Party Organization and Communication in Poland (Political Campaigning and Communication) 3030599922, 9783030599928

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POLITICAL CAMPAIGNING AND COMMUNICATION

Party Organization and Communication in Poland Michał Jacuński · Barbara Brodzińska-Mirowska Anna Pacześniak · Maria Wincławska

Political Campaigning and Communication

Series Editor Darren G. Lilleker Bournemouth University Bournemouth, UK

The series explores themes relating to how political organisations promote themselves and how citizens interpret and respond to their tactics. Politics is here defined broadly as any activities designed to have an impact on public policy. The scope of the series thus covers election campaigns, as well as pressure group campaigns, lobbying, and campaigns instigated by social and citizen movements. Research included in the series might focus on the latest strategies and tactics within political marketing and campaigning, covering topics such as the strategic use of legacy, digital and social media, the use of big data and analytics for targeting citizens, and the use of manipulative tactics and disinformation. Furthermore, as campaigns are an important interface between the institutions of power and citizens, they present opportunities to examine their impact in engaging, involving and mobilizing citizens. Areas of focus might include attitudes and voting behavior, political polarization and the campaign environment, public discourse around campaigns, and the psychologies underpinning civil society and protest movements. Works may take a narrow or broad perspective. Single-nation case studies of one specific campaign and comparative cross-national or temporal studies are equally welcome. The series also welcomes themed edited collections which explore a central set of research questions. For an informal discussion for a book in the series, please contact the series editor Darren Lilleker ([email protected]), or Ambra Finotello ([email protected]). This book series is indexed by Scopus.

More information about this series at http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/14546

Michał Jacunski ´ · Barbara Brodzinska-Mirowska ´ · Anna Pacze´sniak · Maria Wincławska

Party Organization and Communication in Poland

Michał Jacunski ´ Institute of Political Science University of Wroclaw Wroclaw, Poland Anna Pacze´sniak Department of European Studies University of Wroclaw Wroclaw, Poland

Barbara Brodzinska-Mirowska ´ Department of Communication, Media and Journalism Nicolaus Copernicus University Torun, Poland Maria Wincławska Faculty of Political Science and Security Studies Nicolaus Copernicus University Torun, Poland

ISSN 2662-589X ISSN 2662-5903 (electronic) Political Campaigning and Communication ISBN 978-3-030-59992-8 ISBN 978-3-030-59993-5 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59993-5 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: Robert Podlaski/Alamy Stock Photo This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Acknowledgements

This book is the fruit of a research project entitled ‘Political Parties and Their Social Environment. An Analysis of the Organisation and Communications Activities of Polish Political Parties’, funded by the Polish National Science Centre (grant no. 2015/18/E/HS6/00763). The project was run jointly by the authors in the period of 2016–2020. Scores of people were involved in its implementation. First of all, we would like to express our gratitude to the respondents who agreed to take part in the in-depth interviews and in our surveys (party leaders, MPs, communication experts, administrative staff as well as rank-andfile members) and selflessly devoted their time to share their knowledge, experiences and opinions on the functioning of their organisations. We would also like to thank a trio of our junior research assistants, Julia Trzcinska, ´ Krystian Witt and Paula Wi´sniewska, who helped us conduct field research and took care of a tedious but indispensable work of transcribing and coding individual in-depth interviews and focus group interviews as well as inputting quantitative data into statistical software for analysis. Dominik Szczepanski ´ in his capacity as a field research collaborator provided us with invaluable help in implementing the mystery client method to study the attitudes of parties’ administrative staff. We give our sincere thanks to students from the University of Wroclaw, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Torun´ and the University of Rzeszów who became our mystery clients, visited dozens of party offices in their home

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

cities and diligently reported their findings in tailor-made questionnaire forms. We presented papers offering early findings of our research at many conferences and seminars, including: the ECPR Standing Group at BabesBolyai University in Cluj-Napoca (2018), 11th and 12th Central and Eastern European Communication and Media Conferences (CEECOM) in Szeged (2018), and Sofia (2019), the 114th APSA Annual Meeting & Exhibition in Boston (2018) as well as at several conferences in Poland. We are grateful to many participants of all these events for their questions, comments and suggestions. Our appreciation goes to Sergiu Gherghina, Katarzyna Sobolewska-My´slik and Michał Kotnarowski whose constructive observations helped us improve the cohesion of the narrative and the methodological precision. We are also grateful to the peer reviewers for their acknowledgement of the value of the project and their remarks on the manuscript. We owe our thanks to Paweł Burzała who took on a job of not just merely translating the manuscript, but also blending our differing styles as authors and ensuring the readers would receive a book consistent in tone and language throughout. Finally, our gratitude goes to the editors of Palgrave MacMillan for their understanding and support, especially given the fact that our work on the book coincided with the extraordinary circumstances brought on by the COVID-19 pandemic.

Introduction

Political parties continually face new challenges as they strive to adapt to the ever-changing environment. Like most other entities, they have certain organisational and communication patterns they are strongly attached to, which means change does not come easily. Those formations that manage to react and adjust in a timely fashion have better chances of surviving and becoming permanent fixtures of the political landscape. It is this dynamic character of the environment and the resulting evolution of parties that continue to attract scholarly interest and justify the publication of more and more works on the subject. The three decades that have elapsed since the beginning of democratic transition in Central and Eastern Europe have seen several developments which presented political parties with significant challenges: low levels of trust in political institutions and parties, disinterest in politics in general, weak party identification and the advancement in communication technologies. So far, no comprehensive monographs on the relations between Polish parties and their internal or external environment from 2000s onwards have been published in English. Moreover, if one looks at articles and books that have been published, and are at least in some parts devoted to Polish parties, certain findings require a new, updated assessment. One shortcoming of the existing literature on Polish parties and party system is that it focuses on the development of the post-communist system and the early stages of party-building (e.g. Casal Bértoa 2012; Casal

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INTRODUCTION

Bértoa and Mair 2012; Horowitz and Browne 2005; Jasiewicz 2007; Markowski 2007; Spirova 2007; Szczerbiak 2001; Lewis 2000), structural analysis based mostly on party statutes (Sobolewska-My´slik et al. 2010; Bichta 2010) or the socio-demographic examination of national and middle-level party elites as well as their socio-economic views (Grabowska and Szawiel 1993, 2001; Grabowska 2004; Jacunski ´ 2011; Pacze´sniak and De Waele 2011). Our goal was to move a step further. Parties operating in new democracies have had to confront some additional challenges on top of those which were also encountered by their counterparts in Western Europe. They had to not only perform the standard functions of political parties in established democracies (including the recruitment of candidates for public office, mobilisation of electoral support, structuring of policy agendas and formation of governments), but also they played key roles in the consolidation of newly born democratic regimes. At the same time, they needed to institutionalise as viable partisan organizations. Our aim was to understand why some political parties consolidated their positions, while others declined. In order to do so we identified organisational solutions they employed, analysed the process of institutionalisation, studied the internal dynamics and relations among different levels of organisational structures. We also examined the potential and resources available to Polish parties with regard to party membership base as well as internal and external communication processes. We looked at how parties utilised their resources—mainly local structures, activists and members. We showed how the quality of internal communication affected the external dimension. We paid particular attention to party grassroots, studying their motivations to join and their expectations towards their respective organisations. We also analysed the electorates’ attitudes towards parties and how their administrative apparatus assessed the functioning of each formation. This monograph focuses on empirical observations rather than theory building—we share the opinion expressed by Patricia Moy et al. (2012: 241) that ‘literature on political parties and political communication in the US was being more empirical and data-driven, while elsewhere in Western Europe, theoretical concerns and critiques have been more prevalent’. This claim applies particularly well to the research on political parties and party systems in Central and Eastern Europe, as empirical studies on the subject are scarce. This book is an attempt at filling that gap. Our publication offers a rare and innovative formula, as it describes research carried out simultaneously from two perspectives: political

INTRODUCTION

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science and communication science. By combining them, we were able to examine areas in which political parties exhibit strengths and those where they show weaknesses. We analysed communication and organisational strategies that parties adopt in times of a weakening democracy, low trust and a demanding, mediatised environment. In order to do so, we utilised several methodological perspectives, such as system and comparative perspectives as well as the mixed methods research approach. The research was carried out between 2016 and 2018—at a time when Poland began to be seen as a country with a weakening democracy and ‘anti-constitutional populist backsliding’ (Sadurski 2018) tendencies. The data we obtained allowed for a genuinely comprehensive, multidimensional analysis of Polish parties’ relations with their environment. Field research turned out to be a challenge. It took over two years of intense work. Reaching our target groups of respondents was far from easy, but by doing so, we gained something of a backstage view into the functioning of parties. We visited the parliament and MPs’ offices all around the country to conduct in-depth interviews. We spoke to leaders, party in central office representatives and press officers about the relations among different levels of partisan structures, the role of each level and the parties’ communication efforts. Throughout our research, we observed internal elections in several parties, participated in congresses and meetings. We witnessed moments of failure and triumph: we talked to the Modern representatives shortly before the formation experienced a damaging split, while the examination of Law and Justice coincided with the party’s victory in the parliamentary election. We were therefore privileged to observe various moments and circumstances of partisan life. The research encompassed six parties. At the time it was conducted, four of them were present in the parliament: the Law and Justice (PiS), the Civic Platform (PO), the Modern (.N) and the Polish People’s Party (PSL). The other two, i.e. the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) and the Together Party (R) were non-parliamentary. The selection of parties was based on two elements. First of all, we decided to only consider entities that met certain formal criteria, i.e. they were registered as political parties. Secondly, we selected those formations which in the 2015 parliamentary election exceeded the 3% threshold required to be eligible for state funding. Given the wealth of material we collected, the decision about what exactly to include in the monograph presented a difficulty in and of itself. We chose to concentrate on those elements that tell us most about

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INTRODUCTION

parties as structured, communicating organisations whose functioning is regulated by certain mechanisms. The book is divided into two main parts, each consisting of four chapters. The first part presents the theoretical frame to be used as a reference point for further analysis. In Chapter 1 we outline the purposes of our research as well as its framework and methodology, then proceed to characterising the examined political formations. We discuss various possible approaches to studying parties and point out they can be considered either as organisations or institutions. Later, we explain these different perspectives and how they were applied to our work. Chapter 1 also presents the framework for communicational analysis which goes beyond campaigning and encompasses the inter-electoral period, covering both the internal and external aspect of the process. Subsequent chapters introduce the reader to Polish politics and political communication. We outline how democracy was reinstituted after 1989 and how the party system was shaped. We also discuss the environment in which political formations operate and signal some of the challenges they face. Hence, Chapter 2 provides a background for the analysis of contemporary political parties in Poland by referring to the legacy of the communist regime and the impact of post-1989 democratic transition. It describes how the past influences the current system, discusses citizens’ trust in public bodies and parties as well as voter turnout and the sustainability of democratic institutions. The attitude towards the communist past was one of the key themes of the political debate and a major point of disagreement among political parties during the years after the transition. Chapter 2 explains why the accountability of the previous, non-democratic regime became one of the focal points for the right-wing conservative government led by Law and Justice, which has remained in power since 2015. Chapter 3 contains an analysis of how Polish parties have functioned after 2001. We begin by outlining the development of the party system before that date. We then use the concept of institutionalisation to determine why some formations failed while others survived and became permanent features in the partisan competition. The chapter employs classic models of political parties to place the analysis in a well-known and understood conceptual framework. The final part is devoted to identifying entry barriers that new entities face when attempting to break into the Polish political market.

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Chapter 4 analyses political parties’ communication environment. It discusses the main differences between the third and fourth eras of political communication, focusing on the factors that determine the character of communication practices adopted by different parties. It also examines the consequences and challenges of adapting to media logics. The media system, pluralism, political involvement and polarisation of journalism, which are considered relevant to how parties communicate with their environment, are considered in the context of relations between political actors and the media. The second part of the monograph is strictly empirical in its nature. It discusses the findings of the research conducted within the abovementioned conceptual and theoretical framework. Chapter 5 covers the organisational structures of the examined parties. We scrutinise the relations within each organisation and the role of party leaders. We raise the question of the local structures’ potential, both in the organisational and communicational dimension. Chapter 6 focuses on the membership base of Polish political parties. It examines members’ formal rights and obligations, their social profile and motivations for engaging in partisan politics. It also considers the nature of their engagement in these organisations’ functioning. Here, internal communication is seen from the members’ perspective, as we study their expectations and satisfaction levels vis-à-vis the key premises and practices observed in each formation. We argue that the quality of communication affects members’ activity, involvement and sense of agency with regard to various aspects. Chapter 7 investigates the relations of political parties with the established media and social media. In order to reflect parties’ own perceptions on this topic, we quote opinions from various party members. While such a perspective is rarely used for research purposes, it provides a vital insight into the mediatisation process, showing the media’s profound influence on Polish politics. The chapter also focuses on the role played by the media in the process of building trust in politicians and political parties. Finally, Chapter 8 looks at the social perceptions of parties and at citizens’ involvement in their activities. We base our analysis on several data sources, including surveys and interviews. The chapter is divided into three parts. First, we depict the electorates of all six examined formations. Then, we look at voters’ identification with their preferred parties and their attitudes towards parties and involvement in political life in general. Lastly, using the findings from our study based on the mystery client technique, we assess parties’ openness to accept new members.

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The book ends with final conclusions and a brief synthesis. It includes a recapitulation of what was done within the research framework. We paint a broad picture of relevant Polish political parties in the 2010s. We identify challenges they face and summarise how parties respond to these difficulties, both in the organisational and communication dimension. Readers are presented with the overview of the results of an extensive empirical study the book is based on. However, we also venture beyond Poland’s case and present what our findings may imply for the future development of political formations elsewhere. Finally, we signal what issues related to political parties in democratic countries warrant further research. September 2020

Michał Jacunski ´ Barbara Brodzinska-Mirowska ´ Anna Pacze´sniak Maria Wincławska

References Bichta, T. (2010). Struktura organizacyjna partii politycznych w Polsce po 1989 roku. Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej. Casal Bértoa, F. (2012). Parties, Regime and Cleavages: Explaining Party System Institutionalization in East Central Europe. East European Politics, 28(4), 452–472. Casal Bértoa, F., & Mair, P. (2012). Party System Institutionalization across Time in Post-Communist Europe. In F. Müller-Rommel & H. Keman (Eds.), Party Government in the New Europe (pp. 85–112). Cham: Routledge. Grabowska, M., & Szawiel, T. (1993). Anatomia elit politycznych. Partie polityczne w postkomunistycznej Polsce 1991–1993. Warszawa: Instytut Socjologii UW. Grabowska, M., & Szawiel, T. (2001). Budowanie demokracji. Podziały społeczne, partie polityczne i społeczenstwo ´ obywatelskie w postkomunistycznej Polsce. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN. Horowitz, S., & Browne, E. C. (2005). Sources of Post-Communist Party System Consolidation: Ideology Versus Institutions. Party Politics, 11(6), 689–706. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068805057605 Jacunski, ´ M. (2011). Aktywista partyjny jako bierny obserwator, czyli kadry s´redniego szczebla wobec partii i jej kierownictwa. In A. Pacze´sniak & J. M. de Waele (Eds.), Ludzie partii—ideali´sci czy pragmatycy? Kadry partyjne w ´swietle badan´ empirycznych (pp. 89–111). Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar.

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Jasiewicz, K. (2007). Poland: Party System by Default. In P. Webb & S. White (Eds.), Party Politics in New Democracies. Oxford University Press. Lewis, P. (2000). Political Parties in Post-Communist Eastern Europe. London and New York: Routledge. Markowski, R. (2007). EU Membership and the Polish Party System. In P.G. Lewis & Z. Mansfeldová (Eds.), The European Union and Party Politics in Central and Eastern Europe. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Moy, P., Mazzoleni, G., & Rojas, H. (2012). Transnational Connections| On the Dichotomies of Political Communication. International Journal Of Communication(Online), 6(6). Pacze´sniak, A., & de Waele, J. M. (Eds.), (2011) Ludzie partii—ideali´sci czy pragmatycy? Kadry partyjne w ´swietle badan´ empirycznych. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar. Sadurski, W. (2018). How Democracy Dies (in Poland): A Case Study of AntiConstitutional Populist Backsliding, Sydney Law School Research Paper No. 18/01, 104–178. Sobolewska-My´slik, K., Kosowska-G˛astoł, B., & Borowiec, P. (2010). Struktury organizacyjne polskich partii politycznych. Kraków: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellonskiego. ´ Spirova, M. (2007). Political Parties in Post-Communist Societies. Formation, Persistence, and Change. Palgrave Macmillan. Szczerbiak, A. (2001). Poles Together? Emergence and Development of Political Parties in Post-Communist Poland. Budapest: CEU Press.

Party Names in Polish and English

AWS–Akcja Wyborcza Solidarno´sc´ (Solidarity Electoral Action) K–Konfederacja (Confederation) KNP–Kongres Nowej Prawicy (New Right Congress) KO–Koalicja Obywatelska (Civic Coalition) KORWIN–KORWIN (Freedom party) KP–Koalicja Polska (Coalition for Poland) Kukiz ’15–Kukiz ’15 (after the name of the founder, Paweł Kukiz) LPR–Liga Polskich Rodzin (League of Polish Families) .N–Nowoczesna (Modern) PJN–Polska Jest Najwazniejsza ˙ (Poland Comes First) PiS–Prawo i Sprawiedliwo´sc´ (Law and Justice) PO–Platforma Obywatelska (Civic Platform) PSL–Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (Polish People’s Party) PZPR–Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza (Polish United Workers’ Party) PR–Polska Razem (Poland Together) R–Partia Razem (Together Party) ROP–Ruch Odbudowy Polski (Movement for Reconstruction of Poland) RP–Ruch Palikota (Palikot’s Movement) Samoobrona RP—Self Defence of the Republic of Poland SdPL–Socjaldemokracja Polska (Social Democracy of Poland) SdRP–Socjaldemokracja Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej (Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland) xv

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PARTY NAMES IN POLISH AND ENGLISH

SLD–Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej (Democratic Left Alliance) SP–Solidarna Polska (United Poland) TR–Twój Ruch (Your Movement) UW–Unia Wolno´sci (Freedom Union) W–Wiosna (Spring) ZP–Zjednoczona Prawica (United Right) ZSL–Zjednoczone Stronnictwo Ludowe (United People’s Party)

Contents

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Theoretical and Methodological Framework 1.1 Approaches to Studying Political Parties 1.2 Political Parties as Communication Organisations 1.3 Research Outline 1.4 Data Selection and Party Characteristics 1.5 Research Methods References

1 2 6 13 16 21 27

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Democracy in Poland: The Post-communist Regime and Its Performance 2.1 The Legacy of the Communist Regime 2.2 Trust in Political and Public Institutions 2.3 Low Voter Turnout 2.4 Towards an Illiberal Democracy References

33 34 39 47 52 56

The Emergence of the Party System in Poland—From Instability to Permanent Rivalry Patterns 3.1 Party Institutionalisation 3.2 Organisation Model(s) of Political Parties 3.3 Entry Barriers to the Political Market References

61 64 70 80 92

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CONTENTS

Changing Communication Environment 4.1 Parties’ Communication Orientation 4.2 Media Logics in Party Communication 4.3 Factors Shaping Politicians’ Relations with the Media in Poland References

97 98 104

Are Political Party Structures Still Important? 5.1 Beyond the Party Central Office—Organisational Potential 5.2 Local Structures in the Eyes of Party Elites 5.3 Beyond Mass Media: The Communication Potential of Political Parties’ Structures References

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Political Party Membership Features 6.1 Legal Regulations Regarding Party Membership 6.2 Party Members’ Profiles 6.3 Motivations for Joining Political Parties 6.4 Party Members’ Activities 6.5 Internal Communication: Practices vs Members’ Expectations References

159 160 163 166 170

Political Parties and Their Relations with the Media 7.1 Relations with the Established Media in the Eyes of Political Representatives 7.2 Relations with Social Media 7.3 Media and Trust in Political Parties References

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Parties and Citizens Relations: Connecting or Disconnecting? 8.1 The Electorate of Examined Parties 8.2 Party Identification 8.3 Reluctance Towards Parties 8.4 Citizens’ Political Involvement and Parties’ Openness to New Members References

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133 144 149 156

174 181

186 196 203 209

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CONTENTS

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Conclusion: Party Democracy in Poland and Its Future

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Annex: Field Research

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Index

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Abbreviations

CBOS CEE EBU EIU EP EUI EUROSTAT ESS FGI GUS HQM ICT IDEA IDI MEP MPM MP OSCE ODIHR OSCE PMO PPDB TEU TVP UKIP

The Public Opinion Research Centre, abbreviation in Polish Central and Eastern European The European Broadcasting Union The Economist Intelligence Unit The European Parliament The European University Institute The European Statistical Office The European Social Survey Focus Group Interview The Statistics Poland, abbreviation in Polish High Quality Membership Information and Communication Technologies The Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance Individual In-depth Interview Member of the European Parliament The Media Pluralism Monitor Member of Parliament The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Political Market Orientation The Political Party Database The Treaty on the European Union The Polish Public Television United Kingdom Independence Party

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List of Figures

Fig. 2.1 Fig. 2.2 Fig. 2.3 Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig.

5.1 5.2 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4

Fig. 7.1 Fig. 8.1 Fig. 8.2 Fig. 8.3

Trust in political parties in Poland Mean turnout in legislative elections in post-communist EU countries (1989–2019) Mean turnout in Poland in different types of elections (1989–2020) Party structures’ activity and communication potential Party structures’ activities to support communication Gender of the surveyed political party members Age cohorts of the surveyed party members Grassroots’ preferred forms of communication Members’ satisfaction with communication in relation to their sense of influence on the functioning of their parties Dominant logic in various types of media in Poland Poles’ attitudes towards political parties in 2017 Positive and neutral associations with political parties in Poland Negative associations with political parties in Poland

43 49 49 152 153 164 165 176 180 188 226 229 230

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List of Tables

Table 1.1 Table 1.2 Table 2.1

Table 2.2 Table 2.3 Table 2.4 Table 2.5 Table 3.1 Table 3.2 Table 3.3 Table 3.4 Table 3.5 Table 3.6 Table 4.1 Table 4.2

Internal and external dimensions of political parties as communication organisations Overview of parties subjected to analysis Interpersonal trust as measured by responses to the following statement: ‘Most people can be trusted or you can’t be too careful’ Trust in political parties in selected EU member states, 2010–2018 Trust in politicians in selected EU member states, 2010–2018 Relation between trust levels (general and institutional) and declarative participation in parliamentary elections Discrepancies between liberal and illiberal democracies Indicators of party institutionalisation in political parties in Poland The models of party organisation and their characteristics Classification of Polish political parties Selected consequences of the voting system for the Polish political market, 1991–2019 Share of income from various sources for publicly funded parties in the years of 2016–2018 New parties’ presence in the Sejm, 1991–2019 Two-stage nature of political communication perception Political parties’ inter-electoral communication orientations

8 22

42 44 45 46 53 69 75 77 86 87 91 99 103

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xxvi Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table

LIST OF TABLES

5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 6.1 6.2 6.3

Table 6.4 Table 6.5 Table 7.1

Table 8.1 Table 8.2 Table 8.3 Table 8.4 Table 8.5

Competitiveness of the leadership contest in PSL Competitiveness of the leadership contest in SLD Competitiveness of the leadership contest in PO Competitiveness of the leadership contest in PiS Competitiveness of the leadership contest in the Modern Character of grassroot structures’ activity Criteria and conditions for party membership Reasons for joining a political party Time devoted by members to party work in the inter-electoral period and during campaigns Average involvement in selected types of activities Members’ assessments of internal communication Facebook followers of selected Polish political parties and monthly user activity measured through the number of interactions Socio-demographic characteristics of voters’ identification with a given party Correlation analysis of voters’ feeling of closeness to a given political party Correlation analysis of voters’ emotional attitudes towards political parties Socio-demographic characteristics of individuals potentially interested in joining a political party Other characteristics of individuals potentially interested in joining a political party

136 138 140 141 143 154 161 168 171 172 178

201 220 222 231 237 239

CHAPTER 1

Theoretical and Methodological Framework

It is hard to imagine contemporary democratic systems without the institution of political parties. When justifying their choice of research focus, many scholars still recall Elmer Schattschneider’s (1942/2017: 1) assertion, made nearly 80 years ago, that parties play a ‘major role as makers of democratic government (…) and modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of the parties. As a matter of fact, the condition of the parties is the best possible evidence of a nature of any regime’. Since the late 1980s, many political scientists have claimed that parties as political entities are in crisis—some have gone so far as to prophesy their death (see for example: Andeweg 1996). Reality, however, continues to prove otherwise: parties remain key actors in parliamentary democracies, thus upholding the study of party politics as a relevant, developing field of study that includes a great number of theoretical perspectives and empirical approaches. Even though the scholarly literature on political parties is enormous, there are still numerous under-researched areas within that subject. Many theoretical frameworks and models focus on established, rather than nascent, democracies and, as Jan Zielonka (2015: 4) noticed, ‘it is far from obvious that the experiences of the former are relevant for the latter’. Thus, on the one hand, when referring in the book to various classical theories, concepts and models (e.g. the theory of participatory democracy, normative theories of democratic politics, the theory of party © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 M. Jacunski ´ et al., Party Organization and Communication in Poland, Political Campaigning and Communication, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59993-5_1

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institutionalisation, models of party organisation), we followed Slavko Splichal’s assumptions (2001) on ‘imitative theory’, rather than look for new ideas, because political systems of the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries (including Poland), with their procedures and routines, can be analysed within the existing theoretical framework for studying democracy and parties. On the other hand, we try bore in mind that because of young democracies’ instability over time, many researchers— for example, Radosław Markowski (2015), Barbara Pfetsch and Katrin Voltmer (2012), Paolo Mancini and Jan Zielonka (2012)—concluded that in the CEE region no clear models of democracy, political party or media system can yet be constructed. In our opinion, the reasons for that lie not only in the different conditions under which these political systems and parties have developed, but also, and perhaps primarily, in significant socio-political and technological changes that the world is currently experiencing. The dynamics of this evolution are such that it affects even the well-established democracies that have up to now been used as prime examples of stability and maturity. Today, these previously solid models of party democracy and media systems are losing their validity. Keeping this in mind, we make use of the existing framework but also take account of the ongoing changes when examining the phenomena on which our book focuses. In this respect, we paid heed to Denis McQuail’s (2000: 7) assertion that theory is not just formal propositions, but also ‘any systematic set of ideas that can help make sense of a phenomenon, guide action or predict a consequence’. Peter Dahlgren (2004: 11) points out that such a view highlights theory’s function as the intellectual scaffolding for the research one does. We decided to follow his assumption that there might not be any demarcated distinctions between formalised theory and the more general (and less systematic) thought modes that are to be used.

1.1

Approaches to Studying Political Parties

When examining parties, political scientists usually opt for either the structural or the functional perspective, depending on which exact aspect they are focusing on (Herbut 2002: 15–31). The structural approach is selected if the research revolves around issues such as internal structures, leaders’ positions and their links to the rank-and-file members, the faces of party organisation and relations among them, intra-partisan dynamics or the role of membership in general. The structural perspective has a long tradition going back to the classic works of Moise Ostrogorski (1902) and

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Robert Michels (1911/2009), as well as somewhat less renowned authors such as Jesse Macy (1904). In post-war Europe, some of the already classical analyses of political parties were published by Maurice Duverger (1956/1969), Angelo Panebianco (1988) and Richard Katz and Peter Mair (1993, 1994, 1995, 2018), as well as by Susan Scarrow et al. (2017), to name just a few. As far as CEE countries (including Poland) and their parties are concerned, notable works were presented by Paul Lewis (2000), Margit Tavits (2013) and Katarzyna Sobolewska-My´slik et al. (2016). Aleks Szczerbiak (2001) focused exclusively on Polish parties, looking at them from the structural and organisational perspective. His monograph encompasses the first decade after the democratic transition and examines the internal distribution of power, modes of representation, the role of the party bureaucracy, the focus of electoral appeals and the development of parties as membership organisations, as well as the relations between the parties and the state (Szczerbiak 2001). Sociodemographic analyses of the party elites, including their socio-economic views, were conducted in the 1990s and 2000s by Mirosława Grabowska and Tadeusz Szawiel (1993, 2001), Mirosława Grabowska (2004) and Anna Pacze´sniak and Jean-Michel De Waele (2011). Other attempts at the structural approach were based on dissecting party statutes (Bichta 2010) and/or surveying the grassroots in search of the rank-and-file members’ views of a given organisation (Sobolewska-My´slik et al. 2010). The authors of this book researched previously also partisan structures (Jacunski ´ 2011; Pacze´sniak 2011; Wincławska and Brodzinska-Mirowska ´ 2016). Anna Pacze´sniak and Michał Jacunski ´ created a sociological portrait of the mid-level cadres in the Civic Platform (Polish abbreviation: PO) and the Democratic Left Alliance (Polish abbreviation: SLD). Maria Wincławska and Barbara Brodzinska-Mirowska ´ examined party subsystems and looked into issues related to organisation and communication, as observed by party members in one of the Polish regions. A significant portion of research presented in this book follows the tradition of analysing parties as organisations. In terms of the structural perspective, we were interested in the process of institutionalisation, organisational solutions adopted, the faces of party organisation, relations between various subsystems and the internal distribution of power. We considered aspects connected to party leadership and management. Last but not least, we examined parties as membership-based organisations. We looked into mutual assessments and expectations on the part of both

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rank-and-file members and the elites, as well as the nature of membership status in Polish political parties. The other traditional approach to studying parties is the functional perspective. Here, the key questions refer to the roles performed by political formations in the party and political systems, both domestically and internationally. Historically, parties were perceived as intermediaries between society and public authorities. Today, however, it is claimed they have moved closer to the state and away from citizens (Katz and Mair 1995). As Mair and Bartolini (2001: 332) put it: ‘a shift can be observed in the activities conducted by modern political parties from representative functions and formulating strategic policy objectives (policy formulation) to procedural functions, namely the recruitment of political leaders, obtaining parliamentary representation, and governance’. Such a shift was possible because legislators provided parties with certain resources, for example, guarantees of state funding and access to public media. The development of political communication tools has also played a part here as the dominance of certain channels and methods means the roles and importance of members and followers are severely curtailed. Party elites and scholars alike are convinced that typical communication functions (persuasion, self-presentation, providing information and instigating dialogue) may well be performed by the party in central office and in public office. As one of the most renowned researchers to have adopted the functional approach, Max Weber maintained that the existential goal of a party is to compete for power. Given such a standpoint, it was only natural that he emphasised the electoral function (Weber 2002: 216). Other notable names to have employed the functional perspective include Elmer Schattschneider (1942/2017), Leon Epstein (1967) and Giovanni Sartori (1976/2005). As far as research into CEE party systems is concerned, valuable contributions were made by, among other authors, Herbert Kitschelt et al. (1999), Tomáš Kostelecký (2002) and Andrzej Antoszewski (2005). Polish parties were the objects of Aleks Szczerbiak’s (2006) attention. The functional approach focuses on the ‘relations of a political party with its environment and the consequences of those relations for the distribution of votes within the electorate and the competition for power’ (Herbut 2002: 25). For the purpose of our research, we adopted the functional perspective to study parties’ positions vis-à-vis the environment, primarily regarding the media and voters. We looked into strategies

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that political formations adopt for campaigning. We considered a complex set of conditions and circumstances within which they operate, especially when it comes to their contact with the media. Apart from the two main above-mentioned approaches, academic literature contains works presenting research based on rational choice theory (Downs 1957). Here, scholars examine parties either as organisations (by adopting the structural perspective as a starting point) or as marketoriented entities (with the functional approach as a basis) seeking to maximise their leaders’ gains in the political market (see for example: Schlesinger 1984; Panebianco 1988; Hopkin and Paolucci 1999) and meet voters’ needs. This perspective is often equated with the concept of political marketing. Its weakness is a feeble theoretical foundation— a problem that scholars in this area openly acknowledge (Strøm 1990; O’Shaughnessy and Henneberg 2002). Regardless of these reservations, research centred on market-oriented parties (Lees-Marshment 2006) is being continued and developed. Analyses based on rational choice theory presume that parties apply the marketing mix in a rational manner to implement specific political and electoral strategies. Various challenges emanating from the market induce them to adapt, in line with the needs and impulses coming from the environment. As a result, they become more adept at pursuing their crucial goals—they are more selling-oriented and/or instrumentally oriented entities, stronger in terms of relational management. In our examination of Polish parties, we analysed the political market and compared how different formations adjust to face market- and communication-related challenges. Furthermore, we determined whether (and if so, how) parties organise their communication resources based on rational decisions. Hence, this portion of our research utilises the marketing paradigm as applied to political parties, even though we are aware of the limitations of such an approach. We believe that these various research perspectives can be complementary and that their combination has made our effort more comprehensive. The marketing approach includes, among other elements, the behavioural theory of competitive political parties, the author of which ‘retains the assumption that party leaders are rational agents, but stresses the constraints imposed by their organizational and institutional environments’ (Strøm 1990: 566). The research process may encompass factors and phenomena that this behavioural theory sees as determinants of parties’ activities in three areas: vote-seeking, office-seeking and policy-seeking. Here, we observed the leadership’s attitudes towards the

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rank-and-file members and the roots of these relations, as well as the effectiveness of mediated communication, which the party engages into influence the opinions and actions of voters. In this, we followed the pioneering work of Paul Lazarsfeld (1941), which strove to combine normative and empirical research.

1.2 Political Parties as Communication Organisations Research on political parties’ communication is usually limited to campaign communication or other selected elements, for example, channels and tools, content or image shaping. Meanwhile, the overall subject is far more complex. This is why our analysis revolved around Polish parties’ potential in the area of communication, rather than any singular aspect. Instead of focusing on the results of communication, we looked at various factors related to managing the process. We considered the resources at the disposal of political formations and how they are employed for the handling of communication. Hence, we examined the mechanisms of intra-partisan (vertical) and external (horizontal) communication and assessed whether the process is managed professionally, for example by coordinating and integrating all activities so as to utilise a given entity’s full potential. With regard to the internal aspect, we studied how vertical communication between party members in the central office and those on the ground is organised. As for the external component, we concentrated on how political formations build relations with and through the media, as it is their presence in the media that enables mediated communication with voters and other political players. The communication structures that emerge within partisan organisations enable them to interact with internal and external stakeholders, particularly members, the electorate, and political competitors. By communicating, they provide citizens with a chance to participate in various activities of a transactional or relational character. In functional terms, an organisation engaging in external communication is able to mobilise voters, bring together those who share a common political objective or agree with a certain agenda or encourage dialogue and civic participation. This is why parties typically see electoral communication through traditional large-scale media as the most important element— one which serves short-term, transactional goals. They are far less likely

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to adapt communication for relational purposes, i.e. for continuous activities aimed at building citizens’ trust and enabling genuine dialogue. In the course of our analysis, we showed why the internal and external dimensions are well worth integrating. We identified key elements of a model communication framework within a partisan organisation. In this chapter, we provided a set of terminology, which is then used to guide our discussion of organisational communication. Table 1.1 shows, in a synthetic form, the aspects of internal communication selected for analysis: main subjects and directions and goals of communication, as well as the extent of the leeway that each participant of the process enjoys. The internal component includes communicating with members, as well as with followers and volunteers. This allows parties to develop and shape their views on certain issues, implement HR policies and coordinate activities to be undertaken at the grassroots level. However, many political formations neglect this area, particularly in inter-electoral periods. The leadership often believes that the key to influencing public opinion and mobilising the electorate lies primarily in external resources—most of all, the use of media, which is seen as a tool that allows them to reach the wavering and swing voters. To balance that view, we showed how parties can benefit from better internal communication. At the same time, we addressed a gap in the existing research of political communication, where the internal aspect is often conspicuous in its absence. The purpose of parties’ external communication is to distribute information on their agendas, shape their images, influence voters and defend their standpoints on certain matters of public interest. By employing mediated communication, formations are able to reach groups and stakeholders with whom they have no direct affiliations but who are, nonetheless, important participants in the communication process. The representatives of the party in public office and in central office act as links in the communication between the organisation and external entities. Moreover, the development of information and communication technologies (ICT) has created various forms of digital affiliation, which are mostly a supplementary channel for members’ input and offer an important new resource to parties during campaigns (Gibson et al. 2017). While we identified the two dimensions—internal and external—separately, the observation of some political formations in Western European countries points to the blurring of the roles played by members and partisan structures in communication. It seems that as communication

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Table 1.1 Internal and external communication organisations

dimensions

of

political

parties

as

Internal communication

External communication

Main subjects of communication (senders and receivers)

Nominated representatives, members, groups affiliated with the party: partisans, volunteers

Communication directions

Vertical communication within the organisation, top-down (from leadership to rank-and-file members) and bottom-up (vice versa). In parties with less stratose structures, horizontal communication is also possible

Goals of communication

Informing, mobilising, ensuring coherence, legitimising the leadership’s actions, determining standpoints on particular issues, coordinating grassroots-level activities Depending on a given party’s organisational culture, members and representatives’ freedom of communicating on its behalf is or is not restricted

Groups not affiliated directly with the organisation: well-wishers, voters, group actors (social or professional groups, civic organisations), political competitors, journalists, communicators, domestic and foreign public institutions Vertical communication in the case of parties with centralised electoral and marketing strategies Horizontal communication between the party in central office/party on the ground and other political actors or participants of the communication process Informing, mobilising, legitimising the leadership’s actions, shaping the party’s image, influencing voters, defending the party’s standpoints on specific issues Parties introduce limitations depending on their organisational culture and the extent of discipline applied to communicating with the public. Parties aiming at obtaining a presence in the media tend to centralise and personalise their communication

Leeway in communication

Source Authors’ elaboration

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becomes more processual, the distinction between internal and external aspects may be unclear. Internal communication can fail if the formal membership base does not reflect the actual state of affairs, with some members being entirely inactive. Meanwhile, symphathisers operating without formal partisan legitimation may, for instance, openly support a given formation in the social media and, in effect, promote its interests much better than many members. The ecosystem of communication is also changing significantly. The Internet has become home to groups, forums and other platforms where the distinction between the status of a member and that of a follower is far less meaningful. The structure of the communication process is stratose: information does not necessarily cascade through successive layers of the organisation, but instead flows more horizontally. If one considers the emergence of digital parties, such as Podemos in Spain, and the status of light membership (Scarrow 2015), the need for a new understanding of external and internal communication becomes apparent. Hence, in our research we tried to find out whether Polish parties fit into the analytical framework based on this clear distinction of the two dimensions. The leeway available to particular participants of communication is another component that differentiates parties from each other. Media operate in a manner that prompts parties to maintain coherence in their messages to the public. Therefore, party members are often limited in how and what they communicate to and through the media. Those formations that focus on being present in traditional media tend to centralise and personalise communication by nominating a narrow group—usually leaders, selected members of parliament (MPs) and/or press officers—to represent them. Parties that do not introduce such strict measures are usually rewarded with greater satisfaction levels among their members regarding intra-party democracy. However, the price of that is a lower level of coherence and the troublesome coordination of communication. Naturally, followers and other groups loosely linked to a given party are not bound by formal regulations related to media appearances on its behalf. Any norms that may apply to them are either customary in nature or entirely beyond the control of partisan organisations (for example, policies of online forums). When looking at political parties as communication organisations, scholars are interested in two groups of entities. The first one comprises well-established formations: (1) highly institutionalised and mature parties present in Western European democracies and (2) in the young

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CEE democracies, those parties that, over the last dozen or so years, have exhibited the capacity to survive and become permanent features of the political market. The second group is composed of newly formed parties that have recently entered the political arena and lack stability. Both groups face various challenges related to garnering or retaining voters’ support as they strive to organise their communication processes. In their capacity as communication organisations, parties undergo a continuous transformation and professionalisation, driven by the need to adapt to the ever-changing internal and external environment. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, scholars examined the professionalisation process, with particular regard to the application of political marketing and the evolution from bureaucratic partisan organisations towards electoral-professional machines as a response to a fluid environment (O’Shaughnessy 1990; Lees-Marshment 2001; Wring 2005; Negrine et al. 2007). The consequences of professionalising the campaigning process were described by David Farrell and Paul Webb (2002: 103–104). The authors concluded that campaigns have ‘gone through three main stages, from pre-modern, through the TV dominated modern stage, and onto the current advanced-modern stage of campaigning personified by the use of new telecommunications technology’. Some researchers pointed out that parties adjust to the changes in their surroundings by developing new campaigning techniques and methods, centralising communication and focusing it in the hands of leaders. Moving away from ideology-based agendas backed by rank-andfile members and grassroots structures, parties focus on media presence geared towards promoting their leaders and presenting their standpoints on specific issues over the course of campaigns. This has led to changes in communication at the organisational level. Margit Tavits (2013: 17) identified how the party in central office and the party on the ground have evolved in these terms. As the central structures become more professional, they gradually monopolise the responsibility for managing both internal and external communication through partisan channels, as well as for ensuring coherence among different levels of the organisation. Political formations were forced to adhere to the media logic and the needs of the voters, typically articulated directly to the leadership rather than to the grassroots structures. For the purpose of our research, we adopted a much broader understanding of professionalisation. In our view, it is expressed not only in the perfection of specific techniques used for campaigning or the utilisation

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of external expertise. Professionalising communication also comprises the application of proper management to the entire process, both during and beyond campaigns. It is further visible in the integration of internal and external aspects, as well as through the fuller use of the resources available to a given party (Brodzinska-Mirowska ´ 2019). When examining young democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, scholars have often applied classical party models introduced in the Western European tradition of political science. This is why, midway through the 1990s (Grzymala-Busse 2002), they began analysing changes in post-communist formations as these evolved from being mass organisations to catch-all parties. At the same time, they observed younger cadre parties trying to grow into electoral-professional organisations. All these changes had consequences for the process of professionalising communication, although it should be kept in mind that in Poland and other CEE countries, the evolution of parties as communication organisations had its own specificity. Parties’ communication and organisational features can partly be linked to their developmental paths, which, for several reasons, differed significantly in CEE countries when compared to Western European democracies (Tavits 2012). In the post-communist countries, the construction of political formations was primarily a top-down process, driven by small groups or milieus acting of their own accord, rather than by socio-political cleavages. Ever since the democratic transition, society had been highly sceptical about the institution of parties. Voters’ loyalty was low, and a substantial membership base was not necessary to succeed in an election. Several scholars (Kopecký 1995; van Biezen 2003) maintain that political formations in the post-communist part of Europe are organisationally weaker than their Western European counterparts and will remain so given the absence of a strong stimulus. Such an assertion seems like an oversimplified generalisation because one needs to remember that the post-1989 era in CEE states saw competition among two groups of parties: the post-communist successor formations and the genuinely new entities sprouting from the pro-democratic movement. Soon after the transition, the former enjoyed much greater stability and an unquestionable advantage in terms of resources in comparison to the latter. The supposed weakness with regard to communication potential was also relative. Successor parties had ample internal resources, access to a network of media they formerly controlled and a host of friendly journalists. Meanwhile, their younger rivals sought help from foreign advisors and those publicists that had previously operated independently from the

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regime, often underground. Since the mid-1990s, the professionalisation of marketing and communication had progressed fairly equally among Polish parties, regardless of their exact provenance. Domestic advisors, boasting different experience and sets of expertise, were commissioned to provide communication support, usually on a temporary basis. They referred to themselves as political marketing or public relation specialists. The public sometimes described them in less flattering terms, as spin doctors, or by the more neutral, yet semantically vague, name of political consultants. Most of them came from either a political or an academic background; commercial entities operating in this area were something of a rarity. Their services were most frequently acquired when parties needed advice on how to run an election campaign in the media. As such, they did not contribute to the shaping of a long-term communication culture. Towards the end of the 2000s, political parties were faced with the need to adjust their communication as new ICTs matured and social media expanded into the mainstream. Initially, it seemed like political actors could use this shift into the Web 2.0 era for purposes other than just traditional, one-way electoral communication strategies. As it turned out, however, neither they nor the voters were interested in building any kind of novel relations. As the established formations remained passive, a new type of partisan organisation emerged. Often built around grassroots structures, these young entities attempt to exploit the potential of online communication and replace the vertical, hierarchical structure, with its accompanying top-down approach to communicating, with a more horizontally oriented framework. These so-called cyber parties, digital parties (Gerbaudo 2019) or connective parties (Bennett et al. 2018) are supposed to enable more inclusive, two-way communication with the electorate. Internally, they should theoretically encourage an interactive organisational culture, the creation of interlinked networks and the inclusion of like-minded, politically active groups (Jacunski ´ 2018). They strive to become technology-enabled organisations in which ‘technology platforms and affordances are indistinguishable from, and replace, key components of brick and mortar organization and intraparty functions. These components include affiliation management, policy generation, leader and candidate selection, and public communication’ (Bennett et al. 2018: 1666). By developing horizontal models, connective parties ‘potentially offer a response to voter demand for greater engagement at the electoral interface’ (Bennett et al. 2018: 1668). The effectiveness of such an approach cannot be assessed unequivocally at this

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point. On the one hand, one can look at the example of the Pirate Party, with its national branches operating in several European countries and Australia. So far, even though it has based its efforts on the potential of online tools and has seemed poised to capitalise on its competitive advantages over traditionally organised political rivals, it has failed to register any success, be it in domestic or European parliamentary elections. On the other hand, there are formations, such as the Italian Five Star Movement, Spanish Podemos, La France Insoumise or the Polish Together Party. Over a short period of time, they have shown the capacity to build dispersed structures centred around activists and followers who are attracted using the Internet, making this kind of online-based presence their trademark. Still, despite their initial successes, they have so far fallen short of being genuine game changers in terms of having a lasting impact on how the political elites communicate with the electorate. The political mainstream continues to organise its communication in an integrated manner, using resources available to cartel parties that do not limit their area of interest to the Internet and to groups of sympathisers loosely linked with a given organisation.

1.3

Research Outline

Researchers have described many structural and functional aspects of the trends that are visible in political parties across European democracies. The framework for research presented in this book is based on the observed tendencies, and the analyses are carried out for the Polish democracy. Peter Mair and Stefano Bartolini (2001: 332) noticed that the twentieth-century methods of political party management are not suitable in the face of today’s challenges. Therefore, in order to survive in the market and effectively implement their goals, formations need to adapt to various political, sociological and technological changes. They do so by making adjustments to both internal and external dimensions. Internally, they need to consider party subsystems: active members at different levels of the organisation (from rank-and-file cadres to representatives in local and national public offices) and the administrative structure. They introduce new organisational solutions, for instance, by implementing direct democracy mechanisms, broadening internal selectorates or changing the relations between various subsystems. The external dimension comprises occasional voters and those who do not vote, the stable electorate, supporters, passive members, the media,

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civil society organisations and other parties (van Haute 2009). All these actors and stakeholders form an environment in which the party system evolves. Society’s expectations of parties’ change, as do politicians’ relations with social partners, including the media. Finally, technological developments affect how parties communicate, both when campaigning and in the inter-electoral period. By observing and analysing changes in the socio-political environment, as well as within parties themselves, we attempted to answer questions regarding the strength and functioning (including the adaptive processes) of relevant Polish parties throughout the 2010s. Following Margit Tavits’ (2013: 7) assertion that ‘parties with strong organizations are more likely to be electorally successful and survive as significant players’, we examined the organisational solidity of selected formations. Therefore, apart from taking on the structural perspective, we looked into their inner workings, both in terms of partisan structures and the organisation of communication. We dissected their subsystems and the relations among them and their available resources and the application of these. Furthermore, we studied party management and the positions of leaders in each organisation—all in an effort to assess which formations are stronger or weaker. Our goals were to understand how their strength and organisational potential is linked to their electoral success and long-term survival. We analysed the currently undergoing changes in the character of membership, members’ ranges of activities and the relations between rank-and-file members and the elites. Most political parties in Europe are losing their membership bases, which, according to many scholars, proves that their overall robustness is in decline (see for example: van Haute 2011; van Biezen et al. 2011). The erosion of traditional social milieus, the weakening of political loyalties and the shift towards mass media campaigning has reduced the supply of potential party members and has made parties less interested in formally enrolling their supporters (Scarrow 2002: 82). Although the catch-all party still emphasises membership, it does not require the same degree of commitment on the part of its members, who, in turn, become ‘organized cheerleaders’ for the elites, as the independence of the parliamentary party is emphasised (Katz and Mair 1995: 18). Cartel parties also follow this trend: their members may formally enjoy even more rights than before (e.g. they can nominate leaders) (Bolleyer 2009: 564), but their role in the organisation is actually diminished. As they are increasingly atomised, they are less able to influence and control party elites. Personal, personalist or personalistic

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parties built around a leader do not provide a range of meaningful activities for their members to engage in, especially outside campaign periods. Changes to the structure of contemporary societies, parties’ increasing reliance on state funding (Nassmacher 2006: 446–456), the professionalisation and mediatisation of campaigns and the growing role of marketing experts (Sabato 1981; Plasser 2001: 44–59; Newman 1999) mean that even the active members are not able to do much for their organisations. The latter actually do not expect much besides the legitimisation of their roles through their sheer presence in the structures. Moreover, in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the democratic transition of its former satellite states, scholars observed that parties moved away from their traditional functions as entities that socialise and mobilise the electorate (Mair 2006). There is less emphasis on the articulation and aggregation of interests of different communities and social groups (Pacze´sniak 2014), as parties struggle to operate amid low trust in public institutions. Another tendency observed across many of the established democracies is the increasing importance of individual actors (politicians, leaders) at the expense of the collective identities embodied by political parties (Karvonen 2010: 4). This affects partisan structures and intra-party rules and dynamics. It coincides with the fading of ideologies and the decline of popular loyalties to political parties. The process of partisan dealignment has increased the potential for party leaders to influence the way people vote (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000). As parties realised that recognisable leaders effectively became their main public currency, they increasingly chose to tailor the conduct of their election campaigns to the logic of television, which lends itself more readily to focus on individuals than to the discussion of relatively complex policy issues. By projecting themselves more and more through their leaders, they suit the needs of the media (Mughan 2015: 28). The process does not occur everywhere with identical intensity: the impact of leaders on patterns and outcomes of campaigning varies across time and space. On the one hand, scholars have noted the emergence of a new type of electorally successful party, referring to it as a personal (Calise 2015) or personalist party (Kostadinova and Levitt 2014). An expression of a dominant founder-leader’s vision, such an organisation seems to depend on the presence of said leader for its survival (Kefford and McDonnell 2018: 1). On the other hand, despite the trend towards personalisation, most partisan leaders in parliamentary democracies are products of their organisations and need their continued

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support. Electoral success comes when the potentials of the leader and the party are combined (a win-win situation), while situations where leaders leave their parent organisations usually lead to a lose-lose scenario for both sides. Our research, however, is not limited to the structural perspective. In order to grasp the link between a given organisation’s strength and its electoral performance, one needs to look beyond the intra-partisan dynamics; it is important to consider a given party’s perception and image among society, as well as its ability to adapt and remain a relevant political actor. This is why we analysed how each of the examined parties communicated, as well as looking at the environments in which this happens. We asked questions about when and how parties adopt a strategic approach to political communication. We considered the role of specific structures and party members in the era of a high-choice media environment (van Aelst et al. 2017). Moreover, we attempted a diagnosis of social perceptions and judgments, of the level of trust and of what is expected of parties. The internal and external dimensions of parties’ functioning are interlocked in a feedback loop. Changes in the environment, as well as relations with the media and the electorate, affect not only the style of partisan competition but also the organisational strategies adopted by each formation. These, in turn, translate into strategies for communicating with the environment. This is why both these components should be considered in conjunction—even more so, given that the dynamic development of ICT creates new possibilities for organising partisan life in several areas. To the best of our knowledge, no other scholarly team has so far attempted to comprehensively explore these subjects. Finally, we studied the role of grassroots structures, whose importance, in our view, goes well beyond their instrumental use during campaigns. Despite parties’ somewhat obsessive focus on media presence and campaigning, grassroots elements constitute a vital resource during the inter-electoral period.

1.4

Data Selection and Party Characteristics

The empirical research we conducted encompassed six parties. At the time it was conducted, four of them were present in the parliament: the Law and Justice (PiS), the Civic Platform (PO), the Modern (.N) and the Polish People’s Party (PSL). The other two, i.e. the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) and the Together Party (R) were non-parliamentary.

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The selection of parties was based on two elements. First of all, we decided to only consider entities that met certain formal criteria, i.e. they were registered as political parties. Secondly, we selected those formations which in the 2015 parliamentary election exceeded the 3% threshold required to be eligible for state funding. The Law and Justice and the Civic Platform were both formed before the 2001 parliamentary election. They targeted the gap which opened up in the centre and on the right side of the political scene as two post-Solidarity parties which formed the government from 1997 until 2001, the conservative Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS) and the liberal Freedom Union (UW), lost most of their support and drifted into irrelevance. PiS and PO attracted not only AWS’s and UW’s voters, but also many of their members and activists from lower levels of organisation. Initially, from 2001 to 2005, they formed parliamentary opposition against the SLD-PSL cabinet and often cooperated closely with each other. In the aftermath of the 2005 election, they attempted to build a governing coalition. A breakdown in negotiations caused a quickly escalating rift. PiS went on to form the cabinet with other partners, while PO remained in opposition until the early election in 2007. The two formations have dominated Polish political scene ever since, garnering between them anywhere from around half to over 70% of votes1 in each subsequent parliamentary election. Their conflict has remained the defining element of Polish politics. Law and Justice is founded on conservative rhetoric. It emphasises the need for a strong, active state and a moral revival in the society. It calls for adopting patriotic and religious values as bases for building community within the nation. Its economic programme is centred on economic statism: state-owned entities and public investments are meant to invigorate the economy. At the same time, PiS pushes for welfare state, with the caveat that the government’s role is not so much to improve the quality of public services, but to directly redistribute income to certain social groups, such as families with children and the elderly. Axiologically, PiS operates on an anti-liberal agenda and opposes movements striving for the rights of women or the LGBT community. It embraces the links between the state and the Catholic Church. For this reason, it is supported by

1 In the 2005 election, the combined support for PiS and PO was 51.13%. In 2007, it was as much as 73.63%. In 2011—69.06%. In 2015—61.67% and in 2019—70.99%.

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many high-level representatives of the clergy and a media conglomerate established by an influential Redemptorist, Tadeusz Rydzyk. PiS postulates the need for a far-reaching reconstruction of the state. The party peddles a narrative according to which the institutions of state in the post-1989 era were appropriated by the elites, many members of which had previously been associated with the communist regime. In its quest to ‘heal’ the country, PiS has since 2015 embarked on a campaign to seize control of independent public institutions, including the public media, courts and some supervisory organs (such as the Supreme Audit Office). It has also moved to limit the powers of regional self-governments. The party won parliamentary election on three separate occasions: in 2005, 2015 and 2019. Between 2005 and 2007 it led a governing coalition, co-opting the support of two other formations: the League of Polish Families (LPR) and the Self-Defence of the Republic of Poland (Samoobrona RP). In 2015 and 2019, it ran joint candidate lists with two smaller right-wing formations and subsequently formed the government under the moniker of the United Right Coalition. Its representatives also held the office of President—from 2005 to 2010 it was Lech Kaczynski, ´ while since 2015 it has been Andrzej Duda. PiS’ main rival and the other dominant player on Polish political scene is the Civic Platform. At its inception, it was meant to be a party of the centre. It launched on a liberal economic agenda and with a liberalconservative axiological profile. Most of all, it was intended as a champion of pragmatism, modernisation and European integration. In an effort to attract more support and broaden its electorate, it appealed to more and more circles and social groups, gradually incorporating a ‘leftist sensibility’. Some of its proponents were reluctant to see such evolution which they perceived as endangering the party’s ideological identity. PO favours decentralisation and a stronger role of local self-governments as well as far-reaching economic freedoms. At the same time, it wants to maintain a certain degree of social solidarity. It calls for an ‘amiable’ separation of church and state. The values mentioned in its programme include freedom, responsibility, equality and solidarity. Its preferred tenets for the functioning of the state are subsidiarity, efficiency, moderation and rationality. The Platform began as an organisation meant to draw its strength from the spontaneous involvement of those citizens who were tired with the previous state of partisan politics. In time, it turned out that a traditional form of party organisation offered greater effectiveness. PO won the 2007

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and 2011 parliamentary election, on both occasions forming the cabinet in coalition with PSL. Its representative, Bronisław Komorowski, served as Poland’s President from 2010 until 2015. The Modern was formed before the 2015 parliamentary election by an economist, Ryszard Petru. The name of the party signifies its identity and core values: progress and modernisation. In just a couple of months, through a deft use of political marketing and PR, the Modern attracted enough support to exceed the representation threshold and win 28 seats (6%) in the parliament. Many of its members come from liberal circles that had previously been involved in other parties: the Freedom Union, the Democratic Party and the Civic Platform. Its agenda is based on economic liberalism: the party postulates limiting the cost of labour and eliminating privileges enjoyed by some professional groups. It wants to strengthen Poland’s place in the European Union, supports the development of civic society and calls for an axiologically neutral state. The party has failed to build up its membership base and develop grassroots structures. Even though it quickly attracted as many as 1,1 million voters, its initial successes were soon followed by several disappointments and disillusionment among supporters. At the end of 2016, the party’s founder and leader provoked a crisis of image which resulted first in factionary infighting and then, his own departure. In the run-up to the 2019 election, the weakened party joined the PO-led Civic Coalition. After the elections its representatives sit on PO’s parliamentary group. The Polish People’s Party was formed in 1990 but claims the heritage of the agrarian movement dating as far back as the 1890s. Its communistera predecessor, the United People’s Party (ZSL), was a satellite party of the ruling Polish United Workers’ Party. This is why it is dubbed, along with SLD, a successor party. Its long-standing traditions mean PSL has a strong grassroots organisation. The formation describes itself as centrist, built on the agrarian ethos as well as patriotic and Christian values. Its current programme borrows heavily from the neo-agrarian doctrine.2 PSL maintains that agriculture is one of the foundations of Polish economy and aspires to represent the rural electorate and farmers. However, it is aware that its traditional, natural voter base is shrinking. Hence, it has 2 According to PSL, neo-agrarianism ‘re-evaluates the historic heritage of the agrarian thought in line with the achievements of science and acknowledges the need to adjust socio-economic life to the requirements of the scientific-technical revolution’ (Polska lepszych szans 2007).

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recently been trying to revamp itself as a Christian Democratic formation open also to citizens from outside rural areas. PSL espouses the idea of welfare state. It is in favour of developing social programmes and exempting certain groups from some forms of taxation. It calls for more ecology-minded solutions in the quest to combat air pollution and grow the country’s renewable energy sector. It is a pivot party with high coalition potential. It has been involved in cabinets on numerous occasions. From 1993 to 1997 and from 1997 to 2001 it partnered with SLD, while from 2007 until 2011 and from 2011 until 2015 it joined PO, always as the smaller member of the coalition. As a separate political party, the Democratic Left Alliance was created in 1999. Previously that name was used by a coalition of left-wing formations led by the Social Democracy of Poland (SdRP)—a successor party to the communist Polish United Workers’ Party (PZPR). Almost right from the beginning of the democratic transition and all throughout the 1990s, SLD held a strong position on Polish political scene. Afterwards, in the aftermath of several scandals, it experienced a series of secessions (2004, 2005, 2012) and systematically lost support. In fact, its decline went so far that in the 2015 election it failed to reach the 8% threshold (SLD run in a coalition with Your Movement) which meant it lost its parliamentary representation altogether. Such marginalisation sparked an identity crisis (Burchert 2016) and the need to search for potential allies. SLD found them in new left-wing formations which had initially emerged as its competitors: the Together Party and Robert Biedron’s ´ Spring. In the run-up to the 2019 election, the three entities formed a coalition that garnered enough support to allow SLD a much-hoped-for return to the parliamentary arena. The Alliance bases its appeal on the heritage of Polish and international socialist and social-democratic movement. The party emphasises humanist values, including the protection of minority rights, equality of men and women as well as legalisation of same-sex marriages. It calls for a strict separation of church and state. It also preaches social justice, which is why it postulates social market economy and progressive tax rates. SLD favours a stronger role for local self-governments and further European integration. Its representatives held the post of Prime Minister on four occasions (twice in the period from 1995 to 1997 and again twice from 2001 until 2005). The party’s candidate, Aleksander Kwa´sniewski, served as Poland’s President from 1995 to 2005.

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Alongside the Modern, the Together Party is the youngest of the six formations included in our research. It was formed outside the parliamentary arena, in 2015, by a group of young, strongly left-leaning activists. The Together Party preaches welfare state, maintaining that high taxation should be used to support a broad range of public services and social programmes. It also calls for stronger protection of employees and grating trade unions an active role in managing economic entities. Moreover, it postulates shorter working hours. Axiologically, the Together Party pushes for anti-discriminatory legislation and equal treatment of all families, including same-sex marriages. Its programme includes a green component, as the party endorses transition towards renewable energy. It appeals primarily to young people, the urban precariat, sexual minorities and the proponents of secular state (Table 1.2).

1.5

Research Methods

The study described in this monograph is based on mixed methods research, i.e. the combination of quantitative and qualitative analyses. By employing both methods, we were able to look comprehensively at how political parties are organised, communicate, act and position themselves in regard to their environment. A careful triangulation of the quantitative and qualitative research provided us with a broad picture, as seen from the perspective of party elites, their administrative staff, the grassroots and voters. We utilised the system perspective to answer questions regarding parties’ functioning in the political system, as well as on relations between the different faces of party organisation in terms of both organisation and communication. All in all, the system perspective has allowed us to consider parties as complex organisations operating in a societal environment. We complemented it with the comparative perspective in order to capture similarities and differences between the examined parties, as well as in the assessments, opinions and expectations expressed by the representatives of various party subsystems and the electorate. At the operational level of our research design, we used (1) field research methods, including qualitative interviews and focus groups, as well as non-participant and participant observations; (2) paper and online surveys and (3) desk research methods, including content analysis and secondary data analysis, focused primarily on publicly available sources. Adopting mixed methods makes sense when one wishes to collect and analyse an extensive set of information (Creswell 2009: 221), which

Law and Justice (PiS) Civic Platform (PO) Modern (.N) Polish People’s Party (PSL) Democratic Left Alliance (SLD)

Parliamentary

Parliamentary

Parliamentary

Parliamentary

Extra-parliamentary

2001

2001

2015

1990

1999

Year of Position in 2015 creation

Party

Parliamentary

Parliamentary

Parliamentary

Parliamentary

Parliamentary

Position in 2019

Overview of parties subjected to analysis

Table 1.2

Opposition party

Opposition party Opposition party

Opposition party

Governmental party

Status in the research period (2016–2018)

New party

Post-solidarity

Post-solidarity

Party origin

Social democratic

Post-communist

Christian Post-communist democratic, agrarian

Liberal

Liberal–conservative

Conservative

Party profile

33,554

100,320b

4,196

36,000

37,409

Membership figures 2018a

22 ´ M. JACUNSKI ET AL.

2015

Extra-parliamentary

Year of Position in 2015 creation Parliamentary

Position in 2019 Opposition party

Status in the research period (2016–2018) Socialist

Party profile

New party

Party origin

2,000

Membership figures 2018a

make this information available. This is partly because they do not update their central databases on a regular basis. Thus, it is not easy to estimate the number of members in Polish political parties. All data we provide here came from the parties’ declarations published in various media, sometimes during interviews with party leaders. Data on PiS came from the article ‘Ro´snie liczba działaczy PiS’ (2018), and information on PO came from an interview with Sławomir Neuman, chairman of the party’s parliamentary caucus, on Radio TOK FM on February 4th, 2018. The data on the Modern came from Magdalena Brukwinska ´ (2018), the director of the party’s central office, as published on its website. The data on PSL, SLD and Razem came from an article by Jakub Szymczak (2019) b The number for the Polish People’s Party is from November 2016—the party counts its members before congresses that take place once every four years. The last one was held in 2016 Source Authors’ elaboration, based on data collected, coded and processed by the authors

a Polish political parties are rather reluctant to provide researchers with accurate numbers regarding their members, and they are not legally obliged to

Together Party (R)

Party

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in our case, consists, first of all, of primary data coming directly from political parties (constitutions, statutes, regulations, directives, etc.). For dealing with these sources, we applied the legal-institutional approach. We also included materials published by parties online, on websites or in social media. Here, we performed content analysis. Secondly, statistics released by various entities: the European Union (EUROSTAT), the Statistics Poland (a public institution, for which the Polish abbreviation is GUS), public opinion research agencies (in particular, a Polish entity known by the abbreviation CBOS) and other institutions, for example, the European Social Survey (ESS). We used information on parties’ online activities, collected and processed by Sotrender. Secondary data analysis was applied to all statistical data provided by other entities and scholars. Thirdly, the main part of our study is based on materials collected by the team itself. We conducted 59 individual semi-structured in-depth interviews (IDIs) with representatives of the elites of the six political formations named and described above. Among the carefully selected interviewees, there were party chairpersons and members of top-level management and parliamentarians (MPs and MEPs), as well as staff members responsible for communication and media activities (spokespersons, heads of press offices). Interviews were conducted from December 2016 to December 2017, in numbers sufficient to achieve theoretical saturation. All quotations, unless stated otherwise, are drawn from these interviews, which, for the purpose of the book, were anonymised. They are marked with the Polish abbreviations of the respective parties and numbers assigned to the interviews. For instance, the fifth interviewee from the PSL is marked in this book with PSL_5. Grassroots-level party members were asked to complete a questionnaire. In total, between 2016 and 2018, we got back 2,587 of such questionnaires,3 either as online surveys or during party congresses and meetings. In the latter cases, we were also able to conduct direct nonparticipant observation. The exact manner in which the questionnaires were filled in depended on the leadership’s consent to a particular form of distribution. None of the examined formations granted us access to membership databases that could constitute our sampling frame. Therefore, we could neither draw a random sample nor predict the response rate. As a result, we settled on a convenience sample. 3 The numbers of respondents from each party were as follows: the PiS – 124; the PO – 737; the .N – 591; the PSL – 400; the SLD – 279 and the Together Party – 456.

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Data collected through questionnaires were complemented through focus group interviews (FGIs) with party members. The interviews were scripted so as to find out more about individual motivations and levels of involvement in partisan activity, as well as to gauge interviewees’ opinions on the organisational and communicational aspects of the functioning of their respective parties. We led six FGIs in two cities—each one was attended by rank-and-file members of a single formation, what allowed the respondents to concentrate on their party and discuss freely in their own group. Another group scrutinised during the course of our research was the administrative staff of the six examined parties. They were asked to complete questionnaires, which provided us with an additional insight into how political entities operate as organisations, including in terms of communication. Clerical staff, working both at the national level and in regional/local branches, described and evaluated the activities of their respective parties as membership organisations. We were able to collect 47 such questionnaires from all six parties—they were filled in either directly by the respondents or by the researcher during interviews. A separate portion of the research focused on the voters. In January 2018, a research agency conducted a survey on a representative sample of adult Poles (1,006), based on ESOMAR standards. We used it as a source of information on how the electorate perceived political parties: their image among citizens, assessments of them and what is expected of them. Moreover, we drew certain conclusions regarding respondents’ willingness to engage in partisan politics. The final element of our work required us to discover parties’ actual, rather than declarative, readiness to accept new members. To that end, students of three Polish universities (the University of Wroclaw, the Nicolaus Copernicus University in Torun´ and the University of Rzeszów) were asked to utilise the mystery shopping method. Operating as a mystery client, each student selected one of the six examined parties and attempted to join its ranks. This took the form of field research as students visited parties’ regional offices in three Polish districts4 and held short conversations with the staff, always following an identical script. Subsequently, they described the course and outcomes of their meetings on an observation sheet. The three selected regions vary widely in terms 4 The three selected districts were as follows: Dolno´sl˛askie, Kujawsko-Pomorskie and Podkarpackie.

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of political traditions and prevailing voter preferences so as to minimise any potential distortion caused by location-specific factors. In total, 47 observations were made. Despite our extensive experience in studying political parties, we encountered difficulties that many political scientists had previously observed during empirical research (see for example: Pomper 1990; Tavits 2013). As Margit Tavits wrote, ‘studying party organizations is notoriously challenging (which probably explains the dearth of empirical studies on this topic, even in advanced democracies). (…) Parties themselves are relatively secretive and closed organizations’ (Tavits 2013: 13). Multiple field trips and interviews, preceded by endless phone calls and e-mail exchanges—these were the realities of our work, as respondents’ willingness to participate was far from what we would have liked to see. On some occasions, the leadership of a given formation first consented to us conducting IDIs or to pollsters being present during the party congress, only to backtrack on their decision—sometimes at the very last second, after the researcher had already arrived at the venue. This not only meant unnecessary costs, but also tested our patience and composure, as we needed to find creative solutions and tap into layers and layers of resolve. We were driven by the conviction that in order to get an accurate picture of contemporary Polish parties, we could not limit our efforts to analysing the existing literature, secondary data, materials produced by parties themselves or relevant media content. We needed to incorporate field research. At the same time, we kept in mind Aleks Szczerbiak’s assertion that ‘it is extremely difficult to obtain relevant data on internal party life [and] there is a serious problem of distinguishing formal accounts of how parties operate from what occurs in practice’ (Szczerbiak 2001: 4). By applying mixed methods and critically analysing all the collected data, we were able to largely alleviate that problem. The right combination of sources and methods allowed us to spot patterns, draw conclusions on the nature of the observed phenomena and generalise them, even if only for a limited temporal and spatial context.

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Scarrow, S., Webb, P., & Poguntke, T. (Eds.). (2017). Organizing political parties. Representation, participation, and power. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Schattschneider, E. (1942/2017). Party government. New York: Holt, Reinhart and Winston. https://books.google.pl/books?id=CK00DwAAQBAJ&pri ntsec=frontcover&dq=Schattschneider,+Elmer&hl=pl&sa=X&ved=0ahUKE wiqnoPZkcnnAhWB_KQKHe-BDl4Q6AEIKTAA#v=onepage&q=Schattsch neider%2C%20Elmer&f=false. Accessed 11 February 2020. Schlesinger, J. (1984). On the theory of party organization. Journal of Politics, 46(2), 369–400. Sobolewska-My´slik, K., Kosowska-G˛astoł, B., & Borowiec, P. (2010). Struktury organizacyjne polskich partii politycznych. Kraków: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellonskiego. ´ Sobolewska-My´slik, K., Kosowska-G˛astoł, B., & Borowiec, P. (Eds.). (2016). Organizational structures of political parties in Central and Eastern Europe. Kraków: Jagiellonian University Press. Splichal, S. (2001). Imitative revolutions changes in the media and journalism in East-Central Europe. Javnost - The Public, 8(4), 31–58. https://doi.org/10. 1080/13183222.2001.11008785. Strøm, K. (1990). A behavioral theory of competitive political parties. American Journal of Political Science, 34(2), 565–598. Szczerbiak, A. (2001). Poles together? Emergence and development of political parties in post-communist Poland. Budapest: CEU Press. Szczerbiak, A. (2006). Power without love? Patterns of party politics in post – 1989 Poland. In S. Jungerstam-Mulders (Ed.), Postcommunist EU member states party and party systems (pp. 91–124). Hampshire, Burlington: Ashgate. Szymczak, J. (2019, June 13). Partie jak ekskluzywne kluby, nalezy ˙ do nich tylko 0,8% Polaków. To fatalny wynik na tle Europy. Oko Press. Retrieved from https://oko.press/partie-jak-klubiki-dla-elit-nalezy-do-nichtylko-08-proc-polakow-to-fatalny-wynik-na-tle-europy/dost˛ep. Accessed 15 October 2019. Tavits, M. (2012). Organizing for success: Party organizational strength and electoral performance in postcommunist Europe. The Journal of Politics, 74(1), 83–97. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022381611001198. Tavits, M. (2013). Post-communist democracies and party organization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. van Aelst, P., Strömbäck, J., Aalberg, T., Esser, F., de Vreese, C., Matthes, J., et al. (2017). Political communication in a high-choice media environment: A challenge for democracy? Annals of the International Communication Association, 41(1), 3–27. https://doi.org/10.1080/23808985.2017.1288551. van Biezen, I. (2003). Political parties in new democracies. London: Palgrave.

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van Biezen, I., Mair, P., & Poguntke, T. (2011). Going, going, ...gone? The decline of party membership in contemporary Europe. European Journal of Political Research, 51(1), 24–56. van Haute, E. (2009). Adhérer à un parti. Aux sources de la participation politique. Bruxelles: Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles. van Haute, E. (Ed.). (2011). Party membership in Europe: Exploration into the anthills of party politics. Bruxelles: Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles. Weber, M. (2002). Gospodarka i społeczenstwo. ´ Zarys socjologii rozumiejacej. ˛ Warszawa: Polskie Wydawnictwo Naukowe. Wincławska, M., & Brodzinska-Mirowska, ´ B. (2016). Niewykorzystane szanse? Polskie partie polityczne w działaniu. Torun: ´ Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika. Wring, D. (2005). The politics of marketing the Labour Party. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Zielonka, J. (Ed.). (2015). Media and politics in new democracies: Europe in a comparative perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

CHAPTER 2

Democracy in Poland: The Post-communist Regime and Its Performance

Presumably, the Polish political system should no longer be described as a young or unconsolidated democracy; after all, 2019 marked 30 years since the first, partially free election of the post-communist era. However, the three decades that have elapsed since the beginning of the democratic transition was not enough to build high levels of public trust in politicians and political institutions. This particular problem has been experienced by many post-communist states. Polish citizens’ knowledge of and interest in politics is low, as are election turnout rates. Since 2015, public media have been subordinated to the right-wing coalition government and have openly supported the ruling party. Poland, however, appears to represent a double paradox. First, some scholars see the weakening of Polish democracy as one of many manifestations of the ‘liberal Europe in retreat’ (Zielonka 2018). At the same time, if one looks at the situation from the perspective of the internal balance of power within the political system, some parties have actually strengthened their role in it, thus disproving the notion that ‘the age of party democracy has passed’ (Mair 2013: 3). Secondly, despite a rather loose connection with their electorate, some formations successfully implemented strategies that consolidated them institutionally, they attempted to cartelise the party system by trying to close the political market to other entities, such as new parties, non-party actors and political movements. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 M. Jacunski ´ et al., Party Organization and Communication in Poland, Political Campaigning and Communication, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59993-5_2

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Having recently celebrated the 30th anniversary of the so-called Round Table Talks, negotiations that are thought to symbolise the beginning of the democratic transition, Poland stands at a turning point, with the prospect of moving towards some form of illiberal democracy (Tomini 2015; Coman and Tomini 2015). Such a model of governance, where the system of checks and balances becomes inoperative, is based on, among others factors, the presence of a strong predominant party and its populist appeal. In Central Europe, this was first implemented in Hungary after Fidesz, led by Viktor Orbán, came to power in 2010 (Tomini and Sandri 2018). Such regimes are legitimised both domestically and in the international community by regular elections, but in fact the function of such elections is to stabilise, reinforce and consolidate the power of a single political party. This chapter serves as a background for the analysis of the contemporary political parties and relates to the legacy of the post-1989 regime: its impact on the political landscape in Poland, the level of citizens’ trust towards the public institutions and each other, turnout rates and the sustainability of democratic institutions.

2.1

The Legacy of the Communist Regime

Poland’s transition towards democracy (i.e. the introduction of the democratic order) was characterised by a temporary coexistence of institutional elements typical of authoritarian states and democracies (Morlino 2008). A power-sharing agreement was struck by the elites representing the communist regime and the now legalised pro-democratic opposition. Institutions and procedures inherited from the pre-1989 era functioned alongside other components that are typical of well-developed democracies. This dichotomy was exemplified by the composition of the parliament, where the majority in the Sejm (the first chamber of parliament) remained in the hands of the communists even after the 1989 semifree election, vis-à-vis the line-up of the new cabinet formed in August of that year, which was led and dominated by the opposition. The two political milieus—erstwhile rivals—were now participating in the gradual dismantling of dysfunctional elements incompatible with democratic standards. This was done primarily through changes to the law, as stipulations providing the basis for the authoritarian rule were replaced by new norms which allowed genuine pluralism, protected the citizens from abuses of

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power on the part of the state and introduced accountability for the authorities (Antoszewski 2016: 15–16). The transition process was evolutionary in nature. In the course of the Round Table Talks, held from February to April 1989, the representatives of the communist party and the opposition reached an agreement. This envisaged the drafting of a new constitution within two years (by 1991) and the organisation of a free election within four years (by 1993). First, however, there was to be a single semi-free election in June 1989, in which 65% of the seats in the Sejm were guaranteed to remain with the communist party and its allies. Such an arrangement created something of a hybrid: a reality where the ruling role of the communist party was still enshrined as a key tenet of the political system, while at the same time the opposition was granted entirely legal, albeit limited, access to the parliamentary arena. The Senate (the second chamber) was to be elected without any undemocratic restrictions. This solution, however, proved short-lived. Only a few months later, in August, Poland became the first Soviet Bloc country with a non-communist government—a move that went well beyond the Round Table agreement. The revamp of the constitutional framework in Poland began in April 1989, just after the end of the Round Table Talks. The parliament was transformed into a bicameral institution, and the office of president was introduced. In December, the parliament abolished those articles of the constitution which described Poland as a socialist state and the Polish United Workers’ Party (abbreviated in Polish to PZPR) as a ‘civic leader’ and ‘the governing entity’. March 1990 saw the adoption of a new law regarding local self-government (shaped in line with the European Charter of Local Self-Government) and a statute for local and regional elections. By opening this area to democratic competition, the latter document de facto reinstated local self-government as an independent political entity rather than a mere figurehead, a status to which it had been confined under the communist regime. The next step was a thorough reconstruction of the institutions operating under the Ministry of the Interior. The notorious Security Service, PZPR’s primary tool of oppression, was shut down. The police changed its name (the previous denomination ‘milicja’ suggested it was somehow a ‘civil’ entity, which was the exact opposite to its actual nature). In the same time, censorship was abolished. Subsequent amendments to the constitutional framework concerned the introduction of political pluralism. In May 1990, the parliament voted on a new act on political parties, which guaranteed citizens

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the right to form political organisations and regulated their functioning. More on this topic can be found in Chapter 3. After the fall of communism, breaking away from the past became an issue of utmost importance for the new political elite born out of the anti-communist opposition movement of the 1980s. The pattern of de-communisation was not uniform across Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), depending on various factors, primarily the character of the communist regime and the type of transition to democracy. Compared to other countries in the region, Poland had been subjected to a relatively liberal variation of communism. Changes towards a free market economy had already been initiated in the late 1980s, as the regime had been forced to address at least some of the worst woes brought on by decades of ruinous economic policy. Because the transition towards democracy had started with the negotiations between the ruling communist party and the opposition, the process of de-communisation was systematic but unhurried, limited in scope and depth (Mˇešˇtánková and Filipec 2019: 64–65). Some parts of the new political elites believed that such a gradual, negotiated shift corrupted the emerging democratic order and its institutions, such as the courts, the media and the bureaucratic structures. Today, it is exactly this group, represented by Law and Justice (PiS) and its leader, Jarosław Kaczynski, ´ that questions the achievements of the post-1989 era, proposing changes to the constitutional order and the construction of the so-called IV Republic.1 After 1989, the attitude towards communism’s legacy became one of the key themes of the political debate and a major point of disagreement among various actors and stakeholders. The transition mechanism based on a compromise caused deep divisions, with politicians arguing about how (or whether) to hold members of the erstwhile regime accountable for their past. As the former communist party revamped itself in

1 The 1997 constitution refers to the post-1989 political order as the III Republic of Poland (the I Republic being the nobles’ democracy of the sixteenth century and the II Republic signifying the 1918–1939 period), thus emphasising the contrast with the pre-1989 era when the country’s official name was the People’s Republic of Poland. Kaczynski ´ maintains that the III Republic is an altogether post-communist creation, a fraudulent system based on a morally corrupt compromise that accommodates former oppressors. The term ‘IV Republic’ was first used publicly in 1997 by a Polish conservative philosopher, Rafał Matyja. In the 2005 parliamentary election campaign, the right-leaning Law and Justice (PiS) party used this as a political slogan describing its plan for a moral revolution and political change.

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the 1990s into a Western-style social-democratic formation, it maintained that the pre-1989 order was the consequence of the post–World War II balance of power in Europe rather than any domestic factors. While the post-communists did not deny that the previous authorities were guilty of numerous crimes, they justified them by pointing to unusual political circumstances. Moreover, they claimed that, on the whole, the regime’s achievements outweighed its downsides, pointing to significant progress in urbanisation and industrialisation, as well as an improved standard of living for blue-collar workers and farmers (Dudek 2016: 53). In contrast to the post-communist camp which spoke on the matter with a single voice, the former opposition split into two groups. The first was led and represented by Lech Wał˛esa—the legendary leader and symbol of the Solidarity movement, who in 1990 was elected president of Poland. Wał˛esa and other like-minded politicians, including Jarosław Kaczynski, ´ then at the head of the Centre Agreement party (PC), championed a far-reaching de-communisation. They demanded a universal, unequivocal condemnation of the regime. The identities of the informants of the former Security Service were to be disclosed to all citizens. The public administration was to be reshuffled and largely repopulated with new staff. Members of the regime were to be stripped of the wealth they had acquired at the expense of the general public while in power (Dudek 2007: 132). The second perspective, sometimes referred to as ‘drawing the line’, was personified by the first non-communist prime minister, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, who believed that the fledging Polish democracy needed to focus on introducing the rule of law and the free market economy rather than de-communisation. Mazowiecki acknowledged the role of certain members of the communist apparatus who in 1989 negotiated with the opposition at the Round Table and worked on the compromise regarding the systemic transition. He saw former communists as eligible participants in the political life under the new order. One of the measures of de-communisation adopted across Central and Eastern Europe was the so-called lustration: the screening of incumbents of and candidates for certain posts (e.g. high-level officials in the public administration, police, judiciary and media), intended to reveal cases of collaboration with the communist Security Service. If such collaboration was proven, the person in question was dismissed from the position and banned from further political activity. In Poland, the issue of lustration was first discussed by the parliament in 1992. A resolution adopted in May

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of that year obliged the Minister of the Interior to disclose which current MPs, members of the cabinet, district governors, judges and prosecutors had records of secret collaboration with the Security Service between 1945 and 1990. The list, based on the archival records of the Security Service, was published on June 4, 1992, exactly three years after the semi-free election. It included the names of then-President Lech Wał˛esa, the speaker of the Sejm, and MPs from nearly all parliamentary parties, as well as ministers in the government. The manner in which the new law was enacted caused a major political storm. The right-wing government was dismissed. The Constitutional Court found that the resolution was actually in breach of the constitution. As the dust settled, the decommunisation of the political elites came to an abrupt halt and was effectively delayed by several years. The next attempt at lustrating high-ranking public officials came in 1997, when a more conciliatory lustration law was passed by the parliament dominated by two post-communist parties: the Democratic Left Alliance and the Polish People’s Party. The new act obliged individuals holding or seeking certain posts to present their own statements specifying whether or not they had collaborated with the communistera Security Service. The range of positions under scrutiny was quite broad: it included the president, MPs, high-level officials and judges, as well as leading figures in the public media and academia (Krotoszynski ´ 2014: 206). However, collaboration itself, if admitted by the person in question, was not penalised. Only those found to have submitted a false statement (i.e. those who lied to the public by denying collaboration) were to be prosecuted. A significant change came with the decline of the post-communist political parties and the rise of their right-wing rivals. In 2007, when Law and Justice was in government, a harsher lustration law was adopted with support from the Civic Platform. The new act required around 300,000–400,000 high-level politicians, scientists, scholars and members of other professions to provide statements on whether they had collaborated with the secret police before 1989. When Law and Justice, Kaczynski’s ´ party, returned to power in 2015, the accountability of the communist regime became one of the focal points of the new right-wing conservative government. In 2016, the parliament passed new legislation which prohibited the propagation of communism and other totalitarian ideologies. The act applied mostly to symbolic aspects, introducing, for example, a requirement to remove all

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street names deemed to suggest a positive association with the communist past. In 2017, the law was extended to encompass monuments, commemorative plaques, sculptures and symbols located in public spaces. The first 15 years of the democratic era were marked by a deep postcommunist cleavage (Grabowska 2004). This applied not only to political parties and elites but also to society at large: it affected individual identities, convictions and electoral preferences. The opposing groups differed in their political provenance and reflections on the communist past, as well as in their positions on more contemporary matters, such as the preferred model of democracy, social order and governance and attitudes towards the Catholic Church. The influence of the cleavage lessened somewhat after the Democratic Left Alliance, the successor party formed in place of the PZPR, lost much of its political relevance following a number of corruption scandals (Słowikowski and Pierzgalski 2019: 58), repeatedly suffering heavy electoral defeats. The 2005 parliamentary election campaign redefined the main axis of political competition in Poland. The post-communist dilemma was replaced by another division: ‘liberal Poland’ vs. ‘Poland of solidarity’. This time, the roles of bitter rivals were assumed by two parties of anticommunist provenance: the Civic Platform and Law and Justice. This fundamental rift has persisted until today. One camp, populated by liberal and left-wing formations, advocates a more liberal version of democracy with free, pluralistic media as well as numerous checks and balances. The other group, occupying the right side of the political spectrum, pushes for a stronger state and a more pronounced role for the executive branch (Zdravkovski 2019: 20). Preaching ‘sovereign democracy’, it places the nation state at the centre of politics and sees the public media as a means to support the ruling majority’s position and communication efforts. The divide over communism’s legacy and the extreme polarisation between the left–liberal and right-wing conservative parties generated political apathy and a general distrust towards public institutions among society.

2.2

Trust in Political and Public Institutions

While trust is a phenomenon rooted in social psychology, its presence in the political realm is necessary for the functioning of a democracy (e.g. Rose 1994; Tilly 2005: 133). Hence, it is emphasised by both sociologists and political scientists. It is needed ‘practically wherever people interact,

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work as teams or groups, and function in various communities’ (Szymczyk 2016: 19). Trust enables cooperation among individuals, strengthens social bonds and is vital for society’s growth. It binds people to a certain social and political system adopted by the state. Democracy is thought to be a type of system particularly conducive to the establishment of trust between the state and its citizens, as trust ‘results from democracy and, at the same time, enhances it’ (Sztompka 2007: 343). However, democracy has a built-in component of institutionalised distrust, which materialises in the shape of various control mechanisms: checks and balances, periodically held elections and the stability and primacy of law. Free media and the institution of the ombudsman are also tools designed to control authorities and hold them accountable. While the presence of so many safeguards in a supposedly trust-friendly system may seem like a paradox, it can be easily explained. Democracy places trust in its institutions, which are designed to act for the common good. At the same time, it lets society scrutinise the actions of the individuals in charge of these institutions, thus ensuring they serve their intended purpose. In states ruled by communist or other non-democratic regimes, the overarching theme of social relations is suspiciousness—people trust neither public institutions nor their fellow citizens. The stifling atmosphere within society is exacerbated by the ever-present threat of denunciations and the omnipotence of secretive security services. In Poland, this legacy of communism is evident even today. This is hardly surprising. As the transition initiated in 1989 led the country through numerous swift changes, the country has not had a chance to experience stability, which is one of the prerequisites for building people’s trust in political institutions. Laws regarding virtually every area of social, economic and political life have seen a myriad of changes. For example, the Act on Political Parties, adopted in its initial form in 1997, has been amended 20 times in 22 years. The election statute, originally introduced in 2011, had seen 29 changes by the end of 2019.2 Sociologists and political scientists usually examine two dimensions of trust. The first refers to interpersonal relations: people’s trust towards their fellow citizens, an element which enables the growth of social capital (Fukuyama 1995; Putnam 2000). Constituting a prerequisite for the other type of trust, namely trust towards institutions, it is seen as a civic

2 Based on the authors’ own calculations.

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value (Haman 2012: 97), as, in the words of Putnam (1993: 171), ‘[it] lubricates cooperation. The greater the level of trust within a community, the greater the likelihood of cooperation. And cooperation itself breeds trust’. Researchers point to a correlation between levels of trust and civic activity, claiming that ‘in societies where citizens are involved and active, a higher degree of trust is recorded. Conversely, a low level of trust suggests stagnation and apathy within the society’ (Szymczak 2016: 243). Researchers also maintain that ‘trust breeds a closer bond between the population and the institutions of state, provided the latter act predictably as the guarantors of safety’ (Bartkowski 2016: 242). The second type of trust describes citizens’ attitudes towards state institutions and other actors present in the public sphere, including entirely independent entities such as private media and non-governmental organisations. According to surveys conducted periodically by a Polish institution, the Public Opinion Research Centre (CBOS, in its Polish abbreviation), and the European Social Survey (ESS), Poles are rather distrustful. In Europe, Poland ranks among the countries with the highest deficit of public trust (Cybulska and Pankowski 2018; Domanski ´ 2012: 12). Poles exhibit a fairly high distrust of people other than their relatives and friends, as well as of the institutions of state. Between 2010 and 2018, only 25–30% of Poles adopted a trusting attitude in social relations, as measured by a synthetic benchmark developed by CBOS.3 Similar to other countries in Central and Eastern Europe, Poland recorded noticeably lower levels of interpersonal trust than the western part of the continent. In fact, except for Bulgaria (and, in 2010, Slovenia), Poland has recorded the lowest trust levels of all CEE states in each edition of the European Social Survey (Table 2.1). Tendencies at the interpersonal level translate into public and political life (Domanski ´ 2012: 9, 16). The aforementioned CBOS survey shows low trust in public institutions. In 2018, Poles were asked about their

3 The benchmark was constructed around three questions: (1) In general, can most people be trusted? (2) In general, do you trust strangers encountered in different situations? (3) Does trusting your business partner usually pay off? (Cybulska and Pankowski 2018: 2–4).

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Table 2.1 Interpersonal trust as measured by responses to the following statement: ‘Most people can be trusted or you can’t be too careful’

Austria Belgium Bulgaria Czech Republic Denmark Estonia Finland France Germany Hungary Ireland Italy Lithuania Netherlands Norway Poland Portugal Slovenia Spain Sweden Switzerland United Kingdom

2010

2012

2014

2016

2018

– 5,95 4,52 5,57 7,73 6,66 7,48 5,26 5,69 5,48 6,28 – 5,74 7,03 7,62 5,33 4,86 4,96 6,10 7,31 6,64 6,24

– 6,04 4,35 5,42 7,87 6,49 7,56 5,42 5,90 5,80 6,19 5,79 6,16 6,96 7,63 5,12 4,67 5,53 6,15 6,99 6,67 6,36

6,07 5,97 – 5,55 7,75 6,56 7,69 5,57 6,02 5,16 6,25 – 5,87 7,00 7,54 4,93 4,67 5,11 5,87 7,20 6,70 6,35

6,45 6,17 – 6,05 – 6,73 7,70 5,56 6,24 5,51 6,58 5,54 6,17 7,03 7,71 5,10 5,05 5,43 5,99 7,06 6,97 6,39

6,52 6,17 4,51 5,96 – 6,61 7,94 5,68 6,40 5,76 6,51 5,78 – 7,21 7,77 5,04 – 5,48 – – 6,89 6,20

Source Authors’ elaboration based on data from the European Social Survey Values in the table represent averages on a scale from 1 to 11, where 1 signifies a complete lack of trust, while 11 means total trust ‘–’ means a given question was not asked in that particular country or that the particular edition of the survey was not conducted in the country in question

attitudes towards 13 different bodies.4 Only five of them (local authorities, the president, the ombudsman, public administration staff and the European Union) enjoyed the trust of more than half of all respondents. Political parties, for whom trust levels stood at a lowly 23% (Cybulska

4 Polish citizens were asked about their trust towards the following institutions: local authorities (municipalities and counties), the president of Poland, the ombudsman, public administration staff, the European Union, the Institute of National Remembrance, the government, TV, parliament, courts, newspapers, the Constitutional Court and political parties.

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30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0% 2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2016

2018

Fig. 2.1 Trust in political parties in Poland (Source Authors’ elaboration based on Cybulska and Pankowski 2018: 9)

and Pankowski 2018: 7), were far behind this group. It should be noted, however, that trust towards parties has increased since 2010 (Fig. 2.1). A slight increase in trust towards political parties has been a universal theme across Europe in recent years, as indicated by the European Social Survey. Nonetheless, in the larger picture, the numbers remain fairly low. Comparative research puts Poland among the countries with the lowest trust levels. Over the period encompassed by the survey, only Bulgaria, Italy and Slovenia scored lower, as shown in Table 2.2. A similar trend can be seen with regard to politicians: Table 2.3 presents average rates for the period from 2010 to 2018. High levels of trust in other people and institutions of a democratic system decrease the cost of governance and allow authorities to use the society’s resources, both material (e.g. citizens do not evade taxes and are willing to purchase treasury bonds) and symbolic (e.g. support and recognition) (Sztompka 2007: 341). Data from the European Social Survey reveal a positive correlation between interpersonal trust and trust in politicians or political parties.5 A link, albeit less pronounced, is also visible 5 In the 2018 edition, the correlation coefficient between the variables (1) ‘Most people can be trusted or you can’t be too careful’ and (2) ‘Trust in politicians’ stands at 0,364

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Table 2.2 Trust in political parties in selected EU member states, 2010–2018 Country

2010

2012

2014

2016

2018

Austria Belgium Bulgaria Czech Republic Denmark Estonia Finland France Germany Hungary Ireland Italy Lithuania Netherlands Norway Poland Portugal Slovenia Spain Sweden Switzerland United Kingdom

– 4,82 2,95 3,71 6,12 4,43 5,53 4,13 4,32 4,14 4,07 – 3,12 6,31 5,93 3,52 3,09 3,24 3,74 6,11 5,80 4,43

– 5,23 2,80 3,69 6,31 4,20 5,89 4,13 4,68 4,24 3,94 3,00 3,82 6,02 6,15 3,21 2,87 3,27 2,88 5,86 5,99 4,61

4,51 5,14 – 4,31 5,97 4,42 5,64 3,75 4,92 3,95 4,29 – 3,94 5,87 6,29 2,97 3,22 2,97 3,21 6,06 6,06 4,58

4,87 5,00 – 4,56 – 4,62 5,84 3,86 5,14 4,55 4,75 3,26 4,20 6,14 6,43 3,44 3,67 3,48 3,43 5,80 6,24 4,87

5,13 5,26 3,15 4,61 – 4,75 6,03 4,08 4,99 4,91 4,86 3,92 – 6,39 6,40 4,17 – 3,70 – – 6,25 4,58

Source Authors’ elaboration based on data from the European Social Survey Values in the table represent averages on a scale from 1 to 11, where 1 signifies a complete lack of trust, while 11 means total trust ‘–’ means a given question was not asked in that particular country or that the particular edition of the survey was not conducted in the country in question

between people’s trust in other citizens and their interest in politics,6 as well as their readiness to get involved in the activities of a political

(p < 0,01) for all surveyed countries. For Poland, it stands at 0,191 (p < 0,01). Slightly lower values were recorded for the following variables: (1) ‘Most people can be trusted or you can’t be too careful’ and (2) ‘Trust in political parties’. These stand at 0,358 (p < 0,01) and 0,178 (p < 0,01) for all surveyed countries and Poland, respectively. 6 In the 2018 edition, the correlation coefficient between the variables (1) ‘Most people can be trusted or you can’t be too careful’ and (2) ‘How interested in politics’ stands at 0,197 (p < 0,01) for all surveyed countries. For Poland, it stands at 0,147 (p < 0,01). The value for the following variables (1) ‘Trust in political parties’ and (2) ‘How interested in politics’ is 0,24 (p < 0,01) for all surveyed countries, and 0,123 (p < 0,01) for Poland.

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Table 2.3 Trust in politicians in selected EU member states, 2010–2018 Country

2010

2012

2014

2016

2018

Austria Belgium Bulgaria Czech Republic Denmark Estonia Finland France Germany Hungary Ireland Italy Lithuania Netherlands Norway Poland Portugal Slovenia Spain Sweden Switzerland United Kingdom

– 4,82 2,94 3,63 5,98 4,60 5,41 4,22 4,34 4,11 4,11 – 3,15 6,29 5,95 3,63 3,03 3,25 3,76 6,05 6,00 4,34

– 5,28 2,70 3,55 6,10 4,29 5,83 4,21 4,72 4,29 4,09 2,88 3,93 6,15 6,08 3,22 2,80 3,27 2,91 5,71 6,20 4,69

4,55 5,13 – 4,26 5,82 4,47 5,57 3,78 4,88 3,94 4,34 – 4,12 5,90 6,21 3,01 3,06 2,87 3,23 5,95 6,25 4,50

4,92 5,08 – 4,62 – 4,67 5,69 3,89 5,09 4,69 4,75 3,27 4,48 6,08 6,35 3,50 3,49 3,44 3,41 5,76 6,37 4,78

5,23 5,26 3,11 4,61 – 4,89 5,90 4,54 4,97 5,02 4,94 4,04 – 6,39 6,28 4,11 – 3,67 – – 6,37 4,51

Source Authors’ elaboration based on data from the European Social Survey Values in the table represent averages on a scale from 1 to 11, where 1 signifies a complete lack of trust, while 11 means total trust ‘–’ means a given question was not asked in that particular country or that the particular edition of the survey was not conducted in the country in question

grouping.7 The level of trust seems to be higher if the respondents feel a particular affinity to any of the existing parties. In the case of interpersonal relations, the correlation is low,8 but it increases if trust in political 7 For all surveyed countries, the correlation coefficient between the following variables (1) ‘Most people can be trusted or you can’t be too careful’ and (2) ‘Able to take active role in political group’ stands at 0,177 (p < 0,01). For Poland, it stands at 0,157 (p < 0,01). For another set of variables: (1) ‘Trust in political parties’ and (2) ‘Able to take active role in political group’, is 0,201 (p < 0,01) for all surveyed countries, and 0,148 (p < 0,01) for Poland. 8 In the 2018 edition, the correlation coefficient between the variables (1) ‘Most people can be trusted or you can’t be too careful’ and (2) ‘Feel closer to a particular party than

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formations is considered.9 Higher trust means the world of politics is seen more positively and the respondents declare greater willingness to participate, although the latter element does not apply to voting in elections. All surveyed EU countries recorded only a marginal correlation between individual trust and voter turnouts in the most recent elections. All other analyses we have so far conducted led to statistically insignificant results.10 Data from CBOS’s research paint a somewhat different picture, suggesting a definite link between trust and voter turnouts. The survey shows that the more trustful a given person is towards other citizens and political institutions, the more likely they are to declare their intention to participate in elections. Details are presented in Table 2.4. Table 2.4 Relation between trust levels (general and institutional) and declarative participation in parliamentary elections Declared willingness to vote in parliamentary elections

Average values General trust level (from –3 to 3)

Trust in the public sphere (0–13 scale)

–0,65 –1,37 –1,57 –0,87

6,13 4,47 3,91 5,57

‘Will vote’ ‘Not sure’ ‘Do not intend to vote’ Average Source Cybulska and Pankowski (2018: 11)

The discrepancies between the results of the European Social Survey and CBOS’s work stem from the methodologies adopted by the two research teams. Although both intend to examine the same phenomenon, they do so in a different manner. The ESS asks about citizens’ actual all other parties’ stands at 0,118 (p < 0,01) for all surveyed countries, and at 0,074 (p < 0,01) for Poland. 9 For the variables (1) ‘Trust in political parties’ and (2) ‘Feel closer to a particular party than all other parties’, the correlation coefficient stands at 0,202 (p < 0,01) and 0,211 (p < 0,01), respectively. 10 The correlation coefficient between the variables (1) ‘Most people can be trusted or you can’t be too careful’ and ‘Voted last national election’ stands at 0,054 (p < 0,01) for all countries surveyed in the ESS, but for Poland the correlation is insignificant (p > 0,05) for. The correlation between ‘Trust in political parties’ and ‘Voted last national election’ is statistically insignificant (p > 0,05) for Poland and all surveyed countries alike.

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past electoral behaviours, while CBOS opts for collecting declarative statements regarding the future. Experience shows that voter turnout is typically lower than people’s declarations would suggest. Therefore, the results referred to here cannot provide an unequivocal answer as to whether trust in other citizens and public institutions is correlated with participation in elections. Relatively low trust in fellow citizens and institutions stems from several factors. One of these, commonly present in all contemporary democratic societies, is the emergence of a ‘risk society’ (Beck 1992). Amid the development of science and technology that progress individualisation and the constant flood of information (including fake news), people functioning in late-modern or post-modern societies feel more and more lost. At the same time, public institutions—primarily the authorities—come under increased scrutiny and criticism. As stated by Pippa Norris (2011: 188–216), societies are disappointed with the perceived ineffectiveness of public policies and infringements of basic tenets of the political system. They are increasingly critical of the quality and honesty of political elites. In Central and Eastern Europe, the problem is compounded by the legacy of authoritarian regimes, still reflected in the political culture. In extreme cases, this ‘instinctive’ or ‘cultural’ distrust leads to ‘demobilisation, passivity, caution, opportunism, distancing, atomisation and alienation’ in interpersonal relations (Sztompka 2002: 324), which, in turn, translate into weaker links between citizens and the state. The end result is a low level of civic activity, disinterest in the public sphere and disengagement from political life.

2.3

Low Voter Turnout

A lack of trust in political actors and institutions does not automatically mean that democratic processes lack legitimacy. In democratic systems, there are different forms of citizens’ control over decision-makers. Therefore, the relationship between the population and the policy makers does not need to be based merely on trust. In fact, distrust towards democratically elected political actors and institutions can be regarded as a hallmark of a healthy democracy. Representative democracy requires attentive citizens who evaluate the performance of decision-makers and hold them accountable in elections (Grönlund and Setälä 2007: 400). People’s participation in elections is the essence of democracy, regardless of whether one follows the procedural perspective (Schumpeter

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2013), whereby electoral competition is the most important feature of a democratic system, or any other model (consociational, deliberative, participatory, etc.) which sees regular voting as a relevant, but not the only, form of individual political activity. It is also common-sense wisdom that the voter turnout matters. Its consistently high level is often seen as a manifestation of democratic legitimacy (Topf 1995: 27). However, studies on democratic systems show that this does not have to be tantamount to the acceptance of the political system and support for decision-makers. Instead, it could be a form of ritualistic behaviour (Raciborski 2010: 106). In Poland, just like in other CEE states, before 1989 ritualistic electoral behaviours were commonplace, with the turnout rate frequently exceeding 90% (Raciborski and Wiatr 1987). However, these were not signs of citizens’ approval and legitimisation of the authorities. If one accepts that high turnout rates, be it in democracies or non-democratic countries, do not legitimise the political system as such, it can similarly be argued that the opposite trend does not necessarily mean the regime is not accepted by the people. One example of this is Switzerland, where voters do not consider parliamentary elections as a vital influence and control mechanisms because of the consensual composition of the Swiss government and the extensive use of referendums (Trechsel and Kriesi 1996). Nonetheless, low turnout rates in democratic states are typically thought to confirm a growing distance between citizens and their representatives. When compared to the recent decline in turnout across the democratic world, high levels of electoral absenteeism (an average turnout of 45% in all types of elections over the last 30 years) make Poland the most apathetic democracy in the entire EU. All other post-communist member states fared better (Fig. 2.2). Even if such a statistic is not sufficient to question the legitimacy of democracy as such, extensive absenteeism is a serious cause for concern in post-transition states where democratic procedures are not fully embedded in society (Cze´snik 2009: 5). Voter turnout in Poland depends on the type of election (Fig. 2.3). It is highest in the presidential elections (58%) and visibly below average in local elections (45%), despite the fact that Poles consider the latter to be the most important electoral event. Obviously, the significance attributed to different types of elections is not reflected in turnout rates. André Blais (2007: 624) explains that ‘higher turnout observed in presidential elections may indicate that more personalised campaigns have greater appeal.

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100%

90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%

Fig. 2.2 Mean turnout in legislative elections in post-communist EU countries (1989–2019) (Source Compiled by the authors based on data from the Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance [IDEA]) 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Presidenal

Parliamentary

Local

European

Fig. 2.3 Mean turnout in Poland in different types of elections (1989–2020) (Source Compiled by the authors based on data from the National Electoral Commission)

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The lower turnout in local elections may reflect the lesser importance given to local government, but it may also result from weaker media coverage’. Across all parliamentary elections held over the three decades following the transition, the average absence rate has hovered around 50%, albeit there were cases, such as the 1989 and 2019 elections, where the turnout rates were higher, at 62.7% and 61.7%, respectively. Poles have least interest in the European Parliament (EP) elections, in which the average turnout is a mere 28%. Interestingly, in the most recent EP election, held in 2019 amid a particularly high polarisation of the electorate, this rate stood at a much higher 45%. This situation is consistent with a theory proposed by Mark Franklin (2004), whereby turnout increases or decreases from one election to another depending on the character of the election, primarily the degree of political competition. A systematic analysis of who votes and who abstains (not in Poland, but generally in democratic countries) points to two factors being most relevant: education and age. These are followed by religiosity, income and marital status (Blais 2000). Sociologists claim that resources which affect political participation (e.g. money, time and civic competences) are linked, to a greater or lesser extent, to the social structure. Interest in politics is strongly correlated with education, which, in turn, is frequently reflected in socio-economic status. Civic competences are highly dependent on education and political socialisation. Electoral absenteeism is therefore a structural issue, as demobilisation is particularly visible among the lower, less educated social strata. Similar correlations can be observed in Poland. However, widespread absenteeism has reasons other than inequalities in terms of socio-economic status and education. Poland has made spectacular progress over recent decades when it comes to the average level of its citizens’ formal education. Moreover, its Gini coefficient, which measures income inequality, does not differ significantly from other European countries with higher voter turnouts. Polish society does not exhibit any specific socio-demographic peculiarities that could explain such high absenteeism. Blais (2007: 631) argues that if one asks why people do not participate in elections, the possible answers can be reduced to four reasons: because they cannot, because they do not want to, because nobody has encouraged them or because they think it does not matter. When Poles who choose to abstain from voting are asked for the reasons behind their decision, most of them point to a number of issues:

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none of the candidates and/or parties has met their expectations; they were disappointed with what the political actors had to offer; they were disillusioned with politics; they did not feel competent enough.

There is another group for whose members absenteeism is a rationalised, calculated expression of their dissatisfaction and critical attitude towards the political system. In this case, the refusal to participate constitutes an act of quiet civic protest (Skarzy ˙ nska ´ 2005). In practically every society, citizens showing knowledge of politics, as well as interest and involvement in it, are a minority (Dahl and Stinebrickner 2003). However, absenteeism in Poland is far higher than in most democratic countries: it stands at around 50%, rather than in the usual range of between 20% and 33%. According to Dahl and Stinebrickner, people are more likely to become involved in political life if they (1) value its potential rewards, (2) believe their voice matters, (3) believe they can affect the outcome of an election, (4) are convinced the results will be unsatisfactory if they fail to act, (5) have knowledge or skills relevant to the topic in question, (6) have fewer obstacles to overcome in order to act and (7) are mobilised to participate by others. On the one hand, a deep polarisation of political rivalry in Poland and the fact that election results are frequently close should, in theory, stimulate turnout. On the other hand, parties do not act to boost participation, as they are afraid of mobilising the electorate of their competitors. In conjunction with low civic competences,11 this leads to a decline in people’s involvement in political life. William Riker and Peter Ordeshook (1968) point out yet another aspect that might affect participation levels. They assert that voters may feel satisfaction derived from performing their civic duty. As Blais argues, many people believe voting is every citizen’s responsibility, and it is this conviction which is strongly correlated with their decision to vote (Blais 2007: 633). Such a feeling of a ‘moral obligation’ is also declared by many Poles in public opinion polls. Still, equally many claim that voting is not

11 Low civic competences were exemplified by the 2015 local election, when a change to the layout of the ballot led to as many as 2,5 million (18%) invalid votes being cast (Gend´zwiłł et al. 2016).

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so much a duty as a right which, in the name of individual freedom, does not need to be exercised.

2.4

Towards an Illiberal Democracy

For years, post-1989 Poland was considered to be an example of a successful democratic transition. A political system equipped with checks and balances, limits on the power of the majority, guaranteed fundamental rights and the protection of minorities—all of these elements met the standards of a genuine, democratic rule of law. However, since Law and Justice’s 2015 electoral victory, the Polish government has begun to move away from Western European democratic ideals by questioning the separation of powers, the constraints on the will of the majority, the independence of the judiciary and the freedom of the media. This postulate of replacing liberal democracy with ‘sovereign democracy’ or ‘illiberal democracy’—terms signifying a complete leeway for the rule of the majority—has emerged not only in post-communist states such as Poland and Hungary; similar tendencies are observable in France, Italy, the USA and the UK. Some scholars stress that illiberal democracy is, in fact, an oxymoron and that any country moving away from the liberal model should be considered non-democratic (Ekiert 2017). Others assume that democratic systems may vary in terms of their adherence to specific norms and rules (Olejnik 2019: 69). They argue that discrepancies between liberal and illiberal democracies are based on core systemic principles: the rule of law, the accountability of the government, the integrity of political elites, the freedom of media, civil rights and the protection of minorities (Table 2.5). Victories in the 2015 and 2019 elections gave Law and Justice and its smaller allies a parliamentary majority but left them short of possessing a constitutional majority. PiS’s candidate, Andrzej Duda, won the 2015 and 2020 presidential races. Despite controlling both the parliament and the office of president, PiS is not able to amend the 1997 constitution constructed around liberal democratic values—a document which, in their opinion, requires far-reaching modifications. Reasons for rejecting liberalism as a constitutive precondition of democracy are justified by Ryszard Legutko, one of PiS’s ideologues, who claims liberal democracy is similar to communism in its reliance on the ideas of modernisation and progress (Legutko 2016). As Halmai (2019: 5) points out, Legutko bases his argument on the supposed fallacy of liberalism’s tendency to root out

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Table 2.5 Discrepancies between liberal and illiberal democracies Areas of differentiation between liberal and illiberal democracies

Systemic criteria constituting a liberal democracy

Systemic criteria constituting an illiberal democracy

Rule of law

The government usually follows the rule of law

Government control and accountability

There are institutions independent from the government which can hold political elites accountable and have the right to repeal their unlawful policies. The government recognises all decisions made by these independent institutions The political elites are corrupt to a small extent There is a free and independent media

The government often breaches the rule of law if it is in its political interest to do so The government is de facto not overseen by any institution. While oversight bodies may formally exist, they are deprived of most competences or captured by the ruling group. Their decisions are ignored if the executive branch finds them unfavourable The political elites are corrupt The majority of the media is controlled by the government or its allies Some rights are suspended or abolished. Minorities are exposed to discrimination and are not protected by the law

Integrity of political elites Media freedom

Civil rights and protection of Citizens can benefit from minorities civil rights. Minorities’ rights are protected by the law Source Olejnik (2019: 70–71)

all forms of inequality. He maintains that human rights, as expressed in legal norms promoting equality, become ideologically motivated, arbitrary claims made by various political groups in blatant disregard of the common good. The necessity of change is further supported with the argument that ‘legal constitutionalism alienated the constitution from citizens (…) The place of excluded citizens was taken by lawyers’ (Czarnota, cited by Halmai 2019: 14). Polish constitutional law professor Adam Czarnota acknowledges that Law and Justice bases its approach ‘on the principle of supremacy of the parliament in relation to constitutional review and acceptance of a role of the judicial restraint not judicial activism which was earlier the norm’ (Czarnota, cited by Halmai 2019: 14). This is why PiS, despite falling short of possessing a constitutional

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majority, embarked on an effort to concentrate power in its hands by limiting the independence of the Constitutional Court, assaulting the independence of the judiciary, colonising public administration with political proxies and increasing political control over public media (Bustikova and Guasti 2017: 170). According to some authors, one of the reasons behind the illiberal turn in the post-communist states of Central and Eastern Europe has been the absence of consensus regarding liberal democratic values at the time of the transition (Halmai 2019: 1). In the early phases of the transformation, general economic effectiveness took precedence over mass civic and political engagement (Bohle and Greskokovits 2012). The prospects for liberal constitutional democracy were limited by a judicial control of politics which blunted civil society and participatory democratic government as necessary counterpoints to the technocratic machinery of legal constitutionalism (Blokker 2013; Sadurski 2005). The political elites accepted a minimalistic version of a liberal consensus, understood as a set of rules and laws rather than values (Dawson and Hanley 2016). The lowered quality of Polish democracy has been reflected in rankings prepared by international organisations, governments and private think tanks. Such classifications affect other actors’ perceptions of Poland as a member of the international community. The country has slipped down the lists, with the 2020 Economist Intelligence Unit report placing it among the so-called flawed democracies—states where, although elections are fair and free and basic civil liberties are honoured, there may be problems such as infringements on the freedom of media or minor suppression of political opposition and dissent. Flawed democracies may have significant faults in other democratic aspects, including an underdeveloped political culture, low levels of participation in politics, and issues regarding the functioning of governance (EIU Democracy Index 2020). This index categorises each country into one regime type, based on 60 indicators grouped into five categories: the electoral process and pluralism, the functioning of the government, participation in political life, political culture and civic freedoms. While some authors have criticised the EIU Democracy Index for lacking transparency and accountability beyond numbers (e.g. Tasker 2016)12 the ranking is considered as one of the most reliable barometers for the state of democracy around the world. 12 Tasker argues that ‘despite the appearance of scientific objectivity, the whole exercise of ranking a country’s democratic credentials is as much riddled with biases, value judgments and hidden agendas as awarding Oscars to films or Michelin stars to restaurants

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Concerns about the state of Polish democracy are also evident in the annual report of Freedom House published in 2020. The document, assessing civil liberties and political rights in 195 countries and 15 territories, points out that ‘the ruling Law and Justice party had politically captured the state media, whose taxpayer-funded broadcasts leading up to the [parliamentary] voting amounted to partisan propaganda’ (Freedom House 2020). The authors of the report claim that after its 2019 victory, PiS ‘redoubled its efforts to purge the judiciary’. The state of Polish democracy has attracted the attention of the Venice Commission established by the Council of Europe and, subsequently, the European Commission, which started a probe into a rule of law violation dating back to 2016. In 2017, the Commission decided, for the first time in the history of European integration, to trigger Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) after the Polish government failed to abide by earlier recommendations to roll back legal changes undermining the independence of the judiciary and thus the rule of law. The Commission’s determined attitude towards the situation reflects its belief that attacks against the judiciary in one member state threaten the judiciary system in the entire Union. After both of its victories, in 2015 and 2019, Law and Justice stressed that it won a parliamentary majority in free democratic elections. Its electoral legitimation was questioned neither by the international community nor domestically by the opposition. A presidential election was scheduled to take place in May 2020, however due to the COVID-19 pandemic it took place in July of 2020. The incumbent Andrzej Duda won the election by a narrow majority of votes. In this extraordinary health situation the campaign was drastically limited, as the authorities battled to curb the spread of the virus by implementing restrictions on freedom of movement, assembly and the use of public spaces, including a compulsory quarantine for some citizens and social distancing rules. The emergency measures were particularly troublesome for the opposition candidates, whose access to public media was limited. A legal opinion issued by Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s (OSCE) Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) on the request of the Polish Commissioner for Human Rights states the following: ‘introducing such substantial changes at the time when electoral preparations – which are also decided by groups of mysterious experts using criteria best known to themselves’.

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were already underway, diverges from the principles of stability of electoral legislation and legal certainty’ (ODIHR 2020: 4). The legality of the election was also a subject of controversy, as the Polish constitution and EU values specify that elections must be universal, free and held by secret ballot. Changes in the electoral procedure, the manner in which they were introduced and how they were finally held, inevitably affected citizens’ trust in political institutions, marking another step towards an illiberal democracy in Poland.

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Tasker, P. (2016). The flawed ‘science’ behind democracy rankings. asia.nikkei.com. https://asia.nikkei.com/NAR/Articles/Peter-Tasker-The-flawed-science-beh ind-democracy-rankings. Accessed 5 April 2020. Tilly, C. (2005). Trust and rule. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tomini, L. (2015). Democratizing Central and Eastern Europe: Successes and failures of the European Union. New York: Routledge. Tomini, L., & Sandri, G. (Eds.). (2018). Challenges of democracy in the 21st century: Concepts, methods, causality and the quality of democracy. New York: Routledge. Topf, R. (1995). Electoral participation. In H. D. Klingemann & D. Fuchs (Eds.), Citizens and the state: Beliefs in government (pp. 27–51). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Trechsel, A. H., & Kriesi, H. (1996). Switzerland: The referendum and initiative as a centrepiece of the political system. In M. Gallagher & P. V. Uleri (Eds.), The referendum experience in Europe (pp. 185–208). Basingstoke: Macmillan. Zdravkovski, A. (2019). Polish politics, April 1989–October 2015. In S. P. Ramet, K. Ringdal, & K. Do´spał-Borysiak (Eds.), Civic and uncivic values in Poland: Value transformation, education, and culture (pp. 15–39). Budapest: Central European University Press. Zielonka, J. (2018). Counter-revolution: Liberal Europe in retreat. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

CHAPTER 3

The Emergence of the Party System in Poland—From Instability to Permanent Rivalry Patterns

The evolution of the party system and partisan actors within Polish democracy can be roughly divided into two stages. The first one began with the democratic transformation towards the end of the 1980s and was characterised by a high degree of instability as well as an openness of the political market. The symbolic shift into the second stage came with the 2001 parliamentary election, after which the patterns of partisan competition solidified and adopted relative permanence. Throughout the 1990s, Polish democracy constituted a proving ground for successor parties (i.e. new incarnations of erstwhile communist parties) and entirely new formations alike. For the former, it was the first time their mettle was tested in a democratic political competition. The latter, in turn, went through a sinusoid of highs and lows as they were thrust into a dynamic environment, having no previous experience of operating as legal political entities. Upon entering the political market, they encountered uncertainty and novelty. Some voters had their clearly specified preferences, while others were open to experimentation and quick to shift their support. The adaptation to a fluid socio-political situation was made harder still by the instability of the institutional context. In the first years after the transformation, the magnitude of changes to regulations governing the functioning of political parties in Poland was higher

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than in all other post-communist countries in Europe (Casal Bértoa and van Biezen 2018: 13). The first Act on Political Parties of the democratic era, adopted in 1990, stipulated that a party could be established by as few as 15 people. This resulted in the emergence of dozens of new formations, many of which were minute and failed to attract any support among the citizens. This virtual absence of any entry barriers set the tone for the first fully democratic parliamentary election that took place in 1991, when 111 registered committees put forward their candidates. Twenty-nine of those entities won seats, with the most successful one having only 62 deputies (which amounted to barely 13.5% of all mandates). Such fragmentation of the parliament meant fluid coalitions and frequent changes of cabinets. In reaction to this, the legislature made its first attempt to limit the access to the political market by amending the election statute and replacing the proportional Hare–Niemayer and St. Laguë’s methods with the d’Hondt formula, while also introducing a 5% electoral threshold. These crucial changes to the election statute forced political parties to adapt. The plethora of formations that emerged from the Solidarity movement joined forces to set up the Solidarity Electoral Action. Its main rival in the 1997 election was the largest successor party, the Democratic Left Alliance. Other parties, such as the Polish People’s Party, the Freedom Union (UW), or the Movement for Reconstruction of Poland (ROP), proved appealing enough to meet the 5% threshold but remained unable to threaten the two biggest competitors. That prevalence of two actors forebodes a further consolidation of the party system. The political market continued to stabilise as a result of several subsequent developments and legal changes. In 1997, the country saw the adoption of a new constitution that included fundamental principles of the voting system. A revised Act on Political Parties that entered into force the same year required all existing formations to re-register; a stipulation that effectively reduced the number of parties from 326 to 78 (Kubisz-Muła 2013: 167). The act (with some amendments made in the early 2000s) also introduced new rules allowing political parties to receive subventions from the central budget, while limiting other funding options (e.g. commercial operations or public fundraising). Furthermore, political formations were obliged to regularly submit financial reports on the pain of being removed from the list of registered parties. All of the abovementioned institutional changes not only consolidated the system but also

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infused politics with a certain routine that, according to Andreas Schedler (1998: 91–92), is a hallmark of a stable democracy. As Poland marked the first decade since its democratic transformation, only some parties ‘have begun to transform themselves more and more into centralized and professional campaigning organizations, in which the scope for the amateur politician has been curtailed, and in which the weight and direction of party strategy have tended increasingly to be located within the party leadership as such’ (Mair et al. 2004: 265). Those included the Democratic Left Alliance and the Polish People’s Party, as well as the Civic Platform (PO) and the Law and Justice (PiS)—two entities formed in 2001 from the remnants of the Solidarity camp, as that political movement fell into disarray and lost its appeal to the public. As it turned out, the beginning of the new millennium brought about the stabilisation of Poland’s party system. The electorate gradually accepted a small group of invariably relevant parties as the core of the political arena. Some of those entities (e.g. PSL) retained a fairly constant support, while others shrank (SLD) or grew to become dominant forces (PO and PiS). However, the stabilisation of the political environment did not bring the partisan arena to a complete freeze. Ingrid van Biezen and Ekaterina Rashkova’s (2014: 901) assertion that ‘as regulation increases in range and magnitude, it indeed acts to prevent new parties from successfully crossing the threshold of parliamentary representation’ is not entirely correct when it comes to Poland. New initiatives continue to spring up, ‘some of them even with good electoral results, despite being formed just few months ahead of elections’ (Casal Bértoa and Walecki 2018: 44). Admittedly, most of these new entities fail to mature and achieve longevity, they lack grassroot structures and sufficient membership base, relying solely on the popularity of their leader(s). This chapter provides an analysis of how Polish political parties functioned after 2001. The time scope was selected to fill a gap in the existing academic literature: There are no comprehensive examinations of Poland’s party system in the twenty-first century. The concept of party institutionalisation is used to determine why some formations failed while others have survived and become permanent features in the partisan competition. We also employ the classic models of political parties so as to place the analysis in a well-known and understood conceptual framework. The final part of the chapter is devoted to identifying entry barriers that new entities face when attempting to break into the Polish political market.

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3.1

Party Institutionalisation

As Polish democracy stabilised, political parties had to confront a set of challenges, just like their peers in other transformed countries of Central Europe. They had to perform functions typically attributed to political formations (e.g. recruit candidates for public offices, mobilise public support, draft policy agendas, or form governments), but at the same time needed to institutionalise as viable partisan organisations. Party institutionalisation is an elusive concept. It refers both to the organisational development of the party (the internal dimension) and to its relations with the outside environment (the external dimension). In academic literature, institutionalisation is identified by party durability and persistence (Rose and Mackie 1988), party solidification (Panebianco 1988: 49) or party stabilisation (Harmel and Svåsand 1993). Samuel Huntington sees party institutionalisation as ‘the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability’ and argues that it may be measured ‘by its adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence’ (Huntington 1968: 12). Kenneth Janda defines an institutionalised party as ‘one that is reified in the public mind so that the party exists as a social organization apart from its momentary leaders, and this organization demonstrates recurring patterns of behavior valued by those who identify with it’ (Janda 1980: 19). According to David Arter and Elina Kestila-Kekkonen, party institutionalisation can occur in the electoral, organisational and legislative arenas. They argue that an institutionalised party has a stable electoral base that shows social rootedness and is served by an organisational structure that includes a core membership, an effective candidate supply and a de facto dispersal of roles, and its body of elected representatives functions as a coherent legislative actor (Arter and Kestilä-Kekkonen 2014: 937). Due to the democratic transformation that started in 1989, most Polish political parties were formed practically from scratch. Hence, they faced the challenge of becoming complex, autonomous, cohesive entities, able to carve out permanent places in the political landscape. Tellingly, over the first decade after the transition, the only two formations that accomplished that feat were successor parties: the Polish People’s Party and the Democratic Left Alliance. Their communist provenance meant they inherited vital assets—funds, structures, experience—that were unavailable to new political actors. Even though they encountered

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animosity from a large part of the population while their Solidarityderived rivals repeatedly tried to discredit and isolate them, they were the only formations that survived that initial period of building a democracy. In contrast, virtually all parties formed by members of the former anticommunist opposition failed to find a sustainable organisational formula and take root in the new political reality. In other words, they did not complete their institutionalisation (Antoszewski 2004: 179). Literature offers several catalogues of institutionalisation indicators that differ in content depending on how the term is defined and what importance a given author attaches to its internal and external dimensions. It seems that some of the indicators—for instance, those related to public funding—have become irrelevant. In the classic concept of institutionalisation developed in the 1980s by Angelo Panebianco, a party can achieve only internal cohesion and autonomy if it possesses ‘a revenue system based on a regular flow of contributions from a plurality of sources’ (Panebianco 1988: 59). The introduction of state subventions as a universal practice in most European countries secured some consistency in parties’ finances. In Poland, this particular form of public funding has become their single most important source of income.1 Eliminating the need to seek private funding has an impact on party internal structures, membership, as well as links between parties and interest organisations (Casal Bértoa and van Biezen 2018: 17). An examination of how public funding affects survival prospects of Polish parties, conducted by Fernando Casal Bértoa and Marcin Walecki (2018: 45–49), reveals that most formations deprived of subsidies were forced to dissolve, merge, or form coalitions (in the aftermath of the nearest election, at the latest), while those that received public funding (e.g. PSL, SLD, PO, and PiS) have continued to play relevant roles within the party system. Casal Bértoa and Walecki add that ‘public subsidies have helped certain party organizations to endure, especially in the case of electoral backlash, while condemning into oblivion all those parties deprived of it’ (Casal Bértoa and Walecki 2018: 46). Arguably, that connection is not as obvious and straightforward as it may seem. This is so because a political party is eligible for a state subvention (granted for the duration of the parliament’s term of office) only if it has garnered a certain minimum percentage of votes in the most recent election. Nonetheless, 1 Since the 2001 reform, the financial dependence of Polish parties on state subventions has almost no parallel in Europe (Casal Bértoa and Walecki 2018: 46).

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the financial security provided by public funding surely helps parties maintain their presence in the market and translates into an objective durability of a given entity. In the case of Poland, two other traditional indicators of institutionalisation, specifically, name changes and organisational discontinuity, as suggested by Janda (1980), also seem debatable. As Robert Harmel et al. (2016: 8–9) point out, a fact that a party changes its name does not necessarily prove its low institutionalisation. Instead, it may be the hallmark of political maturity. They reference examples of Swedish and Norwegian agrarian formations that changed their names when faced with a shrinking traditional electoral base. The move reflected their attempts to broaden their appeal and seek support among other social groups. Regarding Poland and the time period examined in this chapter, such a change frequently came down to the removal of the founders’ and/or leaders’ names: Vide the examples of the Ryszard Petru’s Modern (which was later renamed as the ‘Modern’), the Palikot’s Movement (which became the Your Movement), the Zbigniew Ziobro’s United Poland (renamed the United Poland), or the Jarosław Gowin’s Poland Together (later the Poland Together—United Right). All of these decisions were made by party structures in a symbolic attempt to decouple a given political project from its creator, increase its autonomy and depersonalise the leadership—they were effective steps towards greater institutionalisation. Organisational discontinuity was typically a result of splits, secessions, mergers and other reshuffles in the political market. Interestingly, it has become a common occurrence among Polish parties, not only in the early years after the democratic transition. Since 2001, five out of six parties examined in this book experienced secessions. In 2004, a group of politicians left the SLD to form the Social Democracy of Poland (SdPL). Its biggest success was winning three mandates to the European Parliament the same year. However, the SdPL’s independent life as a political entity ended soon afterwards. In the next election, it was forced to form a coalition with the SLD to have any hope of earning representation in the national parliament. In 2006, the PSL’s former leader, along with several other members, decided to establish another agrarian formation, the PSL ‘Piast’. The new party failed to register candidates for any election and came short of forming any sustainable structure. The PiS went through two significant splits. First, in 2010, a group of members created a party named Poland Comes First. Then, in 2012, another faction moved to form Zbigniew Ziobro’s United Poland. Only

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the latter has survived but, as it turned out over subsequent years, its continued existence is conditional upon strict cooperation with the PiS. The PO experienced a somewhat different situation. Between 2010 and 2013, two of its most prominent members decided to start their own political entities. In 2011, Janusz Palikot launched the Palikot’s Movement and quickly gained substantial momentum, garnering 10% of votes in that year’s parliamentary election. In 2013, Jarosław Gowin started Poland Together, which has been a part of the governing coalition since 2015, as Gowin chose to side with his former party’s biggest competitor, the PiS. Even the youngest of the six examined formations, the Modern, has already been through a split, as its founder and erstwhile leader left in 2018 to form another ephemeral entity called the ‘Now!’—which lasted less than a year. In all the cases described here with the exception of the Modern, the parties that experienced secessions went through short-lived perturbations but recovered from the chaos and even managed to enhance their internal cohesion. The existing literature names one particularly important obstacle to party institutionalisation: the tendency to put extensive decision-making authority in the hands of a single leader. If one agrees with the assertion that it is a hindrance, it follows that a party can be considered highly institutionalised when the decision-making process is depersonalised and collegial. Our view is somewhat different: the determining factor is not the number of people involved in making decisions—but whether these decisions are made in line with routinised rules and procedures. This means a party can be considered internally institutionalised if its members (or even supporters) are involved in all important decision-making, but also if the power is centralised in the hands of only a few leaders. What is crucial is not the exact shape of the decision-making process, but rather, the replacement of personal loyalty to the leadership with loyalty to the organisation. This is why a degree of a given party’s institutionalisation can often be judged on how it survives a change of leadership; this is when it becomes apparent whether the personality and charisma of the leader were the formation’s most valuable assets, without which, it ceases to represent a viable value to its members, partners, and the electorate. Furthermore, depersonalisation can effectively reshape the party’s external image from a personal vehicle for the leader into something potentially more lasting and reliable. Most of the formations we examined survived the change of leadership, even if the outgoing leader was also the founder. The only one to

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fail that test—the Modern—is also one of the two youngest parties we looked at. Upon removing its founder from the position of leadership, it continued to bleed support (a trend that had been apparent even before), losing private sources of funding.2 In the run-up to the 2019 parliamentary election, the Modern opted to form a coalition with a stronger partner, a move that allowed it to win (albeit not under its own brand) two mandates. The only other party not to have successfully navigated a change of leadership is the PiS. In this case, however, the reason is entirely different: Put simply, since its inception in 2001, its only chairman and leader has been Jarosław Kaczynski, ´ as no other member ever chose to challenge him for the position. Internal institutionalisation refers, as Harmel and Svåsand argue, to a party’s being valued in its own right apart from its momentary leaders and their initial goals and behaving according to regularised procedures rather than on the whims of a leader. In turn, external institutionalisation is found in the perceptions of other actors—such as the electorate or leaders of competing formations—i.e. their belief that the party of focus is an established entity with lasting power (Harmel and Svåsand 2019). A high extent of internal and external institutionalisation translates into an objective durability of a political party because the combination of the internal and external dimension maximises the ability to persist. However, some formations are able to achieve external institutionalisation (i.e. they are seen by others as predictable and trustworthy) even before value infusion and routinisation. Vice versa, some highly routinised and value-infused parties may still find it difficult to achieve external institutionalisation. Table 3.1 presents an overview of internal and external institutionalisation in the six formations examined in our research. We adopted the following indicators: (1) the party’s sustainability after leader change; (2) a stable or growing membership base; (3) a resilience to secession; (4) efficient field structures; (5) a stable or growing electoral base; (6) role-playing alternation (government/opposition) and (7) stable relations with other parties. The table is a simplified form as it shows only the presence or absence of a given indicator without specifying its intensity.

2 Due to formal discrepancies, in 2016, the Supreme Court ruled that the Modern was not eligible for a public subvention. Hence, the party needed to seek other sources of funding. However, many private donors considered its founder the main guarantor of its success. Therefore, upon his removal, they chose to withdraw their financial support.

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Table 3.1 Indicators of party institutionalisation in political parties in Poland Law and Civic Modern Polish Justice Platform (.N) People’s (PiS) (PO) Party (PSL) Internal institutionalisation Sustainability after leader Not Yes change applicable Stable or growing Yes No membership base Resilience to secession Yes Yes Efficient field (grassroot) Yes structures External institutionalisation Stable or growing Yes electoral base Role-playing alternation Yes (government/opposition) Stable relations with Yes other parties (e.g. coalition agreements)

Democratic Together Left Party Alliance (R) (SLD)

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Not applicable Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Source Authors’ elaboration with original data, collected, coded and processed by the authors

In general, the scale of membership in Polish political parties is limited, compared not only to Western European democracies but also other postcommunist countries. This is why instead of gauging the numbers of members boasted by the examined formations, we looked at their ability to maintain whatever membership base they have managed to build up (which may be as little as several thousand registered members). When it comes to grassroot structures, we considered not so much their sheer existence, but rather, their efficiency, as expressed by the party’s ability to register candidates in all constituencies, a task that requires presenting the National Electoral Commission with a candidates’ registration petition signed by a certain minimum number of supporters. The assessment of all indicators represents the state of affairs as of early 2020 and takes an account of each party’s history (which is as short as five years for the Modern and the Together Party, and as long as 30 years for the Polish People’s Party).

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Four out of six of the examined parties meet all of the criteria for external institutionalisation and most of the criteria for internal institutionalisation. The PO, the PSL, the SLD and the PiS have proven their ability to persist and gain a permanent presence in Poland’s political landscape. In their case, the only indicator with substantial fluctuations is the membership base. As a general rule, membership in Polish parties tends to fall while a given formation acts as the opposition and bounces back up when it comes into power. The two youngest parties in our research, both formed in 2015, have not experienced role-playing alteration yet, which we consider an indicator of external institutionalisation. However, it is one of the few similarities between them. Otherwise, their stories developed vastly differently. The Together Party boasts a stable membership base and efficient field structures. Its collective leadership and the lack of one-person governing organs mean any change of leaders does not affect its organisational stability. We cannot assess its resilience to secessions, as it has not yet confronted any. Meanwhile, the Modern, despite its promising electoral debut in 2015, failed to build a solid membership base and establish grassroot structures. It has not been able to withstand the leadership change that came when its founder, upon being removed as the party chairman, led a faction to split away from the organisation. In the run-up to the 2019 parliamentary election, the new leadership believed the party was at risk of not exceeding the 5% threshold. Therefore, it made the decision to place its candidates on the lists registered either by the Civic Platform-led coalition or the Civic Platform itself. Soon after the election, the Modern decided it would eventually cease operating as an independent entity in the future. The two contrasting examples described here show that the institutionalisation process is not a direct consequence of a party’s age, as two formations established virtually may simultaneously find themselves in entirely different points of organisational development within just a couple of years.

3.2

Organisation Model(s) of Political Parties

Throughout the 1990s, the Polish political arena remained divided into two groups as far as the level of party institutionalisation was concerned. One was composed of the successor parties that reaped the benefits of substantial organisational and financial resources inherited from their communist antecedents. The other comprised entities that emerged from

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the former underground democratic opposition camp, most of which, being cash-strapped and devoid of a grassroots base, proved ephemeral and unable to create stable structures. In 2001, Aleks Szczerbiak wrote about the ‘general instability of the emerging post-communist East European parties and the concomitant immaturity of their organizational structures, arising from the fact that many of the newly formed parties were often simply cliques of supporters clustered around individual personalities’ (Szczerbiak 2001: 4). His observation, while valid with regard to the first decade after the transformation, loses its relevance for the period after 2001, i.e. the time scope adopted for this publication. Parties that survived the 1990s or were formed in the early 2000s (e.g. the Law and Justice and the Civic Platform) managed to build up reasonable membership bases and field structures, establish relations with other actors in their environments and attract constant, consistent support from some segments of the electorate. The process, driven by apt management and growth strategies, was helped by certain legal and institutional changes, particularly the 1997 Act on Political Parties and its amendments regarding public subventions. Nonetheless, almost every election campaign saw the emergence of new formations that wanted to vie for power. While none of them succeeded enough to participate in the cabinet, some of them (the Palikot’s Movement in 2011, the Kukiz ’15, the Modern in 2015, the Together Party, and the Confederation in 2019) did win mandates in the parliament. If one wants to comprehend the principles behind the organisation and functioning of political parties, one needs to reference a classification system that provides a suitable framework and is heuristically useful insofar as it gives easily understandable labels that will help the readers grasp complex, multidimensional concepts (Gunther and Diamond 2003: 172). As Paul Webb, Thomas Poguntke, and Susan Scarrow argue, it is difficult to discuss ‘comparative party organization without invoking the shorthand of “mass”, “cadre”, and “cartel” party types. These categories identify important aspects of party organizational differences and they sometimes point to important sequences or patterns of party development’ (Webb et al. 2017: 309). While these are models most frequently used by researchers for examining parties, they are far from the only ones present in political science. Other notable concepts include Richard Gunther and Larry Diamond’s classification (2003: 171–173) based on three criteria: ‘(1) the nature of the party’s organization (thick or thin);

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(2) the programmatic orientation of the party (ideological, particularisticclientele-oriented, etc.) and (3) tolerant and pluralistic (or democratic) versus proto-hegemonic (or anti-system)’—which discerns as many as 15 types of parties. Other scholars, based on their observations of parties or a specific party system, describe certain features typical for political formations contemporary with their research. Although their models can be attributed with a certain universality (i.e. applicability to systems other than those observed by the given author), they refer primarily to a specific local context. Upon examining the organisational evolution of Norwegian formations, Kunt Heidar and Jo Saglie (2003: 219–239) proposed a concept of a network party that applies to entities dominated by groups of leaders who combine their managerial functions in the partisan structure with parliamentary mandates. Other models centred around the role of leaders were suggested by Tatiana Kostadinova and Barry Levitt (2014), who term them personalist parties, or Mauro Calise (2015), who names them personal parties. Focusing on the relations between a party in central office and a party on the ground in Canada, Kenneth Carty (2002, 2004) formulated the franchise party model. Still, the classic models such as the cadre party and mass party by Maurice Duverger (1954), catch-all party by Otto Kirchheimer (1966), electoral-professional party by Angelo Panebianco (1988), and cartel party by Richard Katz and Peter Mair (1995) ‘are unavoidably embedded in party scholarship’ (Webb et al. 2017: 309). Although they were created with Western European political systems in mind, they are readily and successfully applied to discuss the types of organisational patterns present in Central and Eastern Europe (see: Szczerbiak 2001; Sobolewska-My´slik et al. 2010; Gherghina et al. 2018: 11–12). This is so because the legal and institutional environment that Central and Eastern European parties encounter today, as well as key organisational tenets these entities operate on, are not so different from those observed in the older democracies of Western Europe. Even though they were often created under different circumstances3 by politicians whose previous experiences as public figures were also starkly different, since 1989, these formations have been learning from their older Western European counterparts. Organisational imitation has occurred as a result 3 For a discussion of the differences in the democratisation process, including the patterns of forming parties in Western Europe vs. in post-communist countries, see: Offe (1991) or Grabowska (2006).

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of direct contacts within a given party family or supranational umbrella organisations and, in the era of the EU membership, also within political groups in the European Parliament (Pacze´sniak 2014). It seems that the analytical utility of models developed for the purpose of examining Western European parties is particularly valid today when democracies of Central Europe are stable and many political formations operating in them are well-rooted, able to adapt to their environments. Moreover, some researchers point out that the late 2010s saw a certain convergence among parties and party systems in various parts of Europe, as the stabilisation in Poland coincided with an opposite trend in the West in which anti-establishment formations emerged to challenge traditional competition and coalition-forming patterns amid dwindling turnout rates (Sokół 2018: 81–82). Webb, Poguntke and Scarrow attempted to empirically assign various parties they examined4 to the types defined by Mair and Katz: the elitist party, mass party, catch-all party and cartel party (1997). To do so, they adopted a minimalist approach, in which only ‘major features of these models in terms of three key criteria: the principal source of party funding, intra-party relationships between members and elites, and the character of membership’ are used (Webb et al. 2017: 310, 311–315). Interestingly, they were able to apply this classification to a mere 25.4% of the 122 PPDB parties. In all other cases, the examined formations did not meet even the bare minimum criteria to be designated as one of the four types. Furthermore, the authors noted there was evidence ‘of national “contagion” rather than of developmental eras driven by technologies or transnational social changes’ (Webb et al. 2017: 315). This observation suggests that when it comes to the evolution of how parties are organised, domestic factors are more influential than general, transnational tendencies. While the aforementioned research team attempted to classify a plethora of parties from many states, we undertook a theoretically easier task, i.e. the examination of formations operating in one political system. Therefore, instead of trying to specify each analysed entity as a particular type, we focused on pointing out which organisational elements observed in a given party correspond to the models developed by Mair and Katz (1997). Such an approach is justified by the fact that the elements of the 4 They examined parties included in the Political Party Database (PPDB). See also https://www.politicalpartydb.org.

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classic party organisation models successfully coexist with each other in modern political structures. We chose not to refer to all dimensions included in Mair and Katz’s definitions of party types. Instead, we concentrated on those related to the organisational aspect. However, due to the nature of our research, we did not adopt the above-mentioned minimalist approach. We looked at various elements, including the ‘basis of party competition, nature of party work and party campaigning, the principal source of party resources, intra-party relations between members and elites, the character of membership, party channels of communication’ (Mair and Katz 1997: 110–111). Additionally, we examined the role of ideology, its impact on a given party’s agenda and operations. Employing ideology for communicating with the members and voters may constitute one of the factors that determine the formation’s cohesion and differentiate between various models (Table 3.2). The tool presented above has allowed us to classify each party along the lines of Mair and Katz’s model with regard to each aspect, as described in Table 3.3. The table clearly shows that all parties we examined draw from several organisational models, with the catch-all and cartel characteristics being the most common ones. We will now take a look at each of the categories indicated in Table 3.3. The competition among contemporary Polish parties is based mostly on their managerial efficiency, although two formations (the PSL and the Together Party) continue to emphasise their representative capacities. The former, while situated in the centre of the political spectrum, maintains its rural and agrarian identity. The latter directs its message primarily at young, strongly left-leaning people, often suffering from the disadvantages of a gig economy and sometimes referred to as the precariat. The Polish political scene has been relatively stable since the beginning of the twenty-first century. Using a cinematography metaphor, one might say the leading actors stay the same. They simply alternate between different roles: those of the governing party and the parliamentary (sometimes even non-parliamentary) opposition. Hence, it can be said that the pattern of electoral competition among the main actors is contained. This rings particularly true with regards to the rivalry between the two largest formations: the Law and Justice (PiS) and the Civic Platform (PO), both of which were established in 2001 and have been dominant forces in the political arena since 2005. The supporting cast changes more often, as

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Table 3.2 The models of party organisation and their characteristics Party model Category

Elite party

Mass party

Catch-all party

Cartel party

Basis of party competition Pattern of electoral competition Nature of party work and party campaigning

Ascribed status Managed

Representative capacity Mobilisation

Policy effectiveness Competitive

Managerial skills efficiency Contained

Irrelevant

Labour-intensive

Capital-intensive

Principal source of party resources

Personal contacts

Members’ fees and contributions

Intra-party relations between members and elites Character of membership

Elite are the ‘ordinary members’

Bottom-up; elite accountable to members

Small and elitist

Large and homogenous; actively recruited and encapsulated; membership a logical consequence of identity, emphasis on rights and obligations

Both labour-intensive and capital-intensive Contributions from a wide variety of sources Top-down; members are organised cheerleaders for the elite Membership open to all (heterogeneous) and encouraged, emphasis on rights but not on obligations; membership marginal to individual’s identity

Interpersonal networks

Party provides its Party competes own channels of for access to non-party communication channels of communication

Party channels of communication

State subventions

Stratarchy; mutual autonomy

Neither rights nor obligations important (distinction between members and non-members blurred); emphasis on members as individuals rather than an organised body; members valued for contribution to legitimising myth Party gains privileged access to state-regulated channels of communication

(continued)

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Table 3.2 (continued) Party model Category

Elite party

Mass party

Catch-all party

Cartel party

Role of ideology

Negligible or none

Vital (classical understanding of ideology)

Diminishing (situational ideology)

Insignificant, ideology only as a label

Source Adapted from Mair and Katz (1997: 110–111), as well as Webb et al. (2017: 311); also inspired by Gunther and Diamond (2003)

these actors compete for votes not only with their bigger peers but also among themselves. Some of them (for instance, the Polish People’s Party) have maintained a constant presence, while others (such as the League of Polish Families, the Palikot’s Movement, the Modern, or the Kukiz ’15) managed to enter the parliament only occasionally. The nature of party work and campaigning puts all of the examined parties within the catch-all category. Both labour and capital are vital for day-to-day work and electoral competition. Representatives of regional branches point out that the involvement and work of the party on the ground and mid-level clerks are necessary if the organisation wants to function and perform its tasks, both in the inter-electoral period and during campaigning. State subventions provide a principal income source for those formations that manage to exceed 3% of votes in parliamentary elections. While parties continue to seek private donors, collect membership fees, and levy a party tax on their representatives holding public offices, all of these sources put together amount to a mere few (around a dozen, at the most) percent of their income. The sole exception to this reliance on public funding is the Modern, which was stripped of its entitlement to a subvention due to certain irregularities and was then forced to explore other avenues to secure funding.5 Intra-party relations between the members and the elites are among the basic factors that describe the party’s organisational model. In this regard, three of the examined formations (the PiS, the PO, and the SLD) can be categorised as the catch-all type. This means their rank-and-file

5 See https://wspieraj.nowoczesna.org (accessed on 31 January 2020). The financial report for 2018 indicates that the party was funded solely from membership fees and private donations (Nowoczesna 2019).

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Table 3.3 Classification of Polish political parties Political party Category

Law and Justice (PiS)

Civic Modern Platform (.N) (PO)

Polish People’s Party (PSL)

Democratic Together Left Party Alliance (R) (SLD)

Basis of party competition Pattern of electoral competition Nature of party work and party campaigning Principal source of party resources Intra-party relations between members and elites Character of membership

Cartel party

Cartel party Catchall party Catchall party

Cartel party Catchall party Catchall party

Mass party Catch-all party

Cartel party Catch-all party

Mass party Catch-all party

Catch-all party

Catch-all party

Catch-all party

Cartel party

Cartel party

Cartel party

Cartel party

Cartel party

Catch-all party

Catchall party

Catchall party Elite party

Mass party

Catch-all party

Mass party

Catchall party Party channels Combination Catchof of elite and all communication cartel party party

Catchall party Catchall party

Catch-all party

Catch-all party

Catch-all party Catch-all party

Role of ideology

Catchall party

Combination Catch-all of mass party party and catch-all party Mass party Catch-all party

Catch-all party Catch-all party

Catch-all party

Mass party

Cartel party

Mass party

Source Authors’ elaboration with data from party statutes, IDIs with party elites and observation. Coded and processed by the authors

members are largely perceived as cheerleaders for the elites. The latter verbally express their appreciation for the former and are keen to emphasise their input. Such an attitude was termed as a passive or occasional legitimisation of the leaders. As one SLD member put it: ‘Everybody would agree that a cheering crowd looks good on TV’ (Wincławska and Brodzinska-Mirowska ´ 2016: 201). The two remaining formations under our scrutiny (i.e. the PSL and the Together Party) are situated closer to

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the mass category. Both exhibit strong intra-partisan democracy mechanisms, with the elite accountable to the members. In the case of the PSL, members sitting on a governing body called the Supreme Council have particularly broad powers, going as far as the right to dismiss the party’s chairman at any point during their term of office, a unique solution in Polish politics. The Modern can be characterised as an elite party in the aspect of the intra-party relations between members and elites, because the membership base of the party is limited. Membership status continues to play a central role in the functioning of Polish political formations. A look at their statutes quickly reveals that the chapters on membership are typically placed early in the documents, given ample space, and filled with detailed stipulations.6 Some statutes contain elements characteristic of the mass party model. For example, the SLD’s statutory regulations specify that members are entitled to ‘use the Party’s assistance if any harm befalls them in the course of their political activity, or in case of other particularly challenging life circumstances’ (Statut SLD, 2019, art. 10h). Communication channels figure among several categories established by Mair and Katz. Again, most of the parties we examined fit the catchall model: They primarily compete for access to non-party channels. The two exceptions are the PSL and the PiS. The former, apart from striving for access to non-party channels, acts like a mass party by producing its own magazine, to which members are obliged to subscribe. The latter, in turn, can be classified as a cartel party due to its influence over the public media. Upon coming to power in 2015, the PiS proceeded to take control over state-owned TV and radio stations that are now clearly biased and geared towards promoting the governing party. Other actors therefore lost the ability to present and defend their views by using public mass media. One other factor that needs to be considered is the development of information and communication technologies (ICT). When Mair and Katz formulated the party models, technologies and tools that are prevalent today were still in the early development stages. Hence, assessing their future shape and impact on communication was not possible. Contemporary parties and politicians of various levels use online communication (most of all, social media) to directly reach other 6 In another part of this book, the readers will find our analysis of what do party elites and members think about membership, as well as their roles and functions in the organisation (see Chapter 6).

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party members, followers, and potential supporters; a phenomenon we examine in another part of this chapter. The last category we chose to include was the role of ideology in the functioning of political parties. Seeing ideology as a factor that generates internal cohesion within a given entity, we adopted its traditional understanding as a ‘set of ideas, values and principles that constitute a moral and intellectual basis of organized and collective political action, aimed at preserving, modifying, or breaking the prevailing power relations’ (Bielanowska 2020: 172). From this standpoint, there are three formations that fall into the mass party group: The Law and Justice, which builds its narrative around nationalism and Catholic values; the Together Party, which espouses socialism and the Polish People’s Party, which retains its agrarian roots. Alternatively, ideology can be approached in a situational context, whereby it becomes ‘a set of solutions proposed to address a particular social issue’ (Antoszewski 1999: 172). This is how two of the examined parties—namely, the Modern and the Democratic Left Alliance—employ ideology in their functioning. The Modern uses liberalism as a central tenet of its agenda, while the SLD can be placed in a broad category of contemporary social-democratic formations. However, both of these parties treat ideology as a point of reference rather than a strict determinant of every decision and proposal. This is why we classified them as the catch-all type. The Civic Platform is the only cartel party on our list—its members espouse elements drawn from several different ideologies, and the party does not focus its agenda on one particular school of thought. It speaks of itself as ‘a party of reason and moderation, not of compulsions and extremes’.7 A couple of observations can be made as a summary of this section. First of all, nearly all Polish political formations (there are few exceptions) exhibit organisational characteristics of a catch-all party, as reflected in Table 2.3, where the catch-all label features in 30 out of 48 boxes. Second, it seems that parties tend to adopt similar solutions with regard to a particular aspect. For instance, in terms of competition patterns, the nature of work and campaigning, and the character of membership— all of them fall under the catch-all category, while features typical for

7 This sentence is a quotation from Władysław Bartoszewski (former Minister of Foreign Affairs) and can be found on the party’s website, as an opening to the ‘about us’ section. https://platforma.org/o-nas (accessed on 31 January 2020).

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cartel parties prevail in aspects such as the basis of competition or principal funding sources. Interestingly, not a single formation bears all the hallmarks of one particular party type. The most consistent ones are the PO and the SLD, which draw from two models: the catch-all party and the cartel party. Others exhibit even more diverse features, with single elements typical of other models. Traits of an elite party can be found in the PiS and the Modern, while characteristics of a mass party are present in the PiS, the PSL and the Together Party.

3.3

Entry Barriers to the Political Market

The marketing aspect of research on political parties, which covers issues such as access to the market and survival strategies, is typically said to have originated in the 1980s. This was when Western democracies saw significant changes in the electoral and political environment, mostly as a consequence of societal developments, the erosion of voters’ loyalty, the so-called structural electoral dealignment, a shift in political culture and prevailing values, as well as new methods and techniques of communication. All of these factors led to an evolution within parties themselves. The same process did not occur simultaneously in Central and Eastern Europe. First of all, in the first half of the 1990s, the systemic transition was still in its early phase, and the new political market was not yet fully shaped. Second, political actors became more active, having been invigorated by the opportunities that came along with pluralism. The unfamiliar realities meant they needed to establish a solid link to the electorate. That effort was often chaotic and filled with experimentation. Once the voter base was identified parties tried, with a greatly varying degree of success, numerous ways to maintain the support. This begs the question of whether the existing regulations regarding access to the political market prevent the emergence of new parties—especially since many such entities, once formed, manage to meet the parliamentary representation threshold. The following section discusses entry barriers to political market observed in Poland. To describe those barriers, we will refer to categories derived from two analytical models. The first one, formulated by Michael Wohlgemuth (1999: 182; 2000: 280–281), distinguishes three types of barriers: (1) rule-based barriers; (2) so-called innocent barriers and (3) strategic barriers. Wohlgemuth’s approach grants particular importance to those

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political parties that are able to create strategic barriers and/or influence the regulations and procedures. Barriers regarding rules primarily encompass procedures surrounding the election process, including the submission and registration of candidates, as well as the basic laws that determine how parliamentary representation is created (including the election statute). They also refer to how parties need to be organised in order to be allowed to compete for power. The innocent barriers focus on the differences in potential among parties, stemming, for instance, from brand recognition and competitive advantages that come with certain resources, such as experience in governing, deep-rooted social support or well-developed grassroots structures. These barriers, while informal, should not be underestimated as they often determine the survival or extinction in political rivalry. Strategic barriers are related to how governing parties manipulate rules and use public resources that other actors have no access to, in order to gain certain privileges. Creating strategic barriers is one of the mechanisms characteristic of the cartelisation of politics (Katz and Mair 1995). The process has been observed since the final years of the twentieth century, when ‘the principal governing parties (and their allied smaller parties, collectively the political “mainstream”) were effectively forming a cartel, in which the form of competition might remain, and indeed even appear to intensify, while its substance was increasingly hollowed out’ (Katz and Mair 2018). The second model to be used is based on Schumpeterian perspectives. It was presented by Miklós Seb˝ ok, Attila Horváth and Ágnes Balázs, who ok et al. 2019: 182) inside of which identified a three-tier pyramid8 (Seb˝ market competition among parties occurs. The barriers are divided into three groups: (1) hard entry barriers; (2) hard candidates and party lists entry barriers and (3) soft entry barriers. The first tier encompasses procedures for forming a party or another political organisation and registering candidates at the national level, as well as selected elements of the voting system, particularly the electoral threshold. The second tier consists of barriers to accessing resources that cause disproportions and differences between the incumbents and the pretenders, with the assumption that the former enjoy a systemic 8 The pyramid is structured as follows: The top tier is made up of parties in the government, the middle tier is parties represented in the parliament, and the bottom tier consists of parties present at the electoral level on the ground and those that are not represented at a national level.

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privilege by being allowed to use public funding and other forms of support. The final tier is linked to the access to state-owned and private media. One example of such a barrier may be the limitation of access to public broadcasters as a means to eliminate competitors who do not meet certain criteria (or, alternatively, one party taking control over the media outlet). In the case of privately owned media, broadcasters themselves may create such an obstacle by being interested only in cooperating with their preferred actor(s), in line with the partisan media model (McQuail 2003: 52–53). By using the two above-mentioned theoretical models, we identified the following entry barriers to the Polish political market: 1. hard barriers determined by rules, strategic in their nature: registration of candidates, electoral threshold and voting system, district magnitude, public funding mechanism for parties; 2. soft and innocent barriers, partly driven by regulations, comprising access to media (including state-owned broadcasters) during and beyond campaigns, as well as recognition of political brands. Let us take a look at some of the barriers in the first category. Registration of Candidate Lists In the case of parliamentary elections, in order to initiate the candidate registration process, a party needs to submit a support petition signed by at least 1,000 citizens eligible to vote, which is a relatively easy task to accomplish. There are three types of campaign committees vying for space on the ballot: (1) those set up by political parties; (2) those formed by coalitions and (3) non-partisan committees established by independent candidates. In order to register candidates in a given single constituency, a committee needs to present a support list with at least 5,000 signatures. Registering a nationwide candidate list requires submitting such petitions from at least half of all constituencies across Poland. In practice, in order to compete at the national level, a committee needs to collect no less than 105,000 signatures from a variety of constituencies.9 In the run-up

9 There are 41 constituencies for parliamentary elections in Poland, which means that registering a nationwide list requires collecting signatures from at least 21 constituencies.

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to the 2015 election, that feat was accomplished by eight committees. In 2019, the number decreased to five (out of 88 committees that were registered anywhere in the country).10 Given the statistics, it can be said that signalling the intention to put forward candidates and registering them in less than half of all constituencies is not a hard barrier. Only when a political entity aspires to a nationwide competition will it encounter one. Once this particular barrier is cleared, a committee earns a chance to be represented in the parliament and, thus, gain access to certain resources that will be discussed later. Electoral Threshold and Voting System (Formula for Allocating Seats) The electoral threshold has remained fairly constant ever since 1993. For partisan and independent committees, it has stayed at 5%. For coalition committees, it was set at 7% from 1993 until 1997, and afterwards, it rose to 8%. Under such regulations, parties that decide to cooperate for the purpose of campaigning devised two types of approaches: legalist and pragmatic. In the former, several independent political entities form a coalition committee and compete precisely in line with the spirit of the law: Candidates represent their respective parties, and the coalition is bound by the higher, 8% threshold. This strategy was used on multiple occasions by left-wing, post-communist parties, as they opted to build federation-like blocs for the purpose of campaigning. When the coalition managed a good or exceptional result, the seat allocation formula made this approach clearly beneficial. However, when support was hovering around the threshold, it was highly risky. In 2001, the coalition of the Democratic Left Alliance and the Labour Union secured a record win by garnering over 41% of votes—a fact that provided a glaring validation of the approach. However, in the 2015 election, a coalition of several left-wing formations failed to reach the required 8%, which meant that practically the entire left side of the Polish political scene found itself removed from the parliament. The second, pragmatic strategy sees a number of parties establish a coalition for the purpose of campaigning, but only its leader formally registers candidates through a standard partisan committee. Candidates put forward by other members of the coalition are allocated slots on that single ballot by way of an 10 There were 30 committees formed by parties, one coalition committee and 57 nonpartisan committees.

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informal agreement. In the 2015 and 2019 elections, this pragmatic method proved successful, allowing several parties to maximise their de facto gains, albeit in different ways. For each such entity, the benefit came in a somewhat different form. The United Right Coalition, led by the PiS,11 set its sights on securing a parliamentary majority that would allow it to govern without the need for appeasing any members of the opposition. The latter, in turn, joined forces under the banner of the Civic Coalition (represented formally on a list registered by the PO) in order to create a bloc able to compete with the PiS for power. The Coalition for Poland (with its list registered by the PSL) sought to break through the electoral threshold, similarly to left-wing formations that returned to the parliament after a four-year hiatus and positioned themselves as a single unit ready to complement a governing coalition. As far as mandate allocation is concerned, Poland has opted for the d’Hondt formula that has been adopted for all elections since 1993, with the sole exception of 2001. Coupled with the electoral threshold and the requirements regarding registration of nationwide candidate lists, the formula ensures that a fairly low number of parties compete effectively for parliamentary seats. Since 2007, the effective number of parliamentary parties’ index has oscillated between 2,76 and 3 (see Table 3.4). Barriers formed by the threshold and the mandate allocation formula pushed all nationwide committees established in the run-up to the 2019 election to opt for joint campaigning in an attempt to limit the risk of vote dispersal. While several parties had previously succeeded in breaking through the initial entry barriers, they later encountered other difficulties that significantly hindered their functioning. District (Constituency) Magnitude An average constituency in Poland is allocated 11,2 parliamentary mandates. The size of constituencies can only be considered a hard barrier in conjunction with other elements. Given the proportional character of 11 PiS’ strategy for the 2015 and 2019 elections envisioned a tri-partisan coalition under the name of the United Right and a pragmatic approach, i.e. registration of a single, PiS candidate list, with other coalition members granted a certain share of slots. Had the two smaller coalition members registered their own lists, they would have probably failed to reach the threshold, and the bloc’s overall number of mandates would have been lower. Although PiS enjoyed solid support among voters on its own, this move allowed the party and its partners to maximise their gains and, therefore, their ability to govern.

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the Polish parliamentary representation system, parties that barely exceed the electoral threshold enjoy higher chances of winning mandates in larger districts, where the proportionality is less skewed by the peculiarities of the d’Hondt formula. The size differential between constituencies is quite substantial, with the smallest ones being given seven mandates and the largest getting as much as 20. This means parties can adjust their strategies: The lesser actors may choose to focus on competing for seats in the more populous districts, while leading parties usually share nearly all of the spoils in the smaller constituencies. A summary of the findings regarding entry barriers is displayed below in Table 3.4. As shown in Table 3.4, some numbers and indices adopted a fairly constant value, while others fluctuated. Since 2007, the number of parties represented in the parliament has remained the same, while the index of the effective number of parliamentary parties has varied slightly, with a median of 2,8 across the last four elections. The index of the effective number of electoral parties is low and exhibits a decreasing trend,12 which would suggest that the market is becoming more hermetic. The reduction ratio index stayed within a narrow window of between 15,06 and 20,99, with the exception of 2015, when it jumped to nearly 37. Public Funding of Parties The financial situation is an important factor that determines parties’ ability to survive and function. In Poland, party budgets are largely based on public subsidies and refunds for expenses made during campaigns. Political parties are conditionally eligible for two types of funding: a oneoff, vote-based reimbursement of campaign costs and a mandate-based subsidy granted for the duration of a single parliamentary term of office. Those who fail to meet the public funding eligibility criteria find themselves in a much more difficult position, as their ability to compete in the market is significantly curtailed. Membership fees are far less vital. For the six parties represented in the parliament, their share in the overall budgets between 2011 and 2016 averaged at only 4.2% (Gend´zwiłł et al. 2017: 47). Meanwhile, the refunds distributed as a one-off payment after each campaign accounted for 41.2% and 40% in 2012 and 2016, respectively. The mandate-based subsidies were the single largest budgetary position, 12 Calculated through the following equation for the ‘effective number of electoral parties ’ index: y = –1,0122x + 11009, R2 = 0,6035.

3,88 60,41

10,45 24,6

20

3,6

8 4,5

20,99

4,63

7 5,86

15,06

2,82

5 3,32

19,79

3,0

5 3,74

2011

36,85

2,81

5 4,45

2015

19,06

2,76

5* 3,41

2019

* The value refers to the number of partisan and coalition committees that won mandates. The actual number of parties whose members won mandates in 2019 was 18 Source Authors’ calculations based on data from the National Electoral Commission, with the use of a template by Alberski (2010: 151–152) and Michalak (2012: 107–108)

35,73

2,95

6 4,59

2007

7 9,8

2005

29 13,86

2001

Number of parties in the parliament The Laakso–Taagepera index of the effective number of electoral parties The Laakso–Taagepera index of the effective number of parliamentary parties Reduction ratio of the effective number of parties

1997

1991

Election

1993

Selected consequences of the voting system for the Polish political market, 1991–2019

Table 3.4

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making up an average of 48.5% of parties’ total income between 2011 and 2016. A quick look at a detailed data (see Table 3.5) reveals that the reimbursements and subsidies provided by far the largest portion of money available to the two biggest Polish parties: the PiS and the PO. Numbers for the 2016 through 2018 period indicate that financial barriers (i.e. the lack of access to public funding) do not actually prevent new actors Table 3.5 Share of income from various sources for publicly funded parties in the years of 2016–2018 Party

Income source

PiS

Public subsidies and reimbursements Private donations Loans Other (e.g. sale of assets) Public subsidies and reimbursements Private donations Other (e.g. sale of assets) Public subsidies and reimbursements Private donations Other (e.g. sale of assets) Public subsidies and reimbursements Private donations Loans Other (e.g. sale of assets) Public subsidies and reimbursements Private donations Loans Other (e.g. sale of assets) Public subsidies and reimbursements Private donations

PO

Modern

PSL

SLD*

Together Party*

2016

2017

2018

85

82

86

6 9 – 96

17 – 1 88

12 – 2 93

2 2 46

8 4 –

6 1 –

54 – 82

100 – 58

92 8 47

18 – – 40

29 – 13 79

26 27 – 68

14 43 1 80

19 0 3 86

30 2 0 87

20

14

13

The table encompasses three full reporting years. Data in percentage points * The Together Party and the SLD were not represented in the Sejm, but were eligible for public funding as they met the minimum support levels specified by the law Source Authors’ calculations based on the National Electoral Commission resolution on 2018 fiscal reports submitted by political parties, available at: https://pkw.gov.pl/817_Sprawozdania_finansowe_ partii_politycznych_za_rok_2018/1/41437_Uchwaly_Panstwowej_Komisji_Wyborczej_w_sprawie_spr awozdan_finansowych_partii_politycznych_za_2018_r. Accessed on 22 January 2020

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from entering the market, but they definitely limit their organisational capacity to perform even the basic functions. Naturally, entities deprived of public funding try to overcome these obstacles by implementing strategies of stronger media presence and PR operations, reducing their staff and obtaining private backing (including a party tax levied on individuals who perform certain functions on behalf of a given formation). A related but currently rarely mentioned issue is a selective access to the resources left behind by the communist parties. Its relevance diminished over time, but early after the democratic transition, it was a significant factor that affected the look of the political market. Entities established as effective successors to the pre-1989 governing communist formations inherited a substantial wealth, most often in the form of real estate, which they could rent or sell, thus, generating extra income. As Krzysztof Skotnicki (2016: 92) concluded: ‘The fact that only a handful of political parties receive public subsidies is most of all beneficial to the strongest formations, represented in the parliament, and leads to the petrification of the political market’. The author proceeds to consider whether such a legal construct adheres to the constitutional principle of political pluralism, of which the equality of parties is a key tenet. Eligibility criteria for public funding mean that ‘parties deprived of subsidies face many more difficulties when in comes to undertaking their statutory activities, including participation in elections’ (Skotnicki 2016: 92). In the next section, we will take a look at some barriers that can be classified as soft or innocent. The list is by no means exhaustive, as we selected only two examples we found to be of particular significance: an access to the media and political brand recognition. Barriers with access to the media stem from regulations regarding the presentation of content in the public media and the attitudes of private broadcasters towards each political party.13 Differences in the extent of access, as well as biased views voiced by state-owned and private outlets, amplify the inequalities between the smaller (or new) and the larger (or more established) players. According to the Act on Radio and TV Broadcasting, ‘public broadcasters are obliged to enable key state institutions to directly present and explain public policies’ (art. 22). As far as political parties, trade unions, and employers’ organisations are concerned, ‘public radio and TV outlets provide a platform for presenting their views on

13 More about parties’ relations with the media can be found in Chapter 7.

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vital public issues’ (art. 23). These stipulations grant the government a monopoly over some media formats. In turn, the determination of which exact issues are ‘vital’ is effectively left to public broadcasters themselves, who either follow the media logic (if they choose to assert themselves as independent entities) or the political logic (if they are subservient to the ruling party). Hence, a given political formation’s visibility in the media depends on objective factors such as legal regulations, as well as subjective strategies adopted by media outlets, which may open an easy way to circumvent the hard barriers dictated by access rules. The existence of such barriers to media access was confirmed empirically in a research that examined the content of 36 feature programmes across major radio and TV channels in Poland (Piechocka et al. 2018). The research revealed a clear overrepresentation or underrepresentation of certain parties in the media. Rules of media access distort the proportionality of exposure granted to different political actors. Between 2015 and 2018 the governing party, the PiS gained a notable advantage with regard to its presence in the media. Conversely, the main opposition formation, the PO, experienced a decline in representation. In general, parties present in the parliament enjoyed much broader access than the non-parliamentary ones. The frequency of media appearances was not always correlated to the size of the entity, as proven by over-representation of the PSL and the Modern. Election campaigns represent a separate segment of parties’ presence in the media. All registered committees are allowed to place advertisements on public radio and TV. However, while the sole issue of formal access is merely a soft barrier, other factors act as hard limitations to media presence. First of all, in order to be granted access to the main, nationwide channels, a committee needs to be registered nationwide (the requirements for that are discussed earlier in the chapter). Second, if advertising materials are to be published to a wide audience, they need to be professionally prepared and of high quality. This, of course, means a substantial expense. As parties deprived of public funding are typically much more cash-strapped, they tend to save on advertising. Therefore, only a handful of committees are able to project their messages across the entire country through well-designed material. The lucky few not only enjoy free airtime on public media but are also able to spend a hefty chunk of their predominantly publicly funded budgets on quality advertising in both state-owned and private outlets. This makes for a vicious

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circle in which publicly financed parties, through access to nationwide media, solidify their dominant positions in the political market. In the case of politics, brand recognition is correlated with access to the media. Barriers, particularly for young parties, include a lack of interest on the part of media outlets, a fact that usually translates into insufficient media presence and low recognition among voters. In order to overcome that obstacle, freshly established formations typically follow two paths: They try to use their leaders’ personal brand and gain parliamentary representation as soon as possible. In the recent history of Polish parties, utilising personal brands has, in many cases, followed a similar pattern. The founder and leader of a formation, movement, or another initiative brings in certain attributes (for instance credibility, a well-known name, competences), frequently attained in the course of non-political activity, and transfers the positive associations onto the new entity. This entices voters to support it in what they see as a lower-risk transaction. The newly formed party instantly gains a personality that mirrors the key attributes of the leader. This was how the Palikot’s Movement (2011), the Ryszard Petru’s Modern (2015), the Kukiz ’15 (2015), and the Robert Biedron’s ´ Spring (2019) went about breaking through the barriers blocking their access to the media and the political market. Interestingly, upon winning parliamentary representation, most of such formations decided to change their names in an effort to decouple their further existence from the reputation of the leader. Given the low levels of institutionalisation and autonomy, such attempted divorces often led to a decline in support and disinterest on the part of media. As was mentioned before, gaining parliamentary representation grants parties far broader access to the media. This is due partly to legal regulations (especially those binding state-owned broadcasters) and partly to the fact that once a political formation is present in the parliament, both public and private outlets are much more likely to be interested in presenting (and sometimes promoting) its agenda. A separate barrier for younger and smaller entities is the media’s tendency to frame every political conflict in the context of a Westminster-style duopolistic competition between the governing party and the main opposition party. In summary to the considerations regarding various types of entry barriers, it can be said that Poland represents a semi-open political market. This assertion is backed by the dynamics of the partisan and parliamentary arenas. There is no doubt that several entry barriers are clearly present.

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Moreover, there were certain manoeuvres towards cartelisation of politics, and the two biggest players, the PiS and the PO, have long tried to cement their dominance. Despite all that, ever since 2001 (with the sole exception of 2005), the share of parliamentary mandates held by the incumbent parties and the new contenders has remained fairly constant. More detailed data is presented in Table 3.6, with the right column Table 3.6 New parties’ presence in the Sejm, 1991–2019 Election year 1991 1993 1997 2001 2005 2007 2011 2015 2019 Median

Share of seats held by new parties (%) 83.2 54 43 12.4 0 11.5 8.7 15.2 13 13

Source Authors’ calculation based on official data from the National Electoral Commission and Sokół (2018: 63–83)

showing the percentage of seats held after each election by representatives of new formations. The median for the entire examined period stands at 13%. The first three elections saw plenty of changes in the composition of the parliament, suggesting a high degree of openness in the political market. Such volatility was detrimental to both the continuity of government and the stability of parties. Therefore, the lawmakers introduced certain mechanisms that consolidated the position of some of the existing entities, but they did not entirely block the access of new challengers. Some of the latter, specifically those that emerged in 2011 or 2015 and successfully competed for mandates, proved to be a source of a certain paradox. As noted by Beata Kosowska-G˛astoł and Katarzyna SobolewskaMy´slik (2019: 107), ‘Despite their novelty in the party system, they did not bring about much change (…). The extent of change has been insignificant because of newcomers’ lack of coalition and blackmail potential’.

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References Alberski, R. (2010). Ewolucja systemu wyborczego w Polsce. In A. Antoszewski, A. Kolodia, & K. Kowalczyk (Eds.), Transformacja w Polsce i na Ukrainie (pp. 147, 151–152). Wrocław: Oficyna Wydawnicza ATUT. Antoszewski, A. (1999). Ideologia. In A. Antoszewski, & R. Herbut (Eds.), Leksykon politologii (pp. 171–172). Wrocław: atla2. Antoszewski, A. (2004). Wzorce rywalizacji politycznej we współczesnych demokracjach europejskich. Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego. Arter, D., & Kestilä-Kekkonen, E. (2014). Measuring the extent of party institutionalisation: The case of a populist entrepreneur party. West European Politics, 37 (5), 932–956. Bielanowska, J. (2020). Ideology. In J. Marszałek-Kawa & D. Plecka (Eds.), The dictionary of political knowledge (pp. 172–178). Torun: ´ Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek. Calise, M. (2015). The personal party: An analytical framework. Italian Political Science Review/Rivista Italiana Di Scienza Politica, 45(3), 301–315. Carty, K. (2002). The politics of Tecumseh Corners: Canadian political parties as franchise organizations. Canadian Journal of Political Science, 35(4), 723– 745. Carty, K. (2004). Parties as franchise systems. The stratarchical organizational imperative. Party Politics, 10(1), 5–24. Casal Bértoa, F., & Walecki M. (2018). Party regulation and reshaping of party politics in Poland. In F. Casal Bértoa, & I. van Biezen (Eds.), The regulation of post-communist party politics (pp. 31–55). New York: Routledge. Casal Bértoa, F., & van Biezen, I. (Eds.). (2018). The regulation of postcommunist party politics. New York: Routledge. Duverger, M. (1954). Political parties. Their organization and activity in the modern state. London: Neuhen & CO LTD. Gend´zwiłł, A., Bukowska, G., Haman, J., Sawicki, A., & Zbieranek, J. (2017). Finanse polskich partii. Resource document. Fundacja im. S. Batorego. _Finansowanie.pdf. Accessed 29 December 2019. Gherghina, S., Iancu, A., & Soare, S. (2018). Party membership and its conceptualization in democratizing European countries: An introduction. In S. Gherghina, A. Iancu, & S. Soare (Eds.), Party members and their importance in non-EU countries (pp. 1–20). London and New York: Routledge. Grabowska, M. (2006). Partie polityczne w Polsce po 1989 roku. In J. Wasilewski (Ed.), Współczesne społeczenstwo ´ polskie. Dynamika zmian (pp. 231–273). Warszawa: Scholar. Gunther, R., & Diamond, L. (2003). Species of political parties a new typology. Party Politics, 9(2), 167–199.

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CHAPTER 4

Changing Communication Environment

A system of political communication is shaped by its main actors: politicians, the media and the electorate. The relations between these actors are determined by the nature of the media and the political environment. The fundamental elements of political communication models are the links between senders, transmitters and receivers, which are analysed within a classic framework comprised of a message, channel, receivers and feedback. Such models also take into account the peculiarities of politics as topics of communication (Waller 1995: 209; Lamprinakou 2008). While various models differ in their perspectives, they share a common feature: political communication is presented as a process involving interdependencies among its main actors (McNair 2011; Blumler and Gurevitch 1995; Perloff 1998, 2014). Electoral communication is the area most often subjected to analysis (Tenscher et al. 2009; Gibson and Römmele 2001, 2009; Norris 2000), and researchers typically seek to discover how parties change their approach to pursue their goals in a given campaign. Depending on the duration, promotion methods and use of external expertise, activities undertaken by political parties are classified as premodern, modern or postmodern (Farrell 1996, 2006; see also Norris 2000; Strömbäck and Kiousis 2014). This categorisation is meant to reflect ‘certain macro trends’, but it fails to account for the diversity of socio-political contexts (Strömbäck and Kiousis 2014: 116). For many © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 M. Jacunski ´ et al., Party Organization and Communication in Poland, Political Campaigning and Communication, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59993-5_4

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years, scholars interested in formulating models of campaign communication paid particular attention to certain practices, sometimes referred to as the Americanisation of political communication, which were often considered to be a sign of professionalisation. For instance, Gibson and Römmele (2001) use the term ‘professionalisation’ in their party-centred model of professional campaigns, but their concept includes strong references to Americanisation. In essence, the latter concept describes centralised coordination of campaigning; involvement of external communication consultants; implementation of political marketing tenets; and a focus on media, broadcasting and narrowcasting (Lilleker 2006: 32– 33). We adopted a broader perspective by including parties’ activity throughout the inter-electoral period. For us, professionalism in communication is not only about methods and technicalities; an overall approach to communication and parties’ ability to adjust their approach depending on the nature of their environment are equally important. In this chapter, we first look at changes in political communication, paying attention to parties’ activity both during and beyond campaigns. Second, we consider the evolution of the communication environment, primarily in regard to media. We discuss its consequences and the resulting challenges that contemporary parties face. We seek to explain the relations between Polish politicians and the media, identify the factors that affect them and determine whether media logics reign over political logic or vice versa.

4.1

Parties’ Communication Orientation

It can be said that ‘the history of political parties is also a history of political communication’ (Römmele 2003: 8; see also Negrine 2008: 23– 28). When describing the evolution of political parties, Richard Mair and Peter Katz wrote, ‘As television and the mass media more generally have emerged as the key channel of communication between party leaders and voters, offering the benefits of a direct linkage in place of what previously had been mediated by organisational cadres and activists, party campaigning has become more centralised and ‘nationalized’, with the core of the parties’ messages now emanating directly from a single national source. A specifically local input has therefore become less and less relevant’ (Katz and Mair 2002: 125). Communication processes underwent a substantial transformation. The environment in which political parties find themselves today is different from the one to which Katz and Mair referred. Most importantly, the first two decades

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of the twenty-first century saw dynamic development of information and communication technology (ICT) and the deepening of mediatisation. As Lilleker (2014: 19) put it, ‘political communication is argued to have simultaneously passed through three interconnected processes: professionalisation, mediatisation and marketisation’. These processes are argued to have shaped the strategies and tactics of political communicators and have had a profound impact upon the public’s levels of trust, engagement and participation’. The aforementioned changes forced researchers to revise their perspectives on communication and created a number of challenges that parties in various countries now face. Table 4.1 shows how perceptions of political communication have changed over time. As a point of reference for analysing campaigns, Americanisation was once equated with a trend towards homogeneity in campaigning. Reality, however, proved more complex, as the process varied between countries (Nord 2001; Xifra 2011; Strömbäck and Kiousis 2014). This was exemplified by the post-1989 developments in Poland. From 1989 to 2020, the once-again democratic state has held seven presidential, nine parliamentary (excluding the semi-free 1989 election), eight regional and four European Parliament elections. Like their counterparts in other postcommunist countries, Polish parties had to quickly adopt a new approach to communicate with voters. Throughout the 1990s, they looked for inspiration in the older, well-established democracies of Western Europe, and each successive campaign was more advanced than the previous one. Politicians increasingly employed communication tools and began making Table 4.1 Two-stage nature of political communication perception Mass media communication—The third age of communication Premodern political campaign Modern political campaign Postmodern political campaign—Americanisation High - choice media environment—The fourth age of communication Strategic political communication Political communication management Professional political campaign Professional inter-electoral communication Sources Authors’ summary based on Farrell (2006), Van Aelst et al. (2017), Kavanagh and Blumler (1999), Blumler (2016), and Strömbäck and Kiousis (2014)

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use of more advanced social research and opinion polls. Parties gradually incorporated negative campaigning into their repertoire. Campaign offices and staffs gained a clearer, more developed organisational structure. The image of individual candidates and parties as a whole became more of a focal point (Mazur 2002, 2007, 2011; Piasecki 2004; Sztumski and Kolczynski ´ 2003; Bralczyk and Mrozowski 1993; Kolczynski ´ and Mazur 2007, 2009; Kułakowska et al., 2016; Wiszniowski and Kasinska´ Metryka 2012; Daniel 2013). As noted by researchers, since 2005, campaigns run by Polish parties have exhibited the hallmarks of a strategic approach (i.e. they were based on analyses and careful planning, involving specialised staff and multiple communication tools). The main reasons for this development are increased political stability (compared to the 1990s) and the gradual accumulation of experience in communication (Mazur 2007). Campaigns followed a repetitive pattern built around a modular framework, and they employed well-proven methods for the organisation of staff, media exposure, communication of key messages and application of specific communication tools. Still, the modular approach ‘requires political wisdom. A mass-production approach would demand only that the procedures that created a successful campaign event be repeated step by step for each venue. An artisan’s approach would tailor each campaign event to the specific need of every campaign stop’ (Shea and Burton 2006: 200). The analysis shows that the Polish parties are similar to each other in terms of communication activities during the electoral campaigns. All engage in multi-channel communication for the purpose of campaigning. They strive to reach voters through traditional mass media as well as the internet, and they cooperate with their own grassroots structures. Regarding management, campaigns are centralised, which means that central offices determine the framework for communication, while local branches are tasked with executing the communication strategy in their areas. Campaigns are based on the party concept rather than the marketing concept (Cwalina et al. 2012: 260; Biskup 2011a). In other words, crucial decisions are made by campaign offices and the party leadership rather than external experts. Poland lacks the welldeveloped market for political consultancy known from the American tradition; there are no agencies that specialise specifically and exclusively in political communication. In the first several years after the transition to democracy, there were cases in which parties commissioned foreign

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experts in political communication. However, such attempts were quite rare and did not always yield electoral success (Piasecki 2004; Biskup 2011a). When seeking external expertise, politicians typically turned towards scholars (Mazur 2002). Today, the most common practice is to either hire tried and trusted experts or rely on internal resources (i.e. party members who specialise in the planning and implementation of campaigns). This approach fits with the Western standard of how parties cooperate with communication specialists, which ‘is oriented towards political parties whose resources, both material and human, constitute a base for conducting election campaign’ (Biskup 2011a: 228; Drobczynski ´ 2011; Biskup 2011b). The Polish style of campaigning is often described as ‘replication marketing’, as it is characterised by a very high degree of repetitiveness and the absence of a creative component. Strategies are not tailored to fit the specific context of a particular campaign (Kolczynski ´ 2013). Consequently, parties may fail to achieve a satisfactory result even though their efforts to appeal to voters are highly professionalised. The course of campaigns in Polish politics suggests that what separates winners from losers is primarily the quality of strategies and their implementation (i.e. how communication is managed). Contemporary political communication takes place in a ‘high - choice media environment’ (Van Aelst et al. 2017), and in a situation where trust levels towards parties are low. Emerging technologies bring an increased risk of losing reputation and credibility among voters. Given these circumstances, strategic communication that incorporates long-term goals is particularly important. This forces political actors to adopt a holistic view of communication and affects the spectrum of tools they use to reach the electorate. Robert Ormrod refers to this as ‘political marketing orientation’ and states that it includes activities such as image management, voter opinion research and advertisement creation, all of which are carried out principally by party professionals during the run up to an election. In contrast, when all party members feel a responsibility for taking part in both the development of policies and their implementation and communication, they are said to have a ‘political market orientation’ (PMO) (Ormrod 2006: 113). Marketing-oriented communication is no longer sufficient. Ormrod’s PMO, whereby ‘all members of a party are sensitive to internal and external stakeholders’ attitudes, needs and wants, and synthesise these within a framework of constraints imposed by all stakeholders to develop policies and programmes with

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which to reach the party’s objectives’ (Ormrod 2005: 51), has become a foundation for strategy-oriented approaches to communication. Such approaches call for the integration of various tools from the fields of political marketing and strategic public relations (Strömbäck and Kiousis 2011, 2014; Brodzinska-Mirowska ´ 2019), particularly with regard to long-term communication. If one assumes that ‘the professionalization of political campaigns stems partly from efficiency of well-executed modularization’ (Shea and Burton 2006: 201), it follows that communication between campaigns is also based on specific modules that increase its effectiveness in the long run. Given the time periods between campaigning, it is vital that actors use diverse channels (both direct and mediated) and formulate strategies that encompass both the external dimension and internal relations (i.e. activity at the grassroots level). Attempts to implement such solutions can be observed among Polish political parties. In the inter-electoral period, parties adopt noticeably different paths in regard to campaign communication (see Table 4.2). Some adopt the strategy-oriented approach to communication, while others are selective and, for various reasons, do not integrate all of their efforts. Instead, they conduct communication through the channels to which they have the easiest access, be it traditional media, the Internet or direct forms. Usually, they concentrate on external mediated communication. There is no plan for internal communication, including at the grassroots level; if it occurs, it is typically in reaction to an unexpected issue that demands immediate attention. Few Polish parties adopt what could be called a strategic communication orientation in the inter-electoral period. The exception is PiS, which made consistent efforts to follow this orientation both when it led the parliamentary opposition and after its 2015 victory. This is significant because nowadays a permanent information campaign is seen as much more than just an instrument in a ‘government by campaigning’ (Heclo 2000: 32). Between elections, Polish parties focus on external communication, frequently through mediated channels. Mass media is particularly popular, but communication usually takes the form of a tactical reaction to a current narrative rather than a strategic creation. In the inter-electoral period, most parties do not tap into the strategic potential of their structures. They do not engage in planned, well-thought-out communication with their rank-and-file members and followers (Wincławska and Brodzinska-Mirowska ´ 2016). Actions are often taken ad hoc in response to a sudden need. Meanwhile, active,

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Table 4.2 Political parties’ inter-electoral communication orientations Law Civic Modern and Platform (.N) Justice (PO) (PiS)

Polish People’s Party (PSL)

Democratic Together Left Party Alliance (R) (SLD)

Proactive attitude

+

−

−

−

−

+

Reactive attitude

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

Strategic use

+

−

−

+

−

+

Occasional use

−

+

+

−

+

−

Centralisation of communication-related work

+

+

+

+

+

+

Role of political consultants

Occasional cooperation, mainly related to media training

Traditional mass media orientation

Online media orientation

Grassroots orientation

Source Authors’ summary based on original data that were collected, coded and processed by the authors. Plus (+) symbols indicate which elements parties employ in inter-electoral communication, while minus (−) symbols indicate the elements that are unused

involved structures constitute an important—and largely untapped— resource, both during and between campaigns. They can play a vital role in helping parties to shape their image and build communities of supporters and sympathisers. With regard to the last two dimensions presented in the table, all parties have several features in common. Their communication work is centralised, and they do not systematically cooperate with political consultants in the inter-electoral period. If and when they do cooperate, it is usually a temporary arrangement to gain support in relations with the media.

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The outcome of an election campaign is determined by the quality of adopted strategies and their implementation, which are driven by the activities undertaken by parties and their members throughout the inter-electoral period. In today’s era of multi-channel, individualised mass communication (Castells 2013), permanent campaigning leads political organisations to face a number of challenges. Many of these challenges relate to planning and implementing communication schemes, which are ongoing activities undertaken in response to what happens in and through the media as well as skilful use of new technologies and direct channels. The overall approach to communication—and understanding its role in organisations for both the internal and external dimensions—is as important as adeptness at employing specific techniques and tools. This point is particularly valid in an environment where parties still provide the institutional foundation for political communication (see Nitschke and Murphy 2016), as is the case in Poland.

4.2

Media Logics in Party Communication

Mediatisation means that ‘the media form a system in its own right, independent although interdependent on other social systems such as the political system’ (Strömbäck and Esser 2009: 209; Strömbäck 2008; Hjarvard 2008; Mazzoleni and Schulz 1999; Meyen et al. 2014). The intensity of this process is determined primarily by the nature and characteristics of the media system as well as the extent to which political actors internalise media logics in their communication. Media logics are commonly used to analyse how political organisations evolve as they adapt to the realities of the media system. However, these logics are hardly uniform (Lundby 2009; Thimm et al. 2018), not least because the requirements imposed by different types of media (TV, print media, online media) vary significantly. Therefore, media logics are typically understood as a framework to describe how media construct and transmit information. This framework describes certain mechanisms involved in the functioning of the media that other social and political actors must accommodate as well as the realities (e.g. market forces) that affect how the media work (Mazzoleni and Schulz 1999; Strömbäck 2008). Hence, it refers not only to what media impose on politics but also to the norms and principles that apply to journalists, the market situation and the specific character of a given medium (Esser 2013: 167). This is why scholars have distinguished several types of media logics, such as news media logic

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and network media logic (Asp 2014; Klinger and Svensson 2015). Urlike Klinger and Jakob Svensson differentiated between mass media logic and network media logic, finding substantial differences in media use and the production and distribution of content. In network media, users drive the creation of content. The ultimate reach of a given piece of news is determined not by capacity for its distribution (which is virtually unlimited), but its appeal and attractiveness (Klinger and Svensson 2015). The authors emphasise that ‘whereas mass media targets, to a large extent, geographically defined communities (audiences), social media platforms are more bound to communities of peers and like-minded individuals. This means that information on social media platforms may reach a large number of self-selected like-minded others but rather not a general public’ (Klinger and Svensson 2018: 4656). The progression of mediatisation has spurred a significant evolution in political communication. According to Mazzoleni and Schulz (1999: 250), ‘mediatized politics is politics that has lost its autonomy, has become dependent in its central functions on mass media, and is continuously shaped by interactions with mass media. This statement of the mediatization hypothesis is based on observations of how mass media produce political content and interfere with political processes’. Frank Esser and Jörg Matthes (2013) identified various consequences of mediatisation in several areas, including the impact on politicians and parties, the decision-making process in politics and the transmission of information and knowledge to voters. In this chapter, we use the media logics category to examine how the internalisation of these consequences has affected the communication of Polish parties. In addition, we distinguish between consequences depending on the type of media in question and the character of the cooperation that occurs between the given medium and political actors. We established two main categories of challenges related to media logics. The first comprises issues that emerge when parties try to adapt to media logics and the nature of various media formats. This adjustment is the single biggest problem for many political organisations, including the ones discussed in this book. It ‘might affect not only their communication efforts, but also the actual political output and the way political actors are organized’ (Strömbäck and Van Aelst 2013). The second category includes challenges related to the strategies adopted by parties in response to the political activity of the media.

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In this chapter, we are interested in how political entities view the consequences of internalising media logics. Our analysis is based on Gianpietro Mazzoleni and Winfried Schulz’s seminal discussion of the manifestations of media logics in political communication. When looking at the communication of Polish parties, we focus on two aspects: (1) whether political actors’ approach to communication is based on integrating various forms of communication or mediated forms retain their primacy and (2) parties’ reaction to the evolution of media content (e.g. tabloidisation, scandalisation) (Mazzoleni and Schulz 1999). The dominance of media logics, which creates a situation in which political actors internalise and adapt to these logics, marks the fourth stage of mediatisation. Media logics dominate when ‘media take center stage and shape the means by which political communication is played out by political actors, is covered by the media, and is understood by the people’, while the primacy of political logic means that ‘the needs of the political system and political institutions—in particular, parties, but also governmental agencies as well as democracy as a set of norms and procedures—take center stage and shape how political communication is played out, covered, and understood’ (Strömbäck 2008: 234). Does pressure from the media mean that political actors are forced to adapt, or is it their autonomous decision? Scholars lean more towards the latter option (Blumler and Esser 2019), although they acknowledge that parties that refuse to make an adjustment, or make only limited adjustments, face substantial, and sometimes even insurmountable, obstacles to their functioning. Jay Blumer and Frank Esser (2019: 856) asserted that ‘political actors deliberately draw news media logic into their own considerations and action rationales. In short, although mediatization may pressurize political actors to carry out strategic adaptations, this does not lead them automatically to lose power to the media’. If one agrees with this view, it can be assumed that political actors take media logics into account when communicating, but they continue to pursue their goals constructed along the lines of political logic: (1) the ‘policyand decision-based “production” of politics’ (policy), (2) the ‘power and publicity-gaining’ aspect (politics) and (3) the ‘institutional framework conditions of politics’ (polity) (Esser 2013: 165). It follows that policy, politics and polity retain their validity as the core elements of political logic; they are merely presented within a framework that accommodates media logics. This disproves the notion that one logic permanently

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prevails over the other, in contrast to the common belief that mediatisation imposes media logics on political entities. The fact that these two types of logic are typically seen as antagonistic reflects the evolutionary approach to the transformation of political communication in reaction to mediatisation (Kissas 2019). The process of self-mediatisation postulated by Blumler and Esser suggests that interactions between the media and political actors are in fact characterised by ‘mobile or labile domination’ (Jacunski ´ et al. 2019), complementarity or competition of the two logics (Downey and Neyai 2014: 447). Political parties adapt to their mediatised communication environment through changes at different levels. Jesper Strömbäck and Peter Van Aelst point to organisational adjustments: the creation of internal structures that support the party’s media presence and the corresponding division of responsibilities in this area. In many political parites, the adjustment results in the establishment of a press office. The second possible adjustment is the inclusion of an in-house media expert in decision-making processes, an idea espoused by most political organisations across Europe. The third option takes into account the importance of communication skills and media savviness for both leaders and lower-level representatives of the party. As explained by Strömbäck and Van Aelst (2013: 344– 345), ‘When parties select leaders and candidates, (…) they should be highly skilled in handling the substance of policy matters; they should be able to manage intra-party tensions or conflicts; they should be able to establish, build or maintain relationships with important stakeholders and publics; they should function as symbols for what the party stands for; and they should have charisma and be skilled in communicating with the media’. While adapting to media logics is very much an organisational effort, the process of adaptation also occurs at the individual level when party members internalise new approaches to the evolving environment. This brings about several challenges, as parties strive to maintain cohesion of their message to the public. Their members differ widely in terms of their media-handling abilities. Naturally, such disparities affect external communication, since the personalisation of politics means that the voice of a single representative is perceived as the voice of an entire organisation. The adaptation process discussed here occurs both during and in between campaigns through internal and external (i.e. media) activity. As parties pursue different goals at each of these levels, they may employ alternative forms of communication, such as the Internet or

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direct communication. However, following media logics carries certain risks. By trying to adjust their political message to suit particular media formats, parties can cause disillusionment among their voters. Additionally, by overemphasising the importance of media presence, they may become short-sighted in their communication, able only to achieve shortterm goals, and risk marginalising alternative communication methods and other aspects of their activity (Strömbäck and Van Aelst 2013: 352– 353; Brodzinska-Mirowska ´ 2013). Adapting to media logics leads parties to reshape their relations with the media, the electorate and their own membership base. Questions emerge as to which kind of strategy is best for minimising the above-mentioned risks. In our research, we analysed how Polish parties handle communication in a mediatised environment and how they shape and implement communication at various levels and in different formats. Also, we explored which strategies are adopted to manage the inherent dangers of adhering to media logics. As stated by Kees Brants and Katrin Voltmer (2011: 2), ‘political parties and other elites of established political institutions are losing control over the way in which politics is communicated and interpreted in public sphere’, and the changes observed in political communication constitute a ‘dynamic process of centrifugal forces that pull political communication towards “media logics”, popular culture and consumerism’. The phenomenon that Brants and Voltmer describe explains why the consequences of self-mediatising and internalising media logics are challenges related to the choice of communication strategies. Political actors are bound to use traditional media, as these remain their main channels for communicating with the environment. As Esser (2013: 155) points out, ‘politicians have grown to rely on the mass media for gauging public opinion (using media coverage as a proxy for public sentiments), and for generating attention, acceptance, and legitimation of their actions’. The difficulty of merely attracting the attention of the media pales in comparison to influencing the agenda and narrative that media adopt with regard to politics. Thus, political actors must determine the manner of communication that will allow them to retain greater control over the message that reaches voters. Esser and Matthes (2013: 180) called this problem the ‘mediatization of political reality in “news”’. It occurs when media content is built around media logics rather than political logic. The long-observed trend of media towards soft news, trivialisation and embedding political content in a negative context presents parties with serious

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difficulties when it comes to handling communication. They face danger to their reputation, credibility and, consequently, the trust of vital electorate segments (Schnee 2015). Media provide a platform that promises much broader reach, but they can significantly influence the character of the messages that are transmitted to the public. Thus, parties are caught in a ‘mediatisation trap’ (Brodzinska-Mirowska ´ 2018); they tend to concentrate their efforts on external, mediated communication at the expense of direct forms and internal dimention, even though the latter could allow them to build stronger ties with voters and their membership base at the grassroots level. In an era of scandalised, tabloidised content, a balanced approach to communication is crucial to the effectiveness of parties’ efforts to achieve their objectives. Indeed, mediatisation and adaptation to media logics affect how voters relate not only to politicians and parties but also to democracy at large. Esser and Matthes (2013: 193) observed lower levels of public trust in political actors as well as diminishing willingness among citizens to actively participate in politics. In addition, ‘the media legitimize their increasingly proactive political involvement with reference to democratic expectations such as providing “transparency”, contributing to “checks and balances”, and vitalising the “public sphere”. However, on the other hand, the media themselves are hard to “sanction” themselves in case of negative consequences’ (Esser 2013: 156). Political actors are forced to handle the consequences of all these developments, and they may do so in a manner that is constructive from the perspective of a democratic system, such as one involving the integration of different levels of communication. However, the desire to exert greater control over how political messages are conveyed by the media can push them towards other strategies that are detrimental to democracy, such as attempts to politicise specific media outlets to ensure their submission and cooperation.

4.3 Factors Shaping Politicians’ Relations with the Media in Poland Academic interest in the relations between politicians and the media has a long-standing tradition in Poland. It dates back to the era of the People’s Republic of Poland, although research back then was fairly limited. Work on this topic intensified after 1989 as Polish academia dove deeper into the topic (Dobek-Ostrowska 2002; Goban-Klas 1996; Jakubowicz 1995; Mocek 2006). Foreign scholars have also looked into these relations,

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particularly during Poland’s transition period, when making comparative analyses (Curry 1990; Voltmer 2013). Relatively recently, a discussion on the relations between journalists and political actors emerged in research, mainly that conducted domestically (Dobek-Ostrowska et al. 2013; St˛epinska ´ and Ossowski 2012; St˛epinska ´ and Głowacki 2014; St˛epinska ´ et al. 2017). This discussion concentrates on (1) journalists’ roles and practices in the context of increasing party–media parallelism, (2) journalists’ attitude towards political actors and (3) politicians’ views on some elements and manifestations of mediatisation. The key factors that shape the relations between Polish politicians and the media include (1) the media system, (2) the pluralism of media, (3) its political involvement and (4) its polarisation. All of these elements are discussed below to provide readers with a background and understanding of what drives politicians’ own assessments of their relations with the media, which are presented and discussed in Chapter 7. The first factor we identified is the shape of the media system. Scholars interested in the media systems of Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, including Poland, have struggled to classify them in line with the model previously developed for Western Europe. However, the media system of CEE countries cannot be classified as unique either (Castro Herrero et al. 2017); the diversity among states and the multiplicity of traditions make local peculiarities relevant. Research on the evolution of the Polish media system in the early 1990s indicates that, just like other post-communist countries, Poland adopted solutions that were previously employed in the Mediterranean area (i.e. Greece, Italy and Spain). However, according to Bogusława Dobek-Ostrowska (2011), two decades after the democratic transition, increases in commercialisation, convergence, concentration of ownership, globalisation and Europeanisation led Polish media to become a mixture of the liberal model and polarised pluralism (Hallin and Mancini 2004). The former is reflected in the prevailing role of market forces in the press and online media segments. The latter is characterised by a high degree of parallelism, the pattern of governance in broadcasting media, state intervention in the funding of public media and the supremacy of politics over media, particularly public outlets. Compared to other countries in the region, Poland boasts the biggest and one of the most competitive radio and TV broadcasting markets, which has led to the development of strong media outlets. The division

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into public and private outlets (referred to as the mixed model) is accompanied by a distinct differentiation of ownership structures. In the press, online news services, radio and TV segments, domestic organisations operate alongside international media corporations as well as companies owned by foreign (e.g. German or US) entities. Political patronage practices have been present in various areas of political, social and economic life since early on in the democratic transition process. Media were faced with these practices in the 1990s, with further political probing occurring in the 2000s, when the SLD-PSL coalition was in power, and in recent years, as PiS came to dominate the political scene (Gwiazda 2008). The practices were primarily intended to exert pressure on or control public media, and they coincided with political instability and frequent personnel changes. Iwona Merklejn and Agnieszka W˛eglinska ´ (2014: 114) noted that ‘problems with independence of public media in Poland are not caused by defective law or introduction of an untested system but by political condition, which resulted from the very beginning in more or less secret attempts to influence and control public television’. Although the politicisation of public media, specifically, TVP S.A., a TV broadcaster, and Polskie Radio S.A., a radio broadcaster, is not a new phenomenon, its scale has changed significantly since 2015. This is further discussed later in the chapter. In the 2010s, Peter Bajomi-Lazar analysed the relations between political parties and the media in five post-communist countries, including Poland, at the meta-level. He asked two main questions: (1) Which parties are willing to colonise media, and under which circumstances? (2) Which parties try to limit the freedom of media, and under which circumstances? According to Bajomi-Lázár, several factors affected the relations between political actors and the media. First, in the legal system of post-communist countries, freedom of expression and freedom journalism became more economic category than political one. Second, the quality of public debate has declined, and journalists contributed to this trend. Finally, the concept of common public interest has been largely pushed out of public debate. Bajomi-Lázár observed that in Poland and other countries in the CEE region, the media are colonised by parties. This means that political organisations adopt a ‘strategy aimed at extracting from the media resources and channelling these to party supporters in order to reward them for past and future services’ (Bajomi-Lázár 2015: 76). This, in turn, enables them to ‘mobilize their inactive supporters, to address undecided voters, to deploy new resources for party funding, to engage in party

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patronage and clientelism, to paralyse their rivals by means of limiting their visibility, and to influence decision-making processes’ (Bajomi-Lázár 2015: 76). Such colonisation occurs primarily in the public media, which are far more susceptible to politicians’ attempts at controlling human resources policies and access to resources compared to private outlets. According to Reporters Without Borders (RWB 2017), Polish authorities have been taking measures that threaten all checks and balances as well as fundamental freedoms, especially freedom of the press. RWB’s 2016 World Press Freedom Index, published a year after PiS came into power, marked Poland’s first spectacular drop from 18th to 47th of the 180 examined countries. In a subsequent edition, the trend continued, and Poland was ranked 62nd. The relations between the media and politicians are strongly influenced by not only the latter’s ideological orientation but also their attitude towards the post-1989 order in media. In Poland, that order was constructed based on a framework developed during the process of transformation from authoritarian communism to liberal democracy. The most substantial changes occurred in several stages from 1990 to 1997, as described by several Polish scholars (Filas 1999; Dobek-Ostrowska 2002). As one of them noted, ‘the shape of the Polish media system is a result of two separate strategies that were adopted with regard to the printed and electronic media, respectively. The press was driven by the private sector and market forces of supply and demand. Radio and TV were dependent on how the state regulated their functioning’ (Czapnik 2006: 101–102). The media order established throughout the 1990s was shaken up by politicians on two separate occasions. The first was the so-called Rywingate1 scandal. According to Grzegorz Haber (2006: 60), the case ‘revealed certain mechanisms at the intersection of politics and media to the general public’, causing significant damage to both milieus. For Agora, post-1989 Poland’s biggest media empire, which was supportive 1 The so-called Rywingate incident remains one of biggest corruption scandals of the post-1989 era, with parts still shrouded in mystery today. In 2002, it was revealed that Lew Rywin, a highly influential TV producer with links to the left-wing political establishment, secretly approached Adam Michnik, editor-in-chief of Gazeta Wyborcza. Rywin offered to ensure that the parliament (then controlled by an SLD-led coalition) would rig the new act on media by adding certain stipulations favourable to Agora, a media corporation of which Gazeta Wyborcza was a part. In return, he expected $17,5 million, the post of chairman at the Polsat TV station and Wyborcza’s lenience towards the prime minister and the SLD leader, Leszek Miller.

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of liberal and left-leaning political elites, the scandal sparked a crisis of trust among the public. It would eventually limit Agora’s influence over the political scene and lead to a major reconstruction of certain segments of the media market. In addition, Rywingate provided ample fuel for a political narrative that has since been used to delegitimise the post-1989 political order as a corrupt system controlled by an all-powerful group formed during the Round Table Talks. The second seismic shift came with the transformation of the public media system initiated in 2015. Upon coming to power, PiS decided to go beyond the common practice of exerting pressure on journalists and moved to take control over and colonise public media to an extent previously unheard of in democratic Poland. The government reshuffled the structure, personnel and agenda of public broadcasters, motivating its moves with an ideologically driven desire to restore media pluralism. Its understanding of pluralism, however, was very peculiar; PiS assumed that if private media consistently criticise the government, public media should support it so that some kind of balance is struck. The reconstruction of public TV and radio outlets began with far-reaching personnel changes. Then, their agenda was redefined. Public media were effectively turned into national media, not just semantically but also in terms of content and organisation. Draft media bill related to the functioning of public broadcasters (primarily TVP S.A. and Polskie Radio S.A.) specified in 2016 that their mission is to ‘cultivate national historic traditions as well as patriotic and humanist values, with the goal of meeting the spiritual needs of the viewers and listeners’ (Bubula, 2016). As Robert Sata and Ireneusz Paweł Karolewski (2020: 213) write in their reconstruction of events, in December 2015, the government passed controversial laws enabling the Minister of the Treasury to directly appoint heads of public TV and radio, circumventing the National Broadcasting Council, a constitutional institution tasked with guaranteeing the independence of state-owned media. In 2016, PiS established a separate entity, the National Media Council, with the power to appoint the heads of TVP S.A., Polskie Radio S.A. and the Polish Press Agency. At the same time, the National Broadcasting Council was rendered powerless and eventually taken over entirely by the ruling party, who used it to pressure private media. Since then, stateowned media have become a platform for campaigns against politicians and journalists who are critical of the government and the party in power. The increasing politicisation of public media prompted RWB (2017) to describe Polish public outlets as ‘government propaganda mouthpieces’.

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Capturing public TV and radio broadcasters was one of PiS’s political goals, as the party is well aware that these outlets boast massive audiences and substantial market shares (in this respect, Poland seems to be the exception among CEE countries). The transformation of public media into national media became the ruling party’s plan for a new media order that would give it greater control over broadcasters and lead to the ‘re– Polonisation’ of targeted companies. Another important factor that affects the relations between the media and political actors is linked to media pluralism in terms of both structure and content. Pluralism is a fundamental value in liberal democracies. Media perform their role as political watchdogs best if they are diverse, independent from politicians and unbiased. A dispersed ownership structure ensures such pluralism and is therefore hugely important in democratic states, as it increases the quality of public debate. Internal (i.e. content) pluralism is reflected in diversity of opinions and equal access to broadcasters that represent various segments of the political market. However, some authors noted that increasing the volume of content and access to various media services actually leads to polarisation and extremism in public discourse rather than strengthening pluralism (Sunstein 2007; Pariser 2011). In Poland, the growing supply of information and multiplicity of outlets, many of which are owned by a small handful of media groups, is accompanied by the de-politicisation of content and public disinterest in political matters. Media pluralism in the EU is assessed by a tool called the Media Pluralism Monitor (MPM)2 , which was developed by the Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom at the European University Institute (EUI). In Poland, the implementation of MPM is coordinated by Beata Klimkiewicz. Out of several aspects considered in the reports, two call for particular attention on Polish media. First, there is the matter of media ownership concentration. MPM looked at the state of the media market and the presence of regulations preventing excessive concentration of ownership. Both before and after PiS came to power in 2015, the report pointed to high risk in this regard (Klimkiewicz 2018: 85), with Poland placed alongside some other countries (namely, Finland, Lithuania and Spain) facing similar issues. The lack of regulations to curb ownership concentration has caused the largest players to collectively claim as 2 MPM examines four domains: (1) basic protection, (2) market plurality, (3) political independence and (4) social inclusiveness.

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much as 70–90% of the market share, which has translated into a limited diversity of views in the media. The second aspect was political independence, for which there are five indicators. Poland was initially judged to be at medium risk in this regard (40%). In a subsequent report for 2017, Klimkiewicz (2019: 13) updated her estimate and assessed the risk as high (69%). This was primarily due to two factors: the absence of legal safeguards against political control of media outlets and the danger to governance and funding independence. According to Jan Zielonka (2015: 18), ‘a weak state, hegemonic and volatile at the same time, parties and unconsolidated democratic procedures’ mean that the media are at risk of being taken over by entities clearly linked to certain political or business milieus. It is worth adding that Polish law does include some guarantees regarding access to public TV and radio broadcasters for political parties, trade unions and employers’ organisations. All these entities are entitled to present their views and standpoints on vital public matters, as stipulated by Art. 23 of the Act on Radio and TV Broadcasters. The act burdens stateowned outlets with certain obligations related to informing the public about domestic political developments. However, according to Maciej Mizejewski ˙ (2015: 113), the interpretative nature of these stipulations is a problem, since the act does not define what exactly constitutes a ‘vital public matter’. This means that the media, rather than politicians, are the gatekeepers who manage the agenda for content and determine what is important enough to warrant airtime or is attractive enough to draw the public’s attention. Hence, politicians are forced to follow media logic, which is driven by economic factors (i.e. audience numbers and income from advertising). One can imagine an alternative scenario whereby the hierarchy of topics is determined by political logic and dictated by the will of the governing party. By colonising public media, the governing coalition (or even the leadership of a single, dominant party) may be able to impose its idea of what is important and should be discussed by the media. Mizejewski ˙ (2015: 114) also says that ‘the form in which political events are presented is chosen by a given editorial board, sometimes to the displeasure of certain politicians’. This is because the media determines how information is conveyed and framed. When reporting on a given event, a TV station can choose to provide a live broadcast, highlights with selected statements from a representative of one party or a verbal description delivered by the news anchor. Both the governing parties and

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the opposition expect the media to show up whenever they call a press conference. Hence, the way journalism is practiced matters, as it can turn pluralism into a genuine principle or render it largely superficial. Studies on the Polish public TV broadcaster, such as the 2019 Monitoring Report by the European Parliament, showed that, in terms of its informativeness, the reporting of by TVP S.A. is politicised. It lacks pluralism, as the information is one-sided. An analysis of content broadcasted over a two-week period prior to the 2019 European Parliament election confirmed these findings. Internal pluralism in the public media must be ensured, particularly during election campaigns, in accordance with the 2011 Electoral Code Act. Public broadcasters are obliged to organise debates for presidential candidates so that all contenders can directly present their views and agendas. Similar regulations apply to parliamentary elections: all parties and committees are supposed to have equal access to both debates and feature programmes aired by state-owned TV and radio outlets. The Code specifies rules for campaigning on public TV and radio, including the allocation of free airtime dedicated to political party broadcasts. In general, the nature of the regulations contained in the Code is not called into question. However, since 2015, the National Broadcasting Council, a constitutional institution tasked with preserving freedom of press and citizens’ right to information, has stopped publishing any reports on broadcasters’ conduct during election campaigns. Thus, no reliable, objective data on this topic are available. The oppositional parties has repeatedly complained in other media outlets that, outside campaign periods, public TV and radio stations regularly air news shows and feature programmes in which the selection of guests and the framing of information are largely biased. Political involvement and the resulting bias shape the media’s relations with the world of politics. This phenomenon is far from unique to Poland or even the CEE region as a whole; it has been observed in many countries all over the world. The content of media often reflects the views of the owners, journalists or other staff members. Dan Hallin and Paolo Mancini (2004: 28) highlight this aspect of media bias, pointing out on one hand the tendency of media staff to undertake activity in the political sphere and, on the other hand, the importance of journalists’ and media employees’ own political orientations as well as their professional connections to politicians. In Poland, politics–media relations are very similar to those in other CEE democracies, where ‘informal rules

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and practices compete with formal rules and laws in defining everyday interactions between political, business, and media elites’ (Lašas 2019: 1379). Many Polish journalists ‘themselves do not hide their political and ideological engagement’ (Dobek-Ostrowska 2019: 87). Naturally, then, ‘media content reflects not only [the] partiality of the owners, but also of journalists and media staff’ (Dobek-Ostrowska 2019: 86). Research on Polish journalists conducted in 2012 by a team led by Bogusława Dobek-Ostrowska seems to confirm the above-mentioned observations. Approximately one-third of the interviewees (30.6%) declared that they had centre-left or clearly left-wing views. Less than a quarter (22.5%) admitted to centre-right or right-wing leanings, and 24% positioned themselves as centrists. Around 20% refused to disclose their political preferences, with public media employees being the most likely to do so (31% and 37% of pundits in public radio and TV, respectively) (Dobek-Ostrowska et al. 2013: 21–23). The media’s political involvement may be affected by the professional attitudes that are prevalent among journalists. Another research team, led by Agnieszka St˛epinska ´ et al. (2017), applied Claudia Mellado’s (2015) typology of journalism roles to examine Polish media. They identified two main but largely opposing approaches: critical monitoring (i.e. the watchdog model) and compliance (i.e. the loyal-facilitator model). An ideologically detached provider of information emerged as a third alternative that is common among the younger generation of journalists. Given the context of political involvement and bias in Poland, the relations between media and parties can be examined with two theoretical perspectives: Denis McQuail’s classification of bias (1992) and Jay Blumler and Michael Gurevitch’s typology for the politicisation of media (1995). In Poland, political actors build links to the media depending on the bias of the latter. McQuail distinguished four bias options: (1) partisanship, or an open and intended bias; (2) propaganda, or a hidden and intended bias; (3) unwitting bias, or an open but unintentional bias and (4) ideological bias, or hidden and unintended bias. When one looks at Polish politically involved media, combinations of types 1 or 2 and 4, 1 and 2, and 2 and 4 seem most frequent. Politicians’ cooperation with partisan, propagandistic and ideological media was particularly visible during SLD’s time in power (2001–2005) and PiS’s first government (2005–2007). It then became less commonplace when PO’s stint in the government (2007–2015) brought about the relaxation of axiological conflicts. Finally, it re-emerged in recent years, after PiS returned to

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power in 2015. The biased, ideological content appears in some segments of the press (e.g. the newspapers Nasz Dziennik, Gazeta Polska, Rzeczpospolita and Do Rzeczy), Catholic media (the radio station Radio Maryja and TV station Trwam) as well as news shows aired by public TV (i.e. TVP) and, to a lesser degree, radio. Cooperation with ideological media is most common among politicians and parties connected with the current government, which is led by conservatives with nationalist leanings who espouse Catholicism. Moreover, the officials responsible for overseeing national media (i.e. previously public media) effectively became political patrons and customers for journalists. As a result, the media hail the government’s achievements and peddle negative narratives to discredit the opposition. The propagandistic media collect and spread emotionally charged messages and information, mixed with biased commentary. The content usually focuses on political pathologies, corruption, scandals and crimes for which, supposedly, the opposition is directly or indirectly responsible. When it comes to the combinations of types 1 and 2 as well as 2 and 4, it seems that Poland contradicts McQuail’s theoretical model. The signs of propaganda and bias are no longer hidden in public media, and part of the private media has become intentionally biased. In the latter case, depending on the situational context (e.g. an upcoming election), they may choose to camouflage their bias or keep it entirely open. Hidden bias is often evident in, for instance, Gazeta Wyborcza and liberal magazines (e.g. Polityka, Newsweek Poland) as well as private TV broadcasters (e.g. TVN). However, while indulging their political leanings, these outlets try to retain their watchdog function, which means that liberal politicians and parties cannot always rely on their lenience and friendliness. Unwitting bias is the domain of tabloids and gossip websites. Such outlets are often fed leaks and ‘insider stories’ supplied by politicians in an attempt to use political public relations to control the agenda. This approach has varying results. The political involvement of the media is linked to their politicisation. It can be examined based on Blumler and Gurevtich’s (1995: 64–65) typology of media–party relations, which is summarised below: 1. Political parties or their leaders’ own mass media 2. A medium engaged in voluntary relations with a certain party

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3. The editorial line of a given media outlet that is, as a rule, favourable towards a certain political option but also expresses doubts, reservations and points out deficiencies of the supported party and its leaders 4. Media that provide ad hoc support in unpredictable ways 5. Media that are politically neutral and refuse to support any organisations. In its pure form, the first scenario is absent from the Polish political scene. Parties may establish their own media outlets, but they are very limited in reach. Alternatively, the new media ecosystem allows them to communicate through official channels on social networking sites. In this regard, Polish political parties are similar to their counterparts in many other countries: their efforts focus around websites, YouTube accounts and Facebook fan pages. Newspapers, and occasionally magazines, in either print or online versions are also part of parties’ strategies. PSL has been publishing its own magazine, entitled The Green Banner, since 1931. Currently, it is published biweekly, and party members are obliged to subscribe to it. With regard to the second type of relations, especially as they apply to national media, it should be noted that the role of the parliamentary majority and the government is far more pronounced in Poland now than in previous years. The connections between the governing party and some media outlets are no longer merely voluntary, but deliberately constructed at many levels, including laws regulating the functioning of national media; political appointments for top management positions and solutions allowing for additional public funding (beyond the usual TV licences) for state-owned media companies; and government influence over content. Meanwhile, opposition parties seek support among privately owned broadcasters who voluntarily declare certain political sympathies or are open to conditional arrangements. Such links may arise both from ideological choices (i.e. when a given medium and the party it supports represent similar standpoints) or for economic reasons (i.e. if the outlet in question wants to provide a market counterbalance to its pro-government competitors). In recent years, the increasing presence of such voluntary alliances has been driven by the government’s move to control public media and the growing intensity of political polarisation. The third scenario refers neatly to those biased media that try to impose their logic on political actors and thus retain the freedom to

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choose whether to support or criticise a given political party or individuals. In Poland, the increasingly dichotomous way in which politicians and the public perceive the media (e.g. ‘theirs’ vs. ‘ours’, ‘pro-government’ vs. ‘opposition’, ‘propaganda’ vs. ‘independent’) puts broadcasters and publishers in a peculiar position. Finding a balanced approach and applying healthy criticism becomes increasingly difficult as outlets feel compelled to pick sides. However, by doing so, they inevitably limit their leeway to question the agenda and actions of the parties they opt to support. Politicians try to exploit this situation, which ‘may explain party’s positions and individual attitudes demonstrating belonging to one of the two “media tribes”, which may translate into the behaviour of political actors driven by the urge to get only “friendly” journalists’ attention and coverage and depreciate the “unfriendly” or hostile media’ (Jacunski ´ et al. 2019: 25). It is difficult to identify any clear-cut cases of the fourth scenario occurring in Poland. Online news sites or tabloids may occasionally surprise politicians by offering support that does not result from formal partisan public relations efforts. Such cases are driven largely by personal factors and the degree of closeness in the relations between particular journalists and politicians. In empirical research discussed elsewhere in this book (Chapter 7), our interviewees did not wish to divulge details of their informal links to the media but admitted that these links often affected the ad hoc support they received. In Poland, media neutrality is often solely declarative. It may guide the work of a select few journalists, but it rarely applies to entire outlets. There have been attempts to construct deliberately, consistently unbiased media, as some outlets have tried to preserve objectivism and cooperate with politicians from all major parties and milieus. However, neutrality can reflect escapism, a desire to not discuss politics or become ideologically invested and a preference for replacing political content with lighter news or infotainment. This approach has been espoused by many of the biggest radio stations (e.g. RMF FM) and some online services (e.g. interia.pl). The last factor shaping media–party relations is connected to pluralism in the world of media. In the early stages of Poland’s democratic transformation, journalists were among those groups that played a vital role in the formulation of Poles’ social, civic and political attitudes. On more than one occasion, they directly shaped the course of political events (Mocek 2006: 8). Throughout the 1990s, as the transition progressed, they found

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themselves facing ethical dilemmas. Which values should they prioritise? Should their work be driven by commercialisation or by the mission and role of journalism in a democratic society? Should they serve the so-called common good, assist a particular political group or follow the economic interests of media owners? By making these choices, journalists determined their professional futures. They either strove for independence or became embroiled in complex interdependencies at the intersection of politics, business and the world of media. The early divisions within their ranks were driven by differences in attitudes towards their profession between those who prioritised values (e.g. the ethos and mission of journalism, a sense of calling) and those who pursued specific interests, whether their own or those of others (through political clientelism). According to Paulina Olechowska (2017: 57), the high degree of politicisation observed in Polish media ‘is exemplified by the increasingly clear-cut ideological divisions among particular outlets and individual journalists’. In theoretical terms, such divisions can be seen as manifestations of the polarised pluralism model (Hallin and Mancini 2004) and the universal theory of journalism culture (Hanitzsch 2007). Given a near absence of consensus, these deepening rifts lead to significant political parallelism, and the structure of the media system increasingly reflects the polarisation of the political scene. After 2001, the underdeveloped journalism culture and political parallelism contributed to the gradual establishment of two major media camps: one adopting an antiPiS rhetoric and the other countering this rhetoric by being anti-PO. The crash of the presidential airplane near Smolensk ´ in 2010 triggered further polarisation. Similar to politicians and society at large, the media were highly divided in their views on the causes and consequences of the tragedy. However, the media’s political involvement and bias reached new heights after 2015. Strong polarisation and entrenchment were visible within the professional group of journalists and media pundits as well as in content and its framing. There are at least two major groups of media actors that shape public discourse and contribute to the deepening of political conflicts. If one accepts the notion that politics have primacy over media, these groups merely reflect existing social and political divisions. The first group represents the right wing of the political scene. Since 2015, it has enjoyed direct and indirect support from the government and state-owned companies. It consistently endorses the governing party and acts as its mouthpiece in order to mould public perceptions and preserve PiS’s positive image. A Polish media scholar, Tadeusz Kowalski

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(2019), has shown that state-owned enterprises direct a majority of their advertising budgets to outlets such as Gazeta Polska, Tygodnik wSieci and Do Rzeczy; state-related funds accounted for 45%, 40% and 23% of these newspapers’ advertising revenues, respectively. The second group supports various segments of the opposition and comprises liberal and left-wing media. Private outlets also feature prominently in the conflict, despite their reiterated claims about independence and the high standards of journalism. Severe political polarisation manifests in the emergence of two opposite narratives developed by the rival political camps and peddled by their media partners. Circles centred around the government preach patriotism, the primacy of the nation-state and the principle of solidarity, while their rivals espouse liberalism, cosmopolitanism and progressive and inclusive rhetoric. The media are faced with the need to convey these messages to polarised audiences. The bipolar competition promoted through narratives and multilayered polarisation marginalises centric political actors. The mainstream media, which should include ample space for moderate, impartial outlets, is instead torn towards opposing sides of the conflict, similar to the centrifugal tendencies that draw competing political actors towards the extremes of the spectrum. Over the last dozen or so years, the political duopoly of PiS and PO has attempted to preserve the bipolarity of competition and render smaller parties either irrelevant or dependent. It is therefore hardly surprising that the media copied a similar pattern of development. Interesting questions emerge with regard to whether the same phenomenon applies to social media. In 2016, working in cooperation with Sotrender (an analytics company), Kamil Rakocy researched polarisation among Polish Facebook users (Rakocy 2016). His effort revealed that 80% of all examined users did not participate in the abovementioned political contest and subscribed to neither the anti-PiS nor anti-PO rhetoric. Therefore, it seems that the strong polarisation in politics and the media does not translate into the social scene. The author’s conclusions suggest that the polarisation of society, which the binary character of opinions and the dominance of certain narratives are supposed to reflect, may be largely an illusion. His findings are corroborated by earlier research suggesting that ‘network bias also affects an individual’s local perceptions and the collective social phenomena that emerge’ (Lerman et al. 2016: 7). If one follows these assertions to their logical conclusion,

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it seems that the media’s conviction regarding the existence and mutual hostility of two highly entrenched social groups is misguided. Their claims amplify the notion of social division but are not representative of the opinions voiced by social media users at large. A similar misperception may be prevalent among politicians who believe that the polarised views presented by the media reflect public sentiment. Given the state of our knowledge about the development of socio-political cleavages, the issue is worth further examination to verify the results of the aforementioned research on the activity of Polish Facebook users. However, since this would require working with large data sets and accessing Facebook’s API, it promises to be a difficult undertaking.

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CHAPTER 5

Are Political Party Structures Still Important?

The role of political parties in modern democracies is changing. They are becoming less connected to society as they edge towards state institutions, and they focus on fulfilling their procedural functions at the expense of representative ones (Katz and Mair 1995; Mair 2002). As a result, the significance of grassroots structures is also evolving. Theoretically, they continue to be assets that are vital for maintaining rapport with the electorate and exchanging information within the party. They are the source of human, organisational and communication potential. However, party leaders show increasing disregard for their role (van Biezen 2003; Sobolewska-My´slik et al. 2010). This trend raises questions about the role of parties on the ground in the organisational and communication activities of party organisations. Although well-established political parties capable of withstanding electoral defeats usually boast solid regional and local structures, in recent years there have been several examples of parties without grassroots organisations that garnered substantial support at the polls (albeit sometimes only briefly). Some scholars maintain that parties lacking that asset are bound to be largely irrelevant, and any successes they might enjoy will most likely be short-lived (Nalewajko 2006: 187). Nonetheless, it is becoming increasingly obvious that strong grassroots organisations, by themselves, no longer guarantee electoral victories; leaders and their personal qualities became at least as (and quite possibly © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 M. Jacunski ´ et al., Party Organization and Communication in Poland, Political Campaigning and Communication, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59993-5_5

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more) important. In the current era of mediatisation, individual popularity and recognisability are key. This prompts party elites to believe that maintaining complex local structures is not worth the effort this takes. As campaign strategies are increasingly centred around personalities, leaders take over the responsibility for wooing the electorate. They act as a cognitive shortcut for mobilising support and become the bond between citizens and parties (Sandri et al. 2019: 82), thus strengthening their position within party organisations. While the importance of regional and local structures may be shifting, they still unquestionably carry certain advantages. For example, they are key for monitoring local events and developments, they enable direct mobilisation of both members and voters and they give the party in central office a sense of control over the organisation’s image in a given constituency. Further, as mentioned above, they provide human and organisational resources (Wincławska and Brodzinska-Mirowska ´ 2016: 40). Finally, they preserve the party’s ideological function, since grassroots members and activists are usually the most ideologically driven group within partisan ranks (Sobolewska-My´slik et al. 2010: 30). The benefits of maintaining local structures were also identified by Margit Tavits. Through the party on the ground, partisan organisations can stay frequently in contact with the electorate, build their credibility and ability to cope with environmental challenges as well as take responsibility for their actions (Tavits 2013: 8). The apparent breadth of the aforementioned benefits does not mean that Polish political parties see the merits of grassroots organisations. Nonetheless, when conducting our research, we refrained from assessing the management strategies that are being adopted. Instead, we sought to answer the following questions: (1) Can any general patterns be observed in how Polish parties shaped their partisan structures throughout the 2010s? (2) Have previously identified relations between party subsystems changed notably in any direction? (3) Have Polish parties followed the trend of ditching a hierarchical structure in favour of a more horizontal one, as described by Richard Katz and Peter Mair (1995)? In this chapter, we characterise the structures of six Polish parties and the relations between various subsystems of party organisations. We focus on the communication potential of the party on the ground and identify what prevents parties from fully tapping into it. To that end, we analyse declarations made by representatives of the party in central office and the party in public office with regard to internal cooperation with the party

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on the ground. Subsequently, we juxtapose those statements with the results of research conducted at the grassroots level. In this way, we are able to examine the activity of various grassroots structures and determine whether they still play a vital role in their organisations.

5.1 Beyond the Party Central Office---Organisational Potential In most Polish parties formed after 1989, organisations have been dominated by the elite (party in central office) and parliamentary representation (party in public office). These two levels, which are frequently populated by the same individuals, formulate the agendas and initiate the establishment of local offices (party on the ground). This pattern is typical in many Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries. Newly created formations have immediately focused on reaching positions of power and paid little attention to building up mid-level structures and a broad membership base. Soon, they became mistakenly convinced that consistent success at the polls can be achieved without a substantial grassroots presence. As explained by Ingrid van Biezen (2013), this was possible because most young democracies in post-communist states lacked traditional socio-political cleavages that would tie certain social groups to a particular party. Political parties were fairly quickly granted access to modern political marketing, communication tools and, subsequently, public funding. All these developments meant that there was little incentive to build mass organisations. As parties concentrated on gaining the largest possible parliamentary representation and achieving the potential for coalitions that would allow them to govern or co-govern, their mobilisation and socialisation functions faded into insignificance or, in extreme cases, disappeared altogether (Pacze´sniak and De Waele 2011: 17–18). After examining Polish political organisations in the 2000s, Ewa Nalewajko concluded that the party in central office found grassroots structures to be useful primarily as local campaign offices, means of temporary mobilisation and a way to recruit new activists. The party on the ground was not expected to actively foster public support for the party’s agenda and development vision, nor was it asked to convey information about local issues to higher levels of the organisation (Nalewajko 2006: 239). In this chapter, we discuss whether the institutionalisation of parties and the party system in Poland changed the attitudes of the party in central office and party in public office.

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According to Angelo Panebianco (1988), the relations between the central organisation and grassroots structures are driven largely by how a given party was born. Panebianco proposes two models: diffusion and penetration. In the former, separate regional and local entities establish joint bodies and task them with coordinating cooperation at the central level. This means that the party on the ground is strong, legitimising the central organisation and determining the scope of its power. Today, this pattern is typical of Europe’s green parties. The latter model describes the opposite case, whereby parties are formed by elites. The central offices come first, and once they exist, the leadership seeks individuals willing to set up local branches and organise the recruitment of new members. Parties established in this way usually remain highly centralised and hierarchical, even after grassroots structures are developed. Nearly all of the parties we examined followed the penetration model, but intra-party relations between their members and elites developed differently, as shown in Chapter 3. Three of them, the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), the Law and Justice (PiS) and the Civic Platform (PO), resemble catch-all parties in which, as Katz and Mair (1995) describe it, members effectively act as organised cheerleaders for the elite. Two others, the Polish People’s Party (PSL) and the Together Party differ widely in terms of the size of their membership base, but they exhibit similar characteristics to the larger parties in terms of relations between party subsystems (the Together Party applies elements of direct democracy). The last party, the Modern, can be classified as a cadre party due to its modest number of members and the very limited scope of local structures. Its development model hindered its growth and led to its absorption by PO. Below, we will take a closer look at each party’s organisational potential, beginning with PSL and SLD, two successor parties, whose roots can be traced back to the communist era. Then, we discuss PO and PiS, both of which were formed in 2001. Finally, we examine the youngest political parties, the Modern and the Together Party. Applying a chronological order is intended to help readers understand the extent to which the structure of a given organisation results from factors linked to its birth and early development. To provide a fuller picture of contemporary Polish parties, we also consider the positions of their leaders. While all formations operate in the same socio-cultural, legal and communication environment and all are subjected to the same external pressures, they differ in the scope of the

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power with which they equip their leaders. We analyse statutory stipulations and the competitiveness of the leadership selection process, revealing similarities and differences between parties. The party with the most elaborate and biggest grassroots structures is PSL. In the 2000s, it boasted a local presence in 90% of boroughs (Sieklucki 2006: 189), a statistic that, according to party leaders, remains correct today. Scholars interested in Polish political parties almost unanimously claim that PSL’s strength lies in its mid-level cadres, which are composed primarily of individuals who join a party not because of its leader or specific elements of the programme, but because they agree with its overall purpose or wish to continue a family tradition (Stobinski ´ 2010: 360). The party inherited a well-developed structure and substantial wealth (in both movable and fixed assets) from its predecessor, the United People’s Party (Polish abbreviation: ZSL). ZSL, which existed until 1989, was a satellite of the communist Polish United Workers’ Party. The benefit of this provenance was that, from the outset, PSL had access to significant resources to run consistently successful campaigns. The depth and reach of its grassroots organisation put it in the category of mass-based parties, as it focuses on articulating the interests of a specific electorate segment. According to scholars, the size and efficiency of its structures, along with its inherited wealth, are the only sources of its competitive advantage over rivals (Stobinski ´ 2010: 361) and the sole reason that PSL has been able to maintain a fairly stable level of support. The party’s structure is organised to mirror Poland’s administrative division into three levels (i.e. boroughs, counties and regions, or voivodships). The intra-partisan democratic process is representative in nature; the party leader is elected at a congress of delegates where representatives of all branches of the party on the ground convene to vote. PSL has two affiliate mass organisations, Voluntary Fire Brigades and the Country Women’s Clubs, which have near-monopolies on civic organisations in rural areas. PSL is also the only contemporary Polish party to publish its own magazine, to which members are obliged to subscribe. PSL has adopted a collegial leadership model, which means that the scope of its leader’s (i.e. chairperson’s) exclusive competence is rather narrow. The chairperson directs the party’s day-to-day operations, represents it externally and heads the General Executive Committee (i.e. the party’s board). Chairmanship also comes with a seat on the General Council, which is led by another person. The chairperson cannot singlehandedly nominate individuals for other party organs. In fact, the group

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of people working most closely with the leader is determined by collegial bodies. Decisions regarding coalitions or nominations for candidate lists in regional or parliamentary elections are also made collegially. While the chairperson may be able to take the initiative in this regard, they need the approval of the General Council, the body tasked with shaping and enforcing PSL’s internal regulations in between party congresses. PSL’s statute clearly states that the chairperson is elected by the party congress from a list of at least two candidates. The contest for leadership is often highly competitive (see Table 5.1), but this is not necessarily an automatic consequence of the statutory requirement to consider at least two candidates. For instance, during the 2016 congress, the opponent of the favourite openly admitted that he was only running because the statute did not allow for a single candidate. In the time allocated to him to present his programme, he hailed his rival, who went on to garner 95% of all delegates’ votes. So far, every change of leadership has gone smoothly, meaning that even if the selection process was competitive, the outcome has never led to a rift within the party or secession of some of its members. This suggests that PSL is a highly institutionalised party that is rather independent from the chairperson. Table 5.1 Competitiveness of the leadership contest in PSL (data shown as percentage points) Date

Proponents of the leader

Opponents of the leader

2000

n/a

n/a

2004

55,60

44,40

2005*

80,00

20,00

2008

83,37

16,63

2012

50,79

49,21

2016

95,25

4,75

Selected leader Jarosław Kalinowski Janusz Wojciechowski Waldemar Pawlak Waldemar Pawlak Janusz Piechocinski ´ Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz

* The General Council elected a new chairperson after the incumbent was dismissed before the end of his term Source Authors’ calculations based on data from the official PSL website and archival media records

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The other successor party, SLD, also inherited the organisational model, grassroots structures and membership base from its original communist incarnation, the Polish United Workers’ Party. Throughout the 1990s, SLD retained a strong network of local offices and fairly competent staff. Its membership base continued to grow dynamically until 2003. Its access to resources meant that even when the party suffered a string of heavy electoral defeats (as in 2005, 2007, 2011 and 2015), it managed to survive. What dealt the biggest blow to SLD’s popular appeal and organisational strength was a crisis of leadership and a collapse of cadres, which began in 2003. Local and regional structures shrank in size, and partisan coffers dried up, as the failure to maintain a presence in parliament meant that SLD received far lower sums in state subventions. These developments badly affected the party’s grassroots presence; the party on the ground, which was tasked with recruiting candidates for local elections, found it increasingly difficult to fill SLD’s space on the ballot. For example, in the run up to the 2014 local election, the board of the local party organisation in Wroclaw, a city of 640,000 people, appealed to party members to run for seats on the city council and the regional assembly. Although there were over 70 vacancies to fill on SLD’s list of municipal positions and around a dozen more on the list for the assembly, only nine candidates volunteered (Pacze´sniak 2018: 189). The example is far from unique, reflecting how the party’s mid-level structures degraded and ceased to be a viable source of local cadres. The position of the leader is another way in which SLD resembles PSL. The leader is not an independent organ, but the head member of certain collegial bodies. Even external representation is not his exclusive prerogative; the National Board is tasked with that. The chairperson does not single-handedly select his deputies or the party’s General Secretary. Instead, these decisions are made by the Congress. Collegial organs are responsible for allocating spots on candidate lists for parliamentary elections, designating SLD’s presidential candidate and deciding on potential coalitions for the purpose of campaigning or forming a government. The statute provides for the possibility of selecting the leader through a direct vote by all party members, but it stipulates that the selection procedure is to be determined by the General Council by way of a resolution. So far, the direct democracy mechanism has been applied only once, in 2012. In 2016, the party opted for a mixture of direct votes and delegates; in the first round, all eligible members cast their votes directly, and in the second round, delegates for the congress chose the leader from

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among the two candidates who received the most votes. On the one hand, this compromise allowed the party to uphold its image as an inherently democratic entity among its members. On the other hand, by incorporating the congress and delegates into the process, the regional branches of the organisation were able to retain a certain degree of control over the selection of the leader. The leader’s relative weakness is compounded by the selection process and environment, which are often highly competitive. On many occasions, the results for two candidates were very close (see Table 5.2). In such cases, the rivalry did not end with the nomination of the new leader, as the defeated opponent attempted to build a loyal camp within the party and continued to challenge the chairperson. Both PO and PiS were formed in 2001. Their membership bases primarily comprised people associated with previous partisan incarnations (i.e. the Solidarity Electoral Action and Freedom Union) of the former anti-communist opposition camp. However, their founders did not expect to be joined by large organised groups. Instead, they intended to rely on attracting individual members. Apart from this single aspect, their visions of how a political party should be organised differed widely. Ewa Nalewajko (2006: 216) observed that PO left the creation of local branches largely up to grassroots activists at lower levels of the organisation, giving them fairly broad autonomy. This was consistent with how PO presented itself to the general public: as a grassroots civic movement comprised of people who are dissatisfied with other parties’ offers and seek to build an alternative. Initially, PO promoted an inclusive procedure for nominating Table 5.2 Competitiveness of the leadership contest in SLD (data shown as percentage points) Date 2003 2004 2008 2011* 2012 2016

Proponents of the leader

Opponents of the leader

80,43 55,88 52,38 n/a 92,00 58,39

19,57 44,12 47,62 n/a 8,00 41,61

Leader Leszek Miller Józef Oleksy Grzegorz Napieralski Leszek Miller Leszek Miller Włodzimierz Czarzasty

* The chairperson was selected by the National Convention after the General Council accepted Grzegorz Napieralski’s resignation Source Authors’ calculations based on data from the official SLD website and archival media records

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candidates for public office. In 2001, an electoral college selected the party’s candidates for MPs in a primary. Over subsequent years, the party constructed local branches and equipped them with certain competences that support a hierarchical structure, such as the selection of delegates for primaries, through which nominations for public offices and the party’s candidate lists were determined. Before the 2010 presidential election, PO reverted to a solution that saw all party members eligible to vote in the primaries. This meant that mid-level structures were stripped of a vital tool for influencing the selection of candidates for the country’s highest political office. However, the presidential primary proved to be a one-off occurrence; five years later, PO endorsed the incumbent president in his bid for re-election. In the run up to the 2020 election, the choice of the presidential candidate was left to the National Council, a body comprised of representatives of the party’s regional structures. However, when the election did not take place in May, as was originally scheduled, PO decided to change its candidate. This time, the decision was made by the National Board, a much narrower group of party elite. The 2013 chairperson election and the 2017 regional leaders’ election involved direct votes. Since all members could vote, mid-level structures again lost some of their power and influence. As a result, PO is closer to the horizontal pattern described by Katz and Mair than to Maurice Duverger’s hierarchical mass-based party model. PO’s chairperson possesses a fairly broad set of competences, such as leading and representing the party as well as heading both the National Board and the General Council. The leader may also call meetings of other organs, such as the parliamentary group. However, the chairperson’s prerogatives fall short of being able to nominate party members for posts at lower levels of the organisation. They also cannot hear appeals against the decisions of other party organs or decide on forming coalitions, whether in the run up to an election or in its aftermath, for the purpose of forming a government. Issues related to coalitions and allocating spots on candidate lists for domestic and European parliamentary elections are handled by the General Council. However, in the course of successive parliamentary campaigns, PO leaders have proven capable of initiating and driving even far-reaching, spectacular reshuffles of candidates. Since 2013, the chairperson of PO has been chosen through direct elections in which all party members are eligible to vote. This means that regional structures lost some of their influence. Earlier, in 2001

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and 2003, the leader was selected by PO’s parliamentary group. Soon after, a court ruling found this procedure to be in violation of the Act on Political Parties. Hence, the selection process was transferred to the party’s national convention, which exercised this prerogative in 2007 and 2010. Overall, in the case of PO, the leader’s position was less affected by the formal selection procedure or the intensity of competition; instead, it was determined largely by the chairperson’s personal traits. This is evidenced by the fact that Donald Tusk, who led PO from 2003 until 2014, enjoyed much broader leeway and power than any of his successors: Ewa Kopacz (2014–2016), Grzegorz Schetyna (2016–2020) or Borys Budka (2020–present) (see Table 5.3). PiS constructed the structure of its party on the ground through a strictly top-down mechanism. The effort was led by party elites and aimed at creating a bureaucratically, hierarchically managed organisation (Nalewajko 2006: 216–217). When designing its structure, instead of mirroring the country’s administrative division, PiS mirrored constituency areas, suggesting that this ‘perfectly controllable system’ (Nalewajko 2006: 220) is geared towards allowing the party in central office to compete for power. Grassroots structures were tasked with creating an organisational culture based on the myth of a visionary leader and the unique ethical importance of the entire undertaking. The party has not introduced any direct democracy mechanisms. The leader is elected by delegates, who in turn are nominated by mid-level structures. To include some rank-and-file members in decision-making processes, the Chairperson of the Board for a given constituency is elected by all members Table 5.3 Competitiveness of the leadership contest in PO (data shown as percentage points) Date

Proponents of the leader

Opponents of the leader

2001 2003 2007 2010 2013 2016 2020

n/a n/a n/a 98,39 79,58 91,00 78,77

n/a n/a n/a 1,26 20,42 9,00 21,23

Leader Maciej Płazy ˙ nski ´ Donald Tusk Donald Tusk Donald Tusk Donald Tusk Grzegorz Schetyna Borys Budka

Source Authors’ calculations based on data from the official PO website and archival media records

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from that constituency. However, the candidates are nominated by the party leader, and therefore, the process is merely a façade for direct democracy. All crucial decisions are made by the leadership, which is dominated by the chairperson, and the party does not conduct any internal referenda. Representatives of local structures (i.e. delegates for PiS’s national conventions) participate in the process of nominating candidates for public office. Taken together with the leader’s strong position, this shows that PiS has been deliberately constructed as a hierarchical, centrally managed structure. Compared to all other examined parties, PiS formally grants its chairperson the broadest set of competences by far. According to the statute, the chairperson is the highest executive organ, directing day-to-day operations and leading the work of several bodies, including the Political Committee (comprising over one hundred members), the Executive Committee (over 30 people) and the Presidium. PiS’s parliamentary group technically has its own separate leader, but in reality, its work is also driven by the party’s chairperson. The chairperson can form and dissolve various organisational units as well as nominate and dismiss their heads. Although technically the approval of the Political Committee is needed, in practice, the chairperson is responsible for the composition of candidate lists for domestic and European parliamentary elections as well as nominations of presidential candidates. Such sweeping powers are coupled with a virtual absence of competition for the party’s top position. Ever since PiS was formed in 2001, there has been a single candidate for each term of office. In 2001, it was Lech Kaczynski, ´ and from 2003 onwards, his brother Jarosław has been the sole contender (see Table 5.4). Table 5.4 Competitiveness of the leadership contest in PiS (data shown as percentage points) Date

Proponents of the leader

Opponents of the leader

2001 2003 2006 2010 2013 2016

100,00 n/a 98,48 95,14 97,50 99,31

0,00 n/a 1,52 4,86 2,50 0,69

Leader Lech Kaczynski ´ Jarosław Kaczynski ´ Jarosław Kaczynski ´ Jarosław Kaczynski ´ Jarosław Kaczynski ´ Jarosław Kaczynski ´

Source Authors’ calculations based on data from the official PiS website and archival media records

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The two youngest examined parties are the Together Party and the Modern. Both were formed in 2015. The Together Party was launched by, among other groups, activists from a left-wing youth organisation and former Green Party members. However, the new party did not take over any previously existing structures. On the one hand, it built its grassroots presence in a manner characteristic of hierarchical organisations, albeit with a somewhat flatter, two-level structure. On the other hand, it pushed for strong horizontal links among lower-level components through the broad use of social media for intra-partisan communication. The Together Party has embraced direct democracy since its inception. Initially, even the national party congresses were massive congregations of all members rather than selected delegates. As the membership base grew, this ceased to be a viable option for obvious logistical and organisational reasons. Nonetheless, the Together Party has continued to use internal referenda, which are organised when the party in central office needs to make vital decisions. Since June 2019, the party has operated under the name of the Left Together. It is the only Polish party to have collegial leadership; it has abolished the post of party chairperson altogether, the work of the National Board and the General Council is led by small groups rather than individuals. The Modern emerged as a personal project of a recognisable founder and leader (see Hloušek and Kopeˇcek 2017). Composed primarily of his followers, the party did not intend to build elaborate grassroots structures, nor did it provide for direct participation of its rank-and-file members in decision-making processes, the selection of leadership or the nomination of candidates for public office. Hence, the Modern carried the hallmarks of an elite party, where the party in public office reigns supreme over all other structural elements. Although the party did attempt to broaden its regional and local presence towards the end of 2019 and early 2020, it was, for all practical purposes, absorbed by PO and effectively ceased to exist as an independent political entity. If one considers only statutory stipulations, the position of the Modern’s leader is similar to the situation in the PO. The statute specifies that the chairperson represents and leads the party in political activity, particularly by heading the General Council and National Board. The chairperson’s competences include nominating and dismissing their deputies as well as the general secretary and treasurer. Furthermore, the chairperson drafts candidate lists for domestic and European parliament elections to be approved by the National Board.

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The Modern’s leader is selected for a four-year term by delegates to the National Convention. So far, however, no chairperson has been able to complete their full term of office. When Katarzyna Lubnauer was chosen in 2017 after a tightly contested race, she had to rally the party around her amid rows between her supporters and members who stood behind her rival. Since then, weak leadership has plagued the party and resulted in a downturn of its fortunes (Table 5.5). Analysis of Polish parties’ organisational composition showed that most of them retained numerous features typical of the mass-based party model: vertical relations between different structural levels, representative democracy mechanisms for selecting leadership and an indirect formula for nominating candidates for public office, whereby the selection of candidates is made at the highest level of representative structures within the party. Some of the parties implement elements of direct democracy: rank-and-file members choose leaders, nominate candidates for important public offices or voice their opinions through internal referenda (e.g. to decide about forming coalitions). However, such instruments are used sparingly, and there are no signs that the leadership is ready to abandon the hierarchical structure of the party. When it comes to the position of leaders, Polish parties follow three distinct patterns. In the successor parties, whose roots can be traced back to the communist era (i.e. PSL and SLD), leaders are the least powerful, both formally and informally. These two entities underwent a transformation that mirrored the transition of the entire political system, and their adaptation to the democratic order was centred around their legacy and ideology rather than the personalities of their leading figures. Both parties went through several leadership changes, with the post of chairperson often resulting in tight contests. The second pattern is represented Table 5.5 Competitiveness of the leadership contest in the Modern (data shown as percentage points) Date

Proponents of the leader

Opponents of the leader

2015 2017 2019

100,00 51,56 61,68

0,00 48,44 38,32

Leader Ryszard Petru Katarzyna Lubnauer Adam Szłapka

Source Authors’ calculations based on data from the Modern’s official website and archival media records

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by the PiS, the PO and the Modern, three parties that have been far more leader-dependent, albeit not to the same extent. They were built by and around politicians, who were meant to be ‘trump cards’. The last pattern is exhibited by the Together Party, which emphasises collective leadership and has dispensed with single-person organs altogether. However, even this party has not been able to completely escape the trend towards personalisation, which is ubiquitous in contemporary politics; the media and public opinion dubbed it ‘Zandberg’s party’ after the most popular member of its National Board.

5.2

Local Structures in the Eyes of Party Elites

Each political party is a system composed of several levels of formal organisational attachment and actual involvement. Emilie van Haute (2009: 45–51) proposed the concept of concentric circles of participation, whereby the groups furthest away from the centre are, in descending order, swing voters, the hard electorate, followers and passive members whose partisan identification is somewhat legitimised by the sheer fact of holding a membership card. Tiers closer to the centre are occupied by grassroots activists and mid-level elites. The centre includes party leaders, members holding public office and paid employees. Regardless of whether we are talking about a cadre, mass, catch-all or cartel party, and regardless of whether its structure is hierarchical or stratified, it can be assumed that proximity to the organisational centre corresponds to influence on decision-making processes, the party’s image and strategic direction. In the formations we examined, the centre is populated by representatives of the party in central office and the party in public office. Hence, we treat these two groups as the elite. We ask MPs and party leadership about their perceptions of grassroots’ role and participation in making decisions regarding strategy or specific initiatives. We conducted several dozen individual in-depth interviews with elites in the six examined Polish parties in order to determine how deputies to the parliament and other members of partisan leadership bodies interpret the function of grassroots structures in contemporary parties. When conducting the interviews, we were well aware of a basic issue that typically surrounds research among party elites: their members are used to being interviewed and may resort to giving ready-made answers that were prepared to promote a certain desired image of their organisations (see Hertz and Imber 1995). Nonetheless, we decided that their narratives

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regarding grassroots structures may give us a somewhat better view of contemporary Polish parties, provided we confront them with statements from rank-and-file party members. Our respondents, regardless of their political affiliation, were unanimous in claiming that local structures constitute a vital organisational resource during campaigns. One PiS representative said, the ‘party needs these structures most of all for campaigning. This is very important; you need people to run an effective campaign, people dispersed far into communities. Somebody has to put posters up, distribute leaflets. Somebody needs to organise rallies, meetings with locals. A very large partisan apparatus comes in handy and I think one of PiS’s successes in recent elections, both presidential and parliamentary, is that we were present practically everywhere’ (PiS_3). According to a respondent from PO, ‘grassroots structures know their regions inside out, which is necessary when you organise election campaigns. I mean, something like posters; it is the local branches that post them up, they know where to put them. We cannot sort out all such details from the central office’ (PO_6). A Modern member struck a similar tone: ‘The importance of grassroots is on display during the elections, when these people are needed to distribute leaflets, put posters up. This is our organisational resource to create some buzz when the leader is about to visit and we need to arrange a massive rally with loads of people so that we can show that something is really happening, something works. I think without these people all around the country it is simply not possible’ (N_6). An interviewee from the Together Party suggested that local structures could compensate for the party’s financial shortages: ‘Before every election there is a campaign and, especially in a party like ours, where our funding does not have the scale that the largest parties achieve, we do many things by ourselves. We need all hands on deck, we cannot garner support any other way than through hard work’ (R_5). When talking about grassroots’ potential for campaigning, some interviewees pointed to the fact that the party on the ground is the source of human capital. As expressed by a PO representative, ‘lower-level structures know candidates, they can evaluate them, and we have to trust their judgement because we will ultimately be held responsible. If somebody fumbles things in Milicz or Oława, the entire Platform has some explaining to do. Structures are there to find good candidates’ (PO_1). A Modern member observed that ‘this is where people cut their teeth. Their talents, capacity, competences and, of course, ambitions are revealed;

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these are assets that can make them suitable candidates for mayors, borough leaders, MPs. For me, it is a natural career path’ (N_4). For parties, grassroots structures are a source of information about what is happening outside Warsaw and the parliamentary scene. At the same time, they are way in which organisations shape and convey their message and image or generally maintain relations with voters. This was emphasised by a PiS representative: ‘Rank-and-file activists are simply a source of information. They provide us with information, but also through them we can pass information down. Normally, outside campaign mode, they help arrange meetings with voters in some village or town. They invite potential voters, interested locals. They know the place and how to spread information. Maybe leave a note at the shop, maybe let the parish know, it depends. So, they are there for us to pass on information about some things’ (PiS_4). A PO MP asserted that ‘without grassroots structures, I [as an MP] would find it hard to operate because in most counties or boroughs, it is easier to learn about local problems, local challenges, what a given borough needs, what investments are necessary, what problems need solving’ (PO_4). His colleague stressed that ‘it is the local structures that are typically the link between the party and the local population because locals trust them much more than they do politicians in Warsaw’ (PO_5). Another interviewee representing PO talked about using grassroots structures for communication: ‘You need to reach various groups, so you need people from these groups that will be, well, how to put it… leaders of opinion. You need people who will carry information from the party to these communities, but also in the opposite direction, from communities to the party, so that the party can react’ (PO_3). A PSL member argued that ‘the fact we are in every borough means we can be faster in collecting signals about what is happening in these local communities and reacting to the expectations from society’ (PSL_1). According to a member of the Modern, ‘While at the national level we often have to deal with very serious matters like acts or legislation, the members in smaller communities grapple with much more mundane issues and are needed to prove that, everywhere across the country, the views we preach translate into day-to-day work’ (N_11). Interviewees from the two biggest organisations we examined (i.e. PiS and PO) mentioned that the job of local structures is to handle criticism directed at the party. According to a PiS member, ‘the leaders of local, county or regional structures have their duties, first and foremost. Being promoted in grassroots structures means taking on more duties related

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to informing, explaining and also absorbing punches, attacks from our opponents. Somebody needs to be the face of the party, something of a mug for slapping. They need to be able to handle accusations against PiS’ (PiS_7). Likewise, a PO representative emphasised, ‘you need somebody credible and reliable on the spot. When some PO politician makes a mistake, that person has to react before the fire spreads and we are all in trouble’ (PO_1). MPs from the Modern, a party that did not manage to build a nationwide grassroots presence, pointed to practical problems stemming from the lack of organisational and logistical support: ‘I would like to visit many towns in the east of Poland and I have nobody there to help me. This means I have to personally, through my office in Warsaw, make phone calls, look for venues, go there a week in advance to put posters up or, obviously, send someone and pay them to do that. I pay out of my own pocket, as I cannot use any party funding. So, there is an awful lot of organisational work on which I have to waste my time. As a result, I often do not go to such places because, if nobody can support me, I have to count on my family and friends who are outside the party and politics in general’ (N_6). Regional and local structures contribute to the ideological function that parties should, in theory, perform. An interviewee from PiS recalled the process of creating his party’s programme: ‘Almost all regional, county and borough structures have their own agendas. An amalgamation or analysis of these agendas, conclusions drawn from them provide a foundation for formulating the national-level programme. I participated in drafting these programmes and I transferred many such conclusions to the central level’ (PiS_9). According to a PSL representative, ‘each of our initiatives, each point of view that we present at the local level and in the parliament, they are outcomes of actual discussions and consultations. These are not just decisions made in somebody’s office and presented at a press conference, they are preceded by an internal debate’ (PSL_10). Interviewees reflected on how their parties changed their attitudes towards the role of grassroots structures and the membership base. A PiS member admitted, ‘we have gone through trying to be either a cadre party or a mass party. I think neither of these models works, if taken to the extreme. A cadre party is no good because, you know, there are not enough hands to do the work. A mass party is not the way to go either because we are unable to find use for all the structures on a daily basis. Besides, maintaining mass membership is difficult, technically and

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financially. Now, we are kind of in between’ (PiS_3). A PO representative recalled the early days of his party: ‘When the Platform was born, there was this strong sense of longing for what we called a lightweight party, where there are few members but plenty of followers. And, surely, initially the Platform was this civic movement which avoided being equated to a political party, a party with official meetings, some apparatus. So, we avoided formalising it’ (PO_1). The same interviewee added that, over time, the party realised that a consistent, assured presence in the political scene would be difficult to achieve without a stable grassroots structure. In fact, similar assertions were made by members of all six examined parties. A Modern representative argued that ‘the lack of structures can defeat any party and developing them requires hard work over many years’ (N_11). Likewise, an SLD member stated, ‘no party can pursue any of its goals—from the most natural one (i.e. elections) to implementing its agenda—without grassroots structures’ (SLD_6). The statements quoted above demonstrate that representatives of the party in central office and party in public office see grassroots structures as having the potential to implement communication activities, shape the party’s image and contribute in a creative manner. All the examined parties, regardless of their age or provenance, see this potential. One way in which the members of the six parties differed was the model they preferred for relations between various levels of party organisations and how much autonomy should be granted to local branches. In that, they confirmed the findings of the analyses presented in previous chapters. A PiS representative admitted that his party was built top-down and defended the centralisation of decision-making processes, particularly with regard to nominating regional and local leaders: ‘The point is that you want to have some control over what is going on, hence this fairly strong centralisation of the party. A reversed pyramid. I mean, first you choose the chairman, then regional authorities, then local authorities. At first, it may seem like things are flipped on their head, but there is a reason behind it. And it is also not like everything is totally dictated top-down because there are instances when the decisions made by the leadership are struck down in elections’ (PiS_3). The interviewees representing PO did not analyse the organisational model of their party. One of their MPs stated simply, ‘we have the structures, we have something to work with, but they surely need a lot of work to be expanded and mobilised’ (PO_6). A PSL politician stressed the level of autonomy afforded to grassroots structures in his party: ‘All structures have plenty of

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autonomy and they have the final say. Of course, some signals, or guidelines, come from the top, but the final decisions are made at a given level of the structure’ (PSL_1). A Modern member identified the shortcomings of his party, stating, ‘Today the challenge for Modern is not just developing a programme but, most of all, recruiting personnel. An idea cannot be turned into reality by a single leader and a group of MPs. You need an entire backstage staff who will support these people and work at the lowest level’ (N_2). Meanwhile, a representative from the Together Party described his party as a ‘highly informal structure which is actually composed of dozens, or hundreds of fairly spontaneously emerging local groups, formed at the grassroots level. It is a space where people can find like-minded peers and organise themselves by using the tools at the disposal of the party’ (R_3). Such an approach, however, is the exception in Poland’s political scene.

5.3 Beyond Mass Media: The Communication Potential of Political Parties’ Structures The mediatisation of politics has led scholars to focus on the media dimension in their analyses of political parties’ communication. As we are aware of the potential that grassroots structures hold for communicating with citizens, we decided to look at communication beyond the mass media sphere. Research has rarely examined the communication dimension of relations between different structural components within party organisations because it is commonly thought that the effectiveness of parties’ communication is determined primarily by specialists working for the party in central office, while regional and local structures have little to offer in this regard. Communicating outside mass media, a feature of the fourth era of communication (Blumler 2013), requires political actors to develop a multi-channel presence (see Chapter 4). For this reason, we identified three areas in which grassroots structures hold communication potential. We then ask whether the model adopted by a given party for relations between the party in central office and party on the ground allows it to fully tap into that potential. Our analysis is based on information obtained from grassroots activists, party employees and mid-level elites. The organisational structure of Polish political organisations and the cooperation between central offices and grassroots structures lead to a

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fairly clear division of responsibilities. Central structures are responsible for: 1. formulating a general image and communication strategies; 2. developing specific procedures, standards and guidelines for communication; 3. acting as an intermediary in the transfer of communication knowhow to lower-level structures through courses and workshops; 4. monitoring grassroots structures’ communication activities and effectiveness; 5. collecting information on regional/local initiatives that might inspire nationwide campaigns and 6. developing internal communication strategies that determine the relations between the party in central office and party on the ground. Grassroots structures, in turn, are tasked with: 1. implementing communication activities and strategies proposed by the central office; 2. implementing nationwide campaigns locally and 3. initiating grassroots-level communication activities tailored to the local environment. By acting outside campaign periods and employing direct methods of communication, lower-level components build the party’s longterm rapport with its social environment (Wincławska and Brodzinska´ Mirowska 2016: 69–102). As mentioned above, we believe that grassroots structures hold a significant potential for communication, which may be divided into the following three areas: 1. implementation: local structures communicate by implementing centrally developed projects and organising locally tailored campaigns 2. creativity: grassroots structures provide a reservoir of information, knowledge and ideas that may be used to develop communication projects, solutions for specific issues and elements of the agenda

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3. image: as grassroots structures are inevitably closer to citizens, their activity (particularly in the form of direct communication) supports the party’s efforts to build rapport and relations with the electorate. The scope of tasks assigned to grassroots structures enables us to evaluate the extent to which their potential is being utilised and the character of cooperation between the party in central office and party on the ground. As Peter van Houten (2009: 237) asserted, ‘the interactions between actors and units active at different territorial levels within political parties are typically complex, and state-wide political parties face a variety of challenges in shaping and operating a multi-level party organization’. Van Houten provides a theoretical framework for assessing these complex relations by referring to the theory of organisation, and specifically, to the concept of delegating. From this perspective, lower levels of partisan structures simply execute assignments dictated by the central office. Alternatively, cooperation may be viewed through the lens of participatory management (Gallie 2013; Knudsen et al. 2011; Cabrera et al. 2003). In this context, participation needs to be understood as more than just belonging; it entails being actively involved in certain undertakings, taking responsibility and showing initiative. When applied to political parties, participation may take different forms, including financial, informational, decision-making or consultative (Piwowarczyk 2006: 81–83). In Polish political organisations, financial participation (i.e. membership fees) is by far the most prevalent. Informational and decision-making participation are also present, albeit to a limited extent, depending on the exact stipulations of party statutes and the way they are applied in practice. The consultative aspect is treated as something of a novelty, which highlights a contrast between political organisations and businesses, as the latter often features ‘practices where management encourages employees to share their opinions regarding work-related concerns, yet retains the right to make all final decisions’ (Cabrera et al. 2003: 44). Building intra-partisan cooperation regarding the delegation of tasks and implementation of consultative participation enables parties to make full use of the potential of their grassroots structures in all three areas we distinguished, as shown in Fig. 5.1. The character and scope of cooperation between the party in central office and party on the ground are determined by the extent to which structures at various organisational levels are seen as a strategic asset

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Implementation potential Delegation model

Collecting signatures Participating in marches Ensuring attendance at events Communicating directly with voters

Consultative participation model

Contributing to the programme Exchange of opinions, information

Image potential

Creative potential

Fig. 5.1 Party structures’ activity and communication potential (Source Authors’ elaboration)

for ensuring the party’s survival, sustainability and competitive advantage in the political market. Each party possesses different capacities in this regard because they vary in size, the number and involvement of their members, the organisational base available at the grassroots level, experience, management practices, the charisma of their leaders and the telegenic features of key representatives. Members of the party in central office and party in public office stressed the importance of grassroots structures not only in their public statements but also in the interviews conducted as part of our research. This suggests that regional and local structures are indeed considered to be strategic assets. However, such declarations made by elites should be juxtaposed with the tasks with which grassroots are actually assigned; only then can we discern which areas of cooperation are considered by party leadership to be genuinely important. Polish parties mobilise their regional structures most during periods of intensified communication (i.e. election campaigns). Interestingly, grassroots activists see their own role as having a much broader temporal scope. For example, 55.3% of the Modern members declared that their involvement went beyond campaigning, while 51.2% of those in the PSL, 42% of those in the SLD, and 80.5% of those in the Together Party made similar statements. Only PiS and PO differed in that regard. In total, 40% of PiS’s rank-and-file members thought that their importance was largely

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confined to campaign periods, while 32.9% were of the opposite opinion. Among PO representatives, 47.7% agreed and 39% disagreed with this assertion. If one assumes that the opinions voiced by members are driven by their experiences of working for their respective parties, it follows that PiS and PO utilise their grassroots structures primarily for campaigning. We asked our interviewees about the types of tasks they were most typically asked to perform, primarily providing examples of activities related to communication. Collecting signatures for support lists, a standard campaign-period duty, was the most common response (24%). Parties also use their grassroots structures for media activities, encouraging their members to attend partisan events as the audience (9.7%) or to participate in marches and demonstrations (19.2%). Few respondents mentioned that they were involved in shaping their parties’ agendas (5.8%) or activities aimed at exchanging knowledge and information. The character of grassroots structures’ involvement is summarised in Fig. 5.2. Although party elites declare that grassroots structures are vital for building direct relations with voters and followers (as will be discussed later in this chapter), our research indicates that Polish parties involve their rank-and-file members to a very limited extent; only 8.2% of members confirmed they were asked to help the party reach the citizens. Table 5.6 presents details regarding their involvement in specific 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 Collecting Participating in Creating Assisting in signatures for marches audience during direct contact the support lists party events with voters

Co-creating of Transmitting the party information and program opinions about voters’ concerns

Fig. 5.2 Party structures’ activities to support communication (results in %) (Source Authors’ research. N = 2572. Survey question: ‘What activities are party members involved in?’ Respondents were asked to choose no more than three activities)

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Table 5.6 Character of grassroot structures’ activity (data in percentage points) Activity type/Party

PiS

PO

SLD

PSL

.N

Razem

Collecting signatures for support lists Acting as the audience during party events Participating in marches and demonstrations Co-creating agendas and programmes Direct contact with voters Transmitting information and opinions about voters’ concerns

27,0 13,5 18,2 2,8 5,0 5,4

29,8 16,6 19,4 1,7 4,2 3,3

27,6 9,7 13,7 5,1 5,5 6,1

27,5 4,7 6,6 4,2 11,0 8,3

20,7 10,8 24,6 3,6 8,2 4,4

12,9 1,5 28,0 17,8 14,1 5,5

Source Authors’ research. N = 2572. The percentages in the table refer to the proportion of respondents who reported activities directly or indirectly related to communication

activities undertaken by each organisation. The Together Party and the PSL use their members for direct communication more often (14.1% and 11% of rank-and-file members, respectively, are asked to reach out to voters). Although these percentages are far from impressive, the members of PSL and the Together Party predominantly believe that they constitute valuable assets for the parties when it comes to direct communication with citizens. The underwhelming statistics regarding actual involvement stand in contrast to the proportion of rank-and-file members who declare they are ready and willing to help their organisations reach out to voters. Of the interviewed PiS representatives, 64.6% said that they wanted to contribute in this area. For other parties, the numbers were even higher: 70.2% for the SLD, 74.9% for the PO, 86.5% for the PSL, 87.7% for the Modern and 94.5% for the Together Party. The huge gap between members’ declarative readiness and actual involvement suggests that, so far, Polish political parties utterly failed to exploit their grassroots structures’ potential for building relations with the social environment. Members of the Together Party, the SLD and the PSL were more likely to be involved in activities that are conducive to consultative participation than their peers in other parties. Therefore, their creative potential is utilised to a greater extent. For example, 18% of surveyed Together Party members participated in shaping the party’s programme, while 5.5% were involved in exchanging and transmitting opinions or information. The corresponding proportions were 4.2% and 8.3% for PSL and 5.1% and 6.1% for SLD. The way in which the central offices of these three parties work with the party on the ground demonstrates a focus on implementation and image-building through specific activities within the framework

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of communication campaigns. The potential for direct communication is utilised to a lesser extent. Regarding creative potential, only the Together Party stands out, while the PSL and the SLD hover just slightly above their remaining competitors. The findings discussed above raise a relevant question: Does the party on the ground adhere to some centrally developed framework that dictates its functioning and communication efforts, or is it left to its own devices? To answer this, we went beyond party elites, rank-andfile members and press officers and interviewed administrative personnel about how the party in central office cooperates with its grassroots structures in the pursuit of communication-related goals. Our analysis indicates that regional branches are not limited to executing orders that come from central offices; they also implement their own ideas. Nearly half of the interviewed clerical staff said that the leadership provided certain general guidelines (with PSL being the only party lacking such guidance), but regional offices acted on their own initiative. While they are involved in the party’s overall communication strategy, they seem to enjoy a certain degree of autonomy. As stated by a representative of PO, ‘there are both grassroots initiatives and activities that are parts of a centralised, planned strategy. Even though we are a fairly centralised party, regions have their autonomy and can operate on their own accord. They engage in some activities in parallel to whatever tactic or strategy there might be’ (PO_7). If they are to be able to effectively pursue their parties’ communication objectives, grassroots structures need support. This involves not only funding but also access to communication-related competences. Our research indicates that parties strive to disseminate know-how on campaigning and media relations among their rank-and-file members and cadres. Most employees said that they underwent internal training in campaigning techniques, managing online communication and media relations. However, similar education with regard to image crisis management and establishing rapport with voters who contact parties directly was a rarity. Parties’ adeptness at exploiting the potential of their structures is dependent on a variety of factors, such as leadership style, leaders’ awareness of grassroot structures’ importance and the readiness of grassroots structures to play an active role in the political communication process. Our analysis shows that while grassroots structures are aware of their potential and elites acknowledge the importance of that potential, rankand-file members are seldom actually involved in reaching out to the

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electorate. This means that political parties tap primarily into the implementational potential of their grassroots presence and less so into the creative and image-building potential. This has two consequences. First, parties miss out on a valuable source of information that could be used for both formulating agendas and centrally implemented communication campaigns. Thus, they do not benefit from the creative potential of their membership base. Second, they fail to capitalise on an opportunity to strengthen members’ sense of partisan identity and belonging. Holding genuine dialogues with members or involving them in the formulation of agendas and communication strategies allows a party to spark some life into its internal functioning. This is particularly relevant today because, as Piero Ignazi (2018) commented, internal changes, such as increased participation levels, are able to respond to challenges emanating from the environment. Ignazi noted that parties that have so far functioned along the logic of appropriateness became overly attached to certain solutions, making any substantial change difficult. Similar mechanisms are visible in how cooperation between the party in central office and party on the ground looks in Polish political formations. It is common to delegate the execution of certain tasks, but instruments allowing for consultative participation are used sparingly. Perhaps this reflects a mental barrier that comes with the strongly rooted perception of parties as centralised organisations, which is how most Polish parties see themselves. Both the sentiments voiced by party elites and the conclusions from our talks with party members reveal that grassroots structures are still relevant. This assertion is corroborated by the sustainability and resilience of political parties that possess well-developed grassroots structures and the troubles experienced by those who do not. The following observation made by an SLD politician seems to ring true: ‘One of the issues of all [Polish] political parties is their excessive centralisation because very often grassroot structures complain about not being heard, about the fact the leadership does take their opinion into account’ (SLD_6). His claim is reflected in our conclusions about how parties use their organisational potential.

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Cabrera, E., Ortega, J., & Cabrera, A. (2003). An exploration of the factors that influence employee participation in Europe. Journal of World Business, 38(1), 43–54. Gallie, D. (2013). Direct participation and the quality of work. Human Relations, 66(4), 453–473. Hertz, R., & Imber, J. (Eds.). (1995). Studying elites using qualitative methods. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Hloušek, V., & Kopeˇcek, L. (2017). Entrepreneurial parties: A basic conceptual framework. Czech Journal of Political Science, 24(2), 83–91. https://doi.org/ 10.5817/PC2017-2-83. Ignazi, P. (2018). The four knights of intra-party democracy: A rescue for party delegitimation. Party Politics, 26(1), 9–20. https://doi.org/10.1177/135 4068818754599. Karlsen, R. (2010). Fear of the political consultant: Campaign professionals and new technology in Norwegian electoral politics. Party Politics, 16(2), 193– 214. Katz, R., & Mair, P. (1995). Changing models of party organization and party democracy. Party Politics, 1(1), 5–28. Knudsen, H., Busck, O., & Lind, J. (2011). Work environment quality: The role of workplace participation and democracy. Work, Employment & Society, 25(3), 379–396. Mair, P. (2002). Populist democracy vs. party democracy. In Y. Mény & Y. Surel (Eds.), Democracies and the populist challenge (pp. 81–98). London: Palgrave Macmillan. Nalewajko, E. (2006). Powiatowe partie polityczne – trudna adaptacja. In J. Wasilewski (Ed.), Powiatowa elita polityczna: rekrutacja, struktura, działanie (pp. 187–243). Warszawa: ISP PAN. Pacze´sniak, A. (2018). Jak przetrwa´c dekad˛e porazek ˙ wyborczych? Studium przypadku Sojuszu Lewicy Demokratycznej. In A. Pacze´sniak (Ed.), Anatomia porazki ˙ wyborczej (pp. 177–194). Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Sejmowe. Pacze´sniak, A., & De Waele, J.-M. (2011). Ludzie partii – ideali´sci czy pragmatycy? Kadry partyjne w s´wietle badan´ empirycznych. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar. Panebianco, A. (1988). Political parties: Organization and power. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. Piwowarczyk, J. (2006). Partycypacja w zarzadzaniu ˛ a motywowanie pracowników. Kraków: Oficyna Wydawnicza. Sandri, G., Seddone, A. &Venturino, F. (2019). When charisma is no longer enough. Insigths on polulist parties’ leadership from the (Nortern) League. Polish Political Science Review. Polski Przeglad ˛ Politologiczny, 7 (1), 80–95.

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Sieklucki, D. (2006). Partie lewicy i centrolewicy w polskim systemie partyjnym: aktywno´sc´ SLD, PSL i UP na polskiej scenie partyjnej. Kraków: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellonskiego. ´ Sobolewska-My´slik, K., Kosowska-G˛astoł, B., & Borowiec, P. (2010). Struktury organizacyjne polskich partii politycznych. Kraków: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellonskiego, ´ Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Pedagogicznego w Krakowie. Stobinski, ´ M. (2010). Silna struktura członkowska jako główny zasób partii politycznej na przykładzie Polskiego Stronnictwa Ludowego. In K. Sobolewska´ My´slik, A. Hess, & K. Kowalczyk (Eds.), Polska scena polityczna. Srodowiska - komunikacja polityczna - strategie (pp. 351–363). Kraków: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellonskiego, ´ Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Pedagogicznego w Krakowie. Tavits, M. (2013). Post-communist democracies and the party organizations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. van Biezen, I. (2003). Political parties in new democracies: Party organization in Southern and East-Central Europe. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. van Biezen, I. (2013). The decline in party membership across Europe means that political parties need to reconsider how they engage with the electorate. https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2013/05/06/decline-inparty-membership-europe-ingrid-van-biezen/. Accessed 30 June 2020. van Haute, E. (2009). Adhérer à un parti. Aux sources de la participation politique. Bruxelles: Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles. van Houten, P. (2009). Multilevel relations in political parties: A delegation approach. Party Politics, 15(2), 137–156. Wincławska, M., & Brodzinska-Mirowska, ´ B. (2016). Niewykorzystane szanse? Partie polityczne w działaniu. Torun: ´ Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika.

CHAPTER 6

Political Party Membership Features

Political parties are, at their core, membership organisations even though the position and role of members evolves in parallel to the changes that occur within parties and their social environment. Thanks to the research that has been conducted among party members since at least the 1970s, ‘we know a fair bit about the social and demographic composition of party membership (…). We also believe we know something about why people join parties and what they do for them once they’ve joined (…). And we know the extent of the say afforded to those members—something that varies considerably both over time and between parties’ (Bale et al. 2019: 7). We have broad knowledge about rank-and-file members in Western European countries (Whiteley et al. 1994; Seyd and Whiteley 2002; Whiteley et al. 2006, Bale et al. 2019; van Haute and Gauja 2015b), but also some about non-EU European states (Gherghina et al. 2018). As for Polish parties, their membership bases and elites were examined by Mirosława Grabowska and Tadeusz Szawiel, who scrutinised delegates for national party congresses (1993, 2001; Grabowska 2004); by a team led by Anna Pacze´sniak and Jean-Michel De Waele (2011), who looked at mid-level elites of the Democratic Left Alliance and the Civic Platform; as well as by Maria Wincławska and Barbara Brodzinska-Mirowska ´ (2016), who examined grassroots structures of four than parliamentary

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parties (Civic Platform, Law and Justice, Democratic Left Alliance and Polish People’s Party) in one region of Poland. This book is based on research that includes the first attempt in Polish political science to carry out a full-membership survey. Undertaking it allowed us to have gained a very broad perspective of parties’ membership bases. We used institutional and legal analysis, surveys, individual in-depth interviews and focus-group interviews to examine issues which have long been topics of interest among scholars of party organisations in many countries. We sought to answer the following questions: (1) What is the members’ position in political parties? (2) Who joins them? (3) What incentivises and motivates these people? (4) What is their actual engagement in their respective parties’ activities? (see van Haute and Gauja 2015b). However, we went beyond these issues and included in our analyses aspects related to internal communication—the binding element of any organisation. We discussed communication practices and considered questions about members’ expectations and satisfaction from how their formations function in this regard. Our goal was to show how the quality of internal communication affects members’ overall assessment of their parties.

6.1 Legal Regulations Regarding Party Membership Political parties in Poland are membership organisations, as stipulated in the Constitution adopted in 1997. Article 11 specifies that membership is voluntary and based on the principle of equality, while Article 13 prohibits parties from making information about their structures and members classified. Including such regulations in the constitution is not unique to Poland—several other European countries including Belgium, Finland, Hungary, Lithuania and Slovakia also did so (Chmaj 2006: 59–60). General constitutional stipulations are complemented with more detailed laws concerning political parties. In Poland, the Act on Political Parties specifies that, in order to be an eligible party member, a person must be a Polish citizen aged 18 or above. By law, members enjoy a high status in political formations. Their congregation is a party’s supreme power. Only members (or their democratically selected representatives) can enact a statute, elect party organs and adopt resolutions by a regular majority of votes (Act on Political Parties, Art. 8 and 9). Their status is reflected in statutory documents, where chapters on membership are found early

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on and are usually well developed. They specify the criteria and conditions for membership and describe members’ rights and obligations. In many parties, the terms of membership are fairly similar. These are usually not overly strict and resemble rules found in many other countries across Europe. Detailed criteria and conditions for each of the examined parties are presented in Table 6.1. In terms of exclusivity and adherence, there are no significant differences among the above parties. None of them allow their members to simultaneously belong to other parties. The PiS and the SLD statutes go a step further by stating that their members may neither join nor support any other organisations that effectively compete against or engage in any activity detrimental to the parties. In all six parties, members are obliged to follow statutory regulations and identify with the party’s programme Table 6.1 Criteria and conditions for party membership Party

Exclusivity Adherence Level of Probationary Sponsorship members’ period by another acceptance member(s)

Law and Justice (PiS) Civic Platform (PO) Modern (.N) Polish People’s Party (PSL) Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) Together Party (R)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Registered sympathisers

District or national Local

No

No*

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

District, national Local or district

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

Local

Yes

Yes

Yes

District or national

Yes

No

Yes

Sources Statut PiS (2016), Statut PO (2017), Statut .N (2017), Statut PSL (2017), Statut SLD (2019), and Statut Partii Razem (2019) * In the case of PiS, the candidate for a member needs to collect signatures from two sponsors in order to submit a membership declaration. This requirement is, however, not mentioned in the statute

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and goals. In the case of the Modern, they are also tasked with popularising the organisation and working to promote its development. The PSL requires its members to adhere to and promote its ideological principles. PiS, in turn, obliges them to follow moral and civic guidelines derived from the party’s programme. Where the parties do differ is in the following aspects: the level of organisation at which new members’ submissions are accepted, the use of trial periods, the requirement of sponsorship from other members and the registration of sympathisers. People wishing to join these parties must complete a declaration which is then processed by the party structures. In the PO and the SLD, this happens at the local level. The same is true for the PSL with the caveat that candidates who had previously belonged to another party need to be approved by the district executive board. A district-level body accepts new members into the Modern. In the Together Party, membership is processed either at the district level or, if no suitable structures exist in a given region, centrally through the national executive board. A similar procedure has been adopted by the PiS, although its statute does not specifically designate the district- or national-level board to accept new members. In three of the six examined parties (the PO, the SLD and the Together Party), candidates are put through a three-month (the Together Party) or six-month (the PO and the SLD) probation period during which they do not possess passive and active suffrage. This mechanism is meant to protect parties from tactics such as the mass recruitment of new members shortly before an internal election by a faction seeking to take control of the party. Four of the parties studied require sponsorship by a current party member. The Modern requires new entrants to have as many as three sponsors, while the PSL, the SLD and the PiS require two. In the case of the PiS, this particular requirement is not explicitly included in the statute, but every membership declaration needs the signatures of two members who vouch for the candidate in question. Parties argue that sponsorship, which makes the members’ group more exclusive, is a necessary tool for making sure that the candidates are the right people for the party. A PiS politician explained during interviews that the rule was introduced to ensure the new entrants are ‘verified, even if only by the two sponsors’ (PiS_8). His colleague added that ‘when a new person comes in, I do not know them. They may have a kind face, but the membership declaration is the only thing that allows us to build their profile, as it describes their professional careers, political affiliations, education, membership in other

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organisations, the fact of running for posts. Sponsorship means there are at least two Law and Justice members who vouch for them, who know them, their morality, ethics—they take responsibility for the new member’ (PiS_7). A representative of the PO—a party which does not require sponsors—expressed a different perspective on this matter: ‘Given that a political formation is a civic organisation, it is hard to verify candidates for members or sympathisers in terms of their CVs. It is not an employment process (…), we do not verify potential members by checking what skills they have, what is their educational background or how they could serve the organisation. What we say is: if you want to join and you have not done anything that would disqualify you, you are welcome’ (PO_4). This represents a more inclusive approach to accepting new members. In contemporary politics, formal membership is one of many possible forms of affiliation. Apart from full members, parties have sympathisers (sometimes called light members), cyber-members, social media followers and friends, sustainers, and news audiences (Scarrow 2015: 30–33). However, statutes of Polish parties regulate only full-membership status. Light members are either omitted altogether (as in the PSL statute) or mentioned briefly in articles specifying that party organs shall keep a register of sympathisers. Regulations regarding their exact role are relegated to lower-level internal documents (the PO, the PiS, the Modern, the SLD and the Together Party).

6.2

Party Members’ Profiles

As shown in several studies, including the European Value Survey (2018), citizens of Central and Eastern European countries1 are passive and unwilling to get involved in public and political life. Only 2.5% of CEE citizens had worked in a political party or action group during the 12 months preceding the Survey. In Poland, that number was marginally higher at 2.8%, but still notably lower than in Western Europe, where the average stood at 4.3%. These modest involvement levels also encompass party membership. Even if, as noted by Susan Scarrow (2002: 100), ‘the strong membership-based parties were never as widespread as some accounts suggest’, post-1989 Central and Eastern Europe has consistently

1 The survey included: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland, and Hungary.

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100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% PiS

PO

.N women

PSL

SLD

Razem

men

Fig. 6.1 Gender of the surveyed political party members (Source Authors’ research, N = 2486)

seen low political participation levels, regardless of the objective or subjective measure2 used. Data on the scale of membership in the parties that we examined is presented in Chapter 2 of this book. Here, we focus instead on profiling the group which populated political formations in the second half of the 2010s. Previous, partial research on party members (Grabowska and Szawiel 1993, 2001; Grabowska 2004; Jacunski ´ 2011; Wincławska and Brodzinska-Mirowska ´ 2016) has shown that ever since the beginning of the democratic transition, most members were middle-aged or elderly men, usually with university degrees. The presence of women, young people and individuals without university degrees was far less common. Little has changed in this regard. Three-fourths of our respondents were men. Women were more often found in the left-wing groups the Together Party and the SLD than in the right and centre of the political scene. Of the six examined parties, the PSL had the lowest number of female members (see Fig. 6.1)

2 For more on these two techniques of quantifying party membership, see: van Haute and Gauja (2015a: 9–11).

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Of the surveyed members, 43.3% were aged over 50, and a further 20.5% were between 40 and 50 years old. The parties with the longest presence in Poland’s political scene had the oldest membership base. For the two successor parties, the SLD and the PSL, the proportion of members aged over 50 stood at 65.4% and 57.2%, respectively. In the two parties that trace their roots to the Solidarity movement and were formed (in their current incarnations) at the turn of the millennium, PO and PiS, the corresponding numbers were 49.9% and 47.1% of members over 50. The Modern had a slightly younger membership base, with 40.8% aged over 50. The Together Party possessed by far the youngest group of members: only 10.6% were over 50, while as many as 78.2% were under 40 (see Fig. 6.2). Over 80% of members in all six examined parties possessed university degrees. The Modern, the PO and the PSL led in this respect (over 85%), while The Together Party, the SLD and the PiS trailed slightly. Of our respondents, 45.2% lived in cities of over 100,000 inhabitants and 71.5% described themselves as either management staff, white collar worker, practitioner of a liberal profession or entrepreneur. For nearly 70%, their job was entirely unrelated to politics. According to the resource theory articulated in Verba and Nie (1975) and Verba et al. (1995), people who enjoy higher levels of resources 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%

PiS

PO 18-29

30-39

.N 40-49

PSL 50-59

60-69

SLD

Razem

more than 70

Fig. 6.2 Age cohorts of the surveyed party members (Source Authors’ research, N = 2499)

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are far more likely to be party members. Hence, membership is a highintensity form of participation. This has been confirmed with respect to Polish parties, whose membership base is socio-demographically similar to what is observed in other democracies. When analysing membership in Danish political formations, Karina Kosiara-Pedersen (2015: 77) wrote that ‘party members are more often male, older and more educated’. Monica Poletti et al. (2019: 164) echoed those findings when looking at the UK: ‘Party members in the United Kingdom are significantly more likely to be male, middle class, educated and older’. It should be noted that the group populating Polish political parties has a profile that differs notably from the society overall: 52% of Polish citizens are women, the age median is 41 and the proportion of people with university degrees stands at just over 20%.

6.3

Motivations for Joining Political Parties

Few people ever decide to join a political party. In some European countries the statistic is as low as 1–2% of eligible voters. As we mentioned before, these are usually people who enjoy access to certain resources, but beyond that, they also have specific motivations. What drives them to become politically involved? In comparative politics, the widely accepted approach to this issue is known as the General Incentive Model (GIM). It was first introduced by Patrick Seyd and Paul Whiteley in 1992 and has since been developed and used in a number of studies (Seyd and Whiteley 2004; Whiteley and Seyd 1996, 1998, 2002; Poletti et al. 2019). The GIM combines three approaches: the socio-demographic perspective derived from the resource model mentioned above, the rational-choice theory which points to selective incentives and the socio-psychological approach which emphasises collective incentives and norms. Analyses based on the GIM have been conducted in many countries, for example in the UK by the GIM’s creators, in Germany (Spier and Klain 2015: 92–96), in Denmark (Kosiara-Pedersen 2015: 71–74) and in Ireland (Gallagher and Marsh 2002). However, examinations of post-communist countries are scarce. Inspired by the GIM, we decided to fill that gap and ask members of Polish parties about their reasons for joining. When responding to our survey, they could select from a list of motives divided into several groups:

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– Motivations related to a party’s ideology and programme, the alignment between the respondent’s views and those of the party. – Affective and normative incentives in which the act of joining stemmed either from high regard for the party’s leader or the desire to adhere to norms and expectations calling for civic and political involvement emanating from the respondent’s social circles. – Altruistic incentives in which the respondent felt compelled to work for and on behalf of other people. – Selective incentives in which the move was driven by the prospect of personal gains. In the case of selective-process incentives, these gains referred to satisfying a need to belong to a like-minded group. Selective-outcome incentives referred to gaining party or public office or enlisting the party’s help in finding a job (see: Spier and Klein 2015: 92–93). A detailed breakdown of motives can be found below, in Table 6.2. For members of all six parties, ideology and programmes were the most important reasons for their decision to join: 77.8%3 of all respondents indicated them as their motivation. The numbers varied somewhat for each party. The Together Party and the PiS attracted as much as 90% of their members with their programmes and values. Both parties emphasise their ideological identities and use them as a foundation for their appeal to the public—the Together Party espouses leftist ideas, while PiS champions conservative, right-wing values. Ideological incentives were also very important for members of the liberal Modern (80% of members indicating them as their motive) and the left-wing SLD (79%). In the PSL, a party built on an agrarian ethos, 73% of members were attracted by its programme and values. The PO had the least ideology-driven (66.8%) membership base—a fact which corroborates the opinions voiced not only by some pundits (see for example, Fiedorczuk 2020) but by party members themselves, who speak of the PO as an entity somewhat devoid of any particular ideological identity. Affective and normative incentives were indicated by 25.6% of all surveyed individuals. They were most common among PO members, somewhat less frequent among the PSL, the Modern and the SLD

3 The numbers given here represent the proportion of all surveyed members of a given party who pointed to a particular category of incentives. N = 2247.

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Table 6.2 Reasons for joining a political party (data in percentage points)

Incentives related to ideology and programme

Affective and normative incentives

Altruistic incentives

Selective process incentives

Selective-outcome incentives

The party’s ideology is close to my heart The party’s programme aligns with my views I valued the leader I was encouraged by a family member, friend or acquaintance By becoming a member, I could help other people I have a say on matters vital to the country I have a say on matters vital for my local community I wanted to connect with people who share my outlook and think similarly I joined to socialise I sought to have a career in politics I sought to have a career in the party I was hoping the party would help me find a job

PiS

PO

.N

PSL

SLD Razem

54,2

32,3

45,4

41,0

39,6

58,5

54,2

41,1

50,9

37,4

45,5

58,7

10,2 8,5

26,0 15,3

18,7 7,4

8,2 19,8

9,1 12,7

2,9 6,2

9,3

10,7

6,7

19,3

18,2

18,2

3,4

4,6

7,3

3,9

5,1

8,6

11,0

15,8

8,5

21,1

15,3

4,0

18,6

33,3

31,1

20,9

26,9

28,6

0,0 1,7

2,1 5,1

0,7 4,3

1,3 2,8

3,3 5,5

1,3 3,5

0,8

0,4

0,9

0,8

1,5

0,7

0,8

1,5

0,7

1,8

2,5

0,2

Source Authors’ elaboration, N = 2487. Since the respondents were asked to choose a maximum of two options, the percentages sum to more than 100

members and least typical of the Together Party and the PiS members. The allure of a charismatic leader was strongest for the PO and the Modern members, which is hardly surprising given that both parties were built around recognisable figures. The opposite was true for the Together Party, a party which adopted a collective leadership structure. Somewhat surprisingly, the leader was not a strong motivation for PiS members, even though the party is often identified primarily with its chairman who,

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compared to other formations, has the broadest powers and the firmest grip on the entire organisation (Pacze´sniak and Wincławska 2018). Altruistic incentives provide another set of motives for party enrolment. They were indicated by 31.6% of respondents, most frequently by members of the PSL and the SLD. The Modern and the PiS members were least likely to be driven by this factor. Notably, among people who mentioned altruistic motivations, the possibility of working for the benefit of one’s local community far outweighed the desire to affect matters of national importance. The latter element was significant only for representatives of the Together Party. Selective-process incentives were mentioned by 31.3% of respondents. These were more important to members of the PO, the Modern, the SLD and the Together Party than to their peers from the PSL and the PiS. In this category, belonging to a community of like-minded people was far more significant than the pursuit of opportunities to socialise. The last group, selective-outcome incentives, was a decidedly less-significant factor for all six parties. Few respondents (5.9%) joined their respective organisations with the hope of making a career in partisan politics or being assisted in finding a job. The ambition of being a career politician was only marginally more common. Members of the PiS and the Together Party, two parties where ideological motivations were most prevalent, were least inclined to follow this category of incentives. In all, the results of the quantitative research indicate that ideological and programmatic factors are the most common reasons to join political parties. Identification with the organisation and its values is greatly relevant. Such conclusions were corroborated by the analysis of focusgroup interviews, in which participants said they enrolled because they felt ‘closest to the ideas of this party’ (PSL) or ‘attached to conservative, centre-right views’ (PiS). A Together Party member explained that ‘when this genuinely leftist option emerged onto the scene, with a properly leftwing agenda, I knew it would suit me’. Meanwhile, selective-outcome incentives were among the rarest motivations. They also featured very scarcely in focus-group interviews. When asked directly about the benefits of membership, our interviewees preferred to point to the fulfilment that comes from working for the good of other people or the satisfaction from a job well done (the Modern, the Together Party), personal development (the Together Party, the PO) or gaining experience in politics (the PO). The fact that the respondents seldom mentioned any material benefits from membership makes them similar to party members in other countries (see, for example, Baras et al. 2015: 27; Kosiara-Pedersen

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2015: 75; Rahat and Kening 2015: 110). It also shows that, contrary to popular belief and social perceptions of politicians and parties, involvement in partisan politics is more about convictions and political output than careers or other personal gains.

6.4

Party Members’ Activities

Members may be involved in a wide range of activities undertaken by their parties. The character and extent of members’ involvement depends on two factors: Firstly, on their resources and motivations. Secondly, on the attitude and aptitude of the leadership, its readiness to engage with rank-and-file personnel and ability to foster participation. In this section, we shall look at how party members see themselves in the context of their organisations. Do they consider themselves active? How much time do they devote to working for their parties? What types of activities are they most ready to take part in? Most members believe that they are actively involved in their parties’ operations. 34.4% claim they are ‘very actively involved’, and a further 42.4% think they are ‘quite involved’. Nearly 30% of respondents stated that, outside campaign periods, they spent more than 10 hours per month working for their respective parties. Eighteen percent estimated their input at between five and ten hours. In terms of time devoted to partisan life, the PSL and the Together Party members were the most active. The Modern, the PiS and the SLD members reported very similar time contributions, while the PO members were notably behind. Compared to their peers from other parties, the PO members were more commonly involved in ad hoc initiatives, meaning they only devoted their time if specifically needed. Meanwhile, members of all other parties were involved on a more regular basis. Activity levels increased during campaign periods. In months directly preceding elections, almost 55% of all respondents spent more than 10 hours on party work. Once again, members of the PSL and the Together Party led the way, while those from the PO ranked at the bottom; although nearly half of them contributed over 10 hours. Details are presented in Table 6.3.

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Table 6.3 Time devoted by members to party work in the inter-electoral period and during campaigns (data in percentage points)

The inter-electoral period* More than 10 hours 5–10 hours Up to 5 hours Ad hoc, when there is a need None The campaign period** More than 10 hours 5–10 hours Up to 5 hours Ad hoc, when there is a need None

PiS

PO

.N

PSL

SLD

Razem

29,7 19,5 18,6 30,5 1,7

18,8 14,4 14,3 47,8 4,7

29,9 19,0 16,0 32,1 3,1

40,5 24,0 11,7 23,5 0,3

24,6 18,5 13,4 39,5 4,0

39,2 15,9 13,7 28,9 2,4

58,5 17,8 4,2 19,5 0,0

49,7 11,2 4,4 30,9 3,8

50,0 11,4 4,0 32,1 2,6

75,1 6,8 3,1 14,8 0,3

46,2 15,3 7,3 27,3 4,0

53,5 10,4 4,6 24,8 6,6

Source Authors’ elaboration, *N = 2,500. **N = 2490

Respondents whose identification with their party was stronger4 and who believed they had a say in decision-making processes5 typically spent notably more time working for their organisations during campaigns. However, the correlation between these two variables was even more pronounced during the inter-electoral period. Assessments of management practices also correlate with the time spent on party work, albeit to a lesser extent. Those respondents who thought their party was well managed were likely to spend more time working for it.6 Satisfaction derived from membership status, the sense of agency and a positive opinion of management are therefore conducive to greater involvement. 4 For the campaign period, the value of Kruskal-Wallis H-test is 170,187 (p < 0,01). The correlation coefficient as measured by Kendall’s tau-b 0,229 (p < 0,01). Outside campaign periods, the Kruskal-Wallis H-test is 251,281 (p < 0,01), while Kendall’s tau-b 0,277 (p < 0,01). 5 For the campaign period, the value of Kruskal-Wallis H-test is 143,333 (p < 0,01). The correlation coefficient as measured by Kendall’s tau-b 0,201 (p < 0,01). Outside campaign periods, the Kruskal-Wallis H-test is 303,674 (p < 0,01), while Kendall’s tau-b 0,285 (p < 0,01). 6 For the campaign period, the value of Kruskal-Wallis H-test is 67,756 (p < 0,01). The correlation coefficient as measured by Kendall’s tau-b value is 0,128 (p < .0,01.) Outside campaign periods, the Kruskal-Wallis H-test is 103,737 (p < 0,01), while Kendall’s tau-b is at 0,163 (p < 0,01).

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In terms of the nature of their involvement, members of all examined parties proved to be fairly similar (see Table 6.4). They more often participate in less time- and energy-consuming activities such as branch meetings, meetings with the leadership, following the party’s online presence, posting political content. They are less likely to expend their energy on demonstrations, marches and other such initiatives, whether organised locally in their constituencies or in the capital city. Table 6.4 presents the intensity of their involvement in certain types of activities, where 1 means they had never participated in a given type of event and 4 means they had done so on a regular basis. In terms of average involvement levels, members of the youngest parties (i.e. the Modern and the Together Party) and the PSL were more active than their peers from the PO, PiS and SLD. The Modern and the Together Party members were also most present on the internet, with regard to both reading as well as posting and commenting. However, it should be remembered they are typically younger than members of other examined parties. Similar to the question of time spent on party work, Table 6.4 Average involvement in selected types of activities* PiS I participate in branch meetings in my borough I participate in meetings with party leaders organised in my hometown I take part in demonstrations, marches, rallies and other initiatives organised by my party in my constituency or the surrounding areas I take part in demonstrations, marches, rallies and other initiatives organised by my party in the capital city I post or comment on other people’s posts on the Internet, on the party’s website or social media profiles I read posts published by the party or its representatives on websites or in social media Average involvement level for all types of activities

PO

.N

PSL

SLD Razem

3,15 3,62 3,62 3,86

3,30

3,31

3,10 3,33 3,29 3,82

3,19

2,70

2,90 2,95 3,16 3,13

2,83

3,16

2,54 2,37 2,40 2,32

2,17

2,18

2,79 2,46 2,90 2,65

2,51

2,95

3,04 3,33 3,53 3,20

3,07

3,73

2,92 3,01 3,15 3,16

2,85

3,01

Source Authors’ elaboration. N = 2,506. *Measured on a scale of 1–4

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stronger identification7 and a sense of being able to influence the party’s decision-making process8 led to higher involvement levels. Many of the changes observed in political parties over the last decades came as responses to the issue of declining membership and concerned internal, organisational structure. Some parties introduced a direct democracy mechanism by broadening party selectorates or granting grassroots structures a more prominent place in decision-making processes (e.g. internal referenda) (Mjelde 2013; Cross and Gauja 2014). However, as Piero Ignazi noted, such moves proved insufficient to revitalise parties. In his opinion, ‘only the integration of members’ inclusion with the other ‘knights’ of party democracy—diffusion, pluralism, and deliberation—may foster an effective intra-party activity and revive partisan mobilization’ (Ignazi 2018: 9). Polish parties have a lot to do in this regard if they wish to boost the internal dynamics that Ignazi refers to. Their efficiency is determined by a combinations of factors: the aptitude of leaders, the state of internal relations, cooperation between various levels of party structures and, finally, the extent of members’ involvement driven by their sense of agency and inclusion in decision-making. The quality of relations and the strength of the organisation is also reflected in members’ trust in each other, satisfaction and commitment to the party (Grunig 2006, 2011; Tavits 2013). Good internal relations provide strong foundations which allow parties to be nimbler and more effective in adapting to their changing environment. This is why membership should be considered in qualitative as much as quantitative terms. We need to look beyond the number of members and consider how they are actually involved in the work of their organisations. This quality-centred approach seeks to identify the so-called high-quality membership (HQM) which is described elsewhere in academic literature (Brodzinska-Mirowska ´ and Wincławska 2019).

7 Kruskal-Wallis H-test value is 213,851 (p < 0,01). Kendall’s tau-b correlation coefficient is at 0,239 (p < 0,01). 8 Kruskal-Wallis H-test value is 132,877 (p < 0,01). Kendall’s tau-b correlation coefficient is at 0,178 (p < 0,01).

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6.5 Internal Communication: Practices vs Members’ Expectations Research on political communication largely omits the internal aspect— i.e. how parties organise and conduct communication within their organisations. By knowing more about it we could not only get a more complete picture of the professionalisation process in this area, but also evaluate the ways parties develop their organisational potential. In this section, we focus on the tools most commonly used by Polish parties. We also discuss members’ preferred forms of contact with partisan structures and their satisfaction with internal communication. Finally, we show how the level of that satisfaction affects their assessments of various other aspects of their parties’ functioning and their sense of involvement in decision-making processes. Communication connects organisational processes; it is crossfunctional in nature. Its quality determines relations within the organisation, and its role goes far beyond that of a one-directional transmission belt for information. For internal communication symmetric strategies, which employ forms and activities oriented towards dialogue, partnership and exchange of opinions, are particularly effective (Men and Sung 2019; Grunig 2009). As Linjuan Rita Men and Yongjun Sang wrote, by implementing solutions typical for symmetric strategies companies ‘actively initiate conversations, monitor internal goings-on, and are willing to adjust their behaviours and make adaptive changes based on the feedback given by their employees’. The symmetric model calls for polls, face-toface meetings and tools that allow the exchange of thoughts and ideas—in other words, channels based on interaction. Many entities complement such strategies with solutions conducive to members’ multi-dimensional participation. They also reap the benefits of a stronger internal reputation (Men and Sung 2019: 6). All these elements are, for several reasons, particularly important for political parties. First of all, efficient internal communication fosters closer bonds between the organisation and its members. It allows parties to build communities around the ideas they espouse. Secondly, employing these strategies breeds more active involvement in partisan life, and an engaged membership base constitutes a vital resource for their parties. Thirdly, it means that members feel they have a say in what is happening within the organisation. It should be noted that less formalised forms are usually more effective. Since Polish parties remain, by and large, hierarchical organisations, they may struggle with

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implementing such solutions. It has been shown that the more hierarchical the structure is and the more formal the means of communication it employs, the lower the quality of that communication is (Bharadwaj 2014). This is why we decided to examine internal communication in Polish political parties. We wanted to find out whether parties, being hierarchical entities, are able to implement the symmetrical model and, if so, to what effect. The first aspect we considered were the tools used for internal communication. Similar to other organisations, parties moved into online channels: mobile applications, social media and closed fora (see also, Jacunski ´ 2018). During interviews, party members emphasised the internet as a standard means of internal communication. For instance, a PSL representative said that his party distributed a daily online newsletter (PSL_4). Our interviewees also talked a lot about face-to-face meetings. One PiS member stated: ‘Most of all, I attend plenty of meetings’ (PiS_7). A person from the PO also stressed the importance of that form: ‘People crave such direct way of passing information. This is why we meet on a fairly regular basis to have conversations’ (PO_2). Such declarations from party members in public office were confirmed by the grassrootslevel activists who, when asked about what tools the party used to contact them, named emails and newsletters (83.6%), face-to-face meetings (65.2%), phone calls (49.3%), social media (44.7%) and messaging apps (41%). Elements such as printed magazines and online periodicals were mentioned rarely (7%).9 The efficiency of communication also depends on how well the selected tools and channels match the needs and expectations of recipients. Electronic forms (email and newsletters) and face-to-face meetings were most often named by our respondents as their preferences. Phone calls competed with messaging applications for the next spot on the list. The Together Party was the sole exception to this trend, as can be seen in Fig. 6.3. PiS was one of the two parties in which face-to-face communication was the most preferred form. Phone calls were second on the list, with email and newsletters only slightly behind. The other party where face-to-face meetings were most commonly mentioned was the PSL. Its members were also keen on communicating through emails and over the phone. In the PO, electronic forms (emails and newsletters and, to a 9 Respondents were asked to name no more than three forms most commonly used for internal communication in their respective parties.

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100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 PiS Face to face

PO

Modern E-mail/Newsletter

PSL

SLD

Internet messenger

Together Phone

Fig. 6.3 Grassroots’ preferred forms of communication (data in percentage points) (Sources Authors’ research. N = 5,712. Because respondents could choose up to three forms in order of their preference, the sums for each party may exceed 100%)

lesser extent, also messaging applications) were chosen more often, but face-to-face meetings were also a frequent preference. A similar distribution was recorded for the Modern, where most members would like to be contacted electronically. Direct meetings and messaging applications came second and third, respectively. The Together Party was the only party where online communication in general (emails, newsletters, messaging applications) was clearly preferred over face-to-face meetings. This is likely linked to the fact that its membership base contains the lowest proportion of people over 50 years of age. Members’ expectations regarding forms of communication match their assessments of how effective a given form is. Of our respondents, 91.8% found direct communication to be most effective, while 57.5% pointed to online channels. It is therefore clear that members wish to be contacted in a manner they believe to be effective. They appreciate both face-to-face contacts and electronic forms. Similar findings were recorded by Linjuan Rita Men (2014), who discovered that while members often preferred newsletters or e-mails for internal communication, they wanted them to be complemented with direct forms. Face-to-face communication is more

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conducive to creating a genuine bond and perfectly suits the symmetric approach. ‘Face to face communication is the richest medium because it provides immediate feedback so that interpretation can be checked. Face to face also provides multiple cues via body language and tone of voice and message content is expressed in natural language’ (Daft and Lengel 1986: 560). As noted by Men, the development of ICTs means that a modern day ‘organizational social media channel’ allows for creating roughly similar, but not identical conditions (Men 2014: 270). Direct meetings are popular because they give attendants a certain sense of occasion which stems from the chance to meet the party leader (or the leader of its regional structures). Meanwhile, online tools allow faster access to information and are more flexible—one can use them at any time and place. However, these online media are effectively unavailable to a certain portion of members, particularly older ones, who might lack the tech-savviness necessary to use them. The next issue we considered is members’ satisfaction with the way their parties communicate with them. According to the results of our survey, a little over half of all respondents were satisfied with internal communication in their organisations. Of the respondents, 52.3% said they were in regular contact with their party and received all information they were interested in, 47.7% admitted some degree of discontent, 28.4% wished for more regular communication, while 19.3% complained that their respective organisations remembered them only when they were needed. In general, internal communication was a challenge for every entity. Making it effective requires accounting for members’ individual preferences and needs, which are not always clearly articulated. In the case of the parties we examined, the proportions of members happy with internal communication and those dissatisfied with it were nearly equal. This presents us with something of a paradox: even though parties respond to their members’ expectations regarding communication forms, nearly half of the membership base still says it does not like the way communication is conducted. What are the reasons for this discrepancy? Firstly, they can be found in the frequency of communication. Detailed data on each party, presented in Table 6.5, shows that members of almost all of the examined parties expected more regular contacts with their organisations. Secondly, the quality of communication—specifically, the scope and character of information conveyed—was insufficient. Our research indicates that parties did not attempt to analyse the needs and expectations of their members. Having no knowledge about those

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Table 6.5 Members’ percentage points)

assessments

of

I am in constant touch with the party and receive all information I need I would like more regular contacts Party only remembers about its members when it needs them

internal

communication

(data

in

PiS

PO

.N

PSL

SLD

Razem

49,6

29,4

42,7

66,9

53,8

86,2

41,3 9,1

30 40,6

32,7 20,1

28,2 4,9

28 18,2

11,6 2,2

Source Authors’ research N = 2507

aspects, they were unable to formulate internal communication strategies. Instead, they were bound to resort to ad hoc, one-off initiatives dictated by current circumstances. A detailed look at the distribution of opinions among members of each party shows that the Together Party delivered the most satisfactory experience to their members, as 86.2% of them were content with the frequency and quality of communication. The other party with relatively good reputation in this regard was the PSL, with 66.9% of members declaring themselves satisfied. The proportion of satisfied members was 53.8% for the SLD and 49.6% for the PiS. The party struggling most with this aspect was the PO, with only 29.4% of its membership base happy. The PO’s elites seem to be aware of the problem, as signalled in an opinion expressed during an interview by one of their representatives: ‘The thing that Civic Platform members complain about most often is internal communication (…) I think this is the biggest issue’ (PO_5). However, that awareness did not translate into any specific remedial actions. Another respondent from PO said there was ‘no [planned, well-thought through] model [for internal communication]’ (PO_13). As mentioned above, respondents from all examined parties wanted contacts to be more regular. This sentiment was, understandably, most common among PiS members. They were particularly interested in what their organisation, as a governing party, was doing. The need for more frequent communication was also evident in the Modern, the PO, the SLD and the PSL. It was less pronounced in the Together Party, the party whose members were most satisfied with internal communication in general. PO members, who as a group occupied the other end of the satisfaction spectrum, were most likely to feel that they were being treated instrumentally, complaining that the party contacted them only when it

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required their help. The examined parties varied in terms of effectiveness of their internal communication. The PO was ranked at bottom, while the top three included, in descending order: the Together Party, the PSL and the SLD. Our research indicates that Polish parties struggle somewhat in the area of internal communication. They meet their members’ expectations regarding forms, but still face their criticism with respect to quality. While they employ tools typical for symmetric strategies, communication has no such character, as it is usually one-directional. Its purpose is passing information from the top-down rather than allowing a genuine dialogue. The sole fact of using appropriate tools does not guarantee that communication will occur according to a symmetric model. The last element of our analysis concerned the links between members’ satisfaction with communication and their assessments of selected aspects of their parties’ functioning. Our data indicates the two elements are indeed related. The 64.9% of respondents who were happy with internal communication also claimed their organisations were well managed. Similarly, only 13.2% of those dissatisfied with communication were happy with management quality10 (see more Wincławska et al. 2020). Similar connections can be observed with regard to members’ sense of having an influence on aspects such as the choice of the leader, the party’s image in local communities or the shape of its programme. Details are presented in Fig. 6.4. Members who were happy with how their organisations communicated with them were far more likely to feel involved in all the considered aspects, with 33.9%11 of respondents in that group believing that they could participate in the shaping of the programme, 56.9%12 convinced that their voice mattered when it came to choosing the leader and 72.8%13 believing that they could help build the party’s social image. While such sense of agency and influence is subjective, it develops as a 10 Kruskall-Wallis H-test value: 492,722 (p < 0,01). Kendall’s tau-b correlation coefficient: 0,386 (p < 0,01). 11 Kruskall-Wallis H test value is 443,262 (p < 0,01); Kendall’s tau-b correlation coefficient: 0,367 (p < 0,01). 12 Kruskall-Wallis H test value is 321,203 (p < 0,01); Kendall’s tau-b correlation coefficient: 0,309 (p < 0,01). 13 Kruskall-Wallis H test value is 203,938 (p < 0,01); Kendall’s tau-b correlation coefficient: 0,250 (p < 0,01).

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100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Perceived influence on Perceived influence on Perceived influence on the party’s programme* the choice of leader** the party’s image*** members satisfied with communication

Belief that the party is well managed****

members dissatisfied with communication

Fig. 6.4 Members’ satisfaction with communication in relation to their sense of influence on the functioning of their parties (results in %) (Source Authors’ research *N = 2,451. **N = 2,453. ***N = 2,461. ****N = 2,587)

function of one’s satisfaction with communication and through specific procedures that govern participation in partisan life. Respondents satisfied with communication had higher opinions of intra-partisan relations: in 81.4% of cases they claimed that they remained in regular touch with the organisation. Meanwhile, in the dissatisfied group, 60.3% of members believed the party did not reach out to them enough. Satisfaction with communication translates into a more positive perception of one’s involvement in the party’s functioning. For instance, 62.1% of respondents who believed they were very involved were also happy with internal communication. Conversely, the highest proportion (43.5%) of respondents claiming that party contacted them only when they were needed was recorded among those who admitted they were not active. Results of our survey confirm the existence of mechanism we discussed earlier: internal communication affects numerous other internal processes within political parties. As we have already stressed, party members constitute a fairly exclusive group, enjoying access to substantial resources. This means their expectations with regard to communication, particularly access to unique information tailored to their needs, go beyond the one-directional pattern of passing messages. At the same time, parties have so far failed to implement

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sufficient measures that allow for dialogue and the exchange of thoughts. This is also visible in the results of research described in Chapter 5, where we examined the nature of intra-partisan cooperation. The Together Party and the PSL were the only two parties found to implement elements of consultative participation. It seems to be no coincidence that the same two parties recorded the highest levels of satisfaction with communication among their members. Moreover, we observed statistically significant correlations between respondents’ satisfaction with communication and their assessments of management practices as well as their own influence. It seems, therefore, that parties have plenty of room for improvement, provided they are willing to enhance internal dialogue and improve the quality of communication.

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CHAPTER 7

Political Parties and Their Relations with the Media

The communication environment of party organisations is strongly mediated. This fact is reflected in many activities undertaken by the parties and elected officials in their relations with the media. The media retain their dominant role in contemporary political communication, and in ‘highly mediatized democracies, managing the news is not optional’ (Strömbäck and Esser 2017: 77). While numerous teams have conducted research among journalists on the subject of their cooperation with politicians, analogous efforts that include the perspective of parties and their representatives are very rare. As Kate Kenski, Kathleen Hall Jamieson and Yariv Tsfati suggest, such a gap in our knowledge may breed certain ignorance but has persisted because researchers face ‘the difficulty of obtaining the cooperation of elected legislators’ (2017: 10). The virtual absence of research addressed at Polish politicians can be similarly explained. The underdeveloped culture of cooperation between political actors and academia means scholars have limited access to parties and their members. The way Polish parties cooperate with the media is the outcome of several factors: their experiences from the period when democratic transition allowed the emergence of a new media order, the execution of political plans and their management of day-to-day communications through political public relations tools. It can also be affected by their long-term communication strategies. However, relations with the media © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 M. Jacunski ´ et al., Party Organization and Communication in Poland, Political Campaigning and Communication, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59993-5_7

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are not addressed as a specific area in partisan agendas; they are not discussed in policy documents or political manifestos. Before we move on to the examination of political actors’ perceptions of their links with the media, let us clarify our understanding of media relations. In the practice of PR, media relations may be narrowly defined as the shaping of acceptable, typically amicable, or close relations with journalists and media outlets, with the purpose of drawing either mutual or one-sided benefits from such relations. However, we adopted a broader perspective, beyond the PR aspect. In our view, media relations are a set of symbiotic connections based on several possible variations of cooperation and interdependencies among parties, politicians and the media. Such relations can be symmetrical or asymmetrical, while the system as a whole is determined by systemic, historical, cultural and organisational factors.

7.1 Relations with the Established Media in the Eyes of Political Representatives First, let us take a look at some theoretical constructs that provide a framework for the analysis of relations with the established media. Otfried Jarren (1988), Ulrich Sarcinelli (1991) and Patrick Donges (2016) utilise three paradigms that have shaped the academic discourse on the links between politicians and the media: (1) autonomy, (2) instrumentalisation and (3) interdependence/symbiosis. In the first model, the media remain autonomous, since they operate primarily as the fourth estate whose task is to control the other three branches: the legislative, the executive and the judiciary. Media act on a sense of mission—a moral imperative—complemented by an external component in the shape of professional code of conduct, norms and regulations that apply to the media system. They are free from both institutional supervision and informal pressures. In the instrumentalisation scenario, one subsystem seeks domination by trying to influence and control the other. If the media are the stronger actor, it leads to a so-called mediacracy. If the opposite is true, media outlets are effectively submitted to political control. In the former scenario, broadcasters and publishers become an independent force, capable of or genuinely affecting the political process. In the latter case, political logic dominates, as the media are used instrumentally by parties or individual politicians in pursuit of their goals. Their function in political communication is confined to transmitting persuasive messages prepared entirely externally. The last of the paradigms—i.e. symbiosis—points to a complex

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set of relations between the world of politics and the media. Political actors depend on the media for distribution of their messages, while the media need politicians to provide information as fuel for content. These links are stabilised by commonly accepted norms and rules of cooperation, as well as professional roles. Symbiosis can also result from joint initiatives in the field of political communication, such as parties’ participation in certain media formats acceptable to both sides (e.g. debates, press conferences, interviews, etc.). Another theoretical model, proposed by Bogusława Dobek-Ostrowska (2006: 166–168), differentiates between five types of symmetrical or asymmetrical politics–media relations based on the strength or weakness of both sides. Symmetry occurs in three of the five variations: (1) when both the media and political actors are weak and need to depend on each other; (2) when both the media and political actors are strong and may choose to either cooperate or compete; (3) when neither side can be considered as clearly strong or weak. An equilibrium between their positions may result either from the practice of deliberative democracy, characterised by low levels of media politicisation and high civic participation, or from an alliance between the political circles and the media, a reality in which the two sides form a highly symbiotic bond. Asymmetrical relations occur in two versions: (4) between strong political actors and weak media, whereby the latter are dominated and subjected to significant control or (5) between weak political actors and strong media, in which case journalists and media management are able to influence politics, while politicians need to compete for media attention and endorsements. If one considers whether the above-mentioned classification can be applied to examine Poland’s case, it turns out there are certain paradoxes in how politicians view the issues of media autonomy and instrumentalisation as well as their own positions in that environment. Some of them maintain that governing parties are able to impose political or partisan logic on public media. If such an assertion was confirmed, it would place political actors in the position of strength and dominance. At the same time, other politicians see themselves as being marginalised by the media or forced to adjust to their expectations and requirements. It seems that perceptions of the media’s position vary significantly among Polish parties. On the one hand, there are those politicians who believe in the primacy of media logic. On the other hand, there are tendencies to control the media in order to ensure political logic dominates. This is why we decided to take account of various types of asymmetrical relations

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Public service broadcasting ruling party logic

entrenched journalism

ruling party/coalition bias

Private/commercial/ mass media media logic or political logic

horse-race coverage/personalization/escapism or entrenched journalism

structural bias or political bias (pro vs. contra political actors)

Social media network logic/ personal + party logic

opening public sphere/ political promotion/selfmediation

distribution of political ideas/political bias

Fig. 7.1 Dominant logic in various types of media in Poland (Source Elaborated from Dobek–Ostrowska [2019: 204, 214])

in our analysis. Dobek-Ostrowska suggests examining politics–media relations separately with regard to three types of media (see Fig. 7.1), since the conclusions will depend largely on how a given type is positioned vis-à-vis politicians. When it comes to the public media, relations are driven by the political instrumentalisation that the ruling party, PiS, has embarked upon. Public outlets represent entrenched journalism—an approach whereby the outlets clearly take sides and play a militant role (López-Escobar et al. 2008: 185). They convey biased opinions favourable to the government and critical of the opposition. Private media, in turn, function in a way closer to traditional journalism. In such media, political logic may at times prevail through selective (but surely not systemic) support from entrenched pundits. However, media logic may also dominate in several scenarios, such as when the media build their relations with the world of politics through horse-race coverage, personalisation and confrontation of leaders or escapism leading to de-politicisation of content. Given the plethora of private outlets in Poland, as well as their polarisation and bias, one can discern several variations of both media and political logics. Furthermore, an entirely separate type of logic, based on networks, personal and party logic, is taking shape for social media. For instance, network logic may depend on the algorithms that determine the distribution of content or on financial aspects related to promoting specific

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political content. Social media is also witness to personal and party logic related to strategies of self-mediation and self-promotion. If one tries to juxtapose the above-mentioned assertions with opinions voiced by party representatives, no clear-cut pattern for party–media relations is apparent. There seem to be two groups of views that fit into the asymmetrical types: the dominance of political actors and state power (4) and the primacy of media (5). Members of the ruling formation point out that using political leverage to control the public media is their tool for ‘restoring balance’—i.e. addressing the fact that mainstream liberal private media has been far more favourable towards the opposition. For many years, Law and Justice (PiS) and its leader, Jarosław Kaczynski, ´ have expressed their frustration at how the liberal media supposedly distorted the party’s image, as one electoral defeat followed another. PiS leaders even referred to their experiences back in the 1990s, when as members of PiS’s predecessor, the Centre Agreement, they saw the emergence of the media system which they thought was a part of a ‘power-sharing agreement’ among the creators of the new post-communist socio-political order: business oligarchs, corrupt politicians, criminals and former security service officers. According to PiS’s leadership, Polish public and private media carry ‘the original sin’ of their founders—hence their provenance and ownership structure is part of the problem. Throughout the 1990s and in the early 2000s, many press publishers in Poland were privatized and purchased by German, French, Norwegian and Swiss media conglomerates. Now, PiS justifies its actions with the desire to restore the ideological and ownership balance. ‘As a representative of PiS, I might not be unbiased about what is going on in the media, but I think what TVN, Onet and Wyborcza [private media, opposition-friendly, governmentcritical] are up to is unparalleled. There should be more balance. Public media should objectively report on the whole of the political scene. There is a bias towards the ruling party now, for obvious reasons: we have to defend our interests. If we had not captured the public media, we would have probably fallen already’ (PiS_8). An experienced opposition politician sees the situation differently. In his mind, the ruling party decided to endure criticism over its assault on the independence of public media in order to build an advantage in the media sphere—a reward he believes is worth the punishment. ‘At first, PiS took offence [at media criticism] but it soon realized it was pointless and started to create their own media. This time around, they have just taken full control of public media. And they are saying, “Up for a fight?

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Let us have it”’ (SLD_1). It should be noted that this sort of approach to colonising media and using them instrumentally is in line with practices used in other CEE countries. However, PiS members maintain that the party’s efforts are not aimed at controlling the media. They are convinced that pundits and journalists have enjoyed far too much influence over numerous areas of public life and that it is in politicians’ best interest to reclaim the ability to dictate the agenda and narrative. ‘It just matters, and it seems that the whole contest is about stopping media from doing that. […] What I hope for is that we [i.e. the politicians] are able to drive the narrative – even if it means the opposition gets to choose the topics. Getting airtime and attention is their problem. Do they have anything to say except criticising PiS? That is for them to figure out. But, objectively, I will happily trade sensationalised news for a discussion of whether the [Civic] Platform actually has any programme’ (PiS_4). The opposition politicians see two coexisting media orders: that of the public media and that of private media. With regard to the former, they confirm that media are treated instrumentally as political actors reign supreme over broadcasters, with a caveat that it is only the parliamentary majority that enjoys such benefits, while opposition parties are pushed out of the discourse presented on air. ‘Theoretically, we have national [hence public] media, but according to me and many Poles, the national media have become the media of just one political party’ (PSL_1). The fact that public media is practically appropriated by one particular formation has another consequence: it moderates increasingly withdraw from public debate, as they do not want to become associated with either side of the conflict. ‘For years, I was very active in the media. Now I am curbing this activity. It is absolutely a conscious effort. Firstly, I do not want to get entangled in the current political war in Poland. And secondly, public television is a PiS propaganda division, and I feel no need to work for a PiS propaganda division’ (SLD_4). As for the second asymmetrical order, politicians acknowledge that all parties find themselves (in various ways) in an inferior position, as the media are able to dictate the agenda, decide which events will be discussed and create or destroy certain public entities. ‘The big change definitely came about when these 24-hour news channels appeared (…). It all means that news is needed here and now in big quantities’ (PSL_5). A member of a party who is very well versed in navigating media admitted that broadcasters can themselves act as biased creators of political reality. ‘Objectivism in the media. […] It is just not there because, frankly, the

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media can promote and destroy anybody. I once considered whether the media, should they decide to do so, could create something like a virtual party and whether it would work. They would promote three, four individuals, previously totally unknown to the public. If it was well organized, they could effectively create an all-new party that would garner strong support’ (N_8). While politicians notice some interdependence between themselves and the media, they do not consider this relationship to be symbiotic. Instead, they see the media, regardless of their type and ownership structure, as being in a privileged position by virtue of priming, framing and their ability to determine the agenda. Such a situation means pundits can force parties into specific, often confrontational, roles within the competitive political environment. ‘In reality, it [the media’s role] is dominant. If you look at it honestly, we generate plenty of events which, if not leveraged by the media, effectively do not exist’ (N_7). Another opposition politician noticed that the media adopted a more engaged role. ‘They chase sensation and contribute to the tabloidization of our work, but that is the world we live in, and it cannot be changed; we need to find some middle ground. The worst thing is that they have become a participant instead of an observer. I have the impression that I am talking not to a journalist but to a political opponent, a genuine political opponent following a political agenda’ (PO_14). A different interviewee, a PiS member, noticed something more. He believes the media abandoned their traditional role as information providers and have instead become generators of events. ‘Without a shadow of a doubt, the media are the fourth estate; it often happens that the media cross that fine line and start creating political reality instead of reflecting it, and that is a very unfortunate state of affairs’ (PiS_1). The quoted PiS representative was not the only one to blame the media for stoking political confrontation. ‘Even when we have something interesting to say, it is oversimplified. The media distort and polarise the message, which they then convey. Actually, I would not say it is because that is what the audience wants to watch; it is because that is what will make the media want to air it. That is something all parties have to deal with. They all participate in something akin to a theatre’ (N_9). It should be noted that not all our interviewees placed the blame for feeding the political conflict exclusively on the public media. According to an experienced PSL politician, the tendency to dictate such a confrontational style is simply a common feature among contemporary pundits: ‘PSL does not fit into this trend which is prevalent in journalism nowadays – the trend

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towards confrontation. We have never aspired to this style of confrontation. We aspire to be a political centre, and this sometimes means we are less present in the media’ (PSL_11). It may be said that opposition politicians perceive the issue more selectively—i.e. they do not see themselves as guilty of imposing political logic on the media; they maintain that this is an exclusive domain of the ruling party. This is why their interviews contained statements to the effect that strong political actors, able to control public media, are present only among the parliamentary majority. Their view of journalists’ political involvement seems equally biased, as they maintain that only progovernment loyal facilitators exhibit such tendencies—an opinion which ignores the findings of empirical research (see, for example, St˛epinska ´ et al. 2017; Olechowska 2017) revealing declarative political preferences among other media people. ‘Nowadays, the public media are completely politicised. They submit to just one side. What is worse, they manipulate, and their main aim is actually praising the government and turning people against the opposition, while private media attempt to retain some kind of balance despite their preferences’ (PO_11). A politician linked to the governing party pointed to indications of bias also among private media outlets. ‘Private media, I mean newspapers and news portals, may deliberately ignore a certain party or MP because of their own political leanings’ (PiS_7). According to politicians, the fact that the media try to cast them in certain roles reflects broadcasters’ strength and advantage, as well as their tendency to operate beyond their traditional function as information providers. The media need celebrities and see politicians as suitable candidates. ‘But we are forced to do it [to be celebrities] by the media. This is how we build the image of the party. The media make us do it’ (PSL_11). A representative of an opposition party spoke about asymmetric relations between political actors and the media. ‘Polish politics and political parties are in a way incapacitated by the media. This happens through the imposition of the form and level of political debate. Media formulas are more important than the messages that politicians want to convey. Politicians are subordinated to these formulas virtually every time they try to get a message across. It is not only on TV stations dealing with politics but also in the mainstream media that you can see how everything is staged to suit the TV stations’ (N_1). Tabloid outlets are seen as particularly strong contributors to the media’s advantage, since they are able to shape the image of the entire political elite to fit oversimplified

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cognitive patterns. ‘Here, the media will jump at a chance to disparage a politician from any formation. Take tabloids, for example, aggressive and unchecked (…), aggressive in how they build only a negative image of politicians’ (PO_11). Some interviewees attributed political actors’ weak position to a crisis of leadership. ‘I think we have a crisis of leadership which, to a large extent, resulted from the development of media. These days, you can create a public person through social media, electronic media, even printed magazines. (…) These are sufficient means. Look, Poles have elected Andrzej Duda for president, and they did not even know who they were voting for! No clue!’ (PO_8). As it turns out, political actors’ position vis-à-vis the media is relative and may be judged differently by representatives of different parties. The above quotations come from members of parliamentary formations. Meanwhile, the views expressed by small and non-parliamentary parties paint a different picture: their ability to attract the attention of public and private media is fairly limited. ‘You are a small parliamentary formation. You can go and hold a conference on a particular topic. Then PO or PiS hold theirs on the same topic, and nobody will listen to you. They will listen to them’ (PSL_11). Small formations’ dependence on media attention is the consequence of a pattern whereby non-parliamentary actors are often snubbed by the media. Representatives of the SLD and the Together Party—two formations which did not hold any seats in parliament at the time our research was conducted—needed to put significantly more effort into reaching the media. As a result, they felt weak in relation to the news media. ‘This is SLD’s biggest problem, and you can now talk of the fourth estate. (…) It has become a common practice for the media to only be interested in those who are currently in the parliament. Not because they are doing something super-interesting, but because they are easily available’ (SLD_2). Unwittingly rather than by design, the media largely gloss over opinions voiced by those entities which are not present in the parliament. ‘Obviously, the question of being in the [parliament] building in Wiejska Street1 is the key. The media are there. The cameras are there. Those [politicians] who are there need only to step outside their office. We have to be invited. The media have to make the effort of inviting us’ (R_1). Furthermore, small and non-parliamentary parties feel ignored in televised feature shows aired by the largest nationwide

1 Wiejska Street (Warsaw, PL) is the address of the Polish Parliament building.

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outlets, in which only the representatives of major political forces are welcome. ‘(…) In September 2015, our media presence, apart from the paid electoral commercials, (…) lasted exactly 8 seconds. Over the whole month! Compare this with several hours for the Civic Platform (PO). It illustrates well how new organisations are treated, even though by law they have exactly the same rights as big parties’ committees’. (…) ‘[After the 2015 election,] the media situation changed a little. We are absent from public media, we are absent from national media, and there is little we can do about it. But we are present in local media’ (R_1). As mentioned in Chapter 3, Polish law provides equal access to public media for all parties. However, according to SLD member, if one looks at actual airtime statistics, his party is marginalised. ‘We should have access to public media, the nationwide ones, because we have the [state] funding. Starting at a certain level, if you have the funding, you have the access, and it should be proportionate (…). Somebody calculated that when SLD was in the parliament, over one month, our representatives were present in the media, nationwide broadcasters, some two hundred times. And now, it is just fifty. With the dynamic information processing, that is not much’ (SLD_1). Therefore, what can be observed in the Polish political scene is an asymmetry not so much between the media and politicians, but between the new or small parties, which feel underrepresented, and the large, established actors. We shall refer once again to opinions voiced by representatives of the SLD and the Together Party: ‘There are shows and programmes where only the parliamentary parties get invited. It is written into the formula of these programmes. It is an evident example of how media presence is limited when the party does not make it to the parliament, and nothing can be done about this problem’ (SLD_5). The Together Party member was critical of keeping pluralism in the media: ‘The role of the media includes informing the citizens about alternative political offers, and this is not always happening at the moment’ (R_5). Our analysis has revealed that whenever possible, the largest, most relevant parties in Poland attempt to establish political patronage over public media. When it comes to private outlets, politicians may either adjust to account for their somewhat inferior position or try rebalancing the relations by imposing their will, albeit in a manner more subtle than they do with public media. If such efforts fail, they resort to political PR and political spin doctoring and build up their in-house communication staff to address the area of media presence.

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As the Polish media landscape looks different with regard to public and private media, the former’s role is particularly important. They should enjoy legal protection and autonomy to reflect a genuine pluralism of opinions. Such internal pluralism in terms of content is just as important as the pluralism of media outlets as entities. If some political circles are deprived of opportunities to present themselves to the public, be it for political or economic reasons, this internal pluralism is limited. The danger is particularly visible to minor formations such as the SLD or the Together Party, which see themselves on the fringes of public discourse and media attention as they endure stints without parliamentary representation. One other aspect should be touched on in conclusion to our consideration of media–politics relations. The links between politicians and traditional media are rooted in a specific political communication culture. Barbara Pfetsch (2004: 353, 361) distinguished between four types of culture, based on two basic criteria: the primacy of either political or media logic and the distance between political communicators and journalists. The types she identified are as follows: (1) media-oriented, (2) PR-oriented, (3) strategic and (4) partisan-political.2 According to Dorota Piontek (2011: 160–161), as recently as the 2000s, no single type seemed to dominate in Poland. In terms of structural factors, Piontek saw the prevalence of the PR or partisan-political orientation. She justified this view with several arguments. The first related to the duopoly of public and private media. The former are legally obliged to inform and shape political discourse. The latter, while not under such obligation, do so out of a sense of duty and in the name of the public interest. In both cases, this attracts the attention of political parties. There are successful attempts at the politicisation of public media when the ruling parties, or entities

2 According to Pfetsch, the respective cultures may be characterised as follows: (1) structurally determined by autonomous media, weak parties and the primacy of media logic, where the power of the media is a primary goal; large distance between communicators and journalists; (2) based on the dual media’s political involvement, the presence of weak parties, the dominance of symbolic politics and substitute topics; the primacy of media logic; small distance between political actors and journalists; (3) dual, politically involved media, strong parties, the prevalence of substitute partisan and political topics, low distance between communicators and journalists; (4) centred around commercial media, strong parties, with the preservation of power as a key goal; political logic dominates, and political power is the primary purpose; large distance between political actors and the media.

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forming a cartel of parties, take control over broadcasters to preserve their position in power or ensure survival. As Katarzyna Pokorna-Ignatowicz (2010: 42–43) noted, this is also possible because ‘the quality of Polish institutions is determined by low political culture of the ruling groups, who perceive public media as their election spoils. (…) With such an attitude, the ruling party is able to gain absolute control over public media’. When it comes to private media, politicians try to build a closer rapport with journalists and develop relations based on creating symbolic politics, peddling distraction topics and pseudo-events. Although private outlets seem to remain beyond the direct influence of any Polish party, there are potential pressures in the form of fiscal or legal supervisory control mechanisms proposed by the government. As a final remark, it can be said that while some of Pfetsch’s assumptions lost their relevance as the media landscape continues to evolve, one can still discern interdependence between different types of logic in political communication. This is why parties need to maintain presence in a variety of media types and manoeuvre amid several cooperation patterns. This was succinctly expressed by one of our interviewees: ‘I think what you need today is multichannel communication [with the voters]. You have to meet people in person, be present in the social and traditional media alike’ (PO_3).

7.2

Relations with Social Media

Digitisation and technological development affect both politics and media. In modern competitive democracies, digital technology has become an increasingly important element of political activity, particularly during campaign periods. Scholars agree that ‘parties have adapted more quickly to new media technologies, than to any previous technological advance’ (Ward 2008: 1–2), and so ‘most parties and candidates have hastened to establish a presence on any genre of digital communication that has been made available to them’ (Vaccari 2013: 48). According to Internet World Stats data for 2018, Poland had 29.7 million Internet users, which amounted to 78.2% of the population. Over the last decade, penetration has increased by approximately 20%, but Poland remains somewhat behind countries leading in this respect, for which penetration stands at over 90%. The most popular social media platform is Facebook, with 18.6 million users (i.e. 49.1% penetration). The emergence of social media has changed politics and the way parties relate

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to the electorate. Social media are characterised by interactivity, openness, directness and responsiveness. Hence, they should be conducive to the existence of parties that are ‘more open to ordinary people, more immediate and direct, more authentic and transparent’ (Gerbaudo 2018: 4). This assertion seems obvious and is endorsed by politicians themselves, as they see numerous advantages to these communication tools. ‘We have plenty of members, followers. We attract a greater following, we build relations. We are able to make our case, talk to people through modern technologies. Social media allow this. We want to reach the youth. Today, there can be no electoral success without social media’ (PO_15). The use of social media offers several benefits, particularly with regard to building rapport with voters. ‘With the emergence of social media into the mainstream, our contact with the voters became closer and more frequent, because when social media were still in their infancy, this direct contact was confined to single initiatives: us approaching the voters, organising meetings. Now, through social media, such contacts occur absolutely on a daily basis’ (PO_11). Additionally, social media serve as a platform for integrating party members and internal debate. ‘The partisan reality has changed a lot because of social media. Today, for this [internal] communication, for activity, Facebook, Twitter and other social media are a great area to explore, and I think the intra-partisan democracy is enormous. Within the entire Civic Platform, there are plenty of discussion groups on Facebook where anybody can chip in’ (PO_1). Regardless of all the above declarations, building relations through social media is not always beneficial and easy. On the contrary, politicians are aware that social media provide ample space for disillusioned, disgruntled individuals to express their criticism. ‘Social media provides more opportunities for the dissatisfied than the satisfied. This means that those who are unhappy will always be more active than the contented ones’ (N_2). Party leaders in particular need to show resilience in the face of criticism. ‘Being a party leader is the single most difficult and responsible role one can have in social media, or in shaping the party’s image in general. The leader is the first line of defence. Leaders need to show some thick skin, so if they want to be open and participate in social media debates, they must be ready for tough challenges’ (PO_15). According to W. Lance Bennett et al. (2018: 1659), socially mediated political communication ‘between candidates and supporters may be perceived as more genuine (and replace bureaucratic functions) when coming directly from politicians with thin formal party organizations’.

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This finding may explain why politicians without the backing of massive partisan organisations find popularity on social media. The academic literature has seen the coining of several terms for political movements and parties which have based their appeal on social media activity. They are sometimes referred to as ‘digital parties’ (Gerbaudo 2018) or ‘connective parties’ (Bennett et al. 2018), and their roots can be traced back to Spanish digital-enabled movements such as Indignados (15-M), which emerged in 2011, or Podemos and Ciudadanos, which started in 2014. Provided an unfulfilled need exists within the electorate and social media platforms are easily accessible, new parties may utilise various online connectivity strategies in the pursuit of their goals. However, according to Bennett et al. (2018: 1670), ‘their capacity to balance inclusive and meaningful participation and shared authority with coherent and robust organization is open to question’. The only new movement in Poland that fits the etymological criteria of a digital-enabled movement is Kukiz ’15. We chose not to include it in our examination for several reasons. First of all, it is not a formal political party. Secondly, its existence as a viable political actor has proven to be short-lived. The absence of new types of parties in our publication also stems from the fact that we based our analysis on data collected between 2016 and 2018. At that time, the core of the electoral process rested on established parties, rarely bringing unexpected breakthroughs for newly established digital-like or connective-like movements or parties, such as Kukiz ’15 and the KORWIN party. Both of these were rightwing populist entities with relatively weak offline structures and significant online communities. Our research encompasses six political parties, none of which are prime examples of Internet-born initiatives. Only the Together Party may be considered as having a partial organic connection with dispersed online structures. According to one of its members, the Together Party was a pioneer in this respect, its precedent followed by other parties. ‘Every day, a few times a day, we communicate with the world via Facebook, Twitter, Instagram. I dare say, however it may sound, that when it comes to Polish politics, we started it. Now, all parties that communicate through Facebook communicate in this way’ (R_1). However, another Together Party representative pointed to a digital divide in Polish society which makes it harder to maintain contact with all members through social media. ‘[Some of] the members come from different towns and remote villages, and it is more difficult for them. (…) and they are often digitally excluded,

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older people, who cannot take advantage of communication platforms to get in touch with others across Poland’ (R_4). One entity whose activity is based on its leaders’ social media presence is the right wing, nationalist Confederation, which debuted as a new entrant in the Polish parliament in 2019. It is largely absent from our analysis, as it was not represented in the parliamentary arena until 2018. However, it provides a very interesting example for researchers wanting to examine how activity outside the mainstream media affects chances to gain support. In terms of its strategy for social media presence and rhetoric, Confederation resembles the UK Independence Party (UKIP). The varying approaches to building relations with the media are also driven by the character of electorate groups. For parties whose voters are not heavy users of social media, focusing on traditional media is a natural choice. ‘Traditional media are still influential. Our voters require that because that is our target group. Here, each party acts differently. We do not have an electorate in big cities. They are in medium or even small rural boroughs. They do not always have a digital platform’ (PSL_9). One SLD member offered an explanation for why traditionally developed parties do not prioritise being connective: people above a certain age need to meet and talk. ‘There must be a group of people who do not use the Internet that often in SLD, too, but there are also people in all parties who do not use it at all. They like to meet, and it is telling that when you actually organise a meeting, those in attendance are from a generation which has not mastered modern communication or the Internet or media in general, and they have a need for a traditional meeting’ (SLD_6). According to an interviewee representing PO, engagement with digital technologies is not dependent on age but on somebody’s preference (or lack thereof) for face-to-face meetings or online communication. ‘Members are open [to new digital technologies] but they need to be categorized into those who prefer to simply meet face-to-face and talk in a meeting and those – although I did not expect it – often older people who have Facebook, who are not digitally excluded, who write emails which you need to answer’ (PO_6). Among politicians themselves, there are also light users of social media who remain sceptical and claim that Twitter or Facebook are not the right media for pursuing politics. ‘Twitter kills politics and politicians. That is my opinion. But I am quite particular about these matters. I do not feel the need to constantly follow what is happening in politics. I do not go on the Internet all the time’ (PiS_5).

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Based on our interviews and observations, it might be asserted that four out of the six examined parties show no distinct inclination towards using social media exclusively. Only the younger formations, the Modern and the Together Party, stand out from the rest as geared towards a more extensive employment of digital communication and enabling the public to follow their activities mainly through social media platforms. There may be several reasons for this (Jacunski ´ 2018: 20). The first is the presence of many younger members who happen to fall into the digital native, rather than digital immigrant, category. The second is that the leaders’ attitude and awareness seem to be of key importance, as they adjust their parties’ technological advancement to members’ expectations and capabilities. The third is the context for how they organise their activities and the conditions under which they were established: both the Modern and the Together Party were formed in 2015. By contrast, PO and PiS launched in 2001, while SLD and PSL date back as far as the early transformation years of the 1990s. Academic discourse has seen an ongoing discussion about political actors’ online presence in relation to the normalisation and equalisation hypotheses (Bimber and Davies 2003; Margolis and Resnick 2000). Our research confirms that small and relatively young Polish parties had an opportunity to use strong social media presence to redress their inferior positions and achieve better balance vis-à-vis their larger, older competitors. The analysis of electoral performances shows that in order to retain support and exploit the potential offered by social media, a party must meet several key conditions: it must enjoy political credibility; its leader(s) must be approved of by the public and it should engage with the online community in a meaningful way, develop its grassroots structures and tailor its agenda to voters’ expectations. All these requirements should be reflected in the adaptation of content presented to the followers. If a party retains a large but inactive community, it may be said to have lost its link with the voters; its followers are mere statistics. We shall take a look at several such cases. Table 7.1 presents data about parties’ Facebook followers and the number of interactions generated by each formation. It may be used to assess whether a given party is capable of engaging with and mobilising its followers. The data was collected through three measurements: (1) in March 2019, at the outset of a European Parliament election campaign; (2) in October 2019, at the time of the domestic parliamentary election and (3) in March 2020, early in the presidential campaign.

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Table 7.1 Facebook followers of selected Polish political parties and monthly user activity measured through the number of interactions (numbers round off to full thousands) Party/measurement date Mainstream parties PSL SLD (Lewica) Modern Together Party PO PiS Protest movements and radical parties The New Right Congress Freedom party (KORWIN) Confederation Kukiz ‘15

March 2019

October 2019

March 2020

32 (7) 64 (39) 98 (8) 113 (21) 174 (99) 208 (102)

39 (29) 83 (132) 97 (6) 125 (124) 195 (385) 238 (290)

41 (15) 95 (59) 96 (18) 132 (91) 215 (333) 259 (133)

188 (1) 209 (230) n/a 295 (55)

184 226 143 283

181 230 239 277

(39) (308) (210* ) (38)

(no data) (249) (1018) (9)

Source Authors’ elaboration. Data derived directly from Facebook, the application Sotrender and the website politykawsieci.pl * Data from the period of 14–20 October 2019

The data in the table suggests that the oldest, post-communist parties with a nominally large membership base (over 100,000 and approximately 23,000 members for PSL and SLD, respectively) have the fewest social media followers. Particularly, the agrarian PSL refrains from exploiting the potential of social media, though it is clearly capable of mobilising its community. SLD has slowly but systematically improved in this area and, during the 2019 parliamentary election, was able to generate most interactions. This might have been one of the factors which allowed it to return to the parliamentary arena. Having emphasised online presence and positioned itself as a Polish version of the Spanish Podemos, the Together Party has demonstrated how to effectively engage with an online community. It consistently strives to broaden its follower base and enter into meaningful interactions with them. In the spring of 2019, when vying for mandates in the European Parliament, it opted to join a coalition of left-wing formations. The move might actually dilute its otherwise distinct, recognisable identity, which the party had been keen to stress ever since its formation. That, in turn, could be what led to a decrease in interactions.

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The composition of the PiS–PO duopoly changed slightly in the runup to the European Parliament election in 2019, as several opposition parties launched a joint effort under the banner of the European Coalition. The Coalition managed to garner a very respectable 40% of votes but came second to PiS, which received 45%. The outcome caused disappointment among the temporarily united formations and a subsequent end to the Coalition itself. PO returned to the somewhat narrower context of the Civic Coalition to continue its cooperation within the parliamentary opposition. Subsequent months brought attempts at refreshing the party’s image and identity around the anti-government coalition. Perhaps this is what sparked more interactions in the domestic parliamentary campaign. Three entities experienced a marked drop in the activity of their Facebook followers, even as they remained politically active. Two of them, the Modern and the Kukiz ’15, seemed to be promising prospects when they won their first parliamentary mandates in 2015, also thanks to building up their electorate through social media. However, four years on, their fortunes seemed far more in doubt, as did their ability to engage with voters, if one judges it through the numbers of interactions. The third entrant in this category, The New Right Congress, is a different case. The growth of its sizeable community has stalled, with no interactions to speak of, after the formation went through a split and a secession of some of its leaders. One of them went on to form the Freedom Party (KORWIN), taking some supporters with him. Later, the Freedom Party became a part of a grouping of political formations known as the Confederacy. In 2019, the Confederacy gained parliamentary representation and has since recorded unprecedented (by Polish standards) numbers of interactions—as much as 1 million per month, well beyond the reach of any other Polish formation. When operating on social media, parties encounter several logics different from those familiar from traditional media. However, their impact is, as yet, difficult to assess since ‘the specific rules by which online media provide orientation and generate attention are less well known than the traditional news values of old media’. This means ‘a discussion of the characteristics of the “online media logic”’ is yet to come (Donges and Jarren 2014: 186).

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Media and Trust in Political Parties

Questions regarding the media’s impact on trust in politics and the image of political parties are relevant and worth asking due to two important factors. The first is the role played by the media as active participants in the process of political communication. The second is the connection between the evolution of the media and political systems, including the importance of the media for the quality of democracy (Tworzecki and Semetko 2012). Their impact in this area is analysed from two major perspectives. The concept of ‘media malaise’ describes how journalists contribute to citizens’ disillusionment with politics and the decrease in political involvement. Meanwhile, the idea of the ‘virtuous circle’ assumes that the media may also have some positive influence in this respect (Holtz-Bacha 1990; Norris 2000; Curran et al. 2014; Avery 2009). Going beyond these two approaches, we looked at the subject from yet another angle. We considered the media’s role in building trust in political parties and politics in general by taking into account people’s trust in the media themselves. This is an increasingly popular perspective among scholars, as it combines research on trust in politics with the examination of trust in specific sources of information (Enli and Rosenberg 2018; Tsfati and Ariely 2014). It acknowledges that the media provide a crucial cognitive lens for people seeking news on politics (Sztompka 2007). Additionally, we were able to identify how political actors see the media’s contribution to the shaping of public trust in them. Our considerations were prompted by the conclusions from an increasing number of research projects that show a correlation between citizens’ trust in news sources and in political institutions. As Andrea Ceron and Vincenzo Memoli demonstrated, ‘the negative relationship between trust and the consumption of content from media outlets skewed away from the cabinet is greater among citizens whose ideological position is already far from that of the government. Conversely, the positive association between watching public television and trust is strengthened among citizens who are already ideologically close to the cabinet’ (Ceron and Memoli 2015: 351). Gunn Enli and Linda Rosenberg’s (2018) analysis showed that people tend to have more trust in politicians who appear in media formats that the given person also trusts. Such conclusions demonstrate the existence of echo chamber effects (Tworzecki and Semetko 2012: 22): a situation whereby receivers choose the types of media and content which reinforce their attitudes and opinions. Some

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scholars have pointed to a link between lower trust in political parties, or politics as a whole, and the use of the Internet as an information source (Ceron 2015). The cases of connections between trust in media and trust in politicians that we refer to in this book exemplify receptive models of communication, in which the receiver has agency in the process of communication. As Ceron and Memoli argue, citizens ‘are not passive consumers of political news, media usage interacts with the individual ideological stance of each consumer’ (Ceron and Memoli 2015: 340). Hence, receivers interpret the encountered content according to their own preferences. It follows that trust in politics is determined not only by individual factors3 , but also by the levels of trust in the media and their credibility (McQuail 2008; Moy and Hussain 2011). Given the diversity in the character of media types, it is hard to formulate any general conclusions regarding the overall impact of media on trust in politics. This is why analyses usually focus on a specific section of media: TV, press or online news services (Brosius et al. 2019). We followed this path by verifying the credibility of different media formats as sources of information about politics. To that end, we used the results of research presented by the European Broadcasting Union (EBU). The EBU’s effort encompasses 28 EU member states (as of 2019) and five candidate states. It shows differences with regard to trust in different types of media. Radio emerges as the most trustworthy medium, as it occupies the top spot in trust charts for 24 out of 33 examined countries, including Poland. Among EU citizens, radio enjoys a 57% trust rating, followed by TV (49%), press (46%), Internet (32%) and social networks (20%). The EBU’s survey has noted a systematic decrease in trust towards social networks. In a majority of the analysed countries (28 out of 33), social media had the lowest trust levels (EBU 2020: 9). Although Poles consider radio to be the most trustworthy medium, it is far from their favourite source of information about politics. A significant portion of respondents seeks politics-related news on TV (58%) and the Internet (27%). Only 9% said they used radio as their source (OmyłaRudzka and Feliksiak 2019: 1). From 2002 until 2018, average trust in TV stood at 50.3%. On the other hand, 40.1% of respondents declared they did not trust television. For the press, the same metrics were at 40.5% and 47.3%, respectively. This particular research did not encompass online

3 We examine those in Chapter 2.

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news services (Cybulska and Pankowski 2018: 89). Our own examination has shown that the highest trust levels are recorded by private media (37.7%). Public TV is trusted by 23.3% of citizens, and daily newspapers by 22.7%. Websites are considered a reliable source of political news by 21.5% of respondents. Further down the list came weekly magazines (15.3%), conversations with family members (14.6%) and private radio stations (12.5%). The results of our research corroborate the findings of the analyses produced by the Reuters Institute. The 2019 Digital News Report concluded that Poles tend to trust private outlets more than public ones. The authors of this publication stress that ‘despite significant indirect support from the government, partisan media failed to grow audience or trust’ (Digital Report News 2019: 100–101), a trend we discuss at greater length in Chapter 2. Lower trust levels in public media are also confirmed by the aforementioned the EBU research. Poland is among only five countries where public media remain outside the top five of the most trusted media brands (EBU 2020: 18). Our survey has also revealed a correlation between political preferences and the assessments of credibility of various media outlets. Public TV (TVP) is declared trustworthy by most supporters of the ruling PiS (64.1%). Among those who endorse opposition parties, trust in the public broadcaster is far lower: TVP is seen as trustworthy by 26.3% of the PSL voters, 13.8% of the SLD voters, 7.8% of the PO voters and just 3.7% of the Modern voters. The most distrustful group, however, are the Together Party’s followers, none of whom were willing to rely on public TV for politics-related content. Supporters of opposition formations declare much higher trust in private TV outlets: the statistic stands at 81.5% among the Modern voters, 72.3% of the PO faithful, 63.2% of the PSL’s electorate, 61.1% of the SLD supporters and 33.3% of the Together Party endorsers. Only 14.3% of PiS proponents trust private TV channels. The numbers confirm that people seek and value the sources of information which reinforce their own views. Trust in political parties is also linked to general interest in political matters and, consequently, to involvement in politics (Skarzy ˙ nska ´ 2002). Therefore, in our research, we also looked at assessments of media credibility that differ among citizens interested or uninterested in politics. Our analysis shows that among respondents who declared interest in politics, private TV broadcasters were most commonly named as a reliable source of information (48.4% of respondents). They were followed by daily newspapers (29.4%), weekly magazines (24.6%), websites (22.6%),

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private radio stations (13.1%) and public radio (10.5%). For the group of respondents disinterested in politics, the order was somewhat different. Private TV channels also came first (26.9%), but they were followed by the public broadcaster TVP (23.1%), private radio stations (20%) and websites (16.9%). Weekly magazines stood at 13.8%, daily press at 18.5%, while public radio closed the list with 12.3%. While both categories of respondents most frequently pointed to private television broadcasters, the trust in that medium was notably higher among citizens interested in political affairs. The printed press was also far more trusted by that group. These sources are seen as more conducive to building trust as well as encouraging civic and political involvement (Moy and Hussain 2011). Websites were another source seen as slightly more reliable by people seeking news on politics. Among this group, tabloid media proved unreliable, with only 5.6% of respondents declaring they were willing to believe them. Citizens with no interest in politics were far more likely to claim that no medium was trustworthy—12.3% gave that answer, as compared to only 2% in the second category. Disinterest in politics accompanied by a negative assessment of the media’s credibility is linked to personal tendencies towards distrust (Sztompka 2007). This, in turn, affects trust in politics and political entities. Social psychology sees low trust levels as one of the key factors leading to political alienation characterised by passive behaviours (Skarzy ˙ nska ´ 2002: 37). When commenting on the impact of specific factors on trust in political institutions, representatives of nearly all parties named the work of the media among other elements, such as people’s previous experiences with parties and politicians’ actions and attitudes (Jacunski ´ et al. 2019). The media’s negative impact was typically linked to tabloidisation, bias and strong political polarisation. This is clearly visible in our interviewees’ responses. One of them pointed to the media’s tendency to seek scandal: ‘Sensationalised topics on radio, TV or in a newspaper are always more interesting for the potential audience, so the media peddle all sorts of more or less important quasi-affairs’ (PO_4). Another representative from the same party also emphasised the media’s interest in sensation: ‘The revulsion toward politics is created by politicians themselves, but also by the media, very much so in fact. As a politician, I will likely complain about the media because there is plenty of things that could be shown, and broadcasters usually choose these strong, horrible statements and go over them again and again’ (PO_6). Interviewees often mentioned that

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the overall media narrative surrounding politics was negative: ‘When [television] speaks about the ruling party, they are negative. When they speak about the opposition, the same thing’ (PO_5). Apart from tabloidisation and the overall character of media narrative, political actors pointed to the problem of politicisation and strong polarisation as a component that contributes to how media affect people’s trust in politics and politicians. Bias and polarisation put more strain on politics–media relations, which, in turn, cause a decrease in general trust in partisan politics. As one PSL member put it, ‘more and more people say that the media are the first estate. Today, access to the Internet and to the media is commonplace, and so media have a huge influence on public opinion. The question is: are they objective, or do they depend to some extent on a particular political party?’ (PSL_1). Our interviewees referred not only to the character of the narrative around political topics, but also to its quality. This is reflected very well in one response, in which a politician observed that ‘journalists actually create news events to a large extent, and then create opinions about them. And quite often, in the public sphere, we discuss the news just created by the media (…) not devoting time to important matters’ (PSL_5). The party members we spoke to mentioned how the negative presentation of politics degrades people’s trust in it but, at the same time, exhibited a certain powerlessness in the face of the evolution that occurs in the media. One of them said: ‘The media can shape opinions; that is a downside. They are very powerful, and that refers to any medium, beginning with the press which, in truth, is losing its significance but still remains relevant in some circles, to the Internet or public television. It is impossible to not be subjected to this pattern imposed by the media’ (PSL_6). Another interviewee clearly stressed the media’s negative effect on the process of building citizens’ trust in politicians. He claimed that the media ‘played a very bad role, an exceptionally negative role, by trying to denigrate, accuse politicians, expose all sorts of silly moments, pathologies – they [these phenomena] should be denounced because that is what media are supposed to do. But peddling the opinion that all politicians or members of political parties are immoral and dishonest and that politics is a dirty line of work – this creates the public’s image of politics’ (PiS_7). Political actors have listed several downsides to the media’s role as an intermediary in communication and the impact of that role on public perceptions of politics. At the same time, they expressed something akin to an unwitting approval for this kind of cooperation with the media.

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This is exemplified by the following statement: ‘We like to see other people’s dark side. The media enable us to do that. It is rare that politicians are spoken about in positive terms. When we make wise, correct decisions, these are taken for granted and not commented on. A contemporary politician must be aware that we operate in a very transparent environment, where every misdeed, every mistake, will become public knowledge’ (PSL_5). In the context of shaping the image of politics, politicians and parties, our interviewees focused on TV and online content (or Internet in general). Interestingly, these are the exact two communication channels which, according to researchers, are most dubious in terms of their impact on trust in politics. The influence of television, as we have shown before, also depends on several other factors that co-shape the trust-building process. Although the Internet as a whole enjoys relatively high trust as a source of information about politics, this refers primarily to news websites. Social networks are largely distrusted and rarely pointed to as reliable. One of the previously quoted respondents mentioned the declining relevance of the press. However, as our data indicates, printed media are seen as a relatively trustworthy source (behind TV and radio). Moreover, using the press to obtain politics-related information correlates positively with trust in politics. Politicians see their own contribution to the trust-building process as significant but maintain that the way media portray politics also shapes public perceptions. As indicated in Chapter 4, we see their repeated emphasis on media objectivism as a reference to the politicisation of public media observed since 2015. Politicians point to the media as one of the culprits when discussing the reasons behind the low levels of public trust in politics. This is because news outlets act as intermediaries in their communication with voters. Citizens’ trust and attitudes towards the media correlate with their trust in political institutions and democracy at large (Tsfati and Ariely 2014; Bennett et al. 1999). The existence of such patterns is clearly a source of numerous fears for Polish politicians, even though they are well aware of the negative impact their own actions have on the electorate’s trust in them.

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CHAPTER 8

Parties and Citizens Relations: Connecting or Disconnecting?

Today’s democratic societies which live under a ‘contemporary condition of political disaffection and disengagement’ (Hay 2007: 154) are generally rather critical of politics, politicians and parties. The latter’s ‘prestige and allure have been steadily waning [and political parties themselves] are seen not as natural habitats for idealists but for fast-talking and often hypocritical opportunists and careerists’ (Naím 2017). A similar point of view was voiced by Colin Hay when he stated that politicians are considered ‘self-serving and self-interested rational utility-maximisers. They are, moreover increasingly seen to be powerless and ineffective in the face of processes beyond their control’ (Hay 2007: 155). So we can ask whether politicians and parties’ prestige and reputation are really as low as some pundits and scholars claim? The answer may be not as unequivocal as it may seem at first. Several things need to be considered here. Firstly, ‘direct survey evidence on popular attitudes towards political parties is largely unavailable’ (Poguntke 1996: 319; see also Torcal et al. 2001: 2). Empirical research on voters’ attitudes towards the institution of political parties is scarce, so ‘the discussion of public images of political parties often relies on indirect measures’ (Dalton and Waldon 2005: 993). The behavioural trends seen by researchers as proof of parties’ detachment from the society include the declining voter turnout rates and party membership © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 M. Jacunski ´ et al., Party Organization and Communication in Poland, Political Campaigning and Communication, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59993-5_8

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numbers, the weakening of partisan identification among citizens and their reluctance to participate in parties’ activities as well as the rising percentage of undecided voters (Poguntke 1996: 322–328). Also, Aaron Martin (2014) used the category of confidence to assess people’s attitudes towards parties. Other researchers pointed to the phenomenon of antipartyism, i.e. a ‘general criticism or even the rejection of the idea that political parties are an important institution in a political system, that is, the rejection of party democracy’ (Havlík 2019: 74). Secondly, disillusionment with parties and, more broadly, with politics as a sphere of public life may be caused by situational and cultural factors. The former have to do with how citizens perceive their country’s current social, political and economic reality. Mariano Torcal et al. (2001: 5) referred to this as ‘reactive antipartyism’, whereby people are dissatisfied with the political system, with the performance of party elites and institutions, or the country’s economic situation (Havlík 2019: 76, 80). As a result, citizens may become convinced that parties act solely in their self-interest (Martin 2014: 14). The latter (i.e. cultural) factors were discussed, for example, in Giacomo Sani and Paolo Segatti’s (2001) analysis of anti-party attitudes in Italy, or in Torcal, Gunther and Montero’s comparative research on several Southern European states. Such ‘cultural antipartyism’ (Torcal et al. 2001: 5) is deeply rooted and permanent—it does not depend on current affairs. It seems ‘to be [also] particularly important in Eastern Europe, where anti-party sentiment may be largely the product of previous experiences with one party government’ (Poguntke and Scarrow 1996: 260). Our view is that, in the absence of longitudinal data, it is impossible to empirically distinguish which indicators point to reactive and which to cultural antipartyism. This is why, when using the results of our own research, we assumed that all opinions voiced by the respondents were effectively assessments of parties’ current activities and how well political formations performed their basic functions in the political system. Such an approach is particularly justified given the clear polarisation of the political scene and the cementing of conflict between the two biggest parties which occurred in Poland throughout the 2010s. Keeping the above considerations in mind, we decided to use empirical data we obtained from research to look at the following aspects: voters’ identification with parties and potential involvement in their activities as well as parties’ own openness to new members. Before we move on to discuss our results and conclusions, we shall briefly characterise the

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electorate of the six parties which, in the period from 2015 to 2019, were most relevant to the Polish political landscape. The data on political formations and their voters were obtained from reports published by the Public Opinion Research Centre (CBOS). We also utilised conclusions based on the analysis of parties’ communication strategies.

8.1

The Electorate of Examined Parties

Many voters have neither party identification nor a preferred party-ofthe-moment (Millard 2010: 4). This is why political formations adopt various self-presentation styles and employ elements of their programmes to appeal to the electorate. As a party whose ambition is to maintain enough support to govern single-handedly, Law and Justice (PiS) uses a catch-all strategy. It wants to attract numerous social and professional groups. A CBOS survey (Badora 2015; Roguska 2015) showed that its voter base comprises primarily religious, less educated and typically older people. A large part of its electorate is found in small towns and villages, among economically disadvantaged people who need to rely on social benefits. As a group, PiS supporters differ from the electorate of other parties in several elements of their outlook. They endorse the Catholic Church’s privileged role in Poland, and they espouse conservatism, anti-liberalism and Euroscepticism. For these reasons, PiS is considered a right-wing formation. Interestingly, its voters lean strongly towards economic statism—more so than supporters of other parties, even the left-wing ones. They advocate the establishment of a welfare state and believe a substantial portion of businesses should be state-owned. The Civic Platform (PO) is the champion of the urban electorate. Ever since 2005, a large number of its voters has come from big cities (>100,000 inhabitants). Before the 2015 election (which the PO ultimately lost), the profile of its electorate became slightly less urban-heavy, as the Modern (.N) drew away some of the PO’s voters. The party is endorsed by people with higher education who are more likely to enjoy economic safety. For many years, the PO had been a reliable campaigning machine, able to deftly manage its image. Its voters appreciated its efficiency more than any specific values it preached. Over time, however, it lost its appeal and its centre-right, liberal-conservative appearance. As it moved towards the centre, it attracted some moderate and even leftleaning voters, who felt otherwise deprived of political representation. As

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a result, the percentage of practicing Catholics among PO voters declined. Of all the examined formations, the PO has the most pro-EU electorate—its proponents are the most likely to endorse further European integration. In 2015, in the first and thus far the only election in which it competed as an independent entity, the Modern (then known under its original name of Ryszard Petru’s Modern) garnered nearly 8% of the votes, most of which have come from inhabitants of the five largest cities in Poland (>500,000). Over the subsequent years, support for the party fluctuated. Antoni Głowacki (2017: 2) distinguished three specific periods of its history: (1) before the 2015 election, when the Modern quickly gathered a notable following, (2) from the election to early 2017, when it preserved its gains and popularity and (3) from 2017 onwards, when support dwindled. The party appealed to the economically and socially liberal urban electorate. Part of its initial success laid in the fact that it managed to attract a considerable number of voters who had previously not identified with any political formation or movement. It was supported by welleducated people, most of whom did not engage in religious practices. At the peak of its popularity, in 2016, it also managed to convince some less educated citizens, people dissatisfied with their economic situation and practicing Catholics. Many of its supporters had previously endorsed PO: in the 2015 election, 41% of the PO’s erstwhile voters shifted their support to the Modern (Głowacki 2017: 6). As the party went through a crisis of image and a change of leadership, it lost ground in the polls, sliding to levels similar to those recorded in 2015. It continued to be supported by the urban population, people with higher education and those content with their living standards. In contrast to its nascent period, women have recently constituted the majority of its voters. The Polish People’s Party (PSL) is the only formation in our research which was rooted in one specific social and professional group: the rural population and farmers. Identification with PSL is based on a structural identity and long-standing traditions of the party’s link to the agrarian sector. In terms of their views, PSL voters are somewhat nondescript. Axiologically, they lean towards conservative values—hence, for instance, their opposition to legalising same-sex marriage. Similarly to the PiS supporters, the PSL’s followers endorse economic statism and a welfare state. As its traditional electorate has aged and shrunk, the party has spent the last several years trying to reshape its image to attract new voter segments. One way to do that was by choosing a new leader, very

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different from the agrarian archetype: a young well-educated doctor from the second largest Polish city of Kraków who is now striving to revamp PSL as a new christian democratic entity. The Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) is a post-communist left-wing formation. Ewa Marciniak (Nowosielska 2019) described its electorate as ‘sentimental’. Many of its voters—especially retired soldiers and members of other uniformed services whose careers date back to the era of communism—harbour positive attitudes towards the pre-1989 political order. SLD supporters also distance themselves from the Catholic Church and are opposed to all forms of its involvement in public life, maintaining that public debate should remain free from religious influences. As a left-wing entity, the SLD has long been associated with advocating for minorities, be they ethnic (Belarusians, Lemkos), sexual (non-heteronormative people) or religious (Jews, Orthodox Christians, Muslims). Its cosmopolitan, tolerant outlook attracted minorities which felt excluded and unrepresented. Finally, the party’s voters are predominantly in favour of European integration. As the party’s traditional electorate has aged, its structures experienced stagnation. Identity crisis ensued, with waning voter support pushing SLD onto the fringes of the political scene (Burchert 2016). Additionally, new formations in the form of the Together Party (founded 2015) and Robert Biedron’s ´ Spring (founded 2018) emerged to compete for left-wing votes. The Together Party attracts those individuals who do not see SLD as an honest advocate and carrier of leftist values. Being a new actor with no history of participating in the government, it constitutes an alternative to the ‘road-worn’ left-wing formations. Its supporters espouse economic statism and seek to achieve social equality through strong interventionism. They endorse an expansion of welfare state, including free healthcare and education. The Together Party attracted many young people who appreciate its progressive programme and feel more connected to its also relatively young leaders and membership base (Cybulska and Pankowski 2018: 10). One-third of Together Party’s voters is aged 25–34. They emphasise the problems of the contemporary labour market: the existence of precariaty, unequal pay for men and women and exploitation of workers. The party has strong social media presence and attracts radical, anti-establishment individuals who reject the spectrum of parties (even the left-wing ones) in existence since 1989. Almost two-thirds of Together Party’s voters have higher education, and almost half of them live in cities of over 100,000 inhabitants.

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8.2

Party Identification

People’s identification with a certain party is relevant for two reasons. Firstly, it allows us to explain their voting behaviours by distinguishing groups that are loyal and fairly consistent in their choices from those that can be described as floating voters. Secondly, the declarative identification reflects a sense of ideological kinship. With regard to the first aspect, identification suggests the threshold between partisan alignment and dealignment. The literature on sociopolitical changes in Western European countries has described a process of gradual dealignment which is conducive to volatility in the electoral market and has been taking place since as far back as the 1970s. The Polish electorate is also extremely volatile—in fact, according to data from a continuous research project Polish General Electoral Study (PGSW) and the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), it is more so than in most countries around the world. Over the last three decades, Polish political scientists have delivered solid analyses on the matter (Markowski 1992; Raciborski 1997; Markowski 2002; Przybysz 2004; Cze´snik 2007). In fact, citizens frequently alter their attitudes towards electoral participation, oscillating between abstention and voting. They are also easily swayed in favour of supporting different parties. As Mikołaj Cze´snik and Agnieszka Kwiatkowska (2017: 30) put it, ‘Poles are far more likely to change their behaviours in between elections than citizens of other countries’. Parties contribute to this phenomenon as they often clumsily manoeuvre from one political or ideological position to another. In a survey conducted during the first months of 2018, we asked Poles whether they identified with any party more than with others. Nearly half (49.2%) responded affirmatively. The rest answered negatively or could not specify their preference. A little less than half of respondents named their preferred formation without prompts or hints from the interviewers. Nine parties were mentioned, with 46.3% of respondents in this group pointing to the PiS, 18.7% to the PO, 11.2% to the Modern, 6.2% to the Kukiz, 6% to the SLD, 3.9% to the PSL, 3.7% to the Together Party, 2.9% to the Freedom Party and 1% to the Jarosław Gowin’s Agreement. The results approximated the findings of public opinion polls from that period.1 1 For instance, an IPSOS poll conducted in mid-January 2018 recorded the following support: the PiS – 43%, the PO – 19%, the Kukiz’15 – 10%, the Modern – 6%, the SLD

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Firstly, we sought to establish potential links between selected sociodemographic characteristics and a preference for a given party. We opted to look at four correlates, as presented in Table 8.1: gender, age, place of residence and education. Among people who admitted a specific identification, gender did not emerge as a factor. Results of statistical tests indicated there are no parties which have notably more supporters among men or women. However, the structure of answers in our survey indicated certain differences, albeit statistically insignificant. In the case of several parties, the number of responses was not sufficient to identify or disprove gender correlation. If one looks exclusively at three formations that most voters felt close to, the PiS and the Modern electorates included equal proportions of men and women, while the PO was declared as the party of choice by notably more women (70%) than men. The opposite trend was seen with regard to small parties such as the Kukiz’15 and the Freedom. Another potentially relevant variable was age. Here, results pointed to a linear, negative correlation: the younger the person, the less likely they were to select one party they feel especially close to. Among respondents aged >65, as many as two out of three declared a clear preference. Three parties were most commonly selected by the elderly: PO, SLD and PiS. Very low and low identification levels among young and middleaged voters, respectively, perhaps stem from a broader tendency towards changeability of views and electoral behaviours. Support of the younger electorate was the least consistent. Meanwhile, the seniors showed the highest stability—possibly a reflection of how age leads to consolidating one’s views and developing voting habits. From the perspective of statistical significance, the correlation between age and identification was clearly visible, although moderate. The place of residence variable had five values corresponding to size brackets. We decided not to assign any particular numerical range to the sixth, ‘rural’ bracket, assuming respondents would identify villages as low populated areas. The other five comprised: (1) towns under 20,000, (2) cities of 20,000 to 50,000, (3) cities of 50,000 to 100,000, (4) cities of 100,000 to 200,000 and (5) cities over 200,000 people. We did not

– 5%, the PSL and the Freedom Party – 3%, and the Together Party – 2%. Another poll, from IBRIS, recorded the following: the PiS – 41%, the PO – 20%, the SLD and the Modern – 7%, the Kukiz’15 – 6%, and the PSL – 5%. Source: https://www.wnp.pl/par lamentarny/sondaze/poparcie-dla-partii-politycznych/.

53.6 48.7

Male Female

18–24 25–34 35–44 45–54 55–64 65+

Rural (countryside) Small town 200 k

High school or lower University degree

Gender

Age cohort

Place of residence

Education

Source Authors’ calculations based on survey results, N= 972

50.3 49.7

49.5 56.5 46.1

50.5 43.5 53.9 51.6 48.4

55.0 48.1 46.8

67.1 65.5 56.0 50.9 40.2 34.6

46.4 51.3

No (%)

45.0 51.9 53.2

32.9 34.5 44.0 49.1 59.8 65.4

Yes (%)

0,165

5,612

54,320

2,336

2

5

5

1

0,921

0,346

0,000

0,126

–

–

0,236

–

Cramer’s V

Significance

Value

df

Symmetric measure

Chi-square test

Socio-demographic characteristics of voters’ identification with a given party

Is there any party that you identify with more than with others?

Table 8.1

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record any link between the variables which meant that there would be no statistical evidence of correlation between the size of community in which an individual lived and the likelihood of that person identifying with a party of their choice. The answers we recorded indicated that urban dwellers more frequently have a clear preference. Excluding the least numerous bracket (cities of 100,000–200,000 people), the inhabitants of the biggest cities showed the highest proclivity for expressing partisan identification. The reverse was true for rural areas: there were fewer people who had a clear identification than those who did not voice any preference. The last socio-demographic variable we used was the level of education. As it turned out, we found no discernible link between one’s education and the likelihood of having a preferred political party. Slight statistical differences and correlations existed between education and the exact preference: the less educated people were statistically more often supporters of PiS and Kukiz’15, while the better educated electorate leaned more frequently towards the Modern, the PO, the SLD and the Together Party. When searching for significant correlates of declarative identification with a party, we looked at a spate of other independent variables (see Table 8.2): interest in politics, readiness to invite a politician for a short conversation at one’s home, direct contact with a politician, engagement in political activities in the past 12 months, political beliefs and participation in the last parliamentary election. Our findings indicated that people interested in politics tended to have a party they leaned towards, while those for whom this subject was not of interest usually did not exhibit such sentiments. There was a correlation coefficient of moderate strength between these two variables. Disinterest in politics also corresponded to a higher propensity for abstaining from voting. Hence, the results suggested that the group of citizens who vote is not random—it comprises people who believe they are familiar with the political scene, keep up to date with current affairs and, at least in part, identify with a party of their choice. It is this group that makes electoral decisions based on a sense of closeness to a particular formation. We suspected that the feeling of connectivity may stem from an experience of direct contacts with politicians. However, the data we collected do not support this assertion, as people who did not have any such experiences were just as likely to have a preference towards a specific party. There was no statistically significant link here.

66.1 46.9 30.0

33.9 53.1 70.0

Yes No

Yes No It depends

None In one In two In three or more

Direct contact with a politician

Readiness to host a politician for a short conversation at one’s home

Engagement in political activities in the past 12 months

45.5 52.9 61.6 65.2

58.0 36.6 57.1 54.5 47.1 38.4 34.8

42.0 63.4 42.9

46.3 52.0

61.6

38.4

53.7 48.0

79.4

20.6

Not interested at all Rather not interested Hard to say Rather interested Very interested

Interest in politics

No (%)

Yes (%)

20,881

37,410

3,174

81,053

3

2

1

4

0,000

0,000

0,075

0,000

0,147

0,196

–

0,289

Cramer’s V

Significance

Value

df

Symmetric measure

Chi-square test

Correlation analysis of voters’ feeling of closeness to a given political party

Is there any party that you identify with more than with others?

Table 8.2

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19.6

80.4

Yes No

Participation in the most recent parliamentary election*

Source Authors’ calculations based on survey results, N = 972, *N= 926

44.3 74.3

65.2 37.5

34.8 62.5

55.7 25.7

37.0 55.7

63.0 44.3

Left wing Moderate left wing Centric Moderate right wing Right wing

Political beliefs

No (%)

Yes (%)

Is there any party that you identify with more than with others?

34,694

144,368

1

9

0,000

0,000

0,194

0,385

Cramer’s V

Significance

Value

df

Symmetric measure

Chi-square test

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Another question we asked in the survey referred to people’s readiness to host a politician at home for a conversation. All three answers (‘yes’, ‘no’ and ‘it depends’) were roughly equally frequent. We confirmed a weak, yet statistically significant link between one’s willingness to invite politicians and the fact of having a preferred party. Citizens who did not identify with any political formation were more likely to reject the prospect of direct contact in such form. This particular finding is interesting in so far as it casts doubts on the efficiency of the door-to-door technique that some politicians employ when trying to garner more support. The analysis of the previous variable established that an experience of direct contact in general does not affect voters whose preferences are already specified—their attitudes towards a particular individual or formation seem more permanent and impervious to impressions from singular situations. Therefore, it may be said that other cognitive patterns, derived from different experiences, apply. Respondents who were neither unequivocally willing nor unwilling to invite politicians to their homes often stated that their decision would depend primarily on which exact politician they were to host or what party that person represented. Thus, political sympathies and antipathies emerged: some people would readily meet with opposition politicians, but refuse to host members of the governing party. Others were happy to invite PiS members, but would not extend the same courtesy to PO representatives, etc. Political activity levels varied notably among respondents. Those who, in the 12-month period preceding the survey (i.e. throughout 2017), were involved in two or more initiatives were more likely to identify with a party. For formations who lost their connection to the electorate or are exclusively media-centric, this is a clear indication that without devoting considerable effort to maintaining rapport with the voters, they will not be able to involve them in any activities. The statistical relationship here was weak, but confirmed the citizens’ rationality and potential for engaging with them. In another part of our survey, respondents were asked to position themselves on the left–right spectrum of political views. It turned out that the people most likely to have a clear identification were those with a centre-right, strongly rightist or radically leftist outlook. Centrists and the occupants of the centre-left sector were less attached. A moderate correlation showed that the closer one’s views are to the extremes of the political spectrum, the more likely they are to have a clear preference for a selected

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party. Centrists and moderates were significantly less prone to such identification. It might be argued they constitute the floating segment of the electorate, unwilling to become permanently attached to a single party. Participation in the 2015 election was the next variable to be juxtaposed with the respondents’ answers. Citizens who abstained from voting often said they did not have a party they felt a particular closeness with. We cannot say whether the reason behind this link was the respondents’ overall negative attitude towards parties and reluctance towards political participation, or a perceived absence of suitable representation. Perhaps, both these elements were relevant. Among those who did vote, the proportion of different answers was somewhat more balanced. The number of people who identified with their chosen formation exceeded the number of those who did not feel particularly attached to any party. It might be assumed that this part of the survey revealed the parties’ hard electorates and active floating voters. The respondents were also asked about what they associated with political parties. More on our conclusions from applying this variable can be found later in this chapter. In summary, we found that socio-demographic characteristics had a very limited impact on people’s sense of closeness to parties. Only the age variable hinted at the existence of a statistical relationship. The absence of a link between education levels and identification was curious, as the theory of modernisation claims that the better educated citizens should be considerably less likely to become attached to a single political formation. At the same time, our research revealed that formal education had no bearing on this matter. An alternative explanation is that, rather than social aspects or belonging to a certain group, it is cognitive elements related to one’s previous experiences and political attitudes that determine the likelihood of one having a clear preference for a party. Active voters with stronger left- or right-wing leanings, who were interested in politics, occasionally involved in partisan activities and more approving of political parties, were more able to point out a specific party they were attached to.

8.3

Reluctance Towards Parties

Polish citizens’ attitude towards domestic political parties has been the subject of several surveys conducted by the Public Opinion Research Centre (CBOS). The Centre asked respondents about what parties are and what are their functions and objectives (Cybulska and Pankowski

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Parties cause rows and chaos in the country

8

64

28

Parties are cliques of politicians scrambling for power

54

37

9

Parties are composed of people driven primarily by personal ambitions

55

33

12

Actually, it is hard to say what parties are for Parties are receptive to voters’ expectations and demands

No

10

20

30

40

7 6 3

91

0 Yes

6

87

Parties try to address the issues faced by ordinary people

9

11

80

Parties suggest solutions to important national problems

6

28

66

50

60

70

80

90

100

Hard to say

Fig. 8.1 Poles’ attitudes towards political parties in 2017 (results in %) (Source Authors’ elaboration based on data from CBOS [Cybulska and Pankowski 2017: 62])

2017: 60–682 ). The results revealed that a prevailing majority of people had a negative or strongly negative view of political parties (see Fig. 8.1 for details). In 2017, 87% of respondents agreed with the statement that parties are cliques of individuals seeking power, while 80% agreed they are composed of people driven primarily by personal ambitions. Also, 66% admitted they could not tell what the actual goal of the parties was. Only slightly fewer (64%) said parties did not strive to solve issues faced by the citizens. At the same time, the respondents did notice some positive aspects. Most of all, they agreed that parties are receptive to people’s expectations and demands (55%). Almost as many (54%) thought that parties came up with solutions to important problems. CBOS has so far conducted the survey on three separate occasions: in 2001, 2011 and 2017. This means that we could use the results to determine trends over a fairly long period of time. The negative attitude towards parties has slowly (by no more than five percentage points) but systematically increased. Positive opinions about parties’ activities are the only exception to the slow rate of change—compared with the 2 All data published by CBOS that we refer to in this sub-section is drawn from the following report: ‘Ogólny stosunek do partii politycznych’ [‘General Attitudes towards Political Parties’] (Cybulska and Pankowski 2017: 60–68).

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2001 and 2011 editions, in 2017 they declined by ten percentage points. Similar conclusions can be drawn from looking at the approval–disapproval index—a rating created based on respondents’ answers about their attitudes towards parties and assessments of partisan politics. The index may take values from one to four, where one means that a given respondent saw all examined aspects negatively, and four means that assessments of all elements were positive. The average index for the 2001 survey was at 1,94. In 2011, it stood at 1,96 and in 2017 at 1,90. On all three occasions, the overall evaluation was therefore negative, but the differences were not substantial. Socio-demographic variables were either irrelevant3 or only marginally relevant to people’s views on parties. For political formations, their predominantly negative social image is a challenge. It means they operate in an adverse environment. Even if some of their actions are seen as an effort to solve vital social issues, many of their decisions are criticised as being driven by their members’ selfinterest. The fact that society is largely inimical to parties is being exploited by other entities: the formally non-partisan actors who nonetheless participate in the power struggle as well as leaders who try to build their political capital around their novelty and being from ‘outside the system’. Riding on slogans of ‘shaking up’ or even ‘breaking up’ the system, these emerging protest movements or ‘anti-parties’ often resort to populist rhetoric. Our own research on people’s perceptions of political parties was based on the analysis of unprompted answers. Instead of providing respondents with a ready set of multiple-choice questions or Likert scales, we asked them an open question and allowed them the space to freely express what their associations with political parties were. They had no trouble providing numerous answers. Parties evoked specific reactions that may be divided into various categories based on their emotional content (attitude) or the analysis of keywords and their meanings. The associations were then coded and split into initial groups: positive, neutral, negative and others. There was also a small proportion of people who either had no specific associations with parties or answered, ‘I do not know’ (alternatively: ‘Nothing comes to my mind’). There were few evaluative answers that could be categorised as positive, and many

3 In all cases, the correlations suggested they were statistically insignificant (p > 0,05).

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of them were semantically close to being neutral. This is why, for the purpose of further analysis, we shall only use the binary division into neutral and negative categories. Predictably, pejorative associations were more common: 46.1% of respondents provided answers that were coded as negative. Among the most frequent ones were: chaos, hypocrisy, lies, mess, quarrel, rows, scams, struggle and thieves. A fractionally smaller group (42.7%) had neutral associations and mentioned concepts such as governance, politics and power or institutions that are populated with representatives of political parties such as the government and parliament. Also, 6.1% of the entire sample group had no associations, and 5.1% of respondents provided associations that could not be assigned to neither of the above-mentioned categories. We examined the answers in two ways. Firstly, we identified 25 key categories based on the meanings of the terms used by respondents.4 The results of that procedure are visualised below as bubble cloud charts. The disks in Figs. 8.2 and 8.3 represent specific semantic categories for words and phrases, with their size corresponding to the frequency with which they were used. Secondly, we analysed socio-demographic characteristics and other correlates linked to the respondents’ political activity so as to determine any relations with a certain type of association. The five most common answers among neutral associations were: governance; a group of people, organisation with a common goal and views; political institutions; politics; and power. Together, they represented 85% of all neutral phrases used in relation to political parties. The five most frequent negative associations were: a negative feature; row; mess; benefits; and thieves. These accounted for approximately 74% of all negative mentions. Some categories, such as struggle or interest group, were considered as both negative and neutral associations, depending on the context in which they were placed by a given respondent. For example, when struggle was meant as part of ‘power struggle’, it held a pejorative connotation and was therefore classified as negative. However, when it referred more to political competition, it was interpreted functionally, as an acceptable element of negative cooperation. Hence, it was deemed neutral. 4 Key categories included the following list: negative feature, governance, power, row, politics, don’t know, mess, political institutions, benefits, other, group of people, organisation, thieves, struggle, lie, scams, specific party, elections, corruption, money, it depends, interest group, competition, programme, views, democracy, positive and representation.

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Fig. 8.2 Positive and neutral associations with political parties in Poland (Source Authors’ elaboration based on categories of voters’ responses in the survey. Question: ‘What do you associate political parties with?’ N = 432)

In another part of our analysis, we looked for links between respondents’ socio-demographic profile and their attitudes towards political parties. Four correlates that we concentrated on were gender, age, place of residence and education. However, none of the combinations of sociodemographic variables and attitudes produced a statistically significant correlation. Having verified that, we sought alternative variables that could have potentially been relevant. We utilised the same set of elements as when examining people’s identification with political parties: interest in politics, readiness to host a politician for a short conversation at one’s

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Fig. 8.3 Negative associations with political parties in Poland (Source Authors’ elaboration based on categories of voters’ responses in the survey. Question: ‘What do you associate political parties with?’ N= 464)

home, direct contact with a politician, engagement in political activities over the past 12 months, existence of a party that the respondent identifies with more than with others, political beliefs and participation in the most recent parliamentary election. Results of that juxtaposition are presented in Table 8.3. Four out of seven independent variables showed correlations with respondents’ emotional attitudes towards political parties as institutions. Voters who spoke about parties in negative terms were not willing to invite a politician for a chat to their homes, or such willingness depended on which exact formation a politician in question represented. It seems

Very interested Rather interested Hard to say Rather not interested Not interested at all

Yes No It depends

Yes

None In one In two In three or more

Interest in politics

Readiness to host a politician for a short conversation at one’s home

Direct contact with a politician

Engagement in political activities over the past 12 months

60.0

40.0

46.6 53.7 44.7 46.9

47.5 48.2 53.4 46.3 55.3 53.1

52.5 51.8

45.1 63.7 49.2

58.3 60.2

41.7 39.8

54.9 36.3 50.8

46.7 50.0

Negative

53.3 50.0

Neutral

3,120

0,047

22,995

9,415

Value

3

1

2

4

df

Chi-square test

Correlation analysis of voters’ emotional attitudes towards political parties

Emotional attitude towards political parties as institutions

Table 8.3

0,373

0,828

0,000

0,052

Significance

(continued)

–

–

0,161

–

Cramer’s V

Symmetric measure

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(continued)

Left wing Moderate left wing Centric Moderate right wing Right wing No or rather no Hard to say

Political beliefs

39.9 52.8 57.5

60.1 47.2 42.5 50.6 67.7

57.0 42.6

43.0 57.4

49.4 32.3

60.1 52.8

46.2 57.2

Negative

39.9 47.2

53.8 42.8

Neutral

Source Authors’ calculations based on survey results, N = 890, *N = 851

Participation in the most Yes recent parliamentary No election*

Yes No

Existence of a party that the respondent identifies with more than with others

Emotional attitude towards political parties as institutions

Table 8.3

10,002

27,587

14,906

Value

1

9

2

df

Chi-square test

0,002

0,001

0,001

Significance

0,108

0,176

0,129

Cramer’s V

Symmetric measure

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that one’s readiness to change opinion about a given party or politician would necessarily entail a shift from an overall negative to neutral or positive attitude towards parties. What could trigger this kind of change? Certainly not direct contacts with politicians. Further personal experiences resulting from involvement in political activities also did not promise to have any effect. In fact, it was hard to point to a single difference maker here. In some cases, a citizen who admitted being disillusioned with political parties had become temporarily convinced that a certain figure or entity could emerge onto the political scene unburdened with the usual sins that parties are accused of. This suggested that granting one’s support to such a new actor becomes a form of anti-establishment protest. Such behaviours could then mean that political debutants coming from outside the partisan mainstream are more likely to be given the benefit of the doubt. A low statistical dependence existed between having negative associations with political parties and not having any party that one identified with more than with others. Some Polish parties were thought of in clearly negative terms, which was why some voters did not identify with them. This idea has been asserted by scholars and confirmed by the electorate, but it is doubtful whether it has been acknowledged by politicians. Indeed, people’s disaffection with parties provided an explanation for how new candidates, formations or movements were able to succeed by positioning themselves as anti-parties, protest movements or political outsiders. Building rapport and community around rejecting the current state of partisan politics may be enough to attract those citizens who feel disenfranchised or discouraged from participating in political life. As part of our research, we looked at how respondents who held preferences for a party of their choice (440 cases) assessed the institution of political party at large. Among people who identified with older, more established formations such as PiS, PSL, PO or SLD, neutral attitudes towards the institution of party were more common. Meanwhile, supporters of younger entities, e.g. the Modern, the Kukiz’15, the Freedom Party and the Together Party, were more likely to express negative opinions. An analogous correlation emerged between attitudes and participation in the 2015 election. Supporters of the younger formations were more often critical of political parties, while those who leaned towards older entities were more neutral. It appeared that novelty was more likely to breed trust and was often the key to new entrants’ initial successes in the electoral market.

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Overall, people who abstained from voting held more negative opinions about parties than those who exercised their suffrage. In our sample group, among people who did not cast their ballots in the 2015 election and had negative attitudes towards parties in general, only a handful admitted they had a party with which they identified. Active voters outnumbered abstainers and typically exhibited ambivalent attitudes towards parties. On the one hand, they mentioned a number of negative associations. On the other hand, they clearly pointed to neutral characteristics and expressed support for specific parties they found most appealing. In the context of an election thus, approximately half of the electorate stops seeing parties as a mere theoretical construct and begins to perceive them as real-world entities which can be actively supported. A dependence was also noted between declared political leanings and attitudes towards parties. People without specified political views and those who described their beliefs as left-wing or centric often held negative opinions about the institution of party. Those more neutral were typically proponents of centre-right or right-wing ideologies. Although it is merely a supposition, the relation between one’s attitude and declarative position on the left-right-wing spectrum may be associated with respondents’ assessment of the governing party. However, people supporting the PiS tended to remain neutral, while the followers of all other formations were more critical. Therefore, a positive attitude towards the ruling party complemented by right-leaning political views possibly constituted a determinant of a neutral assessment of parties as institutions. Our analysis highlighted Polish voters’ disaffection with political parties. The results of our research corroborate findings of earlier surveys and point to the fact that politicians and parties are often spoken of in unequivocally negative terms. Many respondents seemed to build their opinions of parties around pejoratively framed clichés. The use of labels such as ‘thieves’, ‘chaos’, ‘rows’, ‘lies’ or ‘privileges’ revealed the depth of emotionally charged, negative perceptions. Many of the associations mentioned by the citizens verged on stereotyping and generalisations. Apparently, at times one bad apple is indeed enough to spoil the whole barrel. Nearly half of our respondents had more neutral perceptions and saw parties as entities formed to compete for power, govern and, in general, do politics. If complemented with data from the aforementioned CBOS surveys, our research also identified a group of voters who associated parties primarily with their actual function in the political system and, contrary to the prevailing trends, were able to assess them more dispassionately.

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8.4 Citizens’ Political Involvement and Parties’ Openness to New Members Although political parties were commonly seen as fundamental for democracy, they were generally disliked by the respondents. The citizens often distanced themselves from parties and were critical in their assessments of partisan politics. This disaffection with the institution of party caused weak identification and low trust in political formations as well as a tendency to shift one’s support. Moreover, many people were disinterested in political activity and rejected the possibility of becoming party members. Poland is far from the only country to experience such trends. At the same time, as we indicated in previous chapters, higher readiness to participate in political life and stronger trust in public institutions would clearly be of benefit to political parties. It would not only legitimise their existence, but also allow them to tap into voters’ energy and initiative. However, given the public’s overwhelmingly negative sentiment, can parties find people willing to join them? Our research indicated the answer to that question is affirmative. Among adult citizens, there appears to be a group of potential new members or activists. The following pages are devoted to describing this group and discussing whether parties are actually interested in broadening their membership base. We looked at whether political formations conduct regular recruitment and what were the experiences of prospective members as they contacted parties’ organisational units at the grassroots level. Scholars have often tried to identify what motives push people to join political parties (see e.g. Seyd and Whiteley 1992; Whiteley et al. 1994, 2006; Spier and Klein 2015: 84–99, Chapter 6 of this book). They have also sought to discover ‘why some people who are strongly supportive of particular parties choose to belong to them while others prefer not to’ (Poletti et al. 2019: 157). In our research, we framed the problem somewhat differently. All surveyed people were asked if they would be potentially willing to join a political party. When analysing their answers, we took our inspiration from Sydney Verba and Herbert Nie’s (1972) civic voluntarism model, whereby undertaking political activity calls for specific resources as well as being psychologically engaged with politics or coming across recruitment networks that might draw one into politics. While the concept proposed by Verba and Nie does not directly refer to the issue of joining political parties, we found it to be a good point of

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reference for considering party membership as an expression of high-level participation. As could easily be predicted, a prevailing majority of respondents— 73.6%, to be exact—were not ready to join a party, and 48% answered that they were definitely unwilling, while 28.6% said they were rather unwilling. However, 14.7% were open to such a prospect, and 4.9% answered ‘definitely yes’, while 9.8% answered ‘possibly’. We asked: Who are these individuals, and are there any features common to all of them? The biggest group among those declaring readiness to join a party consisted of young people. Men outnumbered women, although the difference was fairly small. Another differentiating variable of limited relevance was the place of residence. Surprisingly, education proved not to affect one’s declarative readiness for party membership.5 Even a quick glance at socio-demographic characteristics of potential members showed their profile differed in several aspects from that of the actual membership base, although it should be noted that correlations for all variables were in low values. As we discussed in Chapter 6, most current members of political parties are well-educated, middle-aged or older men. Details are presented in Table 8.4. It came as no surprise that willingness to join a political formation was more common among people interested in politics, open to having a conversation with a politician or involved in political activity. Importantly, participation in the most recent election was not a differentiating variable.6 Becoming a party member was a prospect more welcomed by people who declared having a party they identified with and those who described their views as decidedly left or right-wing. Moderates were less keen on joining any formation. Emotional attitude (neutral vs negative7 ) proved to be a statistically significant variable, although the strength of correlation here was minimal. Having a personal experience with politics, even if only in the form of direct contacts with politicians, was also relevant. Respondents who personally knew a politician were more likely to 5 Both the general incentive model proposed by Seyd and Whiteley (1992) and the

civic voluntarism model perceive education as a variable which provides ‘people with the chance to develop the organisational and communication skills that are relevant to political participation’ (Poletti et al. 2019: 159). 6 It also proved not to correlate with trust in political parties, as we explain in Chapter 2. 7 Other categories were very limited in size and were therefore omitted from our

analysis.

18–24 25–34 35–44 45–54 55–64 65+

Rural areas City of 200 k

High school or lower University degree

Age cohort

Place of residence

Education

Source Authors’ calculations, N = 888

Male Female

Gender

15.2 18.5

17.7 8.7 26.4 14.4 18.2 16.0

27.4 18.7 23.8 207 12.8 8.4

21.5 12.8

Yes (%)

84.8 81.5

82.3 91.3 73.6 85.7 81.8 84.0

72.6 81.3 76.2 79.3 86.3 91.6

78.5 87.0

No (%)

1,757

14,839

26,047

11,847

Value

1

5

5

1

df

Chi-square test

0,185

0,011

0,000

0,001

Significance

_

0,129

0,171

0,116

Cramer’s V

Symmetric measure

Socio-demographic characteristics of individuals potentially interested in joining a political party

Declarative readiness to join a party

Table 8.4

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consider the possibility of joining a party. Specific findings are presented in Table 8.5. In general, the strength of correlations within each pair of variables was rather low. The highest values occurred with regard to interest in politics, willingness to invite a politician for a conversation at one’s home and recent engagement in political activities. Lower values were recorded for the existence of party with which one identifies, political beliefs and direct contacts with politicians. Not all people who are potentially interested in joining a party (or at least do not exclude such a possibility) actually take steps in that direction. According to the civic voluntarism model, in order to undertake political activity, apart from certain resources and psychological engagement with politics one also needs ‘access to networks through which the individuals can be recruited to political life’ (Verba et al. 1995: 267). Citizens who join political formations or get otherwise involved in politics possess the necessary resources, but also exhibit a certain degree of determination. Others do not engage in politics ‘because they can’t; because they don’t want to; or because nobody asked [them to do so]’ (Verba et al. 1995: 269). As nearly 15% of respondents in our research answered they were open to joining a party but had up to then not done so, one could argue that they had not been encouraged by anybody. Such encouragement may come from one’s circle of family and friends. As we showed in Chapter 6, approximately 10% of party members we had asked originally joined on the recommendation of their relatives or colleagues. Alternatively, parties themselves may run recruitment campaigns, reaching out to their followers. The question is then: Do they? Even more fundamentally: Do they want to broaden their membership base in the first place? To find out, we interviewed party elites and members of decision-making bodies. The above-mentioned group proved far from unanimous in their stance on the preferred membership strategy. Those who leaned towards smaller, leaner organisations were a minority. One of our interviewees said: ‘If anybody in SLD had an idea to organise a mass-scale recruitment, I would be opposed (…) If a party is to be a cohesive, well-oiled, effective army, we cannot have a whole bunch of random people lining around the block to sign up’ (SLD_2). Most of them, however, agreed that the influx of new members was something positive. One person emphasised that ‘it is very important that our structures should grow, the number of members needs to increase’ (N_2). Another representative added: ‘It

Very interested Rather interested Hard to say Rather not interested Not interested at all

Yes No It depends

None In one In two In three or more

Yes No

Interest in politics

Readiness to host a politician for a short conversation at one’s home

Engagement in political activities over the past 12 months

Participation in the most recent parliamentary election

93.7

6.3

16.8 17.6

11.0 18.3 25.9 37.0 83.2 82.4

89.0 81.7 74.1 63.0

73.9 94.6 83.1

94.5 92.0

5.5 8.0

26.1 5.4 16.9

71.4 82.8

No (%)

28.6 17.2

Yes (%)

0,051

47,696

50,015

43,383

Value

Chi-square test

1

3

2

4

df

0,821

0,000

0,000

0,000

Significance

Other characteristics of individuals potentially interested in joining a political party

Declarative readiness to join a party

Table 8.5

PARTIES AND CITIZENS RELATIONS …

(continued)

_

0,232

0,237

0,221

Cramer’s V

Symmetric measure

8

239

(continued)

Left wing Moderate left wing Centric Moderate right wing Right wing

Neutral Negative

Yes No

Political beliefs

Emotional attitude towards political parties as institutions**

Direct contact with a politician

74.1

25.9

21.7 11.4

78.3 88.6

80.5 86.5

87.9 83.6

12.1 16.4

19.5 13.5

78.8 84.4

77.7 88.7

No (%)

21.3 15.6

22.3 11.3

Yes (%)

Source Authors’ calculations. N = 888, *N = 863; **N = 796

Yes No

Existence of a party that the respondent identifies with more than with others*

Declarative readiness to join a party

Table 8.5

16,913

5,249

16,533

18,314

Value

Chi-square test

1

1

4

1

df

0,000

0,022

0,002

0,000

Significance

0,138

0,81

0,136

0,146

Cramer’s V

Symmetric measure

240 ´ M. JACUNSKI ET AL.

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is obvious that it is in the party’s interest to attract new members, to go down the levels of hierarchy and reach out as broadly as we can’ (PiS_4). However, amid such a chorus of voices in favour of expansion, only PiS among the six parties we examined translated these declarations into planned, long-term activities. Several representatives of Law and Justice stressed that the party’s chairman, Jarosław Kaczynski, ´ repeatedly called on them to ‘build up membership, look for people, reach out to them, encourage them’ (PiS_7), to ‘go beyond your current circles, expand our presence, try to attract credible people who can represent us [in local communities]’ (PiS_8). Moreover, the PiS’s leadership explained who should be targeted: people who ‘place their hopes in PiS, who have a similar vision of politics and the change that should be brought about in Poland (…) These are mainly people connected to “Solidarity”, the [Catholic] Church, combatants, probably those to which we address our offer in the first place’ (PiS_7). The job of expanding the membership base was delegated to local branches. Their leaders were tasked with seeking out new recruits, with the warning that ‘they were expected [by the party’s leadership] to deliver’ (PiS_8). There was a carrot to go with the stick, as well. As explained by another interviewee, successful recruitment efforts would ‘bring prestige [within the party], as they would reflect the organisational efficiency [of a given branch]’ (PiS_3). We refer to this type of approach as active recruitment, whereby a party thinks about expansion in strategic terms, and defines and identifies categories of preferred candidates for new members. The Together Party opted for a centrally coordinated, one-off, narrowly targeted effort over a specific period of time. Its purpose was to attract more female members. The initiative, called “Women for politics”, ‘entailed several types of activities, including meetings and the printing of brochures on historical events related to first female politicians, women’s struggle for universal suffrage and other matters important to women’ (R_4). The party’s representatives assured us they ‘put a lot of effort into encouraging women to join’ and ‘were successful in that because Together has more women than other formations’ (R_4). However, the quantitative data did not corroborate their claims about women’s supposedly more numerous presence compared with other examined parties.8 8 According to data collected in 2018 from political parties by Małgorzata Kaczorowska (2019: 121), 35.8% of the Together Party’s members were women. For PO, that number

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Representatives from other parties admitted that their organisations, particularly their central structures, do not pay that much attention to recruitment. Initiative is left largely to local branches. ‘We leave it up to leaders at the borough level’, said one of our interviewees, adding: ‘Our borough leaders are often not active enough, and this inactivity means there are not enough people signing up to join the Polish People’s Party’ (PSL_1). Others mentioned that they took matters into their own hands, reaching out to people in their respective constituencies. One PO member talked about his involvement with the local community: ‘We have always looked for people who are simply engaged in what is going on. For example, they speak out that a new road is needed, or a school needs some renovation work. Or they have ideas for how, by simple means, we could improve traffic flow into and out of the city – for instance, by stretching out cycling lanes we could connect the suburban areas to the centre more. If such people come to me or send me information about problems they spot, provided they go beyond just grumbling and complaining, I tell them: “How would you like to join our branch?”’, but he admitted that this kind of ‘recruitment is happening really slowly’ (PO_2). Members of other parties did not see the point of active recruitment, as they assumed prospective activists would approach their parties on their own initiative. We dubbed this mechanism, whereby new members join because they notice and appreciate what the party is doing, passive recruitment. One of our interviewees called it ‘the law of good examples’, saying that ‘people watch what we do, they watch what these branches are doing, or individuals in these branches are doing, and if they want to become politically active, they choose PSL and that is how the contact occurs (…) We do not go somewhere and recruit, entice people. No, we would rather show what we do and what happens then is people come to join us because of what we do’ (PSL_6). The Modern representatives described their party’s strategy in similar terms, saying it was predicated on the conviction that ‘if structures at different levels are active and visible, attracting people becomes easier’ (N_9). Another member added that ‘members who join, do that simply because they like what the Modern is doing’ (N_2). In the light of statements made by our interviewees, we concluded that, with the exception of Law and Justice, the parties did not engage

was only slightly lower at 35.51%. For SLD, it stood at 34.59%, and for PiS at 33.09%, just to name a few examples.

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in a systematic, direct, active recruitment of new members. If some activities were undertaken in this area, they were usually one-off events or initiatives coming from singular members, activists and leaders in particular regional or local structures. While appreciated by the leadership if successful, on the whole, they tended to be merely a side effect of the parties’ grassroots presence. Party representatives noted that they believe the visibility of their organisations in the public sphere is enough to encourage other people to get involved or even become new members. However, this passive approach lacks any kind of strong inducement, such as a direct invitation to join. Attracting people’s attention by organising a local meeting or setting up a stand to collect signatures under a petition for a civic initiative has rarely been enough to spark further political involvement. For the final aspect to be examined, we decided to verify whether the parties’ openness to new members, as declared by their leaders and representatives, matched the realities at the lowest organisation level, i.e. in local branches. To that end, we sent out mystery clients to a number of local offices, tasking them with gauging how parties approached people who voiced interest in joining their ranks. We recruited students from three regions of Poland and assigned them with visiting local party offices. They were to act as if they were considering becoming members of a given formation. Although mystery shopping is a technique used primarily for assessing customer service in the business sector, it has also been used to evaluate non-commercial institutions such as public administration organs (Wilson 1998). In our research, it was employed for the purpose of gauging local structures’ openness to prospective members. Our mystery clients visited 51 offices of all six examined parties. In the majority of cases, they were met with friendly, engaging attitudes. Party offices’ staff were open and keen to talk to them. They provided exhaustive information about the procedure of joining: filling in and submitting membership declaration, the time needed for the approval process and the amount of membership fees. At times, staff members handed out printed forms. Others pointed to the possibility of downloading the form from the party’s website. Mystery clients asked if they could participate in a party meeting even before formally joining. In most cases, they were told they could do so as observers. Sometimes, they were informed of the date of the next meeting or promised to be contacted by phone on this matter. The party least keen to allow prospective members to attend its local meetings was Law and

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Justice. In many (though not all) instances, the clients were told that such meetings were closed events, for formal members only. Office staff members were also interested in finding out something about the clients. The most common questions concerned their educational background, interests and political views, their assessment of current political situation in Poland, their motivations for joining, and their reasons behind selecting this particular party. They were also asked if they knew other people potentially willing to join. In one of the offices, after a short conversation, the client was offered a spot on the party’s candidate list for the upcoming local election.9 While we are aware of all the limitations inherent in the mystery client technique (see Dawes and Sharp 2000), by incorporating it into our research, we were able to get an interesting snapshot of how open local party structures were to welcoming new members.

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9 The visit took place approximately five months before the 2018 local election.

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Dawes, J. G., & Sharp, B. (2000). The reliability and validity of objective measures of customer service: ‘Mystery shopping’. Australasian Journal of Market Research, 8(1), 29–46. Głowacki, A. (2017). Historia elektoratu Nowoczesnej (Research Report no. 126/2017). Warszawa: CBOS https://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2017/ K_126_17.PDF. Havlík, V. (2019). Economy and political mistrust: Explaining public antipartyism in the Czech Republic. Human Affairs, 30, 72–85. https://doi. org/10.1515/humaff-2020-0007. Hay, C. (2007). Why we hate politics? Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. Kaczorowska, M. (2019). Kobiety a demokracja wewn˛atrzpartyjna w polskich partiach politycznych. Wzbieraj˛aca fala czy jej zapowied´z? In J. G. Otto (Ed.), Kobiety w polityce. Studia i rozprawy (pp. 88–139). Warszawa: Dom Wydawniczy Elipsa. Markowski, R. (1992). Polscy non-voters. Cz˛es´c´ I: Strukturalne rozmieszczenie bierno´sci wyborczej. Studia Polityczne, 1, 19–33. Markowski, R. (Ed.). (2002). System partyjny i zachowania wyborcze. Dekada polskich do´swiadczen. ´ Warszawa: ISP PAN and Fundacja im. Friedricha Eberta. Martin, A. (2014). The party is not over: Explaining attitudes towards political parties in Australia. International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 26(1), 1–17. Millard, F. (2010). Democratic elections in Poland 1991–2007 . New York: Routledge. Naím, M. (2017, September 19). Why we need political parties. New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/19/opinion/need-pol itical-parties.html. Accessed 1 April 2020. Nowosielska, P. (2019, September 2). Portret wyborcy lewicy: Badania pokazuj˛a, ze ˙ to najbardziej proeuropejski elektorat, wywiad z Ew˛a Marciniak, politolog z Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego. Gazeta Prawna. https://www.gazetaprawna. pl/artykuly/1428062,kto-glosuje-na-lewice-portret-wyborcy-lewicy.html. Accessed 10 February 2020. Poguntke, T. (1996). Anti-party sentiment. Conceptual thoughts and empirical evidence: Explorations into a minefield. European Journal of Political Research, 29, 319–344. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.1996.tb0 0655.x. Poguntke, T., & Scarrow, S. (1996). The politics of anti-party sentiment: Introduction. European Journal of Political Research, 29, 251–262. Poletti, M. Webb, P., & Bale, T. (2019). Why do only some people who support parties actually join them? Evidence from Britain. West European Politics, 42(1), 156–172. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2018.1479921.

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CHAPTER 9

Conclusion: Party Democracy in Poland and Its Future

Since 2015, Poland has been perceived as a somewhat problematic case of democracy—a country on its road towards the illiberal model, where the governing party is questioning the rule of law, politicising and colonising the public media as well as trying to limit the freedoms of private broadcasters. The country’s image has also been tarnished by the introduction of controversial legislation threatening the independence of the judiciary as well as the use of discriminatory language towards refugees and sexual minorities by some politicians seeking re-election. This means our research coincided with a peculiar time in Polish politics. After winning control of the parliament and the presidential palace, the Law and Justice made a number of decisions that the international community found disturbing. Enough so, in fact, to prompt the European Commission to trigger art. 7 of the Treaty on the European Union which refers to instances in which core EU values, such as the rule of law, are deemed at risk of being breached. This context also affected the very realities of Polish partisan politics we were trying to examine. In our book we analysed strategies, membership bases and communication activities of six Polish parties. Our goal was to explain why some formations consolidated their positions, while others declined. The research was interdisciplinary in its character—its analytical framework combined approaches derived from political science with those typically © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 M. Jacunski ´ et al., Party Organization and Communication in Poland, Political Campaigning and Communication, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59993-5_9

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applied to studying organisational structures and communication, with particular focus on communication strategies. When looking at parties, we primarily followed the structural perspective. This is why we concentrated on identifying organisational solutions as well as describing the process of institutionalisation, party membership bases, internal dynamics and relations among different levels of organisational structures. The second component of our research was based on the communicational perspective. We examined the mechanisms, potential and resources available to Polish parties with regard to internal and external communication. With respect to the internal aspect, we looked at how parties utilised their resources, both for activities implemented through local structures and for strategic, centrally coordinated efforts. We showed how the quality of internal communication could affect the external dimension. When considering parties’ communication with the environment, we referred to the consequences of the mediatisation of politics. This is why we dissected elements such as trust in the media, media vs political logic, the shape of the media system and party–media relations. The analysis presented here shows political parties as, first and foremost, organisations. We believe that capturing and describing the state of their relations with the external environment requires looking beyond the intra-party dynamics. This is why we expanded our research to encompass selected institutional and social components of that environment. We pointed to barriers to entry present in the political market. We examined trust in political parties and their image in the society. Since we were aware that the environment in which parties operate was changing dynamically—not just in Poland, but also elsewhere across Central and Eastern Europe—we considered parties’ potential for adaptability. In the course of the research, we obtained data that allowed us to identify what factors determine voters’ perceptions of political parties. Given low membership numbers, we tried to discover how new activists could be attracted and whether the electorate was willing to participate in partisan life in the first place. The research subject was placed in both the historical and contemporary context. In Chapters 2 and 3 we glanced at the past, as we described how the post-communist legacy and various aspects of the democratic transition affected the shape of the party system, party institutionalisation process and the media system. We used models previously applied to Western European formations to describe the objects of our research. We examined the organisational and communication solutions as well as

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an overall organisational integrity of the six most relevant Polish parties. Four of them (SLD, PSL, PiS and PO) are older, more established entities while the remaining two (the Modern and the Together Party) are relatively new competitors on the political scene. When embarking upon our research project, we knew cooperating with parties and investigating their internal workings might be difficult. Political entities are somewhat distrustful towards scholars and tend to always present an idealised version of their functioning. There is no well-developed culture of cooperation between the partisan world and the academia. Nonetheless, in most cases we were met with an understanding attitude. Party leaders granted us opportunities to look inside their organisations and collect empirical material. Their willingness to allow a large-scale survey among party members and administrative staff testifies to their openness and a certain degree of cognitive bravery, as they embraced a chance to learn something about their formations. By conducting a full-membership survey, we were able to add a genuinely unique component to our research—one which makes it of particular value to people interested in the study of partisan politics. It should be noted that not everything in this aspect went according to our plans and wishes. Apart from many positive reactions, we encountered some instances of refusal to cooperate. At times we struggled with very limited availability of politicians whom we wanted to interview. The biggest degree of distrust was visible among representatives of Law and Justice. The governing party effectively refused to participate as a unit. Instead, our contacts occurred at the level of individual members rather than party structures. In the following paragraphs, we wished to summarise our findings. We referred to the following aspects: membership and the role of party structures, internal and external communication, building rapport with the voters. As we discussed in Chapter 6, members of Polish parties do not differ substantially from their peers in other European countries. One common trait is a higher-than-average level of access to resources. Party members identified with their organisations and the membership status was a vital element of their identity. Many of them felt they were important to their respective formations and acknowledged their potential for getting involved in various aspects of partisan life. Most of the surveyed individuals believed they actively contributed to the functioning of their parties. However, the character of tasks they performed suggests they were treated

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somewhat instrumentally by the leadership. For example, they were more likely to be involved in collecting signatures or legitimising their parent organisations through participation in rallies, than in more meaningful activities such as contributing to the programme or nominating candidates for public offices. When asked about reasons for enrolling, most of them pointed to ideological factors and the allure of belonging to a community of like-minded people. Rank-and-file members said they acted on the basis of their political convictions and altruistic incentives—a finding that goes against highly critical opinions held by a large portion of the Polish society. For many politically active citizens, the reward lied in the possibility of being involved in ‘real’ politics rather than in politics as it is portrayed by the media. This exclusive character of party membership is a seemingly timeless factor, valued regardless of respondents’ precise political affiliation. However, its validity and relevance depend on whether parties enable internal debate and involve grassroots in decision-making processes as well as the shaping of communication strategies. It is fairly obvious that parties’ electoral successes and failures stem largely from their ability (or lack thereof) to communicate with the voters. We sought to verify this supposedly fundamental importance of communication, in both the internal and the external dimension. Party leaders and communication experts were usually aware of the main forces that shape the ways of addressing the electorate. However, they tended to focus on exogenous factors: changes experienced by participants of the political rivalry; the emergence of new actors adept at navigating the contemporary communication environment; the evolution of public and private media brought about by the development of ICT; the progressing polarisation of media; the democratisation of communication and the impact of online tools on the freedom of expression. Endogenous factors were rarely mentioned, as if the involvement of structures and members as well as the overall organisation and quality of communication did not count for very much. In Chapter 5 we showed that Polish parties adopted primarily a one-directional, asymmetric model of internal communication. Even though representatives of party in central office declared that structures and members had a vital role in the party’s communication efforts, strategic approach to internal communication was not prioritised. This is because, as we indicated in Chapter 5, party elites had a very limited appreciation for the potential benefits of long-term, well-planned internal communication strategies.

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We studied the role of grassroots structures whose importance, in our view, goes well beyond their instrumental use during campaigns. Formations which boasted well-developed grassroots structures and knew how to tap into their potential were not only better prepared for performing their functions, but also more capable of coping with electoral defeats, changes of leadership and, to a certain extent, organisational modifications. As a caveat to this point, one should remember that an established, solidified structure may resist reforms, perceiving any change (for example an attempt at broadening selectorates) as a risk to its position within the party. Provided grassroots structures and rank-and-file members are not treated exclusively instrumentally, their involvement in communication offers a significant added value, particularly in the context of challenges generated by media logics and the mediated forms of communication. Depending on resources at their disposal, parties concentrated their communication efforts in selected areas which they see as crucial. Usually, they prioritised media presence and cooperation with traditional broadcasting media, making it the main pillar of external communication. Formations less successful in presenting themselves through traditional outlets shifted their attention to enhancing communication through grassroots structures and with the use of online media, as we explained in Chapter 7. The fact that mediated forms still dominate in political communication does not mean that other basic channels (such as direct contact with the voters) are ineffective. To the contrary: as mediatisation carried certain negative consequences for political actors and public media in Poland were being colonised by the ruling party, some opposition formations seemed to have rediscovered the opportunities that face-to-face meetings and social media offered for building rapport with the electorate. Given the existence of barriers to entry, parties with robust organisational structures and well-developed communication were more capable of surviving in an evolving environment. The dynamic of adaptive processes varied across the examined formations. Two types of such processes—progressive and regressive—seemed to be occurring simultaneously. On the progressive side, parties strove to be more efficient in performing their function in the political system. They did so by identifying new solutions for organising their activities: ways to build and strengthen their structures or broaden the scope of intra-party democracy. They used existing communication methods and sought new ones to increase their media appeal and expand their reach with regard among

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selected groups of recipients. The regressive part of the trend means that both in Poland and many other European countries some actors reverted to old, tried and proven tools such as a strategic application of populism or the use of propaganda techniques, which in Poland carry unequivocally pejorative associations. We found that while parties continuously strove to adapt to the changing environment, there seemed to be no single, universal strategy or behaviour pattern that proved effective in all organisations. The efficiency of their efforts was determined by the character of Polish political system and, as we explained in Chapter 2, the country’s historical experiences. The shape of the media system and a number of situational factors related to the current political context were also of some importance. In Chapter 7 we pointed out that the formations we examined consistently tried to professionalise their communication activities. The process did not progress evenly in all parties. Plenty of resources were pumped into improving the effectiveness of mediated communication. Parliamentary parties were at an advantage in this respect, since they also benefited from the selective approach adopted by the media. Formations enjoying strong parliamentary presence utilised it to further build up their communication superiority over smaller rivals. Meanwhile, parties with a scarce representation or those absent from the parliament altogether faced a number of challenges and obstacles to developing their relations with the media. Journalists and pundits focused their attention on members of the dominant PiS–PO duopoly. The nature of the media system and their political involvement also acted against smaller actors. This element has been particularly visible since 2015 in the public media. After falling under PiS’ control, public broadcasters became increasingly biased in favour of the government. As the process progressed, it reshaped the media–politics relations in Poland. Overall, the analysis of communication practices and resources at the disposal of Polish parties suggests that the concept of professionalisation, as it applies to political communication, needs to be reassessed. Evaluating communication exclusively through the prism of campaigning and media presence is no longer sufficient. If a party is to be deemed truly professional in its communication efforts, it also needs to adjust its internal communication and the character of cooperation between party in central office and party on the ground. Without such adaptation, parties cannot fully utilise their resources for enhancing the effectiveness of their communication. Given that the examined formations pursued different political objectives, their approaches to communication

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also varied and were somewhat selective. Few parties exhibited signs of an integrated model of communication, i.e. the use of multiple channels and forms tailored to the needs and expectations of a given target group, the balancing of internal and external communication as well as the development of strategies for the inter-electoral period. We described these aspects in Chapters 5 and 6. In general, political formations eschewed strategic planning and long-term communication activities. Their communication was more structured and streamlined at the level of party in public office, but decidedly less orderly at the grassroots level. In most cases, communication outside the parliamentary arena depended largely on the initiative and ingenuity of local or regional structures and, at times, even on the personal involvement of individual MPs who reached out to their constituents. In another part of the book, we tried to determine whether parties were connected or disconnected from the citizens. The results of our empirical research lead to ambivalent conclusions. As presented in Chapter 8, people were generally unwilling to join political parties. Identification levels were low. Several surveys—both our own and those conducted by other entities across many years—revealed Poles’ strong disillusionment with political parties at large. A substantial portion of the society not only held negative assessments of political actors, but also abstained from voting, as attested by the fact that turnout rates in Poland were consistently below the European average. People saw parties as a necessary evil, an element that is to be tolerated for the sake of democracy. On their part, political formations did not know how to change such perceptions. They also did not actively seek to identify and recruit new members, although they did not create barriers for those willing to enrol. The fact parties had no specific plans for expanding their ranks may be caused by differences in attitudes on this matter among their elites. Given that in Central and Eastern Europe empirical studies of political parties and party systems are still scarce, we intended to focus on making empirical observations rather than proposing any theoretical constructs. An in-depth, empirically grounded analysis of party structures and communication in a single post-communist Central- or Eastern European country offered a chance to draw broader conclusions about the development of parties in this region. It could also contribute to the development of multilevel analyses of intra-party relations. Given the subject of our research and the time when it was conducted, we would like to point readers’ attention to several implications and a number of

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issues that could be examined further. The first one is the future of political parties as membership organisations. The second one is the rise of populism, with its inherent anti-elite rhetoric and the potential to hurt the traditional, well-established political parties. The third one concerns the prospects for the functioning of political formations in systems heading towards the illiberal model of democracy. Finally, the issue that could be examined is the determinants of and limitations to communication effectiveness in the era of the return to propaganda techniques. It is our belief that political parties will continue to exist as membership organisations. There are numerous examples which prove that, in the long term, formations with a stable membership base and well-developed grassroots structures are more successful. However, maintaining and expanding such structures is not an easy task. One reason for that is the development and broad adaptation of new communication methods, along with all the consequences of this process. Another is the evolution of societies: the increase in average education levels, the progressing individualisation, the declining appeal of collective identities and the increasing preference for ad hoc, low intensity participatory opportunities. Traditional membership competes with (and often loses out to) other forms of political activity. People choose to get involved in social and civic movements that protest against the governing elites, the policies adopted by a given state or the inaction of the international community in the face of crises and injustices. Indeed, they often see political parties as part of the problem rather than potential providers of solutions. At the global level, glaring examples of this trend are the International Climate Strike and Black Lives Matter. In Central and Eastern Europe, several movements that protest the infringements on democratic standards emerged in recent years: A Million Moments for Democracy in the Czech Republic, the Committee for the Defence of Democracy in Poland or #Rezist in Romania. Low intensity participatory opportunities are often related to single-issue actions. Equipped with online communication tools, citizens take the initiative into their own hands and circumvent parties which find themselves stuck in an ineffective, twentieth century-approach to aggregating and articulating people’s interests. However, this trend may be interpreted not so much as the expression of parties’ weakness, but as a reflection of the civic society spirit, whereby people are capable of organising themselves without relying on political patronage.

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Political parties have always been keen to tap into the potential of civic movements and organisations. To that end, they have suggested cooperation or tried to entice some of the activists to move into partisan politics. Given low levels of public trust in politicians and parties, this has proven to be increasingly difficult. Politicians therefore resorted to camouflaging their intentions by offering citizens non-partisan participation opportunities. In Poland, examples of such subterfuge are the PiS-sponsored discussion clubs affiliated to a right-wing periodical (Gazeta Polska), Civic Clubs supported by the Civic Platform or the ‘New Solidarity’—an initiative proposed in mid-2020 by the Platform’s presidential candidate. His non-partisan rival Szymon Hołownia, who came third in the presidential race having garnered nearly 14% of votes in the first round, quickly decided to exploit his surprisingly high (given the dominance of the PiS– PO duopoly) popularity. He announced his intention to build a civic movement under the moniker of ‘Poland 2050’ and establish a new political party. The purpose of such moves is most of all to build networks of supporters or sympathisers around political parties. Polish formations can serve as examples of the evolving approaches towards party members in Central and Eastern European countries. Initially, parties did not pay much attention to the size of their membership base. Formed by the elites, they were preoccupied with attaining a presence in the parliament and, ideally, the government. Their fairly safe situation meant they did not have to actively encourage potential members or develop grassroots structures. Over time, their attitudes gradually changed, although there were still examples of new parties which either openly disregarded the aspect of membership (Down of Direct Democracy in the Czech Republic) or chose not to build grassroots structures (the Modern). Most formations, however, found out through experience that while having robust structures and membership base was not necessary to succeed in a single election, not having them most likely made any gains or successes short-lived. This is why more and more party leaders around the world attempted internal reforms: the opening of their organisations to new forms of participation or the inclusion of members in decision-making processes. Their goal was to stop the party from bleeding its membership base, attract new followers and gain credibility on the political market. In Polish parties, such changes were often introduced very timidly, as if the leaders feared they were inviting extra management risks and uncertainties. Hence, parties largely retained their hierarchical, centralised structures.

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Contemporary politics are seeing the rise of populist parties and leaders which question the principles of liberal democracy and build their appeal around an anti-elite and anti-party rhetoric. They argue that the vox populi which granted them power in the first place is the quintessence of democracy. Large portions of the society buy into the populist agenda as the yearning for higher living standards cannot be fully satisfied by national economies. Additionally, Europeans, particularly in the CEE region, feel threatened by the influx of refugees and migrants. Liberal democracy is by its very nature responsive to voters’ expectations. It also protects the rights of the minorities, but stands no chance of surviving if the leading political actors, especially parties, do not follow the basic rules of the game. The fact our research took place at the time when the governing parties in Poland and Hungary increasingly undermined the foundations of liberal democracy brings questions about the prospects for opposition formations in illiberal democratic systems. The ruling majorities decided to systematically dismantle the system of checks and balances by infringing on the rule of law, limiting the independence of the judiciary, colonising public media, subjugating the non-governmental sector and curtailing the competences of local self-governments. Controversial amendments to the electoral codes introduced first in Hungary and, recently, in Poland were designed to increase the chances of the ruling parties staying in power. All these developments altered the institutional environment in which political parties now have to operate. While formations defending the liberal principles and the rule of law are theoretically free to exist and function, they lost many of the instruments needed to counteract or moderate the moves of the ruling entities, i.e. PiS (Poland) and Fidesz (Hungary). Upon winning a parliamentary majority, the parties led by Kaczynski ´ and Orban took over a number of public institutions and politicised public media by turning them into propaganda tools for hailing their achievements and criticising the opposition. Such steps, coupled with policies based on direct social transfers to the benefit of certain social groups, petrify the state of political rivalry, thus creating a new type of barrier that has so far been observed only in non-democratic systems. Further research is also necessary with regard to how organisational factors determine the effectiveness of parties’ communication. Most of all, there is a need for a more in-depth examination of the institutionalisation and organisation of communication. By gaining a better picture of these areas, we could improve our understanding of political parties as

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communication organisations, while keeping in mind that they should not be assessed through the same parameters as commercial actors. Insight into their internal mechanisms would allow us to better evaluate the outcomes of communication activities. This, in turn, could potentially open up prospects for broader studies and breaking the research impasse that scholars interested in political communication have mooted in recent years. The evolution of party–media relations, particularly in the context of media politicisation and a return to propaganda techniques, calls for renewed interest in the nature and scope of political professionalisation. Given the findings from our research, political scientists should ask questions about the threshold between acceptable means of pursuing efficiency in communication and the abuse of public (state) resources by the ruling formation. In the absence of an ethics code for communication commonly accepted by the political elite and the elimination of mechanisms preventing further appropriation of the state by a single actor, the pursuit of professionalisation at all cost, combined with the use of propaganda in a manner currently observed in Poland will lead to a further decline in trust in political parties and growing tensions within the society.

Annex: Field Research

1. List of individual in-depth interviews (IDI) Law and Justice (PiS) 1. PiS_1—IDI with MP, and member of party board, held on December 20, 2016 2. PiS_2—IDI with MEP, and member of party board, held on December 7, 2016 3. PiS_3—IDI with MP, and member of party board, held on December 30, 2016 4. PiS_4—IDI with MP, and member of party board, held on January 30, 2017 5. PiS_5—IDI with MP, and member of party board, held on February 17, 2017 6. PiS_6—IDI with MEP, and member of party board, held on January 24, 2017 7. PiS_7—IDI with MEP, and member of party board, held on February 14, 2017 8. PiS_8—IDI with MEP, and member of party board, held on January 27, 2017 9. PiS_9—IDI with MP, and member of party board, held on January 27, 2017. © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 M. Jacunski ´ et al., Party Organization and Communication in Poland, Political Campaigning and Communication, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59993-5

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Civic Platform (PO) 10. PO_1—IDI with MP, and member of party board, held on February 8, 2017 11. PO_2—IDI with MP, and member of party board, held on February 1, 2017 12. PO_3—IDI with MP, and member of party board, held on February 2, 2017 13. PO_4—IDI with MP, and member of party board, held on October 13, 2016 14. PO_5—IDI with MP, and member of party board, held on October 18, 2016 15. PO_6—IDI with MP, and member of party board, held on October 17, 2016 16. PO_7—IDI with MP, member of party board, and communication specialist, held on November 29, 2016 17. PO_8—IDI with MP, and member of party board, held on December 19, 2016 18. PO_9—IDI with communication specialist, held on November 29, 2016 19. PO_10—IDI with MP, and member of party board, held on February 17, 2017 20. PO_11—IDI with MP, and member of party board, held on May 15, 2017 21. PO_12—IDI with MP, and member of party board, held on January 25, 2017 22. PO_13—IDI with MP, and member of party board, held on February 9, 2017 23. PO_14—IDI with MP, and member of party board, held on February 10, 2017 24. PO_15—IDI with MP, and member of party board, held on December 2, 2017. Modern (.N) 25. N_1—IDI with MP, and member of party board, held on December 6, 2016

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26. N_2—IDI with MP, and member of party board, held on February 20, 2017 27. N_3—IDI with MP, and member of party board, held on February 16, 2017 28. N_4—IDI with MP, and member of party board, held on April 6, 2017 29. N_5—IDI with communication specialist, held on December 16, 2016 30. N_6—IDI with MP, and member of party board, held on February 10, 2017 31. N_7—IDI with MP, member of party board, and communication specialist, held on March 9, 2017 32. N_8—IDI with MP, and member of party board, held on May 10, 2017 33. N_9—IDI with MP, and member of party board, held on February 13, 2017 34. N_10—IDI with MP, and member of party board, held on February 8, 2017 35. N_11—IDI with MP, and member of party board, held on April 6, 2017. Polish People’s Party (PSL) 36. PSL_1—IDI with MP, and member of party board, held on October 24, 2016 37. PSL_2—IDI with MP, and communication specialist, held on February 13, 2017 38. PSL_3—IDI with communication specialist, held on May 10, 2017 39. PSL_4—IDI with MP, and member of party board, held on April 3, 2017 40. PSL_5—IDI with MP, and member of party board, held on June 1, 2017 41. PSL_6—IDI with MP, and member of party board, held on May 12, 2017 42. PSL_7—IDI with MP, and member of party board, held on March 9, 2017 43. PSL_8—IDI with MEP, and member of party board, held on January 26, 2017

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44. PSL_9—IDI with MP, and member of party board, held on April 6, 2017 45. PSL_10—IDI with MP, and member of party board, held on March 10, 2017 46. PSL_11—IDI with MP, and member of party board, held on April 6, 2017 47. PSL_12—IDI with MP, and member of party board, held on July 6, 2017. Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) 48. SLD_1—IDI with member of party board, held on January 4, 2017 49. SLD_2—IDI with member of party board, held on January 20, 2017 50. SLD_3—IDI with member of party board, and communication specialist, held on April 27, 2017 51. SLD_4—IDI with MEP, and member of party board, held on December 14, 2016 52. SLD_5—IDI with member of party board, and communication specialist, held on March 16, 2017 53. SLD_6—IDI with MEP, and member of party board, held on January 25, 2017 54. SLD_7—IDI with MEP, and member of party board, held on January 24, 2017. Together Party (R) 55. R_1—IDI with member of party board, held on February 26, 2017 56. R_2—IDI with member of party board, and communication specialist, held on February 17, 2017 57. R_3—IDI with member of party board, held on March 16, 2017 58. R_4—IDI with member of party board, held on March 16, 2017 59. R_5—IDI with member of party board, held on April 10, 2017.

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2. Survey of party members. Overall number of questionnaires is 2587 in the following breakdown: Law and Justice (PiS)—124 Civic Platform (PO)—737 Modern (.N)—591 Polish People’s Party (PSL)—400 Democratic Left Alliance (SLD)—279 Together Party (R)—456. 3. Party administration employees survey. Overall number of questionnaires is 47 in the following breakdown: Law and Justice (PiS)—10 Civic Platform (PO)—9 Modern (.N)—4 Polish People’s Party (PSL)—5 Democratic Left Alliance (SLD)—12 Together Party (R)—7. 4. Survey of voters (CATI): Nationwide random sample of 1006 Poles voting and not voting in the 2015 parliamentary elections (18+). The study was conducted in January 2018 in cooperation with a research agency that meets the standards set by the ESOMAR. Control of the representativeness of the sample due to: gender and age, place of residence, level of education, regions of Poland. Additional test n=10 measurements for pilotage purposes. The questionnaire contained one-time and multiple-choice questions and two open-ended questions. 5. Focus group interviews (FGI) with party members: FGI 1, Wroclaw, December, 07, 2017 Participants from PiS party: PiS1_FGI—Woman, student, in party’s youth organisation since 6 months, in the party since October 2017

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PiS2_FGI—Woman, education worker, in the party since 2016 PiS3_FGI—Man, student, in the party and youth organisation since 2014 PiS4_FGI—Man, student, in the party since 2015 PiS5_FGI—Man, student, in the party since 2014 PiS6_FGI—Man, pensioner, in the party from the 1990s (previously Centre Agreement member (PC)) PiS7_FGI—Man, student, in the party since 2012. FGI 2, Wroclaw, December, 08, 2017 Participants from SLD party: SLD1_FGI—Man, running his own business, in the party since 2010 SLD2_FGI—Woman, pensioner, in the party since 2013 SLD3_FGI—Man, pensioner, in the party since 1993, previously SdRP member SLD4_FGI—Man, running his own business, in the party since the end of the 1990s, previously SdRP member SLD5_FGI—Man, retired military man, in the party since 1997, previously SdRP member SLD6_FGI—Man, an employee of local government administration, in the party since 1993, previously SdRP member. FGI 3, Torun, ´ December 13, 2017 Participants from Modern party: N1_FGI—Man, in the party since 2015 N2_FGI—Woman, student, in the party from the age of 18, previously in a youth organisation. FGI 4, Torun´ December 19, 2017 Participants from PO party: PO1_FGI—Woman, therapist, in the party since 2012 PO2_FGI—Man, sport activist, in the party since its inception in 2001 PO3_FGI—Man, employee of a sport club, in the party since 2009 PO4_FGI—Man, party office worker, in the party since 2013.

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FGI 5, Torun, ´ December 12, 2017 Participants from PSL party: PSL1_FGI—Man, student, in the party since 2012 PSL2_FGI—Woman, pensioner, local activist, in the party since 1970s, previously member of the United People’s Party (ZSL) PSL3_FGI—Man, pensioner, former local government employee, from 1970s, previously member of the United People’s Party (ZSL) PSL4_FGI—Man, farmer, municipal councillor, in the party since 2012 PSL5_FGI—Man, in the party since 2010. FGI 6, Wroclaw, November 24, 2017 Participants from Together Party: R1_FGI—Woman, worker in a factory, in the party since 2015 R2_FGI—Man, computer scientist, in the party since 2015 R3_FGI—Man, trade union activist, in the party since 2015. 6. Mystery client visits to the parties’ offices across Poland. All of them took place in the spring and winter of 2018 in the following breakdown: Law and Justice (PiS)—15 Civic Platform (PO)—7 Modern (.N)—4 Polish People’s Party (PSL)—6 Democratic Left Alliance (SLD)—9 Together Party (R)—6

Index

C Citizens attitudes towards parties, 214, 227, 234 political involvement, 109, 203, 206, 235 relations with political parties, 40, 45, 149, 154, 203

D Democracy anti-communist opposition, 36, 65 communist regime, 34, 36 consociational model, 48 de-communisation, 36–38 deliberative model, 48, 187 democratic competition, 35 democratic transition, 11, 20, 33, 34, 52, 66 illiberal democracy, 34, 52, 53, 56 liberal democracy, 52, 53, 112, 256 participatory model, 1, 54, 254

post-communist camp, 11, 37 the Round Table, 34, 35, 37 sovereign democracy, 39, 52

I Institutionalisation, 2, 3, 63–67, 69, 70, 90, 133, 248, 256 party external institutionalisation, 64, 68–70 party internal institutionalisation, 64, 68–70 Internal communication inter-organizational reputation, 174 satisfaction, 9, 160, 174, 177–181 symmetrical communication models, 175

M Media colonisations of public media, 112 media–party relations, 118, 120

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 M. Jacunski ´ et al., Party Organization and Communication in Poland, Political Campaigning and Communication, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59993-5

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INDEX

media logic, 10, 89, 98, 104–109, 115, 187, 188, 195, 202, 251 mediatisation, 15, 99, 104–107, 109, 110, 132, 149, 248, 251 polarisation, 39, 50, 110, 114, 119, 121, 122, 188, 206, 207, 250 political logic, 89, 98, 106, 108, 115, 186–188, 192, 195, 248 politicisation of public media, 111, 113, 195, 208 public media, 4, 39, 78, 88, 89, 110–119, 187–192, 194–196, 205, 208, 247, 251, 252, 256 ruling party logic, 89 self-mediatising, 107, 108, 189 watchdog role, 114, 117 Media polarization journalism culture, 121 multi-layered polarisation, 122 Media system liberal model, 110 media pluralism, 113, 114 Media Pluralism Monitor (MPM), 114 parallelism, 110, 121 polarised pluralism, 110, 121 private media, 41, 82, 113, 118, 188–190, 192, 193, 195, 196, 205, 250 public broadcasters, 82, 88, 89, 113, 116, 205, 206, 252 public media, 4, 18, 33, 38, 39, 54, 55, 78, 88, 89, 110–113, 115–119, 187–192, 194, 195, 205, 208, 247, 251, 252, 256 Membership in parties district executive board, 162 General Incentive Model (GIM), 166, 236 membership incentives, 167, 169, 250 national executive board, 162

resource theory, 165 socio-demographic approach, 3, 166, 219, 225, 227–229, 236

P Party members adherence, 161 campaign period activities, 15, 170 cyber-members, 163 exclusivity, 161 inter-electoral period activities, 7, 14, 16, 76, 98, 102–104, 171, 253 level of members’ acceptance, 161 light members, 9, 163 probationary period, 161 registered sympathisers, 161–163 social media followers and friends, 163 sponsorship by another member(s), 161 sustainers, 163 sympathisers, 103, 163, 255 Party models cadre party, 11, 72, 134, 147 cartel party, 72, 73, 75, 76, 78 catch-all party, 72, 75, 76 electoral-professional party, 72 elite party, 75, 76, 78 mass party, 72, 73, 75, 76, 78, 79 Party organisation communication potential, 131, 132, 149, 152 consultative participation model, 151, 154, 156, 181 delegation model, 151 diffusion, 134, 173 leadership model, 135 local structure, 131, 132, 145, 151 party in central office, 132, 148–151

INDEX

party in public office, 132, 133, 148 party on the ground, 132, 133, 137, 149–151 penetration, 134, 196 regional structure, 137 Political market cartelisation of politics, 81, 91 entry barriers, 62, 63, 80, 82, 90 rule-based barriers, 80 strategic barriers, 80, 81 Political parties behavioural theory of competitive political parties, 5 communication organisations, 6, 8, 9, 257 communist party, 38, 61 functional perspective, 2, 4 horizontal communication, 8 market-oriented party, 5 membership-based organisations, 3 rational choice theory, 5 strong organization, 14 structural perspective, 2, 3, 14 vertical communication, 6, 8 Professionalization Americanisation, 98 external communication consultants, 98 inter-electoral period, 7, 14, 16, 76, 98, 102, 103, 171, 253

269

political consultants, 12 political marketing, 10, 12, 98, 102 public relations, 12, 102 spin doctors, 12 strategy-oriented communication attitude, 102

R Research methods focus group interviews, 25 full-membership survey, 160, 249 individual in-depth interviews, 144, 160 mystery client, 25, 243, 244

T Trust institutionalised distrust, 40 public trust, 33, 41, 109, 203, 208, 255 trust in media, 204 trust towards institutions, 40

V Voter turnout, 46–48, 50, 213 legitimisation of the authorities, 48 ritualistic behaviour, 48