Police Tactics in Armed Operations [1 ed.] 0873641663, 9780873641661

Citation preview

?OX.,TSE TACTTCS

iT

ARI'[E} OPERAII0NS

POIICE TACTICS IN ARMED OPERATIONS

COTIN

GREEJ{WOOD

Superintend.ent , West Yorkshj.re Metropolitan Police

PAI,AD]}I PRESS BoIIL,DER, C0L0RAD0

Copyright 1979 by Paladln Enterprises, Inc.

All rights reserved.

No portlon of this book may be reproduced 1n any form wlthout the express written pemlsslon of the publisher, except for the quotation of brief passages in crlticism or review.

Published by Paladln Press, a division of Paladin Enterprlses, Inc., Post Office Box 1307, Boulder, Colorado BO3O5. rsBN 0-87354-166-3

Printed 1n the United States of

America

CONTENTS

ACIOIO}ILEDGMETITS

vii

INIRODUCT]ON

1

POTICE TACIICS AI{D F]REANMS IRA]NING

2

CONIROTS ON TTIE POI]CE USE OF FTREASMS

3

THE BASIC PRTNC]PI,ES OF POLICE TACIICS AIMS A}ID PTAIIS

l+ 5

ix

TIIE BASrc PRTNCTPLES MEN AI{D EQUIP}MIWI

7 B

28

l+1

TIIE BASTC PRINCTPI,ES OF POTICE TACTTCS 5B

THE BESTEGED CR]MINAI

62

CHMVIICAI UUNITTONS

72

THE HAIID TNG oF PRISONERS

9 10

SIRAIEGTC CONTAINMETIT

11

I/EIICI,E CI{ECK POTNIS

9B

SEAX.CHING 3UITDTNGS

12

ENCOUNTERS

13

PoSTTI\E

1h

SEARCHING oPEN Cou\T[RY

15

IHE arMED RESpoNsE

v

15

0F poI,]cE TACTrcs

TMPI,EMEIITATTON AIID PHTTOSOPET

6

1

WIUI

107

-

CRII{INAIS

SUSPECT \ffiITCI,ES

ROAD BtocKS

TEAIVI

IN IEIICI,ES

tz6 1)+1

158 155 17Lt

189

vi

Contents

16

SEARCI{ES

17

' STATEOUT

1B

H0STAGE

IN UNSA}T

I

AREAS

TIIE POLICE A}IBUSII

SIrUAIIONS TIIE PROBL,EIVI, PoLICIES

A}ID STRAIEGY

SIIUATIONS

TACIICS

197

215

226

2\1

19

IIOSTAGE

20

ITIE PROTtrCTION OF PTJBLIC FIGURES TIIE PROBTM{ A\TD MIE STRATtrGY

269

21

['IIE PROTECTION OF PT]BLIC FIGURES TACTICS

287

22

MAJOR SECURITY OPERATIONS

300

23

SUBPRTSE ENCOUNIERS

308

2t+

OPERATI0NS NOT II\YOL\ING FIREABIVIS

313

INDEX

319

ACKNOWIEDGMENTS

police offi-cers, from many d-ifferent countries, have helped. j-n the research for this book by d.iscussing method.s and id-eas, and by contributing infomation about research projects, tralning systems and. practicaL experiences. It would- not be possible to list these officers ind.ividuilIy, but I must acknowled-ge their contribution. Other i-nd-ividuals in this field- have generously helped with meitten material, info:mation, or erqperience. I a.m particularly grateful to the well knor,n: American writer and. consultant in this field, Col-onel Rex Applegate; and. to lvlr Jim Daugherty, Police [raining Division, National Rifle Associ"ation of America. Photographs of the f Ferretr CS projectiles, and other i-nfo:mation about these muniti.ons, were supplied by Viking A:ms Ltd., of Pateley Brid.ge, Yorkshire. lvly special thamks atre due to Jan Stevenson who, d.espite his hearry writing and. research commi tments, found. time to plough through my manuscript word- by word-, offering constmctive and helpful criticism and- advice. I have received neither help nor encouragement from any official sor.l-rce j-n the Urited- Kingd.om. Marqr will think this strange, but it at least has the advantage of lea;vi-ng me free from obligation in that respect. Produci-ng this book has enta-iLed a great d-eal of research, writing and re-r^rciting. $r preoccupation with the work has resulted in ad.d.itional burd.ens being placed. on my wife and. in a d.egree of neglect of my child.ren. They have accepted. this with good. g?ace and. I am grateful to them.

Marry

CG

vl-r_ I

INTRODUCTION

booklet, rTactics in the Police Use of Firea.mst, was published. in 1969 by H. Leah of [od-nord.en, and. has been out of print for some time. As far as can be ascertained- it was the first work d.evoted. specifically to the su.bject of police tactics and. it is therefore not surprising to find. that it was incomplete; that it was shaky aurtd. hazy in some. areasi and. that it was a little i.mpractical in others. But for all its shortcomings that little booklet was a start, and. a number of police forces ad.opted. and. d.eveloped- some of its suggestions. This present work follows a complete re-appraisal of the problems, based. on a continuous prograrnme of research over a nrmber of years. It is more d-etaiIed., more comprehensive and. eliminates many of the shortcomings of the original booklet. The basic id.ea has been carried. over from the original work, but everey aspect has been subjected- to the most d.etalled. re-examination to ensujre its corltinued. valid-ity. The book represents the views of one ma^n. That some aspects of these tactics have already gained acceptance d.oes not invest the work with any official status. Much of the content of this book cannot have been ad.opted. by anyone because it is u.ew. The fact that particrrlar method.s a.re advocated. in the book d.oes not imply that such method.s have the approval of the police serrice, nor of any particular force. The book d.oes not represent an official vi-ew; it has no official support; it has had. no official backing. It therefore has no authority except such merit as the read.er might find. in it. Ivly

l-x

Chapter

1

POIICE TACTICS AND EIREARMS TRAINING

It may be a matter for regret, but it is a matter of fact that police the world over find- it necessaaTr to have recourse to firea:ms to enable them to perfo:m their basic duties. It is a matter for regret, but also a matter of fact that the frequency with which crimi-nals use firea:ms is increasing in most parts of the wor1d. and. the acti-viti-es of a:med. extremists a,re creating a constant challenge to those whose duty it j-s to protect society. The nature of the threat from these criminals varies substantially from cor.:ntry to cor.mtry and. it therefore foLlows that police requirements for weapons and types of trairing will aLso vaqr. In the not too cListant past the threat to Britain from a:med. -/ (which includes the extremi.st, who shoul-d. be regard.ed as a criminaLs common criminal d.espite his cl-aims to high motives for hi.s excesses) was so low that police weaponaTr was l-ow in both ni.mbers and. quality, nhilst police fireams training was, for all practical purposes, non-existent. In the veqf rare cases where arms had. to be used. the British polJ-ce showed. an almost end.earing incompetence and. seemed. quite proud. of a total unfaniliarity with their weapons and. sensible method.s of d.ealing with such cases. But the problem grew and., d.espite i-ntensive efforts by many police officers and. ci.vil se:srants to i-gnore it, it simply would. not go away. Reluctantly, and often al-most screaming in protest, police forces were compelled. to look at the problem afresh. A few looked. long and. hard-, whilst most turned. away after a brief glance. Eventually, almost al-I gave firea:ms training a little greater d.egree of priority than had. previously been the case. It soon becarne apparent that the absence of experience i-n this fielcL was a serious problem. Marry firea^ms training programmes were inad.equate, misd.irected. and. lacking in clarity of purpose. Techniques used. by the military or by the police in other cor.mtries were ad.opted. without consi.d.eration for their quality as training systems or their relevance to the problems of the force in questi-on. All too often the problem was d.ismissed. after some jr:nior offi-cer had been i-nstructed. to I start some weapon-trai-ningr. In marry cases the most senior rar:k d-J-rectly concerned. was at the first supe:srisolT level of sergeant. This d.oes not necessarily reflect adversely on the quality of marry of the officers concerned. but it ind.icates a 1

2 Chapter

1

lack of appreciation at the higher leveIs of the complexities of good. firea:ms training and. of the responsibilities of an officer cfrargea with the d.evelopment and. implementation of a training programme. - Marry forces tooked. to other cor.mtries for guid.ance. Sure1y, they seem to have said., police who have been permanently anmed- since their inception will have d.eveloped. systems of firea:rus training whi-ch leave nothing to be d.esired.. Those who looked d.iscerroingly were frequently horrified. to find unsatisfactory trairring and. outmod.ed. techniques to be the rule. A few police forces provid.e the excepti-on to that :rule with ad-equate training clesigned to meet their particular problems. Others of those seeking grrid.ance turned. to the *ifitrrqy whose business, it might be thought, is concerned- with firea:ms and. firea^::ns training. The d.iscerning again saw that their problems were not to be so easily artswered-. Milita":ry weapons, militurry training and- nilita":ry techniques have been evolved. to d.eal with military problems and. there is, or should- be, a basic d-ifference of approach and- mentality. The arrny cLeals with wa:es and. with enemies on battlefield.s, where reasonable casualty rates are both inevitable aniL acceptable. The police deal with ind.ividuals or small groups in situations where the surrounding poprrlace is basically 1aw a.bid-ing apd where casualties cannot be accepted.. Their problems are &tff erent ; their ob j ective s are d.iff erent ; their method.s are d.ifferent. Their weapons and. their trairrlng should. also be d.ifferent. fn no part of the world. catrr the police find. an easy answer to the problem of providing ad.equate fj-rea":ms training. Each police force has a r.rnique problem va":rying, even i-f only s1ight1y, from that in other countries. Each police force has a constantly changing prob1em, a3fl failure to appreciate the changes wilt cause that constant lagging behind- whi-ch d.ecreases efficieney and. d-emoral-ises men. Despite the variations, many police problems are the same the world over apd. many aspects of firea:ms training will- be common to al-I. It would- therefore be r:nwise to fail to take aceount of the problems and. systems of other cor:ntrj-es. Of course, the answer woul-d- be so much easier to fincL if police officers coul-fl be pe:mitted- unlimited. training, but the time of an operational- potice officer is valuable in every sense of the word-. In purely financial terms the cash cost of each day spent in training is high, but the cash cost fails to account properly for manBower shortages. The absence of a police officer from his operational duties may have a cost to the community far outweighing any money involved-. Pol-ice training in a1I field-s must seek to balance the d.emand. that the officer be well trained- and competent against the d.emapd. that he be constantly available for operational duties. It would. be qn:ite easy to d.evise a programme of police training C1ear1y, such which took up 50 per cent of the martts working life. a progranme wou1d. be veaT costly, requiring an immed.iate doubling of police strengths. Even if the men and the money were available, such expend.iture is imlikely to be justified. in terrns of greater efficiency. The law of d-imidshing returns woul-d- operate long before the 5O per cent of-time-in-traini-ng point was reached.. Conversely, the price to be paid. for inad.equate police training is enormous. Untrained. and. ill d.irected. effort will be wasted on tasks which training could- make simple. Ignora.nce and. incompetence

3 Chapter

1

will cause costly mistakes which on the one hand. couId. invol-ve a fail-ure to clear up a serious crime or to produce that evid.ence whi-ch woulcL aLLow the eourts to free society of a d.angerous offend.er. 0n the other hand. ignorance and. incompetence can Iead. to improper actions, possibly resulting in the wrongful imprisonment of the innocent. The price of gross inefficiency cannot be paid. in cash. An inefficient force will quickly lose the confid.ence of the public and. wil-l thereby fail to get the co-operation and. help which it need.s. This lack of public confid.ence will reduce effici-ency further and. so there is produced. the vicious d.ovn:ward- spiral towards police incompetence and. generaL lawl-essness. In no field is the price of incompetence so high as in a^:med. operati-ons. Mistakes in marr5r areas of police activity can cause failures, d.elays and embamassment, but frequently these mistakes can be rectified. later. [he criminal not arrested. toclay may be arrested. tomorrowl the person wrongly d.etai-ned. can be releasecl with apologies and. possibly compensation. In a^med. operations the mistakes may well have to be buried.. No subsequent acti-on, no recriminations and. no compensation can bring to life the ir:nocent citizen or the police officer need.lessly kiIled.. Nothing wiLl d.estroy confid.ence in the police more thoroughly than the apparently i11 trained. and. iIl d.isciplined. policeman who kills or malms the innocent or who, through his incompetence, fai-1s to protect the public from a d.angerous offend-er. In this respect firea^:ms training d.emand.s possibly the highest d.egree of priori-ty, with good. d.river trairuing (which bears many similarities to good. firea,ms training) coming a close second.. Before proper consid-eration ean be given to the problems involved. in providins ad.equate firea:rms train:ing it is essential that the ultimate objecti-ves of the a:med. poliee officer a,:ee mad.e perfectly cIeatr. llhe objectives of the police se:srice have been d.escribed. in many ways but, simply, it can be said. that the poli-ce exist to protect the public; to safeguard. their Iives, their liberties ancL their property. This objective d.oes not change simply because the police officer is a^:med.. Police firea::ns must not be used. merely to therefore police firea:ms tralning cannot al-l-ow the police to kil1; be ad.equate if it teaches onfy how to shoot. Police f,irea:ms d.o not exist merely to pe:mit the police officer to protect himself ; therefore firea:ms trai-ning cannot be ad,equate if it merely teaches shooting skills ancl d.efensive method.s. Polj-ce firea^ms exist as a tool which will al-low a police officer to perfom his primary fi-mction of protecting the public. It fo1lows that, in protecting the public, a responsible police officer will- only resort to the ultimate degree of violence involved i-n the use of fireams where nothing else will suffice against an extreme threat. fn brief, then, the object of an a":med. police coul-d- be d-efined. as rto protect the public by neutral-ising a d.angerous offend.err. In thi s context the word. t neutrali se I means to ensu-re that the d.angerous offend.er is prevented. from harning society. In the short te:m th'is might be achieved by isolating krim from the public, but it will usually mea^n that the offend.er must be arrested. and. subjected. to the processes of law which will- ensure his removal from society for an appropriate time. Where his conduct is such that it is not possible to arrest him, the cri-minal- may produce a situation in

l+ Chapter

1

which he must be kiLled.: (ff he is shot and. only wound.ed. he wi11, of course, be arrested.. ) fn consid.ering the role of the amed. police officer ttris fact must be acknowled-gecL from the start. The officer, in the course of his dutiesr o&X have to kill but this can only be justified. if it was necessaqr for the protection of the public against an immed.iate or potential threat of extreme viol-ence. The complex 1egal and- practical i-ssues raised. by this proposition will be consid.ered. in d.etail in Chapter Z. The role of the amed. poli-ce offi-cer is not d.efensi-ve. The objective set out a.bove cannot be achieved by passive attitud.es. It d-emand.s action a6ainst those who threaten life, liberty or property. Within the restraints placed. upon i.t, proper and. effective police action is aSSIessive, involving a positive approach to those violating the law. Yet, within that aggressive action, the ultimate objective must not be lost from vj-ew. The results of any course of acti-on must always be consj-d.ered. i.n relation to their effects on the people concerned. in a set ord.er of priorities. Consid.eration must be given: First to the publie

Second. to the police Last to the criminal This apparently simple statement of priorities is in keeping with the objectives and. must be applied to every aspect of the police use of fireams, includj-ng the selection of weapons and. the choice of method-s used.. The fact that the police are required. first to consid-er the risk to the public must have a substantial effect on their choj.ce of weapons and they will be d.enled. the use of some simply because they cause too great a d.anger to i.nnocent persons in the aJcea. Similarly the method.s used- must be those which will cause least risk to the publie even if thisr otl some occasions, increases the ri-sk to the poh-ce. The object of the police is to eliminate the d.anger caused. by an a:rmed. criminaL and., in d.oing so r they must not be permitted. to cause more d.anger than was in fact being caused. by the person whom they a^re attempting to neutralise. ff the police a,re required. to consid.er the public first and. thereby increase the risks which they will take, they must make quite sure that the safety of the police is consid.ered. before that of the crimi.nal who has put himself at risk. The point may be iIlustrated by cases which continue to occur where police have been und-er fire from a besieged. criminal and., at some stage of the operation, a poli.ce offi.cer, often of senior rank, elq)oses himself to gmfire in an attempt to persuad.e the cri.minal to surrend-er. All too frequently such conduct results in an award. for bravery, yet it is stupid.ity rather than courage which has been d-ispIayed., Any d.emand.s for the surrend.er of a crininal can be mad.e by ]oud. hailer from a safe position. If sueh d.emand.s d.o not immed.iately succeed-, the police should. be capable of forcing a sugend.er without risk to themselves or the likelihood. of injury to the criminal_ by, for example, the use of chemi-cal mr-mitions such as CS. Police officers must not be permitted- to take such risks simply to reduce a possible d.anger, or the likelihood. of d.i-scomfort, to the criminaL. ff, in a confrontation between criminals antL police, it is inevitable that someone is kilIed or injured., that someone should. be the criminal who is there by choice and. who has it in hls power to end the

5 Chapter

1

operation at once by the simple exped-ient of putting up his hand.s. Keeping the u1timate objective of the police and. their ord.er of priorities in mind., attention may be ad.d-ressed. to the processes which will produce good. police fireams training related. directly to the need.s of a particular area. Good- training will not be produced. by slavishly copying the method.s of some other organisation, nor will it be produced by allowing I expertsr to ha.ve free rein for their id.eas. Ind.ividual-s who a^:re enthusj-astic and. skiLled perfo::mers in the various shooting sports frequently try to introduce into trainlng the method-s used- by top class competitive shots. Frequently such method.s will work only for the ind.ividual who is enthusiastic and. is able to d.evote the greater part of his leisure to improving his skilI. They may have no application to the training of a body of men who, though wi11ing, cannot be e:qlected- to be d.evotee s . The ski1l s of the erqlert are invaluable , but only if they a,re applied. with great catre. There is, or should. be, no mystique about firea:ms training. f ts application may require certai-n specialised. skiI1s, but its fo:m and. d.irection should. be established. by the logical use of scientific method.s. A good. system of firea:ms training can only be produced. by: 1 Studyirrg in d.etail the nature of the problems which will face a^:med- police. 2 Studying and d.efining the method.s which police will use in d.ealing with the problems. Establishing rnrhat weapons and. equi-pment are need.ed. to help the 3 police d.eaL with the problem. l+ Establishing what skilIs and- knowled.ge will be required by officers employed. in this role, together with the d.epth to which these must be taught and. the d.egree to which they must be retained-.

how best the sklIls and. knowled.ge can be imparted. and maintaj-ned. to an optimum leveI. Throughout each sta6e the objective of protecting the public by neutralising a d.angerous offer-.'d.er must be kept clearly in mind. along with the ord.er of priorities for the people involved. -

5 Esta.blish'ing

First

the public - the poli-ce Last the crimirralThe bulk of this book wil-l be concerned- with items 1 and. 2 on1y, that is the study of sj-tuations in whi-ch a:med. police hare been involved. and. the d.evelopment of tactics to meet those situations. It will be necessar1r to touch briefly on the remaining aspects of the process at various stages of the d.iscussion on tactics. This chapter will run briefly through each item, but d.etailed- treatment of the last three willr &s far as is compatible with a proper consid.eration of the tactics, be d.eferred. to fo:m part of another book. [he first step in the production of a va]-id- firea:ms training programme is a d.eta;iled. survey of the problems 1ikely to face an This is no si-mple matter Xet, if it is to be a:med. police officer. of val-ue, it must be camied. out over the broad.est possible field.. The range of i-ncid.ents which might requi-re the attention of a:med. police i-s very wi-d.e, and. within each true an almost infin:lte number of variations is possibl-e. The relative frequency of various types of i-ncid.ent will change, and. recognisable patterns sometimes d.evelop Second.

5 Chapter

1

quickly. As an example, ts]ryjackingr d.eveloped. from a ratre oeclrrrence to a major threat in a re1atively short tj-me and- changing patterns have been produced- throughout its d.evelopment. There i-s very gfeat d.anger in allowing assr.mptions to replace d.etailed- resea^rch. In marry field.s of police activity personal experience is one of the more important grrid.es to the method. of operation. Control of situati-ons is maintained. by senior ranks who have, over a period. of years, d.eveloped. a system which they have tested. and. proved. in previous sj.milar incid.ents and which they l-earned. through working with their superiors in the past. Whatever its value in routine situations, this process must not be accepted- as the sole method- of assessing the problems of d.ealing with a^::ned. offend.ers. No ind.ividual police officer in arry part of the world ever becomes involved. in a sufficient range of a::ured. operati-ons to alIow him to make balanced- jud.gurents so1ely on the basis of experience. Personal experi-ences are like1y to be in certain restrictecl- fie1d.s, and. it will be all too easy to place a d-isproportionate importance on that type of incj-d.ent to the d.etriment of other aspeets which may be more important. Experience is essential to a proper assessment of thorough research, but it i-s no substitute for it. Assumptions about the nature of the problem cart also be coloured by more or less va€ue recollections of newsworthy incid.ents which, because of some sensational aspectsr or because of the absence of other news at the time, received. a cLisproportionate a.mor.int of attention in the press. I11-for.mcLed. assumptions have no place i-n an assessment of this problem. A nr.:mber of shallow and. narrowly based. surveys of a:med. incid.ents have been mad.e in the past and some have purported. to set out their results in simple tabular fo:m, almost as if they represented. tschedules of datrtgerst. This t],'pe of approach has been used. in surreys of the killings of police officers and. these show that almost evelxr shot which caused. the d.eath of an officer was firedfrom a range of seven yard.s or less. 0n the basis of such sur'\reys some rather questionable assr.:mptions have been mad.e. The simple fact that the majority of police officers a^re killed. at short range has often caused. a great d.eal of emphasis to be placed. on fast shooting at short rang:es, and. on fast d.raw. A closer examination of the cases will invariably show that many refer to situati-ons in whlch the offi-cer was shot before he knew what was going on, and. before he woul-d. hare any opportr.mity to d.raw a gun, no matter how fast he night have been. A more thorough appraisal might well show that more lives wou1d. be saved. by teaching police officers to approach certain situati-ons in a way which will avoid- the need- for fast shooting. Frequently the only assumption which can properly be mad-e from the much quoted. fact that most police officers are killedat short range, is that crimina-ls are generally poor shots who have d.ifficulty in hitting a policeman when the range exceeds seven yard.s. Bald statements and. brief tabrrlations are of litt1e value. fo produce i-nfomation of sufficient scope and. detail requi-res the assembling, over a lorrg period., of reports of all incid.ents in which firea:ms werer or could. have been, used. by the police. Reports from all parts of the world. should. be includ.ed. in the survey. If police officers in one country can l-earr: from the mistakes of officers in another cormtry, they have a cluty to d.o so.

7 Chapter

1

Useful info:mation will be available from a nrmber of sources includ.ing:

1 Police training marrua1s and. inst:rrctions, particularly those concerned. with situational- training. 2 Reports from police officers and. other persons d-i-rectly involved. in specific incid.ents. 3 Press reports. l+ Books, papers, research reports and. simiLar d.ociments on a variety of police, criminological or soci.ological topics. Whatever the source, each report must be critically reviewed., preferably by someone with a good. d.eal of practical extrlerience and a wid.e knowled.ge of police procedures and. problens. [he most important points to be extracted. from the material- are mistakes mad.e in the conduct of the operation, the technical d-etaiI of the situation, and. the nature of the plans mad.e. Police training marruals and. other info:mation about systems of fi-rea^:ms training a,re most important sources, particularly when they are the result of intel-l-igent d.evelopment. There a^:ee mar\y systems, however, which have been d.eveloped. or have simply grolrn with too Iittle background. research ancL whj-ch are singularly inappropriate to mar$r situations. Experience and. jud.gment a"re required. to sort the wheat from the chaff. Official police reports of specific inci-dents may be available withj.n one force or one cor.intry, but are verT d-ifficult to obtain on a wid.e scal-e. The no:mal police incid.ent report will be concerned. either with evid-ence to place before a courtr or with broad.ly based. info:mation for senior officers. The operation, or any aspect of it, ruhich fails and. which may be of the utmost importance to the resea.trcher, will not be reported. or will be mentioned. only briefly. Infomation which is important to the surrey will often be imelevant to any court proceed.ings and. so will not be includ.ed. in the evid.ence presented-. Reports explaining the incid.ent for the benefit of superiors, whether in broad- te:ms or in answer to specific queries, can a-1so be incomplete and. mislead.ing. The police officer who has mad.e a mistaker or whose operati.on d.id. not go as planned., is, in the most hr-man fashion, like1y to gloss over the mistakes and. place emphasis on the more cred-itable aspects. Thus, for the purpose of this true of survey police reports need. to be critically exa.mined. and. to be consid.erecL with jud.gment before any part i-s accepted. or rejected.. Personal interriews with those cLi-rectly concernecL in the operation will often elicit vita1 d-etai-ls, particularly where mistakes were mad.e but rforgottenr in the official report. These interviews can be conducted onfy on a verTr limited. scal-e and. the ad.d.itional- info:mation will be obtainecl only if those invol-ved- are satisfied. about the motives of the interviewer. The results of such interriews must be jud.ged- carefirlly in the light of a^11 other info:mation, particularly where there is conflict with an official report. Press reports provid-e a most prolific and. easily availabl-e source of j-nfo:mation, but in ind-iviclual- cases their accuracy, particularly of technical d.etail, is suspect. Much will d.epend. on the news value of the incid.ent and the voh.ime of other news at the ti-me. One thins is certain, if the poliee have mad.e mistakes or acted. in a questionable way, the press will- d.raw attention to it. For all their d.rawbacks, press reports often provid.e a relatively accurate account of

B Chapter

1

the broad. outline of an incid-ent. Lack of confi:med- technieal d.etail in any incj-d.ent is often compensated. for by the range of info:mation whlch can be built up over a period. Press reports needto be eval-uated with great care, but they will provid.e an exceptionally useful source of info:mation. A wid_e range of published. books, papers and. reports is availa.ble. These varry from techni-cal- or socj-ologicaI stud.ies of partj-cular aspects oi the problem, through d.etailed- examination of specifi-c to the *o=" tpopulart writings of a rather sensational nature "*""", which occasionally yie1d. inportant detail-s. Their merit is varia,b1e; for example some of the stud-ies of skyiacking published- in recent years are soimd., well researched. d.oci:ments conta-i-ning a weal-th of useful information, whilst other pseud.o-scientlfic stud-ies are based. on l-ittle more than fancy and. speculation. A11 need- the add-ition of sound. judgrnent before conclusions a,re reached-. Special care must be taken when seeking to apply lessons learnedin one cor.rrtry to situations in another. There may be wid-e d-ifferences in police equipment, training, efficiency and avail-ability; the relationship between the police and- the public i-n the area of operations may be quite different; general social cond.itions, pr-ti"ofarly the general 1eveI and acceptance of violence may &iffer substantially. Supposing, for example, that a study was to be mad-e of initial response where a patrolling police officer was sud.cLenly confronted. with an armed. criminal. Info:mation from countries where the police are no:maIIy armed. would. have to be applied. with great d.iscretj-on in a study relating to a cor-Lntry where police are generaIIy r.ina^:med. Similar1y, operations occurring J-n areas where the majority of the public alee opposed or urlsJrupatheti-c to the police would. create problems not present in areas where the police have a large measure of support. In some parts of the world civil strife apd- a high leveI of violence are almost the accepted. state of society apd- measures which are appropriate in such circumstances might be totally inappropriate elsewhere. The product of the survey is not, therefore, a mass of scientifically correct d.ata which can be analysed statistically and. tabulated. to give instant and r.:narguable answers to all problems. Certain facets cap be tabulated- and subjected- to statistical analysist but generally the sulc'\rey will consist of the sum of the errperience of marqr peopler possibly covering more than one view of each case, but none tha less subjective. The infomation must be assessed. with experience and- jud.gurent, and. often the most usefuf system of retrievaJ- will be no more scienti-fic than to file the reports und.er broad- head.ings. The greatest merit of such a sulsrey will be that already-errperienced persons can extend. their knowled.ge by studying a series of reports. 0ccasiona11y, statistical method.s may be used to support jufunents about the relative frequency of certain incid-ents, or the likelihood. of success of a particular line of actj-on. fn this present study much info:mation was gathered. from press reports collected-, categorised- and- carefully filecL over a ten year p"riod-. In marry cases reports of a particular inci-d.ent have been oUtainea from a m:mber of d.ifferent press sources and-, especially where an incid-ent has been reported. over a number of d-ays, a surprising amor.mt of info:mation is available. The total nt]rnber of cases stud.ied. greatly exceed-s 1 ,000 and., because of various problems

9 Chapter

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already d.iscussed., they have generally been filed. r.md.er relatively broad- headings to aflow sifting and re-arra^ngement in relation to specific problems. Some aspects, those involving hostages for exa.rrple, are in such voh:rne and- d.etail- that a more complex classification is possible. It would. not be possible to surnmarise all the infomation gathered. in this w&Xr but reference to reports will frequently be mad.e when specific aspects of the problem are d.iscussed.. Occasiona11y, summaries of nrmbers of cases will be possible, and where they hare val-ue, they will be incl-ud.ed-. The press reports have been supplemented. over the years by stud.ies of police reports of incid.ents in varj-ous parts of the worId., supported. in some cases by d-iscussion with those d.irectly or ind.irectly involved.. Di.scussions on indiviclual etqreriences, tactics and. trainirrg generally have been held. with large numbers of senior police officers from all over the world. and. with firearms training offi-cers from a nwnber of countries. Where the materiaL is of a confid.ential- nature it cannot, of course, be referred- to d-i.rectly, but the lessons learned. can be applied. and. the e:rtrlerience invol-ved. will help in making assessments. Finally, a surpri-sing amor-rnt of published. material i-s available and. has been colIected.. Reference will be mad.e to this in various sections. A number of important factors began to emerge at an early sta6e of assembling the i-nfo:mati-on. Having regard. to the objectives already d.efined., it qi;uickly beca^me apparent that police failed. more frequently through bad. planning, poor tactics, poor d.eployment and. so orr than through lack of shooting ability. This find.ing d.oes not mean that shooting ability is rmimportant in the final analysi-s it will be atI-important in marry cases. Confid.ence in proven ability is vital- to the morale, efficiency and- control of the officers concerned.. [he man who knows that he carl perfo:m well with his firea:m wilL control the situati.on and hold. his fire r-mtil there is no alternative course of action. The man who is unsure of himself (o= who knows himself to be incompetent) will react badly. The effect which a knovnn high stand.ard. of shooting ability will have on the crimj-nal cannot be accurately assessed- butr &s an exanple, a general belief in the shooting ability of officers employed. on protection duties may well have an important effect on a woul-d-be assassin. For these and. for many other reasons shooting ability is vitalr yet it becomes clear that other factors are even more important. An attempt to isolate those important factors which can make the d.ifference between success and- failure, and which can be quite 1itera1ly a matter of life or d.eath, will quite speed.ily produce a lorrg list of points, each of which is important. This list will veaTr quickly amor:nt to little more than a series of tips and. hints on the conduct of operations in certain fieLd.s. In a particular field. ttr-is series of tips ancL hints can become unwieldy, but taken over the whol-e rarlge of possible incid-ents it becomes impossible to cope with. In marr;r training schemes selected. lessons in certain field.s are put together i-nto what are of ten caLled. rfi-eld.craf t I lessons, which includ-e vital points orr s&X, how to approach a house.

[o approach situationa] training in that way leaves a great d.eaL to be d.esired. and. tend.s toward-s a superficial treatment of the problems. In exanining the problems of tackling criminals isolated- in a

10

Chapter

1

roomr elperiencer or linlted- research, wil-l show that entry into the same room as an a^:med- crimi-nal is verxr d-angerous. tField.craftt l-essons tend. to take up this point with advice such as f Go in low and fast, rolJ, for coverr shooting as you ro11. t In fact the need. for going j-nto the room must first be questioned. and. a more careful exami nation of the whole problem, covering a wid.er range of incid-ents, wi-11 show that it wi]l generally be better to remaj.n outsid.e and- force the cri-mi-nal out. Entry into a room r:nd.er the gun of a criminal is a most hazard.ous r.md.ertaking no natter how it is conducted.. What is requireiL is thought, planning and. carefully consid-ered. action and. not merely Eu3. attempt to reduce the risks of the most obvious method. of approaching the problem. Long lists of tips and. hints and. superficial- 'field.craftt points need- to be approached. with the greatest caution because their real failing, quite apart from the merit of each poi-nt when consid.ered. separatel}., l-i.es in the impossibility of teachlng a series of r:nconnected. points in a ma,nner which will ensure a sgfficient d.egree of retention. The planni.ng, organisation and. conduct of a:med. operati.ons will reEri-re careful thought, but there will be neither time nor opportr:nity for reinforcing superficially retained. know1ed-ge by read.i-ng or d.iscussion. llhe important points must be retaj-ned. at such a level that they can be cal-led. to mind- and. applied. wi-thout d.elay. lhere emerges from all this a need. to d.evelop a3d. teach a logical but si-mp]e system of tactics which will meet at least the immed.iate need-s of any a:med. operation. Military tactics have been stud.ied. and taught for centr:ri-es and everTr officer is requi-red. to be familiar with at least the principles. It is therefore quite strange to find. that this science has not been applied. in arry d.epth to police operations. 0f course, any tactics d.evLloped. need. to be police tactics and. not military tacties for, as we may show later, confusion between the two could be qui-te IiteraIly fatal-. No aspect of firea^:ms training is r:nimportant. f t is essenti-a1 that the most appropriate weapons and equipment are availabLe. It i-s essentialthat police officers are safe in their use of fi-rea^:ms ancL fully

aware of their responsibj-lities. It is essential that police officers are who11y competent in their use of firearurs in any situation whi.ch might be anticipated.. A11 these things, a3d. more, a^re vital to any training prog?amme. But research ind.icates that more important than any of these i.s the teaching apd. practice of good. tactics. Good. tactics will avoid. d.angerous situations rather thap rely on shooti-ng ability to extricate an officer from them. Good. firea:ms training will d.evelop a high d.egree of shooting ski11, and good- tacti.cs wilL go a long way toward.s ensuring that such ski1l is

never used..

The ultimate objective of a:med. police officers is to protect the public and this wilL best be secured. if the police so conduet their operations that no one, either police or criminal-, fires a single shot. AnJr police operation which involves shooting on anyonets part should. be appraisecL with the greatest care ancl- with a presumption (aruei-t a rebuttable presumption) that the firing of shots was caused. by a failure of police tactics. It will be for:nd. in some cases that the police couLd. not avoid the shooting if they were to caray out their duty, but research ind-icates that in marry cases the

11 Chapter

1

in which the police d.eal with the situation can have a marked. effect. Supposirrg that an a:med. crimi-nal is confronted- by a single police officer who is apparently not well a^:med and obviously not well traj-necL. llLren if that officer is the only thing which stand-s between the criminal and. his freed.om, there will be shooting. If , however, the criminal can be mad.e to lc:ow that he is facing a number of well trained. men and. that if he were to shoot one of them he could. gain nothi.ng because the others woul-d. prevent his escape, then the chances of hls shooting, and- thus forcing the police to shoot, wiLl be reduced.. Police tactics must be d.esigned. to convince the criminal- that he has no chance. Ife must be mad-e to feel that he i.s opposing an irresistible force which is closing inexorably around. him. He has two choices, to be arrested. or to be kiIIed.. If that sort of situation can be produced., the necessity for shooting by the police will be reduced., though it cannot be eliminated.. To create such a situation the police must seek over:whelm:ing superiority: 1 They must have superiority in numbers. There must never be any suggestion that the criminaL will- be given a fair chance or an even fight. One policeman agai-nst one crimj-naL is arr intolerabl-e situation whi-ch will cause blood.shed.. The od.d.s against the criminal- must be heavily weighted.. 2 They must have superiority in quality. The tralned. police offj-cers must be confid.ent in their ability to hand.le the si-tuation, and. such confid.ence can only come through good. tralning. 3 [hey must have superiority in weapons and equipment. Even though the types of weapon mi-ght be restri.cted- by the all important problem of not creating d.angers to the public, equipment such as body amour, chenical munitions etc ca.n enslrre that all the advantages are with the police. 4 They must have superiority in tacti.cs. A proper assessment of the situation must be foll-owed by a carefully organised. cLisway

ciplinecL and. controll-ed- response. A11 these th:ings are vital-, but they lose value if they a^re hid.d-en. The cri-mi.nal must know of them and. must be mad.e to feel that he is in a hopeless situation. The police must appear to be professional, they must appear to know what they a,re d.oing. If police officers arrive at a scene in d.isarray and- then d.ash about in a state of obvious confusion and. inefficiency, with ord.ers given and. cor:ntermand.ed, the criminal- will be encouraged. to thtnk that he can fight, trick, bluff or bargain hls way out. If police officers arrive and. move rapidly and. efficiently into effective positions, obviously capable, obviously superior, the effect on the criminal must be d.emoral-ising. What the police must d.o is not merely to el-iminate the criminalts chance of success, but his hope of it. [his process is greatly aid-ed. if the police have a reputatj-on for efficiency in such operations. Each successful operation wj.II increase such a reputation, but arry bailLy hanclled. situation is like1y to cause d.ifficul-ties long after the immed-iate operation is over. The unconnected. series of tips and hints for each of the manJr tytrles of operation cannot be taught properly and. cannot be retained. at a sufficiently high Ievel. The requi.rement is for a system of tactics which can be taught fairly quickly ancL which wi1l, with a minimum of refresher training, remain clear in the mj-nd.s of those

12 Chapter

1

concerned.. The system must take into accormt the objectives d.efi-necL earlier and. the method-s d.escri-bed- a.bove. It must provid-e a fra,mework within which every tree of operation can be conducted.. It must be fIexibIe, but must folLow a constant patterre. Whilst it ca^n never provJ-de all the answers, it must at least set forth the questions so that answers can be found. and. so that in the heat and. excitement of the moment vital- factors are not overlooked.. This is a d.emand.i.ng requirement and- any proposed. system must be fu11y tested. before being accepted.. The system advanced- in this book was d.evisedseveral years ago and its basic principles have been accepted. and. used. operationally. This book will seek to d-evelop those principles into a complete system. If proper regard- is paid to the objecti-ves of the police and. the ord.er of priorities already d.efined., a study of the d.etail of the tacti-cs will d.efine the reqrrlrements of the police for weaporuTr and. equipment. fhe final sel-ection will irnrolve careful testing and. consid-eration of technical- d.etail to enslrre that equi.pment selectedis that ruhich best meets the requirements. A d.etailed. study of weapons selection will be d-eferred. for inclusj-on in a Later work and. for the puryoses of this book it will be assumed- that a police force

will use ! 1 A pistol which is sound., utterly reliable and. of a tJpe which men can learr: to use as easily as possible, This must be coupled. with anrn:niti-on which gives ad-equate stopping power' andholsters suited. to the parti.cular need.s of each true of operation.

2 A shotgun selected on the criteria mentioned. above for use with cartrid-ges containing large shot or those which fire a single solio projectile. 3 A superbly accurate rj-fle of a^rr effective calibre for use by specially trained- police snipers. fu:ned. operations will involve the use of a wid.e range of stand.ard. police equipment such as rad-ios, lighting and. so ollr but many operations will cal-I for specialised. equipment such as body a,rmoix. Detailed. examj-nation of the various items of equipment and. their variants will not be includ.ed. in this work, but brief mention will be mad-e of selected- items i-n a later chapter. Chemical m-mitions fo:m a vital, much maligned and. grossly misund-erstood. part of any police arsenal. A proper appreciation of the chemical mu:ritions best suited- to police operations involvi.ng a^:med. crj-minals (r" opposed. to those involvj-ng riots) will therefore be attempted. in a later chapter. By studying the job d.escription which can be compiled. from the completed. study of tactics, and by consid.ering the weapons and. equipment which wil-I be used-, it will be possible to set out the skills and- knowled.ge which must be imparted. to those officers required- to fill the various roles. Mren exarnining the skills andknowled.ge required., it is important also to assess the d.epth of retention required.. Skil1s and knowled.ge can be retaj-ned. at d.ifferent level

s:

1 The superficial; for example, in relation to police work it be sai-d. that much knowled.ge of the Iaw need. be retained. only superficially provid.ed. that such knowled.ge is linkecL with a facility for rapicl- research.

ca.n

13 Chapter

1

2 The consciousl where the essentials of the knowled.ge a^re capable of being called- to mi-nd in sufficient d-etaiI almost immed-iately, as for exarnple with basic poli-ce powers. 3 The subconsciousl where training produces in an ind.ividual an immed-iate and. almost habitual response to a particular situation. Such reaetions a^re often misna,med- rinstincti-verbut in police work they should be the product of careful training rather than a d.evelopment of narrow experience. Good. d-river training provid-es a classic exa.nrple of this leve1 of teaching when an unexpected. skid- produces an instant skilled. reacti-on. There are, of course, vari-ations with-in each of these 1eve1s, but the anor.mt and- tJrtrle of tralning given must, in any efficient system, be lirrked. to the d-epth of retention necessary for each aspect. It is uneconomie and- inefficient to attempt to teach to a greater d-epth than is in fact required.. When finally d.esigrrlng the firea:rurs training programme it will be necessarXr to assume that stud.ents start with no knowled.ge but that, in an efficient police force, they will be of reasonable intellect and. catrr, with little effort, be properly motivated.. The ability or wi-Ilingness of a force to reject those men who cannot reach a,n ad-equate stand.ard- after reasonable traj-ning will effect the rate of progress which must be fixed-. l'Ihere eveaTr man is required- to reach a velTr high stand.ard- the rate of progress will be governed by the sl-owest matrl. Where rejection of a smalL proportion of stud.ents is possible the rate of progress can be faster and. the stand.ard-s car:. be

higher. Preparation of the traj-ning programme wilL require that each of the.skill-s be analysed and. each step isolated. and. taught with care to produce a step by step progression to the necessarTr stand-ard- andd.epth of retention. There are many pitfalls along the w&X, particularly where training is i.ntend-ed. to be retained. at the subconscious level, where the training wiI1, in effect, be creating habits. Great caJee must be taken to ensure that bad. or mi-sd.i-rected. habits are not produced.. Two examples might illustrate the point. Any analysis of combat situations will ind.icate a need- for an ability to shoot qrriekly at targets which appear briefly. !'Jhen this stage of training is reached. there is an absolute requirement to train on targets which appear briefly. In a combat situation the officer will respond. to a visual signal. Training must not, therefore, attempt to make d.o with stationa":ry targets and. time limits signaIled. by audLi-ble means. If this is d.one, the stud.ents will not be ?progra^mmecLr into the habit and- will have to think about the mechanical action of shootirrg in a situation where he will have other things to occupy his mind., and- in particular when he should. be thinking about whether to shoot rather than how to shoot. SimilarIy, some trairing prog?ammes try to compensate for a fallure to provid.e proper equipment by increasing the elrposure time of the target and. the nr.mber of shots to be fired. on each exposure. Some go so far as to require that each tj-me the ma^n fires, he fires the ma^:rimr"m number of shots which his pistol wilL hold-. Apart from being rather impractical, this method- will induce the habit of emptying the gt:rr at a single target and. there is evid.ence to suggest that this habit wil-I caxry over into combat situations. If the complete process suggested. here is comectly appliecL it

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wil-l produce trai.nJ-ng systems which show consi-d.era.ble variations from cor:ntry to cor:ntry, but the variations will be j-n emphasis rather than i-n principle. Some coi.intries will need. to place greater stress on a situation which may be rare in other countries. The basic principles will remain constant, but the reseatrch nust be continuous and. tactics must be eontinually upd.ated. to meet changing situations. As the tactics are revj-sed., the emphasis of, training may have to shift to ensure that events d.o not overtake the abiliti.es of the trained. men.

lhis workr &s has been said., i-s to concentrate on tactics, but before attention can be focused. there one other very important preliminary must be d.isposed. of . In any operation, armed. police must act strictly within the law. There is no point in producing a system of tactics u:rless any actions envisaged. are completely withj-n the Iaw. The situations in which police officers can lawfully resort to the use of frea:ms are strictly controlled. and. it is therefore essential- that the nature of these restricti-ons be fu11y exlplored. before a study of tactics can begin. The next chapter will therefore relate to this problem.

Chapter

2

CONTROIS ON THE POIICE USE OE EIREARMS

Chapter t has established- the objectives of a:med. police officers and-, it is hoped., has ind.icated. i-n broad. te:ms the method.s which shoul-d- be employed. and. the attitud.es which must be ad.opted.. The restrictions r,'*rlch are praced. on the use of firea:ms by officers must be carefully consid-ered. in the light oi lolice th""" objectives, method-s and. attitud.es and. this will ralse importapt legaJ- a,d. practical problems. No police officer will wish t; find. himself outsid-e the law as a resu1t of his efforts to protect the public, but there is more involved. than merely ensuring that ind.ividuaLs are not mad-e liable to some fo:m of penalty. It is of the utmost importance that the poli-ce are seen to be uphold.i-ng the 1aw, not breuf.irrg it or even bend-ing it for their oum convenience. fn this d.elicate field- a clear r,md.erstand.ing of , and stri.ct compliapee with, the legal restrictions und.er which the police must work is vital to the ind-j-viduaJ- officer, but it is no l-ess important that the police service shouLcL safeguard. that respect and. reputation which is so vital to continued. efficiency. The problem is not merely a 1ega1 one, it is an importapt practical problem which bears d.irectly on the conduct of amed. police operati-ons. Supposirrg a wanted- man is thoright to be at a parti-cu1ar house al}d- a":med- police officers have been stationed- arou.nd. the outsid-e, able to shoot anJrone who runs out. ft would. be foolish to assume that such d.isposi.ti.ons wouLd automatically ensure that the crj-minaI coul-d- not escape. What will the officers d.o if the is a petty criminal wanted. for relatively mi-nor matters a3d. hesuspect runs from the house apparently unarmed.? ft is important to keep in mj.nd. the fact that a:med. police officers are not free to use their firearms at rartdom. fn marSr cases it will be necessaqr to consid.er the aetion which will be taken i.n situations vrhere firlarms, though issued., cannot be used.. The whole question of the use of fi-rea^:ms by police officers is often seen as sensitive and-, in some cases, police forces issue confid-ential instmctions intend.ed. to regulate the circumstapces in which firea:ms are to be used-. These often introduce restrictions beyond- those imposed. by the law and- such ad-<ional restrictions aJrer it is submitted., improper and rmd.esirable. They increase the risk to police officers and. are likely to d.eter them from the proper 15

15 Chapter 2 perfo:mance of their duty to protect the publi-c. The control exercised. over the use of firea":ms by the police is a matter of immense public importance and. interest. Any instmctj-ons issued., and. any policy ad-opted. should , it i s sugge sted., be available to arqr member of the publicr ar5r lega1 representative, and. any researcher who wishes to see them. In this important fieId. the police should. be controlled- by the l-aw. No other inst:rrcti-ons shoul-d be issued. r-rnless some aspect of the law is uncertain when a policy may have to be introduced. until the Iaw is clarified.. The problems faced- by the police of different countries varry substantially. The laws which control the use of police fireams also vary substantially. lhis chapter will d.iscuss the law in England. and. Wales. Certain aspects of tkr-is law may be valid in other common law coi.:ntries, and. marry of the principles involved. will be of d-irect interest elsewhere. It would-, however, be r-mwise to attempt to apply these cornments to a cor:ntry other than England. or Wales without further local research. Some of the more practical aspects of the problem such as policies about shooting to wound., which a,re not

clearly set out by Iaw, will be of d.irect interest in all countries. Reference to stand.ard. textbooks of English law will d.o little to clarify the position of the police officer who, in the course of his dutie s, find-s it nece ssary to kiIl or wound. a criminal . Pre sumably because the situation has arisen infrequently, the subject has received. little attention. The 1aw is complex and- not well d.efined. d.espite recent Statutes whlch were intend.ed. to clarify many aspects of the problem. A d.etailed- examination is therefore essential, but in some areas it may be possi-b1e only to give an ind-ication of the probable state of the law with pe.rsuasive argr:ment, but no firm authority for the opinions given. INDIVI}UAL NESPONS]BTLITY

point to emerge from any examination of this problem is poli-ce officer's responsibility for hi-s use of a fi-rea:m is that the entirely ind.i-vidual. ff a police officer fires a shot, he personal1y will be responsible for the consequences. ff he acted. unlawfully or with gross negligence, he may well be charged- with murd.er or manslaughter, or with rmlawful wound.ing if his target su:srives. ff his actions d-o not amor.:nt to crime, but were nevertheless negligent or othe::wise actionable, then he personally may be liable to pay very substantial d.amages to his victim or the relatives. The Chief Constable of an English or Wefsh police force is jointfy liable for the actj-ons of a consta.ble acting und.er his d.irection, and- d.ama,ges may be award.ed. against him. (t) fhis d-oes not reli-eve the ind.ividual It is important to note that the police officer of his liability. awarded. against the Chief Constable by pay d.amages must authority in the case of the indiviclual- officer, position, but virtue of his the authority may pay such d.arnages, or may d-ecline to d.o sor leaving the offi-cer entirely responsible . (Z) ff the police officerts actions are neither criminal nor actionable, but sti1l falI short of the stasd.ard-s requi-red., the Police Discipline Regulations might well be invoked-. If a police officer causes a d-eath and- has behaved. in every way

The first

17 Chapter 2 with the utmost propriety, he may stilI suffer what some will find. an ordeaI. First, the investigation by his senior officers, with every aspect of his conduct probed. and. d.ouble checked-. Then the wait. The report will inevitably be submitted. to the Director of Publ-ic Prosecutions who will d.ecid.e whether or not proceed-ings should be instituted.. Finally, if he has been exonerated- at everTr stage of the enquiry, he will have to face the Coronert s Inquest, probably suffering the hostility of lawyers provid.ed. for the relati-ve s by the state . Throughout thi s , certain sections of the pre ss are likely to question his actions, his jufument and. his authority; in some cases trying to cond-emn hi-m in advance. Simul-taneously certain politicians will be prejudging and- pontificating from their privileged. po sitions. OBEDTENCE TO ORDERS

Nor is the police officer 1ike1y to escape liability if he was obeying some misguid.ed- ord.er to shoot. The general principle of English l-aw is that obed.ience to ord.ers cannot excuse a crime because no one can 1awfu1Iy ord.er another to break the law. fn certain cases obed.ience to ord.ers, parti-cuIar1y on the part of a sold.i-er, would represent strong mitigation and. might rarely constitute a d.efence. In any case it would. be unwise to assume that the law would. place a

police officer in the same position as a sold.i-er. First there is the fact that a police officer d.erives his authority d.irectly from the Crown and not through his superiors. fhe relationship of the police officer with the authority which pays his salary was ercplored. in depth in a case in 1930 (:) ancl- the following quotation from a jud.ge of the Australian High Court (l+) was approved.: Now the powers of a constable . o r are exercised. by him by virtue of his office and. cannot be exercised- on the responsibility of any person but himse1f . . o a constable, therefore, when acting as a police officer, is not exercising a d.elegatecL authority and the general 1aw of a6ency has no application. The law makes important d.istinctions between the liability of the sol-d-ier to obey lawful cornnand-s, and. that of the policeman. The sold.ier offend.s if he rwi1fu11y or through neglect d.isobeys any lawful command-' (5) Uut the police officer cornmits an offence against his Discipline Regulations if rwithout good- ancL sufficient cause, he disobeys, or onits or neglects to caxry out arry 1awfu1 ord.err. (6) [he Iaw, it seems, allows a police officer to d.isobey a la,wful

command. if he has good. and- sufficient cause to d-o so. He is expected- to be more d.iscerning and i-nd-ividually responsible about the ord.ers which he obeys. Ord.ers given to a police officer might lead. hin to make a mistake about the facts of a situation, &sr for example, if he were given wrong info:mation during a briefing. This might raj-se a d.efence to his subsequent actions but this would. be based- on mistake of fact, which will be d.j-scussed- later, and. not on mere obed.ience to ord.ers. A police officer who pursues a course of action which he d-oes not believe to be entirely lawfu1 will be YerT foolish ind.eed. if he thinhs he might escape the consequences of that action by pleading that he was acting in obed.ience to ord.ers.

1

B Chapter 2

A11 this d.oes not meatrr that an ord.er to shoot may not be Iawfu11y given to a police officer. If the circumstances justify the shooting, the ord.er will be Lawful and. the officer wil-l be obliged. to obey it r:nless he has some good reason for failing to d.o so. If the shooting was not justifiable, the ord.er will be unlawful, the officer will not be obliged. to obey it, and will not be protected. if he d.oes. In the vast majority of situations this problem is merely acad-emic. The practicalities of a police operati-on (t" opposed. to a military operation) a:ee such that the question will al-most never arise. Ar. a":med. officer will be commi tted. to a speci-fic aspect of the operation and., usually in response to sometlting which happens, he may sud.d.enly be required. to shoot. When he d.oes so it will be on his own judguent and. ord.ers will be quite impractical. GF,NERAT PRTNCIPI,E

[he situation is, therefore, that if a police officer shoots, and. on subsequent exarnination is for.md. to have been wrong in cl-oing sor the consequences for him will be verXf serious ind.eed.. Conversely, he may well be in a situation where if he fails to shoot he, or someone else, may be kiIled. It seems that he is placed. in an invid.i-ous poisiti.on, yet in principle his position is the same whenever he takes action. If a police officer uses excessive force when making an arrest he is likely to be charged. with an assault. If he fails to use sufficient force he may well- suffer persona-l inju:ry ancL aLlow his prisoner to escape, perhaps to commit further serious offences against innocent members of the public. [he princip]es a,re the sane whether the officer is using some gentle restralnt, or his fistsr oI his truncheon, or a gu.n. The problem r.ind-er consid-eration is the use of force by police officers and. a najor mistake often mad.e when consicLering this is to tldnk of the gun as something special and. to suggest that the question of the use of firea:ms is somehow &ifferent. In consid.ering the d.egree of force which night be involved., the firea^m must, of course, be seen as the ultimate. Its use is Iikely to result in d.eath and it must be accepted. from the start that this couLd. only be justified in extreme cases. Accepting that the police officer is personally responsible for his use of a gun, ancL aecepting that it can only be used. in extreme cases, how d.oes the law justify the officer i-n such cases? The question might best be consid.ered. by taking some specific exanples and. examining them in great d.etail, seeking to establish principles which can be applied to all cases. Example 1t The police are searching for a man who is wanted- for a series of vi-oIent a":med. robberies and who is known to be d.a.ngerous. It is believed. that he is a:med. with a shotgun and. will- shoot to resi.st arrest. hr. the course of the hunt a number of houses are searched and. at one a young constable enters a room and. is there confronted. by the criminal. As the two see each other, the criminal swings his shotgr.m round. toward.s the police officerr appffiently about to shoot. The policeman shoots first and kil-ls the criminal . Most people would- probably agree that such a killing would. be justified-, but how d.oes the law justify that actj-on? The imned.iate

19 Chapter 2 is to say that the police officer acted- in 'self-d.efencet that the killing was justified. on that ground.. It may well be that at the moment he fired., the officer was clefencling himself , but his actions may not a.nor:nt to self-clefence in law. response and.

SELF-DETENCE

is not, perhapsr &s cLear as it might be (Z) the textbooks d.iffer somewhat in d.etail. ft seems, however, that a person who is attacked. may use t such force as is reasonable in the circumstanees' (B) to escape from the attack. The force which he may use is limited. to that whi.ch will all-ow him to escape r.mtra,med.. The essence of the matter is that the person plead.ing self-d.efence must be able to show that he is the d.efend.er, not the attacker, and. one of the most important factors in jufuing: this willbe whether he ca.n show that, before resorting to force, he rretreated.t. (y) This duty to retreat, which is so important to a plea of self-d.efence, was clearly set out by Lord. Wid-gery in a case in The 1aw on self-d.efence ancl-

1969. ( ro)

It is not, as we r.md.erstand- it, the law that a person threatened. must take to his heeLs and. run ... what i-s necessarJr is that he should d-emonstrate that he is prepared. to temporise and. d.isengage

and. perhaps make some physical withdrawaJ-.... Thus, the d.efend.er must be able to show that he would. avoid. the confrontation if he reasonably couId., that he would. ilisengage if he cou1d., and. that the force wh-ich he used. was purely d.efensive and was used. with the objeet only of d.efend.ing himself . If we were to attenpt to apply these principles to Exarnple 1 it seems clear that the officer cannot p1ead. that he acted. in tsel-fd.efencer . What, first, of his duty to retreat? A poliee officer could. not perfo:m hls duty if , each time a criminal violently resisted- him, he was reqirlred. to I temporise and. clisengage and. perhaps make some physical withd.rawal r. The wanted. man is a d.anger to society and. the 1aw requi.res the police officer to arrest him and. take him before the courts. It cannot also requi-re that the constable should retreat before using necessarJr force. Is the force which the officer is usi.ng purely d.efensive and. liuited. to that which wilL aLlow hin to escape? Ind.eed., in this situati-on, is the constable the d.efend.er or the attacker? The whole tenor of the cLemand.s which the ]aw and. society make of the police cannot be equatedwith the mles of seLf-d.efence. If an ord.inarXr citizen were to be confrontecl by a gunman or d.angerous offend.er, society wou1d. ercpect that person simply to take care of himself. A great d.eal more wouLd. be e:iqlected. of a police officer. He is bor:nd. to d.o what he catrr to end. the d.anger to society ancl to bri-ng the offend.er to justice. In the circumstances outlined- in f,:rample 1 , as in everTr case where a police officer properly uses force, he is the attacker, not the defend.er. The wanted. man is to be amested. - that is to be attacked. 1awfuI1y and. with proper restrai-nts, but none the less attacked.. The use of force in such cases is therefore a€:gressive, and. the proper use of firea^ms will invariably cast the police in this positive role and. never in a purely d.efensive attitud.e. rself-d.efencet, as cLefined by law should. never be consid.ered. in any attempt to .

20 Chapter 2 justify the use of a fiream by a police officer. A great d.ea1 of confusion has been caused. by those serrlor police who officers who apologise for the existence of police firear.ms andpolice refer to then Ls 'purely d-efensivet and. attempt to d-efine the a:med. police officer has role in similar tertns. The role of the t to protect society by neu1 as been clearly d.efined- in Chapter tralising a d.apgerous offend.ert. Whilst any use of force must be strictly regulated- by Iaw, the proper protection of society d-emand-s and- positive attitud.es. These cannot exist r:nd-er positivl ""ilon the rules of self-d.efence, EEFECTING AT{ ARREST

acting positivelX, attempting to affest a d.apgerous offend.er so as to protect the public. The force which he used_ was not related. to the law of self-d-efence, but to that governing the use of force by police officers acting in the execution of their duty. Section i of the Criminal Law Act 196T says3 1 A person may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstasces in the prevention of crimer or in effecting or assisting in the la.l^rful arrest of offenders or suspected. offend-ers, or of persons unlawfullY at large. In seeking further clarification of the tern tsuch force as is reasonable in the circumstancest reference is usually mad-e to the report of the Committee wtr-ich recommend.ed. the framing of that Act: The officer

(rt)

in

Exa,mple 1 was

if a question arose on clause (now secti-on) 3, the court, in consid-ering what was reasonable force, would take into account all the ci-rcumstances, including in particular the nature ap6 d-egree of force used., the serj-ousness of the eviL to be prevented and. the possibility of preventing it by other means; but there is no need to specify in the clause the criteria for d-eciding the question. Since the clause is frarned. in general te:ms, it is rroi limited. to arrestable or any other class of offence, though in the case of very trivial offences it would verT likely be held that it would- not be reasonable to use even the slightest force to Prevent them. The CommitteL clearly had. in mind. the use of force in preventing crime, but the principle is equally applicable to the use of force in making arrests. This explapation and. the wordirrg of the section leave a ntmber of points unanswered and. we are bound. to look back to common law prinand to some later cases for further il-h.:mination. It is "ipt"" cllar that, at common law, an officer acting in the execution of hls duty was und-er no obligation to retreat before resorting to necessary force to achieve tr-is object. That principle continues and- the of officer is not only entitled-, but required, to use that d-egree the make to him alrow a,d. opponent force whj_ch will over-power his force of the d.egree arrest. There is a vilat distinction between which may be used. in such circumstances and. that which is pe:missible in self-d-efence. In the latter case the force usetl mustthebe purely d-efensive and limited. to that necessaly to safeguard and person attacked.. In the fo::rner case the force is aggressive No tLoubt

21

Chapter

2

must enable the officer to overpower his opponent. The officer in Exarnple 1 was using a firearm for the purpose of making a.n arrest. He was resisted. and the killing was necessalTr to overcome the resistance. The fact that the officer was in d.anger merely illustrates the reasonabl-eness of his actions. REASONASLE FORCE

But what of the timing of the officert s actions? Should. he have shot first? Is the police officer entitled. to shoot as soon as a man picks up a gurr, or must he wait r,mtiL the vealy last moment when the gun i.s being brought to bear? Shoul-d. a police officer even be encoura8ed. to let the criminal- have the first shot so that there can be no d.oubt about his intentions? This last suggestion is surely most unreasonable. The id.ea that the poli.ce cannot shoot first is Iike1y to 1ead. not only to the d.eath or injury of the officer, but to his consequent failure to arrest the d.angerous offend.er who may then remain at liberty to commit further crimes and cause further d.a^nger to society. llhe officer must shoot first and-, in the situation in which he find.s himself , he cannot and is not e:rpected. to make cold clinical jud.gments about the precise moment when he should. fire a shotr or the precise a^rnount of force needed in a particul-ar situatj-on. Hi.s actions must be jud.ged. with due regard. for the stress and tensions of the moment. The comment of a United. States

(lZ) has been approved. mar:y times: reflecti.on canr:.ot be d.emand-ed. in the presence of an uplifted. knife. ft is not a cond.ition of immr.inity that one in that situation should pause to consid.er whether a reasonable man might think it possible to d.isable his opponent rather than ki1l hj-m. More recently, i-n an English case, (t:) the principle was e:plai-nedin the following te:ms: In the circumstar:.ces one d.id. not use a jewellerst scal-es to jud.ge

Detached.

measu:re reasonable

force. o . .

In the stress of the situation the officer will make a d.ecision. The 1aw requi-res that he should. act with reason, but not with a cold., calm jud-gment which no no:maL person wil-l possess in such circumsta^rrce

s.

TI{E NMD TO CHALLENGE

The need. to challenge a crlminal and. offer him an opportunity to surrend.er tend.s to be heavi-Iy stressed. in some circles, even to suggesting that some particular fom of word.s is necessarJr before shots can be fired.. Clearly the criminaL should. know what he is faci-ng, and- clearly it wouLd. be most unreasonabl-e in most cases to shoot a

without giving him the opportr:nity to surrend.er. In man;r a sufficient warning woul-d- be t stand- stiIl I or tstop I . hthere the id.entity of the police is not apparent, some announcement of this will be necessarTr, perhaps, tPolice stand. stil-I. I But where the criminal, by his own actj.ons, makes such a warning impracticalor hazaxd.ousr rro challenge need. be offered.. The circumstances in Example 1 are such that the officer concerned. may well not issue any ma^n d.own

cases

22 Chapter 2 waruing before shooting. This will be a matter of jud-gment for him' He must afford- the crimi-nal- an opportuni-ty to surrend-er if he ca,n, but he is not required. to stand there trotting out some trite word-s of warning whilst the criminal shoots him, or someone else. MISTAKE OF FACT

the officer in Example 1 sees the criminal turning, applrentry about to shoot. In the heat of the moment he sees the d.a,ger as so imminent that he cannot challenge or othe::r^dse d-e1ay action. He shoots ancl- kills the criminal and. it is subsequently found. that the criminalt s gun was emptyr or was an im:itation. There was never any real d.a.rrger and- the criminal could. easily have been overcome with bare hand.sr or with a t:runcheon. In fact the shooting was not necessaaTr. The ir.*, it seems, is quite clear' ( 11+) The matter at issue is not what the situation reaI]y was, but what the officer honestly and. reasonably believed. it to be. Clearly the I s officer cou1d. not be expected. to check the loacl-ing of the crininal to see if he could- id-entify it Smr nor to make a ninute inspeetion ," an imj-tation. He will be justified. if he mad.e an honest andreasonable nistake of fact, providing the facts as he believed- them to be would. have justified- the shooting'

Supposing

ABSENCE OF IMMEDIATE DANGER

The reasonableness a3d. legality of the actions of the officer in Example 1 are self-evid.ent when the facts and the l-aw are examinedproperly. But the issues may wel-l- not be qrrite so clear cut. At the other end. of the scale will be cases where there was no imme&late danger. fwo further exarples might be posed-: ExamFIe 2z An a:med. robbery has taken place in a small tor^rn ancL as one of the criminals, who is known to the poli-ce, is making his escape an unanned. police officer confronts him and is shot d.ead.. A zealous citizen intervenes and. he too is shot, but only wor.:nd.ed.. The offend.er escapes on foot and. a limited- nrxnber of a^:med. officers are placed- around. the area. [hei-r numbers are such that they canlot see or support each other. Thirty minutes after the robbery an armed. officer sees the criminal and- icLentifies him. The map is still carrying his gun and is crossing a road. some short d.istance away, breakirrg through the cord-on andabout to escape. The officer challerrges, but the man runs on and will not stop, though he makes no attempt to use the 911n. Thethe police officer is feft with two alternatives; one is to let criminal gor possibly to be arrested. at some later d-ate; the second. is to shoot the ma.n in the back as he is nll:ning away. t Arry shot fired. at the crimina.f s back must involve a very high

risk of

d.eath.

about bomb attacks by )z As a result of inteltigenceguar&ing certain build-ings' terrori"t", a:med. police officers a,re a A lone a:med. police officer sees a man place a suitcase n'ea^r rltr sa challenged-, the matrI shouts, vulnerabl-e brrild.ing apd, when t The man then runs off , ignoring the bombr xou have been wartoed..

Exa,rrp1e

23 Chapter 2 officerrs orders to stop. There is no ind.ication that the ma, is amed-. The officer ca^r:not catch him and. there is no way of stopping him there and. then except by shooting him in the back. 0f course, the te:m, tshoot hi-m in the backf is ,"=y emotive. The instinctive reaction is, tNever. t It is abhorrent. It is not gentlemanly. It surely cannot be justified. The problem might seem a Iittle d-ifferent if the question were posed. in d.i-fferent In Example 2 the offend.er has d.emonstratea ver-;r clearly whatte:ms. wil_I happen to arurorle who gets in his way whi-lst he is in the pa*ic of his escape. That being sor if the police officer allows the ma^n escape, what will happen to the next person who gets in his way? to Should- a police officer allow a man such as that to remaln at large when he has the means to stop him? In Exa,mple the man is appar3 ently r-ma":med- and. any threat from him i-s .ot immed.iate. However, it seems to be wel-l estabLished. that the nr-mber of activists j-n any terrori-st organisation is small. The officerrs duty is to affiest that man using as much force as he find.s necessarxr and. reasonable. ff the officer faiLs to d.o so when he has the means at his dlsposil, what will be the d.anger to society from this terrorist? Will he plant more bonbs, killing and. maj.ming innocent people includi-ng women and. babi.es?

In both cases the officer faces a dilemma which will with the certain knowled.ge that if he shoots a man r.md.erincrease such circunstancesr his actions will be subjeet to the most rigorous scrutir\y. He will be answerable to his superiors, to the courtsr or to a Coroner, before whom he must justify having shot a map who was not offering any immed-iate violence. [here wil]- be those organisatj.ons and ind.ividual-s who will d.emand. that he be piIIoried. The first point of confusi-on 1ike1y to a=is" in consid.ering these circumstances is that neither the officer nor anyone else was in. immed-iate danger. The self-d.efence theorists are 1ike1y to ra-lse their head-s a8ain, but it has surely been esta.blished. tLat, whilst immi-nent d-anger may help establish the reasonableness of the action taken in some casesr it is by no means an essentialin justifying the officer's actions. fn both cases thei.ngred.ient oificer is seeking to make an amest and. we a^re therefore concerned. only with establ-ishing whether or not the force used. was reasonable for the purpose of making an amest in such circumstances. The princi.ple concerr:ed. is well set out by smith and. Hogan. (1il It cannot be reasonable to cause d.eath unless- (a) it was neces9a{y to d-o so in ord.er to prevent a crime or effect an amest and. (U) the evil which would fol-Iow from failure to prevent the crime or effect the arrest is so great that a reasonable man might think himself justified. in taking another's life to a;yert that evil. ft is ]ikeIy, therefore, that a killing will be justified. to prevent r:nLawful killingr or to arrest a map r^rho is 1ikely to cause d-eath or grievous bo&l]y ha:m if left at liberty. [he problem reaIly reduces itself to the balancing of twl evils. For a poli-ce officer to kiIl is arl evil which society must be reLuctant to accept; but it would. be an even greater evil- for a police officer to allow at liberty a man whom he knew to be a seri.ous d-anger to society, a ma^n whom he believed. to be likely to cause d-eath or grievous bod.ily ha^:m to those members of the public whom the police offi.cer is bor.md. to protect. The officert s d.ecision

2l+ Chapter

2

must, it i-s suggested., be based- on three points 1 A clear and positive id.entification of the offend.er. Z An u,""""s*"nt of the offend.erts willirrgness or ability to kilI or cause flrther serious d.anger to the public. llhi-s will be linketl closely to an assessment of the offend.err s state of mindat the time. opportr:nity to kill or cause 3 An assessment of the offend-erts he can be arrested-. before public serious d.a^nger to the Item 1 is obvious. Action of the t)rpe now contemplated can only be taken where there is no reasonable d.oubt about the id.entity of the person beipg shot at. The assessment of the criminal-ts potential io= ha^:m w1r be based. Iargely on his state of mind. as inclicated- by his recent behaviour. fn Example 2 the offend.er is in a state of pa.rric probably the most d.angerous state of mind.. Such a mental cond_ition night persist for 30 minutes, but might not remain at some later tj.me. In another case the offend.er might be totally d.eranged and. whilst one would. wish to synpathise with a person who was menta1ly ill, a police officer must not allow such sympathy to be the cause of the d.eaths of innocent people. llLre extremist in Example 3 may well be a complete fanatic, read;r and anxious to kill those whom he sees as legitimate targets. From all the surrounding circumstances and from his background knowled.ge, the police officer must make an assessment of the potential for grave ha^m in that offend-er. Ilaving d.one so r he must then exa,mine the slrrrounding circumstances to see what opportrmity for ha^:m might arise before the offend-er can be arrested-. The criminal nrnning in a crowd.ed. street where members of the public are 1ikeIy to get in his way may present a cLifferent problem to the man running into a build-ing which is lmoun to be could- conveniently be contained.. empty -Theand. whj-ch wi-11be difficul-t. The police officer must be con'sd-ecisj-on cious of the fact that his actj.ons will be carefully sc:rutirdsed. If he shoots a man who is n:nning away, he wil-l- have to justify his actions pubh-cly, one way or another. Nevertheless situati-ons willarise where it will be the cluty of a police officer to use extreme force to ensure that a d-angerous offend.er does not escape. In such cases the poli-ee officer must not fail j-n his duty. What the la,r,tr requires, it is suggested., is that the police officer should- d-o his job, not shrirrking from the use of extreme force if that is necesresorting to extremes only in the face of a serious threat ="rry, but to the public whj-ch cannot be removed by arry other meatrrs. SHOOT]NG TO WOUND

of force whi-ch the police may use in any situation is Iimited. to that reasonably necessa,ry to achieve their lawful object. Excessive force is not merely und-esirable, it is unlawfirl. 0n that premise, a3d. particularly in respect of incid.ents like those d-escri-bed- in Examples 2 ancl 3 where the offend.er is not posing an immed.iate threat to Iife, there is a superficial attraction towards a policy of requiring that a police officer should shoot onfy to howwor-md.. Before the d.esirability of such a policy is accepted', its of assessment ever, there should be a more than superi-fical The d.egree

probable consequences.

25 Chapter 2 Supposing, first, that an officer shooting to wormd. is successful infl-icts an injury which is not likely to prove fatal, perhaps in a Ieg or BtrlII. Having regard. to the excited. and. ad.renalised state which the criminal is likeIy to be in, such a wound. may slow him d.own, but it is most r-mlikely to neutralise him. An a:med., d.angerous and. wound.ed. criminal- might well start shooting back at the police, producing that I gr:n battle t situation which the police should. be tryirrg most d.esperately to avoid.. Wor.md.i-ng the offend-er may occasionally produce the results d.esired., but it is al-so like1y to produce a result quite opposite to that intend.ed.. In any event, the practicalities of a combat situation are such that no one will be able to cornmand. the d.egree of precision and. control need.ed. to hit a particular part of the body. In an incicLent like that in Exa,mple 2, the range might be something of the ord.er of 20 yard-s. Assuming that the police officer was usi-ng a pistol with l+ i-n. banel, he would have a 6 in. sight rad.ius. fn attempting to align his sights rapid.ly und.er the tension of the situati.on, the officer might well produce an error and. he would be veay fortrmate, or verTr skilful, if that error was as low as one-tenth of an inch. Any error in alignment in the weapon will be multipliefl on the target by the number of times the sight radi-us will go into the d.istance to the target. Thus, if an error of one-tenth of an ineh is produced. in the 6 in. sight rad.ius, the error on the target can be found. by: and.

Error on target = Error of alignment

1 --- x7-1; 20 yds =fb'rii.

x

Di stance

Sight raf,ius

1

= -

v

1OJL

720 6

= 12 in. An error of one-tenth of an inch in the alignment of the sights wiII, therefore, produce an error of 12 in. on a target which is ZO yard.s away. Consid.er then that the target wiLl be moving, often unpred-ictably; that the shooter may wel-l be movingr or have been moving and. be und.er physical stress; and that the shooter will be in a state of extreme tension. Attempts to hit a parti-cul-ar part of a body in such circr-mstances catrr succeed. only by the merest ehance. The probability is that the shot will not strike where the officer intend.ed.. It could. well mj-ss the target completely with the possibility of two ad.d.itional hazard.s. First, the bulIet which mi-sses will not simply vapourise. It has to go somewhere. From most police pistols, the bullet will have an extreme range of about one nile. Unless there is some substantial obstmcti-on, any innocent person within a mile of the incid.ent and- in the line of fire will be at risk. The d.anger from ricochets from certain t;rpes of ammunition will increase this risk vealf substantially. For a police officer d.eliberately to create such d.angers is hard.ly in keeping with his stated. objectives. A second. hazard, may be created. by the criminal t s response. Someone has shot at him, and. missed.. He is therefore very 1ike1y to start shooting back, with all the d.a^ngers to both public and police which such a situation will entail. But the real d.anger of a policy which requires or pe:mits the

26

Chapter

2

possibility that police to shoot to wormd. springs from the verT real tenor of whole fhe a buLlet intend.ed to ,o',*d i" fiX"fy to kiII. shoot to to such policies is Iikely to "rr"o*rgl a police officer The situations in woimd. more freely tha* he wourcr. otherwise shoot. serious situaExamples 2 and. I might justify. a_killing, but in lesstI ca^nnot , tions the officer wil-l i" temptea to say to himself just win'g l,rim' I I if right justify killing him, but it ,ilr be all a shot Such an ,pp=or-h will and. has 1ed. to situations where are circumstances intendecl only to wor-md-, ki]1s, and- the sulrrounding correct The not such as would properly justify the killing' must be n'o shootirrg there that say to i. approach, it is "".f*itt"a, is absolutely no alternative, and- unl-ess any No at all unless there honicide. d.eath which results will clearly a,mount to justifiable extreme that reachedshots must be fired. r:ntil the situation has

shoulcL simply state. gnce that stage has been reached. theisofficer from conprevented. shoot to stop; to ensure that the criminal the shootirrg. tinuing witlr that course of action which justified.police should' the that suggests way no Such a proposition in a police circumstances, exceptional shoot to kiII. unless there a,re to ki]] and', if such a officer has no right to fo:m arl intentionproceed.i-ngs would be justistate of mind. courcr. be proved., cri-minar must be to fied. in some circr.mstarrles. The officert s intentionsmust hold' back He make an arrest or prevent a crime, not to kil]' such a from the use of extreme force r-mtil- he has n'o other choice' will have freed'om to be policy, far from suggesting that the police upon r trigger-happyr represents the stri-ctest possibre restriction the both with them and., :-t is =otr*itt"a, complies most strictly spirit and. the letter of the law' WAXNING SHOTS

ca* be similar to those applied to shooting to woundsupersimilar a is There applied. to the firing of warrring shots. of headthe over fired ficial attraction to the id.ea that a shot surto cri-minalthe the criminal will end. the probrem and. persuad.e warning that rend_er. Such evidence ," i" avail-abre (15) suggeststhe d-angers all and. purpose their shots are r:nlikeIy to achi-eve equally to apply wolmd' to intend.edwhich apply to a miss with a shot that the a warning shot. The crininal, after aff, will not know that someone assume to shot was intend.ed as a warnirrg, ancl is likely cases, but it has fired. at him. proper warning is essential- in marry misha,&Led a should. be given with s-omething less d.a.ngerous tha*

comments

firea:m. SHo0[ING AT DooRS, CoNCEAIED PERSoNS,

ETC

of the llo1ly*ood- d-etective it is as a result of the exploits as an instn'ment which can that police officers sometimes see a gu3.d'oors, for pr:ncturing the properly be used. for shooting locks off a variety of similar tyres of cars driven at high speed-, and' forachj'eves itS purpose' A purposes. such misuse of firea.:ms rarely causing rittle car tyre hit by a burlet wil-l usually d.eflate slowry

perhaps

2T Chapter 2 i-nconveni.ence to the d.river. Doors d.o not invariably f1y open r,,rhen a few round.s of pistol ammr:-uition have been fired. near the 1ock, especially if there are bolts fitted. at the top or bottom. Misuse of fj-rea":ms in th:Ls fashion can cause the most seri-ous of mishaps. Ri-chard- Hard.ing (ll) reports the case of an American poli.ce officer respond-ing to a report that a woman was being raped. in her flat. He took a shotgr:n with him when he went to the i:-rt- agd., fin&ing the d-oor loeked, he stepped. back to shoot the lock off . The rape vj.ct1m was stand-ing behind. the d.oor and. was killed.. Need- one say more? CONCLUS]ON

It is submitted- that a proper use of police firea"ms involves first a recognition of the objective of protecting the public from an immed-j-ate or potential threat of extreme violenee. The d.ecision to shoot must be a resrrlt of balancing two evils apd. any shots fired. must be fired- d-eU-berately, to hit a person who has been clearly id-entified-, in circr.mstances so extreme that no other colrrse of action wil-l suffice. NOTES

Pol-ice Act 196\, section hB. Ibid.. , su.bsection [. 3 Fisher v 0lclhan Corporation 1930 (Aff ER 9G). l+ Per Griffith CJ in Enever.v. R. (tgOe) (:Cln 969). 5 Army Act 1955, section 3)+Q) . tPoLice Discipli.ne Regulatj.ons 1965, 1st 6 sched.. , para. 3. , 7 For a cLetailed. d.iscussion on the present state of the law a*6 its application to th'is problem see the authorts The EviI Choice, tCri.minal Law Reviewt, Jarruary 1975, p.h. Extracted- from section 3 CriminaL Law Act 1967 ancL applied. to a plea of self-defence by R. v Mcrnnes 1971 (SS cr App n S5l). 1

2

9

10 11

12 13 1l+

R. v Mch:nes. R. v JuLien 1969 $l Cr App R h07). Criminal Law Revision Qsmmi f,fss, 7th Report, 'Feloni.es and. Misdemeanours I , May 1955, Cmnd. 2659, paras 2O_3. Holmes J i.n Brown v united states 1921 (256- vs 335). Reed. v Wastie (lglZ) rTh" Ti.mes,, 10 Febmary. see for example, R. v Rose, 1BBh. 15 cox cc fl+o; R. v Tolson, -n. 1Bq2 - 23 QFo 168-; R. v King, 19G3. 2 Ar1 ER v-Gouto., s6i; 1968. 1 A11 ER Bhg.

15 15

17

J.c. smith and T.G. Hoga,, tcriminal rrawr, Butte:rr,rorth, Lond.on, 3rd edition, 1973r p.260. see, for exa,mpIe, Par.r1 oboz, Hits and. Mi.sses, rlaw and.ord.er Magazine t (uSn) , April 1958, where one researcher sr-rggests that warrrir:g shots might have succeed.ed. in 28 per cent of the cases j-n whieh they were fi-red.. rt is not clear, however, that some other fom of warning would. not have been equally effective in these cases. Richard. Hard.ing, Killings by chicagp por-ice 1969-T0, r souther:a California Law Reviewt , vo1 . ,l_15 , rto .2.

Chapter

3

THE BASIC PRINCIPIES OE POTICE TACTICS -AIMS A}TD PIANS

rn exaninj-ng the probrems of providirrg ad.equate firea:ms training establishthe first principles of police tactics have already been t to protect as stated. ed.. The OBJECTIIJE of a,mred police has been the public by neutral-ising a d.a^r:gerous offend.ert and. in seeki-ng this ot;eltive it has been proposed. that the people concerned- must be consiilered in relation to a fixed. ord.er of PRIORITIES: 1 The public 2 The police 3 The criminal Il has further been establ-i-shed. that the objective j-s best achievedby METH0Ds which create a situation of ove::tuhelming police superioriiy. These broad. statements apply to all situations and- must be coirsta,tly borne in mind-, but much more is need-ed to provid-e the framework within wkrich all police operations can be conducted-. IMIqEDIAIE AIM

It is extremely important to establ-ish very clearly the immediate aim of any operation. Before any d.ecision can be taken on the mor:nting of an a^:cned. operation all involved. must be clear about what they iniend. to achieve. The immediate alm of an a^:med- operation will generally be d.ete:mj-ned. by the quality of the infomation available and. this wil-I be either IMPBECISE or PBECISE. An imprecise operation might be one where a wanted. man has been reported- to be in a particular town and loca1 intel-tigence suggests that he could be at the home of his mother, or at that of his girl friend-, both of whom live in the toun. Equally, of course, he might not be will in the town at all. In response to that info:mation the police probably have to mor:nt an operation d.esigneal to I0CAIE the crimj-naI, might be by searching the houses. conversely, a PRECISE situation house antLhis in ba*icad.edperson is one where a-nentally d.erarlged is shooting at the police whenever they show themselves. Clearly there is no need to search for that rnorr. whatever remains ur:known, his location is well established. and- the aim of the operation will be to ARREST him. There are, therefore, two tytrles of operation; the IMPBECIffi 28

29

Chapter

3

where the aim is to t0CATtr, and. the PRECISE where the alm is to ARREST. A momentts reflecti-on will show that an operation d.esi.gned. to search a house thoroughly to establish whether or not a wanted.

is present will not be appropriate for arresting a map whose established.. But the d-istincti-on is not just a matter of the aesthetics of correctly d.esigned operatiorrs. Fai-lure to appreciate this d.istinction is one of the major causes of police d.eaths and. of gunpoint confrontations which need. never have occurred-. If the aim of the operati-on is clearly d.efined., then the operation end.s when that aim has been achieved.. The aim of the precise operation is to anest the criminal and. the operation is over when that has been d.one. The aim of the imprecise operation is to locate the criminaL and. when that has been achievea lfre operation is at an end-- Supposi-ng, for example, that police searching the gror:nd. floor of a house in an impreeise situation such as that d.escribed. above become aware of the presence of the criminal on the first fIoor. Once they ha,rre estabLished. that the person upstairs is the crimj-nal-, the operati.on is over. They must not be pe:mittea to go charging upstairs producing the panic confrontation which is so Iike1y to Iead. to shooting and. d.eath. Wtren the criminal has been located- the imprecise operation is over. A quite d.ifferent type of operation is required. to effect the aruest, and the precise operation plannecl subsequently should. not call for police to 11sh Lpstairs. It shoul-d. require that the criminal- be brought out, perhaps in response to a d.emand. for his surrend.er, perhaps bt the use of cherrieal agents such as CS, ind.eed., by anJr means except send.i-ng in poli-ce officers. A locati-on occupied. by an armed. cri-mj-nal- is no place for a sensible poli.ceman. The exa,mples quoted. refer to criminals in buildings, but the point applies to all situati-ons. If a wanted. man were to escape i-nto an area of open cor.mtry where contact with him was lost, the man

whereabouts have been

infomation

would. be imprecise and an operation wou1d. be mor:nted. to

for him. Possibly that operation woul-d. invol-ve a line search with police advancing across the area. If the man were then to appear in a triteh or behind. some rocks and. was to refuse to suL:rrend-er, the situation wou1d. become precise. If the 1ine of policemen were to attenpt to advance upon hj-m casua]ties would. be inevita,ble. It i-s essential that everyone should. know that when the crinlnal has been precisely located the operation is over. Steps should- be taken to confine him to that location and. a new operation must be planned. to effect his arcest. Failure to recognise the change from the imprecise to the precise and- to act upon it will cause d.anger to the public an6 has often eaused- the d.eaths of police officers. The ability to recognise apd. implement this cha^::ge in tacti.cs requires goocL training. A1I police officers must know what is required. of them. If a search or chase has been in prog?ess for some time the police wiLl have become caught up with the spirit of a hr-mt and an air of tense excitement will prevai.I. In such cond.itions it is all too easy to react to a sud.d.en sighting or a confrontation by charging fo::ward.. If such an instinct exists, it must be c:rushed.. Occasional1y, in the more complex precise operations the immed-iate aj.m of the first stage will be somethirrg other than to amest the criminal. A.rr sxample might be seen in a precise situation where search

30 Chapter 3 is complicaa cri-minal- is besieged. i-n a buird-ing and. theofsituation priorities demands ted. by the presence of hostages. The ord-er The immed-iate aim consj-d-eration. that these hostages be siveJrirst be to free the therefore, of the first stage of ,,i op"=ation might, of the a*est the hostages, and. this might oi *ight not involve on a attack an of criminal at that time. Similarly, in the casethe immed-iate aim public figure subjected- to police protection, of the might be to ="*or" the targlt from the scene and. the arrest attacker woul-d become seconda^rXr' PIIASES

when, on the basis of the info:mation available, the operation been been esta,blished. as imprecise or precise and- the aim has d'own broken be must operation the of clearly d-efined., the conduct into for.lr Phases: 1 Containment 2 Planning

has

3 0rganisation l+ Execution way of The objects of this breakd.ourn are to provid-e a logical which, by putting the operati-on together; to establ-ish a process eveaTrone will virtue of trai-ning a,d- trre use of established. te:ms, d-espite the overl-ookecL point is und.erstand; to ensure that no vital the that to ensure tensions present in an a^:mecL operation; andin injuries adpolice avoid. those mistakes which have caused d-eaths the past.

1

Containment

to d-o no The first of the four phases is contair:ment, which mea'n's If there is more tha, to isolate t-tre criminal in a particular spot. it is this orre one importa,t word. in the ra,g:rrage of police tactics to confine the' The first step in any effective police action must be entire build-ing or a criminal to ai particular area *hich might be an rocky outcrop' smalla single room, a vast tract of open cormtry or Irooking again a maze of urba, road. or a single stationa^rxr vehicre. at one of two houses at the imprecise operation where a man m:tght beboth so that, if the in a toun, the first step should. be to contain at least he can*ot man is at one of them, h; must remain there ; or precise the with cLealing in leave without being seen. similarly, the house, his from si-tuation where the d-eranged. man is shooting If house' that first step must be to "rt"o=" that he can*ot leave then police the the public are removed. from the immed.iate area and' shooting' contain the man from protected- positions, he can continueaction, nor There wil_l be no need. for the police to take precipitate even to return fire. tlpes of operaHow containment can best be achieved- in various heading, but whatever tion will be d.iscussed. in d.etail und.er eacharlocated an area within the area of containment, each man must be range of his weapons. his capabiliti.es a,d within the practical d.efined- so as to ensure Fierd.s of responsibility must be carefully

31

Chapter

3

that, if shooting occurs, police officers will not be end.angering other. It is often d.esira,ble to employ men in pairs at the various locations. This provides for better observation, better morale, and. a greater ability to deal with situations which might arise if the criminal should attempt to break out. fn the case of a d.etached. build.ing, containment might be achieved by stationing palrs of a":med. officers at two d.iagonally opposed. corners and giving each pair two ad.joining sid.es of the house as their area of responsibi1ity. If the build.ing is not a simple rectangle ad.d.itional men might be necessarlr to ensure that the criminal cannot leave. In the case of an open cor:ntry search, the initial police response all too often consists of d.espatching numbers of men to the point where the cri-minaL was last seen. Such situations are i-mprecise and. very often little infomation is available. The only thing known for certain i-s that the criminaL has left a certain point, JIet police are often sent to the place where it is knovrn that the criminal is not. fnstead. of assembling men at a particular spot, the commapd.er or controlLer should d.efine an area, possibly using road.s or other features as bound-aries, and. d.eploy the immed.iately available police around. that axea to contain it. It may well be ilifficult to achieve such containment, but that effort is more likely to produce results than is the assembly of poli-ce at a point which the criminal has certainly left. Contai-nment cannot always be positive. The d-egree of avai1ability of police may be such that positi-ve containment cannot be aehieved. quickly and. in marry large scal-e situations positi-ve contalnment through whi-ch the criminal coul-d. not possibly break would. require battalions which will never be avail-able. fn such cases it will be necessar1r to settle for visual containment. In other word.s, although the police may not be able to say that the matrl cannot leave the arrea, they may be able to say that he cannot Leave without being seen. If he is able to break through the contaj.r:nent, the police must be red.eployed to secilre his positive containment as quickly as each

possible. In countries where patrolling police offi-cers a^re nomally unmed. and. yet a,re required. to respond. to an emergency by attempting to contain an a^:med. criminaL there arises the question of the action expected. of the unamed. officer i.f the crimi-nal attempts to leare. Must he, a:med. only with a short stick, tackle a d.esperate ma^n a:med. with a shotgun? The a^nswer can be for:nd. by reference to the ord-er of priorities. ff that criminaL is causi-ng a serious and. immed.i.ate d.anger to the public, the police officer has a duty to try to stop hlm. He is not required. to commit srricid.e, but he will be expected. to take some risks. If there is no serious and. immed.iate d.anger to the public, the officer is a fool who tries to tackle the matrl. He should. let him go and. go with him, mai-ntaining contact and. achieving what may be a contradiction in te:ms, a moving containment. If thi-s is d.one, a^:med. police officers can be d.eployed. as quickly as possible to produce a static and. positive containment. The initiaL response to any situatj-on i-nvolving a^:med. crj-minaLs must , therefore , be to seek to achieve containment . If thi s i s d.one the police have secured. the th:tng they need. most time. Time to plarl, time to orgarrlse, time to get men and- equipment to the scenei time, in fact, to d.o the job properly. Only when there is a real

32

ChaPter

3

there be any justification for immed'iatemay be is moving there action agarnst the crimj-nar. rf the-criminaf contained- immediate action a need. for some action, but where he ismembers of the public are colr will usually be r.md.esirable evenoIwhen like}y to be used'' as hostages' fined with him apcl being osear length later and' it is [he hostage problem will be d.ealt with ataction is more likery to sufficient here to say that precipitate In the vast them' cause the d-eaths of hostages than to prevent the sole iilitial t" of situations coitainment

and. d.esperate need. can

majority

=froota

response.

situation This is lLo more than good- sense. Take the imprecise Common houses' of nr'mber a of where a waptecL ma11 m:ight be at one shourd' they house the sense d.ictates that before the police approach 1969 police throughensure that the criminal cannot escape' During a record of serious out Britain were searching for a man who had-who was wanted' for anfl violence, who was believefl to be a,:med', block of flats where they m;rd.er. llvo d.etectives enquired at a city in a top floor fl-at were given info:mation suggesting that a malI d-id- not approach might be the matrI they *"=" seeking. l^Iise1y, they of officers nt;mber a Later' until additional men were avallable' police a and' approached the fIat, there was a fIurry of shots time shooting at a short -through officer felf , wor:nd.ed.. ['he matrI then spent a window. IIe rampaged escaped. he arrything thai moved before was finally kiIIed' by across the city shooting wirdly ,"rt b"fo=" hema, wound-ed- a totalpolice he had. latarly *I..,,,d;d Z es years orcr. wasandshot in the o1d' chil-d' of twel-ve other people. l1 B yearsshopper in the neck as shot was stomach as he was playing, a woman failed' to police the she went about her businEss. Wkry? neiause flat' to the contain the buil-d.i'g: property beiore they went for an escaped 1g71 police trrrougilout Britain were searching prisoner who had d.emonslrated- that he was a:med. a*d-

In

willi*g to shoot IIis shooting ability did' by firing at a mmber of police officers. charged. with the not match his intentions, but he was eventually reliable inmost The attempted. murd.er of seven police officers' an hotel room and' a fo:mati-on was received. that this man was in fhey went into the hotel party of a:med. police went to the scene' Approachins the Iea,,ing one r:na^r^med- constable outsi-d-e with a ca'r' d.oor,thepolj.cecalled.forthema^nto'Comeout.'Hectid.:through where he took the the window, across a roof and. into the street a cax chase in which the police ca]- at gr:npoint. There followecL who returned' fire as they escaper fired. from a moving catr at police

the ma'n was trapped- in a sped. through ap urbap ur.*. Finally, he was wor-md.ed- a*d- arrested-. A gard.en vrhere, a^fter further shooti-ngj-n that gard-en ad-.nanJr more number of in,ocent peopre were also why was tha! . d'a*ger An6 were end.angered- auring: the car chase ' effecbuild-ins

the caused.? Because the iolice failed. to contain tivelY before theY went in' the info:mation i-s imsuch incid-ents d.o not only happen where-house where a man had gone to a precise. In 1g7O police ,"rL caliedofficers, who withd'rew' police at berserk with a shotgun. IIe shot his own home' shooting as he went' Later, the ma,n was able to leavehouse where he herd- a woman a*d her a*d. force his way into another Drring that time' the two chil-d.ren hostage for thirty-six hours' in the hand-s of a lives of those innocent people were entirely

33

Chapter

3

d.angerous, d.eranged. man. Those innocent people were taken hostage and their lives were put at risk because the police failed to con-

tain the

man

effectively.

No d.i.rect criti-cism is intend.ed. of the officers concerned. in these operations. They are the people upon whose mistakes others should- build. and., having regard- to cond.itions in Britain at that time, it is probable that other officers and. other police forces would. have reacted- in the sane way. Similar cases have occurred. in manJr cor-mtries and. they continue to occlrr. Proper and. effective contaj-nment d-oes not just happen and. will not be achieved by send.ing an ind.ividual- police officer to twatch the backt nor by tsurroundirrgt the place in a haphazatd- way. It reqr:-ires a careful cLeplolment of the correct number of officers, each with his fie1d. of responsibility, each m€iln trained., each ma^n briefed., and each ma.n knowing exactly what is required- of him. It requires that no vital point roof, basement, concealed. exist, etc. - is left uncovered..

2 Planning When, in any situati-on, contaj-r:ment has been achi-eved., the police have bought time. There is now no d.esperate need. for further action until d.etaj-led. plans hare been mad.e. ft i-s clear from the incid.ents stud-ied. durirrg the research d.escribed. in Chapter 1 that a:med. operations are often badly prepared., with senior officers trying to run them roff the euff t, and. with no one else having any clear id.ea of what is intend.ed.. That way lies confusion and. in a:med. operations confusion will kill. No matter how apparently simple the operation, clear plans are vital. The next phase of the operation must, therefore, be the planning phase and. this can be broken d.own i-nto three or five stages:

fhe gathering of info:mation. ") The preparation of the basic p1an. (U) (

(") The preeparation of conti-ngency plans. In certain more complex operations it may also be necessa"ry to consid.er:

(a) Plans for a preli.minarlr operation, with contingencies. (") Plans for a second.a^:qr operation, with contingencies.

(

")

Gathering infomation

Plans cannot be mad.e without i-nfo:mation. A11 too frequently the police are satisfied. with that info::nation wtr-ich is to hand.. This is not enough, and. there must be a positive effort to gather all the avai-labl-e infomation about the criminal. Ilho is he? What has he d.one? IIow will he be id.entified.? lrlhat is his mental and. physi-calcond.ition? What weapons ancL ammuniti.on d.oes he have? l'lhat is his previous record.? What is known of his motives? Every tit-bit of infomation which can be produced. is vital. 0f course, it couldhappen that d.espite police enquiri.es all that j-s knom: is that an unid.entified. man is shooting at them for reasons which are far from cIear, but every effort should. be mad-e to create a fu1l and. cLetailed pi-cture of the subject. Info:mation about the venue is also vital.

3L+ ChaPter

3

search a house they will need sketch plans, irancL so o1r'. rf posfo:mation about d.oors, windows, light switchesfuruiture. supposing sibLe they should. even know the layout of the search a to begin infomation' that the police, acting on imprecise they shourd- fintL a settee house knowins that in trre sitting room see that the across the centre of the room. When they look in they will ask They settee has been pulletL across a corner of the room' their direct themserves why. That rittre pi-ece of info:mation will The layout of attention to that point ancL *o night avert a tragecly. other id-entical a house ca, frequentry be ascertarned. by rooki*g at other police or neighbours houses on an estate, or by seekirrg out to find important be officers who may have been there. rt wilr arso and' brick they out how the interior walls ar,e constnrcted.. Are through capable of stopping a burr-et or are they of praster-boa"rd-be impo::which a bul]et will easily pass? other info:mation will cmcial at the tant what other people ,ilr be in the vicirrity sought' be must info:mation time, and. so o11. l,ff available

rf the police

a^re

to

(u) Basic plan the command'er all availabl-e info:mation has been assembled',plans as aJ.le prosuch often All_too must produce his basic plan. a*cL d.irection. [hey contain duced. for a^:eured. operatiins rack clarity rbutst rifs' intend.ed- to cater for a-11 a*d an infinite number of not lendeventual-ities. The resrrlt is often confusing antL d-oesbe committed' elements itself to ease of commrmication, nor can itspurpose of the tactics easily to memoly. The basic Plan, for the will bring which action of course that being consid.ered., refers to basic plan The goes wrong. nothing the operation to a conclusion if must be mad-e with complete single-mind.edness, whilst wearing the police from brir:kers a*d_ rooking onty straight akread.. rt takes operation on the the of their arrival at the """rr" to the conclusionan impreeise situation assumption that nothing will interfere. In courses where a wanted. man misht be at a particular house, various axea they l-eave the of action are open, but before th; police courd. the house completesearch or man, would. either ha.ve to affest their guarantee in they ly to be sure that he was not there. since basiccannot be to will plan adva,ce that the criminal- will be there, the taken be may conduct a search of the house, even though other steps assr:mption before that is d.one. A11 detail- will be settled. on the nothing will and completelY, searched. be that the house will have to where the man interfere with the search. In a precise situation, the police from at shooting pLrhaps has already been located. a*d is him to surfor call to the house, the basic pf an will no:mal-Iy be will surhe that rend.er. The plan will be mad.e on the assr-mption can they rend_er and. men wirr- be d.eployed- in positions from which d.eal with him when he comes out' llhe basic pfan will generally utilise one of threeaapproaches' wa*ted' ma, is For example, if It may be tasla mainly In =',r=1,=1"". in assemble to be might plan known to be in an hotel bed.room, the

h,l:en

through the the corrid.or outsid.e the room ad- then sud.d.errfy burst pfan might basi'c A d.oor to grab the matrI whilst he is stil] asleep' in a situatj-on like that just d.epend_ mainly on subterfuger so that

35

Chapter

3

d.escribed., a police officer might d.ress as a walter to gain entry to the hotel room to establish the id-entity of the occupant or gain some other advantage. Most frequently, however, the basic plan will involve d.irect action, open moves by the police &irected. at the criminal in a clear way. If a man is knoun to be i-n a builtl-ing,

they may contain him and. then simply call for him to surrend.er. If they suspect that a wanted. man is in a build.ing, they may move in to

search quite openly. The basic plan must be prepared. in d.etail. A plan for searching a buil&ing on i-mprecise info:mation should show how containment has been achieved. and. if it is to be supplemented. for the actual seareh. It would. then d.etail the progression of the search, starting with the arrival of the police in the area, their assembly at, a starting point, their method. of approach, their point and. method. of entry, and the pattern of search within the build.ing. Ar\y subsequent changes in d.etail- which might affect officers other than those searchi.ng must be reported. to eveaTrone concerned-. Unannor"mced. d.eviati.ons from the lcoor^n: plan could. be d-a^ngerous. In one incid.ent police were searching the gror.lnd. floor of a house for an a^mred. criminal. The lead-er of the team had entered. wearing a blue tr"rric and. hat, with body' a"Tmorrr over the tr:nic. In the course of the search he took off his tunic and. hat. He then d.iverted. from the pattern of search by emerging unannounced. from a back d.oor. A police rifleman covering that d.oor reported. seeing a t suspect I d.ressed. in a white shirt and. tbrow: pullovert and. carrying a gun. The rifleman took aim but, fortunately, d.id. not see a need. to shoot. Such an incid.ent illustrates the need. for a clear plan and. for strict adherence to it r:nless all concerr:ed. are notified. of the change.

(")

Contingency plans

It is quite r.rnreal-istic to suppose that all operations will be concl-ud.ed. in accord.ance with the basic p1an. The basic plan assumes that nothirrg will go wrong, but things d.o go wrong and it is when this happens that d.eaths occlr. Marry of the things which a:ce like1y to happen could. be foreseen from the start antL yetr oD so manJr occasions, no provision has been

resulted.. It is therefore

mad.e and.

confusion and. tragedy have

to prepare a limited. nr-mber of contingency plans to cater for the foreseeable. This must not be neeessarXr

done in a haphazaxd w&yr thinking of a cor:.rse of acti-on if and. when a problem comes to mi nd.. Contirrgency plans must be produced. in such a way that all Iikely occlrrrences a,re consid.ered.. This is d.one by examining the d.eta;il of the basi-c plan step by step, consid.ering what is like1y to happen as a result of each step. Consid.ering again the i-mpreeise operation in which it i-s proposed. to search for a wanted. man at the home of his mothei, the basic plan will d.etall- the amival and assembly points and. the approach to the house. As soon as the police make an open approach to the house there is a possibility that the criminal will attempt to escape by breakirrg out, and ttris possibi-lity will be present throughout the operation. The situation will be that a"med. offi-cers are stationed. outsid-e the house to contain it, and. other amed. offj-cers a,re either

36

Chapter

3

for the purpose of searching' If approaching the house or inside it are no plans, the officers the crimina] breaks out, apd. there. At the sa'me time the searchi-ng may well pursue him immed'iately' ancl, if forced to d'o so; may ehallenge officers containing the house by the confusion whj-ch worrld' caused. be wi1] shoot. Great d.a'ger ran into the area of respollsibility result if the searching officers they l,rhen these cr-a,gers are foreseen of the containi*g officers. break-out, by planrring that, ifi case of a can' easily be will- stand fast' The ",,oia"a those officers responsiure for searching officers on containment who break_out is the =""porr"ibirity of the unfortr-inatery it is not quite wilr challerrge a*d. stop thelittle "=1*irril. further' If the criminal d'oes so simple; ie must l-ook a him? If the officers on constop when chaIIenged., who is to arrest in suitable positions, they tainrnent are in sufficient strength and. on members of the searchirrg tea'm may d.o sor othenvise th;t may 9"11 Contingency plan 1 would therefore to come to their assistai:ce. provide that if the crj-micover this eventuality a,cr. perhaps ,6oro- for the eontair:nent of nar breaks out, those officers responsibl; him' If he stops' the point from which he breaks will challenge theywillmovehimtoasuitab}epositionarrd.thencaflonthe make the arrest whilst they searchirrg officers to come fo::t'rard' to practical the plan may call on remain und.er cover. rf that is not make the a*est themselves. those resporrsible for tontainnent to wilr stop when chalLencontingency 1 assumes that the crininal ancr, stop trim. rt is shoot ged, or that irr" police will be forcecr. tocriminal may not stop when necessa4r to loor- a r-ittle further. Thesuch that shooting cannot be challenged a*d. the circr.msta*ces may ue danger to the public' A justified. or night cause unacceptable account of this ancl define the second. contirrgency plan must take criminar- breaks through the immed.iate action to be taken if the to establish a' outer conir:ner contain*ent. rt might be necessaJsr maintain a mobile resel\re tail,rment, further from the scener oI to to .say that, io such a for this purpose, or it uight be srrfficient in the axea from which the crimj-case, the offj-cers o11. cont;nment pursuit t9- maintain contact' nal breaks will go immed.iately in are rmtir they are redeployecl to other officers wilr stay where !h"y a*d_ oir.ce again contain the criminal. cut off the avenue of "L"u.p" plan a stage fi:rther, an approach will Irooking through the basic officers will be mad.e to the d-oor and; p=""ir*ably, the searchirrg irrlt the d.olr win be answered by his mother

welr be with her. It will be desiran1 a plan *r1lt t" fo:muLated to deal event but she shorrld al-so be able to get her out of the house in arry aim is to establ-ish inte:sriewed_ about her sor1. The immed-ilte NOT to amest }1:im' If his whether or not the m.an is in the house, is ove,r and' it mother says that he is i-n the house, the operation ad. turn to a new, precise will be necessalTr to maintain conta^i-nment be that her son' is not there' she will operation. If the ,o** sayssearch plan contingency will corrtinue. assr:med. to be lyirrg a'd. the got out of the house and be will 3 will outline iror- d;;?T.11 has been inte:rriewed'' provid.e for a pause or withdrawal r:ntir she the crj-mina'I' ad' conby fhe d.oor might, of course, be answered with him' such contact may occur at tact will- then have been mad-e police are makirrg their any stage. It cou]-d. r,u,pp"' whilst the ar.rring the seatrch' [he aim approach, at the cLoor, ;; at any stage

knock. rt

may

3T Chapter 3 of the operation is to locate the criminal-, but clearly if he su-rrend.ers at once he will be amested.. ff , however, he resists, or retreats further into the house, and d-oes not immed.iately surrend.er, the operation is over. The police must not go fon^rard. to overcome him, they must not indulge in need.Less exehanges of shots. [hey shoul-d wi-thdraw to the point where they a,:ee safe and ensure that containment j-s effective in the new situation. Having d.one this, they should await the new precise plans before trying to effect the amest. If the ma^n has been contained. and. the publi-c have been safeguarded there can be no need. for the police to msh in to make a swift heroic arrest. If the police a^lee i-n protected. positions and. the public aJee cl-ear of the atea, there can be no need to return gr:nfire . If , dt thi s stage , the crimina1 wi she s to shoot he should. have no targets. In this exa.mpIe, where the police were acting on imprecise info:matj-on to search for a wanted- man at the home of his mother, the basic plan was to search the house and. this would. cover the details of approach, search pattern ancL so otr. By exa,mining the basic pfan from the begir:ning, four contingency plans have been produced. to d.eal- with:

1 A break out by the crimina1 inner contair:ment. 2 A break out by the criminal containnent.

3 A confrontation with the

where he can be stopped. where he

within the

gets through the inner

woman where she can

be got out of the

house. h The locating of the criminal when he d.oes not immed.iately surrend.er. fn this way the foreseeable can be catered. for, and most of the situati-ons which catrr cause real chaos and. d.anger can be avoid.ed.. 0f corarse, the totally unforeseen could. happen. The criminal might agive outsid.e the house which the police a,re searching insid-e; une:4lected. visitors might be at the house; and so otr. To cater for every remote possibility woul-d. be impossible and. unwise. Renote possibilities must be catered. for by producing a system of control ancL command. which wil-] alIow of immedi-ate red.eplo;rment. In ad.d.ition to catering for the d.angerous foreseeable events, contirrgency plans have another vital role in that they provid.e a

check on the viability and advisability of the basic pIan. Taker &s an example, the basic plan which invo1ves nrshing through the d.oor of a room to grab the ma^n supposed to be asleep in bed.. The basj-c plan might cal-l for assembly outsid.e the room d-oor and. for the nrsh to be mad.e at a partieular signal. A1l- the officers will make for the bed. to grab the criminal. But what if the man is not in bed? It is possible that he would. be d.isturbed by the assembling of the rreo. Suppose he is sitting at the other sid.e of the room with a shotgr:n in his hancLs. Once that possibility is e:rpIored., the whole plan is brought into questi-on. Is that the right way to cLo it, or would. it be more wise simply to push open the d.oor with no policemen e:cposed., ard call for the occupant to come out of the room? Alternatively, steps might be taken to ensure that he can be seen to be asleep before an entry is mad-e. The application of the test of proper contingency planning will check the basic plan in many respects and. might result in a complete change of approach.

38 (

Chapter

3

a) Preliminarry oPerations

,ohe basic

pla, is

achieve the immed-iate ai-m of the mo"i-"r""s virl be either to r-ocate the criminal

desigRed

to

in to arrest him' In some circunorr if the situation is preciset some of the problems before stances it might be usef-ur- to &ispose of it may be d'esirable to mount the basic plan is put into effect, and'where the woma'rtt s house is to a preli-mina^ry operation. fn the case immed-iate aim is to l-ocate the be searched. for her wa*tecl son the be to search the house' criminar a*d. the basic plan will generallynatters inclu&lng what is contingency plans wilr aear with variousThe problem caused' by the to happen if the woman is encountered-' which might be obtained' mother, and. the value of the info::sration a prerimina^ry plan may be d'efrom her on inte:nriew, are such that woma, out, perhaps by vised. with no object other tha, to get trrepreriminaJry pran is dethe some subterfuge. rn such a situati6n quiti d.ifferent from that of resrrlt immed.iate signed to *"hl"rr" an It is may be the 1""' the basic pfarr, even though the ena prJdqctfirst. rf then certain important that the basic pr"r, is_comileted. basic p1a, is put into aspects need. to be aeJt ,itr, before- the appropriate' If a prelimieffect, a preliruina.ry operation might be whieh it raises wirl d-iffer continglncies na^rTr p1a* is prepared., it some, such as plan. " basic io= the in some respects from those mad.ecan be catered. for by the arrangethe possibility of a break-out, wil-I require special ments mad.e for the basic op"=riion; others preparation. between a preliminary operation rt is importa,t to distingrrish the case of a house search a'd. initial steps in the basic p]a,. rn itnightbethoughtusefultomoveallmenintopositionarrd.then, hailer to order the before the search commefloesr to use a loud'This is merery an iritial criminal from the house if he is there.aim is precisely that of the step in the basic p1a,. rts immed.iate a,d' it basic plan, it d.oes not raise any d-ifferent "otttit'gencies'

operati-on, which

doesnotcallforanyd.ifferentorganisation. preced'e the basic cases a prelim'ina4r opeiation might

In some proiection is being provid'ed operation by a consid.erabre time. when be concerned- with action at to pubric figures the basic pfan wilrprobably have as its immed-iate aim the seene of any attack a*a wilr the source of d-a,ger. PreLiminarry the removal of the rrrt;""i from of the subject a*cl to operations will be needed. to search atread. r:ntiI the maln body of men secure the areas which have been searched. arrives.Theinmediateainoftheprelimina^ryoperationwillbeto or aIIr weapons such as locate ancl id-entify any potential attackers' raised, and- these m:ight inbombs. Different contingencies_wil-l be with any suspect, isolate and clud.e prepaxation to "orrI"in ancL ileal the subject from a dear with suspected. bombs, method.s of diverti-ng a case different organisasuspected. d-anger, and so o11. In such be raised'' tional problems, involving different ment will llheproperpreparationofthewho}eoperationrequj-resthatthe any contingency plans' basic plan be prepared. first, followed' by ,itt' it= own contirrgencies The plarr for the preliminary operation, main operation' ca.n then be welded on to the

39

Chapter

(")

Second.arxr

3

operations

operations it may be necessarJr to mount seconlike preliminarJr operations, these are d-istinguished. from the basic plan by the fact that they have a cl-ifferent immecLiate aim, raise cl-ifferent contingencies, and. requi-re a &ifferent orgapisation. An example might again be for:nd. in an operation for the protection of a public figure. The basic plan for pro-

In

some more complex d.a^ry operations and.,

tection would. almost certainly revolve around. the rapid. removal of the subject from any suspected. source of d.anger without ilealing with the attacker unless he were preventing the removal- of the subject. A prelimina,ry operation would. ha;ve been mor-rnted. to deal with advance checks along the route, etc. If an attack occurred. the prima^ry effort woql-d. be involved with the basic plan but once the subject was clear a carefully planned. and. co-ord.inated. effort wouLd. be need-ed. first to contaln, and- then to arrest, the attacker. Roles which offi-cers perfo:med. for the basie stage would change, and- efficiency would. d.epend. on pre-planning the second.ary sta6e of arresting the criminal-. A second.a^rXr plan must not be confusecL with a minor aspect of the basic plan, which may requi-re separate attention. If police officers were to set up an ambush at a banlc as a result of info::mation that it was to be raid.ed., the basic plan might be concernedwith the arrest of the crimi-naIs insid.e the bar"lk. If there was an escape vehicLe outsid.e the bank a separate Little operation, executed. simul-tageously, might be needed to d-eal with the driver. This wou1d. involve ad.d.itional- men, but its aim woulcL be id.entical to that of the basic Flan, to arrest the cri-minals, ancL this would- therefore be a simr.il-taneous minor operation. A second.a:qr plan has an aim which is qrrite ilistinct from that of the basic plan, and is put i-nto effect when the basic operation is completed-. CONCIUSION

Thus far the basic princi-ples have been concerned. with aims ancL p1ans. llhese can be sr,mmarised. in the t aid.e-memoiret shovrn bel-ow. ffr" problems of organisation - of marrpower, comrnand. ancl. control, andof equipment must be consj-d-ered- next. Sr,mma^:ry

of aims ancL plans

OBJECTIVE:

PR]ORITIES:

MEIIIOD:

IMMEDIATE AIM:

[o protect the public by neutra]-ising a clangerous off end.er

1 The public 2 The police 3 The criminal [he creation of a situation of obvious whelming police suPerioritY 0n IMPRECISE info:mation - to I0CAIE

and. over-

h0

Chapter

3

0n PRECISE PIIASES:

1

2

info:mation - to

ARREST

Contair:ment

Planning ( Gathering info::mation ") Basic plan (u) ( Contingency plans ") in some operationss Plus, (a) PreliminarJr plans with contingencies (") Second.a^ry plans r,,rith contingencies

Chapter

la

THE BASIC PRINCIPIES OE POTICE TACTICS -MEN AND EQUIPMENT

When, and. onLy when, the planning phase of the operation is compIete, attention should be turned. to the third. phase, 0RGA\IISATf0N. This is concerned. with the production of precisely the right nr-imber of men, properly organised., properly command.ed, properly equipped. and properly briefed.. There is d.anger j-n confusing the plaruring phase by too much consid-eration of d.etailed. requirements of marrpower and weaponaTr. Obviously, the basic plan wi1l, from the outsetr pro-

vid.e some ind.i.cation of manpower requirements. When establishing or revi.ewing contair:ment it will become apparent that men will be requirecL at certain points aror:nd. the scene. This d.oes not esta,blish the manpower requi.rements with ar5r precision, and. planning must not be sidetracked. by concern with the exact numbers of men at each pointr the types of weapon they will use and. so otl. These are matters for the organi.sation phase. This phase i-s of fi:nd.a.mental importance and. it is vital that the command.er applies himself properly to it and. d.oes not attempt testimatest of its requirements. The organisation phase is broken d.own into four stages:

1 Marrpower 2 Command. stmcture 3 Equipment l+ Briefing

Each stage may be

1

further

d.ivid.ed.

to

aid. consid.eration.

IVIANP0I4IER

first few minutes of an emergency may involve a d.esperate shortof marrpower, but as time goes on more and more men are usually &irected. to the scene. In. many cases embamassment, inefficiency, failure and. even d.eaths can be attributed. to excessive numbers of officers, bad.ly organised. and ba&Ly comma.nd.ed. Polj-ce officers no:mal1y act ind.epend.ently, using thei.r own initiative and. enjoying wi-d.e areas of d.iscretion. In a planned. and controlled. operation they must act as a r:nit und.er d.irection and. must not react as ind.ivid.ual-s. New arrivaLs at a scene must be instantly d.rawn into an organisation or they will move off ind.epend.ently, using their ov,m initiative and. causing real d.ifficul-tj-es and. d-anger for others. A The age

h1

)p Chapter

h

too manJr men a,re iLeployed. is probably more in which too few a^re available. What is required. is exactly the right number of men for that operation. That number cannot be ascertained. until the planning phase is completed.. The number of men reqrrired. to implement the basi-c plan can only be established. by examining that pfan in cLetail, step by step, taking account of tasks which each man might have to perfo:m and. of the need. to provid-e the fullest possible protecti-on for all police officers. The process is facilitated. by d.eploying the men in four g?oups, each of which has a specific area of responsibility, and. by provid-ing an ad.equate command. structure. Each of the groups is responsible for a specific fi.inction, and. for that fi:nction alone. (") [he perimeter group: Responsible for contro]Iing the pubIi.c. (U) [he cover group: Responsible for achieving and. maintaining contair:ment throughout the operation. (") [he rai-d. group: Responsi-ble for achieving the immed-iate aim of the operation. No:ma1ly searching for and. locating the criminalr or effecting the a^rrest. (a) fhe support group: Responsible for assisting the raid. group, provicl-ing them with proteetion, d.ealing with persons other than the criminal, and. generally ensuring that the raid. group are free to concentrate solely on their own task.

situation i-n whi-ch d.angerous than one

(

r) [he perimeter

group

of the perimeter group is the protection of arry members of the public in the area of the operation. fhey must remove any members of the public who may be i-n dangerr or protect them if they cannot be moved.. [krey must establish a perimeter and. ensure that the public, inclu&ing the press and. med-ia representatives, are kept well clea^r. This task is vital. In the first place the whole object of the operation i-s concerned. with the protection of the public and. this cannot be achieved. if inrrocent bystand.ers or spectators are all-owed. to get themselves shot. Second., the entire operati.on couLd. be jeopard-ised. by one person walking into a field. of fire at a cnrclal time. Apart from any operational failure, police Ii-ves may have to be put at risk to rescue or protect such ind-ividuals. The role of the perimeter g:eoup is an extremely d.ifficult one for a police officer. This group must i-gnore the crinlnal and. quite The task

Iitera11y turn their backs on him. Every policeman at the scene will feel- that he shoulcl be involvetL with the criminal. Good organisation, fi:m control and. clear briefing are required- to ensure that the fi.mctions of the perimeter g?oup are properly carried. out. Failure to d.esignate and- organise this aspect of an operation can have the most serious consequences ancl- the problem is not one which can be tackled. by allocating tasks to ind.ividuals as a commartd.er happens to think of a lnazayd. The role must be isolated. and. consid.ered in depth. It is noi just a matter of closing road.s, nor of establishing ta ring of poli-ce officersr around- the aTea. A number of problems arise when the functions of the perimeter group are consid.ered-. First, it is necessarTr to take account of those people alreacty in the area when the police arrive. Shal-l they be evacuated., or wiLl it be simpler, more effective, ancl sa.fer to

I

l

l+3 Chapter

la

keep them insi-d-e build.i.ngs. If the l-atter course is axrangements wiLl have to be made to safeguard. those adopted., people. second', it is necessarrr to consid.er those who, for nay wish to go into the area of operations. rt willvarious reasons, be sufficient simply to close road.s and. d.epend. on the rgood.not sense' of such people' During a hostage situation irl 19T0, to which reference has already been mad-e, a position arose in whi.ch the d.era,ged. ma, was threatening the life of a verTr smalI chi-ld-. It seemed. that the babyt s life hr:ng by a thread. and. at that moment a teLevision crew sneaked' between two houses and. set up their camera in view of the erininaL' The opportr:nity to perfom before a large aud-i-ence is very likely to provoke a deranged- person to take action. These intmders were takins some risk themselves, but they were causing serious d'anger to one of the hostages. ample nr:mbers of police were availa'ble and some had. been d.eployed. at end. of the road., but a perimeter Sroup had not beer. p=op"rly organised """r, apd the area through which the newsmen' slipped was no one I s responsibility. organise the perimeter group could. have end.ed in tra.gedyFaiLure to in that case.

rn some operations it may be d.ecid.ed. that the peri.meter g?oup wiLl consist of one man, for exa.mple when an operation is to be :nounted' in a qulet area in the early hours or lrre morning. fn other cases the perimeter g?oup will enploy the vast majority tr the police officers committed- to the tperation. Occasionally it wi1l be found that the basic plan produces no requi.rement for perimeter a group, perhaps when an isolated. build.ingls to be searchld.. If , during the orga,isation phase, the perimeter group's role is considered and it is d'ecid-ed- that it is unnecessarrr, the result will be a consid.ered. d.ecision and. not a foolish oversight. lu) The cover

group

The cover groupts role is containment. These officers should. take up protected positions before the operation proper commences, a,,d.

will- remain in those positions until ope-ration end.s. Their positions and areas of responsibility the must be selected. with great care' ft is their fi-rnction to ensurer &s far possible, that the criminal- cannot leave the area to which he hasas been confined.. Their locations should- be such as will allow them to challenge and. d.ea1 w"ith the criminar- whirst he j-s insid.e the atrea. supposirrg, for exampIe, the cover group were seeking to contain the rear of a buil&ing which backed- on to a yard.. rt wourd. be -important to try to secure positions which worrld. allow them to challengl the crim1nal i+hen he came to the d-oor of the build.ing, thap to use positions which left the wi.nd.ows and. d.oor out rather of vi.ew and made it inevitable that the challenge would. be mad.e in the yard or street. rf challenged- whilst he is in the d.oomay, the od.d-s are that the criminal- wilL bolt back into the build.ing, sla.urming the d_oor. ehallenged in the open he i-s much more 1ike1y to break outIf or shoot, so forcing the police to take action in the street. [he importance of contaj-nment has already been d.iscussed. at length, but in ad-d-ition to securing operationaL effi-ciency the cover group will play a vital role in reducing the ri.sk to other officers

hl+ Chapter

l+

more active ro1es. Taking again the exa,mple of an operation where a house is to be searched. for a wanted. man; it has already been established. that containnent woul-d. be the first step. Initially, that containment would. probably be covert with every effort mad.e to avoid. attractirrg the attention of the crimina-1 if he were there. Subsequently, other groups will approach the house to commence the search and at, that sta6e the presence of the cover group should- be mad.e perfectly clear. If the criminal were to beiierre that a small number of poli-ce officers approachirrg a d.oor constituted. the total of the forces opposi-ng him, he would. be encouraSed. to fi-re at them in his efforts to escape. If, however, he is mad.e to know that he is contained- and. there is no hope of escape, he is much less 1ikely to shoot, knowing that he will thereby run a serious risk and. that he has no chanee of escape. [hi-s process must not, of course, make the cover group more rnrlnerable. The criminalshorrl-d. be mad-e aware of their presence but they must remain in their protected. positions so that they appear to the criminal to be committed.

to

inrnrlnerable. 1phe cover group has one job and. one job only: to ensure that the criminal cannot leave a specified. area or, if that is impracticable' to ensure that he cannot leave without being seen. This iob requires their full attention and. they must not be asked. to combine iunctions by trying to includ.e perimeter gseoup duties of keeping out the public. A brief period. of inattention coul-d. result in the crimj.nal breakirrg through before the cover man can respond., and. the results couLd. be tragic. Because of the nature of the task evelTr effort must be mad-e to restrict the peri.od. of time for which a man is employed. j-n a cover ro1e. A ma^nt s attenti-on is likely to wand.er after a very limited. period. of watching two sid.es of a house from which there is no activity, or of watching a stretch of d.esertedroadway. If possible reliefs should. be arranged. for any lengthy operation, and. the fact that the cover group will not no:mal-Iy be involved. in physical effort means that they should. be relieved. more qruiekly, not less quickly, than the members of other groups.

(")

The raid. group

The raj-d. group is charged. with the achievement of the immed.iate aim. In an imprecise operation these atre the officers who will d.o the

actual searching. In the precise operation they are the officers who will make the arrest. In the vast majority of cases the raidgroup will consi-st of two rl€n. Where a build-ing is to be searched-, these two will enter each roo-m, searching carefully in their effort to 1ocate the criminal. If the operation 1s precise, the raid- group must still be fo:med-. They are the men d.esignated. to make the arrest. If the criminal is known to be in a build.ing or room there shoulcl- be no searching and. the police will not go in for him. IIe should. be forced. from the bruild:ing either with caLls to surrend-er, by the use of CS, or by some other means. When he emerges the raid g3oup, apd. the raid- group onfy, will- take charge of the process of ,==""ting him. The raid. group will not be responsible for such tasks as lar.mching the CS, and- they must not be tasked with dealing with persons other than the criminal. They must be free to

-5 Chapter

Ja

:oncentrate all their attention on the criminal-. ,

a) Ihe support

group

If the raid. group a:re to concentrate entirely on their immed.iate :ask they will clearly need. some help. If, in an imprecise operation, the raid. group move into the entrance hall of a house to com:ience searching, they may have the choice of three or more rooms cefore them. No matter which they choose, there is a d.asger of the eriminal coming from one of the other rooms to shoot them in the oack. The support group are responsible for isolating that part of the build.ing which is being searched- from arrSr parts y;t to be searched-, and. for protecting the raid. group from attack from the unsearched- areas. Support men must always be avaj-lable to the raid. +oup to watch d.anger points and. generally assist in searching. [he sapport 8roup wiLl be responsible for d.ealing with anJrone other than :he crimj-nal who may be for.md. at the scene. If there are hostages 3r other non-criminals, support men must be available to take them away, leaving the raid. group free to concentrate on the criminal. If the operati.on involves the use of CS, or d.ogsr or arrything else rhich might assist the raid. group, the officers concernea wiff be in the support group which will varJr in size accord.ing to the d.emand.s :rade upon it. fhis allocatj-on of marrpower to groups, each with its specijic ro1e, senres several- purposes.four First it ensures that everTrone 3as a iob and. knows exactly what that job entails and. where it fits j-nto the overall picture. llkte gouping helps to ensure that nothing ras been overlooked. in the planning phases. It might be possible, ior gxample, to overlook the role of the perimeter g?oup auring the planning phase, but exanination of the manpower requirements i-n this '*ay will d.raw attention to the group, provid.ing another check on the oasj-c plan. llkre grouping also helps to avoid. confusion. By using :er3trs with which trai-ned. men are familiar each will more clearly --md.erstand. the nature of the task allotted. to him, and. wi1l have confid.ence in a system which he und.erstand_s. When the manpower requirements for the basi.c pfan have been d.e-

termined- group by group, each contingency plan must be examined. to see if it creates a requi-rement for ad.d.itionaL men.. Looking again at the sarnple operation used- in the previ-ous chapter, contirrg"r"y 1 Ceals with a break-out which is stopped. by the cover goup. Generally speaking no ad.d.itional- men wilL be required. for this. ContinSency 2 d.eals with the situation which will arise if the crinj.nal breaks thror:gh the inner containment and this might wel1 call for add-itional men as an outer cover group or mobile reserre. Even if an outer cover group is not established., it will be necessarTr to ensure that the inner cover group is in sufficient strength to al-Iow nen to move off in pursuit to maintai.n contact. Contingency 3 d.eaIs with the wanted. ma^nt s mother and- this clearly ralses a requirement for an extra support man, who will interview the woma^n and. subsequently remain in charge of her r:ntil- the operation is over. Contingency la relates to the possibility of a besieged. criminal situation arising. lhe contingency pfan will eover onfy the withd.rawal and re-containing, not the subsequent precise operation, but it will

)$

Chapter

1+

be necessa,aTr to consid.er such matters as the rapid. reinforcing of the perimeter group. These men might well not be taken to the scene, but simply ea^marked. for caLl if required-. Any prelimina":ry or second.a4r plans and. their contingencies must then be consid-ered. in exactly the same way. Sometimes they will utilise the sane manpower as the basic operation, but often a small but vital ad.d.itional marlpower requirement will be indicated.. In some cases the prelimina^r5r or second.ary operations will need. to be manned. separately and. so will create a large extra requirement.

2 (

COMMAXTD STRUCIURE

")

0perationaL

commatrrd.er

No matter how effective the d.ivision of responsibilities and. no matter how efficient the system of grouping men, the operation is likeIy to collapse at the first sign of action rmless the commandst:ructure i-s correct. 0nce an operati-on of this t)rpe j-s und.er way there j.s a requi-rement for d-ecisions, not &iscussions, for clear

channels through which ord.ers will be passed. d.ownward-s and. information fed back. In marry cases an emergency situation will overlatrl a ntmber of routine command. areas and. it is not r-musual- to find- a nr.mber of officers of similar rank at a scene. A.bsolutely immed.iately an operati-onal command.er must be iiLentified. and. must take up the reins. This is no place for d-emocracy, with confereu.ces and. consul-tati.ons before arry d.ecisions a^re reached-. In ma^ny arued. operati-ons an instant d.ecision will be the only d.i-fference between success and. failure, ind.eed., between life and. d-eath for some poor ind-ividual . It i s vita1 , therefore , that the cornmand.er should. know that he is in charge of the operation, and- that everyone else who is concerned. should. know who

is the operational

command-er. Where an

operati.on is subject to a buiId.-up, the id.entity of the command.er may change from time to time. A verTr junior rank may respond. to the call initially. Subsequently a supe::vising officer may take over, folLowed by a mid.d.le ranking offj.cer and. finally a senior ra,nk. The number of sueh changes must be limited. as far as possible but, provid.ed. that each inconing command.er is properly briefed., and. providing that everyone is perfectly clear about the change in cornmand.ers, no special problems should. aJcise.

(U)

{ fr

$

{ m

I

Admi

ni-strative

assj.stance

An operational command.er will al-most invariably require some ad.minjistrative assistance. If the operation is to lr1n for some time it will be necessary to make arrangements for rel-iefs or for meals to ensure that all men a^:ee kept as fresh as possible. Once the operation gets und.er way things may start to happen thick and. fast. If the crimi-nal breaks out, the operationaf command-er must start to red-ep1oy all his men. Wj-thout the aid. of a staff officer to keep track of the men, the command.er may well find. that he has moved. the same man three times but has not used. another man who is now se:sring no useful pur?ose. It is essentj-al that someone keep a record. of

)+7 Chapter

Ja

men who arrive, of the equipment received- and how it was issued-, apd- so orl. The command-er may need. a rad-io operator, a 1og keeper, a runnerl Err interpreter, a negotiator, a press liaison officer, andsomeone to keep his supe:srisors off his back rmtil he gets the iob und.er way. All this is adrninistrative assj-stance and in al-l but a few operations the fi:nctions will be combined- in one man who will

all

act as staff officer. lrlhere the operation is on a large scale s or lasts for a long tj-me, the various functions may well be allotted to separate officers. (")

Group cornmand.ers

of the four groups must have its own cornma.nd-er. In the case of the perimeter group the operati-onal cornmand.er should. be able to pass most of the responsibility for d-eployment to a subor&lnate. Where the perimeter group is wid-espread., as it so often is, sub-command.ers should. be appointed- to such a level that each has a small nurnber of men, preferably not more than six, with responsibility for a part of the perimeter which he carr see and control-. By this mea^ns the group comma.nd-er ca^n easily issue inst:ructions through hls sub-command-ers, and. can control and. red.eploy viable imits. Each ind.ividual officer in the perimeter group will know his irnned.iate superior to whom he should. pass all reports and. problems. lVfinor problems will be solved at the lowest level, and- many others wil-l be solved. at sub-command.er l-evel. The group command-er will receive only the major problems andwill pass to the operational command.er onfy those which effect the rumnlng of the entire operation. The cover group too must have its command.er. This group willoften be put into position some time before the operation proper gets r.ir:.d-er w&Xr and. whilst the operati-onal cornmand-er rema-Lns at his office, working out p1ans. The operational- command-er will probably j-nd.icate the broad- outline of how contai-nment should. be achieved., but no matter how well- he knows the area the absent operational- commapd.er will not see all the problems and. he must, therefore, appoint a cover group command-er wkro may change d-ispositions if he thinks it essential. Any changes from suggested. d.ispositions must be reported back to the operational command-er at once. By the nature of its dutj-es the cover group is bor;nd- to be sub-d.ivid.ed. and. where a su.bgroup consists of two men or more, it is vital that a sub-command.er is appointed-. If a pair of cover men are watching two sj-d.es of a house they may be in position for hours and. then, sud.d.enly, the criminal may break out. If neither man has been appointed to command-, both may hesitate, each waiting for the other to make a d-e-

Each

cision. Alternatively, each man may make his own d-ecision and- then both wil-l start to give instructions. llhe resulting d.eIay or confusion could. be quite literally fatalThe raid. group will, in most operations, consist of only two men, but they will be charged. with conducting a search or with effecting an a^rrest. There will be no room for confusi-on or hesitati-on. Clear1y one of the pair (who will be d.esignated. R1 ) must take commapd., apd- he must be the man who makes the initial entry to each room, or the man who moves in tc make an arrest. If a man is to make the first entry into a room, or is always to be in the most

hB

Chapter

l+

on the position, he must be abl-e to instnrct hi-s number two to d-irect able da*ger points he wants covered, a,d. he must also besituation R1 must a such group. rn the close mernbers of the support

exposecL

His life may aepena on the d.eployment of others' There d.iscussion. will be no time for hesitation and. no time forbe controllecL by R1 ' The support group will, to a large extent, move in Continuirrg with the "**pi" of house searching, R1 will needs fi-rrther assisfirst ancL will next call 0n hls R2. When he by raising his hand' ta*ce he shoulcL be abl-e to comnand- it simply from R1 supsignal a on and The support group should. be numbered. ad- so' on. 52 call will port t- wi11 Eo flnrard.. A further signal more remote cj-rcumstances may arise, however, where R1 requires some command-.

Someone to support. IIe may requi-re ad.d.itional equi-pment or wapt then larmch cs. If he has one of four support men wi-th him and- he

a messa8e to the remaining three asking for some action remaining three to be taken, there is bor.ind. to be a d.elay whir-st the he must be andrequ-lred. is sort out who wil-1 d.o it. A cornmand.er support of close to able to control_ arr support men not committed. group should' therefore the raicL gfoup. The command-er of the support be the last man to be commi-tted' , have admini strative reAlI group command.erS will , of coursepresent, equipment used' and' so sponsibility to report d.etails of men men after the o3.. They will be responsible for checking in all back hancLed is all equipnent operation and. for ensuring that correctlY. wil-I Dia8ra,matically the command. stnrcture for a basic operation send.s back

be:

0perational Cornmand.er I

(

l0mini strati-ve Assi stance )

Perimeter GrouP

Sub-

Group

SubGrouP

Cover

--+ GrouP

Sub-

Group

Raid. Group

Support Group

SubGrouP

preliminary or second.a^r1r operations atre involved-, the command' of the situation. somestructure must be varied. to meet the need.s with exactly the sane tj-mes these operations will be carried. out stnrcture will comma*dsaJne the a*d. manpower as the basj-c operation operation second-ar1r or be used_. rn other "u.""-" the prelimina"lTr separate have but g?oups, might use the Sane perimeter and- cover cLirectly remain raid. a,d. support groups. Each group wourd. then command- nright of chain trr" ,rta r:nder the oplrational commad-er

where

be:

l$

Chapter

l+

Operational (lam:-ni

Perimeter

Cover

Group

GrouP

t, Sub- Subroup

Command.er

Assi stance )

"t="tilr"

Raid. Group

Support Group

Support

Ra[ Group

Group

I

_J__r

Sub-

Group

Group

SubGroup

Very rarely, and. at its most command. st:ructures for the basic, preliminaJry and second-ary operations, with an overal1 cornmand-er, command.ers for each part of the operation and. for each group within

[he chain can be varied infinitely. complex, it could- invol-ve separate each

part.

Such

a

command-

stmcture night be:

Operational

Command.er

I

(lOmirri

Command-er

Basic

Preliminar5r

Command.er Second.a":ry

0peration

0peration

0peration

Cover

Sub- Sub- Sub-

Sub-

Group Group Group Group

Periraeter

a)

Assi stance )

Cornmand.er

Perimeter

(

strative

Command po

port

Perimeter

Cover

Raid

Sup-

Port

Sub-

Sub-

Sub-

Su.b-

Group Group Group Group Support

st

of the operational command.er i-s to cornmand. the entire operation. This may sound- like a statement of the obvious and. yet it is, in fact, a matter which requires a good. d.eal- of thought. There j-s a tend.ency for senior police officers to want to be where the action is, to be seen to leacl their men from the fronti a prid.e in not asking their men to d-o that which they would. not d.o thenselves, arld a feeli-rrg that they have to prove this. There is a tend.ency for the command-er to want to go forr^rard. with the raid. group and to become closely involved- in one part of the operation. But if he al-lows himself to d.o sor he will not be in a posi-tion to control the cover group or the perimeter group. The command.er wiIl have planned. the operation and. he must then locate himself so that he catrr control all groups. Once the basic plan has been laimched., there is nothing for the command.er to cLo except note progress and. wait for somethi-rrg to go wrong. It is when one of the contingency plans must be implemented. that the eomma^nd.er becomes active. fhen he must think fast and. act fast, red.eploying, re-organisi-ng, recontalning. To d.o this he must establish a command. post which may be anything from a mobj-le poli-ce station to a sheltered. eorner where he can hold.

The task

50

Chapter

,la

a pocket ra&lo apd. consul-t a sketch p1an. Id.ea1ly the commandw:-1f alIow him to see at least the start of the operation, but must not be in a position which could. come und-er fire. (

"

)

Rend.e

po

it

st

zvous po st

Situati-ons have arisen where officers respond.i-ng to an emergency have been sent cLirectly to the scene, where they have been r:nd-er fi.re and. commi tted. before they knew what was going on or what was required. of them. 0nce i-n that situation, the police offi-cer willuse his own d.iscretion, taking such action as he thinks appropri-ate on what he can see and hear. tf,hen a number of men do this the resul-t is 1ike1y to be totat chaos, with wild. actions and wild shootirrg. 0nce the cover group is in position, no more men a,re rethe scene r:ntil the operation has been properly plannedqrrlred. "t ,rra o=gapised.. Yet, r.mless positive action i-s taken, men will continue to be sent to the scene where they will commi t themselves unnecessarily, ruining the planned. operation and. producing the most serious consequences. At a very early stage a rend.ezvous post should. be estiUl-i-shed. close to the scene so that al-I arrival-s can be checked, allocated. to groups, briefed. and. then d.eployed- in accord.apce with the pIan, It j-s also important that this rend.ezvous post be d-eca1"1 be for-r3d. by strangers to the o,r€&. In marry cases it will he catrr that so route main traffic a on sirable to station an officer essenhavirrg avoid. post, so and. d-irect amivaLs to the rend.ezvous tial persor:nel running around the area trying to follow rad-io d-irections to an obscure ad.d.ress. In pre-planned- operations the rend-ezvous post will be the police station or other place at which the men are assembled- for briefirrg.

(f)

UncommittecL men

It has already been said- that officers in excess of the ntmbers actually requi-red. can be a serious problem. It may be thought d'esirable to l"rold- a few men in reser\re at a rend.ezvous post, but generally, any spare men should. be ord-ered. back to their normal duties. It wil1 be necessar1r to ensure that specific ord-ers are given ap6. that such men a^re not just left without instructions. In the absence of fi:m ord.ers to the contra^:qr these men might well remain in the arcea and. are likely to interfere with the operation. Spare jq11ior ranhs present something of a problem, but the gpeatest d.apger of a1l can come from rxrcommi ttetL senj-or officers who have no place in the chain of command.. fkre senior officer with some responsibilities for the routine policing of an area is like1y to feel that he shoul-d. remai-n in case he is need.ed.. Such a man is possibly a greater d.anger than the criminal-. If he is present when anything happens he will feel that, because of his rank he must take charge, y"i- rr" wil-I be r.mbriefed. and. less capable of taking charge than the most jr.mior officer who is properly a part of the operation' It requires fi:m command. ancL discipline to tell such a senj-or officer to that he must leave the emergency situation in his area and return his officer or to his becL, but he must d.o so.

51 Chapter

l+

Other problems can be caused. by officers senior to the operati-onal commatrrd.er who wish to satisfy themselves about the way i-n which the operation is being conducted.. Clearly such officers have a duty to ensuire that all is being d.one correctly, and. they must be free to visit the scene. In doing so they shor.lJ-d. first check with the operational comma,nd.er and. it should be mad.e cl-ear to everyone that there has been no change in command-. If a chief officer is not satj-sfied. with the d.eplolment in a particular atea, he should. make any changes through the operational cornmand.er and not by moving ind.ivj-cluaLs or gi.ving instructi.ons to sub-command.ers. If he is generaIly cLissatisfied. with the way in which the operati-on is being run, he shouliL either take charge himseLf , with all that that entails in staying at the command. post, etc., or he should. appoint a fresh command.er. Und-er no circumstances shoulcL he anive at a scene, i-nterfere with the :r.mning of the groups without consrrlting the operational ssmmand.erl make broad. sweeping criticisms, and. then d.isappear, leaving the operational- command-er uncertain of his posi-ti-on and. uncertain of the d.i-sposition of his men. So, the first sta.ge of the orga.rtisation phase is complete. lhe manpower reqrrirements have been establ-ished- by checking all plans a6ainst four groups perimeter, cover, rai-d- antL support. A cornmand structure has been established. and. comma.nd. and. rend-ezvous posts set up. Finally, the d.angerous spare men have been id-entified- and d.isposed. of. That having been d.one, it is possi-b1e to move on to the next stage of the organisation - equipment.

3

EQUIPMEM

The process already appliecL to establishi-ng the marrpower reErire-. ments must now be applied to establishing the requirements for equipment r:nd-er three head.ings:

(") weapons (u) Commr.mications (") Other equj.pment Once a6ain it i-s important that the problem is stud.j-ed. 1ogica11y ancL thoroughly by examining first the basic p1an, then the contingency plans and. subsequently anJr prelimj-nary or second.arXr plans involved.. The role of each marr must be checked. agai-nst the three classes of equipment to d.ete:rmine what might most usefully be employed.. (")

weapons

Force poliey, which hopefully will be based. on the principles set out in Chapter 1 , will have d.ete:roined. what weapons are available to the command.err but it should. be left for him to select which he will employ. For the purpose of this study it will be assumed. that a force has available to it pistols, shotguns and. srriper rifles meeting the requJ-rements alreacly d.iscussed.. Pistols will be essential for all personnel, but the commatrrd-er wiLl need. to examine the task of each man to d.etemine what ad-d.itional weapons wiLl be usefi-Ll-. For exa.mple, if the range at which the cover group is operating is, s&Ir ttrirty yard.s, shotgr.ms will be most usefirl to them. If there

52

Chapter

I

yard's from the alternative to a position more thap sixty group will frequently scene, a rifleman must bl employed.. llhe raicr. encumberance, but it will often find. that second. weapons will be an between nr-:mbers 1 ancl 2 be for:ncL that a shotgun which ca,, be passed the problems of spread- of shot, the will be veaT usefur_. Beca*se ofgroup will be restricted' in some use of shotguns by the support a reasonable knowled-ge of cases. The comma,d.er wili need. to have of weaponr or must be the role a,d. potential of the various tytrles be taking part in the prepared. to tatce advice from those who 1oirr may be taken officers the of operation. lhe personal preferences used. be d-ictated' nomally will into account, but the true of weapon be frequently group will by the nature of the tasl. [he perimetermust the of members protect r:na:med., but in circumsta,ces where they so them to a^Hn pubric confined. within an area, it will be necessa4r that they can protect these people in case of a break-out'

was no

(t)

Communications

of good commu-nibe d.ifficult to exaggerate the importance r cornmr.micationt must be cations in a police operation. The word. transmi-tting inused in its wid.est sense to cover arl- method.s ofto communicate police fo:mation. It will be necessa^rxr for the the criminal' In anongst themselves, with the potti", and with all other means of commod.ern police operati-ons rad.io overshad.ows is d-esirable that a mr.mication, a,d in the situations envisagetl it [h'is may rad.io scheme be esta.blished. exclusively for the operation. instarled- in comma'd be achieved by using pocket rad.io base stations use of IIIIF rethe by or vehicles or in a temporary command- post, on a single be must peaters from wF vehicle rad.ios. All rad-ios operation must be with the channel and. all traffic not concernedjamming by r-mcor:nected' routine avoid. to cleared from that channel transmi ssi-ons. systems, there are bor'md' No matter how good. the establ-ished- rad-j-o

rt

would.

tobeblackspotswherereceptionispoor'arrdsituationscanarise consid'eration the system fails, "rr"r, if only t"*po=arily' might be no which system shorrld. always be given to an arternltive if all else that, so more than a r_oud. hairer reft with the command.er group command'ers' fails, he can shout an ord.er to hiscommr:nications need to be conother fo:ms of police-to-pol-i-ce the nr:mber of sets sid.ered either as supplementl to rad-io when man, or as an alternaevery available d_oes not aliow of an issue to be used' to of emergency. coroured flares might in casetstopt tive system flares Such i; large scale operatioos' signal tstartr a,d. weapons' extra carrying ca* be fired_ from sta,d.Lrd. shotguns to avoid.be it must veaT simpre, involvrf a cod.e of signals is to be used., color:red flares are ing no more than three different instructions' it is often useful to often d_ifficult to see in bright sr:nlight ancr- star' or use the expreced.e any coloured signal ,itf, ,"' "*pfo*it'Smight arso be useful in plod_i.g stlr as the =irrEr" sigRar. rnrhistles routinely carried- by a,.e no longer some operations, althoush they aTe to be employed' a velcy strictly all policemen. If whistles must be d-evised' linited_ series of clearly d.istinguished. "igrrrls better to d'o something in a^:med. op"=riiorr" ha.'e

where

I ,lr

tl il

i, I

.fficers

involved.

53 Chapter

la

than to try to commit to memory a long series of signals involving long and. short blasts. Generally two or three signals should. be the maxi-mm. Perhaps it is the voice which provid.es the best supplemen-

tary communications system in marry cases, but even that requi-res a little thought. The word-s to be used. must be pre-p1anned.. A shout of tOver here! or t0ver thereI is quite meaningless to those who caru:ot see the person shouting. Locations must be given by reference to fixed. objeets visi-b1e to all. All word.s which require a response should. be pre-arranged.. In generil, a message in&icating the possible location of a suspect should. be prefixed. with tStopr which should. ind-icate to eveaTrone that they shoultL stop and. seek cover. IlancL signals can be most useful provid.ecL they a.re limited. in scope. The offi-cers concernecL will be poli-cemen, not sold.iers or boy scouts. They will r:nd.erstand. the no::nal traffic signals for stop and. cone fo:mrard-, but arr;r other signals must be limited. in number and clearly explained.. It wouId. be most infuriating to have a ma^n gesticulating wilclly with hancL signals which only he antL his boy scout troop can und.erstand.. Commr:ni-cations with the public will generally be by way of loud. hailers issued. to the perimeter group as necessaaTr. Commu.:rications with the criminal will also be by way of loud. hailer in marry cases, but where he is in a buil&ing it might be possible to use a telephone which will gi-ve a more d.iscreet and. more effective meatrrs of communication.

(") Other equipment The equipment used. in an a:med. operation will includ.e much of the stand.ard. equipment used. in any operation, but speci.al consid.erati-on should. be given to certain items, some of which Elre intend-ed. specifically for a:med. operations and- some of which have some special application. The followirrg contains some suggestions but is by no means exhaustive. (i) Id.entification: It is vitaL that ar:y plain clothes police can be recognised. as such and. various method.s of id.entifying officers are in use. One which has merit is the issuing with weapons of a:mband.s of various colours. Arr a^:mband. of the type selected. for that operation can be kept in a pocket until the operation starts when it can be put on the left arm. If three d.ifferent t;4les of a^:mband. a^re available there is vlrtuaLly no chance of the criminal provid.irrg himself with the correct t]rye in adva.nce. (ii) Body a^rmours The vast majority of police offlcers killed in a^:med. operati-ons are shot in €lreas which body armolrr would. protect and. with bullets whi-ch amour would stop. Ilhere is a wid.e range of armour available va^:rying in composition, weight ancl area of protection. A force should. select armour suited. to its own needs and keep ad-equate stocks availa,bl-e. The cLetailed. problems of bocty arsnour selection must be left for consj-d-eration in a separate work. A:mour will- generally be used. by the raid. group and. by some support men in operations such as house searchirrg, checking vehicles ancl so o1]. (iii) Otfrer armolrr: Other protective armour such as smaLl shielcl-s or the vetcy usefirl buLLet resistant clipboard.s can be lifesavers in some operatiolLs.

5l+ ChaPter l+

the searchi'ng irr) Forcing equipment: If an operation -involves raid' group The 6 force cr-oors. of buirdings, it may be necessaJxr or chargkicking of them admust not c!.o this by starraing in lrontcapable of opening a d-oor whilst irrg them. A light weight implement shoulcL be available' the operator is sta'ding to i*" side with telescoping ha'dles (.r) Mirrors: searcrr:ing mirrors fittedoperations' particularare most useful in ""=tJi aspects of search Iv will almost Any buildins search, bv dav or night, eellars, ilri"Hliirr*, in use to certainr-y produce " ="qJ""*"rrI for handlamps to flood-light an necessa^rrr be roof space, etc. rt may in som?.cases is generally available' entire atrea at night, ,r1a such lighting often c*ry hand'cuffs rou(vii) ttanacuff;: Unifo:med officersmay not d-o so' The raid group clothes tinely, but officers i" prrtn to ensure that they can must have sufficient pai-rs of ha*d.cuffs and- spare hand'cuffs of secure the a*ticipated. number of criminals, (

starrd.ardord.isposabletypesshorrld.beavailable. -*ta, (viii)mas-tovision:InSomeoperationsitwil]-beusefulto at night' light intensigroup cover the to issue binoculars if floocl-Lighting fiers or other night viewing "ia*il:- be requiredis not used-. nrmitions such as cs together (i*) crremica-r mr.mitions: chemical adequate nr'mber of respi'rators with weapons for Ia;r:'chi*g a*d an This problem i's wilr be absolutely essential i-n marry Jituatio,.s. consj-d.ered in d-epth in Chapter 7' control equipment might be (*) Barriers, ropes ,ta other crowdattract consid'erable required. if * op"=Ltion is 1ike1y to attentionparticur-ar operation shoul. be The selection of equipment for a L" the manpower requirements the carried. out in exactly the same "ytirat first thL basic plan, then were arrived. at. That is to say preliminarT or second'ary p1a,s -""" contingency pla,s, followed- by anlr what equipment might be t; should. be exanined. "t"p-uy stlp be hel-d' at the scene for usefi:-l either as immed-iate issue or to t="$irll quoted in chapter l, where a search ffi::"L*" the example equipman u't the home or r'i= mother' the is to be macLe for a wanted-basic pIan, considered- group by #oup r ment reqrrirements for the might be assessed' as foll-ows: to sub-commander Perimeter group: No weapons required'' -Rad'ios to be in r-mimen All d"= leveI. level. Loud. hailers to sub-cornmrt insta,ce. first in for crowd. control equipment

fo:m.

No requirement each pair to have a A:mecl with pistols' One man in cover group: -orr"man in plain rad.io to each pair. Arurband.s to arqr shotgr-m. man in each pair' clothes. Sinoculars to onepistols' gnJ shotgun between the two Raid. group: AmecL with searching rairror for R2' men. Radio for R2. Body a^rmour for both. Ilandcuffs for both' I n-rj^a *a ^.-mmqrrrlo, and one

Supportgfoup:Amedwithpistols.Rad.iostocommarrd-erarrdon(/ raid group to commr':-nicate with other matrr. Iroud. hailer carried' for for in prair, "loth"". Body armour crini-nal. A:mband.s for any marl group' Forcing a)ce carried for raidat reast the first two ,"*.group' Ilandlamp caried' for raid' witrr the criminar- breaking out a,dcontingency 1 is

"o*""*ea

55

Chapter

I

being stopped. by the cover group. They may then have to effect the affiest and should. therefore have hand-cuffs. Contingency 2 is concerm.ed. with the criminal breaking free and. calls for an assessment of transport requi.rements ancL d.isposition so that the command-er can redeploy his men quickly. Conti-ngency 3 is concerned. with the woman and- may raise a requirement for a spare vehicle to take the woman away. Contingency h d.eals with the bamicad.ed. criminal situation. The initial response will require no extra equipment, but before the precise operation can be planned. and. i.mplemented. a requirement for crowd. control equipment may be raised.. This need. not be taken to the scene, but should. be checked. for ava-ilability. Depend.ing on the circumstances, it might be d-esirable to anticipate the precise operation a little and- take CS and. its associated. equipment to the scene.

I+

BRTEFING

A thorough briefing for all persor:neI is obviously necessa^rTr, but the process must not end. when the command.er has instructed. a]l groups on their role. There is a need. for a continuous flow of info:mation in both direetions and the process might be consid.ered- in

three stages: ( rnitiat briefing ") Progressive briefing (U) (") Control of shooting

(") rnitiaL briefing initia-l briefing will generally be conductecl- by the operationalhe must ensure that every man i-n everTr part of the operation is farniliar with the aim, the basic plan and- aLl contingencies. Those officers of the cover group who may have been involved. in contalnment before the plan was fo:mulated. nust not be forgotten. There is no point in producing an excellent contingency plar1 to d.eaf with a break-out if the cover group is not properly briefed. on it. Special arrangements must be mad.e to Ur:.ef these cover men, or they must be replaced by men who have been briefed.. fn operations invoLving large ni.mbers of men, it might be more effective if d.etailed. briefing is given first to the group comma^nd-ers, who wouLd. then brief their own men. When this is d.one it woul-d. stil1 be d.esirable for the operational- command.er to give the alm of the operation together with a very broad. outline of the plan before the group cornmand-ers take over. Briefing to separate g?oups must contai-n sufficient i-nfo:mati-on about the role of other groups to ensure that each man r-md.erstand.s how the operation wi-11 be conducted. and. how he fits into the overall patterrr. [he general effect of the briefingr oo matter how it is d.one, must be to ensure that eactr man feels that he is an essential and. integral part of the operation. Every man shoul-d. feel that no matter how d.istant he may be from the centre of activity, he is important. The

cornmand.er and

55

Chapter

l+

(u) Progressive briefing whenever posjust a once-a,d-for-a11 process. Good. briefing is not be kept info:mecL of the progress of shorrld. invorved. those arl sibre a man pisted- to. some more remote not the operation. All too often not triowing what is happenirrg and

corner wil_I be left for hours is making any contribution to sure whether his conti_nued. presence not be cloggecl, but whenever the operation. Rad.io chan*eIs must to all men' Having possible prog?ess ="po=i" shoulcL be broa'd'cast crininal (o= to the broadcasting to regard to th; need. to. avoidbe listenirrg to police transmismed.ia ="r=""I";;;i";"; rrro might cod'eword's or obscure te:ms' In sions, it might be necessa4r to use that no broad-cast be mad'e' those rare cases where- """r.iity d-ema,d.s rn this way the interest an expla,ation should. be given in adva*ce. in the operation will be malnand. attention of all those concerned. of activity will know what tained, and. those away from the centre at that point. This progressive contingencies are IikeIy to arise traffic' Rld-io time must notfedbe back briefing must not be , Lr" wayrer-evant info:mation must be taken up with trivia, but arl commartder' In search from group command.ers to the operational be initiated' by the raid' operations at least, progress reports will

group.AnJreharrgesinpatternmustbereported.backtothecommangroups' E"= ro= th; information of other

(") Control of

shooting

the interests of the public police operation it is vital in be avoitled- if possible and' in shour-d. ancr. of the police that shootirrg minimr:m. shooting to ord-er any case ="lt=i"t"d. to the absorute be quite impractical in most will r &s has already been "xprainua,briefing must take account of the cases, but initiar ,"ra-p=ogrlgsive ir it is r-rnavoi-d-ab1e for problems. shooting "*r'oJy re justified short or long te:m, which inthe protection of trr"-potril in irre a police officer who is in clud.es, of course, the protection of rrr," fired on police or public d_a'ger. [he mere fact irrrt a criminal justify a returrr of fire andr in particular'

rn

arry

, not, of itself never be justified'' Large it out t grm-battles can almost present a massive hazavd numbers of bullets flying in all directions ind-icate a pa,ic response from to both public a,a poiice and usually be a more efficient a11d' the police. There *iff almost invariably tha* by a hail of less d.angerous way of neutrarisins theshoot, "=i*irr*r then the minimum nunber bullets. rf it becomes nece"""ry"to number of people is what is required'' of shots firecl by the minimr:m a crj-ninal who is contalned -targets The response to a shot fired- by a*d- then d-eal with the should. nomarly be to remove the without further risk to police situation effectively and. efficientr!Lack irnned-iately can be illusor public. The aarrglrs of shooting North of Errgla,d- ruhen police trated- by a case r^rhich occurrea iritrre be a:med. robbery ad believed' to were looking for a marr wa,ted. for *a" contained without aIa:ming in a trailer-caravan' Thegroup, "oat'L support' then moved' closer to its occupant and. the raid-The man,with hearing someon'e outsid'e' nrshed ord-er the occupant out. police officer screamed' ad' out firing a shotgrm as he ca'Ine' A

d-oes t

shoot

5T Chapter

l+

fe1l. The remaj-ning police officers d-id. not shoot. They challenged the criminal and- annormced. their id-entiti.es. The ma^n surrend.ered. at once and was arrested.. The self-controL exerci.sed. by the police officers was fortunate because the wanted. man, believing that other itinerants were about to attack his caravan, had- fired. into the air. At that same moment a police officer had. stumbled. in a hole, breaking his feg. When asked- why they d.id. not fj.re, the officers had explained that they d-id. not need. to. They could. have kiIled the man at any ti.me. They knew he coul-d. not get away and. they had. suffieient confid.ence in thej-r own ability to feel- secrare in issuing a challenge rather than imme&iately to return fire. No one else was in any d.anger. Such cases r-md.erline the need. for a stri.ct control on shooting where no one is in irnme&late d.anger. fn Jarruary 1973, following a series of incid.ents of sniping at police, a man entered- a New Orleans hotel and. ran from room to room starting fires and shooting. As poli-ce arrived., they came und.er fire and. to them, at least, it seemed. that they were being fired- on from several d.ifferent places. In fact one man was d.oing al-I the shooting but the poli-ce reasonably assumed. that there were at least two. Some 6OO police were eventually at the scene and- a crjninal was located- in a roof-top lift-head.. A helicopter was ca1led. and. the cri-mi-naL was shot as he came out on to the roof to fire at the helicopter. The shooting continued., but it is now clear that when police in one position fired., this caused. poli.ce in other positions to fire back, thinking they were themselves being shot at. None of them cor,il-d. have been able to see a target, but they reported. another sniper aLive and- shooting on several occasions. [he phantom sniper was rlocated.r and. eventually a milita^:ry style assault was la;unched.. SeveraL police officers were wor.md.ed. in this attack, but the criminal the only crimi-nal was fong d.ead.. Al-1 the shots were being fired. by police officers. 0f all the faults to be found. with this operation, the continuous, uncontrolled. and r.maccor.mted. shooting by police was the worst. Other such incid.ents have occurred. and. all i-nd.icate first that there should. be no shooting by the police r:ntil there i.s no alter:rative and. r:ntil a target has been clearly id.entified.. Second., any shot fired. by a police offieer must be reported. back to his command.er at once. Particularly in built-up areas, the source of shots is veqy d.ifficult to establish. There must be no d.oubt in arryoners mind. about who fired. a particular shot. With the completion of the briefing, the thircL phase, organisation, i s complete . [Lre final phase , execution, remai.ns for consid.erati-on.

Chapter

5

THE BASIC PRINCIPIES OT'POIICE TACTICS

- IUIPIEUIENTATION

AND PHIIOSOPHY

PIIASE l+

-

E)GCUTI0N

planning and organisation l,lhen the first three phases, containment, phase of execuare completed the operation can move to its final have been

of the pla,s which tion, that is the puttirrg into effect operation, as for example an of mad.e. where there is forewarning on the basis of when the police are setting up an ambush operation phases will three intell-igence reports, the oraer of the firstthe event, the police rechapge. supposing that, three d.ays before carrying vehicle ' The ceive info:mation about an attack on a cash of info:mati'on' planning phase will come first with the gatheri-ng a[d any prelimithe production of a basic plan, conting"r"y plans, come the organisation phase na^aTr or second-a^:qr plans. Th"t will equipment need-s folwithin which will be assessed the manpower a'dthe operation' The for lowed. by the briefing when the men assemble the execution phase. rn containnent phase must come third., beforeto make arrests' a cover other word.s, before any officers move in as possible group will take up po"Ltiorr= which will ensure as far 0n1y when containment that the criminals are confined. to the atea. groups move in to make is complete should. the raid and- srrtrrport escaping are drascriminals of arrests. By this meail.s the chancel-are of their containaware tically redlced.. rf the crininals to mad-e their firea:ms will also be ment, the cha'ces of them resorting three phases of any reduced.. No matter *hat the ord.er of the first r:ntil- the preoperation, the execution phase must not be commenced' three phases have been completed' "LAittS PRINCIPTES OF PROTECTION I

can be label-Ied' The The finar basic princi-ples of police tacticsdema,ds that a, operaprinciples of prbtectionr. This principte for every man in the operational command-er should- seek to provid-e he can*ot be shot. rd-ea]ly, tion a position which will ensure thatproof cover throughout the every ma' would. remain behind- bur]et some precise operations where in operation. This might be possible out by the use of cs' In an brought is the criminal surrend.ers o= 5B

59

chapter

I

imprecise operation where searchi.ng is involved. the rald. and. support groups must be called on to leave cover. When the plan cal1s for men to be exposed. to the risk of gunfire, it is the responsibility of the operational command.er to ensure that any risk is reduced. to the absolute minimr:m. fhe man who is moving must not be left to protect himself. ft simply is not possible for a man who is out in the open and. who i-s subjected. to a sud.d-en attack to protect himself by responsive gunfire. If such a matrr is attacked., he shorrld. be free to take those measures most likeIy to achieve his imned-iate protecti-on, and. almost invariably, this will involve ilLvj-ng for cover. Any shooting must be left to men who a,re i-n protected. posi-tions, read;r and. a,ble to respond. quickly and. accuratelX, apa wno have their attention d.evoted. to specifi-c d.anger spots. ff R1 were making an approach to the d.oor of a house, he would. approach to one sid.e of the d.oor, leaving R2 in a protected. position with his 8un readSr, ai-med- at the d-oor. If during the approach the d-oor opened. to reveal the crininal about to shoot, R1 ,orfa simply move to the nearest cover, probably by :r:lning fo::,urard. to the wall of the house. R2, from his relatively safe and. steady position, woul-d- d.o a.:ay challenging and. shooting which became necessaly. If arqr wind-ows overlook the approach, a support map would. be all-ocatedto each, and- he too would. have his weapon lined. on that wind.ow ready to fj-re. llhe situation created. should be one where it is virtually impossible for anyone insid.e the house to shoot R1 as he makes his approach. Throughout the operation similar d-ispositions must be mad-e for every move. When the search has moved- insid-e, the d.i-spositions will be mad.e by R1 , but it is the responsibility of the command.er to ensure that he has sufficient support men. [here must be no heroi-cs with the raid. group making unsupported. assatrlts into the d.anger area, t:rusting their lives either to pure luck, to the lrnlikely chance that their opponent will- give them ad.equate war:rlng before he shootsr or to the chance that the cri-minal will miss with his first shot whilst they will be effective with their response. There must be no Ja.mes Bond- style ind.ividuality. There must be no militaey style thinking of assaults with metaphori-cal fixed- bayonets and. an acceptance of a rreasonable, casualty rate. fn wartime a casualty rate may have to be accepted., but in a police operation the onfy acceptable casualty rate i-s zero. The immed.iate aim of the operati-on must be kept constastly in mind.. That aim will not call for the bayonet charge mentality. If the aim is to locate, the operaticn must be stopped. when the criminal has been found.. ff the aim is to arrest, the criminal must be mad.e to come out, rather than have the police go in. lhe basic phi-losophy shoulcl be that of the efficient ancL effective coward.: the man who is d.etemined. that his duty to protect the public will be completely ful-filIed. in both the long and. the short tem, but who, in the process, is afraj.d. of being ki11ed or injured.. It must not be the philosophy of the bh:nd.ering command.er who compensates for his own inefficiency with the bloocL of his subord.inates. It must not be the philosophy of the medal seeking id.iot who cart think of no method. but that of mshing in where angels (o= any sane man) would. fear to tread. The operation should- depend for its success on efficiency - cold-, calm, i.rresistible effi-ciency. ff the a^:med. police officer need.s a motto, he should. take it from the

6o

Chapter

5

rUhen danger threatens, absence of body is inphilosoPher who said', mind-. I fioit"fY to be Preferred' to presence of

APPLICATION

of police tactics is too A d.escription of the basic pri-nciples at the conscious fevel dislengthy for every word. to b; retained' remain at this revel and cussed in chapter 1, yet much of it must philosophy irnrolved-' must be veIT some parts, particularly the broad' be retained' at the conswelr retained-. The ,rrriorr" head-inss can reca11, a sunmaaTr ca, be procious level ad, as an aid. to insta,tpostcard' in' - say 6 in' x 3'75such duced. on a card about the size of a a of ai6 the with claimed that, or 15 crr. x 9,5 crl. It is heremarry firearrns' which d'o not involve card, any a:med- operation, and cannot supply all the anscard[he ca, be conducted_ efficierrily. a fashion that the wers, but it can supply the questions in such it produces answers can be for:nd- easily and logica]ly. _Furthermore, be farriliar' When a pattern with which all tire trained- mel, will basic principles prothe applied to the various tlpes of operation, that deta:Ll which vid-e the fra.me within wnilrr there ean be fiiled- ally such d'etails applies specifically to one type of operation' in line with the basic principles and philosophy

will be strictly

alreadY set out.

Ac]-aimthatasystemoftacticsprovidesthebasisfordealing scepticism and' a:med. operation must be treated' with being accepted-. rt is proposed should_ be thoroughly tested. before by exa.mining a range of situato attempt to substa*tiate the claimtactics. This wirl illustrate ti-ons in the light of the suggested. a,d- provid-e an opporthe application of the tactics in that area tunity for filling in d-etail appropriate to such situations'

with every

SUMMARY

POLICE TACIICS

OBJECTIW: PRIORTIIES:

MEIIIOD:

I}IVEDIATE AIM: PHASES:

-

BASIC PRTNC]PI.'ES

roprotectthepublicbyneutralisingad.arrgerous of f end.er

1 2 3

The Public The Police The criminal The creation of a situation whelming Police suPerioritY

of

obvious and' over-

0n fIvIPnnCfSU information - to L0CATE 0n PRECISE i-nfo:mation - to ffinEST 1 COMAINI'JtrM confine ancl isolate

2

PTA\TNING ( Gather

info:mation

") Basic Plan (t) ( ) Contingency "

If appropriate:

Pl ans

(a)-p="1iminary pfan with contingencies i;i ie"ond-ary plan with contingencies

6l

!

Chapter

3

0RGAl[rSAT]oN 1 Manpower

(") Perimeter g?oup protect

public (U) Cover g?oup contain criminal

(")

Raid.

group

achieve aim

(a) Support group assist raid

2 (

(t)

Sroup Command.

structure

r) 0perationaL Cornmand.er Admi

ni"t=rtlr"

\----

Prelimj-naJqr

Basic Operation

0peration

(") Perimeter

Cover Group

Group I

,_r_1 Sub- Sub-

Group

Group

Raid. Group

,_l_.,Su.b-

Assistance Seco-nd.a":ry

0peration

Support Group

Sub-

Group

Group (

a)

3

Command. po

st

zvous po st Uncommitted. men Equipment

) " (f) (

(")

(O)

Rend.e

Weapons Commr.mj.cati.ons

(") Other equipment l+ Briefirrg (") rnitial (u) Progressive

(") Control of l+

PRINCIPI,ES

OF PROTtrCTION:

1

2

E)GCUIION

shooting

Provid.e bul-let proof cover 0R Provid.e protective fire capability

Chapter

6

THEBESIEGEDCRI}/IINAI

problem crininal presents a relatively frequent adavailabfe, The anount of experilnce in all parts of the worrd.. them make shouldthe incid.ents the rer_ative simplicity of man)r ofcase there is evelTr ind-ication of after easily ha,dred, yet in casecomplete absence of planningi and of poor police tactics; of a extremely valuable .rt Fs chaos following arry burst of ".ti.rity. (t) Professor Alan Bristow study of shootirrgs of police officerl, police officers were killec' or in-that examined- thirty cases in which criminar-s. IIe found jured whirsi alarirrs with ,r*"d- ba*icaded shot when of the cases policemen were in no less than 30 per centarrest without apd with no preparation they nrshed in t; make an have a'. reinforcements which coul. maki-rrg use of special equipment shootto s study relates only been mad.e a;rrailable to irr"*. Bristowr the research for this present but ings of America, police officers,parts of the world, where bad preall from work shows manJr cases, officers' rmskilled use of cs paration, poor deplolment of policeofficers were easily identified' a,d aimress risks taken by police [he basic tactics card- extrllained such failings have led to d.eaths. to conduct an operation of this in chapter 5 will al]ow a cornma,d.er fatal- errors made in the past' The tlDe effieiently, avoiaing the this true of operation can best be application of tfro"" tactlcs to situation' ill-ustrated- by applyirrg them to a hytrlotheticaJfor vio]ence has been Prob]em: A man with previous "o,,,,i"tions breakirrg into a shop' The d.isturbed. by police offilers whilst pistol, seriously a criminar_ firecr. on police offi-cers with !rnm. pursued' by his escape "" u't' whenpursuing wound.ing one of them. IIe mad-e insid-e. \lhen the he abad.oned_ this near his home a*d rar,. from a* upstairs wj-nd-ow. The offi-cers approached. he fired on them the sard-en walr from which poli_ce have-withd.rawn to positions behind. the house' There is 11o one they cap watch both fronC apd rear of else in the build-ing' shovrn in Figure 6'1' All walls' A sketch plan of the house is walls gate in the , are oi b'i"k'the A includ.ing the 3 ft. fri*h garden which kitchen. The opens into door back the to lead_s warl to rear reacring to the empty garage and' gates aooui" has entra,ce front the ha1, with the stair'=oo* Into. the front door. The front d.oor ;;;;; to the right. occupa'ts of case to the left a*d. the sitting

The

a^:med.

6z

besieged.

6l Chapter

6

the house no:mall-y use the front d.oor. No telephone is instal-led.. The criminal i-s aLone in the house. IIe seems to have an arrple

supply of ammr-mition for his 9rr. pistol. Ilis mental stability j-s very questi-ona,ble and. he is known to be prone to sustained. outbursts of uncontrollecL violence.

FIGURE 5 .1

Sketch of crimi-naI t s

home

The problem i-s deliberately kept si.mpIe, avoid.irrg such problems as potential hostages which wil-l- be ful1y covered. l-ater. Despite the obvious simplicity, a little thought will show that the situa-

tj-on is fraught with potential d.anger. Possibly the greatest initial d.anger is that various senior offi-cers will at once 'grab their hats I and. msh to the scene, leaving vaeue extrortations to tget some men there | . [he command.er shou]d. seat himself fi:mly at his d-esk, i-ssue an immed.iate d.irectj-ve that he has taken charge, and then the system of tactics ean be invoked. to help him plan and. run his operation. IIVII\iffiDIATE AIM

task for the operational comma.nd.er is to sort out quietly and. Erickly in his own nlnd. exactly what it is that he is seeking to achieve. He must then impress on all concerned. what his immed.iate a-im will- be. fn this operati-on the aim will be to contain the criminal and then amest him.

The first

CO}1'IAINMEI\I'I

matter what other problems exist the comma^nd-err the officers at the scene, the rad-j-o controller, ancL anJrone else concerneiL with the operation must have only one word. i.n their mincLs COMAINMEM. The criminaL i.s in the house. He must not be pe:mitted. to leave. Those men. already at the scene must not mount an heroic solo attack, they must simply d.o as much as possible to achieve contalnment r:ntil ad.d.itional men can reach them. The quickest and. probably the best way for the comma^nd.er to d.ispose of the problem in the initial stages will be for him to appoint a cover group command.er and.

No

6L, Chapter

6

a^:med- men to make initial to the scene with sufficient eommad'er have been mad-e the cover group d.ispositions. when theseoperatiol'f essenany make ca, comma^d-er into can report back, a'd. th; put the rra,s ye irnied.iately or before tial adjustments eitherfor rebe woul. men the laylut, four a^:med effect. Having regard cover the front a*d. brind- sid-e of theinhouse qrrired.. rwo-*En shouldof the gard-en (ct and c2 of the from positions at the bottom right the 8#4e sid'e and' rear Figrrre 6.2). [[wo men should. cover c1 and- c2 (cr and' cl+ on house from positions d.iagonally _oqrnositE must_p" clearly d-efinecr- an. Figure 6.2)-. Fie,,.s "il""porrliniiity lines' These must be veaTwind'ows wil-I be as ind.icated- ny ifr" brokenthe sid.e wan which has no crearly set out arra mult includ.e into that area from the rear ofof or d.oors. The criminar ruight run has moved from one field' the house a*d. it must be "I"o when he of Fig,re 6.2 wirl show that Exanination responsibirity to a'other. and. bottom ri[rrt of thg sketch) left (top the reverse positions no one *ould hrrr" sight of the back woulcl not be acceptable because leave by that route ' he would be d.oor. If the criminal were toanJrone courd. challenge ltim' The object crear of the build.ing before the house, not to conof containnent is to r.""p-irr" "-=i*irr*r insicle front him after he has left'

despatch him

FIGURE

6.2 Positions of cover group

[he cover group and he mu s t,

commancler wou]d'

take up one of the positions (Ct)

;f ;ii*mi=,I

rfl : :i Hi,' lal,,t';,

i,.' *:."1 "i=: i " rrear coverl coveri-ng tht rfront covert a*dfied. ad perhaps wourd. be d-esignated[he cover group must be to avoid- confusion over rlmbers orIt letters' is not their purpose to force a properly briefed. on their task. seek to make an affest' If the confrontati-on, and- they must not before he ca, Ieave the criminal appears, he must be challerrged' mJ'st be left alone' If he surhouse. If he goes back insicle, hearea he has emerged- will d'ea1 with rend.ers, the sub-group into whose must be stopped- if possible' rf him. rf he attempts to break hethe break-out the sub-group from the cover group can*ot p""rr""t report to the' operationar cornmand'er must breakiilg is he area whose othe= *"n wirl be red-eployed and then for_r_ow to maintLn contact. In this problem' the crimina-lr s caT by the operational commartd-er' a*d. needs no special consid-eration' has been left some d-ista*ce away

Ft;

65 Chapter 6 If it were at the house or in the garage, speci-aI steps might be need.ed. to ensure that the criminal could- not use it to break through the conta-inrnent. If the men at the scene initially were already a:med., they could. be utilised. i-n the cover group. When the a^:emed- cover group is in position any ad.d.itional men must be withcLrarnm from the scene either to reserlre at a rend.ezvous post or to fo:m part of a perimeter 8roup. Containment

is not simply a matter of confining the criminal to a particular spot: it involves isol-ating him. In this situation, the cover g:eoup cannot meet the problem alone. A perimeter group must be fo:med. at once. They will close the road.s which pass the front and. rear of the house, clear arry members of the public from the area of operations, and. keep them clear. 0nce again the operational- command.er may find. it best to d.elegate this to a group command.er with such assi-stance as is avallable. The group command.er may initially take charge of a sub-group as we11, but eventuaIly he shouLd. leave himself free to operate arr;rwhere on the perimeter, appointing subcommand.ers for front and. rear. Closing road.s may be the idtial step, but consid-eration must qu:ickly be gi-ven to the evacuation of buil*ings in the line of fi-re. It might be thought necessa"LTr to evacuate those houses imned.iately opposite the front and rear, but large scale evacuation causes massive problems and. it is often safer to leave people i-nsid.e their homes with instmcti-ons to remain insid.e. lflhe final d.isposition of the perimeter group must provid.e for cover of the entire peri-meter including any gaps between houses. A rend.ezvous post and. a command- post will probably be required close by and. a staff officer should. assemble all arrivals at the rend-ezvous post. Phase 1 is complete, and. the urgency has now been taken out of the si-tuation. The criminal may continue to shoot if he wishes. There will be no need. for the police to return fi-re, and no need. for hasty police action. The command.er can esta.bl-ish himself at hi-s command. post and. at least d.raw breath before tu:srlng to the next phase planrring. PLAI{NING

The planning phase need. not involve a great d.eal- of time, must be d.one thoror:ghly, step by step.

but it

Gathering infomation ") A great d.eal of info:mation i-s already avai-1ab1e, but a good. cLeal more may be easily obtaj-ned.. The cover group may be abl-e to report the criminal-ts location witltln the house. Info:mation about furniture and- other d.etails of the insj-d.e may not be essential at first but could. be needed. later. tilithout r;nduly d.elaying the operation any further i-nfo:mation shoul-d. be gathered.. (

66

Chapter

5

(t) Basic plan cause d-ifficurties because situations like the one outrined. often basic pra,. often, it seemst the comma,d.er is not crear about his a Lriuinal to surrend-er a,d' the pla, is a confused. mixture of aski*g out' with changes taking steps to go in after him, or to forceofhi-m this situation will frequently being mad.e. Proper exa'minationfor the criminal to surrenshow that the basic plan ,olt b" to car-l be taken and-, if it sucder. This is the firsi step which wil-I pla, must therefore be ceed.s, it will end. the op"=Ltiorr. A cr.etailed. surrend-er when ordercriminar- will mad.e on the assr:mption that the the front d-oor is the one n'ormed. From the infomation available, j.nvolve the maintenance of contaj-nally used.. The basic ,,u,, wi]-l mentbythecoverarrd.perimetergroups,butensurirrgthatthecrimiof the cover group' llhe two man nal is mad.e aware of the presence ei-ther sid-e of the front raid_ group wirr then take'up positions on he comes out' \alhen all gates, read,r to d.eal with t-he-prisoner when front gard'en wa1l will use a is ready, a support man outsid-L theout. Th; te:ms of the d-emand- must roud. hairer to ord.er the criminal not asking, they are cl-ebe clear a*d. unmistakeabre. The police areto walk out of the front ma,d.ing a surrend.er. The man must be told. [here is no point in d.oor with his hand.s out in front of him' simplytellingthecrimina]to'comeout'.Ilemustbetolcl.exactly where- and. how he should' come out' raid- group will take overt trrlhen the criminal- is outside, the they can best d'eaI ord.ering the criminal- to a position from which of d-ealing methoddetail the with him. There will be no need tobut often method's some of the with a prisoner in the basic Plan, is impon it be d-esired and used. in securing prisoners reave much to crimithe into chaos when ta,t that the operation d.oes not colrapse ma^n belongs to the raid' nal appears. The iob of arresting theexceptionally the raid' group group. No one must interfere, though foolish or careless may call on a support man to assist. The of police cause a has been ha'd.Iing of criminars about to surrend-er r^rith in dealt wilr- be casuar-ties. Method.s of d_ealing with prisoners conis plan the basic chapter B, but the importa,t poitt so far as out to a point where cerned. is that the "=i*irrrt shourd- be brought group must not be the police can safely d.eal with hi-m' The raid' required. to move in for the crimina-l' Thebasicplani.sthuscompletearrd.eachmanwillknowwhathis will be shouting ord-ers part is. Equally importantr o"ry one manaroundto create confusion' a,d. there will be no il;" men sta*aing But,ofcou:rse,thecriminalmaynotsurrenderarrd-Socontingency the basic plaps will be required-. These atre produced by examini-ng

pfrn from its first (

steP '

Contingency Plans

") by in*er cover group: From 1 criminar breaks out a*d. is stopped. there is a d-anger of the moment the police -begin their overt moves plan 1 d-eals with ttt-is eventhe criminar breaking ooI. contingency cri*i""r will be stopped- by the tuality on the *=".,*ptio* thatilIthegroups wil-I Stand- fast' The cover cover group. In such a case,

6T Chapter 6 group into whose area the cri.minal breaks will hold. him at gurrpoint and- the sub-group command.er wiLl have discretion either to secure the prisoner with his group or to call for the raicl group to secure him.

2 Criminal breaks and. gets beyond. inner covers If the cover group are llnable to stop the criminal from breaking through, the sub-g:eoup will first info:m the operational- command-er and. then foll-ow the criminal to maj-ntain contact. The operational comrnand.er will then red.eploy other men in the operation to recontain the criminal. fn some cases it might be thought necessarTr to have an outer cover group available to d.eal with this contingency, in whi-ch case it might be d.ecicLetL to have tr^ro men (CE and. C5) with a car in the front street and. possibly two further men (CZ and. CB) with a car in the back street. Outer cover is d.esirable in marry situations and. rnight vaay from a smal1 mobile force to large numbers of men d.eployed. in static positions. In this operation it might be thought unnecessa^qr.

3 Criminal refuses to surrend.er: The basic plan assumes that the criminal wil-l surrend-er, but there i-s every possibility that he will refuse to d.o so. In such a ease there will be no need. for haste, but it is r-md.esirable that the operation shoul-d. d.rag on. The longer the situation persists, the greater the d.anger of something going wrongi it i-s tying up policemen and. attractirrg r.mdue attention. The stancLing and. reputation of the police force will be aclversely affected. if they appear to be incapable of end-ing the situation. fn the command.errs ourn good. time, the criminal must be forced. out of the house if he will not come out in response to the surrend.er call. Generally speaking this will best be achieved by the use of a chemical- munition such as CS which, when correctly used-, will make the location r:ntenable but will have no lasting effects. If CS is used. it may give rise to other contingencies, but the first plan will be mad.e on the assr.imption that it will succeed.. fhe arrangements must not be mshed.. Because of the possibility of CS spreading outsid.e the house it may be necessarJr to evacuate acLtLj-tional houses (a task for the perimeter group). All police officers even remotely concerned. must be issued. with respirators, which shouliL be fitted. in pairs, one man dor:ning Lr-ls respirator r,,rhil-st the other maintains a watch. l'lhen all members of a group or sub-group are wearing respirators, their command.er should. report back to the operational- comma^nd.er. No further moves must be mad.e until the operational command.er is satisfied. that all is read;r. CS wi]l be lar:nched by a support man on the ord.er of the operational- comma^nd.er. Details of the effects of CS, the tl4tes of ntmitions and- lar:nching systems, a,re contained- in Chapter 7. It will suffice here to make two points. The criminal- shouId not be war::ed. that CS is to be used.. This will merely al1ow him to erect bamiSecontL, both cad.es, making the d.e1ivery of the CS more clifficult. man support of a second. CS before, durirrg ancL af ter the d.elivery hj-m ord-eri-ng hailer through l-oud. a must be constantly acLdressing hj-m produee of a d-egree to come out through the front d.oor. CS can pasic ancL the cLesired. course of action must be implanted- in the criminalts mind.. When the eriminal- is forced. out, the rald. group will 6eal with him, though if he is bacLly gassed., they may have to mocLify their tactics a Iittle.

68

Chapter

6

hCsused.,criminald.oesnotcomeout:CS,whenpropgrlyused, a person out of a builcLing, but is a most reliable means of forcirrg It is not uncommon for an unstable it d.oes not always succeed.. to shoot himser-f when cs is crininar placed. in such-" p"sition. be so ovelcome that he was l-a;unched-. In some cases a man coul-d' there is the i:na,ble to d.ismaptle tagicad'es, etc' ^Llternatively' some sort of protection, perhaps by risk that the criminal has for.md. founcr. a source of unconthe use of a respirator, or perhaps he has out, there must be no taminated. air. rf the criminar is not forced. when the cs was hasty action. rf the ma,r s location was knovnr aror:nd- him, but if his lar:nched., it should harre been concentrated allow the cs to percoto rocation was unknor^rn it may be necessa"rrrafter a reasonable time' If , late to a1L parts of the build-irrg. to the operational referredthere is no response, the matter must be consid'er: command.er for furtfrer ord'ers' Ile may surrend'er (") Renewed calls for (n) fhe use of (") 1rhe use of

more

some

CS

6 :-^:--:-- r.r^^ m6r, nrrt ( other means of driving the ma11 out (water'

foam, etc.

) that the (a) In extreme cases, and. if he is reasonably certain necessaJsr become criminal is i-ncapacitated, it may eventually to mor:nt a search of the build:tng such a search would- be very rf the criminar_ is not incapacitated.search shoulcL be delayed hazardous a*d. should. be avoided. any l0cation and- cond-ition of until all 0ther means of establishing thenecessaaTr, the search will the crimi_naI have failed. rf it becomes plan ancl continbe conducted. as a new operation with a fresh basic in chapter at gencies. [he technique*s used. wi]-r- be d.i-scussed- lerrgth g,butifCshasbeenused.,theofficerswillhavetheacld.itional In this connection problem of wearing respiraio=, whilst searching. d.eterred- by cs and can be it is worth noting thai d.ogs are not cotrrse arle the re9f useful in this situation. These problems, far as the men are' concerned'' sponsibility of the commapd-er. S; that if the criminal d-oes contingency r+ wilr be dealt with by sayirrg bs tire matter must be referred- to not come out forlowing the use orother action may be taken until the the operational "or*rid."= a'd. no command.er issues fresh orders' all the probable Four contirrgency plarrs wi,I, therefore ' ofcover a' unforeseen contincourses of action. rn the untikely event as quick]y as safety gency arising, the operation will [" suspend'ed' a,d red-eploy his aflows, a*d. the operationar- comma*d.er will re-p]a* men.Inthesituati-onbeingconsid-ered-rthereisnocal-l-forprelininary or second'a^rXr Plans'

ORGA}TISATION

when the commence.

phase willptan'ing phase is complete, the organisation

69 Chapter 5 1

Marrpower

Basic plan: ( Perimeter group: The size of the perimeter group will depend. ") on a mmber of factors, but assr.ming a qrriet area and. an operation conclud.ed. in a reasonable time it cou1d. involve perhaps six men plus a commartd-er. (t) Cover group: The four ma^n cover group d.iscussed- r-md.er containment will be ad-equate for the basic plan. (") Raid. group: The stand.ard. two man raid. group is appropriate for this operation. ( a) Support group: One support man will- be need.ed. to use the loud- haiLer.

In acLd.ition the cornmand-er will require his staff officer, and- one will probably suffice for thi-s. Contingency plans: Conti.ngency 1 requires no ad.d.itional men. Contingency 2 might require the four outer cover men d.iscussed. r.md.er that head.ing. Contingency 3 will require an ad.d.itional- support ma^n to d.eliver the CS and. it will usually be necessarJr to provid.e him with another man to protect him, to note the faII of his canj-sters, etc. The total of support men i-s therefore brought to three. Ad-d-itionally the d-e1ay and. the need. to evacuate a wi-d.er area will- d.ouble the d.emand.s on the perimeter group which should be increased., perhaps to twelve. If , und-er contingency h, a search of the house i-s finally necessary there will be a need. for a d.og hand.l-er who will join the man

support group.

TABLE 6 .1 Marrp-ower sunma^r1r

Basi.c

plan

Extra for contingency plans

Perimeter group

Tx

$x

Cover group

l+

h?

Raid. group

2

0

Support group

1

3

2x

0

Command-er and.

xln

staff

marry cases it command.er or the

(aos)

will not be necessaqr for the perimeter group, the staff officer to be a::trred..

lhe manpower requj-rement d.escribed- here is far below the Ievel usually found. in operations of this sort, but in most circumstances it will be ad-equate. The command-er may d-ecid-e that he will maintain a reserre at the rend-ezvous post, but all other men, and. especially the d.angerous spare mid.d.le and- senior rarrks, must be fi:m1y ord.ered. away.

70

Chapter Command.

6

stnrcture

Perimeter GrouP

ctu (1)

_l_, tr'ront Rear (

l)

cornmand.

(:)

Eurer Cover

OuJer Cover

GrouP

GrouP?

(

sh

to

command )

I

I

ReAr Frdnt

(z)

Support Group ( l+)

Raid.

Group (z)

(z)

Reb,r Front (z)

(z)

post a,d. rend-ezvous post should alread.y be esta.blished-.

3 Equipment to (r) Weapons: All a^:rued. men must have pistols a3d, havingtoregard' of each the likeIy ranges, one shotgr:n might useful-ly be issuedno need for rifles' the -- - ir:ner cover Sroups. There will be radj-o scheme is d-esirpocket (;) Co**,roications: An exclusive station or from a base mobile a able apd- this m:lght be run through sets woul-d- be Rad-io vehicle fittecL with UIIF repeater facil-itj-es. issued. to the perimeter sroup as far as possible, and certainly to the commapd-"= ,rra sub-command-ers. Each pair of men on the inner cover group wouId. requi-re a set, as woulcL each pair i-n the outer cover group if one were used.. R2 woulcL have a set and- two of the

support group wourd. ar-so carry them, probably the command-er (sl+) adwith the base s2. The operational command.er would., if possible, be0vera11, there station, but he may operate from a remote hand. set. Loud' sets' would. be a requi="*"*t for perhaps ten or e]even rad-io least one with hairers will be essential- to the perimeter group atgroup and' one each sub-group. Qne will be required by the support should- be tept with the operational command.er for standby cornrtr-mications. A tota:- of four loud. hailers is required'' men (") gther equipment: for the basic plan: armband-s fortoanJrremove vehicle group; in plain clothes; hand.cuffs for the raid' Ad'd'itional prisonerl possibly barriers for the perimeter group'groups; two Lquipment for contingency plaps: hapd-cuffs for cover vehi-cles to move outer cover group or for red-eployuent of other men; respirators for all men, cs mr.mitions, l-aunchj-rrg weapons. If(l+a search is cal}ed. for there will be a need. for: body armolrr -"t"1 ; forcing equipment; searching mirror; hapcl-Lamp; other lighting if d.aYlight f ail- s .

l+ Briefing

at the men except the cover a,d. perimeter groups ca* be briefecL men the for mad-e rend.ezvous plst, but specia-1 arrangements must be men

A1

Ii might be possible to replace them with already or, be necessarJr "trtion. who are ful1y bri.efed. for the main operation, it might to sendbriefing, for in to have comrna,d.ers rer_ieved. a*d brought by rad'io' brief to falIs someone round. to brief them, or if all else for During the briefing all men must be told. of the arrangements

7

1

Chapter

5

progressive briefing and for the need. to report any shots irnmed-iately. E)GCUTION

the first three phases have been completed. a move can be mad-e to put the pfan into operati-on. A d.escription of the process upp"os rather lengthy, but the procedures take very little tine and,rry time so spent will be more than justified- by the success rate and. the absence of casualties. There will also be a marked. increase in confid.ence a.mongst the trained. men when they are operatrrig a system with which they a^re familiar.

l,lhen

CONCLUSION

The example set for d.iscussion j-nvolves a simple operation. It could-, of course, be much more involved.. There could be innocent people j-n the sane build.irrg. The exterrral or internal layout of the bqild.ing may be complex. [he location might be something other thart

a solid. bruililing. A crimina1 besi-eged. j-n a caravatrr or flimsy wood-en build-ing, the waLls of which offer no protection from gr.rnfi.re, would. raise speci.al problems if an approach hacL to be mad.e. Thi-s exa,mple reLates to a crininaL in a build.ing, but a sinilar situation woul-d. arise if the criminal were confined. to arry lim-ited. area. A cri-mina-l taking refuge in a d.itch, or rock outcrop, wou1d. be d.eaLt with in the sane way. An i-ncid.ent might well involve more than one crimj-ngf, in which case the problems of the cover group in particular would. be complicated- if there was a break-out by one man. A11 these factors, and- many morer o&y complicate an operation, but the princi-ples will remain the same. The basic tactics provid.e an efficient apd- logical prog?ession through the operation, avoiiLi-ng marry of the pitfalls which have led to tragedy in the past. NOTE

1 Alag Bristow, Poli-ee Officer Shootings A Tactical Evaluation, rJourrral of Criminal Law, Criminology and. Police Sciencer, voI.

5\,

no.1

,

1963.

Chapter

7

CHEMICAI MUNITIONS

Chemical mr.mitions have been available to the police for marqr years. Paris It seems to be generally accepted. that they were first used- inethyl l-achrimator, an early with ghen hand. grenad.es fiIled. in 1912 bromacetate, were used. in oonfrontations with the criminal gangs then plaguing that city. since that time a wid.e range of chemi-cal agents nas been used. to produce lachrimatory, irri'tant, or nauseatup to ing effects. Swea="tg"t (t) lists over twenty agents in use 196G and. many of these had. several variants. Since 1956 there has been at least one new agent ancL a major variation on an existing agent. The major use for these chenical agents has been in riot control, and. both they an6. the mr.mitions in which they a,re delivered- have generally beln d.esignetL with this in mi-nd.. Further, most of the writing on the subject concentrates on this aspect of the problem a*d. med.ical ,eseur"h tend.s to concentrate in that field-. The var1ous j-nst:rrction marruals, marrrrfacturersr handbooks and the like appliarso concentrate on riot contror with sparse mention of otheruse of the with onfy cations of the agents. This work is concernedwhere situations in chernical agents against a:med. besieged. crininals an indivitlual or a smaLl group are contained., probably in a build-ing of but occasionally in " =""t=icted. area in the open. The use chemical agents in riot control is outsi-d.e the scope of this work, as is the use of these agents in pressurised- aerosol- canisters in

face-to-face confrontations with vi-olent intLividuals. The d.isti-nction between the various uses is vital. The requirements for a chemical mr.mition for use against a besieged- criminal are quite d-ifferent from the requirements for riot control-, and- it migh{ be useful to contrast the two requirements' RIOT

CONTROL MUNITIONS

in the open, often In riot control the area of operation is usually covering a relain a built-up area of streets, alleys and road-s, to spread' its a8ent munition a of tively large aTea. [lhe ability wirl be large in invor-ved wid.ely is a varuab]e asset. The subjects core of violent nrmber and- are likery to incrud-e * =Lr-rtively smaIl 72

7

3

Chapter

T

rioters, a much larger number of less committed. d.emonstrators, andvery frequently a large number of resi-dents and- others who are lawfu11y or accid.entally within the area of operati-orrs. If it were possible, a riot agent should. be d.iscriminating in that it shoul-cL l_rr"u,prcitate and. immobilise the violent rj-oters, deter and- d-isperse the d.emonstrators, and. leave the j.nnocent r;naffected.. Nothing ca^n be so selective, but by careful placement of mr-initions somethirrg approaching that situation can be aimed. for. A good- riot agent will p=oao"" iniolerable effects, the r-mpleasantness of which is d-irectly related. to the concentration. If the agent is correctly d.elivered-, those nearest the point of d-ispersal will receive the greatest concentration. In ma.n;r cases riot control agent is mixed. with smoke so that it will d.eter and d.isperse persons outsid.e the field. of its d.j-rect effects when they see the smoke d.rifting toward.s them. The effects of a riot control agent must be so unpleasant that rioters d.o not immed.iately return for a second. exposure. The a.rnormt of agent to which a rioter will be subjected. will- usually be controlledto a large extent by the subject hi-mself , who will move away when he has had. enough. It will be useful in a riot situation if the concentration oi agents build-s up gradually. [he ]ess d.ete:Enlned- willd.rift away at an early stage whilst the more d.ete:mined will stay r.mtil the agent "orr""rrtration i s intolerable . Whil st the efficient use of chemical agents in rj-ot control tend.s toward.s these d-esj-ra,bIe results, the fact remains that large rrr:mbers of ir:nocent people willsometimes be enveloped. and. these will includ.e the o1d-, the very young, and. the infi:m who wil-l be subjected- to va^rXring d.oses of the agent. CHMVIICAI MUNTT]ONS

]N

TIIE BESIEGED CRI]trNAL SITUATION

fn a besieged crininal situation the agent will be used- j-n a confined. a3ea, no:ma11y in a build.irrg but occasionally in a smal-l defined. space out of d.oors. The requirement for agent distribution is therefore Less and- a mr:.aitj-on which spread-s its agent too wid-eIy could cause d.ifficulties some d.j-stance away from the scene of operations. The target will be an inclividual or a small group of people, apd. the various factors which ruight effect the ind.ivitlual-s involved c3n usually be properly weighed. llhe crimina]- will not no::nally be subjected. 1o CS before he has hacL an opportr:nity to surrend-er, and the whole situation arises because he is a d.anger to society andcannot othentrise be neutrali-sed. without unacceptable risks to the public an6 the police (u-nless perhatrls by shootirrg him). The agent mgst therefore U" eapa.ble of forcing a d.etermined and- possibly d-erapged- crinlnal from a particular location into the hand-s of the police. It must clo so quickly with the absolute ninimrm of delay between the cLelivery of the agent and its full effects on the subject so that the criminal cannot take counter-measures. The degpee shooting or of incapacitation must prevent aggressive action such as immobilise trickery after the criminal comes out, but it shoul-d- not him' the criminal-, creatirrg a need. for police to go in and- fetchmaxim:m for both possib1e as The agent shoul6 be as rlear invisible psycrrotogical effect and. to ensure that the criminal's activities are not obscured-. The agent must find. its way throughout the a,ea,

7)+ Chapter 7 through a through any d.oor or barricad.e, and. be capable of spread-ing used- in a complete house or buildi*g. rd.eal1y the chemicaf agent area of operasiege situation woultl be iestricted- to the verxr smallhe might be where matter no tion, it shourcl seek the criminar- out,by the criminal until he hid.ing, and. it woul-d. not be d.etected surrender' to place sud.cLenly for:ncl himself rr,mrrins from his hid:ing being incapable of offensive action' CHOICE OF AGEMS

parts of the Four chemical agents a,re in use by police in various Adansite' cal]-ecL worl-d. DM Cip["rryiar,i nechloroarsine), sometimes used. in serious a*d peris a nause"iirr-s aglnt which is occasionally with a total sistent rioting" rt prod,ces very vior-ent reactions contror munitions it incapacitation, but it is slow to act. rn riot that a fast acting agent is often combined with another agent soqrrite Iiterally lmocks them drives the rioters away before the DM DM d.oun. Because of its violent, untrllea"rtt ad persistent-effects reaction initial slow is now little used., but in any case its vely most unsuitable for it make incapacitation folrowed by almost total in a siege situation' use *--cR is not (lit"rrroxacepin")--i" a recently d.eveloped. agent which which is primarily yet avairabre for genera] use. rt i; a* irritant or jets. such sprays of intencled for direct use on rioters by means use against for d_elivery method.s will_ frequently not be appropriate CR available' a besieged. criminaL and., o,, the info:mation currently is not suitable for this application' a"re the lachrimatory agent CN Remalning for consid.eration (

cr* o ro c e tolhenone

) *r;- ; s

(o ch1 o rob enzyl i- denema] ononi tril e ) =ilro cN was d.iscovered- in 1869 and- irritant.

which is both lachrimatory as a riot control t by a Ge:ma* chemist a*d. hls been in consta't useThe te:m ' tear gas agent since shortly after the First lforltl war. will was inspired by this agent whichr_ in mirr*te concentrations' chenipolice major cause a copious fl-ow or tears. cN has been the be effective and to cal agent for ma.n;r years and. has proved. itself development combining recent more safe when used. correctry. cs is a irrita't features. strong a more powerful lachrimltory action with consid'erably requires it When comparecL with CN, CS i; faster acting, a,d these effects rower concentrations to produce its fulr range of that both shows testing effects are more potent. The most extensive whilst cN has agents aJ3e safe to use but cs is r-ess toric than cN. situations and- for use attributes which make it useful in some riot ind-ividual, there is no viorent in aerosol ca*isters for subduing aa^:medcriminals are besieged- in d.oubt that for situations in which

is vastly superior' use crrapie*ilr therefore be rimited tototheother this Discussion in applied comment about the effects of cs cannot be cs.o \,\/rru of l.rtJ UJ. -'r-^l^ ^f applv to and. it would be unwise agents, (4re otts.lrvpr ":Y?i:t.3l::ti::n?*:,,ot them make use to other a8ents which night havL- properties which .--+ the use about macle comments similarly, uerra'vv pL'ure::**^::::;-;;;;; ffi# lied. to the use of ""-"rnfr-ilir"="nt1y.nqt s ?., ofCsagainstbesieged.criminalscanrrotbeapp. A where cr.ifferent problems arise. a8en u r ;;;;;rraitiorr. ;;;"#;T; tnaE /o\ M (z) I{arry ----i'r^r^'r^ great deal of infomati-on about cs is publicly available.

limited. areas,

CS

.Ir!P\rstJP+!

+1^

^f,

-1-1

--^

,

^-.1

a^

A

75

Chapter

7

of the stud-ies of its properties and effects a^:re couched- in technicaL and- medical te:ms which may cause d-ifficulties for the lalmart seeking info::nation quickly about the practical use of CS. fn this chapter every effort wil-l be mad.e to reduce the inforrnation to simple te:ms and. it will often be necessa^:1r to generalj-se. Such generalisation is almed. at the practical user of CS and. i-n complex matters such as erposure levels any emor which may arise from broadtreatment will be on the sid.e of caution, leaving a greater margin of safety than may perhaps be essential. Orthochlorobenzylid.enemal-ononitrile was first produced- in 1928 by two British chemists naned- Corson and. Stoughton and., thankfully, it is universally id.entified. by a syrnbol which utilises the initia] letters of their two names, CS. The agent is frequently referred- to as tgasr or ftear gas' or rCS gasr, but it is important to a proper und.erstancl-ing of the way in which CS works to be quite clear that it is not a gas. It is a white crystalline solid- which i-s usually d.ispersed. as verry fine particles of dustr or in some cases as very small d-roplets. When used., CS will not behave as a true gas would, but rather as a cl-oud. of the finest particles of dust. GENERAI EIT'ECTS

[he effects of CS vary slightly accord.ing to the tJDe of munition used., the eventual concentration created., and. the speed. with which that concentration is established.. In its verT lowest concentratj-ons CS will produce a pri.cking sensation about the eyes and. nose. As the level of CS in the air increases the range of effects increases. The eyes begin to strea^m, the nose begins to run, the respiratory tract is irritated. and- the subject begi-ns to cough and. spit. The eyelid.s close and. the subject find.s it impossibf e to keep them open for more than veaT brief period-s. Especially when the sj-ze of the particles is sma11, the sub ject feels a tightening of his chest and. arr apparent inability to breathe. In faet the effect on his breathing has no clinicaL significance (:) but it i-s sometimes d.escribed. as rlike being held in a bear-hug from which one cannot escapet. The skin is imitated., first by a pricking sensation which d.evelops into a burning as the concentration increases. This effect is particularly marked. where the skin is darnp or specia11y tend.er, as for sxample on the cheeks and. neck after shaving. If any CS is swal1owed., the subject will retch and vomit. The evid.ence in&icates that CS d-oes not, of itself , produce unconsciousness, but in hear,6r concentrations the full rarlge of effects is produced- quickly and. there is eveaTr possibility that the subject will faint. An al-most invariable product of a mod.erate d.ose of CS is a d.egree of pani-c brought on by the sudden onset of the s;rrnptoms. It has been established. that, although even verry low concentrations of CS are extremely unpleasant, a d.ete:mined. or highly motivated. incl-ividual can tolerate low concentrations for amazingly long period.s. It has also been shown that whilst sud.d.en elrposure to a high concentration will produce results qu:lck1y, a gradual rise in concentration can be tolerated. much longer. (1+) Even in hearry concentrations, the d.eranged. or the highly motivated- can resist for peri-od.s completely beyond- the capacity of no:ma1 people. In the besieged. criminaL situation the police shoulcL seek to produce

76

Chapter

7

an wilr create in the criminal proinstantly that concentration which an!' which will also immed.iate and d.esperate d-esire to get out, that he cannot thirik duce a sufficient d.egree of pa,ic to ensure of evasive or retaliacourse crearry a,d. can*ot folrow a Lonsid-ered.use so much cs that the crimihoweverr not, tory acti-on. They must nal will be complltely incapacitated- in his pos1tion'

NECO]ERY

of cs, re-

Despite the severity of the effects of mod.erate in cfean air' the coveqr is very rapid.. once free of the agent and' qruptoms almost person rapi&Ly regains control of himself and the time d-epend-s on the immed.iately begin to ease. The actual- recovearr but in most cases d.egree of exposure ad wir-I vary with ind.ividuals, to open the ability an there is an easing of the chest effects and.stage arry panic will subeyes within two o= three minutes. At this once more become a sicLe and the very d-ete:mined. incLividual nay to a mod.erately hearry d'ose of cs threat. A no:mal p"="o* subjectedExceptionally, some sympwill be fu1ly recovered. in ten minutes. be &rscussed- r-:nd-er toms may p"=Li=t in ind.ivlduals and. this wirl police officer i's the as important pointr so far 'First ai-d.'. The be exaggeratedmight concerned., is that the aegpel of incapacitation recover from a teaJfrom the start a,d. the d.ete::nined. criminal might with such a person incapacitation in a very short time. rn d-ealing offenit must not be assumed. trrrt cs has rend.ered. hin incapable of sive action. doses

TONG TERM EFTECTS

campaigp mor.mted- by

cs has been subjected. to a' intensive propaga,d.a were an:cious to those elements in various parts of the 'o"ld' 'ho contror persistent ensure that the authorities were not able to been taken up by some has propaga*d.a politically inspired_ mobs, The best intentio*s, but erements of the mass med.ia who, oftln with thefostered- horrific usually in complete ignora,cer have sometimes to cause impotal_es of after-effects. The agent has been alleged babies; to tence and sterility; to cause deformities in r:nborn Serious stomach d-isord-ers affect pregna,t women seriously; to cause to the e1derryi to be in child-ren; to be particularly dangerous or card-iac ailments; to induce or fatal to persons with respiratory so o11' aggravate mental d-isord-ers; and' CS in 1928, but litt1e work produced. first Stoughton Corson and. to intense developwas d-one for some time. Late= :-t was subjected. by the British in use ment and. testing before its fj-rst operationaJin almost daily llse' been has il time Cytrrnrs, io 1960: Since that

Ithasbeenaccepted.allovertheworld.aSthemajorriotcontrol of people harre been subjected' agent. Operati-onal1y, manJr ttrousands have includ-ed- vast nr:mbers of to it. In riot situaiions these and' the mentally babies, pregnant women, old- peoPle, sick people experience-' which by d.isturbed-. In ad.d-ition to this practical be properly tabulated or vlrtue of the circr:mstapces ca31 never testing scientifically assessed., cs has been sut;LctLd- to rigorous

77

Chapter

7

particularly in EnglancL and. the USA. Tests on animal-s have been supplemented. by tests on hr.man vohmteers and. by the fact that members of the a:med. forces of many cor-lntries are routinely subjected. to CS in training as are vast numbers of police the world. over. [he resu]-t of the resea^rch has been mad-e public. Man;r of the reports originating with the United. States A:myrs Ed.gewood.

in

marr;r

countries

and.

Arsenal Researchers have been released. for publication and., following the recommend.ations of the Himsworth Committee, the result of British research is now published. in appropriate scientific journals. 0ther scientists have conducted. research and. produced. their reports in various parts of the world.. There is therefore no need. to speculate about the effects of CS; they a,re well known and well established.. The agent has been and. continues to be subjected. to a more rigorous testirrg than any dmg. The person requiri-ng d.etailed. technical i-nfo:mation about the effects of CS is referred. to the various reports and. might d.o well to start with the Himsworth Report. It will be sufficient for t}:-is chapter to summarise the main effects, bearing in mind. that it is the use of CS in confined. areas against barricaded. criminals which is contempLated.. In this cor:nection it is important to keep in mi-nd. that, if he is subjected. to too gpeat a concentration, the criminal may be r,mable to leave his location to surrend.er, and. might faint. If he d.oes so the poliee will have the velT d.angerous task of searching for him in the contaninated. area, not lcoowing whether he has fainted. or for-md. protection. It is also important to keep in mind. that we are d.ealing with a d.angerous offend.er and. the alternative to CS is probably an a,med. assault by the police with a veaTr good. chance that the criminal will be killed- in the process. Qccasional1y, innocent persons may be trapped. in the area which will be affected. by CS, but they will be in limited. nr:mbers and. any special problems should. be easily icLentified.. EITECTS ON I{EALTIIY ]IIDIVIDUAIS

n1]ter the most extensive testing ancL research and. the mass of operaJtional and- training e:rperience with thousand.s of people over a fifteen year period., there is not one single shred. of evid.ence to suggest that lasting effects are caused by CS. People have not become impotent or sterile after e{posure, nor have animal-s in laboratory tests. Exposu-re to massive d.oses created. enperimentally has caused. burning of the skin but this heals norora11y and. in any case the concentration reErired. could. only be produced. in the most unusuaL circr.i.mstatrrces. There is, theoretically, a chance of causing d.eath with massive concentrations of CS if the person is r.mable to escape. [his aspect will be d-iscussed. later, but for all practical puaT)oses such concentrations cannot be maintained. in operational conflitions and. the fact of the matter is that not one single d.eath ca^n reliably be attributed. to CS.

78

Chapter

EIIECIS

7

ON PNEGNANTI

WOMEN

that cs has no i]1 effects Extensive testing with animals showsurrborn child. No evi-d-ence of the either on the pregnant woman orafter any operationaf use in which such effects has been produced. harre been exposed- to va:rying large numbers of pregna,t women must in a very adva'ced- stage of pregd.oses of cs. However, if a woma, erperience (rrrd exposuire naney were to be subjected. to arry violent a very violLnt e:rperience) she to hearry concentrations of CS isserious consequences' Iu' a riot m:ight wel-l suffer more or less urrlikeiy to be at the centre si-tuation a heavily pregna,t woman is abre to move qruickly away from and in ,r,y I""" wourd. be

of activity

arryCs.Inthesiegesituationsuchawomanmaybetrappetl.withthe call for special presence criminal, perhaps as a hostage. Herco-ncentrations 'oora of cs woul-d be consicleration a*d- the use of heavy adva*ced- stage of r-ess a avoided if possible. wtrere a woman was in of CS essenuse the Lr where other consid'erations made pregnancy, be essentiar, arrangements for inme..iate medi-caf attenti-on wourd-

tial before the CS was la;r.lnched'

EEFECTSONSASIESA\TDSI{AILCIILDNEN

the veaT young in va:rying concentrations' and' ha.ve frequently been extrlosed- to cs evid'ence that CS has ever d.espite extensive testing, ther-e is no or young chil-d-ren' Ilowever' ir caused. a^ny permagent rrari'to babies of heaviest is unlifcefy to L" 't the point riot cond.itions, a baby probably from any quickly very bL removedconcentration ad. woult be exto Iikely and criminal cs. A baby trapped wiilr a besieged. consid'eration' given further posed to rrl"ry Lirr""rrtrations rn*st be young child' are so d-eIivearr a of lrlng! rn the first insta,ce, the of cs acting as an irrita*t coul6 cause cate that very hearry 6.o="" where that this has never happened' butofcases danage. It be veaT "L"*"trapped in hearry "orr""nt=ations cs mustevent babies have been the acknowledged-. rn _any few a,cl the d.a,ger *o"t therefore bethe sud.d.en onset of the full effects on a baby or smarl chifd- of rangeofeffects-woutatetrar:matic.Noonewould.wishtocreatea sud.d.enry find-s itself apparently situation where a smaIl chil-cl breathe, and with afmost a'11 of its bl-ind.ed.r apparently r.mable to the presence of a tend.er skin irritating and- brrrning' Generally' of bS. If the alternative baby or smal-l chi,d. ,rIofa inhibit the use cs may have to be people of ir:*ocent is a serious risk of d.eaths must be mad'e for the removal of the used., but special p=ori"ion chilcl- the attention. The older the will c'ird. a,cr. for immed.iate medicar be chiLcLren all less consideration it will need., except that

Despite

its

wid.espread. use i-n circumsta*ces where

particularfysusceptibletoparricfromexposuretoCS. EI'TECTS ON OLD PEOPLE

the

fact of adva,cing years cLoes not' of itself ' rend'er person.moreorless"o"""ptiur"toCs.Theelderlya^remorelikely special to suffer from other ailmlnts whi_ch nright d.emad-

The mere

79

Chapter

I

consideration, but age al-one is not an importapt factor. ETTECTS ON

EXISIING BESPIRAIORY AIII',IENTS

The apparently violent effects on the chest and. on breathirrg causedUy moalrate concentrations of CS tend. to create the impression that pl="orr" suffering even minor respiratory ailments will be seriously it risk. The facts are that CS will cause a minor cha.r:ge in breathirrg patterns, these wil-I not impair gas exchanges between the lungs and. lhere is no increased- resistance in the bodyt s airtr,rays. CS will not cause respiratorT ailments but it may cause irritation in a person already suffering. If the subject is suffering from a milcl asthma or bronchitis, there need. be no irihibitions about the use of CS. The irritapt may bring on an attack, but it will be a no:maI attack for that ind.ividual. In very mild cases subjects will findtheir cond.ition eased- by the clearing of the passages which CS induces. If any j-nnocent subject suffers from a chronlc respiratory ailment, CS nay exacerbate the cond.ition temporarily. The evid-ence is that there wil-I be no pemanent d.eterioration, but the presence of a1,1 inlocent person suffering from a chroric respiratorT ai-lment will cal-1 for special consicLeration. The d.egree of illne ss concerreed. is such that a cri-minal woul-d- not be persisting in a course of action which d.emand.ed the use of CS if he were so chronically

ill.

ETEECI ON CARDIAC AITMEMS A\TD IITPERIENS]ON

results in a transient rise in blood pressure bot, in healthy persons, produces no char:ge in heart beat rlrythms. It requires f:-ttfe imagi-nation, however, to visualise the effects of a sud.d.en onset of the qroptoms of CS on a person with a vely weak heart or very high blood. pressure. The tension and- stress might well induce L freart attack or a stroke. Of course, in the sort of sj-tuation envisaged, where a d-angerous criminal is besieged- ancL innocent people o" trapped with him, the su.biects will already have r:ld.ergone a Lonsid.erable strain. The existence or continuation of the situation might itself be a greater hazard than the use of CS. It must be ="*"rb"red-, however, that the onset of CS qmptoms will be rapicL agd. the presence of persons with weak hearts or very high blood. pressure will be an inhibiting factor.

Errposure

SUMIqARY

to

CS

OF SPECIAI CONSIDEMTIONS

fhe police officer involved. in the conduet of an operation against d-apgerous a:med. criminal will have mar$r factors to consid-er. The criminal who is violently resisting arrest is har&Ly likely to CS suffer from some acute cond-ition which would. inhibit the use of the a'd-, in any case, he will have the option of surrend-er. l^lkrere criminal is alone ancL will not surrend.er li-ttle thought need- be given to the points menti-oned- atrove. Where innocent persons are trappecL the command-er wi-Il need. to consid.er each ind-iviclual in

a

Bo

Chapter

7

creates in rerelation to the special problems which that person gpeat ned-ical no have lation to the use of cs. The comma*d.er will hospital d-octor will knowlecr.ge ancl the read.ily available fami Iy or his advice have so rittle knowledge about the effects of cs that a command'er which in way useful will rarely be helpful. The mostis to ensure that he himself has can prepare for such a situation of cs' rf he e:rperienced. the effects of a su.bsta,tiar concentration suffered'' person, then consid.ers the effect which he, as a healttSr conpersons he will be able to pred.i_ct the effect on the ir:nocent wilr- make him over-cautj-ous. rrl cerr.ed.. rn generar_ this approach -cs might still be used- af ter special prothe vast maj6rity of "r"""innovi-sion has been mad.e for the evacuation and treatment of any centpersonwhoisnotcompletelyhealthy. EITECTI\TE AND I,ETHAI CONCEIVIRATIONS

parts of the Despite its extensive use over manJr years and. in manJr for a single world., cs has never been shovrn to have been responsible to it' d-eath, nor can any serious lasting consequgnges be attributecL of d-eaths that (5) allegecL .ne crarm mad.e to the Himsworth committee supto evid'ence the persons trapped. i-n dugouts were due to cs, but }'lhen used' in port the criim was, to say the Ieast, inconclusive. j-s subjected- will be the open the amount of cs to which a person very strictry limitecr.. Apart from the fact that the cs willofd-isCS fincling himself in a concentration perse quickly, a person -cs criminars besiegedinvolvi*g used. in operati-ons wilr move "rrry. problems. A rel-atively high concendifferent rather create wi1l to achi-eve the tration will be necessarrr in trre first insta*cethe of cs object of the operatioll. with some mr:nitions tod'ispersal a from move able will be uneven, ffid the subject may not be and d-ose heavily contaminated. a,rea. The question of concentrati-ons rates, which is an acad.emic point in riot control-, becomes an impo::tant practical consid.eration in the siege situation' is toric Despite its cl-ear record-, it must be acceptecL that cseffects of The and that massive concentrations could cause death' particles ancl cs are related. to a nr-mber of factors. The size of factors. the sensi-tivity of the intrividual are two of the lesserthe vo}:me of liberated', cs of anount the The i-mportant factors a,re for which the subject air in which the CS is d.ispersed., ancl thethetime of air is te:med' voh:ne is exposed.. The amor-mt or cs linlced. to cs per cubic of the concentration ancL is expressed. in milligrans r:nd'erstoocl it properly metre of air. To ensure th;t these tems atre one ounce, and- a shou_ld. be mentioned. that there are 28-35 grams to of air is milligran is one thousantl-th of a gTaJn. A cubic metre nillieqnal to 35 cubic feet. A concentration in whj-ch one be would' air of "tooi metre cubic one in grarn of cs is evenly di-spersed ounce of an millionth one I*p="ssed- as 1*g./^.3 apd.is equal to about of cs in a cubic foot of air. rt is, incid.entally, twice the anount of cs need.ed_ to make bystanders hurrTr away. takes The concentration oi cs is not the d.ose which the subject breathe an hour to into his 1:ngs. A person at rest will takeisabout importa't. The most factor time one cubic metre of air, so the anor:nt which the greater longer the person remai-ns in the cs, the

81

Chapter

7

to which a person has been erqposed- can therefore be elq)ressed. by multiplying the concentration in mg. fm.3 Ay the time in minutes to give the total- exposure. This is still- not the arnount which the person has taken in, but the total amormt to which he has been exposed. The product of ttris calculation is j-n min. mg./m.3 Urrt it is more frequently expressed as the Ct (Concentratj-on time). Thus, if a man has been exposed. to a concentration^of 1mg. /^.) for five minutes, this coul-d- be wil-l have acted. upon him. The amount of

CS

5*it.mg./m.3 U.rrt would- probably be shown as Ct5. The importance of the ti-me factor is ill-ustrated. by an experi-ment which shows that when some smaI1 animaLs were subjected. to a concentratj-on of l-1rOOOmg./^.3 maj-ntained- at that level r-md-er la,boratory cond-itions the mortality rate increased- progressively with the time. After a 5 minute elrposure only 2 ani-ma1s out of 6O subsequently illed.. After a 10 minute elieosure 16 out of 6O subsequently d.ied.. nfter a 15 minute elcposure 25 out of 60 d.ied. and. after a 20 mi-nute erq)osure 50 animals out of the-60 d-ied- subseErently. (6) A concentration as high as [rOOOmg./^.3 cou]-d. not be maintained. und-er operational conditions r.mless a rid.iculously massive amor.mt of CS was liberatecL in a confined. space and. then the concentration was maintainecL by the d.ischarge of further mr,mitions at a completely irresponsible rate. The initial concentration of CS fa1ls rapidly i-n any operational situation. Erqleriments i-n a smal-l ventilated. room ind.icate that witkr-ln ten minutes the original concentration of CS will have halved- and. in twenty minutes onfy one-seventh of the original concentration will- remain in the ai r. (Z) It is technically incorrect to speak of a particul-ar concentration of CS as lethal or near lethal. The problem of lethality d.emand.s proper" consid.eration of the time factor. Yet the person d.eci&ing uporl the anount of CS which will be introduced. into a particular space requires some simple ind.ication of the a.mount which will be d-angerous and. the a.mount that might be lethal, and he will not be able to assess in advance the time factor. It can be said. for practical purposes that a concentration of [rOo0mg./*.3 *igfrt in the most unusual ci-rcumstances cause d.eath and. this concentration shou]d., it is suggested., be thought of as Ietha1. I{aving regard. to the facts that room sizes cannot be accurately estimated- during an operation, and. that CS mr-mitions d.o not disperse their payload.s perthe arnount of Cq which can safely be used. must fall fectly evenly,'tfri" well short of [r000mg. /^.3 leve]. Such concentrations are tikely to cause total incapacitation and. so a,re r.md.esirable. To al1ow for a reasonable margin of error and. to make for simplicity it is suggested. that a concentration of 1 ,OO0mg. /*.3 should. be consid.ered. the maximr.m which should. be created. in arqr normal situation and. so might be regarded. as the d.anger level. This maximtm concentration is equal to one grarn of CS per cubic metre of air and. since the payload. of mr-r.reitions is nomally stated. in grams it should. be possible to express minimr.m room sizes for the safe use of a particular m.mition. Experiments conductecL by the British lvtinistry of Defence (B) sr.l"ssest that trained. sold.iers can tolerate a concentration of 10;;. /*.3 for not more than a minute or so r and that untrai-ned- ind.ivicluals a^re Iikely to be d-eterred by as little as 0'5rg. /^-3. The barricad-ed. criminal who refuses to surrend-er is 1ike1y to be either

L:rpressed. as

Bz

Chapter

T

mentally d.eranged. or highly motivated. and. such a person will- resist the effects of CS for much longer than even the trainecL ancL e:rperienced. so1d.ier. 0n that basis, an operational- minimum concentration of not less thap 30mg. /*.3 will be d.esirable i-n marSr cases. Sroa&Ly oi incapacitation is related. to the concentration speaking the "p""d. oi CS used., *rd in extreme cases where the fastest possible incapacitation is essentiaf (in frostage situations for^exa.nrple) it might wel-l be necessaqr to think in te:ms of 1O0mg. /*.) at the outset. No one ca^n expect that police officers engaged in an arrned- operation will make any precise measurements of rooms, nor enter into precise calculations of concentrations, but the Ievels suggestecL gir" a tlirty-three fo1cl margin of safety and. it should be easy to relate each of the ni:nitions to some basic room measurementsr PaXinS little attention to such matters as ventilation, errors in measurement, etc. This will provid.e the operational officer with a quick but sufficiently accurate guiile to the arnount of CS which shor.l-ld. be used- in a confined. space. Suppose, for exa.mpIe, that the proiectile in questi.on has a payload. of 25 grams. It can be assumed. that rooms in private houses will- generally be about 2.5 metres high. Twentyfi-ve grans of CS will create an und.esirable leve1 of CS in 25 cu-bic metres of air which, allowing for 2.5 metres of height, would give 10 square metres of floor or just over 100 square feet. It could therefore be said. that in a closed. room as smalI as 10 feet by 10 feet, that projectile woul-d- create an r-md.esirably hearry concentra-

tion of

CS.

particular Whil-st the theoretical marcim.m area of coYerage of ard-angerr the of that times thirty-three up to be mr:nitj-on coulil area, no single CS mr-mition ca.n d.isperse its payload. so efficiently that it will effectively fill such a large E^reo. For practical purposes, the largest room size rohich can be covered. by a single m.:niiion will be about five times the minimr-lm. In this case the single 25 grarn munition might cope with a room !0 feet by 5O feet, providirrg that time coulcL be allowed for full dispersal. In such a large ,ri^, initial &ispersal would be uneven with a-11 tJ4res of mr:nition ancl- it woul-d. be more effective to release a ntmber of smaller m-ini-tions at different points in the room than to try to use a single large munition. IYPES OF MUNITION

A wide range of CS mufiitions is available, involving ilifferent method.s of cLelivery ancl- d.ifferent method.s of d-ispersi-ng the CS from the point of i-mpact. Dispersal is achieved. in three ways

1 Pyrotechnic mr.mitions j.s used. as a so1id ancl is mixed. with a pyrotechnic composition for release by burning. A fuse system is in.o-porated- and. when the main charge is ignited. the pyrotechnic compositj-on burns fiercely. The products of the combustion are emitted. from the muaiti-on, carrying the CS with them. lhrch of the CS is vaporised. and. is canied- into the air where it cond.enses i-nto

In this true of munition

CS

83

Chapter

7

droplets antl then into particles of dust. Grenades: Pyrotechnic dissemination i.s used. in a witl-e range of grenad.es ruhich are usually metal canisters on top of which is the initiating system. A striker und-er sprir:g tension is heltL back by a f1y-off lever whi-ch, in turn, is heltL in place by a pin. Sefore throwing, the pin is removed. by means of a pu1l-ring ancL when the grenade leaves the hantL, the lever flies offr allowing the striker to fa11 on to a cap. Ehe cap igrrites a fuse with a cLelay of from 1.$ Lo 5 secontLs d.epencl-ing on the t;rpe of grenad.e. The main charge of CS and. pyrrotechnic eomposi.tion j-s ignited. by the fuse. Surning time varies consid"erably from grenaile to grenad.e but may avereage about 2! second.s. The quantity of CS varies consid.erably from the

100 grans in many commercial grenades, to l0 g'rams in the Sritish milita^:ry grenatLe, doun to the 20 grarns containecl- in the relati-ve1y new but exceptionally useful miniature grenad.es now available in the USA. Plate 7.1 shows the Sritish nilitaxy grenad.e, which contains 5O grans of CS.

7.1 Left to right - Sritish nilitary CS grenatLe; Sritish milita:ry 37mm. CS cartritLge and" projectile; Ferret 12 bore CS cartridge antl

projectile

As with most burrring mlnitions some of the payloacL i.s tLestroyecl" tluring functj-oning and this grenade night emit as little as hO grarns of CS. The payloacL of this grenacLe woultL make it appropriate for a single closed room of no:mal height of from 200 to 1 1000 square feet of floor space (assr:ming in the latter case that it woulcL be acceptable to wait for efficient tl-ispersal over the whole area). llhe high capacity grenad.es generally carrXr more CS than is appropriate for a single room i-n a house, though they night be used. in a haII or staircase as a means of coveri.ng several rooms. Projectiles: Projectiles which tli-sperse their CS p1rrotechnically are gene?al1y of 37mm. ( tf in. ) calibre antL intentletL for use in the

Bh Chapter 7 t

riot

and.

gr.ms I

Scott

of thi s ealibre

gas

.

t|ruicaI of these

illustrated in

P1ate

7

weapons

.2.

.,.,.,..,.........,,,:.,.,,..,,.,,,,,,.:':,.....,,.,.....,,.......,.,.,,.,..,. .,',..',...,..,..,'.,',...,,.,,,.:.',.,.,.,.,.,.:.,.,,,..,,',.,,.'.,,,,,,,,....,:,,,

.,.,'.....:....,.,...,.',1i.,.,,.,..,..i....,,.,.,.......,..'.,..,.....,..,.,.

37rtn gas gun

Webley

Thegr.misaverysimple,singleshotweaponnotcatrlableofarryhigh -1, projectile are ,r1 rt"" of different types of d_egree of ,""o=rly. ruhich is clainfor versions available irr"roaifi =tr" ri-o-stabilj-sed such as ba*icad'es ed i"mprov"a *"",oliy ancl the abil-ity to penetrate are shoun in Plate d.oors. The British cartritlge aptL ii= proSectile case with a propellent 7.1. This consists ofis,",loaded "a=t=icLge ":-',*iti.tr, a metal cylind-er h in' in length' charge aheacL of wfricfr z5 grans of cs mixed. with a pyrotechnic comThe canist"= "o*iJis posS.tion.}rlhenfired.thepropellentchargeignitesafuseralhich ignites the main burns whilst the projectilL is it the air an6 then *strrs grenade. charge, a^fter wtcicrr Lt runctions much like the a projectile would' account of some loss of cs in fr.rnctioning, such beappropriatetoasingleclosed.roomofno:malheightoffroml00 assuming_time for dispersal in to 25O square feet of floor space, was tLesigned' the case of larger rooms. tftL p=oi"ctile illustrated' for siege d.esirable is as for riot control antL is not as Lccurate of cartrifue tytrre this situations. The combination of riot gun with group at l+0 potentia-l no betier than a h foot produces * yards.

"""Lrcy

EfficiencY of

cLisPersal

effici'ency of that A major advantage of pyrotechnic 'mun:itions is the is veaT sma11 methott of tl:-speisal. [he size of partic]e produced' the respiratory system and. this gir"=-"*"e11ent penetration into composition with a *o=" =rtr,ia orrset o-f chest s5rmptoms. The burtring arrd. the rapicl.Ly, spread.s it lifts the CS ,"tt i,,to the air where with the wi'nd' is something fact that the c10ud. of cs will tl-rift 1n riot situations' In many which can be turned to great advantage

siegesituationsrthisveryefficiencycanbead'ra'l^fuackifmj]}ia mr-unition j-ntentLed' for a tions have to be used. out of cl"oors, o= ir The problen will house fails to enter and. aiscrlos"" in the street' be discussect uncLer tExcess spreadr '

85

Chapter

7

Smoke

large volumes of quite

d.ense smoke. andfn siege situations this can cause real clifficulties and d.angers has no compensating advantages. Marrufacturers and. others sometimes suggest th;t this smoke can be used. to hicLe a police advance. Such the suggestions ind-icate either a complete failure to r:nd.erstandtbayonet d.angerous and. aIa:ming an ,r"irre of police operations, or charget mentality. The object of using CS i-s to avoid. the need- to I move fomard.. Smoke will obscure the scene, hicling the cri-minal- s activi-ties. If a search of the builcl-ing becomes unavoid.a,bler aflX remaining smoke will create unacceptable hazard.s.

A11 burning mr.mitions produce

Fire

rate of burning and. the temperature produced by these munitions are very high agd. they frequently cause serious fires. Accord-ing to one report (g) police in tlie USA were burning d.own (not merely

The

settirrg fire to) about one house per month by the use oi these m:nitions ir, 1969. Case after case is reported. where build.ings are set alight agd., from time to time, cLeaths are cLirectly attributable to ttr-is :nazar:d-. So great is the d.anger from this source that it may call into question the su:itability of this type of munition for use i-n any siege operation in a build.ing. If they are to be used-, the fire service must be imned.iately available before the mr.:nitions are launched..

Excess spread.

pyrotechnic d.issemination is d-esignecL to spread. the CS payloacL as uria"ty as possible. The vapour, droplets and. ultra-fine dust partitles #e carried. into the air by the hot gases and-, as the g*""= cool, the CS falls out over a veaTr.wid.e area. Wind- will have a marked. effect and. in id.eal cond-itions ( a wa^:m dry d.ay with a light breeze) tfre spread. outd.oors will be substantial. Thi-s may be most useful in d.ealing with riots but in the besieged. criminal situation it creates a massi-ve problem beyond. the original confines of the operation. The effects of CS from a eanister wkrich has missed- its target agcL fi:nctioned. outsid.e couLd. be very serious if , foT example, a main road. runs some &istance d.oun wind.. One experiment (tO) showed. that a canister eontaining only 12'5 glrans of CS would produce a concentration of 1mg. /*.3 (twice the amor"rrt which would- make bystapders hurry away) almost 200 metres d-own wind.. lhe larger pyrotechnic mr:nitions contain much more CS and. a 50 graln grenad-e ioofa, r.md.er perfect conclitions, produce traces almost a mile doun wind.. The p=obl", might be particularly acute if builclirrgs with ventilation systems have their air intakes at a point where reLatively large concentrations of CS will be produced''

85

Chapter

7

Delay

via a fuse which ca, be from land near the crininal 1.5 to 5 second.s in d_eray tiLe. rf it shoulcl has throvrn) the ca,ister back, or at he coir16. a**-(*a a "o*"ii*es when the main charge has ignited- there is least divert it. Even proconcentration is consid_erabr-e time lapse before a reasonabre problems: duced.. This can create a nr.mber of may eventually get very hot, 1 Throwback: Although the mr"rritionsback, especially if some implethey can be picked. up and. hurledthus miniment is h*di, or thly can be kicked. out of the way nisirrg the a.mount of CS d'elivered' lancL could- escape 2 Escape: The criminal seeing the cs mr.mition takes effect' A cs the before to another part of the btuild.ing but the probrisk, this proper delivery pattern woufd. *iti*i=u 1"*wi1I a1waYs be Present' before an ad.equate concentration of CS 3 Retaliation: [he alfay time to retaliate and'' is produced. may well gir." the criminal especially in irostage situations, th:ls can be trighly d'angerous'

pyrotechnic mu*itions usually fi:nction

Direct injury pyrotechnic grenad.es are r:nIikely to cause any serious injury if )'lnm. proiectiles they strike a person in the target area. Ilowever, penetrate barricad.es vary in their 1it"ry effeet. Those d.esigned. to could' kill or and' beings wi]}, of course, also penetrate

-htman not d'eseriously injure *yorrl struck directly' The proiectiles caused' have a'bove, signed- to penetrate, such as the tlrce ittustrated' unare they injuries *ir"r, they have struck a person directly, but

1ike1Y to

kil1.

Concl-usion cs pyrotechnic mr:nrtions a,e extremely efficient in d-ispersing their approbe al-so They may and may tre id.ea1ly suited. to riot control-. but for use inside operations, siege priate for use in some outd.oor which outa build.i-ng their many d.rawbacks create serious hazards availpresently As weigh the advantages of efficient &lspersal. situations the of ma.r:y ab1e, they are toi the tJrye best suited. for involving a besieged cri-minal '

2 Dust exPulsion mr:nitions of micro-purverised- cs The payload. of dust errpuf sj-on munitions is chemicals to aid- free dust, usualry with "*uir qua*tities of other grenad-es and in 37mm. projecd.ispersal. trr" system is used. bothtoinexpel the cs ei-ther directry by used. tiles. A sma-l,. explosion is the body of trr" mi:nition; or indirectly nrpturing or d.isinte#ating of a piston' The by forcing its enission throwh po=1" by meansmunrtions is similar basic d.esi-gn ad. appearance of dlst elrplarsion systems are to that of pyrotechnic munitions, a'a similar initiation

87

Chapter

7

usually employed-. One dust elrpulsion 37mm. projectile is initiatecl by impact instead. of by a fuse, and. some of the grenad.es are spherical- rather than cylindricaL.

Efficiency of d.ispersal The d.irect blast mr,r-rritions, which quite literally blow out their CS dust payload.s, tend. to d,:mp large amor,Lnts of CS at the point of release when they a,re d-ischarged. on the gror.ind., whilst the absence of a large voh.me of hot gas and. vaporised. CS makes d-ispersal of the remaj-nd.er less efficient than in the case with p;rrotechnic mr,mitions. With d.ireet bl-ast d.ispersal there will tend. to be a very

high concentration close to the d.ispersal point, but d.istribution further out will be uneven. These d-rawbacks apply to manJr of the ind-irect e4pulsion systems but are avoid-ed. to some extent j-n one d-esign, tlryified by the Lake Erie Mod.el 3h g"renad.e. In this latter system there is a space between ir:ner and. outer containers. The explosive charge d.rives fo:n^rard. a piston which forces CS from the inner container i.nto the space and. then out through a large nr.imber of ports all aror.md. the body. The maski.ng of a small m.mber of these ports as the grenad.e or projectile lies on the gror.ind. will not sigrificantly reduce effici-ercIr but there is a tend.ency for a part of the payload. to be left between the two parts of the mrmition, reducing the effective payload.. Smoke

little smoke is produced. in fi.mctioning and., although the CS dust will obscure vision briefly whilst it is being d.ispersed., vj.sibility will quickly be restored.. Very

Fire

It is sometimes claimed that blast d.ispersal d.oes not create a fire hazaxd", but manJr such mr.r-nltions will start fires i-n materiaLs whj.ch ignite easily. The hazaxd, cannot be ignored. though it is much 1ess than that created. by pfrotechnic mr:nitions,

tytrles of

indirect brast e:qpulsion m.i-nltions.

and.

is

mirrimal with

some

Delay

Drst erpulsion

mr.rniti-ons tend. to be fused. at about 2 second.s. Af.ter this time d-ispersal of the payloacL is imned-iate an6 the velTr serious problems caused. by d.e1ay are avoid.ed.. Some of the )lwn. projectiles in this range d.etonate on impact and. there is no d.elay wilfr these.

BB Chapter

7

Direct injury

are which fr,mction by cr-irect blast mr.mitj-ons e]rpulsj-on systems' dust [hose from^the striker like,y to cause r=ree"*t"r-parti"J;1t if- they extrllod'ed very i"i"ty cor.r-Id types blast the Most of "u,.r""-

c}osetoapersoninthetargetaxea,*aworrld.certainlycause enough, to pick one up foolish or enough, qui.ck injury to ,,ryo*" tf,rougrl. In the "u's" of a besieged' before the fuse was uurntto thes_e hazard-s would' be of if criminal who had refused they "*="r,a"=l ha,rre to be taken into accor'mt will b;; significance, little *ao"' inrrocent Persons are in the Conclusion

the inefficient a*d rmsuitableofto D*st expulsion mr.r*itions va^ry from siege situations. A mr:nitionout for very are which those "o:-t*rl mEet the requirements set to Larefr,r-l1y selected. if of tyre, ttris hazard-s created- by other tytrres t}" *r;r-;i avoid. can earlier, *#- offer the besl avairable attrimunrtion and. one or twl mod.e," butes for siege situations'

3 liquidl,

I *

CS

be ra,.ge of liquid-s and can then in rimited. a i-n dissolved. be cs ca,, grenad'es a*d' projectiles-' veqf m,ch employed i;blast d.ispersal protlems of leakage' storage the sarne way as dust ir:nitions. [he that the-system is more

d.issemination have teen- such There warra*t further comment here' in or less obsolete a*d does not of liquid cs a proapplication recent relrti;;i; a however, is, ir-se against besieged' criminals'

a*d.

efficient

jectire specifically-a"sis,""a ror (il) Gii;;trated in Prate T'1) is rhe Ferrel 12 bore cs projectile cylind'er a it*arra'poii"e shotgr-:n with-awith a prod.esigned. to be used in-rro:mar r z tore cartrid-ge, load'ed' (r:nchoked-) ba*el. ,1, mad-e of tough fin-stabilised prljectilepellent "irog", contains alorrg, o1d-sty1e ,ta shapedj's"ih"' like toanaid' plastic, 'loit two inches ilissegmented' p=o;ectill the of nose The bomb. aerial of iethylene chlorid'e in of 3cc' consists pryior.a The integration. tha* one gram of cs. fkre projecti]e which is dissorv"a rJrrer lessobstnrction such as a wind-ow or door' at an is d.esigned. to be fired-the proiectir-e begins to break up a*d a^fter of nose 0n impact, the leaving the liquid free' '"-on penetration, the nose disiniegrates' tha, the container, it carries cause the liquid. is much heavier the target area' [he into aerosor to velocity with considerable The effect at the point of release carriscontarner falrs to trre grl.,.,nd. produced by a pressurisetl aerosol obis not &rssinirar to--irrrt the an through p=:ojecti]-e ryPt paSS 'not fi:nction effectiveter. For efficient, use' rt 'iii stnrction such as *irrao, o= d;;;: lyiffired.through,*-op"*,i"ao,tostrikearrirrrrerwall. Thecartrid.geisvelyaccurate.rrrlmaluractt.lrersclaim90per yards' but actual tests with a at 50 ti="f" 1 foot a in cent hits better sta*d-ard' lroduced , ,r"h at a,l 20in. barrel viking police proiectile ^lhotgun Lr the iistrt d.eflectio* strong wind_s will "*i="

89

Chapter

7

but the shortest ranges and. the stand-ard- of accuracy at long ranges will suffer in high wind.s. There is virtually no recoil- in a no:maL shotgun, but the ror-md. has a muzzle velocity well in excess of 11000 feet per second.. Its perfo:mance against the type of barricad-e 1ike1y to be for-md. in a house is most impressive. hlhen fired. at 90 d.egrees it will penetrate wind.ow glass, *air. plate glass, arld hollow core d-oors at 100 yards. At veaT shallow angles the maximum effective range will- be reduced., but it wil-l- perfom effectj-veIy at angles of 20 d.egrees to the target sr:rface. Hear6r curtains or venetian blind.s may cause some loss of effective payload., but will

effect. Car wind.screens can be penetrated. by a 90 shot at ranges of 30 yard.s and. sid.e wind-ows will be penetrated. at greater ranges. Three-quarter inch plyt'rood- can be penetrated. at h0 yard.s, but there is some loss of payIoad.. lhe low payload. of these projecti]es is an advantage in marry situations, but it also limits the usefulness of the rou::.d-. Danger levels ca.n, for al-I practical purposes, be forgotten. The payload. is l-ess than a gram and. so the d.a^nger l-evel wouId. not be quite achieved. in a cubic metre of air. Ihe cartridge is safe to use agalnst a man hid.ing in a smal-I closetr or a lavatory, or in a small car. ff there is room for a ma^n to hid.e, there is room to use a Ferret. The largest space which a single Ferret will effectively cover is a single closed. room of no:mal- height with a floor space not more than 10 feet by 10 feet. If the room is arry larger, ad-d-itional Ferrets must be used. at the rate of one per 10 feet by 10 feet of floor space. There will be no need. to attempt anJr preci.se measurements of a room. Having regard. to the margi-n of error, a rough estimate will suffice and. if there is any d-oubt, an extra cartrid.ge should. be fired-. The system is excellent for use in a single room in arry no::naI house, but there comes a point when a room is just too large for the 12 bore Ferret to be practicable. have no other d-egree

Efficiency of d.ispersal

of the particles produced by the Ferret cartridge is verxr much larger than those produced by burning mr.mi-tions. [his has two effects. The larger particles will not penetrate the respiratory system to the sane extent and. the chest sSmrptoms will therefore be lost to some d.egree. This may be compensated. for to some extent by a more rapid. and. extreme eye irritation and. more marked. effects on the upper respiratory system produced by the Ferret. So far as d.ispersal is concerned., the larger d.roplets produced by the Ferret tend. to faIl out much more quickly and. the concentration is not maintained. at a high level for the same length of time as is the case with some other m.un-lti-ons. When the projectile d.isintegrates, the CS aerosols. The initial patterm. of concentration will be along the line of fi-re, spreatling outward.s from the point of fragmentation. The concentration will spread- rapid.ly over the area aror.md the line of fire, but the initial d-ispersal pattern will alIow of the di-rectiona1 d-ispersal of CS from these cartrid.ges. The d-istance beyondthe point of fra.gmentation over which effective concentrations wil-I be produced. j.mmed-iately is limited-, but is greater than that likely to be need.ed. in arry nomal house. The size

90

Chapter

7

Smoke

disPersed'' of the Ferret is completely invisibl-e when of the ind.icate to Presence nor Therl i" nothing to obscure visi-on

The payloacL

CS concentration.

Fire

Therej.sn'opossibilityoffireinar\ysituation. Excess sPread-

at which it was aimed-, ancL rf a Ferret were to miss the wind.ow cs wouId. be &ispersecL on the outstrike an outer war-I, the liqutd. veqy inefficj-ent. This, coupled' si-d.e, but the d.ispersal wo,Id be that there is lro excess with the smar-r- amount of cs involvecr., means spread probien beyoncL the immed.iate area of operation' Delay

that sufficient of cs is instantaneous and., providing vely rapicLly cartridges a,,e used., it will produce its effects concentration' it hearry fairly ind.eed. In an icLeal situation with a can be extrlected. to incapacitate in ten second.s.

The d.ispersal

Direct injury

travelling at over 11000 feet per Fe*et is a 12 bore projectire beirrg before disintegration it second.. rf it were to hit a human be capable of causing a wou1d., by virtue of its velocity a}one, of a projectile serious wou.nd.. The injury wourd. not simply be that the n'ose of fairly high velocitf flr, when the proiectile stnrck, wound- at the into The

liquid. cs woutdbe injectedperson stnrck d.irectly with a Ferret pro1 ,000 feet per second.. A -area of 250 yard-s i-s vely like1y to rejectile wit-1in its d.anger i s easily a;roidceive f atal injr:rie s . once recogni sea, thi s L,aza'd the firer to a]low to ed.. ['he cartrid.ge is sufficiently accurate of fire' fiefcl the d.eliver almed. shots which wirl avoid. persons in fragments the .Mter the projectile has penetrated Jwind.ow or d-oor, to the fal1 of glass, etc., will of the contalner and. the particlesFerret clirectly were to be firedgror:ncr. witrr.in-"[o"t 6 feet. rf a behind- a pane of immediatery into the face of a person stand.ingreceive serious injuries, especialglass or d.oor, that person would. or more from the 6 feet Iy to his eyes. If the person was stapding risk of serious without glass the Flrret courd. bL d.irected. at him by simply can be avoicLedinjury. ary hazard. from tLris source to the or above clirecti*g tire Ferret to a part of the obstnrction would. cr.isj_ntegrate and.

si-cLe

of

anJrone stand'ing

near

it'

91

Chapter

7

Conclusion

Ferret is without d.oubt the most effective CS muniti.on for d.eal-ing with a criminal in a knovrn positi-on in a room of the size ]ikely to be for:nd. in most houses. ft is of no use out of d-oors, and. is not ad.equate for the situation where an entire building must be filIed. to clear a criminal from an r,mlcnown position. It is a major breakthrough in the application of CS to si-ege situations. A mu.nition of this tlrye shouLd. be for.rnd. in evelTr police a^rmourTr. The

FinaL concLusions on mr,Lrtitions

single t}rye of CS munition will- meet the need.s of al-I situations. lllrere i-s no d.oubt that the Ferret projectil-er or somethj.ng of the sort, will be ad.equate for most situations, but there wilL also be a need. for a range of mr-mitions, includ.ing grenad.es of mod.erate capacity and 37mm. projectiles. Where possible mr:nltions shouLd. have interrelated. payload.s so as to help calculations about the tJ4les and. nr:mbers to be used. in a particular situation. The final selection should. be mad.e in the light of the criteria set out here and. after carefuL eonsid.eration of all the d.ifferent tl4les which a^re No

avaiLabLe.

OPERAT]ONAI USE OF CS

Respirators

It should. be quite obvious that eveqr police officer who might possibly be reached. by the smaLlest amormt of CS shouliL be wearing a respirator, and. these must be comectly fitted. before the CS is lan:nched.. From tine to time incid.ents oceur where police officers think they can just rnip-in-quicklyt to low concentrations of CS, perfo:m some simple taskr and then nrsh out again. Sinilarly, 1nstances have occurred. where officers quite close to the scene have been r.mprotected. and. haye been caught by a trick of wind. which has carried. CS to them. The d.angers of such foolishness should. not need. further emphasis. Every police officer who might possibly come into contact with CS must be wearing a respirator before any agent is reIeased.. Officers already in position who need. to d.on respirators must be paired. off so that one matrl may put on his respirator whilst the other keeps watch. The t)rye of respirator used. in si.ege operations is not veay important provid.ing it is efficient. In riot situations where respirators may be wolsn for man;r hours, specially cushioned. mod-els may be advi.sa,bLe, but the siege should. be end.ed. fairly quickly after CS has been introduced. and the simplest tfpe of respirator will suffice. There is 1ittle point in d.etailing the various t;4les of respirator, nor the fitting and. d.e-misting procedures. A milita^:ry, or good. quality commercial- respirator d.esigned. to give protection against chenical agents should. be fitted. ancL d.e-misted. in accord.ance with the marrufacturerrs instmctions so that it lrill provid.e an airtight seal around. the face.

92 0b

I

Ip ;

i

j

Chapter

ectives

7

and' PreParation

where a d-a*gerous criminal is situations those in used be to surcs wirl he has refused- several d-ema,dS besieged., a*d usually after must be specific and must take the rend.er. Demand.S to sorr"rrder The criminal must be fo:m of a' ord.er arra noi a polit"-="qo""t. a particular prace' prrii"p* a""i, or go toclelr tol. to come out of u.repeated.even that he will arier ii is These ord.ers must be that cs will be used in caserf tora ue not mlst he but surrend-er, not given di; opportrmity to surrend'er' of a refusar. IIe is beirrg start to trrat bs will be used- he mayproiectiles he refuses and. is trren wainEa that his barricad-es so take precauti_ons by strengthening from a knorm position' [his wi]I cannot be got in, o= ty-*Iv1"g apart from d.a*ger of the operation a'd, criminal' raise the generar revei ofwill th; da,ger to the must be the risk to the inrrocent, forinc="r"" the-use of cs, trr" criminal re[hroughout the p="p*"{ions which he should' use must be told to sr:rrend.er, an. the avenue put in so that the cs has been t s mind- and'' even' peated_. This should_ continue after in the criminal the thought wilr be ,"ii planted. he is likeIy to follow those through the pa:ric which c-s ca* indo"e,

instnrcliSix;

placing at the scene is a of munitions ad. theirthiught. slpqosing, for exa'rnpret matter r,,rhich requires consid.erable doors. probably the of out d.itchl a in confined was that a criminal a pyrowith him wourd be to rereasethe cs to most effective way or-a"aring aflow up wind. of him to release technic grenad.e a littre d.ista,ce of between the point drift dor,m to him. The id.eal d.istairce such as the wind force' but factors wilr'-a"p"rra_on criminar the a*d a*d' somea110w the cs cloud- to spread' io sufficient be should. it would' be appropriate in a light most tkring of trre ord.er of 10 yardsor a-o=", ,:-"a hirection wir-l be breeze. rn any use of cs out the most appropriate'

importa't

and. Lurrring

nunitions

a,.e

ofien

Mostsiegesituatio,,"*irroccurinahouseorotherbuild.ing. the placing of mimj'tions .involved' Assr.ming th;t no hostages aTe that leaves his locawhen the "-=i*i,',t shourd. be d.esigned- to Err"*" concent=rtio* rmtil he is forced' effecti-ve a, in remain will he tion mr-mitions may also be used' to pracing_of The build.;ing. the from &irection by blocking other d_rive the criminar ,,, ; iarticurarof cs. Intelligent placing can avenues with hearry "orr""i.trationspiacirrs or munitions can often make often achieve this. Thoughtless was besieged' i-n not work. rn one case a man it seem that cs wir_,terraced. shor^rn in house, the layout of which is was room of a the front attack' the front d'oor Figure -l .1. For trr" poreos" of-the proiectile was fired in' It forced. open and. u. py=itllr,oi-" 37;: *a the wind browirrg from the =ood no cs reached- the crj-nina]. went past the d_oor to trre front viriually a run open front d.oor ensured_ that a usefur prelimina', to prevent The projectire might harre been irr" haII a,d- staircase virtually free for the back d.oor, t,-ri it left ofCS'Theproblemwourd.havebeenbetterso}ved.bytheuseof through the front d-oor with-A cartrid.ges, the first orr"-pracedha','

Fe*et

the an effective "o*""*Iration infront room' out opening it, to "reat"then the have been fired' into tosecond. proiectile shoulda third. shorrld have been directed of d.irected. towards th; d.oor, and. the room. [he ord-er a*d- di'rection ward_s the far corner of

93 Chapter 7 deIivery is ind-icated. by the nr.imbered- arrows in Figure 7 .1. The total a^rnount of CS used. would. have been 1ess than 3 grans instead. of the 25 grarns, but the effect would. have been immed.iate.

Front room

12

3

Figure 7.1 Sketch plan of terraced. house showing suggested. placing of Ferret cartridges

a crimina-l j-s knor,m to be on the gror,md. floor of a house, but his location on that fl-oor is not known, it m:lght be d.esirable first to seaL the staircase, probably by the use of a 37mm. projectile or small dust elrpulsion grenade. If the man was then to be forced. from the front of the house, the first attack should. be from the rear with appropriate mu:ritions. The final mr:nltions could. be fired. at the front of the house if the d.esired. result had. not already been achieved.. Where the manr s location was totally r"mknown, it could. be necessa,rXr to start at the top, putting CS on the top floor, to d.rive him d.own and. then progressively moving on r:ntil he i s d.riven out . Where

Reactions

to CS

lhe proper use of CS is 1ike1y to d.rive the criminal out verryr quickly ancL in such a state that he is no d-anger to anyone. ft would. be foolish to assume, however, that a cri-mi-naI d.riven out by CS j-s incapable of offensive action. He may have run out at the first whiff of CS and. be exaggerating his sSmptoms. He must be regard.ed. as a serious d.anger r:ntil he has been secured.. Method.s of d.ealing with such situati.ons will be explai.ned. in Chapter B and. these will i.nvolve controlling the crimj-na1 r.mtil he can be moved. into a suitable Location and. position. A person who has been subjected. to a hearry concentration of CS will not respond. to ord.ers, even on the threat of death. Once in fresh air, such a person is 1ike1y to ro11 aror-md. on the fLoor oblivious to any ord.ers. The

rald. g?oup cornmand.er must then d-eci-d.e whether he will leave the ma^n i]ntil he has recovered. sufficiently to obey instmctio4s t or to move in at once, whi-Ist the cri-minaL is incapacitated.. In the latter case the d.anger that the criminal j.s coneeal-irrg his ability to take aggressive action must be kept in mind. and- proper caution must be exercised. until the criminal- is hand.cuffed. and. searched.. When

9l+ ChaPter 7 bY CS, theY too will be affected are criminal the group must persons other than Members of the support of state Panic' a in out driven them' be available to take catre of

First

I

aid- and' medjcaI treatment

Despitetheseverityoftheresultsofamod.eratetohearryconcel]t"-rro neecl for ar:y medjcal treat-It r^rilr-rror*r-rry there cs of effective' tration ,i*pf" a'd. usually completeiy will have ment. Immed.iate ai.. is trraf subiect tire cs is "- a*"t andj-s important to recalr inst:rrctecr' not to rub his u" *.',"t he ar-' Above him. eyes that dust on. be bad.lv-irrit?I"d. rf he r'bs 'is eyes even though they ,oiri the ausi into them ad he will substarthe is, in effect, grirdi*g 'restrained. r:ntil it is certain tiallyd.elaythe=""o.rfftime:-A-p=i.orr"=should-behanclcuffed'at should. te p"=aorrathe other AnJr once. eyes. - chest qmtrrtoms and their nrb i; *"t by ri* merely that they =tot u" t'rooghl r:nder c91!ro1 in the persist generar...,.fee1ing or pJJ will will dust cs subj""t.the to of exspeakingl. ,"r""i=insly b:rrshed-.c1e11. rn the case to clothing and hair and. srroura ne it may be ad-'isablewithcha*ge water posure to *-r*i=ry rrigil-"o*""rrtration skj-n can be flushed off the on cs .gny once. in at cloth_ing eyes *iii n" eased by bathirre;-them are and any i:ritation of t;; sometimes =L"o**"nd-ed-, but conare med.ica,ts mild. -iirst water. various trre instarr"e. rmmed-iate aid- therefore better a.rroid.ed. in sists of b to cl-ea,, air 1 Remove the sub j ec-into the wind' 2 Stand- him faeing nrbbing his eyes from 3 Prevent h-imCS or hair clothirrg ay?t from ;t

h R"mov" from skin if i Flush CS

necessa'aTr

except for slight minutes'

,i" :ll3:";'il"ffiffi:":#r??:ii:H'overed' in-rrom ten to fifteen the

to properly qualified' per";;;; ]eft t" med.icati;;of use [he "rroorabe sought if : sons arra meaicaf advice should which might be pre-exirtirrs""onilitions evid.enc"-"r is 1 There

recld.ening aror.md

exacerbated- bY

2 3

CS

llhe subject hls been ul]con'scious including eye irritation' Serious "y*pto*t, mirrutes ten to fifteen

pe:

rsist after

from

r+ H.,,# ;*;T';- H'i-;li. *' i:^i"::f?r{,::.i?ffii""L:ffi;} rX" ll ffi # h : t' ; ; {,ii i i " "" =. F l} 1H ^'- i : ? #?I', " ffi "

::; "3;' llii:i:s*,:i: ffifi* Jffi*:li"o'" $:'U::T? r' ;:i":':;";t-ii-:i; :f?::ffi"h. proper ll"'.'i treatment "

"n

nir,ve ,* ro ?:=il:H""l'#e :ii::,i.."'u . authority. prepared bY all approprl- ate med_ical

Failures of

CS

forced- out of his that the criminal will be deused CS will Produce the properly When case eveaTr leave ' location in but the criminal uraY not sired results qrrickly and reliably' For examPle: in some cases for a nr':mber of reasons'

It cannot be

assr-:med'

95 (*)

Chapter

T

hinself . A nr.mber of cases have occurred. where crimi-na]s, particul-arly the d.eranged., have shot themselves when

He may shoot

CS was la;unehed..

(t) Even though the concentration is controlled., the cri-minal may faint. (") The criminaL may be r.mable to d.ismantle a bagicad.e or other obst:ruction, or may be r:nable to find. his way out of a strange build.ing.

(a) Especially if burffiing mr:nitions have been used., the canister may have been [iverted. preventing the build-up of an effecti-ve concentration. (") The criminal- may have found. some protection. Some inclustrial respirators will protect a€:ainst CS and. others wiII d.elay the effects even though they d.o not provi.d.e complete protection. (ffre wet cloth over the mouth so frequently sportld. by rioters will have no real effect i.n a confined. space. ) (f) The criminal may have a source of uncontaninatecL air which is d.ifficul-t to attack, for exarrple, in a foreed. ventilati-on duct orr more rarely, by the use of aj.r induction fatrrs. There may be other reasons for the failure of CS to d.rive the

criminal out and. the great d-ifficulty will be that the police will not la:ow the reason for the failure. The mere fact that a shot has been heard. d.oes not show that the criminal has kil1ed himself; nor d.oes the fact that all is qtuiet ind-icate that he is unconscious. fhe first step should be to reappraise the a.mor:nt of CS used. and the placirrg of mr:nitions to ensulre that the less accessible areas have been covered.. There is no point j-n ad.&ing to an already ad.equate concentration of CS, but d.ifficulties of layout, etc., might have

been und.ere stimated..

If the command.er is satisfied. with the quantity of CS and. the placing of mr:ni.tions, he should next consi-d.er the time which has e1apsed.. If the subject has hid.d.en in an inaccessible place where the air flow is away from him and. toward.s the point of release, it could. be some consid.erable time before the CS produces an effect. [en minutes might elapse in r:nusual circumstances and. a longer time in rare cases. There need. be no hurry and. the command.er must avoid. the temptation to :rrsh things. If neither of these steps produces a solution, the command.er must move veaTr carefully, trying every possible ploy to avoi-d. send.ing men in to search the area. ff, uLtimately, a search becomes inevi.table, the method.s to be ouil-ined. in Chapter 9 will be employed. but there will be the ad.d.ed. complication that the searchirrg officers will be wearirrg respirators which in-

hibit movement and restrict vision. fn such cases consid.erati-on must always be given to the emplo;rurent of d.ogs. Effects of

CS

on

d.ogs

Having regard. to the effect of CS on matrl, it surprises manJr to finiL that d.ogs remain virtually unaffected.. In heavy concentrations which wouLcL be quite intolerable to a ma.n, a d-og will work well and. show little or no signs of being inconvenienced.. Some may cough a Iitt1e, nrb their noses, cheeks or ears on the gror.md., and. show a littIe iruitation ruhen first e:cposed. to a hea.i6r concentration, but

96

Chatrrter

7

articles, afre capable of find.ing hid-d-en they quickly settle d.oun a'd.track and' with no apparent d'ifficulty'work by includ.ing drugs. They will the cs will usuarly d-o will attack i-n their ,ror*"rasfashion. rarely it will' Td searching becomes itself ; but if it rails, to reduce the rlsk to ht-:'mans' una.rroid.able, dogs can be used' Decontanination

I I

of cs insid-e a bu:irding will

The use of effective concentrations problems' CS is only produce E ii! substaptial d-econtaruination The so will break d-oram only slowly' where slightly volatile in J= ,rra crarlny a,. way into evearr nook fine d,st will have found. its ' ad make a room u:sirrkrabitable it will contirrire to "r.r"" irritationr^rith no point in is There care. the Decontamination must b;";p;;oached. orr" house by spreading the cs aro.:nd starting decontamj_nation i"r,step and' is to ="*orl the cs containers nei-ghbourhood.. The first articles such as curtains through any very heavily "orrtrroinated.- [hese should- be sealed- in prastic or wkr_ich projectiles r.*r"lrssed.._ habitation to be burned' or of clear welr taicen a,d. contarners metal a s*ction clea,er of the buried.. Deposj-ts of Ca ca' be picked' up in

typewhichhasdispo,*r"bags.ThebaSsshould.bedisposedofin contaminated materials' The the sarne way as the other heavily run in fresh air to clear it' soft clea*er itSelf should_ then bethe true of washing machine which profurnishings may be washed in will require special convid.es several rinses, but dry left "f"'i'it'g in trre fluid- an. could- be d'esid_eration because cs ,ilr b; walls in the saae fluid' Floors' posited on other articies clea*ed.*rtu=, where ad'd'ed' with d-etergents a*d. furniture ca* be wasrrea with venwell a]:ea should' be vely approprj-ate. Followins this tt" whole action if possible, Even with Massive of tilated., usirrg forced. ientiration take a] consid.erable time. this sort, decontamination can or in areas which must be cfearedconcentrations in d.ifficult areasr a,. this is a matter which quickly, will d-ema*d the use of chemicals Jfroofa

t" left to the exPerts'

TI{E VAIUE OF

CS

und'erstand'ing of how intelligently and-yith a proper siege d;, will provi-d-" trr"- answertheto manJr it works a,,d_ what it "*miracle the for iob agent which wilr d-o probrems. rt is not a effecmost but it is one of the police when casually thrown about, to help them in their primary t1ve weapons available lo the police d.o trris without causing ariy task of protecting the pouii".- rt will to the public or the police' rear risk or sigrr:ifica,t inconvenience th;-;;ssibility of the police beingrn At the sarne time it will reduce ' *"i, hry" -to Lilr the criminalr:nderforced. into a positj-on where they properly be it that is it short, cs is a lifesu.r"=, arrd "it"r used''

cs,

when used

.

stood- and ProPerlY

97 Chapter 7 NOIES

1

2

Thomas F. Swearerrgen, rTear Gas Ivirrnitionsr , Charles C. Thomas, 1966. See for exa.mple: Swearengen, op. cit. ; Rex Applegate, t Riot Control Material and. Techniquest , Stacktrlole Co. , 1969i , Report of the Enquiry into the Mecl-ical and. Toxicological Aspects of CS' , IIMSO , 197 t (Cmna )il75) (ttre report of a comnittee of enquiry r-md.er the chaimanship of Sir Harold. Ilimsworth KC3, FRS, I{D, FRCP, su.bsequently referred. to in this book as the Ilimsworth Report); various scientific papers and. reports listecL at p.BO of the Himsworth Report; training marruals and. marrufacturerst

handbooks from various sources. Himsworth Report, pa.ra.63.

3 Journal of Industrialh rBriti.sh rThe

Timest, 28 July 1972. 5 Himsworth Report, p .21 . 6 Ibid.. , pata.)) .

7 B 9 10 11

Ibid..

,

Med.icinet

, July 1972, reported- in

p.22.

Ibj-d.. , paxa.1l. rYearbook of the International Associ-ation Llashington DC, 1970.

of

Ctr-iefs

Ilimsworth Report, p .52. by the AAI Corporation, Baltimore,

Manufactured.

USA.

of Policet,

Chapter

B

THE HANDIING OI' PRISONERS

of

the surrender The id.ear concrusion to every precise operation is his removal- from ancl a*est, the criminar, his prompt a'cl elficient if an operation wh-ich hacL the scene. rt would. be tragedy incr.eed. pieces when the criminar d-ebeen welr plannecl a,cr. executed. felr to in cLeath or injurxr' eid.ecL to surrend.er and. resulted. at that sta,ge attributetL to such tragedies have occurred. a'd. they ca* often be poor arre st techni que s ' i-s to ord-er The most comTno,. method. of secr.rring an armed. criminaL other supor Some him to stascl about three feet from a walI, a cat' with his the against port, ffid then to ha,rre him lean fo::ward-this positionwal] off is he hapd-s spread. out above heacl level-. In If two quickly' balance and., in theory at least, is unable to move the other goes whilst officers ,r" present, one covers the criminal him, that is by frisking by usually fo:eward. to search the criminal, After this the :r,mning the ha*d-s over the outsid.e of rris clothirrg'place kris hand-s criminar is made to resume a, upright position a,dofficer stands to behind. his back to be hand.cuffed.. The searching s field of one sid.e of the criminal so that the protecting officert often sugis It fire remains free, and. he can shoot if necessaJxr. front of in gested. that the searching officer should. place one foot st:rrggles, the the criminar r s nea,rer root so that if the crininal llhe position is illusofficer can kick his feet from imd.er him.has to secure a prisoner, tratecL in plate 8.1. rf a singre officer his pistol in he takes on the role of the searching officer, keeping criminal the his hand., but held. well back into his sitLe so that cannot easilY grab it. is hazard'ous [hat this method. of securing a d.a.ngerous offend-er ca, be used- to show ca' be illustrated- by marry cases. f\,; examples York police officer was d.i-fferent aspects of the problem. A New(t) states, ca1led. to an a^:med. robber| ancL a report robbers a,d- was about the Gun in ha.d. the officer grabbed. one of when sud'denly the thief to put him a8ainst a waIl to frisk him a,d to the ground-' attacked. a*d. knocked. the officer off balance the officer in the fhe robber then drew a concealed. gr-rn a*d. shot chest and- buttocks ' the officer shot The account goes on to rePort that' though wor.lnd-ed-, ma.rr escaped' at the back at the fleeirrg robber, wound'ing him. lhe 9B

-..

99

Chapter

B

time but was a^:rested. shortly afte::ward.s. The attempt to secure this prisoner had. resr.il-ted. in a street gr.m-battle in which a police officer was seriously wor:nd.ed. and. a crimj-nal slightly wound.ed., ancl in which there must have been d.anger to the public. A d.ifferent aspect of the problem i-s ilLustrated- by an Australian case. A police officer in Victoria hacL been involved. in a chase of a stolen vehicle which had. been driven in a very cLangerous matrlner. When the vehicle finally stopped., the officer ord.ered. the d.river out at gunpoint. Hold.ing a cocked. self-Ioa&ing pistol in one hand., the officer pushecL the d.ri-ver, a youth, toward.s the car with the other hand., intend.ing to lean hi.m agai.nst the car to frisk him. Sud.d.en1y, the youth pushed. backward.s into the officert s gun which went off , killirrg the youth who was una:med. . (Z) The system of frisking a suspect l*rilst he is in an off-bal-ance posi.tion may have meri-t where a nr.mber of suspects a^re to be searched. but not necessarily anested.. It is not the most suitable method. of d.ealing with a d.angerous offend.er who is to be arrested.. lhe basic fault with the off-bala^nce method. is that it d.emand.s close contact between the police officer, who may have a gun in his hapd., and. the criminal who, cLespite his theoreticaL d.isadvantage of being off balance, is stil1 capable of effective action. The key factor in securing a d.angerous criminaL is one which applies to marrJr aspects of a:med. operations reaction tj-me. The sinple fact is that even when a person is aLert and. read;r for an emergency, a period. of time wiLl elapse before he can respond. to an aggressive move. The period. wilL varXr accord.ing to the d.egree of alertness of the ind.iviclual, from one-third. to two-third.s of a second-. If the person is off 8;rla,rdr his reaction time will be very much slower. It is because of this reaction time that d.isa^ming techniques wil1 work. It is a fact that, wi.th a littLe trainirrg and practice, it is possible to take a guio from ar\Jrone who is within touching d-istance before that person can fire a shot. Safe and. proper prisoner hand.Ling d.emand.s, therefore, that wtrilst the criminal- is capable of offensive action, the d.istance between him and. the anesting officer must be such as will give the officer time to react to a hostile move. An officer w"ith a gun in his hand. should. avoid. coming within reach of the person he is intending to arrest, othe::trise that person might well be able to disa::m hlm. In ad.d.iti-on, the whole process of d.ealing with the prisoner must confo:m to the principles of protection outlined irChapter !. police officers must remain in protected. positj-ons for as long as possible ancL should only leave them when they have d.one everything possible to provi-d.e for a protective fire capability and generally to ensure that the officer required. to move is erqlosed. to the minimr:m rj-sk. There must be no confusion about who i-s dealing with the criminal . No:emally it will be the clesignatecL raid group, though if a contingency plan has been brought into operation it corrld. well be officers originally cLeployed. in a cover role who a^re preventing a break-out and. have challenged. the criminal. [wo officers shou]-cL d.eal with one criminal and. if there are several criminal-s it will usually be d.esirable for the support group to ho1d. the cri-minals und.er their control whilst the raid. group move one criminal at a time away from the group and. cl-eal with him. Occasionally it may be necessa;rXr to d.eal with several prisoners at once and. this can be

100 Chapter B

B. U.1 1 Searching

prisoner prisoner

- off

balance method.

d.one i-n exactly the sane way as is used in d.ea_1ing with one prisoner. 0n1y the raid. group should. give instrr.rctions to the crimi-nai and., within the raid. group, the orders u-i11 generally gi.ven by R1. He should ensure that the crininal is: 1 Mad.e to come out to them 2 Separated from any visible weapon 3 Brought to a sui.table location and. immobilisecL l+ Secured 5 SearchecL

be

when thi-s has been d.one the criminal can be removed. and. arry rdeapons can be recoverecL and. mad.e safe. The principles of protection d.emand that police officers should be in a protectecL position where they must remain as far as possibIe. The mere fact that a crimi.nal lncl-icates that he wishes to sumend.er d.oes not call for the police to leave cover. If he wishes to surrend.er, he shoulcL be ord"ered. out into the open where he is

vulnerable, r,rrhilst the police remain in their protectetl positions where they are clearly safe. rf the criminal is, or claims to be, injured, it may eventualLy become necessartr for the police to go fon^rartL. [trey should. d-o so reluctantly and. u-ith great care, working always on the assr:mption that the crininal i.s merely waiting for an opportunity to kill them. 0n1y in the most exceptional circumstances, after they have been convinced. that there is no reasonable alternative, is it proper for the police to go to the criminal. The m1e is that the crirrinal must come out to the police. The criminaL will not be brought out in a proper fashion by confused- shouts of rcome out.t lre must be given c1ear, precise ord.ers in a manner which establishes from the outset that the police are in comma.ndr and. he nust d.o exactly as he is told.. Once the police have galnecL this psychological advantage, they must ensure that they cLo

8.2 Securing prisoner - prone position

3 Pri soner i.mmobili position kneeling B.

sed.

1O2 Chapter

B

not lose it through hesitation or confusion. The criminaL should- be with your hancLs to1d., for exanple, tIllalk out of the front cLoor I he has d.one sor palms trlhen you, first. of front in stretched. out g:ood. look at him, police a have the whilst he may be ord.ered. to stop possession. In his in a weapon or it may be necessarXr to d.eal with he mgst be talked. through whatever actions the police want any "rr"*1 hi; to perfom, always ensuring that ord.ers a^:ee fi:m and. positive ap6 without the possibility of misinterpretation. The criminal must hear the ord.ers clearly and. a 1oud. hailer may be necessarXr. The attitud.e conveyed by these ord.ers must be one of no nonsense. 1lhe criminal must be convinced. that the police will be completely rrththough he might d.isobey them. less agd. he must not even look as tlland.s upt may not be appropriate in The olcL stancLard. command. of al-1 situations. A man cannot pass through a d.oorulay with tris hancLs heliL high above his head., and. if he is al1owed. to lower them to headIeve1, they wlll- come d.a^r:gerously neaJc the back of the neck where weapons are often concealed. If a man is in the open it will be appropriate to teII hin to put his hand.s h:igh in the air, palms for ward.. In general the cri-minal must be ord.ered. to keep his hancLs away from kris body, in fulI view, ancl with the palms facing fon'rard. Accord.ing to the circumstances he may be tolcL to stretch his aflns above his head., out to the frontr oI out to the sid.e. When the crininal is out in the open, in full vi-ew, he shoul-d. be separated. from any weapon which he is holclirrg. If he is thought to have a concealed. weapon, or a pistol in a holster, it wil-I sometimes be better to leave this where it is. There may be more d.anger in having him reach for that weapon to get ritl of it than in leaving it where it is, ensuring that hls a::rns are kept well clear of his body ancL then securing hi-m before taking the concealed. gr.m from him. If he has a gun in his hancLs, he must NOT be told. to throw it d.or^rn, or drop it. A cocked. weapon coulcL well fire when d.roppecL and. the resulting shot corrld- cause consid.erable cLanger to anyone in the area. In ad.d.ition, the situation wil-l- be velTr tense and a sud.d-en shot might provoke a most r.md.esirable response. [he most suitable methodj-s to ord.er the criminal to take the weapon by the mu:zz7-e in his weak hapcl and- then move his shooting hand. a,way from the weapon and out to the sid.e. Ilol&ing the weapon by the mtzzi.e he should. then be told. to bencL slowly r-rntil he can place the weapon on the ground.. lilhen he has d-one so r he shoulcL strai-ghten up again and. stretch out both his affms with the palms of his hand.s fo::r^rard.. He should. then be walked. away from the gun and toward.s the police officers. Qnce i-n the open aniL separated- from any gun he was ho1d.ing, the criminal shoulcL be moved. towards the officers r.mtil he is 6-10 feet from the officer r,utro wiLl cover him, usually R2. [he criminal should. then be ord.ered. to lie on his stomach, with his head. towards R2 and. lookirrg at that officer. To prevent him rolling over quickIy, he shoul-cL be told- to spread. his legs wid.e, and. then he should. place tris hand.s behind. his back, backs of the hand.s together, and hand.s held. clear of the back. Irtthen the crimi-na] is immobilised., R1 should. holster h:is pistolapd- take out hand.cuffs before moving fo::ward., well clear of the He will then move criminaL, to a point in line with his should.ers. t in at an apgle of 90 d.egrees to his number two s l-ine of fire and-, when close enough, he shoulcl ilrop d-own quickly w"ith one knee across

103 Chapter

B

the back of the cri.mi-nalts neck, ensuring that he cannot move. At this point, R2 should. move his gun asid.e, elear of his nr;mber one. R1 will then hand.cuff the criminal. The position is il-lustrated. in Plate 8.2. As soon as the crimi-na1 is hand-cuffed. all police fireaJms must be hoLstered.. The man is no longer an a^:med. criminal, but a hand.cuffed. pri-soner. If at that stage he shoul-d. stmggle, or even make a break it is almost certain that the use of firea:ms by the police would. not be justified., but a police officer who kept a grxr. i.n his hand. might react badly. After the criminal- has been handcuffed. he shoul-d. be searched. very carefully, starting by checking the area of his back which he can reach with his hand.cuffed. hapd.-, then stand.ing him up to search the rest of him. fhe quick frisking sometimes used. to check for weapons is too r,mcertain arra *rrry corrcealed. weapons will be nlssed. by such method.s. Fina11y, the police officers wil-I take possession of the criminalts gun *ra must U" capable of making it safe. [heir training must therefore includ.e timL spent on exanining and i:nloading a variety of weapons so that they ca^n at Least make the weapon safe without risk of an unintentional

d.ischarge. A nr:mber

of ulnor variations may be caIIed for. The positions of the police officers ruight make it more appropriate for R1 to remai-n behind. cover aniL for R2 to move out to secure the prisoner. That d-ecision will be a matter for R1 . If the securing- officer has no hand.cuffs, he should make use of any substitute which is to hand., but it is vital that the criminalts hand.s be secured. both to inhtbit his movement physically and. to ensu:re his psychological acceptance of the fact that he is a prisoner. Suitable substitutes ar:e always to hand. in the fo:m of a necktie, a beltr or a simi.lar articLe. In some situations it will be r-md.esirabl-e to lay the prisoner on his stomach. He might, for exanple, be more or less Iosl to view because of vegetatj-on or some physical feature. In such cases the criminal may be mad.e to kneel on both knees, facing R2, and with one foot crossed. over the top of the other. kdtially he should. be mad.e to stretch his a^rms out to the front or sid.e so that they are in flrl1 view. R1 will move in in the no:mal way and. when he is 1evel with the criminal, and. c€lr3 see his back, the criminaL should. be told. to put tr-is hand.s behind. his back, backs of the hand.s together, hapiLs held. away from the body. [his movement must take place whilst R1 is out of reach. R1 wilL then move in to hancLcuff the criminal-. If there is arry suggestion of a struggle the criminaL, who is on the very point of balance, can be knocked. on to his face by the lightest tap on hi-s head., neck or should.ers. R1 can then cLrop his neck to subdue him and conti-nue with the arrest in the""=o"" prone position. The 90 d.egree angle between the approach line for nt and. the Line of fire for R2 must be ma-intained. so that R2 will be able to shoot right up to the last possible moment if necessar1r. plate 8.3 illustrates the position. ff a lone police officer has to make such an arrest, he should assume the role d.escribed. for R1 , but having moved. round. to the line of the shoulder he shor.il-d. ord.er the crinlnal to look straight atread. and. shoul-d. not holster his pistol r,mtil he is within touching d.istance of the criminal, following which he should. move in quickly to secure his m€u3.. The lone officer may weLl feel that, when he has mad.e his approach he will want the criminal to move from the kneeling to the prone position so that he can be more safely

secured-.

10h ChaPter B an example based on the fhe method.s might be illustrated- with 6, where a crj-minaf is besieged precise situation set ooi in chapter in the frouse sketched' in Figure B ' 1 '

FIGURE

i

I

i

8.1

Sketch plan

of

house and'

location of officers

up and- the raid' gToup have taken The cover group are in position gateway' A support mal-with a loud' site of the their places ot each gard.en when the criminal ind-icates his waIl. the behind. is hai]er the front will be told to walk through willingness to surrend"" rr"front criminal is the as of him' As soon d.oor with his hand.s out in ad', if he stop to criminal outsid.e, R1 will take orr"=, orderingl-tk " already way be mad.e # put it dovrn in the the is holding a g:u-11, he will will then be ordered- to walk fo::rarard' to described.. The crimi_nal behind with both officers still his point shor,,m i* fi*r=" 8.2 where, on his stomach, faci-ng R2, with rie to ord.ered be will he lifted' cover, his back, backs together ad' regs spread. a'd. hls had.s behind he wilr be told' to

he is in trrat position clear of his body. when R1 will ** directry at hi? head-. broken rook at RZ who will be pointirrg-" the by the path inticated' then holster his pistor- and. follow drop s th; crirnlnal ' R1 will line in Figr:re B . 3. r,*r"r, rr" reache across his neck and hand'cuff him' cs is used'' the crimina'1 is surend'er' to refusal a following If r ,u"iI b" rolling around' on the rikely to nort I=o* the d.oor arra may

FIGURE

8.2 Positions of raid'

group and' movement

of prisoner

105 Chapter B

FIGURE 8.3

Final

moves

to

make

arrest

in the front gard.en. If he has been subjected. to a reasonable d.ose of CS he will not respond. to ord.ers for a timer rro matter what threats are used.. 0f course, he may be exaggerating or even faking the effects, seeking to catch a police officer off guard.. R1 must then d.ecid.e whether he will wait a few minutes r.intil the criminal- has recovered. sufficiently to obey ord.ers s or whether he should- move in at once. He should. consid.er the situation carefuIly, but may well opt for the l-atter course of action. Soth members of the raid. group must be close enough to the crininal to ensure that they are effective, even though they will be wearing respirators. If the criminal- is in the open, it may be that both will- leave cover together and. move fon^rard., keeping wid.ely separated. so that the criminal could. not shoot both of them before one retal-iated.. They should. move fon^rard. rmtil R2 is a,bout 10 feet in front of the criminal and. R1 has moved. ror-ind. to the shouLd.er line. Wi-th R2 covering, the criminal- shouLd. be ord.ered. to assume the prone position d.escri-bed. earlier. If he will d-o so the arrest wil-l proceed. no:maIly. If he will not R1 may nevertheless d.ecid.e to move in ground. somewhere

at

once.

The erimj-nal who is or who professes to be wor-ind.ed. or othe::t,ri.se unable to come out must be treated. with the utmost ca^re and. should. be d.ealt with on the assr.mption that he will kill a police officer if he catrr. Supposing that, during a siege, shots had. become unavoi.d.able ancL the criminal was wound.ed.. lrlhen given the opportr.mity to surrend.er the criminal reaches the sitting room wind.ow where he apparently loses consciousness. After a d.e1ay the ra-ld. group, with support, are sent fo:nr,rard.. Using the techniques to be d.escribed. in the next chapter, they reach the sitting room d.oor and. see the crini.nalr apparently unconscious, nea,r the wind.ow in the position ind.icatecL in Figure B.h. The crininal- may be seriously injured. t or already dead., but the police must work on the assr:mption that he is feigning. Perh&psr before they enter the room they woul-cL resort to the oId ga.ne hunterr s trick of throwirrg somethi-ng hard. at the man to see if it provokes ar5r response. If there i-s no response they night move into the room, R1 movir:g to the large chair to be joined by R2. R2 would. then line his weapon on the criminal- ancL Rl would. move out, following the line in&icated. in Figure B.h. If he were sti11 not

106 Chapter B

B.h position of unconscious criminal and. moves for arrest might compretely satisfied. about the cond.ition of ther criminal, R1 to Ieg, or foot s stay out of reach, perhaps kickirrg the criminal completely see if that proclucecL anJr response. Qnly when he was Rl move ror:nd- to

FTGUBE

satisfied. that there would. be no resistance woulcL criminalr s neck the shorrld.ers alld, when possible, drop aeross the before hanclcuffing him. Even though he may be unconscious the criminal should. be hancLcuffed- before he is searched' a*cL that to some may feer that such an approach is over-cautious 3t, or harcL suggest th;t police officers should. throw something may quessome kick, , ,rr, ,iho may be seriously injurecL is inhr:man. andwor:nd-edtion the proprietp of hanclcuffing a man who is itseriousry to uight be wise unconscious. Before accepti-ng such criticism, concerm.ed-, l-eavi-s cri-minaI the as far so consid.er the alternatives the conseand police the to irrg asid.e for the moment the d.angers the police Supposing quences for the pqblic of arry poii"e failure. grapple with one d.oes d.o not take such precautions and. the crimi-naI shoot to have of them, it ,*y ,Ltt be that the police will then harsh approachhim' is possibly killing him. llhe careful and. apparently includ'ing the criminal ' in the best interests of eveaTrone concerned-, which requires matter a is prisoners [|he proper hapcLling of and' injuries d-eaths thought, plannirrg ancL training. unrtecessaly The correct here' mad-e points have occurred. through neglect of the principles basic method.s reflect the attiiucles and. precepts of the of police tactics and. foster that calm efficiency of operations wfrilfr

will

avoid. d.a,ger a,'cl easualties.

NOIES

1 2

York city Police Magazi-ne, 'spring 3100r, Jr:ne 1972' rPolice Killings in Australiat, Penguin, RicharcL llarcLing, Australia, 197Or P' 125'

New

Chapter

9

SEARCHING BUITDINGS

fn the precise situation, where the crimj-nal's location has been established., the police would. not contemplate entering the building or room except in the most urrusual circumsta^nces. The aim of the operation is to arrest the criminal and. this must be d.one by compelling krim to come out rather than by asking police officers to go in after lTim. In an imprecise situation, where the crimj.nalrs location is not knovne, police offieers may be compelled. to r:nd.ertake the potentially hazard.ous operation of searching. If the person sought is d.ete:mined., or is panlcked by a sud.d.en open assault, it can be quite easy for him to shoot the lead.ing offi-cers. Research has i-nd.icated. a number of specific areas in which the hazar.d can be reduced.. For exanple, Professor Bristow, whose stucly has been referred. to previouslJr, ( t ) in&icates that in such operations special d-angers lie in failing to search a room correctly, in stand.ing in front of a d.oor whilst knocking on it, and. in having two officers close together in an unprotected. location. fn all the research it seems clear that a too casual- approach, or a too hurriecL approach a^re equally d.angerous. Any lessons which are to be learned. from such specific exa,mples a^re, it is hoped., incorporated. in the basj-c tactics. If these are appliecL correctly, operations involving the searchi.ng of buil&ings can be conducted. with greater efficiency and. with less risk to both public and. police than has often been the case. The claim can be testetL by applying the basic tactics to an imprecise operation and. by d.igressing to show how specific tasks might be carried. out to confom with the basic principles. PR03LE['I: A loca]- criminal, of questionable mental stability aniL with previous convictions for violent crime, was d.i-sturbed. by police officers whilst he was breaking into a shop. He fired at the police with a !mrt. automatic pistol and. seriously wormd.ed. one officer. Ile escaped. from the scene in a car which he has since aband.oned. and., for the time, af1 trace of him has been l-ost. Officers who know the matrr well ind.icate that he will al-most certainly be at one of three houses. IIe is most likely to have gone to the home of his mother who is well aware of his criminal acti-vities and. will d.o arrything to help him. IIe may have gone to his brother who is also likely to help him, beirrg himself an active criminal-. IIe may have gone to his girl friend. who is also likeIy to help him but seems to be afraicL of 107

108 Chapter

9

thought most any involvement with the police. 0n balance, it is may or may not she ffid house, likely that he will be at the motherrs a search execlted, be there as well. A d.etective who has recentl-y ( see Figure plan warrant at that house can suppry a detarled. sketch the same as that is ;:1i. mre house is of brich asd6.its Itd-escription is, of courset Possibl-e that given in the exa,mple in Chapter the criminal is at one of the other housesr o3 that he is at none of them.

FIGURE

9.1

The suspect build:lng

-

ground-

floor layout

of urgency in such an operation, para'd the criminar has ticularly since a police offi""= has been shot avoid. a^rrest. IIe is clearly d.isprayea rr:_s willingness to shoot tothe police, but zea;. to as wel1 clearly a Aanglr to the pu.blic as to produce all-owedbe not a,,cL d.ete:mination to arrLst the man must running no be hasty and inefficient police action. There must prepared- plansoff to the three houses, or to one of them, with ill the command'er mustand' with r.mbriefed, iII equipped. men. 0n'ce a9a;1n, remain firmly in tr:is ""*1, establish his position and then apply himself to the tactics. There may well- be a d.egree

CO\rIAINMEitrI'

of containing the motherf s house is similar to the probA lem outlined in Chatrlter 6, but there are ad-d-ed- complications'suba*other a*dcomma,d.er appointed. cover group of four men, one for the cornma*d_er, shourd. be d.espatched.. The positions ind-icatedit case this in that precise situation may be appropriate except confrontaa provoke will be important that the cover group d.o not in Chapter 6 the tion at this stage. rn the circumstances outl-inedconfrontation already existed. to a large extent, but in this situain ignorance of the tion the criminal, if he is there, should. remain [kris presence of the police r-mtil- all preparations are completed'' absolute and' contair:ment may d.emand a compromise between perfect the cover concealment, urrd. th" final cleploynent may well be left to the to safeguard' group command-er at the scene. The objective is group to be in the house, the covel futfic a,d., assuming the man will be failing in their duty if they hang so far back that the

1.he problem

1O9 Chapter

9

cri-minal is allowed. to escaper or so that any confrontatj-on takes place in the street with innocent people in the area. They willalso be failing if, by getting too close, they allow the criminal to become aware of their presence too soon. By doirrg so they may well

a situation where the criminal starts shooting. Deplo;ment in this situation calls for jud-gment on the part of the cover group cornmand.er and- trust on the part of more senior officers not at the

produce scene.

Broad-ly speakirrg, the locations suggested. in Chapter 6 will be appropriate and the problems of field.s of responsibility, commandwithin the group, ea11 signs and- d.esignations, briefing, and. the action to be taken in case of a break-out, have been d.iscussed. i-n Chapter 6 and. conti.nue to be applicable. The perimeter group must not be d.eployed. as a matter of course in such a situation. This group will be need.ed- for the execution phase of marry operations, but the question of their d-eployinent during con-

talnment is a matter for the jud.gment of the operational commartd.er. [he iruitial reaction may well be to tfdnk that innocent members of the public must be prevented- from wand.ering into the d.anger area so that there will- be no d.anger to them in case of an early confrontation. Conversely, it might be thought that the criminal-, if he is there at all, has been there for some time. fhe cover group will d.o everything possible to avoid. attracting his attention and. the chances of the crim-inal- trrying to leave a situation which he sees as no:mal are veaTr low. If the perimeter group i-s deployed. and. a no:mally busy street is sud.d.enly d-evoid. of acti-vity, the cri-minaI will be alerted. and. must surely investigate, producing a confrontation before the police are read;r. The action which was intend-ed. to safeguard. the public may eause an even greater d.anger. 0n balartce it might be thought that public safety would- best be se:sred- in this parti-cular case by covert containment and. by allowing no:mal activity to continue. The question cannot be answered- in advance and each command.er must make a d.ecision based- on his situation, but it is a matter of balancing the likely risks and. gains of alternative courses, rather than of followirrg some previously d-ictated. rcorrectr procedure. Up to this point consid.eration has been given only to the motherrs house, but the crj-minal may be at one of the other two houses and they cannot be ignored.. l'lhere ad.equate numbers of a,:med. police offj-cers a^re available, al-I three houses should. be contained in the same fashion, but it may not be possible or d.esirable to tie d.oun twelve or more armed- police officers immed-iateIy. It may be for.md. necessaaTr to settle for something less than positive containment in the first instance. It might be for.md. most appropriate to put on a positive containment at the motherfs house, and to restrict action at the other two houses to surreillance so that anyone at the house can be seen. If the criminal was at one of the latter two houses and. tried. to leave, the unarued. officers, or the limited. numbers of a:med. officers, may not attempt to stop him, but might simply report to the operati-onal cornmand.er and then maintain contact r:ntil ad.equate nr,mbers of a:med. officers could. be d-eployed.. Again, the commapd.er must apply jud.gpent to the facts of each case. Where only one house is positively contained. and. the remaind-er are visualIy contained., it must be ensured. that there is no cornmunication from

1

10

Chapter

9

to the others, if necessa:ry by arranging for the telephone to be temporarily out of ord'er' r nn other men are neecled at, or no nthaz. tfith the cover groups d.espatched-,moves into its execution phase' near the scene until the operation police station or at a Al1 other men should. rend.elvous at thefrom the scene to avoid' excitrend.ezvous post a sufficient &istance irrg the interest of the public in the area'

one house

PLANMNG

the command-er must settLe with the contain:nent phase implemented., immethe prr*ri"gl phase, keeping ln nind' that thenot back to the whether or "orpt"t" of the operation is merely to Lstabrish cr_iate aim circr:mstances outlined criminal is at one of the three houses. The each of the three with caLl for three separate operations to d.eal to cLeal with a-11 three houses. rn some cases if may be essential

requirements of simul-taneously despite the falrly hearry manpower positively contained' each ofre. If this is sor each house must be with an a,d an operationaf commad.er must be appointed' for each, it may be d'ecicLecL overarl comma^nd.er as co-ord.inator. mternatively, contained- and- then that one house, the motherrs, wilr- be positively the second- house a*cL dealt with before the operation moves o* to the same for each house antL finally the third.. The problems a,re be d'iscussed' in only the operation at th; motherrs house will contained' a,d' either d.etail, assr:mir:g that the remaining houses arethe conclusion of the being d.ealt with by someone el-se, o= awaitirrg first oPeration. (

")

Gathering info:mation

the reports of A good. tleal of info:mation j-s already to hand, but wirr be most important' the cover groups when they are in positionhadseen a,d- icl-entified they trrit rf a cover group were to report It woul-d' not be a end'' an at be the in&ivi-dual, the operation wouldin to make an matter of making slight adjustments before movinganda tota-11y new aJerest. fhe operation woold. be completely ended. The cover operation srrouta te started. by reviewing the containnentthe not or g,foup may a-1so establish by their obse:srations whether info:mation which mother is at home. so implrtant is the ad.ditional group to keep watch can be gained. by allowingl a well placed. covgr the execution 1elaying worth that, ir some cases, it ,iff be ,Lff for a time. (t

) Basic plan

plan is that course of action which, if it is carried of Examination through, will bring the operation to a conclusion' steps might other what the problem posed. will show thatr oo matter if they either locate be taken, the police wilr only be satisfied. with certainty the criminar or they search the house and establish will l-ocate that he is not there. They cannot be certain that they

The basic

111 Chapter

9

the criminal he may not be there so the basic plan must be to search the house. Various things may be d.one to avoid. the necessity for searching but the operation must be planned. aror.md. the search because, in the end., it may well come down to just that. 0f colrrse, tto search the houset sr.mmarises the basic Plarl, but a great deal more d.etail wiII be required. ancL the followirrg might be appropriate. [he cover group has already been despatched. and is d.eployed- in the positions d.iscussed. earl-ier. When all is ready, the perimeter group may be called in to close both end-s of the street and- they to circu.urstances, visit houses opposite the front and *ryr"""o=d.ing rea^r of the suspectt s house so that the occupants can be warned. of the d.angers. In some cases other perimeter men wil-l- be requiredwith l-oud. hailers to keep the occupants of all surroull.d.ins houses insid.e apd. to keep other people from wand.ering into the a,re&. In other situations it wil-I be sufficient for a perimeter group of one m1n to be on hand. to stop any stray ped.estrian who tri-es to walk past the d.oor. [he nr.mber of perimeter men involved. and. the t]"pe of action to be taken will vaJry from case to case and. must remain a matter of jucLgroent for the command-er. It is r.lnlikely that evacuation will be thought justified. j-n an imprecise operation, though it

be consid.ered. in extreme cases. The raj-d- and. support groups will then approach the house to search it, but there must first be a d-ecision about which of the two d.oors is to be approached.. A nr.mber of factors may influence this d.ecision, but one of the most important will be the principles of protection outlinecL earl-ier. hlith a proper d-eployuent of support men the raid group can be ad.equately protected. from attack at either d.oor, but the basic plan calls for them to enter and. seatrch- Consid.eration rmrst therefore be given to protecting the raid. group as they enter apd- search the first room. If the front d.oor is usedt the raid. group will go j-nto the halI where there will be danger from the kj-tchen d.oo::tuay, the sitting room d.oo::way, the staircase, and the whol-e of the first floor land.ing. Support men outsid.e the hall canlot protect the raid. group from a threat comirrg from upstairs. If the back d.oor is used., support men catrr cover the d.oors to the hall apd. the d-ining room whilst the raid. group search the ki-tchen. In most houses, the most d-angerous feature is the staircase and any entry lead.ing straight on to it shoulil be avoid.ed.. [he idtial approach to this house wiLl, therefore, be to the back d-oor. When the raid. group approach the back d.oor, they may be rnrlnerable to arqrone who is in the ga^rage. The info:mation ind.i-cates that there is no d.irect access from the house, but the cLanger from the garage must not be ignorecL. A search shoulcL be conducted., as far as po""ift", by clearing all tLangers as they ariser so that no one needUe lookirrg over his should.er. If the ga,rage is Iocked., it woultL be d-ifficult to get in without attracting attention from the house ancL it might be better to search at least the gror.md. floor of the house before opening the garage. What might be practicable and. sensible would. be to check the garage as far as possible through the wind-ow, apd. then leave a support ma.n watching the wind.ow and. the front corner of the garag; whilst the raid group move to the back of the

may

house.

The first move towards the house will therefore be toward-s the gaa.age wind.ow, apcL the raicl group will wish to approach as cl-ose as

112 Chapter 9 therefore move behind possible in protected..positions. They wiLlthe g#4e wind'ow' In opp;site the neighbori='" wa11 to positions protection, support men will be or accord.a,ce with the priricipres 51 will- cover the back d'oor' need.ed to cover other aargier sngts-' back door or on the staircase' 52 ancl if there is a wind.or Srr"= trre the front corner of the g*.'€.e in will watch that. s3 will watch the garage d-oor ad' tries case someone lea,rres by the front d.oor or that an that Erarter: - It is importantthe to attack the raid. grorrp--i=o* men raid protect #" available to appropriate number of sirpport be not group must group from tfrese possibl!- aurrgers. The cover i

r il

askedtoprovid.ecloseprotectiontotheraiclgroup.Theywil].be i;;k (La tr'eir only task) is too fax away and., in any case,Totrr"ii ensure that any car whj-ch might be to d.eal with any break_Lut. to break through the containment' the in the gaTa,.e cannot be used- move into position from the =ear ad' raid. group iitr, s1 a'd. s2 woulda polile vehj-cle across the when they were ready s3 could. d.rive d-riverr s shoufcL All the cat d.oors except theposition' d.riveway to block it. s3 car is in be l-ocked. before s3 moves off . },Ihen the the the house locking should. ro11 out on the sid-e away from ' positions. [hese starting d.riverr s d.oor before he leaves the edT. are shoun in Figure 9'2'

Police

FIGIJRE

9.2 Initial

d'eplo3nnent at

the

scene

group will lnove to check the From these positions, the raicL 53 to watch the garage garage as fur ,= possibie ancL then, leLving they will move to the buildi{,-when wind.ow and the front corner of the appropriate, entry a*d., d.oor the on knock wilf back d_oor. R1 d-oor to the &itdns the using s1 to cover will be mad.e to the kitchen kitchen is the haII' when room ancL s2 to covel the d.oor to the whilst the ha,l the the d.oor to searched. s2 w'-1 contirr*e to watch the d'oor cover using s1 to raid. group move i-nto the d.inins room, room' conwil-I search Th" Before from the drning room into the "ittit'g the hall. attempt arly t; tinue to the sitting room ad. then staj'rcase the cover be left to is mad.e to go upstairs, s2 y111 out to search the g#%e a,d free move s1 with whilst the raid. group l,Iith the gror:nd- floor completes3 from his responsibilities there. the land.ing will go upstalrs and- fromthat ly checked, the raid groupu,,a ord'er' bed'roomi 1, 2 a*d' 3 in will search the bathroom d'eviation from the Finally the roof space must be searched'' any

113 Chapter

9

patterrr of search must be reported. to the

into effect.

command.er

before being put

a suj-table basic plarlr the command.er must have a knowledge of those techniques of searching which accord. with the basic principles. These will be d.escrj-bed. more ful1y rmd.er Executiont , and. the plan suggested. here is basecl on the assr-mption that all the men involved are trained. in the appropriate techniques. [here is no single t correct plant for such an operation; each command.er must va:qr hi-s approach accord.irrg to his situation and, to some extent, his personal preferences. This plan, and- the more d.etailed. techniques d.escribed. later, represent one way of applying the basic principles to the problem which has been set. To produce

f

(

"

) Contingency pl ans

by step, to see what conIikely to arise, and- to plan for them. 1 Crininal breaks and. is stopped- by cover group: The plan for this conti-ngency will be the sane as that produced. for the precise situation clealt with in Chapter 6. All groups will stand. fast. That cover sub-group into whose area the crimi-nal has broken will challenge hi-m and. hold. him at gr:rrpoint. At the d.j-scretion of the sub-group comma.trrd.er they will then either d.eal with him themselves or call for the raid. group to make the a^rrest. 2 Crimina1 breaks and. gets beyond- inner cover: In marry imprecise operations an outer cover group will not be justified.. The plarr will be for the responsible cover sub-group to report to the operational command.er and. then to maintain contact with the crirninal wkr-llst other officers a,re red.eployed to contai-n him. 3 Criminalrs mother is encounterecL: When an approach i-s mad.e to the back d.oor, the wanted- ma^nrs mother might well atrrswer. If she d.oes not she may be encountered. at some other stage of the search. It is very cLesirable that she be got out of the house. Although, from the infomation availa.bIe, she is unlikely to be used. as a hostage, her presence in the house is a complication which should. be avoid.ed. i.f possible. fn ad.d.ition, it is extremely important that she be interriewed.. If the woman can be got out of the house and. intenri-ewed., she may reveal that the wanted. man i-s in the house, and. the operation is end.ed.. There must be no rushing in. The man has been located. and. the operation has become precise. A new set of plans is now required. to cLeal with a precise operation. 0f colrrse, if the woman d.enies that her son is present, she cannot be beli-evedand the search will be resr.imed.. The plan to d.eal with the woman, if she is encor:ntered., will therefore be for the raid grroup to get her out of the house and. hand. her over at once to the support group who will have a man specially selected. for his abil-ities as an interviewer. The raid. group must not attempt to i-ntervi.ew the womatrr. fhey must continue to concentrate on the criminal. The operation wilL be suspend.ecL whilst the womatrr is being interrogated.. l+ Crininal located. and. refuses to surrend.er: At any stage of the operation the criminal- may reveal- his location. I{e might fire at the police as they approach; he might reveal himself at a wi-nd.ow; it night be he, and- not his mother, who answers the d.oor; he might The basic plan must now be exa,nined., step

tingencies

a^re

1

i i I I

I

i i

I

it r

I

th

Chapter

9

of the indisclose his presence at any stage cluring the search confrontation a,d the criminal terior. rf there is a face to face with him' If the surrend.ers, the raicL group wiIl, of course,tod'eaI sr:ffend-er, the raicl criminal backs off , or rigrrtsr or refuses the criminal were group mgst not be d.raun forward'' If , for example' offj-cers, were to step back to open the d.oor ad., seeing the police the raid group must not barge amcL slan the d.oor in their faces, operation has been through the d.oor to follow him. The aim of theraidgroup must now achieved.. ['he criminal has been I0cated.. The safe' From be will back off to a point phere R1 consid'ers they may re-locate who there he will report to the operational command.er situation; precise them whilst he begins kris ,pp=,i**f of the new, tleart with in which is, of course, the be-sieged. criminar situation Chapter 6. any wlforeseen 0nce ?€{frr., four contingency plans a,re requ-ired' operati-onal the by with d-eart be and. r:npred.ictable happeninls ,il1 through his command' st:ructure' "o.*rrrd."=

(a) Preliminarry oPeration the wapted' martr s For the reasons d.escribed- r:nder contingency pfan 3' and it night, mottrer is a very important figure in th-is situationoperation aimed' therefore, be wortrr'.while "orrsid."ring a prelimina^:ry or trr" house is startecl' [his at gettirrg her out before any ""ut"h by the fact that its immed-iate prelimi-na^ay is d.istingrrished as such get the woman out, thus it aj-m is not to locate the criminal, but to p1an. Some fo::n of subteris at varla'ce with the aln of the basic the wa,ted. manr s brother is fuge might be used.. rf it is known that given delivering a not at the house, consid.eration could. be to thetosecond' son' If she message asking the mother to go urgently man a*d- be wa*tedthe respond.s to this she ca* be inte:srieweil about A1progress' in is kept away from the house whilst any searchwill basic the before come though, chronologically, this pretimi-narry first completed pran, it is important irrat the basic plan should- be in the inrrolvedeveayone effect, and. that, before it is put into position as possibl-e' basic plan is in position or as crose to hisan officer, possibly a for rn this case the prelimina^ry night call of tLelivering the pretext woman, to go to the d.oor opltfly ot the woma' i-f she will the message. irr" officer will offer to transport be taken far enough go at once. hlhen the woman comes out she can the operation will then away to be interyiewed. ancL the progress of Au shoulct be ready for the d.epend. on the resrrlt of the interriew. contingencies basic pran to be put into effect, but some aclcl-itionalcontingencies two first The peculiar to the prelimina^ry will arise. will break-out a of possibilitl of the basic plan concerniirg therlrtrrer Confor' called is actj-on apply to the prelimi""=v *d to of possibility the tingencies pecuriar to irr" prelimina^ar includ-ecallirrg d-eploynent for the criminal- attempting to shoot the officer, ofthesupportgroups,arrd.the.needford.efinecl-escaperoutes. will ask the officer lrhere is also the po""iuirity that the womanmust be refused-, perhaps into the house to wait. such an invitation onthepretextofnothavingtimetowait.Examinationofthese about such a contirrgencies ruight result in second- thoughts

115 Chapter 9 preliminarJr. If a policewoman is sent to d.eliver such a message, can she be protected. if the criminal tries to shoot her, and. are

there reasonable escape routes for her? The making of these ad.d.itionaL contirrgency plans wiLl allow of a reappraisal of the preliminaries ancl a balancing of the risks involved. a6ainst the benefits of securirrg and interviewing the womatrr. There is no stock atrrswer. In each case the operati-onaL command.er must use his judgment to strike the best bal-ance having regard. to the ord.er of

prioriti-es.

(")

Second.arSr

operation

There is no second.arXr objective in this operation plans l.rill be cal-led. for.

and.

no

second-arXr

ORGA}IISAIION

1

Manpower

Basic plan: Perimeter group: The size of the peri-meter group for the basic plan will probably be veaT small in such an operation. 0perations will varry consid.erably accoriling to the area of operation and the time of d.ay but assr:mirrg that a quiet time will be selected., two men ruight be appropriate. Cover group: [he cover group wil1 be of four men, acting in pairs and. covering the front and. rear of the house respectively.

group: f\uo rlen. Support group: Three men, for the roles already outli-ned.. When the command.er ancL his staff officer a^re taken i-nto account the basic plan will- require a totaL of thirteen men for effi-cient implementation. fhe use of cLogs to assist in searehing is fliscussed. 1ater, but if a cLog is to be employed., its handler w"iIl be includ.ed. in the support group. Contirrgency plans: Contingencies 1 and. 2 d.o not require any ad.&itional men, but contingency 3 raises a requirement for an ad.ditional support matrr to ileal with the woman, bringirrg the support group to a strerrgth of four. Contir:gency h will probably produce a requi.rement for ad.d.itionaL perimeter men but it may wel-I be d.ecicLed. that these men will simply be ea^:marked. but not called. to the scene unle ss that contingency a^ri ses . Preliminarlr operation: In general the marrpower available for the basic plan will be ad.equate for the prelimina^:ry plan, but it is important that the officer used. to d.eliver the message is not one of the basi-e raicL group. llkrese two officers must be ready to cleal with the criminal. llkre aim of the preliminarJr operation is to get the woman out ancL the person who d.oes this fo:ms a prelimina:ry raid. grcoup of one for that task on1y. Raid.

116 Chapter TASLE

9.1

9

Marrpower sulnmarJr

Ad.ilitiona1 requirements for:

Sasic

GrouP

plan

Contirrgencies Prelimina^ry

2

6x

0

Perimeter group Cover group

l+

0

0

Raid. group Support group

2

0

Commander and'

staff

[otaI x rhe additional perimeter

:Hrlttt:t?f;f

I

t t I

3xx

1

2

0

0

men mav

the !:^?*"f*k"li"::*"":I*: become s preci se arter J"il:-ilil$'tn'J-ln"="*ion

or he wil1 be a,r additional member

"";=ilt* the suPPort group' Command

0

7x

13

IHJ:fr'"";3*;3'o""a,

2

1

stnrcture

rtl the must be placed in charge ' olg ) men, perimeter take also two -(t't 0f the and will g";6 be wirr group, for.ir man "or"= _c1 command the Teax sub-gtoup' wirl"or*-*d-"= charge of th;-rionc "d-*=;rrp. - _c, wi-ir commad' the support s! Irr" s=;"pl of charge =ria R1 will be in she is rocated' rf this if trre-woira, of takEs group until he "rrrrs" S3 will- assume comma'nd-' ;;p;"- -Cfrain of command:

Operation+

Command-er

I

Staff Officer Raid.

Cover

Perimeter Group (z)

Group (z)

GrouP

r,roJrt

Preliminarry Ha^Lo

Group (t )

ne'ar

Cover z) Cover (z) a command post establish to d.esirable be wirl rt a commad. post: parked- in the front street polic;"; a perhap=-rt near the scene, house. trri-" vehicle wirr move into the from dista*ce sufficient (

;iT:"H51"::tr::;:"-ilt *i::+:.eit";n"

cover sroup who would be at the police station' probably ,oora =""a"r"oo= d_eployed u.t*Ir,i", requirement is fi}le. it will ,*po'er the l{hen men: uncornmittedtr''t no one else is Sent to to orders issue to be necessalxr """o="in the a*ea are specifically officers oirr"= arly that a*d scene the normal duties' toId. to "oni:-"o" with their

117 Chapter 9

3

Equipment

basic, contingency and. preliminary plans must now be examined. afresh in relation to the equipment need-ed. for each. (i) Weapons: For all officers except perhaps the perimeter group; the command.er and. the staff officer will have pistols. Shotgms will be useful with each cover group and might be d.esirable for the raid. group. Generally speaking the support group will be bad.ly placed. for the use of shotguns. It is r-mlikeIy that rifles would- be required. in such an operati-on. (li) Commr.mications: ff the cornmand. post is a police ca:r the icLeal commr.mications system might be UHF repeaters through the VIIF ca,r rad.io. By this system the command.er will be in touch with his head.quarters and. can also maintain contact with all men in the operation. Whatever system is used. it shou1d., if possible, be exclusive to the,operation. Pocket sets will be required by both perimeter men (z), each cover sub-group (z), Rz or the =riaagroup and. support men 2, 3 and h (h). The command.er should have 1oud. hailer for emergency commr.mications, another loud. hai.ler shoulcL be availa.ble to the support g-Toup ancL a third. should. be i.ssued. to the perimeter g?oup. If r or contingency la arising, acLd.iti-onal perimeter men are required., ad.cLitional raillos and loud. hai]ers wil-l also be required., but these can be brought with them if they are on the correct frequency. The original requirement will be for eight pocket rad.ios and. three loud. hailers. (iii) Otrrer equipment: For the basic plan: amband.s for any men in plain clothes; body a:mour for the raid. group and. three support men; forcing equipment; . searching mirror; handlarnp (for false roof or other d.ark.places); hand.cuffs for raid. Sroup; vehicle for removing pri-soner (one of the police vehj-c1es used. to take men to the scene would. no:maL1y be ad.equate); police cLog if required. for seatrch. Equipment for the conti-ngency plans: vehi-c1es for red.eployment (usua11y suffj-cient vehicles will be at the scene); hand.cuffs for cover g?oup; vehicle to take mother from scene. Equipment for the preliminaqr operation: coneeal-a,ble body a^rmour for raid. ma^n or woman. The

h Briefing All men except the cover group will be briefed. at the police stati.on. It may in some cases be possible to brief the group fu11y before they move off , but this is r.m-likely. If "over they have not been bri.efed., it may be possible to replace them with fresh men who a,re briefecL prior to execution, othemdse special arrangements must be mad.e to brief the cover group. Arrangements must be mad.e for progressive briefing and special emphasis must be placed. on the need. to report any shots fired.. E)MCUIION

When move

aLl is read.;r, the peri-meter group, raid. and. support groups wiII to their starting positions whilst the command.er ancL his staff

118 ChaPter 9 Detailed' lcnowledge and' freinto their command' post' operatechniqpes _is vital to the q*ent practice of the searching comma*d'er who af so i*po=irrrt for the is it but officers, tionar the tlchruiques ancL the philosophy shoultl thoroughly und.er.iLad'etailea a"""=iption applies to the behind them. The foffowing t" varied' within techniq*es The ootiirr"a. arready "r, basic plan as t; the attitude and- philosophy certain bound.s but they must "o*roil suggested. group will depend on a nr:mber their lhe action taken by the perimeter been .riI"o"-""a. leaving asid'e arreJay have which positions of factors start with the men inintheposition for rore, tJre operatiol n=6"=-r1* [he cover g'o*p wi!] 1?"" been from the shor^rn in Figure 9.2. s3'll'approach Ei-ria raid;;*;ith [he positions some ti.me. the neighbo.o] I y*l to thed-ri-veway with back street, movj-ng u"r,i,,a the block is not sh shown. when they are i* positionr'$-wi11 too wiir iorr" to rris position' the the police car and. trren-G watchirrg ha,cr.. s1 *i-tt t" yet gemmitted. but should. be close-to that backcl.oor,s2willbewatchinganywindoy:onthefirstfloor,arrd. or the bruirding to ensure front the ,rt"rdrrs be will s3 will "ot*"=t'lhen all men atre read;r' R1 front' to no one comes ror.md. r=o* tr'"command'er ad seek his pe:mission to waI} gard'en report to the operatiorru.r given, R1 will cross th; the to back start. when the orcler is ,"rJ *i-ll stand. with his place' the sid.e of the soug" *i*a", wind.ow until R1 is in irr" r^ratchirrg be fl2wi11 . until he wa1' out garage R1 can move his head covering-irr"-wind.oi, stiff R2 ooith onfy to the. end- of the looking tui windor^r, th; through can see in he d'oes t'Lt have to stick his that so po=itio* his. garage opposite of that end' he has seen as much as possible siII andhead. out too far' When the retow the levll of rf ' when he wilr cross the ,i*aor, keeping grrug" as fax as possible'not the end.'of other the sufcheck is then manner, a brief loot< this in ri*aow u, but through again checking head, pause "'a tr'"n look stay in his *iirra=r,, should. he not ficient, position. ILis head should' in the appear with his head. in a different not arra srrouldtwo o" ,""orra a trri more posas one place for garage has_been checked' as far an. the corner sane place twice. !,rhen the window i's well as the front behind' the sible, 53 will cover the trre uacr< .oor. R2 will remain to o* move will group raid. coveri*g the back d-oor. s1 , for in s1 or"=-from taking ,Jr, garden raid In"nfr:T:li knock at the back door. rhe at the i*o=i'rTi*prv,rr"ir'"= or not the criminar is group's job is to ""tdbiilr, aogr and. he is there, he may run from the house. rf they lmock at be so kind' as to call out; or he mayabout may he his whereone room to a,other; leaving no doubt shoot at them through the -door, thesE things happen, the operation ,rry rf intentions. a'rroida'd. .oi abouts or Jo"lrirrg has been ro"irr""" tense somewhat the malI a*d one is over It requires onfy *i"a' i" kept U" ,r""A'-to things ed. fwo this stage' rt go--ro*'q1.Jo*"-u't *o"t R1 so d.oor, a at to lo:ock been shot that iori"" officers have en'sure that must also be kept in mind. marcing will rds upp=or"rr, R1 of through d.oors ancL "o ,rr"r,trr"t # to olLe sid-e the door ,rra rine of out simply keeps he ""*ai;; at.tli" sta6e' R1 wi,l n?*";s ,rrytrdne If 1ea'rrhouse Imocking. when warf of the i'gJ*"t ' rrimsef flatt-en ln; to move fo::r,rard with ,iyo"" at the d'oor' and learring irrg his number tro io d.eal

officer I i I

move

119 Chapter 9 support men to cLeal with any other threat. R1 , then, will stand. to the si-d.e of the d.oor, reach out with his hand., and. Ic:ock. But on which sid.e of the d.oor should. he stand.? IIe osyr i-n some cases be compelled. by the layout of the builtring to stand. in a particular place, but the sketch i-nd.i-cates that he could- stand. on either sid.e of the d.oor. [he choice is important and. the reasordng helps to

illustrate the basic philosophy ruhich must be ad.opted.. If , when }o:ocking at the d.oor, R1 takes up a position on the hinge sid.e of the d.oor, he will more easily be able to see who opens the d-oor ancL he will be in a better position to take action agalnst ar5rone in the house. But R1 is not there to see who opens the d.oor, nor to take action against them. He is there to knock at, the d.oor that is aIL. If the cri-minal- appears, someone else will be in a posi-tion to take ca,re of him. R1 t s job at this stage is simply to lcoock at the d.oor and to ensilre that he d.oes not get himself shot in the process. He must therefore choose the positi-on in which he is safest, not that from which he is most effective. Figure 9.3 illustrates the possible d.angers of a bad. position. R1 is stan&lng on the hinge sid.e of the d.oor and R2 is coveri.ng him from behind. the wall-. If the criminal stand.s in the position marked X, he need. open the door only a couple of inches to get a shot at R1. If this happensr rro other police officer can take arry action and- R1 is unIikely to be a.ble to react fast enough to save his or^rn l-ife. C3

C4

r:ll L /

tL_

[ruryJ*

"*# FIGURE

9.3

Danger from w:rong

position

r^rhen

lmockirrg at d.oor

lrlhenever possible, R1 should. knock at a d.oor from the sid.e opposite the hinges. His R2 will cover the d.oor cLirectly and. he shou-lcL harre d.eployed. his support group to cover all other d.anger spots. The basic plan is mad.e on the assr-mption that nothing will happen as a result of the knocking and. the search is to go fo:eward.. The next step is to open the d.oor. Just that open the d.oor. Not open the d.oor ancL jump in - not even open the d.oor and. look in just open the d.oor. This i-s not a milita:ry street fighting operation, nor is it a Janes Bond. film. The aj-m is to find. out whether or not the criminal- is in the kitchen and- to do so if possible without going in there. Police officers should not enter a room rmtil they a,re as sure as they can be that the crimi-naI is not there. fn other word.s, they go into a room to confim the belief that the criminal is not there, not to find. out whether he is there. They go

12O Chapter 9

other means of

exl:austed' evely into a room only after they have rn preparing to open the establishi*g the criminartL rocation. This officer wirl almost certainly door, R1 wiir call R2 fonrard.. the d'oor, although in sol? cases it ha,e to take the hinge side of to be at one sid'e' R2 d-oes not may be necessa^aTr for.both officers r:ntil some steps have been take up a p;sition at the hirrge sid.e bala*ce, it then becomes the taken to locate the criminal *a, onbe one side of the d-oor besafer place. rf both officers must R1on will crouch low ad- R2 wil-I cause of the layout of the building, his covering of the d'oor and' sta*d. behincr. him. s1 wir-I now ="s*" of tl: criminal- :*shing out -ro"=" he should. keep in mind. ifr" possibility to-haipen, the raid group coul-d- not in a blind. pa,ic. rf this to tleal with enda*gering each other u,a s1 wour-d- have

shoot without

the situation.

it wid'e open' ready R1 should- open the d'oor and' push ldhen the this' d'o to use forcing equipment It may be necessaly togroup at wa11s the miust r6main back against -"ti"t d-oor opens, the raitl the in cri-minal out their heads. A either sid.e a,d. must oot but door, the by the opening of room might be startred. into activj-ty at or in, to rush expecting if he is not he wirr- probably be "o-*"o*" must do none of these things' least l-ook in. [he raid. Sroup1r'" the time' Time is on the sid'e off1y Tension will- be mounti*s ;-r d'oor the see will he police, If the cridnJ is in the roomt charging in - nothing one no movement no open, then - nottr-lrrg tj-me will seem to the crimlnal to be for a 1orrg, long time. The be about a minute' In that time the hours, but in fict need.s to presence: lsrn' crininal j-s likely to d-o something to reveal his \^Jhen

all is

move,shoutorshoot.Nomatter,or,"thed.oeshecanhurtnooneif If !h: criminal reveals his the officers d.o their iob correctly' he has been located'' presence in any way, tte operatiori rr"" end.ed-:to the openirrg of the is no response rf after a minute or so thlre look into the kitchen' Two of them then d.oor, the raid. gToup wil-I at the sid'e of the room for are at the d.oor and. so each would' 100k stick their head-s out Lr,im so that they will need. to -po""itr" opposi-te to on a distance-. [hey may both look together the least In any case their head's signal r or they may d.o so ind-epenLentiy'time possible,' and m*st shortest shour-d. be sticking out for the rrhis sort of exanination will twice. place never appear in the "*L area close to the d-oor, leave some parts of the room unseen: the forexa,mplerca.nnotbeseenr:nlesstheofficersputtheirhead's by the use of the searching right inside. This can be avoid'ed cupboards mirror. other areas such as behind iurniture or i-nsid-e As far as it is possible cannot be seen r:ntil entry has been mad'e' searched. from the outsid-e with virto d.o sor the room has now been still not happy' they tuaIly no risk, but if the raid- group areand' try to draw the might d.e1ay their ""irv a little-further lid'' or something criminal by throwing slmethirrg, a hat,isa dustbin stilr no respolLse, it is the room. rf there

of the sort, into time to Plan the entrY'

ror it will usualty beordesirable ir"irliT";H H;"i admoving rrhich he room the to_ that part Hli: i'i;:'";1i;"; J-'t^^ r.rhi n-h he he can which room or the -An?n that. part "=":l :il":":: H'i:#* R;';;;i"s I -- ^-^: ^l^^,''l i tO SOme some to move "nnrra entry quictry and shouldfrrrrrni i$*=331.*'[l'ffi"ffiuil; his i.rrra oT or ^f rurniture the most suitabr; piece or ?:il :;";""t#;;.*;; him to

t^^

%An7n r.rhi n-h he

C

a

121 Chapter

9

other protection

d.oes not lie in the l-ine suggested. above, R1 will for cover no matter where it might be. Before he moves off, R1 will- call S1 fo::r^rard. to take his place and. to watch the d.oor into the dining room. R2 will be watching the d.oor into the haII. R1 will then move quickly into his pre-selected position, bringirrg the men into the locations shor,,n: in Figure 9.)+. When he has moved. into position, R1 will call kr-is R2 into the room and. 52 will- move forward. to take the place of R2, covering the d.oor into the hall. The raldgroup will then search the kitchen carefully, checking every cupboard. or corner which might hold- a man ( even a crouchlng man, who can get into a remarkably smal-I space). [he need. for thorough

move

searching cannot be over-emphasised.: men have hid.d.en i-n the most amazing peri.od.s of time

peculiar places and. have remained. there for whilst police officers moved. all round. them.

Po

lice

-*

FIGURE

9.)+ Entering the kitchen

the kitchen has been thoroughly searched., the raid. group prepare will to move into the next room. They have two alternatives, but it has already been pointed. out that the halI, with its two d.oors, staircase ancL landing, i-s extremely d.angerous. It should be left until the remaind-er of the gror:nd. floor is clear so that only the upstai-rs d.anger points exist when it finally must be tackl-ed.. The d.oor to the haIl cannotr of course, be forgotten. 52 will be left where he is, covering that d.oor to ensure that no one ca.n come from the ha1l to attack the raid. group from the rear whilst they a,re entering the dining room. Leaving 52 in position, the raid. When

on the hinge sicLe of the d.oor and so R1 will crouch on the opposite sid.e with R2 stand-ing behind. him covering the d-oor i-nto the sitting room. 51 will be waiting to move fo::.r^rard. when R1 makes his entrXr. [hese positions are iI]ustrated. in Figure 9.5. R1 wil-l now go through the process of opening the d.oor, making a vi.sual check and. usirrg the searching mirror as d.escribed. in rel-ation to the back d-oor. R2 will be r.inable to assist except by watching the d.oor to the sitting room. hlhen he is satisfied. that the d.:ining room is cIear, as far as can be seen, R1 will signify his intentions to the others antl- then move into the dining room, making for the safest pIace. R2 will crouch d.or,rn, assr-:mi-ng the positi-on just vacated- by R1 , whilst S2 moves in to stand. behind., takirrg over the man cannot stancL d.or^n:

122

Chatrrter

9

move in to assist R1 then will R2 d'oor' has been wateh on the sitting room lilhen the d.ining room room' the tining the in searching the sitting room in exactlY into made be will clearecL, arl ""irY sane way.

Police

a

I

I

l

to dining room 9.5 Positions for entry probably of the ground- floor it will layout the at essenwas again it rf Looking from the "ittirrg room'to call s2 ad h-Ji the enter to be urnuise it *isrrt be io""itre-first into tial to move that ws,yr to the harr, checkirrg aitirren hr" i=o* indoor be the to have him open s2 ,,o"ia have rrr"Ioy-case, so. do;" had he conwrong the haII after he woirld' not jump to thein that so moves this case arsr of fo:med. A safer approach -th" movement. arra noise room to the about sitting crusion i=o* aoo=the ,o*t"rrirrs would be to lea;ue s1 kitchen' pickin'g up s2' raid. *oo, the the d'oor l"*q-io-tr'" haII, whilst aoo=. s1 coul. open tnai ?rr="irsr, ha* the the stairs 0f and entering watch the fool he th;t so room "oora The- g=o'':na 11:?= woul-d then from the sittirrg their maae group "*i=y. taexrEa it right be worthwlr_i,st the raid staircas"-i" the before be cleared, but ;; eliminate any remaining the sor*;-complet;i; the staircase t clearing while sz srrour-a t" lef t to watch s: release to ad. outsid'e the front hazard room ?=, p="ru='rry' f;";up the stairs' sitting the from either way iare but "ri-""u pari d.oor where he will ue the pid group with s1 coufd inteniionsrtrr"ir of s3 Ilavirrg info:med. one thenenterthegaraSetr,rowhtheaoo,.arrd.clearthat. what is almost invariablyj's tactcre to ,r""""""ri rt then becomes ' There trr"- rroose , the staircase may be da*geroor-i[t, most criminal the of ^9r il op=irir". The first of the no safe way of getting'th; view tuc close to the top or in arty of ;;i rarrairrsl ih" o* hiding rr"'*u'iJe in the bathroom shoot' stairs a*cL waiting to'shoot; out o* to lrr" landing to to ,Ltirrs standing bed.rooms, =rr"i, one of the oi support men will be out of viewpresent, but carr be reMuch of the da*ger o", always is da*ger fhe at the 1i-;"1: on the grormd. floor. ;h; safest i" 11..:*,,tu ad '"tr'"a r'i" *m pglntirr*that duced.. rn rnanv cases i' ;;;; stairca="; the ll" rmrikely 'itr' i; Is bottom of of the slair"u.su.trrev carL, lot more than ready to fire at trr"-top u"i-ir be spol?.can other danger "or"="i-, to- the fott of the stairs'point Urougfit te (Sf )lry one *oppoit man three poii""*"" at this or tw6 uro"rrirrs of [here is a d.anger

FIGIIRE

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123 Chapter

9

wi-th no ad.d.ed. safety factor produced.. R1 will then move up the staj-rs on kris stomach, staying as close as possible to the steps and. as close as possible to the inner wall. This position ensures that the crlminal who wi-shes to take a shot at him must lean out to d.o sor whereas if R1 went rrp close to the outer wa1l, he would. reach a point where the criminal wou1d be able to shoot without being exposed.. It j-s interesting to note thatr &s R1 nears the top of the stalrcase, any shooting which might take place will be within j-nches of his head.. It is therefore important that R1 has faith in the shooting ability and self-control of his R2. Indeed., the rrle shoulcL be that R1 is alIowed. to select his ovno R2. llhen R1 reaches a point from whj-ch he can see the 1and.ing, he will- cl-ear it visually as far as possible and. then call up R2. The raid. group will then make their move on to the land.ing and clear that, calling up support men as necessarJr to watch bed.room d.oors. flkre searching of bed.rooms is carried. out in the sarne fashion, using support men to watch the

of the unsearched- rooms. the first floor has been cleared there wi1l, in most houses, be one finalr veaTr d.ifficult problem - the roof space or false roof . 0ften a trap will lead from the lan&ing to the roof space and. this will be the only way in. Insid.e will be almost complete d.arkness and., if the crimi-nal- is there, he will }