Politics in Contemporary Portugal: Democracy Evolving 9781626374195

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Politics in Contemporary Portugal

Politics in Contemporary Portugal Democracy Evolving

José M. Magone

b o u l d e r l o n d o n

Published in the United States of America in 2014 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 www.rienner.com and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU © 2014 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Magone, José M. Politics in contemporary Portugal : democracy evolving / José M. Magone, Berlin School of Economics and Law. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-62637-025-8 (alk. paper) 1. Democracy—Portugal. 2. Democratization—Portugal. 3. Portugal—Politics and government—1974– 4. European Union—Portugal. I. Title. JN8605.M345 2014 320.9469—dc23 2013037195

British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library.

Printed and bound in the United States of America The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1992. 5

4

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To my mother

Contents

ix xi

List of Tables and Figures Preface 1

Portugal’s Evolving Democracy

2

The Historical and Socioeconomic Context

21

3

The Structure and Development of the Core Political System

43

4

The Evolution of Public Administration

65

5

The Dynamics of Parties and Elections

85

6

Interest Groups at Play

115

7

The Role of the Judiciary

139

8

Civil Society and Political Culture

157

9

Local Government and the Challenge of Decentralization

179

1

10 The Europeanization of National Public Policies

195

11 The Priorities of Foreign and Defense Policy

219

12 Challenges and Opportunities in the Twenty-First Century

241

List of Acronyms References Index About the Book

247 253 287 295

vii

Tables and Figures

Tables 1.1 1.2 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 4.1 4.2 4.3 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 6.1

Phases of Democratization in Portugal Assessing the Quality of Democracy Government Bills and Approval Rates by Legislature, 1976–2012 Private Members’ Bills and Approval Rates by Legislature, 1976–2012 Standing Committees of Parliament in the Twelfth Legislature, 2011–2012 Governments in Portugal Since 1976 Number of Civil Servants in Portugal, 1968–1982 Level of Education of Public Administrators, June 2011 Level of Education of Civil Servants in the EU-Sponsored Public Administrator Training Program, 2004–2009 Evolution of the Portuguese Party System by Ideological Positioning in Legislative Elections Since 1976 Leadership, Party Conferences, and Membership Evolution of the Socialist Party Since 1974 Leadership, Party Conferences, and Membership Evolution of the PSD Since 1974 Leadership, Party Conferences, and Membership Evolution of the CDS-PP Since 1974 Leadership, Party Conferences, and Membership Evolution of the PCP Since 1923 Constituencies in the 2011 Legislative Elections Legislative Elections in Portugal, 1976–2011 Composition of the Economic and Social Council, September 2012 ix

7 9 53 54 55 59 67 77 79 88 92 97 100 102 109 111 127

x

Tables and Figures

6.2 9.1 9.2 9.3 9.4 11.1

Social Concertation Agreements Since 1985 Local Authorities, 2009 Local Election Results, 29 September 2013 Regional Election Results in Madeira, 1976–2011 Regional Election Results in the Azores, 1976–2012 Portuguese Contributions to International Peacekeeping Missions, December 2012

130 184 185 190 191 226

Figures 1.1 3.1

Impact of Europeanization on EU Member States Presidential Political and Constitutional Vetoes of Bills from the Assembly of the Republic, 1976–2010 3.2 Bills Submitted to the Constitutional Court, 1986–2010 3.3 Length of Government in Relation to Maximum Possible Term, 1986–2011 4.1 Sustainable Governance Indicators: Status Index, 2011 4.2 Sustainable Governance Indicators: Management Index, 2011 5.1 Abstention in Legislative Elections, 1976–2011 6.1 Number of Opinions of the Economic and Social Council, 1996–2012 7.1 Trust in the Judicial System, 1999–2010 8.1 Materialist and Postmaterialist Values in EU Member States, 2008 8.2 Citizen Interpersonal Trust in Selected European Societies, 2010 8.3 Interest in Politics Among the Population, 2004–2010 8.4 Politics Considered Too Complicated to Understand, 2004–2008 8.5 Trust in Politicians, 2004–2010 8.6 Trust in Political Parties, 2004–2010 8.7 Satisfaction with How Democracy Works, 2002–2010 9.1 Local Election Results, 1976–2009 10.1 Budget Deficit and Surplus Among Southern EU Member States, 1998–2012 10.2 Public Debt Among Southern EU Member States, 1998–2012

14 48 49 60 82 83 110 128 144 163 165 173 174 175 175 176 185 207 208

Preface

PORTUGAL IS CURRENTLY IN A PHASE OF TRANSITION FROM A PROCE-

dural to a substantive qualitative democracy—a transition that has been more difficult than originally envisioned. This book is intended to provide a balanced overview of the achievements and deficits of Portuguese democracy in the four decades since the Carnation Revolution of 25 April 1974. A modern sustainable democracy must be supported by a robust social market economy with entrepreneurs who are able to compete in global markets. It also requires a strong, well-educated civil society. During the Age of Discovery and Expansion, the Portuguese proved that they were great entrepreneurs. Many of their enterprises were pioneering efforts that created the globalized market that we know today. One of the main incentives for the Portuguese voyages of discovery was the search for new trade routes. The Portuguese empire was built along the coasts of far-flung continents as a series of connection points for specific trade routes. Contemporary Portugal needs to regain this spirit of adventure and enterprise in order to improve the quality of its democracy. The country has great potential. However, there is still much to be done. The agenda of necessary reforms seems endless, but that is the nature of democracy. It is an open-ended process that requires constant vigilance; achievements must be safeguarded, even as one simultaneously strives to improve on them. Portugal has a great advantage in this quest for the improvement of its democratic structures. It is embedded in a community of like-minded democratic states, the European Union. A great sign of hope for the future of Portuguese democracy is the establishment of professional political science in the country—the science of democracy par excellence. When I started conducting research on Portugal in the late 1980s, there were barely any studies being done on the country. Pioneers in the profession, such as Manuel Braga da Cruz, Manuel Villaverde Cabral, Franz Wilhelm Heimer, and to some extent Boaventura de Sousa Santos, were important reference points for younger scholars. Then, in 1998, a political science xi

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Preface

association was founded in Portugal, thanks to the hard work of António Costa Pinto and João Carlos Espada. In addition, several biennial conferences have taken place that have brought to the fore an inspiring number of young political scientists with excellent research ideas, many of whom I have met over the past two decades. I would like to thank all of them for their excellent research, as it will ultimately contribute to the reengineering of Portugal as a substantive qualitative democracy. I particularly want to thank Isabel Carvalhais, Laura FerreiraPereira, Marina Costa Lobo, Verónica Martins, Alice Cunha, Cristina Leston Bandeira, Luis de Sousa, Pedro Aires Oliveira, Pedro Magalhães, Carlos Jalali, André Freire, Pedro Tavares de Almeida, and of course António Costa Pinto and Nuno Severiano Teixeira. Many special thanks go out to Nancy Bermeo, who has always encouraged me to continue studying Portuguese politics. Furthermore, I want to thank Elisabetta Linton of Lynne Rienner Publishers for taking on this book project. Her advice throughout the process has been excellent. I would also like to thank Claire Bacher for excellent editing, proofreading, and extensive comments on my manuscript before submission. Moreover, I would like to thank two referees for reviewing the manuscript and supplying me with excellent constructive comments, which were incorporated in the work. Any mistakes, omissions, or excessively daring interpretations are, of course, my own. I would like also to thank Senior Project Editor Lesli Brooks Athanasoulis for outstanding support during the production of the book and Jason Cook for his excellent copyediting of the text. Last but not least, I want to thank my mother for her support and patience during the writing process. This book is dedicated to her.

Ó mar salgado, quanto do teu sal São lágrimas de Portugal! Por te cruzarmos, quantas mães choraram, Quantos filhos em vão rezaram! Quantas noivas ficaram por casar Para que fosses nosso, ó mar! —Fernando Pessoa (1888–1935) in Mensagem

1 Portugal’s Evolving Democracy

IN AN INCREASINGLY GLOBALIZED WORLD IN WHICH BLURRED NA-

tional sovereignty and borders daily challenge the traditional meaning of the Westphalian state, it is difficult to study a country in isolation. Such research becomes even more difficult when one takes into account a particular country’s engagement in regional integration within the European Union (EU). This global and European context has become important for all EU member states, and Portuguese democracy is no exception to the rule. Since 2008, the financial and euro crises have negatively affected the economy of the country, such that on 6 April 2011, Portugal was forced to ask for a financial bailout from the European Union (Wall Street Journal, 7 April 2011). On 23 May 2011, Portugal signed a detailed memorandum of understanding with the so-called troika (consisting of representatives from the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund) in which a strict timetable for economic, social, and administrative reforms with clear targets was agreed upon. Before Portugal’s request, Greece and Ireland were similarly compelled to ask for bailouts and to sign memorandums of understanding. Greece was even the beneficiary of a second bailout and further debt relieving measures in 2012. Four decades after Portugal’s Carnation Revolution of 25 April 1974, the Portuguese population is enduring a rather demanding austerity program that the country’s government agreed upon together with the troika. Any international or European bailout leads to considerable constraints on the sovereignty of the country, particularly in the case of a relatively small country like Portugal. However, integration in the EU has softened this situation in many ways, as member states already share and pool sovereignty in order to increase their protection against the volatility of global markets. Although Portuguese political leaders portray this aspect in a different light, Portugal’s individual sovereignty no longer exists; rather, Portugal shares its sovereignty with the other member states in the European Union. Portugal is no longer an independent country: it is an interdependent one. This means that Portuguese affairs are intertwined 1

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with what occurs in other European states and at the supranational level, and vice versa. Portugal is part of a new collective governance regime in Europe (Wallace, 2005: 491–494). For example, the agreement on the EU bailout for Portugal had to be ratified by all eurozone national governments; however, in Finland, the True Finns party opposed any Finnish participation in the bailout. Despite considerable opposition, the more moderate parties were eventually able to get enough votes to approve Portugal’s bailout (Bloomberg, 12 May 2011; Reuters, 11 May 2011). The financial crisis and the euro crisis have clearly shown that the member states of the European Union can today act only in consultation and in solidarity with the other member states. This is even more relevant for members of the eurozone, who clearly must react dynamically to the markets. After four decades of democracy, Portugal now shares and pools its sovereignty within the European Union, a circumstance that has major repercussions for how the country operates. Portuguese democracy is exposed not only to the scrutiny of domestic civil society, but also to that of the other member states. The open method of coordination used to mutually peer-review a number of the policies of member states (such as in the areas of employment, economic policies, and public administrative reform) subjects Portugal to permanent pressure in terms of delivering on accountability, transparency, and its targets as defined collectively by the member states at the supranational level (Borrás and Greve, 2004; Borrás and Jacobsson, 2004). The implications for democracy are clear. Portugal is a democratic country in which the minimalist procedural democratic structures have successfully been consolidated and institutionalized; however, in comparison to other small democracies in the European Union (such as Sweden, Denmark, Austria, and the Netherlands), the country still lags behind in terms of the quality of its democracy. The necessity of the bailout of Portugal by the European Union has exposed the fact that the country suffers from both a weak political economy and also a weak state that is unable to control its expenditures. The Portuguese political economy is semi-peripheral: it features elements similar to those of the core member states of the European Union (in particular, consumption patterns), but also elements reminiscent of developing countries, such as a low level of investment in research and development and a labor-intensive industrial sector (Santos, 2011; Magone, 1996a). Portugal has had poor performance in terms of public policy, particularly in the education sector, as Program of International Student Assessment (PISA) surveys have demonstrated. This is rather disappointing, because Portugal has invested considerably in education, only to see mediocre results year after year. In 2009, nearly one-third of secondaryschool pupils (31.2 percent) left school without a diploma—a figure that was an improvement compared to previous years. Education has become an important dividing line in Portuguese society (Justino, 2010; European Commission,

Portugal’s Evolving Democracy

3

2011b:4). In a detailed article, the Wall Street Journal called Portugal a “nation of dropouts” (25 March 2012). Portugal has one of the highest inequality rates in the European Union, exceeded only by Romania and Bulgaria (European Commission, 2010:299–300; for more detail, see Chapter 10). Portugal exhibits levels of socioeconomic development closer to those of central and eastern Europe than to those of the developed economies of the western part of the continent. Portugal can be considered a stalled democracy, as its social mobility has not changed significantly since at least the 1990s—and scarcely at all in comparison to 1974. This means that in four decades of democratic rule, Portuguese society has reproduced the same class divisions that existed before the Carnation Revolution. As Manuel Villaverde Cabral asserts, Portugal has the inequality levels of the United States, but without the social mobility. This means that Portuguese society has not evolved very much in the past four decades. All this has had an impact on the country’s civil society, which remains one of the weakest in the European Union; this presents problems in terms of improvements in the quality of democracy (Cabral, 1998; Diário de Notícias, 30 August 2006; Mendes and Estanque, 1998; Estanque and Mendes, 1999; see also Estanque, 2009, 2011). This assessment of Portuguese democracy has been confirmed by several Portuguese scholars (Santos, 1993, 2011; Cabral, 1998, 2000, 2004; Aguiar, 1983, 1986, 2005). In this book, I analyze different aspects of this so-called stalled democracy in an attempt to delineate the reasons underlying Portugal’s inability to move from a formal procedural democracy to a substantive democracy. My primary interest is not in the democratization process through democratic transition, consolidation, and institutionalization, although references will certainly be made to these periods in Portugal’s history. My main focus is on the quality of democracy in Portugal in the context of the country’s membership in the European Union. Therefore, the main research question is: What are the primary obstacles to Portugal’s transformation from a procedural minimalist democracy to a substantive democracy? The memorandum of understanding agreed upon by the Portuguese government and the troika is used as a structuring element in this analysis of the condition of Portugal’s democracy. Special emphasis will be placed on the political and economic constraints on Portugal’s attempts to move toward a more sustainable substantive democracy. Thus far, Portugal has failed to build a strong social market economy that would contribute to the development of a fairer and more equal society. It is particularly the inequality of opportunities for different social groups that tends to perpetuate the country’s class structure; only certain minor improvements have taken place in this area since the fall of the authoritarian regime. In sum, Portugal is a stalled society, and the package of reforms set out by the memorandum of understanding may be important in encouraging reflection upon what must change in order for

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Portugal to fulfill the provisions of its constitution and the original aspirations of its Carnation Revolution.

From Formal Procedural to Substantive Qualitative Democracy A good starting point for developing an understanding of the current state of Portuguese democracy is the Treaty of Lisbon, which features a comprehensive description of democratic politics as conceived by the European Union. This treaty is clearly compatible with the Portuguese constitution, which includes similar concepts (Articles 1 and 2). All member states of the European Union seek to achieve the highest possible quality of life for their citizens. This entails ensuring access to high-quality public goods. Articles 1 and 2 of the Treaty of Lisbon clearly define the values and the type of democracy that should prevail in each member state. Article 2 states that “the Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.” Moreover, Article 3, in its third paragraph, clearly defines the internal market as a “social market economy”: “The Union shall establish an internal market. It shall work for the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress, and a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment. It shall promote scientific and technological advance.” This is a quite advanced definition of democracy; democratic order in the European Union stands in stark contrast to the mere procedural understanding of democracy. The minimalist procedural approach to democracy dates back to AustroAmerican sociologist Joseph Schumpeter. According to Schumpeter, “the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote” (1947:269). Schumpeter refers to Britain as the perfect example of this kind of elite democracy. This minimalist procedural definition is also compatible with the definition of a polyarchy, which, according to Robert Dahl (1989:233), includes the following features: 1. Control over governmental decisions about policy is constitutionally vested in elected officials. 2. Elected officials are chosen and peacefully removed in relatively frequent, fair, and free elections in which coercion is quite limited. 3. Practically all adults have the right to vote in these elections. 4. Most adults also have the right to run for the public offices for which candidates run in these elections.

Portugal’s Evolving Democracy

5

5. Citizens have an effectively enforced right to freedom of expression, particularly political expression, including criticism of the officials, the conduct of the government, the prevailing political, economic, and social system, and the dominant ideology. 6. They also have access to alternative sources of information that are not monopolized by the government or any other single group. 7. Finally, they have an effectively enforced right to form and join autonomous associations, including political associations, such as political parties and interest groups, that attempt to influence the government by competing in elections and by other peaceful means.

Since the onset of the third wave of democratization in the 1970s, a great deal of research has been conducted on the process of moving toward such a minimalist conception of democracy. Generally speaking, most authors have focused on the genetic aspects of democracy, in particular on the role that political actors have played in “crafting” such democratization processes. I do not present a review of this literature here, as it may be found elsewhere (Huntington, 1991; Pridham, 2000; Grugel, 2002; Di Palma, 1990; for the Portuguese case, see Maxwell, 1995; Magone, 1997: chap. 1). Suffice it to state that democratization is achieved over several phases: transition, consolidation, and institutionalization: • Transition (1974–1975). Marked by inconclusive struggles between political actors in order to define the new regime; the struggle between the Movement of Armed Forces (MFA) and political elites; and an alliance between moderate forces in the MFA and moderate political leaders. • Consolidation (1976–1985). Marked by asymmetrical consolidation of different politico-institutional regimes (party system, system of interest intermediation, interinstitutional framework, and industrial relations). This was a period of political and economic instability with ten governments in office from 1976 to 1985, and the impact of two austerity programs of the International Monetary Fund. • Europeanization (1986– ). After consolidation, European integration was an important vincolo esterno (external link), helping the country to overcome negative path-dependency forms of institutional behavior inherited from the previous authoritarian regime. From 1986 to 1993, up to the adoption of the Treaty of Maastricht, Portugal saw government autonomy, particularly in economic and monetary policy. Since 1993, there has been a reduction in government autonomy in economic and monetary policy, due to the conditions of the Treaty of Maastricht. It takes at least one or two generations to fully institutionalize the political system (Converse, 1969:141–142). This means that at the end of the first generation or at the beginning of the second, democracy becomes taken for granted as a reality and is no longer questioned either by the established political elites or

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by the general population. At this point, it clearly frames the modes of thought and behavior of the country’s citizens. Portugal must be regarded as one of the most successful democracies in terms of its institutionalized democratic procedures. Portugal is certainly more than a formal procedural democracy as defined by Schumpeter and Dahl. However, Portuguese democracy remains flawed, as it is still too weak in terms of the population’s participation in the political process, and above all due to its weak civil society that is unable to significantly control the state institutions. Institutionally, Portugal has yet to reform its judicial sector, which is still characterized by a low level of human and material resources, by its slow-moving pace, and by unequal access for citizens. Portugal still features what Benjamin Barber would refer to as a “thin” democracy with a low-intensity citizenship (1984:4). The country has not yet made the transition to a more substantive qualitative democracy. I understand substantive democracy also in terms of the equality of opportunities provided by a strong and efficient state with an output performance that improves over time. In this sense, I very much follow Jean Grugel’s idea that state capacity is an important factor in the development of a democratic society. For such development to occur, the state institutions must be able to quickly respond to and resolve any problems that may emerge in implementation of public policy. Globalization also requires the state to set out the correct conditions and policies to prepare citizens for the labor market and the knowledge society. A substantive democracy means that the state provides a framework that equalizes the life-chances for all its citizens. Although democratic order does not preclude a complete eradication of inequality, an excessive gap between the haves and the have-nots will shape democratic politics according to the dominant interests. The role of the asymmetrical power exhibited by some groups over others will therefore become more salient. Substantive democracy can only be achieved over a period of time spanning more than two generations (see Grugel, 2002:5; see also Table 1.1). In the context of the European Union, Portugal must be committed to the construction of a social market economy such as that found in the Nordic countries, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Austria. The central issue is not the amount of social benefits that the Portuguese population receives, but rather their fair redistribution, also in terms of the promotion of life-chances. Thus far, the Portuguese state has failed to redress the current imbalance between its social classes. In substantive democracy, it is expected that civil society will become an important factor in transforming and sustaining the state, the political economy, and the political culture of the country. Civil society is broadly defined as those associations that are independent from political parties and intermediate between the population and the state institutions. They are important watchdogs of political, economic, social, and cultural development (see Keane, 2010). In

Table 1.1 Phases of Democratization in Portugal

Transition

Consolidation

Institutionalization

1974–1976

1976–1985

1985–

Not Yet Achieved

Political framework

Constitutional settlement

Establishment of institutional framework and habituation

Internalization of democratic institutional framework by political elites and population; political framework not questioned

Reality of political framework taken for granted

Political economy

Unstable economic situation

Stabilization of political macroeconomy

Stable macroeconomy; economic reform in order to create a globally competitive economy

Stable macroeconomy; strong social market economy able to compete in the global economy

State

State embedded in authoritarian culture

Democratization of state; authoritarian culture and structure dominate; democratic culture and structure expand

Democratization of state; authoritarian culture and structure recede; democratic structure dominates; many mixed regimes with two cultures and structures

Democratic state; decentralized, accountable, and transparent citizenoriented state

Public policy performance

Poor public policy performance: not universal, but selective in terms of constituencies

Poor public policy performance: new strategic aims are defined and implemented; quality of public services is poor

Improving public policy performance: better access to public goods for citizens; quality of public services improving

Excellent public policy performance: universal access to public goods for citizens; quality of public services is excellent

Civil society

Thin civil society consisting of small middle classes; however, popular movements also exist

Thin civil society consisting of the more highly educated

Growing civil society; however, quite asymmetric in different areas in terms of density

Strong civil society that is able to challenge government policies

Political culture

Parochial or subject political culture

Different subcultures; tiny civic culture

Different subcultures; minority civic culture

Strong civic culture

7

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the case of Portugal, one can cite the large number of environmental associations that are also linked to European and international networks. A good example is the Portuguese branch of Transparency International, which makes a significant contribution by highlighting cases of corruption in Portugal. Transparency International’s reporting on national integrity is an important ongoing assessment of the quality of democracy in Portugal (Transparency International, 2013). For Benjamin Barber (1984) and Carole Pateman (1970), civil society is of the utmost importance for their models of “strong” and “participatory” democracies, respectively. In addition, some excellent contributions have been made with regard to measuring the quality of democracy. Probably the best-known framework is that developed by David Beetham, which has been adopted by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) in Stockholm (Beetham et al., 2002). Beetham has been developing a framework for assessing quality of democracy (see Table 1.2). Four main categories are of crucial importance in this framework: (1) citizenship, law, and rights; (2) representative and accountable government; (3) civil society and popular participation; and (4) democracy beyond the nation-state. These categories of assessment contain subcategories. In Beetham’s model, there is also a clear division between procedural democracy (which would include parts of the first and second categories) and more substantive democracy (with elements from the second and third categories). Accountability and transparency are important elements in the Beetham framework. Quite important for our purposes is the fact that civil society and the participation of citizens are assigned significant roles in the assessment of a particular democracy as “strong” or “substantive” (Beetham et al., 2002:16). Beetham’s approach was certainly a source of inspiration for Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino (2005) as they developed their sophisticated multidimensional framework for assessing quality of democracy. They emphasize the difference between the procedural aspects of democracy related to the rule of law and accountability and those aspects that are more substantive, such as freedom and equality. Like Beetham, they also highlight the results-oriented dimension, focusing particularly on responsiveness. Each aspect alone could provide an idea of the quality of a certain democracy; however, Diamond and Morlino are keen to view the various dimensions in their interactive totality. Morlino has further developed this framework in order to describe the contrast between qualitative and nonqualitative democracies. It is difficult for a democracy to be qualitative in all its dimensions—responsiveness, rule of law, accountability, freedom, and equality; nevertheless, Morlino labels a democracy that is qualitative in all five dimensions a “full-fledged democracy,” and stresses the role of civil society in the functioning of such a democracy (2004:12, 26–29).

Table 1.2 Assessing the Quality of Democracy Categories of Assessment Citizenship, law, and rights

Representative and accountable government

Civil society and popular participation

Democracy beyond the nation-state

Subcategories

Criteria

Nationhood and citizenship

Inclusiveness of state citizenship; protection of ethnic groups

Rule of law and access to justice

Universal coverage by rule of law; equal access to justice; proper conduct in legal cases

Civil and political rights

Protection of human and civil rights; protection from physical violence

Economic and social rights

Access to public goods, education, health, infrastructure

Free and fair elections

Civilian control of the government

Democratic role of political parties

Ability of parties to act freely; internal democracy among parties

Government effectiveness and accountability

Executive-legislative relations; auditing institutions

Civilian control of the military and police

Freedom from criminal gangs, warlordism, and organized crime

Minimization of corruption

Ability to hold civil servants and politicians accountable

Role of the media

Media support of democracy; media are independent of government

Political participation

Equality of access; gender equality; civil society

Government responsiveness

Responsiveness to the concerns of citizens

Decentralization

Appropriateness of decisionmaking; inclusion of social partners; relationship between center and periphery

International dimensions of democracy

Consistency of foreign policy in relation to democracy; support of the UN Charter and international norms

Source: Beetham et al., 2002:16.

9

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In the dimension of the rule of law, the country still has major problems in terms of the efficiency of its judiciary and the enforcement of law in crucial areas related to political corruption (Santos et al., 1996; Santos and Gomes, 2008, 2010, 2011). In the dimension of accountability, the country still demonstrates problems with regard to the continuous horizontal accountability exercised by parliament and other auditing institutions in relation to the government. Although there have been considerable improvements, including increases in the professionalization of parliament and the auditing institutions over the past few decades, these actors are still too timid in their attempts to control the government. In particular, the responsiveness of the Portuguese government to demands from civil society and the population in general has been poor. Joaquim Aguiar even speaks of the autonomization of the political discourse of the political class from the needs of the population (2005:34). The assessment of the country’s Sustainable Governance Indicators conducted by Thomas Bruneau, Carlos Jalali, and César Colino (2011) has been quite negative; Portugal’s responsiveness has been poor and patchy. Although Portugal is a relatively free society in terms of the existence of both formal and substantive civil and political rights, it has thus far failed to create a socially level playing field for all of its citizens. Social citizenship remains an unfulfilled promise for a large part of the population. In sum, Portuguese democratization is still incomplete. The country remains far removed from a full-fledged democracy. As has been mentioned, the highly unequal social-class system compromises any policies related to the equality of opportunity.

Europeanization and Democratization I will not delineate here a detailed history of how Europeanization became an integral part of the European integration process. In brief, the Europeanization of national polity, politics, and policy became a truly important phenomenon after Jacques Delors assumed the presidency of the European Commission in 1985. Before that point, the attempts of coordination coming from the supranational level were quite timid. Through the so-called Luxembourg compromise of 1966, intergovernmentalism (meaning the dominance of the member states in shaping the European Community [EC]) had become central to any attempts by the European Commission to expand European policymaking. The two terms of the Jacques Delors presidency changed all that. His strategic vision based on the “Russian dolls” approach led to the creation of the Single European Market, the establishment of the Economic and Monetary Union, and the upgrading of cooperation in political affairs to cooperation in foreign and security policy and then finally to cooperation in justice and internal affairs (Ross, 1995:39). The Single European Act, ratified in 1987, and the Treaty of Maastricht (Treaty

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on European Union), ratified in 1993, effectively created enough pressure on member states to allow the implementation of a large number of directives in a very short period of time. For the implementation of the directives related to the Single European Act, the deadline was 31 December 1992. The establishment of the third and final phase of the Economic and Monetary Union was accomplished in 1998. In parallel with these extensive projects, several new or revamped policies were developed in order to facilitate and accelerate the Single European Market and the Economic and Monetary Union. Mark Pollack (1994, 2000) referred to this as “creeping incrementalism,” a process that peaked in the early 1990s and finished with the end of Jacques Delors’s second term as president of the European Commission. A fairly good measure of the growing importance of the concept of Europeanization is the number of scientific articles that have been published on the subject. Through an analysis of the database of the Social Sciences Citation Index, Kevin Featherstone (2003:5) found that five articles on the subject were published between 1981 and 1989, while between 1990 and 1999 the number of such articles grew to sixty-five; in 2000–2001, a further forty-six research contributions appeared in top indexed journals. This highlights the fact that Portugal (along with the other southern European countries) accessed the European Community during a period of transition from its previous low-intensity “intergovernmentalist” model of European integration to the current long-term, high-intensity, supranationally and strategically defined European Union. The new southern EU member states thus accessed the European Union at a time when the visionary president of the European Commission, Jacques Delors, was introducing a number of dynamic changes in a project referred to as “Eurosclerosis,” meaning primarily that the European integration process was stagnating. As noted, there is a burgeoning literature focusing on Europeanization (e.g., Ladrech, 2010; Falkner et al., 2005; Bulmer and Lequesne, 2005; Knill, 2001). Among these numerous studies and theories, Claudio Radaelli’s definition of the process of Europeanization seems to be the most complete and is therefore important to reproduce here. Radaelli defines “Europeanization” as follows: “Processes of (a) construction, (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalisation of formal and informal procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms that are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU public policy and politics and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures, and public policies” (2003:30). Europeanization is a top-down asymmetrical process in which the member state must incorporate directives, policy guidelines, and other aspects of public policy into its national politics. This has inevitable consequences for the polity and the politics of the country. In parallel with this top-down process, one can also identify horizontal transnational Europeanization processes that are specifically aimed at achieving the convergence of policymaking in certain areas, such as administrative reform, education, employment, and economic policy.

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To this end, an open method of coordination is used, based on an ongoing peer review by the other member states, which sometimes entails punitive financial action when a country has not complied with the recommendations issued by the respective forum. At present, the budgetary supervision of member states, the so-called European semester, is conducted at the beginning of each year. This type of horizontal Europeanization is no longer merely intergovernmental, but rather transgovernmental, meaning that national interests are slowly being replaced by a common strategy and interests, albeit over a long period of time. While the Europeanization of national politics has been at the forefront of studies on European integration in recent years, there is also another side to the coin, which I would call the domestication of European politics. Further integration has led to the emergence of a multilevel domestic space in which national public spaces are more and more completely integrated into a larger European whole (Magone, 2011a:165–166). This domestication of European politics can be observed in the euro crisis and the sovereign bond crisis. Since 2009, the debt crisis in Greece has become a domestic European issue because it has negatively affected the prospects of the eurozone, but also those of Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Italy and Cyprus. Another example of domestication can be seen during the Portuguese EU presidency in 2000, when Austria’s conservative People’s Party (Österreichische Volkspartei [ÖVP]) and its Eurosceptic, antiimmigration Freedom Party (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichische [FPÖ]) formed a coalition government, leading to protests by the governments of France and Belgium; these nations were afraid that this action could set a precedent for the large extreme-right-wing parties in their own countries (the National Front and the Flemish Interest, respectively). Following the recommendations of the “Three Wise Men Report” in monitoring the situation in Austria, the European Commission now has a commissioner responsible for human rights in the EU who can intervene whenever a member state does not comply with the democratic values enshrined in the Treaty of Lisbon and the Charter of Fundamental Rights (Kopeinig and Kotanko, 2000; Pernthaler and Hilpold, 2000; Merlingen, Mudde, and Sedelmeier, 2001). In the course of the European Commission under the presidency of José Manuel Durão Barroso, Commissioner Vivian Reding of Ireland took on this role and had occasion to intervene in Hungary (due to the changes to the national constitution proposed by Prime Minister Viktor Orban in 2012) and in Romania (after Viktor Ponta approved legislation by emergency decree, suspended the mandate of President Traian B sescu through a parliamentary vote, and ignored a ruling by the Constitutional Court to reinstate President B sescu, declaring it to be nonbinding). B sescu was replaced in the interim by Crin Antonescu, who was the president of the Senate and a member of Viktor Ponta’s party (Euractiv, 6 July 2012). In addition, governments can also promote new policy areas that will then become part of the domestic European agenda. The best examples of this have been the efforts of former French prime minister Lionel Jospin in 1997 and former Portuguese

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prime minister António Guterres to achieve more employment coordination at the European level (Cole, 2001; Magone, 2004:202–204). In this book, I am only partially interested in the domestication of European politics. My focus is primarily at the national level, centering on how Europeanization is contributing to improvements in the quality of Portuguese democracy. Portugal resembles all other southern European countries in its approach toward the European Union. The country regards the European Union as an important external link with respect to modernizing and improving the quality of its democracy (Dyson and Featherstone, 1996). In many ways, this externallink approach has been pursued by political elites without any real reflection about its implications for the country. Many policies decided at the EU level have been implemented without proper consideration of how they will affect the quality of life of the population. The European cohesion policy is probably the best example. Portugal has been receiving structural funds for more than twenty-five years, however, the structure of the economy and the social stratification of society have not changed at all. This indicates that the Portuguese government has been able to absorb the funding provided by the European Union, but has failed to create a more sustainable economy or a more qualified work force. One of the reasons underlying this failure is that public policy in Portugal is still conducted in a top-down centralized fashion, in which policymakers maintain their patronizing and paternalist attitude toward the population. This means that the population is generally not asked about new projects in their community; when they are asked, it is merely a pro forma consultation intended to satisfy the requirements set out in Brussels. Policymaking is conducted in Lisbon and then discussed perfunctorily with local authorities. In the end, this centralized mode of policymaking is not responsive to the needs of the local population; policymakers prefer to invest in infrastructure because such projects are concrete and visible, while investment in people is “invisible” and can therefore be neglected.1 Europeanization through a European public policy more directly related to the structural funds in a way that would have allowed the local population to have greater input and ownership in the projects could have been an important factor in enhancing the quality of democracy. Instead, however, a top-down, heavily bureaucratic decisionmaking process was carried out by paternalist policymakers who were unfamiliar with the local authorities and circumstances as they planned projects.2 Tanja Börzel (2005) developed a spectrum of possible outcomes for Europeanization attempts in various countries. In some countries, one can observe a complete transformation in the sense of Radaelli’s definition; in other countries, one sees only inertia (see Figure 1.1). The Portuguese institutional and policymaking framework is well adapted and is a good fit (more or less) with the supranational decisionmaking process, but this adaptation has been achieved at the cost of democracy—namely, the almost complete exclusion of civil society and other actors from the process.

14

Politics in Contemporary Portugal Figure 1.1 Impact of Europeanization on EU Member States

No Change

Low Change

Medium Change

High Change

Reaffirmation

Inertia Retrenchment Negative change

Absorption Accommodation Peripheral change

Transformation Systemic change

Source: Börzel, 2005:59.

In this sense, the paternalist and patronizing administrative and political elites have absorbed and accommodated the demands of the European policymaking process. This indicates that the Portuguese administrative machinery is well suited to the supranational level, as there are no other relevant players that delay decisionmaking processes, but the subsequent implementation process is quite dull and technocratic, permitting the population no voice or ownership in the system. The institutional and policymaking “good fit” has had high costs in terms of democratic quality (for more, see Chapter 10). In the case of Portugal, democratic institutionalization has been conflated with Europeanization, such that the further democratization process has been hidden by the pressures of the European integration process. However, Europeanization requires a highly advanced governance model that includes features that Portugal still lacks, such as strong public institutions, a strong civil society, and a strong private economic sector. The problems of this mismatch between the supranational and national levels in terms of accountability, transparency, and responsiveness have become quite evident.

Europeanization by Stealth: Implementing the Memorandum of Understanding Before I turn to the other chapters, it is essential that I give an overview of the implementation process of the troika’s 2011 memorandum of understanding. Since then, the Portuguese government has been engaged in fulfilling the targets set out in the memorandum; as a result, policymaking has been centered around the memorandum and the comprehensive strategy specified therein. Despite the Portuguese government’s fulfillment of most of these targets, the outcome has been the deterioration of the national economy and social situation, even worse than had been expected. At the end of 2012, Portugal’s budget deficit was 6.4 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP), well above the revised target of 5 percent agreed upon with the troika, and public debt was 123.6 percent of GDP well above the 60 percent allowed by the European Commission (Eurostat, 2013).

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Portugal has had to implement measures and reforms from the memorandum in a very short period of time. Here, I give a brief overview of the measures and the problems associated with them; more in-depth analyses of the measures and reforms are presented in the respective chapters. Among these measures and reforms are some that may be politically and socially costly at the present but that could pay off in decades to come. The time factor is also an important category for grouping the various measures: there are short-term, medium-term, and long-term measures and reforms. Short-term measures and reforms are generally related to Portugal’s economic governance. These measures seek to facilitate a considerable improvement in budgetary streamlining in order to reduce the country’s budget deficit. Moreover, significant actions have been undertaken to assess the global debt owed to providers within the country. This is a major problem in Portugal that has been exacerbated by the bad example set by state institutions in terms of timely payments: many construction enterprises in the country have had to file for bankruptcy, because the national and local public authorities have not paid their bills. According to estimates made by the Portuguese Association of Civil Construction and Public Works (Associação Portuguesa de Construção Civil e Obras Públicas [APCCOP]), the state owed €1.55 billion to construction enterprises in mid-2012, with most of the debt owed by local governments (Diário de Notícias, 24 July 2012). Today, most websites of Portuguese authorities feature a file dedicated to unpaid debts to providers. Other short-term measures and reforms are connected to the financial sector. The banking sector is now under considerable scrutiny from government authorities, in part because a portion of the country’s €78 billion bailout is dedicated to the recapitalization of the banks in Portugal. The banks form an important and powerful interest group, which had lobbied the former government of José Sócrates to ask for a bailout. In the package, an amount of €12 billion is reserved for the recapitalization of the banking sector. Further reforms include the liberalization of markets for goods and services in Portugal. Medium-term measures are generally associated with the overhaul of present and future public-private partnerships. Thus far, such partnerships have overwhelmingly resulted in negative experiences for the state. In most cases, the state has incurred losses in the partnerships that must be paid by the taxpayers. Overall, the state has thus far been a bad negotiator in these partnerships (Moreno, 2010). Further medium-term measures to reduce the budget deficit and public debt situation have involved the rapid privatization of Portuguese public enterprises, particularly those that were incurring large debts. Among these negative examples are the Portuguese national airline, the nationalized bank, and the freight branch of the national railways. An attempt to privatize the national airline in December 2012 failed because no serious buyer emerged at the end of the competition. One major problem is the airline’s high level of debt and the archaic

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industrial relations still prevalent in the company. In contrast, the national electric company was able to attract investment from the Chinese Three Gorges Investment Corporation, which holds a share of 24.5 percent as of 2011; in addition, Portugal’s national airports were sold to the French consortium Vinci for €3 billion. However, on the one hand, the Vinci consortium negotiated a highly favorable contract, ensuring €3.7 billion for the construction of the new airport in Lisbon and the exclusive rights to run it. As a result, the French company will earn sizable profits, confirming the reputation of the Portuguese state as a bad negotiator. On the other hand, the Vinci Consortium has to work closely with the Portuguese government in terms of a strategic partnership in the development of airports across Portugal. Government sources made aware that between year 11 and 50, the Portuguese government is entitled to between 1 and 10 percent of the profit made by the company. It is estimated that a further €2.2 billion in state revenue will be disbursed to the public purse (Expresso, 27 December 2012; Semanário Económico, 22 February 2013; Expresso, 17 September 2013). A detailed discussion of economic governance can be found in Chapter 10. The health sector is also under considerable pressure to cut back its pharmaceutical expenses. There has been a general shift toward buying pharmaceuticals online to reduce costs. The national health service still owes a significant amount of money to pharmaceutical companies, with its debt rising to €1.1 billion in December 2012. The pharmaceutical company La Roche suspended delivery of pharmaceuticals to twenty-six hospital units due to nonpayment of bills at the end of February 2012 (Público, 27 February 2012; Público, 5 March 2012). The long-term reforms included in the troika’s 2011 memorandum of understanding are more complicated. I discuss all these reforms in the respective chapters; however, a general overview here illustrates how much pressure the Portuguese government is under to achieve positive results from the implementation. These long-term reforms also have important implications for changes in management in the shift from a procedural to a substantive democracy. The reform of the public administration has been in progress with mixed results; the memorandum now sets out additional measures intended to make the state smaller and more efficient. This is an area that will be addressed in greater detail in Chapter 4. One major problem is the lack of a strategic agreement between the two main parties to move in the same direction and emphasize the continuity of reform. Another important long-term reform is found in the decentralization agenda of the memorandum, which envisages changes in local governance. However, this reform has been organized in a rush, leading to protests by functionaries in local governments (see Chapter 9). Another important reform that began before the troika’s intervention involves the judicial sector. The Portuguese courts are quite inefficient, slow, and archaic in their organization. Judicial reforms started during the Sócrates

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governments and were continued by the government of Pedro Passos Coelho. A general assessment is presented in Chapter 7.

Methodological Notes and Structure of the Book This book is based on my research on Portugal over the past twenty-five years. Thus far, this research has led to the publication of two books just on the Portuguese case (after twenty and thirty years of democracy, respectively). Moreover, I have written several journal articles and book chapters on the subject over the years. A considerable number of these studies are included in the references to permit more intensive research. All of these studies are based on extensive field research over the years, including interviews with members of parliament, ministers, policymakers, and the general population. In this book, my accumulated research is at times presented in a simplified form, but this overview can be complemented by the examination of more specific research laid out in other books, chapters, and articles. For this book, I conducted new interviews, which were undertaken to allow a better understanding of the implementation of the structural funds; these interviews provide new information that cannot be found elsewhere and were primarily conducted for the book. A general overview of the quality of democracy in Portugal is a difficult undertaking, and I am completely responsible for any mistakes, gaps, or shortcomings. I have utilized most of the primary and secondary resources relevant to the various topics. Portugal now boasts one of the best electronic government policies in the European Union, with a huge amount of information provided on most government websites. The digitalization of many of these primary documents has created an excellent resource for researchers. In addition to intensive field research over the past decade in specialized libraries in the ministries and public institutions in Lisbon, I have also made the effort to read all of the secondary literature produced by Portuguese and foreign political scientists. This was a much easier task some twenty-five years ago; nowadays, it has become nearly impossible due to the substantial growth of the discipline in Portugal. A number of young Portuguese political scientists are now well integrated in the international circuits of research and are publishing extensively. It has become quite difficult for me to keep track of every publication; however, I have made an effort to obtain all the relevant studies. The most important Portuguese newspapers and their online archives are also a valuable source of information. I have extensively referenced Diário de Notícias, Público, Jornal de Notícias, and the weekly newspapers Expresso and Semanário Económico. A valuable source of more critical information is the weekly magazine Visão. In order to avoid biased information, I have used a certain amount of “triangulation” by researching topics in more than one newspaper.

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I begin my analysis, in Chapter 2, with a discussion of Portugal’s historical legacy and the socioeconomic path-dependent aspects of the political development of the country. This is followed by discussions of the core institutions of the political system (the presidency, government, and parliament), and the reform of the public administration, in Chapters 3 and 4 respectively. A review of the party system and elections can be found in Chapter 5, followed by a discussion of interest groups in Chapter 6. Next, Chapter 7 addresses the judicial sector, an area that will require radical reform in order to restore trust in Portuguese justice. A crucial study of civil society and political culture is found in Chapter 8, while local government and the autonomous regions of Madeira and the Azores are the main topics of Chapter 9. The next two chapters are devoted to European and international dimensions, with Chapter 10 outlining the growing impact of the European Union on national public policies, and Chapter 11 dealing with foreign and defense policy. In Chapter 12, the book closes with some thoughts on the future development of Portugal.

Conclusion Although Portugal is a part of the European Union, its quality of democracy lags considerably behind that of other member states. There are several reasons underlying the country’s underdevelopment in this area. First, although Portugal has achieved great success in terms of procedural democracy, its political system remains deficient in its substantive dimension. The result has been that its democracy has not greatly evolved over the past four decades. The system remains as unequal today as it was during the authoritarian regime preceding the 1974 revolution. Second, although a great deal of funding has been spent to improve education, the health sector, and other policy areas, the results have been mediocre, reinforcing the assessment of the country as a stalled democracy. Third, politicians and policymakers have adopted models of governance from the European Union and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) that only partially correspond to reality on the ground in Portugal. These models of governance have created even more problems and have been quite expensive for the state. The ill-considered adoption of such models without a strategic outlook has further reinforced the general atmosphere of crisis and lack of orientation. Fourth, Portugal is far removed from the model of a social market economy represented in the Treaty of Lisbon. The political economy of the country is semi-peripheral, meaning that it has the superficial features of a modern advanced economy; however, when one examines the country’s business enterprises more closely, a picture emerges of low productivity due both to the low level of worker qualifications and to poor human-resource management.

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Notes 1. Interview with a senior official of QREN, 9 June 2010, Lisbon; interview with a senior official of the Ministry of Territorial Restructuring, 9 June 2010, Lisbon. 2. Ibid.

2 The Historical and Socioeconomic Context

IN THE CURRENT DYNAMIC PERIOD OF A GLOBALIZED ECONOMY AND

open markets, it is important to look back and discover the historical origins of this process. Portuguese history from the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries constitutes an important piece of the puzzle that is this highly complex system of global and regional governance that we experience today. Recent studies have highlighted the fact that the Portuguese were “pioneers of globalization” and that they “surprised the world” in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries when they set up innovative, advanced maritime studies of the Atlantic, developing new inventions terms of both hardware (the technology of caravel construction) and software (nautical mapmaking and maritime navigational technology; Rodrigues and Devezas, 2007:64–66). However, in the seventeenth century, other powers such as the Netherlands, Britain, and France replaced the Portuguese and Spaniards as the primary global pioneers. Both the Portuguese and Spanish empires became peripheral in relation to those of the central European powers. I will therefore concentrate my attention on this structural global dependency and its impact on Portuguese development. In this chapter, I have no intention of writing a detailed political history of Portugal, nor of going into great detail with regard to socioeconomic features. My main task is to present an overview of some of the themes that will be dealt with in the subsequent chapters from various perspectives. My approach in this chapter is to offer a kaleidoscopic configuration of the historical and socioeconomic patterns and themes that may be reprised and further developed in subsequent parts of the book. This chapter thus historically and socioeconomically contextualizes the focus of this book: the quality of democracy in Portugal after four decades of democratization and almost thirty years of European integration. I adopt here a path-dependency approach based on the heuristic model of historical institutionalism. I argue in this chapter that one of the reasons for the current quality of Portuguese democracy is related to the socioeconomic and cultural developments 21

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occurring throughout the country’s historical trajectory after the Age of Discovery and Expansion (1521–1580). Despite attempts to resist these circumstances, the pattern of Portuguese integration into the world economy has been reactive and characterized by underdevelopment rather than being proactive in nature. Therefore, it is essential to examine what Fernand Braudel (1993:34) refers to as the longue durée of the Portuguese historical legacy: the very slow development of the socioeconomic and cultural features of the country. Historical institutionalism does not promote the idea of a deterministic relationship between historical legacy and a particular political system, but rather suggests that such patterns may frame more or less unintended outcomes (Pierson, 1998; Thelen and Steinmo, 1992). In this book, I argue that Portugal has been unable to escape its peripheral (or rather, semi-peripheral) position in the modern world since at least the second half of the seventeenth century. The semi-periphery is here understood as those countries characterized by features of both the more advanced economies and also of the developing countries. This concept is borrowed from Immanuel Wallerstein’s analysis of the modern world system (Wallerstein, 1974, 1980, 1989, 2011; Magone, 1996a:110–114).

Historical Path-Dependent Structural Features of Portuguese Politics and Economy The Legacy of Empire and Its Decline The formation of nationhood and ascendancy to world power (1143– 1580). The history of Portugal begins in the north of the country in the eleventh

century, emerging from a window of opportunity presented by a vacuum in the constellation of powers in the Iberian peninsula. A strong united Spanish state did not yet exist; rather, the peninsula was divided into several kingdoms, among which Castile and León were quite dominant. All of these kingdoms were located in the north of the peninsula, as the south had been occupied by Arab taifas (kingdoms) since the year 711. One of the main aims of the northern Christian kingdoms was to push the Arabs back to northern Africa. The pope and the Catholic Church played a major role in rallying the European dynasties around the objective of expelling the Arabs. Henry of Burgundy made a considerable contribution to the campaigns against the Arabs at the end of the eleventh century. In return, King Alfonso VI of Castile-León gave him the territory Portucale, which was located in the northwest of the peninsula between Minho and Coimbra. This county was not independent, but it enjoyed a high level of autonomy. Henry’s son Afonso Henriques became the first king of Portugal between 1139 and 1143 and founded the dynasty of Burgundy. There is no concrete evidence that King Alfonso VII of Castile-León officially allowed Portugal under Afonso Henriques to become independent; it seems that Afonso

The Historical and Socioeconomic Context

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was proclaimed king by his army because of his success in combating the Arabs in the south, and that this fait accompli was accepted by Castile-León. The victory in a crucial battle against the Arabs at Ourique (south of Coimbra) in 1139 contributed immensely to Afonso’s reputation as a leader, not only in Portucale but also among the other Iberian kingdoms in the north. This was a crucial battle in which several armies of the northern Christian kingdoms fought together against the armies of the taifas. The so-called reconquista had been in progress since the tenth century, when the various Iberian kingdoms, despite their disagreements, had decided to work together in order to defeat their common enemy. Another important aspect of the Middle Ages in Portugal is that this participation of the population in determining the region’s government also took place during periods of peace and tranquility. Portuguese kings had to regularly consult the Cortes (a parliament of the estates) in order to obtain approval for taxation measures and other issues. Between 1143 and 1383, the Cortes met twenty-six times, most frequently during the reign of Afonso III. The Cortes of Leiria of 1254 is regarded as an important milestone in Portuguese democracy because the general population was also included. The Cortes became more structured and consolidated during the monarchy (Ventura, 2004; Coelho, 2004). However, King Afonso III and his successors began to promote a program of administrative restructuring that envisioned the centralization of royal power (Mattoso and Sousa, 1997:115–118). In the fifteenth century, the Portuguese initiated a program of discoveries across the world that was innovative and unique in its time. In 1415, the Portuguese were able to conquer Ceuta in northern Africa, which became a model for further exploration outside Portugal. Quite important for the successful expansion of the Portuguese colonial empire was the work of King João II (1481– 1495), who continued the efforts of his uncle, Henry the Navigator. João II is often characterized as a Machiavellian king who utilized modern forms of strategic thinking, including a network of spies around the world that helped him to protect the Portuguese Empire. He established a “war room” based on updated information from all parts of the empire, with the intent of protecting Portugal’s commercial interests (Rodrigues and Devezas, 2007:92). João II was followed by Manuel I (1495–1521), who clearly profited from many of the initiatives undertaken by Henry the Navigator and King João II. The scientific spirit was quite predominant during this period. Portugal established itself as an important power in Asia, with the Indian city of Goa as the center of the new empire. This was made possible by Vasco da Gama’s discovery of the maritime route to India over the Cape of Good Hope in southern Africa (Feldbauer, 2005:50–72). The discovery of Brazil in 1500 further contributed to the global reach of the Portuguese. The state took over the entire enterprise as it became necessary to build more sophisticated and better ships. The caravel (1420), the nau (1480), and later the galleon (1510) were important innovations in shipbuilding, permitting the country to explore uncharted waters and to defend them

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from competing nations, including England, France, and the Netherlands (Rodrigues and Devezas, 2007:130–132, 143–145). The decline of Portugal to a peripheral power: dependency on England.

The decline of the Portuguese Empire was precipitated by the death of King Sebastião (1557–1578) after a failed war against the Arabs in Alcácer Quibir. This death presented a major problem for the succession of the Portuguese throne, as King Sebastião did not leave an heir. Between 1580 and 1640, Portugal was in personal union with Spain. However, in 1640, João IV of the House of Bragança was crowned king in the Terreiro do Paço in Lisbon, and Portugal regained its independence from Spain. Meanwhile, the world had changed considerably. Portugal was no longer the innovative power it had been in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. There was a tendency to live off of the trade of goods from the country’s large empire; however, there was no attempt to invest the profits of such trade in the development of the country. Moreover, the Inquisition continued to have an important negative impact on the culture of the country. Most Jews had been expelled from Portugal by the sixteenth century, resulting in a considerable loss of innovative power for the country as well as a loss for the financial sector. No attempt was made to reduce the power of the church in the country. By the seventeenth century, Portugal had declined to a second-rate power and was forced to accommodate the new superpowers of England and the Netherlands. The country’s alliance with England was renewed in 1663 through the marriage of Catarina de Bragança to King Charles II. In essence, England now dominated the relationship, a fact that became quite evident with the signing of the Treaty of Methuen of 1703, in which Portugal opened its markets to English textiles in exchange for port wine, the trading of which was largely controlled by English trading houses. This is the most symbolic representation of the decline of Portugal to a peripheral country within the European context. Throughout the sixteenth century and the first half of the seventeenth, the Portuguese trade balance deteriorated considerably, despite the gold imported from Brazil. England in particular profited from this situation, as the deficit between the two countries increased each year (Marques, 1983, vol. 2:289–290). The first shipment of gold from Brazil was 500 kilograms in 1699, which increased over time to 25,000 metric tons in 1720. It is calculated that, on average, 1,000 to 3,000 metric tons of gold per year were shipped to Portugal between 1699 and 1799 (Saraiva, 1981:233). However, this new income was not used to improve the economic structure of the country, but instead to sustain the high level of consumption of goods imported from other European countries. This pattern dates back to the second phase of consolidation during the Age of Discovery and Expansion. Very few attempts were made to build endogenous industries that would be able to compete with the products imported from other countries in Europe. Another constant feature was the lack of linkages between the dormant

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rural economy in inner Portugal and the predominantly consumer economy of the urban centers along the coast. One of the reasons for this was that the economy of the Portuguese Empire was concentrated in the urban centers, which were almost independent from the economy of the rural areas. This concentration of the dynamics of the economy along the coast led to the neglect of the agricultural sector. One last major attempt to reverse the fortunes of the country was undertaken by Sebastião José de Carvalho de Melo, who served as prime minister throughout the reign of King José I (1750–1777). King José I trusted in de Melo completely, promoting him to the aristocratic rank of Count of Oeiras in 1759 and Marquis of Pombal in 1770. Pombal introduced several reforms in education, economy, and also administration, although as the Marquis of Pombal, he acted much like a dictator. He was well known for his personal engagement in the reconstruction of Lisbon after the tsunami of 1755. The geometric center of the city (known as Baixa) was probably the most salient feature of this reconstruction. Another major reform he carried out was in the educational system: Pombal expelled the powerful Society of Jesus (the Jesuits) from Portugal and introduced reforms in the curriculum and in the structure of education that took into account the latest developments in science and technology. He was also very engaged in the construction of a self-sustainable economy in Portugal that could induce improvements in the economic situation and reduce the trade-balance deficit. Pombal also established several so-called monopoly companies, following the British and Dutch examples. Among these were the Company of Asia (established in 1753), the Company of Whale Fishing (1755), and the Company of Pará and Maranhão (1755). Pombal was certainly influenced by the new ideas propagated by the Age of Enlightenment; however, his dictatorial behavior created a considerable number of enemies among the nobility. Although he abolished the Inquisition, he introduced his own institution of censorship, the Royal Committee of Censorship, in order to control publications that might present dangers to the security of the state. Despite his reforms, the king ruled the country in an absolutist manner. One of the reasons for this absolute power was that the Cortes had not convened since 1698. The death of José I led to the removal from power of Pombal by his enemies (Cardim et al., 1998:141–239, 415–419).

The Legacy of Discontinuous Democratization The emergence of liberalism and the constitutional monarchy: the politics of restricted democracy. The French Revolution of 1789 and Napoleon

Bonaparte’s subsequent campaign across Europe led to three invasions of Portugal by French troops (in 1807, 1808, and 1810). Queen Maria I and her regent João VI fled with the court to Brazil in 1807 and remained there until 1821. Influenced by the liberal movement in Spain, in particular the Constitution of

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Cadiz of 1812, a similar movement emerged in Portugal. Upon his return to Portugal in 1821, King João VI (1816–1826) had to accept a highly radical liberal constitution. One consequence of this was the independence of Brazil on 7 September 1822 and the proclamation of his son Pedro as king. Among the positive aspects of the constitution was the establishment of a unicameral parliament elected by universal male suffrage. The constitution also limited the power of the king, in this sense creating a constitutional monarchy. In 1826, Pedro returned to Portugal and became king. However, pressure from the court and the general population of Brazil led him to abdicate in favor of his daughter Maria II; Pedro asked his brother Miguel to be her regent. While Pedro was still king, he replaced the highly radical Constitution of 1822 with the more moderate Constitutional Charter; this document remained the primary constitutional framework (with a few interruptions) for the rest of the constitutional monarchy until its end in 1910. After King Pedro returned to Brazil, his brother Miguel sidelined Maria II and took over the throne in 1828, establishing an absolutist monarchy. This led to a long, internecine civil war between the conservative absolutists and the liberals that lasted until 1838, a conflict that affected Portuguese politics until the middle of the century. Indeed, the coup d’état of 1852 was supported by Queen Maria II; soon after the insurrection, she asked the coup’s leader, the Duke of Saldanha, to come to Lisbon and form a new government. Between 1851 and 1910, a new two-party system was established that closely followed the British model. The new system, which featured groups of notables from various factions—groups that were at times not clearly distinguishable from each other and that constantly changed sides—lent greater stability to the constitutional monarchy. The apparent similarity of the Portuguese system to the British model of alternation in power between the Liberals and the Conservatives was merely superficial. In reality, the monarch would appoint a new prime minister before the elections, then creating the appropriate electoral result through a national network of supporters in villages and rural areas who would rally, bribe, and coerce the population to vote for the appointed governmental party. Thanks to an outstanding study conducted by Pedro Tavares de Almeida, we know now in great detail how this system worked. Originally, it was quite difficult to streamline all the relevant actors in this clientelistic and patronage-based network, but over time a governmental machinery was established that could be used from election to election. Despite the fact that the electorate had almost doubled by 1878 (from 10 to almost 18 percent of the population; Almeida, 1991:36–37) and that the reform of 1884 allowed minorities greater possibilities for representation, the political parties were still able to manipulate the necessary majority for the already nominated government (Almeida, 1991:136–137). After the reform of 1895, suffrage was reduced back to 9.4 percent, as the heads of families were again excluded from participation (Almeida, 2010:63). However, it sometimes happened that an electoral success was undermined by the

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governmental party’s inability to carry one of the larger cities, in particular Lisbon. It was crucial for a party to be successful in the big urban centers, where the majority of the literate population lived. The peaceful alternation of power between the so-called Regeneradores and the Históricos (later replaced by the Progressistas) allowed considerable stability over the forty-year period between 1851 and 1890. The clientelistic system was based on local notables known as caciques, especially near the end of the nineteenth century. Originally, the caciques would use their own resources in order to rally the local electorate; however, increased suffrage made it more difficult to engage in coercion and bribery, such that the caciques later became employed by the state at the local level and utilized both public and private resources. In the system of regeneration (regeneração) after 1870, a major transformation thus took place, evolving from what Almeida refers to as the owner cacique (cacique proprietário) to the bureaucratic cacique (cacique bureaucratico). This latter system could be better controlled by the center due to the public position of the caciques (Almeida, 1991:135–136). The political system of regeneração was also one of the most successful periods in terms of economic growth. After the Treaty of Methuen of 1703 and the French invasions, Portugal became peripheral in the world economy, despite its still-extant colonial empire (which was unsustainable due to the lack of human, economic, and military resources). According to the analysis of Manuel Villaverde Cabral, four items made up the majority of Portuguese exports: wine, cork, cattle, and copper. In the 1860s, these products constituted, on average, 58 percent of exports; in the 1870s this proportion increased to 65 percent, and in the 1880s to 80 percent. In particular, the export of wine and cork continued to grow as the other two industries stagnated. At the same time, Portugal was compelled to import quite-sophisticated machinery and primary resources to remedy its low level of industrialization (Cabral, 1988:35). Between 1860 and 1880, there was a fivefold increase in the import of machinery (Cabral, 1988:14). In the end, the overall stagnation in exports and the continuing increase in imports led to considerable problems in the country’s trade balance. This was barely offset by the growing number of Portuguese immigrating to Brazil and sending money back home (Cabral, 1988:18). However, in the 1880s, the budget deficit led to a considerable accumulation of debt. By the 1880s, Portugal was forced to use up to 50 percent of its revenue to service this debt (Cabral, 1988:30). At some stage, this became unsustainable. In the beginning of the 1890s, the system of regeneração entered a deep crisis. One factor was the fierce competition in imperialism from other European nations. The Conference of Berlin of 1885 led to the division of Africa among the superpowers, and the new principle of “occupation of territory” was established. However, the Portuguese Empire never ventured into the interior regions of its colonies, and might thus have lost territory simply through not engaging in this occupation principle. Consequently, the Portuguese tried to link Angola to Mozambique in order to claim the territory. This was opposed vehemently by

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the British, who had plans for another link, between Cairo and Cape Town. On 11 January 1890, Britain issued an ultimatum to Portugal, demanding that the country renounce its claims to this territorial linkage, and Portugal complied. This ultimatum was a shameful moment for the country, and also the end of the legitimacy of the constitutional monarchy, as it had proved to be incapable of defending Portuguese interests. Portugal also had to make other concessions that clearly demonstrated the complete dependency of the country on Britain. In parallel with this political situation, Portugal was forced to declare partial bankruptcy in 1892 because it was unable to service its debt to the full extent. Although these two processes were largely independent of each other, the ultimatum led to insecurities in the market that created problems for Portugal’s repayment of its sovereign debt (for an explanation, see Santos, 2001:197–198, 203–204). Negotiations with the country’s creditors lasted for a decade. Finally, in 1902 it was agreed that Portugal would have to bear only half of the previously agreed interest rates, with the time frame to pay back the debt ending in 2001 (Mata and Valério, 2003:173). Thus, at the turn of the century, the constitutional monarchy had been discredited. The political parties of the regeneração also began to fragment into various factions. The Republican party became a potential alternative for change; in addition, a small Socialist party was beginning to emerge with the support of the industrial workers. A weak but growing industrialization began to take place, allowing the country to internally produce those goods that could no longer be imported, owing to the extremely difficult financial situation. In 1907, with the support of the king, Prime Minister João Franco introduced a dictatorship that was condemned by the political class. On 1 February 1908, King Carlos I and his heir Luis Filipe were assassinated in the Praça do Comércio in the center of Lisbon. The last king of Portugal, Manuel II, was compelled to change his cabinet seven times, as none of them were able to reestablish political stability (Ramos, 2001:301–308). Manuel II was unable to save the monarchy and had to go into exile when the First Republic was proclaimed on 5 October 1910. The First Republic (1910–1926): hope and disappointment. In 2010, Portugal celebrated the hundredth anniversary of its republic; however, its legacy is mixed. Enormous expectations were associated with the installment of this new regime, but the sixteen years of the First Republic were actually characterized by permanent political and economic instability. According to José Hermano Saraiva, during this period, the First Republic saw seven elections and the resulting parliaments, eight presidents, and forty-six governments (Saraiva, 1981:345; see also Guimarãis et al., 2000). Although there was a timid effort to extend suffrage during the early days of the First Republic (11.8 percent of the population in 1910, 14.2 percent in 1911), the fear of being outvoted by the more conservative, monarchist, rural regions of the country led to restrictions

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in suffrage (7.7 percent in 1915, 8.8 percent in 1925) (Almeida, 2010:65). The Republican party established its own system of caciquismo and organized elections. The literate population of the urban centers were now privileged with respect to the illiterate working class and the farmers and rural population (Lopes, 1994:77–78). According to Manuel Villaverde Cabral, the Republican party refused to democratize the political system in order to prevent the strengthening of other parties, such as the Socialist party among the emerging urban working class and the Monarchists among the rural population (Cabral, 1988:159). There were several coup d’états, both failed and successful, that led to interruptions in democracy; for example, in December 1917, General Sidónio Pais came to power after a successful coup. Sidónio Pais tried to introduce what he called a “New Republic”; in April 1918, he was elected president by the universal suffrage that he had introduced, only to be assassinated in December of the same year in the railway station of Rossio (for an in depth-study, see Antunes, 1981). The period between 1920 and 1926 was the worst in the Republic’s history. The number of governments and coup attempts increased considerably. The last government of the First Republic, of António Maria da Silva, lasted twenty-two months, which in terms of longevity was more successful than most other governments. The authoritarian regime of António Oliveira Salazar and Marcelo Caetano (1926–1974). On 26 May 1926, a military coup under the leadership of

Afonso da Costa ended the First Republic and introduced a dictatorship—a prelude to the civilian dictatorship of António Salazar that followed in 1928. One of the major issues that came to the fore during this dictatorship was the catastrophic financial situation in Portugal. This was the main reason why the military granted all its powers to Salazar, the finance minister, who used an austerity policy to find a way out of the crisis. Indeed, in 1927, before Salazar came to power, the dictatorship had attempted to negotiate a loan with the League of Nations; however, the required conditions of the loan were so humiliating that it was decided to abort the attempt. Between 1928 and 1932, Salazar, who controlled the spending of all of Portugal’s ministries, introduced a demanding austerity program that helped to consolidate the country’s finances. By 1932, Portuguese finances were balanced, and he proceeded with his authoritarian ideology and the establishment of the so-called New State (Estado Novo) (Telo, 1994). Salazar’s ideology was close to that of authoritarian Catholic movements in advocating a model of social corporatism as an alternative to economic and political liberalism. He wanted to establish a harmonious society based on cooperation between the social classes, seeking to avoid class conflict. In this sense, Salazar was influenced by Italian fascism, although without adherence to the totalitarian theories of Benito Mussolini. His corporatist state was developed with the intention of controlling the working class by forcing it into the official syndicates. However, the state corporatist model was never built to com-

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pletion; it served as more of a controlling instrument (Lucena, 1979; Schmitter, 1979). In 1933, Salazar organized a referendum on a new constitution that was liberal in appearance and also envisioned presidential elections and a bicameral parliament; however, in reality this document was merely a façade. The constitution was approved by adding the abstentions to the positive votes. Salazar’s New State was a one-party system, since no other party apart from the National Union (União Nacional [UN]) was allowed to be active in the country. The moribund UN was relaunched in 1970 as the People’s National Action (Acção Nacional Popular [ANP]) by Salazar’s successor, Marcelo Caetano; however, it was never able to play the same role as the Fascist Party in Italy or the National Socialist Workers Party in Germany. Salazar was also keen to eliminate any radical fascist or nationalist movements and ultimately forced parallel movements into his new party, compelling them to adhere to his brand of authoritarian state. This was the case with Rolão Preto, the leader of the Lusitanian Integralism (Integralismo Lusitano) movement. By the 1930s, Salazar was able to streamline Preto’s movement into his National Union (Cruz, 1988; A. C. Pinto, 1995, 2000). The authoritarian regime of Salazar was, as Manuel de Lucena asserts, “fascism without a movement” (1976:23). Salazar was very interested in preserving an idyllic authoritarian regime that had as its foundations the nation, the church, and the family. However, all of these foundations were to be strictly in a paternalist, authoritarian mold. The authoritarian dictatorship lasted for nearly fifty years and considerably shaped the way in which politics was conducted in Portugal. The opposition was unable to play a relevant role because the secret police were extremely efficient in dismantling or dividing the efforts of the opposition to challenge the government (Raby, 1988). The period of the authoritarian regime can be divided into three main phases. The first phase, of rise and consolidation, lasted from 1928 to 1945. The second phase started in 1945 and lasted until Salazar’s fatal accident and death in 1968. The third and final phase spanned from 1968 until the end of the regime in 1974. In the first phase, Salazar followed a policy of steering the political system toward his vision. He was also keen to preserve national independence through more autarchic policies. Moreover, there was a general disinterest in improving the educational situation or reducing the high rate of illiteracy. Salazar’s New State could count on at least two advantages. One was the fact that Portugal was geographically quite far removed from central Europe, where most of the political events and crises were emerging in the early twentieth century. This isolation helped to preserve and stabilize the country’s political system. Portugal’s second advantage was that many countries were becoming more authoritarian in the 1920s and 1930s. In this sense, Salazar’s regime was in the mainstream of the right-wing Zeitgeist that was coming to power throughout Europe (Nolte, 1963). Another factor that proved to be significant was the role that Britain played in world politics, as Salazar was positively inclined to British leadership.

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During World War II, Portugal was a neutral country; however, Salazar exported tungsten first to Germany and later to the Allies (when the Allies began to turn back the German army). In this sense, he used Portugal’s neutrality in an opportunistic fashion. In the second phase, Salazar had to deal with the new architecture of world politics after the defeat of the Axis powers. The United Kingdom was no longer the hegemon of global politics, and Salazar reluctantly accepted the leadership of the United States. Moreover, he had considerable difficulties with the process of European integration (Andresen, 2007:55–61). Several elections were organized after 1945, although all of them were tainted by fraud. In 1959, Salazar had to abandon his autarchic policies and move toward a more dynamic approach to the economy. In the 1960s, the socalled development plans were implemented in order to allow Portugal to catch up with the rest of the European countries. In addition, the liberation movements in the colonies of Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau forced the regime to conduct wars in three different places. The loss of Goa, Damão, and Diu in December 1961 after an occupation by the Indian Federation began the process of decomposition of the last colonial empire. Industrialization in the 1960s and early 1970s created new middle classes that became quite critical of the government. The authoritarian regimes in Portugal and Spain became anachronistic in the context of the regional community of democratic states (Ramos, Sousa, and Monteiro, 2010:679–685). The death of Salazar in 1968 opened up prospects for new leadership under his successor, Marcelo Caetano, a professor of constitutional law at the University of Lisbon. This can be regarded as the final phase of the authoritarian regime. Caetano had major difficulties in commanding authority among the ultraconservative military elite, the so-called bunker. Whereas Salazar had been able to manage the clienteles and power groups within the regime he had created, Caetano had to learn to deal with the existing situation. In 1973, the bunker put a stop to Caetano’s efforts at reform from within, and a more conservative, repressive approach began to emerge, in particular with regard to the opposition (Ramos et al., 2010:696–704).

Breaking the Cycle of Discontinuous Democratization: The Role of the European Union The Carnation Revolution: an uncertain transition to democracy (25 April 1974–25 November 1975). On 25 April 1974, a group of military cap-

tains staged a successful coup against the authoritarian regime that ultimately led to its downfall. The captains were no longer prepared to bear the burden of conducting three separate wars in Africa. The wars in the field had encouraged empathy and sympathy among the middle-ranking officers with the liberation

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movements they were fighting against. In the end, many of these officers were ideologically influenced by the Socialist theories of the liberation movements and adopted similar positions with respect to the Portuguese regime, indicating that the captains had become quite politicized. This coup became the Carnation Revolution when the population took to the streets and sided with the captains, a group that later became known as the Movement of Armed Forces (Movimento das Forças Armadas [MFA]). Between 25 April 1974 and 25 November 1975, Portugal was in a state of revolution. The political elites who had returned from exile had to confront the ambitions of the MFA. During this period of revolutionary instability, there were six provisional governments. However, after 18 July 1974, Colonel Vasco Gonçalves (who, many believed, was close to the Communist Party) became the prime minister of four successive provisional governments, each more radical than the one before. This led to considerable tensions between the political parties and the MFA. The turning point for the political parties was the election on 25 April 1975. For the first time, genuine universal suffrage for both men and women was introduced in Portugal. The electoral results established the Portuguese party system as it is known today. The moderate Socialist Party (Partido Socialista [PS], affiliated with the Socialist International) and the liberal Democratic People’s Party–Social Democratic Party (Partido Popular Democrático [PPD]–Partido Social Democrata [PSD]) received the largest number of votes, winning 37.9 percent (116 seats) and 26.39 percent (81 seats), respectively. The biggest surprise was the weak performance of the Portuguese Communist Party (Partido Comunista Português [PCP]), despite having probably the best organizational resources of all the political parties: the PCP received just 12.5 percent of the vote (30 seats). The People’s Democratic Movement– Democratic Electoral Coalition (Movimento Democratico Popular [MDP]–Coligação Democratica Eleitoral [CDE]), a movement that had rallied the opposition from the left and Catholics during the later phases of the authoritarian regime, won 4.14 percent (5 seats). This movement was regarded by the other parties as a replica of the Communist Party. In addition, a Christian democratic party featuring politicians with close ties to the former authoritarian regime, the Democratic Social Center (Centro Democrático e Social [CDS]), received 7.6 percent of the vote (16 seats). This meant that the vast majority of the population had opted for a liberal democratic constitution and not a replacement of the right-wing authoritarian regime with a left-wing dictatorship. During the hot summer of 1975, the MFA began to disintegrate into various factions. This led to the downfall of Prime Minister Vasco Gonçalves and his government in early September. The sixth government, of Admiral Pinheiro de Azevedo, became the last of the revolutionary process. The period between September and the end of November 1975 was a turbulent, almost anarchic phase of the Carnation Revolution. Even the government decided to go on strike in view of the continuing instability resulting from the multitude of

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power centers. The role of the smaller left-wing parties that subscribed to various versions of Maoist and Trotskyite socialism cannot be underestimated in this context. Although the Communist Party was an active agent in pushing for revolution, one must also take into account the smaller Socialist parties and their role in the destabilization of the country. In the end, an attempt by these smaller Socialist left-wing groups to stage a coup was counteracted by the more moderate Colonel António Ramalho Eanes on 25 November 1975 (for more detail on this final period, see Antunes, 1980; on the period in general, see also Ferreira, 1983; Mailer, 1977; Magone, 1988, 1996a:303–327; Ramos et al., 2010:705–745). The late democratization and the legacy of a weak economy (1976– 1985). The Constituent Assembly adopted the new democratic constitution on

2 April 1976. The constitution was a compromise between various factions, also taking into account the so-called achievements of the revolution, such as workers’ committees and residents’ committees. It clearly followed the eclectic model of “pluralist socialism” (on this aspect, see Eisfeld, 1984). The constitution has been the target of seven reforms (to date); however, the first and second revisions have probably been the most important in terms of adjustments of the constitutional order into alignment with those of other European countries. The 1982 constitutional reform abolished the Council of the Revolution, a group consisting of members of the MFA who had been in charge of monitoring the democratic process and had acted as a Constitutional Court. In addition, the powers of the directly elected president were restricted. In the second revision of 1989, the economic part of the constitution, which had been highly influenced by the Socialist movements of the revolution, was adjusted to reflect a more liberal economic order. Between 1976 and 1985, a consolidation of the new democratic structures took place; however, in reality, none of the political parties was strong enough or had enough experience to achieve long-term political stability. After a year and a half of revolutionary progress, the Portuguese economy was still in dire straits, and a new basis for the transition to democracy had not yet evolved, resulting in continued turbulence until 1985. During this period, there were ten governments that lasted on average less than a year (207.5 days) each. Despite this political instability, some considerable improvements took place during the first decade of democracy. Between 1976 and July 1979, there were five governments that lasted on average 173.2 days each, but between August 1979 and early November 1985 the duration of administrations increased to 479 days each (Magone, 1997:45–46). Between 1976 and 1978, the Socialist Party dominated the political process. Prime Minister Mário Soares established a minority government after the general elections of 25 April 1976, which he won with a relative majority. However, the lack of a parliamentary majority led to the regime’s downfall in parliament; Soares then formed a second government with the smaller, conservative

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(Christian democratic) Democratic Social Center in 1978, which lasted only six months. One of the most urgent problems that Soares had to manage was the financial situation, with its roots in a trade-balance deficit that had resulted in an unsustainable deficit. As a result, the new government was compelled to apply for a standby credit with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The standby credit in 1978 led to an austerity program aimed at consolidating the state’s finances. However, the fall of the second Soares government was followed by a more proactive position taken by the directly elected president António Ramalho Eanes. In order to bridge the last years of the legislature period until 1980, Eanes appointed three presidential governments consisting of independent ministers; these were not very successful in dealing with the complexity of the problems in the Portuguese economy and society. On 5 December 1979, new elections took place in which the Democratic Alliance (Aliança Democrática [AD]), a center-right electoral coalition under the leadership of the charismatic Francisco Sá Carneiro, won an absolute majority. These elections were also designed to bridge the first legislature period. On 5 October 1980, new elections for the second legislature took place, and the AD was again able to win an absolute majority. Unfortunately, Prime Minister Sá Carneiro died in early January 1981 in an aviation accident while campaigning for the presidential candidate of the AD. Even today, the reasons for this crash are not clear, and several enquiries into the event have taken place. Sá Carneiro was replaced by the media tycoon Francisco Pinto Balsemão, who headed two governments between 1981 and 1983. The primary achievement of the AD government was a reduction in the military’s influence in the political system, achieved by means of the first constitutional revision, in 1982. The military enjoyed continuing power through the Council of the Revolution; one of the primary priorities of the political class was to abolish the council and replace it with a proper Constitutional Court. The German and Austrian models were important examples for the establishment of an institution that would be above the political parties and could rule over disputes in a constitutional matter (see Chapter 7). After the elections of 25 April 1983, the leader of the Socialist Party again became prime minister, forming a coalition government with the Social Democratic Party. This coalition government became known as the Central Block (Bloco Central), as it included the two main political parties. Prime Minister Soares had the unrewarding task of applying for a second standby credit from the International Monetary Fund owing to the high interest rates abroad and Portugal’s trade imbalances and budget deficit. As a result, the Portuguese government had to implement another difficult austerity package. Many Portuguese survived only due to their close-knit family networks, as the weak welfare state was under financial scrutiny from the IMF. In 1985, Prime Minister Soares was beginning to focus on his candidacy for the presidency, as elections were scheduled to take place at the end of the year. Unexpectedly, the vice prime minister, Carlos Costa Pinto (of the PSD),

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resigned and died on 7 May 1985. After a power struggle within the PSD during the party’s conference, the new leader, Aníbal Cavaco Silva, emerged; after failed renegotiations with the Socialists, Cavaco Silva withdrew the PSD ministers from the government. This led to new elections on 6 October 1985 that were won by the PSD, under the leadership of Cavaco Silva, with a relative majority. In these elections, the Socialist Party suffered heavy losses, with a large percentage of the electorate opting for a new party founded by then-president António Ramalho Eanes (see Cunha, 2005:211, 292; Stock, 1989b). The reality of superficial Europeanization (since 1986). Cavaco Silva’s vic-

tory was an important turning point for the consolidation of democracy in Portugal, as he symbolized the transition from the period of political and economic instability to that of stability. Moreover, Cavaco Silva profited from the country’s accession to the European Community in 1986 and the resulting structural funds. It was the first Socialist minority government of Mário Soares that had submitted the original application for membership on 28 March 1977. It took about eight years for Portugal to become a member of the European Community; in contrast, Greece had achieved member status by 1981. One of the reasons for the delay was that Portugal’s accession process was linked to the Spanish process, which was more complex and was obstructed by France up until the last moment (Magone, 2010d:225). Cavaco Silva’s administration initiated the second phase of Portuguese democracy: Europeanization. This stage has required Portugal to gradually adjust institutionally, politically, socially, and culturally to the policies defined at the European Union level. Among these policies are the cohesion policy, which attempts to overcome national priorities, and economic and monetary union. This phase is still ongoing, but one can note the growing peripheralization of the country in terms of its autonomy and sovereignty (see Chapter 10). Cavaco Silva was a renowned professor of economics at the University of Lisbon and had completed his doctorate at the University of York in the United Kingdom. In many ways, his self-confident, charismatic outlook created confidence both internally and externally, with a positive spillover on politics and the country’s economy. In 1987, after a motion of censure carried by all the political parties against Cavaco Silva, new general elections were called on 17 July 1987 that led to an absolute majority for Cavaco Silva’s party. Cavaco Silva was to remain in power until 1995 after winning a renewed absolute majority in 1991. This “decade of reforms,” to paraphrase the title of a book by Cavaco Silva, clearly institutionalized the democratic structures of the country. During this so-called Cavaquismo, the state’s finances were balanced and Portugal experienced one of its greatest periods of economic growth, lasting from 1986 to 1992. Although European integration was an important factor in strengthening Portuguese democracy, the hard work of the governments under Cavaco Silva cannot be underestimated. These governments initiated the first

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programs of administrative reform, added sustainability and stability to the country’s weak welfare policies, and attempted to reform many other areas that had been neglected by previous governments. Overall, it was an important decade of consolidation. However, one negative aspect of Cavaco Silva’s governance style was his failure to engage with the opposition. This became particularly evident in his refusal to take part in televised debates with the main leader of the opposition. It was also Cavaco Silva who prepared Portugal to join the eurozone, explaining some of his emphasis on the importance of sound fiscal policies. The final phase of Cavaquismo, between 1992 and 1995, was less positive due to the economic recession (Magone, 1997:33–36). In the elections of 1 October 1995, the Socialist Party under its leader Prime Minister António Guterres won a strong majority. In 1999, this victory was repeated again. Until 1998, the Socialist Party had closely followed the fiscally prudent policies of previous governments, in particular because Portugal wanted to become one of the founding members of the eurozone. This objective was achieved without problems, as Portugal had fulfilled all of the necessary criteria. However, after the elections of 1999, the Socialist government began to spend more, especially in terms of welfare policies. The economy was greatly boosted by this public spending while the export sector was stagnating. In 2001, the European Commission began an excessive deficit procedure against Portugal because its budget deficit was above the allowed 3 percent of the country’s GDP. To make the situation worse, Prime Minister Guterres resigned after a catastrophic defeat in local elections in December 2001. Early elections were set for 17 March 2002; these were won by the PSD under José Manuel Durão Barroso (Magone, 2003b). Barroso then formed a coalition government with the CDS-PP, with the intention of reducing the budget deficit below the 3 percent mark. The population consequently had to endure austerity policies that were increased in severity several times. Between April 2002 and July 2004, the Barroso government became quite unpopular, also due to growing opposition from the trade unions. In July 2004, Barroso was appointed by the Council of Ministers of the European Union to be the new president of the Commission, and he was replaced as prime minister by Pedro Santana Lopes. However, the government of Santana Lopes lasted only until the end of the year. President Jorge Sampaio decided to call for early elections due to the catastrophic mismanagement of the government (Magone, 2006c). New elections on 20 February 2005 resulted in an absolute majority for the Socialist Party under José Sócrates. The new Socialist government remained on the same path of reform for the public administration and the economy. These policies were fairly successful until 2008; by that point, the Portuguese government had been able to reduce the budget deficit to almost 3 percent of GDP. However, the global financial crisis that originated in the United States following the collapse of Lehman Brothers forced the Portuguese government to bail out some banks as well, in particular the Portuguese Business Bank (Banco Português de Negócios, BPN). By the

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end of 2009, the budget deficit had soared from 3.5 to 10.1 percent. Despite this situation, the Socialists won the elections at the end of September 2009 with a relative majority; however, the new Socialist government had no working majority in parliament. Everything had to be negotiated with the other parties, and the budgetary process in particular was difficult and cumbersome. The 2010 and 2011 budgets were approved only because the PSD abstained, which meant that the Socialists had a majority relative to the smaller parties. During 2010, several austerity packages were approved in order to comply with guidelines coming from the European Commission. These packages were approved in parliament only by the abstention of the PSD. In the end, the Sócrates administration was unable to force through a fourth austerity package on 23 March 2011, and the prime minister resigned (Semanário Económico, 23 March 2011). Within weeks, pressure from the sovereign bond markets had substantially increased the interest rates under which Portugal was able to borrow new money; in addition, Portuguese banks refused to give further credit to the government. Consequently, on 7 April 2011, the Sócrates government had to ask for a bailout of €78 billion from the European Financial Stability Mechanism in order to circumvent the extortionary interest rates that the markets were demanding for new credit (The Guardian, 7 April 2011). As discussed in Chapter 1, a memorandum of understanding with the troika (the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the IMF) was signed on 23 May 2011; this document envisions a radical restructuring of the Portuguese state. The memorandum is quite wide-ranging and detailed in terms of targets and measures. Its overall aim is to reduce the country’s budget deficit to 3 percent of GDP and to enable its return to the sovereign bond markets in the second half of 2013 (European Commission, European Central Bank, and International Monetary Fund, 2011). This memorandum was supported by the PSD and the CDS-PP, but rejected by the Communist Party and the Block of the Left (Bloco da Esquerda [BE]). In the elections of 5 June 2011, the new PSD leader, Pedro Passos Coelho, was the winner; he then formed a coalition with the CDS-PP. Due to the extremely serious situation Portugal was facing, the government was installed much earlier than planned; the administration has been implementing the conditions of the memorandum of understanding ever since. The Portuguese budget deficit for the year 2011 was quite encouraging: The government ran a budget deficit of 4.2 percent after transferring surplus pension funds to cover the shortfall, an achievement that was confirmed by the National Institute of Statistics (Instituto Nacional de Estatistica [INE]) (Bloomberg, 20 December 2011; Marketwatch, 30 December 2011). However, in 2012 it was more difficult to achieve a similar target, and the budget deficit soared to 6.4 percent. Similar problems of budgetary discipline were experienced in 2013, leading to a string of substantial unpopular cuts in the budget. As this historical review shows, the nature of Portuguese democracy has affected the country’s integration into the European Union and the world economy,

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and considerably constrained its further development. Many contemporary themes in the Portuguese experience have been recurrent in the country’s history since at least the seventeenth century.

The Weak Semi-Peripheral Economy The Portuguese economy is semi-peripheral in the modern world system. This means that it has features similar to those of the more highly developed advanced economies, but also to those of developing countries (Santos, 2011:21; Magone, 1996a:110). As we have seen in the historical overview, the peripheral or semi-peripheral position of Portugal in the world economy dates back to the seventeenth century, when the Portuguese economy became subordinate to the British. Although Portugal had a huge empire, the country developed into an intermediary economy between its colonies and the rich advanced economies in Europe. The decolonization process during the revolutionary period did not alter this status very much. The competitiveness of the Portuguese economy is still based on labor-intensive products. Over the past four decades, since the Carnation Revolution of 1974, the economic policy of the Portuguese government has been one of survival rather than of structural change. According to Luciano Amaral, in the past four decades, the Portuguese economy grew considerably only between 1986 and 1992 due to its exports; in all other years, it either stagnated or receded due to austerity policies. The country’s participation in the eurozone has been a major constraining factor for its weak economy, because it cannot use devaluation of its currency in order to gain international competitiveness. According to Amaral, the Portuguese have been living off of the state, meaning the welfare benefits and the intervention of the state in the economy through infrastructure projects and other investments, all of which increased the budget deficit to unsustainable levels after 2001 (Amaral, 2010:35–43). The weak economy is highly dependent on the weak state, implying that the state often intervenes in order to subsidize enterprises. One of the most important aspects in developing public-private partnerships is the public sector’s confidence that it can rely upon a strong partner in the private economic sector. However, in Portugal the market is weak, and most enterprises are micro-, small-, or perhaps medium-sized. The vast majority of large enterprises are foreign multinationals (see Chapter 10). In a study conducted by a former judge of the Audit Court, Carlos Moreno, it was found that the state is a poor negotiator of such partnerships. Ultimately, the state ends up footing the bill for the partnership, which is added to the deficit in the government’s budget (Moreno, 2010; Público, 2 November 2010). In addition to the negotiation of contracts, there is also the issue of enforcement of contracts, which still remains a problem for many Portuguese public-private partnerships (see Marques and Silva, 2008:

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42–43, 48–49). The costs that the state bears in many of these partnerships created problems for the Sócrates government in the 2010 budget deficit, which had to be revised upward to 9.1 percent of GDP (Público, 24 April 2010). In comparison to the more advanced small democracies of the Nordic countries, the Netherlands, Germany, France, and Austria, Portugal lags considerably behind. First of all, Portugal has a semi-peripheral economy that does not even fulfill the minimal conditions of the social market economy enshrined in the Treaty of Lisbon. Portugal cannot even afford its already weak welfare state. The achievements of the country in the health sector are remarkable; however, the national health service is suffering under a considerable debt crisis that is now being affected by cuts from the government’s austerity measures. Hospitals cannot afford to pay their pharmaceutical bills, leading to dissatisfaction by providers. The rise in unemployment is creating major problems for the ailing welfare system. In the second trimester of 2012, over 15 percent of workers were unemployed, and youth unemployment reached over 36 percent (Statistics Portugal, 2012).

The Features of Semi-Peripheral Governance Considering the country’s semi-peripheral economy, the weakness of its civil society, and the shortcomings of the state in terms of capacity, there is a need for a conceptualization of what I mean by governance in the case of Portugal. Governance is understood here as more than the sum of all the interactions between the public institutions related to the state at various levels of the political system, the private economic sector, and civil society actors (see Magone, 2009; Rosenau, 2000; M. Rhodes, 1996; R. Rhodes, 1997, 2003; Cassese, 2003; Müller, 2003). Governance as experienced in most of the advanced OECD countries does not yet exist in Portugal. What does exist is a superficially emulated version that is highly subsidized by the state. The weakness of Portuguese enterprises in terms of management is a major contributing factor to this situation; this weakness is reinforced by an anemic civil society. Over the past four decades, the Portuguese government has imported new philosophies of governance from the OECD and the European Union in an incautious manner. The consequence has been a series of mostly failed experiments funded by the Portuguese taxpayers. The Portuguese government has built a distorted form of the system of governance common in more advanced complex democracies. The Portuguese system appears similar, but only on the surface; when it is examined more closely, elements of clientelism, patronage, and mismanagement in Portuguese governance structures become evident. The case of public-private partnerships in Portugal provides a good example of these shortcomings, as an overwhelming majority of these partnerships have been quite expensive for the state, resulting in considerable losses (Moreno, 2010).

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Portuguese democracy has become more complex over time; however, its governance structures are not of the same quality as those of more advanced OECD countries. One of the reasons for this difference is Portugal’s historical legacy of neopatrimonialism, due in part to the very late introduction of Weberian principles of neutral civil administration. Many other European civil systems began to organize and create their Weberian neutral civil administrations in the nineteenth century (e.g., the United Kingdom and the Netherlands), but Portugal’s development was restricted by clientelistic regimes during the constitutional monarchy, the First Republic, and the New State. The Carnation Revolution did not help to remedy this situation, as similar processes of clientelism and patronage were exercised during this brief period as well. The serious construction of a Weberian state in legal and also in real terms began to be implemented only after 1976; however, political and economic instability prevented any major lasting reforms until 1987. Just afterward, during the absolutemajority governments of Cavaco Silva (1987–1991), a Weberian neutral service began to be constructed. However, most of the more advanced countries were then undergoing a process of change management from the rigid neutral Weberian state to a lean new public management system. Portugal began to implement these new public management reforms without having ever completed its Weberian neutral civil administration. As a result, the civil administrative culture in Portugal is a mixture that includes subcultures based on the Weberian neutral service (mostly among the older members of staff), new public management supporters (among younger staff), and also neopatrimonial forms of behavior based on clientelism and patronage (especially at local and regional levels). In the 1980s, Joaquim Aguiar wrote about this mixed political culture. At that time, the new public management reforms were not yet in evidence; consequently, what Aguiar called “post-Salazarism” was a transitional state with cultural traits of the previous neopatrimonial authoritarian regime and a timid emerging subculture of democratic Weberian behavior. In the 1990s, the new public management further undermined efforts to create a Weberian neutral civil service because of its associated marketization principles. In the context of a weak state, a weak economy, and a weak society, the result could only be a distorted form of governance. Several features of this distorted form of governance can be found in Portugal and in most of the other countries that were latecomers to the club of democracy in Europe (Aguiar, 1985, 2005). First among these features is the inability to build a sustainable social market economy as enshrined in the Treaty of Lisbon. One of the major principles of the social market economy is that a strong economy is required to sustain any social state. In Portugal, in contrast, the state has been the focus of redistribution, without the economic basis to sustain this system in a long-term perspective. The country has a semi-peripheral dual economy with two groups of workers, unprotected and protected, in which microenterprises without innovation potential predominate.

The Historical and Socioeconomic Context

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Second, the country’s flexible labor markets are not backed by a strong social security system. This so-called flexicurity is dominant in the Nordic countries; it is primarily a Danish approach to flexible labor markets, refined and perfected over time, that has been adopted at the European level by all EU member states. Flexicurity is a compromise between those countries with very flexible labor markets and countries with more rigid markets. This concept formed a part of the Lisbon strategy that required revision in 2005 (Antoniades, 2008:336–340; Solari, 2011; European Commission 2007). Its implementation in southern, central, and eastern Europe (the semi-peripheral economies of the EU) has been relatively biased toward deregulation and flexibilization without the accompanying social welfare policies. Portugal is no exception to the rule in this regard, and the euro crisis has exposed the weakness of the country’s labor market and its associated social policies. Third, as previously mentioned, industrial relations in Portugal are still underdeveloped. There is a central institution that regulates industrial relations in the formal economy, particularly in the roughly 1,000 large enterprises, but there is also a large unprotected sector with either highly inefficient industrial relations structures or none at all. The state institutions are also too weak to efficiently control noncompliance with labor and social legislation (see Chapter 6). Fourth, the state within the governance system is merely first among equals in providing any public services. It acts in competition with other providers that may be able to offer the same services more efficiently or at lower costs. In Portugal, due to the weak economy, the state tends to be quite dominant, but it suffers from a low capacity. Both the weak economy and the weak society depend on subsidies in order to survive. This subsidiodependencia has been a significant characteristic in Portugal (see Chapters 4, 9, and 10). Fifth, after decades of restricted democratic regimes, a strong civil society is still under construction in Portugal. The low level of education among a large percentage of the population has remained one of the major obstacles to the creation of a more vibrant civil society independent of the state. However, there are positive signs that over the next decade a critical mass may emerge that will contribute to improvements in Portugal’s democracy. The national crisis has been an important catalyst in this respect (see Chapter 8). Sixth, Portugal is not the only country in the European Union with these features. Many countries in southern, central, and eastern Europe are constrained by similar features as they attempt to move toward a more advanced form of governance. In general, a distorted form of governance is evident that is undermining the political and economic foundations of Portuguese democracy. This book seeks to explore the quality of democracy in Portugal after four decades of the new regime. Its analytical framework will closely follow the categories proposed both by David Beetham and by Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino (see Chapter 1).

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Conclusion Portugal’s historical development demonstrates that the country has been semiperipheral in the world economy since the seventeenth century. The main reason for this socioeconomic constellation has been the inability of the country’s political elites to use the wealth accumulated during the Age of Discovery and Expansion for the development of a sustainable economy within the country. The coastal economy has not been well integrated with the agricultural survival economy of the interior regions of the country. Portugal’s industrialization has lagged behind that of its peers since the eighteenth century. Despite the acceleration of the nation’s economic industrialization during the 1960s under the regime of Salazar, the Portuguese economy has remained semi-peripheral in the world market. Structural changes since 1976 have been merely superficial, and the semi-peripheral nature of Portugal has remained a constant. The historical path-dependency of both its semi-peripheral economy and discontinuous late democratization are still shaping Portuguese democracy today. Portugal is characterized by a triad of a weak state, economy, and civil society that has clearly prevented the development of strong governance in the country. Instead, a distorted governance (in comparison to that found in the more advanced economies of the European Union) has resulted. The pitfalls of this distorted governance have become evident since 2000 when the economy began to stagnate and public finances became unsustainable. The only sustainable way out of the nation’s crisis is a considerable investment in people (the country’s primary resource) and entrepreneurship, including improvements to the managerial skills of the work force.

3 The Structure and Development of the Core Political System PORTUGAL HAS BEEN QUITE SUCCESSFUL IN DEVELOPING A MORE OR

less functional procedural democracy. After four decades of interactions between the institutions of the core political system since the Carnation Revolution of 1974, the outcome in terms of democratic behavior has thus far been quite positive. The rules associated with the democratic procedures have been internalized by the Portuguese political elites; moreover, the performance of the core institutions has improved considerably over time. Today, most procedures related to the government, parliament, and presidency are well regulated, and the political elites adhere to these rules. The main pattern of government has been majoritarian; this means that Portugal is not a consensus democracy, but rather a democracy that tends to be polarized between the left and the right (for a typology, see Lijphart, 1999).

The Presidency The requirement for a genuinely directly elected president was an innovative addition to the Portuguese constitution. According to André Freire and António Costa Pinto, there are at least four reasons underlying the emergence of the direct election of the president in the Constitution of 1976. First of all, after decades of authoritarian rule, the Portuguese population wanted to enjoy greater participation in the political process; the direct election of the presidency was a way to achieve this goal. Second, the positive experience of an opposition that was galvanized against the authoritarian regime in the presidential elections of 1951 and 1958 played an important role in the collective memory of a segment of the population. Third, the governmental and parliamentary instability of the First Republic was certainly a factor in the creation of the directly elected presidency, because it was believed that an elected president could act as an anchor of both stability and moderation. Fourth, the new party system was quite 43

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weak and still in development, and personal likes and dislikes between leaders were inherent in the Portuguese political culture. A directly elected president could stand above the weak party system and act as a guarantee of institutional functioning. In addition, the president would be an important figure in ensuring the proper functionality of minority governments, particularly on the left side of the party system, as the Communist Party and the radical left were ostracized from governmental power by the mainstream parties due to the negative role that they had allegedly played during the revolutionary period. One could probably add a fifth reason, related to the nature of military legitimacy (Freire and Pinto, 2005:39–40). In 1976, the political parties had to sign a second pact with the Movement of Armed Forces in which they agreed that the president should be a military officer; this reinforced the dominance of the military-revolutionary legality over the emerging democratic-civilian trend (Domingos, 1980:150). The direct election of the president clearly helped to bridge the divide between the two legalities and sources of legitimacy. The pact was signed on 26 February 1976; the constitution was adopted by the Constituent Assembly some months later. This pact significantly constrained the work of the Constituent Assembly, as the demands of the military had to be included in the Basic Law. According to Emidio da Veiga Domingos, the presidency of the republic and the Council of the Revolution were the two most important bodies of sovereignty, followed only by the Assembly of the Republic and the government, as enshrined in Article 113 of the Constitution of 1976 (Domingos, 1980:127). The civilian political elites were thus forced to share power with the MFA, which dominated the revolutionary process for at least five years after the adoption of the constitution. The Council of the Revolution could be regarded as the equivalent of the Assembly of the Republic for the military-revolutionary legacy of the new democratic regime. The Council of the Revolution was presided over by the president, and its Constitutional Commission examined the constitutionality of laws (for more detail, see Chapter 7; see also Domingos, 1980:127–132). In this sense, the new political system consisted of a military-revolutionary domain (based on the new institutions created between 1974 and 1975) and the emerging but still weak civilian-democratic domain (based on the democratically elected Assembly of the Republic and the government). Only after five years was there the possibility for civilian politicians to revise the constitution, which they accomplished in 1982. The new constitution abolished the Council of the Revolution, which had been a central part of the double legality of the democratic regime, and considerably reduced the powers of the president, such that any officeholder is constrained by the practices of parliamentary government common in most western European democracies. The legal competences of the Council of the Republic were now divided into two new institutions: the Constitutional Court (Chapter 7) and the advisory State Council. Presidents were limited to two consecutive terms. Although the first president of the republic was a general, António Ramalho Eanes (1976–1985), he was succeeded by Mário Soares, a civilian leader. The

The Core Political System

45

second round of the presidential elections of 1986 completed the process of the civilianization of the new democratic regime. Therefore, in order to assess the presidency of the republic since 1976, one must differentiate between the periods before and after 1982. Before 1982, there were two legal orders integrated through the office of the president of the republic; since 1982, the office has been entirely integrated into a traditional system of parliamentary democracy. In the first period, General Ramalho Eanes enjoyed broad powers due to his central position in the political system. The structure made him the uniting element between the two legacies. Moreover, the party system was still in development and therefore quite weak. Another factor that gave Eanes the edge over civilian politicians was that most politicians were relatively inexperienced in terms of government. In addition, personalism related to the likes and dislikes of politicians within and between political parties strengthened his role as the anchor of stability. The position of Eanes remained strong after the constitutional revision of 1982 because the political parties continued to have difficulties creating stable governments. Eanes tried to extend his influence even after his second term by founding the Democratic Renewal Party (Partido Renovador Democrático [PRD]), which was able to win more than 17 percent of the vote in the October elections of 1985. However, its support collapsed in the July 1987 elections due to an ill-considered motion of censure passed with the help of the Socialists and Communists in the Assembly of the Republic against the first Aníbal Cavaco Silva government (1985–1987). Semipresidentialism as a distinct model of parliamentary and presidential systems was developed by the French political scientist Maurice Duverger, who took inspiration from the 1958 constitution of the Fifth French Republic. Originally, the president of France was indirectly elected, but after 1962 a direct election was introduced. Duverger’s model identifies three features that characterize semipresidential systems: A political regime is considered as semipresidential if the constitution, which established it, combines three elements: (1) the president of the republic is elected by universal suffrage; (2) he possesses quite considerable powers; (3) he has opposite him, however, a prime minister and ministers who possess executive and governmental power and can stay in office only if the parliament does not show its opposition to them. (1980:166)

Despite the 1982 revision of its constitution, Portugal remains a semipresidential system; however, the government and parliament are at the center of the political system. The president, as mentioned, acts as a moderating power. Any measure of the power of the president of the Portuguese republic can only take place using a dynamic approach including a variety of factors. First of all, a learning process has taken place since 1976, making the office more structured and formalized. The presidency of General Ramalho Eanes took place during a period of democratic consolidation, such that the relationship between the institutions was characterized by trial and error. Second, the constellation between

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the three institutions plays a significant role. In periods of absolute majorities with a president and a government of different factions, one may expect greater tension or perhaps a president who seeks to act as a counterbalance against the dominance of the executive branch over the parliament. This was notably the case in the second term of Mário Soares, from 1990 to 1995, a period during which the third Cavaco Silva government faced numerous vetoes from the president. Third, the president’s role becomes crucially important during periods of minority governments. Minority governments cannot rely on a stable majority in parliament and are thus generally weakened from the outset. However, the president can ensure political stability and act as a mediator in order to achieve consensus over bills or legislation of national importance. This could be seen in particular during the first term of President Cavaco Silva, who played a vital role in helping the second Sócrates government (2009–2011) to get the 2010 and 2011 budgets approved with the abstention of the main opposition party (Magone, 2011d:1104; Magone, 2012). In addition, the importance of a president is enhanced when a coalition government resigns or is functioning extremely poorly, as was the case with the coalition government between the social-democrats and centrists under Prime Minister José Manuel Durão Barroso that was formed after the elections of March 2002. In 2004, Barroso was appointed by the Council of Ministers of the European Union to succeed Romano Prodi as the president of the European Commission. Barroso therefore had to resign from his post as prime minister of Portugal. However, he wanted the coalition government to continue under a different prime minister without calling early elections. President Jorge Sampaio consulted the political parties and the Council of State and made the decision to allow the continuation of the coalition government under the leadership of a new prime minister, namely a close friend of Barroso, Pedro Santana Lopes. However, the new coalition government under Santana Lopes was not successful in managing the austerity program that had been initiated by the previous government. After the summer, it became clear that the Santana Lopes government was deteriorating at a rapid rate. Even members of Santana Lopes’s own social democratic party (including former prime minister Aníbal Cavaco Silva) were very critical of the performance of the Santana Lopes administration. After consultation with the political parties and the Council of State, President Sampaio dissolved the Assembly of the Republic on 10 December 2004 and called for early elections. Prime Minister Santana Lopes had to resign soon thereafter. In order to guarantee the functioning of the governmental institutions, Sampaio was intent on obtaining approval for the 2005 budget of the outgoing government. This case demonstrates that even when the government has an absolute majority based on a winning coalition, the quality of performance can be a crucial factor that pushes the president to act and intervene in the political process (Magone, 2006c). Despite the parliamentary constraints, the powers of the president are still considerable. In addition to the right of political veto, the president can also

The Core Political System

47

send bills ex ante and post facto to the Constitutional Court in order to verify their constitutionality. All presidents have thus far used these powers either to reject legislation or to make the court aware of problems related to certain bills. According to the Constitution of 2005 (Articles 133–136), primary and interinstitutional powers of the president include: • Veto rights. The right of political veto for legislative bills approved in the Assembly of the Republic, which can be overturned by an absolute majority. In some areas (such as external relations, delimitations of public-private as well as private-cooperative and social-sector ownership of means of production), the right to regulate electoral acts. And the right of political veto for governmental decrees. • Preventive and successive scrutiny of the constitutionality of laws. The right to submit parliamentary and governmental bills to the Constitutional Court in order to check their constitutionality. Can request the Constitutional Court to declare legal norms unconstitutional, as well as to declare the omission of such legal norms unconstitutional. • Appointment, dismissal, and dissolution powers. Includes dissolution of the Assembly of the Republic after consultation with the political parties and the Council of State, and appointment of the prime minister after consultation with all political parties and consideration of the electoral results. The president can dismiss the prime minister only when this is necessary to ensure the regular functioning of democratic institutions, and only after consultation with the Council of State. • Appointment of the ministers of a new government following a proposal from the prime minister. Dissolution of the regional assemblies of the Azores and Madeira after hearing all parties represented in the parliament and the Council of State. • Other powers. Commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Presides over the Supreme Council of National Defense and over the Council of State (main advisory body). Can submit to referendum questions of national interest. However, in general the use of this power has been fairly moderate, when one compares the number of political and constitutional vetoes relative to the number of laws (Figure 3.1). Notable here is the performance of President Mário Soares in his second term, which almost resulted in an “institutional guerrilla war” with the government. The prime minister at the time, Aníbal Cavaco Silva, had great difficulty getting legislation approved (see Magone, 1997:41–42). Jorge Sampaio was also quite active during the cohabitation period with the Barroso government between 2002 and 2004. As a comparison, Sampaio’s number of political and constitutional vetoes is about the same as for the longer period of the same-party governments of António Guterres between 1995 and

48

Politics in Contemporary Portugal Figure 3.1 Presidential Political and Constitutional Vetoes of Bills from the Assembly of the Republic, 1976–2010

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