Police Respond to Terrorism: Case Studies from India, France, Belgium, and England 3031432495, 9783031432491

Citation preview

Garth den Heyer

Police Respond to Terrorism Case Studies from India, France, Belgium, and England

Police Respond to Terrorism

Garth den Heyer

Police Respond to Terrorism Case Studies from India, France, Belgium, and England

Garth den Heyer Arizona State University Phoenix, USA

ISBN 978-3-031-43249-1    ISBN 978-3-031-43250-7 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-43250-7 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland Paper in this product is recyclable.

This book is dedicated to the police officers who everyday put their lives in danger to ensure that our communities are safe. It is also dedicated to my parents, Nicholaas den Heyer and Dawn den Heyer and to my two grandsons, Liam and Joshua.

Preface

For more than 10 years I was the Manager: Special Operations, which subsequently changed to Manager: Counterterrorism and then Manager: National Security, at the National Headquarters of the New Zealand Police. This role was responsible for the research, development, and application of national, organizational, and border security, counterterrorism, emergency management, and search and rescue and disaster victim identification, policies, procedures, plans, and responses. I also undertook short-term research and was responsible for the national co-ordination of protective operations, the delivery of national counterterrorism exercises, and operational and technical security measures. I was appointed to this role in 2005, after being the first Departmental Security Officer from 2002 to 2005. These roles held some importance following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States and the Bali terrorist attacks in 2002. However, the role was underresourced and was not well appreciated by senior managers and executives, but I was required to have an up-to-date knowledge of the facts relating to terrorist attacks around the world and how to respond to these evolving events. At the time, there was very little academic research into how the police were responded to terrorist attacks. This led to me relying exclusively on formal and informal relationships with other police officers around the world and the reviewing of official reports that were prepared following major international terrorist attacks. It was these gaps in the information in how the police responded to terrorist attacks that led me to undertaking the research for this book and it is hoped that the findings presented from this research go some way to improving how the police do respond to terrorist attacks. Phoenix, USA  Garth den Heyer

vii

Acknowledgments

As is usual with such writing projects, I am indebted to my family for their patience and understanding. I am also extremely grateful to my wife, Vicki den Heyer, for her editing skills of earlier drafts of the book chapters and for her support during the project. As such, the role is no easy feat.

ix

Contents

1

Introduction��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������     1 Introduction����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������     1 Defining Terrorism����������������������������������������������������������������������������������     2 The Four Waves of Terrorism������������������������������������������������������������������     5 Radicalization and the Financing of Terrorism����������������������������������������     5 Media Coverage of Terrorist Attacks ������������������������������������������������������     6 The Use of Intelligence����������������������������������������������������������������������������     6 The Terrorist Attacks That Have Been Examined in the Case Studies ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������     7 Conclusion ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������     7 References������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������     8

2

 The Police Response to Terrorism – Draft Chapter������������������������������   11 Introduction����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    11 The Background of Modern Terrorism����������������������������������������������������    13 The Development of Counterterrorism Strategies ����������������������������������    15 The Role of the Police in Responding to Terrorism��������������������������������    17 The Responsibilities of the Police������������������������������������������������������������    20 Changes in the Role of the Police������������������������������������������������������������    22 The Preparedness of the Police to Respond to Terrorism������������������������    22 Studies That Have Examined How Prepared Police Agencies Are to Respond to Terrorism����������������������������������������������������������������    23 Using Contingency Theory to Examine How Prepared Police Agencies Are to Prevent and Respond to Terrorism����������������������������    25 Community-Oriented Policing and the Role of the Police in Countering Terrorism��������������������������������������������������������������������������    26 Community-Oriented Policing and the Gathering of Intelligence������    31 Gathering Intelligence from the Community to Counterterrorism������    32 Intelligence-Led Policing and Countering Terrorism������������������������������    34

xi

xii

Contents

The Practical Aspects of Responding to Terrorism����������������������������������    36 Planning for a Terrorist Attack������������������������������������������������������������    37 Working with the Media����������������������������������������������������������������������    38 Countering Terrorism in the United Kingdom����������������������������������������    39 Responding to Suicide Terrorists and Bombers in the United Kingdom������������������������������������������������������������������������    41 The Prevention of Terrorism��������������������������������������������������������������������    42 Conclusion ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    44 References������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    45 3

2008 Mumbai Terrorist Attacks��������������������������������������������������������������   53 Introduction����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    53 Lashkar-e-Taiba (LET) and the Attacks on Mumbai ������������������������������    56 The Terrorist Attacks��������������������������������������������������������������������������������    56 The Locations Targeted������������������������������������������������������������������������    57 An Analysis of the Attacks����������������������������������������������������������������������    59 Concluding Comments������������������������������������������������������������������������    61 The Police Response to the Terrorist Attacks������������������������������������������    62 The Intelligence Prior to the Attacks ��������������������������������������������������    62 A Review of the Police Response to the Attacks ������������������������������������    63 The Complexity of the Attack������������������������������������������������������������������    68 An Overview of the Mumbai Police Organization����������������������������������    69 The National Security Guard and Operation Black Tornado ������������������    72 An Analysis of the Police Response to the Attacks ��������������������������������    73 The Command and Control of the Mumbai Police������������������������������    74 The Police Response����������������������������������������������������������������������������    76 Standard Operating Procedures������������������������������������������������������������    76 Training������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    77 Communications����������������������������������������������������������������������������������    78 The Media��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    78 Information from Social Media ����������������������������������������������������������    79 The Handling of Intelligence ��������������������������������������������������������������    79 Conclusion ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    79 References������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    84

4

 The Threat of Terrorism in Europe��������������������������������������������������������   89 Introduction����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    89 Terrorism in Europe ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������    91 Terrorism in the United Kingdom������������������������������������������������������������    94 Conclusion ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    94 References������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    95

5

Paris����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   97 Introduction����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    97 Terrorist Attacks in Europe Before November 13, 2015�������������������������    99 Attacks in France ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   100

Contents

xiii

The Terrorist Attack ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������   103 The Terrorists ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   105 Belgium����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   106 The Deaths and Injuries Resulting from the Attacks ������������������������������   107 An Analysis of the Attacks����������������������������������������������������������������������   108 Weaponry ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   111 The Police Response to the Attacks ��������������������������������������������������������   111 The Police in France����������������������������������������������������������������������������   112 The Police Response to the Bataclan Attack����������������������������������������   112 State of Emergency����������������������������������������������������������������������������������   114 An Analysis of the Police Response��������������������������������������������������������   117 Incident Command������������������������������������������������������������������������������   118 Crucial Decisions ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������   119 Weaknesses in Intelligence������������������������������������������������������������������   120 The Investigation into the Attacks��������������������������������������������������������   122 Crisis Information��������������������������������������������������������������������������������   123 Police Training ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   123 Operation Sentinelle����������������������������������������������������������������������������   124 The Loi Sur le Renseignement—Law Changes for the Gathering of Intelligence������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   124 Jihadists Returning Home to France��������������������������������������������������������   125 The Use of Social Media During the Attacks������������������������������������������   125 Conclusion ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   126 References������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   127 6

Brussels ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  133 Introduction����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   133 The Reform of the Police in 1998������������������������������������������������������������   136 The Response of the Belgian Government to the Charlie Hebdo Attacks in France ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   137 The Terrorist Attacks��������������������������������������������������������������������������������   138 An Analysis of the Attacks����������������������������������������������������������������������   140 Intelligence������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   142 The Reaction of the Government to the Attacks����������������������������������   143 Crisis Centre����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   144 The Response of the European Union ������������������������������������������������   144 The Police Response��������������������������������������������������������������������������������   145 An Analysis of the Police Response��������������������������������������������������������   146 Conclusion ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   148 References������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   148

7

Manchester ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  153 Introduction����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   153 The Attack������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   154 An Analysis of the Attack������������������������������������������������������������������������   155 The Attacker��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   156

xiv

Contents

Response to the Attacks ��������������������������������������������������������������������������   158 An Analysis of the Response to the Attack����������������������������������������������   161 Scenario Planning and Response ��������������������������������������������������������   162 Inter-agency Collaboration������������������������������������������������������������������   162 Strategic and Tactical Coordinating Groups����������������������������������������   163 Operation PLATO��������������������������������������������������������������������������������   164 Communication with the Public����������������������������������������������������������   165 The Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service (GMFRS)��������������   167 The Response to a Terrorist Attack by the United Kingdom ������������������   167 Conclusion ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   169 References������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   170 8

 Analysis of the Four Case Studies����������������������������������������������������  173 An Introduction����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   173 Overview of the Four Case Studies����������������������������������������������������������   174 A Comparison of the Police Response to the Attacks������������������������������   177 Social Media��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   180 Changes in Terrorism ������������������������������������������������������������������������������   182 Conclusion ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   183 References������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   184

9

 Improving the Police Response ��������������������������������������������������������������  187 Introduction����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   187 Engaging with the Community����������������������������������������������������������������   189 Lessons Learned��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   190 The Need for Plans and Goals ����������������������������������������������������������������   192 Command and Control����������������������������������������������������������������������������   193 Communications��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   193 Reducing the Availability of Firearms ����������������������������������������������������   195 Identifying and Apprehending Terrorist Attackers����������������������������������   196 Conclusion ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   196 Appendix: Recommendations to Improve the Prevention of and Response to a Terrorist Attack������������������������������������������������������   196 References������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   197

10 Conclusion������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  201 Introduction����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   201 The Police Response to Terrorism ����������������������������������������������������������   202 Moving Forward in Responding to Terrorism�����������������������������������������   205 Conclusion ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   205 References������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   206 Index������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  207

Chapter 1

Introduction

Introduction Acts of terrorism have occurred for centuries. Very early acts of terrorism were committed to advocate the abolition of hierarchical, government systems, whereas in modern times, religion is the main reason why terrorist acts are committed. Acts of terror in modern times have centered on causing as much chaos and carnage as possible (Burgess 2015; Danzer 2019). During the decade 2010 to 2019, an average of 24,000 people lost their lives from acts of terror. During this decade, the highest number of deaths recorded from acts of terror occurred in 2014, with 44,500 deaths (Ritchie et al. 2022). Research that was undertaken by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA Services) (2022) found that while the number of terrorist attacks had increased during the period 2010 to 2019, the impact that the attacks had had diminished. The report noted that in 2021, the number of deaths that resulted from acts of terrorism fell by 1.2% to 7142, while the number of attacks that were carried out increased by 17%. Hence, the number of attacks is increasing, but the attacks are less lethal. The research also found that acts of terrorism were generally concentrated in countries that were already suffering from violent conflict, such as those in Africa. Western countries also experienced terrorist attacks, with the number of attacks peaking in 2018, but by 2021, the number had decreased by 68%. According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2022) in 2021, there were 113 terrorist attacks in Europe and seven attacks in the United States, of which five were politically motivated. There were 12 attacks in the United Kingdom in 2021, half of the number that had occurred in 2020, and the lowest number since 2008. France recorded seven attacks, which was a decrease of 72% in comparison with the 25 attacks that were recorded in 2020. Of the attacks that were carried out in

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. den Heyer, Police Respond to Terrorism, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-43250-7_1

1

2

1 Introduction

Europe, three were undertaken by Islamic extremists, the lowest number since 2014, and only one attack that took place in the United Kingdom was motivated by religion. Since 2018, there has been a change in the reasons why terrorist attacks have been carried out in Western countries. Religious extremism had been the main reason why terrorist acts occurred, accounting for 18% of attacks that were carried out in Western countries, but religious extremism has now been replaced by politically motivated terrorism. Politically motivated terrorism currently accounts for five times more attacks than those motivated by religion. Politically motivated attacks are driven by a left or right ideology that targets government organizations or political figures (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 2022). As the report documented by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2022) indicated, the occurrence of terrorism in Western countries appears to have stabilized, and, in some cases, has decreased. However, it is not known whether the decrease is a trend that will continue downward, or whether the number or the severity of the attacks will increase in the future. It is important to learn from the terrorist attacks that have occurred in the past and how the police have responded to the various forms of attack. It is for this reason that four different terrorist attacks that took place in four different countries have been examined and included in the case studies that will be presented later in this book. It is intended that the lessons learned from the attacks will provide information that will assist the police in their response to terrorism. It is also intended that the information will prompt the police to review their agency’s approach to preventing and responding to terrorism and that lessons will be learned from the past. This chapter sets the foundation for understanding the findings from the case studies and for understanding the recommendations that have been made later in this book that will assist the police in improving their response to terrorism. This chapter also introduces the case studies that have been presented in Section II of this book and documents the reasons why the terrorist attacks were included in the case studies.

Defining Terrorism The word “terrorism” is derived from the Latin word “terrere,” which means to frighten (Burgess 2015). It was first used in the 1790s to refer to the reign of terror by revolutionaries who executed large numbers of their opponents by using the guillotine during the French revolution (Crenshaw 1995; Jenkins 2022). The use of the term can also be traced back to Roman times and appears to have a religious basis (Danzer 2019). The Romans executed people in public places to cause terror in the empire and used crucifixion to spread fear among subjected populations (Burgess 2015). The type of terrorism that we encounter today, which is said to be for religious reasons, can be traced back to events that took place in the tenth century, where Shia Muslims assassinated people who would not adhere to Islamic traditions (Danzer 2019).

Defining Terrorism

3

One of the difficulties in understanding terrorism is that there is no legally recognized definition of terrorism (Schmid 2011; Frampton 2021). This is because scholars, researchers, and politicians cannot reach a consensus on a universally accepted definition and “because of the subjective nature of the phenomenon” (Kaura 2020, p. 154). There is, however, a consensus by academics as to the elements that make up a terrorist act (Schmid 2011). Other factors that make it difficult to define terrorism is that its threat and form varies, depending on the country involved and its occurrence. It also takes many different forms, depending on the perpetrator’s ideology or grievance (Kaura 2020). Dictionaries do not provide any assistance in defining terrorism as the definitions that they give are very general. The Oxford Dictionary (2022), for example, defines terrorism as being “the use of violent action in order to achieve political aims or to force a government to act.” This definition is not specific and is subjective (Teichman 1989), and as a result, only gives a general indication as to what comprises of an act of terrorism. The definitions of terrorism that have been presented in Table 1.1 all emphasize the execution of violence and the use of violence to achieve goals. Determining and agreeing as to whether the use of violence to achieve a political or religious goal is legitimate or not, is one of the difficulties in defining terrorism. Difficulties also arise because violence is used by both states and non-state groups to achieve their political goals. Some definitions determine terrorism as being an action or a threat that is designed to influence a government or intimidate the public. Therefore, the purpose of terrorism is to advance a political, religious, or ideological cause. Danzer (2019) claimed that terrorism could be defined as a method to kill civilians, while Goodwin (2006) asserted that terrorism is the “deliberate use of violence against, or the infliction of extreme physical suffering upon civilians or non-combatants in order to pressure or influence other civilians and thereby government or armed rebels” (p. 2028). According to Danzer (2019), Goodwin’s definition explains that terrorists usually have a specific target for an attack and that there is usually no other goal other than to kill and injure as many people as possible. Some researchers maintain that there are two distinct aspects involved in defining terrorism. The first aspect is called “selective terrorism.” This is when attacks are made against people because of the role or the position that they hold, for example, a politician (Goodwin 2006). The second aspect is “categorial terrorism.” This form of terrorism is where random individuals are attacked because they are a part of a specific group (Goodwin 2006). The two aspects have been based on two different theories. The first theory proposes that terrorism is a response to the desperation of the insurgents and the second theory proposes that terrorism is a response which is relative to what the enemies of the insurgents believe is terrorism (Goodwin 2006). The second theory justifies a terrorist using violence against members of the public who are going about their daily lives, rather than using violence against officials or political leaders (Goodwin 2006). Another point is that members of the public are easier to attack because they gather in large numbers in public places or while an event is taking place, and this

4

1 Introduction

Table 1.1  Definitions of terrorism Country Organization 1 N/A United Nations

2 N/A

3 USA

4 USA

5 UK

Definition Criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act European According to EU law, terrorist offenses are acts committed with the Union aim of:  Seriously intimidating a population;  Unduly compelling a government or international organization to perform or abstain from performing any act; and,  Seriously destabilizing or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic, or social structures of a country or an international organization Federal International terrorism—“…activities that involve violent… or government life-threatening acts… that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any state and… appear to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and…(C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States…” Domestic terrorism—(A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any state; (B) Appear to be intended—(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and (C) Occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States Federal bureau International terrorism—Violent, criminal acts committed by of individuals and/or groups who are inspired by, or associated with, investigation designated foreign terrorist organizations or nations (state-sponsored) Domestic terrorism—Violent, criminal acts committed by individuals and/or groups to further ideological goals stemming from domestic influences, such as those of a political, religious, social, racial, or environmental nature The use or threat of action, both in and outside of the United Kingdom, designed to influence any international government organization or to intimidate the public and for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial, or ideological cause

Sources: European Union (2002); Federal Bureau of Investigation, (2022); United Nations Security Council (2004); United Kingdom Government (2000); United States Government (2009).

5

Radicalization and the Financing of Terrorism

makes it easier for terrorists to achieve their goals, which is to cause as much disruption as possible and to kill as many people as they can.

The Four Waves of Terrorism Research has determined that there have been four waves of terrorism in modern times, which have primarily been based on different features of nationalism (Rapoport 2013). The first wave was the anarchist wave, the second was the anticolonial wave, the third was the new left wave, and the fourth being the religious wave, which is what the world has been experiencing since the 1980s (Rapoport 2013). The four waves of terrorism, the country where it took place, the goals of the terrorists, and the outcomes of the attacks have been presented in Table 1.2.

Radicalization and the Financing of Terrorism Terrorism occurs because of a multitude of factors, the main one being radicalization (see Smith 2018). Disaffected individuals or groups may become radicalized by a terrorist group and can be coerced into either undertaking an attack or providing support for an attack (Kundnani 2009). Terrorists who recruit disaffected individuals and groups usually use social media as their main method of communication and use it to offer incentives to potential terrorists and supporters. Another element that enables terrorists to undertake an attack is financing. Terrorists may be financed by either domestic or international participants. Funding Table 1.2  The Four Waves of Terrorism Period/Year 1 Late Nineteenth century 2 Following the second world war

Country Russia

Former European countries colonies 3 Following the Numerous Vietnam war under-­ developed nations 4 End of Former soviet Twentieth republics and century Western nations Sources: Rapoport (2013)

Goal of attack Destroy the conventions that were occurring in Russian society. Achieve independence and self-determination.

Kidnap individuals and hijack planes.

Consequence Leaders and politicians attacked and assassinated. Independence and self-­ determination achieved in most countries.

Start of international terrorism. Branches of terror groups established in other states. Targets attacked internationally. Establishment of The beginning of religious independent states and for terrorism. This wave is still the United States to exit present today and will continue the Middle East. for the foreseeable future.

6

1 Introduction

may be made available by using registered charities and businesses that are operated as non-profit organizations but are primarily a backdrop for the financing of terrorism. Finance can also be made available from the use of other methods, such as using third-party operators (Wilson 2017). Individuals or groups who are terrorists may partner with criminal organizations to undertake crimes such as drug smuggling and robberies to fund their terrorist activities (Wilson 2017).

Media Coverage of Terrorist Attacks The news media play an essential role during and after a terrorist attack. However, there is a thin line between reporting an event, providing information, and reassuring the public, and being used as a platform for spreading propaganda for the terrorists who are undertaking an attack (Lim 2016). During the attacks in Paris on November 13, 2016, the French mainstream news media provided continuous coverage of the attacks and this went through until the next day (Landivar et al. 2017). The intention of the mainstream news media was to create fear among the viewers (Danzer 2019) but they were deceptive in their attempts to achieve this. They did not broadcast that the attacks were perpetrated by domestic terrorists but instead, broadcasted that the attacks were undertaken by terrorists who dwelled outside of France. The media were also selective in that they only reported on the failings in the handling of intelligence which led to the attacks and did not report on the social or political problems that influenced the attacks (Danzer 2019). The actions of the mainstream news media in France and the media in the other countries that were examined in the case studies have contributed to the debate as to whether they assist or hinder the prevention and response to terrorism. In all of the attacks outlined in the case studies, the mainstream media affected the perceptions of the public by causing a sense of panic and fear, and this led people to avoid public areas and the areas that were of a high risk of being attacked (Delhalle 2018).

The Use of Intelligence Intelligence is one of the most important and critical components for the police to use to prevent and respond to terrorism (Bolz et al. 2002; Ganor 2011). The gathering of intelligence, the analysis of counterintelligence, the use of covert activities, and disseminating information for policymakers and decision-makers are the main components of the intelligence cycle (Kaura 2020; Caparini 2007). However, gathering intelligence is often not easy, owing to the inherent difficulties involved in identifying individuals and groups in a community. One of the more effective ways of gathering intelligence is to use methods that have been adapted from community-­ oriented policing.

Conclusion

7

 he Terrorist Attacks That Have Been Examined T in the Case Studies The analysis of the police response to the terrorist attacks has been based on an analysis of the terror attacks that have been documented in the four case studies: Mumbai in 2008, Paris in 2015, Brussels in 2016, and Manchester in 2017. Three of these locations were subjected to complex, multi-site attacks, and one was subjected to a bombing. An examination of the attacks documented in the case studies enabled a comprehensive assessment of the different responses by the police in each of the locations to be made. One attack could have been examined instead of four attacks, and it would have revealed some lessons to be learned, but whatever could have been learnt from examining a single attack would have been unique to that attack alone and may not have applied to the other attacks. The methodological approach used in the case studies is comparative and includes an interactive framework that incorporates a number of key variables. These variables examine and analyze the terrorist attacks and the response strategies and tactics that the police used. Using these variables ensures that the analysis concentrates primarily on the actions of the police, as they are the centerpiece of the case studies, not the reasons why the terrorist attacks occurred. Each of the terror attacks outlined in the case studies has similarities to the other attacks, but each attack is also unique in the targets that were selected, the weapons that were used, and how the police responded. Each attack provides valuable information as to the strategic maturity and evolution of the terrorist group and the way that the armed groups and the Manchester bomber used the various gaps in security arrangements to their advantage. The continual change in the use of tactics by terrorists and their ability to take advantage of gaps in security is an ongoing problem when developing response plans and affects how the responding agencies and the police cooperate and interact. The 9/11 Commission Report maintained that these factors along with others contributed to the attacks against the United States in September 2001 (The 9/11 Commission Report 2004). Cooperation, interoperability, and the sharing of intelligence continue to challenge the police and the security intelligence agencies (Dew, 2012).

Conclusion Historically relevant events become turning points. Turning points occur from learning from past mistakes and from events that lead to a new understanding and the development of new strategies (den Heyer 2020). If the reasons why the police responded to an attack in the way that they did are to be understood, then how the police perceived how an event was unfolding needs to be examined. This belief is supported by della Porta (della Porta 2016), who proposed that existent police knowledge and the way that it is applied to a situation need to be examined.

8

1 Introduction

Many terrorist attacks have been studied and critiqued. However, none have been studied or compared internationally, nor have there been any international comparative studies that have examined the response of the police to a terrorist attack. An international comparison is vital because it has the capability of providing new or alternative perspectives (Tonry 2015). The deliberations in this book have been structured in three distinct but overlapping sections. The first section analyses the current literature that relates to the police response to terrorism and disasters followed by a presentation and discussion of the four case studies. In the concluding section, the main themes that were found from the analysis of the literature and the case studies have been drawn together and are then discussed in the context of improving how the police respond to terrorist attacks.

References Bolz, F., Dudonis, K. & Schulz, D. (2002). The counterterrorism handbook: Tactics, procedures, and techniques. CRS Press. Burgess, M. (2015). A brief history of terrorism. https://www.pogo.org/investigation/2015/02/ brief-­history-­of-­terrorism/. Caparini, M. (2007). Controlling and overseeing intelligence services in democratic states. In H. Born & M. Caparini (Eds.), Democratic control of intelligence services: Containing rogue elephants (pp. 3–24). Ashgate Publishing Company. Crenshaw, M. (1995). Thoughts on relating terrorism to historical contexts. In M. Crenshaw (ed.), Terrorism in context. Pennsylvania State University Press. Danzer, M. (2019). The political consequences of terrorism: A comparative study of France and the United Kingdom. Masters Dissertation. University of Bucharest, Bucharest, Romania. della Porta D. (2016). The policing of protest repression, bargaining, and the fate of social movements. African Studies, 56(1), pp. 97–127. Delhalle, M. (2018). L'impact de la personnalité et des médias sur la perception du terrorisme. Masters Thesis. Faculté de Psychologie, Logopédie et Sciences de l’Education, Université de Liège, Liège, Belgium den Heyer, G. (2020). Police response to riots: Case studies from France, London, Ferguson and Baltimore. Springer. Dew, S. (2012). Exploiting seams and closing gaps: Lessons from Mumbai and beyond. Journal of Strategic Security, 5(4), 19–34. European Union. (2002). Framework Decision on combatting terrorism. Article 1. 2002/475/ JHA. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-­against-­terrorism/#:~:text=EU%20 definition%20of%20terrorism&text=unduly%20compelling%20a%20government%20 or,country%20or%20an%20international%20organisation. Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2022). What we investigate: Terrorism. https://www.fbi.gov/ investigate/terrorism. Frampton, M. (2021). History and the definition of terrorism. In R. English (ed.), The Cambridge History of Terrorism (pp. 31–57). Cambridge University Press. Ganor, B. (2011). The counter-terrorism puzzle: A guide for decision makers. Transaction Publishers. Goodwin, J. (2006). Theory of categorical terrorism. Social Forces, 84(4), 2027–2046. Jenkins, J. (2022). Terrorism. https://www.britannica.com/topic/terrorism.

References

9

Kaura V. (2020). India’s federalism puzzle, counter-terrorism challenge and NCTC debate. Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism, 15(2), 154–174. Kundnani, A. (2009). Spooked! How Not to Prevent Violent Extremism. Institute of Race Relations. Landivar, D., Ramillien, E. &., Dell’Omodarme, M. (2017). Les attentats comme objets médiatiques instables. [Attacks as Unstable Media Objects]. Hommes & Migrations, 3, 19–31. https://doi.org/10.4000/hommesmigrations.3708. Lim, S. (2016). The contested ethics of mainstream reporting of terrorism in the social media age. Auckland University Law Review, 22, 249–280. Oxford Dictionary. (2022). Terrorism. https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/ english/terrorism?q=terrorism. Rapoport, D. (2013). The four waves of modern terror: International dimensions and consequences. In J. Hanhimäki & B. Blumenau (eds.), An International History of Terrorism. Western and non-Western Experiences (pp. 282–310). Routledge. Ritchie, H., Hasell, J., Mathieu, E., Appel, C. & Roser, M. (2022, June). Terrorism. https://ourworldindata.org/terrorism. Schmid, A. (2011). The definition of terrorism. In A. Schmid (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research (pp. 39–98). Routledge. Smith, A. (2018). How Radicalization to terrorism occurs in the United States: What research sponsored by the National Institute of Justice tells us. National Institute of Justice. Teichman, J. (1989). How to define terrorism. Philosophy, 64(250), 505–517. The 9/11 Commission Report (2004). Final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. W. W. Norton. Tonry, M. (2015). Is cross-national and comparative research on the criminal justice system useful? European Journal of Criminology, 12(4), 505–516. United Kingdom Government. (2000). Terrorism Act 2000 (UK). Section 1. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA Services). (2022, March). Global terrorism index 2022. https://reliefweb.int/report/world/globalterrorism-­index-­2022. United Nations Security Council. (2004). Resolution 1566 on Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts. S/RES/1566 (2004). United Nations. United States Government. (2009). Federal criminal code: 18 U.S.  Code § 2331  – Definitions. Chapter 113(B). Sections (1) and (5). Wilson, T. (2017). Foreign funded Islamist extremism in the UK. Center for the Response to Radicalisation and Terrorism. Research Paper No.9.

Chapter 2

The Police Response to Terrorism – Draft Chapter

Introduction The police are expected to take a primary role in preventing and responding to terrorism (Randol 2013) and Davis et al. (2004) noted that the police have “a critical role in responding to, preventing, and deterring terrorist attacks” (p. iii). This is because the police are in the best position to learn about any terrorist threats and will be aware of the targets that are at the most risk of being attacked. They also have the ability and the resources to coordinate an early response to an attack (Kelling and Bratton 2006). The police must be aware of all of the phases of a response and be proficient in delivering all of the actions that each phase requires. These phases include the mitigation of an attack, being prepared for an attack, managing the response to an attack, and managing the recovery phase after an attack has taken place (Haddow and Bullock 2006). Not only do the police need to be proficient in responding to an attack, but they also need to have the ability to coordinate their response with the response of other agencies (Mosser 2007), and do so quickly. All agencies that are involved in a response must be equipped correctly and be well trained in how to respond to an attack (Office of the President of the United States 2002). How well a police agency is prepared and how capable they are will determine whether a response to an attack is effective (Sedevic 2011). It is the responsibility of the police to prevent terrorism. However, research has suggested that the police are more focused on responding to terrorism than they are on preventing terrorism. This is because the functions that are needed to prevent terrorism are incompatible with the traditional functions that policing entails. However, the police are under a lot of pressure from the public and from politicians to prevent a terrorist attack before it occurs (Randol 2013). Some agencies perform preventative activities, while others do not. Randol (2013) noted that the research

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. den Heyer, Police Respond to Terrorism, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-43250-7_2

11

12

2  The Police Response to Terrorism – Draft Chapter

that was available on the topic did not explain why some police agencies were engaged in preventative activities while others were not. The police are not isolated from the communities that they serve and are affected by any change in the social fabric of the community (Ortiz et  al. 2007). During times of change, the police are compelled to change in ways that reflect the new needs and wants of a community (Ortiz et  al. 2007). After the occurrence of the September 11, 200, terrorist attacks, pressure mounted for the police to undertake a broader role in preventing and responding to terrorism (Sedevic 2011). Some researchers and practitioners thought that there should be a paradigm shift in the way that the police countered terrorism and called for the police to be more actively involved in preventing terrorism. They also thought that the police should move toward a Homeland Security model of policing and that an emphasis should be placed on the gathering and sharing of intelligence, performing covert operations, and enforcing immigration legislation (Ortiz et al. 2007; Sumpter 2016). In most Western countries, the police have adopted the Homeland Security model of policing, but it is challenging for them to ensure that their operational policies, tactics, and training are kept up to date. Keeping up to date in these areas increases the chances of the police being able to respond effectively to the various types of terrorist attacks that are emerging (Straub et al. 2017). The failure of the police to maintain their capability in these areas was evident when the police responded to the 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai. Prior to the Mumbai attacks, the police and the intelligence agencies did not think that terrorists would target more than one site during an attack, and therefore, when the coordinated attacks on multiple sites occurred in Mumbai, the police were not prepared for them, and this left the response to the attacks to be found wanting. Responding to an attack of this type is extremely challenging and complicated and requires the command of a response to be undertaken at a central location, and not from an attack site (Slettenmark et al. 2019). This was what happened during the response to the attacks in Mumbai. Senior officers from the Mumbai Police attended the scene of the attacks rather than remaining in a central location where they could take command and control. This led to confusion and made it difficult to coordinate the actions of the specialized policing units and to deploy officers to the attack sites. Managing a response to a Mumbai style of terrorist attack requires a considerable amount of coordination between the specialized policing units and the other responding agencies, and it needs to have an effective command and control structure in place. The knowledge and practices of countering terrorism have advanced since the September 11, 2001, attacks (Spalek and Weeks 2017) but despite the advances made, the threat of terrorism remains great, and as terrorism continues to evolve, so must the response and other countermeasures evolve (Slettenmark et al. 2019). This chapter examines the literature that is available on how the police respond to a terrorist attack. Compared to other police practices, the amount of research undertaken on police practices and their strategies to counter terrorism is comparatively small (Burruss et al. 2012). Nor has there been a lot of research undertaken that clarifies the role that the police have in preventing or responding to terrorism (Lum et al. 2009).

The Background of Modern Terrorism

13

The first section of the chapter examines the background of modern terrorist activity, and the second section examines how counterterrorism strategies are developed. The role that the police have in countering terrorism and how well prepared they are is then discussed. The next sections discuss the roles that the methods used in Community-oriented Policing and Intelligence-led Policing have in preventing and responding to terrorism. The last sections of the chapter explore the practical aspects of responding to terrorism, how terrorism is countered in the United Kingdom, and the prevention of terrorism.

The Background of Modern Terrorism Western liberal democracies are especially vulnerable to a terrorist attack because of how open their societies are (Wilkinson 1979) and because terrorist attacks are secretive and unpredictable, it makes it difficult for the police to prevent them from happening (Reinares 1998). Terrorist attacks threaten the stability of a state because they can undermine its legitimacy and its ability to protect the public (Waddington 2007). The police are the only institution that has a state’s authority to use force; therefore, it is the responsibility of the police to protect the legitimacy of the state from the threat of terrorism (Reinaries, 1998). Prior to the 1993 World Trade Center attacks in New York, the police and the intelligence agencies did not place an emphasis on preventing terrorism (Drones, 2020). After the September 11 attacks, the emphasis changed, and the police began to gather intelligence on terrorists and the threat that they posed. Since the attacks on the World Trade Center, there have been numerous attempts and actual terrorist attacks that have taken place in the United States and around the world. These attacks have been described as being second-generation terrorist attacks (see Rapoport 2002 for a discussion on the four waves of terrorism) and have been committed by terrorist groups and individuals that use different weapons and methods to fulfill their objectives. The terrorist attack in Mumbai in 2008 indicated that there had been a progression to a third generation of terrorist attacks (O’Rouke, 2010). The attacks in Mumbai were complex and included a number of coordinated attacks on multiple sites. The terrorists used automatic AK-56 firearms (a Chinese version of the Russian AK-47) in combination with improvised explosive devices and hand grenades (Rabasa et al. 2009). The multifaceted attacks meant that the police in Mumbai were unable to comprehend the size and the form of attack that they were facing, and the attacks challenged their ability to plan and deploy their resources appropriately to confront the terrorists. The attacks suggested that terrorist groups were able to analyze the capabilities of the police and were able to adapt their movements according to the response tactics that the police used. The attack in Mumbai was the first terror attack that employed military, small group tactics, and these proved difficult for police patrol officers to respond to, as they were not equipped or trained appropriately to handle this form of attack (O’Rouke, 2010).

14

2  The Police Response to Terrorism – Draft Chapter

The aim of third-generation terrorist attacks is to kill or injure as many people as possible (Rabasa et al. 2009), which means that an attack will continue until the terrorists are killed or over-powered. Having this goal, and by using high-powered weapons and technology goes beyond the threat that is posed by armed criminals and can easily overwhelm the initial response by the police. The third-generation form of terrorist attack indicates that there has been a meaningful shift in the tactics used by terrorists. This is evident from their willingness to use improvised explosive devices. The attacks that occurred in Mumbai were the first of the third-generation type of attack, and these attacks provided valuable lessons for the police in how to respond to a terrorist attack (N.Y.P.D.  Intelligence Division, 2008). At the time that the Mumbai attacks took place, there were few police agencies that would have been capable of successfully responding to this type of attack. The attack was significant because of its scale and because of the complexity of the elements involved, and this created a number of challenges for the police in how they would respond and how they would manage the communication process with the media (Rabasa et  al. 2009). It has been proposed that second-­ generation terrorist attacks have been able to progress to third-generation terrorist attacks because of the availability and the use of social media, and the improvements made in communication technology (O’Rourke 2010). The attacks that occurred in Mumbai prompted other countries to review their terrorist prevention and response policies. Many countries upgraded the capability of their police to confront a terrorist threat by supplying officers with high-powered weapons and larger capacity ammunition magazines (O’Rourke 2010). Research that has examined how the police and the intelligence agencies respond to terrorism found that in earlier attacks major problems arose from poor coordination and a lack of information sharing between the police and the intelligence agencies. It was also found that insufficient human intelligence had been gathered and that any intelligence that was gathered that pertained to terrorism was given little priority (Dones 2020). These issues were exacerbated by the involvement of terrorists in other crimes, such as identity fraud, money laundering, and human and illicit drug trafficking (White 2006), which created a greater workload for the police and put pressure on existing resources. The flaws in the ability of the police and other agencies to prevent terrorism enabled terrorists to commit attacks in the United Kingdom and other European countries. The attacks that were carried out in these countries led to doubts about the capability of counterterrorism agencies in Europe and the policies that they used (D’Amato 2019). In response to the terrorist attacks, some European nations developed various and often contrasting response strategies and policies that left gaps in their security, and terrorists have used these to their advantage.

The Development of Counterterrorism Strategies

15

The Development of Counterterrorism Strategies Besides having different generations and waves of terrorism, researchers have classified the form that a terrorist attack takes into an old type of terrorism and a new type of terrorism (see Pickering et  al. 2007). They have defined old terrorism as being parochial and tangible and new terrorism as being transnational, less tangible, and being undertaken for religious or cultural reasons. However, some researchers disagree that terrorism can be classified into being an old type or a new type. Because terrorism has become more transnational, it is no longer possible to respond to terrorism using traditional prevention and response methods. The response strategies that the police use currently have been based on an old understanding of terrorism and there is now a need for new strategies that will guide the response to the new type of terrorist threat (Pickering et al. 2007). Developing new strategies and tactics to respond to the new type of terrorism has been challenging for the police (Innes 2004a). Any new strategies that are developed need to be flexible and should consider the capabilities of the police, account for the change in the structure of terrorist groups and their mode of attack, and must acknowledge that terrorist groups need to be confronted (Leman-Langlois and Broduer 2005). Understanding how previous terrorist attacks have occurred and how the police have responded to them is an important and necessary step if the police are to develop and implement effective prevention and response strategies to counter modern terrorist attacks. It is also important that the strategies that are in place are reviewed to determine which strategies and tactics have proven to be inadequate, inappropriate, or ineffective and that these are revised and improved upon (Pickering et al. 2008). Strategies that have been amended and updated will increase the chances of an effective police response. Historically, Western nations have responded to terrorist attacks by using paramilitary and hard power strategies and tactics (McCulloch 2001). These types of response strategies and tactics were developed by examining the counter-insurgency measures that were used in Northern Ireland and Israel and to a lesser extent in South Africa and Algeria during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s (Grabosky 1992). These strategies place an emphasis upon intelligence gathering, paramilitary policing, and counter-insurgency models, which often creates the perception that the police are partisan, and a part of the problem (Greene 1999). This style of policing is very different from the traditional style of policing, which places an emphasis on the apprehension of offenders (Maguire and John 2006). These two different styles of policing have been defined as being “high” and “low” forms of policing (Brodeur 1983). “High policing” is primarily concerned with protecting the state and the nation and is usually undertaken by the intelligence and security services and by some police units. This form of policing is based on the use of intelligence to primarily undertake covert or special operations “to pre-empt, infiltrate and subvert insurgent groups deemed threatening to the state and public good” (Theil 2009, p. 36) whereas “low policing” involves preventing and responding to the occurrence of crime and is designed to protect the public and maintain

16

2  The Police Response to Terrorism – Draft Chapter

public order (Brodeur 1983). Low policing is carried out principally by uniformed police officers. Since the 1970s, the policing of terrorism has taken a paramilitary form, and this has had an influence on the development of counterterrorism strategies (Silke 2005). The use of the high policing style evolved from the tactics that the police used to respond to the war on drugs, and these have advanced even further since the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States (Stevens 2004). Using counter-insurgency strategies and methods to counter terrorism can have unintended consequences, such as increasing the chance of radicalizing some members of the community and enhancing the support that is given to terrorists (Hahn 1998). It has been documented that using paramilitary, counterterrorism tactics, such as racial profiling, has been an important factor in spreading support for jihadists in Western nations (Pickering et al. 2007). If the police are to counter terrorism, then it can only be achieved by preventing terrorist incidents and by identifying those who could potentially become terrorists without causing any grievance to members of minority communities (Pickering et al. 2007). The challenge for the police is to be able to develop and implement strategies and programs while maintaining the legitimacy of the police in conjunction with strengthening community cohesion and reducing social exclusion. Pickering et al. (2007) suggested that the strategies and programs used to prevent the occurrence of a terrorist attack and those that inhibit the support for jihadists need to be flexible and “subject to continual reflection and refinement” (p. 39). Governments also face many challenges in designing legislation to prevent terrorism. Legislation needs to be balanced and should not focus on any specific minority community or culture. If legislation is not balanced, then it tends to marginalize some members of minority communities and can make them feel alienated and excluded from society. It can also lead to members of minority communities increasing their support for terrorism (Pickering et al. 2007). Legislation must be impartial, and when it is not, it makes it very difficult for the police to establish relationships with members of minority communities. It also makes it challenging for the police to perform community policing and it ultimately hinders the ability of the police to respond to a terrorist attack. The effect of using counter-insurgency strategies to counter terrorism is not well understood (Pickering et al. 2007). Despite this, the police need to have counter-­ insurgency capabilities if they are to be able to respond successfully to a threat of terrorism. Using counter-insurgency practices against terrorists, who reside in communities, is critical for the police and if the police are going to take action, then this relies heavily upon the police having a relationship with members of a community. Having a positive relationship with a community increases the likelihood of the community having confidence in the police and may result in information being provided to the police about potential terrorist activity. The challenge for the police is to manage their capability to prevent and respond to terrorism while maintaining their relationship with the community and not to give terrorist groups the opportunity to recruit new members and supporters.

The Role of the Police in Responding to Terrorism

17

The Role of the Police in Responding to Terrorism After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, authorities acknowledged that terrorists would use any means necessary to attack governments and civilian populations (Epperson 2005). However, unlike the national intelligence agencies at the time of the September 11 attacks, the police did not have the mandate to address any threats made against national security (Jackson and Brown 2007). This was the case even though it was the responsibility of the police to respond to a terrorist incident. Prior to the attacks in the United Kingdom by the Irish Republication Army and the attacks in the United States on September 11, police agencies did not have a mandate to counter terrorism and did not have the resources or the support to undertake a counterterrorism role (Desai 2005). The police, despite not having a recognized mandate to respond to a terrorist attack, played a fundamental role in providing public security following the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States and in preventing other attacks. Research has determined that the police do have a role in responding to terrorist attacks because they are first responders, and it is their role to respond to and manage disasters and incidents and to minimize the loss of life and damage to property (Clarke and Newman 2007; Doner 2013; Gilmore 2003; Hart et al. 2002; Johnson and Hunter 2017; Lambert and Parsons 2017; Murphy and Plotkin 2003; Pollard et al. 2003; Randol 2013; Rinaldi 2003; White 2004, 2006). Since the September 11 attacks, the police have been trained to identify and investigate potential terrorist threats, to secure targets that are of a high risk of attack, and to coordinate the response to a terrorist attack (Clarke and Newman 2007). Some researchers have concluded that for the police, responding to terrorism is no different from responding to any other crime (Kelling and Bratton 2006). According to Kelling and Bratton (2006), countering terrorism needs to be a part of the role of the everyday policing of a community and a part of the everyday thinking of patrol officers. The attacks on September 11 profoundly affected the police around world and the way that they policed communities. The way that the police operated changed in many important ways. After the attacks, the police were expected to undertake the lead in preventing and responding to terrorism and to gather and analyze intelligence on any possible terrorist activity. This was a fundamental operational shift for many police agencies that had previously placed an emphasis on undertaking Community-oriented Policing (Lee 2010; Oliver 2004, 2006; Ortiz et al. 2007). Some researchers have claimed that the September 11 terrorist attacks were the catalyst for a new era in policing. The new era in policing has been described as Homeland Security policing (Johnson & Hunter, 2016; Ortiz et al. 2007). Homeland Security policing is different from traditional policing methods and focuses on the analysis of social events, the use of target-oriented strategies, coordinating intelligence, and preventing and coordinating the response to the threat of terrorism (de Guzman 2002; Oliver 2005). Delivering Homeland Security policing has given the police more responsibilities and has meant that the police have had to make significant changes to the way that they work (Ortiz et al. 2007).

18

2  The Police Response to Terrorism – Draft Chapter

Homeland Security policing entails the police being prepared for a terrorist attack, responding to a terrorist attack, and managing the response after an attack (Shernock 2009). The responsibilities that the police are expected to undertake have been outlined in the Homeland Security Presidential Directive 81 (Executive Office of the President 2003). The activities that the police are expected to perform include the gathering and sharing of information, undertaking tasks that pertain to the countering of domestic terrorism, and preventing the acquisition and use of weapons of mass destruction (Executive Office of the President 2003). The role that the police have in preventing terrorism has also been explained in guidelines that were issued by the Office for Domestic Preparedness (2003) Guidelines for Homeland Security: Prevention and Deterrence. The guideline states that preventing terrorism is achieved through the: • • • • •

cooperation and collaboration between agencies; gathering, storing, analyzing, and disseminating terrorism-related intelligence; recognizing and assessing the threat of terrorism; managing risk by developing plans and other actions; and, intervention and pre-emption activities (Office for Domestic Preparedness 2003; Pelfrey 2009).

The move to Homeland Security policing was necessary because the model of policing that existed before the September 11 attacks was not adequate for preventing and responding to terrorism and for identifying terrorists (Henry 2002). Henry (2002) envisaged a more comprehensive system for countering terrorism, one where the police undertook the gathering of intelligence and operated in a more flexible and dynamic system. If policing were to change successfully to this system, then the countering of terrorism would need to be included as one of the functions that they carried out and police officers would need to receive training “about terrorist practices, methods, and activities” (Henry 2002, p. 325). Many police agencies were uncertain about adopting Homeland Security policing. The uncertainty arose because they did not fully understand the role that they would play and how they would manage and respond to a terrorist attack (Johnson & Hunter, 2016; Morreale and Lambert 2009). This was because Homeland Security policing combined the provision of national security and the countering of terrorism with law enforcement to an “unprecedented extent” (Pickering et al. 2007). The difficulty that police agencies had in understanding the role that they would play was exacerbated by their lack of preparedness and their inability to increase their capacity to respond to a terrorist event. They did not have the funding to undertake Homeland Security policing and nor did they have the strategies or tactics in place to guide them in how to prevent or respond to terrorism (Gilmore 2003; Henry 2002; Holden 2003). The public expect the police to undertake Homeland Security activities; however, not all police agencies do so (Johnson & Hunter, 2016). Those that do perform Homeland Security activities do so because they are a part of a larger jurisdiction or  The Directive defines “terrorism prevention” as “capabilities necessary to avoid, prevent, or stop a threatened or actual act of terrorism” (Executive Office of the President 2003, p. 6). 1

The Role of the Police in Responding to Terrorism

19

because they receive additional funding while some other agencies perform Homeland Security policing because they perceive that there is a risk of an attack (Davis et al. 2004). The police play a key role in forming and implementing counterterrorism strategies (Pickering et  al. 2007). However, the police cannot prevent terrorist attacks alone and need to work in partnership with other public and private agencies (Clarke and Newman 2007) and this will continue to be the case (Davis et  al. 2004). Preventing and responding to terrorism expands the workload of the police, and this can have a negative impact on the delivery of other policing services. The increase in workload may mean that police agencies need to expand in size, employ more staff, or restructure. Some researchers have cautioned police agencies against moving completely to the Homeland Security policing model (Ortiz et al. 2007). These researchers have agreed that the police do have a role in countering terrorism, but they warn that this role could increase the militarization of the police, which could alienate some sections of the community (Lyons 2002). Furthermore, changing the focus of the police to responding to terrorism can de-emphasize their traditional role of providing community safety (Bowling and Sheptycki 2012). Adopting Homeland Security policing implies that police agencies are using community policing in a different way than what it was originally proposed for. They may be using community policing as a method for gaining intelligence to counter terrorism rather than using it as a method for responding to the occurrence of crime in a community. Using community policing for the purposes of Homeland Security policing affects the reasons why members of the public are stopped and integrates the gathering of intelligence for countering terrorism with street policing (Petroski 2004). This has the effect of embedding low policing2 into Homeland Security policing (Parmar 2011; Weisburd et al. 2010). Murray (2005) claimed that employing community policing is a more “sensible and effective” response to countering terrorism, while Lehrer (2002) determined that the police are effective in gathering intelligence from the community because they engage with the community. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (2014) argued that while the police play a key role in the response to violent extremism and radicalization that leads to terrorism (VERLT), their responsibilities should be limited to proactive prevention only. They also argued that the police have an obligation to respect and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, which means that they need the support of the community if they are to successfully counter terrorism (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 2014). The issues and challenges that the police face in preventing and responding to terrorism are complex and can be categorized into three main areas (Henry 2002). The first is that the public expect the police to prevent terrorism and to respond to acts of terrorism. The second is that the police alone cannot respond to terrorism. A response requires the services of other agencies, which means that a response needs to be structured and coordinated and that the police and other responding agencies  See Brodeur (1983, 2007).

2

20

2  The Police Response to Terrorism – Draft Chapter

work together cooperatively. The third is that the public expect terrorists to be quickly identified and prosecuted. However, as Henry (2002) noted, the success of identifying and prosecuting terrorists depends on the effectiveness of the first two areas and on the police overcoming some of the problems that they have experienced when working with other agencies.

The Responsibilities of the Police The public deem that it is the responsibility of the police to ensure that a community is kept safe and that they need to allocate their resources to prevent, disrupt, and respond to terrorist threats (Henry 2002). Following the September 11 attacks, the government of the United States published the National Strategy for Homeland Security, which outlined the responsibilities and activities of the police when responding to terrorism (Pelfrey 2007). The responsibilities and activities that were recommended were codified by Doner (2013) and Stewart and Morris (2009) and have been presented in Table 2.1. Table 2.1  The responsibilities and activities recommended for the police to respond to terrorism in the United States • Implement the National Incident Management System (The National Incident Management Systems (NIMS) incorporates the Incident Command System (ICS) and is a nationwide standardized approach to incident management and response that proposes a national doctrine that the police and other emergency responding agencies can refer to for a protocol on how to respond during a local or national emergency (Federal Emergency Management Agency 2017). The primary goal of the NIMS is to align state- and local-level emergency response plans and procedures with the concepts and terminology of NIMS to increase intra- and interagency cooperation and to provide an outline for “bridging the gap” among governmental agencies that are responsible for making action-based decisions (Dutton 2005)) (NIMS) for coordinating and managing terrorism and other major events; •  Develop a prevention and response plan for all hazards, including terrorism; • Change the mission of a police agency to include the responsibility of providing Homeland Security policing; • Broaden the investigative functions of a police agency to include intelligence gathering and analysis; • Create or update mutual aid agreements to include the responsibilities of Homeland Security policing; •  Participate in exercises and drills that include terrorism scenarios; • Ensure interoperable radio communications between public safety agencies and this will assist the police when they are responding to a terrorist incident; • Implement a linked records management system (RMS) that allows agencies to share records and information; •  Conduct a risk assessment for terrorist threats, for the police agency and for the community; •  Ensure that the police agency is a member of a state fusion center; • Form or strengthen partnerships with non-governmental organizations (NGO) that will assist the police with the response to a terrorist incident; and •  Participate in anti-terrorism task forces. Adapted from Stewart and Morris (2009); Doner (2013)

The Responsibilities of the Police

21

The police would need to undertake three tasks in order to be prepared to respond to a threat of terrorism: collect and analyze intelligence about possible terrorist activity, ensure that vulnerable targets are identified and protected, and ensure that they have the capacity and are capable of responding to a terrorist attack. They would also need to be able to differentiate between the different types of terrorist attacks and the different levels of terrorist threats and this will help them to protect targets from attacks and to develop plans and strategies to prevent and respond to terrorism (Clarke and Newman 2007). When developing prevention and response strategies, each type of terrorist activity would need to have been analyzed and assessed separately, and this would ensure that any vulnerabilities that could be exploited by terrorists can be identified, enabling the prevention strategies to be corrected in readiness for when a threat occurs. The challenge for the police is being able to balance the allocation of their resources between preventing an attack, providing security, and responding to an attack. Clarke and Newman (2007) cautioned that spending large amounts of police time on removing threats can be counterproductive, as one terrorist can quickly be replaced by another terrorist or terrorist group. However, securing potential targets presents a different type of challenge for the police. Securing a site that may be a target of an attack is not a familiar role for the police, and it requires new skills (Clarke and Newman 2007). Terrorists choose targets because they are more attractive than other targets, usually because of their iconic value or because they have, or can attract a large number of people to them. The more people at a target site means that there are more victims for the terrorists to kill or injure. However, Clarke and Newman (2007) claimed that terrorists are constrained in their choice of target by a number of factors, such as how much the attack will cost, where the potential target is located, and how accessible the target is. How attractive a target is to a terrorist can be summarized by using the acronym EVIL DONE (Clarke and Newman 2006). The meaning of the acronym and an example of the acronym have been presented in Table 2.2.

Table 2.2  The acronym EVIL DONE, its meaning, and examples Acronym E

Meaning Exposed

V I

Vital Iconic

L D O N

Legitimate Destructible Occupied Near

E

Easy

Examples United state capitol, Eiffel tower, London tower bridge Infrastructure and communication systems Buckingham place, statue of liberty, louvre museum Any Western nation building, site, or embassy Any Western nation city building or site Where people congregate—Events, transport hubs Any site that is close to the terrorists’ residence or work Any site that does not have adequate security

Source: Adapted from Clarke and Newman (2007)

22

2  The Police Response to Terrorism – Draft Chapter

Changes in the Role of the Police Policing has traditionally been undertaken at a local level within a bounded geographical jurisdiction. However, a police agency is now no longer confined to policing in a geographical jurisdiction (Crank and Irlbeck 2012). This has come about primarily as a result of the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States, but also because of the terrorist attacks that took place in Bali, Madrid, and London. These attacks demanded a national and international response, which has meant that police agencies have focused on the terror threat rather than on local crime. Changing the focus of policing to more of a national and international focus has meant that police agencies have had to make significant changes to their structures and in how they allocate their resources (Pickering et al. 2007). Policing is still undertaken at a local level, but now includes an international dimension of countering terrorism, responding to crime, and the gathering of intelligence (den Heyer, 2021). The police now have the responsibility of being the lead agency for preventing and countering terrorism in a jurisdiction. As well as preventing terrorism by disrupting an attack, the police need to prevent members of the community from being radicalized (Carter and Carter 2012). To reduce the likelihood of this occurring, the police have adopted Intelligence-led Policing to help them to gather information from local communities and to identify those who are at risk of being radicalized (Crank and Irlbeck 2012). Regional- and state-based Fusion Centers have been established to enable intelligence to be gathered in a central location for the purpose of developing terror threat assessments (Taylor and Russell 2012). Police officers and crime analysts are deployed from police agencies to staff the Fusion Centers and they assist with the gathering of intelligence and its analysis.

The Preparedness of the Police to Respond to Terrorism The police have adapted to changes (Marks and Sun 2007; McGarrell et al. 2007) in the environment, such as the differences in the types of crime committed and the changes in terrorism (Jiao and Rhea 2007; Zhao et al. 2010). McGarrell et al. (2007) noted that the police have probably changed more than any other government agency in recent decades. Accepting the responsibility of preventing and responding to terrorism has been slow and uneven, with some police agencies embracing the change positively and developing new capabilities, while other agencies have not. Some agencies are only performing Homeland Security policing functions because they do not have any other choice. Any changes that the police have made have been with little guidance or supervision by local or national governments (Davis et al. 2004; Pelfrey 2007, 2009; Randol 2013; White 2004). The slow acceptance for preventing and responding to terrorism makes it important to understand how prepared the police are to prevent and respond to terrorism

The Preparedness of the Police to Respond to Terrorism

23

(Burruss et  al. 2010; Davis et  al. 2004; Gerber et  al. 2005; Giblin et  al. 2009; Schafer, Burruss, & Giblin, 2009). This is especially so given the continual changes made in the types of attacks that terrorists carry out. The theory of the Contagion Effect could help to clarify the reasons why police agencies are at different levels of preparedness (Burruss et al. 2010; Pelfrey 2007; Schafer et  al. 2009). Research has found that there was often a contagion effect when new policies, practices or structures have been adopted by a police agency. When a police agency makes changes, then other police agencies often follow and make the same type of changes (Crank and Langworthy 1992; Giblin 2006). Policies and practices that have been adopted by one agency and then by another may also be explained by Institutional theory (Meyer and Rowan 1977) and because organizations need to appear legitimate to their peer organizations, politicians, or the public (Roberts et  al. 2012). The adoption of new policies and practices by police agencies can also be explained by the presence of network influences (the influence of other police agencies) a concept that is depicted in the Contingency theory (Roberts and Roberts 2009).

 tudies That Have Examined How Prepared Police Agencies S Are to Respond to Terrorism A number of studies were undertaken after the September 11 attacks to assess how well police agencies were prepared for an attack and to examine their prevention and response practices (Johnson & Hunter, 2016). Most of this research focused on individual police agencies (Chappell and Gibson 2009; Foster and Cordner 2006; Marion and Cronin 2009; Pelfrey 2007; Stewart and Morris 2009) rather than on the police in general. The research focused on individual agencies because policing in the United States is more fragmented and is subjected more to local community priorities than it is in the United Kingdom. For this reason, the chances of there being a consistent, national Homeland Security policing approach in the United States are minimal (Stewart and Morris 2009). This is not the case in the United Kingdom. The Home Office and the Police Superintendents Association in the United Kingdom have been able to coordinate agreed upon strategies for police forces in the United Kingdom to use to prevent and respond to terrorism. In research that was undertaken by Davis et al. (2004) after the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States, it was found that approximately half of local police agencies and most of the state police agencies were involved in responding to terrorist-related incidents. It was also found that most police agencies had introduced a number of different policies and procedures to improve their preparedness for a terrorist attack. These included increasing the number of personnel employed to plan for emergencies, updating response plans and mutual aid agreements, and reallocating budgets to include the costs of responding to terrorism (Davis et  al. 2004). It was found that more than a quarter of police agencies had increased their spending on preparations for a terrorist attack (Davis et al. 2004).

24

2  The Police Response to Terrorism – Draft Chapter

Davis et al. (2004) also found that there were significant differences in the perception of the risk of a terrorist attack occurring, in the amount of contingency planning, and in the level of preparedness of a police agency, depending on whether it was a larger-sized agency or a smaller one. The research found that there was a relationship between the level of perceived risk by police agencies, the size of the jurisdiction, the size of their budget, and how prepared an agency was for a terrorist attack. According to Davis, et al., (2004), police agencies in jurisdictions where the perceived risk of a terrorist attack occurring was high, the agency was more likely to be prepared. Agencies that were prepared had updated their response plans, had conducted training, and had reallocated resources to increase their response capabilities (Davis et al. 2004). Research that was undertaken at around the same time by Epperson (2005) also assessed how prepared the police in the United States were to respond to a terrorist attack. The objective of the research was to find out whether there was a need to improve the capabilities of the police in the United States, and if there was a need, what needed to be addressed. Epperson’s view was that even though police were vital for the response to a terrorist attack, their capabilities had not improved, nor had they been altered in any meaningful way after the September 11 attacks in the United States. The research found that there were several common themes in the policies used by police agencies in the United States. The main theme was that the police should deter, prevent, and interdict the actions of terrorists, and another was that as the response, the coordination of a response, the mitigation, and the management of a terrorist attack are the same as it is for a natural or man-made disaster, and therefore, the police need to use the same response strategies and structures (Epperson 2005). Epperson (2005) also reviewed the police in England, Northern Ireland, and Spain to examine how prepared they were for a terrorist attack. The aim of this research was to identify relevant concepts and recommendations that would provide a benchmark that could be used to compare the policies of police agencies in the United States. The review examined existing policies and included a direct investigation into the capabilities of the police. Epperson also looked at how the police in these countries combated terrorism and how these tactics could help the police in the United States (Sedevic 2011). The research included an analysis of the role of the police during a terrorist incident, the technical capabilities that were needed, the laws that were in place for countering terrorism, the importance of the community, and the use of intelligence by the police. Epperson claimed that a terrorist threat is mainly conventional and that an attack would be based on the use of firearms and conventional explosives. Epperson (2005) found that the main role of the police in countering terrorism was to detect, prevent, and deter terrorism, and in order to be able to undertake these tasks, the police had to be equipped appropriately. Epperson claimed that the police should be equipped with body armor, ballistic helmets, and automatic rifles. Epperson also highlighted that the police needed laws that gave them broader powers to search and recommended that partnerships be established with communities in order to gain intelligence.

The Preparedness of the Police to Respond to Terrorism

25

It was found in other research that there had been little examination of how prepared the police were to respond to terrorism and that there was no universal definition of preparedness (Mosser 2007). The claim was based on the findings of an examination of municipal and county police agencies in the early 2000s in the state of Florida in the United States. The researcher used the definition of preparedness as “an ongoing effort to lessen the impact of disasters of people and property” (Mosser 2007, p. 46). The factors used for assessing how prepared police agencies were, were based on the capability of its personnel, communications, training, planning, equipment, and procedures. Overall, the police in Florida received a rating of 33 percent of being prepared to deal with a terrorist incident (Mosser, 2017). In more modern research that was undertaken in the United Kingdom by Harris (2016), it was found that the police in the United Kingdom had adjusted their tactics and response plans based on the terrorist attacks that were carried out in London on July 7, 2005. Harris also found that the police had amended their response strategies following the attacks in Mumbai in 2008 and in the attacks in Paris in 2015 and noted that marauding terrorists who were using firearms was the new normal in terror attacks. Harris (2016) highlighted that there had been an increase in the number of lone wolf type of attacks, and these individuals had been inspired by the Islamic State, rather than being directed by them.

 sing Contingency Theory to Examine How Prepared Police U Agencies Are to Prevent and Respond to Terrorism Contingency theory is a concept that is useful for examining and analyzing how prepared police agencies are to prevent and respond to terrorism (Burruss et  al. 2010; Lawrence and Lorsch 1967). The theory “view[s] the effectiveness of police organizations as a product of a proper fit of organizational design and environmental exigencies” (Langworthy 1986, p. 31; see also O’Hara 2012). This means that any changes that a police agency makes to their organizational structure, or their practices are a response to environmental factors, such as the type and occurrence of crime or the nature of the terrorist threat being faced (Jiao and Rhea 2007; Zhao et al. 2010). It implies that any change in the environment will be one of the most important factors for determining how prepared the police are to prevent or respond to terrorism (Roberts et al. 2012). Previous research that used the Contingency theory to examine how prepared the police are found that there was a positive association between perceived risk and how prepared they were for a terrorist attack (Burruss et al. 2010; Gerber et al. 2005; Giblin et al. 2009; Schafer et al. 2009). The research also found that jurisdictions that had a higher risk of a terrorist attack occurring were better prepared than jurisdictions that had a lower risk. Other research that examined the police found that organizational factors are important in influencing the adoption of new ideas (Rogers 1995; Weisburd and Braga 2019). Organizational factors are usually grouped under “structural

26

2  The Police Response to Terrorism – Draft Chapter

complexity” or “structural control” (Langworthy 1986), with complexity referring to the organizational structure used and how centralized police stations, patrol bases, and patrol areas are. According to Damannour (1996) and Randol (2012), police agencies that have more specialist units and technically specialized staff are more likely to introduce new ideas, while the more hierarchically structured police agencies will be less creative and less flexible in adopting new innovations. This is because the more structured police agencies are, the more bureaucratic they are. They also have a greater reliance on formal policies and procedures (Damanpour 1991; Randol 2012). Randol (2012) claimed that the more policies and procedures that a police agency had, the more negatively it was related to being prepared for a terrorist attack. This implies that if an agency is not flexible, then this will inhibit their ability to adopt new innovations. Another factor that influences whether an agency has adopted strategies to counter terrorism is the size of the police agency. The size of an agency can have a positive or a negative influence on whether they are more inclined to adopt counterterrorism measures. Larger-sized police agencies are generally more bureaucratic and centrally controlled (Donaldson 2001; Langworthy 1986; Maguire 2003), which may provide greater capacity and capability for managing and coordinating terrorism prevention strategies or a response to a terrorist attack (Burruss et  al. 2010). However, because of their size, large-sized police agencies are often more organizationally complex and inflexible, which may inhibit the adoption of new ideas (Roberts et al. 2012).

 ommunity-Oriented Policing and the Role of the Police C in Countering Terrorism It is difficult for the police to ensure that they maintain a trustworthy relationship with the community while they prepare for and respond to a terrorist attack (Pickering et al. 2008). To maintain the trust of the community, some police agencies are using an approach to counter terrorism that is similar to Community-­ oriented Policing (Lambert 2008). The police have good reasons for using community-oriented strategies to counter the use of terrorism strategies. Community-oriented Policing is based on the police developing a relationship with the community, and this underpins the legitimacy of the police (Pickering et al. 2008). How the community views the police is critical for the effective delivery of their services. Unfortunately, the changes that the police have had to make in order to adopt a Homeland Security style of policing have been transformational, and this has led the police to being more involved in the gathering of intelligence than on delivering community policing (Ortiz et al. 2007). Homeland Security policing and the countering of terrorism uses a style of policing that has been based on a paramilitary model of policing (Pickering et al. 2007). Some researchers view this as being in

Community-Oriented Policing and the Role of the Police in Countering Terrorism

27

opposition to Community-oriented Policing (Jefferson 1990; McCulloch 2001). Community-oriented Policing is a conciliatory approach, whereas Homeland Security policing is more coercive (Pickering et al. 2007). O’Connor (2007) claimed, however, that the two different approaches to policing terrorism are interdependent. Since the terror attacks on September 11 in the United States, the police have changed their focus from Community-oriented Policing to Homeland Security policing (Wells 2003). Using Homeland Security policing can have a negative impact on Community-oriented Policing (Kim and de Guzman 2012) and its use can be the reason why some of the members of minority communities are reluctant to cooperate with the police. Homeland Security policing is a more aggressive form of policing, with some researchers, arguing that policing has undergone a paradigm shift from Community-oriented Policing to Homeland Security policing (de Guzman 2002; Oliver 2006; Pastor 2005). Unfortunately, to date, there has been little research that has examined the changes that have occurred in policing since the September 11 attacks (Lee 2010). One study that did examine the changes made in policing since the September 11 attacks was that which was undertaken by Ortiz, et al., (2007). These researchers found that police agencies in the United States had implemented Homeland Security policing to varying degrees, with some agencies having established specialized counterterrorism units. However, it was found that none of the agencies had established any new procedures for gathering intelligence (Lee 2010). Other researchers who had studied the changes in police agencies found that there was more interaction between police agencies but there was no identifiable organizational change on the part of the police (Marks and Sun 2007). The reason why little change had been made was because there was no financial incentive for the agencies to make any changes. According to Marks and Sun (2007), only the police agencies that had received funding had made any changes to their organizational structures. Other researchers also found that receiving funding made a difference as to whether an agency made any changes. He et al. (2005) found that only police agencies that had received federal funding to implement Community-oriented Policing had actually implemented the strategy. Other research that was conducted found that police agencies that were undertaking Homeland Security policing were also countering terrorism, gathering intelligence and were mitigating terrorism-related hazards (Maguire and King 2004). The researchers argued that as a result of undertaking these tasks, the police were developing specialized skills in investigation and surveillance, were better at working with intelligence agencies and the military, and were improving their knowledge in how to secure critical infrastructure (Maguire and King 2004). Adopting Homeland Security policing may mean that police agencies will focus more on “tactical methods, technology, and alternative service providers, such as security personnel” with some researchers cautioning that it could “replace community policing” (Brandhl 2003; Pastor 2005, p. 4). Oliver (2006) held a similar view and argued that policing has entered a fourth era; the era of Homeland Security

28

2  The Police Response to Terrorism – Draft Chapter

policing, and as a result, the police will change their principal role of providing services and maintaining order to controlling crime and the gathering of intelligence. There has been some debate as to whether using Homeland Security policing is the most effective way of countering domestic and international terrorism (Pickering et al. 2007). The subject is contentious as some researchers have claimed that ill-­ conceived strategies to counter terrorism can marginalize and alienate members of minority communities and can cause the same type of terrorism to occur that the strategies were designed to combat (Cordner 1995). Ill-formed strategies are those that have been designed on ethnicity, religious, or cultural factors and can lead to the polarization of some members of minority communities. These types of strategies can lead to members of some minority communities in countries such as the United States (Crawford 1995), the European Union (Crawford 1997), and Australia (Edwards 1999) to view the police as being a part of the problem (Pickering et al. 2007). It is important that the police are held accountable for their actions. The actions taken by the police to counter terrorism have often been viewed as not taking individual human rights into consideration. It has been perceived “that when it comes to dealing with the threat of terrorism there is an unavoidable trade-off between individual rights and national security” (Pickering et al. 2007, p. 9). To ensure that an individual’s rights are considered while maintaining national security, the police need to be held accountable for their actions. If the police are held accountable for their actions, then this safeguards the view that the police are legitimate. When there is confidence and trust in the police, public support for the police will increase (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 2014; Weine et al. 2017). It is important that trust is established with a community before any relationship with the community can be established (Schanzer et al. 2016). How willing the community will be to establish a relationship with the police will be influenced by how effectively the police respond to crime in the community (Schanzer et al. 2016). One way of increasing the accountability of the police and increasing the effectiveness of responding to terrorism is to use Community-oriented Policing strategies. Using Community-oriented Policing strategies to prevent and respond to terrorism needs to include a broader approach to working with the community. The United States Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) and the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) developed five key principles to guide those police agencies that are considering adopting Community-oriented Policing to prevent and respond to the threat of terrorism: 1. Promote and enhance trusting relationships with the community. 2. Engage all residents in a neighborhood to address public safety matters. 3. Leverage assistance from public and private stakeholders. 4. Utilize all partnerships to counter violent extremism. 5. Train all personnel in a police agency in Community-oriented Policing (International Association of Chiefs of Police 2014).

Community-Oriented Policing and the Role of the Police in Countering Terrorism

29

In a recent study that was undertaken by Duke University, it was found that approximately half of the police agencies in the United States were using Community-oriented Policing practices and this included engaging with the community to prevent and respond to the threat of terrorism (Weine, et, al., 2017). Engaging with the community is critical for building the trust of a community and for successfully integrating Community-oriented Policing into Homeland Security policing. The sharing of information should be the main factor that is included when engaging with the community (Pickering et al. 2007). Community-­ oriented Policing and Homeland Security policing has been viewed as being at the opposite ends of the policing continuum but now the principles of Community-­ oriented Policing are being used to develop strategies to prevent and respond to terrorism in the United Kingdom (Pickering et  al. 2007). This is because it is believed that working closely with the community will prevent acts of terrorism (Gordon-Smith 2019). The use of the strategies in the United Kingdom has highlighted that community engagement can have a positive impact on the reporting of radicalization and extremism, especially by family members after members of the police have engaged with members of the community. It was also found that for the engagement to be effective, the police needed to make a connection with the ethic or cultural identity of the person who was reporting the terrorist behavior and that they needed to understand that the person who was making the report was frightened (Gordon-Smith 2019). There can be difficulties in establishing a trusting relationship with the community to prevent or respond to terrorism. The difficulties stem from a lack of understanding of the principles of Community-oriented Policing, how the strategy contributes to countering violent extremism and its limits in helping to solve crime (Weine et  al. 2017). The findings from research about the relationship between Community-oriented Policing and preventing and responding to terrorism have been consistent (Roberts et al. 2012). In a survey of Chiefs of Police in Virginia, it was found that the majority of chiefs considered Community-oriented Policing and Homeland Security policing as being complementary. It was also found that this view was more likely to be taken by those chiefs who were committed to Community-­ oriented Policing (Chappell and Gibson 2009). The findings indicate that the principles of Community-oriented Policing and Homeland Security policing do not contradict each other, but they are in competition for police resources. This is because any resources that are allocated to one of the strategies will be at the expense of the other (Roberts et al. 2012). The implementation of Community-oriented Policing by police agencies had been increasing prior to the occurrence of the September 11 attacks, and by 2001, most agencies had implemented the strategy, or some parts of the strategy (Lee 2010; Maguire 2002; Oliver 2009). However, as police agencies began to adopt Homeland Security policing, debate ensued as to whether the practice fits with the principles of Community-oriented Policing (Roberts et al. 2012). The debate has centered on the inherent conflict between the two strategies of policing, especially because Community-oriented Policing incorporates an openness by the police, the decentralization of decision-making, and the development of a relationship with the

30

2  The Police Response to Terrorism – Draft Chapter

community to respond to crime and its causes. This contradicts the activities used in Homeland Security policing, which includes the undertaking of covert operations and the gathering of intelligence (Oliver 2004, 2006; Sumpter 2016). Research that used regression modeling to examine the relationship between Community-oriented Policing and Homeland Security policing found that the two strategies were not “fundamentally incompatible” (Lee 2010, p.  357). The research also found that Community-oriented Policing was not negatively associated with Homeland Security policing. Other researchers have suggested that Community-oriented Policing complements the prevention and response to terrorism, rather than the two strategies not working together (Henry 2002; Lyons 2002; Murray 2005; Thacher 2005). In line with the findings of Gordon-Smith’s research, other researchers have claimed that a strong partnership with the community will encourage members of the community to share information with the police about potential terrorist activities (Chappell and Gibson 2009; Henry 2002; Innes 2006; Murray 2005; Pelfrey 2005). Using Community-oriented Policing strategies, can, according to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (2014), lead to proactive problem-solving that can contribute to broader, multi-agency responses to prevent terrorism and counter Violent Extremism and Radicalization that can Lead to Terrorism (VERLT). If the police are going to use Community-oriented Policing to disrupt and prevent terrorism, then it needs to consider what the strategy can offer. If the strategy is to be used, then it needs to be a part of a comprehensive approach of responding to terrorism (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 2014). A similar approach has been taken by the United States Federal Government. It incorporated Community-oriented Policing into its Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) strategy. The strategy empowers local police agencies to prevent violent extremism and helps the police to develop problem-solving strategies for preventing terrorism (Community Oriented Policing XE "Community-oriented policing" Services 2014). Community-oriented Policing strategies have been used successfully to prevent and reduce the fear of crime, and it can be used effectively to prevent and respond to terrorism (Community Oriented Policing XE "Community-oriented policing" Services 2014). Community-oriented Policing recognizes that in communities where terrorists and supporters are recruited, people are more likely to provide information to the police about terrorist activities if they have been treated respectfully (Lambert and Parsons 2017). However, any benefits from using a Community-­ oriented Policing approach may be more of a side-effect and the success of its use will depend on the level of trust and cooperation that exists between the police and the community. Community-oriented Policing can be strengthened by the use of Intelligence-led Policing, but Intelligence-led Policing should not be used as a method for gathering intelligence solely to prevent or counter terrorism (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 2014). As discussed earlier in this section, the cooperation of the community is essential for the police to effectively prevent and respond to terrorism. To obtain the support and cooperation of the public, there are six points that the police may find useful:

Community-Oriented Policing and the Role of the Police in Countering Terrorism

31

1. Attentiveness—the police should attend to the problems that a community has and undertake visible patrols. 2. Reliability—there needs to be a degree of predictability in what the police do. 3. Responsiveness—the police should provide a client-centered service, and this will provide reassurance to the community. 4. Competence—the public respect the police when it gets the job done and when it cannot, the public respect the police when it clearly and honestly explains why it cannot. 5. Manners—is how the police treat people on an interpersonal basis and is far more significant than what the police accomplish. 6. Fairness—the police should treat all people fairly (adapted from Mastrofski 1999).

Community-Oriented Policing and the Gathering of Intelligence In 1976, a counterterrorism researcher made a claim about the use of intelligence which is as valid now as it was then. The researcher maintained that if “there was a 90 percent failure in Israeli counterterrorism policies, doctrine, and capabilities, that 90 percent could be defined as failure of intelligence” (Sloan 2002, p. 339). The observation highlighted how important intelligence is in countering terrorism. However, the traditional practices used for gathering intelligence are not well suited for responding to the new forms of terrorism. The new form of terrorism has been influenced by non-state actors, cultures, religious, and political objectives that have been prompted by an extremist ideology and has spread throughout social media and other communication platforms (United States Government 2006). This means that the police are in the best position to gather domestic intelligence because they have a knowledge of their local communities, offenders, types of crime, and patterns of behavior (O’Rouke, 2010). The gathering of intelligence on potential threats and risks to a community is of particular importance in preventing and responding to terrorism. However, any change in society and form that a terrorist attack takes will need a new model for collecting and analyzing intelligence (Sullivan 2008). New models would need to include predictive types of analysis that would inform the police so that they could undertake preventative activities or pre-emptive operations prior to a terrorist attack. An effective and reliable way to assess a threat of terrorism is by gathering intelligence from the community. Gathering information from the community relies on the community having trust in the police, the police engaging with the community, and not using covert or other coercive methods (Pickering et al. 2007). Any engagement with the community should not be conducted with the aim of gathering intelligence as some members of minority communities will be sensitive about being targeted by the police (Innes 2006). Critics of the practice of gathering intelligence from the community have claimed that the use of the strategy can lead to the police profiling specific individuals and communities based on their ethnicity (Ortiz et al. 2007). As Pickering et  al. (2007) noted, the aim of the police engaging with the

32

2  The Police Response to Terrorism – Draft Chapter

community is to build trust, not to gather intelligence. To establish trust, information needs to flow from the community to the police and from the police to the community (Pickering et al. 2007). There are many factors that limit the ability of the police to gather and analyze intelligence, the key factors being budgetary and resource constraints. Police agencies are unable to allocate resources solely for countering terrorism or for gathering intelligence (Riley et  al. 2005) as the personnel needed to counter terrorism or gather intelligence are generally committed to policing local crime events. Another challenge for the police is being able to locate and retain those who have skills in intelligence and analysis methods. Counterterrorism intelligence analysts need to have an in-depth knowledge of national and international issues, and they can often become experts about specific terrorists, terrorist groups, or geographical regions (O’Rouke, 2010). Acquiring specialized knowledge can take many years (Best 2003) so it is important for the police to retain these skills. Skilled analysts can provide the police with the information that they need to assist with their decision-­making and in allocating resources (Cooper 2005). Intelligence can only be useful once it has been analyzed and it needs to be presented in a manner that is useful for decision-makers (Evans 2005). Any intelligence that is supplied needs to consider future terrorist activity (O′ Rouke, 2010) and the operational needs of other institutions that use the intelligence products of the police. This may mean that the procedures that are used to analyze intelligence may need to be altered into a form that is more suitable for decision-makers of other agencies so that they can achieve their objectives (United States Government 2019). Intelligence that meets these requirements and is specific to a situation is more likely to result in operational action being taken (United States Government 2019).

 athering Intelligence from the Community G to Counterterrorism A community-focused approach should be used to gather intelligence from the community because the methods for collecting intelligence that are currently being used are not suitable for use in countering the new type of terrorist threat (Innes 2006). The forms of intelligence gathering that are currently being used are intrusive and may be offensive to some members of the community. The current practices that are used to gather intelligence need to be replaced with a community-focused approach. A community-focused approach would mean that the police would be more visible in a community, especially in minority communities, which would reassure the community and give them confidence in the police (Innes 2006). However, any increase in the presence of the police in a minority community must not result in the community perceiving that it is being over policed. If communities have confidence in the police, then this facilitates the gathering of intelligence from the community. To gather intelligence from the community, the police will need to

Community-Oriented Policing and the Role of the Police in Countering Terrorism

33

increase the number of contacts with minority community members to gather information that enables the police to monitor and observe the activities of individuals of interest. This means that the community-focused approach can be defined as “a form of ‘soft power’ that works through processes of ‘persuasion, negotiation and agenda setting’” (Pickering et al. 2007, p. 93). The community-focused approach to gathering intelligence for countering terrorism comprises of Innes’ (2004b) notion of acting on the indication that a crime may occur. The community-focused approach takes into account that any preventative or responsive tactic that the police use can have an impact on any tensions that may exist within a community and that there are challenges for the police to engage with members of minority communities where the relationship has previously been problematic for the police (Innes 2006). The community-focused approach for gathering intelligence was used after the terrorist attacks in London. Intelligence was gathered successfully because the police had demonstrated their respect for the religious beliefs of members of diverse communities. The model was based on the premise of trust. If a community feels that the police do not respect their religious beliefs, then this can affect their level of trust in the police. If the police are able to demonstrate that they respect legitimate religious beliefs, then the likelihood of terrorists exploiting any anger in a community is reduced. The principle of respect in the model has two components: the importance of understanding religious beliefs and practices and that the police need to recognize that there are significant similarities and differences between the beliefs and practices of Muslims who live in a community. This is important because most of the terrorist threats to Western nations arise from Muslim activities. Islamic terrorists have the ability to exploit technology to recruit, radicalize, or influence young Muslims to their cause (Lambert 2012; Lambert and Parsons 2017). Using the approach to gather information from the community has some drawbacks. The main drawback being that the police are often not able to connect with the appropriate members of a community. However, by using a wide, but shallow range of contact networks, the police may be able to connect with the members of a community that they wish to communicate with (Innes 2006). Such an approach that relies on neighborhood policing to gather intelligence is inherently fragile owing to the interference of other community groups or politicians (Innes 2006). Another challenge with the approach is the reliance on using Community-oriented and Problem-oriented Policing strategies. According to Loader (2006), community policing-based strategies can contribute toward increasing insecurity in a community, as they are often viewed as being intrusive by what the researcher calls “ambient policing.”3

  Ambient police strategies—such as community, broken windows, and Problem-oriented Policing—radically misconstrue the contribution that policing institutions can make to security in democratic societies. These strategies rest, in particular, on a shallow but wide understanding of the police–security relationship that runs the risk of making security institutions, practices, and discourse—and hence insecurity—a pervasive feature of everyday life (Loader 2006, pp. 203–204). 3

34

2  The Police Response to Terrorism – Draft Chapter

Loader (2006) criticized the community-based strategies because they were based on “wide but shallow” methods to engage with the community and that these methods did not take into account the negative consequences of having more officers who were visible and involved in community problems. In his critique of Innes’ (2006) community intelligence approach, Loader (2006) argued that the approach presumes that public demand for security is benign, that demands for police services should be met, and that these strategies did not consider the views of the community. Loader (2009) also claimed that Innes (2006) misunderstood the contribution that policing makes to the security of a community. The police should not respond indiscriminately to the needs of the community but should ensure that community concerns are heard because a relationship with the community is central to the core functions of the police (Loader 2006). A relationship with the community, according to Loader (2006), is not developed from visible police patrols but from a rights-­ based type of policing.

Intelligence-Led Policing and Countering Terrorism A number of failures by the intelligence agencies led to the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States, but the two main failures were that information was not shared between the intelligence services and the police and that the intelligence agencies did not act on the intelligence that identified a possible threat (The 9/11 Commission 2004). The breakdown in the sharing of intelligence highlighted the need for a national strategy that would organize the more than 18,000 police and law enforcement agencies into a coordinated effort to prevent future terrorist attacks (United States Office of Homeland Security 2021). To do this, police agencies needed to integrate their primary mandate of enforcing the law and reconfigure their organizational structures to suit the national strategies that were proposed. This would improve the national response to the threat of terrorism (Carter 2003). However, the changes that were needed were not as difficult as expected because police agencies were able to use Intelligence-based Policing strategies along with Compstat to “transition from a ‘law enforcement paradigm’ to an ‘intelligence paradigm’” (Jackson and Brown 2007, p. 112). Intelligence-led Policing was introduced because intelligence was not being shared between police agencies. Other factors that led to the introduction of Intelligence-led Policing were the failure of traditional policing methods to prevent and control crime, the shortcomings of Community-oriented and Problem-oriented Policing, and the financial constraints that were placed on police agencies (Carter 2003). Intelligence-led Policing had been adopted earlier by the police in the United Kingdom as it was perceived that the police were spending too much time responding to specific incidents and not concentrating on repeat offenders, who were thought to be the cause of the increase in crime. Reports that were written by the Audit Commission (1993) and Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary in 1997

Intelligence-Led Policing and Countering Terrorism

35

made recommendations that intelligence and surveillance be increased to target recidivist offenders. This led to the introduction of the National Intelligence model in the United Kingdom and to the use of intelligence to inform the response to crime and it became recognized as being an effective method for allocating resources (Carter and Carter 2009; McGarrell et  al. 2007; Ratcliffe 2002; Ratcliffe and Guidetti 2008). The need for police agencies to coordinate and exchange information with other law enforcement and intelligence agencies was a change in direction for policing. The theory behind the police and the intelligence agencies sharing information was to “connect the dots” across local, state, and federal agencies (The 9/11 Commission 2004). To ensure that connections are made and that individual rights are not breached, the Intelligence-led Policing model needs to make use of human intelligence, technological and statistical techniques, and interagency cooperation. The model used to share intelligence must also be technologically advanced and be able to work with existing policing policies, practices, and procedures (Martin 2004). The type of model selected could provide a framework for gathering “action-­ oriented intelligence” (Carter 2003). While there are benefits for the police in implementing Intelligence-led Policing, there has been some debate as to whether it is effective in countering terrorism (Jackson and Brown 2007). Earlier research that examined the introduction of Intelligence-led Policing found that a number of police agencies had implemented the approach, but they were not sharing any information with other police agencies (Jackson and Brown 2007). The main obstacle to sharing information was that each police agency had its own culture (Desai 2005). Desai argued that there was no common doctrine between police agencies and the intelligence agencies which would provide a platform for them to cooperate with each other. This should change with the creation of the Office Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) in the United States. The office will be responsible for the dissemination of Homeland Security intelligence to local, state, tribal, and federal police and intelligence agencies (The 9/11 Commission 2004). There are other reasons why police agencies do not share information. They often do not share information because there is no common concept of intelligence (Carter 2003), and because terrorism has not been defined. Different concepts and different definitions mean that there are various interpretations as to what is defined as terrorism. This may have an impact on determining whether the activities that an individual is performing can be classified as being terror-related and whether an individual can be classified as a terrorist. Other reasons why information is not shared is because, historically, the police have not been able to establish or manage an information-sharing process. There are many examples of divisions or units not exchanging information, and of investigation departments withholding important information from patrol officers (Walker and Katz 2001). By not exchanging information, decisions made by the police can be found wanting, with errors made in allocating resources to strategic priorities and miscalculating the planning of a response to an incident (McGarrell and Schlegel 1993). The police have been gathering intelligence on both criminal and non-criminal activity for many years. Despite their long history of gathering intelligence, there

36

2  The Police Response to Terrorism – Draft Chapter

have been a number of examples where the police have misused the information that they have (Chang 2002) and of not converting their intelligence into usable information (Chang 2002; The 9/11 Commission 2004; Webb and Katz 2003). To provide the public with the confidence that the police are using intelligence appropriately and that human rights are not violated, six steps should be taken: 1. Embed an agency’s structure, policies, practices, and procedures into the intelligence model. 2. Develop a vision that describes how the organization will respond to a terrorist or criminal threat. 3. Use the information from a threat assessment to develop a response plan. 4. Ensure that all operational staff are trained in the gathering, handling, and the securing of information. 5. Allocate an appropriate level of resources to undertake the intelligence function. 6. Provide modern technology to assist with the gathering, handling, and the securing of intelligence (Carter 2003; Ratcliffe 2002, 2008). Intelligence-led Policing may offer some advantages over other police service delivery models because it emphasizes how resources should be allocated, how technology should be used and suggests methods for delivering services efficiently. It also suggests which agencies the police need to cooperate with. The use of the strategy can, however, breach the privacy of members of the community and enable misinformation to be shared. Misinformation can occur because more proactive intelligence-gathering methods that are used to respond to crime and terrorism are utilized (Gould and Mastrofski 2004; Lyons 2002; Martin 2004; Moore, 2003; Nunn 2003). The police need to ensure that they understand the effect that adopting an Intelligence-led Policing model may have on its relationship with the community.

The Practical Aspects of Responding to Terrorism The ability of the police to effectively prevent and respond to terrorism hinges on a number of strategic and operational factors, such as coordinating successfully with other response agencies (Storm and Eyerman 2007) and using response frameworks such as the National Incident Management System (Jackson and Brown 2007). Since the September 11 terrorist attacks, police agencies have progressed in their ability to prevent and respond to terrorist activity and to develop policies in consultation with other response agencies. The broader approach to countering terrorism emphasizes the importance of coordinating and communicating with other agencies (Butler et al. 2002; National Research Council 2002; Reuland and Davies 2004; US General Accounting Office 2000, 2004). The strategic and operational factors that are required to effectively prevent and respond to terrorism have been presented in Table 2.3. Preventing and responding to terrorism is not just a problem for the police. Countering terrorism is a problem for many agencies and requires multi-agency solutions. It is important that the police and other response agencies work together

The Practical Aspects of Responding to Terrorism

37

Table 2.3  The strategic and operational factors required to effectively prevent and respond to terrorism • Build collaborative relationships and mutual aid protocols with other responding agencies, institutions, and non-government organizations (NGOs) • Review, study, and apply the lessons that have been learnt from reviewing previous critical incidents • Planning and exercising a unified command for complex incidents should be undertaken on a regular basis and involve all responding agencies at a regional level • Preparing and using equipment and technology to keep officers and community members safe and informed •  Establish a regional cadre of executive experts who can provide advice to the police • Establish an inventory of unique assets to assist the police in identifying potential resources that may be used during a response •  Establish procedures for investigating terrorists’ use of online communications •  Establish a public affairs (public information) unit that uses social media during a response Source: Braziel et al. (2016) and Doner (2013)

to develop effective response strategies and capabilities that can be used across various agencies and jurisdictions (Storm and Eyerman 2007). Responding to an attack where multiple sites have been targeted simultaneously is different from responding to an attack where a single bomb has been placed in a single site and requires a swift and coordinated response from a number of different agencies. The response needs to draw on the coordination frameworks that have already been established, such as the National Incident Management System or the Gold-Silver-Bronze system that is used in the United Kingdom and from plans that have been developed for specific terrorist threats (Storm and Eyerman 2007). For the response to be effective, it needs to be based on protocols that have been established for coordinating, planning, allocating resources, communicating, and training (Storm and Eyerman 2007). However, coordinating with different agencies can be challenging for police agencies and for other institutions that have seldomly ever worked together and that have specific legislative mandates and operating procedures.

Planning for a Terrorist Attack A terrorist attack has been described as having three phases: before, during, and after an attack (Newman and Clarke 2008). Each phase is separate, but if each phase has been planned and prepared for, then this will alleviate any problems in subsequent phases. The police tend to focus mainly on the attack (the during phase) rather than on the other two phases (Newman and Clarke 2008). To counter this, the prevention and response strategies and plans need to take into account all three phases, and this should be a part of everyday policing (Doner 2013). The three phases should be used by the police for developing its terrorism prevention and response strategies and plans. To ensure that the strategies and plans are effective, the police will need to gather information, develop, and analyze options and then make decisions that have been based on the information that has been

38

2  The Police Response to Terrorism – Draft Chapter

gathered. Action should be taken in accordance with the response option chosen. The third phase, taking action after an attack, should include a recovery stage. This is when another set of strategies and plans need to be developed and organized with other agencies that will aid in the recovery.

Working with the Media Preventing and responding to terrorism includes being able to convey information that is essential for the public to know of or is of interest to them. One avenue for conveying this type of information is by using mainstream media. However, the relationship of the police with the media has traditionally been challenging, especially after a terrorist attack has taken place (O’Rourke 2010). As the media control how the information from the police is presented, the police need to be respectful of the media (O’Rourke 2010). Being respectful of the media helps to establish and maintain the media’s trust in the police. A trusting relationship will help to ensure that any reporting of an incident is balanced and that the media rely on the police for the factual and reliable information. If the information provided by the police is not presented correctly, then the image of the police can be adversely affected, and this in turn can influence the amount of confidence that the public have in the police. Any reduction in confidence can inhibit the willingness of the community to provide information. It can be difficult for the police to manage their response because of the terrorists using real-time, intelligence data that have been obtained from mainstream media outlets. Media outlets can release real-time intelligence that pertains to the police response and to their deployment to a terrorist attack. The use of the 24/7 news cycle that has been adopted by mainstream media agencies and the streaming of live video and photographs from the scene of an attack site, via mobile phones and the Internet, enables anyone with a connection to remotely access the data stream. Constantly available, live information can create pressure for the police to provide continual updates about their response and the wider investigation of an incident. It enables a real-time analysis of information at a location that is other than that of an incident site and it allows terrorists who have the capability to receive real-time intelligence to act upon that intelligence. If the police do not establish a plan for updating the media, the media will fill the gap, often with irresponsible reporting (O’Rourke 2010). The challenges that were created by the unnecessary competition between media outlets were demonstrated during and after the terrorist attacks in Mumbai (Acharya et al. 2009). The mainstream media focused on business news instead of delivering information about the attack to the community (Acharya et al. 2009). When they did report on the attacks, they concentrated on how the police were responding at each of the attack locations. Focusing on the response tactics of the Mumbai Police provided information to the handlers of the terrorists, who were located in Pakistan, as to where the police units were located and about the hostages that were held. This resulted in the terrorists

Countering Terrorism in the United Kingdom

39

being able to counteract the effectiveness of the police response (New York Police Department Intelligence Division 2008). Some police agencies have employed former journalists and experienced media advisors to staff media units within its agency to manage mainstream media outlets and to provide them with up-to-date information (O’Rourke 2010). The agencies that have established media units found that it enables open communication between the police and the media. If police commanders are to be interviewed live, then this needs to be managed. Managing media releases ensures that any information about timeframes, the intentions of the police, and how specialist units will be deployed will not be released, because details such as these have the potential to provide terrorists with advanced warning of police actions (O’Rourke 2010).

Countering Terrorism in the United Kingdom The United Kingdom has had extensive experience in responding effectively to threats of terrorism and in developing effective counterterrorism strategies and tactics (Howard 2004). Their experience has been gained by responding to the threat of terrorist attacks from the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and its various splinter groups from 1969 to 2001. As a result, the police in the United Kingdom have had significantly more experience in executing counterterrorism operations than police have had in other countries and “remain on the leading edge of counterterrorism best practice” (Howard 2004, p. 5). According to Gregory (2007), not only have the police developed competencies in preventing and responding to terrorism, but they have also developed operational relationships with the intelligence services and military special forces. There are 43 police forces in England and Wales, and one police force in Scotland. The forces range in size with the London Metropolitan Police Force having more than 33,000 police officers, the London City Police Force having 811 police officers, and the Wiltshire Police Force having 1019 police officers (Home Office 2021). The larger, urban police forces are better suited to perform the complex task of countering terrorism because they have more resources and specialized staff, who are able to gather intelligence, undertake complex security operations, and conduct investigations (Howard 2004). The investigation of a terrorist attack requires specialized skills at a local and an international level, not only in relation to undertaking the investigation, but also in being able to coordinate personnel and gather information from other police forces in the United Kingdom and from police forces in other countries (Hindle 2007). The complexity of preventing and responding to terrorism means that the police must operate and coordinate a range of tasks, far beyond what they have undertaken in the past (O’Connor 2006). The role of the police in countering terrorism in the United Kingdom consists of four tasks:

40

2  The Police Response to Terrorism – Draft Chapter

1. identifying and protecting important, vulnerable sites, both locally and regionally; 2. developing intelligence leads based on targeted criminal investigations and community policing programs; 3. creating security partnerships with private industry and commerce in high-risk areas or industries; and, 4. using reality-tested crime analysis and crime-prevention technologies (Howard 2004). The United Kingdom Counter-Terrorism strategy that guides the police is grounded in the law enforcement model of responding to terrorism (Gregory 2007). The strategy distinguishes between the necessary, immediate response and the medium- and longer-term responses to the threat of terrorism (House of Commons 2001). The aim of the strategy is to deter people who may facilitate or support terrorism (Hindle 2007) and is based on the three guiding principles of public safety, gathering evidence, and maintaining public support (Gregory 2007). This means that terrorism is regarded as a criminal activity and “therefore the primary and lead responders are the Home Office and police in terms of both the national role of the Metropolitan Police Special Branch (SO12) and the Anti-Terrorist Branch (SO13), who take a national lead in investigations” (Clutterbuck 2004, pp. 142–143). There are three components to the strategy: 1. The collection, analysis, and distribution of intelligence. This is undertaken primarily by the SO15 Counter Terrorism Command Unit within the Metropolitan Police. 2. Target hardening activity in areas that are of high risk of a terrorist attack. Security is increased from sound design and from technological measures and from the stopping and questioning of people by uniformed police officers. 3. The generation of intelligence gathered from the community and the cooperation of the community from the use of uniformed, “low policing” and neighborhood policing-style practices in areas that are deemed to be at risk of producing violent Islamist extremists (adapted from Theil 2009). The aim of the strategy is to make the environment too hostile for terrorists to operate in and to find ways of increasing the likelihood of terrorists coming into contact with the police (Howard 2004). By focusing on the crimes that are associated with terrorist funding and by raising the awareness of how terrorists plan for and prepare for their attacks, the police can make it difficult for terrorists to operate. The tasks that are required to undertake the three components of the strategy are a significant shift from the traditional tasks that the police perform. The three components impose the responsibility on the police to deliver counter terrorism services in combination with patrol and investigation services. This means that the police need to target the activities of terrorists and develop the processes that establish trust when communicating with the public so that intelligence can be gathered (Howard 2004).

Countering Terrorism in the United Kingdom

41

The core of the strategy re-aligns the emphasis placed on prevention and the pre-­ emption of possible terrorist attacks. This has come about because the terrorists are using suicidal tactics in their attacks, and this has two implications for the police: the need to act on intelligence and the need to develop relationships with the community to ensure that they share intelligence (Hindle 2007). The tasks that the police need to undertake to meet the direction of the strategy have been described as the four Ps, and are: 1. Prevent—address the underlying causes of terrorism. 2. Pursue—use intelligence effectively to disrupt and apprehend the terrorists. 3. Protect—ensure that reasonable security precautions are in place. 4. Prepare—making sure that there are people and resources in place to respond effectively to the consequences of a terrorist attack (Lewis 2004). This means that the police need to develop and maintain their capabilities and capacities in countering the threat of terrorism and they need to establish frameworks that will assist communities to develop their own security. This will counter any efforts taken by terrorist groups to radicalize those who are vulnerable (United Kingdom Government 2006). In a practical sense, the police need to ensure that they have the following abilities and the resources to respond to terrorism: well-­ trained personnel at the gold level who are able to take command and control of a terrorist incident, a response structure that has been tested and exercised, that personnel at the tactical, silver and bronze levels of command have the capability to take control at the scene of an incident and are able to use Police Support Units and other specialist units to secure the location and maintain public order (Gregory 2007).

 esponding to Suicide Terrorists and Bombers R in the United Kingdom The threat of terrorists and bombers committing suicide during an attack poses a number of different challenges for the police compared to traditional terrorist attacks. Terrorists who are prepared to commit suicide may use a person, an aircraft, a vehicle, or a boat to undertake their attack, which means that the scale of the attack may be much larger and more devastating than if a bomb was used. Another challenge that needs to be managed during a suicide attack relates to the shock value that is generated when a terrorist commits suicide (Gregory 2007). The police need to have tactical options available to them to prevent a suicide bomber attack. The following four questions may guide the police in developing their tactical options: 1. Can the early gathering of intelligence from the community and elsewhere identify that there is a threat of a terrorist using a suicide bomb and who the bomber(s) are?

42

2  The Police Response to Terrorism – Draft Chapter

2. Can technology or bomb dogs identify the bomber(s) if earlier disruption operations are either not feasible or are unsuccessful? 3. How will the bomb be triggered? The options are self-detonation, by automatic timer or from the remote detonation by a third party. 4. How do you respond to, or stop an identified bomber(s)? (Gregory, (2007).

The Prevention of Terrorism Research has suggested that decision-makers place a greater emphasis on responding to terrorism than on preventing terrorism (Bellavita 2005; Pelfrey 2009). The emphasis that policymakers placed on responding to terrorism instead of preventing terrorism was highlighted by the former Chairman of the United States House Committee on Homeland Security when he suggested that “the Homeland Security system is not designed to support prevention as its first priority, it is designed to respond” (Bellavita 2005, p. 3; Pelfrey 2009, p. 261). The prevention of terrorism is one of the most important components of responding to the threat of terrorism (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 2014). To prevent terrorism, three aspects of terrorism need to be concentrated on. The immediate focus should be on the events that have occurred or are occurring, and the perpetrators of the event. There also needs to be a long-term focus on the factors that influence individuals to become terrorists or that lead to individuals supporting terrorist attacks (Pickering et al. 2007). One of the methods for assisting the police in preventing terrorism, as discussed earlier in this chapter, is Community-oriented Policing. Community-oriented Policing has been used for many years as a way of reducing crime (Gill et al. 2014; Sherman et al. 1998). As Schanzer et al. (2016) noted while the strategy had been used by police agencies prior to the September 11 attacks, it was not endorsed as an official strategy of the United States Government until 2011, when the White House released its national strategy document, Empowering Local Partnerships to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States (Office of the President of the United States 2011). Since September 11, some police agencies have made progress in their preparations to respond to terrorism (Donnermeyer 2002; Giblin et al. 2009; Marion and Cronin 2009; Randol 2012; Schafer et al. 2009; Stewart and Morris 2009; Thacher 2005), but research has suggested that progress in implementing terrorism prevention programs and initiatives has been limited (Carter and Carter 2009; Pelfrey 2009). One of the reasons why police agencies may not have made progress in developing terrorism programs and strategies is because they are more focused on being prepared to respond to terrorism (Bellavita 2005; Pelfrey 2009; Shernock 2009). It could also be because prevention activities are intrusive on a community and are incompatible with traditional policing functions (Randol 2013).

The Prevention of Terrorism

43

The prevention of terrorism relies on the activities that the police undertake. However, the police are challenged by a range of factors within a system that contains many “inherent flaws” (Pelfrey 2009, p.  261). Questions have been raised about the capacity and capability of the police to prevent terrorism-related threats and what other agencies should be involved in its prevention (Randol 2013). The primary factor that challenges the police in preventing terrorism is premised on the police being able to pre-empt terrorist threats through intervention and mitigation. Another factor is because there has been very little empirical research that has been carried out on the effectiveness of terrorism prevention programs and strategies. Research conducted in this area would provide police agencies with some guidance. Furthermore, preventing terrorism may not be a top priority for some police agencies that must also respond to violent crime, drug use, and other public security concerns (Schanzer et al. 2016). One of the difficulties in preventing terrorism is that it focuses on addressing violent extremism by Muslims and not on other forms of violent extremism (Shane 2015). Governments have provided little guidance on the methods that the police should use to respond to terrorism (Pelfrey 2009; White 2004). Any direction given by Western governments has been broad and vague and has not provided information in how prevention strategies should be designed (Pelfrey 2007). This has led the police to struggle with understanding their role in preventing terrorism and how they should develop strategies and tactics to counter terrorism (Pelfrey 2007). The role of preventing terrorism is incompatible with the tasks that the police traditionally undertake (Shernock 2009), which is to react to the occurrence of a crime (Braga 2002; Goldstein 1979, 1990). The organizational structure of a police agency, and the plans, procedures, policies, and tactics that it uses have been designed to suit a reactive rather than a proactive approach. A proactive approach is what is needed to prevent terrorism (Randol 2013). Nor do the police have the capacity or the capability to gather and analyze intelligence that could prevent terrorism. Thacher (2005) deliberated whether it was the responsibility of the police to gather intelligence or whether the gathering of intelligence should be the responsibility of intelligence agencies. The surveillance methods needed to gather information about potential terrorists is often intrusive and has the potential to threaten civil liberties (Carter and Carter 2009; Shernock 2009; Thacher 2005). Balancing the resources that are required to undertake terrorism prevention and response tasks with the resources that are needed to undertake traditional policing roles is also problematic (Randol 2013). Preventing terrorism is resource intensive (Schanzer et al. 2016), and there are differing views on how the police should balance the priorities of preventing terrorism and being prepared to respond. Despite the challenges discussed, establishing a relationship with the community that is appropriately framed, resourced, and implemented will provide a foundation for preventing terrorism (Schanzer et al. 2016).

44

2  The Police Response to Terrorism – Draft Chapter

Conclusion The complex and changing nature of terrorism requires the application of innovative and collaborative prevention and response strategies (Slettenmark et  al. 2019). Preventing and responding to terrorism is a multi-agency activity and the police must work with intelligence agencies, security services, and other agencies to ensure that any preventative or response action is undertaken within the framework of the law (Gregory 2007; Lum et  al. 2006). Countering terrorism is principally about pre-empting and disrupting the behavior of potential terrorists so that the likelihood of a terrorist attack occurring is diminished. The police must be able to measure success effectively and to be able to learn from their successes and their mistakes (Neyroud 2007). This means that the police also need to understand that each aspect of policing has a relationship with other aspects of policing. In other words, any activities undertaken in preventing or responding to terrorism will affect the delivery of other policing services, such as the policing of communities. Furthermore, the skills and practices developed for the policing of terrorism will have an impact on policing, especially in the allocation of limited resources and in the development of strategies and tactics for dealing with crime in the community (Neyroud 2007). Preventing and responding to terrorism require different activities from those that are traditionally performed by the police. To prevent and respond to terrorism, police officers and investigators need to have different policing, intelligence gathering, and interviewing skills. They also need to be more perceptive to the behavior of individuals in their communities and more aware of the activities that are taking place in their communities. Police managers and executive members will also require skills, especially in relation to leadership, negotiation, interagency coordination, and in being able to analyze information from a number of different sources. This means that police managers and executive members will need the capability to learn from the occurrence of terrorist events, including events that have occurred in other jurisdictions (Neyroud 2007). The response to a terrorist attack is different from the response to other crises and disasters. The response to a terrorist attack requires coordination and a comprehensive framework of pre-planning, mutual aid agreements, protocols with the media, and policies and procedures in place. This will ensure that personnel know what to do should an incident of terrorism occur (Donnermeyer 2002). There is also a need for the leadership of a police agency to commit to community engagement across many communities and that their staff are trained in outreach and cultural competency techniques (Schanzer et  al. 2016). The adoption of all of these strategies should ensure that the police are able to prevent and respond to a threat of terrorism in an equitable and just manner. However, the fact remains that irrespective of the pre-planning and training, the police and other terrorist response agencies will most likely be quickly overwhelmed by either a single or coordinated terrorist attack (Sloan 2002). This means that developing the response structures and processes at all jurisdictional levels will ensure that the police are capable of responding to a terrorist attack and will increase the resilience of the community.

References

45

References Acharya, A., Mandal, S. & Mehta, A. (2009). Terrorist attacks in Mumbai: Picking up the pieces. International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research S. Rajaratnam School for International Studies Nanyang Technological University. Audit Commission. (1993). Helping with enquiries: Tackling crime effectively. Her majesty’s Stationery Office. Bellavita, C. (2005). What is preventing homeland security? Homeland Security Affairs, 1(1), Article 3. Best, R. (2003). Intelligence to counter terrorism: Issues for Congress. The Library of Congress. Bowling, B & Sheptycki, J. (2012). Global policing. Sage Publications Limited. Braga, A. (2002). Problem-oriented policing and crime prevention. Criminal Justice Press. Brandhl, S. (2003). Back to the future: The implications of September 11, 2001 on law enforcement practice and policy. Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law, 1, 133–154. Braziel, R., Straub, F., Watson, G. & Hoops, R. (2016). Bringing calm to chaos: A critical incident review of the San Bernardino public safety response to the December 2, 2015, terrorist shooting incident at the Inland Regional Center. Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, U.S. Department of Justice. (pp. xv-xvi) Brodeur, J-P. (1983). High policing and low policing: Remarks about the policing of political activities. Social Problems, 30(5), 507–520. Brodeur, J-P. (2007). High and low policing in post-9/11 times. Policing, 1(1), 25–37. Burruss, G., Giblin, M., & Schafer, J. (2010). Threatened globally, acting locally: Modeling law enforcement homeland security practices. Justice Quarterly, 27, 77–101. Burruss, G., Schafer, J., Giblin, M., & Haynes, M. (2012). Homeland security in small law enforcement jurisdictions: Preparedness, efficacy, and proximity to big-city peers. National Institute of Justice. Butler, J., Cohen, M., Friedman, C., Scripp, R. & Watz, C. (2002). Collaboration between public health and law enforcement: New paradigms and partnerships for bioterrorism planning and response. Emerging Infectious Diseases, 8(10), 1152–1156. Carter, D. (2003). Law enforcement intelligence: A guide for state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies. US Department of Justice. Carter, D. & Carter, J. (2009). Intelligence-led policing: Conceptual and functional considerations for public policy. Criminal Justice Policy Review, 20(3), 310–25. Carter, J. & Carter, D. (2012). Law enforcement intelligence: Implications for self-radicalized terrorism. Police Practice and Research, 13(2), 138–154. Chang, N. (2002). Silencing political dissent: How post-September 11 anti-terrorism measures threaten our civil liberties. Seven Stories Press. Chappell, A., & Gibson, S. (2009). Community policing and homeland security policing: Friend or foe? Criminal Justice Policy Review, 20, 326–343. doi:https://doi. org/10.1177/0887403409333038 Clarke, R. & Newman, G. (2006). Outsmarting the Terrorists. Praeger Security International. Clarke, R. & Newman, G. (2007). Police and the prevention of terrorism. Policing, 1(1), 9–20. Clutterbuck, L. (2004). Law enforcement. In A. Cronin & J. Ludes (Eds.), Attacking Terrorism – Elements of a Grand Strategy (pp. 140–161). Georgetown University Press. Community Oriented Policing Services (2014). Using community policing to counter violent extremism: 5 key principles for law enforcement. Community Oriented Policing Services. Cooper, J. (2005). Curing analytical pathologies: Pathways to improved intelligence analysis. Center for the Study of Intelligence. Cordner, G. (1995). Community policing: Elements and effects. Police Forum, 5(3), 1–8. Crank, J. & Irlbeck, D. (2012). Introduction. Police Practice and Research, 13(2), 99–102. Crank, J. & Langworthy, R. (1992). An institutional perspective of policing. Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 83, 338–363.

46

2  The Police Response to Terrorism – Draft Chapter

Crawford, A. (1995). Appeals to community policing & crime prevention. Crime, Law & Social Change, 22, 97–126. Crawford, A. (1997). The local governance of crime: Appeals to community & partnerships. Oxford University Press. Damanpour, F. (1991). Organizational innovation: A meta-analysis of effects of determinants and moderators. Academy of Management Journal, 34, 555–590. D’Amato, S. (2019). Cultures of counterterrorism: French and Italian responses to terrorism after 9/11. Routledge. Davis, L., Riley, J., Ridgeway, G., Pace, J., Cotton, S., Steinberg, P., Damphousse, K. & Smith, B. (2004). When terrorism hits home: How prepared are state and local law enforcement? Rand Corporation. de Guzman, M. (2002). The changing roles and strategies of the police in time of terror. ACJS Today, 22, 8–13. Desai, S. (2005). Solving the interagency puzzle. Policy Review, 129, 57–71. Donaldson, L. (2001). The contingency theory of organizations. SAGE. Doner, C. (2013). Police under attack: Southern California law enforcement response to the attacks. Police Foundation. Dones, D. (2020). Terrorist recruitment of US gangs: Global criminal alliances and biological weapons. Lexington Books. Donnermeyer, J. (2002). Local preparedness for terrorism: A view from law enforcement. Police Practice and Research, 3(4), 347–360. Dutton, J. (2005). Bridging the gap between management—Organizational research and public policy. Academy of Management Journal, 48, 956–957. Edwards, C. (1999). Changing police theories for 21st century societies. The Federation Press. Epperson, C. (2005). Law enforcement first responders and terrorism: An international comparison of needs and capability requirements. Unpublished master’s thesis, California State University, Long Beach. Evans, S. (2005). Law enforcement intelligence: A call for new strategies and tactics in countering criminal insurgency. Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement, 13(3), 262–279. Executive Office of the President. (2003). Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8. Office of the Press Secretary. Federal Emergency Management Agency. (2017). National incident management system. 3rd edition. United States Department of Homeland Security. Foster, C., & Cordner, G. (2006). The impact of terrorism on state law enforcement: Adjusting to new roles and changing conditions. Council of State Governments. Gerber, B., Cohen, D., Cannon, B., Patterson, D., & Stewart, K. (2005). On the front line: American cities and the challenge of homeland security preparedness. Urban Affairs Review, 41, 182–210. Giblin, M. (2006). Structural elaboration and institutional isomorphism: The case of crime analysis units. Policing, 29, 643–664. Giblin, M., Schafer, J, & Burruss, G. (2009). Homeland security in the heartland: Risk, preparedness, and organizational capacity. Criminal Justice Policy Review, 20, 274–289. Gill, C., Weisburd, D., Telep, C., Vitter, Z., & Bennett, T. (2014). Community-oriented policing to reduce crime, disorder, and fear and increase satisfaction and legitimacy among citizens: A systematic review. Journal of Experimental Criminology, 10, 399–428. Gilmore, J. (2003). Forging America’s new normalcy: Securing our homeland, preserving our liberty. The fifth annual report to the president and congress of the advisory panel to assess domestic response capabilities for terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction. Rand Corporation. Goldstein, H. (1979). Improving policing: A problem-oriented approach. Crime & Delinquency, 25, 236–258. Goldstein, H. (1990). Problem-oriented policing. McGraw Hill.

References

47

Gordon-Smith, H. (2019, 2 April). Preventing terror: The impact of community engagement on reporting extremism. https://www.n8prp.org.uk/2019/04/02/ preventing-­terror-­the-­impact-­of-­community-­engagement-­on-­reporting-­extremism/. Gould, J. & Mastrofski, S. (2004). Suspect searches: Assessing police behavior under the U.S. constitution. Criminology and Public Policy, 3, 315–362. Grabosky, P. (1992). Law enforcement and the citizen: Non-governmental participants in crime prevention and control. Policing and Society, 2(4), 249–271. Gregory, F. (2007). The UK’s domestic response to global terrorism: Strategy, structure and implementation with special reference to the role of the police. Working paper. Real Instituto Eleano. Greene, J. (1999). Evaluating planned change strategies in modern law enforcement: Implementing community-based policing. In J. Brodeur (Ed.), How to recognize good policing (pp. 141–160). Sage. Haddow, G., & Bullock, J. (2006). Introduction to emergency management (2nd ed.). Elsevier Butterworth-Heinemann. Hahn, P. (1998). Emerging criminal justice: Three pillars for a proactive justice system. Sage. Harris, T. (2016). An independent review of London’s preparedness to respond to a major terrorist incident. https://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/londons_preparedness_to_respond_ to_a_major_terrorist_incident_-­_independent_review_oct_2016.pdf. Hart, G., Rudman, W., & Flynn, S. (2002). America still unprepared – America still in danger: Report of an independent task force. Council on Foreign Relations. He, N., Zhao, J., & Lovrich, N. (2005). Community policing: A preliminary assessment of environmental impact with panel data on program implementation in U.S. cities. Crime & Delinquency, 51, 295–317. Henry, V. (2002). The need for a coordinated and strategic local police approach to terrorism: A practitioner’s perspective. Police Practice and Research, 3(4), 319–336. Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary. (1997). Policing with intelligence: Criminal intelligence - a thematic inspection on good practice. Home Office. Hindle, G. (2007). Policing terrorism in the UK. Policing, 1(1), 38–42. Holden, G. (2003). Building a homeland security strategy: State and local law enforcement on the line. University of Pennsylvania, Jerry Lee Center of Criminology, Forum on Crime and Justice, Washington, DC. Home Office. (2021). Police workforce, England and Wales, as at 30 September 2020. Statistical Bulletin 03/21. Home Office. House of Commons. (2001). The Threat from Terrorism. House of Commons Defence Committee Report, HC348. Session 2001–02. Howard, P. (2004). Hard won lessons: how police fight terrorism in the United Kingdom. Safe Cities Project. Innes, M. (2004a). Reinventing tradition? Reassurance, neighbourhood security and policing. Criminology & Criminal Justice, 4(2), 151–171. Innes, M. (2004b). Signal crimes and signal disorders: Notes on deviance as communicative action. British Journal of Sociology, 55(3), 335–355. Innes, M. (2006). Policing uncertainty: Countering terror through community intelligence and democratic policing. The AANALS of the American Academy, 605(1), 222–241. International Association of Chiefs of Police. (2014). Using community policing to counter violent extremism: Five key principles for law enforcement. United States Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. Jackson, A. & Brown, M. (2007). Ensuring efficiency, interagency cooperation, and protection of civil liberties: Shifting from a traditional model of policing to an intelligence-led policing (ILP) paradigm. Criminal Justice Studies, 20(2), 111–129. Jefferson, T. (1990). The Case Against Paramilitary Policing. Open University Press. Jiao, A., & Rhea, H. (2007). Integration of police in the United States: Changes and development after 9/11. Policing & Society, 17, 388–408.

48

2  The Police Response to Terrorism – Draft Chapter

Johnson, T. & Hunter, R. (2017). Changes in homeland security activities since 9/11: an examination of state and local law enforcement agencies’ practices. Police Practice and Research: An International Journal, 18(2), 160–173. Kelling, G. & Bratton, W. (2006). Policing terrorism. Civic Bulletin 43. Manhattan Institute. Kim, M., & de Guzman, M. (2012). Police paradigm shift after the 9/11 terrorist attacks: The empirical evidence from the United States municipal police departments. Criminal Justice Studies, 25, 323–342. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/1478601X.2012.707014 Lambert, R. (2008). Empowering Salafis and Islamists against Al-Qaeda: A London Counterterrorism Case Study. PSOnline, 31–35. www.apsanet.org. Lambert, R. (2012). Countering al Qaeda in London. Hurst. Lambert, R. & Parsons, T. (2017). Community-Based Counterterrorism Policing: Recommendations for Practitioners. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 40(12), 1054–1071. Langworthy, R. (1986). The structure of police organizations. Praeger. Lawrence, P., & Lorsch, J. (1967). Organization and environment: Managing differentiation and integration. Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration. Lee, J. (2010). Policing After 9/11: Community Policing in an Age of Homeland Security. Police Quarterly, 13(4), 347–366. Lehrer, E. (2002, July 29). What cops can teach the FBI. The Weekly Standard, p. 17. Leman-Langlois, S. & Broduer, J-P. (2005). Terrorism old and new: Counterterrorism in Canada. Police Practice and Research, 6(2), 121–140. Lewis, L. (2004). Terrorism: Policing the unknown. Home Office Speech, 20/V/2004. Loader, I. (2006). Policing, recognition, and belonging. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 605(1), 202–221. Lum, C., Kennedy, L. & Sherley, A. (2006). Are counter-terrorist strategies effective? The results of the Campbell systematic review on counter-terrorism evaluation research. Journal of Experimental Criminology, 2(4), 489–516. Lum, C., Haberfeld, M., Fachner, G., & Lieberman, C. (2009). Police activities to counter terrorism: What we know and what we need to know. In D.  Weisburd, T.  Feucht, I.  Hakimi, L. F. Mock, & S. Perry (Eds.), To protect and to serve (pp. 101–141). Springer. Lyons, W. (2002). Partnerships, information and public safety: Community policing in a time of terror. Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management, 25(3), 530–542. Maguire, E. (2002). Multiwave establishment surveys on police organizations. Justice Research and Policy, 4, 39–60. Maguire, E. (2003). Organizational structure in American police agencies: Context, complexity, and control. SUNY Press. Maguire, E. & King, W. (2004). Trends in the policing industry. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 593, 15–41. Maguire, M. & John, T. (2006). Intelligence-led policing, managerialism and community engagement: Competing priorities and the role of the national intelligence model in the UK. Policing and Society, 16(1), 67–85. Marion, N., & Cronin, K. (2009). Law enforcement responses to homeland security initiatives: The case of Ohio. Southwest Journal of Criminal Justice, 6, 4–24. Marks, D. & Sun, I. (2007). The impact of 9/11 on organizational development among state and local law enforcement agencies. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 23, 159–173. Martin, K. (2004). Domestic intelligence and civil liberties. SAIS Review, 24, 7–21 Mastrofski, S. (1999). Policing for people. Ideas in American Policing. Police Foundation. McCulloch, J. (2001). Blue army: Paramilitary policing in Australia. Melbourne University Press. McGarrell, E., & Schlegel, K. (1993). The implementation of federally funded multijurisdictional drug task forces: Organizational structure and interagency relationships. Journal of Criminal Justice, 21, 231–244. McGarrell, E., Freilich, J., & Chermak, S. (2007). Intelligence-led policing as a framework for responding to terrorism. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 23, 142–158.

References

49

Meyer, J. & Rowan, B. (1977). Institutionalized organizations: Formal structure as myth and ceremony. American Journal of Sociology, 83, 340–363. Morreale, S. & Lambert, D. (2009). Homeland security and the police mission. Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, 6(1). http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/ jhsem.2009.6.1/jhsem.2009.6.1.1618/jhsem. Mosser, M. (2007). Law enforcement preparedness against terrorism in the state of Florida. Unpublished doctoral dissertation. Walden University, Minneapolis, Minnesota. Murphy, G., & Plotkin, M. (2003). Protecting your community from terrorist, strategies for local law enforcement: Volume 1 local-federal partnerships. Police Executive Research Forum. Murray, J. (2005). Policing terrorism: A threat to community policing or just a shift in priorities? Police Practice and Research, 6(4), 347–361. National Research Council. (2002). Making the nation safer: The role of science and technology in countering terrorism. The National Academies Press. Neyroud, P. (2007). Editorial. Policing, 1(1), 5–8. Newman, G. & Clarke, R. (2008). Policing terrorism: An executive’s guide. Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, U.S. Department of Justice. Nunn, S. (2003). Seeking tools for the war on terror: A critical assessment of emerging technologies in law enforcement. Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies and Management, 26, 454–472. New York Police Department Intelligence Division. (2008). Mumbai Attack Analysis. http://publicintelligence.net/nypd-­law-­enforcement-­sensitive-­mumbai-­attack-­analysis/. O’Connor, D. (2006). Intercepting terrorism: Combining effectively, responding collectively. Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary. O’Connor, D. (2007). Intercepting Terrorism. Presentation made at the RUSI conference ‘Politics and Terrorism’ on 15th February 2007 in London. Office for Domestic Preparedness. (2003). Preparedness guidelines for homeland security: Deterrence and prevention. United States Department of Homeland Security. Office of Homeland Security. (2021). National strategy for homeland security. https://www.dhs. gov/publication/first-­national-­strategy-­homeland-­security. Office of the President of the United States. (2002). The national strategy for homeland security. The White House. Office of the President of the United States. (2011). Empowering local partners to prevent violent extremism in the United States. The White House. O’Hara, P. (2012). Why law enforcement organizations fail: Mapping the organizational fault lines in policing. 2nd Ed. Carolina Academic Press. Oliver, W. (2004). The homeland security juggernaut: The end of the community policing era? Crime and Justice International, 20(79), 4–10. Oliver, W. (2005). The era of homeland security: September 11, 2001 to… Crime and Justice International, 21(85), 9–17. Oliver, W. (2006). The fourth era of policing: Homeland security. International Review of Law, Computers & Technology, 20(1–2), 49–62. Oliver, W. (2009). Policing for homeland security: Policy & research. Criminal Justice Policy Review, 20, 253–260. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (2014). Preventing terrorism and countering violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism: A community policing approach. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. O’Rourke, S. (2010). The emergent challenges for policing terrorism: Lessons from Mumbai. Presentation at the 1st Australian Counter Terrorism Conference, Edith Cowan University, Perth, Western Australia, 30th November, 45–53. Ortiz, C., Hendricks, N. & Sugie, N. (2007). Policing terrorism: The response of local police agencies to homeland security concerns. Criminal Justice Studies, 20(2), 91–109. Parmar, A. (2011). Stop and search in London: Counter terrorism or counterproductive. Policing and Society, 21(4), 369–382.

50

2  The Police Response to Terrorism – Draft Chapter

Pastor, J. (2005). Terrorism and public safety policing. Crime and Justice International, 21(85), 9–17. Pelfrey, W. (2005). Parallels between community-oriented policing and the war on terror: Lessons learned. Criminal Justice Studies, 18, 335–346. Pelfrey, W. (2007). Local law enforcement terrorism prevention efforts: A state level case study. Journal of Criminal Justice, 35, 313–321. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcrimjus.2007.03.007 Pelfrey, W. (2009). An exploratory study of local homeland security preparedness: Findings and implications for future assessments. Criminal Justice Policy Review, 20, 261–273. Petroski, H. (2004). Technology and architecture in an age of terrorism. Technology and Society, 26(2–3), 161–167. Pickering, S., McCulloch, J. & Wright-Neville, D. (2008). Counter-terrorism policing: towards social cohesion. Crime, Law and Social Change, 50, 91–109. Pickering, S., Wright-Neville, D. & McCulloch, J. (2007). Counter-terrorism policing and culturally diverse communities: Final report. Monash University. Pollard, N., Tuohy, R., & Garwin, T. (2003). Project responder: A national technology plan for emergency response. Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism. doi:https://doi. org/10.1117/12.548163. Rabasa, A., Blackwill, R., Chalk, P., Cragin, K., Fair, C., Jackson, B., Jenkins, M., Jones, S., Shestak, N. & Tellis, A. (2009). The lessons from Mumbai. Rand Corporation. Randol, B. (2012). The organization correlates of terrorism response preparedness in local police department. Criminal Justice Policy Review, 23, 304–326. Randol, B. (2013). An exploratory analysis of terrorism prevention and response preparedness efforts in municipal police departments in the United States: Which agencies participate in terrorism prevention and why. Police Journal, 86(2), 158–181. Rapoport, D. (2002). The four waves of rebel terror and September 11. Anthropoetics, 8(1). Ratcliffe, J. (2002). Intelligence-led policing and the problems of turning rhetoric into practice. Policing and Society, 12(1), 53–66. Ratcliffe, J. (2008). Intelligence-led policing. Willan Publishing. Ratcliffe, J. & Guidetti, R. (2008). State police investigative structure and the adoption of intelligence-­led policing. Policing, 31(1), 109–28. Reinares, F. (1998). Democratic regimes, internal security policy and the threat of terrorism. Australian Journal of Politics and History, 44(3), 351–371. Reuland, M., & Davies, H. (2004, September). Protecting your community from terrorism: The strategies for local law enforcement series. Vol. 3. Preparing for and responding to bioterrorism. Police Executive Research Forum. Riley, K., Treverton, G., Wilson, J., & Davis, L. (2005). State and local intelligence in the war on terrorism. Rand Corporation. Rinaldi, T. (2003). The role of “home” in homeland security, symposium number 4. Rockefeller Institute for Government. Roberts, A., & Roberts, J. (2009). Impact of network ties on change in police agency practices. Policing, 32, 38–55. Roberts, A., Roberts, J. & Liedka, R. (2012). Elements of Terrorism Preparedness in Local Police Agencies, 2003–2007: Impact of Vulnerability, Organizational Characteristics, and Contagion in the Post-9/11 Era. Crime & Delinquency, 58(5), 720–747. Rogers, E. (1995). Diffusion of innovations. Free Press. Schafer, J., Burruss, G., & Giblin, M. (2009). Measuring homeland security innovation in small municipal agencies: Policing in a post-9/11 world. Police Quarterly, 12, 263–288. Schanzer, D., Kurzman, C., Toliver, J. & Miller, E. (2016). The challenge and promise of using community policing strategies to prevent violent extremism: A call for community partnerships with law enforcement to enhance public safety – Final report. Duke University. Sedevic, M. (2011). An evaluation of the Chicago police department’s recruit curriculum in emergency response week relating to terrorism awareness and response to terrorism incidents. Doctoral Dissertation, Olivet Nazarene University, Bourbonnais, Illinois, United States.

References

51

Shane, S. (2015, 24 June). Homegrown extremists tied to deadlier toll than jihadists in the U.S. since 9/11. New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/25/us/tally-­of-­attacks-­in-­ us-­challenges-­perceptions-­of-­top-­terror-­threat.html. Sherman, L., Gottfredson, D., MacKenzie, D., Eck, J., Reuter, P., & Bushway, S. (1998). Preventing Crime: What Works What Doesn’t, What’s Promising. United States Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice. Shernock, S. (2009). Introduction to the special issue on policing and homeland security. Criminal Justice and Behavior, 36(12), 1249–1258. Silke, A. (2005). Fire of Iolaus: The role of state counter-measures in causing terrorism and what needs to be done. In T. Bjørgo (Ed.), Root causes of terrorism: Myths, reality and ways forward (pp. 241–255). Routledge. Slettenmark, O., Fetz, M., Townsend-Drake, A. & Moffett, H. (2019). Strategic coordination. (1st ed.). Counter Terrorism Preparedness Network. Sloan, S. (2002). Meeting the terrorist threat: The localization of counter terrorism intelligence. Police Practice and Research, 3(4), 337–345. Spalek, B. & Weeks, B. (2017). Community-based counterterrorism. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 40(12), 987–990. Stevens, A. (2004). The roots of war and terror. Continuum. Stewart, D., & Morris, R. (2009). A new era of policing? Criminal Justice Policy Review, 20, 290–309. doi:https://doi.org/10.1177/0887403409337225 Storm, K. & Eyerman, J. (2007). Interagency coordination in response to terrorism: Promising practices and barriers identified in four countries. Criminal Justice Studies, 20(2), 131–147. Straub, F., Zeunik, J. & Gorban, B. (2017). Lessons earned from the police response to the San Bernardino and Orlando terrorist attacks. CTCSentinel, 10(2), 1–7. Sullivan, J. (2008, 29 March). Analytical approaches for sensing novel and emerging threats. Paper presented at the 49th Annual ISA Convention, San Francisco, CA, USA. Sumpter, C. (2016). Community policing to counter violent extremism: Evident potential and challenging realities. S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. Taylor, R. & Russell, A. (2012). The Failure of Police ‘Fusion’ Centers and the Concept of National Intelligence Sharing Plan. Police Practice and Research, 13(2), 184–200. Thacher, D. (2005). The local role in homeland security. Law & Society Review, 39, 635–676. The 9/11 Commission. (2004). The 9/11 Commission report: Final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. W. W. Norton & Company. Theil, D. (2009). Policing terrorism: A review of the evidence. The Police Foundation. United Kingdom Government. (2006). Countering international terrorism: The United Kingdom’s strategy. Her Majesty’s Government. United States General Accounting Office (GAO). (2000, April 7). Combating terrorism: How five foreign countries are organized to combat terrorism (GAO/NSIAD-00-85). United States Government Printing Office. United States General Accounting Office (GAO). (2004, June). Border security agencies need to better coordinate their strategies and operations on federal land (GAO-04-590). United States Government Printing Office. United States Government. (2006). NCTC and Information Sharing: Five years Since 9/11: A Progress Report. www.nctc.gov/docs/report_card_final.pdf. United States Government. (2019). The National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America. https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/National_Intelligence_ Strategy_2019.pdf. Waddington, P. (2007). Editorial: Policing Terrorism. Policing, 1(1), 1–8. Walker, S., & Katz, C. (2001). The police in America. McGraw-Hill. Webb, J., & Katz C. (2003). Policing in an era of community policing. In S. Decker (Ed.), Policing gangs and youth violence (pp. 17–52). Thomson Wadsworth.

52

2  The Police Response to Terrorism – Draft Chapter

Weine, S., Ahmed, Y. & Polutnik, C. (2017). Community Policing to Counter Violent Extremism: A Process Evaluation in Los Angeles. Final Report Office of University Programs, Science and Technology Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security. College Park, Maryland: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Weisburd, D., & Braga, A. (2019). Policing innovation: Contrasting perspectives. (2nd ed.). Cambridge University Press. Weisburd, D., Hasisi, B., Jonathan, T. & Aviv, G. (2010). Terrorist threats and police performance: A study of Israeli communities. British Journal of Criminology, 50(4), 725–747. Wells, B. (2003, September). Bush’s war on cops. Washington Monthly. http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2003/0309.wallace-­wells.html. White, J. (2004). Defending the homeland domestic intelligence, law enforcement and security. Thomson-Wadsworth Publishing. White, J. (2006). Terrorism and homeland security. (5th ed.). Thomson-Wadsworth. Wilkinson, P. (1979). Terrorism and the Liberal State. New York University Press. Zhao, J., Ren, L., & Lovrich, N. (2010). Police organizational structures during the 1990s: An application of contingency theory. Police Quarterly, 13, 209–232.

Chapter 3

2008 Mumbai Terrorist Attacks

Introduction The terror attack in Mumbai on November 26, 2008, has been referred to as “India’s 9/11” (Machold 2017; Rabasa et al. 2009; Shankar et al. 2011) or as “26/11” (Kolås 2010). The attacks have been compared to the September 11 attacks that occurred in the United States because of the use of symbolic targeting, the extensive amount of media attention that it received, and the public’s reaction to the attack. In both countries, the response to the attacks by the police and the emergency services was well-­ organized and resulted in both countries strengthening their counterterrorism capacities and extending the mandates of their intelligence agencies (Kolås 2010). The commercial and entertainment center of India is in Mumbai, and it is known as India’s Wall Street, Hollywood, or Milan (Rabasa et  al. 2009; Shankar et  al. 2011). It is the most populous and busiest city in India and is the capital of the state of Maharashtra (Chakraborty et al. 2014; Shankar et al. 2011). The city is prosperous, has several historical landmarks, and is frequented by a large number of foreign tourists (Rabasa et al. 2009). It is also a city of contrasts, with a population density 10 times that of New York City, with more than half of its population living in slums (Monahan and Stainbrook 2013). The terrorist attacks in Mumbai lasted for more than 60 h, with more than 175 people killed and hundreds more being injured (Shankar et al. 2011; Sharzad and Kelly 2015). The terrorists entered Mumbai from the port and then divided into several teams. They undertook a number of sequential, but mobile attacks using automatic weapons and preassembled improvised explosive devices (IED) (Fuentes 2010). The attacks were an example of how quickly terrorists can operate and indicated that the counterterrorism measures used were not enough for this new type of terrorist attack (Sharzad and Kelly 2015). Even well-defended cities would have been caught by surprise by the tactics that the terrorists used (Fuentes 2010).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. den Heyer, Police Respond to Terrorism, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-43250-7_3

53

54

3  2008 Mumbai Terrorist Attacks

The attacks in Mumbai were not the first terror attacks to have occurred in India. More than 800 people have been killed in more than 25 separate, terrorist bombing attacks across India between mid-2006 and November 2008 (Curtis 2008). The deadliest attack that was carried out during this period was the bombing of a commuter train in Mumbai in 2006. This attack killed 209 people (Rabasa et al. 2009). Most of the attacks that were carried out during this time usually involved the detonation of bombs or timed or remote-controlled, improvised explosive devices being planted in crowded public places such as trains, markets, or mosques (Kolås 2010; Mohad n.d.). The location and the number of people killed in each of the terror attacks that occurred between 1993 and 2008 in India have been presented in Table 3.1. Most of these attacks were undertaken by the “Indian Mujahideen” (Machold 2017). The methods that terrorists use are continually evolving, and it is for this reason that the attacks in Mumbai were significant. The number of weapons that they used, the number of people that were killed and injured, and the strategy and tactics used made the attacks significant. It was the first mass casualty terrorism attack in the country where the terrorists had utilized hand-held weapons (Raman 2009). The use of small arms in multiple locations signaled a new form of terrorism (Sharzad and Kelly 2015) and “transformed the meaning of terrorism in India” (Machold 2017, p. 477). The attacks highlighted the strengths and the deficiencies in the capability of the Mumbai authorities to respond to a terrorist attack (Machold 2017) and tested the response structures and plans that were in place (Chakraborty et al. 2014; Shankar et al. 2011). The attacks revealed a failure on the part of the intelligence agencies (Mohan n.d.), the failure of the police to be prepared (Shankar et al. 2011), and the inadequacy of the police response (Mohan n.d.; Shankar et al. 2011). The attacks also signaled that global terrorism had arrived in India and were a turning point in how the authorities in India viewed the security of the country (Machold 2017). The response to the attacks was seen by the public as an abdication of the responsibility of the state to provide an appropriate level of security for the community. A number of senior elected officials resigned because of the attacks (Machold 2017) and there were calls for the government to make changes (Wax 2008). Pressure mounted for an extensive reform of the terrorist response framework (Barnard-Wills and Moore 2010) so that the police would be able to respond to any future terrorist attack “in a competent and ‘modern’ way” (Machold 2017, p. 478). The attack in Mumbai in 2008 demonstrated how the police should respond to small groups of terrorists who undertake coordinated, and sustained attacks on multiple sites in a large, metropolitan area. This chapter examines and critiques the response taken by the Mumbai Police to the attacks. It looks at three challenges that the police faced: their outdated communication networks, their ability to establish security and control at each of the attack sites, and their use of response resources (Fuentes 2010). The first section of the chapter discusses the background of the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), the terrorist group behind the attacks and is followed by a detailed description of the attacks, how complex they were and how each attack unfolded. The third

Introduction

55

Table 3.1  Terrorist attacks and the number of deaths in India 2003 to 2008 Date 1993 1 March 12

Details Mumbai

257 killed and 700 injured in a coordinated bombing attack. 13 bombs were used

2002 2 December 6

Mumbai

Bomb blast in a bus near Ghatkopar station killed two and injured 28

2003 3 January 27

Mumbai

4

March 13

Mumbai

5

July 28

Mumbai

6

August 25

Mumbai

A bicycle bomb exploded near the vile Parle station killing one person and injuring 25 11 people killed and 70 were injured by a bomb attack on a commuter train A bomb blast in a bus in Ghatkopar killed 4 people and injured 32 Two bombs exploded in South Mumbai, one near the gateway of India and the other at Zaveri bazaar in Kalbadevi which killed 60 people and injured 150

2005 7 October 29 2006 8 March 7 9 July 11

10 September 8 2007 11 February 19

New Delhi

66 people were killed by three bombings at a market

Varanasi Mumbai

15 people killed in three bombings Seven bombs exploded in railway stations and trains and killed more than 209 people and injured more than 700 32 people killed in a series of bombings at mosques

Malegaon

68 train passengers were killed after two bombs exploded and started a fire on a train

12 May 18 13 August 25

Train traveling between India and Pakistan Hyderabad Hyderabad

2008 14 May 13

Jaipur

15 July 25 16 July 26

Bangalore Ahmedabad

Seven bombing killed 63 people outside Hindu temples and markets One killed and 15 injured by eight bombings. 45 people killed and more than 150 injured from 16 small IED explosions 18 killed in five separate bombings

17 September 23 New Delhi

11 worshippers killed by a bombing at a mosque. Three bomb blasts killed 40 people at a roadside stand and amusement park

Adapted from: BBC (1993, 2003, Curtis (2008), Monahan and Stainbrook (2013), Rabasa et al. (2009), Singh and Ashra (2003), The Times of India (2003)

section looks at the police response to the attacks and examines the organization of the Mumbai Police and its capability to manage large, terrorist incidents. The last section of this chapter discusses several areas that may help to improve the response by the police to a terror attack.

56

3  2008 Mumbai Terrorist Attacks

Lashkar-e-Taiba (LET) and the Attacks on Mumbai Lashkar-e-Taiba, which translates to “the Army of the Pure,” was founded in 1987, by Hafiz Saeed, Abdullah Azzam, Zafar Iqbal, and several other Islamist Mujahideen. The group was formed with funding made available from Osama bin Laden. The group grew rapidly throughout the 1990s, mainly with assistance from the Inter-­ Services Intelligence directorate (ISI), which is the Pakistani intelligence and security agency. Lashkar conducted a proxy war for Pakistan against India for the control over Jammu and Kashmir in return for arms, funds, intelligence, and training in combat tactics and communications technology (Glanz et al. 2014). The group subscribes to a strict fundamentalist interpretation of Islam and seeks to establish an Islamic caliphate in southern Asia. Lashkar-e-Taiba has declared that the United States, Israel, and India are enemies of Islam (Center for International Security and Cooperation 2021). In early 2008, counterterrorism agencies in the west and in India began to receive information about a potential attack on Mumbai. The intelligence agencies and the police forces in India received information from local sources that Lashkar-e-Taiba were threating the city (Glanz et al. 2014). Later in 2008, the United States Central Intelligence Agency received information from electronic and human sources that there could be a terrorist attack on the iconic Taj Mahal Palace Hotel and on other sites in Mumbai that are frequented by Western tourists. This information was passed on to the Indian Intelligence Service (Glanz et al. 2014), but was not acted on. The Central Intelligence Agency warned the Indian Government on various occasions between June and November 2008 about the threats made by Lashkar-e-­Taiba and that they were planning an attack in Mumbai. The information identified several potential targets across the city, but the Central Intelligence Agency did not have any specific information about the timing or the method of attack (Glanz et al. 2014). By November 24, Lashkar-e-Taiba operatives had moved to the suburbs in Karachi, where they established an electronic control room with the help of an Indian militant. It was from this room that the Lashkar-e-Taiba LeT handlers would issue minute-by-minute instructions to the terrorists in Mumbai once the attacks had begun (Glanz et al. 2014).

The Terrorist Attacks The attacks began at approximately 9:40 p.m. on Wednesday, November 26, 2008 (Thirteen Productions 2009). There were 11 coordinated shooting and bombing attacks in prominent places and landmarks of Mumbai (Mohan n.d.). The attacks took place in the following nine locations: 1. Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus—formerly known as Victoria Station. 2. The Taj Mahal Palace and Tower Hotel. 3. Leopold Café.

The Terrorist Attacks

57

4. The Trident-Oberoi Hotel. 5. Nariman House, a Jewish community center. 6. Cama Hospital. 7. Metro Cinema. 8. the lane behind the Times of India building. 9. St. Xaviers College (D’Souza n.d.; Fox News Channel 2008; Magnier 2008). The attacks were carried out by 10 gunmen who were believed to have connections to Lashkar-e-Taiba, a Pakistan-based terrorist organization (CNN 2020; D’Souza n.d.). They traveled from Karachi, Pakistan to Mumbai, via a boat in order to circumvent Indian defenses (Rabasa et al. 2009). Along the way, they hijacked a fishing trawler and killed four crew members, throwing their bodies overboard (CNN 2020; Rabasa et  al. 2009). The gunmen docked at the waterfront near the Gateway of India monument and hijacked passing cars, including a police van, and these were used by the terrorists to travel to the attack sites (CNN 2020). The gunmen split into five teams of two to launch mobile attacks targeting the first five locations (CNN 2020; Yazujian 2017). They struck simultaneously (Mahadevan 2019), using automatic firearms and grenades (CNN 2020; D’Souza n.d.), at the Taj Mahal Palace Hotel, the Trident-Oberoi Hotel, Café Leopold, Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus, and the Nariman Chabad House (Azad and Gupta 2011). Some were shooting attacks, such as those undertaken at the Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus and the Leopold Café. At The Taj Mahal Palace Hotel, the Trident-­ Oberoi Hotel, and Nariman House, the gunmen entered the buildings and killed numerous people. They intended to establish a siege at these locations (Thirteen Productions 2009). In both hotels, the gunmen went from floor to floor and room to room to find targets. They also lit fires at the attack sites to cause further confusion (Thirteen Productions 2009). In total, 164 people, including 26 foreigners, were killed and at least 308 were injured at these locations (Black 2008; CNN 2020; D’Souza n.d.; Mohan n.d.). People that were found to be American or British passport holders were executed (McElroy and Bedi 2008), and at the Jewish cultural center, Israeli nationals were tortured before they were killed (Mahadevan 2019). A café frequented by Western backpackers was fired upon by terrorists who were armed with automatic firearms. Only at the city’s main railway station, where most of the people were killed, were Indian (Mahadevan 2019). Nine of the gunmen were killed during the attacks and one was arrested (D’Souza n.d.; Mohan n.d.).

The Locations Targeted The terrorists attacked 11 targets, five of which were planned targets and the other six were targets of opportunity (Acharya et al. 2009). The primary targets were the Taj Mahal Palace Hotel, the Trident-Oberoi Hotel, the Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus, the Café Leopold, and Nariman House. The targets of opportunity were the Cama

58

3  2008 Mumbai Terrorist Attacks

Hospital, the area around the Metro Cinema, a petrol station in Colaba, and two taxis, one in Ville Parle, and the other in Wadi Bunder (Acharya et al. 2009). The attacks on the planned targets are discussed below. 1. Leopold Cafe Leopold was one of the first sites to be attacked (Blakely and Page 2008). It is a popular location for European backpackers (Chamberlain 2008). Two terrorists traveled to the café by taxi and left a small bomb in the taxi upon alighting (Mohan n.d.). When the terrorists reached the café, they fired indiscriminately and hurled grenades into the building. The attack killed 11 people and injured another 28, of which nine were foreigners (Chamberlain 2008; Mohan n.d.). The two terrorists then walked to the Taj Mahal Palace Hotel (Acharya et  al. 2009) and planted a bomb on the kerb near the Gokul Restaurant and Bar (Mohan n.d.). The bomb was diffused by the police, but the bomb planted in the taxi exploded, killing two passengers and the taxi driver and injured a number of bystanders (Mohan n.d.). 2. Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminal Two terrorists traveled by taxi to the Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminal with the aim of killing as many people as possible. They left a bomb in the taxi and planted a bomb in the station while firing indiscriminately at people in the station. The attack started at 9.30  pm and resulted in 58 people being killed and 104 people being injured. This attack accounted for more than a third of the total deaths in the Mumbai attacks (Jenkins 2009; Mohan n.d.). It was at the railway station that one of the terrorists was photographed. The terrorist wore gray combat trousers, a dark blue T-shirt and was wearing a backpack that contained spare ammunition. The photograph depicted the terrorist nonchalantly shooting people who were waiting for trains (Chamberlain 2008). The terrorists were intercepted by a police officer and a number of Home Guards who managed to drive the two terrorists out of the station and onto the foot over bridge from where the terrorists continued to fire their weapons and use their grenades. The terrorists tried to break into a parked vehicle, but were unsuccessful, so they walked toward the Cama Hospital, firing at people as they went. As the terrorists were walking to the Cama Hospital, they shot and killed the Chief of the Mumbai Police Anti-Terrorist Squad and another senior officer (Chamberlain 2008). On entering the hospital, the terrorists killed two officers and injured several others. The two terrorists then walked down Mahapalika Marg, killing another two police officers and the driver of the car that they had attempted to hijack. As the police arrived, the terrorists continued to fire, killing three more officers. They then took control of a police vehicle and drove it to Metro Cinema square, while continuing to fire on pedestrians as they drove. They left the vehicle because one of the tires had a puncture. They hijacked another vehicle by holding the occupants at gun point. The terrorists were eventually stopped at a roadblock at Girgaum Chowpatty, where one of the terrorists was killed and the other was arrested (Chamberlain 2008; Mohan n.d.).

An Analysis of the Attacks

59

3. Trident-Oberoi Hotel The third pair of terrorists landed at the coast just opposite the Trident-Oberoi Hotel after the other terrorists had disembarked at Machimar Colony, Badhwar Park. One of the terrorists planted a bomb in a flowerbed near the main entrance of the Trident Hotel. On entering the hotel, the terrorists fired indiscriminately into the lobby, the restaurant, and the reception area. They took hostages from the Kandahar restaurant and went upstairs where they barricaded themselves in. It was 42 h before the security forces were able to end the attack. Thirty-seven people were killed, including the two terrorists and nine foreigners. Twenty-four people were injured (Mohan n.d.). 4. Taj Mahal Palace Hotel The fourth pair of terrorists reached the Taj Mahal Palace Hotel by taking a taxi from Badhwar Park. They planted a bomb outside the hotel and then proceeded to enter the hotel, where they killed 20 people by firing indiscriminately into the hotel lobby before being joined by the two other attackers who came from the Leopold Café (Tankel 2011). The four terrorists then went to the Heritage wing of the hotel and took British and American citizens as hostages (Mohan n.d.). 5. Nariman House Nariman House is a Jewish center run by Rabbi Gavriel Holtzberg, and his wife Rivka. The terrorists opened fire as they entered the center, killing the seven people who were in the building. The terrorists then laid siege to the center for 3 days. The Rabbi’s son, two-year-old Moshe, was rescued by his nanny. Moshe and his nanny were the only survivors (Chamberlain 2008).

An Analysis of the Attacks The terror attacks, known as 26/11, “scarred the nation’s psyche by exposing the country’s vulnerability to terrorism” (Despande and Raina 2011). According to Rabasa et al. (2009), the terrorist attacks were intended to not only to cause fear, but also “to attract both Pakistani and Indian recruits to their cause” (p. 2). The police Command and Control station was the first target of the attack. The attack on the station caused an interruption to the communications system and interfered with the police response (Vernon, Vernon n.d.). The terrorists knew that they could expect a rapid police response from lightly armed officers who could be “easily overcome” (Rabasa et al. 2009, p. 7). The other five locations that were attacked were soft targets and all were unguarded. The terrorists deliberately targeted civilians ( D’Souza n.d.) and appeared to have the goal of causing as many casualties as possible, particularly among Westerners and Jewish people (Friedman 2008; Rabasa et al. 2009). However, the attack at the train station seemed to focus on the killing

3  2008 Mumbai Terrorist Attacks

60

of Indian citizens (Rabasa et al. 2009), as did the 60-hour attack on the streets of the city (Azad and Gupta 2011). Across the city, dozens of people were taken hostage or were trapped by gunfire (D’Souza n.d.). It seemed that the general purpose of the attacks was “to spread terror in a major Indian city” (Friedman 2008). A summary of the attacks and the number of people killed at each location has been presented in Table 3.2. While most of the attacks ended within a few hours, the attack on the Trident-­ Oberoi hotel ended at midday on November 28 and the attack at Nariman House ended during the evening of November 28 (D’Souza n.d.). The siege at the Taj Mahal Palace and Tower did not end until Saturday morning, November 29 (Thirteen Productions 2009). The attacks were the outcome of “precise planning, detailed reconnaissance, and thorough preparation” (Rabasa et al. 2009, p. 3). It relied on the use of suicide terrorists and the element of surprise to create confusion to overwhelm the response capability of the Indian authorities. Confusion was also caused by the terrorists splitting into groups, moving from target to target, and using explosive devices as they departed from each of the locations (Rabasa et al. 2009). The terrorists were also under the remote command and control of handlers who were based in Pakistan. The handlers provided information to the members of each of the terrorist groups about what was happening in each of the attack sites (Unnikrishnan and Ahmed Ali 2006). The attacks comprised of “armed assaults, carjackings, drive-by shootings, prefabricated IEDs, targeted killings (police officers and Westerners), building takeovers, and barricade and hostage situations” (Rabasa et al. 2009, p. 5). Attacking such a large number of locations made it difficult for the police to respond. The approach that the terrorists used is called “swarming” which increases the lethalness of an attack (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2000). It is also known as “pulsing” and involves mobile attackers undertaking a coordinated attack at multiple locations (Sullivan and Elkus 2009). The terrorists used this type of attack to respond to the Table 3.2  A summary of the terrorist attacks in Mumbai on November 2008 and the number of people killed at each location Date 1 November 26 2 3

Location Chhatrapati Shivaji terminus railway station Cafe Leopold Cama and Albless hospital

4 November 26–28 5

Nariman house

6 November 26–29

Taj Mahal palace and tower hotel

Trident-Oberoi hotel

Details 58 people killed during the 90-min attack 10 people killed outside the train station 10 people killed in the 10–15-min attack Outside the hospital, gunmen ambushed a group of police officers and killed six of them Seven people killed in the three-day siege at a Jewish community center 30 people and two terrorists killed in the three-day siege 31 people killed and 28 people injured in the four-day siege

Adapted from Chamberlain (2008), CNN (2020), Despande and Raina (2011), (D’Souza n.d.), and Mohan (n.d.)

An Analysis of the Attacks

61

changes that the police were making to the tactics that they were using and to the deployment of their officers. The attackers would keep changing their location, which meant that their engagement with the police kept changing, and this made the response complicated. The planning of the attacks appeared to be intricate and comprehensive. Friedman (2008) claimed that the attacks were complex, but not “because of the weapons used or its size,” but because the terrorists used a number of different ways to get to the city and that they were disciplined and had suicidal tendencies. The terrorists used technology (Mohan, n.d) to stay in constant contact with their handlers in Pakistan during the attack (Roggio 2009). The handlers in Pakistan gave orders via telephone to the gunmen, instructing them to attack and execute civilians, and to ultimately commit suicide in order to gain greater media coverage (Roggio 2009). The simultaneity and the number of attacks at different locations were challenging for the police and prevented them from developing an initial, overall assessment of the situation. The media that was broadcasting live overestimated the number of attacks, the number of terrorists, and the number of people killed, and this in turn undermined the police assessment of the attacks (Rabasa et al. 2009). The broadcasts also put the police at a disadvantage because the information conveyed by the media was relayed to the terrorists by their handlers (Mohan n.d.; Rabasa et  al. 2009). The handlers alerted the terrorists as to when the police had arrived at a location and how many police officers there were. They also provided updates as to where the military units were located.

Concluding Comments The terrorists were members of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) (Azad and Gupta 2011) which is known to have links to Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (Trellis 2012). They planned the attacks carefully before the attacks were executed (Arabinda and Marwah 2010) and “displayed a proficiency in advanced combat techniques including intelligence collection/knowledge of terrain and target, speed of execution/surprise, weapons precision/proficiency, and fields of fire, control of terrain, and rapid neutralization and/or separation of targets” (Arabinda and Marwah 2010, p. 4). The attacks could not have been carried out without a well-established organizational structure and possibly without “state support” (Arabinda and Marwah 2010) or at least an agreement to the attack. The attacks were unprecedented because of its complexity and its protracted form, and this enabled the terrorists to kill and injure a large number of people (Arabinda and Marwah 2010). According to Azad and Gupta (2011), the attacks were a “game changer” in how terrorist attacks are undertaken: multiple attack locations, with an intent to kill as many people as possible.

62

3  2008 Mumbai Terrorist Attacks

The Police Response to the Terrorist Attacks Maharashtra State Police, of which the Mumbai City Police are a part, had not experienced a terrorist attack such as that in which they were confronted with on November 26, 2008 (High-Level Enquiry Committee 2018). Previous attackers in Mumbai had used small bombs to cause terror. Because small firearms had not been used in a terror attack before, the Mumbai Police were of the mindset that if any terrorist attack was to occur, then small bombs would be used (High-Level Inquiry Committee 2018). The sounds of gunshots at various locations across the city were initially assumed to have been caused by feuding gangs (Mohan n.d.). It was several hours after the first gunshots were heard that the shooting was confirmed to be a part of a terror attack (Gupta 2009). The simultaneity of the attacks was confusing for the police, and this was compounded by the fact that the police had never experienced a direct commando attack. The number of almost simultaneous attacks, with the perpetrators using a variety of weapons was something that took the police by surprise (Mohan n.d.). Despite the lack of experience in countering complex terrorist attacks, “the speed and efficiency of the police even in light [of the] simultaneity of the attacks cannot be ignored” (High Level Enquiry Committee, 2018, p. 12). The problem, was however, that the police responded to the attacks “as they would have responded to a normal law and order situation” (Mohan n.d., p.  14; High-Level Enquiry Committee 2018). In other words, the responding officers did not have any protective equipment, only a limited number of police officers had bulletproof vests, and almost all were armed only with sticks (lathis) or outdated 0.303 caliber bolt-­ action rifles (High-Level Enquiry Committee 2018). While the initial response by the police was reasonably quick, they were at a tactical disadvantage. By the time they arrived at the location of an attack, the terrorists had already positioned themselves at higher vantage points where they were able to fire upon and throw grenades at the approaching police.

The Intelligence Prior to the Attacks By August 7, 2006, a number of intelligence reports had been distributed that indicated that the Pakistan-based terrorist group Laskhar-e-Taiba (LeT) was making preparations to travel by sea to undertake attacks in India. A report dated February 27, 2007, stated that there was a possibility that terrorists were going to use a sea route. However, neither of these reports identified Mumbai as being the location of the attack or of the possibility that terrorists may launch an attack on Mumbai from the sea. Even if these reports specified such information, the Mumbai Police would not have had the capability or the resources available to conduct sea patrols to intercept any potential terrorists (High-Level Enquiry Committee 2018).

A Review of the Police Response to the Attacks

63

The possibility of a seaborne, terrorist attack was not thought to be realistic, despite numerous intelligence reports documenting the possibility of multiple and simultaneous suicide attacks originating from seaborne terrorists (High-Level Enquiry Committee 2018). However, contrary to what was reported by the media, there was no specific intelligence that seaborne terrorists would attack the Taj Mahal Palace Hotel or the Trident-Oberoi Hotel. Regular intelligence reports did, however, highlight that the two hotels and the Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus could be a target of terrorist violence. There was no intelligence prior to the attacks on November 26, 2008, that the Cama Hospital and Nariman House would be targets of a terrorist attack. Three intelligence reports had been received that stated that Jewish targets could be attacked. However, Nariman House was not specified in any of the reports (High-Level Enquiry Committee 2018). Although there was confusion in the analysis of the intelligence at the state level of government and that there was no specific information pertaining to terrorist attacks or possible locations, it would be incorrect to assume that the police did not take the information that was available seriously (High-Level Enquiry Committee 2018). All information received by the Police Commissioner’s office on possible terrorist attacks had been forward to operational units and the Anti-Terrorist Squad.

A Review of the Police Response to the Attacks The police received 1365 phone calls between 9 pm on November 26 and 2 am on November 27. Of these, 267 calls related to the terrorist attacks (High-Level Enquiry Committee 2018). The first phone call that the police received in relation to the gun fire and people being injured was received at 9.48 pm. The caller reported a shooting at the Leopold Café. The police thought that the shooting was drug related or because of a gang war. At 9.50 pm, a police officer was shot at, and at 9.54 pm, the police received phone calls that there were people shot at the Taj Mahal Palace Hotel. It was at this point that the police realized that there was a series of terrorist attacks occurring in the city (High-Level Enquiry Committee 2018). Not long after, at 9.56 pm, the Trident-Oberoi shooting was reported, and at 9.59 pm, the attack at the Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus was reported. The first report of an explosion in a taxi was made at 9.56 pm and a call about another explosion in another taxi was received at 10.53 pm. The violence caused by the explosions in the taxis and the attacks on six different targets made police officials believe that the city was under attack by a large terrorist group. The police were not able to gain any information from the phone calls as to the number of terrorists that were involved, their identity, or how many people had been killed or injured. To add to the confusion, the police received information that turned out to be a rumor that 60 terrorists had entered the city. They were also receiving phone calls from police units who were under attack and were outnumbered by the terrorists at various locations (High-Level Enquiry Committee 2018).

64

3  2008 Mumbai Terrorist Attacks

To respond to the calls from the police units, the police deployed more staff, but this was not done in an organized manner. The Mumbai Police initially responded to the simultaneous attacks promptly and efficiently, but it was in a manner that they would usually use to respond to a law-and-order situation. Police officers were deployed to the various locations but were at a disadvantage because the terrorists were holding vantage positions and the police did not have the tactical skills to counter the operational superiority of the terrorists (High-Level Enquiry Committee 2018). The following section examines the police response to the attacks at each of the attack sites. The information has been drawn from the Report of the High-Level Enquiry Committee (2018). 1. Leopold Café At approximately 9.30 pm, two terrorists entered the café and began firing indiscriminately. The first call to the police about the attack was received at 9.50 pm, but no details were given, other than some people had been injured (High-Level Enquiry Committee 2018). Five police officers, with two rifles between them, were deployed to the café shortly after the police received the first call. By the time that the police officers arrived at the café, the terrorists had already left to travel to the Taj Mahal Palace Hotel. Two police officers who were nearby and had responded to the sounds of the gun fire in the café were among those killed. 2. Taj Mahal Palace Hotel The Taj Mahal Palace Hotel is a dominating structure that is 11 stories tall and contains 570 rooms. The interior of the original section of the hotel opens on to a central courtyard and the doors of the accommodation rooms lead to walkways around the enclosed inner courtyard. Two terrorists arrived at the Taj Mahal Palace Hotel and entered by the main lobby. They were then joined by the two terrorists who had attacked the Leopold Café. These terrorists entered the hotel by the Northcote entrance. The first police officers arrived after the terrorists had killed several people in the coffee shop, in the area near the swimming pool, and in the passage in front of the elevators. The terrorists had established positions on the fifth and sixth floors of the hotel. The first police officers to arrive consisted of a small group of eight officers (Chamberlain 2008) who only had one automatic rifle, one 0.303, and their duty revolvers or pistols between them. From their position on the fifth and sixth floors, the terrorists were able to counter any attack from the police. The terrorists moved from this position and engaged in a number of small firefights with the police. During these encounters, a number of officers were injured, and the senior officer made a number of requests for reinforcements. Eventually, the terrorists moved to a position that enabled them to take several people hostage. At approximately 2.14 am, Friday November 27, a squad of Naval Commandos entered the Northcote entrance of the hotel. However, the squad only comprised of

A Review of the Police Response to the Attacks

65

seven commandos, who were not comprehensively briefed about the layout of the hotel (Chamberlain 2008). They did not know how many terrorists there were, or what weapons they had. The police cordoned the hotel but there were problems with communications between the officers at the hotel, the cordon, and the central control room. At about this time, the officers observed that the terrorists were “area clearing” each floor of the hotel using grenades. As a result of their injuries and not having the appropriate weapons, the police exited the hotel. At approximately 2.40 am, police officers entered an area of the hotel called the Chambers, an exclusive club for business people, after being told that people were trapped in the area. The officers were able to lead more than 30 people away to safety. At approximately 3  am, the police rescued another 48 people from the Gateway room on the first floor and 52 people who were trapped in the Zodiac Grill on the ground floor. It was only after rescuing people from the various areas of the hotel that the police were able to gather information about the terrorists and establish that there were four terrorists involved in the attack on the hotel. At around the same time, another eight Naval Commandos arrived at the hotel. The commandos then entered the hotel and made contact with the terrorists. The commandos used tear gas initially to “flush out” the terrorists. A gun battle ensued in the area of the Chambers and the kitchen, injuring two of the commandos. The terrorists then moved to another floor of the hotel (Chamberlain 2008). At approximately 5.56 am on Friday, November 27, the National Security Guard (NSG) contingent arrived at the hotel. Upon their arrival, the Naval Commandos withdrew from their positions inside the hotel. The National Security Guard entered the hotel and engaged with the terrorists. However, each time they were able to gain ground, the terrorists retreated into the maze of corridors and rooms, setting fires as they left (Chamberlain 2008; Monahan and Stainbrook 2013). This tactic created distance and separation from any pursuing group and gave the terrorists a tactical advantage. The terrorists were also able to use the floating circular staircase in the center of the internal courtyard to their advantage. The layout of the staircase allowed the terrorists to retreat upwards from the National Security Guard and enabled them to attack the guards from above (Monahan and Stainbrook 2013). Three attackers were killed at the hotel by members of the National Security Guard at 8 am on Sunday, November 29, and this ended the attack (Team HT 2008). Three hundred people were rescued from the hotel (Agencies 2008). 3. Trident-Oberoi Hotel At approximately 9.51  pm, a police officer on patrol near the Trident-Oberoi Hotel received information from members of the public that they had heard gunshots in the hotel. The officer was only armed with a revolver, but he still entered the hotel, and this is when he realized that there had been an attack. The officer found a number of injured and dead people in the lobby of the hotel. A number of dead were also found in the Atrium and the restaurant of the Oberoi. At approximately 10.15 pm, a bomb exploded outside the Trident. At around the same time, the officer at the hotel was joined by several other officers, and they began to search the Trident-Oberoi Hotel. It was in the lobby of the hotel that they

66

3  2008 Mumbai Terrorist Attacks

encountered one of the terrorists, who fired at them. The other terrorists had positioned themselves on higher floors of the atrium so that they could attack the police officers as they entered the building. At approximately 10.30 pm, a second bomb exploded adjacent to the hotel lobby. This explosion caused extensive damage and ignited a fire. As a result of the explosion, and because of the officers only had revolvers, they retreated to the entrance of the hotel. The police then cordoned off the hotel to await the arrival of Naval Commandos or the National Security Guard. On their arrival, the Anti-Terrorist Squad, with staff from the Quick Response Team tried to enter the hotel through the fire escape in the lower lobby, but it was dark and filled with smoke. At the same time, the terrorists were firing at them from higher floors. The squads could not enter the hotel from other sides of the building, as the fire exits could not be opened from the outside. At approximately 12 am, one of the terrorists was seen on the ledge between the 18th and 19th floors and was trying to break into locked rooms. The police fired at the terrorist, but he disappeared into the hotel. At approximately 2 am, Friday, November 27, a detachment of Naval Commandos arrived at the hotel. At about 2.45 am, the commandos stormed the hotel and sighted a terrorist on the ninth floor but could not advance toward the terrorist because they came under attack from the other terrorists. The commandos then joined with the National Security Group and cleared the hotel, floor by floor, eventually killing all of the terrorists. Members of the National Security Guard rescued 250 people from the Oberoi (Agencies 2008). 4. Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus and Cama Hospital At approximately 9.40  pm, two terrorists alighted from a taxi outside the Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus building. They entered the building from the area where the long-distance trains arrive and depart. They entered a toilet block and at approximately 9.44 pm, they entered the passenger waiting area that faces the platforms and started to indiscriminately fire at the people in the area. The two terrorists then advanced toward the area where the suburban trains arrive and depart. The two rail stations are connected by a large canopy that provides entry to either the local train station or the long-distance train station, and on one side, the Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus Police Station is located. By 10.02 pm, the terrorists had reached the Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus Police station where they fired and seriously injured and killed a number of police officers. The officers that were protecting the police station were overwhelmed by the superior fire power of the terrorists, but their resistance led to the terrorists leaving the area via a foot-overbridge that crossed the main road and connected the Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus to a narrow lane that was adjacent to the Times of India building. The police in the control room and the police who were pursuing the terrorists could not track the movements of the terrorists because simultaneous events were happening in that area at that time. Police officers who were present in the terminus were not keeping those in the control room or those pursuing the terrorists informed of their response. Staff in the control room were under the impression that 60

A Review of the Police Response to the Attacks

67

terrorists had entered the city and were undertaking the attack at the terminus. Staff in the control room also feared that their building would be attacked because their building was adjunct to the Times of India Lane. There were also false reports that the GT Hospital and JJ School of Art were being attacked. The two terrorists who had left the Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus were able to elude the police by firing and injuring the two police officers that were following them. The terrorists then jumped over the rear wall of the Cama Hospital. On entering the hospital grounds, they shot at a number of huts near the rear gate, killing a number of residents in the huts. They also killed a security guard at the Cama Hospital who was standing outside the maternity ward of the hospital. They then headed toward a building on the opposite side of the grounds, where they killed another security guard. Upon entering the building, the terrorists climbed up to the upper floors to take a position that was to their advantage. The police entered the hospital grounds through the front gate, after receiving reports that the terrorists were inside the hospital. The police entered the main hospital building and climbed to the sixth floor where the terrorists were holding a number of hospital employee hostage. The police engaged with the terrorists, and a number of shots were fired. The police were overwhelmed by the terrorists and two officers were killed. The police then retreated from the building and the terrorists descended the stairs, exited the building, and jumped over the wall in the hospital grounds. During the Cama Hospital attack, the police had 60 Special Reserve Police and officers from the Quick Response Team at the rear of hospital building. Despite this large number of officers, many officers were killed because there was no planned or determined attack against the terrorists as they exited the building. However, a small group of police officers fired their revolvers toward the terrorists from the opposite side of the road. Upon leaving the hospital area, the terrorists fired at a car, injuring the driver. The terrorists tried unsuccessfully to hijack the car, but they could not break open the door of the car. A group of officers fired on the terrorists as they were standing beside the car, but during an exchange of gun fire, six police officers were killed. The terrorists then walked up the lane and ambushed a second group of police officers who were in a patrol vehicle. They killed the police officers and took the vehicle. They drove the police vehicle toward Nariman Point area, pursued by the police. The terrorists abandoned the vehicle near the Council Hall and hijacked another vehicle. The police attacked the terrorists at Chowpatty Beach, killing one and capturing the only surviving terrorist, Ajmal Kasab. Fourteen officers were killed and 20 were injured during the Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus and Cama Hospital attack. 5. Nariman House An explosion was heard by a lone police officer who was on his way to the Leopold Café attack. Upon investigating, the officer realized that the explosion had occurred at Nariman House. The officer was then joined by two other officers and the Special Reserve Police at approximately 11.30 pm. The officers cordoned off

68

3  2008 Mumbai Terrorist Attacks

the area and moved at least 300 people out of the surrounding buildings. The police then engaged the terrorists, and at approximately 8 am on Friday, November 27, they fired tear gas into the building. The terrorists remained in the building, sporadically firing at the police. At approximately, 4 pm on Saturday, November 28, the National Security Guard arrived to assist the police. A gun battle ensued, and the terrorists were killed. Members of the National Security Guard rescued 60 people (members of 12 different families) from Nariman House (Agencies 2008).

The Complexity of the Attack Several dimensions made the terrorist attacks complex and distinct from previous attacks in the region, mainly because the terrorists’ use of technology and misinformation (Shankar et al. 2011). An example of misinformation that was transmitted during the attacks was an email which was allegedly sent from Deccan Mujahideen, who claimed responsibility for the attacks as they were occurring (D’Souza n.d.). After a few hours, the police traced the email to Pakistan and established that the email was sent as a diversion, as the Mujahideen did not exist. However, this was only after the police had diverted some of their resources to locate and identify the Mujahideen (Shankar et al. 2011). The attacks were also unique in that the attack was carried out against an entire section of the city as opposed to a single target. The response by the Mumbai Police was also unique in that they were not supported by the Central Paramilitary Forces. This was because the Central Paramilitary Forces were not in a position to be a part of the initial response to the attack (Badri-Maharaj 2009). The Mumbai attacks were planned and staged in a conscious effort to obtain maximum media coverage, and this made the masterminds dependent on the media (Kolås 2010). The terrorists appeared to be focused on foreigners and this initially led the police to believe that the Islamic militant group al-Qaeda could be involved (D’Souza n.d.). The length of the attacks, the number of different locations that were attacked, and the operational tactics used highlighted the complexity of the attacks. The attacks lasted for more than 68 h, which was the longest attack ever carried out by a terrorist group (Acharya et al. 2009). Because the attacks occurred simultaneously, the Mumbai Police would not have been able to counter “a professional and well-trained group of heavily armed commando terrorists unless they had an equally professional and well-trained set of commandos who should have [sic] superior weaponry” (quoted in High-Level Enquiry Committee 2018). This perspective was supported by the New  York Police Department Commissioner Raymond Kelly, who stated that “the attackers displayed a sophisticated level of training, coordination, and stamina. They fired in controlled, disciplined bursts” and used hand signals to communicate with each other (quoted in Mohan n.d., p. 10). The terrorists made use of state-of-the-art digital technology and global positioning systems (GPS) to guide them to their target locations (Shankar et al. 2011). They remained in touch with each other throughout the attacks, using cell phones and

An Overview of the Mumbai Police Organization

69

voice over Internet protocols (Mohan n.d.; Shankar et al. 2011). The police, with assistance from the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation, accessed the phones of the terrorists after the attacks and found that the phones had received calls from a United States number, which made outgoing calls to three Austrian numbers using the voice over Internet protocols. The attack was coordinated and controlled by handlers in Pakistan. This was noted by Goodman (2011): The terrorists entered the hotel room of a hostage who claimed to be a teacher. It did not make sense that a teacher stayed in a suite. The attackers called their handlers with the name of the hostage. The handlers in the operations center [in Pakistan] ‘Googled’ this person’s named and asked the attackers. ‘Is this person bald? Does he wear glasses? Is he heavyset?’, the attackers responded yes, whereby the handlers told them ‘we found him online, kill him’.

This is the first example of terrorists using Google as a tactical tool to carry out a terrorist attack (Goodman 2011). Goodman (2011) also described: At one point the handlers picked up on a Twitter image that was broadcast by the BBC and relayed it directly to the attackers. The ‘Tweet pic’ actually gave away the location of the Indian counterterrorism forces storming the Nariman House during the waning moments of the event and resulted in the terrorist’s counter-attacking the assault forces storming the building from the roof.

Apart from the complexity of the operation, the diversity of the targets (patients in hospitals, the Jewish community, foreign hotel guests and everyday commuters at the Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus) made the response to the attacks difficult (Mohan n.d.). It was made even more difficult by the terrorists using minute-by-minute reporting made by the media, and the advice and guidance given by their handlers based in Pakistan. The terrorists monitored and utilized situational information that was broadcast from live media and Twitter to out maneuverer the police (Thussu 2009).

An Overview of the Mumbai Police Organization At the time of the attacks, the Mumbai Police employed approximately 42,000 people (Marpakwar 2008). The Mumbai Police is organized, armed, and equipped in the same way that the police in most of the other cities in India are, and provides similar training to their staff (Badri-Maharaj 2009). Police recruits complete less than 6 months of basic training, “in overcrowded training schools with grossly inadequate facilities” (Badri-Maharaj 2009, p.  149), where they learn basic policing skills and receive weapons training. According to Rahman (1993), this type of training means that not enough time is spent on any subject, leaving the average Constable inadequately trained. The level of training given to an officer or the lack of, and the obsolete weapons that the Mumbai police possessed may have contributed to the failings in the police response to the attacks and the number of police and civilian deaths and injuries.

70

3  2008 Mumbai Terrorist Attacks

How the Mumbai Police deployed their staff put them at a disadvantage when they responded to the attacks. They dedicate a large number of staff to specific policing roles which meant that when the attacks occurred, staff were not available to respond to the attack. Of the 42,000 officers, between 16,000 and 17,000 are committed to special duties, such as security, traffic, and special branches. This means that there are approximately 24,000 officers available for patrol and normal police station duties. The officers work in two shifts, with approximately 12,000 officers per shift. However, on a normal day, there are usually about 2000 officers who are on days off or are on leave per shift. According to the Report of the High-­ Level Enquiry Committee (2018), this translates to there being approximately 100 officers deployed to each police station across the city. This number decreases even further because each station carries a 10 percent vacancy rate. The Mumbai Police do have a number of specialist squads that are capable of responding to a terrorist attack. Despite not having a dedicated commando unit, the Mumbai Police have approximately 4000 officers in Local Armed Police Units, which are located at four different sites across the city (Badri-Maharaj 2009). The police also have three companies of Riot Control Police, with one platoon in each company that is equipped for counter-insurgency duties (Badri-Maharaj 2009). According to BadriMaharaj (2009), at least one Riot Control company and its counter-insurgency platoon was available on the night of the attacks. The counter-­insurgency unit formed the only Quick Response Team that was available during the attacks. The following sections examine the specialist units that were available to be deployed to respond to the terrorist attacks and that form a part of the Mumbai Police. 1. Anti-Terrorist Squad The squad was established on July 8, 2004, with an initial establishment of 450 officers (Badri-Maharaj 2009) and has the following mandate: • gather information about anti-national elements working in any part of the state of Maharashtra; • exchange information with intelligence agencies; • respond to the activities of organized crime groups; and, • investigate counterfeit currency notes and the smuggling narcotic offenses (Badri-Maharaj 2009). The Anti-Terrorist Squad was not able to respond adequately to the terrorist attacks. The squad lacked the tactical capability and did not have the weaponry available to be able to engage the terrorists, and as a result, many of its members were killed (Badri-Maharaj 2009). According to the Report of the High-Level Enquiry Committee (2018), the structure of the squad and its operations were in a state of confusion because it was under the dual control of Mumbai city and the Maharashtra state. 2. The Police Quick Response Teams The Quick Response Teams were established in 2003 to respond to a terrorist attack. The teams initially comprised of 8 senior officers and 48 officers, who were

An Overview of the Mumbai Police Organization

71

not to be older than 35 years of age. The members serve on a team for 3 or 4 years. The teams are available for deployment 7 days a week and the members work in two shifts of 12 h. Each 12-hour shift comprises of four senior officers and 24 officers and must be ready to move as a team with one senior officer and 12 officers at any given time. When the teams are not deployed, they undertake training and weapons firing every 4 days (High-Level Enquiry Committee 2018). On the night of the terrorist attacks, one team could have been deployed in 10 min and the second team could have been deployed within 40 min. However, the teams had not been deployed for some time because they were being used for other policing purposes and they were often split into small groups to undertake these duties (High-Level Enquiry Committee 2018). This practice confused the teams during the terrorist attacks and meant that the teams were not effective in making an assault on the Taj Mahal Palace Hotel and the Trident-Oberoi Hotel. During the attacks, the teams were deployed in smaller groups; at the Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus, they were deployed in four groups, with each group comprising of two senior officers and eight officers. Later, at the Cama Hospital, they were deployed in a group of two senior officers and nine officers, while at the Taj Mahal Palace Hotel, the team comprised of only six officers, and at the Trident-Oberoi Hotel, the team comprised of two senior officers and nine officers (Report of the High-Level Enquiry Committee 2018). The report by the High-Level Enquiry Committee (2018) stated that the original deployment structure of the teams was flawed and inadequate. The report noted that the teams should never have been deployed as squads of one senior officer and 12 officers, because this size was too large to undertake counter-insurgency type assaults. The committee noted that the teams should have comprised of one senior officer and five officers. The teams were not up to date in their training of counter-insurgency tactics or in their skills maintenance training. In the review undertaken by the High-Level Enquiry Committee (2018), it was noted that prior to the attacks, the teams had been trained in commando and counter-insurgency tactics by the State Reserve Police Force and by the National Security Guard. However, this training did not include any simulated training in confronting a terrorist attack and how to rescue hostages. Furthermore, the teams had not completed any live weapon firing practice since September 27, 2007, owing to a shortage of practice ammunition (High-Level Enquiry Committee 2018). 3. Assault Mobiles The Assault Mobiles were established on February 17, 2009, and are based at seven locations across the city. Each mobile consists of an Inspector and five officers who are equipped with one 9-mm pistol, one AK-47, one SLR, and one Carbine with an adequate amount of ammunition. They also have six bulletproof vests (High-Level Enquiry Committee 2018). Members of the mobiles are given 7 days of training in all four weapons and are required to attend simulator firing practice once a month. They wear the regular police uniform of the Mumbai Police and are posted for a period of 1  year to the unit. As noted by the High-Level Enquiry

72

3  2008 Mumbai Terrorist Attacks

Committee (2018), the members of the mobiles are effectively armed police officers and they were not capable of responding to the terrorist attacks of November 26 effectively. 4. Special Operations Squad This squad was formed in the 1990s and was meant to undertake anti-terrorist operations and to control crime. The squad comprises of 15 senior officers, 22 officers, and four drivers and is attached to the Detection of Crime Branch with the Crime Investigation Division. Each member of the squad carries either an AK-47 rifle or SLR or pistol. The squad had not partaken in any anti-terrorist operations, but were used to provide armed protection to investigating officers or when officers were serving a search warrant (High-Level Enquiry Committee 2018). The squad was not deployed during the terrorist attacks in Mumbai. 5. Motorcycle Commandos Squad The Motorcycle Commando Squad was established in the 1990s and was created to deal with violent, organized crime, and to respond to terrorist strikes in Mumbai. The commandos deploy two officers to a motorcycle and two motorcycles to a unit. The original squad comprised of 92 officers or 46 commando units and were trained in self-defense, the handling of wireless sets, the rescue of captives, the handling of weapons such as AK-47, SLR, Carbines, and 9-mm Glock pistols. At the time that the terrorist attacks occurred, the squad comprised of 58 officers with most being deployed at various places around the city, leaving only 10 to 15 officers available to respond to an emergency. The squad was not activated or deployed during the terrorist attacks (Report of the High-Level Enquiry Committee 2018). 6. State Reserve Police Force (SRP) The State Reserve Police Force (SRP) was created on March 6, 1948, as a Special Armed Police Force of the State of Maharashtra. The force is responsible for maintaining law and order, responding to disasters, countering terrorism, and the security of vital installations across the state. According to Bishnoi (2017), the State Reserve consists of approximately 16,000 officers and is the backbone of the Maharashtra State Police. It is organized into 16 groups, three battalions, and one training institution (Bishnoi 2017).

The National Security Guard and Operation Black Tornado The National Security Guard is a special force that was created by the Cabinet Secretariat under the National Security Guard Act of the Indian Parliament in 1986. The guard works completely within the Central Armed Police Forces structure as a second line of defense and is primarily used to respond to terrorist activities. The army and the naval authorities were requested by the police to provide support to the police response following the first of the terrorist attacks (Press

An Analysis of the Police Response to the Attacks

73

Information Bureau 2008). The guard arrived in Mumbai at 3  am on Friday, November 27, 2008, after traveling by air from New Delhi. The deployment of the guard to respond to the terrorist attack was called Operation Black Tornado and the first two locations that they were deployed to were the Taj Mahal Palace Hotel and the Trident-Oberoi Hotel. The guard was split into two squads, each under the command of a senior officer. Subsequently, two sniper detachments of the guard were deployed to Nariman house (Mohan n.d.). As it was the only agency with the resources and personnel to conduct this type of security operation, the guard undertook an extensive, floor-to-floor and room-to-­ room clearing of all of the attack sites. The clearing operation took a long time because the terrorists had established barricades and because civilians had hidden in many locations throughout the buildings. It took more than 900 soldiers and police officers to successfully clear and secure the incident sites (Vernon n.d.) A second contingent of the guard arrived in the afternoon of Friday, November 27 and a third contingent arrived during the morning of Saturday, November 28. In total, the task force comprised of 195 guard personnel (Mohan n.d.).

An Analysis of the Police Response to the Attacks The response by the Mumbai Police highlighted several flaws in its counterterrorism and threat-mitigation structure (Rabasa et  al. 2009) and in its organizational capability and response frameworks. Sullivan and Elkus (2009) characterized the flaws as being deficiencies in the analysis and operability of intelligence, its command and control, and its counterterrorism capability. There were also problems with coordinating the responses of the emergency response organizations. The first hours of the attack caused a state of confusion (Kolås 2010), which was exacerbated by officers in the control room thinking that the attack was only small and that it would end shortly with the terrorists being captured (Chakraborty et al. 2014). Chakraboty et al. (2014) claimed that it was possible that the officers in the control room did not place any importance on monitoring the attacks because similar incidents that had occurred previously had been brought under control quickly. Confusion also came about because the control room was not capable of handling the more than 1300 emergency phone calls that it received in 3 h. The calls to the control room were made while most of the attacks were taking place (Monahan and Stainbrook 2013. The inability of the control room to manage the response was exacerbated by poor communications and coordination between those in the control room with the deployed police officers and the single platoon that comprised of the Mumbai Quick Response Team (Badri-Maharaj 2009). The lack of coordination, according to Badri-Maharaj (2009), was demonstrated by “the fact that the Local Armed Police units were not fully committed within a short space of time to seal off areas of the conflict zone and to contain the threat” (p. 153). Furthermore, both the Local Armed Police Units and the Riot Control Police were slow to react and deploy, leaving

74

3  2008 Mumbai Terrorist Attacks

patrol officers to engage with the terrorists. Shankar et al. (2011) claimed, however, that the Anti-Terrorism Squad responded quickly, but were lacking in training and did not have access to the right equipment. This resulted in a poorly coordinated response, and because there were delays in deploying the correct police units, with some units not being deployed at all, the Quick Response teams and the Special Reserve Police were rendered ineffective (Badri-Maharaj 2009). The complexity of the attacks also highlighted a number of problems with the leadership of the Mumbai Police. They were not able to coordinate an effective response nor were they able to provide any reassurance to the public (Badri-Maharaj 2009). One of the reasons why the police were unable to coordinate an effective response was because all of the previous attacks in Mumbai had been carried out by terrorists using truck bombs. The police did not have any experience in handling attacks in multiple locations where the terrorists had used small arms. The leadership of the Mumbai Police was out of their depth in responding to the terrorist attacks (Badri-Maharaj 2009). There were also many organizational challenges. The patrol officers and their supervisors are employees of the city of Mumbai, while the command and executive officers are members of the Indian National Police, which is headquartered in New Delhi, which is more 700 miles away from Mumbai. Compounding this issue was the culture of the Mumbai Police, which is similar to any paramilitary organization, in that all orders are obeyed. Because patrol supervisors and officers are not trained to act independently and need to be given direction, they cannot act without approval from command or executive officers. This meant that the officers deployed were incapable of responding to the fast moving, well-armed terrorist attacks that were occurring in multiple locations (Monahan and Stainbrook 2013). These problems were intensified by the terrorists’ innovative use of technology (Burton and Stewart 2009), and the fact that the police in India do not generally carry firearms. Firearms are not carried by the police generally because India is a country that has a low crime rate (Badri-Maharaj 2009). However, patrol officers are the first responders to any terrorist attack, and they should have had access to the right equipment and have been trained in how to respond to a terrorist attack.

The Command and Control of the Mumbai Police The terror attacks initially appeared to be continuous and widespread (Shankar et al. 2011). Consequently, the police focused their response on control and coordination. Coordination of resources is essential as it enables the police to respond to concurrent attacks and for specialist teams to work interdependently with other police officers and supervisors (Shankar et al. 2011). One of the main drawbacks in the police response to the attacks was that there were no senior officers in command at the attack sites. Because there were no senior officers present, either inside or outside the Taj Mahal Palace Hotel, a police officer took command. The same officer was also in command of the attacks at the Leopold

An Analysis of the Police Response to the Attacks

75

Café and Nariman House. A crisis command center should have been set up to serve as a single point to coordinate resources and to provide a contact and safe arrival point for deployed officers (Shankar et al. 2011). The control room, which only had a single senior officer available, replicated the function of command and control. The control room should have been the center for the police response, led by the Commissioner of Police, but on hearing of the attacks, the Commissioner of Police went directly to the Taj Mahal Palace Hotel. If the Commissioner had been in the center, he would have been able to see how the situation was unfolding and that a number of sites were being attacked. From the center, the Commissioner would have had more information available to assess the situation and to make deployment decisions (see Report of the High-Level Enquiry Committee 2018). He would have also been able to gather his senior advisors around him to advise on the police response and would have been able to identify incident commanders who could have taken control at each of the scenes. Although the Mumbai Police had planned for a terrorist attack, they did not have a modular and flexible response structure that would enable them to organize and coordinate their resources and communicate with forward command posts (LaRaia and Walker 2009). Mumbai Police do not use an organizational response structure such as the National Incident Command System (see Federal Emergency Management Agency 2017), which is used in the United States, and similar derivatives of the system that are used in Australia and New Zealand. Nor did the Mumbai Police have a Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) that draws upon the experiences and lessons learnt from previous attacks and emergencies. The Emergency Operations Center (EOC) did not have access to live television feeds. Live television feeds would have enabled the police response commanders to have access to “real-time information in the quickest manner possible” (Kelly and Rizvi 2015, p.  5). Furthermore, the center did not monitor social media. Social media was an important element in the Mumbai attacks and could have been a source of instant information. There were numerous social media posts during the attacks; more than 1000 Twitter messages were posted per minute about the event at one point (Azad and Gupta 2011). If the Mumbai Police had had access to these, they would have been provided with up-to-date information on the attacks. While most of the officers understood their role in responding to the terrorist attack, there was an absence of leadership at the central command level of the police and in the control room. This meant that there was a lack of overt and visible leadership (High-Level Enquiry Committee 2018). The High-Level Enquiry Committee (2018) also commented that there was lack of cohesion and communication in the internal processes used by the police, which resulted from the bureaucratic structure of the organization. These issues arose because the police had not implemented any type of reform and nor had they undertaken any type of modernization program. This led to the police failing to complete day-to-day processes, such as the purchase of bulletproof vests, firearms, and ammunition and ensuring that officers and members of specialist squads had undertaken regular weapons firing training and practice. These factors culminated in the police not having an offensive capability (High-Level Enquiry Committee 2018).

76

3  2008 Mumbai Terrorist Attacks

One of the main organizational problems was the bureaucratic processes used (High-Level Enquiry Committee 2018). The bureaucracy of the police organization slowed down any of their plans to modernize and their plans to purchase firearms and ammunition. According to the High-Level Enquiry Committee (2018), the police approve the purchase of equipment and ammunition once a year, following a 13-stage review process. The lengthy process is compounded by a lack of approved equipment-testing laboratories, specialized equipment in the Indian market being unavailable, equipment not being able to be manufactured locally and delays in importing equipment. The police failed to appreciate that a terrorist attack could occur and this meant that there was no understanding of how to carry out an operation to respond to a multi-targeted attack (High-Level Enquiry Committee 2018). However, the report did highlight that the police were able to react to the unfolding events at five different venues in a short space of time.

The Police Response The failure of the police to establish command and control at the attack sites, according to Sullivan and Elkus (2009), can be traced to their flawed response doctrine and that they lacked “police operational art” (p. 1). The researchers defined police operational art “as the capacity to go beyond managing single tactical incidents to influencing the effects of multiple incidents in multiple locations over time” (p. 1). They then clarified the definition by stating that “[c]urrent police practice, for example, conceives response as a series of tactical engagements, rather than a campaign with many different elements that must be intricately coordinated to achieve a larger aim” (p. 1). The response by the Mumbai Police was tactic-centric rather than being strategic and operational in form. A tactic-centric response is restrictive and it fails when it is used against terrorists that attack a number of locations or when they split off into smaller groups. To respond to terrorist attacks at multiple locations, the police need to have operational strategies that “integrate operational swarming, manoeuvre tactics, and real-time intelligence support across the entire urban operation or battlespace” (Sullivan and Elkus 2009, p. 1).

Standard Operating Procedures The main flaw in the police response was its lack of preparedness. The Mumbai Police had Standard Operating Procedures available, but they were in a printed form and were not available digitally (Chakraborty et al. 2014). A printed form is difficult to keep updated. It is also difficult for the police to maintain Standard Operating

An Analysis of the Police Response to the Attacks

77

Procedures for these types of attacks because the tactics that the terrorists use keep evolving. The police only had their Standard Operating Procedures to guide them in their response to a bombing form of attack and not for any other form of terrorist attack. The procedure also stated that the Commissioner of Police would head the Crisis Management Command and the Senior Officer in Charge of Crime Investigations would work with the Senior Officer in Charge of the Anti-Terror Squad. According to the Report of the High-Level Enquiry Committee (2018), these procedures were not adhered to during the November 26, attacks. The Police Commissioner did not arrange for a formal debriefing session to take place with all of the staff who were involved in the response. Formal debriefings are held to assess what went wrong and how to improve the response procedures and structures of the police (High-Level Enquiry Committee 2018). Another problem was that the Hostage-Rescue Plan was flawed, and that the police had never used the plan in an operational exercise (Rabasa et al. 2009).

Training The training provided to police officers was another factor that influenced how the police responded to the terrorist attacks. It appeared from the way that the police responded to the attacks that they were ill-prepared for a terrorist attack and were not able to respond to the attacks effectively. Chakaborty et al. (2014) claimed that commanders and senior officers are generally better trained than those in the lower ranks, especially in responding to terrorist attacks, gang wars, and other violent incidents. The imbalance in the levels of training provided implies that the more higher-ranking officers are responsible for coordinating resources and for making decisions about the deployment of officers (Chakraborty et al. 2014). It is unclear whether the senior officers in the Mumbai Police knew of the command procedures and the resources required for responding to a terrorist attack. These types of incidents require more strategic decision-making because they evolve faster than other types of incidents. Nor did it seem that operational officers had received any active or maintenance firearms training at any time during the previous 12  months (Livingstone 2009). There were also shortcomings in the training of the commanders and officers of the Anti-Terrorism Squad. Although the members of the squad acted quickly, they were not trained in how to establish a command post and how to cordon an area and search for offenders (Rabas, et al., 2009). The terrorists’ intention was to not give the police a containable event, and as a result, the police did not know how to cordon an area that contained several ongoing attack sites).

78

3  2008 Mumbai Terrorist Attacks

Communications Clear and timely communications between police commanders and deployed officers are vital when a terrorist attack is taking place. Unfortunately, a number of problems were experienced during the Mumbai attacks. The outdated wireless system quickly became overloaded, and as a result, officers and the control room resorted to using personal cell phones to communicate with each other (High-Level Enquiry Committee 2018). This problem was compounded by the fact that the Mumbai Police do not have an electronic log to record phone calls or radio messages. This meant that officers in the control room had to record all phone calls and radio messages manually by writing details on specific record sheets. This laborious method of recording resulted in the officers in the control room not being able to coordinate the response to the simultaneously occurring attacks or to deploy officers when they received calls from field units for assistance (High-Level Enquiry Committee 2018).

The Media Both the media and the social media play a crucial role for the police when they are responding to a terrorist attack. The modes of media provide the police with access to up-to-date information (Oh et al. 2011). Information pertaining to an attack can be disseminated to the public and ensures that any critical information that is released is accurate and trustworthy (Oh et al. 2013) and is provided to the public at the right time (Shankar et al. 2011). During the terrorist attacks in Mumbai, the media were reporting live from the attack sites, which caused confusion around the cordoned areas. The live coverage was also used by the terrorists as a method for gathering intelligence on the police response (High-Level Enquiry Committee 2018). However, the terrorist attacks in Mumbai were not the only terror attacks in which the media and other public sources were used mistakenly to release tactical information to the attackers (Sharzad and Kelly 2015). During the 1972 Munich Olympic Games, for example, the attackers watched the television broadcast while they were in the residences of the Olympic Village, and in the 2013 Westgate mall attack in Kenya, the attackers from Al Shabaab received regular updates from their handlers via their cell phones (Onuoha 2013). The Mumbai Police did not work with the media, which would have been to their advantage, nor did they appoint a designated media spokesperson who would have been responsible for liaising with the media. Media briefings were not held by the police at any time during the attacks (High-Level Enquiry Committee 2018), and because media briefings were not held, incorrect information was released by the media. This also meant that the public were not fully informed (Report of the

Conclusion

79

High-­Level Enquiry Committee 2018) and resulted in the police failing to “project an image of being in control of the response, with the words ‘chaos’ and ‘paralysis’ being used repeatedly to describe events as they unfolded” (Sahni 2008, p. 3).

Information from Social Media Nor did the police monitor any forms of social media during the attacks. The lack of information gathering led to the police not capturing vital information regarding the terrorists and the attacks. One of the most successful examples of the police monitoring social media in real time was the Boston Police Department. Immediately after the 2013 Boston Marathon Bombing, information was gathered that led to the identification and the location of the two bombing suspects (Cassa et al. 2013). If the Mumbai Police had the capability to monitor the social media, they may have been able to gather critical information about the number of terrorists, their movements, and their locations. This information may have enabled the police to deploy their officers more effectively, thereby saving the lives of officers and members of the public.

The Handling of Intelligence Access to up-to-date or real-time intelligence during a response is necessary to assist with operational decision-making. Such intelligence ensures that the appropriate strategies and tactics are being used and that resources are coordinated and allocated effectively (Sullivan and Elkus 2009). The gathering of real-time intelligence is accomplished from the deployment of intelligence officers and by using technology that provides a common operating picture in a central command center. Unfortunately, the Mumbai Police did not have either of these capabilities. There was little coordination between India’s central security agencies and the Mumbai Police. This was even after the intelligence agencies had intercepted “chatter” about a possible Lashkar-e-Taiba attack on Mumbai. It is not clear whether the Mumbai Police received this information, but if they did, they did not act upon it (Rabasa et al. 2009).

Conclusion The former United Kingdom Security Minister, Lord West, described the Mumbai terrorists as acting “a bit like soldiers,” because they used military tactics, and because they used “fire and support” while moving forward, with the intention of killing as many people as possible (cited in Gardner 2010).

80

3  2008 Mumbai Terrorist Attacks

The 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks were like the September 11 attacks in the United States, a turning point in the evolution of terrorist attacks. The attacks in Mumbai were unique in that the terrorists deliberately targeted foreign nationals (Singh 2019). It was described by the New York Police department as “a major shift in traditional terrorist tactics” (p.  4). Furthermore, most of the previous terrorist attacks in India had been undertaken by using bombs at a single site. The attacks were a “new brand” of terrorism, using an urban setting and concentrating on multiple targets to maximize the number of casualties (D’Souza n.d.). The terrorists used tactics that are more often seen on battlefields and for which the police were not equipped or trained to respond to (O’Rourke 2010). The Mumbai terrorist attacks were a culmination of a number of previous attacks (Singh 2019). Internationally, terrorist tactics have been evolving since the 1970s, when terrorist tactics mainly involved the taking of hostages and demanding media coverage to highlight their cause (O’Rourke 2010). As a result of the introduction and the growth of social media, modern terrorists are not as dependent on conventional media coverage to achieve their goal of publicity, and they have now adopted more wide-ranging tactics to increase the number of people that are killed and injured and to increase the amount of shock experienced by the public. The attacks in Mumbai were significant because of their scale and complexity (Rabasa et al. 2009) and presented a number of challenges for the police (O’Rourke 2010). The attack involved active shooters that required a rapid police response to contain them (O’Rourke 2010). This is a different type of response from a traditional type of response, where the police would cordon and contain an offender. The new type of attack requires the police to be proactive in engaging the terrorist, which may require force to ensure that the terrorist is subdued. The attacks shook the Indian government in the same way that the American government was shaken by the September 11 attacks (Kaura 2020). The police were confronted with multiple attacks and were initially unable to gain an understanding as to the extent of the attacks and what was actually happening (O’Rourke 2010). The attacks revealed numerous “vulnerabilities and inadequate tactical and operational” capabilities in India’s internal security and police organizational frameworks (O’Rourke 2010, p. 160). It also highlighted failings in how the intelligence was analyzed and applied by the security agencies and the police, and how it was coordinated between these institutions. A summary of the limitations in the Mumbai Police response has been presented in Table 3.3 below. The main factor in responding to a terrorist attack is timeliness. Any evaluation of the police response to an attack will primarily be evaluated on this factor, together with whether the response was effective in terminating the attack (Shankar et al. 2011). The Mumbai Police responded quickly to the initial attacks, despite patrol officers not knowing at that stage that it was a terrorist attack. One patrol officer who was in the vicinity of the Leopold Café made his way to the café upon hearing the gunshots. Those in the control room and those in command of the police were confused because of the number of locations under attack and because of the lack of initial information and this meant that their response was not timely (High-Level

Conclusion

81

Table 3.3  Summary of Mumbai response to November 26, 2008, Terrorist Attack Failure to act on intelligence warnings No structure for sharing intelligence between agencies Outdated communications equipment which could not provide communications interoperability between the police units Leadership and command—no unified or central command was established Failure to use an incident command system No forward command—which led to such problems as not being able to cordon concurrent attacks in multiple locations Standard Operation Procedures for an attack other than a bomb were non-existent. Slow response by National Security Guard Lack of availability of automatic firearms Lack of availability of bulletproof vests Lack of availability of night-vision equipment Lack of training delivered in responding to terrorist incidents Failure to establish an operational command center Failure to monitor social media No media strategy No debriefing of the incident was held

Enquiry Committee 2018). The untimely response was compounded by the large number of phone calls being received and the overloading of the phone system. No immediate action was taken to stop the attackers’ “momentum” as patrol officers were not prepared for the intensity of the attacks (Sullivan and Elkus 2009). This arose from a deficiency in operational doctrine and the capabilities of the police (Sullivan and Elkus 2009). The Report of the High-Level Enquiry Committee (2018) took a different view and claimed that the “general police response to the terrorist incidents at five places was swift and according to the standard law and order response to such incidents” (p. 2). The National Security Guard was, however, delayed in deploying to Mumbai and did not arrive until Friday morning (D’Souza n.d.). The major failing in the response was the poor synthesis and dissemination of intelligence before the attack. Traditional practice, which has been in existence since the Cold War, was not capable of meeting the challenges presented by the methods adopted by the Lashkar-e-Taiba to plan the attack (O’Rourke 2010). The local police are the most suitable organization for gathering domestic intelligence, and this is because it is the police that operate in a community and are familiar with how a community functions. They are generally large organizations that are capable of gathering basic intelligence for strategic decision-making (Kaura 2020). However, as the police are not an intelligence agency, they need to balance their policing role with the gathering, analysis, handing, and acting on any intelligence received (Riley et al. 2005). As Rabasa, et  al., (2009) noted, command, control, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance were not integrated, and information was not provided in real time to the control room (Rabasa et  al. 2009) and had this happened, then

82

3  2008 Mumbai Terrorist Attacks

well-­informed decisions could have been made. There was also no coordination between Maharashtra state officials and Mumbai city officials (D’Souza n.d.) which is required by the country’s constitutional framework (Kaura 2020). The framework highlights that the responsibility for countering terrorism is shared between both central and state governments and that both have a significant role in gathering and analyzing national security intelligence (Kaura 2020). This structure was created to harness both central and state institutions and their resources, ensuring that there is the capability to respond to a terrorist attack (Kaura 2020). These problems were compounded by the inadequate command and control displayed by the senior and executive police officers (Sullivan and Elkus 2009), and the lack of organizational preparedness and capability to respond to a multi-pronged terrorist attack. The situation was made worse by the fact that the police did not use an incident command system to command and control the police response. The complexity of the attacks highlighted other organizational failings in its planning, its Standard Operating Procedures, the use of outdated firearms and communications systems, the lack of firearms training, and the lack of individual equipment, such as bulletproof vests (Chakraborty et al. 2014). Responding to the type of terrorist attacks that took place in Mumbai on November 26, 2008, requires sophisticated coordination, the allocation of police resources, support of real-time intelligence, and coordinated command and control (Sullivan and Elkus 2009). The establishment of a comprehensive operational planning framework is necessary to identify the objectives for the officers who are responding to an attack and to control the uncertainty and friction involved in violent conflict. This type of response structure ensures that officers are flexible and guided in their response and that they have a “common operating picture or concept of operations” (Sullivan and Elkus 2009, p. 2). The structure would enable the tactical and operational capability of the police response to transition between a low policing service delivery to a high policing deployment. Because there was no plan in place for managing the media, the 24-hour media coverage of the attacks increased confusion and provided the attackers’ handlers with real-time tactical intelligence and advice (Rabasa et al. 2009, p. 4). The handlers were able to relay this information to the attackers who were then able to use it to their advantage. The police relationship with the media can provide opportunities for the police during a response to a major incident. It can also provide challenges for the police. During the attacks in Mumbai, the terrorists were accessing real-time information regarding the police response and deployment via the live reporting by the media and this made it arduous for the police. The police should have used the media to communicate factual messages to the public and to detail the police response to incidents (O’Rourke 2010). Unfortunately, by not involving the media led to a reduction in the public’s confidence in the police and limited the amount of information that was gathered from the public.

Conclusion

83

One approach that the police could have used to improve their relationship with the media was to appoint a Public Information Officer (PIO). This person would be responsible for liaising with media outlets. However, this approach can lead to an open approach to the coordination of the response, which can be inherently problematic, especially with live reporting from incident scenes. This can provide information to terrorists (O’Rourke 2010). When the police use a Public Information Officer to coordinate with the media, they need to ensure that they have the appropriate media strategies in place so that the media does not release any information that details the police response tactics, their weapons, the specialist squads deployed or their intentions. The main shortcoming at the political level is that India does not have a government agency that can coordinate the operations and resources of the police and the security and intelligence agencies (Kaura 2020). Furthermore, the country does not have a robust intelligence system to counter terrorism and the counterterrorism strategy that it does have is “ill-defined, reactionary, and lacking in coherence” (Kaura 2020, p. 156). To respond to multiple, active shooter locations requires a coordinated police response and an incident such as that experienced in Mumbai would stretch the capability and resources of most police agencies around the world (O’Rourke 2010). To be able to respond to such an attack, the police need to consider five core activities that could be implemented to improve their response. These activities are establishing a crisis command center, assessing real-time needs of the incident, dispatching emergency responders, media management, and collaboration with other agencies (Bigley and Roberts 2001; Department of Homeland Security 2016; Rabasa et al. 2009; Shankar et al. 2011; Wybo and Kowalski 1998). The challenge now for the police is to ensure that they use the experience of these attacks to improve their responses to counter the changing tactics that terrorists use (O’Rourke 2010). The intent of the terrorists in Mumbai was to kill as many people as possible, which goes beyond the threat posed from armed criminals (Rabasa et al. 2009. This means that terrorists will continue killing until stopped, and police officers need to be trained and equipped to be able to engage with terrorists until specialist counterterrorist squads are able to respond. The attacks in Mumbai presented an example of the type of environment that the police operate in when responding to a terrorist attack. Heavily armed terrorists that use the latest technology, social networking, and social media are a part of this environment. Therefore, the police need to develop the capability to gather and analyze intelligence that informs the development of the appropriate response policies and strategies to use as a basis for the training and exercising of staff and this will ensure that they are well versed in the organizational response frameworks and procedures.

84

3  2008 Mumbai Terrorist Attacks

References Acharya, A., Mandal, S. & Mehta, A. (2009). Terrorist attacks in Mumbai: Picking up the pieces. International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research S. Rajaratnam School for International Studies Nanyang Technological University. Agencies. (2008, 29 November). Battle for Mumbai ends, death toll rises to 195. The Times of India. Arabinda, A. & Marwah, S. (2010). Nizam, laTanzim (system, not organization): Do organizations matter in terrorism today? A study of the November 2008 Mumbai attacks. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 34(1), 1–16, Arquilla, J. & Ronfeldt, D. (2000). Swarming and the future of conflict. Rand Corporation. Azad, S. & Gupta, A. (2011). A quantitative assessment on 26/11 Mumbai attack using social network analysis. Journal of Terrorism Research, 2(2), 1–11. Badri-Maharaj, S. (2009). The Mumbai attacks – lessons to be learnt from the police response. Journal of Defence Studies, 3(2), 145–156. Barnard-Wills, D. & Moore, C. (2010). The terrorism of the other: Towards a contrapuntal reading of terrorism in India. Critical Studies on Terrorism, 3(3), 383–402. BBC News. (1993; 12 March). 1993: Bombay hit by devastating bombs. http://news.bbc.co.uk/ onthisday/hi/dates/stories/march/12/newsid_4272000/4272943.stm. BBC News (2003; 14 March). Fear after Bombay train blast. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_ asia/2848123.stm. Bigley, G. & Roberts, K. (2001). The incident command system: High reliability organizing for complex and volatile task environments. Academy of Management Journal, 44(6), 1281–1299. Bishnoi, S. (2017). SRPF is the backbone of Maharashtra Police. The Protector. https://www. theprotector.in/srpf-­is-­the-­backbone-­of-­maharashtra-­police/. Black, I. (2008). Attacks draw worldwide condemnation. The Guardian (UK), 28 November. Blakely, R. & Page, J. (2008). Defiant Leopold café shows that Mumbai is not afraid. The Times (UK), December 1. Burton, F. & Stewart, S. (2009). Mitigating Mumbai. Stratfor Global Intelligence. www.stratfor. com/weekly/20090114_mitigating_mumbai. Center for International Security and Cooperation. (2021). Lashkar-e-Taiba. https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/lashkar-­e-­taiba. Chakraborty, R., Agrawal, M. & Raghav Rao, H. (2014). Information processing under stress: A study of Mumbai Police first responders. IIMB Management Review, 26, 91–104. Chamberlain, G. (2008). Mumbai terror attacks: Nightmare in the lap of luxury. https://www. theguardian.com/world/2008/nov/30/mumbai-­terrorism-­attacks Cassa, C., Chunara, R., Mandl, K. & Browstein, J. (2013). Twitter as a sentinel in emergency situations: Lessons from the Boston marathon explosions. PLoS Currents. http://www.ncbi.nlm. nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3706072/. CNN (2020). Mumbai terror attacks fast facts. https://edition.cnn.com/2013/09/18/world/asia/ mumbai-­terror-­attacks/index.html. Curtis, L. (2008). After Mumbai: Time to strengthen U.S.–India counterterrorism cooperation. Back-grounder, Number 2217, 9 December. The Heritage Foundation. Department of Homeland Security. (2016). National Response Plan. https://www.ready.gov/sites/ default/files/2019-­06/national_response_framework.pdf. Despande, R. & Raina, A. (2011). The ordinary heroes of the Taj. Harvard Business Review. December. https://hbr.org/2011/12/the-­ordinary-­heroes-­of-­the-­taj. D’Souza, S. (n.d.). Mumbai terrorist attacks of 2008. https://www.britannica.com/event/ Mumbai-­terrorist-­attacks-­of-­2008.

References

85

Federal Emergency Management Agency (2017). National incident management system. 3rd Edition. US Department of Homeland Security. Fox News Channel. (2008; 27 November). Wave of terror attacks strikes India’s Mumbai, killing at least 182. https://web.archive.org/web/20081204073907/http://www.foxnews.com/ story/0%2C2933%2C457885%2C00.html. Friedman, G. (2008). Strategic motivations for the Mumbai attack. https://worldview.stratfor.com/ article/strategic-­motivations-­mumbai-­attack. Fuentes, A. (2010). Emergency response is a product of preparedness. Presentation at 2010 Indiana Interoperable Communications Conference. Gardner, F. (2010). Police in training for ‘Mumbai-style’ gun attack in UK. 26 October. http:// www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-­11622218. Glanz, J., Rotella, S. & Sanger, D. (2014, December 21). In 2008 Mumbai attacks, piles of spy data, but an uncompleted puzzle. https://www.propublica.org/article/mumbai-­attack-­data-­an­uncompleted-­puzzle. Goodman, M. (2011). The business of illegal data: Innovation from the criminal underground. www.strataconf.com, September 22. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6ueKilyThQg. Gupta, A. (2009). Urban Counter Terrorism Operations: OP Black Tornado-A Case Study. Presented at the United Service Institution of India, New Delhi, on 4 March. High Level Inquiry Committee. (2018). Full Text: What the High Level Inquiry Committee on the 26/11 attacks had to say. https://thewire.in/security/26-­11-­mumbai-­terror­attack-­inquiry-­committee. Jenkins, B. (2009). Terrorists can think strategically. Lessons learned from the Mumbai attacks. Rand Corporation. Kaura V. (2020). India’s federalism puzzle, counter-terrorism challenge and NCTC debate. Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism, 15(2), 154–174. Kelly, J. & Rizvi, S. (2015). The continued relevance of the November, 2008 Mumbai terrorist attack: Countering new attacks with old lessons. Homeland Security Affairs, 11(6), 1–9. Kolås, A. (2010). The 2008 Mumbai terror attacks: (re-)constructing Indian (counter-) terrorism. Critical Studies on Terrorism, 3(1), 83–98. LaRaia, W. & Walker, M. (2009). The siege in Mumbai: A conventional terrorist attack aided by modern technology In M. Haberfeld & A. Hassell A. (Eds.), A new understanding of terrorism: Case studies, trajectories and lessons learned. Springer. Livingstone, N. (2009). Mumbai: The lessons learned: What not to do-implications for the west. DomPrep Journal, 1(9). Machold, R. (2017). Militarising Mumbai? The ‘politics’ of response. Contexto Internacional, September/December, 39(3), 477–498. Magnier, M. (2008; 3 December). Facing attackers with little more than courage. Los Angeles Times. Mahadevan, P. (2019). A Decade on from the 2008 Mumbai Attack: Reviewing the question of state-sponsorship. International Centre for Counter-Terrorism. https://icct.nl/publication/a-­decade-­on-­from-­the-­2008-­mumbai-­attack-­reviewing-­the-­question-­of-­state-­sponsorship/ Marpakwar, P. (2008, September 19). More teeth to fight terror, Times of India. McElroy, D. & Bedi, R. (2008). Bombay attacks: Britons and Americans targeted. Telegraph, 27 November. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/india/3529123/Bombay-­ attacks-­Britons-­and-­Americans-­targeted.html. Mohan, A. (n.d.). WikiLeaks project – 2008 Mumbai terror attacks – An analysis. IDC Herzliya, International Institute for Counter-Terrorism. Monahan, T. & Stainbrook, M. (2013, May). Learning from the lessons of the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks. The Police Chief, 78, 24–32. Oh, O., Agrawal, M., & Rao, H. R. (2011). Information control and terrorism: tracking the Mumbai terrorist attack through twitter. Information Systems Frontiers, 13(1), 33–43.

86

3  2008 Mumbai Terrorist Attacks

Oh, O., Agrawal, M., & Rao, H. R. (2013). Community intelligence and social media services: a rumor theoretic analysis of tweets during social crises. Management Information Systems Quarterly, 37(2), 407–426. Onuoha, F. (2013). Westgate attack Al-Shabaab’s renewed transnational Jihadism. Al Jazeera Center for Studies. http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2013/11/2013111112818580417.htm. O’Rourke, S. (2010). The emergent challenges for policing terrorism: Lessons from Mumbai. Presented Australian Counter Terrorism Conference, 30 November, Edith Cowan University, Perth, Western Australia. Press Information Bureau. (2008). Home Minister announces measures to enhance security. New Delhi, India. Rabasa, A., Blackwill, R., Chalk, P., Cragin, K., Fair, C., Jackson, B., Jenkins, M., Jones, S., Shestak, N. & Tellis, A. (2009). The lessons from Mumbai. Rand Corporation. Rahman, M. (1993, February 28). Trying to raise standards. India Today, pp. 58. Raman, B. (2009). Mumbai 26/11 a day on infamy. Lancer Publishers. Riley, K., Treverton, G., Wilson, J. & Davis, L. (2005). State and local intelligence in the war on terrorism. Rand Corporation. Roggio, B. (2009). Mumbai handlers in Pakistan cheer after ordering murders over phone. The Long War Journal, January. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/01/mumbai_handlers_in_p.php. Sahni, A. (2008). Mumbai: The Uneducable Indian. Outlook (Delhi), December 1. Shankar, D., Agrawal, M. & Rao, H. (2011). Emergency response to Mumbai terror attacks: An activity theory analysis. In R.  Santanam, M.  Sethumadhavan & M.  Virendra (eds.), Cyber Security, Cyber Crime and Cyber Forensics: Applications and Perspectives (pp.  46-58). IGI Global. Sharzad, R. & Kelly, J. (2015). The continued relevance of the November 2008 Mumbai terrorist attack: Countering the next attack. Homeland Security Affairs, 11, Article 6. https://www.hsaj. org/articles/4541. Singh, S. (2019). 2008 Mumbai Attacks: Author of book on 26/11 discusses significance of his book being adapted into a ZEE5 series. https://www.firstpost.com/entertainment/2008-­mumbai-­ attacks-­author-­of-­book-­on-­2611-­discusses-­significance-­of-­his-­book-­being-­adapted-­into-­a-­ zee5-­series-­7699981.html Singh, V. & Ashra, S. (2003). Blast in Ghatkopar in Mumbai, 4 killed and 32 injured. https://www. rediff.com/news/2003/jul/28blast.htm. Sullivan, J. & Elkus, A. (2009, June). Preventing another Mumbai: Building a police operational art. CTC Sentinel, 2(6), 1–3. Team HT. (2008, 29 November). Mumbai’s nightmare ends, finally. Hindustan Times. Tankel, S. (2011). Storming the world stage: The story of Lashkar-e-Taiba. Columbia University Press. The Times of India (2003, 28 January). 1 killed, 25 hurt in Vile Parle blast. https://timesof india.indiatimes.com/city/mumbai/1-­k illed-­2 5-­h urt-­i n-­v ile-­p arle-­b last/articleshow/ 35711165.cms. Thirteen Productions (2009). Mumbai massacre: Background information. 24 November. https:// www.pbs.org/wnet/secrets/mumbai-­massacre-­background-­information/502/ Thussu, D. (2009). Turning terrorism into a soap opera. British Journalism Review, 20(1), 13–18. Trellis, A. (2012). The menace that is Lashkar-e-Taiba. Policy Outlook. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Unnikrishnan, C. & Ahmed Ali, S. (2006). 26/11 calls traced to Pak serving Colonel. Times of India, February 26. Vernon, A. (n.d.) First responders critical incident guide. Red Hat Publishing.

References

87

Wax, E. (2008). In outcry over siege, two India’s emerge. The Washington Post Foreign Service, December 9. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-­dyn/content/article/2008/12/08/ AR2008120803685.html?sid=ST2008120900105/. Wybo, J. & Kowalski, K. (1998). Command centers and emergency management support. Safety Science, 30(1–2), 131–138. Yazujian, T. (2017). A comparative social network analysis of the 2008 Mumbai, 2015 Paris, and 2016 Brussels terrorist networks. Master’s Dissertation. The College of Information Sciences and Technology, The Pennsylvania State University.

Chapter 4

The Threat of Terrorism in Europe

Introduction The 2014 Global Terrorism Index (GTI) stated that between 2000 and 2013 there had been 48,000 terrorist incidents around the world (Institute for Economics and Peace 2015). The report noted that there had been a 61% increase in the number of terrorist incidents in 2012 compared with the number in 2011 and there had been a significant increase in the number of incidents in 2013 compared to 2012. Every year between 2000 and 2013, there was a fivefold increase in the number of terrorist-­ related deaths. There were 3361 deaths in 2000 and 17,958 in 2013. Most of the fatalities, 82%, were from terrorist incidents that occurred in five countries: Iraq; Afghanistan; Pakistan; Nigeria; and Syria. In the same period, only 5% of all terrorist-­related fatalities occurred in Europe (Institute for Economics and Peace 2015). Each of the attacks that occurred in Europe incurred a higher rate of fatalities than those that took place in the five countries: the train bombings in Madrid in 2004, the bombing and shooting attack in Norway in 2012, and the Underground and bus bombings in London in 2015 (Institute for Economics and Peace 2015). The report also noted that although explosives were mainly used in the attacks, firearms were used in more than 30% of the 48,000 terrorist attacks. The use of firearms in an attack increased from approximately 400 attacks in 2004 to more than 4000 in 2013 (Institute for Economics and Peace 2015). At the time that the report was written, some researchers claimed that a terrorist attack, similar to the type and scale of the attacks that occurred in Mumbai, was unlikely to occur in Europe or the United Kingdom as the planning needed for this type of attack would more than likely come to the attention of the police or the intelligence agencies (see Jenkins 2013). This prediction was incorrect, as the type and the magnitude of the attacks that were carried out in Paris in 2015 were similar to the attacks that were carried out in Mumbai. It was forecast in a report that was prepared by the United Kingdom Cabinet Office (2015) that this type of attack had © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. den Heyer, Police Respond to Terrorism, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-43250-7_4

89

90

4  The Threat of Terrorism in Europe

a medium to high chance of occurring again in Europe within the next 5 years and this created grave concern across Europe and the United Kingdom. Other attacks that were predicted to have a high risk of occurring were random terror acts. These attacks would be encouraged by jihadist groups who would use social media and online publications to incite sleeper terrorists to carry out attacks using bombs, firearms, or knives or to drive vehicles into crowds in Western countries (Jenkins 2013). Random acts of terror were occurring more often at the time of the prediction, with attacks being undertaken in London, including the murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby in 2013 (BBC News 2013) and a similar attack on a soldier in Paris two days later (Bertin 2013). Low-level forms of attacks are not new and can be traced back to when “[l]ate-19th-century anarchists in Europe developed a theory known as the ‘propaganda of the deed’, in which the theatricality of the crime was at least as important as the degree of violence employed” (The Economist 2013). These types of attacks may not result in a large number of casualties, but they attract the attention of the social media and the mainstream media to the event, which the terrorists want to have happen (Graham 2018). Prior to the terrorist attacks in Paris in 2015 and the terrorist attacks in Brussels in 2016, the factors leading to an attack were not appreciated or well understood by the European intelligence agencies and security services (Rathore 2016). Until these attacks, the intelligence agencies viewed the threat from Islamic State as being concentrated in Iraq and Syria, which caused European Union governments and intelligence agencies to ignore the increase in the number of radicalized youth and the number of foreign fighters who were residing in the European Union. This meant that the intelligence agencies did not implement prevention strategies and pre-emptive measures to decrease the risk of a terrorist attack occurring in the European Union (Rathore 2016). The terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels demonstrated that there was a need for governments in Europe to invest in the gathering and dissemination of specific intelligence that related to terrorist threats and the development and implementation of prevention strategies that would meet the threat (Crumley 2015). However, at the time of the Paris and Brussels attacks, other than the United Kingdom, the majority of European Union countries did not have the resources, capability, or legal frameworks that were needed to support a preventive approach to countering terrorism (Rathore 2016). This was the case in France and Belgium after the terrorist attacks that occurred there, but the problems in France arose more from the fact that the intelligence agencies and the police operated within a centralized structure. They were constrained by bureaucratic processes that is often found in centralized structures, rather than being constrained by the skills and capabilities of the personnel in these institutions (Rathore 2016). In the case of Belgium, the police did not have the capability to respond to the growing threat that Islamic State sympathizers and supporters in the country posed (Sanchez 2016). Limited resources and the constraints in the capabilities of the European security institutions and the police meant that the governments in the European Union needed to give priority to providing the resources that were needed and to build the

Terrorism in Europe

91

capability of these institutions so that terrorism could be prevented and responded to. Governments in the European Union also needed to look at ways of ensuring that their agencies would collaborate and that the agencies had the personnel who were trained appropriately and could develop and implement prevention and response strategies to deal with the evolving terrorist threat (Rathore 2016). This chapter has two sections. The first section reviews the threat of terrorism in Europe, and the second section reviews the threat of terrorism in the United Kingdom.

Terrorism in Europe The problem of jihadists in Europe is significant and far-reaching. Europe is home to a large number of jihadi believers and supporters. More than 6000 Europeans, including 1700 from France, made their hijrah (migration) to Iraq and Syria (Kirk 2016) prior to the attacks in Paris and Brussels occurring. Belgium and the city of Molenbeek have been referred to as “a microcosm for Europe’s wider problem” of jihadists infiltrating the Islamic community (Rathore 2016, p. 5). Those responsible for the terror attacks in Paris in 2015 and in Brussels in 2016 came from Molenbeek, which has been described as “a slum neighbourhood in Brussels with a history of radical Islam, drugs and lawlessness” (Rathore 2016, p. 5). Salah Abdeslam, who was arrested for the terrorist attacks that occurred in Paris in 2015, in Molenbeek on March 19, 2016, was found to be living there with his family and friends, who had helped him evade the police (Times of Oman 2016). Similarly, the Kouachi brothers who carried out the Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris in 2015 lived in a run-down, poor neighborhood of the city (Schram and Fredericks 2016). It has been difficult to respond to the jihadists living in Belgium because of the large number of jihadists who live there. The highest number of foreign fighters per capita from Europe to fight in the conflicts in Iraq and Syria came from Belgium (Sanchez 2016). Approximately 500 jihadists left Belgium, to fight in Iraq and Syria and when the fighting was over, more than 150 of these jihadists returned to Belgium, which increased the number of individuals who were likely to commit a terrorist act (Rathore 2016). At the time that the terrorist attacks took place in France and Belgium, Europe was facing an escalating threat from jihadi terrorism (Neser et  al. 2016). It was noted that because of the increasing threat, more terrorist plots were going undetected, which led to more deadly attacks. Neser et al. (2016) stated that 273 people were killed in terrorist incidents in Western Europe between 2014 and 2016 compared to 267 people being killed in all of the previous years. The large number of people killed between 2014 and 2016 can be attributed to a small number of extreme terrorist incidents that caused more mass causalities: the attacks in Paris on November 13, 2015, where 130 people were killed, the attacks in Brussels on March

92

4  The Threat of Terrorism in Europe

22, 2016, where 32 people were killed and the truck attack in Nice on July 24, 2016, where 84 people were killed. The increase in terrorist activity and the number of plots that had a link to the Islamic State began in late 2013 (Neser et al. 2016). This has been described as the “IS-effect” on jihadi terrorism (Neser and Stenersen 2014). The link between the increase in activity and Islamic State was attributed to the members of terrorist cells who had been trained and directed by the group, and to the individuals who responded to a call from Islamic State to undertake a lone attack (Neser et al. 2016). Nessar et al. (2016) stated that there were 135 documented terrorist plots in Europe from 1994 to November 1, 2016, or approximately six plots per year, on average. Between 2014 and 2016, there were 42 documented terrorist plots: 9 in 2014, 17 in 2015, and 16 in 2016 (Neser et al. 2016). In relation to the 135 plots from 1994 to 2016, 50 were perpetuated by jihadis, and of those attacks, one-third were launched between 2014 and 2016: 2 in 2014, 6 in 2015, and 10 in 2016. Of the 42 documented plots between 2014 and 2016, 38 were reported to have had a link to IS and the other four cases were linked to or were inspired by al-Qaida-affiliated conspirators (Neser et al. 2016). The more modern terrorist attacks that have occurred in Europe are different to those that were previously undertaken and appear to be a new type of terrorist threat (Neser et al. 2016). The new threat was identified by a number of researchers who considered that a new type of threat was posed by members of European-based, Islamic State terrorist cells who had a criminal record or a criminal past (Basra and Neumann 2016). Another factor that may have contributed to the change in the form of terrorist threats may have arisen from the large number of refugees who had made their way to Europe. The arrival of refugees gave the jihadi networks in Europe a larger pool to recruit from (Hegghammer 2013). Other factors that may have influenced the increase in radicalization are geopolitical and take place in the international arena. How the Muslim population in Europe view the involvement of Western countries in conflicts in the Middle East is one factor that may have influenced individuals to become radicalized (Neser et al. 2016). Relationships that have been built between European individuals and groups who have been training or fighting in places such as Syria may also influence the radicalization of individuals. Young, male Muslims who have migrated to Europe often become quickly disenfranchised from European cultures and this leaves them open to radicalization. They often play a crucial role in the establishment of terrorist cells and the establishment of relationships with international terrorist groups (Neser et  al. 2016). They often recruit like-minded people, criminals, and others from the margins of society to undertake jihadi or other terrorist activity (Neser and Stenersen 2014), and this causes non-political and non-ideological people to become involved in political violence and support the ideology of al-Qaeda or Islamic State. Neser et al. (2016) noted that the composition of European-based cells has remained consistent over time. The cells have links with international armed groups or with

Terrorism in Europe

93

members of groups who are operating in conflict zones and who make members of European cells act on their behalf (Neser et al. 2016). Members of European terrorist cells established networks with groups that were initially loyal to al-Qaeda. The groups that the cells communicated with were Islam4UK, Sharia4Belgium, Fursan Alizza (France), Millatu Ibrahim (Germany), the Prophet’s Ummah (Norway). The cells also used support webs such as The Zerkani Network (Belgium) and the Artigat Network (France). However, over time, the boundaries between the ideologies of these groups have become indistinct, and as a result, it has become difficult to distinguish whether these networks are aligned with al-Qaeda or with Islamic State. This was demonstrated by the two attacks that were undertaken in Paris in 2015. One of the attacks was undertaken by Armedy Coulibaly, who was aligned with Islamic State, and he attacked a Kosher grocery store, and the other attack was undertaken by the Kouachi brothers who attacked Charlie Hebdo on behalf of al-Qaeda on The Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) (Neser et al. 2016). The difficulty of distinguishing between the terrorist cells coincides with the claim that during the period of 2015 and 2016, there appeared to be a fundamental change in the nature of the terrorist threat to Western Europe. Neser et al. (2016) noted that all of the terrorist attacks between 2008 and 2013 in Western Europe were undertaken by lone terrorists who attacked specific, symbolic targets. After this period, terrorist attacks became more complex and were undertaken using a diverse range of weapons and tactics and were carried out on more specific targets (Neser and Stenersen 2014). The terrorist attacks that occurred after 2013, for example, were usually undertaken by groups of terrorists, who carried out simultaneous attacks on a number of sites and on random crowds of people, using firearms and small bombs or suicide vests. It is challenging to respond to the threat that the European-based terrorist cells and networks pose, and the challenges are intertwined. The difficulties center on the increase in the number of those who have been recruited and radicalized and are being tasked by al-Qaeda or Islamic State using social media, to undertake a terrorist attack in Europe. This means that those who have been recruited online have no connections to a European network and could be seen as a genuine, lone wolf if they undertake a terrorist attack. Because of the increase in the direction given by Islamic State to European-based individuals, there has been a downturn in the number of terrorist attacks committed by foreign fighters in Europe. However, Neser et  al. (2016) noted that the number of threats to attack, that included foreign fighters, increased by 45% between 2001 and 2016. During this period, there was also an increase in the number of attacks undertaken by a lone individual. Another intricacy in responding to the threat that the European-based terrorist cells and networks pose is the number of refugees who have been recruited by terrorist cells to support their cause (Neser et al. 2016).

94

4  The Threat of Terrorism in Europe

Terrorism in the United Kingdom Prior to 2008, the assumptions made by the police and the intelligence services when undertaking their planning processes was that if a terrorist attack was to occur, then it would be undertaken by a suicide bomber or by planting a bomb in a vehicle (Graham 2018). After the terrorist attacks that occurred in Mumbai in November 2008, the United Kingdom changed their approach in how they would respond to terrorism. The terrorist attacks in Mumbai comprised of small groups of suicide terrorists who undertook coordinated attacks on multiple targets, using firearms and explosives to kill as many people as possible (Rabasa et  al. 2009). The United Kingdom wanted to ensure that they were prepared for the new form of terrorist attacks and encompassed how they would respond into their planning processes. However, the first time that the new type of attack occurred in the United Kingdom in 2017, it demonstrated that there were limitations in the response to the bombings in Manchester by the emergency services, and it exposed gaps in the initial response arrangements and collaborative structures. The year 2017 was a turning point for terrorism in the United Kingdom. During 2017, five terrorist attacks were disrupted by the security and intelligence agencies and the counter-terrorist police, but three of the terrorist attacks that resulted in multiple fatalities were not: • On March 22, a car was driven into tourists and others and killed four people. The terrorist then stabbed a police officer to death within the precincts of the Houses of Parliament before being shot dead by another police officer; • On May 22, a suicide bomber attacked concertgoers in the foyer of Manchester Arena at the end of the Ariana Grande concert, killing 22 people and seriously injuring many more; and. • On June 3, three terrorists drove a van into pedestrians on the London Bridge and then ran into the Borough Market area where they attacked and stabbed people in the bars and restaurants. Eight people were killed and 48 were seriously injured before the police shot the three perpetrators dead (Harris 2017). Following these attacks, the United Kingdom raised the threat level for terrorism to “substantial,” which meant that a terrorist attack was “likely” (Fenn and Brunton-­ Smith (2021). Raising the terrorist threat level reflected the heightened state of fear in the United Kingdom, especially among the people who lived in and around London (Fenn and Brunton-Smith (2021).

Conclusion The problem for the police and the intelligence agencies in Western countries is that jihadist who attack Western countries use different methods to attack and they are often not suicide attacks. Using vehicles to attack, for example, has become popular

References

95

with jihadists, with only two attacks using vehicles occurring in Western countries before 2013, but between 2013 and 2017, the number rose to 13 (van Dongen 2017). Neser and Stenersen (2014) noted that there was a similar trend in attacks in Western countries that involved firearms and knives. After 2010, the number of attacks using vehicles or firearms increased at a faster rate than suicide attacks. In 2017, terrorist attacks using vehicles, firearms, or knives overshadowed the number of suicide attacks that took place in Western countries. There were 21 jihadist terrorist attacks in the first 11 months of 2017 and only two of these (the bombing in Manchester and the vehicle attack using explosives in Paris) were suicide attacks (van Dongen 2017). There were 13 suicide attacks that occurred between 2004 and 2017, with two suicide attacks occurring in each consecutive year in the last three years of this period (van Dongen 2017). The number of people who were killed in each attack increased during the 2011 to 2017 period. This was attributable to the suicide bombings in Paris in 2015, Brussels in 2016, and Manchester in 2017 and these were the deadliest terrorist attacks to be undertaken in Europe, to date.

References Basra, R. & Neumann, P. (2016). Criminal pasts, terrorist futures: European jihadists and the nNew crime-terror nexus. Perspectives on Terrorism, 10. http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index. php/pot/article/view/554. BBC News. (2013, 23 May). Woolwich machete attack leaves man dead. https://www.bbc.com/ news/uk-­22630303. Bertin, N. (2013, 25 May). French soldier stabbed while on patrol near Paris. Reuters. https:// www.reuters.com/article/us-­france-­stabbing-­idUSBRE94O09420130525. Crumley, B. (2015, November 17). Were the Paris attacks a French intelligence failure? Al Jazeera. http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/11/17/were-­paris-­attacks-­a-­french-­intelligence-­ failure.html. The Economist. (2013, 25 May). Return to old-style terror. https://www.economist.com/britain/ 2013/05/25/return-­to-­old-­style-­terror. Fenn, L. & Brunton-Smith, I. (2021). The effects of terrorist incidents on public worry of future attacks, views of the police and social cohesion. British Journal of Criminology, 61, 497-518. Graham, D. (2018). Marauding Terrorist Firearms’ Attacks. The RUSI Journal, 163(2), 42-50. Harris, T. (2017). London’s preparedness to respond to a major terrorist incident. Resilient Cities. An Independent Review of London’s Preparedness to Respond to a Major Terrorist Incident. Hegghammer, T. (2013). The future of Jihadism in Europe: A pessimistic view. Perspectives on Terrorism, 10(6), 156-170. Institute for Economics and Peace. (2015). Global terrorism index: Measuring and understanding the impact of terrorism. https://reliefweb.int/report/world/global-­terrorism-­index-­report-­2014. Jenkins, B. (2013, 12 June). The threat of a Mumbai-style terrorist attack in the United States’, testimony given to the House Homeland Security Committee, Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence. Rand Corporation. Kirk, A. (2016, March 24). Iraq and Syria: How many foreign fighters are fighting for Isil? The Telegraph. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/03/29/iraq-­and-­syria-­how-­many-­foreign-­ fighters-­are-­fighting-­for-­isil/ Neser, P. & Stenersen, A. (2014). The modus operandi of Jihadist terrorist in Europe. Perspectives on Terrorism, 8(6), 6–7.

96

4  The Threat of Terrorism in Europe

Neser, P., Stenersen, A. & Oftedal, E. (2016). Jihadi terrorism in Europe: The IS-Effect. Perspectives on Terrorism, 10(6), 3–24. Rabasa, A., Blackwill, R., Chalk, P., Cragin, K., Fair, C., Jackson, B., Jenkins, M., Jones, S., Shestak, N. & Tellis, A. (2009). The lessons from Mumbai. Rand Corporation. Rathore, S. (2016, March). Brussels attack: Lessons learned. Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis, 8(3), 4-8. Sanchez, R. (2016, March 27). Why Belgium? Five reasons terrorists struck heart of Europe. CNN. https://edition.cnn.com/2016/03/24/europe/belgium-­why-­terrorists-­struck/index.html. Schram, J. & Fredericks, B. (2016, March 22). Muslim ghettos in Europe are breeding grounds for terror. New  York Post. https://nypost.com/2016/03/22/muslim-­ghettos-­in-­europe-­are-­ hotbeds-­for-­terror/. Times of Oman. (2016, March 29). Paris attack fugitive relied on network of friends, not IS militant group. Times of Oman. van Dongen, T. (2017). The fate of the perpetrator in the Jihadist modus operandi: Suicide attacks and non-suicide attacks in the west, 2004-2017. International Centre for Counter-Terrorism Research Paper. United Kingdom Cabinet Office. (2015, March). National risk register of civil emergencies. 2015 edition. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-­risk-­register-­for-­civil-­emergencies­2015-­edition/national-­risk-­register-­of-­civil-­emergencies-­chapter-­2-­risk-­summaries.

Chapter 5

Paris

Introduction Terrorist incidents are extreme events that have become more volatile over time (Enders and Sandler 2002). Terrorist attacks lead to a complicated lengthy operational response, an extensive investigation, and the subsequent apprehension of terrorists. Stronger anti-terrorist legislation has been introduced in many countries because of terrorist attacks (Estrada and Koutronas 2016). In January and November of 2015, the city of Paris suffered a series of coordinated terrorist attacks (Faucher and Boussaguet 2018; Maillet-Contoz 2018). The magnitude and scale of these attacks were described as very ambitious (Yeo (2015). The attacks that occurred in January were committed by two brothers who assaulted the headquarters of the satirical newspaper, Charlie Hebdo, and then on the following day, the brothers attacked a kosher supermarket. The attacks in November were simultaneously executed by three teams of terrorists who used firearms and explosives at three different locations across the city: a stadium, in an area where terrace cafes and restaurants were located and a concert hall (Faucher and Boussaguet 2018; Vasilopoulos et  al. 2019). Many casualties resulted because of the attacks and this was mainly because the security services did not have the capability to respond immediately (Yeo 2015). The attacks were centrally controlled (Yeo 2015), were well coordinated, and comprised of a number of different methods of attack. This reflected a level of sophistication that could only have been achieved by persons who had prior military training. Seventeen people were killed and 140 people (130 victims and 10 terrorists or their relatives) were injured in the January attacks, while more than 130 people were killed and 413 people injured in the attacks that took place in November. This made them the worst mass killings ever recorded during peacetime in Paris (Faucher and Boussaguet 2018; Tracqui et al. 2020; Vasilopoulos et al. 2019).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. den Heyer, Police Respond to Terrorism, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-43250-7_5

97

98

5 Paris

The day after the attacks occurred, the Islamic State claimed responsibility for the attacks (Vasilopoulos et  al. 2019). The attacks were complex (Moloney and Morgan 2019) and were unprecedented in magnitude and scale (Yeo 2015). The January and November attacks created a “critical juncture” (Mahoney 2001; Pierson 2004, p. 135) in the form that a terrorist attack can take. Because the attacks in Paris in January and November were undertaken simultaneously at a number of different locations meant that terrorist attacks could be classified into a “before” and an “after” type of attack (Bensa and Fassin 2002). The attacks in Paris emphasized the constant threat of terrorism in France and exposed the country’s vulnerability to armed, political violence. They also alerted Europe and the rest of the world of the continuing jihadist threat (Yeo 2015). France had been subjected to terrorist attacks before the 2015 attacks. Terror attacks had taken place in the early 1980s but were not motivated by religious causes. It was after the first counterterrorism laws that were enacted in 1986 that religious beliefs inspired acts of terrorism and the country has been a target for Islamic terrorism ever since (Maillet-Contoz 2018). The first wave of terrorism took place between 1982 and 1986. The first attack in this wave occurred in Paris in 1982 and targeted the offices of a pro-Iraqi-Arab newspaper. A bomb was planted in a vehicle, near the Champs-Elysees, which killed one person. A drive-by shooting in a Jewish neighborhood, which left 6 people dead, was the second terrorist attack to take place that year. Between 1985 and 1986, there was a series of bombings in Paris, with the most serious occurring on September 17, 1986, at the Montparnasse Railway Station, where seven people were killed (Filiu 2014). The second wave of terror took place between 1995 and 1996, and this wave was initiated by terrorists who wanted to expand the Algerian civil war into France. The worst of the attacks were carried out on subway stations in central Paris on July 25, 1995, and on the southbound tracks of the Port-Royal Reseau Express Regional Station in Paris on December 3, 1996. The attacks in July killed eight people and injured 190 and the attack in December killed 4 people (Filiu 2014). A third wave of terror could have occurred but was fortunately disrupted by the French police that were working in collaboration with the European, Arab, and United States security agencies (Filiu 2014). Both France and Belgium have large communities of people who are of the Muslim faith, with 7.5% of the population of France identifying as being of the Muslim faith, and in Belgium, approximately 5.9% of the population are followers of this faith (Hackett 2015). Both countries have been striving to integrate the Muslim people into their wider communities, but unfortunately the attempts have not been successful. The reason why the governments have been unable to integrate the Muslim population is because Muslims believe that integrating with the wider community means that they need to adopt the European culture, and this would mean that they would have to change their culture and their identity. Because Muslims want to retain their ethnic and religious identities, this, in turn, has impeded their acceptance by the wider community and has resulted in an intolerance for the Muslim culture in France (Shadid 1991). This has created barriers for the Muslim

Terrorist Attacks in Europe Before November 13, 2015

99

people in the areas of employment, housing, education, political involvement, and funding by the state and the community (Teich 2015). This has fostered segregation rather than integration (Kern 2015) and means that the Muslim population is susceptible to radical influencers (Teich 2015). Terrorist groups have undergone a transformation since the late 1990s. Their ideologies have changed, and this has facilitated the use of more complicated and dynamic attack strategies that inflict more violence than the strategies that they used in the past (Estrada and Koutronas 2016). The changes have transpired even though the relationship between the terrorist groups and the counterterrorist agencies, which has been described as a theoretical game, has not changed (Chlebik 2010; Sandler and Arce 2003). The idea of terrorism being a theoretical game began with Landes (1978) who developed a number of responses to counter hijacking in the United States. Other researchers have expanded on Landes’ theory by examining the wider concept of terrorism and by defining the term of terrorism (Crenshaw 1992; Wilkinson 1986; Wilkinson and Stewart 1987). The researchers who expanded on Landes’ theory used datasets to analyze the trends and the cycles of attacks (Cauley and Im 1988; Enders et al. 1992; Fleming 2001; Hoffman 1998; Mickolus 1980, 1982; Yonah and Pluchinsky 1992) and their research found that being able to predict whether a terrorist attack was likely to occur depended on the type of attack, such as whether it involved a suicide bombing. How a terrorist perceived the level of security in a country also played a part in predicting an attack. The attacks in Paris on November 13, 2015, and the response by the police have led to a change in the balance between personal security and freedom after a terrorist attack has taken place (Bigo et al. 2015). This chapter reviews the terrorist attacks that occurred in France and Europe before 2015, the terrorist attacks that occurred in Paris on November 13, 2015, and examines and analyses the police response to the November attacks.

Terrorist Attacks in Europe Before November 13, 2015 The year before the terrorist attacks that took place in Paris on November 13, 2015, there had been a number of attacks and terrorist-related incidents across Europe that were considered to be some of the worst acts of violence to take place on European soil (Estrada and Koutronas 2016). Amongst these acts was an attack on a high-­ speed train traveling between Amsterdam and Paris that was carrying 554 passengers. The attack was perpetrated by Ayoub el-Khazzani (Quinn-Williams 2016). Just after the train crossed the Belgium border into France on August 25, 2015, Khazzani emerged from a bathroom with an AK-47 assault rifle. He was also carrying nine rounds of ammunition, a pistol, a bottle of gasoline, and a box cutter in his bag. A person waiting to use the bathroom tried to wrestle the AK-47 from Khazzani. However, Khazzani shot the person in the neck with his pistol. Khazzani then tried to fire the AK-47 into the train carriage but the weapon jammed (Quinn-Williams 2016). Two passengers attempted to subdue Khazzani, but Khazzani slashed one of

100

5 Paris

the passenger’s hands and their neck with the box cutter. The second passenger then used the assault rifle to knock Khazzani unconscious. Other passengers then assisted with restraining Khazzani (Quinn-Williams 2016).

Attacks in France Five terrorist attacks were carried out in Paris between January 7 and January 9, 2015 (Nevalsky 2015). On the morning of January 7, two gunmen, brothers Cherif and Said Kouachi, attacked the offices of the French satirical magazine, Charlie Hebdo (Quinn-Williams 2016). Armed with assault rifles, the brothers shot and killed 12 people, including Stephane Charbonnier, the magazine’s editor, who was under police protection at the time (Nevalsky 2015; Quinn-Williams 2016) and wounded eight others. As the brothers left the offices of the magazine, they shot and killed an unarmed police officer before stealing a car and escaping (Quinn-Williams 2016). The following day, the ‘Je suis Charlie (I am Charlie) movement was born. The second attack took place on the morning of January 8 when the Kouchi brothers shot a police officer during a traffic stop and then robbed a convenience store in the northeast of Paris. Following the robbery, the brothers were tracked to a printing factory that was located near the Charles de Gaulle airport (Nevalsky 2015). When the police arrived, a stand-off ensued for more than 8 hours. During the negotiations, Cherif Kouachi said that they had been sent by members of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) (Quinn-Williams 2016). The negotiations for the brothers to surrender failed, and at approximately 5 pm, the police used flash grenades to storm the building. The brothers then emerged from the building, firing at the police. Both brothers were killed, and two police officers were injured (Quinn-­ Williams 2016). While the stand-off with the Kouchi brothers was taking place at the printing factory on January 9, another shooting and hostage situation was taking place at the HyperCacher, a Kosher grocery store, on the outskirts of Paris (Quinn-Williams 2016). Armedy Coulibaly, armed with a rifle, two pistols, and a submachine gun, entered the grocery store, pledged allegiance to the Islamic State, and shot and killed four people. He then took 15 hostages and threatened to kill more people if the Kouachi brothers were harmed. Shortly afterward, the police stormed the printing factory in which the Kouchi brothers were barricaded in and at the same time they stormed the supermarket in which Coulibaly was holding the hostages. The police killed Coulibaly and freed all 15 hostages (Quinn-Williams 2016). The police entered the supermarket at the same time that the police entered the printing factory as it was feared that Coulibaly had access to real-time media information on his cell phone or that he was in contact with the Kouchi brothers (Quinn-Williams 2016). The coordinated operation was undertaken by the National Gendarmerie Intervention Group (GIGN). Members of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula claimed responsibility for the two attacks, which resulted in the death of 17 people and injured 22 others (Nevalsky

101

Attacks in France

2015; Randolph and Valmary 2015). This was the start of a series of terror attacks in Paris attacks that led up to November 13, 2015, attacks. The events leading to up to these attacks have been summarized in Table 5.1. Table 5.1  Timetable of events leading to the terrorist attacks in Paris on November 13, 2015 Date January 10

January 15

February 12

June 26

June 30

July 7

August

September 1 and 3

September 9

October

October 3

October 5

Event The United States issued a worldwide travel alert amid fears that recent attacks in France, Australia, and Canada may be the beginning of a new wave of terrorist violence because of competition between Islamic terror organizations The Belgian police raided a safe house used by suspected terrorists in Verviers. They discovered evidence that Abdelhamid Abaaoud was among its occupants. The raid uncovered weapons, cash, a body camera, multiple cell phones, handheld radios, fraudulent identification documents, and the precursor chemicals for making the explosive, Triacetone Triperoxide (TATP). Officials lost track of Abaaoud after his SIM card stopped transmitting. Police later found his DNA in an Athens apartment Abaaoud appeared in Islamic State’s online magazine, Dabiq. He claimed that he was in Syria and boasted of having plotted terrorist attacks under the noses of the European authorities A terrorist attack took place in Saint-Quentin-Fallavier where Yassin Salhi decapitated his employer Hervé Cornara and drove his van into gas cylinders at a gas factory in Saint-Quentin-Fallavier near Lyon, France. The explosion injured two other people The French Interior Minister established the Terrorism Prevention Operations group as a response to the June 26 attack. The role of the group was to gather information relating to the threat of terrorism Mohamed Abrini was told by Abdelhamid Abaaoud to travel to Birmingham in the United Kingdom and obtain funds. Abrini received £3000 in cash from Mohammed Ali Ahmed and Zakaria Boufassil. The money came from the bank account of Anwar Haddouchi, a Belgian who was fighting in Syria Reda Hame informed French authorities that he had been given instructions by Abaaoud to attack a concert hall in Paris. Abaaoud gave Hame money and encryption software The first group of attackers entered Europe from Syria. Unknown individuals, using forged identity documents, rented safe houses in Brussels and Charleroi as well as other locations for the month of September. The rent was paid in cash. These safe houses were used by the perpetrators of the Paris attacks Salah Abdeslam, Najim Laacharaoui, and Mohamed Belkaid were detained at the border by Austrian officials as they attempted to travel from Budapest, Hungary to Belgium by the way of Austria. Laacharoui and Belkaid were returning home from Syria Salah Abdeslam bought ten battery-operated detonators at a fireworks store in Saint-Ouen-l’Aumône, north of Paris. He produced a license as a proof of identity The second group of Paris attackers entered Europe from Syria. This group included Ukashah al-Iraqi and Ali al-Iraqi who used a well-known route for refugees, traveling via the processing centers in Greece, with forged Syrian passports Unknown individuals rented a safe house in Auvelais, as well as other locations (a total of eight safe houses were rented) for the month of November. The rent was paid in cash and the houses were used by the Paris attackers (continued)

102

5 Paris

Table 5.1 (continued) Date November 4

Event Islamic state leaders gathered in Tabqah, Syria, to discuss a strategic shift from using lone actors to using sleeper cells to attack capital cities in Europe. This information was conveyed to Western intelligence officials by their counterparts in the Middle East November 12 Terrorists arrived in Paris in three rental cars November 13 Three terrorists were driven to the Stade de France by Salah Abdeslam, the 21:20 hours brother of Ibrahim Abdeslam Stade de France. After failing to gain entrance to the Stade de France, a terrorist detonated his suicide vest, killing himself and a member of the public. The device comprised of Triacetone Triperoxide (TATP), batteries, and shrapnel (bolts, nails, etc.) An international soccer match between France and Germany held at a stadium was attended by approximately 72,000 people, including president Hollande. The stadium was the primary target of a terrorist plot. The soccer game continued until its conclusion, on which the attendees evacuated in an orderly fashion. The president had been relocated to safety earlier. The orderly movement of the crowd may have thwarted a component of the terrorist plans, as did their inability to gain entrance to the stadium There were three suicide bombs attacks at the Stade de France between 21:20 and 21:53. The perpetrators were Bilal Hadfi, a dual-Moroccan national, who traveled to Syria in November 2015 to become a foreign fighter; Ukashah al-Iraqi, an Iraqi national who was sent to assist with the operation, had a fake Syrian passport in the name of Ahmad al-Mohammad; Ali al-Iraqi, another Iraqi national, who was sent to assist with the operation, had a fake passport in the name of Mohammad al-Mahmud 11th arrondissement. Gunmen opened fire from a black car on customers at Le 21:25 hours carillon bar and Le petit Cambodge restaurants, killing 15 people. The gunmen 21:32 hours used Kalashnikov rifles 21:36 hours Shortly after, at 21:32, there was a similar event at nearby rue de la Fontaine-­ au-­Roi; La Café bonne Bière and La casa nostra. This same car was seen at La belle Equipe Café in the 11th district where the shooters killed another 19 people. Five more people died at the Café bonne Biere in the 11th district. There were more shootings at rue de Charonne. 21:40 hours A suicide bomb was detonated at Boulevade Voltaire and seriously injured a waitress and killed the suicide bomber. The bomber was Ibrahim Abdeslam, and at the time, he still had five AK47 magazines available The attackers at La belle Equipe Café, Café bonne Biere, rue de Charonne, and Boulevade Voltaire included the leader of Islamic state external operations in France and Belgium. The other attackers were Ibrahim Abdeslam, a foreign fighter from Belgium, whose brother provided the logistical support for the attack and Chahib Akrouh, who was killed later, in the police siege in seine Saint Denis, on November 18, 2015 Bataclan concert hall. Three gunmen with military style weapons entered the Bataclan concert hall, fired into the crowd and killed 89 people and injured many others. There were reports that the attackers had used hand grenades, but these reports were inconsistent. The event was a concert by an American band “eagles of death metal.” there were approximately 1500 people present The perpetrators were Sami Amimour, Omar Ismael Mostefai, and Foued Mohammed Aggad. One was killed by the French police and the other two killed themselves using suicide bombs. The perpetrators were heard asking, “should we call Souleymane?” during the operation (continued)

The Terrorist Attack

103

Table 5.1 (continued) Date 21:47 hours

23:55 hours

Event Two police officers responded to the Bataclan. One fired his weapon, hitting Foued Mohamed-Aggad in the chest, which detonated his suicide vest. At about this time, the shooting ceased. The two remaining terrorists had already taken some of the concert goers hostage on an upper floor and were shooting into the hall as well as into an alley beside the hall, where many concert goers were trying to escape Mandatory curfew. President Hollande of France declared a state of emergency and instituted a mandatory curfew.

Adapted from Cragin (2017, pp.  222–225), Moloney and Morgan (2019, pp.  1–2), and Mulholland (2015)

The Terrorist Attack On the evening of Friday, November 13, 2015, Paris was hit by a series of coordinated and simultaneous attacks that were committed by nine members of Islamic State, who were split into three groups and were operating in three different locations (BBC News Europe 2016; Fenech and Pietrasanta 2016; Riegert and Widholm 2019; Tracqui et al. 2020; Vasilopoulos and Brouard 2020). Three suicide bombers were driven to the Stade de France by Salah Abdeslam, another group drove to the Bataclan, and the third group drove toward the bars and restaurants of the tenth and 11th arrondissements (Quinn-Williams 2016). The first attacks involved three, successive suicide bombings, which occurred outside the Stade de France in Saint-­ Denis, a suburban city located in the north of Paris (Ghanchi 2016; Tracqui et al. 2020). The bombings triggered the beginning of an unprecedented scale of terrorist attacks that occurred over the next 48 hours (Hirsch et al. 2015). At 21:20 hours, the first of three explosions occurred outside the Stade de France, where 78,000 fans were watching France play Germany in an exhibition soccer match (Pfeifer 2016; Quinn-Williams 2016; Tracqui et al. 2020). A man wearing a suicide vest was prevented from entering the stadium near Gate D. The man backed away from the security guards and detonated the explosives. The bomber and a bystander were killed (Quinn-Williams 2016). This attack was undertaken by Bilal Hadfi, M al Mahmod and Ahmad al-Mohammed (BBC News Europe 2016). At 21:25  hours in the tenth arrondissement, in a neighborhood known for its abundance of bars, restaurants, and cafés, the second team of terrorists (Samy Amimour, Ismail Omar Mostefai, and Foued Mohamed-Aggad) who were in a black vehicle, opened fire, using automatic weapons at the crossroads junction of

104

5 Paris

Rue Bichat and Rue Alibert, in the location of the Le Carillon and Le Petit Cambodge restaurants (BBC News Europe 2016; Woo 2016). They also shot diners on Rue Alibert and on Rue de la Fonatine au Roi and opened fire on two more restaurants, the Café Bonne Biere and La Casa Nostra (Pfeifer 2016; Nossiter et al. 2015; Quinn-­ Williams 2016; Riegert and Widholm 2019). Fifteen people died in the attacks, and 15 people were severely injured (Quinn-Williams 2016). At 21:30 hours, another terrorist detonated his suicide vest outside Gate H of the Stade de France on Boulevard Voltaire. President Hollande, who was inside the stadium, watching the game, was rushed to safety (Nossiter et al. 2015; Riegert and Widholm 2019; Tracqui et al. 2020). Although the crowd heard the bomb blast, they were not notified of it, and the match continued. At 21:53, a third suicide bomber self-imploded at a fast-food store near the stadium (Quinn-Williams 2016). At this point, the stadium authorities were aware of the shootings at the cafes in the tenth arrondissement and concluded that a terrorist attack was occurring (Pfeifer 2016). A decision was made by the stadium authorities to keep the crowd in place and to continue the game. The President also remained in the stadium until half time. According to Pfeifer (2016) “[a]t the conclusion of the game, people were directed to the field and given specific directions” (p. 23). At 21:32  hours, the terrorists attacked the La Café Bonne Bière and La Casa Nostra at the junction of Rue du Faubourg du Temple and Rue de la Fontaine au Roi. At La Cosa Nostra, Salah Abdeslam was seen on CCTV, shooting at patrons, but left when his AK47 misfired (Woo 2016). At 21:36 hours, gunmen opened fire on another bar in the 11th arrondissement, La Belle Equipe, which is located on the Rue de Charonne at the junction with Rue Faidherbe (Woo 2016). The same gunman attacked the adjacent Sushi Maki Japanese restaurant, which resulted in a number of casualties. Witnesses again said that the attackers arrived in a black vehicle. Nineteen people died in the shooting and nine were severely injured (Quinn-Williams 2016). At 21:40, an attacker, later revealed to be Brahim Abdeslam, entered the restaurant Le Comptoir Voltair, which is situated at the other end of the Boulevard Voltaire and is also in the 11th arrondissement. The attacker sat down, placed an order, and then detonated his suicide vest, killing himself and injuring 15 others (Pfeifer 2016; Quinn-Williams 2016). This attack was synchronized with the assault on the Bataclan and was aimed to confuse the police and emergency responders (Woo 2016). Forty people were killed, and 36 people were wounded in five separate cafes along four city blocks (Pfeifer, (2016). At 21:40, three men with assault rifles emerged from a black vehicle (Brahim Abdeslam, Abdelhamid Abaaoud, and Chakib Akrouh) and entered the 1500-seat concert hall, the Bataclan club, where the American rock group, Eagles of Death Metal were playing to a sold-out crowd. The terrorists killed a security guard and began firing indiscriminately into the crowd (BBC News Europe 2016; Nossiter et al. 2015; Quinn-Williams 2016). At 22:15  hours, the BRI (Brigade de Recherche et d’Intervention) and RAID (Recherche, Assistance, Intervention, Dissuasion) arrived at the Bataclan and at 00:20 hours they entered the building. The Brigade de Recherche et d’Intervention

The Terrorists

105

is the special anti-terrorism unit of the Paris police (Woo 2016). Following an interaction with law enforcement, one suicide vest that was worn by one of the remaining two terrorists was detonated and the other terrorist was shot by the police (Moloney and Morgan 2019; Quinn-Williams 2016). Most of those who were suspected of being the terrorists were caught soon after the attacks, with the exception of Mohamed Abrini, who was arrested in Brussels on April 8 (BBC News 2016b). The terrorists appeared to have planned another attack in the Montmartre area, in the 18th arrondissement, which is in the north of Paris, while the attacks in the tenth and 11th arrondissements in central Paris were taking place. The attack was to include the detonation of a suicide vest, but Ibrahim’s brother, Salah, did not undertake the attack. He had driven to the area but left his car in Place Albert Kahn in the 18th arrondissement and then contacted his friends who were based in Molenbeek, and they drove him back to Belgium (Woo 2016).

The Terrorists The attacks on November 13, 2015, were undertaken by 12 members of the Islamic State (Yazujian 2017). They were organized into three teams of three, with the remaining three individuals (Salah Abdeslam, Mohamed Abrini, and Mohamed Belkaid) providing logistical support (Nossiter et al. 2015; Woo 2016). The teams were tasked with attacking the Stade-de-France, the Bataclan concert hall, and the neighboring bars and restaurants (Woo 2016). The core group of nine individuals were under the leadership of Abdelhamid Abaaoud (Callimachi 2016) seven of which were foreign fighters who had fought for the Islamic State. They had returned home to France and Belgium specifically to undertake the attacks (Cragin 2017). The other two assailants, who were from Iraq, were sent to Europe by Islamic State to specifically undertake the attack (Cragin 2017; ISIS 2016). The third team of attackers was made up of entirely French residents and included Sami Amimour, a known French terrorist, Ismael Mostefai, who had fought in Syria and Fouad Mohamed-Aggad, also a Syrian veteran (Woo 2016). According to Cragin (2016), the nine attackers did not travel together from Syria to Europe but came in two separate groups. The first group arrived in September 2015, and the second group arrived in October 2015. The two Iraqi nationals, who used forged Syrian passports, traveled the route that is taken by refugees; by means of the processing centers in Greece (Connelly, 2016; Glackin 2016; Pelletier and Raisse 2016). The nine attackers recruited another 21 people to assist with the planning and coordination of the attacks and to provide logistical support. Seven of them had previously fought in Syria or Iraq (BBC News 2016a) and included Najim Laachraou, whom the authorities believed had built “the explosive devices for both the Paris and subsequent attacks at the Brussels airport and subway” (Cragin 2017, p. 219). In total, the group represented over half of the terrorists who attacked Paris and half of those who were responsible for the attacks in Belgium (Cragin 2017).

106

5 Paris

On November 10, 2015, three days before the attacks, Salah Abdeslam’s brother, Brahim Abdeslam arrived in Paris to finalize the details of the attack (Quinn-­ Williams 2016). Salah was the primary link between the Paris terrorists and the group of terrorists that would undertake the March 2016 attacks on the airport and a subway station in Brussels (Cragin 2017). The Abdeslam brothers owned a bar, called the Molenbeek bar in Les Beguines, Belgium, but it was sold to fund the attacks that took place in Paris in November. They traveled to Paris from Brussels in hired cars and booked hotel rooms in Paris using their real names. Over the next three days, the Abdeslam brothers shuttled people, cars, and weapons back and forth across the border between France and Belgium (Quinn-Williams 2016). Salah Abdeslam drove the three attackers to the Stade de France and was later seen on CCTV with the other three attackers at the La Casa Nostra. He then left the café wearing a suicide vest and made his way to the Brasserie Barbes, in the Montmartre area. However, his suicide vest was not fitted with a detonator and was later found in a rubbish bin in Mountrouge. He left Paris shortly afterward and returned to Belgium, where he was arrested in March 2016 (Counter Extremism Project, n.d.). Abdelhamid Abaaoud, who had previously appeared in Islamic State videos, was killed during a police search after the events. It is thought that he was the operational mastermind of the attack (Moloney and Morgan 2019; Woo 2016; Yazujian 2017). Abaaoud (aka Abu Omar Al Belgiki) of Moroccan-Belgian descent was a self-confessed terrorist and was well known for his involvement in a number of thwarted terrorist attacks (Woo 2016). He is thought to have been present or to have participated in the café shootings and the Bataclan attack (Woo 2016). This was presumed to be the case because his fingerprints were found on one of the three AK47s that were found in the car that was used in the attacks. The car was found later, abandoned in Montreuil (Moloney and Morgan 2019; Woo 2016). Abaaoud had also been seen on CCTV at Croix de Chavaux station and the trace on his cellphone revealed that he was in the area of the Bataclan between 22:20 and 00:28 hours (Moloney and Morgan 2019). According to Moloney and Morgan (2019), there are suggestions that Abaaoud was monitoring and controlling the attacks at the Bataclan and providing information to the attackers. It is also believed that he was providing information to Bilal Hadfi, one of the suicide bombers at the Stade de France (Moloney and Morgan 2019).

Belgium Islamic State exploited the Syrian refugee crisis to send terrorists to Europe. They also took advantage of the lax security in Belgium, which enabled four Belgium-­ based terrorists to travel to Paris to carry out the November 13 attacks. According to Woo (2016), Belgium was chosen as a base for the terrorists because of its poor standard of counter-terrorism surveillance and its relaxed approach to countering

The Deaths and Injuries Resulting from the Attacks

107

terrorism in comparison with France, which has more counterterrorism capability than Belgium. The attacks on Paris were planned from the Molenbeek immigrant district of Brussels, which has the highest concentration of Jihadi foreign fighters per capita in the European Union. It also has a large number of Jihadists and is known as being a weapons trafficking center (Woo 2016). The area provided a safe haven for the terrorists, as Molenbeek is only 150 miles from Paris.

The Deaths and Injuries Resulting from the Attacks The terrorist attacks on November 13 were the deadliest on French soil since the Second World War (Quinn-Williams 2016; Riegert and Widholm 2019; Tracqui et al. 2020; Vasilopoulos and Brouard 2020) and marked the first act of terrorism by suicide (Fenech and Pietrasanta 2016). The attacks, which lasted little more than 30 minutes at the Stade de France, the terrace café sites, and for more than three hours at the Bataclan, resulted in the nine attackers killing 130 people and wounding 368 (Brisard 2015; Cragin 2017; Estrada and Koutronas 2016; Fenech & Pietrasanta, 2015; Quinn-Williams 2016; Woo 2016). Ten of the terrorists were also killed (Tracqui et al. 2020). One hundred and four of those that were wounded were classified as being in a critical condition (Pfeifer 2016). Ninety-nine people who were injured in the Bataclan attacks were taken to hospital during the evening of the attacks and 90 people died at this location (Quinn-Williams 2016). Like other terrorist attacks that have taken place in crowded public places, the young and the middle-aged were the main victims of the attacks that took place in Paris (Woo 2016). The average age of those killed was 32 years (Pfeifer 2016), and of the dead, 25% were between 35 and 39 years of age; 20% were between 30 and 34 years of age and 20% were between 25 and 29 years of age. Approximately 10% killed were between the ages of 20 and 24  years and between 40 and 44  years (Woo 2016). All of the wounds that were inflicted on the 130 casualties were caused by firearms, except for one that died from injuries sustained from one of the explosions at the Stade de France (Tracqui et  al. 2020). All firearm wounds “were perpetrated with AK-47 or Zastava M70 assault rifles using 7.62mm x 39mm cartridges” (Tracqui et al. 2020, p. 202). Of the 10 terrorists that died, eight died from suicide and one was shot by the police (Tracqui et al. 2020). On November 18, 2015, during a forced entry by the police into a residence in Saint-Denis, two of the terrorists who survived the attacks in Paris and a female relative of one of the terrorists were killed. The female relative died because the building partially collapsed on her (Tracqui et al. 2020). Woo (2016) was critical of the number of deaths and injuries that resulted from the attacks. Woo claimed that one of the strategic aims of the terrorists was to overload the critical care facilities with injured people and this they achieved. Woo expanded on this claim by stating that some of those who were injured may have

108

5 Paris

survived if the emergency medical response personnel and facilities were better equipped. Woo also noted that overall, more lives could have been saved if the police had responded sooner. However, Woo did concede that the police were occupied with attending to the initial attacks at the stadium and at the cafes and bars before the subsequent attack at the Bataclan. Woo also pointed out that there could have been significantly more people killed or injured if the terrorists had not been keeping to such a tight timeline in undertaking the attacks.

An Analysis of the Attacks One of the terrorists justified the attacks while the attack on the Bataclan was taking place by stating: “We are the soldiers of the Caliphate. It is all Hollande’s fault. You attacked our women and children in Syria. We are defending ourselves by attacking the women and children in France” (cited in Woo 2016, p. 9). The terrorists’ believed that there was an advantage in undertaking synchronous attacks (Yeo 2015). Following an attack, security is usually heightened at any location that the authorities think may be at risk. The terrorists thought that if multiple sites were targeted, and if one attack failed, then the other attacks may be successful (Woo 2016). This form of attack gave the terrorists some flexibility and enabled them to discriminate between the targets should a target be comprised by the police. It also ensured that there would be many casualties, and this would generate worldwide, media interest, and exposure (Yeo 2015). These types of attacks are spectacular, but are not unique, and they have been used in the past. The terrorists made use of a number of institutional weaknesses and exposed flaws in the European border security. The complexity and sophistication of the attacks revealed limitations in the gathering of intelligence by the Belgian and French counter-terrorism services. These limitations were similar to those that were uncovered during the 2008 Mumbai attacks. As with similar attacks in developed nations, the terrorists specifically targeted symbols of the west, and in this case, the French culture (Riegert and Widholm 2019). The complexity of the attack was unparalleled because it involved nine terrorists and eight different locations (Moloney and Morgan 2019). Because of the exact timing of each of the attacks, they have been “compared to the precision of a pyrotechnical display” (Moloney and Morgan 2019, p. 1). The terrorist attacks disclosed the existence of a Jihadi support community in Europe that was linked to the Islamic State and revealed that the Islamic State was capable of undertaking a terrorist attack in a major European city. This led to the realization that a major European city could suffer a coordinated mass gun attack such as that which occurred Mumbai in 2008 (Woo 2016). Such an attack had not happened in Europe prior to November 2015, and this was because Western security and intelligence services had been successful in identifying and preventing terrorist attacks (Woo 2016).

An Analysis of the Attacks

109

The identification of the targets of the attack and the timing of the attacks was “deliberate and purposeful” (Woo 2016). This was highlighted in a communique by the Islamic State that claimed responsibility for the attacks: A group of believers from the soldiers of the Caliphate set out targeting the capital of perversion, the lead carrier of the cross in Europe Paris. Eight brothers equipped with explosive belts and assault rifles attacked targets in the heart of the capital of France, which had been precisely chosen in advance. These targets included the Stade de France stadium during a soccer match between the teams of Germany and France, both of which are crusader nations (cited in Woo 2016, p. 9).

France has experienced terrorist attacks that have targeted international soccer matches in the past. The Stade-de-France was chosen in the November attacks because President Hollande was attending a friendly soccer match between France and Germany. As a result of the attack, a soccer match between the Netherlands and Germany that was planned to take place in Hanover, Germany, on November 17, 2015, was cancelled. The Stade-de-France had more than 150 security guards deployed on the evening of November 13, and it was one of these guards who stopped a person trying to enter the stadium by tailgating a legitimate ticket holder. The offender was found to be fitted with a suicide vest and was later identified as suicide bomber number one. He was a refugee from Syria who had recently arrived from Turkey. The second suicide bomber at the stadium was also from Syria and had traveled with the tailgating offender. The third suicide bomber was Bilal Hadfi, who had journeyed from Belgium to Syria in early 2015 (Woo 2016). The intention of the attack was to kill as many people as possible. This was to be achieved by the first suicide bomber detonating their suicide vest inside the stadium, and as the crowd fled the attack, the other two suicide bombers would detonate their vests outside the stadium (Moloney and Morgan 2019. Because suicide bomber number one was prevented from detonating his vest, this meant that the coordinated suicide bombing attack was not as successful as the terrorists had planned. Although many people were seriously injured, especially from being hit by shrapnel from the denotation of the third suicide bomber’s vest, the apprehension of the first suicide bomber limited the number of causalities at the stadium to the death of a single, Portuguese fan. As Woo (2016) and Moloney and Morgan (2019) suggested, the timing of the attack on the stadium and the Bataclan suggests that the intention was to spread the resources of the first responders across multiple sites in the city or to draw the first responders away from Bataclan. The apprehension of the first suicide bomber at the stadium may have altered the timing of the planned denotations at the stadium. If the stadium attack had gone ahead as intended, which would have been 20 minutes before the beginning of the attack at the Bataclan, there could have been many more fatalities and injuries (Moloney and Morgan 2019). This would have meant that the police and other first responders would have already been at the stadium or enroute when the Bataclan attack began (Williams 2016). The second key target was the Bataclan. For more than 40  years before the attacks, the Bataclan was one of the most famous concert venues in Paris. The concert hall is located at 50 Boulevard Voltaire in the 11th arrondissement of Paris and

110

5 Paris

is owned by two Jewish brothers and this is why the concert hall has been attacked so many times by terrorists (Woo 2016). The attack at the Bataclan was undertaken by three French terrorists who were thought to have been radicalized in Syria. The attackers hoped to kill members of the American band, Eagles of Death Metal, who were playing at the hall, but fortunately the members of the band escaped. Tragically, more than 90 people were killed during the attack (Woo 2016). Woo (2016) stated that the targets of the attacks were not chosen because of their Western decadence, but because the timing, sequence, and logistics needed had to be precise if the attacks were to be successful. The terrorists would have planned to carry out the attacks in the Boulevard Voltaire area to cause confusion in the general area of the Bataclan and to divert the attention of the police and the emergency services. The confusion would allow the terrorists enough time to attack a small number of separate targets and would give them enough time to carry out an attack at the Bataclan and leave before any armed police arrived. The bars and cafes that were targeted as a part of the attack were probably selected because: • They were located on side streets, which increases the time that it takes for the police to react and attend. • They were located at, or near crossroads and this ensures that there are a number of escape routes. • There would be large crowds in the bars and cafes on a Friday evening. • There would be large numbers of people on the streets, and this would increase the number of people who would likely be injured or killed and minimizes the amount of time spent at each location. • The bars and cafes are contiguous or closely located, maximizing the target opportunity. • The bars and cafes that are located to the north and south of the Bataclan would ensure that the capacity of the emergency response agencies would be fully utilized, and the most amount of confusion and traffic congestion would result. • Attacking bars and cafes away from the vicinity of the Bataclan would mean that the emergency response agencies would not be aware of the ultimate target. • Synchronizing a suicide bombing on the Boulevard Voltaire with the Bataclan attack would ensure that the emergency response agencies would be confused and there would be a delay in responding to the two separate attacks (adapted from Woo 2016, p. 13). As music is an anathema to Islamic extremists, the American band would have been one of their principal targets, and even if the events at the stadium that evening were not enticing for the terrorists, the appearance of the American band at this specific concert hall would have been (Woo 2016). The soccer match and the appearance of the American band would have meant that there was a high risk of there being an attack and this should have been noted by the police and the intelligence agencies. There should have been a higher level of security at both of the events. It is not known why the terrorists complicated the attacks on the Stade-de-France and the Bataclan by attacking other, less valuable targets. It may have been because

The Police Response to the Attacks

111

the area around the Bataclan is in the Jewish quarter of the city and is known for its liberal lifestyle. It is also known for its number of bars and restaurants (Woo 2016). However, none of Kosher restaurants or supermarkets in the area were attacked. Of the restaurants that were attacked, 15 people were killed in shooting attack at the La Carillon and Le Petit Cambodge, and 19 were killed at the La Belle Equipe bistro (Woo 2016). Another five were killed at the La Café Bonne Bière and at the La Casa Nostra (Woo 2016). Following the shooting attack, Ibrahim Abdeslam denotated his suicide vest at the Le Comptoir Voltaire, killing himself and injuring a waitress and a number of patrons (Woo 2016). During long periods of the attack, the streets surrounding the Stade-de France and the Bataclan remained difficult and dangerous for the first responders to attend to the injured. This meant that locating and treating the injured was a long process (Hirsch et al. 2015).

Weaponry Like most terrorist attacks that take place in crowded places, the terrorists in Paris relied on improvised explosive devices and assault rifles to maximize the number of causalities. Each terrorist wore a suicide vest containing Triacetone Triperoxide (TATP) explosives. This is a mixture of hydrogen peroxide, acetone and sulfuric, nitric, or hydrochloric acids, which are chemicals that are available in neighborhood stores (Yeo 2015). TATP is highly unstable and volatile, and therefore, the blast has an unpredictable impact (Woo 2016). According to Woo (2016), the unreliability of TATP was demonstrated during the Stade de France attack, where only one person was killed, even though three suicide vests had been detonated. In comparison, the use of the AK47 automatic rifle proved to be more lethal than an attack that used TATP.  It was the weapon that caused all of the casualties during the attacks (Woo 2016).

The Police Response to the Attacks The terrorist attacks in Paris on November 13 revealed that the French authorities were not prepared for such a complex attack even though simultaneous attacks on multiple sites had occurred in France as early as 2008. One of the reasons why the authorities were not prepared was because they thought that if there was to be a terrorist attack, then the attack would be the same as those that had been previously undertaken by fighters who had been trained in Syria. The type of attacks that the Syrian trained fighters generally undertook was a single mode of operation, such as a shooting, an explosion, or the taking of a hostage. However, in the attacks in Paris, the terrorists used three modes of attack. The terrorists were able to exploit the weaknesses in Europe’s border controls and overwhelm the capabilities of the French emergency responders (Quinn-Williams 2016).

112

5 Paris

Prior to the attacks in Paris on November 13, France was still recovering from and responding to the terror events that had occurred earlier in the year (Quinn-­ Williams 2016). The scale of the attacks, their uniqueness, and the number of simultaneous attacks on November 13 confused the initial response by the police (Pfeifer 2016). The attacks perplexed the police and other emergency responders as they did not know whether they would become victims of a secondary attack. The number of attack sites across the city called for police units to be deployed from various French police agencies. The response effort came under even more pressure when a rumor began to circulate of there being a shooting attack at the Les Halles shopping center in central Paris while the other attacks were taking place (Wilson et al. 2017). Quinn-Williams (2016) remarked that the death toll could have been much higher had the actions of the terrorists not been limited by the police response to the attacks and the key decisions that the police made as soon as the attacks began.

The Police in France There are two national police forces in France: the Police Nationale and the Gendarmerie Nationale (Quinn-Williams 2016). The Police Nationale is a civilian police force, while the Gendarmerie Nationale is part of the French armed forces and its role is to police smaller towns and rural areas, as well as ports and military installations (Quinn-Williams 2016). The Police Nationale Paris Perfecture provides policing for the city of Paris and three of its neighboring suburbs and was the main police force used in the response to the attacks on November 13. France also has three elite police units. Their full names, their concise name, and their roles have been presented in Table 5.2.

The Police Response to the Bataclan Attack There were more than 1500 people attending the concert at the Bataclan Concert Hall. At 21.40 hrs, three terrorists entered the concert hall through the main entrance into the area where an orchestra would play. For more than 7 min, the terrorists fired their weapons into the crowd of concert goers, reloading their weapons several times (Pfeifer 2016). Hearing the shooting, two nearby police officers, carrying only handguns, entered the concert hall to respond. The officers engaged with the terrorists and one of the officers shot one of the terrorists in the chest, causing their suicide vest to detonate (Pfeifer 2016). According to Pfeifer (2016), the actions of the officers prevented the terrorist from firing into the crowd. The other two terrorists then retreated to the second floor of the hall, taking several people hostage (Pfeifer 2016). The police did not know at this point how many terrorists were involved in the Bataclan attack and whether they were still inside the hall. Nor did they know

The Police Response to the Attacks

113

Table 5.2  The elite French police units Short Full name Name 1 Brigade de Recherché et BRI d’Intervention (research and intervention brigade) 2 Recherche, assistance, intervention, dissuasion (research, assistance, intervention, dissuasion)

RAID

3 Groupe d’Intervention de la gendarmerie Nationale (intervention Group of the National Gendarmerie)

GIGN

Role The unit is a part of the police Nationale and are the “SWAT” team of Paris. It responds to serious criminal events, such as robbery and kidnappings within the city limits RAID is a special forces unit of the police Nationale that was formed to counter organized crime and terrorism. It responds to hostage situations and high-profile crises throughout France. It is a tactical response unit which is comparable to the GIGN gendarmerie units The special operations unit of the military national police. It responds to events in rural localities. While stationed throughout France, the GIGN units can operate anywhere in the world and are frequently sent to outpost of the French armed forces

Adapted from QuinnWilliams (2016)

whether any bombs had been set in the hall or in the entrances to the hall. At approximately 00.20 hrs on Saturday 14 November, teams from BRI and the RAID entered the Bataclan and “were met with a most horrific sight of more than 500 people lying on the concert floor, covered with blood and torn body parts; 89 were dead, 68 were in critical condition, with an equal number also wounded and hundreds paralyzed with fear as they were pretending to be dead and praying not to be shot” (Pfeifer 2016, p. 24). Tactical medical doctors accompanied the BRI and RAID when they entered the hall. The doctors undertook patient assessment and treatment procedures, but they quickly ran out of medical supplies. It was difficult to establish hot and cold zones1 while the police were engaging the terrorists on the second floor (Pfeifer 2016). To further complicate the police response, “it took more than an hour to determine that the terrorists were located on the second floor in a narrow (four- by 28-foot) hallway, with 20 hostages lined up along the walls” as human shields (Pfeifer 2016, p. 24). The police attempted to negotiate with the terrorists, but the terrorists only “wanted media coverage of [the] hostages being killed” (Pfeifer 2016, p. 24). Pfeifer (2016) describes in detail how the police resolved the hostage situation: With the BRI in position, they forced the door open and started pushing a heavy, six-foot-­ tall ballistic shield down the narrow hall filled with hostages and two terrorists at the far end. The ceramic metal shield took 25 rounds from a terrorist’s assault rifle. Under a light haze, it was impossible to see two small steps about a third of the way down the hall. As the

 Cold zone is all areas where there has been no terrorist activity and is currently unlikely to be; a Warm zone—an area that has recently been exposed to terrorist activity, the threat is understood to have moved to another area, or is over, but the threat could return, making the people in this area vulnerable to an attack; and a Hot zone—an area where terrorists are located and are active, or an area that is within reach of terrorist activity (Graham 2018). 1

114

5 Paris BRI officer pushed the shield forward, it suddenly tumbled down these steps, falling flat. The officer now was face to face with the terrorist. He quickly drew his 9mm handgun from its holster and shot him. This knocked the terrorist on his back, less than a couple of meters away from the third terrorist. After hitting the floor, he ignited his suicide vest. The shrapnel went straight up, injuring only the third terrorist. On a small stair, half-landing at the back of the hallway, this terrorist was attempting to detonate his suicide vest as police officers moved in. He was quickly neutralized and the bomb was disarmed (p. 24).

After the terrorists had been neutralized, the police conducted a search of the building because they were not sure of the number of terrorists involved and whether they had embedded themselves with the concert goers. The police also needed to clear the building and take people to safety. People were hiding in cupboards, on top of the roof, and in locked rooms (Pfeifer 2016). Following the terrorist attacks, the police began to look for the perpetrators and any of their associates. Four days after the attacks in Paris, while tracking Abdelhamid Abaaoud, the alleged mastermind of the attacks, the police searched an apartment in the St. Denis neighborhood of Paris. This was close to the Stade de France. During the search, the police found the body of Abaaoud who was killed along with his female cousin, Hasna Aitboulahcen, and one of the seven attackers, Chakib Akrouh (Quinn-Williams 2016). The death of Abdelhamid Abaaoud meant that only one other suspected terrorist was still alive: Salah Abdeslam. To locate Abdeslam, both the French and Belgian police released his name and photograph to the public on November 15. As a result of information received from the public, the police searched an apartment in Brussels in mid-December. During the search, the police found explosives and fingerprints that matched those of Abdeslam. Abdeslam was captured in Molenbeek on March 18, 2016, but was shot in the leg while trying to escape arrest (QuinnWilliams 2016). A summary of the events that took place after the terrorist attacks in Paris has been presented in Table 5.3.

State of Emergency The attacks led to the activation of the “White Plan” at 22:34  hrs on Friday, November 13. The plan was developed in the 1990s and specified that all hospitals be activated, medical staff recalled, and hospital beds released so that they would be available for those who were wounded. This was the first time that the plan had been activated and had a critical effect on the availability of resources and medical personal (Hirsch et al. 2015). In response to the terrorist attacks, President Francois Hollande declared a State of Emergency on November 14 (Quinn-Williams 2016). The power given to a French President to declare a State of Emergency was created in 1955 following a wave of attacks that were perpetrated by the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) in November 1954 (Thenault, 2007).

State of Emergency

115

Table 5.3  Summary of events after the attacks Date Event 2015 November 14 Islamic state released a statement and took responsibility for the attack. Salah Abdeslam fled Paris for Brussels with the help of two friends, Hamza Attou and Mohammed Amri. They were reportedly stopped by security officials on their way to Belgium but were not detained. They were carrying forged identity cards November 15 Security officials in France coordinated a manhunt for unknown assailants who were believed to have escaped after the Paris operations. They reportedly mobilized 115,000 police, gendarme, and soldiers. They searched homes and arrested several individuals who were believed to be involved in the attacks November 16 Investigators in France and Belgium stated that Abaaoud was the mastermind behind the attacks in Paris, but they did not know whether he was directly involved. Instead, they claimed that Abaaoud was in Syria. Investigators also identified Omar Ismael Mostefai, Sami Amimour and one of the two Iraqi perpetrators and claimed that they had traveled to France through Greece and the refugee system November 17 Security officials in France claimed to have identified five of the seven perpetrators responsible for the attacks in Paris. They announced that there was a manhunt for Salah Abdeslam, who was the brother of Ibrahim Abdeslam. He had provided logistical support for the attack. France extended the state of emergency by three months November 18 Security officials in France searched a residence in the Parisian suburb of Saint-Denis. They killed two suspects, Abdelhamid Abaaoud and his cousin Hasna Aitboulahcen and arrested eight others. November 21 Turkish officials arrested Ahmed Dahmani, a 26-year-old Belgian national of Moroccan origin, in Antalya, Turkey, on suspicion of having scouted out targets for the Paris attacks. He allegedly returned to Turkey from Amsterdam on November 14, 2015. Belgium was put on high alert under threat of a “serious and imminent” terror attack by Islamic state and Brussels was locked down so that security officials could track the terrorist threats more easily. December 4 Security officials in Belgium issued an arrest warrant for Hamza Attou and Mohammed Amri, who helped Salah Abdeslam flee Paris. December 9 French authorities identified Foued Mohammad Aggad as one of the Bataclan hall attackers. 2016 January 14 French security officials identified Chahib Akrouh as one of the victims who were killed in the residence that was searched in Saint-Denis. He was then identified as being one of the Paris attackers. January 20 French media reported that authorities had identified seven of the nine perpetrators of the Paris attacks and warrants for Salah Abdeslam, who was assumed to have fled to Belgium were issued. January 24 Islamic State’s al-Hayat Media center released a video that had statements recorded by nine perpetrators of the Paris attacks. In the video, Sami Amimour confirmed that the leader of Islamic state, Abu Bakr al-Baghdad, ordered the attacks. The video also confirmed that Ibrahim Abdeslam had been in Syria, which was previously suspected but not confirmed. Salah Abdeslam was not in the video. (continued)

5 Paris

116 Table 5.3 (continued) Date March 15

March 18 March 21

March 22

Event Belgian authorities search a house in Brussels and kill a suspected Islamic state sympathizer, Mohamed Belkaid. Fingerprints of Salah Abdeslam were found in the house. News reports stated that Abdeslam and two of the individuals who were linked to the Belgium airport and subway attacks, Ibrahim and Khalid el-Bakraoui, likely fled, prior to the police searching the house. Salah Abdeslam was arrested in Brussels. The investigators found Abdeslam after tracing a phone that was linked to him was reactivated. French and Belgian authorities announced that they were looking for Najim Laachraoui and Mohammed Abrini, who had suspected ties to Salah Abdeslam and the Paris attacks. Laachraou allegedly assisted with the explosive devices, while Abrini allegedly drove some of the perpetrators to Paris. Authorities say they had traced 30 individuals to the Paris attacks. Islamic state sponsored the attacks on the Brussels airport and the metro that killed 32 people. The perpetrators were Ibrahim and Khalid el-Bakroui, Najim Laachraoui, Mohammed Abrini, and Osama Krayem.

Adapted from (pp. 222–225) Cragin, R. (2017)

As a result of the declaration, the borders were closed, and additional military forces were deployed around Paris (Davis-Cross, 2017). The declaration granted emergency powers to the police and to the security forces, which would enable them to search businesses and residences and place any suspects under arrest. The State of Emergency was extended twice by the French authorities and had some positive outcomes (Fenech and Pietrasanta 2016). According to The Guardian (2016) within 48  hours of the attacks, 168 homes had been searched and 104 people had been placed under house arrest. Similarly, BFM TV (2016) claimed that from November 2015 to November 2016, more than 4000 searches had been undertaken and 89 people had been placed under house arrest (BFM TV 2016). The number of searches and arrests, according to the Chief of French Internal Intelligence Services (DGSI), destabilized the terrorists and put them under unprecedented pressure (Fenech and Pietrasanta 2016). The State of Emergency in Paris did not allow large gatherings and marches to take place (Davis-Cross, 2017). This restriction on freedom led to discussions about the change in the relationship between security and liberty while the investigation into the attacks was taking place. It also called into question the policies that were in place to respond to these events (Bigo et al. 2015). On November 20, the State of Emergency was extended and amended to expand the procedures for making house arrests and increased the powers of the police to search terror suspects in both public and private places that were not homes or vehicles. The changes also banned associations or groups participating in acts that threatened public order or that advocated violence (Maillet-Contoz 2018). A number of civil rights groups denounced the decline in freedoms because of the implementation of the State of Emergency, but Fenech and Pietrasanta (2016) maintained that it was fully justified because not all of the perpetrators of the attacks had been apprehended and it was feared that there would be more attacks.

An Analysis of the Police Response

117

Along with declaring a State of Emergency, the Government of France adopted six other measures as a response to the terrorist attacks, and these measures included: 1. The Sentinelle Military Protection mission. Ten thousand military personnel were mobilized to assist the police with maintaining security across the country. 2. The introduction of legislation to strengthen the gathering of intelligence in relation to domestic terrorist activities. 3. Counter-radicalization programs focusing on inmates in the French prison system. 4. The introduction of legislation against incivilities and attacks on public safety and terrorist acts on public transport. The legislation also enabled agents of public transport networks to conduct physical and baggage searches. 5. Creation of additional posts in the security forces (police, gendarmerie, customs, and justice). 6. The introduction of legislation that would assist in the investigation of organized crime, terrorism, and its financing and would improve the efficiency of criminal proceedings and sentencing (Blavignat 2016; Legifrance 2016; Maillet-Contoz, J. (2018). President Hollande also requested that the European Union activate the Mutual Defense Clause, which enables support to be given from other member states (Davis-Cross, 2017). France also announced a number of new security measures after the attacks (d’Allonnes and Bonnefous 2015) in an effort to monitor the estimated 2500 Jihadi radicals across the country (Hellmuth 2015). A significant increase in funding was made available to initiate the changes and to establish 2680 new jobs, of which 1100 were in the area of domestic intelligence (Hellmuth 2015).

An Analysis of the Police Response France has the largest Muslim population in the European Union, with the Pew Research Center estimating that in 2016, 4.8 million people, or approximately 7.5% of French residents were of Muslim descent (Pew Center for Research, 2017). France has a problematic colonial past that includes a legacy of many Muslims feeling isolated and discriminated against (Quinn-Williams 2016). This problem has been exacerbated by the strategy of arresting and prosecuting terrorist suspects on a regular basis while not seeking to prevent the radicalization of individuals or reintegrating those who have Jihadi beliefs (Hellmuth 2015). This has meant that many Muslims do not trust the police, and as a result, it is difficult for the French authorities to build relationships and trust, and this hinders their ability to gather any information on the activities of potential terrorists. The counterterrorism institutions in France were admired internationally and their capabilities were one of the reasons why France did not suffer a Jihadi attack during the years 1996 to 2012 (Hellmuth 2015). Its institutions were well regarded because they were able to coordinate with other agencies, undertake joint intelligence analysis, and share information at an operational level (Hellmuth 2015). In

118

5 Paris

1984, their ability to cooperate was strengthened from the creation of a fusion center within the Interior Ministry. Personnel from law enforcement and the intelligence services, the Anti-Terrorist Coordination Unit, and UCLAT (Unite de Coordination de la Lutte Anti-Terroriste)2 operated from the fusion center. The center was chaired by a police officer at the rank of Commissaire Divisionaire but was led by the Director General of the National Police during times of crises (Foley 2013). The fusion center was responsible for the analysis of terror threats and for administering the interagency Interministerial Committee of the Fight Against Terrorism and the CILAT (Comite Interministeriel de Lutte Anti-Terroriste) (Hellmuth 2015). However, the terror attacks in Paris on November 13 revealed a communications flaw between the intelligence services and the police. The flaw came about because of rivalry between the services and because each service had to answer to separate authorities (Maillet-Contoz 2018).

Incident Command A terror attack has several elements that distinguish them from other mass casualty incidents (Goralnick et al. 2017). One element is that all first responder agencies need to work together at the scene of an incident while they are under intense pressure (Thompson et al. 2014). These types of events not only require incident management, but also require leadership and a framework that provides the ability for various agencies to communicate, collaborate and coordinate their individual responses (Pfeifer 2016). The frameworks that allow this to happen are the Incident Command System and a Common Operating Picture, which is achieved by co-­ locating the incident commander from each of the agencies that are involved in the response (Pfeifer 2016). The authorities in Paris established a 24/7 Command Post or an Emergency Operations Center (EOC) following the attacks. The purpose of establishing the center was to facilitate the development of inter-agency relationships and to give personnel a better understanding of their roles and responsibilities (Quinn-­ Williams 2016). Although a central command system was established quickly after the attacks in Paris, there were however difficulties in coordinating and commanding personnel. Quinn-Williams (2016) claimed that there was a lot of confusion in the early phase of the response because of the number of crime scenes and because there were three different field commands that were acting independently. This caused some difficulties in communicating information in real time. The separate command structure also caused problems with the deployment of the Brigade de Recherche et d’Intervention (BRI) and RAID, who are generally jointly mobilized under a unified

 The UNCLAT provides the same coordination as the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre in the United Kingdom and the National Counterterrorism Center in the United States. 2

An Analysis of the Police Response

119

command system known as FIPN, (Force d’intervention de la Police Nationale), which includes a liaison officer who is deployed to the Central Command Center. A military liaison officer is also deployed to the Central Command Center to assist with the coordinated response between the Police Nationale and the Gendarmerie Nationale (Quinn-Williams 2016). There were also communication difficulties at the incident sites. The police at the sites had been using handheld radios to communicate with each other, but the Central Command Center took control of radio communications to ensure that information was being relayed to the incident commander. However, this interfered with the officers at the incident sites being able to communicate effectively with each other (Quinn-Williams 2016). There were also difficulties in accessing the sites of the attacks. A number of police officers who had self-deployed had parked their personal vehicles around the attack sites, and this created traffic bottlenecks and made it difficult to gain access to the sites (Quinn-Williams 2016). The response to a terror attack that has an active shooter needs to be based on the police engaging with or confronting the shooter or shooters and securing the area quickly. This will prevent further injuries and deaths and will enable simultaneous investigations to begin. The main lesson learned from the attacks in Paris is that if victims can stay alive until the police or emergency personnel can get to them and transfer them to a medical or forward trauma center, their chances of survival are greatly increased (Pfeiffer, 2016). Saving lives is the most important goal for all responding agencies and acknowledging this when developing a coordinated response is important (Pfeiffer, 2016; Wurmb et al. 2020). It is also important that the police engage with the shooters and create hot, warm, and cold operating zones. The initial steps involved in responding to a terrorist attack can be summarized as: 1. Engaging or confronting the shooters. 2. Creating hot, warm, and cold zones. 3. Deploying a tactical medical team. 4. Transporting victims to forward trauma centers and hospitals. 5. Securing the site and key locations from secondary attacks (adapted from Pfeifer 2016).

Crucial Decisions Two key decisions that were made a short time after the suicide bombing at the Stade de France were credited with saving hundreds of lives (Quinn-Williams 2016). Following the denotation of the first suicide bomb outside the stadium, the first key decision made was to allow President Hollande, who had been inside the stadium, watching the game, to remain in the stadium until half time. The second important decision was that although the crowd had heard the detonation of the

120

5 Paris

bombs, the authorities decided not to inform the stadium spectators as to what had happened. The authorities were concerned that the attackers wanted the spectators to stampede toward the stadium exits where a second group of suicide bombers could be waiting to ambush them (Meichtry et al. 2015). The strategy that the police adopted supported the approach that was taken by the officials of the Stade de France. They decided not to deploy a large number of police officers to the area surrounding the stadium. This decision was critical, because after an incident, the police usually deploy to the location of the incident, and this restricts the number of resources that are available should another incident occur. The French intelligence agencies believed that the attackers of the Stade de France intended to draw the police away from the city center and the Bataclan (Quinn-­ Williams 2016). The police had learned not to deploy a large number of police officers to the stadium from the Charlie Hebdo attacks earlier in the year (Quinn-Williams 2016). The police believed that the suicide bombing at the stadium was probably a terrorist attack, and since they expected another, the police decided to reserve some of their resources so that they would have the capacity to respond to any further attacks (Quinn-Williams 2016). Another crucial decision was made by an officer who responded to the attack at the Bataclan. The officer decided he would actively confront the attacker, thereby violating organizational protocol. On firing at the terrorist, one of the shots hit the terrorist’s suicide vest, which caused it to detonate and kill the terrorist. No other Bataclan concert goers were killed after the shooting of the terrorist (Quinn-Williams 2016). However, this information was not relayed to the central command, and nor was any information that the officer had gained about the number of attackers, the weapons that they used, or the number of hostages taken relayed back to the central command.

Weaknesses in Intelligence Some researchers have stated that the attacks in Paris were an example of poor information sharing between the member states of the European Union (BBC News 2015; Cragin 2017; Quinn-Williams 2016). The French intelligence agencies did not think that technological intelligence would have prevented these attacks. The French intelligence agencies argued that human source intelligence is more effective at countering terrorism, especially if it has been gathered from the community (Quinn-Williams 2016). Another downside was that on August 11, 2015, a French supporter of Islamic State, Reda Hame, was stopped on his return from Syria to France and detained for plotting a mass-casualty attack on a concert hall (Woo 2016). Woo (2016) claimed that in September, the French intelligence services were warned by American intelligence agencies of an imminent terrorist attack that would take place in Paris in November. However, the French intelligence agencies could not confirm this because the attacks in Paris were plotted across the border in Belgium, which does

An Analysis of the Police Response

121

not have a strong intelligence culture (Woo 2016). The BBC News (2015) claimed that the police in Michelen, a town just north of Brussels, failed to pass on information months before the attacks in Paris that could have led to the location of Salah Abdeslam, one of the planners and logistical organizers of the attack. There were also other opportunities for intervention. The attackers, for example, crossed international borders between Syria and France, and other internal European Union borders on a number of occasions (Cragin 2017). At the border crossing between Belgium and Hungary, two of the attackers were detained by Austrian officials because they were traveling on forged documents (BBC News 2015). The terrorists arrived in Brussels from Syria in two waves. The first wave arrived in early September and the second, in early October 2015 (Cragin 2017) and at least two of the terrorists went through a refugee processing center in Leros, Greece (Connolly, 2016; Glackin 2016). Abdelhamid Abaaoud, who was known to intelligence agencies as an operational leader for Islamic State, claimed on social media that he was involved in terrorist plots against Europe (BBC News 2015), and because of his declaration, he and five of the other terrorists were placed on watch lists (AFP 2016). Another drawback in the gathering of intelligence prior to the attacks occurring was that the intelligence agencies did not detect that the terrorists were recruiting support from residents of Paris and Belgium. The residents would be used to provide assistance with logistics and purchase firearms and other weapons (Cragin 2017). They would also rent vehicles and lease safe houses in Paris and Belgium as the operation was being planned and executed (Cragin 2017). According to Cragin (2017) between September 2015 and November 2015, the terrorists rented eight safe houses and leased 11 vehicles. Other events could have also forewarned authorities that the terrorist attacks would take place in Paris. For example, the Islamic State sympathizer, Mohamed Abrini, traveled to England in July 2015 to collect funds from Islamists from around the country. The funds would be used to fund a terrorist attack in Europe (Dodd et al. 2016). Similarly, Reda Hame, following his arrest in France in August 2015, confessed that Abdelhamid Abaaoud had ordered him to attack a concert hall in Paris (Cragin 2017). Western intelligence agencies, prior to the Paris attacks, had gathered information from various sources that Islamic State were planning to attack the capital cities of Europe (Cragin 2017). The French authorities did not institute any interdiction methods to gather information that related to the possibility of a terrorist attack. The intelligence agencies could have gathered information from: • • • • •

informants, agents provocateurs, tip-offs, surveillance of known terrorists or radicalized individuals, surveillance of supporters of terrorist organizations (Woo 2016).

122

5 Paris

The Investigation into the Attacks Although the complexity and size of the terrorist attacks appeared to have caught the police by surprise, the response and the subsequent investigation were successful (Quinn-Williams 2016). This was despite the French not using an incident command system. The system they did use, however, enabled the emergency agencies to share information and to organize and coordinate their resources. This was despite the difficulties involved in handling and transmitting classified communication, the sizeable number of crime scenes, and the large number of fatalities (Quinn-Williams 2016). The police were able to realize situational awareness quickly, with a high degree of accuracy, in a short period of time. This led to 414 warrantless searches of residences and commercial buildings within six days of the incident (Quinn-­ Williams 2016), The criminal investigation began while the attacks at the Stade de France were ongoing. Criminal investigators had been deployed following the detonation of the first suicide bomb outside the Stade de France. The early deployment of investigators led the police to quickly gather information about the suicide vests used and that the terrorists had used TATP (Triacetone Triperoxyde) explosives. The information pertaining to the explosives helped the police develop a response plan for the Bataclan (Quinn-Williams 2016). The Bataclan was a complex crime scene (Quinn-Williams 2016). To assist with the search and the collection of evidence, the floor areas of the Bataclan were divided into zones. Search teams were then assigned to each zone to gather, identify, and tag the bullets casings, while other investigators were assigned to interviewing witnesses to the attack. The number of terrorists that attacked the Bataclan was underestimated by the witnesses, but the police were able to identify the number of attackers from surveillance-camera footage. Access to other surveillance camera footage also enabled the police to confirm that the attackers had driven to Paris from Brussels (Quinn-Williams 2016). The police were fortunate to find a cell phone in the trash bin during the search of the area around the Bataclan. The phone contained a text message in relation to the attacks. The text message was sent at 21:42 hrs on November 13, which said, “on est parti en commence” (“we have left, we are starting”) (Bennhold 2015). The police were able to use the geolocation services on the cell phone to find the locations of the attackers prior to the attacks (Quinn-­Williams 2016). One of the strengths in the police investigative response was the use of the SINUS system (Standardized Information Numeric System). This is a database that records all information that pertains to the victims of an attack, in real time (Quinn-Williams 2016). During triage at the attack site, every victim was given a bar-coded wristband. The victim’s information was instantly uploaded to SINUS and was continually updated if the victim was admitted to a hospital. The system enabled investigators to track the victims following their transportation to a medical facility and to create a list of all victims, regardless of their location. This system enabled the police to locate and share information with family members of the victims and to assist with the gathering of information about the attacks (Quinn-Williams 2016). Intelligence obtained by the police enabled them to locate an apartment in the Parisian suburb of St. Denis, where Abaaoud was residing. The arrival of the police

An Analysis of the Police Response

123

at the apartment led to a seven-hour stand-off with the terrorists. The stand-off ended with explosions and the deaths of three people, including Abaaoud (Quinn-­ Williams 2016, June). As well as searching for Abaaoud, the police were also tracking Salah Abdeslam. The records of a rental car company that hired a vehicle to him, and which he used in the attacks, were used to track him. His fingerprints and his DNA were found in the car. Abdeslam was arrested in Molenbeek, Belgium, in March 2016 (Quinn-Williams 2016).

Crisis Information One of the most challenging aspects for the police was managing communication with the public and ensuring that information flowed to those who needed it (Quinn-­ Williams 2016). One of the challenges was that the emergency phone system (the French 911) was quickly overloaded, with only one in six emergency calls being answered in the first few hours following the attacks (Quinn-Williams 2016). This was despite there being two call centers, each staffed with 40 operators to handle the incoming phone calls. The police deployed an extra 160 officers to the call centers to respond to the missed phone calls and to handle the incoming information. The police also created separate, dedicated phone numbers to aid in the investigation and to provide victim support (Quinn-Williams 2016). Another challenge was posed by members of the public using social media to share information about the attacks. Some of the information was incorrect or false. This situation came about because the police did not use social media effectively to share official news or to provide updates in the first few hours after the attacks. The void in communication gave rise to a sense of panic in the community as the police did not release its first official statement on social media until the following morning (Quinn-Williams 2016).

Police Training As a result of the police response to the terrorist attacks, questions were asked as to whether the police had the ability to respond adequately to this new type of terror attack (Quinn-Williams 2016). Multiple, simultaneous attacks in a number of different locations require a flexible and dynamic response from the police and from the intelligence agencies. These agencies also need to be aware of the strategies and tactics that are needed for countering-terrorism and these strategies and tactics need to be put in place as quickly as possible. The policing system used in France is centralized and rigid and is based on general patrol officers condoning off an incident and waiting for specialized units to arrive to handle an incident (Quinn-Williams 2016). During the Bataclan attack, two patrol officers responded after hearing the shooting from the concert hall. One of the officers shot one of the terrorists but was ordered to withdraw from the hall and to wait for the arrival of the Brigade de

124

5 Paris

Recherche et d’Intervention (BRI). The 30-minute delay in the arrival of the Brigade de Recherche et d’Intervention (BRI) meant that the terrorists were not confronted quickly, and this allowed them to take hostages and build a barricade in an upstairs room to protect themselves (Quinn-Williams 2016). French patrol officers are not trained in crime scene procedures. Nor are they trained in countering or confronting a terrorist during an attack. On top of this, they do not have ready access to high-caliber semi-automatic firearms. This means that officers do not have the appropriate equipment or training to confront, or at least, contain a terrorist event (Quinn-Williams 2016). This is different to the practice of most police forces around the world whose patrol officers have been trained to use small unit, infantry type tactics to confront terrorists immediately. Most police forces do not establish a cordon and wait for the arrival of specialist firearms units.

Operation Sentinelle Within three days of the terrorist attacks, the French Ministry of Defense (MOD) introduced Operation Sentinelle as a complement to the Vigipirate plan (Fenech and Pietrasanta 2016). The Vigipirate plan is a framework that is used for increasing the internal security of France and the plan prescribes that more combined police and military patrols are undertaken in subways, train stations, and other locations that have been identified as being of a high risk of a terrorist attack (Service-Public 2016). At the time of the November 13 terrorist attacks, 800 military personnel had been deployed to the Paris region (Maillet-Contoz 2018). Following the implementation of Operation Sentinelle however, the number deployed to the Paris region increased to 6000 and another 4000 were deployed across the country. The military personnel, together with 4700 police officers and gendarmes, were responsible for the security and protection of 1400 sites including religious schools, places of worship, public transportation, government buildings, and media organizations (Maillet-Contoz 2018). Police officers and military personnel were used to maximize the deterrent effect of a visible deployment in the face of a terrorist threat (Fenech and Pietrasanta 2016). The increased visibility of police officers and military personnel was designed to have an impact on the community’s sense of security and provide them with some reassurance (Pascale and de Saint Saveur 2017).

 he Loi Sur le Renseignement—Law Changes T for the Gathering of Intelligence On July 24, 2015, the French parliament introduced a number of law changes which enabled the French intelligence services to use new intelligence-gathering techniques. These techniques included the use of technology to locate a person, vehicle,

The Use of Social Media During the Attacks

125

or object, the capture of images, sounds, or computer data, the use of devices that capture data, and in some cases, the correspondence from mobile devices (Legifrance 2016). The changes were made to detect a terrorist attack early and to enhance the ability of the intelligence services to prevent its occurrence.

Jihadists Returning Home to France One of the main threats to the security of France is the number of citizens who have left the country to fight in Syria or for the Islamic State (IS). At the time of the attacks in Paris, the French intelligence services believed that there were more than 400 French citizens fighting in Syria, making the French contingent of fighters among the largest group of foreign fighters in Syria (Yeo 2015). Many individuals from France had traveled to countries such as Syria and Libya to receive paramilitary training (Yeo 2015), which compounded the threat. These individuals not only posed a threat from the perspective that they could plan and undertake an attack, but they also posed a threat from being perceived as being able to undertake an attack or being able to radicalize other vulnerable individuals (Yeo 2015).

The Use of Social Media During the Attacks Modern researchers have claimed that there is a role for the use of social media platforms when responding to a crisis. They enable social convergence (Hughes et  al. 2008) and for organizing volunteers to assist with the response to a crisis (Starbird and Palen 2010). The sharing of information was once limited to those who were in geographical proximity to an event. However, the introduction of social media enables information to be circulated quickly (Hughes et al. 2008) by participants and non-participants of an event (Reilly and Vicari 2021). Unfortunately, the problem with participants and non-participants circulating information quickly by social media is that it enables rumors to circulate (Shibutani,1966; Starbird et al. 2016) and enables unverified information to be spread (Bordia and Difonzo 2004). As a result of social media, the police and other responding agencies are no longer the only source of information about an event. Twitter has been described as being an ideal platform for sharing information during crisis events (Murthy 2013). Retweets can be used as an informal information system during a crisis, with individuals who are geographically close to an event sharing information about a crisis (Starbird & Plan, 2010). It can also involve some form of anonymity (Kepi & Oskanen, 2014), which is considered by some researchers to make some online groups more efficient in drawing people in to follow their activities (Awan and Blakemore 2016). However, social media exposes information quickly without any official control or substantiating the information that is being shared (Oksanen et al.

126

5 Paris

2020). It can also enable members of the public to have an influence on the way that the police respond to an event (Tikka 2019). Twitter functioned as a tool for addressing the information needs of the community and those who were directly affected by the terrorist attacks in Paris (Reilly and Vicari 2021). There were approximately 9000 tweets with images from the Paris attacks posted between 21.00 hours on November 13 and 07.00 hours, the day after (Cvetojevic, S. & Hochmair, 2018). A number of different hashtags also emerged during and after the attacks (Schafer et al. 2019). The first hashtag to emerge was #Paris and # rechercepersonne (search for person), which enabled Twitter users to locate where the incidents were occurring and to share related information in real time. Another set of hashtags emerged that enabled people to express their sympathy for the victims by tagging their tweets with compassionate hashtags such as #PrayforParis, #jessuisparis, and #PrayforSyria (Garcia and Rime 2019). However, there were also examples of hate speech within the compassionate tweets, especially toward Muslims after the Islamic State had claimed responsibility for the attacks (Kaakinen et al. 2018; Magdy et al. 2015).

Conclusion The terrorist attacks in Paris on November 13, 2015, changed our understanding of what an act of terrorism is (see Jenks 2003). The attacks were similar to and were built on the actions taken by the terrorists in their attacks on Mumbai in 2008 (see for Rabasa et al. 2009; Yazujian 2017). The attacks in Paris and Mumbai required extensive planning and coordination and a detailed assessment of the intended targets. The attacks were executed by splitting the terrorists into small teams of two or three individuals so that a number of different targets could be attacked to create the greatest amount of confusion, inflict injuries on, and cause the death of the largest number of people possible. The attacks comprised of armed assaults that resulted in the death of the terrorists and the use of suicide vests. The police response to the attacks was fitting and the subsequent investigation quickly led to the identification of the attackers and their arrests. However, there were some deficiencies in the performance of the intelligence services and by some politicians. After the attacks, the French government implemented legislation to strengthen their counterterrorism policies, which is their standard response to a terrorist attack since Islamist terrorism began in France in the 1980s (Bonelli 2008; Maillet-Contoz 2018). The government took this conservative approach because it gave the appearance that they were responding to the threat posed by Islamist terrorism and because it was easier and politically safer to do so than it was to undertake a review of the domestic intelligence agencies and their procedures. The response to the attacks by the European Union was similar to that taken by the French government, in that following the attacks in Paris, the European Union

References

127

focused their response on the refugee crisis in Europe by strengthening the Schengen area borders and their asylum policies (Bigo et al. 2015). Bigo et al. (2015) stated that instead of focusing on these political issues, the European Union should have been evaluating what has and what has not worked in policing and the criminal justice sector. The researchers argue that the European Union should develop a new counter-terrorism strategy that is based on traditional policing and criminal justice responses to criminality. They also recommended that the law enforcement and intelligence agencies in the European Union reinforce their capabilities and improve their ability to cooperate with agencies from other countries (Bigo et al. 2015).

References AFP (2016, April 27). Paris Abdeslam: Pot-smoking ‘little moron’of Paris attacks. The Local. https:// www.thelocal.fr/20160427/salah-­abdeslam-­the-­pot-­smoking-­little-­moron-­of-­paris-­attacks/. Awan, I. & Blakemore, B. (Eds.) (2016). Policing cyber hate, cyber threats and cyber terrorism. Routledge. BBC News. (2015, December 9). Paris attacks: What happened on the night. https://www.bbc. com/news/world-­europe-­34818994. BBC News. (2016a, March 26). Suspect Salah Abdeslam planned further attacks. http://www.bbc. com/news/world-­europe-­35857388. BBC News (2016b, April 9). Paris attacks: Key suspect Abrini arrested in Brussels. https://www. bbc.com/news/world-­europe-­36000407. BBC News Europe. (2016, April 27). Paris attacks: Who were the attackers? http://www.bbc.com/ news/world-­europe-­34832512. Bennhold, K. (2015, November 18). Paris attacks highlight Jihadists’ easy path between Europe and ISIS Territory. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/19/world/europe/ paris-­attacks-­islamic-­state-­jihadis.html. Bensa, A. & Fassin, E. (March 2002). Les sciences sociales face a l’e’ve’nement. Terrain, 38, 5–20. BFM TV (2016). 13 Novembre 2015: Comment la France a musclé sa politique anti-terroriste [How France toughened its counter-terrorism arsenal since 13 November 2015]. http:// www.bfmtv.com/societe/depuisle-­1 3-­n ovembre-­2 015-­l a-­f rance-­a -­m uscle-­s a-­p olitique-­ antiterroriste-­1055983.html. Bigo, D., Brouwer, E., Carrera, S.,Guild, E., Guittet, E-P., Jeandesboz, ., Mitsilegas, V., Ragazzi, F. & Scherrer, A. (2015, November). The EU and its counter-terrorism policies after the Paris attacks. CEPS Papers in Liberty and Security in Europe, No. 84, CEPS, Brussels. Blavignat, Y. (2016, March 30). Déchéance de nationalité: Un abandon en six actes. Le Figaro. http://www.lefigaro.fr/politique/le-­s can/2016/03/30/25001-­2 0160330ARTFIG00296-­ decheance-­de-­nationalite-­un-­abandon-­en-­sixactes.php. Bonelli, L. (2008). Les caractéristiques de l’antiterrorisme français: Parer les coups plutôt que panser les plaies. (Characteristics of French counter-terrorism: Parry the blows rather than binding up the wounds]. In B. Didier (Ed.), Au nom du 11 septembre..: Les démocraties à l'épreuve de l'antiterrorisme (pp. 168-187). La Decouverte. Bordia, P. & Difonzo, N. (2004). Problem solving in social interactions on the internet: Rumor as social cognition. Social Psychology Quarterly, 67(1), 33–49. Brisard, J. (2015). The Paris attacks and the evolving Islamic State threat to France. CTC Sentinel, 8(11), 5, 7–8. Callimachi, R. (2016, January 25). ISIS video appears to show Paris assailants earlier in Syria and Iraq. New York Times.

128

5 Paris

Cauley, J., & Im, E. (1988). Intervention policy analysis of skyjackings and other terrorist incidents. American Economic Review, 78(2), 27–31. Chlebik, K. (2010). Terrorism and game theory: From the terrorists’ point of view. Pepperdine Policy Review, III,15–26. Cragin, R. (2017). The November 2015 Paris attacks: The impact of foreign fighter returnees. Obris, 61(2), 212-226. Crenshaw, M. (1992). Current research on terrorism: The academic perspective. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 15(1),1–11. d’Allonnes, D. & Bonnefous, B. (2015). Valls annonce la creation de 2 680 postes pour lutter contre le terrorisme. Le Monde, 23 January. https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/ article/2015/01/21/manuel-­valls-­annonce-­la-­creation-­de-­2680-­emplois-­pour-­lutter-­contre-­le-­ terrorisme_4560334_823448.html. Dodd, V., Grierson, J. & Parveen, N. (2016, April 15). Five arrested in UK after inquiry linked to attacks on Brussels and Paris. Guardian.co.uk. https://www.theguardian.com/uk-­news/2016/ apr/15/five-­people-­arrested-­in-­west-­midlands-­uk-­over-­planning-­terrorist-­acts. Enders, W., & Sandler, T. (2002). Patterns of transnational terrorism, 1970–1999: Alternative time-­ series estimates. International Studies Quarterly, 46(2), 145–165. Enders, W., Sandler, T., & Parise, G. (1992). An econometric analysis of the impact of terrorism on tourism. Kyklos,45(4), 531–554. Estrada, M. & Koutronas, E. (2016). Terrorist attack assessment: Paris November 2015 and Brussels March 2016. Journal of Social Modeling, 38, 553–571. Faucher, F. & Boussaguet, L. (2018). The politics of symbols: Reflections on the French government’s framing of the 2015 terrorist attacks. Parliamentary Affairs, 71, 169–195. Fenech, G., & Pietrasanta, S. (2016). Commission d’enquête relative aux moyens mis en oeuvre par l’Etat pour lutter contre le terrorisme depuis le 7 janvier 2015 (Rep. No. 3922) [Commission of Inquiry into the means implemented by the State to fight against terrorism since January 7, 2015]. Assemblée Nationale. Filiu, J-P. (2014). Ansar al-Fatah and ‘Iraqi’ networks in France. In B. Hoffman and F. Reinares (Eds.), The evolution of the global terrorist threat: From 9/11 to Osma bin Laben’s death (pp. 353-371). Columbia University Press. Fleming, P. (2001). International terrorism: Attributes of terrorist events 1992–1998. Mimeo. Foley, F. (2013). Countering terrorism in Britain and France. Cambridge University Press. Garcia, D., & Rime, B. (2019). Collective emotions and social resilience in the digital traces after a terrorist attack. Psychological Science, 30(4), 617–628. Ghanchi, A. (2016). Insights into French emergency planning, response, and resilience procedures from a hospital managerial perspective following the Paris terrorist attacks of Friday, November 13, 2015. Disaster Medicine and Public Health Preparedness, 10(5), 789–794. Glackin, M. (2016, November 16). Paris and the end of the beginning. The Daily Star (Lebanon). Goralnick, E., van Trimpont, F. & Carli, P. (2017). Preparing for the next terrorism attack: Lessons from Paris, Brussels and Boston. JAMA Surgery, 152, 419–420. Graham, D. (2018). Marauding Terrorist Firearms’ Attacks. The RUSI Journal, 163(2), 42–50. The Guardian. (November 15, 2016). France under first state of emergency since 1961. https:// www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/16/france-­nationwide-­state-­of-­emergency. Hackett, C. (2015, November). 5 facts about the Muslim population in Europe. FACT TANK. http:// www.pewresearch.org/fact-­tank//11/17/5-­facts-­about-­the-­muslim-­population-­in-­europe/2015. Hellmuth, D. (2015). Countering Jihadi terrorists and radicals the French way. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 38(12), 979-997. Hoffman, B. (1998). Inside terrorism. Columbia University Press. Hirsch, M., Carli, P., Nizard, R., Riou, B., Baroudjian, B., Baubet, T., et. al., (2015). The medical response to multisite terrorist attacks in Paris. https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/ article/PIIS0140-­6736(15)01063-­6/fulltext?rss=yes.

References

129

Hughes, A., Palen, L., Sutton, J., Liu, S., & Vieweg, S. (2008). Site-seeing in Disaster: An examination of on-line social convergence. 5th International ISCRAM Conference (May), 44–54. ISIS. (2016, January 24). Kill them all wherever you find them. al-Hayat Media Center. Jenks, C. (2003). Transgression. Sage. Kaakinen, M., Oksanen, A., & Rasanen, P. (2018). Did the risk of exposure to online hate increase after the November 2015 Paris attacks? A group relations approach. Computers in Human Behavior, 78, 90–97. Kern, S. (2015, January). European ‘No-Go’ zones: Fact or fiction? Gatestonbe Institute. http:// www.gatestoneinstitute.org/5128/france-­no-­go-­zones. Landes, W. (1978). An economic analysis of US aircraft hijackings, 1961–1976. Journal of Law and Economics, 21(1),1–31. Legifrance. (2016). LAW No. 2016-731 of June 3, 2016, strengthening the fight against organized crime, terrorism and their financing, and improving the efficiency and guarantees of criminal procedure. https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/loda/id/JORFTEXT000032627231/. Magdy, W., Darwish, K., & Abokhodair, N. (2015). Quantifying public response towards Islam on Twitter after Paris Attacks. arXiv. https://arxiv.org/abs/1512.04570 Mahoney, J. (2001). Path dependent explanations of regime change. Studies in Comparative and International Development, 36, 111–141. Maillet-Contoz, J. (2018). Terrorism and counterterrorism: French policy after the 2015 attacks. Retrieved from: https://www.e-­ir.info/2018/12/07/terrorism-­and-­counterterrorism-­ french-­policy-­after-­the-­2015-­attacks/. Meichtry, S., Robinson, J. & Kostov, N. (2015, 15 November). Behind François Hollande’s snap decision at Stade de France and the unfolding terror in Paris. The Wall Street Journal. https:// www.wsj.com/articles/behind-­francois-­hollandes-­snap-­decision-­at-­stade-­de-­france-­and-­the-­ unfolding-­terror-­in-­paris-­1447634427. Mickolus, E. (1980). Transnational terrorism: A chronology of events, 1968–1979. Greenwood. Mickolus, E. (1982). International terrorism: Attributes of terrorist events, 1968–1977. Inter-­ University Consortium for Political and Social Research. Moloney, J. & Morgan, D. (2019, July). The Paris Terrorist Attacks: Implications for First Responders. Journal of High Threat & Austere Medicine, 1(1). https://doi.org/10.33553/jhtam. v1i1.18. Murthy, D. (2013). Twitter: Social communication in the Twitter Age. Polity Press. Nevalsky, E. (2015). Developing terrorism coverage: variances in news framing of the January 2015 attacks in Paris and Borno. Critical Studies on Terrorism, 8(3), 466-477. Nossiter, A., Breeden, A., & Bennhold, K. (2015, November 14). Three teams of coordinated attackers carried out assault on Paris, officials say; Hollande blames ISIS. New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/15/world/europe/paris-­terrorist-­attacks.html. Oksanen, A., Kaakinen, M., Minkkinen, J., Räsänen, P., Enjolras, B. & Steen-Johnsen, K. (2020) Perceived Societal Fear and Cyberhate after the November 2015 Paris Terrorist Attacks. Terrorism and Political Violence, 32(5), 1047-1066. Pascale, E. & de Saint Saveur, C. (2017). Faut-il supprimer l’opération sentinelle ? Le Parisien. http:// www.leparisien.fr/faits-­divers/debat-­faut-­il-­supprimer-­l-­operation-­sentinelle-­10-­08-­20177185321.php. Pelletier, E. & Raisse, T. (2016, April 25). From Raqqa to Salzburg, in the steps of the phantom commando. Aujourdi’hui en France. Pfeifer, J. (2016). International anti-terrorism preparedness. www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/ default/files/centers/research-­i nitiatives/crisisleadership/files/feifer_2016-­4 -­w nyf/ International_anti-­terrorism. Pierson, P. (2004). Politics in time: History, institutions, and social analysis. Princeton University Press. Quinn-Williams. (2016, June). The attacks on Paris: Lessons learned. Homeland Security Advisory Council.

130

5 Paris

Rabasa, A., Blackwill, R., Chalk, P., Cragin, K., Fair, C., Jackson, B., Jenkins, M., Jones, S., Shestak, N. & Tellis, A. (2009). The lessons from Mumbai. Rand Corporation. Randolph, E. & Valmary, S. (2015, November). More than 120 people killed in Paris terror attacks. http://www.webcitation.org/6d1kwppjd. Riegert, K. & Widholm, A. (2019). The Difference Culture Makes: Comparing Swedish news and cultural journalism on the 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris. Nordicom Review, 40(2), 3-18. Reilly, P. & Vicari, S. (2021, January-March). Organizational Hashtags During Times of Crisis: Analyzing the Broadcasting and Gatekeeping Dynamics of #PorteOuverte During the November 2015 Paris Terror Attacks. Social Media + Society, 1-13. Sandler, T. & Arce, M. (2003). Terrorism & game theory. Simulation & Gaming, 34(3), 319–337. Schafer, V., Truc, G., Badouard, R., Castex, L., & Musiani, F. (2019). Paris and Nice terrorist attacks: Exploring Twitter and web archives. Media, War & Conflict, 12(2), 153–170. Service-Public. (2016). Vigipirate: le niveau de vigilance redescend au risque attentat. https:// www.service-­public.fr/particuliers/actualites/A14434#:~:text=Le%20plan%20Vigipirate%20 est%20port%C3%A9,au%20niveau%20%C2%AB%20Urgence%20attentat%20%C2%BB. Shadid, W. (1991). The Integration of Muslim Minorities in The Netherlands. International Migration Review, 25(2), 355–374. Starbird, K. & Palen, L. (2010). Pass it on? Retweeting in mass emergency. Proceedings of the 7th International ISCRAM Conference, December, 1–10. Starbird, K., Spiro, E., Edwards, I., Zhou, K., Maddock, J., & Narasimhan, S. (2016). Could this be true?: I think so! Expressed uncertainty in online rumoring. Proceedings of the 2016 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems, 360–371. Teich, S. (2015). Islamic Radicalization in Belgium. International Institute for Counter-Terrorism. Thompson, J., Rehn, M., Lossius, H. & Lockey, D. (2014). Risks to emergency medical responders at terrorist incidents: A narrative review of the medical literature. Critical Care,18, 521–528. Tikka, M. (2019). Ritualisation of crisis communication: Crowd enabled responses to the Stockholm terror attack on Twitter. Nordicom Review, 40(1), 105–120. Tracqui, A., Deguette, C., Delabarde, T., Delannoy, Y., Plu, I., Sec, I., Hamza, L., Taccoen, M. & Ludes, B. (2020) An overview of forensic operations following the terrorist attacks on November 13, 2015, in Paris. Forensic Sciences Research, 5(3), 202-207. Vasilopoulos, P. & Brouard, S. (2020). System justification and affective responses to terrorism: Evidence from the November 2015 Paris attacks. Political Psychology, 41(3), 569–586. Vasilopoulos, P., Marcus, G., Valentino, N. & Foucault, M. (2019). Fear, anger, and voting for the far right: Evidence from the November 13, 2015 Paris terror attacks. Political Psychology, 40(4), 679–72. Wilkinson, P. (1986). Terrorism and the liberal state. Macmillan. Wilkinson, P., & Stewart, A. (1987). Contemporary research on terrorism. University of Aberdeen Press Williams, Q. (2016). The attacks on Paris: Lessons learned. Homeland Security Advisory Council. https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5782ad8f9de4bb114784a8fe/t/5783fec9d482e95d4 e0b79bf/1468268235955/HSAC-­Paris_LessonsLearned_WhitePaper.pdf. Wilson, T., Stanek, S., Spiro, E. & Starbird, K. (2017, May). Language limitations in rumor research? comparing French and English tweets sent during the 2015 Paris attacks. Presented at the 14th ISCRAM Conference, Albi, France. Woo, G. (2016). Terrorism insurance as insurance against the failure of counter-terrorism: ISIS attacks in Paris and San Bernardino. www.rms.com/FISIS_Paris_San_Bernardino.pdf. Wurmb, T.; Franke, A., Schorscher, N., Kowalzik, B., Helm, M., Bohnen, R.  Helmerichs, J., Grueneisen, U., Cwojdzinski, D., Jung, G., Lücking, G. & Weber, M. (2020). Emergency response to terrorist attacks: Results of the federal-conducted evaluation process in Germany. European Journal of Trauma and Emergency Surgery, 46, 725–730.

References

131

Yazujian, T. (2017). A comparative social network analysis of the 2008 Mumbai, 2015 Paris, and 2016 Brussels terrorist networks. Master’s Dissertation. The College of Information Sciences and Technology, The Pennsylvania State University. Yeo, W. (2015, November 18). The 2015 Paris attacks: An assessment. RSIS Commentary: 250. S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore. Yonah, A. & Pluchinsky, D. (1992). Europe’s red terrorists: The fighting communist organizations. Frank Cass.

Chapter 6

Brussels

Introduction Between 1984 and May 24, 2014, Belgium did not endure any jihadi terrorist attacks (Devroe and Ponsaers 2018; Lasoen 2017). This was despite it being one of the main centers in Europe for the recruitment of jihadi activists (Ponsaers and Devroe 2016b). Terror attacks did occur in the country during the 1984 to 2014 period, but these attacks were not undertaken by jihadis. They were committed by extreme left-­ wing groups such as the Combating Communist Cells (Van der Velpen 1986), and a criminal gang, called the Gang of Nivelles, which was suspected of having connections with extreme right-wing groups (Ponsaers and Dupont 1988). A number of anti-Semitic assaults were also perpetrated during this period across the country (Ponsaers and Devroe 2017). The first act of terrorism by jihardis was an assault on the Jewish Museum in Brussels on May 24, 2014, which killed four people (Devroe and Ponsaers 2018). The attacker was Mehdi Nemmouche, a French-Algerian, who had fought in Syria. He recorded a video prior to the attack, with the Islamic State flag in the background, and he was the first European who had fought in the Syrian war to undertake a terrorist attack upon his return to Europe (Bartunek 2014). At the time, Belgium had more nationals fighting for jihadist forces in Syria and Iraq as a proportion of its population than any other Western European country (Elbagir et al. 2016). Prior to the attack on the Jewish Museum, preventing radicalization had not been a political priority, despite Belgium being the place where Islamist terrorists planned their European operations and attacks (Devroe and Ponsaers 2018; Lasoen 2018). Between 2014 and 2015, a number of terrorist attacks were disrupted by the police and the intelligence agencies, and the number of wiretapping and surveillance operations directed at suspected terrorists by Belgian intelligence almost doubled (Lasoen 2019). © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. den Heyer, Police Respond to Terrorism, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-43250-7_6

133

134

6 Brussels

After the first terrorist attack had occurred in France in early 2015, the Belgium Federal Government developed a comprehensive counterterrorist program to increase security at supposedly high-risk terrorist targets and to increase the public’s confidence in the ability of the government to counter terrorism. The program consisted of two separate phases. The first phase broadened the scope of terrorist-­ related legislation and procedures to enforce the new legislation and increased the powers of prosecution and sanctioning offences. The second phase comprised of a risk management framework for the police and the intelligence agencies to manage those individuals who were identified as being a terrorist or were on the path to becoming a terrorist (Lasoen 2017; Ponsaers and Devroe 2017). The new legislation and powers were different from the broader, social policy, and preventative approaches that were previously favored by the government (Edwards et al. 2017). The implementation of the program was impeded by the decentralized, federal structure of the country, and the complex structure of the Brussels Capital Region Government (Ponsaers and Devroe 2017). The police in Belgium had been on alert to a possible terrorist attack occurring in the capital following the various terrorist attacks that had taken place in France. They implemented an anti-terrorist operation in January 2015 to respond to what they thought was a group who were planning a second Charlie Hebdo style of attack. On January 15, 2015, a search of a house in the border town of Verviers was undertaken because this was where members of a suspected jihadist terrorist cell were living (Lasoen 2017). The cell was suspected of having links to Islamic State and it was believed that they were planning a terrorist attack in Belgium. The cell was led by a Belgian–Moroccan Islamic terrorist named Abdelhamid Abaaoud from Molenbeek (Brussels) who had spent time in Syria (Ponsaers and Devroe 2017; Devroe and Ponsaers 2018). He was the leader of the terrorist group that attacked Paris in February 2015. Unfortunately, Abaaoud was not located during the search, and as a result, Abaaoud went on to plan and lead the attacks that took place in Paris on November 13, 2015 (Devroe and Ponsaers 2021). Two people who were suspected of being terrorists died while the police were searching the house. The Belgian prosecutor’s office stated that the searches were in response to the actions of a jihadist terrorist cell who was known to have links to Islamic State and was planning a terrorist attack against sites in Brussels (Devroe and Ponsaers 2018; Ponsaers and Devroe 2017). The police in Belgium became aware shortly after the attacks in Paris in November 2015 that the operational base for the terrorists was Sint-Jans-Molenbeek, a suburb in Brussels (Lasoen 2017). This led the Belgian intelligence services and the police to believe that because the attacks had occurred in Paris, then there was a possibility that an attack could occur in Brussels. Therefore, the Belgian Organization of Coordination for the Analysis of the Threat raised the terrorism threat level to 3. The level was increased again on November 21, following the interception of a SMS message that said “On est cramés. On doit le faire avant demain” (We are compromised. We have to do it before tomorrow) (La Derniere Haure 2015). The change in the threat level was reinforced by the information gathered from the joint

Introduction

135

investigation with France into the Paris attacks, which provided credible indicators that a terrorism threat was likely (Crisis Centre 2015). The government of Belgium changed its view of radicalization after an attack on the Jewish Museum in 2014 and this influenced a change in the domestic threat level after the 2015 attacks in Paris had occurred (Devroe and Ponsaers 2018). The Charlie Hebdo terrorist attacks and the later terrorist attacks in Paris led to an increased fear of terrorism in Belgium and led to the establishment of a joint police operation between France and Belgium (Devroe and Ponsaers 2018). It was the joint operation that undertook a search for jihadist terrorists in Verviers in Belgium. Following the terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2015, one of the terrorists, Salah Abdeslam, a Belgium-born French national of Moroccan descent, fled to Brussels, while five of the ten terrorists, and their suspected accomplices were identified as being Belgian and French nationals who were living in the Brussels districts of Molenbeek-Saint-Jean and Neder-Over-Heembeek (Quivooji 2016). The realization that the terrorists who had carried out the attacks in Paris had been based in Belgium led to Minister Charles Michel to declare, “what we feared has happened” (Quivooji 2016). The government of Belgium tightened its security along its border with France and introduced tighter security screening of people who arrived from France (Devroe and Ponsaers 2018). The government also implemented a security lockdown in Brussels, which closed shops, schools, and public transportation (Tutt and Pramuk 2015). The lockdown was for 5 days, and this enabled the police to search for suspects in the suburb of Molenbeek (Lasoen 2019). On March 18, 2016, after 4 months of being on the run, Salah Abdeslam was arrested following two anti-terrorist raids in Molenbeek that killed a suspect and injured two others (BBC News 2016a). Following the arrest of Abdeslam, at 08.00 hours on March 22, 2016, three coordinated bomb attacks took place in the Brussels area. The first two explosions were in the departure lounge of Zaventem International Airport (Estrada and Koutronas 2016), which resulted in 11 people being killed and 81 injured (European Council 2023). One of the suicide bombers was Najim Laachraoui, who had taken part in the attacks in Paris. At approximately the same time that the blast in the airport occurred, a bomb blast took place in the Maelbeek Railway Station, striking the middle carriage of a three-carriage train, that was beginning to depart. The blast killed 20 people and injured more than 100, 17 of whom were critically injured (Chad et al. 2016). The attacks caused major disruptions to both the local and international transport networks, as Zaventem Airport is a major transit point for people traveling from Europe to locations around the world. The terrorist attacks in France and Belgium in 2015 and 2016 occurred while these countries were in a heightened state of alert (Lasoen 2017). Questions were raised about the gathering, sharing, and the use of intelligence by the intelligence agencies and the police, and the effectiveness of the use of the military and preventative patrols. Lasoen (2017) suggested that a better way to manage the risk may have been to deploy resources to places of high risk or to vulnerable targets and infrastructure.

136

6 Brussels

This chapter examines the terrorist attacks that took place in Brussels in 2016, the relationship between the attack and the 2015 attacks in France, the effect that the reform of the Belgian police had on its response to the attacks and the strengths and weaknesses of the police response.

The Reform of the Police in 1998 The police forces in Belgium faced a crisis in their legitimacy because they had failed to respond appropriately to several high-profile events (Devroe 2012; Ponsaers and de Kimpe 2001). The police were unable to solve the case of the shooting of 28 people by the right-wing gang called the Gang of Nivelles (Ponsaers and Dupont 1988). They also failed to locate the Cellulles Communist Combattantes (CCC), a left-wing terrorist group that had committed several serious assaults (Van der Velpen 1986) and nor were they able to prevent the “Heysel Stadium Tragedy” in May 1985, which was a clash between Juventus and Liverpool supporters that resulted in the death of 39 people (Devroe and Ponsaers 2021). The crisis led to an extensive reform of the policing system between 1998 and 2001 (Ponsaers and de Kimpe 2001). Three police forces merged as a part of the reform. Five hundred and eighty-nine municipal police forces were merged with the national gendarmerie and the national judicial (criminal) police to form one police service that was structured on two levels (Devroe and Ponsaers 2018; Ponsaers and Devroe 2016b). The federal level operates at the national level and is responsible for serious or complex forms of public disorder and crime, while the territorial level covers several municipalities and is responsible for responding to crime of a less serious nature and for preventing crime (Ponsaers and Devroe 2016b). The two levels are not hierarchically linked but are integrated operationally through annual planning cycles and technology systems (Van Branteghem et al. 2007). The new structure enabled a whole of government, Integrated Local Security Policy (ILSP), to be implemented. The policy required municipalities, non-­ government organizations, and the local police to collaborate to promote security and to address the root causes of public disorder and crime. The policy enabled Local Cells for Integral Security (LCIS), to be established. Local Cells for Integral Security focuses on countering terrorism and was implemented through the Community Policing Preventing Radicalisation and Terrorism (CoPPRa) program. Eleven states of the European Union collaborate in the program. In practical terms, the Community Policing Preventing Radicalisation and Terrorism program (CoPPRa) is a manual that is used to enable operational police officers to identify the signs of radicalization at an early stage (Ponsaers and Devroe 2016b). However, the program is not coordinated nationally, as the anti-terror section of the federal police has only a limited number of people who work on the prevention of radicalization (Doraene 2016). A lack of coordination nationally has

The Response of the Belgian Government to the Charlie Hebdo Attacks in France

137

meant that the program has not been implemented consistently with some municipalities having too many resources, while others not having enough (Ponsaers and Devroe 2016b).

 he Response of the Belgian Government to the Charlie T Hebdo Attacks in France The government of Belgium implemented 12 counterterrorism measures in January 2015, as a response to the Charlie Hebdo terrorist attacks and because the joint police operation located one of the perpetrators in a raid that was being carried out in Verviers (Blyth 2015). The counterterrorism measures mainly pertained to improving the effectiveness of enforcing criminal laws, but there were also a number of measures that focused on the response to counter terrorism and the structures of security organizations (Ponsaers and Devroe 2017). The measures that were introduced have been presented in Table 6.1. A second tranche of 18 counterterrorism measures were implemented by the government following the terrorist attacks in Paris on November 13, 2015. These measures have been presented in Table 6.2.

Table 6.1  The counterterrorism response and the organizational structure measures 2015 • A National Security Council was established to determine and coordinate the policies of the intelligence and security services and to set their priorities. The council coordinates the actions taken to prevent the financing of terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (Devroe and Ponsaers 2013). • The establishment of mechanisms to identify persons who are involved in the financing of terrorism and to freeze their assets (Devroe and Ponsaers 2018). • Directs the police and intelligence agencies to identify foreign fighters who are living in Belgium (Ponsaers and Devroe 2016b). • City mayors requested to establish Local Cells for Integral Security (LCIS) (Devroe and Ponsaers 2018). • he methods for exchanging of information between the authorities and the administrative and judicial services optimized and a foreign fighters database was established. •  The development of a new plan to respond to radicalization. • The development of a plan to respond to radicalization that is taking place in prisons (Ponsaers and Devroe 2016a). • Increases the ability of the police to call on the Belgian army for specific monitoring operations (Ponsaers and Devroe 2016c).

138

6 Brussels

Table 6.2  Second tranche of counterterrorism measures 1. The security budget was increased to €400 million to respond to the threat of terrorism (Ponsaers and Devroe 2017). 2. More police resources were made available for policing Belgium’s borders. 3. 520 soldiers were deployed to increase internal security. 4. New technologies were introduced for the intelligence services, such as voice recognition and the expansion of wiretapping. 5. The length of time that someone can be detained in relation to a terrorism case was increased from 24 h to 72 h. 6. The hours that search warrants could be executed was extended to any time during the day or night and was no longer restricted to being between 7 am to 9 pm. 7. Police and the intelligence services were directed to focus on returnee foreign fighters. 8. Legislation was created to enable foreign fighter returnees to be placed under electronic surveillance. 9. A database was developed to store records of passenger names (PNR) of international travelers. 10. Legislation was implemented to place preachers of hate speech under house arrest. 11. Legislation was implemented to dismantle unrecognized places of worship that propagate jihadism. 12. Access to anonymous, pre-paid, mobile phone cards was withdrawn. 13. The execution of the Molenbeek Plan (later renamed Canal Plan), which focused on eight municipalities in Brussels and surrounding areas that were identified as having populations that were vulnerable to radicalization. 14. The screening of applicants for jobs that were deemed to be sensitive. 15. An extension of the network of cameras that recognize car license plates. 16. The closing down of websites that preach hate. 17. An extension of the state of emergency legislation to include temporary and exceptional measures that would ensure public safety. 18. Increasing participation in the international fight against Islamic State. Adapted from Devroe and Ponsaers (2018)

The Terrorist Attacks The authorities in Belgium increased security along the border with France and increased security checks for people arriving from France immediately after the November 13, 2015, terrorist attacks (Devroe and Ponsaers 2021). The Belgian government had received information that a terrorist attack could occur in the wake of the coordinated attacks in Paris, and as a result, increased security in Brussels which included the closing of shops, schools, and public transportation (Tutt and Pramuk 2015). What the Belgium authorities did not realize was that of one of the November 2015, Paris attackers, Salah Abdeslam had driven from Paris to Molenbeek in Belgium on the night of the attacks. On March 19, 2016, after being on the run for 4 months, Salah Abdeslam was apprehended during a police search of a house in Molenbeek (Rubin 2016). Following the arrest of Abdeslam, on the morning of March 22, 2016, the Zaventem International Airport and Maelbeek Metro Station were attacked by two separate

The Terrorist Attacks

139

squads of suicide bombers (Quinn-Williams 2016; Yazujian 2017). Two explosions were set off in the airport departure lounge by the attackers who were carrying large suitcases that were packed with nail bombs (Austin 2016; Devroe and Ponsaers 2021; Ponsaers and Devroe 2017; RTBR 2016). The first explosion occurred at approximately 07.58 hours in Check-in Row 11 and the second explosion occurred 9 s later in Check-in Row 2 (Ponsaers and Devroe 2017; Quinn-Williams 2016). A third suicide bomber was prevented from detonating their bomb by the force of the first explosion (Miller 2016), and the bomber left the scene soon after the explosions. The bomber did not take the bomb that had not exploded, which was found later in the day by the police and was subsequently disarmed (Ponsaers and Devroe 2017; Reuters 2016). Some witnesses to the attacks alleged that before the first explosion occurred, shots were fired, and there were yells in Arabic. However, it was found later that no shots had been fired (BBC News 2016c). Following the attacks, the authorities halted air traffic, evacuated the terminals, and immobilized rail transport to the airport (Quinn-Williams 2016). At approximately 09.11 hours, a third explosion occurred in the middle carriage of a three-carriage train at Maalbeek Metro Station. The station is 10 kilometers (6  miles) away from the Zaventem Airport and is located near the European Commission Headquarters, NATO Headquarters, and the European Parliament in the center of Brussels (Dearden 2016; Lasoen 2017; Quinn-Williams 2016; Sahay 2016). The train was traveling on line 5 toward the city center and was pulling out of Maalbeek Station when the bomb exploded (Keneally 2016). By 09:30, all public transportation in Brussels had been suspended. The Belgian authorities released surveillance footage showing the three airport attackers arriving in a taxi and pushing luggage trolleys into the entrance of the departure lounge of the airport. Two of the attackers were later identified as Ibrahim el Bakraoui and Najim Laachraoui (Gardham 2016; Quinn-Williams 2016; Yazujian 2017). The bomber of the Maelbeek Metro Station was identified as Khalid el Bakraoui, Brahim’s brother (Quinn-Williams 2016). The third airport attacker who did not detonate their bomb was identified as Mohamed Abrini, who was suspected of providing logistical assistance to the terrorists that attacked Paris on November 13, 2015 (Yazujian 2017). Abrini’s connection to the broader network became apparent after his capture by the police in a raid in Anderlecht, a town near Brussels, in April 2016 (Gardham 2016). Abrini had driven Salah Abdeslam to Paris 2  days before the November attacks in Paris. While in Paris, Salah drove the attackers to various locations to undertake the attacks. Salah, after fleeing the attacks in Paris, provided Abrini and the other attackers with transportation to the Brussels airport (Clarke 2016). According to Yazujian (2017) Salah’s role in providing transportation and logistics to both networks was important as he was the link between the Paris terrorist cell and the Brussels terrorist cell. The attacks at the airport and the metro station killed 35 people (including the three terrorist attackers) and injured more than 340, of which 62 were critically injured (BBC News 2015; Eurojust n.d.; Holehouse 2016; Ponasaers and Devroe 2017; Quinn-Williams 2016; Quivooji 2016; Sahay 2016).

140

6 Brussels

That afternoon, Amaq, a news website affiliated with the Islamic State, broadcast that the Islamic State had claimed responsibility for the attacks (New York Times 2016; Ponsaers and Devroe 2017). Islamic State stated that the attacks were in retaliation to Belgium’s involvement in the coalition against them (Stevenson et  al. 2016). Yazujian (2017) claimed that the two attacks had been conducted by a single Islamic State cell in Brussels. The cell was also linked to the perpetrators of the train attack in Thayls in August and the attacks in Paris in November 2015 (BBC News 2015). On March 25, 2016, a propaganda video was released on the dark net that featured a French-speaking terrorist who originated from Verviers, Belgium. Two more videos were released the next day where Belgian Islamic State fighters joked about the bombings in Brussels and demanded that the Belgian government withdraw its military from the Middle East (Ponsaers and Devroe 2017) (Table 6.3).

An Analysis of the Attacks The jihadist terrorist campaign began in Belgium on May 24, 2014, with an assault on a Jewish Museum in Brussels that killed four people (Devroe and Ponsaers 2021). The attacker had fought in the Syrian civil war and had returned to Belgium. He was the first European volunteer in the Syrian war to undertake attacks upon their return to Europe (Bartunek 2014). The attacks appeared to be in retaliation for the arrest of the only remaining Paris attacker, Salah Abdeslam. Abdeslam was arrested on Friday, March 18, in the Molenbeek area of Brussels (Sahay 2016). The attacks conveyed the message that terrorists could undertake an attack anywhere within the European Union, including in the vicinity of the headquarters of the Union (Meissner 2016). They also highlighted to Europeans and to the world that no city was safe from terrorists. Despite Brussels having raised its terrorist threat level after the terrorist attacks in Paris, the terrorists were still able to plan and undertake an attack without being detected, which substantiated their claim that they could attack any target at any time (Sahay 2016). The terrorist bombings on March 22, 2016, were the deadliest that Belgium had ever experienced (Devroe and Ponsaers 2018). Prior to the bombings, Belgium had avoided acts of jihadist terrorism on its territory. This was despite its long history of being a center for jihadist recruiters (Ponsaers and Devroe 2016b). Other researchers claimed that the terrorist bombings of the Zaventem International Airport and Maelbeek Metro Station were not isolated events (Devroe and Ponsaers 2018). According to Devroe and Ponsaers (2018), the attacks “were part of a chain of events in a terrorist campaign by a French-Belgian terrorist Jihadi network” that had been established in both France and Belgium (p. 20). The researchers also claimed that the Belgium authorities knew about the network, and this is why they had increased security prior to the March 2016 attacks. While this could be correct, the increase in security could also be linked to the attacks in Paris that occurred in

An Analysis of the Attacks

141

Table 6.3  Timeline of the terrorist attacks at Brussels Airport and Maalbeek Metro Station 1 2

3 4 5

6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

18 19 20 21 22

23

Time Event 07.55 The three attackers arrive at Zaventem airport in a taxi. 07.58 Two explosions occur in the departure terminal of the airport. Two of the attackers die in the bomb blasts. One was identified as El Bakraoui. The third attacker left the airport. 08.00 The crisis cell meets at the interior ministry. 08.20 Rail transport to the airport halted and road closures begin. 09.00 The European Commission tells staff to stay home or in their offices, and a similar appeal is later made by the Belgian crisis Centre to all residents of Brussels. 09.04 Belgium raises the terror threat level to its highest level. The Federal Prosecutor’s office announces at least 13 dead and 35 wounded at the airport. 09.11 Explosion in the Maalbeek Metro Station kills at least 20 people. The attacker is identified by fingerprints as Khalid el Bakraoui, brother of Ibrahim el Bakroaui. 09.27 All public metro transport is suspended in the city. 10.00 All public transport in the city is suspended. 11.15 Brussels transport operator STIB announces that the metro blast killed at least 15 people and wounded at least 55. 11.20 France deploys an additional 1600 police officers to its borders and to the public transport system. 11.25 Police and soldiers reinforce security around Belgium’s nuclear power plants. 11.30 Belgium deploys an additional 225 troops to Brussels. 11.40 Eurostar rail journeys between London and Brussels are canceled. 11.43 Belgian prime minister Charles Michel condemns the “blind violent and cowardly” attacks. 12.20 Facebook activates its “safety check” system to help people check on their friends and loved ones. 13.15 The U.S. embassy in Brussels recommends that Americans in Belgium stay where they are and that they avoid public transportation. 15.00 The Belgian government declares three days of mourning. The media publishes photos from video surveillance of the suspects of the airport bombing; three men pushing luggage trolleys. 15.20 Islamic state claims responsibility for the attacks, saying their members detonated suicide belts. 16.15 The Brussels governor states that a third bomb fails to explode at the Brussels airport. 17.14 Belgian police detonate a suspicious package at Brussels airport. 17.15 Belgian police issue a wanted notice for a suspect in the airport attack. 17.30 A taxi driver contacts the police to state that he had picked up three passengers in Schaerbeek. A search is carried out at the address where the taxi driver picked up the passengers and bombmaking chemicals and materials are found at the address. Investigators find a computer containing the testimonial of Ibrahim el Bakraoui in a garbage bin on the same road as the house being searched. A fourth search is carried out in Schaerbeek. One person is arrested. 17.45 Police search residences and buildings across Belgium and several witnesses are questioned according to the Federal Prosecutor.

Sources: Austin (2016), BBC News (2016c), Clarke (2016), Gamio (2016), Reuters (2016), and RTE News (2016)

142

6 Brussels

November 2015 and the need for Belgium authorities to take measures to mitigate any possible threats from copycat jihadi activists in the country. Islamic State claimed responsibility for the attacks in Brussels and maintained that Belgium was targeted because it is “a country participating in the international coalition against the Islamic State” (Hjelmgaard et al. 2016). It became more obvious as the police investigation progressed that the terrorists that committed the attacks in Paris in November 2015 and the attacks in Brussels in March 2016 were part of the same jihadi network (Ponsaers and Devroe 2016b). The investigation enabled the terrorist network structures used for both of the attacks to be compared. It was claimed by Yazujian (2017) that the terrorist network that was responsible for the attacks in Brussels had an efficient and agile operational structure. The researcher based this perspective on the fact that after the attacks in Paris, the terrorist cell was nearly eliminated, but the cell in Brussels was resilient and survived. As discussed in Chap. 4, after the Paris attacks, Salah Abdeslam fled the scene by car with Ali Oulkadi and went back to Belgium (Latin American Herald Tribune 2017) where he hid in a safe house for more than four months (Forster and Thomas 2016) before his arrest on March 19, 2016. According to Forster and Thomas (2016) from an operational security perspective, the Brussels terrorist cell demonstrated operational agility by changing their original attack plan to attack new targets in Brussels, specifically the Zaventem International Airport and the Maalbeek Metro Station, as a response to Salah Abdeslam’s arrest. The researchers also claimed that the speed with which the terrorists changed the targets demonstrates that the Islamic State identifies multiple targets before choosing a final target to attack (Forster and Thomas 2016).

Intelligence The terrorist attacks in March 2016 highlighted the drawbacks of the policy of a borderless Europe. A borderless Europe means that terrorist can move freely between the countries in Europe (Bures 2016). Most of the terrorists in both the Paris and Brussels attacks were known to the police in several European Union member states because of their earlier, criminal offending. The Abdeslam brothers are a case in point. Firstly, the Abdeslam brothers owned and ran a café in Brussels that was known to deal in drugs. The brothers were questioned by the police in early 2015 about a failed attempt to travel to Syria, but they were not arrested. The Dutch police stopped them during a routine traffic check and found that they were carrying a small quantity of hashish. The brothers were given an instant fine but were not arrested because they were not listed in the Dutch law enforcement database. La Baume and Paravicini (2015) claimed that neither the French police and intelligence agencies, nor Europol, were allegedly informed of these incidents prior to the terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2015.

An Analysis of the Attacks

143

The Reaction of the Government to the Attacks The bombings in March 2016 caused more than 2.3 billion Euros worth of damage to buildings and its victims were paid more than 322 million Euros (Andersen 2016). They also led to Belgium being accused of having “weak security policies and a complex institutional infrastructure” (Devroe and Ponsaers 2021, p.  8). According to King (2015), the country was labeled a “failed state,” while Papirblat (2015) claimed that it was a “jihadi rear base.” However, Renard (2016a, 2016b) claimed that these accusations were largely exaggerated and were rejected later by academic research and by the testimonies of government officials to the parliamentary enquiry commission that was established in Brussels after the attacks. In response to the 2015 terrorist attacks, the federal government announced that they would adopt 30 counterterrorist measures to increase its analysis and detection capability (Seron and Andre 2016). The countermeasures adopted have been presented in Tables 6.1 and 6.2. The measures included broadening the legal counterterrorism framework and increasing the availability of financial and human resources for security services (Devroe and Ponsaers 2018). One of the main measures introduced was the strengthening of the capability of the Coordination Unit for Threat Assessment (CUTA). This unit was established in 2006 as a response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States and was to coordinate the policing and intelligence services and to assess the level of Belgium’s vulnerability to terrorist and extremist threats (Vercauteren 2013). The Coordination Unit for Threat Assessment uses a scale to measure threat of 1 to 4, with 4 being the highest threat level (Dallison 2016). After the terrorist attacks in Paris in 2015, the threat level was at 2 and by March 2016, the country was at level 3. After the attacks in March 2016, the level was raised to level 4 for the entire country and was lowered to 3 on March 25, 2016. The rise in level was a shift from a “normal” situation to an “exceptional” situation, enabling the deployment of large numbers of police officers and the mobilization of the Belgian army to undertake specific monitoring and surveillance missions (Devroe and Ponsaers 2021). More than 500 military personnel were deployed to “reinforce security” and to assist the police after the 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris and they remained available after the terrorist bombings in Brussels had taken place in March 2016 (Devroe and Ponsaers 2021). Since the 2016 terrorist attacks, an awareness of the threat level has increased across the security agencies and there has been an increase in focus on the prevention of terrorist attacks (Paul and Virgili 2019). There has also been a shift away from hard security measures, such as using physical barriers, to a more community-­ based approach that strengthens the resilience of vulnerable communities and the capabilities of the security agencies (Paul and Virgili 2019). Before the terrorist attacks in March 2016, it was noted that the federal government austerity policy was affecting the policing of jihadists in Belgium, and the delivery of Community-oriented Policing (Devroe and Ponsaers 2021). Community-­ oriented Policing was introduced in 1998, but it had not been completely

144

6 Brussels

implemented in all areas of the country, and this led to the downscaling of the mandate of the police in these areas (Devroe and Ponsaers 2021). The downscaling affected the number of community police officers in some neighborhoods and as a result, federal police officers had been deployed to cover the policing gaps. These officers, however, only reacted to the occurrence of crime and did not interact with the community, which meant that the ability to gather intelligence on radicalized youth and jihadists was limited. In addition, the specialized Federal Anti-terror Section in Brussels (the “DR3”) only had seven people deployed to prevent and detect terrorist activities (Doraene 2016). The attacks highlighted the problem of radicalization and the weaknesses in the policing of jihadists in the Brussels suburb of Molenbeek. In response, local mayors established Local Cells for Integral Security (LCIS) which enabled the exchange of information between the police and the administrative and judicial services of an area to take place (Devroe and Ponsaers 2021). In addition, the federal government developed an intelligence database, which enabled foreign fighters and their activities in Belgium to be tracked (Devroe and Ponsaers 2021). This increased the analytical ability of the security services and boosted their capacity to disrupt terrorist activity.

Crisis Centre The Crisis Cell met shortly after the first attacks on March 22 and the Crisis Centre was operational shortly after the meeting. The actions of, and communications by the Crisis Centre during the response to the terrorist attacks were reviewed by the Belgian House of Representatives (Pop-Flanja 2019). Their report portrayed the actions and communications in a positive light and noted that the Information Unit of the Crisis Centre was activated after the federal phase of the emergency plan was activated and that information was provided to the public through the public notification tool, BE-Alert (Pop-Flanja 2019). The report went on to note that the emergency services of the ASTRID national radio communications, paging and dispatching network was not fully functional because of a technological failure (Van der Hulst 2016).

The Response of the European Union The terrorist attacks in Belgium on March 22, 2016, exposed a number a of deficiencies in the European Union Counter-terrorism policy. There was a lack of information and intelligence sharing across the European member states, but the greatest drawback was the lack of investment in preventative strategies that focuses on responding to radicalized youth in immigrant populations across Europe (Paul and Virgili 2019).

The Police Response

145

There is no correct response to radicalization and terrorism (Paul and Virgili 2019). However, following the March 2016, terrorist attack, the European Union did implement a number of new security measures to respond to the hard security elements of the international terrorist threat (Paul and Virgili 2019). Other measures, which have been described as being of a softer element included strengthening the resilience of communities and strengthening the capacities of local, non-profit groups to respond to the problem of radicalization (Paul and Virgili 2019).

The Police Response The government and the police of Belgium had been aware of the likelihood of a terrorist event occurring during 2015. The arrests of members of the terrorist cell in the city of Verviers in January 2015 and the large number of individuals who were suspected of being sympathizers or belonging to Islamic State prior to the attacks were some of the reasons for the disquiet (Quivooji 2016). The terrorism threat level was at its highest; it had been set in December 2014 when there were no terrorist attacks (Quivooji 2016). The Belgian Organ of Coordination for the Analysis of the Threat (OCAM), then set the terrorism threat level to a lower level between the time of the arrest of Salah Abdeslam on March 18, 2016, and the attacks in Brussels on March 22, 2016 (Quivooji 2016). Shortly after the attacks in March 2016, the Belgian National Security Council raised the terror alert level for the country to the highest level because some of the attackers were still at large (Reals 2016). As a response to the attacks, the authorities halted air traffic to the airport and evacuated the terminal buildings (BBC News 2016c; Ponsaers and Devroe 2017). All public transport in Brussels was shut down (ABC News 2016), and the Brussels-North, the Brussels-Central, and the Brussels-­ South Stations were evacuated and closed. The closing of the public transport system quickly led to road congestion within the city (Ponsaers and Devroe 2017). The Eurostar, which was traveling to Brussels Midi Station, was also halted and all trains from Paris to Brussels were canceled. The Paris Nord Railway Station, that had services to Brussels, was also halted (International Business Times 2016). A number of buildings around the city were placed into lockdown, including the Berlaymont building, which is in the vicinity of the Maalbeek Metro Station and is the headquarters of the European Commission. The mobile phone network was quickly overloaded following the attacks at Zaventem International Airport and Maelbeek Metro Station (Ponsaers and Devroe 2017). The country’s two nuclear power plants were also partially evacuated as a result of the attacks (Shoichet et al. 2016). The police carried out a number of controlled explosions on suspicious objects around Maalbeek Station (Tagesschau 2016) after the attacks, and later in the day of the attacks, the police searched an apartment in Schaerbeek, a northern district of Brussels. Following the release of photographs of the suspects, the police received information from a taxi driver who had driven three of the bombers from a

146

6 Brussels

Schaerbeek apartment to the Zaventem International Airport (Higgins and de Freytas-Tamura 2016; Quinn-Williams 2016). The police conducted a search of the address where the taxi driver had picked up the suspects. Inside the apartment, the police found a nail bomb, 15 kilograms (33 lb) of acetone peroxide, 151 liters (33 imperial gallons or 40 US gallons) of acetone, nearly 30 liters (7 imperial gallons or 8 US gallons) of hydrogen peroxide, and other ingredients for making explosives, and an Islamic State flag (Gazet van Antwerpen 2016; Quinn-Williams 2016; Rubin et al. 2016). The police had visited the apartment twice in the 3 months prior to the bombing after complaints had been received from nearby residents about unusual smells coming from the residence, but the police did not enter the building on either occasion (Higgins and de Freytas-Tamura 2016). During a search of the area around the apartment, the police found a laptop inside a waste container belonging to Ibrahim El Bakraoui, one of the airport attackers, near the house (M’Kele and Jamieson 2016). The laptop had a suicide note stored on it, in which Ibrahim stated that he was “stressed out,” felt unsafe, and was “afraid of ever-lasting eternity” (De Morgen 2016). The laptop also contained images of the home and the office of the Belgian Prime Minister, Charles Michel among information about other possible terrorist targets in Brussels (Casert 2016). The police arrested a number of suspects and others who were involved in the plot. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) helped the police to identify the “man with the hat” who was captured in the airport CCTV footage as Mohamed Abrini (RTL INFO 2016). By March 26, 2016, 12 people had been arrested in connection with the bombings (BBC News 2016b). The investigation into the attacks uncovered a sophisticated terrorist network that had links to several European Union States and the 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris (Eurojust, n.d.). The investigation also found that the Brussels terrorists had been supported by a number of individuals who were connected to other serious crimes and networks that involved the trafficking of firearms and the forgery of documents (Eurojust, n.d.). As an example, the person seen next to one of the terrorists on surveillance footage from the attack on the Maelbeek Metro Station, who escaped prior to the detonation of the bombs, was identified as a known Foreign Terrorist Fighter from Syria. His DNA was found in several terrorist cell safe houses and cars that were used by the terrorist network and led to the discovery of links to networks in other European Union States and to his involvement with the Paris attackers (Eurojust, n.d.).

An Analysis of the Police Response One of the problems with the response by the police and emergency services was the lack of flexibility in their centralized control. The response of the police was confused initially, even more than the police response to the terrorist attacks in Mumbai in 2008 (New York Times 2015; Rabasa et al. 2009). Simultaneous attacks in multiple locations enabled the terrorists to kill as many people as they could and

An Analysis of the Police Response

147

hindered a rapid and effective response by the emergency services and security forces (Jackson and Frelinger 2009). The geographical distance between the attack locations meant that the police were not able to treat the locations as one event and allowed the terrorists to cause extensive damage and to kill and injure many people to achieve their purpose (Kiss 2016). International criticism was leveled at the French and Belgian police and their intelligence services, as most of the perpetrators were known to them, and in some cases, the agencies had previously monitored their activities (Kiss 2016). They had also received warnings from intelligence services from other countries about the likelihood of a Islamic State-sponsored terrorist attacks occurring in their capital cities and about the international movements of high-risk terrorist individuals. However, even with this information, the police and the intelligence services did not recognize the threat posed and did not uncover any indications of an attack being planned (Kiss 2016). The information received was not specific as to who the terrorists were, what the terrorist organization was, the timing of the attack or where the attack would be (Kiss 2016). Without these specifics, the information was just confirming what the security services already knew. The lack of specific information meant that the pool of potential terrorists was too large for the police and intelligences to keep under constant surveillance. This meant that they could only use periodic surveillance and wiretaps to monitor those who were identified as high-risk individuals (Kiss 2016). The situation, according to Lasoen (2017), was exacerbated by the role of the Anti-Terrorist Mixed Group (Antiterroristische Gemengde Groep, AGG), which had been established in 1984. The group was established to coordinate and synthesize all intelligence gathered by the police and the intelligence service. However, the group did not achieve its objectives as it was marginalized by the police and the intelligence services because these organizations did not provide the group with any intelligence and nor did they share any intelligence between themselves (Matthijs 2008). Closely aligned to the Antiterroristische Gemengde Groep is the Coordination Unit for Threat Assessment (CUTA), which uses the intelligence gathered by the counterterrorist agencies to develop threat assessments (Vercauteren 2013). This unit had provided a number of threat assessments prior to the attacks and had highlighted the risk posed from returning foreign fighters from Iraq and Syria (Ponsaers and Devroe 2017). One of the main areas that the police and intelligence services have concentrated on following the March 2016 terrorist attacks is the online radicalization of individuals (Paul and Virgili 2019). Leading up to a terrorist attack, there is an increase in extremist, jihadist comments and violence-inciting websites, blogs, and social media platforms. There were more than 400 online platforms hosting terrorist content at the time of the terrorist attacks (Stolton 2019). Terrorists were using the Internet to organize themselves, to publish their ideas, and to make contact with likeminded supporters, while social media was being used by terrorist groups to groom, radicalize, and recruit supporters (Paul and Virgili 2019).

148

6 Brussels

Conclusion By 2016, mass terrorism involving small teams of terrorist who attack multiple targets was no longer a new phenomenon (Quivooji 2016). The terrorist bombings in Brussels on March 22, 2016, were not isolated events, but were the last of a series of attacks in France and Belgium that were undertaken by a French-Belgian terrorist jihadi network that was based in Belgium (Ponsaers and Devroe 2017). As a result of the 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris, the Belgian police and intelligence agencies established a relationship with their French counterparts and were prepared when the terrorist attack occurred in Brussels in March 2016 (Ponsaers and Devroe 2017). The government and the police in Belgium were able to respond quickly to the March 2016 attacks and were able to make arrests on the day that some of the attacks took place and were able to put in place other security measures such as the strengthening of security at its borders and implementing transport lockdowns in Brussels. The rapid response to the attacks by the government and the police in Belgium was recognized by the media and other governments, but the media and others were critical that they had not used the intelligence gathered before the attacks to disrupt the activities of the jihadi network. One media article described Belgium as being a failed state and claimed that the attacks highlighted weaknesses in the governing structure of the police. The governing structure of the police caused problems in coordinating and sharing intelligence and responding to the threats that the intelligence reports had identified (Venkit 2016). These problems are especially prevalent in countries that have a governing structure of the police at a regional, municipal, and local level (Devroe and Ponsaers 2021). These types of structures are not flexible and do not allow for a large contingent of specialist officers to be deployed and nor are they able to respond to terrorist groups that span multiple countries. Despite this, earlier research undertaken by the same researchers claimed that the terrorist attacks in Brussels highlighted how important it was to include local municipalities in the response structure to a terrorist attack (Devroe &. Ponsaers 2016).

References ABC News (2016, March 23). Brussels airport, metro rocked by explosions, at least 34 people killed; terror threat raised. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-­03-­22/brussels-­airport-­rocked­by-­two-­explosions/7123136. Andersen, L. (2016). Brussels attacks: attacks cost 322 million euros in compensation and damages. The Brussels Times. Austin, H. (2016, March 23). Brussels attacks: Timeline of the events in the Belgian capital. NBC News. https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/brussels-­attacks/brussels-­attacks-­timeline-­events-­ belgian-­capital-­n544221. Bartunek R. (2014). Police hunt Brussels Jewish Museum gunman, France tightens security. http:// uk.reuters.com/article/uk-­belgium-­shooting-­idUKKBN0E50IO20140526.

References

149

BBC News. (2015, December 9). Paris attacks: What happened on the night. https://www.bbc. com/news/world-­europe-­34818994. BBC News (2016a, March 21). Paris attacks: Salah Abdeslam ‘worth his weight in gold’. https:// www.bbc.com/news/world-­europe-­35860157. BBC News. (2016b, March 26). Brussels attacks: Man charged with terrorist offences. https:// www.bbc.com/news/world-­europe-­35903368. BBC News (2016c, April 9). Brussels explosions: What we know about airport and metro attacks. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-­europe-­35869985. Blyth, D. (2015). Government introduces 12 anti-terrorist measures. Flanders Today. Bures, O. (2016). Intelligence sharing and the fight against terrorism in the EU: lessons learned from Europol. European View, 15, 57–66. Chad, S., Boyle, C., & Knoll, C. (2016). Hunt is on for Brussels bombings suspect; Islamic State warns of more, worse attacks. Los Angeles Times. http://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la-­ fg-­brussels-­airport-­explosion-­20160322-­story.html. Casert, R. (2016, March 30). A Belgian official says laptop used by one of the Brussels bombers contained images of the Belgian prime minister’s home and office, heightening fears after last week’s attacks on the airport and subway system. US News. https://www.usnews.com/news/ world/articles/2016-­03-­30/belgium-­premiers-­residence-­office-­found-­on-­bombers-­laptop. Clarke, S. (2016, March 22). Timeline of the Brussels attacks. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-­interactive/2016/mar/22/where-­the-­brussels-­attackers-­struck. Crisis Centre. 2015, December 29). Verfijning dreigingsanalyse en maatregelen [Refinement of threat analysis and measures]. http://crisiscentrum.be/news/crisisbeheer/verfijning­dreigingsanalyse-­enmaatregelen. Dallison, P. (2016). Belgium lowers security threat level to 3: Alert level dropped as police hunt for alleged plotters. http://www.politico.eu/article/belgium-­lowers-­securitythreat-­level-­to-­ 3-­brussels-­attacks-­jan-­jambon/. Dearden, L. (2016, March 22). Brussels attacks timeline: How bombings unfolded at airport and Metro station. The Independent. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/brussels-­ attacks-­timeline-­how-­bombings-­unfolded-­at-­airport-­and-­metro-­station-­a6945781.html. De Morgen. (2016, March 23). Suicide bomber leaves laptop with will in trash can. https://www. demorgen.be/nieuws/zelfmoordenaar-­l aat-­l aptop-­m et-­t estament-­a chter-­i n-­v uilnisbak~ b43ab635/. Devroe, E. (2012). A Swelling Culture of Control. De Genese En De Toepassing Van De Wet Op De Administratieve Sancties in Belgie. Maklu. Devroe, E. & Ponsaers, P. (2013). Reforming the Belgian police system between central and local. In N. Fyfe & J. Terpstra, (Eds.), Centralizing Forces? The Netherlands: Comparative Perspectives on Contemporary Police Reform in Northern and Western Europe (pp. 77–98). Eleven. Devroe, E. & Ponsaers, P. (2018). Terrorism and governance strategies in Brussels. Forensic Research & Criminology International Journal, 6(1), 19–25. Devroe, E. & Ponsaers, P. (2021). The power context of police reform in Belgium—The Brussels case: A shift in the style of policing after the terrorist attacks. Policing, 15(4), 299–313. Doraene, J-P. (2016, May 17).Terrorisme: le rapport qui de’cortique les vraies raisons de l’e’chec policier. Le Vif/L’Express. https://www.levif.be/actualite/belgique/terrorisme-­le-­rapport-­qui-­decortique-­ les-­vraies-­raisons-­de-­l-­echec-­policier/article-­normal-­501223.html. Edwards, A., Devroe, E. & Ponsaers, P. (2017). The European world of metropolitan policing, Interpreting patterns of governance, policy and politics. In E.  Devroe, A.  Edwards & P. Ponsaers (Eds.). Policing European Metropolises, The Politics of Security in City-Regions (pp. 315–343). Routledge. Elbagir, N., Naik, B. & Ben Allal, L. (2016, March 24). Why Belgium is Europe’s front line in the war on terror. CNN. https://edition.cnn.com/2016/03/21/europe/belgium-­terror-­fight-­molenbeek/. Estrada, M. & Koutronas, E. (2016). Terrorist attack assessment: Paris November 2015 and Brussels March 2016. Journal of Policy Modelling, 38, 553–571.

150

6 Brussels

Eurojust (n.d.). Brussels terrorist attacks of March 2016. Criminal Justice Across Borders. www. eurojust.europa.eu. European Council (2023). The EU’s response to terrorism. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/ policies/fightagainst-terrorism/. Forster, P. &Thomas, H. (2016, July 18). Combating domestic terrorism: Observations from Brussels and San Bernardino. Small Wars Journal. http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/combating-­domestic-­ terrorism-­observations-­from-­brusselsand-­san-­bernardino. Gamio, L. (2016, March 22). What we know about the attacks in Brussels and how they connect to Paris. The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/world/brussels­terrorist-­attack/. Gardham, D. (2016, December 7). The ‘man in the hat’spills terror gang’s secrets. NBC News. http:// www.nbcnews.com/storyline/brussels-­attacks/man-­hat-­spills-­terror-­gang-­s-­secretsn693046. Gazet van Antwerpen. (2016, March 23). Was the attack brought forward by Abdeslam’s arrest? https://www.gva.be/cnt/dmf20160323_02198234. Hjelmgaard, K., Reuter, D., & Bacon, J. (2016). Islamic State claims responsibility for Brussels attack that killed dozens. http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2016/03/22/ explosions-­rock-­brussels-­airport/82107254/ Higgins, A. & de Freytas-Tamura, K. (2016, March 27). In Brussels bombing plot, a trail of dots nNot connected. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/27/world/europe/in-­brussels-­bombing-­ plot-­a-­trail-­of-­dots-­not-­connected.html. Holehouse, M. (2016). El Bakraoui brothers: who are the suicide bombers Khalid and Brahim behind the Brussels attacks? http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/03/23/elbakraoui-­brothers­who-­are-­the-­suicide-­bombers-­khalidand-­brah/. International Business Times. (2016, March 22). Brussels explosions: Full list of Zaventem airport diverted, cancelled and arrived flights. https://www.ibtimes.co.uk/brussels-­explosions-­ full-­list-­zaventem-­airport-­diverted-­cancelled-­arrived-­flights-­1550932. Jackson, B. & Frelinger, D. (2009). Understanding why terrorist operations succeed or fail. Rand Corporation. Keneally, M. (2016, March 24). How the Brussels attacks unfolded. https://abcnews.go.com/ International/brussels-­attacks-­unfolded/story?id=37877145. King, T. (2015). Belgium is a failed state: Brussels’ nest of radicalism is just one of the failings of a divided, dysfunctional country. http://www.politico.eu/article/belgiumfailed-­state-­ security-­services-­molenbeek-­terrorism/. Kiss, P. (2016). First thoughts about the terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels. Defence Review: The Central Journal of the Hungarian Defence Forces, 144(1), 15–23. La Baume, M. & Paravicini, G. (2015, August 12). Europe’s intelligence ‘black hole’. Politico. http://www.politico.eu/article/europes-­intelligence-­black-­holeeuropol-­fbi-­cia-­paris-­counter-­ terrorism/. La Dernière Heure. (2015, December 5). Exclusif: voici le SMS qui a plongé Bruxelles dans la terreur ! [Exclusive: This is the sms that plunged Brussels into fear]. https://www. dhnet.be/actu/belgique/exclusif-­voici-­l e-­s ms-­q ui-­a -­p longe-­b ruxelles-­d ans-­l a-­t erreur-­ 5661fdfd357031c12b00ea8b. Lasoen, K. (2017). Indications and warning in Belgium: Brussels is not Delphi. Journal of Strategic Studies, 40(7), 927–962. Lasoen, K. (2018). Plan B(ruxelles): Belgian intelligence and the terror attacks of 2015–16. Terrorism and Political Violence, 32(6), 1291–1309. Lasoen, K. (2019). Belgian intelligence SIGINT operations. International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence. International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence, 32, 1–29. Latin American Herald Tribune. (2017, January 31). Belgium reveals calls between Abdeslam and detained Paris attack suspect. http://www.laht.com/article.asp?CategoryId=12395&Artic leId=2402380.

References

151

Matthijs, H. (2008). Intelligence services in Belgium. Intelligence and National Security, 23, 572–573. Meissner, M. (2016). Brussels attack rattles nerves across Europe as cities tighten security. Retrieved from: https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/brussels-­attack-­rattles-­nerves-­across-­ europe-­as-­cities-­heighten-­security/article29357083/ Miller, N. (2016, March 26). Brussels attacks: man in the white coat ‘blown away’ by other bombs. https://www.smh.com.au/world/brussels-­attacks-­man-­in-­the-­white-­coat-­blown-­away-­ by-­other-­bombs-­20160326-­gnrihw.html. M’Kele, A. & Jamieson, A. (2016, March 24). Brussels attacks: El Bakraoui brothers were jailed for carjackings, shootout. NBC News. https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/brussels-­attacks/ brussels-­attacks-­el-­bakraoui-­brothers-­were-­jailed-­carjackings-­shootout-­n544241. New York Times. (2015, December 31). Response to Paris attacks points to weaknesses in French police structure. http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/01/world/europe/response-­to-­paris-­attacks-­ points-­to-­weaknessesin-­french-­police-­structure.html?_r=0. New York Times. (2016, March 22). Strikes claimed by ISIS shut Brussels and shake European security. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/23/world/europe/brussels-­airport-­explosions. html. Papirblat (2015). The rear base of Jihadi terror: A quiet Brussels suburb. http://www.haaretz.com/ world-­news/. Paul, A. & Virgili, T. (2019). Three years after the Brussels attacks: No quick fix to counter terrorism and radicalisation. Policy Brief, Europe in the World Programme. European Policy Centre. Ponsaers, P. & Devroe, E. (2016a). A new structure for the Brussels police? Vigiles, Review of Police Law, 42(2), 51–56. Ponsaers, P. & Devroe, E. (2016b). How integrated is local prevention of radicalisation and terrorism? In T. Renard (Ed.), Counterterrorism in Belgium: Key challenges and policy options (pp. 23-33). Egmont Paper Number 89. Egmont Institute. Ponsaers, P., Devroe, E. (2016c). Molenbeek (March 2016) after Paris (November 2016). The canal plan and the insidious privatization. Cahiers Police Studies, 39(2), 213–236. Ponsaers, P. & Devroe, E. (2017). The Brussels bombings: Balancing between law enforcement and risk management. In A. Kellner (Ed.), Democracy and Terrorism – Experiences in Coping with Terror Attacks  – Case Studies from Belgium, France, Israel and Norway (pp.  5–14). Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Publishing. Ponsaers, P. & Dupont, G. (1988). De Bende. Een documentaire. EPO. Ponsaers, P. & de Kimpe, S. (2001). Consensusmania  – Over de achtergronden van de politiehervorming. ACCO. Pop-Flanja, D. (2019). Terrorist attacks  – A challenge in crisis communication. International Conference RCIC ‘19, Vlora, 2-4 May, Redefining Community in Intercultural Context, 1, 219–225. Quinn-Williams. (2016, June). The attacks on Paris: Lessons learned. Homeland Security Advisory Council. Quivooji, R. (2016, March 26). The Brussels attacks: Challenges of unravelling terrorist networks. RSIS Commentary, Number 67. S. Rajarathnam School of International Studies. Rabasa, A., Blackwill, R., Chalk, P., Cragin, K., Fair, C., Jackson, B., Jenkins, B., Jones, S., Shestak, N. & Tellis, A. (2009). The lessons of Mumbai. Rand Corporation. Reals, T. (2016, March 22). Deadly explosions rock Brussels airport, subway. https://www. cbsnews.com/news/reported-­explosions-­at-­brussels-­airport-­in-­belgium/. Renard, T. (2016a). Key policy options to strengthen Belgium’s counterterrorism Approach. In T. Renard (Ed.), Counterterrorism in Belgium: Key challenges and policy options (pp. 7–9). Egmont Paper Number 89. Egmont Institute. Renard T. (2016b). Why Belgium is not Europe’s Jihadi base: Belgium bashing is unfounded and only dilutes our collective sense of responsibility. Politico. Reuters. (2016, March 23). Third Brussels airport bomb destroyed in controlled explosion: governor. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-­belgium-­blast-­third-­idUSKCN0WO2EU.

152

6 Brussels

RTBR. (2016, March 23). Le troisième kamikaze identifié, un testament retrouvé à Schaerbeek. https://www.rtbf.be/article/attenats-­de-­bruxelles-­et-­paris-­un-­suspect-­interpelle-­a-­anderlecht-­9 249575?id=9249575. RTE News. (2016, March 23). Timeline: Brussels attacks. https://www.rte.ie/news/2016/0322/ 776700-­timeline-­brussels-­attacks/. RTL INFO. (2016, April 15). Attacks in Brussels: Mohamed Abrini identified as “the man in the hat” thanks to the FBI. https://www.rtl.be/info/belgique/faits-­divers/attentats-­a-­bruxelles-­ mohamed-­abrini-­identifie-­comme-­etant-­l-­homme-­au-­chapeau-­grace-­au-­fbi-­810388.aspx. Rubin, A. (2016). Radicalization of a promising student turned bomb maker in Brussels. https:// www.nytimes.com/2016/04/09/world/europe/najim-­laachraoui-­parisbrussels-­attacks.html?_ r=0. Rubin, A., de Freytas-Tamura, R. & Breeden, A. (2016, March 23). Brothers among 3 Brussels suicide attackers; Another assailant is sought. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/24/world/ europe/brussels-­attack.html. Sahay, C. (2016, March). Brussels terror attack: Implications for India and the region. https://www.vifindia.org/article/2016/march/28/brussels-­terror-­attack-­implications-­for-­india-­and-­the-­region. Seron, V. & Andre, S. (2016). 30 measures against terrorism: Penal populism between expected efficiency and potential collateral damage. In T. Renard, (Ed.), Counterterrorism in Belgium: Key Challenges and Policy Options (pp. 10–22). Egmont Paper no. 89, Egmont Institute. Shoichet, C., Pleitgen, F. & Botelho, G. (2016, March 23). Surveillance footage, cab driver offer clues in investigation in Brussels attack. https://edition.cnn.com/2016/03/22/europe/brussels-­ explosions/index.html. Stevenson, K., Keneally, M., Ferran, L. & Jacobo, J. (2016, March 23). Brussels attacks: manhunt underway as ISIS claims responsibility. https://abcnews.go.com/International/isis-­claims-­ responsibility-­deadly-­brussels-­terror-­attack/story?id=37832022. Stolton, S. (2019, March 7). Up to 400 online platforms hosting terrorist content Commission says. Euroctiv. https://www.euractiv.com/section/cybersecurity/news/up-­to-­400-­online-­platforms­hosting-­terrorist-­content-­commission-­says/. Tagesschau. (2016, March 22). Explosionen in Brüssel  – was bisher bekannt ist. https://www. tagesschau.de/ausland/explosion-­am-­flughafen-­bruessel-­105.html. Tutt, P. & Pramuk, J. (2015). Brussels lockdown: Highest alert level maintained. http://www.cnbc. com/2015/11/22/brussels-­lockdown-­arrests-­made-­shots-­fired-­in-­salahabdeslam-­ hunt.html. Van Branteghem, J.-M., Van de Sompel, R., Ponsaers, P., Boekaert, T. (2007). Pillars of community policing in Belgium. In W. Bruggeman, J-M. Van Branteghem & D. Van Nuffel, D. (eds.), Towards an excellent police function (pp. 15–36). Politeia. Van der Hulst, M., Secretary General of The Belgian House of Representatives (2016). Investigation Committee. Terrorist attacks 22 March 2016, Summary of the activities and recommendations, House of Representatives, 2016. https://www.dekamer.be/kvvcr/pdf_sections/publications/ attentats/Brochure_Terrorists_Attacks.pdf. Van der Velpen, J. (1986). De CCC. Het terrorisme en de staat. EPO. Venkit, R. (2016, May 25). Belgium: Not a failed state, but a troubled one broken bureaucracy, homebred terrorism and union disruptions require Belgium’s unity. The Globalist: Rethinking Globalization. https://www.theglobalist.com/belgium-­not-­a-­failed-­state-­but-­a-­troubled-­one/ Vercauteren, G. (2013). International conference on national and international coordination in counterterrorism. https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMCo ntent?documentId=0900001680640c5c#search=cuta. Yazujian, T. (2017). A comparative social network analysis of the 2008 Mumbai, 2015 Paris, and 2016 Brussels terrorist networks. Master’s Dissertation. The College of Information Sciences and Technology, The Pennsylvania State University.

Chapter 7

Manchester

Introduction Terrorist violence is not a new phenomenon for the United Kingdom. Between March and June 2017, London and Manchester experienced four attacks in which terrorists used vehicles, knives, and explosives to injure and kill members of the public. During the attacks in London and Manchester, 36 people were killed and approximately 200 were injured (Anderson 2017). The terrorist attack in Manchester on May 22, 2017, was similar to the terrorist bombing attacks that occurred in Europe in 2016. The attack confirmed that individuals who had been influenced by members of the Islamic State intended to attack places in Western countries where there were mass gatherings of people (Carroll and Batt 2017). The government of the United Kingdom had policies and procedures in place for the security and protection of public events, which had been based on the lessons learnt from the bombing campaign that was carried out by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in the 1990s (Carroll and Batt 2017). Since the late 1800s, Manchester has experienced several terrorist attacks, which have mainly been carried out by Irish nationalists or by groups using terrorism to attract the attention of the public to their cause. The most destructive attacks on the inhabitants of the city were carried out during the 1990s when the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) bombed two locations in the city center. Sixty-five people were wounded, and a number of buildings were extensively damaged in these attacks (Ruf 2019). Before the 1990s, the Provisional Irish Republican Army, on average, undertook four terrorist attacks a year in England. This changed in 1990, when they conducted 19 days of attacks and in 1992, they carried out attacks that continued for 47 days (Ruf, 1990). One of the most devastating attacks that was carried out by the Provisional Irish Republican Army was on June 15, 1996. Using a 1500-kilogram truck bomb, the Provisional Irish Republican Army undertook an attack in © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. den Heyer, Police Respond to Terrorism, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-43250-7_7

153

154

7 Manchester

Corporation Street, which is in the central part of Manchester. No one was killed, but the attack injured 212 people and caused more than £700 million in damage. The reason that no one was killed was because the emergency services were able to evacuate more than 75,000 people from the city center in less than 90 minutes, after a warning about the bomb was issued by the Provisional Irish Republican Army (Ruf 2019). Terrorist attacks usually have an impact on how the public perceives the safety and the security of a public space. If the public perceive that a public space is not safe, then government policies are generally changed, and this can often result in tighter security measures. An attack can also have an impact internationally, with an attack in one country influencing how neighboring countries respond to terrorism. A terrorist attack can also lead to a change in how the public perceives the police (Jonathan 2010; Jonathan-Zamir and Weisburd 2011; Stanko and Bradford 2009). This may affect several areas of police service delivery and includes the prevention of, and the response to terrorism (Fenn and Brunton-Smith 2021). Research has suggested that public support for the police may increase after a terrorist attack has occurred (La Free and Adamczyk 2016). Following the attacks in Manchester on May 22, 2017, support for the police increased because of the way that the police responded to the attack and how they tended to the dead and injured. There was also more support for the police because the public viewed the police as being a part of the community (Lowe 2020), This chapter examines the police response to the terrorist attack in Manchester on May 22, 2017, and discusses some of the details of the attack. The next section of the chapter analyses the attack and then discusses and scrutinizes the police response to the attack.

The Attack At approximately 10.30 pm on Monday, May 22, 2017, after two years of little terrorist activity (Ruf 2019), 22-year-old Salman Ramadan Abedi detonated an Improvised Explosive Device in the City Room in the foyer of the Manchester Arena. An Ariana Grande concert, which was attended by 14,000 children, teenagers, and families (Anderson 2017; Carroll and Batt 2017; Nazmi et al. 2018; Moore 2018; The Kerslake Arena Review Panel 2018; von Drachenfels 2017) was concluding. The foyer was full of concertgoers who were leaving the arena, waiting family members, and merchandise sellers (The Kerslake Arena Review Panel 2018). The foyer is the busiest entrance to, and exit from, the Manchester Arena, as it provides access to the ticketing office and leads to a bridge that connects to the arena to the Victoria rail and tram stations (Staton 2020). The concertgoers were making their way through the arena’s foyer toward the exits, where many parents were waiting to collect their children who had attended the concert, when Abedi, who entered the foyer as the concert was ending, detonated a bomb that was in a backpack that he was wearing (Carroll and Batt 2017;

An Analysis of the Attack

155

Lowe 2020). The bomb was sizeable and contained approximately two thousand steel nuts that acted as shrapnel (Nazmi et al. 2018; The Kerslake Arena Review Panel 2018). Concertgoers and others in the foyer and in proximity to the explosion were pierced by shrapnel from the blast (Staton 2020). The bomb blast had a devastating impact, blowing concertgoers off their feet and causing widespread panic (Staton 2020). The blast was described as the worst, and the first successful terrorist bombing in the United Kingdom since the bombing in London in July 2005 (Andrew 2017; Lowe 2020). Chaos ensued after the bomb blast, as people sought to find exits in the dust cloud (Staton 2020). The attacker, Abedi was killed, along with 22 other people. One hundred people were hospitalized and at least 800 people suffered physical or mental injuries (Andrew 2017; Carroll and Batt 2017; Lowe 2020; Moore 2018; Ruf 2019; Staton 2020; The Kerslake Arena Review Panel 2018). Ten of the people killed were under 20 years of age, and the youngest, a girl, Saffie Roussos, was only 8 years old (Anderson 2017). Many of the injured were treated by paramedics in and around the attack area and others were taken by ambulance to hospitals in the Greater Manchester area. Others made their own way to hospitals across the city (The Kerslake Arena Review Panel 2018).

An Analysis of the Attack The bombing in Manchester in May 2017 was the first terrorist bombing in the United Kingdom, and the most lethal attack since the attacks in London on July 7, 2005 (Anderson 2017; Carroll and Batt 2017). This was despite the United Kingdom being on a higher terrorist threat level. The United Kingdom was on a higher level of alert for terrorist activity because from 2014 through to 2017, the police and the intelligence services in the United Kingdom had uncovered 12 major terrorist attack plots, including plans to use Improvised Explosive Devices to bomb the North Greenwich train station (Carroll and Batt 2017). The four terrorist attacks1 that occurred in the United Kingdom in the spring and summer of 2017 were savage and callous (Anderson 2017). The attacks had an impact on the public’s perception of security in public places in the United Kingdom as there had been jihadist attacks in France, Belgium, and Germany (Anderson 2017). The attacks in the United Kingdom in 2017 were similar to jihadist terrorist attacks that occurred in other Western countries, especially those that took place in northern Europe. The target sites selected in the United Kingdom were similar to sites that had been attacked in Western countries and included political centers (Oslo 2011, Ottawa 2014, Brussels). The attackers targeted concertgoers, revelers, crowds (Paris 2016, Barcelona 2017), and police officers (Melbourne 2014, Berlin

 22 March in Westminster with 6 deaths; 22 May in Manchester with 23 deaths; 3 June on the London Bridge with 11 deaths; 19 June in Finsbury Park with 1 death. 1

156

7 Manchester

2015, Charleroi 2016). The weapons chosen by the terrorists in the attacks on Western countries were similar, the most common being explosives that contained Triacetone Triperoxide (TATP) (Anderson 2017; Simcox 2017). Just as the concert was finishing at the Manchester Arena and as security officers were getting the area ready for the concertgoers to leave the venue, Abedi accessed the foyer area of the arena. Because of lax security, he was able to bring an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) into the foyer. This was because bags were not being searched as concertgoers were entering the venue, according to eyewitnesses (Ibekwe 2017). After entering the foyer, Abedi placed the Improvised Explosive Device close to the foyer exit. Abedi used Peroxide-based Triacetone Triperoxide (TATP) to make the Improvised Explosive Device. This chemical is unstable but is often used by terrorists as it is readily available and is difficult to detect. Triacetone triperoxide (TATP) was used in the bombing in London in 2005, the bombing in Paris in 2015, and in the bombing in Brussels in 2016 (Carroll and Batt 2017). The police believed that Abedi had received training and advice from a foreign or foreign-trained terrorist network because of the instability of Triacetone Triperoxide (TATP) and he would have needed training in how to handle it. The knowledge that Abedi had in handling the explosive caused the media to cite European intelligence reports that claimed that Abedi had used an intermediary in continental Europe to contact his Libyan terrorist support group. The media also claimed that Abedi used encrypted devices to avoid his phone calls being monitored by the United Kingdom intelligence services (Carroll and Batt 2017). The Manchester Arena was selected as the target site because the long-term objective of the Islamic State is to separate and radicalize communities in the United Kingdom. The ability of the police to communicate effectively after a terrorist attack, especially via social media, can prevent terrorist organizations from achieving this objective (Russell and de Orellana 2020). The Greater Manchester Police made extensive use of social media in the aftermath of the attack, and this disrupted the intentions of the Islamic State. An analysis of the online reaction to the attack by the public showed an immediate increase in negative comments but this was replaced within hours with consistent repetition of statements that pertained to community spirit (Kostakos et al. 2018) (Table 7.1).

The Attacker The bomber was Salman Ramadan Abedi, a 22-year-old local Manchester man of Libyan descent (Carroll and Batt 2017). Salman Abedi was born in Manchester in 1994, to parents who had been granted political asylum in the United Kingdom after escaping the Gaddafi regime in Libya. He was the second of six children (Anderson 2017). His parents returned to Libya in 2011, and it is during regular visits to his family in Libya that the United Kingdom intelligence services believe that Abedi received training and direction. It is believed that Abedi contacted an affiliate group

The Attacker

157

Table 7.1  Timeline of Major Events May 22–25, 2017 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22

Time Monday, May 22 22.31 British transport police officers at Victoria station run to the sound of an explosion in the foyer of the arena 22.32 First of the British transport police officers arrive in the foyer area of the arena 22.33 The first phone call reporting an explosion at the arena is received by the greater Manchester police 22.42 First paramedic arrives at Victoria train station. The train station provides access to the foyer of the arena 22.43 First armed police arrive in the foyer 22.46 Road closures around the arena commences 22.49 12 ambulances arrive at the scene 22.58 The injured are relocated from the foyer to the Victoria train station concourse Tuesday, May 23 00.37 Three fire engines arrive at the scene 02.30 The Manchester City Council open a reception center at the Etihad Stadium 02.46 All of the injured are transported from the scene to local hospitals 04.15 Meeting of the strategic multi-agency group is held at greater Manchester police Force Headquarters 08.30 First meeting of the coroners, the greater Manchester police senior identification manager and the deputy senior identification manager is held 10.00 Meeting of mass fatalities coordinating group is held 12.00 The first arrest of those involved in the attack is confirmed by the police 15.35 The body of the first victim is moved to a temporary body storage facility at the scene. The last body is removed to the temporary facility at 21:07 hrs 16.00 Family liaison officers are allocated to all families with missing relatives at Etihad Stadium 18.00 Vigil is held in front of the Manchester town hall 20.10 The body of the first victim is transported from the arena to the mortuary Wednesday, May 24 03.20 The body of the last victim is transported to the mortuary 16.00 Meeting of bereaved families with the coroner and the greater Manchester police Thursday, May 25 18.00 A two-minute silence is marked by mass attendance at vigil in St. Ann’s square

Adapted from The Kerslake Arena Review Panel (2018, pp. 59–60)

of Islamic State, Katibat al Battar al-Libi, when in Libya. Abedi was in Libya between April 15 and May 18, 2017, and returned home 4 days before the attack (Anderson 2017). Abedi was radicalized and assisted by Katibat al Battar al-Libi in undertaking the bombing in Manchester (Carroll and Batt 2017). The Islamic State claimed responsibility for the attack and released a statement through its Nashir Telegram channel. The statement called Abedi a “soldier of the Khilafah,” which according to Carroll and Batt (2017) indicated “that the attack was inspired or enabled rather than directed by IS” (p. 1).

158

7 Manchester

Abedi was known to police because of his petty offending, although he was not thought to be a terrorist, even though he had made several trips to Libya and that he had been identified as having extremist views (Carroll and Batt 2017). His offending was limited to theft and the receiving of stolen property, although in 2012, he assaulted a woman while he was in college. He was never charged for any of these offenses (Anderson 2017). Abedi had been a person of interest to MI5 but was not under active investigation or monitoring. He was investigated in January 2014, when MI5 received information that he may have “been an individual who had been seen acting suspiciously with” another subject of MI5 interest (Anderson 2017, p. 15). However, Abedi was not the person seen with the other person of interest, and the investigation was closed in July 2014, and he was classified as a person of low residual risk (Anderson 2017). However, an investigation into Abedi began again in October 2015 when MI5 received information that he had contact with a Daesh group member in Libya. The case was closed again on the day that it was found that any contact was not direct (Anderson 2017). Abedi did not become a person of interest again until the day of the attack, although his name had appeared in other intelligence that pertained to other people and purposes (Anderson 2017). MI5 had received some intelligence a few months before the attack in Manchester; however, they did not appreciate the intelligence at that time, and as a result, an investigation into Abedi was not opened (Anderson 2017). The information received was assessed and was believed not to have been related to terrorism but to his criminal actions. According to Anderson (2017), “[i]n retrospect, the intelligence can be seen to have been highly relevant to the planned attack” (p. 16). However, it is unknown as to whether any investigation of Abedi would have prevented the attack (Anderson 2017). Abedi was identified by the MI5 as a person who warranted further consideration in a review of Persons of Interest files that had been closed. This only happened a few days before the attacks and there was not enough time to consider the result of the review of the files (Anderson 2017).

Response to the Attacks The initial response by the police and other emergency services to the bombing in the arena was “immediate, proportionate and well-coordinated” (Carroll and Batt 2017, p. 2). Following the bomb blast, a phone call reporting that an explosion had occurred at the arena was received by staff in the control room of the Greater Manchester Police (GMP) at 22.33 hours. From the information received, the duty officer, an inspector, who was not initially clear as to what type of incident had occurred at the arena, decided to alert the Armed Response Vehicle unit, and requested that they make their way to the area (The Kerslake Arena Review Panel 2018).

Response to the Attacks

159

The emergency service call centers received more than 240 incoming calls within minutes of the bomb blast occurring (Staton 2020), with all calls being answered (Carroll and Batt 2017). It is important that emergency services can manage a high number of emergency calls and that they can mobilize their emergency response swiftly. This means that victims can be aided promptly, that the terrorists can be confronted quickly, and that the public can have confidence in the police. The situation at the arena was still not clear even after the arrival of the first Armed Response Vehicle at 22.41 hours. The police were not aware that there had been a bomb attack at the arena. However, as more phone calls were received by the police, the force duty officer authorized the Armed Response Vehicles to deploy in an armed response capacity. Shortly after more police arrived at the Manchester Victoria Railway Station, it became clear that there had been a major incident at the arena (The Kerslake Arena Review Panel 2018). As the arena is associated with the Manchester Victoria Railway Station, four British Transport Police (BTP) officers were deployed to the incident, and they arrived at the scene within 30 seconds of the bomb blast. They were joined within 10  min by 19 other British Transport Police officers and a supervisor from the British Transport Police Headquarters, which is located 150 meters from the Manchester Victoria Railway Station (Lowe 2020). The supervisor, a sergeant, realizing the damage and the level of injuries inflicted, and that a second explosion could occur when the emergency services arrive, cordoned the area, and commenced a search for any other Improvised Explosive Devices. The sergeant also provided information to the Control room of the British Transport Police. From the scene, at 22:39  hours, a major incident was declared by British Transport Police (The Kerslake Arena Review Panel 2018). The British Transport Police Officers were given support by an inspector and officers from the Greater Manchester Police. The inspector was designated as the bronze commander, who would be responsible for the police resources at the scene of the incident. The inspector initially focused on coordinating the response in the foyer of the arena and ensured that the two police forces and paramedics from the North West Ambulance Service (NWAS) moved quickly to secure the scene and Table 7.2  The Structure for the Command of a Major Incident used by the police in the United Kingdom Gold Command – This level has the overall strategic command of an operation. It sets the overarching strategy that all other response plans must take account of and sets the strategic direction of the response. Silver Command – This level co-ordinates the strategies that have been developed by the Bronze Command and ensures that they reflect and contribute to the overarching direction and strategy set by the gold commander. Bronze Command Operations – This level is responsible for the command of resources and for carrying out the functional responsibilities outlined in the tactical plan at the scene of an incident. Bronze Command Firearms – This level is responsible for developing a firearms strategy and for ensuring that the tactical plans are developed and implemented to support the plan. Adapted from College of Policing (2013), Lowe (2020), and Moore (2018)

160

7 Manchester

assess the injuries of the victims of the blast (The Kerslake Arena Review Panel 2018). A second Inspector, who arrived shortly afterward, took command of the cordoned area. The structure, and the responsibilities for the command of a major incident that is used by the police in the United Kingdom has been presented in Table 7.2. At 22.35 hours, the first Armed Response Vehicle from the Greater Manchester Police arrived at the scene, and by 22.51 hours, there were 12 armed officers at the scene (Lowe 2020). The officers from the Armed Response Vehicle initially undertook a search of the arena and the Manchester Victoria Railway Station. They also provided security for the public and the emergency responders at the scene while other officers attended to the injured concertgoers. According to Lowe (2020) even though it was obvious to the police that there had been a bomb blast at the arena, they had received information that led them to believe that “some of the injuries sustained by the casualties were gunshot wounds” and that a “Paris-style” terrorist attack was in progress (Lowe 2020, pp. 2–3). This led the duty officer from the Greater Manchester Police to declare at 22.47 hours that the Operation PLATO contingency be deployed. PLATO is a multi-agency response to a Marauding Terrorist Firearms Attack2 (The Kerslake Arena Review Panel 2018). Declaring an Operation PLATO incident activates a multi-agency response that informs, mobilizes, and deploys the most appropriate resources to an incident to resolve the threat posed (Graham 2018; Manchester Arena Inquiry, n.d.). As well as activating Operation PLATO, the force duty officer activated the Force Command Module at the Greater Manchester Police Force Headquarters. The Force Command Module is a center that has been established for the police and other responding agencies to manage a multi-agency response. This is where the Strategic Coordinating Group and the Tactical Coordinating Group meet. The Strategic Coordinating Group has the overall responsibility for the management of an emergency and establishes the policy and strategic framework from which the tactical and operational command and coordinating groups will work. The role of the Tactical Coordinating Group is to coordinate the delivery of an effective multi-­ agency response to a major incident (The Kerslake Arena Review Panel 2018). The declaration of Operation PLATO empowers the force duty officer to initiate mutual aid arrangements with neighboring police forces. Enacting mutual aid arrangements leads to Armed Response Vehicles and additional firearms officers being deployed. Within one hour of the attack, 106 authorized firearms officers were deployed to the arena and the Greater Manchester area to assist with the response and to provide security (The Kerslake Arena Review Panel 2018). More than 400 police officers and 60 ambulance units were quickly deployed to the incident site (Staton, 2021). The police and security officers cordoned the area, checked the facility for other Improvised Explosive Devices and suspicious items, and moved more than 14,200 people away from the area. The Manchester Victoria  A Marauding Terrorist Firearms Attack is defined as “attack is a fast-moving attack where the terrorists, armed with firearms, move though a location aiming to find and kill or injure as many people as possible” (Manchester Arena Inquiry, n.d.). 2

An Analysis of the Response to the Attack

161

Railway Station was also evacuated and then closed to the public as it had received substantial structural damage from the bomb blast (Carroll and Batt 2017). As a result of the attack, and because it was not known whether the attack was part of a multi-target attack, the government raised the national alert level from “Severe” to “Critical,” which has been defined as “a terrorist attack is expected.” The threat level remained elevated until May 27, 2017. The government also authorized the use of Operation Temperer and deployed 984 British troops to assist the police in undertaking protective security duties (WarFare Today 2017). The swift response to the attack by the police and other emergency services highlights the importance of being able to respond quickly to a terrorist attack that will affect many people in a large venue and is likely to injure or kill many people (Carroll and Batt 2017).

An Analysis of the Response to the Attack The attack on the arena was the deadliest in the United Kingdom since the bombings in London on July 7, 2005 (The Kerslake Arena Review Panel 2018). The police response and their actions were commented on positively and an analysis of the response highlighted the effectiveness of the response by local emergency services, especially in their preparation and pre-planning (Graham 2018). However, it was noted that there were several areas that could be improved upon (Carroll and Batt 2017; The Kerslake Arena Review Panel 2018). The emergency response agencies were able to respond to the attack with a high level of confidence as there had been a significant investment in multi-agency planning and exercising as part of the Greater Manchester Resilience Forum. As part of this capability building, the forum had held a major exercise at the Trafford Centre 2 months before the attack at the arena (The Kerslake Arena Review Panel 2018). During the initial response to the attack, “key emergency personnel exercised sound judgement in an extremely stressful, chaotic and dangerous environment” (The Kerslake Arena Review Panel 2018, p. 7). One of the decisions that was made early in the response, which was critically important and significantly influenced the course of the response, was the establishment of a casualty assessment and triage zone that enabled ambulance personnel to operate in the area that was designated a hot zone. The hot zone was in the concourse of the metro station where it merged with the entrance to the arena (The Kerslake Arena Review Panel 2018).

162

7 Manchester

Scenario Planning and Response The Greater Manchester Police and the Greater Manchester Resilience Forum had undertaken a number of planning exercises prior to the terrorist attacks on May 22, but none of the scenarios that were used in the planning exercises were based on the type of attack that occurred at the arena (The Kerslake Arena Review Panel 2018). It is important that all police and emergency service agencies have response plans for a major incident in place. Such plans should be dynamic, flexible, and practiced to ensure that they are capable of providing a framework for emergency service workers to respond to events that have not been planned for (Makin et al. 2020). An agency’s response plan should also take local factors into consideration, determine how a response will be managed and coordinated, and have recovery phases that function alongside the response plans of partner agencies (Page and Morgan 2018).

Inter-agency Collaboration Emergency preparedness, response, and recovery in the United Kingdom is built on the concept of delivering a multi-agency response that uses the Integrated Emergency Management3 plan (The Kerslake Arena Review 2018). This model is based on the agencies and organizations that have been designated as Category 1 and Category 2 Responders4 under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 communicating and collaborating with each other. The process that is in place for the responding agencies to interact is called the Local Resilience Forum, and in Greater Manchester, this partnership process is called the Greater Manchester Resilience Forum (The Kerslake Arena Review Panel 2018). According to the Kerslake Arena Review Panel (2018) under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, the partners of the Greater Manchester Resilience Forum are statutorily required to cooperate, share information, assess the risks associated with the delivery of their service, plan for emergencies, communicate with the public, ensure business continuity, and provide business continuity advice to businesses. In addition to these statutory functions, the agencies of the Greater Manchester Resilience Forum are to make connections with other community-based partners, and private-sector and third-sector organizations. The forum was developed to ensure that there was a working relationship between the agencies and that the

 There are six phases of Integrated Emergency Management: Anticipation, Assessment, Prevention, Preparation, Response, Recovery Management (The Kerslake Arena Review, 2018). 4  Category 1 Responders are the main organizations involved in most emergencies at a local level (for example emergency services—Police, Fire, and Rescue—along with the health sector and local authority partners). Category 2 responders are those organizations involved in some emergencies (for example, utilities and transport companies) (Her Majesty’s Government 2012: p.7). 3

An Analysis of the Response to the Attack

163

agencies were able to plan, train, and exercise organizational contingencies for dealing with emergencies collaboratively (The Kerslake Arena Review Panel 2018). In November 2012, the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Programme (JESIP) was established following the release of a report on how emergency services could work together more effectively at major or complex incidents. The report was written by the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), the Chief Fire Officers Association (National Resilience), and the Association of Ambulance Chief Executives (AACE) (Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary 2016). The report was developed after an examination of 32 emergencies and major incidents that had taken place in the United Kingdom between 1985 and 2010. The examination found that “a significant number of these reports … identified interoperability failings of the response organizations” (Pollock 2013, p. 8). The program is underpinned by five key concepts, which are: the co-location of agencies, communication between agencies, the coordination of a joint response, a joint understanding of risks, and a shared situational awareness (The Kerslake Arena Review Panel 2018). The joint response to a major event is also underpinned by the concept of subsidiarity, which means that decisions should be made locally wherever possible, rather than being made at a national level (The Kerslake Arena Review Panel 2018). In January 2015, a review, led by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) was undertaken to examine the extent to which the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability program had been adopted by emergency services (Moore 2018). The review found that progress was being made in its implementation, but more was still needed to be done (Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary 2016). Following the interoperability program, the Manchester emergency services established a structured, coordination framework that would allow a single, or a multi-agency response to an incident (The Kerslake Arena Review Panel 2018). The structure describes the priority of the actions to be taken, how each agency’s assets would be deployed and the risks involved. In the case of the attack at the arena, the agencies did not co-locate their strategic and tactical assets at the Greater Manchester Police Force Command Centre. At the scene of the attack, the bronze scene commander for each agency was co-located and was able to hold multi-agency briefings by forming, what the Kerslake Arena Review (2018) referred to as “scrums” (p. 24). These meetings enabled the commanders to ensure that any actions taken by agencies or multi-agencies were coordinated and that any critical information could be relayed to the command center.

Strategic and Tactical Coordinating Groups A senior police officer, often the gold commander, chairs the Strategic and Tactical Coordinating Groups during a response to a terrorist incident. These groups coordinate the resources from all of the agencies involved in the response while individual agencies retain operational command of their own resources in the response (The Kerslake

164

7 Manchester

Arena Review Panel 2018). “The multiple duties that fell to both the Police Gold Commander [sic] and to the force duty officer on the night of the attack were extremely wide-ranging and testing” (The Kerslake Arena Review Panel 2018, p. 9). The first meeting of the strategic coordinating (gold) group was not held until 04:15 hours, the following morning (The Kerslake Arena Review Panel 2018) and this meant that the gold commander was making decisions that were based on a police perspective without having any information from the other responding agencies.

Operation PLATO Because of the terrorist attack in Mumbai in 2008, the authorities in the United Kingdom developed a procedure called the Joint Operating Principles. The Joint Operating Principles has been designed to be used for responding to the type of attack that occurred in Mumbai. The Joint Operating Principles is “the agreed national identifier for the response to a no-notice Marauding Terrorist Firearms Attack” (The Kerslake Arena Review Panel 2018). While this definition describes the type of incident, Operation PLATO describes the response that has been agreed upon for the type of incident. Operationally, this means that if a Marauding Terrorist Firearms Attack occurs without warning, the police force responsible for the area that the attack occurs in would declare the activation of Operation PLATO.  This would ensure that there is a structured and coordinated multi-agency response (The Kerslake Arena Review Panel 2018). The proviso for declaring Operation PLATO is that it must be communicated immediately to the emergency control rooms of all partner agencies (The Kerslake Arena Review Panel 2018). The Police Duty Officer made the decision to declare Operation PLATO early in the response to the attack at the Manchester Arena. While a declaration is usually made in response to a terrorist attack or when firearms officers are deployed to the scene of an incident, the attack at the arena was much more complex. This was because after the explosion, emergency personal, security staff, members of the public and family and friends of concert goers who had been drawn to the scene were left unprotected (The Kerslake Arena Review Panel 2018). This meant that the armed police response was not only dealing with the terrorists but were also assisting the injured and attempting to gain control of the situation. Another factor that complicated the response was that the declaration had not been communicated to all of the responding the agencies, and as a result, there was no shared understanding of the implications of the declaration. This meant that for approximately an hour and a half, responding agencies were developing strategic and tactical priorities without being aware that Operation PLATO protocols should have informed their actions (The Kerslake Arena Review Panel 2018). Operation PLATO was only a plan to be used to respond to a Marauding Terrorist Firearms Attack. In a review of how Operation Plato had been declared, The Kerslake Arena Review Panel (2018) recommended that Operation PLATO be amended so that it defined the response to any form of terrorist attack. The panel

An Analysis of the Response to the Attack

165

believed that agencies that are responding to a Marauding Terrorist Firearms Attack may be confused as to what stage Operation PLATO should be declared. The panel recommended that the changes be made, because if they were not, it could lead to a lack of common situational awareness or it could constrain agencies from deploying the assets to deal with the situation (Lowe 2020).

Communication with the Public The ability to communicate effectively is critical when responding to major incidents and terrorist attacks. In a review of the major incidents that occurred in the United Kingdom between 1986 and 2010, it was found that in every case there were failings in communicating with the public and within the responding agency (Pollock 2013). During the response to the bombing at the Manchester Arena, “almost every organization found that improvements needed to be made in its ability to communicate within the organization and externally” (The Kerslake Arena Review Panel 2018, p. 166). However, any difficulties in communicating did not appear to affect the response of either the police or the ambulance service, but it did affect the fire service (Moore 2018). Effective communication with the public following a terrorist event is essential as it provides the public with the confidence that the police can respond and it ensures that essential information is relayed, such as the nature of the attack, road closures, and information about the victims. The immediate period following an attack is an extremely delicate time that requires diplomacy and tact (Russell and de Orellana 2020). How the police manage this time will have a bearing on how it affects the outcome of the response, the identification of the attacker, the assistance given to the victims, and the response to the crisis. It also affects how an attack is described and ultimately, on how the authorities, the media, and the public understand the attack. The first communiqué by the police was in a tweet on Twitter posted by the Chief Constable, which set the tone for communicating about the response (Russell and de Orellana 2020). The tweet was posted by the Chief Constable as he was being driven by his son to police headquarters. It established a sense of leadership in that the police had control over the flow of information and how the attacks would be described. The tweet described was “simple, almost dry,” which was appropriate, as all the Chief Constable knew was that “an ‘incident’ had occurred” (Russell and de Orellana 2020, p. 25). The language used in the tweet was “direct and clear with no verbs” and only advised the public that the police had responded and were at the incident, and “that its chief [Constable] is in control of the information and on his way to the headquarters” (Russell and de Orellana 2020, pp. 25–26). Because the police had already responded to the attack and were at the scene of the incident made it clear that the police organization was working the way that it should during an emergency and that the officers were confronting the terrorist threat and tending to the injured. The tweet subtlety suggested that the police

166

7 Manchester

response system is reliable, even in the face of a terrorist attack, and that the police were able to deploy officers who had immediately “sprung to action,” and this also indicated that the police were in control (Russell and de Orellana 2020, p. 26). In an analysis of the effect that the first tweet by the Chief Constable had, Russell and de Orellana (2020) claimed that it reinforced “a complex political aspect of crisis communications, particularly in an era when faith in institutional communications is at a nadir” (p.  26). The tweet encouraged people to follow the Greater Manchester Police, which was a way for the police to be the one source for information on the attacks and for the police to control any information pertaining to the attacks. It also provided a sense that any information from the @gmpolice Twitter account was the one source of truth and that it was reliable and could be trusted (Russell and de Orellana 2020). After the early tweets by the Chief Constable, the police used a number of media platforms such as Twitter and Facebook to release media statements and videos to highlight how they were engaged with the community. The media releases, for example, featured the Chief Constable attending a number of community events. This was a deliberate strategy by the police to ensure that they were being seen as being a part of the community and that the resilience of the community was strong after the attack. The strategy was intended to improve the relationship between the police and the community as the community moved on from the attack (Russell and de Orellana 2020). Later communications by the police focused on the victims of the bombing and demonstrated that they stood in solidarity with the community in their grief for the horrific nature of the attack (Russell and de Orellana 2020). This aided in the public’s perception that the police were a part of the community and that they shared their grief. Another strategy that the police used to communicate with the public was that they did not discuss the attacker, and if they did, it was in general terms. This created the perspective that Manchester was “against the specific perpetrators, rather than “the terrorists,” “terror” or Islam more broadly” (Russell and de Orellana 2020, p. 24). The media took this lead from the police, and they did not discuss the attacker in any detail or link him to migration, religion, or a community (Russell and de Orellana 2020). The strategy used to communicate with the public ensured that the community were fully informed and that the focus was on the victims, the reaction of the community to the attack, and the subsequent police investigation. This meant that the police did not follow the intent of the Islamic State, which was to single out the Muslim community, but instead they engaged with the Muslim community to obtain their assistance with the investigation into the attack and to counter any other radicalization problems. The police released regular media statements to update the community about the investigation, reminded them that it was ongoing, and that the “suspects were in custody and that the threat level remained critical” (Russell and de Orellana 2020).

The Response to a Terrorist Attack by the United Kingdom

167

The Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service (GMFRS) The lead agency for the response to the bombing was the police. A response can only be effective when priorities, resources, and capabilities are identified and coordinated with other first responding agencies (Moore 2018). Unfortunately, the Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service (GMFRS) did not coordinate their response with the other responding agencies because their on-call senior officer delayed the deployment of staff from the fire service that night (The Kerslake Arena Review Panel 2018). The officer did not go to the joint Gold Command at the Police Command Module, where senior ambulance, health, council, and transport officials were, and instead, went to the command room of the fire service, arriving just before midnight, almost one and half hours after the attack (The Kerslake Arena Review Panel 2018). Personnel from the Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service (GMFRS) did not arrive at the scene of the bombing until almost 2 h after it happened (Moore 2018; The Kerslake Arena Review Panel 2018). Therefore, they did not perform a meaningful role in the initial response to the attack, and as a result, they were not able to assist with assessing the injured or with transporting them to the safe zone. Because the fire service only had a limited presence at the Strategic Gold Command and did not have a presence at the safe arrival point of the cordoned, disaster area, they were outside the information loop and had little awareness of what was happening in relation to the emergency response at the arena (Kerslake Arena Review Panel 2018). The failure of the fire service to deploy commanders to the Strategic Gold Command, the scene of the attack or to the safe arrival point meant that they had little understanding of the risks involved in responding to the incident or an in-depth understanding of the situation (The Kerslake Arena Review Panel 2018). If the fire service had deployed staff to these locations, they would have received information about the impact of any threat or hazard that had been identified and would have understood the control measures that had been implemented (Moore 2018).

The Response to a Terrorist Attack by the United Kingdom After the terrorist attacks in Mumbai in 2009, the authorities in the United Kingdom reviewed the strategies and tactics that they had in place for responding to a terrorist attack. The review determined that in the future, there would be two types of response to a terrorist attack and the form of response would depend on whether the attack was a conventional attack or a Marauding Terrorist Firearms’ Attack (MTFA). A number of Marauding Terrorist Firearms’ Attacks have occurred since the attack in Mumbai in 2009, such as those in Paris in 2015, and in an Istanbul nightclub on New Year’s Day 2017, where a single gunman killed 39 people in less than 7 minutes (BBC News 2017). The occurrence of a Marauding Terrorist Firearms’

168

7 Manchester

Attack was considered to be a viable threat in the United Kingdom at the time of the bombing at the Manchester Arena (Meja 2014). The review highlighted that this type of attack, should it occur in the United Kingdom, would lead to the police being significantly outgunned and would most likely need the support of the military to resolve an incident. As a result of the review, the weapons carried by the Armed Response Vehicles were upgraded to modern, high-powered weapons that were “capable of bringing concentrated firepower onto a terrorist target” (Gardner 2017). The change in the type of weapons carried by the Armed Response Vehicles meant there was a philosophical change in how the police could respond to a terrorist attack. The previous response to a terrorist attack “was to locate, contain and neutralise,” whereas the more powerful weapons gave the police the ability to move quickly to resolve a situation (National Police Chiefs’ Council 2017). To ensure that a response to a Marauding Terrorist Firearms’ Attack would be effective, the area in which an attack occurred would be divided into three broad areas of operation: 1. Cold zone—all areas where there has been no terrorist activity and is currently unlikely to be; 2. Warm zone—an area that has recently been exposed to terrorist activity, the threat is understood to have moved to another area, or is over, but the threat could return, making the people in this area vulnerable to an attack; and a. 3. Hot zone—an area where terrorists are located and are active, or an area that is within reach of terrorist activity (Graham 2018). Non-specialized first responders, such as police patrol officers, firefighters, and medical personnel that arrive at the scene of an attack first, operate in the cold zone. Authorized firearm officers and other first responders operate in the warm zone, undertaking tasks such as treating and retrieving casualties and attending to fires. In the hot zone, other armed police officers and military firearms teams actively pursue and confront the armed threat (Graham 2018). The drawback of this response framework is its rigidity, and it does not take cognizance that in the initial stages of a response to a terrorist attack, it is often a complex and fast-moving situation, that the information available may be confusing and there may be unseen dangers (Westlake 2012). Nor does the framework make it easy for the responding agencies to collaborate effectively in each of the zones or across the zones (Graham 2018). The shortcomings in the structural design of the response framework used in the United Kingdom was similar to the shortcomings in the structural design of the response framework that was used in the United States. In 2010, for example, an Assistant Sheriff who was employed by the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department claimed that it was inappropriate for medical staff and firefighters to remain in a cold zone to wait for specialist teams to arrive and deal with an incident. The Assistant Sheriff suggested that “[o]rganizational paradigms that exclude fire and medical personnel from hot zone operations are naïve and will not stand up to the test of … Mumbai” (Moody 2010). The problem was also highlighted in a

Conclusion

169

critique of the response to the Columbine High School massacre in Colorado on April 20, 1999, by Erickson (2001). Quoting the Chairman of the Columbine Review Commission, Erickson (2001) stated that a teacher bled to death while emergency medical personnel were held outside for more than three hours. The medical personnel were unable to respond owing to the response tactics that were in use at that time, which comprised of the police cordoning and “containing the scene, and awaiting a specialist firearms’ response, effectively creating a siege scenario” (Graham 2018). The bombing attack in the Manchester Arena on May 22, 2017, highlighted a breakdown in how the Marauding Terrorist Firearms’ Attack strategy was communicated to the responding agencies. Personnel from the first Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service, who arrived at the scene first, had not been advised that the Marauding Terrorist Firearms’ Attack strategy had been activated. This meant that they were not able to enter the area of the arena and were instructed to wait for the arrival of a specialist fire service response team who would be able to enter the high-­ risk area. This meant that only paramedics and police officers could attend to the injured, whereas they could have been assisted earlier by fire service personnel (Keeling 2017).

Conclusion Suicide attacks have long been considered the hallmark of jihadist terrorism. The killing of oneself during a terrorist attack is a feature that differentiates jihadist terrorism from other forms of terrorism (Crenshaw 2016). Jihadi terrorist attacks have been the deadliest form of terror attacks that have been carried out in the west in recent years (van Dongen 2017). They have taken place in Paris in 2015, in Brussels in March 2016, and in Manchester in May 2017. Like the rapid and positive response of the Belgian authorities to the terrorist attack that occurred there in March 2016, the response to the terrorist bombing attack in the Manchester Arena was well-coordinated and timely (see Anderson 2017; Lowe 2020; Ruf 2019; The Kerslake Arena Review Panel 2018). According to the Kerslake Arena Review Panel (2018), the benefits of investing in collaborative partnerships and emergency planning were demonstrated by how the emergency agencies responded and worked together in Manchester. The response on the night of May 22 was distinguished by the willingness and the readiness of members of the public who were in the vicinity to assist the first of the police and emergency responders to attend to the injured. The speed of the arrival and the deployment of staff from the police and emergency services, accompanied by security contractors, meant that the scene of the attack was secured quickly and many lives were saved. The Greater Manchester Police coordinated the deployment of hundreds of their personnel and assets as well as those from other forces from across the country to respond to the attack and to assist with the subsequent investigation and arrest of people of interest. The

170

7 Manchester

effective deployment of resources resulted in more than 20 addresses being searched by the police by the eighth day after the attack. The success of the response to the terrorist attack rested in the sound judgments made at critical points during the first few hours of the response in an extremely stressful, chaotic, and dangerous environment. The way that the police released information to the media ensured that the police did not let the terrorists’ control the confidence of the public and their perception of the response to the attacks and this contributed to the successful response to the attack.

References Anderson, D. (2017). Attacks in London and Manchester March-June 2017: Independent assessment of MI5 and Police internal reviews. Assets Publishing. Andrew, G. (2017). Manchester Arena attack: All the facts about suicide bombing after Ariana Grande concert. Independent. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-­news/ manchester-­arena-­attack-­facts-­what-­happened-­timeline-­suicide-­bombing-­ariana-­grande-­ concert-­a7751176.html. BBC News. (2017, 1 January). Istanbul New Year Reina nightclub attack leaves 39 dead. https:// www.bbc.com/news/world-­europe-­38481521. Carroll, J. & Batt, M. (2017, July). Manchester Arena bombing, 22 May 2017. CT Quick Look. Australian Strategic Policy Institute. College of Policing (2013). Command structures. https://www.college.police.uk/app/operations/ command-­and-­control/command-­structures. Crenshaw, M. (2016). The debate over old vs new terrorism. In R. Coolsaet (ed.), Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalization Challenge: European and American Experiences (pp.  57–69). Routledge. Erickson, W. (2001, May). The report of Governor Bill Owens’ Columbine review commission. State of Colorado. Fenn, L. & Brunton-Smith, I. (2021). The effects of terrorist incidents on public worry of future attacks, views of the police and social cohesion. British Journal of Criminology, 61, 497–518. Gardner, F. (2017, 4 May). Terror threat: UK upgrades armed police response. BBC News. https:// www.bbc.com/news/uk-­39810721. Graham, D. (2018). Marauding Terrorist Firearms’ Attacks. The RUSI Journal, 163(2), 42–50. Her Majesty’s Government. (2012). Emergency response and recovery non-statutory guidance to complement emergency preparedness. https://www.gov.uk/guidance/emergency response-­and-­recovery. Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary. (2016). The tri-service review of the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles (JESIP). www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmic. Ibekwe, D. (2017, 23 May). Manchester Arena attack witness: my bags weren't searched when entering the arena. Insider. https://www.businessinsider.com/manchester-­attack-­witness-­bags-­ searched-­when-­entering-­the-­arena-­terror-­ariana-­grande-­2017-­5?IR=T. Jonathan, T. (2010). Police involvement in counterterrorism and public attitudes towards the Police in Israel 1998–2007. The British Journal of Criminology, 50, 748–771. Jonathan-Zamir, T. & Weisburd, D. (2011). The effects of security threats on antecedents of police legitimacy: Findings from a quasi-experiment in Israel. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 50, 3–32. doi:https://doi.org/10.1177/0022427811418002. Keeling, N. (2017, 1 June). Specialist terror response fire crews were not used on night of Manchester bomb attack. Manchester Evening News. https://www.manchestereveningnews. co.uk/news/greater-­manchester-­news/specialist-­terror-­response-­fire-­crews-­13124964.

References

171

(The) Kerslake Arena Review Panel. (2018). The Kerslake Report: An independent review into the preparedness for, and emergency response to, the Manchester Arena attack on 22nd May 2017. https://www.kerslakearenareview.co.uk/. Kostakos, P., Nykanen, M., Martinvita, M., Pandya, A. & Oussaiah, M. (2018). Meta-terrorism: Identifying linguistic patterns in public discourse after an attack. Presentation at IEEE/ACM International Conference on Advances in Social Networks Analysis and Mining, August 28–31, 2018, Barcelona, Spain. La Free, G. & Adamczyk, A. (2016). The impact of the Boston marathon bombings on public willingness to cooperate with police. Justice Quarterly, 34, 1–32. doi:https://doi.org/10.108 0/0741/8825.2016.1181780 Lowe, D. (2020). Manchester arena bombings: Main lessons that have been learnt. Counter-IED Report, Autumn, 1–6. Makin, S., Smith, L. & McDevitt, K. (2020). How a major incident plan can be used in an acute healthcare setting. BMJ Mil Health, 166, 17–20. Meja, A. (2014). The Westgate terrorist attack: Was lapse security a contributing factor? Alert: Journal of the Institute of Civil Protection and Emergency Management, Autumn, pp. 13–16. Moody, T. (2010, September). Filling the gap between NIMS/ICS and the law enforcement initial response in the age of the urban jihad. Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterrey, California. Moore, T. (2018). What price JESIP after the Manchester arena terrorist incident? Alert, Summer, pp. 9–12. National Police Chiefs’ Council (2017, 19 April). More firearms officers ready to protect the public. https://news.npcc.police.uk/releases/more-­firearms-­officers-­are-­ready-­to-­protect-­the-­public. Nazmi, N., Rashid, R., Zani, N., Jabar, N. & Aziz, M. (2018). Discourse analysis on international online news reports of Manchester bombing. International Journal of Asian Social Science, 8(9), 660–668. Page, P. & Morgan, C. (2018). Ready for anything: considerations in emergency preparedness. British Medical Journal  – Military Health. https://militaryhealth.bmj.com/content/ 166/2/58.full. Pollock, K. (2013). Review of persistent lessons identified relating to interoperability from emergencies and major incidents since 1986. Occasional Paper No. 6. Emergency Planning College. Ruf, M. (2019, March). Crisis response: Lessons from the Manchester Arena bombing of 2017. Ex post paper study visit: Responding to crisis  — Building resilience, Manchester, United Kingdom. Radicalisation Awareness Network. Russell, J. & de Orellana, P. (2020) Public communications leadership: #crisiscomms and the Manchester arena attack. The RUSI Journal, 165(5–6), 22–35. Simcox, R. (2017). European Islamist plots and attacks since 2014—and how the U.S. can help prevent them. The Heritage Foundation. https://www.heritage.org/europe/report/ european-­islamist-­plots-­and-­attacks-­2014-­and-­how-­the-­us-­can-­help-­prevent-­them. Stanko, E. & Bradford, B. (2009). Beyond measuring ‘how good a job’ police are doing: The MPS model of confidence in policing. Policing, 3, 322–330. Staton, A. (2020). Evolving crisis communication in social media era: Analysis of tweets and news stories of the Manchester arena bombing. Honor Thesis. The University of Southern Mississippi. van Dongen, T. (2017). The fate of the perpetrator in the Jihadist modus operandi: Suicide attacks and non-suicide attacks in the west, 2004–2017. International Centre for Counter-Terrorism Research Paper. von Drachenfels, M. (2017, September). Benefit concert in the Manchester arena: The terror threat and peaceful protests. https://blog.prif.org/2017/09/18/benefit-­concert-­in-­the-­manchester-­ arena-­the-­terror-­threat-­and-­peaceful-­protests/ Warfare Today. (2017, 24 May). First troops deployed in Operation Temperer.. http://www.warfare.today/2017/05/24/first-­troops-­deployed-­in-­operation-­temperer/. Westlake, R. (2012). Emergency services interoperability speech: Keynote speech for the JESIP national interoperability summit. Stareton Hall, Coventry, 21 November.

Chapter 8

An Analysis of the Four Case Studies

Introduction Terrorist attacks in India, France, Belgium, and the United Kingdom have been reasonably frequent events, with each of these countries experiencing a number of different types of attacks, such as bombings, shootings, and vehicles being driven into pedestrians. During the late 2000s, each of these countries experienced a large, terrorist attack that was complex and tragic, and was taxing on the country’s resources. At the time that the attacks took place, all of the countries had a military presence in a war in a country where jihadist attacks were occurring (in Kashmir or Syria or Iraq) (Bakker 2015). This chapter analyses the attacks that were discussed in the four case studies that were presented earlier in this book. The attacks were different from other attacks that were carried out around the world because of the amount of damage caused, the number of people injured and killed, and the political reaction of each country. The terrorist attacks that were discussed in the case studies were selected because of their similarity to one another in terms of their operational structure, execution, and the devastation caused (Yazujian 2017). They were also chosen because of the form that the attacks took and the type of establishments that the terrorists targeted. The terrorist attacks in Mumbai in 2008, Paris in 2015, Brussels in 2016, and Manchester in 2017 were all influenced by Islamic State or their affiliate terrorist groups. Ten members of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) carried out an attack in Mumbai on November 26 which carried on until November 29, 2008, and culminated in a 60-hour siege at one of India’s most prestigious hotels. The attacks in Mumbai were regarded as being a turning point in how terrorist attacks are carried out. As a result of the ferocity of the attacks, the confidence of the people of India was shaken, and there were concerns as to whether the police in India were capable of countering terrorism (Yazujian 2017).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. den Heyer, Police Respond to Terrorism, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-43250-7_8

173

174

8  An Analysis of the Four Case Studies

The terrorists highjacked a fishing trawler in Karachi and used this to travel to Mumbai. A fishing trawler was selected as the means of transport because the terrorists thought that by using a fishing trawler, they would avoid Indian defenses. The terrorists killed the crew of the trawler in an attempt to cover their tracks (Rabasa et  al. 2009). Upon landing in Mumbai, the terrorists separated into five mobile teams of two, to target five locations, which included hotels and restaurants. During the attack, the terrorists had access to live news feeds and were in constant contact, via their mobile phones, with their handlers who were in Pakistan. The handlers instructed the terrorists to execute civilians in order to gain greater media coverage, and then to ultimately commit suicide (Roggio 2009). The attacks in Paris in 2015 were committed by a terrorist network that was similar in size and structure to the network that carried out the attacks in Mumbai. The plan for the attack in Paris was similar to the plans used to attack the other three countries - they were planned in a country other than where the attacks took place. The attacks in Paris were carried out by 12 members of the Islamic State. These terrorists were organized into three teams of four, who separated to attack three different locations (BBC News Europe 2016). While in Brussels in 2016, two separate attacks were carried out by two teams of terrorists. These attacks were carried out by a single cell of Islamic State that was located in Brussels (Gardham 2016). The attack in Manchester in 2016 was undertaken by a single terrorist, who was influenced by the Islamic State. The terrorist was trained by an Islamic State affiliate in Libya. The attack in Manchester was different to those carried out in Mumbai, Paris, and Brussels because the attacker used a bomb rather than an automatic firearm to inflict injuries and cause as many deaths as possible. Developing the case studies has provided a basis for conducting a comparative analysis of the terrorists, the attacks undertaken, and the police response to the attacks. This chapter reviews and compares the terrorist attacks that have been examined in the case studies and examines the response of the police to the attacks.

Overview of the Four Case Studies Several commentators and researchers have highlighted parallels between the attacks that took place in Mumbai in 2008 and Paris in 2015 (Riedel 2015). It has been noted that the attacks in Paris in 2015 were likely to have been modeled on the attacks that took place in Mumbai in 2008 (Riedel 2015). This assumption was made because there was a clear and identifiable improvement in the tactical and operational skills of the terrorists (Kiss 2016). An analysis of the attacks that occurred in Mumbai in 2008, Paris in 2015, and Brussels in 2016 all indicated that the planning of the attacks was more advanced and that the skills of the attackers had progressed. They were able to make functionally reliable bombs, identify vulnerable targets, and maintain operational security prior to, and during the attacks (Kiss 2016).

Overview of the Four Case Studies

175

Table 8.1  Comparison of the terrorist attacks that were examined in the case studies

Number of terrorists Number of sites attacked Modus operandi Length of attack Attack targets

Mumbai 2008 10 (four teams of either 3 or 4 terrorists)

Paris 2015 12 (three teams of 4 terrorists)

12

6

Coordinated – firearms Coordinated – and bombs firearms and bombs Three nights One night

Hotels, hospital, entertainment center, restaurants, and cafes Islamic state No – influenced by influenced Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) Number of 164 deaths Number 308 injured

Manchester Brussels 2016 2017 5 (one team of 3 1 and one team of 2 terrorists) 2 1 Bombs

Bombs

One day

One day

Entertainment center, restaurants and cafes Yes

Airport lounge, metro railway station Yes

Entertainment center

130

35

23

413

340

800

Yes

Source: author

The terrorists also demonstrated their capabilities by coordinating and synchronizing attacks in different locations. They learnt to do this from the 9/11 attacks in the United States. By coordinating and synchronizing multiple attacks, the terrorists could inflict more injuries, cause more deaths, and create the most confusion. The ability of the terrorists to organize multiple, coinciding attacks indicated that the professionalism of the terrorists had progressed (Kiss 2016). These attacks also demonstrated that by using simple tactics and equipment, combined with sophisticated pre-planning, intelligence, training and execution, panic, terror, and economic disaster was likely to follow (Trindal 2009). The attacks that were examined in the case studies have been analyzed and compared and the results of the comparison have been presented in Table 8.1. The attacks that were discussed in the case studies highlighted that there was a significant degree of coordination, technical sophistication, and strategic thinking in carrying out these attacks. These factors point to the involvement of well-structured terrorist cells, and a well-trained, lone terrorist in Manchester. The attacks were all organized or influenced by foreign jihadist terrorist organizations: Lashkar-e-­ Tayyiba in Mumbai, the Islamic State in Paris, Belgium, and Manchester, and these groups all claimed responsibility for the attacks. A review of the attacks in Brussels illustrated how efficient and agile the operational structure of the Islamic State was. Following the Paris attacks, the terrorist cell in Paris was almost liquidated, but the cell in Brussels made sure that it was more resilient to the activities of law enforcement agencies (Yazujian 2017). Abdeslam, one of the terrorists responsible for the attack in Paris, was able to escape

176

8  An Analysis of the Four Case Studies

the scene of the attacks and travel back to Belgium by car (Latin American Herald Tribune, 2016) where he hid in a safe house for over 4 months (Forster and Hader 2016). In response to Abdeslam’s arrest in March 2016, the cell in Brussels demonstrated its operational agility by changing the target of its attack to new targets. The terrorists determined that the airport and the metro station would be the new targets (Forster and Hader 2016). Forster and Harder (2016) claimed that the quick response to Abdeslam’s arrest by the Brussels terrorist cell demonstrated that the Islamic State conducted surveillance on multiple target sites before they chose the final sites for the attacks. The terrorists who attacked Paris and Brussels used Triacetone Triperoxide (TATP), a relatively easy-to-prepare explosive, to strike the two transport systems in and around Brussels and the targets in the city of Paris (Quivooji 2016). The use of this form of explosive indicates that the terrorists understood the characteristics of explosives and were skillful in its use (Quivooji 2016). In three of the attacks (Mumbai, Paris, and Brussels), small teams carried out a series of carefully planned and timed attacks at multiple locations (Kiss 2016; Riedel 2015). According to Costello (2015) coordinated terrorist attacks involving multiple teams and the use of small unit tactics have proven to be very devastating when employed in large, urban, highly populated areas. This occurred in Mumbai, where ten terrorists undertook 12 attacks at six locations. Some of the attacks were simultaneous, and explosives and automatic weapons were used to create confusion and to inflict as many injuries and cause the death of as many people as possible. Similarly, in Paris, three teams of terrorists, wearing suicides vests and using automatic weapons, struck six locations. While in Brussels and Manchester, a large entertainment center and travel hubs were selected as the sites for the attacks which. An attack on these places would ensure that the attack would gain the most attention from the media and cause as many injuries and deaths as possible. The targets had symbolic significance and included well-known hotels, restaurants and cafes, centers of entertainment, and streets where people gathered. They were all places where people liked to meet and mix, drink alcohol, and enjoy entertainment. In all four locations, the attackers disrupted the public transport system, and in Brussels, they disrupted one of Europe’s busiest airports. The attacks in Paris closely resembled the attacks in Mumbai in 2008 (Quinn-­ Williams 2016). Both attacks were complex, but the Mumbai attacks required, “precise planning, detailed reconnaissance and thorough preparation, both physical and mental. It relied on surprise, creating confusion and overwhelming the ability of the authorities to respond” (Rabasa et  al. 2009, p.  3). In these attacks, the terrorists divided into teams of two to four terrorists and each team attacked a different site (Rabasa et al. 2009). The terrorists in Paris and Mumbai were heavily armed, each carried assault rifles and multiple rounds of ammunition as well as improvised explosive devices (Fair 2014). The terrorists in both attacks killed indiscriminately, as their goal was to murder as many people as possible, rather than targeting people to kill (Quinn-Williams. 2016). The attacks in Paris in November 2015 were better planned than the earlier in the year, Charlie Hebdo attacks, with the terrorists killing a security guard before taking hostages to create a siege. The actions taken by the

A Comparison of the Police Response to the Attacks

177

terrorists suggested that they had studied how the attack in Mumbai was undertaken and they replicated what they thought worked during that attack (Quinn-­ Williams. 2016). The country from where the terrorists originated is one of the differences that was discussed in the case studies. The terrorists that attacked Mumbai all came from Pakistan and five of the eight terrorists who attacked Paris came from France with the others coming from Iraq. All of the terrorists that undertook the attack in Belgium were either French or Belgian and the Manchester terrorist was born in the United Kingdom but was of Libyan descent. Security in the planning, preparation, and execution of the attacks was maintained to ensure that the police and the security services were not aware of the pending attack. While the attacks in Mumbai were being carried out, the terrorists used mobile phones and satellite phones to strengthen the security of their communications with the handlers who were based in Pakistan. They used pre-programmed, handheld GPS units to navigate quickly and efficiently throughout the city of Mumbai to reach their target sites (Trindal 2009). This level of sophistication in command and control was missing in the attacks that were carried out in Paris (Riedel 2015). The terrorists in Paris and Brussels relied on “burner phones1” and only used them to make a small number of calls before discarding them. The terrorists who carried out the attacks in Paris used the cell phones that were taken from the hostages to communicate with the group’s intermediaries (Moody 2016).

A Comparison of the Police Response to the Attacks The review of the case studies highlighted several similarities and differences in the response of the police to the terrorist attacks. The attacks exposed the strengths and flaws in each country’s approach to countering terrorism. Some of these were at a political level, while others were at a more operational level. In all of the attacks that were examined in the case studies, the police agencies responded quickly to the attacks and the media and other commentators commented positively on the police response. However, there were a few early media reports that criticized the police response to the attacks in Mumbai and Paris, but these were later replaced with more balanced and analyzed reporting. The police response to the attacks in Paris, Brussels, and Manchester were also determined to be efficient and effective. The response by the police in Mumbai was not however, considered to be efficient and effective. The inability of the police to respond competently to the attacks in Mumbai was for a number of reasons but was primarily because they were not equipped to deal with such a complicated terrorist attack and what equipment they did have, was out of date. Costello (2015) stated that the reason why the police response to the attacks in Mumbai was initially

 These are usually cheap cell phones that are purchased anonymously using fake documents.

1

178

8  An Analysis of the Four Case Studies

Table 8.2  Comparison of the strengths in the police response to the terrorist attacks Responded quickly Efficient and effective response Police response and actions were commented on positively

Mumbai Yes No Yes

Paris Yes Yes Yes

Brussels Yes Yes Yes

Manchester Yes Yes Yes

described as ineffective was because there were a number of reports of police officers failing to engage the terrorists and because of police officers running away from the attacks (Costello 2015). However, the High-Level Enquiry Committee determined that the police response could not be criticized because several officers either confronted the terrorists at various locations or assisted members of the public to escape while being unarmed or only armed with an outdated revolver (High-­ Level Enquiry Committee, 2018). Furthermore, none of these officers had been fitted with ballistic or bulletproof vests. Felling (2010) also noted that the police were ill-equipped and inadequately trained. The strengths in the police response that were found in the case studies have been compared and have been summarized in Table 8.2. One of the main criticisms of the police response in Mumbai and Paris was the time that it took for the police to understand what was happening. In both of the attacks, some time passed (several hours in the case of Paris and days in the case of Mumbai) before a clear picture emerged. The lack of understanding made it difficult for the police to decide on the appropriate level of response and what specialist resources needed to be deployed (Kiss 2016). There were limitations in the governance and command structures of the police in Mumbai, Paris, and Manchester. In Mumbai, there was no formal incident management system for the police to refer to, as there is in the United States. The police in the United States are able to refer to the National Incident Management System2 to respond to any incident. Such a system would have enabled the police in Mumbai to establish a coordinated response. While in Paris, the specialist tactical police units had a separate command structure from that of the general police. This meant that the response of the tactical units and the general police was not coordinated. It took a half an hour for the anti-terrorist unit to reach the Bataclan concert hall because the unit had been initially deployed to a location where an attack had already finished (Kiss 2016). In Manchester, not all of the emergency agencies that were responding to the attack co-located their strategic and tactical commanders at the Greater Manchester Police Force Command Centre. This meant that the gold commander was not fully aware of the incident because the commander did not  The National Incident Management System (NIMS) guides all levels of government, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector to work together to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from incidents. The NIMS provides stakeholders across the whole community with the shared vocabulary, systems, and processes to successfully deliver the capabilities described in the National Preparedness System. NIMS defines operational systems that guide how personnel work together during incidents (see FEMA n.d.). 2

A Comparison of the Police Response to the Attacks

179

know how the other agencies were responding, and decisions had to be made based on assumptions. The police and the security services in France, Belgium, and the United Kingdom had closely studied the attacks that occurred in Mumbai and had learned key lessons from the attacks and were probably better prepared and armed for a complicated terrorist attack than what the police in Mumbai were. In France, Belgium, and the United Kingdom, elite police units and military tactical teams were deployed rapidly, whereas in Mumbai, members of these teams had to be flown in from New Delhi, which is approximately 1000  miles away, before they could be deployed (Riedel 2015). This meant that members of the specialist Anti-Terrorist Response Unit did not arrive on the scene of the attack until nearly 12 hours after the first attack had occurred (Kiss 2016). Terrorist attacks that were committed in the 1990s exemplify that the first key factor in preparing an effective response to an attack is to understand the nature of the threat (Omand 2017). In all of the attacks that were outlined in the case studies, the police were left exposed by the actions of the intelligence agencies. The intelligence agencies did not share information with their international counterparts or with the police fast enough. This was especially so when information had been gathered about the terrorists traveling internationally to locations that were known to be jihadist safe havens. The nature of the European borders meant that the terrorists were able to travel across the continent with relative ease. The intelligence agencies in the United Kingdom have well-developed capabilities and legal frameworks for gathering intelligence and have a collaborative framework in place between many of the border agencies, but the police in the United Kingdom were not informed that the terrorist who attacked Manchester had traveled to Libya and was associated with Islamic State members (Omand 2017). In the case of the attacks in Mumbai, the police had, however, been notified of the possibility of a terrorist attack occurring in the city, but they chose not to act on the information. The problems associated with the handling and sharing of intelligence were highlighted by the French parliamentary commission of inquiry into the Paris attack. The commission claimed, “that Europe was not up to the task of fighting terrorism” (Omand 2017, pp. 83–84). According to the commission, there were failures in the handling and analysis of the intelligence and in the passing of that intelligence to the police (Omand 2017). Similarly, the Belgian authorities accepted that their counterterrorism intelligence processes were lacking. Many of the European intelligence agencies were slow to recognize the threat that Islamic State posed (Omand 2017). Omand (2017) maintained that the European intelligence agencies failed to assess the terrorist threat from the information gathered domestically and internationally and did not consider how the police use intelligence to counter terrorist activity. These factors contributed to the terrorist networks establishing themselves in Belgium. The networks were made up of terrorists who were in possession of European passports, who had fought in Iraq and Syria, and had hidden among Europe’s many undocumented refugees (Omand 2017). In the United Kingdom, intelligence was used differently than it was in Mumbai, Paris, and Brussels. The police have successfully identified and prosecuted

180

8  An Analysis of the Four Case Studies

Table 8.3  The shortcomings of the response to the terror attacks in the case studies Confusion caused by the attacks Did not possess the appropriate equipment Not deployed in an organized manner Shortcomings in governance Deficiencies in intelligence analysis and its operationalization Leadership could not coordinate an effective response Shortcomings in the coordination and command Communication difficulties at incident sites

Mumbai Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No Yes X

Yes Yes No No No Yes No Yes No

Yes Yes No No X No No Yes No

hundreds of potential terrorists because of the cooperation and support between MI5 (the United Kingdom domestic intelligence agency), MI6 (the United Kingdom foreign intelligence agency), and the police. To ensure that there is an effective response to countering terrorism, the police and the intelligence agencies should adopt a joint approach, similar to that which operates out of the Joint Terrorism Analysis Center, that was established in the United Kingdom in 2003. The center is staffed by members of the intelligence agencies, the police, the military and other government agencies that collaborate to analyze information. The response of the police to the attacks that were examined in the case studies has been summarized and compared and has been presented in Table 8.3.

Social Media Social media has become an important part of the way that the police communicate, and it is one method that they use to disseminate time-critical information and counter the spread of incorrect information, disinformation, and rumors (Akkaya et al. 2019). Social media enables timely, critical information to be shared with the public during an emergency and does not interfere with other methods of media reporting (Crowe 2011; Lieberman et al. 2013). In comparison, traditional media methods are used to provide information to inform an audience, seek to resolve any ambiguity, and expand the understanding of a situation (Ball-Rokeach 1985; Ball-Rokeach and DeFleur 1976). If the police were to rely solely on traditional communication methods, then timing constraints may arise, and this can result in the generation of incorrect information and disinformation, and the spreading of rumors. The police use social media for many purposes, such as providing information on policing events, crime, safety awareness, and disseminating time-critical information (Cassa et al. 2013; Heverin and Zach 2010; Meijer and Thaens 2013; O’Connor 2017). They also use social media for building community support (O’Connor 2017) promoting specific policing strategies, such as Community Policing (Mergel 2012; Xu, et al., 2017) and encouraging community engagement on crime related

Social Media

181

issues (Xu, et al., 2017). Social media is also used to enhance the transparency of the police (Rick and Nicholas 2013) manage their image (O’Connor 2017), and foster trust in the police (Crump 2011), As a trusted authority, and the agency responsible for the coordination of the response to a terrorist attack, the police have an essential role in providing information and instructions to the community. It is vital to manage information using social media well during a terrorist attack because this will ensure that the image and the credibility of the police is maintained (Akkaya et al. 2019). If the management of information is not effective or timely, then the reputation of the police may be damaged and this could affect their ability to respond to an attack (Akkaya et al. 2019). Akkaya et al. (2019) noted that any damage to the reputation of the police or loss in confidence of the police could have other consequences, not only in regard to the response to a terrorist incident, but also in normal day-to-day compliance dealings with members of the public. The need for the public to access information and instructions increases following a terrorist attack. The public seek information to cope with uncertainty and to provide assurance and comfort to mitigate tension (Lachlan et al. 2016; Seeger et al. 2003). If information and instructions have not been made available by the police in a timely manner, then members of the public may look for alternative avenues or other forms of media to obtain the needed information. However, in searching for timely information, the public may not acknowledge the credibility of the information, and this poses a risk that members of the public may take actions that are based on incorrect information or misinformation (Akkaya et al. 2019). Despite the benefits of using social media, it can potentially cause panic and anxiety in the public, and this may affect the police response to a disaster or a terrorist attack (Acar and Muraki 2011; Tanaka et  al. 2012). Panic and anxiety can arise from the propagation of hearsay and from unsubstantiated information (Acar and Muraki 2011; Tanaka et al. 2012) that has been posted on social media. Tanaka, et  al. (2013) suggested that the spreading of rumors during a disaster is human nature. During an emergency, it is difficult for the police to check the accuracy of information and the validation of shared content, given the amount of data and the number of texts and tweets posted (Yates and Paquette 2011). If the police were to check the accuracy of their communications against the information circulating on social media, it could affect the nature of their communication patterns and the public’s reaction to it (Akkaya et al. 2019). People are accustomed to accessing information immediately and are often not tolerant of any delay in obtaining specific information (Xu et al. 2016). Many people expect to be able to contact the police directly if they require information or if they have questions about an attack, and as a result, the public have moved away from the conventional, one-way reporting by the mass media (Mergel 2012; Xu, et al., 2017). The number of public inquiries to the police for time-critical information can, however, quickly overwhelm the police and if information is not made available to the public promptly, then public anxiety may result (Akkaya et  al. 2019). This is one of the main reasons why the police began to use social media. The public depend on social media for timely information following a terrorist attack

182

8  An Analysis of the Four Case Studies

and if information is not made available on social media, the public may turn to other sources for information, which may not be accurate (Seeger et  al. 2003; Shklovski et al. 2010).

Changes in Terrorism The purpose of a modern terrorist attack is to make an impact “at the very heart of democratic politics, undermining public confidence, attempting to change government policy and influence electoral outcomes” (Canel and Sanders 2010, p. 449). This has been achieved from a qualitative jump in the planning and execution of terrorist attacks and in the operational skills of the jihadists in the 1990s to the Mumbai attacks. The earlier attackers, “for all their dedication, were really just gifted amateurs at best” and relied extensively on the use of bombs made from Triacetone Triperoxide (TATP), with Hexamethylene-Triperoxide-Diamine (HMTD) for the detonators (Kiss 2016, p. 17). These bombs are easily made from commonly available materials but comprise of dangerously unstable compounds. Kiss (2016) claimed that the technical and tactical skills of the earlier terrorists were quite limited, and they did not take any “precautions to hide their activities apart from being careful about mobile phone communications” (p. 17). The attack in Mumbai (other than the attacks on the Twin Towers in the United States) was completely different from earlier, terrorist attacks. The attackers were not only members of the Pakistani jihadist terrorist group, Lashkar-e-Taiba (The Army of the Pure), but they were specifically recruited and trained in Pakistan for the attacks (Kiss 2016). The attackers appeared to have been trained to a level that is equivalent to the military, as they were able to hold their positions in the Taj Mahal for more than 60 hours before being overcome by the Indian security forces (Kiss 2016). The second qualitative jump, according to Kiss (2016), can be seen in the methods that were used in the attacks in Paris and Brussels. The attackers in both Paris and Brussels were foreign fighters and had fought for the Islamic State (Cragin 2017). They appeared to have been trained in target selection, attack preparation, and execution and how to undertake coordinated attacks at multiple sites, as they did not require any external guidance (Kiss 2016). It is also assumed that they practiced how they would keep the operation secure, as they did not come to the notice of the police or the intelligence agencies. There have also been a number of other changes in the modus operandi that terrorists use since the attack on Mumbai. Targets are chosen to ensure that there will be a high number of fatalities and casualties. Terrorists are increasingly focused on soft targets and on avoiding secure or protected targets (Hemmingby 2017). Attackers will also make use of indiscriminate targets during an attack if the opportunity arises to ensure that the number of fatalities and casualties is increased. Hemmingby (2017) claimed that both terrorist groups and individual attackers prefer soft targets, but individual attackers are more likely to discriminate in their target

Conclusion

183

selection. Furthermore, jihadist terrorists are conservative in selecting their preferred targets, their methods of attack, and the weapons that they use. Any changes made in their attack will be influenced by practical and contextual factors (Hemmingby 2017).

Conclusion The terrorist attacks that have been examined in the case studies are not one-off terrorist attacks. All of the attacks have similarities in the methods that were used and were all influenced by the jihadist movement. The attack in Manchester was undertaken by a lone terrorist, but the attacks in Mumbai, Paris, and Brussels were undertaken by small groups of terrorists. This illustrates the importance of understanding the operational methods that Islamic State and other terrorist groups use to undertake attacks. In all of the attacks that were examined in the case studies, an external handler or attack coordinator, who was either a part of the terrorist group or was an individual who was outside of the group was used. Recruiting individuals who are willing to coordinate an attack is a force multiplier3 which enables Islamic State to attack larger, more desirable targets without having the problem of having foreigners enter a country to undertake an attack. Jihadist terrorist groups are continuously evolving to find weaknesses in the security strategies that are adopted in Western countries, and it is likely that these groups will develop their professionalism, tactical skills, and destructive capabilities further (Kiss 2016). The attacks and the police response to the attacks that were examined in the case studies were similar. The analysis found that there were similarities in the police response in all four countries and that there were strengths and weaknesses in each response. Only the police in Mumbai were criticized for their response to the terrorist attacks in the city. However, given that Mumbai was the first city to experience a multi-pronged terrorist attack and that the police were not equipped to engage with the terrorists, the criticism is not deserved. The analysis of the attacks in the four case studies identified that there were a number of other shortcomings in the police response to the attacks, either before, during, or after the attacks. These shortcomings included how intelligence was gathered and shared between agencies, the way in which different branches of the police and other responding agencies communicated, and how social media was used. The analysis of the four case studies highlights that policymakers must adapt their strategies and methods to ensure that the police are able to respond effectively to complex, multiple forms of attacks where various weapons are used across multiple sites.

 In military science, force multiplication or a force multiplier is a factor or a combination of factors that gives personnel or weapons (or other hardware) the ability to accomplish greater feats than without it (Locke 2020). 3

184

8  An Analysis of the Four Case Studies

References Acar, A. & Muraki, Y. (2011). Twitter for crisis communication: lessons learned from Japan's tsunami disaster. International Journal of Web Based Communities, 7(3), 392–402. Akkaya, C., Fedorowicz, J. & Helmut, K. (2019). Successful practices for using social media by police departments: A case study of the Munich police. In Proceedings of the 27th European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS), Stockholm & Uppsala, Sweden, June 8–14. Bakker, E. (2015). Mumbai-style attacks in Paris. Retrieved from: http://icct.nl/publication/ paris-­mumbai-­style-­attacks-­with-­a-­different-­outcome/. Ball-Rokeach, S. (1985). The origins of individual media-system dependency: A sociological framework. Communication Research, 12(4), 485–510. Ball-Rokeach, S. & DeFleur, M. (1976). A dependency model of mass-media effects. Communication Research, 3(1), 3–21. BBC News Europe. (2016, 8 November). Belgian jihadist atar ‘co-ordinated’ Paris and Brussels attacks. BBC. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-­europe-­37906961. Canel, M. & Sanders, K. (2010). Crisis communication and terrorist attacks: Framing a response to the 2004 Madrid Bombings and 2005 London Bombings. In W. Coombs & S. Holladay (Eds.), The Handbook of Crisis Communication (pp. 181–204). Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Cassa, C., Chunara, R., Mandl, K. & Brownstein, J. (2013). Twitter as a sentinel in emergency situations: Lessons from the Boston marathon explosions. PLoS Currents, 5. Costello, V. (2015). Learning from tragedy: Why American law enforcement should be prepared to counter a Mumbai-style attack within the United States. The Bill Blackwood Law Enforcement Management Institute of Texas. Cragin, R. (2017). The November 2015 Paris attacks: The impact of foreign fighter returnees. Obris, 61(2), 212–226. Crowe, A. (2011). The social media manifesto: A comprehensive review of the impact of social media on emergency management. Journal of Business Continuity & Emergency Planning, 5(1), 409–420. Crump, J. (2011). What are the police doing on Twitter? Social media, the police and the public. Policy & Internet, 3(4), 1–27. Fair, C. (2014). The 2008 Mumbai attack. In B. Hoffman & F. Reinares (Eds.), The evolution of the global terrorist threat: From 9/11 to Osama bin Laden’s death (pp. 570–599). Columbia University Press. Felling, B. (2010). Under siege: Responding to a Mumbai-style attack on the Homeland. The Guardian Antiterrorism Journal, 12(3), 31–37. FEMA. (n.d.). National incident management system. https://www.fema.gov/emergency-­managers/ nims. Forster, P. & Hader, T. (2016, 18 July). Combating domestic terrorism: Observations from Brussels and San Bernardino. Small Wars Journal. http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/ combating-­domestic-­terrorism-­observations-­from-­brusselsand-­san-­bernardino. Gardham, D. (2016, 7 December). The ‘man in the hat’spills terror gang’s secrets. NBC News. http:// www.nbcnews.com/storyline/brussels-­attacks/man-­hat-­spills-­terror-­gang-­s-­secretsn693046. Hemmingby, C. (2017). Exploring the continuum of lethality: Militant Islamists’ Targeting preferences in Europe. Perspectives on Terrorism, October, 11(5), 25–41. Heverin, T. & Zach, L (2010). Twitter for city police department information sharing. Proceedings of the American Society for Information Science and Technology, 47(1), 1–7. Kiss, P. (2016). First thoughts about the terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels. Defence Review: The Central Journal of the Hungarian Defence Forces, 144(1), 15–23. Lachlan, K., Spence, P., Lin, X., Najarian, K. & Del Greco, M. (2016). Social media and crisis management: CERC, search strategies, and Twitter content. Computers in Human Behavior, 54, 647–652. Lieberman, J., Koetzle, D. &Sakiyama, M. (2013). Police departments’ use of Facebook: Patterns and policy issues. Police Quarterly, 16(4), 438–462.

References

185

Locke, S. (2020). Multiplying an Army: Prussian and German Military Planning and the Concept of Force Multiplication in Three Conflicts. Master’s Dissertation. Youngstown State University, Youngstown, Ohio. Meijer, A. & Thaens, M. (2013). Social media strategies: Understanding the differences between North American police departments. Government Information Quarterly, 30(4), 343–350. Mergel, I. (2012). Social media in the public sector: A guide to participation, collaboration and transparency in the networked world. John Wiley & Sons. Moody, G. (2016, 21 March). Paris terrorists used burner phones, not encryption, to evade detection. Ars Technica. http://arstechnica.com/tech-­policy/2016/03/paris-­terrorist-­attacks­burner-­phones-­not-­encryption/. O’Connor, C. (2017). The police on Twitter: Image management, community building, and implications for policing in Canada. Policing and Society, 27(8), 899–912. Omand, D. (2017). Keeping Europe safe: Counterterrorism for the continent. Foreign Affairs, 95(5), 83–93. Quinn-Williams. (2016, June). The attacks on Paris: Lessons learned. Homeland Security Advisory Council. Rabasa, A., Blackwill, R., Chalk, P., Cragin, K., Fair, C., Jackson, B., Jenkins, B., Jones, S., Shestak, N., & Tellis, A. (2009). The lessons of Mumbai. RAND Corporation. Rick, R. & Nicholas, J. (2013). Social media and policing: Matching the message to the audience. Safer Communities, 12(2), 64–70. Riedel, B. (2015). Modeled on Mumbai? Why the 2008 India attack is the best way to understand Paris. Retrieved from: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2015/11/14/modeled-­ on-­mumbai-­why-­the-­2008-­india-­attack-­is-­the-­best-­way-­to-­understand-­paris/. Roggio, B. (2009, January 7). Mumbai handlers in Pakistan cheer after ordering murders over phone. The Long War Journal. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/01/mumbai_handlers_in_p.php. Seeger, M., Sellnow, T. & Ulmer, R. (2003). Communication and organizational crisis. Greenwood Publishing Group. Shklovski, I., Burke, M., Kiesler, S. & Kraut, R. (2010). Technology adoption and use in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans. American Behavioral Scientist, 53(8), 1228-1246. Tanaka, Y., Sakamoto, Y. & Matsuka, T. (2012). Transmission of rumor and criticism in Twitter after the Great Japan Earthquake. Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society. Sapporo, Japan. Trindal, J. (2009, January). The Mumbai attacks  – Lessons for the western world. DomPrep Journal, V(1), pp.5–7. Xu, J., Fedorowicz, J. & Williams, C. (2016). It's what you write and how you write about it: The policing Facebook experience. Proceedings of the Pacific Asia Conference on Information Systems. Chiayi, Taiwan. Yates, D. & Paquette, S. (2011). Emergency knowledge management and social media technologies: A case study of the 2010 Haitian earthquake. International Journal of Information Management, 31(1), 6–13. Yazujian, T. (2017). A comparative social network analysis of the 2008 Mumbai, 2015 Paris, and 2016 Brussels terrorist networks. Master’s Dissertation. The College of Information Sciences and Technology, The Pennsylvania State University.

Chapter 9

Improving the Police Response

Introduction The occurrence of a terrorist attack may have an impact on how the public perceives the police and can determine whether the public’s confidence in the police is maintained. After an attack has taken place, the public may perceive that the police are not well trained or equipped to respond to an act of terrorism. When there is a demand for more police services, such as preventing and responding to an act of terrorism, the public are likely to be sensitive to any weaknesses in the delivery of services by the police, especially if it is in a time of austerity and increasing crime levels (Millie 2013). It has been well accepted that it is the role of the police to prevent and to respond to acts of terrorism (Kelling and Bratton 2006). For the police to be able to respond to terrorist attacks that range from the more traditional type of bombings and suicide attacks to the large-scale, multi-location “swarm” type of attacks effectively, they need to be well prepared and well trained (Costello 2015). There are three essential elements that will assist the police in being able to successfully respond to a terrorist attack (Service Medical du RAID, 2016). These are: (1) having a response structure that has been developed from continuous planning and learning and its value has been tested by running an exercise; (2) having competent, knowledgeable, and trustworthy leadership that can make decisions that are based on evidence; and. (3) having a structure in place that enables competent individuals and responding agencies to improvise while uncertain events are taking place (adapted from Wurmb et al. 2020). One area that particularly needs to be examined is training. Costello (2015) claimed that the current training given in how to respond to an active shooter and how to take command and control of a terrorist event are not effective when © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. den Heyer, Police Respond to Terrorism, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-43250-7_9

187

188

9  Improving the Police Response

responding to attacks on multiple sites and that comprise of terrorists using firearms to kill and injure as many people as possible. The researcher suggested that new forms of training should be developed to address any weaknesses that have been identified in an agency’s use of force and response tactics. Costello (2015) recommended that patrol officers, and other responding officers should be trained to react and confront a threat of terrorism quickly and in an “efficient, and surgical manner” (p. 4). Because terrorist attacks are extremely violent, authorized rules of engagement (ROE) need to be understood by all officers and they should be tested in their knowledge and skills of these rules to ensure that they have an appreciation of its application. Better training and testing will make officers more confident in their ability to move toward and confront a threat and will enhance their ability to respond to a Mumbai or Paris style of terrorist attack. Research has highlighted that preventing and responding to terrorism can cause some difficulties in the relationship that the police have with the community. The difficulties arise because a more proactive style of policing, which is more intrusive, covert, and intelligence-focused, is being used to prevent and respond to terrorism instead of engaging with the community (Bayley and Weisburd 2009; Husband and Alam 2011). Taking a proactive approach can make communities distrustful of the police and can lead to communities being less willing to work with, or assist the police (Cherney and Harley 2016). The police rely on information and assistance from the community to prevent, disrupt, and respond to terrorism (Cherney and Harley 2016). However, information from the community will not be forthcoming unless the police are trusted by the community and the community feels comfortable in sharing information with them (Pickering et  al. 2007). If the police need to use a proactive style of policing to counter terrorism, using Community-oriented Policing can help to lessen any unfavorable effects from using this policing style. Community-oriented Policing is a program that encourages positive engagement with a community and eases the likelihood of the police exacerbating any community tensions. The use of the program also facilitates the gathering of intelligence (Innes 2006). The style of communication used is particularly important when conversing with Muslim communities. These communities can feel targeted and stigmatized and the style of communication is important to help prevent and disrupt radicalization and violent extremism (Cherney and Harley 2016). This chapter discusses some of the ways of improving the police response to a terrorist attack. The first section examines the strategies that the police to use to engage with the community. The second section looks at the lessons learned from previous terrorist attacks. The need for flexible response plans, skills in command and control, effective communication, and the development of strategies to reduce the availability of firearms are discussed in the next section. This chapter uses the information that was discussed in Chap. 2 and the findings from the case studies that were presented in Chaps. 5, 6 and 7 to discuss the police response to terrorism. For an agency to be in the best position to respond to an attack by terrorists, police leaders need to be aware of the following:

Engaging with the Community

189

1. That an agency needs personnel who can observe, record, collect, process, interpret, and share suspicious pre-operational terrorist activity. 2. That when a terrorist attack is occurring, a communications (911) center needs to be able to process a high volume of phone calls while simultaneously communicating with police, fire, and emergency medical services (EMS). 3. That a communications center can relay real-time, tactical information to an intelligence/fusion center. 4. That an intelligence/fusion center can relay actionable intelligence to field or forward commanders. 5. That there are protocols in place for requesting regional assistance and other regional assets, not just SWAT/tactical teams. 6. A response protocol needs to detail the response to a coordinated attack that takes place in multiple venues. 7. That the protocol documents how the fire and emergency medical services react when facing an armed threat while simultaneously tending to fires and wounded victims (adapted from Monahan and Stainbrook 2013).

Engaging with the Community The police response to the terrorist attacks that were outlined in the case studies demonstrates how important it is for the police to use Community-oriented Policing for gathering intelligence about the actions of potential terrorists (The Soufan Group 2016). Many researchers have found that Community-oriented Policing is an important strategy for the police to use to counter terrorism (Birt 2009; Briggs 2010; Lambert 2011; Ramiriz et al. 2013; Spalek 2013). Engaging with the community is a process that is used in Community-oriented Policing (Cherney and Hartley 2017). Engaging with the community is an important part of policing because it is pivotal in building the trust of the community. Having the trust of the community is essential if the police are to gather information about those who may be partaking in the planning or the execution of a terrorist attack (Cherney and Hartley 2017). Members of terrorist cells reside in communities, and they develop “friendship, familial and peer ties that can be hard to identify and disrupt without help from the broader community” (Cherney and Harley 2016, p. 17). It is difficult for the police to identify these types of relationships without having the assistance of the community. However, the community must have trust in the police and be willing to share this type of information. Cherney and Harley (2016) emphasized the importance of trust and recommended that when the police engage with a community, it should be done with the aim of building trust. Having a community’s trust will aid in preventing, disrupting, and responding to acts of terrorism (Cherney and Murphy 2013; Huq 2013). It is particularly important for the police to engage with the community using programs such as Community-oriented Policing if violent extremism and radicalization among Muslim populations is to be averted. Engagement with the

190

9  Improving the Police Response

community is, however, more of a craft than a science and was described by Murray et al. (2015) as being a basis for the “hearts and mind” approach to preventing terrorism. Any engagement needs to be founded on the best interests of the community and should contain a clear message that the police cannot keep communities safe from acts of terror without their assistance. Interacting with a community needs to be managed sensitively. If it is not, then the interaction can have the untended consequence of creating hostility toward the police and this will therefore hinder any prevention efforts (Blackwood et al. 2013; Briggs 2010; Breen-Smyth 2014; LaFree et al. 2009; Peek 2011). It can then result in undermining the legitimacy and the effectiveness of counterterrorism policies and strategies (Cherney and Murphy 2013). Research that has examined how the police engage with the community in the United Kingdom and the United States found that minority communities are often suspicious of engagement programs, especially when the programs are primarily focused on gathering information for countering terrorism (Schanzer et al. 2016). This has led to communities having low levels of confidence in the police and not perceiving the police as being legitimate (Murray et  al. 2015). The studies concluded that engaging with minority communities was important in countering terrorism and that the police need to display respect for any religion that community members may have and be aware of their cultural needs. When community engagement is appropriately framed, resourced, and implemented, it can provide a foundation for addressing the threat of violent extremism (Murray et al. 2015; Schanzer et al. 2016). One of the difficulties in seeking to identify the individuals who are at risk of radicalization is that the signs of radicalization are varied. This makes it very difficult for police officers to determine who has become radicalized (Brandon 2011). Defining a person who has been radicalized or is at risk of being radicalized is made even more difficult by the fact that the definition of radicalization has not been based on any scientific evidence (McCauley and Moskalenko 2008). Difficulties in identifying those who may be radicalized are compounded even further when the strategy of engaging with the community is at odds with other operational service delivery requirements of the police. There may be a higher priority placed on other operational services rather than engaging with the community and the police may not have the resources available to meet with the community, thereby missing out on an opportunity to identify those who are susceptible to becoming radicalized. The elements that facilitate the effective engagement of the police with the Muslim community have been presented in Table 9.1.

Lessons Learned It is prudent to review previous terrorist attacks to see how the police responded to the attacks and to scrutinize the practices and policies that they used. Reviewing past attacks provides an opportunity to identify whether there were any common themes in the attacks (Moran et al. 2017; Thompson et al. 2014) and to see if there are any lessons that can be learned from them. Terrorism is continually evolving and

Lessons Learned

191

Table 9.1  Elements that facilitate the effective engagement with minority communities •  Having a community engagement plan •  Being transparent about the objectives being sought • Engaging comprehensively with the community and being able to address a variety of community concerns • Community trust is the basis for engagement with the community and is key to its sustainability • Engagement with the community is based on enhancing community well-being before focusing on intelligence gathering • Engagement is consistent, participatory, creative and involves personal interaction over an extended period • Recognizing that some police operational practices may exacerbate tensions between minority communities and the police • Ensuring that all personnel in an agency are trained in the principles of engaging with the community and that the agency has operational officers who have received basic cultural, language, and religious education and have worked in minority communities • In the case of Muslim communities, the police should display respect for Islam and should try to give a voice to Muslims in the context of responding to terrorism • Law enforcement responses to terrorism can undermine community trust and cooperation when trying to balance the goals of intelligence gathering with disrupting the likelihood of terrorist activity. Community engagement may not always be possible Adapted from: Cherney and Harley 2016 and Schanzer et al. (Schanzer et al. 2016) Table 9.2  Lessons learned from terrorist attacks • Public gathering sites, such as tourism destinations and hospitality industry sites, continue to be attractive to terrorists and are vulnerable targets • Venues with a high density of humans are especially attractive targets because they enable a maximum number of casualties using a minimal amount of ammunition. These types of venues can be confusing for the response • Easily available, light weaponry can cause more casualties than explosives, which are difficult to obtain or manufacture Choosing landmark and iconic targets guarantees media coverage, which is an objective of all terrorist groups • Taking hostages by terrorists enables them to fortify their position and can cause delays in the counterattack taken by the police • Taking hostages motivates media outlets to cover an event continuously, offering the terrorists a source of intelligence • State and local law enforcement leaders will be faced with relentless pressure from the worldwide news media while responding to an attack • A command-and-control structure is critical for the police and should have the flexibility to collapse and expand as an incident progresses •  Multi-agency collaboration and training exercises are factors for a successful response Adapted from: Grant and Dady (2019) and Monahan and Stainbrook (2013)

by reviewing previous attacks and considering the lessons that have been learnt from them enables new tactics to be developed rather than relying on the more traditional response approaches. The lessons that have been learned from previous terrorist attacks have been presented in Table 9.2.

192

9  Improving the Police Response

The Need for Plans and Goals A standardized response plan needs to be developed to ensure that the police have a structure, the policies, and resources, and the relationships in place to respond to a terrorist incident. Having a plan and access to these resources will enable an agency to respond effectively to an attack. A response plan will provide direction to the responding agency during an attack and will coordinate the response of other agencies that are involved in the response. Response plans usually incorporate other emergency services and responding agencies, how these agencies will respond, and how local hospitals will provide medical care to those who are injured. The plan does not generally extend beyond these institutions (Elliott 2017). However, response plans should include the contribution of other institutions and non-­ governmental organizations such as the Red Cross and city councils and should document how the services and resources that they can provide will aid in the response. A response plan should specify the goals and the objectives of the response and explain the execution of the mission and its phases of execution (Wurmb et  al. 2020). Having a common goal that has been agreed to by all responding agencies is a key to a successful response outcome. This enables all responding agencies to understand the key aspects of a mission and will give these agencies the information that they need so that they can adapt their response strategies and tactics accordingly. A well-devised response plan enables the various responding agencies to communicate with other responding agencies while a mission is taking place and it also provides the opportunity for any potential conflicts between any of the agencies to be resolved before an actual attack takes place. One of the most important aspects in the development of a response plan is the testing of the plan. This is done by undertaking exercises to identify any deficiencies and inconsistencies in the plan and whether the responding agencies will experience any difficulties in the event of an attack. Any problems that are found with the plan during the exercise can be resolved by amending the plan before an attack takes place. The first form of exercise is a tabletop exercise where components of the plan in the context of a basic terrorist attack are discussed. How each agency would respond to an attack is outlined in the plan and any fundamental vulnerabilities in and between the responding agencies in the event of an attack are identified during the exercise. The tabletop exercise will also identify any deficiencies or gaps in the plan, the role that each agency performs in a coordinated response and enables all of the participating agencies to understand how each agency is expected to respond when an attack is taking place (Elliott 2017). Memoranda of understanding are developed (usually by the police because they lead the response to a terrorist attack) during the tabletop exercise. Mutual aid agreements and other official interaction agreements between the police, other police agencies and other responding agencies may already be in existence, and

Communications

193

these are tested during the tabletop exercise. If these agreements are not already in place, then they may be developed during the tabletop exercise. After the tabletop exercise has been held, the police should then develop a series of scenario response plans. Each scenario plan should be tested beyond the initial response to a terrorist attack by undertaking a full deployment or field exercise. It is a more in-depth test of the response plan and should be organizationally challenging and tailored to specific susceptibilities. The purpose of scenario planning is to challenge the organization to consider the consequences of any decisions made and the actions taken during the initial response to an attack. It should motivate commanders and planners to analyze the decisions made and to take a more strategic perspective of the response. The testing of the scenario response plans will highlight any weaknesses in the command structure and the communication process (Elliott 2017).

Command and Control Command and control are integral components to the police response to a terrorist attack, given that terrorist attacks usually take place in multiple locations that can cross jurisdictional borders. Any command-and-control system that is to be used needs to be robust and flexible. The establishment of a central command center (or Unified Command Center) and forward command centers should be incorporated into the command-and-control system. These centers need to be able to share an operational picture of the response to the attack and be able to coordinate the response of a number of different agencies. The centers should provide responding agencies with an awareness of the situation and should manage any resourcing requests that come from multiple incident sites (Elliott 2017). A response plan should clearly identify the command-and-control system to be used, where and how the command-and-control center is to be established and the roles and responsibilities of those who will staff the center. Having these factors determined in the response plan will mean that when an attack occurs, confusion will be minimalized, and responding agencies will know how to coordinate their response.

Communications The ability to communicate within an agency, with other responding agencies and the public is vital for a successful response to a terrorist attack. Historically, communication with these groups has proven to be challenging during a response to an attack (Elliott 2017). Most communication networks today are dependent on cellular networks. If a cellular network becomes unavailable during a terrorist attack, then the police need to have a contingency plan in place. They need to have a plan

194

9  Improving the Police Response

on how they will communicate during an attack and after an attack, especially if a cellular network is not available. An attack may disrupt the operation of a cellular network, or a network may become overloaded during or after an attack owing to the number of calls being made by the public. The police need to plan for how they are going to communicate with the public following a terrorist attack. How they are going to communicate should be documented in a communication plan which forms part of a response plan. The communications plan should consist of three phases (Coombs 2007): the pre-attack phase, the attack response, and the post-attack phase (Staton 2020). The pre-attack plan would document who the spokesperson for the police would be, who the public information officer would be and the processes to be used for releasing information to the media and social media. During the response to a terrorist attack, the attack communication plan would be activated. The post-attack phase would keep the public informed on any updates of the response following the attack via media releases. It would also inform the public of the investigation into the terrorists and notify them of the recovery efforts (Coombs 2007). During the initial response to a terrorist attack, information should be released to the public as quickly as possible. This will demonstrate that the police are active and are in control (Carney and Jorden 1993). Any information that the police release should be accurate and be consistent with all other messages that the police release (Coombs 2007). The initial message that is disseminated to the public should include information that will help the public to organize their own security and protection and should convey an expression of concern about the victims (Coombs 2007). The best practices for initial media releases by the police have been presented in Table 9.3. Having a formal messaging plan to keep the public informed of unfolding events during a terrorist attack is necessary. The public will need to know about the areas that have been affected by an attack, what roads have been closed, and any other transport disruptions.

Table 9.3  Best practices for initial media releases

1. Release information that a response is underway. 2. Any information released must be accurate and consistent across all messages. 3. Emphasizes public safety and security. 4. All available communication channels are used. 5. Conveys an expression of concern for the victims of the attack. Adapted from Coombs (2007)

Reducing the Availability of Firearms

195

Any messages that the police convey to the public need to be up to date, pertinent, and accurate (Elliott 2017). Conveying relevant and timely information portrays that the police are in control of the media narrative and that the police are capable and have the capacity to handle the attack and the subsequent response (Russell and de Orellana 2020). Having control of the media narrative ensures that the terrorists cannot use the media to their advantage. Terrorists try to use the media to advance their cause and to create division within the community. It is key that the police release information early in the attack to counter the effort of the terrorists to control the media narrative, and this cannot be underestimated. Controlling the media will ensure that the community has confidence in the police and will deter division in the community. It will also provide a platform for the police to engage with the community, which should help to manage any further radicalization (Russell and de Orellana 2020). It is important that the police do not speculate on issues pertaining to the terrorist attack. Any media releases or discussion with the public should only be factual. Nor should the police provide any speculative descriptions of the terrorists or issue warnings unless they are necessary. Furthermore, the police should not release any information about the action taken by a terrorist because while an attack is occurring, the police do not have all of the information, and any release of information may create legal difficulties later on. Another reason why unsubstantiated information should not be released about the actions taken by the terrorists is because people react differently to information and the police do not want information that is inaccurate to be circulating on social media because this can add to speculation and cause a negative public reaction (Russell and de Orellana 2020).

Reducing the Availability of Firearms The case studies that were reviewed earlier in this book highlight how firearms are increasingly being used in terrorist attacks. This finding supports an analysis of recent terror attacks in Europe (Duquet 2016) in which firearms were used to inflict terror. In recent years, police forces across Europe have seized significant quantities of firearms and ammunition from various terrorist groups (Europol 2015). Preventing terrorist from being able to acquire firearms is one strategy that can be used to counter terrorism. Restricting the availability of firearms will, however, need to be implemented across all countries at the same time (Duquet 2016). To successfully restrict terrorists’ access to the licit and illicit gun market, a three-­ element process will be required (Duquet & van Alstein, 2016): 1. A clear and coordinated legislative framework needs to be developed that safeguards the legal possession and trade in firearms from the illicit gun market. 2. Better information and insight into illicit gun markets need to be obtained. 3. Cooperation between police and other law enforcement agencies should be encouraged (Duquet 2016).

196

9  Improving the Police Response

Identifying and Apprehending Terrorist Attackers The investigation into an attack and identifying and apprehending the terrorists who undertook an attack are important parts of the police response to a terrorist attack (van Dongen, 2017). To identify those who are responsible for an attack, the police will need to coordinate with intelligence agencies, military units, and police agencies in other countries. This means that the unity of command and inter-operability with other agencies is very important as is the successful coordination and sharing of information between the various agencies (van Dongen 2017).

Conclusion This chapter has examined how the police can improve their response to a terrorist attack. The discussion has been based on an analysis of the findings of the terrorist attacks that were outlined in the four case studies. Recommendations have been made in the areas of command and control, communications, planning, and inter-­ agency exercises. A complete list of the recommendations made to improve the prevention and response to a terrorist attack has been presented in Appendix 1. Preventing, disrupting, and responding to terrorism require more than the police just looking for signs of radicalization (Cherney and Harley 2016). Instead, the police need to have established and exercised their incident management systems and their communications systems. They must have established relationships with other responding agencies and have appropriately trained personnel. Relationships with minority and Muslim communities is also important for countering terrorism and for assisting with investigations should a terrorist attack occur (Cherney and Harley 2016).

 ppendix: Recommendations to Improve the Prevention A of and Response to a Terrorist Attack Intelligence 1. Increase efforts to cultivate and leverage human intelligence sources. 2. Improve the tracking of individuals who have traveled abroad for training and then have returned. 3. Increase the amount of engagement with the community. 4. Create or adopt community training programs to counter violent extremism. 5. Develop training programs and protocols to neutralize the radicalization of incarcerated individuals.

References

197

Investigation 6. Study past terrorist attacks to identify lessons learned. 7. Create a tracking system to maintain real-time information on the status of the victims of a major attack as they make their way through the medical system. 8. Continue efforts to improve major case management of terrorist attack investigations. 9. Continue the use of real-time data tracking systems to enhance the situational awareness of terrorist attacks that take place over multiple sites. Incident Command 10. Train all staff in the application of a National Incident Management System (NIMS) and an Incident Command System (ICS). 11. Ensure that protocols are in place and are practiced so that an agency’s emergency operations center is ready at any time to initiate a response to a terrorist attack. 12. Ensure that multiple communications processes are in place before a response to an attack is initiated. This should include contingency plans. Crisis Information 13. Develop media protocols. Ensure that media personnel have the appropriate credentials. 14. Establish processes to incorporate social media into an agency’s communication plan. Data from social media should be able to be mined in real time. 15. Educate the public on how to react and respond during a terrorist attack. Training 1 6. Deliver counter-terrorist training to all patrol officers and supervisors. 17. Deliver training to Emergency Medical staff and Fire Department personnel in how to operate in an incident site that has been classified as a hot zone (adapted QuinnWilliams. 2016).

References Bayley, D. & Weisburd, D. (2009). Cops and spooks: The role of the police in counterterrorism. In D. Weisburd, T. Feucht, I. Hakimi, L. Mock & S. Perry (eds.), To Protect and to Serve: Policing in an Age of Terrorism (pp. 81–99). Springer. Birt, Y. (2009). Promoting virulent envy: Reconsidering the UK’s terrorist prevention strategy. RUSI Journal, 154(4), 52–58. Blackwood, L., Hopkins, N. & Reicher, S. (2013). Turning the analytic gaze on ‘us’: The role of authorities in the alienation of minorities. European Psychologist, 18(4), 245–252. Brandon, S. (2011) Impacts of psychological science on national security agencies post-9/11. American Psychologist, 66(6), 495–506. Breen-Smyth, M. (2014). Theorising the ‘suspect community’: counterterrorism, security practices and the public imagination. Critical Studies on Terrorism, 7(2), 223–240.

198

9  Improving the Police Response

Briggs, R. (2010). Community engagement for counterterrorism: lessons from the United Kingdom. International Affairs, 86(4), 971–981. Carney, A. & Jorden, A. (1993). Prepare for business-related crises. Public Relations Journal, 49, 34–35. Costello, V. (2015). Learning from tragedy: Why American law enforcement should be prepared to counter a Mumbai-style attack within the United States. The Bill Blackwood Law Enforcement Management Institute of Texas. Cherney, A. & Harley, J. (2016). Engaging Muslim communities to tackle radicalisation and violent extremism: What does the evidence say and what can police do? Police Science: Australia and New Zealand Journal of Evidence-Based Policing, 1(2), 17–21. Cherney, A. & Hartley, J. (2017) Community engagement to tackle terrorism and violent extremism: challenges, tensions and pitfalls. Policing and Society, 27(7), 750–763. Cherney, A., & Murphy, K. (2013). Policing terrorism with procedural justice: the role of police legitimacy and law legitimacy. Australian & New Zealand Journal of Criminology, 46, 403–421. Coombs, W. (2007). State of crisis communication: Evidence and the bleeding edge. Institute for Public Relations. Van Dongen, T. (2017). The fate of the perpetrator in the jihadist modus operandi: Suicide attacks and non-suicide attacks in the West, 2004–2017. The International Centre for CounterTerrorism, 8(12). Duquet, N. (2016). Firearms acquisition and the terrorism-criminality nexus. In S.  Andre, E. Devroe, N. Duquet, F. Lemeunier, P. Ponsaersand & V. Seron (Eds.), Counterterrorism in Belgium: Key challenges and policy options (pp. 51–57). Egmont Institute. Duquet, N. & van Alstein, M. (2016). Guns for sale: The Belgian illicit gun market in a European perspective. Flemish Peace Institute. Elliott, T. (2017). Complex coordinated terrorist attack: Considerations for practical emergency preparedness and resiliency exercises. Master’s Dissertation. Wright State University, Dayton, Ohio, United States. Europol. (2015). European Union terrorism situation and trend report 2015, The Hague: Europol Grant, A. & Dady, S. (2019). How does the response and management of terrorist attacks by emergency medical services in the UK compare to Europe and the USA? Journal of High Threat & Austere Medicine, 1–18. Husband, C. & Alam, Y. (2011). Social cohesion and counterterrorism: A policy contradiction? Policy Press. Huq, A. (2013). The political psychology of counterterrorism. Annual Review of Law and Social Science, 9, 71–94. Innes, M. (2006). Policing uncertainty: Countering terror through community intelligence and democratic policing. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 605, 222–241. Kelling, G. & Bratton, W. (2006). Policing terrorism. Civic Bulletin 43. Manhattan Institute. LaFree, G., Dugan, L. & Korte, R. (2009) The impact of British counterterrorist strategies on political violence in Northern Ireland: Comparing deterrence and backlash models. Criminology, 47(1), 17–45. Lambert, R. (2011). Countering al-Qaeda in London: Police and Muslims in partnerships. Hurst and Co. McCauley, C., & Moskalenko, S. (2008). Mechanisms of political radicalization: Pathways toward terrorism. Terrorism and political violence, 20(3), 415–433. Millie, A. (2013). The policing task and the expansion (and contraction) of British policing. Criminology and Criminal Justice, 13, 143–60. Monahan, T. & Stainbrook, M. (2013, May). Learning from the lessons of the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks. The Police Chief, 78, 24–32. Moran, C., Webb, C., Brohi, K., Smith, M. & Willett, K., (2017). Lessons in planning from mass casualty events in UK. BMJ, 359(4765). https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.j4765.

References

199

Murray, A., Mueller-Johnson, K., & Sherman, L. (2015) Evidence-based policing of U.K. Muslim communities: Linking confidence in the police with area vulnerability to violent extremism. International Criminal Justice Review, 25(1), 64–79. Peek, L. (2011). Behind the backlash: Muslim Americans after 9/11. Temple University Press. Pickering, S., Wright-Neville, D. & McCulloch, J. (2007). Counter-terrorism policing and culturally diverse communities: Final report. Monash University. Ramiriz, D., Quinlan, T., Malloy, S. & Shutt, T. (2013). Community partnerships thwart terrorism. In D.  Silk, B.  Spalek & M.  O’Rawe (Eds.), Preventing ideological violence: Communities, police and case studies of success (pp. 151–169). Palgrave Macmillan. Russell, J. & de Orellana, P. (2020) Public communications leadership: #crisiscomms and the Manchester arena attack. The RUSI Journal, 165(5–6), 22–35. Schanzer, D., Kurzman, C., Toliver, J., & Miller, E. (2016). Challenge and promise of using community policing strategies to prevent violent extremism: A call for community partnerships with law enforcement to enhance public safety, final report. National Institute of Justice, US Department of Justice. Service Médical du RAID. (2016). Tactical emergency medicine: lessons learned from Paris marauding terrorist attack. Critical Care, 20, 37–38. Spalek, B. (2013). Terror crime prevention with communities. Bloomsbury Academic. The Soufan Group. (2016, April 12). Unravelling Europe’s terrors networks. TSG Intel Brief. http://soufangroup.com/tsg-­intelbrief-­unraveling-­europes-­terror-­networks/. Staton, A. (2020). Evolving crisis communication in social media era: Analysis of tweets and news stories of the Manchester arena bombing. Honor Thesis. The University of Southern Mississippi. Thompson, J., Rehn, M., Lossius, H & Lockey, D. (2014). Risks to emergency medical responders at terrorist incidents: a narrative review of the medical literature. Critical Care, 18(521). https://doi.org/10.1186/s13054-­014-­0521-­1. Wurmb, T.; Franke, A., Schorscher, N., Kowalzik, B., Helm, M., Bohnen, R.  Helmerichs, J., Grueneisen, U., Cwojdzinski, D., Jung, G., Lücking, G. & Weber, M. (2020). Emergency response to terrorist attacks: results of the federal-conducted evaluation process in Germany. European Journal of Trauma Emergency Surgery, 46(4), 725–730.

Chapter 10

Conclusion

Introduction More crises and events are occurring that transcend national boundaries (Ansell et al. 2010; Goldin and Mariathasan 2014). These types of events often result in a large number of fatalities and extensive damage to property and infrastructure. They have been described as mega disasters, and it has been claimed that they are “the new normal” (Tierney 2014, p. 238). Changing political structures, such as those that have taken place in Asia and the Middle East, and attacks by terrorists can also be described as mega disasters. Cyber threats and emerging technologies, such as 3D printing and artificial intelligence, may be used by terrorists to create a mega-­ disaster (Boin and Lodge 2016). A terrorist attack that takes place simultaneously over many sites is another form of mega disaster. These types of attacks feature predominantly on the security agendas of Western nations around the world, primarily because of the threat that the attacks pose and the fear that they generate in a community. One of the main difficulties for the police while they are preventing and responding to terrorism is maintaining the confidence of the public. It is also challenging for the police to design frameworks for preventing and responding to terrorism that are transparent. A framework for preventing and responding to terrorism needs to be designed in a way that it holds the police accountable for their actions but does not weaken their response to an attack (Boin and Lodge 2016). Terrorist attacks that have occurred in recent years have demonstrated that the police and other security agencies are easily overcome by the complexity of an attack and by the level of violence used. When examining the responses by the police to the attacks described in the case studies, it was found that the responses had several common factors. The threat of a pending attack was not uncovered in any of the cases, despite the processes and structures being in place for detecting a threat. The responses to the attacks in all four locations were hampered by © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. den Heyer, Police Respond to Terrorism, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-43250-7_10

201

202

10 Conclusion

shortcomings in the command and control that was executed by senior police officers. In hindsight, it is easy to criticize the police response to these attacks, but the analysis of each of the attacks found that it was very difficult for the police to respond to the dynamics of the attacks. Inadequacies have also been found in other responses to terrorist attacks, not just those that were examined in the case studies. Flaws have been revealed in a number of responses to terrorist attacks since 9/11. These have occurred despite Western countries having invested in developing the skills of their police and emergency services and having established institutions to manage emergencies and megadisasters. Members of the police and other agencies who are first responders have received training in how to respond to a single-event terrorist attack and the majority of agencies have received more funding to aid with coordinating and managing a response (Kuipers et al. 2015). Since the 9/11 attacks, the police have invested in developing the crisis management skills of their staff and have made more resources available for increasing their capability and capacity to prevent and respond to terrorism. However, there has been very little investment made in developing the strategic thinking and the decision-­making skills of senior officers. This is detrimental to an effective police response, and, as some researchers have claimed, the lack of investment in the development of these skills became evident when examining past responses to terrorism. The problems in the responses that came to light transpired at the political and strategic levels and not at the tactical level (Boin and Lodge 2016). It is not known though, how effective decision-making at the strategic level contributes to the success of a response or whether specific strategies or leadership styles and behaviors by commanding officers affect the effectiveness of a response. Nor is it known how important strategic decision-making is in a crisis and how decision-­ making influences a response, even when a response has not been performed well (Boin and Lodge 2016). This is important because there is a difference between responding to a terrorist attack, which is ongoing and developing, and responding to a natural disaster, which is not ongoing, and finishes once it has occurred. Once a natural disaster has occurred, the initial response moves quickly to the recovery stage of a response. There are also differences in the demands made on commanding officers. When a commanding officer is taking control of a response to a terrorist attack, the demands placed on them are often conflicting and are subject to change, whereas the response to a natural disaster does not place these types of demands on a commanding officer to the same extent.

The Police Response to Terrorism The complexity and the nature of the terrorist attacks that occurred in Mumbai in 2009 and the attacks that occurred in Paris in 2015 highlighted how proficient the terrorists were in organizing and undertaking the attacks. These attacks can be seen as being as significant as the Moscow Theater siege in 2002, the attacks in London

The Police Response to Terrorism

203

in 2007, and the attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Centre towers on September 11, 2001. None of these attacks were spontaneous, and all required a high degree of preparation and training on the part of the terrorists as well as significant oversight on the part of their handlers (Sullivan and Elkus 2009). As Tindal (2009) noted, all of these attacks generated a turning point in our understanding of the capabilities of terrorists. After these attacks, police from around the world re-­ appraised their response plans, assessed the training that was delivered to their staff, and examined how capable their agency was in preventing and responding to terrorism. They also examined the relationships that they had with the community and with other responding agencies. Police agencies need to learn from the experiences that other police agencies have had in countering terrorism, and this will help them to prepare for responding to any future attacks (Pfeifer 2016). One way to understand how terrorists attack and how the police have responded to them is to review past events and draw upon the experiences and the actions taken by the police that responded to the attacks. Drawing on the information that was presented in Table 8.3, Chap. 8 of this book, the shortcomings in the police response to the terrorist attacks that were examined in the case studies can be attributed to deficiencies in how intelligence was shared with other agencies, the processes that were used to prevent an attack, the command and control of the response, and the capability of the police to counter terrorism. While all of these deficiencies were evident in the response that was undertaken by the Mumbai Police, the response by the other three police agencies only revealed some of these deficiencies. The poor use and response to intelligence and the poor protection of targets created an opportunity for the terrorists to attack Mumbai, Paris, and Brussels. The intelligence agencies had information about the attackers and that an attack could take place but did not share this information with the police. Deficiencies in intelligence and inadequate security arrangements provided opportunities for other attacks to occur, including the attacks on the World Trade Centre in 2001. However, failing to detect that terrorists were preparing to attack the World Trade Center did not result from the failure to coordinate intelligence but resulted from the intelligence agencies failing to assess the seriousness of the risk in the intelligence gathered (The 9/11 Commission Report 2004). The 9/11 Commission Report (2004) found that the various agencies that were collecting intelligence and preventing and responding to terrorism did not have a common understanding of the threat and that these agencies were not using an integrated approach to collect and share intelligence. Prior to the 9/11 attacks, the Commission noted that the users of intelligence were not able to have any input into what intelligence was being produced. This was one of the reasons why the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) created intelligence fusion centers around the United States, so that the producers and the users of intelligence could meet and discuss the terrorist threats that had been identified in intelligence reports. The main drawbacks found in the analysis of the police response to the attacks included in the case studies related to command and control. All of the responses by the police to the terrorist attacks were flawed, ranging from not having a critical

204

10 Conclusion

incident management system in place to not being able to coordinate the various response units and agencies. Some of the problems that were associated with this was that the training given to police officers, and the response doctrine used at that time, focused on the tactics that specialized units use, instead of focusing on the command of and the deployment of these units and other armed officers (Sullivan and Elkus 2009). This indicates that the officers who were in command of the response did not have the skills to consider and understand the wider dimensions of a response, which is needed in complex terrorist attack. These officers often did not know the capabilities of the specialist units or how their tactics are used. The police are often not able to recognize and exploit the capabilities that the various specialized units have, and nor do they understand the differences between the strategic and operational levels of a response. To respond effectively to a terrorist attack, the police need to combine both the strategic and the operational skills into their practices (Sullivan and Elkus 2009). The ability of response commanders is often limited as they are not trained to view the bigger picture of an operation. Police officers are trained to react to a situation at a local level and often do not appreciate the larger scale of a terrorist attack and its effect. Large-scale response operations, especially those involving simultaneous attacks at multiple sites, require the sophisticated coordination of tasks, such as deploying police and other agencies’ resources, the gathering and analysis of real-time intelligence, and the command and control of resources. Commanders must appreciate these tasks and be able to make strategic decisions based on the execution of these tasks. How these tasks interact with the risks associated with a response to an attack needs to be understood as does how these tasks contribute to or generate risks to the effectiveness of a response (Boin and Lodge 2016). Therefore, response commanders need to be trained in being able to prepare for an unknown threat and the training should include how to develop a generic response and how to apply the leadership skills that are applicable to a range of different terrorist attack scenarios. In addition, response plans need to be comprehensive and should clearly describe the objectives of a mission and the responsibilities and roles of the staff who are involved in the response. Tasks that need to be delegated and undertaken need to be laid out in a response plan, which will enable the commander to respond to any unknown aspects of an attack. The plan should provide a detailed, strategic outline in how to respond to an attack, and this will prevent a commander from reacting tactically and without having a concept of operations or having a common operating picture in place. Terrorists use unrestrained violence to drive an attack which means that the police need to confront the terrorists early in the response to halt their advantage. Disrupting an attack makes the terrorists vulnerable to being overcome by police specialist or SWAT units. It also means that the first police officers who arrive on the scene of a terrorist attack, usually patrol officers, need to be trained in forming active shooter response teams, to counter an attack or at least contain the terrorists (Sullivan and Elkus 2009).

Conclusion

205

Moving Forward in Responding to Terrorism The preceding chapters in this book have examined the police response to four similar, but slightly different terrorist attacks that occurred in Mumbai, Paris, Brussels, and Manchester. The reasons why the research was undertaken and the theory of how the police should respond to disasters and terrorism have been outlined in Chaps. 1 and 2. This has been followed by an analysis of the terrorist attacks that occurred in Mumbai in 2008, in Paris in 2015, in Brussels in 2016, and in Manchester in 2017. The last section of the book discusses how to improve the police response to a terrorist attack. Some of the lessons that have been learned from the terrorist attacks that were examined in the case studies have been summarized into five points and are listed below. These should be considered by police agencies with the view of improving the effectiveness of their response: 1. Coordinated, simultaneous, terrorist attacks that target multiple sites should be expected, and past attacks should be studied by all police agencies and jurisdictions. The attacks that have been outlined in the case studies in this book will not be the last attacks that will target multiple sites simultaneously. Terrorists have recognized how effective these types of attacks are and will keep using them to inflict as many casualties as possible and to confuse the police and other responding agencies. 2. All police and other responding agencies and the intelligence services along with private-sector owners of potential targets should be involved in the planning for and the preparations made for a potential terrorist attack. 3. Communications interoperability should be expanded, tested, and improved upon. 4. Ensure that a police agency has the capability to rapidly develop accurate, real-­ time situational awareness and provide a common operating picture between responding police agencies and other responding agencies. 5. Private-sector businesses must be encouraged to participate in emergency-­ preparedness activities (adapted from Cherney and Hartley 2017; Monahan and Stainbrook 2013; Schanzer et al. 2016; Trindal 2009).

Conclusion This book has presented a comparative study of the response by the police to four terrorist attacks. Given the importance of the involvement of the police in preventing and responding to terrorism and the implications identified and discussed in this book, there is a need for more research and a greater focus on improving the capabilities of the police to counter and respond to terrorism (Neyroud 2007). How the response to the attacks was implemented and how successful the response was in resolving the attacks has been examined in the case studies. Using

206

10 Conclusion

research and media articles and reports that were documented after each of the attacks had taken place was critically analyzed in the case studies. The response taken by the police in all four attacks that were outlined in the case studies exhibits some common characteristics. Examining the attacks in the case studies can help in developing our understanding of police organizational theory and the structures that the police use when responding to a large incident or a terrorist attack. As there are relatively few comparative studies in this area of policing, it is intended that this book will assist in advancing the thinking in this regard.

References Ansell, C., Boin, R. & Keller, A. (2010). Managing transboundary crises: Identifying building blocks of an effective response system. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 18(4), 195–207. Boin, A. & Lodge, M. (2016). Designing resilient institutions for transboundary crisis management: A time for public administration. Public Administration, 94(2), 289–298. Cherney, A. & Hartley, J. (2017) Community engagement to tackle terrorism and violent extremism: challenges, tensions and pitfalls. Policing and Society, 27(7), 750–763. Goldin, I. & Mariathasan, M. (2014). The butterfly defect: How globalization creates systemic risks and what to do about it. Princeton University Press. Kuipers, S., Boin, A., Bossong, R. & Hegemann, H. (2015). Building joint crisis management capacity? Comparing civil security systems in 22 European countries. Risk, Hazards & Crisis in Public Policy, 6(1), 1–21. Monahan, T. & Stainbrook, M. (2013, May). Learning from the lessons of the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks. The Police Chief, 78, 24–32. Neyroud, P. (2007). Editorial. Policing, 1(1), 5–8. Pfeifer, J. (2016). International anti-terrorism preparedness. www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/ default/files/centers/research-­i nitiatives/crisisleadership/files/feifer_2016-­4 -­w nyf/ International_anti-­terrorism. Schanzer, D., Kurzman, C., Toliver, J., & Miller, E. (2016). Challenge and promise of using community policing strategies to prevent violent extremism: A call for community partnerships with law enforcement to enhance public safety, final report. National Institute of Justice, US Department of Justice. Sullivan, J. & Elkus, A. (2009, June). Preventing another Mumbai: Building a police operational art. CTC Sentinel, 2(6), 1–3. The 9/11 Commission Report (2004). Final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. W. W. Norton. Tierney, K. (2014). The social roots of risk. Stanford University Press. Trindal, J. (2009, January). The Mumbai Attacks  – Lessons for the Western World. DomPrep Journal, V(1), 5–7.

Index

C Community-oriented policing, 6, 13, 17, 26–34, 42, 143, 188, 189 Complex terrorism, 19 Confidence in police, 16, 32, 82, 159, 187, 190, 195 D Defining terrorism, 2–5 I Intelligence-led policing (ILP), 13, 22, 30, 34–36 M Multi-faceted terrorism, 13 P Police command and control, 59 Police response, 7, 15, 38, 39, 54, 55, 59, 72, 75, 76, 78, 80–83, 99, 112–114, 117–124, 136, 145–147, 161, 164–166, 177, 178, 181, 183, 187–197, 202, 203, 205 Police response to terrorism, 8, 11–44, 188, 202–204 Policing terrorism, 27

R Responding to terrorism, 2, 11–13, 17–20, 22, 23, 28–31, 36–40, 42, 44, 188, 191, 196, 201, 203, 205 T Terrorism, 1, 11, 54, 90, 98, 133, 153, 173, 187, 202 Terrorism planning, 37–38, 134, 189 Terrorist attacks, 1, 2, 6–8, 11–19, 21–26, 31, 33, 34, 36–42, 44, 53–83, 89–95, 97–109, 111, 114, 117, 119–126, 133–148, 153–156, 160–162, 164–170, 173–179, 181–183, 187–197, 201–206 Threat of terrorism, 12, 13, 16–18, 21, 28, 29, 31, 34, 40–42, 44, 89–95, 98, 101, 138, 188 2008 Mumbai, 53–83 2008 Mumbai attacks, 53–83, 108 2015 Paris, 7, 25, 89–91, 93, 95, 97, 99–103, 115, 138–143, 156, 167, 169, 173–175, 202, 205 2017 Manchester, 7, 95, 153–170, 173, 205 2017 Manchester terrorist attacks, 7, 153–170 2016 Brussels, 7, 90, 91, 95, 136, 142, 143, 145, 148, 156, 173–175, 205

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. den Heyer, Police Respond to Terrorism, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-43250-7

207