Politics and Resentment : Antisemitism and Counter-Cosmopolitanism in the European Union [1 ed.] 9789004190474, 9789004190467

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Politics and Resentment

Jewish Identities in a Changing World General Editors

Eliezer Ben-Rafael, Yosef Gorny, and Judit Bokser Liwerant

VOLUME 14

Politics and Resentment Antisemitism and Counter-Cosmopolitanism in the European Union

Edited by

Lars Rensmann and Julius H. Schoeps

Leiden  • boston 2011

This book is printed on acid-free paper. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Politics and resentment : antisemitism and counter-cosmopolitanism in the European Union / [edited] by Lars Rensmann and Julius H. Schoeps.    p. cm. — ( Jewish identities in a changing world)   ISBN 978-90-04-19046-7 (hardback : alk. paper) 1. Antisemitism—Europe— History—21st century. 2. Europe—Ethnic relations—History—21st century. 3. Europe, Western—Politics and government—1989– 4. Europe, Eastern—Politics and government—1989– 5. Right and left (Political science)—Europe. 6. Europe— Relations—Israel. 7. Israel—Relations—Europe. 8. Arab-Israeli conflict—Influence. I. Rensmann, Lars. II. Schoeps, Julius H. ( Julius Hans), 1942–  DS146.E85P65 2010   305.892’404—dc22 2010028911

ISSN 1570-7997 ISBN 978 90 04 19046 7 EISBN 978 90 04 19047 4 © Copyright 2011 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Hotei Publishing, IDC Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change.

Contents Acknowledgements  ....................................................................... Contributors  . ................................................................................

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I.  Foundations Politics and Resentment: Examining Antisemitism and Counter-Cosmopolitanism in the European Union and Beyond  . .................................................................. . Lars Rensmann and Julius H. Schoeps

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II.  European Comparisons Is There a “New European Antisemitism?” Public Opinion and Comparative Empirical Research in Europe  ...... . Werner Bergmann

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“Against Globalism”: Counter-Cosmopolitan Discontent and Antisemitism in Mobilizations of European Extreme Right Parties  ............................................................................. 117 . Lars Rensmann Antisemitism and Anti-Americanism: Comparative European Perspectives  .............................................................. 147 . Andrei S. Markovits Playing the Nazi Card: Israel, Jews, and Antisemitism  ................ 183 . Paul Iganski and Abe Sweiry III.  Eastern Europe The Empire Strikes Back: Antisemitism in Russia  ....................... 199 . Stella Rock and Alexander Verkhovsky

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Hatred towards Jews as a Political Code? Antisemitism in Hungary  .......................................................... 231 . András Kovács The Resilience of Tradition: Antisemitism in Poland and the Ukraine  ........................................................................ 249 . Ireneusz Krzemiski IV.  Western Europe Beyond the Republican Model: Antisemitism in France  . ............ 277 Jean-Yves Camus The Liberal Tradition and Unholy Alliances of the Present: Antisemitism in the United Kingdom  . ..................................... 307 Michael Whine Political Cultures of Denial? Antisemitism in Sweden and Scandinavia  . ............................................................................. 329 Henrik Bachner Erosion of a Taboo: Antisemitism in Switzerland  ........................ 363 Christina Späti Anti-Jewish Guilt Deflection and National Self-Victimization: Antisemitism in Germany  ......................................................... 397 Samuel Salzborn Between Neo-Fascism, “Anti-Fascism,” and Anti-Zionism: Antisemitism in Italy  ................................................................. 425 Emanuele Ottolenghi V. Epilogue Rethinking Antisemitism, Counter-Cosmopolitanism, and Human Rights in the Global Age: A Political Crisis of Postmodernity?  ......................................................................... 457 Lars Rensmann Index  ............................................................................................. 491

Acknowledgements We are particularly grateful to the Moses Mendelssohn Center for European-Jewish Studies at the University of Potsdam and the Department of Political Science at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor. Both provided an invaluable institutional and intellectual climate and an academic environment that is second to none. This book is also greatly indebted to the ongoing support by the German Academic Exchange Service/DAAD (Deutscher Akademischer Austausch Dienst). The DAAD helped make this work possible. Without the commitment by the many outstanding scholars who contributed to this project, this volume would not have seen the light of day, either. We owe special thanks to Gideon Botsch, Christoph Kopke, Roswitha Kuska, Stella Rock, and Samuel Salzborn. Anthony Pinnell, Halrun Luppes and Jeffrey Luppes did a tremendous copy-editing job on different parts of the manuscript and deserve our gratitude. We also want to thank the editors at Brill in Boston, and in particular Jennifer Pavelko and Katelyn Chin, for their fabulous, superbly professional work, as well as the readers who managed an unusually speedy and supportive review process. Last but not least we are especially grateful to Elizier BenRafael, Yosef Gorny and Judit Bokser Liwerant for their staunch support and their idea to publish this book in their wonderful, renowned series “Jewish Identities in a Changing World.”

Contributors Henrik Bachner, Ph.D., is an independent scholar in Stockholm. Most recently, he was Researcher for the Swedish Research Council project “Sweden’s Relations with Nazism, Nazi Germany and the Holocaust”. Werner Bergmann, Ph.D., is Professor of Sociology at the Center for Antisemitism Research at the Technical University Berlin. Jean-Yves Camus, Ph.D., is Professor at the Institut Universitaire d’Études Juives Elie Wiesel, Paris, and Associate Researcher at the Institut de Relations Internationales et Strategiques, Paris. Paul Iganski, Ph.D., is Senior Lecturer in Social Justice at the Department of Applied Social Science at Lancaster University. András Kovács, Ph.D., is Professor of Nationalism Studies at the Central European University, Budapest, and Academic Director of the Jewish Studies Project, Central European University. Ireneusz Krzemiski, Ph.D., is Professor of Sociology at the University of Warsaw. Andrei S. Markovits, Ph.D., is Arthur F. Thurnau Professor and Karl W. Deutsch Collegiate Professor of Comparative Politics and German Studies at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. Emanuele Ottolenghi, Ph.D., is the Director of the Transatlantic Institute, Brussels. Samuel Salzborn, Ph.D., is the Interim Professor for Democracy and Democratization Research at the Department of Political Science, University of Giessen.

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Lars Rensmann, Ph.D., is DAAD Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, and Permanent Fellow at the Moses Mendelssohn Center at the University of Potsdam. Stella Rock, Ph.D., is Senior Research Fellow in the Keston Center for Religion, Politics & Society, Baylor University, Texas. Julius H. Schoeps, Ph.D., is Senior Professor of History at Humboldt University and the Director of the Moses Mendelssohn Center at the University of Potsdam. Christina Späti, Ph.D., is Lecturer at the Department of Swiss and General Contemporary History at the University of Fribourg, Switzerland. Abe Sweiry is a Doctoral Candidate in the Department of Applied Social Science at Lancaster University. Alexander Verkhovsky is Director of the SOVA Center for Information and Analysis, Moscow. Michael Whine is Director of Government and International Affairs, Community Security Trust, London.

I.  Foundations

Politics and Resentment: Examining Antisemitism and Counter-Cosmopolitanism in the European Union and Beyond Lars Rensmann and Julius H. Schoeps I.  An Unlikely Resurgence of a ‘European Phenomenon’? In the course of history, antisemitism has been an integral part of European modernity. It certainly marked the “short twentieth century,” an “age of extremes” (Hobsbawm 1994). Post-War Europe after 1945, then, emerged against the background of the catastrophe of the Holocaust and the genocidal antisemitism that motivated it. However, by and large post-War European governments and citizens recognized—and at times were forced to accept—the need for a substantial break with the past. This affected first and foremost the democratization of political institutions. Yet, it also entailed facing the legacy of ethnic nationalism’s and antisemitism’s road to destruction and persecution. In particular, Europe’s post-national integration into the European Union evolved—among other things—as a moral and political counter-model to the antisemitic, totalitarian and ethnicnationalist legacy that shaped the first half of the European 20th century. Although coming to terms with the colonial and totalitarian past continues to be a difficult matter for European nations and publics, many significant lessons have been drawn from the continent’s moral and political downfall, and from the crises and mass atrocities that were part and parcel of European political modernity. To be sure, European societies continue to be shaped by ongoing public controversies about their difficult legacies of the 19th and 20th century: namely the continent’s colonial history, two world wars, Stalinism and Nazism, the rise of “totalitarian antisemitism” and in particular the atrocities of the Holocaust (Horkheimer & Adorno 1985). These debates continue to signify a “constant seesaw between learning and forgetting,” as Saul Friedlander (1993) once put it. They also document considerably varying, sometimes only half-hearted efforts by different governments, parties, and elites to address a nation’s

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difficult legacy (Art 2005; Barkan 2004). Indeed, especially the Nazi terror of Auschwitz and Treblinka is not just an “unmastered” but also an unmasterable past (Lowenthal 1987a). Working through this past is by no means an easy task. The process of collective learning in order to overcome century-old legacies of resentments and particularistic enmities is an ongoing, open-ended process. Deep-seated prejudices can dissipate with time. They do not disappear overnight. Political systems can change from one day to the next; political cultures need much time to substantially transform. Significant cross-national variations notwithstanding, however, overall antisemitism and racism had been in decline in post-War Europe and, in particular, since Europe’s politico-cultural cosmopolitanization in the wake of the second globalization (Markovits & Rensmann 2010). By now, such group resentments have become generally discredited among the publics of democratic member states of the European Union, though they are still virulent in significant parts of the electorate. By and large European nations, and first and foremost the EU itself, have turned into political agents of inclusive cosmopolitan agendas (Beck & Grande 2007; Checkel & Katzenstein 2009) that are engaged in struggles against ethnic, social, cultural, or religious discrimination. The shifting memory regimes in relation to Europe’s Holocaust legacy and national remembrance have played a significant role in this process (Fogu, Kantsteiner & Lebow 2006). Furthermore, while latent forms of antisemitism never fully dissipated among considerable segments of citizens and voters, comparative time series survey data from Western Europe demonstrate that post-war European societies also witnessed an overall intergenerational change. Over five decades until the 1990s, there has been a notable, though not necessarily linear decline of antisemitic and racist attitudes in subsequent generational cohorts (cf. Bergmann 2008). These empirical findings are as much a reflection of Europe’s aforementioned institutional democratization as they express cultural modernization and liberalization processes in European societies.1 The European and World Value Surveys indicate that contemporary Europe is shaped by cultural change towards post-materialism, tolerance, self-expression values and   In various respects this process has been belated in Western countries like Spain, Portugal and Greece, which remained military dictatorships until the beginning of the post-industrial age. This also applies to the post-Communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. 1



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inclusive cosmopolitan preferences generally at odds with old antiJewish and racist hatred. They are part of a “broader shift towards self-expression values that is reshaping orientations toward authority, politics, gender roles, and sexual norms among the publics of postindustrial societies [. . .]—the rise of humanistic norms that emphasize human emancipation and self-expression” (Inglehart & Welzel 2005: 126). The latter are in turn reliable predictors of political democratization; those values generate demands for institutional democratization bringing stronger entitlements to liberty, autonomy, and liberal democracy. Inglehart and Welzel also suggest that post-material cultural change toward self-expression values favoring autonomous human choice over authoritarianism and conventional prejudice is conditioned by low levels of existential security (Inglehart & Welzel 2005: 287). From an neo-institutionalist and from a discourse-theoretical perspective, however, such value change may also be caused by increasingly democratized institutions and rights entitlements, on the one hand; interacting processes of democratic public will-formation leading to changed normative self-understandings of postmodern societies, on the other (Habermas 1996; Rensmann 2004a; 2004b). Be that as it may, in spite of recurring exceptions to the rule, by the 1990s overt racial antisemitism and racism had become more and more illegitimate. They were discredited in post-War West European political cultures. According to European self-understandings, public manifestation of open racism and antisemitism usually experienced negative sanctions or scandalizing (Bergmann 1997). This is a mechanism that right-wing extremists, whose objective is to overcome liberal democracy, often portray as an infringement on freedom of speech and democracy. Nonetheless, these—nationally varying—discursive boundaries that were established in post-War Europe’s democratic publics have had significant impact. They have re-shaped societal selfunderstandings, cultural values, and their public display (Rensmann 2004a). Consequently, public antisemitic and racist agents could only survive on the radical fringes of European societies. Since 1945, antisemitic agitators had little public space to disseminate their views. They were socially and politically marginalized. In spite of several attempted attacks on Jewish synagogues and community centers by left-wing radicals in the name of ‘anti-Zionism’ (Kraushaar 2005) or antisemitic hate crimes by neo-Nazis, radical antisemitism remained predominantly limited to graffiti and isolated incidents of demagogic political speech, or it was pressed into semi-public spheres and camouflaged in

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coded forms of crypto-antisemitism. In the context of the consolidation of democratic political and party systems, extreme right parties became largely politically irrelevant and had little to no electoral success until the mid-1980s; the Movimento Sociale Italiano in post-War Italy being one of few exceptions (cf. Ignazi 2003). In many respects, all of these developments made a significant resurgence of open antisemitism, ethnic nationalism and racism unlikely to occur in the European context. Or so it seemed. II.  Signs of Trouble: New Actors, Issues, and Mobilizations in Transnational Spaces If the quasi-linear narrative of post-War democratization and working through the past—to a varying degree and with diverging speed in different European countries—gave us the full picture, why is there a need to address antisemitism as a pressing concern in contemporary European societies? All the progress within the horizon of the EU’s liberal democracies and the Union’s post-national politico-cultural integration notwithstanding, we witness more than one indicator that points to the ongoing resilience of resentful societal undercurrents, if not to a partial reversal of the presumed collective learning process. As Robert Wistrich points out, the specter of “apocalyptic anti-Semitism” has returned to haunt Europe, “while often assuming radically new forms” (Haaretz, November 3, 2009). This affects individual attitudes as well as public manifestations in national and transnational spaces. To be sure, the political consensus that blatant expressions of antisemitism (and open racism, for that matter) are unacceptable still holds among most established democratic parties and other crucial public agents (Bergmann & Heitmeyer 2005: 84). Additionally, there is little evidence that democratic and cosmopolitan value change is in ‘reverse gear’ (Norris & Inglehart 2009). However, just as organized right-wing extremism and radical right parties experienced an unexpected comeback since the 1980s, in recent years antisemitic manifestations appear to have resurfaced across the European continent, and far beyond the borders of the European Union. Stretching from violent extremism to public invectives and political mobilizations, they are often facilitated by extreme right parties and fringe antisemitic organizations, including Islamist groups. But recent research also shows that antisemitism is by no means limited to these groups. It reaches into, and resurfaces,



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in the political center. In light of new—in various collective self-understandings perfectly “moral”—anti-Jewish hostilities, a much more fractured and contested picture emerges today; one that is signifying an ongoing and new challenge. The Rise of the European Extreme Right Right-wing extremism initially re-entered the political space to a large extent in the form of “anti-immigrant parties” (van der Brug, Fennema & Tillie 2000) in Western Europe more than twenty years ago. They were accompanied by racist sub-cultural movements, which in some places led to a trade-off between electorally successful parties and racist subcultures but often had mutually reinforcing effects (Pedahzur & Weinber 2001). Since then, several parties and movements collapsed and dissipated, or their relevance declined. In some cases predecessor parties were replaced by new competitors. Yet, other actors consolidated their political force as ‘new’ extreme right parties, defined here as post-industrial authoritarian and xenophobic antisystem parties that oppose liberal democracy and civil/human rights but which have ‘modernized’ their ideology and distanced themselves from old fascist identity politics (Ignazi 2003; Mudde 2003). In many cases, such new extreme right parties succeeded in expanding their electoral outreach beyond the small traditional fascist constituencies in post-War Europe. All in all, compared to previous periods in postWar Europe, the extreme right reemerged as political players more or less across Eastern and Western Europe: Modernized radical right and right-wing populist parties that re-mobilize ethnic nationalism and exclusionism have celebrated varying, yet in several cases repeated success in regional, national, and European elections (Kitschelt 2007; Norris 2005; Mudde 2007). Effectively exploiting particularly favorable demand and supply side conditions, some new extreme or “populist” variants even entered national governments as junior partners (Frölich-Steffen & Rensmann 2007). In some cases they are nurtured by racist sub- und youth cultures, i.e. local networks of “uncivil society” (Pedahzur & Weinberg 2001). Among other things, they have led to high levels of violence against ethnic minorities, immigrants, Jews, and asylum-seekers (Mudde 2005). In other cases they have found the favorable environment of an intellectual neo-nationalist New Right that facilitates cultural racism, opposition to the liberal post-materialist and post-national values represented by the New Left, and—in

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countries like France and Germany—subtle anti-Jewish sentiments and Holocaust revisionism (Minkenberg 1992). In the recent 2009 European elections many extreme right parties once again succeeded in increasing their turn-out at the ballot box: The new anti-Islam party, led by Geert Wilders in the Netherlands, received 15% of the Dutch vote, the anti-immigrant Danish People’s Party doubled its support, and even the revamped extreme right British National Party (BNP) celebrated large gains and entered the European Parliament, moving from the fringes to becoming the first fascist party in British history to win seats in a national vote. Never before did the BNP gain a seat in the European or the British Parliament.2 We have thus witnessed another breakthrough in a history of many extreme right successes since the French Front National entered the European Parliament in 1984 (Ignazi 2003; Rensmann 2003). A Revival of Antisemitism? Indicators of Change and New Conflicts While the revival of extreme right parties has received broad attention by political science research, turning the radical right into arguably the best studied European party family (Mudde 2007),3 the diagnosed recent rise of antisemitism within and beyond the confines of extreme right mobilizations has so far hardly come under scholarly scrutiny. This void is especially apparent for comprehensive comparative European studies that include quantitative and qualitative approaches aiming at methodologically robust explanatory frameworks. Apparently breaking with the post-War evolution of anti-antisemitic public norms in Europe, however, the indicators of a new wave of renewed and revived anti-Jewish resentments are many.4 They can be found on various levels and in different contexts.

2  This previous lack of success is, of course, also due to internal party factors (the BNP only recently tried to overcome its overtly militant roots) and due to the electoral system: the Single Member District Plurality (SMDP) electoral system in Britain is unfavorable for small parties (Norris 2005; Goodwin 2007) but the European elections have introduced proportional representation in the UK. 3  The isolation of factors and explanatory variables as well as persuasive theorizing on the interaction of supply and demand side conditions are still in many ways controversial and contested (Kitschelt 2007; Rensmann & Miller 2010). 4  Antisemitic resentment, not racism or hostility against immigrants and Muslims, is the primary subject of this volume. Yet while racist resentment is not the special focus of this volume, it will be addressed at various junctures. In fact, one of the general



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(1) Since 2000, comparative surveys point to a rise of antisemitism. Reversing the long-time downward trend evident in pre-2000 time series data, this entails younger generational cohorts in several countries (Bergmann 2008). Contrary to the preceding long-term decline, cross-national surveys show a stable plateau of anti-Jewish attitudes in most European member states over the last decade and a new willingness to display such resentment in polls. While traditional forms of antisemitism have continued to decline in some countries (though at a slower pace), there is a consolidation of antisemitic resentment across Europe and a dramatic rise in some EU member states (ADL 2009). (2) In addition, public manifestations of anti-Jewish slander, hate crimes, and violent attacks directed against Jews, synagogues, and Jewish centers have also dramatically increased in the 2000s. Although data collection by law enforcement and public agencies is of varying quality because they employ unstandardized, in some cases vastly different statistical criteria, comparative data do indicate that such antisemitic incidents have substantially increased in Europe since the turn of the century. In some countries the rise has been quite steep. In January 2009 alone hundreds of Jewish cemeteries were vandalized (or, in the case of the Malmo cemetery, firebombed); Jewish centers and synagogues were attacked in different locations such as Amsterdam, Barcelona, Paris, Charleroi, Brussels, London and Helsingborg. In Toulouse, for example, a car filled with Molotov cocktails rammed into the front gate of a synagogue, while in Amstelveen shots were fired at a clinic run by the Jewish community (European Agency for Fundamental Rights 2009: 26ff; EFA 2009: 4ff ). According to the European Agency for Fundamental Rights, data since 2000 reveal fluctuations and national variations. They also point to a substantial rise of antisemitic crimes in several countries, in particular in 2009. In the wellstudied case of France, for instance, there has been a mean increase

hypotheses of this book is the claim that there is a high correlation between antisemitism and racism, though both need to be distinguished as different forms of resentment. Any new mobilization of antisemitic and counter-cosmopolitan resentment tends to entail the resurgence of racist mobilizations against immigrants and other ethnic minorities (Rensmann & Miller 2010). There are several indicators for an increasing relevance of racist exclusion in various European contexts. For instance, a recent study on “Ethnic Profiling in Paris” shows that those who appeared to be of Arab origin were at least 7.5 times more likely than whites to be stopped by police forces, and that those perceived to be black were six times more likely to be stopped—although racial and ethnic profiling by the police is illegal in France (Erlanger 2009).

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of antisemitic hate crimes by 48% between 2001 and 2006. While racist violence also remains at a high level, since 2000 more French Jews than French immigrants have been injured as a result of violent incidents. In 2004, France saw the largest number of antisemitic incidents in recent memory, and antisemitic “actions and threats” have remained at a historically high level since then (Commission Nationale Consultative des Droits de l’Homme 2006). As Robert C. Lieberman points out, this is “hardly a picture of a society in which antisemitism is an insignificant matter.” (Lieberman 2009a: 249) In Germany, the largest member state of the EU, anti-Jewish hate crimes also remain on an extraordinarily high level. It reached a peak of 1,682 in 2005 (European Agency for Fundamental Rights 2009: 22). Those data reflect the ongoing need to have high alert security surrounding virtually every synagogue and Jewish institution in Europe. Furthermore, during the escalating military conflicts in South Lebanon in 2006 and Gaza in early 2009 banners and slogans demanding “Jews out” or “Death to the Jews” have become more popular and tolerated on anti-Israel demonstrations across Europe (EFA 2009: 8). According to the European Jewish Congress, European governments and police have “ample evidence that some anti-Israel demonstrations have descended into openly antisemitic tirades” (EFA 2009: 8). At any rate, the list of those incidents and public manifestations, some of them violent, that can be classified as antisemitic has become more extensive in recent years, with annual and cross-national variations and with peaks after specific events such as the escalations of the Middle East conflict or the financial crisis, which have been widely covered by the media. (3) There appear to be some revived anti-Jewish political mobilizations that incorporate new salient issues in the public sphere such as globalization, the global financial crisis, or the Middle East conflict. At times such mobilizations come from nominally different poles of the political spectrum or otherwise different political persuasions. More often than not antisemitism is on display or promoted by some reputable agents in civil society. In 2009, for example, the well respected left-wing trade union Flaica-Uniti-Cub called for a boycott of “all Jewish-owned or Jewish-run stores” in “solidarity with the Palestinians,” the “Jews of today,” and asked its members to draw lists of Jewish shops that should be targeted (Owen 2009). Two years before the extreme right and notoriously antisemitic Italian party-organization Forza Nuova (FN) had attacked the Israeli embassy with tomatoes.



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They were supposed to symbolize the blood of Palestinians. FN took action under the banner “Hezbollah—until victory” (Corriere della Sera 2006). Other European right-wing agitators have adopted the term “Zionist Occupied Government,” invented by American neoNazis, to portray national governments and the United Nations as controlled by “war-mongering” Jews or “Zionists.” Accusing them of running a ‘secret world government,’ extreme right groups charge “the Zionists” with manipulating national governments and orchestrating the UN and America in order to advance their alleged cause: world domination. In Germany, the National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD), which can be classified as an extreme right party with significant links to the militant neo-Nazi spectrum, now mobilizes for “peace demonstrations.” The militarist party calls, ironically, for an “end to war.” It fights against “Zionist occupation,” “warmongering imperialism,” and “Israel’s terror” or “apartheid regime” (cf. www.npd.de). Antisemitism, at times in modernized and populist forms, therefore, seems to recapture its formerly prominent place in the arsenal of (new) extreme right rhetoric, ideology and campaigns, along with neo-racism and anti-immigrant agitation. But often such resentments also transcend the confines of the extreme right. This also applies to hostility against immigrants and, in particular, prejudices against Muslims. (4) A revival of anti-Jewish conspiracy myths, antisemitic cartoons, and free-floating hate speech also appears to benefit from the possibilities offered by the Internet and other new media technologies, where people can articulate resentments anonymously and in an unfiltered fashion. These new media are of increasing relevance in shaping the public spheres of our European post-industrial information societies. And there is a notable increase and flourishing of hate speech against Jews over the last decade that finds an outlet in these new media. Some hate sites openly call for a “new final solution of the Jewish question.” Others deny the Holocaust altogether. Many, however, display other forms of blatant anti-Jewish hatred and racism. For instance, an entire series of antisemitic cartoons showing Jews as cockroaches and insects and making a mockery of the Holocaust—cartoons that were distributed by the Iranian government after an official “Holocaust cartoon competition”—soon found entry into various extreme right and also left-wing websites. They have managed thereby to escape the legal prosecution under laws against instigation of racist hatred that are enforced in several European countries and reflect EU policy.

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(5) Finally, there are indicators of a rising readiness to publicly articulate anti-Jewish resentments, both in blatant and coded forms, within the democratic public space. This is presumably linked to a change in public and political reactions. While antisemitic conspiracy myths appear to experience a European-wide renaissance through various new media, new research also suggests that antisemitic stereotypes are more often articulated in broader national and transnational publics. In some countries, researchers diagnose an “erosion of communication latency” with regard to antisemitism (Bergmann & Heitmeyer 2005). They claim that formerly latent or semi-public resentments have entered the democratic public. Due to more lax public and political responses, such resentments are reiterated with more confidence. Some national studies also suggest that the boundaries of what is viewed as antisemitic or acceptable in the public sphere are changing and eroding, and with it the latency of antisemitism (Salzborn 2008; Rensmann 2004a).5 For example, a wide-ranging report by the British Parliament diagnoses a broadened “antisemitic discourse”: “a widespread change in mood and tone when Jews are discussed, whether in print or broadcast, at universities, or in public or social settings. We are concerned that anti-Jewish themes and remarks are gaining acceptability in some quarters in public and private discourse in Britain and there is a danger that this trend will become more and more mainstream.” The report also concludes that “it is clear that violence, desecration of property, and intimidation directed towards Jews is on the rise since 2000.” (All-Party Parliamentary Group Against Antisemitism 2006, Summary) This “regained acceptability” along with a rationalizing tolerance displayed by considerable parts of European elites, media, and the “chattering classes” when it comes to various contemporary forms of anti-Jewish hostility may well be the most telling indicator that times

5  As Samuel Salzborn argues, it is long customary in German research “to distinguish four sub-dimensions of Judeophobia: 1) religiously-based Christian prejudice against Jews; 2) a biologically construed racial antisemitism; 3) so-called secondary antisemitism (see below), and 4) anti-Zionist antisemitism. [. . .] The public articulation of attitudes that could be classified as religious or racial antisemitism has slowly but continuously declined in the course of postwar German history—which, of course, says nothing about how widespread such opinions really are. Quantitative studies reveal, however, a relatively high incidence of secondary and anti-Zionist antisemitism in political and social discourse.” (Salzborn 2008: 156)



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have changed for Jews; not only but also in democratic, increasingly cosmopolitan Europe.6 All these observations require more systematic data and research. But in spite of considerable national variations, it appears that it is fair to diagnose resurgent anti-Semitism across the continent. This problem is neither limited to certain national communities, nor does it stop at the European Union’s borders. In fact, antisemitism is no longer exclusively a ‘European problem’, either. It also needs to be viewed in its global context—especially in the age of the second, post-industrial globalization. Although political cultures matter and are often resilient, there is no longer any genuinely ‘national’ or ‘European antisemitism’ in the contemporary world, though antisemitism’s origins may vary. Ethnic national identity constructs or specifically European issues— such as post-colonial and post-Holocaust guilt and the unconscious desire to externalize both—may still play a distinct role as motivational factors. Be that as it may, the Holocaust, the unprecedented atrocities against the European Jews committed by German Nazis and their collaborators, has changed the very essence and meaning of antisemitism. The genocidal judeophobia that motivated the extermination of the European Jews will continue to signify a particular, and particularly important, legacy in post-Holocaust Europe and beyond. The memory of Auschwitz is not a ‘screen’ that shields us from understanding contemporary political realities and genocidal threats; rather, reflecting on this history of the breakdown of civilization is essential if we are to understand the present and draw lessons for the future (Arendt 1963). We also follow Theodor Adorno’s dictum that Auschwitz has forced a new categorical imperative upon humankind, namely to “arrange their thoughts and actions so that Auschwitz will not repeat itself, so that nothing similar will happen.” (Adorno 1966) Hannah Arendt was among the first who recognized the era of the Holocaust as the beginning of a new “global condition,” and of an age of statelessness and genocidal politics. The atrocities and the new global condition force us to take humanity as a political reference

6  This includes the all too often downplayed and rationalized radical antisemitism and mass hate (Kressel 2002) advocated by radical Islamists as well as the president of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who has called for the destruction of the Jewish state of Israel and denied the Holocaust on more than one occasion, thereby turning overt antisemitism into a key element of domestic and foreign governmental policy.

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point, with dramatic consequences for human rights and international law (Arendt 1951; Benhabib 2006; Rensmann 2009; Simmons 2009). More specifically, the Nazi crimes—committed against the Jews and against humanity (Arendt 1963)—are also of key significance if we look at anti-Jewish resentments in contemporary society. Such resentments can only be adequately analyzed against the backdrop of their genocidal past. To be sure, since 1945 racial antisemitism, which culminated in Nazism’s murderous totalitarian ideology and the annihilation of the European Jews, is by and large still profoundly discredited in European democracies (more so than in most other countries in the world); so is any blatantly antisemitic conspiracy myth that serves as an all-encompassing world explanation. As a socially delegitimized resentment (Marin 2000: 112–113), antisemitic ideology had for sometime been banned from public communication and pushed into a “communicative latency” (Bergmann 1997). Nonetheless, there is also new evidence of a resurgence of both overt and subtle antisemitism as an attitudinal pattern and as a political ideology, indicating that anti-Jewish resentments in Europe are by no means just a matter of historical inquiry. III.  Theoretical Models in Contested Terrain: Theorizing Contexts, Classifications, and Dimensions of Antisemitic Resentment and Counter-Cosmopolitanism Until recently, antisemitism in Europe has been almost exclusively the focus of historical research, and of occasional single-case national studies and opinion surveys. Though social and political science research has begun to focus on the subject and produced some important scholarly contributions as of late (u. a. Endelman 2005; Heitmeyer & Zick 2010; Markovits 2007; Taguieff 2004; Wistrich 2005), theoretically guided comprehensive comparative work on contemporary antisemitism is still largely lacking. This also applies to the broader context of counter-cosmopolitanism, which we will theoretically unfold in this essay. There are two plausible reasons why such research has been marginal. First of all, contemporary political science research and models still tend to neglect questions of political ideology. This also applies to party research, even in case of the extreme right, although there are notable exceptions to the rule (e.g. Mudde 2003; Ignazi 2003).



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Neither do the conventional focus on demand-side theories (e.g. ideal policy preferences and voting behavior) or supply-side approaches (party competition and agency in electoral market-places) sufficiently address the broader public environment of politics, i.e. the question of public will-formation through public discourse and political culture beyond the confines of electoral politics or governmental policy. In these research frameworks politically relevant topics such as antisemitism and nationalist opposition to cosmopolitanism tend to be set aside. More importantly, antisemitism—just like Israel—is a subject that regularly causes much controversy, especially against the background of its European legacy. The subject of antisemitism tends to evoke strong emotional and opinionated public reactions, thereby creating a difficult terrain for sober research. This reinforces a remarkable gap between the widespread public attention on issues of antisemitism and the exclusion of minorities, on the one hand, and the relatively small amount of scholarly inquiries, on the other. Recent public discussions have become very heated and are often polarized across the European publics. Some of these controversies have been framed as new “antisemitism debates.” Political editors and op-eds may help to re-generate an already politically and, in fact, legally charged climate. This creates a difficult environment for any research—which is always embedded in societal contexts. While many Jews are affected by antisemitism and feel threatened as a minority by violent manifestations of hostility that many government authorities increasingly recognize, some parties and public agencies argue antisemitism is an historical phenomenon that is irrelevant today or limited to neo-Nazi fringe groups. Public Controversies and Contexts: Europe, Antisemitism, and the Middle East The controversy about antisemitism and its salience is often linked to ongoing public disputes on Jewish identity, Israel, anti-Zionism and the Middle East. They have only increased in intensity over the years. The controversies about Jews and Israel and the heated argument about the extent, use and character of antisemitism by no means stop before the gates of the scholarly community. A few authors claim that warnings about the rise of antisemitism in Europe, especially on the left, are greatly exaggerated and largely unjustified (Beller 2007b). While some scholars detect an alarming new antisemitism mobilized by extreme right, radical left and Islamist agents that express Jewhatred by singling out and demonizing Israel as a ‘collective Jew,’

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others claim that anti-Jewish resentment is marginal, a matter of the past, and has been quite thoroughly replaced by Islamophobia (Bunzl 2007).7 In fact, Martin Bunzl maintains that even most European extreme right parties and groups have become “pro-Jewish” and “proIsrael.” But so far evidence supporting this claim is scarce. Moreover, some international relations scholars argue that there is a powerful “Israel lobby” which operates, for instance, as a de facto foreign government in the United States, which—using the alleged power of its money and its control of the media—deliberately equates anti-Israel sentiments with antisemitism, and which uses inflationary antisemitism charges as their ultimate weapon, so that “anyone who criticizes Israeli actions [. . .] stands a good chance of being labeled an antisemite.” (Mearsheimer & Walt 2007, 188; for a critique Fine 2006; Lieberman 2009) They therefore suggest that antisemitism is currently primarily used as a (wide-spread) method to silence criticism of Israel. Authors and publicists who feel that criticism of Israel or Jews is severely restricted and harshly sanctioned in the democratic public also regularly charge critics of antisemitism with being part of a global “network” of a “pro-Israel lobby” or “Zionist lobby.” This “lobby,” which presumably suppresses popular opinion or censors political speech, is therefore accused by such critics for exploiting antisemitism and the Holocaust for political and material purposes, most notably in order to disguise an alleged anti-Palestinian genocide (Finkelstein 2005). Consequently, such critics view “antisemitism” exclusively as a “political weapon” (Cockburn & St. Clair 2003; see also Kovel 2007). The claim that any mentioning of antisemitism as a contemporary problem is part of pro-Israel propaganda apparently also strongly resonates in various European publics. To be sure, the charge of antisemitism (or racism for that matter) is one that should never be made lightly. Yet, claiming that there is a 7  The term “islamophobia” is contested in contemporary scholarly and public debates. It is supposed to point to existing cultural and racist prejudices against Muslim minorities and their religious practices. Yet critics point out that it is also used by Islamists and their supporters to immunize and delegitimize any criticism of radical Islamism, including expressions of homophobia, religious oppression, misogyny, and antisemitism within Islamist ideology and practice. However, it is important to distinguish between reflective criticism of Islamists and of Islam as a political ideology, which is often raised by citizens with a Muslim background as part of struggles within Muslim communities, on the one hand, and generalized hatred of Muslims and Islam on the other, which is racist in nature. This distinction is frequently ignored in public debates and even by scholars on the subject. See also fn. 24.



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general misuse of ‘antisemitism’ is as deeply problematic, if not outright dubious as the analogous claim that “racism” is only a “political weapon” of powerful groups to suppress “the white people.” Both claims also have a long tradition, and are typical of, extreme rightist—and recently New Right—discourses that feed the fantasy that ordinary citizens are persecuted by powerful, hegemonic anti-racists and anti-antisemites (cf. for instance Koch 2006). Such discourse often goes hand in hand with ethnic stereotyping. As Robert Fine (2007) points out, today here is a troubling “tendency to downplay anti-Semitism itself (for example, by arguing that the physical protection of synagogues is unnecessary) and to discredit those who are concerned about anti-Semitism—especially on the grounds that they are not really concerned about anti-Semitism but only about silencing and restricting criticism of Israel.” Often Jews and other critics are also defamed as “oversensitive,” and threats or violence against them are trivialized—contrary to the perception that the threshold for the scandalization of public antisemitism is very low. Moreover, it is important to note that researchers who point out public manifestations of antisemitism and decipher new antisemitic forms of antiZionism and conspiracy theories are themselves exposed to speech restrictions that are induced by massive intimidations through public smear campaigns, and at times by violent threats. By now antisemitism researchers are frequently also confronted with, if not silenced by, libel suits—or the threat thereof—across Europe.8 Plus, the image of an all-powerful, conspirational, string-pulling, global “Zionist lobby” controlling media and politics is itself strikingly similar to traditional resentments against “world Jewry,” “hidden Jewish power” and “Jewish conspiracies.” Most importantly, it is quite difficult to substantiate the claim that criticism of Israel and Zionism is “taboo” or censored in any European public realm. Content analyses rather indicate that in spite of its small size and population Israel is arguably among the most criticized countries in the world. This includes the Western and the European public.9 8   For instance, most recently the Center for Antisemitism Research at the Technical University of Berlin was successfully sued by a conspiracy theorist (Wisnewski 2009). 9   Political attention on events in the Middles East in general and criticism of Israel in particular certainly exceed public criticism of the governments of Sudan or Sri Lanka, where recent massacres in each case cost more lives than there are casualties in the entire history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as violent as the latter has been.

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Be that as it may, there can be little doubt that any public and scientific conversation dealing with antisemitism today takes place in the context of a highly polarized, contested political territory. In fact, antisemitism research has become a minefield. The argument is often heated. It is shaped by serious and at times hefty political charges, on the one hand, and on the other hand ignorance towards, or the outright denial and lack of reflection/recognition of, the very existence of present-day anti-Jewish resentments or violence. Critical political science research has to face the challenge of a controversial and highly charged political environment. The adequate response to this challenge is critical scholarly inquiry in comparative perspective. Such research, to be sure, should be driven by two goals: (i) to rigorously understand and explain the phenomenon but also (ii) to be publicly relevant in the sense of the “normative turn” (Gerring & Yesnowitz 2006) of political science: in our context this entails the goal of combatting and overcoming antisemitism. What is Antisemitism? Seeking Dependent Variables, Defining the Subject(s) Even within the special field of academic research on antisemitism the subject remains highly contested—as is the very idea of cosmopolitanism, for that matter (cf. Vertovec & Cohen 2002). For a start, it is often controversial what is taken as the dependent variable of inquiry, i.e. what it is that should be explained. The subject can be characterized in a number of different ways. These different conceptions have significant consequences for research designs and findings. “Narrow” definitions recognize antisemitism only in manifest phenomena of racial antisemitism, where Jews are openly defamed or attacked as Jews (Klug 2003); in which they are identified as a collective “race” and blamed for a global conspiracy (as exemplified in the infamous, antisemitic forgery “The Protocols of the Elders of Zion”); where Jews are portrayed as vermin; or in cases where antisemites identify themselves as such. The very existence (let alone significance) of latent antisemitism is dismissed (for a critique, Salzborn 2008). However, under liberaldemocratic conditions, even neo-Nazis usually do not identify themselves as antisemites. They also often avoid blatant public hate speech against Jews and other minorities. Instead, they use coded language.10

10  Today, to be sure, it is common that even extreme rightists who outright attack “Jewish dominance” or other conspiracy theorists who feel persecuted by ominous



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Supported by EU-sponsored anti-discrimination legislation, the threat of legal prosecution for racial incitement puts limits on hate speech in many European countries. Openly antisemitic or racist propaganda in the tradition of Nazi demagogues (as embodied in cartoons portraying Jews as cockroaches) is usually subject to criminal prosecution and effective law enforcement in various European member states.11 Too narrow definitions tend to overlook most current and often coded manifestations of Jew-hatred by classifying only neo-Nazi hate speech as such because those instances fall outside of the scope of the initial definition (and thus they suppose a priori that antisemitism has all but completely vanished). All too broad definitions of antisemitism, however, risk conceptual diffusion of the dependent variable’s boundaries. Definitions with a very broad scope tend to ignore discursive ambiguities and ‘grey zones.’ They also tend to distract from the fact that antisemitism is a collective resentment directed against Jews. That does not mean that Jews could not harbor antisemitic resentments. Antisemitism is not a natural but a socio-cultural phenomenon. This implies that Jews—the primary objects of this hatred—are not automatically free from such collective resentments. In fact, it is a common mechanism of anti-Jewish propaganda to use antisemitic Jews as “token witnesses.” Definitions that are too broad, however, might blur the boundaries and see antisemitism as omnipresent, for instance in any criticism of Israeli policies or the critique of capitalism. Neither are accusations against Israel or speculations about the alleged ‘secret machinations’ of finance capital automatically free of antisemitism, as some suggest; nor is the critique of (finance) capitalism or Israeli policies automatically evidence of antisemitism and resentment against Jews. What, then, is antisemitism? What defines its ‘space’—where does it start and where does it end, and are there ambivalent ‘grey zones’ and borderline cases? What are

Jewish “global networks” or “Zionist lobbies” fiercely reject to be called “antisemites” because the term has long become a politically discrediting label, equipped with the aura of illegitimacy—especially in post-1945 Europe. However, most recently “antisemitism charges” have also turned into a badge of honor among conspiracy theorists and right-wing extremists. 11   Via the Internet, such hate speech and cartoons continue to be easily accessible and avoid law enforcement. For instance, such cartoons are published on anti-Israel hate sites such as www.no2israel.de—which claims to be left-wing—or Iranian websites. The former website also displays moral outrage over the “behavior of Jewry” and “Jewish power” as well as “Jew-dominated key positions in media.” Retrieved February 17, 2008.

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the identifiable dimensions, forms and functions of contemporary antisemitism (and, for that matter, counter-cosmopolitanism)? How can we provide robust, theoretically sound dependent and independent variables for empirical studies on antisemitism that illuminate causes and effects while avoiding to simply sample against the dependent variable (i.e. illuminate that antisemitism, the subject of research, exists)? In light of the lack of clarity in much of the public and academic debate, we will suggest some basic definitions and conceptualizations that guide our research. They take both the history and the changing nature of hostility against Jews into account. We will also provide criteria to classify antisemitism and distinguish between antisemitic and non-antisemitic phenomena; the boundaries between the two are too often blurred in public and even academic discussions. In so doing, we will lay the conceptual foundations and the framework of this volume. We will hereby expand the debate on antisemitism by recognizing the specificity of this increasingly transnational, ‘global resentment,’ which in several ways differs from other resentments, and its simultaneous interrelatedness with other resentments and the context of what we conceive as counter-cosmopolitanism. Since the publications by the anti-Jewish ideologue Wilhelm Marr the term antisemitism points to the collective discrimination against and hatred of Jews (it has nothing to do with any actual ‘semitic’ ‘race,’ ‘ethnicity,’ or language origin; cf. Lewis 1999). Similar to other conceptualizations such as ‘anti-Jewish hostility’ or the more psychologically biased but equally useful notion of ‘judeophobia,’ antisemitism is the generic term for group prejudices, stereotypes, and Manichean friend-enemy distinctions through which Jews are collectively devalued as inferior or as “enemies of the nation” (Benz 2004; Rensmann 2004a). According to Helen Fein, antisemitism is a matrix of hostile perceptions, narratives and imaginations about Jews as a collective entity, expressed through attitudes, statements, myths, political ideologies, folklore, images and acts (which include social or legal discrimination, political mobilizations against Jews, as well as individual, collective or state-sponsored violence). It may lead to the exclusion, displacement, persecution, or murder of Jews (Fein 1987). Antisemitism has hereby a special historical record. The term points to a specific history of discrimination reaching back to the pre-Roman and early Christian periods. In the context of this history, multiple antiJewish stereotypes and images have been constructed, re-constructed, and transmitted (Schoeps 1998). They entail centuries old resentments



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about ‘the Jews’ as Christ-killers (Laqueur 2006; Wistrich 2010), ritual murderers and blood libel, conspiring and cosmopolitan wanderers, personified laziness and physical weakness, a decadent group that subverts public norms, cheating salesmen etc. Today, it is unthinkable to understand antisemitism without thinking of its genocidal expression in the Holocaust. Modern antisemitism is, moreover, a specifically modern construction. It identifies Jews as cosmopolitan enemies of the (European) nationstate and, moreover, literally as the embodiment of all problems and ambiguities of the ‘modern condition’ and modern crises. Antisemitism as a projective worldview can be theorized as an anti-modern reaction that is simultaneously part and parcel of modernity. Antisemitism thereby provides a historically, culturally and politically situated form of a modern world explanation that combines various heterogeneous resentments. In fact, it is one of antisemitism’s specific features that it is a special matrix of resentment that cannot be reduced to a fixed set of semantically unambiguous meanings and stereotypes. We argue that there is no immanently coherent logic in the antisemitic perception of the world: In antisemitic discourses, Jews appear physically weak yet unbelievably powerful, as enemies of civilization yet also too far ahead of the very same civilization (Adorno & Horkheimer 1969).12 They embody regression, decay and decline as well as modern progress (Schoeps 1998). Jews are associated with “raw” instincts, unbridled desires, and low creatures (insects or swine), yet they are also seen as too intellectual, displaying an overpowering intelligence and a sneaky talent to maneuver and manipulate the entire modern world. Poor or wealthy, weak or strong, exclusive or anti-nationalist, moderate or radical, communist or capitalist, pariah or parvenu: seen through the antisemitic lens, Jews are damned whatever they are or do. This insight into the nature of antisemitism points back to the early reflection of Jean-Paul Sartre that antisemitism is not an idea or reflection of the real world but “first of all a passion”: “Far from experience producing his idea of 12  Some researchers still suggest that there is a strictly limited and ‘logical’ set of anti-Jewish stereotypes. For instance, in spite of new empirical findings showing how Jews are blamed for the loss of jobs in various public discourses, Jan Weyand claims that there is no historical or contemporary evidence of antisemitic statements that attribute the rise of unemployment to Jews because—Weyand insists—this stereotype is not part of antisemitism’s historic arsenal (Weyand 2006). Such narrow conceptions fail to understand past and contemporary antisemitism, and its effects. And they gloss over empirical findings.

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the Jew, it was the latter that explained his experience. If the Jew did not exist, the anti-Semite would invent him.” (Sartre 1948: 10 & 12) In order to conceptualize modern antisemitism it is therefore, on the one hand, necessary to (i) recognize its general dimension. It is a form of collective discrimination directed against Jews, a matrix of resentments against Jewish minorities that is similar to other prejudices against ethnic or cultural minorities or excluded ‘others;’ thus, on the one hand, antisemitism can be defined as a form of racism analogous to other forms of discrimination and exclusionism. It is an “ensemble of resentments, clichés, (re)constructed collective images, binary cultural codes, and categorical attributions as well as discriminating practices against Jews, which can intensify to a full-fledged or partial political ideology and an all-encompassing world-view.” (Rensmann 2004a: 20) We argue that—like other forms of racism—antisemitism is an essentialist and projective matrix that is unrelated to actual behavior of Jews (or other minorities). Yet, on the other hand, it is also important (ii) to conceive anti­ semitism’s specific dimension. There are distinct features that differ from any other racist resentment. They point to distinct traditions and functions in the modern social world. Modern antisemitism is not just a prejudice; it is distinct in that it also serves as a world explanation. Immunizing itself against empirical facts, it is anchored in a quite flexible conspiracy theory that ‘explains’ the origins of all social conflicts, social change, and complexities in the modern capitalist world by projecting them onto Jews. Therefore, there is a significant difference between prejudice and institutionalized racism, which justifies and rationalizes exclusion of ethnic minorities or (post)colonial exploitation, on the one hand, and the anti-modern ideology of antisemitism, on the other, which is not just a form of ethnic stereotyping but attributes secret world domination to ‘the Jews’. Antisemitism views Jews as anti-national, “parasitic,” wandering, “rootless cosmopolitans” and all-powerful but secret “string-pullers” behind the workings of modern society (and today, global society). Thus antisemitism imagines a closed community and hidden conspiracy manipulating the world and pursuing world domination—a ‘fact’ that only the antisemite is capable of exposing. The most striking manifest and lasting expression of this image are the forged Protocols of the Elders of Zion, a piece of propaganda from 1903 that presents the Jews as “a ubiquitous secret society, alien and evil, supernaturally powerful . . . [and] intent upon dominating the world” (Bronner 2000: 71–72).



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As mentioned before, modern antisemitic beliefs construct Jews as lazy, decadent, and ruthless, among other things. In the antisemitic perception they are imagined as greedy agents of finance capitalism, globalism, and cosmopolitanism who subvert the cohesion and values of national communities. A modern antisemitic world-view suggests that the ‘war-mongering Jews’ manufacture public opinion by controlling modern media. And another related, typically antisemitic, stereotype suggests that ‘they’ drive nations and the world into war. Modern antisemitism, hence, is another but a far cry from being just another form of racism that rationalizes ethnic exclusion and oppression; the former is part of a distinct, anti-modern societal movement of the modern world (Longerich 2010). Historically, it marched in step and gained in popularity with the political, social and cultural rise of modern enlightenment, modern capitalist society, and civil-republican rule of law. The rise of modern bourgeois society entitled Jews with rights and increasingly included Jews in its social fabric, with which they where henceforth identified. Thus, different from other forms of racism, it is modern antisemitism’s specific quality to explain the modern world—with all its crises, problems, complex and contradictory developments—by blaming the Jews and their allegedly ‘evil character.’ It is, again, an ideology/movement that explains the world by attributing all the negative aspects of contemporary modern society— including economic crises, transformations, capitalism, and war—to a small minority (of the global community and within the nations) or, more recently, also to the Jewish nation-state of Israel. In the words of some extreme right anti-Jewish publicists, there is a lingering “Israelization of the world.” Unlike other forms of racism against ethnic minorities or ‘others,’ only antisemitism provides for an all-encompassing, personified and objectified anti-modernity. Such objectification does not just devaluate Jews; it also ‘elevates’ them in a stereotypical fashion by attributing enormous ‘secret power’ to them. The underlying structure of modern antisemitism, then, is an encompassing conspiracy theory that ascribes the most heterogeneous societal and political phenomena to Jewish behavior and ‘string-pulling.’ Through this reified personification of social processes, Jews are constructed not just as a generalized other but also as the specific other of the modern world, they embody an endless multiplicity of socio-cultural phenomena as well as, in particular, political modernity’s actual and perceived problems and the cosmopolitan erosion of traditional identities. Conspiracy myths are thereby a central ingredient of antisemitic thought. Serving as the

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primary historical target of conspiracy thinking, there is often a close link between conspiracy myths and the anti-Jewish imagination. In contemporary antisemitic manifestations, too, “the Jews,” “the Rothschilds” or “the Zionists” are often portrayed as secret string-pullers behind immigration, diversity, cultural multiplicity, socio-cultural change, military conflicts, the American and other “imperialist” governments, the global economic crisis, or the presumed decline of national communities and national sovereignty. In a typical fashion, for instance, the American Holocaust denier and violent neo-Nazi James von Brunn claimed: “Obama is created by the Jews” (cf. CNN 2009). It is thereby an integral part of antisemitic ideologies and perceptions to view ‘the Jews’ as “aggressors;” the antisemites, in turn, claim that they are only defending themselves against ‘the Jews’ and their all-powerful “global Zionist network” and that they are a “persecuted minority.” They are, in Adorno’s words, potential persecutors “who pretend to be the persecuted” (Adorno 1964). Criteria and Boundaries: Antisemitism, Racism, and Anti-Zionism We can speak of antisemitism when Jews are directly discriminated against, and thus essentialized. But anti-Jewish stereotypes directed against Jews can be articulated in various, possibly subtle ways. In contested discursive spaces, boundaries of such classifications are not easy to determine; neither are their cultural, political and legal contexts and implications. The working definition suggested by the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) [now EU Agency for Fundamental Rights] offers some useful reference points in order to develop a set of robust criteria to classify antisemitism. It runs counter to the polarized political debate on “inflationary” antisemitism charges, on one hand, and the denial of antisemitic phenomena altogether, on the other. But it explicitly includes new forms of anti-Jewish hostility and exclusion, such as forms of anti-Israel hatred in which Israel functions as a “collective Jew,” and collective discrimination of Israelis as rights-bearers, as exemplified in boycotts not just of Israel but of all Israeli citizens.13 According to the EUMC, “antisemitism

13  The Council of Europe’s European Court of Human Rights, which is independent of the EU, declared not just boycotts against Israeli citizens but also against Israeli products as an illegal form of discrimination. It confirmed the ruling against a French



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is a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred towards Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed towards Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities.” (EUMC 2005) In addition, the EUMC argues, such manifestations could also target Israel, conceived as a Jewish collectivity or “collective Jew” (Klug 2003). Antisemitism, the EUMC adds, frequently “charges Jews with conspiring to harm humanity, and it is often used to blame Jews for ‘why things go wrong’.” Beyond Nazi racial theories, the EUMC suggests criteria that point to various forms of stereotypes and anti-Jewish violence. They include: (a) Justifying the killing or harming of Jews in the name of a radical ideology; (b) Making mendacious, dehumanizing, demonizing, or stereotypical allegations about Jews as such or the power of Jews as a collective—such as the myth about a world Jewish conspiracy or of Jews controlling the media, economy, government or other societal institutions; (c) Denying the Holocaust; (d) Accusing the Jews as a people, or Israel as a state, of inventing or exaggerating the Holocaust; (e) Denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination, e.g. by claiming that the existence of a State of Israel is a racist endeavor; (f ) Applying double standards by requiring of Jews or Israel a behavior not expected by any other group or democratic nation and drawing comparisons of contemporary Israeli policy to that of the Nazis (EUMC 2005). Thus, we can speak of antisemitism if, for instance, there are calls to or justifications of violence against Jews; if ‘the Jews’ (or the Jewish Israelis, for that matter) themselves are, as a collective, blamed for antisemitism or seen as the cause of antisemitism; if there are dehumanizing, demonizing and stereotypical claims about Jews or the collective power of ‘the Jews’—for example by suggesting that they control the media, the UN, world politics, and national governments; if the Holocaust is denied or downplayed, or if it is claimed that ‘the Jews’ or Israel have invented or exaggerated the Holocaust and they are, in turn, equated with Nazism (“Zionazis”), or if classical antisemitic symbols and images are used to characterize Jews (e.g. ritual murder, Jews as insects etc.). These criteria address a “family resemblance between these old antisemitic images and the singling out of

mayor, stating that he was convicted “for inciting the commission of a discriminatory, and therefore punishable, act.” (European Court of Human Rights 2009).

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Israel as uniquely evil among nations, or holding either all Israeli Jews or all world Jews collectively responsible for actions of the state of Israel, or the association of the practices of Israeli military occupation with the Nazi extermination of Jews.” (Fine 2007) As we will discuss below, one problem with these criteria and definitions is that they tend to be fixed and rigid; they seek to demarcate clear lines, and they are helpful tools for that, yet they fail to grasp the “grey zones” (Rensmann 2005; recently Milbradt 2010). The deliberate use of allusions, ambiguity and vagueness requires contextual interpretations that seek to understand anti-Jewish codes (Volkov 2006) and such “grey zones,” as well as the role they play for post-Holocaust antisemitism and climates of anti-Jewish hostility within liberal democracies in which overt hate speech is largely taboo. Be that as it may, especially the last two criteria of the EUMC definition—(e) and (f )—have drawn much controversy. As mentioned before, already conflictive political constellations have further escalated in the public discourse on “anti-Zionism” and the boundaries between criticism and anti-Jewish resentment in the perception of the Middle East conflict. Criticism of Israel and of Israeli policies similar to those leveled against any other country, to be sure, should not be regarded as antisemitic. This is a point also stressed by the EUMC. On the one hand, it is possible (as well as already practiced) to criticize Israel’s governmental policies without resorting to anti-Jewish resentments—and without being accused of antisemitism. On the other hand, it is a misleading claim that “criticism of Israel cannot be construed as antisemitic,” as the former London mayor Ken Livingston has asserted in the past (Hirsh 2007; cf. Herf 2006). Yet, for some publicists, most extreme right-wing groups, and a relevant Stalinist “anti-imperialist” section of the radical left in Europe—and beyond the continent’s shores— antisemitism today is relevant only insofar as it is seen as “a spurious charge that ‘the Zionists’ or the ‘pro-Israel lobby’ would throw at ‘critics of Israel’.” (Hirsh 2007: 73) Be that as it may, there is a broad scholarly consensus that forms of anti-Jewish hostility which utilize the nebulous concept of “the Zionists” and instrumentalize the Middle East conflict, is of increasing importance as of late (e.g. Bergmann & Welzel 2003; Cohen 2007; Haury 2000; Herf 2006; Hirsh 2007; Kloke 2007; Markovits 2007; Postone 2009). Hereby the ubiquitous pejorative use of ‘the Zionists’ does not immunize against antisemitism. In fact, the substitution of the word ‘Zionists’ for ‘Jews’ may sometimes make little substantial difference (Fine 2007). It all too often functions



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as stand-in for ‘the Jews’ if it is linked to other anti-Jewish resentments and if people are attacked who do not politically identify themselves as such. At issue is not, as Moishe Postone (2009) points out, “whether or not Israeli policies can be criticized. Israeli policies should be criticized, especially those aimed at undermining any possibility of a viable Palestinian state.” But an analysis of any conflict situation “ought to be intersubjective and not look to blame one side or the other independently of the context in which they operate.” (Fine 2007) A generalized ‘fight against the Zionists’, which goes beyond a critique of Israeli policies or discrimination of minorities in Israel but rejects the existence of the Jewish state (and only of the Jewish state), has little to do with conflict resolution, concern for human rights, and solidarity with the Palestinians in their plight; it can function “as a ticket for traditional hostility against Jews, while its ultimate rationale is the annihilation of Israel.” (Weiß 2005) Postone (2009) insists that also “ ‘leftist’ anti-Zionism has converged with radical Arab nationalism and radical Islamism [. . .] for whom the eliminationist impulse towards Jews in Israel is justified as being directed against ‘European’ colonizers.” Needless to say, antisemitism does nothing for Palestinians (Fine 2007). Israel is hereby often demonized as a ‘collective Jew’ among the world’s nations; for instance if the country is characterized as “grasping for global power, and by exhibiting Old Testament like vengefulness,” or if Israel is singled out as the country that “bamboozles the world, as cunning Jews are wont to do, extorts money from hapless victims, exhibits capitalist greed and [. . .] indulges in constant brutality of the weak.” (Markovits 2007: 164f ) It is antisemitic, for instance, if the critique of ‘Zionism’ attributes to Israel and ‘the Zionists’ a unique malevolence and global conspirational power, and to seek their elimination as the solution to the Middle East crises (Postone 2009). And even if we did not classify some of the most egregious examples of charges against Israel, its citizens and their right to exist as antisemitic (“child-killers”), such charges are offensive and antisemitic in effect. Moreover, images and cartoons that portray Israelis as children-eating, blood-drinking monsters—resuscitating old Christian anti-Jewish propaganda according to which Jews ritually murder children for Pesach and drink their blood or use it for making bread—are also antisemitic, though they pretend to be “criticism of Israel;” and even legal agencies in Germany, which has particularly strict hate speech laws, do not

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classify them as such (for example, such ‘cartoons’ are displayed on a so-called “wailing wall” installed by political activists on Cathedral Square in Cologne). To be sure, ‘anti-Zionism’ does not have to be antisemitic in historical perspective (Herf 2006). Zionism itself was a minority movement among Jews prior to the Holocaust (Davidson 2001), though it is worthy to remember that we no longer live in a pre-Holocaust but in a post-Holocaust world—a world that had proven during the Shoah and thereafter how little it cared for stateless Jews. At any rate, conflating and confusing “politically active Zionists” or Israeli government officials with Jews in general is—just like the idea that there is an “Israeli occupation of America” (or of the European Union, for that matter) because there are some outspoken Jewish supporters of Israel in both polities—a form of pars pro toto antisemitic generalization and stereotyping, as Lawrence Davidson (2010) points out.14 It can be antisemitic to attack Jews as ‘Zionists’ if there is no detectable political context, or conversely to speak generally of ‘the Jews’ when Israel’s government is criticized. Not all Jews support Israel, or are “Zionists,” and there are several Jewish organizations that oppose Zionism without being antisemitic (while it is important to remember that just as blacks can be racist, Jews can be anti-Semitic). Nonetheless, today there is often considerable overlap between anti-Zionism and antisemitism, and the former has long lost its unambiguous political innocence: recent research has found a strong and robust association between antisemitism and anti-Israel sentiment in ten Western European countries (Kaplan & Small 2006; Lieberman 2009; see also Cohen, Harber, Jussim & Bhasin 2009).15 Anti-Zionism, conceived 14  To be sure, Davidson calls into question Israel’s—and seemingly only this nationstate’s—legitimacy to exist; and he boldly claims: “what the Zionists do is actually a generator of anti-Semitism.” He is thereby following dated ethnic conflict theories about actual group behavior as the main cause of anti-Jewish or racial resentment. He also equates blatant antisemites and Holocaust deniers with defenders of Israel and “the Zionist Holocaust gambit,” as “if you will, two sides of the same coin.” Both take part, he argues, “in the mass confusion of name calling and wild accusations that have resulted,” while “it has become increasingly difficult for the audiences to whom both groups are pitching their propaganda to make any distinctions based on the actual positions taken by various constituencies.” 15   After controlling other factors, Kaplan and Small (2006) show in an empirical study of respondents in ten European countries that antisemitic resentment consistently increases with the intensity of the hostility against Israel. Respondents with strong anti-Israel attitudes are six times as likely to be antisemitic compared to respondents who do not support anti-Israel statements. Antisemitism therefore highly correlates



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here as the fundamental rejection of a Jewish state and specifically the Jewish right to political self-determination, today often serves as a modernized medium to express antisemitism,16 though anti-Zionism with “anti-Zionism.” “Based on this analysis, when an individual’s criticism of Israel becomes sufficiently severe, it does become reasonable to ask whether such criticism is a mask for underlying anti-Semitism” (Kaplan & Small 2006: 560). In Germany, 28.9% somewhat agree with the statement: “If one considers Israel’s policies, I can understand if one is against Jews,” while 15.5% fully agree with the statement. An experimental study by Geissler (2002) provides findings similar to Kaplan and Small. From the point of analytic philosophy, Harrison (2006) argues that anti-Israel opinion may disseminate, however inadvertently, a range of traditional antisemitic claims and motifs. According to Harrison, such opinion restricts anti-racism to particular groups instead of defending Palestinian rights without demonizing Jews. Be that as it may: While there may be ‘anti-Zionists’ who are not antisemites, just as there are foes of affirmative action who are not racists, “the crucial question is prejudicial overlap.” (Cohen 2007). 16   Israeli policies, such as potential human rights violations, are and should be subject to public scrutiny and criticism. Yet such criticism should follow the same or similar standards that apply to other democratic and non-democratic governments. In the global age, all governments and nation-states should not just be exposed to national but also to global public scrutiny. However, “anti-Zionism” as an ideological system that specifically singles out Israel and denies Jewish political self-determination, tends to violate this universal principle by stigmatizing the Jewish state alone, while simultaneously defending, denying or downplaying human rights violations by repressive regimes in the region and elsewhere, including violent acts against Palestinians committed by Hamas or others. One of many cases in point is the fact that most radically “anti-Zionist” groups remained silent across the board when it became public that Jordan had stripped 3,000 Palestinians of their citizenship rights over the last years, thereby creating a new mass of stateless people (cf. Gavlek 2010). There are four sufficiently tested indicators to effectively distinguish criticism of Israel from antisemitic hatred of Israel, where Israel is viewed as a “collective Jew;” to be sure, diffuse ‘grey zones’ that blur these boundaries remain. Attacks on Israel can be regarded as antisemitic if they match one of the following conditions: a) the demonization of Israel is viewed as reincarnation of Nazism, or the atrocities of the Holocaust are equated with actual or perceived human rights violations in Israel, suggesting that the Jewish state produces a “new Holocaust” and “racist apartheid state” (Hirsh 2007: 40); b) traditional antiJewish stereotypes are employed when Israel is discussed, e.g. the image of the ruthless, war-mongering or vengeful Jew/Israeli, or the identification of Israelis with “Christ-killers,” “baby-killers,” or ritual murderers; c) the complete delegitimation of Israel’s right of existence, i.e. the denial of a Jewish right of self-determination in the only Jewish state in the world; d) the singling out of the Jewish state and the obvious use of double standards, for instance by seeing Israel as a fundamentally war-mongering collective and by attacking its “ethnic nationalism” while glorifying the ethnic nationalism of other groups (in the region), and while human rights violations, dictatorships, and antisemitism are downplayed or portrayed as “peaceful” or if blatant antisemitism and antisemitic violence against Jews are portrayed as justified “reactions to Israel’s state terrorism,” thereby suggesting that actual Jewish or Israeli behavior causes antisemitism. In such variants of anti-Israel resentment and Holocaust relativization, a projective and distorted picture of Israel is painted in which Israel embodies the stereotypical image of an evil, monolithic, generalized Jew. As Hirsh points out, those perceptions of “Zionism” that insinuate “Zionism” would refer to a

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as a coded form of antisemitism is not new but can be traced back to Stalinism. Experimental studies show that radical anti-Zionism also strongly correlates with racism, including resentments against Muslims, Arabs, and Palestinians (Geissler 2002). Therefore it does not imply genuine support of or interest in the Palestinians. In general, the regional Israeli-Palestinian conflict often appears to serve as a projective matrix for problems and conflicts of contemporary European immigration societies. Yet, publicized events and conflict escalations in the Middle East can be used to stir or enhance anti-Jewish acts, though they evidently do not cause antisemitic thought.17 Zones of Acquiescence: Manifest and Latent Resentments in Liberal Democracies In addition, we differentiate between manifest and latent forms of antisemitism. Sophisticated research designs recognize that antisemitism does not start with neo-Nazis and actors who openly declare to be antisemites. There is a broad consensus among researchers that antisemitism neither starts with full-fledged ideologies of racial antisemitism, nor with manifest hate crimes. We often encounter more latent and subtle forms in public communication and in attitudes towards Jews. While manifest forms make open generalizations about “the Jews” or overtly attack Jews as Jews, latent communication mobilizes anti-Jewish stereotypes by means of innuendo, allusive speech, and codes. Demagogues often utilize and play with ambivalences, and then deny the charge of antisemitism or racism (Lowenthal 1987b). They deliberatively articulate the “rumors about the Jews” (Adorno 1955) by employing innuendo, which leaves much room for interpretation; the listeners know to what and whom it is referred to. As mentioned before, liberal-democratic societies put restrictions on overt expressions of antisemitism, by legal means and/or by the

homogenous ideology, group and entity across time and political division are problematic (Hirsh 2007: 7). 17  Contrary to claims by some scholars and publicists, Jewish or Israeli behavior cannot cause (or justify) antisemitism, which is a matrix of distorted perceptions, just as the behavior of—let’s say an African—dictator cannot cause (or justify) racism against blacks. In fact, it is itself an antisemitic or racist concept to seek the causes of group and minority discrimination in the actual behavior of groups or minorities. Prejudice does not derive from actual behavior of members of a group. However, events in the Middle East or Africa can be used in antisemitic or racist discourses and be utilized to facilitate existing stereotypes.



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­ iscursive public scope or “zone of acquiescence” (Norris 2005: 20) d that defines the boundaries of democratic legitimacy of public statements and actors. In many ways, today we can speak of an “antisemitism without antisemites” (Marin 2000) simply because even neo-Nazis deny that they are antisemites—a charge which discredits political outreach and social recognition in Europe and beyond. In reaction to these boundaries, even apparent forms of hate speech often adapt to democratic conditions and become more coded. For example, in some cases old anti-Jewish stereotypes are simply replaced by less suspicious code words; such as substituting “the Jews” by “the globalists,” “the mondialists,” “the Zionists,” “the American East Coast” or, in a Stalinist and nationalist tradition, the “cosmopolites” (Cohen 2007). None of these terms automatically imply antisemitism. Yet, in certain contexts these words can function as proxies for overt tirades about “the Jews” (Cohen 2007; Haury 2002; Kloke 2007; Iganski/ Kosmin 2006). For instance, “the “American East Coast” has been used as a code for the alleged “power of the Jews,” and the term “the Jewish lobby” might not just refer to actual Jewish lobbyists, interests, and lawmakers in Brussels or Washington. It may also deliberately mobilize fantasies about an allegedly ‘powerful global Jewish network’ or world-dominating conspiracy behind major conflicts, wars, international institutions and governments. In such cases, among the most reliable criteria to evaluate if Jews are essentialized in an antisemitic fashion—or if we are faced, to the contrary, with a rational argument about specific political actors and actions—is the simultaneous existence or absence of traditional anti-Jewish stereotypes. Yet, interpretative ambiguities will remain; any classification reflects a conceptual continuum, and researcher needs to make transparent decisions where to draw the line when examining the heterogeneous, “changing faces” of antisemitism (Laqueur 2006). The Concept of Modernized Antisemitism Research designs also need to take into account that the ‘antisemitic imagination’ may discursively respond to changing terms, political issues and conflicts. We do not believe that there is any ‘eternal antisemitism.’ Anti-Jewish resentment is subject to changes over time. This refers to its forms, its functions, and its relevance. We therefore conceptualize new and coded forms of anti-Jewish resentment as modernized antisemitism (Rensmann 2004a). We prefer this term instead of the

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contested concept of ‘new antisemitism.’ The latter refers to new phenomena in which we may find disguised forms of antisemitism—such as the subtle identification of Jews as the string-pullers of multi-national capital or ‘globalism.’ It is suggested that these elements ideologically unite the extreme right, some parts of the radical left, and radical Islamists (Taguieff 2004; Iganski & Kosmin 2006). While such ideological convergences point to certain changing political constellations (see below), some scholars claim that the term ‘new antisemitism’ overemphasizes the novel character of re-articulated old resentments and falsely suggests a new quality. Others have argued that the “new” label is effectively erroneous as it fuses supposedly leftist and “Muslim” antisemitism into one entity when they are not necessarily always linked (Peace 2009). Our concept of modernized antisemitism, however, addresses the link between contemporary and past articulations of anti-Jewish resentment in Europe and beyond while simultaneously accounting for variations; the matrix of antisemitism and its imagery are not new. We also prefer the term “modernized antisemitism” because it illuminates the connection rather than the distinctions between manifest and latent forms that take shape in reaction to liberal-democratic and cosmopolitan conditions. Analogous to the well-established theory of neo-racism and “cultural racism,” which has developed critical tools to decipher new forms of “racism without races” (Balibar & Wallerstein 1990; Taguieff 2000), research needs to respond to changing forms and coded articulations of anti-Jewish hostility, and thus develop critical methods accordingly. Similar to coded or ‘cultural racism,’ it is part of the modernization of antisemitism to ‘culturalize’ racist antisemitism and employ subtle forms of collective exclusion without openly blaming ‘the Jews’ or ‘the Jewish race.’ By developing critical methods over years, racism research is far more advanced in understanding and illuminating various forms of ethnic minority exclusion under the veil of democratic and universalistic public discourse. Antisemitism research is largely lagging behind in this area. While it is important to avoid inflationary applications of ‘racism’ and ‘antisemitism,’ research on anti-Jewish phenomena also needs to further develop experimental methods to identify subtle stereotypes, their functions, and explain causal mechanisms. The authors of this volume seek to break new ground in this direction. No matter how much trouble this may cause for standardized long-term time series, it is important



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to recall that neither antisemitic forms nor manifestations, functions or criteria for their analysis are fixed; they are socially embedded and changing. They are context-dependent and need to be continuously re-constructed in the research process. Consequently, more sophisticated research tools also need to take “socially desirable” behavior and norms into account when designing and conducting surveys, as well as discourse or content analyses. This also applies to the secondary analysis of survey data and to the interpretation of public communication. For instance, it appears insufficient to us to simply ask in a survey if the respondent agrees to the statement that “more than others, Jews work with dirty tricks to achieve their goals” (Brähler & Decker 2008: 21). Even in anonymous surveys respondents are less likely to agree if the question points to publicly discredited antisemitic stereotypes in such a blatant and immediately recognizable way. It can be expected that few respondents will agree, and then antisemitism automatically appears rather irrelevant. Although some research suggests that public manifestations of anti-Jewish hatred have generally become more aggressive, outspoken, and open, we still need to refine our methods and measures to understand latent and less blatant resentments in the European electorate and in public spheres. Further, we need to understand the interplay of demand side and supply side factors. Utilizing the notion of “new politics of resentment,” a concept introduced by Hans-Georg Betz’ landmark work on radical-right populist parties in the 1990s (Betz 1993), we locate new mobilizations of resentment in the broader context of ‘anti-modern’ counter-cosmopolitan discontent. Yet, we also stress that antisemitism is a specific phenomenon and ‘undercurrent’ that plays particular roles in (post)modern societies and their cultural legacies. The Concept of Counter-Cosmopolitanism While the authors in this book explore multi-faceted models to explain the conditions of the presumed resurgence of antisemitism, we situate antisemitism also in the broader context of what Kwame Anthony Appiah (2007) has aptly called counter-cosmopolitanism. We conceive counter-cosmopolitanism as the generalized particularistic rejection of cosmopolitan inclusiveness, recognition of plurality, cultural diversity, obligations to strangers, or loyalties to humankind. Counter-

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cosmopolitan orientations claim national, religious, or cultural superiority over non-nationalized or non-religious rights entitlements or indivisible human rights based on universal equality, freedom, and solidarity. Counter-cosmopolitanism, to be sure, does not necessarily imply narrow nationalisms or regionalisms. Counter-cosmopolitan Islamist fundamentalists, in fact, employ their own version of global outreach, global justice, and “globalism” (Steger 2008). Distinct from the critique of actual globalization or of global injustices based on universal human rights, which are driven by inclusive cosmopolitan norms and claims, however, counter-cosmopolitanism points to the fundamental opposition to any socio-cultural modernization and cosmopolitan diversity. It rejects the universality of human rights. The latter are modern, non-traditionalist norms and patterns that traditionally have been embodied by Jews. In the historical European imagination they were perceived as the cosmopolitan ‘pariahs of nations.’ We do not argue that resurgent antisemitism can be reduced to or fully explained by counter-cosmopolitanism. But it can also be conceptualized as a radical form of counter-cosmopolitanism with which, we argue, it consistently marches in step in postmodern times. Hatred towards cosmopolitan cultural change, diversity, and modernity, especially relevant in times of rapid transformations, can be viewed as a factor contributing to antisemitic personifications of this very process. While both antisemitism and counter-cosmopolitan discontent should not be equated, it is our hypothesis that there are also aspects of historical and contemporary convergence and overlap. We argue that antisemitism is a specific, distinct phenomenon that differs from other racisms in its forms and functions. Yet, it should also be situated in and explained by the broader context of counter-cosmopolitanism, which experiences a rise in reaction to the multi-faceted globalization of societies. Accordingly, both antisemitism and counter-cosmopolitanism can be understood as anti-modern formations that are part of modernity. They do not originate, or are directly caused by, post-industrial globalization and concurring cosmopolitan transformations of society but constitute cultural perceptions thereof. Modern antisemitism attributes to ‘the Jews’ or ‘the Zionists’ the perceived evils of contemporary cosmopolitanization, and cosmopolitan modernity: they are, and have traditionally been perceived, as the embodiment of cosmopolitan universalists who, behind the goal of the



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‘destruction’ of national, ethnic and religious communities, advance their own particularistic cause:18 they are seen as global ‘string-pullers’ 18  The counter-argument that “Zionism” is always attacked solely for the reason that it is an “ethnonationalist ideology and, as such, contradicts the universalistic logic of the socialist and liberal left” (Beller 2007b) is rather simplistic. It is not persuasive for several reasons. First, this does not explain why ‘Zionism’ and Israel have become such major targets of the extreme right, for which ethnic nationalism and nativism are core ideologies (Mudde 2003; 2007). If opposition to ‘Zionism’ documents a universalistic logic, why does the decidedly anti-universalistic extreme right view Israel and ‘the Zionists’ as main enemies and continuously target them in mobilizations and campaigns? Rather, as Fine (2007) argues, only a self-reflective, critical eye on antisemitism within the left that is reflective towards its own premises “opens the space for criticism to be based on universal grounds rather than on some racist, nationalist or other particularistic premise.” Second, throughout its history, many parts of the socialist and liberal left have also supported and endorsed “national liberation” struggles, collective particularism and territorial sovereignty based on national identity including, most significantly, Palestinian national liberation struggles and other forms of ethnic or religious political self-determination. Until this day, many Stalinist groups and Communist parties have outright rejected post-nationalism and cosmopolitanism as mere ‘capitalist ideologies’. While there is a relevant cosmopolitan left today, there are also left-wing nationalists and counter-cosmopolitans who strongly defend nationalism and national labor protectionism against more inclusive political organizations, human rights claims, or cosmopolitan solidarity. However, such “left-wing” support of ethnic nationalism and cultural essentialism often overlooks the diversity and multiplicity of conflicts and interests in Israeli and Palestinian societies. Third, Beller overlooks the striking fact that in many cases (the Jewish state of ) Israel seems to be the only case where a rigidly “universalistic logic” is applied that is not sensitive to the negotiation of cultural difference, while, for instance, post-national, post-ethnic and post-religious claims to reorganize political communities are not raised in relation to any of the neighboring countries in the region. Subjecting Jews, and only Jews, to universalistic demands and aspirations while supporting cultural and religious particularism elsewhere may risk to turn the “universalistic logic” into its opposite: a particularistic logic that applies human and collective rights selectively. Human rights claims now tend to be invoked by both extreme right and radical left anti-Zionists when it comes the Middle East conflict. Simultaneously, the latter’s allegedly universalistic bases of their fundamental opposition to Israel’s existence are often difficult to identify. Universalism does not distinguish between victims of human rights violations, which are indivisible, no matter if they are committed by Israel, Hamas, or in Darfur; it also does not distinguish between good essentialisms and bad ones. Fourth, Beller ignores that in those cases when “the Zionists” are publicly attacked, it is often not (only) about the state of Israel but about the rejection of any transnational or cosmopolitan agency: “the Zionists” tend to be identified as operating through global lobbies and networks, international institutions, global media and international banks. Fifth, the very classification of “Zionism” as an “ethnonationalist ideology” displays a rather monolithic and indeed oversimplified view of the various political movements and factions associated with the right to Jewish self-determination (i.e. Zionism). “Zionism” entails many post-ethnic variants of which Beller does not take notice (for a thorough cosmopolitan critique of such monolithic misperceptions of “Zionism” cf. Hirsh 2007). Beller hereby also runs the risk of obscuring the reality of the highly culturally diverse, democratic state of Israel, and its inner contradictions, and those “Zionists” who endorse the full

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who are unattached to a ‘real’ homeland or ‘roots.’ Imagined as allegedly manipulating the modern world behind the scenes, antisemites project onto ‘the Jews’ that they aspire to worldwide domination. In particular, the notion of a Jewish conspiracy and hidden Jewish power is structurally linked to the idea of an alien threat to the nation, both through alleged domestic subversion and foreign control. These still present historical narratives make Jews a likely target if people feel their exclusive, particularistic community is threatened, changing, or diversifying, and if they seek to blame someone for all the ills of contemporary society. IV.  Antisemitism and Counter-Cosmopolitanism: Modeling Favorable Conditions According to our model, for this antisemitic and counter-cosmopolitan reaction to be politically relevant or become salient it needs to meet other favorable political and social conditions that shape “politicocultural opportunity structures” (Rensmann 2004a). We suggest that there is a set of four specific conditions that are favorable for—and indeed predict—the overall rise, public display, and political mobilization of counter-cosmopolitanism and modernized antisemitism in contemporary Europe. They entail (i) more favorable political opportunity structures for new counter-cosmopolitan mobilizations. These include an increasing volatility among voters, changes in the political divides structuring the electorate, and overall party system change, i.e. the transformation of party competition towards more polarization and the increase of the effective number of parties (Peterson & Lane 1998). In Western Europe’s established democracies, this process began with the rise of new parties in the mid-1980s. It became manifest especially with the electoral success of green, extreme right, and populist parties, some of which entered national governments. High inclusion of Arab Israelis, Ethiopian Zionists, and non-Jews. Most Zionists see themselves simply as defenders of their national homeland Israel and do not make ethnic superiority claims associated with racist “ethnonationalism.” Be that as it may, today we find that it is often counter-cosmopolitan particularists that have little hesitation supporting other (non-Jewish) nationalisms and restrictive forms of national or religious citizenship who invoke generalized attacks on the frequently nebulously targeted “Zionists” and the very legitimacy of the Jewish state as an “alien body” (rather than merely criticizing Israeli policies). This is especially striking in the case of the Iranian regime and its supporters, who virtually blame “the Zionists” for all the government’s problems and the very protests against the Islamic regime’s policies.



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electoral volatility and the lack of party system stability are even more obvious in Central-Eastern Europe. With the exception of the bi-polar party system in Hungary, in most cases the long expected consolidation of party systems in post-Communist transformation societies is still to come. All of these developments open space for new actors and political re-alignments. In addition, even though they encounter a hegemonic trend towards cosmopolitanism in public discourse, we assume that (ii) counter-cosmopolitan mobilizations also face more favorable cultural and discursive opportunity structures because of new issues and spaces generated in the process of politico-cultural change. First and foremost, they are linked to new public issues and agendas, such as globalization, global conflicts, terrorism, immigration, or the worldwide financial crisis. These new issues often stimulate polarized responses and have become new wedge issues. They can be utilized by countercosmopolitan actors, which can draw from different legacies of political, historical and cultural resentment. The changing conditions of political communication also matter. In part due to post-industrial technologies and the spread of anonymous hate speech via the Internet in democratic societies, resentments are increasingly displayed in transnational publics. Although the resonance of cultural resentments may vary in different political cultures, new communication permeates territorial boundaries and more restricted public spaces. This also contributes to an expansion of the discursive space of legitimate discourse about Jews and ethnic minorities. With few restrictions on anonymous hate speech along with a lack of ability to differentiate between reliable sources and hoaxes, conspiracy myths and an arbitrary, postmodern antisemitism could flourish with the help of new media—along with their powerful democratic potential. This ‘normalization’ of discrimination against minorities or talk about ‘the Jews’ makes it easier for public actors to tap into different popular resentments and stereotypes that still play well in certain segments of society—without experiencing significant discursive sanctions or other political repercussions.19 We hereby suggest that the public “boundaries of the speakable” (Rensmann 2004a; Bergmann & Heitmeyer 2005), i.e. the (il)legitimacy of

19   Again, this assumption requires two qualifications: new transnational public spaces and established spaces of democratic public will-formation are always contested. Resentful claims usually tend to evoke contestations.

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resentments against Jews and other minorities in democratic political culture, play a key role. Our preliminary hypothesis is that there is a shift towards a lower barrier to articulate such resentment in European societies—a trend supported not just by new media but also by a presumably expanding “zone of acquiescence,” i.e. “a lowering of barriers” inhibiting antisemitism, among European mainstream media. It is difficult to overlook that, contrary to widespread claims that criticism of Jews and Israel is taboo in the European public sphere after the Holocaust, anti-Jewish views are at times published, articulated and constructed as ‘another opinion,’ while publicly expressed antiIsrael views are undoubtedly ‘alive and kicking.’ There is evidence that bias against Israel is hegemonic in Europe’s mainstream media ( Jäger & Jäger 2003; Wistrich 2005). Even incidents of open antisemitism, in part by using Israel as a matrix, have apparently become more and more common in mainstream media, as some examples of 2009 may illustrate. For instance, over years El Pais, the most-circulated paper and the newspaper of record in Spain, has published a series of blatantly antisemitic cartoons that always display an innocent girl asking questions to, and accusing, an orthodox Jew with a hooked nose. A recent one alludes to the alleged Jewish financial power to control world politics: “But how is Israel able to violate with total impunity all human and international laws?” The orthodox Jew answers: “It costs us a good amount of money.” (quoted in The Coordination Forum for Countering Antisemitism 2009) In turn, Spain’s second most important and (self-defined “liberal”) paper, El Mundo, published an interview with the Holocaust denier David Irving as part of the paper’s coverage marking the 70th anniversary of the beginning of World War II. The editors argued that Irving’s crime, for which he has “already paid,” was a “crime of opinion rather than of action,” and that Irving was invited as part of the “now open” debate whether laws in some countries against expressing certain opinions about the Second World War were too harsh and should be changed (quoted in Tremlett 2009). The Swedish left-wing tabloid Aftonbladet recently published a story suggesting that Israeli troops killed Palestinians to steal their organs (Boström 2009). Time and again, Israel—not the majority of the globe’s states which are authoritarian or semi-authoritarian dictatorships—has been portrayed as the ultimate global villain. But there are indicators of an increasing density and intensity of this construct in European mainstream media.



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Apparently eroding boundaries in the discourse about Jews, Israel, and cultural minorities—making resentments more socially acceptable—are also important enabling conditions for the political mobilization of resentments. Radical counter-cosmopolitan and modernized antisemitic mobilizations are (iii) also likely to benefit from broader reconfigurations of political conflict in Europe’s post-industrial societies. The old left-right divide, which has structured political opinion and party competition in Europe for much of the twentieth century and shaped post-War political culture, is under pressure (Kriesi et al. 2008). For decades, a new cleavage has emerged and begun to re-shape political conflict axes and party systems: namely the value-based cultural divide between post-material, anti-authoritarian and self-expression values (values that emphasize individuality, human choice, freedom of expression, civil and political liberty, diversity and autonomy radiating into all domains of life), on the one hand, and materialist, authoritarian-collectivist orientations, on the other hand. Inglehart and Welzel have explained the role of the former in stabilizing support of substantive democracy and democratic institutions, while the latter lead to an instrumental support of democracy that can change with altered economic conditions. Although self-expression values “are themselves shaped by socioeconomic resources, they have a significant independent impact on democracy” (Inglehart & Welzel 2005: 182). This cleavage has been arching over and re-adjusting the social cleavage between market liberalism and redistributive government interventionism that had previously dominated the left-right divide. It shifted the conflict axis of political competition and began to transform the self-understandings associated with the traditional left-right distinction (Kitschelt & McGann 1995; Grande 2006; Kriesi et al. 2006). One of the most significant political manifestations of this shift is the disproportionate support of working class voters for extreme right and national-populist parties since the 1990s, which began to focus on and promote protectionist redistributive social policies (Ignazi 2003).20 Authoritarian-nationalist, radical right political formations have

20   In a recent multi-level modeling study, Kai Arzheimer shows, however, that while unemployment rates are important their interaction with other political factors is much more complex than suggested by previous research. Moreover, Arzheimer argues, persistent country effects prevail even if a whole host of individual and contextual variables is controlled for (Arzheimer 2009).

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effectively articulated and linked economic frustration with opposition to value change in post-industrial societies and the overall widened support of democratic self-expression values. According to Inglehart and Welzel, such self-expression values are still considerably weaker in the East than in the West (Inglehart & Welzel 2005). Moreover, we suggest that a new cleavage—cosmopolitanism vs. national protectionism—is emerging across Europe (tab.1). It is closely linked to and develops alongside broader postmodern value diffusions and value change. This divide further shifts the cleavage structure along a new combination of cultural, value-based conflict and economic polarizations. Confronting hegemonic cosmopolitan views (including support for immigration), the increasingly relevant countercosmopolitan pole represents cultural/economic protectionism and exclusionism. The shift becomes apparent in widespread union mobilizations—traditionally anchored in ‘the left’—against foreigners and immigrants, as exemplified in recent British labor union protests demanding “British jobs for British workers” (quoted in Burns 2009). This may lead to political re-alliances. Left-wing mobilizations for counter-cosmopolitan national particularism may also call into question Noberto Bobbio’s claim that the opposition between a horizontal or egalitarian vision of society (on the left) and a vertical, non-egalitarian vision of society (on the right) is the only criterion for the left-right divide that resists changes over time (Bobbio 1997). The shift may therefore indicate more fundamental cracks in the traditional left-right divide in Europe:21 involving party agency, presumed changes of cleavage structures may evolve into a broader transformation of European party spaces (Enyedi 2005). ‘New’ actors that employ counter-cosmopolitan discontent—which can be traced back to the success of anti-immigrant parties in the 1980s—find therein a favorable environment. Putting ‘radicals’ against ‘centrists,’ content analyses indicate that all extreme right, most national-populist and several non-mainstream left-wing parties have programmatically aligned on the pole of counter-cosmopolitan discontent. They may thereby occupy the ideological space that is created by this presumed

21   Of course, there are additional political divides that influence party competition, many of which are context-dependent. For example, in some post-Communist EU member states like Hungary and Poland the relationship to the Communist legacy continues to play a role in structuring party competition and electoral support (Kitschelt et al. 1999; Grzymala-Busse 2002; Jungerstam-Mulders 2006).



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Table 1. Major Cleavages of European Party Competition Redistributive government interventionism Post-materialism and self-expression values Liberal cosmopolitanism, support of cultural inclusion (pro-EU) Left (?)

Free market allocation Materialism and authoritarian conformism Counter-cosmopolitanism, exclusionism, national/religious protectionism (anti-EU) Right (?)

new cleavage and the recent ‘cosmopolitan centrism’ of major parties in Europe. This does not mean that economic factors have become unimportant. To the contrary, (iv) post-industrial structural economic transformations, neo-liberal policies that have re-distributed wealth from the poor to the wealthiest, and acute societal modernization crises—manifest, for instance, in the near collapse of the global financial system in 2008— may help to generate a new social basis for our theory of countercosmopolitan discontent. New social grievances certainly count to the favorable contributing factors for successful anti-universalistic countercosmopolitan mobilizations, as much as they may invigorate progressive claims to cosmopolitan solidarity. However, our model suggests that social protest—including many anti-globalization protests—is today often shaped by (or combined with) cultural exclusionism, authoritarianism, and national protectionism directed against demonized cultural others, immigrants and, in more or less coded forms, against ‘the Jews.’ It is our hypothesis that the interaction of these factors provides key enabling conditions for revived politics of resentment mobilized by some actors in the context of the European Union.22 In sum, the diagnosed resurgence of antisemitism and rise of countercosmopolitanism can be conceived in the context of a deeper crisis of global modernity. It can be theorized as a reified, anti-modern and anti-cosmopolitan reaction to rapid economic and socio-cultural

22  Of course, other contextual factors need to be taken into account that may explain the cross-national variation of antisemitism and counter-cosmopolitanism— and the political organizations mobilizing such resentment. For instance, Arzheimer and Carter provide ample evidence that varying structural contextual factors strongly influence the initial political opportunities—hence the success or failure—of extreme right parties (Arzheimer & Carter 2006).

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change and current crises in the increasingly complex but also conflictual network society of the 21st century. In the public sphere, it also appears that this reaction has in part returned from the fringes to the center of politics and civil society. It is part of this problem that there is a simultaneous wide-spread denial of antisemitism’s existence, and that resurging manifestations of antisemitism are often no longer identified and recognized as such. In ‘cosmopolitan Europe’, the reloaded antisemitism of the 21st century is frequently no longer identified as an imminent international and domestic human rights challenge. V.  Mobilizing Discontent: The Transnational Emergence of New Politics of Resentment in Europe Before we turn to the research framework of this book, we take another step to illustrate the guiding questions and substantiate our preliminary claims. We briefly offer some evidence that lends support to some of the aforementioned empirical assessments and to the initial plausibility of our theoretical narrative. We first summarize new survey data that support the rather cautious claim that—along with other racist resentments and counter-cosmopolitan views—antisemitism is currently on the rise among European citizens, indicating a significant reversal from trends up to the 1990s. In addition to this look at demand side conditions, we will address some evidence that illustrate new counter-cosmopolitan and antisemitic mobilizations among hate groups, European extreme right and populist parties, and broader transnational European publics. In doing so, we point to the potential on the political and discursive supply side that European democracies are facing. Stigmatizing Jews and Immigrants: Changes in Public Opinion Comparative survey data on the subject continue to be eclectic and— unlike Eurobarometer polls—are conducted on an irregular, less comprehensive basis. However, while there are questions about data reliability and comparability, recent surveys by the PEW Global Attitudes Project (2008) and the ADL (2009) both indicate a long-term increase of antisemitism since the turn of the century, and an especially steep rise since 2006. Though this presumed rise is more drastic in some countries than in others and, as mentioned before, there are



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overall considerable cross-national variations (for example, 37% more Spaniards than Britons display negative feelings towards Jews), we can speak of a European-wide development. According to PEW’s survey data only Great Britain stands out as the single European country included in the survey where there has not been a substantial increase in antisemitic attitudes. 9% of the British rate Jews unfavorably, which is largely unchanged from recent years. 46% of the Spanish rate Jews unfavorably (up from 21% in 2005). More than a third of Russians (34%) and Poles (36%) echo this view. Fewer, but still significant numbers of the Germans (25%) and French (20%) interviewed also express negative opinions of Jews (fig. 1). These percentages are all higher than obtained in comparable PEW surveys taken in recent years. In a number of countries the increase appears to be especially stark. Overall, it has been particularly notable between 2006 and 2008 (PEW 2008; EU Agency for Fundamental Rights 2009). It is noteworthy that the PEW data also indicate a strong relationship between anti-Jewish and sentiments against Muslim immigrants. Indeed, in the U.S. and the six European countries included in the survey the correlation between unfavorable opinions of Jews and unfavorable opinions of Muslims is remarkably high (neg .80; PEW 2008). Overall, negative views of Muslims have also increased in this period. Exceptions are Spain and Germany where negative views of Muslims are nevertheless still high (52% and 50% respectively).23 The seven-country European ADL Survey was conducted between December 1, 2008 and January 13, 2009 (n=3,500: 500 respondents each in Austria, Britain, France, Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Spain). It displays an overall increase (compared to previous ADL surveys) of respondents who answered “true” or “probably true” to

  A 2009 study on ‘group-focused enmity’ conducted by researchers from the University of Bielefeld in Germany finds that hatred of Muslims to some extent decreased, however, while according to this study hatred of Jews and homosexuals is growing. The level of most resentment against most minorities declined—sexism and racism even considerably, resentments against Muslims slightly, while the percentage of people who believe “that there are too many Muslims” in their country is still especially high in those countries that actually have a low percentage of Muslim minorities. According to the study, 41.2% of Europeans believe that “Jews try to take advantage of having been victims during the Nazi era,” and 45.7% of respondents supported the contention that Israel in general “is conducting a war of extermination against the Palestinians,” thereby equating the Jewish state with the genocidal Nazi regime and projecting colonial and Holocaust-related European guilt to the Jews. Cf. Stricker 2009. 23

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50 46

45 40

39

35

20 15 10 5 0

Poland

32

30 25

36

27 20 11 9 2004

22

21 16 6

2005

25

Spain 20

13 6

2006

Britain Germany France

9 2008

Sources: PEW Global Attitudes Project (2008) Unfavourable Views of Jews and Muslims on the increase in Europe. (Washington, D.C.: PEW). Available at http://pewglobal.org/ reports/pdf/262.pdf; EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (2009), Antisemitism— Summary overview of the situation in the European Union 2001–2008 (February 2009).

Figure 1.  Negative views of Jews in Europe since 2004 (in percent).

at least three of four traditional antisemitic stereotypes. The stereotypes are 1) Jews are more loyal to Israel than to this country; 2) Jews have too much power in the business world; 3) Jews have too much power in international financial markets; 4) Jews still talk too much about what happened to them in the Holocaust. Almost one of two respondents in Spain, Poland, and Hungary believe that at least three of these four antisemitic stereotypes are “probably true” (Spain: 48%; Poland 48%, Hungary 47%). In Austria we find support of 30%, in Germany and France 20%, and 10% in Great Britain. Overall, nearly one-third of those surveyed (32%) believe that at least three of the above statements are “probably true,” while 15% believe that all four are “probably true” (ADL 2009). According to the ADL survey, age, education and income level are key factors in determining the likelihood of a respondent believing in the traditional antisemitic stereotypes tested. Those over the age of 65, those who did not continue their education beyond the age of 17 and those earning less than €11,000 are more likely than the rest of the population to agree with at least three of the four antisemitic characterizations presented in the survey. This correlation is valid throughout Western Europe.



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In light of the recent economic and financial crisis associated with “Wall Street,” it is of particular interest how widespread the modernized antisemitic stereotype is that “Jews have too much power in international financial markets.” In Spain, 74% of those asked, that is almost three out of four respondents, said they felt it was ”probably true” that Jews hold too much sway over the global financial markets ( fig. 2). Even more specifically, the ADL survey asked “How much blame do you place on Jews in the financial industry for the current global economic crisis? Do you blame them a great deal, a good amount, a little or not at all?” Despite the complexities of the current global economy, survey data indicate that Jews receive a considerable amount of blame for the global financial crisis. Overall, 31% of respondents across Europe blame Jews in the financial industry either “a great deal,” “a good amount” or “a little” for the current global economic crisis. 46% of Hungarians, 43% of Austrians, 38% of Poles, 30% of Germans, 25% in Spain, 16% in the UK, and 15% in France share this antisemitic stereotype and ‘explanation’ at least to some degree (ADL 2009). These data sets show (i) that more people seem to display antisemitic resentments in public, if not an evident cross-national rise of such resentments. They also illustrate (ii) a widespread readiness to ‘explain’ current or new socio-cultural and economic issues or conflicts by conventional anti-Jewish stereotypes and thereby personify the complex process of globalization. Antisemitism has not been ‘substituted’ by other forms of racist discrimination but it correlates with them.24 24  Empirical research shows that the popular claim that Jews were “replaced” by Muslims and other minorities as the target of societal resentment (Bunzl 2007) in the 21st century is unfounded (cf. Heitmeyer 2005; Kaplan & Small 2006). Let us explain: European Muslims are often, and increasingly so over the last decade, subjected to discrimination, social exclusion, and politico-cultural resentments in European societies. Part of forms of institutionalized racism, propaganda against Islam and Muslims can instigate hate crimes similar to those against other religious, cultural or ethnic minorities. It is noteworthy, however, that these resentments and hatred against Muslim immigrants also differ from antisemitic projections and their functions, dynamics and content in many ways (as indicated and explained above). First, antisemitism, as a negative matrix of modernity, is more than, and different from, just a variation of racism. Antisemitism has motivated mass movements, declared Jews as “enemies of mankind,” and, in its past and present forms, attributes to Jews global conspiracies, hidden power, control over media and politics, the subterranean global destruction of societies, and multinational finance capitalism, in sum all the negative sides of modernity—none of which we tend to find even in the most radical forms of public

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74

80 70

59

60 50 40 30 20

Austria 54

France Germany

37

Hungary 27

Poland

22 15

Spain Britain

10 0

Source: ADL, Attitudes Toward Jews in Seven European Countries (New York: ADL, February 2009).

Figure 2.  “Jews have too much power in international financial markets” (in percent).

Realignments and Political Mobilizations of Resentment: Right, Left, and Beyond How much such attitudes and preferences matter as vectors defining ‘ideal policy preferences’ of voters, let alone political behavior, is subject to debate. Antisemitism and other resentments are significantly anti-Muslim resentments. And while there has never been a “Jewish declaration of war” against societies in which Jews live, the “totalitarian ideology” (Yehuda Bauer) of radical Islamists, which has some influence on Muslim immigrant communities in Europe, offers exactly that, in addition to a right-wing philosophy based on authoritarianism, misogyny, and hatred of “others” (Brumlik 2009; Benhabib 2002). Second, the claim that islamophobia—in itself, as mentioned before, a contested concept also employed by Islamists to fence off criticism of Islamist political doctrines—has “replaced” antisemitism downplays the ongoing empirical relevance of the latter. All accessible data indicate that rising prejudices against Muslims take place alongside, not instead of rising antisemitism. (Wistrich 2010) Empirical indicators show that antisemitism is thriving in and beyond Europe, and antisemitic cultural artefacts such as the Turkish blockbuster “Valley of the Wolves,” which portrays Mossad agents as baby-snatchers, grow in popularity. Likewise, party research cannot substantiate Bunzl’s claim that extreme right parties have increasingly become “pro-Jewish” and “pro-Israel.” Most evidence points to the contrary: a radicalization of antisemitic mobilizations and programmatic orientations among extreme right parties seeking counter-cosmopolitan realignments with an antisemitic edge (see the article by Rensmann in this book). Hence, the relationship between antisemitism and anti-Muslim prejudice is more complex than some scholars have suggested in the past.



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widespread but do not necessarily translate into, or predict, electoral behavior. However, empirical party research and discourse analyses presented in this volume show that political antisemitism and countercosmopolitanism are currently mobilized by various actors and have become increasingly salient. This happens with some considerable— though cross-nationally varying—political success and impact. And we suggest that voters holding xenophobic, antisemitic and counter-cosmopolitan views (i.e. fundamentally reject cultural, economic and political globalization and the ‘cosmopolitanization’ of society going along with it) are more likely to support right-wing extremist and nationalpopulist parties, but also other parties that facilitate or promote such views and antisemitism. First and foremost, antisemitism is once again a key ideological feature of European extreme right parties and organizations. Today, it is also once again a core element of global right-wing extremism (Weitzman 2006), which is reflected in shifting campaigns by old and “new” extreme right parties. While agitation against immigrants (“repatriation instead of right to stay”) and overt racism—to a large degree directed against Muslim minorities who have increasingly become the target of racial discrimination—remain essential to extreme right nationalist ideology (Scharenberg 2006: 86f ), antisemitism today is central to political organizing and campaigning in the context of broader counter-cosmopolitan mobilizations. Several—though not all—extreme right actors increasingly adopt new popular issues in Europe such as neo-liberalism, the European Union, multi-culturalism and immigration, imperial wars, global conflicts and the Middle East. For instance, during the 2009 electoral campaign for the European Parliament, the extreme right Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ)—by some classified as “radical right-wing populist” (Mudde 2007)—dramatically increased its turnout after a campaign against EU accession of Turkey and Israel, although the latter is not even a candidate or has any ambitions to become a EU member (www.derstandard.at, May 21, 2009). While, in this case, opposition to Turkey represents Muslim immigration and socio-cultural change, the mobilization against Israel represents a reference to ‘the Jews.’ Targeting both groups responds to the aforementioned considerable demands in the Austrian electorate. Witnessing varying political and electoral performances, the extreme right mobilizes these ‘new issues,’ which often serve as a medium for anti-Jewish hatred. Employing an anti-war rhetoric and calls for world

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peace, Jews or “world Zionism” are attacked as the root cause for all of these issues. Often, the ideological targets and enemies are coined as “multi-national globalization,” “cultural imperialism,” or “Jewish globalism.” Supporting the call by the Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to create a “world without Zionism,” Jews are perceived as the “string-pullers” behind all modernizing dimensions of globalization: cosmopolitan democracy, multi-culturalism, capitalism, and international law. The new ‘social question’ and the critique of neoliberalism, which have become a focus of extreme right actors with its changing, more and more proletarian electorate since the 1990s (Ignazi 2003), is re-phrased in a nationalistic and antisemitic fashion by blaming American “locusts” and “Jewish banks” for any social malaise linked to globalization. Their programmatic answer is national protectionism, “overcoming the capitalist interest rate economy,” and the redistribution of wealth among ‘ethnic’ nationals. While some political parties primarily target Muslim minorities domestically, others also show open solidarity with Islamists, the ‘anti-imperialist resistance’ by Hamas, Hezbollah, and Islamist hard-liners in Iran. For instance, the Austrian neo-Nazi publication “Alpen-Donau.Info” states in an inflammatory article under the title “How Jews Agitate against States” that Jews are responsible for “the nastiest and most irreconcilable hate campaign on the part of ‘our’ media—against the Iranian state, its president and its people. Jewish lobby groups have been busily spreading their venom.” Attacking “the sort of Jews who label everything short of unconditional philo-Semitism as ‘anti-Semitism’ ” and hoping that “the Jews can choke on the world’s hatred: as the self-appointed ‘only chosen people,’ they have brought it on themselves,” the neoNazis also oppose “the Islamization of Europe.” Yet they support, as expressed in left-wing rhetoric, “the Palestinian-self-defense against ‘Israel’s’ war of extermination” and display their “friendship with the last free state, Iran!” (quoted in Melman 2010) Many right-wing extremists across Europe display Palestinian symbols and claim to fight “For a world of free peoples—solidarity with Iraq and the Palestinians!” (Puschnerat 2005: 69) For instance, the German extreme right NPD went so far to imitate traditional leftwing rhetoric by demanding: “Stop the Israeli Holocaust in the Gaza Strip.” Israel is hereby targeted as an “artificial” state of a (cosmopolitan) “non-people” oppressing the Palestinian people. The Jewish state is also attacked as a special center of cosmopolitanism and globalization: as the presumed heart of “multinational finance capitalism” and



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“war-mongering imperialism” with the ambition of “world domination” (quoted in Gessler 2004: 29). Adjusting to new issues while avoiding to alienate voters by sounding too openly antisemitic or radical, this coded extreme right “anti-Zionism,” along with the selective use of human rights rhetoric, also creates an opening for formerly often rejected alliances with left-wing “anti-Zionists,” “anti-imperialists,” and with radical Islamist groups.25 As mentioned before, anti-Jewish resentments and political counter-cosmopolitanism also resurface in parties not associated with the extreme right. Today, indeed, there are various examples of such mobilizations among self-declared “left-wing” groups, websites, and publications. Several participate in populist politics of resentment, though there are some discursive differences. While there are some cases of (endorsements of ) Holocaust denial among left-wing publications and groups, “antisemitic leftists far more commonly view Jewish nationalism as the very source and motive force of world imperialism; contend that Jews are running world affairs secretly, through financially powerful organizations and lobbies; and compare Israeli assaults on the Palestinians to the Nazi German genocide of European Jewry.” (Simonsen 2007) History—and the current revitalization of antisemitism in Europe as well as in other parts of the world—reveals, thus, that the Left is in no way immune to antisemitic and racist notions. With considerable impact among some radical left parties, a set of groups openly mobilizes anti-democratic, counter-cosmopolitan and nationalist resentments and frames this as “anti-imperialism” and “antiZionism.” In this context, nationalistic, anti-egalitarian and culturalist ideologies replace or trump previous attachments to universal human rights, anti-fascism, and opposition to capitalism. Favoring ethnic particularism, parochial hierarchical societies and authoritarian nationalism over cosmopolitan solidarity, such political groups view exclusively the Jewish state “as such [as a] crime against humanity,” or see the fight against Israel and for “Palestinian national-selfdetermination” intimately linked to the “fight against globalization.” (quoted in Gessler 2004) Thus Israel is not seen as a ‘normal nation-state’ embodying national self-determination but as an expression of globalization, against

25   In a similar fashion, the extreme right German paper Junge Freiheit complains about the “inflation of antisemitism charges” while seeking a political alliance with “Marxist” enemies of Israel (Koch 2006).

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which both the radical right and parts of the radical left mobilize indiscriminately—and when it comes to the Jewish state they are increasingly supported by a generally more hostile political climate.26 In some cases such groups turn Israel into a ‘collective Jew’ and employ stereotypes and imagery that resemble the unfiltered antisemitic agitation of the extreme right, even if there may be a different set of self-identifications, intentions, and motivations involved. For example, we can speak of public manifestations of left-wing antisemitism if the “Rothschilds,” “the Zionists,” or Israel as a collective Jew are characterized as agents “without scruples,” “parasitic,” “fundamentally evil,” “materialistic,” “string-pullers,” “war-mongering,” “greedy,” “artificial,” “inhuman,” or as a “foreign body” that “exploits the peoples of the world” and “controls the media.” Parties and groups facilitating such antisemitic resentments—sometimes in the guise of anti-imperialism and even international solidarity27—often also identify with groups which are at odds, if not in outright contradiction with other post-materialist left ideals such as cosmopolitanism, democratic humanism, gender equality, and social and political egalitarianism (Cohen 2007). It is therefore not surprising, for instance, that

26   For instance, a Swiss National Councilman, a representative of the Green Party, recently called Israel a “terrorist state” and an “alien element” in the Arab world during an interview with the conspiracy theory website “We Are Change Switzerland,” which presumably believes that “the Jews are the string-pullers behind a secret world government” and that two agencies are controlling all Western media while these media are “in the hands of the Rothschilds.” (cf. Stamm 2010) 27   “Anti-Zionism,” as a political ideology directed against Israel’s very existence, had resonated in parts of the left since the late 1960s, but had been marginalized since the 1980s. However, radical anti-Zionism has resurfaced since the “Al-Aqsa-Intifada” in 2000. One of the reasons for anti-Zionism and anti-Israel sentiments among leftwing groups is a change in perception since 1967 (Kloke 2007). Since then, Arab regimes and Palestinians are rather seen as the weak and “the oppressed;” Israel, to the contrary, is seen as “the powerful aggressor”—independent of actual behavior of either. According to radical “anti-Zionist” ideology, Israel is to blame for virtually all problems in the Middle East. Israeli military actions and human rights violations are hereby often described as “genocide,” whereas Hamas’ suicide bombings in Israeli civilian neighborhoods are portrayed as “acts of despair” or openly justified as “resistance.” In the context of this ideology, Hamas’ human rights violations, including the arbitrary killings of fellow Palestinians and members of Fatah, and the groups’ glorification of the ‘Protocols of the Elders of Zion’ are downplayed—as is the organizations’ homophobia, authoritarianism, and claim that “the Jews” are responsible for the French Revolution, Western colonialism, Communism and both world wars. Rigorously filtering out any facts that may challenge this binary code, such anti-Zionism is part of a Manichean perspective that projects domestic fantasies on the complex Middle East conflict.



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European neo-Nazi and extreme right parties celebrated Ahmadinejad for standing up against the “Western world and its Jewish lobby” (npdblog.info, June 25, 2009); just as several leftist organizations and parties, along with many radical Islamist groups, declared their unconditional “solidarity” with the dictatorial regime in Iran and with its president Ahmadinejad—even while the regime launched a brutal crackdown on the democratic grassroots opposition and blamed “Zionist media and agents” for instigating these protests.28 In fact, several parties and groups of the European populist and radical left share the Iranian regime’s (and other political Islamists’) claim that America and “Zionism” are the major menace to the earth, and “the U.S. and Israel” are “the real enemies of the Islamic world” (Ayatollah Khamenei; quoted in Worth 2010). Though it is unclear if, or in how far, such views and actors reach critical mass or salience, they do in part resonate among elite segments as well as actual and potential voters of both several extreme right-wing and populist left-wing parties in Europe. While the former have been more successful in mobilizing cultural and economic

  For instance, the European-wide organization “Campo Antiimperialista,” decidedly “left-wing,” seeks a “world without Zionism” and calls for unconditional solidarity with Hamas and Hezbollah in spite of the antisemitic and authoritarian policies of these groups. It glorifies lynching and suicide attacks against the “true terror” of “Zionist-imperialist politics” and perceives the “destruction of Zionism and the socalled state of Israel [as] the only way to justice.” Its Austrian branch “Antiimperialist Coordination” also supports Holocaust deniers such as Ibrahim Alloush as “one of the most important figures of the progressive pan-Arab movement” (cf. DÖW 2003). The group perceives elections as “imperialist theater.” In addition, it explicitly supports the theocratic authoritarian Iranian regime because of its allegedly antiimperialist character, and its hard-line president Ahmadinejad, who denies the Holocaust and declares that there are no gays in Iran (while his opponent Moussavi, a founding father of the Islamic Republic, publicly criticized Ahmadinejad’s “antisemitic outbursts” and Holocaust denial). Small wonder, then, that the group was among those on the left which expressed “joy over the success of Ahmadinejad” after the presumably fraudulent election on June 12, 2009 (Campo Antiimperialista 2009). The German daily newspaper “Junge Welt,” an agenda-setter for the Left Party, also celebrated Ahmadinejad’s alleged “victory” and the violent suppression of the democratic opposition, which is viewed as a “counter-revolutionary,” “asocial revolution” aiming at “Iran’s complete integration into the system of the imperialist global order.” (quoted in Mohr 2009) Likewise, George Galloway’s Respect Party praised “Iran’s democracy” and situates extreme right/religious fundamentalist groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah on the global left. Islamist support for the brutal crackdown on demonstrators includes the influential German Islamist Internet platform muslimmarkt.de. It appears that human rights violations are often criticized selectively in these contexts; they are only addressed if Israel takes actions but tend to be ignored if they happen elsewhere in the world and even if Palestinians are killed by Hamas or other governments, or treated as second-class citizens in Syria or Lebanon. 28

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‘globalization losers’ in electoral politics (Kriesi et al. 2008), the latter have arguably more influence on elite opinion. Moreover, in an increasingly polarized political context distinctions between Israeli policies, ‘the Jews,’ and the Holocaust are often blurred among leftist activists as well. In Thessaloniki (Greece), for example, communist groups desecrated a Holocaust memorial. They attached pictures of dead Lebanese civilians to the site—the Jewish victims of the Shoah and their memory actions are held responsible for actions by the Israeli military in its war with Hezbollah. In the Swedish city Malmö, a broad left-wing political alliance “Stoppa Matchen” (“Stop the Match!”) mobilized against a Davis Cup tennis match between Sweden and Israel, forcing the players to play in front of empty chairs while some activists attacked the hall. Left-wing members of the Malmö city council described the presence of Israeli players and the regular international game as “a provocation against the Arabs living in Malmö.” In January 2009, the left-wing regional government in Catalunya cancelled its service marking Holocaust International Remembrance Day arguing that “marking the Jewish Holocaust while a Palestinian Holocaust is taking place is not right.” (quoted in Mahler 2009) The latter is what Paul Iganski and Abe Sweiry call the “growing normalization of the Nazi card” in their chapter of this book.29 It is also an expression of secondary antisemitism that exonerates and downplays the European past by turning living Israelis and Jews into present-day Nazis; moreover, it implicitly legitimizes war against the Jewish state because the Nazis were so evil that they needed to be stopped by military means.30 This equation, which relativizes the

29  As mentioned before, it is noteworthy that even in light of such incidents, which employ the harshest pejorative attacks on Israel and Israeli citizens, the perception that criticism of Israel is “taboo” and strictly negatively sanctioned in European publics continues to survive and thrive. 30  To be sure, there are several Jews who are among those treating Israel policies as equivalent to the Nazi atrocities of the Holocaust. One prominent example is Norman Finkelstein, a radical anti-Zionist publicist, activist and scholar who claims that Jews control the media. On his website he claims that “the grandchildren of Holocaust survivors of World War II are doing to the Palestinians exactly what was done to them by Nazi Germany.” (Finkelstein 2010; see also the article by Bachner in this book) As early as 1982 Finkelstein, the best-selling author of “The Holocaust Industry” who is widely popular in Europe, waved a banner during a protest urging “Israeli Nazis” to “stop the Holocaust in Lebanon.” (cf. Holden 2010). Equating the Nazi genocide with the plight of the Palestinians resonates among considerable segments of the European publics if we follow recent empirical surveys (cf. Heyder, Iser & Schmidt 2004). The aforementioned anti-Israel activists, who apparently invoke their Jewish background



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atrocities of the Holocaust, is indeed quite common in the European radical left, and reaches far beyond (e.g. Joachim Martillo, who speaks of “evil Jewish Nazis,” quoted in Davidson 2010). We find this especially in the left’s nationalist variants, which are indeed difficult to distinguish from right-wing nationalists for whose activists the “ethnic peoples” living in dictatorships such as Iran or Libya are not oppressed by their rulers but exclusively by the United States and Israel. In this context, internal individual and collective struggles and contradictions within societies are often completely ignored. For example, a leftist party in Spain recently expelled one of its members for creating a proIsrael website, arguing that “Our friends are the people of Iran, Libya and Venezuela, oppressed by imperialism, and not a Nazi state like Israel.” (quoted in Rahola 2010) Robert Wistrich argues that this common “Nazi” branding and demonization of Israel, which downplays the Holocaust, “has become the most potent form of contemporary antiSemitism.” (Wistrich 2004) Hence, Jews and Israelis are targeted by right-wing extremist actors, and recent data suggest that this is increasingly so. But, as mentioned before, right-wing extremists do not have an exclusive mandate for Jew-hatred. There is also a long tradition of societal antisemitism of the center, and of left and liberal antisemitism in Europe and beyond. Moreover, there appear to be new ideological bridges between former political antagonists, especially between various populist parties that were formerly at odds with each other. This may be enabled by new ‘wedge issues’ such as globalization, the EU, national identity, and cultural as well as economic protectionism. Newly salient topics that turn into wedge issues and thus induce political realignments also include the banking crisis, the Middle East, the Iran conflict, and Israel. Novel ideological convergences and realignments between the radical right and parts of the radical left that are reflected in such new

to legitimize anti-Israel sentiments and shelter those sentiments from accusations of antisemitism, are frequently invited to public forums and promoted by media across Europe. They are often constructed as “dissident voices,” and they are especially celebrated by the extreme right and by various populist left-wing parties and organizations, but also by some mainstream media outlets. Some of those organizations believe, like Finkelstein himself, that the German (or the European) media are “totalitarian;” i.e. they are allegedly quelching legitimate dissent by using charges of antisemitism. On links between some “progressive” Jewish thought and new antisemitism cf. Rosenfeld 2006.

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‘wedge issues’—issues that divide and reassort parts of the political spectrum—particularly affect some re-emerging parties of the radical left and their mobilization effort (Hödl & Lamprecht 2005). While for many leftist parties and voters, pro-Palestinian or anti-Israel views are markers for a left-wing identity that sides with ‘the oppressed’ (the perceived weaker side) and pro-Israel views presumably signify an association with ‘the right,’ a majority of extreme right parties and voters also identifies with Palestinian nationalism and opposes Israel as a “collective Jew.” In fact, the new extreme right has adopted many ‘antiimperialist’ and anti-Zionist ideological components from the radical left in order to modernize its platforms and political outreach (Kloke 2007). Simultaneously parts of the radical left try to regain terrain (and the electorate) that has been lost to extreme right parties in the context of this ideological shift and rebranding. Radical opposition to Israel as a Jewish state is arguably one of the Stalinist left’s most popular causes, and can be traced backed to some variants of Communist anti-Zionism of the 1920s when, for instance, Die Rote Fahne depicted Jews as counter-revolutionary “Zionist agents” (Kistenmacher 2006). This history and Soviet-led campaigns against “the Zionists” are, by the way, another reason why we should treat with some caution the thesis of a ‘new anti-Semitism’ (Fine 2007). A case in point are the vigorous attempts by British trade and academic unions to boycott the Jewish state, its academics and its citizens; and Israel only (leaving some of the most egregious human rights violators, such as Iran or Sudan or China, consistently unaddressed).31 31   It is noteworthy that the often exclusive focus on Israel corresponds with the particular attention that the relatively small Middle Eastern country and the Israeli-Arab conflict receive in national and global media. Although this conflict, as violent as it is, is largely a limited regional conflict over land and resources, much bloodier conflicts, such as the persecution of Darfurians, have found little public interest. Since 2003, the Sudanese government armed and organized tribal militias to launch a campaign of violence and forced displacement against the civil population of Darfur under the pretense to fight rebels. The Arab-Muslim “Janjaweed” militias have attacked civilian villages, killing and raping the inhabitants and destroying their homes. Until today, more than two million people were forced to flee their homes, and more than 400,000 were murdered. The intent and degree of mass violence as well as its duration over time represents a crime of almost genocidal magnitude. Yet, this massive crime against humanity receives only a fraction of the international media attention dedicated to Israel, Gaza and the West Bank, and it is even more marginalized in public campaigns by unions and left-wing organizations.



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In this context, it does not come as a surprise that the University and College Union also invited, for instance, the International Relations Secretary of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), Bongani Masuku, to speak about “Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions against Israel,” despite the fact that the South Africa’s Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) had condemned him for hate speech and ruled that his statements “imply that the Jewish and Israeli community are to be despised, scorned, ridiculed and thus subjecting them to illtreatment on the basis of their religious affiliation.” (cf. Schraub 2009) This type of political activism tends to follow a binary logic and Manichean world-view: “the Zionists” are almost exclusively constructed as evil-spirited perpetrators, more often than not equated with “the Nazis,” while “the Palestinians” are consistently construed as “innocent,” defenseless collective victims, or compared to inmates of Nazi concentration camps, who play no active role in the conflict. Among other things, this model deprives Palestinians of their subjectivity as acting beings and reduces them to Pawlow’s dogs whose actions cannot be judged. If Palestinians mobilize antisemitism or take (violent) actions against innocent civilians, it is, some anti-Israel activists claim, a “reaction to Israel’s state terrorism” that is inevitable, i.e. without alternative. In fact, it can be seen as a form of ‘orientalism’ to declare that “the Arab world or Islam is culturally immune to antiSemitism and that any manifestation of anti-Semitism in this context is either an understandable response to oppression or an import from the West.” Indeed, the myth of the non-existence of Arab antisemitism “constitutes a curious denial of agency to Arabs and an inverted form of disrespect.” (Fine 2007) Consequently, among anti-Israel critics mobilizing a binary perception of the conflict there also tends to be little public outrage about the ‘extrajudicial killings’ of civilians committed by Hamas’ and Hezbollah’s suicide bombers (i.e. non-state actors). Following the logic that ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend’ (for a critique Young 2006) some leftist publicists and political activists justify, collaborate with, or at times even glorify Islamist militant organizations such as Hezbollah, Hamas and Asbat al-Ansar as part of the global “left-wing resistance” and view their terror as “legitimate”— although, according to all ideological measures (Mudde 2003), these organizations classify as (religious) radical right, and although they do not respect human rights but target and kill dissident Muslims and

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Jews because they are Jews (without making the effort of distinguishing between Israelis and Jews).32 It can be argued that this binary logic (demonization of “evil” Zionism vs. glorification of Hamas and “good” Islamism; rejection of Israel’s governmental violence as “state terrorism” vs. appraisal of the violence of Islamist non-state actors) points to European and Western legacies and projections rather than being a reflection of the complex, often violent realities of the Middle East conflict that are rather difficult to disentangle. Strikingly, however, such binary views on the ‘Israel question’ and Israel as the ‘forefront of globalization’ or of cosmopolitanism are frequently mobilized by the radical right, parts of the radical left, and some public actors of the center of civil society—signifying some fertile ground for further potential realignments on this issue. Antisemitic criticism of Israel therefore emerges as a focal point around which “otherwise disparate political forces may unite: the far right, certain sections of the anti-imperialist left, certain forms of Islamic radicalism” and, though Israel is in this context often also viewed as ‘too cosmopolitan,’ even “certain types of postnational liberalism which heap all the sins of nationalism in our post-national age on one particular nation, Israel, as if this nation has a unique and particular illegitimacy.” (Fine 2007) While direct organizational cooperation between right-wing extremists, radical leftists, and Islamists has been limited and fragile so far, in some countries there is noticeable collaboration between the radical left and extreme right Islamist groups, such as Hamas and Hezbollah, as well as significant outreach to Islamists by some extreme right and left groups. These organizational developments, too, are indicators of some significant countercosmopolitan realignments. To be sure, ideological differences are still significant in various ways. After all, one of the radical left’s declared goals is to combat all forms of antisemitism and racism. Left-wing radicals and populists are still less likely to mobilize against immigrants and usually do not attack Jews as Jews. Moreover, opposition to cosmopolitan change is often framed from an “alter-mondialism” perspective that supports a different globalization rather than its generalized counter-­cosmopolitan   As an Egyptian judge Adel Abdul Salam Gomaa, convicting a 26-member Hezbollah group for planning to attack on Israeli tourists in the Sinai Peninsula and fire on ships passing the Suez Canal, put it: “Is preparing explosives and targeting tourist resorts support for the Palestinians?” (cf. Slackman 2010). 32



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rejection. By and large, radical left anti-Zionists are also less successful in mobilizing forms of counter-cosmopolitan discontent in electoral politics. Most importantly, left-wing agents are divided on many policy issues within and across European countries. In fact, the presumed realignment along the cosmopolitanism cleavage may also signify a major division between and within (radical) left parties (March 2010): between those rather ‘dogmatic’ or traditionalist wings that support political authoritarianism, neo-Stalinism, ethno-nationalist ‘Third Worldism’ and the fight by exclusive nationalists and radical Islamists against participatory democracy, cosmopolitanism, and the Europeanization of the European continent (or even against a presumably powerful ‘world Zionism’), on the one hand; and those of a democratic left supporting grassroots democracy, human rights, and cosmopolitan solidarity while opposing nationalism, exclusion, and authoritarianism, on the other.33 But, as Lars Fischer puts it, is the political left adequately responding to contemporary antisemitism, and to what extent is its response indicative of an already established tradition of problematic dealings with antisemitism and ‘the Jews’? (Fischer 2007: vii) As Antje Schumann points out, there is “a special need for self-reflection among those who consider themselves progressive and leftist.” (Schumann 2006: 170f ) But it is evident that even many activists from the ‘undogmatic’ left are far from being immune to antisemitism and anti-Jewish resentment, and there is the noticeable, aforementioned trend to trivialize antisemitism and portray it as mere charge or political weapon. There are many radical left groups for which the Middle East is a wedge issue; they turn a single small country, Israel, into the globe’s major villain and, thus, make this single country responsible for all violent acts in the region and elsewhere in the world, including all kinds of global injustices and those suicide bombings directed against Jewish and Arab

33   For instance, the newly founded Nouveau Parti Anticapitaliste/New Anti-Capitalist Party (NPA) of France displayed unambiguous support for the Iranian opposition and solidarity “with the fight of the Iranian people, for the overthrow of the dictatorship, for liberty and the rights of the workers.” (NPA 2009) To be sure, the NPA has a staunch anti-Zionist political outlook. In a similar fashion, the Italian Rifondazione Comunista, also anti-Zionist in orientation, clearly supported the democratic opposition movement in Iran, as did the Kommunistische Partei Österreichs/Communist Party of Austria (KPÖ) and several other European left-wing parties. And the British radical left magazine “The Militant” consistently criticizes antisemitism that disguises as radical anti-Zionism (cf. Pederson 2009).

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Israeli civilians. We do not share the view that all cases of a very strong anti-Israel predisposition and bias constitute antisemitism, let alone that harsh criticism of Israeli policies constitutes such. Yet, as mentioned before, targeting the Jewish state and “the Zionists” instead of “the Jews” does not make any statement automatically ‘non-antisemitic,’ either, as many critics of Israel suggest. It is difficult to contest that there is prejudicial overlap between antisemitism and hatred of Israel, and experimental studies have shown that on the individual level the likelihood of antisemitism increases with the intensity of antiIsraelism (Kaplan & Small 2006; Cohen, Harber, Jussim & Bhasin 2009; see also fn. 14). Few things may demonstrate this link more strikingly than the almost unequivocal praise that the radical anti-Zionist left receives from the radical right in Europe (Fine 2007; Heni 2007; Wistrich 2010). Moreover, even those cases of strong, unqualified antiIsrael bias not to be classified as antisemitism may help reinforce a political climate of hostility against Jews—and thus may nurture the politics of resentment and undermine politics of understanding. At any rate, there are various present-day European left-wing groups and parties that display an open flank to radical anti-Israel views, or show very strong bias against the Jewish state (without necessarily supporting the interests of Palestinians). And many of the left’s political, intellectual and public representatives do have significant influence on public discourse and opinion-making (MacShane 2008). The European Union and Beyond: The Resurgent Rise of an ‘Extremism of the Center’? This book develops individual country studies as well as systematic comparative research examining the contemporary significance and origins of antisemitism and counter-cosmopolitanism in the public realm. It assesses the potential political realignments on the demand side—in terms of voter constituents that shift allegiances because their culturally, politically and economically protectionist, counter-cosmopolitan, racist, and anti-Jewish attitudes are not politically represented—and the supply side, i.e. political parties (and other intermediary political organizations or public agents) facilitating such views and reinforcing existing resentments among their actual or potential electorate. The volume also seeks to predict how such cleavage changes and realignments will play out in the present and the future.



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Most studies suggest that the relevance of antisemitic and countercosmopolitan groups, Internet platforms, and parties has significantly expanded in comparison to previous decades. Within the European Union, such mobilizations, which employ new media and at times unconventional strategies, are embattled and contested. In contrast to the Russian case and other contemporary authoritarian regimes, antisemitic mobilizations continue to face serious restrictions in the transnational publics of the European Union, and their agents usually do not have access to major catch-all parties, let alone government agencies. Antisemitism and exclusive nationalism today are neither a ‘European problem’, nor an ‘export article.’ In fact, they are more prevalent in the countries of Europe’s peripheries than in Europe’s liberal-democratic political cultures. Nevertheless, antisemitic and counter-cosmopolitan parties and groups are part of relevant local, national and transnational mobilizations that have—in sheer numbers—spread in multiple European publics, indicating ideological shifts along new divisions and pointing to political conflicts that open spaces for new ‘politics of resentment.’ Research on interest groups tells us that even small groups—and websites—can have considerable public or political impact. This is the case when they use public venues effectively; are strongly committed to a particular ideology; and consistently promote a single issue. More importantly, there have also been mobilizations of countercosmopolitan, xenophobic and antisemitic resentments by established democratic parties of the center that seem to match and validate the presumed rising popular demand for the political representation of such resentments. For instance, in his effort to transform the wellestablished German liberalist party FDP (Free Democratic Party)—a junior partner in most governments of the Federal Republic since its birth in 1949—into a right-wing populist party, vice chairman Jürgen Möllemann focused the FDP’s election campaign in 2002 on attacks against Jews (cf. Rensmann 2004a: 442ff ). His declared goal was to reach out to “disenfranchised voters,” including resentful voters on the right. He did so with support of the entire party leadership. Mixing anti-Jewish and anti-Israel resentments, Möllemann blamed the German-Jewish lawyer Michel Friedman and the Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon for instigating antisemitism. He claimed that the behavior of these public Jews causes antisemitism. After the 2002 election, however, Möllemann was discredited in the FDP and eventually had to resign, in part due to the fact that the turnout at the ballot box

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did not meet the high expectations he himself had raised. Nonetheless, as a leader of a respected and well-established democratic party Möllemann provided political space for antisemitism within the “zone of acquiescence” (in other words, the zone of democratic legitimacy). For some time, one of the main established democratic parties had re-launched a hardly coded ‘extremism of the center.’ In a departure from the previous normal practice in response to public antisemitic gaffes by politicians, during the long 2002 national campaign neither Möllemann nor the tactically maneuvering party chairman Guido Westerwelle had to resign, even though this case was not a single “slip” but an antisemitic populist mobilization lasting for months (Rensmann 2004a: 442ff; Bergmann & Heitmeyer 2005, 83f ). It can be argued that this created a broader ideological space for those radical parties utilizing the Middle East conflict to spread anti-Jewish agitation. Moreover, the public legitimacy that such campaigns provide for previously discredited, latent anti-Jewish resentments is likely to have an effect on political culture. In light of that, there are many indicators that there is a new public receptiveness for antisemitic resentments. More often than in any previous post-Holocaust decade in Europe, it seems, Jews are publicly portrayed as the embodiment of, and charged with, inciting war and genocide; cosmopolitan social change and cultural diffusion; the global erosion of the nation-state; ‘dual loyalty’ and capitalist or financial crises—all of which points back to classical anti-Jewish stereotypes. At the same time, Jews appear to be more frequently targeted as globally powerful nationalists or particularists (i.e. “Zionists”), who are believed to be a ‘major force’ that disrupts and prevents world peace. But this, again, deserves further study. Further Research Questions The theoretical concepts, empirical predictors and preliminary research findings presented in this essay call for robust testing in national and comparative studies. They raise an entire set of research questions that need to be addressed in multiple ways. On a descriptive level, what reliable data do we have? What relevance do antisemitic resentments have in contemporary European societies, and how are they distributed across different countries, generational cohorts, and social groups, including immigrants and (Islamic) religious minorities? Do they correlate with other resentments such as racism, homophobia,



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misogyny, rejection of democracy and human rights, or anti-Americanism? What is the qualitative and quantitative evidence in national and European contexts—and is there a significant East-West divide? How does antisemitism play out in the political landscape, i.e. in public discourse, party competition and political mobilization—if it is relevant at all? Which agents (including groups and movements) still mobilize antisemitism in Europe—or do so again? And how do democratic institutions and established political parties react on the national and EU level? What part of the problem is limited to more or less ephemeral organizations and milieus, the fringe of the fringe—or is there significant evidence of an ‘extremism of the center’ through which cultural racism, neo-nationalism and antisemitism gain new legitimacy in the contested public spaces of “cosmopolitan Europe’s” (Beck & Grande 2007) multi-cultural societies? Have the politicocultural repression of resentments and the post-War restriction to the private or semi-public sphere indeed lost their effectiveness (Bergmann & Heitmeyer 2005)? On an analytic level, what patterns do we find in such data? Are we confronted with a “new” antisemitism, or do we face resilient long-term undercurrents and reiterations of “old” resentments and particular national legacies in European societies that point back to re-constructed cultural narratives, some of them originating in pre-modern periods (Schoeps 1998)? Is there indeed a broader cross-national trend that may reverse some of the previous democratic progress, as the allparty parliamentary report by the British Parliament suggests—or is there rather a temporary, incident-related wave of antisemitism that is similar to previous ‘regular’ fluctuations in post-War Europe, and which can be predicted to fade away in coming years? Have forms and functions of antisemitism changed and ‘modernized’ under contemporary liberal-democratic conditions? If so, how can we adequately conceptualize phenomena such as modernized antisemitism in liberal democracies? Hence, are the revival of antisemitism, racism and exclusive nationalism part of a broader development on the demand and the supply side? How do such ideologies relate to changing political opportunity structures, party spaces, and value conflicts—are they part of a broader realignment shaped by an emerging political cleavage between socio-cultural modernization, cosmopolitanism and Europeanization, on the one hand, and anti-modernization, counter-cosmopolitanism and anti-immigrant cultural exclusionism, on the other (Grande 2006; Rensmann & Miller-Gonzalez 2010)?

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Most importantly, there is a set of questions on the explanatory level. Exploring new theoretical models, the editors and authors of this book seek to understand the causal mechanisms for the support and the mobilization of political resentments in general—and counter-cosmopolitanism and antisemitism in particular. Which independent variables, generalizable factors and contributing conditions can be isolated and controlled? Which alternative models offer theoretically robust explanations for the rise or decline of antisemitism, as well as related resentments against democracy and cosmopolitan diversity? Are there conditions that predict such resentment? Expanding the perspective beyond hate groups, what role do democratic institutions, media, and parties play in shaping favorable or detrimental conditions for any new ‘politics of resentment’—and what role do distinct national political cultures and legacies play? How can we understand the mobilization of antisemitic, ethnic-nationalist, and counter-cosmopolitan resentments in relation to aggregated policy preferences and the citizenparty linkage in Western democracies? Do new political actors (such as parties) and agitation generate such demand, or do they just create equilibriums of supply and demand? Is the presumed resurgence of ‘politics of resentment’ against Jews and other minorities an expression of a ‘return of the repressed,’ or does it rather reflect specific social, political and cultural constellations and cleavage formations in the post-industrial age? Finally, is the image of Jews as the cosmopolitan and particularistic “pariahs of nations” resurfacing, as hypothesized here, in context of ‘anti-modern’ discontent with globalization and socio-cultural change? And does this indicate fissures in Europe’s cosmopolitan face, a sign of a broader backlash against post-nationalism, Europeanization, and liberal democracy? These are some of the additional questions this book seeks to explore. VI.  Toward a Comparative Framework: Hate Crimes, Party Politics, Public Discourse, and Beyond If our general hypotheses and qualifications are valid—and those of the contributors to this book and research project—it can be predicted that resurgent antisemitism is a present and future challenge in European democracies, and also beyond the confines of Europe’s borders (Cohen 2007; Hirsh 2007; Markovits 2007). This claim and the explanatory models provided here deserve detailed scrutiny and



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robust testing; so far, we have primarily focused on hypothesis generation and political theorizing. The national and comparative studies collected in this volume examine the social and political relevance and explore whether antisemitism is no longer as marginalized in public and political discourse as it once was in the ‘old’ EU member states. The book thereby provides the first broad comparative analysis of its kind. Different from previous accounts, it expands the scope of inquiry and analyzes the conditions and transformations in Eastern European countries. Even more so than in the case of the study of the extreme right in Europe, thus far, there has been “a lack of a comparative pan-European perspective” in the field (Anastasakis 2000: 6). Previous studies have been limited to national cases (e.g. Bergmann & Erb 1997; Gross 2007; Rensmann 2004a; Wieviorka 2007) or focused on quantitative survey data (ADL 2009; EFA 2009) or special dimensions (Taguieff 2004). Very recent publications have also begun to address the long neglected issue of antisemitism among EuropeanMuslim minorities.34 While they are part of Europe’s cosmopolitanized societies, in this context, antisemitism may have distinct motives and origins and thus may require special forms of inquiry (Israeli 2009).35 34   While Muslims are undoubtedly confronted with cultural hostility, racism and exclusion, Muslim critics of Islamism, female oppression, and antisemitism are also increasingly exposed to hostility by mainstream media, branded as “racists” or, as articulated in the leading German newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung, “our hate preachers” ( January 14, 2010). 35  Antisemitism among Muslim minorities in Europe is another controversial subject, and research is in its nascent stages. Considering the lack of empirical data, generalizations about antisemitism among Muslim Europeans are often prejudiced and in some cases empirically unjustified. Similarly unfounded are hasty assertions that deny the very existence of Muslim antisemitism. In an introductory book on the subject of antisemitism, Beller (2007a) makes the strong claim that the resurgence of attacks on Jews in Europe “is fairly obviously due not to antisemitism as such” but rather due to Arab and Muslim “resistance” and “revenge” (Beller 2007a: 113). However, there is no evidence yet that hate speech and attacks on Jews and synagogues by Muslims are unrelated to “antisemitism as such” or “caused” by Israeli or Jewish behavior or actions. In fact, initial research suggests that widely shared criticism of Israel among Muslim immigrants is in many cases merging with antisemitism (Gessler 2004; Israeli 2009). Moreover, we fail to conceive hate crimes against Jewish-European citizens committed by Muslim-European citizens as “resistance” to Israeli occupation, or reflections thereof. More complex research designs will have to consider multiple factors—from social exclusion, racist discrimination by societal majorities to Islamist antisemitic propaganda—and test alternative models to explore the significance and causal mechanisms of antisemitism among European Muslims. However, new ­counter-cosmopolitan and antisemitic political actors—including radical Islamists (Appiah 2007)—and relevant attitudes among European Muslims will also be examined in this volume and in its various national case studies.

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However, theoretically guided case studies and systematic comparative analyses of “modernized antisemitism” at the beginning of the 21st century have been lacking so far. Methodological Pluralism This book addresses this desideratum. European countries will be examined from various scholarly and methodological perspectives. Including contributions by political and social scientists from America and nine European countries who are leading experts in the field, the volume explores many of the questions and hypotheses developed in this essay. A single method or approach is insufficient to explore antisemitic phenomena. We assume that antisemitism, and its political or public relevance and effects, cannot be reduced to a single causal mechanism (unemployment, social deprivation, propaganda, party agency etc.). This is why this book integrates a broad set of political and social science methods and generates a multiplicity of perspectives. Many of them explore new research venues but also reflect different research traditions and approaches. Special relevance is attributed to innovative uses of statistical and survey data (including regression analyses), discourse and content analyses, (extreme right) party research, and political psychology; the latter is of particular importance to understand the dynamics of antisemitism. Antisemitism is not just a complex and contested research field. It is also socially and politically relevant. Following the ‘normative turn’ in recent political science debates, research should be primarily oriented at (potentially) relevant subjects (Gerring & Yesnowitz 2006: 133). The contributors to this project hereby share the assumption that narrow political science approaches that are strictly focused on parties, governments, and other political agents (and public opinion in relation to strictly political issues) are insufficient to explore the causes and effects of this complex phenomenon. Neither is antisemitism—or the broader horizon of counter-cosmopolitanism and other forms of racism—limited to hate crimes and other criminal activity, though both appear to be on the rise in recent years and ‘old’ racial antisemitism has not yet vanished. While all of these aspects are extensively addressed in their quantitative and qualitative dimensions, the research presented here therefore also moves beyond strictly criminal and political contexts.



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Setting a broad innovative framework for future research on the subject, social movements, new media, and public and semi-public ‘everyday discourses’ are considered relevant, too. Antisemitism can be part of political organizations, campaigns and party ideologies (especially in case of the radical right and left). Yet, it can also become manifest in public media and everyday culture: For instance, “Jew” has turned into a popular curse word among German high school students (Die Welt 2008). Empirical social research on the scope and correlations of antisemitic and ethnic-nationalist attitudes in relation to different European countries, regions, generational cohorts, gender, education, and class therefore needs to be complemented by studies on public discourse and institutions, parties and party systems. Beyond causal mechanisms, we need to understand the different dynamics and origins of the phenomenon. In addition, the focus on macro-level explanations needs to be supplemented by meso- and micro-level analyses (cf. Schoeps et al. 2007). There are many plausible components that deserve consideration in order to explore the interrelated factors that facilitate the salience of antisemitism and counter-cosmopolitanism (or lack thereof ) in the political realm and in policy terms; the structure and operation of the polity, policy-making institutions and their constitutional or legal framework, the dynamics of public opinion, the electoral process, political ideologies and national or European political cultures, and historical legacies might all be components of causal accounts of the political salience of antisemitism (Lieberman 2009b: 275). We argue that reactions by democratic parties and media, which are faced with politics of resentment, are of special relevance. These reactions may vary from clear-cut objection to passivity or even adaptation of certain resentments. Are public resentments confronted, refuted, scandalized or tolerated? As intermediary societal agents and political agenda-setters, democratic parties and public media shape political cultures. Public arenas, where political communication takes place and conflicts are shaped, are not only key spheres of democratic contestation, action, will-formation, and accountability; they also re-generate democratic contradictions and re-arrange the boundaries of democratic legitimacy. This discursive space is always in flux. However, the analysis of the changing public “zone of acquiescence” is of particular importance for the windows of opportunity and the potential success of any mobilization of resentment. To be sure, it is a contestable

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proposition whether the content of media reporting or even reactions by democratic parties have significant impact on public opinion (Lieberman 2009b: 279). But they clearly influence what is considered legitimate speech, and in our context the boundaries of what is considered antisemitic and thus discredited. They shape the demarcations of what people feel comfortable to articulate in public spaces. As has been argued in this essay and in previous studies of the subject, the political relevance and the effects of anti-Jewish and other resentments strongly depend on institutional conditions of the democratic polity. They also depend on a broader set or environment of “politico-cultural opportunity structures” (PCOS), i.e. specific political, discursive, and cultural conditions in society (Rensmann 2004a; Salzborn 2009).36 In spite of an increasing relevance of transnational publics that is generated through new media, it is worth mentioning that political communication and public will-formation are still primarily determined by national agents. They are communicating within national publics using national languages and media (Schmidt 2006: 41). The views expressed in this introductory chapter do not necessarily reflect those of all authors in this book. Many of the central issues identified here are subject to discussion and even disagreement. However, the authors of this volume all conclude that antisemitism—and other forms of racism—cannot be explained by the alleged group behavior of Jews or ethnic minorities. Racist and antisemitic resentments are projections that are independent from the actual behavior of the objects of discrimination. They cannot be deduced from the actual or perceived actions of members of a minority, a group, Jews, or Israel for that matter. ‘Explaining’ antisemitism in Europe by the actions of an Israeli politician or government is similarly implausible as ‘explaining’ racism by pointing to the actions of an African dictator (Brumlik 2006; Rensmann 2006a). Neither can the actions of a state or members of a group ‘rationalize’ racism or antisemitism, or allow for any ‘collective liability’ charges against Jews or blacks (Bergmann & Welzel 2003). There is no evidence for causal mechanisms that con-

36  Thus, the internal supply side (antisemitic/counter-cosmopolitan organizations and parties that mobilize antisemitism) must be situated in the contextual space created by the external supply side of party competitors but also in the context of broader political, discursive, and legal spaces of each polity. Together with demand side conditions (political attitudes, mentalities, and structuring cleavages) they provide specific “politico-cultural opportunity structures” (Rensmann 2004a: 211ff ).



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nect individual or group activities to prejudice and stereotyping; thus while there are various ways to explain and understand the origins of antisemitism, it cannot be ‘caused’ by the actions of Jews (or Israel as a ‘collective Jew’), and antisemitism can never be justified. While antisemitism often increases in times of financial crises or in times of escalations in the Middle East conflict, just as racism seems to benefit from unemployment and international competition, empirical studies show that the behavior of Jews, blacks or immigrant are never the cause of resentment (Rensmann & Miller 2010). Finally, most authors of this book observe a rise of hate speech and mobilizations of antisemitism or counter-cosmopolitanism over the last two decades that may well lead to the emergence of new ‘politics of resentment.’ Some argue that these developments are also indicative of profound changes in political communication and its discursive scope; and they predict related transformations of European party systems. Others, however, focus primarily on generalizable empirical findings, correlations, and causal mechanisms while acquiring and appropriating new datasets. Thus, while there is much theoretical agreement and a high degree of compatibility in the findings on the national and European level, there is also considerable plurality and variation. Not every author follows the theoretical assumptions and conceptual framework laid out by the editors. For instance, several authors dispute the thesis that there is ‘modernized antisemitism,’ or they challenge the distinction between ‘old’ and ‘new’ antisemitism in different ways. Neither does the concept of counter-cosmopolitanism resonate throughout this book. The multiplicity of perspectives, in turn, leads to alternative models, measures, and hypotheses. They are tested in distinct ways. In so doing, the book offers a comprehensive, complex and differentiated account of the scope and causes of antisemitism in Europe’s societal and political spaces. Europeanization and Cross-National Variation Despite Europeanization processes, the findings of these studies continue to point to significant national variation and the ongoing relevance of contextual factors—as previously demonstrated in the case of right-wing party success (Arzheimer 2009). Decades ago Horkheimer and Adorno (1985: 128) have argued: “In no way is totalitarian antisemitism a specifically German phenomenon. Attempts to extract it

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from questionable concepts such as ‘national character’—the pitiful and hollow imprint of what was once called ‘Volksgeist’ (people’s spirit)—downplay the inexplicable that we need to understand. The problem needs a societal explanation, and this is impossible in the sphere of national particularities.” While this programmatic search for generalizable explanations is as valid today as it was then, there are also contextual factors and specific conditions in different political cultures that still matter. Particular national legacies play a role in shaping the public relevance, resonance, and causes of antisemitic mobilizations. For instance, in Germany and Austria Holocaust remembrance, which deeply affects national self-understandings and narratives of one’s collective past, tend to be more relevant for the perception of Jews than in Portugal, for example. And in Poland and Russia, religious antisemitism plays arguably a much larger role in the public sphere than in each of the West European countries. Yet, the book also challenges the still all too common rigidity of the East-West divide in political research. Cas Mudde points out in his comparative study of the European extreme right that much literature on Eastern Europe argues that the region is fundamentally different from “the West,” including Western Europe, and should therefore not be studied with similar concepts and theories (Mudde 2007). Although differences clearly do exist, there are also remarkable differences within Western Europe. And there are even considerable domestic variations within nation-states (e.g. Southern and Northern Italy, East and West Germany). However, such differences are relatively irrelevant for many specific research questions (e.g. Blokker 2005; Rensmann 2003). Moreover, ‘Western’ concepts and models go a long way in explaining developments in both established democracies of the West and post-Communist countries of the East (Mudde 2007; Clark 2002). This is especially the case in light of converging conditions in the age of post-industrial globalization and Europeanization (Frölich-Steffen & Rensmann 2007). The volume also expands the comparative perspective beyond the confines of the European Union. Although this book focuses on the EU, three cases outside of its political boundaries receive special attention, namely Switzerland, Russia, and the Ukraine. We have included these three cases for several reasons. First of all, it is unlikely that antisemitism stops at the borders of the European Union; in turn, the post-national EU and its legislation might have a positive or taming



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effect on politics of resentment that does not affect non-member countries, which therefore function as interesting comparative test cases. As many researchers have suggested, Russia is a case sui generis and in many ways not comparable. Though Russia surely stands out, some may argue that this can also be said about most countries. Be that as it may, Russia is an important political player. As such, it offers another relevant ‘European’ case worthy of examination. Yet, it is also of interest as a comparative contrast because it allows us to look at an (East) European case under conditions of authoritarian “semidemocracy” (Stykow 2007). Ukraine serves as a reference point for a European comparative analysis that entails systems in transition from authoritarianism to democracy. Switzerland, geographically in the heart of Europe, enables us to understand if EU membership matters. Switzerland and its liberal democracy are not subjected to EU policy and law. Thus, we can examine not only the context-dependent particularities of the three-lingual Swiss case but also if antisemitism (and counter-cosmopolitanism, for that matter) may be of different political or social salience under conditions of non-membership.37 From a normative theoretical perspective, the European and global response to new manifestations of antisemitism, hate speech and hate crimes, including those committed by national governments, is also a key test case for the credibility and practical opportunities of robust forms cosmopolitan democracy—or political and legal cosmopolitanism—in an increasingly post-national, “partially globalized” world (Keohane 2002). This affects the question how the European Union and its member states deal with larger questions of social justice and cosmopolitan immigrant and asylum rights. But it also entails the need for a robust democratic response to antisemitic threats in the international arena, in particular those by transnational Jihadist terrorist organizations and currently by the Iranian government, which— while denying the Holocaust and seeking the destruction of the Jewish state—also commits massive human rights violations against their democratic opposition, women, and gays, who are often publicly executed. While we face a problem of anti-Muslim rhetoric, discrimination and populism within European societies, antisemitic jihadists and other

37   In the long run, of course, the future of Switzerland may still be in the European Union if the integration process gets a new boost.

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Islamic fundamentalists continue to pose an actual, often explicitly articulated genocidal threat (Küntzel 2007; Rubenstein 2010). Like other democratic and human rights issues in domestic and foreign policy, it is an important challenge for the development of a cosmopolitan European Union. More European politicians, institutions of the European Union, and other international organizations in Europe (such as the OSCE) have, so it seems, recognized the problem of antiSemitism—and the anti-democratic implications associated with it— than in previous years. But we also find wide discrepancies in dealing with antisemitism and racism on the level of national governments and parliaments, and the level of the EU. Governments of several European member states still lack sensitivity and a resolute approach. On the EU level, antisemitism is subject of the “Annual Report on the Activities of the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities in the European Union” and monitored by the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. However, special annual reports and sets of measures that address antisemitism as a particular problem do not exist on the supranational level, either. This is in part due to the complex agenda-setting in the EU and the European parliament (Hix/Noury/Roland 2007: 111). Be that as it may, the EU is also challenged to take a leading foreign policy role and decisive steps in combating state-sanctioned antisemitism and incitement to genocide. The first section of this book offers systematic comparative analyses of European attitudes, public discourses, institutional responses, and mobilizations by extreme right parties across the continent. The following two sections provide meticulous in-depth national case studies as well as two-country regional comparisons. These studies address hate crimes, political actors, public discourses and public opinion. In some cases a particular empirical problem or causal mechanism is tested that has general research implications. At the same time, all of the contributions of these two sections offer insights into countryspecific conditions, and they help further explain national variations. The goal of this volume is therefore not limited to exploring new data, models and research tools with respect to a, unfortunately, surprisingly topical subject. The book also intends to open a sober academic debate on antisemitism and counter-cosmopolitanism in Europe devoid of the public polarizations that have surfaced in recent years. We also hope that the various innovative models, methods and findings gathered in this book contribute to encourage new research on



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the subjects of antisemitism, counter-cosmopolitanism, and discrimination against minorities in the European Union. This is, of course, not the ultimate research account of the problem. Important questions will remain. Last but not least, while this work does not offer any set of policy recommendations, the editors do cherish the hope that such research may also help raise sensitivity towards the subject in the transnational European publics and among policy-makers in the European Union. References Adorno, Theodor W. et al. (1950) The Authoritarian Personality (New York: Harper). Adorno, Theodor W. (1955) Minima Moralia: Reflections from Damaged Life (London: Verso, 1987). ——  (1964) Bekämpfung des Antisemitismus heute. Argument 6: 88–104. ——  (1966) Negative Dialectics (New York: Continuum). Ahlheim, Klaus & Bardo Heger (2002) Die unbequeme Vergangenheit (Schwalbach/Ts.: Wochenschau Verlag). All-Party Parliamentary Group Against Antisemitism/British House of Commons (2006) Report of the All-Party Parliamentary Inquiry into Antisemitism (London: The Stationery Office Limited). Altemeyer, Robert (1996) The Authoritarian Specter (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press). Anastasakis, Othon (2000) Extreme Right in Europe. www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/European/ hellenic/Anastasakis-_Discussion_Paper3.pdf Anti-Defamation League (2009) Attitudes Toward Jews in Seven European Countries (New York: ADL). Appiah, Kwame Anthony (2007) Cosmopolitanism (New York: W.W. Norton). Arendt, Hannah (1951) The Origins of Totalitarianism (San Diego: Hartcourt). ——  (1963) Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (New York: The Viking Press). Art, David (2005) The Politics of the Nazi Past in Germany and Austria (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Arzheimer, Kai & Elisabeth Carter (2006) Political Opportunity Structures and RightWing Extremist Party Success. European Journal of Political Research 45 (3): 419–444. Arzheimer, Kai (2009) Contextual Factors and the Extreme Right Vote in Western Europe, 1980–2002. American Journal of Political Science 53 (2): 259–275. Balibar, Etienne & Immanuel Wallerstein (1992) Race, Class, Nation: Ambiguous Identities (London: Verso). Barkan, Elazar (2001) The Guilt of Nations (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press). Bauman, Zygmunt (1993) Modernity and Ambivalence (Cambridge: Polity Press). Beck, Ulrich & Edgar Grande (2007) Cosmopolitan Europe (Cambridge: Polity Press). Beller, Steven (2007a) Antisemitism. A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press). ——  (2007b) In Zion’s Hall of Mirrors: A Comment on ‘Neuer Antisemitismus?’ Patterns of Prejudice 41 (2): 215–238.

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Niedermayer, Oskar & Richard Stöss (2005) Rechtsextreme Einstellungen in Berlin und Brandenburg (Berlin: Otto-Suhr-Institut für Politikwissenschaft). Norris, Pippa (2005) Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Norris, Pippa & Ronald Inglehart (2009) Cosmopolitan Communications: Cultural Diversity in a Globalized World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Nouveau Parti Anticapitaliste (2009) With the People and Workers of Iran. Links: International Journal of Socialist Renewal. http://links.org.au/taxonomy/term/194. Retrieved February 20, 2010. Owen, Richard (2009) Outrage over Proposal to Boycott Jewish-owned shops. The Times, January 8, 2009, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/ article5474090.ece. Retrieved January 8, 2009. Parekh, Bhikhu (2000) Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press). Peace, Tim (2009) Un antisémitisme nouveau? The debate about a ‘new antisemitism’ in France. Patterns of Prejudice 43 (2): 103–121. Pedahzur, Amir & Leonard Weinberg (2001) Modern European Democracy and its Enemies: The Threat of the Extreme Right. Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions 2 (1): 52–72. Pederson, Paul (2009) Israel boycotts and divestment serve as cover for antisemitism. The Militant, April 6, 2009. Pennings, Paul & Jan-Erik Lane (1998) Introduction. In Pennings & Lane (eds) Comparing Party System Change (New York: Routledge), pp. 1–19. PEW Global Attitudes Project (2008) Unfavourable Views of Jews and Muslims on the increase in Europe. (Washington, D.C.: PEW). Postone, Moishe (1986) Anti-Semitism and National Socialism. In Anson Rabinbach & Jack Zipes (eds) Germans and Jews since the Holocaust (New York: Holmes & Meier). ——  (2003) The Holocaust and the Trajectory of the Twentieth Century. In Moishe Postone & Eric Santner (eds) Catastrophe and Meaning: The Holocaust in the Twentieth Century (Chicago: University of Chicago Press): 81–116. ——  (2009) Hamburg 2009—Another German Autumn. Contested Terrain, http:// contested-terrain.net/moishe-postone-hamburg-2009-%E2%80%93-another-germanautumn. Puschnerat, Tania (2005) Antizionismus im Islamismus und Rechtsextremismus. In Bundesministerium des Innern (eds) Feindbilder und Radikalisierungsprozesse (Berlin: BMI). Rahola, Pilar (2010) Misplaced Outrage. Israel National News, February 4. www.israelnationalnews.com/Articles/Article.aspx/9292. Retrieved February 20, 2010. Rensmann, Lars (1999) Holocaust Memory and Mass Media in Contemporary Germany: Reflections on the Goldhagen Debate. Patterns of Prejudice, 33, 1: 59–76. ——  (2003) The New Politics of Prejudice: Comparative Perspectives on Extreme Right Parties in European Democracies. German Politics & Society 21 (3): 93–123. ——  (2004a) Demokratie und Judenbild: Antisemitismus in der politischen Kultur der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften). ——  (2004b) Collective Guilt, National Identity, and Political Processes in Contemporary Germany. In Bertjan Doosje & Nyla Branscombe (eds) Collective Guilt: International Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 204–223. ——  (2006a) Parameter einer selbstreflexiven Antisemitismusforschung. Sozialwissenschaftliche Literaturrundschau 52: 63–79. ——  (2006b) From High Hopes to On-Going Defeat: The New Extreme Right’s Political Mobilization and its National Electoral Failure in Germany. German Politics & Society 24 (2): 67–92. ——  (2009) Genocidal Politics. Crimes against Humanity in the Global Age. Journal of Contemporary History 44, 4 (2009): 753–766.

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Rensmann, Lars & Julius H. Schoeps (2008) Feindbild Judentum: Antisemitismus in Europa (Berlin: Verlag Berlin-Brandenburg). Rensmann, Lars & Jennifer Miller-Gonzalez (2010) Xenophobia and Anti-Immigrant Politics. In Robert A. Denemark (ed) International Studies Encyclopedia: Ethnic Minorities and Migration (Oxford: Blackwell). Rosenfeld, Alvin H. (2006) “Progressive” Jewish Thought and the New Anti-Semitism (New York: The American Jewish Committee). Rubenstein, Richard L. (2010) Jihad and Genocide (Studies in Genocide: Religion, History and Human Rights) (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield). Salzborn, Samuel (2008) Uncovering Latent Antisemitism in Germany. Yalkut Moreshet 5 (Summer): 155–170. Sartre, Jean-Paul (1948) Anti-Semite and Jew (Paris: Schocken Books, Paris). Scharenberg, Albert (2006) Brücke zum Mainstream—Mainstream als Brücke: Europäische Rechtsparteien und ihre Politik gegen Einwanderung. In Thomas Greven & Thomas Grumke, eds., Globalisierter Rechtsextremismus? Die extremistische Rechte in der Ära der Globalisierung (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften), pp. 70–111. Schmidt, Vivien A. (2006) Democracy in Europe: The EU and National Polities (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Schoeps, Julius H. (1998) Das Gewaltsyndrom: Verformungen und Brüche im deutsch-jüdischen Verhältnis (Berlin: Argon Verlag). Schoeps, Julius H., Gideon Botsch, Christoph Kopke & Lars Rensmann (eds) (2007) Rechtsextremismus in Brandenburg (Berlin: Verlag für Berlin-Brandenburg). Schraub, David (2009) South Africa Conveys a Message Back to Bongani Masuku. The Moderate Voice, December 6. http://themoderatevoice.com/55315/south-africaconveys-a-message-back-to-bongani-masuku/ Schuhmann, Antje (2006) Whose Burden? The Significance of the Israeli-Palestine Conflict in German Identity Politics. In Jan Herman Brinks, Stella Rock & Edward Timms (eds.) Nationalist Myths and Modern Media: Contested Identities in the Age of Globalization (London: I.B.Tauris). Simmons, Beth A. (2009) Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press). Simonsen, Kjetil (2007) Anti-Semitism in the Socialist Tradition. Communalism 11: 1–8. Slackman, Michael (2010) 26 in Egypt Are Convicted in Terror Plot. The New York Times. April 28. Stamm, Hugo (2010) Die Nationalräte Vischer und Müller bei den Verschwörern. Tagesanzeiger, Maz 8. http://www.tagesanzeiger.ch/schweiz/standard/Die-Nationalraete-Vischer-und-Mueller-bei-den-Verschwoerern/story/17 Steger, Manfred B. (2008) Globalisms: The Great Ideological Struggle of the 21st Century (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield). Stricker, Sarah (2009) Europe: Anti-Semitism up, Islamophobia Down. Muslim Media Network, http://muslimmedianetwork.com/mmn/?tag=university-of-bielefeld; http:// www.antisemitism.org.il/eng/events/44847/Europe%E2%80%93Study:antisemiti smup,Islamophobiadown. Retrieved February 1, 2010. Stykow, Petra (2006) Staat und Wirtschaft in Russland (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften). Taguieff, Pierre-André (2004) Rising from the Muck: The New Anti-Semitism in Europe (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee). The Coordination Forum for Countering Antisemitism (2009) Spain—Antisemitic Cartoon in El Pais, July 7, http://www.antisemitism.org.il/eng/events/41183/ Spain-AntisemiticCartooninElPais. Retrieved February 20, 2010.



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Tremlett, Gilles (2009) David Irving Interview in El Mundo Provokes Israeli Anger. The Guardian, September 3. http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2009/sep/03/davidirving-interview-el-mundo. Retrieved February 19, 2010. van der Brug, Wouter, Meindert Fennema & Jean Tillie (2000) Anti-Immigrant Parties in Europe: Ideological or Protest Vote? European Journal of Political Research 37 (1): 77–102. Vertovec, Steven & Robin Cohen (2002) Introduction: Conceiving Cosmopolitanism. In Vertovec & Cohen (eds) Conceiving Cosmopolitanism: Theory, Context, and Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 1–21. Volkov, Shulamit (2006) Germans, Jews, and Antisemites: Trials in Emancipation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Weinthal, Benjamin (2010) Europe’s New Anti-Semitism. The Jewish Advocate, February 19. Weiß, Volker (2005) ‚Volksklassenkampf ’: Die antizionistische Rezeption des Nahostkonflikts durch die militante Linke der BRD. Tel Aviver Jahrbuch für deutsche Geschichte 33: 214–238. Weitzman, Mark (2006) Antisemitismus und Holocaust-Leugnung: Permanente Elemente des globalen Rechtsextremismus. In Thomas Greven & Thomas Grumke, eds., Globalisierter Rechtsextremismus? Die extremistische Rechte in der Ära der Globalisierung (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften), pp. 52–69. Weyand, Jan (2006) Zum Stand kritischer Antisemitismusforschung. Jahrbuch für Antisemitismusforschung 15: 233–258. Wieviorka, Michel (2007) The Lure of Antisemitism: Hatred of Jews in Present-Day France (Leiden & Boston: Brill). Wisnewski, Gerhard (2009) Antisemitismus-Vorwurf widerlegt. TU Berlin muss Schmerzensgeld an Gerhard Wisnewski zahlen, Open PR, April 6. http://www .openpr.de/news/298307/. Retrieved July 1, 2009. Wistrich, Robert S. (2004) Anti-Zionism and Anti-Semitism. Jewish Political Studies Review 16, nos. 3–4. Wistrich, Robert (2005) The Politics of Resentment: Israel, Jews, and the German Media ( Jerusalem: The Vidal Sassoon International Center for the Study of Antisemitism). Wistrich, Robert (2010) A Lethal Obsession: Anti-Semitism from Antiquity to Global Jihad (New York: Random House). Worth, Robert F. (2010) Iranian Supreme Leader Denies Nuclear Arms Push. The New York Times, February 20, 2010, A7. Young, Michael (2006) The Western secular left has flatlined. The Daily Star (Lebanon), May 18, 2006 http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=10&categ_ id=5&article_id=24520. Retrieved February 1, 2010. Zick, Andreas et al. (2008) The Syndrome of Group-Focused Enmity: The Interrelation of Prejudices Tested with Multiple Cross-Sectional and Panel Data. Journal of Social Issues 64 (2): 363–383.

II.  European Comparisons

Is there a “New European Antisemitism?” Public Opinion and Comparative Empirical Research in Europe Werner Bergmann I.  On the Concept of “New Antisemitism” After the Second Intifada began in October 2000, or at the latest following a wave of antisemitic attacks that spread throughout Europe in the spring of 2002, people began to discuss whether a “new” form of antisemitism was taking shape. Although its “newness” can be reasonably called into question, this article aims to examine whether social scientists in Europe have designed complete studies or single items in reaction to this “new” form of antisemitism. First it is necessary to identify what exactly might be “new” about this antisemitism. As part of the debate on this subject a number of possible suggestions have been offered: (1) Some see the newness in the European-wide wave of anti-Jewish violence and hostility that emerged after the Second Intifada in 2000. In particular, Americans, Jewish organizations and representatives of Israel speak of a new climate of antisemitism that exists in Europe, especially, and which goes beyond right-wing extremism to include intellectuals, mass media and Muslims, specifically North African and Arab-Islamic immigrants. The question to clarify is whether opinion research has been able to identify a clearly negative change in attitude since 2000 and whether studies exist which include Muslims in Europe as they may represent a new group holding strong antisemitic attitudes. (2) Others see the newness in the choice of target. In this view Israel serves as the “collective Jew” with antisemitism appearing in the guise of anti-Zionism. It is argued that pre-existing leftist antisemitism has re-emerged in response to the conflicts in the Middle East (Gulf war, Second Intifada, Iraq war and Islamist terrorism), but that traditional “leftist radical” positions have also shifted to the political center. This argument requires examining the degree to

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which opinion research has been able to establish a connection between antisemitism and attitudes toward Israel and its policies. (3) A third explanation for the term “new antisemitism” was proposed by the French philosopher Pierre-André Taguieff (2002). According to Taguieff, the “nouvelle judéophobie planitaire” is grounded in the belief that the world’s problems are caused solely by the existence of the racist state of Israel. Jews, then, are accused of racism. According to this view, new antisemitism is ‘anti-racist antisemitism,’ which Taguieff suggests has been mustered up first by radical Islamic activists, the heirs of “third-world mundialization,” and by far-left critics of globalization. To take Taguieff ’s term as a basis would require empirical studies to be able to capture the views of these new groups of anti-racist antisemites. To be sure, as in the second example, research must also be able to make an empirical distinction between antisemitic views and views critical of Israel. II.  On the Database of Comparative Empirical Research on Antisemitism International comparative empirical research on anti-Semitism is still in its infancy (on the situation up to 1995 see Bergmann, 1996). This is true both for opinion research and for the registration of antisemitic incidents for which international unified standards do not yet exist. Consequently, only the data of each respective country can be analyzed over a period of time, but cross-national comparisons of data are impossible in most cases. Since 1990 the American Jewish Committee (AJC) has repeated a series of empirical studies in European countries to measure antisemitic attitudes. These studies used the same items, thus providing a comparative database, but unfortunately the items used in these studies are not very helpful in answering the question at hand here. In reaction to the wave of antisemitic attacks that occurred throughout Europe in the spring of 2002, the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) initiated a number of consecutive comparative studies (ADL 2002, 2004, 2005) conducted in ten or twelve European countries (and in the U.S.) that contain useful items for our query. In addition to the few comparative data available, this article also analyzes the data of recent national studies to better ascertain where and how these developments have led to a change in the formulation of items or in the design of questionnaires. In general, however, we



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expect to find that attitude research has been slow in responding to these new manifestations since developing and testing new items entails work and money. Furthermore, working with already well-tried items is preferable since they provide the basis for a comparative analysis over time. This explains the decision to include in our analysis also non-representative studies. These studies often have an experimental character (Frindte et al. 2005). As far as I know, until today, such studies have only been conducted in Germany. III.  A New Atmosphere for Antisemitism? An antisemitic atmosphere can develop from a whole range of factors: from a wave of anti-Jewish attacks; from events or problematic situations that receive broad media coverage and lead to an “agendasetting-effect” in the public; or as a consequence of a noticeable and drastic shift in attitude among the population. Studies of attitudes that repeatedly use the same questions and thus allow for a diachronic comparison are generally the exception in Europe. Some data of this kind is available for Germany and France. Using the same antisemitism scale of six items, the Forsa Institute identified a slight increase in 2003 in comparison to 1998 (20% to 23%) in the number of people harboring antisemitic views in Germany.1 In 1998 and in 2003, Forsa asked the respondents to evaluate whether their attitude toward Jews in recent years had become more positive, more negative or remained unchanged. The answers present a striking negative trend: in 1998 only 15% of the study participants identified a negative shift; in 2003 it was twice as many (30%). Conversely, only 36% saw a positive shift; in 1998 it was 49%.2 More respondents in 2003 than in 1998 recognized a negative trend in attitudes toward Jews among their acquaintances as well: The response

1   Forsa 2003. The scale consists of the following six items: “Many Jews try to take advantage of the Nazi past by getting the Germans to pay;” “Jews feel connected to Israel first. They are only minimally interested in the affairs of the country in which they live.”; “Jews have too much influence in the world;” “The Jews’ own behavior makes them partially responsible for their persecution;” “There is something different and peculiar about Jews that makes them not fit in with us;” “A Jew can be recognized from his looks.” 2   Most of the people (46%) who chose to see a worsened situation are already antiSemitic. Only 23% recognized a positive change (Forsa 2003, p. 52).

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“none” sank from 67% in 1998 to 59% in 2003. The response “about half” rose from 4% to 6%. “Almost all” remained constant at 3% and the response “few” acquaintances have negative attitudes increased from 17% in 1998 to 24% in 2003 (Forsa 2003). In general this suggests a slightly negative trend in opinions, but this may have more to do with a greater willingness among antisemites to communicate their views than with an actual change in attitude. This raises the question of whether the trend that we have recognized over the past few years is a period effect—a short-term reaction to specific events—or a general trend shift. Evidence that the ongoing discussion of the Middle East conflict is having a certain influence on people’s views is reflected by the fact that not all of the six items on Forsa’s antisemitism scale show a negative trend. We do have a decline from 41% to 36% in the number of respondents who agree with questions dealing with the Nazi past (taking advantage of the Nazi past) and there was no change in the frequency of answers to three other items between 1998 and 2003 (“Jews are partially responsible for their persecution,” “Jews don’t fit in with us” and “Jews can be recognized from their looks”). Instead we have a noticeable increase in respondents’ agreement only to the two questions dealing with Jews’ loyalty to Israel (1998: 25%, 2003: 35%) and Jews’ political influence in the world (1998: 21%, 2003: 28%). Hence, it would appear that the negative development of attitudes presented by the scale is a reaction to the public criticism of Israeli policies. This suggests a possible period effect, but it may also be a sign that the connection between antisemitism and German history is beginning to loosen and that there is a new focus on Israeli policies. A long-term study’s findings on “GroupFocused Enmity” also suggest a period effect. Based on its short scale of two items (“Jews have too much influence in Germany” and “The Jews’ own behavior makes them partially responsible for their persecution”) the study measures an insignificant negative increase in the answers’ mean value from 2002 to 2003. In 2004 and 2005 this value gradually returned to the previous levels of 2002, only to decrease further in 2006 (Heitmeyer 2006: 24).3 ADL’s comparative surveys

3   A follow-up survey in August 2006, in response to the military conflict between the Israeli army and the Hezbollah in Lebanon, showed a temporary rise to the 2002 level (Heitmeyer 2006, p. 22). This fact, and the slight increase between 2002 and 2003, may be a sign that escalations in the Middle East conflict lead to period effects, but not to permanent negative attitude changes toward Jews.



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too show a decline in antisemitic attitudes in most of the European countries examined between 2002 and 2004 (ADL 2004: 6), a trend that continued in most countries in 2005 (ADL 2005: 13). For France a whole range of items such as electing a Jew for president or the power of Jews, reflect a further decline for 2005 (Mayer 2005: 95f). The time series for the item “Jews in France have too much power” shows this in conjunction with a period effect. Table 1. Adherence to the Stereotype “Jews Have Too Much Power in France” (in percent)

Agree Disagree No response

1988

1991

1999

2000

2002

2002

2004

2005

21 52 27

21 49 30

31 56 13

34 54 12

24 61 15

25 66 9

23 60 17

16 67 17

Mayer 2005, Tab. 2.

In the early 1990s 21% of the French completely or partially agreed with this statement. By the year 2000 agreement had reached its peak after which values begin to decline strongly. By 2005 they were lower than they had been in 1988. At the same time the group of people who rejected this stereotype had noticeably grown. It seems likely that in this case the Middle East conflict caused a sharp polarization of views but did not lead to a negative attitude change (Mayer 2005: 96). In recent years there have been only brief “eruptions,” but otherwise attitude levels have not changed significantly. In some countries an erratic increase of antisemitic incidents occurred with the start of the Second Intifada, and the types of people committing these attacks vary according to country. In France and the Netherlands the increase is due to the activities of young Muslim immigrants from the North Africa or Arab countries who were acting in response to the Middle East conflict, the Iraq war and Islamic terrorism (Mayer 2005: 93; Hirschfeld/van der Sluijs 2005; a similar development is evident in Denmark and Belgium).4

 The number of attacks rose to above 100 in the Netherlands in 2000 but the real dramatic rise occurred in relation to the escalation of the Middle East conflict in 2002 when 359 attacks took place. The number of attacks remained high in the following years with 334 and 327, respectively. According to Hirschfeld/van der Sluijs 4

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In Germany the perpetrators came primarily from the right-wing extremist political camp. Only a small portion of antisemitic attacks were committed by immigrants from Arabic-Muslim countries (the number would be higher, particularly among young people, if we were to include incidents such as verbal attacks that do not qualify as a criminal offense).5 This is also true for Great Britain where there has been a strong increase in recorded antisemitic incidents since 2000, but the perpetrators there were primarily from the white majority.6 A breakdown of the Metropolitan Police Service for London showed that 56.9% of the perpetrators were “white;” 6.3% were “dark Europeans.” The remaining crimes were committed by members of various ethnic groups (15% African-Caribbean, 12.3% Indian/Pakistani, 7.2% Arabic/Egyptian, 1.1% Chinese/Japanese). This means that the portion of perpetrators in Great Britain with a presumed MuslimArabic background is rather small (Iganski et al. 2005). In 2004, however, 124 of 532 attacks were motivated by anti-Zionist or anti-Israeli feelings. Only 84 could be categorized as being motivated by rightwing extremism (Community Security Trust 2005). There was a dramatic rise in the number of antisemitic incidents committed in Europe in the spring of 2002 when the Middle East conflict was escalating. This suggests that such acts are mobilized more easily by events (and would explain why they often occur in waves) than personal attitudes, which posses a greater stability. Hence, one explanation for the high level of antisemitism on this level is that Israel’s negative image provides antisemites with a motivation and an advantageous opportunity structure to commit antisemitic acts, but being not proposed to differentiate between Jews and the state of Israel, they direct these actions against Jews at home. The Middle East conflict also creates a favorable context for young Arab-Muslim perpe-

(2005: 9) in 2002–2004 between 41%–45% of the anti-Semitic perpetrators came from North Africa. 5   In analyzing xenophobic and anti-Semitic incidents in Germany, we face the problem that crimes directed against a person because of their political views, nationality, race, skin color, religion, handicap, social status or gender are generally categorized by the police as “right-wing politically motivated crimes” or as “hate crimes.” Xenophobic and anti-Semitic offenses are generally considered to be “motivated by the right-wing ideology” even when perpetrators such as extreme leftists and radical Muslims act out of other reasons. There are no official numbers on crimes committed by Arabic-Muslim immigrants. Hence, it is not possible to analyze the trend. 6  There were between 228 und 270 recorded anti-Semitic crimes in Great Britain in the late nineties, but the number rose to 405 in 2000, decreasing slightly afterwards only to reach a new climax of 532 in 2004 (Community Security Trust 2005).



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trators, even when they are less motivated by ideological antisemitism than by social deprivation. Sociological studies in France have shown that Muslim youths in particular often see their desolate social situation and experience of discrimination reflected in the conflict situation in the Middle East and begin to identify with the Palestinians as “victims of Israel” or as victims of the Jews in general (Wieviorka 2005: 287). Hence, it is difficult to determine exactly whether the change in recent years is really an indication of a new atmosphere of antisemitism. With regard to attitudes we are able to recognize a brief negative period effect, but not a long-term negative trend. Many countries have recorded much higher numbers of anti-Jewish crimes in recent years than in the 1980s and 1990s. What we don’t know is to what degree factors such as Israel’s policies in the Middle East conflict and its widespread coverage by the mass media, strong nationalist and right-wing extremist groups and the activities of young Arabic-Muslim immigrants are responsible for these acts. In other words, whether or not these possible causes are an indication of a “new anti-Semitism” remains unclear. IV.  International Comparative Studies In response to the wave of antisemitism in 2002, the ADL commissioned two surveys that year (in June and in October), another in 2004 and one more in 2005 that addressed attitudes toward Jews, Israel and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Surprisingly, the data reveals a negative trend for both (!) conflict parties. In the first study ADL used an antisemitism index that had previously been used in 1964 in the United States (consisting of 11 questions). Consequently the survey did not include questions about a “new anti-Semitism.” The data shows that between 34% and 72% of the respondents in Europe found it “probably true” that Jews were more loyal to Israel than to their home country. These results could be related to a distinct view of the Middle East conflict and Israel and an indication that some of the respondents negatively associate Israel’s politics with the locals Jews in their own country.7 In fact, in 2004, 55% of the respondents replied that the 7  The ADL data report is convinced that the responses to the loyalty question are an indication of a “new anti-Semitism”: “This new anti-Semitism is fueled by antiIsrael sentiment and questions the loyalty of Jewish citizens” (2004: 17). The available data do not support this conclusion. A French study did not find any significant

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violence directed against European Jews was a result of anti-Israeli sentiment. Only 15% saw it as an expression of “anti-Jewish feelings” (ADL 2004: 23). A year later, however, the views have changed: In 2005 only 39% thought the violence directed against European Jews was a result of anti-Israeli sentiment. Instead, 23% identified anti-Jewish sentiment as the cause (ADL 2005: 12). Probably these differences are caused by the dwindling focus on the Middle East conflict and the public European debates on antisemitism (for example the major OSCE-conferences). If we compare the distribution of answers to the question concerning “Jewish loyalty” over time, we see that the charge of disloyalty after 2002 decreased again after the Middle East conflict simmered down (in 2004 and 2005 an average of 43% respondents in Europe doubted their loyalty; in 2002 the average was 51%). Apparently the respondents’ evaluation of Jewish loyalty varies according to current events. The attitude toward Israel continued to worsen between 2002 and 2004/2005 while doubts about the loyalty of local Jews diminished. It seems unlikely that the respondents were accusing Jews of a higher loyalty to Israel in order to deny them recognition as fullfledged citizens in their own country. In 2005 29% of the French respondents answered “yes” to the question of whether the Jews were more loyal to Israel than to France, but in another survey conducted the same year only 8% answered “no” to the question: “A votre avis, est-ce qu’un Français juif est aussi Français qu’un autre français?” (tnssofres 2005). This means that some respondents were critical of the French Jews’ loyalty to Israel, but that only a small fraction of these critics considered the Jews to be anything but “real French.” The first study of 2002 only included three questions on the Middle East conflict but the two later ADL studies in 2004 and 2005 included additional questions about attitudes toward Israel and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Respondents held a mostly critical image of Israel and its actions toward the Palestinians in 2004: 34% said they saw Israel negatively; 23% of the European respondents saw Israel more favorably. The values were less favorable than in 2002 when 29% saw Israel negatively and 28% positively. In each survey almost half

correlation between holding Israel responsible for the Middle East conflict and believing that Israel is more important than France to French Jews (Mayer 2005, Tab. 6).



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the European respondents were of the opinion that Israel is not an open and democratic society (46%) and that Israel’s treatment of Palestinians is similar to the policies of Apartheid in South Africa (39%). Israel’s desire for peace was questioned by 45% and 35% accused the Israeli army of intentionally attacking Palestinian civilians (although 41% believed these attacks to be accidental). In total there was a difference of 12 percentage points to the disadvantage of Israel with regard to the question of responsibility for the last three years of violence (26% held Israel responsible, 14% held the Palestinians responsible). This, however, does not mean that the majority of Europeans are on the side of the Palestinians in the Middle East conflict: Only 25% were sympathetic to the Palestinians, 15% to Israel (ADL 2004: 23), but the sympathy curve for the Palestinians declined from 2002 to 2004 (2002: 32%) while the values for Israel remained unchanged. In fact, the governments of both sides were given very negative ratings: 59% for the Sharon administration, 52% for the Palestinian Authority under Arafat. The respondents named both Israel and the Palestinian Authority almost equally often in answer to the question over which side aspired to achieve a peace treaty: 38% for the Palestinian Authority, 34% for Israel. Trust in both sides’ desire for peace decreased somewhat in comparison to 2002 when 40% had trust in Israel and 41% believed in the Palestinian Authority. If we look at the distribution of sympathy for both conflict parties in the individual European countries, we find that sympathy varies less with the spread of antisemitic attitudes within the population than with the traditional attitudes of the country to Israel and the Arabic states: Only in the Netherlands and Italy was sympathy for Israel slightly higher than for the Palestinians (NL: 28% to 27%; Italy: 16% to 13%). In Germany sympathy for Israel was only slightly less than for the Palestinians (17% to 21%). In countries such as Denmark, Belgium and France, where antisemitic attitudes were held only by a small part of the population, but which have been critical of Israel for a long time, sympathy for the Palestinian side was much higher (DK: 27% to 13%, B: 30% to 12%, F: 17% to 8%). These countries in particular were more likely to attribute the violence against Jews in Europe to antiIsraeli sentiment rather than to anti-Jewish feelings (ADL 2005: 12; the difference was most striking in Denmark where 65% of the respondents identified anti-Israeli feeling as the cause and only 10% held anti-Jewish feelings responsible.) Responses to the surveys of 2004 and 2005 show that in each of the European countries the percentage of

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respondents who held anti-Israeli resentments responsible for the wave of violence declined by 19 percentage points. In contrast, those who saw the cause for violence in anti-Jewish sentiment increased clearly (up to 14%). This also shows that the presumed causality between Israel’s policies and manifestations of antisemitism is apparently not a fixed parameter but actually varies in relation to the political situation in the Middle East conflict. The media coverage of the conflict in each country also appears to play an important role since those who followed the news more carefully were much more likely to express sympathy for the Palestinians than those who did not (ADL 2004: 34). This also suggests that attitudes toward Israelis and Palestinians develop more strongly as a reaction to current political events and the respondent’s judgment of them and less as entrenched views motivated by antisemitic feelings. In 2005 the ADL study asked for the first time questions in relations to the issue that concerns us here: the connection between the perception of Israeli actions and the attitudes toward Jews (see chart). On average, 29% of the European respondents said their views were influenced by these issues. 45 40 35 30 25 % 20 15 10 5 0

1 Countries Austria Germany Poland

Belgium Netherlands Spain

Denmark Hungary Switzerland

France Italy Great Britain

Source: ADL 2005, p. 10.

Figure 1.  “Is your opinion influenced by actions taken by the State of Israel?” (in percent).



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80 70 60 50 % 40 30 20 10 0

1 Countries Austria Germany Poland

Belgium Netherlands Spain

Denmark Hungary Switzerland

France Italy Great Britain

Source: ADL 2005, p. 11.

Figure 2.  “Is your opinion of Jews better or worse?” (in percent).

Those who claimed such influence were then asked whether their opinion of Jews had improved or worsened. Just slightly more than half of the respondents (53%) said their view had worsened, but the direction of the attitude change varied strongly from country to country. In Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Great Britain the change of attitudes in the negative direction was far above the European average, while the Danes, French, Hungarians and Poles changed more in the positive direction. The changed view of the Austrians, Germans and Italians balanced each other out in both directions. If we apply the percentage of those who said their view of Jews had worsened to the entire population, we have the following picture. This distribution of opinions is not easy to interpret. On the one hand the populations in the former Eastern Bloc appear to be less strongly influenced by the events in the Middle East with only a small percentage affected negatively in their view of Jews.8 Evidence of this is

8  On the basis of a survey conducted in 2002 Krzeminski also sees a difference between Poland and the Western European countries: “In Poland most of the respondents

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Table 2. Percentage of Population Whose View of Jews Worsened as a Consequence of Israel’s Actions. Country

% of Population

France

7

Hungary

8

Poland

12

Italy Denmark

13 13

Germany Netherlands Belgium Great Britain

16 16 16 16

Austria

18

Switzerland

24

Spain

25

Calculation based on ADL 2005 data.

also provided by the fact that in 2005 only in Poland did the majority of respondents assume that the violence against Jews in Europe was due to anti-Jewish sentiment (34% vs. 21% who blamed it on antiIsraeli sentiment) whereas in all the other countries anti-Israeli feelings were more often given as the explanation. In France, which was seen by many observers as the center of “new anti-Semitism” in recent years and where a large number of anti-Jewish attacks occurred, the reaction of the population to the Middle East conflict seems to contradict this picture. The attacks in France were committed by a specific group—young Muslim men—and did not have a basis in the broader French population. In the case of Spain, however, for which no conclusive individual studies exist, the three ADL surveys suggest a link between the changed view and the widespread anti-Jewish bias. The

believed that both sides—Palestinians and Israelis—were responsible for the unsolved and worsening conflict” (2006: 67). He comes to the conclusion that anti-Semitism in Poland and Ukraine is still rooted in religious tradition (traditional anti-Semitism), but that that it feeds primarily on nationalistic feelings, especially victim competition with Jews (modern anti-Semitism: 58ff.). “New anti-Semitism” appears to be marginal here.



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available data for Switzerland suggests that this explanation for the negative change does not apply to this country. The ADL studies did not pursue the question of whether respondents who harbored extreme anti-Israeli views were also more inclined to have antisemitic leanings, although based on the data, this would have been possible to investigate. Edward H. Kaplan and Charles A. Small (2006) explored this question more closely using the data from the ADL 2004 survey and came to the conclusion that even with controls for other possible influential factors, antisemitic views also rise consistently with the degree of agreement with anti-Israeli statements (0–4 agreements on an anti-Israel index was possible). Respondents with extreme anti-Israeli views (agreement with four statements) were six-times more likely to harbor antisemitic sentiments than those who did not agree with any of the anti-Israel statements (Kaplan/ Small 2006: 550). Of the respondents with the most extreme antiIsraeli views, 56% were also antisemitic. “Based on this analysis, when an individual’s criticism of Israel becomes sufficiently severe, it does become reasonable to ask whether such criticism is a mask for underlying anti-Semitism” (Kaplan/Small 2006: 560). Nevertheless, the authors also point out that every anti-Israel statement or view is not necessarily motivated by antisemitism since only a quarter of those with anti-Israel index scores of 1 or 2 (agreement with one or two anti-Israel statements) reveal a clear antisemitic leaning (2006: 560). The findings apply to the respondents in each of the ten European countries that participated in the study. But the available data does not allow us to evaluate the question of causality—whether antisemitism gives rise to anti-Israeli sentiment or vice versa. V.  Studies of Individual Countries France Studies on antisemitism conducted in individual countries in Europe rarely make reference to Israel and the conflict in the Middle East. This is also true of the recent French survey “L’antisémitisme en France” (tns-Sofres 2005) which adopted the same established questions that had been used in past French surveys on this topic. None of these surveys addressed the Middle East conflict or Israel although the importance of this subject has been stressed in the French debate on “new

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anti-Semitism,” in particular by Taguieff.9 In France, views toward Israel have become a topic of discussion in another current political context, namely the Iranian president Ahmadinejad’s repeated threat “to wipe Israel off the map.” One percent of the French who participated in a survey agreed with his demand; another 4% expressed sympathy with the statement (CRIF 2005) and 10% had no opinion. The remaining respondents disagreed with the statement. Those on the side of Israel in the Middle East conflict expressed a much clearer rejection of this statement (94%) than those who were negatively inclined toward Israel (78%), but even this group rejected the statement clearly as did those who sympathized with the Palestinians (93%), Egypt (89%) or Iran (89%). The response to this statement varied according to political convictions: People with right-wing leanings were more likely than the average to either welcome the Iranian president’s demand (7%) or feel “sympathy” with it (8%); supporters of the Communist Party expressed sympathy (10%), but did not approve of it. Thus, we have no grounds for assuming that, in France, criticism of Israel’s policies bear an anti-Zionist—antisemitic dimension to any large degree. With one exception: among the youngest age group, the 18–24 year olds, 14% showed some approval (3% agreement, 11% sympathy) which is clearly well above the average and this could be an indication that the younger generation is developing a hostile image of Israel as an enemy. It is possible that the high birthrate among French immigrants with an Arab or North African background plays a role here. In an article examining the issue of “Transformations in French Anti-Semitism” (2005) Nonna Mayer established that there is no quantitative increase in antisemitic views in France. Additionally, she was also able to use empirical data to refute Taguieff ’s theory that there is a new, leftist antisemitism cloaked in shades of anti-racism and anti-colonialism. Instead she found that the stereotype of “Jewish power” goes hand and hand with a negative image of Islam and of immigrants, and is coupled with an acceptance for discrimination against the Black people and Maghrebians and racist feelings of superiority. This means that antisemitism is part of a more general attitude

9  No reference is made to Israel, for example, in the detailed Polish study conducted by Ambrosewicz-Jacobs (2003: 258) Israel is not mentioned in any of the ten possible answers to the question of what might cause anti-Jewish attitudes.



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of “ethnocentrism” held more frequently by people with right-wing political views, blue-collar workers, lower middle-class citizens (small farmers, small shopkeepers, artisans), the uneducated classes and the unemployed rather than by the extreme left or people with a higher level of education (Mayer 2005, Tab. 3). Mayer also examines whether there is a connection between antiZionism and antisemitism. The escalation of the Middle East conflict changed the distribution of sympathy strongly in favor of the Palestinians who were able to win 18% of the French people’s sympathy for their cause in 2000 versus 34% in 2004. Sympathy for the Israelis has remained stable at 13–14%. This distribution is not necessarily an indication of antisemitic anti-Zionism as shown by the answers provided to another question: Asked about the degree of liking for foreign politicians, both Yasser Arafat (3.7) and Ariel Sharon (3.2) achieved low values on a ten-point sympathy scale (10 points = strong sympathy, 1 point = strong antipathy). The number of antisemites among the respondents who expressed a strong dislike for Sharon was predictably higher at 32% (vs. 60% who rejected the anti-Jewish stereotype) than among those who felt the strongest liking for him (20% vs. 70%), but the difference turns out not to be that great after all. Surprisingly, the percentage of antisemites among those who reject Arafat is also higher than among those who are sympathetic toward him (28% vs. 24%). This suggests that the popularity of both political leaders has little to do with antisemitic sentiments. If we cross the popularity of the two opposing leaders with the adherence to the stereotype “Jews have too much power in France,” we find that those who harbored the strongest antisemitic views tend to dislike Arafat and Sharon equally (32%), whereas the least antisemitic respondents (18%) were among those who feel sympathy for both leaders (Mayer 2005: 100, Tab. 4). In 2005, French people with and without immigrant backgrounds (Africans and Turks) were asked the following questions about Jews and Israel (see tab. 3). A negative view of Jews was among French immigrant respondents with 7 to 19 percentage points higher than the average (11.6 points). It correlated with their ties to Islam. There was no difference in the groups’ negative view of Israel although the immigrants were more often likely to hold Israel responsible for the conflict in the Middle East.

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(Agree completely/Tend to agree)

French people of immigrant origin (N 1003)

French population (N 1006)

50

35

39 52

20 45

49 28

51 13

There is too much talk about the extermination of Jews Jews have too much power in france For French Jews, Israel matters more than France Israel (evokes something rather negative) Israelis bear more responsibility in the Israelo-Palestinian conflict

Source: CEVIPOP/TNS-SOFRES, survey April–Mai 2005 (cited in Mayer 2005, Tab. 5).

Table 4.  Correlations between Opinions concerning Jews and Israel 1 1) There is too much talk about the extermination of Jews 2) Jews have too much power in France 3) For French Jews, Israel matters more than France 4) Israel (evokes something rather negative) 5) Israelis bear more responsibility in the IsraeliPalestinian conflict

2

3

4

.338** .159** .155** .297** .150** .095** .346** .137** .265** .218** .102** .113**

5 .075* .071* .072* .145** .031 .169** .215** .306**

Persons significant on the threshold of .01 (**), or .05 (*). Read: normal font: French population, italics: French of immigrant origin.

The results of the correlation analysis are especially interesting for our study. Whereas the first three items which address Jews in France are rather closely correlated in the sample of “French population” (.338, .159 and .346) and somewhat less so among the “French of immigrant origin” (.297, .150 and .265), there is little overlapping of anti-Jewish and anti-Israel items. In this case the correlation for the French population with regard to the negative image of Israel is much lower. The correlation with regard to responsibility is so low (.031) that it is not



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even significant. As is expected, the values of the French group with immigrant origins are somewhat higher: the correlation between the item “Jewish power” and a negative view of Israel is the clearest (.218). The connection between talking about the Holocaust (.095) and the French Jews’ loyalty to Israel (.113) is much lower. Rather surprising is that the connection between having anti-Jewish beliefs and giving Israel greater responsibility was higher among the French with immigrant origin than among the French population but in general rather low. Based on this correlation analysis, Nonna Mayer comes to the following conclusion: “People may criticize Israel and condemn its policy toward the Palestinians without holding the Jews of France responsible and without necessarily being ‘anti-Semitic’ in the classic sense of the term” (2005: 103). Only in the sample of French people of African and Turkish origin does there appear to be a closer connection. This leads Mayer to conclude that not only is there less widespread antisemitism in France, there is also no fundamental shift in its structure. Sweden The first systematic survey study conducted in Sweden, “Anti-Semitic Images and Attitudes in Sweden” (Bachner/Ring 2006), for the most part used the same classic items that were used in other countries to investigate questions of national loyalty, power and influence, and the Holocaust. But the authors also adopted questions that address Israel and the Middle East conflict because they are “central themes in contemporary anti-Semitism.” Israel’s right to exist was only challenged by a very small minority of 3% (total or partial agreement to the statement “Israel has no right to exist”). But 9% saw the existence of Israel as a basic obstacle to world peace (“Peace on earth is not possible as long as Israel exists”). According to Bachner and Ring, 4% of the adults (19–75 years old) and 5% of the 16–18 year olds systematically support antisemitic views in connection to Israel. Measurement was made on the basis of a scale consisting of many items, including the statements “Israeli politics are characterized by a vengefulness rooted in the Old Testament” and “Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians is similar to the Nazis’ treatment of Jews” (each with 26% agreeing totally or partially). The 4–5% corresponds to the 5% of Swedes to which the study ascribes “strong and systematic anti-Semitic

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views.”10 Unfortunately, Bachner and Ring did not calculate a correlation between antisemitism and negative attitudes toward Israel, but the 14% of the pro-Palestinian respondents who agreed with antisemitic statements is considerably higher than the average in the population (5%), and vice versa: those sympathetic to Israel had above average negative views of Muslims (20% to 8% on the population average). With regard to the question of whether a negative attitude toward Israel is transferred onto Jews in general (“Because of Israeli politics, I dislike Jews even more”), the agreement among Swedes with 8% is considerably lower than in Germany (32%, see Heyder et al., 2004). Only 14% of the Swedes assumed that Israel’s policies could be the reason for hostility toward Jews (“Israeli politics are the cause of hatred of Jews”). Today people associate conventional antisemitic views with global power, the influence of American foreign policy (17% agreed completely or partially to the statement that Jews control U.S. foreign policy,) and conspiracies. Only 7% assumed that Israel was involved in the terror attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001 (47% did not agree, but 46% had no opinion!). Given that public opinion as formed by politics and the mass media in Sweden was considerably more critical of Israeli actions than in Germany from 2000–2004, we recognize that the media is probably responsible for spreading negative stereotypes about Jewish vindictiveness and making unfavorable Nazi comparisons (Bachner/Ring 2006: 135), but the specific form of antisemitic anti Zionism has only a small appeal. It seems more likely that people with antisemitic attitudes project these views onto Israel but the larger majority does not see in Israeli actions any reason to develop negative attitudes toward Jews in general. Even people who are sympathetic to the plight of the Palestinians do either systematically reject antisemitism (47%) or do not harbor outright antisemitic views but a somewhat ambivalent altitude (39%). Switzerland A study examining anti-Jewish and anti-Israeli attitudes and the possible connection between them was conducted in Switzerland for the first time in 2007 (GfS 2007). The study addresses these questions on  Among Swedes with a “foreign, particularly non-European background” the percentage (11%) is considerably higher (Bachner/Ring 2006, p. 132); among Muslims it was even as high as 39%. 10



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both the emotional and the cognitive level. The Swiss respondents had mostly a positive association with Jews (respect, admiration), but over 20% currently expressed negative feelings such as a lack of understanding and disappointment toward them. Only a small percentage (less than 10%) harbored extremely negative feelings such as anger or hatred. In the factor analysis, the positive emotions are charged onto one factor and all the negative ones are loaded onto a second factor. With regard to emotions toward Israel, however, we find a third factor where the majority of Swiss experience more situational emotions such as disappointment, anger and a lack of understanding (lack of understanding: 49%, disappointment 43%, the latter primarily among older respondents and people in left-wing circles). The feelings that charge the third factor, such as hate (8%) and contempt (12%), also appear much less frequently. The question is whether the anti-Israeli emotions have an influence on attitudes toward Jews. Six percent of the respondents said that the actions of Israel strongly influence their personal attitude toward Jews. Another 19% said the influence was “somewhat strong.” People in right-wing political circles, people who attend church regularly and more men than women were most likely to admit to this transfer of emotions—the very same groups of people who are most likely to harbor traditional antisemitism (GfS 2007: 37, 74). The connection between feelings toward Jews and Israel was investigated using a two-dimensional scale (MDS), which showed that “otherwise, on an emotional level—that is to say unconsciously—the population hardly differentiates between Jews as a people and Israel as a state.” (GfS 2007: 37) On the cognitive level, however, the relationship looks quite diffe­ rent. The majority of the Swiss expressed a basically positive attitude toward Israel, which they see as a “state just like any other” (68%) and part of the western world (56%). Two-thirds of the respondents accepted and understood Israel’s reaction “to the threats from the Islamic world.” But this doesn’t keep them from judging certain aspects of Israeli politics negatively: Half of the Swiss believe that Israel is conducting a “war of extermination against the Palestinians,” 43% hold Israel partially responsible for world-wide terrorism and 40% believe it has “too much influence in the world.” Thirteen percent— a clear minority—expressed an obvious anti-Zionist position in which they demanded that the state of Israel be dissolved (GfS 2007, tables 25, 26 and 27). This radical position is also expressed most often by church-goers and people in right-wing-oriented circles, by residents of

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the French region of Switzerland and by less educated people. In summary, we can say these are certainly not segments of the population that would qualify as bearers of a “new anti-Semitism.” (for similar findings, see the chapter on Germany below). The cognitive level is different than the emotional level in that it does not easily reveal a clear identification of Jews with the state of Israel. The factor analysis separates anti-Jewish attitudes from views critical of Israel although there are two items that overlap: “excessive influence in the world” and “Israel’s role as the extended arm of the U.S.A.” (GfS 2007: 41) The following factor analysis of items that could indicate the dimensions of antisemitism reveals that the cognitive views and the situational emotions toward Israel are distinct from hostile views toward Jews. Table 5. Results of the Factor Analysis on Attitude Dimensions Attitude Dimensions Negative stereotype of Jews Anti-Jewish views about their foreignness to Christian culture Anti-Jewish opinions regarding world domination Situational negative emotions toward Israel Anti-Israeli opinions Negative emotions toward Jews Generally negative emotions toward Israel

1st Factor

2nd Factor

3rd Factor

.79 .56 .52

.57 .76 .73

.81 .72

Source: GfS 2007, p. 48.

The factor structure suggests that “anti-Israeli attitudes are not essential . . . to determining anti-Semitism.” The authors of the Swiss study come to the conclusion that “anti-Israeli views in Switzerland . . . are increasingly common and widespread,” but that “because the distribution of these views in the population differs quantitatively and qualitatively from the distribution of anti-Jewish attitudes, it should be regarded as a separate phenomenon and evaluated independently from anti-Semitism.” (GfS 2007: 48) The factor analysis also shows, however, that there are two “bridges” that connect both phenomena: the stereotype of “excessive Jewish/Israeli influence in the world” and the very pronounced negative emotions of hate, envy and anger. Consequently, the authors of the study assume that “Israel’s political actions in the Middle East” and the claim of Israel’s “excessive influence



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on world events” have a negative impact on attitudes toward Jews in general. There is a lack of understanding for how “former victims could themselves become perpetrators in the Israel-Palestine conflict.” (GfS 2007: 42) Interestingly, this lack of understanding is found among all segments of the population and cannot be tied to any specific group. The study’s claim that “criticism of Israel is independent of antiSemitic attitudes” is a rather daring conclusion for a number of reasons. For one, the authors themselves concede that further investigation is required to determine the degree to which those with antisemitic attitudes are directly or indirectly influenced by their perception of Israel. Furthermore, it is not clear to what degree negative emotions toward Israel are fed directly from antisemitism (GfS 2007: 48). The correlation analysis does not allow for any conclusions to be drawn regarding the direction of this causality. A cluster analysis shows that the connection between both phenomena applies primarily to the generally negative emotions but not to stronger situational emotions. Five clusters were identified using a cluster analysis: a pro-Jewish cluster (37%), an “emotionally disgruntled with Israel’s policies” cluster (15%), a cluster with selective anti-Jewish views (28%), an antisemitism cluster (10%) and an incoherent views cluster (10%) (GfS 2007: 49). The “emotionally disgruntled“ cluster is interesting in that the respondents expressed disappointment over Israel’s Middle East politics and increasingly expressed disappointment with Jews in general, but this does not transfer into a negative attitude toward Jews on the cognitive level. The emotionally disgruntled respondents deviated from the population average in their attitude toward Jews on only two points: in their feeling of disappointment and in their perception of Jews as “politically radical,” which suggests that an attitude transfer has taken place, originating from their view that Israel’s actions toward the Palestinians are hard and radical. Germany The image of Israel among the radical leftists in Western Europe changed after the Six-Day-War of 1967, when Israel became an occupying power. By accusing Israel of the worst crimes of the National Socialists—apartheid, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity, genocide— the leftists implied that opposition to Nazism and racism is opposition to Israel and the Jews. Anti-racism legitimized and even demanded

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an anti-Zionist and antisemitic position and was squarely positioned on the side of the Palestinian fighters. This form of legitimization is found above all among the extreme left and extreme right in Europe but other segments of the population also think that Israel’s actions are one of the main causes for hostile feelings toward Jews. Little empirical research has been conducted to examine this connection between the perception of Israel and antisemitic views. One exception is an early attempt undertaken by Bergmann and Erb. For their representative study they used an “anti-Zionism scale” for the first time, created out of extremely negative statements about Israel and its actions toward Palestinians. The correlation between the antisemitism and the anti-Zionism scale was quite strong (.56) (1991: 193).11 The more entrenched the antisemitic attitude was, the more likely it was to include an anti-Zionist attitude. The same was true conversely as well. But there were some “anti-Zionists” identified who did not harbor antisemitic convictions (22% of the “hard-core antiZionist”). This means that an acute or aggressive criticism of Israel’s actions could be fed from other motives and views and is not clearly an expression of antisemitism (Bergmann/Erb 1991: 195f ). If we look at the distribution of responses that have been gathered since 1956 regarding sympathy for Arabs or Israelis in the Middle East conflict, the sympathy for Israel clearly correlates with political events and fluctuates more strongly than the more stable antisemitic convictions (Bergmann/Erb 1991: 182). In most European countries a pattern of sympathy distribution has established itself since the nineties that is characterized by an neither/nor constellation or by indecision with the sympathizers of both conflict parties representing a minority.12 This pattern was clearly identifiable when the Middle East conflict

11  A 1996 study of youths in Brandenburg and North Rhine-Westphalia showed an even clearer correlation between the scale of “anti-Jewish prejudices” and “AntiIsraelism” (consisting of 9 items from the 1991 Bergmann/Erb study): .68 for the Brandenburg youths and .69 for North Rhine-Westphalia youths (Sturzbecher & Freytag 2000). 12   In 2001, the Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach registered an equal amount of supporters for the Israelis and the Palestinians (14% each); 53% chose “neither,” 19% had no opinion (Noelle-Neumann & Köcher 2002: 1007). It is interesting to note that the number of West Germans who believe the Palestinians have a right to their own state remained stable from 1983 to 2001 (51% or 52%). This is also true for the number of respondents who believe this state would be a threat to Israel (13% or 12%). This hardly suggests a dramatic change in views toward Israel or the Middle East conflict in the last few years.



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c­ ulminated in the spring of 2002: 76% of the German respondents held Israelis and Palestinians equally responsible for the violent conflict. Only 9% found Israelis more responsible while 7% held Palestinians more responsible (NFO-Infratest 2002). A 1991 Emnid study posed a whole series of questions on the Middle East conflict and Israel. The study shows that agreement with antisemitic items13 and an antipathy toward Jews living in Germany (which, incidentally, corresponded completely with the antipathy for Jews in Israel and conversely with the sympathy of both groups) was more often connected to a pro-Arab position, but it was also possible that strong partisanship could co-exist with sympathy for Jews in Germany and Israel. Table 6. Sympathy for Jews in Germany and Sympathy Distribution in the Middle East Conflict (in percent) Sympathy/ Antipathy of Jews

−5

−4

−3

−2

−1

0

+1

+2

+3

+4

+5

Total Pro-Israel Pro-Arab

2 1 3

3 0 6

4 3 7

5 2 7

6 6 5

38 28 40

12 11 10

12 15  7

 8 12  7

4 9 4

3 9 1

Emnid 1991, Tab. 20: Sympathy scale: −5 very unsympathetic; +5 very sympathetic.

A comparison of the mean sympathy values shows that those who regard Jews in Germany more positively are also more likely to have a pro-Israeli attitude: (1.4 vs. a total average of 0.5), but the respondents with a pro-Arab view did not necessarily feel hostile toward the German Jews (–0.1). If we regard the sympathy distribution for the Palestinians we find a positive correlation with the sympathy distribution to the advantage of the Arabs, but this has no influence on the degree of sympathy felt for Israel. In fact, just the opposite is true: those who dislike Jews in Israel also do not care much for the Palestinians on average (–1.0). The reverse is also true: Those who dislike the Israelis tend also to not to like Palestinians (+0.8). In the Middle East 13   63% of those who agreed with the statement “The Jews have too much influence in the world” were on the side of the Arabs (30% on the side of Israel). 49% of those who did not agree tended to be on the side of the Israelis (25% supported the Arabs). Those who agreed were also more likely to dislike Jews in Israel and more likely to feel moderately positive about National Socialism (Emnid 1991, Tab. 14).

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conflict the mean values of sympathy for the Palestinians (0.6) and for the Israelis (–0.7) are not far apart. All this suggests that the attitude toward the Middle East conflict is more strongly influenced by politics and less an expression of mere sympathy/antipathy toward Jews and Palestinians. In response to the first Intifada in 1989, the Emnid Institute added a projective question to their survey that was related to “critical views about Jews” and “Israel’s policies in the occupied territories.” The question was repeated again in the 2003 survey. The answer distribution is as follows: Table 7.  “Some People are Critical of Jews Here. What Is It They Are Affended By?” (in percent; multiple answers possible) Item The Jewish faith Social influence Economic power Restitution payments Certain Jews enrich themselves by restitution payments Israel’s policies in the occupied territories Total of %

Total

1989 AS-high

AS-low

2003 Total

 8 14 27 29 28

11 21 29 47 54

 8 11 24 23 23

19 32 32 52 39

40

30

42

65

146

194

132

239

(Emnid 1990, Tab. 83; tns-emnid 2003).

These answers ascribe motives to other people. In the 1989 survey there were characteristic differences between the answers offered by antisemitic and non-antisemitic respondents in the question of Israeli policies. The antisemites offered the alleged “exploitation” of Germans and the Jews’ social influence as central motives—motives that were much less important to the respondents who revealed little or no antisemitism. The antisemites were less likely to assume that Israel’s policies could be the cause of antisemitism, a response offered much more often by those who were classified on the antisemitism scale as not or minimally antisemitic. The connection between political party preference and the assumed cause of “criticism of Jews” in 2003 shows a similar pattern (tns-Emnid 2003, Tab. 2): Israeli policies were offered as a motive equally often by almost all the parties (66–69%) with the exception of the FDP voters



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(78%). The “Möllemann-Effect” is no doubt playing a role here. The voters of Bündnis90/Die Grünen (the Green party) (92%), whose concern for human rights and political interests cause them to be very critical of Israel and skeptical of their fellow citizens, expressed almost total agreement. Only 40% of the voters of the right-wing extremist parties DVU and NPD claimed that Israeli policies motivated their “criticism of Jews” and instead preferred the more traditional motives of antisemitism (“certain Jews enrich themselves by restitution payments”: 82%, “economic power”: 65%).14 People with antisemitic views saw in Israel’s politics an additional motive or a confirmation of their views. In contrast, the respondents who were not antisemitic were critical of Israel’s polices without sharing these views. The assumption that Israel’s policies are the main cause for hostility was more widespread among people who are interested in politics (1989: 45%) than people who are not (31%).15 This also explains the higher values in 2003. The attitude development from 1989 to 2003 indicates a negative trend for all of the assumed motives, but especially for the motive of “Israeli policies,” which, no doubt, has to do with the public debate about the escalated situation in the Middle East. Within the international discussion about “new anti-Semitism” some claim that Israel, as a kind of “collective Jew,” has become the primary target of hate and that the Middle East conflict is the main cause for the negative attitude toward Jews as well as the attacks against Jews in Europe. With regard to attitudes it must be asked whether the sharp criticism of Israel is not perhaps being used to justify personal antisemitic judgments, an issue that up to now has only been investigated in Germany (Heyder, Iser, Schmidt 2004). The authors of this study distinguished between different dimensions of antisemitism and criticism of Israel and investigated how they were related to one another.

14  The small number of respondents with this party preference (N=11) makes statistical statements difficult. The results of 1989 confirm these findings: 34% of the rightwing voters believed Israel’s politics were the cause of anti-Semitism as compared to 46% of the left-wing voters (Emnid 1989, Tab. 83). 15   In 1991 30% of the politically interested respondents were of the opinion that Israel should give in in the Middle East conflict as compared to 20% of those who were less interested in politics. The political right-left orientation played no role here (Emnid 1991, Tab. 34). Those who called for Israel to give in were clearly more likely to be sympathetic to the Arabs in the Middle East conflict, but they did not bear an above average antipathy toward Israel.

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Tend to agree

Agree fully

Classical antisemitism Jews have too much influence in Germany. Because of their behavior, Jewish people are partly to blame for their persecution.

Tend to disagree

Categories and statements

Fully disagree

Table 8. Statements and Values for Antisemitic-Critical Political Attitudes (in percent)

43.6 50.4

34.9 32.2

10.9 11.1

10.6   6.3

19.8

23.8

44.5

23.2

20.9

41.3

23.1

45.2

19.1

12.6

18.9

36.8

28.9

15.5

  7.9

36.6

33.7

21.9

10.7

41.5

29.2

18.6

  7.6

24.0

33.2

35.1

18.8

30.0

23.9

27.3

14.2

37.5

44.4

10.0

34.5

51.5

Secondary antisemitism I find it annoying that the Germans today are 11.9 still being blamed for the crimes against the Jews. I am sick hearing about the German crimes 14.6 against the Jews all the time. Israel-focused antisemitism Israeli policies make me feel increasingly unsympathetic towards the Jews. Looking at Israeli policies, it is no surprise that people are against Jews. Antisemitic Separation German Jews have stronger ties to Israel than to Germany. Jews in this country care more about Israeli affairs than German affairs. Nazi Analogy Israel is waging a war of extermination against the Palestinians. There is not much of a difference between what the state of Israel is doing today to the Palestinians and what the Nazis did to the Jews during the Third Reich.

Critical attitude toward Israel I get angry when I think about how Israel 4.0 treats the Palestinians It is unjust that Israel is taking land away from 3.9 the Palestinians.

Values that reflect antisemitism or views critical of Israel are shaded grey. The order of items was altered after the survey. The greater larger the value, the stronger the agreement with the statement (Heyder/Iser/Schmidt, 2004, Tab. 1, p. 151; data from the GFE-Survey 2004).



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The results show that one third of the respondents admitted that their negative view of Israel’s policies make them like Jews less (of whom 56% said they were strongly attached to Israel). Half of them equated Israeli policies to the policies of the National Socialists against the Jews.16 Respondents explained or justified their negative view as a consequence of the Jews’/Israelis’ actions, thus providing themselves an “opportunity” to deny the Jews their moral position as victims. The factor analysis shows that an Israel-focused antisemitism is a separate factor that correlates very strongly with classical antisemitism (.70) and with the belief that the Jews generally feel more closely tied to Israel (.57). The correlation matrix, however, shows that not every form of criticism of Israel is an expression of antisemitic feelings, but that in some dimensions they are closely related. Table 9.  Empirical Relationships between Dimensions of Antisemitism and the Critical Attitude towards Israel (correlations) Secondary antisemitism

Classical antisemitism Secondary antisemitism Israel-focused antisemitism Antisemitic Separation Nazianalogy

.50

IsraelAntisemitic focused Separation antisemitism .70 .67/.73 .40

Nazi analogy

Critical attitude towards Israel

.53 .52/.57 .40

.36

n.s. n.s./.28 n.s.

.57

.54 .57/.61 .48

.49

.21 n.s./.48 14 n.s./.28 31 .28/.50

(Significance level < 1%-error probability) n.s. = not significant (Heyder/Iser/Schmidt, 2004, Tab. 2, 5, 160); Additions in 2006: numbers in italics: Respondents with leftist political leaning; bold typeface: with right-wing political leaning.

The very different left-right distribution of agreement with classical and Israel-focused antisemitism as compared to critical attitudes towards

16   In Austria in 1992, 43% (13% agreed fully, 30% tended to agree) with the statement “Israelis basically treat the Palestinians no differently than the Germans treated the Jews” (Karmasin 1992, Tab. 20).

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Israel, in part with regard to the use of Nazi analogy to describe Israeli policies, is an indication that these responses reflect varying motivations. This confirms the above correlation analysis (Tab. 9), which reveals interesting differences between the values for all the respondents (normal font), those with leftist political leanings (italics) and those with right-wing political leanings (bold). Among right-wing respondents Israel-focused antisemitism and antisemitic Separation correlates much more clearly with classical antisemitism than among the left-wing respondents. Among the former, the critical attitude towards Israel is connected significantly to classical antisemitism (.28) and more strongly to an Israel-focused antisemitism (.48). This is not the case in the sample as a whole or among left-wing respondents. This means that right-wing oriented people are more likely to project a critical attitude towards Israel onto all Jews and this view only reveals a significant correlation to classical anti-Semitic views here. It is interesting to note—unlike the sample as a whole and among right-wing respondents—that left-wing respondents do not show a significant connection between criticism of Israel and the transfer of this critical view onto Jews in general. This suggests that such criticism, regardless of whether it is correct or not, is actually directed at the concrete policies of Israel and is not generalized or being used to confirm one’s own antisemitism.17 Wolfgang Frindte, Susan Wettig and Dorit Wammetsberger conducted two non-representative studies in 2002/2003 to examine the connection between antisemitic and anti-Israeli/anti-Zionist views. Based on a confirmatory factor analysis they were able to develop a four-component model comprising four strongly interrelated dimensions: manifest/latent antisemitism, rejection of responsibility for the Jews, exaggerated anti-Israeli views and anti-Zionism (with regard to the existence of the Jewish state in the Middle East), with the two final factors correlating significantly (.45 and .49) with manifest/latent antisemitism and rejection of responsibility (.48 und .41) (2005: 251ff ). These results correspond to the findings of Bergmann/ Erb from 1991. 17   This is also confirmed by the fact that in the same survey a high, albeit not unanimous criticism of Palestinian policies was registered. 61.4% agreed fully or tended to agree with the item: “The Palestinian attacks against Israel are unjustifiable.” (12.4% rejected this statement fully and another 26.2% tended to reject it.) In response to the item: “I think it is bad how the Palestinians are trying to destroy the state of Israel,” 67.5% agreed, 9.4% did fully disagree and another 23.1% tended not to agree (Heyder et al. 2004, p. 162).



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Frindte et al. draw the conclusion that, based on the positive correlation between antisemitism and the exaggerated criticism of Israel and anti-Zionism, antisemites use the latter to affirm their antisemitic prejudice or as a “form of substitutional communication in public if there are strong social sanctions against direct communications of one’s own prejudices” (Frindte et al. 2005: 255).18 In other words, the authors do not ascribe an independent motive to these views of Israel. Instead, they rightly concede that more investigations are necessary to determine the causal relations between antisemitism, anti-Zionism and anti-Israeli expressions (Frindte et al. 2005: 257). The correlations with values below .50 suggest that some of the respondents harbor such views without actually being antisemitic. Similar to Bergmann/Erb 1991 and Heyder et al. 2004, these findings also show the influence of political orientation as Wolfgang Frindte (2006) has shown in another publication based also on the 2002/2003-data: Whereas antisemitism and rejection of responsibility receive a much higher level of agreement the more right-wing the respondent’s political views are, criticism of Israel and anti-Zionism is represented mostly by respondents who fall into the extreme left-wing and extreme right-wing category. In their study, 47% of the extreme left-wing respondents expressed an anti-Israeli position. Only 3% of them expressed antisemitism. Yet, 25% of the extreme right-wing individuals shared anti-Israeli positions, while 75% of them also harbored antisemitic views. The author draws from this the conclusion that critics of Israeli policies come from two politically opposing camps: One is formed from left-wing, multi-culturally-oriented individuals who bear no antisemitic views; the other is made up of right-wing antisemitic individuals. Using a cluster analysis Frindte was able to identify four clusters: One cluster (32.2%) shows a low value in all four attitude dimensions and can be categorized as being without prejudice. A second cluster (27.6%) had, in comparison to the first one, significantly higher values, particularly in the dimensions concerning Israel. The respondents of Cluster 1 and 2 hardly differed in their social cultural background. They were, for the most part, younger than 45 years old, the majority had a high-school diploma (Abitur) and classified themselves as more to the left or left of

18   Frindte et al. are right to add to this theory the following comment: “This is conjecture, however, as it still has to be demonstrated that there is no distinction made between the politics of the state of Israel and Jews in general” (2005: 255f.).

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center on the political spectrum. Frindte categorized the respondents of Cluster 2 as “left-wing critics of Israel without anti-Semitic views” (2006: 132). Another cluster (21.7%) reflects a high level of agreement only in the dimension “rejection of responsibility.” In the other three dimensions this cluster lies only slightly higher than Cluster 1 und 2. Frindte categorizes this mostly younger (54% under 45) and more to the right or right of center (55%) group of respondents as “rightwing conservative individuals who want to put the past behind them and who are without pronounced anti-Semitic or anti-Zionist views” (2006: 132). This is no doubt an accurate reading of the respondents leaning but with regard to their agreement with criticism of Israel, this group lies marginally lower than the left-wing critics of Israel, which means there is a strong possibility of “offsetting interests” here. And finally, the last cluster (17.9%) achieves the highest values in all dimensions. It consists mostly of older, less educated and right-wing-oriented individuals. Frindte describes them as “secondary anti-Semites,” who hold anti-Israeli and anti-Zionist positions as a way to articulate their antisemitism in a socially acceptable manner. He chooses to see in them the “new anti-Semites,” who are “hostile to Jews in a modern way” (2006: 132). The newness of this view is, however, questionable; an argument which Frindte admits at the end of his presentation when he notes that evidence of concealed communication existed as early as 1945. It would be also a surprise to see in mostly older, uneducated, right-wing persons the sustainers of a “new anti-Semitism”—at least, this would contradict Taguieff who located the “new anti-Semites” among young, well-educated citizens identifying with the left. Whether the criticism of Israel, which in the surveys is always measured as an attitude and not as a form of communication or a willingness to communicate, is actually a form of substitutional communication or communicational detour, still needs to be empirically examined beyond the analysis of factual communication. The attitude studies are not able to do this. VI.  Summary Empirical research has only just begun to investigate the premise that antisemitism has taken on a new form. The basic methodological task requires isolating within the rejection of Israel a separate motive for hostility to Jews. In other words, it needs to identify the direction of



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the causality between traditional antisemitism and antisemitism motivated by anti-Zionism or hostility toward Israel. Studies have confirmed that a high correlation exists between antisemitic attitudes and a negative view of Israeli policies, but it has not been possible to read from this a clear statement about the direction of the influence. Some of the respondents in Europe admitted that their view of Jews has worsened as a consequence of Israel’s policies but this alone is not proof of an antisemitic view. It could be that most of these respondents already harbored a negative view that has now worsened. That the majority of antisemites include Israel, a Jewish state, in their resentful worldview is not surprising. Studies in the late eighties already showed that the extreme left, in particular, harbored an anti-Zionist attitude tinged with antisemitism. The French and German studies (Mayer 2005; Heyder et al. 2004; Frindte et al. 2005; Frindte 2006) show that even among the far-left a form of anti-Israeli antisemitism exists, which also correlates with traditional antisemitism. But they also show that this antisemitism is less common among the left compared to the political center and to the extreme right. They also show that unlike views of the far right, a strong rejection of Israel’s policies and anti-Zionist positions exists among the left which has nothing to do with classical antisemitism but also not with Israel-related antisemitic views. In sum, it can be said that on the basis of the survey data, there is no recognizable change in the structure of antisemitism. For this reason I agree with Nonna Mayer’s findings for France, where a stronghold of “new anti-Semitism” is believed to exist: “ ‘New’ Judeophobia is still very much like the old kind” (2005: 103). Translated from German by Miriamne Fields References Ambrosewicz-Jacobs, Jolanta (2003), Me, US, Them. Ethnic Prejudice Among Youth and Alternative Methods of Education. The Case of Poland. Cracow, Universitas. American Jewish Committee (2000), Swiss Attitudes toward Jews and the Holocaust. A Public-Opinion Survey. New York: American Jewish Committee. ——  (2001), Attitudes Toward Jews and the Holocaust in Austria. New York: American Jewish Committee. ——  (2005), Thinking about the Holocaust 60 Years Later. A Multi­national Public-Opinion Survey, March–April. American Jewish Committee in Deutschland (2002), Die Einstellung der Deutschen zu Juden, dem Holocaust und den USA. Berlin.

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Anti-Defamation League (ADL) (2002), European Attitudes Toward Jews. New York. ——  (2004), Attitudes Toward Jews, Israel and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict in Ten European Countries. New York. ——  (2005), Attitudes Toward Jews in Twelve European Countries. New York. Bachner, Henrik and Jonas Ring (2006), Antisemitic Images and Attitudes in Sweden (English Summary). Bergmann, Werner (1996), Antisemitismus-Umfragen nach 1945 im internationalen Vergleich. Jahrbuch für Antisemitismusforschung, 5, pp. 172–195. Bergmann, Werner and Rainer Erb (1997), Anti-Semitism in Germany. The Post-Nazi Epoch since 1945, New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers. Bergmann, Werner (2005), Neuer oder alter Antisemitismus? Das Parlament, Vol. 55, No. 15, S. 13. Community Security Trust (2005), Antisemitic Incidents Report 2004. Conseil Représentatif des Institutions juives de France (Crif ) (2005), A Large majority of French condemn the call of the Iranian President “to wipe Israel off the map,” 5th December 2005, http://www.crif.org. Emnid-Institut (1989), Zeitgeschichte. Bielefeld. ——  (1991), Antisemitismus in Deutschland. Bielefeld. Forsa-Institut (2003), Antisemitismus in Deutschland, 14–15. Nov. 2003 commissioned by the “Stern,” published in “Stern” on 20th November 2003 (Stern 48/2003), 52–53. Frindte, Wolfgang (2006), Inszenierter Antisemitismus. Eine Streitschrift. Wiesbaden, VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. Frindte, Wolfgang, Susan Wettig and Dorit Wammetsberger (2005), Old and New Anti-Semitic Attitudes in the Context of Authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation—Two Studies in Germany, in: Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology 11/3, pp. 239–266. Gesellschaft für Sozialforschung (GfS) (2007), Kritik an Israel von antisemitischen Haltungen unabhängig. Antisemitismus-Potenzial in der Schweiz neuartig bestimmt. Schlussbericht zur Studie “Anti-jüdische and anti-israelische Einstellungen in der Schweiz.” Bern. Heitmeyer, Wilhelm (Ed.) (2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006), Deutsche Zustände. Folge 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. Frankfurt a. M., Suhrkamp Verlag. Heyder, Aribert, Julia Iser and Peter Schmidt (2004), Israelkritik oder Antisemitismus? Meinungsbildung zwischen Öffentlichkeit, Medien und Tabus. In W. Heitmeyer (Ed.), Deutsche Zustände. Folge 3. Frankfurt a. M., Suhrkamp Verlag, pp. 144–165. Hirschfeld, Hadassa, and Agnes van der Sluijs (2005), Anti-Semitic Incidents in the Netherlands. Report for 2004 and January 1–May 5, 2005, Center for Information and Documentation on Israel, Den Haag. Iganski, Paul, Vicky Kielinger and Susan Paterson (2005), Hate Crimes Against London’s Jews, London, Institute for Jewish Policy Research. Kaplan, Edward H. and Charles A. Small (2006), Anti-Israel Sentiment Predicts AntiSemitism in Europe, in: Journal of Conflict Resolution 50/4, pp. 548–561. Krzemiski, Ireneusz (2006), “Neuer” oder “alter” Antisemitismus? Anmerkungen auf der Grundlage soziologischer Untersuchungen in Polen und der Ukraine, in: Bernd Kauffmann/Basil Kerski (Ed.), Antisemitismus und Erinnerungskulturen im postkommunistischen Europa, Osnabrück 2006, pp. 53–73. Mayer, Nonna (2005), Transformations in French anti-Semitism. Journal für Konfliktund Gewaltforschung 7/2, pp. 91–104. NFO-Infratets (2002), Umfrage für den Spiegel 14, 2002, pp. 26–27. Noelle-Neumann, Elisabeth and Renate Köcher Hrsg.) (2002), Allensbacher Jahrbuch der Demoskopie 1998–2001, BD. 11, München, Allensbach, Saur Verlag. Sturzbecher, Dietmar and Ronald Freytag (2000), Antisemitismus unter Jugendlichen, Göttingen.



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Taguieff, Pierre-André (2002), La nouvelle judéophobie, Paris, Mille et une nuits. tns-Emnid, Die Welt, November 10, 2003. tns-Sofres, L’antisémitisme en France, May 2005, www.tns-sofres.com/etudes/ pol080605 antisemitismer.htm. Wieviorka, Michel (2005), Antisemitismus in Frankreich, Jahrbuch für Antisemitismusforschung 14, pp. 285–292.

“Against Globalism”: Counter-Cosmopolitan Discontent and Antisemitism in Mobilizations of European Extreme Right Parties Lars Rensmann I.  Introduction In spite of its often still marginal political standing in European party spaces, the extreme right is arguably the best studied European party family today (Mudde 2007)—though it is contestable if we can even speak of a unified party family at all. At first glance, the enormous research interest is quite astonishing given the irrelevance of these parties for much of European post-War history. Until the early 1980s, there was virtually no politically relevant and electorally successful extreme right party in Europe. The neo-fascist Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI) was Europe’s exception to the rule, but the party was isolated by established political parties and in Italy’s democratic political culture, and unable to gain much public traction. Yet, extreme right parties have meanwhile undoubtedly achieved many electoral successes, even though in some cases initial breakthroughs were followed by an inability to consolidate their space within the party system.1 Be that as it may, most liberal democracies in Western and Eastern Europe are by now confronted with relevant political parties conventionally conceived as extreme (or “radical“) right, defined here as authoritarian and xenophobic parties that reject a liberal-pluralist society that values democracy and civil/human rights (Mudde 2003; Braunthal 2009). These parties challenge established party systems and liberal constitutional democracy as a polity (Minkenberg/Perrineau 2007).2 1  However, studies on the European extreme right by far exceed research on other new parties (for instance from the radical left; cf. March 2009), including those that have had similar or more success in the post-industrial age, such as Green parties. 2   On the conceptual mess—almost every author applies a distinct definition and uses a different label for this party family, from “new extreme right parties,” “right-wing populist parties,” “radical right-wing populist parties,” “neo-fascist parties” to “radical right parties” etc.—cf. Mudde 2007; Kitschelt 2007; van der Brug & Fennema 2007. Some researchers distinguish between “extreme right parties” and “national-populist

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One of the continuous challenges is to explain very significant regional and cross-national variation in extreme right party success (Golder 2003; Carter 2005). Earlier mono-causal explanations have been replaced by multi-faceted models, which itself is a reflection of this indisputable fact of variation that cannot be explained by a single independent variable. Kai Arzheimer (2009) shows, for example, that while unemployment rates may be an important contributing factor—extreme right parties today do tend to glean greater benefit from unemployed, less educated blue-collar workers (Oesch 2008) than their middle-of-the-road or left-wing counterparts—the interplay of joblessness with other political factors is much more complex than earlier research has suggested. In a previous study, Arzheimer and Carter provided ample evidence that varying structural contextual factors strongly influence the initial political opportunities—and hence the success or failure—of extreme right parties in European party systems (Arzheimer & Carter 2006). Their research points to multiple factors explaining extreme right success in general. In particular, it moves beyond demand-side macro theories and takes into account the relevance of national politico-cultural opportunities and specific external supply sides, i.e. party spaces and competitors in situated electoral marketplaces (Norris 2005; Kitschelt 2007). But even the recent turn to the internal supply side of party agents has not yet sufficiently focused on the extreme right’s political ideology3 and party platforms, and the framing of ‘new issues.’ Although previous studies have emphasized that the ideological transformations from the conventional, old “fascist” to a “new extreme right” (Ignazi 2003) are a necessary (though as such not a sufficient) condition for extreme right success in a changing European political environment and party competition, rigorous studies of these transformations and their political impact have been rare and peripheral. parties” (Frölich-Steffen & Rensmann 2007) or differentiate between subcategories: for instance more moderate, neo-populist variants, on the one hand, and radical variants of the extreme right, on the other (Rensmann 2003). 3   ‘Party ideology’ is defined here as the underlying, structuring ‘world view’ and basic policy outlook of parties. ‘Party ideology’ is hereby not only defined by manifestos. To do so is particularly insufficient, if not misleading in the case of extreme right parties, which often operate with innuendo, tend to have little inner-party democracy and are focused on authoritarian leaders. Public statements by party leaders, party web publications and campaign platforms carry much heavier weight than official party platforms (for an opposing view, see Mudde 2003). However, I primarily focus on party websites and platforms.



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What is even more astonishing is that, so far, almost no attention has been paid to antisemitism as an independent ideological variable. Antisemitism was a key element of many old fascist parties but has presumably been marginal in platforms and mobilizations of the postmodern ‘new extreme right’ (Ignazi 2003; for an analysis of extreme right ideology Mudde 2003). This scholarly neglect, based on the common assumption that antisemitism is largely irrelevant for voting behavior and electoral choices, if not detrimental for the electoral prospects of those parties that invoke anti-Jewish prejudice, is all the more puzzling in light of: (i) public survey data (Bergmann 2008; ADL 2009; Niedermayer & Stöss 2005) indicating antisemitic attitudes are widespread and in many cases salient among potential extreme right voters; (ii) emotional cultural issues (rather than economic deprivation) and ideological factors (such as hostility towards Jews and other minorities) particularly matter to anti-system parties and their voters, who tend to be more driven by ideology than centrist voters (Mudde 2007); (iii) new cleavage formations and ‘new issues,’ such as the global financial crisis and the responsibility of Wall Street bankers in it, new global wars and the Middle East conflict, as well as globalization and cosmopolitanization of society represent the type of issues that, in past and present, have often been identified with “the Jews.” However, just as racism motivates various policy preferences that are not immediately recognizable or framed as racist, racial sentiment continues to exist (Kinder & Sanders 1996): and so, it is suggested here, are antisemitism and broader resentful counter-cosmopolitanism relevant sets of attitudes that have ideological meaning and may currently play a particular, resurging role in extreme right political mobilization. Against this background, two key puzzles in relation to extreme right electoral politics and mobilizations will be addressed in this article: First, why do some extreme right parties succeed in mobilizing voters in some countries and fail in others, even if demand side conditions (authoritarian, nationalist, xenophobic and antisemitic attitudes of potential voters) are similar? And second, what role do new issues play, as well as—the presence or absence of—specific transformations of extreme right ideology in response to changing demand and public discourse, considering that conventional fascism and, in particular, racist antisemitism are largely discredited in the European public and its “zone of acquiescence” (Norris 2005)? In particular, what is the role of ‘modernized antisemitism’ and counter-cosmopolitanism

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in reshaping extreme right ideology under changing conditions in the 21st century? II.  The Model In order to explain the success of contemporary European extreme right parties and their cross-national variation in the context of globalization and Europeanization, I claim that it is important to re-focus on the supply side. I argue that the supply side—parties and other intermediary organizations—both responds to changing demand and generates it itself (Enyedi 2005). Our model encompasses three dimensions: First, following Kriesi et al. (2008) I assume that there is significant counter-cosmopolitan discontent among cultural and economic globalization losers, favoring a combination of economic protectionism, cultural protectionism authoritarianism, as well as stereotypical ‘explanations’ of globalization such as coded or modernized antisemitism.4 In contrast to Kriesi et al., the claim is that the latter correlates with and is a relevant part of this counter-cosmopolitan discontent, i.e. generalized opposition to all manifestations of globalization. It is not necessarily alienating but rather carries weight with many voters. However, such generalizable shifts on the demand side (political attitudes in the electorate) in reaction to new issues in the context of globalization create new openings and more favorable conditions for newcomers, marginal and anti-system parties. Second, I argue that these openings are dependent on competitors in existing party systems and their politico-cultural environment, as well as the electoral system (single member district plurality/SMDP electoral systems tend to offer few political opportunities for small and new parties; in the UK, traditionally based on SMDP, the British National Party succeeded gaining parliamentary seats only in the elections for the European Parliament which, according to EU law, need 4   “Modernized antisemitism” is distinguished here from racial and other forms of overt antisemitism. Modernized antisemitism can take different forms and use different codes, such as “the Zionists” or “Zionazis,” “USIsrael world government,” “globalists from New York and Tel Aviv,” to express anti-Jewish resentment. Modernized antisemitism refers to new, more respectable forms of antisemitism based on innuendo and other transformed forms of anti-Jewish discrimination or hostility, including ones that are directed against Israel as a ‘collective Jew,’ or the identification of Jews as the string-pullers of multi-national capital or “globalism.”



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to be conducted under conditions of proportional representation). The political opportunity structures for extreme right competitors depend on the polarization of the party system, on the discursive “zone of acquiescence” (the boundaries of legitimate discourse), and the political behavior of party competitors in reaction to new challenges and challengers (external supply-side). However, by and large, the significant counter-cosmopolitan segment of voters (economic-protectionist, authoritarian-exclusive or nationalist, and frequently anti-Jewish) has often been ‘underrepresented’ in European electoral politics. For various reasons, mainstream democratic and especially centrist catch-all parties only reluctantly reach out to these voters. The costs of doing so tends to outweigh the benefits. The appeal to centrist voters as well as pro-cosmopolitan and pro-European elites and business, and the overall image of the party in matters of political responsibility and governmental pragmatism could be damaged. Thus, there is generally a gap or enhanced disequilibrium between voter demand and political party representation. This gap opens space for new extreme right parties capable of re-branding their image and appeal. And this favorable condition, in terms of party space, is reinforced by other trends affecting long-time party system change in Europe: although major cleavages continue to matter, we also face a rising relevance of new ‘issue politics’ and increasing gross voter volatility that signifies declining party loyalty, identification and milieus, as well as the general loosening of the partyvoter linkage. These post-industrial and postmodern developments put established parties and party systems under pressure, or contribute to a lack of their consolidation in several East European cases (Pennings & Lane 1998). In particular, few mainstream parties in Europe articulate cultural/economic protectionist preferences shared by a significant minority of voters across Europe. Third, it is of crucial importance that these generally favorable new demand side and party space conditions do not automatically translate into successful extreme right mobilizations and electoral success. This is far from being the case. In fact, the key independent variables that may explain extreme right success and its variation are to be found on the internal and ideological supply side of these parties: the organizational capacities (Art 2008) and the ideological supply as well as their issue responsiveness. The shifts on the demand side and the erosion of established party-voter-linkages are insufficient conditions for extreme right success if they are not answered by significant shifts in strategic mobilization and appeal to voters beyond core constituencies of the

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ideological fringe. Under conditions of globalization, the model suggested here hypothesizes that the ‘new extreme right’ breakthrough issue of anti-immigrant resentment no longer suffices. The widespread turn to the ‘social question’ that many extreme right parties have exhibited since the 1990s (Ignazi 2003) already indicated that the radical right’s initial “winning formula” of a combination of authoritarianism with free market neo-liberalism, as proposed by Herbert Kitschelt and Anthony McGann (1995), is no longer valid. As Sarah de Lange (2007) suggests, the “winning formula” has altered. While it is hardly contested that most extreme right parties no longer take a free-market position, de Lange suggests that the “winning formula” entails a centrist economic position but qualifies after testing that many parties do not adopt this winning formula (de Lange 2007). The third level of my model suggests a different “winning formula” on the ideological supply side that deserves testing: the extreme right parties most likely to be successful are those which offer a comprehensive ideological transformation into counter-cosmopolitan parties that seek to occupy the formerly largely unrepresented general discontent with cultural, political and economic globalization in a persuasive and ‘modern’ fashion. Given their nationalist background, extreme right parties are ‘naturally’ in an advantageous position to do so. Unlike extreme right parties, many left-wing populist competitors do not only suffer from organizational problems and divides. Radical left parties are often also still identified with cosmopolitanism, and they are frequently divided about issues such as anti-immigrant opposition and human rights universalism, while they tend to have considerable credibility in the programmatic areas of economic opposition to globalization, multinational corporations, and “American locusts” or “American-Israeli world government.” At any rate, according to our model, extreme right success in postindustrial Europe generally depends on these parties’ capacity to ‘occupy’ previously unrepresented issues and political values by modernizing their ideological appeal, and thus, by transforming their image and ideology. Those extreme right parties that expand the established “zone of acquiescence” by challenging the boundaries of legitimate public discourse without sticking to radical fascist dogmas are more likely to be successful. In particular, I suggest that successful extreme right parties try to market, and respond to, an emerging new socio-cultural cleavage related to popular discontent in the age of globalization, namely between cosmopolitanism and national protectionism (Kaldor



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1997; Kriesi et al. 2006; 2008). The latter, it is argued, correlates with cultural exclusionism, economic protectionism, anti-immigrant resentments but also, quite importantly, traditionally popular antisemitic ‘explanations’ of economic crises, modernization, and globalization. In contrast to Kriesi et al. (2008), our proposed model claims that modernized—not overtly racist—antisemitism, which attributes globalization and cultural change to conspirational machinations and in particular to the “war-mongering” ‘collective Jew’ of Israel, the “USrael world government,” “banking locusts” or the “Israelization of the world,” is a significant yet underestimated and often ignored independent ideological variable that, if used effectively, improves rather than diminishes electoral chances of party challengers even in postindustrial Liberal democracies. Such opposition to all forms of “globalism” and societal cosmopolitanization has become increasingly relevant for significant parts of the electorate and is reflected in a set of interdependent salient issues. It is arguably part of major new cleavages and conflicts and what Manfred Steger (2008) calls the “ideological struggle of the twenty-first century,” which does not only entail different globalisms, from market globalism to global justice and jihadist globalism, but also anti-globalism. This anti-globalism or counter-cosmopolitan discontent—as opposed to mere opposition to economic globalization and neo-liberalism or a specific globalization policy—is shared by a large segment of the electorate. Anti-globalism further reshapes voter demands and cleavages in the context of loosened traditional party-voter linkages. To be sure, any comprehensive ideological transformation is confronted with the challenge to balance appeals to new potential voters—cultural and economic globalization losers—with (hard)core constituencies while avoiding to alienate either group of voters. However, extreme right success requires strategic mobilization shifts on the supply side. As mentioned before, the relevant new “counter-cosmopolitan” side of this cleavage is largely unrepresented by mainstream parties. Hence, it is our hypothesis that—as in the past—the (varying) success of extreme right parties in the European Union strongly depends on the parties’ ability to ‘modernize’ their party ideology and mobilizations in response to changing demands reflecting this disequilibrium. Given the nationalist ideological core of these parties, globalization is quite naturally the extreme right’s “multi-faced enemy” (Mudde 2007: 184ff ). These parties oppose cosmopolitan cultural change and inclusiveness as well as human rights qua definition. This is why we need to

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ask ourselves if any presumed counter-cosmopolitan transformation is just a question of definition: is there a significant transformation and a genuine change in the ideological profile, possibly towards a new party family, or is there only a turn to new issues within the extreme right’s conventional ideological framework? However, according to our argument only those parties that effectively adapt to a whole range of new globalization-related issues, transform their ideological outlook, articulate discontent with globalization and effectively respond to broader counter-cosmopolitan demands with ideological modernization are likely to be more successful electoral competitors. Although anti-immigrant resentment still plays an important role in extreme right mobilizations, it is no longer necessarily the key—let alone the only—issue that may mobilize voters; within a counter-cosmopolitan framework, the ‘social question’ (economic national protectionism), politico-cultural protectionism, and antisemitic resentment are of increasing relevance. In our context it is important to note that once fully discredited yet increasingly widespread antisemitism, if presented in a more ‘legitimate,’ modernized fashion, is likely to play an important function as an ideological factor, just like effective populist opposition against “the above,” namely European and global elites viewed as personally responsible for the globalization process. I therefore argue that electorally successful extreme right parties respond to generally more favorable politico-cultural opportunity structures for their mobilizations by transforming into counter-cosmopolitan parties—and by mobilizing ‘new antisemitism.’ Thus the model assumes that, along with other favorable conditions, there are similar demand side conditions shaped by an emerging new cleavage between cosmopolitanism and counter-cosmopolitanism. It seeks to explain why some extreme right parties exploit these changing conditions, while others fail to do so. With electoral success being the dependent variable, the ideological modernization of extreme right supply according to a new “counter-cosmopolitan” winning formula is isolated as a key independent variable that explains success and its variation; while, of course, multiple other explanatory factors, including the strategic behavior of political competitors, the discursive environment and variation in demand also need to be taken into account. From here I will take two steps: First, I further frame favorable demand side conditions, external supply side factors and, consequently, the presumed new winning formula. I suggest that there is an emerging cosmopolitanism/counter-cosmopolitanism cleavage that



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has largely lacked representation in party politics and increases political pressure on established European party systems. I also suggest that this cleavage formation entails a rising ‘antisemitic demand’ that ‘explains’ cultural and economic globalization by blaming Jews. It entails opposition to ‘foreign capital’ in addition to anti-immigrant reactions to globalization. However, for the most part European centrist parties have been—for various reasons, including the cost of alienating centrist voters—reluctant to offer anything resembling a comprehensive counter-cosmopolitan manifesto or program, though some have occasionally mobilized resentments in the context of ‘new’ (globalization-related) issues. More relevant competitors for extreme right counter-cosmopolitans are, in fact, some new, reformed, radical or populist left-wing populist contenders. Although I suggest that extreme right parties are in a better position to mobilize counter-cosmopolitan discontent, contrary to Kriesi et al. (2006; 2008) I claim that there are various (self-defined leftist) “anti-imperialist” groups and parties, often with a Stalinist and traditional Communist political background, that do not just endorse national economic protectionism but also mobilize cultural protectionism, anti-immigrant resentments, modernized antisemitism, and opposition to human rights as an “imperialist” and “cosmopolitan” ideology. Stalinist left-wing parties and organizations also have a long history of opposing “cosmopolitanization,” going back to the Moscow trails, as well as “Jewish globalism” and Jewish political self-determination in the state of Israel. Ideological transformations of those parties with left-wing background and allegiances, however, are not explored in this article. Second, I examine which role counter-cosmopolitanism, national protectionism, and especially antisemitism actually play in contemporary extreme right mobilizations and party ideologies, and thus, if our special focus on the ideological internal supply side as a significant independent variable explaining success and variation is justified, or if we have to revise and modify our model. We will do so by looking at six case studies from Western and Eastern Europe (taken from a study of altogether twelve EU member states). This unstandardized test is based on content analyses of party literature corpora from extreme right parties as well as their electoral turn-out. But before we look at possible programmatic shifts and their electoral effects and thus test the use of the new “winning formula” according to our model, let me explain each condition and dimension of this model in more detail.

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By addressing the issue of immigration, initially neglected by ­established democratic parties, and by facilitating existing resentments against foreigners in parts of the electorate, successful extreme right parties filled a void and created political space for themselves in the 1980s and 1990s (Kriesi 1999). Effective and modernized anti-immigrant mobilizations by these parties were key ideological factors in their electoral breakthrough. In turn, they undoubtedly helped to increase the salience of the immigration issue in European democracies. In much of Eastern Europe, successful parties were able to facilitate issues of ethnic minority rights. Accordingly, successful extreme right parties played an active role in new, post-industrial cleavage formation (Enyedi 2005). However, the immigration issue alone proved insufficient for continuous mobilizations in light of new conflicts in the global age. In order to be successful extreme right parties, with their particularly fragile position in most European party systems, are pressed continuously to modernize their ideological supply and respond to new issues and changing voter demand. The most pressing set of new concerns and popular demands are related to ‘globalization issues,’ which include rapid cosmopolitan cultural change, the effects of the global financial and banking crisis, new international conflicts and war (especially in the Middle East), Americanization and Europeanization, and job competition between ‘natives’ and the global labor market. Moreover, empirical surveys suggest that significant segments of the European electorates display an increased readiness to interpret several of these globalization-related issues and conflicts—such as the financial crisis—in an antisemitic fashion. The broader counter-cosmopolitan set of attitudes hereby correlates with antisemitic and anti-immigrant attitudes. In particular, crises and conflicts associated with globalization and cosmopolitan change correlate with a rise in anti-Muslim and especially antisemitic resentment, i.e. the readiness to express antisemitism and blame ‘the Jews’ or ‘ “the Zionists”’ for developments associated with globalization and cosmopolitanism (cf. Rensmann & Schoeps in this volume). In addition, according to present demand-side research, uneducated, blue-collar workers are disproportionately represented among extreme right voters. Yet, the perception of economic and cultural status



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or, more specifically, fear of status loss and (anti-market) economic attitudes are more robust independent variables of extreme right voting than actual socioeconomic status. In fact, ‘objective’ demographics, such as economic status, unemployment rate, or the number of ethnic minorities and immigrants have insignificant impact on xenophobia and antisemitism. In contrast to economic attitudes, anti-immigrant and anti-refugee attitudes and cultural protectionism have been the most significant predictors of extreme right party voting even after applying a battery of prior social and attitudinal controls (Norris 2005: 185f ), though existential economic insecurity might be a contributing factor (Inglehart & Welzel 2005). Avoiding wholesale generalizations about economic status as an independent variable, specific economic dimensions can play a role, however, if they are linked to specific cultural perceptions and value-based conflicts. In this context, demand for ethno-cultural mobilizations is currently related to widespread public fears towards the multiple changes linked with globalization (Ishiyama 2004: 20).5 In light of these findings, there are strong indicators that sociocultural, economic and political changes associated with globalization face opposition among significant portions of the European electorate. Value change towards inclusive liberal cosmopolitanism faces ­polarized opposition from a bulk of voters with authoritarian-nationalist, xenophobic and culturally protectionist orientations (Grande 2006). The latter often—but not consistently—correlate on a secondary level with economic protectionism, i.e. reservation towards new global economic competition and neoliberalism (Weiss 2003). However, such competition is today frequently seen as embodied by “foreign workers” and “foreign capital” (or Anglo-American “locusts”), rather than domestic capital. Kriesi et al. (2006) provide indicators of the social basis of this new cleavage that pits new losers of globalization against new winners; unqualified employees, entrepreneurs in traditionally protected sectors and citizens who strongly identify themselves with their national community become opposed to qualified employees, international entrepreneurs and citizens with cosmopolitan orientations. Against this background, successful extreme right parties are likely to transform into counter-cosmopolitan actors and seek to become credible

5  The relevance of those fears and their political resonance, to be sure, also depends on particular politico-cultural legacies that shape political behavior over generations.

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‘counter-cosmopolitan parties’ that reflect the rise of a new structuring cleavage of European politics along a cosmopolitanism/nationalism conflict (Kaldor 1997; Held & McGrew 2002; Norris & Inglehart 2009).6 Following Kriesi et al. (2008), according to our model countercosmopolitan parties, which generally oppose globalization and the “cosmopolitanization of society” (Beck & Grande 2007), seek to strategically mobilize those citizens who identify with the national community, citizens from economic strata which have traditionally been protected by the nation-state and now find themselves increasingly exposed to foreign competition, and those who lack the cultural competence to meet the economic and cultural challenge of a globalizing world (Kriesi et al. 2008). Traditionally, Jews are identified with these cultural and economic modernizations processes; and Jews are stereotypically portrayed as embodiments of (global) media, finance capital, multi-national corporations, as well as cultural change and diffusion of national identities. In an increasingly complex globalized world, such reified and populist personifications of responsibility for societal malaises have resurfaced along with conspiracy theories over the last decade. Especially with the help of the Internet and other media, counter-cosmopolitan populism and coded antisemitism have regained legitimacy, though they have few organized political outlets. In our conception, counter-cosmopolitanism refers to the mobilization of ethnic-nationalist resentment and defensive nationalism in the form of “identity populism” (Betz 2002). It finds expression in claims to protect cultural, national or regional identity against the threat of cultural, political and economic globalization (Swank & Betz 2003). In contrast to criticism of or opposition to specific aspects of globalization and cosmopolitanization (e.g. neoliberal economics), i.e. political opposition that may be motivated by critical, liberal or radical cosmopolitan and inclusive norms, counter-cosmopolitanism as conceived here combines cultural, economic and political discontent with globalization (anti-immigrant

6   We prefer the term ‘counter-cosmopolitan party’ over ‘anti-globalization party’ to avoid conceptual confusion. While some left-wing parties are indeed ‘countercosmopolitan’, i.e. they reject economic, cultural and political globalization and inclusive cosmopolitan norms, there is a greater ideological variance in ‘anti-globalization parties’ because many left-wing competitors identified with opposition to economic globalization—and thus labeled ‘anti-globalization’—endorse human rights norms, cosmopolitan solidarity, and elements of global public law.



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exclusion, neoliberal economics, nationalism). ­Counter-cosmopolitanism refers to wholesale rejections of globalizations based on the generalized opposition to cosmopolitan norms of tolerance, inclusiveness, racial diversity, obligations to strangers, or loyalties to all humankind (Appiah 2007). Such cosmopolitan norms and ‘disloyal’ cosmopolitan citizens have traditionally been identified with ‘the Jews.’ Countercosmopolitans create a rigid dichotomy between globalization or ‘globalism,’ on the one hand, and national and/or social identity. Against this background, it can be argued that discontent with globalization in its cultural dimensions (rapid socio-cultural change and multi-cultural ‘cosmopolitanization’ of European societies’ demographic compositions, self-understandings and hegemonic values), its socio-economic dimensions (unemployment, restructuring of the labor force, global financial crisis and neo-liberal economic policies that erode the national welfare state) and its political dimensions (transfer of political authority to international institutions and, first and foremost, to the post-national EU polity) count among the set of increasingly relevant attitudes. Discontent with globalization—and for that matter Europeanization and other forms of cultural, economic and political post-nationalism—is of increasingly high salience. For present-day counter-cosmopolitans, this ‘cosmopolitanization’ of European societies tends to be particularly personified by immigrants, foreigners, the cosmopolitan elite, and first and foremost by ‘the globalist Jews’—the traditional target of counter-cosmopolitan affects in 20th century history (Benhabib & Eddon 2007). Modernized counter-cosmopolitanism, then, expresses an ensemble of generalized and ‘ethnicized’ social discontent with, and anti-modern reactions towards, globalization. Placing an exclusive community generally over the rights of others in all political, economic, cultural and social questions, it implies a set of wide-spread ethnically exclusionist resentments, socio-economic protectionism, and claims of national, religious or cultural superiority. In addition, modern counter-cosmopolitanism also entails populist opposition against ‘the elite’—and especially ‘cosmopolitan’ elites operating in contemporary financial and political institutions such as the United Nations and the European Union (Blokker 2005). It often goes hand in hand with conspirational claims. In the context of counter-cosmopolitan political attitudes and manifestations, globalization is thereby often personified by a whole range of enemies: the European elites, multi-national capital, failing banks and

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corporate “locusts,” immigrants and ethnic minorities, global diseases, American “imperialists,” “Wall Street,” and “the Zionists.” Hereby, antisemitic causal explanations have begun to play a more prominent and salient role than in the recent past. Against the backdrop that overt antisemitism is largely discredited in European publics modernized political antisemitism is likely to be mostly coded. Yet, there is a significant demand and antisemitism is likely to be increasingly salient and potentially relevant for broader political outreach. In political terms, common issues which reflect convergences with some new counter-cosmopolitan parties on the left include countercosmopolitan opposition to “EU dictatorship” and the Lisbon Treaty, rejection of globalized “Western capitalism,” neo-liberalism and “Wall Street,” and cultural globalization as identified as “Americanization,” individualism, and “Western imperialism” or the “New World Order.” Simple populist explanations and blame-games tend to gain support in the horizon of increased counter-cosmopolitan discontent and eroding zones of acquiescence, as long as they are framed in modernized, coded ways that generate an aura of ‘legitimacy’ distant from the old fascist or Nazi right. Effective mobilization of ideological opposition to cultural, economic and political globalization, which reflects widespread discontent in European societies, and the construction of ‘credible enemies’ while ‘modernizing’ racism and antisemitism, is likely to increase electoral turn-out. Contrary to common wisdom in party system research, electorally successful ‘modernization’ does not necessarily imply ‘moderation’ or de-radicalization of political ideology. Rather, it implies new ways to sell and adapt a message and party ideology in relation to changing demands and public discourse. This can lead to a return not just of nationalist resentments (against “the others”) and populist resentments (against “the above”) but also to a political resurgence of antisemitic resentment (against “the Jews” or “the Zionists”), which offers personified ideological explanations of the complexities of globalization. To be sure, cosmopolitan norms and self-expression values have been on the rise in post-industrial democracies for decades (Inglehart/Welzel 2005). That does not mean they do not face opposition that may increase with this very rise of changing values and norms. Counter-cosmopolitanism, and the multiple ideological facets thereof, can therefore be conceptualized as a new “silent counter-revolution” (Ignazi 1992), i.e. an anti-modern reaction-formation towards the



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actual or perceived hegemony of cosmopolitan inclusion and the impact of post-industrial globalization, including its socioeconomic effect on the national welfare state. The relevance of these reactions is likely to increase in times of rapid socio-cultural and economic change, ongoing cosmopolitan modernizations of society (including Europeanization), and perceived or actual crises associated with these transformation processes. However, such reactions and resentments usually fall out of the democratic “zone of acquiescence.” Even support for state-interventionist, national redistributive welfare policies had been on the decline among mainstream party competitors, leaving cultural and economic ‘globalization losers’ without political representation. According to our theoretical model, this gap creates a new opening for issue-related ideological mobilization and subsequent success for extreme right parties. Extreme right parties seeking electoral success are likely to turn increasingly into ‘counter-cosmopolitan parties’ that oppose socio-cultural, economic and political globalization. In doing so, they may be able to occupy a largely unoccupied ideological space in the context of an emerging new cleavage related to cosmopolitanism. Apart from some left-wing populist competitors in some national party spaces, the cultural economic and national protectionist side in relation to globalization has not been represented, leaving more space for new parties (and especially extreme right exclusionist parties) to tap into this disequilibrium—provided they offer modernized and ‘coherent’ ideological responses to new issues linked to this emerging cleavage along the ‘winning formula’ of opposition to cultural, political and economic cosmopolitanization and its actual or imagined agents. IV.  A ‘Counter-Cosmopolitan’ Turn? Six Case Studies of New Extreme Right Platforms and Mobilizations Looking at six country case studies as part of a study of twelve EU member states, we briefly examine how the presumed turn to globalization issues and a counter-cosmopolitan framework that represents the emerging new cleavage plays out in extreme right ideology formation. Hereby, our hypothesis is tested that the relevant and electorally successful extreme right has begun to evolve into identity-populist counter-cosmopolitan parties, i.e. the extreme right tries to mobilize widespread discontent with cosmopolitan cultural and economic change

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that is associated with globalization or ‘globalism’ (and with the EU, Jews, and immigrants). Our test looks at the salience (or lack thereof ) of two ideological components of counter-cosmopolitanism: First, we examine the salience of explicit identity-populist opposition to cultural, economic and political globalization (including support for socioeconomic protectionism) and the prominence of its role in extreme right party ideology. Second, we test if these parties hereby revive modernized, coded and populist forms of antisemitic resentment that point to personified explanations of globalization issues, such as new global conflicts, the Middle East conflict and Israel, the global banking crisis and multi-national/finance capital. In the course of European history and in national-populist perceptions, Jews have been traditionally identified with cosmopolitanism and anti-nationalism, and are currently often identified with ‘globalism.’ Antisemitic resentments, while publicly discredited and less relevant in most European democracies, might now—in response to post-industrial globalization and modernization—attract a new set of disenfranchised voters no longer represented by mainstream parties. Altogether, we have analyzed the content of extreme right parties in twelve European member states in an unstandardized qualitative content analysis. Our measure is the frequency of the two sets of issues under consideration and their prominence in platforms, campaigns and electoral mobilizations, while party websites are the primary source for estimating ‘party ideology.’ Only one extreme right party is currently relevant in the fluid, unconsolidated multi-party system in Bulgaria. The ethnic-nationalist party Ataka (National Union Ataka) was founded in 2005 by the populist talk show host Volen Siderov. The party name refers to his popular talk show. The party immediately gained 8.9% of the vote in the national parliamentary elections in 2005, making it the fourthstrongest party in the country (Savkova 2005; Spirova 2006). In the July 2009 elections, it was even able to improve on the 2005 results, winning 9.36% of voters, and in the 2009 European election the party made it into the double-digits (12%). According to the party’s two programmatic manifestos, the ‘20 Principles’ and ‘Program Scheme,’ the party’s ethnic nationalism clearly favors Bulgarian ethnic supremacy over cultural and religious diversity. It calls for the criminal prosecution of what the party defines as “national traitors” and defamation of Bulgaria. Moreover, the party mobilizes strong opposition against “Western” cultural and economic globalization and international institutions, thereby adjusting



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its ideological profile in response to contemporary issues reflecting the cosmopolitanism/nationalism cleavage. Responding to new international conflicts and popular concerns, the party campaigned against globalization, “Americanization,” American hegemony and the war in Iraq—issues which are also identified with the left. Although the party does not oppose EU membership in principle (while it does oppose NATO), criticism of EU policies is fierce; the party demands more national protectionism and sovereignty and rejects the Lisbon Treaty. Opposing neo-liberal economic policies, Siderov’s party also pushes for national economic protectionism and wants to de-privatize key industrial sectors. It therefore successfully appeals to working class voters (turning away from the weakened Bulgarian Socialist Party) and considerable segments of Bulgarian ‘globalization losers.’ The party links its counter-cosmopolitan mobilizations against globalization, ethnic minorities and immigrants—and alleged “Turkish rule” over Bulgaria—with antisemitic innuendo (Ivanov & Ilieva 2005).7 Jews are at times seen as “string-pullers” behind globalization, immigrants and Turkish influence. Another major programmatic issue is the attack on the elite and corruption, which is significant in Bulgarian politics. In sum, all indicators show high salience. With its anti-elite populist and decidedly anti-American, anti-globalization and anti-European political orientation, its modernized antisemitism as well as its claim that the party is “neither left nor right, but Bulgarian” (www.ataka. bg/en), Ataka can be classified as a prototype or even ideal-type of the electorally successful new counter-cosmopolitan extreme right party that we expect to flourish in European party politics. Its modernized counter-cosmopolitan populism also bridges the gap between new issues and traditional extreme right politics of resentment. In Ataka’s shadow, other extreme right parties are no longer electorally relevant (Norris 2005). All major parties—none of them offer nationalprotectionist, anti-Western and anti-globalization platforms—have lost voters to Ataka. For most of the post-Communist era, MIÉP (Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja-“Hungarian Party for Justice and Life”) has been the ­electorally

7  In 2002, Siderov had participated in an anti-globalization conference of the extreme right that took place in Moscow. The American racist and antisemite David Duke also participated. Siderov himself is the author of the antisemitic book “The Boomerang of Evil” (Ivanov & Ilieva 2005: 10f ). According to Siderov, “the West” and its “globalism” are colonizing the orthodox East (Siderov 2002).

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most successful extreme right party in post-Communist Hungary. By now, it also dedicates much of its propaganda and campaigning on globalization issues, though it hardly modernized its extreme right ideology and rhetoric. Under the authoritarian leadership of István Csurka, the party has continuously promoted aggressive exclusive nationalism and expansionist ambitions, especially with regard to the Hungarian ethnic minority under “foreign rule” (www.miep.hu). The 2002 national electoral campaign focused especially on an interrelated set of anti-globalization, antisemitism, anti-Communism, and anti-Israel issues. While MIÉP no longer sees Western cooperation as a “US-Zionist plan” but views Hungary’s NATO membership as a fait accompli, it continues to oppose EU membership and especially promotes a distinctly anti-Jewish anti-globalization ideology, thereby breeding and reinforcing popular antisemitic and anti-globalization resentments. For instance, bankers are portrayed as “a bunch of Jews sucking the money of average people.” Viewing “cosmopolitan JudeoBolshevik plutocrats” and “cosmopolitanism and globalization” as the main enemy, the party has explained electoral success of the left and allegedly ongoing “Communist rule” by “Jewish-Zionist activity” (Stephen Roth Institute 2002). The liberal Jewish-Hungarian billionaire George Soros is a special target of such attacks. The party leadership also mobilizes against “Israel’s war crimes” and views 9/11 as a “just punishment.” Be that as it may, the party has continuously lost votes since its 1998 success (5.5%) (2002: 4.4%). By 2006, electoral support for MIÉP was down to 2.2%, in spite of the fact that it formed an electoral alliance with the initially even more radical Jobbik (“Movement for a Better Hungary”). Although the MIÉP has for some time remained a powerful political player able to mobilize mass demonstrations (Bernáth, Miklósi & Mudde 2005: 82), Jobbik has taken its place as the most significant political and electoral extreme right force in Hungary. By 2008, the now independent Jobbik was already at 7% in national polls, and the party received stunning 14.77% in the 2009 European elections. This turned Jobbik into the third strongest party, gaining three seats in the European Parliament. Without being necessarily less radical than MIÉP, Jobbik has sought wider electoral appeal after its separation from the former. Its strategic mobilization focus is opposition to “globalism” in its economic, political and cultural dimensions, turning Jobbik into the proto-type of an extreme right counter-cosmopolitan, modernized antisemitic party that seeks to mobilize both nationalist



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core constituencies of extreme right voters and a broader spectrum of ‘globalization losers.’ While all the indicators of counter-cosmopolitan ideological transformation are prevalent and highly salient, however, the party does neither sacrifice its traditional extreme right ideology and self-declared radicalism (www.jobbik.com), nor its displayed militancy—both of which do not seem to alienate voters. Since 2007, Jobbik, which is led by Gábor Vona, operates the Magyar Gárda Kulturális Egyesület (“Cultural Association of the Hungarian Guard”). The Hungarian Guard is, along with the movement by the same name, a uniformed street militia. It is a paramilitary organization with sworn-in members designed “to awaken the active self consciousness of the nation.” Jobbik has not renounced on radical nationalist rhetoric, either. We find partyaffiliated publications that employ inflammatory rhetoric against Jews, Roma, and gays. Party members are also linked to anti-Roma and antisemitic violence (Freeman 2009). The party suggests the creation of a national special police unit to deal with “gypsy delinquency.” While the militant “Christian” Hungarian nationalism and radicalism displayed by subgroups of the party, including the party elite level, indicates that there is considerable “legitimate” political space for such views in Hungarian politics (the center-right FIDESZ also campaigns against “anti-national elements”), Jobbik broadened its appeal and transformed its party ideology and identity. First and foremost, this entails a programmatic focus on opposition to globalization and Europeanization. Reaching out to various alienated segments of the Hungarian electorate, the modernized party platform is still dedicated to a combination of anti-globalization views and coded popular antisemitism, alongside its previous support of “Christian values,” Hungarian nationalism, and attacks on Roma and other ethnic minorities. Serving both radical nationalists and disillusioned voters, its economic policies are primarily directed against “the neoliberal ideology dominated policies during these years under the name of privatization, liberalization and deregulation” (  Jobbik 2009), while it also rejects the Lisbon treaty and European integration. Hereby Jobbik is capitalizing on increasing joblessness, corruption crises, and social unrest caused by the global economic crisis. In light of wide-spread economic and cultural fears, the party mobilizes political and cultural resentments against pro-European and “pro-cosmopolitan” elites and minorities but also against multi-national corporations, America and Israel, i.e. “globalism,” “imperialism,” and international

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institutions. The modern face of the party is the popular human rights lawyer and law professor Krisztina Morvai, head of Jobbik’s EP delegation, who has a strong record in anti-Israel advocacy. Most recently, massive transformations of the party system have largely isolated the extreme right in post-Communist Romania. The “Party of Romanian National Unity” (PUNR), an extreme right single-issue movement against the Hungarian minority in Romania with programmatic attachments to the old ideology of the fascist legions, was initially the most relevant party of this spectrum. However, it collapsed due to endogenous conflicts and—under the leadership of Mircea Chelaru—dissolved into the moderate Conservative Party, which formed an alliance with the Social Democrats. The remaining relevant extreme right party, Partidul România Mare (“Greater Romania Party”/PRM), which—like PUNR—was temporarily a junior partner in national government between 1994 and 1996, had massive electoral success in the early 2000s. It came in second in the 2000 parliamentary elections (19.5%), and its widely popular, authoritarian leader Corneliu Vadim Tudor gained 28.3% in the first and 33.2% in the second round of the 2000 presidential elections (Andreescu 2005: 188f ). While the electoral turn-out rapidly declined in the following years (13.0% in 2004 followed by 3.15% in 2008), Tudor’s extreme nationalist party regained strength by receiving 8.65% at the ballot-box in the 2009 European elections, placing three successful candidates, including Tudor himself, in the European Parliament. Apparently, voters did not honor Tudor’s temporary moderation in 2005, when he endorsed a change in leadership and a name change in order to seek membership in the mainstream conservative European People’s Party (EEP) faction of the EU Parliament—an endeavor that utterly failed and led to a reversal of this strategy. The party elite is still said to consist of many members of the former Securitate secret service and be guided by a leadership cult. The party has continuously agitated against Roma (and demanded their wholesale imprisonment). The nationalistprotectionist party platform of the PRM calls for a “war against the traitors of the Romanian people” and is explicitly directed against the Hungarian minority, “gypsies,” and Jews (Grün 2002). The party also cooperates with extremist anti-Israel Palestinian groups (Andreescu 2005: 189), the antisemitic Russian LDPR, and the French new extreme right party Front National, while supporting the “Vienna Declaration,” which calls for organizational and ideological cooperation of six rel-



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evant European extreme right parties. However, the mobilization focus has shifted somewhat over the last decade. While the Roma people remain a particular target, reflecting widespread resentments in the electorate, the party ideology and campaigns were cautiously—or half-heartedly—adjusted and modernized. Distancing itself not only from Romanian historical fascism but also from its own propaganda against Israel and Jews, it today increasingly mobilizes opposition against economic and political globalization and the European Union while promising a “tough hand” against immigrants (“others”) and corruption (the elite) as well as Hungarians (www.prm.org.ro). In this, the party is quite similar to the new extreme right in Western Europe. Still, the long-term ideological impact of this specific modernization remains as unclear as the future of the PRM’s partially contradictory party ideology and message. Extreme right alternatives to PRM, such as the New Generation Party/Christian Democratic Party, remain politically marginalized and irrelevant. While the Alleanza Nazionale, the successor of the fascist Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI), can no longer be classified as right-wing extremist (Ignazi 2003), the only relevant extreme right party in Italy is the separatist Lega Nord under the leadership by Umberto Bossi. The party is currently a junior partner in the Berlusconi government and the only Western European extreme right party in government. After some internal crises and programmatic shifts, the party has turned to counter-cosmopolitan “identity populism” (Betz 2002). Opposition to economic, cultural, and political globalization has become a major campaign focus.8 While for the LN regionalist separatism and the fight “for the people of the North” remains the major objective—the “Lega Nord per l’indipendenza della Padania” continues to support the creation of the fictional state of “Padania” and separation from Southern Italy—it has adjusted its program accordingly. It now combines ‘antiglobalization’ with its anti-Southern racism, which is also still characteristic for the party (Gómez-Reino Cachafeiro 2001). The Lega Nord recently began to specifically target Muslim immigrants and “illegals,” responding and reinforcing current public discourses. It claims that Italians live on a reservation like Native Americans, and calls for a

8  In the 1990s, Bossi began focusing on globalization, attacking “materialism” and the “evil high finance controlling all economic power by means of globalization” as main enemies (Die Presse, October 20, 1999).

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stop of the ­“invasion” by immigrants (www.leganord.org). The party’s participation in government, its focus on “identity politics” and the mobilization of new popular resentments against globalization helped to regain electoral successes. After its modest ‘reform’ and as a junior partner in government, the Lega Nord recovered from its poor electoral results of the early 2000s, receiving 4.6% in the 2006 national parliamentary elections and 8.3% in 2008. The party’s radical opposition to cultural globalization is more modest in economic terms, but it is supplemented by strong anti-EU statements, anti-immigrant rhetoric and modernized antisemitism. The latter, however, is primarily limited to statements by politicians rather than evident in party platforms and programs. On a local level, the party collaborates with the openly antisemitic, neo-Nazi Forza Nuova (www.eumc.eu.int 2004; Caiani & Parenti 2009). Counter-cosmopolitan modernization and increased issue-responsiveness are even visible among the most radical relevant extreme right parties in Europe. In Germany, the ultra-nationalist Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD) has increasingly focused on economic and national protectionism against globalization and immigration, calling for a comprehensive “revival of the nation-state” (www.npd.de). As previous studies indicate, new and revamped antisemitism is an integral element of the (re-)emergence of “anti-capitalist and anti-globalization themes within the ideology and discourses of the German extreme right” (Sommer 2008; see also Rensmann 2006). The NPD has started to focus on global issues and made the international fight against “globalism,” “multi-national corporations,” “Jewish banks,” and “Americanization” as well as “imperialism” and “Zionism” a top campaigning priority, while it claims that in the 2009 election year, “the social question is the key question.” For instance, behind the “aggression of Israel” the NPD suspects a “strong Israeli lobby on the US East Coast” (Wernigerode Nationaler Beobachter 2006). While this anti-American, anti-Zionist and anti-globalization focus has appealed to more voters in Eastern regional elections, the core elements of party ideology remain open racism, ethnic nationalism and overt antisemitism. In fact, the party has rather reinforced its old fascist and neo-Nazi ties, which will make it unlikely to become a serious contender in national elections. The same lack of distance from the old extreme right applies to the Deutsche Volks-Union (Art 2005; Rensmann 2006). Lacking comprehensive modernization and credibility, both parties remain relevant only at a regional level—they are



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represented in three Eastern state parliaments—but are a far cry from entering national parliament. The Austrian extreme right Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), by the late 1990s clearly the most successful extreme right party in Western Europe and the second strongest party in the Austrian parliament, has experienced electoral seesaws over the past ten years since it joined the government as a junior partner in 2000. After its split into FPÖ and BZÖ (Bündnis Zukunft Österreichs—“Alliance for the Future of Austria”) and the departure of its charismatic populist leader Jörg Haider, the party kept an ethnic-nationalist and antisemitic ideological profile. However, popular opposition to the EU in favor of “Austrian patriotism” and “independence” (www.fpoe.at), populist calls for referenda and anti-establishment rhetoric and economic national protectionism against globalization have also been modernized ideological focal points for more than a decade. In recent years, the FPÖ further ‘refined’ its ideological message and effectively responded to new issues while retaining some of its hard-line ideology. In the 2008 electoral campaign it demanded a halt to immigration, the establishment of a ministry for repatriating foreigners, and the return of powers conceded to the EU (www.fpoe.at). The party now mobilizes popular resentments especially against Muslims (for instance, party leader HeinzChristian Strache campaigned for a ban on Islamic dress which, he said, made women look like “female ninjas”) but also against Jews and Israel while appealing to a militant core electorate; the party seeks to overturn strict Austrian laws banning the display of Nazi symbols, such as the swastika (cf. Sarn and Waterfield 2008). The FPÖ also articulates “anti-imperialist” anti-Americanism and antisemitism in global and foreign policy. Addressing both modernized anti-Muslim xenophobia and antisemitism, the party almost doubled its vote in the European elections after a campaign “against EU accession of Turkey and Israel” (Der Standard 2009; EU Elections 2009). In reality, Israel has never even been under consideration for candidacy but the party, recognizing the electoral potential of anti-Israel populism, continued to mobilize voters on this self-generated issue— under protest by the center-left Social Democratic Party of Austria (Der Standard 2009). The combination of ethnic-nationalist populism and effective counter-cosmopolitan mobilizations consolidated the party’s electoral success on the national (17.5% in the 2008 parliamentary elections, in addition to 10.7% for the alternative extreme right BZÖ) and the European level.

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lars rensmann V.  Findings and Outlook

On theoretical and empirical grounds, it was argued that extreme right parties—in an ideal position to become or be seen as ‘credible’ opponents of cosmopolitan change—are more likely to be successful in cases where parties modernize their ideological profile and display issue-responsiveness in relation to rising anti-globalization, ‘countercosmopolitan’ and antisemitic demand that has been largely unsatisfied by mainstream parties. Demand-side and spatial explanations alone are insufficient in explaining cross-national success and variation of extreme right parties in Europe (Norris 2005). It has been suggested that supply side ideology matters as a key independent variable explaining extreme right success in a changing, generally more favorable political environment in Europe. More favorable conditions include widespread counter-cosmopolitan demand and voter segments that are largely unrepresented in European party systems. But success is likely to depend on shifts of the extreme right’s organizational and ideological supply. According to our model, the “new winning formula” entails a departure from fascist dogma and a ‘counter-cosmopolitan’ ideological transformation of extreme right parties (towards economic, cultural and political protectionism) going along with strategic mobilizations of “new issues” related to globalization. Modernized versions of formerly discredited—and self-marginalizing—antisemitism can be an important mobilizing factor in this context. Key issues linked to the globalization theme are new cultural, military and economic conflicts (especially with regard to “imperialism,” terrorism, Israel and the Middle East), new immigration and Muslim minorities, the rise of cosmopolitan norms and institutions (like the EU and UN), and discontent with ‘the cosmopolitan’ elite. In particular, counter-cosmopolitan discontent in relation to these actual or perceived issues is reflected in rising opposition to cultural diversity and increasingly popular, yet often subtle antisemitism. A relevant segment of European voters attributes to “the Jews” the power of “globalist” international institutions, multi-national banks, and cultural change. Our hypothesis that many extreme right parties have evolved into modernized ‘counter-cosmopolitan parties’—and in so doing increased their electoral chances—was preliminarily examined by unstandardized content analyses of extreme right party ideologies and mobilizations in twelve EU member states.



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Our model finds only partial support in our preliminary test: Several new extreme right parties follow the ‘new’ counter-cosmopolitan winning formula, i.e. they are in the process of transforming their ideological profile and subsequently have increased their electoral turn-out. Yet, others have only addressed globalization-related issues without significant ideological shifts. For some globalization is only a marginal issue. In a few cases, quite traditional fascist mobilizations have let to electoral success. Overall, globalization and globalization-related issues are salient (Tab. 1). However, we have mixed findings in (Central) Eastern Europe. Parties like Ataka and recently PRM seem to confirm our hypothesis. There is also evidence of mixed correlating electoral success. The new contender, Jobbik in Hungary, for instance, has hardly modified its message and party ideology, or turned into a modernized, “counter-cosmopolitan party.” It is a nationalist-fascist party that does not turn globalization into a central issue or specifically reaches out to traditionally “left-wing” protectionist voters. Yet, it is successful in electoral contests (with the support of new faces such as prominent celebrity lawyers) by mobilizing a nationalist core and constituencies of the major party player FIDESZ. SNS in Slovakia also succeeds in elections without distancing itself from overtly fascist and conventional antisemitic roots. In Western Europe, the findings are more supportive of our model. Indicators of ideological modernization (such as the salience of globalization issues including economic national protectionism, opposition to multi-national corporations, anti-EU views, antiIsrael, “anti-imperialist” and anti-immigrant resentments) and image ‘renovation’ point to significant recent transformations of extreme right parties into counter-cosmopolitan and modernized antisemitic parties. We observe such change especially in our case studies of the Lega Nord and the FPÖ. The French Front National’s turn away from its earlier focus on anti-globalization and national/economic protectionism in the 1990s marched in step with its relative electoral decline. While German extreme right parties have turned to new issues over the past decade and had considerable regional electoral gains in return, these parties also remain very strongly tied to old Nazism and militant radicalism, and thus severely limit their potential outreach in national elections. While anti-Muslim and, more generally, anti-immigrant resentments play a great role in West European political mobilizations (whereas

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Table 1.  ‘Globalization’ and Its Counter-Cosmopolitan Rejection in Extreme Right Party Platforms and Mobilizations (12 European countries) High Salience FP (Austria) LN (Italy) NPD (Germany) DVU (Germany) SNS (Slovakia) VB (Belgium) Ataka (Bulgaria) FN (France) BNP (UK) Jobbik (Hungary) LPF (Poland) Samoobrona (Poland) PRM (Romania)

Medium Salience

No Salience

            

traditional ethnic minorities are more often targeted by extreme right parties in Eastern Europe), this trend is not replacing modernized forms of antisemitism, as Bunzl (2007) has suggested. His claim that the European extreme right has become pro-Jewish and pro-Israel, and thus being pro-Jewish has turned into an ideological feature of ‘the right,’ could be falsified. To the contrary: antisemitism remains not only a “permanent element of global right-wing extremism” (Weitzman 2006) but has gained salience in the context of counter-cosmopolitanism and the new extreme right’s focus on opposition to globalization (Tab. 2). Apparently modernized antisemitism increasingly serves as an interpretative matrix to personify globalization, and is more often mobilized as such in response to the global financial crisis, the increasing role of global institutions, and new international conflicts. In fact, parties that have invoked modernized or subtle antisemitism as part of a countercosmopolitan agenda have generally gained votes, confirming that antisemitism may be part of a new counter-cosmopolitan winning formula. The global financial crisis is only one indicator that the emerging formation of a cosmopolitanism/nationalism cleavage—and, along with it, antisemitism—may become even more relevant in the future. Extreme right parties may further adjust their party ideology, platforms and campaigns accordingly, as part of more general realignments in European political spaces. Consequently, contrary to hegemonic perceptions in current European popular discourse, resentments against



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Table 2.  Antisemitism in Extreme Right Party Platforms and Mobilizations (12 European countries) High Salience FP (Austria) LN (Italy) NPD (Germany) DVU (Germany) SNS (Slovakia) VB (Belgium) Ataka (Bulgaria) FN (France) BNP (UK) Jobbik (Hungary) LPF (Poland) Samoobrona (Poland) PRM (Romania)

Medium Salience

No Salience

            

Jews are likely to play a bigger role in extreme right mobilizations in the future and do not decline in political relevance. Although there is no powerful new European “antisemitic international” (Arendt 1945) on the horizon and it remains contested which aggregated preferences are decisive in influencing individual voting behavior, there is evidence that modernized counter-cosmopolitanism and coded, seemingly more ‘legitimate’ forms of antisemitism are increasingly employed by extreme right parties across Europe and have become part of a new winning formula of the extreme right. Furthermore, it can be argued that increasingly shared counter-cosmopolitan and antisemitic platforms have already facilitated more international cooperation between extreme right parties, and between these parties and other—even “leftwing”—populist actors. Viewed in this context, a further modernized “counter-cosmopolitan” and antisemitic extreme right is likely to play an even bigger role in European party politics than in the recent past. References Andreescu, Gabriel (2005) Romania. In Cas Mudde (ed) Racist Extremism in Central and Eastern Europe (London: Routledge): 184–209. Appiah, Kwame Anthony (2007) Cosmopolitanism (New York: W.W. Norton). Arendt, Hannah (1945) The Seeds of a Fascist International. In Arendt, Essays in Understanding, 1930–1954: Formation, Exile, and Totalitarianism (New York: Schocken Books, 1994): 140–150.

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Art, David (2005) The Politics of the Nazi Past in Germany and Austria (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Arzheimer, Kai (2008) The Organizational Origins of the Contemporary Radical Right: The Case of Belgium, Comparative Politics 40 (4): 421–440. —— (2009) Contextual Factors and the Extreme Right Vote in Western Europe, 1980–2002. American Journal of Political Science 53 (2): 259–275. Arzheimer, Kai and Elisabeth Carter (2006) Political Opportunity Structures and Right-Wing Extremist Party Success. European Journal of Political Research 45 (3): 419–444. Benhabib, Seyla & Raluca Eddon (2007) From Antisemitism to the “Right to Have Rights. The Jewish Roots of Hannah Arendt’s Cosmopolitanism. Babylon: Beiträge zur jüdischen Gegenwart 22: 44–62. Bernáth, Gábor, Gábor Miklósi & Cas Mudde (2005) Hungary. In Cas Mudde (ed) Racist Extremism in Central and Eastern Europe (London: Routledge): 80–100. Betz, Hans-Georg (2002) Conditions Favoring the Success and Failure of Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties in Contemporary Democracies. In Yves Mény and Yves Surel (eds) Democracies and the Populist Challenge (New York: Palgrave Macmillan): 197–213. Blokker, Paul (2005) Populist Nationalism, Anti-Europeanism, Post-Nationalism, and the East-West Distinction. German Law Journal 6 (2): 371–389. Braunthal, Gerard (2009) Right-Wing Extremism in Contemporary Germany (New York: Palgrave Macmillan). Bunzl, Matti (2007) Antisemitism and Islamophobia: Hatreds Old and New in Europe (Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press). Caiani, Manuela & Linda Parenti (2009) The Dark Side of the Web: Italian RightWing Extremist Groups and the Internet. South European Society and Politics 14, 3: 273–294. Carter, Elisabeth (2005) The Extreme Right in Western Europe: Success or Failure? (Manchester: Manchester University Press). Day, Alan (2000), Directory of European Union Political Parties (London: Harper). De Lange, Sarah L. (2007) A New Winning Formula? The Programmatic Appeal of the Radical Right, Party Politics 13 (4); 411–435. Der Standard (2009) FPÖ wirbt weiter mit Nein zu Israels EU-Beitritt. Der Standard, May 21, 2009. http://derstandard.at/1242316372122/Trotz-SPOeProtest-FPOewirbt-weiter-mit-Nein-zu-Israels-EUBeitritt. Retrieved May 22, 2009. Enyedi, Zsolt (2005) The Role of Agency in Cleavage Formation. European Journal of Political Research 44 (5): 697–720. EU Elections (2009) Austria. www.elections2009-results.eu/en/austria_en.html. Retrieved December 12, 2009. Freeman, Colin (2009) Feminine face of Hungary’s far-Right Jobbik movement seeks MEP’s seat. Telegraph. May 24. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/eu/5372983/Feminine-face-of-Hungarys-far-Right-Jobbik-movement-seeks-MEPs-seat.html Frölich-Steffen, Susanne & Lars Rensmann (2007) Conditions for Failure and Success of Right-Wing Populist Parties in Public Office in the New European Union. In Philippe Poirier and Pascal Delwit (eds) The New Right in Power (Brussels: Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles): 117–140. Givens, Terry E. (2005) Voting Radical Right in Western Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Golder, Matt (2003) Explaining Variation in The Success of Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe. Comparative Political Studies 36 (4): 432–466. Gómez-Reino Cachafeiro, Margarita (2001) Ethnicity and Nationalism in Italian Politics: Inventing the Padania—Lega Nord and the Northern Question (London: Ashgate).



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Grande, Edgar (2006) Cosmopolitan Political Science. British Journal of Sociology 57 (1): 87–111. Grün, Michaela (2002) Rechtsradikale Massenmobilisierung und ‚radikale Kontinuität’ in Rumänien. Osteuropa 52 (3): 293–304. Hainsworth, Paul (2008) The Extreme Right in Western Europe (New York: Routledge). Held, David & Anthony McGrew (2002) Globalization/Antiglobalization (Cambridge: Polity Press). Hix, Simon & Christopher Lord (1997) Political Parties in the European Union (New York: St. Martin’s Press). Ignazi, Piero (2003) Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Welzel. (2005) Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Ishiyama, John T. (2004) Does Globalization Breed Ethnic Conflict? Nationalism and Ethnic Conflicts 9: 1–23. Ivanov, Christo & Margarita Ilieva (2005) Bulgaria. In Cas Mudde (ed) Racist Extremism in Central and Eastern Europe (London: Routledge): 1–30. Jobbik (2009) About Jobbik. www.jobbik.com/about_jobbik.html. Retrieved December 10. Kaldor, Mary (1997) Cosmopolitanism versus Nationalism: The New Divide? In R. Caplan and J. Feffer (eds.) Europe’s New Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press): 42–58. Kinder, Donald R., & Sanders, Lynn M. (1996) Divided by Color: Racial Politics and Democratic Ideals. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Kitschelt, Herbert (2007) Growth and Persistence of the Radical Right in Postindustrial Democracies: Advances and Challenges in Comparative Research. West European Politics 30 (5): 1176–1207. Kriesi, Hanspeter (1999), Movements of the Left, Movements of the Right: Putting the Mobilization of Two New Types of Social Movements into Political Context. In H. Kitschelt (ed) Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 398–423. Kriesi, Hanspeter, Edgar Grande, Romain Lachat, Martin Dolezal, Simon Bornschier, and Timotheos Frey (2006) Globalization and the Transformation of the National Political Space: Six European Countries Compared. European Journal of Political Research 45: 921–956. —— (2008) West European Politics in the Age of Globalization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Mair, Peter (2007) Political Opposition and the European Union. Government and Opposition 42 (1): 1–17. March, Luke (2009) Radical Left Parties in Contemporary Europe (New York: Routledge). Minkenberg, Michael & Pascal Perrineau (2007) The Radical Right in the European Elections 2004. International Political Science Review 28 (1), 29–55. Mudde, Cas (2007) Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Niedermayer, Oskar & Richard Stöss (2005) Rechtsextreme Einstellungen in Berlin und Brandenburg (Berlin: Otto-Suhr-Institut für Politikwissenschaft). Norris, Pippa (2005) Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market (New York: Cambridge University Press). Norris, Pippa & Ronald Inglehart (2009) Cosmopolitan Communications: Cultural Diversity in a Globalized World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Oesch, Daniel (2008) Explaining Workers’ Support for Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe: Evidence from Austria, Belgium, France, Norway and Switzerland. International Political Science Review 29 (3): 349–373.

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Pankowski, Rafal & Marcin Kornak (2005) Poland. In Cas Mudde (ed) Racist Extremism in Central and Eastern Europe (London: Routledge): 156–183. Rensmann, Lars (2003) The New Politics of Prejudice: Comparative Perspectives on Extreme Right Parties in European Democracies. German Politics & Society 21 (3): 93–123. —— (2006) From High Hopes to On-Going Defeat: The New Extreme Right’s Political Mobilization and its National Electoral Failure in Germany. German Politics & Society 24 (2): 67–92. Rydgren, Jens (2005) Is Extreme Right Populism Contagious? Explaining the Emergence of a New Party Family. European Journal of Political Research 44 (3) 413–437. Sarn, Andreas & Bruno Waterfield (2008) Austrian Election delivers gains for Far Right. Telegraph. September 28. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/austria/ 3097540/Austria-election-delivers-gains-for-far-Right.html. Retrieved March 1, 2010. Savkova, Lyubka (2005) Europe and the Parliamentary Election in Bulgaria. European Parties and Referendums Networks, www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/documents/epern-e. Siderov, Volen (2002) Globalization: The Last Stage of the Colonization of the Orthodox East. Radio Islam: International Conference on Global Problems of World History, www .radioislam.org/conferences. Sommer, Bernd (2008) Anti-Capitalism in the Name of Ethno-Nationalism: Ideological Shifts on the German Extreme Right. Patterns of Prejudice 42 (3): 305–316. Spirova, Maria (2006) The Parliamentary Elections in Bulgaria, June 2005. Electoral Studies 25 (3): 616–621. Steger, Manfred B. (2008) Globalisms: The Great Ideological Struggle of the 21st Century (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield). Stephen Roth Institute for the Study of Contemporary Antisemitism (2002) Annual Reports: Country Report Hungary 2001/2. www.tau.ac.il/Anti-Semitism/asw2001-2/ hungary. Retrieved March 1, 2010. Swank, Duane & Hans-Georg Betz (2003) Globalization, the Welfare State and RightWing Populism in Western Europe. Socio-Economic Review 1: 215–245. van der Brug, Wouter and Meindert Fennema (2007) Causes of Voting for the Radical Right. International Journal of Public Opinion 19 (4): 474–484. Weiss, Hilde (2003) A Cross-National Comparison of Nationalism in Austria, the Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary, and Poland. Political Psychology 24 (2): 377–401. Weitzman, Mark (2006) Antisemitismus und Holocaust-Leugnung: Permanente Elemente des globalen Rechtsextremismus. In Thomas Greven & Thomas Grumke, eds., Globalisierter Rechtsextremismus? Die extremistische Rechte in der Ära der Globalisierung (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften): 52–69. Wernigerode Nationaler Beobachter (2006) www.wernigerode.nationaler-beobachter. de, August 30, 2006. Retrieved January 5, 2008.

Websites (Examined Political Parties) www.ataka.bg/en www.fpoe.at www.jobbik.com www.leganord.org www.miep.hu www.npd.de www.prm.org.ro

Antisemitism and Anti-Americanism: Comparative European Perspectives Andrei S. Markovits I.  Introduction: Why and How Anti-Americanism Matters This article examines the convergences and divergences of antiAmericanism and antisemitism in contemporary Europe. It can be argued that anti-Americanism is an even more contested concept than antisemitism. According to Paul Hollander, “anti-Americanism is a predisposition to hostility toward the United States and American society, a relentless critical impulse toward American social, economic, and political institutions, traditions, and values; it entails an aversion to American culture in particular and its influence abroad, often also contempt for the American national character (or what is presumed to be such a character) and dislike of American people, manners, behavior, dress, and so on; rejection of American foreign policy and a firm belief in the malignity of American influence and presence anywhere in the world.” (Hollander 1992: 339)1 It is a generalized and comprehensive normative dislike that often lacks distinct reasons or concrete causes. Anti-Americanism is a particularly murky concept because it invariably merges antipathy towards what America does with what America is—or rather is projected to be in the eyes of its beholders (Ajami 2003). The difference between “does” and “is” corresponds well with Jon Elster’s fine distinction between “anger” and “hatred.” Elster writes: “In anger, my hostility is directed towards another’s action and can be extinguished by getting even—an action that reestablishes the equilibrium. In hatred, my hostility is directed toward another person or a category of individuals [Americans and/or Jews in the case of this paper, A.M.] who are seen

1  Emphasis on original. In addition to Hollander’s key book on this topic, I would like to mention three others that, in my view, offer the most comprehensive analysis on this topic. For Germany, it is clearly Diner (2002), for France Roger (2002); for Spain Seregni (2007); and for Canada Roy (1993) I have yet to find comparable books for anti-Americanism in Britain and Italy.

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as intrinsically and irremediably bad. For the world to be made whole, they have to disappear.” (Elster 1999: 65)2 Thus, it has characteristics like any other prejudice in that its holder “prejudges” the object and its activities apart from what actually transpires in reality. And just as in the case of any prejudice, anti-Americanism, too, says much more about those who hold it than the object of its ire and contempt. But where it differs so markedly from “classical” prejudices such as antisemitism, which will also be subject of this study, homophobia, misogyny and racism, is the fact that unlike in these latter cases— where Jews, gays and lesbians, women and ethnic minorities rarely, if ever, have any actual power in and over the majority of populations in most countries—the real existing United States most certainly does have power. Because of this unique paradox, the separation between what America is—i.e. its way of life, its symbols, products, people—and what America does—its foreign policy writ large—will forever be jumbled and impossible to disentangle. I would argue that it is precisely because of this fact that—unlike these other prejudices which, as a fine testimony to progress and tolerance over the past forty years, have by and large become publicly illegitimate in most advanced industrial democracies—anti-Americanism remains not only acceptable in many public circles, it has even become commendable, indeed a badge of honor, and perhaps one of the most distinct icons of being a progressive these days. After all, by being anti-American, one adheres to a prejudice that ipso facto also opposes a truly powerful force in the world. Thus, in the case of anti-Americanism, one’s prejudice partially assumes an antinomian purpose, thereby attaining a legitimacy in progressive circles that other prejudices—thankfully—do not anymore, at least in the accepted public discourse of advanced industrial democracies. Anti-Americanism, as any other prejudice, is an acquired set of beliefs, an attitude, an ideology, not an ascribed trait. Thus, it is completely independent of the national origins of its particular holder. Indeed, many Americans can be—and are—anti-American, just as Jews can be—and are—antisemitic, blacks can—and do—hold racist views, and women misogynist ones.3 The reason I am mentioning this  Elster himself attributes the distinction between anger and hatred to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. 3   For an excellent article demonstrating how American intellectuals have cultivated anti-American views, see Buruma (2003). 2



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is because often the very existence of anti-Americanism is denied by dint of Americans also adhering to such positions. It is not a matter of the holder’s citizenship or birthplace that ought to be the appropriate criterion but rather her/his set of acquired beliefs about a particular collective. The special focus of this article will be the interaction and overlap between anti-Americanism and antisemitism.4 To be sure, just as to the Europeans this imagined America served all kinds of purposes, not least of which was to delineate a clear “other” to themselves, the exact obverse pertained as well to Americans, who throughout their history created all kinds of imagined Europes that fulfilled an “othering” function. This America as Europe’s “other” and vice versa has best been characterized as a “compulsive folie à deux for over three centuries with a remarkably stable set of choreographies, but with a rather uneven, historically specific set of performances.” (Ostendorf 1999; see also Ostendorf 2001)5 However, I perceive an important difference in the respective agencies of this folie à deux on the two continents: whereas in the United States the carriers of prejudice and antipathy toward Europe have predominated—if at all—in the lower social strata, American elites—particularly cultural ones—have consistently extolled Europe, and continue to do so. This love for and emulation of European tastes, mores, fashions and habits remained a staple of American elite culture even during the country’s most nativist and isolationist periods. Americans in their history have been known to be anti-French, antiGerman, anti-Russian, anti-British, and anti-Communist, but never 4   As much as possible, this study is about the is, not the does. I will argue that in Europe, anti-Americanism has been much more about the essence of America—or put more precisely, the interpretation of how Europeans constructed this essence for their own purposes—than its actual activities. This is clearly not the case with other manifestations of contemporary anti-Americanism. Thus, for example, as my colleague Meredith Woo-Cummings argues in a perceptive paper on changing public opinion in the Republic of Korea, Korean antipathies towards the United States have none of the depth, characteristics and tradition that their European counterparts have, and remain clearly much more anchored in dislike of America’s actual activities— its doing—rather than its character, its essence—its being. Unlike elsewhere in the world, at least until very recently, America represented a particularly loaded concept and complex entity to Europeans precisely because it was, of course, a European creation which, however, more than any other former European extension, consciously defected from its European origins. Anti-Americanism in Europe has always been much more about America’s being, as opposed to the rest of the world’s antipathy towards America which has been much more anchored in its doing. 5  I will only look at the European side of this folie à deux in this study, not the American.

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anti-European. To be sure, one important aspect of acculturation to America was to oppose things from “the old country,” to try to distance oneself from the “old world” in an attempt to create a new one. (This, too, changed in the course of the twentieth century since by its end the ideology of a multicultural America demanded pride in one’s origins as opposed to the ideology of the melting pot of the pre-1960s era which exacted distancing from one’s previous culture.) In that sense, one could speak of a distancing from Europe. But this has not been even remotely similar to the degree of aversion that anti-Americanism has entailed for Europeans. And here, too, there are huge differences by social class and status. “Ordinary” Europeans have never exhibited the aversion towards America that their elites have. Indeed, as demonstrated by regular public opinion surveys since the early 1960s, a solid majority of Europeans have expressed positive views of America, with only about 30% holding negative ones. Tellingly, the higher one proceeds on the social scale of the respondents, the greater the quantity of negative attitudes towards America becomes. As such, anti-Americanism is arguably one of the very few prejudices in contemporary Europe which correlate positively with education and social status: the higher the education the greater the prejudice. Until the mid-1960s, this was also the case with antisemitism in Austria and Germany where, since the nineteenth century, the most virulent antisemites were to be found at universities and among their graduates, such as doctors, lawyers and engineers. In the course of the past four decades, conventional antisemitism in these two countries has assumed the pattern of other kinds of collective prejudices and hatreds: the lesser the respondent’s education and the lower her or his social standing, the greater the probability of her or his having prejudices and collective dislikes. This has never been the case with anti-Americanism and—as will be discussed later—might yet again have received a new twist in terms of antisemitism as well. Thus, a sort of inverted mirror image has characterized this European-American folie à deux with very different weights in their respective agencies: European masses have by and large liked and respected America while European elites have certainly not, whereas American elites have liked and respected Europe with American masses much less so. Perhaps what differentiates the current level and quality of European anti-Americanism from all its predecessors is the fact that by 2008 a solid majority of European publics also bear negative attitudes towards the United States thus establishing— maybe for the first time—a considerable congruity with their elites



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on this topic. There can be no doubt that the Bush Administration’s actions, tone and demeanor have greatly contributed to this congruity between European publics and elites in terms of their massively felt and politically mobilized anti-Americanism. To be sure, the reasons and causes might be manifold. They can be analyzed along different narratives. In an earlier work on antiAmericanism in Europe, I developed a fourfold table that establishes categories along the lines of left and right on the one hand; and politics and culture on the other. These are the narratives that comprise the four fields: Left/Politics: “America, as the world’s foremost capitalist country, is engaged in imperialism. It is the leader of world reaction. America is a predatory power which is bent on totally controlling the world . . .” Right/Politics: “America, because of its essentially vulgar nature, is not equipped to be the much-needed leader of the free, White and Western world. Because of its lack of traditional elites and its permissiveness, America’s political system is disorganized, confused, and completely inappropriate to govern the United States adequately, let alone the world. Thus, Europeans would do well not to trust the United States because it is structurally and historically incapable of furnishing serious political leadership. America ultimately is weak, shallow, naive, inexperienced, and no match for the adversaries of the free world.” In a sense then, whereas the left fears America’s power by virtue of its size and ubiquity, the right disdains American power for its wannabe parvenu character that pretends but fails to execute effectively. Left/Culture: “American culture is the expression of an alienated, brutal, capitalist society which has produced soulless, plastic, and inauthentic artifacts solely for the profit of huge companies. The American ‘culture industry’ produces cheap, essentially worthless things for a quick fix in a mass market populated by misguided, manipulated and exploited individuals who are stripped of their collectiveness by the inherent divisiveness of a capitalist society . . .” Right/ Culture: “American culture is not worthy of the name. The United States, because of its vulgar nature, has never been capable of producing anything of lasting value. Worse, it has used its newly acquired financial might to buy real, that is European, culture and/or imitate it in a crass style behooving the nouveau riche that the United States will always remain. The danger of American culture, however, is its mass appeal that has made it so successful among Europe’s masses as well. Thus, American culture is not only worthless and shallow, but also dangerous and corrupting by virtue of its universal appeal.” Hence,

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if the European left has feared American power more than has the right, it is exactly the inverse in the realm of culture: here, the right is much more worried than the left. But both merge in their dismissal of American culture as “inauthentic” with the left seeing this mainly as a consequence of America’s commodified essence whereas the right as a result of America’s alleged lack of history and tradition, thus of depth, sophistication and the requisite Bildung (Markovits 1989: 42, 43). In all of these dimensions, we find historical and present-day convergences but also divergences in relation to anti-Americanism. II.  Antisemitism as a Constitutive Companion to Anti-Americanism in Historical Context In the course of the twentieth century antisemitism has become one of anti-Americanism’s most consistent conceptual companions, perhaps even one of its constitutive features. To be sure, European antisemitism preceded anti-Americanism by centuries. And the two did not emerge as the inseparable tandem that they have now become until the late nineteenth century. However, far and away the most important difference between the two is the fact that European antisemitism killed millions of innocent people whereas, even in its most virulent form, European anti-Americanism rarely, if ever, went beyond the prolific burning of American flags and/or the destruction of buildings and property. Already in the seventeenth century, well before the establishment of the American Republic, the divergent paths that religion took in these two settings—and that still differentiate the United States from Europe perhaps more than any other single social, political or cultural factor6—also had a major bearing on the development of antisemitism in these two respective societies, as well as on its role in their relationship with each other. Whereas Europe’s religious life continued to be ruled by a deeply antisemitic Catholic Church in the continent’s geographic center and its south, a state-oriented, equally antisemitic Protestantism mainly of the Lutheran variety in its north (though one would need

6  On this important difference between the United States and Europe, see the work by Ronald Inglehart and his World Value Survey at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.



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to differentiate the vehemence of antisemitism practiced by German Lutheranism as opposed to its much milder Danish and Swedish variants), and a structurally very similar Orthodoxy in its eastern regions, America’s religious life featured two characteristics that Europe never had, and the ramifications of which Europeans fail to comprehend to this day: first, religion in America was completely decentralized and local. The search for political freedom in America was—as Tocqueville so well understood in contrast to other Europeans of his time and so many of Europe’s current elites—inextricably tied to the search for religious freedom, thus giving religion and religious vocabulary in American politics a completely different meaning than both have had in Europe. Second, it featured a Protestantism that professed its great admiration for the Jews, that indeed saw itself as a close relative of the Jews, whose ancient writings and customs it extolled. This, after all, was the world in which Biblical names such as Elijah, Jeremiah, Jeddediah, Josiah became commonplace. The point is that from well before the founding of the American Republic the framework wherein people related to Jews and Judaism were profoundly different in America from what they had been in Europe. Still, it was not until the late nineteenth and early twentieth century that antisemitism began to accompany European anti-Americanism in a systematic and regular manner. It was the fear and critique of capitalist modernity that brought these two ressentiments together. America and the Jews were seen as paragons of modernity: money-driven, profit-hungry, urban, universalistic, individualistic, mobile, rootless, hostile to established traditions and values. That it was the fear of modernity linking Jews and Americans at this juncture of European ressentiment is best borne out by the fact that Jewish immigration to the United States had not yet reached the large numbers that it would twenty years later, and that American power in the world was still rather ephemeral. In other words, it was not the actually existing United States and its Jews that were feared and disdained but the combination of Judaism and Americanism as concepts and social trends. After World War I, the Jews as rulers of America became pronounced. It was at this juncture that the notions of Jewish Wall Street, Jewish Hollywood, Jewish Jazz, in other words of a thoroughly “Jewified” America became commonplace. It was at this time that all the forerunners for current codes such as the “East Coast” were permanently established. From then on, Jews and America became inextricably intertwined, not only as representatives of modernity but of holders of actual power. America

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was powerful and the Jews in it even more so. One of the standard staples of European antisemitism has always been to impute much more power to Jews than they actually have. Moreover, what makes this putative power even more potent is that it is believed to be clandestine and cliquish. With America’s real power massively growing after World War I, power as a unifying notion between Jews and America became more pronounced and also lasting. The hostile perception of this alleged link became as integral to National Socialism as it later did to Stalinism, though with a significantly weaker intensity and less murderous manifestations. III.  Antisemitism and Anti-Americanism in Europe: Contemporary Convergence and Divergence Things appeared to change after the end of World War II, the Holocaust, the establishment of Israel and the Cold War. American power, though still massively resented, became a much-needed protector against the Soviet Union, its allies and Communism. Probably for the first time in over 900 years, the Holocaust rendered overt antisemitism socially unacceptable among Europe’s elites.7 And Jews for the very first time in nearly two thousand years actually attained real power by dint of running a state. While these structural changes substantially altered the tone and the substance of the discourse about Jews and America in Europe, the two remained as intertwined as ever. By the late 1960s, Israel became little more than an extension of American power to many, especially on Europe’s political left. Israel was disliked, especially by the left, not so much because it was Jewish but because it was American. And as such it was powerful. It is by virtue of this shift in power that contemporary Europeans dislike Israel so intensely and why their current antisemitism assumes a different

7  I have been impressed with the work of Richard Landes, who dates European anti-Semitism to the winter of 1010 CE, which brought the first organized massacres of Jews in Europe (France in particular) as a consequence of the Muslim Caliph alHakim’s destruction of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem. These systematic and politically motivated mass murders occurred in the context of Christianity’s new statebuilding and modernizing measures that were necessary to raise armies to fight the Muslims in the Holy Land. There were, of course, violent actions against Jews before this event but—according to Landes—these did not go beyond the usual vendettatype revenge that have characterized the cohabitation of any rival societies and cultures anywhere in the world. See Landes (2000: 1,2).



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veneer from the traditional one that dominated Europe for one thousand years. As Mark Lilla has so eloquently argued, contemporary Europe’s allegedly post-national elites dislike states that behave the way European states used to before 1945: assertively, unilaterally, particularistically, realpolitikally—all of which pertain to Israel’s conduct in the world, as well as to America’s, especially under the aegis of the Bush Administration (Lilla 2003). To be sure, this post-nationalism only pertains to intra-European dimensions and to any kind of bellicose interaction among European states. War among European states truly is unthinkable, surely an impressive accomplishment. But to call France’s policies post-national really misses the point. Indeed, by every conceivable measure, France continues to pursue its highly national interests as it always did. It merely uses the post-national veneer as a convenient smoke screen to pursue its Realpolitik which—over the past 15 years—has been mainly directed against the United States. The same pertains to Germany, particularly under the Red-Green coalition of the Schröder government. Germany, too, uses the postnational ideology to justify the pursuit of its highly nationalistic policies. If the (West) Europeans were genuinely so post-nationalist, why then would the French and the British not relinquish their permanent seats in the United Nation’s Security Council and have them replaced by a genuinely post-national European seat? Instead, Germany seeks to join the Council in an act of old-style nationalism. The alleged post-nationalism of the West Europeans only extends to the Paris-Madrid-Berlin-Moscow axis whose sole purpose was to oppose the United States in every possible forum. The fact that current European antisemitism has changed is best demonstrated by the fact that the very people who are ostensibly appalled by antisemitic incidents in their own countries are also often Israel’s most ruthless critics. That they then often resort to characterizations of Israel’s essence and its very existence—as opposed to its policies—in eerily similar terms and tone to the old-fashioned European antisemitism of yore attests not to the end of European antisemitism but merely its mutation from what Daniel Goldhagen so aptly calls the Shylock Jew (which is unacceptable in contemporary Europe) to the Rambo Jew (a highly legitimate perception) (Goldhagen 2003).8

8  The concept of the “tough Jew” is nothing new, of course. Particularly in the United States, there is an entire literature on “tough Jews,” mainly gangsters and boxers among whom Jews played a prominent role, often to the delight—even pride—of

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And we all know how much Rambo has become a synonym for America and Americans in European discourse of the past two decades. The tough Jew in the form of the omnipotent Israeli has led to a new twist on the longstanding interaction between antisemitism and antiAmericanism: if in former times it was the almighty United States that basically used powerful Israel as its puppet in its “imperialist” and “neocolonial” designs, then we witnessed a reversal, especially in the context of the Iraq War of 2003, in which an all-powerful Israel and its East Coast minions were alleged to have co-opted American power for their own purposes. As I mentioned above, anti-Americanism had been perhaps the only prejudice in Europe which correlated positively with the respondents’ level of education and social position. One could legitimately voice this prejudice because it inevitably also expressed a critique of— often even an opposition to—a very powerful actor. Being prejudiced against the powerful has an entirely different social acceptability than being prejudiced against the weak. And this is the position to which the new European antisemitism has mutated. While it has become illegitimate in the post-Holocaust world to express hatred for powerless Jews—meaning Jews currently living in Europe—it has become all the more acceptable to express antipathy towards powerful Jews. The former is obvious antisemitism which one can only express in the pub, the Stammtisch or on the Internet, in other words apart from acceptable public discourse. The latter has become a badge of honor and very much forms acceptable public discourse. One of the legacies of the late 1960s has been the important fact that acceptable discourse does not permit derision and chiding of the weak be that women, the physically challenged, ethnic minorities, animals. Accepted discourse towards the weak has truly changed in the public spheres of all advanced industrial democracies. Exactly the opposite pertains to the strong. Criticizing, deriding and attacking them has not only become acceptable, indeed it has become a badge of honor, a clear code of belonging to the socially other Jews, especially Jewish men. See for example Cohen (1998), an excellent account of the life and world of Jewish gangsters. Paul Breines (1990) offers a very different study under the ex­act same title. In addition to dwelling on Sigmund Freud’s tough Jewish fantasies, Breines argues that the fantasy about and the role of the tough Jew increased in direct response to the horrors of the Holocaust and the cre­ation of the state of Israel which—for the first time in nearly 2000 years—accorded the Jews real power. See for ex­ample his sections “From Massada to Mossad: A Historical Sketch of Tough Jewish Imagery” as well as “The ‘Rambowitz’ Novels.”



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desired group of progressives. Thus, deriding the Jews is not acceptable because the Jews are weak; deriding Israel is totally commendable because Israel is strong. Jews have become contested space by dint of the following developments: (1) The disappearance of communism as an enemy and a perceived threat and thus the need to accord absolute primacy to the task of containing, even defeating, this perceived ill (maybe even evil). This is gone. (2) Indeed, with the disappearance of communism and the major task at hand to begin coming to terms with that past, antisemitism has made its periodic appearance in a number of East European countries where the old adage of Jews = Bolsheviks has been revived. Somehow, the antisemitic dimensions of Communist regimes—the Doctors’ Plot in the Soviet Union, the Rajk Trial in Hungary, the Pauker trial in Romania, the Slansky trial in Czechoslovakia, and the Merker affair in East Germany, to mention but the most obvious ones—come up much more rarely when compared to the constant mention of the disproportionate presence of Jews among the Communist elites. (3) Because of Communism’s defeat, the immensely decreased need for the United States as a protector. This fostered the resurgence of an already present anti-Americanism of which the intellectuals and the political classes have been the most avid carriers. As is well known, with manifest anti-Americanism, antisemitism has been rarely behind. (4) What makes them so related is, of course, their being perceived as the quintessential expressions of modernity. With a massive critique of modernity afoot in Europe—just as in the United States and elsewhere—there emerges yet another piece of the puzzle that might explain a necessary, albeit not a sufficient, reason for the rise in antisemitism in Europe. (5) Modernity is, of course, also associated with “Europe,” with Brussels, with this new central power of a newly-constituting state in this fascinating process of state-building before our very eyes. As we know from history, all state-building processes are very painful. Inevitably, there are clear winners and clear losers—and the losers do not fade easily. The debate about a European identity, about what will constitute the soul, the flesh and blood of this new entity—never mind its skeleton which is now being gradually put into place—has not even begun yet. We have no idea what shape it will take, where it will go, who will lead it, who will be the winners and losers. What is quite clear—to me, at least—is that the enemies of this process have already

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mustered tropes from the past that have not been the most favorable to Jews. (6) Everything that I said about “Europe” in point 5 pertains to the whole issue of “globalization,” a process that has been with us most certainly since the advent of capitalism and the discovery of the Americas in the sixteenth century, and that has had many more vastly greater leaps in its history than the one we are currently experiencing, some of which—like the one from 1890 until 1920—changed human existence much more profoundly than anything that we are witnessing today. (Fordist mass production, the automobile, the airplane, antibiotics, the radio, women entering the public arena via the franchise, a major step no matter how limited we view it as today [and correctly so], World War I as the most important hiatus between the old, essentially feudal, world and the new capitalist world of what Eric Hobsbawm has aptly called the “short twentieth century”). That one of the major responses to this massive transformation was the “age of fascism” should not surprise us in hindsight but should give us pause as to what collective social formations and political manifestations might be still awaiting us in response to the globalization phase that we are currently experiencing. (7) Europe’s multiculturalism. This has a number of dimensions: (a) The simple fact that as a consequence of the post-Yalta world, borders have opened up and population shifts have occurred that Europeans never expected and that exacerbated the earlier immigrations waves of the 1960s and 1970s which these states could contain under the guise that these workers were merely “guests” or “temporary.” In the 1990s, the whole question of identity and citizenship—of permanent inclusion and exclusion—became central. This changed the tenor of the debate completely. Suddenly, the multiculturalism that these Europeans enjoyed in terms of the growing diversity of their culinary possibilities mutated into a nasty contest over identity, citizenship, permanence, language, ethnicity, religion—the hot buttons of politics. (b) The empirical reality that a large number of these new immigrants hailed from the Muslim world: Turkey (but also Arab countries and Iran) in Germany, The Maghreb (Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco) in France, Pakistan and the Arab world in Britain, Kurds in Sweden, Albanians in Italy, Moroccans in Spain. While these immigrants awakened first and foremost a nasty strain of xenophobia in all European countries against themselves, they also have triggered a massive reemergence of antisemitism in a twofold way: first, on the part of those who hate



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these newcomers and wish them ill. This is the European antisemitism of old, “your father’s anti-Semitism;” second, on the part of those who are the targets of this hatred who happen to be from cultures where antisemitism has attained a major presence mainly—though not exclusively—by dint of the Arab-Israeli conflict. It is not that Muslim antisemites and German (or European) antisemites suddenly discovered their mutual love for each other—although that has happened too, and is increasingly becoming common in certain right-wing circles in Germany and elsewhere in Europe where radical rightists seek out radical Islamists as allies even though they hate each other, but in the hierarchy of their respective hatreds that of Jews and Americans receives respective pride of place thus fostering this otherwise bizarre alliance—but that antisemitism has yet another voice in these plural and democratic societies where such voices have often reached very receptive audiences. By having to adjudicate faraway conflicts on their own soil—i.e. when the Middle East conflict is suddenly carried out in the middle of Hamburg, London or Paris— these European states invariably and inevitably are drawn into disputes that willy-nilly involve Jews yet again. And they do not like it. (8) Surely one needs to mention Israel’s sometimes problematic policies and frequently objectionable actions in the occupied territories as irritants to most European publics, elite as well as mass. But here, too, the line between completely legitimate criticisms of policies and the much more worrisome questioning of Israel’s very existence needs to be strictly delineated. Alas, it is increasingly less so in the commentaries of the European public. Be it The Guardian or the French ambassador to Britain, there is increasing irritation and impatience with Israel that goes well beyond the country’s policies, and questions the worth of its very existence. While such things are nothing new in the worlds of the extreme right and left in Europe and have been commonplace since the Six Day War in June of 1967, they were not part of Europe’s accepted political discourse until the 1990s. After all, many people have been rightfully upset with many a country’s policies. But in virtually no case that I can recall has that led to the questioning of the very worth of that country’s existence. Slobodan Milosevic’s Yugoslavia became the bogeyman of Europe’s publics (certainly after the slaughter of 9,000 Bosnian Muslim men in Srebrenica) but even this atrocity never led any British, French, German or Italian diplomats or journalists writing for these countries’ papers of record to question the very right of Yugoslavia to exist as a country. Put crudely,

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it is becoming clearer by the day that the post-Auschwitz “Schonzeit,” as the Germans so aptly have called this era, tellingly using a term from hunting which means the “no hunting season” or the “off-limits season,” is gradually coming to an end. The Jews are not “off limits” anymore in Europe.9 This development reinforces my view that among all the prejudices that have beset European history, antisemitism has constantly assumed a place all its own. It is related to racism but yet different from it, furnishing a category all its own. And it is back with a vengeance in acceptable European discourse. “Der Ton macht die Musik,” the tone makes the music. Seldom has this been clearer than in the case of contemporary Europe’s irritation with Israel and Jews which can never be analyzed by itself but must be done so in a comparative context. A new tone has entered among European intellectuals in which criticizing Jews—not merely Israel and Israelis—has attained a certain urgency that reveals a particularly liberating dimension. One can almost hear the cries of relief: “Free at last, free at last, we are finally free of this damn Holocaust at last!” In this context Europeans posit that Jews, who created a culture of guilt and shame for Europeans, and kept them from speaking their minds as they wished, now behave just like they did. The lid is off; Jews are legitimate targets yet again. To be sure, anti-Zionism and antisemitism are distinguishable: one is a political position, the other a prejudice. “Yet the overlap between antisemitic and anti-Zionist discourses today is considerable, and it is especially striking at a time when many intellectuals, notably the post-modernist left and post-colonial theorists, base their work on the very notion of ‘discourse,’ contending that clusters of assumptions, embedded in our languages and cultures, pre-select how we think about the world, and mesh the production of knowledge and power.” (Cohen 2004) By constantly bringing up the truly warped and ill-willed analogy of the Israelis with the Nazis, Europeans absolve themselves from any remorse and shame and thus experience a sense of liberation. As well, one hurts the intended target by equating it with the very perpetrators who almost wiped it off the earth in the most brutal genocide imaginable. Above all, all of this needs to be viewed in a comparative

9   For an amazingly stark demonstration of this, see The New Statesman’s cover story called “The Kosher Connection.”



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context both in terms of its tone as well as its substance: as to the former, what is important here is that no other vaguely comparable conflict has attained anywhere near the shrillness and acuity as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. If one looks at two much more bloody— and geographically proximate conflicts—the four succession wars following the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia and the Russian wars in Chechnya—neither of them have even vaguely created a tone of dismissal, bitterness and contempt for the respective aggressors (the Serbs, the Croats and the Russians) among Europe’s intellectuals as have the Israelis. Oxford dons never even thought of banning Russian, Croatian or Serbian researchers from their laboratories, as actually happened with Israelis. Norwegian veterinarians did not refuse to send dna samples to institutes that requested them if they were in Russia, Serbia or any other country that was engaged in a military conflict, or even in measures of undeniable repression and injustice. But they certainly did when a Jerusalem institute asked for such samples. The editor of The Translator and Translation Studies Abstract published in Britain did not dismiss colleagues from its editorial boards because they belonged to nationalities whose countries were engaged in some form of conflict and injustice. But two Israeli academics—both critical of the Sharon government and active in Israel’s peace campaigns—were summarily dismissed from this board merely for being Israeli citizens. No European intellectuals and academics called for an organized boycott of Serbian, Croatian or Russian institutions, including research and cultural links, as did 120 university professors from thirteen European countries in the case of Israel. And Britain’s Association of University Teachers’ (AUT) resolution to boycott Bar Ilan and Haifa Universities speaks volumes about the singling out of Israel as the world’s sole miscreant. Adding insult to injury, this so called boycott was really much closer to what is conventionally known as a “blacklist” since it stigmatized academics not only by their university affiliation and nationality but—worse still, if such a thing is possible—by their political beliefs. After all, the boycott statement made it totally clear that faculty members at these two institutions were exempt from the British AUT’s boycott if they were “conscientious Israeli academics and intellectuals opposed to their state’s colonial and racist policies.” In other words, if they passed an ideological litmus test devised by the AUT, then they were not to be boycotted. Studies by German researchers of the tone in which the Israeli-Arab conflict has been reported by the mainstream German media showed clearly that there

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was a marked difference in that the Israelis and their actions were much more frequently couched in words with negative and pejorative connotations as compared to the actions by the Arab side, which were conveyed in a much more neutral tone. Invariably, Palestinian suicide bombers were “nationalists” who acted out of “desperation” whereas Israeli retaliation was inevitably “vengeful” and “brutal.” Interestingly, the German media have without any hesitation always depicted the Basque eta and the Irish ira actions in Spain and Britain respectively as “terrorist.” The passion against Israel is simply disproportionate in its tone and its shrillness when compared to other agents of injustice.10 This noticeable change in European discourse hails much more from the left than the right. The latter—mainly because of the continued illegitimacy and unacceptability of Nazism and fascism in European public opinion—has had a much more circumspect influence on how Jews and Israel are depicted than the left has had. Because classical antisemitism—certainly in its praxis—was mostly associated with the European right, the left enjoyed a certain bonus when it came to discussing all matters relating to Jews and Israel. The left could take liberties with being anti-Israeli and antisemitic that the right could never have. This legitimacy bonus enabled the left to employ anti-Israeli discourse that—in the meantime—has become completely common and acceptable parlance in Europe. Because of this general acceptability and overall legitimacy, left-wing antisemitism is much more relevant and disturbing than right-wing antisemitism, which has essentially remained the same, without major mutations. It thus embodies oldfashioned, i.e. “your father’s anti-Semitism.” Today’s neo-Nazis are ugly and unpleasant, but as they are beyond the pale of acceptable European discourse, they are not particularly dangerous in a systemic kind of way. The Guardian, the bbc, The Independent—to borrow from the British case which, however, has its counterparts in all European countries—have not assumed their overly one-sided language about Israel, Jews and the United States under the influence of the National Front, but reflect changes in British and European attitudes and the altered nature of discourse among Britain’s and Europe’s intellectuals in the wake of the late 1960s. The BBC never admonished, let alone considered firing, the poet Tom Paulin as one of its regular

10   For a fine paper on the inextricable relationship between recent anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism, see Klein Halevi (2003).



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commentators on culture after the latter had openly incited for the murder of Jews: “Brooklyn-born” Jewish settlers on the West Bank “should be shot dead” because “they are Nazis” and “I feel nothing but hatred for them.” (Steyn 2004) Paulin, of course, is a solid man of the left, not of the right, and remains a respected member of Britain’s cultural elite that sees itself as anti-fascist, anti-Nazi, and—of course— anti-antisemitic. Paulin is not an aberrant exception in this milieu. It is by dint of this left-liberal voice, not the right’s old-style antisemitism, that 59% of Europeans view Israel as being the greatest threat to global peace, putting this country in first place ahead of countries such as Iran, North Korea, the United States, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, in that order. China was mentioned by 30%, thus ranking it as number 13. Not surprisingly, Europeans had the best opinion of themselves, placing Europe as dead last in terms of representing any danger to world peace. Only 8% of the respondents listed the European Union or any of its members as threats to peace with the Germans having the self-confidence (or might it be a bit of selfish arrogance) to list themselves dead last at 2%. The respondents in the Netherlands were particularly critical of Israel, viewing it as a threat to peace by a whopping 74%. The equivalent figure in Germany was 65%. Anybody following the European media’s tone in covering the Israeli-Palestinian conflict since the second Intifada in September 2000 will not be surprised by these results. Once again, the origins of this hegemonic tone in Europe’s totally acceptable discourse does not hail from the right but from the left. And the tone set by elites and opinion leaders, such as journalists, really matter in terms of framing the acceptable contours of mass opinion.11 And this brings us to the difference in substance. It is rather evident that European intellectuals and political classes—as well as increasingly the general public—are not so much expressing their sympathies for suppressed Muslims or disadvantaged Arabs as they are their antipathies towards Israel and (not so indirectly) the Jews. This is best demonstrated by the following paradox: precisely those Europeans who were the most silent during the Bosnian War’s massive slaughter of Muslims at the hands mainly of Serbs but also Croats have been among the most vocal opponents of Israel. These people only raised their voices in the Bosnian War once the United States intervened. Because the

  For a solid treatment of this issue, see Zeller (1992).

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United States intervened on behalf of Muslims, many European intellectuals de facto rallied to the side of Slobodan Milosevic, who had engaged in mass murder of such Muslims. Thus, antipathy towards Israel and its accompanying antisemitism cannot be separated from a larger enmity towards the United States and what it represents. How else can one explain the attitude of Greek intellectuals, politicians, clergy, and public opinion, all of whom were rabidly pro-Serbian and vehemently anti-Bosnian Muslim (whom they pejoratively called “Turks”) while at the same time they are among the most pro-Arab and pro-Palestinian Europeans? What drives the liberal left in Europe is dislike and hatred of Israel and America, and not a genuine sympathy for and identification with downtrodden Muslims. It was not the slaughter of innocent Muslim women and children that really riled the European left. Instead, what mobilized thousands in the streets of Berlin, Paris, and Athens once the much-belated step was taken to intervene on behalf of the brutalized Muslims, was once again the American bogeyman. And once again, far right and far left meet on matters relating to America and Jews. No far right in Europe has a nastier anti-Serbian history than the German and Austrian, both of which have been long-time supporters of the most vicious anti-Serbian fascists in Croatia (the notorious “Ustashe”) and elsewhere (primarily Bosnia). Still, their hatred of Serbs could not compete with their hatred of Americans, and once the United States intervened against Serbs on behalf of the Bosnian Muslims and their Kosovar co-religionists, German and Austrian neo-Nazis and far rightists rallied to Milosevic’s side in their unmitigated opposition of nato’s American-led interventions. “Les extremes se touchent” on matters related to Jews and America yet again, as they did so often throughout the twentieth century. The common trope here—as elsewhere—is mobilized anti-Americanism. When José Bové, the anti-globalization leader, joined the Palestinians in Ramallah in the spring of 2002 instead of traveling to Gujarat, where many more Muslims were slain in multiple pogroms by Hindu mobs, he did not primarily express solidarity with a repressed people and their religion but rather voiced a collective enmity towards the United States and everything that it purportedly represents. It is by dint of America’s proximity to Israel that the latter has become such a bogeyman to the anti-globalization movement. We were all witnesses to that ugly—but telling—political theater by demonstrators at the Davos meeting in 2003 when one person sported a Donald Rumsfeld mask and a yellow Jewish star of David (the kind the Nazis made the



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Jews wear everywhere in German-occupied Europe) with the word “sheriff ” on it. His companion was dressed like a cudgel-wielding Ariel Sharon. They and their colleagues danced around a golden calf embodying money and wealth. And surely most, if not all, of the antiglobalist protesters in that scene viewed themselves as leftists, not as rightist. Similar openly antisemitic iconography was commonplace at anti-globalist meetings in Porto Alegre and Durban among others. Clearly, the intensity of the hatred borne towards Israel, which goes far beyond a legitimate criticism of its policies, derives in good part from Israel being perceived as the complete American proxy, as a de facto part of the United States. And as such, any tone—no matter how offensive—is completely legitimate and acceptable since it is directed against a very powerful entity rather than a weak minority. But there is also an antisemitic dimension to this linking of Israel to the United States among the anti-globalization movements. Why Israel, why not—say—Saudi Arabia, to which the United States is equally close and which—arguably—has a greater global role and influence than does Israel? The answer to this aspect of the puzzle lies not only in Israel’s political proximity to the United States but also to the former’s identity as a Jewish state and in the Jews’ relationship to Europeans and their history. The Israeli psychologist Zvi Rex once said that the Germans will never forgive the Jews for Auschwitz. The issue goes far beyond the Germans and pertains to all of Europe. The surplus of enmity exhibited towards Israel by Europeans, the much greater coverage of Israel by the European media than any other conflict in the world, including those much closer to Europe, bespeaks a qualitative dimension to this sentiment and attitude that borders on an obsession that reaches way beyond the conventional criticisms that are accorded to other political conflicts and disagreements. Much deeper historical, cultural and psychological forces are at work here. And thus we are back to the three standard pillars of classical antisemitism and anti-Americanism: Jews, America and modernity. The substance and tone of public debates really matter. These debates create “frames” that influence political behavior and can also contribute to enduring elements of political culture. Debates shift the boundaries of legitimate discursive space in politics since they define the realm of acceptable terms and sanction those who violate them. Debates shape language and create new code words for old ideas, including prejudices and antipathies. Above all, the ensuing changes in discursive space change how elites and ordinary citizens discuss

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and then think about a topic. Thus, the tone of these debates reflects broader ideological shifts in politics and society.12 IV.  Beyond Antisemitism: Anti-Americanism in Public Discourse As part of a larger empirical project on European anti-Americanism, I collected nearly 1,500 articles written on the United States in the four key European countries: Germany, France, Italy, Britain. In order to maximize America’s “is” dimension as opposed to its “does” one for my study, I consciously excluded articles and reports that dealt with overtly political questions, particularly all those related to American foreign policy broadly construed, since it is via its foreign policy that America “does” things most overtly to other countries. I concentrated my research on articles about film, theater, food, travel, human interest pieces, descriptions of the iconography of particular events such as party conventions, car manufacturing, subway construction and the world of sports. Now, as a child of the 1960s, I realize that there is no realm of social or cultural activity—or any activity for that matter—that is not also political. But I tried as best I could to eliminate the obviously political from my study precisely to analyze a ressentiment against America by Europeans that one could call “surplus” or gratuitous anti-Americanism. This is an anti-Americanism for its own sake so to speak, where the invoking of a generalization about the United States added little analysis or description to the issue at hand but merely served to reinforce already present prejudices instead. My sample included elite as well as other publications in Britain, Germany, France, and Italy. The publications that I consulted and analyzed were: The Guardian, The Times, The Independent, The Daily Telegraph, The Sunday Times, The Observer in Britain; Le Monde, Le Figaro, Libération, L’Express, Le Point, L’Equipe in France; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Frankfurter Rundschau, Süddeutsche Zeitung, Die Welt, Der Tagesspiegel, die tageszeitung (taz), Die Zeit, Der Spiegel in Germany; and Corriere della Sera, La Stampa, La Repubblica, La Gazetta dello Sport in Italy.13

12   For a superb treatment of these ideas in the context of the different approaches to the Nazi past taken by Germany and Austria, see Art (2005). 13  That there exists a clear discrepancy—but also a certain underlying congruence—between how the European elite media view and interpret the United States and how the “regular” European “man in the street” does, is best described by a



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Well before George W. Bush became the convenient—and partly appropriate—caricature of the American cowboy for the European press, over two-thirds of the collected and analyzed articles included some form of irritation with, condescension towards or ridicule of the topic that was being described. Overall conclusion: virtually all aspects of American culture—including its highbrow variant—experienced at least one derisive or dismissive comment, even in an otherwise positive review. The term “Americanization” of whatever the case may be (movies, theater, universities, business practices, habits) was invariably invoked in a negative manner and conveyed an undesirable situation as in “Wien darf nicht Chicago werden,” Jörg Haider’s highly successful slogan in an Austrian electoral campaign (Why Chicago? Why not Palermo? Liverpool? Or any number of troubled European cities). Or take Gerhard Schröder’s constant invoking of “amerikanische Verhältnisse” (American conditions) as a very powerful bogeyman for his successful electoral campaign in 2002. This campaign was the very first in Europe’s postwar history in which a major—indeed governing— party structured its electoral strategy on the national level around an explicit negation of America. It would certainly not be the last. Indeed, my research published in another context clearly shows that the term “amerikanischen Verhältnisse” has become a standard phrase in German when one wants to describe something bad, undesired, inferior, and also dangerous. “Amerikanische Verhältnisse” are conjured up by trade union leaders but also by businessmen; by lawyers and educators; by police officials and doctors; they exist in virtually every conceivable niche of German life, from soccer to films, from television to trade unions, from construction to education, from the courts to the animal world. Tellingly, in virtually no cases does the reader learn what these conditions are truly like in the United States. But that, after all, is not the point. “Amerikanische Verhältnisse” does not delineate actual conditions in the United States. Instead, it is constantly used to stigmatize something in Germany. And there is no better way to do this than to invoke American conditions. One hardly needs a more persuasive example for the acceptability of anti-Americanism as a potent agent of political mobilization. Above all, America was damned if it did, and damned if it did not. The negative judgement was almost

French baseball fan’s statement: “It’s the media that make this distaste for the United States, but the people aren’t in favor of it.” As quoted in Vinocur 2003.

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automatically assured independently of the action’s intention, process or outcome. The pervasiveness of a baseline and a priori negative attitude and pejorative view of America by West Europeans was best underlined by the antonymic existence of the characteristics ascribed to America in these views and attitudes. Thus, everything and its opposite pertained: America, the prudish, America the pornographic; America, the religiously fanatic, America, the bastion of secularism; America, the intolerant, America, the indulgent; America, the repressive, America, the super-free with no limits and boundaries which, in turn, mutates into total repression; America, the individualist, America, the forced collectivist of which “political correctness” is the latest incarnation; America, the elitist, America the populist; America being the last bastion of a nationalism bordering on chauvinism, America actually not even being a proper nation best exemplified by the fact that it is the only country in the world that does not have a “proper,” i.e. nation-tied, name but bears the name of a continent, of a geographic whole that is much larger than the actual country of “the United States of America,” which has led the Germans, singular among all Europeans, to introduce the term “US-Amerikaner” (US-American) to denote Americans. Not even the French speak of Americans as “EU-Americains.” Worse than bearing a name of a continent instead of a “proper” nation state” is the usage of “the United States” which is even less of a concrete national entity and totally abstract, devoid of history, substance and authenticity. The latter point is ubiquitous: Whatever America might be, it is inauthentic. The world of soccer offers a fine example for my point precisely because, whatever one wants to argue about this sport and its culture, it is clear that the United States has been—at best—an also-ran in it throughout all of the twentieth century with no power or importance. America simply did not matter—and still matters very little. When the World Cup was awarded to the United States for the summer of 1994, much of the European press was appalled. Instead of rejoicing that the last important terra incognita for soccer was about to be conquered by the “beautiful game,” the usual objections to American crassness, vulgarity, commercialism and ignorance were loudly voiced by Europeans in notable contrast to Latin Americans who, if objective criteria and real injustices were to decide predilections and negative opinions, have had many more compelling reasons to dislike the United States than do Europeans. Many Europeans argued that giving the ­tournament



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to the Americans was tantamount to degrading the game and its tradition. The facilities were denigrated, the organization ridiculed, the whole endeavor treated with derision. When the stadia were filled like in no other World Cup tournament before or since, when the level of violence and arrests was far and away the lowest at any event of this size, the European press chalked this up to the stupidity and ignorance of Americans. Of course Americans came to the games, because they like events and pageantry, but did they really enjoy and understand the games? Could they ever learn to? When more than 60,000 people crowded into Giants Stadium near New York City on a Wednesday afternoon to watch Saudi Arabia play Morocco (surely no powerhouses in the world of soccer), this, too, was attributed to the vast ignorance of Americans regarding soccer. Indeed, five articles proudly pointed to the fact that similar games in soccer-savvy Italy attracted fewer than 20,000 people in the 1990 World Cup held in that country. Those few European journalists that bothered to write anything about American sports such as baseball which, as always in the summer, was in full swing at the time, had nothing but contempt, derision and ridicule for the game: no attempt to engage its traditions, no endeavor to understand it on its own terms, just merely yet another vehicle to confirm one’s prejudices about America. Michel Platini, the former French soccer great of the 1980s and in charge of organizing the subsequent World Cup in France, summed up his feelings and judgments in the vernacular of current Europe: “The World Cup in the United States was outstanding, but it was like Coca Cola. Ours will be like sparkling champagne.” (quoted in Markovits 1998: 1) Surely Platini could not have meant to characterize the riots, the violence, the ticket scandals, the racial insults that occurred during the tournament in France as “sparkling champagne.” And it is equally unclear what he meant by characterizing the American tournament as “Coca Cola.” The code, however, was clear to all: regardless of its actual success and its achievements, the American event was by definition crude and inauthentic (like Coca Cola), whereas the French— equally by definition—was inevitably going to be refined and profound (like champagne). It was remarkable how differently the European press reported on the World Cup 2002 in Japan and South Korea, both newcomers to the world of soccer, just like the United States. Rave reviews were accorded to the facilities and organization in both countries. This contrasted sharply to the negative tone describing the equivalent ­structures

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in the United States in 1994 even though fifa, for example, and soccer officials had nothing but praise for the American effort. What was viewed as kitsch in the American context (the opening ceremony, for example, and other pageantries accompanying the tournament) was lauded as artistic and innovative in the Japanese and South Korean equivalent. Lastly, the American team was first ridiculed as an incompetent group of players who barely deserved to be in the tournament. The huge upset over Portugal was attributed to sheer luck. When Team USA advanced to the second round and then defeated its archrival Mexico, many in the press corps who were vocally rooting for the Mexicans during the game remained stunned in silence at the press center. In notable contrast to the positive sentiment that was expressed towards Turkey, Senegal and South Korea, the other Cinderella teams of the tournament, nothing but bitterness and derision was voiced towards the American team. And when the mighty Germans narrowly (and luckily) beat the Americans in a quarterfinal, some European commentators became genuinely alarmed. Quipped one British journalist: “This is terrible. Now they are getting good at this, too. They will steal our game. Imagine eleven Michael Jordans running onto the pitch at Wembley. That would be the end.” Damned if you do, damned if you don’t—it could not be articulated more clearly: when the Americans play poorly, they are irritating merely by doing so and because they are aloof from everybody. When they finally play well, they are disliked because they have joined everybody but in doing so have also become threatening. This underlying irritation was further confirmed during my many lectures on comparative sports in Germany, especially on my two book tours in support of the German edition of my book Offside. In literally every forum in which I presented my book and work—from university campuses to book stores; from rented public halls to semi-private settings; from Saarbrücken in the West to Potsdam in the East—at some point the question arose as to whether I did not find it arrogant that the Americans’ sports culture centered on baseball, basketball and American football, and did not include soccer; whether indeed this was not yet another expression of America’s self-anointed status as being better than the rest of the world. To many people my response that this development bespoke America’s different history and its construction of its own modernity, which indeed entailed creating its own sports culture, did not allay their suspicions that underneath it all there lurked a normative dimension that somehow made America—in the



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Americans’ eyes—better rather than just different. Fears along the lines that Americans might yet prove successful at soccer as well merely reinforced the constant malaise with and disdain for the United States regardless as to what it actually did or did not do. Lastly, one need only follow the British media’s openly anti-American (and barely concealed antisemitic) tone in its opposition to the American Jewish businessman Malcolm Glazer’s recent acquisition of Manchester United. The derision of Glazer as a poor dresser, as physically ugly, as arrogant, as greedy, as being a total ignoramus of the world of soccer has no bounds. But beyond that, the take-over of Manchester United—without any doubt the world’s most capitalist football club and as globalized a business entity as one can imagine—is uniformly depicted as the rape by an ugly American Jew of a pristinely little and innocent local English club that has thus far never even encountered capitalism let alone become its most obvious poster child in the world of international sports. The tone and content of the British media in the Glazer–Manchester United affair parallel exactly in time and space the notorious “locust” affair in Germany wherein Franz Müntefering, the Social Democratic Party’s (SPD) chairman explicitly singled out American firms with Jewish-sounding names as locusts that descend upon defenseless German companies, suck them dry of their profits and assets and then depart—like locusts. Not to be outdone, metall, the monthly publication of IG Metall, Germany’s— perhaps Europe’s—most important trade union featured mosquitoes with American hats and Stürmer-style beaks who suck out the blood from upright and well-meaning German firms and then burp out their destroyed carcasses. The link between Jews and America is obvious to all in the German and the British cases. While it was indeed the case—as expected—that left-leaning publications like The Guardian, Le Monde, Frankfurter Rundschau and die tageszeitung featured on balance much more negative reporting about things American both in style and in content compared to that of their centrist and conservative competitors, this was by no means always the case. Precisely because my sample was heavily skewed towards cultural topics and away from conventionally political ones, disdainful language toward and ridicule of America was often also quite eminent in such publications as Le Figaro, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, The Times and La Stampa. Notable was the increase in irritation as the 1990s progressed. Well before George W. Bush entered the White House and even during Bill Clinton’s presidency, European newspapers became noticeably

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more critical of the United States. After all, this was the decade in which the French foreign minister Hubert Védrine used every opportunity to inveigh against the United States, this new “hyperpuissance.” And with each passing year of the decade more Europeans welcomed his message. The negative predisposition ran so deep that even those few American innovations that one would expect European progressives to like were deformed into basically negative caricatures. Take affirmative action, multiculturalism, feminism and America’s campaign against cigarette smoking. Rather than seeing these as impressive steps towards progressive reform, many European commentators—even on the Left—decried these as merely mutated expressions of American puritanism, collective control and hysteria. Many articles derided these reforms under the rubric of “political correctness.” They warned that American universities had been taken over by zealous feminists who dictated a moral code that forbade flirting and punished men for complimenting women. Indeed, key French elites all but accused American feminism of deviously undermining the purity of the French language. When the French decided to introduce some neologisms such as “directrice,” “conseillère,” and “Madame la ministre” that feminized hitherto male nouns for women holding such positions of distinction, the secretary of the Académie Française, among others, opposed these potential changes not only on the ground of tradition and linguistic esthetics but by virtue of seeing this unwanted reform as a dark ploy by American feminists who, by way of Québec and the successful perversion of the French language used in that Canadian province, were going to undermine surreptitiously the purity of the French language in France proper. Concerning the prominence of women in America’s soccer world, to Europeans this was yet another prima facie case for the American penchant to subvert, distort and essentially sully a sacred European tradition. Article upon article warned of the decline of American universities whose curricula were allegedly hijacked by ideological commissars whose task it was to replace Western civilization with politically correct multiculturalism. Once again, damned if you do, damned if you don’t. If one of the standard staples of European complaint against American universities consisted of their alleged elitism, now the alleged opposite was held against them: somehow they seem to have degenerated into institutions wherein standards of achievement were completely forfeited for measures governed by political correctness dictated by the



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unqualified. To many European commentators—and their high-brow audiences—America had degenerated into a quasi-Orwellian society, following the dictates of a puritanical culture supervised by increasingly rigid governmental rules on the one hand, and succumbing to the exigencies of an uncontrolled market with no social consciousness whatsoever. America the prudish and the prurient; home of unbridled individualism and collectivist conformity; progenitor of Harvard and Hollywood, the former representing the very best education that only lots of money can buy, the latter embodying shallow shlock. In a sense, ever more Europeans began to view America as a different civilization from Europe’s, and surely an inferior one.14 European labor’s anti-Americanism, usually confined to vocal opposition of American capitalism and foreign policy, also manifested itself in a clear disdain for American workers. In a detailed study of Daimler workers’ attitudes in Stuttgart towards their presumed fraternal colleagues in the Daimler-Chrysler plants around Detroit, there were no attempts made to hide the contempt and disdain. Chrysler workers were characterized as lazy, incompetent, inferior. The Stuttgart crew did not want its allegedly superior products “contaminated” by the shoddy American ways of the Chrysler workers. The contempt did not remain confined to the factory gates. Chrysler workers’ home milieus and recreational habits were also ridiculed and characterized as inferior (Markovits 2001). Overall conclusion: virtually all aspects of American culture— including its highbrow variant—experienced at least one derisive or dismissive comment, even among the minority of articles that featured a positive view towards the issue reported. More than 75% of the articles were overwhelmingly negative in the presentation of their topic. Most of these exhibited what I have called “gratuitous” or “surplus” anti-Americanism meaning that there were objections lodged which were not imminent criticisms of the issue at hand but rather catered to a pejorative generalization of America or Americans that had little bearing on the immediate topic. The term “Americanization” of whatever the case may be (movies, theater, universities, business practices, habits, subway construction, car manufacturing, sports) was almost always invoked in a negative manner and conveyed a clearly undesirable situation. Even beyond the United States itself, many adversities

  For a succinct summary of this argument, see Shlapentokh (2002).

14

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in Europe were conveniently associated with America. When a crazed teenager gunned down his classmates and teachers in Erfurt, much of the subsequent German debate blamed an alleged “Americanization” of German youth, society and culture for this tragedy. When an extreme heat wave tormented Europeans, articles appeared decrying the “Americanization” of Europe’s climate. Americans were to blame when the dollar was high, just as they were to blame when the dollar was low. Thus Gerhard Schröder’s constant invoking of “amerikanische Verhältnisse” as a negative icon for effective political mobilization made perfect sense for his successful electoral campaign in 2002. “Americanization” of anything has in the meantime developed such a solid basis of pejorative connotations in Western Europe that it pays for politicians to use this sentiment as an agent of mobilization and legitimation. Above all, it elicits virtually unanimous contempt that crosses political allegiances, social positions, nationalities, age, and gender. It short, “America” has ubiquitously become a thoroughly negative trope in contemporary Western Europe. 9/11 added a hitherto underdeveloped sentiment to this antiAmerican mix—that of Schadenfreude. One always hears on this side of the Atlantic how Europe’s good will towards the United States immediately following 9/11 was squandered by the Bush Administration’s aggressive unilateralism. True for the masses, not true for the elites, who had no such good will to squander. Never before was the cleavage between the views of Europe’s elites and its masses concerning America clearer than in the immediate wake of that tragedy. While, on the whole, Europe’s mass opinion was deeply sympathetic towards Americans (New Yorkers in particular) and empathized with Americans as victims, Europe’s elites—especially its cultural ones—by and large did neither. Ground Zero was still burning when the first reports in the quality media initiated all the arguments, objections, analyses, conjectures, conspiracy theories and open rejoicing that have become commonplace: that the Americans clearly had it coming to them; that this was justified payback for all American misdeeds of the past, from Vietnam to globalization, from exterminating the Native Americans to Dresden (two often-voiced staples of the German reaction as expressed repeatedly in taz, Der Spiegel, Frankfurter Rundschau, radio and television talk shows, and the Römerberggespräche in Frankfurt to mention but a few venues); that this was no big deal since many more Americans die in yearly traffic accidents; that, if anything, the destruction of the Twin Towers improved New York’s skyline; that the Israeli Mossad was



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behind it all since many Jews stayed away from work that day lest they be killed; that it was all a ploy by the American government to obtain a carte blanche for its imperialist endeavors, very similar to the burning of the Reichstag in February of 1933 that led to the consolidation of the Nazi dictatorship (again, often voiced in Germany, though not exclusively there); that George W. Bush and Osama bin Laden were identical in their mental makeup and their (mainly religious) fanaticism, basically mirror images of each other, just as the United States in its religious revivalism was not a real democracy but in fact resembled the theocratic fanaticism of the Islamists. Just as the Israeli psychiatrist Zvi Rex was completely correct in saying that the Germans will never forgive the Jews for Auschwitz, so, too, will they never forgive the Americans for being daily reminders that it was they—together with the Red Army—who defeated Nazism, not the Germans. By year’s end, bookstores in Paris, Berlin and London were full of publications that—basically—rejoiced at the tragedy of 9/11. In France, Thierry Meyssan’s L’Effroyable Imposture (The Terrible Fraud ), which argued that the crime of 9/11 was totally committed by the American government, made it to the top of the charts and became a steady bestseller. Ditto Mathias Broecker’s—a former taz editor’s—book with an identical theme that sold 130,000 copies for a very small German publisher in less than eight months and remained on various bestseller lists for many more. Examples abound wherein a significant voice of Europe’s intellectuals and elites expressed a virtually unveiled Schadenfreude in America’s woes: for Baudrillard the destruction of the Twin Towers was the fulfillment of a long-held dream; for Stockhausen it was a great piece of art. And the rhapsodization by European intellectuals went on and on. A close reading of Jean-Marie Colombani’s editorial in Le Monde of September 12 entitled, “Nous Sommes Tous Américains,” which has been touted as a major statement of solidarity with the United States, reveals quite the opposite: Colombani accuses the Americans of being the progenitors of Osama Bin Laden and thus the godfathers of jihaddist terrorism. Permit me to submit the following telling counterfactual: had the Air France Airbus A-300 Flight 8969 on December 24, 1994, crashed into the Eiffel Tower in Paris, as the Groupe Islamique Armée wanted it to, I doubt very much that any— let alone many—American intellectuals would have written lengthy pieces in prestigious publications like The New York Times or The Washington Post by, say, December 26 and 27 all but exculpating this crime by invoking France’s many military and political missteps as well as

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its atrocities, from the Vendée to the Paris Commune, from Indochina to Algeria. Nor would they have invoked all kinds of conspiracy theories involving the French government, the Israeli Mossad or any of the other agents so often mentioned in connection with 9/11. I doubt very much that books purporting that such a crime was actually planned and executed by the French president—had this terrible tragedy become reality—would have been written by American intellectuals, let alone become bestsellers in the United States. But all of this indeed happened in Europe, particularly among social groups from whom one would least expect it by dint of their intelligence and education. Clearly, antipathy, as has often been the case, trumps either and both. It was payback time for Mr. Big’s arrogant attitude and demeanor, for his general misdeeds like imperialism as well as specific ones like the bombing of Dresden, but above all simply for his being big. To be sure, everybody hates Mr. Big in any contexts, be it in politics or in the classroom, be it Manchester United, the New York Yankees, or Harvard.15 Alas, Schadenfreude is a very human trait which in fact gains in respectability and legitimacy when it pertains to the suffering of a perceived giant. That the widely held and vocally expressed Schadenfreude and anger pertaining to 9/11 quickly shifted from Europe’s intellectuals and elites to a significant percentage of the population is best demonstrated by opinion polls, which clearly reveal that by the summer of 2003, for example, one-third of Germans under age thirty believed that the U.S. government sponsored the September 11, 2001, attacks on New York and Washington. About 20% of the entire German population agreed with this view, according to the same survey (Bittner 2003). And when as serious a person as Andreas von Bülow, former state secretary in an spd-led government, writes a very successful book touting these views and when conspiracy theories deeply steeped in anti-Americanism and antisemitism have entered the

15  There are many books dedicated solely to expressing antipathy towards Manchester United. Among the better known are Manchester United Ruined My Life, Red Devils: A History of Man United’s Rogues and Villains, and Yessss!!!: United in Defeat, the latter being an especially evocative expression of Schadenfreude at its purest. As for parallels concerning the New York Yankees, one only need to think of the immensely popular musical “Damn Yankees,” in which the Yankees are equated with the devil. And pertaining to Harvard, I have never heard colleagues refer to any other university as the “evil empire.”



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mainstream in Germany and France, then this clearly constitutes a serious matter. Fifty years ago, in a 1954 lecture at Princeton University dealing with the European image of “America” (that is, of the United States), the social theorist Hannah Arendt warned of a political-cultural undercurrent which she conceptualized as a rising ‘pan-European nationalism’ (Rensmann 2006). Its very basis, she claimed, was neither a common European history and experience, nor a pre-existing European identity. It was first and foremost anti-Americanism, that is a general hostility towards “America” and the citizens of the United States to which this European ‘pan-nationalism’ is intimately related. In the European image, Arendt argues, America now 1) becomes emblematic for the (European) problem of totalitarianism, 2) represents all the negative aspects of socio-cultural and technological modernization and, foremost, 3) serves as a common foe, a counter-image with an identitycreating function for Europe herself. Based on empirical observations, Arendt fears that the political institutionalization of a European body politic and government and Europe’s integration, which she strongly endorses in principle, is in danger of being approached as an act of liberation from America’s democracy, culture, and America as a symbol of modernity at large: “If it is true that each nationalism (though, of course, not the birth of every nation) begins with a real or fabricated common enemy, then the current image of America in Europe may well become the beginning of a new pan-European nationalism. [. . .] Since Europe is apparently no longer willing to see in America whatever it has to hope or to fear from her own future development, it has a tendency to consider the establishment of a European government an act of emancipation from America.” (Arendt 1994: 416–7; cf. Rensmann 2005) At the end of the day the debate about America and the various views of and attitudes towards America by Europeans have little to do with the “real existing America” itself and everything with Europe. It is far from certain in which direction the anti-Americanism analyzed in this work will proceed, since it remains equally uncertain where, how, perhaps even if and whether Europe will develop. But one thing remains quite telling: nobody ever spoke of Europe’s birth being the fall of the Berlin Wall or the dissolution of the Soviet Union and its communist rule over the eastern half of the continent. And true enough, none of those events attained nearly the popular enthusiasm that February 15, 2003, clearly did. Then, in 1989–1990, while Berliners danced in the

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streets, Londoners and Parisians fretted in their homes. And nobody in Europe’s West thronged any public place in support of the celebrations in Warsaw and Prague. Whether Strauss-Kahn, Habermas and their friends will prove correct in that this day will indeed become Europe’s national holiday, only future historians will be able to ascertain for certain. One thing is clear, though: the long tradition of a deep ambivalence towards and a constant preoccupation with America in Europe clearly set the intellectual stage for the powerful symbolic presence of this potentially fateful day. History teaches us that any entity—certainly in its developing stages—only attains consciousness and self-awareness by defining itself in opposition to another entity. All nationalisms arose in opposition to others. While at the moment it still remains unclear what positive sentiments and identifications unite Swedes and Greeks, it is quite clear what negative dimension does: that of not being American. This need not at all necessitate an active anti-Americanism but it certainly requires a clear delineation in opposition to America. Today, one is primarily European by dint of not being American. Whereas the European flag has obviously become an important symbol of a new sovereignty, I have yet to see it identified with any positive emotions and pride the way national flags of conventional states do with regularity. Only once have I seen the European flag being an object of pride and obvious emotion—and not surprisingly it was in the context of a contest between the United States and Europe: The Ryder Cup match between Europe and the United States in September 2004 in a suburb of Detroit, Michigan. Sitting beside me on one of the greens was a portly Englishman sporting an England T-shirt, not a British one. When the Irish player Padraig Harrington won the hole with a superb putt defeating his American opponent, the Englishman jumped up with unfettered enthusiasm, waved a European flag widely all over the place and screamed at the top of his lungs, “Go Europe.” Indeed, when the superbly playing European team humiliated the poorly playing Americans, the ensuing celebration featured many European flags that draped the players hailing from England, Northern Ireland, the Irish Republic, Sweden, and Spain. They were coached by a German. Lest I be misunderstood, the last thing I want to do is accuse any of the players of being even in the vaguest way anti-American. They certainly were not. But their unity was defined as “European” merely by dint of their playing Team USA. With the entity of “Europe” now on the agenda, anti-Americanism may well serve as a useful coagulating function for the establishment of this new entity and become a potent



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political force on the mass level way beyond the elites’ antipathy and ressentiment that has been a staple of European intellectual life since July 5, 1776, if not before. V.  Outlook Upon a superficial glance, it would appear that the arrival of Barack Obama as the 44th president of the United States has eliminated much of the Europeans’ anti-Americanism. After all, Obamamania engulfed Britain and the Continent by the spring of 2008 when Obama fought his epic primary battle for the nomination of the Democratic Party with the titanic Hilary Clinton. Certainly, by July of that year, when more than 200,000 enthusiastic people cheered Obama’s every word in front of Berlin’s Victory Column, one could have had the impression that anti-Americanism was all but dead and would certainly be by January 20, 2009, when the hated George W. Bush was to depart to Texas and the beloved Obama was to occupy the White House. Alas, this was not the case as was repeatedly demonstrated in the economic crisis that was to beset the world by the fall of that year in which Europeans blamed the United States and its “American ways” as the singular culprits of this depression. (It would be much beyond the purview of this essay to argue that the economic crisis facilitated, if not necessarily unleashed, an added degree of overt and covert antisemitism in Europeans’ discourse about the crisis. A few mouse clicks onto the Internet pages of the most established and finest media will reveal a tone of hostility and aggression towards Jews—let alone Israel—in the thousands of readers’ voices that make it clear that antisemitism remains alive and well in contemporary Europe.) But even before the crisis, Europeans’ view of Obama became so friendly and enthusiastic because—in a sense—they appropriated him as a quasi European: elegant, eloquent, sophisticated, and educated, thus by definition, a European in every way. Most certainly, Obama was not a “real” American: cowboy-like, inauthentic and uncouth in every way. What rendered this depiction so insincere was, firstly, the fact that in any European country—bar none!—anybody vaguely similar to Barack Obama—from his name, to his skin color, from his ancestry, to his life’s history—would have had less than zero chance to being elected to any high office in the land, let alone to those of head of state (president) or head of government (chancellor or prime minister).

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But secondly, by depicting Barack Obama as this quasi European, this un-American, European Obamamania obviated a genuine engagement with America, a true understanding of the side of its history which has offered millions of people like Obama a chance in life that they would never have had anywhere in Europe. George W. Bush, the most convenient conduit for recent antiAmericanism, had departed from the scene. But this did not mean that anti-Americanism had lost its potency. Indeed, in a world in which challenging the United States and everything American, has gone way beyond the chattering classes of London, Paris and Berlin, and constitutes an essential part of global politics, anti-Americanism will remain a valuable currency that politicians will readily harness for their purposes. No degree of Obamamania will obscure this reality. References Ajami, Fouad (2003) The Falseness of Anti-Americanism. Foreign Policy 138, September/ October. Arendt, Hannah (1994) Essays in Understanding, 1930–1954, ed. by Jerome Kohn (New York: Harcourt, Brace And Co., 1994). Art, David (2005) The Politics of the Nazi Past in Germany and Austria (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Bittner, Jochen (2003) Umfrage: Blackbox Weißes Haus—Je komplizierter die Weltlage, desto fester glauben die Deutschen an Verschwörungstheorien. Die Zeit, July 31. Breines, Paul (1990) Tough Jews: Political Fantasies and the Moral Dilemma of American Jewry (New York: Basic Books). Buruma, Ian (2003) Wielding the moral class. The Financial Times Weekend Magazine, September 13. Chiozza, Giacomo (2009) A Crisis like no Other? Anti-Americanism at the Time of the Iraq War. European Journal of International Relations 15, 2: 257–289. Cohen, Mitchell (2004) Auto-Emancipation and Anti-Semitism: Homage to Bernard Lazare. Jewish Social Studies 10, 1: 69–77. Cohen, Rich (1998) Tough Jews (New York: Simon and Schuster). Diner, Dan (2002) Feindbild Amerika: Über die Beständigkeit eines Ressentiments (Munich: Propylaen Verlag). Elster, Jon (1999) Alchemies of the Mind: Rationality and the Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Goldhagen, Daniel Jonah (2003) The Globalization of Anti-Semitism. The Forward, May 2. Hollander, Paul (1992) Anti-Americanism: Critiques at Home and Abroad, 1965–1990 (New York: Oxford University Press). Klein Halevi, Yossi (2003) Entwined Hatreds: Anti-Americanism. Gloria Center, Herzliya, Israel, September 17. Landes, Richard (2000) What Happens when Jesus Doesn’t Come: Jewish and Christian Relations in Apocalyptic Time. Unpublished paper, Center for Millenial Studies, Boston University.



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Lilla, Mark (2003) The End of Politics. The New Republic, June 11, 2003. Markovits, Andrei S. (1989) Anti-Americanism and the Struggle for a West German Identity. In Peter H. Merkl (ed.) The Federal Republic of Germany at Forty (New York: New York University Press). Markovits, Andrei S. (1998) Reflections on the World Cup ’98. French Politics and Society 16, 3. Markovits, Andrei S. (2001) Deutscher Hochmut statt internationaler Solidarität—ein trauriger Vorfall. Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte 52, 3 (March): 186–188. Ostendorf, Berndt (1999) The Final Idiocy of the Reversed Baseball Cap: Transatlantische Widersprüche in der Amerikanisierungsdebatte. Amerikastudien/American Studies 44, 1 (1999). —— (2001) Why Is American Popular Culture So Popular? A View from Europe. Amerikastudien/American Studies 46, 3 (2001). Rensmann, Lars (2006) Europeanism and Americanism in the Age of Globalization: Hannah Arendt’s Reflections on Europe and America and Implications for a Post-National Identity of the EU Polity. European Journal of Political Theory 5, 2: 139–170. Roger, Philippe (2002) L’Ennemi Américain: Généalogie de l’antiaméricanisme français (Paris: Editions du Seuil). Roy, Mario (1993) Pour en finir avec l’antiaméricanisme (Québec: Boréal). Seregni, Alessandro (2007) El Antiamericanismo Español (Madrid: Editorial Sintesis) Shlapentokh, Dmitry (2002) The New Anti-Americanism: America as an Orwellian Society. Partisan Review LXIX, 2. Steyn, Mark (2004) “We are falling under the imam’s spell,” The Daily Telegraph, January 13, 2004. Vinocur, John (2003) Continental Divide: Despite Some Promising Signs, Europe Is Still a Baseball Backwater. The New York Times, July 19. Zeller, John (1992) The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion (New York: Cambridge University Press).

Playing the Nazi Card: Israel, Jews, and Antisemitism Paul Iganski and Abe Sweiry1 I.  Introduction: The Growing Normalization of the ‘Nazi Card’ Placards carrying images of swastikas superimposed on the Star of David, and the Israeli flag, were commonplace in street-level protests about the recent Israeli military actions and the conflict in Gaza in December 2008 and January 2009. Allusions between Nazi genocidal practices and the activities of the Israeli state were also drawn in some of the speeches at protest meetings, and press commentary on the conflict. Although this was not the first occasion that the ‘Nazi card’ had been played against Israel and Jews, the prevalence of the phenomenon appears to indicate its growing normalization. Playing the ‘Nazi card’ is a discursive act involving the use of Nazi or related terms or symbols (Nazism, Hitler, swastikas, etc.) in reference to Jews, Israel, Zionism or aspects of the Jewish experience.2 It manifests in words uttered in speech or in writing, or in visual representations such as artwork, drawings, caricatures, cartoons (Kotek 2008), graffiti, daubings and scratchings, or visual expressions such as a Nazi salute or the clicking of heels. In many instances, the playing of the Nazi card is unquestionably antisemitic. However, the inclusion of particular modes of criticism of Israel in definitions of antisemitism has provoked controversy. The result has been a war of words which has stagnated into an intellectual and discursive cul-de-sac of claim and counterclaim about what does and does not qualify as antisemitism.

1   This chapter is extracted and amended from Paul Iganski and Abe Sweiry (2009). Understanding and Addressing the ‘Nazi Card.’ Intervening Against Antisemitic Discourse (London: European Institute for the Study of Contemporary Antisemitism (EISCA). See: http://www.eiscablog.eu/). The authors gratefully acknowledge EISCA for permission to reproduce extracts from the original in this chapter. 2   The term ‘Playing the Nazi card’ should not be confused with the notion of ‘Reductio ad Hitlerum’ whereby, in the words of Leo Strauss, a view is refuted “by the fact that it happens to have been shared by Hitler” (Strauss 1953: 42–3).

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Because of this, in focusing on discourse, this chapter attempts to shift the focus of analysis of contemporary antisemitism onto new ground: away from labeling and defining the problem, to an understanding of the consequences of antisemitic discourse. By unraveling and dissecting various manifestations of the phenomenon, the chapter reveals how the playing of the Nazi card scratches deep wounds by invoking painful collective memory of the Holocaust. Given the war of words that has been in evidence about the problem of Nazi allusions voiced about Israel and Zionism the chapter aims to bring some clarity to the egregious nature of the Nazi card by discussing four different variants of the problem: the Nazi card as abuse against Jews; the Nazi card as abuse against the collective memory of the Holocaust; the Nazi card in the casting of Jews as conspirators and collaborators with the Nazis; the Nazi card manifest in discourse about Israel and Zionism. II.  The Nazi Card and Abuse against Jews When the Nazi card is played in explicit abuse against Jews it is almost exclusively antisemitic. Few would question such an assertion about the many incidents reported annually to the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) in the United States and to the Community Security Trust (CST) in the United Kingdom. Examples of such incidents from the CST’s Antisemitic Incidents Report 2007 include a swastika and the words “Hitler will return” daubed on a wall outside a Jewish youth club in London; headstones daubed with swastikas in a Jewish cemetery in Surrey; a message left on a synagogue answering machine in Lancashire in which the caller said: “Jew dog, gas sniffer, six million wasn’t enough, your synagogue is on fire”; “Heil Hitler” shouted at a Jewish man in his workplace by a colleague, followed by a Nazi salute and a threat that he would make his “f * * * ing head roll”; and swastikas scratched into the door of a Jewish student’s room and on nearby walls in a university hall of residence. Unquestionably, when the Nazi card is played in such cases of abuse against Jews, most people would consider it to be antisemitic and to involve harmful consequences for those victimized. Irrespective of whether it is labeled as ‘antisemitic’, however, playing the Nazi card undoubtedly always offends—even when it is played against Jews by fellow Jews. And it is the offense that matters for deciding why and how the Nazi card should be addressed.



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The Nazi card is not exclusively played against Jews. But, when Jewish people are targeted, it would be an understatement to propose that given the depth of the collective wounds involved, we might anticipate deeper hurts to be inflicted than when it is played against others. The hurts inflicted are inevitably mediated by the collective historical memory of a people.3 It is the discursive nature of the acts that inflicts the greater harms, and those harms are also inflicted when the discourse alone constitutes the act. But such discourse lies generally beyond the reach of the criminal law in nation states unless the person on the receiving end is put in fear of immediate violence. It is also beyond the reach of the civil law unless it occurs in the workplace, thereby constituting unlawful race discrimination, or is published in writing, whereby it will be subject to provisions for libel. III.  The Nazi Card and Abuse against the Collective Memory of the Holocaust When the Nazi card is played against identifiable persons individually or collectively, it unquestionably involves clear-cut abuse and its unacceptability is obvious to everyone, even if such cases are dealt with inconsistently by the criminal and civil law. The problem becomes more opaque, however, when discursive acts are couched in less profane language and are targeted at more diffuse entities. Such is the case with the discourse of Holocaust-related abuse. The problem of Holocaust denial is one prominent example of such discourse—by definition a case of playing the Nazi card as it is a discursive act against Jews collectively in which the historical memory of the Nazi regime is invoked and used against them. Not many people would question an assertion that distortion and misrepresentation of the historical facts of the Holocaust is insulting and offensive to the memory of those who were murdered, those who

3   Given the collective memory amongst German people of the Nazi regime, Nazi allusions are especially sensitive and hurtful. For this reason, in part, the public display of Nazi insignia has been banned in Germany since the end of the Second World War.

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survived, and their descendants. But the harm inflicted by Holocaust denial goes beyond insult and offense. Abuse of collective memory of the Holocaust scratches deep wounds that are not yet healed over. This was acknowledged by legal judgements in Germany where some of the very first provisions in Europe against Holocaust denial were established criminalizing what is there referred to as the “AuschwitzLüge,” or Auschwitz-Lie. The provisions prohibit the disparagement of the memory of deceased persons and aim to protect human dignity (StGB 2008). It is instructive to briefly examine the legal origins of the provisions to reinforce the point about the harms inflicted by Holocaust denial. In one of Germany’s earliest landmark legal decisions on the problem, the then West German Federal Supreme Court in 1979 concluded that “nobody has a protected right to make untrue allegations” and that: “Whoever tries to deny the truth of past events, denies to every Jew the respect to which he is entitled. To the individual affected this must appear as a continuation of discrimination against his group and therefore indirectly against his person.” (Institute for Jewish Affairs 1979) In upholding a civil injunction against a neo-Nazi who had erected signs declaring that the murder of six million Jews by the Third Reich was a “Zionist swindle” and a lie, the court concluded that offense was not only inflicted upon those who suffered personally, but upon every Jewish person: “Not the personal fate but the historical events are the criterion which weighs upon the personality of every Jew in Germany and upon his personal and social relationship to his German fellow-citizens . . . The terrible events have formed the personality of the citizens of Jewish origin, who embody the past even if they were not personally part of it.” (Institute for Jewish Affairs 1979: 4) The Court also concluded that no time limit could be set upon the harms inflicted: “As long as the past is still present, it can only be done when the events have become a mere historical process. In Germany at present, such distance from the past does not yet exist.” Three decades on from this judgement it might be argued that such distance from the past still does not yet exist for Jews around the world. That is why Holocaust denial hurts—it is an ongoing act of discrimination that strikes at the core of a person’s Jewish identity—and the harmful consequences provide the justification for addressing the problem.



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IV.  The Nazi Card in the Casting of Jews as Conspirators and Collaborators with the Nazis Conspiracy theories about Jews have historically provided the mainstay of antisemitic discourse. New conspiracies are promoted with varying malevolence often in reaction to prevailing social, political and economic calamities. Once given life, the conspiracy theories become part of the everyday ideology and discourse of what it is to be a Jew. In the view of one scholar, Brian Klug, antisemitism can be conceived as a doctrine, an ideology, a discourse, and particular sentiments about Jews. To borrow Klug’s words it is a “form of hostility towards Jews as Jews, in which Jews are perceived as something other than what they are. Or more succinctly: hostility towards Jews as not Jews. For the ‘Jew’ towards whom the antisemite feels hostile is not a real Jew at all. Thinking that Jews are really ‘Jews’ is precisely the core of antisemitism” (Klug 2003: 123–4). The conspiratorial nature of the Jew is a core theme of antisemitic discourse. According to such a characterization, Klug proposes that Jews collectively are conceived as “a sinister people set apart from all others not merely by its customs but by a collective character: arrogant, secretive, cunning, grasping, always looking to turn a profit. Wherever they go, the Jews form a state within a state, preying on the societies in whose midst they dwell. Mysteriously powerful, their hidden hand controls the banks and the media, dragging governments into war if this suits their Jewish agenda” (Klug 2006). The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, and Henry Ford’s The International Jew, are exemplars of such a depiction of the Jew. And more recent conspiracy theories about Jews manifest this malevolent discursive characterization. It has been suggested that in recent discourse regarding the alleged role of Zionists or an Israel lobby in Western societies, the language and terms of reference used to depict their alleged actions has sometimes been reminiscent of language and themes similar to those identified by Klug when discussing the traditional depiction of the conduct of the mythical Jew (see Hirsh 2007; Lappin 2009; Gardner 2007; Rich 2007). Zionists and the “Zionist lobby” have periodically been depicted as conspirators, controllers of the media, and of wielding undue power and influence over governments. It might therefore be suggested that such sentiment, when echoing traditional antisemitic conspiracy theories but ostensibly targeting Zionists, is likewise not

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grounded in any real sense of ‘what they are’ but has similarly come to reflect a discourse of hatred against Zionists as ‘Zionists.’ In other words, creating an image of the mythical Zionist that echoes that of the mythical Jew. This has coalesced most visibly with the playing of the Nazi card in the objectionable allegations of historical ‘Zionist’ collaboration with the Nazis during the Second World War. Likewise, one of the most egregious conspiracy theories about Jews concerns not just allegations of Jewish complicity and collusion with Nazi genocidal policies, but also alleged distortion, manipulation and exploitation of the catastrophe of the Holocaust by Jews since that time. In one of the earliest British contributions to the Holocaustdenial literature, Did Six Million Really Die? The Truth at Last,4 published in 1974, Richard Harwood claimed that the “deception” committed by “the Jewish people” had brought an “incalculable benefit” in that the “alleged extent of their persecution quickly aroused sympathy for the Jewish national homeland they had sought for so long.” Such sympathy, according to Harwood, swayed the British government as after the end of the Second World War it “did little to prevent Jewish emigration to Palestine which they had declared illegal, and it was not long afterwards that the Zionists wrested from the government the land of Palestine and created their haven from persecution, the State of Israel” (quoted in Lipstadt 1994: 104). Harwood preposterously concluded: “It is a remarkable fact that the Jewish people emerged from the Second World War as nothing less than a triumphant minority.” The “Jewish people” were not only the victors of the Second World War, according to Harwood, they were also the financial beneficiaries as the “supposed massacre of the Six Million” was “undoubtedly the most profitable atrocity allegation of all time.” Harwood claimed: “To date, the staggering figure of six thousand million pounds has been paid out in compensation by the Federal Government of West Germany, mostly to the State of Israel (which did not even exist during the Second World War), as well as to individual Jewish claimants.” (quoted in Lipstadt 1994: 104) The core conspiracy themes voiced by Harwood are key themes reproduced in Holocaust denial literature. The language used in the

4   Harwood (1974). The booklet was not just circulated amongst a lunatic fringe. It was sent to all members of Parliament, a number of other public figures, journalists, academics and prominent members of Britain’s Jewish community. Apparently, “within less than a decade, more than a million copies had been distributed in more than forty countries.” (Lipstadt 1994: 104, citing New Statesman, November 2, 1979: 670).



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discourse of Holocaust denial is illuminating in itself, as Gill Seidel pointed out over two decades ago: “The language is significant— ‘hoax,’ ‘swindle,’ ‘racket’—all in themselves implying ‘Jew’ through the historical accumulation of antisemitic connotations (money grabbing, Jewing, Shylock, etc.).” (Seidel 1986: 130) V.  Playing the Nazi Card against Israel and Zionism One of the most challenging components of antisemitic discourse in general, and the discursive theme of the Nazi card in particular, concerns the problem of when the Nazi card is played against Israel and its founding movement, Zionism. In this case playing the Nazi card involves equating the Israeli state collectively, or the state embodied by its leaders or its military practices, with Nazis, Nazi Germany, and the genocidal actions of the Nazi regime. It is a powerfully potent discursive strategy for those who use it. Anything associated with the Nazis is condemned with unconditional moral indignation in most contemporary Western societies. Playing the Nazi card therefore brands the object of the accusation with the “stigma of absolute evil.” (Wistrich 1990: 225) As a discursive act it has parallels with the playing of the Nazi card against identifiable persons because identifiable entities, Israeli political leaders, or the Israeli state, or symbols of the state such as the Israeli flag, are targeted. However, it also has clear parallels with discourses that abuse the collective historical memory of the Holocaust as some claim that it targets Jews as a collectivity with such abuse. However, there has been much more contention about labeling the problem as antisemitic compared with the other variants of the Nazi card discussed to this point. There have been numerous manifestations of the problem. In April 2008, representatives from Belgium, Britain, Costa Rica, France and the United States walked out of a UN Security Council debate on the Middle East after Libya’s deputy UN ambassador, Ibrahim Dabbashi, reportedly drew a comparison between conditions in Gaza and the concentration camps of Nazi Germany. And he went even further after the meeting by claiming that conditions in Gaza exceeded conditions in the Nazi concentration camps, arguing: “It is more than what happened in the concentration camps . . . There is the bombing, daily bombing (by Israel ) . . . in Gaza. It was not in the concentration camps. It is worse than that.” (ABC News 2008) Syria’s UN ambassador, Bashar Ja’afari, although not a member of the Security Council,

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told reporters after the meeting that he agreed with the depiction of Gaza, stating: “Unfortunately those who complain of being victims of genocide [during World War Two] are repeating the same kind of genocide against the Palestinians.” (Aljazeera 2008) This occasion was not the first time officials associated with the UN had played the Nazi card by drawing parallels between Israeli military actions and atrocities committed by the Nazis. Richard Falk, the incoming United Nations special rapporteur on human rights in the Palestinian territories, published an article in 2007 titled “Slouching toward a Palestinian Holocaust” (Falk 2007) in which he asked: “Is it an irresponsible overstatement to associate the treatment of Palestinians with . . . [the] . . . criminalized Nazi record of collective atrocity? I think not. The recent developments in Gaza are especially disturbing because they express so vividly a deliberate intention on the part of Israel and its allies to subject an entire human community to lifeendangering conditions of utmost cruelty.” Although Falk later admitted that playing the Nazi card was “perhaps not the best way to make the argument” he stressed that his “intention was based on the feeling that you have to shout to be heard” (Mamoun 2008), as indeed he asserted in his article that his argument represented “a rather desperate appeal to the governments of the world and to international public opinion to act urgently to prevent these current genocidal tendencies from culminating in a collective tragedy” (Falk 2007). This particular variant of the Nazi card has been depicted by some as a form of Holocaust inversion whereby the victims are cast as the perpetrators (Gerstenfeld 2007). Gabriel Schoenfeld has described it as “an extraordinary reversal” consisting of a “breathtaking way in which the victims of Nazism have been transformed into Nazis themselves by a distortion that is every bit as distant from historical reality, and every bit as slanderous of Jewish memory, as the work of Holocaust deniers” (Schoenfeld 2005: 98). The “extraordinary reversal” to which Schoenfeld refers is evident in the words of Syria’s UN Ambassador quoted above and it is clear to most people why such discourse hurts. Jonathan Freedland has cogently articulated such hurts: “Jews end up with the gravest hour in their history first taken from them—and then returned, with themselves recast as villains rather than victims.” (AllParty Parliamentary Group Against Antisemitism 2006: 19) Some have claimed without hesitation that when the Nazi card is played against the Israeli State, its leaders, its military practices, or its founding ideology of Zionism, it is clearly antisemitic (Wistrich 1990;



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Gerstenfeld 2007). Jonathan Freedland has asked, therefore: “If antiZionists wonder why Jews find this antisemitic, perhaps they should imagine the black reaction if the civil rights movement—or any other vehicle of black liberation—was constantly equated with the white slave traders of old. It feels like a deliberate attempt to find a people’s rawest spot—and tear away at it.” (Freedland: 121) The report of the UK All-Party Parliamentary Inquiry into Antisemitism drew attention to the “increasingly widespread” use of discourses of Holocaust inversion in protest and propaganda against Israel (AllParty Parliamentary Group Against Antisemitism 2006: 19). It concluded: “This may be political propaganda but it is still objectionable.” But it stopped short of labeling it as antisemitic. The EUMC (now the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights [FRA]) has been a little less equivocal on the matter by proposing in its working definition of antisemitism adopted in 2005 that antisemitism can be manifest in “drawing comparisons of contemporary Israeli policy to that of the Nazis.” In comparison to the policy community in Europe, the United States Department of State has been much less equivocal on the matter by proposing in its Report on Global Anti-Semitism (2005) that: “The demonization of Israel, or vilification of Israeli leaders, sometimes through comparisons with Nazi leaders, and through the use of Nazi symbols to caricature them, indicates an anti-Semitic bias rather than valid criticism of policy concerning a controversial issue.” (U.S. Department of State 2005) But it is neither useful nor necessary to try to get inside the heads of those who use such discourse—if that were ever possible, which it isn’t—to determine whether antisemitic bias is at work. It is the consequences of the words they use that matter. Abhorrence and protest against the policies, practices, and leaders of the Israeli state can be expressed in numerous forceful and trenchant ways, as they could against any other state—none of which would be antisemitic. But when criticism is voiced by playing the Nazi card in drawing parallels with the genocidal eliminationist atrocities committed by the Nazi regime, then many Jews and non-Jews who view Israel and Zionism as central to Jewish identity will regard the discourse as unquestionably antisemitic.5

5   Hence, the perspective offered by Robert Wistrich that: “‘Anti-Zionists’ who insist on comparing Zionism and the Jews with Hitler and the Third Reich appear

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Many of those who engage in such discourse would deny the accusation of antisemitism. And indeed, some will not be motivated by hatred or animus towards Jews, or have antisemitic intentions. Their motivations might be to draw attention to their concerns about human rights abuses and the excesses and casualties of war—as Richard Falk claimed. But, as with the other variants of playing the Nazi card, irrespective of whether the discourse is labeled antisemitic, such discourse has consequences, whether intended or not. The fact that perpetrators of incidents against Jews are far less discriminating in their sentiments than those who play the Nazi card against the Israeli state might claim, should give the latter pause for thought about the responsibilities that accompany their rights to express criticism in such a way. Furthermore, some critics play the Nazi card in such a way that it would involve splitting very fine hairs indeed to determine whether or not their words demonize all Jews collectively, or even individuals on the basis of their Jewishness. They have a responsibility to consider the impact of the words they use because of the potential for generating antisemitic bias. Playing the Nazi card against Israel as a state clearly demonizes the state in the minds of many people who encounter such discourse. But the fundamental issue at stake concerning the question of whether playing the Nazi card against Israel and Zionism demonizes all Jews collectively, and is therefore antisemitic, depends upon the degree to which Israel and Zionism are viewed as essential components of Jewish identity. For those for whom Israel is fundamental to Jewish identity, playing the Nazi card against Israel, and the demonization it involves, will be an assault against the core of Jewish identity and it is likely to be seen to defame and demonize all Jews as a collectivity. It will therefore be unquestionably antisemitic. For those for whom Israel and Zionism are not fundamental to Jewish identity, then demonization of Israel may solely be regarded as an attack on Israel as a state and not on Israel as the collective Jew. With regard to this latter perspective, Antony Lerman has argued: “For decades Zionism was supported by

unmistakably to be de facto antisemites, even if they vehemently deny the fact! This is largely because they knowingly exploit the reality that Nazism in the postwar world has become the defining metaphor of absolute evil. For if Zionists are ‘Nazis’ and if Sharon really is Hitler, then it becomes a moral obligation to wage war against Israel. That is the bottom line of much contemporary anti-Zionism. In practice, this has become the most potent form of contemporary anti-Semitism.” (Wistrich 2004)



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only a minority of Jews. The rest were either indifferent or manifestly opposed to the whole idea of the Jewish state. Anti-Zionism was therefore a perfectly respectable position to hold, and one that continues to be held today by hundreds of thousands of strictly orthodox Jews and many secular Jews with left-liberal perspectives.” (Lerman 2008: 171)6 The problem then, for one critic, Jenny Bourne, is that it is the supporters of Israel, “not Israel’s critics” who conflate “Jewry and the state of Israel, which in turn enables (them) to claim that any Nazi metaphor applied to Israel applies equally to Jews” (Bourne 2004: 129). Unfortunately, these types of argument and the counter-arguments against them have lead down an intellectual cul-de-sac with the consequent need for new thinking of the type offered here to try to find a way out. The point is that labeling the playing of the Nazi card against Israel and Zionism as antisemitic, even though it is perceived to be so by many, leads to a discursive dead-end. The matter at stake, and the matter that more people would be more certain about, is that the playing of the Nazi card in this way hurts by invoking painful collective memories for Jews and by using those memories against them, and it hurts many Jews irrespective of whether they perceive Israel and Zionism to be essential to their own Jewish identity. VI.  Conclusion: Articulating the Hurts Inflicted by the Nazi Card Most people would accept that it is completely unacceptable to call a Jewish person a Nazi. Many would assert that it is also antisemitic. But discursive offenders are sometimes not so clear-cut in the words they choose. This seems to be especially the case when Jews collectively are targeted by discourse directed at Israel and Zionism. When comparisons are drawn between the Israeli state, or its founding movement, Zionism, and the eliminationist crimes of the Nazis, rights to freely

6   Lerman continues that “If people feel unfairly stigmatized as anti-Semitic simply for speaking out about the plight of the Palestinians and the Israeli government’s role in causing their suffering, they could become cynical and alienated whenever the problem of anti-Semitism is raised.” (Lerman 2008: 171) Judith Butler argued that “if the charge of anti-semitism is used to defend Israel at all costs, then its power when used against those who do discriminate against Jews—who do violence to synagogues in Europe, wave Nazi flags or support anti-semitic organizations—is radically diluted. Many critics of Israel now dismiss all claims of anti-semitism as ‘trumped up,’ having been exposed to their use as a way of censoring political speech.” (Butler 2004: 27)

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express criticism are often claimed. Such comparisons are made, it is sometimes claimed, to clearly voice deep concerns and get them heard. Such critics sometimes allege that accusations of antisemitism are leveled against them in return to trump them into silence. However, the harmful consequences of equating Israel to Nazi Germany will be obvious to most people: deep wounds are scratched hard. It is hardly a cause for wonder then that the motives of those who engage in such discourse, even if they are Jewish themselves, will be questioned, as well as their ‘objective’ effects on public opinion. Given the recent Israeli military actions and the conflict in Gaza in December 2008 and January 2009 some might ask whether the deaths and injuries of civilians, the destruction of infrastructure and property, and allegations of war crimes and military excesses, mitigate in any way the playing of the Nazi card against Israel—as was evident on many placards carried in street level protests? Do the hurts inflicted by the Israeli military cancel out the hurts inflicted when parallels are drawn between Israel and the Nazi regime? Do the hurts inflicted perhaps even become irrelevant when compared with the suffering inflicted in the conflict? Is the playing of the Nazi card understandable in any way in these circumstances? These are difficult but important questions. Yet, the answers should be obvious. One hurt does not cancel out another. One hurt does not justify another. Given the blow-by-blow news media coverage of the consequences of the Israeli military actions in Gaza, it may be understandable that many television viewers and others will be harsh in their criticism of Israel. But the demonization of the Israeli state by using the Nazi comparison can never be understandable no matter what the motivation might be. The hurts inflicted against Jews when the Nazi card is played—as unraveled in this chapter—cannot be written-off as collateral damage in the protest against Israel, just as the deaths and injuries of innocent Palestinian civilians cannot be written-off as the inevitable casualties of war. In the climate of public protest against Israel in many of Europe’s cities, and an upsurge of attacks against Jews on the streets of Europe triggered by the Gaza conflict (see, for example, Leicester 2009; BBC News Online 2009), critics of Israel bear a heavy responsibility, no matter what the justifications for their criticism might be. Demonization of the Israeli state by playing the Nazi card not only hurts. It not only potentially incites violence against Jews who have no involvement in the conflict and are thousands of miles away from it. Calling Israel



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a Nazi state calls for destruction not dialog. Those with a genuine commitment to a lasting peace between Israelis and Palestinians will recognize that engagement, compromise, and communication are necessary for reconciliation. Drawing attention to the consequent harms inflicted when the Nazi card is played against Jews, Israel, and Zionism, should not be intended, or taken, in any way as an attempt to suppress criticism of Israel and its military practices. Instead, it is a call not to use particular words, even in the most trenchant criticism, because some words wound. Most people would surely agree that this is a very reasonable plea once those hurts are articulated. References ABC News (2008) Gaza worse than Nazi death camps: Libyan envoy. ABC News, April 25, available at: http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2008/04/25/2227323.htm. Retrieved May 20, 2009. Aljazeera.net (2008) UN walkout over Gaza “Nazi” remarks. Aljazeera.net, April 24, 2008, available at: http://english.aljazeera.net/news/americas/2008/04/ 2006614233335392401.html. Retrieved May 20, 2009. All-Party Parliamentary Group Against Antisemitism (2006) Report of the All-Party Parliamentary Inquiry into Antisemitism (London: The Stationary Office). BBC News online (2009) “Rise in attacks” on British Jews. BBC News online. February 13, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7887511.stm. Retrieved May 20, 2009. Bourne, Jenny (2004) Anti-Semitism or anti-criticism? Race & Class 46, 1. Butler, Judith (2004) No, it’s not anti-Semitic. In Henri Picciotto and Mitchell Plitnick (eds.), Reframing Anti-Semitism: Alternative Jewish Perspectives (Oakland, CA: Jewish Voice for Peace 2004). Falk, Richard (2007) Slouching toward a Palestinian Holocaust. The Transnational Foundation for Peace and Future Research, June 29, available at: http://www.transnational.org/Area_MiddleEast/2007/Falk_PalestineGenocide.html. Retrieved May 20, 2009. Freedland, Jonathan (2003) Is Anti-Zionism Anti-Semitism. In Paul Iganski and Barry Kosmin (eds), The New Anti-Semitism? Debating Judeophobia in the 21st Century (London: Profile Books). Gardner, Mark (2007) ‘The Zionists are our misfortune’: On the (not so) new antiSemitism Democratiya 10: Autumn, available at: http://www.democratiya.com/review .asp?reviews_id=110. Retrieved May 20, 2009. Gerstenfeld, Manfred (2007) Holocaust inversion: the portraying of Israel and Jews as Nazis. Post Holocaust and Anti-Semitism 55, April 2007, available at: http://www.jcpa .org/JCPA/Templates/ShowPage.asp?DRIT=0&DBID=1&LNGID=1&TMID =111&FID=624&PID=0&IID=1526&TTL=Holocaust_Inversion:_The_Portraying_of_Israel_and_Jews_as_Nazis. Retrieved May 20, 2009. Harwood, Richard E. (1974) Did Six Million Really Die? The Truth at Last (London 1974), available at: www.ihr.org/books/harwood/dsmrd01.html. Retrieved June 20, 2009.

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Hirsh, David (2007) Anti-Zionism and Antisemitism: Cosmopolitan Reflections (New Haven: The Yale Initiative for the Interdisciplinary Study of Antisemitism Working Paper Series). Iganski, Paul and Abe Sweiry (2009) Understanding and Addressing the ‘Nazi Card’. Intervening Aqainst Antisemitic Discourse (London: European Institute for the Study of Contemporary Antisemitism, EISCA). Institute for Jewish Affairs (1979) German Supreme Court’s landmark decision: Denial of the Holocaust is an offence against Jewish dignity. IJA Research Reports 79, 7. Klug, Brian (2003) The collective Jew: Israel and the new anti-Semitism. Patterns of Prejudice 37, 2. —— (2006) In search of clarity. Catalyst, March 27, available at: http://www.catalystmagazine.org.uk/Default.aspx.LocID-0hgnew0bv.RefLocID-0hg01b00100600f009.Lan EN.htm. Retrieved May 20, 2009. Kotek, Joel (2008) Cartoons and Extremism: Israel and the Jews in Arab and Western Media (Edgware: Vallentine Mitchell 2008). Lappin, Shalom (2008) This Green and Pleasant Land: Britain and the Jews (New Haven: The Yale Initiative for the Interdisciplinary Study of Antisemitism Working Paper Series). Leicester, John (2009) Fears mount of Gaza conflict spill over into Europe. The Guardian, January 6, 2009, available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/worldlatest/ story/0,,-8202556,00.html. Retrieved May 20, 2009. Lerman, Antony (2008) Is anti-Zionism a cover-up for anti-Semitism? CQ Global Researcher, June 2008. Lipstadt, Deborah E. (1994) Denying the Holocaust: The Growing Assault on Truth and Memory (Harmondsworth: Penguin). Mamoun, Linda (2008) A Conversation with Richard Falk. The Nation, June 17, available at: http://www.thenation.com/doc/20080630/mamoun. Retrieved May 20, 2009. Rich, Dave (2005) If I say ‘Zionist’ not ‘Jew’ then I can’t be antisemitic, can I? Engage, September 15, 2005, available at: http://www.engageonline.org.uk/blog/article .php?id=652. Retrieved May 20, 2009. Schoenfeld, Gabriel (2005) The Return of Anti-Semitism (London: Politico’s). Seidel, Gill (1986) The Holocaust Denial: Antisemitism, Racism & the New Right (Leeds: Beyond the Pale Collective). Strafgesetzbuch—StGB (German Criminal Code as amended on November 5, 2008), Federal Ministry of Justice, Sections 130, 189 and 194, translation available at: http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/index.html. Retrieved May 20, 2009. Strauss, Leo (1953) Natural Right and History (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press). U.S. Department of State (2009) Report on Global Anti-Semitism. January 5, 2005, available at: http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/40258.htm. Retrieved May 20, 2009. Wistrich, Robert S. (1990) Between Redemption and Perdition: Modern antisemitism and Jewish identity (London: Routledge). —— (2004) Anti-Zionism and Anti-Semitism. Jewish Political Studies Review 16, nos. 3–4, Fall, available at: http://www.jcpa.org/phas/phas-wistrich-f04.htm. Retrieved May 20, 2009.

III.  Eastern Europe

The Empire Strikes Back: Antisemitism in Russia Stella Rock and Alexander Verkhovsky I.  Introduction As the society that gave the world the Protocols of the Elders of Zion and the word “pogrom,” Russia has more than a passing relationship with the history of antisemitism.1 It is a culture in which “Jewish ritual murder” is still seriously debated within the dominant Christian church (Hackel 1998), and literary and academic heavyweights write books on “the Jewish Question.”2 It is also a society in which Jews occupy significant positions of political and economic influence, have equal rights under the law, and where antisemitism is—at least in theory—a prosecutable offence. John Klier has observed that Russian policies towards Jews were formed after the partition of Poland in 1772, which brought substantial Jewish communities under the ‘Enlightened Absolutism’ of Catherine II, who desired “to include the Jews within the ‘well-ordered police state’ and to harness their abilities for the maximum advantage of the state.” (Klier 1998) Subsequent governments fretted about how to ensure that Russia’s Jews were productive and loyal Russian citizens, but ‘the Jewish Question’ exploded in political and social life in the late nineteenth century, as Western ideas about race met the religious prejudices of an Orthodox Christian culture. The Soviet decision to categorize Jews as a ‘nationality’ rather than as a religious community,3 the virulent antisemitism of the Whites during the Civil 1  As Steven G. Marks (2003) suggests, “Russian practitioners . . . went on to shape twentieth-century anti-Semitism throughout the world.” Marks explores the impact of “black hundredism” and the “Protocols” outside Russia (Marks, 2003: 140–175). 2  A. I. Solzhenitsyn, Dvesti let vmeste (1795–1995), chast 1 (Moscow: Russkii put’, 2001), chast 2 (Moscow: Russkii put’, 2002); Selected extracts in English are published in Ericson, Jr. & Mahoney (2006) and Shafarevich (2006). See also Klier (1995) on Shafarevich’s earlier “Russophobia.” 3   In Soviet Russia, all citizens had to list their natsional’nost (‘nationality’, not to be confused with citizenship) in their internal passport, based on their parents’ ethnic identities. In Tsarist Russia, the government was primarily concerned with the religious identity of citizens: a Jew who converted to Russian Orthodoxy was automatically

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War and later Soviet anti-Zionism have added a further layer or two of complexity, but generally ‘plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose.’ The degree to which Jews have been viewed in society as a negative economic influence and an alien community of suspect allegiances has varied depending on economic and political circumstances, but the same old themes (supported by the same old images and texts) reemerge on a regular basis. In the early 1990s, the activities of marginal but vocal groups such as the National-Patriotic Front ‘Memory’ (Pamyat) and the relative success of Zhirinovsky’s peculiar brand of political demagoguery provoked both media and academic speculation about a ‘Weimar Russia’ in which nationalist extremists and antisemites were poised for success.4 While there have indeed been vicious, racist attacks and astonishing publications in both mainstream and marginal media, the gloomiest predications about antisemitism have not been fulfilled. Antisemitism in Putin’s Russian Federation may be more muted than that which appeared in the ‘wild Russia’ of the 1990s, but it is still significant. This article will explore the extent and impact of antisemitism in postSoviet civil society, politics and media—three overlapping and interconnected areas—focusing on the period 2000–6. Most commentators are now preoccupied with the question of whether ‘true’ democracy will ever emerge from Putin’s bureaucracy, and important questions have been raised about the ‘virtual’ nature of post-Soviet politics and the role of the Kremlin in the creation and nurturing of nationalist parties both marginal and mainstream (Wilson 2005). However, while political protagonists may continue to play with nationalist and racist sentiments (or with public and foreign fears about ‘the fascist threat’ ) in their attempts to manipulate the electorate, the real impact of racism and extreme nationalism on Russian society is undeniable. A total of 267 people were the victims of racist attacks in 2004, including 49 killings. In 2005 the numbers attacked rose to 464, again with 47 fatalities. 2006 saw a total of 552 victims, 56 of whom died.5

counted as (and treated as) a Russian Orthodox citizen. To apostatize from Russian Orthodoxy was a crime until 1905. See Deutsch Kornblatt (2004: 46–51). 4  See for example Yanov (1995), Reznik (1996) and Starovoitova (1995). 5   Data from the Sova Centre, updated October 1, 2007. Numbers continue to rise as reports reach the Centre, but since under-reporting is common, the actual number of attacks is likely to be far higher.



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II.  Antisemitism in Civil Society The vast majority of Russian citizens have a very strong ethnocentric perception of social problems. Soviet internationalism meant not the denial of discrimination—everyone was aware that discrimination against ethnic groups existed—but the promotion of the so-called ‘friendship of peoples’ (druzhba narodov). Based on the notions of Soviet ethnology, and reflecting a romantic ethno-nationalism borrowed from nineteenth century Germany (Vishnevskii 2005), the concept of a ‘friendship of peoples’ implies that ethnic groups are not social constructs but actual, discrete communities, and that these communities must engage in friendly relations under the control of the state.6 In the pre-war period, Soviet ethnologists even identified ethnic groups where local inhabitants did not, and while ethnology was released from the armor of Soviet ideology during the stormy developments of the perestroika years and the 1990s, the romantic mind-set has survived. The indisputable supremacy of ethnocentric ideas in post-Soviet Russia is observable not only within the social science research community, but above all in the education system.7 Without sufficient pressure from government, these ideas naturally result in the belief that ‘the peoples’ may not only be friends, but also enemies. To be more accurate, this belief existed in private before, but by the end of the 1980s it emerged into the public sphere, and antisemitism was one of the first (if not the first) enmities to become public. Despite the post-Soviet revival of nationalism and outbreaks of inter-ethnic strife across the former Soviet Union, social surveys from the end of the 1980s until 2006 do not reveal any substantial shift of antisemitic moods in the wider layers of the population. Antisemitic prejudices are very widely distributed, as are other ethnically-coloured prejudices—unsurprisingly perhaps, given the strong ethnocentric consciousness of most citizens. The idea that a Jew could become president of Russia is firmly rejected by around two-thirds of the population for example, and a third to a half (depending on the question) of respondents are not inclined to closely associate with Jews (for example to become related via the marriage of children). The percentage of  Martin Terry (2001) has usefully explored ‘the Friendship of Peoples’ (432–61).   For further details of this see Voronkov, Karpenko and Osipov (2002). The same group of experts is currently preparing a similar collection on racism in Russian education for publication. 6 7

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people who may be deemed ‘conscious antisemites,’ who not only consistently display antisemitic prejudices, but also negatively respond to Jews in any question put to them, wavers at between 6–9%. However, only 1–1.5% of respondents admit to cultivating their antisemitism by regularly reading antisemitic books or newspapers, or attending—even sporadically—the events of antisemitic groups.8 The figures cited above are by no means insignificant, but the socalled ‘everyday’ or ‘kitchen’ antisemitism—ethnophobia pertaining to Jews which is unmotivated by ideological considerations—has faded in the post-Soviet years into a background of other, far more substantial ethnophobias.9 In 2005 for example, a survey revealed that while 18% of Russians favored limiting the right of Jews to live in Russia, 50% favored restricting the right of residency for immigrants from the Caucuses, 46% and 42% in relation to Chinese and Vietnamese respectively, 31% in relation to immigrants from the countries of Central Asia and 30% in relation to Roma (Levanda Centre 2005). One must, of course, be aware of the ambiguities highlighted by sociological surveys. The terms ‘antisemitism’ and ‘fascism’ have extremely negative connotations in Russian society: in a June 2006 survey by the Levada Centre, antisemitism was considered a serious or very serious crime by 80% of Russian citizens, with only 3% deciding to admit to the interviewer that they didn’t consider it a crime. ‘Fascism’ is generally accepted term of political abuse (without any understanding of the precise sense of the word), partly as a result of the cultural importance of the Second World War, in which over 20 million Soviet citizens perished. The war is commemorated twice annually as the ‘Great Patriotic War’—on the Soviet-instituted holiday of Victory Day (May 9th) and on the Day of Remembrance and Sorrow ( June 22nd), which President Boris Yeltsin instituted in June 1996, shortly before the 55th anniversary of Germany’s attack on the USSR. While knowledge of the war is declining amongst the younger generation,

8  See Gudkov (1999). These statistics are taken from an analysis of the research of the Levada Centre—the best sociological service in Russia—from the 1990s. According to Gudkov, nothing has changed in the last ten years. 9   Xenophobia in relation to Jews can be interpreted not only as an ethnic but also as a religious phobia. In Soviet Russia however, Jews were perceived as an ethnic, and not a religious group. This perception also divides the overwhelming majority of those who identify themselves as Jews in Russia. The word ‘evrei’ in contemporary Russian indicates an ethnic identity: to indicate religious adherence the word ‘iudei’ (variant ‘iudaist’ ), and occasionally the phrase ‘religioznyi evrei’ (‘religious Jew’ ) are used.



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74% of Russians surveyed in 2001 wanted June 22nd to be made a day of national mourning for Soviet war dead (Strana.ru 2001). Despite the strong anti-fascist culture, when respondents were asked in January 2006 about a serious knife attack on worshippers at a Moscow synagogue, 14% interpreted it as an expression of ‘protest against the strength of alien, non-Russian forces’ in the country.10 44% of Russians also considered it necessary ‘to limit the influence of Jews in the organs of power, politics, business, the legal sphere, the education system and show-business’ in 2005. Survey results in the early 1990s reflected similar attitudes—in 1992 an astonishing 17.8% of respondents thought a global Zionist plot against Russia definitely or possibly existed, although academic commentators argued about whether ‘Zionist’ equated to ‘Jewish’ in the minds of the survey respondents (Brym & Degtyarev 1993; Gibson 1994; Brym 1994). There seems little doubt that this most persistent of antisemitic myths retains its resonance in post-Soviet Russia. The revival of Russian Orthodox Christianity—which began in earnest with glasnost’ and significantly influenced the earliest nationalist groups to emerge under Gorbachev—has reintroduced even older antisemitic myths and prejudices. While there was a parallel growth in neo-pagan nationalism, much of which was markedly antisemitic (Shnirelman 1998), nationalists aligning themselves with the Russian Orthodox Church far outweighed those who harked back to a (largely fictional ) pre-Christian heritage. Commentators argue about the degree to which the Russian Orthodox Church influences society and politics in the Russian Federation, but certainly the Church is a symbolic repository of Russian identity to which politicians of all persuasions pay lip service, and more Russian citizens identify themselves as Russian Orthodox than participate in any religious activity.11 Within the Church hierarchy there have always been individuals who condemned pogroms and defended Jews against dangerous libels— Archpriest Alexander Glagolev for example condemned the Blood libel at the Beilis trial (indeed, no Russian Orthodox priest could be found to testify against Beilis)—and there are streams of Orthodox

  The data is available on the website of the Levada Centre (2007).   A 2007 Levada survey reveals that 56% of respondents identify themselves as Orthodox Christian, one third as atheists and the rest as other faith adherents, while 59% never attend a place of worship. A VTsIOM survey the same year suggests that 63% identify as Orthodox Christian. Cf. Interfax-religion (2007). 10 11

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thought which have condemned antisemitism and accorded Jews a positive role within a Christian theological framework (whilst expecting their ultimate conversion).12 There is, however, a rich vein of antisemitic literature which is associated with or part of Orthodox tradition. Unlike the Roman Catholic Church, which revised its texts and its theology during the Second Vatican Council (1962–5) in an effort to address residual anti-Judaism and antisemitism,13 the Russian Orthodox Church continues to condemn the Jews as ‘deicides’ in the Easter liturgy (Hackel 1998). Orthodox respect for Church Fathers such as St John Chrysostom also ensures that anti-Judaic polemics continue to circulate, and the reaction of the head of the Union of Orthodox Brotherhoods to the Patriarch’s condemnation of an attack on a synagogue reflects this position: .

And our Patriarch said: ‘A house, in which one prays to God, must not be subjected to any attack.’ You understand, that he said—a house in which one prays to God, to God! . . . From our point of view, no, not from our point of view but from an Orthodox point of view, from any point of view, a Synagogue is a place of the devil . . . They pray to Satan, and not to God. (Simonovich 2001)

The Moscow Patriarchate is in an unenviable position when trying to deal with the issue of antisemitism. Publicly the Patriarch maintains cordial relations with Jewish leaders, denounces antisemitic acts and makes efforts to quash some of the more embarrassing campaigns conducted by fringe groups with Orthodox credentials, such as the Union of Orthodox Brotherhoods, initially created by the Patriarchate in an effort to control the grassroots revival of Orthodox lay movements (Rock 2002a). However, the Church is hampered by its pre-revolutionary past, or rather by the past that has been selectively resurrected in reaction to the Bolshevik revolution and the atheist excesses of the Soviet regime, and by the Orthodox respect for tradition, especially in matters liturgical. ‘Tradition’ is a useful weapon for those who would oppose ecumenism, inter-faith dialogue, reform of antisemitic liturgical texts and revision of the church calendar to remove saints such as the ‘child-martyr’

12  See for example the discussion of ‘The Paradox of Orthodox Philosemitism’ in Rossman (2002: 211–20); see also Agursky (1983: 88–93); Lindemann (1991: 187). 13  See for example Pope Paul IV’s declaration Nostra Aetate (Paul IV 1965).



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Gavriil,14 and the vocal strength of conservatives within the Church has restricted efforts by the Patriarch to make progress in this sphere. Since the scandal that followed his conciliatory speech to prominent Rabbis in New York in 1991 (during which his name was dropped from the liturgy by various monastic communities and parishes—a serious indication of schism; see Senderov 1997), the Patriarch’s ecumenical ventures have been rather muted. Calls to reform Church practices or revise the canon often draw forth accusations of ‘Judaizing’—a reference not only to anti-Judaic polemics of the Church Fathers but to a small but prominent group of heretics in fifteenth century Muscovy, who probably had no connection with Judaism but were associated with Jews by one of their chief opponents, St Joseph of Volokolamsk (Klier 1997). There is a 15 significant number of baptized Jews, and a small number of charismatic, reform-minded priests (most famously, Father Alexander Men,’ murdered in 1990) of Jewish parentage within the Russian church. The feeling that these Christians are somehow spiritually ‘Other’ and prone to meddling within the Church can be found in a mainstream publication entitled How they make us antisemites. Written by Deacon Andrei Kuraev, a prominent conservative cleric who has condemned some of the more extreme Orthodox brotherhoods as ‘placing a black mark’ on Orthodox life,16 the book suggests that Jewish converts to Orthodoxy are not seeking their own salvation but rather the reform of the Church (Kuraev 1998: 79–83). Russian nationalists phrase their opposition to these ‘Others’ rather less subtly: Speaking plainly, the contemporary Jewish, half-Jewish and near-Jewish intelligentsia, which for the last ten years has infested the Russian church, introducing into her a completely un-Russian and particularly Jewish spirit, a spirit of the Jewish people, which is nothing less than contrary to the Russian spirit, in everything—contemporary ‘Jews’ [‘iudei’] inside the Church have created some sort of new corporation, strongly bound namely by nationalist bonds, from which simple Russian priests and monks are nothing short of suffocating . . . (Simonovich 2006)

14   His ‘Life’ can be read online at http://days.pravoslavie.ru/Life/life6516.htm—it describes his kidnapping by a Jew shortly before Easter and his ‘martyr’s death,’ crucified, pierced in the side and bleeding to death over ten days. 15  This is ably explored by Deutsch Kornblatt (2004). 16   Panorama database, confirmed by email correspondence with Deacon Kuraev, June 10, 2001.

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The ‘Judaiser’ (zhidovstvuyuschii) label is used promiscuously by nationalists: Dushenov calls adherents of the ‘ecumenical heresy’ (evidently, members of the episcopate) ‘Judaiser heretics’ (Dushenov 2005); for others, all those who help Jews, including masons and contemporary American Protestant supporters of Israel are ‘Judaisers’ (Nazarov 2007). In the somewhat surprising summary of the St Petersburg Procurator’s Office: In Orthodox understanding ‘zhidy’ [yids] are Satanist-theomachists. The term zhid in the understanding of the Orthodox Church does not indicate a specific national identity. Not all Jews [evrei ] are zhidy, and conversely, not all zhidy are Jews. French, Chinese, Tatars, Kalmyks may all be ‘Judaisers’ [zhidovstvuiushchie]. Zhid also does not indicate a specific religious, confessional identity. Not all religious Jews [iudei] are zhids, and again, not all zhidy are religious Jews. There may be Judaiser renegades amongst Christians. The publications of the newspaper Rus pravoslavnaia correspond with this point of view.17

The pre-revolutionary antisemitic and radical monarchist legacy associated with the Orthodox Church provides a welcome resource for the myriad Russian nationalist groups which mushroomed in the glasnost’ and post-Soviet periods. Pre-revolutionary texts such as It is near, at the doors (Bliz est’, pri dverekh, a reference to Matthew 24:33) by Sergei Nilus, which contains the infamous Protocols (Nilus 2004), are republished by religious and secular presses and distributed via Church bookstalls; nationalists ostentatiously recreate pre-revolutionary Orthodox organizations, such as the Union of Orthodox Banner Bearers and the Union of Russian People (Rock 2002b), or adopt the trappings or rhetoric of Orthodoxy for political expediency. Attempts to recreate the pre-revolutionary ‘Black Hundred’ were made more than once in the 1990s, but in November 2005 a mass meeting attended by several prominent politicians (see below) re-established the Union of Russian People with barely a murmur of protest. While no official representative from the Moscow Patriarchate attended, publicity photos revealed clerical participation at the event, and the Church’s canonization of several prominent pre-revolutionary black hundred supporters (the charismatic priest Ioann of Kronshtadt, archpriest Ioann Vostorgov,

17   See the decree of the Petersburg Procurator’s office on June 19, 2006, available on Rus pravoslavnaia (2006).



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Bishop Germogan of Tobolsk and Patriarch Tikhon)18 makes Patriarchal opposition to the movement impossible. Many of these Orthodox-nationalist groups were, until his death in 1995, able to claim Metropolitan Ioann (Snychev) of St Petersburg and Ladoga as their spiritual guide. Indeed, his death has barely diminished the flow of publications issued with his blessing, thanks to the labors of Konstantin Dushenov, his former secretary and current editor of Rus pravoslavnaia, a newspaper and website currently under investigation for publishing antisemitic material. Russian messianism, the belief that Russia has suffered for universal salvation, is a prevalent theme that allows nationalists to equate Russia’s tempestuous twentieth century with the persecution and crucifixion of Christ. In this schema, the Jews are both the ‘deicides’ of the New Testament and the Bolshevik revolutionaries persecuting and repressing Russian Orthodox believers. In 2002, a Moscow-based conference entitled ‘Global problems of world history’ but ‘dedicated mainly to the Jewish factor in history, politics and the social life of Russia and other countries’ (Rusk.ru 2002), brought together a nationally, religiously and ideologically diverse collection of individuals (including Jürgen Graf, David Duke, Ahmed Rami, René-Louis Berclaz, Gerhold Reisegger, Russ Granata and Friedrich Töben) who appeared to agree on this ‘special role’ of Russia.19 This messianic role was most clearly articulated by Mark Lyubomudrov, a Petersburg publicist: Russia, as the main bulwark of the Orthodox Faith, remains the only country which can save the world from the wrath of God, from its final destruction and Judgement Day . . . Russia today is repeating Christ’s final days. And just as Christ remained God, even on the cross, today’s crucified Russia remains a God-chosen country . . . (Lyubomudrov 2002)

Messianism is not a new feature in Russian nationalism,20 and as Schöpflin has pointed out in his exploration of the functions and types of myth, myths of redemption and suffering are common in Eastern and Central Europe (Schöpflin 1997:29). More surprisingly, non-Russian participants concurred. Ahmed Rami (the Swedish-based editor

18  On St John of Kronstadt’s limited relationship with the black hundreds and his canonization, see Kizenko (2000). The nationalist paper Rus Pravoslavnaia listed ‘black hundred’ saints in ‘Torzhestvo Istiny’, Rus Pravoslavnaia 9 (2000). 19  On this conference cf. Rock (2003); on Holocaust denial in post-Soviet Russia more generally cf. Rock (2001). 20  Peter J. S. Duncan (2000) has explored the history of this phenomenon.

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of Radio Islam) described Russia as the only country able to effectively hinder the process of globalization. David Duke asked for a minute’s silence ‘to honour the memory of the millions of victims of the Jewishled Holocaust in Russia’ (Duke 2002a) and according to Rami, ‘in an emotional speech . . . pointed out that Russia has often been a bulwark of Europe against barbarian invaders from the Asian steps [sic].’ (Duke 2002b) Duke’s conference paper is not available online, but Russia’s significance for Duke is clear from a paper he wrote in 2000, after another visit to Moscow: Russia has always been a bulwark to the East, the frontier of our race, and it is now on the frontline of our current struggle. It is my prayer that Mother Russia be strong and healthy, may Mother Russia be free; may she always be White. When a racially aware Russia and reawakened America become united in our cause, the world will change. Our race will survive and together we shall go to the stars!

Similar gatherings have occurred since: the most recent conference was again headlined by David Duke, and met in the House of the Union of Writers in July 2007 to discuss ‘Europe and Russia: New Perspectives’ (Sova Centre 2007). Duke begins his speech by applauding Russia, before going on to identify Jews as undermining ‘White nations’ with pornography, prostitution, homosexuality, feminism, abortion and immigration: It is only fitting that we gather in the largest populated city of European Mankind on Earth. The masses of our beautiful people that we see on the streets of Moscow in some ways give us hope. In other ways, the endless passing by of bright eyes and fair complexions may blind our own eyes to the dark danger facing our people. (Duke 2007)

All of these disparate but interrelated phenomena—‘black hundredism,’ messianism, belief in Jewish ritual murder—may be found within the astonishing post-Soviet cult of the murdered Tsar Nicholas II and his family. Veneration of the royal family is certainly a mass rather than a marginal phenomenon—the campaign to canonize the family, which succeeded in 2000, mobilized thousands of ordinary people and forced a reluctant hierarchy to canonize them as martyr-saints (‘passion-bearers’ ), even whilst acknowledging that there was no grounds in the Tsar’s political or religious actions to warrant canonization (Komissiia Sviashchennogo Sinoda Russkoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi po kanonizatsii sviatykh 1999: 191). During that process, the Moscow Spiritual Academy was asked to assess whether the family was



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ritually murdered by Jews: their report concluded that it was not (without unambiguously condemning the concept of Jewish ritual murder as an antisemitic libel ), but the fact that this warranted serious discussion testifies to the campaigning skills of radical Orthodox nationalists (ibid: 193–4; cf. also Slater 2007). Sadly, despite the Patriarchate’s efforts to distance itself from the activities of such radicals, they remain an influential and vociferous minority within the Orthodox community. Antisemitism is also to be found amongst Russia’s Muslims (around 6% of the population),21 although—as with the Russian Orthodox Church—the official leaders of Muslim communities in the Russian Federation maintain publicly good relations with Jewish leaders. An attempt to disentangle religious anti-Judaism from modern antisemitism and anti-Zionism amongst Russian Muslims has been made by Vyacheslav Likhachev, and will not be repeated here—suffice to observe that it is a growing phenomenon aggravated by global politics, as elsewhere in Europe (Likhachev 2006: 179–96). III.  Antisemitism in the Political Sphere Overt antisemitism is a fairly taboo form of xenophobia in the political sphere of Putin’s Russia. No ambitious politician at national level (excluding the vice-chair of the State Duma Vladimir Zhirinovskii, who has been definitively assigned the role of ‘political jester’ without greater political pretensions) can afford to make direct antisemitic statements. In the 1990s, politicians of this type could still achieve prominence; two such examples are Mikhail Poltoranin and his creature, Boris Mironov, Minister for the Press—both were favored by Yeltsin in the early 1990s. In the last two years, Mironov has been subjected to an inquiry on a charge of incitement of ethnic hatred.22 At regional level, openly antisemitic speeches are made fairly often. The most famous example is Bat’ka Nikolai Kondratenko, the former governor of Krasnodar region (1996–2000), who devotedly denounced

 Statistic from a 2007 VTsIOM survey; cf Interfax-religion (2007).  Mironov was accused of antisemitism during the election campaign in Novosibirsk oblast at the end of 2003. Proceedings were initiated in 2005, and Mironov was not arrested but signed a written agreement not to leave town. For breeching this agreement he was arrested in December 2006, and in April 2007 again released under oath. The trial began in 2007. 21 22

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‘the Zionist conspiracy’ against Russia as a whole and against Krasnodar region in particular. Now he is a fairly insignificant Duma member and talks of the ‘Zionist conspiracy’ far less often, and his replacement in the region, Aleksandr Tkachev, expresses overt xenophobic feelings towards many ethnic minorities but confines himself to antisemitic allusions rather than overt statements. Accusations of high-level antisemitism are sometimes made on the basis that those of the so-called ‘oligarchs’ who came out in open opposition to Putin and were seriously persecuted by him are Jews: Vladimir Gusinskii in exile, Boris Berezovskii not only in exile but also the object of repeated attempts to extradite him, Mikhail Khodorkovskii serving a serious prison term in a Siberian camp. It is difficult to say whether subjective antisemitic motives played a role in these three sufficiently different cases, but publicly not a single hint of this has been given. Moreover, it is clear to all that—given good political relations— President Putin is well able to find a common language with highranking Jews. One such example is Roman Abramovich, who did not have Sibneft taken away from him as Khodorkovskii did, but bought from him (by the Russian government-controlled Gazprom in 2005) for a substantial sum. Another example is the head of the Federation of Jewish Communities, the Hassidic Rabbi Berl Lazar, promoted by the Kremlin in 2001 as Chief Rabbi in counterbalance to the traditional Chief Rabbi Adolf Shaevich, and since then in markedly close relations with the President. Nationalist authors have naturally interpreted the struggle of Putin with, for example, Berezovskii as the struggle of a Russian President with Jewish influence, but these same authors are energetically indignant about the visits of Putin to Rabbi Lazar and especially about the visits of Lazar to the Kremlin. IV.  Political Parties, Movements, and Organizations Terms like ‘mainstream,’ ‘marginal,’ ‘left,’ ‘right,’ ‘liberal,’ and ‘conservative’ are rather misleading when discussing Russian politics. ‘Mainstream’ does not necessarily imply ‘moderate,’ but rather that the party garners wide support and is prominent in the political sphere and mass media. One can divide parties and organizations with political aims into radical nationalist and mainstream nationalist, but there is often a cross-over in terms of personnel, and some figures (such as Zhirinovskii, who excels in contradictory radical statements but heads a party which supports Putin at every turn) are barely worth labeling.



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Radical nationalist organizations play a noticeable role in maintaining the level of antisemitism in the country. In contrast to the so-called ‘kitchen antisemitism’ of the masses, antisemitism amongst radical nationalists is conscious, overt, and part of their political ideology. Antisemitism may now be found in a wide variety of nationalist movements (amongst Chechen separatists for example; see Cherkasov 2002: 397–405), but it has always played a significant role in the ideology of Russian nationalists. The entire spectrum of Russian nationalism from traditional Orthodox monarchists to neo-fascists and neo-Eurasianists is, to a greater or lesser degree, prone to antisemitism.23 Any attempts by Russian nationalists to reject antisemitism on a conceptual level were until recently individual initiatives, and generally unconvincing (Verkhovskii 2004: 251–64). As mentioned above, a surprisingly effective revival of old-style Russian nationalism was witnessed on November 21, 2005 in Moscow, in association with the centenary of the creation of the infamous Union of Russian People, better known as the ‘Black Hundred.’ Around 70 organizations of Orthodox-monarchist persuasion were represented, and fairly high-level government activists participated, most notably Sergei Glaz’ev, the leader of the Motherland (Rodina) parliamentary faction, and Sergei Baburin, the vice-chair of the State Duma (from a different faction of Motherland;24 earlier considered to be a moderate nationalist). Baburin also formally joined the organization. Less surprisingly, Nikolai Kur’ianovich, then a radically-disposed deputy of Zhirinovskii’s inaptly-named Liberal Democratic Party (LPDR), also participated. The late Viacheslav Klykov, a famous sculptor, was elected as head of the new Union of Russian People.25 Mainstream nationalist leaders such as Sergei Baburin or Dmitrii Rogozin have generally striven to avoid public antisemitic outbursts, in their efforts to attract a wider electorate to their parties. Similarly, the predominant communist party, Gennadii Ziuganov’s Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) now tends to avoid crass

23  On the role of antisemitism within Russian nationalist movements see for example Laqueur (1993); Shenfield (2001); Korey (1995). 24   In 2005 the Rodina faction formally split between Rogozin and the more radical Baburin. However, several radicals remained with Rogozin, including the aforementioned Andrei Savel’ev. 25  Klykov died in June 2006. The Union has now split—the most radical groups are headed by Dushenov, Nazarov and others, while the relatively ‘moderate’ wing is headed by General Leonid Ivashov, whom the radicals refuse to recognize as a leader.

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antisemitism. Analysts argue about whether the KPRF is a leftist or nationalist party,26 but it is more accurate to conclude that the KPRF combines both traits; its composition is diverse and it is perhaps best characterized as nationalist-populist. That said, ‘left’ now indicates a leaning towards Soviet tradition and nostalgia for the USSR, and therefore does not exclude antisemitism. Antisemites in the KPRF have never been in short supply—General Albert Makashov,27 for example, became infamous for his remarks about ‘yids’ in 1998—but although antisemitism is in evidence in the KPRF, it is not a prominent feature in their ideology or publications. Gennadii Ziuganov included a few arguments about the ‘Jewish factor’ in his book Beyond the Horizon (Za gorizontom), but before a larger mass reprint they were removed.28 Efforts to create more openly antisemitic parties headed by wellknown politicians have been unsuccessful: prominent politicians and active radicals proved unwilling to collaborate, and more moderate activists were reluctant to leave the moderate parties. Thus ingloriously ended the history of the Movement in Support of the Army (Dvizheniia v podderzhku armii) of Albert Makashov and Viktor Iliukhin, and the People’s Patriotic Party of Russia (Narodno-patrioticheskaia partiia) was almost insignificant on the political stage, despite being lead by the former Minister of Defense Igor Rodionov and the charismatic Nikolai Kondratenko. Since the collapse of the People’s Patriotic Party, Rodionov has joined Sergei Mironov’s Just Russia party (Spravedlivaia Rossiia), as have many nationalists within the Duma. Antisemitism remains an organic part of the more marginal nationalist organizations which peaked in popularity in the 1990s: Russian National Unity (Russkoe natsionalnoe edinstvo—which, after its dramatic collapse in 2000 splintered into various organizations of the same name, with a substantially reduced total membership),29 the Party of Freedom (Partiia svobody—the former National Republican Party), the People’s National Party (Narodnaia natstionalnaia partiia) and a multitude of others. Antisemitism is also energetically growing in the current 26  This issue is explored, with numerous references to other works, by Umland (2005). Parland has suggested it be considered ‘rightist;’ see Parland (2005: 95–101). 27  Makashov, together with a group of comrades, has now split from Ziuganov, but not as a result of disagreement over the ‘Jewish question’. 28  This episode, like many others relating to everyday antisemitism in respectable political parties, is described in detail by Likhachev (2003). 29   See Dunlop (1996) and the two-volume study of RNE by Likhachev and V. Pribylovskii (2005).



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decade within the Nazi-skinhead movement, although the primary object of their hatred is the ethnically ‘other’ (in their understanding, the racially ‘other’ ) from regions of the South, from Africa to the Caucuses.30 The situation has changed perceptibly only since the appearance in 2002 of the Movement Against Illegal Immigration (Dvizhenie protiv nelegalnoi immigratsii, DPNI), an informal network lead by Aleksandr Potkin. Potkin’s pseudonym—Belov, from the word belyi (‘white’ )—has clearly racist connotations, and he is a former leader of the Moscow branch of the oldest radical-nationalist organization—the NationalPatriotic Front ‘Memory’ (National’no-patrioticheskii front ‘Pamiat’ ), often known simply as Pamyat. In 2005–6 the DPNI became one of the most notable nationalist movements in the country. The DPNI has conducted a very harsh program of propaganda against ‘migrants,’ a term which in contemporary Russian usage relates not only to immigrants (people from other countries moving to Russia), but also to Russian citizens who originate in ethnically ‘other’ regions. Thus, the word ‘migrant’ (migrant) has simply replaced the word ‘non-Russian’ (inorodets—literally, ‘otherborn,’ historically the word for a member of an ethnic minority in Tsarist Russia). For example, a Slav arriving in Moscow from Baku in Azerbaijan would not be normally called a migrant, but an Azerbaijani moving from Petersburg to Moscow would be. Using sociological instead of ethnic terminology makes the rhetoric of the DPNI more respectable and socially acceptable. The leader of the DPNI has become a prominent figure in the media, considerably more famous than other comparably significant nationalist figures, as many journalists consider it entirely appropriate to invite Potkin (Belov) to speak not only as a political activist, and also as an ‘expert on migration.’ It is difficult to ascertain to what degree journalists are simply motivated by the prospect of producing a controversial political activist who may nevertheless be relied upon not to break the law on air or in print, or to what degree these journalists themselves share the ideas of the DPNI and are glad to be able to propagate them without risk of sanctions. Doubtless journalists of this latter type are not few, given the large number of people who hold strongly xenophobic views in Russian society.

  For further details about the Russian skinhead movement see Tarasov (2000).

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Despite their increasingly respectable façade, the DPNI directly and openly depends upon groups of Nazi-skinheads and collaborates with radical nationalist groups. The DPNI organized and provided the majority of participants for the most substantial radical nationalist demonstration in recent years—the ‘Right March’ on November 4, 2005, the newly-instituted ‘National Unity Day.’ Three thousand people participated in the march in Moscow, and openly racist slogans against migrants were displayed and shouted without any repercussions from the authorities. A year later, the second Unity Day rally or ‘Russian march’ was sabotaged by the authorities, although around a thousand people attended a town hall meeting in Moscow and vast media coverage ensued. At this rally, antisemitic slogans were more in evidence, although the main focus of racist slogans was again ‘blacks’—migrants from the Caucuses. More worryingly, similar ‘Russian march’ events took place in eleven other cities in 2006, and a further four events were suppressed by the authorities (cf. Sova Centre 2006). The leaders of this movement avoid public antisemitic statements, however. While racist notes sometimes resonate in their public remarks about Tadjik or other ethnic groups, DPNI leaders rarely make reference to Jews. The DPNI has consciously broken with the ‘black hundred’ tradition of Russian nationalism and tried to copy the behavior of successful right-wing politicians of Western Europe—Le Pen, Haider and others.31 Their primary activists—skinheads—remain something of a handicap in their drive for respectability, since the average citizen, although inclined to xenophobia, is suspicious of this constituency. In terms of copying the National Front of Le Pen, Motherland (Rodina) had noticeably greater success. Motherland was hurriedly created with the support of the Kremlin before the parliamentary elections of 2003, with the aim of stealing votes from the KPRF (Wilson 2005: 112). This hastily thrown together, motley national-populist coalition quickly gained popularity, despite regular internal conflicts. The leadership of Motherland openly indicated their xenophobic sentiments, but refrained from articulating crass racism or antisemitism of the Makashov type. Their television advert, which pictured men from the Caucuses throwing melon rind beneath the wheels of a white

31  The DPNI have made overtures to the European far right; see for example European National Front (2006).



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mother’s pram and closed with a declaration of their intention to ‘clean the city of rubbish,’ is a good example of the sort of fine line Motherland chose to walk. This tactic proved very successful, and Motherland could have gained much, had it not been effectively destroyed at the beginning of 2006 by covert pressure from the Kremlin. Motherland may have been a mirage rather than a real democratic development, but it struck a chord with the electorate nonetheless; the very fact that it garnered 9% of the vote after a mere three months in existence demonstrates just how popular anti-immigrant, pro-Russian themes are amongst the electorate. The position of the DPNI and Dmitrii Rogozin (the former leader of Motherland, who resigned under Kremlin pressure) is nevertheless exceptional. Antisemitism remains significant for Russian nationalists, including for those genuine radicals who entered the State Duma on the party list of Motherland. In contrast to previous parliaments where real radicals numbered not more than one or two, Motherland’s success introduced around a dozen to political life at federal level. All of these, however, lost their seats in the Duma elections of December 2007. V.  Antisemitism in the Mass Media The mass media in post-Soviet Russia is as diverse as it is in Western Europe, but there are significant differences in the relationships between society, government, and the media which impact upon the problem of nationalist and racist propaganda. The role of the mass media in transforming Russia from the center of a totalitarian Soviet empire to an independent nation state, apparently embarking on a democratic and capitalist path, has been so fundamental that a great deal of academic effort has been expended in exploring it.32 More recently, an apparent decline in press freedom and increasing state

32   Significant research projects at the University of Surrey and the University of Glasgow have recently been funded by the AHRC and ESRC (Economic and Social Research Council ) respectively to explore the role of television in post-Soviet culture and society. Selected English language publications are listed in the bibliography and further reading can be found particularly in the bibliography of Ivan Zassoursky (2004).

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control over the media under President Putin has prompted a further flurry of publications (see for example Panfilov 2005 and Becker 2004). Monitoring of the federal and regional press in recent years suggests that prejudiced remarks about ethnic minorities are even more prevalent amongst journalists and readers than amongst politicians, and that increasingly journalists are reporting racist remarks made by politicians without comment, or favorably (Kozhevnikova 2004). Given the symbiotic relationship between media and society, it is unsurprising that recent polls agree that a significant percentage of the population of the Russian Federation share xenophobic views. Antisemitic remarks, even veiled allusions, are fairly rare in the Russian mass-media, with the exception of course, of ideologically nationalist publications. Manifestations of antisemitism are criticized by journalists more often than manifestations of other ethno-religious phobias, especially ‘Caucasophobia’ and Islamophobia, so popular nowadays in Russia.33 This does not mean that antisemitic publications are not in circulation: they are available and acquire in the eyes of readers an air of ‘forbidden truth,’ so their influence, possibly, is disproportionate to their meager numbers. It would be a mistake to assume that archaic antisemitic myths of the ‘Protocols of the Elders of Zion’ type are always confined to fringe publications, however. In 2000, Aleksandr Ignatov, Director of the Informational Analytic Agency at the Presidential Administration, discussed in all earnestness ‘the usurpation of power in world government by a Hasidic-paramasonic group’ on the pages of the large circulation broadsheet The Independent Newspaper (Nezavisimaia gazeta) (Ignatov 2000). In July 2006, an article in the Krasnoiarsk newspaper Krasnoiarskii komsomolets about the killing of five local boys the year before cited the legal representative of the victims’ families as suggesting ‘that this is the work of the Hassidic sect, which in the days leading up to Easter performs ritual murder with the aim of extracting blood from children’s bodies. I may say that similar murders happened in Saratov [a reference to an incident in 1853] and Tver.’ (Sova Centre 2006c) The article did not contest this supposition. Instances such as these are rare, but similar aberrations occur in other media. In 2002, the television channel TVTs broadcast the first program of a new series, Anti-disinformation (Antideza), which promoted

 This is discussed in detail in Verkhovskii and Kozhevnikova (2005).

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antisemitic myths, and which was swiftly taken off the air after the resulting public outcry.34 In 2004, however, the Petersburg channel TV-3 (available also in Moscow and a number of other regions) regularly broadcast the television program Our Strategy (Nasha strategiia), later replaced by the similar talk show Two against One (Dva protiv odnogo), created by the same team. The presenters and some guests on this program continue to systematically conduct nationalist, including antisemitic, propaganda—and no noticeable protests have been made. Channel TV-3 (not to be confused with the Moscow ‘Third Channel’ ) does not generally promote nationalism; it would appear that its leadership for some reason simply does not pay attention to this program—as, indeed, the wider community does not. It is important to note, therefore, that there is some reduction of vigilance amongst the Russian public in relation to manifestations of antisemitism in the mass media. For all that, we repeat, similar incidences happen on television or radio sufficiently rarely. Ivan Zassoursky sees the Internet as offering an alternative to the state-controlled media of Putin’s Russia, operating as samizdat did during the Soviet period (Zassoursky 2004: 21–3), and certainly in terms of extreme nationalist and racist activity the Internet has proved a haven for publicists restricted in other media, and a convenient means of bringing together geographically and even politically disparate groups.35 A typical development is the ‘Ring of Patriotic Resources,’ which boasts nearly four hundred sites ranging from the web pages of St Petersburg branch of the Ministry of Interior Affairs to the ‘Apocalypse’ website, which offers a commentary to Revelation, all united to form an ‘information front’ against the liberal mass media’s alleged campaign against Russia (Apocalypse 2007). Some commentators observe a widening gap between those who only watch television and ‘liberal intellectuals’ who choose liberal newspapers, independent radio and the Internet as their news sources (Gessen 2004), but the Internet has a wider popular appeal, especially amongst the young. There has been a spectacular growth in Internet use, despite the problems caused by the inherited Soviet telecommunications system, which has hampered the growth of networks. Of Russia’s 148 million inhabitants, 2 million were Internet users in 1999,

  For further details see Zassorin (2006).  See Rock (2004) for a focused study of racism on the Russian-language Internet.

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and 3 million in March 2001.36 By 2004, 15 million Russians were apparently accessing the Internet on a regular basis—roughly 10% of the population (Corwin 2004). The reach of the Internet does not stop here, however. The deputy director of Rambler (a major Russian language Internet portal and search engine) estimates that the reach of news or information posted on the Internet extends to as much as one-third of the population, as radio and other media pick up ‘hot’ topics from the Internet and broadcast them more widely (Corwin 2004). The impact of the Rasputin and Ivan ‘the Terrible’ canonization campaigns, which were laced with antisemitic slurs and organized mainly through marginal newspapers and nationalist websites, is evidence of this phenomenon. This topic eventually reached the mainstream Western press, and the Patriarchate has had to take an unusually public stand on the issue (Rock 2006).37 VI.  The Letter of the Five Hundred: A Very Russian Case Study In the last two years (2005–6) there has been a perceptible increase in open xenophobia, including antisemitic slurs such as those which appeared in a local newspaper in Riazan, describing the former mayor as a Jew masquerading as an Orthodox nationalist and building a Jewish mafia in the town (Sova Centre 2006). Perhaps the most curious and revealing case of antisemitism in recent years has been the socalled ‘Letter of the Five Hundred,’ initiated by an Orthodox nationalist activist, Mikhail Nazarov. This text, which might have remained as marginal as his other writings, was catapulted into mainstream news because of the participation of a Duma deputy from Motherland, Aleksandr Krutov, at the beginning of 2005. Before his election to the Duma, Krutov was famous as the main editor of the Orthodoxnationalist magazine Russian House (Russkii dom—which he still edits) 36   The Russia Journal (March 3–9, 2001); The Moscow Times Business Review May 2001 vol. 9, No. 4. 37   In addition to public pronouncements, the Patriarchate has published and widely disseminated copies of pamphlets entitled “Tsar’ Ivan Vasil’evich: Groznyi ili sviatoi? Argumenty tserkvi protiv kanonizatsii Ivana Groznogo i Grigoriia Rasputina [Tsar Ivan Vasil’evich: Terrible or Holy? Arguments of the Church against the canonization of Ivan the Terrible and Gregory Rasputin], cf. Arguments of the Church (2004).



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and the presenter of a television program of the same name. The history of this letter is significant in both political and legislative terms, and to best explore its significance, we will outline the events relating to it in chronological order. Russian legislation against racist propaganda, ethnic, and religious hatred has always been applied very badly. Along the slow and uneven road to democracy, from the 1990s until the first decade of the new century, even the most radical appeals to hatred—those including clear incitement to violence and discrimination—have failed to attract prohibition and criminal sanctions. Until 2006, real sentences for such appeals (which are notable country-wide) could be counted on one’s fingers: newspapers systematically publishing lawbreaking propaganda are very rarely closed by the decision of the courts, and it is still rarer for such a fate to befall a marginal nationalist organization. In 2006, there was a perceptible upturn in sentencing, but nevertheless, the familiar conflict between the need to curtail the incitement of hatred and the right to free speech is not simply resolved badly, it is not resolved at all. In 2002, a new law ‘On the counteraction of extremist activity’ was introduced, which together with other amendments in legislation, created a very powerful repressive mechanism (and, incidentally, an extremely serious threat to civil rights),38 but at the same time broadened and made even less specific the object opposed, now called ‘extremism.’ Amongst other things, the following point is included in the definition of extremism: the propaganda of exclusiveness, arising either from the inferiority of the citizen by virtue of their attitude to religion, social, racial, national, religious or language membership. It was immediately apparent that, relating to religious pronouncements at least, this point constitutes an obvious threat: the assertion of superiority—in one sense or another—by adherents of their religion is very often an integral part of dogma. Needless to say, this applies also to Judaism. One can repeat as often as one likes that calling the Jews ‘God’s chosen people’ does not imply any privileged status, but being ‘chosen by God’ can definitely be interpreted as an assertion of exclusiveness—and so it is often interpreted.

  See for example Levinson (2002).

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Almost immediately upon the passing of this law, Mikhail Nazarov published an article, subsequently published as a separate brochure, in which he demonstrated that the accepted corpus of religious regulations in Judaism fits perfectly under the new definition of extremism. Nazarov pointed out that Judaism is based on a whole series of religious texts which are intolerant to the heterodox, beginning with the Talmud (an Orthodox author would not cite examples from the Holy Scriptures) and finishing with a corpus of religious rules published in the nineteenth century—Kitsur Shulkhan Arukh—which in turn is based on a compilation of the sixteenth century, Shulkhan Arukh. Nazarov, mining a rich tradition of anti-Judaic polemics, quoted a list of citations from Shulkhan Arukh and other sources which prove that these books provoke in the reader nothing remotely like positive feelings towards other-believers. Nazarov is certainly guilty of citing these texts loosely, and at times extremely loosely (and has been roundly condemned for doing so), but his main point is impossible to contest—ancient and medieval religious texts are intolerant, and it would be odd to perceive this as an exclusive feature of Judaism. Society is aware that the contemporary activities of religious groups and organizations are not generally governed literally by such texts, although there are potential and actual exceptions. Nazarov, for example, as a genuine Orthodox fundamentalist, would not dream of promoting the malleability of religious tradition. During the fall of 2004, Nazarov began to collect signatories to a letter addressed to the General Prosecutor requesting that he recognize Kitsur Shulkhan Arukh as an extremist book and ban all Jewish organizations—secular and religious alike—since their activities are supposedly based on the ideas of Kitsur Shulkhan Arukh (Nazarov 2002). By the beginning of 2005, this letter, overflowing with references to famous antisemitic myths and seasoned with an overtly Judeophobic tone, had already been signed by five hundred people. At this point, the Motherland deputy Aleksandr Krutov tapped into the process, securing an additional nineteen signatures from members of the State Duma—fourteen of whom were from Motherland and five from the Communist Party of the Russian Federation. There were also other nationally famous signatories, for example, the sculptor Viacheslav Klykov, whose statue of Marshal Zhukov stands at the entrance to Red Square, and the former world chess champion Boris Spasskii. In January 2005, the letter was published on a fairly wellknown website—that of the Orthodox-nationalist newspaper Orthodox



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Rus (Rus pravoslavnaia), edited by Konstantin Dushenov—apparently against the wishes of the authors. This action provoked an unusually loud public outcry, with even the Ministry of Foreign Affairs making a special announcement to condemn the ‘Letter of the Five Hundred.’ The majority of those deputies who had signed the letter renounced their actions. Others refused to surrender and produced a barely watered-down demand that the Ministry of Justice not immediately shut down, but first investigate the activities of all Jewish organizations, on the same grounds. The campaign continued on the Internet as part of a ring of Internet resources entitled ‘To Live Without Fear of Jews’ (a reference to John 19:38),39 and Nazarov, Dushenov and other activists have now collected and passed on to the General Prosecutor—if Nazarov is to be believed— around twenty thousand signatures. One can only guess why the nineteen deputies decided to take such a step. There is no reason to doubt their genuine antisemitism—many of them (including the aforementioned Albert Makashov and the ideologist of ‘Russian racism’ Andrei Savel’ev, an influential member of Motherland until the expulsion of Rogozin, and now the leader of the Great Russia party), long ago demonstrated their commitment to it. However, their signing of an openly antisemitic, official document indicates that these people, notable for caution, had for some reason decided that the time was ripe for a public battle. It is possible they were misled by rumors circulating in political circles. Either way, they were mistaken; the authorities did not attempt to support them in any way. Neither did the authorities punish them in any way, however, and that of itself has served as a serious stimulus to antisemitic propaganda. On January 26, 2005, the General Prosecutor Vladimir Ustinov, answering questions in the Federation Council, justified his office’s inaction thus; ‘kitchen antisemitism in Russia is incurable. The main thing is to make sure it does not go further than the kitchen. Don’t touch and it won’t stink.’ Ustinov suggested that one should generally avoid discussion of antisemitism—‘the more we talk about it, the greater interest there is in it.’ (regnum.ru 2005) One can understand the Prosecutor’s unease: it is difficult to open proceedings against what would be hundreds (and later thousands) of people, including a number

  The official site of the letter is at Russia Talk (2005).

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of Duma deputies, without a clear directive from the political leadership of the country. Such a directive was not forthcoming. However, fear of political consequences cannot wholly explain the systematic failures of the system to tackle this crude antisemitic propaganda. Since then, more and more slippery reasoning has been resorted to in explaining why criminal proceedings should not be brought against the author(s) of this letter of the five hundred and related publications. In March 2006, citing from unnamed experts, the Prosecutor’s Office of St Petersburg declared that antisemitic speculations in the newspaper Rus’ pravoslavnaia correspond with Orthodox tradition. In June 2006, a new refusal to prosecute, based on the expert conclusions of three infamous Petersburg nationalists and antisemites, included the argument that the ‘Blood Libel’ and the existence of the Holocaust are topics of legitimate academic discussion. It was also suggested that the position of Rus’ pravoslavnaia corresponds to the contemporary official position of the Russian Orthodox Church—a clearly false proposition. This is a sadly typical display of tolerance on the part the Prosecutor’s Office towards radical manifestations of antisemitism, with legally inadmissible speculations based on theological arguments. Social opposition to this new flourishing of antisemitism appears also very weak. Civil claims in defense of the honor and values, lodged against a few authors of the letter of five hundred by a few Jewish activists, were met with analogous counter-claims against them themselves. Most of these claims, from both sides, have been dismissed by the Courts. More worryingly, efforts to create public discussion in the popular talk show ‘To the Barrier!’ (a phrase indicating the start of a duel ) with the participation of letter signatory General Albert Makashov, ended with the triumphant victory of this well-known antisemite, supported by the majority of viewers’ votes. While there has been a gradual increase in cases brought to court, successful prosecutions of crimes based on ethnic hatred are notoriously few and far between. Reference is often made to the complicated and lengthy process of securing the expertise necessary to prosecute in criminal cases of antisemitic propaganda, and the 2004 murder of ethnologist Nikolai Girenko (who advised police and prosecutors on racist crimes committed in Petersburg and in the North-West of Russia) was a grim reminder of the risks that such participation brings. In many cases, however, this should have no bearing on the decision to prosecute—the law does not require the engagement of expert witnesses in cases where ordinary common sense and the legal expertise



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of the investigator, prosecutor and judge are enough to evaluate the text or utterances under consideration. There are many cases where a prosecution might have easily been secured but the prosecutor has nevertheless refused to bring criminal proceedings. One such case is the January 2004 publication in the Pskov regional press of the Catechism of the Jew in the USSR, an antisemitic forgery from the Soviet period, which the infamous antisemite Viktor Korchagin was convicted for publishing as long ago as 1995. Criminal proceedings were likewise not brought, despite repeated demands, when Hassidic Jews were publicly accused of the ritual murder of children in 2005 (including at the meeting in the center of Moscow on May 29th), despite the fact that the ‘Blood Libel’ was long ago proved to be a lie, and one might easily prosecute on those grounds. The website Rus pravoslavnaia, on which the letter of the five hundred initially appeared, distributes new antisemitic films without difficulty, including Soviet (The Hidden and the Clear —suppressed in the USSR for antisemitism) and Nazi (The Eternal Jew, one of a number of sources already acknowledged as extremist in court). The website disseminates many less well-known examples of antisemitic propaganda, too, including antisemitic presentations at protest meetings in 2006. In late 2007, a case was launched against Dushenov for inciting racial hatred, but Rus pravoslavnaia continues to be published on the Internet. VII.  Conclusion: Antisemitism on the Rise? The real problem raised by the ‘Letter of the Five Hundred’ is not how to deal with an insignificant antisemite, but that following a literalist, fundamentalist reading of ancient texts is now prosecutable under the new anti-extremist law. We have not only witnessed the head of a Jewish organization being summoned to the Prosecutor’s office to give an explanation of the contents of Kitsur Shulkhan Arukh as a result of an appeal by Russian nationalists: in April 2004, one of Moscow’s judges declared extremist and banned on those grounds the eighteenth century Book of Monotheism by Mohammed ibn Suleiman al-Tamimi (also known as Mohammed ibn Abdul-Wahhab), which is, of course, also by no means a manifesto of tolerance. The passing of the ultra-repressive law ‘On counteracting extremist activity’ has weakened rather than strengthened the influence of the prosecutor and controlling organs of government on those conducting

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inflammatory propaganda of organizations and the mass media. (Verkhovskii & Kozhevnikova 2005) As the ‘Letter of Five Hundred’ (amongst other cases) demonstrates, this law is so badly constructed that law enforcement bodies find it difficult to implement successfully. The astonishing weakness of opposition to antisemitic propaganda has lead to its noticeable growth. It is difficult to statistically measure the growth of antisemitic propaganda, but in terms of aggressiveness and openness, it clearly increased in 2005 and 2006. It should be stressed that here we are talking specifically about propaganda: violent attacks on Jews are still extremely rare and the main target of violent street crime remains individuals of non-European appearance, above all those from the Caucasus and Central Asia. In 2002, there was a brief fad of antisemitic placards which were mined with explosives or fake bombs, but in recent years there has been no recurrence. Acts of vandalism—sometimes using explosives—on synagogues, Jewish cemeteries, schools and cultural centres are more numerous, but their number holds at around thirty incidents per year and, as yet, has not shown any tendency to rise.40 The knife attack in January 2006 on worshippers at a Moscow synagogue by a lone antisemite (who had been reading inflammatory literature) was exceptional; the attacker managed to wound nine people before he was restrained, and he was quickly sentenced to 16 years imprisonment for attempted murder motivated by ethnic hatred. Antisemitism is not usually used in electoral campaigns, even by the most radical nationalists who garner between one and two percent of the vote, since this motif is not particularly popular with the electorate. However, since the creation of Motherland in 2003, nationalists have proved increasingly successful in elections, and even when antisemitic rhetoric is used it does not appear to dampen the enthusiasm of the electorate. This was evidenced in 2005, when the retired colonel Vladimir Kvachkov participated in a Moscow by-election to the State Duma. Kvachkov was still in custody at the time, accused of the attempted murder of Anatoli Chubais. Despite appealing from prison (in the newspaper Zavtra) for a violent struggle against the ‘JewishInternational Occupation,’ Kvachkov received almost 29% of the vote  All such incidents can be found in the news strand of the Sova Centre (2007). Some news sites show a few more incidences, but some of these are questionable because the motivation for the attacks was more likely to have been commercial competition than antisemitism. 40



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in the December elections. It is possible that many who voted for him may have been simply indicating their support for a frustrated assassin of the extremely unpopular Chubais, but the electorate could have had little doubt about the views of the man they were voting for, since they were highlighted by his active campaigning and discussed both on television and in the newspapers. Interestingly, Komsomolskaia pravda, one of the highest-circulation newspapers in the country (this newspaper is famous for a high level of xenophobia, and is the traditional channel for high-ranking bureaucrats hoping to reach ‘the people’ ) found it necessary to mitigate the accusation of antisemitism: Kvachkov, in talking about ‘yids,’ allegedly meant simply ‘greedy people.’ (For further details see Kozhevnikova, 2005) The stormy times at the beginning of the 1990s forgotten, in 2006, we have once again observed nationalists marching without hindrance through the centre of Moscow (ironically, on Victory Day, when Russians celebrate their triumph over fascism), chanting ‘Off with the Jewish yoke!’ (Doloi zhidovskoe igo! ). Why Russian society is so passive in the face of radical nationalism in general, and antisemitism in particular, has been endlessly debated. There can be little question that it continues to shape and re-shape the Jewish experience in post-Soviet Russia (Gitelman 2003). One theory is that the government is covertly supporting ultranationalism, and especially antisemitism, as a means of intimidating democratic society, and offering the choice of ‘fascism or Putin.’ Despite a public commitment to combating racism and antisemitism, it is indeed hard to see in the actions of the current government anything other than a cynical manipulation of legal systems, law enforcement bodies and popular, xenophobic sentiment for their own ends. The creation, promotion and destruction of the nationalistpopulist bloc Motherland, and the prosecution of political opposition and independent activists under the new anti-extremist legislation, are a clear indication that immediate political ends take precedence over any articulated aim of promoting tolerance. More likely, however, is the theory that the failure of law-enforcement bodies to secure prosecutions against radical nationalists is not the result of external political directives or influence, but of internal incompetence or lack of motivation. The growth in popularity of nationalist ideas and groups poses a choice before the government: to overcome this tendency or to conform to it. To overcome this tendency, the government either needs

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to apply forceful sanctions or completely overhaul internal politics. For a variety of political reasons today’s government is able to do neither, and therefore it has had to adapt to the growth of nationalism, and consequently, antisemitism. Whether this means that the recent rise in antisemitism will continue remains to be seen. References Agursky, Mikhail (1983/4) Russian Orthodox Christians and the Holocaust. Immanuel 17: 88–93. Apocalypse (2007) Kol’tso patrioticheskikh resursov, www.rossija.info. Retrieved May 13, 2007. Arguments of the Church (2004) Tsar’ Ivan Vasil’evich: Groznyi ili sviatoi? Argumenty tserkvi protiv kanonizatsii Ivana Groznogo i Grigoriia Rasputina [Tsar Ivan Vasil’evich: Terrible or Holy? Arguments of the Church against the canonisation of Ivan the Terrible and Gregory Rasputin] (Moscow, 2004). Becker, Jonathan (2004) Lessons from Russia: A Neo-Authoritarian Media System. European Journal of Communication 19, 2: 139–162. Brym, Robert J. and Andrei Degtyarev (1993) Anti-Semitism in Moscow: Results of an October 1992 Survey. Slavic Review 52, 1: 1–12. Brym, Robert J. (1994) Anti-Semitism in Moscow: A Re-examination. Slavic Review 53, 3: 842–55. Cherkasov, Alexander (2002) Chechnya. In Nationalism, Xenophobia and Intolerance in Contemporary Russia (Moscow: Moscow Helsinki Group). Corwin, Julie A. (2004) Draining The ‘Cesspool’: Internet Legislation in Russia. RFE/ RL Media Matters 4: 13, July 16. Deutsch Kornblatt, Judith (2004) Doubly Chosen: Jewish identity, the Soviet Intelligentsia and the Russian Orthodox Church (Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press). Duke, David (2000) Is Russia the Key to White Survival?, available online at http:// www.davidduke.com/dukereport/10–00.html. Retrieved November 7, 2007. —— (2002a) Novy Peterburg 28 February, No. 8, available online in English translation at http://eairc.boom.ru/reports/lyubomudrov2.html. Retrieved November 2, 2007. —— (2002b) www.abbc.com/conferences/index.htm. Retrieved April 10, 2002. —— (2007) Europe and Russia: New Perspectives, available online at: http://www .davidduke.com/general/from-the-abyss-david-dukes-moscow-speech_2520.html. Retrieved November 28, 2007. Duncan, Peter J. S. (2000) Russian Messianism: Third Rome, revolution, Communism and after (London and New York: Routledge). Dunlop, John B. (1996) Alexander Barkashov and the Rise of National Socialism in Russia. Demokratizatsiya 4, 4: 519–30. Dushenov, Konstantin (2005) Zhidovskaia zhestokovyinost’ i khristianskaia liubov’. Rus’ pravoslavnaia, July–August 2005, available online at http://www.rusidea .org/?a=155005. Retrieved November 2007. Ericson, Jr., Edward E. and Daniel J. Mahoney (eds) (2006) The Solzhenitsyn Reader: New and Essential Writings 1947–2005 (Wilmington, DE: ISI Books). European National Front (2006) www.europeannationalfront.org/?p=40. Retrieved May 13, 2007. Gessen, Masha (2004) ‘In this context, you can’t really be a journalist’: An interview with Masha Gessen. RFE/RL Media Matters 4, 3, February 13.



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Gibson, James L. (1994) Understandings of Anti-Semitism in Russia: An Analysis of the Politics of Anti-Jewish Attitudes. Slavic Review 53, 3: 796–806. Gitelman, Zvi (2003) Thinking about Being Jewish in Russia and Ukraine. In Zvi Gitelman (ed) Jewish Life after the USSR (Bloomington: Indiana University Press), pp. 49–60. Gudkov, Lev (1999) Antisemitism in post-Soviet Russia. In Intolerance in Russia. Old and New Phobias (Moscow: Moscow Carnegie Centre). Hackel, Sergei (1998) The relevance of post-Holocaust theology to the thought and practice of the Russian Orthodox Church. Sobornost 20, 1: 7–25. Ignatov, Aleksandr (2000) Nezavisimaia gazeta, September 7. Interfax-religion (2007) Rossiiane stali men’she poseshchat’ religioznye sluzhby—opros, August 8. Available online at http://www/interfax-religion .ru/?act=news&div=19672. Retrieved September 23, 2007. Kizenko, Nadieszda (2000) A Prodigal Saint: Father John of Kronstadt and the Russian People (University Park: Penn State University Press). Klier, John D. (1997) Judaizing Without Jews? Moscow-Novgorod, 1470–1504. In A. M. Kleimola and G. D. Lenhoff (eds), Culture and Identity in Muscovy, 1359 –1584 (Moscow: ITZ-Garant) pp. 336–49. —— (1995) Russian Jewry as the “Little Nation” of the Russian Revolution. In Yaacov Ro’i (ed), Jews and Jewish life in Russia and the Soviet Union (Ilford: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd), pp. 146–56. —— (1998) The Dog That Didn’t Bark: Antisemitism in Post-Communist Russia. In Geoffrey Hosking and Robert Service (eds), Russian Nationalism Past and Present (London: Palgrave), pp. 129–47. Komissiia Sviashchennogo Sinoda Russkoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi po kanonizatsii sviatykh (1999) Kanonizatsiia sviatykh v XX veke (Moscow: Izd. Sretenskogo monastyria). Korey, William (1995) Russian Antisemitism, Pamyat, and the Demonology of Zionism (Studies in Antisemitism, Vol. 2: Reading: Harwood Press). Kozhevnikova, Galina (2004) Iazyk vrazhdy v predvybornoi agitatsii i vne ee (Moscow, SOVA Center). —— (2005) Hate speech in the year after Beslan. Sova Centre website Nationalizm i ksenofobiia, December 27, 2005, online at http://xeno.sova-center .ru/213716E/21728E3/698E1F2. Retrieved November 2007. Kuraev, Alexander (1998) Kak delaiut antisemitom (Moscow: Odigitriya). Laqueur, Walter (1993) Black Hundred. The Rise of the Extreme Right in Russia (New York: HarperCollins Publishers). Levada Centre (2005) Otnoshenie rossiian k liudiam drugikh natsional’nostei, a press release by the Levada Centre, November 11, 2005, available online at http:// levada.ru/press/2005111101.html. Retrieved November 2007. —— (2007) http://levada.ru/takoemnenie.html. Retrieved November 1, 2007. Levinson, Lev (2002) S ekstremizmom budut borot’sia po-stalinski. Rossiiskii biulleten’ po pravam cheloveka No. 16. Likhachev, Vyacheslav and Vladimir Pribylovskii (2005) Russkoe natsional’noe edinstvo 1990–2000 (Soviet & Post-Soviet Politics & Society 10; Stuttgart/Hannover: Ibidem). Likhachev, Vyacheslav (2003) Politicheskii antisemitism v sovremennoi Rossii (Moscow: Akademia). —— (2006) Political Anti-Semitism in Post-Soviet Russia: Actors and Ideas 1991–2003, edited and translated from the Russian by Eugene Veklerov (Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society; Ibidem-Verlag: Stuttgart). Lindemann, Albert S. (1991) The Jew Accused: Three Anti-Semitic Affairs (Dreyfus, Beilis, Frank) 1894–1915 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Lyubomudrov, Mark (2002) The Anti-Globalist Leader’s Conference. Novyii Peterburg March 7, 2002, available online at http://eairc.boom.ru/reports/lyubomudrov3 .html. Retrieved November 2007.

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Marks, Steven G. (2003) How Russia Shaped the Modern World: From Art to Anti-Semitism, Ballet to Bolshevism (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press). Nazarov, Mikhail (2002) Fashizm ot Shulkhan Arukh. Zavtra, Nos: 30–1. —— (2007) Vozhdiu tret’ego Rima, available online at http://www.rusidea.org?a=411005. Retrieved November 2007. Nilus, Sergei (2004) Bliz est’, pri dverekh . . . (Moscow: Alt’ta-Print 2004). Reprinted from the fourth edition of 1917, printed by the Trinity-St Sergius Monastery. Panfilov, Oleg (2005) Putin and the Press: The Revival of Soviet-style Propaganda (London: The Foreign Policy Centre). Parland, Thomas (2005) The Extreme Nationalist Threat in Russia: The growing influence of Western Rightist ideas (London and New York: Routledge). Paul IV (1965) Nostra Aetate, available on the Vatican website at www.vatican.va/ archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/index.htm. Retrieved December 2, 2007. Regnum.ru (2005) ‘Kukhonnyi antisemitizm v Rossii neiskorenim’: V. Ustinov otvetil na voprosy senatorov, Regnum, January 26, www.regnum.ru/news/396078.html. Retrieved November 12, 2007. Reznik, Semyon (1996) The Nazification of Russia: Antisemitism in the Post-Soviet Era (Challenge Publications: Washington DC). Rock, Stella (2001) Russian revisionism: Holocaust denial and the new nationalist historiography. Patterns of Prejudice 35, 4: 64–76. —— (2002a) Nationalismus und Bruderschaften. Glaube in der 2. Welt 6: 24–29. —— (2002b) Militant Piety: Fundamentalist Tendencies in the Russian Orthodox Brotherhood Movement. Religion in Eastern Europe XXII, No. 3: 1–17. —— (2003) “Revisionists of the World, Unite!” Collaborative Myth-Making in Russia Today. In Il’ia Al’tman (ed) Kholokost i delo Evreiskogo antifashistskogo komiteta. Materialy IV mezhdunarodnoi konferentsii “Uroki Kholokosta i sovremmennaia Rossiia” (Fond Kholokosta: Moscow, 2003), pp. 125–131. —— (2004) Racism and Xenophobia in Virtual Russia. In Ralph Walden (ed) Racism and Human Rights (Leiden: Brill ), pp. 101–24. —— (2006) Rasputin the New: Mythologies of Sanctity in Post-Soviet Russia. In Jan Herman Brinks, Stella Rock, and Edward Timms (ed.) Nationalist Myths and Modern Media: Contested Identities in the Age of Globalization (London and New York), pp. 257–70. Rossman, Vadim (2002) Russian Intellectual Antisemitism in the Post-Communist Era (Studies in Antisemitism, SICSA University of Nebraska Press, 2002). Rus pravoslavnaia (2006) http://rusprav.org/biblioteka/ZBSI/23110.htm. Retrieved November 12, 2007. Rusk.ru (2002) ‘O evreiakh, tret’em khrame i novoi kartine mira: beseda glavnogo redaktora Russkoi linii Sergeia Grigor’eva s redaktorom otdela politiki Anatoliem Stepanovym,’ available online at www.rusk.ru/news/02/3/new20_03a.htm. Retrieved April 10. Russia Talk (2005) ‘To Live Without Fear of Jews.’ Russia Talk. www.russia.talk.com/ rf/Nazarov-obr.htm. Retrieved February 22, 2005. Schöpflin, George (1997) The Functions of Myth and a Taxonomy of Myths. In Geoffrey Hosking & George Schöpflin (eds) Myths and Nationhood (London: Routledge). Senderov, V. (1997) Russkaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov’ i ee otnoshenie k antisemitizmu. Dia-Logos 1: 123–36. Shafarevich, Igor (2006) Trex-tysiacheletniaia zagadka (Moscow: Eksmo). Shenfield, Stephen D. (2001) Russian Fascism. Traditions, tendencies, movements (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe). Shnirelman, Victor A. (1998) Russian Neo-pagan Myths and Antisemitism (ACTA 13: Vidal Sassoon International Center for the Study of Antisemitism). Simonovich, Leonid (2001) Personal Interview (Moscow, May 13).



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Hatred towards Jews as a Political Code? Antisemitism in Hungary András Kovács I.  Introduction Surveys conducted in the mid-1990s indicated that approximately one-tenth of the Hungarian adult population was strongly antisemitic and that a further one in four Hungarians harbored some form of anti-Jewish prejudice. The data of the surveys demonstrated beyond doubt that antisemitism afflicted a significant part of the adult population—although the figures have not been exceptional by international standards (Kovacs 1999).1 Antisemitism in Hungary seemed to be a phenomenon of the capital city: antisemitic prejudice occurred more frequently among residents of Budapest than among residents of other settlements. Excluding the place of residence, and the possession of economic and social resources, other social-demographic variables did not directly correlate with antisemitic prejudice. Age, education, and disposable economic-social resources did, however, indirectly affect the degree of anti-Jewish prejudice—by way of other attitudes. Xenophobia has been more common among older and less educated groups; and antisemitism was one of the manifestations of this phenomenon. Our observations indicated that in sections of society with diminishing economic-social resources the feeling of anomie were stronger than in other social groups disposing of a greater number of such resources. In turn, anomie induced antisemitic feelings both directly and indirectly, by generating xenophobia. In combination, anomie and conservative attitudes strengthened, in particular, the inclination towards extreme antisemitism. By themselves, religious-conservative views and attitudes did not induce antisemitism. The inclination towards antisemitism among groups with such religious-conservative attitudes was most pronounced among 1  The surveys conducted between 2005 and 2007 signalize a noticeable growth in the proportion of blatant antisemites in Hungary. The analysis of these data see in my forthcoming book Kovács, The Stranger among Us. Antisemitic Prejudices in Post-Communist Hungary (Boston; Brill, 2010).

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those groups in which the feeling of anomie was strong or in which antisemitism performed the function of a code for the expression of ideological and political positions. In this last group, which amounts to about 1% of the total adult population, antisemitism has been a political phenomenon. Several hypotheses may be formulated to explain the appearance and dynamic of antisemitic prejudice after the political changes of 1989–90. First, although antisemitic prejudice declined during the post-war decades and was present only in isolated pockets among certain generations, nevertheless, hostility towards Jews never disappeared completely. Various factors served to preserve it: the continued existence of prejudice below the surface of public life; its more or less coded presence in intellectual disputes; and the policies of the communist party state which sustained the “Jewish question” in a great variety of ways for the duration of the regime (Kovacs 2004). For this reason, the appearance of antisemitism after the fall of Communism in Hungary’s intellectual debates, as well as its emergence as an overt form of prejudice and a phenomenon in political life, surprised only those people who had considered the taboo as tantamount to the eradication of prejudice. It was to be expected that the conflicts caused by the collapse of the communist regime and the difficulties and challenges faced by ordinary people in the new social and economic environment, and the absence of a political culture capable of offering a variety of explanations for the newly emerged problems would indeed permit certain forces to mobilize cognitive patterns and ideological systems, such as antisemitism, which were still present in society even though they had been marginalized. Nevertheless, nobody could predict exactly how the dynamics of antisemitism would develop in the ensuing years. It is an old observation that as the language of the “Jewish question” becomes acceptable in the various elite discourses, so the legitimacy and vociferousness of antisemitic prejudice increases in ordinary everyday life. In view of this, a distinct possibility was that some groups would succumb to the temptation to imbue antisemitism with political content and to use it for political mobilization purposes. If this were to happen, anti-Jewish prejudice would obviously spread rapidly. But one could also envisage a situation in which the opinions and behavior of cultural and political elite groups for whom antisemitism was both morally and socially unacceptable as well as shameful would have a greater effect on the spread of anti-Jewish prejudice. Moreover, it seemed possible



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that anti-Jewish prejudice could actually be diminished, or at least stifled, by the resolution of post-Communist conflicts, the attraction of new ideologies more suited to explaining the new circumstances, the consequences of Hungary’s western orientation, and active measures designed to counter anti-Jewish sentiment—such as legal sanctions against antisemitism and the introduction of school educational programs. The survey we undertook in 2002, seven years after the last previous survey, sought to determine which of the two possible scenarios could be substantiated by empirical data.2 II.  Changes in the Level of Antisemitic Prejudice between 1994 and 2002 Although no separate survey on antisemitism was conducted between 1995 and 2002, nevertheless the questionnaires of several research institutes did occasionally include questions indicating trends in antisemitic prejudice. For instance, beginning in 1993, Gallup Hungary asked a representative sample of the national adult population each year the following question: “Are you a person who likes or dislikes Jews?” The response data (see Diagram 2.) show that in the period under inquiry hostility towards Jews actually declined among the Hungarian population. This finding is noteworthy, even if other surveys produced different results: according to our surveys, for instance, 8% of respondents in 1995 and 12% in 2002 placed themselves in the group that “dislikes Jews.” Taking into account the error margin of empirical studies and the fact that respondents replying to questions react very sensitively to ongoing political debates and in the media (as well as

2  The survey was conducted by TÁRKI, Budapest in June 2002. The sample of 1,000 was representative of the Hungarian adult population in terms of gender, age, domicile, and level of education. The questionnaire was compiled by a research group comprising the researchers that had conducted the surveys in 1994 and 1995 (Zsolt Enyedi, Ferenc Ero´´s, Zoltán Fábián, Zoltán Fleck, and András Kovács). The research was coordinated by Zoltán Fábián and funded by OTKA (National Scientific Research Foundation). Thanks are due to TÁRKI and, above all, to Zoltán Fábián, who enabled me to participate in the research project, and to Szilvia Balassa (Minority Studies Institute, Hungarian Academy of Sciences), who was the first person to process the research data in an MA thesis written for the Nationalism Studies Department of the Central European University (Szilvia Balassa: Longitudinal analysis of antisemitic, anti-Roma and Xenophobic attitudes in Hungary,” Unpublished MA thesis, 2003. Central European University.

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to the context established by other questions on the questionnaire), we may state that, judging by this indicator, the extent of affective antisemitism has not changed dramatically, either one way or the other, over seven years.

42

50

40

41

50

45

43 36

40

38

37

30 14

20

15 10

11

13

11

11

10

10 7

0 1993

6 1994

1995

1996

“does not like the Gypsies” “does not like the Jews”

1997

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

Figure 1. Anti-Jewish and anti-Roma hostility in Hungary (1993–2003) (as percentage of the total adult population).

Responses to other questions measuring the emotional content of prejudice and social distance also failed to show a clear trend: slightly fewer people were opposed in 2002 to having Jews in their neighborhood than in 1995 (11% versus 15%). On the other hand, sympathy towards Jews had declined, whereas an increase was observed with respect to all other groups, apart from the Chinese. (See Table 1.) Even so, Jews continued to be one of the two most popular groups (the Germans are the most popular). Examining changes in the cognitive dimension of antisemitic prejudice (that is, comparing the responses given to the various questions of the surveys conducted in 1994, 1995, and 2002), we again received a rather mixed picture: we found that the share of people agreeing with some antisemitic statements of political content increased slightly, while



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the percentage accepting other statements of similar type declined. More people in 2002 than in the mid-1990s think that Jewish influence in the media and culture is excessive and that the liberal parties represent Jewish interests. But fewer people believed in a secret Jewish conspiracy or that Jews were the principal beneficiaries of Hungary’s democratization. The only clear trend to emerge from the responses is an increase in the percentage of missing responses (Tab. 2). Table 1.  How Much Do You Like or Dislike . . .? (average scores on a ‘1 = dislike strongly’—‘9 = like strongly’ scale)

1995

2002

Arabs Serbs Roma Romanians Germans Chinese Jews

3.83 3.58 2.98 3.58 5.41 4.24 5.54

3.88 4.06 3.53 3.84 5.53 3.98 5.17

Table 2. Anti-Jewish Attitudes 1994–2002, I (in percent) Year

Fully agree

Partially agree

Partially disagree

Fully Do not Average disagree know (SD)

Jews have always 1994 16 18 17 13 36 had great influence on the left-wing 1995 27 38 35 movements. 2002 10 24 20   9 37 Jews even try to 1994 17 22 23 24 14 gain advantage from their own 1995 26 64 10 persecution. 2002 12 21 28 19 20 Jewish intellectuals 1994 12 18 22 25 23 control the press and cultural sphere. 2002 13 21 27 16 23 There exists a 1994 9 14 16 21 40 secret Jewish net- work determining 2002 8 14 15 22 41 political and economic affairs.

2.57 (1.07) 2.55 (0.91) 2.38 (1.09) 2.33 (1.00) 2.23 (1.07) 2.41 (1.00) 2.19 (1.07) 2.14 (1.08)

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Tab. 2 (cont.) Year

Fully agree

Partially agree

Partially disagree

Fully Do not Average disagree know (SD)

Liberal parties 1994 8 13 21 21 37 represent primarily Jewish interests. 2002 8 16 20 19 37

2.16 (1.02) 2.20 (1.01)

Jews are the ones 1994 14 13 24 33 16 who have really benefited from the 2002 6 16 26 29 23 change of system.

2.11 (1.10) 1.99 (0.96)

The responses to questions gauging support for anti-Jewish discrimination indicate a decline in the proclivity to discriminate—but here again the number of missing responses increased (Tab. 3). There was, however, a decline in the percentage agreeing with statements of religious origin expressing anti-Judaism (Tab. 4). Based on responses to the 12 questions in the three groups of questions, we can compare the change in the percentage of antisemites in the adult population during the period under inquiry (Tab. 5). Supposing that respondents that select antisemitic responses to more than half the questions are definitely prejudiced and respondents that select no antisemitic responses are definitely not prejudiced, then according to the findings of the 1994 and 2002 surveys—which incorporated the same questions—the group of non-antisemites was 8% larger in 2002 than in 1994, while the group of antisemites was 3% smaller. The differences compared with 1995, however, are negligible: the percentage of definite non-antisemites is about the same (29%), and the share of antisemites is 2% less than before. (In order to make the comparison, we aggregated the percentages of the extreme antisemitic group and antisemitic group of the 1995 survey, which together amounted to 25%.) These data appear to indicate a decline in the share of antisemites since 1994 (although we suspect that for various reasons the 1994 survey measured a higher rate than the actual rate), and that the percentage has remained essentially unchanged since 1995 (Tab. 5).



hatred towards jews as a political code?

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Table 3. Anti-Jewish Attitudes 1994–2002, II (in percent) Year

Fully agree

Partially agree

Partially disagree

Fully Do not Average disagree know (SD)

It would be best 1994 11 12 26 46 5 if Jews left the country. 1995 5 89 6 2002 3 6 24 54 12

1.87 (1.03) 1.53 (0.79)

Marriages 1994 7 10 21 48 14 between Jews and non-Jews 2002 4 7 22 46 22 are not good for either of the partners.

1.72 (0.97) 1.60 (0.84)

In certain areas 1994 8 9 21 56 6 of employment, the number of 2002 3 9 21 53 14 Jews should be limited.

1.68 (0.97) 1.55 (0.81)

It’s better not to 1995 17 71 12 have much to do 2002 5 9 21 48 16 with Jews.

1.66 (0.91)

Table 4. Anti-Judaism (in percent) Year

Fully agree

Partially agree

Partially disagree

Fully Do not Average disagree know (SD)

The crucifixion 1994 15 11 20 34 20 of Jesus is the unforgivable sin 1995 23 55 22 of the Jews. 2002 8 9 18 35 30

2.11 (1.15)

The suffering of 1994 12 12 19 37 20 the Jewish people was God’s 1995 17 58 25 punishment 2002 7 10 18 37 28

1.99 (1.10)

1.87 (1.04)

1.84 (1.02)

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andrás kovács

Table 5. Change in the Proportion of Antisemites in the Adult Population, 1994–2002 (in percent) Percentage of antisemitic 1994 2002 responses 0 1–4 5–8 9 or more

22 52 21 5

1995 (data of the 1995 survey)

30 29 Non-antisemites 47 18 17 Antisemites 5   8 Extreme antisemites

III.  Latent Antisemitism As we have seen, compared with the 1990s, some types of anti-Jewish prejudice became more widespread in Hungary after the turn of the millennium while other types became less widespread, but the survey data do not allow us to speak of an increase in the overall level of prejudice. Between 1994 and 2002, the percentage of overt antisemites among the Hungarian adult population remained about the same. Nevertheless, if we compare the three surveys, a clear trend does emerge: the number of people not replying to questions that measure the degree of prejudice increased significantly. Whereas in 1995 just 10% of respondents gave no reply to more than 40% of the questions measuring antisemitism, in 2002 the corresponding ratio was 23%, while 16% of subjects gave no reply to more than 50% of the questions, and 5% of them declined to respond to any of the questions. Table 6. The Number of Missing Responses to the 12 Questions Measuring Antisemitism (in percent) 0 missing responses 30 1–3 missing responses 36 4–5 missing responses 18 6–9 missing responses 10 10–12 missing responses   6

A natural suspicion is that the great number of response refusals and “don’t know” answers actually conceal prejudice, thereby also indicating that respondents now feel far greater latency pressure than they did at the time of the previous surveys (Kovacs 2000). That is to say, they are now more inclined to feel that admitting to antisemitic



hatred towards jews as a political code?

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prejudice—even as part of a survey—could have negative social or psychological consequences. The 1995 survey questionnaire included questions enabling us to estimate the extent of latent antisemitism and, consequently, to adjust our estimate of the overall level of antisemitic prejudice. Based on this, we concluded that, theoretically speaking, between 3–10% of the population may be latently antisemitic, but that the actual percentage lies somewhere between these two extremes. During the 2002 survey, we worked with fewer questions, which meant there was no opportunity to conduct such a thorough study of latent antisemitism. For this reason, out of the two groups suspected of being latent antisemites— those who regularly refused to reply to questions and those who may have expressed false views in their responses—we concentrate, in the following, on the first group—on those who declined to respond to questions. In a first step, we examined the group whose members had given no reply to more than half of the 12 questions of the antisemitism scale. As we have seen, this group accounts for 16% of the sample (161 respondents). Social and demographic data indicated that many of these non-responders belonged to a group of very low social status: the poorly educated were significantly overrepresented among the group ( just 36 individuals in the group had high school graduation) as were also rural inhabitants, unskilled workers, agricultural laborers, homemakers, elderly people, and women. The group exhibited aboveaverage religiosity and high levels of political passivity: people who were unlikely to vote at the next election were highly overrepresented in the group. Given the composition of the group, two hypotheses may explain the refusal to answer questions. According to the first hypothesis, the reluctance of group members to respond is explained by factual latency; that is, they have no established opinions on the issues raised. Our questions may have sounded rather irrelevant to poorly educated, elderly rural respondents: in their day-to-day lives they meet neither with Jews nor with the “Jewish question,” and during the 50 years of the old system the stereotypes concerning Jews may have faded away. Refusing to answer a question could mean a lack of relevant attitudes. The second hypothesis, however, suggests something very different. It points out that the social milieu in which most of the group is living is characterized by above-average levels of anxiety and distrust.

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Many members of the group consider it risky to express opinions on “sensitive” issues. If this is true, then a refusal to answer may indicate communicative latency; that is to say, the respondents do have opinions concerning the questions raised but consider it better not to voice their opinions in public. If this is true, then many of them may be latent antisemites. We examined the two hypotheses on the basis of questions concerning opinions and attitudes that were not directly related to Jews. As noted above, in response to questions concerning political activity, the percentage of the group that did not intend to vote in the next election (24%) was higher than the average for the full sample (15%). But those who did intend to vote were equally divided in their support for the two major political parties—the center left Hungarian Socialist Party and the center right League of Young Democrats—and almost none of them intended to vote for any of the other parties. For most non-responders, religious sects and fascists were the most disagreeable social groups, followed by homosexuals and communists. As far as their general attitudes are concerned, non-responders tended to be significantly more authoritarian, anomic and xenophobic than the average. They typically exhibited strong national sentiment as well as a conservative mindset. In keeping with this, they exhibit greater than average social distance from Jews—they are less likely than average to accept marriage, neighborly contact or employment with Jews. But their replies to other questions concerning Jews, which were not on the scale, indicated indifference rather than acute hostility. Seventy-six percent of them would vote for a Jewish candidate of their preferred political party at elections (compared with 81% of the full sample). They do not consider the relationship with Jews to be an important social issue. They perceive hostility towards Jews to be negligible in the country and placed themselves towards the middle on a scale measuring sympathy to Jews. Thus, this group of systematic non-responders comprises a higher than average number of people of low social status, who are characterized by a generalized xenophobia resulting in prejudice manifested in social distance rather than by antisemitism—which is analytically distinguishable from xenophobia and has different roots. The relationship of this group towards Jews does not differ from its relationship with other “alien” groups, and its social distance from Jews is not linked with any particular hostility towards them. Even so, the questions measuring social distance are useful in determin­ing the size of the latent antisemitic core, because most



hatred towards jews as a political code?

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non-responders to the questions of the antisemitism scale (more than 80–90% of them) gave replies to more than 50% of the questions on felt social distance. As it turned out, 6–8% of them disliked Jews, 15% did not want Jewish neighbors, 17% preferred not to have Jewish work colleagues, and 38% rejected the possibility of a Jewish spouse. Based on these figures, we may state that 10–30% of systematic nonresponders are possibly latent antisemites, but that the true figure lies in all certainly between the two extreme values.3 This means that the estimated percentage of antisemites in the adult population must be approximately 2–5% higher than our estimate based on the antisemitism scale. All this demonstrates that the increase in the percentage of non-responders between 1995 and 2002 does not indicate an increase in the number of latent antisemites but is explained by other factors. IV.  The Causal Explanation of Antisemitic Prejudice According to our calculations concerning the extent of antisemitic prejudice, the number of people harboring antisemitic prejudice did not increase significantly during the eight years between 1994 and 2002— even if we include latent antisemites. This does not mean, however, that there was no change in the inner structure of the antisemitic views and prejudiced groups. Much of the research undertaken in Europe over the past decade has found that in recent years traditional antisemitic prejudice has been replaced by new forms of antisemitism, manifested within the context of anti-Americanism and anti-Zionism and to be found primarily on the left wing of the political spectrum.4 It is possible that in Hungary, too, antisemitic prejudice is now manifested by views that differ from those of previous years. Another possibility

3  We undertook a separate investigation of the educated (high school diploma or above) non-responders group (36 respondents), expecting to find that this group would be more inclined to perceive the latency pressure and thus conceal anti-Jewish attitudes. The data refuted our expectations. Among educated non-responders, 3% are hostile to Jews and 6% would reject neighborly or spousal contact and 18% marriage, but 84% would vote for a Jewish candidate of a political party. Thus, the share of latent antisemites in this group must be very low. It is noteworthy that young people are slightly overrepresented in this group, which indicates that a failure to respond to a question may in fact reflect an inability to give an answer rather than an attempt to hide opinions. 4  Among the wealth of literature on this problem, see Diner (2002); Markovits (2007); Gordon (2002); Schoenfeld (2003); Iganski and Kosmin (2003).

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is that antisemites are now to be found among different social groups and that—perhaps even in correlation with both possible variables— the explanatory causes of antisemitism have changed. In what follows, I therefore seek to determine whether the nature of antisemitic prejudice has changed, whether the groups harboring antisemitic prejudice are the same as before, and whether the structure of factors explaining anti-Jewish prejudice has altered over the past years. First of all, we seek to determine the underlying factors explaining antisemitic prejudice today. In the causal model established on the basis of the findings of the 1995 survey, (Kovacs 1999: 42) five factors—domicile, the relative availability of economic and social resources, xenophobia, anomie, and conservatism—determined the extent of antisemitic prejudice. These variables explained 21% of the variance on the antisemitism factor. The causal model based on the 1994 survey gave a similar picture. Four factors explained the extent of antisemitic prejudice (explained variance: 33%). The most influential factors were ideological attitudes (nationalism and conservatism), but an inclination towards prejudice, anomie, and self-placement on a political left/right scale were also influential.5 The causal model based on the 2002 survey data shows a simplification of structure (see Fig. 2).

.127

sex -.179

xenophobia R2=17%

-.196

-.331 status 8%

-.285 age

anomie2 R2=5%

-.216

.222 conservatism2 R2=17%

-.296

antisemitism R2=37% .582

-.165

Figure 2. Causal model of the explanation of antisemitism I, 2002 (Regression analysis: stepwise method; beta coefficients). 5  Since some of the questions posed were different, the causal models established on the basis of the 1994 and 1995 surveys are only comparable in terms of their basic features, and any comparison must be treated with caution. The principal differences



hatred towards jews as a political code?

243

In this model, antisemitic attitudes are explained by just two different but significantly correlated factors—xenophobia and conservatism— and their influence is greater than in previous models: 37% of explained variance on the antisemitism factor. Rather than directly contribute to anti-Jewish prejudice, anomie now exerts an influence only by way of xenophobia. Similarly, economic and social factors no longer have a direct effect on antisemitic prejudice. Deprived status strengthens xenophobia, conservatism and anomie, while gender and age are only linked with conservatism. It seems that elderly people of low status, especially women, are inclined towards conservatism, whereas deprived status can on its own trigger anomie and xenophobia.6

were that the 1994 survey did not examine the effect of xenophobia and that the questions used to establish underlying attitudes were only partially the same as the questions posed a year later. 6  The status, xenophobia, nationalism, and conservatism factors, as well as the various anomie factors, were developed by means of principal component analysis (missing pairwise). The following statements were used to construct the principal components: Status-factor Eigenvalue: 1.700; Explained variance: 57% Loading: Level of education   .71211 Settlement type   .74717 Household fixed property   .66023 Xenophobia-factor Eigenvalue: 3.352; Explained variance: 41.9% Loading: Crime is increasing because of immigrants –.649 Immigrants are taking jobs from people born in Hungary –.648 Immigrants are making Hungary more open to new ideas and cultures .509 Immigrants are of benefit to Hungary’s economy .597 Do you like or dislike foreigners living in the country? –.645 Would you restrict or not restrict the acceptance of refugees? .603 Would you restrict or not restrict the number of black people living in    the country? .697 How many groups would you let into the country? .730 Personal frustration factor (anomie1.1) Eigenvalue: 1.601; Explained variance: 40.03% Loading: You wish you were more confident in social settings You are generally a rather shy person You are a friendly and open personality You feel you have much in common with the people around you Social defenselessness, loss of norms factor (anomie1.2) Eigenvalue: 2.038; Explained variance: 50.9% Loading: Most people don’t care what happens to others

.676 .770 –.577 –.468

.591

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andrás kovács

Nowadays almost anything and anyone can be bought Nowadays even the courts don’t provide justice for people In this country the only way to get rich is by being dishonest

.779 .750 .722

Distrust of politics factor (anomie 1.3) Eigenvalue: 2.267; Explained variance: 45.3% Loading: Despite its failings, parliamentary democracy functions well in Hungary .744 Since 1990, people have had more opportunities to influence the country’s    destiny .753 National leaders are not really concerned about the fate of people like you –.470 Ordinary people can influence government decisions .661 Even though they often make mistakes, politicians still want the best for    people .698 Anomie-factor (anomie 2) Eigenvalue: 1.290; Explained variance: 64.5% Loading: Social defenselessness, loss of norms factor Distrust of politics factor Nationalism-factor Eigenvalue: 3.136; Explained variance: 44.8% Loading: No other nation has a history as glorious and yet as tragic as Hungarian    history The culture of Hungarians is superior to the culture of neighboring peoples Hungary should be concerned about changing the borders established by   Trianon The presence of the multinationals is more damaging than beneficial to    the country The defense of national values is more important than EU membership There should be more teaching about patriotism in schools People with strong national sentiments should decide on important issues Conservatism-factor Eigenvalue: 2.222; Explained variance: 37.0% Loading: Would you support or not support the death penalty for serious crimes Do you consider or not consider homosexuality to be immoral Would you support or not support tough prison sentencing for drug users Religious instruction should be compulsory in all elementary and high    schools The church should be given a bigger role in the running of the country Press freedom should be restricted more than it is now

.803 –.803

.696 .580 .698 .619 .681 .579 .803

.437 –.574 –.596 .702 .758 .530

Religiosity-factor Eigenvalue: 1.615; Explained variance: 87.0% Loading: How religious are you (zscore)? How often do you attend mass (zscore)?

.899 .899

Secondary conservatism-factor Eigenvalue:1.693; Explained variance: 56.4% Loading: Nationalism-factor

.733



hatred towards jews as a political code?

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sex -.179

xenophobia R2=17%

.374 status -.216 R2=8%

anomie2 R2=5%

nationalism R2=9%

.137

-.246 -.285 age

-.127

conservatism R2=18%

-.395

antisemitism R2=43%

.402

.285

-.147

Figure 3. Causal model of the explanation of antisemitism II, 2002 ­(Regression analysis; stepwise method; beta coefficients).

The explanatory capacity of the model increases further if we treat the two variables constituting the conservatism factor as separate factors. In this instance, the best explanatory factor of antisemitic prejudice is nationalism. In this model too, the effect of anomie and the economic and social factors is indirect. It seems that the tendency of a person to accept anti-Jewish prejudice is strengthened on the one hand by

Conservatism-factor .870 Religiosity-factor .631 The antisemitism factor used in the path model is a secondary factor composed of three principal components (principal component). To construct it, we used the method applied in the 1995 survey. First we constructed factors measuring the three dimensions of prejudice—cognitive, affective and conative. Then we formed out of these an aggregated antisemitism factor. The various principal components were as follows: Cognitive component of antisemitic attitudes Eigenvalue: 3.753; Explained variance: 62.6% Loading: Jews have always had great influence on the left-wing movements .694 Jews even try to gain advantage from their own persecution .795 Jewish intellectuals control the press and cultural sphere .823 There exists a secret Jewish network determining political and economic    affairs .819 Liberal parties represent primarily Jewish interests .821 Jews are the ones who have really benefited from the change of system .784 Affective component of antisemitic attitudes Eigenvalue: 3.142; Explained variance: 52.4% Loading: Would you vote for a candidate who is Jewish?

–.624

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andrás kovács

advanced age and conservative/religious attitudes and on the other hand by low social status, xenophobia, nationalism, and conservatism. The intermediate position of anomie in the model indicates that frustration and loss of norms derived from low status influences the degree of antisemitic prejudice by means of xenophobia and nationalism. This is an important change compared with previous models. Previous surveys indicated that personal frustration, social norm disturbances, a loss of belief in the validity of social values and standards of behavior, a weakening of perceived social cohesion, and a perception of a lack of solidarity in society are direct causes of prejudice. As part of this process, frustrated anomic individuals make use of the “available” stock of prejudice when selecting the object of their prejudice. In other words, when selecting an object for their prejudice, they turn against groups—such as Jews—which have traditionally been on the receiving end of prejudice. This observation fits in well with the conclusions of conceptual analyses of antisemitism and prejudice and is easy to interpret within the framework of frustration-aggression theory and the theories of anomie.7 Nevertheless, according to the data of the 2002 survey, anomie does not induce anti-Jewish prejudice in the same manner as it did in 1995.

How would you feel if a family member or other close relative married    a Jew? How would you feel about having a Jewish colleague? How would you feel about having a Jewish neighbor? How much do you like or dislike Jews? Are you hostile or not hostile towards Jews? Conative component of antisemitic attitudes Eigenvalue: 2.915; Explained variance: 72.9% Loading: It would be best if Jews left the country Marriages between Jews and non-Jews are not good for either of the    partners In certain areas of employment, the number of Jews should be limited It’s better not to have much to do with Jews

.791 .791 .782 .706 .624

.871 .801 .867 .873

Secondary antisemitism-factor Eigenvalue: 1.661; Explained variance: 55.4% Loading: Cognitive component of antisemitic attitudes .835 Affective component of antisemitic attitudes –.477 Conative component of antisemitic attitudes .858 7   For the frustration-aggression theory, see Dollard, Dobb, Miller, Mowrer, Sears (1939) Th. W. Adorno et al. (1969: 609–622); Bergmann (1988: 20–25). For the theory of anomie, see Srole (1956a; 1956b; 1965). About the Strole-scale, see Merton (1957: 167ff ).



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Anomic attitudes no longer directly account for prejudice. Instead, a series of attitudes stemming from well-articulated social and political opinions has arisen between anomie and prejudice, whose various elements are closely correlated with antisemitic prejudice. It seems that anomie has become “rationalized,” which could mean that antisemitism has begun to be transformed from diffuse anti-Jewish prejudice into a type of antisemitism that functions as a political or ideological code. V.  Summary According to the data of the survey conducted in 2002, the percentage of antisemites in the Hungarian adult population has not risen dramatically over seven years (1995–2002), even if we take into account the group of covert antisemites. Nevertheless, significant changes have occurred with regard to the causal background of antisemitic prejudice, the content of prejudice, and the structure of the groups harboring anti-Jewish prejudice. Analysis of the causes of antisemitic prejudice showed that anomie, which had been an important explanatory factor earlier on, is no longer one of the immediate causes of hostility towards Jews. Indeed, in 2002, all the direct causal factors behind antisemitic prejudices were ideological-political and social in type. It seems that anomie had become “rationalized.” This meant that certain ideological-political choices could function as channels for the tension caused by the lack of integration, and that these choices were often coupled with anti-Jewish attitudes. This is an important change: it may mean that in the last decade antisemitic prejudice has begun to be transformed from diffuse anti-Jewish attitudes into a type of antisemitism that functions as a political or ideological code in Hungary. References Adorno, Theodor W. et al. (1969) The Authoritarian Personality (New York: 1969 [1950]). Bergmann, Werner (1988) Psychoanalysis and personality theory. In Werner Bergmann (ed.) Error without trial. Psychological research on antisemitism (Berlin-New York: De Gruyter). Diner, Dan (2002) Feindbild Amerika. Über die Beständigkeit eines Ressentiments (München: Propyläen Verlag, 2002).

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Dollard, John, Leonard W. Dobb, Neal E. Miller, O. H. Mowrer and Robert R. Sears (1939) Frustration and Aggression (New Haven: Yale University Press). Gordon, Murray (2002) A new anti-semitism in Western Europe. International Perspectives 50, The American Jewish Committee. Igansky, Paul and Kosmin, Barry (eds) (2003) A New Antisemitism? Debating Judeophobia in 21st Century Britain (London: Profile Books). Kovács, András (1999) Antisemitic Prejudices in Contemporary Hungary. Analysis of Current Trends in Antisemitism, Acta no. 16 ( Jerusalem: The Vidal Sasson International Center for Study of Antisemitism at The Hebrew University of Jerusalem). —— (1999) Antisemitismus im heutigen Ungarn. Jahrbuch für Antisemitismusforschung 8: 195–227. —— (2000) Measuring latent antisemitism. Sociological Review Magyar Tudományos Akadémia, Budapest, 74–85. —— (2004) Hungarian Jewish Politics from the End of the Second World War until the Collapse of Communism. In Ezra Mendelsohn (ed) Jews and the State. Dangerous Alliances and the Perils of Privilege. Studies in Contemporary Jewry XIX (Oxford: Oxford University Press): 124–156. Markovits, Andrei S. (2007) Uncouth Nation: Why Europe Dislikes America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007). Merton, Robert (1957) Social theory and social structure (New York: Free Press). Schoenfeld, Gabriel (2003) The Return of Anti-Semitism (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2003). Srole, Leo (1956a) Social integration and certain corollaries: an explanatory study. American Sociological Review 21, 6: 709–716. —— (1956b) Letter to the editor. American Journal of Sociology 62, 1: 63–67. —— (1965) A comment on ‘anomy’. American Sociological Review 30, 5: 757–762.

The Resilience of Tradition: Antisemitism in Poland and the Ukraine Ireneusz Krzemiski I.  Introduction Conducting a sociological examination of antisemitic attitudes is not easy. Up to now, most have been more or less comprehensive studies which have incorporated various methods. A majority of scholars hold the view that antisemitic attitudes—that is, hostile and negative attitudes toward Jews—are deeply connected with other elements of the psyche or combined with almost the entire personality structure of the ­individual. That was the assumption of the researchers of the Frankfurt Institute, who later developed the Theory of the Authoritarian Personality. This supposition has played a considerable role to the present day. In most cases, the public opinion polls, which are supposed to substantiate antisemitic attitudes, draw upon a wealth of findings which describe opinions toward Jews as individuals or as a particular group on the basis of religion or origin (e.g. Weil 1987; also Bergmann 1988; Bergmann/Erb 1997). In the German study published by Bergmann/ Erb (1997, pp. 29–31 and Appendix 2, pp. 339–349), more than a dozen questions were asked which examined the many aspects of possible attitudes toward Jews and Israel. Bergmann indicates, however, in postwar analyses of antisemitic attitudes that those who are examined could state their feelings toward Jews themselves (Bergmann/Erb 1997, pp. 2–5). Accordingly, the results of the studies became a matter of voluntary personal details of those questioned. In our examinations we also applied indicators for antisemitic opinions which are also based upon voluntary personal details. However, the key element of the concept prepared by our team was the emphasis of two types of antisemitic attitudes and the development of questions which corresponded thereto.1 They resembled or were identical 1  In 1992, the research team—under the direction of Ireneusz Krzemiski— consisted of Alina Caa, Helena Datner-piewak, Ewa Komiska-Frejlak, und

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to the questions posed earlier, since 1990, in different Polish examinations (Nowotny 1993). It should be pointed out that we carried out our study twice: at the beginning of the democratic transformations in 1992, and ten years later in 2002. Back then, a financial grant from the Polish Committee for Scientific Research enabled us to conduct the survey in the Ukraine as well, naturally with the help of a correspondingly comparable questionnaire. Further details will be discussed below. Two theoretical assumptions brought us to the differentiation between two types of antisemitic views: first, a conceptual version of the term of this view itself, comprised of three elements: the cognitive element, the evaluative and emotional element, and the behavioral element. Second, the assumption that feelings like hate and antipathy are unpleasant for the individual him or herself, and therefore, the continuity of such feelings requires strong motivation. And, with regard to these motives fueling hostility toward Jews, we have focused on two types of attitudes. The attitude resulting from traditional antisemitism is based on religiously motivated repudiation and enmity; whereas, the attitude resulting from modern antisemitism is motivated by the antisemitic ideology which spread throughout Europe in various guises after the French Revolution. Following Hannah Arendt, we presume that the development of the modern nation-state brought about a new ideological type of animus and aversion vis-à-vis Jews in Europe (Arendt 1973, 1989). This ideology is based on three beliefs that converge in an antagonistic image of Jews: Jews rule the financial world; they strive after power and, ultimately, world domination; and they are characterized by extraordinary loyalty to one another. The three elements comprise one axis of the ideological conviction. These characteristics were substantiated by empirical studies—in particular, by the analysis of responses to the question why some people do not like Jews. In principle, one must also add the allegation of Jewish support of Communism as another expression of ideological views about Jewish anarchism and liberalism which by necessity accompany the belief in “Jewish control of capital.” It is surprising that this eleAndrzej bikowski. The study in 2002 was carried out by Helena Datner in cooperation with colleagues from the Ukraine: Prof. N. Czernysz from Lviv and Prof. Leonid Finberg from Kiev (Institute Judaica). Both examinations were financed by the State Committee for Scientific Research in Warsaw.



the resilience of tradition

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ment of the ideology is only important for a small number of the respondents in Poland. This type of antisemitic attitude in Poland cannot be differentiated from corresponding attitudes in other European countries or in the rest of the world. The antisemites in Poland think the same things about Jews as the antisemites in Europe and the entire world. By contrast, we queried directly at the formation of the indicator of traditional antisemitism whether Jews were to be held accountable for the crucifixion of Jesus Christ and whether they should be held responsible for what happens to them.2 Answers to the questions indicating attitudes of traditional antisemitism (i.e. religiously motivated) and of the modern variety (i.e. ideologically motivated) allowed us to calculate different scales. The formulation of the questions allowed the respondents either to confirm the anti-Jewish accusations implicit in the questions—a sign of antipathy toward Jews—or to reject them, suggesting an attitude of anti-antisemitism. The answers enabled us to undertake two measurements. The first scale measures the intensity of antisemitic attitudes resulting from the addition of confirming answers. The second measures the degree of the disagreement resulting from the addition of rejecting answers. With regard to modern antisemitism, we developed an indicator for antisemitism and one for anti-antisemitism, both of which comprise values on a scale of 0–4. Analogously, indicators emerged pertaining to traditional antisemitism; here as well, we use an indicator of antisemitism and one of anti-antisemitism, which encompass values of 0–2, respectively (Datner 1996, p. 32ff ). II.  Antisemitic and Anti-Antisemitic Attitudes in Poland The following is our presentation of the tables which substantiate the pervasiveness of antisemitic attitudes in Poland by means of a comparison of two studies combined from 1992 and 2002. As one can see, the percentage of respondents displaying attitudes of modern antisemitism—as suggested by our indicators—grew considerably over ten years, from 17% to 27%. Interestingly, the number of answers considered anti-antisemitic increased at the same time.

2   The formulation expresses the view that Jews provoke negative reactions because of their lifestyle.

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Table 1. Indicators of Modern Antisemitism 1992–2002 (in percent) 1992 Modern Antiantisemitism .00 Antisemitism 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 Decisively (declared) Antiantisemitism Total

Number of Respondents N

2002 %

Number of Respondents N

%

386 233 87 137 168

38.2 23.0 8.6 13.6 16.6

355 198 93 154 298

32.3 18.0 8.5 14.0 27.1

1011

100.0

1098

100.0

Table 2. Indicators of Modern Anti-Antisemitism 1992–2002 (in percent) 1992 Modern Antiantisemitism .00 Antisemitism 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 Decisively (declared) Antiantisemitism Total

2002

Number of Respondents N

%

Number of Respondents N

%

578 162 61 130 80

57.1 16.0 6.0 12.9 8.0

502 140 76 208 172

45.7 12.8 6.9 18.9 15.7

1011

100.0

1098

100.0

Just as the indicator of antisemitic sentiments rose significantly approximately 10%, the number of respondents who ruled out entirely the possibility of answers suggesting hostility toward Jews almost doubled. The percentage of respondents who provided no response declined considerably. If one interprets these figures relative to the answers to the other questions, we can ascertain that a polarization of sentiments has come about: The attitudes vis-à-vis Jews became more definite and disclosure of these opinions less problematic. The Polish respondents display the tendency to possess either clearly friendly or unfriendly views toward Jews. The numbers on traditionally antisemitic attitudes remained constant over the ten years.



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Table 3. Indicators of Traditional Antisemitism in the Years 1992–2002 1992

2002

Traditional Number of Antisemitism Respondents N

%

Number of Respondents N

%

.00 No Antisemitism 1.00 2.00 Maximal Antisemitism Total

594

58.8

603

54.9

300 117

29.7 11.5

368 127

33.5 11.6

1011

100.0

1098

100.0

Table 4.  The Link between Education and Average Values of the Indicators in 2002 Indicator

Primary School Vocational School Secondary School University Average value for the Number of Respondents

Modern Modern Anti- Traditional Traditional Antisemitism antisemitism Antisemitism Antiantisemitism 1.8986 2.0655 1.7674 1.8070 1.8783

1.0676 1.4379 1.6115 1.7193 1.4783

.6763 .6621 .5108 .4503 .5733

.9275 .9552 1.2254 1.3099 1.1097

The fact that the indicator of traditional antisemitism remained unchanged is, however, noticeable. When we analyzed the results in 1992, we assumed that the range of this indicator was shrinking. It turns out— and as we prove here—that it depends very much on the education level: this type of sentiment almost disappeared for respondents with a higher education level. This is shown in the table of average values of indicators for the individual categories for education in the scales of both traditional and modern antisemitism. The values of the indicators of traditional antisemitism are highest for the category of people with the lowest education level and decrease in the categories of the better educated respondents. The reverse is the case for the indicators of traditional anti-antisemitism: one sees the average numbers for the rejection of traditional antisemitism increase in the respective groups of higher educated respondents.

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What is more: traditional antisemitic views were characteristic precisely of a definable group of respondents—poorly educated, older people who lived in rural areas or in smaller cities predominantly in the eastern regions of the country. We expected, therefore, a reduction of the percentages of this sort of attitude in 2002. That did not happen. One can assume that one factor “conserved” this attitude. One of the possible, explanatory hypotheses is the assumption that societal institutions originating after 1992 (the years 1996 and 1997 can also be considered caesurae) which reinforced and strengthened the sentiments of traditional antisemitism, such as the radio station Radio Maryja, known for the public dissemination of decisively antisemitic convictions. Almost half (48%) of the listeners of Radio Maryja in our study have only a primary school education. A conspicuous correlation exists between antisemitism and listeners of Radio Maryja. III.  Indicators of Antisemitic Views In all the sociological examinations undertaken in Poland after 1989, education is one of the most important elements distinguishing Polish society. It is essential to repeat that traditional antisemitism almost entirely disappears at each higher level of education. It turns out, however, that the frequently uttered conviction that antisemitism generally disappears as a result of higher education—based on the term of enlightenment—is not tenable. The second type of antisemitic views, namely, modern antisemitism does not simply disappear with the attainment of a university degree. In 2002, the number of staunch antisemites of this type in the group with a university degree was slightly less than in the group with just a primary school education. However, education level certainly plays an important role in the problem of antisemitism. Although education does not directly cause sentiments of modern antisemitism to disappear, it influences considerably opinions that reject antisemitism, the so-called anti-antisemitic attitudes, as they are called in the context of this study. The same applies today and ten years ago: the higher the education level, the higher the average value on the scale of modern anti-antisemitism. Respondents rejected thus the opportunity to give antisemitic answers to a large extent. In 2002, the corresponding average values are higher than in 1992, which is proven by the increased resistance in light of the lower number of respondents, who provided no answer.



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The age of the respondent is a factor that most starkly distinguishes the level of antisemitism. The inclusion of the respondents’ age as a factor not only shows beyond doubt that the disappearance of antisemitic views is generally more likely among younger people, especially the disappearance of old anti-Jewish attitudes. Young people do not tend to articulate views hostile to Jews; they tend to resist them. In 1992, we drew attention to the fact that religiosity, based on both a personal declaration of faith and the frequency of religious practice, very well had an influence on traditional antisemitism but did not correlate to modern antisemitic attitudes.3 Religious beliefs (and religious practices) influence antisemitic sentiments in the categories of people with a lower level of education; this connection disappears in people with a higher education level. This led us to formulate the thesis that the religious beliefs of educated people are different from those of uneducated people. The situation changed in 2002. The simple dependencies between antisemitic patterns and religiosity indicate the connection of both variables: Table 5.  Religious Belief and Average Value of Antisemitism and Anti-Antisemitism in 2002 Religious Belief Very Religious Religious Undecided Not Religious Decisively Unreligious Average Value for the Number of Respondents

Modern Modern Anti- Traditional Traditional AntiAntisemitism antisemitism Antisemitism antisemitism 2.2088 1.8093 1.8182 2.0000 1.4444

1.1978 1.5244 1.8864 1.3448 1.7778

.9066 .5183 .3636 .4138 .3333

.8297 1.1430 1.4091 1.3793 1.3333

1.8789

1.4815

.5730

1.1091

P=(.04–.00)

3   We used questions that normally were used over time in surveys of the postwar era. Nowadays, one uses more precise indicators; it was important to us to be able to compare them. The question was: What is your relationship to religion, a) Regarding religious faith:—1. Very religious 2. Religious 3. Undecided 4. Not religious 5. Decisively unreligious; b) Regarding religious practices:—1. Practice regularly (once per week) 2. Practice irregularly 3. Participation only at certain practices (baptism, wedding) 4. No religious practice.

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ireneusz krzemiski Table 6.  Religious Practice and Average Value of Antisemitism and Anti-Antisemitism in 2002

Religious Practice

Modern Antisemitism

Modern Traditional Traditional AntiAntisemitism Antiantisemitism antisemitism

Practice Regularly Practice irregularly Participation only at certain practices (baptism, wedding) No religious practice Average Value for the Number of Respondents

1.9814 1.8080

1.3588 1.5761

.6680 .5212

1.026 1.1521

1.7222

1.6019

.4537

1.1574

2.0638

1.3191

.3830

1.2340

1.8915

1.4659

.5764

1.0980

P=(.2–.00), A part of the results in the table is statistically not significant

In both tables a link becomes visible: the percentage of antisemites amongst religious people and those who practice religion is higher compared to others. Symmetrically, a reversed relationship exists: the percentage of unreligious people is considerably higher amongst anti-antisemites, although religious believers obviously can be classified with those possessing antisemitic (25.5%) and anti-antisemitic attitudes (34% compared to 50% of unbelievers). Simultaneously, we can see that there are a large number of ideologically motivated antisemites amongst the unreligious. One can speak here of antisemitic sentiments with an atheist origin—to which we will return later. When education level is factored in, one ascertains that religious people find themselves back in categories of all education levels with antisemitic and anti-antisemitic views. It appears that clear manifestations of deep religious belief facilitate antisemitic attitudes; perhaps this applies especially to people with a university degree. One could not ascertain this statistical result with the results of 1992. Put differently, highly educated people can be made out who articulate openly antisemitic views. This does not amaze insofar as the return of antisemitic ideology, i.e. modern antisemitism, is propagated above all by educated people.



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The factor place of residence is meaningful only for traditionally antisemitic attitudes: 18.5% of the rural population reaches the maximal level of antisemitism—this applies to 16% of the inhabitants of small cities (fewer than 50,000 residents) and for 4% of the inhabitants of cities with more than 200,000 residents (the correlation is statistically significant, p=.000). In general, the percentage of antisemites in large cities is low or very low, or the inhabitants divide themselves clearly into antisemites and anti-antisemites. In the 2002 examination we added a new variable to our schema of social-demographic data that reflects the place of residence in the former partition regions of each respondent. The last sociological analyses, for example, election results, suggest that Poland’s history of territorial divisions and their consequences play a significant role in determining attitudes or even electoral preferences (Bartkowski 2003). It turns out, in the context of our study as well, that antisemitic attitudes vary according to location within the various former regions of partition. Most significant to detect are those for the former Russian region of partition, although at the same time, most respondents did not give a single antisemitic answer. This points to special differentiation within the former Russian region of partition, formerly called Congress Poland. On the one hand, its greater part consists of agricultural, sociologically and economically quite backward eastern regions whose inhabitants were known during the interwar period for their active antisemitism; on the other hand, the largest city and capital of the country, Warsaw, is located there, where antisemitism is rarely observed. The differentiation is explained thusly: Table 7.  Regions of Partition and Modern Antisemitism (2002) Region of Partition Galicia Congress Poland Prussia Total P=.001

Level of Modern Antisemitism 0 No Antisemitism N %

1

2

3

4 Maximal Antisemitism % N %

N

%

N

%

N

67 203

45.9 47.9

19 53

13.0 12.5

14 26

9.6 6.1

261 7.8 62 14.6

219 502

42.5 45.7

68 140

13.2 12.8

36 76

7.0 6.9

120 208

23.3 18.9

20 80 72 172

13.7 18.9

Total N

%

146 100.0 424 100.0

14.0 515 100.0 15.7 1098 100.0

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ireneusz krzemiski Table 8.  Regions of Partition and Traditional Antisemitism (2002) Level of Modern Antisemitism

Region of Partition Galicia Congress   Poland Prussia Total

0 No Antisemitism N %

1 N

%

2 Maximal Antisemitism N %

Total N

%

81 236

55.5 55.7

41 151

28.1 35.6

24 37

16.4 8.7

146 424

100.0 100.0

273 603

53.0 54.9

176 368

34.2 33.5

66 127

12.8 11.6

515 1098

100.0 100.0

Table 9. Former Regions of Partition and the Average Value of Indicators of Modern Antisemitism Region of Partition Galicia-Austrian Region of Partition Congress Poland (Russian partition region) Prussian Region of Partition Sample Average Correlation F P=

Modern Antisemitism Traditional Antisemitism 1.9863

0.6096

1.9292

0.5307

1.8058

0.5981

1.8561 6.416 .000

0.5665 3.871 .009

The results show clearly the differentiation of the indicators of antisemitism with regard to the variable place of residence in the former regions of partition. There is no doubt that the fewest antisemites, particularly of the modern type, live in the former Prussian region of partition. The situation is most differentiated in the territory of the former Russian region of partition, Congress Poland. Here, you have parallel the most decisive antisemites as well as the highest percentage of people who did not select a single answer that would suggest antisemitic attitudes. The differentiation of this region demonstrates that peoples’ views are influenced by both historical traditions of the past as well as the changes of the modern age. The material situation—in particular poverty and poor living conditions—is also frequently associated with xenophobic sentiments as well as antisemitism. If based on objective indicators like verifiable income, it is not accurate that poor people are more likely to espouse



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259

antisemitism and the affluent are less likely. Antisemitism correlates rather with one’s assessment of one’s own material situation: the negative assessment of one’s own and of one’s family’s living conditions tends to promote both modern and traditional antisemitism. However, we identified an interesting deviation in this tendency: in the group that judged its material situation as the best, the percentage of decisively traditional antisemites grows (the correlation is statistically significant, p=.000). It turns out supplemental that education level is highly influential in this context: those people who only completed primary school more regularly articulated antisemitism than those who judge their living conditions as better! One may say thus that independent of further factors the material situation of people does not influence their views and antisemitic attitudes. A more important indicator for antisemitic sentiments could be political sympathies. The connections are clear and allow for interesting conclusions. An obvious link is revealed in the tables with the corresponding correlations between preferences for nationalist and xenophobic political parties and sympathy for antisemitism. The reverse applies as well: People who are free of antisemitism elect liberal-democratic and pro-European political parties. Amongst those who voted for the LPF (League of Polish Families) there exists a large number who hold antisemitic views. The LPF is the most important party directly tied in to the traditional ideology of National Democracy—and with that to the Polish version of nationalCatholic antisemitism of the prewar era. It is interesting that such a high number of antisemites were identifiable amongst those who cast their vote for the post-communists of the SLD. In 1992, the results were similar: the results point toward a clear schism between the supporters of the post-communist left, namely between the decidedly antisemitic and those who came up “0” on the antisemitism scale. Clearly, one can speak here of an atheistic, left-wing antisemitism, which we already mentioned. The communist tradition also constitutes a source of antisemitic views. We call the remaining group of determinants of antisemitic attitudes “psycho-social.” The first of which comprises one’s own assessment of control over and influence on one’s situation in life. In questionnaires we posed the question, what place the respondent considers him/herself to occupy within the social hierarchy. The basis, therefore, was the designation of the respondent’s life as the worst life a person could ever have, and the last—or rather—highest level was linked to the ­designation

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of the respondent’s life as the best life one could have. The second question aimed to determine whether the respondent viewed his/her place within the social hierarchy as the result exclusively of his/her own actions or whether the place occupied has nothing at all to do with them. Those who in the assessment of their lives came closest to an “arduous life” more frequently articulated antisemitic attitudes. The feeling of external control over one’s own life is, however, not connected to antisemitic manifestations. We had assumed the opposite, namely, that a higher number of those who maintain their lives are not controlled by themselves would display antisemitic biases. That could not be substantiated. This leads to the important conclusion: the feeling that one lacks control over one’s social status is not a determinant of antisemitic attitudes; instead, it is the sense of injustice that one is not leading as good of a life as the others. This highlights clearly the character of the resentment: according to Max Scheler, it is important to underscore that it has nothing to do with one’s own efforts or activities (Scheler 1977). It is the exact opposite: Envy over the success of others is more connected to passivity and to the conviction that “I am entitled to something and it is unjust that others are doing better.” We will try to verify that by analyzing the results of the questions which, in a comprehensive and general sense, shed light on the more or less friendly disposition toward other people. We will examine whether the proclivity for antisemitic attitudes corresponds in general to a disposition—friendly or hostile—toward others, trust toward others, and optimism about life. In the previous and the current survey we posed the corresponding questions whether the respondent believes that people in general are more inclined to be friendly or hostile vis-à-vis others and whether one can expect more good or more bad from life. In the survey in 2002 we asked a question about the degree of trust; that is, the extent to which one can trust others (in everyday life, one can trust most people; one can only trust a few individuals; one cannot trust anyone). Analysis of the correlations allows us to say that an attitude of general hostility (people are generally disposed to be hostile to one another) increases the probability of articulating antisemitic sentiments, as does the belief that one cannot expect anything good out of life and that one can only trust a few people. Interestingly, a friendly or hostile disposition toward others does not correlate with articulation of traditional antisemitism: amongst those pre-disposed to be friendly, the percentage of antisemites is even somewhat higher than amongst the hostile



the resilience of tradition

261

(14.7% to 12.8%). That can confirm our theoretical hypothesis: the tradition, religiously motivated enmity toward Jews treats Jews specifically insofar as one does not connect them—at least not directly—with psychological, generally applicable dispositions of individuals toward others. There is also a reverse condition: a general friendliness makes likely a more pronounced anti-antisemitism. Among those inclined to be friendly toward others, 20.5% are antisemites, while among the hostile the percentage sinks to 13% (p=.037). Also, those inclined to be friendly to others more frequently hold anti-antisemitic views than those inclined to be hostile. This tendency is analogous to the one already discovered in the previous survey. People who are disposed to be friendly toward others, who have an optimistic view of life, and who trust others, more seldom express antisemitic attitudes, especially the modern variety, and are more likely to harbor anti-antisemitic opinions. In our survey, we posed a question, which we adopted from German studies pertaining to rejected minorities and social identities (Bergmann/Erb, 1977) This question was a fairly exact translation of the question posed in the German studies which is why it sounded somewhat strange in Polish: Z którymi z wymienionych osób niech\tnie nawi[zaby Pan(i) znajomo? (With which of the named persons would you not like to make an acquaintance? As possible answers we then offered: rather not and I would not have anything against it. For us it was most important to be able to compare the results. One can consider this question an indicator for rigor as well as especially for the hostility toward strangers and those who deviate from the norm. We were of the opinion—and will analyze this shortly—that this can be the indicator for the proclivity to authoritarianism, or rather to an authoritarian personality. As is well known, this interpretation has been one of the most important theoretical explanations for antisemitism for years, which I mentioned in the introduction. The second question with a similar theoretical meaning was the question about pedagogy and educational methods in the questionnaire from 2002. Unfortunately, it was not used in the earlier survey. The possible answers in the Polish study (the named groups or social identities) deviated fairly substantially from the original German version for clear reasons: first amongst the groups rejected by Germans were the Turks who simply do not exist as a minority in Poland. Homosexuals were not named in the original German study, while gays were the most rejected social group in Poland (78% rejection in 1992 and 64% in 2002).

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Table 10. Average Values Regarding Antisemitism and Rejected Identities—Factor 1; 2002 Factor 1Xenophobia Israeli Black Russian German Jew Arab Respondent  Average

Modern Antisemitism

Modern Antiantisemitism

Traditional Antisemitism

Traditional Antiantisemitism

Reject

Accept

Reject

Accept

Reject

Accept

Reject

Accept

2.3721 2.2515 2.2206 2.3525 2.4942 2.1824 1.8561

1.7725 1.8185 1.8124 1.8052 1.6493 1.7656

0.9721 1.0429 1.0649 1.0082 0.9382 1.2443 1.4608

1.600 1.5651 1.5517 1.5468 1.6827 1.5876

0.8791 0.8712 0.8506 0.9098 0.9537 0.7622 0.5665

0.5000 0.5228 0.5292 0.5382 0.4667 0.5123

0.8372 0.8282 0.8377 0.7787 0.7722 1.0098 1.0965

1.1850 1.1701 1.1629 1.1529 1.2267 1.1577

Table 11. Average Values Regarding Antisemitism and Rejected Identities—Factor 2; 2002 Factor 2-Moral

Modern Antisemitism

Modern Antiantisemitism

Traditional Antisemitism

Traditional Antiantisemitism

Reject Accept Reject Accept Reject Accept Reject Accept Homosexual Prostitute 1.9985 AIDS Patient Sinti and Roma Alcoholic Mentally Disabled Respondent Average

2.1008 1.6891 2.1244 2.1189 1.9283 1.8131

1.5070 1.3549 1.7854 1.7066 1.8491 1.9106

1.8561

1.2535 1.6359 1.1599 1.2505 1.3811 1.5935

1.8319 0.6698 1.6639 1.6642 1.6164 1.4573

1.4608

0.7165 0.4594 0.7208 0.6964 0.6585 0.6402

0.3819 1.0602 0.5092 0.4945 0.5262 0.5848

0.5665

1.0063 1.2073 0.9695 0.9915 1.0547 1.0093

1.2941 1.2013 1.2140 1.1719 1.1393

1.0965

Table 12. Average Values Regarding Antisemitism and Rejected Identities—Factor 3; 2002 Factor 3-Religious Correctness Abortion Advocate Atheist Feminist Disliked Party Lazy Unemployed

Modern Antisemitism

Modern Anti-antisemitism

Traditional Antisemitism

Traditional Anti-antisemitism

Reject

Accept

Reject

Accept

Reject

Accept

Reject

Accept

2.0177

1.8371

1.3816

1.5368

0.7491

0.5170

0.9859

1.1629

2.0882 1.9592 1.9916 1.9969

1.8346 1.8741 1.8514 1.8447

1.2311 1.5000 1.4206 1.3931

1.5526 1.4794 1.5031 1.4986

0.7731 0.7041 0.7437 0.6981

0.5226 0.5661 0.5124 0.5242

0.9076 0.9184 0.9916 1.0440

1.1742 1.1323 1.1734 1.1311



the resilience of tradition

263

Tab. 12 (cont.) Factor 3-Religious Correctness Former Communist Alcoholic Respondent Average

Modern Antisemitism

Modern Anti-antisemitism

Traditional Antisemitism

Traditional Anti-antisemitism

Reject

Accept

Reject

Accept

Reject

Accept

Reject

Accept

1.9553

1.8514

1.4281

1.4964

0.6709

0.5455

1.0032

1.1573

1.9283 1.8561

1.8491

1.3811 1.4608

1.6164

0.6585 0.5665

0.5262

1.0547 1.0965

1.1719

The tables above clearly show a correlation between the rejection of specific groups and the manifestation of antisemitism. The results of the most recent research, especially, show a clear differentiation. At the same time, rejection answers formed three divided sub-scales: a majority of respondents rejected all foreign groups; secondly, a trend toward rigorous rejection of some minorities based on morality; and thirdly, a trend to generalize all identities criticized by Catholics— starting with atheists. Based on the theoretical premises, we should have expected that people who rejected specific minorities are more likely to express antisemitic attitudes. Thus, the average values of the antisemitism scale of people who rejected specific minorities should have been higher than those of people who accepted the above listed minorities. Reversed results had been expected for anti-antisemitism: In this case, the acceptance of the above mentioned groups and identities should have indicated a clear pronouncement of anti-antisemitic attitudes. This regularity is dominant in the above tables, even though some results did not correspond with our expectations. We highlighted those. In both cases they do not refer to indicators of antisemitic attitudes, but anti-antisemitic ones: We expected that the active anti-antisemitic attitudes would be more prevalent among those who do not reject other people. Instead, the average values of anti-antisemitism in cases of “feminists” and “mentally disabled” were slightly higher for those who reject these groups but not for those who accept them. Those are insignificant differences, however, that do not influence the overall picture, especially with regard to the 2002 results: The average values of antisemitism are clearly higher among those who also reject specific groups.

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Questions related to child-rearing showed similar results: Antisemitism was more apparent amongst those with the belief that obedience is an important component of child-rearing. On the contrary, amongst people who prefer autonomy of thought for children, antiantisemites dominated by a ratio of 17.4% to 11.5% for those who preferred obedience and of those 8.6%, who refused to answer the question (p=.006). In the case of indicators of traditional antisemitism, the correlation clearly proves the theoretical hypotheses: Amongst those who preferred obedience as a value of child-rearing, 25% expressed antisemitic attitudes, whereas that percentage was not quite 9% among those who emphasized autonomy of thought (12% indicated no preference). The exact reverse is true for anti-antisemitic attitudes (both correlations are statistically significant). It can be stated with certainty that antisemitism correlates with hostile attitudes towards other people—with xenophobia and rejection of feminism as well as the tendency for strict child-rearing. The old concept of authoritarian personality does not belong to the past. Certainly, more precise analyses can better substantiate the thesis discussed in this paper for the Polish society of today. IV.  Antisemitism in the Ukraine Now, I would like to present a comparison of the most important results of the Ukrainian research.4 The questionnaire included both the Polish questions as well as a number of questions that were regarded as important by Professor Natalia Czernysz and Professor Leonid Finberg in order to evaluate anti-Jewish sentiments in the Ukraine. Those questions referred to the anti-Zionist slogans, which were known in Poland only in connection with the shameful anti-Jewish campaign of 1968. In the Soviet Union, of which the Ukraine is a former republic, anti-Zionist slogans were a component of the language of propaganda. After evaluating a number of analyses (including factor analysis) it became apparent that the questions in the Ukraine, like in Poland,

4   Research in the Ukraine was conducted as a comprehensive and representative experimental trial by the company Socjoinform, based in Lviv, under supervision of PBS during January and February 2003.



the resilience of tradition

265

were connected most noticeably to significant syndromes. We had to assume the same indicators of antisemitism as in Poland. Below we present the Ukrainian research results along with the Polish results. The above evaluation clearly shows that in the Ukraine fewer people shared attitudes of modern antisemitism than people in Poland (approximately 19%). The data resembles results of 10 years ago, not 2002. Attitudes of traditional Antisemitism are more prevalent in the Ukraine than in Poland: more than 17% compared to 11.5% in Poland. Within the scope of the analysis of the Ukrainian results, researchers point out that place of residence plays a significant role (Konieczna 2002). Socio-cultural differences dominate this vast country. The division of Western and Eastern Ukraine is of great importance; initially, researchers had divided the country into 11 regions, with special consideration for Kiev and Crimea. The following table shows six of those regions. Table 13. Frequency of Antisemitic Attitudes in the Ukraine 2003 (N=1000) Level of Antisemitism

Modern Antisemitism N %

Modern Antiantisemitism N %

Traditional Antisemitism N %

Traditional Antiantisemitism N %

0 No  Antisemitism 1 2 (More  Decisive) 3 4 (More  Decisive)

389

38.9

417

41.7

584

58.4

524

52.4

207 103

20.7 10.3

176 80

17.6 8.0

244 172

24.4 17.2

264 212

26.4 21.2

114 187

11.4 18.7

158 169

15.8 16.9

Table 14. Indicators of Modern Antisemitism and Anti-Antisemitism in Correlation to Regions of the Ukraine 2003 Modern Antisemitism Regions of the Ukraine Kiev Zentral Region Western Reion Eastern Region

No Antisemitism N

%

29 78 60 167

53.7 36.3 26.3 47.4

Modern Anti-antisemitism

Decisive Antisemitism N % 3 48 70 40

5.6 22.3 30.7 11.4

No Antiantisemitism N % 26 101 104 118

48.1 47.0 45.6 33.5

Decisive Antiantisemitism N % 4 40 35 69

7.4 18.6 15.4 19.6

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Table 14 (Cont.) Modern Antisemitism Regions of the Ukraine Southern Region Crimea

No Antisemitism N

%

42 13

41.6 26.0

Modern Anti-antisemitism

Decisive Antisemitism N % 15 11

14.9 22.0

No Antiantisemitism N % 46 22

45.5 44.0

Decisive Antiantisemitism N % 12 9

11.9 18.0

P=.001 P=.01 Attention: The table displays only fragments of the scale: 0 and the maximum strength of the indicators. % in the lines, N=1000

Table 15. Indicators of Traditional Antisemitism and Anti-Antisemitism in Correlation to Regions of the Ukraine 2003 Regions of the Ukraine

Kiev Central Region Western Reion Eastern Region Southern Region Crimea

Traditional Antisemitism No Antisemitism N % 41 120 78 233 75 37

75.9 55.8 34.2 66.2 74.3 74.0

Decisive Antisemitism N % 4 35 77 42 7 7

7.4 16.3 33.8 11.9 6.9 14.0

Traditional Anti-antisemitism No Antiantisemitism N % 28 111 138 170 58 19

51.9 51.6 60.5 48.3 57.4 38.0

Decisive Antiantisemitism N % 11 50 25 86 21 19

20.4 23.3 11.0 24.4 20.8 38.0

P=.000 P=.01 ATTENTION: The table displays only fragments of the scale: 0 and the maximum strength of the indicators. % in the lines, N=1000

There is no doubt that the percentage of antisemitic attitudes differ between regions in the Ukraine. The highest levels of indicators of traditional as well as modern antisemitism were observed in the Western Region. A majority of the Western Region belonged to Poland prior to the war and was populated by a large number of Jews. National, religious, and ethnic tensions played out in the Polish-Jewish-Ukrainian triangle. Nationalism and pursuit of independence were most prevalent in the Western Ukraine, which led to close cooperation with Hitler during World War II. The collaborative Ukrainian units joined in on the annihilation of the Jewish population.



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Interestingly, antisemitic patterns appeared as much on the Crimean Peninsula as they did in the so-called Central Region and, therefore apply to the majority of the country. This does not apply, however, to traditional Antisemitism which shows significant differences in percentages between the Western and the remaining regions. The percentage of traditional Antisemitism in the Western Region of the Ukraine is very high, reaching almost 34%! Even on the Crimean Peninsula the percentage of people with such sentiments still amounts to 14% more than in Poland. Thus, one can ascertain that at least half of the Ukraine is similar to Poland in terms of antisemitic attitudes. Particularly striking is the high degree of prevalence of traditional antisemitism motivated by religious factors. In Poland, such attitudes are apparent in a specific minority. The Ukrainian respondents were able to indicate their denomination themselves on the questionnaire and in doing so used more than a dozen labels including simply “Christian.” Ultimately, I chose six such voluntary disclosures for the table. Only some of them are real denominations. Below is the table of results indicating the correlation between religion and indicators of antisemitism. Table 16.  Religious Denomination and Antisemitic Attitudes in the Ukraine 2003 Religious Denomination

None RussianOrthodox Catholic (including Greek-Catholic) Protestant (Various Denominations) Christian Non-Christian Denominations

Traditional Antisemitism

Sum Traditional Anti-antisemitism N=1000 No Strong No AntiStrong AntiAntisemitism Antisemitism antisemitism antisemitism N % N % N % N % 127 281

70.2 57.6

18 79

9.9 16.2

181 488

78 236

43.1 48.4

55 106

30.4 21.7

27

40.9

25

37.9

66

56

84.8

6

9.1

5

41.7

3

25.0

12

4

33.3

2

16.7

138 6

57.5 46.2

44 3

18.3 23.1

240 13

144 6

60.0 46.2

40 3

16.7 23.1

For both parts of the table p=.000; The results indicate position 0 and +2 on the scale of antisemitism (no antisemitism and decisive antisemitism.)

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Table 17.  Religion and Attitudes of Modern Antisemitism in the Ukraine 2003 Religion

None RussianOrthodox Catholic (including Greek-Catholic) Protestant (Various Denominations) Christian Non-Christian Denominations

Modern Antisemitism

Sum Modern Anti-antisemitism N=1000 No Antisemitism Strong No Anti- Strong AntiAntisemitism antisemitism antisemitism N % N % N % N % 73 174

40.3 35.7

39 96

21.5 19.7

181 488

75 194

41.4 39.8

36 82

19.9 16.8

13

19.7

19

28.8

66

36

54.5

3

4.5

6

50.0

12

13

25.0

3

25.0

117 6

48.8 46.2

240 13

104 5

43.3 41.7

45

0 32 1

13.3 7.7

0

18.8

P=.002 P=.08533 ATTENTION. The table displays only fragments of the scale: 0 and the maximum strength of the indicators. % in the lines

The correlation between denomination and antisemitism appears to be a significant one, as the factor “Catholic” (also “Greek-Catholic”) apparently brings forward traditional as well as modern antisemitism. It is interesting that affiliation with one of the churches or one of the protestant groups increases the probability of the articulation of traditional antisemitic views while at the same time such affiliation is irrelevant for modern antisemitism. Open atheism (as in Poland) by no means leads to the disappearance of modern antisemitic attitudes. This pertains primarily to the corresponding occurrences of modern antisemitism, even though the level of traditional antisemitism decreases. It is remarkable that, unlike in Poland, the percentage of traditional antisemites is significantly higher in regions where we actually dealt with antisemitic sentiments. In many regions of the Ukraine traditional antisemitism plays a more important role than modern antisemitism. This does not just apply exclusively to older citizens. Although the results of research in the Ukraine show that modern antisemitism is most prevalent in people between the ages of 40 through 59, in some regions modern antisemitism is, nevertheless, most pronounced in some of the youngest respondents. Kiev is one such example. More precisely, the youngest respondents possess, along with the oldest, the strongest antisemitic sentiments when they share the attitudes of the



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grandparents (This is significant on the Crimean Peninsula where the oldest and the youngest display the most ardent antisemitism at 25%; the percentage of antisemitism is lower in all other age categories). In this case it is necessary to correlate the occurrence of antisemitism with the age categories and place of residence. According to the results of our research, a younger age meant a higher likelihood of rejecting antisemitic attitudes, meaning the younger the respondents the higher the percentage of anti-antisemitic views: 24% of the youngest (12–24 years) and only 13% among the oldest respondents (over 56 years). This regularity repeats within most regions with the exception of Kiev. In Kiev, the oldest respondents (over 59 years) most frequently articulated attitudes of decisive antiantisemitism, as opposed to the youngest respondents, a group in which there was not one decisive anti-antisemite. The results of the Kiev research are remarkable for other reasons as well: compared to other age groups, the percentage of modern antisemites was the highest among the youngest respondents, reaching 11%, while indicators of traditional antisemitism doubled within this group! In Kiev, there are no traditional antisemites present in the oldest age groups! This implies that age is not a decisive indicator for occurrences and types of antisemitic attitudes in the Ukraine. Moreover, various regions of the country can provide differing results. Nevertheless, it can be proven that younger people are more able to adopt modern anti-antisemitism with the exception of Kiev. Additionally, we ascertain that in many regions of the Ukraine traditional antisemitism plays a much larger role than modern antisemitism; this does not necessarily apply only to the oldest citizens, but most notably to young people, who in some cases exhibit religiously motivated antisemitic sentiments significantly more often than older people. This may be related to the renaissance of religious life in the Ukraine, meaning that it is also connected to the return of old convictions and stereotypes, one of which is antisemitism. All age groups contained people who, if they identified themselves as Catholic (Roman Catholic), exhibited decisively antisemitic attitudes noticeably more often; this pertains especially to lower age categories. 67% of Catholics ages 18 to 24 and ages 25 to 39 articulate modern antisemitic views; the values of believers of different denominations in these age groups amounted to 11% to 22%, at the most. In some cases in Catholic Poland we observed a distinct polarization of attitudes; this applies to various denominations. It appears that in the Ukraine,

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Catholicism favors antisemitic sentiments; most notably young Catholics exhibit such attitudes. Likewise, people who simply identify themselves as “Christian” most often (or comparably most often) disclose their attitudes. The youngest atheists represent most anti-antisemitic attitudes of both types. Analogous to the results in Poland, strong believers are more likely to exhibit antisemitism of both types. This also applies to religious practice: those, who regularly attend church articulate more often antisemitic sentiments. This rule applies to all denominations, especially those that are most common in the Ukraine, meaning RussianOrthodox as well as Catholic and Greek-Catholic. There is a similar correlation as in Poland: a strong religious belief significantly increases the likelihood of antisemitic manifestations of both types, especially in Catholic, Greek-Catholic denominations as well as confessors of the Kiev Patriarchy, which, presumably, are all areas in which religious sentiments are connected to nationalism. Antisemitic attitudes of members of the Russian-Orthodox church are less frequent, although the aforementioned rule applies. In my opinion, the research results are convincing proof for the thesis formulated above: The religious renaissance in the Ukraine means a return of old, traditional convictions and stereotypes including religiously motivated antisemitism independent of denomination. It is important to mention that Pope John Paul II called antisemitism a sin during the Catholic festivities celebrating the year 2000. V.  The “Polish-Jewish Competition” One of our core theses states that Polish national consciousness can lead to disliking other nations and to distancing oneself from such nations. The “core” and most important element of Polish national identity is its romantic-messianic model of “Polishness.” It projects the image of the Pole, who fights for freedom, based on universal human values, which in turn are based on Christianity. This element can develop in two directions: either with emphasis on the slogan “for our and your freedom,” or with emphasis on defending traditions and traditional values against the entire world. The first possibility generates openly patriotic views; the second possibility encircles the own nation into a “besieged fortress” of religious nationalism.



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In general consciousness, “Polishness” is defined in opposition to the symbolic Jew and symbolic German. This can be summarized in one sentence: A Pole is neither German nor Jewish, who historically act according to their own interests, he is always loyal to declared values, which he will defend against his own interests. That is why to most Poles, even to the most educated Poles, national history appears to be an incurred injustice inflicted upon them by others. The meaning of the symbolic Jew and the symbolic German is evident for the self-perception of Poles. It is interesting that this perception does not translate to Russians and Russia, even though they can certainly be viewed as a source of Polish suffering. Poles have a discerning relationship with Russia: They differentiate between the Russian state and its brutal, despotic government, and the Russian population, who also suffered under the despotic government. Furthermore, Poles exhibit sentiments of superiority vis-à-vis Russian civilization, much like Germans feel towards Poles. Hostility towards Jews or at least emotional distance towards them originated from national beliefs, wherein the antisemitic ideology lies and is connected with nationalism. Apart from antisemitism, nationalism leads to rivalry with Jews in defining which group is truly loyal to declared morals. Similar aspects apply to the relationship with Germans; however, the relationship with Jews is also affected by religious factors. This element plays a lesser role in the relationship with Germans, especially when the civilization distance factor comes into play. Today, Germans constitute a quasi paradigm in terms of civilization for Poles. That is why in symbolic terms today, Poles rival above all the Jews. This refers to the peculiar, imagined rivalry over cultural and moral superiority, not the “Correspondence Theory” which refers to antisemitism based on the real behavior by Jews or Israel (Krzeminski 1993). The easiest approach to prove this hypothesis is based on the attitude analysis of Poles towards World War II. We asked how the conduct of Poles (especially towards Jews) and Polish and Jewish suffering can be evaluated. There is no doubt that a certain degree of rivalry exists in terms of suffering. Moreover, the analysis of results from 1992 and 2002 shows that the importance of such rivalry has increased. Most notably, the number of people who believe that Jews suffered more has decreased. This is especially surprising, since several important discussions have taken place during the ten years between the polls. Bear in mind A.Koskowska, who, in the context of the ­Polish-Jewish

272

ireneusz krzemiski Table 18.  Who Suffered More during World War II? (in percent)

Suffered More

1992

2002

The Jewish People The Polish People Both Peoples Equally Difficult to Compare Difficult to Say

46.1 6.2 32.3 12.4 3.0

38.3 10.2 46.9 3.3 1.3

tragedy of World War II, reasoned as follows: “If it is difficult to find a Polish family in which no one died during the Occupation, there are few Jewish families, in which anyone actually survived.” (Koskowska 1988, S. 119) One could have assumed that this reasonable opinion would have spread over time; instead the opposite is true. Uncertainty regarding this subject matter has decreased; the Polish population’s opinion on this subject is much more clear and decided. Sensitivity decreased and willingness to articulate opinions openly increased. The questionnaire showed clear tendencies to offset suffering and possible blame towards one another. We also inquired about help received by Jews during the war— there are only minor differences between the first and second polls— the majority of respondents indicated that Poles did what they could. The number of responses indicating that more Jews could have been saved clearly declined, although that number was higher than in the Ukraine. There is no doubt that Poles have no qualms about their actions during the war: This was confirmed by 70% of the respondents; 62% in the Ukraine. The Ukrainian responses did not differ from the Polish responses. Bearing in mind the Ukrainian army’s cooperation with the Nazis in exterminating the Jews, this either points toward a knowledge gap or a lack of willingness—on the part of the Ukrainian respondents—to attend to the subject. The percentage of evasive responses was significantly higher in the Ukraine than in Poland. While Poles solidified their beliefs regarding the Occupation as well as Polish-Jewish relations during the War, Ukrainians still face important revelations on the topic of the national past. We can determine that the belief of the same amount of suffering by Poles is mostly a defensive expression, which is justified by the belief that Poles are viewed as antisemites in most parts of the world. This



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view is most prevalent amongst younger people. This would prove the hypothesis of “Polish-Jewish competition”: It is difficult not to feel enmity towards Jews (meaning symbolic Jews) when the memory of a brutal past is that of the ( Jewish) Holocaust. To defend the image of its own people—especially the memory of suffering by the Polish nation, which is forgotten by the world in light of Jewish suffering—is the decisive motive for the increase in antisemitism and hostility towards Jews. According to the majority of Poles, the remembrance of the Holocaust has supplanted the suffering of other nations in the memory of the entire world. This applies especially to Poles, who are not only accused of antisemitism, but whose own suffering and help towards the Jews are forgotten. The results of this research can be interpreted as such. We cannot overlook an important factor—the renaissance of hostile, national-Catholic ideology. Its influence, especially on older Poles, should not be underestimated. After all, the phenomenon of the socalled new antisemitism in Western Europe is also a return to old hatred, which is ideologically founded. This ideology fetishizes Palestinian suffering and denounces the “evil” Israeli government, because it is right-wing. We wanted to verify whether a similar phenomenon is present in Poland and asked questions that required an evaluation of the current situation in Israel, especially in regard to the IsraeliPalestinian conflict and the pro-Israeli policies of the United States. A solid majority of the respondents held the opinion that the proIsraeli policies of the United States could be the cause for the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York: This was implied by almost half (46.8%) of the responses. 22.5% of respondents did not agree. 30.8% found it too difficult to answer this question. Answers to the question of who is responsible for the intensification of the conflict in the Middle East were as follows: Table 19.  Who is Responsible for the Intensification of the Middle East Conflict? Especially the Israelis Especially the Palestinians Both Parties Others Difficult to Say

13% 5% 64% 4% 15%

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Forty-three people believed that other parties were responsible, 32 (74.4%) pointed, in one way or another, at the United States, the American people, or President Bush. Only three people referred to Arabic terrorist or fanatics. It is clear that we examined the reason for such answers. Antisemites, more so than anti-antisemites, attributed fault to Israelis, although most of the antisemites were present among respondents who equally attributed fault to the Israeli and Palestinian sides for the escalation of the Middle East conflict. Similar to Western Europe, an ideological, pro-Palestinian and anti-Israel attitude can be found among young, left-wing Poles. However, such attitudes do not have significance in comparison to old antisemitic ideology and political ideology anchored in national-Catholic tradition. Translated by Jeffrey and Halrun Luppes References Arendt, Hannah (1973) The Origins of Totalitarism (San Diego: Harcourt Brace). Bartkowski, J. (2003) Tradycja i polityka. Wpyw tradycji kulturowych polskich regionów na wspóczesne zachowania spoeczne i polityczne (Warszawa: ak). Bergmann, Werner (ed) (1987) Error without Trial. Psychological Research on Antisemitism (Berlin: de Gruyter). Bergmann, Werner/Rainer Erb (1997) Anti-Semitism in Germany. The Post-Nazi Epoch since 1945 (New Brunswick/London: Transaction Publishers). Datner, H. (1996) Struktura i wyznaczniki postaw antysemickich, w: Czy Polacy s[ antysemitami? I. Krzemiski, red. (Warszawa, Oficyna Naukowa). Konieczna, J. (2002) Tosamo narodowa a wartoci polityczne, religijne i moralne w transformacji ustrojowej. Ukraina na tle Polski i innych krajów Europy Wschodniej (Pr. doktorska, napisana pod kierunkiem prof. dr hab. A. Jasiskiej—Kani, Instytut Socjologii UW, Warszawa). ——. (2003) Polska—Ukraina. Wzajemny wizerunek. In L. Kolarska-Bobiska (ed) Obraz Polski i Polaków w Europie (Warszawa: ISP), pp. 279–344. Koskowska, A. (1988) Polacy wobec zagady ydów w Polsce. Próba typologii posta. Kultura i Spoeczestwo, 1988, Nr. 4 (XXXII). Krzemiski, I. (1993) Antisemitism in Today’s Poland: research Hypotheses. Patterns of Prejudice 27, 1: 127–135. Nowotny, S. (1996) Czy antysemityzm ma wpyw na ycie w Polsce? Wi\Ω 4. Scheler, M. (1997) Resentyment a moralno (Warszawa: Czytelnik) (zwaszcza r. II i V Paragraf 1, pp. 83–86, 162–174). Weil, Frederick (1987) The Extent and Structure of Anti-Semitism in Western Countries. In Helen Fein (ed) The Persistent Questions. Social Perspectives and Social Context of Modern Antisemitism (Boston/New York: de Gruyter).

IV.  Western Europe

Beyond the Republican Model: Antisemitism in France Jean-Yves Camus I.  Introduction The French Jewish community, numbering about 600,000 out of a total population of 63.3 million, is the largest in Europe. The greatest concentration is in the Paris area (300–350,000), followed by Marseille (80,000), Lyon (30,000), Nice and Toulouse (20,000 each). Strasbourg, where 12,000 Jews live, is a major religious and cultural center. In comparison, the foreign population (i.e., holding foreign nationality) amounts to about 4.3 million, while French citizens of foreign origin number 19.7 million (official census figures). The number of Muslims is estimated at 4 million, including 2 million holding French citizenship. When dealing with the issues of antisemitism and Islam in France, one has to remember that the French legislation forbids census questions relating to religious affiliation, does not allow the ethnic origin of people to be mentioned in official statistics, and is quite restrictive about ethnic opinion polls. According to the statistics of CRIF (Conseil Représentatif des Institutions Juives de France, the umbrella organization of French Jewry), the number of antisemitic incidents peaked in 2004 (974 incidents), decreased significantly in 2005 (504 incidents), and another peak had occurred in 2006 with 742 incidents. Those included the most horrible act ever to have taken place in France since 1945, that is the kidnapping, torturing and subsequent murder of Ilan Halimi, a 23-year old Jewish cell-phone salesman, by a multiracial gang led by the Ivory Coast-born Yussuf Fofana, who will stand trial in April 2009. Halimi’s kidnapping took place because the gang believed that if they asked for a ransom, the whole Jewish community would raise money to pay for it. This was a murder motivated by antisemitism, as proven by the fact that Fofana was later indicted on the ground that he wrote numerous violently antisemitic letter threats to the (non-Jewish) judge in charge of the case.

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In 2007, the figures again dropped to 361 antisemitic incidents and this trend continued in the first half of 2008, although the definitive figures for that year will only be released in March 2009. However, the whole situation changed at the end of December 2008, because of the mobilization of the Muslim community, the Far-Left and part of the Extreme-Right, against the Israeli military operation in Gaza. It is now estimated that 113 incidents took place between December 27, 2008 and January 26, 2009. It is not only the numbers that matter: in the demonstrations against Israel, many marchers described the Israeli operation as a “genocide” or a “Holocaust” of the Palestinian, they often equated the Israeli policy with that of the Nazis against the Jews, and the demonstrations were followed by incidents of a very new nature, such as in Metz and Strasbourg, where a crowd of several hundred Muslims marched on the synagogue. Those new developments go against the findings of previous research by CRIF, according to which antisemitic violence was no longer linked to the events in the Middle- East. The Israel/Hezbollah confrontation in summer 2006, for example, did not result in any spectacular rise of antisemitism, a fact that led CRIF to say that antisemitism had become a structural phenomenon, with occasional peaks of incidents occurring when the situation in Israel/Palestine became tense. What is certain, anyway, is that antisemitism is now a permanent feature of Jewish life in France and that antisemitic violence remains at a high level that was unknown before the start of the second Intifada. Nevertheless, opinion surveys show that traditional antisemitic resentment is declining continuously (Mayer 2005). According to a survey published in 2006 and made on behalf of the University of Tel-Aviv by the French opinion institute SOFRES, only 16% think that “Jews have too much power in France” while 67% are of the opposite opinion, and only 6% think that “there are too many Jews in France,” opposed to 83% who do not share this opinion. As a comparison, 92% of those surveyed say that “A French Jew is as much French as any other French citizen,” while in 1946, only 37% said so, a proportion which rose to 60% in 1966; and 83% in 1978.1 It is also noteworthy that a recent ( January 2009) survey showed that the majority of the French

1   In 2006, 81% said that they would not mind electing a Jew as President of the Republic, an all-time high figure since 1946, when the first surveys about antisemitism were published.



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did not blame Israel for the military confrontation in Gaza. According to this opinion poll, 18% put the responsibility on Israel and 23% on Hamas, while 28% said that both were responsible and 31% said they did not know.2 Fewer people put the blame on Israel than in a previous 2002 survey, but the survey suggests that those who feel close to the Left are more prone to blame Israel than conservative voters. In short, there is no evidence that antisemitism is more widespread than before, but the anti-Zionism of the Radical Left and the ExtremeRight, as well as that of a significant part of the Muslim opinion, now amounts to antisemitism. In this article, we shall try to show that the expression “New Judeophobia,” used by many scholars in the steps of Pierre-André Taguieff (2002) to uphold this idea, is certainly true, but that it does not exactly report the current situation of the Jews in France. While it is true that many perpetrators of antisemitic incidents are immigrants from Muslim countries or their French descendants (in 2003, according to the Commission Nationale Consultative des Droits de l’Homme, out of 163 antisemitic acts which could be linked to any specific group of perpetrators, 50 were caused by extreme-Right activists and 117 to young people living in the suburbs, the overwhelming majority of whom were of Muslim origin; the CNCDH report for 2006 states that 41% of the antisemitic incidents recorded in 2005 were perpetrated by Muslims), the “New Anti-Semitism” which is prevalent in the Muslim community is strident because it has blossomed in a context where the Extreme Right was stronger than ever, and where anti-Jewish prejudice, often in the disguise of anti-Zionism, continues to be tolerated by a wide spectrum of political families, including mainstream political parties that are sometimes stained by the antisemitic utterances of some of their prominent members.3 In other words, while antisemitism among the immigrant population of Muslim origin is a new phenomenon and is the main threat to the Jewish community, antisemitism

 Survey by CSA Institute (2009).   For example, former Prime Minister Raymond Barre, who was in office in 1980, at the time of the bombing of the liberal synagogue of rue Copernic by Palestinian radicals, repeated on a state radio station, on March 1, 2007, that he was the victim of a “Jewish lobby” because he had been widely criticized when, after the bombing and in his official capacity, he made a statement saying that the terrorist act was “a despicable action, which aimed at hurting the Jews who were inside the synagogue, and hit innocent Frenchmen who were passing in the street.” Cf. Le Monde, March 3, 2007. 2 3

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from the Extreme Right remains strong, even if it is less a source of physical violence, and radical anti-Zionism, which often amount to plain antisemitism, has become a regular feature in the Radical Left. And, of course, old-style anti-Jewish prejudice, stemming from the traditional, pre-Vatican II theology of the Catholic Church, has not disappeared, although the overwhelming majority of the population is non-observant and the Catholic fundamentalist movement is marginal.4 II.  Antisemitism, Islam, and the Immigrant Community: A French Perspective The antisemitic wave which hit France after 2000 was widely interpreted as a consequence of the growth of fundamentalist Islam and the support of the Muslim community for the Palestinian. Apart from the fact that the Muslims are diverse in opinion and religious practice, surprisingly enough, so far, the Muslims perpetrators of antisemitic incidents are very seldom militants of the Islamist cause and are, more often than not, young people from the decayed suburbs, sometimes with a criminal record (L’Express 2002). Their anti-Jewish feelings may be grounded in their cultural understanding of Islam, but it also draws much from their feeling of being alienated from the mainstream society because of racism. One of the major problems within the Muslim community now is that, in addition to the reality of institutional racism and petty discrimination, many people with an immigrant background use self-victimization in order to show their hatred of society, law and order and the State. Groups such as the Leftists “Indigènes de la République;” the Mouvement de l’Immigration et des Banlieues (MIB) and the pro-Tariq Ramadan Collectif des Musulmans de France use this self-victimization discourse to tell the Muslim youth that France is intrinsically racist because of its colonial past, and that the immigrants living in the suburbs today suffer under the same yoke that was used by the State in the colonial times against the “indigenous” population. This attitude can lead to antisemitism, in a context where these people see the Jews as belonging to the “elite” which they think rules

4  According to an INSEE survey, only 9.4% of men and 14% of women say they are regularly observant, while 18.6% of men and 22.2% of women say they are irregularly observant. Cf. INSEE (2004).



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the country;5 and where many immigrants from the Maghreb think of the Jews in France as they thought of the Jews in their home countries that is, as allies of the colonial power against them. The roots of the present day antisemitism are certainly as much in there as they are in the Islamist movement. Furthermore, many Muslims (and also the majority of Leftists), equate the “colonialism” of the French State today, with that of the Israeli in the occupied territories. As a consequence, they also see the French Muslims as an oppressed minority, much like the Palestinian. This, of course, does not mean that France does not have a problem with the growth of Islamic fundamentalism. Proof to this, since the last wave of terrorist attacks linked to the situation in Algeria hit France in 1995, a few terrorist plots have been unfolded by the French security agencies, showing that the international jihadi network around al Qaeda wants to target Jewish interests in France. Among the terrorist plots targeting the Jews, one can mention the planned attack of the Strasbourg synagogue by an al Qaeda cell (the so-called “Frankfurt group”) led by a Frenchman, Ouassani Cherifi (December 2000) and probably the car bombing of a Jewish school in Villeurbanne (near Lyon), in September 1995.6 Islamic radical propaganda does exist in and around some mosques, too: imams are regularly deported to their native countries because they incite antisemitic, anti-Christian and anti-Western hatred during their khutba (Friday sermons). Since 2002, those radical imams who have been deported by the Minister of the Interior belong to the Salafi movement or the small Turkish movement Hilafat Devleti, led by the Caliphate supporter and former al Qaeda contact man, Metin Kaplan. It should also be mentioned that antisemitic books, religious manuals and other propaganda are widely available in most Islamic bookshops. They are mostly written in the French language, catering to the needs of the non-Arabic speaking Muslims (second generation immigrants and converts), and are distributed free by Saudi Arabian religious NGOs, or are imported from Egypt, Syria and the Gulf States. Also, there are some antisemitic books on sale in religious bookshops which are published in France. Such is the case

5  The antisemitic prejudice which associates the Jews and power, whether it be the political establishment or the worlds of finance or industry is, of course, often grounded in a conspiracy theory which sees the Jewish community as the one “pulling the strings” behind the curtain, as in the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. 6  The plot was not elucidated and it was not claimed by any group.

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of Israel Shamir’s L’autre visage d’Israël (2005), published by the Islamist company, editions al Qalam.7 The publisher, Abdelila Cherifi Alaoui, has been sued by anti-racist organizations and received a fine. His lawyer was Eric Delcroix, a former elected official of the extremeRight parties Front National and Mouvement National Républicain. Roger Garaudy’s books are also popular with the Islamists, especially the Mythes fondateurs de la politique israélienne (81996), and so are Thierry Meyssan’s writings about alleged neo-conservative/Zionist plot behind the 9/11 bombings,9 especially his book, L’effroyable imposture (2002). However, despite the fact that fundamentalist Islam has a sizeable constituency, there are very few, if any, reports of a radical activist, or simply an Islamist militant, assaulting/threatening Jews, or vandalizing Jewish communal property. In other words, Muslim antisemitism is more cultural than religious. This is quite consistent with the relatively low level of religious practice among French Muslims: regular attendants of the Friday prayer are only 10%, and those who say they are observant of some of the rites are 36% (Godard & Taussig 2007, 29). On the other hand, anti-Jewish prejudice among those who are observant remains high: according to a 2005 survey by the academic institution CEVIPOF, 46% of religious Muslims show some kind of antisemitic prejudice, while 28% do not. Antisemitic prejudice among them tends to diminish with the level of education: while 37% of those with two years higher education show antisemitic prejudices, only 20% of those with a university degree do so. Now that there is a representative body of French Islam, the Conseil Français du Culte Musulman (CFCM), one may have thought that the desire of the major Muslim organization’s seating on this body to achieve respectability would have toned down antisemitism within the observant Muslim community. But then, not all Muslim organizations belong to the CFCM: the followers of Tariq Ramadan, the Salafi, the Jamaat Tabligh, some major mosques such as Addawa in Paris, are outside of it. Then, even some of the organizations taking part in it show very ambivalent feelings towards the Jews, and even more towards Israel and Zionism, which 7  On Shamir, a Holocaust denier who has been denounced as an antisemite by many Palestinian activists, see Camus: “Israel Shamir: faux ami de la cause palestinienne et vrai antisémite,” Politis, October 28, 2005. 8  On Garaudy, a former Communist Party top level executive turned Muslim and Holocaust-denier, cf. Prazan & Minard (2007). 9  On Meyssan, a member of the mainstream Left Parti Radical who now heads the Réseau Voltaire, cf. Venner (2005).



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they quite clearly and openly oppose. The CFCM is divided between three factions: one consists of the moderate followers of the Grande Mosquée de Paris, led by Dalil Boubakeur and supported by the Algerian government; another is the orthodox Sunni Union des Organisations Islamiques de France (UOIF; led by Laj Thami Breze), which is guided by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and by the Egyptianborn Shaykh Yusuf al-Qaradawi as the supreme religious authority; and a third component is the Fédération Nationale des Musulmans de France (FNMF), a predominantly Moroccan organization which is very close to the Moroccan Government. The UOIF, which is the most important component of CFCM in terms of the number of affiliated mosques, is a controversial organization. While it agreed to meet with representatives of CRIF, in September 2004, it has not disavowed Shaykh Qaradawi’s fatwa condoning of the suicide bombings against civilians in Israel and it supports Hamas. It is very close to the Comité de Bienfaisance et de Secours aux Palestiniens (Committee for Charity and Assistance to Palestinians— CBSP), which, at the March 2005 annual meeting of UOIF in Le Bourget, near Paris, distributed video tapes urging Jihad and supporting Hamas. CBSP is a registered charity and raises money for institutions linked to the Islamic movement of the Arab-Israeli mayor of Umm al-Fahm, Shaykh Raid Salah. Its fundraising activities, mostly through the network of hallal shops, play a pivotal role in spreading an ideology that still rejects the existence of the State of Israel. It also magnifies the example of the struggle of the Palestinian people, in a way that appeals both to the devout Muslims and to those who feel close to the “anti-Imperialist” movement. Another example of the UOIF condoning antisemitic language and propaganda is the fact that at its 2005 convention, near Paris, one can find cassettes praising the late Hamas leader, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin.10 Also, one of the Union’s most popular preachers is Hassan Iquioussen, whose cassettes sell by the thousands, is clearly antisemitic in his approach to the Palestinian issue.11 Another problem with French militant Islam is that, while CFCMaffiliated organizations mostly represent the older generation of

 They were on sale at the CBSP booth. Cf. Gilles-William Goldnadel (2005).  As shown by the critical coverage in the Communist daily, L’Humanité, in the article: “Iquioussen or the culture of anti-Jewish hatred,” January 17, 2004. 10 11

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­ uslims who were born abroad and maintain strong links to their M native countries, the younger, French-born generation of devout Muslims is more attracted by the aforementioned Swiss-Islamic theologian Tariq Ramadan, who, in 2009, asked for the removal of Hamas from the European Union list of terrorist organizations and its recognition as “a legitimate national liberation movement” (Petition 2009). Ramadan, who draws from the Muslim Brotherhood ideology, although he is probably not a Brotherhood member himself, advocates a modern orthodox Islam, rooted in the reality of European societies and values, and has close ties to the anti-globalization Left, as shown by his participation in the European Social Forum in Paris in 2003. Two of his articles sum up his thinking on the Jewish issue. First of all, in October 2003, he wrote a “Critique of the New Communitarian Intellectuals” (Ramadan 2003/2006). It attacked several prominent French Jewish intellectuals on the ground that, because of their Jewishness, they had become staunch supporters of the policies of Israel. The fact that Ramadan put on a list of prominent Jews, eventually including in it the philosopher Pierre-André Taguieff, who is not Jewish, was seen by many as bordering on antisemitism. Then, in April 2006, Ramadan published an article in which he claimed that “Israel is very much the country which, at the present time, is the biggest danger for peace in the world.” (Ramadan 2003/2006) Those widely publicized columns, which caused a thunder of criticism, overshadow Ramadan’s earlier declarations condemning anti-semitic violence and especially anti-semitism stemming from Islam.12 When looking at the issue of Muslim antisemitism in France, one should not forget, also, the important role of the Internet in the emergence of a ‘virtual’ Muslim identity, that is attested by the existence of several well-designed sites with a wide audience, such as www.saphirnet.info, http://www.mejliss.com and www.oumma.com, which spread radical anti-Zionism. Other Muslim websites such as www.quibla.net and http://news.stcom.net, present themselves as Muslim but are run by non-Muslim antisemites who belong to the far-Left (in the case of Quibla)13 or to sects which spread the conspiracy theory of the “new

12   In a column published in Le Monde, December 24, 2001, Ramadan wrote that: “the anti-Semitic discourse is not only spread by disoccupied young people, but also by intellectuals and imams who, behind every act, see the hand of the ‘Jewish lobby’.” 13   Quibla is run by a team comprising Leftist Fausto Giudice and a former Green Party activist, Ginette Skandrani, who was expelled from the party in May 2005, because of her association with Holocaust deniers.



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world order” (in the case of St.com).14 The French authorities and courts have issued warnings that the border between anti-Zionism, which is a legitimate opinion guaranteed by the laws on freedom of speech, and antisemitism, which is a criminal offence, had to be clearly drawn; so, in June 2005, a Paris court declared the webmaster of the Islamiya website guilty of incitement to racial hatred, after he posted online a collection of photographs equating the fates of the Palestinians today and that of the Jews in the concentration camps. In January 2007, Smain Bedrouni, webmaster of the jihadi website St.com, was also convicted for sending threatening letters, full of antisemitic content, to Mouloud Aounit, the chairman of an anti-racist organization, MRAP, although Aounit is of Muslim origin and is an outspoken critic of Israel. The importance of the aforementioned websites cannot be overlooked, because they report on the Israel/Palestine conflict daily, using anti-Zionist stereotypes which usually equate the methods of the Israeli army with that of the Nazis (in the case of Islamiya and Quibla) or because they allow their readers to post comments which, in the case of Mejliss, combine religious antisemitism of the crudest kind with the “islamo-Leftist” rhetoric blaming Israel for all the evil in the world. Apart from those Muslim groups which play quite cleverly with the legal border between the legitimate criticism of Israel, and plain antisemitism, there exist a few openly antisemitic Islamic groups, but in this regard, the French situation is much different from that in the United Kingdom or Scandinavia, because the jihadi movements do not operate publicly and the most extreme antisemitic groups ( such as Hizb ut Tahrir15 or al Muhajiroun, although the latter group claims to have established a French branch in Lille) have never been able to set foot here. The only such group of some significance is the Strasbourgbased Parti des Musulmans de France (PMF), led by a man with far right connections,16 Mohamed Ennacer Latrèche, who received his religious education in Syria, but the PMF is more of an “identity” 14  St.com is close to a sectarian guru, Christian Cotten, who runs a cult named “Politique de vie.” 15   A leaflet by HUT has been distributed in Paris, during the Gaza demonstration that took place in Paris on January 24, 2009, but HUT has no activity in France, apart from a website (http://albadil.edaama.org) that seems to emanate from abroad. 16   In February 2003, the PMF send a delegation to Irak, before the fall of the Baath regime, in order to show its support for Saddam Hussein. Along with Latrèche, there were militants of the extreme-Right, national-revolutionary movements, Réseau Radical, from France, and Nation, from Belgium.

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Arab movement than a Muslim one. Much more serious, and a big concern of the French security services, is the growth of the Salafi movement inspired by Saudi Muslim scholars. According to a report of the Renseignements Généraux, the Salafis now number some 5,000 and control about 30 mosques. Salafi activity is noticeable especially on the Internet, at sites such as www.darwa.com, http://sounnah.free .fr, and http://www.salafs.com. The Salafi do not seek confrontation with the Jewish community, despite their belief in the inferior nature of the Jews, as written in the Koran. They want to build their own separate, cloistered society, and do not use violence against the Jews. Nevertheless, their role in the context of antisemitism is important for two reasons: first, as said before, they provide antisemitic religious literature to those even outside of their group; second, they are a movement which serves as a recruiting ground for would-be jihadist fighters. The same can be said of the pietist Tabligh movement, which, like the Salafis, recruits mostly among unskilled youth and converts; of Foi et Pratique, a Tabligh splinter group; and of the French branch of the Lebanon-based Ahbachi movement, which is known for its strident anti-Jewish propaganda during the first Gulf War, when the imam at its headquarters in Montpellier, Shaykh Khalid al-Zant, called for the destruction of Israel. Finally, it is not possible to properly assert the scope of antisemitism in France without mentioning that it is not confined to radical, or even fundamentalist, Islam: expressions of support for the Palestinian movement, rejection of Israel or hatred of the West, with antisemitic undertones, are widespread among the secular Muslims as well, and meet with the anti-Jewish prejudice rooted in the history of one segment of the Radical Left. The war in Iraq had radicalized people who were more Arab nationalist than religious zealots. The law banning the Muslim headscarf from the public schools (March 2004), was another reason for their radicalization. On both occasions, Muslim militants have build alliances with secular groups belonging to both ends of the political spectrum. This is exemplified by the case of Nouari Khiari, who was jailed in April 2005 because of his reported involvement in raising money for Jihad, and re-appeared as an organizer of the Gaza demonstrations in January 2009. Khiari also spoke at the European Social Forum in Paris (2003) and signed a petition of the Indigènes de la République, a left-wing movement that claims that France is still a colonial state and treats the Muslims as second-class citizens.



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Among secular but radical groups, one should also mention CAPJPO (Coordination des Appels pour une Paix Juste au Proche-Orient), led by Olivia Zemor, a Jew, which campaigns for the boycott of Israeli goods and for the severing of scientific cooperation between French and Israeli universities. Although the group is not antisemitic, its actions tend to de-legitimize Israel: CAPJPO was the driving force behind the short-lived attempt to create an anti-Zionist/radically proPalestine political movement, Euro-Palestine, which ran for the 2004 Euro-election in the Paris district. It is also a reality that, since Hamas has become part of the Palestinian government, and even more so since the war against Hezbollah in 2006, the traditional pro-Palestinian organizations such as Association France-Palestine Solidarité (AFPS), which are aligned with the PLO and the Palestinian Authority, have to confront the emergence of competing radical groups which do not recognize the right of Israel to exist and support either Hamas or Hezbollah on the ground that they refuse the two States solution. Those groups, all of them secular in ideology, are Palestine en Marche; Mouvement Justice Palestine and, since December 2005, the Mouvement de Soutien à la Résistance du Peuple Palestinien (MSRPP), which is a front organization for Hamas and the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade. On April 30, 2007, the MSRPP organized a meeting in Ivry, near Paris, in support of Hamas. Although the French government denied a visa to the Al Aqsa Brigades activist who was invited, the PFLP activist Rabah Mhanna was able to speak at the rally, and the Palestinian Prime Minister, Ismail Haniyeh, delivered a message. The Communist-led city council of Ivry, however, banned the meeting, which had to be held in the street. Another fundamentalist-oriented pro-Hamas group is the Comité Cheikh Yassine, led by Imam Abdelhakim Sefraoui, who belonged to Dieudonné’s campaign staff (see below). Finally, the Réseau Voltaire, led by Thierry Meyssan, disseminates conspiracy theories that try to demonstrate that the 9/11 bombings were a joint US-Israeli plot aimed at justifying the war against radical Islam. Originally a left-wing, anti-fascist and pro-gay rights group, the Réseau Voltaire became a rallying point for anti-Zionists of all kinds after 2001. In November 2005, it held an international conference entitled “Axis for Peace,” attended by Dieudonné, hardline Communists, Polish representatives of the right-wing populist Samobroona, Russian Slavophiles; US conspiracy theorists (Christopher Bollyn, from American

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Free Press), officials from Iran and Syria and Israeli Arab Palestinian activist Ahmad Tibi.17 III.  The Demonstrations against the Israeli Operation in Gaza: From Support for Palestine to Support for Hamas The demonstrations in support of Gaza were a turning point in the expression of antisemitism because the older generation of pro-Palestine militants who repudiate antisemitism, support the Palestinian Authority and a two-States solution, seem to have lost control over the movement. The pro-Gaza demonstrations began on December 30, 2008, when about 4,000 gathered in Paris at the call of the Communists, the Green Party, the Trotskyite Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire, (but not the Socialist Party), and major pro-Palestine organizations like the Association France-Palestine Solidarité. Even on the first day of their mobilization, it was clear that the crowd was asking for more than the usual slogans in support of the PLO, Mahmoud Abbas, and the rights of the Palestinian people. This crowd believed that the Palestinian Authority is too moderate and that the only “resistance” today is that of Hamas and Hezbollah. As a result, there were many flags with the emblem of both movements in the ranks of the demo. While the official slogan was “Stop the bombing and blockade in Gaza,” there was a huge flag in the crowd which read: “Paris-GazaBeirut-Kabul-Baghdad-Jenin, Resistance!,” a combined reference to anti-imperialism and Islamic fundamentalism. On December 31, 2008 another demonstration took place in Paris, at the call of the Parti des Musulmans de France (PMF) and the Collectif Sheikh Yassine. The PMF, which marched through the heavily Muslim districts of northern Paris, explained that the Israeli strike was caused by the belief of the Tsahal soldiers in “their Torah, which has become an inspiration for committing the most filthy of crimes.” The same slogans were repeated the following day, when Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni was in Paris, by about 800 Islamists burning Israeli flags in front of the Paris Opera, who chanted, “Israel, you are Nazi” and “Long live

17  On the role of anti-Semitism as cement between alternative Left movements and the extreme-Right, an alliance in which Réseau Voltaire plays a pivotal role, cf. Camus (2006a).



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Hamas.” Another popular slogan was: “United Nations, in 48 you gave birth to a monster and you named it Israel.” The anti-Jewish tone of the pro-Palestine movement reached unprecedented heights on January 3, 2009. The protesters planned to march through Paris to the Israeli Embassy, located near the ChampsElysées, which meant that they had to walk through the heavily Jewish district near the Grands Boulevards. When they arrived there, the Jewish quarter was under heavy police protection and the streets leading to it were closed, but it was certain, from all the “Allahu Akbar” and “Weapons for Hamas” that one could hear, that many wanted to physically confront the Jews. Anti-Jewish literature was sold on the sidewalks alongside the demonstration. The Comité sur le génocide en Palestine distributed a leaflet written by Ginette Skandrani, who was banned from the Green Party because of her links to Holocaustdeniers. It was entitled The Planned Genocide of the Palestinian. A look at the name of the committee members shows a variety of ideologicallyopposed people: Jean Brière was also banned from the Green Party because of an article he wrote in 1991 against the “bellicist Jewish lobby” that was allegedly behind the launching of Operation Desert Storm. Abdelhakim Sefrioui is a Moroccan imam who belongs to the leadership of the Comité des Imams de France. Mondher Sfar is a Tunisian political activist and opponent of the Ben Ali regime, who wrote in several Holocaust-denial French publications in the 1990s and the last member is the www.aredam.net website, run by Daniel Milan, a neo-Nazi who converted to Islam. Another leaflet was distributed by the Mouvement des Indigènes de la République and featured a photograph of Sheikh Izz ad-Din al Qassam, “hero of the Palestinian revolution, who gave his name to the armed branch of Hamas.” Late in the evening, a riot started. There were cries of “death to the Jews” and youngsters wearing “Hamas” t-shirts throwing stones at the police. This is when the black supremacists of the Mouvement des Damnés de l’Impérialisme (MDI) began to distribute their propaganda. The MDI, led by “Kemi Seba” (aka. Stellio Gilles Capochichi), whose family comes from Benin, began under the name Tribu KA as a radical offspring of the Nation of Islam. It evolved into a bizarre cult advocating the return of Black people to Africa and believing in a mix of ancient Egyptian wisdom and black racialism. It is virulently antisemitic and Seba has in 2008, returned to the Islamic faith. In the demonstration, the MDI leaflets called the “Arab diaspora” to “efficiently fight against the Zionist enemy who is occupying our lands.”

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Of course, “our lands” means both Israel and France. The MDI is now building an alliance with Islamists and white neo-Nazi supremacists of the Droite Socialiste, and their common ground is hatred of the Jews. This kind of unholy alliance explains how it was possible, on January 24, that Extreme-Right leaders Alain Soral,18 Thomas Werlet19 and Christian Bouchet20 marched for Gaza under the banner “United Front against Zionism,” with Shia militants and other Islamists. IV.  Antisemitism on the Extreme Right: Old Antisemitism and the New Generation of pro-Islamist Militants One of the weak points of the “New Islamophobia” concept is that it does not put the emergence of the violent expression of antisemitism among the immigrant/Muslim community in the broader frame of the French political situation since the 1980s. This situation was characterized by the existence of a strong extreme-Right political party, the Front National, with a charismatic leader, Jean-Marie Le Pen, who has succeeded in bringing back a discredited ideological tradition, that of racist nationalism, almost back into the mainstream. The young Muslims who attack Jews today were born at the time when this party came out of the fringes of politics and became of political force to be reckoned with, eventually up to the point where, in 2002, Le Pen came to the second ballot in the presidential election with 16. 86%, while in 1974 he only polled 0.75%. They grew up in a country where Le Pen was able to make speeches with a distinct antisemitic tone without losing his voters’ support, nor having his party banned, nor even making crowds going to the streets to demonstrate against his remarks that “the gas chambers were a mere detail in the history of the second world war” (1987, then again in 1995), and that “the big international forces, like the Jewish international, play a significant role in spreading the anti-nationalist ideas” (1989).21 It is thus a possibility that Muslim antisemitism in France has been legitimized 18  Soral is the leader of the Egalité et Réconciliation group, which was close to Front national. 19   Werlet is the leader of the very anti-Semitic Droite socialiste. 20   Bouchet is the most prominent intellectual of the national-revolutionary movement and is the editor of the anti-Zionist quarterly Résistance! 21  Not to mention the numerous cases where FN militants or even executives have been sentenced in the courts for plain Holocaust-denial, or even neo-Nazi propa-



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by the antisemitic discourse of the extreme Right, and even, to some extent, that it has drawn from it. Far from being on the decline, and far from having become pro-Jewish or pro-Israel, the French extreme Right is alive and well. This can be seen from the fact that around 10 publications from this part of the political spectrum, all of them more or less anti-Jewish, are on sale in the newsstands, including an Holocaust denial weekly (Rivarol); a Catholic fundamentalist daily (Présent); two nationalist-revolutionary periodicals which regularly eulogize the Waffen SS and some aspects of Nazi Germany (Le Choc du Mois and Réfléchir et Agir) and even a nationalist quarterly, Le National Radical, which in January 2007, published excerpts from the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, although it is a criminal offense to do so. The impact of the extreme right on French politics is declining, since President Nicolas Sarkozy succeeded in marginalizing the FN in the 2007 election. Le Pen polled 10.44%, and in the following legislative election, the FN polled a mere 4.29%, its lowest score since 1984. Due to the age of Le Pen (who turned 81 in June 2009), to lack of financial resources and to the bitter internal fight over its succession as party leader between his daughter Marine and other contenders, the FN is now a minor actor in French politics, but it retains a sizeable part of the blue-collar vote, in areas that are hit hard by economic recession. If it wants to catch the votes of those former supporters who switched to Sarkozy in 2007,22 the FN will need to continue positioning itself as a hardline anti-establishment, anti-immigration party. This is the reason why, even though Marine Le Pen as a person seems to be more moderate than her father (and certainly less prejudiced against the Jewish community), the party as such, remains associated with people ridden with anti-Jewish prejudice or who endorse denial of the Holocaust. For example, a former FN regional councilman Georges Theil,23 received a six-month suspended sentence and a heavy fine, on October 7, 2005, after he published, under the alias Gilbert Dubreuil, a booklet entitled Un cas d’insoumission, comment on devient révisionniste, which draws heavily on the writings of Holocaust deniers Maurice Bardèche and Robert Faurisson. Further, the party’s second-in command, Bruno Gollnisch,

ganda. For example, the former FN regional councillor, Georges Theil, was among those who attended the Tehran Holocaust-denial conference in December 2006. 22  That is, 70% of those who had voted for Le Pen in 2002. 23  Theil attended the December 2006 Holocaust denial conference in Tehran. The text of his speech can be read at Theil (2007).

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a university professor in Lyon, was suspended from his tenure for five years by the Higher Education Board, after he stated, inter alia, at a press conference on October 11, 2004: “There is no longer any serious historian who supports the findings of the Nuremberg Trials.” When the trial in appeal took place, in October 2006, Gollnisch finally recognized under cross examination that the Shoah actually took place, but this does not change the fact that the 2007 platform of the party calls for “the restoration of freedom of opinion and freedom of speech (in academic research)” (cf. Front National 2007), which amounts to toleration of the Holocaust deniers’ pseudo-scientific discourse. One should also remind that, far from repenting for his previous antisemitic remarks, Le Pen said in the weekly paper Rivarol ( January 2005), that the German occupation of France was not especially inhumane, which in some way is an antisemitic comment. Within the FN, anti-Jewish prejudice also comes from the Catholic traditionalist wing, which clings to the pre-Vatican II theology and refutes the Nostra Aetate declaration. Several party leaders belong to the schismatic St. Pius X Fraternity, which recently became entangled into the controversy raised by Bishop Williamson’s Holocaust-denying comments. Others (the majority) belong to the traditionalist movements that have remained faithful to the Vatican. Led in the 1980s and 1990s by Bernard Antony, who left FN in 2005 to focus on his movements Chrétienté-Solidarité and AGRIF (an association which seeks to prosecute ‘anti-French racists’ and those holding ‘anti-Christian’ views), the traditionalists still have an influence on the top leadership of FN: the man in charge of Le Pen’s program in the 2007 presidential campaign, Thibault de la Tocnaye, belongs to it. It should also be noted that although FN puts anti-immigration policies at the core of its ideology, and is very hostile to immigration from the Maghreb and Turkey, and indeed to Islam as a religion (“a foreign religion which causes legitimate fears,” as Le Pen put it), it has not become pro-Israel as a consequence. In March 2007, the vice president of the party, Roger Holeindre, explained in a video which can be seen on the FN website (www.frontnational.com), that “Israel is in the hands of the settlers, who are supported by Mr. Bush’s friends in the US, and all this can lead to a third world war.” Holeindre, who wrote a book called Israël-Palestine: assez de mensonges (2003), is quite typical of the FN thinking on the Middle-East issue, when he equates Israeli policies with the nationalist and religious views of the religious-Zionist Right, thus promoting the idea that Israel is a fanatical State driven



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by a messianic view which is detrimental to peace in the world. But because French voters do not pay much attention to foreign policy issues, the FN remains quite silent on the Middle East conflict (which is not even mentioned in the 2007 program), although it is clear that it does recognize the right of Israel to exist, as does its rival party, Bruno Mégret’s Mouvement National Républicain. The official stand of the FN on antisemitism, Israel and the Jews, is rather cautious, because the party fears being labeled “extremist” or “anti-Semitic,” but the youth wing, Front National de la Jeunesse, many rank and file members, and many websites or blogs coming from the local branches, are far more outspokenly and radically anti-Israel.24 Further Right of the FN, the fringe movements of the radical right are unabashedly antisemitic and some of them even consider Islamism as a political force they should support and work with, against the Jews and Israel, their common enemy. What are those groups? In January 2005, the Renseignements Généraux (the state security police) released a report concerning the far right scene in 2004/5. It estimated that the total number of activists outside of FN and MNR ranged between 2,500 and 3,500. The report stressed that the main target of far right activity had become the Muslim community and that Alsace, in eastern France, was home to 35% of the far right activity. It identified 20 groups, split into five ideological subdivisions: the skinhead movement (1,000–1,500 activists); the ‘Identity’ movement; ultra-nationalists; neo-Nazis and soccer ‘hooligans.’ The skinhead movement is divided between the French Blood & Honour division (although an unofficial branch exists in northern France, under the name Blood & Honour Midgard), the Hammerskins and local, unaffiliated groups mostly concentrated in Alsace (where ‘white noise’ music concerts draw an audience of up to 1,000 people, 90% of them from Germany), northern France, and the southeast. Nearly all skinhead fanzines that are overtly antisemitic, deny the Holocaust and justify the use of violence against immigrants and people of foreign origin. One of their publications is called Charlemagne, referring to the French Waffen SS division of the same name; another, Genocide. Skinheads are often implicated in racist attacks against immigrants and colored people, but also in the desecration of Jewish and Muslim cemeteries or graves, or of monuments related to the

 See: http://www.nationspresse.info.

24

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second world war, such as was the case in Verdun in May 2004, when the monument in honor of the Jewish soldiers fallen during World War I, was desecrated by a skinhead. Also, in April 2004, the Jewish cemetery in Herrlisheim (Alsace) was desecrated by neo-Nazi skinheads. The ‘Identity’ movement (total membership, according to the police report, around 500) revolves around the Bloc Identitaire, led by Guillaume Luyt and Fabrice Robert. It publishes the quarterly ID (for Identité, but also a pun on the French word for ideas), which has an address in Belgium in order to avoid prosecution. In 2005, the Bloc became a high-profile group in the media due to its initiative to distribute pork meals to the homeless in Paris, thus excluding both Jews and Muslims. The Bloc also maintains an online ‘press agency’ Novopress (www. novopress.info). Its position on the Jewish issue and the Middle-East is very specific: the “Bloc” thinks that, as a nationalist group, it cannot take sides in the conflict between the Jews and the Arabs, and it has a motto on this issue which is “Ni keffieh, ni kippa” (“Neither [Palestinian] keffieh, nor skullcap.” A rival national revolutionary faction is led by Christian Bouchet, the former leader of Nouvelle Résistance and Unité Radicale. His organization, Les Nôtres, which runs the www. voxnr.com website and publishes the magazine Résistance!, numbers about 40 loosely organized activists. The group promotes hard-line anti-Zionism such as that of Iran, and supports Palestinian Jihad, Arab nationalist movements such as the Baath party and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party or Muslim fundamentalist groups. Another ‘Identity’ movement is Terre et Peuple, led by former GRECE president and FN national leadership member Pierre Vial, who promotes an ideology close to that of the “völkisch” sub-family of the German Konservative Revolution. The “identity” movement also includes the Groupe union défense (GUD), a mainly student group with a record of violence and extreme antisemitism, which is now active under the name RED (Rassemblement des Etudiants de Droite). The ultra-nationalist movement consists of four groups with followings of between 30 and 80. The Œuvre française is a rabidly antisemitic movement (founded in 1969) led by Pierre Sidos, who claims that is “anti-Semitic, no more, no less than Saint Louis;” the Cercle franco-hispanique is led by Olivier Grimaldi, an admirer of the Spanish Falange who does not especially put the emphasis on antisemitism and the Renouveau Français, a fascist and Catholic fundamentalist group which belonged to the trans-national European National Front



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and is so antisemitic that it took part in several militant actions of the Black supremacist Tribu Ka (see below), the most virulent anti-Jewish group in France today. Finally, the ageing Marshall Pétain devotees gather in two rival factions of the Association Nationale PétainVerdun, and, although they are not openly antisemitic, try to downplay the role of Vichy France and Pétain’s responsibility in the deportation of the Jews. The neo-Nazis are few and often belong to the political folklore, although neo-Nazi activity remains high in two regions: Nord-Pas de Calais and Eastern France. On May 18, 2005, the Alsatian Nazi movement, Elsass Korps, was outlawed. This was a loose group of some 30 ‘white power’ neo-Nazi skinheads, with a record of convictions for racist violence against immigrants, and their antisemitism was blatant: according to police sources, some members could have been involved in the wave of Jewish cemeteries desecrations which took place in 2004, and they organized “white power music” concerts where songs of “Kill the Jews” could be heard.25 Other neo-Nazi groups are Combat furtif- Werwolf (about 100), also in Alsace; la Meute de Fenrir (neo-Nazi skinheads) in northern France, and the French section of the German-Austrian based Truppenkameradschaft IV, an association of former French Waffen-SS soldiers, which also attracts younger recruits to the neo-Nazi scene. The antisemitic propaganda of the two former groups is very simplistic and consists of references to Holocaust denial and national-socialist ideology, combined with references to the American-born concept of “leaderless resistance” to the alleged existence of ZOG, the Zionist Occupation Government, which is but a new name for the old “Jewish world conspiracy.” The French neo-Nazi far right mostly consists of loonies who have sought refuge in cyberspace, where they disseminate Holocaust denial and praise of the Third Reich. A good example of this political sect can be found at http:// www.mnsf.info/phenix/dossiers.htm,26 the website of the Mouvement National-Socialiste Français, whose very radical anti-Jewish language has never been followed by any kind of militant action. This explains why, although they are violent, antisemitic and racist, those groups are perceived today by the Jewish community as posing a minor threat,

 Cf. the online website of the Nouvel Observateur magazine, May 18, 2005.  The webmaster of the MNSF website was arrested in January 2009 and indicted for incitement to racial hatred. 25 26

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when compared to the antisemitism/radical anti-Zionism spread by Islamist organizations and a part of the far-Left. V.  The Radical Left and Antisemitism: Traditional Anti-Zionism and the New Alliance between Islam and the Anti-Globalization Left To be correct, there are very few cases of open antisemitism from the far-Left and when there are, the authors of such tirades are usually expelled by the movements they belong to, a fate well known to the former Trotskyite Bernard Fischer (a former LCR member) and the Green Party member Ginette Skandrani. The problem with the far-Left (and the Greens) is not that its political discourse is overtly or racially antisemitic. It is that anti-Zionism, when it amounts to refusing the existence of Israel as a State, or when it describes Israel is an imperialist, theocratic warmonger which oppresses the Palestinian in ways that are reminiscent of those used by the Nazis, amounts to using the same prejudice which, in Christian antisemitism, held the Jews responsible for all the evil in the world. The French far left is no different from that of the other western countries: anti-Zionism is historically part of its agenda, and it supports the idea of “one democratic and secular state in Israel/Palestine,” although some voices within the LCR now openly advocate a two- states solution. The peculiarity of France is that this party family participates in the elections and polled 7.07% in the 2007 presidential election, the vote, when it was split between three Trotskyite factions: the Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire27 (LCR; led by Olivier Besancenot), Lutte Ouvrière (led by Arlette Laguiller) and the Parti des Travailleurs (led by Daniel Gluckstein). Not all of them favor an alliance with political Islam: in fact, as rigorously secular parties, both Lutte Ouvrière and the PT are against it, while the LCR is divided. The pro-Islamists are influenced by the Socialisme par en bas—the French branch of the British Socialist Workers’ Party—which has integrated into the LCR. It is this group who imported in France the theory, used in the UK by the SWP or George Galloway’s Respect Party, that political Islam is anti-imperialist and progressist in essence, and

27   In February 2009, the LCR changed its name into that of Nouveau Parti Anticapitaliste (NPA).



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that Zionism and Israel are, in essence too, imperialist, colonialist and racist. From there, a tiny minority of the far-Left militants come to support Hamas as the “vanguard of the Palestinian resistance” and refuse to condemn the antisemitic language of Haniye’s movement. From there too, others chose to support Hezbollah as an anti-imperialist movement which also fights for a legitimate cause against Israel, and stay silent about suicide bombings or how a Hezbollah-run State under the Sharia would be compatible with secular, leftist ideology. And finally, almost the whole radical Left supports the idea that the Palestinian armed resistance is legitimate, as is the Iraqi resistance to the U.S./western forces, or any so-called “liberation movement” in the Muslim world. The Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire and its youth wing, Jeunesses Communistes Révolutionnaires, are particularly active in the anti-war and pro-Palestine movements (in the latter case, in support of PFLP). In the 2003 demonstrations against the war in Iraq or in the 2009 demonstrations for Gaza, posters equating the star of David with the Nazi swastika, cartoons of Bush and Sharon featuring heavy antisemitic stereotypes (blood dropping from Sharon’s teeth, or him drawn as a vampire, or cartoons showing Israeli soldiers in the attire of the Nazi Waffen SS) were common and the leftist organizers were either unable, or unwilling, to forbid their display. The Communist Party has been so vocal in its hard-line criticism of Israel, during the confrontation with Hamas in Gaza that CRIF has decided not to invite the party leaders to its annual meeting with the political elite of France that is, its annual dinner which took place on March 2, 2009 (the leaders of the Green Party were not invited, either). The connection between the Communists and the Jewish community has been severed a long time ago, not only because of the party’s uncompromising anti-Zionism, but also because the Jewish working class does not exist anymore. The Communists try to remind the Jewish community that their party took a prominent part in the struggle against Fascism and antisemitism, or that there were many Communists in the Résistance, but the younger generations of Jews do not understand how the Communist Party can identify with the Palestinian cause, a stand they often explain by the supposed will of the dwindling party to draw votes from the immigrants in the suburbs, where many cities are still run by the Communists. Even if this may be true, the real explanation is that the Communist Party clings to a vision of the Israel/Palestine conflict, which is determined by anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism. As a result, although the

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­Communist Party supports the existence of Israel alongside a Palestinian state, many Communist leaders are at the forefront of antiZionism and several of them even favor working with the Islamists, on the ground that Islamism is first and foremost a reaction against the Western domination of the Arab world. Mouloud Aounit, the secretary general of the anti-racist NGO, Mouvement contre le racisme et pour l’amitié entre les peoples (MRAP), who is also a regional councilman elected on a Communist slate, supports working alongside the disciples of Tariq Ramadan, to the point where the fight of MRAP against Islamophobia has completely overshadowed its struggle against antisemitism. Orthodox communist and sometimes Stalinist groups on the fringe of the Communist Party, such as the Pôle de Renaissance Communiste de France (publication: Initiative Communiste), Renaissance Communiste and Gauche Communiste, are particularly supportive of Palestinian hardliners (mostly the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine—PFLP) and promote extreme anti-Zionism as a part of their ‘anti-imperialist,’ anti-American agenda. They suffered a setback when in 2004, the leadership of the party decided to fire Bruno Drweski, an academic and director of the party’s theoretical review, La Pensée, on the grounds that he worked with the controversial Réseau Voltaire, led by Thierry Meyssan. Drweski, who has launched an online periodical called La pensée libre, travelled to Damascus to meet with Hamas’ Khaled Mechaal.28 Antisemitism has also become an issue within the anti-globalization movement, after the presence of Ramadan at the European Social Forum almost led to the breakup of the main anti-globalization group, ATTAC. While the leaders of the movement are not antisemites, the freedom of speech they consider as sacred often leads to, for example, the far-Left Internet portal, Indymedia (http://indymedia.paris .org) allowing plain antisemitic messages to be posted online, although the site is moderated.29 Finally, one should remind that some of the French most active Holocaust-deniers, among them Serge Thion and Pierre Guillaume, come from the radical Left, and that in the 1960s they belonged to the Spartacist group, La Vieille Taupe.

 Drewski’s interview with Mechaal is reproduced in the hardline Communist paper, Le Manifeste, n° 19, juillet-août 2006. 29   For an example of how an opponent of the anti-globalization movement’s alliance with political Islam is slandered on Indymedia (2007) for having “Jewish blood.” 28



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VI.  A New Development in French Antisemitism: Black Supremacism One of the most intriguing new forms of antisemitism is that of the militants of the Black cause, an ideological trend that has become famous and quite popular through the media exposure of the wellknown comedian Dieudonné M’Bala M’Bala. While many of those, and at the forefront, Dieudonné himself, began their political career in the Radical Left, they now promote extreme anti-Zionism in disguise of anti-Imperialism, are outright racial supremacists who are working together with neo-Fascists and even neo-Nazis, in order to spread the Jewish conspiracy theory, as it is the case with the sectarian movement, the Mouvement des Damnés de l’Impérialisme (formerly known as Tribu KA). Dieudonné, born of a Cameroonese father and a French mother,30 is a successful figure of the show business industry. After having had a try at politics in 1997 as an “anti-fascist” candidate against the Front National in its then-stronghold of Dreux, he became disillusioned by the Left, probably because he never got any reward for his political activism. The break-up of his long-time association on the stage with the Jewish comedian, Elie Semoun, after a financial quarrel, seems to have led him to harbor antisemitic feelings. But a failing career at the beginning of the 2000s probably also convinced him that he could find a wider audience if he tailored his shows to meet the growing resentment of the immigrants, the Muslims, the Black people and the Leftists, against the “establishment” and the “Zionists” who and he subsequently began to speak in his plays about highly controversial topics, such as the plague of the Palestinian people because of Zionism, the racism of the White man against Black people, and especially the refusal of France to recognize slavery as a genocide and to pay compensation for it to the heirs of the former slaves. Thus on December 1, 2003, on the State television channel, France 3, Dieudonné took part in a broadcast with a very wide audience31 and appeared dressed in the traditional garb of Orthodox Jews, with a machine gun

30  His mother is a native of Nantes, a city that was the main center of the trade of slaves. Interestingly enough, his (white) wife’s family comes from Bordeaux, another city that owes much of its wealth to slavery. 31   “On ne peut pas plaire à tout le monde,” produced and presented by the Jewish TV celebrity, Marc-Olivier Fogiel.

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in hand, and ended his performance by giving a Nazi salute with the words “Heil Israel.” This was only the highlight of a long series of antisemitic utterances, for which he was been convicted several times for antisemitism, the last time on February 16, 2007 by the French Supreme Court, the Cour de Cassation, because, in an interview with Lyon Capitale ( January 23, 2002), he said that “for me, Judaism is a sect, a swindle (. . .). The chosen people, that is the beginning of racism.” Dieudonné, who was a candidate to the French presidency in 2006 before he dropped out of the race and chose to support the anti-globalization candidate, José Bové,32 is not a supporter of Islamism, and has no articulated political ideas. However, what he says, either in his performances or on the websites he is associated with (http://lesogres.info; http://labanlieusexprime.org) is that France today is ruled by a political mafia, that of the Socialist Party (often referred to as the “Parti Sioniste”) and the conservative UMP, which in fact are, according to him, both puppets of what he calls the “neo-Zionists,” that is, the Jews. This kind of talk appeals to four segments of the public: the Muslim immigrants, not necessarily fundamentalists, who think that they are subject of racist persecution by the State; the minority of the Black people who resent the fact that France voted financial compensation for the victims of the Shoah, but not for the descendants of slaves; the radical Leftists who think that all the political parties, except those of the Extreme Left, bow allegiance to Israel and the representative body of French Jewry, CRIF, which is one of the targets of Dieudonné’s hatred; and this part of the Extreme Right which, although it opposes immigration and remains racist, is, before anything else, committed to spreading the myth of a Jewish conspiracy. This explains why, on November 11, 2006, Dieudonné visited the annual convention of the Front National in Paris, and later said that Le Pen was “the natural candidate of the French Africans” (Press Conference February 13, 2007). This also explains why he visited Lebanon and Syria in August/September 2006, meeting with top officials from the Hizbullah and the Syrian government, together with Thierry Meyssan from the Réseau Voltaire and the novelist Alain Soral, a member of Le Pen’s campaign staff, in a trip which was prepared by Frédéric Châtillon, a former leader of

32   Bové, although he is hostile to the policies of Israel and anti-Zionist, has rejected this support.



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the neo-fascist student movement, GUD, who is close to the neo-Nazis (cf. Camus 2006a). This also brings Dieudonné to support the most extreme Black militants, who are in favor of race supremacy and are ready to ally with white racists in order to further their cause, at the heart of which is, once again, antisemitism. The Black supremacist movement came at the forefront of the news when, in the afternoon of Sunday, May 28, 2006, a group of about 30 to 40 Black militants unexpectedly arrived in the rue des Rosiers, in the heart of the historical Jewish neighborhood of Paris, and began abusing the passers-by with antisemitic shouting. Clad in black leather jackets and obviously looking for a fight, some in the group were heard saying: “Death to the Jews,” and according to witnesses, one of them even raised his arm in a Nazi salute. The men said they were searching for the militants of two far-right Zionist groups, the Betar and the Jewish Defence League, whose activists usually hang out in this street, but the confrontation ended without physical violence. The movement responsible for the action, which received wide media coverage, was the Black supremacist, antisemitic, racialist movement named Tribu KA. This incident, occurring shortly after the antisemitic murder of a young Jew, Ilan Halimi, by a gang led by an African criminal, caused such a shock that the Minister of the Interior, Nicolas Sarkozy, came to meet the local Jewish community the following day and pledged to ban the Tribu KA, which was done on July 29. The group’s website was closed down within a few days and its leader, Kemi Seba, was indicted for incitement to racial hatred. This bizarre cult group promoted the theory that everything good in the history of mankind came from Africa and was invented by colored people, while the root of all evil was the white race in general and the Jews in particular. The Tribu KA believed that black people originated from Egypt and that the Egyptians of the ancient times were black. As a consequence, their religious creed blended ancient Egyptian beliefs with Black supremacism and they used a “home-made” language which looked like ancient Egyptian to those with little knowledge of linguistics. “Kemi Seba,” whose real name is Stellio Gilles Robert Capochichi, was born in 1981 in Strasbourg, and his parents seem to come from Benin, although other sources say that one of them is from Haiti, or from Ivory Coast.33 In 1999, after a trip to Los Angeles, he formed a French   Many nationals of Benin have migrated to Ivory Coast. Seba’s interest in Ivory Coast, however, is not without political importance, as we shall see below. 33

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branch of Nation of Islam, which was not recognized by Farrakhan’s movement as an official section. Then around 2002, he realized that Islam is a religion “alien to African culture” and switched to his own brand of Egyptian wisdom, eventually forming a new group in July 2003, under the name Parti Kémite. However, this party was not radical enough for him and in December 2004, he founded the Tribu KA (the two letters stand for “Kémites athoniens,” a name for the Black people derived from that of the Egyptian god of the sun, Athon). He adopted the motto of “de-zionization; compensation; repatriation.” In other words, the Tribu KA believed that France is ruled by a “Zionist conspiracy,” asked the French government to pay financial compensation to colored people whose ancestors were victims of slavery, and wanted to repatriate Black people to Africa. After several name changes and several court convictions, Seba set up the Mouvement des Damnés de l’Impérialisme (MDI) and returned to Islam, with the same Black supremacist and anti-Jewish agenda. His antisemitic rhetoric is by far the most obsessive and the most radical of the lunatic fringe. For example, in spring 2006, after one black man was reportedly assaulted by Jewish activists during the march commemorating Ilan Halimi’s murder, the Tribu KA issued a press statement saying its members would “cut off the sidelocks of the rabbis.” In May 2006, his crew invaded a sports club where they wrongly thought the Jewish Defence League was training. In July, in another press statement, the Tribu KA said it will “spill blood in the streets.” Now, what is certainly the most specific feature of this movement’s ideology is that it advocates the emergence of an alliance between all the “anti-Zionist” forces from the far-Left to the extreme-Right to the Islamists to the Black supremacists. In June 2006, Seba traveled to Belgium, where he met with representatives of the Arab European League, but without results. On the extreme-Left, he did not find people to answer his call, although he is admired by the supporters of Dieudonné. There was some response, however, from the Extreme-Right. On July 28, 2006, the “White identity” website Novopress, featured a long interview with Seba. On September 18, 2006 in Paris, several anti-racist organizations went to court against the Tribu KA, calling for a ban on their website. At the court premises, a few militants of the radical Right came to support Seba. Among them was Hervé Lalin, a former member of Unité Radicale who now uses the alias Hervé Ryssen and maintains his own website, full of obscene antisemitic cartoons and diatribes. Ryssen also



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published a book, Psychanalyse du Judaïsme, which aims to show that being Jewish is a mental disease which leads, among others, to incest and suicide. Jean Lecointe, one of the leaders of Renouveau Français, was also there, as was Gaétan Bertrand, a member of the Bloc Identitaire. This unholy alliance between racialists was also at work during the meeting convened by Tribu KA on September 9, 2006, on the theme of the “alliance of separatists” against Zionism, which was also attended by members of the Bloc Identitaire and Renouveau Français. The national-revolutionary website http://www.mnsf.info/ phenix/dossiers.htm published an interview with Seba after he was arrested and sentenced to three months in jail for antisemitism, in February 2007. Finally, Seba allied with the neo-Nazi Droite Socialiste, and in May 2008, demonstrated with them against the presence of French troops in Africa, which they say “is giving a hand to international Zionism.” VII.  Conclusion The annual report of the CNCDH shows that those who are the most opposed to the Jews are also the most hostile to foreigners, the most racist. While it is true that the violent expression of antisemitism often comes from people who are born Muslim, antisemitic discourse and prejudices are by no mean confined to the Muslim-born population, and there is a great continuity between the stereotypes of today and those of the past. It should also be noted that antisemitism is not always motivated by political ideas or religious extremism. The murder of Ilan Halimi has an antisemitic motive, but the perpetrators have no political beliefs and are not Islamists. Also on April 22, 2007, a young Jewish soccer fan was threatened by a mob of hooligans after a Paris club played Hapoel Tel Aviv in Paris. Running for his life, the young Jew, who did not bear any sign of his religion, was protected by a Black policeman who shot at one of his assaulters and killed him. The hooligans were a mixed crew consisting of one Moroccan youth and far-right oriented, native white French Paris club supporters. Antisemitism in France is both structural and a consequence of the events in the Middle-East. It is structural because the number of antisemitic incidents remains superior to 400 per year since the start of the Second Intifada, and because those incidents take place all around the country, all around the year, even when there is no violent con-

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frontation between Israel and the Palestinian or the Arab countries. It is a consequence of the situation in the Middle East, because the number of antisemitic incidents in January 2009 (operation in Gaza) is 352, whereas it was only 58 in January 2008. The Government and the Sate take the situation seriously and the judiciary, as well as the police, have both the will and the means to tackle the issue. However, despite the growing number of arrests and court convictions in cases of antisemitism, the situation does not seem to improve. There is still much research to be done about the motivations and social profile of the perpetrators. Any analysis that revolves around the belief that “old-styled” antisemitism from the Right is dead, and that the “new anti-Semitism” is an exclusive feature of the anti-globalization Left and the Islamists, is doomed to failure. Antisemitism is just there, as another outburst of violence in a French society which has become more ridden by conflict and more divided along sectarian and ethnic, religious, community divides; a situation which may show the end of the republican model of ethnic integration but also the refusal to become a multi-cultural society. References Camus, Jean-Yves (2005) Faux ami de la cause palestinienne et vrai antisémite. Politis October 28. —— (2006a) Dieudonné et l’ultra-droite. L’Arche, October. —— (2006b) Une volonté de transgressions très forte. Libération, December 20. CSA Institute (2009) Survey for Le Parisien. http://www.csa-fr.com/dataset/ data2009/opi20090108-les-francais-et-le-conflit-dans-la-bande-de-gaza.pdf Front National (2007) Party Platform. Front National. http://www.frontnational. com/programmerecherche.php. Godard, Bernard & Sylvie Taussig (2007) Les musulmans en France (Paris: Robert Laffont). Goldnadel, Gilles-William (2005) Guysen Israel News, April 8. Indymedia (2007) http://www.prochoix.org/cgi/blog/index.php/2007/03/18/1278indymedia-parle-de-sang-juif. INSEE (2004) Femmes et hommes: regards sur la parité (Paris: Insee). L’Express (2002) “Qui s’attaque aux juifs.” in: L’Express, April 25. Mayer, Nonna (2005) Les opinions antisémites en France après la seconde intifada. Revue Internationale et Stratégique. n°55/2. Meyssan, Thierry (2002) L’effroyable imposture suivi de Le Pentagate (Paris: Editions Demi Lune). Petition (2009), February 18, 2009, http://www.lcr-lagauche.be/cm/index.php?vi ew=article&id=1278&Itemid=53&option=com_content. Retrieved February 19, 2009. Prazan, Michael & Adrien Minard (2007) Roger Garaudy, itinéraire d’une négation (Paris: Calmann-Lévy).



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Ramadan, Tariq (2001) Exite-t-il un antisémitisme islamique? Le Monde, December 23. —— (2003/2006) Critique des (nouveaux) intellectuels communautaires. http:// www.oumma.com/spip.php?article2007&var_recherche=tariq%20ramadan%20 europe%20palestine. Retrieved February 14, 2008. Shamir, Israel (2005) L’autre visage d’Israel (nn: editions al Qalam). Taguieff, Pierre-André (2002) La nouvelle judéophobie (Paris: Editions Mille et Une Nuits). Theil, Georges (2007) Tehran speech. http://revurevi.net/Teheran/Theil.pdf. Venner, Fiametta (2005) L’effroyable imposteur (Paris: Grasset).

The Liberal Tradition and Unholy Alliances of the Present: Antisemitism in the United Kingdom Michael Whine I.  Introduction Historically Britain has not been an arena for violent antisemitism, other than in early medieval times. The Crusades, the Inquisition and the Holocaust did not affect British Jews directly, and British political parties do not have the same tradition of antisemitism that those in continental Europe have. During the inter-War years Nazi and fascist ideologies never really took hold in Britain and Oswald Mosley’s British Union of Fascists never came remotely near to gaining power, let alone having a member elected to Parliament. However, it is worth remembering that ritual murder and the blood libel originated in medieval Britain, and Jews were expelled for a period of several hundred years. After their re-admittance in 1656 Britain did not really discriminate against Jews, other than in the social sphere, until it sought to limit the influx of East European Jews fleeing the pogroms and poverty of Russia and Poland by passing the Aliens’ Act in 1905, and although Jews were not admitted to Parliament until 1858, they were not denied their place in society after the political emancipation struggle of the Victorian era. This is not to say that the popular image of the Jew, particularly in literature, was not a negative one. It was, and our most enduring literary images of ‘ugly’ Jews come from Shakespeare, Marlowe, Dickens and T. S. Eliot. But at the same time you can also find positive images which almost counter-balance these, such as those in the works of Disraeli, Walter Scott and George Eliot ( Julius 2000). It is more that Britain tolerated its Jews, perhaps rather disdainfully, after their re-admittance. It is also interesting to note that a considerable portion of the descendants of the original Sephardim, and indeed of the German Jews that came to Britain in the early nineteenth century, intermarried to an unacknowledged and substantial extent with the British aristocracy, and even with the Royal Family.

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Lord ­Mountbatten’s wife Edwina, Princess Anne’s husband, and the late Princess Margaret’s husband were all descended from early Jewish immigrants. This suggests a degree of tolerance if not acceptance. In the post War years there has been no barrier to Jews reaching the highest positions in government, the armed forces, business and the law. At one time recently, both the head of the criminal and civil jurisdictions of the law and the Attorney General were practicing Jews, as have been Army Generals. The current Foreign Secretary and his brother, the Energy Secretary, are both Jews, though from a secular background. The social and political antisemitism that characterized Britain up to the early twentieth century has increasingly dissipated. The antisemitism of the golf and tennis club, and the City, is no longer very present (Bolchover 2003). The reasons for this lie in the reaction to the Holocaust, the birth of Israel and a more muscular and self-confident Judaism that came with the community’s improving socio-economic position. The 2001 census released in February 2003 showed that 267,000 respondents identified themselves as Jews. We know that the strictly orthodox community declined to answer the question on religion, the first time such a question had been included in a national census, and adding their known size to an estimate of those who regard themselves as religiously unaffiliated gives a figure of between 300,000 and 350,000 Jews. The higher figure is the one suggested by the Institute for Jewish Policy Research ( JPR) who, with the Board of Deputies of British Jews’ Community Research Unit, have been measuring and analyzing the community and its institutions for many years. According to the JPR, the above average socio-economic status of British Jewry is a consequence of its highly educated membership with a high proportion of university graduates: 54% of working men and 50% of working women are in professional occupations compared with approximately 10% of men and 8% of women in the population as a whole. A further 25% of men and 16% of women in the age group 15–64 who are economically active are in managerial posts (Institute for Jewish Policy Research 2003). One unofficial estimate put the average income of a Jewish family as three times that of other British families. Despite this there are growing pockets of poverty, primarily within the strictly orthodox community. The Jewish community maintains 2000 voluntary charitable and non-profit institutions, many founded in the Victorian and Edwardian eras, which provide the complete range of welfare, housing,

the liberal tradition and unholy alliances of the present 309 e­ ducational, cultural and recreational services. Again, according to the JPR, the Jewish voluntary sector has a turnover six times the expected size according to the Jewish proportion of the national population. As far as affiliation is concerned, 55% of the Jewish population rate themselves extremely conscious of being Jewish or quite strongly Jewish. Support for Israel is a key component of Jewish identity in Britain. The JPR survey of social and political attitudes of British Jews carried out in 1995 showed 43% of respondents reporting a strong attachment to Israel, with 38% showing a moderate attachment. Only 3% had negative feelings towards Israel. The same survey also looked at the relationship between attachment to Israel and Jewish identity, and attachment to Britain. 54% of respondents felt equally British and Jewish, with 26% feeling more Jewish than British, and only 18% responding that they felt more British than Jewish. Nearly 70% of respondents reported they had close friends or family in Israel, and this attachment is manifest in visits to the country, with 78% stating that they had visited Israel at least once, with many making multiple visits. Even during the last eight difficult years British Jewry retained its close identification with Israel maintaining a high level of visits. The British government has taken seriously its responsibilities for commemoration of the Holocaust. Teaching the Holocaust has been part of the national history curriculum for all school pupils for many years. Holocaust Memorial Day has become a national institution with strong government backing and funding, with a commitment to televise the main five-yearly commemorative service on BBC television. The work done by the government-owned and funded Holocaust Museum, the Anne Frank Trust and the privately-owned Beth Shalom in teaching history teachers and school children about the Holocaust are beginning to have a profound effect. The Holocaust Education Trust now takes teachers, high school students and police officers from around the country regularly to Auschwitz. A recent example of this caring concern was the presence of senior government figures at the unveiling of the statue commemorating the Kindertransport, at Liverpool Street station, a few years ago and the provision by the government of an extra £1.5 million to the Holocaust Education Trust to send two high school pupils from every school to Auschwitz, ­annually. Important milestones in the beneficial processes which have removed anti-Jewish discrimination were the Race Relations Acts 1964 and 1976, and the legislation which has followed since. These not only forbade discrimination, but positively encouraged equal treatment

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and opportunities for all. The legislation which followed the judicial inquiry into the killing of black teenager Steven Lawrence cemented and made more workable the previous legislation. This is not to say that there isn’t racism in British society; there is, but the Jewish community has benefited, perhaps to a greater extent than any other, from these changes in legislation. And it was the Jewish community that, above all, fought for this legislation, and indeed in part, it owes its genesis to the research and lobbying done by the Board of Deputies of British Jews (BDBJ 2000). Latterly the British government has formally and officially recognized the deterioration in the situation and the growth of a new antisemitism, and its One year on Progress Report to the All-Party Inquiry into Antisemitism, conducted by the Parliamentary Committee Against Antisemitism, was a thorough response with practical outcomes. The government has now established an inter-departmental taskforce to progress the recommendations of the Inquiry, which will affect education in schools and universities, policing and prosecution policy (AllParty Inquiry into Antisemitism 2006). It also sponsored the inaugural London Conference on Combating Antisemitism attended by 120 parliamentarians from around the world, and the parallel Experts Forum attended by Jewish and other experts in February 2009. If all of this is the case what then has changed and why do we now talk about antisemitism in Britain? Why are the newspapers and television screens full of pieces about antisemitism? Perhaps the ICM poll published in the Jewish Chronicle in January 2004 provides some answers. In response to the question “do Jews make a positive contribution to political, social and cultural life in Britain?” 23% strongly agreed, 37% agreed and 44% said they didn’t know. Only 20% disagreed, of which 11% strongly disagreed. In response to the question “do Jews have too much influence?” 31% strongly disagreed, 47% disagreed, and 35% didn’t know. 18% agreed, of which 8% strongly agreed. In response to the question “would a British Jew make an equally acceptable Prime Minister as a member of any other faith?” 40% strongly agreed, 53% agreed, and 28% declared themselves neutral. Only 18% disagreed, of which 11% strongly disagreed. In response to the question “has the scale of the nazi Holocaust against the Jews during the Second World War been exaggerated?” 62% strongly disagreed, 70% disagreed, and 15% declared themselves neutral. Only 15% agreed, of which 10% strongly agreed. In other words, 81% believe that Jews make a positive contribution to Britain

the liberal tradition and unholy alliances of the present 311 or were neutral; only 18% believe Jews have too much influence; only 18% don’t think that a Jew would be as acceptable as any other to be the Prime Minister; 15% believe the scale of the Holocaust has been exaggerated ( JC/ICM Poll 2003). The bias against Jews is strongest among working-class pensioners. Given that it is only the 65 year-olds and older who lived through the war this is surprising, but on the other hand it does tend to suggest that teaching the Holocaust to young people, now two and three generations removed from that era, and with a much more multi-national and diverse population, is having some beneficial effect ( JC/ICM Poll 2003). Compared with other recent polls it suggests that the situation in Britain is better than in other European countries (PEW 2008), but that there is still a significant problem. II.  The New Antisemitism The problems now facing the community are those which previously did not exist. Firstly, the overspill of the Israel Palestine conflict. Secondly, the growth of the Muslim community and the parallel growth of militant Islamist ideology. Thirdly, the recent resurrection of the far left, and its reactions to globalization. This matrix has recently been conceptualized as “new anti-Semitism” (Taguieff 2004). Others see rather “modernized anti-Semitism” (Rensmann 2004) at work that utilizes new issues, such as the Middle East conflict, globalization and the cosmopolitanization of society, to articulate anti-Jewish resentment. Again, with all of these influences the effect is more muted in Britain than elsewhere in Europe. The attitude of the Church, at least until recently, has also been important. Anglicanism provided fewer barriers than Catholicism or Orthodoxy to the advancement of Jews in society, and indeed contained a strong strain of Zionism in Victorian and Edwardian times. For the sake of accuracy it’s also important to record that there was a strain of antisemitism within the upper echelons of British society, and indeed it played a part behind the Balfour Declaration. But the influence of the Church in Britain now is rapidly diminishing. At grassroots, and on the margins, particularly in Scotland and Wales where it still retains some measure of influence its attitudes to Israel have been swayed by the Palestinian Church, and by the Sabeel Palestinian liberation theology organization, although the Church of England rejects replacement theology.

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One tangible result of this was the 2004 debate within the Church of England on divestment of commercial holdings in Israel or in companies trading with Israel, in particular Caterpillar, the Americanowned manufacturers of bulldozers and heavy moving equipment. The Church General Synod voted in the end not to sell its holdings, but the Church of Scotland is currently considering its position, although in fact it holds no investments in Israel, other than in land and property. How can we measure the current scale of antisemitism? In addition to the aforementioned attitudes and values, we can measure the physical manifestations of antisemitism, as incidents, and this the Community Security Trust (CST) has been doing since 1984. Finally, we can at least analyze and explain social, intellectual and political antisemitism, even if we cannot accurately quantify it. III.  Antisemitic Incidents The CST recorded a total of 541 incidents during 2008, a 4% fall from 2007 (561 incidents). Antisemitic incidents have risen steadily since the outbreak of the second Palestinian Intifada in October 2000, and the long term trend is of rising incident levels since 1997 (Community Security Trust 2008). The 88 violent incidents recorded in 2008 marked a 25% fall from the 2007 level (117 incidents), and in a fourth successive year violent incidents against Jews outnumbered incidents against property, of which there were 74 in 2008, 65 in 2007 and 70 in 2006. The one incident of extreme violence in 2008 occurred when a Jewish man in Manchester was stabbed to death. His assailant had delusions that Jewish people were persecuting him, and he has since been detailed indefinitely in a psychiatric hospital. Synagogue and cemetery desecrations rose in 2008 from 65 incidents in 2007 to 74 incidents, an increase of 14%. The category of abusive behavior includes all types of antisemitic abuse including verbal and written, and the 314 reported to the CST in 2008 was a fall on the previous year’s figure of 336. However, the figures for the two years together were the highest total recorded in this category since the CST began recording antisemitic incidents, and encompasses the full range of low level, often spontaneous abuse, that is an indicator of antisemitism in society.

the liberal tradition and unholy alliances of the present 313 Antisemitic threats and the mass distribution of antisemitic literature both declined in 2007. Threats include only clear, verbal or written threats. The CST recorded 28 incidents in 2008, a small increase on the 2007 total of 24 incidents. In 2008 there were 37 literature incidents, compared with 19 in 2007. This category, however, gives no indication of the extent of distribution, as mass mailings are counted as a single incident. Antisemitic incidents levels usually follow a baseline which rises and falls in response to trigger events. In 2006, Israel’s incursion into Lebanon saw the largest such ‘spike’ recorded when 134 incidents were recorded in the UK during the 34 days of fighting. There were none in 2006, but in 2005 two events acted as triggers. Media pictures in January of Prince Harry, third in succession to the Throne, dressed in Nazi uniform at a fancy dress party; accusations by then London Mayor Ken Livingstone that a Jewish journalist was acting “like a concentration camp guard” (cf. Hirsh 2007). Media reporting of both cases led to a spike of 60 incidents in January, which suggests that negative press coverage of Jews provides a reminder for antisemites to engage in anti-Jewish activity. At the beginning of 2009, the often violent reactions to Israel’s campaign to put a stop to rocket attacks from Gaza led to 260 incidents being recorded in the four weeks of January, the highest monthly total ever recorded. IV.  The Measurement of Antisemitic Incidents Over the years the CST has encouraged members of the community to report incidents. The CST also has universal press coverage, which means they see every article and every letter about antisemitism. They liaise with the police in London and around the country and by being appointed ‘third party reporters’ they are able to report antisemitic incidents on behalf of victims to the police, and investigate either on their own or with police investigators. Indeed the CST has become the model which the police like to promote to other communities. At the end of 2003, the Metropolitan Police Service launched a CST-designed leaflet on how to report antisemitic incidents. It was distributed via synagogues, Jewish schools and given to all Jewish students and it was launched at a Chanukah party held at Scotland Yard, where the Police Commissioner lit the first candle of the Chanukiah. In 2007, the police sponsored the Police Officers Guide to Judaism and in 2008 the Aegis Trust sponsored The

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Holocaust: A Guide for Police Personnel, both published by the CST. CST statistics are accepted by police and government as accurate and have been quoted by government ministers in response to questions in parliament. Since April 2008 all police forces have been required to record racist incidents and crimes in a manner that will allow them to be disaggregated by major faith group, and it will therefore be possible for them to publish official national statistics. To avoid potential divergences, the CST has been invited to compare its figures with theirs on a regular basis. The CST began recording antisemitic incidents in 1984, but in 1990 it changed its classifications to bring them into line with the then current discussions among some Jewish organizations on how to record incidents, and also in line with the way in which police define crimes. In other words, CST categories fit more or less within judicial definitions. This was important if the community wishes to promote its concerns, and educate and influence law enforcement and ­government. Three broad trends emerge from analysis of these statistics. Over the twelve-year period from 1990 to 2001 the CST recorded an average of 282 antisemitic incidents per year. The monthly averages showed little substantial variability. Prior to this period, the six-year period from 1984–1989, showed an average of 173 incidents per year. More tellingly, if we divide that twelve-year period, roughly the decade of the 1990s, into quarters and compare it with the previous period, roughly the 1980s, we find that the average number of incidents rose from 173, to 269 in the 1990 to 1992 period, to 301 incidents between 1993 and 1995, falling to 228 incidents from 1996 to 1998. However, during the final quarter, from 1999 to 2001 the average rose to 328 (Community Security Trust 2008). Something happened in the year 2000 which led to this jump, and if we remove the influence of this year the average rose only to 290 incidents per year. The broad trend therefore is clear. Incidents rose during the early 1990s, and fell back during the mid 1990s, and rose again. Also, the implication is that there is a constant background of low-level, antisemitic activity against which we live our lives (Whine 2003).

the liberal tradition and unholy alliances of the present 315 V.  What Caused the Increase in the Early 1990s? The 1990 desecration of the Jewish cemetery in Carptentras in southern France led to a spate of cemetery desecrations throughout Europe. Parallel to this was the rise of a more neo-Nazi-like far right political extreme in Britain, with the British National Party and Combat 18 replacing the National Front, which by then had embarked on an organizational decline. At the same time Islamist organizations, initially encouraged by the campaign against Salman Rushdie, began their activity in the early 1990s, and rapidly adopted the antisemitic core of their ideological influences. The fall in the number of incidents during the mid-1990s came about after the police began to prosecute far right activists who had been involved in publishing and distributing antisemitic literature. The calming influences of the Madrid and Oslo peace conferences also played a part in reducing the activities of Islamist and pro-Palestine groups. A second broad trend that emerges from analysis of the statistics is the decline in targeted antisemitic literature, which was a feature of far right activity during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Prosecution or threat of prosecution, made easier by the amendments to the criminal code after 1994 have continued to lead to a reduction in far right anti-Jewish activity. Again the Jewish community, and in particular the Board of Deputies of British Jews, played a prominent part in campaigning for the introduction of new and more effective legislation. This campaign involved some acrimonious meetings with government ministers, and even led to public criticism of the Attorney General by the then Commissioner of Police who believed that the failure to prosecute incitement gave encouragement to antisemitic and other extreme propagandists. A third broad trend suggests that antisemitic violence rises and falls following tension in the Middle East. When the media report on Israel and the Palestinians, for example, during the Iraq war, we know that incidents will rise. Fortunately, the police now recognize this ‘spillover effect’ and regard Middle East tension as a trigger point, which means that they can take, and have taken, pre-emptive action such as throwing a security umbrella over the community. This is not to say that all violence comes from Arabs and Muslims; it doesn’t, although an increasing amount does. What it does show is that media reporting of tension in the Middle East acts as an ‘igniter.’

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Such evidence as exists suggests that the violence is perpetrated by a range, which includes Islamists, sympathizers of the Palestinian cause, neo-Nazis and just thugs on the street—a proportion of whom appear to be Muslim. The implications are important. Abusive behavior constitutes the largest proportion of antisemitic activity. This more than any other category mirrors the general feelings of those who hate Jews, coming as it does from face-to-face encounters and spontaneous acts. More than any other trend it reflects the cumulative effects of biased and/or inaccurate media reporting on the Middle East, or the promotion of hatred against the Jews that comes from Iran and the Arab world and from radical Islamist groups. These findings were also confirmed by research carried out between 2001 and 2004 by a group of researchers led by Paul Iganski, a criminology lecturer at the University of Lancaster, but then a Fellow at the JPR. With the assistance of two senior criminologists at the Metropolitan Police Service, he analyzed crime records in London, and this was the first time that outsiders had been allowed to do so. Their findings were published jointly by the Police and JPR in early 2005 (Iganski, Kielinger and Paterson 2005). In April 2004, the House of Commons had debated the rise in antisemitic incidents, and the growth of antisemitism in Britain. At the same time the European Union Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia published its report which noted that antisemitic incidents in Britain were among the highest in Europe. Responding to the debate on behalf of the government, the then Home Office Minister, Fiona Mactaggart reported that “together with the Institute for Jewish Policy Research, the Metropolitan Police is conducting research into such findings to get a more accurate feel for their nature, and to develop a more effective response to them.” The aim of the project was to better understand the nature and social context of incidents in terms of the characteristics and the possible motivations of offenders, the circumstances in which antisemitic incidents occur, the events that precipitate incidents, and the consequences and the management of incidents by victims, offenders, and the police. The project researchers found also that antisemitic incidents rise following international political tension, and especially conflict in the Middle East and flare-ups in the Israel/Palestine conflict. In important respects the researchers agreed with the findings of the CST but their research went further than the CST was able to conduct at that point.

the liberal tradition and unholy alliances of the present 317 They found that most antisemitic incidents occur either at identifiably Jewish locations (such as synagogues and schools) or in public locations where the victims are identifiably Jewish. They found that incidents taking place at Jewish locations are directed more frequently at individuals rather than at property, synagogues or Jewish organizations. Incidents involving threats and harassment, criminal damage, malicious communications, and violence accounted for most of the incidents reported to them. However, they found that many incidents appear to be opportunistic and indirect in nature. Just under one in ten of a sub-sample of incidents involved direct contact with and explicit targeting of an individual by the perpetrator where there was some evidence of a political or antisemitic belief or ‘mission’ that appears to have driven the incident. However while a number of the incidents were clearly politically motivated, the majority of incidents reported to the police (in one particular period, between April and May 2002) did not appear to be carried out by perpetrators who were active in organized or extremist groups. Additionally they found that male victims experienced proportionally more incidents involving violence and fewer incidents involving malicious communications and female victims. They found the age range of victims to be fairly evenly distributed across the age groups, whereas the age range of suspects or perpetrators was skewed towards younger age groups, and that almost two thirds of incidents were carried out by male suspects against male victims. Disappointingly, in over one third of incidents no suspect was identified or recorded on the police crime report. Less than one in ten incidents resulted in a suspect being charged, cautioned or having other proceedings taken against them. Of the persons accused of committing antisemitic incidents (suspects who were charged, cautioned, or had other proceedings taken against them), the largest proportion fell within the 41–60 age range. This suggested failings on the part of the police, which they subsequently accepted. Surprisingly in just over three fifths of the incidents in which there was an ‘accused,’ the offender was a neighbor or business associate. This problem will be addressed in due course by planned improvements in training for police and prosecutors. Also surprisingly the evidence of anti-Israel sentiment in the discourse of perpetrators accounted for approximately only one in five incidents in a sub-sample of the peak months (April and May 2002) selected for an in-depth analysis (Iganski, Kielinger and Paterson 2005).

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A second consequence of the report by the All Party Parliamentary Inquiry was the year-long investigation carried out by the Crown Prosecution Service which reported in 2008. This too found that identification of suspects in antisemitic attacks was a problem and that 69% of recorded crimes did not progress for this reason. However, 81% of those cases which did go forward resulted in a conviction (The Crown Prosecution Service 2006). VI.  Contemporary Antisemitism Measuring antisemitic incidents and prosecuting antisemitic criminality requires an integrated infrastructure which brings together trained prosecutors and responsible criminal justice agencies. Combating ‘intellectual’ antisemitism, on the other hand, is an entirely different matter. Contemporary antisemitism is coming from new directions. It is not primarily the religious, racial or economic antisemitism of the past. Now we face a more insidious problem, and as the evidence suggests, a part of it is the consequence of the spill-over of the Israel Palestinian conflict, part of it is the growth in Islamism, and a part is the influence of the far left. The Israel Palestine conflict is reshaping Britain’s attitudes to antiZionism and antisemitism, and our concern is not so much about any valid criticism of Israel’s actions but the form that criticism of Israel takes (on the controversy about the distinction cf. Klug 2004; Hirsh 2007). The demonization of Israel and the increasing use of antisemitic imagery in anti-Zionist discourse have grown as a consequence of its promotion by Arab states, Palestinian bodies, and Islamists. The identification of Israel with the United States also provides a new vehicle for antisemitism. In a perceptive article Ian Buruma noted that European political discourse accepts not only anti-Zionism but also a belief in the power of Jewish influence in the USA (Buruma 2003). The outburst by Tam Dalyell MP, the longest serving Member of Parliament of the House of Commons three years ago that British foreign policy-making was influenced by a “Jewish cabal” surrounding President Bush drew widespread public criticism. But he was not forced to resign as commentators suggested he would have done in the United States (Brown & Hastings 2003). Media criticism of Israel at times descends into outright antisemitism. Comments by a few noted journalists, such as Richard Ingrams,

the liberal tradition and unholy alliances of the present 319 founding editor of the satirical weekly Private Eye and a regular writer in the Observer Sunday newspaper, Brian Sewell and A N Wilson, the Evening Standard’s correspondents, and the late leftist Paul Foot, have given rise to anger in the Jewish community. But mainstream media criticism of Israel rarely descends into outright antisemitism. Overall, media tends to be pro-Jewish and whilst its Israel coverage, particularly in the electronic media, has been objectionable on occasion, and the Iraq war allowed some commentators to suggest it was a Zionist/U.S. conspiracy, the situation overall is reasonably balanced. This is measurable by analysis of editorial comment, rather than the writings of regular or occasional correspondents. The BBC and three mainstream journals, The Independent, the Guardian and the New Statesman however stand out in this respect. The antisemitic allusion in the New Statesman’s front cover in 2003 were, I suggest, an aberration, just as were The Independent’s use of Dave Brown’s series of cartoons with antisemitic overtones. Brown’s cartoons are generally sarcastic and hard-hitting on all the issues he covers, but particularly when he dealt with Sharon. The Guardian’s views reflect those of the left in Britain generally. Its anti-Zionism does occasionally lapse into antisemitic conspiracy motifs and it is blatant in its opposition to Israeli governments. This is especially evident in its web-based discussion forum (Shindler 2001). But it even goes beyond this political one-sidedness when, for example, it continues to give space to an Islamist journalist who not only wrote that Israel has no right to exist but whose involvement in anti-Jewish organizations was neither noted nor explained, even when it was pointed out to them. Jewish readers of these journals cannot but help but feel that there is a double standard operating with regard to Israel. What poses as antiIsrael comment can be seen by the Jewish community as antisemitism. Dave Brown may have denied that his Independent cartoon of Sharon devouring a Palestinian baby was a pastiche of Goya’s Saturn devouring his own child, but Jews saw it as a blood libel. The New Statesman’s front cover of a Magen David piercing the Union Jack beneath the headline “A Kosher Conspiracy?” was a virtual crash-course in antisemitic iconography, as Jonathan Freedland observes. (Freedland 2003) The obvious similarity between Nazi era cartoons and those of the contemporary Arab and radical Left media are graphically shown in Joel Kotek’s book on Cartoons and Extremism, which was updated, translated from its original French and republished in English in December 2008 (Kotek 2009).

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The BBC has certainly been guilty of blaming Israel to an unreasonable extent for the Middle East impasse and in giving airtime to commentators who are so anti-Israel that they either do not recognize Israel’s right to exist or distort the truth. They thereby lay themselves open to accusations of failing in their duty as a public broadcaster. Only severe criticism, and Israel’s temporary withdrawal of co-operation with the BBC, led them to re-examine the criticism and begin to redress their failings by appointing Malcolm Balen, a senior editor, to review the Israel/Palestine coverage, the appointment of Jeremy Bowen as Middle East editor, and finally the appointment of an outside commission to review overall BBC policy towards Israel and Palestine. These issues and the symbiotic relationship between antisemitic incidents and deteriorating discourse were discussed in the first CST annual report on discourse. The analysis showed that anti Zionism and anti Israel propaganda increasingly draws on traditional antisemitic tropes and iconography (Community Security Trust 2007). VII.  Islamist Extremism The British Muslim community is primarily of Indian sub-continent origin, rather than Arab. It is less directly involved in the Middle East perhaps than might be the case if it were of Arab or North African origin. But Britain has become a focus and safe haven for Islamists. Islamist religious influences and reaction to society racism have pushed growing numbers of young Muslim men towards Islamist ideologies. The Muslim Brotherhood and its ideological Asian parallel, the Jamaat e Islami, exert increasing influences on the British Muslim community, most especially among the young. Smaller groups are equally active such as Tablighi Jamaat, a worldwide revivalist group, and the Salafi sub terrorist groups such as Hizb ut Tahrir and the Al Muhajiroun successor groups. Saudi Wahabi influence is perhaps not as important in the UK as elsewhere, and one even finds some echoes of Saudi antipathy in the Muslim community, but Britain has become a center for Islamist activity which has had its overspill elsewhere. A poll of Muslim community views conducted by Populus in December 2005, but only published in The Times and Jewish Chronicle newspapers in February 2006, showed that 37% of the 500 Muslim adults surveyed, viewed Anglo-Jewry as a “legitimate target as part of the

the liberal tradition and unholy alliances of the present 321 struggle for justice in the Middle East.” 53% believe that British Jews exerted too much influence over foreign policy; 46% believed Jews are in league with the Freemasons to control the media and politics. In contrast, 52% backed Israel’s right to exist. Overall the poll indicated that the Muslim community is less extreme in its consideration of Jews than are the most well known Muslim community groups and leaders (Riddell 2006). Significantly, small numbers of Muslim leaders and community groups began to approach the Jewish community during 2005 with requests to visit Israel, Auschwitz and to campaign against antisemitism within their own communities. These are initiatives that the Jewish community is keen to encourage, and it therefore has responded appropriately. The far left has always been anti-Zionist, most within it are now increasingly influenced by Islamist anti-Israel positions. It is their anti-Zionism with its occasional portrayal of a worldwide ‘Zionist’ conspiracy that is a direct denial of Jewish selfdefinition, and indeed of Jewish history and aspirations. Inevitably this spills over into outright antisemitism. Anti-globalism and the rallies and meetings against the Iraq war have prompted the alliance between the far left and Islamists, particularly the Muslim Association of Britain, Cordoba Foundation and other groups which promote the Muslim Brotherhood in Britain. The Respect Party, founded by George Galloway MP, which split into two antagonistic factions in 2007, was one outcome of such alliances. A second were the demonstrations jointly organized by far left and Islamist groups in January 2009. The apparent contradictions of socialists and Islamists forming political coalitions are brushed aside or at least overcome in their desire to create a broad front against Israel, the Iraq war and globalization. It is at their events and in their literature that one sees this confluence most starkly. The danger of using banners that equate Zionism with nazism is that you end up for example with elements of the far left Socialist Labour Party hailing Asif Mohammed Hanif, the British Muslim who carried out the suicide bombing in Tel Aviv, as a hero of the revolutionary youth who carried out his bombing in the spirit of internationalism. It also led British delegates and the Che Leila Youth Brigade, a tiny radical left wing student group, named after Che Guevara and Leila Khaled, to hold a meeting with Palestinian Islamic Jihad. It allows far left politicians to sit down with antisemitic fascists like Vladimir Zhirinovsky and the Frenchman Serge Thion, or officials of the Front Nationale of France and the Vlams Blok—just as George Galloway and other British delegates did

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at international meetings against the war in Iraq, or as Galloway has since done with Hezbollah. I have referred to the attitude of the Church above and there are two additional points to be made here. Firstly that Britain does not suffer the guilt that continental European countries do over the Holocaust. One can criticize Britain for not allowing more Jews into Britain, or indeed to Mandate Palestine, for interning them during the early War years when it was obvious that they had talents that could, and should, have been used quicker in the anti-Nazi struggle; that Britain could have bombed the railway lines to Auschwitz, but generally Britain does not regard itself as requiring rehabilitation like other European countries. The Church in Britain never compromised itself with Nazism or fascism, and took an early lead in opposing both, and their home-grown British variants. The second is that the Church now is subject to different pressures, particularly from Palestinian Anglicans who have made a particular point of lecturing in Britain. This has led to growing grassroots support for the Palestinian cause within the Anglican Communion, and which is reflected in the Church press, which is universally condemnatory about Israel. Even antisemitism and the Holocaust are nearly always seen through the perspective of Palestinian suffering. Conversely, some Anglicans, and Catholics with an interest in the church in Africa and Asia, and particularly the evangelicals, are moving against this trend as they see the effects that militant Islam is having on their religious brethren in those continents. The Christian aid agencies and those agencies which draw their support from Christians however do provide a focus for increasing and unsupportable criticism of Israel and Zionism. Again the reaction to globalization in Britain has been less violent and less antisemitic than elsewhere. Marches by anti-globalization protestors, and the literature they have publicized have not openly blamed the spread of global capitalism on Jews or Zionists, as one sees elsewhere. But in the academic world although the early promoters of the boycott of Israel were British, and indeed Jewish, the boycott of Israeli goods and of Israeli academia has not caught on and has been widely criticized. In April 2005, members of the Association of University Teachers (AUT) voted to boycott Bar Ilan and Haifa Universities but the decisions were subsequently reversed at an emergency meeting in May when the union voted to give practical support to Palestinian and Israeli trade unionists, and committed itself to a full review of its international

the liberal tradition and unholy alliances of the present 323 policy. However in May 2006, the National Association of Teachers in Further and Higher Education (NATFHE) passed a conference resolution which called for the boycott of Israeli academics who did not publicly declare the opposition to Israeli government policy. In June, NATFHE merged with the AUT to form the University and Colleges Union (UCU), and members of the executive subsequently voted to institute the boycott yet again, in defiance of government criticism. This was challenged by lawyers acting for a group of members who threatened legal action if it was carried out, on the grounds that their decision was ultra viries the constitution, and the union backed down. Doubtless proponents of an academic boycott of Israel will continue to seek ways of influencing opinion within the universities but they will do so in the face of strong government, academic, and Jewish community opposition. Demonstrations by boycotters outside what are perceived to be Jewish-owned retail stores, although continuing, have been small and organized completely by far left groups and proPalestinian activists. Reaction to the campaign to boycott Israeli academics was strong and fairly rapid. Oxford University suspended a don (Andrew Wilkie), who had rejected a student because of his Israeli citizenship and because of his country’s “gross human rights violations against Palestinians” for two months (Ward 2003). Yet, some media have shown clear bias against Israel: For instance, the BBC failed to act on what were perceived to be Tom Paulin’s antisemitic and antiIsrael comments. Attempts by Islamist extremists to attack Jewish students have generally been dealt with by university authorities, and indeed the umbrella body for British universities issued guidance to all university and college heads some years ago on how to combat this problem. Likewise, the National Union of Teachers and the National Union of Students have both, during the past four years, issued strong condemnation of antisemitism and anti-Zionism, and guidelines on the suppression of it. That is not to say that there have not been some moves to demonize Israel, to isolate Israeli academics and to ban pro-Israel activity on universities, particularly at under-graduate student level, but generally they have not been successful. The places where they have been is where there is no Jewish student presence or where Arab and Islamist students constitute an active majority, such as at the School of Oriental and African Studies. So, in summary, there is a continuing threat. Tension in the Middle East, most particularly between Israel and the Palestinians, provides a

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trigger for dramatic increases in anti-Jewish violence. Islamist antisemitic influences have had a malign effect on some within the Muslim community and have provided a pool for Islamist recruitment and violent jihadi activity. The far left is once again on the ascendant and elements within it seek alliances with Islamist radicals. Various media, however, are supportive of, and even in some cases enthusiastic about, Jews, particularly in 2006 which marked the 350th anniversary of the re-establishment of the Jewish community in Britain. This was commemorated by a series of communal and public events which started with a religious service at the 300-year old Spanish and Portuguese Jews’ Bevis Marks Synagogue in the City of London, and the only synagogue in Europe which has had uninterrupted Jewish worship for 300 years (for a critical account of British media see Hirsh 2007). VIII.  Conclusion Jews are now jostling for government’s attention along with other and more assertive religious and ethnic minorities such as the Muslim, Hindu and Sikh communities. The government recognizes the potential power of the Muslim community and it is obvious that it will go a long way to meet its concerns and demands. If the Muslim community’s agenda is unduly influenced by anti-Israel and anti-Western interests, then a difficult scenario will present itself in due course. This is not to suggest that the government, any government, will accede to unreasonable demands, but it could act, possibly even unwittingly, against what are perceived to be the Jewish community’s interests. Electoral strength will inevitably encourage government to consider these demands. That is part of the democratic process. Nevertheless, there is a growing apprehension within the Jewish community. Together, the Jews, the Hindus and Sikhs almost equal the Muslims in numbers, and although it would be an exaggeration to say that the situation is a competitive one, there are significant common concerns that we share. As a consequence, we have reached out to each other over the years and now co-operate in a limited way on strategic and security issues. We have also established cultural and social groups. This is not to say that we ignore the Muslims; we don’t. Again, we have encouraged local joint initiatives and, at a national level, we meet the Muslim groups. We did, however, break contact with the Muslim

the liberal tradition and unholy alliances of the present 325 Council of Britain, with whom we met regularly if infrequently, as it became increasingly influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood’s anti Israel and antisemitic ideologies. There are issues on which the Jewish and Muslim communities could and should jointly campaign and where there is a measure of accord. At the same time, we have reached out to other emerging Muslim groups who represent more moderate views. Among them are the growing numbers of Safis who seek political representation and who resent Islamist and Arab influences. A second long-term threat is that of terrorism. Threats by al-Qaeda to attack Jewish communities have been carried out. Djerba, Casablanca and Istanbul all followed the strategy of attacking Jewish communities because they support Israel. The British authorities imprisoned a terrorist group which planned attacks against shopping centers but had also begun to target Jewish institutions. These are indirect attacks on Israel because they cannot reach Israel itself, and because antisemitism is a vital component in the Global Jihad Movement’s ideology. Britain has provided a base for Islamist terrorism, and a safe haven for command and control, and banking, although the authorities are now working to stop this. The arrests from the end of 2002 to the present of North African Salafist and Asian network members revealed that they were planning terrorist attacks in Britain. As a consequence, the Jewish community now incorporates security as part of its everyday existence and the CST operates throughout the community from the secular to the strictly orthodox providing advice and training to members of synagogues, to schools and to other Jewish institutions. In this we are encouraged and assisted by the police and government who recognize that the Jewish community faces a threat, and that it is in our own joint best interests to have a high level of security. Aside from Islamist terrorism, we also face the threat of Islamist antisemitism. In a sense it is immaterial how deeply engrained it is in Islam. We confront it now and the criminal justice agencies until recently treated it rather diffidently, seeing it initially as an expression of Muslim views against Israel rather than as criminal incitement. Now the climate is changing and four prosecutions in the past two years have served a warning to others. Despite referrals we have not yet had criminal prosecutions of Arab antisemitism published in mainstream Arab journals as in, for example, the Arab press which may be published in the Middle East but which is on sale in Britain. But we have overcome the reluctance to prosecute incitement on the Internet, as in the Sheppard and Whittle case in 2008, when two active anti-Jewish

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and racist agitators were convicted of incitement, and the heretical. com website closed down. However, it is still possible to buy the Protocols in Muslim bookshops and there is evidence to suggest that antisemitism is preached in some mosques and madrassas. But notice has been served to those who think they can get away in Britain with what may be permissible in the Arab world. The third problem is ignorance. While changes in the law provide a high measure of protection against antisemitism and the education system teaches children about the evils of racism and its ultimate manifestation in the Holocaust, we, nevertheless, face a new generation that perceives Israel to be an oppressive and militaristic state. To some it is the new South Africa. References All-Party Inquiry into Antisemitism (2007): Government Response (London). http:// www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm73/738/7381.asp Board of Deputies of British Jews (2000), Jewish Day Schools in Britain: 1992–1999 (BDBJ: London), November 17. Bolchover, Richard (2003) The Absence of Antisemitism in the Marketplace, in A New Antisemitism? Debating Judeophobia in 21st-Century Britain, ed. Paul Iganski and Barry Kosmin. London: Profile Books/Institute for Jewish Policy Research ( JPR). Buruma, Ian (2003) How to Talk About Israel, New York Times, New York, August 31. Colin Brown and Chris Hastings (2003) Fury as Dalyell attacks Blair’s “Jewish cabal.” Telegraph, May 4, 2003. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1429114/Furyas-Dalyell-attacks-Blairs-Jewish-cabal.html. Retrieved February 27, 2010. Community Security Trust (2007) Antisemitic Discourse in Britain in 2007, London: CST. http:www/thecst.org.uk/docx/Antisemitic%20Discourse%20Report%202007_ web.pdf. —— (2008) Antisemitic Incidents Report 2008. CST: London www.thecst.org.uk/docs/ Incidents_Report08. Freedland, Jonathan (2003) Is anti-Zionism antisemitism?, in A New Antisemitism?, ed. by Paul Iganski and Barry Kosmin. London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research. Hirsh, David (2007) Anti-Zionism and Antisemitism: Cosmopolitan Reflections. New Haven: Yale Initiative for the Interdisciplinary Study of Antisemitism Working Paper Series. Iganski, Paul and Barry Kosmin (ed) (2003) A New Antisemitism? London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research. Iganski, Paul, Vicky Kielinger, and Susan Paterson (2005) Hate Crimes against London’s Jews, London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research and Metropolitan Police Service. Institute for Jewish Policy Research (2003) Long-term planning for British Jewry: final report and recommendations. London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research. JC/ICM Poll (2003) in Jewish Chronicle, London, January 23. Julius, Anthony (2000) England’s Gift to Jew Hatred, The Spectator, November 11.

the liberal tradition and unholy alliances of the present 327 Klug, Brian (2004) The Myth of the New Anti-Semitism, The Nation, February 2, 2004. Kotek, Joel (2009) Cartoons and Extremism: Israel and the Jews in Arab and Western Media (London & New York: Valentine Mitchell). PEW Global Attitudes Project (2008) Unfavourable Views of Jews and Muslims on the increase in Europe. (Washington, D.C.: PEW). Available at http://pewglobal.org/ reports/pdf/262.pdf. Rensmann, Lars (2004) Demokratie und Judenbild: Antisemitismus in der politischen Kultur der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften). Riddell, Peter (2006) Poll shows voters believe press is right not to publish cartoons, in The Times, 7 February, www.timesonline.co.uk/printfriendly/0,,1-10-202803310,00.html. Retrieved February 27, 2010. Shindler, Colin (2001) Reading The Guardian: Jews, Israel—Palestine and the Origins of Irritation, Spring. Taguieff, Pierre-André (2004) Rising from the Muck: The New Anti-Semitism in Europe (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee). The Crown Prosecution Service (2006) Response to the All-Party Parliamentary Inquiry into Antisemitism (CPS: London), http://www/cps.gov.uk/Publications/research/antisemitism_refs_html. Ward, Lucy (2003) Oxford suspends don who rejected student for being Israeli. The Guardian. http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2003/oct/28/internationleducationnews. accesstouniversity. Retrieved February 27, 2010. Whine, Michael (2003) Antisemitism on the Streets, in A New Antisemitism?, ed. by Paul Iganski and Barry Kosmin. (London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research).

Political Cultures of Denial? Antisemitism in Sweden and Scandinavia Henrik Bachner I.  Introduction Prejudice and hostility towards Jews today, no doubt, has some novel qualities to it, but the label “new” with regards to contemporary antisemitism in Europe is nonetheless problematic. This is shown not least by an analysis of anti-Jewish thinking in Sweden. If we study the ideas that again surface in political discourse and in the media, there is very little change. Whereas some important new images—shaped by current developments and needs—do emerge, stereotypes and myths are basically traditional. What has changed is primarily language, context and the way the message is being rationalized. This, on the other hand, has characterized also previous phases in the history of antisemitism. What is relatively new, in a post-war perspective, is rather a growing attraction within the political mainstream for certain forms of anti-Jewish imagery as well as an increased tolerance for such ideas. Another element that can be described as relatively new is the influence of antisemitism emanating from parts of the Muslim world. The principal aim of this article is to discuss the characteristics of anti-Jewish thinking in Sweden in the beginning of the 21th century. Even though more research is needed in order to gain a more comprehensive and thorough understanding of current tendencies, a preliminary picture can be drawn on the basis of some recent qualitative and quantitative studies. A few references will also be made to developments in other Scandinavian countries. The focus of this article is antisemitic tendencies and motifs in public discourse within the broader political culture as well as prevalence of anti-Jewish prejudice amongst the Swedish population. Antisemitism in the context of right-wing extremism and radical Islamism, therefore, will be given less attention. It is important, however, to underline that parallel with more visible anti-Jewish tendencies within the Swedish public debate during the last couple of years, the development in terms of extremist propaganda and antisemitic incidents is worrying.

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There are also indications of a growing support for, and maybe influence from, radical Islamist movements such as Hezbollah and Hamas among certain left-wing groups. This could be seen for instance during the Lebanon war in 2006 and during the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza at the end of 2008 and beginning of 2009. Amongst several right-wing extremist groups, today like before, antisemitism constitutes a central element of ideology and propaganda. A 2006 study of web sites belonging to Swedish racist and Nazi organizations points to the notion of a Jewish world conspiracy as a core idea. According to the propaganda disseminated, Jews, through the control of media and politics, promote immigration and multiculturalism with the aim of weakening Western societies and gain world mastery (Lagerlöf 2006). While some right-wing extremists cling to the conspiracy theory that Jews were behind the 9/11 terrorist attack, others hailed it as a successful strike against the center of Jewish world power (Lööw 2001). (For a description of radical right-wing organizations and parties in Sweden, see the Stephen Roth Institute Annual Report 2006). Sverigedemokraterna (Sweden Democrats), a populist and xenophobic party with seats in many municipal assemblies, is predominantly anti-Muslim. In recent years antisemitism within parts of the Muslim community have also become a more serious problem. On several occasions Islamists, Swedish and foreign, have attacked Jews in sermons and speeches, and in 2005, cassettes urging the killing of Jews were sold at the main mosque in Stockholm (Ekot 2005; Karam 2004; Hansson 2004; Malm 2003). A recent survey indicates that negative attitudes towards Jews are more prevalent among Swedish Muslims than among the population in general (Bachner and Ring 2006), and a previous report pointed to anti-Jewish sentiments among groups of pupils of Muslim or Arab background and the promotion of antisemitic propaganda on some Swedish Islamic web sites (Tossavainen 2003). An extreme example of the latter is to be found on the Radio Islam web site, run by a Swede of Moroccan origin, Ahmed Rami. There have been violent expressions of hostility towards Jews at some pro-Palestinian demonstrations. There has also been several cases of threats, harassment and violence against Jews as well as vandalism and cemetery desecrations (Bergmann and Wetzel 2003; EUMC 2004; Stephen Roth Institute Annual Report 2004 and 2006). During the war in Gaza in late 2008 and early 2009 a number of such incidents were recorded (Olsson 2009). According to statistics from the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention the number of reported



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crimes with antisemitic motives, during the last ten years, have varied between 90 and 150. In 2007, 118 such crimes were reported. In 34% of those cases the perpetrators were connected to the Nazi scene (Brå 2008). II.  Post-War Developments and Historical Legacy Sweden has had a Jewish community since the end of the 18th century, when Jews were allowed to reside in the country without converting to the Christian faith. The political emancipation was completed in 1870. The Jewish community always was and has remained small. Today, there are approximately 18–20,000 Swedish Jews, constituting 0.2% of a population of 9 million. While anti-Jewish prejudice—primarily in its Christian forms—has a long history in Sweden, and while negative attitudes towards Jews were fairly widespread and relatively accepted within the broader Swedish society from the late 19th century until 1945, Sweden never experienced any popular political antisemitic movement of the kind that emerged in several other European countries at the time. A racist radical right did emerge during the inter-war period, but it had relatively few followers and limited political influence. A vague and sometimes explicit dislike of Jews and an often ambivalent position with regards to Nazi-Germany existed within parts of the traditional right in the 1930s and during the war years. Racism and prejudice against Jews, however, was not the preserve of conservatives, but could, to various degrees, be found throughout the political landscape. Negative perceptions of Jews also influenced popular attitudes as well as restrictive government policies toward Jewish refugees from Nazi-Germany during the 1930s (Levine 1996; Svanberg & Tydén 1997; Wright 1998; Berggren 1999; Andersson 2000; Blomqvist 2006; Bachner 2009). Like in many other Western countries, the impact of the Holocaust led to a strong delegitimization of antisemitism in the dominant political culture of post-war Sweden. But long-held and deep-rooted prejudices did not totally disappear. An undoubtedly limited, yet significant, revival of anti-Jewish thinking could be discerned at the end of the 1960s and the beginning of 1970s, primarily within the context of extreme left-wing anti-Zionism. Yet, with time, with the gradual erosion of the taboo against antisemitism and with the emergence of a more critical stance toward Israel amongst broader segments of the

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public, similar tendencies could be observed within parts of mainstream political opinion. The effects of these developments could be seen not least during Israel’s 1982 Lebanon War, which in Sweden, as in many other countries (Wasserstein 1996; Wistrich 1985; Epstein 1993) unleashed marked anti-Jewish reactions. Whereas most of the criticism in Swedish media and public debate was directed against Israel’s policies and actions, a not insignificant part of it was colored by traditional prejudices and more recently developed demonical images (Bachner 2004). To some extent, similar tendencies were to be seen during the initial stages of first Palestinian intifada, which began in 1987. There were also other indications that the climate gradually was changing. Holocaust denial had been part of the agenda of the Swedish radical right since 1945 (Bruchfeld 2005), but in the beginning of the 1980s, a fraction of the radical and anti-Zionist left openly embraced parts of the “revisionist” propaganda. The most prominent and influential individual within this group was the writer Jan Myrdal, son of Nobel Prize Laureates Gunnar and Alva Myrdal (Bachner 2004). Radio Islam, headed by Ahmed Rami, is today a web site on the Internet, but it began as a radio station in Stockholm in 1987. Although Radio Islam claimed to be speaking on behalf of the Palestinians, its message was from the beginning openly and radically antisemitic, portraying Jews as ritual murderers and a poison destroying non-Jewish societies, propagating the myth of a Jewish world conspiracy and denying the Holocaust. When the message spread by Radio Islam was publicly exposed and criticized, and when the Chancellor of Justice decided to prosecute Rami for incitement against an ethnic group, Radio Islam drew significant support from a number of well-known journalists, intellectuals and academics, many of whom were outspoken anti-Zionists, who claimed that Radio Islam was nothing but a pro-Palestinian voice expressing legitimate criticism against Israel and Zionism. This support, with certain exceptions, receded when Rami, in a trial in 1989, was found guilty of incitement and sentenced to prison, but the backing received by Radio Islam prior to the sentence showed that the stigma associated with antisemitism was slowly weakening. The Radio Islam affair indicated that an anti-Jewish message could be openly defended if propagated in the name of pro-Palestinian solidarity or Islam (Ahlmark et al. 1993; Arvidsson (ed.) 1994). If this context was lacking, the reaction could be different. This was shown, for instance, with the launching of the magazine Salt at the end



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of the 1990s. Salt described itself as a radical conservative publication, and it could among its contributors count several prominent conservative leaning intellectuals and academics. The magazine from the beginning gave vent to ideas of Jewish omnipotence and exploitation of the Holocaust, but also articulated anti-immigrant sentiments. This time, mainstream media reacted forcefully. Salt was strongly condemned and, in 2002, the magazine closed down. The episode, however, is also important in that it indicated the existence or the appeal of anti-Jewish sentiments within a certain intellectual conservative milieu. One crucial conclusion that can be drawn from studying anti-Jewish tendencies in public discourse in post-war and contemporary Sweden is that the debate on Israel and the Middle East is the major context in which prejudice and negative attitudes toward Jews are being articulated. Even though other topics—primarily the Holocaust and its place in contemporary political culture as well as US domestic and foreign policies—sometimes can attract hostility and mythologizing about Jews, these sentiments and ideas are more commonly expressed in discourses related to the Middle East. There are several reasons for this. One important reason is that the debate on the Middle East, for a long time, has constituted the only public arena where negative attitudes toward Jews can be legitimately articulated, since in this context they can easily be packaged and rationalized as criticism of Israel, Zionism, and US policies. III.  Old and New Motifs Like in some other Western European countries, the year 1982 constitutes a breaking point in the history of post-war antisemitism in Sweden in the sense that it saw the first major outburst of antisemitic sentiments within mainstream political culture. The debate on the Lebanon war is particularly interesting, also, in that it so clearly elucidates both the persistence and flexibility of anti-Jewish thinking. It shows how stereotypes and beliefs, largely absent from the public discourse for decades, can be easily revived and adapted to new circumstances. Although Sweden is one of the most secularized countries in Europe, the anti-Israel mood created by the Lebanon War unleashed a flood of age-old Christian anti-Jewish perceptions that were woven into—and rationalized as—criticism of Israeli government policies (For a detailed analysis of the 1982 debate, see Bachner 2003; Bachner 2004).

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In general, it can be said that the original theological construct of Judaism as the antithesis of Christianity—the contrast between Christian love and forgiveness and Jewish unforgivingness and malevolence—constituted a leitmotif in the antisemitic tainted argumentation during the war. A recurring theme was that of a specific Jewish vengefulness and cruelty, an “Old Testament” wrath and bloodthirstiness, that was said to characterize Israeli behavior. The Swedish debate also included other traditional antisemitic beliefs. Among them was the myth of Jewish control of world finance, politics and the media, and the conspiratorial fantasies that often accompany such ideas. In 1982, these specific ideas were primarily to be seen in radical anti-Zionist argumentation, although they were in evidence within the political mainstream. Another prominent theme was the analogy between Israel and Nazi-Germany and between the Israeli invasion and the Holocaust. The debate, sparked by the war showed that this motif was no longer, as it had been since the end of the 1960s, the preserve of anti-Zionist propaganda, but had gained legitimacy within a significant part of public opinion. There are probably several reasons for this change of climate. However, the problem of coming to terms with the mass murder of the European Jews and its historical, political, and psychological consequences seems to have been a major factor behind the increased popularity and usage of such images. This has been evident not only in countries directly involved in the genocide, but also in neutral “bystander” countries such as Sweden. The process at work can, to some extent, be understood as a form of liberation demonology, a fantasy that serves a number of purposes and satisfies a number of needs. The construction of Jews or Israelis as Nazis and perpetrators of a new Holocaust, brings relief from feelings of guilt, relativizes the Shoah, transforms victims into perpetrators and provides liberation from restrictions on anti-Jewish discourse. By constructing Jews or Israelis as Nazis they again become legitimate targets of hostility and anti-Jewish sentiments can be articulated under the banner of anti-racism. This interpretation appears to be plausible if we look at the argumentation that, in many cases, supported these representations in 1982—the recurring references to “guilt,” to irritation over not being permitted to speak in unambiguous terms about Jews or Israel and generalizing assertions about the transformation of “the Jews” as a collectivity. Moreover, it is given credence by the scope, intensity, and, above all, selectivity in the pattern of association



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(Bachner 2003; Bachner 2004. Regarding Holocaust related antisemitism, see also Taguieff 2004; Rensmann 2005; Bachner 2006). IV.  Anti-Jewish Motifs in Public Discourse since 2000 The antisemitic mood that emerged in parts of Europe after the outbreak of the second intifada in 2000 has also been evident in Swedish public debate, but more research is needed before its full impact can be adequately assessed. An examination of news coverage and public debate on Israel and the Middle East within parts of the mainstream media primarily between 2000 and 2004 (Bachner 2004), but also including some examples from the period thereafter, however, allows for some preliminary conclusions to be drawn regarding the character and legitimacy of anti-Jewish thinking in this context. From this limited examination, one thing is clear: it cannot be said that criticism against Israel, in any general sense, is tainted by antisemitism. Some of the criticism is, but it is not the dominant pattern. While it is important to make clear that criticism of Israeli policies and actions is perfectly legitimate and should not, even if considered biased or unfounded, automatically be branded as prejudiced, it is also important to note that parts of the general criticism against Israel seems to be influenced by irrational motives. This can be seen, for instance, in the view of Israel or Israeli policies as the main threat or obstacle to world peace and the root cause of radical Islamism and global terrorism. But it is also to be seen in the obsession with Israel and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the reactions that it stirs. The wrath that Israeli policies often rouse amongst part of public opinion in Sweden—matched only by the fury directed against the US following the invasion of Iraq in 2003—betrays a selectivity of indignation when compared with the silence and indifference that normally marks Swedish reactions to the conflicts and atrocities taking place in, for instance, Congo, Sudan, Sri Lanka, Kashmir, Afghanistan, Colombia or, if we go back a few years, in Chechnya and Algeria. The phenomenon can also be illustrated by the boycott and divestment campaigns that are directed against Israel. These campaigns—in Sweden backed up by the Church of Sweden and much of the radical left—are not simply based on principle. If they were, similar positions would have been taken on other states occupying foreign territory (for example Morocco and China) or violating human rights (in which case

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the list would be extensive and hardly headed by Israel when ranked on scale and severity). To what extent can these kinds of phenomena be understood in terms of antisemitism? This is not an easy question, since in most cases, the underlying motives cannot be known. All kinds of anti-Israel sentiment cannot and, therefore, should not simply be interpreted as forms of antisemitism. However, it would be equally wrong not to accept that prejudice and hostility against Jews to some extent and in some cases is a factor, if certainly not the only one. The philosopher Michael Walzer, a long time critic of Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territory, has correctly pointed out that “there is an oddly disproportionate hostility toward Israel on the European left, which requires some explanation . . . Indeed, much of the criticism directed at Israel has more to do with the existence of the state than with the policies of any of its governments . . .” (Walzer 2003). Against this background the proposition put forward by New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman, like Walzer often critical of Israel’s policies, is not unreasonable: “Criticizing Israel is not antisemitic, and saying so is vile. But singling out Israel for opprobrium and international sanction—out of all proportion to any other party in the Middle East—is anti-Semitic, and not saying so is dishonest.” (Friedman 2002). V.  Christian Anti-Jewish Images The anti-Jewish motifs that can be identified in parts of Swedish media and public debate during later years are very similar to the ones that surfaced in 1982. Also this time around, Christian anti-Jewish images have been frequently woven into descriptions of, or criticism against, Israel’s policy and actions—particularly the idea of an Old Testament vengefulness, an image often codified in the words “an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth.” This is not a phenomenon can be observed solely in anti-Israel biased media. The liberal newspaper Expressen, for example, explained at the beginning of the new intifada that Israel, in its response to Palestinian violence, was “implementing the primitive teaching of an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth” (October 13, 2000). However in papers like Aftonbladet, social democratic and Sweden’s largest daily, which is markedly anti-Israel and has a history of antisemitic stereotyping when criticizing and reporting on Israel, the image of Israel’s policies, as a reflection of a specific



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vengefulness rooted in Judaism, has been a recurring theme. From its Middle East correspondent Aftonbladet’s readers learned that Israel, under the leadership of Ehud Barak, was striking at the Palestinians in accordance with the principle of “an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth” (October 13, 2000), that Israel’s prime minister Ariel Sharon had “tried the eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth method since coming to power” (22.3.2002), and that in order to stop Palestinian terror Israel’s government “must give up its eye for eye, tooth for a tooth tactics” (May 20, 2002). How easily these images are activated could be seen also in connection with the controversy that unfolded in January 2004 when Israel’s ambassador to Sweden protested against and attacked the installation “Snow white and the madness of truth” (depicting an Islamic Jihad terrorist in a basin of blood) at the Museum of National Antiquities in Stockholm, accusing it of glorifying suicide bombers. Under the heading “A tragic proof that Israel is stuck in hatred and violence,” Aftonbladet’s Middle East correspondent explained: “The Israeli ambassador’s violent behavior elucidates the situation in the Middle East. Eye for an eye, tooth for a tooth” (  January 18, 2004). In the web publication Dagens PS the prominent journalist Peppe Engberg described what had happened at the museum as “God’s people” acting with their “reptilian brain” and claimed that the Israeli ambassador was inspired by “the vengeful God of the Old Testament” (http://www. dagensps.se January 16, 2004). These examples illustrate another basic characteristic of all forms of prejudice: the collectivization of responsibility or guilt. Israel’s ambassador is transformed into all Israelis or all Jews. How these transformations take place, and how an event such as the Israeli ambassador’s protest serves as a stimulus for different kinds of anti-Jewish projections, is also demonstrated in an article published on the web site Tidskrift. nu, which is a portal for Swedish cultural periodicals, sponsored by the Swedish Arts Council. Under the heading “Report from the Museum of National Antiquities,” the following reflection was made: “In the 1930s the Nazis destroyed art they looked upon as not being real art. Now, it is those who were hardest hit by the Nazis—the Jews—who claim the right to decide what constitutes art and what doesn’t and to destroy what they don’t appreciate.” (  January 20, 2004). Here the Israeli ambassador not only is transformed into all Jews, but the Jews—as a collectivity—are also transformed into contemporary Nazis repeating the crimes of Nazi-Germany.

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However, if we turn back to Christian anti-Jewish themes, the image of Jewish vengefulness has not been the only stereotype rooted in anti-Judaism that has colored the debate on Israel. The conservative Svenska Dagbladet published a letter that invoked the image of Jews as child murderers in that it described the Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon as acting in accordance with his “biblical equivalent—the king of the Jews of that time, Herod—with his infamous child slaughter” (  January 25, 2002). During Easter 2002, Aftonbladet—intentionally or not—revived the accusation of Christ killing when it, on its editorial page, condemned Israel’s policy towards the Palestinians under the heading: “The Crucifixion of Arafat” (  January 4, 2002). One could argue that crucifixion is a general metaphor in Western culture and that it therefore must not be understood as anti-Jewish even when used as in this example. But speaking against this interpretation is, among other things, the fact that Aftonbladet never uses such metaphors when discussing or criticizing other states. It is an association that awakens only when the Jewish state is being discussed. Moreover, applying such images on the government of a Jewish state has, for historical reasons, a different meaning than if done on, say, that of Luxemburg or New Zeeland. The fact that the image of Jews as Christ killers surfaces during Easter—something that happened also for instance in the Italian newspaper La Stampa (April 3, 2002)—again signifies that the image is rooted in age-old anti-Jewish thought patterns. Nor was this the first time that Aftonbladet made this association: the paper condemned Israel’s invasion of southern Lebanon in 1978 in a similar manner. An editorial headlined “Eye for an eye, tooth for a tooth” was illustrated by a drawing showing the victims of Israel’s invasion as the suffering Christ (March 27, 1978). During the 1982 Lebanon War, another image was chosen. This time, Aftonbladet’s editorial page (  June 17, 1982) portrayed the Israeli prime minister as the “Angel of Death” of the Old Testament (referring to the Destroyer in the book of Exodus). An overall assessment of the role played by antisemitism in the Swedish debate on the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza in 2008/2009 has to wait until it has been thoroughly researched. Yet, it is safe to say that stereotypes and negative attitudes towards Jews did again color some of the discussion. One example, illustrating the theme dealt with above, is an article written by the former spokesman of the Swedish Green Party, Birger Schlaug, in which he compared, what he described as, Israel’s indiscriminate “mass killings” of Palestinians with Treblinka



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and Babi Yar and associated it with “Old Testament ethics—eye for an eye, tooth for a tooth” (Katrineholms-Kuriren January 19, 2009). VI.  Persistent Projections: Power, Manipulation, and Conspiracies Another theme that has re-emerged, and much more strongly so than in 1982, is the myth of Jewish power and manipulation of politics and the media. Today, these ideas seem to be more attractive and tolerated within the mainstream of political opinion. This can be seen in the frequent fantasy-like descriptions of the omnipotence of the socalled “Jewish lobby” in the United States, a lobby that in the minds of some Swedish observers single-handedly runs American foreign policy, or in the insinuations that the U.S. war on Iraq was secretly masterminded by Jews and conducted in the interests of Israel. The myth of the Iraq war as a “Zionist” conspiracy is normally presented in subtle terms. The argumentation is characterized by a marked disinterest for non-Jews within the American administration and an obsession with those who happen to be Jewish. In this specific genre of articles the concept “neoconservative” does not primarily designate an ideological position, but serves as a code-word for Jews. Sometimes, however, the idea of a Jewish cabal is put forward in a more outright fashion. In the run-up to the Iraq war, the US correspondent of Aftonbladet, answering a question from a reader, explained that the Americans were sure about winning the war but they also “feared that someone would strike back with more terror. Someone who doesn’t like the Zionist conspiracy.” (Aftonbladet web edition March 29, 2003) The writer Israel Shamir, who is a Swedish citizen, even borrows neo-Nazi terminology when describing the conspiracy. In his book, Blommor i Galiléen [Flowers of Galilee], which was published in Sweden in 2003, he writes that “The occupation regime in Iraq was installed by the US army in the interests of Zionists, and it may be rightly called ZOG, Zionist Occupation Government . . .” (Shamir 2003, p. 186). Shamir would have been of little interest if his book, which (like his web site) is full of antisemitic statements, had not been published by a respected publisher, Alhambra, and if he had not been praised as a brave critic of Israel by parts of the left. The Palestine Solidarity Association in Sweden, the major pro-Palestinian organization in the country, not only has engaged Shamir as a speaker at an anti-Israel rally but also helped promote and sell his book (Svenska

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kommittén mot antisemitism 2005). In an article published on the web site Socialistiskt Forum in late 2004 Shamir’s book was recommended by Evert Svensson, a former social democratic MP and for twenty years (until 2003) chairman of The International League of Religious Socialists (http://www.socialistisktforum.se November 5, 2004). The entering of the myth of Jewish omnipotence and manipulation into the mainstream can also be observed in other contexts. A frequently repeated charge is that Israel is protected from criticism, that truths about Israel are treated as taboo and censored. According to this mythology, politicians and media in Sweden and other Western countries are either controlled by Jewish or “Zionist” interests or so afraid of these “powerful forces” or “lobby groups”—the two dominant code-words for Jewish power in the Swedish discourse—that they do not dare to “speak their mind.” Needless to say, the claim that Israel should somehow enjoy preferential treatment in the Swedish media has little to do with reality. Anyone following the reporting and debate on Israel in Sweden knows that criticism against Israeli policies is widespread, open, and sharp. In an article titled “Worst in the world?” Nathan Shachar, for many years Middle East correspondent for the liberal daily Dagens Nyheter, drew attention to a report showing that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict during the years 1996–98 as a subject not only represented 23.5% of all articles dealing with international conflicts in that paper’s cultural section, Israel was also “the largest country in the world measured by the level of indignation.” Seventy-seven percent of all articles published on Israel were negative (Dagens Nyheter October 19, 1998). It is not unlikely that we would find a similar pattern in much of the Swedish media, nor that the percentage of articles dealing with or criticizing Israel would have risen since the end of the Oslo peace process and the beginning of the second intifada. A typical example of the kind of mythology described above can be found in the writings of Herman Lindqvist, one of Sweden’s most well known journalists and an author of best-selling popular history books. In an article in Aftonbladet in late 2000, Lindqvist claimed that most Swedish journalists visiting Israel are “shocked by the Israeli arrogance and racism towards the Arabs.” This, however, is never reported to the Swedish public, he continued, the reason being that few dared to write about it, knowing that those who did “immediately become sprayed with poison by powerful and influential pro-Israeli



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lobby groups” (November 26, 2000). As always, in articles repeating this theme the “influential lobby groups” remain anonymous. Another example can be found in the now defunct program Mediemagasinet, which was produced and broadcast by Swedish public service TV, Swedish Television. In November 2001, the program, specializing in examining the media, claimed that the full truth about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was never revealed in the Swedish press. And the reason for this, it was explained, was that some of the Swedish correspondents in the Middle East were Jews—which was presented as in itself a cause for suspicion—and that pressure from the “Jewish lobby” made Swedish newspapers censor certain information that might be negative for Israel (November 1, 2001). In 2005, Ordfront Magazine, one of the most influential left-wing periodicals in Sweden, carried an article that, in an unusually blatant manner, sought to invoke the image of a Jewish conspiracy manipulating the media. Under the heading “Swedish media is controlled by the Israeli regime,” journalist Johannes Wahlström claimed that the Israeli government with the help of a powerful and secretive “lobby” and through the use of pressure, threats, and intimidation made Swedish newspapers, radio, and television suppress certain information that could be damaging to Israel. These activities, Wahlström argued, were part of a global plan for media control drawn up in Jerusalem (No. 12, 2005). The article was simultaneously published on Israel Shamir’s web site. Shamir is Wahlström’s father (Slätt 2006). When the piece first was published, few protests were heard. To the contrary, the article was enthusiastically received by parts of the radical left. It was not until some of the Swedish correspondents interviewed by Wahlström explained that their words and views had been totally distorted in order to support his thesis that a reaction emerged. The editor in chief of Ordfront Magazine now distanced himself from the article and apologized for having published it (http:// www.ordfront.se January 2006). However, in the ensuing debate the fact that Ordfront Magazine had published an article clearly colored by antisemitic mythology played little role and was never admitted by the editor. It seems highly unlikely that the piece would have drawn much criticism at all had not Wahlström’s interviewees publicly protested. Even after they had made clear that their statements had been falsified, Wahlström’s claims were defended as basically correct by the radical leftist historian Åsa Lindeborg in Aftonbladet (  January 17, 2006).

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The Ordfront affair is another indication that there is a growing readiness to accept images of Jewish omnipotence and manipulation. The latter is also illustrated by the case of stand-up comedian Magnus Betnér. Betnér, a professed admirer of the American anti-Zionist writer Norman Finkelstein (see below), regularly appears on various TV shows and has, on several occasions, made “jokes” about Jews. A recurring theme is that Jews whine too much about the Holocaust and about being victims. On October 30, 2005, in Parlamentet, a popular comedy program broadcast by TV4, Betnér stated: “One group I believe suffers from discrimination in Sweden is the Jews. They own only 45 per cent of the media in Sweden, that’s not even half goddammit!” In Expressen on November 4, 2005, Willy Silberstein, a well known Swedish-Jewish journalist, criticized Betnér for exploiting anti-Jewish stereotypes. Betnér replied that he stood by his statement. Although Silberstein had not mentioned Israel or Betnér’s views on the Middle East conflict in his critique, Betnér—following a common strategy of argumentation—stated that he was actually being attacked for criticizing “the state of Israel” (Expressen November 7, 2005). Apart from this there was little public reaction. The mythology of Jewish control of the media is also applied on a global level. An article headlined “Israel is a Gulag,” published on April 1, 2004 in the cultural section of the social democratic daily Dala-Demokraten, claimed that “No information about the crimes that are taking place [in Israel and the occupied territories] can reach us since the world’s media from New York to Moscow via Paris and London are secured for Israel’s cause. The Israeli invasion of Ramallah and Bethlehem was camouflaged in the Jewish controlled press and media, like CNN . . .” In this particular case the editor-in-chief, after protests from the Swedish Committee Against Antisemitism, acknowledged the article as prejudiced an apologized for publishing it (DalaDemokraten April 21, 2004). The image of powerful Jews manipulating the media was also invoked during the Hillersberg controversy in 2001. This debate was unleashed by a Swedish government decision late 2000 to award the artist Lars Hillersberg with a life-long income guarantee by the state as a reward for his artistic achievements. This decision drew criticism from a number of historians and intellectuals who pointed out that Hillersberg, a left-wing anti-Zionist, since the late sixties had made a number of clearly antisemitic pictures. It was also noted that the artist had been a supporter of the strongly antisemitic and “revisionist”



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radio station Radio Islam (nowadays a web site) and had drawn a picture used on the cover of a book written by Radio Islam editor Ahmed Rami. This particular Hillersberg drawing showed Rami being crucified by Jews. (This and other Hillersberg drawings are reprinted in Bachner 2004.) Very soon, however, it became clear that Hillersberg was supported by a substantial number of Swedish intellectuals who explained that the pictures that had drawn criticism were not at all anti-Jewish. Many lined up behind the interpretation offered by Lars Lönnroth, a professor of literature and chairman of the committee that had nominated Hillersberg for the award, who in Svenska Dagbladet stated that the pictures should be seen as “left-wing anti-capitalist and anti-Israel satire” (  January 22, 2001). One of those taking the same position was Folke Edwards, for many years head of the Gothenburg Art Museum, who described the critics as “torpedoes for powerful interests” (Göteborgs-Tidningen April 19, 2001). Gunnar Fredriksson, a former editor-in-chief of Aftonbladet, also acquitted Hillersberg’s pictures from antisemitism and condemned the “powerful group” that had voiced criticism against the artist (Aftonbladet March 11, 2002). (For the Hillersberg debate, see Bachner 2004: 564–577; Frohnert 2001.) The Hillersberg controversy, on a more general level, also pointed to the gradual erosion of the postwar taboo on antisemitism in the public space. It indicated the increase of the level of tolerance and attraction toward such ideas within parts of the mainstream political opinion. It demonstrated, once again, that antisemitism can be defended in public without any political risks, if cloaked in anti-Israel, anti-Zionist, anti-capitalist or anti-American rhetoric. Another example illustrating the same tendency was the reception of the American writer Norman Finkelstein’s book The Holocaust Industry. If this book, to some extent, points to some very real (if not unknown) problems concerning the use and misuse of the Holocaust, it, no doubt, also invokes the idea of a global Jewish or “Zionist” conspiracy driven by greed and sinister political motives. If Finkelstein in Germany was applauded primarily by conservative and right-wing extremist circles, his most enthusiastic supporters in Sweden were to be found within the radical left. Finkelstein, for instance, quickly became a hero at Ordfront, who also published The Holocaust Industry in Swedish (Bachner 2001; Frohnert 2002. For an analysis of the Finkelstein phenomenon and the German reception, see Surmann ed. 2001).

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The growing acceptance within mainstream media of notions of Jewish omnipotence and conspiracies, as well as other stereotypes, had previously been demonstrated by the broadcast of a satirical program called “The third power” in Swedish public service television on August 7, 2002. In a feature it was argued that it is not always bad being a victim. The point was illustrated by the Holocaust: images of murdered Jews in Nazi concentration camps, of stocks of gold barrels and jubilant Israelis were accompanied by a text explaining that the Holocaust wasn’t so bad for the Jews after all, since it gave them a state and billions of dollars from Germany and the Swiss banks. As a consequence, it was argued, the position of the Jews was now stronger than ever. The feature ended with an image of the World Trade Center and an insinuation that there might be a connection between Jewish power and the 9/11 terror attacks. An unambiguous use of the myth of Jewish control of Western and Swedish media is also to be found on some of the web sites belonging to certain groups within the Swedish anti-globalization movement, a movement that sometimes combines anti-capitalism with radical antiZionism. In 2002, for example, an anarchist web site called 44an.com published an image depicting a photographer with cameras manufactured by “Zion” and with Stars of David on their lenses. The message read: “To become a successful journalist talent is not necessary.” A list of “satisfied clients” was added, mentioning CNN, TV4 and major Swedish newspapers. (The image is reprinted in Bachner 2004.). The image of sinister Jewish power and influence appears in many different contexts. In Aftonbladet on January 3, 2006 readers learned that many Americans no longer dared to use the word Christmas, instead they were being forced to use the more neutral term Holiday. And the reason, journalist Robert Collin explained, was that “the strong Jew Lobby” sought to ban the word Christmas because of its Christian origin. Again, this claim, delivered in Sweden’s largest daily, did not cause any public reaction. It should be noted that the idea of Jewish power and manipulation also frequently colors the debate on antisemitism as a contemporary problem. What I am referring to here is not the justified criticism that is directed towards those voices that tend to brand also quite legitimate criticism against certain Israeli policies as anti-Jewish. What I have in mind is, instead, the growing mythology that totally denies or grossly trivializes the problem of antisemitism and that claims that antisemitism today more or less is an invention by “Zionist lobbies”



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with the purpose of silencing criticism against Israel. These kinds of claims and insinuations, which indirectly are based on the idea of Jewish control or manipulation of public opinion, are common in Swedish mainstream debate. The charge that “Zionists” brand every form of criticism of Israel as antisemitism has also become a central argument in any discourse that seeks to defend and legitimize anti-Jewish opinions. (For an important analysis of this kind of argumentation, see Hirsh 2008.) A final example elucidating on the one hand the increase in the level of acceptance of and growing attraction to certain forms of antiJewish mythology in the political mainstream, and on the other hand the use of “critique against Israel” as a straw-man argument to legitimize such ideas, is the Gilad Atzmon controversy in 2007. In March of that year two major organizations connected to the Social Democratic Party, the Christian Broderskapsrörelsen and ABF, the Worker’s Educational Association, together with the radical leftist and militant anti-Zionist periodical Fib-Kulturfront invited the writer and political activist Gilad Atzmon to speak at a meeting on Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan in Stockholm. Atzmon, a former Israeli today residing in Britain, is well-known for his antisemitic views. He has, among other things, stated that “it is about time that [  Jews] apologized for killing Jesus,” that “Zionism is a very singular political method aimed at perfecting the transformation of world disasters and human pain into Jewish gain” and that “American Jewry makes any debate on whether the ‘Protocols of the elder of Zion’ are an authentic document or rather a forgery irrelevant. American Jews (in fact Zionists) do control the world.” With regards to Israel, Atzmon has made clear that he believes that the state must disappear. He has also declared that “Israel is the ultimate evil, rather than Nazi Germany.” (quoted from “On Anti-Semitism,” “Protocols of the Elders of Zion (verse 2),” http://www.gilad.co.uk/ and “Israel Beyond Comparison,” http:// www.aljazeerah.info/). When criticized by the Swedish Committee against Antisemitism (SCAA) for inviting an anti-Jewish propagandist, a critique in which statements such as those above were quoted (Expressen March 22, 2007), Broderskapsrörelsen defended the decision and explained that there was nothing antisemitic in what Atzmon was saying. Atzmon, the Christian social democrats stated, “is critical of the policies of the state of Israel” (Expressen March 27, 2009). An identical response came from ABF (Fib-Kulturfront March 26, 2009 http://www.fib.se/).

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The SCAA expressed dismay at these answers and asked the leadership of the Social Democratic Party to distance itself from the views held by its sister organizations (Expressen May 15, 2009). The party, however, chose to remain silent. VII.  “Progressive” Antisemitism A further theme evident during the time of the Lebanon war, namely the projection of Nazism and the Holocaust onto Israel or Jews, is also present in the current debate. Within the radical left it constitutes a central element in the anti-Israel propaganda. In publications and on web sites belonging to radical left-wing groups, cartoons equating the Star of David with the swastika or the sufferings of the Palestinians with the Holocaust are common place. These groups have also exploited the day commemorating the Nazi pogrom against the Jews on November 9, 1938, in order to draw parallels between the Nazi persecution of the Jews and the Israeli treatment of Palestinians (Gerner 2002). For the anti-Zionist left these images serve a number of purposes. Primarily, they help delegitimize Zionism and the Jewish state. Yet, an important reason for their attraction is also that they transform Israelis and “Zionists” to legitimate targets of hostility—which they of course become when constructed as Nazis—and they enable antisemitism to be presented and legitimized as anti-racism, anti-Fascism and antiNazism. It is a formula to make hostility against Jews and the Jewish state look progressive. An example of how this works is the Swedish periodical Mana and its reception. Mana was launched as an “anti-racist” publication at the end of the 1990s by a Swedish-Iranian socialist organization. With time anti-Zionism became a central issue in the magazine. Articles carried headlines like “Hate Israel” (No. 2, 2002) and urged understanding for Palestinian suicide terror. The antisemitic outbursts that accompanied the UN conference on racism in Durban in 2001 were described as legitimate criticism of “Zionism” and Israel (No. 6–7, 2001), as were the anti-Jewish statements made by the German politician Jürgen Möllemann in 2002 (No. 3, 2002). Mana, however, also published a piece by Israel Shamir in which Jews were referred to as “Shylock the loan shark” or “pay-while-you-cry-holocaust-sobber” (No. 1, 2003).  



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When the editor-in-chief, Babak Rahimi, in 2003 addressed the issue of antisemitism and the Holocaust the meaning of both concepts were inverted. Antisemitism was said to mean Jewish hatred against Arabs and the Holocaust to signify an Israeli crime against the Palestinians. The Holocaust, Rahimi explained, was an ongoing Israeli mass murder against “people of semitic origin.” Even Holocaust-denial was given a new twist. It meant denying “the Holocaust” against the Palestinians and falling prey to “the Zionist version” of the Holocaust (Mana, No. 1, 2003). Soon after this, Mana was being hailed by wellknown left-wing intellectuals as Sweden’s preeminent anti-racist publication. In Journalisten Per Wirtén, at the time editor for the socialist magazine Arena, praised Mana as an important “anti-racist and radical political voice” (  June 11–16, 2003). In Dagens Nyheter, journalist Karolina Ramqvist applauded “the anti-racist cultural magazine Mana” (December 4, 2004). Equally enthusiastic about, what she called, the “anti-racist magazine” was historian Åsa Linderborg (LO-Tidningen, No. 29, 2004). During the following years Mana continued to publish texts containing antisemitic motifs (Bachner 2008a). When, in the beginning of 2008, the Swedish Arts Council, a government agency, was criticized for funding the magazine—the critics argued that the state should not sponsor publications that expressed anti-Jewish and anti-democratic views—this caused an uproar among left-wing intellectuals. The view put forward by Gunnar Bergdahl, head of the cultural section at Helsingborgs Dagblad (  January 16, 2008), that Mana was ”programmatically anti-racist” and its supposed antisemitism nothing but “criticism of Israel,” was echoed by many also in major newspapers like Dagens Nyheter and Aftonbladet (Bachner 2008b). The Swedish Arts Council, a little later, decided to continue to fund Mana. The case of Mana shows the success of the formula of “progressive” antisemitism within parts of the left. The readiness to accept it, no doubt, also has to do with the self-image of the left. As the German sociologist Werner Bergmann has pointed out, “Typical for ‘anti-racist anti-Semitism’ is its clean conscience and a self-image that sees antisemitism as principally incompatible with a leftist outlook.” (Bergmann 2004: 8). It is also quite clear that the construct of Jews as new Nazis and perpetrators of a new Holocaust continues to attract because of its ability to relieve from feelings of guilt by relativizing the Shoah. In Ordfront Magasin (No. 12, 2002) a well-known journalist and best-selling author,

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Katarina Mazetti, suggested that: “Maybe it is time to stop the efforts of taking Swedish youngsters to Auschwitz in order to teach them the consequences of racism and ethnic cleansing. Maybe we shall invite them for a Christmas trip to Bethlehem instead, so that they can have a look at what the grandchildren of the victims of Auschwitz are up to when they are devoting themselves to ethnic cleansing!” That Mazetti attacked not the Israeli government, nor the Israeli army, but “the grandchildren of the victims of Auschwitz” and implied that this group was now repeating the crimes of the Holocaust, is of course telling. Another example, a review of a documentary on the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza published in Kommunalarbetaren (April 11, 2005), the organ of the Swedish Municipal Workers’ Union, explained that “the Jewish people who were murdered” are now murdering another people. The film, the reviewer wrote, “portrays the Jewish people who were murdered by Hitler more than 60 years ago. And who now themselves persecute and murder another people—the Palestinian Arabs.” The role of Israel as the “collective Jew,” and as a stand-in for the victims of the Holocaust, is obvious in many of these fantasies. The Israel-Hamas war in 2008/2009 produced a new wave of similar analogies. Even in mainstream media the image of Gaza as the Warsaw Ghetto and Israelis as Nazis were commonplace. In several instances religious or political organizations as well as intellectuals refused to participate in the Holocaust Memorial Day commemorations in January 2009, referring to the Israeli offensive in Gaza (Edvardson 2009; Thorsén 2009), thereby, not only drawing a parallel between the two but also holding all Jews—including the victims of the Holocaust—responsible for Israel’s policies. VIII.  Public Opinion: Results from a 2005 Survey In March 2006, the first ever Swedish survey study focusing specifically on antisemitism was published by the Living History Forum and the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention (Bachner and Ring 2006). The study was carried out by postal questionnaire during March–May 2005 to a random sample (stratified by two age groups) of 5,011 people aged between 16–75 years who were registered in Sweden. A total of 2,956 questionnaires were returned and used, giving a response rate of 59%. The bulk of the attitude questions were



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formulated as statements and the respondents were asked to mark the degree to which they agreed or disagreed with each statement, by choosing one of five fixed response categories. Results from survey studies should be interpreted with caution. The findings (based on results for attitude scales including several statements as well as for separate attitude statements), nevertheless, do indicate that certain stereotypes that exist in public discourse have some support within segments of the Swedish population. According to the results of an attitude scale measuring notions of power and influence, 13% of the adult individuals (19­­–75 years) and 6% of the young people (16–18 years) tend to support images of power and influence held by “the Jews” (i.e. Jews as a collectivity) over the media, global economy and US foreign policy. Regarding separate attitude statements, the results shows that a total of 26% of all respondents agree completely or partly with the statement “The Jews have major influence on the global economy,” 18% agree completely or partly with the statement “The Jews have major influence on the media,” and 17% agree completely or partly with the statement “The Jews control US foreign policy.” Finally, 15% agree completely or partly with the statement “The Jews have too much influence in the world today.” According to the results from a multinational survey conducted by the American Jewish Committee (AJC) in the spring of 2005, a total of 27% of Swedes fully or partially agreed with the statement that “Now, as in the past, Jews exert too much influence on world events” (AJC 2005). (The differences between the two studies with regard to the percentage agreeing with this particular statement might have something to do with both the formulation of the statement and, probably more important, the usage of somewhat different response categories.) The Swedish study also contained a statement reflecting a contemporary version of the myth of the Jewish world conspiracy: the claim that “Israel was involved in the 9/11 terror attacks on the U.S.” 7% believe there is some truth in this statement, 47% reject it completely, and 46% have no opinion. According to one attitude scale, 10% of the adults and 13% of the young people tend to agree with antisemitic notions related to the Holocaust. Results for separate statements show that a total of 17% agree completely or partly with the statement “The Jews believe they are the only ones who have suffered,” and 14% fully or partially agree with the statement “The Jews exploit the Holocaust for financial and

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political purposes.” Furthermore, 2% of adults and 4% of young people tend to support the notion that Jews themselves are responsible for antisemitism. The claim that antisemitism is caused by Israeli policies, however, have significant support (see below). The report underlines that whereas criticism against Israeli policies does not constitute antisemitism, Israel and Israeli policies in some contexts do constitute targets for stereotyped images and hostility towards Jews, and criticism of Israeli policies sometimes can be used as a means or pretext for articulating or justifying antisemitism. Results from a scale measuring antisemitism in relation to the topic of Israel indicates that about 4% of the adults and 5% of young people tend to support anti-Jewish stereotypes and attitudes articulated in this context. Regarding the distribution of responses on the separate statements, a total of 26% agree completely or partly with the statement “Israeli policies are characterized by a vengefulness rooted in the Old Testament (‘an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth’).” Similarly, 26% agree completely or partly with the statement “Israel’s treatment of Palestinians is similar to the Nazi’s treatment of the Jews.” A total of 9% agrees completely or partly with the statement “Peace on earth is not possible as long as Israel exists,” and 3% agree fully or partially with the statement “Israel has no right to exist.” 14% agree completely or partly with the statement “Israeli policies is what causes hatred of Jews,” and 8% are in total or partial agreement with the statement “Because of Israeli policies, I dislike Jews even more.” Respondents were also asked to react to the statement “A Jewish Prime Minister in Sweden would be totally acceptable.” 25% completely or partly disagreed with this statement. Approximately half of all the respondents, 48%, were positive to the statement to varying degrees. That one in four were negatively responding to the thought of a Jewish Prime Minister in Sweden might indicate that Jews, by parts of the population, are not perceived as “real” or “proper” Swedes. Results from a combined scale of antisemitic notions (based on responses to 15 statements) points to that approximately 5% of the respondents between 16 and 75 years harbor a relatively systematic antisemitic attitude. A majority, 59%, tends to consistently reject antiJewish prejudices. The 36% in between, according to the results, contain a significant group with a somewhat ambivalent attitude towards Jews. This group comprises individuals who agree with some antisemitic statements but disagree with others and/or cannot say whether they agree or disagree with such statements.



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The study also contains a battery of questions on what is called intolerance towards Jews and Muslims, previously used in a study of attitudes among young people published by the Living History Forum and the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention in 2004 (Ring and Morgentau 2004). “Intolerance” in this context refers to an attitude characterized by mistrust, social rejection and hostility towards a group, and a readiness to embrace or support measures that discriminate against this category or individuals belonging to it. An intolerant attitude means, for instance, not wanting to live next door to Jews or Muslims, believing that there are “too many” of each respective category in Sweden, wanting to deprive them of the right to build synagogues or mosques in Sweden, and to vote in elections. A total of 2% of both adults and young people harbor a pronounced intolerant attitude towards Jews. Corresponding figures for the percentage of people who show intolerance towards Muslims is 8% of the adult population and 11% of young people. The results thus show that intolerance towards Muslims is stronger than intolerance towards Jews. In the study certain background conditions as well as views of individuals are compared to how they respond to various attitude scales. An analysis of the correlation between antisemitism and age shows that attitudinal differences between young people and adults are relatively small, although among the oldest age categories the percentage of respondents who tend to reject prejudice against Jews is lower. Men are comparatively more ambivalent and influenced by antisemitic notions and attitudes than women. This applies for both young people and adults. Results also show that highly educated respondents are less prejudiced against Jews than less-educated respondents. However, educational level and secondary school programmes do not seem to affect the tendency to harbor images of Jewish power and influence. Blue-collar workers and self-employed people are often more antisemitic and ambivalent towards Jews than white-collar workers, yet, the tendency to support images of Jewish omnipotence is relatively equal regardless of occupational category. Antisemitic images and ambivalent attitudes towards Jews are com‑ paratively more prevalent amongst individuals with foreign, particularly non-European background than others. Results furthermore show that antisemitic attitudes are markedly more prevalent amongst Muslims than amongst Christians and non-religious groups. Attitudes towards Jews are relatively independent of political party sympathies. The exception is preferences for extreme nationalist and

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Nazi parties, where sympathizers harbor distinctly more negative views of Jews than others. Sympathies in the conflict between Israel and Palestine have a certain correlation with the tendency to embrace antisemitism. The percentage that rejects prejudice against Jews is lower, and the percentage that harbors antisemitic views is higher amongst pro-Palestinian sympathizers than in other groups. However, the percentage of people who are intolerant of Muslims is higher amongst pro-Israeli sympathizers than among those taking other positions in relation to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. (For complete results see Bachner and Ring 2006.) Since this study is the first survey in Sweden focusing particularly on antisemitism and that contains this specific set of questions, there is no other material that enables a change over time comparison. Nothing can be said about the development of this prevalence, i.e. whether it has increased, fallen or remains stable. Yet, it is clear from these results that stereotypes articulated in media and public discourse, to some extent, reflects images harbored by not insignificant parts of the population. It is also seems probable that the relatively large percentage that support notions of Jewish omnipotence, of Israels’ policies being rooted in “Old Testament vengefulness” or the comparison between Israeli policies and Nazi-Germany’s persecution of the Jews, to some extent, is an effect of the frequent usage of such images in the media and public debate. The prevalence of stereotypes in mainstream media not only influences the general public but also signals that images of this kind are legitimate. IX.  Perceptions of Antisemitism In 2005, the American Jewish Committee (AJC) published a multinational survey in which respondents were asked how they looked upon antisemitism as a current problem in their own society. According to the results 15% of Swedes viewed antisemitism as a “very serious problem,” 50% regarded it as “somewhat of a problem” and 18% saw it as “not a problem at all” (AJC 2005). A 2005 study conducted by the ethnologist Susanne Nylund Skog on behalf of the Swedish Integration Board, and based on interviews with 20 young Swedish Jews between the ages of 18 and 30 years, concluded that the interviewees, on a regular basis, were exposed to prejudice in the form of stereotypes. Even though few claimed to have



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personally fallen victim to anti-Jewish hostility, many had experienced prejudiced attitudes including having been attacked as representatives of Israel. Several of the interviewees also said they were reluctant to openly identify as Jews out fear for antisemitism. Furthermore, a majority referred to a silence surrounding antisemitism in Sweden as something deeply troubling (Nylund Skog 2006). X.  A Culture of Denial If many Swedes perceive antisemitism as a problem in Swedish society, and if results from qualitative and quantitative research show that anti-Jewish prejudice manifests itself in public discourse, popular attitudes, and actions, while hatred against Jews is a crucial element of right-wing extremist and radical Islamist ideology and propaganda, this in many ways stands in sharp contrast to how antisemitism is generally perceived in public debate. There certainly are voices that recognize the problem as real and who criticize its manifestations, yet, there is also a strong tendency to deny the existence of or trivialize antisemitism in Sweden. The view put forward by Jan Guillou, columnist in Aftonbladet and a best-selling fiction writer, that antisemitism is a historical problem that has disappeared, that “the racist disease of our time is not directed towards Jews but towards Muslims,” and that any mentioning of antisemitism as a contemporary problem is part of a pro-Israeli propaganda (Aftonbladet April 16, 2001), is echoed by many. As has been pointed out above, a discourse of denial, relativization and justification of antisemitism frequently accompanies controversies involving anti-Jewish expressions. But there is also a widespread mythology, often disseminated by the very same groupings that tend to deny or justify antisemitism, that portrays Jews as a privileged minority, allegedly protected from any kind of criticism. These types of arguments were, for example, heard repeatedly during the Swedish debate on the caricatures of Mohammed, published in a Danish newspaper in 2005, and the reactions they stirred. In many articles Islamophobia was said to be a completely legitimate form of prejudice, whereas antisemitism was portrayed as totally unacceptable and always counteracted. Muslims were thus said to constitute legitimate targets for hostility, whereas Jews on the contrary were said to be protected and defended at all times. Again, Jan Guillou illustrates the tendency. Having for many years not only denied the phenomenon altogether but

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also on numerous occasions defended anti-Jewish expressions—including Lars Hillersberg’s drawings of hook-nosed Jews—as legitimate forms of criticism, Guillou now explained that “had the same drawings portrayed hook-nosed Jews . . . they would have been thought criminal. And they would have unleashed a hurricane of justified indignation.” (Aftonbladet February 2, 2006). This was being written at a time when the Chancellor of Justice had just ruled that an encouragement to “kill the Jews” by radical Islamists in Sweden must be seen not as antiJewish incitement but as legitimate “battle cries” in the discussion on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (  Justitiekanslern 2006). The Norwegian theologian Inge Lønning made an important observation in his report on the Bergman affair, a controversy that concerned antisemitic statements and support for Radio Islam, articulated by Uppsala University theologians Jan Bergman and Sigbert Axelson: in Swedish society it seems as if it is left to Jews themselves to protest against antisemitism and when they do so they are met with irritation. (Lønnings report is published in Arvidsson (ed.) 1994.) A similar point was made by historians Lars M. Andersson and Mattias Tyden in an article in Dagens Nyheter (April 4, 2006). Referring to recurring insinuations in the Swedish debate about “oversensitivity” regarding antisemitism, they poignantly wrote: “During the discussion on the Mohammed caricatures it was said that had the pictures been antisemitic they would have been met by countless condemnations. That is wrong. A number of ‘affairs’ during the last decades (Radio Islam, Jan Bergman, Lars Hillersberg) has demonstrated that antisemitism very seldom unleashes public protests in our country, with the exception of those coming from small, primarily Jewish, groups and from Sweden’s few antisemitism scholars. To the contrary, each time numerous excuses and justifications are produced.” The culture of denial in Sweden is complex. Its causes and functions must be understood against the background of several factors. One important factor is the national self-image that was constructed during the post-war era. This was a self-image from which problematic elements of the recent past—pro-German sympathies during 1930s and the war years, cooperation with the Nazi regime, racial biology, eugenics, and antisemitism—had been erased or rendered a place of little importance. Antisemitism was reconstructed as a foreign, particularly German, phenomenon or as an element isolated to marginal Nazi groups. Manifestations of antisemitism within the broader politi-



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cal culture represented and continue to represent a challenge to this image. It is not supposed to exist and must therefore be denied or at least trivialized. From this reconstruction also followed ignorance. There was no need to study or teach a subject considered so irrelevant to Swedish history. The Holocaust was until the 1990s hardly a subject at all for Swedish academics. As a result knowledge of antisemitism, whether in its historical or present forms, is very limited. Another factor is ideology. Within significant parts of the political left, including parts of the Social Democratic Party, Israel and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have become topics of great symbolic value. Israel has been constructed as a prime symbol of American or Western imperialism, neo-colonialism and racism, and the Palestinians have been transformed into prime victims of all these ills. To keep this ideological construction intact antisemitism as a contemporary problem must be dismissed. It cannot be allowed to play any part, at least not a significant one, in a Western, European or Swedish context. Nor can it be allowed to have any significant influence in the Arab or Muslim world. In some cases Jew-hatred stemming from Arab or Islamist sources can be acknowledged, but are generally explained as understandable, yet deplorable, effects of Israeli policies. To admit that antisemitism is a component in European or Swedish public discourse on Israel, however, is out of the question. Here, it cannot be allowed to play any role whatsoever. To this shall be added a self-perception, described above by Werner Bergmann, which “sees antisemitism as principally incompatible with a leftist outlook.” A third factor influencing this culture of denial is antisemitism itself. XI.  Comparative Scandinavian Perspectives: Tendencies in Denmark, Norway, and Finland There is relatively little data and research on developments regarding contemporary antisemitism in other Scandinavian countries, yet, there are signs pointing to the existence of problems similar to those identified in Sweden. Parallel with troubling xenophobic and antiMuslim tendencies, Denmark over the last couple of years experienced a number of incidents involving vandalism, violence, harassment and threats against Jews and Jewish institutions. According to some reports, antisemitic themes have also figured in the Danish debate on the

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Israeli-Palestinian conflict and in demonstrations against Israel (see entries on Denmark in EUMC 2004 and in Stephen Roth Institute Annual Reports 2004, 2006 and 2007; Arnheim 2008). Results from multinational surveys, conducted by the ADL, suggests that there had been a slight increase in the percentage of Danes agreeing with traditional antisemitic stereotypes in 2005 if compared with 2004. In the 2005 survey, 34% of Danes responded affirmatively to the question whether their opinion of Jews was influenced by “actions taken by the State of Israel,” and 39% of those, who so claimed, stated that their attitude toward Jews was more negative as a result of Israeli policies (ADL 2005). In Denmark, like in Sweden and several other European countries, antisemitism within parts of the Muslim community has become a more visible problem in later years. In 2002, the Danish branch of the radical Islamist organization Hizb-ut-Tahrir distributed flyers urging Muslims to kill Jews. The organization also has propagated antisemitism through its web site (EUMC 2004). A study, based on interviews with teachers and students focusing on antisemitism and anti-Muslim attitudes in Danish schools, was conducted by the Danish Institute for International Studies in the spring of 2005. According to this study, anti-Jewish expressions are not commonly heard, however, at schools with a large percentage of pupils of Muslim or Arab background antisemitic attitudes are more prevalent. These attitudes primarily become manifest when topics related to the Middle East are raised. Several teachers, for instance, report having heard pupils argue that Jews were behind the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States. Many teachers pointed towards Arab language media as an influence for these kinds of beliefs. According to the study, anti-Muslim attitudes were also present in Danish schools, and had become more prominent after the terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001 (DIIS Report 2006). In 2006, Norway experienced several antisemitic incidents, including violence, harassment, and vandalism. The most serious attack occurred on September 17, when 13 gunshots were fired at the Oslo synagogue. The Norwegian debate on the Middle East has, during the last couple of years, on numerous occasions included anti-Jewish stereotypes. A recurring theme is that of Israel being a Nazi state committing crimes comparable to the Holocaust (Stephen Roth Institute Annual Report 2004 and 2006; Uriely 2008). In July 2006, for instance, Dagbladet, a



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major daily, on its editorial page published a cartoon by Finn Graff portraying the Israeli prime minister Ehud Olmert as Amon Goeth, the SS commander of the Plaszow concentration camp (  July 10, 2006). During the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza in January 2009, the Norwegian diplomat Trine Lilleng, stationed in Saudi Arabia, distributed e-mails with the message that “The grandchildren of the survivors of the Holocaust are now doing the same thing to the Palestinians as Nazi-Germany did towards their grandparents” (quoted in Aftenposten January 21, 2009). During the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah, Jostein Gaarder, author of the international best-selling novel Sophie’s World, wrote an article in the leading newspaper Aftenposten (August 5, 2006) in which he questioned Israel’s right to exist and invoked a number of antisemitic notions. In his piece, titled “God’s chosen people,” Gaarder claimed that Israel’s policies were inspired by Judaism which he described as a “war religion” based on antihumanism, racism and vengefulness. Gaarder furthermore implied that Judaism legitimized the killing of children. In line with age-old anti-Jewish theology, he also deplored the Jews’ “stubbornness” in rejecting the teachings of Christ, which he construed as antithetical to Judaism. Gaarder’s article was sharply criticized by several Norwegian historians and intellectuals, but it was also supported by many, among them the former prime minister and ex-leader of the Conservative party, Kåre Willoch, and noted social anthropologist Thomas Hylland Eriksen. In December 2008, Willoch, known for his anti-Israel sentiment, caused controversy by stating in an interview in Norwegian radio (NRK) that he was pessimistic as to whether the incoming US administration under Barack Obama would pursue a different policy towards the Middle East, partly because the president had chosen “a chief of staff who is a Jew” (quoted in Nettavisen January 15, 2009). A survey among adult members (above 18 years old) of the Jewish community in Oslo, conducted in the fall of 2002, included some questions regarding experience and perceptions of antisemitism. 73% of respondents said they believed antisemitism had increased in Norway during the last five years, whereas 1% thought it had decreased. 75% said they personally had not been targets of antisemitism during the previous five years, 16% responded that they had been targeted on a single occasion, and 8% repeatedly. A total of 59% had never personally experienced antisemitism, 18% had done so on several occasions (Levin 2004a; Levin 2004b).

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With regard to Finland, psychoanalyst Mikael Enckell has pointed out that both Christian and more contemporary anti-Jewish images sometimes are invoked in the discussion on Israel. In 2002, under the heading “Paarma lashes out against the Chosen People,” the archbishop of the Lutheran church, Jukka Paarma, in an interview in Finland’s largest daily, Helsingin Sanomat, explained that the Israelis, inspired by the Nazi persecution of Jews, were constructing “Ghettoes and work camps” for the Palestinians. The previous year, the Finnish Foreign Minister Erkki Tuomioja made a similar comment when interviewed in the influential news magazine Suomen Kuvalehti. Israeli Jews, Tuomioja claimed, were pursuing politics “similar to the one they themselves fell victim to in the 1930s.” (Enckell 2004; Titelman, Enckell, Bachner 2004). In January 2009, the daily Hufvudstadsbladet in an editorial criticized Israeli actions during the Gaza war by claiming that “Israel seems to cherish the primitive, Old Testament ‘eye for an eye, tooth for a tooth’-principle” (  January 2, 2009). XII.  Conclusion Antisemitism has, without doubt, become a more serious problem both globally and in Europe at the beginning of the new century. This development has also affected Sweden. Although it is difficult to determine whether or not antisemitism in Sweden has increased since 2000, many indicators point to an increase of visibility of prejudice and negative attitudes towards Jews in public discourse. An analysis of media and public debate within mainstream political culture shows that historically and culturally rooted stereotypes as well as more contemporary demonic images surface rather frequently. While there is no basis whatsoever to claim that criticism against Israeli policies in any general sense is colored by prejudice, the debate on Israel and the Middle East, nevertheless, constitutes the central context for antisemitism in public discourse. There are several probable reasons for this. Israeli policies and actions, and the criticism they draw, serves as a stimulus for pre-existing anti-Jewish sentiments and prejudice to become manifest. But the debate on the Middle East also functions as a magnet for antisemitism because it constitutes a public arena where negative attitudes toward Jews can be legitimately articulated, since in this context they can easily be packaged and rationalized as criticism of Israel, Zionism or US foreign policy.



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Partly as a result of the connection between antisemitism, antiZionism and, although to a lesser extent, anti-Americanism, antisemitism within the broader political culture and mainstream media remains—as it has done for some decades—primarily, but certainly not solely, a left-wing phenomenon. The frequent usage of anti-Jewish language and imagery in publications such as Aftonbladet and Ordfront Magazine illustrates the tendency. This, however, might be mainly an “elite” phenomenon. According to the 2005 survey, there were no significant differences between respondents sympathizing with leftwing political parties and those favoring other parties represented in parliament with regards to the percentage harboring antisemitic attitudes. The stereotypes that figure in media and public debate, to some extent, correspond with, as shown by the survey study, attitudes and images harbored by limited, if not insignificant, parts of the general population. This is shown not least with reference to images of Jewish power, influence, and manipulation. Anti-Jewish discourse in Sweden contains a number of different themes and motifs. Most of them are traditional stereotypes that are recycled and adapted to a contemporary setting and to current needs. An analysis of the discourse, however, points not only to the continuity, adaptability, and elasticity of antisemitic imagery, but also to its propensity for renewal. The latter can be seen, for instance, in the fantasy of Jews or Israelis as presentday Nazis repeating the Holocaust. Finally, simultaneously with a more visible anti-Jewish discourse, there are signs of a growing tolerance of certain forms of antisemitism within mainstream political culture. Often, anti-Jewish expressions are not recognized as such. And this may well be the most deeply troubling tendency: the denial or trivialization and, at times, even the justification of antisemitism in Swedish political culture. References ADL (2005) Attitudes Toward Jews in Twelve European Countries—May 2005 (New York: ADL). Ahlmark, Per, Henrik Bachner, Maria-Pia Boëthius, Jerzy Einhorn, Peter Englund, Håkan Holmberg, Jackie Jakubowski, Georg Klein, Stieg Larsson, Agneta Pleijel, Jörgen Weibull, Per Wästberg (1993) Det eviga hatet. Om nynazism, antisemitism och Radio Islam (Stockholm: Bonniers and Svenska kommittén mot antisemitism). AJC (2005) Thinking about the Holocaust 60 Years Later. A Multinational Public-Opinion Survey—March–April 2005 (New York: AJC).

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Andersson, Lars M. (2000) En jude är en jude är en jude . . . Representationer av “juden” i svensk skämtpress 1900–1930 (Lund: Nordic Academic Press). Arnheim, Arthur (2008) Anti-Semitism after the Holocaust. Also in Denmark. In Manfred Gerstenfeld (ed) Behind the Humanitarian Mask. The Nordic Countries, Israel and the Jews (  Jerusalem: JCPA), pp. 171–178. Arvidsson, Håkan (ed) (1994) Affären Rami-Bergman. Dokument om judefientlighet och akademisk röta i Sverige (Stockholm: Moderna Tider). Bachner, Henrik (2001) Därför älskar de Finkelstein. Expressen, December 2. —— (2003) Anti-Jewish motifs in the public debate on Israel. Sweden: A case study. In Antisemitism Worldwide 2001/2 (Tel Aviv: The Stephen Roth Institute for the Study of Contemporary Antisemitism and Racism, Tel Aviv University), pp. 5–25, http://www.tau.ac.il/Anti-Semitism/asw2001-2/bachner.htm —— (2004) Återkomsten. Antisemitism i Sverige efter 1945 (Stockholm: Natur och Kultur). —— (2006) The uses of the Holocaust in antisemitic stereotyping. Paper (unpublished), Overlapping Histories—Conflicting Memories. The Holocaust and the Cultures of Remembrance in Eastern and Central Europe, Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research and Austrian Academy of Sciences, Vienna, April 23–25, 2006. —— (2008a) Tidskriften Mana klart antisemitisk. Axess web January 18, 2008, http:// www.axess.se/ —— (2008b) Vad vi kan lära oss av debatten om Mana. Axess web January 25, 2008, http://www.axess.se/ —— (2009) “Judefrågan.” Debatt om antisemitism i 1930-talets Sverige (Stockholm: Atlantis). Bachner, Henrik and Jonas Ring (2006) Antisemitiska attityder och föreställningar i Sverige (Stockholm: Forum för levande historia and Brottsförebyggande rådet). Berggren, Lena (1999) Nationell upplysning. Drag i den svenska antisemitismens idéhistoria (Stockholm: Carlssons). Bergmann, Werner (2004) Neuer alter Antisemitismus in Europa (2002–2003). Paper, Universität Zürich, February 3. Bergmann, Werner and Juliane Wetzel (2003) Manifestations of anti-Semitism in the European Union. First Semester 2002. Synthesis Report (Draft), (Berlin: Zentrum für Antisemitismusforschung, Technische Universität Berlin). Blomqvist, Håkan (2006) Nation, ras och civilisation i svensk arbetarrörelse före nazismen (Stockholm: Carlssons). Bruchfeld, Stéphane (2005) Grusade drömmar. Svenska “nationella” och det tyska nederlaget 1945. In Charlotta Brylla, Birgitta Almgren, Frank-Michael Kirsch, eds., Bilder i kontrast. Interkulturella processer Sverige/Tyskland i skuggan av nazismen 1933– 1945 (Aalborg, Center für deutsch-dänischen Kulturtransfer: Aalborg Universitet), pp. 61–87. Brå (2008) Hatbrott 2007. Rapport 2008:15 (Stockholm: Brottsförebyggande rådet), pp. 73–74. DIIS Report (2006) Eleverne skal lære at skelne. Erfaringer med antisemitisme, antimuslimske holdninger, undervisning i Holocaust og mellemøstenkonflikten i danske skoler og ungdomsuddannelser. En eksplorativ undersøgelse (Copenhagen: Dansk Institut for Internationale Studier). Edvardson, Cordelia (2008) Förintelsen som ’en sorglig händelse’? Svenska Dagbladet, January 28. Ekot (2005) Moské säljer judefientligt material. Sveriges Radio, http://www.sr.se, Retrieved November 27, 2005. Enckell, Mikael (2004) Uppror och efterföljelse. Essäer (Helsingfors, Söderströms). Epstein, Simon (1993) Cyclical Patterns in Antisemitism: The Dynamics of AntiJewish Violence in Western Countries since the 1950s. ACTA 2 (1993). EUMC (2004) Manifestations of Antisemitism in the EU 2002–2003 (Vienna: EUMC). —— Antisemitism—Summary overview of the situation in the European Union 2001–2005 (working paper) (Vienna: EUMC).  



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Friedman, Thomas L. (2002) Campus Hypocrisy. New York Times, October 16. Frohnert, Pär (2001) Das linke Auge sieht nur, was die Rechte tut. Antizionismus als verdeckter Antisemitismus: Der Fall Lars Hillersberg als skandalöses Exempel. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, April 19. —— (2002) Tyska reaktioner på Norman Finkelsteins The Holocaust Industry. Historisk Tidskrift 2 (2002). Gerner, Kristian (2002) Minnet av Kristallnatten skändas. Nyhetsbrev Februari 2002, Svenska kommittén mot antisemitism. http://www.skma.se/. Hansson, Wolfgang (2004) Kristna och judar ska dö. Aftonbladet, June 1. Hirsh, David (2008) Anti-Zionism and Antisemitism: Decoding the Relationship, http://www.z-word .com/, February 2008. Justitiekanslern (2006) Beslut January 2, 2006, Dnr 6335-05-33, http://www.justitiekanslern.se Karam, Salam (2004) Flygblad hetsade mot judar. Svenska Dagbladet, March 27. Lagerlöf, David (2006) Bland judiska konspiratörer och muslimska kolonisatörer— Antisemitism och islamofobi på internet. In Rasism och främlingsfientlighet i Sverige. Antisemitism och islamofobi 2005 (Norrköping: Integrationsverket), pp. 26–54. Levin, Irene (2004a) Jødisk liv i Norge: Hva sier DMT Oslos medlemmer om forholdet til Israel og antisemittisme? Hatikwa 2 (2004). —— (2004b) Personal communication. Levine, Paul A. (1996) From Indifference to Activism. Swedish Diplomacy and the Holocaust; 1938–1944 Uppsala (Department of History: Uppsala University). Lööw, Heléne (2001) Durban och terrorattackerna mot USA—antisemitismen förenar. Nyhetsbrev November 2001, Svenska kommittén mot antisemitism, http://www/ skma.se/. Malm, Fredrik (2003) Massmordspredikan i svensk moské. Dagens Nyheter, August 21. Nylund Skog, Susanne (2006) Med Davidsstjärnan under tröjan. Upplevelser av diskriminering och judiskt ursprung i Sverige 2005. In Rasism och främlingsfientlighet i Sverige. Antisemitism och islamofobi 2005 (Norrköping: Integrationsverket), pp. 73–110. Olsson, Tobias (2009), Fler hot mot judar i Sverige. Svenska Dagbladet, January 7. Rensmann, Lars (2005) Demokratie und Judenbild. Antisemitismus in der politischen Kultur der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag). Ring, Jonas and Scarlett Morgentau (2004) Intolerance. Antisemitic, homophobic, islamophobic and anti-immigrant tendencies among young people (Stockholm: Forum för levande historia och Brottsförebyggande rådet). Shamir, Israel (2003) Blommor i Galiléen (Stockholm: Alhambra). Slätt, Richard (2006) På Ordfronten intet nytt. Neo, 2 (2006), p. 79. Stephen Roth Institute Annual Report (2004, 2006, 2007), The Stephen Roth Institute for the Study of Contemporary Antisemitism and Racism, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, http://www.tau.ac.il/Anti-Semitism/annual-report.htm. Surmann, Rolf (ed) (2001) Das Finkelstein-Alibi. “Holocaust-Industrie” und Tätergesellschaft (Köln, Papyrossa). Svanberg, Ingvar and Mattias Tydén (1997) Sverige och Förintelsen. Debatt och dokument om Europas judar 1933–1945 (Stockholm: Arena). Svenska kommittén mot antisemitism (2005). Israelkritiker rekommenderar antisemitisk bok. Nyhetsbrev April 2005, Svenska kommittén mot antisemitism, http://www .skma.se. Taguieff, Pierre-André (2004) Rising from the Muck. The New Antisemitism in Europe (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee). Thorsén, Tjerstin (2009) Regissör hoppar av pjäs efter Israels Gazaattacker. Helsingborgs Dagblad, January 21. Titelman, David, Mikael Enckell and Henrik Bachner (2004) Antisemitism in Sweden and Finland. A documentation and a psychoanalytic discussion. The Scandinavian Psychoanalytic Review, 27 (2004), pp. 52–57.

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Tossavainen, Mikael (2003) Det förnekade hatet. Antisemitism bland araber och muslimer i Sverige, (Stockhom, Svenska kommittén mot antisemitism). Uriely, Erez (2008) Jew-Hatred in Contemporary Norwegian Caricatures. In Manfred Gerstenfeld, (ed), Behind the Humanitarian Mask. The Nordic Countries, Israel and the Jews (  Jerusalem: JCPA), pp. 146–153. Walzer, Michael (2003) The United States in the World—Just Wars and Just Societies: An Interview with Michael Walzer. Imprints 1 (2003). Wasserstein, Bernard (1996) Vanishing Diaspora. The Jews in Europe since 1945 (London: Hamish Hamilton). Wistrich, Robert (1985) Hitler’s Apocalypse. Jews and the Nazi Legacy (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson). Wright, Rochelle (1998) The Visible Wall. Jews and Other Ethnic Outsiders in Swedish Film (Carbondale/Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press).

Erosion of a Taboo: Antisemitism in Switzerland Christina Späti I.  Introduction In 1979, Bernd Marin (2000) introduced the concept of ‘Antisemitism without Antisemites’ in order to describe antisemitism in Austria after the Second World War.1 This is a concept that also applies to the situation in Switzerland. It suggests that even though its extent may vary, antisemitism still continues to exist, in spite of the taboo that it became in the aftermath of the atrocities committed by the National Socialists. Moreover, the concept points to the everyday character of antisemitism after 1945. Antisemitism is no longer an integral part of a specific worldview or Weltanschauung, but consists of a diffuse and incoherent conglomerate of anti-Jewish stereotypes. Finally, the concept also addresses the way in which society in general handles antisemitism: if it is assumed that there are no antisemites, then it also follows that there is no reason to be preoccupied by the phenomenon, or to consider the need for appropriate counter-measures. Antisemitism can generally be defined as an attitude that targets Jews specifically because they are Jews. It thus relies on generalizations and traditional, long-standing antisemitic prejudices and stereotypes. So-called ‘secondary antisemitism’ is a specific characteristic of post-war antisemitism. It results from a certain way of addressing and handling the memory of the Shoah (Haury 2002: 132–144; Rensmann 1998; Bergmann and Erb 1991: 231–273). As described by Marin, antisemitism after 1945 is generally no longer expressed as part of a Weltanschauung, but in everyday situations. A further feature is the unorganized manner in which it is articulated. Such manifestations of antisemitism can predominantly be found in Letters to the Editor, in

1  I would like to thank Damir Skenderovic and Daniel Wildmann for their useful critique of earlier versions of this paper, as well as Duncan Brown for his precious help in editing the final version. All translations from German or French are mine.

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personal letters to Jewish organizations or persons, and also occasionally in the media. In this chapter, I will address this specific form of antisemitism. Following an overview of the history of antisemitism since the foundation of the Swiss Confederation in 1848, I will focus on two debates, led in the 1990s and 2000s, in which antisemitism was expressed in a variety of forms. One debate took place in the context of the controversy of the mid-1990s regarding Switzerland’s conduct during the National Socialist period, when the Swiss were ‘abruptly wrenched from the state of innocence in which the majority had believed themselves to be’ (Benz 2001a: 96). Several observers registered an upsurge in antisemitic resentments expressed in the course of the discussions, resentments which were now brought into public debate with an increasing lack of restraint. A second, though less far-reaching controversy emerged from the discussions concerning the Federal Government’s plans to abolish the interdiction of ritual slaughter in the winter of 2001/02. Finally, I will analyze attitudes towards the conflict in the Middle East as a further context in which antisemitic stereotypes are brought forward. In contrast to the other two debates, however, this context has additionally to be seen as part of a longer historical tradition. In addition to these mainly unorganized manifestations of antisemitism, the radical right in Switzerland represents a political movement which incorporates antisemitism as a part of its exclusionist ideology (Skenderovic 2009a). Protagonists of the radical right and their antisemitic statements will thus be discussed in a further section of this paper. Finally, I will focus on the reaction of the majority society to antisemitism and its handling of the phenomenon. As the conclusion will show, Switzerland has known a long tradition of antisemitic patterns which have mainly sought to fend off Jews on the grounds that they were seen as being ‘foreign’ to Swiss society. II.  A Brief History of Antisemitism in Switzerland Antisemitism in Switzerland has a long history that has been shaped by discrimination, persecution, and ghettoization. Emancipation was a long and difficult process. It occurred relatively late in international terms and then only under pressure from other countries, which did not want their Jewish nationals living in Switzerland to be subject to discrimination.



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After 1776, Jews were only allowed to settle in two village ghettos in Oberendingen and Lengnau, which both lay in the county of Baden (Böning 1998; Weingarten 1991; Weldler-Steinberg 1966). The foundation of the Swiss Confederation in 1848 did nothing to alter the precarious status of Jews, nor the traditional patterns of their exclusion. The new constitution restricted freedom of settlement and the right to equality before the law to Swiss citizens of Christian denomination. It was only when several other states, particularly France, made the conclusion of business treaties dependent on Jewish emancipation that Swiss citizens voted in favor of freedom of settlement for Jews in 1866. However, the process of Jewish emancipation was only brought to an end in 1874, when the totally revised constitution recognized the freedom of the Jewish cult, something which had continued to be denied in 1866 (Mattioli 1998b; Külling 1977: 9–14; 36–45; WeldlerSteinberg 1970: 133–147). Nearly twenty years later, however, the legal equality of Jews was partially revoked when the people voted in favor of a popular initiative, which inscribed the interdiction of ritual slaughter into the constitution (Krauthammer 2000: 52–94; Mesmer 1998; Külling 1977: 249–383). As was the case in neighboring countries, the process of Jewish emancipation in Switzerland was accompanied by riots and acts of violence, which mainly took place in the two Jewish villages of Lengnau and Oberendingen (Böning 1998; Mattioli 1998c). All in all, however, antisemitism in Switzerland did not manifest itself predominantly in acts of physical violence, but, instead, took on a number of other forms. In the 19th century, the important issues were traditional Christian anti-Judaism, on the one hand, and the repulsion of the stranger on the other. These two discursive threads were connected in the representation of Switzerland as a ‘Christian nation’ (Mattioli 1998d), from which everything that was not Christian needed to be kept well away. At the end of the 19th century, antisemitism in Switzerland thus predominantly took the form of national antisemitism. With the beginning of the 20th century, antisemitism in Switzerland increasingly began to express itself in terms of a defense against so-called ‘Over-foreignization,’ a concept that had drawn ever more attention within public debates (Kury 2003; Skenderovic 2003). The discourse on ‘Over-foreignization’ specifically targeted Jews from Eastern Europe (the so-called ‘Ostjuden’), who were represented as being doubly foreign and were thus discriminated against in the domains of rights of settlement and work permits, as well as naturalization

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procedures (Gast 1997: 235–238). Following the First World War, the concept of assimilation became increasingly salient in migration and naturalization policies, and the conditions for naturalization were tightened accordingly. These measures specifically targeted Jews whose capacity for assimilation was denied, with specific reference made to biologist and culturalist argumentation (Mächler 1998). The continuity as well as the impact of the discourse of ‘Overforeignization’ became evident in the 1930s and 1940s, when Swiss refugee policy was tightened under the aegis of the antisemitic head of the Police for Foreigners, Heinrich Rothmund. The general assumption was that the presence of Jews would cause a rise in antisemitism and that Switzerland must therefore be protected against ‘Judaization’ (‘Verjudung’) (Picard 1994: 34–40). Gerhart Riegner (1997: 50) has used the term ‘prophylactic antisemitism’ to describe this antisemitism based on an attitude of defense. In addition to this antisemitic attitude, which was mainly expressed in policies related to naturalization and refugees, antisemitic positions were also spread within society (Metzger 2006). Various publications of a Catholic-conservative orientation drew on the traditional and well-known stereotypes referring to an alleged Jewish world conspiracy and a Jewish domination of the press (Altermatt 1999). Particularly in the domain of culture, Jews were seen as ‘destabilizing elements.’ Antisemitism was thus connected to anti-socialism, as well as to antiliberalism. As a consequence, Jews came to represent a commonly held conception of the enemy. In the fields of agriculture and the economy, Jews were exposed to commonly known clichés relating to them being in possession of warehouses or making use of unfair business practices. Jews were also discriminated against in the army, particularly in respect to promotions. Moreover, only a small number of Jews could be found in the civil service, or among the ranks of university professors (Kamis-Müller 1990). Sporadically in the 1920s, and more frequently in the 1930s, antisemitic assaults were registered, which were partially inspired by events taking place abroad. The so-called ‘swastika surge’ (‘Hakenkreuzwelle’) of 1923/1924 manifested itself in the form of anti-Jewish flyers and graffiti, thereby startling the population who predominantly disapproved of antisemitic physical assaults. In the 1930s, several groups from within the so-called ‘fronts movement’ made their public appearance. Influenced directly or indirectly by German or Italian fascism, these groups added antisemitism as an



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essential cornerstone of their nationalist and exclusionist ideology. They were responsible for several antisemitic riots and assaults, for instance during the Zionist congresses which were held in Switzerland in 1935 and 1937 (Stutz 1997a; Glaus 1969; Wolf 1969). Initially, 1945 meant no caesura in the history of antisemitism in Switzerland. Various authors (Kreis 2001, 1998; Altermatt 1999: 149) point to the consistency of Jew-hatred even after the decline of National Socialism. As Georg Kreis (2001: 56) has shown, antisemitism even increased in the years following the Second World War, because it was now possible, once again, to make antisemitic remarks without immediately being decried as a National Socialist. Moreover, after 1945 and 1948, two new contexts arose which presented potential opportunities for the expression of antisemitism: the question of how to deal with the memory of the Shoah, on the one hand, and the establishment of the State of Israel, on the other. Firstly, shortly after the End of the Second World War, a small, but very active group of propagandists emerged who can be seen as precursors of negationism (Fischer 1999, Tschirren 1999), a fact which has so far been widely disregarded in historical research on international negationism (Skenderovic 2009a: 282). Secondly, most Swiss viewed the foundation of the State of Israel with a certain scepticism based on traditional anti-Jewish prejudices expressing doubt concerning the loyalty of Swiss Jews towards Switzerland (Kreis 2001; Roschewski 1994: 19–22). Even though a majority of the Swiss took a positive attitude towards Israel in the 1950s and 1960s, out of admiration for its pioneering accomplishments and the military superiority of the Israeli army, referral to Israel remained an issue that was at least potentially prone to antisemitic statements. These emerged as soon as Israel was specifically regarded as a Jewish State, which allowed anti-Jewish stereotypes to surface. This became markedly clear after 1973, when Israel’s image was shattered and increasing criticism of its policies was voiced. This happened among the Swiss Left in particular (Späti 2006; Häsler 1991; Ritterband 1989; Guggenheim 1983), but gradually diffused into mainstream political attitudes. Some of the critical statements on Israel drew on antisemitic stereotypes. A kind of ‘subtle negationism’ arose in the way that Zionists were equated with National Socialists. In the first instance, such equations represented a trivialization of the Shoah. At the same time, they also insisted on a reversal in the status of perpetrators and victims, by making Jews in general culpable for the fate of the Palestinians (Späti 2006: 334–335).

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Sporadically, anti-Jewish assaults took place in the years following the Second World War. In 1978, for instance, radical left-wing groups perpetrated arson attacks against cinemas showing a movie on the mission to rescue Israeli hostages in Entebbe. One year later, in the context of the broadcasting of the film Holocaust, anti-Jewish graffiti appeared and a synagogue was vandalized by a small explosive device (Guggenheim 1983; Roschewski 1994). Moreover, negationism and antisemitism remained central parts of the ideology of the extreme Right throughout the post-war era (Skenderovic 2009b; Fischer 1999; Niggli and Frischknecht 1998; Altermatt and Skenderovic 1995). Rightwing extremism reached a peak during the so-called ‘small springtime of fronts’ (Frischknecht 1991) in the late 1980s, when various new extreme right groups emerged and violence against asylum seekers increased considerably. III.  Surveys on Antisemitism in the 1990s and 2000s Empirical studies based on surveys represent an important aspect of research on antisemitism, since they make it possible to formulate a response to questions regarding the intensity and historical development of antisemitic attitudes. Contrary to other countries, there are no significant and continuous empirical studies on the phenomenon of Jew-hatred in Switzerland (Späti 2005; Manetsch 2003; Eidgenössische Kommission gegen Rassismus (EKR) 1998: 45–47). This statement is also true with regard to studies concerned with the exploration of right-wing extremism (Cattacin et al. 2006: 10–11). Accordingly, it is rather difficult to assess the development, quality, and quantity of antisemitic opinions, attitudes, and acts over time in Switzerland. Assertions stating that antisemitic incidences have increased during the debates on Switzerland’s role during the time of National Socialism, or since the outbreak of the Second Intifada in 2000 are based foremost on the observations of interested organizations (e.g. CICAD 1999; 2002). While there are some surveys related to the percentage of the population who indicate agreement with antisemitic statements, their results are hardly comparable since there have been no replication studies. Surveys from the 1970s and 1980s have consistently shown a base stock of about 10% of the population who have agreed with explicitly antisemitic statements (EKR 1998: 47). However, these studies were



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restricted to the exploration of traditional antisemitic stereotypes. Specific aspects of post-Holocaust antisemitism (Benz 2001b; Rensmann 1998), such as the phenomenon of secondary antisemitism, were not considered (Späti 2005). In 1994, a Vox-analysis was carried out in order to examine the proximity of voters to statements emanating from the extreme right (Schloeth 1994). One of the questions pertained to opinions regarding the influence of Jews in Switzerland. 12% of the sample fully or partially agreed with the statement that their influence was too great (ibid: 17).2 A further survey dating from the autumn of 1995 tried to determine the degree of agreement with antisemitic statements, as well as the respective desires for social proximity to, or distance from Jews (Gredig 2000). More than 50% of the respondents fully or partially agreed with the stereotype of Jewish wealth, as well as with claims regarding the physical recognizability of Jews.3 Over 70% of the respondents stated that they would object to accommodating a Jew within their family.4 In the analysis of the survey, the author concluded that there was ‘considerable agreement with the stereotypes and a widely held emotional rejection of Jews’ within Switzerland (ibid: 135). According to the Federal Commission against Racism (EKR), it was possible to observe a surge of ‘common antisemitism’ in 1997 (EKR 1998: 40). In the course of the debates on Switzerland’s conduct during the period of National Socialism, many observers agreed that there was an increase in the number of antisemitic statements made in public (  JPR & AJC 1999; CICAD 1998; Stutz 1997b). However, this observation cannot be backed by surveys based on comparable parameters, since such studies do not exist. The only survey that allows for a direct comparison consists of the questioning of young adults in the city of Zurich, which was carried out twice, in 1995 and 1997 (Gisler 1999). Responses to questions concerning the Jews sharing joint responsibility for their own persecution and in the evaluation of the persecution of Jews revealed very similar results between the two dates of questioning. A significant difference, however, could be observed in   3% of the respondents agreed fully, 9% partially with this assessment.   The questions were: ‘All Jews have always been efficient businessmen and are therefore very clever in dealing with money;’ as well as: ‘Jews can be recognized from their outward appearance’ (Gredig 2000: 128). 4   However, a survey conducted by the GfS in 2007 found that only one quarter of the respondents fully or partially refused the idea of accommodating Jews to their family (Longchamp et al. 2007: 24). 2 3

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relation to the respondents’ attitude towards the statement ‘The Jews have too much influence in the world.’ Whereas in 1995, 14% of the respondents had agreed with this statement, in 1997 the percentage rate of agreement stood at 31%, which more than doubled the figure from 1995 (ibid: 45). In view of the heated debate on unclaimed Jewish assets and Switzerland’s role in the 1930s and 1940s, further surveys were carried out in 1997, some of them mandated by media enterprises. Their results are of limited significance, however, since they were based on a different set of questions (EKR 1998: 45–46). A survey conducted in 2000 by the Research Institute of the Swiss Society for Applied Social Research (GfS) was met with particular interest (Späti 2005). GfS determined a ‘typically Swiss antisemitism’ based on levels of agreement with three statements that referred to an alleged, excessively powerful Jewish influence both throughout the world and within Switzerland, as well as to an alleged exploitation of the Holocaust by Jews seeking to serve their own interests (Longchamp et al. 2000).5 16% of respondents fully endorsed an antisemitism that might be defined by their relation to these statements, while 60% did so partially (ibid: 25–26). The survey’s findings were questioned by other researchers, however, since the percentage of antisemites was significantly higher than it had been in former surveys. Particular criticism was made with reference to the definition of antisemitism that was used by GfS, with critics arguing that those aspects considered to be ‘typically Swiss’ were too greatly influenced by the debates on unclaimed Jewish assets and thus expressed a certain unease among the population that should not be mistaken for antisemitism (Steinmann and Weill 2000). These criticisms did not, however, take into account that the elements of antisemitism as defined by GfS were consistent with the definition of secondary antisemitism. On the other hand, the survey from 2000 cannot be seen as an indicator of an increase in antisemitism within the population, since former studies had neglected to incorporate secondary antisemitism into their questions. In 2007, the GfS once again carried out a survey on anti-Jewish attitudes in Switzerland (Longchamp et al. 2007). However, the definition of antisemitism as well as the questions asked were rather different

5  It remains unclear, however, why these antisemitic statements should be considered as ‘‘typically Swiss.’’



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from the ones used in 2000, making it impossible to regard it as a follow-up. This study, which also included an assessment of anti-Israeli attitudes among the population, found 10% of the respondents to have systematically antisemitic attitudes, whereas 28% showed selective antiJewish attitudes. The only surveys conducted in the 2000s whose results are comparable are those conducted by the Anti-Defamation-League (ADL 2007; 2005; 2004; 2002). Based on these findings, the levels of agreement with antisemitic statements in Switzerland showed a tendency to sink between 2002 and 2005, and then once again increased in 2007. The percentage of those who believed it to be ‘probably true’ that Jews still talked too much about what happened to them in the Holocaust remained consistent between 2002 and 2005 (at around 50%), and then dropped to 45% in 2007. Antisemitic statements suggesting that Jews were more loyal towards Israel than towards Switzerland, or that they had too much power in the business world and in international financial markets lost support between 2002 and 2005, but saw a considerable upsurge in 2007. In comparisons with eleven European countries, Switzerland’s scores were more or less average in 2005, with the exception of Swiss positions on the question of whether Jews still talked too much about the Holocaust. In this aspect, their levels of agreement were above average. In 2007, the percentage of Swiss respondents who thought that the majority of the antisemitic statements were ‘probably true’ equalled the percentage results obtained in Austria (32%) and Belgium (30%), while the percentages were much higher in Hungary (50%), and significantly lower in the Netherlands (8%) and in the United Kingdom (17%). Given the diversity of the surveys, consistent analyses are difficult. Hypotheses concerning a rise in antisemitism in the course of the debates on unclaimed assets, or—as in other countries—as a consequence of the Second Intifada cannot really be proven. Even though the survey conducted in the city of Zurich revealed a percentage increase between 1995 and 1997 in the number of respondents who consented to the assumption of Jews having too much power, this was not true for the other questions pertaining to antisemitic attitudes. Moreover, Gredig’s study (2000), carried out in 1995, already showed considerable levels of agreement with antisemitic statements, as well as a clear desire to maintain social distance from Jews, even before the outbreak of the debates in the second half of the 1990s.

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IV.  Debates on Switzerland’s Conduct during the Period of National Socialism 1996 saw the onset of a fierce public debate regarding unclaimed Jewish assets in Swiss banks, the involvement of the Swiss National Bank in gold transactions and looted assets, profits made by the Swiss economy in relation to National Socialist ‘aryanization measures,’ as well as the question of whether the Swiss refugee policy of that time had been affected by antisemitic attitudes. Since the mid-1990s, the Swiss public was increasingly confronted by reproaches, emanating predominantly from the US, with regard to Switzerland’s conduct during the period of National Socialism. These reproaches struck the self-image of many Swiss with unexpected vehemence, particularly among the elderly people who had experienced wartime, the so-called ‘active service generation’ (Maissen 2005). In 1989, Switzerland had celebrated the anniversary of the general mobilization of the army in 1939, and thus the outbreak of the Second World War (Chiquet 1998). This shows the extent to which the awareness of the historical and moral significance of the Holocaust remained underdeveloped at the onset of the 1990s (Altermatt 2004). Equally, it serves to demonstrate the self-image and the evaluation of Switzerland’s conduct during the period of National Socialism that were held by large sections of Swiss society. This image was defined by a notion of armed self-defense and neutrality, combined with the idea of a Swiss humanitarian tradition which had made Switzerland a safe haven for refugees. While historical research since the 1970s had provided reasons to doubt this representation of a well-fortified, neutral, and humanitarian Switzerland in the 1930s and 1940s (Kreis 2002a, 2002b), these findings only gradually diffused into the consciousness of greater sections of the public. The debates that began in the mid-1990s led to a critical revision of Swiss history, in particular through the Independent Commission of Experts Switzerland—Second World War, which was mandated by the Federal Council. On the other hand, however, they also provided a valve for antisemitic statements, since many saw ‘the Jews’ as the principal protagonists behind the accusations levelled against Switzerland (EKR 1998: 10). According to Aram Mattioli (1997: 77), this provoked the first wave of antisemitism to be seen since the end of the Second World War. It reached its first peak at the beginning of 1997. Various authors and reports (Benz 2001a: 97; Gisler 1999: 115–118; EKR 1998: 40) agree



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on the event that led to the outbreak of the upsurge in antisemitism. At the end of 1996, Jean-Pascal Delamuraz, then President of the Federal Council, declared in an interview with two Swiss newspapers, that he saw it as an admission of guilt to establish a fund for victims of National Socialism, a decision which had been taken in order to dilute the momentary crisis (24 heures, December 31, 1996; Tribune de Genève, December 31, 1996). Moreover, he denounced the 250 million dollars demanded by Jewish Organizations as ‘ransom’ and ‘blackmail.’ After these statements had caused national and international uproar, Federal Councillor Delamuraz sent a letter to the Jewish World Congress in which he regretted having hurt the feelings of the Jewish community (Nouveau Quotidien, January 16, 1997). Delamuraz’s declarations triggered hundreds of Letters to the Editors of Swiss newspapers, as well as to Jewish and anti-racist organizations and to Jewish public figures (EKR 1998: 40–41; Gisler 1999: 115–118). After reaching its peak in the spring of 1997, the antisemitic wave declined temporarily, but rose again in the spring and summer of 1998. At that time, the media reported extensively on the discussions for a global solution between the Swiss banks on the one side, and Jewish World Congress and class action lawsuits from the USA on the other. In August 1998, the parties agreed on a global settlement of 1.25 billion dollars (Maissen 2005: 421–426; Gisler 1999: 139). The upswings and downswings of antisemitic statements, thus, paralleled the intensity of media coverage (Gisler 1999: 135). After the new highpoint in the summer of 1998, the amount of public antisemitic declarations gradually declined (CICAD 1998). Many of the antisemitic statements uttered in connection with the debates between 1996 and 1998 operated with traditional anti-Jewish stereotypes connoted to ‘power’ and ‘money’ (Erdle and Wildmann 1998).6 Jews from the USA were particularly ascribed with overwhelming power. Senator Alfonse D’Amato, for instance, was decried as an ideal advocate of ‘the American Jews whose omnipotence in the USA is well known’ (Le Matin, May 24, 1997). In January 1997, the weekly publication Facts published a dossier on Swiss Jews which discussed,

6   The analysis of antisemitic utterances in the years between 1996 and 1998 is based on the examples cited in the report by the Federal Commission against Racism (EKR 1998), as well as on Gisler’s (1999) examination of hundreds of letters sent to Sigi Feigel, a prominent Jewish lawyer who repeatedly took a public stance during the debates on unclaimed Jewish assets.

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among other things, the percentage of Jews in important business sectors (Facts, January 16, 1997). Even though the goal of the article was to demonstrate that ‘the Jews’ did not have too much influence in Switzerland, it invoked ‘the stereotypical idea of Jewish power in an uncritical fashion’ (Erdle and Wildmann 1998: 155). Connected to the notion of ‘power’ was the idea of conspiracy, of a Jewish complot to tear down the Swiss financial centre. This hypothesis had already been brought forward by Delamuraz in the aforementioned interview (24 heures, December 31, 1996; Tribune de Genève, December 31, 1996). It could also be found in some of the blatantly antisemitic letters to Sigi Feigel, honorary president of the Jewish community of Zurich. These letters equated the monetary demands of Jewish organizations with alleged Jewish aspirations to dominate the world (Gisler 1999: 184). According to Gisler (1999: 182), ‘mercenary’ was one of the negative expressions that was used most often with reference to Jews as uttered in the letters to Feigel. The alleged avarice of Jews was seen as their main incentive to demand money from Swiss banks (Benz 2001a: 101–102). Furthermore, the connection of ‘power’ and ‘money’ evoked the idea of ‘blackmail’ that had already been expressed by Delamuraz. In addition to the usage of traditional anti-Jewish stereotypes during the debates on Switzerland’s conduct during the period of National Socialism, a further expression of antisemitism also made an appearance which was similar to the secondary antisemitism which emerged in the Federal Republic of Germany after the decline of National Socialism. Jews were blamed for denigrating Switzerland and for not being thankful enough for the fact that Switzerland had actually admitted Jewish refugees. Moreover, they were accused of bad-mouthing the country and of exploiting the memory of the Holocaust (Benz 2001a). This reversal of perpetrators and victims was further fueled by the reproach that the Israelis were treating the Palestinians much worse at that time than the Swiss had previously acted towards the Jewish refugees. According to Gisler (1999: 206), criticism of Israel was one of the most salient themes in the letters to Feigel, even though Israel had hardly participated in the debates on unclaimed Jewish assets. A further aspect of a reversal of perpetrators and victims can be seen in the warnings issued to Jews that they would evoke antisemitism with their behavior. These arguments were all frequently connected, as is exemplified in the following letter sent to Sigi Feigel in November 1997: ‘We all are outraged over the unbelievably exorbitant and



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inconsiderate, malicious and extortionate behavior of the Jews towards a small country which had itself at that time been in a very dangerous situation and had nevertheless admitted so many Jewish refugees. [. . .] We Swiss were also forced at that time to guard our own interests, as Israel has always done in considerably more extremist and inconsiderate fashion. [. . .] Unfortunately, it is now impossible to reverse the fact [. . .], that Switzerland has been totally denigrated by World Jewry and that its international reputation has utterly undeservingly been ruined. [. . .] Thus, the absolute boomerang effect comes into effect: sympathy or at least indifference towards Jews has been completely reversed and this will have long term consequences even though they may not be obvious yet! In any case, one now understands the Palestinians and the general unpopularity of the Jews in the whole world.’ (cited according to Gisler 1999: 32). V.  Antisemitism in Attitudes towards Israel Proponents of the thesis that a ‘new antisemitism’ has appeared within Europe in the last couple of years base their argumentation on the idea that the central issue of the conflict in the Middle East acts as a projection surface for antisemitic statements and it is this which distinguishes it from traditional expressions of antisemitism (Embacher 2005; Iganski and Kosmin 2003; Taguieff 2002). While many authors agree on the increase of anti-Zionism among Muslim immigrants and representatives of the Left since the outbreak of the Second Intifada in 2000, some of them, nevertheless, reject the idea of a ‘new antisemitism’ because this would indicate that a fundamentally different type of antisemitism was making its appearance (Holz 2005; Klug 2003). However, as some authors have pointed out, criticism of Israel, in particular among the European Left, has been partially mixed with antisemitic elements since as far back as the late 1960s (Späti 2006; Rabinovici, Speck and Sznaider 2004; Alderman 2003). The question of the degree to which anti-Zionism can be equated with antisemitism is a controversial subject not only among academics (Späti 2006: 40–43). Any assumption that the two phenomena share a deep-seated sense of identity presupposes that the notions of ‘Zionists’ and ‘Jews’ are interchangeable and are used synonymously by antiZionists (e.g. Holz 2001: 441; Taguieff 1989: 3; Keilsohn 1988: 773). This statement, however, is difficult to prove empirically. Moreover, it

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would mean that every criticism of Zionism contains antisemitic tendencies. Thus, according to Brian Klug (2003), antisemitism should only be attributed to criticism of Israel when it is obvious that it targets Jews because they are Jews. This means that criticism of Israel is antisemitic only when it is directed not towards Israelis or Israeli politics, but rather contains a generalization which explicitly refers to Israelis as ‘Jews’ in an essentialist fashion. Firstly, this kind of generalization occurs when Israelis are characterized with attributes which are based on traditional anti-Jewish stereotypes and prejudices. In the context of criticism of Israeli politics, such prejudices are often connected to classical anti-Judaist constructions which depict Judaism as revengeful and bellicose, where Christianity, in contrast, is believed to be conciliatory and peace-loving. An unusually explicit example for such an utterance could be read in a column by Margrit Sprecher in the Bernese daily Berner Zeitung (Berner Zeitung, June 16, 2001). Therein, the author reported the decision of the Israeli government to teach the bible, particularly the Book of Joshua, more frequently in schools. The author went on to describe this book as ‘the most bloodthirsty of all books in the bible,’ even though it was commonly known that ‘the Old Testament is a grim oeuvre and has always served as a quarry in which to find all sorts of missiles for acts of revenge. Advocates of the death penalty are particularly successful in finding their arguments in it. “An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth” is one of their most handy and popular slogans.’ Sprecher then drew some parallels between Joshua’s wars and current Israeli politics and ended up by concluding: ‘This is not the literature that brings peace to the country.’ The column was met with harsh critique from parts of the newspaper’s readership. Sigi Feigel (Berner Zeitung, June 23, 2001) emphatically admonished that the article was likely ‘to fuel antisemitic tendencies within parts of the population.’ Berner Zeitung later apologized to those whose religious feelings had been hurt (Berner Zeitung, June 23, 2001). A second context in which statements on Israel and Israeli politics target Israelis as Jews and assess them in a negative fashion manifests itself in comparisons that are drawn between Israeli politics and those of the National Socialists. This kind of identification of Israelis/Zionists and National Socialists has a long tradition within the Swiss Left, not only among radical anti-Zionists, but also among Social Democrats, trade unionists, and religious Socialists who are, in general, only moderately critical of Israel. Such an equation implicitly or explicitly



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leads to a trivialization of the Shoah and can therefore be interpreted as an expression of secondary antisemitism. Firstly, the equation does not limit itself to (excessive) criticism of Zionism or Zionists, but rather concerns Jews in general due to the inherent relativization of the Holocaust. Secondly, the reversal of perpetrators and victims which is at the core of this construction implies an extension of the notion of ‘Zionists’ to a notion of ‘Jews,’ for it was not Zionists, but Jews in general, regardless of their religious or political orientations, who were victims of the Shoah. The equation of Zionists and National Socialists thus targets Jews in a twofold way. This equation was exemplified, for instance, in a cartoon posted on the left-wing media website indymedia in 2002. It shows a boy in the Warsaw ghetto, wearing a yellow Star of David and saying the words: ‘I am Palestinian.’ The organization Aktion Kinder des Holocaust subsequently reported the website for an offense under the anti-racism law (Späti 2002; Die WochenZeitung, April 4, 2002). A further form of equation can be found in the usage of notions for Israeli politics which clearly stem from National Socialist vocabulary. The well-known Middle East commentator Arnold Hottinger (Die WochenZeitung, April 22, 2004), for instance, wrote about the ‘final solution’ that Sharon was aiming towards with his policies towards the Palestinians.7 Thirdly, antisemitic tendencies can be found in criticisms of Israel which hold Jews in general responsible for acts committed by Israelis. In April 2001, for instance, Kurt Schaub, a pastor and sociologist, wrote an article in a protestant paper in which he harshly criticized the politics of the Sharon government: ‘Most Swiss are becoming more and more aware of the discrepancy between the moral claims of the Jews towards us (unclaimed Jewish assets, refugee policy, an international Commission mandated to re-evaluate history) and Jewish racism when it comes to the matter of Israeli interests, and they see its hypocrisy’ (Magnet, April 2001). Schaub obviously does not differentiate between Israeli and non-Israeli Jews, but rather ascribes certain kinds of behavior to ‘the Jews,’ as if they were a single, homogenous group. The findings of a survey conducted by the ADL in 2005 are quite revealing in this aspect. Among the 12 countries considered, Switzerland registered, with a figure of 41%, the highest percentage of ­respondents

7  For more examples of equations of Israelis and National Socialists, see CICAD Rapport (2002: 8–9).

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who claimed that their opinion of Jews was influenced by actions taken by the state of Israel. 59% of those whose opinions were thus influenced declared that their opinion of Jews was worse as a result of actions taken by Israel (ADL 2005: 10–11).8 One can therefore conclude that in Switzerland, there is relatively little willingness to differentiate between Jews and Israel, in comparison to what is expressed in other European countries. It is generally assumed that the attitude of the Swiss towards Israel has become more negative in the last forty years (Kreutner 2007; Späti 2007). Once again, however, there are no surveys to substantiate this assumption (Longchamp et al. 2007). Moreover, it seems that the assessment of Israeli policy is closely connected to actual events that take place in the Middle East. In the last couple of years, antiIsraeli and even antisemitic statements have often been triggered in the context of events such as the outbreak of the Second Intifada, or even more strongly, Israel’s attack against Hezbollah in Lebanon, in the summer of 2006 (Schär and Zurlinden 2006). VI.  The Debate on the Abolishment of the Legal Interdiction of Ritual Slaughter In the context of discussions on ritual slaughter, antisemitic statements have shown remarkable continuity in Switzerland. When a popular initiative to ban ritual slaughter was discussed in 1892 and 1893, large portions of the debate were marked by antisemitic attitudes (Krauthammer 2000: 60–78; Külling 1977: 331–350). The Society for the Protection of Animals, which had launched the ultimately successful initiative, effectively transformed the question of ritual slaughter into ‘the Jewish question’ (‘Die Judenfrage’) (Mesmer 1998: 233). Flyers, Letters to the Editor, presentations, and press articles operated with antisemitic clichés and stereotypes in order to demonstrate why ritual slaughter should be banned. Many of them drew parallels between alleged ritual murders of children and ritual slaughter, the German words of ‘Schächten’ (shehitah, or laws of slaughter) and ‘Schacher’ (haggling) were equated in order to underpin the Jews’ alleged abjec8  Among the twelve countries compared in this survey, only Spain (69%), Belgium (63%), and Holland (62%) registered even higher levels of agreement with the statement contained in this question (ADL 2005: 11).



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tion and cruelty. Moreover, the argument against ritual slaughter was in many cases motivated by an aversion to Jews from Eastern Europe: it was expected that by restricting the freedom of cults, it would prevent the immigration of Jews from Eastern Europe. During the First World War, it had no longer been possible to import kosher meat into the country and in 1918, the Swiss Federation of Jewish Communities (SIG) managed to receive temporary permission from the authorities to butcher their own kosher meat. However, the Society for the Protection of Animals immediately reacted, and under its consistent pressure, the temporary permit was abrogated soon after the end of the war. In their argumentation, protagonists of the Society for the Protection of Animals had once again drawn on antisemitic motives. During the Second World War, when the importing of kosher meat was yet again made impossible, the SIG made a new request to the authorities, but this time around, it was denied (Krauthammer 2000: 117–194). The beginning of the 1970s saw a public discussion over a revision of article 25bis of the Federal Constitution, in which the interdiction of ritual slaughter was stipulated. Some of the animal protectionists once again argued their case with the use of antisemitic stereotypes (Krauthammer 2000: 208–222). For instance, they equated the alleged agony of animals being ritually slaughtered with the suffering of Jews in National Socialist extermination camps. Article 25bis was eventually removed following a popular vote on December 2, 1973 and the interdiction of ritual slaughter was thus discarded from the constitution. However, this did nothing to change the situation, since the law for the protection of animals came into force in July 1981, which once again prohibited ritual slaughter. As late as the 1990s, neither the Jewish umbrella organization of the SIG, nor any Muslim associations had been consulted in any preparliamentary consultation procedures concerning the regulations on animals for slaughter (Krauthammer 2000: 237–245). In 1996, it was only by chance that the SIG learned that the authorities intended to extend the prohibition of ritual slaughter to include poultry. While the openly antisemitic and islamophobic Society Against Animal Factories (Verein gegen Tierfabriken—VgT) had been invited to the respective consultation, neither the SIG nor Muslim representatives had received such an invitation. In 1997, a new law finally explicitly permitted the ritual slaughter of poultry.

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When Pascal Couchepin, Federal Councillor and head of the Federal Department of Economic Affairs (EVD), made an announcement in September 2001 of his intention to abolish the ban on ritual slaughter in the context of a revision of the law for the protection of animals, it was met with unexpected uproar within sections of the population. The Federal Councillor supported his argument in favor of the implementation of an exemption clause in the law with regard to ritual slaughter by drawing on the notion of religious freedom and the freedom of conscience that was guaranteed by the Federal Constitution (Revision Tierschutzgesetz, Erläuterungen zum Vorentwurf 2001). Any restriction of religious freedom and freedom of conscience has to be kept in proportion. According to Couchepin, proportionality was not being given in the case of ritual slaughter, since it represented an important ritual act to Jews and Muslims. Between the fall of 2001 and the spring of 2002, pre-parliamentary consultation procedures took place in which various political parties, organizations and cantons participated and voiced their opinion on the revision of the law. It soon became clear that the issue was very controversial. Among the large parties, the Swiss People’s Party (Schweizerische Volkspartei—SVP), the Christian-Democratic People’s Party (Christlichdemokratische Volkspartei—CVP) and the Green Party were in all favor of relaxing the regulation on ritual slaughter. The Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei—SPS) was against the proposition, while the Liberal Democratic Party (Freisinnig-Demokratische Partei—FDP) abstained. Organizations supporting the protection of animals and of consumers, as well as the associations of veterinaries, peasants and butchers, all opposed the relaxation of the law, some of them quite fiercely. Opposition also came from a majority of the cantons (Tages-Anzeiger, December 24, 2001; Basler Zeitung, March 14, 2002). In January and March of 2002, the Swiss Animal Protection group (STS) and the Society Against Animal Factories (VgT) respectively launched two popular initiatives which included demands not only for the prohibition of the ritual slaughter of all animal species, but also for an extension of the principles of animal protection to include imported meat. Later on, however, the STS declared that its initiative did not include a prohibition of the importing of kosher and halal meat (Neue Zürcher Zeitung, March 27, 2002). While the VgT-initiative did not manage to collect the required number of signatures (100,000) within the time limit prescribed (Stutz 2003), the STS initiative was submitted successfully. In June 2004, however, the Federal Council



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recommended that parliament reject the initiative on the grounds that it partly violated regulations of international law. Both houses followed the Federal Councillor’s judgment and rejected the STS initiative in December 2005 (Zusammenfassung Parlamentsverhandlungen). As a result, the STS withdrew the initiative (Medienmitteilung STS, December 20, 2005). In view of the unexpected strong opposition and after consultation with the SIG, Federal Council Couchepin decided in March 2002 to renounce the initiative to relax the ban of ritual slaughter. He justified his decision by referring to the ‘interest of religious peace’ (Pressemitteilung EVD, March 13, 2002). According to statements made by the Coordination Intercommunautaire contre l’Antisémitisme et la Diffamation (CICAD), in the winter of 2001/02, Jewish persons in Switzerland received hundreds of antisemitic letters with regard to the ban of ritual slaughter, some of which even contained death threats (CICAD 2002). Moreover, between September 2001 and March 2002, numerous Letters to the Editor were published in Swiss newspapers, most of which strongly opposed the abolishment of the ban on ritual slaughter.9 The rejection of ritual slaughter was partially justified by antisemitic arguments. Several patterns of argumentation can be distinguished in the debates of the early 2000s. In a similar way to what was seen in 1893, a number of Letters to the Editor referred to an alleged specific cruelty in ritual slaughter which was depicted as extremely brutal. Along similar lines, the Jewish religion was criticized for stipulating such a procedure: ‘I ask myself which religion has the right to do such a thing [. . .] What kind of God do these people pray to? Surely not to the creator of everything alive, the God of love and wisdom’ (Berner Zeitung, September 29, 2001). In another letter, the following judgment of Judaism was made: ‘A religion which does not target love and consideration towards humans and animals as its first commandment loses its very meaning and thus its right to existence’ (AnzeigeBlatt für die Gemeinden Gais-Bühler, January 4, 2002). Through the usage of religiously and theologically grounded stereotypes, a contrast was established between peaceful Christianity and Jewish religious fanaticism, with its ‘Old Testament rituals of slaughter’ (Zürcher Unterländer,

9   This statement is based on the well-documented collection of newspaper clips maintained by the SIG on the topics of Kashruth and Shehitah. I would like to thank the SIG for making this material available to me.

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March 22, 2002). It is of no surprise that the antisemitic stereotype (Benz 2004: 204–205) of an alleged ‘Jewish tradition’ demanding ‘An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth’ (Zofinger Tagblatt, December 27, 2001) was also evoked in this context.10 Many authors of Letters to the Editor regarded ritual slaughter as something antiquated. The abolishment of the ban on ritual slaughter was thus regarded as a regression to the ‘Middle Ages’ or the ‘Stone Age’ (e.g. Blick, September 27, 2001; Berner Zeitung, September 29, 2001; Neue Zürcher Zeitung, October 2, 2001). They hereby constructed a contrast to a ‘civil’ or ‘Christian’ society that chose to reject cruelty against animals (e.g. Tages-Anzeiger, October 3, 2001). Further antisemitic stereotypes could also be found in those Letters to the Editor which suggested that the Federal Council’s willingness to relax the regulations on ritual slaughter was due to strong pressure applied by ‘Jewish circles’ or ‘potent lobbies’ (Le Journal du Jura, October 11, 2001). One letter argued that the visit of a Jewish delegation to the Federal Council back in 1997 had been all that was required for the ban on the ritual slaughter of poultry to be abandoned. And now, the Federal Council was once more ‘uncritical towards a Jewish suggestion’ (Der Zürcher Oberländer, December 12, 2001). Some of the conspiracy theories were quite subtle. For instance, a woman wrote to the tabloid Blick (September 27, 2001): ‘One asks oneself what kind of powers are at work when things that were prohibited more than a hundred years ago should now be allowed once again.’ The abolishment of the ban on ritual slaughter was considered to be the determination of a minority to impose their religious rituals on the majority: ‘We think that it is extremely alarming that a minority in Switzerland wants to inflict a cruel method of slaughter upon the majority of our population.’ (Neue Zürcher Zeitung, October 2, 2001; see also Tages-Anzeiger, October 3, 2001; Mittelthurgauer Tagblatt, October 9, 2001; Bodenseenachrichten, October 11, 2001; Basler Zeitung, November 19, 2001). The Jewish minority was also accused of using unfair practices in the ongoing debates, meaning that they drew on the charge of antisemitism in order to silence their opponents (e.g. Le Journal du Jura, October 11, 2001; Metropol, January 10, 2002). The reproach of

10   This commonly misunderstood bible quotation does not call for revenge and retaliation, but actually refers to a legal principle: jurisdiction should see to the proportionality of means (Benz 2004: 205).



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antisemitism was strongly countered in every case, but some people warned that antisemitism would increase if the ban on ritual slaughter were to be abolished (e.g. Neue Zürcher Zeitung, October 2, 2001; Obersimmentaler, January 31, 2002). In so doing, they insinuated that Jews themselves were responsible for anti-Jewish resentments within the population. A similar reversal of perpetrators and victims was also suggested in those Letters to the Editor which connected their opposition to a relaxation of the ban on ritual slaughter to criticism of the State of Israel (e.g. Die Weltwoche, January 17, 2001). One reader of the Neue Luzerner Zeitung (December 21, 2001) deemed it unwise to bring forward the issue of ritual slaughter in a moment in which any last sympathies for Israel were being lost because of the politics of Ariel Sharon. Another reader stated that, today more than ever ‘the Jews are badly in need of sympathy from the rest of the world because of their reprehensible politics in Palestine’ (Anzeige-Blatt für die Gemeinden Gais-Bühler, January 4, 2002). Finally, xenophobic motives were expressed in many Letters to the Editor. It became clear that in many cases, Muslims as well as Jews were seen as foreigners who needed to assimilate to the majority society and adopt its moral concepts (e.g. Der Toggenburger, September 26, 2001; Tages-Anzeiger, October 3, 2001). It was argued that the Swiss, too, were required to adjust if they went to a foreign country and that it was not acceptable that ‘we have to adapt our laws to foreign cultures’ (Blick, September 27, 2001; see also: Berner Zeitung, September 29, 2001; St. Galler Tagblatt, September 29, 2001; Elgger Zeitung, February 19, 2002; Thurgauer Zeitung, March 2, 2002). VII.  Antisemitism within the Radical Right As we have seen, in the context of the debates on unclaimed Jewish assets, in the rekindled criticism of Israeli politics, and in the discussions about the abolishment of the ban on ritual slaughter, an unorganized antisemitism was expressed which manifested itself predominantly in Letters to the Editor and in correspondence sent to Jewish persons and organizations, as well as appearing sporadically in the mainstream media. However, antisemitism can also be found in a more organized form within groups and parties at the right margin of the political spectrum. For these actors, antisemitism is one aspect of their

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exclusionist worldview, alongside nationalism, (neo)racism and xenophobia (Skenderovic 2009a: 15–22; Rensmann 2004: 241–296). This is also true for their partisans, as surveys have shown that within the left-right political spectrum antisemitism correlates predominantly with partisanship to right-wing parties (Cattacin et al. 2006: 61; Longchamp et al. 2000: 26). According to Damir Skenderovic (2009a: 26–29), the radical right in Switzerland can be divided into three categories, based on the concept of the political family: the radical right-wing populist parties, the intellectual New Right, and the various propagandists and groups of the extreme right. While they refer to a common ideology based on an exclusionist, nationalist, and xenophobic worldview, they differ in the actions and strategies they use in order to implement their Weltanschauung. Moreover, they hold distinct positions within the political system and therefore exert a different impact in terms of public support. The Swiss radical right-wing populist parties (Swiss People’s Party/ Schweizerische Volkspartei SVP, Swiss Democrats/Schweizer Demokraten SD, Swiss Freedom Party/Freiheitspartei FPS, and the League of Ticino/Lega dei Ticinesi) engaged quite prominently in the debates on Switzerland’s conduct in the 1930s and 1940s, partly drawing on antisemitic stereotypes. To a lesser degree, they also commented on the abolishment of the ban on ritual slaughter. In view of the growing international criticism of Switzerland in the mid-1990s, the upholding and defense of the national myth that Switzerland constitutes a special case became an important aspect of the identity politics pursued by radical right-wing populist parties (Skenderovic 2009a: 221–222). In some cases, representatives of these parties were confronted with the accusation of antisemitism. This was mainly the case with reference to statements which made a connection between ‘Jews’ and ‘Money.’ The most prominent example is a speech that was given on March 1, 1997, to some 1,500 people in Zurich-Oerlikon by the then party president of the Zurich cantonal SVP Christoph Blocher, who later became Swiss Federal Councillor between 2003 and 2007 (Skenderovic 2009a: 161; Buomberger 2004: 212; Niggli and Frischknecht 1998: 439–447). In the speech entitled ‘Switzerland and the Second World War. A Clarification,’ Blocher said among other things that the debate on Switzerland and the Second World War was determined by Swiss moralists on the one side, and Jewish organizations from abroad on the other. On both sides he identified hypocrites: ‘The Jewish organizations which are demanding



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money deny that they are interested in money. In fact, however, this is exactly what they want.’ (Blocher 1997: 10).11 The following day, the newspaper Sonntagsblick ran the headline: ‘Blocher: The Jews are only interested in money.’ As a consequence, Blocher sought libel action against the editor-in-chief of the newspaper. The latter was acquitted, however, in 1999, following the tribunal’s verdict that Blocher had: ‘trifled with the discriminatory cliché of the mercenary Jew’ and ‘in unrestrained fashion appealed to antisemitic instincts’ (cited according to Der Bund, September 6, 2000).12 As mentioned above, the SVP endorsed the abolishment of the ban of ritual slaughter in the pre-parliamentary consultation procedure. However, this did not prevent individual party representatives from underpinning their rejection of ritual slaughter with antisemitic and xenophobic undertones, similar to those made by representatives of the Swiss Democrats (Stutz 2001). In a newspaper column, SVP National Councilor Hans Mathys made it clear which religions were considered to be Swiss and which were not: ‘Our freedom of religion is based on the religions that we know, which have been here for centuries and have a firm place within our society. Foreign religions have to adapt to us Swiss, and not we to them.’ (Wynentaler Blatt, February 19, 2002). He thereby constructed a contrast not only between the Christian religion, on the one hand, and Jewish or Muslim religions on the other, but also between Swiss and Jews. A similar xenophobic statement was made by the president of the cantonal Freedom Party of Zurich, who wrote with reference to the abolishment of the ban on ritual slaughter: ‘All people of foreign culture are in our country voluntarily and therefore have to respect our laws, and not the other way around.’ (Neues Bülacher Tagblatt, November 2, 2002). Some representatives of the fringe radical right-wing populist parties made overtly antisemitic statements during the debates on unclaimed Jewish assets (Skenderovic 2009a: 89; 119). On the Swiss Democrats’ website in 1998, SD President and National Councillor, Rudolf Keller, made a call to boycott ‘all American and U.S. Jewish goods, ­restaurants 11  Moreover, in response to a question after his speech, Blocher allegedly said: ‘These bloody Jews only want money anyway.’ (Kreis 2004: 444). 12   Blocher appealed against this judgment, but finally agreed to a settlement in late June 2000. In early August of 2000, the district attorney’s office of Zurich sought to indict Blocher under the anti-racism law (Neue Zürcher Zeitung, September 7, 2000). However, in 2001, both houses of the parliament refused to lift Blocher’s parliamentary immunity (Skenderovic 2009a: 161).

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and vacation offers’ until there was a halt to the attacks against Switzerland (SD Pressemitteilungen 1998).13 A leading representative of the Lega dei Ticinesi, Giuliano Bignasca, made some overtly antisemitic statements in the party’s newspaper Il Mattino della domenica, for which he was eventually sentenced under anti-racism legislation (CICAD 1998; Niggli and Frischknecht 1998: 456). Among representatives of the New Right, anti-Jewish tendencies could be found predominantly in two domains. On the one hand, in a similar way to the radical right-wing populists, many exponents of the New Right felt compelled to justify and defend Switzerland’s comportment in general and particularly that of the so-called active service generation (Aktivdienstgeneration) during the Second World War (Skenderovic 2009a: 222–225). In so doing, some of them also exploited antisemitic stereotypes when searching for the initiators of criticism against Switzerland. The Living History Working Group (Arbeitskreis Gelebte Geschichte AGG), for instance, in its 2002 book Erpresste Schweiz (Blackmailed Switzerland) insinuated that the media campaign against Switzerland had been meticulously orchestrated by Jewish organizations in the United States, namely the World Jewish Congress (Skenderovic 2009a: 224–225). Moreover, the AGG accused Swiss Jews of showing more solidarity towards American Jews than towards Switzerland, thus, reproducing the traditional anti-Jewish stereotype of ‘Jewish betrayers of the nation’ (Haury 2002: 95–97): ‘In this solidarity, tensions emerging from double loyalty (towards national and towards Jewish interests) are unmistakable and manifest themselves again and again as disruptive factors.’ (AGG 2002: 42). Secondly, some representatives of the New Right, particularly in French-speaking Switzerland, are associated with the negationist scene. This is particularly true in the case of the paper Le Pamphlet, which was founded in the 1970s and published articles throughout the 1980s that justified negationist propaganda. In the 1990s, the review repeatedly printed antisemitic and also partly anti-Judaist statements (Skenderovic 2009a: 236–240).

13   Keller was consequently arraigned on charges of breaking the anti-racism law. The Council of States, however, refused to lift his parliamentary immunity (Skenderovic 2009a: 89). This was justified by stating that Keller had not intended his call for a boycott to be antisemitic. His action was therefore considered to be rash and negligent, but not willful. Law professor Marcel Niggli, however, was not convinced by this justification, arguing that a call to boycott was always a willful action (TagesAnzeiger, February 3, 1999).



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For the extreme right, antisemitism constitutes an integral part of their aggressively exclusionist ideology and expresses itself in various forms. First of all, we have to point to negationism with its long tradition in Switzerland (Fischer 1999; Tschirren 1999). The 1990s saw the foundation of a number of negationist organizations which tended to seek public attention more effectively than in previous years and aspired to establish an international network (Altermatt and Skenderovic 1995: 66–75). The Swiss negationists continued to publish their works in spite of the anti-racism legislation that came into force in 1995 and made denial of the Holocaust liable to prosecution (Skenderovic 2009a: 285–290). Furthermore, antisemitism plays an important role for ­extreme-right conspiracists for whom the assumption of a Jewish world conspiracy is central to their theses (Skenderovic 2009a: 290–296). In the 1990s, it was predominantly the ‘Universal Church,’ inspired by New Age beliefs and esotericism, which drew on conspiracy theories in order to make Jews responsible for all kinds of evils. The ‘Universal Church’ planned, among other things, to publish a reinterpretation of the notorious ‘Protocols of the Elders of Zion’ (Niggli and Frischknecht 1998: 716). Under the presidency of Erwin Kessler, the above mentioned Society Against Animal Factories, founded in 1989, is a further example of an organization promoting antisemitic conspiracy theories. Its paper Vgt-Nachrichten not only fought the abolishment of the ban on ritual slaughter with antisemitic and islamophobic arguments, but also alleged that a lobby of ‘Slaughtering Jews’ (‘Schächtjuden’) would secretly control Swiss media and politics. In the late 1990s, Kessler was sued and indicted under the anti-racism legislation (Stutz 2001; Krauthammer 2000: 249–262). VIII.  Dealing with Antisemitism: Politics, Science, and the Public Despite the many indicators pointing to a considerable extent and intensity of antisemitism in Switzerland, it is not generally considered to be a pressing issue. In 1997, Madeleine Dreyfus stated: ‘One of the main characteristics of specifically Swiss antisemitism is that it is unaware of its existence.’ (Dreyfus 1997: 73) She went on to remark that antisemitism in Switzerland tended to be trivialized, accordingly, by the downplaying of antisemitic incidents. One explanation for a restrained, if not palliating way to deal with antisemitism can be found in its ex-territorialization, meaning that

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antisemitism is restricted to being viewed as a product of National Socialist Germany. Tied-in to this restriction is the assumption that antisemitism does not exist in Switzerland and is, thus, considered to be ‘an un-Swiss phenomenon’ (Erdle and Wildmann 1998: 150). For instance, Dick Marty, States Councilor for the FDP in the canton of Ticino, stated in a commentary following an arson attack against the synagogue in Lugano that he would be very surprised if the perpetrators were Ticinesi (Blick, March 15, 2005; see Stutz 2005). Closely connected to ex-territorialization is a marginalization of the phenomenon of antisemitism. Following the tight nexus of antisemitism and National Socialism, many Swiss consider antisemitism to be mainly a phenomenon of the extreme right. Everyday antisemitism is thus rarely debated (Kreis 2000). Finally, antisemitism is seen as a predominantly historical phenomenon, implying that after 1945, it would for the greater part have disappeared in Switzerland. These perceptions have generally led to the fact that in Switzerland, antisemitism has thus far been widely met with ignorance and indifference (Späti 2005). Firstly, this is expressed in the way in which scientific research has dealt with the phenomenon. As mentioned above, there are only a few significant empirical studies on antisemitism in Switzerland. In 1998, historian Aram Mattioli stated that antisemitism had until recently been treated as a ‘markedly marginal issue’ in research (Mattioli 1998a: 6). It was only in the mid-1990s that racism and antisemitism became specific objects of research (Picard 2000: 151). Before this turn, it was predominantly Jewish authors who had dedicated themselves to the study of antisemitism in Switzerland after 1945 (Späti 2005). Secondly, there are indications of a certain disinterest towards the issue within politics as well as in society. When a report on past and current antisemitism was published by the Federal Commission against Racism in 1998, shortly after the peak of the antisemitic wave connected to the debates on Switzerland’s past, it was met with merely ‘tepid reactions from authorities and churches as well as most of the parties,’ alongside ‘no less ample indifference within a majority of the population’ (Kreis 2004: 436). A survey conducted by ADL in 2004, which compared results in various European countries, showed that in nearly all of the countries included in the survey, there was a greater number of respondents who considered their government’s actions against antisemitism to be an issue of importance than was the case among the Swiss respondents (ADL 2004: 19).



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The low level of interest in the issue of antisemitism can be connected to various patterns of argumentation. First of all, antisemitism is seen to be merely a partial aspect of racism and therefore does not need to be considered as a specific problem. Moreover, it is argued that xenophobia and racism are the dominant problems in Swiss society (Kreis 2004: 436–437; Gerber 2003: 385). This assumption is contrasted, however, by the fact that between 1995 and 2006, it is Jews who constituted the largest group of victims of actions which led to law suits under anti-racism legislation, with a figure of 25.4%.14 However, it has to be taken into consideration that they also constitute one of the most active groups in the fight against discrimination. Furthermore, anti-Jewish incidents in Switzerland are frequently trivialized by the public or the media.15 When assessing verbal or physical actions against Jews, the majority of society tends to exclude antisemitism as a motive. For instance, when members of the Zurich Yacht Club were due to decide on whether or not to admit Jewish publicist Peter C. Newman in late 2003, the item was omitted from the agenda at the last minute. While Newman and others saw the reason for this in the existence of antisemitic tendencies among some members, the club’s president vehemently denied this assumption (Tages-Anzeiger, April 28, 2005). Similar patterns emerged in the reaction to the above mentioned arson attack against the synagogue in Lugano. Even though the perpetrator not only targeted the synagogue, but also set fire to a draper’s shop belonging to a Jewish family, the district attorney involved said that she could not perceive an antisemitic background for the actions (Neue Zürcher Zeitung, March 26, 2005). In May 2005, the Federal Commission against Racism issued a statement to the public which warned of the increasing trivialization that it perceived in the population’s reaction to antisemitic assaults such as the desecration of a Jewish cemetery in Vevey-Montreux (EKR 2005).

  See the figures released by the Federal Commission against Racism (2009).  Longchamp et al. (2007) conclude that levels of sensitivity to antisemitism in statements directed towards members of the Jewish community are rather low in Switzerland. 14 15

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IX.  Continuities of Antisemitism: Jews as an Epitome of the Cultural Other An important and ongoing motive behind Swiss antisemitism lies in the perceived need to defend against the stranger. The discourse of socalled ‘Overforeignization’ has a long tradition in Switzerland and has occasionally been directed against Jews as the epitome of that which is ‘culturally foreign.’ In the 19th century, the main aim was to preserve the Christian nation from non-Christian influence. In the inter-war and wartime period, the predominant issues of this discourse concerned the repulsion of Jews, particularly those from Eastern Europe who were seen as unassimilable, as well as the defense against an influx of antisemitism, which was seen as un-Swiss and therefore foreign. The common hypothesis was that antisemitism would increase with a higher presence of Jews in the country, making it an important issue within refugee policy. In the postwar period, too, there are many indications suggesting the assumption of a difference between ‘Swiss’ and ‘Jews.’ In a similar way to that which was seen in the 19th century, the 1990s saw various expressions of a national antisemitism which depicted Jews as betrayers of the nation and doubted their loyalty towards Switzerland. The debates on the abolishment of the ban on ritual slaughter have also frequently appeared to be xenophobically motivated. Not only did many opponents of ritual slaughter depict it as uncivilized, cruel and contradictory to the values of the majority society, the many demands for assimilation and adaption of Jews also showed the xenophobic tendency of antisemitism. In addition to the traditional stereotype that mainly identified Jews with money and power, a secondary antisemitism emerged in various contexts which is expressed in issues dealing with the memory of the Holocaust. Apart from its most radical form, negationism, which is predominantly pursued by members of the extreme right, the motives and elements related to secondary antisemitism manifested themselves most significantly in the debates about Switzerland’s conduct during the 1930s and 1940s. Criticism of Israel also sometimes included aspects of secondary antisemitism, particularly in the kind of reversals of perpetrators and victims that have equated Israelis with National Socialists, and have been expressed by some parts of the left since the early 1970s. In view of these continuities, it is inappropriate to address antisemitic incidents in the 1990s and 2000s as ‘new antisemitism.’ There are no



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new types, motives or bearers of antisemitism. If, in 1997 and 1998, it was possible to observe an increase in the number of antisemitic expressions made in public during the debate on unclaimed Jewish assets, and similarly in 2001/02 during the course of the discussions about the ban of ritual slaughter, this was less due to an actual rise of antisemitism in the population, than to the breaking of a taboo, or the erosion of communication latency such as could also recently be observed in other countries (Bergmann and Heitmeyer 2005; Rensmann 2004: 16–18). As Bergmann and Erb (1986) have shown, antisemitism persisted after the end of the Second World War, but it was not permitted for it to be communicated, since it was an expression of socially delegitimized ‘forbidden’ prejudices (Marin 2000: 112–113). This communication embargo led to a depreciation of certain topics and to a factual consciousness latency, but it did not, however, change the attitudes themselves (Bergmann and Erb 1986: 228). In the debates about the restitution of unclaimed Jewish assets, or on the ban of ritual slaughter, as well as in critical assessments of Israel, Jews—in a reversal of perpetrators and victims—no longer appeared to be victims, but rather as perpetrators. And accordingly, it again became admissible to criticize them. Many protagonists themselves commented in this way about violating a taboo, arguing that it had again become possible to take a critical stance against Jews. This led to an increase in the number of antisemitic statements, not only among the various actors of the radical right, but also among the broader sections of society. References Alderman, Geoffrey (2003) The Tradition of left-wing anti-Jewish Prejudice in Britain. In Paul Iganski and Barry Kosmin (eds) A New Antisemitism? Debating Judeophobia in 21st Century Britain (London: Profile Books & Institute for Jewish Policy Research), pp. 223–230. Altermatt, Urs (1999) Katholizismus und Antisemitismus. Mentalitäten, Kontinuitäten, Ambivalenzen. Zur Kulturgeschichte der Schweiz 1918–1945 (Frauenfeld, Stuttgart, Wien: Huber Verlag). —— (2004) Verspätete Thematisierung des Holocaust in der Schweiz. In Georg Kreis (ed) Erinnern und Verarbeiten. Zur Schweiz in den Jahren 1933–1945, Itinera, Fasc. 25 (Basel: Schwabe Verlag), pp. 31–55. Altermatt, Urs and Damir Skenderovic (1995) Die extreme Rechte: Organisationen, Personen und Entwicklungen in den achtziger und neunziger Jahren. In Urs Altermatt and Hanspeter Kriesi (eds.) Rechtsextremismus in der Schweiz. Organisationen und Radikalisierung in den 1980er und 1990er Jahren (Zurich: Verlag Neue Zürcher Zeitung), pp. 11–155.

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Anti-Defamation League (2002) European Attitudes Toward Jews: A Five Country Survey, October 2002. http://www.adl.org/anti_semitism/EuropeanAttitudesPoll-10-02.pdf. Retrieved February 27, 2009. —— (2004) Attitudes Toward Jews, Israel and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict in Ten European Countries, April 2004. http://www.adl.org/anti_semitism/european_attitudes_ april_2004.pdf. Retrieved February 27, 2009. —— (2005) Attitudes Toward Jews in Twelve European Countries, May 2005. http://www. adl.org/anti_semitism/european_attitudes_may_2005.pdf. Retrieved February 27, 2009. —— (2007) Attitudes Toward Jews and the Middle East in Six European Countries, July 2007. http://www.adl.org/anti_semitism/European_Attitudes_Survey_July_2007.pdf. Retrieved February 27, 2009. Arbeitskreis Gelebte Geschichte (2002) Erpresste Schweiz. Zur Auseinandersetzung um die Haltung der Schweiz im Zweiten Weltkrieg und um die Berichte der Bergier-Kommission. Eindrücke und Wertungen von Zeitzeugen (Stäfa: Th. Gut Verlag). Benz, Wolfgang (2001a) Judenfeindschaft aus Abwehr. Aktualität und Tradition des Antisemitismus in der Schweiz. In Wolfgang Benz, Bilder vom Juden. Studien zum alltäglichen Antisemitismus (Munich: C.H. Beck), pp. 96–109. —— (2001b) Antisemitismusforschung als gesellschaftliche Notwendigkeit und akademische Anstrengung. In Wolfgang Benz, Bilder vom Juden. Studien zum alltäglichen Antisemitismus (Munich: C.H. Beck), pp. 129–142. —— (2004) Was ist Antisemitismus? (Munich, C.H. Beck). Bergmann, Werner and Rainer Erb (1986) Kommunikationslatenz, Moral und öffentliche Meinung. Theoretische Überlegungen zum Antisemitismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 38, 2 (1986): 223–246. —— (1991) Antisemitismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Ergebnisse der empirischen Forschung von 1946–1989 (Opladen: Leske und Budrich). Bergmann, Werner and Wilhelm Heitmeyer (2005) Communicating Anti-Semitism— Are the ‘Boundaries of the Speakable’ Shifting? In Antisemitismus, Antizionismus, Israelkritik. Tel Aviver Jahrbuch für deutsche Geschichte 33 (2005): 70–89. Blocher, Christoph (1997) Switzerland and the Second World War. A Clarification. Speech given at a function organized by the SVP of the Canton of Zurich on March 1, 1997. http://www.blocher.ch/en/artikel/970301worldwar2.pdf. Retrieved February 27, 2009. Böning, Holger (1998) Die Emanzipationsdebatte in der Helvetischen Republik. In Aram Mattioli (ed) Antisemitismus in der Schweiz 1848–1960 (Zurich: Orell Füssli), pp. 83–110. Buomberger, Thomas (2004) Kampf gegen unerwünschte Fremde. Von James Schwarzenbach bis Christoph Blocher (Zurich: Orell Füssli). Cattacin, Sandro et al. (2006) Monitoring misanthropy and rightwing extremist attitudes in Switzerland. An explorative study (Geneva: Université de Genève). Chiquet, Simone (1998) Der Anfang einer Auseinandersetzung. Zu den Fakten, Zusammenhängen und Interpretationen in der Debatte um die ‘Übung Diamant’ 1989. In Jubiläen der Schweizer Geschichte 1798–1848–1998. Studien und Quellen 24 (Bern, Stuttgart, Vienna: Haupt Verlag), pp. 193–227. Coordination Intercommunautaire contre l’Antisémitisme et la Diffamation (1998) Rapport sur l’antisémitisme en Suisse 1998. http://www.cicad.ch/index.php?id=53&tx_ ttnews[tt_news]=13&tx_ttnews[backPid]=39&cHash=fba38e4b82. Retrieved February 27, 2009. —— (1999) Rapport sur l’antisémitisme en Suisse 1999. http://www.cicad.ch/index .php?id=53&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=14&tx_ttnews[backPid]=39&cHash=d27b77fe49. Retrieved February 27, 2009.



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Keilson, Hans (1988) Linker Antisemitismus? Psyche. Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse und ihre Anwendungen 42, 9 (September): 769–794. Klug, Brian (2003) The collective Jew: Israel and the new antisemitism. Patterns of Prejudice 37, 2: 117–138. Krauthammer, Pascal (2000) Das Schächtverbot in der Schweiz 1854–2000. Die Schächtfrage zwischen Tierschutz, Politik und Fremdenfeindlichkeit (Zurich: Schulthess). Kreis, Georg (1998) Öffentlicher Antisemitismus in der Schweiz nach 1945. In Aram Mattioli, ed., Antisemitismus in der Schweiz 1848–1960 (Zurich: Orell Füssli), pp. 555–576. —— (2000) Introduction: Four Debates and Little Dissent. In: Georg Kreis (ed) Switzerland and the Second World War (London, Portland, OR: Frank Cass), pp. 1–25. —— (2001) Antisemitismus in der Schweiz nach 1945. In Christina Tuor-Kurth, (ed) Neuer Antisemitismus—alte Vorurteile? (Stuttgart, Berlin, Cologne: Verlag W. Kohlhammer), pp. 53–63. —— (2002a) Zurück in den Zweiten Weltkrieg. Zur schweizerischen Zeitgeschichte der 80er Jahre. Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Geschichte 52, 1: 60–68. —— (2002b) Zurück in die Zeit des Zweiten Weltkrieges (Teil II). Zur Bedeutung der 1990er Jahre für den Ausbau der schweizerischen Zeitgeschichte. Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Geschichte 52, 4: 494–517. —— (2004) Judenfeindschaft in der Schweiz. In Jüdische Lebenswelt Schweiz / Vie et culture juives en Suisse, ed. Schweizerischer Israelitischer Gemeindebund (Zurich: Chronos), pp. 423–445. Kreutner, Jonathan (2007) Euphorie, Kritik, Ablehnung. Israelbilder in der Schweiz. In Dialog, Verständnis, Freundschaft. 50 Jahre Gesellschaft Schweiz-Israel—Dialogue, compréhension mutuelle, amitié. L’Association Suisse-Israël a 50 ans, ed. Gesellschaft SchweizIsrael (Zurich: Chronos), pp. 113–135. Külling, Friedrich (1977) Antisemitismus. Bei uns wie überall? (Zurich: Juris Druck und Verlag). Kury, Patrick (2003) Über Fremde reden. Überfremdungsdiskurs und Ausgrenzung in der Schweiz 1900–1945 (Zurich: Chronos). Longchamp, Claude, Jeannine Dumont and Petra Leuenberger (2000) Einstellungen der SchweizerInnen gegenüber Jüdinnen und Juden und dem Holocaust. Eine Studie des GfSForschungsinstituts im Auftrag der Coordination intercommunautaire contre l’antisémitisme et la diffamation (CICAD) und des American Jewish Committee (AJC). http://www.gfs.ch/ antsem.html. Retrieved March 19, 2000. Longchamp, Claude et al. (2007) Kritik an Israel nicht deckungsgleich mit antisemitischen Haltungen. Antisemitismus-Potenzial in der Schweiz neuartig bestimmt. Schlussbericht zur Studie ‘Antijüdische und antiisraelische Einstellungen in der Schweiz’ (Berne: GfS) http://www.soziotrends .ch/pub/Antisem_07_Schlussbericht_berdef.pdf. Retrieved February 27, 2009. Mächler, Stefan (1998) Kampf gegen das Chaos—die antisemitische Bevölkerungspolitik der eidgenössischen Fremdenpolizei und Polizeiabteilung 1917–1954. In Aram Mattioli, ed., Antisemitismus in der Schweiz 1848–1960 (Zurich: Orell Füssli), pp. 357–421. Maissen, Thomas (2005) Verweigerte Erinnerung. Nachrichtenlose Vermögen und Schweizer Weltkriegsdebatte 1989–2004 (Zurich: Verlag Neue Zürcher Zeitung). Manetsch, Rachel (2003) Wer hat die Hausaufgaben nicht gemacht? tachles, July 25. Marin, Bernd (2000) Ein historisch neuartiger ‘Antisemitismus ohne Antisemiten’? In: Bernd Marin, Antisemitismus ohne Antisemiten. Autoritäre Vorurteile und Feindbilder, unveränderte Neuauflage früherer Analysen 1974–1979 und Umfragen 1946–1991 (Frankfurt, New York: Campus), pp. 107–147. Mattioli, Aram (1997) Antisemitismus in der Schweiz. Geschichte und Erklärungsversuche. In Madeleine Dreyfus and Jürg Fischer (ed) Manifest vom 21. Januar 1997. Geschichtsbilder und Antisemitismus in der Schweiz (Zurich: Verlag WoZ), pp. 77–92. —— (1998a) Antisemitismus in der Geschichte der modernen Schweiz—Begriffsklärungen und Thesen. In Aram Mattioli (ed) Antisemitismus in der Schweiz 1848–1960 (Zurich: Orell Füssli), pp. 3–22.



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—— (2009b) Organised Right-Wing Extremism in Switzerland: An Overview Since 1945. In Marcel Alexander Niggli (ed.) Right-wing Extremism in Switzerland. National and International Perspectives (Baden-Baden: Nomos), pp. 28–38. Späti, Christina (2002) Abfall für alle. Das linke Netzforum Indymedia Schweiz zeigt sich tolerant gegenüber antisemitischen Texten. Jungle World, March 6. —— (2005) Kontinuität und Wandel des Antisemitismus und dessen Beurteilung in der Schweiz nach 1945. Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Geschichte 55, 4: 419–440. —— (2006) Die schweizerische Linke und Israel. Israelbegeisterung, Antizionismus und Antisemitismus zwischen 1967 und 1991 (Essen: Klartext). —— (2007) Einsatz für Israel und Kampf gegen Antisemitismus. Die GSI im Kontext der Zeitgeschichte. In Dialog, Verständnis, Freundschaft. 50 Jahre Gesellschaft SchweizIsrael—Dialogue, compréhension mutuelle, amitié. L’Association Suisse-Israël a 50 ans, ed. Gesellschaft Schweiz-Israel (Zurich: Chronos), pp. 85–106. Steinmann, Matthias and Ralph Weill (2000) Wie viele Schweizer Antisemiten? Jüdische Rundschau, March 23. Stutz, Hans (1997a) Frontisten und Nationalsozialisten in Luzern 1933–1945 (Lucerne: Raeber Bücher). —— (1997b) Rassistische Vorfälle in der Schweiz. Eine Chronologie und eine Einschätzung. Einschätzung der Situation 1997. http://chrono.gra.ch/chron/chron_einschaetzungen .asp?Jahr=1997. Retrieved February 27, 2009. —— (2001) Rassistische Vorfälle in der Schweiz. Eine Chronologie und eine Einschätzung. Einschätzung der Situation 2001. http://chrono.gra.ch/chron/chron_einschaetzungen .asp?Jahr=2001. Retrieved February 27, 2009. —— (2003) Rassistische Vorfälle in der Schweiz. Eine Chronologie und eine Einschätzung. Einschätzung der Situation 2003. http://chrono.gra.ch/chron/chron_einschaetzungen .asp?Jahr=2003. Retrieved February 27, 2009. —— (2005) Rassistische Vorfälle in der Schweiz. Eine Chronologie und eine Einschätzung. Einschätzung der Situation 2005. http://chrono.gra.ch/chron/chron_einschaetzungen .asp?Jahr=2005. Retrieved February 27, 2009. Taguieff, Pierre-André (1989) La nouvelle judéophobie. Antisionisme, Antiracisme, Anti-impérialisme. Les Temps Modernes 45, 520: 1–80. —— (2002) La nouvelle judéophobie (Paris: Mille et une nuits). Tschirren, Jürg (1999) Negationistische Propaganda in der Schweiz 1946–1994 (University of Fribourg, unpublished Master’s Thesis). Weingarten, Ralph (1991) Geschichte des Antisemitismus in der Schweiz. In Ernst Braunschweig (ed) Antisemitismus—Umgang mit einer Herausforderung. Festschrift zum 70. Geburtstag von Sigi Feigel (Zurich: Jordan-Verlag), pp. 29–49. Weldler-Steinberg, Augusta (1966) Geschichte der Juden in der Schweiz vom 16. Jahrhundert bis nach der Emanzipation. Vol. 1 (Zurich: Schweizerischer Israelitischer Gemeindebund). —— (1970) Geschichte der Juden in der Schweiz vom 16. Jahrhundert bis nach der Emanzipation. Vol. 2 (Zurich: Schweizerischer Israelitischer Gemeindebund). Wolf, Walter (1969) Faschismus in der Schweiz. Die Geschichte der Frontenbewegungen in der deutschen Schweiz, 1930–1945 (Zurich: Flamberg Verlag). Zusammenfassung Parlamentsdebatten (2004) Für einen zeitgemässen Tierschutz (Tierschutz—Ja!). Volksinitiative. http://www.parlament.ch/afs/data/d/rb/d_rb_20040039 .htm. Retrieved February 27, 2009.

Anti-Jewish Guilt Deflection and National Self-Victimization: Antisemitism in Germany Samuel Salzborn I.  Introduction The various forms of antisemitism seen in Germany’s public discourse all share one common factor: an explicit or implicit deflection of guilt and denial of responsibility for National Socialism and the Shoah. This applies not only to the openly racist antisemitism of the neo-Nazis and the more “respectable” antisemitism of mainstream society, but also to the left-wing antisemitism that so frequently underlies criticism of Israel and globalization. This deflection of one’s own guilt is a unifying factor found across the political spectrum. Motivated by the desire to exonerate Germany of past misdeeds, this guilt-deflecting antisemitism exists “not despite Auschwitz, but rather because of it,” as put by Henryk M. Broder (1986: 11, emphasis in the original); within the politics of remembrance in Germany, it tries to blame the Jews for the consequences of the Shoah, redefining the Holocaust as an inconvenient disturbance within the national act of remembrance. This desire to (re) establish a national identity, and a normality that draws a Schlussstrich (“concluding line”) under the past, has been disturbed by memories of the Holocaust; however, instead of tracing this disturbance to Nazi Germany’s mass extermination of European Jews, blame is placed on the victims instead, who (in this worldview) are stubbornly refusing to put away the past: “In this country, there dominates [. . .] a particular form of antisemitism that is superficially ‘correct’ in its general rejection of traditional anti-Jewish prejudices, but which extricates the issue and the debate from the questionable handling of the Nazi past and the Holocaust, clinging instead to the ‘question of responsibility,’ as well as to the work and ‘act’ of remembrance that so many Germans find unpleasant.” (Ahlheim/Heger 2002: 49f.) Ever since the German mass murder of European Jews more than half a century ago, antisemitism has developed a certain need for selfjustification; therefore, to facilitate this act of social self-exoneration, Jews are needed to play the role of perpetrators, not victims (cf. Haury

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2002; Markovits 2006, 2007; Markovits/Reich 1997). However, as Werner Bergmann (2002) points out, although this specifically German form of antisemitism may be secondary in nature, its expression nonetheless remains traditionally antisemitic. Even if contemporary attitudes—characterizing “the Jews” as powerful, influential, and avaricious—may not generally share the genocidal goals found in Naziinspired antisemitism, they still do share its delusional projections as well as the tribal desire for segregation. In the midst of this yearning for normality, there emerged in 2002 a political, social, and media storm surrounding the antisemites Jürgen Möllemann and Martin Walser; this controversy was a watershed event in postwar German history, helping to normalize antisemitic sentiments as representing an ostensibly unproblematic political position, leading to an “Ende der Schonzeit” (“end to the kid gloves”), as aptly expressed by Salomon Korn (2002), which did not signal the emergence of a new antisemitism, but rather the exposure of a latent one (such as that existing under the guise of anti-Zionism, among others). Here, one refers to the 15% to 20% of Germans who exhibit latently antisemitic tendencies, a statistic repeatedly confirmed by opinion pollsters over the years (cf. Bergmann/Erb 1991; for a critical evaluation, cf. Salzborn 2007). There had already been many attempts to arouse this latent antisemitism, such as in the controversy surrounding the Fassbinder play “Trash, the City, and Death” (1985), or during the Historikerstreit (“historians’ dispute”) in 1986 (cf. Diner 1987). In the past, antisemitic statements in the public sphere had been consistently rejected by the majority, with the ostensible taboo-breaking being named for what it was: a rebellion against the arduously won civilizing elements of postwar German society (cf. Pelinka 2002). This attitude changed in 2002; since then, secondary antisemitism oriented towards deflecting guilt has become socially acceptable in Germany.1 In this development, two factors played decisive roles: on the one hand was the lifting of taboos against expressing antisemitic sentiments in the public sphere, and on the other hand was their linkage with the new discourse that presented Germans as victims. The concrete result is that antisemitism can now be openly communicated in Germany,

1   Wolfgang Frindte (2006: 124f.) rightly pointed out that numerous antisemitic “taboobreakings” had already happened before 2002, although the resulting social responses varied enormously through the decades of West German history up to 2002.

anti-jewish guilt def lection and national self-victimization 399 as long as it is formulated in the stereotypes geared towards deflecting guilt regarding National Socialism, or if it is directed against Israel and/or Zionism; however, recent years have also seen the intertwining of guilt-deflecting antisemitism with the fantasy of Germans having become victims in their own right, in an attempt to formulate a national collective victimhood, as seen in recent debates regarding the flight and expulsion of Germans in the aftermath of National Socialism, as well as the so-called Bombenkrieg (“bombing war”). The present article aims to analyze this development in two steps. First, empirical data demonstrating the virulence of guilt-deflecting antisemitism in Germany will be introduced, and the development of guilt deflection will be discussed. Then, the relationship between antisemitic guilt deflection and the national victim mythos will be described and analyzed. II.  The Origins and Empirical Aspects of Antisemitic Guilt Deflection When the first surveys regarding the Nazi past were conducted in Germany after the end of World War II, antisemitic attitudes proved to be not the exception, but the rule. In the period just after the Allies abolished National Socialism, the open declaration of antisemitic beliefs still existed as an ideological convention within social normality, which had hardly been shaken at all by the subjective shock of the German defeat, or by the Allied occupation of Germany: according to the first survey conducted within the American occupation zone in December 1946, 18% of the population were classified as “hard” antisemites, another 21% were antisemites, and 22% were racists (cf. Bergmann/ Erb 1997: 398). This was hardly surprising and simply emphasized how mistaken the Allies had been in their early assumptions: at the war’s beginning, there had still existed the prevalent belief that the majority of Germans were at least privately estranged from the Nazi regime and its ideological foundations (cf. Padover 2001). However, it was not as if the Germans had completely lost their moral compass: it was simply that this moral sense was not much oriented towards the philosophical traditions of republican civil society, as the Allies had expected; instead, it was deeply interwoven with an antisemitic and racist worldview that had become part of everyday life in German society, thereby constituting part of the consensual norm for most people. The framework

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of values, norms and morals had not been annulled, but instead had been shifted so far into the völkisch (“ethno-nationalist”) extreme that antisemitism could function as a useful delusion for interpreting the wider world, without actually contradicting the “gesunder Menschenverstand” (“healthy common sense”) of most Germans (cf. Salzborn 2002: 8ff.). The people were very willing to be guided by this particular conception of “gesunder Menschenverstand,” as put by Karin Orth (2002: 105), but this must ultimately be understood as a coded term for the antisemitic and racist consensus. In this context, it was only logical that when the first nationwide empirical surveys were conducted in the autumn of 1949—the founding year of the Federal Republic of Germany—one quarter of the German populace still identified itself as antisemites, and this percentage had even risen to one third of respondents in 1952 (cf. Bergmann/ Erb 1997: 399). The social climate of the 1950s was characterized by a renazification, or an insufficient denazification (cf. Frei 1997; Hoffmann 1992: 107ff.). It was a time in which a “grand peace treaty with the perpetrators” was made, as put by Ralph Giordano (1996: 13). In this period, (neo)Nazi splinter groups, parties, and publications emerged; former National Socialists became “reintegrated” into politics, industry, academia, and the civil service; efforts to continue the denazification process either faded away or were deliberately terminated; and a great number of Nazi trials became more characterized by a solidarity with the accused than by a rigorous political and legal confrontation with the various groups of perpetrators. At the same time, the Federal Republic saw a massive wave of antisemitic acts, such as the numerous desecrations of Jewish cemeteries and synagogues (cf. Reichel 2001: 125ff.). The Allies, with the support of democratic voices within the Federal Republic, pushed for a critical examination of Nazi crimes committed against the Jews, resulting in the decision that redress payments needed to be made, and that the political stance towards the State of Israel should be free of any antisemitic sentiments: these measures were all met by rejection from the German populace. In August 1952, nearly half of German respondents spoke against the redress payments to Israel, while another 24% accepted the need for redress but considered the amount too high, and just 11% approved of the redress as it was (cf. Noelle/Neumann 1956: 130): “This rejection was expressed in the form of traditional anti-Jewish prejudices (accusations of greed and

anti-jewish guilt def lection and national self-victimization 401 vindictiveness), which seemed ‘confirmed’ by Jewish demands (reversal of guilt).” (Bergmann/Erb 1997: 400) With the economic and political solidification of the Federal Republic, as well as the legal battles against neo-Nazi parties such as the Socialist Reich Party (banned in 1952 by the Federal Constitutional Court, due to its openly National Socialist platform), a reestablishment of democratic frameworks, and a change of personnel (if only gradual and sometimes only marginal) within the public sphere, contemporary survey statistics began to register a slow decrease in the percentage of open antisemites in West Germany during the late 1950s and the 1960s. A survey question regarding social distance was repeatedly posed over the years: “Would you say that it would be better for Germany if there were no Jews in the country?” In 1952, 37% of respondents agreed, but the percentage gradually decreased (28% in 1956, 22% in 1958, 18% in 1963, 19% in 1965), dropping to 9% in 1983 (cf. Köchner 1986: 23). Although the percentage in agreement increased again to 13.1% in 1987, the percentage in disagreement exhibited an overall increasing trend (from 19% in 1952 to 66.8% in 1987) (cf. Institut für Demoskopie 1987: table 13g),2 demonstrating that West Germany had seen a reduction (sometimes steady, sometimes fitful) in openly expressed antisemitism. However, although public forms of antisemitism were becoming increasingly rejected, there was still a consistent tolerance for antisemitic statements in the private sphere. When the Allensbach Institut für Demoskopie conducted a survey in 1986, asking if the respondent could maintain a friendship with an acquaintance who earnestly called for the banishment of Jews from West Germany, 40% said they could, and only 26% said it was hardly possible, while another 34% declined to answer the question (cf. Köcher 1986: 57). According to Werner Bergmann, this discrepancy between private tolerance and public rejection of antisemitism could be taken as evidence of “the tabooing and latency of antisemitism in the FRG, which is less about having implemented a comprehensive change in attitude, and more about simply displacing the prejudice into latency.” (Bergmann 1990: 117) This conclusion is further corroborated by the finding that, to a large extent, survey respondents considered the

2   For the survey conducted in the autumn of 1987, the question was slightly modified: “For us Germans it would be best if all Jews went to Israel.”

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communication of antisemitic statements to be forbidden, especially in the public and political spheres (cf. ibid.: 118). Thus, a communicative latency regarding antisemitic ideas could exist simultaneously with a psychological actuality (cf. ibid.: 112). Looking at early empirical studies concerning the rejection of shilumim— the Israeli expression corresponding to the German terms “Entschädigungen” and “Reparationen” (“redress” and “reparations”)3—which was accompanied by antisemitic guilt reversal and accusations of profiteering, it becomes apparent that, even in the early 1950s, traditional antisemitic motifs were already accompanied by secondary antisemitism; this did not represent a component of official ideology, but rather the social articulation (both public and private) of vague conspiracy fantasies and the desire for exoneration. This development is especially relevant in the context of communicative latency, because it points to a shift in antisemitic articulation. Almost thirty years ago, Alphons Silbermann (1982: 45, 57 and 62) found that, of the various antisemitic motifs, economically articulated antisemitism met with much more agreement than racially or politically based ones. Around 45% of German respondents more or less explicitly agreed with economically framed antisemitism, while less than 20% rejected such ideas (cf. ibid.: 57). When asked about a racially motivated antisemitism—and therefore the type that was considered mostly likely to draw public censure—“only” about 30% either strongly or somewhat agreed, while nearly 35% rejected it (cf. ibid.: 45). In terms of concrete expressions of “economic antisemitism,” surveys from 1960 to 1986/87 showed a constant figure of around 20% accusing “the Jews” of being stingy, with around 30% accusing them of being calculating; in the 1960s, around 55% ascribed business success to “the Jews,” with this figure rising to 74.6% in 1987 (cf. Bergmann 1990: 120). Put into the context of a massive denial of guilt—by the early 1960s, nearly 90% of Germans were rejecting any suggestion of complicity in the genocide of the Jews (cf. Noelle/Neumann 1965: 229)—such antisemitic claims of a specifically Jewish hunger for money and power bear particular significance, demonstrating that Germans felt unsettled   Shilumim is actually closer to the word “payments,” whereby the term lacks any connotation of pardon or forgiveness, which the German terms Entschädigung, ­Reparation, or Wiedergutmachung (literally “making good again”) would gladly buy semantically—as if the German mass murder of European Jews could be “made good again.” 3

anti-jewish guilt def lection and national self-victimization 403 in their national conscience and wanted to deny all responsibility for Nazi crimes, believing that the national Vergangenheitsaufarbeitung (“processing of the past”) was solely driven by an imagined Jewish conspiracy: “A large part of the populace sees itself being subjected to a ‘permanent guilt’ because, in their view, ‘the Jews’ seem insistent on keeping alive this memory. This feeling stands in tense counterpoint to their own wish to finally draw a Schlussstrich under the past.” (Bergmann 1990: 124) As manifestations of antisemitism have shifted over time towards secondary antisemitism, with the goal of achieving the moral and historiographical exoneration of antisemitic thought, not only have secondary antisemitic motifs failed to fade away, they have even found generally increasing support within the German populace, with the tendency towards open expressions of antisemitic and anti-Jewish convictions growing in recent years. In 1994, an EMNID survey showed that 44% of West Germans and 19% of East Germans were of the opinion that “the Jews” were exploiting “the National Socialist Holocaust for their own purposes” (nationwide: 39%) (cf. EMNID-Institut 1994: table 19). Similar findings were also revealed by an ALLBUS survey conducted in 1996, in which some 44% of German respondents strongly or somewhat supported the opinion that Jews were exploiting the German past. This shows that while manifest and explicitly Nazi-inspired antisemitism has continually decreased over time in the Federal Republic, secondary antisemitism, often expressed in non-public settings, has remained constant, and even found growing approval in recent years. However, until the mid-1990s, and despite all resistance by right-wing extremists as well as conservatives, the public and political spheres were ultimately dominated by a broad consensus in which antisemitic indiscretions were socially censured and decisively repudiated as being intolerable within a democratic framework, thus demonstrating that no affirmation of antisemitic ideas could be accepted as simply another “opinion” that was ostensibly just as valid as any other (cf. Habermas 2002). This status quo underwent a major shift in the autumn of 1998, when Martin Walser gave a speech in Frankfurt’s Paulskirche during the award ceremony of the Peace Prize of the German Book Trade (cf. Walser 1998a). Walser’s speech drew strongly on the traditions of guilt-deflecting antisemitism in denouncing critical examinations of the past as well as the “moral bludgeon” of Auschwitz, whose pervasiveness

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he highly overestimated. He spoke of a “never-ending display of our shame” and an “instrumentalization of our shame for today’s purposes,” of a “gruesome memorial profession” and of the media’s “routine of incrimination,” before he, trembling “with daring,” declared (cf. ibid.): It is inappropriate to turn Auschwitz into a routine threat, a tool for browbeating people at any occasion, a moral bludgeon or even just an obligatory exercise. [. . .] In the debate surrounding Berlin’s Holocaust Memorial, ensuing ages will see what was wrought by people who felt accountable to the conscience of others. Concreting over the middle of the capital with a nightmare the size of a football field. The monumentalization of shame. (Ibid.)

The self-conscious eroticism of one trembling with daring, which Walser displayed before his audience, demonstrated the pleasure he apparently derived from presenting himself as a taboo-breaker—and not only Walser, but also numerous other Germans. For it was not just the content of Walser’s speech that was alarming, but also the context: nearly the entire audience at the Paulskirche applauded his speech, with only a few people such as Ignatz Bubis withholding approval (cf. Bubis 1998a). According to the language researcher Siegfried Jäger, Walser’s speech in Frankfurt kicked off a discourse that gave “new impetus to the further undemocratic development of this society”: “For it is not only on the right-wing fringe, but also within the mainstream society of recent years, that it has once again become possible to say—at first in code, and then with increasing explicitness—the idea that had been taboo in postwar Germany: Auschwitz is finished and forgotten!” (  Jäger 1999: 14) Walser’s speech was not in fact unequivocally and unmistakably condemned as intolerable by the political and social establishment, as in comparable cases before, and Walser was not interpreted as falling entirely outside the democratic consensus. On the contrary, it was Bubis who was subsequently compelled to publicly justify his criticism of Walser. The partisanship in favor of Walser reached deep into the populace (cf. Walser 1998b; Dietzsch/Jäger/Schobert 1999; Heckmann 1998; Scheffer 1998), so that the newspaper editorial pages were nearly overflowing with articles sympathetic to his speech—and with antisemitic invective directed at Bubis (Rohloff 1999: 75ff.). Furthermore, ever since Walser gave his speech at the Paulskirche, there has not only been an increase in antisemitic hate mail, such as that which

anti-jewish guilt def lection and national self-victimization 405 arrives every week at the Central Council of Jews in Germany, but many citizens have also become confident enough to give up anonymity and attach their full name and address as they give free rein to their antisemitic statements. Overall, these developments were enough to inspire Joachim Rohloff (1999) to coin a phrase in regards to Walser’s self-image, as well as his function as a social mouthpiece: “Ich bin das Volk” (“I am the people”). As Ignatz Bubis (1999: 59) summed it up back then, a large part of the populace had long been thinking like Walser, wanting to draw a “Schlussstrich” under the Nazi past in order to look towards the future without the burdens of remembrance and memorialization. This analysis was also supported by a FORSA survey commissioned by the newspaper Die Woche and conducted in May 2000, showing that 62% of West Germans and 49% of East Germans believed it was time to draw “a Schlussstrich under National Socialism” (cf. anon. 2000: 7). In response to the social shift that had emerged in the wake of the Walser speech and its reactions, the education researchers Klaus Ahlheim and Bardo Heger (2002a) conducted an empirical study of antisemitism and attitudes towards the Nazi past among students at the University of Essen. This study further corroborated the widespread prevalence of a “Schlussstrich mentality,” coupled with a desire for “normality” and a new national pride, that built upon motifs of secondary antisemitism: “One of the more striking findings is that, among many students, this Schlussstrich mentality is accompanied by a worldview and lifestyle that is strongly marked by materialist and hedonist tendencies, is rather uninterested in solidarity, and is quite plainly uncomfortable with the burdens of the past.” (Ahlheim/Heger 2002b: 21) More than a third of the interviewed students agreed with the statement that it was time to “draw a Schlussstrich under the National Socialist past;” furthermore, this attitude was closely associated with the desire for a new national self-confidence (cf. Ahlheim/Heger 2002a: 24ff.). When asked about the cultivation of a “gesundes Nationalbewusstsein” (“healthy national consciousness/self-confidence”), 61% of students spoke in favor, while just 14% rejected it unconditionally. In fact, hardly any other attitude correlated so strongly with the desire for a “Schlussstrich” as the espousal of a “gesundes Nationalbewusstsein”: “Among the students who were not at all interested in a ‘gesundes Nationalbewusstsein’, only 13% favored a ‘Schlussstrich,’ but among

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those who strongly supported calls for a ‘gesundes Nationalbewusstsein,’ it was 65%.” (Ahlheim/Heger 2002b: 21) Furthermore, Ahlheim and Heger showed in their study that guiltdeflecting antisemitism in particular was common among students—a group destined to exercise great influence on the public discourse of the near future. For example, 17% of students believed that many Jews have attempted to “use the history of the Third Reich for their own benefit today, making the Germans pay for it,” and 20% affirmed that the Jews know “very well” how to “exploit the guilty conscience of the Germans” (cf. Ahlheim/Heger 2002a: 48 ff.). Looking at the two public controversies that were happening simultaneously in the early summer of 2002, surrounding the antisemitic statements of the FDP (Free Democratic Party) politician Jürgen W. Möllemann and the writer Martin Walser, another aspect of latent guilt-deflecting antisemitism can be identified. Both debates included a suppression of remembrance, a swapping of victims and perpetrators, and an ostensible breaking of taboos in defiance of imaginary “thought prohibitions and opinion monopolies.” Michael Naumann (2002a: 10) draws a “direct line” from “Martin Walser’s fateful speech at the Peace Prize ceremony in the Paulskirche to Jürgen Möllemann’s antisemitic outbursts and the populist attitudes of the FDP leadership.” A similar argument is put forth by Micha Brumlik (2002): “That which Walser has been preparing for years, and prepared with the doggedness of an experienced author, step by step, tale by tale, speech by speech, is now being implemented in the political sphere by Jürgen Möllemann, whose Arab-influenced Jew-hating reaffirms a considerable biographical continuity.” Both Walser and Möllemann claimed to be victims of a “Meinungsmafia” (“opinion mafia”), and as fighting for the freedom of opinion. The debate surrounding Jürgen Möllemann reestablished antisemitism as an officially endorsed and accepted factor in Germany’s political culture (cf. Brumlik 2002). To achieve this, one simply needed to invoke the old familiar Judeophobic motifs and bring them into the political arena. The controversy began with antisemitic and antiIsrael statements made by Jamal Karsli, who was then defecting to the FDP, and by Jürgen Möllemann, who at the time was FDP floor leader in the state assembly and president of the FDP state party in North Rhine-Westphalia. Karsli, a former Green Party member of the state assembly in North Rhine-Westphalia (2002), gave an interview in the right-wing extremist weekly newspaper Junge Freiheit in which

anti-jewish guilt def lection and national self-victimization 407 he asserted the existence of a “Zionist lobby,” which controlled “the greatest share of media influence in the world,” and which had the power to “undercut any public figure, regardless of prominence.” According to him, when “the subject of Israel” comes up, ­reminders of National Socialism are used against the Germans to “try and intimidate, directly and viscerally, so that they dare not open their mouths.” In a press release from April 2002, Karsli accused the Israeli government of using “Nazi methods.” At the time, Möllemann publicly supported Karsli. After weeks of silence in the face of public controversy, and later half-hearted statements of disapproval from the FDP national chief (and today’s German Foreign Minister) Guido Westerwelle, Karsli ultimately retracted his request to join the Free Democratic Party. Möllemann, the “prototype of modern antisemites” (Broder 2002: 26), helped articulate the antisemitism that has emerged since and “because of” Auschwitz, which portrays Jews as unpleasant reminders and rememberers of National Socialist crimes, and obstacles ostensibly preventing Germany’s “normalization” and thereby violating its “positive Nationalbewusstsein.” After the start of the controversy, and after Möllemann made his jibes against Friedman, the FDP managed to increase its share in the opinion polls, from 9 up to 12% (cf. Pötzl 2002: 36): “It was only when the party leadership started to teeter in its balancing act between the ‘moderate’ Westerwelle and the ‘radical’ Möllemann, and this was seen by the public as either a disunity or a weakness in leadership, that the FDP began sinking in the opinion polls, from 12 down to 10%.” (Funke/Rensmann 2002: 827) During the Walser and Möllemann controversies, a frequent question was whether it was acceptable to criticize Israel at all—but the question itself was a red herring. Criticism of Israel is constantly and frequently heard in Germany as elsewhere. The question itself harks back to the antisemitic motifs of an omnipotent Jewish world conspiracy and an “Auschwitz bludgeon” raised at every whim. In this scenario, Walser and Möllemann presented themselves as the liberators of “repressed” opinions. That is how they and their supporters managed to deceive, using a classic strategy: first, to claim there exists a taboo topic that cannot be “openly” discussed, and then to enthusiastically break this imaginary taboo, thereby delighting the audience. This antisemitic demand for the abolishment of an alleged thought prohibition—which in fact implies the abolishment of a civilizational cornerstone—has already had an effect, as can be seen by examining

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recent empirical studies, as well as by analyzing the way Jews have lately been treated in the everyday life of German society. According to a mid-2002 survey conducted by the Anti-Defamation League (2002: 6), 32% of Germans alleged that Jews wield too much influence in the “business world,” while 21% believed that “the Jews” were more inclined than other people to use “shady practices” in pursuing their goals. Furthermore, 24% agreed with the suggestion that Jews did not care what happened to other (non-Jewish) people. However, the strongest bias was shown by the 55% of respondents who agreed that (German) Jews were more loyal to Israel than to Germany. In 1999, when posed with the statement that some people considered Jews unpleasant, 56% of Germans said they found it incomprehensible, while 20% found it understandable; by April 2002, the first figure had fallen to 38%, and second figure had risen to 36% (cf. Brähler/ Richter 2002: 2). In this survey, one fifth of Germans blamed “the Jews” for major world conflicts (cf. ibid.: 5). These results thoroughly support Elmar Brähler’s assessment that western Germany has seen a “dramatic rise in antisemitism” and “a definite increase in the whitewashing of National Socialism” (Langenau 2002). According to a representative survey from April 2002, 28% of Germans nationwide agreed that the influence of “the Jews” was “too great,” with western Germany registering an especially rapid increase in this statistic during the previous four years, from 14% in 1998 to 31% in 2002 (cf. Niedermayer/Brähler 2002: 8ff.). Furthermore, 20% of respondents agreed that “the Jews” possessed something “inherently distinct and idiosyncratic” and did not fit in “with us,” while 23% believed that Jews were more prone than other people to using “dirty tricks” in pursuit of their goals (cf. ibid.: 11f.). According to the first survey conducted by the long-term study “Gruppenbezogene Menschenfeindlichkeit” (“group-focused enmity”), approximately one fifth of Germans agree with sentiments similar to those favored by Walser and Möllemann: thus, 22% of respondents feel that “Jews have too much influence in Germany,” while 17% feel that “Jews share responsibility for their own persecution.” Furthermore, every second respondent (52%) believes that “Jews try to benefit from the Holocaust—and they make Germans pay for the past” (cf. Bittner 2002). Similar results were also found in subsequent years, with surveys conducted by the American Jewish Committee (2005) and the Anti-Defamation League (2002; 2004; 2005; 2007; 2009).

anti-jewish guilt def lection and national self-victimization 409 III.  Antisemitic Guilt Deflection and the New German Victim Discourse As can be seen, the willingness to publicly express antisemitic sentiments has not receded in recent years, despite repeated ritual vows by numerous politicians. In fact, quite the contrary is true: since Wal­ ser’s speech at the Paulskirche (1998) at the latest, one has seen an increasing willingness among the German populace to publicly express these antisemitic sentiments. Lars Rensmann (2004: 498) calls this gradual normalization an “erosion of boundaries,” while Kurt Grünberg (2002) speaks of a “rehabilitation of antisemitism.” There exist numerous forums for antisemitic speech, including letters to the editor and internet websites, as well as the hate mail (of varying emotional lucidity) that arrives regularly at Jewish organizations in Germany, in which anonymity has frequently been forsaken for some time now, often including complete addresses and even other personal and biographical details (cf. Salzborn/Schwietring 2003: 43ff.; Salzborn 2005a: 919ff.). Building on the model of communicative latency developed by Werner Bergmann and Rainer Erb (1986: 223ff.), empirical social studies have attempted in various ways to distinguish the dimensions of antisemitism. The concept of communicative latency assumes that the pressures produced by the political and social elites since the founding of the Federal Republic have resulted in antisemitic attitudes no longer being expressed in public, despite still existing in latent form, and that if they are articulated at all, then it is only within the framework of private discussions, or in semi-private situations (e.g. among barroom regulars). According to this, the public suppression of antisemitic sentiments and the resultant wide-reaching communication blackout means that antisemitic attitudes are largely kept out of public discourse, so that in the long run they should in fact undergo a reduction, due to no longer being circulated. While this analysis was largely valid for the “old” Federal Republic (up until 1989/90), it has found the limits of its applicability in the years since German reunification. Ever since Walser’s speech at the Paulskirche, and the subsequent controversies surrounding him and Möllemann, antisemitic statements by prominent figures have led to increasingly frequent public scandals, which are particularly characterized by the fact that neither the antisemitic projections, their sociostructural contexts, nor their psychological dispositions are subjected to close examination; instead, these events are simply framed as media

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scandals: “A [. . .] danger is posed to democratic political culture in that antisemitism is now often seen as simply a recrimination—and a particularly ‘Jewish’ one—in political debates.” (Rensmann 2004: 498) Conversely, this has also led to the normalization of antisemitic positions in the public sphere, since antisemites like Jürgen Möllemann are not explicitly identified as such, nor does a substantial engagement with his positions take place; to pursue this example further, Möllemann is instead framed as simply a bogeyman whose positions have ostensibly been made taboo, but it is precisely because of this demonization that the content of his ideas have only marginally been analyzed, thus allowing them to become anchored as a constant and accepted component of public discourse. In looking at what is now permitted in terms of discourse, another relevant aspect is that the last few years have seen a change in the motifs of antisemitic sentiments—in other words, their projective focus has changed: whereas racially based and Christian religiously based forms of antisemitism were the main targets of the communicative taboo (and it is worth considering whether such a taboo actually existed in postwar Germany, or whether this itself was a fantasy of the antisemites—and certainly in this case, a sociopolitically very useful one), the latest manifestations of antisemitism are generally not subject to this taboo (cf. Benz 2004: 33ff.). Beyond guilt-deflecting antisemitism, which is often called secondary antisemitism (cf. Heni 2008), this analysis is especially relevant in looking at anti-Zionist antisemitism, as well as the allied Islamic antisemitism (cf. Milson 2003: 23ff.; Wurst 2005). Here, the communicative taboo is largely annulled and circumvented. However, if these newer forms of antisemitic articulation only serve as a rhetorical detour for traditional antisemitic sentiments—as empirically demonstrated for the first time by Heyder/Iser/Schmidt (2005: 144ff.) in their corroborating factor analysis—then this could also result in a shift in communicative latency, because antisemitic stereotypes (such as those presented under the guise of critiquing Israel and globalization) are no longer socially stigmatized, allowing for them to be publicly communicated without problem, and ensuring that they find their supporters within the broader political spectrum (cf. Bergmann/ Heitmeyer 2005: 224ff.). This is how—among antisemites—a positive identification with the German nation becomes established, in which “deutsch-sein” (“being German”) is not put into question, and there is no engagement with

anti-jewish guilt def lection and national self-victimization 411 the negative aspects of German history. In this worldview, ambivalence does not exist (or only to a very limited degree), and is replaced by the sole objective of emphasizing and glorifying the aspects that one considers positive. This identification with the German nation becomes a complementary substitute object, standing in for one’s own parents, with whom a critical examination has also been avoided. Psychoanalytically speaking, this process of positively identifying with the German nation and its history involves a substitution of the individual’s super-ego with an external authority (cf. Freud 1921: 73ff.)—in other words, an externalization (cf. Adorno 1951: 416); here, the important point is that this process of identification with the German nation is the direct expression of an authority relationship. When a person is bound by an authoritarian bond to a person (e.g. father, political leader) or a group (e.g. a sports club) because the dialectic of dutifulness and mastery provides for pleasure and satisfaction, this person will also behave similarly in relation to non-personal entities: “Wherever this personality senses power, he is bound to honor and love it, almost automatically. It does not matter whether this is the power of a person, an institution, or a socially approved idea.” (Fromm 1936: 115) The external force is transformed by the super-ego into an internal force. This external force, as represented by the authorities, becomes internalized, so that the individual obeys its commands and prohibitions no longer just because of threatened external punishments, but now because of the fears engendered by the psychic entity that has developed internally. Here, the super-ego stands in a dialectic with authority: on the one hand, it itself is an internalization of this authority, but on the other hand, authority is transfigured by it (through the projection of super-ego attributes) and in this transfigured form once more internalized (cf. ibid.: 84f.). Thus, it can be said that: “Not only is the super-ego an internalized authority and authority a personified super-ego, these two act together to create a voluntary compliancy and subservience, which marks social practice to an astonishing degree.” (Fromm 1936: 87) The central point is that this non-ambivalent identification with the German nation and its history combined with a non-confrontation with one’s own parents represents a two-sided problem: on the one hand, a generalized and psychoanalytic one, and on the other hand, a specific one regarding the complicity of one’s parents in the Nazi past, so that the urge towards national identification becomes a form of

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double infantilism (i.e. individually and historically). Politically speaking, this identification is achieved on the one hand by exonerating the perpetrator collective and casting German history in a purely positive light, and on the other hand by projecting one’s own responsibility and guilt onto the victims. These dimensions of exoneration and projection have become most clearly amalgamated in the new German victim discourse, which over the last few years has culminated in the formula of “Flucht und Vertreibung” (“flight and expulsion”), as well as the controversy surrounding the “Zentrum gegen Vertreibungen” (“Center Against Expulsions”) (cf. Hahn/Hahn 2001: 335ff.). The goal of this debate is to imply that Germans in general were victims of National Socialism, and to claim that National Socialism was simply the prologue to Flucht und Vertreibung (and not the reverse, with the expulsions being an epilogue to National Socialism), and that the expulsions were not only morally objectionable, but also politically, and above all legally so. This revisionist position—regardless of any question of morality and humaneness, the expulsions were in fact endorsed by international law and represented a politically legitimate consequence of Germany’s genocidal policies in Eastern Europe—will now be set in concrete with the building in Berlin of a center for German victims, a “Zentrum gegen Vertreibungen,” in accordance with the will of German expellee associations: to quote the President of the Federation of Expellees, Erika Steinbach, this “Zentrum gegen Vertreibungen” will be placed in “historical and spatial proximity” to the Holocaust Memorial (cf. Wonka 2000). The conceptual role model for this project is the Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington D.C. The implication of Steinbach’s statement could hardly be more obvious: one seeks “historical” proximity to the extermination of the Jews, or more succinctly, to their victim status. Steinbach expressed it this way: “Basically, these two topics—Jews and expellees—complement one another. This dehumanizing Rassenwahn [‘racial fanaticism’], both here and over there, should also be a focus of our Zentrum.” (cited in Wonka 2000) This comparison turns historical reality on its head. In fact, the resettlement of the Germans took place as a consequence of National Socialism and the genocide of European Jews. In contrast to Nazi policies, the resettlement was anchored in international law by the Potsdam Agreement, which is still legitimate today. Applying the word “Rassenwahn” to the resettlement is also inaccurate, in that this policy was not conducted due to racial reasons, but to anti-Nazi ones, in order

anti-jewish guilt def lection and national self-victimization 413 to reduce the potential for future conflicts in Eastern Europe. After all, the German minorities (or “Volksdeutsche,” as they were called back then) of Eastern Europe had also stoked the flames of social and political conflict during National Socialism (cf. Salzborn 2000: 22ff.). This had formed the basis of Nazi foreign policy, at least until it began pursuing its goals by military means. Volkstumpolitik (or politics guided by ethnic concerns), which itself aimed at resettling Germans eastwards, was ultimately foundational to the preparation and implementation of German conquest and annihilation policies. Recent sociohistorical research has even demonstrated a structural connection between German Volkstumpolitik and minorities policies in Eastern Europe, and the mass extermination of European Jews (cf. Haar 2000: 485ff.). This policy of Germanization was simply the flip side of the annihilation suffered by European Jews: what the Nazis called “völkische Flur‑ bereinigung” (“ethnic land clearance”) was meant to create space for the Volksdeutsche, meaning that the majority of future expellees were at least passive participants (and in many cases active ones, as shown by many historical studies)4 in the völkisch and antisemitic policies of occupation and extermination. However, these aspects are conveniently ignored in the current debates. Instead, conservatives try to focus on the innocence of selected individuals, for example by using movies to depict the case histories of those who were children at the time of expulsion—in other words, those who really did bear no personal guilt; within the politics of remembrance, these children’s experiences are portrayed as representative cases, and not just those of a minority, as was historically the case. This personification serves to de-territorialize historical guilt by symbolically subsuming the perpetrators into the non-identity of the German people, which itself is unjustly forced to pay for “Hitler’s crimes.” This is how the portrayal of individual innocence circuitously mutates into the myth of collective innocence, through this communal identification with the innocent bystanders, who, as “average Germans,” allegedly have nothing to do with the perpetrators. In this way, real and widespread complicity becomes inverted into a claim of blamelessness, which is to be applied collectively instead of individually, as would otherwise be the case in a state of law: thus,

4  For an additional overview of current research on the situation in individual countries, see Salzborn 2005b: 81.

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according to an opinion survey commissioned in the autumn of 2003 by the German newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeinen Zeitung (October 23, 2003) and the Polish newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza (October 21, 2003), over 90% of Germans nowadays consider themselves to be victims of World War II too. A striking aspect of this projection is the object of its indirectly articulated desire: although the victim status may often seem like a badge of privilege in historical and political debates, the reality of being a victim is anything but desirable, and every victim of violence would certainly prefer having avoided it. In turn, this projective envy finds expression in the belief (as corroborated by numerous empirical studies) that Jews are trying to use the Nazi past for their own benefit. In this regard, one can agree with Béla Grunberger (1962: 256) when he states that “the projections of the antisemite form the core of his conflicts, and this central core is not further resolvable.” This highlights the defense mechanism triggered by internal feelings of inferiority and guilt, in which one’s own evils become projected upon the Jews, as much as the envy one feels towards their abilities and successes, both real and imaginary (cf. Grünberg 2002). Here, in addition to the previously described aspects of authoritarianism, identification with the impersonal authority of the “German Nation,” and the yearning to take part in and become part of the imaginary invincibility of this collective, a further, central element of narcissism consists of the early-childhood fantasy of omnipotence, or the “God complex” (Richter 1979); this desire to be all-powerful and immortal is permanently thwarted on a daily basis, thereby producing a narcissistic wound (cf. Wirth 2003). Therefore, the antisemite finds the Jews to be despicable precisely because they possess (in his fantasies) the omnipotence that he desires so much, while at the same time, he projects all the emotionally unpleasant (and unconscious) elements of his own megalomania (his “own evils”) onto the Jews, in what Béla Grunberger and Pierre Dessuant (2000: 329) aptly termed a “projective identification”: “Horror and fascination exist side by side. [. . .] that the antisemite fears the thing inside himself: he projects upon the Jew his own, unintegrated anal drive.” (Ibid.: 335) Or, in the words of Theodor W. Adorno (1955: 232): “One’s own drives, repressions, and unconscious aspects are ascribed to others. This is how one comes to terms with the demands of one’s own super-ego, and at the same time finds occasion, under the banner of legitimate punishment, to vent one’s own aggressive tendencies.”

anti-jewish guilt def lection and national self-victimization 415 Under the watchful eye of the antisemite’s own internal control mechanisms, both individual/psychological and collective/political, the antisemitic delusion cannot allow itself to be unmasked as being delusional; therefore, the antisemitic worldview requires Freudian rationalizations that affirm its factuality and deny its irrationality. Here, the antisemite denies “the use he has made of the Jew for the sake of his mental hygiene” (Grunberger/Dessuant 2000: 350), which is most clearly demonstrated by historical and contemporary attempts by antisemites to “prove” the existence of a “Jewish world conspiracy” (cf. Jaecker 2004). In the context of German secondary antisemitism, this deflection of guilt and remembrance in connection with projection leads to a particular dynamic in the unconscious: The Jews are ‘unheimlich’ [‘sinister’] because they represent one’s own repressed tendencies, and because they are a reminder of an external reality from which one no longer wants to hear. The ‘Final Solution’ envisioned the elimination of all witnesses. Non-Jews were supposed to be spared such unpleasant memories after the war. The surviving Jews embody these memories. They are experienced by the next generation as troublemakers disturbing their inner unconflicted state. The guilt of the parents should stay concealed. However, this can only lead to the strengthening of antisemitic ideas, not their weakening. [. . .] The narcissistic framework of the children of ‘persecutors’ becomes traumatized if the omnipotence of the parents is identified with persecution and mass murder. [. . .] The drive conflicts associated with primal identifications remain in existence, and the Oedipal conflict stays unresolved. That is why this industrial mass extermination is obscured and euphemized. One speaks of a ‘holocaust’, a burnt offering, as if the Jews had been sacrificed. In reality, they had been exterminated like vermin. After the fact, one tries to take Nazi ideology and justify it, negate it, rationalize it, or secretly maintain it. (Brainin et al. 1993: 58, 60)

Beyond a few exceptional cases, today’s generation of parents completely refrained from confronting their own parents, the actual perpetrators of National Socialism, or else only obliquely criticized the Nazi movement with coded references to “fascism” and the ­surveillance state, thereby rationalizing the antisemitic core of Nazi politics and in fact subsuming it into capitalism, as astutely recognized by Janine Chasseguet-Smirgel (1985: 160) as early as the mid-1980s: “In Germany, one speaks not of Nazism, but of fascism. [. . .] Among West Germans, the term ‘fascism’ functions to downplay the Hitler regime, as if it was just another kind of fascism like that of Mussolini, Franco, or Pinochet, just another entirely banal dictatorship. This brushes aside

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the essence of National Socialism, namely the racial ideology, whose logical consequences were to be the ‘Final Solution’ and the thousandyear domination of the world by the Aryans.” This refusal to confront the concrete perpetrators of National Socialism (manifested as silence or rationalization) has resulted in an emotional inheritance that is now being passed on to the grandchildren, who in turn are exhibiting even more intense forms of deflecting guilt and memory, in that the avoidance is now doubled: challenging one’s parents would necessarily require a double-critique, not only of the parents themselves, but also of the uncritical way they handled their own history (both individual and collective) in the (non)dialogue conducted with the grandparent generation. Instead, as described by Elisabeth Brainin, Vera Ligeti and Samy Teicher (1993: 64), a “Deckidentität” (“cover identity”) is created, which, in the process of dealing with the past, can take various forms, ranging from a blanket denial of guilt, to a demonization of specific perpetrator types, to a leveling of responsibility through victim/perpetrator inversions, to an identification with the victims of National Socialism. Until a few years ago, pains were taken not only in the public and social spheres, but also sometimes in the scholarly context, to dissociate the perpetrators of the Shoah from the everyday life of Germany. Sometimes they were portrayed as maniacal monsters or brutal savages, sometimes as emotionless and indifferent bureaucrat perpetrators, sometimes as criminal or antisocial elements; furthermore, it was not uncommon to portray the Shoah as the product of a small political or even economic elite within the Nazi leadership (cf. Paul 2002; Salzborn 2002). Today, this is reflected by a kind of rationalizing non-remembrance occurring in private memories, as clearly demonstrated by a study into the remembrance of National Socialism and the Shoah within German familial memories (Welzer et al. 2002). This showed that Nazi perpetrators may even be seen as victims in the eyes of their children and grandchildren, because these later generations possess insufficient knowledge of the Nazi past and the Shoah, and also believe that their parents or grandparents had been the victims of secret surveillance, terror campaigns, war, bombing, and imprisonment. Since these later generations morally condemn Nazi perpetrators, considering them “bad” and “evil,” they recast their own parents and grandparents in the role of resistance fighters and victims of National Socialism. The currently hegemonic form of Deckidentität consists of building up a myth of collective innocence, in which one talks about “German

anti-jewish guilt def lection and national self-victimization 417 victims” without actually addressing National Socialism. Here, the historical context should be made to disappear, and the causal relationships between German Volkstumpolitik and annihilation policies on the one hand and the resulting resettlement of Germans and the bombing of German cities on the other hand should all be excised from memory, without their ever having been seriously addressed within social discourse. The repeated allegation that Germans have suffered a declaration of collective guilt, which never in fact existed as a principle guiding the policies of the Allies and their associates (cf. Frei 2005: 145ff.; Salzborn 2003: 17ff.), is met with an interpretation of history that aims at creating a myth of German collective innocence. The reality of having accepted National Socialism’s teachings that promised Germans special privileges in the world, and the reality that during National Socialism one had projected one’s own aggressions onto fellow human beings, who in this act of projection became transformed into subhumans, caused the overwhelming majority of Germans not to feeling something like shame, but instead elicited the childish excuse that one had “just” been following the Führer. As underlined by Alexander und Margarete Mitscherlich (1980: 53f.), this explains the “tendency of many Germans after the war to take on the role of the innocent victim. Every single one experienced the disappointment of his own yearning for protection and leadership; he was misled, seduced, left in the lurch, and finally expelled and despised, despite having offered nothing but obedience, which was the citizen’s first obligation.” This infantile attitude “forgets” not only the historical facts, but also inverts the victim-perpetrator relationship to one’s own benefit, so that although one may be lamenting an act of destruction and annihilation, it is only in regards to one’s own situation and yearnings. This deflection of guilt and denial of history, already attested in the postwar period, was accompanied by a downright ritualized cultivation of one’s own blamelessness and victim status, which weighs on the present once again like a recurring nightmare—although this time with an important modification that shifts the orientation of the Deckidentität so that Nazi atrocities are no longer generally denied, but historically normalized instead. In this context, National Socialism becomes a deconcretized artifact; for if one actually spoke about the facts, namely Volkstumspolitik and extermination, then it would become obvious that the professed victim status of the Germans is historically untenable. Furthermore, although the horrors of National Socialism

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may be abstractly condemned, they are also meticulously isolated from their historical context. Thus, cause and effect disappear from the account, and the idea of causality itself is simply not acknowledged; the account becomes dominated by accident and destiny, and above all, a depersonalization of Nazi history. Questions are no longer asked about who organized and implemented the Shoah, who concealed it, supported it, or at least kept silent about it. Ultimately, current efforts to construct a Deckidentität have led to a blurring of the line between fact and fiction, as well as between individual and collective, which has paved the way for massive generalizations regarding Flucht und Vertreibung, and the moral judgment of this as an “injustice.” These phenomena are accompanied in wider society by a massive resistance to facts, particularly exemplified by the education system’s obfuscation of National Socialism; although there exists a widespread myth that National Socialism is being constantly addressed, the majority of Germans in fact knows nearly nothing about it (cf. Ahlheim/ Heger 2002; Silbermann/Stoffers 2000). In this context, the German victim myth ties in with the perpetual assertion of innocence, from which spring the constantly repeated calls for a “Schlussstrich,” as advocated by approximately one quarter of Germans in a recent study conducted by the American Jewish Committee (2005). The core problem (both politically and psychologically) remains the lack of a critical “processing of the past” (Adorno 1959: 555). Often, the frequently bizarre-seeming rituals of public contrition have—paradoxically—more to do with exonerating one’s own parents and grandparents, by taking concrete deeds and dissolving them into an abstract haze of generalized violence, or submerging them into the fantasy of having been forced to cooperate; they have more to do with equalizing victims and perpetrators, conjuring a general and diffuse impression of helplessness (and sometimes a projective over-identification with the victims, avoiding the contemplation of one’s own perpetrator role by envying the victims their victim status, which every real victim wishes to have been spared in the first place). They have little to do with any attempt to work on and work through the barbarities contained within specific family histories, or to reflect on them and thereby enable an escape from this need for ritual commemorations that lack actual memory. In this context, Elisabeth Brainin, Vera Ligeti and Samy Teicher (1993: 52) offered a key insight concerning the mass extermination of European Jews from a psychoanalytic perspective: “One can only

anti-jewish guilt def lection and national self-victimization 419 recognize this reality as such—one can never process it.” The reemergence of repressed ideas can be shunted into a critical processing of the past only if the children and grandchildren of the German perpetrators admit that the Nazi regime was massively endorsed by the German populace—including one’s own parents and/or grandparents—and that the overwhelming majority of Germans took part in the mass extermination of European Jews, both actively and passively (be it by participating in confiscations, acts of plunder, denunciations, executions, deportations, etc.; silencing and declining resistance; spreading antisemitic and racist sentiments; keeping silent about crimes; or by profiting from forced labor and “Aryanization”), and that Volkstumpolitik and extermination policies could only have been implemented with such barbarity because there existed a sweeping consensus between the Nazi leadership and the German populace. This would imply not only a working on, and a working through, within the collective memory of the nation, but also individually within one’s own family history (cf. Rensmann 1998): In fact, it could be said that one only becomes free of neurotic guilt and capable of overcoming the whole complex if one first sees oneself as guilty, even for those things in which one had no hand. (Adorno 1955: 320)

However, this idea is rarely reflected in the politics of remembrance in Germany, or even in the handling of today’s antisemitism. Instead, the exact opposite is closer to the truth, as recently illustrated by a March 2010 article in tageszeitung—a politically Green, alternative newspaper—in which Iris Hefets labels Holocaust commemoration “a kind of religion” and writes dismissively of a “Shoah cult,” while at the same time defending radical “anti-Zionists” such as Norman G. Finkelstein against criticism. This article is all the more remarkable for having been published by the left-wing alternative tageszeitung, because this demonstrates that not only has a critical processing of the past been omitted in Germany, but quite on the contrary, criticism is now being directed at those who campaign for a remembrance of the Shoah and a critical examination of National Socialism. References Adorno, Theodor W. (1951) Freudian Theory and the Pattern of Fascist Propaganda. In Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften Vol. 8 (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp) 1997.

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Between Neo-Fascism, “Anti-Fascism,” and Anti-Zionism: Antisemitism in Italy Emanuele Ottolenghi I.  Introduction In Italy, as in the rest of Europe, open antisemitism is chastised and isolated through social condemnation and legal means. Most traditional antisemitism is confined to the publications and websites of extreme groups. Stereotypes of the Jew as a Christ-killer, the blood-libel, and the Jew as international manipulator of media, finance and politics are largely confined to the periphery of intellectual, political and public discourse. Nevertheless, these images resurface through the medium of the ongoing Palestinian-Israeli dispute, where they are occasionally conflated with rhetoric about the conflict, making old prejudices legitimate through the medium of anti-Israel sentiment. This is the main source of anti-Jewish phenomena in Italy today. This phenomenon appears in the mainstream press of all political persuasions, as well as among extremists. It cuts across the ideological spectrum, uniting the anti-global left, the xenophobic and fascist right, pre-Vatican II Catholics, along with more mainstream segments of society. It is not so much Israel’s criticism per se, that constitutes antisemitism, but the confluence of antisemitic imagery and stereotypes with criticism of Israel. In some cases, criticism of Israel borders on antisemitism, especially when antisemitic stereotypes make their way into the discourse on Israel’s present predicament (Ottolenghi: 2003a). Given that these two phenomena overlap but do not necessarily coincide, those who use antisemitic imagery to attack Israel usually deny the charges, claiming instead that their critics aim to silence legitimate criticism of Israel. Indeed, across Europe—Italy is no exception— Israel’s advocates protest that behind criticism of Israel there sometimes lurks a more sinister agenda dangerously bordering on antisemitism (Ottolenghi: 2003). Critics disagree, arguing that attacks on Israel are neither misplaced nor the source of anti-Jewish sentiment. Israel’s behavior is reprehensible and so are those Jews who defend it (Milne: 2002; Mearsheimer & Walt: 2006). The lack of a precise boundary is

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both cause and effect of how public opinion defines, understands and identifies antisemitism and the current spate of anti-Jewish hostility.1 Current debates focus on where the line between Anti-Zionism and antisemitism falls which makes it difficult to agree on a working definition of antisemitism.2 The tendency to minimize the nature of a threat hinders efforts to formulate a right response to the newest manifestations of antisemitism. Along with the existing prejudice comes a denial of its occurrence. Extreme right-wing and neo-Nazi manifestations of antisemitism are universally condemned. Other expressions of anti-Jewish prejudice are downplayed.3 Mainstream understanding of antisemitism is usually influenced by the Auschwitz paradigm. Presuming that antiJewish prejudice can only manifest itself as a racially driven hatred that invariably leads to Auschwitz prevents European societies from acknowledging anything but the most glaring expressions of antiJewish outrage, preferring to downplay or ignore its other currently more widespread manifestations. It should be self-evident that between Auschwitz and social harmony there are infinite shades of gray. The difficulty is precisely in recognizing that the racial antisemitism that eventually begat Nazism was neither the first nor the only form of anti-Jewish prejudice in Europe’s history. There should also be recognition that immunization against it does not necessarily guarantee that other forms of prejudice will not recur. Defining current antisemitism thus requires caution. Not everyone agrees that it can be associated with anti-Zionism, despite a clear correlation between the Middle East news cycle and the resurgence of antisemitic prejudice. Even strong

1   See for example Massimo D’Alema’s interview with the daily La Repubblica, on December 3, 2003, in relation to the October 2003 Eurobarometer poll: ‘Doesn’t the accusation to Sharon betray a basis of ‘left-wing anti-Semitism, as the EUMC dossier suggests?’ ‘Actually, it seems to me that the dossier refers not so much to ‘the left’ but to a few ‘fringes of the extreme left.’ Besides, to me Israel’s right to exist and to security is non-negotiable. But those who criticize Sharon cannot be labeled as antisemites, when he is sending the army to shoot on Ramallah at a time when [Palestinian Prime minister] Abu Ala is negotiating a truce with Palestinian terror groups. This has nothing to do with Israel, a great democracy. This has to do with its government, which is pursuing the wrong policy.’ 2  The EUMC working definition, while a significant step forward in this sense, is not universally endorsed by governments across Europe. 3   A notable exception—and perhaps a sign of trend reversal—was the recent speech by Italy’s President, Giorgio Napolitano, for Holocaust Memorial Day on January 27, 2007 (http://www.quirinale.it/Discorsi/Discorso.asp?id=32021).



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critics of Israel acknowledge that correlation. What is disputed is its nature: What constitutes an act of antisemitism? What causes it? What can be done about it? Clarity of definition is therefore required to seek a remedy. Italy’s historical legacy of Fascism4 looms large in Italian antisemitism, along with left-wing antisemitism, and traditional anti-Jewish sentiments nurtured by the Church until the Vatican II Council. However, along with Catholic anti-Judaism, it is marginal and openly expressed mainly in obscure publications and Internet websites. Indeed, because in post-war Italy antisemitism lost its social acceptability and became stigmatized, its manifestations appear primarily in more extreme sectors. According to Adriana Goldstaub, from the leading Italian research institute on contemporary Jewry, Centro di Documentazione Ebraica Contemporanea (CDEC), its typical elements are: (1) focus on the old forgery The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, (2) emphasis on the Jews’ pursuit of economic and political power to rule society and the world, (3) the compact nature of Jews as a group, (4) more recently the notion of Jewish ‘chosen-ness’ as an indicator of an innate sense of superiority, and (5) the idea of Jews as subversive elements bent on perverting society (Goldstaub: 2002,1). Some of these themes, as it will be seen later, slowly percolate into discourse on Israel and the Middle East. Quantifying prejudice in Italy as well as explaining its causes is the focus of this essay where the current state of antisemitism in Italy will be quantified, based on a number of recent surveys, characterized in its multifarious manifestations and assessed. This essay will therefore do the following: first, it will provide a brief historical background about Italy’s Jewish community; second, it will map out extremism and offer some examples; third, it will quantify anti-Jewish prejudice based on surveys and public opinion polls; and last, it will offer an interpretation of the phenomenon in the context of public readings of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

4   For a comprehensive discussion of the history of Jews during the Fascist period, see Renzo De Felice (2001).

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Recent public opinion surveys in European countries measured traditional antisemitic prejudice and tried to determine if and how antisemitism makes its way into the coverage—and the public perception—of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Among them, there were two surveys commissioned by the ADL, which included data from Italy.5 According to the ADL surveys, 15% of Italians were considered to harbor antisemitic views in 2004, down from 23% in 2002. More specifically, 57% (58%)6 think ‘that Jews are more loyal to Israel than to Italy;’ 24% (30%) think that ‘Jews don’t care what happens to anyone but their own kind;’ 10% (27%) think that ‘Jews are more willing than others to use shady practices to get what they want;’ 29% (42%) think that ‘Jews have too much power in the business world.’ 92% of those interviewed expressed strong support for active government intervention to fight antisemitism, but 43% (43%) felt that ‘Jews still talk too much about what happened to them in the Holocaust.’ An additional ADL 2005 poll expanded on previous ones, asking the public whether it agreed with the statement ‘The Jews are responsible for the death of Jesus Christ.’ (ADL 2005, 4) In Italy, this view is held by 14% of the population—one of the lowest yields in the survey. Finally, in the same survey, respondents were asked to correlate their feelings for Jews to their views on Israel and to explain whether attacks on Jews were a consequence of antisemitism or anti-Israel sentiment. One striking factor emerges from these data: despite a continuous

5   Both surveys included Italy. Their aim was to measure traditional antisemitic stereotypes and then ascertain, through a measurement of attitudes to the Arab-Israeli conflict, whether there is a spillover effect. This approach is justified by the emerging trend where the rate of anti-Jewish incidents is directly correlated to the ebb and flow of the Middle East conflict. See, to this effect, data and statistics from the UK, available at http://www.thecst.org.uk/incidents_statistics.htm. The CST offers the only systematic, comprehensive database of antisemitic incidents in Europe, clearly showing how there is a direct causal correlation between events in the Middle East and attacks on Jews. Since the beginning of the Second Palestinian Intifadah, for example, in late September 2000, there was a dramatic upsurge of attacks in October–November 2000 (following the beginning of the Intifadah); similarly, there was a dramatic upsurge after September 11th, 2001, during Israel’s operation Defensive Shield in April–May 2002, and then again in March 2003, in the run-up to the war in Iraq. 6   Numbers in parenthesis indicate positive responses to the same question in 2002.



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Jewish presence for over 2,000 years, most Italians still view Jews as being more loyal to Israel: 55% in 2005, versus 57% in 2004 and 58% in 2002—a minor variation. On this, Italy’s results are higher than the European mean average—43%—but not by far. The charge of disloyalty Jews suffered from throughout the centuries has now acquired a new, contemporary dimension following the establishment of the State of Israel. Further findings showed strong correlations between education, age, and antisemitism: those over the age of 65 or who completed their education by age 17 or before are more likely than the rest of the population to agree with the antisemitic characterizations presented in the survey (ADL Survey: 2004, p. 22). 25% of respondents aged 65 or older and 20% among those who finished their studies by age 17 harbored traditional antisemitic views compared with 15% of all respondents (ADL Survey: 2004, p. 22). These findings suggest that (1) traditional prejudice is inversely correlated to education, and (2) the generation schooled under Fascism in the 1930s and 1940s internalized the antisemitic message of Fascist education in the period of 1938–1945. Traditional antisemitism is therefore found mostly on the fringes; but hostility to Israel is on the rise. A Eurobarometer poll conducted in early November 2003, asked ‘For each of the following countries, tell me if in your opinion, it presents or not a threat to peace in the world?’ (Eurobarometer: 2003, 80). On average, 59% replied that Israel was a threat to world peace (more than Iran, North Korea, the US, Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan), Italy scored below average (48%).7 These results stirred controversy in Italy (Ottolenghi: 2003, 2).8 soliciting more thorough surveys to corroborate the Eurobarometer. One such survey appeared on the Italian daily Il Corriere della Sera. Questions aimed at ascertaining the degree of traditional anti-Jewish prejudice of respondents (see Table 1) were then linked to attitudes and knowledge to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

7   All other countries scored above 50%; the Netherlands had the highest score, 74%. 8   Some criticism might have been politically motivated, due to the fact that Romano Prodi, outgoing President of the European Commission, was seen as a leading challenger to Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi’s governing coalition.

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Table 1.  Survey on Antisemitism, Il Corriere della Sera, November 10, 2003 In your opinion . . .

Agree

Disagree

Don’t Know

Jews are not truly Italians Jews should leave Italy Jews have a different mentality and   way of life from other Italians Judaism is intolerant Jews have a special relation with   money Jews are not nice and do not inspire   confidence Jews are biased in their support for  Israel Jews should stop acting like victims  because of the Holocaust and persecutions of 50 years ago Jews are lying when they claim that  Nazism murdered 6 millions of them in the gas chambers

22% 8% 51%

74% 91% 41%

4% 1% 8%

20% 39%

66% 41%

14% 20%

11%

82%

7%

37%

41%

22%

38%

56%

6%

11%

83%

5%

Source: Il Corriere della Sera, November 10, 2003.

These data suggest the following: first, Holocaust deniers are a small (11%) but significant minority. While only one in ten question historical facts, 38% think that Jews play the victims’ card. Their response is not only worrisome because of its potential implications on collective memory as the Holocaust fades into the past, but also because it suggests an underlying resentment towards Jews and about Europe’s collective guilt in the Holocaust. If one links this to Israel—and the Holocaust’s centrality to its identity and collective ethos—and the widespread perception that Israel was born due to Western guilt over the Holocaust, one can see how these data indicate a possible link between hostile feelings toward Jews and the Arab-Israeli conflict. This is especially true in light of the view, held by a similar 37%, that Jews are biased in favor of Israel. This opinion, set against a generally less-than-friendly media environment towards Israel and a tendency to conflate Israel and all Jews, suggests a bias against Jews. It is their status as Jews, in other words, that explains their views, not the possible validity of their particular political stance. Data about the belief that Jews killed Jesus solicit similar considerations. Traditional prejudice is still rooted though less widespread and nefarious: the image of Jews as Christ-killers certainly lacks the vicious potency it once had. Regardless, three considerations are in order:



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First, deicide has important theological underpinnings—including supersessionism,9 according to which failure to embrace Jesus as the Messiah and the Gospel as a New Testament, cost the Jews their role as God’s Chosen People and therefore their claim to the Promised Land. In political terms, supersessionism is used to undermine Jewish territorial claims over the Holy Land. For those who believe that Jews are Christ-killers, a return of Jewish sovereignty over the Land of Israel is a theological scandal rather than a historical event. Supersessionism is now the basis for Palestinian liberation theology, serving the purpose of delegitimizing Israel. Second, denying Jesus’ Jewish roots aims to cleanse the land of any reference to its Jewish past thus strengthening the Palestinian claim from a theological point of view, as Palestinian liberation theology organizations such as Sabeel claim. And third, transposing the theme of Jews as Christ-killers in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict serves a more sinister purpose: if Israelis are Christ-killers, Palestinians will be on the cross. This modern variant of the charge of deicide—which frequently emerged in cartoons and articles in Italy and across the continent—has now become a filter through which the conflict is understood. Though Europe is largely post-Christian and this is a minority belief, its recurrence in anti-Israel imagery indicates that in such cases, criticism has crossed the line. Finally, and contrary to the findings of the ADL surveys, the Corriere della Sera survey showed a clear inverse correlation between knowledge and prejudice: the better the knowledge of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the less inclined were respondents to embrace traditional anti-Jewish stereotypes. ADL’s findings offered a more complex picture. In 2002, while most respondents claimed to know little or nothing about the history of the conflict, a third said they knew ‘a great deal’ or ‘a good amount’ about it. The more informed citizens were, the more likely they were to view Israel unfavorably: by a margin of 2 to 1, Europeans sympathized more with Palestinians than Israelis, with a third taking no sides. The 2004 survey confirmed these trends: despite the fact that Italy is, along with the Netherlands, the only country of ten surveyed where, on balance, the public views Israel more favorably than the Palestinians (16% to 13%)—and despite the fact that in Italy alone the public, 18% to 14%, blames the Palestinians more than Israel for

9   For a definition of this doctrine, see Wikipedia, under ‘Supersessionism’ and ‘Replacement Theology’, available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Replacement_ theology.

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the conflict—the more people follow the conflict and claim to know ‘a good or a fair amount about it,’ the more they sympathize with the Palestinians (ADL Survey: 2004,34). Even while holding the Palestinian side more responsible, Italians sympathize more with the Palestinians by a margin of 24% to 16% (down from 31% to 10% in 2002). Despite the apparent discrepancy, both surveys showed how crucial information and knowledge are in shaping public attitudes towards the conflict and in fostering (or hindering) a linkage between the Middle East and anti-Jewish prejudice (Donno, 2003:79–102, and Ottolenghi, 2004:1).10 One could quickly retort that anti-Israelism is not antisemitism. The surveys indicate that this distinction is more easily surmised than demonstrated in reality. In 2005, the ADL survey asked, ‘Is your opinion of the Jews influenced or not by actions taken by the State of Israel?’ To those giving a positive answer, a second question was asked: ‘Does your opinion improve or not?’ (ADL Survey, 2005:10–11) The results of the survey are reproduced below, in Table 2. Table 2.  Is Your Opinion of the Jews Affected by Israel’s Actions? If So, Is It for the Worse?

Austria Belgium Denmark France Germany Holland Hungary Italy Poland Spain Switzerland United Kingdom

Yes

For the worse

36% 28% 34% 15% 31% 26% 22% 25% 28% 37% 41% 28%

49% 63% 39% 38% 50% 62% 39% 51% 42% 69% 59% 56%

Source:  ADL Survey 2005, pp. 10 –11.

10   The discrepancy may have to do with the relatively limited amount of material available on the subject in Italian, the relatively low numbers of works hostile to Israel



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According to these data, in no European country does the majority of the population change its views of the Jews as a consequence of the Arab-Israeli conflict or of Israel’s behavior, though these data alone say nothing of what opinion people hold of the Jews in general. It may mean that they keep their view of the Jews separate of their view of Israel or that their view of Israel confirms their feelings toward the Jews. What the survey clearly illustrates is that a significant minority—always above 20% except for France—changes its views of the Jews based on Israel’s behavior—or rather, based on how Israel’s behavior is perceived through the filter of media reporting and other educational and information material available to the public. Not everyone changes opinion. In Italy, for example, one in every eight Italians does. Even if the majority of Europeans claim not to develop hostile feelings toward Jews as a result of the Middle East conflict, a significant portion of the population do, as evidence of the existence of a correlation between antisemitism and hostility to Israel, though not in as widespread a fashion as some people may believe (Kaplan & Small, 2006: 550).11 Two more surveys were published in January 2004, one by AnsaEurispes (ANSA, 2004), and a second by the Corriere della Sera ( January 26, 2004). Both confirm the above trends: according to Eurispes, there is a hard-core antisemitic constituency among the public, whose size varies depending on the question posed: 11.1% think the Holocaust did not produce as many victims as suggested by history books, 34.1% think that Jews exercise their power over the economy, finance and the media ‘in an occult fashion’ (ANSA, 2004). Interestingly, those who view Jews as too powerful and exercising their influence behind the scenes are not confined to the ideological periphery of the political spectrum: though more prominently on the right fringes, they nevertheless are a cross section of society: prejudice is ubiquitous and predisposition to embrace it is not confined to the extreme right as commonly assumed.

translated and media coverage of the conflict that, while not always friendly to the Jewish state, tends, nevertheless, to be less hostile than in other countries. For example, most of the notoriously hostile works of Israel’s new historians are still unavailable to the Italian reader. 11   According to Kaplan and Small (2006) there is a clear correlation: the more people are anti-Israel, the more likely they are to hate Jews.

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Criticism of Israel’s policies was solid, with 74.5% disagreeing with Ariel Sharon’s approach to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Shown in the extreme where 35.9% of respondents agree that ‘the Israeli government is perpetrating a full-fledged genocide and is acting with the Palestinians the way the Nazis did with the Jews.’ The conflation of Israel’s military policies with Nazism suggests a demonizing element that progressively blurred the boundaries between legitimate criticism and irrational, prejudiced opposition to Israel.12 It also clarifies why a significantly high number of respondents felt that Jews are biased in favor of Israel: Israel’s policy is so discredited in the media, so the logic goes, that only Jews would support it, and this, due to the fact that they are not truly loyal citizens. While a significant number of respondents condemn Palestinian terror and suicide bombings, still 36.9% agree that blame for the attacks lays squarely on ‘Sharon’s aggressive and imperialist policies.’ Israel’s right to exist is considered sacrosanct by 91.8% of the interviewees, but 28% make it conditional on the establishment of a Palestinian state. A picture thus emerges where most of the hostility Israel draws seems to be caused by its policies, or more likely by the way the public perceives those policies through the filter of media reporting. That hostility is not only directed at Israel, but at Jews as well, drawing on well-established traditional prejudice that has little to do with Israel. The reason for this is that the way the conflict is portrayed plays a crucial role in fostering or hindering anti-Jewish prejudice. That this has a direct impact on anti-Jewish prejudice becomes evident if one looks at the findings of the ADL surveys on the nexus between antisemitism and the Israeli-Palestinian dispute: 62% of European respondents in the 2002 surveys believed that recent violence is a product of anti-Israel sentiments and not traditional antisemitic or anti-Jewish feelings. In 2004, 55% thought so. And as noted, while a majority of respondents claimed to know little or nothing about the history of the conflict, a third said they knew ‘a great deal’ or ‘a good amount’ about it. Contrary to what transpired in the Italian-run surveys, the ADL poll showed that the more informed citizens were, the more likely they were to view Israel unfavorably. Nothing better than these findings shows the importance of information in shaping public views. Surveys show that anti-Jewish prejudice is resilient. They also show something

  For a discussion of the implications of comparing Israel to Nazism see below.

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else: most people deny harboring it, for fear of public condemnation. Faced with a new wave of antisemitic incidents, the public feels that anti-Israel sentiment is behind them, but not antisemitism. Thus, while denying that criticism of Israel might be in any way antisemitic, many obviously acknowledge a link between Israel and Jew-hatred. This is a contradiction, caused by a public discourse that has become infected by prejudice but refuses to recognize it for what it is, hiding behind the argument that anti-Zionism, anti-Israeli-ism and anti-Sharonism are not the same as antisemitism.13 To conclude, whilst surveys show the media’s great impact on shaping attitudes on Israel, they also tell another story. Sympathy for Palestinians is directly correlated to media coverage and to knowledge of the conflict. In both cases, hostility toward Israel is bound to grow over time. Scholarship about the conflict is almost uniformly hostile to Israel and, therefore, history books tend to portray Israel as the aggressor (Ottolenghi, 2007). Media coverage—reflecting journalists’ political preferences, their sensitivity to public opinion, and their knowledge of the subject based on the same sources provided to students by the academic community—is not likely to swing in favor of Israel. III.  Antisemitism as a Form of Extremism Extremism is the starting place for a survey of antisemitism in Italy. As the birthplace of Fascism, Italy still has a strong tradition of Fascist nostalgia. Despite legislation barring the re-constitution of the Fascist party and criminalization of advocacy or defense of Fascist ideology, this nostalgia appears in countless publications and, recently, websites. Though different in scope, focus, materials and affiliation, radical right websites share some themes, among them antisemitism. Providing links to classic Fascist and Nazi literature, such as Adolf Hitler’s Mein Kampf, The Protocols of the Sages and Elders of Zion, and more recent neoFascist writings, they share an anti-modern agenda. Some emphasize the link between their ultra-nationalist ideology and Christianity (such as the Centro Tradizione e Comunità), while others refer to the pagan

 As the Guardian’s Leader argued on January 26, 2002.

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dimension of Nazi and Fascist ideologies.14 Islamic, Catholic, and farleft organizations declare their enmity to what they call ‘Worldism,’15 whose latest manifestation is globalization. Behind ‘Worldism’ they see occult forces, driven by money and power, whose agenda is to rule the world. Jews feature prominently in this scheme, both implicitly and explicitly. Fighting globalization stems from a desire to preserve national identities and cultures, and sometimes ‘racial purity.’ Globalization is viewed as the instrument to perpetuate American hegemony, and often ‘Worldism,’ globalization and imperialism are used synonymously. Jews feature as the bogeymen of right-wing anti-global rhetoric (not only) pulling strings at the IMF, the trilateral commission, global finance, the European Union and NATO. Equally, Israel is often depicted as the instrument of globalization and imperialism to subjugate the Middle East. Absent is the open racism against nonEuropean peoples, who are often seen as a natural ally for Europe in the struggle against imperialism, ‘Worldism’ and American domination; suggesting that they have reasons as well to join the fight against these sinister globalizing forces.16 In this context, many websites support the Palestinian cause as an anti-imperialist struggle. Their language often betrays strong antisemitic overtones. Holocaust denial is ubiquitous. Articles and links ‘expose’ the ‘Jewish dogma’ on the Holocaust; show its use for the advancement of Jewish power in the world and as a cover-up of ‘historical truth.’ Extreme Right Forza Nuova on the fringe of the right wing espouses a radically nationalist and reactionary worldview. It opposes immigration, which it perceives as a threat to Italian-ness. It decries the possibility that Turkey or Israel would join the EU, due to their different religious and cultural backgrounds, while it supports membership for Russia, ‘the stronghold of Christianity.’ FN denounces ‘usury and freemasonry,’ emphasizing 14   See for example the Thule website, at www.geocities.com/societathule/index .htm, with a virtual library offering antisemitic material. The Thule society is inspired by the Thule Gesellschaft, a cult-like group established in 1919 that played a role in Nazi Germany. 15   ‘Mondialismo’ in Italian, from the word mondo, world, and mondiale, worldwide. 16   As long as they stay where they are: some of these same websites strongly oppose Turkey’s entry into Europe and take virulent anti-immigrations’ stands.



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family values and tradition as the pillars for a healthy society. It depicts the present state of affairs as ‘corrupt and decaying’ due to ‘foreign’ influences: its political views are the way forward to ‘regenerate’ Italian society. Advocating a boycott of American products, FN provides a list of companies to target. An icon depicting the American flag with McDonald’s, Nike, Levi’s and Timberland logos in place of the stars, and a faded Star of David superimposed to the flag, surmises the nature of the power behind American economic hegemony. A different site, Brigata Nera (Black Brigade), broadcasts a starker message. Brigata Nera features abundant material on Nazism, Fascism, and their leaders such as antisemitic and Fascist thinker Julius Evola. Articles express strong opposition to immigration and globalization, denouncing the idea that Europe should have Judeo-Christian roots and doubting their existence. A section on Revisionism summarizes Holocaust denial’s main themes, with an added Italian dimension, casting doubt on writer Primo Levi’s credibility, the Italian Holocaust survivor. A section devoted to ‘Jews’ offers insights on Zionism, ‘facts’ about Jews and alleged ‘Jewish terrorism’ in France against members of the French Front Nationale. In discussing Zionism, Brigata Nera asserts the authenticity of the old forgery of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, proceeding to define Zionism as ‘a political-religious nationalist movement that calls for the conquest of all nations of the world through the mastery and control of the state and capitalist finances of all the countries of the world.’17 The ideological proximity of extreme right, left, and Catholic websites is recurrent. On the monthly publication Aurora, of the Movimento Antagonista, one can find support for radical Islam in its fight against the ‘Zionist Entity.’ Along openly Fascist themes, the site supports Islamic fighters. An article praising 413 Hamas leaders expelled to Lebanon by Israel in December 1992, advocated support for Hamas: “Abandoned by all, isolated from the world, with the Koran as their only weapon, ready for martyrdom, these Islamic militants are defeating the Israeli government, thus, exposing its true nature independently of its political affiliation. These men must be an example for all of us. In Europe it is our duty to offer total and unconditional support to the fighters of the Intifadah. 1993 must be an occasion to increase our militant

  This definition is reminiscent of Hitler’s exegesis of Zionism in Mein Kampf.

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solidarity with a campaign for Palestinian resistance. The struggle fought in Gaza and al-Quds is our own struggle.” (Battara, 1993) More explicit examples of support for anti-Zionism and anti-Americanism appear on the website of the political grouping Movimento Fascismo e Libertá, an openly Fascist organization devoted to nostalgia for the Fascist puppet regime of the Saló Republic (1943–1945). In a recent article on the war in Iraq, MFL declares: “Frankly speaking we do not understand why there should be any doubt on the position of the Movement Fascismo e Libertá regarding the nth war of blood against gold. Is there even one true Fascist who could support the nth imperialistic aggression of the various Anglo-American and Zionist criminals? Is there any true Fascist who can miss the equivalence between the Second World War, which was wanted and conducted by the same enemy entities against a Fascist and ‘Fascistizing’ Europe? . . .  The motivations are the same: cut at birth any form of nationalist opposition that can be impervious to Worldist and Zionist penetration (MFL Editorial: February 2003).” Another source of anti-Jewish hatred in Italy is found among traditionalist Catholic groups, whose rejection of Church’s overtures to Judaism following the Vatican II council is most prominently expressed by the website ‘Holy War.’ Its stated objective is ‘Combating Jewish terrorism,’ and ‘Nazi Israel,’ including its main supporter and sponsor, the United States. According to Holy War, ‘The Jewish Mafia runs America’: Colin Powell, Dick Cheney and George W. Bush are labeled as ‘racist Jews.’ There follows a list of ‘Bush racist Jewish advisors’ and a call to start ‘taking America back now.’ Although offering a wide variety of material, most of Holy War’s rubrics have a Jewish focus and an obsession with the ‘Jewish conspiracy.’ Radical Islam in Italy In recent years, Islam has taken roots in Italy, with a burgeoning community of approximately one million, mostly immigrants from North Africa, the Middle East, and to a smaller extent Sub-Saharan Africa and the Sub-continent. Among Islamic information outlets, there are some radical websites reproducing inflammatory material. By far one of the most virulent antisemitic websites available is Sweden-based Radio Islam, offering links and material both original and in Italian. Radio Islam offers information on Islam, Zionism, ‘Jewish power,’ the Protocols (with a full Italian version of the forgery



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and an appendix), a section on ‘Jewish terrorism’ replicating extreme right-wing accusations of Jewish terrorism against French Holocaust deniers and Front Nationale activists (e.g. Robert Faurisson), and links on Holocaust denial.18 Like other extreme websites in Italy, Radio Islam shares an aversion to ‘Worldism’ and denounces the Council on Foreign Relations and the international banking system for trying to keep humankind beneath the yoke of ‘diabolical mechanisms of the Great Usury.’ Needless to say, the roots and inspiration of this diabolical attempt to dominate the world originate in Freemasonry and Judaism, whose historical vicissitudes are inextricably entangled and used as a precious instrument of world domination.19 The article, unavailable on the much richer English website, is but one example of the growing convergence of antisemitic rhetoric, to say nothing of the political agenda, of right-wing, Catholic fundamentalist, and Islamist extremism. Common aversion to Jews as the agents behind the ‘Worldism’ phenomenon within ideologically disparate groups explains the shared rhetoric and possibly creates grounds for political cooperation. Despite many of these websites and publications remaining obscure and peripheral to the main public discourse in Italy, their incendiary images and rhetoric do percolate to the mainstream, as a recent episode indicates. On August 19, 2006, one of the three main Muslim umbrella organizations of Italy—UCOII (Union of Islamic Communities of Italy)—published a full page ad on three national newspapers reaching over 600,000 households in which it accused Israel of perpetrating massacres akin to the ones many Italian towns had suffered at the hands of the Nazis during World War II (UCOII, 2006). The comparison between Israel and Nazi Germany features prominently in some of the rhetoric of both Islamic and hard left websites. Conspiracy Theories, New Age Other groups ‘denounce’ and ‘expose’ conspiracies to rule the world. Nuovo Ordine Mondiale describes Jewish mechanisms of control, a conspiracy based on the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. Nexus Italia, the Italian   The much broader selection on the English version of the website offers material from David Duke. 19   The much broader selection on the English website version offers a country-bycountry link to ‘Jewish power’ and ‘the Jewish lobby.’ 18

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version of the Ufologist publication Nexus (www.nexusitalia.com), features articles tying Jews and Israel to several conspiracies and incidents, through the Bilderberg group. Disinformazione offers a special section on Israel, focusing on such themes as ‘the secrets of Bnai B’rith.’ A particularly curious article by Maurizio Blondet (Blondet, 2004),20 describes a conspiracy run by the Tavistock Institute in London to create suicide bombers. The Institute is ‘behind’ similar mental health institutes in Israel, Cairo and Gaza, and its specialists (those mentioned by the author being invariably Jewish), sent to set up shops in the region, have, according to Blondet, trained people who are only apparently mentally ill to carry out suicide operations. Blondet frequently writes for the well-respected Catholic daily L’Avvenire. Extreme Left The extreme left is also very active on the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, as a rallying cry in the struggle against globalization, for peace and ‘global justice.’ Antisemitic stereotypes occasionally surface. However, differently from extreme right and Catholic fundamentalist websites, the rhetoric is usually anti-imperialist, anti-colonialist and Marxist. Thus, it is harder to find direct references to Jews as a group, although Jewish figures appear, Jewish capital is frequently, if obliquely referred to, and Arab masses as the victims of so-called ‘Israeli and Zionist’ imperialism in the Middle East are offered support. The left-wing website Fondazione Nino Pasti has a special section on Palestine, offering links to various Palestinian rejectionist organizations, including Hamas, and to works by Israel Shamir, whose material often borders on antisemitism. One article discusses Israel’s ‘covert role’ in supporting Islamic extremism and suggests the presence of an Israeli ‘shadow’ behind 9/11 and even surmises about the benefit of 9/11 to the Jews and Israel. Moffa offers as evidence an argument based on unquoted articles, that the UCK, the Kosovo and Macedonian Albanian guerrilla, ‘is notoriously financed by George Soros; whereas the Israeli-Muslim alliance in Bosnia is well-established.’ Another piece of evidence is the ‘puppeteer of the Islamic guerrilla’ Boris Berezovsky, as 20   The essay is part of a book written by Blondet, Chi Comanda in America. Blondet’s writings appear also on Radio Islam and other anti-Semitic sites; Centro Culturale San Giorgio for example offers a link to Effe di Effe, Blondet’s publishing house.



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the author labels him, who according to Moffa is a ‘Jewish financier’ who works for the Yeltsin family, is the president of the Moscow synagogue, and has Israeli citizenship. This is then used to ‘prove’ Israeli financial support for the Chechen guerrilla. Other sites have similar features: Arcipelago, Che Fare, and Nuovi Mondi Media, frequently compare Israel to Nazism. Israel’s policies are described as genocide and ethnic cleansing, and the rhetoric of antiimperialism justifies both suicide bombing and armed struggle, including the need to support ‘resistance’ in all its forms to fight oppression. All sites call for organized economic boycotts against both Israeli companies and anyone involved in business and economic cooperation with Israel as a way to expose the contradictions of capitalism, lead to Israel’s collapse and thus aid the ‘oppressed Arab proletarian masses.’ Several articles make reference to antisemitism, in order to deny any linkage between the left and anti-Jewish prejudice (Cararo & Monti, 2003). Differently from Fascist sites, the extreme left tends to draw a distinction between ‘good’ Jews (the progressive Jews who oppose Zionism) and ‘bad’ Jews (the Zionists). Consequently, a familiar argument recurs in the arsenal of left-wing anti-Israel rhetoric: there is no antisemitism on the left; the left sides with and even embraces as their own comrades those Jews who fight Zionism. The left stood side by side with the Jews in the fight against Nazi-Fascism. Now some of its representatives see Israel as the latest reincarnation of Nazi evil and, therefore, expects Jews to fight that evil and ostracizes those Jews— and only those Jews—who see the Arab-Israeli conflict differently and, therefore, refuse to their backs to Israel. This posture is frequently repeated by more mainstream figures (Romano, 2004). They are thus able to dismiss any accusation of antisemitism as ‘blackmail,’ and argue instead that Israel’s Zionist project is inherently racist, accusing Israel of ‘ethnic cleansing.’ Drawing a distinction between ‘Israel lobbies’ that also include non-Jews, and the ‘weak and frail’ progressive Jewish forces that oppose Zionism, is a common theme of the left: Zionism is racist, the only possible solution to the conflict is the creation of one state including both Palestinians and Jews, without any national connotations (Cararo & Monti, 2003). The left sides with those ‘courageous’ Jews who speak out against Israel and support Zionism’s demise; its sympathy for them is presented as evidence that the left is devoid of antisemitism.

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emanuele ottolenghi IV.  Mainstream Media: Prejudice, Images, and Stereotypes

Themes featuring in extreme publications and websites eventually percolate into the mainstream, where media occasionally add to the climate of hostility toward Jews without openly and explicitly using traditional antisemitic prejudice. Instead, they describe the Palestinian-Israeli conflict according to criteria, which reinforce certain misperceptions about Israel and the Jews. Through this filter, antisemitism spreads into mainstream acceptable opinions based on the following messages: • The existence of an enormous imbalance between Israel and the Palestinians where Israel is much stronger •  The depiction of Israel as aggressive, militaristic and violent • The depiction of Israel’s recourse to force as invariably disproportionate • The downplaying of Palestinian terrorism along with the exaggerated nature of Israeli responses • The deriving depiction of the Palestinians as ‘underdogs’ and ‘victims’ • The resulting comparison of Israel either to Jesus’ executioners or the Nazis and of the Palestinians alternatively as the new Jesus or as the new Jew The use of traditional anti-Jewish Christian imagery to describe the above is particularly disturbing, because its main result is to turn the Palestinians into the new Jesus and, by default, the Jews into the proverbial Christ-killers. Similarly, the use of the Holocaust as an analogy for Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians aims to compare Israel to the Nazis and the Palestinians to the Jews. A cartoon appeared in the Italian daily La Stampa, a national newspaper based in Turin, around Easter 2002—while Israel’s siege of the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem was under way. Aptly titled Tanks at the manger—the cartoon depicts baby Jesus sticking his head out of the manger, staring in disbelief as a tank with a Star of David fast (and threateningly) approaches. Jesus screams: ‘What, are they here to kill me again?!’ A similar image appeared in the even more mainstream Corriere della Sera, a few days before, where then Israel’s Prime minister, Ariel Sharon, was depicted as blocking Jesus from resurrecting, while holding a machine gun. Easter was always a time of dread for Jews in pre-Enlightenment Europe, when the ancient accusation that Jews were ‘Christ-killers’



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would be revived. The imagery evoked by these cartoons is unmistakable. Israel is killing Jesus. Jesus represents the Palestinians holed up inside the Bethlehem Church. The message is clear: the Arab-Israeli conflict is a modern re-enactment of the Passion. Appearing as it did on Easter, the holiday that marks Jesus’ crucifixion, that the cartoon presents the Palestinians as the new victims of the Jews, perpetuating the ancient blood libel under a new disguise. The aim is to deny Israel its legitimacy, just like the old accusation of deicide was part of a theology meant to prove that Israel’s covenant with God had been supplanted by the coming of the Christ, and that the Jews, having killed the Messiah, had been punished with the exile and the loss of their land. In addition, the cartoon casts the Jews as cruel murderers of Jesus and the Palestinians as the sacrificial lamb, defining the struggle between Israel and the Palestinians as a struggle between the innocent and the wicked, between good and evil, between light and darkness. The second theme, the comparison between Israel and Nazi Germany, occasionally surfaces as well. One such instance occurred in March 2002, when a prominent scholar of History of the Church at the University of Bologna, Professor Giuseppe Alberigo, refused to attend a conference to honor Jewish professors from that university who lost their jobs in 1938 as a consequence of the implementation of Fascist Italy’s racial laws. His motivation was his desire to publicly express disagreement and condemnation for Israel’s policies. His implicit analogy between yesterday’s victims and today’s perpetrators not only dangerously bordered on a trivialization of the Holocaust, but also showed how piety for those who suffered and solidarity for victims was conditional and could be withdrawn (Ottolenghi, 2002). This comparison reflects what could be defined as ‘the unbearable burden of Auschwitz.’ For nearly 50 years Europe built its new culture of tolerance and multiculturalism based on the tragic lessons of Nazism. Part of this legacy has meant paying special attention to Jewish sensitivities and also by viewing Israel through the prism of the Holocaust. But as surveys showed, many wish to put the Holocaust behind. In the last twenty years, while Holocaust Memory slowly faded as a result of time and generational change, anti-Israel advocacy slowly gained influence in intellectual circles Middle East departments, and media outlets. As a new generation of scholars, pundits and policy enters universities, media and government, their commitment to Israel’s right to exist is correspondingly shallower and more conditional. This opinion

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is well established today and will become mainstream thinking in the future. Holocaust denial and attempts to appropriate the memory of the Holocaust from the Jews and deny its unique Jewish dimension by making it a paradigm of universal suffering paradoxically all conjure up in making the Holocaust a central factor in the return of antisemitism. The burden of guilt for the Holocaust is unbearable as it is and recent debates on how some European countries have failed to face their past and to take responsibility for collusion or even open collaboration with the Nazis have shown how much Europeans simply wish to see their past would stop haunting them. There is Holocaust fatigue, and some resent constant reference to the Holocaust. One way to silence it is to equate the victims of Nazism to their perpetrators. The Israel/Palestine conflict is fertile ground for this kind of thinking. Israel is depicted as a rogue state, its actions compared to Nazism. ‘Yesterday’s victims are today’s perpetrators’ is the underlying argument: Palestinians are defined as the ‘victims of the victims’ and their suffering is depicted as similar to, if not worse than, what the Jews endured in Europe during the Second World War. As a result, Palestinian acts of terror are downplayed, if not outright justified as legitimate resistance,21 and ‘the Jews’ are blamed as ‘the cause of their own suffering.’ This comparison must raise eyebrows even among those who support Palestinian self-determination, considering that Israel’s right to exist does not contradict that sacrosanct Palestinian aspiration. But turning Israel and the Jews into the Nazis of the 21st Century is an attempt to make three dangerous equations: • The equation between the victims and the murderers belittles the Holocaust • The equation between the victims and the murderers provides a retroactive justification for the Holocaust • The equation of what Nazis did to Jews and what the Jews are supposedly doing to the Palestinians gives credence and legitimacy to the call for war against Israel until its destruction as a Jewish state

21   The ADL surveys show an average 15% of European respondents justifying suicide bombing, while an even higher percentage, as noted above, thinks that Palestinian terrorism is a consequence of Sharon’s misguided policies.



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and provides justification for terrorism, once they are disguised as expression of a legitimate grievance. Another manifestation of this conflation, where attacks on Israel’s policies become one and the same with antisemitism is in the frequent use of Jewish symbols. Such symbols are often used to convey the idea that Israel (and the Jews, given the conflation) is engaged in abominable acts. Attributing such acts to Israel through the use of Jewish symbols leaves no space for a clear distinction between legitimate, though harsh criticism of Israel, and incitement against the Jews. Another example is the notion of Jewish power behind world crises, exemplified by the idea of the ‘Jewish lobby’ running Washington and its foreign policy. This theme, globally voiced by mainstream and extremists alike, found its venue in a March 2004 article addressing the question of unfound weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and alluded to Jewish influence behind the war in Iraq (M.M., 2004). As the article in the left-leaning Il Manifesto explained, “behind this glowing heap of lies there was a special intelligence unit of the Pentagon, called the Office of Special Plans. And behind the Office there was Undersecretary for Defense Douglas Feith, one of the deviant minds of the neocons, who created the Office after 9/11 (and behind Feith, for a plentiful supply of all that great mass of ‘evidence’ there was the Israeli government). It was these guys who held the briefings that matter in the offices of Cheney and Rice.” (M.M., 2004) This is the theme of the neocons as the great puppeteers of war, themselves puppets of the Israeli government, who, through its Jewish connections in Washington (neo-con has become a covert euphemism for Jewish), runs American foreign policy to pursue its own, not America’s, interests in the Middle East. This example shows how the conspiratorial nature of antisemitic theories present on extreme websites eventually percolates into mainstream public discourse. The mainstream press, however, rarely offers such explicit and blatant examples and the ones cited above are more the exception than the rule. More commonly found is a romanticized idea of the struggle for Palestine, featuring an image of David vs. Goliath. In this framework those who ‘break ranks’ from the supposedly monolithic support for Israel’s policies—usually described as brutal, disproportionate and aggressive—are celebrated as solitary heroes. Guido Ceronetti (Ceronetti: 2004), used this theme to describe Mordechai Vanunu, the technician at Israel’s nuclear facilities, who in the 1980s revealed

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Israel’s nuclear secrets to the world, as a twenty-first century Spinoza. Drawing a comparison between the two, Ceronetti writes of Vanunu, who converted to Anglicanism and refuses to speak Hebrew, that “in this string of repudiations there is something profoundly Jewish: the vocation to be stateless, to be rooted in uprootedness, the need to be other and elsewhere, the hunger for an unreachable more. Against this type of Jew who is excessively loyal to its own nature, Israel the State, still in search of a national identity by all accepted, is certainly more driven by hatred, than against Arafat or a Hamas chief. Mordechai doubts it, divorces himself from the national idea, he is the Jew who becomes again without-borders, a post-biblical and pre-Zionist Jew.” (Ceronetti: 2004) This theme, where the Jew is exalted as the rootless cosmopolitan, features prominently in the anti-Israel rhetoric, across Europe. Spinoza is frequently mentioned by Sergio Romano, a leading columnist in Il Corriere della Sera. For Romano, Spinoza and similar Jews are the ideal Jews, what he defines as intellectual ‘Marranos’: “They were born from Jewish parents or mixed marriages and were conscious of a blood kinship with the great tribe in which they were born. But they could not be totally Jews. Many . . . were attracted to Christianity also for esthetical reasons. Others saw baptism as a means to leave the narrow spiritual ghetto of Jewish traditions. Others put their hopes on emancipation as offered by the Liberal state or socialist revolutions . . .  the only common data of their intellectual curriculum was probably a certain tendency to transgress, to provoke and to be unpredictable.” (Romano, 2004:108) Another such instance is the romanticized vision of a group of Israeli soldiers who refused to serve in the IDF and launched a petition to that extent in March 2002. The pro-rector of the University of Bologna, Professor Walter Tega, signed an open letter in the local press nearly a year later, along with 130 colleagues, inciting more Israelis to desert. In the letter, Tega and his colleagues explained that they always considered ‘The Jew (sic) people as an intelligent and sensitive people, stronger perhaps than others because it was selected through suffering, persecutions and humiliation’ and proceeded to pre-empt any accusation of antisemitism by saying that they all had ‘many Jewish schoolmates and friends.’22 Having clarified their credentials

  Available at http://www.carta.org/agenzia/palestina/020403letteraAperta.htm.

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and the litmus tests for the Jewish people, they proceeded to warn all Jews that what was happening in the Arab-Israeli dispute was jeopardizing their own esteem, love, and respect for the Jewish people. For the Bologna University petitioners, having Jewish friends was a sign of immunity from antisemitism, supporting Israeli deserters in a lone ranger type of struggle against injustice was a progressive cause, hence devoid of prejudice, and Jews would eventually be blamed for their own suffering and for the petitioners’ future contempt if they did not start behaving properly. V.  Conclusions: Explaining Current Antisemitism Though these data and examples might be unsettling, one should not lose sight of the positive aspects of Italy’s relationship with the Jews. Despite a worrying rise in antisemitism, today’s Italy is nothing like the 1930s. In fact, this comparison is offensive because the attempt to demonize present antisemitism ends up trivializing its much more sinister Nazi strain. A more apt comparison is the Dreyfus trial. In the 1930s, Church and State endorsed antisemitism. Today, both condemn it, legally and theologically. Then, laws promoted antisemitism; today, they prosecute it as a prejudice that neither society nor institutions openly condone. Police enforced that anti-Jewish legislation; today, it protects Jewish institutions from anti-Jewish extremists and terrorists. Governments harassed Jews into submission and poverty before they shepherded them to Auschwitz. Jews were robbed of everything before they were robbed of life. By contrast, today’s Europe is actively supporting a Jewish renaissance, and Italy is no exception. Along with the rest of Europe, institutional Italy not only condemns antisemitism, it also educates its new generations about the evils of Nazism and the Shoah. January 27 is a legislated memorial day, the lessons of yesteryear an integral part of today’s national ethos. All of this proves genuine remorse and a commitment to fight evil’s resurgence and should put current antisemitism into context, rejecting a comparison with the 1930s. The 1930s were an aberration, because Nazi antisemitism, contrary to all other forms of anti-Jewish prejudice preceding and following it, did not make a distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Jews, Jews who could be redeemed and Jews who were lost. While all previous forms of antisemitism persecuted Jews, Nazi antisemitism exterminated Jews. Church antisemitism offered Jews a way

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out: conversion. Liberal antisemitism offered Jews a way out: assimilation. The current wave of Israel-related antisemitism also offers Jews a way out: anti-Zionism. Persecution and prejudice, no matter how brutal, debasing and ignoble, always faulted Jews for their ways of life or their beliefs, hoping to induce change. Nazism went further and left Jews no chance. That is why Nazi antisemitism, even though a by-product of the age-old antisemitic tradition of Europe, was a deviant strain and an abomination that is neither happening today nor is likely to be reproduced any time soon. Regardless, it would be a mistake to dismiss current prejudice as marginal. Many politicians and commentators insist on downplaying antisemitism by associating it exclusively with radicalized members of Arab and Muslim immigrant communities. Others dismiss it by surmising Jewish paranoia in the wake of criticism against Israel’s policies. But by overlooking the return of antisemitism in their midst, they are ignoring the unresolved tension that always existed between Europe and its Jews. This tension is both the cause of the resurgence of antiJewish prejudice and the main reason for Europe’s inability to recognize its ‘Jewish problem.’ That problem is reflected in the obsession with Israel, and the unease by which non-Jews relate to Israel as a central component of modern Jewish identity. As in the past, Jews are expected to assimilate, their acceptance conditional to their abandonment of Jewish identity, especially when closely associated with and expressed through support for Israel. As this survey has shown, there is little doubt that the recent increase in antisemitism is linked to the current phase of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Europeans (and Italians) are of course quick in their unrelenting condemnation of antisemitism in the abstract. But do they see it in its concrete manifestations so many Jews experience on a daily basis? The answer is a qualified no. It is readily accepted that anti-Jewish attacks occur due to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; but it does not follow that it is antisemitism. The dominant view is that frequent public attacks on Israel are neither misplaced nor the source of anti-Jewish sentiment: Israel’s behavior is reprehensible and so are those Jews who dare defend it. Those who cry wolf are simply seeking an excuse to uncritically justify Israel by calling antisemitism what is in fact viewed as legitimate criticism of Israel’s actions. It follows that Israel deserves to be criticized and that it is the Jews, not those who express criticism, who should engage in soul-searching.



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There is, of course, nothing intrinsically wrong or even remotely antisemitic in criticizing specific Israeli policies. Nevertheless, focus on the nature of the criticism, rather than its target alone, suggests that Jewish concerns are often genuine. When criticism focuses on what Israel is, rather than simply what Israel does, an alarm bell must go off. When traditional antisemitic themes—such as the Jewish conspiracy to rule the world, Jews and money, the blood libel, or traditional Christian anti-Jewish imagery—are used to describe Israel’s actions, concern must be voiced. When policies are invariably explained as a product of Israel’s essence as a Jewish state, eyebrows must be raised. The implication of this criticism is not that Israel should act differently, but that it should cease to exist as a Jewish state. When Jews are expected to condemn Israel for the above reasons, lest sympathy be denied, the argument that it is Israel’s behavior, and Jewish support for it, that invite prejudice sounds hollow at best and sinister at worst. What that argument means is that sympathy for Jews is conditional to the kind of political views they espouse. In a world that advocates political freedom for all, this is hardly an expression of tolerance. It is this argument that pervades mainly liberal discourse today on Israel. The slogan ‘Never Again’ is not just a motto, but a sincere European expression of horror and remorse for Europe’s past that Europeans, today, want so intensely not to repeat. Western culture has learned the lesson and those who march under that banner do so with utmost sincerity. The duty to remember as a powerful antidote against future repetitions is a central element of European culture today. And many of those who profess a liberal and progressive political affiliation, who are dedicated to human rights and tolerance, who are worried about the resurgence of that xenophobia and racism which gave birth to Nazism, unquestioningly side with the Jews in perpetuating the memory of the Nazi genocide as a warning to future generations. This fact, alone, is a guarantee against the recurrence of past horrors. Nevertheless, there remains an intense and disturbing ambiguity in the way liberals see the Jews. Many of those who march against Fascism often return to the same public places a few weeks later to wave Palestinian flags in the name of the same exact principles and proceed to equate Israel to Nazism, claiming that ‘yesterday’s victims are today’s perpetrators.’ In doing so, they demonize the Jewish state and those Jews who support it. The same left-wing, anti-racist activists, who oppose xenophobia and neo-Nazism, consider Israel a colonial state

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and a tool of American imperialism which deserves to be destroyed, and speak of Zionist conspiracies to rule the world and oppress the Arabs. Like jack-boot extremists, those Jews who stand up for Israel are viewed as fascists and apologists of murderers. They deserve no dignity, no respect, no sympathy and no protection. Jews as a nation earn no sympathy and no rights, although Jews as individuals are worthy of both. Today’s European liberals love Jews, but not when Jews assert their rights as a national group. What kind of Jew then do they love, given the widespread support Israel enjoys among Jews the world over? Their hero is the Jew who denounces Israel, who dissociates himself from it, who rejects any link with Jewish national identity, who lives his or her Jewishness as a condemnation of Zionism. For them, and for the Jew they celebrate as their hero, Zionism is a perversion of Jewish humanism, something which today’s Europe deeply cherishes, because Zionism has reversed Jewish historical passivity to persecution and asserted the Jewish right to self-defense and survival. In its resort to force, Zionism implies the difficulty of dealing with sometimes impossible moral dilemmas, which traditional Jewish passivity in the wake of persecution never implied. For Europe, the Jew must be a victim, for victims can do no wrong and deserve sympathy and support. Hence, any victim becomes the latest Jew to defend. And by implication, those who oppress and persecute those whom the Europeans have designated as victims, inevitably become the new Nazis. It is therefore expected that the Jews should rise up and denounce Israel, which is viewed as the latest incarnation of an evil they have suffered from not so long ago. Those Jews who criticize Israel and dissociate themselves from it enjoy the respect and, indeed, the praise of progressives. Denouncing Israel becomes the passport to full membership for Jews. The Jewish hero is not Ben Gurion, not Moshe Dayan, not even Mordechai Anielewicz. It is Norman Finkelstein and his denunciation of the ‘Holocaust Industry;’ it’s Mordechai Vanunu ‘the nuclear whistleblower,’ it’s the Israeli soldiers who refuse to serve in their national army, it’s the Israeli new historians and other post-Zionist scholars who ‘denounce Israel’s undemocratic nature’ and call for an end to Zionism, it’s Noam Chomsky and his imitators, whose Jewish pride is expressed through their shame for Israel’s existence. These are the good Jews. All other Jews, if not outright bad, are not so good either. Europe loves and worships the Jew as a victim, but hates and despises the national Jew who dares embracing a weapon to fight back.



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This duality is not only a symptom of an unresolved and schizophrenic relation Europe has with its Jews, but also the most recent and insidious manifestation of European antisemitism. It embodies Europe’s inability to associate Jews to the legitimate use of political power, including crucially sovereign power. For Europe, the Jew should be defenseless, a sacrificial lamb, the conscience of the world, capable of absorbing the pain visited upon him by injustice and of sublimating it through an inner strength that becomes the guiding line of moral rectitude for surrounding societies. And as the embodiment of a new universal morality, the Jew must also be assimilated. Jews cannot be a religious and ethnic minority in the midst of multicultural Europe, but the model of European integration, which their diversity challenges and undermines. For Europe, the Jew must be camouflaged: aware of his membership in the Jewish people, but indistinguishable from the surrounding environment. The Jew is, of course, entitled to be proud of his historical background and cultural patrimony, but should not devote himself to its continuity. That background belongs to Jewish museums (sprouting like mushrooms all over Europe) not to living communities and thriving congregations. The Jew Europeans love knows he is Jewish, but does not know how to be Jewish anymore. Others will remind him of his Jewishness, but if it were up to him, Judaism—as a tradition, a faith and a practice of commandments as well as membership in a collective and commitment to its survival— would not exist. The Europeans love the Jew who has turned Judaism into a universal, humanistic mission, devoid of its distinctive religious and national features. Accomplishing this mission requires crucially the extinction of the concrete Jew and its replacement with an abstract notion of the Jew, namely the unconditional rejection of violence and a universal message of brotherly love. This explains Europe’s enthusiasm for films such as ‘The Pianist’ or ‘Life is Beautiful.’ The hero of ‘Life is Beautiful’ is Jewish, but cannot be outwardly recognized as a Jew: he has shed every Jewish ritual, has married out, and does not speak the language anymore: he does not ‘look’ Jewish. He is Jewish because he is a victim. The hero of Polanski’s movie is imbued with European culture. He is incapable of defending himself and survives the tragedy of the Holocaust not in order to ensure Jewish survival but to bear witness to a universal message of suffering that transcends its Jewish specificity. Polanski’s Jew is saved, but what survives through him is classical (European) music, not the Jewish people.

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That is what Europe wants of its Jews: assimilate and disappear as a people, remain as a moral legacy. The Jew who sees Judaism not as an identity and a tradition but the expression of a universal message transmitted through martyrdom and testimony is a Jew who will not pass his Jewishness to the next generation. While conscious of belonging to a people he does not feel obligated to perpetuate its heritage to the future. Nothing Jewish remains, except the reasons for Jewish suffering. What makes him a hero is his condition as a victim and his resolve to survive to bear witness to a universal morality, not his opposition to Jewish extinction. Europe’s Jew is the idealization of innocence and represents, with his unconditional rejection of violence even when confronting extermination, a primeval condition of innocence that precedes original sin. In politics, that sin is the use of power and the sometimes impossible moral choices and dilemmas that power demands of governments and states. That is why post-modern, multicultural and multilateral Europe—a culture that rejects the use of force as a tool of international diplomacy and nationalism as a vehicle of identity—strongly identifies with the image of the persecuted Jew. Europe would like to see the same kind of Jew reflected in Israel’s behavior as well: Israel should not be closely associated with Jewish tradition and nationalism and should not be committed to Jewish continuity; it should remain a victim. For European liberals, Israel should sever its ties with Jewish tradition and consign the Jewish people to history in order to adopt the universal principles supposedly embraced by today’s Europe. Its stubborn refusal to do so and its attachment to nationalism, which Europeans see as the source of all 20th century evils, draw condemnation. For Europe, Israel becomes Nazism, and the victimized Jew Europe loves as an ideal becomes the alter ego of the aggressive Jew the Europeans pretend to see in a Jewish state that dares to use force to ensure the survival of a national project. Europeans love the idealized Jew whom their ancestors loathed and killed in the flesh and despise the real Jew who, having survived the slaughter, finally learned to defend himself. Precisely because Israel was born of war and is defended by the sword in the name of a national Jewish identity that poorly fits within Europe’s post-national ethos, Israel is accused of having been born in sin. Israel represents for Europeans the loss of Jewish innocence. In so far as Jews identify with Israel, they deprive Europe of the victimized Jew that so well represents Europe’s self-image.



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This is why Europe’s liberals refuse to defend Jews from antisemitism stemming from the Arab-Israeli conflict. The only Jew worthy of being considered Jewish (and therefore deserving of their respect and support) is the Jew who ceased to be Jewish long ago except perhaps in name. The non-Jewish Jew is welcome and cherished in Europe. The Jew who stubbornly clings to a Jewish identity and, right or wrong, identifies with a nation, a culture, a tradition, a distinct identity and is committed to their continuity is by contrast viewed with hostility and stereotyped much in the same way traditional antisemitism used to. References ANSA (2004) Antisemitismo: Italiani poco malati ma virus c’é, studio Ansa-Eurispes, ci sono aree di possible incubazione pregiudizio (press release), January 15. Anti-Defamation League Survey ( June 2002) http://www/adl.org/anti_semitism/ European_Attitudes.pdf. —— (September 2002) http://www.adl.org/anti_semitism/EuropeanAttitudesPoll10-02.pdf. Anti-Defamation League Poll (April 2004) Attitudes toward Jews, Israel and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict in Ten European Countries, http://www/adl.org/anti-semitism/ european_attitudes_april_2004.pdf. Battarra, Marco (1993) Five Years of Intifadah. Aurora 2, January, available at http:// members.xoom.virgilio.it/aurora/AURORA1.htm. Blondet, Maurizio (2004) Hamas Psichiatrico. www.disinformazione.it/hamas.htm Cararo, Sergio and Germano Monti (2003) La sinistra e il ricatto dell’antisemitismo. http://www.acipelago.org/palestina/la_sinistra_e_il_ricatto_dell2.htm. Retrieved March 22. Ceronetti, Guido (2004) L’eresia é un mestiere duro. La Stampa, April 26. De Felice, Renzo (2001) The Jews in Fascist Italy: A History (New York: Enigma Books). Donno, Antonio (2003) La ‘nuova’ storia d’Israele. Sionisti e post-sionisti a confronto. Nuova Storia Contemporanea VII,3, Maggio-Giugno: pp. 79–102. European Commission (2003) Flash Eurobarometer 151: Iraq and Peace in the World, November (by Taylor Nelson Sofres/EOS Gallup Europe) (Brussels: European Commission). Goldstaub, Adriana (2002) Address to the Annual Congress of the Union of Italian Jewish Communities (UCEI), June 23. Kaplan, Edward H. & Charles A. Small (2006) Anti-Israel Sentiment predicts AntiSemitism in Europe: A Statistical Study. Journal of Conflict Resolution 50 (4). Leader (2002) A new Anti-Semitism? Not to be confused with Anti-Sharonism. The Guardian, January 26. —— (2003) Regarding Iraq . . . Il Lavoro Fascista, No. 2, February, Year II (Movimento Fascismo e Libertà). Mearsheimer, John and Stephen Walt (2006) The Israel Lobby. The London Review of Books 28 (6), March 23, available at http://www.lrb.co.uk/v28/n06/mear01_ html. M.M. (2004) Scaricabarile CIA. Il Manifesto, March 11.

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Milne, Seumas (2002) This slur of anti-Semitism is used to defend repression. The Guardian. Comment Section, Thursday, May 9. Moffa, Claudio (2001) I tre aspetti “soggettivi” dell’unitarietá dei teatri di crisi afghano e palestinese. La cosiddetta nuova “Yalta,” il sostegno sionista all’estremismo islamico e l’ombra di Israele negli attacchi dell’11 settembre,’ www.pasti.org/moffa. html. Molinari, Maurizio (1991) Ebrei in Italia: un problema d’identitá (1870-1938) (Firenze: Giuntina). Nirenstein, Fiamma (2003) How I became and ‘unconscious fascist. Jewish World Review, July 15. Ottolenghi, Emanuele (2002) Quando le critiche a Israele diventano antisemitismo. available at www.ideazione.com/settimanale/1.politica/63-12-04-2002/63ottolenghi. htm. —— (2003) L’Europa predilige l’ebreo-vittima. Il Foglio, June 28. —— (2003a) Anti-Zionism is Anti-Semitism. The Guardian, November 29. —— (2003b) Eurobarometro ha sbagliato ma ha colto nel segno: l’antisemitismo c’é. Il Foglio, November 6. —— (2004) Revisionismo e Post-Sionismo. Palomar 17 (1), Spring. —— (2007) Autodafè, Ebrei, Europa e Antisemitismo (Turin: Lindau). Romano, Sergio (2004), Lettera a un amico ebreo (Milano: TEA). UCOII (2006) Ieri stragi naziste—oggi stragi israeliane. Paid announcement, Il Quotidiano Nazionale, August 19. ‘La sinistra e il ricatto dell’antisemitismo,’ available at www.arcipelago.org.

Internet Sources www.adsum.it www.arcipelago.org www.carta.org/agenzia/palestina/020403letteraAperta.htm Che Fare, (www.tightrope.it/user/chefare/index.htm) www.corriere.it/Primo_Piano/Cronache/2003/11_Novembre/10/israele.shtml www.disinformazione.net www.effedieffe.it www.holywar.org www.holywar.org/indextradiz.html www.israelshamir.net/articles_italian.html www.nexusitalia.com www.nwo.it. www.nuovimondimedia.it www.pasti.org www.radioislam.net/islam/italiano/faur/terror.htm

v.  Epilogue

Rethinking Antisemitism, Counter-Cosmopolitanism, and Human Rights in the Global Age: A Political Crisis of Postmodernity? Lars Rensmann I.  Introduction: Antisemitism, Counter-Cosmopolitanism, and Critical Political Theory Few things in Jean-Paul Sartre’s essay on the Anti-Semite and Jew, written after World War II, continue to be as relevant as the claim that antisemitism is “first of all a passion,” and that, far “from experience producing [the anti-Semite’s] idea of the Jew, it was the latter that explained his experience. If the Jew did not exist, the anti-Semite would invent him.” (Sartre 1948: 10 & 12). In many ways, the longest “lethal obsession” (Wistrich 2010) of antisemitism—targeting a community that has always been, on a global scale, tiny and dispersed— remains a mystery that defies theoretical explanation. At the very least, attempts to understand this phenomenon continue to face severe limits. Many authors who sought to make sense of modern antisemitism by deciphering a coherent ‘logical’ structure of antisemitic ideology, or by reducing it to a generalizable form of ethnic stereotyping equivalent to colonial racism, have failed to comprehend its distinct, multifaceted nature. Antisemitism has proven to be astonishingly flexible and persistent. Taking different forms and functions, Jew-hatred’s often unpredicted resurgences have thereby been a significant feature of political modernity. And we know today: Even after the persecution and extermination of the European Jews in the Shoah, it was premature to expect antisemitism’s demise. To be sure, in European post-Holocaust societies blatant Jew-hatred had become more and more marginal in political and public life, if not completely socially discredited. Considering the data and analyses collected in this book, however, it appears that we—once more, you may add—have underestimated the power of these resentments which have been such a tenacious “societal undercurrent” (Max Horkheimer) of the modern world.

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Since the 19th century, Jews appear in antisemitic perceptions as an embodiment of modern civilization. In fact they are, as Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno (1969) point out, viewed as too far ahead of the civilized world. Yet modern antisemitism also constructs Jews as lagging behind this very civilization: they are portrayed as collectively guided by lower, brute instincts, by laziness and the pleasure principle. Reproducing the Christian legend of the “Wandering Jew” (later labeled Ahasver), in modern society Jews have come to represent anti-national cosmopolitanism and universalism and a lack of communal, territorial or national ‚roots’; yet such anti-Jewish imagery also portrays them as stubborn particularists who display a sense of close bonding and superiority, as those who always think of themselves as “the chosen people.” In the antisemitic world-view, Jews control finance capitalism and simultaneously embody communist subversion. Identified with the rise of universalized rights in the modern civic nationstate, they epitomize the promise of universal freedom and human emancipation. Yet they have also been identified with modern market capitalism’s constraints, oppression and communal dissolution. Seen through the antisemitic lens, Jews personify physical weakness and brutal modern violence, or the ruthless use of power; yet at the same time their power is perceived as secret, manipulative, conspirational, presumably lacking ‘grounded,’ actual force, or strength and authority (Schlör & Schoeps 1996). Let’s face it: there’s virtually nothing in this world Jews haven’t been charged with or blamed for. There are plenty of contemporary examples of antisemitism’s irrationalism. Think of the intertwined ideas that Jews were ‘behind’ the attacks of 9/11 and the World Trade Center. Simultaneously, and often in the same breath, it is claimed that they ‘had it coming’: that ‘Jewish’ New York City deserved its horrible fate. These two phantasmagories, which most of the time go hand in hand, have a recurring presence in diverse global publics. We will not be able to find any logical or semantic consistency in those claims. Consistent is only the wish to discriminate against Jews, which links both statements. One thing is certain: antisemitism, as the most heterogeneous and amorphous set of societal resentments, fulfills a variety of social, cultural and psychosocial functions. Only with the help of social psychology and critical theorizing, I will argue, we may be able to better grasp how such an amorphous, contradictory set of resentments is subjectively ‘rationalized.’ And we may identify some of the societal origins, contexts



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and enabling conditions that are favorable for antisemitism’s present rise. From the perspective of normative political theory, these insights require a self-reflexive response that takes antisemitism seriously—as a significant human rights challenge of the 21st century that needs to find reflection in models of cosmopolitan democracy, global public law and, as I call it, situated cosmopolitanism from below. Before turning to these normative issues, the following considerations offer some ways to theorize elements of antisemitism in an increasingly complex, contradictory, and “partially globalized world” (Robert Keohane). If we want to avoid mere abstraction, such theoretical arguments need to correspond to empirical findings. First, the question is: What do we know about antisemitism, and what can we learn from critical theory about its societal conditions and political contexts? Second, we return to antisemitism’s “modernized” political expressions. Following a historical pattern, antisemitism is “intimately linked” (Adorno 1964) to nationalism, and to strong, politicized ethnic and religious identity claims. But we also see it articulated in new contexts of Manichean and anti-pluralist ideologies. Among other arenas modernized antisemitism finds political expression among ethnic nationalists from the new radical right, among Islamists, and in a concurring rise of a new “inverse orientalism” among parts of the radical left. Third, we will situate this resurgence of anti-Jewish hostility and particularly of the image of the “cosmopolitan Jew” in the context of counter-cosmopolitanism, which is defined as a generalized, reactionary opposition to sociocultural change and cosmopolitan norms in the present global age. This leads, fourth, to a theoretical argument about antisemitism and counter-cosmopolitanism. Both are, it is argued, interrelated, objectifed ideologies. They can be interpreted as features of an uneasiness within global postmodernity, and as reflections of its crises. Among other things, antisemitism can be understood as a sociocultural matrix embodying fears, problems, failures and hopes of modernization. In part, antisemitism can be conceived as an antimodern, counter-cosmopolitan reaction that is itself shaped by political (post)modernity. Fifth, we turn to normative theorizing and cosmopolitan responses. Critical cosmopolitanism understands antisemitism as a present-day human rights challenge that needs to be addressed in models advocating public freedom, constitutional ­republics, and ­cosmopolitan democracy.

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Although approaches to antisemitism that originate in the Frankfurt School’s critical theory (Rensmann 1998) have to be re-examined and revised, simply outdated they are not. Critical social theorizing understands antisemitism as a socio-historical phenomenon and seeks to explore its societal origins. But more than that: it provides theoretical tools to decipher and demystify the persistence of resentments within and beneath the level of discourses and social attitudes. It seeks to understand its lack of any inherent semantic “logic”. This also applies, for instance, to developing a critical understanding of the seemingly mysterious empirical disjunction between longitudinal data about antisemitism’s decline in post-War Europe, on the one hand, and its resuscitation in 21st century late modernity or postmodernity, on the other. Boldly put, critical theorizing seeks to look behind manifest phenomena, including the—often fractured—patina of surveys, socially desirable public opinion, and public discourse. To be sure, it is important to closely examine attitudes, which are explored by survey research, and political ideas and narratives, which are addressed in the context of discourse analyses and constructivist methodologies. Yet, although both research areas provide significant data about (and insights into) the relevance and political legitimacy of antisemitism in our societies, they fail to sufficiently reflect the societal and psychosocial conditions, sociocultural contexts, and subterranean dynamics that may enable potential “politics of resentment”. Models of critical theory also suggest situating antisemitism in the context of structural conditions that facilitate—though never necessarily ­actualize—reifications, unconsciously repressed feelings, and cultural projections. A critical understanding of (post)modern antisemitism’s dialectics of continuity and discontinuity shows that legitimate public boundaries, i.e. the crucial public containment of anti-Jewish resentment, do not necessarily prevent it from resurfacing, let alone guarantee its demise. We therefore should also harbor certain skepticism towards clear-cut distinctions between antisemites and anti-antisemites; the former should not be exonerated from responsibility even if they are not aware of their antiJewish intentions (although we should be cautious with the use of labels and charges), yet the latter are not just isolated from prejudices inscribed into—European and global—cultural traditions. While we can only speculate about or theorize subjective motives, there are also “objective” and intersubjectively shared, yet unconscious meanings: antisemitism is not just a matter of deliberate intentions.



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In particular, models of political psychology that are anchored in critical theory point to modern authoritarianism as a ‘syndrome.’ It can be understood as a broader, interconnected set of socio-psychological dispositions towards binary thinking, authoritarian politics, social conformism, and hatred of difference and diversity (Adorno et al. 1950; Altemeyer 1996; Falk 2008). Even though causal, explanatory theory about socially produced personality dispositions is contested, the validity of correlations forming such a syndrome remains striking and is hardly disputed: namely between antisemitism and Manichean thinking that divides the world into good vs. evil (groups); anti-immigrant resentment, and exclusive nationalism or ethnic pride and rigid collective particularism; social conformism, and rejection of self-expression values, including, for instance, gay and women’s rights; anti-pluralism and opposition to constitutional democracy, including universal human rights (recently Ahlheim & Heger 2000; Niedermayer & Stöss 2005). Antisemites are more likely to support authoritarian rule—and vice versa. Antisemitism can also be understood as a part of ‘group-focused enmity,’ that is to say that people who share antisemitic stereotypes are also more susceptible to other ethnic-exclusionist or racist views (Zick et al. 2008; Heitmeyer & Zick 2010) Although antisemitism is a distinct phenomenon that cannot be reduced to a prejudice, this set of correlations finds persuasive support in recent survey data (e.g. Ahlheim & Heger 2000; Heitmeyer 2005). Critical theorists add that hatred of difference in general and antisemitism in particular often self-disclose their projective nature: The hostile images and narratives of the Other, as well as the wishes and phantasies associated with it, reveal stories about oneself. Horkheimer and Adorno make the strong theoretical claim that antisemitism is essentially “based on false projection. It is the reverse of genuine mimesis and has deep affinities to the repressed; in fact, it may itself be the pathic character trait in which the latter is precipitated. If mimesis makes itself resemble its surroundings, false projection makes its surroundings resemble itself. If, for the former, the outward becomes the model to which the inward inclings, so that the alien becomes the intimately known, the latter displaces the volatile inward into the outer world, branding the intimate friend as foe.” Thus, impulses, fears and desires which are neither acknowledged nor recognized by the subject and yet are his, “are attributed to the object: the prospective victim.” (Horkheimer & Adorno 1969: 154). In an objectified form, these unreflected projections express the dreams and potentially violent ­practices of hate-mongers:

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The “nationalist fantasies of Jewish crimes, of infanticide and sadistic excesses, of racial poisoning and international conspiracy, precisely define the antisemitic dream, and fall short of its realization.” (Horkheimer & Adorno 1969: 153) As Zygmunt Bauman argues, this projection mechanism, attributing socially tabooed impulses to Jews, also points to the structuring ambivalences in the antisemitic image of Jews: the dialectic of collective admiration and denigration (Bauman 1993). Such cultural projections can have many functions. For example, in the contemporary German context the legacy of the Holocaust evokes unwanted, disturbing memories and related feelings of unprocessed guilt. The extermination of the European Jews is an inevitable blemish that undermines conventional, idealized accounts of national identity and history. By their very existence, Jews are then often perceived as an embodiment or a constant visible reminder of this “unmastered past” (Leo Lowenthal). Split off the individual and collective self, such critical memory of the criminal past that cannot be redeemed and related feelings of guilt are thus projected onto Jewish communities— and the Jewish state of Israel, for that matter. If such feelings are not processed, Jews are blamed for making Germans feel uneasy, for preventing conventional forms of national identification and for disabling feelings of unbridled collective pride (Rensmann 2004).1 ­Consequently, 1   Among the specific new motives that motivate contemporary Judeophobia is socalled ‘secondary antisemitism.’ It is driven by the impulse to reject or downplay the memory of the Shoa (Adorno 1964; Bergmann 1997; Rensmann 1999). Accordingly, this form of antisemitism is motivated by the perception that Jews, the victims and their children, embody the painful history of Nazi genocide, i.e. the history of German and European collective atrocities. This memory is problematic for conventional nationalist narratives that need to idealize a nation’s past. Attacks against Jews as the “Nazis of today” or “today’s perpetrators” might look for a moral equation that serves to lift the burdens of the past. Such secondary antisemitism is especially relevant in post-Holocaust nations such as Germany and Austria, which struggle to develop a post-conventional, post-national identity against the background of the atrocities of the past (Rensmann 2004). Manifestations of secondary antisemitism tend to reiterate stereotypes of primary modern antisemitism: for instance the images of Jewish vengeance, the inability to forgive, and ruthlessness. Among other things, this new form of antisemitism is expressed in the popular view that “Jews exploit the Holocaust for their material purposes” (Rensmann & Schoeps 2008). The most radical manifestation of secondary antisemitism is outright Holocaust denial. In post-colonial contexts in Europe, the collective conscience towards colonial atrocities may also be relevant. By viewing “the Zionists” as present-day colonialists and the main culprits of today’s world and, past and present crimes by the former imperial powers leave the spotlight. Displaying solidarity with the alleged anti-colonial struggle against the state of Israel in a radically destructive way might psychologically function as a compensation for past injustices committed by the European colonial powers.



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those who are blamed for this problematic memory are attacked for their alleged moral superiority, and they are to be morally dismantled; all kinds of atrocities are then projected to present-day Jews in order to show that they are not better or even “worse than us”. Turning Jews collectively into post-modern day mass murderers and ruthless perpetrators, often via the “collective Jew” Israel, is then a way to liberate oneself from feelings of ‘collective guit’. It is also a socio-psychological tool to rehabilitate national self-images tainted by the Shoah. Such “secondary” antisemitism functions as a projective defense mechanism: As post-modern day Nazis who, for instance, “basically do to the Palestinians what the Nazis did to the Jews”, a statement that 51.2% of Germans support (cf. data in ­Heitmeyer 2005), Jews have seemingly no right to remind Germans of their past crimes and thus undermine German national pride. We find a similar projective dynamic in other European contexts that have to cope with a legacy of Nazi collaboration or crimes committed during colonial rule. Yet again contemporary Jews—especially those living in the state of Israel—may function as convenient targets for the projection of unmastered feelings of national guilt and responsibility. This may help explain the common association of Jewish Israelis with Nazis across the European continent and beyond—an analogy nowhere drawn more frequently than in the context of the Jewish state. This dehumanizes Jewish Israelis and blows human rights issues in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict completely out of proportion and is, ultimately, antisemitic. In addition to unconscious mobilizations of traditional anti-Jewish images, narratives and projections that are emerging in ever new contexts and take new functions, Horkheimer and Adorno (1969: 151) also suggest that antisemitism is a specifically modern variant of “rationalized idiosyncrasy”. It is ultimately directed against the idea of freedom and difference as such—against the very idea of “being different without fear” (Adorno 1955) which is threatening to authoritarian conformists. Universal freedom, modern individualism, and diversity, with whom Jews are traditionally identified, are dangerous threats to a weakened modern ego and to the authoritarian social conformism that stabilizes it. This analysis reflects the most important specific dimension of modern antisemitism: as pointed out, in the history of modern antisemitism in Europe Jews were perceived as the embodiment of political and social modernity (Horkheimer & Adorno 1969; ­Rensmann 1998).

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The reflection of this fact is another key starting point for critical social theorizing about antisemitism. Unlike any other social group, in the modern world Jews were first and foremost identified with the totality of all presumably ‘negative’ dimensions of cultural, social, legal and political modernity. Only under conditions of political modernity, Jews had gained full rights (at least temporarily). Yet their civil and political rights entitlement and their national, religious or political rights to collective self-determination have consistently been challenged even after the Holocaust and the creation of the state of Israel. Be that as it may, this personification of modernity in the image of Jews entailed the utmost contradictory phenomena, from the identification with new forms of abstract power to mass violence, wars, individualism, societal crises, unemployment, rapid social transformations, cultural change and subversion or value diffusion, and modern constitutional rule of law and civil rights. In the 20th century, then, antisemitic propaganda— which, like any other propaganda, traditionally functioned best if people already believed in the message—blamed Jews for all actual or perceived negative aspects of the modern world, including the social malaise of class society. In Europe, Jews were also blamed for a continent in disarray. And this narrative was never restricted to a specific national context (or Nazi Germany, where it found its most horrible articulation); in spite of varying relevance, it successfully cut across national borders. Utilizing traditional anti-Jewish stereotypes, it can be argued that modern antisemitism thereby personifies the abstract, infinitely complex and transformative aspects of modern society and turns them into an objectified, concrete object of resentment (Horkheimer & Adorno 1969; Postone 1986; Postone 2003). This objectified lens through which Jews are viewed and imagined reflects the “real abstraction” and contradictions of modern existence. According to this theoretical argument, anti-Jewish resentments were not just a historical undercurrent of European societies that can be traced back to their Christian origins (Schoeps 1998). Such culturally transmitted resentments could also be re-constructed to serve more efficiently as politically usable and socially tolerated explanations of a modern world that is characterized by both progress and emancipatory norms, on the one hand, and estrangement and desolation, on the other. Antisemitism, then, may function as an objectified lens to ‘explain’ the contradictions and abstractions of modern market capitalism, modern power, communal disintegration, communism, universalism and constitutional ­democracy. Reenchanting a



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“disenchanted world” (Max Weber) by pointing to Jews as mystified agents behind the abstract social relations that shape it, antisemitism signifies a conspiracy theory, a form of social paranoia. It is a way to ‘make sense’ of the modern world’s seemingly impenetrable obscurities and complexities by locating a single, collective living cause responsible for the social malaise: the Jews. Theirs, the antisemite believes, is the pursuit of individual persecution, the subversion of the nation, and the domination of the world. III.  Deconstructing Political Manifestations: The Persistence of Ethnic Nationalism and the Rise of Inverse Orientalism On the political level, anti-Jewish hatred and authoritarianism tend to march in step as well. In most cases where judeophobia turns political—let it be in the radical right, among radical Islamists and other reactionary religious movements, or among neo-Stalinists and other authoritarian leftists—we find it linked to political authoritarianism and other exclusionist features, such as homophobia, misogyny, racism, and hatred for democratic pluralism. Political antisemitism, in short, is frequently articulated by those authoritarian groups, movements and rulers who in theory or practice negate public autonomy, individual self-expression, and universal human rights claims. That antisemitism is mobilized and employed by various dictatorships and semi-authoritarian regimes around the world, however, is not surprising. This has a long tradition in the modern era. Yet it is also important to analyze in how far political antisemitism transcends this spectrum, and how it can become manifest in new forms and venues. In spite of the persistence of political authoritarianism as antisemitism’s political sibling, modernized forms of antisemitism—or “postmodern antisemitism”— may also appear decoupled from it. In the current era, modernized forms of antisemitism have also become rearticulated beyond the usual suspects and their public arenas, such as the radical right and reactionary Islamism. Political manifestations of anti-Jewish resentment tend to go along with the political mobilization of ethnic nationalism and other idealized accounts of homogeneous ethnic or religious communities. This has been the case throughout modern history. And although not all forms of political antisemitism are tied to ethnic nationalism, both continue to be correlated. In exclusive narratives that mobilize

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ethnic particularism and nationalism, to be sure, “the mere existence of the other is a provocation” (Horkheimer & Adorno 1969: 150). Hereby all forms of cosmopolitan inclusion, cultural hybridity, and change tend to be opposed—the generalized Other, not just “the Jews” as a particular Other. However, ethnic or exclusionist nationalism and modern antisemitism are also intimately linked throughout European history in very specific ways. In discourses of ethnic nationalism—as well as other narratives of ethno-cultural or religious exclusion—the ‘Jewish enemy’ often embodies one’s collective self-definition ex negativo. Ethnic-nationalist interpretations and world-views have often invented “the Jews” as the counter-image to the particular, homogenized image of national identity and history (Rensmann 1998). Today various European radical right groups, for which nationalism is a core ideology (Mudde 2003), attack liberal media, intellectuals and politicians as a “Jewish lobby”, “pro-Zionists” and “anti-national elements” that pursue their hidden agenda by controlling public opinion and the “silent majority”. Such power is attributed to the Jews irrespective of the fact that they are marginally represented in European politics and public media, which are, for the most part, rather critical of Jews (and Israel in particular). The marginalization of Jewish voices in European publics does not matter: As always, antisemitism does not need actual Jews. New studies have confirmed that attitudes toward Jews are not shaped by any concrete experiences of cultural differences, or conflicts over scarce resources, but rather by a perceived threat to the national self-image (Bergmann 2008; Wistrich 2010). Jews are hereby seen as the “real threat” to the nation and its identity, and are often blamed for all presumably negative aspects of sociocultural change affecting the nation-state. For instance, in this milieu it is popular to view Jews as string-pullers behind immigration that transforms the identity and ‘essence’ of formerly predominantly ethnic nations across Europe. Unlike other resentments, antisemitism has therefore not just accompanied claims to ethno-religious separation or superiority; Jews were often viewed as the essential and existential Other of the nation or the religious collective. they are not just portrayed as those who do not belong but also as those who are the existential enemies of the nation. In virtually all forms of political antisemitism, Jews are in some way portrayed as the negation of the ethnic nation, of a culture, of religious communities, or “the peoples of the World”. They are in sum, as Horkheimer and Adorno (1969) already point out, often viewed as the modern, “rootless” or “parasitic” “counter race”



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and thus, we may add, have become the “anti-nation” of modernity and postmodernity. As postmodernity we understand a condition with the features of what Ulrich Beck and Edgar Grande define as “reflexive” or “second modernity” (Beck & Grande 2007). Postmodernity has absorbed modernity but is also characterized by new and distinct forms of subjective insecurity and objective risks, postmaterial self-expression, individualization, diffusion of boundaries and social values, value pluralism, “glocalism” and cosmopolitization. Most importantly, in an increasingly post-national, cosmopolitanized world, where the challenges to the idea of national sovereignty are ever more real, the anticosmopolitan phantasy of “the Jew” as the agent who is to be blamed for the subversive processes eroding nations and their cohesion has also gained ground. As indicated, new political mobilizations of antisemitism are neither limited to the radical right nor to radical Islamism. For instance, antisemitism resonates today in multiple variants of ‘anti-imperialism’ and ‘anti-Zionism,’ which cuts across conventional political cleavages and has facilitated new ideological alliances from the radical right to relevant parts of the left in Europe and beyond. Radical anti-Zionism, as a comprehensive world-view that denies Israel’s—and only Israel’s— very right to exist, is not necessarily limited to societal and political fringes, either. While traditionally anti-Zionism does not have to be antisemitic, i.e. a collective resentment directed against Jews, the Middle East conflict has gained in importance as a medium to articulate more tolerated forms of antisemitism. In this process, it has become less and less common to distinguish between Israel, the Jewish state, and individual Jews; the latter are often held collectively responsible for the actions of the former. Of course, not every criticism of Israel is antisemitic—every country needs to be exposed to domestic and global public scrutiny, especially with regard to its human rights record. Yet criticism of Israel is not a priori, automatically free from antisemitism, either. The denial of Israel’s very legitimacy, however, which is quite different from debates over and criticisms of specific policies or human rights concerns is often linked to the antisemitic idea of Jews as an “anti-nation”: traditionally blamed for subverting European nations, Jews are supposedly not “rooted” in the Middle East, either, and thus their right to collective self-determination is called into question just as their full political rights have been denied in other nations—in opposition to allegedly “original”, “legitimate” rights of “autochthonous”

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ethnic communities.2 The latter, of course, are historical inventions just the same; they are essentialized communities as well—world history has been shaped by migration, the redrawing of borders and the transformation of political membership.3 Radical anti-Zionist propaganda frequently dehumanizes Jewish Israelis as ruthless child-murderers, and this happens even in the context of established democratic publics. In cartoons, it utilizes antisemitic images of hook-nosed Israelis seeking world domination and controlling world media and opinion, or portrays them as blood-thirsty canibals baking Matzo with Palestinian blood. This way, Israel functions as a “collective Jew”, and the Middle East conflict becomes another projective matrix of political antisemitism. The ideological overlap between various radical anti-Zionists, from a neo-Stalinist left to radical rightists and Islamist groups, is often not just a particular hostility or obsession with Jews and the Jewish state of Israel—perceived as singularly illegitimate, indeed essentially evil. This ideological bond often entails the simultaneous glorification of the allegedly “rooted”, autochthonous nations, peoples or communities which presumably fall victim to “World Zionism”. Radical anti-Zionism’s mirror image is therefore an objectified ‘Third Worldism’ through which some important postcolonial critiques regress into a Manichean world-view. Even several “mainstream” actors today lend political support to openly antisemitic, anti-­democratic and violent groups and dictatorships—as long

  From a radical anti-Zionist perspective, of all countries of the international community only Israel does not have any right to exist or legitimate territorial claims and is fundamentally ‘illegitimate;’ no matter how constructed, exclusive, violent or arbitrary the origins and the character of other nation-states may be, and altough some of them are colonial constructs and/or ruthless authoritarian regimes. The underlying myth is that all other countries are “real” nations which somehow belong to “their” original land—thus the nation-states and their antagonistic societies are essentialized and made “natural”—whereas Jews cannot be or build a “real” nation or “stole” the land of autochthonous Arabs. Consequently, they are doomed to the status of pariahs. In such a Manichean world-view, the world is well-ordered. In reality the question “who belongs” and “who is indigenous” and “who should be entitled to human and political rights” are very difficult to answer, even from the perspective of political theory in a cosmopolitanized world (Benhabib 2006). 3   Anti-Zionist views of Israel tend to charge the nation not just with discriminating against Palestinians, who unquestionably face significant discrimination in Israel and the rest of the Middle East, but also with violating principles of cultural difference and ethnic self-determination. In that context Israeli and Jewish claims to political selfdetermination are often construed as ‘illegitimate’ because Israel is viewed as part of a “colonial power” that occupies a territory that belongs to a different ethnic community and culture, while it remains unclear of what Israel is supposed to be the colony. 2



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as these actors and rulers declare to fight imperialism or ‘Zionism,’ or are perceived as such. Radical right and left anti-Zionists thereby often reproduce the binary ethno-nationalist construct according to which ‘good,’ homogenous, ‘rooted’ peoples of the world have been invaded and expelled by alien, evil, ‘foreign global agents’ or ‘globalists,’ and especially by ‘war-mongering Zionists’. Among other things, this objectified ‘Third Worldism’ obscures the view on both the conflicts, needs and contradictions of Israeli society, on the one hand, and the agents, ideas, needs and antagonisms within Third World societies and in particular Palestinian society, on the other. By idealizing, homogenizing and essentializing Third World cultures and societies, it turns the “orientalist” Western view of the “strange savage” in the Middle East on its head without challenging it. If Palestinians, for example, are only portrayed as victims and a collectivity that never errs and never acts wrongly, this documents an inverse orientalism. This inverse orientalism (cf. also Fine 2007) denigrates and dehumanizes the object of projection by means of collective idealization. Viewing Palestinians through this lens deprives them of their individuality, agency and subjectivity. But if you have no agency, no ideas and responsibility for your actions, you are deprived from your very humanity. Ignoring the conflicts, contradictions and actors within Palestinian society—most strikingly, the oppression of Palestinians by Hamas—and replacing it by a projective matrix of ‘the good people’ without internal conflicts reproduces the romanticized Western image of the“noble savage”. Politically, this structural misperception or objectification leads in several cases to the blind support of anti-democratic movements irrespective of their political goals, ideologies, practices and methods—as long as they are the ‘enemy of the enemy’ and oppose “the West” (for a critique Benhabib 2002), and especially the Jewish state or “Zionism”. Parts of the global left are susceptible to this logic. It facilitates, for instance, support of repressive regimes such as the anti-Zionist Iranian regime and movements such as Hamas or Hezbollah. In a tunnel vision that is oblivious to extralegal killings of dissidents, the persecution of gays and the disenfranchisement of women and other human rights violations against Palestinians, let alone the outright antisemitic ideology that promotes the “Protocols of the Elders of Zion” and calls for the elimination of “every Jew” in the region (Hamas Charter), or Hamas’s use of random terror against ( Jewish and Arab) Israeli civilians, these anti-egalitarian and authoritarian groups are at times perceived as part of the global

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left and thus equipped with “solidarity” from the radical right as well as from segments of the left (for a critique Yakira 2010). By the same token, the systematic exclusion of Palestinians in Lebanon, who have only limited access to professions, health care and education, or the expulsion of Palestinians from Jordan, producing a mass of “new stateless”, tend to be ignored because they escape the binary “orientalist” logic of good and evil collectivities. Those Palestinians not suffering from Israel’s action or occupation, then, usually evoke disinterest. However, both radical anti-Zionism’s image of a fundamentally evil and illegitimate nation and the glorification of domestic antisemitic political movements such as Hamas which target Jews but also suppress Palestinians, represent reified, abstract images of their objects; they do not refer to actual, living subjects with claims, ideas, conflicts, fears, worries and hopes. And both are two sides of the same coin. They reduce humans to generalized, essentially dehumanized Others. In part such misperceptions and derealizations may be explained by the desire to side with the presumed ‘weak’ side—since the turning point of 1967 the Palestinians were seen as such; in part it feeds into a problematic consolidation of identity politics; and in part this may be interpreted as a way to split off (instead of processing) colonial guilt and responsibilities by supposedly identifying with the “colonized subjects”. The projective “orientalist” idealization in recent political manifestations of modernized antisemitism and various forms of anti-Zionism, then, may also be driven by specific, aforementioned post-Holocaust and post-colonial dynamics. The “orientalist” look at Palestinian and Muslim communities (Fine 2007) thereby instrumentalizes Palestinians, and their suffering and problems, for Western identity issues—and modernized antisemitism. That many Palestinians in Gaza, for instance, simply want security, political rights and better living standards (similar to most Israelis) gets blurred not just through the violent indoctrination by groups like Hamas and their societal supporters that instigate the elimination of the “Zionist enemy” but also through flourishing comparisons between Israelis and Nazis, or Gaza and “concentration camps”—fabrications also promoted by Western radical anti-Zionists who seemed to be obsessed with Israel. Recall that, among many other things, Jews have traditionally been charged with being exceptionally ruthless and driven by the most barbaric raw instincts in their pursuit of world domination. Antisemitic perceptions of Israel revive this traditional stereotype of ‘uncivilized’ Jews by suggesting that Jews have established a uniquely powerful



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global lobby and that the Jewish state is unique (and therefore needs to be singled out) when it comes to human rights violations and ethnoreligious superiority claims. To be sure, human rights violations are always unjustifiable, no matter who commits them or in which cultural context or between which groups they happen—and if this involves a government or a non-state actor (Ignatieff 2002). Thus, as mentioned before, Israel’s government and policies also need to be subject to critical scrutiny by domestic and global publics. However, antisemitic perceptions of Israel are not just critical of governments and policies but derealize the Middle East conflict, invoke anti-Jewish imagery and apply double standards. They reject Israel as a hedonistic, Western, capitalist and indeed cosmopolitan ‘anti-nation’ that presumably exposes cosmopolitan claims as a lie.4 Allegedly not equipped with a genuine, legitimate nationality of territory, in this context Israel is presumably the only country that never complies to international law—a perception at odds with empirical facts, and one which ignores current genocidal politics and mass atrocities that take place in many places of our contemporary world, from Sri Lanka to Sudan. Hereby the Jewish state is constructed as the collective outsider, the objectified and essentialized pariah, or: the Jew of nations. This radical form of denigration is, ultimately, independent of the state’s actual behavior or actions; for those who view Israel as singularly, fundamentally and inevitably evil because of its Jewish character, the country is damned no matter what its government does or proposes. This, however, is part of a set of modernized forms of political antisemitism in postmodern times.

4   Not just in postmodern times, public expressions of antisemitic resentment can co-exist and may be accepted in spite of apparent logical contradictions. On the one hand, Israel is often attacked as a force of capitalist globalization and imperial pursuit that undermines and destroys particular cultural and ethnic communities. In this context, the country is also perceived as ‘too Western,’ too culturally pluralistic, too diverse and ‘too cosmopolitan,’ i.e. disrespectful towards particular traditional, ‘ethnic’ or religious sexual and moral norms. On the other hand, Jewish Israelis are frequently criticized for their particularism, that is the fact that the identity and self-understanding of Israel, though very diverse, multi-cultural and with a substantial Arab-Israeli minority, refers to a Jewish state; thus in this case the religious or ethnic identity of a community is delegitimized (also from some post-national liberals, as Robert Fine (2007) points out, who have no problem with Palestinian nationalism) while it is simultaneously attacked for being too cosmopolitan.

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lars rensmann IV.  Counter-Cosmopolitanism and the “Cosmopolitan Jew” in Postmodern Times

Modernized antisemitism, then, attributes to “the Jews”, or in a more subtle way to allegedly ubiquitous and powerful “Zionists”, certain ‘traits’ that reproduce old and new myths about them. In sometimes coded language, new forms of political antisemitism also ‘locate’ the perceived evils of contemporary cosmopolitanization, and cosmopolitan (post)modernity, in “Jewish” or “Zionist” machinations: corresponding to the image of the cosmopolitan Jew, Jews are thereby perceived as the embodiment of cosmopolitan universalists who, behind the goal of the ‘destruction’ of national, ethnic and religious communities, advance their own particularistic cause: they are seen as global ‘string-pullers’ who are unattached to a ‘real’ homeland or ‘roots’ but seek to dominate and occupy them all. Allegedly manipulating the modern world behind the scenes, antisemites project onto ‘the Jews’ that they aspire worldwide domination. In particular, the notion of a Jewish conspiracy and hidden Jewish power is structurally linked to the aforementioned belief in an existential, identifiable alien threat to the nation(s), both by means of domestic subversion and through foreign control. These still present historical narratives make Jews a likely target if people feel their exclusive, particularistic community is threatened, changing, or diversifying, and if they seek to blame someone for all the ills and conflicts of contemporary globalized society. In Europe, modern antisemitism initially peaked during the period of the first, industrial globalization from the late 19th century, and then on the road to the Holocaust. However, in various spheres and at different junctures, anti-Jewish resentment has repeatedly been recurring and remobilized since then. As pointed out, anti-Jewish resentments have been an integral part of many conventional (ethnic) nationalistic movements emerging in the modern world. But, as Hannah Arendt noticed in the face of the Holocaust, they have also been a crucial part of many pan-nationalistic ideologies and movements since the 19th century. In their most radical historical variants, they have been displayed and mobilized by the extreme right and totalitarian organizations in Europe. But antisemitism as an ideological matrix and societal undercurrent has never been limited to those movements and organizations. It could only succeed in becoming politically relevant through broader support within civil society and politics, and in the context of a crisis of political modernity. Against this background, it can be suggested that in



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a time of rapid sociocultural change, when the power of the nation-state is eroding in face of cosmopolitan normative pressures, international law and institutions, and under conditions of an increasingly connected, globalized, neoliberal capitalist economy that is exposed to social crises, such antisemitic narratives—however coded they may be—are more likely to be revived and take hold. In the European context, this is especially the case if such narratives, which may be driven by the political unconscious rather then merely the cost-benefit calculus of party agents, respond and adapt to the political conditions and changing discursive boundaries of European liberal democracies. Benefitting from deeply seated cultural dynamcis and societal fears, modernized forms of antisemitism may find public expression; they may be actualized along with other politics of fear and resentment, i.e. defensive forms of exclusionist, anti-pluralist, counter-cosmopolitan identity politics. A global revival of public antisemitism, since the beginnings of the modern era a way to ‘make sense’ and personify rapid sociocultural change corresponds with the dramatic transformations of the postmodern era, the “second globalization” (Markovits & Rensmann 2010). The conditions of postmodernity, with all its ambivalent effects between homogeneization and social disintegration (related to the dynamics of neoliberal global capitalism), on the one hand, and cosmopolitanization and democratization (related to transnational media networks, the emergence of global publics and international law), on the other also harbor a reactionary “postmodern antisemitism”: Postmodernity enables multiple new interactions and cosmopolitan selfunderstandings but also allows for the resurgence of old resentments as one of many ‘legitimate’ ways to make sense of, react to, and oppose an incomprehensibly complex world. And in postmodern times, traditional patterns of social interactions and community-formation are challenged in an unprecedented way from above and from below. In particular, as indicated, Jews have long been identified with cosmopolitan universalism and principles of universal equality, as well as with other elements of political modernity such as liberalism, parliamentary democracy, capitalism, and pluralism. Cosmopolitanism— broadly defined as cultural inclusiveness, acceptance of diversity, and the support of universal human rights claims5—represents one of the

5   We employ a broad definition of cosmopolitanism that can be measured by general support of cultural inclusiveness and universal human rights claims. This does

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key links in this modern anti-Jewish imagery: While Jews were identified with various modern regimes and ideologies, the identification of Jews with both communist internationalism and (international) finance capital—allegedly particularly “greedy” and “blood-sucking”—both point to a counter-cosmopolitan rejection of universal norms and transnational practices that allegedly subvert the particular (national or religious) community. In this perception, the Jewish diaspora communities hereby represented a transnational “homeland without frontiers,” in the words of Adorno and Horkheimer (1969: 153). Against the background of this historical cultural matrix of resentments, we suggest that it is no sheer coincidence that antisemitism may, to some extent, resurface in the second, post-industrial age of globalization. After all, we live in times of new rapid socio-cultural change and societal crises, and in a period in which post-national, cosmopolitan transformations of an emerging global society based on “network power” (Grewal 2008) have been powerful but also face significant challenges and challengers. In light of this and the theoretical hypothesis about the specific dimension of antisemitism as an ‘explanation’ that identifies and objectifies unwanted elements of modernity in the image of ‘the Jews’, we situate antisemitism also in the broader context of what we call counter-cosmopolitanism. Like antisemitism, it is not just a European phenomenon. Countercosmopolitanism is conceived as the generalized, rigidly particularistic rejection of cosmopolitan norms of inclusiveness and rights of “others”. These emerging, increasingly powerful cosmopolitan norms entail the recognition of cultural diversity, individual self-expression (Norris & Inglehart 2009) and pluralism. They also include obligations to strangers and some form or loyalties to humankind in its entirety. Countercosmopolitan orientations, on the contrary, are reflected in claims to national, religious, or cultural superiority over non-nationalized or

not mean that those with generally cosmopolitan orientations would have to support global political authority and reject national democratic autonomy or, in Woodrow Wilson’s take, “freedom from foreign rule.” Yet it does imply the general recognition of diversity, complex human allegiances, loyalties to humankind, and certain “obligations to strangers” (Appiah 2007)—all of which are rejected by counter-cosmopolitan exclusionists. In contrast to multiculturalism, which has received broad criticism for resting upon rather rigid notions of culture and group belonging, cosmopolitanism is also invoked to avoid the pitfalls of essentialism or all-or-nothing understandings of identity (Parekh 2000; Vertovec & Cohen 2002). Cf. Vertovec and Cohen (2002) also for various other conceptions of cultural, moral and legal cosmopolitanism.



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non-religious rights entitlements; and reject indivisible human rights based on universal equality, freedom, and transnational solidarity. Such counter-cosmopolitanism has become an increasingly relevant force. It can be conceptualized as the universalized fear of sociocultural change and diffusion. This, to be sure, does not necessarily imply narrow nationalisms or regionalisms. Counter-cosmopolitan Islamist fundamentalists, for example, employ their own version of global outreach, global justice, and “globalism” (Steger 2008). While opposition to economic and political globalization may have very different motivations and purposes—including the universalistic critique of exploitation and social injustice or grassroots opposition to the loss of democratic autonomy and accountability—‘counter-cosmopolitanism’ refers to a generalized discontent with cosmopolitan cultural change, hybridity, and any inclusive universalistic claims that allow for citizens to be “different without fear.” It points to forms of social discontent that generally place an exclusive community over the rights of others in all political, economic, cultural and social questions.6 Distinct from the critique of actual globalization or of global injustices based on universal human rights which are driven by inclusive cosmopolitan norms and claims, counter-cosmopolitanism points to a fundamental opposition to socio-cultural modernization, cosmopolitan diversity, and the universalization of rights. In fact, it points to a refusal to recognize any universality of human rights. The latter are modern, non-traditionalist norms and patterns that have culturally been identified with Jews. We do not argue that resurgent antisemitism can be reduced to or fully explained by counter-cosmopolitanism, which also entails a generalized opposition to a generalized Other, including immigrants, asylum-seekers, ethnic and religious (especially Muslim) minorities. But antisemitism can also be conceptualized as a radical form of counter-cosmopolitanism with which, we argue, it almost consistently marches in step. Generalized hatred towards cosmopolitan cultural change, diversity, and modernity, especially relevant in times of rapid transformations, can be viewed as a key factor contributing to the

6   We have to take into account that there is a conceptual continuum reaching from counter-cosmopolitanism, i.e. the outright rejection of a diverse society and universalistic norms, and criticism of post-national forms of political sovereignty that may undermine democratic autonomy. However, while the latter may also be viewed as counter-cosmopolitan in the broadest sense, we locate such views outside of the realm that we conceptualize as counter-cosmopolitanism.

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articulation of objectified antisemitic personifications of this very process. Immigrants and ethnic minorities are exposed to cultural stereotyping and discrimination, and they may be blamed for cultural diversity or unemployment. Yet, perceived as the driving force of globalization and comprehensive cosmopolitanization of national societies they are not. It is antisemitism—and in particular the modern image of the ‘cosmopolitan’ Jews as global conspirators and enemies of the world (Bronner 2000)—that offers a negative, reified ‘explanation’ of globalization and cosmopolitan modernization, and thereby reflects objectified forms of discontent with social, cultural and political transformations of the present age. This model suggests that antisemitism can be effectively mobilized also because Jews are construed as the radical embodiment of postmodern cultural change, socio-cultural diversity, and individual selfexpression—and thus expresses both general counter-cosmopolitan resentment against generalized ‘Others’ and universal rights and provides a reified “explanation” of (post)modernity and its crises. Against the background of the history of antisemitism it is Jews, and only Jews, no other minority, who are perceived to personify, indeed embody all transformative and contradictory aspects associated with contemporary global (post)modernity. The concept of counter-cosmopolitanism was originally coined by the philosopher Kwame Anthony Appiah (2007). For Appiah, counter-cosmopolitanism is itself transnational in nature, such as global jihadism. Jihadist or religious-fundamentalist counter-cosmopolitans do not just oppose cosmopolitanism but also “resist the call of all local allegiances, all traditional loyalties, even to family.” (Appiah 2007: 137) Appiah therefore views counter-cosmopolitanism not as a particularistic opposition to universalism but as competing universal ethics, namely a “universalism without tolerance” (Appiah 2007: 140). He finds this especially displayed in radical Islamists’ conceptions of a global ummah. It inverts the cosmopolitan claim that everybody matters. However, we frame counter-cosmopolitanism in a slightly different way. For us, as argued before, it entails the rejection of diversity and plurality as well as the endorsement of cultural particularism that is consistently prioritized over universalistic human rights. Countercosmopolitans are not the more radical universalists, as Appiah suggests. Rather, they claim the unconditional superiority of a particular collective—be that a national, ethnic or religious community—over inviolable rights grounded in humanity, just as they reject diversity



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and plurality. Although counter-cosmopolitanism is embedded in and part of the globalization process, we argue that it may take the shape of exclusive localism, radical nationalism, or of a global community of fundamentalist believers. Yet, counter-cosmopolitanism does not just point to forms of exclusive particularism and hatred of diversity; as Appiah argues, it also entails the opposition to the cosmopolitan commitment to pluralism, i.e. the recognition of differences in values and preferences, and especially to fallibilism, i.e. the recognition that knowledge is imperfect, provisional, and permanently subject to revision (Appiah 2007; see also Lefort 1986). Appiah argues that both Hitler and Stalin, who agreed on little else except for mass murder as a totalitarian means of politics, regularly launched invectives against “rootless cosmopolitans;” and for both “anti-cosmopolitanism was often just a euphemism for antisemitism.” From their ideological point of view, Appiah claims, in a way they were also “right to see cosmopolitanism as their enemy. For they both required a kind of loyalty to one portion of humanity—a nation, a class—that ruled out loyalty to all of humanity.” (Appiah 2007: xvi) In a similar fashion, Horkheimer and Adorno have argued that the image of the Jews under the modern totalitarian spell mirrored the universal freedoms and cosmopolitan loyalties that totalitarianism despised: “No matter what the makeup of the Jews may be in reality, their image [. . .] has characteristics which must make totalitarian rule their enemy: Happiness without power, reward without work, a homeland without frontiers, religion without myth.” (Horkheimer & Adorno 1969: 165) In a cosmopolitanized postmodernity, then, we witness the revival of multiple, contradictory stereotypes associated with Jews. In particular, however, we face the revival of the image of the “Wandering Jew”, who has no real home, no legitimate place, no circumscribed territory; who makes claims about universal freedom and rights while he induces cultural diffusion; who is unruly, sets all material things in motion, and subverts the peace of the world, in other words: the “cosmopolitan Jew”. In the historical European imagination Jews were perceived as the cosmopolitan ‘pariahs of nations.’ In the antisemitic view, this is also supposed to be the Jewish future. The image of the “cosmopolitan Jew” is of course, among other things, another false projection. Even those instances when “cosmopolitan Jews” are admired or idealized, a cosmopolitan existence is thereby forced upon them: Jews are not supposed to have ‘their’ homeland or make up the majority of a

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nation-state. Such forced cosmopolitanism singles out Jews. By means of a cosmopolitan image, it projects and objectifies Jewish particularity. Theirs is supposed to be the fate of the existential minority which does not really belong anywhere: if they like or not. V.  Postmodernity, Globality, and Their Discontents: Rethinking Antisemitism and Counter-Cosmopolitanism In her analysis of the Jewish roots of Hannah Arendt’s cosmopolitanism, Seyla Benhabib also points to the broader context of anti-cosmopolitan particularism that rules out multiple allegiances and, especially, loyalty to all of humanity. In addition, she addresses the historical link between (the perception of ) Jews and cosmopolitanism—and, respectively, the common hostility towards both. For Arendt, the Jews were in many ways placed in a ‘supra-national’ and ‘proto-cosmopolitan’ existence, “which at one and the same time called forth and belied the universal belief in ‘the rights of man.’ The Jews seemed to represent human rights as such. Yet, at the same time, their problematic position within the nation also evidenced the vulnerability to which they were subject in virtue of not clearly belonging to a collectivity that would stand up for them. [. . .] Jewish existence thus revealed the fragile balance between the universalistic aspirations of the modern nation-state and the principle of ‘national sovereignty.’ Such sovereignty would repeatedly be defined not in terms of a community of citizens and equals but in terms of an ethnos of blood and belonging.” (Benhabib 2009; Benhabib & Eddon 2007) While both antisemitism and countercosmopolitan discontent should not be equated, it is our hypothesis that there are aspects of historical overlap and contemporary convergence. In light of the rise of counter-cosmopolitan formations, it is no real surprise that the historical “proto-cosmopolitan” Jewish existence and its stereoptypical perception make Jews a target for such diffuse discontent. We argue that antisemitism is a specific, distinct phenomenon that differs from other (colonial) racisms with respect to many features, forms and functions. Yet, it should also be situated in and explained by the broader context of counter-cosmopolitanism, which experiences a rise in reaction to the multi-faceted globalization of societies. Accordingly, both antisemitism and counter-cosmopolitanism can be understood as interrelated anti-modern formations in the context of postmodernity; among other things, antisemitism can be conceived as



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a radical personification, an expression of what has been conceived here as counter-cosmopolitan resentments. To be sure, they do not originate, or are immediately caused by, post-industrial globalization and concurring cosmopolitan transformations of society. In fact, there is scarce evidence that social change, crisis, or unemployment as such directly cause anti-immigrant or antisemitic resentment. In general, cultural perceptions of change are more persuasive and robust explanatory variables for antisemitism and anti-immigrant resentments than actual social data (Norris 2005; Rensmann & Miller-Gonzalez 2010). Although social conditions matter, perceptions of Jews and other minorities cannot be caused by a social condition; social experiences and conditions are always interpreted and linked to specific motives. Just as unemployment does not cause right-wing extremism, social marginalization does not cause antisemitism or racism. But postmodernity provides a set of conditions apparently favorable to the resurgence of such resentments; including highly accelerated socio-cultural and economic change that puts conventional communal bonds as much under pressure as citizens of the global precariat (LaVaque-Manty 2009), on the one hand, and a broadened toleration of the most egrgious claims in the context of new media, on the other. Moreover, as indicated above, antisemitism always functioned well when Jews were present but, if we adopt Sartre and take him a step further, even better without them. This is the case because, like other forms of resentment, antisemitism does not reflect any behavior of ‘the Jews.’ It is unrelated to the actual actions of the objects of antisemitic projections. This gap between perception and presence is most striking in antisemitic resentment because it embodies a form of social paranoia that spots ‘hidden’ Jewish power and control even if Jews are absent; unlike many other minorities they can be invisible, only to be spotted by the antisemite. Yet, we argue that antisemitism and counter-cosmopolitanism may especially thrive, and gain political and public relevance, in times of rapid socio-cultural change, cosmopolitan modernizations of society (including Europeanization), and perceived or actual crises and social fears associated with these transformation processes. The outright rejection of socio-cultural change and the ‘cosmopolitization’ of society—as well as the reified personification of this process—is more likely, then, to be relevant in times of dramatic transition. Adopting the diagnostic definition offered by David Held and his collaborators, we understand the second, post-industrial globalization as

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a complex and multi-dimensional process of such change, “which embodies a transformation in the spatial organization of social relations and transactions—exerted in terms of their extensity, intensity, velocity and impact—generating transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction, and the exercise of power.” (Held et al. 2000: 55) The second, contemporary globalization primarily denotes “the expanding scale, growing magnitude, speeding up and deepening impact of transcontinental flows and patterns of interaction.” (Held & McGrew 2002: 1) As the term counter-cosmopolitanism suggests, we claim that general discontent with socio-cultural and economic globalization and universalism is rather reactive. Globalization is in many ways an irreversible process of transnational and trans-cultural flows. The evolving ‘cosmopolitization’ of the global network society, which also entails the evolution of international law, universal rights norms, increased human interconnectedness, limits to national sovereignty, the recognition of ‘others’ at home and abroad, and global consciousness of distant events, has made tremendous progress over the last decades. This certainly applies also to the “cosmopolitanized” European Union (Beck & Grande 2007). It has evolved into a more inclusive, postnational and post-sovereign immigrant society governed on multiple levels. However, by the same token the stereotypical identification of global enemies that allegedly steer this process also benefits from the often ambivalent processes of post-industrial globalization and its actual cultural, social and political ‘cosmopolitization’ (Kaldor 1997; Beck & Grande 2007); for these processes enhance a form of cultural change and communal diffusion by which significant segments of society feel threatened. In this context antisemitism offers a simplistic causal explanation of an increasingly complex, rapidly changing world. In reaction to the conditions of globalization, Manichean interpretations that divide the modern world into national/cultural protectionists and ‘globalizers,’ or separate the ‘good nations’ and ethnic communities from ‘evil transnational Jews,’ are more likely to gain ground. Hence, public mobilizations of counter-cosmopolitanism and antisemitism are more likely to be successful. This is especially the case against the background that Jews, as we have argued, were historically identified with diverse aspects of modernity: socio-cultural modernization, individualism and liberalism, abstract wealth and banking power—as well as internationalism and cosmopolitan human rights norms that



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have now evolved in globalized publics and through human rights regimes since the Holocaust (Kaldor 1997; Benhabib 2006). The latter—cosmopolitan norms—are some of the most striking features of contemporary globalization. They have emerged with new media and public pressures; along with and beyond its neoliberal, market-driven politico-economic architecture and the social crises it has produced. In the context of postmodernity, antisemitism has once again— or rather ultimately—become a global phenomenon, disseminated through the very same global media that have facilitated cosmopolitan consciousness and human rights regimes. It has also reemerged as a phenomenon of global everyday culture, with national and local variations. In many parts of Europe, “Jew” has become a common curse word in the quotidian culture of adolescents. Modernized anti-Jewish hate interacts with long-existing resentments as well as new political movements, such as jihadism, but also resonates among dictators who are present in the very same international institutions designed to protect and enhance human rights. In Pakistan, for instance, it is now common to imagine a “Zionist-Hindu alliance” that controls the country; an antisemitic phantasy not just but particularly present among Islamic groups and parties (Tavernise 2010). Infused with cultural traditions and their reified reinterpretations, contemporary antisemitism may once again offer simple explanations to all sorts of individual, collective, domestic and international crises. It can be used this way by virtue of its historical character of an all-encompassing conspiracy theory. Though largely discredited in its unbridled forms in European publics, it is a widely available defense mechanism against rapid cultural change and turmoil: transfering all responsibility for globalized society’s problems to ‘the Jews’, antisemitism re-emerges as a global threat. It is part of a more general uneasiness and discontent in our partially globalized, postmodern world. VI.  Towards Situated Cosmopolitanism in the Global Age: Human Rights, Public Freedom, and the Challenge of Antisemitism The diagnosed resurgence of antisemitism can therefore be conceived in the context of deeper crises and conflicts within European and global postmodernity. Interacting with cultural legacies and structural misperceptions, contemporary antisemitism can be theorized as a form of misrecognition of Jews: as a reified, anti-modern and counter-cosmopolitan

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reaction to rapid economic as well as socio-cultural change. Among other things, it can be understood as an objectified reaction to an increasingly complex but also conflictual globalized network society and its crises. This objectification is itself facilitated by societal dynamics and structures, though its actualization depends on human agency. Antisemitism can hereby function as the personification of the abstract, complex process of cosmopolitanization. It is one (though a specific one) of the world-views and resentments on offer to cope with the disorienting effects of postmodern risk society. It seems to ‘explain’ interrelated and overlapping globalizations by identifying a ‘causal agent’: the imagined community of global Jewry. More often than in the past such misrecognition is tolerated in many public spheres across the globe. Taking different new forms, it appears that anti-Jewish codes have returned from the fringes and move into the heart of civil society. They resurface, for instance, in the public talk about Jewish lobbies dominating domestic governments and global agencies, or in claims blaming Jews for the world financial crisis. It is part of this dynamic that at the very moment of antisemitism’s resurgence, there appears to be a wide-spread denial of its very existence. For some, even the blatant Holocaust denial by Iran’s leader Ahmadinejad, who invited neo-Nazis to a conference promoting such denial, deserves mitigating circumstances and should not be described as ‘antisemitism’ or Jew-hatred. In the pluralistic universe of postmodern discourse in which ‘anything can be said’, there is, to use Hannah Arendt’s phrase, a popular habit to treat indisputable historical facts “as though they were mere opinions” (Arendt 1950: 251); it too often goes along with the belief that “this free-for-all, this nihilistic relativity about facts” is “the essence of democracy.” (Arendt 1950: 252) Post-national and postmodern Europe, for instance, has become inevitably more cosmopolitan, democratic, and accepting of diversity. Yet many European citizens blame Jews and Israel for instigating antisemitism, and when Jews inside and outside Israel are assaulted or murdered. If antisemitism’s existence is conceded in this context, it is often interpreted as a direct, unmediated reflection of Israel’s policies or Jewish behavior (including Jewish support of Israel). This is in itself an anti-Jewish figure that has recently reentered European (and global) public spheres. Collective stereotypes against group or group hatred are never caused, and can never be justified, by actual group behavior or political actions. It would be equally racist to claim that an African dictator is the cause for European racism. But with regard to



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Israel, the irrationalism of antisemitism is frequently rationalized, and resurging violence against Jews on European streets often finds such mitigating circumstances. One thing is clear: In cosmopolitan Europe, the reloaded antisemitism of the 21st century is rarely identified as the imminent international and domestic human rights challenge that it is. Critical social theorizing seeks to decipher antisemitism and its societal origins. It recognizes that antisemitism and other resentments are indeed powerful undercurrents of modern societies, and nothing simply external to them. In today’s globalized world, those resentments are surely not exclusively national or European problems. They are to a large extent transnational and transcultural phenomena, permeating multiple societies and demoi. Such resentments are still unevenly distributed, to be sure. There are significant national and local variations in terms of its scope and political relevance, and there are also diverse, multi-faceted motives. Furthermore, the actual mobilization of resentments against socio-cultural transformations, immigrants and minorities as well as, in particular, Jews depends on contingent political and public agents—and the actual spaces in which they operate. These spaces are always politically contested, and the meaning of the discourses shaping them is constantly changing. Nevertheless, the challenge of contemporary antisemitism and counter-cosmopolitanism is part of a crisis of political postmodernity. From a cosmopolitan point of view, there are normative implications to this. A critical cosmopolitan response (Hirsh 2007) to the present challenge of antisemitism and counter-cosmopolitanism needs to address public manifestations of exclusion and resentments. This includes the opposition to the flourishing toleration of antisemitism as an “opinion”. It also forces us to address social and political conditions favorable to its rise. Critical cosmopolitan approaches simultaneously call for education about the societal and political injustices and antagonistic social structures that help enable antisemitic objectifications of the social world. The turn to critical social theory entails the critique of various dynamics of social exclusion and injustice. This includes conditions of domination that can take abstract modern and personal forms. The task, however, is also not to neglect the most immediate threats or, in Adorno’s phrase, “to avert the worst”. Aiming at social, political and cultural nondomination, this also points to a strong commitment to universal human rights, robust forms of political or constitutional protection, and the support for democratic

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voice(s) from below. Such a cosmopolitan stance opposes the dehumanization of any group, minority, or Other in global society—including the increasingly salient dehumanization of Jews and Israelis or the stereotypical portrayal of ‘the Jews’ and ‘the Zionists’ as a global conspiratory power behind global capitalism, media, and imperialism. Unfortunately, such ideas often reemerge today even within the context of transnational organizations, ‘cosmopolitan’ publics, and existing human rights regimes. In fact, international institutions at times aggravate the problems they claim to combat (as reflected, for instance, in the UN Human Rights Council, in which human rights violators and dictatorships often still call the shots and focus on antiIsrael ­resolutions). Cosmopolitan responses to new global crises of political (post) modernity, epitomized in the challenge of modernized antisemitism, also require a critique of any imperial ambitions. Such ambitions are not just “Western”—think of Iran’s geopolitical ambitions in the Middle East. In turn, they point to a “subaltern cosmopolitanism“ (Harvey 2009), that is a cosmopolitan commitment to transnational democratic voices that are emerging from below. These voices often challenge conventional norms and boundaries of politics (Rensmann 2009b). And they translate human and political rights into different, always changing communities and languages. Call this an Arendtian version of cosmopolitanism: it situates the universal “right to have rights” in different public and constitutional contexts. Neither can cosmopolitanism only reside in the security of false, abstract universals; it always requires cultural dialogue, understanding, and defamiliarizing. Nor can any cosmopolitan solidarity with diverse communities and individuals go back any longer to look for origin, purity, or authenticity (Chen 1992). Least of all can it simply reject human rights claims that are raised by excluded and persecuted minorities by resorting to cultural relativism or an “inverse orientalism” that ultimately supports local oppressers. Siding with actual or presumed victims requires social understanding of the problems and issues at stake. Yet it never entails the justification of persecution and domination: the politics of resentment. Critical cosmopolitanism implies the necessity to reflect the contested nature of cosmopolitan norms, and their political character and boundaries (Benhabib 2006; Ingram 2009; Simmons 2009). In fact, as Jeffrey Dudas (2008) points out, even the discourse of rights can be utilized for a nationalist-exclusionary agenda (which is one of the many reasons



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why political theory needs an empirically rich and self-reflective understanding of contemporary phenomena). This also applies to human rights norms. There can be no question: Fundamental human rights have certainly been misused, exploited and selectively utilized around the globe, by blatant dictatorships and even by Western democracies. Yet these claims should be indivisible and upheld. Over time, they have become increasingly universalized in the aftermath of, and in response to, the Holocaust and other genocides. And, as claims, they are now for the most part intersubjectively recognized in our glocalized world (and thus can no longer easily be dismissed even by ruthless regimes). Those claims need to be defended and strengthened, not relativized: their lack of enforcement does not make them less valid. And their misuse does not make them less relevant for people in the 21st century: especially for those who have little else to cling to. Human rights norms matter. They help generate cosmopolitan pressure and binding norms. Expressed in global publics and institutionalized in international law, it is difficult for regimes to evade their politico-moral weight. The ratification of binding human rights law—even if initially only for instrumental or PR reasons—has long-term domestic effects, as Beth Simmons (2009) has demonstrated in her work. However, a critical cosmopolitan focus is not primarily global public law. Its staring point is the struggle for private and “public freedom” (Villa 2008) and robust constitutional democracies facilitating critical publicity and cosmopolitan norms. Most importantly, human rights claims have been appropriated from below—articulated by politically excluded, marginal, subaltern groups and individuals around the globe, by those who are oppressed under authoritarian rule or who suffer from persecution or genocidal politics (Rensmann 2009a). In their struggle for rights and freedom, they need our transnational solidarity and new cosmopolitan spaces to articulate their voices. Think of the victims of Darfur, or the democratic opposition movement in Iran which the regime has crushed so brutally. Essentialist celebrations of blind particularity, exclusion and resentment, however, need to be challenged and subjected to (self-critical) communication (Habermas 1996). In the words of Homi K. Bhabha (2004), we need to self-critically and constantly challenge “those ideological maneuvers through which ‘imagined communities’ are given essentialist identities.” This refers to European constructions of nationality but also, for instance, Israeli and Palestinian essentialist narratives of nationhood and identity. Yet this critique of essentialized nationalism

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cannot be one-sided; cosmopolitanism cannot imply problematizing one ethnic nationalism while glorifying another. And it needs to defend sites of democracy and constitutionalized human rights—such as Israel.7 Moreover, this necessitates both the recognition of diversity and an understanding that human, gay, and women’s rights should ultimately be non-negotiable. They must not be sacrificed by counter-cosmopolitan cultural relativism. No woman deserves to be stoned for “adultery”. Critical cosmopolitan responses should constantly challenge double standards, which often continue to make a mockery of human rights claims and regimes and thus embolden the enemies of such rights: Consider the almost complete neglect of genocidal politics and ethnic cleansing taking place in Africa, or of human rights violations by dictatorial regimes in the Middle East—and think of the wide-spread unwillingness to even recognize Israeli victims of terror against civilians. This selectivity is still displayed in many human rights discourses. In fact, it often goes unnoticed in European and global publics that in many countries Jews are excluded and have been persecuted, or forced to emigrate. Today Israel’s Jews are also faced with genocidal threats to become “wiped off the map”. The toleration of such threats, and downplaying them as mere rhetoric, helps facilitate a climate in which antisemitism has become, once again, a serious global challenge—for Jews in Israel and around the world. Taking side with the most vulnerable members of global society and with communities that are exposed to eliminationist or genocidal threats, a robust cosmopolitan response to the recent crises of political modernity entails the defense of citizens who are under threat, and of the stateless that continue to emerge under the “global condition” (Arendt 1951). This also leads to a commitment to support existing political communities and constitutions that already protect civil, human and democratic rights, as well as to transnational communities and institutions facilitating inclusive cosmopolitan norms. Thus, for instance, situated cosmopolitanism respects the rights of the Jewish

7   The issue is, again, clearly not whether or not Israeli policies can be criticized. They are and should be criticized, in particular those “aimed at undermining any possibility of a viable Palestinian state.” (Postone 2009) But an analysis of any conflict situation needs to be “intersubjective and not look to blame one side or the other independently of the context in which they operate.” (Fine 2007) And it needs to recognize Israel as a legitimate constitutional democracy.



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republic and its constitutional democracy.8 And it implies the need to stand up against the most egregious violations of human rights, let it be in the Middle East, China, Sudan, Sri Lanka, Iran, or elsewhere. Counter-cosmopolitan, antisemitic and racist ideologies continue to undermine cosmopolitan solidarity and the actualization of human rights to this day. In spite of cosmopolitanization processes in the postmodern world, those ideologies and perils are not a matter of the past; they are very much part of the political crisis of postmodernity. Recalling Kant, they also damage the future chances of peaceful co-existence and cooperation among the human race. Cosmopolitanism, critically understood, engages in the struggles for recognition of the concrete and the generalized Other, for “the rights of others” (Benhabib 2006) and their cosmopolitan right to political voice (Rensmann 2009b). This still remains very much a struggle against collective demonizations, or justifications of ideological hatred which denies those rights in principle. Among other places, we can find those justifications in an inverse orientalism projected to the Middle East. Yet as Robert Fine (2007) aptly put it, a cosmopolitan response entails the search for cooperation and democratization (in Europe, the Middle East, and beyond), not the dehumanization of “enemies” and the goal of their destruction. It points to power between equals, in Hannah Arendt’s sense, and to empowerment, not to hatred and the glorification of violence—against Jews and others. References Adorno, Theodor W. et al. (1950) The Authoritarian Personality (New York: Harper). —— (1955) Minima Moralia: Reflections from Damaged Life (London: Verso, 1987). —— (1964) Bekämpfung des Antisemitismus heute. Argument 6: 88–104. —— (1966) Negative Dialectics (New York: Continuum). Ahlheim, Klaus & Bardo Heger (2002) Die unbequeme Vergangenheit (Schwalbach/Ts.: Wochenschau Verlag). Altemeyer, Robert (1996) The Authoritarian Specter (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press). Appiah, Kwame Anthony (2007) Cosmopolitanism (New York: W.W.Norton).

  Israel’s liberal-democratic polity still lacks a formal constitution, to be sure (so does the UK). Yet the rule of law and constitutionalism are solidified through basic laws and the balance between the Knesset and the Supreme Court, which are working out the paradoxes between public autonomy and “rights of others”. 8

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Arendt, Hannah (1950) The Aftermath of Nazi Rule. In Arendt Essays in Understanding 1930–1954 (New York: Schocken Books, 1994). —— (1951) The Origins of Totalitarianism (San Diego: Hartcourt), pp. 248–269. Balibar, Etienne & Immanuel Wallerstein (1992) Race, Class, Nation: Ambiguous Identities (London: Verso). Bauman, Zygmunt (1993) Modernity and Ambivalence (Cambridge: Polity Press). Beck, Ulrich & Edgar Grande (2007) Cosmopolitan Europe (Cambridge: Polity Press). Benhabib, Seyla (2002) Unholy Wars. Constellations: An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory 9 (1): 34–45. —— (2006) Another Cosmopolitanism (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Benhabib, Seyla & Raluca Eddon (2007) From Antisemitism to the “Right to Have Rights. The Jewish Roots of Hannah Arendt’s Cosmopolitanism. Babylon: Beiträge zur jüdischen Gegenwart 22: 44–62. Bergmann, Werner (1997) Antisemitismus in öffentlichen Konflikten (Frankfurt a. M.: Campus). —— (2008) Antisemitic Attitudes in Europe: A Comparative Perspective. Journal of Social Issues 64 (2): 343–362. Bhabha, Homi K. (2004) The Location of Culture (New York: Routledge). Bronner, Stephen E. (2000) A Rumor About the Jews: Reflections on Antisemitism and The Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Chen, K.h. (1992) Voices from the Outside: Toward a New Internationalist Localism. Cultural Studies 6 (3): 347–369. Dudas, Jeffrey (2008) The Cultivation of Resentment: Treaty Rights and the New Right (Stanford: Stanford University Press). Falk, Avner (2008) Anti-Semitism: A History and Psychoanalysis of Contemporary Hatred (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers). Fein, Helen (1987) The Persisting Question: Sociological Perspectives and Social Contexts of Modern Antisemitism (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter). Fine, Robert (2007) Anti-Semitism, Boycotts, and Freedom of Speech. Engage. http:// www.engageonline.org.uk/blog/article.php?id=1020 Grewal, David Singh (2008) Network Power. The Social Dynamics of Globalization (New Haven: Yale University Press). Habermas, Jürgen (1996) The Inclusion of the Other. Studies in Political Theory (Cambridge: Polity). Harvey, David (2009) Cosmopolitanism and the Geographies of Freedom (New York: Columbia University Press). Heitmeyer, Wilhelm (2005) Deutsche Zustände 3 (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp). Held, David, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt and Jonathan Perraton (2000) Rethinking Globalization. In David Held & Anthony McGrew (eds) The Global Transformations Reader (Cambridge: Polity). Held, David & Anthony McGrew (2002) Globalization/Antiglobalization (Cambridge: Polity Press). Hirsh, David (2007) Anti-Zionism and Antisemitism: Cosmopolitan Reflections (New Haven: Yale Initiative for the Interdisciplinary Study of Antisemitism Working Papers). Horkheimer, Max & Theodor W. Adorno (1969) Dialectic of Enlightenment. Philosophical Fragments (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002). Ignatieff, Michael (2002) Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press). Kaldor, Mary (1997) Cosmopolitanism versus Nationalism: The New Divide? In R. Caplan and J. Feffer (eds) Europe’s New Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press): 42–58. LaVaque-Manty, Mika (2009) Finding Theoretical Concepts in the Real World: The Case of the Precariat. In Boudewijn de Bruin & Christopher Zurn (eds) New Waves in Political Philosophy (New York: Palgrave).



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Lefort, Claude (1986) The Political Forms of Modern Society: Bureaucracy, Democracy, Totalitarianism (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press). Lowenthal, Leo (1987) False Prophets: Studies on Authoritarianism (Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers). Markovits, Andrei S. & Lars Rensmann (2010) Gaming the World: How Sports are Reshaping Global Politics and Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press). Mudde, Cas (2003) The Ideology of the Extreme Right (Manchester: Manchester University Press). —— (ed) (2005) Racist Extremism in Central and Eastern Europe (New York: Routledge). Niedermayer, Oskar & Richard Stöss (2005) Rechtsextreme Einstellungen in Berlin und Brandenburg (Berlin: Otto-Suhr-Institut für Politikwissenschaft). Norris, Pippa (2005) Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Norris, Pippa & Ronald Inglehart (2009) Cosmopolitan Communications. Cultural Diversity in a Globalized World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Parekh, Bhikhu (2000) Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press). Postone, Moishe (1986) Anti-Semitism and National Socialism. In Anson Rabinbach & Jack Zipes (eds) Germans and Jews since the Holocaust (New York: Holmes & Meier). —— (2003) The Holocaust and the Trajectory of the Twentieth Century. In Moishe Postone & Eric Santner (eds) Catastrophe and Meaning: The Holocaust in the Twentieth Century (Chicago: University of Chicago Press): 81–116. —— (2009) Hamburg 2009—Another German Autumn. Contested Terrain, http:// contested-terrain.net/moishe-postone-hamburg-2009-%E2%80%93-another-german-autumn. Rensmann, Lars (1998) Kritische Theorie über den Antisemitismus (Hamburg: Argument). —— (1999) Holocaust Memory and Mass Media in Contemporary Germany: Reflections on the Goldhagen Debate. Patterns of Prejudice, 33, 1: 59–76. —— (2004) Collective Guilt, National Identity, and Political Processes in Contemporary Germany. In Bertjan Doosje & Nyla Branscombe (eds) Collective Guilt: International Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 204–223. —— (2009a) Genocidal Politics. Crimes against Humanity in the Global Age. Journal of Contemporary History 44, 4: 753–766. —— (2009b) Cosmopolitan Republics: Rethinking Global Democracy with Hannah Arendt. Paper Presented at the 105th American Political Science Association (APSA) Annual Meeting: Politics in Motion. Change and Complexity in the Contemporary Era, Toronto, 3–6 September. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1449779 Rensmann, Lars & Jennifer Miller-Gonzalez (2010) Xenophobia and Anti-Immigrant Politics. In Robert A. Denemark (ed) International Studies Encyclopedia: Ethnic Minorities and Migration (Oxford: Blackwell). Rensmann, Lars & Julius H. Schoeps (2008) Feindbild Judentum: Antisemitismus in Europa (Berlin: Verlag Berlin-Brandenburg). Sartre, Jean-Paul (1948) Anti-Semite and Jew (Paris: Schocken Books). Schoeps, Julius H. (1998) Das Gewaltsyndrom: Verformungen und Brüche im deutsch-jüdischen Verhältnis (Berlin: Argon Verlag). Schoeps, Julius & Joachim Schlör (1996) Antisemitismus: Vorurteile und Mythen (Munich: Piper). Simmons, Beth A. (2009) Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press). Steger, Manfred B. (2008) Globalisms: The Great Ideological Struggle of the 21st Century (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield). Tavernise, Sabrina (2010) Rumors of U.S. Conspiracies Drive Dialogue in Pakistan. The New York Times. May 26: A1 & A9.

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INDEX

Abbas, Mahmoud  288 Abramovich, Roman  210 ADL. See Anti-Defamation League Adorno, Theodor  13, 24, 414, 458, 459, 461, 463, 474, 477, 484 AFPS. See Association France-Palestine Solidarité AFRIF  292 Ahbachi movement  286 Ahlheim, Kalus  405 Ahmadinejad, Mahmoud  13 n. 6, 48, 51, 51 n. 28, 96, 482 AJC. See American Jewish Committee Alaoui, Abdelila Cherifi  282 Alberigo, Giuseppe  443 Alleanza Nazionale  137 Allensbach Institut für Demoskopie  401 Alloush, Ibrahim  51 n. 28 American Jewish Committee (AJC)  84, 352, 408 ‘Americanization’  173–174 Americans, as paragons of modernity 153 ‘amerikanische Verhältnisse’  167, 174 Amstelveen  9 Amsterdam  9 Andersson, Lars M.  354 Anglican Church  322 Anielewicz, Mordechai  450 animal rights  378–381 Anne Frank Trust  309 anti-Americanism  149–152, 171–172, 241, 373; and anti-Israel sentiment 339; and antisemitism  147–180, 345, 445; in Britain  318; and European identity  177–179; ­gratuitous  166–167; and 9/11  174–177; and political orientation  151–152; and soccer  168–171; as unique prejudice  147–148 anti-antisemitism  8; in Poland  251, 253, 254, 261, 263 Anti-Defamation League (ADL)  184; public opinion surveys by  42, 43–45, 83, 84, 86–87, 89–92, 94–95, 356, 371, 377–378, 388, 408, 428–429, 434

anti-globalism  123. See also counter-cosmopolitanism anti-globalization movement  164, 165, 344 anti-immigrant sentiment  7, 11, 40, 43; and extreme right  47, 122, 126; in Russia  202, 213–215 anti-Israel sentiment, and anti-­Americanism  154, 156, 164; and anticolonialism  27; anti-Muslim sentiment correlated with  43; as antisemitic  10–11, 16, 17, 29 n. 16, 28, 58, 88, 89–90, 92–95, 107–111, 112–113, 159, 350, 375, 376, 448–449; 483; in France  278–279; in Great Britain  318–320, 323; in Italy  425–426; among Jews  450; and Nazism  189; in Norway  356–357; and ritual slaughter  383; in Sweden  331–332, 335–336; in Switzerland  101–103, 367 anti-modern formations  34, 479 anti-Muslim sentiment  11; and antisemitism  43, 45–46 n. 24; in Austria  139; in Sweden  351, 352 anti-racism, and antisemitism  103–104, 346–347 antisemitic discourse  184–185, 187, 189, 191, 192–195 antisemitic hate mail  404–405 antisemitic humor  299–300, 342. See also cartoons, antisemitic antisemitic incidents  9–10, 52, 355, 400; in Great Britain  312–314, 316–318, 323; in Norway  356; reporting of  313–314; in Russia  214; in Sweden  330–331; in ­Switzerland  389 antisemitic propaganda  206, 216, 219–222, 223–224, 313, 315 antisemitic resentment  8–9 n. 4 antisemitic stereotypes  12, 44. See also Jews, stereotypes of antisemitic violence  5, 7, 9–10, 12, 25, 87–88, 88–89, 184, 301, 312; in France  277–278, 293–294; in Great Britain  310; in Hungary  135;

492

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in Russia  203, 204, 224; in ­Switzerland  367, 368 antisemitism, and age  44, 255, 268–270, 311, 317, 351, 429; and anti-­Americanism  147–180; and anti-Israel sentiment  28, 58, 110–111, 112–113; and anti-minority sentiment  263; and anti-modernity  21, 23, 33, 41–42; and anti-Muslim sentiment  45–46 n. 24; anti-racist  84, 96, 346–347; causes of  36–42, 67, 85, 249, 448, 241–247, 311, 318; and class  44, 258–259, 351; classification of  12 n. 5, 24–25; contradictions within  21, 457, 458, 471–472; and counter-cosmopolitanism  459, 479–480, 482; critical theory and  460–465, 474–478, 482–487; decline of in post-War Europe  4–5; definitions of  18–21, 22, 24–25, 187, 363; denial of  344–345, 353–355, 359, 387–389, 397–398, 399, 402, 435; distributed across the political spectrum  425, 433, 465, 467; and education  44, 241 n. 3, 253, 254, 256, 259, 351, 429; and ethnocentrism  96–97; and extreme right  7–8, 120, 123, 132, 140, 142–143; and gender  351; ‘guilt-deflecting’  397–398, 399, 403, 406, 410; history of  20–21, 154 n. 7; and knowledge of Arab-Israeli conflict  431–433, 444; ‘latent’  12, 14, 18–19, 30–31, 110, 238–241, 398, 401–402, 409, 410; legitimization of  346; ­‘modern’  21–24, 250–251, 265, 464–465; ‘modernized’  31–32, 311, 472–473; among Muslims  55, 321, 324–326, 356, 290–291; and nationalism  245–246, 266, 365, 410–411; and the ‘Nazi Card’  183–195; ‘new’  32, 83–84, 89, 89–90 n. 7, 107, 112, 113, 247, 279, 304, 310–312, 329, 375, 390–391; and place of residence  257–258; ‘political’  465–467; and political behavior  46–50, 65, 351–352; ­postmodern  37, 473–474, 482; ­‘progressive’  346–348; ‘prophylactic’ 366; psychoanalytic explanation of  411–416, 418–419; as psychological projection  461–463, 470, 479;

psycho-social factors and  259–264; racist  299–303, 426; recent rise in  6, 9–13, 14, 42–45, 231 n. 1, 232, 251–252, 277–278, 303–304, 314–315, 316, 343, 356, 369, 371, 372, 373, 408; religious  68, 94 n. 8, 152–153, 203–207, 208–209, 219–220, 222, 223, 250–251, 280, 292, 334, 336–339, 365, 376, 427, 430–431, 438; and religiosity  255–256, 267–268, 269–270; and ritual slaughter  381–383; ‘secondary’  363–364, 370, 390, 398, 402, 403, 410, 415, 462 n. 1; study of  8, 14–15, 18, 20, 32–33, 41 n. 22, 60–63, 64–67, 84, 249–251, 388, 458–459; ‘traditional’  250–251, 254, 265. See also anti-Israel sentiment; anti-Zionism; conspiracy myths; counter-cosmopolitanism; Judeophobia; Middle East conflict; racism anti-Zionism  26, 50 n. 27, 51, 192–193, 241, 468–469; and antisemitism  28, 30, 83, 97, 104, 160, 375–376, 410, 426, in France  296–297, 299–303, in Great Britain  318, 321; and left wing parties  49; among Muslims 375; and racism  29 n. 15, 30; in Sweden  331, 346 Antony, Bernard  292 Aounit, Mouloud  285, 298 Appiah, Kwame Anthony  33, 476, 477 Aqsa Brigades, al-  287 Arab antisemitism  55 Arafat, Yassar  91, 97 Arendt, Hannah  13–14, 177, 250, 472–473, 478, 482, 487 art, antisemitic  337. See also cartoons, antisemitic Arzheimer, Kai  39 n. 20, 118 Asbat al-Ansar  55 Association France-Palestine Solidarité (AFPS)  287, 288 Association Nationale Pétain-Verdun  295 Association of University Teachers (AUT)  322 Ataka  132, 133, 141 Atzmon, Gilad  345–346 Auschwitz  4, 13, 165, 175, 309, 321, 348, 426, 447; burden of  443; ­legacy of in Germany  397, 403–404, 407 ‘Auschwitz-Lüge’  186



index

Austria, public opinion surveys in  44, 45, 68, 139, 363, 462 n. 1 Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ)  47 AUT. See Association of University Teachers ‘authoritarian syndrome’  460–461 Axelson, Sigbert  354 Baburin, Sergei  211 Balen, Malcolm  320 Barcelona  9 Bardèche, Maurice  291 Barre, Raymond  279 n. 3 Baruma, Ian  318 Baudrillard, Jean  175 Bauman, Zygmunt  462 BBC  319–320, 323 BDBJ. See Board of Deputies of British Jews Bedrouni, Smain  285 Beilis, Menahem Mendel  203 Belgium  91, 378 n. 8 Beller, Steven  35 n. 18 Ben Gurion, David  450 Benhabib, Seyla  478 Berclaz, René-Louis  207 Berezovskii, Boris  210 Bergdahl, Gunnar  347 Bergman, Jan  354 Bergmann, Werner  104, 110, 111, 249, 347, 355, 391, 398, 401, 409 Berlusconi, Silvio  429 n. 8 Bertrand, Gaétan  303 Besanceot, Olivier  296 Betar  301 Beth Shalom  309 Betnér, Magnus  342 Betz, Hans-Georg  33 Bhabha, Homi K.  486 Bial, Pierre  294 ‘Black Hundred’  206, 211 black supremacism, in France  289, 299–303 Bloc Identitaire  294, 303 Blocher, Christoph  384–385 Blondet, Maurizio  440 blood libel  21, 27, 199, 203, 205 n. 14, 208–209, 216, 222, 223, 307, 319, 338, 378, 443, 468. See also ritual murder Bnai B’rith  440 BNP. See British National Party Board of Deputies of British Jews (BDBJ)  308, 310

493

Bobbio, Noberto  40 Bollyn, Christopher  287 Bosnia  164 Bossi, Umberto  137 Boubakeur, Dalil  283 Bouchet, Christian  290, 294 Bourne, Jenny  193 Bove, José  164, 300 Bowen, Jeremy  320 boycotts, of America  437; of Israel  10, 24, 54–55, 161, 322 Brähler, Elmar  408 Brainin, Elisabeth  416, 418 Breze, Laj Thami  283 Brière, Jean  289 Brigata Nera  437 British National Party (BNP)  8, 120, 315 Broder, Henryk M.  397 Broderskapsrörelsen  345 Broecker, Mathias  175 Brown, Dave  319 Brumlik, Micha  406 Brunn, James von  24 Brussels  9 Bubis, Ignatz  404, 405 Budapest  231 Bulgaria, extreme right in  132–133 Bulgarian Socialist Party  133 Bülow, Andreas von  176 Bündnis Zukunft Österreichs (BZÖ)  139 Bündnis90/Die Grünen  107 Bunzl, Martin  16 Bush, George W.  175, 179 BZÖ. See Bündnis Zukunft Österreichs Campo Antiimperialista  51 n. 28 CAPJPO. See Coordination des Appels pour une Paix Juste au Proche-Orient Carter, Elisabeth  118 cartoons, anti-Muslim  353; antisemitic 11, 19, 27–28, 38, 183, 297, 302, 319, 342–343, 346, 357, 377, 431, 442, 468 Catechism of the Jew in the USSR  223 CBSP. See Comité de Bienfaisance et de Secours aux Palestinians cemetery desecrations  9, 315, 330, 389, 400 center parties, antisemitism in  59–60 Centro Culturale San Giorgio  440 n. 20 Centro di Documentazione Ebraica Contemporanea (CDEC)  427 Centro Tradizione e Comunità  435

494

index

Cercle franco-hispanique  294 Ceronetti, Guido  445–446 CEVIPOF  282 CFCM. See Conseil Français du Culte Musulman Charleroi  9 Chasseguet-Smirgel, Janine  415 Châtillon, Frédéric  300 Che Leila Youth Brigade  321 Chechnya  161 Cherifi, Ouassani  281 Chomsky, Noam  450 Chrétienté-Solidarité  292 Christian Democratic Party  137 Christian-Democratic People’s Party  380 Chubais, Anatoli  224–225 Church of England  311–312, 322 Church of Scotland  312 Church of Sweden  335 civil rights legislation, in Britain  309–310 cleavage formations. See political parties, realignment of CNCDH. See Commission Nationale Consultative des Droits de l’Homme Collectif des Musulmans de France  280 Collectif Sheikh Yassine  288 Collin, Robert  344 Colombani, Jean-Marie  175 Combat  18, 315 Comité Cheikh Yassine  287 Comité de Bienfaisance et de Secours aux Palestinians (CBSP)  283 Comité des Imams de France  289 Comité sur le génocide en Palestine  289 Commission Nationale Consultative des Droits de l’Homme (CNCDH)  279, 303 communication latency  12, 409 communism, rise of antisemitism in the wake of  157, 232 Communist Party (France)  288, 297–298 Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF)  211–212, 214 Community Security Trust (CST)  184, 312, 313–314, 320, 325, 428 n. 5 Conseil Français du Culte Musulman (CFCM)  282, 283 Conseil Représentatif des Institutions Juives de France (CRIF)  277, 278, 283, 297, 300

conspiracy myths, and antisemitism  22, 23–24, 25; in France  295; and global financial crisis  45; in Hungary 235; in Italy  436; among leftists  49; of Jewish media control  341–343, 344, 386, 407; of Jewish plan for global domination  11, 18–19 n. 10, 31, 35–36, 250; and 9/11  175, 176; in Pakistan  481; resurgence of, 12, 17; in Russia  203, 216; in Sweden  330, 339–340, 341–343, 344, 345, 349; in Switzerland  374, 387; and Zionism  187. See also Protocols of the Elders of Zion Coordination des Appels pour une Paix Juste au Proche-Orient (CAPJPO)  287 Coordination Intercommunautaire contre l’Antisémitisme et la Diffamation (CICAD)  381 Cordoba Foundation  321 cosmopolitanism  4, 21, 122–123, 474 n. 5, 484–487. See also counter-­cosmopolitanism Cotton, Christian  285 counter-cosmopolitanism  33–34, 130–131, 474–478; and antisemitism 459; and extreme right  119, 122, 123–125, 128 n. 6, 129, 131–132, 140–143; favorable conditions for  36–42; and political behavior  47; and political realignment  40–41, 57, 58; recent rise in  59; research on  14, 60–63 CRIF. See Conseil Représentatif des Institutions Juives de France crypto-antisemitism  6 CST. See Community Security Trust Csurka, István  134 Czechoslovakia  157 Dabbashi, Ibrahim  189 Daimler-Chrysler  173 D’Alema, Massimo  426 n. 1 Dalyell, Tam  318 D’Amato, Alfonse  373 Danish Institute for International Studies  356 Danish People’s Party  8 Davidson, Lawrence  28 Dayan, Moshe  450 Deckidentität  416–417, 418 Delamuraz, Jean-Pascal  373, 374 Delcroix, Eric  282



index

democracy  65–66, 67, 69–70 democratization  3, 5, 12, 487 Denmark  91, 93, 355–356 Dessuant, Pierre  414 Deutsche Volks-Union  138 Dieudonné  287, 299–301 DPNI. See Movement Against Illegal Immigration Dreyfus, Albert  447 Dreyfus, Madeleine  387 Droite Socialiste  303 Dubreuil, Gilbert  291 Duda, Jeffrey  485 Duke, David  133 n. 7, 207, 208, 439 n. 18 Dushenov, Konstantin  207, 221, 223 East Germany  157 Eastern Europe  63, 93–94 economic protectionism  127 Edwards, Folke  343 EEP. See European People’s Party EKR. See Federal Commission against Racism  369 Elsass Korps  295 Elster, Jon  147 emancipation  364–365, 464 Emnid Institute  105, 106 Engberg, Peppe  337 Erb, Rainer  104, 110, 111, 249, 391, 409 Eriksen, Thomas Hylland  357 ethnic profiling  9 n. 4 EU. See European Union (EU) EUMC. See European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia Eurobarometer polls  42, 429 Europe, anti-Americanism in  149–152 European Jewish Congress  10 European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC)  24–25, 26, 191, 426 n. 2 European Parliament  120, 136 European People’s Party (EEP)  136 European Union (EU)  3, 4, 70, 480 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA)  191 European Union Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia  316 European Value Survey  4 Evola, Julius  437 extreme left, in Germany  103–104; in Italy  440–441. See also left wing parties; radical left

495

extreme right  117–146; and antisemitism  17, 26, 119, 126, 146; and anti-­Zionism  11, 54, 56; and counter-cosmopolitanism  119, 122, 124, 127–129, 131, 140–143; defined  117; in Eastern Europe  141–142; in France  279–280, 290–296; in Germany  103–104; and globalization  126; in Great Britain  315; in Italy, 436–438; rise of  6, 7–8; in Switzerland  369, 387; in Western Europe  141–142. See also extreme right; right wing parties ‘extremism,’ Russian law prohibiting 219–220, 223–224 ‘extremism of the center’  58–60 Falk, Richard  192 fascism  7, 118, 202, 307; in Italy  427, 435, 438 Fassbinder, Rainer Werner  398 Faurisson, Robert  291, 439 FDP (Germany)  59, 406, 407 Federal Commision against Racism (EKR)  369 Fédération Nationale des Musulmans de France (FNMF)  283 Feigel, Sigi  373 n. 6, 374, 376 Fein, Helen  20 FIDESZ (Hungary)  141 financial crisis of 2008  10, 41, 45, 119 Fine, Robert  17, 35 n. 18 Finkelstein, Norman  52–53 n. 30, 342, 343, 419, 450 Finland, antisemitism in  358 Fischer, Bernard  296 Fischer, Lars  57 Flaica-Uniti-Cub  10 Flucht und Vertreibung  412 FN. See Forza Nuova FNMF. See Fédération Nationale des Musulmans de France Fofana, Yussuf  277 Foi et Pratique  286 Foot, Paul  319 Ford, Henry  187 Forsa Institute  85–86 Forza Nuova (FN)  10–11, 138, 436 FPÖ. See Austrian Freedom Party; Freedom Party of Austria FPS. See Swiss Freedom Party FRA. See European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights

496

index

France, anti-Americanism in  166, 175; anti-Jewish attitudes in  93, 94; antisemitism in  8, 10, 87, 277–304; extreme right in  141; and Holocaust revision  8; Jews in  277; Muslims in  159, 277; nationalism in  155; public opinion surveys in  43, 44, 45, 95–99; sympathy for Palestinians in  91 Frankfurt School  460 Fredriksson, Gunnar  343 Freedland, Jonathan  190, 191, 319 Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ)  139, 141 freemasonry  436, 439 Friedlander, Saul  3 Friedman, Michel  59 Friedman, Thomas  336 Frindte, Wolfgang  110–112, 398 n. 1 Front National  8, 141, 214, 282, 290, 291, 292–293, 321, 437, 439 Front National de la Jeunesse  293 Gaarder, Jostein  357 Galloway, George  51 n. 28, 296, 321, 321–322 Garaudy, Roger  282 Gaza  183, 189, 278, 297 Gaza conflict (2008–2009)  194, 288, 330, 338, 348, 357 Germany, and anti-Americanism  166, 167, 174; and anti-Israel propaganda 27–28; antisemitism in  8, 10, 67–68, 85–87, 88, 93, 397–419, 462 n. 1; extreme right in  11, 138–139, 141; and the Holocaust  8, 68, 186; Muslim immigrants in  158; nationalism in  155; Nazism denied in  415–416; public opinion surveys in  43, 44, 45, 103–112; sympathy for Israel in  91; and victimhood  398–399, 403, 408, 412, 413–414, 416, 418 GfS. See Research Institute of the Swiss Society for Applied Social Research Girenko, Nikolai  222 Gisler, Andreas  374 Giudice, Fausto  284 n. 13 Glagolev, Alexander  203 Glazer, Malcolm  171 Glaz’ev, Sergei  211 Global Jihad Movement  325 globalization  129, 158; and antisemitism  13, 130, 473–474, 476;

and extreme right parties  119, 126; Israel as symbol of  49–50; Jews blamed for  48; second  480–481 Gluckstein, Daniel  296 Goldhagen, Daniel  155 Goldstaub, Adriana  427 Gollnisch, Bruno  291–292 Graf, Jürgen  207 Granata, Russ  207 Grande Mosquée de Paris  283 Great Britain, anti-Americanism in  166, 171; antisemitism in  12, 88, 93, 307–326; government response to antisemitism in  12, 310, 316–318; Muslim immigrants in  159; public opinion surveys in  43, 44, 45, 310–311 Gredig, Daniel  371 Greece, antisemitic violence in  52 Green Party  107, 117 n. 1, 288, 338, 380 Grimaldi, Olivier  294 Groupe union défense (GUD)  294 Grünberg, Kurt  409 Grunberger, Béla  414 GUD. See Groupe union défense Guillaume, Pierre  298 Guillou, Jan  353–354 Gusinskii, Vladimir  210 gypsies  135, 136 Habermas, Jürgen  178 Haider, Jörg  139, 167, 214 Halimi, Ilan  277, 301, 302, 303 Hamas  48, 50 n. 27, 51 n. 28, 55, 56, 283, 284, 287, 330, 437–438, 469–470 Hanif, Asif Mohammed  321 Haniyeh, Ismail  287 Harrington, Padraig  178 Harry, Prince of Wales  313 Harwood, Richard  188 hate crimes  10 hate speech  11, 19, 31, 32, 55, 67 Hefets, Iris  419 Heger, Bardo  405 Held, David  480 Helsingborg  9 Heyder, Aribert  111 Hezbollah  48, 51 n. 28, 52, 55, 56, 330 Hilafat Devleti  281 Hillersberg, Lars  342–343, 354 Hirsh, David  29–30 n. 16 Hitler, Adolf  435, 477



index

Hizb ut Tahrir (HUT)  285, 320, 356 Holeindre, Roger  292 Hollander, Paul  147 Holocaust, anti-Semitism affected by  13, 154, 160, 308, 309, 331, 430, 443–444, 457; and German psychology  462–463; as Jewish conspiracy  187–189, 208; Jews accused of exploiting  349–350, 370; in Poland  271–273; relativization of  347–348; rhetorical inversion of  190, 191; in the Ukraine  266, 272. See also antisemitism, ‘secondary’; Holocaust denial; negationism Holocaust denial  8, 11, 13 n. 6, 24, 25, 28 n. 14, 38, 49, 51 n. 28, 185–186, 188, 332, 430, 436, 462 n. 1, 482; in France  291–292; in Russia  222. See also negationism Holocaust Education Trust  309 Holocaust Memorial Museum (U.S.)  412 Holocaust Museum (Britain)  309 Horkheimer, Max  457, 458, 461, 463, 474, 477 Hottinger, Arnold  377 human rights  459, 484–487 Hungarian Guard  135 Hungary, antisemitism in  44, 45, 93, 133–136, 157, 231–247 HUT. See Hizb ut Tahrir ‘Identity’ movement  294 Iganski, Paul  52, 316 Ignatov, Aleksandr  216 Iliukhin, Viktor  212 Indigènes de la République  280, 286 Inglehart, Ronald  5, 39, 40 Ingrams, Richard  318 Institute for Jewish Policy Research (JPR)  308–309, 316 Internet  11, 19 n. 11, 37, 217–218, 221, 284–285, 286 Intifada, first (1989)  106; second (2000) 50 n. 27, 83, 87, 163, 278, 312, 335, 371, 375, 428 intolerance, defined  351 Iquioussen, Hassan  283 Iran  13 n. 6, 17 n. 9, 48, 51, 69 Iraq  156, 297, 339, 445 Irving, David  38 Islam, radical  13 n. 6, 32; in France 281–286; in Italy  438–439; in Sweden  330, 354

497

Islamist groups, and antisemitism  6 Islamophobia  16, 216, 353. See also anti-Muslim sentiment Israel, as ‘collective Jew’  15–16, 24–25, 27, 50, 83, 107, 337, 348, 376, 463; comparisons of to Nazi Germany  25, 29 n. 16, 43 n. 23, 48, 49, 52–53, 55, 103, 109, 110, 160–161, 183–195, 278, 285, 334–335, 337, 338–339, 346, 348, 356–357, 358, 367, 376–377, 434, 439, 441, 444–445, 463; comparisons of to South Africa  91; criticism of as antisemitism  16, 17, 25, 27, 56, 377–378, 448–449; and globalization 49–50; and human rights double standard  17 n. 9, 29 n. 16, 35 n. 18, 54 n. 31, 335, 471, 486; and Jewish identity  309; as Jewish state  449; left wing and  57–58; media bias against  38, 161–162, 163, 194, 340–341; policies of and antisemitism 106–107, 308, 433; viewed as threat to world peace  163, 335, 429. See also anti-Israel sentiment; boycotts, of Israel; Middle East conflict ‘Israel lobby’  16 Israeli deserters  446–447 Italy, antisemitism in  93, 425–453; extreme right in  6, 10–11, 137–138; Muslim immigrants in  159; neo-fascism in  117; media in  166, 338, 442–447; public opinion polls in  428–435; sympathy for Israel in  91 Ja’afari, Bashar  189–190 Jäger, Siegfried  404 Jamaat e Islami  320 Jeunesses Communistes Révolutionnaires 297 Jewish assets, in Switzerland  372, 385 Jewish Defence League  301, 302 ‘Jewish lobby’  339, 445 ‘Jewish question’  199, 232, 378 Jewish World Congress  373 Jews, accused of provoking antisemitism 59, 374–375; anti-Israel  52 n. 30; as ‘anti-nation’  467–468; antisemitic 19; as ‘Christ killers’  428, 430, 431, 442–443; and civil rights  309–310; code words for  31; conversion of  199–200 n. 3, 205, 446; as ­cosmopolitan  34, 459, 472, 474,

498

index

476, 478–479; depiction of in film  451; as embodiment of modernity  153, 458, 464, 481; as ethnic vs. religious group  202 n. 9; European idealization of  452; in France  277; in Great ­Britain  307–309, 324; ­liberal ambiguity toward  450–453; ‘loyalty’ of to Israel  89, 90, 129, 428–429, 446; in Norway  357; as ‘other’  390, 466; as ­perpetrators  190–191, 391, 397, 403, 408; prejudice experienced by  352–353; stereotypes of  20–21, 22, 23, 25, 27, 34–36, 128, 155–156, 187, 189, 307, 334, 336–339, 350, 366; in Sweden  331. See also conspiracy myths Jobbik (Hungarian radical right)  134–136, 141 Jordan  29 n. 16 JPR. See Institute for Jewish Policy Research Judaisers, in Russia  205–206 Judaism, portrayed as ‘extremist’ in ­Russia  219–220, 223–224 Judeophobia  12 n. 5, 20, 279 Junge Freiheit (newspaper)  49 n. 25 Junge Welt (newspaper)  51 n. 28 Kant, Immanuel  487 Kaplan, Edward H.  95 Kaplan, Metin  281 Karsli, Jamal  406, 407 Keller, Rudolf  385–386 Kemi Seba  289, 301–303 Keohane, Robert  459 Kessler, Erwin  387 Khamenei (Ayatollah)  51 Khiari, Nouari  286 Khodorkovskii, Mikhail  210 Kiev  268, 269 Kitschelt, Herbert  122 Klier, John  199 Kłoskowska, A.  271–272 Klug, Brian  187, 376 Klykov, Viacheslav  211, 220 Kommunistische Partei Österreichs  57 n. 33 Kondratenko, Nikolai  209–210, 212 Korchagin, Viktor  223 Korn, Salomon  398 Kotek, Joel  319 KPRF. See Communist Party of the Russian Federation

Kriesi, Hanspeter  120, 123, 128 Krutov, Aleksandr  218, 220 Kuraev, Andrei  205 Kur’ianovich, Nikolai  211 Kvachkov, Vladimir  224–225 Laguiller, Arlette  296 Lalin, Hervé  302 Landes, Richard  154 n. 7 Lange, Sarah de  122 Latrèche, Mohamed Ennacer  285 Lawrence, Steven  310 Lazar, Berl  210 LCR. See Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire Le Pen, Jean-Marie  214, 290, 291, 292, 300 Le Pen, Marine  291 League of Ticino  384, 385 Lebanon war (1982)  330, 332, 333 Lecointe, Jean  303 left wing parties, and anti-Americanism 171–172; and antisemitism  49–53, 426 n. 1; and anti-Zionism  103; in France  113; in Germany  110, 111, 113; and the ‘new antisemitism’ 32, 162; in Russia  212; in Sweden 331, 359; in Switzerland  367. See also extreme left; radical left Lega Nord  137, 141 ‘Letter of the Five Hundred’  218–222, 224 Levada Centre  202 Levi, Primo  437 Liberal Democratic Party (Switzerland, FDP)  380 Liberal Democratic Party (Russia, LPDR)  211 liberation demonology  334 Libya  189 Liebermann, Robert C.  10 Ligeti, Vera  416, 418 Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire (LCR)  288, 296, 297 Lilla, Mark  155 Lilleng, Trine  357 Lindeborg, Åsa  341 Lindqvist, Herman  340 Living History Forum (Sweden)  348, 351 Living History Working Group (AGG)  386 Livingstone, Ken  26, 313 Livni, Tzipi  288



index

London  9 Lønning, Inge  354 Lönnroth, Lars  343 Lowenthal, Leo  462 LPDR. See Liberal Democratic Party Lutheran Church, in Sweden  358 Lutte Ouvrière  296 Luyt, Guillaume  294 Lyubomudrov, Mark  207 M’Bala M’Bala, Dieudonné. See Dieudonné Mactaggart, Fiona  316 Magyar Gárda Kulturális Egyesület  135 Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja (MIÉP) 133, 134 Makashov, Albert  212, 221, 222 Mana (Sweden)  346–347 Manichean worldviews  459, 461, 468 n. 2, 469, 480–481 Marr, Wilhelm  20 Marranos  446 Martillo, Joachim  53 Marty, Dick  388 Masuku, Bongani  55 Mathys, Hans  385 Mattioli, Aram  388 Mayer, Nonna  96–99 Mazetti, Katarina  348 McGann, Anthony  122 MDI. See Mouvement des Damnés de l’Impérialisme media, and anti-Americanism  166–174; and antisemitism in Germany  409–410; and antisemitism in Great ­Britain  313, 318–320; and antisemitism in Italy  434, 435, 442–447; and antisemitism in Poland  254; and antisemitism in Russia  215–219; and antisemitism in Sweden  100, 336–337, 338, 341–343, 344, 346–348; Israel’s portrayal in  161–162, 163; and Middle East conflict  92, 315–316; and spread of antisemitism, 37; and spread of counter-­cosmopolitanism  128 Mégret, Bruno  293 Men, Alexander  205 Meyssan, Thierry  175, 282, 287, 300 Mhanna, Rabah  287 MIB. See Mouvement de l’Immigration et des Banlieues

499

Middle East conflict, and antisemitism  10–11, 15–16, 26, 27, 30, 50 n. 27, 86, 86 n. 3, 87, 87 n. 4, 88–89, 90, 92, 97, 99, 103–104, 105–106; and antisemitism in France  278–279, 286–288; and antisemitism in Great Britain  312, 313, 315–316, 316–317, 318–320, 323–324; and antisemitism in Italy  425, 426; and antisemitism in Poland  273–274; and antisemitism in Sweden  330, 333, 335, 358; and Israel  35–36 n. 18, 448–449; and ‘new a­ntisemitism’  83; in party politics  55–56, 57–58, 59–60, 119 MIÉP. See Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja ‘migrants,’ in Russian politics  213 Milan, Daniel  289 Milosevic, Slobodan  159, 164 Mironov, Boris  209 Mironov, Sergei  212 Mitscherlich, Alexander  417 Mitscherlich, Margarete  417 modernity, and antisemitism  157–158, 165, 459 Moffa, Claudio  440–441 ‘Möllemann-Effect’  107 Möllemann, Jürgen  59, 60, 346, 398, 406–407, 408, 410 ‘Mondialismo’  436 n. 15. See also ‘Worldism’ Morvai, Krisztina  136 Mosley, Oswald  307 Motherland (Rodina)  211, 214–215, 220, 221, 224, 225 Moussavi, Mir-Hossein  51 n. 28 Mouvement contre le racisme et pour l’amitié entre les peoples (MRAP) 285, 298 Mouvement de l’Immigration et des Banlieues (MIB)  280 Mouvement de Soutien à la Résistance du Peuple Palestinien (MSRPP)  287 Mouvement des Damnés de l’Impérialisme (MDI)  289–290, 299, 302 Mouvement des Indigènes de la République  289 Mouvement Justice Palestine  287 Mouvement National Républicain  282, 293 Mouvement National-Socialiste Français 295 Movement Against Illegal Immigration (DPNI)  213–214, 215

500

index

Movimento Antagonista  437 Movimento Fascismo e Libertá  438 Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI)  6, 117, 137 MRAP. See Mouvement contre le racisme et pour l’amitié entre les peoples MSI. See Movimento Sociale Italiano Mudde, Cas  68 Muhajiroun, al-  285, 320 multiculturalism  158–159, 172–173 Münterfering, Franz  171 Muslim Association of Britain  321 Muslim Brotherhood  320, 321, 325 Muslim Council of Britain  321 muslim-markt.de  51 n. 28 Muslims, and antisemitic violence  87, 88–89, 94; antisemitism among  63, 83, 158–159, 279, 280–288, 356; in Bosnia  163–164; in France  290–291; in Great Britain  320–321, 324–326; and ritual slaughter  379, 380; in Russia  209; in Sweden  330 Myrdal, Jan  332 NATFHE. See National Association of Teachers in Further and Higher Education Nation of Islam  289, 302 National Association of Teachers in Further and Higher Education (NATFHE)  323 National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD)  11, 48, 138 National Front  162, 315. See also Front National National-Patriotic Front ‘Memory’  200, 213 national protectionism  40, 41 National Socialism. See Nazism Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD)  11, 48, 138 nationalism, and antisemitism  465–467; and cosmopolitanism  486; defensive 128; ethnic  3; left wing  49; European  155, 177–178; in France 294–295; in Hungary  245–246; in Russia  201–202, 203, 207, 211, 225–226 Naumann, Michael  406 Nazarov, Mikhail  218, 220, 221 Nazism  3, 14, 154, 183, 447–448; in Switzerland  366–367, 372–275, 388. See also antisemitism, and the

‘Nazi Card’; Israel, comparisons of to Nazi Germany negationism  367, 368, 386, 387, 390. See also Holocaust denial neo-fascism  117 neo-Nazism  24, 48, 339, 426; in France  291, 295–296; in Germany 401; in Sweden  331 neo-racism  32 neocons  445 Netherlands, anti-Jewish attitudes in  87, 91, 93, 378 n. 8, 429 n. 7 New Generation Party  137 New Left  8 New Right  7, 386 Newman, Peter C.  389 Nicholas II, veneration of in Russia  208–209 Niggli, Marcel  386 n. 13 Nilus, Sergei  206 9/11  174–177, 273, 282, 287, 330, 356, 458 Norway, antisemitism in  356–357 Nôtres, Les  294 Nouveau Parti Anticapitaliste (NPA)  57, 296 n. 27 Nouvelle Résistance  294 NPA. See Nouveau Parti Anticapitaliste Nuovo Ordine Mondiale  439 Obama, Barack  24, 179–180, 357 Œuvre française  294 Ordfront affair  341 Organisation für Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa (OSZE)  90 orientalism  55; inverse  469–470, 484 Oxford University  323 Paarma, Jukka  358 Pakistan  481 Palestine en Marche  287 Palestine Solidarity Association (Sweden)  339 Palestinian Anglicans  322 Palestinian Authority  91 Palestinians, European support for  91; French support for  286, 287, 288–290, 297; German support for  104, 104 n. 12, 105; and inverse orientalism  469–471; Italian support for  431–432; use of in antisemitic rhetoric  27, 29 n. 16, 30,



index

48, 55, 56 n. 32, 445. See also Middle East conflict Pamyat  200, 213 Paris  9 Parti des Musulmans de France (PMF)  285, 288 Parti des Travailleurs  296 Parti Kémite  302 Partidul România Mare (PRM)  136 Party of Romanian National Unity (PUNR)  136 Paulin, Tom  162–163, 323 PCOS. See politico-cultural opportunity structures Pew Global Attitudes Project  42 PFLP. See Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine Platini, Michel  169 PMF. See Parti des Musulmans de France Poland, antisemitism in  68, 93, 93 n. 8, 94, 251–264; and the Holocaust  271–273; nationalism in  270–271; public opinion surveys in  43, 44, 45 Polanski, Roman  451 political parties, and rise of antisemitism 36–37; in Hungary  240; in Poland  259; realignment of  39–41, 53–54, 119, 124–125, 127–128, 131, 142–143; in Russia  210–215. See also center parties; extreme left; extreme right; left wing parties; radical left; radical right; right wing parties political psychology  64, 461–463 political science, and study of antisemitism  14–15, 18, 33; and supply/demand analysis  7, 8 n. 3, 58, 66 n. 36 political theory  459 ‘politico-cultural opportunity structures’ 66 Poltoranin, Mikhail  209 Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)  287, 297, 298 Portugal  68 postmodernity, defined  467 Postone, Moishe  27 Potkin, Aleksandr  213 Potsdam Agreement  412 PRM. See Partidul România Mare Prodi, Roman  429 n. 8 projection, as mechanism behind antisemitism  461–463, 479 Protocols of the Elders of Zion  18, 22, 50 n. 27, 187, 199, 206, 216,

501

281 n. 5, 291, 326, 427, 435, 437, 438. See also conspiracy myths public opinion polls  4–5, 9, 42–45, 119, 426; in Denmark  356; design of  85 n. 1, 89, 100–101, 249–251, 255 n. 3, 261; in Europe (comparative) 85–112; in France  282; in Germany 399–401, 402, 403, 405–406, 408; in Great Britain  308–309, 310–311; in Hungary  233–241; interpretation of  33, 349, 371; in Italy  428–435; in Norway  356–357; in Poland  252–259, 261–264; in Russia  201–203; in ­Sweden  348–352; in Switzerland  368–371; in Ukraine  265–270 PUNR. See Party of Romanian National Unity Qaeda, al-  281 Qaradawi, Yusuf al-  283 Qassam, Izz ad-Din al-  289 Quibla  284 racism  4–5, 7, 29 n. 15, 30, 32, 84. See also antisemitism; black supremacism racist resentment  8–9 n. 4 racist violence, in Russia  200 radical left, and antisemitism  49–50, 56–58; and cosmopolitanism  122; in France  286–288, 296–298; and Israel  54, 56; and Islam  55. See also extreme left; left wing parties radical right, and nationalism  466; in Switzerland  364, 383–387; websites of  435, 454. See also extreme right; right wing parties Radio Islam  330, 332, 354, 438–439, 440 n. 20 Rahimi, Babak  347 Ramadan, Tariq  280, 282, 284, 298 Rami, Ahmed  207, 208, 330, 332, 343 Rassemblement des Etudiants de Droite (RED)  294 Reisegger, Gerhold  207 Renouveau Français  294–295, 303 Renseignements Généraux  293 Rensmann, Lars  409 reparation payments, in Germany  400–401, 402; in Switzerland  373–374 Research Institute of the Swiss Society for Applied Social Research (GfS)  370

502

index

Réseau Voltaire  287, 300 resentment, antisemitic and racist  8–9 n. 4; politics of  33, 67, 460 Respect Party  51 n. 28, 321 Rex, Zvi  165 Riegner, Gerhart  366 Rifondazione Comunista  57 n. 33 right wing parties, and antisemitism  32, 47–49, 51, 53, 88; in France  113, 290–296; in Germany  110, 111, 113; in Switzerland  368. See also extreme right; radical right ritual murder  199. See also blood libel ritual slaughter  364, 365, 378–383, 384, 385, 387, 390 Robert, Fabrice  294 Rodina  211 Rodionov, Igor  212 Rogozin, Dmitrii  215 Rohloff, Joachim  405 Roma  135, 136 Roman Catholic Church  204, 270 Romania  136–137, 157 Romano, Sergio  446 Rumsfeld, Donald  164 Rushdie, Salman  315 Russia  68–69; antisemitism in  199–226; commemoration of WWII in  202–203; media in  215–219; Muslims in  209; nationalism in  200, 201–202; political parties in  210–215; public opinion surveys in  43, 44, 202; religious antisemitism in  68, 203–207, 208–209 Russian messianism  207–208 Russian Orthodox Church  203–207, 208–209, 211, 222, 270 Ryssen, Hervé  302–303 Salafi movement  286, 320, 325 Salah, Ra`id  283 Salt (Sweden)  332–333 Salzborn, Samuel  12 n. 5 Samobroona  287 Sarkozy, Nicolas  301 Sartre, Jean-Paul  21–22, 457, 479 Saudi Arabia  165, 320 Savel’ev, Andrei  221 Schachar, Nathan  340 Schaub, Kurt  377 Scheler, Max  260 Schlaug, Birger  338 Schlussstrich  397, 403, 405, 418 Schoenfeld, Gabriel  190

Schöpflin, George  207 Schröder, Gerhard  167, 174 Schumann, Antje  57 Scotland  311 SD. See Swiss Democrats Sefrioui, Abdelhakim  287, 289 Seidel, Gill  189 self-expression values  5, 39 Semoun, Elie  299 Serbia  164 Sewell, Brian  319 Sfar, Mondher  289 Shaevich, Adolf  210 Shamir, Israel  282, 339–340, 341, 346, 440 Sharon, Ariel  59, 91, 97, 165, 338 Sheppard, Simon  325 Shoah. See Holocaust Siderov, Volen  132 Sidos, Pierre  294 SIG. See Swiss Federation of Jewish Communities Silbermann, Alphons  402 Silberstein, Willy  342 Six-Day War  103, 159 Skandrani, Ginette  284 n. 13, 289, 296 Skenderovic, Damir  384 skinheads  213, 214, 293–294, 295 Skog, Susanne Nylund  352 Slovakia  141 Small, Charles A.  95 SNS (Slovakia)  141 soccer  168–171, 178, 303 Social Democratic Party (SPD)  171 Social Democratic Party (SPS)  380 Social Democratic Party (Sweden)  345, 355 social psychology  458 Socialisme par en bas  296 Society Against Animal Factories (VgT)  379, 387 Society for the Protection of Animals  378, 379 SOFRES  278 Soral, Alain  290, 300 Soros, George  134 South Africa  55, 91 South Korea  149 n. 4 Soviet Union  157 Spain  38, 52, 53, 93, 94, 159, 378 n. 8; public opinion surveys in  43, 44, 45 Spasskii, Boris  220 SPD. See Social Democratic Party



index

Spinoza, Baruch  446 Sprecher, Margrit  376 Sri Lanka  17 n. 9 Stalin, Joseph  477 Stalinism  3, 30, 154 Steger, Manfred  123 Steinbach, Erika  412 Stockhausen, Karlheinz  175 Strache, Heinz-Christian  139 Strauss, Leo  183 n. 2 Strauss-Kahn, Dominique  178 STS. See Swiss Animal Protection Sudan  17 n. 9 supersessionist theology  431 supply/demand analysis, and extreme right parties  120–122 surveys. See public opinion surveys Svensson, Evert  340 SVP. See Swiss People’s Party Sweden, antisemitism in  38, 52, 329–355, 358–359; public opinion surveys in  99–100 Swedish Arts Council  347 Swedish Committee Against Antisemitism 342, 345 Swedish Integration Board  352 Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention  348, 351 Sweiry, Abe  52 Swiss Animal Protection (STS)  380–381 Swiss Democrats (SD)  384, 385 Swiss Federation of Jewish Communities (SIG)  379, 381 Swiss Freedom Party (FPS)  384 Swiss People’s Party (SVP)  380, 384–385 Switzerland, antisemitism in  50 n. 26, 68–69, 93, 94, 364–391; public opinion surveys in  100–103 Syria  189 Tabligh movement  286 Tablighi Jamaat  320 Taguieff, Pierre-André  84, 96, 112, 279, 284 Tavistock Institute  440 Tega, Walter  446 Teicher, Samy  416, 418 Terre et Peuple  294 terrorism, in France  281; in Great Britain  321, 325. See also 9/11 Theil, Georges  291, 291 n. 21 Thion, Serge  298, 321

503

‘Third Worldism’  469 Thule Society  436 n. 14 Tibi, Ahmad  288 Tkachev, Aleksandr  210 Töben, Friedrich  207 Tocnaye, Thibault de la  292 Tocqueville, Alexis de  153 Toulouse  9 Tribu KA  289, 295, 299, 301, 302–303 Tudor, Corneliu Vadim  136 Tuomioja, Erkki  358 Turkey  47, 133 Tyden, Mattias  354 Ukraine  68–69; antisemitism in  94 n. 8, 264–270 unemployment  39 n. 20, 118 Union des Organisations Islamiques de France (UOIF)  283 Union of Islamic Communities of Italy (UCOII)  439 Unité Radicale  294 United Nations  155, 189–190 United Nations Human Rights Council  484 United States  51, 153. See also Americans; anti-Americanism Universal Church  387 UOIF. See Union des Organisations Islamiques de France Ustinov, Vladimir  221 Vanunu, Morechia  445–446, 450 Védrine, Hubert  172 VgT. See Society Against Animal Factories Vieille Taupe, La  298 Vlams Blok  321 Volkstumpolitik  413, 417, 419 Vona, Gábor  135 Wahlström, Johannes  341 Wales  311 Walser, Martin  398, 403–405, 406, 408, 409 Walzer, Michael  336 Wammetsberger, Dorit  110 ‘Wandering Jew’  458, 477–478 Warsaw  257 Weber, Max  465 Welzel, Christian  5, 39, 40 Werlet, Thomas  290 Westerwelle, Guido  60, 407

504 Wettig, Susan  110 Weyand, Jan  21 n. 12 Whittle, Steven  325 Wilders, Geert  8 Wilkie, Andrew  323 Willoch, Kåre  357 Wilson, A. N.  319 Wirtén, Per  347 Wistrich, Robert  6, 53, 191 n. 5 Worker’s Educational Association (Sweden)  345 World Economic Forum  164 World Jewish Congress  386 World Value Survey  5 ‘Worldism’  436, 439 xenophobia, in Hungary  231, 240; in Russia  209, in Switzerland  365–366, 383, 385, 389, 390

index Yassin, Ahmed  283 Yeltsin, Boris  202 Yugoslavia  159, 161 Zant, Khalid al-  286 Zassoursky, Ivan  217 Zemor, Olivia  287 Zhirinovskii, Vladimir  200, 209, 210, 321 Zionism  35–36 n. 18, 441. See also anti-Zionism ‘Zionist lobby’  17, 187–188, 407 Zionist Occupation Government (ZOG)  295 Zionists, portrayed as enemy  55 Ziuganov, Gennadii  211, 212 ‘zones of acquiescence’  31, 38, 65; and extreme right  119, 121, 122 Zurich Yacht Club  389

Jewish Identities in a Changing World ISSN 1570-7997 Edited by E. Ben-Rafael, Y. Gorny, and J. Bosker Liwerant

  1. Ben-Rafael, E., Jewish Identities: Fifty Intellectuals Answer Ben-Gurion. 2002. 978 90 04 12535 3   2. Ben-Rafael, E., Y. Gorny, and Y. Ro’i, eds., Contemporary Jewries: Convergence and Divergence. 2003. 978 90 04 12950 4   3. Eisenstadt, S.N., Explorations in Jewish Historical Experience: The Civilizational Dimension. 2004. 978 90 04 13693 9   4. Shiff, O., Survival through Integration: American Reform Jewish Universalism and the Holocaust. 2005. 978 90 04 14109 4   5. Ben-Rafael, E. and Y. Peres, Is Israel One?: Religion, Nationalism, and Multiculturalism Confounded. 2005. 978 90 04 14394 4   6. Ben-Rafael, E., T. Gergely, and Y. Gorny, eds., Jewry between Tradition and Secularism: Europe and Israel Compared. 2006. 978 90 04 15140 6   7. Gorny, Y., From Binational Society to Jewish State: Federal Concepts in Zionist Political Thought, 1920-1990, and the Jewish People. 2006. 978 90 04 15529 9   8. Bosker Liwerant, J., E. Ben-Rafael, Y. Gorny, and R. Rein, eds., Identities in an Era of Globalization and Multiculturalism: Latin America in the Jewish World. 2008. 978 90 04 15442 1   9. Zaken, M., Jewish Subjects and Their Tribal Chieftains in Kurdistan: A Study in Survival. 2007. 978 90 04 16190 0 10. Wieviorka, M., Translated from the French by K. Couper Lobel and A. Declerck, The Lure of Anti-Semitism: Hatred of Jews in PresentDay France. 2007. 978 90 04 16337 9

11. Nocke, A., The Place of the Mediterranean in Modern Israeli Identity. 2009. 978 90 04 17324 8 12. Rein, R., Argentine Jews or Jewish Argentines?: Essays on Ethnicity, Identity, and Diaspora. 2010. 978 90 04 17913 4 13. Rehbun, U. and L. Ari, American Israelis: Migration, Transnationalism, and Diasporic Identity. 2010. 978 90 04 18388 9 14. Rensmann, L. and J.H. Schoeps, eds., Politics and Resentment: Antisemitism and Counter-Cosmopolitanism in the European Union. 2011. 978 90 04 19046 7