Permanent Campaigning in Greece in Times of Crisis: The Samaras, Tsipras and Mitsotakis Premierships (Political Campaigning and Communication) 3031116909, 9783031116902

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Permanent Campaigning in Greece in Times of Crisis The Samaras, Tsipras and Mitsotakis Premierships

Panos A. Koliastasis

Political Campaigning and Communication

Series Editor Darren G. Lilleker, Bournemouth University, Bournemouth, UK

The series explores themes relating to how political organisations promote themselves and how citizens interpret and respond to their tactics. Politics is here defined broadly as any activities designed to have an impact on public policy. The scope of the series thus covers election campaigns, as well as pressure group campaigns, lobbying, and campaigns instigated by social and citizen movements. Research included in the series might focus on the latest strategies and tactics within political marketing and campaigning, covering topics such as the strategic use of legacy, digital and social media, the use of big data and analytics for targeting citizens, and the use of manipulative tactics and disinformation. Furthermore, as campaigns are an important interface between the institutions of power and citizens, they present opportunities to examine their impact in engaging, involving and mobilizing citizens. Areas of focus might include attitudes and voting behavior, political polarization and the campaign environment, public discourse around campaigns, and the psychologies underpinning civil society and protest movements. Works may take a narrow or broad perspective. Single-nation case studies of one specific campaign and comparative cross-national or temporal studies are equally welcome. The series also welcomes themed edited collections which explore a central set of research questions. For an informal discussion for a book in the series, please contact the series editor Darren Lilleker ([email protected]), or Ambra Finotello ([email protected]). This book series is indexed by Scopus.

Panos A. Koliastasis

Permanent Campaigning in Greece in Times of Crisis The Samaras, Tsipras and Mitsotakis Premierships

Panos A. Koliastasis National and Kapodistrian University of Athens Athens, Greece

ISSN 2662-589X ISSN 2662-5903 (electronic) Political Campaigning and Communication ISBN 978-3-031-11690-2 ISBN 978-3-031-11691-9 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11691-9 © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: © Melisa Hasan This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Dedicated to my nephew

Acknowledgements

I would like to acknowledge all those who assisted me in the completion of this project. First, I wish to thank all those former and current ministers, MPs, prime ministerial advisors as well as pollsters who gave me interviews on the communication policy of Prime Ministers Antonis Samaras, Alexis Tsipras and Kyriakos Mitsotakis. In particular, in alphabetical order, I would like to thank: Christophoros Vernardakis, Kostas Zachariadis, Chrysanthos Lazaridis, Dimitris Mavros, George Mouroutis, Nikos Romanos, Akis Skertsos, Angelos Tsekeris and Matthaios Tsimitakis. Secondly, I would like to thank the MP of ND and former Minister of State Theodoros Roussopoulos, the political scientist Vassilis Alevisakos, the communication consultant Georgia Koutsoukou and Lillian Economou. Finally, I am grateful to Professor Darren Lilleker for his trust, support and guidance and to Ambra Finotello and Ashwini Elango at Palgrave for their constant help in the preparation of the manuscript.

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Contents

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Permanent Campaigning in Greece

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Antonis Samaras: The Permanent Campaign Strategy of a Centre-Right Prime Minister

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Alexis Tsipras: The Permanent Campaign Strategy of a Left-Wing Prime Minister

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Kyriakos Mitsotakis: The Permanent Campaign Prime Minister

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The Permanent Campaign Revisited

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Appendix 1: Permanent Campaigning by Greek Prime Ministers (PMs) on Facebook

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Appendix 2: List of Public Appeals of the Six Greek Premiers 1996–2021 (Speeches, Press Conferences, Greek Media Interviews, Greek Press Articles)

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Index

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About the Author

Panos A. Koliastasis is a Postdoctoral Researcher in Political Science at the University of Athens and a Lecturer (adjunct) at the University of Peloponnese and the Hellenic Open University. In parallel, he acts as the country team leader for Greece in the international project ‘Executive Approval Project’. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Queen Mary University of London (QMUL). Previously, he studied Political Science and Public Administration at the University of Athens and received an M.Sc. in Public Policy from University College London (UCL). In his Ph.D. thesis, he studied the communication strategies employed by Greek Prime Ministers to improve their popularity from the perspective of the permanent campaign. His research interests focus on political communication, political campaigning, voting behaviour and comparative politics. He has published books as well as in international and Greek journals and edited volumes. Selected Publications • Hlepas, N-K. & Koliastasis, P. (eds.) (2021). Conditions for local innovations: The importance of communication mechanisms and local narratives, ISBN: 978-960-02-3839-6, Athens: Papazisis Publications, [in Greek]. • Koliastasis, P. (2021). Prime ministers in a permanent campaign process: The K.Simitis, K. Karamanlis and G. Papandreou, Athens: Epikentro Publications, [in Greek], ISBN: 978-618-204-130–7. xi

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• Egner, B., Heinelt, H., Hlepas, N., Koliastasis, ⊓., Lehning, M. & Timotheou, A. (2021). ‘A comparative analysis of communicative mechanisms and narratives enabling and supporting innovations’, in Bjorn Egner, Hubert Heinelt and Nikos Hlepas (eds.), The Politics of Local Innovation: Conditions for the Development of Innovations, pp. 161–200, ISBN: 9780367534080, London Routledge, https:// doi.org/10.4324/9781003084006-13. • Koliastasis, P. (2020). ‘The Brand Has Left the Building: The Cases of Governing PASOK, ND and SYRIZA at a Time of Economic Crisis (2009–2019)’, Veneti, A. and Karatzogianni, A. (Ed.) The Emerald Handbook of Digital Media in Greece (Digital Activism and Society: Politics, Economy And Culture In Network Communication), Emerald Publishing Limited, pp. 245–258. https://doi. org/10.1108/978-1-83982-400-520201048. • Hlepas, Nikolaos-Komninos & Koliastasis, Panos (2021). ‘Necessity as the trigger of invention? The promotion of innovations in Athens and Elefsina’, Urban Research & Practice, 14:5, 543–559, https:// doi.org/10.1080/17535069.2021.1921250. • Koliastasis, P. (2020). ‘The Permanent Campaign Strategy of Prime Ministers in Parliamentary Systems: the case of Greece’, Journal of Political Marketing, vol. 19 (3), pp. 233–257, Available at: https:// doi.org/10.1080/15377857.2016.1193835, Published online: 11 July 2016. • Koliastasis, P. (2015). ‘The Greek Parliamentary Elections of 25 January2015’, Representation, 51:3, pp. 359–372, https://doi. org/10.1080/00344893.2015.1113775.

List of Tables

Table 2.1 Table 2.2 Table 3.1

Table 3.2 Table 4.1

Table 4.2 Table 5.1 Table 5.2

Prime Minister Antonis Samaras: Results of permanent campaigning indicators Prime Minister Antonis Samaras: permanent campaigning indicators Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras: Results of permanent campaigning indicators (in parentheses the monthly average) Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras: Assessment of permanent campaigning indicators Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis: Results of permanent campaigning indicators (in parentheses the monthly average) Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis: Assessment of permanent campaigning indicators Results of the permanent campaign indicators (in parentheses the monthly average) Assessment of permanent campaigning indicators

42 49

77 84

109 117 139 141

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CHAPTER 1

Permanent Campaigning in Greece

Abstract This chapter reviews and discusses the relevant literature on the permanent campaign and describes the theoretical framework and the methodological approach used. Based on (Joathan and Lilleker, Journal of Political Marketing, 2020) proposed framework and three sets of indicators (capacity building and strategy, paid and owned media, and earned media) the work examines three recent successive Greek prime ministers over the period from 2012 to 2022. Moreover, departing from the relevant literature, the work explores the factors that contributed to the rise of the Greek permanent campaign. In this context, it aims to address the research question whether, how and to what extent the Greek premiers followed the permanent campaigning strategy during their terms to deal with the economic, immigration and pandemic crises. Keywords Permanent campaigning · Greece · Political context · Media context · Methodology

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 P. A. Koliastasis, Permanent Campaigning in Greece in Times of Crisis, Political Campaigning and Communication, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11691-9_1

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Introduction Political communication literature that deals with political campaigning has provided various interpretations of the phenomenon including political marketing (e.g. Lees-Marshment, 2001; Lilleker & LeesMarshment, 2005), professionalized campaigning (e.g. Mancini, 1999; Negrine & Lilleker, 2002a, 2002b) and the Americanization concept (e.g. Lilleker, 2006; Negrine & Papathanassopoulos, 1996). Departing from this literature, Norris (2000) has so far offered probably the most complete typology of the evolution of campaign communications dividing into three main categories: the premodern, the modern and the postmodern. Focusing on the latter, postmodern campaigning has been understood as that ‘in which the coterie of professional consultants on advertising, public opinion, marketing, and strategic news management become more co-equal actors with politicians, assuming a more influential role within government in a “permanent” campaign, as well as coordinating local activity more tightly at the grassroots’ (Norris, 2000: 139–140). In this context, this work concentrates on the analysis of permanent campaigning employed by contemporary political executives to maintain their popularity and thus improving their re-election prospects. Unlike Norris, the US-origin permanent campaign goes back to the 1960s and the Nixon presidency (Blumenthal, 1982). As a concept was put forward for the first time by the pollster Pat Caddell who collaborated with President Jimmy Carter, while Sidney Blumenthal defined it as a combination of ‘image-making with strategic calculation [which] remakes government into an instrument designed to sustain an elected official’s public popularity’ (1982: 23). Although presidents and prime ministers have always tended to communicate their policies to the public (Lilleker, 2006, 2011; SeymourUre, 2003), in the case of permanent campaigning the situation is different. The election campaign tools, marketing techniques and communication professionals follow the election winner in office to back his efforts to maintain or even increase his popularity ratings and thus secure re-election (Nimmo, 1999; Seymour-Ure, 2003) as well as exert influence in law-making (Heclo, 2000; Jones, 2000; Tenpas, 2000). This development is mainly due to two reasons. The first is the advent of electronic media and especially (private) television which has decisively changed the communication environment by enhancing the public’s

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emphasis on image. An evolution that in turn has reinforced the personalization of the political process, the importance of the role of leadership and hence the tendency of political leaders to constantly seek positive publicity (e.g. Clarke et al., 2004; Foley, 2000; Karvonen, 2010; Kuhn, 2007; Marland, 2015; Rose, 2012; Seymour-Ure, 2003). In addition, since the late 2000s, technological changes have been joined by the emergence of the internet and social media, which have caused a number of changes in the conduct of political communication. Among others, they have accelerated the dissemination and transmission of news 24/7 creating a more pressing and fragmented communication environment for parties, governments and political leaders. Moreover, they have facilitated direct and unmediated communication between politicians and citizens as well as they have broadened the scope of criticism for politicians (Elmer et al., 2012; Larsson, 2015; Lilleker, 2011). In parallel, the media, in print, electronic and digital form, contribute to the reinforcement and consolidation of a permanent election mood through the frequent presentation of polls that are regarded as election simulations (e.g. Bowman, 2000; Heclo, 2000; Hess, 2000; McAllister, 1996). More specifically, polling indicators that capture voting intentions for political parties and popularity for political leaders are likely to affect the ability of a political executive to make policy decisions and govern effectively, especially if he or she trails in the polls during the term of office (Edwards, 2003). The second reason explaining the emergence of permanent campaigning is reflected in the decline of parties, which includes the decline in party membership, the erosion of party identification and the increase in the number of undecided and floating voters. These developments have contributed to the further enhancement of the role of personalities and political leadership and the need for constant communication activity to maintain or broaden electoral appeal (e.g. Dalton, 1996; King 1997; Veneti, Jackson & Lilleker, 2019b). Against this backdrop, it is indicative that permanent campaigning has been applied so far by politicians (mainly political executives but also MPs) in 32 countries around the globe and the European Parliament. In fact, all of them have followed the trend in North America (US, Canada and Mexico), Europe (UK, Sweden, Norway, Belgium, Austria, Czech Republic, Germany, Netherlands, Hungary, Poland, Spain, Italy, Greece, Turkey), Oceania (Australia, New Zealand), Latin America (Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Nicaragua,

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Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela) and Asia (Taiwan) (e.g. Cockerell et al., 1984; Conaghan & De La Torre, 2008; Koliastasis, 2020; Nimmo, 1999; Roncarolo, 2005; Scammell, 2001; Van Onselen & Errington, 2007). This work focuses on Greece and particularly on prime ministers operating in the parliamentary system of the country from 2012 until 2022. Previous studies have examined the permanent campaign strategy of three successive Greek premiers heading single-party governments in the period 1996–2011 including the centre-left Kostas Simitis (1996–2004), the centre-right Kostas Karamanlis (2004–2009) and the centre-left George Papandreou (2009–2011) finding that they did follow the trend due to technological and political developments like those observed in other Western countries (Koliastasis, 2020). They institutionalized new communication policy structures in the Prime Minister’s Office, collaborated with communication experts, regularly monitored and consulted opinion polls, formulated their political messages in the form of campaign slogans and made numerous public appearances to promote them. This study examines whether the Greek premiers from 2012 onwards have also engaged in a permanent campaigning process. The analysis focuses on the centre-right Antonis Samaras (2012–2015), the radical left Alexis Tsipras (2015–2019) and the current one, the centre-right Kyriakos Mitsotakis (2019–). The first two headed coalitions, while Mitsotakis is leading a single-party government of ND. In parallel, all of them had to deal with multiple crises: financial, migration, pandemic and lately the inflation crisis which is also associated with the political and economic implications of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Samaras dealt mainly with the economic crisis, Tsipras faced the challenges of both the economic and migration crises, while Mitsotakis has faced a series of consecutive crises: economic, migration, pandemic, economic (again), foreign policy (related to the Greek-Turkish relations), natural disasters and the recent inflation crises. In this context, the work aims to extend the research on permanent campaigning applied by the recent Greek premiers. The structure of the chapter is as follows. The next section examines the political communication environment in which prime ministers operate, including the developments in the political and media context like the decline of political parties, the increase in party polarization, the emergence of private television and the growth of the internet and social media that

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contributed to the rise of permanent campaigning in Greece. The third section outlines the hypothesis, methods and data used in the analysis. The final section summarizes the main points of the chapter and describes the structure of the following chapters.

The Political Communication Context As mentioned above, several political and technological developments have reinforced the tendency to personalize the political process and emphasize the role of political leaders as determinants of voting behaviour. In particular, the weakening of political parties, the strengthening of polarization in the political arena combined with the emergence of private television, the rapid expansion of the internet and the proliferation of social media seem to have reinforced the public’s emphasis on political personalities. The latter have, in turn, a strong incentive to engage in a permanent campaign process to maintain a positive public image (Veneti, Jackson & Lilleker, 2019b). According to Koliastasis (2014: 151–166), such factors have also been observed in the case of Greece pushing Greek prime ministers of the period 1996–2011 to adopt the strategy of permanent campaigning. Since then it appears that these factors have been further strengthened. This is reflected in the features of the current political and media landscape in Greece.

The Political Context The Decline of the Parties and the Increase of Polarization In terms of the political context, the Greek political culture is characterized by ideological polarization, partisan extremism, intense populism and constant accusations over alleged scandals. It is rooted in historical divisions caused by past regime crises, the civil war (1943–1949) between the left and right and in parallel it is influenced by existing clientelist relations (e.g. Featherstone, 2005) leading to the creation of ‘highly durable parallel networks of “left” and “right” political blocs’ (Teperoglou & Tsatsanis, 2014: 224). Against this backdrop, from the fall of the military dictatorship and the restoration of democracy in 1974, Greece is regarded as a striking example of parliamentary majoritarian model (Lijphart, 1999: 248). Most of the

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national elections have taken place under an electoral system of ‘reinforced’ proportional representation1 according to which most of the seats are allocated proportionally, while the election winner is granted a bonus of seats enabling it to form one-party government (Gallagher et al., 2006: 344; Voulgaris, 2008). In addition, as Gallagher et al. have suggested, ‘all Greek governments are single-party majority governments, and the opposition in parliament has been effectively powerless’ (2006: 63). As a result, the prime minister emerges as the most powerful political figure since he appears to control both the executive and the legislative powers as the head of a single-party government and the main parliamentary party in a unicameral 300-seat parliament (Makridimitris, 2001: 23). From 1974 to 2009, two parties dominated the Greek political scene creating single-party governments: the centre-right ND (New Democracy) and the centre-left PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Movement) (Nikolacopoulos, 2005). ND under the premiership of its founder Konstantinos Karamanlis governed the country from 1974 until 1981,2 under the leadership of Konstantinos Mitsotakis from 1990 up to 1993 and under the premiership of Kostas Karamanlis (nephew of Konstantinos Karamanlis) from 2004 till 2009. In contrast, PASOK led by its founder Andreas Papandreou ruled the country from 1981 till 1989 and from 1993 up to 1996, under the leadership of Costas Simitis from 1996 until 2004 and under the premiership of George Papandreou (Andreas Papandreou’s son) from 2009 to (November) 2011.3 The political strength of the two natural parties of government was evident on two levels. First, in the national elections held from 1977 until 2009, PASOK and ND together received over 75% of the electorate forming a strong two-party system (Tsatsanis et al., 2020: 24).

1 The exception is the period 1989–1990, during which the system of ‘pure’ proportional representation was applied, leading to short-lived coalition governments, political instability and the conduct of three consecutive national elections in June 1989, November 1989 and April 1990, respectively (Nikolacopoulos 2005). 2 In 1980 Karamanlis took over the Presidency of the Republic and as a result, the parliamentary group of ND, in accordance with the provisions of the Hellenic Constitution, elected Georgios Rallis as Prime Minister (Loulis 2007: 229). 3 From November 2011 to May 2012, the country was governed by the PASOKND coalition (which for a few months included the right-wing Popular Orthodox Rally party as well) led by the extra-parliamentary technocrat Loukas Papademos, following the resignation of the then centre-left Prime Minister George Papandreou.

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Second, both experienced comparatively high levels of party identification (Teperoglou & Tsatsanis, 2014). However, from 1990 onwards the dominant parties have seen their strength and influence decline gradually. The numbers of party membership were falling weakening their ability to mobilize public support at the grassroots level (Teperoglou & Tsatsanis, 2014). Also, there was a gradual decline in trust, both in political parties and in the political system in general (Papathanassopoulos, 2000: 51–52). These trends accelerated after the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 and its consequences for Greece. The eruption of the national debt crisis in 2010 altered radically the economic context and consequently the political landscape. Unable to borrow funds from the international markets, Greece turned for financial assistance to the European Union (EU) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to refinance its debt. In return it had to implement, under the supervision of the so-called ‘Troika’ (European Commission, European Central Bank, IMF), a policy plan (Memorandum) consisted of austerity measures and market-oriented reforms (Gemenis, 2010). Although the Memorandum averted a disorderly default and a Grexit (exit of Greece from the Eurozone), it deepened the recession in the short run leading to massive unemployment (Kazakos, 2011). In this context, the bailout plan emerged as the dominant position issue dividing parties between pro- and anti-bailout, transcending the left–right cleavage and shaping accordingly party preferences (Gemenis & Triga, 2013; Nezi & Katsanidou, 2014; Voulgaris & Nikolakopoulos, 2014). The division between pro-memorandum and anti-memorandum forces and the subsequent increasing polarization would shape Greek politics throughout the period 2010–2015. As a result, party identification receded further. It decreased significantly from over 80% in 1985 to around 70% in 2011 (Teperoglou & Tsatsanis, 2014). In addition, an increasing number of voters seemed to feel reluctant to identify itself in the left–right axis compared to the onset of the democratic regime and to what happened in other countries in South Europe (Freire 2006). As Teperoglou & Tsatsanis have noted, based on relevant empirical studies, ‘[in 1985] an overwhelming majority (91%) of the sample selected a position on the left–right axis (..) By 2011 it had dropped again, with only 74% (..) declaring a left–right position’ (2014: 229). In parallel, in the period 2010–2019, the traditionally polarized Greek party system, was polarized further (Tsatsanis et al., 2020: 513). During

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the first period of the crisis, from May 2010 to July 2015, the dominant division was between the pro- and anti-bailout forces and, at the same time, from June 2012 onwards, between pro-European pro-bailout and Eurosceptic anti-bailout forces (Koliastasis, 2015a; Vasilopoulou & Halikiopoulou, 2013). More specifically, the first post-bailout national poll held in May 2012 was marked as an ‘earthquake’ election characterized by a de-alignment process that was evident in the electoral collapse of PASOK and ND (Hutcheson, 2011; Voulgaris & Nikolacopoulos, 2014). Most of the electorate turned against the Memorandum punishing the parties of the pro-bailout coalition of PASOK and ND. PASOK, as the main coalition partner suffered an electoral collapse taking 13.2% compared to 43.9% it had received previously in the 2009 poll, and it ranked third for the first time since 1974. ND, though it ranked first, also fell from 33.5 to 18.9%—a record low (Vasilopoulou & Halikiopoulou, 2013). In contrast, parties of the anti-bailout camp benefited with SYRIZA rising from 4.7% in 2009 to 16.3% to rank second, and as a result a new smaller ND-SYRIZA two-partyism emerged (Voulgaris & Nikolakopoulos, 2014). Nonetheless, the inconclusive result of the May 2012 election, led to a second consecutive poll held in June 2012. The political uncertainty combined with the rise of the anti-bailout SYRIZA, raised concerns over the willingness of Greece not only to implement the Memorandum, but also to remain in the euro (Vasilopoulou & Halikiopoulou, 2013). Those voters who feared a possible Grexit eventually turned to the centre-right, while those who prioritized the cancellation of the Memorandum mainly supported the radical left (Vasilopoulou & Halikiopoulou, 2013). As a result, the pro-bailout pro-euro ND ranked first taking 29.7% of the electorate and 129 seats forming a coalition with PASOK (and initially with the moderate DIMAR) under the premiership of Antonis Samaras. In contrast, the anti-bailout SYRIZA came second taking 26.9% of the vote and 71 seats (Voulgaris & Nikolacopoulos, 2014). Thus, polarization between pro-euro, pro-bailout and the anti-bailout forces was reshaped and strengthened. Three years later, the failure of the Hellenic Parliament to elect a new Head of State led, as stipulated by the Greek Constitution, to a snap election on 25 January 2015. The receding fear of a possible Grexit in case of SYIRZA’s election, public frustration with the austerity measures combined with the ongoing polarization around the Memorandum issue led to the prevalence of anti-bailout forces (Koliastasis,

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2015a). SYRIZA came in office receiving 36.4% of the vote and 149 seats, while ND came second with 27.8% and 76 seats. Having fallen short of the 151 seats needed to command an absolute majority, SYRIZA collaborated with the anti-bailout right-wing ANEL, to form the first anti-bailout coalition government of Greece since the entry of the country in the Memorandum-era in 2010, under the premiership of Alexis Tsipras (Koliastasis, 2015a). Although from the traditional left–right axis perspective, a coalition between SYRIZA and ANEL seemed rather unusual, it became feasible because of the convergence of the parties within the anti-memorandum populist context (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). The newly elected SYRIZA-led government declared that the popular mandate it had received was to cancel the Memorandum, while maintaining Greece in the Eurozone (Koliastasis, 2015a). In addition, it aimed at negotiating with the EU and the IMF on a new bailout agreement largely based on SYRIZA’s policy plan which, among others, included a generous haircut for Greek debt and expansionary fiscal measures (Tsebelis, 2016). Although the international lenders rejected the Greek demands as a violation of the Eurozone rules, the SYRIZA-led government insisted on its policy platform. The controversy culminated on 26 June 2015 when Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras put the EU and IMF proposal on a third Memorandum to a referendum scheduled for 5 July, arguing for its rejection. The campaign period lasted just one week. Parties and public opinion were deeply divided. The SYRIZA-led government and the neoNazi Golden Dawn supported the ‘No’ vote, while ND, PASOK and the centrist Potami supported the ‘Yes’ option (the communist KKE refused to support either option). Ultimately, the No position won by a landslide taking 61.3% of the vote over 38.7% for the Yes camp. However, a few days after, Tsipras facing the imminent possibility of a disorderly default and a catastrophic Grexit agreed with the EU and the IMF on a third Memorandum—much stricter than the one rejected in the referendum—along with a fresh loan of more than 80 billion euros (Tsebelis, 2016). His decision to agree on a third bailout plan was a major U-turn causing the split of his incumbent party since more than 40 of his MPs voted against the agreement defecting from SYRIZA (Rori, 2016). However, the bailout agreement was approved in parliament since the pro-bailout pro-euro opposition (ND, PASOK and Potami) backed it. After the adoption of the new adjustment program, Tsipras, having lost

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the parliamentary majority and eager to call elections before the unpopular measures of the third Memorandum began to bite, called for early elections on September 20 (Koliastasis, 2015b). Given that the political cleavage ‘pro versus anti-bailout’ had essentially been cancelled, the September election campaign marked the end of the anti-bailout era. Most of the political forces joined the pro-bailout camp (SYRIZA, ND, Potami, PASOK and ANEL) whereas only three minor parties insisted on their anti-bailout as well as anti-euro platform (Golden Dawn, KKE and the split party of Popular Unity). Consequently, the campaign agenda focused mainly on which party and which party leader was the most competent to implement the program. In this context and since he had abandoned his anti-bailout platform, Tsipras sought to realign its disillusioned voters by drawing a new dividing line between the ‘new’ and the ‘old’ politics. In an attempt to increase partisan polarization, he followed once again a confrontational populist strategy. He projected SYRIZA as the representative of ‘new’ politics against the ‘old’ political establishment of ND and PASOK which had been governing Greece for 40 years and were blamed by SYRIZA for both the country’s severe economic crisis and the Memorandum (Rori, 2016: 15; Stavrakakis & Katsambekis, 2014). Furthermore, Tsipras argued that although he failed to avert the memoranda, at least he had made a big effort by negotiating hard with Greece’s international lenders in contrast with his predecessors who had acted rather softly. Thus, he is more willing and capable compared to ND’s leader to protect the most vulnerable citizens by applying a ‘parallel’ to the third Memorandum program consisted of social policy measures (Koliastasis, 2015b). Despite its U-turn, SYRIZA managed to be re-elected taking 35.5% of the vote and 145 seats and forming again a coalition with ANEL, while ND took 28.1% of the electorate and 75 seats. Regarding the second phase of polarization, in the period after the September 2015 until the July 2019 elections, the division between the pro- and anti-memorandum bloc had been replaced by that between the pro-SYRIZA and the anti-SYRIZA front which in turn fueled negative partisanship (Tsatsanis et al., 2020). The root of the anti-SYRIZA tendency can be traced back to the 2015 referendum and to those citizens who had supported the ‘Yes’ vote. In addition, the opposition intensified after the refutation of the anti-Memorandum platform, the

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U-turn of SYRIZA and the austerity measures that followed consisted of heavy taxation (Koliastasis, 2019). The polarization was first reflected in the European polls of May 2019 in which the SYRIZA-led government suffered heavy electoral losses. ND prevailed by almost 10 points, receiving 33.1% of the vote against 23.8% for SYRIZA, forcing Tsipras to call snap national elections for 07 July 2019 (Koliastasis, 2019). Finally, Kyriakos Mitsotakis and ND prevailed again, receiving 39.9% and 158 seats forming a single-party government for the first time since 2009, while SYRIZA received 31.5% of the vote and 86 seats. In a context of extreme polarization, the attacks between the government and the opposition and the negative campaigning between the parties increased, creating a highly confrontational political climate. As a result, in the electoral contests that took place after the country’s inclusion in the first Memorandum in May 2010, the logic of negative voting and negative party identification was strongly manifested (Tsatsanis et al., 2020). Against this backdrop, it is reasonable to argue that prime ministers and political leaders in general had an additional incentive to engage in nonstop communication activities as part of their permanent campaigning to defend their public image against their political opponents. In other words, the rise of populism may have contributed to the further increase of polarization and the consequently to the further proliferation of the permanent campaign. Overall, the weakening of the parties and the fluidity of the electorate, facilitated the ‘personalization’ of Greek politics, highlighting the role of political leadership. In parallel, the intensity of polarization between political forces, both in the context of the distinction between pro-bailout and anti-bailout forces (2010–2015) and between the SYRIZA-led government and the anti-SYRIZA front (2015–2019) made the political conditions for prime ministers and political leaders of this period extremely pressing. They were pushed to engage more in a permanent campaigning process in order to defend their public image, rebut opposition and thus maintaining their popularity. Moreover, as next section will analyse, the evolution of the Greek media context, and in particular the emergence of private television and later the proliferation of the internet and social media, contributed to the further rise of the permanent campaign trend.

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The Media Context The Role of (Private) Television, the Internet and Social Media The Greek media belong, according to the categorization proposed by Hallin and Mancini (2004), to the so-called Southern European or Mediterranean model of media. Its key features include ‘an elite politically-oriented press with high political parallelism, commentaryoriented and weak professionalized journalism, low newspaper circulation, external pluralism covering different opinions and perspectives within one media branch, a public broadcasting strongly influenced by the government and strong state intervention in the media sector’ (Hallin & Mancini, 2004: 67). Private broadcasting, although commercial, profitoriented and less politicized than newspapers (Papathanassopoulos, 2000) appear to have political ties as well. In line with all southern European countries, in Greece ‘political logic tends to play a large role in broadcasting particularly - though not exclusively - in publicly owned media, and of course particularly in news’ (Hallin & Mancini, 2004: 109). Against this backdrop, it took place the gradual modernization of the Greek media system. Initially in the electronic media and especially in television there was a state monopoly. Public Radio and Television (ERT), founded in 1965, remained the only electronic media until the end of the 1980s. It was highly politicized in the sense that it was (and still is) under the direct control of the government of the day (Iosifidis & Papathanassopoulos, 2019; Papathanasopoulos, 2004). From the late 1980s onwards, a process of liberalization of the electronic media market, and in particular television, began. Initially, the initiative belonged to the then mayors of the three largest cities of the country (Athens, Thessaloniki, Piraeus) who were politically affiliated to the party of ND, which at the time was the main opposition party. After their election in 1986, they established three municipal radio stations: Athens 98.4, Thessaloniki 100 and Station 1 of Piraeus which became operational after 1987 (Papathanassopoulos, 2007: 128). The municipality of Thessaloniki also went on to establish TV 100, the first local non-state television network (Papathanassopoulos, 2005). Since 1989, the Greek state has allowed by law the establishment of private television stations and the granting of operating licences (Alexandrou, 2007). As a result, the number of private television networks of national scope has gradually increased and having become a principal

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source of information of public opinion (Deligiaouri, 2020; Negrine & Papathanassopoulos, 1996; Papathanassopoulos, 2000). The emergence of private television had several consequences. First, having de facto adopted commercial logic to increase its advertising revenues in combination with its technological features, (private) television has put more emphasis on personalities and images rather than policies and ideas (Deligiaouri, 2011). Second, the model of news reporting adopted by the major TV networks, with political commentators who interpret and criticize the government’s positions made it very challenging and complicated for a governing party to impose its issueframing (Papathanassopoulos, 2000: 57). Third, the explosion of private electronic media has created challenges for newspapers, which, among other things, are under pressure to modernize through the use of the internet and social media. In response, newspapers have focused on the analysis and interpretation of events as well as starting to exploit the possibilities of the new technologies (Leandros, 2000). In parallel, the media environment has become increasingly pressing and demanding, given that the number of television networks has further increased. For instance, there are currently six private nationwide television stations, dozens of private regional and local channels and hundreds of news radio stations across the country. In addition, from the middle 2000s onwards, the rise of the internet has contributed to the 24/7 news websites and political blogs increased in number as well. Particularly with all the leading newspapers having their own digital editions as well as the number of websites and online forums constantly increases (Alexandrou, 2007; Kotsikopoulou, 2002; Papathanassopoulos et al., 2021: 180–181). Furthermore, social media like Facebook, Twitter and YouTube have been becoming increasingly popular, attracting the interest of the youth and contributing to the speedy transmission of news (Deligiaouri, 2011: 65–66). In parallel, from the end of 2009 onwards the media landscape facing political parties and government in Greece has been broadened. The reason was that Greece was in the spotlight due to the Eurozone debt crisis attracting the focus of foreign media from all over the world (Koliastasis, 2020). Moreover, the media, as Papathanassopoulos has put it, ‘conduct their own polls - as they do in other countries. This means that, far more than just locating and reporting the “news” itself, they can then comment on it, often with their own political ends in view’ (2007: 137). News bulletins

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and newspapers very often publish opinion polls, highlighting not only the figures of voting intention and party preferences, but also government and opposition popularity as well as the prime ministerial and leadership approval ratings (Papathanassopoulos, 2000). As a result, they project the daily political battle in a campaign-like mode as a ‘horse race’, by putting emphasis on leaders’ personalities and sound bites. Hence they reinforce the notion of the personalization of the political process and the role of political leadership in the political scene (Karvonen 2010). The rapid development of private broadcasting together with the increasing presentation of opinion polls has had a considerable impact on the political communication landscape in Greece contributing to the modernization of the political campaigning (Papathanassopoulos, 2007). The 1996 national polls have been considered as the first ‘televised elections’ (Papathanassopoulos, 2000: 147), a trend that was observed in the subsequent elections as well (Yannas, 2001). Since then, parties and party leaders have become more professionalized in designing, crafting and implementing their political communication strategies (Negrine, 2008). For example, they have concentrated their election campaigns around television news programming, TV ads and televised appearances (Papathanassopoulos, 2007). Moreover, the election and thus the political campaigning have been modernized further for two reasons. The first is related to the growing use of the Internet and the creation of websites by political parties from 2000 onwards (Deligiaouri, 2020: 238). The second reason is the growing use of social media by parties and party leaders in political campaigning including Facebook as well as Twitter, YouTube and more recently Instagram in the context of the Web 2.0 era that the Greek political communication landscape has entered gradually from late 2000s onwards (e.g. Deligiaouri & Symeonidis, 2010; Deligiaouri, 2011; Veneti, Jackson & Lilleker, 2019a; Poulakidakos & Giannouli, 2019; Poulakidakos, 2020; Triantafillidou et al., 2020; Veneti & Ioannidis, 2020). Following the American example of the use of social media during the election campaigns by presidential candidates like Barack Obama in 2008 (Bimber, 2014; Katz et al., 2013), Greek political leaders are increasingly utilizing social media. They apply communication strategies that allow them to develop an unmediated communication with public opinion and thus, among other things, intensifying the personalization of the political process (e.g. Poulakidakos & Giannouli, 2019). The latter has also

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become evident in the use of political advertisements during election periods, as was the case in the 2012 elections (Deligiaouri, 2020). Overall, the modernization of the Greek media system with the advent of private television, the internet and more recently social media have contributed to the modernization of the political communication field and consequently of the political campaigning reinforcing, among others, the notion of the personalization of politics as well as the role of leadership in the political landscape. In this context political executives have another motivation to engage in permanent campaigning to defend their public image and improve their popularity.

Hypothesis, Methods and Data The work seeks to explore whether the Greek prime ministers of the period from 2012 to 2022 have employed the permanent campaign strategy. Given the nature of the Greek political communication environment, it is expected that all three premiers under consideration have engaged in a permanent campaigning process. From a methodological perspective, the study seeks to examine the Greek premiers’ communication strategies by applying the framework for the measurement of permanent campaigning as proposed by Lilleker and Joathan (Joathan & Lilleker, 2020). Having done a meta-analysis of the overall relevant literature, they have identified and organized the concept’s indicators into three groups linked to: capacity building and strategy; paid and owned media as well as earned media (Johathan & Lilleker 2020: 6–12). Capacity building and strategy consists of a number of indicators. The first is what refers to institutional adaptations including setting up communication structures in the political executive apparatus, the inclusion of communication professionals in the government staff as well as promoting of law changes and referendums. Conducting opinion polls to regularly monitor and consult polling data is also a key feature of the concept. Moreover, constant search for fund-raising as well as constant search for information on the preferences of citizens constitute core components of capacity building and strategy. The second group of indicators refers to paid and owned media. It consists of themes of election transferred to governance, the use of negative campaigning, the application of marketing techniques like the use of polling evidence to shape strategy, policy and presentation during

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the term of office and the use of institutional advertising to promote policy initiatives and campaign activities. The group of paid and owned media also includes the building of a following in social media for direct unfiltered communication with citizens, frequent posting on social media to set the agenda, engaging political and personalized communication, the application of hyperlinking, the use of promotional discourse, interactive communication with social media users and microtargeting audience. The third group of earned media comprises the promotion of communication activities aimed at generating positive media coverage, giving broadcasted and face-to-face speeches, planning and organizing public events either local, national or international as well as making political travels during the term of office to disseminate political messages. The study aims to examine, measure and analyse, for the first time, permanent campaigning of three Greek premiers (Antonis Samaras, Alexis Tsipras, Kyriakos Mitsotakis) from the perspective of the proposed theoretically informed framework and particularly the three groups of indicators. To identify and evaluate the relevant factors the work applies both qualitative and quantitative methods collecting and analysing both primary and secondary data. Primary data includes interviews with members of the prime ministerial and government staff of Samaras, Tsipras and Mitsotakis, respectively (see Appendix 1). Secondary data includes media reports, prime ministerial decisions and legislative documents on government communications as well as prime ministerial speeches, media interviews, press articles, press conferences and public statements gathered from the official archive of the Prime Minister’s website (www.primeminister.gr) for the period June 2012 (when Antonis Samaras came in office) until July 2021. In addition, posts of the three premiers are collected by their personal Facebook accounts and coded according to the proposed indicators by the methodological perspective (Johathan & Lilleker 2020) (see Appendix 2). In particular, the study organizes the collected Facebook posts in two time periods: thirty (30) days before the conduct of national elections and twenty-four (24) months after the polls during their term of office. In the case of Prime Minister Antonis Samaras the corresponding time periods are from 17 May to 17 June 2012 and from 18 June 2012 until 18 June 2014. In the case of Prime Minister Tsipras, the collection of pre-election posts corresponds to the January 2015 pre-election period— from 25 December 2014 to 25 January 2015, while the post-election ear covers the period from 26 January 2015 till 26 January 2017 including

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the posting in the election campaign of September 2015. To consider this period as part of his term of office is essential to secure methodological consistency with the cases of the other premiers. In the case of Mitsotakis the corresponding time periods are from 07 June to 07 July 2019 and from 08 July 2019 to 08 July 2021. Overall, the collection, coding and measurement of the Facebook posts of the three premiers gathered by their personal accounts allow to ascertain the frequency and emphasis that they put on the promotion of their communication strategy. It is assumed that their public activities are posted as well. Three reasons explain the choice to analyse their personal accounts. Firstly, the fact that there is no official account corresponding to the institution of the Prime Minister of Greece on Facebook, as is the case, for example, with Twitter (https://twitter.com/PrimeministerGR). Secondly, this study analyses the implementation of the communication strategy of three political executives during their terms. In this sense, what is important is to evaluate and examine the communication policies designed and implemented by them in collaboration with their communication staff. The third reason is the fact that Facebook is the social medium that prime ministers have been using more frequently in Greece in recent years compared to Twitter or Instagram. The analysis of primary and secondary data aims to identify and measure the implementation of permanent campaigning by identifying whether and to what extent the examined premiers have applied the proposed indicators.

Methodological Limitations It is worth noting that the examination of the prime ministerial permanent campaign strategy faces methodological limitations. This relates to the extent that premiers not only carry out communicative actions, but also publicize them on their personal social media accounts and particularly on Facebook. In other words, the study analyses the communication activities the prime ministers project within their personal Facebook accounts. However, it seems that in the case of Antonis Samaras, although the use of his personal account was of high frequency in the June 2012 election campaign, it was hardly frequent during his term of office. As a result, from a quantitative point of view, this does not fully reflect the actual frequency of his communication activity. During the same period

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he made more posts promoting his political messages through the official Facebook account of the ND party. It is noteworthy that in the first six months of his premiership he made a total of 26 posts on his personal account compared to 117 posts on the party account. Yet, the analysis and coding of the posts of the three prime ministers on their official Facebook party accounts goes beyond the purpose of this study. The latter focuses on the analysis of the image of the political personalities the premiers formed for themselves in collaboration with their communication staff and not their whole image.

Conclusion The strategy of permanent campaigning has been used for decades by prime ministers, presidents, party leaders and parliamentarians in many countries around the world. The weakening of political parties, the decline of party identification, the strengthening of polarization, the emergence of private television presenting constantly, among others, opinion polls and the growth of the internet and social media have created an environment conducive to the personalization of the political process and the rising role of political leadership, which in turn push political leaders to engage in a permanent campaigning process. One of the countries in which the trend has been observed is Greece, as previous empirical studies have indicated (Koliastasis, 2020). This study attempts to extend the analysis of the application of the permanent campaign strategy by Greek prime ministers of the period 2012–2022, including Antonis Samaras, Alexis Tsipras and Kyriakos Mitsotakis who have faced severe and successive crises in many fields and at multiple levels. To this end, it applies for the first time the methodological framework of measurement proposed by Johathan and Lilleker (2020). The structure of the book is as follows. The next three chapters explore and analyse the communication strategies applied by the prime ministers Samaras, Tsipras and Mitsotakis, respectively, from a permanent campaigning perspective. The fifth chapter summarizes the main findings of the analysis and compares the communication strategy implemented by the three political executives in Greece as well as comparing some of its elements among the six prime ministers of the period of the last 25 years. Moreover, it evaluates the contributions of the study to the relevant academic literature.

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CHAPTER 2

Antonis Samaras: The Permanent Campaign Strategy of a Centre-Right Prime Minister

Abstract This chapter focuses on the analysis of Antonis Samaras’ political background and campaigning style of governing in the era of sovereign debt crisis and the implementation of the memoranda. It measures and assesses permanent campaigning of Samaras against the three categories of the proposed theoretical framework (capacity building and strategy, paid and owned media as well as earned media). It finds that as prime minister and in line with his predecessors did follow the permanent campaign trend though he did not use all its features. He put more emphasis on factors related to capacity building and strategy as well as earned media rather than most of the components of the paid and owned media that focused on the use of social media, except for the election themes and negative campaigning. Keywords Permanent campaigning · Samaras · Coalition · Memorandum

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 P. A. Koliastasis, Permanent Campaigning in Greece in Times of Crisis, Political Campaigning and Communication, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11691-9_2

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Introduction The Political Background Antonis Samaras is a Harvard-educated economist who was first elected as a member of the New Democracy party in 1977 in the constituency of Messinia (Southern Greece), at the age of 26. He was the youngest MP in the history of the Greek parliament. In parallel, he was considered to belong to the conservative right wing of the party. Samaras was first sworn in as Finance Minister in the short-lived coalition government between ND and the left-wing SYN1 that emerged in June 1989 due to the implementation of the ‘pure’ proportional representation system. After the early elections of November 1989 that followed, he was appointed Foreign Minister in the also short-lived coalition government with the participation of all the then parliamentary parties (ND, PASOK, SYN)— the youngest Foreign Minister in the country’s history. He remained in this position after the third consecutive election held in April 1990, when ND managed to form a single-party government with a narrow majority of 151 MPs (in a 300-seat parliament) under the premiership of Konstantinos Mitsotakis. However, two years later Samaras was removed from the government due to his disagreement with the prime minister on the issue of the name of the neighbouring state of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). The latter had emerged after the break-up of Yugoslavia. Mitsotakis had followed a more conciliatory, moderate stance, seeking to resolve the issue by establishing a composite name containing the term ‘Macedonia’. In contrast, Samaras, demonstrating a more intransigent right-wing line, advocated the rejection of any solution containing the term ‘Macedonia’ or its derivative (Voulgaris, 2011). A few months later, in October 1992, he also resigned as a member of ND, founding the Political Spring, a new right-wing party that had the issue of the name of the neighbouring state at the centre of its agenda. In the following months, other members of the ND left its parliamentary group, declaring themselves as independent MPs and support for Political Spring. As a result, Mitsotakis lost his absolute parliamentary majority and was forced to call early elections in October 1993 (Featherstone, 1994).

1 The Coalition of Left and Progress (SYN) was an electoral alliance between the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) and the Greek Left founded in June 1989.

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ND was defeated by Andreas Papandreou’s PASOK, while the Political Spring party received 4.9% and 10 seats (Voulgaris, 2011). However, three years later in the September 1996 elections, it failed to pass the 3% threshold necessary to enter the parliament. In the subsequent elections of 2000, Samaras, although not participating, publicly supported ND, which had in the meantime been led by Kostas Karamanlis—nephew of the party’s founder Konstantinos Karamanlis. In the European elections of June 2004, Samaras returned to ND, becoming head of the party’s European ballot. Three years later, in the 2007 national elections, he returned to the Greek Parliament as a representative of the Messinia district, and in January 2009 he took over the Ministry of Culture. After the electoral defeat of ND in the October 2009 snap polls and the resignation of Kostas Karamanlis, Samaras ran for the leadership post (Pappas, 2010). His opponents were the centrist Dora Bakoyanni— former Mayor of Athens, former Minister of Foreign Affairs and daughter of Konstantinos Mitsotakis—the ultra-conservative Panagiotis Psomiadis and, in the initial phase, the moderate Dimitris Avramopoulos who later withdrew from the race declaring his support for Samaras’ candidacy. In this leadership election, ND, following PASOK, adopted for the first time the open primaries system of selecting a leader directly from the party’s members and sympathizers (Loulis, 2011). The two main candidates for the leadership were Samaras and Bakoyanni. The former sought to distance himself from the negative aspects of the Karamanlis administration, to which he attributed the main responsibility for the electoral defeat, including a number of cases that at the time were considered scandals and the fact that ND appeared to have abandoned its core centre-right principles (Triantafyllou & Terzis, 2009). These two factors, as Samaras argued, frustrated many of the party’s traditional voters who mostly chose to abstain in the 2009 elections rather than shift to PASOK or other right-wing parties. Thus, he suggested that ND should prioritize its ideological reconfiguration by combining traditional conservative values with modern liberal economic ideas, to realign primarily its disillusioned traditional supporters (Samaras, 2009). Once it would achieve this, he claimed, ND could appeal to the undecided, fluid voters (Samaras, 2009). In contrast, Bakoyanni defended Karamanlis’ administration arguing that ND should insist to position itself at the centre of the political spectrum aiming to reach the voters of the middle ground. She suggested that the dilemma is between an open, catchall party and an isolated one (Bakoyanni, 2009). In this context, she

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projected herself as the most electable candidate (Triantafyllou & Terzis, 2009). Samaras prevailed and became president of ND in November 2009. It seems that due to the party’s recent defeat in the October elections by George Papandreou’s PASOK, most ND members and friends considered that a return to power was still a long way off. Therefore, they seemed to have prioritized the ideological reconstruction of the party (May 1973). In these circumstances, the right-wing Samaras had a de facto advantage as he was closer to the ideological roots of the party. In parallel, at the end of 2009, the Greek economy was under severe pressure due to acute fiscal problems. A few months later, the country was unable to borrow funds from the international markets and had to resort to the EU and the IMF for financial assistance to avoid a disorderly default and a Grexit. In return, the PASOK government of PASOK led by George Papandreou adopted in May 2010 a Memorandum of Economic Adjustment aiming to bring down rapidly the double-digit fiscal deficit and improve the economic competitiveness of the country (Kazakos, 2011). Samaras, despite leading a pro-European centre-right party which under the leadership of its founder Konstantinos Karamanlis had succeeded in introducing Greece into the European Community in 1981, decided to vote against the bailout plan. A decision with which his internal party rival Dora Bakoyanni disagreed voting for the Memorandum and as a result she was expelled from the parliamentary group of the party (To Vima 2010a, 2010b). The choice of Samaras to oppose the bailout seems to have been attributed to three reasons. The first one was his disagreement with the economic policy mix (Afonso et al., 2015: 327). Second, his desire to reap the inevitable social discontent generated by the implementation of a program of unpopular austerity measures. Something which initially paid off in polling terms. According to a Metron poll, in September 2011 ND received 34% of the vote, maintaining an eight-point lead over PASOK (Voulgaris & Nikolakopoulos, 2014: 19). Thirdly, Samaras sought to maintain ND as a receptor of social protest and an alternative to the PASOK government, as otherwise the role of opposition would be played by the parties of the communist and radical Left (Pretenteris, 2012: 84–85). Furthermore, there seem to be additional reasons concerning the structure of the Greek political system and the political culture of the country. Comparing the political situation in Greece and Portugal during the

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Memorandum period, Alfonso et al. argue that, ‘parties which rely to a greater extent on the selective distribution of state resources to mobilize electoral support (clientelistic links) are more reluctant to agree to fiscal retrenchment (..) In Greece, where parties relied extensively on these clientelistic links, austerity reforms have been characterized by recurring conflicts and disagreements between the main parties (…) By contrast, in Portugal, where parties relied less on clientelistic strategies, austerity reforms have been more consensual because fiscal retrenchment challenged to a lesser extent [their] electoral base’ (2015: 315). It is worth noting, however, that the structural features of Greek politics hardly prevented Samaras from finally joining the pro-bailout coalition government led by Lucas Papademos in November 2011. However, it seems that his political stance, although antimemorandum, was in practice softer compared to the anti-bailout position of SYRIZA. Samaras promised to renegotiate the Memorandum to ease austerity measures but avoided supporting its total cancellation. In a speech on 7 July 2010, he noted that ‘we have to get out of the forced one-way street of the Memorandum [yet] until then we will respect the obligations the country has undertaken […] The Memorandum is binding as long as we need support […] The question is whether we can in a relatively short time not need it’ (cited in Kazakos, 2011: 211–212). Also, ND voted in favour of several bills in the parliament concerning liberal reforms included in the adjustment program (Kazakos, 2011: 212). In any case, the economic impact of the bailout plan was heavy. The recession deepened, the unemployment rate soared, incomes fell and poverty increased (Liargovas & Tzifakis, 2021). Consequently, social discontent intensified and in June 2011 the so-called the Greek ‘Indignados’2 (Koliastasis, 2014: 190) appeared in the centre of Athens and other Greek cities. The social protest caused political unrest forcing Prime Minister George Papandreou to resign allowing for a formation of a PASOK-ND (initially and Popular Orthodox Rally) coalition under the premiership of the technocrat Lucas Papademos. Under these circumstances, Samaras abandoned his anti-bailout stance and joined the pro-bailout coalition which took over to negotiate and secure parliamentary approval of the second Memorandum. As a result, he lost a significant 2 The Indignados had appeared some time ago in Spain, protesting against the economic crisis (Karatzogianni, 2015).

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part of his parliamentary group as more than 20 ND MPs voted against the second program (Gemenis & Nezi, 2015: 21). In the early elections that followed in May 2012, although ND ranked first, it fell below 20% (18.8%)—a record low for the party. PASOK also fell, for the first time since 1974, to third place taking 13.2% of the vote, while SYRIZA ranked second taking 16.3% of the electorate. The failure to form a coalition led to a second round of elections in June 2012. Worrying about a possible Grexit in case of SYRIZA’s election, the majority of the electorate favoured ND which managed to realign many of its traditional supporters and several centre-right figures such as Dora Bakoyanni who rejoined the party. In the end, ND won again, increasing its vote share by 10 points, reaching 29.7% and taking 129 seats. Under the leadership of Antonis Samaras a coalition with PASOK and the Democratic Left (DIMAR) was formed with a total of 179 seats. The structure of the following sections is as follows. The next three describe and analyse the implementation of permanent campaigning by examining the criteria that make up capacity building and strategy, paid and owned media as well as earned media. The final section summarizes the conclusions. Capacity Building and Strategy Institutional Adaptations Regarding the institutional adaptations as part of permanent campaigning strategy, Samaras had already, since the June 2012 election, included in his communication staff experts like communication advisers, pollsters and journalists (Terzis & Triantafillou, 2012). George Mouroutis with several years of experience in private sector communication companies, had been appointed as head of the party’s Press Office and for a period of time from December 2011 onwards as deputy press spokesman (iefimerida, 2011; Lazaridis, 2022: interview with the author; Mouroutis, 2022: interview with the author). Another journalist, Yannis Michelakis, with many years of service in major newspapers and national TV networks, was appointed as the press spokesman of ND (Kassimatis, 2011; Mouroutis, 2022: interview with the author). His predecessor, from November 2009 to January 2011, Panos Panagiotopoulos, was also a prominent journalist with many years of experience in major newspapers, radio and television networks, while having served for several years as an MP and former Minister in the

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previous Karamanlis administration (Mouroutis, 2022: interview with the author; Proto Thema, 2009). The communication staff also included the pollster and head of the polling company MRB, Dimitris Mavros and the communicator Grigoris Tsimogiannis (Lazaridis, 2022: interview with the author; Mavros, 2022: interview with the author; Mouroutis, 2022: interview with the author). According to Mouroutis, during the opposition period of ND there was also collaboration with the polling firm Rass (2022: interview with the author). In addition, the economist Chrysanthos Lazaridis (To Vima, 2012b), who had many years of political cooperation with Samaras, contributed to the formulation of his political strategy, acted as his key speechwriter and played a central role in his staff (Lazaridis, 2022: interview with the author; Mavros, 2022: interview with the author; Mouroutis, 2022: interview with the author). The staff also included experienced political figures such as Kostas Bouras and Dimitris Stamatis. Furthermore, it seems, according to Mouroutis, that during the June 2012 election campaign, there was cooperation with American communication experts and the Newtons communication and advertising company (2022: interview with the author). During his term of office, Samaras organized his communication staff in the Prime Minister’s Office accordingly. Mouroutis was appointed director of the Press Office (Mouroutis, 2022: interview with the author; Terzis & Triantafillou, 2012), while Lazaridis, who had in the meantime been elected MP, continued to act as key prime ministerial speechwriter and senior adviser with a central role in the formulation of the government’s political strategy (Lazaridis, 2022: interview with the author; Mouroutis, 2022: interview with the author; Terzis & Papadiohos, 2014). He was, after all, the man who represented Samaras and ND in the drafting of the coalition agreement with PASOK and DIMAR and played a role in the effort to renegotiate the terms of the Memorandum with the Troika. In addition, Stamatis was appointed Minister of State and Bouras became director of the Prime Minister’s Office (Terzis & Triantafillou, 2012). Once again, Samaras’ communication staff included communication professionals. Apart from Mouroutis, the position of government spokesman and Deputy Minister to the Prime Minister was occupied by the experienced journalist and MP of ND, Simos Kedikoglou, who had worked previously in print and electronic media (Mouroutis, 2022: interview with the author; Terzis & Triantafillou, 2012). His responsibilities

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also consisted of issues related to state media. Later in June 2014, he was replaced by Sofia Voultepsi, also a journalist and a parliamentarian of ND, who was the first female government spokesperson (Mouroutis, 2022: interview with the author; iefimerida, 2014). Samaras’ team included the journalist Nikos Tsouchias as well, who had been appointed as director of the Prime Minister’s Office in the Parliament (Karageorgou, 2015). The pollster Dimitris Mavros and the communication expert Grigoris Tsimogiannis, who participated for a time in the formulation of the Prime Minister’s communication strategy (Mouroutis, 2022; Terzis & Triantafillou, 2012), continued to offer their services (Lazaridis, 2022: interview with the author; Mavros, 2022: interview with the author; Mouroutis, 2022: interview with the author). It is worth noting that Mavros had previously collaborated with the centre-right Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis (2004–2009), conducting quantitative opinion surveys and focus groups (Koliastasis, 2020a: 243). Daily meetings of the communication staff were held at the Maximos Mansion (where the prime ministerial Office is located). These meetings, that were usually held without the presence of the prime minister who was informed afterwards, seem to have been attended by the Director of the Press Office, the government spokesman, the Minister of State, the Prime Minister’s speechwriter, the Director of the Prime Minister’s Office and, depending on the issue, the respective minister (Mavros, 2022: interview with the author; Mouroutis, 2022: interview with the author). On a weekly basis, the pollster Dimitris Mavros participated in the meetings as well (Mouroutis, 2022: interview with the author). In parallel, from the middle of the governing term onwards, these meetings were also attended by the then press spokesperson of ND AnnaMichel Asimakopoulou, the then minister and MP of ND Makis Voridis and the then party secretary Andreas Papamimikos (iefimerida, 2013; Mavros, 2022: interview with the author; Mouroutis, 2022: interview with the author). Moreover, it seems that an effort was made to coordinate the communication policy of the government apparatus. According to Mouroutis, a meeting was held during the day between him, the government spokesman and the press officers of the ministries. Thus, the Office of the Prime Minister was informed about the ministerial communication activities and it was able to give relevant communication instructions. Moreover, based on this information and in cooperation with the party, communication documents of political positions and political arguments

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were formulated, which were used by the government and party officials for their appeals to the media (Mouroutis, 2022: interview with the author). Even in the January 2015 election campaign, there was close cooperation between the prime ministerial staff and the party’s staff to formulate their communication policy. This included party executives such as the secretary of ND Andreas Papamimikos and the Secretary of Strategic Planning and Communication Menelaos Daskalakis as well as the party spokesperson and journalist Maria Spyraki who, among others, were responsible for organizing the candidates’ tours and channelling communication material to both regional media and social media (Kathimerini, 2014e; Triantafillou, 2015). Overall, the active role of the party in this case is most likely to be attributed to the fact that ND was part of a coalition government. With regard to the particular responsibilities of the Prime Minister’s communications staff, the Press Office was responsible for news management, liaising with journalists and contributing to the formulation of the communication strategy. It was also responsible for monitoring the media and social media trends in order to secure a timely and effective communication rebuttal by the government (Lazaridis, 2022: interview with the author; Mouroutis, 2022: interview with the author; Terzis & Triantafillou, 2012). According to Mouroutis, the General Secretariat of the Press, which was part of the Prime Minister’s Office, compiled a daily report with the publications of the Greek newspapers and another report with the publications of the foreign press, which was sent to the Prime Minister’s Press Office (2022: interview with the author). In terms of the electronic media, Greek and foreign, there was also a media monitoring mechanism. It was operated by a private company acting as an external partner, while for the domestic media, the monitoring of news was done by the corresponding communication mechanism of the party of ND. Conducting Opinion Polls During the Term and Research Citizens’ Preferences and Data Samaras as prime minister systematically monitored public opinion trends by conducting private polls. The pollster Dimitris Mavros, with whom he collaborated, was conducting throughout the term focus groups and polls containing all polling indicators (e.g. voting intention, popularity of

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the Prime Minister and political leaders, suitability for the Prime Minister’s post, etc.) as well as indicators reflecting public opinion trends on current affairs (Mavros, 2022: interview with the author; Mouroutis, 2022: interview with the author). Furthermore, in the weekly meetings of the Prime Minister’s staff in which he participated, he analyzed the poll findings and made recommendations on the PM’s communication strategy (Mavros, 2022: interview with the author; Mouroutis, 2022: interview with the author). Moreover, according to Mavros, on either three-month or six-month basis, he presented to Samaras’ communication staff the Luminus report prepared by his polling firm MRB (2022: interview with the author). The report used polling data from three different databases: the Trends opinion poll which was conducted by MRB consistently every six months using face-to-face interviews; the Target Group Index which concerned social and consumer issues; and the Risc survey which studied issues related to people’s socio-cultural values (Mavros, 2022: interview with the author). In parallel, according to Mouroutis, other pollsters also participated in meetings of Samaras’ staff from time to time (2022: interview with the author). There was, for example, cooperation with the polling company Metron Analysis during the 2014 European elections. In addition, on a monthly basis, there was contact between members of the Prime Minister’s communication staff and the polling company Rass (Mouroutis, 2022: interview with the author). Regarding the use of social media and in particular Samaras’ Facebook account to conduct an opinion survey inviting citizens to offer their views on issues related to either electoral campaigns or government evaluation, the relevant analysis of his posts indicated that no such communication initiative was taken. With respect to the conduct of research through social media and especially Facebook, it appears from the analysis of the relevant data that Samaras used this tool only in the June 2012 election campaign. On 5 June 2012 he made a post on his personal Facebook account, inviting citizens to express their opinion on the issue of renegotiating the Memorandum. Specifically, the post stated that: What renegotiation means to you? Do you believe in it or do you propose an alternative? Share your thoughts with us by writing a comment, asking a question, taking a picture, creating a video or any other way you think is best. We will be very happy to read your suggestions and respond to as many of them as possible!

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Yet, this was a communication practice he did not continue during his premiership. Communication for example with the party base seems to have been conducted in traditional ways such as party meetings, conferences, debates and to some extent through social media (Mouroutis, 2022: interview with the author). Fund-Raising In terms of the fund-raising activities which also constitutes, in many countries (e.g. the US), part of the permanent campaign strategy (Flanagan, 2012), Samaras, in line with his predecessors in the premiership, seems to have avoided developing such communication initiatives. The main reason is the institutional funding framework in Greece whereby most of the parties’ revenues come from state funding. Although private funding is not prohibited, the limits of private contributions are low and the funding conditions are strict (OECD, 2018). Also due to the large-scale state intervention in the economy and the dominant political culture which is characterized by clientelism, intense populism, polarization and constant accusations over alleged scandals and corruption, political leaders (as well as parliamentary candidates) usually avoid engaging in fund-raising activities. Paid and Owned Media Election Themes Transferred to Governance In the context of the paid and owned media that characterize permanent campaigning, one of the key elements that premiers emphasize is to transfer their election agenda to governing term in an effort to retain their credibility by fulfilling their election promises. During the June 2012 election campaign, Samaras made three main pledges: securing Greece’s status in the Eurozone, renegotiating the Memorandum to ease austerity and stimulate growth as well as improving public security by reducing the crime rate and curb undocumented migration (Koliastasis, 2020b: 255). In particular, the link between renegotiation and remaining in the euro was aimed at differentiating ND from SYRIZA, whose anti-bailout strategy was regarded as raising concerns about the possibility of a Grexit (Vasilopoulou & Halikiopoulou, 2013). After the elections, Samaras as prime minister insisted on the same issues. He emphasized that Greece would remain in the euro avoiding

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a Grexit. It is indicative that after the completion of the second Memorandum review at the end of 2012, which ensured the continuation of funding and the implementation of additional debt relief measures, Samaras began to use the ‘success story’ slogan to highlight the recovery of the Greek economy (Koliastasis, 2020b: 249). In particular, in May 2013 he stated that, ‘those who invested in Greece’s failure were disappointed. We are fighting and winning the battle; there is no other solution for us. Greece is writing its own success story, Grexit is dead’ (Samaras, 2013d). Moreover, about a year after the elections he argued in a speech that ‘last year, most of our partners in Europe expected Greece’s exit from the euro. Today, they are expecting the exact opposite: Greece’s exit from the recession and remaining in the Eurozone’ (cited in Koliastasis, 2020b: 255). According to Lazaridis, the promotion of Greece as a ‘success story’ mainly reflected the view of the foreign press concerning the economic progress of the country (2022: interview with the author). Samaras also systematically emphasized the modification of the fiscal adjustment mix allowing for the general improvement of the economy. In April 2013, he claimed that the government had agreed with the Troika on measures to reduce property tax by 15% and to allow more instalments for the repayment of overdue tax debts (Kathimerini, 2013d; Samaras, 2013c). In June 2013, he claimed that Greece was recovering and was now moving away from the risk of exiting the Eurozone, stating that ‘we have, in many ways, in the series of those efforts, succeeded! Now the rating agencies upgrade Greece and nobody is discussing anymore about the Grexit! And I’m very grateful that everybody is discussing about “Greekcovery” [Greece+recovery]’ (Samaras, 2013a, 2013b). In parallel, as premier he kept highlighting public security issues, focusing on both the reduction of crime and the restriction of undocumented immigration (Kathimerini, 2012b, 2013g). Overall, although his activity on his personal Facebook page was limited during his term, about 25% of the eighty-five (85) posts he made during the first 24 months of his tenure, were related to the promotion of issues of his campaign agenda and the fulfilment of election promises. Most of them were related to stimulating growth and recovery of the economy (13) and renegotiating (8) the terms of the Memorandum, while securing the country stays in the euro.

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Negative Campaigning During the election campaigns, parties and political leaders often engage in negative campaigning attacking each other (e.g. Lau & Rovner, 2009; Lilleker, 2006: 127–131) especially through the use of social media (Ceccobelli, 2018). Similarly, it is likely that the negative campaign tactic also used in the post-election period by both prime ministers and opposition leaders (e. g. Kiss & Szabo, 2019; Rose, 2012). In Greece this tactic has been repeatedly observed in the form of negative advertising. ND, for example, applied it in the 1996 national elections against the then PASOK government and the then Prime Minister Kostas Simitis to damage their credibility (Papathanassopoulos, 2007: 134). During the June 2012 election period, Samaras engaged in a negative campaign against SYRIZA, often citing the fear of a possible Grexit in case of an electoral victory (Vasilopoulou & Halikiopoulou, 2013). It is indicative that during this period he made four relevant posts on his Facebook account. Once in office, he argued that the anti-bailout position of SYRIZA and the proposed vote against the relevant bills in the Parliament, which were necessary for the continuation of the country’s funding from the EUIMF, would lead directly to a disorderly bankruptcy and a return to the national currency (drachma) (Kathimerini, 2013g, 2013m). As Lazaridis points out, ‘during the pre-election period, Tsipras had stated that “currency is not a fetish” and also the programmatic platform he presented in Thessaloniki in 2014 would also lead to a Grexit if implemented’ (2022: interview with the author). In parallel, it seems that the PM’s communication staff sought to put pressure on SYRIZA on issues such as public security, terrorism and immigration. In this way, according to Mouroutis, it would have been possible to highlight its contradictions, to blur its image in public opinion and to emphasize the risk in case of a possible win (2022: interview with the author). In addition, Samaras often argued that ‘two extremes’ exist on the political spectrum. Based on this approach, to the formulation of which Lazaridis made a key contribution (Kathimerini, 2013d; Mavros, 2022: interview with the author; Mouroutis, 2022: interview with the author), ND projected SYRIZA as representing the left extreme, while the neofascist Golden Dawn as representing the right one (Kathimerini, 2013e, 2013f). This rhetoric seems to have been based on two assumptions on the part of Samaras and his associates. The first was that both SYRIZA and

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Golden Dawn belonged to the so-called anti-bailout camp seeking the abolition of the Memorandum. Second, according to Lazaridis, both of them, though to a different extent, held the same attitude of tolerating or even promoting the use of violence (2022: interview with the author) and in some cases terrorism (Mouroutis, 2022: interview with the author). The mutual attacks between ND and SYRIZA were multiplied in the period of June 2013. The ND-led government in order to fulfil the Memorandum commitment for 4.000 redundancies of public sector employees (and then carry out an equal number of recruitments in other sectors of the state) (Kathimerini, 2013j), decided to close overnight and restructure the public broadcasting ERT. The aim was to reopen it in a new form, with fewer employees and at a lower cost (Iosifidis & Papathanassopoulos, 2019). Reactions from both ERT employees’ unions and the opposition led by SYRIZA were fierce. The government was accused of attempting to ‘silence’ public television and its journalists (Iosifidis & Papathanassopoulos, 2019). Eventually the Council of State (the highest administrative court of the country) ruled the decision legal (Kathimerini, 2013c, 2013i), and a few weeks later ERT was replaced by a new public broadcaster called NERIT (New Hellenic Radio Internet Television) (Iosifidis & Papathanassopoulos, 2019). Overall, however, Samaras’ associates acknowledge that although the decision was correct, the handling of the case was hardly effective and appropriate (Lazaridis, 2022: interview with the author; Mouroutis, 2022: interview with the author). This issue caused the withdrawal of the Democratic Left from the coalition, the parliamentary majority of which was reduced (Kathimerini, 2013j, 2013l). Samaras’ negative campaigning was also evident in 2014 in two respects. First, in the election campaign for the European Parliament and Local Government elections in May 2014, he repeated that any SYRIZA victory would lead the country to political destabilization, putting at risk the effort of national recovery (Kathimerini, 2014a, 2014c; Terzis, 2014a). Second, in December 2014, when the decision of SYRIZA (and other parties of opposition) to vote against the candidate proposed by the ND-PASOK government for the post of the President of the Republic, which, according to the Greek Constitution, requires a majority of 180 MPs, resulting in the early dissolution of the Parliament and the announcement of early elections (Kathimerini, 2014d; Terzis, 2014b). However, in quantitative terms, according to the analysis of his posts on his personal Facebook account, Samaras made only three posts related

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to negative campaigning during his first 24 months in office. This, as already mentioned, is attributed to the fact that he made relatively limited use of his personal social media accounts for the promotion of his communication activities. Use of Marketing During Terms of Office Regarding the use of marketing and polling findings for the formulation of political and communication strategy and the shaping of political messages, Samaras’ communication staff included the pollster and head of MRB, Dimitris Mavros, who systematically conducted opinion surveys analysing the relevant findings (Lazaridis, 2022: interview with the author; Mavros, 2022: interview with the author; Mouroutis, 2022: interview with the author). Moreover, the influence of polls on Samaras’ political and communication strategy is reflected both during the preelection and post-election period in a number of cases. For example, according to Mouroutis, the findings of the focus groups were used in the 2012 and 2015 election campaigns to shape the advertising spots (2022: interview with the author). During the term, opinion polls seem to have influenced, in part, the Prime Minister’s rhetoric. As Lazaridis points out, focus groups were used, to a certain extent, to shape political messages, although there was not always agreement with the recommendations (2022: interview with the author). In this context, according to Mavros, ‘discussions and brainstorming were held, but the final decision was made by Samaras and his close associates. My influence was greater during the first year of government and with regard to the prime minister’s political messages and public appearances at the two events of the annual International Trade Fair in Thessaloniki in 2012 and 2013, much less in 2014’ (2022: interview with the author). Overall, it appears that the use of the focus group data was not quite extensive since there was, to some extent, concerns in Samaras’ communication staff about their usefulness (Lazaridis, 2022: interview with the author; Mouroutis, 2022: interview with the author). Polls, however, seem to have played a role in the selection of ND candidates for the local elections of May 2014. According to Mouroutis, the then party secretary in cooperation with polling firms investigated the popularity of a number of mayoral and regional candidates and based on the relevant data and taking into account other factors, he made recommendations to Samaras (2022: interview with the author).

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As another indication of the use of marketing techniques by Samaras and his staff can be considered the frequent use and promotion of the slogan ‘by order of Samaras’. The latter accompanied the prime minister’s decisions, among others, on issues of reforms, promotion of development projects, implementation of social policy measures, management of the migration issue and acceleration in the implementation of various policy decisions (Kathimerini, 2012a, 2013a, 2013b, 2013h, 2013k, 2014b). According to the director of the Prime Minister’s Press Office, George Mouroutis (2022: interview with the author), this approach was due to two reasons. Firstly, the desire to demonstrate in political communication terms, the determination of the government and the premier in promoting several policy initiatives. Especially since political intervention was essential either to mobilize some ministers who were delaying the implementation of government decisions or to overcome the longstanding deficiencies and delays of the Greek public administration. Second, the notion that this tactic allowed Samaras to make his political mark more visible and improve his political image among the voter groups he was addressing. However, it is possible to argue that this communication tactic was also related to the nature of the coalition government, which was initially a three-party government (ND, PASOK, DIMAR) and later a two-party one (ND-PASOK) with the participation of PASOK leader Evangelos Venizelos as Deputy Prime Minister. From a theoretical point of view, it is difficult for citizens in the case of multiparty governments to credit political benefits (or to assign responsibility for possible political costs) to the parties forming the coalition (e.g. Powell & Whitten, 1993). Therefore, Samaras probably had an incentive to identify himself with certain government decisions to receive the full political benefit. In terms of the impact of opinion polls on government policy issues, it seems, according to his aides, that it was rather limited mainly due to the pressing political and economic conditions at the time. The government had to push unpopular austerity measures and structural changes of the Memorandum to secure the country’s financing and prevent Grexit. So, it seems that Samaras had no alternative. It is also indicative that crucial decisions such as the one to close ERT (and reopen it in a different form) to fill the number of employees that needed to be fired under the commitments of the Memorandum, had not been polled before it was announced (Mavros, 2022: interview with the author).

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Institutional Advertising Both during the election period and, to a lesser degree, the term of office, Samaras employed advertising spots, including visual and audiovisual messages, to promote his policies. In particular, through his personal Facebook account, he promoted nine (9) ads during the pre-election period and sixteen (16) during the post-election period, although ten (10) of these were related to the campaign for the May 2014 European elections. The themes of the advertising spots focused on promoting the economic recovery and the efforts of his government to stabilize the country’s position in the Eurozone and to gradually exit from the adjustment programs (e.g. Kathimerini, 2012c). Frequent Publication An important indicator of the implementation of the permanent campaign strategy is the frequency of posting on social media. The data on Samaras’ public presence show a mixed picture. During the month of the election campaign, he made a total of 64 Facebook posts on his personal account. However, after the elections, the use of social media to promote his communication policy has been rather limited. During his 24 first months in office, he made only 85 posts (see Table 2.1). The limited use of his personal Facebook page (as well as other social media) is due, according to his associates, to three reasons. The first was that during his leadership in ND and his premiership (2009–2015), the use of social media for political purposes was not as prevalent in Greece as in the following years—back then, television, radio and newspapers were regarded as still more important (Lazaridis, 2022: interview with the author). The second reason, according to his aides, was the highly critical and aggressive attitude of many social media users with the presence of many fake Facebook accounts and trolls which were largely exploited by the opposition of SYRIZA (Mouroutis, 2022: interview with the author). However, as Lazaridis points out, there was an independent group on social media, especially on Facebook, called the ‘Truth Team’ which, although not officially affiliated with ND, was politically affiliated with the centre-right party and could rebut the arguments of political opponents (2022: interview with the author). It is worth noting, however, that this initiative had been launched in a different context by ND during the June 2012 campaign, adopting practices developed in the US and thus referring to the Americanization thesis (Negrine & Papathanassopoulos, 1996; Swanson & Mancini, 1996). According to Mouroutis

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Table 2.1 Prime Minister Antonis Samaras: Results of permanent campaigning indicators Antonis Samaras Pre-election Posts Reactions Shares Comments Fund-raising Research citizens’ preferences Conducting polls Travels Advertising Hyperlinking 1 Hyperlinking 2 Hyperlinking 3 Interactivity—replies Interactivity—mentions Interactivity—questions Interactivity—shares Personalized comm Videos Live Gen. positive coverage Local events National events International events Negative campaigning Theme 1 Theme 2 Theme 3 Prom. Disc.—past deeds Prom. Disc.—specific act- ions/future Prom. Disc.—general goals Prom. Disc.—current actions Prom. Disc.—promotional ideas Prom. Disc.—political positions

64 15.097 1.889 3.854 0 1 0 8 9 0 0 23 0 2 0 0 0 14 4 38 17 4 0 4 – – – – – – – – –

Post-election 85 32.101 1.997 8.555 0 0 0 6 15 0 0 54 0 0 0 0 0 34 1 58 7 12 6 3 8 13 2 5 6 9 6 21 10

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(2022: interview with the author), ND ‘had included in its new website a section called “Truth Team”. The idea was hardly original. It came from Barack Obama’s campaign which developed it in February 2012 for his re-election. It was a group of people, which on a 24-hour basis had undertaken to answer the questions of citizens and certainly the voters of ND. In this context, some videos with old statements of SYRIZA executives that were not widely known, were published (…) In parallel, the “Truth Team” was also an attempt for the party to respond to the “communication army” that SYRIZA had formed in an extremely effective way at that time. So, ND tried in an official way to network its supporters (..) After the elections this team evolved into a private initiative without, as far as I know, an official connection with ND’. The third reason for the limited use of Samaras’ personal accounts on Facebook seems to be related to the emphasis on the use of the party’s Facebook accounts. For example, during the first six months of his premiership, the number of posts made on the Facebook account of ND concerning Samaras’ communication activities was 117, i.e. more than the number of posts made on his personal account (85) during the first 24 months of his term. In parallel, the party’s youth organization (ONNED), which carried out social media campaigns, mainly through advertising spots (Mouroutis, 2022: interview with the author), also had a rather frequent social media activity. Overall, however, according to Mouroutis, ND was much less organized compared to other parties such as PASOK and SYRIZA in the use of social media and the internet (2022: interview with the author). Nonetheless Samaras’ staff seemed to be monitoring the trends and the political climate that was being formed on social media with the use of specialized tools that measured the impact of the premier’s political messages (Mouroutis, 2022: interview with the author). Yet, there were reservations about how representative of the broad public is the political climate formed on social media. In any case, the view of Samaras’ staff was that television remained the dominant medium in terms of shaping the political agenda and its influence was evaluated as much greater compared to other media and social networks (Mouroutis, 2022: interview with the author). Building a Following on Social Media The relatively low importance Samaras attached to social media is reflected in the relatively small number of followers and the low engagement rates

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(likes, shares, retweets) both on Facebook and other social media. Based on the relevant analysis, the number of followers on Facebook on 14 April 2022 was 58 thousand. In the June 2012 election period, when he made a total of 64 posts, the number of reactions he collected reached 15.097, the number of shares was 1.889 and of comments 3.854. During the first 24 months of his term of office, though, he made only 85 posts on his personal Facebook account, which gathered a total of 32.101 reactions, 1.997 shares and 8.555 comments. These are numbers, clearly lower (on average) compared to the pre-election period, a consequence of the low frequency of posting and his preference for his public presence posts to be made more often on the official Facebook account of the ND party. It is indicative that during the first 6 months of his premiership, 117 posts were made on this account concerning the promotion of his communication activities (see Table 2.1). Promotional Discourse and Engaging Political and Personalized Communication Regarding the content of Samaras’ posts on social media and the distinction between political and personal, the relevant data suggest that in his case the emphasis was exclusively on posts of political content. Both during the pre-election and post-election period there were zero posts containing messages in which the PM refers to his private life or family. According to Mouroutis, ‘his public presence on social media was mainly of an institutional-political nature and less of a personalized or lifestyle form’ (2022: interview with the author). Indicative of this approach is that to date he has not acquired an Instagram account, which is used more for posts with content from the personal and private life of politicians compared to other social networks (e.g. Jung et al., 2017; Poulakidakos & Giannouli, 2019). As for the political posts on his personal account promoting specific political initiatives, these were analyzed in six categories including past deeds, specific actions for future plans, general goals, current actions, political ideas the prime minister defends as well as third-party positions that Samaras supports aligning himself with others (see Appendix A). The relevant data indicates he placed greater emphasis on defending political ideas (22) and support of political positions aligning himself with others (13). This might be attributed to the fact he faced multiple challenges as a premier: negotiating with the international creditors of Greece, coordinating and securing the unity of a multiparty government, and confronting the anti-bailout opposition of SYRIZA.

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Hyperlinking The use of hyperlinking as the relevant data suggest is comparatively extensive. Although there was no evidence about Samaras’ Facebook posts linking either to websites which present the PM’s current actions related to constituency service or reinforce the PM’s political-ideological position, there were several posts referring to websites which present the PM’s current actions. Such ones included videos of his speeches posted on the Prime Minister’s YouTube channel, advertising posts, statements and speeches referring to the PM’s website (www.primeminister.gr) and public activities from the PM’s Facebook account. Although Samaras’ use of social media is limited overall, it is worth noting that during the June 2012 election campaign, 23 out of the 64 posts made on his personal account, involved the use of hyperlinking. Similarly, during the first 24 months of his term, 54 in 85 posts, were included in the category of hyperlinking. Interactive Communication In terms of interactive communication, prime ministers (as well as most Greek politicians in general) avoid engaging in online discussions on social media and responding to users’ comments. According to several authors, this is due to the perception of politicians of the impoliteness and hostility that usually characterizes the comments of the majority of social media users (e.g. Theocharis et al., 2016). They therefore believe that they will suffer political and communicative damage and thus the potential political cost will prove to be greater than the potential political benefit. In this context, Samaras (as well as his successors in the premiership) is no exception. During his premiership, none of his social media posts were related to interactive communication except for a few reposts from the ND’s Facebook page. In parallel, no empirical evidence was found regarding the use of microtargeting audience tactics referring to the formulation and utilization of individualized messaging. Earned Media Generating Positive Media Coverage Another key element of permanent campaigning is the pursuit of political executives to earn positive media coverage. During the election period, Samaras sought to promote and advertise the public appearances and

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public events he had planned to implement to achieve positive media coverage. More specifically, in the June 2012 campaign, based on the relevant data, he made 38 posts that fall into this category. In the postelection period, however, the number of posts was relatively low, reaching a total of 58, although given the small number of total posts (85), they could be taken as an indication of his aim to secure positive publicity. Broadcasted and Face-to-Face Speeches (Media Interviews, Press Articles, Press Conferences) Samaras also gave speeches and public addresses to promote his government policy and political messages. He made speeches to the Parliament and the parliamentary group of the ND party, televised addresses from the Maximos Mansion, party speeches and tours within the country as well as political travels abroad. He also gave interviews to Greek and foreign media as well as press conferences. Moreover, he made brief statements either outside the PM’s Office, or outside the Parliament, or after his visits to ministries to coordinate the government’s work. This was an attempt, as in the case of the televised addresses, of unfiltered communication of Samaras with public opinion as he was convinced that in this way he could determine—to some extent— his public image (Lazaridis, 2022: interview with the author; Mouroutis, 2022: interview with the author). Also, the use of short statements seems to have been attributed to Samaras’ view that, as Lazaridis illustrates, ‘he needed a directness in communication and that his message was best conveyed by using short phrases’ (2022: interview with the author). After all, the use of sound bites is a widespread communication technique that allows easy and quick dissemination and reproduction of political messages (Ornstein & Mann, 2000). In other words, it seems that this tactic was more compatible with his personal political and communication style. In total, based on the relevant data, during the pre-election period he made a total of 14 posts related to videos mainly from his speeches, while after the election he made a total of 34 posts related to the viewing and promotion of similar videos. The use of live streaming of speeches or interviews was extremely limited during both the pre-election and postelection periods—four and one post, respectively. However, he hardly emphasized all public appearances. Samaras seems to have preferred giving speeches, both at home and abroad, to promote his communication policy. He gave also many interviews to foreign media.

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At the time Greece was in the international spotlight because of the debt crisis and its inclusion in the Memorandum. As his aides point out, since the country was borrowing from EU and IMF member-states, it was necessary to improve its international image in the public of the European countries (Lazaridis, 2022: interview with the author). It was a communication practice that was also followed by the centre-left Prime Minister George Papandreou in the period 2009–2011 when Greece was for the first time at the centre of the Eurozone debt crisis (Koliastasis, 2020a). However, it seems that the view of Samaras and his staff was that Papandreou’s rhetoric in the past had damaged Greece’s image and intensive efforts were needed to rebuild it. According to Lazaridis, ‘the country had been discredited by the Papandreou government who had claimed that “Greece is corrupt”,3 disregarding the fact that such a reference undermined the credibility of both the country and himself since he had been elected in the premiership from this country (…) It was therefore necessary to conduct a series of interviews in foreign media such as the German ones to explain our positions and improve the image of Greece in the eyes of international public opinion. Also, we had to assist the EU governments to deal with their own populists within, who strongly opposed bailout funding for the member-states in need’ (2022: interview with the author). In parallel, according to Mouroutis, Samaras seems to have sought to improve the country’s image in the eyes of foreign investors as well in order to attract foreign investment to Greece and accelerate its economic recovery (2022: interview with the author). Hence, as already mentioned, he promoted the slogan ‘success story’. It is also worth noting that most of the interviews were conducted in print media, both foreign and Greek, rather than electronic ones. According to his associates, it was a choice that allowed him to better control his message (Lazaridis, 2022: interview with the author). Even more so when he and his staff were convinced that the communication and media environment was not friendly and, in this sense, the slightest communication mistake would cost him dearly. It was therefore necessary for his communicative activity to be more cautious, although in some cases it could have been bolder (Lazaridis, interview with the author). 3 According to a Financial Times article, at the EU leaders’ summit in December 2009, Papandreou had said that ‘our basic problem is systemic corruption’ with a focus on the public sector and pledged to take tough measures to tackle it (Barber, 2009).

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Public Events, Party Conferences and Political Travels In terms of the public events—at local, national and international level— in which he participated, during the election period, based on the posts he made, it seems that he placed more emphasis on visits and tours in the Greek countryside than on public events and speeches in the capital of Athens. In contrast, during the first 24 months of his administration, he focused more on public events of national importance (12) taking place in Athens—including the party’s conferences—while he participated in the same number of public events taking place either abroad (6) or at the local level (7). In terms of the political travels for the promotion of his government policy and his political agenda, according to the relevant Facebook posting data, Antonis Samaras as prime minister promoted a small number of travels during his first 24 months of governance. However, given that these figures came from the small number of posts, there is a need to take into account additional data from the Prime Minister’s archive to get a more complete picture.

Conclusions Overall, the fact that Samaras was not, like his predecessors in the period 1996–2011, the prime minister of a one-party but multiparty government, hardly prevented him from engaging in a permanent campaigning process. It seems that he put greater emphasis on those features related to institutional adaptations, conducting opinion polls during the term of office, themes transferred in governance and negative campaigning. Moreover, he made efforts to generate positive media coverage giving several speeches and public addresses and to a lesser degree use marketing techniques and institutional advertising (see Table 2.2). Yet, it should be noted that the use of social media and in particular his personal Facebook account to promote his communication policy was limited.

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Table 2.2 Prime Minister Antonis Samaras: permanent campaigning indicators Joathan & Lilleker’s framework

PM Samaras

Strong indicators

Conducting public opinion polls during the term Institutional advertising Use of marketing during term periods Negative campaigning Broadcasted and face-to-face speeches Engaging personalized communication

Average indicators

Institutional adaptations Frequency of posting Generating positive media coverage Fund-raising Travel during the term of office Constant search for info on the preferences of citizens Public events Building a following on social media Interactivity level Themes of election transferred to governance Microtargeting audience Hyperlinking Promotional discourse

Institutional adaptations Conducting public opinion polls during the term Themes of election transferred to governance Negative campaigning Broadcasted and face-to-face speeches Public events Generating positive media coverage Hyperlinking Promotional discourse Expansion of travel during the term of office, Use of marketing during term periods, Institutional advertising

Weak indicators

Constant search for info on the preferences of citizens Promotional discourse Fund-raising Interactivity level Engaging personalized communication Microtargeting audience Building a following on social media Frequency of posting

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Kathimerini. (2013k, July 23). By order Samaras ordered to accelerate reforms. https://www.kathimerini.gr/politics/47721/entoli-samara-giaepitachynsi-ton-metarrythmiseon/ Kathimerini. (2013l, August 29). Samaras’ order for the disengagement of the Anavalos development project. https://www.kathimerini.gr/politics/51659/ entoli-samara-gia-apemploki-toy-anaptyxiakoy-ergoy-anavaloy/ Kathimerini. (2013m, September 17). Samaras: Populism derails progress. https://www.kathimerini.gr/politics/53615/samaras-o-laikismos-ektrochia zei-tin-proodo/ Kathimerini. (2014a, January 9). Dilemma of European elections by Samaras. https://www.kathimerini.com.cy/gr/ellada/158990/?ctype=ar Kathimerini. (2014b, January 21). Temporary detention regime changes by order of Samaras. https://www.kathimerini.gr/politics/553100/allazei-to-kathestosprosorinis-kratisis-me-entoli-samara/ Kathmerini. (2014c, May 23). Ant. Samaras: We will not let them bring us back to chaos. https://www.kathimerini.com.cy/gr/ellada/172438/?ctype=ar Kathimerini. (2014d, December 31). Ant. Samaras: SYRIZA leads the country to bankruptcy. https://www.kathimerini.gr/politics/797837/ant-samaras-osyriza-odigei-ti-chora-se-chreokopia/ Kathimerini. (2014e, December 31). M. Spyraki, press spokesperson of ND. www. kathimerini.gr/politics/797788/i-m-spyraki-ekprosopos-typoy-tis-n-d/ Kazakos, P. (2011). After the “memorandum”: Economic policy under international supervision. Papazisis Publications. Kiss, B., & Szabo, G. (2019). Hungary. In O. Eibl & M. Gregor (Eds.), Thirty years of political campaigning in central and eastern Europe (pp. 115–130). Palgrave Macmillan. Koliastasis, P. (2014). The permanent campaign strategy of Greek prime ministers (1996–2011). QMUL. https://qmro.qmul.ac.uk/xmlui/bitstream/han dle/123456789/8449/Koliastasis_P_PhD280714.pdf?sequence=1 Koliastasis, P. (2020a). The permanent campaign strategy of prime ministers in parliamentary systems: The case of Greece. Journal of Political Marketing, 19(3), 233–257. https://doi.org/10.1080/15377857.2016.1193835 Koliastasis, P. (2020b). The brand has left the building: The cases of governing PASOK, ND and SYRIZA at a time of economic crisis (2009–2019). In A. Veneti & A. Karatzogianni (Eds.), The Emerald handbook of digital media in Greece (Digital activism and society: Politics, economy and culture in network communication) (pp. 245–258). Emerald Publishing Limited. https://doi. org/10.1108/978-1-83982-400-520201048 Lau, R., & Rovner, I. (2009). Negative campaigning. Annual Review of Political Science, 12, 285–306. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 1600548 Lazaridis, C. (2022, February 8). Interview with the author.

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Liargovas, P., & Tzifakis, N. (2021). Left-wing populism: The rise of Syriza and its consolidation as a pillar of the Greek (post-crisis) political system. Southeastern Europe, 45(1), 1–18. Lilleker, D. (2006). Key concepts in political communication. Sage. Loulis, J. (2011). The road to the abyss. Kastaniotis Publications. Mavros, G. (2022, March 2). Interview with the author. Mouroutis, G. (2022, February 9). Interview with the author. Negrine, R., & Papathanassopoulos, S. (1996). The “Americanization” of political communication: A critique. The International Journal of Harvard Press/Politics, 1(2), 45–62. OECD. (2018). Integrity in the funding of political parties and candidates in Greece. OECD Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264303997-el Ornstein, N. J., & Mann, T. E. (2000). The permanent campaign and its future. American Enterprise Institute and the Brookings Institute. Papathanassopoulos, S. (2007). Political communication and professionalization. In R. Negrine, C. Holtz-Bacha, P. Mancini, & S. Papatha (Eds.), Professionalisation of political communication: Changing media, changing Europe. Chicago Press. Pappas, T. S. (2010, June). Winning by default: The Greek election of 2009. South European Society and Politics, 15(2), 273–287. https://doi.org/10. 1080/13608746.2010.491964. Accessed 11 April 2020. Poulakidakos, S., & Giannouli, I. (2019). Greek political leaders on Instagram: Between “soft” and “hard” personalization. In A. Veneti, D. Jackson, & D. G. Lilleker (Eds.), Visual political communication (pp. 187–206). Palgrave Macmillan. Powell, G. B., & Whitten, G. D. (1993). A cross-national analysis of economic voting: Taking into account of the political context. American Journal of Political Science, 37 , 391–414. Pretenteris, J. (2012) The Cold civil war. Patakis Press. Proto Thema. (2009, December 2). Panos Panagiotopoulos is the new spokesman of ND. www.protothema.gr/naked-city/genikes-eidiseis/article/ 53663/o-panos-panagiotopoylos-neos-ekprosopos-typoy-ths-nd/ Rose, J. (2012). Are negative ads positive? Political advertising and the permanent campaign. In D. Taras & C. Waddell (Eds.), How Canadians communicate iv: Media and politics (pp. 149–168). Athabasca University Press. Samaras, A. (2009, November 7). Speech in the congress of ND. Samaras, A. (2013a, June 6). Statement made by the prime minister. https://pri meminister.gr/2013/06/06/12196 Samaras, A. (2013b, June 13). Statement made by the prime minister. https:// primeminister.gr/2013/06/06/12196

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Samaras, A. (2013c, June 21). Statement made by the prime minister. https:// primeminister.gr/2013/06/21/12232 Samaras, A. (2013d, September 13). Statement made by the prime minister. pri meminister.gr Swanson, D. L., & Mancini, P. (1996). Politics, media, and modern democracy: Introduction. In D. L. Swanson & P. Mancini (Eds.), Politics, media, and modern democracy: An international study of innovations in electoral campaigning and their consequences (pp. 1–26). Praeger. Terzis, G. P. (2014a, May 16). Ant. Samaras: SYRIZA brings back Grexit. https://www.kathimerini.gr/politics/795486/ant-samaras-o-syriza-epanaf erei-to-grexit/ Terzis, G. P. (2014b, December 12). Samaras: “Mr Tsipras is a subverter”. https://www.kathimerini.gr/politics/767368/samaras-yponomeytis-o-k-tsi pras/ Terzis, G. P., & Papadiohos (2014, April 24). Changes in personnel in Maximou, government. https://www.kathimerini.gr/politics/764408/allages-prosoponse-maximoy-kyvernisi/ Terzis, G. P., & Triantafillou, E. (2012, June 24). When Samaras’ staff moves to Maximou. Kathimerini. www.kathimerini.gr/politics/461118/otan-to-epi teleio-samara-metakomizei-sto-maximoy/ Theocharis, Y., Barber, P., Fazekas, Z., Popa, S. A., & Parnet, O. (2016). A bad workman blames his tweets: The consequences of citizens’ uncivil Twitter use when interacting with party candidates. Journal of Communication, 66(6), 1007–1031. To Vima. (2010a, May 6). Final deletion of Dora Bakoyannis: Out of the CSO of Pasok Sofia Sakorafa, G. Demaras and V. Economou. www.tovima.gr/ 2010/05/06/politics/b-oristiki-diagrafi-tis-ntoras-mpakogianni-b-br-ektosk-o-pasok-sofia-sakorafa-g-dimaras-kai-b-oikonomoy/ To Vima. (2010b, November 21). “Democratic alliance” is the name of Dora Bakoyannis’ party. https://www.tovima.gr/2010/11/21/politics/dim okratiki-symmaxia-to-onoma-toy-kommatos-tis-ntoras-mpakogianni/ To Vima. (2012a, June 12). The twelve measures for the security of citizens by Antonis Samaras. https://www.tovima.gr/2012/06/12/afieromata/ta-dwd eka-metra-gia-tin-asfaleia-twn-politwn-apo-ton-antwni-samara/ To Vima. (2012b, November 19). Chrysanthos Lazaridis: The shadow of Antonis Samaras. https://www.tovima.gr/2012/11/18/politics/xrysan thos-lazaridis-i-skia-toy-antwni-samara/ Triantafillou, E. (2015, November 1). Samaras’ strategy, the non papers and the meetings. www.kathimerini.gr/politics/798961/i-stratigiki-samara-ta-non-pap ers-kai-oi-syskepseis/

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Triantafyllou, E., & Terzis, G. P. (2009, November 8). Two strategic plans for ND. Kathimerini. http://www.kathimerini.gr/375547/article/epikairothta/ politikh/dyostrathgikes-protaseis-gia-th-nd Vasilopoulou, S., & Halikiopoulou, D. (2013). In the shadow of grexit: The Greek election of 17 June 2012. South European Society and Politics, 18(4), 523–542. https://doi.org/10.1080/13608746.2013.779784 Voulgaris, G. (2011). Democratic Greece 1974-2004. In J. Voulgaris, I. Nikolakopoulos, S. Rizas, T. Sakellaropoulos, & J. Stefanidis (Eds.), Greek political history 1950-2004. Themelio Publications [in Greek]. Voulgaris, J., & Nikolakopoulos, I. (2014). Introduction: The electotal earthquake of 2012. In J. Voulgaris & I. Nicolakopoulos (Eds.), 2012: The double electoral earthquake. Themelio Publications [in Greek].

CHAPTER 3

Alexis Tsipras: The Permanent Campaign Strategy of a Left-Wing Prime Minister

Abstract This chapter discusses Alexis Tsipras’ political background and permanent campaigning in times of economic and migration crises. It examines and measures his communication strategy against the three categories of the proposed theoretical framework: capacity building and strategy, paid and owned media as well as earned media. It finds that Prime Minister Tsipras did apply the permanent campaign strategy during his term yet putting emphasis on different features. He gave broadcasted and face-to-face speeches as well as media interviews, participated in public events and retained communication structures on communication policy in the prime ministerial Office. Moreover, he transferred election themes to governance, while he focused on the use of negative campaigning. In parallel, he was the first prime minister who devoted so much time and energy in using extensively social media and communicating his messages through social media networks. Keywords Permanent campaigning · Tsipras · Coalition · Memorandum · Migration · Social media

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 P. A. Koliastasis, Permanent Campaigning in Greece in Times of Crisis, Political Campaigning and Communication, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11691-9_3

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Introduction The Political Background Alexis Tsipras has been active from a young age in the communist and radical Left. As a student, he was a member of the Communist Youth of Greece (KNE) and later at the age of 25 he served for four years (1999–2003) as secretary of the youth organization of the Coalition of Left, Ecology and Movements—a precursor party of SYRIZA, that was founded in 2004 under the leadership of Alekos Alavanos (Papadopoulos, 2019a). Tsipras appeared for the first time on the political scene in the 2006 municipal elections, when he ran for the post of Mayor of Athens, backed by SYRIZA. His electoral performance was seen as remarkable (10.5% of the vote) as it was higher than that of his party (3.26% of the vote) in the same area in the 2004 national polls (Smyrnaios & Karatzogianni, 2020: 291). Later in 2008, Alavanos resigned from the party leadership, promoting Tsipras as his successor. The latter, although not an MP, managed to be elected by the party congress to the leadership of SYRIZA (Papadopoulos, 2019b). In February 2008, at the age of 33, he became the youngest party leader in the country. However, in the parliamentary elections that followed in October 2009, the expectations that had been raised were not met. SYRIZA received only 4.6% of the electorate and 13 seats (Pappas, 2010). Despite the unfavourable result, however, he was re-elected in the leadership post at the 6th party congress held in 2010. The political and economic developments of the following years, however, favoured him electorally. The outbreak of the economic crisis, the implementation of the Memorandum and the further deepening of the recession triggered the electoral collapse of the pro-bailout PASOK and the shift of most of its voters to the then anti-bailout SYRIZA. The latter came second in the 2012 elections, giving rise to the so-called ‘pasokification’ phenomenon according to which the decline of European centre-left benefits the rise of radical left forces (Manwaring & Kennedy, 2018). As head of the main opposition, Tsipras continued his confrontational strategy against the ND-led government. In parallel, he sought to improve his international image. In the 2014 European elections, he ran for the post of the European Commission presidency representing the European Left Party (Kathimerini, 2013). Although he failed to get elected, his pan-European election campaign seemed to have softened the image of a Eurosceptic politician who would put at risk

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the country’s Eurozone membership status (Smyrnaios & Karatzogianni, 2020: 299–301). Thus, in the early national elections that followed a few months later, he managed to win the support of social groups such as pensioners and housewives who had rejected him in the previous 2012 polls (Koliastasis, 2015). In the aftermath of the January 2015 election, although he won, he received 149 seats—two less than he needed to win an absolute parliamentary majority. Hence, he went on to form a coalition with the right-wing populist anti-bailout party of Independent Greeks (ANEL) led by Panos Kammenos, which received 13 seats. It was the first anti-bailout populist government in Greece and the Eurozone since the outbreak of the Global Financial Crisis (Koliastasis, 2015). It is worth noting that the relationship between the two partners was uneven. The leader of ANEL Panos Kammenos, though he took over the portfolio of the Ministry of Defense, did not occupy the position of Deputy Prime Minister as was the case with PASOK’s president Evangelos Venizelos in the previous ND-led coalition. One of the reasons might be his comparatively small parliamentary power. After a turbulent first six months in office that brought Greece to the brink of a disorderly default and a Grexit, Tsipras abandoned his anti-bailout platform and adopted the third Memorandum (Koliastasis, 2020). Consequently, he lost his parliamentary majority as more than 40 members of his parliamentary group defected from the party (Rori, 2016). Thus, he called for early elections. In the September 2015 polls that followed, despite his U-turn, Tsipras managed to be re-elected without again winning an absolute parliamentary majority, receiving only 145 MPs. As a result, he formed a new coalition government with ANEL. The structure of the chapter is as follows. The next three sections describe and analyse the implementation of permanent campaigning through an examination of the criteria that make up capacity building and strategy, paid and owned media as well as earned media. The final section summarizes the conclusions. Capacity Building and Strategy Institutional Adaptations In the context of capacity building and strategy and specifically institutional adaptations, Tsipras as prime minister maintained and strengthened

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the institutional structures of communication policy in the Prime Minister’s Office and the government. He retained the Press Office and the position of the government spokesperson. In particular, Tsipras assigned the General Secretariat for Information and the General Secretariat for Communication and Promotion, which at the time were under the Minister of State, to support the work of the Deputy Minister to the Prime Minister and government spokesperson (PM Decision, 2015a, 2015b). Later the General Secretariat of Information was incorporated into the newly established Ministry of Digital Policy, Telecommunications and Information to which the responsibilities for media issues were assigned (Presidential Decree, 2016). Another indication of Tsipras’ engagement in a permanent campaigning process is his collaboration with communication professionals. The latter joined his prime ministerial staff to help him shape his policy messages and improve news management. Yet, it should be noted that most of them had close ties with the party as well. In particular, the journalist Thodoris Michopoulos was appointed Director of the Press Office (Vernardakis, 2022: interview with the author), with responsibility, among others, for writing the non-papers that informally informed both government and party officials as well as the journalists (Antoniou, 2015a; Margomenou, 2016; Tsekeris, 2022: interview with the author; Zachariadis, 2022: interview with the author). Michopoulos had previously worked in state television, national TV stations and left-leaning newspapers (Proto Thema, 2018). From the September 2015 elections onwards, the position of Director of the Press Office was taken over by the journalist Angelos Tsekeris, while Michopoulos was appointed Head of Strategic Planning (Margomenou, 2016; Tsekeris, 2022: interview with the author). Tsekeris’ responsibilities within the Press Office included drafting announcements, briefing journalists and organizing the Prime Minister’s travels (Tsekeris, 2022: interview with the authors). Previously, he had worked for many years in the party media of SYRIZA including the newspaper ‘Avgi’ and the radio station ‘Sto Kokkino 105.5’ as well as a columnist in magazines (iefimerida, 2015a, 2015b). Apart from being Head of the Press Office, he was also one of the prime ministerial senior speechwriters, mainly on social policy issues that were targeted at a left-wing audience (Tsekeris, 2022: interview with the author; Vernardakis, 2022: interview with the author). However, a few months after taking up his duties as Director of

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the Press Office, he shifted to the position of Director of Strategic Planning in the Prime Minister’s Office with responsibility for planning and organizing the Regional Conferences on growth issues that Tsipras held as Prime Minister across the country (Tsekeris, 2022: interview with the author; Vernardakis, 2022: interview with the author). Tsekeris remained in this post until 2018, when he left the prime ministerial staff in order to take over the management of the newspaper ‘Avgi’, which is still the official newspaper of the party (Avgi, 2018; Tsekeris, 2022: interview with the author). Also, the journalist Thanasis Karteros, who served as Director of the Prime Minister’s Press Office from October 2017 onwards (Kathimerini, 2017; Vernardakis, 2022: interview with the author), seems to have joined Tsipars’ speechwriting staff as well (Tsekeris, 2022: interview with the author). Previously, he had been the director of the newspaper ‘Rizospastis’ (the official publication of the Greek Communist Party ‘KKE’), as well as staff member of several newspapers and private radio stations. He was also director of the SYRIZA radio station ‘Sto Kokkino 105.5’ from 2006 to 2008 (Kathimerini, 2017). After the September 2015 elections, another journalist, Matthew Tsimitakis, joined the staff as a special assistant to the Prime Minister and member of the Press Office, responsible for social media management (Tsekeris, 2022: interview with the author; Vernardakis, 2022: interview with the author; Zachariadis, 2022: interview with the author). In the past, he had worked for ‘Avgi’, the right-leaning ‘Kathimerini’, various magazines and national TV networks (Tsimitakis, 2022: interview with the author). His responsibilities included, among others, the management of the prime minister’s official website (primeminister.gr) and the promotion of the individual communication campaigns on Tsipras’ social media (Tsimitakis, 2022: interview with the author). Furthermore, Tsipras had close cooperation with the communication expert Zoe Chalidia, who came from the private sector with experience in the field of communication and advertising and had already joined his communication staff back in 2006 (Protagon, 2019; Tsekeris, 2022: interview with the author). During the term of office, Chalidia often participated in the meetings of the communication team (Tsekeris, 2022: interview with the author). Also, member of the prime ministerial staff was the pollster and academic Christoforos Vernardakis, who was the head and later scientific director of the polling company VPRC from 1993 to 2014 (To Vima, 2019). Initially, he was appointed Deputy Minister of

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Administrative Reform, while in November 2016 he took up the position of Minister of State responsible for the coordination of government work (Vernardakis, 2022: interview with the author). According to Vernardakis, before taking the post of Minister of State, he was not actively involved in the formulation of the communication strategy and polling analysis (2022: interview with the author). Later, in his capacity as Minister of State, he participated and contributed to the planning and implementation of the 13 regional conferences in all regions of the country on economic growth issues, in which Tsipras was the key figure, as well as in monitoring the implementation of commitments made by the prime minister (Tsekeris, 2022: interview with the author; Tsimitakis, 2022: interview with the author). In addition, Vernardakis monitored and analysed, to a certain extent, the polls, both published and private ones, yet not in a systematic way (Vernardakis, 2022: interview with the author). Also, it seems that the professor at the University of Athens and election expert, Ilias Nikolakopoulos, played the role of an informal polling advisor (Papantoniou, 2019). In parallel, the Prime Minister’s Secretary General, Dimitris Tzanakopoulos, who assumed the post of government spokesman and Minister of State in November 2016, with a key contribution to the formulation of the government communication policy, played a central role in Tsipras’ communication staff. Moreover, a key member of Tsipras’ staff was Alekos Flambouraris, who was also appointed Minister of State, as well as Nikos Pappas in the same ministerial capacity. However, in November 2016, the latter took over the position of Minister of Digital Policy, Telecommunications and Information with responsibility, among others, for media policy issues. Gavriil Sakellaridis also participated in the communication team as government spokesman and Deputy Prime Minister, until his replacement by MP Olga Gerovassili (Antoniou, 2015b; Kathimerini, 2015a, 2015b; Tsekeris, 2022: interview with the author; Vernardakis, 2022: interview with the author). The then director of the party’s Parliamentary Group, Kostas Zachariadis, took part in the communication staff from the September 2015 elections onwards as well (Zachariadis, 2022: interview with the author). In parallel, the position of party spokesperson was retained (iefimerida, 2015a, 2015b; Tsimitakis, 2022: interview with the author). Rania Svigou, who assumed the post, seems to have been in direct cooperation with the Maximos Mansion (where the prime ministerial Office is located) to rebut in political communication terms

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the oppositional criticism of ND (Zachariadis, 2022: interview with the author). Regarding the operation of the communication team, according to Tsekeris, in the daily meeting of the competent officials, which was attended by the prime minister, participated the Director of the Press Office, the Secretary General of the Prime Minister, the government spokesman, the two Ministers of State and the Minister of Digital Policy, Communications and Information as well as Tsipras’ communication advisor, Zoe Chalidia (2022: interview with the author). In terms of the communication policy structures, such as the media monitoring unit, it seems that the Press Office had a mechanism to monitor the media, the news and commentaries broadcasted by news bulletins and news programs. This was done by a group of about 3– 4 working in the Press Office staff (Tsekeris, 2022: interview with the author). Also, with regard to the coordination of the governmental communication policy and the ministries, as Tsekeris notes, ‘there was initially an attempt to coordinate on a daily basis, yet it proved to be ineffective. Thus, the solution that was chosen was that of ad hoc contact with the ministries and the respective Press Offices was’ (2022: interview with the author). Another political initiative that is considered part of permanent campaigning is the holding of referendums on top political issues. The aim is either to mobilize public opinion in favour of the government or to shift responsibility for crucial decisions to the electorate. This has been observed especially in the cases of populist leaders of Latin American countries such as the President of Ecuador, Rafael Correa, who sought to hold a referendum on the revision of the Constitution in such a way that would allow him to consolidate his power (Conaghan & De La Torre, 2008; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017: 69–71). Moreover, as a form of direct democracy, referendums are regarded an unmediated electoral process and thus can easily be coordinated with a populist approach to politics (e.g. Mudde, 2007; Taggart, 2000). In Greece, the situation was partly different. In January 2015, Tsipras was elected as a proponent of an anti-bailout platform. Therefore, if he abandoned it, he would probably pay a heavy political cost as most MPs in his party were against the Memorandum (Antoniou, 2015b, 2015c, 2015e; Sideris, 2015; Vernardakis, 2022: interview with the author). In this context, holding a referendum and shifting the responsibility to

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citizens to decide whether to approve or reject the proposed third Memorandum would potentially widen the scope for political manoeuvre. It seemed that in case of a marginal No vote victory, a compromise with the EU and the IMF would be more politically feasible (Zachariadis, 2022: interview with the author). In parallel, it appears that there was an expectation that the referendum process would cause international political turmoil and therefore would act as a lever to pressure the Eurozone to accept Greece’s demands for a radical change of the Memorandum and a reversal of austerity (Vernardakis, 2022: interview with the author). In a televised speech three days ahead of the referendum day, Tsipras illustrated that a No vote does not imply a rejection of the euro but a strengthening of the government’s negotiating position to cut a better deal within the Eurozone (Tsipras, 2015). According to Vernardakis’ political view, the choice of the referendum is due to the ‘political naivety of the Left that an anti-bailout popular mandate would be sufficient to change the overall policy framework, trigger retreats on the part of the Eurozone or even a domino effect by gaining strong supporters and thus causing political fissures. This political perception existed before 2015 and culminated in the referendum option. This was the last card on the deck and the ultimate resort based on this concept’ (2022: interview with the author). However, there are indications that alternatives were being considered. As Kazakos (2016: 22) points out, ‘in 2015 there were thoughts of a return to the drachma [national currency] and other alternatives in the Greek government enclaves (…) A working group was operating under the supervision of [the Minister of Finance] Yanis Varoufakis. Yet, the issuance of a new currency is being prepared by what appears to be another small group of executives of the then government. There had been travels to Latin American countries to make deals for the supply of fuel, medicines and meat, as well as visits to companies involved in the issuance of currency. Other ministers were seeking external resources, e.g. from Russia, to deal with the initial difficulties following any decision to issue a new currency’. In the end, the alternative plans were never materialized (Kazakos, 2016). Although the No vote was won by a landslide, the EU and the IMF did not give in to their demands for a third Memorandum. Thus, to avoid a disorderly default and a catastrophic Grexit, Tsipras made an unprecedented U-turn by accepting a third bailout (Kathimerini, 2015a, 2017). As he stated, in an interview in December 2015, ‘if I had left that

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night [of the 13 July negotiations in Brussels], I would have been a hero for a night or two, maybe three, but it would have been disastrous for the following days and nights. Not only for me, but for most Greeks. My heart said “No” but my mind said we had to find a solution. If I had left, the banks and the economy would collapse’ (Kathimerini, 2015a). Conducting Opinion Poll During the Term—Research Citizens’ Preferences and Data In terms of conducting and monitoring polls during the term, it seems that Tsipras and his aides had some reservations about the validity και usefulness of opinion polls (Vernardakis, 2022: interview with the author). They might be attributed to two reasons. First, the failure of polling firms to accurately predict the margin of the ‘No’ camp’s victory in the July 2015 referendum as well as the lead of SYRIZA over ND in the September 2015 national election. The second reason might be related to the negative polling findings for SYRIZA since the beginning of 2016. However, it appears that Tsipras and his associates systematically monitored public opinion trends (Tsekeris, 2022: interview with the author; Vernardakis, 2022: interview with the author; Zachariadis, 2022: interview with the author). Relatively often, there was cooperation with polling companies like Kapa Research to conduct private polls both on general political trends and on specific current affairs (Vernardakis, 2022: interview with the author). Moreover, there seems to have been some cooperation with the company Pro Rata (Papantoniou, 2019) and from 2017 onwards, with the firm Opinion Poll which conducted private opinion surveys (Katsigiannis, 2021). The prime minister and his staff also allegedly maintained contact with the company VoxPop, especially during the May 2019 European elections (in.gr., 2019; Papantoniou, 2019; Tsimitakis, 2022: interview with the author). Nonetheless, the then prevailing political conditions, the pressures exerted by the economic and later the migration-refugee influx, the limitations set by the third Memorandum, hardly allow, according to Vernardakis, room for a more systematic monitoring and analysis of the poll findings in order to design a long-term communication strategy (2022: interview with the author). In this respect, as Tsekeris points out, ‘the situation was anyway too much of a given. There were polls that showed that in terms of voting intentions, SYRIZA was significantly trailing ND. Thus, the priority of Tsipras was to complete the program

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and put the economy back on a recovery truck’ (2022: interview with the author). In parallel, as in the case of Samaras’ premiership, the relevant data show that Tsipras’ personal Facebook account was not used to conduct polls like inviting citizens to offer their views on Facebook related to electoral campaigns or government evaluation. Similarly, as the examination of his Facebook posts during the first 24 months of his term suggests, there are no indications that Tsipras invited citizens to offer their views on Facebook in order to gather data on their preferences. An exception may have been SYRIZA’s effort to communicate directly with its party base in view of the 2nd Party Congress held in October 2016. A few months before, an online platform had been launched on the party’s website for those who wished to submit their views and co-formulate the documents of political positions of the SYRIZA party congress. An emphasis was given on the issues of growth, democracy, the welfare state and the international role of the country (Kathimerini, 2016b). Fund-Raising In line with his predecessor, Tsipras as prime minister did not engage in fund-raising activities. It seems that the institutional framework of the country and the Greek political culture, in general, discourage such initiatives. His Facebook postings in this regard were zero, both in the pre- and the post-election periods. Paid and Owned Media Themes of Election Transferred to Governance As far as the paid and owned media category is concerned, the postelection emphasis on pre-election agenda issues is one of the key elements of the permanent campaign strategy. In January 2015, Tsipras promised to abolish the Memorandum and replace it with a new agreement with the EU and the IMF that would, among others, provide for the cancellation of a large part of the Greek public debt, a new larger loan with better repayment terms and a new policy package to stimulate economic growth and strengthen social protection (Koliastasis, 2015). In the post-election period, as prime minister and head of an anti-bailout coalition of SYRIZA–ANEL, he continued to emphasize these issues (Koliastasis, 2015; Tsebelis, 2016).

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Hence, he engaged in constant negotiations with the EU–IMF. The ongoing negotiation between the SYRIZA-led government and the ‘European institutions’ (as Tsipras called the Troika of the European Commission, the European Central Bank and IMF representatives) culminated on 5 July 2015. Then, Tsipras put to a referendum the last proposal of the institutions to the Greek government for a third bailout plan, arguing for its rejection. Although the No vote prevailed, a week later under the fear of disorderly default and a Grexit, in a stunning U-turn he agreed with the EU–IMF on a third Memorandum that was clearly less favourable than the rejected one. Most MPs from both the government and the pro-European opposition parties (ND, PASOK, Potami) voted in favour of the third bailout agreement. However, during the voting process, Tsipras lost his parliamentary majority as a part of its MPs voted against the consolidation program. Thus, he called for early national elections as he had effectively lost the confidence of the parliament. Given that the division between pro- and anti-memorandum had no longer been valid, Tsipras sought to draw a new dividing line with the opposition, particularly ND. He referred to the clash between the ‘new’ political forces that, as he argued, he was the main representative and the ‘old’ political establishment of ND and PASOK. In parallel, he attempted to convince that SYRIZA was able to implement the third Memorandum more effectively than ND, while protecting the most vulnerable. Hence, during the pre-election campaign, he promised to implement a ‘parallel’ (to the Memorandum) program that included social policy measures for the poorest households that constituted the majority of SYRIZA’s electoral base (Koliastasis, 2015). After his re-election, as prime minister, he focused on promoting the implementation of social policy measures with emphasis on poverty and unemployment reduction as well as the improvement of health and education systems (Tsekeris, 2022: interview with the author). Yet, he abandoned the campaign slogan of the ‘parallel’ program. An indication of his approach to transfer election themes to his governing period, was that he made 65 Facebook posts in the first 24 months of his term. It is worth noting that this included several video advertisements as well as public speeches and media interviews containing similar messages that were extensively reproduced by the media. These references enabled him to argue that his government was a guarantor of the maintenance of social policy measures which might be put at

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risk if the centre-right ND returns to power. In this context, he often used slogans such as ‘Fair Growth’ to emphasize the value of social justice. Negative Campaigning As is usually the case in election campaigns (Lilleker, 2006: 127), in January 2015 the political parties and especially the two major ones, attacked each other, following to a considerable extent the tactics of negative campaigning. The then anti-bailout SYRIZA was in constant and fierce confrontation with the parties of the pro-bailout coalition and particularly ND as it was the main rival for power. It is indicative that 11 of the 100 total posts he made during the month of the election campaign on his personal Facebook account concerned attacks against his political opponents. From a theoretical point of view, SYRIZA has been considered as a left-wing populist party (e.g. Exadaktylos, 2015; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017; Stavrakakis & Katsambekis, 2014). In this sense, it was said to represent the ‘pure’ people against the ‘corrupt’ domestic and European political elites promoting the ‘memoranda of austerity’ that SYRIZA, once in office, would seek to cancel and replace them with its electoral platform. The latter contained, among others, expansionary policies. Thus the communication approach generally had strong confrontational features (Papathanassopoulos & Negrine, 2019). After the elections, negative campaigning of Tsipras targeted both the EU and the IMF, which were directly involved in the negotiation for the new agreement, and the opposition (Antoniou et al., 2016; Kathimerini, 2016d). The then Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis projected the three pro-EU opposition parties of ND, PASOK and Potami as the ‘Troika of the interior’ in line with the Troika of Greece’s international lenders (EU, ECB, IMF) (Proto Thema, 2015a). Tsipras’ final agreement on the third Memorandum, combined with the announcement of early elections on 20 September 2015, hardly changed his populist communication strategy and his negative campaigning against ND (primarily) and PASOK (secondarily). His choice was to project SYRIZA as the representative of the ‘new’ against the ‘old’ political establishment of ND and PASOK, invoking that the former had not been tested in governance as much as the other two parties in power (Papathanassopoulos & Giannouli, 2019). One indication of the intensity of negative campaigning was his reference that the

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dilemma of the election is summed up in the phrase ‘either we finish them or they finish us’ (Proto Thema, 2015b). In parallel, Tsipras turned against those media that criticized SYRIZA, something that had already begun during the opposition period. For instance, he had imposed an embargo on SYRIZA MPs and party members so that they would not participate in the TV broadcasts of journalist Yannis Pretenteris on the national TV network Mega Channel. The reason was the criticism Pretenteris had made of a SYRIZA MP in his column in the newspaper Vima 1 (Avgi, 2013; Pretenteris, 2013; Proto Thema, 2013). Also, negative campaigning of the SYRIZA-led government against the opposition media became particularly intense during the very short (just one week) election campaign for the referendum on the 5th of July 2015. The reason was that all national private TV networks, the largest radio stations and almost all of the opposition press had come out in favour of the ‘Yes’ vote (Aslanidis & Kalwasser, 2016: 9). In contrast, all stateowned channels controlled by the government (as is traditionally the case in Greece) (Iosifidis & Papathanassopoulos, 2019; Papathanassopoulos, 2004) together with the pro-SYRIZA newspapers backed the ‘No’ vote. As prime minister, Tsipras continued his confrontational communication strategy against ND and some opposition media throughout his term. For example, at the party event marking the one-year anniversary of his first election victory on 25 January 2015, a video was shown with excerpts of political comments by journalists who criticized the SYRIZA government (iefimerida, 2016). Another indication was his choice to set up a committee of inquiry on party and media loans in Parliament (Antoniou, 2016a; Tsekeris, 2022: interview with the author). Specifically, the committee was concerned with investigating bank loans that both the ND and PASOK parties had received in the past, as well as those taken out by major media organizations and national television stations. In the view of the then government and the prime minister, the loan procedures followed by parties and media in the past concealed corruption scandals (Antoniou, 2016a). In this context, the public tender for the granting of operating licences to nationwide television stations, that was carried out by the

1 Mega Channel and To Vima were owned by the same Lambrakis Press Company.

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SYRIZA government in 2016, could also be regarded as part of negative campaigning. Tsipras presented this initiative as a conflict with the so-called ‘diaploki’ (Kathimerini, 2016e). In particular, the government, citing a relevant scientific study, set the number of available TV stations at just four, when there were more already operating TV stations and some of them were in danger of closure (Kathimerini, 2016f). As Aslanidis and Kaltwasser have observed, ‘populists and other anti-establishment forces frequently rail against the collusion between governing parties and media moguls, the so-called diaploki. Attempts by the SYRIZA–ANEL government to diminish the power and impact of private TV stations have not yet borne any fruit, despite the transformation of public broadcasting into a pro-government vehicle, a rather recurring phenomenon with every change of administration in Greece’ (2016: 9). Finally, the public tender was annulled as it was deemed unconstitutional by the Council of State (the country’s highest administrative court). Moreover, in August 2018, the SYRIZA-led government boycotted the appearances of government officials on SKAI television station, which was considered to be opposing the government (Naftemporiki, 2018a), due to a report on the devastating fire in Mati (a suburb of Attica). The embargo was finally lifted shortly before the early national elections of July 2019, as Tsipras gave a television interview to the network (Naftemporiki, 2019). At the same time, in early 2018, in the context of the clash with the opposition, the SYRIZA–ANEL government, following a relevant file sent by the Justice Department to the Parliament, initiated the procedures for the establishment of a preliminary investigation committee for the control of 10 top opposition politicians. The latter were accused of corruption and bribery by the pharmaceutical company Novartis (Antoniou, 2018). Among others, the charges were against two former prime ministers (Antonis Samaras and Panagiotis Pikramenos), a former Deputy Prime Minister and former PASOK leader (Evaggelos Venizelos), the former Finance Minister and current Governor of the Bank of Greece (Yannis Stournaras) and three former Health Ministers from ND and PASOK (Adonis Georgiadis, Makis Voridis and Andreas Loverdos). Tsipras accused those allegedly involved of bribery (Kathimerini, 2018a). The case was described by the then Deputy Justice Minister as ‘the biggest scandal since the foundation of the modern Greek state’ (Naftemporiki, 2018b). In response, ND and PASOK, accused the SYRIZA-led government of ‘collusion’ aimed at eliminating the opposition. The former

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Prime Minister Antonis Samaras filed a lawsuit against, among others, the Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras and the then Deputy Justice Minister Dimitris Papangelopoulos (To Vima, 2018). However, Tsipras’ associates refute the opposition’s political accusations. According to Tsekeris, ‘there was no plan for the political assassination of Samaras, Venizelos and all those accused of involvement in the case. It was simply a political scandal which was obviously exploited politically, as would happen in any case in all countries of the world. After all, this issue was not raised by SYRIZA. It emerged through the investigation conducted by the Judiciary (…) I don’t think a reasonable person could ever believe that SYRIZA sought to undermine democracy and put political opponents in jail’ (2022: interview with the author). Finally, the competent corruption prosecutor, who received the findings of the preliminary investigation committee, closed the case without a court hearing for nine of ten defendants as the evidence supporting them proved insufficient (Ta Nea, 2022). It seems that the clash with the opposition parties—and the opposition media was part of a broader communication strategy. According to Tsekeris, ‘the first conflict started with the issue of the establishment of the committee of inquiry concerning the loans of the ND and PASOK parties and the loans of the media. It continued later with the conflict over the issue of granting licences to television stations, a decision with which ND disagreed at the time. All this was an overall political agenda. (…) Besides, the strategy of the opposition and the pro-opposition media towards the government was unified on all issues, causing a communication “noise war”. In this sense, the SYRIZA-led government’s response to them was also uniform to a certain extent. In this way it also sought to cause rifts in the opposition front. To a certain extent it even succeeded in doing so, as not all the electronic media had the same negative attitude towards the government. In general, the government at that time saw that it had a united block against it, but it was constantly looking for ways to weaken it’ (2022: interview with the author). In parallel, the government’s communication strategy towards ND and its leadership seems to have had a broader political dimension. The emphasis was on two points. As Tsekeris illustrates, ‘the first was the transparency issue related to both the party’s finances and the background of its leadership. The second was related to Mitsotakis’ neoliberal agenda, which included, among others, issues related to the welfare state and the promotion of privatizations in the public sector’ (2022: interview with the

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author). Hence Tsipras employed the slogan ‘Fair Growth’ with which he attempted to distinct his economic policy plan from the agenda of the ND party (Goutzanis & Stergiou, 2016). Overall, however, and based on the relevant data, it is worth noting that Tsipras as Prime Minister during his first 24 months in office, made 41 posts from his personal Facebook account that refer to the tactics of negative campaigning, targeting opposition parties and opposition media. Use of Marketing During Terms of Office Regarding the use of marketing techniques during his premiership, as already noted, Tsipras collaborated with pollsters and polling companies to monitor and analyse public opinion trends. There are indications that in some cases he was influenced by the polls both in matters of political strategy and policy. For example, in the middle of the week preceding the referendum of July 2015, polls recorded a strengthening of the Yes option which had a small lead over the No vote (Metron, 2015). A possible victory for the Yes camp would have amounted to a political defeat for the premier who had rejected the Memorandum (Vernardakis, 2022: interview with the author). In these circumstances, Tsipras, in one of the four televised addresses he made, attempted to reassure those who were concerned about a possible Grexit, arguing that, ‘a No to an unsustainable agreement does not mean a break with Europe. It means continuing the negotiation with better conditions for the Greek people’ (Tsipras, 2015). In the aftermath, it seemed that the No option was strengthened again. According to his associates, Tsipras’ appeal was strong at the time, and he had a significant influence on the electorate (Vernardakis, 2022: interview with the author). Another example is Tsipras’ decision to change the electoral law for both the national elections and the local polls. In terms of the former, the promotion of the change took place in 2016, a few months after the election of Kyriakos Mitsotakis as leader of the New Democracy party and the retreat of SYRIZA to second place in the polls’ voting intention index (Metron, 2018). In particular, the SYRIZA-led government replaced the system of ‘reinforced’ proportional representation, which rewarded the winning party with a 50-seat bonus, with that of ‘pure’ proportional representation, which abolished the bonus and thus made the formation of multiparty governments almost inevitable (Kathimerini, 2016a; Antoniou, 2016a). It is true, of course, that the system of ‘pure’ proportional

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representation was a constant and long-standing demand of SYRIZA and the Greek Left (Voulgaris, 2011). However, Tsipras as prime minister did not proceed to change it either after the January 2015 elections or before the September 2015 one, since he was consistently leading the polls and seeking an absolute parliamentary. Certainly, according to the Greek constitution, a new electoral law needs to be approved by 200 MPs to take effect immediately, otherwise it applies from the next elections (Zois, 2017). It is likely that Tsipras’ political calculation was that it would be possible to gather this majority with the cooperation of smaller opposition parties such as PASOK, the centrist Potami and the communist KKE, since ND had opposed the ‘pure’ proportional representation from the very beginning (Kathimerini, 2016a). However, the calculation was not confirmed. The new electoral law was finally passed in 2016 only by the MPs of the government majority. Hence, it will be implemented for the first time in the parliamentary elections formally scheduled to be held in July 2023 (Zois, 2019: 659). In this context, Tsipras promoted, at the end of 2017, the change in the electoral law for the local elections as well (Nedos, 2017). In particular, he adopted the system of ‘pure’ proportional representation, according to which the seats in both the municipal council (in the case of municipalities) and the regional council (in the case of regions) are distributed proportionally between the local parties. Consequently, both the elected mayors and regional governors would not be able to control the majority of seats in the municipal or regional council respectively, thus having to seek alliances in order to be able to take decisions. Tsipras’ choice seems to be attributed to two reasons. The first is related to SYRIZA’s limited political appeal in the field of local government and its poor electoral performance in previous polls (Hlepas & Chatzipantelis, 2022). The second might be explained by his desire to form a ‘progressive’ bloc of forces, based on candidates supported by SYRIZA, while causing a fragmentation of candidacies to weaken ND and PASOK (Papantoniou, 2018a). Another example of the importance, the then prime minister attached to polls, was the decision in October 2016 by the party newspaper Avgi to discontinue its cooperation with the polling company Public Issue. The latter had published a poll in the official SYRIZA publication, according to which most of the public opinion considered that an ND government would be more suitable for the country compared to a SYRIZA one and

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at the same time Kyriakos Mitsotakis was considered more suitable prime minister compared to Alexis Tsipras (Proto Thema, 2016). Avgi’s decision was probably taken by the SYRIZA leadership, which considered that such polling findings published by the party’s official newspaper damaged the image of the government. In a non-paper issued by the Prime Minister’s Office, it was noted that ‘opinion polls, valid or not, with scientific or less scientific way of formulating questions and processing data, are used as an argument in shaping the political climate’ (To Vima, 2016). The influence of the polls is also reflected in policy issues such as the management of State–Church relations regarding the employment status of priests. After the reactions that were recorded and due to the entailed political cost, the government decided to postpone the promoted agreement with the leadership of the Church of Greece and to take any decisions later based on the relevant poll findings (Papantoniou, 2018b). In this context, Tsipras used to announce a series of social benefits and allowances to pensioners and the most vulnerable segments of the society—a move that was also used a few weeks before the European and Local Government elections of May 2019 aimed at reducing the polling gap that separated SYRIZA from ND (Kathimerini, 2016g, 2016h, 2019b; Papadiohos, 2019). On the other hand, in line with his predecessors (Koliastasis, 2020), it seems that Tsipras did not always follow the polls. A typical example is the Prespa Agreement, which concerned the resolution of the FYROM name issue with the name ‘North Macedonia’. According to the then Minister of State, Christoforos Vernardakis, ‘the Prespa Agreement was strictly a foreign policy choice (…) The political cost as reflected in public rallies against the Agreement and polls was to be expected (…).) But there was a political assessment that this issue would not be decisive at election time, as it was not in the end’ (2022: interview with the author). Moreover, Tsekeris notes that ‘apart from the uproar that would be raised by a part of Greek society, it was right to do it’ (2022: interview with the author). Overall, however, it seems that the use of polls by Tsipras and his communication staff for the formulation of the communication strategy was hardly systematic. Although they were monitoring and analysing them, they do not seem to have based their political planning mainly on them. Probably for two reasons. First, because of their firm distrust of opinion polls and second, due to the pressing circumstances and the suffocating political and economic contexts created by the economic crisis

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and the need to implement the third Memorandum. As Tsekeris points out, ‘the prevailing view at that time in the PM’s communication staff was “let’s finish with the memoranda and see what we will do next, we have another year to organize ourselves and stand on our feet”’ (2022: interview with the author). Institutional Advertising Both during the electoral and the non-electoral period, Tsipras used advertising to promote his campaign platform and his governmental policy. In the January 2015 campaign, on his personal Facebook account, he made a total of 17 posts related to the promotion of his election program, mainly in the form of videos but also with some posters. He continued this tactic to a certain extent as prime minister. During the first 24 months of his premiership, he made a total of 49 postings involving the use of advertising, either in the form of videos or posters, to promote his government policies and political messages. From 2018 onwards, Tsipras carried out a communication campaign in the context of which a series of ads were posted on social media under the title ‘it was fair and it was done’, which was designed by his communication staff (Bozoni, 2018; Tsekeris, 2022: interview with the author; Tsimitakis, 2022: interview with the author). Related videos were also posted to promote the government’s proposals for the Constitutional Review, some of which were aimed at strengthening the welfare state as well as other policy issues (Kathimerini, 2018b, 2018c, 2018d, 2019a, 2019d). The aim, among others, seems to have been highlighting the government work with an emphasis on social policy issues (Tsekeris, 2022: interview with the author) and therefore highlighting the dividing lines with ND. However, it seems that these initiatives were not part of a wellthought out and systematic communication plan but rather an approach that was linked to the political and economic developments (Tsekeris, 2022: interview with the author; Tsimitakis, 2022: interview with the author). In parallel, given that SYRIZA was a party that owned print and electronic media such as the newspaper Avgi and the radio station Sto Kokkino 105.5, it is possible to argue that to a certain extent it used them to promote its communication policy. However, according to Tsipras’ associates, none of these media had the potential to exert significant political and communicative influence and therefore were not used to any

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significant extent (Tsekeris, 2022: interview with the author; Vernardakis, 2022: interview with the author; Zachariadis, 2022: interview with the author). Frequent Publication From the very beginning of his political career, Tsipras placed great emphasis on the use of social media. To this day he remains the most popular political leader on Facebook. It is noteworthy that on 17 April 2022, his Facebook account had 479 thousand followers. The data shows that the frequency of posting is very high. During the January 2015 election period, he made a total of 100 Facebook posts. In the post-election era, during the first 24 months of his term, he made a total of 724 posts, i.e. an average of about 30 posts per month (taking into account, of course, that the 24-month period includes the election campaign for the September 2015 polls) (see Table 3.1). It seems that the use of social media is attributed to several factors. First, he sought unfiltered communication with the public. According to Zachariadis, Tsipras’ emphasis on social media is related to communicating with citizens in an ‘unmediated way. He had essentially created his own channel of direct communication’ (2022: interview with the author). It was a communication choice that was probably influenced by the international political communication trends observed in the United States and President Barack Obama who was the first to use social media in the 2008 election campaign (Katz et al., 2013; Zachariadis, 2022: interview with the author). Interestingly, as Smyrnaios and Karatzogianni have illustrated, ‘in April 2009, a member of Obama’s Internet team was invited by SYRIZA, in order to share his experience from the successful 2008 US presidential campaign and there is a strategic choice to invest on digital campaigning’ (2020: 291). In this context, as Vernardakis points out, Tsipras sought ‘an unfiltered communication with citizens by bypassing the traditional media, though he hardly ignored them. I think that the use of social media is also related to the trend of the time. In particular, Tsipras as a young politician, was familiar with social media’ (2022: interview with the author). The second reason relates to his view that he can promote his policy initiatives more effectively. According to Vernardakis, ‘Tsipras believed that through social media, he could create communication events and set the public agenda alongside the traditional media communication

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Table 3.1 Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras: Results of permanent campaigning indicators (in parentheses the monthly average) Alexis Tsipras Pre-election

Post-election

Posts

100

Reactions

314.448

Shares

41.172

Comments

15.732

Fund-raising Research citizens’ preferences Conducting polls Travels Advertising Hyperlinking 1 Hyperlinking 2 Hyperlinking 3 Interactivity—replies Interactivity—mentions Interactivity—questions Interactivity—shares Personalized comm Videos Live Gen. positive coverage Local events National events International events Negative campaigning Theme 1 Theme 2 Theme 3 Prom. Disc.—past deeds Prom. Disc.—specific actions/future Prom. Disc.—general goals Prom. Disc.—current actions Prom. Disc.—promotional ideas Prom. Disc.—political positions

0 0 0 45 17 0 0 35 0 0 7 0 0 9 6 91 43 6 0 11 – – – – – – – – –

724 (30,1) 2.895.370 (120.640,4) 219.182 (9.132,5) 349.717 (14.571,5) 0 0 0 245 49 0 1 249 0 0 0 0 1 278 26 79 40 158 460 40 65 – – 15 18 58 39 38 87

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system. Hence, quite often he acted based on his communicative instinct’ (2022: interview with the author). The third reason for the use of social media may be attributed to the fact that Tsipras was in a constant tension and conflict with most of the traditional media, which were critical of SYRIZA. He, therefore, had an additional incentive to bypass them by seeking an unmediated contact with the public. Building a Following on Social Media Tsipras’ presence in social media is reflected, apart from the large number of followers, in the high engagement rates (likes, shares, comments) both on Facebook and other social media like Twitter (Smyrnaios & Karatzogianni, 2020; Triantafillidou et al., 2020), Instagram (Poulakidakos, 2020) and Youtube (Veneti & Ioannidis, 2020). Indicatively, during the election period of January 2015, he collected 314.448 reactions (the vast majority of which were positive), 41.172 shares and 15.732 comments on his personal Facebook account. During the first 24 months of his premiership, his posts attracted 2.895.370 reactions (most of which were positive), 219.182 shares and 349.717 comments. These are figures which, if calculated on a monthly average basis, are not too far from those of the month of the election campaign for the January 2015 elections (120.640,4 reactions, 9.132,5 shares and 14.571,5 comments respectively) (see Table 3.1). The use of social media was something he had invested in from the very beginning of his political career, when SYRIZA was still a minor party. Social media was then the most appropriate way to communicate his political messages and network with citizens and social movements that swelled during the period of the economic crisis from 2008 onwards (Tsimitakis, 2022: interview with the author; Vernardakis, 2022: interview with the author). Monitoring the impact of his posting seems to have been something he and his staff were concerned about. For example, as Tsimitakis points out, ‘when he announced the social policy measures, he issued a video-message that was simultaneously broadcasted live on social media and television. Then we monitored the diffusion of the message’ (2022: interview with the author). Two further indications of the importance that Tsipras gave to the social media is the fact that he is the only one of the political leaders who, since January 2014, maintains an English-language Twitter profile to enhance the effectiveness of his communication with the international

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public opinion. At the same time, he is also very active on Instagram already since the beginning of 2018 (Poulakidakos & Giannoulis, 2019). Promotional Discourse, Engaging Political and Personalized Communication In terms of the content of social media posts and the distinction between political and personal, the relative distribution is proportional to the type of social media. On Facebook, Twitter and YouTube, the vast majority are about political issues and political statements, while very few posts are of a personal nature. Tsipras’ personal Facebook posts as prime minister are zero during the election period and only one (1) during his administration. Even on Instagram, which political leaders use more often to showcase posts of personal content, Tsipras’ relevant posts in both election and non-election periods, although several, are fewer in comparison to those with political content (Poulakidakos, 2020). Regarding political posts on Facebook, they were analysed in six categories, including those referred to past deeds; specific actions related to future plans; general goals and general issues; current actions; promotional ideas namely ideas a PM defends and political positions the PM supports in order to align himself with others. During the first 24 months of his governance on his personal Facebook account, his posts show that he placed more emphasis on the promotion of political positions (87), general goals and issues (58), current actions (39) and promotional ideas (38). The data shows that he focused more on the promotion of his negotiating effort to reach a new agreement with the EU and the IMF that was compatible with his election program. He also gave more emphasis to his meetings with other European leaders with whom he attempted to promote policies related to ideas of social solidarity. It is also worth mentioning that he emphasized the promotion of his government’s work and specifically those social policy measures to protect the most vulnerable segment of the society. Hyperlinking The use of hyperlinking was relatively extensive both during the preelection and post-election periods. The use of links to websites which present the PM’s current actions during the January 2015 election campaign was found in 25 posts. Correspondingly, during the first 24 months of his administration up to January 2017, the number of relevant posts reached 249. These websites included the official website of

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the Prime Minister of Greece, the official YouTube channel of the Prime Minister of Greece as well as the party’s Facebook account. On the contrary, he did not make posts referring to links to websites which present the PM’s current actions related to constituency service as well as links to websites which reinforce the PM’s political-ideological position. Interactive Communication, Microtargeting Audience As was the case with his predecessor in the premiership, Tsipras has systematically avoided engaging in interactive communication with social media users, such as online discussions and responses to comments. The exception the 7 posts about an interview he organized via Twitter, in the election period, inviting citizens to send questions to him. Also, no evidence was found on the use of the microtargeting audience technique. Earned Media Generating Positive Media Coverage With respect to the promotion of Tsipras’ public appearances to attract the interest and attention of both the media and the public, it is indicative that in the January 2015 election campaign he made 91 posts on Facebook. He continued this tactic as Prime Minister. In his first 24 months in office, he made a total of 460 relevant posts on his personal Facebook account, i.e. about 16.9 posts per month. It should of course be borne in mind here that the period under consideration includes the campaign period for the September 2015 elections as well. Broadcasted and Face-to-Face Speeches, Media Interviews, Press Articles and Press Conferences All these posts were intended to promote the Prime Minister’s public appearances, his governmental policy and his political messages. In this context, Tsipras, like many of his predecessors, made many public appearances and in particular speeches which were broadcast by both the media and social media and to a certain extent interviews with media outlets. Moreover, he published articles in the press and websites as well as he gave media interviews. Both during the election period and during his administration.

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According to the available data, during the January 2015 election period, he posted 9 videos on his personal Facebook account, while 6 of his speeches were broadcast live. He also took part in 43 local political events in cities in the province and 6 major events in Athens. Furthermore, he gave several speeches, media interviews and press conferences, while he published a sufficient number of press articles. During the period of his administration, and specifically in the first 24 months, 278 videos were posted on his personal Facebook account, while 26 of his speeches were broadcast live, most of them in Parliament. In addition, during the first 24 months of his term, Tsipras gave numerous media interviews (most of them to media outlets related to Greek media, print, electronic and online), press conferences in Greece and abroad and published signed articles in news websites and newspapers. It is also worth mentioning that most of the media interviews were given to media-friendly or neutral to SYRIZA. Overall, Tsipras avoided giving interviews to opposition media with few exceptions. This can be explained by the political polarization prevailing in the country and his constant clash with the opposition media. In parallel, it is worth noting that several of the press conferences were held mainly abroad following the EU Summits. After all, at that time both the economic crisis in which Greece was a protagonist and the refugeemigration crisis was on the rise. Regarding his speeches, in the first two years of his term, Tsipras as Prime Minister gave many speeches in parliament, in international forums and at home, both at party events and in the periphery outside Athens. He also made several live televised addresses on a number of issues related to the negotiation with the EU–IMF on the new bailout program, the referendum, the management of the refugee crisis, announcements on the provision of handouts to the poorer social strata, the promotion of the Prespa Agreement, the management of the fires in the Mati area in the Attica region as well as the end of the third Memorandum. Tsipras’ frequent and constant public presence is related to the belief of his staff that he possesses significant communication skills (Vernardakis, 2022: interview with the author). According to Tsekeris (2022: interview with the author), ‘there was a feeling that the frequent public presence of the Prime Minister improves his image. It was also felt that such appearances, such as public events related to the completion of public works or regional conferences and a number of other initiatives, give credibility

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to SYRIZA for two reasons. The first was that it managed to present an image that despite the financial constraints of the Memorandum, the SYRIZA-led government can improve living conditions. Second, it deconstructed the view that SYRIZA’s cadres were incapable of governing effectively. Given the confrontation that existed with ND on government efficiency and credibility in the previous years, the view of the Prime Minister’s staff that in political communication terms the Tsipras government is politically benefited when it rebuts the Mitsotakis narrative’ (Tsekeris, 2022: interview with the author). Public Events and Political Travels During the Term of Office In parallel, Tsipras made 158 posts related to his participation in public events of international character, 79 posts in local events and 40 posts related to his participation in events of national character that took place in Athens. These are figures that to a considerable extent underline the adoption of the strategy of permanent campaigning. He also placed particular emphasis on the implementation of 13 regional conferences in the 13 regions of the country, which started in July 2017 and were completed by May 2018. The aim of these initiatives was to highlight and promote economic growth issues at the local level. It was an attempt by Tsipras to communicate with local audiences and stakeholders and to announce specific policy initiatives with a focus on improving the economic conditions. As Tsekeris points out, ‘the rationale was that to the extent that an exit from the memoranda was looming and after a long period when fiscal margins were suffocating and infrastructure had been neglected, there was a need to have a discussion on local problems and local priorities and to take decisions on them. The response was positive, and many citizens took part. Both local actors and local associations as well as representatives of citizens and professionals were positive about the fact that the SYRIZA-led government was coming to listen to them and enter a dialogue with them’ (2022: interview with the author). Apart from regional conferences, many of Tsipras’ speeches were held outside Athens and were related to the completion of public works, roads, infrastructure projects and hospitals. His aim was to highlight government work.

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Regarding political travels, an analysis of Tsipras’ posts on his personal Facebook account during the January 2015 election period showed that he made 45 political travels and most of them were domestic. During the first 24 months of his term of office, he made a total of 245 political travels, most of them foreign, given that the country was in the spotlight of both the economic and refugee crisis.

Conclusions In line with his predecessors in the premiership, Tsipras adopted to a considerable extent the strategy of permanent campaigning. He retained the structures for the exercise of communication policy in the Prime Minister’s office, he set up a staff with the participation of communication professionals, although most of them had close party ties with SYRIZA. He also cooperated with polling firms monitoring systematically their findings, yet without systematically relying on them to formulate his communication strategy. Moreover, he attempted to mobilize the public in his favour by calling a referendum on the third Memorandum, recommending its rejection (see Table 3.2). In parallel, in the post-election period, he emphasized the issues on his election agenda such as the negotiation with the EU–IMF for a new bailout program and later for the implementation of a parallel to the third Memorandum program consisting of social policy measures to protect the most vulnerable social groups. Extensive use was also made of the tactic of negative campaigning against political opponents and the opposition media. Furthermore, he made extensive use of social media to promote his government policy and political messages. To this day, he remains the most popular political leader on Facebook. Finally, an important component of the permanent campaign strategy was the making of numerous public appearances including speeches, media interviews, press conferences and domestic as well as foreign political travels. In this context, the use of advertising spots, either in the form of videos or posters, mainly on social media, was frequent during the period of his administration.

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Table 3.2 Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras: Assessment of permanent campaigning indicators Joathan & Lilleker’s framework

PM Tsipras

Strong indicators

Conducting public opinion polls during the term Institutional advertising Use of marketing during term periods Negative campaigning Broadcasted and face-to-face speeches Engaging personalized communication

Average indicators

Institutional adaptations Frequency of posting Generating positive media coverage Fund-raising Travel during the term of office Constant search for info on the preferences of citizens Public events Building a following on social media Interactivity level Themes of election transferred to governance Microtargeting audience Hyperlinking Promotional discourse

Institutional adaptations Themes of election transferred to governance Negative campaigning Institutional advertising Frequency of posting Building a following on social media Generating positive media coverage Broadcasted and face-to-face speeches Public events Conducting public opinion polls during the term Promotional discourse Hyperlinking Use of marketing during term periods Travels during the term of office

Weak indicators

Constant search for info on the preferences of citizens Fund-raising Engaging personalized communication Interactivity level Microtargeting audience

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CHAPTER 4

Kyriakos Mitsotakis: The Permanent Campaign Prime Minister

Abstract This chapter discusses the political background of Kyriakos Mitsotakis and evaluates his permanent campaigning at a time of the Covid-19 crisis and the resulting economic one. In particular, it examines his communication strategy from the perspective of the three categories of the permanent campaign indicators (capacity building and strategy, paid and owned media as well as earned media). It finds that Mitsotakis has so far applied permanent campaigning, to a greater degree, than any of his predecessors and thus can be considered as the ‘permanent campaign prime minister’. Moreover, he has put emphasis on all three sets of this communication strategy: capacity building and strategy, paid and owned media as well as earned media. Keywords Permanent campaigning · Mitsotakis · Single-party government · Pandemic crisis · Economic crisis · Social media

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 P. A. Koliastasis, Permanent Campaigning in Greece in Times of Crisis, Political Campaigning and Communication, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11691-9_4

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Introduction Kyriakos Mitsotakis is the son of Konstantinos Mitsotakis, who served as ND leader from 1984 to 1993 and prime minister from 1990 to 1993. He studied at Harvard University and worked for a decade in the financial sector in Greece and abroad before entering politics. He was elected for the first time as a Member of Parliament for the ND party in 2004. Like his father, he is considered as representative of the moderate liberal wing of the party. In June 2013 he was appointed as Minister of Administrative Reform in the pro-bailout ND-PASOK coalition serving until January 2015 and attempting to promote the restructuring of the public administration. After the September 2015 election and the defeat of ND by SYRIZA, Mitsotakis announced his intention to run for party leadership which would be decided in an open primary process by members and sympathizers of the party. His rivals were the then party leader Evaggelos Meimarakis, who was seen as representing the party establishment, the right-wing Adonis Georgiadis and the 37-year-old Deputy Regional Governor of Thessaloniki Apostolos Tzitzikostas (Chryssogelos, 2016). In the election, that was held in two rounds, Mitsotakis finally prevailed over his main rival, Meimarakis. From a theoretical point of view, it seems that for most ND members and friends, the main priority was the return of the party to power (Quinn, 2010). After two consecutive defeats in national elections by SYRIZA (in January and September 2015) and one defeat in the July 2015 referendum (where the Yes camp backed mainly by ND), the main criterion for evaluating the candidates for leadership was their electability. Mitsotakis, although coming from a political dynasty, seems to have been evaluated as more capable than Meimarakis to reshape and renew ND’s image in order to prevail over SYRIZA in the next elections (Chryssogelos, 2016). After all, the latter, as the head of ND in the September 2015 polls, had already been defeated once by Tsipras (Koliastasis, 2015). In parallel, Mitsotakis was a proponent of a confrontational opposition strategy against the SYRIZA-led government, unlike Meimarakis who preferred a more moderate one. Indeed, as the new leader, Mitsotakis was a fierce opponent of Tsipras. He attempted to draw a clear dividing line with the populist Syriza to rally around him those voters from the traditional right to the centreleft who had backed the Yes vote in the 2015 referendum and took part in the leadership election of ND (Tsatsanis et al., 2020: 506). From the

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point of view of negative partisanship, it sought to benefit from the antiSYRIZA vote which involved right-wing and centre-right voters on the one hand and the middle ground voters coming from PASOK, Potami together with some disillusioned centre-left SYRIZA voters. The main causes of their accumulated discontent seem to have been the failure of the SYRIZA–ANEL government’s negotiations in 2015, the experience of the referendum, the policy of over-taxation of the middle class followed during the implementation of the third Memorandum and the lack of investments. In the problems in the public safety issue, the failure in the management of natural disasters in Attica, the migration influx and the Prespa Agreement under which FYROM was recognized under the name ‘North Macedonia’ have also played role (Koliastasis, 2019; Skoulariki, 2020; Tsatsanis et al., 2020). In this context, Mitsotakis formulated a liberal platform focussing on the reduction of taxes and social security contributions, the attraction of mainly foreign private investment, the restoration of public safety and the limitation of migration flows. He called it the ‘Truth Accord’ to emphasize, as he argued, the difference between the ND and the SYRIZA’s lack of credibility, which had abandoned its anti-bailout platform and the so-called ‘parallel’ program (Naftemporiki, 2016a, 2016b). In the European elections of May 2019, ND won by 10 points, forcing Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras to immediately call early elections for 7 July 2019 (Koliastasis, 2019).

Capacity Building and Strategy Institutional Adaptations As opposition leader, Mitsotakis had either retained communication structures in the party such as the Press Office, the position of press spokesperson or created new ones like the position of the management of social media strategy and that of a consultant responsible for conducting and analyzing opinion polls. After his election, he completely reorganized the prime ministerial Office and the government machinery. It seems that Mitsotakis shared the view that the way the so-called Maximos Mansion was structured hardly allowed the prime minister to effectively perform his duties, promote government policy and coordinate the ministries in order to implement

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government decisions (Ta Nea, 2019). Although the country’s political system was considered prime minister-centred, it appeared that the Prime Minister’s Office lacked the necessary institutional tools (Featherstone & Papadimitriou, 2015). Hence, Mitsotakis promoted the plan for the creation of the so-called ‘Executive State’ which brought about changes at all levels of the governmental apparatus (Gerapetritis, 2022; Kathimerini, 2019a; Peloni, 2019a). The reform started to be implemented with Law 4622/2019 and some of its most important changes can be summarized as follows (Dramalioti, 2021; Gerapetritis, 2022): the Council of Ministers meets regularly with a predefined agenda and sets the general policy directions. The work of ministers is monitored and evaluated centrally through an integrated information system (“MAZI”). The ‘Executive State’ is a new structure at the core of the government with strong ‘power network’ characteristics consisting of 440 employees (EU 4th Enhanced surveillance report, Greece 2019). Overall, the functioning of the Prime Minister’s Office becomes more centralized, although the communication coordination of the ministries, according to the Prime Minister’s associates, is not as centralized (Skertsos, 2022: interview with the author). It is also indicative that, the institutional structures for the exercise of the communication policy of the prime minister and the government were partially reorganized. According to Article 21 of the Law on the Executive State (Law 4622 2019: 3230–3231), an independent service called the Presidency of the Government (in essence, the Prime Minister’s Office) was established, whose responsibilities include, inter alia, the planning and implementation of the government’s communication strategy and the provision of timely information to public opinion. It is also composed of, among others, the General Secretariat of the Prime Minister and the General Secretariat for Communication and Information. Furthermore, the former includes, among others, competences such as: – the Press Office, which is responsible for monitoring current affairs from the domestic and international press and informing the Prime Minister, communicating and managing the Prime Minister’s relations with the Greek and international media, informing journalists about his initiatives, as well as processing requests from the international or domestic press for interviews with the Prime Minister,

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– the Communications Office, which is responsible for the physical communication of the Prime Minister and the government, the organization of events, the drafting of the Prime Minister’s speeches, the promotion of the government’s work and participation in the preparation of a communication plan for the promotion of the government’s work on all matters not related to digital media, – the Office of Digital Communication, which is responsible for any kind of communication of the above persons by digital means. Furthermore, the General Secretariat of Communication and Information was maintained, as mentioned, with responsibilities including ‘supporting the members of the Government and the Deputy Ministers, as well as the Presidency of the Government, in matters relating to communication and the timely and accurate information of public opinion in Greece and abroad, in relation to the government’s work, as well as supporting the Government Representative in the exercise of his duties’ (Law 4622 2019:3235). In addition, it is responsible for the supervision of the Public Radio and Television (ERT) and the Athens News Agency—Macedonian News Agency (Law 4622 2019:3235). Regarding the structure of the Prime Minister’s Press Office, in addition to the post of Director of the Press Office, two more posts of Deputy Directors were established. The position of government spokesperson and Deputy Minister to the Prime Minister was also retained, while the position of Deputy Government Spokesperson, who was not a member of the Cabinet, was also established (Kathimerini, 2021a). Overall, the institutional development within the framework of the ‘Executive State’ could be evaluated from a theoretical point of view as an attempt at the ‘presidentialisation’ of the Greek premiership, along the lines of the British premiership during Tony Blair’s period (Foley, 2000). For example, by decision of Mitsotakis, Cabinet meetings are now held in the Maximos Mansion (where the Prime Minister’s Office is located) rather than in the Cabinet Room in the Parliament. As he stated in the first Cabinet meeting taking place in the parliament: The next cabinet meetings will not be held in the Parliament but in the Maximos Mansion. Because we must, both practically and symbolically, shift the functions of the executive from the legislature. (Prime Minister, 2019)

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Regarding the composition of the communication staff, Mitsotakis, apart from cooperating with MPs and party cadres, collaborated with communication professionals as well. Ahead of the election, the director of the party’s Press Office was the journalist Konstantinos Zoulas, who came from the right-leaning newspaper Kathimerini. In parallel, a key role in Mitsotakis’ staff played the pollster and then head of the polling company GPO, Takis Theodorikakos (Naftemporiki, 2016a, 2016b; Terzis, 2017). The communications staff of Mitsotakis also included the communicator Eftichis Vardoulakis (Terzis, 2017). Moreover, from the beginning of 2019 onwards, the ND leader seems to have cooperated with the American pollster and strategist Stanley Greenberg, who conducted focus groups, analyzed their findings and contributed to the formulation of the party’s communication strategy (iefimerida, 2019a). Greenberg was previously a political advisor to Bill Clinton and other politicians around the world. It is worth noting that the cooperation of Greek premiers with American communicators has been observed in the past as well. For example, Konstantinos Mitsotakis had worked with the American political consultants James Carville and Paul Begala in the 1993 election campaign (Papathanassopoulos, 2007). Certainly, the phenomenon is international and refers to the concept of Americanization of political communication and the collaboration of American experts with politicians from all over the world (Lilleker, 2006: 30–35; Plasser & Plasser, 2002). During the term of office, the staffing of Kyriakos Mitsotakis’ communications apparatus with communication professionals continued. Several journalists participated in it. Initially, the position of Director of the Press Office of the Prime Minister was taken over by the former Director of the Press Office of the party, Konstantinos Zoulas, who subsequently left the post as he was appointed President of the Public Radio and Television (ERT) (Papantoniou, 2019). He was then replaced by another journalist, Dimitris Tsiodras, who had previously worked at the left-leaning newspaper Eleftherotypia, the right-leaning Kathimerini, the Flash radio station and national television networks (Kathimerini, 2019b; Tsiodras, 2022). Tsiodras, like several of the journalists who joined the prime minister’s staff, had no political ties with the ND party in the past. Previously he had served for four years as press spokesman for the centrist Potami (River) party before running for parliament with ND in the July 2019 elections (Protagon, 2019).

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Furthermore, the journalist Argyris Papastathis was appointed to the position of Deputy Director of Press Office, responsible for monitoring the international media and having contacts with foreign correspondents. The journalist George Efthymiou has also been designated as Deputy Director of the Press Office (Kathimerini, 2019b). Yannis Vlastaris, formerly director of the left-leaning newspaper Eleftherotypia, has been appointed as senior speechwriter (Papachlimintzos, 2019a; Romanos, 2022: interview with the author). Dimitris Mitropoulos, former director of the left-of-centre newspaper Ta Nea, was initially designated as an adviser on European affairs to the prime minister until he moved to a position as a special adviser (iefimerida, 2019b, 2020). Aristotelia Peloni, who had served as political editor of the newspapers Ta Nea and Kathimerini (Kathimerini, 2020a), has also been chosen to perform as deputy government spokesperson. In parallel, Eric Parks, coming from the private sector and digital innovation companies, was initially in charge of the prime minister’s social media strategy and the overall management of his social media accounts (Papachlimintzos, 2019b; Romanos, 2022: interview with the author). A few months ago, however, this position and the relevant responsibilities of managing the digital communication for the prime minister were taken over by the current Director of the party’s Press Office, Nikos Romanos, who also foresees the social media accounts of the ND party (Romanos, 2022: interview with the author). In this context, the digital communication unit, among others, identifies the political mood on social media, the issues that dominate the social media agenda as well as those that the opposition’s social media accounts communicate (Skertsos, 2022: interview with the author). In parallel, Grigoris Dimitriadis, the Prime Minister’s General Secretary, plays a central role in the Mitsotakis’ communication staff (until his resignation in August 2022); Akis Skertsos, responsible for the coordination of the government’s work, initially as Deputy Prime Minister and later as Minister of State, and the professor of Constitutional Law George Gerapetritis, who as Minister of State is responsible for the coordination of legislative work (Kathimerini, 2021a; Peloni, 2019a; Skertsos, 2022: interview with the author). Member of the communication staff is also Thodoris Livanios who monitors and analyzes the polls and who was initially appointed Deputy Minister of Interior, later he shifted to the post of Deputy Minister to the Prime Minister and since mid-2021 has been appointed Deputy Minister of Digital Governance (Kathimerini, 2019c, 2021a, 2021b; NewMoney, 2022; Romanos, 2022: interview with the

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author; Skertsos, 2022: interview with the author). From July 2019 to January 2021, Stelios Petsas, who previously served as Director of the Office of the President of ND, was appointed government spokesman and Deputy Minister to the Prime Minister (Kathimerini, 2021a). Today, this position has been filled by the MP Yannis Economou (Kathimerini, 2021a). The key members of the communication staff hold a daily meeting, usually with the participation of the Prime Minister for the communication management of government policy (Romanos, 2022: interview with the author; Skertsos, 2022: interview with the author). In parallel, the communication staff in the party still operates. The positions of press spokesperson, deputy press spokesperson in charge of regional media, Director of the Press Office, social media manager and the position of the Secretary of Strategic Planning and Communication of the party have been maintained (Kathimerini, 2019d; Peloni, 2019b; Romanos, 2022: interview with the author). It is noteworthy that the party’s Press Office assists the Prime Minister’s Press Office in carrying out media monitoring to enable the government and the party’s communication rebuttal to the opposition’s political attacks. Moreover, the Press Office of ND publishes on a daily basis a document entitled ‘the pulse of the day’ with the political positions of the government and the arguments that ministers, MPs and party officials need to know in order to defend the government’s policy both in the media and in social media (Romanos, 2022: interview with the author). Conducting Opinion Polls During the Term and Research Citizens’ Preferences and Data Mitsotakis, both as opposition leader and prime minister, has been closely and systematically monitoring polls and focus groups. He often seems to be the recipient of rolling polls (Powergame, 2022; Evaggelodimou, 2022; Skertsos, 2022: interview with the author). Livanios, as a member of Mitsotakis’ communication staff, appears to have systematic communication and cooperation with pollsters for the design and implementation of private polls and focus groups as well as for the analysis of poll findings and the formulation of relevant communication strategy reports (NewMoney, 2022; Romanos, 2022: interview with the author; Skertsos, 2022: interview with the author). It also seems that Mitsotakis and his staff have consistent communication with several pollsters, including

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Thomas Gerakis, head of the polling company Marc (Romanos, 2022 interview with the author). Furthermore, Mitsotakis appears to occasionally cooperate with the American strategist Stanley Greenberg who conducts and analyzes focus groups and offers political consultancy (Papachlimintzos, 2021). According to Romanos, ‘the approach of the Prime Minister’s staff is that everything we do must be measured, both before and after it is done’. Certainly, this does not mean that polling findings change our policy decisions. Primarily, polls are useful to implement and communicate government policy in the best possible way and at the right timing (2022: interview with the author). It is worth noting that measurement is also about the formulation as well as the impact of the political messages that the government sends out, although this is usually done in normal political periods when political time is sufficient, rather than in cases of unexpected and serious crises exerting pressure for immediate decisions (Romanos, 2022: interview with the author). However, it should be mentioned that, although Mitsotakis as prime minister uses polls, he has not attempted, as the analysis of his posts on his personal Facebook account indicates, to invite citizens to express their opinion through social media, either for his election campaign or for the evaluation of his governance. Regarding the constant search for information on the preferences and data of citizens based on the analyses of the relevant posts of Mitsotakis during his first 24 months in office, it seems that there were no cases in which he invited citizens to offer their views about the government policy. However, as Romanos notes (2022: interview with the author), the party, through the internet, the websites of its prefectural and local organizations, its official website and its social media accounts, is trying to intensify contact with both party members and potential voters. To this end a newsletter with the party’s positions is sent to both its members and those who subscribe to the ND website. Fund-Raising Activities In terms of fund-raising activities, as party leader Mitsotakis took initiatives to increase the party’s revenues. He promoted the campaign ‘A few of many’. This activity has continued during his term of office. A section

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with this title is maintained on the ND website (https://members.nd. gr/donate), in which any citizen who wishes to do so can donate to the party using a credit or debit card in the amount of 5e, 10e, 20e, 50e, 100e, while he/she is given the opportunity to offer a larger amount of his/her choice within the framework of the relevant legislation (Law 4304/2014). However, since the beginning of his premiership until today, he has not carried out any communication initiative to promote this action, as the analysis of his Facebook posts in the period July 2019–July 2021 suggests and in this sense he has not engaged in fund-raising activities further.

Paid and Owned Media Themes of Election Transferred to Governance In terms of the paid and owned media, in the July 2019 election campaign, Mitsotakis focused his attention on four issues: taxation, investment, public safety and immigration. In particular, he made four campaign pledges: to reduce taxes and social security contributions, attract foreign private investment and facilitate domestic ones, improve public safety; and reduce substantially migration flows (Kathimerini, 2019e, 2019f, 2019g, 2019h). His key campaign promises were part of a centre-right agenda. In the aftermath of the elections, he consistently and constantly emphasized these issues (Kathimerini, 2020a, 2021c). He highlighted the measures of his government for tax cuts (on individuals, businesses, and real estate), the reduction of insurance contributions and the attraction of foreign investments in Greece (by firms like Microsoft, Amazon etc.) (Kathimerini, 2019i, 2021c, 2021d, 2022). He also put emphasis on the enforcement of law and order in areas of Athens where there were frequent riots or crime phenomena. In this context, he abolished the so-called academic ‘asylum’ to allow police intervention in academic institutions in case of law-breaking crimes (Kathimerini, 2019j, 2020b). Moreover, he took drastic measures to curb undocumented immigration which had overburdened those Greek islands in the Aegean Sea that were close to the Turkish coast (Kathimerini, 2019k). Overall, it is telling that he often used the motto ‘we said it, we did it’ (Protagon, 2021). As the Minister of State, Akis Skertsos has put it:

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Mitsotakis’ communication strategy is expressed in two slogans which have been the pinnacle of its political discourse. The first was the “Truth Accord” against the fake populism narrative that SYRIZA had built. It is essential that Mitsotakis wants to speak honestly and have an honest communication with the people. If he makes mistakes, he will say them, he will not hide them as happened with his predecessor in the case of the Mati tragedy. This is part of Mitsotakis’ political DNA. He wants to be consistent and to put what he says into practice. The by-product of this approach is the second slogan “we said it, we did it”. If he says he can’t do it, he will come out and say it explaining why. It therefore seeks through a sincere political positioning to weaken people’s distrust of politicians. (2022: interview with the author)

Interestingly, Mitsotakis insisted on keeping his election pledges even after the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic in March 2020. Perhaps he was facilitated by the implementation of an expansionary, Keynesian fiscal policy of tax cuts and spending increases that was essential to reverse the sharp and deep recession caused by the lockdown. These developments appear to have enabled him to argue that he delivers on his promises despite the difficult circumstances. According to Romanos, ‘in the period before the COVID-19 crisis the aim was to move quickly to implement our pre-election commitments. After the pandemic, the aim was to manage the crisis effectively, both at the sanitary and economic level, so that the country could return to normality as soon as possible. Yet, alongside managing the crisis, we have also tried to continue to implement the key election promises. The insistence on political consistency and political credibility characterizes both Mitsotakis and his staff’ (2022: interview with the author). It is also worth noting that based on the analysis of the posts made by Mitsotakis as prime minister, he placed greater emphasis on the promotion of the policy of attracting foreign private investment, with a total of 35 posts, on improving public security with 21 posts and to a lesser degree on the promotion of the policy of reducing taxes and contributions with 14 posts. Negative Campaigning Mitsotakis, both in the pre- and the post-election period, generally avoided frequent political attacks against the opposition. As the relevant analysis of his Facebook posts during the July 2019 campaign indicates,

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he made only 3 posts of negative campaigning against SYRIZA. Similarly, after the elections and especially during the first 24 months of his term of the total of 887 posts he made on his account, only 9 of them were related to attacks against the opposition and Alexis Tsipras. This choice seems to be attributed to three reasons. The first one is the electoral victory of ND against SYRIZA in the European elections of May 2019, when it won by 10 points against the then government (33% against 23%), forcing the then prime minister to call early national elections (Koliastasis, 2019). Second, the political consultancy he received by his communication advisors, like Stanley Greenberg, was to avoid a head-on confrontation with Tsipras in the July 2019 campaign and focus on promoting positive messages about the policy proposals of his election manifesto (iefimerida, 2019a). Probably because by avoiding a negative campaign would make it more difficult for Tsipras to rally the disappointed SYRIZA voters. In addition, by focusing only on positive messages, Mitsotakis would manage to broaden its electoral appeal among the undecided middle ground voters, many of whom had previously supported Tsipras. Thirdly, as Mitsotakis’ associates illustrate, at the political level ‘the government systematically targets middle ground voters who desire stability, normality, moderation and low profile’ (Romanos, 2022: interview with the author). However, although the adoption of a confrontational strategy with the opposition was hardly systematic, it is a fact that Mitsotakis on some occasions clashed politically with SYRIZA on issues such as the management of the pandemic and the implementation of health measures such as the lockdown. In particular, he had accused SYRIZA of ‘irresponsible’ attitude concerning the opposition party’s youth organization call on citizens to participate in demonstrations amid a pandemic outbreak (Proto Thema, 2021b). There was also a clash regarding the implementation of the ND’s preelection commitments. It seems that Mitsotakis sought in some cases to highlight the dividing lines with SYRIZA and the unique brand of his administration. It is characteristic that in April 2021, referring to the tax reduction measures he was promoting, Mitsotakis claimed that with this policy he was ‘returning to the middle class what SYRIZA took away from it’ (Kathimerini, 2021e). In parallel, as prime minister set up two preliminary investigation committees in the Parliament for former ministers of SYRIZA. The first

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one concerned the former Deputy Minister of Justice Dimitris Papangelopoulos for his role in the Novartis case, which ND had denounced as a frame-up against its former president and its former government officials, and the second one to investigate any criminal responsibility of former State Minister Nikos Pappas for the 2016 TV licence case (Kathimerini, 2019l, 2021f). Regarding possible tensions with part of the media, Mitsotakis as opposition leader had imposed an embargo on ERT for several months so that party officials and MPs of ND would not appear in its broadcasts (iefimerida, 2018). The reason for this was the comments made by a state television journalist who likened him to a theorist of Italian fascism (Lifo, 2018). However, a few months later, ND lifted the embargo (Kathimerini, 2019m). During his governing tenure, there have been identified no significant cases of tension with the national media. Use of Marketing During Terms of Office As mentioned above, Mitsotakis has consistently cooperated with pollsters monitoring public opinion polls since the years of opposition. Moreover, as has been said, his election strategy seems to have been significantly influenced by the findings of the polls, both quantitative and qualitative, and especially by the recommendations of Stanley Greenberg. The latter argued that ND’s polling lead over SYRIZA was wide and uncontested. Therefore, there is no need for Mitsotakis to focus on the negative criticism of the SYRIZA–ANEL government and the polarizing confrontation with the then Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras, but to put more emphasis on the promotion of his program and specifically on the promotion of positive messages about the policies he is going to implement as a premier (Papachlimintzos, 2021). Once in office, and in line with his predecessors, he continued to collaborate with pollsters who have undertaken to systematically carry out private polls. In several cases it seems that the findings of the polls have significantly influenced Mitsotakis’ political strategy, as well as his governmental policy in certain areas. For example, that his decision to emphasize in every circumstance that he will avoid calling snap elections is related to the fact that the majority of the public rejects the prospect of an early poll (Kathimerini, 2021b, 2021c). Moreover, a few weeks after the election of PASOK’s new leader, Nikos Androulakis and the rise of the party to the voting intention figure at 15%

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because of direct gains from, among others, ND, Mitsotakis took the decision to include in his party’s ballot list Michalis Chrysochoidis. The latter was a former leading member of PASOK and until September 2021 Minister of Citizen Protection in Mitsotakis’ administration. It seems that private polls had even been conducted beforehand to measure the popularity of such candidacy in the constituency of Western Athens (Proto Thema, 2022). The impact of the polling data is also evident in policy issues and their presentation. For instance, in the case of establishing a university police force to guard academic institutions and protect students, although the majority of the public was in favour, most students were against (Metron, 2018). As a result, the final implementation of the measure in September 2021 was postponed (Kathimerini, 2021g). Another example is the educational reform. According to Skertsos, ‘in hindsight we polled the university reform bill as a whole [introduced in summer 2022] as well as its specific provisions. The feedback we had was that it received broad public support. On the other hand, there were also policy issues where the polling data were not considered. Such as, for example, the introduction of a minimum grade for university admission. But we implemented it despite political opposition’ (2022: interview with the author). The influence of the polls is still reflected in the Prime Minister’s rhetoric. On some critical occasions he has chosen to apologize for actions or omissions in light of the public mood as it reflected in opinion polls as well as on social media. More specifically, he apologized publicly, as in the case of the forest fires in the summer of 2021 due to the prolonged heatwave or the effects of the ‘Elpida’ snowstorm in early 2022 that caused thousands of drivers to be stranded on ‘Attiki Odos’ (a central avenue of Athens) (Kathimerini, 2021f; Skai, 2022). There are probably two reasons for Mitsotakis’ communication tactics. First, his effort to defuse social discontent and at the same time to weaken opposition criticism, thus slowing down the inevitable cost of ruling that all governing parties incur (Nannestad & Paldam, 1999). From a theoretical point of view, these refer to the approach of market-oriented governing leaders (Elder, 2016), according to which a political executive seeks to manage the difficulties of governance in such a way as to limit as far as possible the unavoidable political costs. In addition, the prime minister tries to show that it ‘is listening’ to public opinion. Secondly, the perception he has, according to his associates, that the premier is the one who has to get out ‘in front of the difficulties’ and does

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not distance himself from the problems in order to protect his personal image. As Skertsos illustrates: it is important that Mitsotakis follows active political marketing, reacting quickly to problems and their communication management, thus surprising his political opponents. He makes decisions quickly. Certainly, this can also lead to some mistakes at times. But he also corrects them quickly. He is generally a very agile politician who follows the approach according to which, in the face of a complex reality, you have to make decisions immediately and with some calculated risk in order to act effectively and not delaying problem-solving (..) He has a very well-developed sense of being a responsible leader and leading by example. This is his political motto and the core of his political thinking and action, and when he thinks he has made a mistake, he comes out and says so. He believes that a relationship of honesty is a key factor in building a relationship of trust with the electorate. (...) I think the polling trends show that this approach benefits him. According to the relevant data, there has never been a prime minister in the past who, after three years in office, is leading the polls by such a large margin. (2022: interview with the author)

Moreover, as Romanos points out, ‘it is his choice to take responsibility by demonstrating honesty and announcing specific actions’ (2022: interview with the author). This probably allows him to influence the public and set the terms of the political debate. Certainly, in this case he is likely to spend some of his personal political capital. However, as Romanos notes, he expects that his intervention will solve the problem and this move will pay off in the medium run; in addition, this approach seems to be an element of his political personality (Romanos, 2022: interview with the author). In parallel, Mitsotakis appears to use new technological tools to enhance the impact of his communication policy and to put issues concerning civil society on the agenda (Romanos, 2022 interview with the author). For instance, in December 2021 he launched a new communication activity under the title ‘Podcast with Kyriakos’. On his own initiative, he invited Ada Stamatatou, the mother of a 19-year-old autistic child, to the Prime Minister’s office in the Maximos Mansion to discuss the issue of autism since that day, 3 December, was the International Day of Persons with Disabilities (Proto Thema, 2021a). However, this initiative in the following months faded away as no new podcast has taken place since then.

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Institutional Advertising Mitsotakis, both as opposition leader and premier, used advertising spots, either in the form of a video or a poster, to promote his policies. Especially since the outbreak of the pandemic, the use of institutional advertising has increased. In total, during the July 2019 election period, he posted six times advertising spots. In the post-election period and especially in the first 24 months of his administration, he promoted a total of 169 commercials, videos and posters, which is estimated at about 7 posts per month. In this sense, the frequency of publicizing advertising spots during his term was similar to the pre-election period, thus highlighting the element of the adoption of a permanent campaigning perspective. The topics of the spots were related to issues on his election agenda such as cutting taxes, attracting investment, improving public safety and reducing migration flows, as well as issues related to the crises that broke out during his administration, with emphasis on the pandemic and the implementation of the vaccination program. The policy campaigns under the slogan ‘Stay at Home’ in the context of the quarantine imposed during the first months of the pandemic as well as the slogan ‘Freedom’ to promote the vaccination program against coronavirus, can be considered as typical examples of his approach. These are initiatives indicating the importance he attaches both to strengthening his credibility by projecting the fulfilment of his electoral commitments and to the need to effectively address the multiple, successive crises that have erupted in the economy, migration and public health. Frequent Publication Another important indicator of the implementation of permanent campaigning is the frequency of posting. The data suggest that Mitsotakis’ number of posts is higher than that of his two predecessors. In particular, he has made 887 posts on his personal Facebook account during the first 24 months of his term (see Table 4.1). It seems that he seeks to create a positive image of himself and broaden his appeal to younger citizens (Romanos, 2022: interview with the author). As Skertsos points out, ‘a large part of the public uses the social media, among other things, to inform themselves. So a prime minister must have a presence there as well and communicate his political

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Table 4.1 Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis: Results campaigning indicators (in parentheses the monthly average)

of

109

permanent

Kyriakos Mitsotakis Pre-election

Post-election

Posts

45

Reactions

180.800

Shares

15.090

Comments

24.105

Fund-raising Research citizens’ preferences Conducting polls Travels Advertising Hyperlinking 1 Hyperlinking 2 Hyperlinking 3 Interactivity—replies Interactivity—mentions Interactivity—questions Interactivity—shares Personalized comm Videos Live Gen. positive coverage Local events National events International events Negative campaigning Theme 1 Theme 2 Theme 3 Prom. Disc.—past deeds Prom. Disc.—specific actions/future Prom. Disc.—general goals Prom. Disc.—current actions Prom. Disc.—promotional ideas Prom. Disc.—political positions

0 0 0 9 6 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 20 13 13 14 3 0 3 – – – – – – – – –

887 (36,9) 6.767.600 (281.983,3) 358.308 (14.929,5) 968.309 (40.346,2) 0 0 0 134 (5,6) 169 (7,0) 0 3 274 0 0 0 5 2 481 (20,0) 291 (12,1) 492 (20,5) 37 6 56 9 14 35 21 39 50 54 183 38 47

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messages. And it is true that Mitsotakis has an exuberant presence. Something that can be explained by the fact that the New Democracy party does not have such a good relationship at the electoral level with the younger age groups. There is therefore a need to address this section of public opinion in a convincing and effective way. So a systematic presence on social media is essential especially since SYRIZA has a strong presence in them’ (2022: interview with the author). He also seeks to shape the public agenda to his advantage by highlighting issues that favour him (Romanos, 2022: interview with the author). Moreover, he appears to invest in the possibility of unmediated communication that social media give to politicians. After all, this possibility has not only been exploited by populist politicians of the left and right, but also by non-populist ones (Triantafillidou & Lappas, 2022). Barack Obama in 2008 was the first to use and eventually establish political campaigning through social media since he was seen as ‘the social media president’ (Katz et al., 2013). Mitsotakis seems to be interested in unmediated communication, but he knows that all forms of communication are needed: both unmediated and mediated. According to Skertsos, ‘you need to mobilize both people and government officials to spread and disseminate your message and advance your policies’ (2022: interview with the author). Building a Following on Social Media In parallel, Mitsotakis’ intense, frequent and systematic presence on social media has resulted in a large number of followers and high engagement rates (likes, shares, comments) both on Facebook and other social media. Based on the relevant analysis, the number of followers on Facebook on the 17th of April 2022 had reached 369 thousand. Also, in the month of the July 2019 election period his Facebook posts have received 180.800 reactions (the vast majority of which were positive), 15.090 shares and 24.105 comments. During the period of his administration and specifically during the first 24 months of his term, his posts have received a total of 6.767.600 reactions (most of which positive) that monthly are estimated at 281.983,3. He has also gathered 358.308 shares which averaged out to 14.929,5 on a monthly basis and another 968.309 comments

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which on a monthly basis averaged out to 40,346.2. The numerical comparison of the pre-election period with the post-election one indicates that for Mitsotakis the election campaign did not stop on the election day but continued afterwards (see Table 4.1). Promotional Discourse and Engaging Political and Personalized Communication In terms of the content of social media posts and the distinction between political and personal, the relative distribution is proportional to the type of social media. Typically, on Facebook, Twitter, Linkedin and YouTube the vast majority are about political issues and political statements. Mitsotakis almost exclusively uses Instagram to promote posts of a personal nature. Even there, however, personal posts seem to be fewer than political ones—at least during the election period (Poulakidakos, 2020). On Facebook, personal posts during the July 19 election period were zero, while during his term there were only two. In terms of the political posts, they were analyzed in six categories including past deeds, specific actions for future plans, general goals and general issues, current actions, political ideas he defends as a PM as well as political positions he supports in order to align himself with others. The findings suggest that Mitsotakis has put more emphasis on the promotion of current actions by making a total of 179 posts, while the number of posts for general goals (54), as well as for specific actions for future plans (50) is relatively high. Less emphasis was put on political positions (47), past deeds (39) and political ideas (38). It was evident from the beginning of his term of office that he intended to promote the implementation of his campaign pledges regarding the reduction of taxes, the attraction of investments, the improvement of public safety and the reduction of migration flows. In addition, he focused on issues that were not so strongly promoted during the election but were part of his election manifesto, such as the reform of education and the digitalization of the state. It is indicative that he often uses the slogan ‘we said it, we did it’ aiming to strengthen his credibility. For this reason, probably several of his posts corresponded to the category of

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past deeds highlighting government policies that have already been implemented. At the same time, it is worth noting that the needs created by the pandemic crisis at the sanitary and economic level, combined with the continuous measures taken to deal with it, may have made it necessary to make systematic and frequent posts referring to the category of current actions. Hyperlinking and Interactive Communication The use of hyperlinking as the relevant data show is partly extensive. On the one hand, posts referring to links to websites which present the PM current actions related to constituency service as well as links to websites which reinforce the PM’s political-ideological position are few. On the other hand, the number of posts concerning links to websites which present the PM’s current actions, although minimal (7) during the election period, reached the number of 274 during his term, which, on average, amounts to 11.3 posts per month. In line with his predecessors in the premiership, Mitsotakis seems to avoid participating in online discussions with social media users. In the election period such posts were zero; the same applies to his term of office. The only exception is a few posts (5) sharing contents from other Facebook users or fan pages mainly the ND Facebook page.

Earned Media Generating Positive Media Coverage Mitsotakis sought to publicize either the public appearances or communication events he had planned as well as to promote his political messages. In this way he was attempting to achieve maximum positive visibility and media coverage of his communication activities. According to the collected data, he made 13 relevant posts in the pre-election period. He continued the same tactic during the first 24 months of his tenure making 492 posts to promote his communication activities in order to attract and secure positive media coverage. It is estimated that he made approximately 12.1 posts on a monthly basis, as many as in the election campaign period.

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Broadcasted and Face-to-Face Speeches, Media Interviews, Press Conferences, Press Articles As Prime Minister, Mitsotakis made numerous public appearances including media interviews, press conferences and speeches in the parliament, at party forums, at public events in Athens and abroad, as well as outside Greece together with publicizing press articles. In addition, he made several televised addresses from the Prime Minister’s Office, several tours as well as introductory speeches at the cabinet meetings that are held quite frequently. Similarly, he has been constantly present in the parliament answering questions from political leaders and MPs as well as in the ‘Prime Minister’s Hour’ (Kathimerini, 2020b). Based on the relevant posts he made on his personal Facebook account during his first 24 months in power, Mitsotakis made 481 video posts, usually related to his speeches in Greece and abroad, which are estimated at around 20 videos per month. This is about as many as he posted during the month of the July 2019 election period. Moreover, he made 291 posts related to the live broadcast of his public appearances, which are estimated at 12.1 posts per month, the same as the number of live broadcasts he made in the election campaign (13). In addition, Mitsotakis posted several interviews to Greek and foreign media, and published articles in the international and Greek press. It is worth noting that of the interviews given to Greek media, most of them were given, in line with Samaras and Tsipras, to friendly or politically neutral media. He also held several press conferences, mainly abroad. He gave numerous speeches as well, which shows that the pace of public appearances has not slowed down since the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic. Mitsotakis, like his predecessors, made significant use of the communication tactic of television addresses from the Prime Minister’s Office in the Maximus Building. In total, in the first 24 months of his administration he made 12 television announcements, most of them in the first days after the pandemic emerged and related to health measures such as lockdowns. As Romanos points out, ‘the conditions at the beginning of the pandemic were unprecedented and the TV addresses were necessary as there was no other option’ (2022: interview with the author). The Prime Minister’s televised announcements were also related to economic support measures

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to deal with the recession caused by COVID-19, foreign policy issues, the management of the consequences of the forest fires in the summer of 2021 and also the election of the new President of the Republic. The frequency with which he appears is attributed by his associates to the Prime Minister’s own choice to be communicatively ‘present’ in the promotion of his government policy through the exercise of an active communication strategy (Romanos, 2022: interview with the author). At the same time, his staff is convinced that communicatively he is the government’s strongest political asset (Romanos, 2022: interview with the author). As Skertsos points out, ‘Mitsotakis’ personal appeal goes beyond the limits of the ND electoral base. He has been voted for and supported even by citizens who have never voted for ND previously (..) In this sense, Mitsotakis secures that ND remains a winning catch-all party. For this reason, he must be constantly at the forefront in order to advance reform initiatives and promote his political messages to non-traditional voters of the government (2022: interview with the author). In parallel, another explanation for the prime minister’s nonstop communication activity, according to his associates, is to weaken the negative image that his political opponents have tried to project about him. The latter attempt to project him as a member of the political elite coming from a political dynasty, that he is detached from the common people and indifferent to the problems of the average citizen. For all these reasons, according to Skertsos, ‘Mitsotakis seeks to communicate his political messages in an unfiltered way and in an effort to remind public opinion that he has nothing to do with this negative stereotypical image, yet he is the one who formulates policies and deals effectively with social problems’ (2022: interview with the author). Public Events With regard to the planning, organizing and implementing of public events, as well as participating in local, national or international ones, Mitsotakis carried out many. Based on his Facebook posts, he took part in 14 local public events, while only three national events in the preelection period. In contrast, concerning his governing term during the first 24 months of his administration, he made 56 posts related to his

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participation in public events of international scope, 37 posts related to in local events and only 6 for national ones, such as, among others, the ND conferences (Peloni, 2019c). In this context, Mitsotakis used the platform of the annual International Trade Fair to signal the direction of his economic policy with central slogans such as ‘Growth for All’ in September 2019 (Proto Thema, 2019) and ‘Greece is changing’ in September 2021 (Protagon, 2021). In the context of his public appearances, Mitsotakis as Prime Minister also held meetings with special groups of the population. For example, he met with people who had been weaned off drugs; in the context of DuoDay on 19 November he carried out all his activities during one day together with a person with a disability (Kathimerini, 2020c, 2021h). Also in the first period after the emergence of the coronavirus he held digital meetings (video-conferences) with school students from the province, volunteer nurses, children learning Greek around the world and Greek expatriate doctors et al. (Kathimerini, 2020d, 2020e, 2020f, 2020g). According to his associates, there are two reasons explaining this approach. First, he seeks to be in contact with as many professional and social groups that are related to the management of COVID-19. Second, as Romanos points out, ‘he is a man who gains a lot through interpersonal contact, bringing out his social sensitivity. In this context he also weakens the negative image that his political opponents seek to project about him, accusing him of elitism and indifference to the real problems of everyday life’ (2022: interview with the author). Travel During the Term of Office: Domestic and Foreign Travels As for making political travels to promote his political agenda, according to his Facebook posts he made 9 during the election period. However, he continued his political travel tactics, both at home and abroad, with a relatively similar frequency in the post-election period. In the first 24 months of his administration he made 134 political travels, mostly abroad, averaging 5.6 per month. This is another indication of the extent to which the permanent campaign strategy is being used.

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Conclusions It seems that Mitsotakis, as prime minister, has, compared to his predecessors, applied the strategy of permanent campaigning to a greater extent and thus can be considered as the ‘permanent campaign prime minister’ (see Table 4.2). He has strengthened the communication policy structures in the Prime Minister’s Office in the context of the general strengthening of the structures that make up the apparatus of the premiership; he cooperates with professional pollsters to systematically monitor public opinion trends and use their findings for the formulation of the communication strategy. He has made maximum use of social media, especially Facebook, to promote his government policy and political messages. He places great emphasis on fulfilling his election pledges alongside managing crises such as the pandemic and currently the inflation. He has been systematically making public appearances in Greece and abroad at a pace similar to that of the July 2019 election period. Overall, he appears to have adopted the strategy of permanent campaigning to a greater extent than all of his predecessors. This choice seems to be attributed to three reasons. First, the presidential style of governance he has adopted. From the outset, his perception was that the Prime Minister and the Prime Minister’s Office needed to be strengthened in terms of institutional tools and structures to effectively coordinate the government and rapidly advance government policy. Secondly, he seems to believe that in a prime minister-centred political system and in an environment of personalized political communication, he as prime minister is the strongest asset, politically and communicatively, of his government. He therefore wishes to come out ahead even in difficult times. Thirdly, Mitsotakis managed to form a single-party government by relying on a diverse electoral base consisted traditional party voters along with centrist and centre-left citizens who had not previously supported the New Democracy party. Therefore, his involvement in a process of permanent campaigning makes it easier for him to keep them together.

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Table 4.2 Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis: Assessment of permanent campaigning indicators Joathan & Lilleker’s framework

PM Kyriakos Mitsotakis

Strong indicators

Conducting public opinion polls during the term Institutional advertising Use of marketing during term periods Negative campaigning Broadcasted and face-to-face speeches Engaging personalized communication

Average indicators

Institutional adaptations Frequency of posting Generating positive media coverage Fund-raising Travel during the term of office Constant search for info on the preferences of citizens Public events Building a following on social media Interactivity level Themes of election transferred to governance Microtargeting audience Hyperlinking Promotional discourse

Institutional adaptations Conducting public opinion polls during the term Themes of election transferred to governance Institutional advertising Frequency of posting Building a following on social media Broadcasted and face-to-face speeches Generating positive media coverage Public events Travel during the term of office Use of marketing during term periods Negative campaigning Constant search for fund-raising Hyperlinking Promotional discourse

Weak indicators

Interactivity level Engaging personalized communication Constant search for information on the preferences of citizens Microtargeting audience

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Kathimerini. (2019e, June 13). Kyr. Mitsotakis: New adventures or strong growth and self-reliant Greece the stakes of the elections. https://www.kathimerini. gr/politics/1029085/kyr-mitsotakis-nees-peripeteies-i-ischyri-anaptyxi-kaiaytodynami-ellada-to-diakyveyma-ton-eklogon/ Kathimerini. (2019f, June 15). Kyr. Mitsotakis: Tax cuts from 2020 (video). https://www.kathimerini.gr/politics/1029346/kyr-mitsotakis-meiosi-foronapo-to-2020-vinteo/ Kathimerini. (2019g, June 10). Kyr. Mitsotakis: We will remove the obstacles that plague businesses. https://www.kathimerini.gr/politics/1028474/kyr-mit sotakis-tha-aroyme-ta-empodia-poy-talaiporoyn-tis-epicheiriseis/ Kathimerini. (2019h, June 18). Kyr. Mitsotakis: Lower taxes, less bureaucracy and liquidity are the keys to investment. https://www.kathimerini.gr/politics/102 9578/kyr-mitsotakis-mikroteroi-foroi-ligoteri-grafeiokratia-kai-reystotita-takleidia-ton-ependyseon/ Kathimerini. (2019i, September 6). Kyriakos Mitsotakis will present the “growth for all” plan at the TIF . https://www.protothema.gr/politics/article/921 547/to-shedio-anaptuxi-gia-olous-tha-parousiasei-sti-deth-o-kuriakos-mitsot akis/ Kathimerini. (2019j, August 8). Kyr. Mitsotakis: Universities can no longer compromise with ugliness and mediocrity—Abolition of university asylum. https://www.kathimerini.gr/politics/1037532/kyr-mitsotakis-ta-pan epistimia-den-symvivazontai-pleon-me-tin-aschimia-kai-ti-metriotita/. Kathimerini. (2019k, September 9). Tighter asylum, faster migrant returns. https://www.kathimerini.gr/politics/1045007/ypoyrgiko-aystirotero-asylotachyteres-epistrofes-metanaston/ Kathimerini. (2019l, September 26). For four offences the preliminary investigation against D. Papangelopoulos. https://www.kathimerini.gr/politics/104 4342/gia-tessera-adikimata-i-proanakritiki-kata-toy-d-papaggelopoyloy/ Kathimerini. (2019m, February 2). Nea Dimokratia announced the end of the embargo on ERT . https://www.kathimerini.gr/politics/1008623/arsitoy-empargko-stin-ert-anakoinose-i-nea-dimokratia/ Kathimerini (2020a, July 7). One year of ND government. Mitsotakis’ message. https://www.kathimerini.gr/politics/government/1086302/ enas-chronos-kyvernisis-n-d-to-spot-kai-to-minyma-toy-kyr-mitsotaki/ Kathimerini. (2020b, January 20). Aristotelia Peloni becomes Deputy Government Spokesperson. https://www.kathimerini.gr/politics/1061005/anaplirotria-kyv ernitiki-ekprosopos-analamvanei-i-aristotelia-peloni/ Kathimerini. (2020c, January 1). Starting today, 1,500 special guards next to citizens. https://www.kathimerini.gr/politics/1061063/mitsotakis-apo-simera1-500-eidikoi-froyroi-dipla-stoys-polites/

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Kathimerini. (2021h, April 24). We are returning to the middle class what SYRIZA took from it. https://www.kathimerini.gr/politics/561343051/ mitsotakis-eicha-desmeytei-oti-tha-epistrafoyn-sti-mesaia-taxi-osa-tis-pire-o-syr iza/ Kathimerini. (2021i, March 30). The House of Representatives decided with 187 “yes” to hold a preliminary investigation on Pappas. https://www.kathimerini. gr/politics/561312244/proanakritiki-gia-n-pappa-apofasise-me-187-nai-ivoyli/ Kathimerini. (2021j, August 25). Mitsotakis on wildfires: Reinforcement by air—Cue for action the public apology. https://www.kathimerini.gr/politics/ 561474715/mitsotakis-gia-pyrkagies-enischysi-me-enaeria-mesa-synthimagia-drasi-i-dimosia-syggnomi/ Kathimerini. (2021k, September 7). Why the University Police is postponed. https://www.kathimerini.gr/society/561488842/giati-anavalletai-i-panepisti miaki-astynomia/ Kathimerini. (2021l, November 19). DuoDay: Who is the 26-year-old Konstantinos who accompanied the Prime Minister today. https://www.kathimerini.gr/pol itics/561594004/duoday-poios-einai-26chronos-konstantinos-poy-synodeyesimera-ton-prothypoyrgo/ Kathimerini. (2022, February 2). Mitsotakis: Permanent 13% reduction in ENFIA. https://www.kathimerini.gr/politics/561698821/mitsotakis-mon imi-meiosi-enfia-kata-13/ Katz, J., Barris, M., & Jain, A. (2013). The social media president: Barack Obama and the politics of digital engagement. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. https:// doi.org/10.1057/9781137378354 Koliastasis, P. (2019). The first defeat of populists: The case of Greece. In Bolin, N., Falasca, K., Grusell, M., & Nord, L. (eds.), Euroflections. Leading academics on the European Elections 2019. Mid Sweden University, Demicom. Available at: https://www.miun.se/globalassets/ovrigt/euroflections/eurofl ections_v3.pdf Koliastasis, P. (2015). Perception matters, in first thoughts on the 20 September 2015 election in Greece, ed. R. Gerodimos, Greek Politics Specialist Group (GPSG), pamphlet no 5. Available at: https://www.gpsg.org.uk/wp-content/ uploads/2015/10/GPSG-Pamphlet-5-September-2015.pdf Lifo. (2018, September 17). Shock at ERT’s comment that Mitsotakis at the TIF reminded “a theorist of fascism”. https://www.lifo.gr/now/media/salos-mesholio-stin-ert-oti-o-mitsotakis-sti-deth-thymise-theoritiko-toy-fasismoy Lilleker, D. G. (2006). Key concepts in political communication. SAGE Publications Ltd. https://doi.org/10.4135/9781446212943 Metron. (2018, March 22). Metron forum 2.0.

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Naftemporiki. (2016a, October 14). Kyr. Mitsotakis: The “Truth Agreement” is an answer to populism. https://m.naftemporiki.gr/story/1159553/kur-mit sotakis-apantisi-ston-laikismo-i-sumfonia-alitheias Naftemporiki. (2016b, October 12). T. Theodoricakos: The Public Issue barometer fully confirms Mitsotakis’ strategy. https://m.naftemporiki.gr/story/115 4360/t-theodorikakos-pliris-epibebaiosi-tis-stratigikis-mitsotaki-to-barome tro-tis-public-issue Nannestad, P., & Paldam, M. (1999). The cost of ruling. A foundation stone for two theories (University of Aarhus Department of Economics Working Paper No. 9). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=165709 or https:// doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.165709 New Money. (2022, January 17). The National Bank of Greece goes to the markets, Mytilineos wins Imérys, United issues bonds and TUI... goes to Rhodes. https://www.newmoney.gr/dark-room/i-ethniki-trapeza-vgeni-stis-agores-omitilineos-kerdise-tin-imerys-i-united-vgazi-omologa-ke-i-tui-pai-rodo/ Papachlimintzos, K. (2019a, December 12). Yannis Vlastaris: From the Panspoudastiki and the Sunday Eleftherotypia, writer for Kyriakos Mitsotakis. https://www.parapolitika.gr/stories/article/1027309/giannis-vlastaris-apotin-panspoudastiki-kai-tin-kuriakatiki-eleutherotupia-logografos-tou-kuriakoumitsotaki/. Papachlimintzos, K. (2019b, August 26). Eric Thanopoulos-Parks: The “high tech” advisor to Kyriakos Mitsotakis.https://www.parapolitika.gr/stories/art icle/1012455/o-high-tech-sumvoulos-tou-kuriakou-mitsotaki/ Papachlimintzos K. (2021, September 22). Stanley Greenberg: The American “guru” of communication is back next to Kyriakos—Why he returned. Parahttps://www.parapolitika.gr/politiki/article/1139735/stanlei-gri politika. nberg-xana-dipla-ston-kuriako-o-amerikanos-gourou-tis-epikoinonias-giatiepestrepse/ Papantoniou, S. (2019, August 13). The new leadership of ERT was announced by Maximou. https://www.kathimerini.gr/politics/1038193/anakoinothikeapo-to-maximoy-i-nea-igesia-tis-ert/ Papathanassopoulos, S. (2007). The professionalization of political communication (edited with R. Negrine, C. Holz-Bacha, P. Mancini). Intellect Publishers. Peloni, A. (2019a, July 9). The President’s people. Kathimerini. https://www.kat himerini.gr/politics/1032983/oi-anthropoi-toy-proedroy/. Peloni, A. (2019b, July 25). Mr Mitsotakis planned changes in ND. Naftemporiki 2020. https://m.naftemporiki.gr/story/1553906 Plasser, F., & Plasser, G. (2002) Global political campaigning: A worldwide analysis of campaign professionals and their practices. Greenwoord Publishing Group

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Peloni, A. (2019c, November 14) “The future begins now”, the motto of the ND conference. https://www.kathimerini.gr/politics/1051623/to-mellon-arc hizei-tora-to-synthima-toy-synedrioy-n-d/ Poulakidakos, S. (2020). The Greek political leaders on Instagram: Comparing Instagram activity during electoral and non-electoral periods. In A. Veneti & A. Karatzogianni (eds.), The Emerald handbook of digital media in Greece (Digital activism and society: Politics, economy and culture in network communication) (pp. 351–365). Emerald Publishing Limited. https://doi. org/10.1108/978-1-83982-400-520201056 Prime Minister. (2019, July 10). Introductory Speech of Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis at the 1st Meeting of the new Cabinet of Ministers. https://primem inister.gr/2019/07/10/21843 Protagon. (2019, March 13). Dimitris Tsiodras is a candidate of the New Democracy Party in Athens from Potami. https://www.protagon.gr/epikai rotita/apo-to-potami-ypopsifios-tis-nd-stin-a-athinwn-o-dimitris-tsiodras-443 41798334 Protagon. (2021, September 11). Mitsotakis: We said it, we did it—Greece is changing. https://www.protagon.gr/epikairotita/mitsotakis-i-anaptyksi-thaftasei-efetos-to-59-44342347127. Powergame. (2022, May 19). The rolling polls of Maximou, the lights of Papastergiou, the zeroing of Hellactor’s debt and an orphaned offshore. https://www. powergame.gr/big-mouth/248986/oi-kyliomenes-dimoskopiseis-tou-max imou-ta-fota-tou-papastergiou-o-midenismos-tou-chreous-tis-ellaktor-kai-miaorfani-offshore/ Proto Thema. (2019, September 9). Mitsotakis at the TIF: “Growth for all” with targeted measures and commitments over 12 months. https://www.pro tothema.gr/politics/article/922662/mitsotakis-sti-deth-anaptuxi-gia-olousme-stoheumena-metra-kai-desmeuseis-se-vathos-12minou/ Proto Thema. (2021a, December 12). Mitsotakis’ podcast with the mother of autistic John for the International Day of Persons with Disabilities. https:// www.protothema.gr/politics/article/1187992/podcast-tou-mitsotaki-metin-mitera-tou-19hronou-autistikou-gianni-gia-tin-pagosmia-imera-atomonme-anapiria/ Proto Thema. (2021b, March 03). Mitsotakis: By calling for demonstrations, SYRIZA undermines the measures for the coronavirus. https://www.protot hema.gr/politics/article/1102811/mitsotakis-me-tin-prosklisi-se-diadiloseiso-suriza-uponomeuei-ta-metra-gia-ton-koronoio/ Proto Thema. (2022, March 3). Michael Chrysochoidis: Candidate in ND in the Western Sector of Athens. https://www.protothema.gr/politics/article/ 1218280/mihalis-hrusohoidis-upopsifios-me-ti-nd-ston-dutiko-tomea-tis-vathinon/

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Quinn, T. (2010). Membership ballots in party leadership elections in Britain. Representation, 46(1), 101–117. https://doi.org/10.1080/003448909035 70967 Romanos, N. (2022). Interview with the author, February 21. SKAI. (2022, January 26). Apologies by Mitsotakis to citizens for the chaos and inconvenience. https://www.skai.gr/news/politics/mitsotakis-syggnomi-apotous-polites Skertsos, A. (2022). Interview with the author, July 1. Skoulariki, A. (2020). Political Polarisation in Greece: The Prespa Agreement, left/right antagonism and the nationalism/populism nexus. South European Society and Politics, 25(3–4), 411–439. https://doi.org/10.1080/13608746. 2020.1932020 Ta Nea. (2019, June 14). New Maximou with a chancellery structure. https:// www.tanea.gr/2019/06/14/politics/neo-maksimou-me-domi-kagkelarias/ Terzis, G. (2017, January 16). All of the President’s people. https://www.kathim erini.gr/politics/891797/oloi-oi-anthropoi-toy-proedroy/ Triantafillidou, A., & Lappas, G. (2022). Depersonalize and attack: Facebook campaigns of populist candidates in Greece during the 2019 Greek national elections. Journal of Information Technology & Politics. https://doi.org/10. 1080/19331681.2022.2054484 Tsatsanis, E., Teperoglou, E., & Seriatos, A. (2020). Two partyism reloaded: Polarisation, negative partisanship, and the return of the left-right divide in the Greek Elections of 2019. South European Society and Politics, 25(3–4), 503–532. https://doi.org/10.1080/13608746.2020.1855798 Tsiodras, D. (2022). CV . Available at: https://www.dimitristsiodras.gr/viogra fiko/

CHAPTER 5

The Permanent Campaign Revisited

Abstract This chapter summarizes the conclusions of the work. It compares the permanent campaign applied by the three political executives in Greece as well as compares in some respects that of the Greek premiers over the last 25 years, highlighting similarities and differences. Moreover, it outlines and evaluates the contributions of the study to the relevant academic literature, while posing new questions for future research. Keywords Permanent campaigning · Greek premiers · Comparison · Similarities · Differences

Introduction Permanent campaigning has been implemented by political executives across the world and particularly in 32 countries in the US, Canada, Oceania, Latin America, Asia and Europe including Greece. This study focuses on three recent Greek premiers ruling from 2012 until nowadays: the centre-right Antonis Samaras, the radical left Alexis Tsipras and the centre-right Kyriakos Mitsotakis. All three had to deal with multiple economic, migration and pandemic crises. The conclusion is that all of © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 P. A. Koliastasis, Permanent Campaigning in Greece in Times of Crisis, Political Campaigning and Communication, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11691-9_5

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them have engaged in a permanent campaign process, though to some extent they have focussed on different aspects of it. The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section one compares the permanent campaigning of the three premiers under consideration highlighting and explaining similarities and differences. Section two compares the same strategy applied by the six premiers governing the country from 1996 until nowadays in order to identify long-term trends. Section three outlines the academic contributions of the work discussing its limitations as well as the opportunities of future research.

The Three Greek Prime Ministers Compared Comparing the permanent campaign of the three Greek prime ministers, a number of similarities emerges. First, regarding institutional adaptations, all three prime ministers maintained or even strengthened the communication policy structures in the Prime Minister’s Office. Samaras retained the Press Office and the position of government spokesman and Deputy Minister to the Prime Minister. Tsipras also retained the Press Office, while assigning more communication responsibilities to the Strategic Planning Office that had been in charge of planning regional conferences on economic growth issues. Mitsotakis reorganized the structure of the prime ministerial Office and partially strengthened its structures on communication policy. He also retained the Press Office and institutionalized the Digital Communication Office. Secondly, all three premiers integrated communication professionals, mainly journalists and communication experts, into their communication staffs. For example, Samaras worked with the communication advisor George Mouroutis, who served as Director of the prime minister’s Press Office. Tsipras also surrounded his communications staff with journalists such as Thodoris Mihopoulos, Angelos Thekeris, Thanasis Karteros and Matthew Tsimitakis for the management of his social media accounts. Moreover, he had a long-standing collaboration with the communication professional Zoi Chalidia. Mitsotakis also staffed his communications team with several journalists, such as Dimitris Tsiodras who took the position of Director of the Press Office, Giannis Vlastaris who is the main speechwriter and Aristotelia Peloni who acts as Deputy government spokesperson. In addition, he worked with Eric Parks, an experienced professional coming from the private sector of digital innovation, for the formulation of his social media strategy.

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The third similarity is related to the cooperation of the three prime ministers with pollsters who conducted private polls. Thus, all three premiers were able to regularly monitor public opinion trends. Samaras collaborated with the head of the MRB polling company, Dimitris Mavros. Tsipras had occasional cooperation with several polling companies such as Kapa Research, Pro Rata, Opinion Poll and VoxPop. it is worth noting that his staff included Christoforos Vernardakis, who had previously served for many years as head of the VPRC polling company. Mitsotakis also appears to have frequent collaboration with pollsters such as, for example, the head of the opinion survey company Marc, Thomas Gerakis and, from time to time, the American pollster and strategist Stanley Greenberg. The fourth similarity is that all of them transferred the issues dominating their election agenda into governance. Samaras once in office continued to focus on the issue of securing the membership status of the country in the Eurozone, renegotiating the terms of the Memorandum in order to stimulate growth and improving public order to reduce crime and curb migration flows. Tsipras initially emphasized the negotiation of a new agreement and a new adjustment program with Greece’s international creditors to cancel austerity; then, after his Uturn on the third bailout program, he emphasized the implementation of a ‘parallel’ program consisting of social policy measures to protect the most vulnerable social groups. Mitsotakis made very specific commitments during the pre-election campaign such as cutting taxes and social security contributions, attracting foreign investments, improving public safety and reducing migration flows. After the elections he kept concentrating on the same issues even after the outbreak of the pandemic and the emergence of multiple crises such as natural disasters, tensions in Greek-Turkish relations, inflation and the increase in energy costs due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The fifth similarity concerns the making of public appearances such as speeches in parliament, at party meetings, domestic political travels, foreign political travels as well as giving interviews to Greek and foreign media and publishing press articles. Furthermore, with regard to the media interviews, following a sort of common practice, all three preferred to give interviews to media friendly or neutral to their government. Also, all three political executives participated in many local, national and international events. They have also made political travels during their terms, though not all of them to the same extent.

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The sixth similarity relates to the fact that all three premiers paid little attention to a number of communication tactics such as promoting fundraising activities, exploring citizens’ views and preferences through social media, making social media posts of personal content, interacting with social media users and using microtargeting. The several similarities in the implementation of permanent campaigning suggest the importance and influence of factors related to the political and media context of Greece, which is similar to that of other countries where the application of this strategy is observed. The emergence of private television and later the development of the internet and social media, the 24/7 news broadcast, combined with the frequent transmission of polls on the popularity of parties, governments, political leaders and prime ministers have made the political communication environment in which prime ministers operate extremely pressing and complex. Further pressure is brought about the crises erupted in recent years such as the economic, migration and pandemic. Especially when Greece has been at the spotlight of both the Eurozone debt crisis and the migration-refugee crisis. In parallel, the continuous weakening of parties, the decline of party identification, the increase in the number of undecided and fluid voters as well as the rise of polarization around mainly economic issues have made the political conditions extremely pressing for prime ministers. The sum of these factors contributes to the strengthening of the personalization of the political process and further enhancing the role of leadership in shaping voting behaviour. Against this backdrop, political executives appear to be increasingly motivated to engage in a permanent campaigning process. It is certain that engaging in this process entails not only similarities, but also differences as well. First, Samaras and Tsipras, unlike Mitsotakis, put more emphasis on the use of negative campaigning against their political opponents and to a certain extent in Tsipras’ case against the opposition media as well. It seems that the premierships of Samaras and Tsipras coincided with a period of polarization generated by the economic crisis and the position issues of the Memorandum as well as the between pro-SYRIZA and anti-SYRIZA fronts. After all, the political public discourse in Greece as a whole especially during the period of the economic crisis was characterized by intense polarization (Poulakidakos & Veneti, 2016, 2017). After the election of Mitsotakis in July 2019, the ideological polarization seems to some extent to have subsided due to the country’s exit from the

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memoranda and the electoral defeat of SYRIZA. Moreover, in the July 2019 campaign, Mitsotakis avoided using a negative campaigning tactic against Alexis Tsipras, following the advice of his party’s strategists, preferring to focus more on promoting positive messages based on his election manifesto. The second difference is the use of marketing techniques and in particular the extent to which the prime ministers formulate their political and communication strategy and policy initiatives based on polling data. It seems that Mitsotakis consulted polls to a greater extent than Samaras and Tsipras. One explanation of this difference is related to the fact that the country was no longer operating within the strict and suffocating limitations of the economic adjustment programs under the supervision of the EU–IMF. It is also possible to advocate the view that Mitsotakis, being a moderate liberal and market-oriented political leader who was supported by voters coming both from the traditional electoral base of ND as well as the middle ground, tends to believe that it is necessary to monitor more regularly polling evidence to craft his communication strategy and thus maintaining the trust of his winning electoral coalition. The third difference between the Greek premiers is identified in the use of social media and especially Facebook in promoting their government policies and political messages. Tsipras and Mitsotakis used them to a much greater extent compared to Samaras. At least as far as the personal Facebook accounts of the three prime ministers are concerned. The difference is probably attributed to two reasons. First, technological developments as the use of social media became more extensive for political communication purposes from 2012 onwards in the context of Web 2.0 era (Deligiaouri, 2020: 239). The second reason is related to the unique communication styles of the three premiers. Samaras was making more use of the ND party’s social media accounts, in particular Facebook through which he promoted many of his communication activities, rather than through his personal page. In contrast, Tsipras and Mitsotakis as representatives of a younger political generation had invested much more in the use of social media. The former had begun to gradually build up his social media presence and the use of social networks for unmediated communication from 2006 onwards (Smyrnaios & Karatzogianni, 2020). Given that, when he was elected party leader SYRIZA was a minor party, it is likely to assume that he had an incentive to use social media more extensively to promote his political messages because of his de facto relatively limited access to traditional mass media (Smyrnaios &

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Karatzogianni, 2020). But even after his rise as opposition leader in the 2012 elections, he kept following the same communication tactics aligned with the practices adopted in other countries by both populist and nonpopulist party leaders and political executives. It is indicative that social media were first utilized by a moderate centrist politician such as Barack Obama (Katz et al., 2013). Moreover, their utilization is nowadays made by almost all politicians, political leaders and prime ministers in Greece, regardless of personal style, ideology and government formation in the sense that Samaras and Tsipras were put in charge of coalitions, while Mitsotakis is now leading a one-party government (e. g. Triantafillidou & Lappas, 2022).

Similarities and Differences Across the Six Greek Premiers (1996–2021) The application of the permanent campaign strategy by Greek prime ministers has been observed previoulsy. As Koliastasis (2020) has suggested, the prime ministers of the period 1996–2011, namely the centre-left Kostas Simitis (1996–2004), the centre-right Kostas Karamanlis (2004–2009) and the centre-left George Papandreou (2009– 2011) engaged in the same process. Thus, the comparison of the campaigning style of governing of the prime ministers of the present study with that of the prime ministers examined in the previous one can highlight important similarities and differences from a long-term perspective of 25 years of Greek permanent campaigning. First, the premiers of the time also strengthened and expanded the structures of communication policy in the Maximos Mansion. Kostas Simitis was the first to establish the Press Office, Karamanlis maintained it and overall strengthened the communication mechanism of the prime ministerial Office and the government by establishing the position of the Minister of State and government spokesman, who was based in the Maximos Mansion. Papandreou also retained the Press Office as well as the positions of Minister of State and government spokesman, although he temporarily separated their roles. He later reorganized the Prime Minister’s Office by institutionalizing in the prime minister’s General Secretariat which oversaw a total of seven units, one of which was the Political and Communications Planning unit. Second, all the prime ministers worked with communication professionals, including communication experts, pollsters and journalists. Simitis

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collaborated with the pollster Stratos Fanaras and the communication expert Lefteris Kousoulis, Karamanlis worked with the strategist John Loulis, the pollster Dimitris Mavros and the journalist Theodoros Roussopoulos, who was appointed press spokesman of ND in 2000, while after the 2004 election became Minister of State and government spokesman until 2008. Papandreou also worked with the journalist George Elenopoulos and the pollster Maria Karaklioumi. Third, all six premiers regularly monitored opinion polls and focus groups and consulted them, to formulate political and communication strategy as well as policy initiatives and policy campaigns. For example, they consulted polling data to select candidates for the local elections as well as for the Presidency of the Hellenic Republic, to carry out a government reshuffle, to choose the appropriate timing of calling early national elections as well as to formulate electoral strategy. The same applies to a certain extent to the promotion or delay of reform initiatives, as in the case of the 2006 university reform by Kostas Karamanlis or privatizations by George Papandreou. A fourth similarity between the six prime ministers is the emphasis during their tenures on the central issues of their campaign agenda. For example, in his first term, Sιmitis focussed on the achievement of entering Greece in the Eurozone as a prerequisite for pushing his modernization project. Karamanlis in his first term concentrated, among others, on promoting reforms in the state and the economy. In addition, Papandreou, during the first months of his term, often repeated his central campaign slogan, ‘there is money’ to highlight the application of the expansionary economic policy he had promised. However, after the adoption of the Memorandum he changed course not only in policy but also in political communication terms. The fifth and perhaps the most striking similarity regarding the implementation of permanent campaigning by all Greek prime ministers since 1996, is the use of public appearances to promote their governmental policies and political messages. They gave speeches to the Parliament, their parliamentary groups and at party meetings which were generally broadcasted live on state and private television stations and from a certain point onwards on news websites. They also held press conferences in Greece and abroad as well as giving media interviews and signing press articles. Comparing the number of public appearances of the six premiers during their first 24 months of their terms, as they were made through

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speeches in international, national and local fora, press conferences in Greece and abroad, interviews to Greek media as well as articles published in Greek newspapers and Greek news websites, some interesting trends are observed (Fig. 5.1). First, it seems that the strategy of permanent campaigning is increasingly adopted, despite some fluctuations, by all prime ministers of the last 25 years, regardless of their ideology, party affiliation and communication skills, albeit with individual differences. Second, there is a remarkable stability in the use of prime ministers’ public appeals to disseminate their political messages. Despite the expansion of the internet and social media in recent years and the opportunities they offer for political promotion, prime ministers in Greece continue, to a significant extent, to make public appearances of a more ‘traditional’ type, such as speeches, press and media interviews and the publication of articles in print and digital newspapers, which are advertised, promoted and replicated through their social media pages. This tendency is related both to the institutional features of parliamentary democracies, such as the Public Appeals 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 Simitis

Karamanlis

Papandreou

Samaras

Tsipras

Mitsotakis

Fig. 5.1 Number of public addresses of the six Greek premiers 1996–2021 (speeches, press conferences, Greek media interviews, Greek press articles) (Source: Data on Simitis, Karamanlis and Papandreou gathered and measured by Koliastasis (2020). Data on Samaras, Tsipras and Mitsotakis collected by the archive in the official website of the Prime Minister of Greece (www.primemini ster.gr) and the archive of the official website of the SYRIZA party for the public appeals made by Tsipras in the September 2015 election campaign)

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Greek one, which emphasizes the role of parliament in the development of the public debate, and to the importance and influence that traditional mass media still exert. The third element observed is that the crises have reinforced the tendency of adopting permanent campaigning. Those who have served as prime ministers since the outbreak of the financial crisis have, in general, pursued this strategy much more intensively. The average public appearances of Papandreou, Samaras, Tsipras and Mitsotakis are higher than that of Simitis and Karamanlis. The fourth element that emerges is that of the six prime ministers of the period from 1996 to the present, Kyriakos Mitsotakis, in terms of the frequency of public appearances, has emerged to date as the greatest permanent campaigner or ‘the permanent campaign prime minister’. More specifically, during the first 24 months of his term, he has made a total of 247 public appearances, compared to 136 for Tsipras, 106 for Samaras, 181 for George Papandreou, 125 for Kostas Karamanlis and 78 for Kostas Simitis during the respective periods of their terms. The conclusion drawn from this regarding the degree of utilization of the permanent campaign strategy is probably shaped by three factors. To begin with, the technological developments have influenced the political communication landscape in Greece as well as internationally. The gradual proliferation of private television networks for the late 1980s onwards (Papathanassopoulos, 2007) and then that of the internet from the mid-2000s onwards together with the rapid growth of social media from 2012 onwards have played a role (Deligiaouri, 2020). Especially the opportunities that social media offer to politicians to engage in an unmediated communication with citizens, bypassing traditional media and journalists. Certainly, the desire and preference of politicians both in Greece and abroad in applying unfiltered public appeals is anything but new. Presidents and prime ministers have always attempted and pursued unmediated and unfiltered communication with public opinion, either by making televised addresses or any form of face-to-face speeches. Yet in the case of the use of social media, the realization of unfiltered communication with the public is easier, and faster. Moreover, the crisis conditions that have emerged in Greece from 2009 onwards which have triggered polarized political conditions have also played a key role. The economic crisis of the previous decade, combined with the implementation of the memoranda and the fact that Greece was at the international spotlight due to the Eurozone debt crisis, made the

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political communication environment extremely pressing and highly fragmented. In this sense, constant communication activity and permanent campaigning were essential tools for prime ministers to defend themselves in political communication terms, protect their political capital, influence agenda-setting and weaken the inevitable political cost.

The Greek Case in a Comparative Context The analysis of the implementation of the communication strategy applied by the Greek premiers, confirms that, in line with others, Greek political executives are constantly involved in a process of permanent campaigning (Elmer et al., 2012). This work contributes to the existing research in that it is the first one applying the theoretical and methodological framework proposed by Joathan and Lilleker (2020) for measuring the implementation of the permanent campaign by prime ministers. Their proposed analytical framework was based on an examination of 87 relevant studies examining political executives, parties and parliamentarians in 32 countries. They identified 20 components that make up the strategy of permanent campaigning which they classified into three broad categories: capacity building and strategy; paid and owned media as well as earned media. Each category contains a different number of components. The paid and owned media include 12 of the 20 indicators that characterize the permanent campaign strategy. This reflects the growing importance of digital media in the implementation of the strategy. However, as the analysis of the relevant literature has indicated, the relevant factors’ importance varied. Therefore, based on their frequency of occurrence in relevant studies, as Johathan and Lilleker (2020: 12– 14) have suggested, some of them have been utilized more and are evaluated as ‘strong indicators’, some of them have been utilized to a moderate extent and are evaluated as ‘average indicators’, and some of them are considered as ‘weak indicators’. The category of strong indicators includes, in order of frequent occurrence in the literature, conducting polls during the term of office, institutional advertising, use of marketing techniques during the term of office, negative campaigning, broadcast and face-to-face speeches and media interviews and engaging personalized communication. In the category of average indicators, elements such as institutional adaptations, frequency of posting, generating positive media coverage,

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constant search for fund-raising, expansion of travel during the term of office, constant search of information on the preferences of data of citizens, public events as well as building a following on social media for direct communication. The third category of weak indicators includes features such as interactivity, themes transferred to governance, microtargeting audience, hyperlinking and promotional discourse. From this theoretical and methodological perspective and focusing on Europe and Greece in particular, this study examined, measured, evaluated and analyzed the implementation of permanent campaigning by three Greek prime ministers in the period from 2012 to nowadays. The cases of Samaras, Tsipras and Mitsotakis are of particular interest for three reasons. First, because they come from different parties. Samaras, Mitsotakis from the centre-right New Democracy and Tsipras from the left-wing SYRIZA. Second because they led both multiparty and single-party governments. Samaras and Tsipras headed coalitions, while Mitsotakis after the July 2019 elections is leading a one-party government. Third, they faced multiple crises in the economy, migration and public health (pandemic) during their terms. The analysis of their cases, which used both qualitative and quantitative methodologies, revealed that all three followed the strategy of the permanent campaign, though they differed to some degree regarding their emphasis on the relevant components of the concept. The relevant categorization reveals similarities and differences (Appendix 3). More specifically, in the case of Samaras, the strong indicators include institutional adaptations, the conduct of polls during his term, election themes transferred to governance, negative campaigning, broadcast and face-to-face speeches together with media interviews and press articles, efforts to generate positive media coverage as well as several public events. In the category of average indicators of Samaras’ permanent campaigning are included elements such as hyperlinking, promotional discourse, political travels during the term, use of marketing techniques, institutional advertising, and the promotion of communication initiatives for generating positive media coverage. In parallel, as weak indicators are considered the constant search for information on the preferences and data of citizens, fund-raising activities, interactivity, engaging personalized communication, frequency of posting, building a following on social media and microtargeting audience.

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Compared to Samaras, Tsipras differs to some extent in political communication terms (see Appendix 4). In the strong indicators group, apart from those already mentioned in the case of Samaras, there are also elements including institutional advertising, frequency of posting and building a following on social media. The latter suggest the particular importance that Tsipras attached to the use of social media to promote his communication policy. In the second category of average indicators, apart from political travels, the use of marketing techniques, promotional discourse and hyperlinking, which were also identified in the case of Samaras, the conducting of opinion polls and focus groups during his terms appears as well. In the category of weak indicators are included the constant search for information on the preferences and data of citizens, fund-raising activities, interactivity, engaging personalized communication and microtargeting audience. Considering the data from the implementation of the permanent campaign in the case of Mitsotakis, the category of strong indicators includes institutional adaptations, the conduct of polls during his term, election themes transferred to governance, negative campaigning, the use of marketing techniques for the formulation of communication strategy, frequency of posting, building a following on social media, broadcast and face-to-face speeches together with media interview and press articles, efforts to generate positive media coverage as well as several public events and political travels. In the category of average indicators, apart from promotional discourse and hyperlinking, there are also those of negative campaigning and fund-raising activities. As for the category of weak indicators, the relevant elements related to interactivity, personalized communication, constant search for information on the preferences of citizens and microtargeting audience. The overall evaluation of the three Greek premiers could formulate the ranking of the individual elements of permanent campaigning as follows. The category of strong indicators includes institutional adaptations, election themes transferred to governance, broadcast and face-toface speeches together with media interviews and press articles, public events, conducting polls during the term, negative campaigning, institutional advertising, frequency of posting, building a following on social media and promoting communication activities to gain positive publicity. The group of average indicators consists of the use of marketing techniques, political travels, promotional discourse, and hyperlinking. Finally, the category of weak indicators seems to include fund-raising activities,

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the constant search for information on citizens’ preferences, interaction with social media users, personalized communication and microtargeting. It is obvious that the degree of utilization of the particular elements of permanent campaigning by the Greek prime ministers under examination deviates to a considerable extent from the categorization and prioritization of the indicators based on the analysis of the relevant literature. This deviation is probably explained by the fact that the hierarchy of the relevant indicators is because this study examined the implementation of permanent campaigning applied by prime ministers who, due to the nature of their position, emphasize different communication techniques. It also seems that circumstances related to the period under consideration in the case of Greece have also played a role, as two PMs, Samaras and Tsipras, exercised their functions in a period in which the country was subjected to the strict and suffocating framework set by the implementation of the memoranda. Thus, the scope for consulting the poll findings for the formulation of a communication and political strategy was clearly smaller. In terms of the differences observed in the composition of the elements belonging to the category of strong indicators, it seems that the Greek prime ministers combine features from both traditional political communication and the use of modern technologies such as social media in the implementation of their communication strategy. Finally, the group of weak indicators includes data from both capacity building and strategy and paid and owned media. The fact that Greek premiers do not participate in fund-raising activities is related to the institutional framework for financing parties and politicians. The framework depends to a greater extent on public funding rather than on private one. The political culture of the country matters as well. It is characterized by low social capital, low trust, intense populism, extensive clientelism and constant accusations over alleged scandals. The findings from this study contribute to the literature in four respects. First, it is the first one applying the methodological framework proposed by Johathan and Lilleker (2020) to measure permanent campaigning. Second, the results of measuring the strategy implemented by Greek prime ministers over the last 10 years show the need for a partial revision in terms of classifying the components of the examined concept among strong, average and weak indicators. It appears that Greek

138

P. A. KOLIASTASIS

premiers have utilized both traditional and timeless elements of permanent campaigning along with modern features related to the use of social media. The third level at which the contribution of this study is reflected is the fact that it confirms the application of the examined communication strategy by political executives in Europe and particularly Greece even in the conditions of economic, migration and coronavirus crises. The latter became visible also at the political level with the rise of populist forces. It also extends the study of permanent campaigning to the case of Greek prime ministers and during the period of the economic crisis and the emergence of coalition on the political scene. Fourth, the study demonstrates that the technological developments of recent years combined with the proliferation of crises has led Greek prime ministers to become increasingly involved in a permanent campaign process. In this context, the current prime minister, Kyriakos Mitsotakis, appears to be implementing this strategy to a greater extent than his predecessors (Tables 5.1 and 5.2). In parallel, the study also reveals a number of findings related to the methodological approach to the analysis of the concept. The quantitative measurement of the strategy implemented by the Greek prime ministers under examination came from the posts they made on their personal Facebook accounts. However, as the case of Samaras indicates, a sitting prime minister is likely to make greater use of his party’s Facebook account. It may therefore be necessary to broaden the study of prime ministers’ and their parties’ social media accounts. It would be useful to form a more comprehensive picture of the degree of social media utilization and more generally the implementation of the permanent campaign strategy, though the overall picture would probably not change radically. Also regarding future research, it might be useful to extend the study to the use by prime ministers of other social media such as Twitter, Instagram, Linkedin and others. Finally, it would probably be interesting to extend the study of the concept using the same methodological framework to other political players such as opposition party leaders, ministers, MPs, MEPs as well as mayors and regional governors.

3.854

Comments 0 1 0 8 9 0 0 23 0 2 0 0 0 14 4 38

1.889

Shares

Fund-raising Research citizens’ preferences Conducting polls Travels Advertising Hyperlinking 1 Hyperlinking 2 Hyperlinking 3 Interactivity-replies Interactivity-mentions Interactivity questions Interactivity-shares Personalised comm Videos Live Gen.positive coverage

15.097

64

0 0 0 6 15 0 0 54 0 0 0 0 0 34 1 58

8.555

1.997

32.101

85

0 0 0 45 17 0 0 35 0 0 7 0 0 9 6 91

15.732

41.172

314.448

100

Pre-election

Pre-election

Post-election

Alexis Tsipras

Antonis Samaras

724 (30,1) 2.895.370 (120.640,4) 219.182 (9.132,5) 349.717 (14.571,5) 0 0 0 245 49 0 1 249 0 0 0 0 1 278 26 79

Post-election

0 0 0 9 6 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 20 13 13

24.105

15.090

180.800

45

Pre-election

THE PERMANENT CAMPAIGN REVISITED

(continued)

887 (36,9) 6.767.600 (281.983,3) 358.308 (14.929,5) 968.309 (40.346,2) 0 0 0 134 (5,6) 169 (7,0) 0 3 274 0 0 0 5 2 481 (20,0) 291 (12,1) 492 (20,5)

Post-election

Kyriakos Mitsotakis

Results of the permanent campaign indicators (in parentheses the monthly average)

Reactions

Posts

Table 5.1

5

139

(continued)

Local events National events International events Negative campaigning Theme 1 Theme 2 Theme 3 Prom. Disc.—past deeds Prom. Disc.—specific actions/future Prom. Disc.-—general goals Prom. Disc.—current actions Prom. Disc.—promotional ideas Prom. Disc.—political positions

Table 5.1

17 4 0 4 – – – – – – – – –

Pre-election 7 12 6 3 8 13 2 5 6 9 6 21 10

Post-election

Antonis Samaras

43 6 0 11 – – – – – – – – –

Pre-election 40 158 460 40 65 – – 15 18 58 39 38 87

Post-election

Alexis Tsipras

14 3 0 3 – – – – – – – – –

Pre-election

37 6 56 9 14 35 21 39 50 54 183 38 47

Post-election

Kyriakos Mitsotakis

140 P. A. KOLIASTASIS

Conducting public opinion polls during the term Institutional advertising Use of marketing during term periods Negative campaigning Broadcasted and face-to-face speeches Engaging personalized communication

Joathan & Lilleker’s framework Institutional adaptations Conducting public opinion polls during the term Themes of election transferred to governance Negative campaigning Broadcasted and face-to-face speeches Public events Generating positive media coverage

PM Samaras

Assessment of permanent campaigning indicators

Strong indicators

Table 5.2

Institutional adaptations Themes of election transferred to governance Negative campaigning Institutional advertising Frequency of posting Building a following on social media Generating positive media coverage Broadcasted and face-to-face speeches Public events

PM Tsipras Institutional adaptations Conducting public opinion polls during the term Themes of election transferred to governance Institutional advertising Frequency of posting Building a following on social media Broadcasted and face-to-face speeches Generating positive media coverage Public events Expansion of travels during the term of office Use of marketing during term periods

PM Mitsotakis

(continued)

Institutional adaptations Conducting public opinion polls during the term Themes of election transferred to governance Negative campaigning Broadcasted and face-to-face speeches Public events Institutional advertising Frequency of posting Building a following on social media Generating positive media coverage

All Three PMs

5 THE PERMANENT CAMPAIGN REVISITED

141

Institutional adaptations Frequency of posting Generating positive media coverage Fund-raising Travel during the term of office Constant search for info on the preferences of citizens Public events Building a following on social media

Joathan & Lilleker’s framework

(continued)

Average indicators

Table 5.2 PM Tsipras

Hyperlinking Conducting public opinion polls during Promotional the term discourse Use of marketing Promotional during term discourse periods, Expansion of Hyperlinking travels during the Use of marketing term of office during term periods Institutional Expansion of travels advertising during the term of office

PM Samaras Negative campaigning Constant search for fund-raising Hyperlinking Promotional discourse

PM Mitsotakis

Use of marketing during term periods Expansion of travel during the term of office Promotional discourse Hyperlinking

All Three PMs

142 P. A. KOLIASTASIS

Weak indicators

Interactivity level Themes of election transferred to governance Microtargeting audience Hyperlinking Promotional discourse

Joathan & Lilleker’s framework Constant search for info on the preferences of citizens Promotional discourse Fund-raising Interactivity level Engaging personalized communication Microtargeting audience Building a following on social media Frequency of posting

PM Samaras Constant search for info on the preferences of citizens Fund-raising Engaging personalized communication Interactivity level Microtargeting audience

PM Tsipras Interactivity level Engaging personalized communication Constant search for information on the preferences of citizens Microtargeting audience

PM Mitsotakis Constant search for info on the preferences of citizens Fund-raising Engaging personalized communication Interactivity level Microtargeting audience

All Three PMs

5 THE PERMANENT CAMPAIGN REVISITED

143

144

P. A. KOLIASTASIS

References Deligiaouri, A. (2020). Shifts in political communication and media democracy landscape in Greece from 1981–2020, in A.Veneti & A. Karatzogianni (Ed.), The emerald handbook of digital media in Greece (Digital activism and society: Politics, economy and culture in network communication) (pp. 229– 244). Emerald Publishing Limited. https://doi.org/10.1108/978-1-83982400-520201047 Elmer, G., Langlois, G., & McKelvey, F. (2012). The Permanent Campaign: New Media, New Politics. Peter Lang. Joathan, I., & Lilleker, D. (2020). Permanent Campaigning: A Meta-Analysis and Framework for Measurement. Journal of Political Marketing. https:// doi.org/10.1080/15377857.2020.1832015 Katz, J., Barris, M., & Jain, A. (2013). The social media president: Barack Obama and the politics of digital engagement. Palgrave MacMillan. Koliastasis, P. (2020). The permanent campaign strategy of Prime Ministers in parliamentary systems: The case of Greece. Journal of Political Marketing, 19(3), 233–257. https://doi.org/10.1080/15377857.2016.1193835 Papathanassopoulos, St. (2007). Political communication and professionalisation, in the R. Negrine et al, (Ed.), Professionalisation of political communication: Changing media, changing Europe. Chicago Press. Poulakidakos, S., & Veneti, A. (2016). Political communication and twitter in Greece: Jumps on the bandwagon or an enhancement of the political dialogue? In T. De.zelan & I. Vobic (Eds.), (R)evolutionizing political communication through social media (pp. 119–146). IGI Global. Poulakidakos, S., & Veneti, A. (2017). The use of twitter and the quality of political dialogue (in Greek). In Demertzis (Ed.), Information society: Governance and the internet (pp. 121–142). National Centre for Social Research. Smyrnaios, N., &Karatzogianni, A. (2020). The rise of SYRIZA in Greece 2009– 2015: The digital battlefield, in A. Veneti & A. Karatzogianni (Ed.) The emerald handbook of digital media in Greece (Digital activism and society: Politics, economy And culture in network communication) (pp. 289–312). Emerald Publishing Limited. https://doi.org/10.1108/978-1-83982-400520201055 Triantafillidou, A., & Lappas, T. (2022). Depersonalize and attack: Facebook campaigns of populist candidates in Greece during the 2019 Greek national elections. Journal of Information Technology & Politics. https://doi.org/10. 1080/19331681.2022.2054484

Appendix 1: Permanent Campaigning by Greek Prime Ministers (PMs) on Facebook

Coding Table Criteria

Indicators

1a. Fund-raising 1b. Research citizens’ preferences

Fund-raising requested on Facebook by the PM PM invites citizens to offer their views on Facebook (unrelated to electoral campaigns or government evaluation) PM invites citizens to offer their views on Facebook (related to electoral campaigns or government evaluation)

1c. Conducting public opinion polls during the term 2a. Travel during term of office 2b. Negative campaigning against parties or politicians or media 2c. Institutional advertising 2d. Themes of election transfered to governance (1st) 2e. Themes of election transfered to governance (2nd)*

Travel advertised/promoted on Facebook by the PM Attacks against rival parties or politicians by the PM on Facebook

Party/Campaign advertising visual or audiovisual language by the PM posted on Facebook Main topic of the post—WRITE IN TEXT—by the PM on Facebook Second main topic of the post—WRITE IN TEXT—by the PM on Facebook *not required if there is only one main theme (continued)

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 P. A. Koliastasis, Permanent Campaigning in Greece in Times of Crisis, Political Campaigning and Communication, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11691-9

145

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APPENDIX 1: PERMANENT CAMPAIGNING BY GREEK PRIME …

(continued) Criteria

Indicators

2f. Hyperlinking 1 (constituency service) 2g. Hyperlinking 2 (reinforcement) 2h. Hyperlinking 3 (ongoing strategy) 2i. Interactive communication 1 (replies) 2j. Interactive communication 2 (mentions) 2k. Interactive communication 3 (invite questions) 2l. Interactive communication 4 (shares) 2m. Promotional discourse 1 (past deeds) 2n. Promotional discourse 2 (future plans) 2o. Promotional discourse 3 (general goals) 2p. Promotional discourse 4 (current actions) 2. Promotional discourse 5 (promotional ideas) 2q. Promotional discourse 6 (political positions) 2r. Personalisation

Links to websites which present the PM current actions related to constituency service Links to websites which reinforce the PM’s political-ideological position Links to websites which present the PM’s current actions

3a. Videos 3b. Live broadcasts 3c. Generating positive media coverage 3d. Public events (local)

Responds to user comments in the PM post

Mentions other users or fan pages (usually highlighted) in the PM’s post, but without sharing the original content Posts in which the PM invites citizens to send questions to him/her

Political posts on the past deeds of the PM or his/her party Political posts on future plans of the PM or his/her party (specific actions) Political posts on general goals of the PM or his/her party (general issues/non-specific goals) Political posts on current actions of the PM or his/her party Political posts on ideas that the PM defends without being current actions, future plans or general goals Political posts on third-party positions that the PM support, aligning himself with others Personalised posts on Facebook—messages in which the PM refers to privatye life or family Videos posted or linked on Facebook by the PM Live broadcasts made by the PM on his/her fan page Links to stories online where the PM is positively mentioned or makes statements Posts about local events attended by the PM (continued)

APPENDIX 1: PERMANENT CAMPAIGNING BY GREEK PRIME …

(continued) Criteria

Indicators

3e. Public events (national) 3f. Public events (international)

Posts about national events attended by the PM Posts about international events attended by the PM

147

Appendix 2: List of Public Appeals of the Six Greek Premiers 1996–2021 (Speeches, Press Conferences, Greek Media Interviews, Greek Press Articles)

Prime Minister Kostas Simitis 1996–2004 (78) 1. Speech in PASOK Parliamentary Group, 8 October 1996 2. Speech in Parliament for the Program of the Government, 10 October 1996 3. Second speech in Parliament for the Program of the Government, 12 October 1996 4. Speech in PASOK Parliamentary Group, 16 October 1996 5. Speech in PASOK Central Committee, 18 October 1996 6. Speech in Parliament regarding the Intergovernmental Summit, 9 December 1996 7. Speech in Elefsina, 16 December 1996 8. Speech in Parliament for the Budget, 21 December 1996 9. Speech in Elefsina, 14 January 1997 10. Speech in PASOK Parliamentary Group, 15 January 1997 11. Speech in Parliament on ‘Agriculture-Countryside’, 17 January 1997 12. Answer in Questions to the PM in Parliament, 24 January 1997 13. Speech in Thessaloniki, 1 February 1997 14. Speech in Ano Liosia, 11 February 1997 15. Speech in Parliament on Education, 19 February 1997 16. Speech in PASOK Central Committee, 21 February 1997 © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 P. A. Koliastasis, Permanent Campaigning in Greece in Times of Crisis, Political Campaigning and Communication, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11691-9

149

150

APPENDIX 2: LIST OF PUBLIC APPEALS OF THE SIX GREEK …

17. Speech in PASOK Political Youth Convention in Athens, 22 February 1997 18. Speech on the launching event for the ‘European Year against Racism’, 26 February 1997 19. Speech in Larisa, 1 March 1997 20. Speech in Volos, 2 March 1997 21. Speech to farmers in Athens, 5 March 1997 22. Televised cross-national broadcasting networks ‘MEGA, ANT-1 and ET-1’ interview on journalists Petros Euthimiou, Giannis Pretenteris & Nikos Chatzinikolaou, 12 March 1997 23. Speech in Parliament on Personal Data Protection Bill, 13 March 1997 24. Speech in PASOK Parliamentary Group, 2 April 1997 25. Speech in Athens, 4 April 1997 26. Speech in Thessaloniki, 5 April 1997 27. Signed article in Expression party magazine, 8 April 1997 28. Speech at the Economist conference for the Greek Economy, 9 April 1997 29. Speech in PASOK Parliamentary Group, 7 May 1997 30. Speech in Parliament on economic policy, 19 May 1997 31. Speech in the Annual General Assembly of the Hellenic Federation of Enterprises, 23 May 1997 32. Speech in Arta, 1 June 1997 33. Speech in Parliament on Social Dialogue, 10 June 1997 34. Speech in Parliament on Constitutional Reform, 11 June 1997 35. Speech in PASOK Central Committee, 20 June 1997 36. Speech in Athens, 30 June 1997 37. Speech at the ‘IΣ TAME’ international meeting, 3 July 1997 38. Speech in PASOK Central Committee on ‘Management and Local Governing’ in Nafplio, 18 July 1997 39. Speech in the opening of the 62nd International Trade Fair in Thessaloniki, 5 September 1997 40. Speech in the formal dinner of the 62nd International Exposition in Thessaloniki, 6 September 1997 41. Speech in PASOK Central Committee, 19 September 1997 42. Speech in PASOK Central Committee, 20 September 1997 Speech in PASOK Parliamentary Group, 8 October 1997 43. Speech in Parliament on Foreign Policy, 6 November 1997

APPENDIX 2: LIST OF PUBLIC APPEALS OF THE SIX GREEK …

151

44. Speech in PASOK Central Committee on Youth, 14 November 1997 45. Press conference at the Foreign Correspondents Association, 18 November 1997 46. Speech at the Annual Hellenic-American Chamber Conference, 25 November 1997 47. Speech in Parliament on European Cohesion, 9 December 1997 48. Speech in PASOK Parliamentary Group, 17 December 1997 49. Speech in Parliament on the 1998 Budget, 21 December 1997 50. Speech in the International Airport of Athens, 10 January 1998 51. Speech in PASOK National Convention on ‘Socialism and Democracy in the twenty-first century Europe’, 13 February 1998 52. Speech in Parliament on Foreign Policy, Greek-Turkish relationships and NATO, 26 February 1998 53. Speech in a PASOK event on ‘Agenda 2000-Agriculture’ in Athens, 20 March 1998 54. Speech in Parliament honoring the 200th anniversary of Rigas Velestinlis’s death, 31 March 1998 55. Speech in parliament on the Bill for Olympic Airways, 8 April 1998 56. Speech in PASOK Central Committee, 11 April 1998 57. Speech in Parliament on a special session honoring Konstantinos Karamanlis, 27 April 1998 58. Speech in Parliament on Social Policy, 28 April 1998 59. Speech in Parliament on Constitutional Reform, 29 April 1998 60. Speech in PASOK Parliamentary Group, 29 April 1998 61. Press Conference on the EMU in Zappeio Mansion-Athens, 7 May 1998 62. Speech in Zappeio Mansion, 8 May 1998 63. Speech in the Center of Substitute Drugs, 19 May 1998 64. Speech in the Annual General Assembly of the Hellenic Federation of Enterprises, 20 May 1998 65. Speech at the Annual Local Government convention, 22 May 1998 66. Speech in Parliament on EMU and the European Course, 2 June 1998 67. Speech in Ancient Olympia, 20 June 1998 68. Speech in Parliament on a special session honoring the memory of Andreas Papandreou, 23 June 1998 69. Speech in the headquarters of Greek Petroleum Group, 24 June 1998

152

APPENDIX 2: LIST OF PUBLIC APPEALS OF THE SIX GREEK …

70. Speech in Parliament on Education, 25 June 1998 71. Speech in Attiko Metro-Athens, 2 July 1998 72. Speech in Lamia, 4 July 1998 73. Speech in Lefkada, 18 July 1998 74. Speech in the launching day of the construction of the Rio-Antirrio Bridge, 19 July 1998 75. Speech in Argolida, 23 July 1998 76. Speech in PASOK National Board, 12 September 1998 77. Speech in PASOK Central Committee, 18 September 1998 78. Speech in Kallithea, 22 September 1998 Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis 2004–2009 (125) 1. Speech in Parliament for the Program of the Government, 20 March 2004 2. Second Speech in Parliament for the Program of the Government, 21 March 2004 3. Speech in Parliament for the Program of the Government, 21 March 2004 4. Speech in Parliament for the Program of the Government, 22 March 2004 5. Speech in ND. Parliamentary Group, 23 March 2004 6. Press televised conference in Brussels after the first European Council session, 25 March 2004 7. Televised press conference in Brussels after the end of the European Council, 26 March 2004 8. Speech in Parliament on Briefing of the Parliament concerning the Cyprus issue, 2 April 24 9. Second Speech in Parliament on Briefing of the Parliament concerning the Cyprus issue, 2 April 2004 10. Televised address in Maximos Mansion after the Meeting with the Opposition leaders under the President of the Greek Republic on the Cyprus Issue, 15 April 2004 11. Speech in ND Parliamentary Group, 23 April 2004 12. Joint televised press conference with the President of the Republic of Cyprus Papadopoulos, 28 April 2004 13. Televised address on the introduction of the Republic of Cyprus into the EU, 30 April 2004

APPENDIX 2: LIST OF PUBLIC APPEALS OF THE SIX GREEK …

153

14. Speech at the Economist 8th Roundtable Discussion on ‘Leadership Strategy for Security and Prosperity in an Era of Uncertainty’, 5 May 2004 15. Speech at the Hellenic-Turkish Business Forum, 7 May 2004 Joint televised press conference with the Prime Minister of Turkey Erdogan, 7 May 2004 16. Speech in Parliament on the Economy, 12 May 2004 17. Second Speech in Parliament on the Economy, 12 May 2004 18. Televised press Conference in Greek and foreign journalists in New York after meeting with the U.N General Secretary, 18 May 2004 19. Speech in the Hellenic-American Business Council on ‘Greece: Ideal Business Partner in Southeastern Europe’, 19 May 2004 20. Televised press conference after the meeting with the President of the U.S George W. Bush, 20 May 2004 21. Speech in the 10th Annual Thessaloniki Forum hosted by Northern Greece Industry Association and the Hellenic-American Chamber, 25 May 2004 22. Speech in the opening of the Annual General Assembly of the Hellenic Federation of Enterprises, 26 May 2004 23. Speech in ND presentation of the European Election Party Declaration, 27 May 2004 24. Speech in the 12th Annual Convention of the Greek Tourism Enterprises Association), 2 June 2004 25. Speech in Thessaloniki on European Elections, 5 June 2004 26. TV Interview in the national broadcast network ‘Antenna TV’, 10 June 2004 27. Televised address in Zappeio Mansion on the European Election, 13 June 2004 28. Televised press conference during European Council’s Summit first day, 17 June 2004 29. Televised press conference after the end of the session of the European Council Summit, 19 June 2004 30. Speech in the 6th Annual ONNED, 25 June 2004 31. Press conference at NATO Heads of Governments Summit, 28 June 2004 32. Speech in ND Pre-Convention in Thessaloniki, 16 July 2004 33. Speech in ND Pre-Convention in Patra, 17 July 2004 34. Speech at ND 6th Party Convention Opening Day, 23 July 2004

154

APPENDIX 2: LIST OF PUBLIC APPEALS OF THE SIX GREEK …

35. Speech at ND 6th Party Convention Closing Day, 25 July 2004 36. Speech in the Opening Day of the 69th International Trade Fair in Thessaloniki, 10 September 2004 37. Speech in the 69th International Trade Fair in Thessaloniki to Business representatives, 11 September 2004 38. Televised press conference in the 69th International Trade Fair in Thessaloniki, 12 September 2004 39. Speech at an event for the 30 years Anniversary of ND’s Foundation, 1 October 2004 40. Speech at the International Herald Tribune Symposium for the Greek Economy in the Aftermath of the Olympics, 11 October 2004 41. Speech in ND Parliamentary Group, 14 October 2004 42. Speech in the Parliament on a special session honoring the 2004 Olympics Greek athletes, 19 October 2004 43. Speech at the 8th Dialogue between the Greek-Orthodox Church and the EPP, 21 October 2004 44. Speech at the 15th Annual Hellenic-American Chamber Conference with topic ‘The Hour of the Greek Economy’, 2 November 2004 45. Televised press conference at the European Council Summit, 5 November 2004 46. Speech in Parliament on Education, 8 November 2004 47. Second speech in Parliament on Education, 8 November 2004 48. Joint press statement with Cyprus President Papadopoulos in Maximos Mansion, 12 November 2004 49. Speech in an event on ‘Polythecneio’ hosted by ONNED, 14 November 2004 50. Speech in the Athens Symposium on ‘Issues of International and Greek Economy’, 19 November 2004 51. Speech in a formal dinner hosted by the Ioannina District Chancellor, 19 November 2004 52. Speech in Parliament on honoring Greek athletes who competed in the Special Olympics 2004, 24 November 2004 53. Speech in ND Parliamentary Group, 4 December 2004 54. Speech in an event on ‘Post-Olympics Use of Infrastructure’, 07 December 2004 55. Speech in ND Central Committee, 10 December 2004

APPENDIX 2: LIST OF PUBLIC APPEALS OF THE SIX GREEK …

155

56. Televised Press Conference after the end of the European Council session, 17 December 2004 57. Speech in Parliament on the 2005 Budget, 22 December 2004 58. Speech in Karpathos Island, 5 January 2005 59. Speech at the Opening of the National Discussion on Education, 21 January 2005 60. Speech in ND Women Department, 26 January 2005 61. Speech in ND Parliamentary Group on the election of the President of the Greek Republic, 8 February 2005 62. Speech in Parliament on Agricultural Issues, 18 February 2005 63. Second speech in Parliament on Agricultural Issues, 18 February 2005 64. Third speech in Parliament on Agricultural Issues, 18 February 2005 65. Speech in Samothraki Island, 19 February 2005 66. Press conference at NATO Heads of Governments Summit, 22 February 2005 67. Press conference at the Foreign Correspondents Association, 8 March 2005 68. Speech in Parliament on ‘Health and Social Solidarity’, 18 March 2005 69. Second Speech in Parliament on ‘Health and Social Solidarity’, 18 March 2005 70. Third Speech in Parliament on ‘Health and Social Solidarity’, 18 March 2005 71. Press televised conference in Brussels after the European Council session, 23 March 2005 72. Speech on the Memorial of Eleftherios and Sofoklis Venizelos, 27 March 2005 73. Speech in the 13th Annual Convention of the Greek Tourism Enterprises Association, 11 April 2005 74. Speech in Parliament on Ratification of the European Constitution, 15 April 2005 75. Joint televised address and press conference with the President of the European Commission Manuel Barozo, 18 April 2005 76. Speech at the Economist 9th Roundtable Discussion, 19 April 2005 77. Speech at the Signing of the Agreement for the ENISA Headquarters in Heraklion city of Crete, 22 April 2004

156

APPENDIX 2: LIST OF PUBLIC APPEALS OF THE SIX GREEK …

78. Speech at the Executive Committee of the International Democratic Association in Athens, 27 April 2004 79. Speech in Parliament on Foreign Policy, 13 May 2005 80. Second Speech in Parliament on Foreign Policy, 13 May 2005 81. Third Speech in Parliament on Foreign Policy, 13 May 2005 82. Speech in Parliament on the 60th Anniversary of the End of World War II, 17 May 2005 83. Speech in the opening of the Annual General Assembly of the Hellenic Federation of Enterprises, 26 May 2005 84. Speech in an event celebrating the 50th Anniversary of Thessaloniki Technical University, 27 May 2005 85. Speech in an event celebrating the 10th Anniversary of the National Judiciary School, 27 May 2005 86. Speech in Parliament on Growth, Employment and Social Coherence, 8 June 25 87. Speech in Parliament setting a Trust Motion to Government, 8 June 2005 88. Speech in Parliament on the closing of the Trust Motion to Government session, 12 June 2005 89. Speech in Parliament commenting the speech of the Opposition leader, 12 June 2005 Press televised conference in Brussels after the European Council session, 18 June 2005 90. Speech in Parliament on Women’s Employment, 22 June 2005 91. Second speech in Parliament on Women’s Employment, 22 June 2005 92. Speech in an event for the opening of a World War II Memorial Monument in Kaisariani, 24 June 2005 93. Speech in Parliament on Public Administration, 28 June 2005 94. Second Speech in Parliament on Public Administration, 28 June 2005 95. Speech in an event for the beginning of the construction of the Hellenic-Turkish Oil Tube in Alexandroupolis, 3 July 2005 96. Speech in an event for the beginning of the construction of the Hellenic-Turkish Oil Tube in Gefira Kipon, 3 July 2005 97. Speech in an ONNED event in Limnos Island, 15 July 2005 98. Speech in ND Central Committee, 26 August 2005 99. Speech at the opening of the 70th International Trade Fair in Thessaloniki, 10 September 2005

APPENDIX 2: LIST OF PUBLIC APPEALS OF THE SIX GREEK …

157

100. Speech in the 70th International Trade Fair in Thessaloniki to Business representatives, 11 September 2005 101. Televised press conference during the 70th International Exposition in Thessaloniki, 12 September 2005 102. Speech in ND Parliamentary Group, 3 October 2005 103. Second Speech in ND Parliamentary Group, 3 October 2005 104. Speech in dinner to the members of the European Central Bank Board of Directors, 6 October 2005 105. Answer in Parliament on Question to the PM by the leader of the Synaspismos party Alekos Alavanos, 14 October 2005 106. Second answer in Parliament on Question to the PM by the leader of the Synaspismos party Alekos Alavanos, 14 October 2005 107. Answer in Parliament on Question to the PM by the Synaspismos party MP Nikos Konstantopoulos, 14 October 2005 108. Second speech in Parliament on Question to the PM by the Synaspismos party MP Nikos Konstantopoulos, 14 October 2005 109. Speech in Parliament on Foreign Policy, 1 November 2005 110. Second speech in Parliament on Foreign Policy, 1 November 2005 111. Speech in Parliament on the Ratification of the Admission in the E.U. of Bulgaria and Romania, 2 November 2005 112. Speech at the 16th Annual Hellenic-American Chamber Conference with topic ‘The Hour of the Greek Economy’, 8 November 2005 113. Speech in working dinner hosted by Japan Industry Association (Keindaren), 11 November 2005 114. Speech in Grevena on business issues, 19 November 2005 115. Speech in an event celebrating the 30th Anniversary of the Centre for Political Research and Communication, 29 November 2005 116. Speech in ND Parliamentary Group on ‘Economy and Growth for the present and the future’, 8 December 2005 117. Speech in ND Central Committee, 10 December 2005 118. Speech in Parliament on the 2006 Budget, 22 December 2005 119. Speech in ND Parliamentary Group on the ‘Constitutional Reform’, 17 January 2006 120. Speech in ND Women Department, 25 January 2006 121. Speech in ND Central Committee, 29 January 2006 122. Speech in ND Parliamentary Group, 24 February 2006

158

APPENDIX 2: LIST OF PUBLIC APPEALS OF THE SIX GREEK …

123. Speech in Parliament on ‘Youth Unemployment and measures on their Social Protection’, 27 February 2006 124. Second speech in Parliament on ‘Youth Unemployment and measures on their Social Protection’, 27 February 2006 125. Third speech in Parliament on ‘Youth Unemployment and measures on their Social Protection’, 27 February 2006 Prime Minister George Papandreou 2009–2011 (181) 1. Speech in the first session of the newly elected Council of Ministers (Greek Cabinet), 7 October 2009 2. Speech in Ancient Olympia, 11 October 2009 3. Speech in PASOK Parliamentary Group, 14 October 2009 4. Speech in Parliament for the Program of the Government, 16 October 2009 5. Second Speech in Parliament for the Program of the Government, 18 October 2009 6. Speech in PASOK National Council, 23 October 2009 7. Televised press conference after the European Council session, 30 October 2009 8. Speech in the 11th Annual Conference of the Greek ICT Forum, 4 November 2009 9. Speech at the Global Forum for Immigration and Growth, 4 November 2009 10. Joint press address after Meeting with Secretary General of the United Nations in Maximos Mansion, 4 November 2009 11. Speech in the Council of Ministers, 5 November 2009 12. Answer in Parliament on Question to the PM by the leader of the SYRIZA party Alexis Tsipras, 13 November 2009 13. Answer in a Question to the PM by leader of the LAOS party Georgios Karatzaferis, 13 November 2009 14. Answer in a Question to the PM by the KKE leader Aleka Papariga, 13 November 2009 15. Speech in the Council of Ministers, 18 November 2009 16. Speech at the Annual Hellenic-American Chamber Conference with topic ‘The Hour of the Greek Economy’, 30 November 2009

APPENDIX 2: LIST OF PUBLIC APPEALS OF THE SIX GREEK …

159

17. Speech in 17th Ministerial Council of the OSCE, 1 December 2009 18. Speech in Parliament on the Extraordinary Financial Aid of Social Solidarity, 1 December 2009 19. Press Conference of the OSCE Troika in Hellinikon Complex, Fencing Center, 2 December 2009 20. Speech in the Council of Ministers, 3 December 2009 21. Speech in the Council of Ministers, 9 December 2009 22. Televised press conference after the European Council session, 11 December 2009 23. Speech in the Council of Ministers, 14 December 2009 24. Speech on the ‘Kallikratis’ bill, 18 January 2010 25. Speech in PASOK Parliamentary Group, 19 December 2009 26. Speech in Parliament on the 2010 Budget, 23 December 2009 27. Speech in the Council of Ministers, 10 January 2010 28. Speech in Parliament, 22 January 2010 29. Speech in Parliament, 1 February 2010 30. Speech in Economist Discussion and Debate on ‘In or out of the economic crisis?’, 2 February 2010 31. Speech in Parliament, 8 February 2010 32. Televised press conference after the European Council session, 11 February 2010 33. Speech in the Council of Ministers, 12 February 2010 34. Speech in Parliament, 26 February 2010 35. Speech in the Council of Ministers, 1 March 2010 36. Speech in Parliament, 2 March 2010 37. Speech in the Council of Ministers, 4 March 2010 38. Speech in the Council of Ministers, 18 March 2010 39. Speech in the 34th National ΓΣ EE (General Confederation of Greek Labour), 19 March 2010 40. Speech at PASOK National Council in Thessaloniki, 20 March 2010 41. Speech in Parliament, 22 March 2010 42. Televised press conference after the European Council session, 26 March 2010 43. Signed article in ‘O Kosmos tou Ependuti’ newspaper, 27 March 2010 44. Interview on ‘To Vima’ newspaper, 11 April 2010 45. Speech in Parliament, 14 April 2010

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46. Answer in a Question to the PM in Parliament, 16 April 2010 47. Speech in an event hosted by Transparency International Greece, 19 April 2010 48. Speech in the 18th Annual Convention of the Greek Tourism Enterprises Association, 21 April 2010 49. Speech in the Financial and Social Committee of Rhodes Island, 23 April 2010 50. Speech at the Council of Ministers in Kastellorizo Island, 23 April 2010 51. Speech in PASOK Parliamentary Group, 27 April 2010 52. Speech in the Council of Ministers, 28 April 2010 53. Speech in an Economist event, 28 April 2010 54. Answer in a Question to the PM in Parliament, 30 April 2010 55. Speech in the Council of Ministers, 2 May 2010 56. Speech at the ‘digital economy forum’ of the Greek Association of Computing and Communication Enterprises, 3 May 2010 57. Speech in Parliament, 5 May 2010 58. Speech in Parliament, 6 May 2010 59. Speech in the opening of the Annual General Assembly of the Hellenic Federation of Enterprises, 11 May 2010 60. Joint televised press conference with Prime Minister of Turkey Tayyip Erdogan, 14 May 2010 61. Speech in the Hellenic-Turkish Business Forum, 14 May 2010 62. Speech at the 3rd Annual Conference for Climate and Energy Security in 63. Southeastern Europe, 19 May 2010 64. Speech in Parliament, 21 May 2010 65. Speech in Parliament, 25 May 2010 66. Speech in the Financial and Social Committee of Rodopi, 28 May 2010 67. Speech in Parliament, 4 June 2010 68. Speech in the Financial and Social Committee of Arkadia, 10 June 2010 69. Speech in Parliament, 25 June 2010 70. Speech in Parliament, 30 June 2010 71. Interview on ‘Sunday Eleftherotypia’ newspaper, 4 July 2010 72. Speech in Ilion on the Drug Problem, 6 July 2010 73. Speech in Parliament, 7 July 2010 74. Speech in Parliament, 9 July 2010

APPENDIX 2: LIST OF PUBLIC APPEALS OF THE SIX GREEK …

161

75. Speech on the Opening Ceremony of the Symi’s Symposium in Symi Island, 12 July 2010 76. Speech in the Closing Ceremony of Symi’s Symposium in Symi Island, 15 July 2010 77. Speech in National Center of Public Administration, 28 July 2010 78. Speech at the International Cretan Conference in Crete, 30 July 2010 79. Signed article in the website of the government, 23 August 2010 80. Speech in PASOK 9th National Council, 3 September 2010 81. Speech in PASOK 9th National Council closing day, 5 September 2010 82. Speech in the Council of Ministers, 10 September 2010 83. Speech in PASOK Commerce Department, 10 September 2010 84. Speech in the 75th International Trade Fair in Thessaloniki, 11 September 2010 85. Televised press conference in the 75th International Trade Fair in Thessaloniki, 12 September 2010 86. Televised press conference after the European Council session, 16 September 2010 87. Speech in a discussion on Education in Delphoi, 26 September 2010 88. Televised press conference after the Europe-Asia Summit in Brussels, 5 October 2010 89. Speech in PASOK Parliamentary Group, 7 October 2010 90. Speech in Corfu Island, 10 October 2010 91. Speech during a meeting with the National Exporters Federation, 14 October 2010 92. Answer in a Question to the PM by SYRIZA, 15 October 2010 93. Answer in a Question to the PM by LAOS, 15 October 2010 94. Answer in a Question to the PM by KKE, 15 October 2010 95. Speech in Larisa, 17 October 2010 96. Televised press address in the Maximos Mansion on the Unemployment, 19 October 2010 97. Speech during a meeting with young and innovative entrepreneurs, 20 October 2010 98. Speech in Peristeri, 21 October 2010 99. Speech in the Mediterranean Initiative for Climate Change, 22 October 2010 100. Speech in Alexandroupolis, 23 October 2010

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101. Speech in the Green Investment Mediterranean Forum, 23 October 2010 102. Signed article in ‘Sunday Vima’ newspaper, 24 October 2010 103. Televised cross-national broadcasting networks interview, 25 October 2010 104. Televised press conference after the European Council session, 29 October 2010 105. Speech in Agioi Anarguroi, 30 October 2010 106. Speech in Kozani, 31 October 2010 107. Interview in ‘Real News’ newspaper, 31 October 2010 108. Speech in Thessaloniki, 1 November 2010 109. Speech in Ioannina, 2 November 2010 110. Speech in Patra, 4 November 2010 111. Speech in Athens, 5 November 2010 112. Town hall meeting hosted with young citizens broadcasted online, 5 November 2010 113. Interview in ‘Ta Nea Weekend’ newspaper, 6 November 2010 114. Interview in ‘Sunday Ethnos’ newspaper, 7 October 2010 115. Speech in the ‘News Xchange 2010’ Conference, 11 November 2010 116. Interview in ‘To Proto Thema’ newspaper, 14 November 2010 117. Speech in an event for Educating the new Local Authorities, 24 November 2010 118. Answer in a Question to the PM by LAOS, 26 November 2010 119. Interview in ‘Kathimerini’ newspaper, 28 November 2010 120. Speech in the 21st Annual Hellenic-American Chamber Conference, 30 November 2010 121. Speech in an event hosted by the Ministry of Development and Competiveness, 8 December 2010 122. Answer in a Question to the PM by SYRIZA, 10 December 2010 123. Answer in a Question to the PM by LAOS, 10 December 2010 124. Answer in a Question to the PM by KKE, 10 December 2010 125. Speech in Crete, 12 December 2010 126. Answer in a Question to the PM by KKE, 14 January 2011 127. Speech at an event hosted by the General Secretariat of Communications for the heads of the Press Secretariat abroad, 17 January 2011 128. Speech in PASOK Parliamentary Group, 18 December 2010

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163

129. Interview in ‘Sunday Eleftherotypia’ newspaper, 19 December 2010 Speech in Kozani, 20 January 2011 130. Speech in Thessaloniki, 21 January 2011 131. Speech in Parliament, 22 December 2010 132. Speech in Parliament, 24 January 2011 133. Speech in PASOK Parliamentary Group, 26 January 2011 134. Interview in ‘Sunday Ethnos’ newspaper, 31 December 2010 135. Televised press conference after the European Council session, 4 February 2011 136. Speech in the Council of Ministers, 9 February 2011 137. Speech at the Conference of the Chairmen of the AmericanJewish Organisations, 10 February 2011 138. Answer in a Question to the PM by SYRIZA, 11 February 2011 139. Answer in a Question to the PM by LAOS, 11 February 2011 140. Speech in Samothraki, 17 February 2011 141. Speech in Komotini, 18 February 2011 142. Speech in Dimario village in Xanthi, 18 February 2011 143. Answer in a Question to the PM by LAOS, 25 February 2011 144. Answer in a Question to the PM by SYRIZA, 25 February 2011 145. Speech in PASOK National Council, 4 March 2011 146. Televised press conference after the Informal Heads of Government Summit of the member-states of the Eurozone, 12 March 2011 147. Speech in the Council of Ministers, 13 March 2011 148. Speech in PASOK Parliamentary Group, 15 March 2011 149. Speech in Parliament, 16 March 2011 150. Speech in Parliament, 22 March 2011 151. Televised press conference after the European Council session, 25 March 2011 152. Speech at the Founding Convention of ‘Dimokratiki Aristera’ party, 31 March 2011 153. Answer in a Question to the PM by SYRIZA, 1 April 2011 154. Answer in a Question to the PM by LAOS, 1 April 2011 155. Answer in a Question to the PM by ND, 1 April 2011 156. Speech in PASOK Parliamentary Group, 15 April 2011 157. Speech in the Council of Ministers, 15 April 2011 158. Speech in the Council of Ministers, 28 April 2011 159. Speech in the 19th Annual Convention of SETE (Greek Tourism Enterprises Association), 4 May 2011

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160. Answer in a Question to the PM by SYRIZA, 6 May 2011 161. Answer in a Question to the PM by LAOS, 6 May 2011 162. Speech in Meganisi Island, 7 May 2011 163. Speech at the Transparency International Greece conference, 9 May 2011 164. Answer in a Question to the PM by SYRIZA, 10 May 2011 165. Answer in a Question to the PM by LAOS, 10 May 2011 166. Speech in the Council of Ministers, 11 May 2011 167. Speech in the Council of Ministers, 16 May 2011 168. Speech at the Economist Conference, 17 May 2011 169. Speech in Argolida, 20 May 2011 170. Interview in ‘Sunday Ethnos’ newspaper, 22 May 2011 171. Speech in the Annual General Assembly of the Hellenic Federation of Enterprises, 24 May 2011 172. Signed article in ‘Kathimerini’ newspaper, 29 May 2011 173. Speech in Achaia, 30 May 2011 174. Speech in the Council of Ministers, 6 June 2011 175. Speech in PASOK Political Council, 8 June 2011 176. Interview in ‘Sunday Vima’ newspaper, 12 June 2011 177. Speech in PASOK Parliamentary Group, 16 June 2011 178. Speech in the Council of Ministers, 17 June 2011 179. Speech in Parliament on the motion of no-confidence, 19 June 2011 180. Televised press conference after the European Council session, 24 June 2011 181. Speech in Parliament on a special session on Special Olympics, 27 June 2011 Prime Minister Antonis Samaras 2012–2015 (106) 1. Speech at the first Cabinet meeting on, 21 June 2012 2. Speech of Programmatic Statements, 3 July 2012 3. Speech at the New Government’s Programme Statements, 6 July 2012 4. Second Speech on the New Government’s Programme Statements, 9 July 2012 5. Speech to the Central Committee of the New Democracy, 24 July 2012

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165

6. Speech at the Political Committee of the New Democracy, 30 August 2012 7. Speech at the opening of the 77th Thessaloniki International Fair, 8 September 2012 8. Interview in VIMAGazino, 30 September 2012 9. Speech at the 125th Anniversary Conference of the first edition of the International Herald Tribune, 4 October 2012 10. Interview in Kathimerini newspaper, 14 October 2012 11. Speech at the International Herald Tribune Conference ‘Greece Investment Forum-Moving Forward’ 16 October 2012 12. Speech at the European People’s Party Summit in Bucharest, 17 October 2012 13. Press conference after the Brussels Summit, 19 October 2012 14. Speech in Thessaloniki, on the occasion of the centenary of the Liberation of Macedonia, 26 October 2012 15. Speech to the Parliamentary Group of the New Democracy, 4 November 2012 16. Speech in the Parliament on the Finance Ministry’s Multilateral Bill, 7 November 2012 17. Speech at the Parliamentary Debate on the 2013 Budget, 12 November 2012 18. Speech at the EPP meeting in Malta, 15 November 2012 19. Televised Address on the Eurogroup results, 27 November 2012 20. Interview in Proto Thema, 1 December 2012 21. Speech at the Hellenic-American Chamber, 2012 December 5, 2012 22. Press conference after the Brussels Summit, 14 December 2012 23. Interview in the journal Parapolitika, 21 December 2012 24. Interview in Vima on Sunday, 12 January 2013 25. Speech at the ceremony for the signing of the Tripartite Intergovernmental Agreement between Greece, Albania and Italy on the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), 13 February 2013 26. Speech at the meeting of French and Greek Businessmen, 19 February 2013 27. First speech in the debate on the agenda of the Parliament on the problems of the agricultural sector, 27 February 2013 28. Second speech in the debate on the agenda of the Parliament on the problems of the agricultural sector, 27 February 2013

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29. Third Speech in the debate on the agenda of the Parliament on the problems of the agricultural sector, 27 February 2013 30. Speech at the event of the ‘Konstantinos G. Karamanlis’ On the 15th anniversary of the death of Constantine Karamanlis, 6 March 2013 31. Speech at the meeting of the Bureau of the European People’s Party, 7 March 2013 32. Speech at the Political Committee of the New Democracy, 9 March 2013 33. Press conference after the European Council Summit in Brussels, 15 March 2013 34. Speech at the 1st National Development Conference for the 2014–2020 programming period, 4 April 2013 35. Televised Address (Negotiation—Agreement), 15 April 2013 36. Interview in Imerisia, Saturday, 13 April 2013 37. Speech at the Annual General Assembly of SEV, 13 May 2013 38. Speech at the inauguration of the Hanns Seidel Foundation in Athens, 14 May 2013 39. Speech at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 16 May 2013 40. Speech at the World Cultural Forum in Hangzhou Province, on the topic: ‘Strengthening International Cooperation to Built an Ecological Civilization”, May 18, 2013 41. Speech at the SETE General Assembly, 29 May 2013 42. Speech at the ‘Economic Ideas Forum’ event organised by the Centre of European Studies, 7 June 2013 43. Speech at the Pre-Congress of New Democracy in Thessaloniki 9 June 2013 44. Televised Address for the abolition of ERT, 14 June 2013 45. Speech at the European Investment Bank event on new credits and financing for Greece, 12 June 2013 46. Speech at the 2013 EBEA Awards for Business and Entrepreneurs at the Athens Concert Hall, 12 June 2013 47. Speech at the 9th Ordinary Congress of ONNED, 14 June 2013 48. Speech at the Pre-Conference of the Southwestern Democratic Party in Nafplio, 16 June 2013 49. Televised Address (ERT), 21 June 2013 50. Televised Address (ERT/Tripartite), 17 July 2013 51. Speech at the 9th National Congress of the party, 28 June 2013

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167

52. Speech at the closing of the 9th National Conference of New Democracy, 30 June 2013 53. Interview in the journal TA NEA, 3 August 2013 54. Interview in Sunday Eleftherotypia, 31 August 2013 55. Speech at the Political Committee of the New Democracy, 7 July 2013 56. Speech at the opening of the 78th Thessaloniki International Fair, 7 September 2013 57. Press Conference at the TIF, 7 September 2013 58. Speech at the European South Youth meeting, 13 September 2013 59. Speech at the International Herald Tribune Conference held at the Attalos Lodge, 16 September 2013 60. Speech at the American-Jewish Committee, September 30, 2013 61. Speech at the annual lecture of the Stavros Niarchos Foundation on ‘New Greece: a factor of stability”, 2 October 2013 62. Speech at the event organized by the Hellenic Initiative on ‘Investing in the future of Greece”, 4 October 2013 63. Speech at the Greek-Israeli Business Forum, 8 October 2013 64. Speech at the Political Committee of the New Democracy Party, 12 October 2013 65. Interview on the MEGA programme ‘Anaprotimata’ with journalist Yannis Pretenderis, 4 November 2013 66. Speech at the Harvard University Alumni Association, November 7, 2013 67. Speech in the Parliament, against the motion of no-confidence of SYRIZA, 11 November 2013 68. Joint Press Conference with the President of the European Parliament Martin Schulz, 26 November 2013 69. Speech at the 24th Annual Conference of the Hellenic-American Chamber of Commerce on ‘The Hellenic Economy Hour”, December 3, 2013 70. Speech at the debate on the 2014 Budget in Parliament, 8 December 2013 71. Interview in Kathimerini, 15 December 2013 72. Joint press conference with the President of the European Commission, Jose Manuel Barroso, 9 January 2014 73. Statement and answers at the joint press conference with the President of the European Parliament, 15 January 2014

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74. Speech at the plenary session of the European Parliament on the presentation of the priorities of the Greek Presidency, 15 January 2014 75. Speech at the event of the Hellenic-German Chamber of Commerce & Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 20 January 2014 76. Speech in Brussels, at the Conference of the Pan-European Federation of Industries, on ‘Industry matters”, 29 January 2014 77. Speech, at the Parliamentary Group of the New Democracy, 30 January 2014 78. Speech at the special event on the EU Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian Region, 6 February 2014 79. Speech at the Athens meeting organised by ‘Nouvel Observateur’ in collaboration with ‘Kathimerini”, 6 February 2014 80. Speech at the European People’s Party Electoral Conference, 7 March 2014 81. Speech at the Panhellenic Conference of Greek Exporters, 19 March 2014 82. Press conference after the Brussels Summit, 21 March 2014 83. Interview with ‘ANT1’ TV station and journalists Maria Houklis and Dimitris Kottaridis, 6 May 2014 84. Speech at the ECOFIN dinner at the Acropolis Museum, 1 April 2014 85. Speech at the presentation of the party’s European candidate list, 15 April 2014 86. Speech at the event of the Management Centre for Energy and the Greek Energy Forum, 30 April 2014 87. Speech at the Association of Greek Tourism Enterprises, 1 May 2014 88. Speech on the Constitutional Review - Reforms, 7 May 2014 89. Speech to the Parliamentary Group of the New Democracy, 8 May 2014 90. Speech in Tripoli, 11 May 2014 91. Speech at the conference of the Holy Archdiocese of Athens, 12 May 2014 92. Speech to women in Lamia, 12 May 2014 93. Speech at an event on the Primary Sector held at the Hellenic Agricultural Cooperative of Lesvos, 13 May 2014 94. Speech in Thessaloniki, 15 May 2014

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169

95. Speech on the Development Plan of Greece, 20 May 2014 96. Speech at an election rally in Ioannina, 22 May 2014 97. Speech at Syntagma, 23 May 2014 98. Speech at the meeting of the Council of Ministers, 10 June 2014 99. Speech on the ‘Review of the Greek Presidency of the Council of the European Union’, 16 June 2014 100. Speech at EPP Group Study Says on ‘the EU’s political challenges 2014–2019’, 17 June 2014 101. Interview with NERIT TV and Journalists Yannis Troupi and George Efthymiou, 27 December 2014 102. Interview with ANT1 TV station and the journalist Mr. Dimitris Kottaridis, 17 January 2015 103. Interview with the SKAI TV station and the journalist Mr. Takis Hatzis, 18 January 2015 104. Interview with the TV show ‘ANT1 Breakfast’ and the journalist Mr. George Papadakis, 23 January 2015 105. Prime Minister’s Televised Address (Presidential Candidate), 9 December 2014 106. Prime Minister’s Televised Address (election of the President), 21 December 2014 Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras 2015–2019 (136) 1. Interview in the German magazine Stern, 19 February 2015 2. Televised Address on the Eurogroup decision, 21 February 2015 3. Interview in the journal Ethnos, 16 March 2015 4. Interview in the newspaper Real, 29 March 2015 5. Interview on Star TV station, in the show ‘Ston Eniko’ with Nikos Hatzinikolaou, 29 April 2015 6. Televised Address, 28 June 2015 7. Televised Address for the referendum on Sunday, 1 July 2015 8. Statement at the Ministry of National Defence, 2 July 2015 9. Prime Minister’s Televised Address, 3 July 2015 10. Speech after exercising his right to vote in the referendum of 5 July, 5 July 2015 11. Televised Address on the result of the referendum, 6 July 2015 12. Interview with ERT1 and journalists Panos Charitos and Antonis Alafogiorgos, 15 July 2015

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13. Interview to Radio Station ‘105,5 Σ τo Kokkino’, 30 July 2015 14. Interview with journalist Ms. Sophia Papaioannou, 26 August 2015 15. Speech at the Panhellenic Conference of SYRIZA, 29 August 2015 16. Second speech at the Panhellenic Conference of SYRIZA, 30 August 2015 17. Interview in Real News, 30 August 2015 18. Speech to the Mayors of Chania, 1 September 2015 19. Speech at a meeting with members and stakeholders of the agricultural world in Kissamos, 1 September 2015 20. Speech in Egaleo, 3 September 2015 21. Interview on Kontra Channel, 4 September 2015 22. Speech in Livadia, 4 September 2015 23. Speech in Kaisariani, 5 September 2015 24. Interview on SKAI, 6 September 2015 25. Speech at the National Centre for Research & Development Research and Technology Development, 6 September 2015 26. Speech at the ‘High Technology Business Park”, 6 September 2015 27. Speech at the 80th TIF, 6 September 2015 28. Press Conference at the 80th TIF, 7 September 2015 29. Speech, in Kozani, 7 September 2015 30. Speech at the presentation of the programme in Thessaloniki, 8 September 2015 31. Interview at the TV debate of the Political Leaders, 9 September 2015 32. Speech in Arta, 10 September 2015 33. Speech in Ioannina, 10 September 2015 34. Interview in the Newspaper of the Press, 10 September 2015 35. Speech in Kavala, 11 September 2015 36. Article in the journal Agora, 12 September 2015 37. Speech in Kalamata, 12 September 2015 38. Interview to the journal To Eθnos, 13 September 2015 39. Speech in Keratsini, 13 September 2015 40. Interview on ERT, 13 September 2015 41. Interview in the debate with the leader of the Southwest, 14 September 2015 42. Speech in Larissa, 15 September 2015

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171

43. Speech in Patras, 16 September 2015 44. Interview in ‘Journal of the Editors”, 17 September 2015 45. Interview with Attica TV, 17 September 2015 46. Interview with SBC TV, 17 September 2015 47. Speech in Heraklion, 17 September 2015 48. Interview to enikos.gr, 18 September 2015 49. Interview in the journal Ta Nea, 18 September 2015 50. Speech at Syntagma, 18 September 2015 51. Speech in Athens, 20 September 2015 52. Speech at the first meeting of the Council of Ministers, 25 September 2015 53. Speech at the UN Summit, 27 September 2015 54. Speech at the high-level meeting on migration and refugee flows, 1 October 2015 55. Speech at the UN General Assembly, 1 October 2015 56. Speech at the meeting of the Parliamentary Group of SYRIZA, 3 October 2015 57. Speech during the reading of the programme statements, 5 October 2015 58. Debate on the debate on the programme statements, 8 October 2015 59. Speech at the International Conference on Religious and Cultural Pluralism and Peaceful Coexistence in the Middle East, 19 October 2015 60. Joint Press Conference with the President of France F. Hollande, 23 October 2015 61. Speech in Parliament on the Refugee issue (Prime Minister’s Hour, 30 October 2015) 62. Speech at the inauguration of the rehabilitation unit ‘PROMITHEAS’ at Diavata Prison, 2 November 2015 63. Joint press conference with President of the European Parliament Martin Schulz, 4 November 2015 64. Speech at the meeting of the Council of Ministers, 10 November 2015 65. Speech at the special session of the Plenary Session of the Parliament dedicated to the day of remembrance and honour for the Polytechnic Uprising, 17 November 2015 66. Joint press conference with his Turkish counterpart A. Davoudoglu in Ankara, 18 November 2015

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67. Interview with ‘Ethnos of Kyriaki and F. Yiotaki, 22 November 2015 68. Television Address after the Council of Political Leaders, 28 November 2015 69. Speech in Paris, at the World Climate Summit, 30 November 2015 70. Speech at the 26th Annual Economic Conference of the HellenicAmerican Chamber of Commerce, December 1, 2015 71. Speech at the Plenary Session of the Parliament on the draft law of the Ministry of Finance ‘Ratification of the State Budget, 6 December 2015 72. Interview on ERT, 8 December 2015 73. Speech at the Greece-Egypt Business Forum, 9 December 2015 74. Answer-Speech during ‘Prime Minister’s Hour”, 11 December 2015 75. Speech in Parliament during the debate on the draft law on civil partnership, 23 December 2015 76. Presentation to the Council of Ministers, 23 December 2015 77. Second speech at the debate on the insurance reform in Parliament, 26 January 2016 78. Press conference after the European Council meeting, 18 March 2016 79. Speech at the international conference ‘Alliance Against Austerity, for Democracy in Europe”, 19 March 2016 80. Speech at the debate on the agenda of the Parliament on Justice, 30 March 2016 81. Second speech in the debate on the agenda of the House of Representatives on Justice, 30 March 2016 82. Speech in Parliament on the draft law ‘Unified Social Security System—Reform of the social security and pension system”, 8 May 2016 83. Presentation at the meeting of the Council of Ministers, 10 May 2016 84. Speech at the 24th General Assembly of the Association of Greek Tourism Enterprises (SETE), 12 May 2016 85. Speech at the inauguration ceremony of the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) construction works, 17 May 2016

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173

86. Speech in the Parliament during the debate on the draft law ‘Urgent provisions for the implementation of the Fiscal Targets Agreement’, 22 May 2016 87. Speech at the Leaders’ Meeting at the United Nations World Humanitarian Summit in Istanbul, 23 May 2016 88. Speech at the Roundtable ‘Leaving no one behind: a commitment to address forced displacement’, 23 May 2016 89. Speech at the Plenary Session of the UN World Humanitarian Summit in Istanbul, 23 May 2016 90. Interview with ‘The Newspaper of the Editors’ and journalist Nikos Sverko, 4 June 2016 91. Speech at the event ‘Greece 2021: Fair Growth - Productive Reconstruction’, 16 June 2016 92. Speech at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, 22 June 2016 93. Speech at the 20th Economist Roundtable, 23 June 2016 94. Speech at the inauguration of the General Hospital of Thera, 15 July 2016 95. Interview with SKAI and Alexis Papachelas, 15 July 2016 96. Speech in the Parliament during the debate on the law ‘Proportional representation of political parties’, 21 July 2016 97. Speech with proposals for the Constitutional Review, 25 July 2016 98. Speech at the meeting of the Governmental Council for Social Policy (KYSKOIP), 27 July 2016 99. Interview with the journal ‘Real News’ and the journalist Vasilis Skouris, 28 August 2016 100. Speech at the handover of the Ancient Corinth-Kiato section of the road axis ‘Olympia Odos’, 2 September 2016 101. Interview with the French newspaper Le Monde, 8 September 2016 102. Article in the APPE-MPA magazine ‘Practorio’ for the 81st Thessaloniki International Fair, 8 September 2016 103. Interview with EurActiv.com and journalist Sarantis Michalopoulos, 9 September 2016 104. Speech at the opening of the 81st Thessaloniki International Fair, 10 September 2016 105. Press conference at the 81st Thessaloniki International Fair, 11 September 2016

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106. Speech at the Plenary Session of the UN Summit on the Management of Large-Scale Refugee and Migrant Movements, 19 September 2016 107. Speech at the 4th UN Summit Roundtable: ‘A Global Strategy for Sharing Responsibility for Refugees and Respect for International Law’, 19 September 2016 108. Prime Minister’s speech at the Concordia Summit, 20 September 2016 109. Speech at the Leaders’ Meeting on Refugees under the President of the United States of America, 21 September 2016 110. Speech at the 71st UN General Assembly, 23 September 2016 111. Speech at the debate on the agenda of the Greek Parliament on Education, 28 September 2016 112. Second speech in the debate on the agenda of the Greek Parliament on Education, 28 September 2016 113. Third speech in the debate on the agenda of the Greek Parliament on Education, 28 September 2016 114. Speech at the debate on corruption and corruption in the Greek Parliament, 10 October 2016 115. The Prime Minister’s second speech at the debate on corruption and corruption in the Greek Parliament, 10 October 2016 116. The Prime Minister’s speech during the debate on corruption and corruption in the Greek Parliament, 10 October 2016 117. Press conference after the European Council, 21 October 2016 118. Opening speech at the Euro-Arab Conference ‘Partners for Development”, 3 November 2016 119. Speech at the meeting of the new Council of Ministers, 6 November 2016 120. Speech at the special session of the Plenary of the Hellenic Parliament dedicated to the day of remembrance and honour for the Polytechnic Uprising, 17 November 2016 121. Speech at the inauguration ceremony of the Kalamata Peripheral Road, 23 November 2016 122. Speech at the meeting of the Parliamentary Group of SYRIZA, 23 November 2016 123. Introductory speech at the meeting of Thrace stakeholders, in the Region of Eastern Macedonia and Thrace, 25 November 2016 124. Keynote speech in Komotini, 25 November 2016

APPENDIX 2: LIST OF PUBLIC APPEALS OF THE SIX GREEK …

175

125. Introductory speech at a meeting with stakeholders of Thessaloniki and Central Macedonia, 26 November 2016 126. Speech at the commemoration of Cuban leader Fidel Castro, 30 November 2016 127. Televised Address on the social redistribution of the overperformance of revenues and the suspension of the VAT increase on the North Aegean islands, 8 December 2016 128. Speech at the Plenary Session of the Hellenic Parliament for the ratification of the 2017 State Budget, 10 December 2016 129. Speech in Nisyros on Island Policy, 13 December 2016 130. Speech at the 5th Congress of the Party of the European Left, 17 December 2016 131. Speech at a meeting with agricultural and livestock operators and producer groups in the Municipality of Phaistos, 20 December 2016 132. Keynote speech in Heraklion, 20 December 2016 133. Speech at a meeting with the productive bodies of Lassithi in Agios Nikolaos, 21 December 2016 134. Speech at the presentation of the ErgoInvestment Fund for innovative businesses, 22 December 2016 135. Speech at the debate on the agenda of the Greek Parliament on the primary sector and farmers, 18 January 2017 136. Interview with the Journal of Journalists and journalists T. Pappas and N. Sverkos, 25 January 2017 Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis 2019 (247) 1. Speech at the 1st Meeting of the new Council of Ministers, 10 July 2019 2. Speech in the Parliament during the debate on the Government’s Programme Statements, 20 July 2019 3. Speech in Parliament, during the debate on the Government’s Programme Statements, 22 July 2019 4. Speech in the Parliament, during the debate on the tax bill, 31 July 2019 5. Speech at the debate on the draft law on the Staff State, 6 August 2019

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6. Debate on the debate of the law on the Staff State, 6 August 2019 7. Speech in Parliament on University Asylum, 8 August 2019 8. Second Speech in Parliament on University Asylum, 8 August 2019 9. Third Speech in Parliament on University Asylum, 8 August 2019 10. Speech in the Parliament, during the debate on the bill on the protection of personal data, 26 August 2019 11. Speech to the productive bodies at the 84th Thessaloniki International Fair, 7 September 2019 12. Press Conference at the 84th IETH, 9 September 2019 13. Speech at the Climate Summit, 23 September 2019 14. Speech in Astoria, 26 September 2019 15. Speech at the 74th UN General Assembly, 27 September 2019 16. Answer-Speech to a topical question on migration in ‘Prime Minister’s Hour”, 4 October 2019 17. Speech at the Athens Democracy Forum, 10 October 2019 18. Press conference on the results of the European Union Summit, 18 October 2019 19. Speech at the event of the Messinia Chamber of Commerce on ‘Large investments as a catalyst for growth”, 19 October 2019 20. Speech at the official dinner of the ‘Thessaloniki Symposium’ on ‘Governing in times of ungovernability’, 22 October 2019 21. Speech at the ‘23rd Roundtable Discussion with the Greek Government”, 23 October 2019 22. Speech at the 4th EU—Arab World Summit, 29 October 2019 23. Speech at the debate on the International Protection (Asylum Legal Framework) Bill, 31 October 2019 24. Answer- Speed to a topical question by the Member of Parliament O. Konstantinopoulos on the waste management of the Peloponnese, 1 November 2019 25. Speech at the Hellenic-Chinese Business Forum in Shanghai, 4 November 2019 26. Speech and visit to COSCO headquarters in Shanghai, 4 November 2019 27. Speech at the opening ceremony of the China International Import Expo 2019 in Shanghai, 5 November 2019 28. Speech at the opening of the ‘Greece 2021’ Committee, 7 November 2019

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177

29. Speech at the Thessaloniki Summit 2019, 14 November 2019 30. Speech at the official launch of the National Action Plan against Smoking, 19 November 2019 31. Answer-Speech in Parliament, in the context of the ‘Prime Minister’s Hour”, to a topical question by the Leader of the Official Opposition, 22 November 2019 32. Answer-Speech in Parliament, in the context of the ‘Prime Minister’s Hour”, to a topical question by the President of Kinal, 22 November 2019 33. Speech in the Parliament before the vote on the Constitutional Review, 25 November 2019 34. Speech at the Digital Economy Forum 2019 conference organised by the Association of Information Technology Enterprises, 25 November 2019 35. Speech at the award ceremony of the Greek student delegation at the Educational Robotics Olympiad, 27 November 2019 36. Speech at the UN Climate Change Conference in Madrid, 2 December 2019 37. Speech in Parliament on the bill entitled ‘Tax reform with a growth dimension”, 6 December 2019 38. Speech at the foundation laying ceremony of the Onassis National Transplant Centre, 9 December 2019 39. Speech at the inaugural meeting of the National Council for Research, Technology and Innovation, 10 December 2019 40. Speech in Parliament on the facilitation of the exercise of electoral rights by voters outside the Territory, 11 December 2019 41. Press conference after the European Council in Brussels, 13 December 2019 42. Speech at the ratification of the State Budget for the financial year 2020, 18 December 2019 43. Speech and visit to the southern section of the E65 motorway of Central Greece (Lamia-Xiniada), 20 December 2019 44. Interview with the newspaper ‘To Vima of Kyriaki’ and the journalist Dimitra Kroustallis, 29 December 2019 45. Speech to members of the expatriate community in Tarpon Springs, Florida January 6, 2020 46. Speech to the Greek community, 8 January 2020 47. Televised Address on the proposal of the government majority for the Presidency of the Republic, 15 January 2020

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48. Article in Our World, 20 February 2020 49. Press conference after the extraordinary European Council meeting, 21 February 2020 50. Televised Address on the 1,000,000 vaccine doses and the evolution of the pandemic, 4 March 2021 51. Televised Address for the participation of citizens in demonstrations in the midst of the pandemic outbreak with an official invitation by SYRIZA, 9 March 2021 52. Televised Address on the new financial support measures, 11 March 2021 53. Televised address on coronavirus, 11 March 2020 54. Interview with the newspaper ‘Proto Thema’ and the journalist Grigoris Tziovaras, 14 March 2020 55. Televised Address on coronavirus, 17 March 2020 56. Televised Address to the citizens, 19 March 2020 57. Televised Address to the citizens, 22 March 2020 58. Televised Address 33 days since my first pandemic message, 13 April 2020 59. Interview with ‘Sunday Kathimerini’ and Alexis Papachelas, 18 April 2020 60. Televised Address on measures to support jobs, economy and tourism, 20 May 2020 61. Briefing to journalists on the outcome of the extraordinary European Council meeting, 25 May 2021 62. Speech on the signing of the Maritime Delimitation Agreement between Greece and Italy, 9 June 2020 63. Press conference in Santorini for the opening of Greek tourism, 13 June 2020 64. Speech at the National Development Conference for NSRF 2021–27, 17 January 2020 65. Speech at a commemoration event for the victims of terrorism, 20 January 2020 66. Speech in the Parliament, during the debate on the Law on Education, 21 January 2020 67. Speech in the Parliament during the debate on the Mutual Defence Cooperation Agreement between Greece and the United States, 30 January 2020

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179

68. Second speech in Parliament during the debate on the Mutual Defence Cooperation Agreement between Greece and the United States, 30 January 2020 69. Speech at the ‘Future of Retail’ Conference of the Hellenic Confederation of Commerce and Entrepreneurship, 7 February 2020 70. Speech at the Parliament, in the debate on Labour, 14 February 2020 71. Speech in Parliament, during the debate on Labour, 14 February 2020 72. Third speech in the Parliament, in the debate on labour, 14 February 2020 73. Speech at the opening of the meeting of the Council of Ministers, 27 February 2020 74. Speech on the 1,000,000 vaccine doses and the evolution of the pandemic, 4 March 2021 75. Televised Address for the participation of citizens in demonstrations in the midst of the pandemic outbreak with an official invitation by SYRIZA, 9 March 2021 76. Speech at the Hellenic-German Economic Forum ‘Vision and Investment Opportunities”, 9 March 2020 77. Televised Address on the new financial support measures, 11 March 2021 78. Televised address on coronavirus, 11 March 2020 79. Interview with the newspaper ‘Proto Thema’ and the journalist Grigory Tziovaras, 14 March 2020 80. Televised Address on coronavirus, 17 March 2020 81. Televised Address to the citizens, 19 March 2020 82. Televised Address to the citizens, 22 March 2020 83. Speech at the German Council on Foreign Relation, 9 March 2020 84. Speech at the Plenary Session of the Parliament during the debate on the ratification of the Legislative Act, 2 April 2020 85. Televised Address 33 days since my first pandemic message, 13 April 2020 86. Interview in ‘Kathimerini di Kyriaki’ and A. Papachelas, 18 April 2020 87. Speech at the meeting of the Council of Ministers, 29 April 2020

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88. Speech in Parliament on government policy on the economic impact of the health crisis, 30 April 2020 89. Televised Address to Parliament on the government’s policy on the economic impact of the health crisis, 30 April 2020 90. Third speech in Parliament on government policy on the economic impact of the health crisis, 30 April 2020 91. Speech at the debate on the bill of the Ministry of Environment and Energy, 5 May 2020 92. Televised Address on measures to support jobs, economy and tourism, 20 May 2020 93. Televised Address to journalists on the outcome of the extraordinary European Council meeting, 25 May 2021 94. Speech to representatives of Thessaloniki, 26 May 2020 95. Speech at the presentation of the tourism promotion campaign, 4 June 2020 96. Speech at the presentation of the programme for the promotion of electromobility in Greece and the signing of the ‘Green Deal”, 5 June 2020 97. Speech on the signing of the Maritime Delimitation Agreement between Greece and Italy, 9 June 2020 98. Speech in the Parliament during the debate on a bill of the Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs, 10 June 2020 99. Speech in Parliament in response to a topical question by the Leader of the Opposition, 12 June 2020 100. Speech in Parliament in response to a topical question by the Leader of the Official Opposition, 12 June 2020 101. Speech to local authorities of Santorini, 13 June 2020 102. Press conference in Santorini for the opening of Greek tourism, 13 June 2020 103. Speech at the Annual General Assembly of the Association of Business and Industry, 15 June 2020 104. Speech at the meeting with the President of Israel Reuven Rivlin, 17 June 2020 105. Speech at the presentation of the Antonis Tritsis Programme, 18 June 2020 106. Speech at the handover ceremony of 20 fire engines, 19 June 2020 107. Speech at the 28th Annual General Assembly of the Hellenic Tourism Business Association, 25 June 2020

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108. Introductory speech at the Cabinet meeting, 30 June 2020 109. Speech at the special event in the framework of the Stavros Niarchos Foundation’s International Action Initiative, 1 July 2020 110. Answer-Speech to a topical question by the President of the Parliamentary Group of the Movement for Change, Fofi Gennimata, 3 July 2020 111. Reply-Speech to a topical question by the President of the Parliamentary Group of the Movement of Change, Fofi Gennimata, 3 July 2020 112. Interview with the Greek International Takis Fyssas, on the anniversary broadcast ‘2004s’ on the occasion of the EURO 2004, 5 July 2020 113. Speech at the inauguration of the ‘Agia Varvara”, ‘Korydallos’ and ‘Nikaia’ stations of Attiko Metro, 6 July 2020 114. Speech in the Parliament during the debate on the Bill on public open-air assemblies, 9 July 2020 115. Speech in the House of Representatives, during the debate of the bill on public open-air gatherings, 9 July 2020 116. Third speech in Parliament, during the debate on the bill on public open-air gatherings, 9 July 2020 117. Speech at the delivery ceremony of a speedboat to the Coast Guard, 9 July 2020 118. Speech at the site of the investment in Kassiopi and his visit to Corfu General Hospital, 11 July 2020 119. Speech at the presentation of the new investment of ELVAL, 15 July 2020 120. Speech at the event for the concession of the old prisons to the Municipality of Oropos, 21 July 2020 121. Press conference after the EU Summit in Brussels, 21 July 2020 122. Speech at the special event for the presentation of the ‘Atlas’ Digital Editorial Office, 23 July 2020 123. Speech in the Parliament, during the debate on the bill ‘Tax interventions to boost growth”, 29 July 2020 124. Speech in the House of Representatives, during the debate on the bill ‘Tax measures to support growth”, 29 July 2020 125. Third speech in Parliament, during the debate on the bill ‘Tax interventions to boost growth”, 29 July 2020 126. Introductory speech at the Cabinet meeting on 31 July 2020

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127. Speech at Aspen Security Forum 2020, 6 August 2020 128. Speech and meeting with the Mayor and members of the Halki City Council, 6 August 2020 129. Speech on the signing of the Maritime Delimitation Agreement between Greece and Egypt, 6 August 2020 130. Speech and meeting with tourism operators of Rhodes, 7 August 2020 131. Speech and presence together with the Prime Minister of Bulgaria Boyko Borissov at the signing ceremony for the Bulgarian participation of the Bulgarian company Bulgartransgaz in the project of the LNG Terminal of Alexandroupolis, 21 August 2020 132. Speech at the signing ceremony for the participation of the Bulgarian company Bulgartransgaz in the Alexandroupolis LNG Terminal project, 24 August 2020 133. Speech in Parliament during the debate on the ratification of the EEZ delimitation agreements, 26 August 2020 134. Second speech in Parliament during the debate on the ratification of the agreements on the delimitation of the EEZ 26 August 2020 135. Speech at the Cabinet meeting, 31 August 2020 136. Speech at the debate in the Parliament on the problems created by the pandemic outbreak, 7 September 2020 137. Second speech in the debate on the agenda of the Parliament on the problems created by the pandemic outbreak, 8 September 2020 138. Third speech in the debate on the agenda of the Parliament on the problems created by the pandemic outbreak, 8 September 2020 139. Speech at Thessaloniki Helexpo Forum, 12 September 2020 140. Press Conference at Thessaloniki Helexpo Forum, 13 September 2020 141. Speech and discussion with Daniel Franklin, executive and diplomatic editor of The Economist, 16 September 2020 142. Speech at the 75th Session of the UN General Assembly, 25 September 2020 143. Speech at the unveiling of the lighting upgrade project on the sacred rock of the Acropolis, 30 September 2020 144. Press conference after the conclusion of the Special European Council Summit, 2 October 2020

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183

145. Speech and discussion with historian and author Yuval N. Harari, 3 October 2020 146. Speech and presentation of Microsoft’s new investment in Greece with the company’s President Brad Smith, 5 October 2020 147. Speech at the event for the presentation of the new corporate identity of PPC, 5 October 2020 148. Speech at the European Empress Theophanos Award ceremony, 7 October 2020 149. Interview with the French newspaper Le Figaro, 9 October 2020 150. Interview with the newspaper ‘Ta Nea’ and the journalist Yannis Pretenteris, 12 October 2020 151. Speech at the event for the official launch of Elevate Greece, 13 October 2020 152. Press conference after the European Council, 16 October 2020 153. Speech and visit to Samothrace, 17 October 2020 154. Speech during the debate in Parliament on the motion of noconfidence tabled by the opposition, 25 October 2020 155. Speech at the meeting of the Council of Ministers, 29 October 2020 156. Speech at the presentation of the Memorandum of Understanding for the investment ‘Smart & Sustainable Island”, 4 November 2020 157. Press conference with the participation of Professor Sotiris Tsiodras, on the response to the pandemic, 5 November 2020 158. Interview with journalist John Defterios on the occasion of the 5th EU—Arab World Summit, 9 November 2020 159. Speech discussion with journalist John Defterios, 9 November 2020 160. Speech in Parliament during the briefing of the House, pursuant to Rule 142A of the Rules of Procedure, 12 November 2020 161. Second speech in Parliament during the briefing of the House, pursuant to Rule 142A of the Rules of Procedure of the House, 12 November 2020 162. Third speech in Parliament during the briefing of the House, pursuant to Rule 142A of the Rules of Procedure of the House, 12 November 2020 163. Speech in the Parliament during the debate on the bill of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, 25 November 2020

184

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164. Speech in the Parliament during the debate on the bill of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, 25 November 2020 165. Statement at the meeting of the Council of Ministers, 30 November 2020 166. Speech and participation in a teleconference at the 31st Greek Economic Sum-mit, organized by the Hellenic-American Chamber of Commerce, 3 December 2020 167. Speech at the teleconference on the ‘Econo—Autonomo’ programme, 9 December 2020 168. Press conference after the European Council, 11 December 2020 169. Speech at the 22nd Capital Link Invest in Greece International Conference, 15 December 2020 170. Speech in the Parliament during the debate on the ratification of the state budget for 2021, 15 December 2020 171. Speech and workshop on the National Vaccination Plan, 8 December 2020 172. Speech at the meeting of the Council of Ministers, 22 December 2020 173. Joint Press Conference Statements with the Prime Minister of Portugal António Costa, 11 January 2021 174. Speech by Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis at the debate, pursuant to Rule 142A of the Rules of Procedure, on government policy, 15 January 2021 175. Second speech in Parliament during the debate, pursuant to Rule 142A of the Rules of Procedure, on government policy, 15 January 2021 176. Third speech in Parliament during the debate, pursuant to Rule 142A of the Rules of Procedure, on government policy, 15 January 2021 177. Speech at the debate and vote on the bill ‘Determination of the width of the coastal zone, 20 January 2021 178. Second speech during the debate and vote on the bill ‘Determination of the width of the coastal zone”, 20 January 2021 179. Third speech during the debate and vote on the bill ‘Determination of the width of the coastal zone”, 20 January 2021 180. Speech and participation in the online session of the World Economic Forum (WEF), 25 January 2021 181. Speech at an event on the progress of the E65 road construction works, 30 January 2021

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185

182. Speech and meeting, in Karditsa, on the implementation of the support measures, 30 January 2021 183. Speech in the online conference ‘Europe 2021’ organised by German newspapers, 4 February 2021 184. Speech at the special event for the National Action Plan, 3 February 2021 185. Speech and visit to Ikaria, 6 February 2021 186. Interview with SKAI TV station and journalist Alexis Papachelas, 10 February 2021 187. Speech in the Parliament during the debate on the draft law ‘Introduction to Higher Education”, 11 February 2021 188. Speech in the Parliament during the debate on the draft law ‘Admission to higher education”, 11 February 2021 189. Speech and participation in the discussion on the Greek High Strategy organised by the Council on International Relations, 12 February 2021 190. Interview to Bloomberg TV, 15 February 2021 191. Introductory speech at the meeting of the Parliamentary Group of the New Democracy, 18 February 2021 192. Speech at the Cabinet meeting on, 24 February 2021 193. Speech in Parliament during the debate requested under Rule 142A of the Rules of Procedure of Parliament, 25 February 2021 194. Second speech in Parliament during the debate requested pursuant to Rule 142A of the Rules of Procedure of Parliament, 25 February 2021 195. Third speech in Parliament during the debate requested under Rule 142A of the Rules of Procedure of the Parliament, 25 February 2021 196. Article in the journal ‘TA NEA”, 27 February 2021 197. Speech and participation in the digital conference ‘Innovative Greeks’ co-organized by SEV and Endeavor Greece, 3 March 2021 198. Speech in Parliament, at the Standing Committee on Social Affairs and the Special Standing Committee on Equality, 8 March 2021 199. Joint article with nine other European leaders on International Women’s Day, 8 March 2021

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200. Answer-Speech in Parliament, in the context of the ‘Prime Minister’s Hour”, to a topical question by the Leader of the Official Opposition, 12 March 2021 201. Speech in Parliament during his reply, in the context of the ‘Prime Minister’s Hour”, to a topical question, 12 March 2021 202. Interview with the newspaper ‘To Vima of Kyriaki’ and the journalist Antonis Karakousis, 21 March 2021 203. Speech and participation in the online anniversary event for the 200th anniversary of the Revolution of 1821, 28 March 2021 204. Speech at the Cabinet meeting, 29 March 2021 205. Speech at the presentation of the National Recovery and Resilience Plan ‘Greece 2.0”, 31 March 2021 206. Speech at the pre-agenda debate in Parliament on the national pandemic plan, 2 April 2021 207. Second speech in the debate on the national plan for the pandemic, 2 April 2021 208. Third speech during the debate on the national plan for the pandemic, 2 April 2021 209. Speech and visit to the old premises of PYRKAL, 3 April 2021 210. Speech at the meeting of the Parliamentary Group of the New Democracy Party, 14 April 2021 211. Speech and participation in the ceremony of integration of two patrol vessels into the fleet of the Coast Guard, 15 April 2021 212. Speech and visit to the Region of Central Macedonia, 24 April 2021 213. Statement at the thematic session on employment and labour at the EU Social Summit, 7 May 2021 214. Speech and debate with the Prime Minister of Spain Pedro Sánchez and journalists, 10 May 2021 215. Speech at the joint meeting of four Committees of Parliament on the strategy for the transition to a climate-neutral economy, 18 May 2021 216. Speech and presence at the inauguration of the 14 airports managed by Fraport Greece, 19 May 2021 217. Speech at the 40th anniversary of Greece’s accession to the European Communities, 27 May 2021 218. Speech and participation in the presentation of the European Digital Certificate COVID, 28 May 2021

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219. Speech at the presentation of the plan for the Northern Road Axis of Crete (B.O.A.K.), 29 May 2021 220. Speech at the conference on ‘The Health System in COVID-19 and the post-COVID-19 era”, 1 June 2021 221. Speech and participation in the event ‘Astypalea: smart & sustainable island”, 2 June 2021 222. Speech at the 66th meeting of the Commission of the World Tourism Organization, 3 June 2021 223. Speech at the presentation of the redevelopment of Attica’s coastal front, 3 June 2021 224. Speech in Parliament, during the debate on the draft law: ‘Ratification of the Legislative Content Act of 30.5.2021 ‘Establishment, content and procedure for issuing the COVID-19 Digital Certificate’ (A’ 87) and more specific guarantees for the protection of personal data”, 8 June 2021 225. Speech at the opening of the Ministerial Meeting of the Mediterranean countries of the European Union, 11 June 2021 226. Interview with the children of Atraktos Kids and the show ‘Big Talk”, 11 June 2021 227. Interview with France 24 and journalist Alexia Kefalas, 13 June 2021 228. Interview with the French newspaper Le Figaro, 14 June 2021 229. Speech at the NATO 2030 conference organised by the Brussels Forum, 14 June 2021 230. Speech in Parliament on the Labour Protection Bill, 16 June 2021 231. Speech at the debate on the Labour Protection Bill, 16 June 2021 232. Third speech in Parliament during the debate on the Labour Protection Bill, 16 June 2021 233. Speech meeting at the offices of the Region of Epirus in Ioannina, 18 June 2021 234. Speech at the signing event of the contract for the start of works for Metro Line 4, 22 June 2021 235. Speech and discussion with SETE President Yannis Retsos, 23 June 2021 236. Press conference after the European Council meeting in Brussels, 25 June 2021 237. Speech presenting measures to encourage vaccination, 28 June 2021

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238. Speech at the Ministry of Education event. 28 June 2021 239. Speech and discussion with the President of SEV Dimitris Papalexopoulos and the Chairman and CEO of Pfizer, Albert Bourla, at the Annual General Meeting of SEV, 29 June 2021 240. Speech at the BPA event for the gas distribution expansion projects, 1 July 2021 241. Speech and visit to the University General Hospital of Heraklion, Crete (P.P.A.G.N.H.), 30 July 2021 242. Speech at the 85th Thessaloniki International Fair, 11 September 2021 243. Speech and visit to Farsala, 13 September 2021 244. Speech at the inauguration of a photovoltaic park in Corinthia, 14 September 2021 245. Speech and meeting in Kozani on fossilization, 26 November 2021 246. Speech and meeting at the Region of Epirus in Ioannina, 26 November 2021 247. Speech and meeting in Istria for the presentation of the reconstruction plan of North Evia, 14 December 2021

Index

B Broadcasted and face-to-face speeches (media interviews, press articles, press conferences), 46–47, 80–83, 113–114 Building a following on social media, 43, 49, 78, 84, 110, 117, 135, 136

C Capacity building and strategy, 15, 30, 59, 134, 137 Conducting opinion polls during the term, 33, 48, 100

D Decline of parties, 3, 128

E Earned media, 15, 16, 30, 59, 134

Election themes transferred to governance, 35–36, 135, 136 Engaging political and personalized communication, 16

F Frequent publication, 41–43, 78, 108–110 Fund-raising, 15, 35, 49, 66, 84, 109, 117, 128, 135–137, 145

G Generating positive media coverage, 16, 45–46, 49, 80, 84, 112, 117, 134, 135 Greece, 3–5, 7–10, 12–14, 17, 18, 26, 28, 29, 35–37, 41, 44, 47, 59, 63, 64, 68–70, 74, 80, 81, 94, 97, 102, 113, 115, 116, 125, 127, 128, 130–133, 135, 137, 138

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 P. A. Koliastasis, Permanent Campaigning in Greece in Times of Crisis, Political Campaigning and Communication, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11691-9

189

190

INDEX

H Hyperlinking, 16, 45, 49, 79, 84, 112, 117, 135, 136 I Increase of polarization, 11 Institutional adaptations, 15, 30, 48, 49, 59, 84, 117, 126, 134–136 Institutional advertising, 16, 41, 48, 49, 84, 108, 117, 134–136 Interactive communication, 16, 45, 80 Internet, 3–5, 11, 13–15, 18, 43, 76, 101, 128, 132, 133 M Media context, 4, 11, 128 Memorandum, 7–11, 28, 29, 31, 34–36, 38, 40, 47, 58, 59, 63–68, 72, 75, 81–83, 95, 127, 128, 131, 183 Mitsotakis, Kyriakos, 4, 11, 16, 18, 72, 74, 94, 98, 109, 117, 125, 133, 138, 184 N Negative campaigning, 11, 15, 37–39, 42, 48, 49, 68–70, 72, 77, 83, 84, 104, 109, 117, 128, 129, 134–136 New Democracy (ND), 4, 6, 8–12, 18, 26–33, 35, 37–41, 43, 44, 46, 63, 65, 67–75, 82, 94, 95, 98–102, 104–106, 112, 114, 115, 129, 131, 152–157 P Paid and owned media, 15, 30, 35, 59, 66, 102, 134, 137 Party conferences, 48 PASOK, 6, 8–10, 26–28, 30, 31, 37, 38, 40, 43, 58, 59, 67–71, 73, 95, 105, 106, 149–151, 158–164

Political communication context, 5 Political context, 5 Political travels, 16, 46, 48, 82, 83, 115, 127, 135, 136 Prime Ministers, 2, 4, 5, 11, 15, 17, 18, 37, 45, 70, 126–135, 137, 138 Private television, 4, 5, 11–13, 15, 18, 128, 131, 133 Promotional discourse, 16, 49, 84, 117, 135, 136 Public events, 16, 46, 48, 49, 81, 82, 84, 113–115, 117, 135, 136

R Research citizens’ preferences and data, 33, 65, 100

S Samaras, Antonis, 4, 8, 16–18, 26, 30, 42, 48, 49, 70, 71, 125 Social media, 3–5, 11, 13–18, 33–35, 37, 39, 41, 43–45, 48, 61, 75, 76, 78–80, 83, 95, 99–101, 106, 108, 110–112, 116, 126, 128–130, 132, 133, 137, 138 SYRIZA, 8–11, 29, 30, 35, 37, 38, 41, 43, 44, 58, 60, 61, 65–76, 78, 81–83, 94, 95, 103–105, 110, 128, 129, 135, 158, 170

T Tsipras, Alexis, 4, 9, 16, 18, 58, 71, 74, 77, 84, 95, 104, 105, 125, 129

U Use of marketing during terms of office, 39–40, 72–75, 105–107