the remnants of the Estonian Citizen party, by criticising the constitutional foundations of Estonia. However, they failed completely, leading to themselves soon being marginalized and consequently 4

Potentially, the Royalists also fell into this group. On the other hand, the defenders of a constitutional monarchy were seen to play, at best, a critical symbolic role, to underline and/ or to ridicule some schizophrenic elements of the painful transition and brand-new emerging democracy. 5 ENIP joined Fatherland in the next elections and Estonian Citizen scored miserably in the next elections on a joint list with Better Estonia.

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resulting in their disappearance from politics. In 1999, the Russian Party in Estonia used certain radical arguments related to linguistic and citizenship issues, but without gaining any meaningful support from their potential voters. The 2003 elections were then characterized by the rise of a new wave of radical right-wing parties. There was a lot of fanfare around these parties, but the electoral outcomes clearly outlined marginality of these specific actors as well. Activity on part of the Republican Party was in fact limited to the 2002 local elections in the Pärnumaa electoral district with no success, whereas the Independence Party ended up with a miserable 0.6 percent in the 2003 elections. However, it is even more difficult to find any political players on the far left. The successor of the Communist Party, the Estonian Left Party could hardly be classified as anti-regime or radical; it supports western social-democratic values and mainly diverges from the Estonian mainstream parties in its critical position towards EU and NATO membership. Hence, Table 2.1 shows clear diminishing public support for the radical parties in Estonia. The definite loyalty to the rules of the game by most of parties in Estonia should be connected to governmental experience. Actually, all parties, but United People’s Party, with more constant parliamentary experience (represented in parliament at least twice) have participated in government, and hence achieved at least one of their main goals (see Table 2.2). All these developments underline the move towards a consolidated party system in Estonia. Table 2.2 Parliamentary and governmental representation of mainstream Estonian parties 1992-20041 Party

Parliamentary Governmental representation in representation in number of periods number of periods Fatherland Union 4 3 Coalition Party 3 4 Center Party 4 2 Moderates/Social Democrats 4 3 Reform Party 3 4 United People’s Party 2 0 3 5 Country People’s Party2 1 limited to parties represented at least twice in parliament. 2 minor partner of the Coalition Party in 1995.

The Institutionalization of Cleavages and the Stabilization of the Party System The crucial question of consolidation is which, how, and when dominant transitional conflicts or issues develop into stable and permanent cleavages. An important criterion for the stabilization of the electoral process is related to the

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simplification of voters’ choices through the formation of a tangible left-right scale6. First of all, this means positioning parties according to the socioeconomic criteria and, secondly, it means that voters adapt their electoral behaviour according to this framework. Although the left-right scale is applicable in most political systems, problems rise with critical peculiarities and differences between different countries, leaving serious doubts concerning the comparability of the different political systems on the basis of this criterion. According to Kitschelt (1995), a concentration of the electoral process on the socioeconomic dimension provides the best chances for the development of strong programmatic party competition and stabilization of the party system. The performance of the party system is then dependent upon the nature of the interaction patterns between parties. Important factors, showing the stabilization of the party system, are related to the number of contesting parties, parliamentary parties in particular, fission and fusion of the parties, dynamics in membership and candidacy. Estonia’s institutional engineers have designed an electoral system that was meant to be highly restrictive towards new parties (see Table 2.3). This can be seen from a number of features, including: the method of converting votes into seats favouring front-runners; a 5 per cent threshold for parliamentary representation; allocation of public subsidies only to parliamentary parties; tough rules for party registration; a prohibition on electoral coalitions; a relatively heavy financial burden associated with running in elections; and high costs of election campaigns. In addition to this restrictive framework, the main public opinion-formers have made strenuous efforts to convince the public that the party spectrum is complete and that there is no free space for newcomers (and hence no reason to waste votes on small or unknown parties). In spite of this, two new parties – the neo-liberal Reform Party and the centre-right Res Publica – were successful in breaking through and carving out a significant presence in parliament in 1995 and 2003 respectively. At the same time, in spite of a promising performance in earlier elections, some mainstream parties, such as the ENIP and the Coalition Party, have simply disappeared from the political arena. This points to the fact that low party identification and high electoral volatility are significant features of Estonian electoral politics. The nifty appearance of the brand new Res Publica, its confident placement on the already overcrowded centre-right in the Estonian party spectrum, and the overwhelming electoral support of the newcomers show the immature character of the Estonian party system, and the potential for large scale changes in elections to come. The only serious obstacle to this process might arise as a result of a strong desire by the governmental coalition to change party and electoral rules – giving even more advantages to the parliamentary parties and significantly limiting the chances of entering the electoral market for potential newcomers. In the last elections to the European Parliament, the serious failure of the leading Res Publica 6

Or any other dimension that the voters can relate to, according to which they can position political actors in relation to others.

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to win seats may weaken their previous bold intentions to introduce even harsher restrictions for the potential newcomers and smaller parties. Table 2.3 The electoral system 1992-2003 Elements Number of districts District Average magnitude magnitude and standard deviation Ballot Rules and First district formulas tier Second district tier

Legal threshold

Third (national) tier First district tier Second district tier Third (national) tier

1992 12

1995 11

1999 11

2003 12

8.4±2.5

9.2±1.3

9.2±1.8

8.4±1.4

categorical (open list with single vote) Hare quota for individual candidates

Hare quota in relation to the total sum of votes cast for a party in the district via its candidates

Hare quota in relation to the total sum of votes cast for a party in the district via its candidates; plus 0.75 Hare quotas for any mandates thereafter

modified1 d’Hondt formula for closed national list Hare quota for individual candidates 5% nationwide for party

5% nationwide for party, 10% of Hare quota for candidates to receive mandate

5% nationwide for party

Assembly size 1 D’Hondt divisors raised to the power of 0.9.

5% nationwide for party, 5% of Hare quota for candidates to receive mandate

101

Table 2.4 Effective number of electoral and parliamentary parties 1992-2003 Election 1992 1995 1999 2003 Effective number of electoral parties 8.9 5.9 6.9 5.4 Effective number of parliamentary parties 5.9 4.1 5.5 4.6 Sources: Author’s calculations based on data from Estonian Electoral Committee (2004).

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On the other hand, the decreasing effective number of electoral and parliamentary parties presented in Table 2.4 shows a clear trend towards stabilization of the Estonian party system. Yet, at the same time, the high average number of the effective parties in elections and parliament highlights the flexibility of the party system. Estonia diverges from most other post-Soviet nations by the overwhelming domination of right-wing parties in the party system. The first three postindependence elections show a gradual but continuous shift from the right to the centre (see right-left share in Table 2.5): in 1992 right-wing positions clearly dominated the electoral competition; whereas in 1995 the main contest was focussed on the centre-right of the party scale; in the 1999 elections most of the contestants were trying to present themselves as centrists. However, the latest 2003 elections were characterized by a new significant turn towards right-wing positions. A significant number of voters was actually ‘fooled’, believing in Res Publica’s centre-leaning (according to some measures even centre-left) campaign promises. Table 2.5 provides the share of the left-right political actors in elections (the Estonian party families and general party pattern are presented in Table 2.14 in the appendix). As can be seen in the table the 2003 elections were characterized by the highest domination of centre and right-wing parties in Estonian politics throughout the post-Soviet period. The historical experience of Estonia, in combination with the absence of strong political actors on the left during the initial phase of independence, has allowed dominant right-wing actors to form public opinion and electoral support according to their own specific interests. Despite the fact that the appearance of the neo-liberal market-orientated Reform Party signalled the actualization of the socioeconomic issue in Estonian party politics in 1994, further developments illustrate the low consolidation of the Estonian party system. In particular the 2003 elections were characterized by the sudden return to the simple and somewhat empty populist rhetoric. However, party membership has been increasing rapidly in Estonia during the whole post-independence period. The main reason for this steady increase is institutional: in order to participate in elections, parties need to be officially registered. However, a minimum requirement of 1000 members was introduced into party legislation in 1994. This requirement focussed public attention on party membership and actually amplified party contest on the basis of larger memberships. The party with the highest membership rates was presumed to be particularly important and honourable. Table 2.6 shows how average membership rates of the current parliamentary parties have increased in recent years. In conclusion, the frequent attempts to redesign the electoral rules, the peculiar left-right scale, and the non-programmatic character of party contest underline the weak foundations of the Estonian party system.

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Table 2.5 Share of left and right-wing parties in Riigikogu 1992-20031 Election 19922 1995 1999 2003 Right-wing parties 40.1 29.1 32.0 49.6 Centre parties 21.9 52.4 53.5 38.4 Left-wing parties 15.2 5.9 6.1 7.0 Parties difficult to place 9.7 1.95 1.72 1.73 2.62 Right-left forces share3 1 Due to the difficulty of locating marginal or peripheral parties on the left-right scale, only parliamentary parties are considered. 2 As the 1992 elections were the first free elections after regaining independence, the first positions of the parties are considered according to their roots to the Soviet period (in relation to the Communist Party). 3 The share of centre parties is divided equally among right- and left-wing political forces. Source: Mikkel (2003b). Table 2.6 Changes in major parties’ membership rates in Estonia 1995-2004 Party 1995 1999 2004 People’s Union 635 1,032 8,500 Center Party 1,210 2,925 7,600 Reform Party 546 1,207 3,695 Fatherland Union 1,400 2,541 2,846 Social-Democratic Party 1,200 2,324 2,821 Res Publica 4,525 Sources: Koch (2004); Archive of the Central Bureau of the People’s Union (for the predecessor of the People’s Union, Country People’s Party membership in 1995 and 1999). The Logic of Dominant Issues and Conflicts According to studies of democratization, in order to understand democratic process one has to examine the effects of historical legacies on post-Soviet conditions, and the ways current circumstances may overcome these legacies (Crawford and Lijphart 1995). Separate periods in history have had a different impact on the democratic process in post-Soviet societies. Elements of every previous stage have had a significant impact on subsequent developments and therefore on the formation of the immediate context. As a general rule, recent history, depending on the length, strength and mobilising efficacy of particular components, has had a rather profound influence on post-Soviet developments. Therefore, due to the crucial role played by communist attributes, pre-communist legacies have survived mainly at the symbolic level, and are related to certain elements of national identity

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and cultural orientation7 (Nørgaard et al. 1999). The communist legacies have provided a central basis for current political and socio-economic developments. In relation to the post-Soviet transitions we must consider three important aspects related to the “conditions” perspective: the dynamics of dominant issues, patterns of actors’ interests and power distribution, and the formation of an institutional framework. The transitional process generates new initiatives and ad hoc constituencies; political actors act in reaction to the mobilizational potential of the dominant issues or conflicts8 and in accordance with their own particular interests. Much depends on the distribution of power among the main actors, and on their ability to take advantage of prevailing conditions during certain periods of change. New institutions have a varied impact on previous legacies during different periods of democratization depending on the dynamics of the processes. The structural constraints are relatively weak during the period immediately following the collapse of the communist system, when social and political actors are confused and disorganised, and cannot define and defend their interests properly. Institutions introduced during such a period of ‘extraordinary politics’ tend to create new social and economic patterns that are self-reinforced as political forces try to adapt to the new circumstances of transition. Later on, these new patterns of interaction tend to become more stable, thus making further changes much more resource- and time-consuming. Either way actors, their values, interests and behaviour tend to change during the process of transition because of changing initiatives, experience gained, and learning. Hence, to consider the dynamics of transition we have to divide transition processes into distinct periods. To discuss the prospects for the formation of a stable party system, one must first ascertain what kinds of dominant conflicts, main actors and institutional frameworks develop and interact at the different stages of transition. Post-Soviet societies are characterized by four main possible conflicts that may cause cleavages. The first conflict is related to the building of a nation/state. All new (re-)emerging states face problems related to their previous inclusion and dependence. Every move towards independence also produces opposition, usually based on socioeconomic or ethnic criteria; it is often reflected in the level of ethnic relations and citizenship rights. The second dimension is linked to the communist past and the role played by communists during the transition. Anti-communists lean towards a harsh de-communization with elements of revenge. Ex-communists prefer to diffuse and stifle the issue, pointing out certain positive elements of the communist past and negative aspects of post-Soviet transition. The third dimension covers the relationship between the individual and 7

Similarly, there is only a weak continuity with the pre-communist party system. Cotta (1994, 114) suggests that ‘… pre-communist party systems do not provide the basic structure for the new party systems of the post-communist era. Their legacies are on the whole marginal.’ 8 For post-communist societies, social cleavages develop, and can be considered only in the long-term perspective.

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the collective. At the one extreme of the ‘cultural’ dimension are the ‘modern libertarians’ with their support of individualism and the right to participate in collective decision-making; at the other extreme are the ‘traditional authoritarians’ who prioritize collective norms higher than they do individual choices (Kitschelt 1995). The fourth cleavage concerns the economic allocation of scarce resources. The liberals support a market economy, with all that it entails, while the social democrats are more attracted to a state-run ‘political’ distribution of resources. Table 2.7 Relative importance of distinct issues for different post-Soviet societies during the initial phase of transition Nation/ statebuilding +

Decommunization +/-

Cultural dimension

Market orientation

New (re-)emerging +/nation/state Patrimonial society +/+ +/National consensus society +/+ +/Rational-bureaucratic +/+/+ society + dominant issues; +/- relatively important issues which have the potential to be used by political actors to mobilize public opinion in their interests; - issues which have no meaningful potential to be used by political actors to mobilize public opinion. Source: Mikkel (1998). Different post-Soviet societies tend to focus on different issues during their own distinct periods of transition (see Table 2.7). During the first stages of transition, political actors are therefore divided along the major dimension and all other issues are, by and large, subordinate to the dominant one. Countries (re)gaining independence concentrate mainly on the nation- and state building dimension. In reality, interaction patterns of issues, actors and institutions tend to change during transition and to have a varying impact on the transition process at different stages. During the first phase of transition, the political orientations of different sections of society are determined, first of all, by the dominant conflicts – political actors emerge in reaction to those conflicts that are likely to mobilize the electorate into participating politically. The transitional process generates new initiatives and constituencies as ‘new’ political actors emerge in reaction to particular interaction patterns, and ‘old’ political actors must either try to channel societal processes in accordance with their own specific interests or adapt to the changes. Important problems are related to the inertia of ‘old’ political actors and their orientation towards a particular status quo. On this basis we can hypothesize that in the initial phase of post-

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communist transition, parties emerge in reaction to the current dominant conflicts or issues, and hence reflect the characteristics of the conflict of their origin. Later on, parties develop their organizational structures and become more orientated towards the mobilisation of a broad electorate and the distribution of selective material/pragmatic rewards on the basis of the organisational logic. On the one hand, it is related to the dynamics of general systemic properties: domination of new parties, bottom-up establishment of new movements or parties, and lack of direct and stable linkages with society. Hence, orientation towards popular ideas and positions in order to gain mass support and votes. On the other hand, it is derived from the process of institutionalization. Several authors (Ignazi 1998, Panebianco 1988) have stressed the ‘logic of party institutionalization’ and Ignazi (1998) has even elaborated on the ‘iron law of party institutionalization’. Parties have to move through certain stages of development during their institutionalization process. Party institutionalization is determined by the specific resources and initiatives necessary to achieve their main goals. Party initiatives and resources tend to change according to the evolution of parties and their relationship with the State. In the initial stage of party genesis, parties have to rely on the collective and symbolic incentives to mobilize specific constituencies. Further, parties move closer to the State and get more orientated towards the mobilization of a broad electorate and the distribution of selective material or pragmatic rewards (Ignazi 1998). Hence, established parties are interested in the stabilization and preservation of the specific conflicts that initiated their emergence. The level of the politicization and of the freezing of the initial conflict dimensions depend, first of all, on the dynamics of societal conditions. Continuous change, high uncertainty and weak electoral traditions produce an absence of stable linkages between voters and parties and cause an enormous electoral volatility. New political actors emerging in reaction to new issues tend to reflect better on the current context; the crucial question is, thus, related to the role of old actors. Can established parties use institutional leverages and their dominant positions in the post-Soviet transition to freeze the main issue patterns and societal processes or they are forced to adapt? Specific interaction patterns of past legacies and current context may promote adequate changes of dominant issues and political actors, or the divisions may tend to remain frozen over longer periods of time. The Move Towards Independence: 1987-1991 During the initial phase of transition (1987-1991) in Estonia, new political parties and movements emerged in reaction to the dominant independence conflict. The main aspects related to the move towards independence are shown in Table 2.8. The first meaningful opposition and the first alternatives to the official communist positions emerged only in 1987/1988; hence there was a lack of tradition for opposition, and a politically inexperienced opposition. The more important steps towards greater autonomy or independence were taken primarily

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within the framework of the existing Soviet-based institutions. This secured the popularity of the local Communist Party (CP) reform leaders and the legitimization, or at least acceptance, of the Soviet-based legislature and government by the majority of the population. Former communists continued to play important roles in most of the new political groupings due to the rapid and early diffusion of the communists into newly emerging movements and quasiparties9. The first elections were dominated by prospective political-sociotropic voting behaviour10, where candidates were chosen largely because of their attitude to the independence issue, and their names and their personal characteristics. Intense competition for popular support produced a radicalisation of the Popular Front and the reform communists under the pressure of popular moods and emerging radical groupings. But balancing the idealistic ideology of reestablishing the pre-war national-state (legal continuity), which was wide-spread and highly popular among the native population, and an actual reality influenced by the essential role played by external factors, forced all political actors who held actual legislative and administrative power to moderate their positions at the risk of losing popular support and positions of power. A major conflict over the independence issue and the essential role of external factors led to necessary cooperation between the pro-independence forces. This diminished the differences in their positions and actions in relation to the achievement of their main goal. The extent and pace of co-operation were determined by, first, the severity of the conflict between the pro-independence and anti-independence forces and, second, patterns of distribution of power between different pro-independence groupings. Actors holding dominant positions tended to refuse to co-operate and tried to turn the processes to their own advantage. The specific process of transition produced a strong bottom-up element in the formation of new political groupings. Only the reformation of the Communist Party proceeded largely on the basis of the already existing nomenklatura networks. The historical legacy, a more polarized society, and thus a complicated struggle between the pro-independence and anti-independence forces largely along ethnic lines, produced: (1) three different tendencies among the pro-independence groupings (the Communist Party, the Popular Front, and national radicals), but none of the actors of these groups gained a clearly dominant position during this period; (2) the expanding role of the centrist Popular Front (PF) as a middle-of-the-road alternative to the moderate reform communists and the national radicals, and the leading role of the PF after the Supreme Soviet elections in 1990;

9

A substantial number of communists were also active in the Popular Front. Political-sociotropic voting behaviour refers here to a plebiscite for the reestablishment of statehood and a democratic regime. 10

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Evald Mikkel

(3) the striking rise of the national radicals. Although they refused to participate in the Supreme Soviet elections, and hence forfeited the option of participating directly in the administrative process, they organized an alternative parliament in the form of the Estonian Congress, which played an important role in the further constitutional design, and introduced the leadership of the national radicals and their views to the public, thus paving the way for their success at the parliamentary elections in 1992; (4) a general trend towards a rather high level of co-operation between all proindependence forces. Table 2.8 The move towards independence in Estonia 1987-1991 • pro-independence versus anti-independence • anti-independence groupings • the local Communist Party • the Popular Front • the pro-independence national radicals • the USSR central administration Dominant actor(s) • Shift from Communist Party to Popular Front1 Voting pattern • prospective political-sociotropic 1 in cooperation with other pro-independence actors; the Popular Front did not gain an absolute majority in the Supreme Soviet. Dominant conflict Major political actors

De-communization: 1991-1995 Once independence was regained, the anti-independence groupings were banned because of their support for the coup d’état in Moscow, and the dominant proindependence – anti-independence conflict was solved. This led to a rapid fragmentation of the Popular Front and other pro-independence movements and to the massive emergence of new parties and groupings. The complex de-communization dimension gained salience. It polarized the pro-independence forces in accordance with their attitudes to: the pre-communist and communist legacies; and the pace and extent of the reform process. Moderate pragmatics, rooted in the communist period nomenklatura networks, were interested in preserving their previous dominant positions and in a more gradual reform process. Radicals, related to the new elite networks, emerged in reaction to the dominant conflicts of transition; their orientation was towards a sharp break with the communist past. The de-communization process was characterized by further popular moves towards radical nationalist and anti-communist attitudes during the first stage, and complete disillusion with the radical government and the actual outcomes of its policies at the end of that period. The main aspects related to the de-communization process in Estonia are shown in Table 2.9.

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Table 2.9 The de-communization process in Estonia 1991-1995 Dominant conflict Major political actors

• • • • •

moderate versus radical de-communization moderate pragmatics (mature elite networks)1 radicals (new elite networks)2 Dominant actor(s) radicals Voting pattern Shift from prospective political-sociotropic to retrospective economic-egotropic 1 rooted in nomenklatura networks and formed in initial phase of transition. 2 formed in reaction to the current dominant conflicts/issues, hence less related to the previous networks. After the parliamentary elections in 1992, the Popular Front lost its leading position because of the fatal pressure for moderation on the governing actors during the complex transition process; moreover, it was seen to be responsible for the transitional hardships. This caused a further shift in popular support for the radical forces in Estonia. The radicalization of public opinion and the massive diffusion of the communists into new parties and movements marginalized the role of the Communist Party and its direct successors. However, there was an obscure but still crucial role to be played by the former communists during the whole transition process in Estonia. The emerging party constellation was characterized by decreasing differences between the political parties: all of them supported the move towards a market economy and they all contributed to this by expressing themselves using a considerable amount of populist rhetoric. All political actors treated the institutional issues, first and foremost, according to their personal or group interests. At the organizational level, party formation was based on personal and group networks, party structure and programmes played a secondary role; the newly emerging parties were small, inarticulate and lacked the political cohesion needed for effective action. Voting behaviour based on a mix of both prospective political-sociotropic and retrospective economic-egotropic11 attitudes, which shifted from a dominant prospective political-sociotropic pattern at the beginning to a largely retrospective economic-egotropic one, punished the incumbent government coalition for its unpopular policies and the dramatic decrease in living conditions. The choice of party was mostly based on personalities, whereas the party programmes played a secondary role. Reform governments introduced massive changes during this period of extraordinary politics. In the Estonian case, the longer period of extraordinary politics allowed the governing elite to have a greater impact on the socio-political process and to introduce meaningful institutional changes, which produced a break in the continuity of the old bureaucracy and elite networks. At any rate, the radicals 11

Here, egotropic refers to the evaluation of the incumbent government on the basis of personal success or failure.

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were unable to overcome the massive impact of the Soviet legacy, the mentality and behavioural patterns produced by communist socialization, and the objective difficulties of the fourfold transition. Consolidation of the Post-Soviet Party System: 1995 to Present The new period started in 1995 when voters punished the incumbent radical government for economic hardships and the declining standard of living. The voters supported opposition parties or new party labels that managed to build new images and articulate more integrated views on current significant problems. Party programmes played a minor role to the voter and the parties’ electoral manifestos were very declarative and tended to be very much alike. It was popular to criticise the incumbent government and to use populist rhetoric. The leadership issue continued to be extremely important and the trend towards personality-centred elections continued in general. The current spectrum of issues is diffuse: the postSoviet complex issue division – i.e. a mix of the heritage from the Soviet period and the first stages of transition – and new issues emerging in reaction to the transition process. Daatland (1997) provides a paramount explanation to the basic issues framing the Estonian party system. According to Daatland, all Estonian parties are focussed on three main issue dimensions, namely an urban-rural, a socioeconomic and a cultural-ethnic divide. The main peculiarity of Estonian party politics is that the

Rural Urban-rural

Socioeconomic

Urban Estonian Right

Culturalethnic

Left Sources: Daatland 1997, 126; Svege and Daatland 2000, 65

Figure 2.1 Major issues in Estonian politics

Russianspeakers

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three main developing cleavages are misbalanced. The urban end of the dimension dominates rural areas, right-wing dominates the looser left and Estonians dominate Russian-speakers. A loose relationship of the weak sides in combination with wellconnected strong sides frame the whole political process: the urban Estonian right is considerably dominant in power politics (see Figure 2.1). Parties have been formed on the basis of the maturing elite networks and they tend to be characterized by the issue patterns in reaction to which they emerged and acted. Hence the established parties, as maturing elite networks, have largely stuck to the previous issues and organizational frameworks. The process of party formation is characterized by the continuous fission and fusion of parties and political groupings, where all political actors, first and foremost, act according to their personal or group’s short-term interests. Financial resources have started to play a crucial role in the realm of political power, connecting the political elites with influential economic circles. Therefore, if during the first few phases of transition new parties emerged in reaction to the dominant issues and were forced to react in accordance with popular moods, there is, at present, a recognisable gap between the elite-centred parties and the actual positions of the voters. Established parties have learnt how to take advantage of their leading roles in the system in order to retain their dominant positions. They possess financial and organizational resources, have achieved the power to grant ‘valuable’ positions in public service, and they have made changes in the electoral laws that make entrance for newcomers troublesome. A new pattern of voter-party linkage formation emerged in the mid-nineties. The new right-wing, neo-liberal Reform Party was successful in the 1995 national elections; they have retained relatively high positions in the public opinion polls. However, the clearly programmatic social democratic party on the left of the party spectrum that might represent the interests of employees and those dependent on the State - those who have lost in the transition, in general – was long missing from the party spectrum. There have been some potential candidates in that position and some who, on occasion, have been tried to label themselves or to give the impression that they have those intentions. However, the Communist Party’s successor the Estonian Left Party has played a very marginal role in the Estonian political process – it did not even manage to get into the Riigikogu until the 1999 elections, and even then, it was thanks to joining the electoral list of the Estonian United People’s Party representing the Russian-speaking community. Moreover, for a long period, the Estonian Social Democrats (Moderates) could not be regarded as a traditional leftist party, actually located at best in the centre of the political spectrum. They survived several alliances with right-wing parties; what is even more important, it joined both the 1992 and 1999 right-wing coalition governments. The Center Party was formed after a group of MPs split from the Popular Front to set up their own party and it is most closely identified with its charismatic leader Edgar Savisaar. Although this party tries to provide a leftist party image, appealing

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Evald Mikkel Table 2.10 Major issues and political actors in Estonia 1995 to present

• post-Soviet complex issue division • socioeconomic: social-market interventionism versus market neo-liberalism • cultural-ethnic: minority identity versus majority identity • urban versus rural identity Major political • mature elite networks1 actors • new elite networks2 Dominant actor(s) • mature elite networks Voting pattern • retrospective economic-egotropic 1 formed in reaction to the dominant conflicts or issues during previous phases of transition. 2 formed in reaction to the current dominant conflicts/issues, hence less related to the previous networks. Major issues

primarily to the losers of the transition, such as pensioners, low-income families, and those residing in resituated property, there are several aspects which refer to the bold populism behind the party’s intentions. In conclusion, the long-lasting absence of a clear social democratic party shows that the socio-political environment has probably not sufficiently matured yet in order to be able to concentrate on the common socioeconomic dimension. Moreover, the Estonian left-right scale still diverges significantly from the traditional one. However, the dominant maturing elite networks and an environment highly supportive of populist electoral competition leave us with little hope of establishing programmatic party competition. The success of some of the new (emerging) parties, so far, has been related mostly to skilful campaign design, the popularity of the leadership, dominant retrospective economic-egotropic voting and to punishing the incumbent government for economic hardships and the falling living standards.

Development of the Voter-Party Linkage Founding elections are usually characterized by lack of previous experience and linkages at a party and a voter level. Voters’ understanding of democratic mechanisms and different ideologies is superficial and limited. Hence, there is a simplified understanding of the logic of the electoral process and sources or reasons for the support for various political forces. Lack of previous affiliations or connections with particular parties provide strong foundations for the candidate or leader’s personality-centred choices where, as a rule, populist statements outweigh programmatic party-based competition. As a result, high expectations and quite the

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opposite reality have produced huge disappointment and protest votes against incumbent governments. Dependency on external factors and specific post-Soviet realities framing transition by its own logic do not leave the different governments much room, increasing political disillusionment and scepticism among voters even further. The obvious outcome is a flexible voter and high electoral volatility. However, gradual normalization of the socioeconomic and political processes in general, clarification of ideological and programmatic positions of parties, continuous experience and learning should provide for the formation of certain voter-party linkages and stabilization of the whole electoral process. Decreasing support to peripheral parties and political newcomers should reduce further the number of potential political entrepreneurs (see Table 2.12). The candidate-centred character of the first elections has been combined more and more with the party-based vote for the following elections. This is despite the re-emerging trend: during the 2003 elections, candidate lists of several parties were supplemented with well-known public figures with no previous relation to that particular party until the very last minute before the election. This aspect definitely shows the immature and opportunistic character of the Estonian party system. Table 2.11 provides an overview of the distribution of seats for Estonian national elections. The first three elections show a clear move towards partycentred choices in electoral behaviour (also see Mikkel 1999). Although the 2003 elections here show a continuous pattern, this might be related to the recent changes in the electoral system. Table 2.12 presents data related to the activity of political actors in the electoral process. The total number of parties in elections and the number of new challengers both show a clear, decreasing trend. Voters tend to support larger and well-known parties that have better chances to be elected into parliament. In light of the overwhelming dissatisfaction of voters with parliament, parliamentary parties, governmental process, presumed little differences, and hence, insignificant choices between parties, there is surprisingly, strong and increasing support for the main parties in Estonia. However, a strong counter-argument to the consolidation thesis is related to the continuous support of the new promising and relevant party actors, like the Reform Party in the 1995 elections and Res Publica in the 2003 elections. Yet, the most problematic aspect to the consolidation is related to the high volatility levels of Estonian elections. A significant share of voters change their support between different political actors from one election to another, and this flexibility does not show any signs of diminishing (see Table 2.13). Therefore, based on these numbers it is far too early to talk about party system consolidation in Estonia.

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Table 2.11 Distribution of mandates in Riigikogu according to the way of their acquisition Election

1992 1995 1999 2003 Sources: Mikkel (2003b).

Personal mandate 17 15 11 14

List-based mandate on electoral district 24 34 44 60

Nationwide compensatory mandate 60 52 46 27

Table 2.12 Support of the new and non-parliamentary parties and the level of wasted votes in Riigikogu elections Election 1992 1995 1999 2003 Average 17+12 16+33 Number of parties/coalitions 12 11 14+1 in elections1 7+24 Number of new 55 26 4.7+0.7 1 parties/coalitions in elections Support for new 26.9 12.6 25.2 21.6 parties/coalitions in elections Vote for non-parliamentary 14.7 12.6 8.4 5.0 10.2 parties 1 For elections where electoral coalitions were allowed, both electoral coalitions and parliamentary fractions formed immediately after elections (to show their higher potential for the party formation) are counted. 2 Immediately after elections two fractions of the Coalition Party and the Estonian Country People’s Union were formed under the party name of Secure Home Electoral Union. 3 Immediately after the elections four parliamentary fractions were formed out of the electoral union of the Coalition Party and the Estonian Country People’s Union: Coalition Party, Rural Union, Country People’s Party, Pensioners’ and Families’ Party. 4 Right-wingers, the Farmers’ Party, Central Union of Estonian Nationalists, the Estonian Future Party, Forestry Party, Reform Party and the Estonian Blue Party. 5 Estonian Christian People’s Party, Estonian Country People’s Party, Russian Party in Estonia, Farmers Assembly, Development Party. 6 Res Publica, Independence Party. Sources: Author’s calculations based on data from Estonian Electoral Committee (2004).

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Table 2.13 Voter volatility in national elections in Estonia Election 1992 1995 1999 2003 Average Volatility 21.5 24.1 31.0 25.5 Sources: Author’s calculations based on data from Grofman et. al. (2000), Sikk (2000), Vabariigi Valimiskomisjon (1999), Vabariigi Valimiskomisjon (1995), Vabariigi Valimiskomisjon (1992), Estonian Electoral Committee (2004).

Conclusions Different theoretical frameworks have various analytical and explanatory applications and relevance in the distinct periods of transition and consolidation. The dominant issues approach has a higher explanatory value in the initial stages of transition, when main political actors emerge and act in reaction to the crucial issues dividing and mobilizing societies. Later on, the continuous process of institutionalization and diverging interest patterns provide a diffuse issue division. This should be approached and understood by evaluating the level of the party consolidation. Estonia has successfully moved from the crucial transitional conflicts of independence and de-communization to the consolidation stage characterized by diffuse issue division. Yet, it is far too early to tell if the socioeconomic, culturalethnic, and urban-rural divides that have had a strong mobilizationary potential since the mid-1990s will develop into full-scale (ideological) cleavages. The largely unconsolidated character of the Estonian party system leaves this question open. Moreover, party competition in Estonia is characterized by adverse developments. Important elements have provided for the stabilization of the Estonian party system, but there are crucial factors operating against a swift consolidation in the near future. The adaptation of actors to the institutional framework (measured by the acceptance of the rule of law), minor support for radical and anti-regime parties, and continuous power alternation, refer to the fulfilment of the minimal conditions required for the consolidation process. However, additional essential elements underline the premature character of the Estonian party system. Firstly, the rise in voter-party connections is mainly related to the reduction of the number of competing parties and hence, there are fewer and easier choices to be made. Estonian voters tend to support mainstream parties with good chances for parliamentary success. At the same time, the appearance of reasonable alternatives like Res Pulica shows that promising newcomers with a high potential for breakthrough gain serious attention and strong support of the electorate. Secondly, continuously high levels of electoral volatility seriously undermine the consolidation process of the Estonian party system. Thirdly, elements related to the institutionalization of cleavages and the stabilization of the party system show clear signs of weakness in respect of the consolidation process.

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Despite the shift in emphasis from de-communization issues towards a socioeconomic orientated debate during the first founding elections, the last national elections showed nostalgia on behalf of both voters and politicians with regard to the themes of the first elections. In fact, most Estonian parties are still in the process of identifying their ideological and programmatic grounds. There is also still a problematic discrepancy between parties’ programmatic statements, actual political behaviour and international affiliations with different European party groups. Therefore, in conclusion, it seems that these negative aspects could not be compensated for by the certain positive trends related to the reduction of the number of electoral and parliamentary parties, relative institutionalization of the organizational basis and a formal rise in party membership.

References Archive of the Central Bureau of the People’s Union. Beyme, K. von (1996), Transition to Democracy in Eastern Europe (London: Macmillan Press Ltd). Chan, Kenneth Ka-Lok (2001), ‘Structuralism Versus Intentionalism in PostCommunist Party System Evolution: The Polish Case’, in Party Politics, vol. 7(5), pp. 605-619. Cotta, M. (1994), ‘Building Party System After the Dictatorship: The East European Cases in a Comparative Perspective’, in G. Pridham and T. Vanhanen (eds.), Democratization in Eastern Europe: Domestic and International Perspectives (London and New York: Routledge). Crawford, B. and Lijphart, A. (1995), ‘Explaining Political and Economic Change in Postcommunist Eastern Europe: Old Legacies, New Institutions, Hegemonic Norms and International Pressure’, in Comparative Political Studies, vol. 28(2), pp. 171-199. Daatland D., C. (1997), From Confusion to Clarity? A Study of the Influental Factors behibd the Estonian Party System (Bergen: University of Bergen). Diamond, L. (1994), ’Toward Democratic Consolidation’, in Journal of Democracy, vol. 5(3), pp. 4-17. Estonian Electoral Committee 2004, http://www.vvk.ee/. Grofman, B., Mikkel, E. and Taagepera, R. (2000), ‘Fission and Fusion of Parties in Estonia, l987-l999’, in Journal of Baltic Studies, vol. 31(4), pp. 329-357. Ignazi, P. (1998), ‘The iron law of party institutionalization’, Paper prepared for the 26th ECPR Joint Session, workshop ‘Change & Continuity in the Roles of Parties in Democratization’, Warwick, UK, March 23-28. Karatnycky, A., Motyl, A. and Schnetzer, A. (eds) (2001), Nations in Transit: Civil Society, Democracy, and Markets in East Central Europe and the Newly Independent States, Freedom House.

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Kitschelt, H. (1995), ‘Formation of Party Cleavages in Post-Communist Democracies: Theoretical Propositions’, in Party Politics, vol. 1(4), pp. 447472. Koch, T. (2004), Erakondade valimisedu meelitab uusi liikmeid, Eesti Päevaleht, 28.01.2004. Kopecký, P. (1995), ‘Developing Party Organizations in East-Central Europe: What Type of Party is Likely to Emerge?’, in Party Politics 1(4), pp. 515–34. Krupavicius, A. (1998), The Post-communist Transition and Institutionalization of Lithuania’s Parties, Political Studies, Volume 46, Issue 3, pp. 465-491. Mainwaring, S. (1998), ‘Party Systems in the Third Wave’, in Journal of Democracy, 9, pp. 67–81. Mair, P. (1997), Party System Change: Approaches and Interpretations (Oxford: Clarendon Press). Laakso, M. and Taagepera, R. (1979), ‘Effective Number of Parties: A Measure with Application to Western Europe’, in Comparative Political Studies, vol. 12, pp. 3-27. Linz, J. and Stepan, A. (1996), Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press). Lipset, S. M. and Rokkan, S. (1967), ‘Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments: An Introduction’, in S. M. Lipset and S. Rokkan (eds), Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross National Perspectives (New York: Free Press). Mikkel, E. (1998), ‘The Cleavage Formation and the Emergence of ‘Party Systems’ in the Post-Soviet Societies: Estonia and Lithuania Compared,’ Paper prepared for the 26th ECPR Joint Session workshop ‘Change & Continuity in the Roles of Parties in Democratization’, Warwick, UK, March 23-28, 1998. — (1999), ’1999 aasta Riigikogu valimised ja kandidaadid’, in R. Toomla (ed.), Riigikogu valimised 1999 (Tartu: Tartu Ülikooli Kirjastus). — (2001),’Venstre og Højre i Estisk partipolitik’, Vindue mod øst, Syddansk Universitet, nr 1, pp. 6-9. — (2003a), Europe and the Estonian Parliamentary Elections of 2 March 2003, RIIA/OERN Election Briefing Paper, no. 11, May 2003. — (2003b), ’Asutavad valimised Eestis võrdlevas postkommunistlikus perspektiivis’ in R. Toomla (ed.), Riigikogu valimised 2003. Kas muutuste lävel? Tartu: Tartu Ülikooli Kirjastus, pp. 13-42. Nørgaard, O. et al. (1999), The Baltic States after Independence (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar). Panebianco, A. (1988), Political Parties: Organization and Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Pettai, V. and Kreuzer, M. (1999), ‘Party Politics in the Baltic States: Social Bases and Institutional Context’ in East Europen Politics and Societies, vol. 13(1), pp. 150-190.

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Pettai, V. and Kübarsepp, K. (2003), ‘Erakondade nimekirjad: valimistoodete võrdlev analüüs’ in R. Toomla (ed.), Riigikogu valimised 2003. Kas muutuste lävel? (Tartu: Tartu Ülikooli Kirjastus). Pridham, G. and Lewis, P. (eds.) (1996), Stabilising Fragile Democracies: New Party Systems in Southern and Eastern Europe (London: Routledge). Przeworski, A. (1991), Democracy and the Market (New York: Cambridge University Press). Rose, R. (1995), ‘Mobilizing demobilizing voters in post-communist societies’, in Party Politics, vol. 1(4), pp. 549–563. Sartori, G. (1997), Comparative Constitutional Engineering (London: Macmillan Press). Sikk, A. (2000), Stabilisation of Post-Communist Party Systems, MA Thesis, University of Tartu. — (2004a), Successful new parties in the Baltic States: similar or different? Paper prepared for the conference ‘The Baltic States: New Europe or Old?’ University of Glasgow, 22-23 January 2004. — (2004b), Party Financing Regimes and Emergence of New Parties in Latvia and Estonia, Paper presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions workshop The Political Representation of Social Interests in Central and Eastern Europe Uppsala, 1318 April 2004. Svege, H. P. and Daatland, C. D. (2000), Estonia, in F. Aarebrot and T. Knutsen (eds.) Politics and Citizenship on the Eastern Baltic Seabord (Hoysole Forlaget AS). Taagepera, R. (2004), Meteoric Rise: Res Publica in Estonia, 2001-2004, Prepared for the ECPR 2004 Joint Sessions of Workshops, workshop New Parties in Government, 13-18 April, Uppsala Universitet. Toomla, R. (1999), Eesti Erakonnad (Tallinn: Eesti Entsüklopeediakirjastus). Vabariigi Valimiskomisjon (1999), Riigikogu valimine. 7. Märts 1999, Tallinn: Vabariigi Valimiskomisjon. Vabariigi Valimiskomisjon (1995), Riigikogu valimine. 5. Märts 1995, Tallinn: Vabariigi Valimiskomisjon. Eesti Vabariigi Valimiskomisjon (1992), Vabariigi Presidendi ja Riigikogu valimised 1992: Dokumente ja materjale, Tallinn: Eesti Vabariigi Valimiskomisjon.

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Appendix Table 2.14 Party families in Estonia Communist parties Excommunist parties Rural (agrarian) parties Social Democrats and Socialists

-

Christian parties Liberal parties

Eesti Kristlik Rahvapartei (Christian People’s Party)

Populist

Ethnic minority parties Conservatives

Greens Single-issue parties

Eesti Vasakpartei/Eesti Sotsiaal Demokraatlik Tööpartei (Left Party/Social Democratic Labour Party) Eesti Maarahva Erakond (Country People’s Party) Rahvaliit (People’s Union) Rahvarinne/Keskerakond: Æ1999 (Popular Front/Center Party) Mõõdukad/Sotsiaaldemokraatlik Erakond: 2003 Æ (Moderates/Social Democratic Party)

Mõõdukad: Æ2003 (Moderates) Koonderakond (Coalition Party) Ettevõtjate Erakond (Entrepreneurs Party) Reformierakond (Reform Party) Eesti Kodanik (Estonian Citizen) Res Publica: 2002-2003 Keskerakond: 1999 Æ (Center Party) Eesti Ühendatud Rahvapartei (United People’s Party) Vene Erakond Eestis (Russian Party in Estonia) Eesti Rahvusliku Sõltumatuse Partei (National Independence Party) Parempoolsed (Rightwingers) Isamaaliit (Fatherland Union) Res Publica: 2003 Æ Parem Eesti (Better Estonia) Rohelised (Greens) Rojalistid (Royalists) Tuleviku Eesti Erakond (Estonian Future Party)

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Chapter 3

Political Parties and the Party System in Latvia Artis Pabriks and Aiga Štokenberga

A Sketch of Latvia’s Parties and its Party System – A Historical Overview Depending on the standard of living and the level of development, each state has different political parties in terms of ideological spectrum and organizational structure. However, in order to categorize the parties themselves, it is necessary to determine the party system characteristics of the state concerned. In the so-called First World countries with a highly developed democracy, multi-party systems dominate; exceptions are Great Britain and France with two dominant parties. Moreover, it has generally been assumed, that the two-party system is more stable, whereas the existence of many different parties underlines the sporadic nature of the country’s party system. Latvia’s case very well illustrates this assumption. Prior to the foundation of an independent Latvian state, the National Council was created in the aftermath of the First World War, which declared the independence of the Republic of Latvia on 18 November 1918. Due to the significant proportion of the people employed in agriculture and in the manufacturing industries, two parties had already become dominant in the first National Council – the Latvian Farmers’ Union (LZS) with 13 representatives, and Latvia’s Social Democratic Workers’ Party (LSDSP) with ten representatives. Soon after the declaration of independence, the first free elections of the Republic of Latvia were announced – the election of the Constituent Assembly. As a result, the Social Democratic Worker’s Party obtained 57 seats, out of a total of 152 mandates, whereas the Farmer’s Union got 26 seats. Furthermore, in the succeeding free elections of the Saeima in the 1920s and 1930s, the LSDSP and LZS received the biggest support, even though the popularity of the LZS had continuously decreased over time. The government was usually formed by either the Social Democrats or the Farmer’s Union, in co-operation with several smaller right-wing or regional parties. However, already in 1918, in the provisional government of Latvia, the National Council, eight political parties were represented. In the following years the number of parties grew significantly: in 1920, 57 candidate lists were submitted

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for the election to the Constituent Assembly; in 1922, 88 candidate lists ran for election to the 1st Saeima, whereas in 1925, 141 lists ran for the 2nd Saeima. Before the election of the 3rd Saeima in 1928, several restrictions were adopted, such as a 1000-lat deposit (today 1 lat equals approximately 1.85 USD), a prohibition for parties to combine their votes, etc. However, these restrictions failed to significantly limit the number of political parties – 120 lists were submitted for these elections, whereas 103 lists ran for the last pre-war election in 1931. According to the prominent Latvian historian Ādolfs Šilde, in the five convocations of Saeima of the first parliamentary period of the Republic of Latvia, the political parties were commonly divided into six party blocks – the left-wing, the centre group, the indefinite group, the party affiliated to the Latgale region, the national minorities, and the right-wing. Thus, the main areas of friction between the voters and the institutionalised political parties in the 15-year long inter-war parliamentary period mainly centred on the conflict between the left- and rightwing parties. Accordingly, the LZS represented the wealthier and the conservative citizens, whereas the LSDSP appealed to the workers’ class, which had taken shape as a result of the country’s fast industrialization. Despite the lack of more profound studies, this conflict between these two wings essentially also marks the discord between the centre and the periphery, since the popular support of the LSDSP was concentrated on the bigger cities, whereas the main share of the LZS’s electorate resided in the countryside. Due to the fact that there was no distinct electoral threshold for the parties to get into the parliament, many regional (Latgale’s) and ethnic (Jewish, Russian, German) political parties were represented in the first four Saeimas. During the first parliamentary period, many new parties (mostly bourgeois) were formed and ended their activity; yet, the two most influential ones – the LSDSP and the LZS – maintained their importance until May 15, 1934, when Kārlis Ulmanis, the head of the LZS, organized a coup d’etat, thereby establishing an authoritarian regime.

The Ideologies of Dominant Parties The popularity and election of certain candidates and parties generally relates to the popularity of the political ideology that they advocate. However, in Latvia the concept of ‘ideology’ is not as clear as it is in many Western European countries and the USA. In countries with a relatively old and stable democracy, the problem of party identification and definition supposedly is no longer an issue, even though the support of certain economic theories is becoming a less important means of identification than the parties’ view of the so-called salient issues (for instance gay marriages, pension schemes, crime etc.). Hence, the general assumption is that the left-right party division defines the parties’ stand with regard to resource allocation, inflation, etc., whereas the liberal-authoritarian dimension concerns individual liberty and the freedom of expression. However, in Latvia, political

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parties are rather defined by their election programmes than by an overall ideological platform. The most important factor influencing the formation of a country’s party system is usually the social structure of its society, as well as the more important ideological conflicts or division lines within that society. These are seen to ‘translate’ into political parties politicising relevant divisions and organizing different interests. Historically, political parties in Europe have been formed on the basis of four general conflicts (see the classical work of Lipset and Rokkan 1967) rooted in basically four dimensions of opposition, i.e. religion, region, class and conflicting interests in the commodity market. Today, too, these division lines are commonly reflected in the party system in most European countries. Of these, the regional line of friction and the religious line of friction both have their roots in the so-called National Revolution in the 16th-18th century, whereas class and commodity market conflicts have their roots in the Industrial Revolution. Issues that the regional divide brought along were the idea of a centralised state versus regional autonomy, alongside cultural and ethnical divisions. Second, there was the conflict between the Church and the Nation-State, between the supporters of a secular state and those who seconded a greater influence of the ecclesiastical authority. Third, during the industrial revolution and the fast growth of the proletariat, the classical economic conflict developed between the so-called left-wing and right-wing political forces, manifesting the conflict between landed and urban interests, and between owners and employers, on the one hand, and tenants, workers and labourers on the other. Moreover, in the past three or four decades, some authors have argued that traditional cleavages have been weakening, however they have been replaced by the emergence of another conflict that has developed in the more developed industrialised societies. This conflict dimension is the one of so-called new politics that, according to some authors, represents a new ‘value cleavage’. Hence, one of the characteristics of new politics parties is a post-materialistic value system, including issues related to quality of life, environment etc. (see Inglehart 1977). Also the pre-World War II Latvian society was characterised by some of those conflicts identified by Lipset and Rokkan. The social-economic and the urban-rural lines of friction were the most distinct ones, and served as a basis for the development and popularity of LSDSP, the Workers’ Faction (in the mid-1920s), and several other left-wing political parties, as well as for many of the farmers’ parties. Similarly, there also existed a religious line of friction, which was marked by continuous conflicts between the so-called Christian parties and the left-wing parties that advocated secular power. The existence of several minority parties marked the ethnic line of friction, which by and large indicates a conflict along the regional line. Because of the inflow of non-Latvians, and the transformations of Latvia’s economy during the fifty years of the Soviet regime (1941-1991), Latvia’s party system after the Second Independence considerably differs from the one that

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existed prior to WWII. The Farmers’ Union (LZS) and the Social Democrats are no longer its corner stones and, even though economic and ethnic policy remain the two most important areas of conflict and discussion, the solutions suggested by the parties differ from the pre-war period. When the independent Republic of Latvia was re-established in 1991, the country’s society had become significantly homogenised regarding lines of friction, which were dominant in the pre-World War II Latvian society. Today, 13 years later, there are only two major lines of friction. Today, there are two matters of current interest that divide the political parties: first, the question concerning the so-called national policy (educational, language and citizenship problems) and, second, Latvia’s economic development. In respect of the former, the parties compete for an ethnically divided electorate – the classical political ideologies seldom refer to such national policy questions, but practically all the parties’ programmes in Latvia indicate some propounds concerning these issues. This specific conflict of interest among the parties relates to the fact that the society in Latvia consists of two separate ethnic communities, Latvians and Russians; consequently, some political parties maintain their popularity only due to the sensitivity of the ethnic conflict. However, whereas the ethnic line regarding noncitizens’ rights and ethnic legislation was seen as the most important conflict not very long ago, after the government had ruled on several important documents (the citizenship law, the naturalization law, the election law, etc.), this line of friction became less evident. Yet, because the non-citizens themselves still do not have the right to vote, they cannot directly influence the number of seats gained by the parties that supposedly defend the non-citizens’ and non-Latvians’ rights. In respect of the second conflict between parties, concerning Latvia’s economic development, there are, in contrast to the national policy conflict which is rather practical, also some major ideological differences between the parties with regard to the role of the State in Latvia’s economy, to the extent of its presence, as well as to its fiscal and monetary policies. The transformation from a planned economy to market economy should be treated here as an important aspect. An example of this conflict is the continuous discussion among political parties about whether certain forms of state monopoly should be maintained or eliminated, as well as about privatization, privatization certificates, the so-called rent ceiling, etc. In this case the parties have clearly taken sides: the LSDSP, SDS and Socialist Party cluster on the one side, whereas most of the right-wing parties cluster on the opposite side. Thus, there are two general political party dimensions shaping present-day politics in Latvia, first, parties’ views on ethnic policy, and second, economic issues. These dimensions are often confused, since a part of society wrongly uses the term ‘leftwing’ to designate both the parties that represent the interests of non-Latvian ethnicities, as well as the parties that advocate an increase in the State’s role on Latvia’s economy. Currently, it is the socioeconomic conflict that has gained the widest recognition in society – a situation typical in all modern European states. Consequently, the popularity of certain political parties is largely determined by

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the solutions they suggest for solving economic problems. Thus, there is a common belief that it is unwise for the parties to underestimate the importance of these problems if they wish to be able to compete seriously for any representation in parliament. Taking into account the current economic and social situation, with the State being unable to provide its inhabitants with satisfactory social guarantees, the rise in popularity of political leaders who offer such guarantees in their programmes is a logical consequence. Hence, in order to maintain their power position and popularity, all political parties in Latvia have to react to the general social insecurity in society, and, regardless of their officially stated ideological core, they have to draw closer to the position of the Social Democrats. Therefore, it can be concluded, that most of Latvia’s citizens could be a potential voter of the LSDSP; however, because of the party’s inefficiency, frequent internal conflicts, and partly because of the term ‘Social’ in the party’s name (which is negatively associated with Socialism of the Soviet era by most Latvians), these potential votes are dispersed among all the other parties. An example of this is the 8th Saeima election, when elements of the socialist ideology could be seen in all the dominant parties’ election campaigns, which also meant that the social sphere and the parties’ positions on it crucially affected the election results. Even Latvia’s Way (LC), the most liberal party in Latvia, chose to include several anti-liberal elements in its campaign; yet, it failed to cross the 5 per cent electoral threshold. Social policy is the sphere in which there has been a clear rapprochement of all the parties to the principles of socialism, and only significant improvements in this sphere could stop this tendency. Therefore, also in the following several parliamentary elections, the social sphere – social guarantees, healthcare, etc. – could remain the dominant theme, as this part of national policy directly affects each individual, and should not be neglected by the political parties. Yet, given that there appears to be no more than two important lines of friction shaping political interests in Latvia, it is noteworthy that there are more than fifty registered political parties, almost half of which are, or have been, represented in the Saeima. This unique situation can be explained by the fact that the party system in Latvia is still developing. Also, the different political organizations’ recent attempts to unite are a sign of consolidation, which may eventually result in a smaller number of parties represented in the parliament. Taking into account the historical experience regarding the considerable number of parties being represented in the Saeima, and the lack of an effective decision-making process, there had already been attempts to limit the number of political parties represented in the parliament in the first years after Latvia regained its independence. Such limitations were the electoral threshold, which was initially set at 4 per cent but increased before the 1995 Saeima elections to 5 per cent1. Still, these measures have since had limited success; thus, it can be concluded, that the 1

See for instance Pettai and Kreuzer (2001) for a detailed description of the Latvian electoral system.

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number of parties in a democratic society cannot be restricted by law alone, and that the formation of the party system is determined by more complex social causes, and by the voters’ unending search for their political identity. Nevertheless, the fact that only six political parties gained seats in the parliament in the last two elections is a sign that some consolidation in this process has been achieved. Another unique characteristic of Latvia’s political culture has been the significant trust in individual political personalities since the mid-1990s. Consequently, this has stimulated the formation of relatively small and weak parties around well-known political leaders, who, nevertheless, have often proved to be unable to offer a political program that would be sufficiently explicit and acceptable for society as a whole. One such party was formed by Joahims Zīgerists, who tried to gain support by using clearly populist means. However, several parties in Latvia have been formed also as a result of parliament deputies seeking electoral support in order to be re-elected. Latvijas Ceļš (Latvia’s Way) is an example of this process, as it was formed on the basis of the influential Club 21 in order to achieve the election of the more moderate National Front activists (those with a more right-wing political agenda) in the 5th Saeima in 1993. The aforementioned patterns of the formation of a state’s political parties are characteristic not only to Latvia. Certain similarities can be also observed in other Eastern European countries which could be explained by the peculiarities of the Soviet system and of the transition to democracy in this part of the world. Hence, because of the fifty years of Soviet rule, when no formation of new official parties was possible, Latvia, like a few other former Soviet republics, has made a ‘jump’ from the 1930s straight into the 21st century, now being characterized by a party system based on personal ambitions and populist campaigns (also see below). Political parties in Latvia are often criticised for their misconception of the differences between various political ideologies, as well as for not holding on to their own programmes. These two criticisms are closely linked, since a party’s programme should specify the ideological line that the party represents. Parties in Latvia do not often co-ordinate their programmes with their ideological convictions; therefore, it is problematic to define the ideological spectrum of the party system as a whole. However, this spectrum can be determined based on the way that the parties officially position themselves, and with less regard to the parties’ actual activities that often differ from the propounds of their programmes. It has already been shown, that Latvia is too small for more than two strong parties from each ideological wing to exist in the same party system. One of the examples is the success of the united Social Democrats in the 7th Saeima election in 1998, and their defeat after four years in the 8th Saeima election, when the party had already split. Another example is the competition among the New Era, Latvia’s Way, and the People’s Party for the support of the same part of the electorate. Before the 7th Saeima election, there was a free – conservative – political niche which was finally occupied by the People’s Party (TP). This position was also

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partly reflected in the party’s political programme, and the party consolidated its position among the centre-right-wing political forces, mainly competing with Latvia’s Way (LC). Right before the 8th parliamentary election, another two rightwing parties emerged – New Era (JL) and Latvia’s First Party (LPP) – which generally were seen as ideological rivals of Latvia’s Way and the People’s Party – and which eventually won a considerable share of Latvia’s right-wing votes. Moreover, several parties in Latvia often try to gain popular support by referring to their considerable age, as they consider themselves the inheritors of the respective pre-war parties and, consequently, the continuers of certain traditions. The two parties that point to this link the most often are LSDSP (Latvia’s Social Democratic Workers’ Party) and the LZS (Latvia’s Farmers’ Union), some of whose members had already been with the party before the Second World War. Latvia’s Way and For the Fatherland and Freedom (TB/LNNK) are two of the oldest right-wing parties, which have already been represented in the Saeima since 1993. Yet, even though both of these parties position themselves as right-wing, Latvia’s Way is more liberal, whereas TB/LNNK could be called nationalist - ultra right-wing - and economically conservative. However, in the 7th Saeima elections, another more conservative (yet, economically more liberal) right-wing political party was also widely represented, i.e. the People’s Party (TP), which had only been formed in 1998. These three parties advocate a swift transition to a market economy, the continuation of economic reforms, and a faster privatization process. However, in the last election in 2002, only two of these three parties gained representation in the 8th Saeima: the TB/LNNK and the TP. The People’s Party gained significant electoral support and 20 seats in the parliament, whereas For the Fatherland and Freedom (TB/LNNK) collected only slightly more than the minimum 5 per cent of the votes. In respect of the most desirable national policy, the positions that these three parties assume slightly differ. The TB/LNNK and TP prefer a more restrictive ethnic policy, whereas this question is subordinated to the party’s foreign-policy goals in Latvia’s Way. Yet, the dominant goal in the area of foreign policy for most of the conservative and right-wing parties in Latvia has been common: the country’s membership in the European Union and NATO. In a complete juxtaposition to these parties, in terms of the ethnic policy is For Human Rights in a United Latvia (PCTVL), a union formed by the TSP (the People’s Harmony Party), the movement Līdztiesība (Equal Rights), and the PSKP (the Communist Party of the Soviet Union), which is officially illegal in Latvia. With regard to the economic policy, PCTVL suggests that the State’s influence on economic processes should be increased, or at least maintained at its current level. The party has lately gained considerable electoral support, and, in the 8th Saeima election, it ranked second after the newly formed right-wing party Jaunais Laiks (New Era). Even though PCTVL have split up recently, the remaining core is still influential enough to gain widespread popular support; the party managed to gain one seat in the recent European Parliament elections, which was due to the protective position the party holds with regard to non-citizens’ rights. Hence,

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PCTVL won a large share of the Russian-speaking citizens’ votes; the latter traditionally chose to align themselves with the cause of the non-citizens (mostly Russians), who are unable to vote at all. The socialist-orientated Latvia’s Social Democratic Union was formed from two political parties: LSDSP, whose leader was Juris Bojārs, and LSDP (Latvia’s Social Democratic Party), lead by Egils Baldzēns. Eventually, the Union adopted the name of LSDSP. Political analysts had long before pointed out the similarity of these two parties’ programmes, but personal conflicts between the two leaders had been an obstacle for a union. The priority of both of these parties was to carry out moderate economic reforms, whilst avoiding an increase in the social pressure on society, as well as increasing the level of social security. However, due to the conflict with Egils Baldzēns, one of the leading members of the united LSDSP, a faction of the party soon broke away, forming the SDS (the Social Democratic Party) led by Baldzēns. Furthermore, Jānis Ādamsons – another member of the LSDSP who initially was a member of Latvia’s Way, and became the Minister of Internal Affairs – was not admitted to the 8th Saeima elections due to some formerly ‘unknown’ facts, raised by Latvia’s Way, about his work in the KGB (the State Security Committee). Consequently, the popularity of the LSDSP dropped significantly, resulting in the party’s failure to gain seats in parliament. One of the consequences of the conflicts among the left-wing politicians was the rise of two completely new right-wing parties with similar agendas – the previously mentioned Jaunais Laiks (New Era) and Latvia’s First Party (LPP). Both of these parties centred on a single well-known personality (Einārs Repše and Ainārs Šlesers, respectively), and excelled in using very well-organized PR techniques. After being elected into the 8th Saeima, these two parties formed a common block, and together with the Greens’, the Farmers’ Union (ZZS) and TB/LNNK, they formed the new government. Einārs Repše, the leader of New Era became Prime Minister; however, his government soon fell. Consequently, the socalled minority government was led by Indulis Emsis (ZZS), and it was only seen as a temporary solution even among the Farmers’ Union coalition partners, until a new right-wing government with a strong leader was formed. Currently, the Prime Minister is one of the leaders of Tautas partija (the People’s Party), Aigars Kalvītis being in coalition with three central and right-wing parties: New Era, the Farmers’ Union and Latvia’s First Party.

Elections: the Parties’ Performance and Recent Electoral Results To see what kind of issues have gained the greatest attention of society and, consequently, of the political parties in the recent elections, it is useful to look at the parties’ election campaigns in which these questions are clearly distinguished. By analysing the past three regional municipality and Saeima elections, it can be seen that, in the parties’ campaigns, the emphasized questions have largely remained the same, wherein only the order of priorities has changed (Table 3.1).

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Table 3.1 Alert issues in Saeima elections

1st alert issue

2nd alert issue 3rd alert issue 4th alert issue 5th alert issue

The 6th Saeima Election in 1995 Latvia’s independence and sovereignty welfare, social guarantees education a judicial state the orientation of Latvia’s foreign policy the elimination of criminality

The 7th Saeima election in 1998 economic development and growth

The 8th Saeima election in 2002 healthcare

national policy (citizenship and language questions) the orientation of Latvia’s foreign policy welfare and social guarantees a judicial state

welfare, social guarantees the elimination of corruption education

the orientation of Latvia’s foreign policy 6th alert the elimination of economic issue criminality development and growth Sources: Latvijas Republikas 6. Saeimas vēlēšanas, Part 1 (1996), Latvijas Republikas 7. Saeimas vēlēšanas (1999), Latvijas Republikas 8. Saeimas vēlēšanas (2003). The information in the table has been collected from the parties’ election campaigns; however, it is difficult to make a general summary of the key issues, as the parties arrange them in a different order. Another obstacle to an objective analysis of these priorities is the widespread use of populist means in the election campaigns. The boom of such means was during the 6th Saeima election, when three parties gained seats in the parliament by using rather populist methods; the People’s Movement for Latvia (TKL), Latvia’s Unity Party (LVP), and the Democratic Party Saimnieks (DP Saimnieks), which eventually failed to carry out a co-ordinated political programme, and were defeated in the next Saeima election in 1998. These three parties’ programmes were characterized by discrepancy and lack of consistency. In addition, the promises given during the election campaigns were very exaggerated and unrealistic. The appearance of New Era (JL) and Latvia’s First Party (LPP) on the political stage before the 8th Saeima election was also based on populism; yet, unlike in the 6th Saeima election, greater attention was given to the new parties’ programmes that were more constructive than, for example, the People’s Movement for Latvia’s programme. The ideological orientation of Latvia’s electorate largely depends on the parties’ programmes and on the personalities who lead them, rather than on a strict

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and intentional ideological conviction. Consequently, more votes are collected by parties that distinguish a single or specific, socially important and comprehensible question, and offer a way to solve it. According to the recent public surveys, the questions that concern Latvia’s citizens the most are social security, employment and educational problems, as well as the low economic welfare level (Latvijas Fakti 2004). Other urgent issues include healthcare, problems related to agriculture, as well as the high level of corruption. Therefore, regardless of their ideological convictions, almost all the parties in Latvia promise to resolve these problems. Table 3.2 reflects the results of the past four parliamentary elections in Latvia from 1993 to 2002, as announced by the Central Election Committee. It is typical for Latvian politics that new political parties appear before every Saeima election, and gain a considerable share of votes: in the 6th parliamentary election the DP Saimnieks emerged shortly before the elections and gained 15 per cent of the votes; in the 7th elections the People’s Party emerged and gained 21 per cent of the vote, while in the 8th Saeima election such a newly formed, winning party was New Era. Another important feature of the Saeima election results is that, usually already by the time of the next election, these parties’ popularity significantly decline. In some cases these parties no longer cross the 5 per cent electoral threshold, such as the DP Saimnieks in the 7th Saeima election, and Latvia’s Way, the LC, which had gained 36 seats in the 5th Saeima, but failed to gain any in the 8th election. The social and political problems in Latvia are factors that greatly affect the choices that the voters make. However, as mentioned before, the main conflict that determined the electoral preferences in the early years of independence was of an ethnic nature. Most Latvians and a minority of Russians supported the parties that were formed by the former Latvian Popular Front (LTF) members, who had actively fought for Latvia’s independence from the USSR in the late 1980s. In contrast to this, most Russians supported the ‘successors’ of the former Interfront (the organization fighting against Latvia’s independence). Another conflict that has influenced the election results concerns the agrarian problem. This has resulted from the State’s inability to subsidize farmers at an equally high level as it is common to do so in the European Union (hence, Latvia’s farmers have not been able to compete with the cheap production offered within the EU), and which had already caused a decline in the popularity of the LZS before the 6th Saeima election. Moreover, a part of LC (Latvia’s Way)’s electorate was formed by those who had incurred financial losses as a result of the bankruptcy of Latvia’s biggest bank – Banka Baltija – as the party’s candidate for Prime Minister, Māris Gailis, had promised to compensate these losses. However, the promise was never fulfilled. The observed fluctuations in voting behaviour can also be explained by the fact that there is a large number of political parties, whose appearance is directly related to the personal political ambitions of certain well-known individuals. Thus, the politicians’ personal images clearly affect their popularity and electoral support; it

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is formed by their political beliefs, long-term goals, as well as by quite personal factors, such as their charisma. However, it is also typical that, as soon as the candidates become involved in political intrigues or scandals, they lose the support of a part of their electorate. Moreover, it appears that with the passage of time, the features that are considered desirable for the candidates have changed. In the early Table 3.2 Saeima election results 1993-2002

5th Saeima election (1993) Latvia’s Way Latvian National Independence Movement (LNNK) Harmony Party Farmer’s Union Equal Rights Fatherland and Freedom (TB) Christian Democratic Union The Democratic Centre Party 6th Saeima election (1995) DP Saimnieks People’s Movement for Latvia Latvia’s Way Fatherland and Freedom (TB) Latvia’s Unity Party Christian Democratic Union / LLDP Latvian National Independence Movement (LNNK) / Latvian Green Party People’s Harmony Party Latvian Socialist Party 7th Saeima election (1998) People’s Party Latvia’s Way For Fatherland and Freedom (TB/LNNK) People’s Harmony Party Latvian Social Democratic Party The New Party 8th Saeima election (2002) New Era For Human Rights in a United Latvia People’s Party First Party The Greens and the Farmers’ Union For Fatherland and Freedom (TB/LNNK)

%

Seats

32.41 13.35 12.00 10.65 5.76 5.35 5.01 4.76

36 15 13 12 7 6 6 5

15.15 14.90 14.65 11.94 7.14 6.33 6.31

18 16 16 14 8 8 8

5.58 5.55

6 5

21.19 18.05 14.65 14.12 12.81 7.31

24 21 17 16 14 8

23.90 19.00 16.60 9.50 9.40 5.40

26 25 20 10 12 7

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1990s, the primary factor influencing a candidate’s popularity was the politicians’ political stands, whereas already by the end of the decade, personal values were ranked higher.

Party Organization and Financing Not only are political parties frequently categorized according to their ideological or programmatic profile; the structure of the party internal organization is often seen as an important attribute of a party’s functioning. As such, a party could be defined as an internally organized association uniting individuals with similar political beliefs that try to get, or at least, influence, political power. The so-called closed or personnel parties have few members and consist of professional politicians. On the contrary, mass parties, are characterized by large memberships and large organizations, wherein members are important contributors and electoral candidates aim to fulfil a representative capacity. Indirect mass parties differ from these, in that they also include members of trade unions. Finally, there are so-called voters’ parties that usually appear not long before elections and are led by a person who is already well-known in society. This latter type of party can be considered as being very typical for Latvia, where many new parties were founded right before each one of the last three Saeima elections, and managed to gain considerable electoral support. Generally speaking, parties in Latvia also tend to be rather short-lived organizations. First, in no more than five years after independence nearly all historical parties with roots either in the inter-war, pre-independence or communist era lost most of their votes. Only the Farmer’s Union made a re-entry into parliament in 2002 on a joint list with the Greens, after two elections with poor results. Moreover, at least six parties that have gained at least one seat in the last few elections, including some that have gained more than 15 per cent of the votes, have faded into oblivion after only one or two elections. Instead, start-up parties have replaced many of the pre-independence parties, as well as successor, fusion and fission parties that have entered the Latvian party political scene. Of these, Latvia’s Way has been the most successful one in terms of prevalence, though leader-dominated parties like the People’s Party and New Era scored very well in 1998 and 2002 (see Kreutzer and Pettai 2003). The ‘organizational instability’ of Latvian parties is also apparent in the percentage of politicians or candidates in elections in Latvia who switched parties between elections in 1992-2002; though roughly 60 per cent of the politicians on average were organizationally loyal, an average of 13 per cent of the candidates switched between ‘established’ parties in the first three elections, accompanied by another 13 per cent that got involved in a reorganisation (fusion) of the party and 9 per cent that opted for joining a new, start-up party (Kreutzer and Pettai 2003). A similar trend has also been apparent among MPs: roughly 24 per cent of the MPs changed their party affiliation in between elections in 1993/1995, followed by 32

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per cent breakaways in 1995/1998, which is a rather vast share of the MPs as compared to other countries (Pettai and Kreutzer 2001). However, one of the most evident explanations for the relative success and appeal of new parties, both in respect of voters’ preferences and politicians’ realignments, is the weak link between parties and the electorate, but also the weak organizational structure of Latvian parties. Decision-making within the party is typically made by a small, centralised clique, and party organization tends to be based on the parliamentary party organization, where personality politics has assumed an important role. Simultaneously, Latvian parties enjoy only little confidence of the voters; according to opinion polls Latvian citizens perceive political parties to be more corrupt than the public administration, the police or the judiciary (see below). Part of the problem is the expense of modern campaigning techniques that are employed in Latvian elections and that parties are highly dependent on individual and corporate donations. For instance in 2002, the election campaign was accompanied by for example holding beer festivals and hiring television celebrities, which as a total resulted in substantially higher costs per vote than in the UK or the USA. Since these events were mainly financed by donations, it is easily suspected that this financial support is also rewarded by those who depend on it (cf. Auers, 2002/2003). In 1995, the party financing act was passed, which did not grant any official party funding by the State, but which allowed parties to accept annual donations from individuals and corporations up to 25,000 lats. This amount was lowered to 10,000 lats in 2002. (Donations from anonymous and foreign sources were banned.) Moreover, parties are allowed to make earnings from private enterprise and membership fees, but these sources of income remain marginal. Because of this situation, and because of the high campaigning costs that are largely dependent on donations, a debate has begun on introducing state financing and, or restricting campaigning costs (Auers, 2002/2003).

The Relationship between Parties and the Electorate Political parties serve the purpose of generalizing different interests – since there are many wants and needs on behalf of society, it is the duty of political parties to generalize these wants and needs and to attempt to fulfil them. Another task to be accomplished by parties is the political preparation of its members for professional work in the government. Yet, through effective communication with the electorate, political parties, and especially their leaders, they can also become objects of emotional attachment which leaves a strong imprint on their followers. A good example of this is the type of communication and PR used in the United States during the presidential election campaigns. This particular trait is also common to the Communist parties and has considerably affected the discipline and mentality of society – a phenomenon that can still be observed in Latvia, and that can be seen

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as a ‘vestige’ of the Soviet era. Consequently, with the presence of several far leftwing parties, there is a common struggle against them, but when these parties are outdone, another struggle arises – this time, among the victorious political alignments. In order to describe the relationship between parties and the Latvian citizens in the period since 1991, it is necessary to mention some features of the parties and their electorate. Firstly, one of the unique features of the society in Latvia is the large number of the so-called non-citizens2. Secondly, the electoral participation in the parliamentary and the regional municipality elections is relatively high – on average, 65 per cent of all the citizens (inhabitants who have the right to vote). The third characteristic trait of the electorate is common to most post-communist countries in Eastern Europe, namely, the inconstancy of the voters’ political choice. On average, every fifth citizen of Latvia voted for a different party in the last two elections (See SKDS Marketing and Public Opinion Research Centre 2003). The above mentioned characteristics are reflected in the political party system. Hence, the political orientation of non-Latvians is influenced by the so-called noncitizens’ problem, and by the protection of non-Latvians’ rights in certain political parties’ programmes. Several parties in opposition – Līdztiesība (Equal Rights), Krievu partija (The Russian Party), Latvia’s Socialist Party (LPS), etc. – appeal to the non-Latvian part of the electorate by using the protection of non-citizens and minority ethnicities as their key issues. It is worth noting that these parties also occupy the ultra left-wing ideological recess; therefore, the non-Latvian citizens are usually considered to be left-wing orientated, even though the majority of them are well-educated and with a high level of economic activity, which in different circumstances would probably have made (part of) them choose a right-wing political orientation. The left-wing parliamentary union PCTVL (For Human Rights in a United Latvia), which includes four rather diverse parties – the People’s Harmony Party (TSP), Līdztiesība (Equal Rights), Latvia’s Socialist Party (LSP), and the Russian Party (KP) – has, until today, based its activities on the protection of the rights of non-Latvian citizens and non-citizens, and has gained relatively good results. However, taking into account the recent European Parliament election and the split of the political union, all these separate parties are likely to lose a part of their electoral support, since one of the most prominent leaders of the former PTCVL, Tatjana Ždanoka, has become a deputy of the European Parliament, and is no longer able to directly influence the party’s activities and popularity in Latvia3. 2

According to the information provided by the Office of Citizenship and Immigration of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, there were 687,000 inhabitants holding a non-citizen status in 1997. In 2001, this number decreased to approximately 590,000. 3 An example of this is the active support of Līdztiesība to the campaign organized by the defenders of Russian schools, which has increased the party’s popularity and enticed other PCTVL supporters’ votes. During its membership of the PCTVL, Līdztiesība was

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The changes in the political culture in Latvia are closely related to the transformation in society, caused by increasing alienation among its different segments, the diminution of communication and information channels, as well as by the globalization of values. Consequently, one may conclude that there is a twofold estrangement of the Latvian society from the political system: one based on the ethnic division between the majority and the minority and one based on institutional distance and distrust. The first dimension of estrangement, the ethnically motivated estrangement, was visible already in the mid-1990s, when public surveys continuously showed an alienation of the non-Latvian inhabitants from the Latvian state. This was largely a result of the slow naturalization process, according to which immigrants who had entered the country in the Soviet era were offered citizenship only based on strict residence and language criteria. Still, by 2003, data collected by the Office of Citizenship and Immigration testifies that no more than 70 per cent of Latvia’s inhabitants had now become citizens4. Hence, about one third of all Latvia’s inhabitants have a high potential of being estranged from the political process, which is continuously reflected in the sociological surveys. For example, when asked ‘Are you proud of being an inhabitant of Latvia?’, only 32 per cent of the surveyed non-Latvians responded affirmatively; among the questioned Latvians, a positive answer was given by 76 per cent (The UN Human Development Report 2000/2001). The estrangement of the non-Latvians is also encouraged by the existence of two different spheres of information, i.e. a Latvian and a non-Latvian (mainly Russian) information sphere. It is common for the Russian media in Latvia, and for certain parties, to try to increase their popularity by aggravating ethnically sensitive questions. Social inequality, as well as the rift between the incomes of different social groups, is another factor that has stimulated alienation both among politicians, and among different social layers. The second dimension that has become a source of alienation is the institutional one, which is characterized by the widespread distrust towards state institutions and politicians, in particular. For example, public surveys (the SKDS Marketing and Public Opinion Research Center 2000-2003) traditionally show a lack of confidence in such institutions as the Saeima, the Cabinet of Ministers, the Supreme Court, Customs and Excise, Latvia’s Privatisation Agency, the State Revenue Service, etc. Other institutions that are mentioned as more trustworthy include the public and private media, the National Armed Forces, the Church, and the Bank of Latvia5. In fact, the trust in the latter two institutions has led to the comparably inactive and forced to join the common stand of the union, which was largely determined by the view of the TSP deputies. 4 Information provided by the Office of Citizenship and Immigration, 2003. On the other hand, only 35 per cent of all the non-Latvians hold Latvian citizenship. 5 The evaluation of the work of the local municipalities, the police, and the frontier guards fluctuates.

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formation of two of the relatively new parties, the LPP (called the ‘priests’ party’), and New Era whose leader is Einārs Repše, the former President of the Central Bank of Latvia. Furthermore, the public surveys also give proof of the alienation between the politicians and society. For example, 57 per cent of the Saeima deputies, and 44 per cent of the directors of ministry departments believe that the most important political decisions made by state institutions serve the interests of the majority of Latvia’s inhabitants. In contrast, only 15 per cent of the inhabitants gave a positive answer to that question (The UN Human Development Report 2000/2001). Moreover, it is worth pointing out that almost half of the politicians are not confident in the actual usefulness of their own legislative activity.

Conclusion To conclude, in the historical context of the existence of an independent Latvia, the development of a Latvian party system is still far from settled. However, since the Second Independence a new party system has taken shape characterized by certain features that appear distinct to Latvian politics. First, the Latvian party system has mainly developed to reflect two division lines in society: the ethnic division and the socioeconomic division. Therein the party system has come to reflect liberal market appeals (advocated by the People’s Party and Latvia’s Way, amongst others) versus State intervention (e.g. Social Democrats), and nationalistic policies versus minority rights (For Fatherland and Freedom on the one end versus the leftwing parliamentary union For Human Rights in a United Latvia in the most recent elections, on the other hand.) Second, Latvian politics are characterized by a unstable party system, where an extensive number of parties participate in elections, and even more so, where breakaway parties and newly founded parties frequently appear quite successful in their first elections. Yet, not many of these survive; it is not uncommon that new parties are replaced in the subsequent elections. This results in highly volatile elections that, combined with a relatively high turnout, suggest that even though a great deal of the Latvian voters are detached from party loyalties, they are still willing to take their chances with new alternatives. Moreover, the willingness to vote for new parties in Latvia may very well be related, in part, to the low levels of trust in political institutions and in political parties, in particular. The latter is a sign of alienation between politics and the electorate, which, accompanied by an unsettled party system, leader-orientated politics and a weak ideological foundation, risks driving politics even further away from the electorate. In addition, the fact that approximately 30 per cent of the Latvian inhabitants were not naturalized Latvian citizens in 2003, constitutes a second source of estrangement that reinforces the distance between political parties and society. Whether this situation is going to settle in the future still remains an open question.

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References Auers, D. (2002/2003), ‘Latvia’s 2002 Elections – Dawn or a New Era?’, in East European Constitutional Review, fall 2002/winter 2003, pp. 106-110. Inglehart, R. (1977), The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles in Western Publics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). Kreuzer, M. and Pettai, V. (2003), ‘Patterns of Political Instability: Affiliation Patterns of Politicians and Voters in Post-Communist Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania’, in Studies in Comparative International Development, vol. 38(2), pp. 76-98. Latvijas Fakti (Latvia’s Facts) 2004. Lipset, S. M. and Rokkan, S. (1967), ‘Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments: An Introduction’, in S. M. Lipset and S. Rokkan (eds.), Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross National Perspectives (New York: Free Press). Pettai, V. and Kreuzer, M. (2001), ‘Institutions and Party Development in the Baltic States’, in P. G. Lewis (ed.), Party development and democratic change in post-communist Europe (London, Portland: Frank Cass). The Latvian Republic 6th Saeima Elections, Part 1 (1996), Riga. The Latvian Republic 7th Saeima Elections, (1999), Riga: AS McĀbols. The Latvian Republic 8th Saeima Elections, (2003), Riga: CVK. The SKDS Marketing anf Public Opinion Research Center (2000-2003), Internet: http://www.skds.lv. The UN Human Development Report 2000/2001, Latvia: The Public Policy Processes (Riga, 2001).

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Chapter 4

The Development of the Lithuanian Party System: From Stability to Perturbation Ainė Ramonaitė

Introduction The roots of the Lithuanian party system can be traced back to the Lithuanian ‘Singing revolution’ of 1988-1991. The longstanding monopoly of the Lithuanian Communist Party was broken in 1988 when the Lithuanian liberation movement Sąjūdis was formed. It was a broad umbrella-type organization which played a crucial role in the process of democratic transformation in Lithuania and which later gave birth to several influential Lithuanian parties. The main ideological adversary of Sąjūdis was the Lithuanian Communist Party (later transformed into the Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party), even though the positions of the two forces were quite similar regarding some issues. During the first free elections in 1990 both Sąjūdis and the Lithuanian Communist Party were in favour of more political and economic sovereignty for Lithuania. The position of Sąjūdis, however, was much more determined than that of the Communist Party. After the declaration of independence on 11 March 1990, the main division between the two political forces was regarding the question of the speed at which economic and political reforms should be introduced, and relations with Russia. The Lithuanian Communist Party advocated a step-by-step reform policy and good relations with Russia, while Sąjūdis aimed at forcing events and increasing political and economic distance between Lithuania and the former Soviet Union. Before the early parliamentary elections of 1992, Sąjūdis began disintegrating as some of its activists created their own parties. The bigger party, led by Vytautas Landsbergis, the main architect of Lithuanian independence, continued to exist under the label of Sąjūdis, and later transformed into the Homeland Union (Lithuanian Conservatives). Although the party lost the elections, a two-block structure of the party system was maintained with the ex-communist Labour Democrats on the left of the party spectrum and the Homeland Union (Lithuanian Conservatives) on the right. The other two parliamentary parties with a much smaller share of seats were the Lithuanian Christian Democrats on the right and the Lithuanian Social Democrats on the left. This simple structure of the Lithuanian

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party system continued to exist after the 1996 elections and this relative stability allowed some scholars to conclude that the process of structuring the Lithuanian party system was over (see Žeruolis, 1998). Even though electoral volatility was quite high in comparison with Western European countries, low fragmentation and a bipolar pattern of party competition remained irrespective of somewhat successful attempts of the Centre Union to change the dominant conflict axis by forming a ‘third force’. The parliamentary elections of 2000, however, destroyed that apparent stability as two new players – the New Union (Social Liberals) and the Lithuanian Liberal Union – emerged on the political scene, expelling the Christian Democrats and the Centre Union from the political game. As it appeared later, this was only the beginning of the decay of the ‘traditional parties’. Despite the growth of the economy and the consolidation efforts of the main parliamentary parties (especially the merger of the Labour Democrats and Social Democrats), turmoil in the Lithuanian party system has been increasing as the elections to the European Parliament (EP) and the parliamentary elections of October 2004 have demonstrated. Three new parties managed to cross the threshold and win seats in the European Parliament and in the new parliament, including the Labour Party, which was founded only eight months before the European Parliament elections. The Labour Party, led by a businessman of Russian origin, was able to win about 30 per cent of the votes in the European Parliament elections and 28 per cent of the votes in the subsequent national parliamentary elections. Recent elections have revealed that the Lithuanian party system is undergoing a dramatic structural change, as ex-communist and ex-Sąjūdis parties have lost their dominant positions, party system fragmentation is increasing and electoral volatility is growing with every election. Therefore, the development of the Lithuanian party system must be divided into two stages: (1) formation of the party system in 1989-1998, and (2) destabilization of the party system, apparent since 2000. Consequently, the intention is not only to describe the development and characteristics of the Lithuanian party system, but also to analyse the destabilization of the Lithuanian party system in the last consecutive elections.

The Formation of the Lithuanian Party System The first parties (apart from the Lithuanian Communist Party) emerged in postSoviet Lithuania in 1989. Most of theses new organizations claimed to be the descendants of pre-war Lithuanian parties (e.g., Social Democrats and Christian Democrats). In fact, however, the continuity is only symbolic because the leaders, the organization and the electorate of the parties have changed beyond recognition. The first free elections to the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania in 1990 were dominated by Sąjūdis and the Lithuanian Communist Party. Most candidates of new parties, as well as some reform-orientated Communist Party members and independents, were supported by the Sąjūdis. In the elections, Sąjūdis candidates won the

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absolute majority and formed the government. Soon after the declaration of independence, the huge economic problems of the country and internal political disagreements disrupted the unity of the Sąjūdis and the Supreme Soviet. This invoked the second wave of creating parties, mainly on the basis of parliamentary groups. Finally, the fragmentation of the Supreme Soviet had become so high that it had to dissolve itself and to declare early elections. Before the elections, an agreement on a new Constitution and a new electoral law was reached among the main political forces. As a compromise, a semipresidential institutional design with a directly elected, though rather weak president, was adopted. Furthermore, a mixed electoral system combining singlemember districts and multi-member districts was introduced. Under the law, 71 members of the Seimas (the parliament of Lithuania) are elected in single-member districts by a majority system and 70 members are elected by proportional representation. This kind of a mixed system was in fact favourable to the largest parties, as was the national threshold of 4 per cent, which was later increased to five.1 The parliamentary elections of 1992 and the presidential elections of 1993 were successful for the ex-communist Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party (LDDP). By gaining about 43 per cent of the votes in multi-member districts, the LDDP won the absolute majority of seats in parliament (see Table 4.1) and could form a single-party government. Moreover, the leader of the party, Algirdas Brazauskas, won the presidential elections. Sąjūdis (later reorganised into the Homeland Union/Lithuanian Conservatives) remained the second largest party in the parliament, despite the defeat, and returned to power in 1996 by winning 70 seats in the parliament. Rather than forming a single-party government, the Conservatives created a governing coalition with the Christian Democrats, often regarded as the ‘younger sister’ of the Homeland Union. The Democratic Labour Party and Social Democrats formed a leftist opposition, while the Centre Union put itself in a vague position vis-à-vis the government.

Destabilization of the Party System after 2000 The parliamentary elections of 2000 were a turning point in the development of Lithuania’s party system. The combined number of seats of the Homeland Union and the Democratic Labour Party decreased from 72.5 in 1992 to 42.6 in 2000 (Jurkynas, 2003), while the newcomers, the New Union (Social Liberals) and the Liberal Union, received almost 45 per cent of the seats in parliament. Moreover, the Lithuanian Christian Democratic Party and the Centre Union failed to cross the threshold and get seats in the multi-member districts. 1

For more detailed information on the Lithuanian constitutional framework and electoral system see Žeruolis (1998), and Clark and Prekevičius (2001).

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Table 4.1 Results of parliamentary elections in Lithuania (% of votes in the multimember district and total number of seats received) Party Homeland Union (Lithuanian Conservatives) Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party Lithuanian Social Democratic Party New Union (Social Liberals) Lithuanian Christian Democratic Party Lithuanian Centre Union Lithuanian Liberal Union Lithuanian Peasants’ Party New Democracy (Women’s Party) Labour Party Liberal Democratic Party

1992 votes seats

1996 votes seats

21.2

28

31.3

70

44

73

10

12

votes 8.6

2000 seats 9

2004 votes seats 14.8

25

20

27 31.1 18

6

8

6.9

12

-

-

-

-

19.6

29

12.6

9

10.4

16

3.1

2

2.5

2

8.7

13

2.9

-

1.5

-

1.9

1

17.3

34

-

-

1.7

1

4.2

4

-

-

3.9

1

*

3

-

-

-

-

-

-

20.7 11

1.4

-

9.2

18

6.6

10

28.4 11.4

39 10

* In the 2000 elections New Democracy ran in coalition with Labour Democrats and Social Democrats. Sources: Central Electoral Committee, Krupavičius and Pogorelis (2004). The Homeland Union lost the election receiving only nine seats after the unfortunate story of the privatization of the oil company ‘Mažeikių nafta’.2 The unsuccessful electoral performance of the Conservatives was also caused by the 2

‘Mažeikių nafta’, the largest company in Lithuania, was sold by the Conservative government to the American company ‘Williams International’. However, the deal was showed by the media to be very disadvantageous for Lithuania as it imposed the risk costs upon the Government. In fact, the operation of the company after the privatization was blocked by the Russian oil company ‘Lukoil’ refusing to supply ‘Mažeikių nafta’ with raw material.

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economic depression of 1999, as well as by internal splits within the party. The elections were much more successful for the Democratic Labour Party which ran in coalition with the Social Democrats, New Democracy (previously the Women’s Party) and the Russian Union. The coalition was led by Algirdas Brazauskas, the former president and one of the most popular politicians at the time. The coalition of Brazauskas gained 31 per cent of the votes and 51 seats in the parliament (see Table 4.1). Soon after the election, the Democratic Labour Party and Social Democrats merged, retaining the name of the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party.3 The success of both the New Union and the Liberal Union can be explained by the striking popularity of their leaders. The New Union, however, can be characterized by the personality politics of a charismatic party, while the Liberal Union is closer to the ideological or programme party model. In fact, the Liberal Union was established in 1990 but it was not able to cross the electoral threshold in parliamentary elections and was only influential at the local level (mainly in Klaipėda, the third largest city in Lithuania). The rating of the party suddenly rose when Rolandas Paksas, former mayor of Vilnius and former prime minister of the Conservative government, joined the party and became its chairmen after the controversial incident of the ‘Mažeikių nafta’ privatization.4 The New Union (Social Liberals) was established in 1998, after the presidential election of 1997/1998, when Artūras Paulauskas lost the presidential elections to Valdas Adamkus by less than 1 per cent of the vote.5 The party did not have an explicit ideological orientation and mainly appealed to those dissatisfied with the reforms. The party mainly attracted the support of an uneducated rural population and ethnic minorities, i.e. the traditional electorate of Labour Democrats. The Liberal Union, in contrast, drew most of its support from the Homeland Union. After the short-lived coalition of the New Union and the Liberal Union, the Cabinet was formed by the left-wing coalition of Social Democrats and the New Union with Algirdas Brazauskas as the prime minister. The stability of the Cabinet was ensured by the popularity of Algirdas Brazauskas and the positive development of the national economy and integration in NATO and the EU. The apparent tranquillity in political life was disturbed by the presidential election in 2002/2003, however. Victory in the election was predicted for Valdas Adamkus who had high ratings and was supported by virtually all parliamentary parties. Regardless, the winner of the election turned out to be Rolandas Paksas who split from the Liberal Union and created his own Liberal Democratic Party. 3

In fact, Labor Democrats rather than Social Democrats dominated the party. The name of the Social Democratic Party, however, was adopted in order to emphasize the adherence to the traditional social democratic values. 4 Rolandas Paksas being prime minister of the Conservatives Cabinet refused to sign the agreement with ‘Williams International’ against the will of his party and thus became the ‘national hero’. 5 In the presidential election, Paulauskas participated as a non-party candidate supported by the Democratic Labor Party and some other parties.

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Paksas ran an aggressive and populist electoral campaign with financial and intellectual support from Russia. Using anti-elite sentiments and applying public relation technologies, he won an unexpected victory over the established political elite and the traditional parties. At the end of 2003, Rolandas Paksas was accused of collaborating with the Russian mafia and was impeached and consequently removed from the office. New presidential elections were held in 2004 at the same time as the elections to the European Parliament. This time the winner of the presidential election was Valdas Adamkus who was supported by the right-wing parties. In the second round, he defeated Kazimiera Prunskienė, the leader of the Union of Peasants and New Democracy.6 For the traditional parties, the elections to the European Parliament were again not very successful. The winner of the election was the Labour Party obtaining 30 per cent of votes and five seats (out of 13) in the European Parliament. The party was established in October 2003 by Viktor Uspaskich, a well-known businessman in Lithuania. The Social Democrats and the Homeland Union7 won two seats each, receiving 14.4 and 12.6 per cent of the vote respectively. The Liberal and Centre Union, which was founded in May 2003 after a merger of the Liberal Union, the Centre Union and the small Union of Modern Christian Democrats, also got two seats with 11.2 per cent of votes. One seat was obtained by the Union of Peasants and New Democracy thanks to the good performance of Kazimiera Prunskienė during the presidential election, and one mandate went to the Liberal Democratic Party of Rolandas Paksas. The New Union (Social Liberals) and Christian Democrats failed to get any seats. The parliamentary elections held in October 2004 drastically changed the composition of the Seimas. Three newcomers (the Labour Party, the Liberal Democratic Party and the Union of Peasants and New Democracy) again won about 46 per cent of the votes and about 42 per cent of the seats in parliament (see Table 4.1). The victory of the Labour Party, however, was not quite as overwhelming as expected after the European Parliament elections. Winning less than 28 per cent of seats in the parliament, the Labour Party could not form a single-party government and it was in a disadvantageous position in the coalition negotiations because of the negative approach of some other parties to the populist leader of the party.

6

Kazimiera Prunskienė was the first prime minister of an independent Lithuania in 1990. Later she lost the support of Sąjūdis and established the Women’s Party (later renamed New Democracy Party). In the presidential elections of 2004, she participated as a leader of the Union of Peasant Party and New Democracy and was supported by expresident Rolandas Paksas. 7 After the merger with the Union of Political Prisoners and Deportees in February 2004 the party changed its name from the Homeland Union (Lithuanian Conservatives) to the Homeland Union (Conservatives, Political Prisoner and Deportees, Christian Democrats).

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The Social Democrats formed an electoral coalition with the New Union (Social Liberals) and together received 31 seats in parliament. The result, though not impressive, allowed Brazauskas to preserve the post as Prime Minister by forming a leftist coalition with the Labour Party and the Union of Peasants and New Democracy. The performance of the conservative Homeland Union was rather successful as it increased the number of seats from nine in 2000 to 25 in 2004. After some unsuccessful attempts to form a ‘rainbow’ coalition with other traditional parties, the Conservatives stayed in opposition together with the Liberal and Centre Union, which received only 18 seats.

The Ideological Profile of the Parties The labels of the main ‘traditional’ Lithuanian parties8 seem to fit neatly into the Western scheme of political ideologies. All the main ideological families are represented in Lithuania, except for the Greens and Far Right, with varying degrees of success. However, this correspondence appears to be somewhat artificial, since the historical origins of the Lithuanian parties differ substantially from their Western European counterparts. The Homeland Union (Lithuanian Conservatives) distinguishes itself by its anti-communist and anti-Russian rhetoric. While being radically reform-orientated, rather then conservative, it resembles Western style right-wing parties in emphasising such values as nation, family and religion. The party has always been the strongest advocate of Lithuanian integration in the European Union and NATO. Although market liberalism has always been the ultimate goal of the party, the priorities of its economic policy have been rather ambiguous. In fact, in 1992, the election programme of the party was dominated exclusively by political and cultural issues. The manifesto was loaded with rhetoric of freedom, democracy and human rights, whereas economic questions were of much less importance, despite the growing crisis of the national economy. In 1996, however, the Conservatives made a clear shift from political and cultural concerns to the concerns of economic policy and currently it is seen as one the most liberal parties in Lithuania in terms of economic policy (Jurkynas and Ramonaitė 2004). The Democratic Labour Party was formed by reform orientated Communists. The party with its leader Algirdas Brazauskas could be characterized as pragmatic and somewhat conservative. It has appealed for friendly relations with Russia but has also supported integration into the EU and NATO. Although the party was trying to present itself as social democratic, it was criticised for representing the interests of the former nomenclature and big business. The merger with the Social 8 The term ‘traditional parties’ is commonly applied to Social Democrats, the Homeland Union (Conservatives), Liberal and Center Union, Christian Democrats and sometimes to the New Union (Social Liberals).

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Democrats in 2001 was supposed to solve the problem of the ideological identification of the party. However, the tension between ‘social democratic’ and ‘pragmatic’ wings is still threatening the unity of the party. The identity of the Lithuanian Christian Democratic Party is based on the longstanding Lithuanian traditions of Christian Democratic political thought. Until 2000, the party had maintained a classical Western-style Christian democratic profile embracing value-orientated politics, pro-Western geopolitical orientation and a socially oriented market economy. Together with the Homeland Union it is a member of the European People’s Party. After loosing the 2000 elections, the party merged with the small and populist Christian Democratic Union. Suffering from internal conflicts and leadership problems, the Christian Democrats finally lost most of its electorate and currently it is on the verge of political extinction. The Centre Union emerged as a result of internal divisions in the Sąjūdis movement. The party sought to become a ‘third force’ and to cut through the dominant communist-anti-communist conflict by appealing to economic rather then political issues. The liberal profile of the party was appealing most of all to the young and educated city dwellers, but the growing popularity of the party was eroded by the sudden rise of the Liberal Union. After some internal splits the party finally merged with the Liberal Union. The Liberal Union also has its roots in Sąjūdis. Established by well-known intellectuals, the party was an advocate of liberal ideology but with little public support. Inviting Rolandas Paksas to become the leader of the party gave it a chance to gain visibility but generated identity problems. Soon after the elections in 2000, the conflicts between Paksas’ team and the ‘old’ liberals became more and more severe, and finally Paksas left the party. Nevertheless, by merging with the Centre Union the party managed to preserve its parliamentary representation. The Labour Party was created from scratch on the basis of the popularity of its leader Viktor Uspaskich. It is a populist party without any ideological orientation rather than the Social Democratic party that the name of the party would suggest. In its manifesto, it presents itself as a party of ‘centrist’ orientation seeking economic prosperity, effective performance of the government and the development of the middle class. Despite its anti-establishment rhetoric, the party willingly joined a coalition with the Social Democrats after the 2004 elections, retreating from its ambitious socio-economic goals and calls for radical reforms of the governing system.

Political Cleavages and Voting Behaviour Since the beginning of the 1990s, many students of party systems in Eastern Europe have discussed the question of the applicability of Stein Rokkan’s cleavage model to post-communist countries (see e.g. Berglund 1998). Using a methodologically strict definition of political cleavages, the only political division

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in Lithuania closely resembling a cleavage in the Rokkanian sense of the word, is the communist-anti-communist conflict.9 The communist-anti-communist cleavage, which was politically manifested by antagonism between the Labour Democrats and the Homeland Union, has deep social roots dating back to the pre-war social structure and, in particular, to the experience of the Soviet occupation. In general, larger land-owners and the intelligentsia were those who suffered the most from the Soviet rule, while smallholders and their family members benefited from the change of the regime. The winners and the losers of the Soviet occupation exchanged roles in the years of democratic transformation. The political competition for symbolic values (e.g. moral evaluation of the Soviet past) in the early 1990s was complemented by the struggle for material benefits (e.g. the questions of property restitution, compensation for victims of Soviet repression, etc.). As the studies of electoral behaviour have shown, the main explanatory factor of voting behaviour in Lithuania is the voters’ evaluation of the Soviet past. For example, those who have victims of Soviet repressions in their families tend to vote for the Homeland Union; those who think they used to have a better life in Soviet times are more inclined to vote for the Democratic Labour Party or Social Democrats (Degutis 2001). In addition to the communist-anti-communist cleavage, religious, rural-urban and ethnic divisions have some importance in shaping voting behaviour in Lithuania. Although these divisions do not constitute any dominant political conflict, they have a decisive impact on the structure of the party system. Contrary to Latvia and Estonia, the question of ethnic minorities is not on the political agenda in Lithuania. The Lithuanian Poles and Russians, corresponding to 6.7 and 6.3 per cent respectively of the population according to the 2001 national census, are represented by several parties. In fact, the ethnic question has never been politicized in Lithuania, and the parties of ethnic minorities have never been influential at the national level. The Lithuanian Polish Union was established before the elections of 1992 (renamed the Polish Electoral Action in 1994) and gained about 2 per cent of the votes (see Table 4.2). Under the Law on Elections to the Seimas, the threshold of 4 per cent for party lists was not applied to the lists of ethnic minorities (see Žeruolis 1998); hence the party gained two seats in a multi-member district. Moreover, the party gained two additional seats in single-member districts in Eastern Lithuania, where the Poles constitute the majority of the population. The Russian minority, which is much more dispersed, was not able to create a party representing their ethnic interests and gained no seats in the 1992 parliament.

9

For more detailed discussion see Ramonaitė (2004).

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Table 4.2 Results of the Polish Electoral Action* in parliamentary elections Votes in multiSeats in multiSeats in singlemember district member district member district 1992 2.1 2 2 1996 3.1 1 2000 1.9 2 2004 3.8 2 * Lithuanian Polish Union in 1992. Sources: Central Electoral Committee, Krupavičius and Pogorelis (2004). In 1996, the exceptional provision for ethnic minorities was abolished and the minimum threshold was raised to 5 per cent for all individual parties and seven per cent for coalitions. As a result, the Polish Electoral Action was not able to get seats in the multi-member district (see Table 4.2). Before the 1996 election, two new parties representing ethnic minorities – the Russian Union and the Alliance of Ethnic Minorities – were established. Both of these, however, failed to gain any seats, receiving 1.63 and 2.45 per cent of votes respectively (Novagrockienė, 1998). In the 2000 elections, the Lithuanian Russian Union ran under the joint list of Brazauskas coalition and received three seats. In the European Parliament and the 2004 parliamentary elections, the Russian Union co-operated with the Polish Electoral Action but failed to get representation. On the one hand, the relatively unsuccessful performance of ethnic parties can be explained by low political participation of ethnic minorities (see Degutis 2001). On the other hand, the reason for this lies in the structure of the party system itself. The ethnic cleavage has been subsumed into the dominant left-right dimension, since the non-Lithuanian speaking population traditionally tends to vote for leftwing parties (LDDP and LSDP) opposing the somewhat nationalist right (Table 4.3). Church attendance is one of the crucial factors explaining political behaviour in Lithuania (see e.g. Degutis 1995). However, the religious cleavage in Lithuania can be easily reduced to the left-right dimension as well. As can be seen from Table 4.3, church attendance is positively related with a rightist political orientation. Religious voters tend to vote for Christian Democrats and for the Homeland Union. Despite the implicit support of the Catholic Church, which has always been one of the most influential institutions in society, Lithuanian Christian Democrats have not been able to establish themselves as a dominant party. In 1990-1996 the party appeared to be the third or even the second largest party in Lithuania in terms of membership and electorate. Since then, however, its electorate has shrunk substantially. The urban/rural cleavage was almost non-existent in Lithuania at the beginning of the party system formation, but its importance has been increasing together with growing differences in the quality of life in the largest cities and in rural areas.

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Already in 1992-1996 some differences in voting behaviour between urban and rural inhabitants could be traced. The leftist rural population was inclined to vote for the Democratic Labour Party rather than the Social Democrats, while the rightist rural electorate preferred the Christian Democratic Party to the Homeland Union (see Table 4.3). Moreover, the rural/urban division was exploited by the Lithuanian Peasants Party which claimed to represent farmers’ interests and demanded protective measures. The party, however, was not influential at the national level. Table 4.3 Voting preferences and socio-demographic characteristics (columns in %)

TS (LK)

Voted for in 1996 elections: LDDP LKDP LCS

Place of residence 5 major cities 43.6 30.4 27.8 Countryside 29.3 40.5 38.9 Nationality Lithuanian 95.7 74.7 94.5 Non-Lithuanian 4.3 25.3 5.5 Church attendance Attend church at least 22.7 7.5 37 once a weak Source: 1996 Post-Election Survey, data from Degutis (2001).

LSDP

32.9 38.4

29.2 30.8

93 7

87.3 12.7

6.8

7.7

Table 4.4 Voting results (in %) in the European Parliament election: national results and Vilnius’ results compared Party

Labour Party Lithuanian Social Democratic Party Homeland Union Liberal and Centre Union Union of Peasants and New Democracy Liberal Democratic Party Source: Central Electoral Committee.

National election results 30.2 14.4 12.6 11.2 7.4 6.8

Election results in Vilnius 16.3 13.7 17.9 17.35 4.5 6.6

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This pattern has partly changed in recent elections as rural voters have switched their support to the Labour Party of Viktor Uspaskich and to the Union of Peasants and New Democracy10 (‘Vilmorus’ post-election survey 2004). The electorate of the Social Democrats is now quite evenly distributed in cities and in the countryside. The right-wing parties (the Liberal and Centre Union and the Homeland Union) are supported mainly by city dwellers, especially in the capital city. As can be seen from Table 4.4, the electoral results in Vilnius, the capital city of Lithuania, differ substantially from the national vote.

The Left-Right Dimension in Lithuania The rhetoric of ‘left’ and ‘right’ politics was used extensively in Lithuania in the period of party system formation. Regardless, in the early 1990s, the left-right conflict reflected the dominant communist-anti-communist cleavage rather than a socioeconomic ideological spectrum (Jurkynas 2003, Degutis 2001, Ramonaitė 2003). According to the studies of the public’s placement of parties on a left-right scale, the left was occupied by the ex-Communist Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party. The Homeland Union (the Lithuanian Conservatives) and the Lithuanian Christian Democratic Party were placed on the right. The Social Democrats (until the merger with Labour Democrats) were positioned almost in the centre, contrary to their own self-identification. The Centre Union was commonly located slightly to the right from the centre (Table 4.5). Table 4.5 Public placement of five ‘traditional’ parties on the left-right scale (from -10 to +10) in 1996 LDDP LSDP LCS LKDP TS/LK -7.17 -0.99 1.92 6.91 8.06 Source: Post-election Survey (1996), data from Novagrockienė (2001). An analysis of the electoral manifestos of the parties reveals that at the beginning of the party system formation, the economic positions of the parties were fairly chaotic and did not match their labels. Paradoxically, the economic policy positions of the largest adversaries – the Democratic Labour Party and the Homeland Union – were very close. Subsequently, the parties have adjusted their economic positions progressively apparently in order to justify their labels. In 1992-1996, the Conservatives made a sharp shift to the right, adjusting to the conventional stance of the conservative parties’ family, while the Christian Democrats modified their radical leftist stance slightly and shifted to the centre. 10 After a long-enduring cooperation on pragmatic rather than ideological grounds, the Peasants Party merged in 2002 with the non-influential New Democracy Party (the former Women’s Party).

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Similarly, the Social Democrats made a natural move to the left, leapfrogging the Christian Democrats. The Centre Union – the most liberal party in 1992 – moved radically to the centre. The position of the Labour Democrats, in terms of economic policy, was still on the right (Ramonaitė 2004). The merger of the Labour Democrats and the Social Democrats after the 2000 elections signifies a major shift of the dominant conflict dimension from communist-anti-communist to socioeconomic divides. By consistently following a pro-Western direction and distancing themselves from their communist past, former Labour Democrats have reduced the importance of the communist-anticommunist cleavage. As a consequence, the left-right polarization in Lithuania has decreased. A journalist has summarised the development in the following words:11 Before, there was a contraposition between Labour Democrats and the Homeland Union. They were like opposite poles, plus and minus, and now they agree on the main, the most important questions. The differences between the left and the right have vanished. Nowadays there are traditional forces and some kind of adventurers like Paksas, Uspaskichas…

As the evidence from public opinion polls reveal, the ability of voters to place themselves and the parties on a left-right scale is decreasing. In 1994, for instance, about 77 per cent of the population could place themselves on the left-right axis and in 2001 the level of public left-right recognition had slumped to 51 per cent (Ramonaitė 2003). Moreover, the voters have difficulties in defining the left-right positions of newcomer parties, such as the New Union (Social Liberals), the Liberal Democrats or the Labour Party because they do not have an explicit position on the Soviet past. Nevertheless, despite the purposive efforts of parties to adjust the left-right axis in Lithuania to that of Western Europe, i.e. to interpret the left-right spectrum in terms of socioeconomic orientations, the public understanding of the contents of the left-right scheme is still linked to political values. Public opinion surveys reveal that the left-right self-identification is best correlated with political and moral questions: assessment of the communist regime, church attendance and national pride. In contrast, the correlation between self-identification of the electorate on the left-right scale and incomes or economic attitudes is very low (Jurkynas and Ramonaitė 2004).

Party Organizations In terms of organizational structure and membership levels, Lithuanian parties are far from resembling the mass-party model. According to different calculations, the

11

In-depth interview with a 27-year-old journalist, Tauragė, July 2004.

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ratio of party members to the electorate in 1999-2000 was 4 to 5 per cent.12 The number seems to be relatively high in comparison to other countries. However, self-reported membership is much lower and constantly decreasing. According to the European Values Survey data, self-reported party membership in Lithuania is one of the lowest in Central and Eastern Europe (European Values Study, 1999/2000). In terms of membership, the Homeland Union, Labour Democrats and Christian Democrats were in the leading positions with membership rates approaching or exceeding 10,000 (see Table 4.6). Other parties, including the Centre Union and Social Democrats had less than 5,000 members. The Homeland Union and the Democratic Labour Party inherited their organizational structure from Sąjūdis and the Lithuanian Communist Party, respectively. In early 1989, the Lithuanian Communist Party claimed to have 200,000 members. After the reorganization, the number diminished to 15,000 (Janušauskienė 2002) and it continued to decline until the merger with the Social Democrats in January 2001. Table 4.6 Party membership in Lithuania in 1992-2004 Party 1992 1996 2000 Homeland Union 16,164 19,487 Lithuanian Democratic 13,600 9,200 8,300 Labour Party Lithuanian Social 500 1,500 4,000 Democratic Party Lithuanian Christian 5,251 10,500 10,500 Democratic Party Lithuanian Centre Union 1,500 3,000 Lithuanian Liberal Union 550 1,000 2,000 New Union (Social 3,500 Liberals) Labour Party Liberal Democratic Party Union of Peasants and New Democracy * data from 2003 Source: Krupavičius and Lukošaitis (2004), Jurkynas (forthcoming).

2004 12,269* 13,000

10,000*

4,500 4,500 12,900 5,900 1,500

Sąjūdis, in turn, could have had about 180,000 members in 1989, but most of them disengaged from political activity after the declaration of independence. The Homeland Union, which was officially established in 1993, managed to mobilise more than 11,000 members, and this number grew steadily until 1998. However, 12

Krupavičius and Lukošaitis (2004) report 5 per cent in 1999 and 4.5 in 2003, Riekašius (2003) reports 4 per cent in 2000.

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the party membership substantially decreased after the unsuccessful election of 2000. The Christian Democrats reached a comparable membership rate by using the organizational structure and the resources of the church. Other parties which had to create their organizational structure from scratch had much smaller organizational capabilities. Among the new parties, only the Labour Party invested much effort into building its organizational structure. Growing at an extraordinary speed, the party now claims to have about 13,000 members. In general, low party membership rates in Lithuania are in line with the downward trend in enrolment figures in Western Europe (Dalton and Watenberg 2000). However, prominent theories of the ‘professionalization’ or ‘cartelization’ of parties (see Katz and Mair 1995) could hardly be applied to Lithuania. On the one hand, Lithuanian parties do not meet the criteria of ‘mass parties’ and, on the other hand, the degree of professionalization of Lithuanian parties is rather low. The state subsidies for parties in Lithuania are much lower than in Western European countries, and even lower than in most Central and Eastern European states. Direct state funding was only introduced in Lithuania in 1999. According to ‘The Law on the Funding of Political Parties and Political Organizations’ of 1999, state subsidies are to be allocated to political parties which receive at least 3 per cent of the votes in parliamentary and municipal elections. However, according to the law, state subsidies cannot exceed 0.1 per cent of the state budget. Yet, actual subsidies from the budget in 1999-2004 constituted less then ten per cent of the amount allowed by the law. In 2000 the parties received 980 thousand Litas (about 284 thousand euros). In 2001, the sum was reduced to 524 thousand Litas, and in 2002 it dropped to 483 thousand Litas (Krupavičius and Pogorelis 2004). The staff of Lithuanian parties is generally small and concentrated mainly to central headquarters (Krupavičius 2000). Because of the lack of stable financial support, the bureaucracy of the parties is usually organised around the parliamentary groups of the parties. Under the Seimas Statute, every Member of Parliament is entitled to have a secretary-assistant. Hence, parties represented in parliament commonly use this provision as a form of indirect funding for their staff. The staffs, however, are mainly working to satisfy the needs of MPs rather than organising extra-parliamentary activities (Krupavičius 2000).

Realignment or Decay of the Party System? Recent developments in Lithuania suggest that the relative stability of the party system in 1992-1996 did not imply a consolidation of the system. In fact, the Lithuanian party system appears to be in the state of flux. The volatility rate in Lithuania has increased with every election and in 2004 it was above 50 (Jurkynas, forthcoming), while the average volatility rate in East Central and Eastern Europe is about 30 (see introductory chapter in this volume).

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Even though the Homeland Union and the ex-Communist Social Democrats (formerly the Labour Democrats) are still among the most important political players in Lithuania, their combined share of seats in the parliament decreased from 72 per cent in 1992 to 32 per cent in 2004. Despite several mergers of traditional parties, the number of parties with substantive parliamentary representation has increased from five to seven and the number of effective parliamentary parties have increased to 6.1 in 2004 (see Table 4.7). In fact, the symptoms of the deepening crisis of traditional parties were already apparent somewhat earlier. Žeruolis (1998) claims that one might interpret the 1997/1998 presidential election as a failure of the party system, because the leaders of the established parties were defeated in the first round by two non-party candidates, Valdas Adamkus and Artūras Paulauskas.13 Moreover, the parliamentary election of 1996 was marked by an increased proportion of wasted votes (see Table 4.7). This suggests that the dominance of traditional parties was caused by the ‘freezing effects’ of the electoral system rather than by the stabilization of electoral preferences. Another sign of the crisis of the Lithuanian party system is the drastic decline in the electoral turnout. As can be seen from Diagram 4.1, the turnout in parliamentary elections in Lithuania dropped from 75 per cent in 1992 to 46 per cent in 2004, reaching the lowest level in Central and Eastern Europe together with Poland (also 46 per cent in 2001). The turnout in Lithuanian presidential elections is constantly diminishing as well. The apparent crisis of the Lithuanian party system might be accounted for by the declining importance of the dominant communist-anti-communist cleavage, and the prevailing distrust for political parties and the political elite in Lithuania. As was argued by Bartolini and Mair (1990), the level of electoral stability depends on the strength of the cleavage system in a given country. Earlier in this chapter it was claimed that the Lithuanian party system had been structured along the line of a communist-anti-communist cleavage reflected in the left-right axis of the party system. The diminishing importance of this dominant cleavage has reduced the loyalties of the electorate to the traditional parties and opened the electoral market. Table 4.7 The effective number of parties and the proportion of wasted votes in multimember district in 1992-2004

Effective nr of electoral parties Effective nr of parliamentary parties Wasted votes in per cent Source: Jurkynas (forthcoming). 13

1992 3.83 2.99 16.19

1996 7.92 3.32 31.00

2000 5.59 4.79 23.40

2004 5.78 6.13 9.00

Valdas Adamkus was supported by right-wing parties, notably the Center Union, while Artūras Paulauskas got the support of left-wing parties, notably Labor Democrats.

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90 80 70

71,7

75,2

60

58,6 52,9

50

46,1

40 30 1990

1992

1996

2000

2004

Figure 4.1 Voting turnout in parliamentary elections in Lithuania (%) A new split between traditional and new political actors appears to have in part a socioeconomic foundation since new populist parties attract most of their support from the poor rural population. An emerging division between modern and growing cities and a stagnating countryside partially overlaps with the communistanti-communist cleavage. To some extent, new parties and political actors such as Paulauskas, Paksas or Uspaskich, are a replacement of the Labour Democrats for those who are disenchanted with the current regime and feel nostalgic about the Soviet past. The voters, however, seem to be confused by the changing names and positions of parties, and it seems that they are less and less able to grasp the sense of the political game. Distrust of political parties and the political authority, in general, appears to be another cause of the crisis in the party system in Lithuania. According to the public opinion data, the Lithuanian parliament is one of the least trusted parliaments among those of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (see Candidate Countries Eurobarometer, 2001-2003). The parties are trusted by about eight per cent of the Lithuanians, which is, again, one of the lowest figures in Central and Eastern Europe. Distrust of the established political elite increases electoral absenteeism and electoral volatility as it prompts the electorate to vote for new parties challenging the existing system.

Conclusion The account of the development of the party system in Lithuania reveals the changing pattern of political competition in Lithuania. The simple cleavage structure and a mixed electoral system ensured a relatively high level of political

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stability in 1992-1996. However, contrary to the expectations of many students of Lithuanian politics, the stability was short-lived. The transformation of the party system in the parliamentary elections of 2000 was followed by a dramatic presidential election and a further erosion of traditional partisan loyalties. The odd combination of increasing fragmentation and decreasing polarization of the party system indicates a probable collapse of the competitive political space in Lithuania. New parties tend to present themselves as ‘centrist’ which basically implies the lack of any ideological and social ground. Decreasing left-right recognition on behalf of the voters reflects the diminishing importance of the communist-anti-communist cleavage. Realignment along a new axis of political conflict, however, is hardly possible because of the lack of social networks and an increasingly personality political style of electioneering. Strong anti-party sentiments in society and under-developed party structures disclose the weakness of the parties as social organizations and political institutions. Striving for immediate political gains, parties are tempted to run a candidate-centred populist campaign rather than invest in the development of an organizational structure or developing an ideological profile. Similar features of political life, however, are increasingly visible in other post-communist countries, as well as in advanced industrial democracies.

References Bartolini, S. and Mair, P. (1990), Identity, Competition and Electoral Availability. The Stabilisation of European Electorates 1885-1985 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Berglund, S. (ed.) (1998), The Handbook of Political Change in Eastern Europe (London: Edward Elgar). Candidate Countries Eurobarometer (2002), http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion. Central Electoral Committee of the Republic of Lithuanian, http://www.vrk.lt/. Clark, T. and Prekevičius, N. (2001), The Effect of Changes to the Electoral Law in Premier-Presidential Systems: the Lithuanian Case, in A. Jankauskas (ed.), Lithuanian Political Science Yearbook 2000 (Vilnius: Institute of International Relations and Political Science, Vilnius University). Dalton, R. J. and Wattenberg, M. P. (eds) (2000), Parties without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Degutis, M. (1995), Penkeri pilietinės visuomenės formavimosi metai: visuomenės reformos ir politinė kultūra, in Politologija, vol. 1(6), pp. 22-53. Degutis M. (2001), How Lithuanian Voters decide: Reasons Behind the Party Choice. In A. Jankauskas (ed.), Lithuanian Political Science Yearbook 2000. (Vilnius: Institute of International Relations and Political Science, Vilnius University).

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European Values Study 1999/2000, data file. Janušauskienė D. (2002), The Metamorphosis of the Communist Party of Lithuania, in A. Bozoki and J.T. Ishiyama (eds.), The Communist Successor Parties of Central and Eastern Europe (Armonk, New York, London, England: M.E. Sharpe). Jurkynas, M. (2003), Political and Social Conflicts in Lithuania: Searching for the Left/Right Dimension and Cleavages. The Baltic Sea area studies, no. 10 (Gdansk/Berlin, Wydawnictwo Uniwersitetu Gdanskiego/Nordeuropa Institut der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin). — (forthcoming), Earthquake Election to Continue: The second shock for the Lithuanian party system after elections in 2004, in European Parliament Elections 2004 in the 10 New Member States – Towards the Future European Party System (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft). Jurkynas, M. and Ramonaitė, A. (2004), Lietuviškosios kairės-dešinės turinys: ekspertų ir visuomenės vertinimai. Paper presented at the Annual Conference of the Institute of International Relations and Political Science and the Lithuanian Political Science Association on Lithuania After the 2004 Elections, Vilnius, 19 November, 2004. Katz, R. and Mair, P. (1995), Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party, in Party Politics, vol. 1, pp. 528. Krupavičius A. (2000), The Post-Communist Transition and Institutionalization of Lithuania’s Parties, in A. Jankauskas (ed.), Lithuanian Political Science Yearbook 1999 (Vilnius: Institute of International Relations and Political Science). Krupavičius, A. and Lukošaitis, A. (2004), Politinės partijos ir partinė sistema, in A. Krupavičius and A. Lukošaitis (eds.), Lietuvos politinė sistema: sąranga ir raida (Kaunas: Poligrafija ir informatika). Krupavičius, A. and Pogorelis, R. (2004), Rinkimų sistema ir rinkimai, in A. Krupavičius and A. Lukošaitis (eds.) Lietuvos politinė sistema: sąranga ir raida (Kaunas: Poligrafija ir informatika). Novagrockienė J. (1998), Lietuvos partinės sistemos raida, in A. Krupavičius (ed.) Seimo rinkimai '96: trečiasis „atmetimas“ (Vilnius: Tvermė). — (2001), Elections to the Seimas 2000: Party System Evolution or Transformation?, in A. Jankauskas (ed.), Lithuanian Political Science Yearbook, 2000 (Vilnius: Institute of International Relations and Political Science). Ramonaitė, A. (2003), The End of the Left-Right Discourse in Lithuania?, in A. Jankauskas (ed.), Lithuanian Political Science Yearbook 2002 (Vilnius: Institute of International Relations and Political Science). — (2004), L’importance du clivage “communistes / anticommunistes” dans les democraties post-communistes: La cas de la Lithuanie, in J.-M. Waele (ed.), Les clivages politiques en Europe centrale et orientale (Bruxelles: Editions de l’Universite de Bruxelles).

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Report of ‘Vilmorus’ Post-election Survey, 2004. Riekašius, R. (2003), Konvencinio dalyvavimo krizė. Politologija. no. 3(31), pp. 38-58. Žeruolis, D. (1998), Lithuania, in S. Berglund (ed.), The Handbook of Political Change in Eastern Europe (London: Edward Elgar).

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Appendix Table 4.8 Acronyms and names of Lithuanian parties Homeland Union (Lithuanian Conservatives)* Tėvynės sąjunga (Lietuvos konservatoriai) Labour Party Darbo partija Liberal Democratic Party Liberalų demokratų partija Lithuanian Centre Union*** Lietuvos centro sąjunga Lithuanian Christian Democratic Party** Lietuvos krikščionių demokratų partija Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party Lietuvos demokratinė darbo partija Lithuanian Liberal Union*** Lietuvos liberalų sąjunga Liberal and Centre Union*** Liberalų ir centro sąjunga Lithuanian Peasants’ Party**** Lietuvos valstiečių partija Union of Peasants Party and New Democracy**** Valstiečių ir naujosios demokratijos partijų sąjunga Lithuanian Social Democratic Party Lietuvos socialdemokratų partija New Union (Social Liberals) Naujoji sąjunga (socialliberalai) Polish Electoral Action Lietuvos lenkų rinkiminė akcija

TS (LK) DP LDP LCS LKDP LDDP LLS LiCS LVP VNDS LSDP NS LLRA

*During the recent congress, the Homeland Union (Lithuanian Conservatives) merged with the Union of Political Prisoners and Deportees and changed the name to the Homeland Union (Conservatives, Political Prisoners and Deportees, Christian Democrats) (Tėvynės sąjunga (Konservatoriai, Politiniai kaliniai ir tremtiniai, Krikščioniškieji demokratai)). ** After the merger of the Lithuanian Christian Democratic Party and the Christian Democratic Union, the new party was renamed the Lithuanian Christian Democrats. *** On May 31 2003 the Lithuanian Liberal Union, the Lithuanian Centre Union and the Union of Modern Christian Democrats merged into the Liberal and Centre Union (Liberalų ir centro sąjunga). **** After the merger with the New Democracy, the party was relabelled the Union of Peasant Party and New Democracy.

1990 LKP Lithuanian Communist Party

LDDP

1996

2000

LSDP

LSDP

2004

LSDP

left

Sąjūdis

LCS

NS

VNDS

LKDP

LCS

NS

DP

Figure 4.2 Party system development in Lithuania 1990-2004

LLS

LDP

TS (LK)

LKDP

LiCS

TS (LK)

TS

right

Chapter 5

Power without Love? Patterns of Party Politics in Post-1989 Poland Aleks Szczerbiak

Introduction Although they are felt to be a central feature in the functioning of nearly every contemporary democracy, political parties have often conjured up negative images in Poland. For example, much of the blame for the failure of the Polish inter-war Second Republic to deliver national integration and unity in its early years was laid at the door of its incoherent party system and fragmented parliament. In 1925 there were no fewer than 92 registered political parties of whom 32 were represented in the Sejm, the more powerful primary chamber of the Polish parliament, organized into 18 political clubs (Leslie 1980). Consequently, many Poles shared their interwar semi-authoritarian leader Marshall Pilsudski’s dislike of party politics, which he pejoratively dubbed ‘Sejmocracy’, and supported his 1926 military coup that brought to an abrupt end a brief period of liberal democratic politics.1 The communist period and the various forms of political organization and behaviour that it promoted re-inforced these existing negative pre-conceptions of political parties. Forty years of one-party rule discredited not just the ruling communist party, but also the whole notion of party politics. It was not surprising, then, that the anti-communist Solidarity opposition movement was imbued with an ethos of ‘anti-politics’ and emerged within the framework of a trade union and social movement (for instance Ost 1990). The fact that the 1989-90 democratic transition process was dominated by a unified, non-party form of political organization, therefore, appeared to accord well with established Polish preferences. However, it also helped to ensure that the process of party development in post-1989 Poland was tortuous, and characterized by high levels of instability and electoral volatility. Initially at least, Solidarity, like the other East European political conglomerates that oversaw the democratic transitions and dominated the first phase of post-communist politics, displayed little interest in transforming itself into a political party (for instance, Kiss 1992). 1

For the best English language monograph account of Polish politics in the inter-war year see Polonsky (1972).

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Most Solidarity leaders were hostile to the divisiveness that party formation implied and chose to present themselves as a stabilising force and part of a broader movement representing the whole of civil society. Indeed, some even questioned whether the formation of Western-style political parties in the traditional form was even appropriate in the post-communist context (Lewis 1994). Nevertheless, in spite of this apparent historical antipathy towards parties, this paper will show they are a powerful (if unloved) institution in post-1989 Poland, vital to the functioning of its post-communist democracy. The paper is structured as follows. It begins by surveying briefly the main parties functioning in Poland. This shows that, at the time of writing (April 2005), there were eight or nine that had a realistic chance of being elected to the next Polish parliament, and were, therefore, potentially ‘relevant’; suggesting a party system that is both still in flux and becoming more rather than less fragmented. Section two attempts to map these on to Western party families and examines the main dimensions of competition within the Polish party system, based on the parties’ social and ideological bases of support. This indicates that clear and relatively stable dimensions of left-right competition have structured the Polish party system and voting in Polish elections throughout the post-1989 period. However, the dominant axis of competition has been a cultural-historical one, defined by religiosity and attitudes towards the communist past and social-cultural values. Socio-economic class variables and attitudes towards related issues of economic intervention and distribution have represented very much a secondary axis in the Polish party system. Section three examines the pattern of post-1989 elections and party development. This shows that while there appears to have been a gradual reduction in terms of the number of ‘effective’ parliamentary and electoral parties, this has been accompanied by very high levels of electoral volatility and party instability. Finally, sections four and five consider whether this pattern of development can be accounted for by reference to the institutional framework on the one hand and nature of the links between parties and society on the other. Section four shows that institutional explanations focusing on the relatively strong presidency and the proportionality of the electoral system do not appear to have much explanatory power in post-1989 Poland. However, as section five shows, the weak links between Polish parties and their electorates appears to be one of the key factors accounting for: high electoral volatility, party instability and extra-ordinarily low levels of election turnout even compared to other postcommunist states, particularly in parliamentary elections. The nature of the weak party-society links in Poland is exemplified by low levels of membership and social implantation, a relatively high (and increasing) level of dependence upon the state for their resources and extremely negative attitudes towards parties as agents of linkage among the general public. At the same time, however, section five shows that parties remain vital to the functioning of Polish democracy and have no rivals in terms of structuring elections and recruiting governmental and parliamentary elites.

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The Main Polish Parties In spite of the introduction of tighter registration restrictions in the 1997 and 2001 Laws on Political Parties2 at the time of writing there were still 90 parties officially registered in Poland, of whom 60 submitted annual accounts for 2003.3 However, only a small number of these were ‘relevant’ in terms of having an impact on the dynamics of the party system. This paper focuses on the nine parties that, at the time of writing (April 2005), had a realistic prospect of being elected (or reelected) to parliament after the next election (due in autumn 2005). Seven of them secured representation following the most recent September 2001 parliamentary election. Four of them contested the election as individual parties: Self-Defence (Samoobrona), the Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość: PiS) party, the Polish Peasant Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe: PSL) and the League of Polish Families (Liga Polskich Rodziń: LPR).4 Two of them contested the election as a coalition, the Democratic Left Alliance (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej: SLD) and the Labour Union (Unia Pracy: UP), while one, Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska: PO), was as a ‘civic’ electoral committee but subsequently registered as a political party after the election. Of the remainder, the Freedom Union (Unia Wolności: UW) failed to cross the 5 per cent threshold for representation while Polish Social Democracy (Socjaldemokracja Polska: SdPl) was formed in March 2004. Consequently, at the time of writing, there were eight or nine parties that had a realistic chance of being elected to the next Polish parliament and were, therefore, potentially ‘relevant’; suggesting a party system that was both still in flux and becoming more rather than less fragmented. These points will be explored in greater detail in other sections; the remainder of this section surveys these nine parties briefly. As Table 5.1 shows, the Democratic Left Alliance-Labour Union won 41.04 per cent of the vote and 216 seats in the September 2001 election. Although it fell short of obtaining a parliamentary majority (231 seats), this represented the best result achieved by any political grouping in a post-1989 Polish election.

2 The 1997 Law on Political Parties increased the number of signatures required to register a political party from 15 to 1000 and required parties to file annual accounts. The 2001 amendments to the law tightened the accounting requirements, particularly for those parties in receipt of state funding, and introduced measures to delete parties from the register if they failed to comply with these requirements. 3 See Państowa Komisja Wyborcza (2004). 4 In fact, although both the Law and Justice and League of Polish Families electoral committees actually compromised coalitions of several parties and organizations, for the purpose of the 2001 election they formally registered as single party committees in order to be subject to the lower 5 per cent threshold for securing parliamentary representation (it is 8 per cent for electoral coalitions).

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Above the threshold Democratic Left Alliance-Labour Union (SLD-UP) Civic Platform (PO) Self-Defence (Samoobrona) Law and Justice (PiS) Polish Peasant Party (PSL) League of Polish Families (LPR) Below the threshold Solidarity Electoral Action of the Right (AWSP) Freedom Union (UW)

Votes 5,342,519 1,651,099 1,327,624 1,237,624 1,168,659 1,025,148

% 41.04 12.68 10.20 9.50 8.98 7.87

729,297 404,074

5.60 3.10

Seats 216 65 53 44 42 38

Source: Rzeczpospolita (2001) and the Polish State Electoral Commission. The Democratic Left Alliance was formed in the run up to the first fully free post-communist parliamentary election held in October 1991 as a specially assembled coalition clustered around Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland (Socjaldemokracja Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej: SdRP), which was formed in January 1990 following the dissolution of the communist Polish United Workers Party (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza: PZPR) as its direct organizational successor. Social Democracy formed an electoral alliance with trade unions and other social organizations that had enjoyed patronage during the communist era, notably the former pro-regime All-Poland Alliance of Trade Unions federation (Ogolnopolskie Porozumienie Zwiazków Zawodowych: OPZZ). To the surprise of many commentators, the Democratic Left Alliance finished a very close second in the 1991 election winning 12 per cent of the vote and 60 (out of 460) seats in the Sejm. It worked patiently throughout the 1991-93 parliament to refashion itself as a modern European, social-democratic formation of constructive reformers with a social conscience and benefited from the impressive performance of its new generation of leaders, especially the young and charismatic Aleksander Kwaśniewski. As a consequence it won the September 1993 election with 20.4 per cent of the vote, a success that the new electoral law magnified into 171 seats. This allowed it to form a coalition government with the Polish Peasant Party, the first since 1989 to enjoy a stable parliamentary majority. Following a government crisis, Democratic Left Alliance nominee Józef Oleksy became premier in March 1995 and, in the historic November 1995 Presidential election, Kwasniewski narrowly defeated the incumbent (and legendary ex-Solidarity leader) Lech Wałęsa by 51.7 per cent to 48.3 per cent. Premier Oleksy was forced to resign in January 1996 following (unproven) allegations that he had collaborated with the Soviet and then Russian security services and was replaced by a non-party Democratic Left Alliance nominee, Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz. Although by the September 1997 election, the Democratic Left Alliance had grown to encompass more than thirty parties and groupings and increased its share of the vote to 27.1 per cent, it saw its

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Sejm representation reduced to 164 seats and lost the election to the new centreright electoral conglomerate Solidarity Electoral Action (Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność: AWS). However, it used its period in opposition to renew its appeal and in, June 1999, transformed itself from being a somewhat amorphous electoral conglomerate into a single unitary, member-based party of the same name, that the tough and pragmatic former communist official Leszek Miller led to victory in 2001. In order to ensure that no organized political force could threaten its left flank, the Democratic Left Alliance also formed an electoral coalition with the Labour Union in October 2000. This was a much smaller social democratic party formed in 1992 that included both former communists and Solidarity activists among its leading members. It performed well in the 1993 election, finishing fourth (7.3 per cent, 41 seats) but chose not to enter government and, in 1997, narrowly failed to cross the threshold required for parliamentary representation with 4.7 per cent. Following its 1997 defeat, under new leadership the party worked increasingly closely with the Democratic Left Alliance. For example, both parties backed Kwaśniewski in his October 2000 presidential re-election bid when we won a landslide victory securing over 50 per cent of the vote in the first round. The liberal-conservative Civic Platform emerged as the main opposition grouping following the 2001 election winning 12.7 per cent of the vote and 65 seats. Civic Platform was formed in January 2001, initially as a rather loose civic movement rather than a political party, by former finance and foreign minister Andrzej Olechowski, Sejm Marshall Maciej Plażyński and Senate Deputy Marshall Donald Tusk (known collectively as the ‘three tenors’). It was as an attempt to capitalise on Olechowski’s relative success as an independent liberal-conservative candidate in the October 2000 presidential election, when he finished second behind Kwaśniewski, with 17.3 per cent of the vote. The governing Solidarity Electoral Action’s liberal-conservative faction clustered around the Conservative People’s Party (Stronnictwo Konserwatywno-Ludowe: SKL) had touted Plażyński as a possible presidential candidate, while Tusk had been narrowly defeated for the leadership of the liberal Freedom Union party at its December 2000 Congress. Most of Tusk’s supporters, who were drawn from the former Liberal Democratic Congress (Kongres Liberalno-Demokratyczny: KLD) party that had wanted to position the Freedom Union as a more overtly liberal party, left to join Civic Platform. In March 2001, the majority within the Conservative People’s Party also decided to follow Plażyński’s appeal and contest the 2001 election under the Civic Platform banner. The biggest shock of the 2001 election was the success of the radical-populist agrarian Self-Defence grouping led by the controversial Andrzej Lepper. SelfDefence, which had been in existence since the early 1990s as both a political party and farmers’ union, won 10.2 per cent of the vote and 53 seats, to emerge as the third largest grouping in the new parliament. One of the most controversial figures in Polish politics, Lepper frequently came into conflict with the law. He first achieved prominence in the early 1990s as the leader of farmers’ protests against

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debt foreclosures although his electoral career was unspectacular until he returned to frontline politics during farmers’ road blockades in January 1999. Running a considerably more professional campaign in 2001, Lepper’s Self-Defence was able to harness the support of those voters (primarily, but not exclusively, in rural areas) who perceived themselves to be losers from the economic transition and had become increasingly radicalised and disillusioned as a consequence. Another new grouping, the conservative Law and Justice party emerged as the fourth largest in 2001 with 44 seats and 9.5 per cent of the vote. Law and Justice was formed in April 2001 by Jarosław Kaczyński to capitalise on the enormous popularity of his twin brother Lech, the Solidarity Electoral Action-nominated (but politically independent) justice minister; and mainly comprised individuals who had once been members of the Centre Agreement (Porozumienie Centrum: PC) party.5 Although the Centre Agreement contested the 1997 election as part of the Solidarity Election Action coalition, its leader Jarosław Kaczyński stood on a separate ticket. After the election, the party split with the pro-Solidarity Electoral Action faction merging with another, smaller party to form the Agreement of Polish Christian Democrats (Porozumienie Polskich ChrześcijańskychDemokratów: PPChD), while Kaczyński’s supporters continued to operate under the original party name until the Law and Justice party was formed. In fact, Law and Justice actually fought the election in alliance with the Right-wing Agreement (Porozumiene Prawicy: PP) party,6 although all the candidates were registered under the Law and Justice banner in order to avoid the more restrictive threshold requirements for electoral coalitions (eight per cent as opposed to 5 per cent). With 8.98 per cent of the votes and 42 seats, the Polish Peasant Party ended up the fifth largest parliamentary grouping, paving the way for its return to government as the Democratic Left Alliance-Labour Union’s junior coalition partner. The party was formed in May 1990, when the successor to the former communist ‘satellite’ United Peasant Party (Zjednoczone Stronnictwo Ludowe: ZSL) merged with a much smaller grouping led by formerly exiled peasantists. In 5 The Centre Agreement was the first major political grouping to emerge from the Solidarity movement. Originally formed in May 1990 as a broad coalition of right-wing and centre-right parties and political groupings to spearhead support for Lech Wałęsa’s first presidential bid, the Centre Agreement transformed itself into a more traditional individualmember based party at its first congress in May 1991. However, it failed to gain Wałęsa’s hoped for endorsement and emerged as one of the President’s most bitter critics. Although an electoral coalition led by the Centre Agreement won a respectable 8.71 per cent of the vote and 44 seats in the 1991 election, the party went on to suffer a series of damaging splits and defections and failed to cross the new electoral threshold requirement in 1993 with only 4.42 per cent. 6 The Right-wing Agreement was also formed in April 2001 and comprised defectors from two Solidarity Electoral Action-affiliated parties: the Conservative People’s Party (unhappy at the decision to link up with Civic Platform) and Christian National Union (Zjednoczenie Chrześcijańkso-Narodowe: ZChN) that remained a Solidarity Electoral Action affiliate.

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attempting to renew its appeal, the Peasant Party invoked the traditions of the precommunist peasant movement, which dated back to the nineteenth century and was also the foremost political opponent to the communists in the immediate post-war years. On this basis, it was moderately successful in the 1991 election winning 8.7 per cent and 48 seats. The party also won credibility and political rehabilitation from its leader, Waldemar Pawlak’s short interlude as stop-gap premier in June 1992 and the subsequent 1993 election saw the most impressive electoral performance ever by a Polish agrarian party, when it won 15.4 per cent which translated into 132 seats under the new electoral law. Indeed, although it was the junior partner in the new coalition government with the Democratic Left Alliance, the party was able to secure the premiership for Pawlak. However, Pawlak was deposed as premier in February 1995 and the party went on to see its share of the vote halved to 7.3 per cent and its seats slashed to only 27 in1997. Along with Self-Defence, the other surprise winner of the 2001 election was the Catholic nationalist League of Polish Families that emerged as the sixth grouping to secure parliamentary representation, winning 7.9 per cent of the vote and 38 seats. Although formally fighting the election as a political party,7 registered only four months before the election, the League was actually a coalition of various Catholic-nationalist parties and right-wing groupings. These included Antoni Macierewicz’s Catholic-National Movement (Ruch Katolicko-Narodowe: RKN), Jan Lopuszański’s Polish Agreement (Porozumienie Polskie: PP) and the National Party (Stronnictwo Narodowe: SN) led by Maciej Giertych and his extremely ambitious son Roman, together with various prominent Catholic-nationalist individuals such as militant Solidarity activist Zygmunt Wrzodak. Due to support from the fundamentalist Catholic-nationalist broadcaster Radio Maryja, the League was able to harness successfully the radical ‘religious right’ electorate that had previously been subsumed within broader right-wing parties and coalitions such as Solidarity Electoral Action. The other striking feature of the 2001 election was the fact that both of the political groupings that been in government in the previous parliament, Solidarity Electoral Action and the Freedom Union, failed to even come close to securing parliamentary representation. The main governing party, Solidarity Electoral Action, which fought the election as the Solidarity Electoral Action of the Rightwing (Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność Prawicy: AWSP) coalition, won only 5.6 per cent of the vote, falling well short of the eight per cent threshold. Solidarity Electoral Action was formed in June 1996 as an electoral conglomerate by an eclectic group of 22 right-wing and centre-right parties and groupings spearheaded by the Solidarity trade union. As the Polish political scene polarized increasingly around attitudes towards the past in the mid-1990s, Solidarity Electoral Action emerged the clear winner in the 1997 election with 33.8 per cent of the votes and 201 seats and formed a coalition government, led by Solidarity economic adviser Jerzy Buzek, together with the Freedom Union, another post-Solidarity formation. 7

Again, to circumvent the higher electoral threshold for electoral coalitions.

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However, from the beginning of 1999 support for the Buzek government and Solidarity Electoral Action began to slump and its leader Marian Krzaklewski, finished a distant third in the October 2000 presidential election with only 15.6 per cent. Chastened by its experience in Solidarity Electoral Action, and anticipating its heavy electoral defeat, the Solidarity trade union decided to withdraw from the rump Solidarity Electoral Action of the Right-wing coalition in May 2001. The election was also a crushing defeat for Solidarity Electoral Action’s erstwhile coalition partner, the Freedom Union that won only 3.1 per cent of the vote. This party was formed in April 1994 following a merger of the Democratic Union (Unia Demokratyczna: UD) and Liberal Democratic Congress, two parties which emerged from within the Solidarity movement and dominated the 1989-93 governments supplying, between them, three of Poland’s first five post-communist prime ministers: Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Jan Krzysztof Bielecki and Hanna Suchocka. In April 1995, Mazowiecki was replaced as party leader by Leszek Balcerowicz, his former finance minister and architect of Poland’s post-communist economic transformation. Under Balcerowicz, the Freedom Union won 13.4 per cent of the vote and 60 seats in the 1997 election and, as noted above, joined the government as junior coalition partner. However, the party found the experience of governing a difficult one, particularly having its leader Balcerowicz as finance minister, and eventually left the coalition acrimoniously in June 2000. Lacking credibility through its association with the unpopular government and led by the somewhat lacklustre Bronisław Geremek who took over from Balcerowicz in December 2000, the party’s core support seeped away following the formation of Civic Platform at the beginning of 2001. Following the 2001 election, the Democratic Left Alliance-Labour Union formed a coalition government with the Peasant Party, led by Leszek Miller. Since then the six groupings (comprising seven parties) that secured parliamentary representation in 2001, continued to be the most significant in the Polish party system. However, there were also considerable shifts in levels of both party support and intra-party instability. The greatest turbulence occurred on the centre-left, which is ironic given that some commentators had posited the Democratic Left Alliance as almost a model of how to transform a former communist party into a modern, electorally-successful social democratic formation. (See Grzymała-Busse 2002) In fact, the Democratic Left Alliance-Labour Union’s support went into sharp decline at the end of 2003 and, by the time of Miller’s resignation as party leader in March and subsequently premier in May 2004, his was the most unpopular government since 1989. The grouping’s massive slump in support precipitated the first major split on the Polish centre-left when, in March 2004, 33 Democratic Left Alliance and Labour Union deputies led by Sejm Marshall Marek Borowski broke away to form Polish Social Democracy, thereby bringing about the downfall of the Miller government. Polish Social Democracy presented itself as representing a more decisive break with both the communist past and the high profile corruption scandals that had dogged the Miller government. However, opinion polls and the results of the June 2004

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European Parliament election in Poland showed both parties hovering dangerously close to the 5 per cent threshold, with the Labour Union likely to be excluded from the next parliament unless it contested the election as part of a broader electoral coalition with a stronger partner. Among the agrarian parties, the Peasant Party lost support as a result of its association with the Miller government and then, when it was forced out in April 2003, was unable to capitalise on being in opposition and relentlessly squeezed by Self-Defence. Its slump in support to around 5 per cent also placed a question mark over the parliamentary survival of one of the few parties that, along with the Democratic Left Alliance, had appeared to be a point of stability in the post-1989 Polish party system. On the other hand, although Self-Defence suffered the defection of nearly half of its parliamentary caucus, this appeared to have little discernible impact on its level of popular support, suggesting that it was party leader Lepper who ‘defined’ the party for most of its supporters. Indeed, at one point at the beginning of 2004, opinion polls showed a surge of support for SelfDefence, capitalising on the decline of the Democratic Left Alliance, that made it briefly the most popular party. However, its European Parliament election result, which showed the party at broadly the same level of support that it enjoyed in 2001, suggested that, while it may have had large reservoirs of potential supporters, its electorate was also ‘soft’ and extremely volatile. At the same time, attempts to organise a single, broad right-wing electoral coalition on the lines of Solidarity Electoral Action were abandoned in favour of consolidating around the three main existing parties: Civic Platform, Law and Justice and the League of Polish Families. Civic Platform survived the departure of Płażyński in April 2003 and the Conservative People’s Party decision not to dissolve itself in the new party8 and, from the beginning of 2004, emerged as the most popular party in opinion polls. Civic Platform also abandoned the loose, social movement formula that it adopted in the run up the 2001 election and reorganized itself as a more conventional, member-based party with Tusk emerging as the party’s single leader in June 2003. The League of Polish Families also survived the defection of some of its smaller affiliated groupings and leaders and re-organized itself as a more coherent, unitary party; with the young and extremely ambitious nationalist-populist Roman Giertych increasingly emerging as its de facto leader. Law and Justice also consolidated its position following its successful fusion with the Right-wing Agreement in June 2002. It remained an open question whether these three parties would survive or whether, following an electoral defeat or when subjected to the pressures of being in government, would simply revert to the fragmentation and instability that had characterized the Polish centre-right. At the same time, while the various parties that once comprised Solidarity Electoral Action were confined to the margins of politics, the Freedom Union made a surprise comeback in the June 2004 European Parliament election and had a 8

Although a significant number of its members, including party leader Jan Rokita, did join Civic Platform as individuals.

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chance of becoming the first ever defeated party in post-1989 Poland to re-enter parliament without having to resort to an electoral pact with a stronger coalition partner.9

Dimensions of Party Competition in Poland So what are the main dimensions of competition in the post-1989 Polish party system? A number of methodologies have been developed in party studies to analyse dimensions of party competition. One simple approach is to attempt to map the parties onto Western political party families, by examining which European party groupings Polish parties identify with or are members of. As Table 5.2 shows, eight of the nine most significant Polish parties were members of European Parliament party groupings. The Democratic Left Alliance, Labour Union and Polish Social Democracy were members of the Party of European Socialists; Civic Platform and the Peasant Party were in the Christian Democratic/conservative European People’s Party-European Democrats; the Freedom Union in the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe; Law and Justice in the Eurosceptic Union for a Europe of Nations; and the League of Polish Families in the more hard-line anti-EU Independence and Democracy grouping. Only Self-Defence was not aligned to any European party grouping. This approach is useful for providing us with a ‘first cut’ in terms of these parties’ ideological self-placement. However, the categorisation of Polish parties according to membership of European Parliament party groupings does not necessarily map (intuitively and empirically) on to the most important dimensions Table 5.2 Polish parties’ European Parliamentary party links European Parliament party group European People’s Party (Christian Democrats)-European Democrats Socialist Group in the European Parliament Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe Union for Europe of the Nations Independence and Democracy Source: European Parliament.

Polish partner Civic Platform, Polish Peasant Party, Solidarity Electoral Action Democratic Left Alliance, Labour Union, Polish Social Democracy Freedom Union (formerly European People’s Party) Law and Justice (formerly European People’s Party) League of Polish Families

9 Although, at the time of writing, it appears that the Freedom Union is likely to be dissolved in April 2005 and re-launched as a party provisionally named the Democrats (Demokraci).

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of Polish party competition.10 For example, while Civic Platform and the Polish Peasant Party are both members of the European People’s Party-European Democrats grouping, analysis of their social bases of support and voters’ policy and ideological preferences indicates that they are primarily distinguished by socio-economic class and attitudes towards economic issues, with these two parties located on opposite ends of this issue axis. Part of the problem here is also the fact that membership of some European party families, such the Union for a Europe of Nations and the Independence-Democracy grouping, reflects party attitudes towards European integration primarily. This may cut across broader ideological divisions that are more relevant in terms of that party’s national party system.11 There are various other approaches to measuring dimensions of party competition in Poland. To date, the most systematic and developed analyses of Polish party competition are those are those based on the ideological and policy preferences of parties’ voters together with their socio-demographic bases of support, and consequently this is the approach adopted in this paper.12 So what dimensions of Polish party competition does this approach reveal? Although, as we shall see in section three, the post-1989 Polish party system was characterized by high levels of electoral volatility and party instability, most Polish voters had little difficulty in identifying themselves as ‘left’, ‘right’ and ‘centre’ and a fairly clear sense of what these terms represented to them.13 At the same time, as the 1990s progressed, the Polish party system appeared to be organized increasingly around two, fairly clear dimensions of competition. The dominant divide was a historicalcultural one: based on a combination of attitudes towards the communist past and moral-cultural values, particularly the role of the Church in public life, and closely linked to the level of religiosity (measured by regularity of Church attendance). In other words, the ‘left’ was identified primarily with a more positive attitude 10

There are also general methodological difficulties associated with this approach to categorizing party families, see Mair and Mudde (1998). 11 Moreover, the League of Polish Families was admitted to the IndependenceDemocracy grouping while Self-Defense was excluded on the basis of the size of its European Parliament delegation rather than stance on European integration per se. 12 Other approaches to examining dimensions of competition in the party studies literature include: ‘subjective’ analyses, based on aggregating the judgements of expert country specialists and ‘objective’ ones, based on content analysis of party programmes and manifestoes, or surveys of the views of party elites or rank-and-file members. All of these have their methodological strengths and weaknesses which lack of space does not allow me to discuss here. However, the main reason why I have not chosen to adopt any of these approaches here is that there is no systematic published data is readily available specifically on the Polish case. For a critical account of both the general methodological difficulties associated with determining dimensions of party competition on the basis of content analysis of manifestoes and party programmes, and the specific difficulties of applying this approach to the Polish case, particularly in evaluating the importance of ‘hidden’ dimensions such as attitudes towards the communist past and religiosity, see Bukowska and Cześnik (2002) and Markowski (2002a). 13 See Pankowski (1997), Szawiel (1999), Szawiel (2001) and Szawiel (2002).

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towards the communist past, liberal social values and relative secularism, while the ‘right’ was associated with anti-communism, conservative social values and high levels of religiosity (Jasiewicz 2002, Grabowska 2002). Socio-economic class and associated attitudes towards the distribution of wealth, the role of the state of the state in the economy, and levels of taxation and public expenditure, the dominant issue axis in most established Western democracies, represented a secondary dimension of competition among Polish voters. These two axes, dominated the Polish party system throughout the 1990s and, towards the end of the decade, appeared to map on to the emerging four-party system and the bases of support and electoral appeals/strategies that these parties pursued: Solidarity Electoral Action and Democratic Left Alliance on the historical-cultural axis; and the Freedom Union and Polish Peasant Party on the socio-economic axis (Szczerbiak 1999a). Comparative analyses written at the beginning of the 1990s predicted that, given the likely success of economic transformation, the main political divisions in Poland would be socio-economic (Kitschelt 1992, Evans and Whitefield 1993). Subsequently, some Polish commentators also argued that the historical-cultural division would give way progressively to competition over socio-economic issues based on economic class voting or, given the increasing salience in public discourse of controversies surrounding Polish membership of the EU, other issue dimensions such as nationalism-cosmopolitanism.14 When the September 2001 parliamentary election shattered what appeared to be the newly emerging order in the Polish party system (see Szczerbiak 2002), this raised the question of whether the ‘old’ divisions in Polish politics were giving way to a new set of sociodemographic and issue alignments? In his analysis based on survey data of voters’ attitudes towards a number of key issues, Markowski found that in 2001 what he termed the religiosity-secularism axis (based on attitudes towards the Church in public life and within which he subsumed both historical and cultural dimensions) had declined in salience as a means of determining Polish voting patterns compared to 1997. However, it still remained a more powerful explanatory variable compared to either the economic axis (based on attitudes towards privatisation, unemployment versus inflation, taxation policy, agricultural subsidies and social welfare), which had also declined in salience since 1997, or the nationalism-cosmopolitanism axis (based on attitudes towards EU integration and the role of foreign capital), which had increased in terms of its relative salience, but remained identical in terms of absolute salience (Markowski 2002b). In terms of distinguishing between individual party electorates, Markowski found that religiosity-secularism and attitudes towards the communist past were the most salient issues for the communist successor and conservative party voters. On the post-communist left, Democratic Left Alliance voters were distinguished 14

Some commentators argued that political debates over and divisions surrounding the issue of EU membership would act as a catalyst for bringing new socio-economic divisions between winners and losers from the economic transition. See, for example KolarskaBobińska (1998) and Bachman (2000).

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primarily by the fact that they were the most anti-clerical and most opposed to excluding former communists from public office (de-communisation); although they were also disproportionately against privatisation. On the other hand, among the conservative parties, League of Polish Families voters were the most proclerical and in favour of de-communisation, as well being as the most anti-EU. They were also disproportionately anti-privatisation and pro-agricultural subsidies. Solidarity Electoral Action voters took similar stances on the religiosity-secularity divide and the de-communisation issue but were also disproportionately proprivatisation and EU integration and anti-agricultural subsidies. The main distinguishing feature of the Law and Justice parties’ voters was that they were disproportionately in favour of de-communisation. On the other hand, the socioeconomic and cosmopolitanism-nationalism issue axes were the most important issue for the post-Solidarity liberal and agrarian party voters.15 Freedom Union and Civic Platform voters were both disproportionately in favour of privatisation and a significant role for foreign capital and against progressive taxation and agricultural subsidies; with the Freedom Union’s voters being the most economically liberal. Both parties’ voters were also disproportionately pro-European integration (particularly Civic Platform’s) and, interestingly, also in favour of decommunisation. On the other hand, Self-Defence and Polish Peasant Party voters were disproportionately in favour of progressive taxation and agricultural subsidies and relatively anti-EU integration. The Peasant Party’s voters, who were the most economically collectivist overall, were also disproportionately against privatisation but, interestingly, also anti-clerical and opposed to de-communisation. Jasiewicz, on the other hand, attempted to identify dimensions of party competition in Poland by examining the link between support for a particular party and both ‘objective’ socio-demographic characteristics (sex, age, income, education, place of residence, religiosity), and voters’ ‘subjective’ evaluations of their past, current and future economic situation, together with systemic and economic reforms more generally. In terms of the 2001 election, Jasiewicz also found that the historical-cultural divide had not disappeared and that the ‘religiosity’ variable (based, in this case, on regularity of Church attendance) was linked strongly (much more so that any socio-occupational variables) with support for the Democratic Left Alliance (negatively) and with support for the League of Polish Families and Solidarity Electoral Action and, although to a lesser extent, Civic Platform and the Law and Justice (positively). However, Jasiewicz also found that socio-economic factors were much more clearly evident in 2001 than 1997. On the one hand, there were parties who could legitimately claim to represent certain specific socio-economic classes or groups of a ‘para-class’ nature who either felt themselves to be beneficiaries of reform or were ideologically broadly supportive of it: Civic Platform as the representative of the emerging ‘middle class’, and the Freedom Union of the ‘old’ intelligentsia. On the other 15

Except in the case of the League of Polish Families (and, although less so, Solidarity Electoral Action voters) as regards the cosmopolitanism-nationalism axis.

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hand, there were parties that appeared to represent the interests of classes potentially or actually threatened by reforms, such as the Polish Peasant Party as the representative of peasant smallholders, or those who represented groups and individuals who felt themselves to be a kind of Polish ‘underclass’ on the margins of socio-economic life as a result of these reforms, as in the case of Self-Defence and, although to a much lesser extent, the League of Polish Families. Jasiewicz concluded that although the 2001 election might have represented a strengthening of the role of economic factors and socio-economic class interests, for the moment at least historical-cultural factors remained the dominant ones determining party voting preferences in Poland (Jasiewicz 2002; see also Szczerbiak 2003). On the basis of the above analysis of Polish voters’ issue preferences and sociodemographic profiles, it is possible to locate the nine most important parties identified in section one within four broad party ‘blocs’ that compete on the two primary dimensions of competition, historical-cultural and socio-economic. Firstly, an ex-communist/social democratic left bloc comprising the Democratic Left Alliance, Labour Union and subsequently Polish Social Democracy, based primarily on a secular electorate that adopted an anti-clerical and communistforgiving stance on the historical-cultural dimension. Secondly, a post-Solidarity conservative/national-populist bloc comprising Law and Justice, the League of Polish Families, and previously Solidarity Electoral Action, based primarily on a religious electorate together with pro-clerical and anti-communist stances on the historical-cultural dimension. Thirdly, a post-Solidarity liberal bloc comprising Civic Platform and the Freedom Union based on socio-economic groups that were perceived beneficiaries from or ideologically supportive of liberal economics reforms (but are also disproportionately anti-communist).16 Fourthly, an agrarian(populist) bloc comprising Self-Defence and the Polish Peasant Party based on socio-economic groups that were perceived losers from, or ideologically hostile to, liberal economic reforms, particularly peasant smallholders. Although, as noted above, there is an absence of ‘hard’ data based on systematic content analysis of party manifestoes and programmes and/or expert surveys of party positions, these profiles of party electorates do map broadly and intuitively onto where one would locate these parties objectively according to their ideological self-definition.

Elections and Party Development in Post-1989 Poland A broader look at the impact of post-1989 parliamentary elections on Polish party development reveals three particularly striking features. Firstly, notwithstanding the earlier discussion about the large number of potentially ‘relevant’ parties in the 16 Although it should be noted that since the 2001 election Civic Plaform has shifted to the ‘right’ and is increasingly seeking to position itself as a conservative (rather than liberal centrist) party on the historical-cultural axis.

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Polish party system, as Table 5.3 shows, there has been a gradual reduction in the number of parties and groupings elected to parliament from 29 in 1991 to 6 in 1993, and then remaining stable at five in 1997 and 6 in 2001.17 Moreover, this reduction in the crude numbers was matched by a consistent fall in the ‘effective’ number of parties, as measured by the Laasko-Taagepera index, over the course of the four post-1989 parliamentary elections both in terms of electoral parties (13.9, 9.8, 4.6 and 4.5) and even more so parliamentary parties (10.4, 3.9, 2.9 and 3.6). Further evidence of consolidation can be seen in the gradual increase in the share of votes (and seats) won by the two largest parties across the four elections which increased from 24.3 per cent (26.5 per cent of seats) in 1991 to 35.81 per cent (65.9 per cent) in 1993, peaked at 61.0 per cent (79.3 per cent) in 1997, before falling back again to 53.7 per cent (61.1 per cent) in 2001. Table 5.3 Party fragmentation in post-1989 Poland 1991 1993 1997 Number of parties elected to parliament 29 6 5 Effective number of electoral parties 13.86 9.8 4.59 Effective number of parliamentary parties 10.45 3.88 2.95 Share of votes won by two largest parties 24.31 35.81 60.96 Share of seats won by two largest parties 26.52 65.87 79.35 Source: Markowski and Cześnik (2002); and author’s calculations.

2001 6 4.5 3.6 53.72 61.09

However, very high levels of electoral volatility have accompanied this steady reduction in the number of effective parties and apparent consolidation of the party system. As Table 5.4 shows, the level of net electoral volatility calculated according to the Pederson index was 38.8 per cent in 1993, falling to 19.9 per cent in 1997 and then increasing to a massive 49.3 per cent in 2001.18 This extremely high level of electoral volatility was exemplified by the fact that, in 2001, both governing parties Solidarity Electoral Action and the Freedom Union, that between them won 47.2 per cent of the vote in 1997, failed to cross the thresholds for parliamentary representation. Moreover, as noted above, at the time of writing it remained in doubt whether the two groupings that comprised the three parties that formed the coalition government after the 2001 election – the Democratic Left 17

The figures for the last three elections do not include representatives from the German minority parties who were exempt from the minimum thresholds required to secure parliamentary representation and of whom there were four in 1993 and two in 1997 and 2001. 18 Although the 2001 figure for gross volatility is considerably lower (28.66 per cent) and the net volatility figure can also be reduced (to 19.25 per cent) if one makes certain assumptions about some of the ‘new’ parties simply being continuations of the old. See Markowski and Cześnik (2002). For more on Polish electoral volatility see Cześnik and Markowski (2002).

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Alliance, Labour Union and Polish Peasant Party – would cross the thresholds for parliamentary representation at the next 2005 election. It is possible that these figures for individual party volatility masked much lower levels of inter-bloc volatility. Markowski has calculated these figures to be: 16.4 per cent in 1993, 6.2 per cent in 1997 and 21.9 per cent in 2001 based on three blocs: left, right and centrist. Using the author’s slightly different typology identified above based on ex-communist/left, post-Solidarity conservative/nationalist, post-Solidarity liberal and agrarian(populist) blocs, one finds somewhat higher, but broadly similar, levels of inter-bloc volatility of: 22.7 per cent in 1993, 12.1 per cent in 1997 and 21.0 per cent in 2001. While these are somewhat lower figures than those for crude inter-party volatility, they are still substantially higher than one would find historically among West European electorates.19 Table 5.4 Electoral volatility in post-1989 Poland 1993 1997 Net electoral volatility (Pederson index) 38.78 19.9 Inter-bloc volatility (Markowski) 16.39 6.17 Inter-bloc volatility (Szczerbiak) 22.69 12.08 Source: Markowski and Cześnik (2002) and author’s calculations.

2001 49.3 21.9 21.04

Moreover, if one shifts the focus of analysis from the individual voter to party organizations, then one also sees a pattern of intra-party instability and fragmentation. In other words, Polish parties appear to be characterized by very low levels of organizational loyalty with every major intra-party dispute ending in a split. Such extreme intra-party instability was originally felt to be a ‘disease’ confined largely to the Polish centre-right. This was exemplified by the break up of the Solidarity coalition in 1989-95. Together with the highly proportional electoral law (discussed below) the proliferation of ‘post-Solidarity’ parties in the run up to the October 1991 election was widely felt to have contributed significantly the extremely fragmented parliament that subsequently emerged. 10 parties and groupings, seven of whom emerged from the Solidarity movement or could be characterized as centre-right, obtained 16 or more seats in the 460-member Sejm and the share of the vote for the seven largest (including five that could be characterized as post-Solidarity or centre-right) ranged between 7.5 per cent-12.31 per cent (Millard 1992). Continuing divisions on the right meant that in the September 1993 election nearly one third of votes were cast for parties that failed to cross the new electoral thresholds, with most of those who found themselves excluded from parliament being from ‘post-Solidarity’ groupings on the (centre-) right of the spectrum (Millard 1994). The formation and subsequent electoral success of Solidarity Electoral Action suggested that the Polish (centre-)right had 19

Bartolini and Mair’s (1990) average for West European elections between 1960 and 1989 is 8.4 per cent.

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finally drawn conclusions from its string of electoral defeats. However, this process of organizational consolidation proved to be short-lived, as Solidarity Electoral Action proceeded to disintegrate rapidly in the run up to the 2001 election (Szczerbiak 2004). The contrast between the instability on the postSolidarity (centre-)right, and the relative organizational cohesion of the communist-regime successor parties, the Democratic Left Alliance (and previously Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland) and the Polish Peasant Party, was particularly striking. However, as noted above, the ‘Polish disease’ also appeared to have spread to the centre-left. In other words, if one characterizes a party system as involving a relatively stable pattern of inter-actions between its constituent units, then the Polish one has been characterized by a rather low level of ‘system-ness’. To make matters worse, the fact that electoral coalitions and parties split frequently during the course of a parliament means that the composition of parties can differ substantially at the end of their term compared with the beginning so that the Laasko-Taagepera ‘effective number of parties’ index can mask the true level of party fragmentation in Poland. A survey of the Polish Sejm in December 2004 shows that there has been a net turnover of 96 deputies in the membership of parliamentary clubs and circles compared with that immediately after the September 2001 election.20 This also has broader implications for government stability. Since August 1989, Poland has had eleven different premierships involving ten premiers (Peasant Party leader Pawlak serving two terms in August 1991 and October 1993-March 1995) and twelve different governments (the October 1997-September 2001 Buzek government becoming a minority one in June 2000). On the other hand, changes to the Polish Constitution introduced in 1997 have, to some extent, helped to protect incumbent Polish governments from the effects of party fragmentation and instability. The new Constitution stipulated that incumbent premiers could only be (involuntarily) removed by a so-called ‘constructive vote of no-confidence’ in favour of a named successor. This provision meant that there were only three premiers (involving four governments) since September 1997, with Buzek being the first post-1989 premier to serve a full four-year parliamentary term, compared with seven (involving six premiers) between August 1989-September 1997.

Institutional Explanations for Party System Development So how do we explain this pattern of electoral volatility and party system instability? One influential school of thought in the party studies literature argues that institutional design is a crucial influence on the formation of parties and party 20

These figures understate the level of gross turnover as they do not account for the effect of defections from one of the parliamentary clubs to another existing one. Gebethner (1993), for example, estimates that 123 deputies changed parties during the 1991-93 parliament.

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systems, especially in new democracies, by creating incentives for party fragmentation and consolidation.21 One such institutional explanation focuses on the state’s executive structures and centres on the proposition that a strong presidency is likely to de-stabilise party formation (for instance Linz 1996, Shugart 1998). While Poland has a parliamentary system in which the main locus of power is located in the premier who emerges from the largest party or coalition of parties in the legislature, it also has some semi-presidential features. The relatively strong, although initially indirectly elected, presidency was introduced at the behest of the then ruling communist party in the compromise deal agreed with the democratic opposition that emerged following the March-April 1989 round table negotiations. Subsequently, in 1990 it was decided that the President would be directly elected for a five year term.22 Although the 1997 Constitution clarified and reduced the President’s powers somewhat,23 those that remained were still significant. These included: the right to nominate the premier on the first and third attempts and appoint ministers (purely a formality, however, if the largest party or parties enjoy a parliamentary majority), initiate legislation, refer bills to the Constitutional Tribunal, call an early election if a government fails to pass a budget by the end of January and nominate a number of key state officials.24 Perhaps most significantly, the President retained the power to veto legislation passed by parliament, a veto that could only be overturned by a qualified 60 per cent majority in the Sejm (previously a two-thirds majority was required). In other words, although the 1997 Constitution moved Poland away from French-style ‘semi-presidentialism’ towards a German ‘Chancellor system’, the Polish President could remain at the centre of the political process if he used his powers intelligently; particularly when a government did not have the qualified parliamentary majority required to over-turn his veto. In a recent paired comparison of the Czech Republic and Poland, Saxonberg tested the hypothesis that moderate and strong presidentialism is linked with weak party structures specifically in relation to centre-right parties in these two countries, arguing that Poland’s relatively fragmented centre right was the result of the incentives facing that country’s head of state. Specifically, that the relatively 21

For a critical discussion of the explanatory power of institutional explanations of party development with specific reference to the centre-right in post-communist states, see Hanley et al. (forthcoming). 22 In two rounds, if the first round failed to produce a winner securing more than fifty per cent of the votes plus one, then a second round would be held involving the two candidates securing the largest number of votes. 23 By, for example, making it clear that he did have the right to nominate the Foreign Affairs, Internal Affairs and Defense Ministers. 24 These include Polish ambassadors and representatives in international organizations, the heads of the armed forces, senior judges, the head of the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Tribunal, the Supreme Administrative Court and three members of nineperson national broadcasting council.

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powerful directly elected presidency in Poland led a charismatic leader like Lech Wałęsa to avoid founding or supporting a party consistently. To counter the argument that these institutional effects should, hypothetically, also have operated on the Polish centre-left, but did not appear to do so,25 Saxonberg (2003) argued that, unlike the Polish centre-right parties, the Democratic Left Alliance was not a ‘new’ formation, so did not experience the early problems of stabilisation and institutionalisation that would make it particularly susceptible to these effects. Clearly, at certain points in the early 1990s Poland's semi-presidential system did create incentives for Wałęsa to avoid a party-building strategy and these may have inter-acted with his personality to foster fragmentation on the Polish centreright. However, detailed analysis suggests that such institutional effects may have been more apparent than real. Firstly, the fact that Wałęsa contested the presidency against rivals from Solidarity, whose proto-parties he proceeded to undermine, speaks of pre-existing problems of cohesiveness within the post-Solidarity bloc, and perhaps also of Wałęsa’s personality and anti-party sentiments together with weak norms of ‘party-ness’ per se, rather than the degree of incentive provided by a semi-presidential system. In other words, a relatively strong presidential regime can be regarded as much (if not more) an effect of weak political parties as a cause; in other words, it is difficult to separate these two processes out analytically. Secondly, Saxonberg’s account does not explain why the centre-right was (briefly) able to overcome these divisions in the mid-1990s when Solidarity Electoral Action emerged. Semi-presidentialism should, perhaps, be viewed as offering a complex mix of incentives and can in certain circumstances favour party formation. For example, defeat in the 1995 Polish presidential election arguably played a polarising role that actually prompted a previously fractured centre-right to consolidate in the Solidarity Electoral Action bloc. Institutional explanations that focus on the nature of the electoral system centre on the proposition that more majoritarian systems produce strong and cohesive parties, while more proportional ones encourage political entrepreneurs who find themselves marginalised within their political formation to pursue a strategy of ‘exit’ rather than ‘voice’ (Hopkin 1999). These ideas have a long lineage in comparative political science dating back to Duverger’s argument that the ‘mechanical’ and ‘psychological’ effects of majoritarian and proportional electoral systems correspond to two-party and multi-party systems respectively (Duverger 1964). Poland’s parliamentary election system has been subject to frequent amendment over the last fifteen years in terms of: the threshold for parliamentary representation, district magnitude, the counting method for seat apportionment, and the existence of (and qualifying threshold for) a national top up list of extra seats for the largest parties (see Millard 2002). Indeed, only two of Poland’s four post1989 elections (1993 and 1997) have been contested on the basis of the same 25

Moreover, when, as noted above, the first major split appeared in 2004 it was not President Kwaśniewski who was the catalyst for it.

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electoral system, and the next one in 2005 will be fought on a different one once again. The electoral system for the Sejm in the October 1991 election was extremely proportional. Of the 460 seats, 391 were elected proportionally in 37 districts each containing between 7-17 seats, with the number of seats allocated using the Hare-Niemayer system that favoured smaller parties, and with no minimum threshold applied to secure parliamentary representation. The remaining 69 seats were apportioned nationally, on the basis of the total votes cast in all constituencies to parties that had registered candidates in at least five districts and either gained more than 5 per cent of the total vote or had their candidates elected in at least five districts.26 The law was then amended for the 1993 election in order to reduce fragmentation and produce a more consolidated parliament. The most important change was the introduction of a 5 per cent threshold to achieve parliamentary representation for individual parties (except for those representing ethnic minorities) and eight per cent for electoral coalitions. The new law also increased the number of electoral districts from 37 to 52 (corresponding to the 49 administrative provinces but with Warsaw divided into two seats and Katowice into three) each electing between 3-17 deputies. The d’Hondt counting method for allocating seats (which favoured larger parties) was introduced and the threshold for obtaining a share from of the 69 seats allocated from the ‘national list’ was raised to seven per cent. The September 1997 election was also fought on the 1993 law but the 1998 local government reforms that reduced the number of administrative provinces to 16, precipitated further amendments. The main governing party, Solidarity Electoral Action, which had originally joined the opposition Democratic Left Alliance in supporting a law that continued to favour larger parties changed its stance when its opinion poll support slumped in 19992001. Consequently, the 2001 law shifted the balance towards medium sized parties. The national top-up list was abolished, the d’Hondt counting system replaced by a modified system of Saint Lague (more favourable to medium sized parties) and, most significantly, the number of constituencies was reduced to 41 each electing between 7-19 deputies. Finally, the electoral law was amended once again in 2002 when the d’Hondt counting method was re-introduced to shift the balance back somewhat towards larger parties (see Frydrykiewicz 2002). However, in spite of these frequent amendments, throughout the post-communist period Poland has retained a broadly proportional rather than majoritarian electoral system, with the main shifts being in the degree of proportionality.

26 The much less powerful Senate, whose term of office runs concurrently to that of the Sejm, was originally elected by a simple plurality system in 49 constituencies corresponding to the then Polish regions with each region elected two members; except for Warsaw and Katowice regions which elected three. Following the 1998 local government reorganization, which reduced the number of administrative regions to 16, the new electoral law passed in 2001 stipulated that Senators would be elected from 40 constituencies, each electing between 2-4 members.

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There is certainly some evidence that the electoral system has helped to shape Poland’s post-1989 party system. Firstly, the highly proportional 1991 electoral law may have helped to produce the extremely fragmented 1991-93 parliament. Secondly, the subsequent amendment to the electoral law, and bitter experience of the Polish (centre-)right parties’ resulting exclusion from the 1993-97 parliament, may have been one of the factors that encouraged them to consolidate, a process that culminated in the formation of Solidarity Electoral Action. Thirdly, Solidarity Electoral Action’s 2001 amendment to the electoral law to make it more favourable to medium-sized groupings may also have accelerated its own decomposition by making the option of 'exit' more attractive to some of its members who went on to form Civic Platform, Law and Justice and the League of Polish Families. However, a more detailed examination of the Polish case also reveals problems with an approach that relates party system development directly to the electoral system. Firstly, given that it was the political elites themselves who were responsible for drafting the country’s electoral laws, it is difficult to distinguish cause from effect, as these laws may, arguably, have reflected party interests or exacerbated existing divisions rather then created them. For example, while the highly proportional 1991 Polish electoral law may have encouraged party system fragmentation and instability, it may have simply reflected the fact that the Polish political scene was already fragmented, with the law’s framers designing a system to maximise their chances of electoral survival. Similarly, Solidarity Electoral Action’s decision to support a 2001 amendment to the Polish electoral law to make it more favourable to medium-sized political groupings may also have reflected its slump in the opinion polls, and therefore its changed perception of its own interests. Secondly, the explanatory power of an electoral system-based approach is undermined by the varying fortunes of the communist successor left and the right. While both had to operate with the same set of institutional incentives the former was (until recently at least) able to achieve relative organizational coherence and consolidation. Thirdly, electoral system effects do not ‘just happen’ but crucially depend on parties (and their voters) responding rationally and appropriately to the incentives facing them and this involves them having a relatively sophisticated understanding of the electoral system and its implications in relation to their electoral strengths. This was clearly not always the case in Poland, exemplified by the Polish right’s failure to consolidate in the run up to the 1993 election, fought on an amended electoral law that favoured larger parties and groupings, that led to its virtual exclusion from the 1993-97 parliament. A similar case was Solidarity Electoral Action’s suicidal decision prior to Poland’s 2001 election to register as a coalition, not a party, thereby raising its own electoral threshold from 5 per cent to 8 per cent.

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Nature of the Links between Polish Parties and their Supporters An alternative explanation for Polish electoral volatility and party system instability lies in the nature of the party organizations themselves and their weak societal links. According to the parties literature, the traditional mass party created the basis for stable voting patterns in Western European democracies and, thereby played a critical role in the structural consolidation (or ‘freezing’) of Western party systems by developing the kind of organizational linkages with voters that acted to form stable ‘cleavages’ (see Bartolini and Mair 1990). By providing its supporters with stable political identities, it encapsulated and ‘closed off’ major segments of the electorate, and thereby narrowed the electoral market for potential new entrants. The more recent catch-all, electoral-professional and cartel party models, on the other hand, had weaker links with their supporters and were much more oriented towards the state as a source of political and financial support, thereby creating more ‘open’ and available electorates, and fostering electoral volatility and party system instability (Katz and Mair 1995). Empirical research has suggested that party organizations in post-1989 Poland were developing in a way that, in many important respects, resembled the more recent catch-all, electoralprofessional and cartel party models than the traditional mass party model (see Szczerbiak 2001a). In other words, if one distinguishes between the respective ‘partyness’ (or penetration by parties) of state institutions and society, parties in post-1989 Poland were relatively strong in terms of the former but much weaker in terms of the latter. On the one hand, Polish parties were quite strong in terms of their penetration of the state and had virtually no challengers recruiting political elites and structuring elections and political institutions. Firstly, party appointees dominated every government since the first fully free parliamentary election in October 1991 until the fall of the Miller government in May 2004. The current government at the time of writing led by Marek Belka, which has been in office since May 2004, appears to be an exception in that it was nominally a technocratic one led by a nonparty figure, but even in this case, initially at least nine out of the fourteen cabinet members were party nominees (eight Democratic Left Alliance, one Labour Union). Secondly, parties dominated the Polish parliament, particularly the Sejm, and the rules for funding (see below), and participation in debates and committees favoured the party-based Parliamentary clubs and circles. Thirdly, parties dominated every post-1989 parliamentary election. At the time of writing 37 of the 460 Sejm deputies were officially categorised as non-aligned independents, but all of them were elected from a party-based list and subsequently defected, or had been expelled from, party-based Parliamentary fractions.27 According to the 2001 electoral law, only registered political parties, coalitions of parties or electoral 27 It is only slightly easier to be elected to the Senate. In 2001, two independent candidates were elected to the Senate, although many of the 15 candidates elected in the ‘Senate 2001’ electoral committee were non-party figures.

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coalitions comprising citizens could contest Polish elections. In order to have any realistic chance of crossing the 5 per cent threshold required for parliamentary representation an election committee had to register in every constituency. Each constituency list had to be supported by at least 5,000 signatures although any electoral committee that registered lists in at least half of the constituencies was automatically registered in all the others. This discriminated against ad hoc ‘civic’ electoral committees and in favour of parties, as the latter were clearly the ones more likely to have an organizational infrastructure capable of collecting these signatures. Of the ten electoral committees that registered candidates in every constituency in 2001, nine comprised parties or coalitions of parties and the only one that did not, Civic Platform, registered itself as a political party shortly after the election (in March 2002). Fourthly, although no in-depth empirical research has been undertaken on this subject and it is unclear quite how widespread the phenomenon is, Polish public administration also appears to be dominated by party appointees. There are various numbers of estimates of how many such appointments are in the gift of political parties. Formally, there are approximately 1700 civil service positions that are subject to political appointment. However, some estimates that also include the supervisory councils and boards of stateowned or partially state-owned companies, government agencies and regulatory agencies and local public administration posts (such as hospital managers, directors of local cultural centres, heads of social services) have put the figure as high as 200,000 (Macieja 2001). The importance of the state to Polish parties could also be seen in their increasingly high level of dependence upon, and interest in, exploiting the financial resources provided by it. The widespread practice of state financial support was of prime importance to all parties in post-1989 Poland and both its level and scope have been expanded progressively (Szczerbiak 2003b). The 1993 Law on Elections introduced a system of one-off election refunds to those parties or electoral coalitions that secured parliamentary representation in proportion to the number of seats they obtained. The 1997 Law on Political Parties supplemented this with a new system of regular state contributions paid to those election committees that specifically registered themselves as parties and that secured at least three per cent of the votes. All this culminated in an amendment to the Law on Political Parties passed in 2001 that massively extended the scope of these refunds and donations, at the same time as preventing parties from obtaining funding from any other sources except membership subscriptions, small donations from individuals (that do not exceed fifteen times the minimum wage), wills and bequests and interest on savings.28 The 2001 law only made provision for ongoing state funding to registered political parties, with ‘civic’ electoral committees only eligible for the one-off election refunds. As Table 5.5 shows, these changes appear to have made the state the main source of income for a number of parties with the proportion of 28

Parties broke the rules or failed to submit accurate annual financial statements or accounts of their election expenses faced reductions in their refunds and donations.

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income made up for by state funding in 2003 ranging from 64.8 per cent in the case of the Democratic Left Alliance to 98.6 per cent for the League of Polish Families.29 Table 5.5 Proportion of party income derived from state funding, 2003 Party Income (zloties) State funding Democratic Left Alliance 33,583,813 64.8% Polish Peasant Party 8,043,375 11.9%* Self-Defence 7,533,349 93.8% League of Polish Families 5,962,100 98.6% Law and Justice 4,523,166 90.1% Freedom Union 3,797,695 85.1% Labour Union 2,396,077 78.5% *51.5% if income from asset sales are excluded. Source: State Electoral Commission and author’s calculations. The other significant sources of state party funding are the various forms of support for parliamentary groupings (comprising parties in most cases), together with the salaries, resources and expenses for parliamentarians. These sums are often overlooked when discussing state party funding as they are formally intended for use on parliamentary rather than strictly party activities and do not show up in party accounts. In practical terms, however, it is impossible to distinguish between the two types of activity. Indeed, until the 2001 amendments to the Law on Political Parties, this source of income represented a considerably larger share of state party funding than the election refunds and subsidies. In 1995, for example, the Democratic Left Alliance parliamentary club received a total of 9.8 million złoties, the Peasant Party 7.9 million, Freedom Union 3.7 million and Labour Union 1.9 million to fund their activities for that year alone (Gebethner 1995). In comparison, the refund that the party central offices received after the 1993 election to cover four years of activities was: three million złoties for the Democratic Left Alliance, 2.4 million for the Peasant Party, 1.1 million for the Freedom Union and 600,000 for the Labour Union (Szczerbiak 2003b). Moreover, 29 The exception to this pattern was the Polish Peasant Party for whom state party funding made up only 11.9 per cent of its income. The Peasant Party acquired a large amount of property: partly from assets that it inherited from the communist-era United Peasant Party and partly through buildings that it purchased with its 1993 election refund, from which it then derived rental income. Amendments to the Party Law passed in 2001 forbade parties from obtaining funding from this source, forcing the Peasant Party to divest itself of these assets; hence the large proportion of its income derived from this source. Without asset sales, state party funding would have comprised 51.5 per cent of the party’s 2003 income. In fact, since 2003 the party not received any state subventions as the income it derived from asset sales was deemed to be contrary to what was permitted under the revised Party Law.

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many local parliamentary offices doubled up as local party headquarters, becoming the de facto basic organizational unit for the most important Polish parties. The corollary of the high level of state orientation is the fact that Polish parties are also remote and somewhat distant institutions and the nature of their links with their electorates is fairly shallow. Consequently, the ‘partyness’ of Polish society is much weaker, and Polish parties are much less effective in terms of articulating and aggregating societal interests and even less so in mobilising citizens and integrating them into the political process. This low level of social implantation can be observed in a number of ways. Firstly, Polish parties have extremely low membership levels. According to comparative data produced by Mair and van Biezen (2001), Poland had the lowest level of party membership at the end of the 1990s among the 20 countries surveyed, at only 1.15 per cent as a percentage of the electorate (326,500) compared with the average of 5 per cent. Similarly, according to the 1999-2000 European Values Survey party membership in Poland was the lowest in Europe at only 0.7 per cent of the population (see Halman 2001). Secondly, survey research conducted by the author in the mid-1990s revealed that Polish parties had very little local organizational penetration and that local party branches functioned as fairly passive and informal bodies, primarily geared toward fulfilling certain local organizational tasks associated with national and local election campaigns, and with local politics providing the main focus for debate and activity in between such campaigns (see Szczerbiak 1999b; Siellawa-Kolbowska 2000). Thirdly, the same research showed very little evidence that Polish parties were attempting to encapsulate their supporters by developing networks of ancillary structures such as youth and women’s organizations directly linked to their party organizations. Indeed, they appeared more interested in developing loose, informal relationships with a fairly wide range of interest groups rather than attempting either to enrol their supporters as collective members or tying themselves too closely to any particular interest organization, and had very weak organic links with social organizations, more generally (Szczerbiak 2001). However, it is also worth noting that, as Table 5.6 shows, membership figures for the two organizational successors to communist-era parties, the Democratic Left Alliance and the Polish Peasant Party, were significantly higher than those of the ‘new’ parties (due, in large part, to the organizational ‘legacy’ that they inherited from their communist-era predecessors), which meant that, in this respect at least, they bore a somewhat closer relationship to the mass party model.30 The explanations for this low level of party membership and weak social implementation lay in a combination of what Scarrow (1994) has termed ‘demand side’ and ‘supply side’ factors, namely: the role of membership recruitment in party organizational strategies and the willingness (or lack of it) of Polish citizens

30 Self-Defence was clearly an exception here but it is difficult to gauge the accuracy of the figure stated in the Table given the overlap between membership of the party and the trade union. (Piskorski 2004).

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Party Membership Polish Peasant Party 120,000 Self-Defence 100,000* Democratic Left Alliance 80,000 League of Polish Families 20,000 Civic Platform 15,000 Freedom Union 10,000 Labour Union 7,000 Law and Justice 6,000 Polish Social Democracy 4,300 *The figures for Self-Defence are difficult to calculate because of overlap between membership of the party and the trade union. Source: Newspaper reports and figures supplied to author by party central offices. to join parties. On the one hand, Polish party leaders had not undertaken pro-active party development strategies viewing the drawing in of looser networks of supporters who could be mobilized at election times more closely into their parties’ orbits as a more attractive organizational strategy than enrolling them as party members, and using the mass media as a more effective means of communication. At the same time, survey evidence suggested that Poles had extremely negative attitudes towards parties, so that even if party strategists actively sought to recruit substantially more individual members, their prospects for success were slim. (Szczerbiak 2001b) Eurobarometer data from 2004 showed that only three per cent of Poles expressed trust in political parties, the lowest of any EU member state and compared with an average of 14 per cent (see European Commission 2004) As Table 5.7 shows, this also made them by far the least trusted institution in post1989 Poland. This was reflected in Polish survey data. For example, an April 2003 survey conducted by the CBOS polling agency found that 87 per cent of respondents felt that Polish politicians only looked after their own interests, 78 per cent that they were not credible and 77 per cent that they were dishonest. When asked what motivated someone to become a politician, 52 per cent said it was a desire to make money and 30 per cent that they wanted to acquire power compared with only 9 per cent who said that they wanted to realise some ideal and 6 per cent that they wanted to do something for others. (CBOS 2003) The reasons for this high level of anti-party sentiment probably lie in a combination of a general mistrust of ‘parties’ as institutions, stemming from negative connotations of ‘the party’ generated by forty years of communist party rule, that is generic to all postcommunist states (see Kopecký 1995 and Mair 1997) together with specific Polish factors relating to conduct of the country’s post-1989 political elites.

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Table 5.7 Level of trust in Polish institutions, 2004 Institution Army Radio Charitable organizations Television Religious organizations Press United Nations Police European Union Trade unions Judiciary/legal system Large firms Parliament Government Political parties Source: European Commission (2004).

Level of trust (%) 63 59 55 54 51 50 50 43 33 21 21 20 8 7 3

Interestingly, other survey evidence points to increasing levels of party identification in Poland starting at a very low base of 17 per cent in the early 1990s, among the lowest in post-communist Eastern Europe (cf. Plasser et. al. 1998; Szczerbiak 2001b), increasingly steadily to 45 per cent in 1995 and 64.3 per cent in 1997. Party identification fell back to 54.7 per cent in 2001, although this was still quite high given that 35.7 per cent of the votes in this election were cast for new political groupings. This suggests that although most Poles may regard parties an evil, they also consider them to be a necessary one, at the very least in terms of providing them with some basic voting cues at election time. Low levels of party membership and trust in parties, weak social implantation, and high levels of anti-party sentiment and alienation from political (and, therefore, party) elites may be the key to understanding the extraordinarily low levels of parliamentary election turnout in post-1989 Poland; even compared with the rest of the region where turnout is low by West European standards. As JungerstamMulders shows in her introductory chapter to this volume, at 47.0 per cent the average turnout in Polish parliamentary elections is significantly lower than the 64.9 per cent average for the new EU member states and 76.5 per cent for the EU15. To date, no comparative research has been undertaken to explain this phenomenon. Most recent research on Polish turnout tends to be country-specific and concerned with how non-voters differ (or do not) from voters more generally together with normative questions about whether low turnout threatens democratic consolidation in Poland.31 Indeed, all of the factors arising from forty years of 31

See, for example Cześnik (2002) and McManus-Czubińska et al. (2004). Most of this

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communist rule that could be advanced to account for very low election turnout in Poland – such as mistrust of political institutions (including parties) and the political process, cynicism towards politics and politicians and societies that are atomised and ‘un-civic’ – are equally applicable to other post-communist states. Indeed, one might even expect these features to be less evident in Poland given the relatively high levels of civic mobilisation during the communist period and the strength of Polish Solidarity, that emerged as a mass popular anti-communist movement far earlier than any comparable one in the region. Disproportionately low levels of party membership and strong anti-party sentiments in Poland, even by post-communist standards, are, therefore, a plausible explanation for such extraordinarily low levels of parliamentary election turnout. Indeed, the fact that average turnout for post-1989 Presidential elections which are focused on individual candidates rather than parties, is consistently higher (61.6 per cent) than that for parliamentary elections (47.4 per cent) also appears to offer tentative support for this hypothesis. On the other hand, the highest turnout in any post-1989 election, the second round of the 1995 Presidential election which was both extremely closely fought and highly polarized, was still only 68.2 per cent. Similarly, only 62.7 per cent of Poles participated in the first round of the epochmaking 1989 semi-free elections, the first (partially) democratic poll in the Soviet bloc for over forty years. Clearly, there is a large segment of the Polish electorate that, quite simply, is completely disengaged from the political process and never participates in elections. Understanding this deeply ingrained level of political disengagement requires further, comparative data and analysis that goes beyond that available to the author.

Conclusion Political parties are powerful (if unloved) institutions in post-1989 Poland, vital to the functioning of its post-communist democracy. On the one hand, while there appears to have been a gradual reduction in terms of the number of ‘effective’ parliamentary and electoral parties, this has been accompanied by very high levels of electoral volatility and party instability. Indeed, this – together with the fact that, at the time of writing, there were eight or nine that had a realistic chance of being elected to the next Polish parliament, and were, therefore, potentially ‘relevant’ – suggested a party system that was both still in flux and becoming more rather than less fragmented. Indeed, it makes it very difficult to talk about a Polish party ‘system’ at all, if one equates ‘system-ness’ with a relatively stable of pattern of party inter-actions. The links between Polish parties and their electorates also appear to be very weak. In this respect, Polish parties bear a closer resemblance to tends to conclude that the views of Polish non-voters differ little from those who participate, and that low turnout is rooted in passive disengagement from the political process rather than alienation from or hostility to democracy as such.

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catch-all, electoral-professional and cartel party models than the traditional mass party model with low levels of membership and social implantation and a relatively high (and increasing) level of dependence upon the state for their resources. Poland is also characterized by extremely low levels of trust in political parties and high levels of anti-party sentiment. The negative attitudes towards parties as agents of linkage among the general public appears to be one of the key factors accounting for high electoral volatility and party instability. This appears to have more explanatory power than institutional explanations that focus on the existence of a relatively strong presidency or a proportional electoral system, about which it is more difficult to draw firm conclusions on the extent and direction of their impact on the party system, particularly given the frequent amendments that there have been to the voting system. Weak party-electorate links are also one of the most compelling reasons accounting for the extra-ordinarily low levels of election turnout even compared to other post-communist states, particularly in parliamentary elections. On the other hand, parties remain vital to the functioning of Polish democracy. They have no rivals in terms of structuring elections, recruiting governmental and parliamentary elites, and are closely integrated with, and increasingly financially dependent upon, the institutions of the state. Steadily increasing levels of levels of party identification also suggest that most Poles regard parties as a ‘necessary evil’, at least in terms of providing them with basic voting cues at elections. Moreover, in spite of the high levels of electoral and party instability, an examination of the social and ideological bases of party support indicates that clear and relatively stable dimensions of left-right competition have structured the Polish party system and voting in Polish elections throughout the post-1989 period. However, the dominant axis of competition has been a cultural-historical one, defined by religiosity and attitudes towards the communist past and social-cultural values. In spite of some commentators’ predictions, socio-economic class variables and attitudes related issues of economic intervention and distribution have represented very much a secondary axis in the Polish party system and, although there is some evidence that the balance between the two may be shifting, the ‘old’ divisions still appear to remain the dominant ones.

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Chapter 6

The Rise of the Power Monopoly: Political Parties in the Czech Republic Petr Kopecký

Background More than ten years after the momentous changes in the Czech Republic, the relevance of political parties for the new political system can be little doubted. Overall, if one examines the functioning of democracy in the country, and the way the system generates substantive outcomes, the political party – in all relevant aspects – is a crucial variable to look at. Indeed, it is far from an exaggeration to say that Czech parties have gradually been able to impose a party government (cf. Katz 1986) order on society (see Kopecký 2005). The political system consequently allows relatively little exercise of independent authority beyond the party reach. Recruitment to both elective and appointive public office is the most obvious sign of strong party control. With respect to the former, parties have virtually no challengers in the selection of political personnel, because access to legislative and (thus) governmental positions is a matter of exclusive partisan considerations (Kopecký 2001). Independent candidates stand no chance in parliamentary elections. This situation largely stems from the electoral law: only registered parties can present lists of candidates, and only parties are in the position to pay the financial deposit required to register for (national) elections. But it is also a function of increased organizational capacity of parties, which are now in possession of enough cadres to avoid the early 1990s practice of enriching (and legitimising) their lists with non-party candidates nominated by social groups, or with high profile personalities from various cultural sectors of society. Indeed, while much hope was put by the champions of ‘independent personalities’ into the election to the upper chamber of the parliament (the Senate) – the election conducted in single-member constituencies – even these elections have so far turned out to be predominantly party races. The electoral system to the lower chamber of the parliament (the Chamber of Deputies) is a PR list system. For all the elections conducted between 1990 and 1998, the voters had to choose in eight multi-member districts between party lists of candidates, but were able to modify the order of the listed candidates through

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preferential voting. The Droop quota was used in districts for the first-tier distribution of seats (redistribution at a national level was first done using the Droop quota, and then the d’Hondt formula for the remaining seats). In 1992, the legal threshold nationally was set at 5 per cent for individual parties, and at 7 per cent, 9 per cent, and 11 per cent for coalitions of two, three, or more parties respectively. The reform of the electoral system further increased these thresholds in 2001: they have now been set nationally at 5 per cent for an individual party, and 10 per cent, 15 per cent, and 20 per cent for coalitions of two, three, or more parties respectively. Moreover, the number of districts was increased from eight to 14, and a modified d’Hondt formula was introduced to distribute the seats in districts. All these changes had two underlying reasons: to limit the competition by increasing the barrier for entry to parliament, and to empower larger political parties by increasing the disproportionality of electoral results (see Crawford 2001, Williams 2002, Kopecký 2004a). The preferential voting, which survived the electoral reform, allows citizens to alter the proposed lists of candidates. This means that deputies might benefit from building up a personal reputation in their constituencies, and thus counter eventual attempts of the party to thwart their re-nomination. Generally speaking, the use of preferential votes has also increased since its introduction in the 1990 electoral laws. Yet, the number of elected deputies who actually jumped up the list has not increased at all, because preferences seem to be allocated in such a way that they fail to favour particular candidates. A partial and very important explanation is that a slight tinkering with the electoral rules has resulted in an increased threshold needed for a candidate to move up on the proposed list, thus insulating parties from potential difficulties in controlling nominations and recruitment to parliament. The selection of ministers conveys a very similar tale. The cabinet members are normally selected from within the parliament and, in addition, even those recruited from outside of parliament are normally party members. The very few non-political and non-partisan specialists appointed to government normally act within the strict political guidelines of the party which nominates them, and their activity is the subject of the same political scrutiny as that of a normal partisan appointee. Party sympathy plays an important role in the selection of candidates to numerous non-elective offices of public bureaucracies as well. A change of government, and often even that of an individual minister, usually spells a significant turnover of higher ranked officials within each ministry, despite the fact that bureaucracies are supposed to provide impartial professional services for policy-defining politicians. In the early 1990s, such practice was widely justified by reference to the ‘communist heritage’ of the civil service, presumably in need of incremental restaffing to ensure its impartiality and professional competence. However, more recent trends do not seem to suggest any significant rise in the continuity of people in higher administrative positions; indeed, the change to a Social Democratic government in 1998 meant that not only a range of ministerial employees, but also

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several appointees to public agencies and advisory boards were eventually replaced by sympathizers and/or members of parties constituting new governing elites. On the contrary, party control is less apparent in the case of two institutions with appointed officials – the Constitutional Court and the National Bank. These institutions are not accountable to parliament and have clearly defined functions and important constitutional prerogatives. Indeed, the independence of the Court and the Bank is one of the key political conceptions embodied in the Czech constitution. The constitutional position of presidents, too, was meant as a potential constraint on party government. The (re-)election of Havel in 1992 seemed to herald the continuity in the ‘above-parties’ approach to the presidential office, established with his election as the Czechoslovak Federal president in 1990. Though owing his election to a qualified majority in parliament, the non-partisan president was supposed to perform his (largely ceremonial) functions independently of the will of the parliamentary majority and the political parties. The frequent clashes which have subsequently occurred between the president on the one hand, and the government and parliament on the other hand, appeared to confirm such a trend (cf. Baylis 1996). However, to interpret presidential activities as an obstacle to party influence on public policies would be a slight misinterpretation of the situation. Havel often tried to moderate the (unrestricted) rule of majority, rather than to prevent the influence of parties per se. Indeed, Havel’s strong credentials as an independent statesman (and opponent of ‘parties’) were seriously questioned since his involvement in the breakdown of Klaus’ second government in 1996 and his overt building of political alliances with the coalition of smaller centre-right parties (cf. Kunc 1999). Moreover, Klaus himself, elected as the Czech president in 2003, is an ex-chairman of the largest party (ODS), as well as a staunch proponent of the party government model. Parties have also managed to establish a monopoly of control over the decisionmaking processes, whereby civil society actors’ relative autonomy vis-à-vis parties is checked by their marginal input into the political process (cf. Green and SkalnikLeff 1997). For instance, the trade union’s position in terms of issues of broader political significance remains clearly negligible, despite their position as the largest interest group in the country. Policy demands originating from within civil society are channelled into the political arena on the basis of either a multi-party strategy, or through personal contacts with MPs, ministers and the bureaucracy. And since the fate of these demands ultimately depends on subsequent decisions within parties, governments and parliaments, the independent groups have been ready to gain the support of individual parties, rather than developing a strategy aiming at reducing parties’ overall role in polity. All in all, it appears that there are few visible obstacles to party influence in all major areas of the Czech government. The institutional constraints which exit, such as the powers of the Central Bank and the Constitutional Court, are a mere modification of what could otherwise be an ideal-typical form of party government, unattained in practice even in the era of mass party politics in Western

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Europe. Nevertheless, the factors which clearly do, and are likely to continue to consistently undermine the scope of party government is the parties’ limited abilities to increase their presence on the ground, to increase political participation and to monopolize interest articulation. As we shall see below, the aggregate party membership figures are mediocre. Local politics in large areas of both countries is in the hands of elected independents, and both parties and governments feature regularly in the polls as the least trusted institutions. Pop-concerts, sporting events and memorial rallies of all kinds seem to attract far more public attention than any mass event organized by political parties and attended by leading politicians, except for the relatively short periods of electoral campaigns. Similarly, numerous single-issue groups, and even the media, probably account for a larger share of interest articulation than parties do themselves. Put differently, the parties’ linkage function, in the sense of being a vent for civic activity and a channel of communication, founders on the low level of citizens’ direct involvement in or around political parties, if not on the parties’ indifference to forging solid links with their constituencies. The ability of Czech parties to penetrate and organize state institutions thus appears significantly greater than their ability to penetrate society at its grass-roots level.

Parties and the Party System The origins of the Czech party system date back to the early 1990s in the Federal Czechoslovakia, when the electorally dominant, but ideologically diverse opposition movement – Civic Forum (OF) in the Czech Republic and the Public against Violence in Slovakia – started to disintegrate into a number of distinct parties. With a few exceptions, the Czech and Slovak parties had already had a national mandate and base of electoral support, reinforced by the rapidly diverging (perceptions of) social and economic realities in the two constituent parts of the Federation. It was at that time that, in the Czech part of the Federation, the now dominant Left-Right divide started to crystallize and replace an amorphous cultural conflict centred on the communist/non-communist divide. The elite which eventually seized power within OF formed around a group of liberal economic technocrats, led by the founder of the Civic Democratic Forum (ODS), the former prime minister and now the president, Václav Klaus, who largely succeeded in modelling emerging institutions in accordance with a highly individualistic liberal blueprint, and who framed social and political conflict in terms of a struggle for allocation of economic resources. Well-grounded research now shows that party system competition in the Czech Republic is of a one-dimensional nature, with the dominant conflict is structured alongside a socioeconomic dimension (Huber and Inglehart 1995, Krause 1996, Markowski 1997, Evans and Whitefield 1998, Kitschelt et al. 1999). The Czech parties compete primarily on positions clustered around questions of social security, redistribution of economic resources, taxation and the role of the State in

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the economy. The composition of government coalitions has so far been a perfect embodiment of these bipolar and rather strongly pronounced lines of conflict: the right-of-centre coalition of the Civic Democratic Party (ODS), the Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA), and the Christian Democratic Union-the People’s Party (KDU-ČSL) formed the government in 1992, and again in 1996; the left-ofcentre Social Democrats (ČSSD) formed the (minority) government in 1998 and, together with KDU-ČSL and the Freedom Union (US), after the 2002 elections. Interestingly, the coalition formed in 2002 is the least consistent in this respect, uniting the centrist KDU-ČSL and leftist ČSSD, with a right-of-centre liberal US. It is also a government coalition which has experienced the most internal tensions so far. Indeed, the government collapsed in June 2004 in small parts because of the internal tensions within the ČSSD, where many leading politicians and party activists started to question the coalition with the more right-of-centre orientated parties, especially the US, following the disastrous party performance in the elections to the European Parliament. The one-dimensional nature of party competition of course does not mean that other issues do not occasionally play a role in political competition, or that other issues are not important for the profile of individual parties. For example, while generally embracing market reforms, liberalization and deregulation, the Christian Democratic Union-the People’s Party (KDU-ČSL) have always advocated a set of active state policies to support the life of families. Moreover, given that the party is electorally very firmly established in rural (Catholic) areas of South Bohemia and Moravia, it has also, perhaps more than any other party, catered to the interests of farmers, and campaigned for active regional policies. These issues of course square easily with the dominant left-right dimension. Indeed, given the KDU-ČSL combination of pro-market and pro-social policies, it has become a party perfectly acceptable for coalitions with both the right (i.e. the ODS) and the left (i.e. the ČSSD). However, KDU-ČSL MPs have also campaigned for years (unsuccessfully) to limit liberal pro-choice policies of the Czech State; the party has firmly stood on the side of those advocating repressive measures in policies towards the production, distribution and use of drugs. The position of the party on these issues, especially on the question of abortions, is out of line with most other parties. But given the relative unimportance of these issues in the overall pattern of party competition, it has never been able to thwart the pivotal position of the KDUČSL in coalition formation following all parliamentary elections. Nationalism has always been important for both the now almost defunct extreme-right Republican Party (SPR-RSČ) and the unreformed Communist Party of Bohemia and Silesia (KSČM). When the Republicans were in parliament (19921998, see also Table 6.1 below), they heavily criticized the Czech pro-EU integration stances, associating closer integration with the sell-outs by the Czech industry to Western (namely German) multinational companies. Similar stances have been present in the ideological positions of the KSČM – the successor communist party, which has domestically been considered as an extreme left-wing and anti-system, and thus pariah, party. The party’s nationalism manifested itself,

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among other things, on two main occasions: when the party actively campaigned against the Czech NATO membership (gained in 1999), and later during the campaign in the run up to the EU accession referendum (in 2004), in which the KSČM was the only parliamentary party to recommend their voters to vote ‘No’. Certain nationalist overtures have also been present in the proclamations of the KSČM’s key rival on the left of the political spectrum – the Social Democratic party (ČSSD). This was most notable when the former party leader, Miloš Zeman, reopened the issue of the so-called Beneš Decrees in 2002 – a set of policies, which expelled members of the German minority in the aftermath of the WWII from the country, for their commonly adjudged complicity with Nazi Germany. However, this was probably more an act of political opportunism, or simply one of the (many) unfortunate comments of the somewhat maverick former prime minister, rather than a deliberate attempt to integrate nationalism into the party’s political profile. Indeed, with the exception of the far right and the communists, and apart from the immediate EU pre-accession period, both the Beneš Decrees and nationalism have been of secondary importance to most Czech political parties, including the ČSSD, which is perhaps the most pro-EU and internationalist party on the political scene. Many observers nevertheless argue (e.g. Hanley 2004) that a significant shift in the direction of nationalism can now be observed in the ideology of the largest and electorally the most successful right-of-centre political party, the Civic Democratic Party (ODS). The ODS, and its former leader, currently the country’s president, Václav Klaus, have been associated with the country’s post-communist economic reform. In socioeconomic terms, the ODS has consistently advocated (though not always implemented) measures aimed at further liberalization, privatization, marketization and debureaucratisation of the economy and society. It is also these policies, and their underlying ideological assumptions, which have been crucial to the ODS’ public profile. However, the ODS is also perhaps the most consistent and most outspoken Eurosceptic formation in the CEE region (see Kopecký and Mudde 2002, and Kopecký 2004b). The party supported Czech EU entry, but has vehemently opposed enhanced political integration and any trends towards supranationalism within the EU. Moreover, mainly but not exclusively in its policies towards the EU, the ODS has increasingly adopted the rhetoric of defending ‘Czech national interests’, prompting observers to put the party into the same category on these issues as the Communists. Interestingly, however, it was precisely when the ODS attempted to make national issues one of the key themes of their electoral campaign that the party polled its lowest share of votes ever. This happened during the 2002 elections in which, like in all the previous post-1992 elections, the economic and social issues, and the competence of government on these issues, turned out again to be decisive to the election outcome. As the Table 6.1 shows, there have been changes, sometimes dramatic, in the electoral fortunes of individual parties, as well as several splits and mergers between political parties. Most notably, these resulted in the near extinction of the small conservative ODA and its replacement (in electoral, and largely also in

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ideological, terms) with the Freedom Union (US) – the party which itself is the product of a dramatic split of the ODS at the end of 1997 which precipitated the fall of Klaus’ second right-of-centre government. Similarly, the parties representing Moravian regionalist sentiments (HSD-SMS) fell into oblivion by the 1996 elections, after two successful electoral campaigns (in 1990 and 1992). Contrary to most predictions, the extreme-right SPR-RSČ did not return to the post-1998 elections parliament, even though the party previously enjoyed two electoral terms as a ‘pariah’ of the same institution. Table 6.1 Electoral results in the Czech Republic (main parties; chamber of deputies) 1992 Votes Seats (%) 29.7 76 6.5 16 6.3 15

ODS ČSSD KDUČSL US KDUČSL/US KSČM 14.1 SPR-RSČ 5.9 ODA 5.9 Other 31.6 parties Source: www.volby.cz.

1994 Votes Seats (%) 29.6 68 26.4 61 8.1 18

1998 Votes Seats (%) 27.7 63 32.3 74 9.0 20

2002 Votes Seats (%) 24.5 58 30.2 70 -

-

-

-

8.6 -

19 -

14.3

31

35 14 14 30

10.3 8.0 6.4 11.2

22 18 13 -

11.0 3.9 7.5

24 -

18.5 1.0 0.5 11

41 -

However, these changes have neither altered the dominant pattern of party competition significantly, nor can they be simply interpreted as the signs of underlying party system instability. The fragmentation of votes has gradually decreased in the Czech Republic, with the same parties accounting for the largest share of votes. This stability is largely affected by the (stability) of the electoral system and, most importantly, by the growing experience of voters with its mechanics (see Kopecký 2004a). The votes of supporters for parties whose popularity oscillates below the 5 per cent electoral threshold have increasingly been absorbed by their larger competitors (within the ideological blocks), because voters are afraid their votes might be ‘lost’ and redistributed among the parties they do not support. Thus, the effective number of electoral parties (Laakso-Taagepera index of fractionalisation, based on vote shares) decreased from 6.3 in the ‘defining’ 1992 legislative elections to 5.5 in the 1996 elections, and even further to 4.7 and 4.8 in the 1998 and 2002 elections respectively.

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Electoral volatility has also been on the decrease rather than increase in the Czech Republic: Gallagher, Laver and Mair (2005), for example, report a volatility level (aggregate electoral change) of 19.3 for the entire 1990s, and 11.5 for the 2000 to 2004 period. Indeed, the Czech Republic appears to have the lowest electoral volatility, well below the mean of 32.7 (in the 1990s) and 30.6 (20002004), of all eight post-communist countries that have recently entered the EU (see also other contributions in this volume). However, if compared with the Western European countries, the Czech electoral volatility figures will appear somewhat less positive: for example, for the 1990s, the mean aggregate electoral volatility in Western Europe was 11.3 (as opposed to 19.3 in Czech Republic), whilst the means for earlier decades in Western Europe is even lower – i.e. 9.4 in the 1980s and 8.6 in the 1970s (see Gallagher, Laver and Mair 2005). Therefore, only relatively short-term based figures of electoral volatility, for the 2000-2004 period will appear in line with the volatility figures for more established and stable party systems of Western Europe. This underlines the relatively weak social rooting that political parties enjoy in the post-communist Czech Republic, a subject to which we shall return in the next section.

Parties and the Electorate The societal anchorage has clearly been seen as the major weakness of not only the Czech political parties, but of parties throughout the post-communist region (cf. Ágh 1996, Lewis 1996, Bielasiak 1997). The data in Table 6.2 show variations among the Czech parties concerning the number of individual members (i.e. feepaying members). In fact, compared with the rest, the KDU-ČSL and KSČM can be characterized as mass membership parties. If we assume that members are also party voters, the figures on member/voter ratio show that roughly every eighth voter of the KSČM, and every tenth voter of the KDU-ČSL, are party members. This indicates that these parties rely on a relatively stable base of supporters. However, these are exceptions to the rule: both parties benefit from the organizational legacy of a long-term uninterrupted existence prior to the transition. Moreover, while these parties possess a membership base higher than the majority of the newly emerged parties, all of them have suffered a loss of members, many of whom joined the parties under the communist regime for instrumental reasons only. In the case of the former Czechoslovak Communist Party (now KSČM), the drop in membership has been astronomical, from almost two million before 1989, to around 107,000 currently. The organizational legacy of these parties also partly explains the relatively high level of organizational density in the contemporary Czech Republic. If we take the available data on party membership of all parties, the total membership in 1995 represented just over six per cent of the electorate. Perhaps surprisingly for a post-communist democracy, the figures are close to the average for 11 Western European democracies at the end of the 1980s (see Kopecký 1995), and are

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substantially higher than levels of party membership in Hungary (about two per cent of the electorate, see Wyman et al. 1995, Enyedi and Tóka 2005), or in Poland (1.5 per cent of the electorate, see Mair 1997 and Szczerbiak 2001).1 However, it is precisely the KSČM and the KDU-ČSL that account for about 60 per cent of the party members, yet they polled only some 20 per cent of the votes in the 1992, 1996, 1998 and 2002 elections. Table 6.2 Party membership (main parties) Members member/voter (in %) ODS 20,412 1.7 ČSSD 16,000 1.1 KDU-ČSL 55,000 10.2 KSČM 107,813 12.2 US 3,000 0.6 Note: member/voter figures are based on 2002 electoral results, except for the KDU-ČSL and US (1998 results). Sources: party web pages and personal interviews with Czech parties. Establishing local networks and a strong presence on the ground demand personnel and money, resources which are not in abundance for the new parties. Thus, after the initial influx of members, which many newly established parties worked hard for in order to secure both the functioning of the organization and its basic legitimization, the membership rates have stagnated on a level far below any mass scale, as is underlined by the generally low scores on member/voter ratio of parties involved. For some of the parties, like the ODA and the US, the minimal level of membership represents an obstacle for their active involvement in local politics. The results of the municipal elections in both countries indicate that parties with at least 15,000 members have been electorally most successful, not least because smaller parties have been unable to field candidates outside of the larger city areas. Moreover, local elections in general have been dominated by independent candidates, running either on their own or on the lists of established parties. For example, 68 per cent of all candidates fielded in the 1998 local elections had no party affiliation. The candidates fielded by the five parties currently in the parliament represented 26 per cent of the total number of candidates. True, most of the Czech parties have been successful in establishing links with sympathetic associations, churches, trade unions, foundations and local networks of entrepreneurs. However, the popular involvement in such organizations tends to 1

Note that figures on Eastern Europe from Wyman et. al (1995) are survey figures, whereas figures in Table 6.2 are figures reported by the parties themselves. Also note that the most recent figures (see Mair and van Biezen 2001) put Czech party membership as 3.94 per cent of the electorate (4.11 per cent in Slovakia).

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be as low as in the parties themselves and activities usually peak only in times of elections. Indeed, no Czech political party displays signs of a permanent and organizationally sanctioned relationship with a large interest group or social movement. Even the biggest trade unions or the churches, however sympathetic and close to the left-wing or Christian democratic parties do not visibly influence party policies. Moreover, many Czech parties include provisions in their statute for the creation of ancillary organizations, with some parties (the ČSSD providing such organizational elements with similar rights and status to their district organizations: fielding of candidates for elections, financial support, and participation in party executive bodies). These affiliated organizations provide some reservoir of activists and source of leadership recruitment (for example in the ČSSD), but none of the Czech parties has been able to create and/or encapsulate more than a few women or youth organizations, who themselves often stress their autonomous position rather than close party affiliations. The relatively low level of direct political involvement in or around parties can best be explained by the reluctance of the individualized, atomised and relatively socially mobile Czech citizens to take political action through such conventional means as active partisanship. The partisanship as such was of course highly discredited by more than 40 years of one party rule. However, recent research also indicates that a chunk of anti-party attitudes in the Czech Republic can be explained by citizens’ dissatisfaction with party performances (see Linek 2003). Wyman et.al. (1995) reported earlier that even though the citizens of the Czech Republic were not particularly hostile to party competition in principle, political parties as a whole were trusted less than other institutions.2 In addition, given an established correlation between levels of party identification and party membership (cf. Katz, 1990), reported high levels of Czech citizens with no attachment to a party (see Rose 1995, Mishler and Rose 1997) add another element to the mosaic of factors underlying the relatively weak ties between parties and their followers.3 To be sure, access to media and the availability of modern campaigning techniques, which the parties enjoy, makes a large party membership, whether individual or collective, less of a necessity, thus undermining the willingness of party leaders to invest in it. As most Czech party leaders will readily confess, their parties are primarily built to win the elections and to govern, rather than to serve as agents of social integration and mass encapsulation. But there is no evidence to suggest that parties would erect, consciously or otherwise, any barriers for new 2

In a similar way, Mishler and Rose (1997) report that, on a 1 to 7 scale (distrust-trust), parties received an average of 2.8, thus being the least trusted of East Central European institutions. Individual scores were: 3.7 Czech Republic; 3.2 Slovakia; 2.8 Hungary and 2.6 Poland. 3 It should be noted, though, that the strength of attachment varies not only between countries, but also between individual parties. The available data show that the Czech population is generally above the Eastern European average; similarly, parties like the KDU-ČSL, KSČM and even the ODS display a significant cohort of stable followers.

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members and activists to join in. Instead, a few parties driven by a desire to emulate ‘a mass party model’, such as the ČSSD, have organized numerous campaigns to attract new members and to strengthen their collective backing. Yet, such sporadic organizational strategies do not seem to have had much positive effect after several years of efforts. Having said all of this, it is striking to see that parties enjoy a virtual monopoly over representation. Alternative channels of representation, such as social movements, trade unions or even distinct anti-party movements, are generally rather weak. There also appears to be an expectation, clearly among the elites, but also (in the absence of alternatives) among a large part of the population, that parties are the crucial agents linking the citizens with the State. A good illustration is the emergence (at the end of 1999) of two civic platforms called ‘Thank You, Now Leave’ and ‘Impuls 99’, which organized several mass rallies, protesting against the ‘opposition agreement’ between the ČSSD and ODS, and the perceived lack of dynamism and political innovation among the Czech parliamentary parties. While expressing some anti-party sentiments, not dissimilar to the populist antiinstitutional and anti-party positions of the early dissident movements in East Central Europe (cf. Kopecký and Barnfield 1999, Mudde 2001), the primary critique of the platforms was directed against ‘the elite’ and against ‘the party collusion between the ODS and ČSSD’, rather than against parties per se (see Dvořáková 2003). Interestingly, the organizers themselves had been juggling with the idea of turning these movements into a more conventional party format, while continuing to call for ‘a restoration of a real competition of distinguished party alternatives’. Thus, despite both evidence of low levels of direct participation of citizens in political organizations, as well as critical attitudes of citizens towards parties in general, parties appear reasonably well placed even at the societal level in the Czech Republic. Party appeals structure the vote, and parties influence citizen’s attitudes to political issues (Vlachová 1997 and 1999, Tóka 1998). The electoral turnouts in national elections have, in general, been relatively high, even at times when most opinion polls suggested large dissatisfaction of citizens with overall political situation: 97 per cent, 85 per cent, 74 per cent, 74 per cent and 58 per cent in 1990, 1992, 1996, 1998 and 2002 elections. As indicated earlier, electoral volatility, even if still higher than in most of Western Europe, has been declining as well (see Tóka 1996, 1998). Despite the high turnover of independent candidates in the local elections, even the smaller local councils are often controlled by multiparty coalitions, not too dissimilar to those formed at the national level. While two thirds of all candidates in the Czech 1998 local election were running as independents (see above), their electoral gains of 40 per cent fared unfavourably with 57 per cent of votes polled by the five parliamentary parties who fielded a mere 26 per cent of all candidates.

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Party Organizations The problems which Czech political parties encountered in their efforts to establish themselves firmly on the ground, at least in numerical terms, have been compensated by rather successful attempts to build effective and strong party organizations at the national level. As a result, most of the established bigger players on the Czech political scene now persist as organizations, regardless of occasional factional struggles or revolts by MPs, and subsequent defections in parliament. Indeed, recent trends in (declining) parliamentary defections suggest that it is not so much that helpless parties cannot hold on to their initial number of parliamentary representatives, but rather that the MPs who now leave their parliamentary clubs are expelled by their party for breach of party rules. The split of the Czech ODS in the autumn 1997 can too be interpreted as the victory of a highly institutionalised organization over a group of rebels who grossly underestimated the mood and strength of their own party. In this sense, what was once perceived as an epitome of party organizational weakness (cf. Ágh 1995, Olson 1997), now turns out to be a sign of growing maturity and party organizational strength. The internal organization and functioning of the Czech parliament suggests that parties have gradually consolidated their grip on individual members of parliament and, in this process, have dramatically changed the picture of fragmentation, instability and MPs’ free-riding behaviour associated with East European parliaments. Furthermore, the rules of the game within the parliament (i.e. Standing Orders) reflect the dominant conception that puts parties above individual MPs and other institutions within the parliament. The parliamentarians are, partly in institutional and almost fully in behavioural terms, the bearers of the party mandate; they are the creators and executors of party policy (see Kopecký 2001). Roll-call analyses indicate a remarkably high level of voting cohesion (Kopecký 2000, Linek and Rakušanová 2002). Moreover, the behaviour of MPs in parliamentary committees, the distribution of committee chairs and positions, as well as the make-up of other parliamentary bodies such as Steering Committees, all reflect the subservience of the parliamentary machinery to party politics in both countries. Needless to say, in the case of many long-standing Czech parties, the high level of fragmentation in the early 1990s helped to sort out the many unviable internal friendships, thus making (surviving) parties more homogeneous and ultimately less prone to fragmentation. But the continued existence of the many Czech parties can also be attributed to the gradual development of their organizations, which makes it simply more and more difficult for rebellious groups to walk away with the party label, and which provides vested interests and career paths for the individuals involved in the party. The position of parliamentary parties (read parliamentary clubs, factions, or fractions) remains important in the web of party hierarchies. This is not surprising given the fact that most of the Czech parties emerged as ‘parliamentary parties’ in the first place, only later extending their organizations, in

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a top-down fashion. However, since the major parties have now also experienced one or more terms in government, and one or more electoral defeats, most have started to rapidly achieve an elaborate division of labour within their organization. The extra-parliamentary party (central office), for example, has been growing from a mere supporting clerical unit to an increasingly professionalized and active bureaucracy (see Kroupa and Kostelecky 1996, van Biezen 2003), organizing and supervising organizational sub-units dealing with specific policy areas, supervising fund-raising, and co-ordinating activities of local party organizations. Since the resources in the hands of individual MPs (or parliamentary parties as a whole) are inferior to that of the central party office,4 the parliamentary parties and their members have become closely integrated into the party as a result. In addition, the extra-parliamentary leadership, and in particular the party executive organs, are now stronger than the parliamentary parties – a tendency which can certainly be seen by the dominance of party leaders in government formation or coalition (re-)negotiations. Of course, the personnel overlap between parliamentary parties and executive leadership tends to be high, chiefly because ministers (mostly party heavy-weights) do not have to give up their parliamentary seat once appointed to office. It also tends to be high in parties with small parliamentary representation. This somewhat obscures the exact power relations and makes the two sub-units highly interdependent, at least in the day-to-day business of parliament and government. However, the party statutes provide for exofficio representation of parliamentary parties in the executive meetings, and it is generally expected (in some cases, like the KSČM, it is even codified by party rules) that resolutions of party executives will be followed by parliamentary parties. Indeed, several conflicts between party leaders and parliamentary parties which occurred in the past normally resulted either in the expulsion of rebel MPs (ČSSD in 1996) or in parliamentary party splits (KSČM in 1993), with executive leadership prevailing in all cases, and splinter groups and expelled MPs falling into oblivion. The local implantation of parties is generally quite uneven, however. The financial assistance that is accorded to the national party (see below) is rarely extended down to maintain and support local party activities. The membership fees, together with an occasional supplement of funds from local enterprises or from a local MP with an office in the constituency, thus represent the major source of Czech local party income. On the face of it, this should make local parties highly dependent on the centre and well restricted in the scope of their activity. 4 The bulk of state subsidies in both countries are channelled from the state to the central party office (see below). The parliamentary parties in both countries are usually provided only with office space in the parliament, a car, a secretary, and a small monthly fee per MP (about $100). Interestingly, even the state subsidies for the MPs’ (constituency) work are normally used by the majority of MPs to partly finance their local party; some deputies in both countries even pass part of their salary to the central party office (the KSČM is known to be particularly insistent on this practice).

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Yet, with time, and taking into account different trends across different parties, local organizations, together with the regional (county) party organs, have become embedded and integrated into the decision-making hierarchies of the Czech parties, developing their own organizational resources if not, in some cases, a potential to challenge the hitherto highly dominant party centres. Party centralization has undoubtedly been a prevailing trend, most clearly visible in the selection of candidates for office at the national level. The regional and local party offices are generally responsible for drawing the lists of nominees in both countries. Some parties, like the ODA and the US, provide for the selection of candidates through intra-party primaries, in which members can vote directly for the candidates proposed by the local branches. However, the party executives retain the veto power over the list and it is not uncommon to see the original nominations challenged by party executives before the elections. The seats which are made available for redistribution at the national level after the first-tier redistribution during the electoral process are also filled by party executives, rather than by local branches. More often than not, the veto procedures are not even employed, because high profile Czech MPs and party leaders tend to secure nominations without any major problems, and the scramble usually involves places well down on the list of candidates. The centralization has largely been part and parcel of the often successful party elite strategies to unify their organizations and make them consistently less vulnerable to disruptive internal conflicts which plagued many parties throughout the early 1990s. However, centralising efforts in some areas of party life, like candidate selection, financial management or policy formation, have been accompanied by diffusion of power in other areas. For example, a decade ago it was difficult to recall a case where the party congress – the highest decisionmaking authority in all parties – would mean more than a regular collective ritual of leadership legitimation. The argument that could not be won at the party elite level could not usually be won at all, regardless of the lengthy and often agonizing debates at the party congresses. To some extent, such a situation prevails in many Czech parties today. The innovation is that a potential leadership challenge or a profound change of policy and ideological direction now also requires conscious and time-consuming efforts of rival elites to build support among the local and regional party delegates, with substantive outcomes often hinging upon a delicate balance of power within the party organization. In addition, the local branches of the Czech parties are normally granted significant autonomy in their day-to-day management, in the selection of both local party leaders and local candidates, and in the financing of their own activities. Thus, while ordinary members perhaps provide only relatively little input at the national level, especially in such centralized parties like the ODS, a great deal of activity has been going at the level of local government and, through patronage, in the public administration. Indeed, the spoils associated with city administration, such as participation in boards of enterprises linked with local government or control over lucrative contracts for numerous building projects, partly explains

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why most of the Czech parties have been able to develop and maintain relatively vibrant, even if numerically unimpressive, local party networks. There is no doubt that party leadership also values local party organizations in some ways. While only negligible financial support will be directed towards localities, all parties (the central office) will distribute discussion papers and party bulletins, organize small opinion polls, or even endorsement votes. Local members and activists provide useful and unpaid sources of labour for organizing party rallies and campaign activities. However, it is not surprising to find a great variation among the Czech parties in terms of their density of territorial implantation and scale of local activism. The parties with organizational inheritance are invariably better represented in the localities in comparison with the newly established parties: for example, the KSČM and the KDU-ČSL have 5,700 and 2,635 local branches respectively, while the two electorally biggest but newer parties – the ČSSD and ODS – have built from scratch just 1,500 and 1,100 local branches (January 2000 figures). As indicated earlier, the scale of territorial implantation bears on the ‘partisan participation’ and, to a lesser extent, also on the outcomes of local elections. But it also bears on the persistence of parties. For the local organizations represent a useful fall-back for the leadership at times when things go badly wrong; i.e. when a party needs to shield itself from a poor electoral performance, an onslaught from other competitors or a tarnished public image. Again, if it had not been for their organizational embeddedness, the ‘historical’ parties would probably not have survived both the factional divisions which beset them after the fall of the communist regime, and the particularly unfavourable political climate (especially towards the (ex)-communists). The near demise of the poorly implanted and organized ODA (after a series of scandals and weak electoral performance), and now also of the US (poor electoral performance) are instructive in a similar vein, and so is the survival – outside of parliament – of the well organized and highly mobilized extreme-right SPR-RSČ.

Party Finances The organizational persistence of the Czech parties is also closely related to the institutional environment in which they operate. Needless to say, this environment is literally ‘man-made’ by the same parties which are to be regulated by it. Nowhere has this been more apparent than in the rules guiding state subsidies for political parties. Political elites already showed a remarkable consensus on the desirability of such form of party financing in the early stages of the postcommunist period. In a 1993/1994 parliamentary survey, only 24 per cent of the Czech MPs agreed with the statement that ‘parties should do their own fund rising and not rely on the state for financial assistance’ (see Kopecký 2001). By now, public funding represents perhaps the strongest bond and solidarity between the

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Czech parties, especially those represented in the parliament, despite opinion polls suggesting its unpopularity with the voters.5 Indeed, the state has provided subsidies to the parties in proportion to their electoral results (reimbursement of electoral campaigns) and according to the number of seats they hold in parliament. It is remarkable that the increases in the sums per vote, together with higher electoral thresholds, have been the most frequent changes in electoral and party laws. The regulations grant state subsidies in several forms: firstly, each party polling at least 3 per cent of the votes nationwide receives 90CzK (about $3) per vote as a reimbursement toward the electoral campaign costs. Secondly, each party polling at least 3 per cent nationwide receives an annual state subvention of three million CzK (about $100,000), plus an extra 100,000 CzK ($3,333) for each one-tenth of their vote above 3 per cent, allocated up to 5 per cent of the votes (the maximum per year for is thus 5 million CzK, that is about $166,666). This is a subsidy for the functioning of the party. Finally, each party having a seat in the parliament receives an annual subsidy of 500,000CzK (about $16,666) per seat, also in the form of a subsidy for the functioning of the party. The effect on the overall income of parties cannot be underestimated: despite a marginal change in the number of obtained votes and seats between the 1992 and 1996 elections, for example, ODS more than tripled its four-year income from the state, from a little over $3 million to a little over $10 million. Given both generally low membership figures and low membership fees (often ignored by members anyway), public funding represents the bulk of parties’ income, especially at the national level. However, donations from private sponsors are allowed, providing they are declared in annual party reports available to the public. According to the parties, these financial sources represent the second highest proportion of party income, the amounts vary from party to party. In any case, the indebtedness, especially to domestic banks and financial institutions, seems to be an enduring problem of parties, leading to pressures for higher financial assistance from the state, as well as to regular discussions about the ways of regulating campaign expenditures (which represent the single most substantial party expenditure). These pressures, it should be noted, have increased in recent years, after several scandals involving illegal financing of parties: the ODS failed to identify its largest sponsors, who gave gifts of 3.75 million CzK. When the press searched for the declared donors, both from abroad, one was found to have died several years earlier, while the other distanced himself from the financial support. Further financial scandals involving the ODS then led to the fall of its (minority) government and the split of the party at the end of 1997. This opened a chain of 5

According to one opinion poll, only 23 per cent of the Czech population favours state financing of political parties. It is absolutely unacceptable for 67 per cent of the population, with a vast majority of 93 per cent thinking parties should be financed by membership fees. See Lidové Noviny, 15 July, 1996.

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public and police investigations and virtually none of the major Czech parties (including the ČSSD and SPR-RSČ) avoided their own finance related problems. The ODA perhaps paid the highest political price. The party disintegrated after its head of central office was investigated in the matters concerning a 52 million CzK loan from a Czech bank, and after further press investigations proved the party’s links to the industry during the process of privatization. As a result, radical reforms involving limits on private donations, stricter regulations on parties’ economic activities etc. have been repeatedly tabled by governments and groups of MPs in a desperate attempt to improve the shattered public image of the political class, and of the political parties in general, embroiled in these scandals. The truth is, though, that with the exception of few party organizers and bureaucrats, the parties have neither been successfully penalized or prosecuted by courts for their questionable fund-raising activities, nor has any party gone bankrupt as a result of its financial debts.

Conclusion Political parties have become the key players in Czech politics. While the comparative literature on political parties in established Western democracies recurrently discusses the alleged decline of parties (cf. Lawson and Merkl 1988, Webb 1995), the Czech Republic provides an example of an extraordinary ascendancy of partisan politics in the every day functioning of this recently inaugurated democracy. Having gradually acquired a new legitimacy, however weak, as the principal managers of the government and state institutions, Czech political parties now also possess some capacity to constrain choice and to manage the political and social environment for their own ends. They operate within institutional structures where party strength plays a crucial role – structures, one should note, which were devised and gradually changed by the same political entrepreneurs who transformed the initially loose amateur parties into more professional and effective party organizations. The reality of party politics in contemporary Czech Republic of course differs greatly from the era of mass party politics and mass participation in Western Europe. While the consolidation of modern mass democracy before and after World War II may still occasionally represent the key marker with which we judge contemporary parties and party systems, one cannot hide the fact that Czech democracy has come into existence in a different social and political climate. The existence of already mobile and individualized populations, now also increasingly stratified by emerging markets, undermines mobilization based on large and permanent collective identities. In contrast to the incremental introduction of electoral democracy in Western Europe, democratization in East Central Europe also involves establishing the principles of electoral competition at a time when citizens had already been mobilized and politicized by the previous communist regime (cf. Mair 1997, van Biezen 1998). A high partisan penetration of society in

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terms of mass membership and the strength of party attachments have always been unlikely in such conditions. Indeed, Czech political parties tend to confine their roles to activities associated with the conduct of office, while their social anchorage and social activities remain relatively weak. Nevertheless, the speed and resiliency to which the Czech political elites have been able to erect and then reinforce the power monopoly of political parties is quite astonishing. If one looks closely at the last decade of democratization in the country, the intentions of the politicians to manipulate current institutional structures in the way that it reduces environmental uncertainty in which their parties rein cannot be doubted. For the numerous modifications to constitutional, electoral and parliamentary rules since 1992 show a rather consistent trend to reinforce ‘party-friendly’ rules and, within these rules, a trend to adopt institutional devices which protect the privileges of the established parties against potential newcomers. The Czech parties are unlikely to be in a position to structure the attitudes and the behaviour of their citizens in the same way. But precisely because they have enjoyed the strong privilege to define the rules of the game, and have showed the willingness and capacity to do so, they put themselves into an excellent, if perhaps slightly unexpected position to dominate the political system in which they operate.

References Ágh, A. (1995), ‘The Experience of the First Democratic Parliaments in East Central Europe’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, vol. 28(2), 203-214. — (1996), ‘The End of the Beginning: The Partial Consolidation of East Central European Parties and Party Systems’, Budapest Papers on Democratic Transition, No. 156 (Budapest: University of Economics). Baylis, T. (1996), ‘Presidents versus Prime Ministers: Shaping Executive Authority in Eastern Europe’, World Politics, vol. 28(3), pp. 297-323. Bielasiak, J. (1997), ‘Substance and Process in the Development of Party Systems of East Central Europe’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, vol. 30(1), pp. 23-44. Biezen, I. van (1998), ‘Building Party Organisations and the Relevance of Past Models: The Communist and Socialist Parties in Spain and Portugal’, West European Politics, vol. 21(2), pp. 32-62. — (2003), Political Parties in New Democracies: Party Organization in Southern and East-Central Europe (Houndmills: Palgrave). Crawford, Keith (2001), ‘A System of Disproportional Representation in the Czech Republic: The Proposed Electoral Law for the Czech Republic’, Representation, vol. 38(1), pp. 46-58. Dvořáková, V. (2003), ‘Civil Society in the Czech Republic: “Impuls 99” and “Thank You, Time to Go”’, in P. Kopecký and C. Mudde (eds.) Uncivil Society? Contentious Politics in Post-Communist Europe (London: Routledge).

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Enyedi, Z. and Tóka G. (2005), ’Ascendant, Yet Fragile: Political parties in Hungary’, in S. White, D. Stansfield and P. Webb (eds), Political Parties in Transitional Democracies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming). Evans, G. and S. Whitefield (1998), ‘The Structuring of Political Cleavages in Post-Communist Societies: the Case of the Czech Republic and Slovakia’, Political Studies, vol. 46 (1), pp. 115-139. Gallagher, M, Laver, M. and Mair. P. (2005), Representative Government in Modern Europe (New York: McGraw-Hill, 4th edition). Green, A. and Skalnik Leff, C. (1997), ‘The Quality of Democracy: Mass-Elite Linkages in the Czech Republic’, Democratization 4 (4), pp. 63-87. Hanley, S. (2004), ‘From Neo-Liberalism to National Interests: Ideology, Strategy, and Party Development in the Euroscepticism of the Czech Right’, East European Politics and Societies, vol. 18(3), pp. 513-548. Huber, J. and Inglehart, R. (1995), ‘Expert Interpretations of Party Space and Party Locations in 42 Societies’, Party Politics, vol. 1(1), pp. 73-111. Katz, R. S. (1986), ‘Party Government: A Rationalistic Conception’, in F.G. Castles and R. Wildenmann (eds), The Future of Party Government: Visions and Realities of Party Government (Florence: European University Institute). — (1990), ‘Party as Linkage: A Vestigial Function?’, European Journal of Political Research, vol. 18, pp. 143-161. Kitschelt, H., Mansfeldová, Z., Markowski R. and Tóka, G. (1999), PostCommunist Party Systems: Competition, Representation, and Inter-Party Cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Kopecký, P. (1995), ‘Developing Party Organizations in East-Central Europe: What Type of Party is Likely to Emerge?’, Party Politics, vol. 1(4), 515-534. — (2000), ‘The Limits of Whips and Watchdogs: Parliamentary Parties in the Czech Republic’, in K. Heidar and R. Koole (eds), Parliamentary Party Groups in European Democracies: Political Parties Behind Closed Doors (London: Routledge). — (2001), Parliaments in the Czech and Slovak Republics: Party Competition and Parliamentary Institutionalization (Aldershot: Ashgate). — (2004a), ‘Czech Republic: Entrenching Proportional Representation’, in Josep M. Colomer (ed.), The Handbook of Electoral System Choice (Basingstoke: Palgrave). — (2004b), ‘An Awkward Newcomer? EU Enlargement and Euroscepticism in the Czech Republic’, European Studies, vol. 20, pp. 225-245. — (2005), ‘Building Party Government: Political Parties in the Czech and Slovak Republics’, in S. White, D. Stansfield and P. Webb (eds), Political Parties in Transitional Democracies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming). Kopecký, P. and Barnfield, E. (1999), ‘Charting the Decline of Civil Society: Explaining the Changing Roles and Conceptions of Civil Society in East Central Europe’, in J. Grugel (ed.), Democracy Without Borders: Transnationalization and conditionality in new democracies (London: Routledge).

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Kopecký, P. and Mudde, C. (2002), ‘The Two Sides of Euroscepticism: Party Positions on European Integration in East Central Europe’, European Union Politics, vol. 3(3), pp. 297-326. Krause, K. (1996), ‘The Political Party System in the Czech Republic: Democracy and the 1996 Elections’, Czech Sociological Review, vol. 32(4): pp. 423-438. Kroupa, A. and Kostelecký, T. (1996), ‘Party Organization and Structure at National and Local Level in the Czech Republic Since 1989’, in P. G. Lewis (ed.), Party Structure and Organization in East-Central Europe (Aldershot: Edward Elgar). Kunc, J. (1999), ‘Parties as the Lonely Protagonists of the Czech Political Transition’, in V. Dvoráková (ed.), Success of Failure? Ten Years After (Prague: Czech Political Science Association). Lawson, K. and Merkl, P.H. (eds), (1988) When Parties Fail: Emerging Alternative Organizations (New Jersey: Princeton). Lewis, P.G. (ed.) (1996), Party Structure and Organization in East-Central Europe (Aldershot: Edward Elgar). Linek, L. (2003), ‘Antistranické postoje české veřejnosti’, II Kongres českých politologů (conference proceedings, Prague: Czech Political Science Society), pp. 455-469. Linek, L. and Rakušanová, P. (2002), ‘Parties in the Parliament: Why, When and How Parties Act in Unity’, Sociological Papers, Institute of Sociology, Czech Academy of Sciences. Mair, P. (1997), Party System Change: Approaches and Interpretations (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Mair, P. and Biezen, I. van (2001), ‘Party Membership in Twenty European Democracies, 1980-2000’, Party Politics, vol. 7(1), pp. 5-22. Markowski, R. (1997), ‘Political Parties and Ideological Spaces in East Central Europe’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 30(3), pp. 221-254. Mishler, W. and Rose, R. (1997), ‘Trust, Distrust and Scepticism: Popular Evaluations of Civil and Political Institutions in Post-Communist Societies’, Journal of Politics, vol. 59(2), pp. 418-451. Mudde, C. (2001), ‘In the Name of the Peasantry, the Proletariat, and the People: Populism in Eastern Europe’, East European Politics and Societies, vol. 15(1), pp. 33-53. Olson, D.M. (1997), ‘Paradoxes of Institutional Development: The New Democratic Parliaments of Central Europe’, International Political Science Review, vol. 18(4). Rose, R. (1995), ‘Mobilizing Demobilized Voters’, Party Politics, vol. 1(4), pp. 549-563. Szczerbiak, A. (2001), Poles Together? Emergence and Development of Political Parties in Post-communist Poland (Budapest: CEU Press). Tóka, G. (1996), ‘Parties and Electoral Choices in East Central Europe’, in G. Pridham and P.G. Lewis (eds), Stabilising Fragile Democracies: Comparing

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New Party Systems in Southern Europe and Eastern Europe (London: Routledge). — (1998), ‘Party Appeals and Voter Loyalty in New Democracies’, Political Studies, vol. 46, pp. 589-610. Vlachová, K. (1997), ‘Czech Political Parties and their Voters’, Czech Sociological Review, vol. 5(1), pp. 39-56. — (1999), ‘The Crystallization of Political Attitudes and Orientation’, J. Večerník and P. Matĕjů (eds), Ten Years of Rebuilding Capitalism: Czech Society after 1989 (Prague: Academia), pp. 251-272. Webb, P.D. (1995), ‘Are British Parties in Decline?’, Party Politics, vol. 1(3), pp. 299-322. Williams, K. (2002), ‘The Czech and Slovak Republics: The Surprising Resilience of Proportional Representation’, in S. Birch, F. Millard, M. Popescu and K. Williams, Embodying Democracy: Electoral System Design in Post-Communist Europe (Basingstoke: Palgrave). Wyman, M., White, S., Miller, B. and Heywood, P. (1995), ‘The Place of “Party” in Post-communist Europe’, Party Politics, vol. 1(4), pp. 535-548.

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Chapter 7

Old Parties and New: Changing Patterns of Party Politics in Slovakia Marek Rybář

Introduction Slovakia’s road to consolidated democracy has not been straightforward. Following the ‘Velvet Revolution’ of November 1989, a multi-party parliamentary democracy was established, at that time still within a framework of the federal Czechoslovak state. Czechoslovakia broke up on 1 January 1993 after the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) and the Civic Democratic Party (ODS), the most successful parties of the June 1992 parliamentary elections in the Slovak and Czech parts of the federation, respectively, agreed to terminate the existence of the common state established in 1918. The decision, although supported by only a minority of citizens in both constitutive states of the federation, resolved the problem of ‘stateness’ which had troubled Czechoslovak politics throughout the entire 1990-1992 electoral cycle1 and confirmed the central role of political parties and party elites in national politics of the two successor states (Kopecký 2001). In the course of the 1990s the quality and even the very principles of democratic processes in Slovakia came into question. Even though concerns for respect for civic and human rights had sporadically appeared since Slovakia’s independence, the most serious backslide in democratic practices occurred between 1994 and 1998 under the Prime Minister, Mr Vladimír Mečiar of the HZDS. The government and parliament, both controlled by the HZDS and its two junior coalition partners, were engaged in a bitter conflict with the head of state, and the rights of minorities were disregarded. The parliamentary opposition was marginalised and various extra-constitutional measures were taken to circumscribe the room for activities of independent civic associations. Moreover, the parliamentary majority ignored important rulings of the Constitutional Court and 1

It was agreed that the first (fully free and fair) multi-party elections of June 1990 would elect federal as well as state parliaments for only a two-year term, thus giving an earlier chance to compete for power to new political parties which were expected to emerge after the first elections.

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the Minister of Interior in 1997 even thwarted a referendum initiated by the opposition (Malová and Rybář, 2003). The international community, especially the European Union (EU) member states, as well as institutions of the EU, indicated their concerns over the state of Slovak democracy in two diplomatic démarches, several resolutions of the European Parliament and numerous public statements. In 1997, Slovakia was not invited to join the NATO and the EU Luxembourg European Council ruled that the country did not meet necessary political criteria to be considered a serious candidate for early EU accession. The situation only changed in 1998, when the ideologically broad-based coalition government of Mikuláš Dzurinda was appointed following the 1998 parliamentary elections. The trend of democratic consolidation was confirmed in the 2002 elections, when Dzurinda was returned to the position of Prime Minister, this time heading the centre-right four-party coalition government. Slovakia was invited to join NATO and the EU in late 2002 and during the course of 2004 it gained full membership in both international organizations. Political parties are the principal actors of political life in modern democracies and Slovakia has been no exception to this trend. Parties play an indispensable role especially in forming and maintaining support for governments. They also represent the primary channels through which new political elites are recruited. Parties in Slovakia also maintain a key role in setting and shaping the political agenda, even though this function is shared with other actors, especially the media, interest groups, international organizations (particularly the EU) and various citizens’ initiatives. Yet not all relevant parties are alike. They differ in terms of the competing visions of policy-making they pursue and in terms of the interests they (claim to) represent. There also seems to be a ‘generation gap’ in terms of organizational characteristics and political style between parties which emerged in the turbulent period of the regime change in 1990-1991 on the one hand, and newer parties originating from the late 1990s and early 2000s, on the other. Moreover, the content of party political struggles in Slovakia has changed considerably, shifting from struggles over stateness, nationalism and democracy which were dominant until the late 1990s to political competition, resembling the more traditional socioeconomic left-right West European pattern. These processes have taken place in an environment characterized by frequent modifications of the institutional (constitutional) design, relatively high turnout in parliamentary elections and significantly volatile voters, and competition of parties with low organizational continuity. In this chapter I focus on several interrelated topics. After briefly examining the main determinants of the 1989-1992 founding period of democratic politics in Slovakia, we will turn to dominant patterns of party competition and government formation in Slovakia. The next section explores the issue of major dividing lines in Slovak party politics. Next, I analyse changes in party politics and party competition after the 2002 elections, arguing that classical left-right policy issues dominate the content of political competition. The final section spells out differences between organization and political style of older parties, established at

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the advent of competitive politics in the early 1990s, and their new competitors formed about a decade later. It is argued that these ‘old’ and ‘new’ parties approximate two ideal-type political organizations differing in both intraorganizational aspects of party functioning and in political style and goals of their leaders.

Slovak Politics in 1989-1992 Democratization processes in Slovakia started in late 1989, when the hegemonic position of the Communist Party, the dominant political force with a constitutionally guaranteed leading role in the state, came under attack from various independent citizen initiatives and forums. The opposition political parties started to emerge only after the implosion of the non-democratic regime in late 1989. Hence, the processes of liberalization and democratization occurred simultaneously, a fact that influenced both the character of party formation and the position parties assumed in linking institutions of the state and civil society. Unlike instances of democratization in Western Europe in the late 19th century, in 1989 all citizens had enjoyed equal political rights before the advent of party competition. At the same time, basic political institutions, including federal and state parliaments and governments, were already in place, encouraging party formation within the institutions of the state. Many new political parties emerged not in society at large, but rather were creations of political individuals who already held parliamentary seats. In the period between December 1989, when the first important constitutional changes paved the way for the transition to democracy, and June 1990, when the first free and fair elections were held, various parties, alliances and forums were established by members of the federal and state (national) parliaments, not only by former members of the Communist Party, but also by new members of parliaments who gained their seats in the process of the so-called co-optations2. The institutional structure of the Soviet-style federation in Czechoslovakia provided few incentives for the creation of parties which would be active in both constituent states of the Czechoslovak Republic. The territories of Slovakia and the Czech Republic, for example, constituted separate electoral entities even for the lower chamber of the federal parliament that usually serves to represent the people of the entire federation. Hence, even though the same PR electoral system was used in the two states for the lower federal chamber elections, the 5 per cent threshold necessary to secure parliamentary representation was applied and counted separately in the Czech and Slovak parts of the state. This also 2

Representatives of the anti-communist civic associations Public Against Violence and Civic Forum used the communist-time constitutional provisions and, on the basis of an agreement with the Communist Party, nominated (‘co-opted’) their own people into the federal and state parliaments. These ‘co-optations’ were made possible because many members of these legislatures were forced to give up their parliamentary seats.

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means that the Czech and Slovak parties did not compete for the same electorate but rather had to appeal to two different electorates. Consequently, two relatively autonomous party systems began to emerge in Czechoslovakia, one in Slovakia and another in the Czech Republic, and the federal government was composed of the largest parties elected in the two states. In 1990 this arrangement did not seem to produce much difficulty, because in both states anti-communist and prodemocratic parties won, most of them pressing for large-scale economic, democratic and constitutional changes. In 1992, however, politically incompatible parties won in the Czech and Slovak parts of the federation, a situation that prompted their leaders to divide the federal state. Due to the autonomy of the Slovak party system, the establishment of an independent Slovakia in 1993 did not in itself substantially affect party competition. Hence, references to parliamentary elections in Slovakia in the remainder of this chapter do not include the results of parties in the 1990 and 1992 federal parliamentary elections3. In the first free elections of June 1990, seven political formations managed to clear the 3 per cent electoral threshold necessary to secure parliamentary representation. The most successful proved to be Public Against Violence (VPN), a broad anti-communist umbrella organization securing 29.4 per cent and 48 out of 150 seats in the parliament4. The VPN formed a coalition government with the Christian Democrats (KDH) who came second with 19.2 per cent of the vote and 31 seats, and the small centre-right Democratic Party (4.4 per cent and 7 seats). The old-regime Slovak Communist Party (KSS), originally a Slovak-territory organization of the Czechoslovak Communist Party (KSČ) came third (13.9 per cent and 22 seats) and the separatist Slovak National Party (SNS) received the identical number of seats with a slightly lower share of the vote (13.4 per cent). They became opposition parties along with a two-party alliance of ethnic Hungarian parties (8.66 per cent and 14 seats) and the Green Party (3.5 per cent and 6 seats). The parliamentary relations between government and opposition had been very dynamic, because all political parties, with the single exception of the alliance of Hungarian parties, suffered from defections of their deputies and the fragmentation of parliamentary parties even led to a breakdown of the government in 1991. A split within the VPN in March 1991 turned out to be the decisive moment, when about a half of the VPN deputies left the party to establish the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS). The decision took place after a VPN-nominated Prime Minister, Mr Vladimír Mečiar was to be replaced by another nominee of the party, the move opposed by many VPN parliamentarians. 3 The votes parties received in the federal elections approximated their gains in the state parliamentary elections. The only exception was the Slovak Social Democratic Party in 1992 which managed to clear the 5 per cent threshold to the upper chamber of the federal parliament but failed to do so in the lower federal chamber and in the state legislature elections held simultaneously. 4 The VPN contested the 1990 elections together with a small liberal Hungarian Independent Initiative (MNI).

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As a consequence, a new government was appointed with the same party composition as the previous administration. This time, however, the KDH had the right to nominate the prime minister, because defections from the VPN had made Christian Democrats the largest parliamentary faction. In February 1992 the KDH split, in turn, following protracted internal tensions over the question of Slovak independence, with the more nationalistic faction leaving the government in a de facto minority position. The parliamentary support for the government was maintained primarily thanks to fourteen ethnic Hungarian deputies who voted for several key government proposals.

Party Competition and Government Formation in Slovakia in 1992-2004 The New Electoral System and Elections in 1992 In 1992, probably as a reaction to the fragmentation of the parliament, the National Council adopted a change to the electoral law. In 1990, a system of proportional representation was used with four electoral districts and the largest remainder Hare counting mechanism for the allocation of parliamentary seats. A 3 per cent barrier was also established for any party or electoral alliance of parties. Two years later, however, the threshold was raised to 5 per cent5 and the Hagenbach-Bischoff quota was applied to seat allocation. Both measures reduced the proportionality of the results, and especially the increase of the threshold to 5 per cent had important consequences in 1992. Formed less than a year before the 1992 elections, the HZDS received almost 37.6 per cent of the vote and 74 seats. Other parties obtained considerably fewer votes, with the Party of Democratic Left (SDĽ), a successor to the Communist Party, coming second with 14.7 per cent (29 seats) and the nationalistic Slovak National Party, campaigning with the message of Slovak independence, gained 7.9 per cent (15 seats). The Christian Democrats, the only party of the 1990-92 government that managed to gain parliamentary representation, received a mere 8.9 per cent (18 seats). The coalition of two Hungarian parties was the other political subject to be represented in the National Council: it gained 7.4 per cent and 14 seats. Nearly 24 per cent of the votes went to parties which did not clear the 5 per cent barrier. Consequently, all parliamentary parties, and especially the HZDS, received a disproportionately larger share of parliamentary seats than expected. The new government was composed of the HZDS and SNS, the latter being represented by a single member of the cabinet. Moreover, shortly after the elections an SDĽ deputy joined the HZDS faction, this not only gave the HZDS a

5 In addition, an alliance of two or three parties had to secure at least 7 per cent of the vote and an alliance of four or more parties needed at least 10 per cent to gain parliamentary representation.

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Marek Rybář Table 7.1 Elections to the National Council (150 seats) 1990 votes (%) and seats 29.35 (48) 19.21 (31)

1992 votes (%) and seats – 8.89 (18)

1994 votes (%) and seats

1998 votes 2002 (%) and votes (%) seats and seats

VPN/ODÚ KDH 10.08 (17) –*** 8.25 (15) 8.57 (15) –*** DÚ DS (and 4.40 (7) – – –*** – allies) SZS 3.49 (6) – –** –*** – 26.33 (42) SDK SDĽ (and 13.35 (22) 14.70 10.42 (18) 14.66 (23) – allies) SNS 13.94 (22) 7.93 (15) 5.40 (9) 9.07 (14) – 7.35 (13) – – ZRS 37.26 (74) 34.96 (61) 27.00 (43) 19.5 (36) HZDS – 8.01 (13) – SOP SMK/MK 8.66 (14) 7.42 (14) 10.19 (17) 9.12 (15) 11.16 (20) MNI/MOS –* – – 13.46 (25) Smer – – – 6.32 (11) KSS 8.01 (15) ANO 15.09 (28) SDKÚ Other 7.60 (0) 23.80 (0) 13.02 (0) 5.79 (0) 18.21 (0) empty field – party did not exist. * The MNI (the Hungarian Independent Initiative) formed an electoral alliance with the VPN 1990. Later it was transformed into the MOS (Hungarian Civic Party). It contested the 1992 elections unsuccessfully; in 1994 it was a part of the Hungarian Coalition with the Coexistence and the MKDH. These three parties merged into the Party of Hungarian Coalition in 1998. **The SZS was a part of the Common Choice (SV) coalition in 1994. ***The KDH, DÚ, DS, SZS and SDSS formed the SDK in 1998. In November 2000 nine SDK deputies left the SDK parliamentary group to form the new parliamentary group of the Christian Democrats (KDH). Source: Statistics Office of the Slovak Republic. de facto control of the parliament (as it controlled exactly half of all parliamentary seats), but also made it the exclusive Slovak representative in the negotiations over the future of the federal state. In 1993, however, the HZDS suffered from the defections of two groups of parliamentarians and even the SNS was weakened by the departure of a group of MPs. These splinter groups, dissatisfied with what they perceived as the increasingly authoritarian style of their original parties, later merged to create the

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Democratic Union (DÚ). In March 1994 they joined the opposition in passing a vote of no confidence in the Mečiar government. After that, a new minority government was appointed, consisting of an equal number of ministers representing the SDĽ, KDH and the DÚ and in parliament it enjoyed the support of two Hungarian parties. In the 1994 early parliamentary elections, however, HZDS was able to get almost 35 per cent of the vote (61 parliamentary seats) and its ally SNS also managed to sneak into parliament with 5.4 per cent of the vote. The Christian Democrats, the SDĽ and the Democratic Union also won parliamentary representation, and so did a coalition of three Hungarian parties. However, none of the two groups of parties commanded a majority of seats, because a newly formed Association of Slovak Workers (ZRS) with 13 parliamentarians assumed a pivotal position in the parliament. The ZRS was a breakaway SDĽ faction whose representatives were dissatisfied with what they perceived as a betrayal of bluecollar workers’ interests by the SDĽ. The ZRS leadership eventually decided to form a government with HZDS and SNS, with Mečiar again taking the position of Prime Minister. In this 1994-98 electoral term the opposition parties were almost completely marginalized and left without any chance to influence the parliamentary agenda and decision-making process. The HZDS managed to impose strong party discipline and thus avoided government instability, but it used unconstitutional measures to suppress rebellion in its parliamentary party group6. The opposition leaders gradually came to realize that close cooperation between their parties was necessary if they wanted to succeed in the forthcoming parliamentary elections. Cooperation between the three ethnic Hungarian parties had long been established and the centre-right Christian Democrats became a leading force in an alliance with the DÚ and other small extra-parliamentary parties and groupings. After the Ministry of Interior marred a referendum in May 1997 on direct presidential elections initiated by the opposition, the centre-right alliance was joined by two small centre-left parties to form the Slovak Democratic Coalition (SDK). The SDK quickly became the main challenger to the dominant position of HZDS. In 1998, the parliament passed a HZDS-sponsored electoral law which effectively banned party alliances from running in parliamentary elections. Moreover, the whole territory of Slovakia was to constitute a single electoral district, a provision which increased proportionality of the results7. In a reaction to 6 All HZDS members of parliament had to sign an undated letter of resignation that the HZDS leadership wanted to use in case defections from its party caucus occurred. In late 1996, when a HZDS deputy decided to leave his party, the letter appeared in parliament as if sent by the deputy himself. Even though he repeatedly denied sending the latter and expressed his willingness to serve a full parliamentary term, the HZDS-led parliamentary majority ‘accepted his resignation’ and he was replaced by a loyal HZDS member. The Constitutional Court later ruled that the parliament had infringed the constitutional rights of the deputy, however, the parliament repeatedly refused to restore his seat. 7 It remains unclear why the government proposed a single electoral district. Some speculate that this was to please the two junior government parties, others claim that the fact that Mečiar would appear as the number one candidate at every single HZDS ballot paper in

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the new electoral law, the SDK transformed itself from a coalition to a single party, and the Hungarian parties took the same steps. While the newly formed Party of Hungarian Coalition (SMK) was established by merging the original parties, the SDK party was set up as a brand new party alongside the original five parties. Hence, only candidates of the five original parties for the 1998 elections joined the new party, while the original parties themselves did not formally take part in the elections and instead supported the SDK campaign. This decision reflected a desire of some SDK politicians, especially from the KDH, to preserve their original parties and to re-vitalise them once the victory in the elections was secured. The HZDS Out of Power In the 1998 elections the HZDS again received the plurality of votes (27 per cent), but the SDK came a strong second (26.3 per cent) and together with the SDĽ and the SMK it secured a parliamentary majority. Moreover, a newly formed left-ofcentre Party of Civic Understanding (SOP), campaigning with an explicitly antiHZDS message joined the three to form a new coalition government headed by the SDK chairman Mikuláš Dzurinda. The new parliamentary majority even mastered a three-fifth majority necessary for constitutional changes. While the SNS was again elected to the parliament (9.1 per cent), the Association of Workers failed to secure further parliamentary existence. The period of the first Dzurinda government (1998-2002) in some ways resembled the first democratic parliamentary term of 1990-92 in Slovakia. There were two major similarities. First, as in 1990, the Dzurinda government had to reconstruct the foundations of the democratic political order, including a respect for civic and minority rights. Re-establishing constitutional limits to the power of the parliamentary majority and regaining the confidence of the international community for the democratic credentials of the new government also featured prominently among the tasks of the two administrations. Second, by the end of the electoral term, in the same manner as in the 1990-92 period, the political fragmentation of the parliament gained its peak. With the single exception of the SMK, all other parties disintegrated or at least suffered from defections of their parliamentarians. The SDK disintegrated into the Slovak Democratic and Christian Union (SDKÚ) and other smaller parties and groupings, while nine of the KDH representatives, originally also members of the SDK caucus, managed to reestablish an independent KDH caucus. The communist-successor SDĽ was first left by an ambitious Róbert Fico, who established his own Smer (Direction) party. The SDĽ later broke into two after a disagreement over strategy towards the centre-right parties of the Dzurinda government. The SOP caucus also experienced numerous defections and recorded declining electoral support. The opposition parties were not immune to similar disintegration tendencies. Several HZDS the country would encourage participation of even those HZDS voters who were less enthusiastic about the government’s policies but remained fascinated by Mečiar’s charisma.

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deputies left the party in 2002 when it became clear that they would not be placed on the party list for the next parliamentary elections. The Slovak National Party also broke up into two in an intra-party struggle for the leadership. By the end of the electoral cycle, the Dzurinda government, even though its party composition had changed very little formally, drew its support from about a dozen parliamentary factions and groupings. The 2002 Elections and Beyond Even though the parliament passed a change to the electoral law, re-enabling the formation of electoral alliances, none of the main parties used this opportunity to combine forces with its political allies. Hence, as in 1992, a large number of votes (18.2 per cent) went to parties that did not cross the required 5 per cent threshold. The 2002 elections again brought a plurality for the HZDS (19.5 per cent), but the centre-right parties of the previous Dzurinda administration also fared well: the SDKÚ, SMK and KDH gained 15.1, 11.2 and 8.3 per cent, respectively. The elections proved to be a disaster for the SNS and the SDĽ, as both disappeared from parliament for the first time since 1990. On the other hand, the newly formed Smer as well as the pro-business New Citizen Alliance (ANO) did win parliamentary seats. In addition, the unreformed Communist Party (KSS) 8 managed to get into parliament, having previously spent over a decade in the political wilderness. A new centre-right cabinet was formed by the SDKÚ, SMK, KDH and ANO, headed by the Prime Minister, Mr Dzurinda, who had originally had a narrow majority in the parliament. By mid-2004, however, the HZDS again suffered from defections of several parliamentarians who were dissatisfied by the fact that their party, under the leadership of Vladimír Mečiar, was not acceptable as a credible coalition party by other parliamentary parties. Moreover, both the SDKÚ and ANO lost some of their deputies who were also dissatisfied with the political style of their parties’ leadership9. These parliamentarians, both from the HZDS and from the SDKÚ and ANO, constitute a ‘grey parliamentary zone’ between the opposition and (the now minority) government, where the Dzurinda cabinet fishes for majority support for its proposals.

8

The communist regime KSS was transformed in 1991 into the Party of Democratic Left (SDĽ). The elements of hard-line communists who disagreed with the socialdemocratization of their party left to establish two independent neo-communist formations in 1991. A year later the two groups united to form the Communist Party of Slovakia (KSS) which, though not a legal successor to the communist-period KSS, claims political and ideological continuity of the original KSS. 9 The HZDS breakaway faction established the Peoples’ Union (LU), while most of the deputies who left the SDKÚ and ANO set up a party called Free Forum (SF).

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Slovak Coalition Governments With the single exception of the government in 199310, all Slovak cabinets have been composed of two or more parties. Coalition governments have been necessary for executives to secure a backing of a majority in the parliament. The share of the vote of the largest party in Slovakia have never crossed 50 per cent, ranging from 37.3 in 1992 to just 19.5 in 2002 and its seat shares have amounted to 49.3 and 24 per cent, respectively. The combined share of vote of the two largest parties was highest in 1998 (53.33 per cent) and the lowest four years later (34.59 per cent). In both cases the two parties represented the largest forces of the mutually opposing party blocs. Hence, proportional representation clearly encourages both party elites and their voters to establish and maintain a support for a great deal of independent political parties. Moreover, even though the 5 per cent electoral threshold is clearly too high a barrier for some parties (like in 1992 and 2002 when 23.8 and 18.2 per cent of the vote, respectively, went to minor parties), it is still a condition that has always been met by more than five parties.

Dividing Lines of Party Politics Multi-party competition in Slovakia is not just a consequence of the system of proportional representation, it also reflects numerous dividing lines between political parties as well as within the electorate. In the formative period of Slovak politics between 1990 and 1992, four main issues shaped the structure of party competition in Slovakia. The most obvious division, typical for nearly all polities in democratic transition, concerned the conflict over the character of new political regime in Slovakia. The principal opponents along this regime divide were the Communist Party, the leading force in the previous non-democratic regime, and the Public Against Violence (VPN), representing a forum-type organization of the anti-communist opposition. However, other parties too had to take a clear stance in the question of what kind of political regime would develop in Slovakia. Other lines of conflict resembled the traditional Rokkanian cleavages more, including the church-state and centre-periphery conflicts and also controversy over the need for a radical transformation of the existing centrally planned economy into a market one. 10

In March 1993, when the first defection of parliamentarians from the HZDS took place, the Slovak National Party, a junior partner in the Mečiar government, demanded a greater share of cabinet posts. When HZDS did not agree, the SNS leader Černák, the only representative of his party in government, resigned, thus leaving HZDS in a de facto single party minority government. The situation changed in November 1993, when SNS re-entered the government with the HZDS, having secured three cabinet portfolios. Between November 1993 and March 1994, another wave of defections hit both the HZDS and SNS. These three groups of rebels (later merged into the Democratic Union) joined the opposition and passed a vote of no confidence in the government in March 1994.

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The church-state conflict was primarily represented by the disagreement of the Christian Democrats (KDH) and the Communist Party over the role religion should play in public life, the question which to some extent also divided the KDH and the more secular VPN. Given the ethno-federal character of Czechoslovakia and the existence of a sizable Hungarian minority in Slovakia, the centre-periphery conflict assumed two variants. The SNS was established and campaigned with a message of Slovak independence (Slovak periphery versus the Czech centre), but it also claimed to represent the interests of the ethnic Slovaks against what it perceived as a threat from the parties representing the Hungarian minority (Hungarian periphery versus the Slovak centre). Finally, controversies existed over whether there was a need or otherwise for a radical transformation of the centrally planned economy. However, this issue was clearly less salient in Slovakia than the other three mentioned above, as parties at that time did not present any elaborate economic strategies. The need for a radical economic transformation was primarily supported by exogenous forces11 and it had its domestic proponents mainly in small circles of economists in the VPN and also in the small Democratic Party. The formation of the HZDS in 1991 gave the structure of political opposition in Slovakia a new twist. The party was scoring political points not just because of the enormous popularity of its leader Vladimír Mečiar but also because it articulated demands that were very popular among the Slovak electorate. The HZDS attacked the radical economic reforms and blamed the government, especially the rumpVPN and KDH, for blindly following the economic strategy of the federal government which it portrayed as dangerous and harmful to the Slovak economy. The party also campaigned for greater autonomy for Slovakia in economic and later in financial and foreign-policy affairs arguing that the structure of the Slovak economy required a specific approach. Before the 1992 elections the party did not favour outright independence for Slovakia but it was clear that many of its policy proposals were incompatible with a federal model of the state. In addition, the core of the HZDS electorate resided in rural areas and consisted primarily of religious, older and less educated people, an electorate also typical for the Christian Democrats. Hence, the HZDS, especially after it negotiated a peaceful division of the Czechoslovak federation, managed to take over the agenda (and also the natural electorate) of three major Slovak political parties: SDĽ, SNS and KDH. Under the leadership of a popular and charismatic leader, the HZDS established itself as the leading force protecting Slovak national interests, defending losers of economic transformation and pledging adherence to Christian traditions of the Slovak people. 11 These forces were exogenous to the Slovak party competition but not to the economy. The main proponent of a radical economic reform was Václav Klaus, a Civic Forum politician who later established the Civic Democratic Party in 1991 in the Czech part of the federal state. The Klaus’ economic reform started in 1991 simultaneously in both parts of the state and the Slovak cabinets of the 1990-92 period, even though they did not initiate these economic changes, supported the reform and assumed political responsibility for its course in Slovakia.

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It also managed to win the confidence of many managers of the state-owned companies who later benefited from the murky privatisation controlled by the HZDS between 1993 and 1998 (Appel and Gould 2000). It is precisely this combination of often contradictory characteristics that make categorization of the party very difficult: for some, HZDS is a charismatic party with only a loose organizational structure12, for others it represents a leftist party drawing on the communist period nostalgia for losers of the economic transformation, others see it as a typical representative of the traditional authoritarian right of the region (Sitter 2003). The socio-demographic analyses of the HZDS’ voters are not helpful in this respect, as they find anti-western, anti-minority and authoritarian values as the dominant characteristics of the HZDS electorate (e.g. Krivý 2000). Self-placement on a left-right scale led most of the HZDS voters placing themselves in the centre, and until 2000, the official line of the HZDS representatives had been to present the party as a centrist force. Only at the 2000 party congress (i.e. two years after having lost the parliamentary elections) was the party re-branded as HZDSPeoples’ Party and party documents claimed a centre-right ideological orientation (Haughton 2001). The party still tries (without much success) to be accepted as a member in the European Democratic Union and in the EPP-ED group of the European Parliament. The main reason why HZDS has been denied membership in all major international party organizations13 rests in the policies of the party between 1994 and 1998. Together with the ZRS and SNS, the HZDS-led government repeatedly violated the principles and procedures of democratic decision-making and some of its representatives were even associated with various criminal activities14. The degree of political polarization between the government and the parliamentary opposition was so enormous that between 1994 and 2000 the main issue dividing Slovak political parties concerned the character of the political regime. The authoritarian-democratic divide did not replace other divisions among Slovak parties, but made them secondary and relatively unimportant (Krause 2000). That is the reason why in the 1994 government we can find both the radical-right (SNS) and radical-left (ZRS), while the executive cooperation between 1998 and 2002 included the Christian Democrats, post-communist SDĽ and the Hungarian minority representatives, to name only the largest political groupings. After the basic democratic credentials of the political regime were restored, the left-to-right anti-HZDS government became less stable and, by late 2000, visible differences in social and economic policy preferences divided its leftist and centre-right parties15. 12

See Haughton (2001) for a discussion of the HZDS as a ‘rally party’. Pridham (1999) even claims HZDS tried to join, but was denied, membership in a conservative, liberal as well as socialist international party organizations. 14 These included, among others, questionable privatisation deals, abduction of a Slovak citizen by the Secret Service, etc. 15 In 2000, some of the SDĽ members of parliament even joined the opposition in an unsuccessful attempt to pass a vote of no confidence in the government of which the SDĽ 13

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The results of the 2002 parliamentary elections also seem to affect the content of party competition to such an extent that we can speak of a fundamental change in this respect. It has primarily been due to the political agenda of the new centreright government, systematically liberalising the economy, curbing public deficit and introducing health care, pension and taxation reforms which have shifted political discourse and public attention to questions of the role the State should play in the economy and of the responsibilities of citizens for their individual wellbeing. This in turn has prompted a reaction from the opposition parties, especially the Communists and the left-leaning Smer, criticising the government for what they perceive as a dismantling of the welfare state and the end of a socially oriented market economy. In comparison to the pre-1998 period, when the issue of the character of the political regime prevailed, socioeconomic themes and left-right competition clearly have dominated post-2002 party competition. There are two other dividing lines which separate Slovak parties: the centreperiphery conflict is still strongly present, since the Party of Hungarian Coalition virtually monopolises the vote of ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia and its controversy with the opposition (and sometimes with its partners in the government) occasionally stir the waters of Slovak politics. In the 2004 European Parliament campaign, for example, the opposition HZDS and Smer urged the ethnic Slovak voters to take part in the elections to prevent a disproportionate share of Slovak seats in the European Parliament being taken by ethnic Hungarians16. The other division between parties concerns the questions of traditional morality, especially the protection of traditional family life, the issue of abortion and the rights of sexual minorities. This (church-state) divide has been put forward by the Christian Democrats who also opposed the EU constitutional treaty on the grounds that its Charter of Rights and Freedoms might eventually regulate these questions against the will of the member states (Rybář 2005). The controversies of the Christian Democrats with the ANO over the issue of abortions in 2003 and with Smer and KSS in 2004 over the extent of religious education in primary schools indicate that the issues go beyond a mere tactical showcase of party leaders and that the churchstate divide has complemented the centre-periphery and the left-right socioeconomic party divisions in post-2002 Slovak politics. Even though the extent to which these conflicting lines dividing political parties also penetrate society is rather difficult to establish, there are some indicators that show a solid support among the electorate for parties mobilizing on the issues dividing political parties. The centre-periphery cleavage in particular seems to be well entrenched, as an overwhelming majority of Slovakia’s ethnic Hungarians vote for the SMK. Moreover, there are various cultural and semi-political organizations associating both members of the Hungarian minority and proponents was the second largest party. 16 The HZDS and Smer argued that the traditionally more disciplined electorate of the SMK could bring the party a disproportional (i.e. larger) share of the European Parliament seats.

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of ‘nationalizing’ policies of the Slovak majority vis-à-vis national minorities. The existence of a clearly defined popular base for the church-state and the left-right divisions is less clear, but especially at the meso-level of society there are interest groups and citizen associations which clearly have an impact on preferences and voting behaviour of Slovak voters. While many of the country’s influential business organizations and interest groups clearly applaud and support economic policies of the centre-right government, the Trade Union Confederation (KOZ) in 2004 decided to closely co-operate with the left-leaning Smer party to help the latter to win the next elections. The Catholic Church, a natural ally of the Christian Democrats in their traditional conservative agenda, is less involved in an open support for the party, but recently several citizen initiatives have emerged, both of pro-life and pro-choice persuasion, which shape and cultivate public perception with regard to the church-state cleavage.

Changing Patterns of Party Competition Competition in the 1990s For most of the 1990s, two opposing blocs of political parties were competing in the Slovak parliament. Even though the party composition of the two blocs was not fully stable, as new parties joined one of the two camps, the important thing was that once a party joined a bloc, it would not join the competing formation in the future. This, however, did not prevent breakaway factions from these parties joining the other camp. Yet, even they, once they had made their choice, fostered links with partners from the same bloc and did not cooperate with the opponents. Christian Democrats (KDH), the communist-successor SDĽ and a coalition of ethnic Hungarian parties were at the core of one of these blocs, while the HZDS and SNS constituted the core of the other one. As none of the blocs was able to maintain a majority position in the parliament over a longer period of time, they needed the support of newly created parties: the HZDS and SNS needed the ZRS in the 1994-98 period, while the DÚ was a member of cabinet in 1994 together with the KDH and SDĽ, supported by Hungarian parties in the parliament. The KDH and DÚ (forming the SDK in 1998 with three minor parties) governed with the Party of Hungarian Coalition also between 1998 and 2002. At that time, however, even the newly formed SOP was invited to join the government coalition to give the new government a three-fifth majority in parliament which is required to pass constitutional amendments17. Although differences between parties of the same blocs were considerable, the dominant conflict over the rules of the democratic 17

A three-fifth constitutional majority in parliament was required to carry out some of the parties’ electoral promises (e.g. the introduction of a directly elected presidency) and also to modify the constitution as to comply with obligations of the country’s future EU membership.

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game drew these parties together – even if that caused serious tensions within the governing coalitions. The fierce competition for the executive positions helped to consolidate the two-bloc mentality, as high political polarization and the need for political partners to build parliamentary majorities urged party leaders to maintain the existing political alliances, however heterogeneous they might have been. Another important feature of party competition before 2002 concerns the open access of parties to the government. All relevant political parties have at one time or another had a chance to enjoy the spoils of executive positions. Some parties, like the DÚ in 1994 and SDKÚ in 2001, were even formed as parties of the government, i.e. their leaders first assumed executive positions and only then started to form their new political parties. Both parties with ‘mainstream’ ideological affiliations like the Christian Democrats and the SDĽ and even the radical nationalist SNS and ethnic minority SMK participated in Slovak cabinets after 1989. Hence, the structure of political competition in Slovakia before 2002 shows a fragmented party political scene with relatively well developed two-bloc competition, accompanied by the alternation of these two blocs in government, and with an access to government open to all parliamentary parties. This situation, however, seems to have changed with the 2002 parliamentary elections. The results were remarkable in themselves: two parties continuously present in the parliament since 1990, i.e. Slovak nationalists and the communist successor SDĽ, failed to gain parliamentary seats. Moreover, the unreformed Communists (KSS) managed to enter parliament for the first time since the regime change of 1989-90. In addition, four out of seven parliamentary political parties might be regarded as new parties. The elections have had a strong impact on the pattern of party competition as well. For the first time the incumbent parties were returned to government after the elections. Both the SMK and KDH were able to keep executive positions which was also the case for the SDKÚ. As before, a new party (ANO) was needed to provide the new government with a majority in the parliament. Unlike previous administrations, the Dzurinda cabinet of 2002 has been ideologically and politically rather compact, as all four parties claim a centreright orientation (although there are tensions between the liberal and conservative streams). Other aspects of party competition change are more difficult to document, because more time is needed before a solid conclusion can be made. Nevertheless, two observations may be made: first, access to government portfolios seems to be closed for at least one parliamentary party and might be for some time to come. The neo-communist KSS seems to have no coalition potential, as no parliamentary party considers the Communists as a feasible coalition partner in future cabinets. Second, not only are the KSS leaders aware of their political isolation, but they also see their ideological orthodoxy and a hard-line rhetoric as the safest way to promote their political cause. If the KSS maintains the reputation of an extremist parliamentary party, its lack of ‘coalitionability’ will undoubtedly affect strategies of government formation in the future.

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The third impact of the 2002 elections on party competition touches the twobloc reality of party politics in Slovakia. There are clear signs that a change has taken place in this aspect of party politics too. Even though the HZDS was again relegated to the opposition benches, parties both in the government and in the opposition have indicated their interest in cooperating with this party in the future. The opposition Smer party’s leader has repeatedly and unequivocally offered the HZDS a form of cooperation which could eventually lead the two to form a government together. The prospects for this development remain unclear, not only because of the rivalry between the leaders of the two parties as to who represents the main opposition alternative to the government, but also because some members of the HZDS broad leadership prefer cooperation with parties of the centre-right government. Some of their leaders too have shown that the HZDS is not that unacceptable a partner as it used to be in the second half of the 1990s. This in part reflects tactical considerations, as the government may try to exchange a promise of future cooperation with HZDS for the latter’s support for the (now) minority government. However, having spent six years in opposition and suffering defeats in parliamentary as well as in presidential elections, the HZDS’s aggressive political style has waned and its rhetoric moderated. Recently, the SDKÚ leader has praised HZDS for supporting the country’s accession to the EU and the SMK leader has even openly claimed that HZDS may be a trustworthy coalition partner for his party in the future. This all suggests that the old dividing lines in Slovak politics, and especially the division of parties into Mečiarite and anti-Mečiarite camps, seem to be fading away. The 2002 elections clearly give many reasons to support a hypothesis of a changing logic of party competition in Slovakia. The Success of New Parties The electoral success of new parties seems to be a perennial feature of Slovak politics. Moreover, many of these new parties also immediately enter the government. In 1992, the newly formed HZDS won the plurality of votes and formed the government. Two years later the Association of Slovak Workers (ZRS) got parliamentary as well as executive seats. In 1998, besides the SDK and SMK, parties built on the foundations of alliances of three and five parties, respectively, the Party of Civic Understanding (SOP) was formed from scratch outside the parliament. The SOP also entered the parliament and became part of the coalition government. Finally, four out of seven parliamentary parties can be regarded as new parties after the 2002 elections. While the SDKÚ and Smer were at least in part built upon parties with parliamentary as well as executive experience18, the Communist Party (KSS) as well as the New Citizen Alliance (ANO) were formed outside the parliament without any previous parliamentary history. Of the four new

18

The SDKÚ was a de facto successor to the SDK, even though its continuity was political and personal, not organizational.

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formations, the ANO and SDKÚ secured executive positions, while Smer and the KSS remained in parliamentary opposition. Several interpretations have been put forward to explain why new political parties fare well in new East European democracies (Birch 2003). Here we refer back to a point made in the introduction of this paper stressing that since (democratic) enfranchisement of voters in Eastern Europe took place simultaneously with the advent of multi-party competition (in the 1989-90 period), it has been more difficult for parties to take root in society. Moreover, the weakness of social identities, which could serve as the basis for a solid party-voter linkage, has also played against the effort of parties to take root in society. Finally, the institutional (i.e. parliamentary or even governmental) origins of many parties and an electoral system with a relatively low effective threshold has also encouraged the proliferation of political parties. Explaining Organizational Discontinuity of Parties Not only do new parties regularly enter parliament and even government, but old parties frequently suffer from break-ups and damaging fragmentation. The low level of political loyalty of parliamentarians to their party organizations thus in turn causes low organizational continuity of political parties, since many of these politicians try to pursue their political careers in newly established parties. A typical situation preceding a break-up of a parliamentary party comes after a disagreement between the party leadership and a group of parliamentarians who disagree over some politically controversial issue. The party leader, given his strong position within his party, strips his opponents of all important positions in the party hierarchy and expels them from the party. Alternatively, the rebel parliamentarians leave before the party leadership terminates their membership in the party, and establish their own political organization. Slovak political parties are notorious for their lack of intra-party factions. Only the SMK in 1998 and SDKÚ in 2001 established official party factions (entrenched in the party documents as well). These were, however, only a temporary solution which was to enable a smooth fusion of several groupings into single parties. Soon after the new parties consolidated, party factions were either abandoned or their relevance decreased considerably. Other parties provide for no official intra-party factions and it can even be claimed that every major intra-party dispute ended up in a break-up of the party (see Table 7.2). Several explanations may shed light on the motivations of politicians to take the risk and leave their original parties or, conversely, to expel their former colleagues from the party. The first may be a short-term view of their political activities. Given the propensity of the electorate in new democracies to punish the incumbents in the subsequent elections, sometimes leading to a complete wipe out of political parties from the parliamentary scene, political leaders may feel compelled to use the time they have in public office to pursue their agenda, private

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Marek Rybář Table 7.2 Splits and mergers among select Slovak parties

Party

Splits/Mergers

HZDS

1993 – Alliance of Democrats (AD) 1994 – Alternative of Political Realism (APR) 2002 – Movement for Democracy (HZD) 2003 – People’s Union (ĽÚ)

SNS

KDH

SMK

SDĽ

Political fortunes of splinters

AD and APR were represented in the Moravčík government in 1994, and later merged with the NDS into the Democratic Union. The Democratic Union in 2001 merged with the SDKU. The HZD failed to gain parliamentary representation in the September 2002 elections. The NDS was represented in 1993 – National Democratic Party Moravčík government in 1994, later (NDS) merged with DU (1995). 2001 – Real Slovak National Party The PSNS failed to gain (PSNS) parliamentary representation in the September 2002 elections. The SKDH merged with the SNS in 1991 – Slovak Christian Democratic 1995 after competing unsuccessfully Movement (SKDH) 2000 – Slovak Democratic and Christian for parliamentary representation in 1992 and 1994. Union (SDKÚ) The SDKÚ was a leading government party until elections 2002 and is the major party of the Dzurinda II cabinet. 1998 – SMK established as a merger of Before merging into the SMK, the MOS (MNI) was a member of the the Hungarian Christian Democratic Mečiar I government and MKDH Movement (MKDH), Movement with Coexistence supported minority Coexistence and the Hungarian Civic Moravčík government in 1994. Party 1994 – The SDL’ auxiliary organization The ZRS was a pivotal party in Mečiar V government, but has failed Association of Slovak Workers (ZRS) defected party and turned into a political to secure parliamentary representation since then. party. The SDA failed to gain 1999 – Former SDĽ vice-chairman left parliamentary representation in the the party to establish his Smer party. September 2002 elections. 2002 – Social Democratic Alternative Smer has been a major opposition (SDA) party since the 2002 elections.

Source: Rybář 2004b.

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or public, at all costs. Hence, whether they seek private or public goals, leaving their original parties may still provide them with a ‘blackmail capacity’ vis-à-vis their original (governing) parties. They may try to influence the governmental policy-making due to their importance in the parliamentary equation. Regarding the behaviour of the party leaders initiating expulsion of dissenting parliamentarians from their party, an alternative explanation is at hand. Many of them established their parties, investing a great deal of resources, including their own finances, charisma and social capital, and hence may feel that they politically ‘own’ these parties. Hence, sharing political power with their (previously often subordinate) party colleagues in organizations they understand as their personal vehicle to public offices is not necessarily an attractive option for many of them. Alternatively, all actors of party break-ups may feel confident about the success of their organizations in the following elections. The Slovak electoral system may be factored here. The change in the electoral law in 1998 reduced the number of electoral districts from four to one. This measure not only increases the proportionality of the vote-to-seat translation, but also makes electoral communication easier for party leaders. The list-based PR electoral system in a single electoral district increases the importance of party leadership and creates the situation where electoral competition focuses on the performance of only a few party leaders. Hence, even minor strategic errors of party leaders may be detrimental to the overall electoral success of the party. On the other hand, good campaign management may bring political success to parties with only a handful of political figures. Thus, the breakaway parliamentary-faction-turned-parties may hope to be re-elected even with limited personal resources and scant political experience of most of their candidates. An unrestrictive piece of legislation regarding the registration of new parties and their participation in the elections is also a factor that facilitates the effort of dissenting parliamentarians to run in the following elections on a party list of their newly formed party. To register a party, the ‘founding fathers’ only need to submit a draft party constitution, a petition with 1,000 signatures together with a list of people acting on behalf of the new party, and to pay a registration fee of approximately 250 euro. To take part in the elections, parties need to prove they have at least 10 000 members19, but they can substitute the lacking number of party members by additional signatures of citizens in a petition supporting the party’s electoral bid. In addition, parties which receive at least 3 per cent of the vote, even if they fail to cross the 5 per cent threshold, are entitled to reimbursement of election expenses20. Hence, this financial compensation may further encourage leaders of new parties to compete in parliamentary elections. Only the 2004 change 19

This condition does not apply to parties which were elected to parliament in the previous parliamentary election. 20 Until 2002 such a party received 60 Slovak crowns (1.5 euro) per vote it received. The new law specifies 1 per cent of the previous year’s average monthly wage (i.e. about 144 Slovak crowns in 2004) per vote to be reimbursed. See Láštic (2004).

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of the electoral law introduced a system of election ‘deposits’ whereby each party participating in parliamentary elections is required to pay a half a million Slovak crowns (12,500 euro). Only parties which gain more than 3 per cent of the national vote will get the money back.

Organizational Aspects of Slovak Party Politics Party Organizations: Old and New The organizational structure of political parties in the new democracies of EastCentral Europe has recently become an important object of scholarly interest. In general, it has been argued that party organizations in new democracies differ from those in Western Europe in several ways. Organizations of new parties in the ECE are said to be characterized primarily by limited opportunities of party members to influence intra-party life, financial dependence of parties on state subsidies, the low levels of party affiliation, weak or non-existent links between parties and interest organizations and an underdeveloped structure of territorial organizational units of political parties (Kopecký 1995, Lewis 1996, Szczerbiak 2001, van Biezen 2003, 2005). Moreover, even though the party in central office is formally the dominant face of the party, most parties are found to be dominated by a small circle of party elites which is located at the intersection of the party in central office and the party in public office, since the top party representatives also occupy the most important public offices controlled by the party (van Biezen 2000). Nevertheless, differences between individual parties across the region and within the individual countries exist for a number of reasons. Because the organizational continuity of political parties in Slovakia as well as in other ECE countries tends to be low, as parties often merge and split (Mair 1997), we may expect that the fact of weak party organizations shall be even more pronounced among newer political parties. Hence, parties like the SDKÚ, Smer and ANO that were established in the early years of this decade will be organizationally weaker than the SDĽ, KDH or HZDS established about a decade earlier. In addition, parties with uninterrupted continuity reaching back to their communist-time predecessors, like the Polish Peasant Party, the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM) in the Czech Republic and the Party of the Democratic Left (SDĽ) in Slovakia, to name just a few examples, should be organizationally more developed than parties formed from scratch in the early period of the democratic transition (e.g. Hanley 2001, Szczerbiak 2002). These interpretations of differences between new and older parties certainly do contain powerful explanatory potential. In the rest of this paper, however, we shall present an alternative explanation which emphasises important attitudinal and motivational differences among the founders of parties concerning the roles their organizations should play in public life. The importance of an existing institutional framework (list-based PR system with a single electoral district) of the electoral competition for behaviour of party elites is

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also underlined. To illustrate the main points of the argument, five parties shall be included in our analysis: the KDH, SDĽ and HZDS, parties established in early 1990s, and the SDKÚ and Smer set up in 1999 and 2000, respectively. I shall use several indicators to illustrate organizational differences between the two groups of parties, including levels of party affiliation, the relative power positions of party leadership vis-à-vis local party organizations and the territorial reach of party organization. Membership The different level of party affiliation is the first striking difference between the old and new parties. It is considerably higher among the former than in the latter. I argue that the difference reflects opposite attitudes of party elites in the old and new parties as to how important party members are for the goals of the party. While among the old parties, especially in the KDH and SDĽ, party members constitute an important source of financial resources and volunteer labour and in all three old parties the opinion of rank-and-file represent important indicators of how parties, their leaders and policies are perceived at the local level, extensive party membership is largely unimportant to the leaders of new parties. They clearly prefer campaign-marketing techniques controlled by PR experts, carried out by Table 7.3 Party membership in old parties Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 n.a. – not available.

SDĽ n.a. 81,000 48,000 n.a. 27,600 24,000 27,600 n.a. 22,482 21,223 21,200

KDH n.a. n.a. 25,000 26,352 27,888 26,386 28,265 30,106 29,541 27,348 27,400

HZDS

30,000 28,320 40,000 50,000 70,000 72,500 40,000

Table 7.4 Party membership in new parties 2000 Smer n.a. SDKÚ 2,762 n.a. – not available.

2001 n.a. 3,403

2002 5,200 5,396

2003 5,800 6,150

2004 6,500 5,650

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professional agencies as compared to volunteer labour and more traditional campaign activities. Party members are also of little importance in terms of their financial contributions to the party coffers. Moreover, as old parties can mobilize their solid core electorate by more traditional methods, the extensive party membership at the local level plays an important role in the process, too. Due to their more fluid party identities and volatile and less reliable electorate, the new parties need to reach as many voter groups as possible, the goal for which extensive membership is less useful. These differences in turn highlight the different extent to which parties have engaged in domination strategies, as opposed to adaptation, towards its environment. In general, all parties simultaneously pursue several goals: they try to gain as many votes in the elections and put as many of their members in influential public offices as possible, and carry out a maximum of their policy preferences. The new parties’ primary orientation, however, has clearly been vote-seeking and, or office-seeking. Politicians within the parliament and even the government established them to boost their chances to remain in influential public positions. As new formations, Smer and the SDKÚ have clearly preferred vote-seeking activities to party building. Their success in the 2002 elections further strengthened this tendency to maintain only a minimalist party organization. The initial policy proposals of the Smer representatives (especially between 1999 and 2002) were carefully crafted to appeal to the majority opinion of the Slovak electorate on a number of issues. In 2002, one of the main slogans of the Smer party was an appeal to the voters to elect the party leader to the position of Prime Minister, a clear illustration of an office-seeking effort. The SDKÚ also concentrated primarily on communication of party leaders (controlling many executive offices) with the voters. A vote-seeking perspective was also clear in the numerous appeals by the party leaders to create a broad electoral alliance with Christian Democrats, the SMK and the smaller centre-right formations to prevent wasting votes which could go to parties without a chance of crossing the 5 per cent barrier. The situation has been rather different with the old parties. Between 1990 and 1991, the new leaders of the communist-successor SDĽ divested the party of hardline communists and all party members had to re-register, a process which also included an explicit acceptance of a liberal democratic political regime and commitment to multi-party competition (Grzymala-Busse 2002, Haughton 2004). Much attention was devoted to giving the party a credible social democratic image and character. Party congresses became important battlegrounds over the ideological orientation of the SDĽ. In retrospect, some of the party leaders acknowledged that in 1990-1992 they did not expect their party to get into government within a decade, and thus concentrated upon party-building and ideological transformation of the party (Ftáčnik 2001). Between 1994 and 1998 the SDĽ opted for an ‘independent opposition strategy’ to reinforce its policy and ideological credentials among the centre-left electorate. The orientation of the KDH towards transforming its environment has been visible since the inception of the party in early 1990. The word ‘movement’ in the

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name of the party reflected the determination of the party leaders to create a broad Christian Democratic movement with both political (i.e. party) and non-political (i.e. various affiliated organizations) elements. Party-building and the cultivation of party ideology featured prominently among the activities of the party in the first half of the 1990s. The party only reluctantly entered the government with the SDĽ in March 1994 and refused to join a coalition government with HZDS after the early elections in the same year (Čarnogurský 1995). Hence, policy-seeking and party-building activities were dominant both in the SDĽ and KDH. The situation within HZDS has been more complicated, but strong nationalism (especially between 1994 and 1998) and investment in party-building activities characterized the party at least until 2000. The party’s orientation towards the domination of its environment has been most visible in the strategy of the party to conflate reform of state administration with building a strong party organization (see below). The Reach of Party Organizations As for the number of local party organizations of the old parties, no exact data is available that would allow a systematic comparison. However, various sources (e.g. Grzymala-Busse 2002) and some newspaper interviews with party leaders report the number of local units for the SDĽ, KDH and HZDS between 1992 and 1999 being at approximately an equal level, ranging between 2,000 and 3,000. Compared with the data received from the SDKÚ and Smer, the data for old parties report roughly 15 to 30 times more local units than the new parties (see Table 7.6). Table 7.5 Number of local party units in new parties

Smer SDKÚ

2000 n.a. 164

2001 60 201

2002 70 295

2003 80 303

The enormous difference clearly displays more than a possible time-lag between the origin of parties and the period of their organizational heyday. Rather, it reveals a fundamentally different strategy of party elites towards party organization building: substantially more time, resources and effort has been devoted to party-building in the old parties than has been the case for the SDKÚ and Smer. While the SDĽ inherited most of the local party units from the pre-1989 period, the KDH local organizations started to emerge in late 1989. Even though not directly tied to the Catholic Church hierarchy, these clubs often emerged within the local communities active in the Church. The organizational structure of the HZDS was originally less formal and institutionalized in 1991-1993. No formal registration of party members existed prior to 1994. However, after the party was ousted from power in March 1994, the party structure became more formalised: individual members were required to pay membership fees and stricter parliamentary discipline was imposed. The HZDS-

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initiated administrative reform of the state – the introduction of eight administrative regions instead of the previously existing four, provided the party with a new opportunity to strengthen its organization. In his famous speech to the regional representatives of his party, Mečiar emphasized that the local and regional party organizations had to be established before the administrative reform of the state could take place, so as to give the party a chance to direct the process of administrative reform from within the regions (Leško 1997). HZDS membership more than doubled in the period between 1995 and 1998, a consequence of the fact that HZDS unofficially required the newly recruited civil servants to join the party21. In the course of the 1990s, the well-developed territorial organizational structure and extensive membership levels of the old parties were also used as the basis for door-to-door campaign and parties (especially the SDĽ and KDH) also engaged in relatively extensive usage of volunteer labour during the parliamentary election campaigns. The HZDS also used local party units as the basis for its campaign, especially in 1994 and to some extent in 2002, but in 1998 its excessive campaign spending outraged and discouraged many of the undecided voters. During most of their existence, however, all three parties have tried to use the party organization as a tool to mobilise its core electorate rather than to reach out to new voters. The latter would require a modification of the core party message (often clearly ideologically identifiable), a measure which could trigger the process of alienating the core electorate and might not be acceptable to leaders and members of these parties. Party Leadership versus Party Members Old and new parties also differ in the relative power positions of their leadership, and especially of that of the party leaders, vis-à-vis the rest of the party structures. The SDKÚ and Smer are unequivocally dominated by the founding leaders: in the Smer party any important decision made by the party congress must also be approved by a majority (about three dozen) of the party’s founding members. Moreover, the 20-member presidency practically decides all matters of party life, including candidate nominations and the drafting of the party election manifesto, without even a formal input from the party congress (Rybář 2004a). The chairman of the party is the undisputed leader who sets most of the party agenda and almost exclusively represents the party in its communication with the voters and the media. Similarly, in the SDKÚ the 13-member Presidency is the most powerful organ of the party. Its strong position is demonstrated by a great deal of decisionmaking powers, and also by the fact that it can even dismiss any of its members. The party congress elects the presidency for a four-year period by a simple majority but it can be dismissed only by a two-thirds majority of the party 21

The number of public employees rose sharply, the fact that HZDS used to boost the growth of its party organization. See also Grzymala-Busse (2003).

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delegates. The party chairman assumes the key executive powers including the right to veto any candidate for public office elected in the party primaries22 (Rybář 2004a). Party congresses in both the SDKÚ and Smer have de facto little opportunity to influence the intra-party situation. Clearly, the two parties were established by a small group of politicians to foster their chances to influence political development in the country. A tendency towards the concentration of power has existed in the KDH and SDĽ as well, but nowhere has it reached the levels existing in the new parties. The SDĽ, for example, reserved a relatively strong position for its local party units and the regional party organizations had a de facto last say in the selection process of party candidates for the 1992, 1994 and 1998 elections (Ištván 2001). Moreover, the SDĽ has been the only relevant Slovak party which has changed its leader in a direct competition of candidates at a party congress23. Intra-party competition and challenges to the party leader has also existed in the KDH. Throughout the 1990s, the broad party leadership consolidated its decisive position within the party, but regional party organizations played an important role in candidate nomination process and policy-formulation. Moreover, even though the position of Ján Čarnogurský, the party founding leader, was respected and acknowledged, important differences between the ‘modernizers’ and ‘Catholics’ in the broad party leadership existed (Haughton and Rybář 2004) and the party leader had to face influential intra-party opposition that prevented him from acting unilaterally. The situation changed in 2000 when the “modernizers” left the party to form the SDKÚ and Čarnogurský left active party politics, recommending his long-term protégé to the party congress who then replaced him, Čarnogurský, in the party chairmanship. The HZDS has long enjoyed a reputation of being a charismatic party totally controlled by its founding leader Vladimír Mečiar (see above). Mečiar has certainly been a strong leader attracting a great share of HZDS voters, but his charisma tends to have eroded over time (Minarovič 2004). At the 2000 party congress, for example, he managed to persuade the party delegates to change the party constitution to strengthen the position of the party leader, giving him the exclusive right to nominate candidates for the top party positions. A formalization of what had been an informal rule before indicates that Mečiar had anticipated a strong intra-party opposition after the party lost the status of governing party in 1998. Throughout the 1990s Mečiar certainly dominated the party and acted as an unquestionable leader. However, as long as they did not question his leadership, a great deal of competing intra-party interests existed in the HZDS, giving it an 22 Even though there are intra-party primaries to choose candidates for parliamentary elections, most of the safe seats are filled directly by the party Presidency and hence are not subject to competition in the primaries. Moreover, the party leader has the right to veto party candidates for the positions reserved for the party primaries. This right was used in two instances before the 2002 elections. 23 Jozef Migaš replaced Peter Weiss in 1996 and Pavel Koncoš replaced Migaš in 2001. In both cases at least two candidates competed for the position of the party leader.

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image of a rather heterogeneous and plural party. For example, the existence of a strong nationalist faction was acknowledged within the HZDS. Moreover, various regional interests and also competing groups of people who benefited from the HZDS’ control of the privatization process in 1993-1998 all point to the HZDS as a ‘broad church party’. These intra-party interests benefited from the popularity of the party leader and did not challenge his leading position. Mečiar in turn allowed them to pursue their interests and successfully prevented his ambitious colleagues from taking over the party leadership. Hence, even if the party has been dominated by an undisputed leader, the degree of internal factionalism and intra-party competition among the party subleaders most likely resembles situations in the SDĽ and KDH than in the new parties. Hence, the SDKÚ and Smer clearly display lower levels of intra-party competition and politically relevant pluralism than the older parties of SDĽ, KDH and HZDS. Differences in the role of the rank-and-file and in levels of party affiliation in the new and old parties, combined with a dissimilar reach of party organizations and the extent to which the party leadership has been able to concentrate the power within the party, point to two fundamentally different organizational strategies. The old parties approximate an ideal type of party that values and seeks active party members, uses more traditional campaigning techniques by deploying volunteer labour, has a more developed territorial party organization and an identifiable ideological identity, and systematically tries to dominate and form its environment. The other ideal type represents a party which neither seeks nor needs many party members, relies on modern marketing techniques of electoral campaigning organized by professional PR advisers, maintains only a modest territorial organization, downplays the importance of political ideologies in public life and is primarily driven by vote and office seeking considerations. The founding fathers of the new party elites deliberately chose the latter strategy in the early 2000s and their choice was further facilitated by the electoral system used since 1998. The list-based PR with a single electoral district, as it has been argued above, helps to concentrate power in the hands of a small circle of party leaders, as there is no need to construct an extensive territorial organization which could serve as a power base for potential intra-party opposition. The single electoral districts further reinforces the tendency of the personalization of politics and especially electoral campaigns, thus giving party leaders additional leverage to uphold their leading position in their respective parties.

Conclusion Slovak party politics have changed substantially over the last fifteen years. In this chapter I have illustrated three principal manifestations of this change. First, the Slovak polity is naturally pluralistic with important divisions both within the population and between political parties. For most of the second half of the 1990s these divisions among parties were overshadowed by a struggle for the rules of the

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democratic game. Only after the democratic character of the political regimes ceased to be a contested issue, the centre-periphery and church-state cleavages, as well as socioeconomic (left-right) divisions of Slovak parties, regained crucial importance. Second, the nature of coalition formation also seems to have changed, as the old divisions between the HZDS and SNS (and allies) on the one hand, and the KDH, SDĽ and Hungarian parties (and their allies) on the other have lost the old salience and there have been the first signs of a (future) cooperation across the two camps. The political dynamics have also changed because several new parties have successfully entered the political arena and some old players have effectively disappeared. Third, organizationally new political parties which were established in the early years of this decade clearly differ from the old parties set up in early 1990s. The former tend to have a less developed organizational structure and primarily focus on vote and office seeking, while the latter have shown their propensity for more extensively developed organizations and domination over their environment. These differences are not just ‘developmental’, they are ‘genetic’. In other words, new parties are organizationally different not because they are new, but because they represent a political logic that is fundamentally different from the organizational logic of major parties which were established after the regime change in early the 1990s. Slovak political parties, especially during the 1990s, have clearly been dominant players in political processes. They have been crucial for the building and maintenance of coalition governments and serve as the primary channel through which new political elites are recruited. They have also tried to shape the identities and preferences of the electorate and to represent many of their policy preferences. However, the new influential parties that have been formed since 2000 tend to have more fluid political identities, focus more on adaptation than domination over their environment, and are primarily orientated towards vote and office seeking. Moreover, the dominant share of public funding in the budgets of political parties and the availability of modern mass-communication techniques shift all parties further from society towards the institutions of the state. The turnout in the 2004 presidential and European Parliament elections, reaching 43.5 and 16.95 per cent, respectively, were also substantially lower than turnout levels in the most recent general elections (84.2 in 1998 and 70.1 per cent in 2002). It remains to be seen whether these data only reveal differences between the first and second-order elections, or whether Slovak parties will have to face a crisis of political representation manifested, among others, in a decreasing turnout.

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References Appel, H. and Gould, J. (2000), ‘Identity Politics and Economic Reform: Examining Industry-State Relations in the Czech and Slovak Republics’, in Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 52 (1), pp. 111-131. Biezen, I. van (2000), ‘On the Internal Balance of Power: Party Organizations in New Democracies’, in Party Politics, vol. 6 (4), pp. 395-417. — (2003), Political Parties in New Democracies: Party Organizations in Southern and East-Central Europe (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave). — (2005), ‘On the Theory and Practice of Party Formation and Adaptation in New Democracies’, in European Journal of Political Research, vol. 44 (1), pp. 147174. Birch, S. (2003), Electoral Systems and Political Transformation in PostCommunist Europe (Houndmills, Basingstoke). Čarnogurský, J. (1996), ‘Stúpa svetu horúčka?’ (Interview). Pravda, August 31, 1995. Reprinted in G. Rothmayerová, Dusno (Topoľčany. Prima Print, undated). Ftáčnik, M. (2001), (Deputy Chairman of the SDĽ) Interviewed by the author in Bratislava, August 28, 2001. Grzymala-Busse, A. (2002), Redeeming the Communist Past: The Regeneration of Communist parties in East Central Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). — (2003), ‘Political Competition and the Politicization of the State in East Central Europe’, in Comparative Political Studies, vol. 36(10), pp. 1123-1147. Hanley, S. (2001), ‘Towards Breakthrough or Breakdown? The Consolidation of KSČM as a Neo-Communist Successor Party in the Czech Republic’ in Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, vol. 17(3), pp. 96-116. Haughton, T. (2001), ‘HZDS: The Ideology, Organisation and Support Base of Slovakia’s Most Successful Party’ in Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 53(5), pp. 745769. — (2004), ‘Explaining the Limited Success of the Communist-Successor Left in Slovakia: The Case of the Party of the Democratic Left (SDĽ)’ in Party Politics, vol. 10(2), pp. 177-191. Haughton, T. and Rybář, M. (2004), ‘All right now? Explaining the Successes and Failures of the Slovak Centre-Right’ in The Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, vol. 20(4). Ištván, M. (2001), (an SDĽ Deputy) Interviewed by the author, September 6, 2001. Kopecký, P. (1995), ‘Developing Party Organizations in East-Central Europe: What Type of Party is Likely to Emerge?’, in Party Politics, vol. 1(4), pp. 51534. — (2001), Parliaments in the Czech and Slovak Republics: Party Competition and Parliamentary Institutionalization (Aldershot: Ashgate). Krause, K. D (2000), ‘Public Opinion and Party Choice in Slovakia and the Czech Republic’, in Party Politics, vol. 6(1), pp. 23-46.

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Krivý, V. (2000), Politické orientácie na Slovensku (Bratislava: Inštitút pre verejné otázky). Láštic, E. (2004), ‘Parties and Government in Slovakia: A Fatal Attraction?’, in O. Gyárfášová and G. Mesežnikov (eds.), Party Government in Slovakia: Experience and Perspectives (Bratislava: Institute for Public Affairs). Leško, M. (1997), Mečiar a mečiarizmus (Bratislava: VMV). Lewis, P. G. (1996), Party Structure and Organization in East-Central Europe (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar). Mair, P. (1997), Party System Change: Approaches and Interpretations (Oxford: Clarendon Press). Malová, D. and Rybář, M. (2003), ‘The European Union’s Policies Towards Slovakia: Carrots and Sticks of Political Conditionality’ in J. Rupnik and J. Zielonka (eds), The Road to the European Union: The Czech and Slovak Republics (Manchester: Manchester University Press). Minarovič, M. (2004), ‘Hnutie za demokratické Slovensko’ in M. Rybář (ed.), Politické strany ako organizácie: Prípady zo Slovenska (Univerzita Komenského). Pridham, G. (1999), ‘Complying with the European Unions Democratic Conditionality: Transnational Party Linkages and Regime Change in Slovakia’ in Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 51(7), pp. 1221-1244. Rybář, M. (2004a), ‘Organizácia nových politických strán na Slovensku: Niekoľko úvah o vnútrostraníckom živote SDKÚ, ANO a strany Smer’, in M. Rybář (ed.), Politické strany ako organizácie: Prípady zo Slovenska (Bratislava: Univerzita Komenského). — (2004b), ‘Party Politics and Changing Patterns of Party Competition in Slovakia’, in O. Gyárfášová and G. Mesežnikov (eds), Party Government in Slovakia: Experience and Perspectives (Bratislava: Institute for Public Affairs). — (2005), ‘The 2004 EP Elections in Slovakia: Euro-Apathy in a Euro-Optimistic Country?’, in R. Hrbek (ed.), European Parliament Elections 2004 in the Ten New EU Member States (Baden-Baden: Nomos). Sitter, N. (2003), ‘Cleavages, Party Strategy and Party System Change in Europe, East and West’ in P. Lewis and P. Webb (eds.), Pan-European Perspectives on Party Politics (Leiden and Boston: Brill). Szczerbiak, A. (2001), Poles Together? Emergence and Development of Political Parties in Post-communist Poland (Budapest: Central European University Press). — (2002), ‘The Polish Peasant Party: A Mass Party in Postcommunist Eastern Europe?’, in East European Politics and Societies, vol. 15(3), pp. 554-588.

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Chapter 8

The Survival of the Fittest: Party System Concentration in Hungary Zsolt Enyedi

Introduction The Hungarian party system is characterized by the combination of decreasing fragmentation, high polarization, bipolar competition and lack of new entries. Still qualifying as volatile according to the standards of late twentieth century Western politics, Hungary has produced one of the most consolidated party systems in the post-communist world. The present chapter tries to answer the question about the role of institutional conditions, socio-structural underpinnings, organizational techniques, alliance-building strategies and ideological formation in the development of this relatively high degree of consolidation.

The Identity of Hungarian Parties The relative simplicity and stability of the Hungarian party system is well illustrated by the fact that the post-communist history of the parliament can be retold, even using a generous definition of relevant parties, with no more than seven party-names1. These are the Independent Smallholders’ Party (FKgP), the Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP), the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF), the Party of Hungarian Justice and Life (MIÉP) and the Fidesz on the right of the political spectrum, and on the left: the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) and the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ). It is noteworthy, however, how much the ideological profile of some of the parties has changed during the past fifteen years. The Independent Smallholders’ Party (FKgP) was the largest party of the short democratic period between the Second World War and the communist takeover. It 1

Next to these parties one more must be briefly mentioned, the Workers’ (or Labor) Party. It was established in 1989 by the orthodox wing of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party. It tried to combine nostalgia for the Kádárist era with the rhetoric of the anti-globalist movements, without much real success. This party used to collect around 3 per cent of the vote at the national elections, but gained no political relevance otherwise.

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resurrected itself in 1989 as an agrarian-populist organization, distinguishing itself from the other parties by its relentless campaign for the restitution of land to its original owners. During its post-communist career the party has vacillated between two options: portraying itself as a traditional peasant-party or following a radical protest-party strategy. Nationalism, traditionalism and anti-communism characterized the Smallholders in all these phases, but the party was better defined by its specific social clientele and by the personal appeal of its charismatic leader than by its political programme. The rationale and the clientele of the other historical party, the Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP), is even more one-dimensional: the party identifies itself with Christian/Catholic values and interests. It could be described as a true subcultural party (Enyedi 1996). The party expresses strong reservations against unregulated capitalism. In this regard its position is best labelled as ‘Christian-social’. With the exception of a short, radical nationalist period, the Christian Democrats have cultivated a pro-European image. Although the party’s anti-communism is more muted than that of the Smallholders, its right-wing identity has never been in question. The third major party of the right, the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF), used to be and partly still is, a more complex construct than the already discussed two organizations. It had no historical predecessors, but it was firmly anchored in the reform circles of the eighties. The Forum (not having yet the status and identity of a party) was organized in 1987 mainly by writers and historians who were particularly concerned about the grievances of Hungarians living in the neighbouring states and about the perceived weakness of national identity. From its original orientation, which is best described as democratic nationalist, it turned into a Christian democratic and conservative party in 1990. During the following years it continued to include Christian democratic, national liberal and populist wings, however its anti-communism became gradually more pronounced. Conflicts between liberal and populist, moderate and radical right-wing groups have been wrecking the party throughout its career. Neither the popularity, nor the unity of the Forum was saved by the simultaneous expulsion of some of the liberal and far right members in 1993. The intensifying competition between the Forum and the other major centreright party, the Fidesz, triggered two, diverging ideological reactions from the leadership of the Forum (MDF). The minority opted for a more traditionalist, populist and nationalist message, but the representatives of this group were soon marginalized. The mainstream decided to strengthen the moderate conservative image of the party, emphasizing that the Forum is the only genuine centre-right organization according to the Western sense of the word (Hanley 2004): it combines moral conservatism with pro-capitalist policies and with a moderate style. The bulk of the expelled right-wing faction resurfaced as the radical nationalist Party of Hungarian Justice and Life (MIÉP) in 1993. Anti-semitism, chauvinism, anti-globalization, anti-communism, anti-liberalism and clericalism characterize

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the ideology and rhetoric of this party. The MIÉP is strongly opposed to the influence of multinational corporations and international organizations. Among the seven listed parties, the Party of Hungarian Justice and Life is the only one that has unequivocally opposed Hungary’s integration into the EU and the NATO. Fidesz2 is the largest and newest member of the right-wing party family. It was established in 1988 based on the network of university colleges, as the counter organization of the communist youth organization. At that time it described itself as ‘radical, liberal, and alternative’ (Bozóki 1989), and in terms of values and style it resembled Western left-libertarian parties. From 1990 onwards, in order to become more electable, it began to downplay its ‘alternative’ features, portraying itself rather as a mainstream, pragmatic, and professional party. In this period liberalism was its dominant ideology. The party was against the restitution of the nationalized property to its original owners: it was anti-clerical and criticized the nationalism of the government parties. In 1993, and especially after 1994, Fidesz started its journey towards the rightwing and conservative corner of the Hungarian party system. It embraced ideas and slogans like ‘Christianity’, ‘family’ and ‘fatherland’. By 1995/1996 it had accepted all the ideological tenets of the traditional right-wing forces. In 2000 the party left the Liberal International and one year later it joined the European People’s Party. After completing its move to the right-wing pole on the cultural dimension, it began to shift to the left on economic issues. Étatism, criticism of privatization or of the privileges of the banking sector was always part of the traditionalist rightwing repertoire, and this discourse was finally embraced by Fidesz as well. As a culmination of this strategy, the party supported the referendum to stop privatization in health care and it proposed a complete halt of any privatization in 2004. In spite of its leftist turn, the party continues to demand lower taxes, particularly while in opposition. The left is dominated by the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP). This party was formed by the reformers and the technocrats of the communist party (Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party, MSZMP). The link to the dissolved ex-ruling party endowed the MSZP with a well-developed infrastructure and a relatively large membership, but it also undermined its democratic legitimacy. The early 1990’s were dominated by tensions between the liberal wing and the leftist faction linked to the trade unions. The mainstream supported the cautious social-democratization, modernization and liberalization of the party’s profile. As a result, and also because of the successful transformation of the old nomenklatura elite into the dominant faction of the new business elite, the Socialists not only accepted the logic of the capitalist transformation, but they proved to be ready to implement 2

FIDESZ was originally an abbreviation, meaning Alliance of Young Democrats. In 1995 the party changed its name to Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Party, and in 2003 to FideszHungarian Civic Union. The word ‘Fidesz’ was kept partly because it was an already established brand name, and partly because the Latin word ‘fides’ has an appealing meaning. For the sake of saving space, I will call the party Fidesz throughout the text.

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radical, and at some points rather ruthless, economic reforms. On moral issues they gradually accepted the anti-nationalist and morally permissive agenda of the liberals, though they are more ready to make compromises with the right on these issues. The popular appeal of the party lies mainly in its pragmatism, promise of competence, and in friendly relations with neighbouring countries. The last significant party to be mentioned, the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ), considers itself to be the heir of the ‘Samizdat’ movement that was launched at the beginning of the seventies by human rights activists. By the end of the 1980s these activists were joined by liberal economists, and the two groups established the party in 1988 as the most radical opposition to communist power. The party was composed of social democrats, liberals and radical anti-communists. Gradually social democrats and anti-communists dropped out, and the liberals prevailed. The once fiercely anti-MSZP and anti-communist Free Democrats, judging the right-wing parties to be hostile to liberal democracy, joined the Socialists in the 1994-1998 government. Since then the party is considered as part of the left-wing bloc, although some of the Free Democrats see the ideological differences that distinguish them from the Socialists not less relevant than those that pit the party against the conservative right.

The Structure of the Ideological Space During the early nineties the attitudes of the Hungarian public produced a fairly weakly organized ideological pattern, in accordance with the fuzzy programmatic profile of most of the parties. But in terms of cultural issues the parties provided distinct alternatives already at that time (Kitschelt et al. 1999). Karácsony (2003) identified two attitudinal dimensions for predicting the party choice. The first was based on clericalism, anti-communism and nationalism, dividing the socialists from the right-wing parties, with the liberals (SZDSZ, Fidesz) in the middle. The other dimension separated the Christian democrats and the socialists from the liberals (SZDSZ, to a lesser extent Fidesz) on the basis of anti-communism, promarket orientation and social liberalism. The dynamics of the last decade was characterized by the virtual disappearance of the second dimension, by the growing relevance of the first dimension and by the increasing attitudinal similarity between the Free Democrats and the Socialist Party on the one hand, and of the traditional right-wing parties and Fidesz, on the other. Anti-communism, nationalism, and clericalism are the issues that correlate best with the left-right identification and partisanship among both voters and MPs (Enyedi and Todosijevic 1999, Tóka 2004). The victory of cultural issues over economic ones contradicted the expectations of many scholars, who anticipated the crystallization of economic polarization as democratic politics began to consolidate. Evans and Whitefield (1993), for example, predicted Western style, redistribution-centred competition for ethnically homogeneous countries like Hungary.

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The prominence of cultural issues is an elite-driven phenomenon that can be traced back to the decisions of the parties. Within the population at large, the crystallization of cultural positions is not significantly more robust than that of the economic positions (Tóka 2004). But since the party elite polarizes almost exclusively along the former issues, the collective political identities were built around cultural elements, and the gap between electorates has grown therefore on cultural, not economic issues. As far as the reasons of parties for embarking on a cultural struggle are concerned, one may suspect the role of particular political traditions, the roots of parties in rival circles of intelligentsia, or, as Kitschelt does, the constrained space in economic policies (Kitschelt 1995). Economic attitudes do play some role in party choice, but, since typically the current government parties are seen as more pro-market than the opposition (Tóka 1997, 2004), this does not lead to a stable differentiation among parties. The secondary role of economic issues means that the semantics of the leftright terminology acquires a strong cultural colouring. ‘Right-wing’ stands for Christian-nationalist, morally conservative and anti-communist orientation, while ‘left’ is associated with communist legacy and with a libertarian-cosmopolitan orientation. Since anti-communism, nationalism, and clericalism are the principal elements of the overarching attitudinal divide, they deserve a closer inspection. Anticommunism seems to be the most consequential element of this ideological package. The defeat of the (reformed) communist party at the 1990 election did not remove the questions related to the past regime, elite-replacement and retroactive justice from the agenda. Actually, the role of this attitude dimension is, if anything, increasing, refuting rationalistic expectations (Kitschelt 2001). This counterintuitive phenomenon has at least two sources. On the one hand, the communist nomenklatura, exactly because of its reformist orientation, could convert its political influence into economic capital more smoothly than in many other excommunist countries. On the other hand, the right-wing parties, coming from various backgrounds (urban and rural, religious and non-religious, conservative and liberal) can identify their common core, and can question the legitimacy of their largest competitor, the MSZP, by emphasizing anti-communism. The second element, clericalism, is less fundamental for mass political behaviour, but it is highly salient for the party elites. The Hungarian right is clerical in the sense of calling for the privileged treatment of the so-called historical churches, demanding higher financial support for them and elevating Christian symbols into the official state discourse. The left is regarded to be anticlerical partly for rejecting all these proposals and partly because of its association with communist rule which repressed churches and religion. Finally, the central role of nationalism (i.e., issues linked to national sovereignty and national identity) deserves special attention. In Hungary the discourse of the right-wing parties posits a sharp divide between a camp ‘with national sentiments’ and one without them. While leftist politicians routinely reject

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this dichotomy (or portray their opponents as extreme nationalists), the prevailing public discourse takes the existence of a national(ist) – cosmopolitan polarization as given. The centrality of this dimension requires explanation, since Hungary, unlike many of its neighbours, is not a newly created state and has no large ethnic minorities. In fact, in Hungary the nationalist divide has a long tradition. The initial, nineteenth century alignment reflected the conflict over the ties to the Hapsburg monarchy, and it evolved around the so-called ‘homeland versus progress’ dichotomy. In the second (interwar) party system the conflicting approaches to nationalism and national identity manifested themselves in the attitudes to the ‘Jewish question’ and to the ‘irredenta project’ (i.e., the plan to re-incorporate the lands lost after the WWI). During the third party system, between 1945 and 1948, the issue of the sovereignty vis-à-vis the Soviet Union re-emphasized the centrality of this dimension. Since 1989 the ‘nationalist’ agenda has called for the strengthening of national identity, after the decades of internationalist communism, and for a more aggressive protection of the interests of Hungarians living across the borders. The ‘cosmopolitan’ side rejects these demands as conflicting with the superior project of westernization (Márkus 1996). However, the conflict around nationalism is not a Hungarian specificity, but is rooted in the modernization process of the European peripheries. The peripheral societies are split between groups closely linked to the interests and values of the continental centre and groups searching for alternative patterns of modernization. This division closely resembles the centre-periphery division that Stein Rokkan studied so assiduously, but it has only feeble links to actual geographic or occupational status, and it functions more as an attitudinal divide.

Elections and Governments Although the party labels have been more stable in Hungary than in most postcommunist countries, the rank-order of the parties changed substantially during the first fifteen years, virtually turning upside down. While the first election was dominated by the struggle between the Hungarian Democratic Forum and the Alliance of Free Democrats, by the second part of the decade these two parties were eclipsed by the Hungarian Socialist Party and Fidesz. The present, 2002-2006, parliament contains only four parties. Given that the two major parliamentary factions possess close to 90 per cent of the seats, Hungary is closer to a two-party system than most European countries (see Tables 8.1 and 8.2). The original menu of parties used to be, of course, considerably wider: on paper, around one hundred, in reality about three dozen parties competed for the support of Hungarian citizens in the first free parliamentary election. But the results of that election elevated only six of the competing parties into the parliament. The most consequential outcome concerned the communist successor party: the Socialists received a dismal 11 per cent, and this result opened the way

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to a clean break with the past at the level of government. The election was won by the Hungarian Democratic Forum, against its main competitor, the Alliance of Free Democrats. The former party’s deeper roots in local society and its perceived moderateness proved to be more appealing than the radicalism (both in anticommunism and in economic reform) of the Free Democrats. Together with the Smallholders and the Christian Democrats, the Hungarian Democratic Forum formed an oversized centre-right government after the election. Although in 1992 the Smallholders left the coalition, the government could retain its legislative majority because three-quarters of the Smallholder MPs remained faithful to the Prime Minister. Despite this relative stability at the level of the government, the popularity of the coalition vanished already by the end of 1990. The shift of the government parties towards a more radical right-wing direction facilitated cooperation between the parties of the opposition, especially between the Free Democrats and the Socialists. Until then the ex-communist Socialists were treated as pariahs by the other parties. Table 8.1 The distribution of list votes in Hungarian parliamentary elections, 1990-2002 in per cent

FIDESZ MDF FKgP KDNP MIÉP MSZP SZDSZ Others *joint list.

1990 8.95 24.73 11.73 6.46 10.89 21.39 15.85

1994 7.02 11.74 8.82 7.03 1.59 32.99 19.74 11.07

1998 29.45 2.80 13.14 2.31 5.47 32.89 7.57 6.37

2002 41.07* 0.75 4.37 42.05 5.57 6.8

Table 8.2 The distribution of seats in Hungarian parliamentary elections, 1990-2002 in per cent

FIDESZ FKgP KDNP MDF MIÉP MSZP SZDSZ Others

1990 5.7 11.4 5.4 42.5 8.5 24.1 2.1

1994 5.2 6.7 5.7 9.8 54.1 17.9 0.3

1998 38.3 12.4 0 4.4 3.6 34.7 6.2 -

2002 42.5 6.2 46.1 5.2 -

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In 1994 Hungary witnessed the landslide victory of the Socialists (reaching absolute majority in Parliament), the collapse of the Hungarian Democratic Forum (sinking below 12 per cent) and the failure of Fidesz to increase its share of votes (despite being the number one party in the opinion polls during 1992 and 1993). While the relative position of the parties changed, the overall menu did not: the same six parties cleared the electoral threshold as in 1990. In order to strengthen the national and international legitimacy of the government, the Socialist Party, although in position to govern alone, made a generous offer of partnership to the Free Democrats. The coalition between the (ex)communists and the (ex)anti-communists was facilitated, among other factors, by the liberal economic programme of the former. In the third election, in 1998, neither the Christian Democrats nor the Hungarian Democratic Forum was able to pass the legal threshold, but some former Christian Democrats were elected on the Fidesz-ticket, and – thanks to a comprehensive electoral pact with Fidesz – enough Forum-candidates were elected in the single-member districts to form a parliamentary caucus on their own. The election ended with a Fidesz victory, and, together with the Forum and the Smallholders, and following the ‘tradition’ of the previous two governments, Fidesz formed a surplus majority government. The subsequent years ruined the Smallholders popular credibility by revealing their nepotistic character. As a result, the Smallholders suffered a heavy defeat in the 2002 election, not even being able to gain 1 per cent of the vote. The decline of these two parties is somewhat unexpected, since they occupied a relatively well-defined social niche. Neither of them was satisfied, however, with the fragile status of a small party, and both experimented with strategies targeting voters beyond their natural constituency. The charisma of Mr Torgyán, the Smallholders’ President, and his inflammatory and populist rhetoric seemed to provide the right answer to the challenge, substantially increasing the popularity of the party during the mid-1990s. In that period the Smallholders’ Party was the most popular right-wing organization. But the voters deserted the party as soon as the voters could choose another party, the Fidesz, which was almost as radical but reliable and able to govern. In contrast to the Smallholders, the Christian Democratic Party was a prime example of stability during its first seven years. But in 1997 the experimentation with radical right-wing rhetoric and the ensuing scandalous battle between its two wings, shook the popular reputation of the party and it also cost the Christian Democrats the sympathy of the Catholic Church and of its Western sister-parties. Subcultural parties are supposed to be particularly stable, but they heavily depend on the support of other subcultural institutions. The conflict between the sponsor institution, in this case the Catholic Church, and the party may undermine the loyalty of the voters, and this phenomenon certainly contributed to the demise of the Hungarian Christian Democrats. At the moment the party exists as the satellite organization of Fidesz, and its leaders are members of the Fidesz parliamentary faction.

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In 1998 the radical right-wing Party of Hungarian Justice and Life also became a parliamentary party. In the following four years it occasionally supported the government, but nominally stayed in opposition. In these years it retained the support of its core voters, but due to the increased turnout, fell short again of becoming a parliamentary party again in 2002. At this fourth election, Fidesz and the Hungarian Democratic Forum campaigned with a joint list. The number of votes cast for the list did exceed the number of votes received independently by the two parties earlier, but since none of the other right-wing parties survived, the left wing opposition, that is, the Socialists and the Free Democrats, could form a government for the second time. By this time the Free Democrats became a minor party, hardly being able to clear the 5 per cent threshold. But their influence in the new government was not necessarily smaller than their leverage on the previous one, since the government’s majority now depended on their support. As a result of the third and fourth election the party system fragmentation has declined. The number of effective electoral parties has dropped from 6.7 to 2.4, the number of parliamentary parties from 3.7 to 2.2 (Table 8.3). While in 1990 the two largest parties commanded just 46 per cent of all list votes, the same figure, according to the opinion polls and electoral results, has been around eighty-ninety per cent since 1999. The major parties stabilized their electorate: Fidesz and the Socialists hover around 35-40 per cent, while the Forum and the Free Democrats are both around 4-5 per cent. This is the pattern that was reproduced by the country’s 2004 European Parliament election as well. The decline in fragmentation followed a different course in the two camps. The leftist bloc became concentrated early on with the rise of the Socialists. The right, however, used to be fragmented, and the arrival of the Fidesz to this part of the spectrum increased fragmentation further. In 1994 four, almost equal parties dominated this side, plus the MIÉP waiting in the wings. Before the turn of the century it seemed that a Scandinavian type fragmented, though co-operation orientated right, would stabilize itself. But the disappearance from Parliament of the minor right-wing parties paved the way for the integration of the bloc within one large party, the Fidesz. Hungarian elections are competitive. Until now all nation-wide elections have been won by the opposition. At the same time local and by-elections results following the national elections reveal that public support for the government has lasted longer and longer. No government has managed to get re-elected yet, but the chances for that seem to have increased from election to election. Table 8.3 Effective number of electoral and parliamentary parties in Hungary Election year Electoral fragmentation Parliamentary fragmentation

1990 6.7 3.7

1994 5.6 2.9

1998 4.6 3.4

2002 2.4 2.2

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Year 1990 1994 1998 2002

1st round, per cent 65.1 68.9 56.3 70.5

2nd round, per cent 45.5 55.1 57.0 73.5

Another important regularity concerns alternation in power: each parliamentary election has been followed by a complete alternation. No incumbent party has ever been seriously considered as coalition partner in a government after an election. A minority government has never been seriously considered as an option either. Oversized coalitions have been the typical form of government, mainly due to the deep distrust among parties, opponents and allies alike. The pattern of coalition-building and party competition has been institutionalized without the direct involvement of a vast share of its citizens. In Hungary, as opposed to many other post-communist countries, the new elite did not enjoy a honeymoon period: participation at the parliamentary elections was low from the very beginning, and even lower for local elections and for referenda. The low and declining level of participation was reversed only in 2002. In this year one seventh of the society abandoned its traditional passivity and came out to vote (see Table 8.4). A further ‘tradition’ was broken in 2004. Until that year prime ministers changed only because of death or due to regular elections held at the end of the term. In 2004, however, the prime minister resigned, and the parties of the government installed his successor without the mandate of a new national election.

Institutional Background Party system concentration and the relative stability of the party labels are both embedded in the general framework of political institutions. Hungary is a unitary, unicameral parliamentary democracy. The power lies at the national and (to a smaller extent) at local (municipal) levels, counties have little relevance. The president is elected by the national parliament for a five year term, and has largely symbolic powers. MEP’s, mayors, local councillors, members of the county conventions, and ethnic minority councils are elected by popular vote. All other officeholders are appointed by the government or by the national parliament. The electoral system for the national parliamentary elections is a mixed one3. Voters have two votes. They can vote for regional party lists and for individual candidates. 176 members of the 386 member parliament are elected in single

3

For a concise description of the electoral system see Tóka (2004).

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member districts, through a French style double-ballot system4. The rest of the mandates are distributed through a proportional list system. 152 of these seats can be gained from twenty regional constituencies, through regional lists, using the Hagenbach-Bischoff largest-remainder formula. Below two thirds of the quota no seats are distributed. Therefore, around one fifth of the 152 mandates are typically not distributed at this stage, but are shifted to the national level. At the national level a minimum of 58 compensatory seats are distributed on the basis of votes that produce no mandates in regional constituencies and in single-member districts. National level candidates are nominated through national lists and the seats are awarded using the d’Hondt method. The threshold for being eligible for list-seats is 5 per cent. In 1989 the leading parties of the Opposition Round Table aimed at 3 per cent, then agreed on 4 per cent. But by 1994 they had realized that their interests were better served by an even higher threshold: 5 per cent for single parties, 10 per cent for two-party alliances and 15 for larger coalitions. Candidates in single-member constituencies may be nominated by both voters and parties, but regional and national lists can be submitted only by organizations registered as parties. A national list may be set up by a party which has lists in at least seven regional constituencies. In order to be eligible for a regional list, parties must be able to nominate at least two candidates in the particular region (and in larger regions more). A candidate’s nomination becomes official after collecting 750 endorsements from the district. The party lists used in national elections are closed lists. The party leadership determines the rank order of the candidates, the voters have no influence over it. The analysis of the institutional rules indicates that Hungarian parties occupy a powerful position within the political system. The closed party list system is evidently party centred. The 176 single member districts are supposed to make the elections more personality orientated, but they are not able to counterbalance the logic of the list-system. There is a close congruence between the single district vote and the list vote, i.e., there is not much sign of splitting the ballot. The distribution of seats, due to the low district magnitude and the high thresholds, is far from proportional, hurting minor parties and typically giving a bonus to the largest ones. The smaller parties must, at least for the second round of the elections, join an electoral bloc that has a chance to win most single-member seats (cf. Tóka 1995). The electoral system raises the bar so high for the minor parties that the otherwise liberal regulations concerning the establishment of parties and concerning their registration for electoral competition (e.g., there is no deposit) are without any consequence.

4

Candidates having obtained at least 15 per cent of the votes validly cast during the first electoral round may stand for election in the second round. If there are no such three candidates, the three candidates having obtained the greatest number of votes during the first electoral round may stand.

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The structure of the legislature is also party-friendly. Corporate interests have no formal role to play, and only parties are entitled to form factions. The rules of party finance provide additional bonuses for the established parties: above 1 per cent of the vote they receive regular public subsidies, and those which have a faction in the parliament are provided with a particularly lavish state support. The Constitutional Court and the Central Bank can potentially challenge the logic of party government. The term of the leaders of these institutions (similarly to the president of the republic, to the ombudsmans, and to the prosecutor general) does not coincide with the term of the parliament. This provides the opportunity for them to pursue technocratic intentions or to support the agenda of the opposition. Governments have often been particularly frustrated by the decisions of the Constitutional Court, which is one of the most activist ones in the world, creating norms in those areas where the Constitution (which originates in the communist era) is silent. Any Hungarian citizen can attack an existing law or regulation in front of the Court, and both civic organizations and politicians frequently resort to this option. The above listed veto-players limit the power of the parliamentary majority. But they do not necessarily create party-free zones. Actually, many of the officeholders in these institutions have received nomination after years of direct involvement in partisan politics. The existence of the above discussed veto-players and the long list of laws which requires a two-thirds majority, confer a consensual character to the institutional framework. But, whereas around the world other countries’ institutional make-up is typically matched with an appropriate elite culture, in Hungary it is not. The political culture is strongly adversarial. The consensual institutions, instead of fostering understanding among parties, often embittered their relations by frustrating the victorious majorities. Each government tried to rid itself of the inherited constrains, thereby gradually bringing the institutional structure closer to the prevailing political culture. The most important shift towards majoritarianism happened in 1990. As a result of a pact between the leading government and opposition parties (Act XL. of 1990), the right of the parliament to exercise a vote of no-confidence in individual ministers, and the two-thirds requirement for a number of laws were abolished and the institution of constructive vote of no-confidence was introduced. All these changes have strengthened the power of the prime minister. The ministers are responsible only to him5 and his removal requires the consensus of the parliamentary majority around an alternative candidate. The rules of the electoral competition, of party finance, and of parliamentary politics all favour, though to a varying degree, larger parties. Tóka (2004) forcefully argues that the dominance of the prime minister over the cabinet and over the parliament, guarded by the constructive vote of no-confidence, discriminates against small parties that cannot hope to capture this important 5

Until now only males were elected, or even considered, for this job.

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office. The unitary nature of the country means that parties missing the parliamentary thresholds cannot sustain a significant political presence in other decision-making bodies. While the shift of the decision-making centre towards the cabinet and the prime minister constitutes a major development, it is important to point out that most of the respective changes have happened at the level of informal practices and not at the level of institutions. Actually, the Hungarian political institutional infrastructure (electoral system, prerogatives of the parliament, etc.) is particularly stable. The institutional regime constructed at the Round Table Negotiations in 1989 was largely left intact. It is without doubt that this underlying stability has helped the established parties to consolidate their power. The lack of major changes in the rules of the game and the artificially stable governments have allowed for the crystallization of patterns of alliances and discouraged new party initiatives.

The Role of Parties in Society and Government In Hungary, just like in most Eastern European countries, political parties fulfil a relatively marginal social function. Party identification is at a low level: in the polls taken between the elections more than 30 per cent of the respondents report no party preference, and the voters move in large numbers between the parties. If strong party identification is a prerequisite of stable democracy (Campbell et al. 1960), then the Hungarian democratic regime is fragile indeed. Parties, compared to other political or social institutions, constantly receive negative public ratings (Enyedi and Tóka forthcoming). But the attitudes of the voters are often influenced by party cues. Satisfaction with the political system, with economic conditions and with the country’s future prospects appear to be directly and strongly linked to progovernment or pro-opposition preferences. When their favourite party is in government, voters adopt more pro-market, pro-NATO and pro-EU attitudes (Hann 1998). Many of the civic organizations are affiliated, at least informally, with parties, but their membership is rather small, leaving the majority of the citizens untouched by direct partisan influence. The inability to mobilize citizens for public activities (indicated, among other factors, by the low turnout at the elections and by the low level of party membership) is a sign of failure in the social functions classically attributed to parties. The weakness of parties at the societal level is, however, part of a larger pattern of political culture. The syndrome is rooted in the ‘negative modernization’ (Hankiss 1983) of the communist era and can be described by keywords like atomization, erosion of traditional collective identities, lack of new forms of cooperation, lack of social trust and solidarity, cynicism, and privatization of attitudes. People in the Kádár era have learnt that individual strategies are more effective in improving one’s status than collectivist strategies. The regime change

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has also happened mainly through elite negotiations, contributing further to the high level of alienation. The suspicion among citizens towards politicians has probably played a positive role in the consolidation of the new regime by keeping the influence of populist demagogues and the number of industrial actions at a minimal level. On the other hand, it has had a negative impact on the quality of democracy, on the level of participation and on the social role of parties. According to a survey conducted in 2004, only 13 per cent of the respondents indicate trust in parties. But the level of trust is still slightly above the regional average, and the same applies to the level of trust in the government and in the parliament. And there are signs indicating that the party system is becoming better rooted in the society. Turnout increased in 2002, surpassing 73 per cent in the second round. Volatility is declining, partly, of course, because there are not many parties left to move between. Aggregate net volatility between 1990 and 1994 was 28.3 per cent, between 1994 and 1998 33.6 per cent, between 1998 and 2002 20.2 per cent6. The mobilizational potential of parties has always been larger than that of trade unions, and in 2002 Fidesz managed to organize demonstrations involving many hundreds of thousands of citizens, to initiate a party related movement with tens of thousands of members (the so called Civic Circles) and to increase its own membership. In spite of these successes in mobilization, parties perform such classical social functions as education, socialization or integration to a very limited degree. But they are well entrenched in power-structures. Hungary is close to an ideal-typical ‘party government’: major decisions are made by elected party officials or by their subordinates and government policies are mainly decided within the parties; parties act cohesively, and officials are recruited and held accountable through parties (Katz 1986). As far as the selection of political personnel and political representation is concerned, the parties have no serious challengers. Local elections in small settlements are typically non-partisan, but at the parliamentary elections independents stand no chance. Only seven independent candidates have ever been elected to the parliament, six out of them in 1990. Although the citizens are given the choice to vote according to their preferences towards parties or personalities, they consistently vote according to party affiliations. The well-known and highly popular candidates of small parties stand little chance in the single member districts. Note, however, that having partisan background does not equal party membership. A large number of MPs and ministers are not members of any party, and even the prime minister between 2002 and 2004 was a technocrat. It seems that in Hungary the very notion of party must be extended (somewhat similarly to the 6

For the last figure the 2002 party alliance ‘Centrum’ is treated as identical with its major component units, the Christian Democrats and the Hungarian Democratic People’s Party, running separately in the 1998 election.

Party System Concentration in Hungary

191

US) to all those public figures who participate in the partisan electoral and governing activities. The borders of parties are also diffuse in another respect: the loyalty of politicians often focusses on the entire political bloc, and not on the individual parties. The ministers’ activities must nevertheless meet the expectations of the particular party that delegated them. If this happens, they can keep their job even if they are unpopular. The large-scale reshuffles in the ministries after elections, reaching nominally non-political positions, also indicate that the presence of parties is strongly felt in the governmental bureaucracy. Obviously, it is difficult to ascertain whether these replacements represent policy orientated ambitions or are just part of the patronage system, in the centre of which one finds the government, and not the parties. The strong position of the prime minister can pose a serious challenge to parties. This challenge was particularly visible in those two years when the prime minister was not member of any party. The fact that he resigned because the parties did not allow him to replace one of his ministers, proved, however, that partisan control over the government still exists. On the other hand, the fact that the leading party chose a relative newcomer as his replacement, suggests that it is more relevant whether a candidate has a chance to win the election than whether he was socialized properly in the party culture. The strong role of parties in the government, the generous state support they receive and their feeble presence in the society may seem to make the cartel party concept applicable to Hungary. Their co-operation in matters like party finance or in the restriction of non-partisan decision making fora seems to justify further this notion. But Hungarian parties are competitive, the party system is polarized, the stakes are high, and the politicians of the government-parties regard the members of the opposition (and vice versa) not as colleagues, but as enemies, whose complete eradication from the public sphere is an unlikely, but worth-trying project. Putting all these features together, the term cartel is clearly a misnomer.

Organization Hungarian parties, just like most of their regional sisters, are very far from being mass parties. Around 2-3 per cent of the electorate is member (Mair 1997). The organizational weakness is less apparent in other dimensions. Hungarian parties are relatively complex organizations, with an elaborate division of labour. They have a permanent and professional staff, and maintain branch offices across the country. The statutes are taken seriously by the parties, who spend a considerable part of their conference time debating them. Financially, the parties do depend on the state: the bulk of their official income comes from the national budget. But this dependence also means a regular flow of income. In spite of the large overlap between the parliamentary and extra-parliamentary elites within the parties, there have been numerous conflicts between the majority

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of MPs and the party presidents. Since it is the party leadership that determines the list of candidates for the next election, typically the latter group prevails. Parties are centralized. The parliamentary groups have always been highly disciplined, although in the first two parliaments the large number of defections (reaching one seventh of the MPs) indicated that the legitimacy of the leaderships was very shaky indeed. The professionalization of the politicians (in 2002 around nine tenths of the MPs ran for the new election, Kurtán and Király 2003) certainly helped to generate more loyalty. The general trend of centralization (Machos 1998, 1999) is most spectacular in Fidesz. The party started with collective leadership, and with a decentralized structure, but since 1993 it has become the most centralized, most homogeneous and most disciplined party in the country, under the firm leadership of its charismatic leader. Charismatic presidents have played an even more important role in the Smallholders’ Party, where between 1991 and 2002 the party was dominated by Mr Torgyán, and in MIÉP, where Mr Csurka dominates his party even more firmly, although perhaps less spectacularly. The Socialist Party, on the other hand, has remained a relatively decentralized party, maintaining well institutionalized factions. In the MSZP, as opposed to other parties, candidates in the single member districts are chosen by the local organizations, without much interference by the party leadership. The relative decentralization of the party is strengthened by its permanent search for a new generation of (non-ex-communist) leaders. This leads to constant fights for the leadership, and reinforces the high level of pluralism within the party. Although centralization and organizational complexity tend to go together within the general process of institutionalization, the turn of the century was dominated by the competition between a centralized and streamlined (Fidesz) and a decentralized and complex organization (Socialist Party). But Fidesz underwent a radical organization transformation after 2002, as a result of which the organization has become more complex, with a large number of specialized sub-units (Fowler 2004, Enyedi 2005). Interestingly, this transformation has not made the party less electorally orientated. The relevance of branch organizations and regional organizations has declined, the constituency organizations have gained larger importance and the top leadership has preserved its almost dictatorial power over the party. The role of media campaigns in deciding the electoral outcomes is probably as important in Hungary as in other post-communist countries. But the recent attention given by both Fidesz and the Socialist Party to the direct mobilization of supporters suggests that organizational techniques gain new relevance under the condition of close competition.

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Social Structure and Vote While the explanatory power of political attitudes has increased, the relevance of socio-structural variables has declined in Hungary. Karácsony (2003) has found that in 1994 33 per cent, in 1998 29 per cent, in 2002 17 per cent of the vote could be predicted with the same socio-demographic variables. The decline is, however, largely a function of the declining party system fragmentation. The presence of fewer parties provides less room for mirroring the social structure (Knutsen 1988). The original, relatively strong connection between social background and party preference was partly due to the presence of the two ‘historical’ parties that used to occupy specific social niches. The Smallholders’ core voters were the uneducated village dwellers, although for some years the party received the support of dissatisfied younger urban groups as well. The Christian Democrats could mainly count on the practicing religious, particularly on the Catholics, and it was disproportionately popular among elderly women. As a result of the close association with religion, the Christian Democrats used to have the most isolated, least permeable electorate within the Hungarian party system (Fábián 1999). Originally Fidesz and the Socialist Party were also serving a specific clientele, however to a lesser extent than the Smallholders and the Christian Democrats. The voters of Fidesz used to come, and partly still come, from among the youngest age groups. The association between party preference and age could survive, in spite of the huge growth of Fidesz, due to the fact that the other large party, the MSZP, has an old and aging electorate. But the core clientele of the Socialists is best defined politically and not through age: half of the MSZP voters were MSZMP (excommunist ruling party) members in 1990 (Karácsony 2003). As these two parties were growing they moved towards a more proportionate voting base, but they maintained their strongholds in the named groups. Fidesz and the Socialist voters also differ in the level of urbanization: while Fidesz became disproportionately popular among the village-dwellers at the turn of the century, the bulk of the Socialist voters continue to come from the cities. The Alliance of Free Democrats is an even more urban phenomenon, and it is supported by highly educated groups. This brief description also shows that one of the more ‘classical’ cleavage variables, urbanization, has a clear relevance in Hungary. Economic transition has sharpened the conflict of interests between agrarian and urban interests throughout the region. Re-privatization of land has often been seen by the social elite as undermining economic efficiency, while the prospect of the integration into the European Union brought up the sensitive issues of agricultural subsidies and the right of foreigners to purchase (cheap) Eastern European land. The tradition of strong peasant parties and the heritage of long standing cultural barriers between the city and the countryside have been accompanied by the perception that the political class has allied itself with urban elites. This view led to a number of initiatives at establishing agrarian parties throughout the region. In case of Hungary the Smallholders’ Party has represented this party family, while Fidesz today only has a loose, but electorally relevant bias in favour of the countryside.

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From the Lipset and Rokkan framework religion is the other variable that is relevant in Hungary. Within this dimension (involving religious practice and attitudes towards religion and towards the influence of the church) the Christian Democrats, the Hungarian Democratic Forum and the Smallholders used to be opposed to the non-religious Free Democrats and Fidesz and to the even less religious Socialists (Angelusz and Tardos 1994, Gazsó, F. and Stumpf 1995, 1996, Gazsó F. and Gazsó T. 1993, Róbert 1994, etc.). During the second part of the decade the electorate of Fidesz became significantly more religious and clerical, but the positions of the other parties did not change (Enyedi 2000). The territorially based centre-periphery cleavage had little room to emerge in Hungary, given the small size and the relatively homogeneous nature of the country. The Socialists have never been able to dominate the richer, more developed Western part of the country, but they have had a strong position in the capital, and therefore the two blocs cannot be clearly identified with either the centre or the periphery. As indicated by the low relevance of economic issues, the Hungarian party system is not polarized according to class divisions, although from time to time social status or subjective class position is found to be associated with various party preferences. Kitschelt’s (1992) prediction concerning the polarization between the winners and the losers of the transition has not materialized. Most of the absolute losers simply do not vote, and those who do are scattered across leftist and rightist parties. After the first election Kolosi at al (1991) and Szelényi and Szelényi (1991) interpreted the opposing camps in terms of occupational groups. They claimed that the petty bourgeoisie and the workers in the private economy supported the national-Christian camp, the entrepreneurs and the intellectuals stood behind the liberals, while the nomenklatura and the workers in the state sector constitute the socialist field. But subsequent research has repeatedly found low correlation between social status and party preference. During the early nineties the nostalgia among the worse-off towards the Kádár era did result in their strong support in favour of the Socialists, but the austerity measures introduced by the MSZP-led government in 1995 diminished the party’s working class support. Since then there has been no major party that relies on working or lower middle class voters. Following Stein Rokkan’s emphasis on critical junctures, the conflicts characterizing transition to democracy should exert a particularly large influence on the structure of East European politics. Indeed, ex-communist party membership (or having a spouse who used to be member of the communist party) is a strong predictor of the vote (e.g. Róbert 1999, Tóka 1998, Angelusz and Tardos 1994), benefiting the Socialists. András Körösényi (1998) argues that the communist nomenklatura can be perceived as a political class. In this perspective the regime divide is not simply an attitudinal cleavage, but a classical social cleavage as well, similar to the class cleavage.

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As indicated above, core groups of supporters can be identified on both sides. In 1998, for example, non-religious managers, who used to be members of the communist party and who were above 45 years old, voted by 95 per cent for the left-wing government. On the other hand, of the religious citizens who had never been members of the communist party, aged between 30 and 60, with a university degree, 75 per cent preferred the opposition. But these core groups are typically small, only 2-3 per cent of the population each (Angelusz and Tardos 1999). And particular parties and party blocs have not only one, but several such core groups with diverging characteristics. Both the left and the right are, for example, supported by lower and higher-class groups. The right is popular among the lower middle classes, but also in the wealthiest districts of the capital, and among the Smallholders in the countryside. The left finds strong supporters both among the university educated and among the workers of large traditional factories. To summarize this section, it is possible to identify links between social groups and party choice, but these links are weakening, and they have never been strong enough to explain the relative stability and the declining concentration of the Hungarian party system.

Stability and Transformation in the Party System Based on the analysis above, institutional stability, barriers in front of newly emerging parties, the longevity of governments, the central role of the prime minister, the successful marketing of moral-cultural issues and the recent emphasis on mobilization seem to contribute to the consolidation of the party system and to the decline in fragmentation. Cultural barriers also matter: because of the dominance of Budapest over the countryside, the elitist political culture, and the predominant role of national media. Leaving the parliament equals leaving the political limelight – for good. But the relations among parties, shaped by the conscious acts of party leaders, have also played a decisive role in the process of crystallization and simplification. And this is the factor I will turn to in the remaining part of the chapter. In 1989 the main divide of the party system was between the Socialists and the rest of the parties, organized into the Oppositional Roundtable (Figure 8.1). But very soon, already in the last phase of the negotiations with the communist partystate, the Roundtable split into a moderate camp, led by the Hungarian Democratic Forum , and a radical bloc, led by the Alliance of Free Democrats. The split within the anti-communist opposition was consolidated by the logic of coalition building in 1990. The rationale for the coalition of the Smallholders, the Hungarian Democratic Forum and the Christian Democrats was not their common programme, nor the mutual sympathies of their voters, but the contention that they (and only they) formed the Christian-national camp. Ever since then, the parties have based their coalitional choices on cultural dimensions, even when the voters have rated economic issues as most relevant ones.

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1988-1990

New parties (MDF, SZDSZ, Fidesz, FKgP, KDNP)

Ex-communists (MSZMP, MSZP)

1990-1994 Liberals (SZDSZ, Fidesz)

Socialists (MSZP)

ChristianNationalists (MDF, KDNP, FKgP)

1994-

Socialists and liberals (MSZP, SZDSZ)

Figure 8.1 Patterns of Hungarian party competition

Conservatives Fidesz, MDF, FKgP, KDNP)

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During the first years of the Hungarian party system two interpretations of the political field competed. One emphasized the government-opposition divide, perceived as a religious-secular, traditionalist-modernizer or nationalistcosmopolitan opposition. The other approach supported the three-polar pattern, according to which the two liberal parties (Free Democrats, Fidesz) were equally far from the Christian-nationalist parties and the Socialists. The uncertainty concerning the fundamental structure of the party system did not last long. The three-polar pattern collapsed when, in the mid-1990s, the liberal camp split into two. The Free Democrats moved to the left, closer to the Socialists, while Fidesz shifted to the right, towards the traditional right-wing parties. Around 1993-1995 smaller groups moved between the two former allies: the conservative Free Democrats joined Fidesz, while the liberal Fidesz leaders integrated into the Alliance of Free Democrats. The slowly forming two-bloc competition was challenged by groups on the radical right, but these groups soon proved to be more right-wing than radical, and in crucial moments supported the centre-right. The Hungarian parliamentary landscape has become deceptively simple. At the moment the two blocs are composed of one large (Fidesz and the Socialists) and one small (Hungarian Democratic Forum and the Alliance of Free Democrats) actor. Consequently, the pattern of competition has become predictable. This development somewhat contradicts the expectations regarding post-communist politics. As Peter Mair has argued, the big stakes, the large number of available and newly enfranchised voters and the almost non-existence of civil society is likely to lead to excessive competition in Eastern Europe, hampering stabilization (Mair 1997). Placing party systems on a continuum ranging from complete closure (coalition alternatives are constant, the range of potential governing parties are fixed, and there is a complete turnover in the government) to complete openness (where the outcome of the party competition is unpredictable), the Eastern European party systems must be at the ‘open’ end. The structure of competition in Hungary is, however, closed. The elections end with complete turnover. Government-membership is restricted to six (at the moment, four) parties. The party alliances have changed somewhat between 1989 and 1994, but the parties’ relations are far from being unpredictable. On the other hand, there are strong attempts on behalf of the parties to isolate each other and to create constraints for the coalition making process. The parties of the left (Free Democrats, Socialists) and the right (Christian Democrats, Forum, Smallholders, MIÉP) mutually refuse to consider a partnership with the organizations from the other side. Instead of promiscuity, strictly enforced fidelity governs the parties’ behaviour in their dealings with ‘their’ side and the ‘opposite’ side. In order to appreciate this rigidity, one must consider that the social, economic and international environment of the party system which has undergone tremendous changes during the past fifteen years. Different phases of the transition have given rise to different political or economic conflicts. This has placed the party relations under tremendous pressure, and yet, in the last decade the pattern of alliances has remained largely identical and no new party has emerged.

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The elites have produced a polarized political space, leaving no room for a centre-force. The most influential intellectuals and ideologues perceive the political struggle in bipolar and extreme terms: democrats versus anti-democrats, nationalists versus non- and anti-Hungarian cosmopolitans, fascists versus communists, etc. This bipolar atmosphere may reinforce even the power of the electoral system. Considering the potential reasons of declining fragmentation, Tóka (2004) points out that even more majoritarian electoral systems fail to reduce the number of parties to the Hungarian level, and consequently he dismisses electoral rules from the list of likely suspects. But the interaction between the electoral system and the polarized atmosphere may still be a relevant factor. Due to the disbelief in the legitimacy of the opponent, the minor parties have been accused of playing with fire: by missing the threshold they are seen as serving the interests of the opposite bloc, and therefore risking the democratic or national character of the country. Following this logic even the Catholic Church names the size of the parties (that is, below or above the threshold) as one of the major criteria voters should base their choice on7. The high level of ideological polarization amplifies the impact of the single-member, double ballot element of the electoral system and washes away the diverging impact of the PR. As a result of the interaction between high polarization, bipolar structure and large number of single member districts, in almost all Hungarian parties there are factions that emphasize the disagreements between the two blocs as opposed to the disagreements between individual parties. These groups are in conflict with those who insist on the specific interests of the particular party. The debates over the degree of cooperation with other parties have emerged as the number one reason of factionalism and splits. The combination of majoritarian institutional elements, polarization and increasingly one dimensional party-space is probably to be blamed for the failure of the more sectional parties (Smallholders, Christian Democrats). The groups these parties were associated with were too small to form the core of an entire political camp. As described above, both parties tried to break out from their social ghetto with radical-populist rhetoric, but this strategy proved to be too risky. High polarization and bipolar competition were not predetermined by the attitudes of the citizens. Probably the traditional animosity between groups of intellectuals could not have produced such a clear-cut structure either. The conscious actions of the parties themselves were the most decisive factors. The Hungarian case seems to be a perfect illustration for the thesis of Peter Mair (1989): the coalitional behaviour of parties may determine the stability and the shape of party systems. By rejecting coalition-partners from the other side, the parties have strengthened the bipolar nature of the party competition, undermined the support of smaller parties, and reduced electoral volatility. As long as no party 7

As Sarah Birch (2001) has shown, thresholds tend to have a particularly large impact on the number of parties in post-communist Europe anyway.

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will be willing (and be in the position) to cross the left-right divide in alliancebuilding, the de-freezing of the party system has no chance to occur.

Conclusion and Caveat As a closing remark, I must stress again that the stability of the Hungarian party system is relative and fragile. It is based neither on socio-structural underpinnings, nor on the organizational isolation of constituencies. The degree of stability is also relative in the sense that while it is true that the Hungarians did not need to learn new party labels during the last decade, the popularity of parties and their ideological positions have undergone significant changes. Actually, the well-timed shifts in the ideological position of certain parties (particularly of Fidesz) may go a long way towards explaining the survival of the party labels. When the collapse of the centre-right created a vacuum, there was an established party ready to move in. But flexibility in itself would not have done the trick. Fidesz’s move was emotionally and ideologically charged, leaving no possibility for the party to turn back, even if electoral rationality demanded that (Enyedi 2005). The endogenous, political polarization seems to be a powerful restraining factor, disciplining parties more than the social environment does.

References Angelusz, R. and Tardos, R. (1994), ‘Paletta fekete-fehérben’, in Politikatudományi Szemle, 3, pp. 128-134. — (1999), A választási erőtér blokkosodása 1994-1998, in Sándor Kurtán et al (eds), Magyarország Politikai Évkönyve, pp. 619-636. Birch, S. (2001), ‘Electoral Systems and Party System Stability in Post-Communist Europe’. Paper prepared for APSA 2001, San Francisco, 30 August-2 September 2001. Bozóki, A. (1989), ‘Mi a Fidesz és mi nem?’, in Magyar Narancs, 23 October, 1989. Campbell, A., Converse, P. E., Miller, W. E. and Stokes, D. (1960), The American Voter (New York: John Wiley & Sons). Enyedi, Z. (1996), ‘Organizing a subcultural party in Eastern Europe’, in Party Politics vol. 2, pp. 377-97. — (2000), ‘Clerical and religious polarization in Hungary’, in D. Broughton and H-M. Ten Napel (eds), Religion and Mass Electoral Behaviour (London: Routledge). — (2005), ‘The Role of Agency in Cleavage Formation’, in European Journal of Political Research, vol. 44(5), pp. 697-720. Enyedi, Z. and Todosijević, B. (1999), A magyar parlamenti pártok ideológiai arculata és reprezentatív funkciója. Research report for MTA PTI. (Budapest:

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MTA PTI). Enyedi, Z. and Tóka, G. (2004), ‘Ascendant, Yet Fragile’, in S. White, D. Stansfield and P. Webb (eds), Political Parties in Transitional Democracies (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Enyedi, Z., Erős, F. and Fábián, Z. (1997), Authoritarianism and the Ideological Spectrum in Hungary. Discussion Papers. Budapest: Collegium Budapest/Institute for Advanced Study. Fábián, Z. (1999), ‘Voter Allegiances and Voter Loyalty’, in Z. Spéder (ed.), Hungary in Flux (Hamburg: Kramer). Fowler, B. (2004), ‘Concentrated Orange: Fidesz and the Remaking of the Hungarian Centre-Right, 1994-2002’, in Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, vol. 20(3), pp. 80-114. Gazsó, F. and Gazsó, T. (1993), ‘Választói magatarás és pártpreferenciák Magyarországon’, in Politikatudományi Szemle, 4, pp. 104-142. Gazsó, F. and Stumpf, I. (1998), ‘A pártok versenyképessége és szavazótábora’, in Sándor Kurtán et al (eds), Magyarország Politikai Évkönyve 1998. Gazsó, T. (2000), ‘A politikai erőtér változásai 1999-ben’, in S. Kurtán et al. (eds), Magyarország Politikai Évkönyve 2000. Hankiss, E. (1983), Társadalmi csapdák. Diagnózisok (Budapest: Magvető). Hanley, S. (2004), ‘Getting the Right Right: Redefining the Centre-Right in PostCommunist Europe’, in Communist Studies and Transition Politics, vol. 20(3), pp. 9-27. Hann, E. (1998), Két választás Magyarországon, Népszava 30 May 1998, pp. 1, 6. Karácsony G. (2003), ‘A választói magatartás trendjei Magyarországon’, in S. Kurtán, P. Sándor and L. Vass (eds), Magyarország politikai évkönyve 2003. (Budapest, Demokrácia Kutatások Magyarországi Központja Alapítvány). Katz, R. S. (1986), ‘Party government: a rationalistic conception’, in F. G. Castles and R. Wildenman (eds), Visions and Realities of Party Government (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter). Kitschelt, H. (1992), ‘The Formation of Party Systems in East Central Europe’, in Politics & Society, vol. 20(1), pp. 7-50. — (2001). ‘Divergent Paths of Postcommunist Democracies’, in R. Gunther, L. Diamond, and M. F. Plattner (eds), Political Parties and Democracy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press). Kitschelt, H., Mansfeldova, Z., Markowski, R., and Tóka, G. (1999), PostCommunist Party Systems: Competition, Representation, and Inter-Party Cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Knutsen, O. (1988), ‘The Impact of Structural and Ideological Party Cleavages in West European Democracies: A Comparative Empirical Analysis’, in British Journal of Political Science, vol. 18, pp. 323-352. Kolosi, T., Szelényi, I., Szelényi, S. and Western, B. (1991), ‘Politikai mezõk a posztkommunista átmenet korszakában: Pártok és társadalmi osztályok a magyar politikában (1989–90)’, in Szociológiai Szemle, 1, pp. 5-34.

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Körösényi, A. (2000), Government and politics in Hungary (Budapest: CEU Press). Kurtán, S., and Nóra, K. (2003). ‘Pártok és jelöltek’. In S. Kurtán, P. Sándor and L. Vass, Magyarország Politikai Évkönyve, 2003 (Political Yearbook of Hungary 2003) (Budapest: DKMKA). Machos, C. (1998). ‘Stabilitás és megújulás a pártvezetõségekben, 1988-1998’, in S. Kurtán, P. Sándor, and L. Vas, Magyarország Évtizedkönyve (Budapest: DKMKA). — (1999), ‘A magyar pártok alapszabályai és szervezeti típusai’, in Politikatudományi Szemle 8(1), pp. 23-67. Mair, P. (1989), ‘The Problem of Party System Change’, in Journal of Theoretical Politics, vol. 1, pp. 251-276. — (1997). ‘What is different about post-communist party systems?’, in P. Mair (ed.), Party System Change. Approaches and Interpretations. (Oxford: Clarendon Press). Márkus, G. G. (1996), Party system and cleavage translation in Hungary. (Budapest: Institute for Political Science of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences). Róbert, P. (1999), ‘Osztály és párt Magyarországon – három választás után’, in Politikatudományi Szemle, vol. 1, pp. 67-96. Szelényi I. and Szelényi, S. (1991), ‘Osztályok és pártok a posztkommunista átmenetben’, in Magyar Tudomány, 12, pp. 1415-1428. Tóka, G. (1995), ‘Seats and votes: consequences of the Hungarian election law’, in Gábor Tóka (ed.), The 1990 Elections to the Hungarian National Assembly (Berlin: Sigma). — (1997), ‘Political parties in East Central Europ’e, in L. Diamond, M. F. Plattner, Y. Chu, and H. Tien (eds), Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Themes and Perspectives (Baltimore MD: Johns Hopkins University Press). — (1998), Party appeals and voter loyalty in new democracies. Political Studies 46, pp. 589-610. — (2004), ‘Hungary’, in S. Berglund, J. Ekman, and F. H. Aarebrot (eds), Handbook of Political Change in Eastern Europe, 2nd revised and updated edition (Cheltenham: Edgar Elgar). Wessels, B. and Klingemann, H-D. (1994), ‘Democratic transformation and the prerequisites of democratic opposition in East and Central Europe’, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, FS III, pp. 94-201.

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Chapter 9

Slovenia: Between Bipolarity and Broad Coalition-Building Danica Fink-Hafner

Introduction The key idiosyncrasies of the development of the party system in Slovenia up to 2004 were gradualism, a lack of any clear-cut ideological shifts or electoral engineering, as well as a combination of ideological polarization with broad governmental coalition-building with the same party in the centre for most of the 1990-2004 period. To understand the idiosyncratic party system developments in Slovenia a historical sequencing of the transition to a democracy – identifying the periods of the liberalization, transition and consolidation of democracy (e.g. Dahl 1971, Linz 1990, Huntington 1991) – is very important. The liberalization and transition stages took place when Slovenia was still part of former socialist Yugoslavia. Especially when Slovenia is compared to party system developments in other states emerging from the territory of former Yugoslavia, it serves as an example supporting the theory that a continuous, consensual and less violent transition ensures better circumstances for the consolidation of democracy (e.g. Dahl 1971, Huntington 1991) and that transplacement (a mix of transformation and replacement) is most supportive of democratic consolidation (Huntington 1991). In addition, it also supports expectations that gradual and moderate long-term transformation supports the success of transformed old political organisations. The key difference between transformation and replacement is the stage of liberalization. At this stage the ruling party of the old regime still has the ruling position but it tolerates the opposition. In circumstances where the opposition is strong enough, the ruling party also negotiates with it. In the liberalization stage a peaceful transition to a democracy is prepared. While the ruling party appeases the political opposition it also adapts to the pluralist circumstances. The Slovenian experiences are in line with Golosov’s (1996) estimation that this kind of (re)creation of party systems is partially formed under the influence of communist rules and partly according to democratic rules. But, as Cotta (1994) stresses, a continuous transition to a democracy is both a challenge and opportunity for the ruling party from an undemocratic regime and its survival in the new democratic

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system for the following reasons: a) at least to some extent the circumstances described allow the ruling party to control events; and b) it ensures the most favourable opportunities for the possible survival of such a party (due to its vital interests it has to continuously adapt to the changing circumstances). But the success or failure of a certain party cannot be fully understood without taking into account the characteristics of party competition (Sartori 1976): first, the relationships between political parties in the party system and, second, the characteristics of how the party system functions. In this article we analyse the Slovenian party system development from two angles: (1) which cluster of parties (old / new; centre-left / centre-right) and which individual parties have been the most successful in the continuous transition to a democracy; and (2) how the cleavages between the liberal and conservative clusters of parties have been expressed and politically managed. It could be said that the cluster of the reformed old and centre-left political organizations has benefited from the idiosyncratic gradual transition to a democracy as well as from its consolidation right up until the 2004 parliamentary elections. New and predominantly centre-right parties have been consolidated with a time lag. It was not possible before the 2004 elections for the centre-right ruling coalition to become a realistic alternative. It seems that the 2004 parliamentary elections have started a new period in the development of the Slovenian party system.

Two Clusters of Parties (Dis-)Continuities in the Transition to Democracy Party development started gradually in Slovenia in 1988. In the liberalization stage, oppositional proto parties developed within what was still formally a oneparty system. The legal space for oppositional movements and parties was first partially given by the League of Socialist Youth of Slovenia (represented in the Socio-political Chamber of the Socialist Assembly) and, with a time lag, partly within the Socialist League of Working People. We can only talk about democratization when political pluralism was legalised. Multipartism was first legally guaranteed by amendments to the old Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Slovenia adopted in September 1989 and later by the Law on Political Association adopted in December 1989 by the old assembly – while federal Yugoslavia still had a one-party system. Since there was no agreement on the transition to a democracy, the Yugoslav democratization project became a national project which was carefully prepared to proceed in a legal way. Slovenian independence (declared in June 1991, like Croatia’s independence) enabled the creation of a democratic polity (the Constitution establishing the new political system was adopted in December 1991). Multipartism flourished in these liberalised circumstances and also later on the basis of pluralist legal norms. The first free elections in spring 1990 helped spread

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the first multiparty system. Transition in the narrow meaning involved a very short period of practical change in the political system: preparation and the holding of the first free elections, adoption of the new Constitution by the new multiparty assembly in December 1991 and the holding of elections to democratically ‘flesh out’ the new political institutions. In Slovenia this stage lasted from autumn 1989 to December 1992. The consolidation stage is still going on, although 2004 could be understood as a milestone in the maturing of the party system. Organizational Advantages of the Old Cluster of Parties over the New The flourishing of many new political organizations, typical of the transition to a democracy (Dahl 1971), took place in Slovenia in the period from 1989 to 1992. While in the old political system only five political organizations were allowed and had a formally defined number of seats in the socio-political Chamber of the Slovenian Assembly, the number of registered political organizations, after the legalization of political pluralism, had reached 124 by 31 December 1993. Election results together with the effects of a new law on political parties 1994 brought about normalization – a relatively sharp decline in that number. By 2003, on the basis of the 1994 law the number of newly registered or re-registered (previously) legal political parties had grown to 38. Most of these parties are minor nonparliamentary parties, which are not visible in public life. Many of these do not have much of a public profile. Given the legal provision that a political party should be erased from the register in the event it does not compete in two consecutive elections, at least some of them can be taken off the list while a few parties established before the 2004 election have still not been added to the published list. In the first two stages political parties developed from various social movements and organizational roots. By 2004 the predominant cluster of parties had developed from the reformed old socio-political organizations. The successful ones were the League of Socialist Youth of Slovenia and the League of Communists of Slovenia, while the reformed Socialist League of Working People soon disappeared from the party arena. New political parties developed out of a variety of organizational sources, such as: (1) new social movements (such as the Greens of Slovenia); (2) social opposition to the old regime – such as the Society of Slovenian Writers; the group around Nova revija – New Journal (proto parties such as the League of Intellectuals which was later renamed the Slovenian Democratic League); (3) mobilization of new social groups – farmers, craftsmen (new parties that at least initially presented themselves as ‘class’ parties); (4) political organizations of previously apolitical social groups such as pensioners (pensioners’ parties); (5) political expressions of regional interests (such as the League for Haloze; the Party of the Slovenian Štajerska; the League for Primorska);

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75

50 no. of organisations

1 2 3 4 5 6

25

0 87 88 89

90

91

92

time in years

1 political parties at the national level (national parties). 2 local organizational units of national political parties. 3 pro-Yugoslav parties or organizational units of parties with their central party offices in other republics of the socialist Yugoslavia. 4 associate organizations of national parties (youth, women’s organisations). 5 societies, social organizations, trade unions. 6 social movements. Socio-political organizations are as defined in the 1974 Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Slovenia; political organizations are organizations registered on the basis of the 1989 Law on Political Association. Figure 9.1 Number of political organizations in Slovenia from 1974 to 15 July 1992

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(6) religious milieu such as Revija 2000 – Journal 2000 (Christian Socialists); (7) an ethnic basis (the League for Equal Citizens’ Rights, the League of Roma, the Italian ethnic community); and (8) branches of political organizations established in other former Yugoslav republics and abroad (e.g. the International Radical Party). The early processes of new party developments were significantly concentrated in the area of the Slovenian capital city. 54 per cent of all the 124 parties registered on 31 December 1993 were registered in Ljubljana – probably as a result of the concentration of oppositional intellectuals, social movements, political struggles and newly emerging political elites in this area. The predominant pattern of party organizational development in Slovenia was territorial penetration (see Panebianco 1988), namely the centre controlled, stimulated or guided the development of the periphery. To some extent this pattern was combined with territorial diffusion (Panebianco 1988) through the spontaneous creation of political associations, which were later integrated with national organisations. The development of political parties in Slovenia since 1989 has shown that their original organizational roots have largely determined their organisational power. Only those parties which developed out of successfully reformed sociopolitical organisations (the United List of Social Democrats, the Liberal Democracy of Slovenia) were in a position to significantly exploit the already existing organizational networks in the shift from the old system to the new system. Despite the legal ban on party activities at work and the disintegration of the functional parts of their organizational networks, they were also organizationally advantaged because of the delayed decision on dividing up their assets (largely built up by the socialist state) amongst the new parties. During the 1990s the core new parties (the Slovenian Christian Democrats, the Slovenian People’s Party and the Social Democratic Party of Slovenia) had consolidated themselves. Still, relatively lively party splits and integrations have kept challenging their organizational consolidation up until very recently (the Slovenian People’s Party integrated with the Slovenian Christian Democrats in 2000 but, just six months later, conflicts within the new party SPP-SCD – Slovenian People’s Party resulted in a split into the completely new party New Slovenia and the remaining Slovenian People’s Party). Party Membership By the end of the 1980s membership in the old socio-political organizations had been declining for various reasons. The most important ones include disillusionment with both the old system and old political organisations despite their attempts to reform themselves, political liberalization allowing members to leave organizations without punishment, and the growing practical freedom of political organization including social movements and oppositional political parties. Still, public opinion survey data show that Slovenian citizens did not easily

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decide to join new or renewed political parties. The share of citizens who were members of any party dropped during the transition to a democracy. According to the Slovenian public opinion poll (SPO), the proportion of all party members dropped from 9 per cent in January 1991 to 6.1 per cent in December 1991, 5 per cent in March 1992 to just 4.5 per cent in November 1992. Expectations that the proportion of adult citizens active in party life would remain as high as the proportion of ruling party members (around 8 per cent) did not prove correct. Slovenian citizens had developed very critical attitudes to political parties which could be described as a phenomenon of anti-party sentiment (Fink Hafner 1994c). The deep distrust of parties has also been translated into relatively low levels of trust in the Slovenian national parliament. Today, only a few per cent of adult citizens are party members (5.4 per cent according to the 2003 SPO survey), but a few more than this feel close to some of the parties (see Table 9.1). The available figures on individual party memberships show that new political parties (predominately centre-right) seem to have more party members. Still, this fact does not seem to have any correlation with either party resources or the electoral support for individual parties. At least formally, Slovenia joining the EU has affected the party membership issue. Namely, at the end of May 2002 the National Assembly adopted the new Law on Political Parties, which allows EU citizens to become members of Slovenian political parties as soon as Slovenia becomes a full member of the EU. Although this is the first step in the direction of allowing EU citizens to participate in elections in Slovenia, it is not expected to significantly affect the party membership figures or electoral outcomes. Table 9.1 Slovenian public opinion (SPO) survey responses to the question of whether the respondent feels close to any party, 1995 to 2003 (in %) 1995(3) yes no don’t know

20.4 69.0 10.5

1996 (1+2) 13.5 81.3 5.2

1997(1)

2000(1)

2001(2)

2003(1)

20.0 72.5 7.5

23.6 68.3 8.1

18.3 74.6 7.1

21.5 75.5 3.0

2003 (3+4) 17.7 80.4 1.8

Source: Centre for Public Opinion Research and Mass Communication, University of Ljubljana. Cartelization, Elitism and Catch-All Orientation During the last 15 years political parties in Slovenia have had a relatively rich variety of organizational experiences, but to some extent they can all be described

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as ‘cartel’, ‘elitist’ and ‘catch-all’. A few of them also briefly experimented with some potentially violent forms. Just after the first free elections, the newly established parliamentary parties were initially very small and active groups of MPs. They were financed from the state budget while at the same time they were also directly or indirectly supported by the parliamentary administration (Krašovec 2000). The system of financing and the predominant way of political decision-making have helped to shape Slovenian parties into ‘cartel parties’. The ‘cartelization’ of parties in Slovenia (Krašovec 1999) has been accompanied by party elitism. Until 1994 the law had not required minimal requirements with regard to internal party democracy. While some political parties did have statutory rules on internal democratic procedures, at least one parliamentary party did not have such rules and the party leader concentrated all of the power in his hands. Despite the provisions of the 1994 Law on Political Parties requiring minimal internal party democracy, some parties have even lost some qualities in this respect (e.g. by deciding to abandon the right to the autonomy of ancillary organisations). Parties are predominately perceived by citizens as egoistic party elites often preoccupied by their own personal interests. The share of respondents in Slovenian public opinion longitudinal research who thought that parties only served the interests of their leaders grew from 32.1 per cent in January 1991 to 41.4 per cent in March 1992, while in November 1992 56.6 per cent believed that politicians misused politics for their own benefit. At the same time, political parties tend to be catch-all parties. They try to mobilise a relatively big variety of groups of voters by avoiding very narrow particularistic, class or professional orientations. Even interest-group-orientated parties (such as the Democratic Party of Pensioners and the Party of Youth) have tended to present themselves as parties in favour of all generations and a broad variety of social groups of voters. Parallel to this, some links between political parties (particularly governmental ones) and business have created some clientelistic party characteristics. Among very marginal and short-term organizational phenomena we can mention the emergence of para-military party organisations (Slovenski sokoli – SS) and a small number of non-armed ‘troikas’ in the second largest Slovenian town of Maribor, which were forbidden by the 1994 law on political parties and which very soon ceased to exist. Party Financing Many newly established political parties encountered serious problems during the first years of the transition to democracy due to the lack of expert and administrative support, financial resources as well as political splits and reorganizations. The branches of parties whose central offices were located in other parts of former Yugoslavia quickly disappeared from the party arena. Although political parties fought vigorously over many issues since the beginning of political

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pluralisation they relatively soon and easily managed to agree on the basis for the long-term and constantly growing state support for parties and to delete one line in the draft Constitution which demanded that political parties publicly disclose their sources and ways of spending their finances and assets (Kranjc 1994; Fink Hafner 2001). The key factor for empowering some of these new parties was the introduction of state financing in 1989 and its consolidation in the Law on Political Parties and the Law on Election Campaigns (both passed in 1994). Parties’ financial links to the national budget have been essential. Political parties mostly remain dependent on state financing. Whereas in 1993 political parties received about SIT 123 million (Slovenian tolars = SIT) (Kranjc 1994), within just a few years of passing the new law in 1994 that amount had grown to about SIT 903 million in 1997 (Krašovec 2000) without even taking into account the non-transparent financing from local communities’ budgets. The amount of money political parties receive has been expanding extremely rapidly. According to official data, in 2003 political parties already received SIT 1.4 billion. When looking at these figures it should be stressed that parties are merely obliged to present their financial reports, but no institution in the Republic of Slovenia has the authority to check them against party practice. The fast-growing state financing, which did not even help all parties to avoid going into the red in their accounts (particularly in election periods), has brought about two complementary phenomena. The first one has affected public opinion of political parties and involved an outrage with implicitly and explicitly denounced unclear reports on party financing, financial scandals, the misuse of a public position and even clear cases of clientelism and corruption in favour of individual political parties. Since the Liberal Democracy of Slovenia was the only party of the Prime Minister in the 1992 to 2004 period, except for a very short break in 2000 (Bajuk’s centre-right government), and was involved in the majority of publicly exposed scandals, by 2004 it had become perceived as the most corrupt party in politics arena. At least at a declaratory level, parliamentary parties have fought against this by passing stricter rules in favour of greater financial transparency and anti-corruption rules (Fink-Hafner 2000). The second phenomenon is the shrinking arena of relevant political parties. Namely, those parties not succeeding in entering the parliament and those which could not keep their parliamentary seats have so far also disappeared relatively quickly from the functioning party arena. Not even an amendment in 2000 to the Law on Political Parties introducing the right of political parties unsuccessfully competing at elections to also receive some national budget funding in certain conditions has changed this. Despite the important level of state support, the core of newly established parties opposed to the old regime or, put better, their successors – the Slovenian People’s Party, the Social Democratic Party of Slovenia (recently renamed the Slovenian Democratic Party) and the Slovenian Christian Democrats (since 2000 the ‘New Slovenia’) – have not gained an absolute parliamentary majority. The closest results came after the 1996 and 2004 elections. Still, only at the last

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parliamentary elections did it happen for the first time that a centre-right party achieved the best election result. The Slovenian Democratic Party’s victory allowed the forming of a predominantly centre-right coalition involving two other centre-right parties (New Slovenia – Christian People’s Party and the Slovenian People’s Party) and the small centre-left Democratic Party of Pensioners.

Party Arena Structure: Old versus New, Centre-Left versus Centre-Right Bipolarity The Slovenian party arena is often perceived as bipolar for it involves a competition between the cluster of old (centre-left) parties and the cluster of new (predominately centre-right) parties. Especially in pre-election periods, the Slovenian party arena behaves in a bipolar way despite the fact it is quite fragmented – the average effective number of parties in the 1990 to 2004 period is 6.5 (Table 9.6 in the Appendix). The relationship between the key two clusters of political parties in Slovenia cannot properly be understood without taking into account individual parties’ relevance in terms of coalition-building potential and practice – such as a party’s participation in coalition governments and the special (partner) relations of a nongovernmental parliamentary party with the leading party in government. Here, we may say that due to the problems of forming governing coalitions all parliamentary parties in Slovenia are in fact relevant. From the data on electoral success (the percentage of votes in parliamentary elections) in the period from the 1990 elections to the 2004 elections we see that support for the cluster of old parties was relatively stable during the first decade with the exception of the 2000 elections when it rose suddenly (see Figure 9.2). On the contrary, support for the newly established parties has shifted quite a lot. A very sharp decline in support was seen at the 1992 elections when 25 political parties and several independent candidates competed and up to 17.7 per cent of all votes were ‘lost’. After some improvement in the 1996 elections there was again a slight decline in support for the new parties in the 2000 elections when the share of lost votes was the smallest (3.8 per cent) and support for the cluster of old parties rose from 36.0 per cent to 48.3 per cent. This large-scale electoral support for the old parties was further strengthened by the ‘frontal’ creation of the ruling coalition. A majority government involved parties from the left, centre-left and centre-right. Besides that, ‘project partnerships’ involving several small non-governmental parliamentary parties made the majority even safer. The 2004 parliamentary elections brought about the first clear shift of voters towards an alternative government only involving new political parties (three centre-right parties and one small centre-left party).

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Danica Fink-Hafner 60 55,3

54,8 52,7

50

47,9

45,3

48,3

40 37

37,1

36

in %

33

30

20 17,7

10

11,7

10,6 8,1 3,8

0 1990

1992

1996

2000

2004

election year new parties

old parties

lost votes

Figure 9.2 Proportion of valid votes for clusters of old and new parliamentary parties (regardless of their ideological orientation) in the 1990-2004 period (in %) Looking at the parties’ success in terms of stages of the transition to a democracy (Figure 9.2) we can identify the following interesting phenomena: (1) The mid-term success of reformed old socio-political organisations The continuous transition to a democracy in which the ruling party from the old regime gradually adapted to the pressures of civil society and accepted the democratic rules of the game (including the political system change) was, in the transition stage, most favourable to the ruling party from the old regime. Namely, as an individual party it attracted the biggest electoral support in the first free elections in 1990 while its last leader during the socialist regime gained absolute majorities in both the 1992 and 1997 presidential elections. After the creation of a relatively polarized party arena the continuous transition to a democracy after 1990 was most favourable for the successor to the former ‘systemic opposition’ under the old regime – the Liberal Democracy of Slovenia. While it adapted itself very

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intensively in the consolidation stage it had also been continuously gaining electoral support (from 14.5 per cent in 1990 to 36.3 per cent in 2000). The Liberal Democracy of Slovenia became a victim of its own long-term success in 2004. (2) The delayed consolidation of newly established parties The cluster of newly established parties has been very unstable. The growth of many parties leading to the fractionalisation of that cluster was its key characteristic up until the 1992 elections (through the whole transitional stage), when this fragmentation caused the biggest share of lost votes (Figure 9.2). Total electoral support for the newly established parties had been changing significantly. After the 2000 elections, for the first time this cluster achieved a similar level of electoral support as the cluster of old parties. The 2004 elections saw the biggest gap in electoral support for old and new parties in favour of the new ones (17.8 per cent in 1990 and 22.3 per cent in 2004). However, even this relationship still does not reveal the ideological relations within the party arena!

Continuity and Change in the Ideological Structure of the Party Arena Common Ground and Key Ideological Cleavages In the process of the transition to a democracy, political parties in Slovenia achieved a high level of consensus on the four basic values: respect for human rights, parliamentary democracy, the welfare state and joining European integration processes. On the basis of longitudinal public opinion surveys (such as Vehovar 1993 and Kropivnik 1998), an analysis of party manifestos (Podmenik 1993; Fink Hafner 1999) and by looking at party names several key political cleavages can be pointed out. Besides a common social democratic core (support for the welfare state and social policies) among all the political parties and the majority of citizens (Fink Hafner 1999), there are some relatively stable social cleavages and their political expressions. The cleavage which clearly politically defines the party arena and its structure (particularly in periods close to parliamentary and presidential elections) is the communism–anti-communism cleavage. Its content is predominantly defined by an alternative evaluation of the socialist political system, an evaluation of the key Slovenian political actors during WWII (collaboration, socialist revolution) and immediately after WWII. On the one hand, under the old regime all opposition parties were extremely critical of the socialist revolution, in particular the executions during WWII and immediately after it conducted by the communists. The parties which have developed as successors to the reformed political organisations of the old regime are usually moderate and politically pragmatic when these issues are discussed, while they are very critical of the collaboration during WWII. The exceptions are the political streams close to the successor to the reformed communist party (the ULSD) which predominantly express the views of

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partisan veterans on WWII, thereby vigorously defending the latter against this criticism in public. It was exactly the communist–anti-communist cleavage which had separated the two social democratic parties up until very recently (the ULSD and the oppositional Social Democratic Party) and even influenced the ideological polarization of civil society (such as polarizations between trade unions and other interest associations). An additional set of cleavages, also typical of many Western European party systems, involves tradition–modernity, which overlaps the rural–urban and conservative (clerical)–liberal cleavages. Some authors (e.g. Vehovar 1993 and 1996) have estimated that the overlapping of various cleavages with these two is so complex that it should be treated as a ‘cultural cleavage’. Post-modern contents of this cleavage (modernity–post-modernity) were only a temporary phenomenon in the parliamentary arena in the transition stage (the Greens of Slovenia) and later organizationally expressed in fragmented non-parliamentary parties in a wave of splits and integrations. Still, the impact of their first and big parliamentary success had some impact on the ‘greening’ of other parties in the party arena. Beside the mentioned key cleavages many other specific issues have entered public life and the party system. In particular, among those that clearly indicate the ideological variety of Slovenian political parties are those addressing either: a) social positions and the roles of marginal social groups (including women, the Roma minority, refugees, ‘the erased’, the Islamic community); or b) values in solving policy-dilemmas (such as the artificial insemination of women – critical for the centre-right in the case of single women and the origin of ‘insemination material’, religious instruction in public schools, the legalisation of prostitution and marihuana, the registration of same-sex marriages, opening hours of shops on Sundays). During the transition revived traditional values mainly found political organisational support in conservative parties based on the Catholic ethos, with important social roots in the countryside and amongst farmers, partly also in the nationalist party (respect for the land and the traditional social role of women). These conservative parties have clashed with parties more secularly orientated and / or with those which support the interests of the newly emerging business class. The key and historically most defined political conflict between liberalism and conservativism (often also historically defined as the conflict between liberalism and clericalism) is further significantly enhanced by the overlapping of the liberal– conservative cleavage with the communist–anti-communist cleavage in the party arena. The post-modern politics expressed by the Greens of Slovenia (receiving 10 per cent of votes in the 1990 free elections) dissolved into: a) several ‘green’ groupings which have so far failed to enter parliament; and b) in the ‘greening’ of other parties in the party arena. Political parties with their various ideological and political programmes have developed in such a way that they have created counterparts in the rainbow of party families as has historically developed in Europe, but without any constant or bold expressions of the extreme right or extreme left (Table 9.2).

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Table 9.2 Slovenian parliamentary parties’ ideological family links before the 2004 parliamentary elections Parties

Party family

United List of Social Democrats (in 2005 renamed Social Democrats) Democratic Party of Pensioners

social democratic

Party of Youth of Slovenia

Liberal Democracy of Slovenia

Slovenian Democratic Party (former Slovenian Social Democratic Party) Slovenian People’s Party New Slovenia – Christian People’s Party Slovenian National Party

no clear party family affiliation – party of pensioners’ interest group with a social democratic orientation no clear family affiliation until 2003; stress on interests of youth and some liberal issues; shift towards green issues in the 2004 campaign liberal

Formal links with European Party Federations Party of European Socialists (PES) since 1996

No of MEPs in the EP in 2004

/

2 common MEPs with the Liberal Democracy (ALDE)

Yes

European Federation of Green Parties / European Greens since 2003

/

No

European Liberal, Democrat and Reform Party (ALDE) since 1994

2 common MEPs with the Democratic Party of Pensioners (ALDE) 2 (EPP)

Yes

1 (PES)

In Parl. after 2004 Yes

conservative (previously anticommunist social democratic)

European People’s Party (EPP) since 2001

conservative/ agrarian

European People’s Party since 2001 European People’s Party since 2001

/

Yes

2 (EPP)

Yes

/

/

Yes

conservative / Christian democrat elements of extreme right and left

Yes

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Particularly during the transition period ideological cleavages were exaggerated by ‘ideological fever’ (Sartori 1976). The most important key cleavage in that period was the communism–anti-communism cleavage (Fink Hafner 2001). A very important factor of ideological cleavages and conflicts during the first decade of the democratic system was the new political parties’ focus on changing the environment. Through their institutionalization and maturing (Panebianco’s model of the institutionalization of political parties) they were expected to gradually change their strategy to one of adaptation to the environment – less ideologically focused on change and having a more pragmatic orientation to building broader electoral support. Old parties have (as is usually the case in the mature stage of Panebianco’s model) been adapting to changes since the liberalization stage – albeit not all of them have been equally pragmatic or equally successful in terms of electoral support. Co-operation across Ideological Lines In spite of some deep ideological cleavages, Slovenian parties have been cooperating across ideological lines when it comes to some important national development issues. The first key issue of this kind was the final decision on Slovenian independence, based on a plebiscite. Slovenia joining European integration processes has had a similar status. Yet, political parties supported Slovenian membership in NATO somewhat less vigorously. In fact, there are no relevant Euro-sceptic political parties. Accession to the EU had been Slovenia’s main strategic orientation. In the process of European integration, for example, parliamentary parties even signed an agreement on cooperation in the Republic of Slovenia’s accession to the EU. The only small exception was the Slovenian National Party which first signed the agreement and then later changed its standpoint to ‘European realism’. The aforementioned agreement to some extent accelerated the harmonization of legislation, improved internal co-ordination, communication and the circulation of information, as well as consolidating a large consensus among the core political elite on the European integration process as the main strategic goal of Slovenian foreign policy. The ideological neutrality of the European integration issue was also reflected in the selection of a non-party leader of the Negotiating Team – Janez Potočnik (he later became the Minister of European Affairs and more recently the first Slovenian European Commissioner) and the way the following four main criteria for nominating members of the Negotiating Team were set: expert knowledge, no party membership, pro-European orientation and the compatibility of members. There have, of course, been some party political differences over particular European issues regarding the speed, nature and intensity of Slovenia’s integration, but full membership of the EU and early entrance to the European Monetary Union (EMU) have nevertheless remained goals for both the government and opposition parties since the 2004 elections. The only relevant exceptions to the generally positive attitude to the EU concern the impact of membership on real-estate

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ownership, national identity and the Slovenian language. This is mainly the result of an awareness of the history of the small and many times endangered Slovenian nation along with the fact that Slovenia gained its independence only recently in 1991. The biggest fears are hence generally politically and culturally motivated while negative social and economic experiences (especially the experiences of very specific social groups affected by them after 1 May 2004) have only started to be expressed in public. Parties’ Social Links At the beginning of the 1990s we could say that (based on survey data on voters’ self-positioning) Slovenians were significantly orientated to the centre-left. In several public opinion surveys conducted in the period from June 1991 to February 1992 (Toš, Slovensko javno mnenje) 69 per cent of respondents positioned themselves on the centre-left side of the left-right continuum, while only 31 per cent put themselves on the right side of the continuum. There were hardly any extreme cases of self-positioning (only a few per cent on each side of the continuum). By 1996 the shift from a predominant centre-left orientation to a predominant centre orientation could be observed. In the middle of the 1990s about one-half of the respondents in the mentioned research positioned themselves in the ideological centre (52.7 per cent in 1995 and 49.8 per cent in June 1996) in such a way that the asymmetry to the left nearly disappeared. Kropivnik (2002) reveals that ‘political abstinents’ became more centre-oriented during the 1990s and just before the 2000 elections they were chiefly positioned in the centre. They had become a group which could not be possessed by any particular political party or could only be mobilised by each party to a limited extent. The Liberal Democracy of Slovenia, which had clearly been following the described ideological shift among voters, gained many votes in 2000 but at the same time it had lost some of its recognizability with respect to its social background, urban roots and conservativeness (Kropivnik 2002). Many key determinants of party identification (such as the structure of the party arena, positioning of voters on the left-right continuum, distance between voters and parties) have been changing dynamically in Slovenia. Data from the longitudinal Slovenian public opinion survey for the years 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000 and 2001 reveal: a) that self-declared members of the upper class were pragmatically more inclined to those parties which had (or in their opinion would soon have) a bigger political influence in a certain period; and b) that self-declared members of the lower and middle classes significantly identified themselves more with the successors to former socio-political organizations immediately after 2000. The election results also showed that there was a shift to the key ruling party – the LDS (the party of the Prime Minister since 1992 with only a short break in 2000). On the basis of public opinion surveys, it was hardly expected that the centreright orientation of Slovenian voters would prevail in 2004 despite the shift to the right seen in the first European elections held in Slovenia in June 2004. Although

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the October 2004 parliamentary election outcome came as a surprise according to public opinion surveys – unsurprisingly, public opinion surveys conducted just after the 2004 parliamentary elections showed much bigger support for the winning party – the centre-right Slovenian Democratic Party and much less support for the former centre-left ruling party (Liberal Democracy of Slovenia), even compared with its most recent electoral support. Left and Right Party Clusters The cluster of newly established parties has been ideologically quite diverse – some were ideologically closer to the transformed old parties and have been integrating, or co-operating in organizational terms, in forming governmental coalitions or partnerships with the party of the Prime Minister (the Liberal Democracy, in power from 1992 to 2004 with just one six-month period of discontinuity in 2000). The cluster of old parties has therefore been further empowered with the help of some of the newly established centre-left parties. Based on data for the 1990 to 2004 period, including the election results and data on the party structure of government coalitions (Table 9.3 and Tables 9.5 and 9.9 in the Appendix), the following five findings emerge: (1) Old centre-left parties which continued to survive in the party arena were those which integrated with small ideologically kindred parties or their split-off parts. With the Liberal Democracy we can notice a combination of the politics of integration and co-optation with its primacy in all coalition governments in the 1992 to 2004 period, with a very short break in 2000. Up until the presidential elections of 2002 the Prime Minister was Janez Drnovšek. According to the number of governments in which the United List of Social Democrats had participated, it had also been above average by 2004 but it has never been the leading coalition party. (2) In the 1990-2004 period newly established centre-right parliamentary parties were intensively transforming organizationally and ideologically (splitting, merging, the creation of new parties and party downsizing). The most stable and electorally successful party (although with some problems at the start of the 1990s and a minimal number of parliamentary seats after the 1992 elections) was the Social Democratic Party (recently renamed the Slovenian Democratic Party). By 2000 it had participated in four coalition governments without ever being the party of the Prime Minister. For the Slovenian Christian Democrats (by 2004 it had been a partner in four governments and, after merging with the Slovenian People’s Party, one government with the Prime Minister) and the Slovenian People’s Party (by 2004 it had been a member of four governments and, after merging with the Slovenian Christian Democrats, one government with the Prime Minister) conflict, a merger and then a split first brought about two different positions after the 2000

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Table 9.3 Continuity of the transition to democracy and electoral support for parliamentary party clusters 1990-2004 Political organizations

Liberalization

Transition

Consolidation of democracy: electoral results 1990-19962000-2004 17.3-9.0-12.110.17

League of Communists of Slovenia – Party of Democratic Renewal (LCPDR) and its successor1

transformation of the LCS (predominance of the liberal stream in 1986); tolerance of the opposition

League of Socialist Youth – Liberal Party (USYS-LP) and its successor 1

transformation to opposition within the one-party system

17.3% electoral support in 1990 (more than any other individual party); Milan Kučan3 – absolute majority at the 1990 elections for President of the Presidency of the RS and the 1992 elections for President of the RS 14.5% electoral support in 1990

cluster of transformed old political organisations and their successors (total) cluster of newly established centre-right parties

Individual performance, disagreements, conflicts and cooperation

37.1% of votes in 1990 for President Kučan2 (1990-2002)

37.1-36.0-48.333.0%

emergence of first proto-parties since 1988; mutual cooperation, disagreements, conflicts, splits

The coalition’s victory of oppositional parties in 1990 (54.8% of votes for all the Demos parties; 45.97% for centreright Demos parties)

45.97-26.4545.13-34.0944.99

14.5-27.036.2%-22.8

Note: the trend in the 1990-1996 period, the middle one of the situation after the 2000 parliamentary elections and the right one of the situation after the 2004 parliamentary elections. 1 For detailed information on the transformation and renaming of old parties, see Toš and Miheljak (2002). 2 President of the League of Communists of Slovenia (1986).

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elections. The New Slovenia-Christian People’s Party entered the party arena (based on election support and leading party personalities linked with the former Christian Democrats) and to date (November 2004) its governmental coalitionbuilding had gone without any governmental positions. In the meantime, the Slovenian People’s Party successfully survived the 2000 merger and split and became a coalition partner following the 2000 elections. In November 2004, newly established centre-right parties signed a coalition agreement on simultaneously joining the same government for the first time. (3) Some small parties which emerged and started to compete in post-1992 elections have generally succeeded in entering parliament due to the relatively relaxed electoral rules (the Democratic Party of Pensioners and the Slovenian National Party several times and the Party of Youth of Slovenia in 2000). So far, they have mainly supported centre-left coalitions led by the LDS. Desus joining the centre-right government supported by the National Assembly on 3 December 2004 is the first exception to this rule. (4) The obvious governmental predominance of successors to the reformed old parties following the 2000 elections (the LDS – the party of the Prime Minister, the ULSD – coalition partner) was based on: a) outstanding growth in their election support in 2000, especially for the LDS (together they gained 48.3 per cent of all votes compared to 37.1 per cent after the 1996 elections; b) a minimal drop in election support for the SPP, NSi and SDP cluster (altogether 34.1 per cent compared to 35.1 per cent for the SPP, SDP and SCD after the 1996 elections); c) partner support of three small new parties (PYS, SNP and DPP); and d) a very small share of lost votes after the introduction of a 4 per cent threshold (had a 5-per cent threshold been introduced the SNP and PYS would simply not have entered parliament!). It is perhaps ironic that the struggle between the centre-right parties in the spring and summer of 2000, coupled with their short period in government, in fact led to greater electoral support for centre-left parties (LDS and ULSD) in the 2000 elections. (5) The first clear ideological shift in the 2004 parliamentary elections making the centre-right government possible came as a surprise despite the growing public outrage with affairs involving the misuse of LDS members’ power (particularly at the local level) and LDS leaders’ arrogance in public debates. No pre-election public opinion survey had shown a clear shift in voters’ political mood while the centre-right success in the June 2004 European elections had been commented on in public mainly as the result of a very low election turnout favouring the mentioned cluster of parties.

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Between Polarized and Moderate Pluralism The characteristics of Slovenia’s party system have been changing dynamically. The process of the proliferation of political parties, which had already taken place by the first free elections, can be described using Sartori’s atomised pluralism. The 1990 elections defined the first new party system. While the first party system was polarized we can see some indicators of the transition from polarized to moderate pluralism during the 1990s. The number of parliamentary political parties was not extreme (seven to nine) but it was still bigger than the number required for the alternative mechanics of competition (Sartori defines the critical number of five to six parties). The processes of splitting up and merging political parties were very dynamic during the 1990s. This had an effect on the number of political parties in the party arena between elections, although the number of parliamentary parties has never really dropped to the mentioned critical number. The phenomenon of a double opposition that was obvious in the first decade (particularly when the successor to the old ruling party and the oppositional social democratic party were both in opposition) has begun to change. Right parties in opposition which had previously competed against each other started to collaborate more after 2000. The index of fragmentation has been declining while the index of aggregation has been increasing. No party is calling for a change in the political system (anti-system parties). Still, there are some elements of polarized pluralism. This includes ideological fever – quarrels between parties predominantly on the basis of ideological arguments – that is still very strong particularly during election campaigns. Some parties have also complained that elections are not completely fair since the mass media is not ideologically plural enough and that the elected political elite (especially during the 1990s) was not entirely legitimate since it included some of the reformed old political elite. In spring 2000 the Social Democratic Party, the Slovenian People’s Party and all small parties demanded early elections. There have been cyclical debates on changing the electoral system but they missed a consensus on one key element of the political system, thereby showing some instability. After the 2000 parliamentary elections elements of a predominant party system emerged in the Slovenian party system. Electoral support for the leading party in the party arena (the LDS) rose to nearly 40 per cent. Despite being such a big party the LDS opted for a safe majority government. Since the 2000 parliamentary elections, there has been a mix of elements of polarized pluralism, moderate pluralism and the system of a predominant party. Polarization again increased during 2004, which is typical of all pre-election years, including a reduction of coalition partners. After the 1996 parliamentary elections, when the centre-right parties came closest to a parliamentary victory, the 2004 elections offered the first real chance for a more radical change in the ruling coalition. Centre-right parties have so far developed the first pre-election campaign simultaneously based on:

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Danica Fink-Hafner Table 9.4 Party system characteristics after elections

Characteristics

1990

1992

1996

2000

2004

Total nr of parties and 17 33 18 16 23 lists competing at Elections Nr of parliamentary 9 8 7 (6) 2 8 7 parties % of valid votes for old 37.1 37.0 36.0 48.3 33.0 parliamentary parties % of valid votes for new 54.8 45.3 52.7 47.9 55.3 parliamentary parties % of valid votes for four 57.4 61.6 72.1 73.7 71,14 biggest parliamentary parties % of ‘lost’ votes (not 8.1 17.7 10.6 3.8 11.7 represented in parliament) Index of 0.873 0.840 0.811 0.785 0.787 fractionalization (Fp) 4(+1)4 45 Number of parties in the 6 4(3)(2)1 (2)(1)(2)3 ruling coalition Fp= Rae’s index of fractionalization (see Sartori 1976, 307). 1 The SDPS left the government in April 1994 and the ULSD in January 1996, which left behind a coalition of two. 2 On 15 April 2000 the Slovenian People’s Party and Slovenian Christian Democrats merged into a new political party, SPP+SCD – Slovenian People’s Party. On 28 April Mr Zagožen and Mr Janša signed an agreement to form the coalition Slovenija. 3 The government composed of Liberal Democracy of Slovenia (Prime Minister Drnovšek), Slovenian People’s Party and Democratic Party of Pensioners won parliamentary support on 27 February 1997. In 2000 the Slovenian People’s Party declared that it was leaving the government and the Democratic Party of Pensioners followed. Drnovšek lost a vote of confidence on 8 April 2000. His government remained in power until 7 June 2000. Andrej Bajuk (representative of the centre-right, proposed by Janša’s Social Democratic Party of Slovenia and the newly merged SPP+SCD – Slovenian People’s Party) won parliamentary support on 3 May 2000 but his nominated ministers did not gain support until 7 June 2000. 4 LDS, ULSD, SPP, DPP and special agreements on co-operation between the PYS and LDS. 5 The government composed of SDP, NSi, SPP, DeSUS was formally supported by the National Assembly on 3 December 2004.

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(1) co-operation among the centre-right parties (particularly the SDP and NSi); (2) building up appeal among all voters and political groupings favouring a change in the government long ruled by the LDS; and (3) political struggles on ideologically burdened issues even involving the question of human rights (such as the status of people from other former Yugoslav republics who did not become Slovenian citizens in the early stages of creating the independent Slovenia, or building an Islamic cultural centre). In the first European elections held on 13 June 2004 the centre-right parties won four out of the seven seats in the European Parliament reserved for Slovenia. The 3 October 2004 parliamentary elections proved that voters in that particular year definitely opted for the centre-right cluster of parties.

Consolidation of the Party Arena in a ‘Natural Way’ The continuous transition to a democracy, in which the former ruling party played an active role, was favourable in maintaining a relatively strong centre-left and centre orientation among voters for a relatively long period of time. This was not expressed in strong support for the successor to the reformed previous ruling party, but in strong support of the ‘systemic opposition’ to the old regime – the party which developed out of the transformed former League of Socialist Youth. While the consolidation of newly established parties has involved a consolidation of both the centre-right and the centre-left, it is the latter that had prevailed until the 2004 elections. The 1990s showed that competition between the two ideological clusters was not a zero-sum game, but was first a struggle for those votes which had not yet been represented in parliament; and second a struggle for predominance defined by a coalitional and common-front strategy. Only by 2004 had the newly established centre-right parties consolidated sufficiently and fully learned the rules of the political game in achieving a governmental majority. The two key ideological clusters of parties have so far been clearly defined due to the concentration of a growing proportion of votes in a smaller number of parties. This is partly based on the loss of small central parties (such as the Democrats), the splitting up of new parties according to left-right divisions (the Greens of Slovenia, Slovenian Democratic Alliance), reduction of post-modern elements in the party arena (the Greens) and the parliamentarization of new small, centre-left parties (the Democratic Party of Pensioners, the Party of Youth of Slovenia). Bipolarization of the party arena up until recently complicated not only coalition-building and the functioning of governing coalitions but also how the state functioned cyclically (for example, the budget for 1997 was only adopted at the end of the same year, the political crisis in spring 2000 caused a two-month deadlock marked by both the minimal functioning of Drnovšek’s government without parliamentary support and the new Prime Minister Andrej Bajuk missing

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parliamentary support for his council of ministers). The effects of the first clearly centre-right government remain to be seen. Slovenia’s party system has so far been consolidating in ‘a natural way’ – without any intensive electoral engineering. Political parties have been gaining nearly the same proportions of parliamentary seats as they gained votes in parliamentary elections (Table 9.5 in the Appendix). With a proportional system in place, the parliamentary party arena has remained relatively dynamic allowing new parties to enter the parliament while the level of volatility has been declined from 25.9 in 1990 to 17.3 in 2004 (Table 9.8 in the Appendix). In the context of opposition parties’ fragmentation, co-operation between the cluster of old parties and the small newly established ones the new party system has evolved from polarized pluralism to a party system with elements of a polarized and moderate system as well as the system of a predominant party (the latter after the 2000 parliamentary elections). The 2004 elections not only brought about the fragmentation known from the periods of a mixture of the polarized and moderate pluralism, but also an alternative coalition government – a new element of possible development in the direction of a moderate type of party system. Still, the recent political change cannot be fully assessed since the new government had only taken over its position at the time of writing. References Adam, F. (ed.) (1993), Volitve in politika po slovensko (Ljubljana: Znanstveno publicistično središče). Ágh, A. (1992), ‘The Emerging Party System in East Central Europe’, Budapest Papers on Democratic Transition, no.13 (Budapest: Hungarian Centre for Democracy Studies Foundation, Department of Political Science, Budapest University of Economics). Bibič, A. (1992), ‘Nekateri vidiki pluralizacije družbe in države na Slovenskem’ in D. Fink Hafner et al., (eds), Nastajanje slovenske državnosti, (Ljubljana: Slovensko politološko društvo). Bibič A. and Graziano, G. (eds) (1994), Civil Society, Political Society, Democracy (Ljubljana: Slovenian Political Science Association). Blondel, J. (1990), ‘Types of Party System’, in P. Mair (ed.), The West European Party System (Oxford University Press). Cotta, M. (1994), ‘Building Party Systems after the Dictatorship: the East European Cases in a Comparative Perspective’, in G. Pridham and T. Vanhanen (eds), Democratization in Eastern Europe (London-New York: Routledge). Dahl, R. (1971), Poliarchy. Participation and Opposition (New Haven and London: Yale University Press). Fink Hafner, D. (1990), Nova družbena gibanja - subjekti politične inovacije (Ljubljana: Znanstvena knjižnica FDV).

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— (1992), ‘Political Modernization in Slovenia in the 1980s and in the Early 1990s’, in The Journal of Communist Studies, vol.8 (4), pp. 210-226. — (1994), ‘Anti-Party Sentiment in the Context of Democratic Transition. Slovenia in Comparison to Other Post-Socialist Countries’, paper presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions, Madrid, 17-22 April 1994. — (1995), ‘The Disintegration of Yugoslavia’, Canadian Slavonic Papers, vol. 37(3-4), pp. 339-356. — (1997), ‘The Development of Political Parties in Slovenia’, paper presented at the Western Political Science Association annual meeting, Tuscon, Arizona, USA, March 13-15. — (1997a), ’Development of a Party System’, in D. Fink Hafner and J. R. Robbins (eds), Making a New Nation: The Formation of Slovenia (Dartmouth (UK), Ashgate (USA). — (1999), ‘The Left in Slovenia’, in C. Bukowski and B. Barnabas (eds), The Return of the Left in Post-Communist States: Current Trends and Future Prospects (Cheltenham, Northampton: Edward Elgar). — (2001), Politične stranke (Ljubljana: Fakulteta za družbene vede). — (2002), ‘Prevzemanje oblasti v kontinuiranem demokratičnem prehodu’, in D. Fink Hafner and T. Boh, (eds), Parlamentarne volitve 2000 (Ljubljana: Založba FDV). Fink Hafner, D. and Haček, M., (eds) (2000), Demokratični prehodi I. Slovenija v primerjavi s srednjeevropskimi postsocialističnimi državami (Ljubljana: Fakulteta za družbene vede). — (2001), Demokratični prehodi II. Slovenija v primerjavi z drugimi nekdanjimi jugoslovanskimi republikami, (Ljubljana: Fakulteta za družbene vede). Fink Hafner, D. and Boh, T. (eds) (2002), Parlamentarne volitve 2000 (Ljubljana: Založba FDV). Fink Hafner, D., Kropivnik, S., Kustec, S., Krašovec, A. (2002), Dejavniki v oblikovanju (ne)zaupanja v Državni zbor, final research report, (Ljubljana: Centre for Political Science Research, Faculty of Social Sciences). Golosov, G. (1996), ‘Modes of Communist Rule, Democratic Transition, and Party System Formation in Four East European Countries’, The Donald W. Treadgold Papers, The Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington, paper no. 9. Kranjc, S. (1992), ‘Razvoj strank in strankarskega pluralizma na Slovenskem (1988-1991)’, RI FDV (Ljubljana: Center za politološke raziskave). — (1993): ‘Politične stranke – dejavnik (ne)stabilnosti demokracije’, in Problemi konsolidacije demokracije’ (Ljubljana: Slovensko politološko društvo). — (1994): ‘Financiranje političnih strank’, in I. Lukšič, (ed.), Stranke in strankarstvo, (Ljubljana: Slovensko politološko društvo). Krašovec, A. (2000): Moč v političnih strankah (Ljubljana: Fakulteta za družbene vede). Krašovec, A. and Lajh, D. (2004), ‘The Slovenian EU Accession Referendum: A Cat-and-Mouse Game’, in West European Politics, vol. 27(4), pp. 603-623.

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Kropivnik, S. (2002), ‘Družbeni in ideološki profili slovenskih političnih strank v preteklem desetletju’, in D. Fink Hafner and T. Boh, (eds), Parlamentarne volitve 2000 (Ljubljana: Založba FDV). Lane, J-E., Ersson, S. (1987), Politics and Society in Western Europe (London, Beverly Hills, Newbury Park, New Delhi: Sage). Linz, J. J. (1990), ‘Transitions to Democracy’, The Washington Quarterly 13, pp. 143-164. Panebianco, A. (1988), Political Parties: Organization and Power (Cambridge, New York, New Rochelle, Melbourne, Sydney: Cambridge University Press). Podmenik, D. (1993), ‘Programska identiteta slovenskih parlamentarnih strank in volilne odločitve’, in F. Adam, (ed.), Volitve in politika po slovensko (Ljubljana: Znanstveno publicistično središče). Prunk, J. (1998), Kratka zgodovina Slovenije (Ljubljana: Založba Grad). Ramet, S. P. (1997): ‘Democratization in Slovenia – the Second Stage’, in K. Dawisha and B. Parrott (eds), Politics, Power and the struggle for democracy in South-East Europe (Cambridge-New York: Cambridge University Press). Ramet, S. P. and Fink Hafner, D. (eds) (2005), Democratic Transition in Slovenia: Value transformation, education, and the media since 1990 (Texas A&M University Press). Sartori, G. (1976), Parties and Party Systems. A Framework for Analysis (Cambridge, London, New York, Melbourne: Cambridge University Press). Toka, G. (1997), ‘Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in East Central Europe’, Studies in Public Policy, Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, no. 279. Toš, N. (ed.) (1999), Vrednote v prehodu II, Slovensko javno mnenje 1990-1998 (Dokumenti SJM 6) (Ljubljana: Fakulteta za družbene vede, Inštitut za družbene vede, Center za raziskovanje javnega mnenja). — (1992), ‘Political Parties, Elections and Voters in Slovenia’, paper represented at the International Conference ‘Political Parties in the New Europe’, organized by The Work Group on Elections and Parties, International Political Science Association, 24 April 1992 in Vienna. — (1992a), ‘Levo-desna orientacija kot razsežje političnega pluralizma’, in Nastajanje slovenske državnosti, Slovensko politološko društvo, Ljubljana. — (1992b), ‘Volivci in politične stranke’, Teorija in praksa, vol. 29(1-2), pp. 109122. Toš, N. in Miheljak, V., (eds) (2002), Slovenia Between Continuity and Change, 1990-1997 (Berlin: Sigma). Vehovar, Urban (1993), ‘Volitve 1992: Slojevska struktura slovenskih političnih strank’, in F. Adam. (ed.), Volitve in politika po slovensko (Ljubljana: Znanstveno publicistično središče). — (1996), Družbeni razcepi in politične stranke na Slovenskem, Master thesis, (Ljubljana: Fakulteta za družbene vede).

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Selected Institutions Election Commission of the Republic of Slovenia (Republiška volilna komisija)http://www.rvk.si National Assembly (Državni zbor), http://www.dz-rs.si National Council (Državni svet), http://www.ds-rs.si President of the Republic of Slovenia (predsednik Republike Slovenije), http://www.up-rs.si Slovenian government website – Slovenia, http://www.gov.si

Political Parties Democratic Party of Pensioners – DPP (Demokratska stranka upokojencev), http://www.desus.si Liberal Democracy of Slovenia – LDS (Liberalna demokracija Slovenije – LDS), http://www.lds.si New Slovenia - Christian People’s Party – NSi (Nova Slovenija - krščansko ljudska stranka - NSi), http://www.nsi.si Youth Party of Slovenia – YPS (Stranka mladih Slovenije), http://www.sms.si Slovenian National Party – SNP (Slovenska nacionalna stranka – SNS), http://www.sns.si Slovenian People’s Party – SPP (Slovenska ljudska stranka – SLS), http://www.sls.si Social Democratic Party – SDP (Socialdemokratska stranka – SDS) – recently renamed the Slovenian Democratic Party – SDP (Slovenska demokratska stranka – SDS), http://www.sds.si United List of Social Democrats – ULSD (Združena lista socialnih demokratov – ZLSD; on 2 April 2005 renamed Social Democrats), http://www.socialnidemokrati.si

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Appendix Table 9.5 Results of parliamentary elections in Slovenia in 1990-2004 Liberal Democratic Party (LDP); since 1994 Liberal Democracy of Slovenia (LDS) Social Democratic Party (SDP), renamed Slovenian Democratic Party (SDP) United List of Social Democrats (ULSD) Slovenian Christian Democrats (SCD) Slovenian People’s Party* (SPP) New Slovenia – Christian People's Party (NSi) Slovenian National Party (SNP) The Greens of Slovenia (GS) Democratic Party of Pensioners (DPP) Democratic Party (DP)

nr of votes % of votes nr of seats % of seats

1990a 156.843 14.49 12 15

1992b 278.851 23.46 22 24.44

1996b 288.783 27.01 25 27.77

2000c 390.797 36.21 34 37.77

2004 220.848 22.80 23 25.55

nr of votes % of votes nr of seats % of seats

79.951 7.39 6 7.5

39.675 3.34 4 4.44

172.470 16.13 16 17.77

170.541 15.80 14 15.56

281.710 29.08 29 32.22

nr of votes % of votes nr of seats % of seats nr of votes % of votes nr of seats % of seats nr of votes % of votes nr of seats % of seats nr of votes % of votes nr of seats % of seats nr of votes % of votes nr of seats % of seats nr of votes % of votes nr of seats % of seats nr of votes % of votes nr of seats % of seats nr of votes % of votes

186.928 17.28 14 17.5 140.403 12.98 11 13.8 135.808 12.55 11 13.8

161.349 13.58 14 15.56 172.424 14.51 15 16.66 103.300 8.69 10 11.11

96.597 9.03 9 10 102.852 9.62 10 11.11 207.186 19.38 19 21.11

130.268 12.07 11 12.22

98.527 10.17 10 11.11

95.640 8.84 8 10

119.091 10.02 12 13.33 44.019 3.70 5 5.56

34.422 3.22 4 4.44 18.853 1.76

102.817 9.53 9 10 94.661 8.76 8 8.89 47.251 4.38 4 4.44 9.712 0.90

66.032 6.82 7 7.88 88.073 9.09 9 10 60.750 6.27 6 6.65 6.703 0.69

46.152 4.32 5 5.56 28.624 2.68

55.696 5.16 4 4.44 8.102 0.75

39.150 4.04 4 4.44 2.670 0.28

102.931 9.51

59.487 5.01

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Party of the Youth of Slovenia (PYS) Slovenian Craftmen's Party (SCP) Socialist Aliance of the Working People (SAWP)

nr of seats % of seats nr of votes % of votes nr of seats % of seats nr of votes % of votes nr of seats % of seats nr of votes % of votes nr of seats % of seats

8 10

6 6.67 46.719 4.33 4 4.44

38.269 3.54 3 3.8 58.082 5.37 5 6.3

229

20.174 2.08

32.696 2.75

* On 15 April 2000 the Slovenian People’s Party and the Slovenian Christian Democrats united in a new party, SPP+SCD – Slovenian People’s Party’. Just before the 2000 parliamentary elections a group, mostly from the former SCD, left the new party and competed at the elections as a new party, New Slovenia. a) Parliamentary elections in April 1990, Socio-political Chamber, proportional system, number of seats: 80 (78 for parties, plus two for the representatives of (Italian, Hungarian) national minorities. b) Parliamentary elections in December 1992 and November 1996, National Assembly, proportional system (d’Hondt’s system), number of seats: 90 (88 for parties, plus two for representatives of (Italian, Hungarian) national minorities. c) Parliamentary elections in October 2000, partial change of the electoral system: introduction of a 4 per cent threshold and the Droop formula. Sources: Uradni list Republike Slovenije: 17/90; 60/92; 65/96; 98/2000 compiled by Alenka Krašovec and Tomaž Boh, in Fink Hafner and Boh, (eds.) (2002); Republiška volilna komisija - http:www.rvk.si Table 9.6 Election turnouts at parliamentary elections Nr of all eligible voters Nr of voters who voted Nr of all votes cast Nr of valid votes Election turnout Proportion of valid votes *

1990 1,490,136

1992 1,491,374

1996 1,542,218

2000 1,586,695

1,241,212

1,280,243

1,136,679

1,116,423

2004 1,634,40 2 991,263

1,238,189 1,128,435 83.3% 91.14%

1,277,604 1,188,378 85.84% 93.02%

1,136,211 1,069,204 73.70% 94.10%

1,116,218 1,079,280 70.34% 96.69%

991,123 968,772 60.64% 97.75%

* proportion of valid votes = relationship between the number of all valid votes and the number of all votes cast. Sources: Uradni list Republike Slovenije: 17/90; 14/90; 60/92; 65/96; 98/2000 – compiled by Alenka Krašovec and Tomaž Boh in Fink Hafner and Boh, (eds.) (2002); www.rvk.si, 16 October 2004.

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Table 9.7 Effective number of parties in the Slovenian parliamentary party arena 1992 1996 2000 2004 Average 8.549 6.376 5.161 6.048 6.5 Calculations based on the Tageperä and Shugard index obtained from Lijphart, Arendt (1984): Democracies. Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries (New Haven: Yale University Press). Table 9.8 Electoral volatility in the Slovenian party arena 1992-2004 1996 2000 2004 Average 25.93 18.755 17.33 20.67 Sources: calculations based on Pedersen, Mogens (1990): Electoral Volatility in Western Europe, 1948-1977, in P. Mair, The West European Party System (New York: Oxford University Press). Table 9.9 Governments in Slovenia (1990-2004)1 Prime Minister PMs party

Coalition parties

Number of parliamentary seats

Period

Cause of the change

Status

Alojz Peterle (SCD; the Demos coalition)

SCD,SPP,GS, SDP,SDA,LP (Demos)

47 (80)2

16.5.199014.5.1992

constructive vote of confidence

Majority

Janez Drnovšek (LDS)

LDS,SDP,GS, SPS,DP

38 (80) 50 (80)3

14.5.199225.1.1993

Majority

Janez Drnovšek (LDS)

LDS,SCD, ULSD,SDP

55 (90) 63 (90)4

25.1.1993 7.4.1994

first elections to the National Assembly based on new Constitution merging LDS, DP and GS; SDP left the coalition

Janez Drnovšek (LDS) Janez Drnovšek (LDS)

LDS,SCD, ULSD

59 (90)

7.4.199426.1.1996

ULSD left the Majority coalition

LDS,SKD

42 (90)5

26.1.199627.2.1997

regular elections

Majority

Minority

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1

231

Janez Drnovšek (LDS)

LDS,SPP, DPP

49 (90)

27.2.19977.6.2000

vote of confidence

Majority

Andrej Bajuk (SPPSCD) Janez Drnovšek (LDS)

SPP-SCD, SDP

45

7.6.200030.11. 20006

regular elections

LDS,ULSD, SPP-SCD, DPP (PYS)

58 (90)

conditional majority – other MPs’ support Majority

Anton Rop (LDS) Anton Rop (LDS) Janez Janša (SDS)

LDS,ULSD, SPP,DPP (PYS)7 LDS,ULSD, DPP

58 (90)

30.11.2000- Drnovšek’s 19.12.2002 stepped down to compete in 2002 presidential elections 19.12.2002- SPP left the Majority 20.4. 2004 coalition

49(90)

20.4. 20043.12.2004

SDP,NSi,SPP, DPP

49 (90)

3.12.2004

regular elections

Majority Majority

The duration of governments refers to the dates when the government as a whole was accepted by the parliament. 2 there were 80 seats in the Socio-political Chamber. 3 The formal coalition held 38 parliamentary seats. Although the Social Democratic Party – United List was not formally a coalition partner it had three ministers and is counted as part of the coalition in the table. When taking this into account the number of parliamentary seats of governing parties rises to 50; we can describe that government as a majority coalition. 4 By 14 March 1994 the number of seats was 55, while after merger with the Liberal Democratic Party, the Greens – Ecological Social Party and the Democratic Party to form the Liberal Democracy of Slovenia the number of seats rose to 63. 5 Two LDS MPs left that party group, one established the Slovenian Forum and the other the Green Alternative. 6 On 3 May 2000 the new Prime Minister was elected, the new government (ministers) won support on 7 June 2000. 7 The LDS signed a special agreement on co-operation with the Party of Youth of Slovenia. Since formally the PYS did not become a member of the governing coalition its parliamentary seats are not counted. Sources: Zajc, Drago (2000): Parlamentarno odločanje, FDV, Ljubljana; Krašovec, Alenka (2000): Politični dejavniki in kazalci demokratičnega prehoda in konsolidacije demokracije v petih državah srednje Evrope, FDV, Ljubljana; Zver, Milan (1996): 100 let socialdemokracije, Veda, Ljubljana; Internet: http://www.gov.si/vrs/slo/servis/servis.html

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Chapter 10

Party System Change in Post-Communist EU Member States Susanne Jungerstam-Mulders

In the introductory section of this book, it was stressed that the aim of the book was first and foremost to provide an in-depth insight into the parties and party systems of the eight post-communist EU member states that entered the European Union in 2004. In doing so, the book has compiled descriptive-analytical essays by experts on these countries, concentrating not only on nation specific features of parties and party system development, but also on three comparative aspects of party system research: first, ideologies and issues, mainly focusing on ideological cleavages, ideological dimensions and salient issues in present-day politics; second, party system competition including institutional aspects and central measurements of party competition; and third, party organizations and the role of parties. Based on these common themes the concluding chapter is designed, firstly, to briefly summarize the nation-specific characteristics of each country as discussed in the country studies of the book. Secondly, I focus on the three main comparative aspects included in all the country studies, i.e. portraying the ideological spectrum of party systems, including cleavages, dimensions and salient issues, and discussing party competition and the development of party organisations. Thirdly, the comparative aspects are brought together in the section on differences and similarities between countries in more general terms. Finally, the last section of the chapter touches briefly upon the issue of what we might expect in respect of party system development in the future.

Nation-specific Developments By focussing on all post-communist EU member states as individual countries, the previous chapters have shed some light on numerous aspects of the parties and party systems of each country, amongst others on those nation specific circumstances that are particular to each of the countries’ parties and party systems, i.e. on those features specific to each country, and which have shaped the development of the party system in that particular country. Therein, it is evident that the countries of this study are united by a communist past with one party rule

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that has influenced politics and ideological dispositions. Yet, the processes of liberalization, transition and consolidation have developed at different paces within different frameworks, reflecting different realities and eventually resulting in quite different parties and party systems, in different patterns of competition, and different prospects for further development. In summary, the country study of Estonia shows that Estonia has experienced a number of rather adverse developments in the process of consolidation. Where the party system seems well consolidated in terms of acceptance for the rules of the (democratic) game, with a negligible support for radical parties in recent elections and government participation by almost all party actors, there is still a low party implementation in society, high levels of volatility in elections, and a weak institutionalization of parties and of cleavage structures, as well as a weak ideological and programmatic foundation. There is also a misbalanced development of cleavages where ‘urban’ issues tend to dominate over ‘rural’ areas, where right-wing sentiments dominate a traditionally left-wing electorate, and where the Estonians dominate over Russian-speaking minority interests. As a result, the Estonian urban right has come to dominate politics. In its neighbouring country, Latvia, the minority issue has had a much clearer imprint on politics than in Estonia, in part because minority issues have still not been entirely solved since approximately 30 per cent of the Latvian inhabitants were not naturalized Latvian citizens in 2003. Simultaneously, the country has experienced an unstable party system structure to an even greater extent than Estonia; the party system is characterized by numerous splits, mergers and start-up parties. In addition, breakaway parties and newly founded parties frequently appear quite successful in the first elections that they contest in. This has resulted in highly volatile elections which, combined with a relatively high turnout, suggest that even if Latvian voters do not feel bound to party loyalties, they are open to new alternatives, perhaps still seeking workable solutions for party system consolidation. Contrary to the Latvian situation, the Lithuanian party system was in fact considered rather stable until the earthquake elections of 2000. However, the sudden shift of political moods has resulted in a party system which today can be described in terms of fragmentation of parliament, erosion of party loyalties, a personality orientated political style, low level of trust in political parties, increasing volatility, and a very low turnout by any standards. Looking for answers to the causes of this development, it is argued that it is partly the result of the erosion of the communist-anti-communist cleavage that has found no clear replacement since many parties appear rather pragmatic than ideological, as well as having deeply-rooted distrust in parties, accompanied by scandals. All in all, these developments have created a situation in Lithuania where party system development seems highly unpredictable. Similar to the Baltic States, the Polish party system is characterized by severe intra-party instability. This can be identified in numerous split-offs, mergers and regroupings of political parties mainly on the centre-right. In addition, frequent

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turnover of MPs in parliament have implications for government stability. The intra-party instability is also reflected by high volatility levels, though there are vast differences between elections levelling out the most extreme results. As in the case of Lithuania, there is also a strong anti-party sentiment and weak links between parties and society, which is reflected in an extremely low turnout level, regardless of whether it is a parliamentary, presidential or European election. The reasons for these features of Polish politics are yet unclear, but one could speculate on the role of political culture along side those features mentioned above. Turning to the Czech party system, it is in most respects characterized by traits that could be ideal and typical of the party government model, unattained in practice in present-day Western European countries. In fact, Czech parties have a virtual monopoly over representation and interest articulation in society, whereas alternative social movements, trade unions etc. are weak or non-existent. Though this goes for all post-communist EU countries to some extent, the Czech parties appear to hold a power monopoly which is not only present, but is also less questioned among the electorate than elsewhere. This means that even though parties are generally not very trusted institutions, and there is a low level of political involvement among citizens, parties lack mass membership and elections are characterized by a volatility higher than average volatility in Western Europe, the role of parties as crucial linkages between citizens and the state is not a questioned one. Slovakia, on the other hand, was dominated by an authoritarian-democratic divide until 2000; where politics in all post-communist countries was more or less dominated by a communist-anti-communist cleavage in the very first elections after democratization, new political divisions and salient issues would enter politics shortly after. In Slovakia, however, the line of conflict concerning the rule of the country was transformed into an authoritarian-democratic divide. This transformation of the communist-anti-communist divide was due to the HZDS’ (Movement for Democratic Slovakia) dominance and questionable methods of maintaining power. However, in 2000 the salience of this divide begun to erode, and since the 2002 elections, when the dominant nationalist and ex-communist parties both fell out of parliament, socioeconomic issues have become more dominant in politics. Among the post-communist countries of this study, Hungary is perceived as the most stable and consolidated party system of all with a very low fragmentation both in terms of electoral and parliamentary parties. Moreover, the country’s party system is characterized by a bipolar drive, where dominant parties are concentrated in the conservative / Christian democratic right, and in a socialist and (social-) liberal left. Elections have produced government alternation in a two-party system like order, while dominant parties have held their positions as compared to their allies in each respective bloc. Regardless of the fact that there are numerous consensual institutions in place, other institutions, such as single-member districts and an adversarial political culture have been feeding the bipolar drive.

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In contrast to Hungary, the party system in Slovenia has been characterized by a dominant party in the centre, and broad coalition strategies. In addition, the party system development has been characterized by a gradual transition, by the lack of clear-cut ideological shifts and no imposed electoral engineering, therein developing into a moderate pluralist system with elements of polarized pluralism. However, unlike all other post-communist countries, the phases of liberalization (in terms of legalization of pluralism) and transition (in terms of practical adoption to a democratic working order, including the development of political organizations, the holding of free elections etc.) took place in Slovenia within the framework of a larger state, Yugoslavia. Thereafter, the reformed ‘opposition party’ of the old regime maintained its position as the dominant party until the most recent elections in 2004.

Ideological Dimensions and Issues Taking a closer look at the ideological cleavages, dimensions and salient issues in politics, different patterns and developmental trends occur in the different countries. However, before turning to the comparative discussion, this section aims at summarizing the findings of the country cases with regard to characteristics of the parties and party systems of the new post-communist EU member states in respect of their ideological spectrum. As in all other post-communist states the period shortly prior to, and in the first elections after independence or democratization, Estonian politics clustered around communism versus de-communization in 1987-1991. Thereafter, the communist party went through diffusion with other parties and there was a radicalization of public opinion. All parties supported a move towards a market economy – and all parties contributed to a populist political rhetoric based on pragmatism. From 1995 to this date, the spectrum of issues in politics has been diffuse, with a mix of postSoviet and transitional issues and new issues emerging in a reaction to the transition process. Party programmes are still rather undifferentiated and they frequently contain critiques of the current government along side populist, ‘antiparty’ rhetoric. In terms of cleavages in society reflected in party politics, there is also a misbalanced development of ‘urban’ issues that tend to dominate the political interests of the ‘rural’ areas and right-wing parties that tend to dominate over a traditionally left-wing electorate. In addition, there is a second ‘misbalance’ in Estonian politics, where Estonian nationals tend to dominate over Russian minority interests. Moreover, the socioeconomic left has long been missing in Estonia, as there has genuinely been no social democratic party in the country. As an overall result, it seems fair to say that at present Estonian urban right-wing interests dominate politics in Estonia. Similar to the Estonian experience, the communist-anti-communist dimension defined political space in the early years of independence in Lithuania. Therein the left was more positive towards the communist past whereas the right tended to be

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more critical. Moreover, voters were shown to identify the placement of parties from the left to the right along this dimension, and only later a socioeconomic dimension became the more important conflict line. However, this dimension has been reflected in the party self-placement only since the late 1990s, whereas party labels and economic policies previous to that time tended to be mismatched. Hence, voters are still less inclined to make a correct judgement of parties’ economic position than of their stand on the communist-anti-communist divide. In fact, looking at voter characteristics in Lithuania, church attendance appears to be the best indicator of voting behaviour, though this characteristic is largely translatable into the socioeconomic left-right dimension. The third Baltic State, Latvia, also has one central feature in common with its neighbour Estonia and Lithuania, as well as with Slovakia and Hungary in East Central Europe, i.e. a salient ethnic dimension. But where ethnic issues have been downplayed in Estonia and Lithuania and have become secondary in Slovakia and Hungary, Latvian politics can by large be characterized according to an ethnic dimension along side an economic interest divide. However, these are often confused, because the left-wing is usually associated with pro-minority policies alongside state intervention in economic issues. In contrast, right-wing parties are associated both with restrictive ethnic policies and liberal or conservative economic policies. However, in recent years the ethnic issue has been fading in importance, whereas socioeconomic issues have been gaining in relevance. Particularly issues such as education, welfare and social guarantees, economic development and growth have dominated electoral campaigns. Moreover, corruption, the fight against criminality and the build up of a judicial state have been important themes in Latvian electoral campaigns. Turning to the East Central European countries, Polish politics are basically dominated by three dimensions of competition: the cultural-historical axis being the dominant dimension, which is defined by moral-cultural values, including religiosity and the role of the Church, and people’s attitudes towards the communist past (cf. the Baltic States, Lithuania in particular). Secondly, socioeconomic class variables and political issues of economic intervention and the distribution of economic resources have been a prevailing dimension throughout the past fifteen years, and it has been increasing in importance but remains secondary. A third dimension of nationalism-cosmopolitanism, based on attitudes towards EU integration and the role of foreign capital, is also present but not as salient. This means that parties mainly compete on the former two dimensions, the historical-cultural and the social-economic dimension; they are concentrated in four party blocs: an ex-communist/social democratic left (secular and communist forgiving), a post-Solidarity conservative/nationalist-populist bloc (based on a religious, anti-communist electorate), a post-Solidarity/liberal bloc of parties which is principally supportive of liberal market policies, and an agrarian (populist) bloc that is broadly based on a socioeconomic platform, and mainly anti-liberal. Here, the Czech party system appears as the outlier, considering that its ideological space is largely one-dimensional focussing on socioeconomic issues:

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party positions are clustered around questions such as social security, redistribution of economic resources, taxation and the role of the State. Yet, comparable to other post-communist states, there are also individual parties dominated or characterized by standpoints on other issues. For example, the Christian Democratic Union-the People’s Party emphasize Christian and conservative moral and family values, including fierce anti-abortion positions etc. In congruence with the more developed nationalism of the Czech Republic’s neighbouring countries, Slovakia and Hungary, there are also a few parties that lean towards nationalism here (the Communists and the Republican Party), whereas the Civic Democratic Party has made efforts to introduce a nationalist dimension with little success. In Slovakia, there were initially four central ideological divides: attitudes towards the communist regime; a centre-periphery dimension in a double sense, i.e. the Slovak versus the Czech centre, and Hungarian minorities versus the Slovak centre; a church-state divide; and an economic divide in terms of attitudes towards the planned economy. However, in the early years of democracy, there were few tangible alternatives with regard to the economic positions, whereas the following years were characterized by other dominant issues, all in all causing the economic divide to become secondary. In 1994-2000 Slovak politics were also quite exceptional as compared to the other countries of this study, in the sense that the dominant dividing line in politics continued to concern dispositions with regard to the regime of the country: the communist-anti-communist cleavage was replaced by a so-called authoritarian-democratic divide, referring to positions for and against HZDS rule and its questionable methods to maintain power and implement privatizations. Only by late 2000 did economic and social issues become dominant political themes and an important division between leftist and centre-right parties. In recent years, the less aggressive style of the HZDS and its moderated rhetoric also suggest that the dispute of regime has been vanishing. In addition to the (socio)economic divide that is now emerging as the dominant one, there is an ethnic divide that remains relevant, as well as moral-conservative issues concerning traditional family life, abortions etc. In Hungary, parties concentrated on the conservative/Christian democratic right, and to a socialist and (social-)liberal left. There is a clear crystallization of dominant cultural-historical issues (anti-communism, nationalism, and clericalism) and a clearly secondary (socio-)economic dimension. Nationalism is a key dividing line between left- and right-wing parties, but also within the population. Here, nationalism stands for the strengthening of Hungarians’ national identity as compared to decades of internationalist communism as well as for an aggressive protection of Hungarian minority rights in neighbouring countries. A leftist opposition rejects the dichotomy between nationalists-non-nationalists and sees nationalism as conflicting with the project of the ‘westernisation’ of Hungary. Among the voters, an urban-rural cleavage line is also found in the relation between party preference and voter characteristics, as well as a religious cleavage line comparable to the moral-cultural divide in, for instance, Poland or Slovakia.

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The religious cleavage line is visible in party policies in positions on the role of the Church in society, alongside the parties’ positions on moral issues. Also the Slovenian party system is mainly clustered along a communism-anticommunism cleavage and a cultural cleavage. The former includes an evaluation of the socialist era, both of actions undertaken by the communist party and of developments after the socialist revolution. Again, parties with roots in the old regime tend to be less critical of the post-WWII period. Instead, they are more critical of collaboration on the part of the opposite side during the war. Moreover, the ‘cultural’ cleavage line includes dispositions alongside a traditionalitymodernity cleavage that overlaps with the Rokkanian rural-urban cleavage and a more recently detected conservative clerical-liberal axis. Beside these cleavages there are also some salient issues that tend to dominate politics, including social positions of marginal groups (minorities, women, refugees etc.) and issues that are often included in the moral-cultural sphere, such as legalization of prostitution, religious education in schools, homosexual marriages etc. Therein, Slovenian politics is characterized by similar issues as Estonian politics (the urban-rural divide), and share many aspects of the ‘moral-cultural’ divide, in terms of salient moral-conservative issues, with the majority of post-communist countries in the new millennium, as well as the ‘cultural-historical’ dimension that was identified in Hungary and Poland, in particular.

Party Competition In terms of party competition, in what characterizes the parties and party systems of the new post-communist EU member states with regard to electoral behaviour in these countries, there are some general trends which were already pointed out in the introduction. Yet, at a country level, there are vast differences. In Estonia, electoral competition is generally based on single issues and personalities’ popularity rather than on the parties’ programmatic appeal. Consequently, elections are dominated by a populist political style, where programmatic debate between parties is often replaced by skilful electoral campaigning techniques, popularity of leadership and economic-egotropic voting (i.e. assessment of government performance based on a voter’s personal failure or success). Maybe as a result of the populist political style, parties also tend to merge and to split, fragmentation is fairly high and volatility very high. Turnout has dropped considerably from the first free elections, to no more than 57-58 per cent in the two most recent elections. In Latvia, fragmentation is even higher, as is volatility on average, whereas the populist style of party competition and dependency on candidates’ popularity, and costly campaigning methods are more or less similar. Though there are two sources of political estrangement – the ethnic estrangement of a vast part of the population still without citizenship or the right to vote and the institutional alienation – only the one can be seen to be responsible for the high volatility and system’s

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instability: the institutional alienation in terms of widespread mis- and distrust towards parties and politicians. Yet, considering that turnout in Latvia is comparatively high, above 70 per cent in all parliamentary elections, it appears that those anti-party sentiments expressed in distrust in parties have not affected people’s trust in the electoral process as such. In contrast, large numbers of the Lithuanian electorate have chosen to express their distrust – or their indifference – in elections by not voting. With an increasing fragmentation, increasing volatility and a downward trend in turnout, reaching its low point of 46.1 per cent in the last elections in 2004, which goes hand-in-hand with low trust in parties, one can only conclude that the Lithuanian parties is in a state of flux. Moreover, Poland shares many of the party competition characteristics that are typical of the Baltic States and of Lithuania, in particular. Here, too, there is a high – and increasing – fragmentation in terms of the registered number of parties (approximately 90 in April 2005 of whom 60 submitted annual accounts for 2003) and parties that are likely to enter parliament in the next elections (eight or nine), even though the ‘effective number of parties’ is at an equally low level as in Lithuania. This is likely to be a result of a combination of variables: there is a high level of distrust in parties that is partially rooted in fifty years of the one-party rule (which is a feature that is common to all post-communist countries), and partially in the workings of the modern Polish party system, weak linkages between parties and electorate, and perhaps disengagement on the part of large segments of the voters. In addition, volatility is high (regardless of vast fluctuations between elections). It is also characteristic of the Polish system that party organizations have been unstable, meaning that especially parties on the centre-right have split, merged etc. even between elections, which may be to some extent disguised in the fragmentation calculations. This intra-party instability may in part be explained by the institutional changes that have been imposed on the electoral system throughout the past fifteen years – but the party fragmentation may also be seen as one of the reasons for institutional instability: in other words, the constant changes of the electoral law is likely to reflect the fact that the Polish centre-right has been very fragmented and that political actors have continuously tried to maximize their own chances. In comparison to Poland, the Czech experience is almost the opposite: there has been a declining fragmentation, declining volatility, and there has been a fairly high turnout with the exception of the 2002 elections. These are all indicators of increasing stabilization that is in part due to the growing experience of voters with electoral mechanisms – and perhaps even more so an effect of the institutional stability that has characterized the Czech party system in recent times. In contrast to all the previous cases, both major parties and the electoral system have been quite stable. In Slovakia, on the other hand, fragmentation has been quite high, but volatility has dropped considerably in recent elections and is now quite moderate in comparison to other post-communist countries. In fact, party competition has been

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characterized by a dominant party and the functioning of a two-bloc mentality throughout the 1990s, where parties kept their loyalties though breakaway factions could join the opposite group. This only changed in 2002 when nationalists and communist successors failed in the elections, and four out of seven parties that entered parliament were newly founded parties. This also means to say that the Slovakian party system is going through a period of flux; however the shifts within the system are less radical than the flux that Lithuania, for instance, is going through. In Hungary, it has already been mentioned that the party system has become increasingly consolidated in a two-bloc mentality, in a party system that has moved from bipolar competition to tripolar competition and back. Therein, party system competition has also stabilized in terms of both a low fragmentation of parties, a decreasing volatility, but most notably, Hungary is the only country with an increase in electoral turnout. Therein, it appears that the party system is quite stable, while voters have adapted to the system and its mechanisms. Slovenia, on the other hand, is rather characterized by moderate pluralism in terms of a fragmented party system with a bipolar competition: centre-left ‘old’ parties with roots in the communist era and centre-right ‘new’ parties that have emerged during the independent era. However, the Liberal Democracy of Slovenia, the successor of the former opposition against the old regime, largely dominated politics throughout the 1990s, even though new parties have booked greater electoral victories than the ‘old’ parties as a whole in all the elections apart from the one in 2000. Moreover, regardless of the one-party dominance in the centre, government-coalitions have been broad-based throughout independence, and all parties participating in elections have had coalition potential. Therein, the Slovenian party system has been more consensus orientated than the Hungarian system, in particular.

Organizational Structure Turning to the organizational structure of parties and the workings of parties in post-communist EU countries, we have again found partially similar patterns, and partially different patterns. This section aims to summarize what characterizes the parties and party systems of the new post-communist EU member states with regard to party organizations. In Estonia, party formation in the early years of independence was mainly based on personal and group networks, whereas party structure development and the development of ideology and party programmes played a secondary role. New parties were small, inarticulate and they lacked political cohesion. Since then, party formation has still been characterized by fission and fusion of parties and political groupings. However, established parties have become more integrated into state structures, gaining advantages of financing, positions in the public service sector

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etc., making adjustments to the electoral law, and making entrance for new parties troublesome. Therein, political parties have been consolidating as organizations. In Latvia and Lithuania parties are also still quite small, with low membership levels and weak implantation in society. Parties in both countries have suffered from intra-party instability in terms of split-offs and mergers – a trait that especially in Latvia has also been recognisable in MPs switching organizational affiliation between elections. Moreover, parties are generally personality orientated, and generally speaking their functioning suffers from a lack of financial resources. This is in part due to the low levels of state financing in Latvia and Lithuania, where state funding is mainly indirect in terms of funding for the parliamentary group. In Lithuania, direct state subsidies for parties were only introduced in 1999, whereas a debate on the issue became salient in Latvia after the 2002 elections. In respect of state subsidies, these countries clearly differentiate themselves from the overwhelming majority of all European countries, but also in relation to other post-communist countries. As already mentioned, Polish parties, especially those on the centre-right, have been characterized by intra-party instability and weak organizational loyalty with numerous split-offs, mergers and realignments within the parties. This tendency has sometimes been called the ‘Polish disease’, however it refers to the intra-party instability on the right of the centre, in particular, whereas the centre-left seemed quite stable until the 2001 elections. Moreover, in respect of the social implantation of parties, there are extremely low levels of party membership in Poland and local organizations are passive and informal. As noted before, parties are also mistrusted; there are high levels of anti-party sentiment and cynicism towards politics. Parties are also highly dependent on state financing, which are considerably more generous than the funding of the parties in the previously mentioned countries. Yet, there are no alternative organizations for representative or government power monopoly. Herein, Polish parties seem to be almost as powerful as the Czech parties – and yet as undesired and disrespected as the Lithuanian parties. In contrast to most other post-communist countries, Czech parties have a comparatively solid organizational structure at the national level even though they, too, have been created in a top-down fashion, first being elected into parliament and only later expanding their organization on the ground. Moreover, established parties continue to survive as organizations, there are few successful start-up parties, few defections of MPs, and a high voting cohesion in parliamentary party groups as well as loyalty to party policies in commissions. In many aspects, there appears to be a strong trend towards centralization, though the interaction between central office and local organizations in terms of party bulletins, opinion polls, endorsement votes etc. is lively. However, financially, local organizations are dependent on fees and occasional support from a local MP or similar. For the national party organization, state subsidies form the bulk of party income, and it is perceived as quite generous as compared to many other post-communist countries. In addition, state subsidies are most favourable for parties which gain a larger share

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of the vote and seats in parliament, which is a feature common to most countries with generous party subsidies. Nevertheless, combined with the electoral thresholds, this is an effective barrier towards newcomers. The Slovakian intra-party structure is best described by its duality: there are relevant differences between old and new party organizations, where the former rely more on party-building and policy-seeking strategies, and a (comparatively) large and inclusive membership. In contrast, new organizations tend to be more vote- and office-seeking; they rely on modern campaigning techniques even more so than the previous, and they rely on a slim party organization. In general, parties in Slovakia are also characterized by many parties being formed out of a position in the executive (for example the DÚ in 1994 and the SKDÚ in 2001) and comparatively frequent breakaway party formations. Hungary, on the other hand, is characterized by organizational stability (few break away parties, few successful newcomers) with centralized party organizations as a rule (the Socialist Party more decentralized than others but yet well institutionalized). Moreover, the workings of the Hungarian party system is like the Czech party system close to the ideal type of ‘party government’, including features such as all major decisions being made by elected party officials or subordinates, government policies are results of party preferences, parties act cohesively and party officials are recruited by parties and held accountable etc. (Note, however, that Hungarian ministers are often non-party members even if they are loyal to the parties that put them in their positions). Though, like in other countries, parties have low membership figures and Hungarian parties have only weak links to society and do not enjoy a mass of trust regardless of the fact that they are not quite as mistrusted as Lithuanian or Polish parties. In Slovenia, there is a somewhat similar distinction to be made between groups of party organizations as in Slovakia. First, there are so-called ‘old’ party organizations that have roots in the communist era (herein referred to as the reformed parties of the previous ruling party and the old opposition, the United Lists of Social Democrats and Liberal Democracy of Slovenia, in particular). These have been in position to exploit old organizational networks and assets in order to build new organizations. Second, there is a group of ‘new’ parties that have been dependent on the introduction of state subsidies to develop their organizations. However, despite the introduction of rather generous party subsidies, many parties have experienced financial difficulties that have culminated in scandals and accusations of misuse of public office, corruption etc. This has contributed to an increased distrust in parties – a phenomenon that has echoed in all other countries as well. Moreover, parties are generally characterized as cartelized in terms of their dependence on state subsidies, elitist in terms of leadership and internal democracy – and catch-all in terms of their political message with which they try to appeal to a broad segment of the voters. As in many of the other countries, there have also been relatively lively party splits and mergers, but no more than 16-33 lists contesting elections since 1990.

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Patterns of Similarity and Patterns of Difference In view of the above, much can be said about similarities and differences between post-communist EU-member states. Yet, for the purposes of this section I am going to focus on those three themes of analysis that have been at the core of the book: party organization, ideological dimensions and party competition. First, focussing on parties as organizations and their links to the voters, Rybář writes in this volume that: …organizations of new parties in the ECE are said to be characterized primarily by limited opportunities of party members to influence intra-party life, financial dependence of parties on state subsidies, the low levels of party affiliation, weak or nonexistent links between parties and interest organizations and an underdeveloped structure of territorial organizational units of political parties.

Therein he also refers to other sources of authors in this volume, providing the general conclusion of intra-party organization that is still true for most of the postcommunist countries of this study. Yet, the national case studies have also showed that there are differences in the workings of parties, both within countries and between countries, as well as in those conditions providing the environment for parties. In some countries, such as Slovakia and Slovenia the different strategies of ‘old’ and ‘new’ parties have been highlighted. Therein, it has been shown that parties with their roots in the ‘old’ regime (referring both to successor communist parties and successor parties of the opposition) have sometimes been able to exploit prevailing networks, while ‘new’ organizations have emerged under different circumstances and have often developed to comprise different strategic and organizational features. In terms of party membership rates a few comparable cases can be seen in other countries, such as the successor communist party in the Czech Republic, which has the highest members-vote share relationship of all Czech parties. However, there the trend is less consistent considering that the successor party to the ‘old’ opposition (ODS) is also one of the parties with the lowest members-vote share relationships. At the same time, it is also true that such ‘successor’ parties which could be identified as ‘old’ parties are not even present in all countries, since the electoral fate of these parties has varied (more about this below). Secondly, parties and party systems in some post-communist countries are clearly more tormented by a lack of intra-party loyalty, split-off parties, party mergers, and the emergence of new parties, some ‘flash-in-the-pan parties’, and others prevailing in the system. Therein, the Baltic States and Poland seem to be the most troubled by party instability, whereas Hungary and the Czech Republic seem to have the most stable party organizations. In between the two extremes, parties in Slovakia have suffered from numerous split-offs and mergers, yet party

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and intra-bloc loyalty is stable, whereas Slovenia has experienced fragmentation and continuous change in the party system, but to a much lesser extent than the Baltic States and Poland. In the extension of intra-party and party system stability we then find that those countries with a stable party system have also generally produced less volatile elections (see below). Similarly, both political cultures, including attitudes of the electorate, and institutional environments, including electoral systems and financing of parties, differ between countries: where some countries experience lack of trust in parties as organizations, others are less bothered by distrust – regardless of the fact that trust is not overwhelmingly high in any of the countries studied. However, the levels of trust do not appear to have any direct relationship to neither party system instability nor the strength of parties in public or central office. Moreover, there are vast differences with regard to institutional environments, including vast differences in the presence of state financing that is often overlooked with respect to the Baltic States with marginal state subsidies. Still, it remains clear that all parties of post-communist EU member states have weak parties on the ground but, generally speaking, much stronger parties in central office, and undisputedly so, strong parties in public office. In respect of ideological divides, it is evident that the first dimension of conflict in post-communist EU countries was the communist-anti-communist cleavage. This cleavage dominated politics in the early years of the democratic regime. However, since then, different dimensions of conflict have risen, and in most countries the communist-anti-communist cleavage line has started to fade away. Instead, different issues have entered the political debate in different countries. But contrary to expectations, in most countries it appears that the socioeconomic cleavage line has not become as dominant as one might have thought. Instead, other conflicts have emerged, along side or instead of the socioeconomic cleavage, and at the moment there is little evidence that the socioeconomic dimension that is still the most dominant cleavage line in Western Europe need become dominant at all in East and East Central Europe. Instead, ideological dimensions in party politics in post-communist EU countries today commonly include something we might call a moral-cultural and a cultural-historical dimension. The former dimension mainly includes religiosity, which is a particularly salient cleavage in Poland and Lithuania, and moral attitudes with regard to family-life, life-styles and sex, drugs, euthanasia, abortions etc. that constitute a commonly significant dividing line between parties in most post-communist countries. Moreover, as noted before, in some instances this dimension is also related to as a Church-State divide in its classical sense; however in a broader sense it focusses more on moral issues in modern societies than on the role of the Church versus the secularization of the state. Therein, this dimension may also be of relevance in countries where the role of religiosity and the Church is downplayed. Moreover, expanding the notion of ‘culture’ from moral-cultural issues to include historical identity, there is a cultural-historical cleavage dealing with the

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past in Slovenia, for instance, and a nationalist cleavage that is most important in Hungary. This nationalist dimension may also be included in the notion of a broader cultural dimension, considering its concern with both the communist past and national identity and the protection of minority rights in neighbouring countries. Therein, this dimension is in part also related to the centre-periphery cleavage line that in Western Europe is usually associated with regional interests – but in Hungary it differs in that its territorial anchorage is diffuse; it includes relations with Hungarian minorities abroad as well as issues related to internationalization, to national identity and to the national history. Hence, Hungarian nationalism seems more related to culture than to periphery. In addition, in Poland, nationalism has also been a salient issue in politics, but here it has primarily been part of a so-called nationalist-cosmopolitan divide, based on attitudes towards EU integration and the role of foreign capital, which in part places the nationalist divide in Poland on the socioeconomic dimension. There is also a cluster of countries with a more clear-cut and dominant centreperiphery dimension, referring to the conflict between the dominant culture of the political centre and the (sub-)cultures of the periphery than the case of Hungary. This dimension is most commonly related to the ethnic issues in Latvia, Estonia and Slovakia. However, where this dimension has been downplayed in politics in Estonia in recent years, where Russian speaking interests have been incorporated into the variety of Estonian parties, this conflict line is still very much present in Latvia. In the Slovak case, on the other hand, the centre-periphery dimension is two-dimensional, including a conflict in respect of regime orientation as well. This conflict is orientated towards positions in respect of the centralized and authoritarian rule of the Slovak Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) in the 90s. Yet, the regime aspect of the centre-periphery cleavage has been fading away in Slovakia since the HZDS became an opposition party, and it appears that efforts have been made to downplay the party’s radicalism as well as old conflicts. Moreover, most post-communist countries have a secondary or subordinated (socio)economic dimension; it is only the Czech Republic party system that seems to be more or less one-dimensional clustering around a socioeconomic dimension with only a few parties making an effort to generate a divide on nationalism and moral-conservative issues. Moreover, in Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia the socioeconomic dimension appears to be emerging as the dominant dimension in the future, whereas in Hungary it is clearly secondary, as compared to the nationalist and moral-cultural cleavage line. In Estonia, on the other hand, there has been no serious left-wing party to generate an opposition on an economic dimension until quite recently, whereas in Poland, too, this dimension has been clearly subordinated to the moral-cultural and historical interests. Finally, there was also a salient urban-rural dimension found, particularly in Estonia and Slovenia, referring to conflicts in respect of landed and urban interests. In some respects this dimension, too, overlaps with the cultural divide, in Slovenia, which for instance, mainly polarizes on issues related to traditionality versus modernity.

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Regarding party systems and electoral competition, we find, first, that there is one cluster of countries with lively party splits and mergers and new start-up parties, and one cluster of countries with a more moderate development. Second, we also find one set of countries with rather stable democratic functions with a moderate or declining fragmentation of parties, moderate volatility levels and turnout levels that are moderate or even quite high for all European standards. With regard to the first finding, concerning the stability of the party system, the first group of countries is most notably dominated by the Baltic states and Poland, of which the Latvian system appears not only to have a large number of split-off parties, mergers and new parties, but also a willingness among the voters to vote for the new parties. This tendency goes hand in hand with a rather stable and comparatively high electoral turnout throughout the independence era. In contrast, the Lithuanian party system that is also characterized by organisational turbulence in the party arena, is characterized by an extremely low electoral turnout that has its match only in Poland. Yet, at first sight the Polish party system seems less fragmented than the party systems of the Baltic States because of a lower ‘effective number’ of electoral and parliamentary parties. However, these numbers are slightly misleading because Polish parties have been characterized by severe intraparty instability and low organizational loyalty, resulting in numerous split-offs between elections as well. Moreover, in both Poland and Lithuania there is an extremely low electoral turnout that is paired with the highest rates of distrust in parties. And whereas institutional developments (continuous changes of the electoral law) do not seem to explain much of the political instability in Poland, the high levels of distrust in parties combined with poor social implantation of parties in society may partly explain the low levels of turnout. Among those countries with a more moderate development of organizational splits and mergers on the party scene, we find Slovenia, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, and the Hungarian party system that appears as the most stable system of all. Herein, Hungary is the outlier with regard to all other countries, because its party system has been more or less stable throughout the past decade, has included the same dominant parties over a lengthy period of time, only changing in terms of its drive from a bipolar structure to a tripolar structure and back. However, the volatility levels are higher in Hungary than in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia, but unlike volatility in most multi-party systems, volatility in Hungary reflects polarization and a strong tendency towards regular alternation between blocs. Moreover, it is also noteworthy that in Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, the main opposition parties to the old regime have also survived more or less intact as (dominant) political parties. In Slovenia, the centre-left Liberal Democratic Party developed from the League of Socialist Youth into the party of all prime ministers, but one, in the period 1992-2004. In Slovakia, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) that emerged out of Citizens Against Violence was also the most dominant during the 1990s, even so much so that its character as

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a democratic party has always been questioned because of its leader orientation, populistic and nationalistic style. Yet, the party has maintained a position as the largest party, although it has been left out of government since 1998. In the Czech Republic, the centre-right party Civic Democratic Party (ODS) that was founded by the present president, Václav Klaus in the backwash of the collapse of Civic Forum in 1991 has gained no less than 24 per cent of the votes in all the elections since then. Among those countries where the opposition towards the ‘old’ regime has faired less well, the Lithuanian Homeland Union-Lithuanian Conservatives, with roots in Sajūdis which played a crucial role in the liberation movement, lost its dominant position in the late 1990s though it is still the third largest party. Somewhat similarly, the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) and the Alliance of Free Democrats, both with roots in the opposition movement of the 1980s have lost their influential positions. The MDF fell out of parliament in 1998 but re-entered only on a joint list with the liberal Fidezs in the 2002 elections, whereas the Free Democrats barely made the electoral threshold. In Poland, there have been several groupings with roots in the former anti-communist movement Solidarity that have entered elections, of which the Centre Agreement was the first. However, in 1991 there were seven parties participating in elections that were centre-right or had roots in the Solidarity movement, none of which could be called the successor party, even though Solidarity Electoral Action refers to the Solidarity movement by name. In Latvia and Estonia, too, the structures of opposition during the ‘old’ regime did not realign in single, dominant electoral successor organizations.

Where to Go from Here? Among political scientists, as well as among others, it has been a common belief that parties and party systems, as well as electoral behaviour, in post-communist countries will eventually consolidate into organizations and patterns of interactions that largely resemble those in Western Europe. Moreover, it has been a common expectation that once the communist-anti-communist cleavage has faded away, new ideological dimensions will take their place, and it has been conceived that the most likely dimension to dominate politics will be the socioeconomic divide, just like we are used to in Western European politics. However, despite the fact that these expectations are well founded, reality points only partially in that direction. Instead, we might expect that a different development is taking place, in which parties and party systems in post-communist countries adapt to modern society with a different set of ideological dimensions and salient issues, and a new political style. Some of these trends are also visible in Western Europe, but because of longlasting loyalties between parties and the electorate, firmly embedded traditions and ideological convictions especially among elderly voters, the changes of the interaction between parties and the electorate may be moving at a slower pace than in East and East Central Europe.

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In respect of the changing role of parties, Peter Mair has recently presented work on the failings of parties on the ground – and therein the failing of democracy as we know it in the past century. In brief, the failing of parties is, according to Mair, based on indifference. Indifference combined with clearly anti-political sentiment that is increasingly expressed by the electorate, as well as by political parties and political leaders in populist rhetoric and pragmatic decision-making, delegitimize parties as representative agents. Moreover, there is enough evidence that parties have moved away from the electorate in the past decades, for instance if we look at the decline in party membership and in the professionalization of parties in western democracies. Simultaneously as parties have moved away from their role as social actors in society they have also moved closer to the State; therein they widen the distance between themselves and those they are assumed to represent, and their legitimacy as representative agents decrease even more. Hence, increasing volatility and declining turnout in elections only provide the evidence of the erosion of ties between parties and society. Instead of being first and foremost representative agents, the role of parties as governing agents has become a more important function; parties ‘bring order rather than give voice’. Even though parties are capable to govern and to take public office – they are no longer able to justify or legitimize themselves by doing so. Turning to the experience of post-communist countries, it appears that many of those characteristics of party failure that lurk around the corner for western parties is already reality in East and East Central Europe: in fact, parties have never been able to recruit the numbers of members that Western European parties have held, and those parties that were present during the ‘old’ regimes are also rapidly loosing members. High levels of volatility and decreasing levels of turnout in many postcommunist countries indicate that ties between parties as representative agents and society are fragile in many of the countries we have studied. The low levels of trust that parties are awarded by the electorate also support the picture of parties as poor representative agents. Yet, parties hold a monopoly position with regard to public office. Therein, some countries seem to have parties that are more capable than others to provide effective government, i.e. where parties uphold intra-party stability and loyalty, where party structures support organizational continuity and intra-party democracy works at least to a satisfactory degree. The problem is then to foresee in what direction the future development of parties is headed: is it feasible to believe that parties and party systems in postcommunist EU member states will indeed consolidate into party systems with more or less fixed levels of fragmentation, established ideological dimensions that are felt to be enduring and relevant, with volatility levels that are stable if not low, and turnout levels that legitimize the governing party or parties? Or is it more feasible to predict that consolidation is relative, that East Central and Eastern European countries in fact will move ahead of the development in Western Europe, wherein the changing role of parties is heading towards the failure of parties as we know them? If this were the case, the question is what could be expected in the future: is Europe moving towards the ‘rebirth’ of its parties into modern ‘elite parties’ based

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on leadership, pragmatism and a restricted participation of the electorate – or is there a way back to representative democracy based on political participation and an ideological message?

Index Adamkus, Valdas 73, 74, 84 Ādamsons, Jānis 58 agrarian parties 99 Agreement of Polish Christian Democrats 96 alert issues 59 Alliance of Ethnic Minorities, Lithuania 78 Alliance of Free Democrats, Hungary 177, 180, 193 Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe 10, 100 All-Poland Alliance of Trade Unions federation 94 anti-party attitudes, sentiment 109, 116-9, 134-5, 235, 242 Association of Slovak Workers (ZRS) 153, 158, 160, 162 atomized pluralism 221 attitudes to political parties 208 attitudes towards EU integration 102 attitudes towards the Church 102 authoritarian-democratic divide 235, 238 Balcerowicz, Leszek 98 Baldzēns, Egils 58 Belka, Marek 112 Beneš Decrees 130 Better Estonia 28, 49 Bielecki, Jan Krzysztof 98 bipolar competition 241 bipolarity 211, 235 Blondel, Jean 4 Bojārs, Juris 58 Borowski, Marek 98

Brazauskas, Algirdas 71, 73, 75, 78 Buzek, Jerzy 97-8, 107 candidate-centred 43 Čarnogurský, Ján 171 cartel parties 209 cartelization 83, 208-9 catch-all orientation 208 catch-all parties 209 catch-all party model 112 Center Party, Estonia 25, 29, 33, 41, 49 centralization 138, 208-9 centre-periphery dimension 238, 245 Centre Agreement, Poland 96 centre-right 30, 32 Central Union of Estonian Nationalists 28 Christian Democratic, Poland 100 Christian Democratic Union-the People’s Party (KDUČSL), Czech Republic 129, 132-3, 139 Christian Democrats (KDH), Slovakia 150-55, 157-61, 166-73 Christian People’s Party 49 Citizenship Law 27 citizenship rights 34 Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA), Czech Republic 129, 130, 133, 138, 141

252

Post-Communist EU Member States

Civic Democratic Forum (ODS), Poland 128, 131, 133, 135-6, 138-40 Civic Democratic Party, Poland 12930 Civic Forum (OF), Poland 128 Civic Platform, Poland 93, 95, 99-100, 111, 113 civil society 127 cleavages 2, 8, 53, 76, 77, 84, 85, 87, 112, 193, 204, 213-4, 216, 2334, 236 clericalism 181 Club 21, Latvia 56 Coalition Party, Estonia 29-30, 49 communist-anti-communist cleavage 76-7, 80-81, 213-4, 234-6, 2389, 245 Communist Party, Estonia 29, 33, 379, 41 Communist Party (KSS), Slovakia 150, 155, 157, 159, 161-3 Communist Party of Bohemia and Silesia (KSČM), Czech Republic 129-130, 132-3, 137, 139 Communist Party of Lithuania 87 conflict between Church and NationState 53 Conservative People’s Party, Poland 99 consolidation 26, 29, 43, 45, 234 consolidation of democracy 203 consolidation of parties 213 cosmopolitanism-nationalism issue axes 103 Country People’s Party, Estonia 29, 49 cultural-historical cleavage (dimension) 237, 239, 245 cultural issues 180 de-communization 25, 34, 38-9, 45-6 decision-making processes 127 degree of proportionality 110

demand side 115 Democratic Forum, Hungarian 177-8, 182-5, 194-5, 197 Democratic Left Alliance-Labour Union, Poland 93-4, 97-9, 100, 102, 104, 107, 115 Democratic Party Saimnieks (DP Saimnieks), Latvia 59, 60, 61 democratization 141-2, 204 Democrats, Estonia 29 dimensions of party competition 101 disillusionment 13 disproportionality 6-7, 126 distrust in parties 18, 208, 234, 240, 243 division lines 53 Duverger, Maurice 109 Dzurinda, Mikuláš 148, 154-5 economic-egotropic voting 239 effective number of parties, see fragmentation election programmes 53 electoral behaviour 2 electoral engineering 203 electoral law 110-12, 125 electoral manifestos 80 electoral-professional party model 112 electoral rules 27, 30, 32 electoral system 2, 109, 111, 1256, 149, 151, 163, 165, 172 electoral threshold, see threshold electoral turnout, see turnout electoral volatility, see volatility elitism 208 Emsis, Indulis 58 Entrepreneurs Party, Estonia 49 Equal Rights, Latvia 57, 64 Estonia Left Party 24, 29, 41, 49 Estonian Citizen 28, 49 Estonian Congress 38

Index Estonian Future Party 49 Estonian National Independence Party (ENIP) 28-30 Estonian Social Democratic Party 24, 33 Estonian Social Democratic Labour Party 24, 49 estrangement 65, 239 étatism 179 ethnic cleavage 78 conflict 54 dimension 237 division 66, 77, 238 minorities 77 parties 23, 25, 27 policy 54, 57 relations 34 Russian parties 24, 25 EU 208 EU parliament, see European Parliament Europe of Democracies and Diversities 10-11 European Liberal Democrat and Reform Party 10 European People’s Party 10, 100 European Parliament 9-11, 70, 74, 789, 87 election 10, 57, 64, 99-100 party groups 100 European party families 101 European United Left-Nordic Green Left 10 extreme left 214 extreme right 214 The Farmers’ Union, Latvia 54, 58 Fatherland Union, Estonia 29, 33, 49 Fidesz (Hungary) 178-80, 182, 184-5, 190, 192-4 For Human Rights in a United Latvia 57, 61, 64, 66 foreign policy 57

253 For the Fatherland and Freedom, Latvia 57, 61, 66 founding elections 5 fragmentation 4-7, 44, 70, 84, 86, 105, 107, 110, 131, 136, 185, 224, 230, 234-5, 239, 240-1 Free Democrats (Hungary) 180, 185, 194, 197 free elections 204 Freedom Union, Poland 93-4, 989, 100, 102-103, 129, 131 funding, see party finances Geremek, Bronisław 98 Giertych, Maciej 97 Giertych, Roman 99 governmental coalition-building 203 government-opposition divide 197 Greens, Estonia 49 Greens , Latvia 58 Greens-European Free Alliance 10 gross volatility 15 Hare quota 31 Havel, Vaclav 127 historical-cultural divide 101-103 d’Hondt formula 31 Hungarian Socialist Party 177, 179, 180, 182, 184, 192-3 ideological cleavages, see cleavages ideological conflicts 53 dimensions 2, 8, 233, 236 families 8, 215 issues 236 orientation 59 platform 53 polarization 203 positions 8 self-placement 100 shifts 203, 220

254

Post-Communist EU Member States

spectrum 2, 13, 233, 236 ideological and political programmes 214 ideologies 52, 56, 241 immigrants 27 independence 24-5, 28, 32, 34-8, 45 Independence and Democracy 100 index of fragmentation 221 Industrial Revolution 53 institutional aspects 233 institutional explanations 107, 109 integrations 214 Interfront, Latvia 60 international party organizations 158 intra-organizational 149 intra-party 155, 163, 171, 172 intra-party instability 106, 234-5, 240, 242 invalid votes, 14 Kaczyński, Jarosław 96 Kallas, Siim 25 Kalvītis, Aigars 58 Klaus, Vaclav 127-8, 130-1 Krzaklewski, Marian 98 Kwaśniewski, Aleksander 94, 109 Laakso and Taagepera index 4, 131 Labour Union 93, 95, 99-100, 104 Landsbergis, Vytautas 69 Latgale region 52 Latvian Farmers’ Union 51, 57, 60 Latvian Popular Front 60 Latvia’s First Party 57-9 Latvian Social Democratic Party 54, 58, 61 Latvia’s Social Democratic Union 58 Latvia’s Social Democratic Workers’ Party 51, 57 Latvia’s Socialist Party 64 Latvia’s Unity Party 59 Latvia’s Way 55-8, 60-2, 66 Law and Justice, Poland 93-4, 96, 99100, 103-104, 111

Law on Elections, Lithuania 77 Law on Elections 1993, Poland 113 Law on Political Parties, Poland 93 Law on Political Parties, 1997, Poland 113 Law on Political Parties, 2001, Poland 113-114 Law on Political Parties, 1994, Slovenia 209-210 League of Polish Families 93-4, 97, 99, 103-104, 111 left 101, 210 Left Alliance-Labour Union’s, Poland 96 left-right 78-81, 84, 86-7, 148, 158-9, 160, 173 left-right continuum 217 left-right dimension 80 left-right scale 30, 32, 42, 80 left-wing parties 23-4, 33 legal provision 205 Lepper, Andrzej 95, 99 liberalization 203-204, 219, 234, 236 Lijphart, Arend 8 linkages between parties and the electorate 2, 240 linkages between parties and the State 2 links between parties and society 235 Lipset, Seymore and Rokkan, Stein 8, 53 Lithuanian Communist Party 6970, 82, 90 Lopuszański, Jan 97 majoritarian and proportional electoral systems 109 majoritarianism 188 manifesto 75-6 market economy 236 mass membership 235

Index mass-party 81, 83, 112 mass party model 112, 135 materialist dimension 8 Mazowiecki, Tadeusz 98 Mečiar, Vladimír 147, 150, 153, 157, 171-2 members 82, 165-70, 172 membership 17, 32, 46, 62, 78, 81-3, 115-6, 118, 128, 132-4, 140, 167-8, 170, 207-8, 242-3 membership fees 137, 140 Miller, Leszek 95, 98 mixed electoral system 71, 85 moderate pluralism 221 Moderates, Estonia 24-5, 29, 41, 49 moral-conservative issues 238 moral-cultural issues, values 101, 237, 239, 245 Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) 147, 150-5, 157-61, 164, 166-7, 169-73 multi-party system 4 multipartism 204 National Council (Latvia) 51 National Revolution 53 National Independence Party, Estonia 49 Nationalism, nationalist cleavage 129130, 181, 238, 245 nationalist-cosmopolitan divide 102, 197, 237, 245 Nations in Transit 25 net volatility 15 New Citizen Alliance (ANO), Slovakia 155, 159, 161-3, 166 the new democratic system 203-204 New Era, Latvia 57-62, 66 The New Party, Latvia 61 new politics 53 nomenclature (nomenklatura) 37-8, 75, 179, 194 non-citizens 64-5 non-citizens’ rights 54, 57 non-Latvians 65

255 non-parliamentary parties 214 Olechowski, Andrzej 95 Oleksy, Józef 94 opposition 203 organization(s), see party organizations organizational consolidation 207 instability 62 sources 205 parliamentary parties 4 parties in central office 17 in public office 17 on the ground 17 parties’ origins 9 parties’ social links 217 partisanship 134 party arena structure 210 competition 2, 100, 233, 239 development 104 families 9-10, 214 finances 39, 61, 63, 83, 139-41, 209-10, 242-3 Party Financing Act 63 party fragmentation, see fragmentation funding, see party finances government model 235 identification 117, 217 income 114 instability 101 inter-actions 118-119 members, see members membership, see membership programmes 241 Party of the Democratic Left (SDĽ), Slovakia 151, 1535, 157-8, 160-61, 166-73 Party of European Socialists 10, 100 Party of Hungarian Coalition (SMK), Slovakia 154-5,

256

Post-Communist EU Member States

159-63, 168 Party of Hungarian Justice and Life (MIÉP), Hungary 1789, 185 party organization development 207 organizations 2, 17, 62, 81, 112, 136, 141, 148-9, 156, 163, 166, 169-173, 233, 24043 subsidies, see party finances system competition 2, 196, 239 development 107 instability 107, 112 party-state links 112 party-voter links 17, 112, 118 partyness 115 pattern of competition 197, 234 Pawlak, Waldemar 97 pendulum requirement 27 People’s Harmony Party, Latvia 57, 61, 64 People’s Movement for Latvia 59, 61 People’s Party, Latvia 56-8, 60-62, 66 People’s Union, Estonia 33, 49 Plażyński, Maciej 95 polarization 198, 221 polarized pluralism 221 Polish disease 107, 242 Polish parties 93 Polish Peasant Party 93-4, 96, 98-100, 102-104, 107, 114, 115 Polish Social Democracy 93, 98, 100, 104 Polish voters 104 (Polish) voting patterns 102 political culture 56, 65, 189, 235 political personalities 56 Popular Front, Estonia 37-9, 41, 49 populism 59, 76, 236 populist parties 76, 85 preferential voting 126

presidentialism 108 professionalization 17, 83, 137 programmes 56 proportionality 151, 153, 165 Public against Violence 128 radical parties 28-9, 234 Reform Party 25, 29, 30, 32-3, 41, 43, 49 relationship between parties and the electorate 63 relevant political parties 210 religious cleavage (division) 77-8 religiosity 101, 103 religiosity-secularism 102, 197 Repše, Einārs 58, 66 Republican Party, Estonia 29 Republican Party (SPR-RSČ), Czech Republic 129, 141 Res Publica, Estonia 25, 30-33, 43, 49 right 101-102, 210 Right-wing Agreement 96, 99 right-wing parties 24, 29, 32-3, 41 Rightwingers 49 Riigikogu, Estonia 24, 28, 41 role of the Church 101 role of membership 115 role of parties 2, 233, 235 role of the state 102 Royalists 28, 49 ruling coalition 204 ruling party of old regime 203 rural–urban, see urban-rural Russia 69, 74-5 Russian community 27 Russian Party in Estonia 27-9, 49 Russian party, Latvia 64 Russian politicians 27 Russian-speakers 24, 41 the Russian Union 78 Saeima elections (Latvia) 59, 61

Index Sąjūdis, Lithuania 69-71, 76, 82, 90 salient issues 2, 233, 236 Savisaar, Edgar 25, 41 Saxonberg, Stephen 108 Scarrow, Susan 115 secularism 102 Sejmocracy 91 Self-Defence (Samoobrona), Poland 93-5, 99-100, 103, 104 semi-presidentialism 108, 109 Šlesers, Ainārs 58 Slovak Democratic and Christian Union (SDKÚ) 154-5, 161-3, 166-72 Slovak National Party (SNS) 150-55, 157-8, 160-61, 173 Smallholders, Hungary 177, 183-4, 192-7 Smer, Slovakia 154-5, 159-160, 162-3, 166-72 social background 193 social bases of support 101 Social Democratic Party (ČSSD), Czech Republic 129 130, 133-5, 139, 141 social implementation 115 social structure 193 Socialist Group in the European Parliament 100 socioeconomic division (dimension) 30, 40, 53-4, 66, 81, 103, 128, 159, 173, 235, 237, 245 class 102 Solidarity 91, 92 Solidarity Electoral Action 95, 97-9, 102-104, 106, 110-111 Solidarity Electoral Action of the Right 94 state financing 210, 242 funding 114 subsidies 114, 139-140, 241 subcultural party 178, 184 Suchocka, Hanna 98 supply side 115

257 Supreme Soviet 37 threshold 7, 24, 30-31, 77, 106, 110, 113, 126, 131, 140, 220 traditionality-modernity cleavage (divide) 197, 214, 239 transition 203, 205, 219, 234, 236 trust 56, 66 in Polish institutions 116 in political parties 18, 116, 119, 234-5, 240 turnout 2, 13-14, 66, 84-5, 117118, 186, 229, 234-235, 239, 240-241 Tusk, Donald 95 two-and-a-half-party systems 4 two-party system 4 Ulmanis, Kārlis 52 Union for a Europe of Nations 10, 100 United Peasant Party, Poland 96 United People’s Party, Estonia 24, 29, 41, 49 urban-rural cleavage 53, 77-9, 214, 238-9, 245 US 133, 138 value cleavage 53 volatile elections 66 volatility 2, 15-16, 70, 83, 101, 105-6, 112, 132, 230, 234235, 239, 241 voter alignments 16 voting behaviour 76-7, 79 voting preferences 79 Wałęsa, Lech 94, 109 Wrzodak, Zygmunt 97 Ždanoka, Tatjana 64 Zeman, Miloš 130 Zīgerists, Joahims 56